

# **Measuring Frames: Discursive Institutions in Polarized Politics**

**A Dissertation**

Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Ph.D.

to the Department of Political and Social Sciences  
of the Freie Universität Berlin

by  
**Oul Han**

Berlin, 2016

First supervisor: Prof. Dr. Eun-Jeung Lee

Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kropp

Date of the viva voce/ defense: October 18<sup>th</sup> 2016

© OUL HAN

*ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, 2016*

# Acknowledgements

This dissertation and its author have received crucial momentum from various benefactors throughout its development. In the first place, I express my deepest gratitude to Professor Eun-Jeung Lee, who has provided unrelenting guidance and support at all times, and to whom I owe courage for conceiving and completing this dissertation. I also thank Professor Sabine Kropp and Professor Hannes Mosler for their erudite comments, eager availability, true patience, and genuine encouragement.

I also thank the faculty, affiliates, and colleagues of the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin for their warm presence and collective dynamic, from which I have learned how to receive and give cooperation as a colleague. I have benefited endlessly from their myriad support and will treasure the experience. I thank Professor Gregory Jackson for his formative teaching and his untiring graciousness to engage with my curious questions, and Professor Verena Blechinger-Talcott for her universal feedback and support.

This dissertation's computational methods presented a steep learning curve, which was tangibly accelerated by precious computer science input from Hoon Jung, Norman Hein, JinYeong Bak, Suin Kim, Jaewon Kim, and Christian Blum in chronological order. I also thank Professor Alice Oh and Dr. Kashif Rasul for trust in my social science input and Dr. Camille Roth for computational social science input. These combined influences elevated my perspective and convinced me to work with interdisciplinary and mixed methods.

Lastly, I thank my parents and brother for gifting me with inspiration daily, and my friends for helping me in endless ways, which made me a better person.

# Abstract

Polarization in politics can indicate problems of young democracy, which can be different from known and desirable advantages of polarization and partisanship in old democracies, such as policy competition and voter information. In fact, political differentiation between camps and policies may be low in young democracies due to the low institutional development of political parties. This dissertation contributes to knowledge by demonstrating polarization between political camps by measuring polarized camp frames, instead of scaling policy that can be non-distinct and non-informative for learning polarization.

For having all aforementioned traits, I use the South Korean case to show that the phenomenon and effects of polarization can be evaluated via discursive polarization, which can be measured by political framing. The theory of hegemonic discourse explains that South Korean actors compete by distinctly framing their promises towards goals, e.g. welfare or unification. Viewed over long time, such frames are discursive institutions that reproduce existing political frames but can adapt to political situations, such as growing income inequality or North Korean armed provocations. The institutional behavior of these deeply engrained and only incrementally changing frames makes them easily measurable in quality and quantity.

To this aim, I apply quantitative text analysis that shows statistical word relationships in large text corpora. I examine the discourses about welfare and unification,

issues that vary by decreasing versus increasing frequency, and by policy polarization versus convergence. By analyzing over 100.000 relevant articles from 24 years (1990-2014) in two partisan newspapers via mixed methods, I am able to make sense of framing patterns, e.g. political strategies, and incentives for polarizing, within the political contexts of that time.

My findings suggest that polarizing frames end up outweighing idea-conveying and consensus-building frames due to their political utility for seizing power. In other words, polarizing behavior trumps political ideas and policy deliberation that can be outcomes of heightened public attention for an issue. The methodological and empirical insights contribute to existing debates, such as polarization studies, democratization studies, and comparative studies of ideological scaling.

# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Table of Contents .....	iv
List of Figures .....	vii
List of Tables .....	ix
List of Appendices .....	xi
Glossary.....	xii
1. Introduction: Ideas in South Korean politics.....	1
1.1. The 2012 election campaign discourse and puzzle.....	1
1.2. Previous assumptions .....	5
1.3. Two camps in South Korea.....	7
1.4. The argument .....	11
1.5. Plan of dissertation .....	13
2. Epistemologies for studying political ideas in a different culture .....	15
2.1. Area studies.....	18
2.2. Political science .....	31
3. Theory and Model: Discursive polarization in South Korea .....	52
3.1. Discursive epistemology .....	55
3.2. Mapping South Korean scholarship.....	57
3.1.1. On polarization .....	63
3.1.2. On political camps .....	66
3.3. Hegemonic discourse .....	73
3.4. Discursive institutionalism .....	78
3.5. Model ontology of frames .....	84

4.	Theory testing: Measuring frames in South Korea.....	89
4.1.	Method: Topic Modeling.....	90
4.1.1.	Unsupervised content analysis.....	92
4.1.2.	Measuring frames.....	95
4.1.3.	Validation.....	97
4.2.	Case selection: One short-term and two long-term discourses.....	101
4.3.	Data collection: Two newspapers.....	105
4.4.	Data analysis.....	107
5.	Empirical validation and evaluation.....	111
5.1.	Validation of frames in the unification discourses.....	115
5.1.1.	State actor frames.....	115
5.1.2.	Civic-level frames.....	120
5.1.3.	Highlighting diverse state roles in <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> frames.....	127
5.1.4.	Collective memory and political triggers in <i>Hankyoreh</i> frames.....	145
5.1.5.	Political ideology: Dealing with modern history.....	156
5.2.	Validation of frames in the welfare discourses.....	166
5.2.1.	Problem spotting frames.....	170
5.2.2.	Idea frames.....	182
5.2.3.	Focus on welfare/social policy and policymaking.....	207
5.2.4.	Framing of interest groups as actors for social policy.....	211
5.2.5.	Frames as systems debates.....	216
5.3.	Hypothesis testing: Explaining variations.....	220
5.3.1.	Variation of unification frames.....	220
5.3.2.	Variation of welfare frames.....	225
6.	Methodological implications.....	232
6.1.	Dealing with local secondary sources.....	233



6.2.	Discursive epistemology for political research in foreign cultures .....	237
6.3.	Utility of text-as-data for implementing discursive epistemology .....	241
7.	Conclusion .....	246
7.1.	Implications and discussions .....	247
7.2.	Broader debates .....	254
7.3.	Outlook for polarized politics in South Korea.....	257
	Appendix A: Mapping the domestic literature regarding polarization.....	258
	Appendix B: Technical protocol and software.....	260
	Appendix C: List of validated frames .....	262
	Bibliography.....	284

# List of Figures

Figure 1: Newspaper articles with the keyword economic democratization .....	2
Figure 2: Model ontology of frames, discourses, and political camp .....	88
Figure 3: Relationship of camp, discourse, and frames with empirical example .....	103
Figure 4: Article weights in three newspapers .....	105
Figure 5: Deductive validation of inductively modeled frames.....	109
Figure 6: Frames shown as labeled word compositions.....	113
Figure 7: Analytical categories for cross-checking frames.....	114
Figure 8: State actor frames .....	116
Figure 9: Civic frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	121
Figure 10: Civic frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	124
Figure 11: Treaty frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	128
Figure 12: Strategy frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	131
Figure 13: Deterrence frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	134
Figure 14: Stakeholder frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	142
Figure 15: Co-existence frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	146
Figure 16: Civic struggle frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	149
Figure 17: Political struggle frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	153
Figure 18: Ideology frames .....	157
Figure 19: State-centered ideological struggle frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	163
Figure 20: Welfare convergence frames.....	167

