id,collection,dc.contributor.author,dc.contributor.firstReferee,dc.contributor.furtherReferee,dc.contributor.gender,dc.contributor.inspector,dc.date.accepted,dc.date.accessioned,dc.date.available,dc.date.issued,dc.description,dc.description.abstract[de],dc.format.extent,dc.identifier.uri,dc.identifier.urn,dc.language,dc.rights.uri,dc.subject,dc.subject.ddc,dc.title,dc.title.subtitle,dc.title.translated[de],dc.title.translatedsubtitle[de],dc.type,dcterms.accessRights.dnb,dcterms.accessRights.openaire,dcterms.format[de],refubium.affiliation[de],refubium.mycore.derivateId,refubium.mycore.fudocsId "fb7d48ee-9a56-413f-af73-0ddd3b2cadde","fub188/14","Riese, Sarah","Prof. Dr. Christoph Zürcher","Prof. Dr. Ursula Schröder","w","Prof. Dr. Michael Daxner","2013-07-10","2018-06-07T19:19:46Z","2014-12-19T12:03:37.440Z","2014","Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Research on Peacebuilding 4 1.2 Agency and Process: Peacebuilding as Negotiation 7 1.3 Findings: Negotiated Peacebuilding in Bosnia 9 1.4 Outline of the Thesis 11 Part I: Researching Peacebuilding as Negotiation 15 2 Conceptual framework 17 2.1 Studying Negotiations 19 2.2 The Peacebuilding Field 22 2.3 Actors in the Peacebuilding Field 30 2.4 Interests in the Peacebuilding Field 33 2.5 Resources 36 2.6 Strategies 45 2.7 The Outcome: Appropriating Intervention 52 2.8 Concluding Summary 53 3 Framework of Analysis 55 3.1 Interests 55 3.2 Resources 56 3.3 Strategies 57 3.4 Outcomes 57 3.5 Outline of the Empirical Chapters 58 4 Research Methods 61 4.1 Approach: Interpretive and Reconstructive 61 4.2 Cases 63 4.3 Accessing Data 65 4.4 Data Analysis 67 4.5 Quality Criteria: Trustworthiness 70 4.6 Locating the Researcher and Access to the Field 74 Part II: Peacebuilding Negotiations in Bosnia 77 5 The Peacebuilding Field in Bosnia 79 5.1 The End of Yugoslavia 79 5.2 The Bosnian Political Elites 83 5.3 The Interveners 102 5.4 Concluding Summary 116 6 Defense Reform 119 6.1 Background to Defense Reform 120 6.2 The Field in Defense Reform 127 6.3 The Story of Defense Reform 134 6.4 Strategies in Defense Reform 141 6.5 Outcomes: Success and Failure in Defense Reform 151 6.6 Concluding Summary 153 7 Police Reform 157 7.1 Background to Police Reform 157 7.2 The Peacebuilding Field in Police Reform 162 7.3 The Story of Structural Police Reform 169 7.4 Strategies in Police Reform 177 7.5 Outcome: Success and Failure in Police Reform 189 7.6 Concluding Summary 189 8 State Property 191 8.1 Background 192 8.2 The Peacebuilding Field for State Property 193 8.3 Negotiating the division of state property 199 8.4 Strategies 207 8.5 Outcome 216 8.6 Concluding Summary 217 Part III: Discussion and Conclusions 219 9 Patterns of Negotiation 221 9.1 Interests 222 9.2 Resources 224 9.3 Strategies 230 9.4 Outcomes 238 9.5 Concluding Summary 240 10 Peacebuilding in Practice 241 10.1 The Trouble with Exit 241 10.2 Dealing with Failure 246 10.3 The (Im)possibility of Peacebuilding 251 10.4 Concluding Summary 253 11 Conclusion 255 11.1 Negotiated Peacebuilding in Bosnia 255 11.2 Issues of Transferability 260 11.3 Process and Agency as Ties between ‘Causes’ and Outcomes 262 11.4 Who Cares about Peacebuilding? 263 11.5 Peacebuilding is Political 264 Bibliography 267 Part IV: Appendix 311 A List of Interviews 313 B Interview Guide 323 C Sample Interview 325","This research investigates the question of how peacebuilding is negotiated between interveners and intervened in Bosnia, which implies asking both for what actors do in peacebuilding negotiations, and what makes them successful. It focuses on three cases of peacebuilding negotiations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely defense reform, police reform and the state property negotiations. To analyze these processes of negotiation, I focus on interests, resources, strategies and outcomes. I find that in all three cases, the interveners had an interest in ‘peacebuilding success’ while the Bosnian political elites had an interest in maintaining access to political authority. This meant that the interests of the interveners and Bosnian Serbs, in particular, often conflicted, as the interveners’ definition of peacebuilding success