<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>EU-LISTCO Policy Papers Series</title>
<link>https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/24657</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 18:31:12 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-04-28T18:31:12Z</dc:date>
<item>
<title>From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case</title>
<link>https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/30715</link>
<description>From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case
Mikhelidze, Nona
Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and amid an ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia has tried to move towards military escalation in the Donbass region making clear that the status quo emerged in 2014 as a “new normal” cannot last. The Minsk II Agreement negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in the framework of the Normandy Format in February 2015 remains unimplemented despite numerous rounds of mediation. Western economic sanctions against Moscow succeeded in limiting the Kremlin’s military advance beyond Donbass and deterred it from making further territorial gains. However, these measures failed to impact on Russian decision-making regarding resolution of the conflict. Influencing Russia’s foreign policy is not an easy task, as the country’s conduct of international relations is shaped by domestic factors and the authoritarian nature of its governance. Still, the West needs a strategy in response to the international and domestic wrongdoings already committed by the Kremlin and as a preventative measure to deter Moscow’s future aggression. In order to face the Russian challenge, the West should first design clear rules for its own foreign-policy behaviour based on the primacy of human rights and democracy and then define how to defend universal values abroad, including in Russia. Only after, it could structure a transatlantic strategy along the following lines: active United States–European Union involvement in the Normandy Format aimed at the fulfilment of the Minsk II Agreement, strengthening Ukraine’s resilience in developing democracy and its military and energy sectors and finally improving sanctions mechanisms against the Kremlin.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/30715</guid>
<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy</title>
<link>https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/30711</link>
<description>From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy
Bargués, Pol
There is a growing scepticism regarding the implementation of the European Union Global Strategy (2016), which builds on the idea of fostering resilience to the east and south, in a neighbourhood increasingly threatened by governance breakdown and violent conflict. Scholars highlight the vagueness of resilience, as well as the existing contradictions between policy sectors and member states’ preferences, as key elements constraining EU foreign policy. In response to these shortcomings, the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ is currently being deployed to entertain a geopolitical EU and implement the Global Strategy more efficiently. This paper discusses how the idea of strategic autonomy is used, contrasts it with that of resilience as envisioned in the Global Strategy, and highlights some unforeseen risks for the EU external action: 1) strategic autonomy might be unrealistic in the short term and thus widen the gap between capabilities and expectations; (2) intervening geopolitically can also imply a move away from aspirations to foster resilience in a constructive and cooperative way with other partners.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/30711</guid>
<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Neoliberalism Fosters State Capture</title>
<link>https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/30712</link>
<description>How Neoliberalism Fosters State Capture
Capasso, Matteo
Despite the popular protests that took place in 2011, the political economy of Tunisia remains largely characterized by processes of state capture and cronyism. While benefiting the ruling class, the social and economic costs of these mechanisms are detrimental to most of the population. There is a tendency in policy and academic circles to characterize state capture as the result of a late-development syndrome and unfair competition. This policy paper, however, proposes to adopt an alternative outlook. It argues for the need to critically reflect on the key role of the current neoliberal economic model in sustaining these dynamics. Based on the pursuit of the profit rate, the push for neoliberal reforms in Tunisia have sustained predation and rentierism since the late 1980s. In such a context, the European Union (EU) should rethink its terms of economic engagement based on neoliberal premises, and instead sustain an economic agenda aiming to regulate the rights and responsibilities of local and international capital in the interest of all.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/30712</guid>
<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Populism Impacts EU Foreign Policy</title>
<link>https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/29473</link>
<description>How Populism Impacts EU Foreign Policy
Cadier, David; Lequesne, Christian
The rise of populism in the European Union represents a key internal political development that is likely to have repercussions on its foreign policy. It is traditionally assumed that, when in the opposition, populist parties affect foreign policy debates though not foreign policy outcomes. But when they are elected into office, as happened in several EU member states, how do they shape policy decisions and processes in EU foreign policy? This policy paper argues that although populist actors can be vocal and conspicuous in aligning with external actors contesting the international liberal order, they rarely go as far as swaying or blocking EU foreign policy decisions and outputs. At the same time, however, populist governments’ domestic illiberal policies have the potential to undermine the EU’s legitimacy, structural power, and resilience-building endeavours.
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/29473</guid>
<dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