Figure 21: Evaluation vs. action frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	171
Figure 22: Action-related frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> , stacked graph) .....	176
Figure 23: Evaluation vs. action frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	177
Figure 24: Trend of local action bolstering policy action ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	179
Figure 25: Health policy externalities vis-à-vis evaluation frame ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	180
Figure 26: Socioeconomic quantification vis-à-vis evaluation frame ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	181
Figure 27: Contrasting ideas of state responsibility and local action ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	183
Figure 28: Value and paradigm frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	186
Figure 29: Policy emphasis frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	189
Figure 30: Corresponding frames for locally provided welfare ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	193
Figure 31: Local investment frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	195
Figure 32: Public values and compassion frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	198
Figure 33: Origin and continuity of public values ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	202
Figure 34: Helping and volunteering ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	204
Figure 35: Helping and donating ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	206
Figure 36: Welfare committee frames.....	208
Figure 37: Interest group frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	212
Figure 38: Interest group frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	213
Figure 39: Medical deliberation frames (stacked graph).....	215
Figure 40: Systems frames.....	217
Figure 41: Polarization outweighing ideas in unification discourse.....	222
Figure 42: Election effect on welfare discourse .....	226

# List of Tables

Table 1: Dual dimensions of discourse during election campaigns .....	8
Table 2: Longitudinal variation of discourse.....	104
Table 3: Comparison of newspaper sizes .....	106
Table 4: Selected article volumes by newspaper and discourse .....	107
Table 5: Words in state actor frames .....	117
Table 6: Words in civic frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	121
Table 7: Words in civic frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	124
Table 8: Words in treaty frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	128
Table 9: Words in strategy frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	131
Table 10: Words in deterrence frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	135
Table 11: Words in stakeholder frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	142
Table 12: Words in co-existence frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	146
Table 13: Words in civic struggle frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	149
Table 14: Words in political struggle frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	153
Table 15: Words in ideology frames.....	158
Table 16: Ideological struggle frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	163
Table 17: Words in welfare convergence frames.....	167
Table 18: Words in evaluation vs. action frames .....	172
Table 19: Words in action-related frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	176
Table 20: Words in evaluation vs. action frames .....	177
Table 21: Words in local action frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	180

Table 22: Words in health policy frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	181
Table 23: Socioeconomic quantification frames.....	182
Table 24: Words in contrasting ideas of state responsibility and local action ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	183
Table 25: Words in value and paradigm frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	186
Table 26: Words in policy emphasis frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ).....	189
Table 27: Words in corresponding frames for locally provided welfare ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) ....	193
Table 28: Words in local investment frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	196
Table 29: Words in value and compassion frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	199
Table 30: Words in related value frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ).....	202
Table 31: Words in helping and volunteering ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	204
Table 32: Words in helping and donating ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	206
Table 33: Words in welfare committee frames .....	208
Table 34: Words in interest group frames ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> ) .....	212
Table 35: Words in interest group frames ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> ) .....	213
Table 36: Words in medical deliberation frames .....	215
Table 37: Words in systems frames .....	217

# List of Appendices

Appendix A: Mapping the domestic literature regarding polarization..... 258  
Appendix B: Technical protocol and software..... 260  
Appendix C: List of validated frames ..... 262

# Glossary

<b>Chosŏn Lotong Tang Chungang Wiwŏnhoe</b>	Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea
<b>Chaebol</b>	conglomerate
<b>Chosun Ilbo</b>	newspaper in South Korea (daily circulation 1,8 million)
<b>Kyŏngsillyŏn</b>	Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice
<b>Minju Jayu Dang</b>	Democratic Liberal Party (1990-1995)
<b>DMZ</b>	Demilitarized zone
<b>Hanch'onglyŏn</b>	South Korean Federation of University Students Councils (1993-)
<b>Hangul</b>	Korean alphabet
<b>Hankyoreh</b>	newspaper in Korea (daily circulation 600,000)
<b>Hannara Party</b>	Name of centre-right conservative political party (1997-2012)
<b>Chŏntaehyŏp</b>	Korean Federation of Student Councils
<b>Kaesong Industrial Complex</b>	Industrial park in North Korea with South Korean collaboration
<b>Minjok</b>	Concept of "Korean race" in the ideology of Korean ethnic nationalism
<b>Kongchŏng Kŏlae Pŏp</b>	Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
<b>Kukka Anchŏn Pochang Pŏp</b>	National Security Act
<b>Pukchosŏn Nodongdang</b>	North Korean Workers' Party
<b>Panmunjom</b>	Former site of the Military Armistice Commission
<b>Ch'amyŏ Yŏntae</b>	People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
<b>Saenuri party</b>	Name of centre-right conservative political party (2012-)
<b>SMEs</b>	Small and medium-sized companies
<b>Sunshine policy</b>	rapprochement policy of South Korea towards North Korea from 1998 until 2007
<b>Jogyŏ</b>	Order of traditional Korean Buddhism
<b>Yusin/ Yushin</b>	Revitalization regime (1972-1979) of bureaucratic authoritarianism under Park Chung-hee