entailed centralizing political authority to the detriment of Bosnian Serb autonomy. In negotiating those diverging interests, the interveners were often less powerful than is commonly assumed. They were at an advantage with respect to resources only in terms of economic resources. Strategies based on those, however, were often not very successful. The intervened, on the other hand, had a powerful tool of blackmail by being able to let peacebuilding fail. In sum, the interveners were successful only in defense reform, where conditions were favorable, and the interveners used them well. Somewhat favorable conditions in the state property negotiations remained unused, and in police reform, there was little chance for compromise in the first place. Considering the limited prospects of peacebuilding success, interveners and intervened often did not work towards success but colluded in avoiding failure, by postponing decisions or by reinterpreting symbolic agreements as successes.||Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Peacebuilding zwischen Intervenierenden und Intervenierten in Bosnien verhandelt wird. Das beinhaltet sowohl die Frage, was Akteure in Peacebuilding Verhandlungen tun, als auch was sie darin erfolgreich macht. Die Arbeit konzentriert sich auf drei Fälle von Peacebuilding Verhandlungen in Bosnien-Herzegowina: die Verteidigungsreform, die Polizeireform und die Verhandlungen über staatliches Eigentum. Um diese Prozesse zu analysieren, nehme ich Interessen, Ressourcen, Strategien und Ergebnisse in den Blick. In den drei Fällen stelle ich fest, dass die Intervenierenden ein Interesse an ‚Peacebuilding Erfolg‘ hatten, während die bosnischen politischen Eliten eine Interesse daran hatten, Zugang zu politischer Autorität zu erhalten. Dies bedeutete, dass die Interessen der Intervenierenden häufig mit denen gerade der bosnischen Serben in Konflikt standen, da die Definition der Intervenierenden von ‚Peacebuilding Erfolg‘ beinhaltete, politische Autorität zum Nachteil serbischer Autonomie zu zentralisieren. Die Intervenierenden waren beim Verhandeln dieser unterschiedlichen Interessen häufig weniger mächtig als gemeinhin angenommen wird. Sie hatten nur in Hinblick auf ökonomische Ressourcen einen Vorteil. Strategien, die auf diesen Ressourcen aufbauten, waren allerdings häufig nicht sehr erfolgreich. Im Gegensatz dazu hatten die Intervenierenden ein machtvolles Mittel der Erpressung, indem sie in der Lage waren, Peacebuilding scheitern zu lassen. Zusammengefasst waren die Intervenierenden nur in der Verteidigungsreform erfolgreich, wo die Bedingungen gut waren und auch gut genutzt wurden. Relativ gute Bedingungen blieben in den Verhandlungen über staatliches Eigentum ungenutzt, und in der Polizeireform standen die Chancen für Kompromisse von Anfang an schlecht. Da Peacebuilding oft wenig Aussicht auf Erfolg hat, arbeiten Intervenierende und Intervenierte häufig nicht auf Erfolg hin, sondern ‚verabreden‘ sich schlicht darauf, Fehlschläge zu vermeiden, indem sie Entscheidungen verschieben oder symbolische Übereinkommen als Erfolge reinterpretieren.","X, 325, 10 S.","https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/5989||http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-10188","urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudissthesis000000098094-0","eng","http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen","peacebuilding||conflict||intervention||negotiation||Bosnia||BiH||Yugoslavia","300 Sozialwissenschaften||300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft||300 Sozialwissenschaften::300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie::303 Gesellschaftliche Prozesse||300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::327 Internationale Beziehungen","Dayton Import-Export","Peacebuilding Negotiations Between Interveners and Intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina","Dayton Import-Export","Peacebuilding Verhandlungen zwischen Intervenierenden und Intervenierten in Bosnien-Herzegowina","Dissertation","free","open access","Text","Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften","FUDISS_derivate_000000016226","FUDISS_thesis_000000098094"