https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/18489 Tue, 28 Apr 2026 19:52:02 GMT 2026-04-28T19:52:02Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20092 A theory of tolerance Corneo, Giacomo; Jeanne, Olivier We develop an economic theory of tolerance where endogenous lifestyles and exogenous traits are invested with symbolic value by people. Value systems are rationally chosen by parents for their children. In conjunction with actual behavior, value systems determine the esteem enjoyed by individuals. Intolerant individuals attach all symbolic value to a small number of attributes and are irrespectful of people with di¤erent ones. Tolerant people have diversi ed values and respect social alterity. We study the formation of values attached to various types of attributes and identify circumstances under which tolerance spontaneously arises. Policy may a¤ect the evolution of tolerance in distinctive ways, and there may be e¢ ciency as well as equity reasons to promote tolerance. Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20092 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19892 Analyzing patterns of economic growth Kerekes, Monika The growth experience of virtually all but the very rich countries is best explained as a combination of high and low growth episodes. Therefore, there is a need to under- stand the sources of growth during high and low growth regimes and in particular the influences as growth regimes change. This paper approaches the issue by combining the derivation of structural breaks in economic growth with nonparametric growth accounting that enables the decomposition of productivity changes into technologi- cal and effciency changes. The results show that even in the medium run growth rate changes are mainly the result of productivity changes whereas factor accumula- tion plays only a minor role. Except for high income countries productivity changes usually represent effciency changes. A comparison of growth take-offs and growth collapses reveals that factor accumulation is even less important in periods of acceler- ating growth. Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19892 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19804 Assessing the bias due to non-coverage of residential movers in the German Microcensus panel Rendtel, Ulrich; Basic, Edin The German Microcensus (MC) is a large scale rotating panel survey over three years. The MC is attractive for longitudinal analysis over the entire participation duration because of the mandatory participation and the very high case numbers (about 200 thousand respondents). However, as a consequence of the area sampling that is used for the MC , residential mobility is not covered and consequently statistical information at the new residence is lacking in theMCsample. This raises the question whether longitudinal analyses, like transitions between labour market states, are biased and how different methods perform that promise to reduce such a bias. Based on data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which covers residential mobility, we analysed the effects of missing data of residential movers by the estimation of labour force flows. By comparing the results from the complete SOEP sample and the results from the SOEP, restricted to the non-movers, we concluded that the non-coverage of the residential movers can not be ignored in Rubin’s sense. With respect to correction methods we analysed weighting by inverse mobility scores and loglinear models for partially observed contingency tables. Our results indicate that weighting by inverse mobility scores reduces the bias to about 60 percent whereas the official longitudinal weights obtained by calibration result in a bias reduction of about 80 percent. The estimation of loglinear models for nonignorable nonresponse leads to very unstable results. Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19804 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20112 Delegation and incentives Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal-agent model by a project selection stage in which the prin- cipal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal. Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20112 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z