# 1. Introduction: Ideas in South Korean politics

*All the candidates proclaim themselves to be in favor of the same things: promoting the growth of the welfare state, reducing social polarization, reforming the chaebol or business conglomerates, fostering “economic democracy”, etc. Who could have imagined that three candidates from such different places on the ideological spectrum—conservative, reformist, and progressive—would adopt the same campaign platforms and slogans?*

*(Choi Jang-jip 2012, 5)*

## 1.1. The 2012 election campaign discourse and puzzle


The above quote by the South Korean political scientist Choi Jang-jip concisely reflects the presidential election campaigns of 2012. Shortly afterwards, the reformist candidate dropped out of the race, leaving the conservative and progressive candidates in the arena to settle the final vote. During the approximately one-year long campaign span until presidential elections in December 2012, the campaign platforms of the leading conservative party and the leading progressive party were unanimous on two ideas on their agendas: welfare and economic democratization, which referred to a vague notion of social market democracy. With equal fervor, mass media highlighted this policy agenda as



the most important agenda *du jour*<sup>1</sup>. However, after elections ended with the victory of the conservative candidate, the frequency of economic democratization in the newspaper ebbed down almost instantly.

In Figure 1: Newspaper articles with the keyword economic democratization, the political and public attention for this policy issue can be observed by the number of articles that mentioned the concept, which I searched in three newspapers from a progressive to conservative political spectrum<sup>2</sup>.

**Figure 1: Newspaper articles with the keyword economic democratization**



Judging by keyword frequency, the leading progressive newspaper *Hankyoreh* generated the highest count of articles that mentioned this issue, whereas the leading conservative newspaper *Chosun Ilbo* showed the lowest count, despite the conservative candidate eventually winning the elections. All three newspapers emphasized that a reform in the sense of economic democratization was challenging but necessary. Overall,

<sup>1</sup> "D-15 until presidential elections" (Ch'ongsön D-15) *Hankyoreh*, March 27, 2012

<sup>2</sup> The leading progressive newspaper is *Hankyoreh* and the leading conservative newspaper is *Chosun Ilbo*. In contrast, *Hankook Ilbo* is of moderate orientation.

despite being a short-term phenomenon, the idea of economic democratization left behind a considerable mass of discourse in written text and spoken word. The above phenomenon confirms several claims by South Korean political scientists. Firstly, South Korean scholars state that political parties in South Korea have a narrow and centrist political spectrum, and converge at the center of socioeconomic policies. This was demonstrated by the unanimous claims to economic democratization during the 2012 election campaigns. Even before the 2012 elections, economic policy has been neoliberal throughout diverse incumbent parties. Secondly, South Korean political scientists state that South Korean politics and political discourse is “extremely polarized”, but observe that ideological polarization in the conflicting discourses by political camps is more distinct in some discourses than for others. Ideological polarization in South Korean political discourse is therefore two-dimensional.

We arrive at the puzzle of how South Korean political discourse is simultaneously extremely convergent and extremely polarized; in other words, how constant polarization experiences constant variation in the form of ideas that come and go. In order to examine this puzzle, I take a long-term perspective on discourses that have been in the public mind for a much longer time than economic democratization: unification and welfare.

My dissertation is an empirical puzzle (How do political ideas fluctuate despite polarization?) and a methodological challenge (How can we know?) in one. In other words, this dissertation inquires how we can observe fluctuating ideas in polarized discourse and seeks to know the effect of fluctuating ideas on political discourse. A methodological challenge stands before the empirical puzzle, and regards how to make sense of political ideas in different cultures, by systematically approaching the contingent meanings of

ideas in political contexts that are different from our own. Mediatized discourse in foreign politics heavily draws from vocabulary similar to Western democracies, but still emerges with fundamentally different meanings that are contingent on relational meaning systems (Toepfl 2016). Thus, specific meanings “can only be properly understood within the horizon of the entire media-politics discourse—that is, within the nexus of meaningful terms” that the foreign discourse generates (Toepfl 2016, 1541). If ideas are building blocks, we need the whole box of discourse to make sense of South Korean ideas.

Understanding South Korean political ideas, whether they arrive in the garb of new ideas or not, necessitates the understanding of interconnected old ideas. Without the aid of discursive perspectives, the exact meaning of economic democratization remains unclear even four years later and with the benefit of hindsight. Frequent use of this term by political camps led to the accumulation of various meanings, of which none solely defines this concept. Competing political actors elaborated possible meanings that illustrated their version of the policy goal economic democratization. Possible meanings therefore generated via political contestation, which then entered the vocabulary and memory of South Korean political discourses. One study points out the following distinction<sup>3</sup>: While the progressive camp favored to restructure the *chaebol*, the conservative camp suggested that the *chaebol* could assume a supportive role towards achieving economic democratization (Doucette 2015). Doucette is quick to point out that the respective policy visions do not differ significantly under the hood, as both camps

---

<sup>3</sup> Due to the temporary nature of this discourse, studies among Korean research in the English language are scarce. A Google Scholar search in October 2015 for articles with the keyword "economic democratization" and "South Korea" returns 186 results among all papers and books published since 2011. Filtering the results additionally by hand leads to a near-empty sample of studies that portray this discourse.

leaned towards capital-centric and market-based solutions. In major political elections, policy visions are temporarily propelled, as agenda issues promise to solve systemic problems without the ability to guarantee the outcome. In order to promise solutions and stir the affirmation of voters, politicians wove political discourses with the threads from the socioeconomic fabric of South Korea<sup>4</sup>.

Overall, the idea of economic democratization is better described as an arrangement of symbols than as a definable concept: It promised fairer distribution in markets, and installed socioeconomic improvement as the aim of regulating the power of conglomerates and increasing the role of the state. Economic democratization was a pregnant symbol for solving systemic problems that stem from the heavily conglomerate-monopolized economy of South Korea (Kim Youngmi 2014). In short, the idea of economic democratization in the political discourse was a hodgepodge of vaguely relevant cause-and-effect interrelationships.

## **1.2. Previous assumptions**

The act of claiming distinction during election campaigns, if understood as a means of self-differentiation and voter persuasion, is best explained with the concept of issue ownership. In issue ownership theory, political camps possess differing strengths by leveraging their image of “handling certain issues better” (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Budge 2015; Petrocik 1996; Van der Brug 2004). Additionally, it differentiates cleavages and ideological lineages of South Korea and which issues are more likely to be owned by which camp. For example, voters in South Korea may generally find that growth is a job

---

<sup>4</sup> The current market structure privileges conglomerates and is the outgrowth of past state-led growth strategies by autocratic governments.

better left to conservatives while distribution is better left to progressives. A focus on discourse then is able to illustrate convergence and issue-trespassing. Thus, a major factor for the conservative candidate Park Geun-hye's campaign victory in 2012 was to seize "the issues of welfare and "economic democratization" in advance, otherwise regarded as the opposition's best weapon" (Sohn Yul and Kang Won-Taek 2013). Campaign agendas of the three main candidates converged in their issues addressed and concepts used. Political contestation can lead to the convergence of agenda issues, while the strategic divergence of frames ensures party differentiation (Petrocik 1996). During political contestation, catch-all parties trespass the issues that are traditionally owned other parties (Damore 2004; Holian 2004). Issue trespasses are triggered by external factors, such as economic crises or presidential elections, and therefore last only for the duration of the campaign.

Candidates have distinctive patterns of emphases in their campaigns, demonstrating that he is better able to "handle" certain issues than his opponent. For example, welfare is traditionally owned by progressive parties (Budge 2015). External shocks can shake the ownership equilibrium and provide a party with a short-term lease of an issue, by enabling them to claim that the incumbent party cannot handle the job (Petrocik 1996). The theory assumes that "the more stable the party system, i.e., the more predictable the group character and size of the party's base, the easier it is to select the issues upon which to focus a campaign" (Petrocik 1996, 829). In the South Korean democratic system of parties and elections, we see weakly distinct yet ideologically extremely polarized party characters that stay consistent over time.

The act of claiming another party's owned issue<sup>5</sup> is a rational act for politicians but heighten the ambiguity of their ideological identities (Damore 2004) whereas they must adapt to public mood and expectations (Damore 2005). Media is the conduit for "crafted talk" (Holian 2004) that can shift issue ownerships dynamically (Walgrave, Lefevere, and Nuytemans 2009). Observable rhetoric and discourses arise from issue ownership competitions, where issue ownerships are dynamic due to trespassing acts (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010b).

These theories have not been linked to the narrow but polarized political spectrum of South Korea. However, they imply that an investigation of discourses in partisan and camp-aligned newspapers can disclose how political ideas for salient policy issues increase or decrease in the political discourse, while also indicating the effect of party competition, polarization, and presidential election campaigns.

### **1.3. Two camps in South Korea**

In the 2012 election campaigns of South Korea, the conservative camp conducted issue trespassing: They radically turned their agenda around from wealth-friendly positions to more progressive appeals for economic democratization and welfare expansion. As a result, the progressive party lost its policy identity and was forced defend their chances by unifying candidates (Chang Ha-song 2014). As result, the leading presidential candidates (Park Geun-hye of the conservative party versus Moon Jae-in of the progressive party) converged by emphasizing economic democratization and welfare. By claiming these traditionally progressive issues, the conservative candidate

---

<sup>5</sup> The act of stealing and claiming another party's owned issues is called issue trespassing (Damore 2005; Damore 2004; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010a; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010b; Holian 2004)

successfully diluted party differences. Voter surveys attest that the conservative candidate was more successful in owning the issue of economic democratization than the progressive candidate (Pak Chan-uk and Kang Won-Taek 2013). The acceptance of welfare subventions was also adopted by conservatives during this campaign; for the first time, welfare spending was rendered as an unopposed issue across both camps. In other words, the distinction between progressives and conservatives became increasingly minute in the socioeconomic arena (Song Ho-gun 2014) during the campaigns.

Table 1: Dual dimensions of discourse during election campaigns shows that trespassed issues nevertheless have dual dimensions. The comparison of policy ideas between the progressive and conservative camp reveals respective emphases on ex-ante structural reform and ex-post regulation measures, whereby the latter is the moderate form of policy ideas for economic democratization.

**Table 1: Dual dimensions of discourse during election campaigns**

<b>Convergent dimension</b>	<b>Issue trespassing:</b> Economic democratization	
<b>Divergent dimension</b>	<b>Progressive emphasis:</b> ex-ante structural reform measures	<b>Conservative emphasis:</b> ex-post regulation measures

At the same time, highly abstract ideological discourse affects also the rhetorical framing of socioeconomic issues of economic democratization and welfare. This effect can be illustrated by observations regarding progressive discourse: Choi has remarked that the present progressive discourse in South Korea carries the same imprints of discourse in pre-democratization times. Today's political language, discourse, and rhetoric is influenced by the past democratic movements, where they once served to maximize resources for mobilization (Choi Jang-jip 2013). Political scientists describe the context of South Korean politics in fairly unequivocal terms. With great concern, they observe

“extreme” and “discursive” polarization between the polarized progressive and conservative camps. These attributions can be unpacked: “Extreme” polarization results from political antagonism between the progressive and conservative camp since the genesis of democratic politics. “Discursive” polarization is maintained by antagonistic regimes of truth that are inconsolable; hence it is also ideological polarization.

Polarized discourse in South Korean politics also provides implications for late-bloomer democracies. Democracy in South Korea was conceived during the emancipatory stages against autocracy and born in 1987. As corollary of conflicted democratization, “contentions and confrontations, rather than consultations and compromises, have become a routine” and the “rule of the game”, caused by “confrontational legacies, ineffective participatory mechanisms, and underinstitutionalized political parties” (Kim Sunhyuk 2009, 2). Frameworks on the quality of democratic institutions offer an avenue to understanding South Korean democracy after democratization (Choi Jang-jip 2010). Choi emphasizes that political competition in South Korea failed to establish representative democracy for all interest groups. Contextual effects on political discourse are palpable in his view: For instance, the progressive camp hurts democracy by sticking to reactionary and anti-political discourses from pre-democratization times. These discourses are outdated and past their valid date, rooting in the era of social grassroots movements and contentious civil society that rebelled against authoritarianism. The progressive failure lies in utilizing the same recursive frames that today’s political, social, and economic environment has outgrown. The dichotomous framing of democratization vs. autocratic suppression is haplessly out of touch with the everyday reality of voters. He concludes that the unrealized potential and social utility of progressive ideology is evident in political language.



Ideology is however a slippery subject. While ideologies polarize the political discourse, they escape Western-centric categories and labels that classify ideologies. Many domestic scholars agree that the political spectrum is narrow and essentially conservative, which constrains policy deliberation. Son Ho-chol (1999) remarks that the conservative party follows a catch-all strategy, while the progressive party (or parties) are ideological. Song Ho-gun (2014) observes, with more recent insight, that all South Korean parties follow catch-all strategies and fail to represent neglected regions, betraying the basic reason why certain regions vote for certain parties in South Korea. Pseudo-ideological polarization hinders the policy-deliberative processes of democratic institutions. The economist Sang-jo Kim (2014) stresses that policy differentiation is vague between conservative and progressive camps. The conservative party does not represent the interest of conglomerates, nor does the progressive party represent midsize-companies and workers. Thus, the labels of “conservative” and “progressive” are unmerited and merely denote vague identities and indeterminate ideologies. He concludes that voter-conscious parties have no choice but to converge at the center during elections. Crucially, he adds that scholarship is politicized as well and fails to escape the dichotomy of conservative versus progressive conflict.

Further, election campaigning and politics in general are fed by polarized ideology in South Korea. Ilmo Yang (2014) attests a domineering role to non-compromising and stand-offish election campaigning, whereas governance is duly dependent on compromise. He calls this phenomenon “permanent campaigning” and identifies it as the crux of conflict between political camps post-democratization. Discourse under the effect of permanent campaigning drives political competition and bars democratic quality, by deterring political institutions from deliberating. Son Ho-chol (2004) a progressive political

scientist, sees the dismissal of anti-ideological pragmatism as the way ahead: In contrast to other countries that have experienced ideological struggles, South Korea never experienced anything similar. A conservative paradigm reigned in South Korea until democratization, helped by the division of the two Koreas and anti-communism. After democratization, the political dichotomy of democracy versus autocratic suppression was replaced by regionalism, still crowding out essential ideological struggle. His argument can be read as an analysis of the emptiness of ideology as a political classifier in South Korea.

Crucially for my dissertation, the choice of method has consequences for the study of ideas in South Korea, as they are scattered on an ideological plot differently than many Western countries. A similar problem exists in the study of Japanese politics, where qualitative accounts imply party competition on the standard left-right spectrum but quantitative accounts fail to substantiate party differentiation (Proksch, Slapin, and Thies 2011). These inconsistencies between “quantitative measures and qualitative assessments” can distort comparative studies due to comparing apples and oranges, and longitudinal country-specific studies due to missing data (Proksch, Slapin, and Thies 2011, 2).

#### **1.4. The argument**

I take a step back in order to sketch the central object of my study, which are political ideas in partisan newspaper discourse and their fate, especially during presidential election campaigns. The effect of elections on ideas is driven by the intentions of what politicians say towards the public when they compete for the public vote. If a salient policy problem is on the debating table during those times, competitive discourses arise with the goal to proffer the best arguments to the voter base. In the case

of economic democratization, this discourse swelled up temporarily and then deflated after the heat of presidential elections had passed. The context of Korean politics therefore contains vital ingredients for the fate of policy ideas that are transferred via political discourse to the broader public discourse.

My theory of discursive polarization is a synthesis of two theories: hegemonic discourse and discursive institutions. It will posit that political camps in South Korea are polarized by nurturing separate hegemonic discourses. Further, discourse talks about polarization and policy ideas among other things but does so through frames that convey ideas through camp-specific interpretations. For example, the conservative camp may convey the idea of welfare through the frame of charity, whereas the progressive camp conveys the idea of welfare through the frame of state provisions. Thus, I will distinguish frames in discourses as discursive institutions that can potentially reproduce political polarization or convey distinct ideas, but are also able to change and adapt to external factors.

Discourse is where political camps are potentially able to squander ideas by over-promising goals and under-developing details at the window of opportunity. What they say via discourse is simultaneously a choice between squandering or deliberating policy ideas. Thus, the context of political competition and socioeconomic landscapes are prerequisite to the shaping of what politicians say and how. If the election-campaigning rhetoric of politicians is *text*, then the discursive *context* is the configuration of interests by politicians and camps<sup>6</sup>. The broader political context of South Korea manifests in the core parts of

---

<sup>6</sup> This dissertation uses the discursive institutionalist framework by (Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2008) that suggests that discourse is the combination of *text* and *context* in the sense described here. She also differentiates between communicative and coordinative discourse. Communicative

political discourse that political actors are able to shape.

In a methodological sense, discourse contains rival frames with guideposts for knowledge, persuasion, and action (Schon and Rein 1994) or frames of reference upon which different understandings are oriented (Jobert 1989). Frames are ideas in political discourses and overlap, contrast, and conflict with each other. Frames are rarely empirically analyzed and operationalized, but more recently, quantitative text-as-data methods integrate the theory and method of frames (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). By implementing this method, I utilize text-as-data and combine the quantitative analysis of large text volumes with qualitative validation by reading text samples and interpreting quantitative patterns via discourse analysis.

## **1.5. Plan of dissertation**

The structure of this dissertation is as follows. In the second chapter, I review previous studies and the challenges for studying ideas in foreign politics from the perspectives of area studies and political science. In the third chapter, I argue for the benefits of discourse analysis to studying ideas in foreign politics. Then, I map the context of polarization and political camps in South Korea. Based on this groundwork, I build a model of polarized discourse that explains polarized discourses as hegemonic projects, and frames as discursive institutions. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the quantitative method for tracing frames in textual data, elaborate the case selection, and describe the data sources. This dissertation will therefore analyze frames in two topical discourses that have been salient discourses in South Korea throughout its democracy, and also possess

---

discourse concerns the policy-simplifying discourse by political actors towards the public and is of focus in my dissertation.

varying ideological traits: unification and welfare. The fifth chapter models various types of frames in two discourses by two newspapers, and then explains how the variation of frames relates to the fluctuation of ideas. Frames will be derived from statistical word relationships, then categorized, and lastly validated and tested. I will devise three categories of frames based on relative comparisons between camps, by evaluating the similarity of content (convergence), relative distinctiveness of content (divergence), and polarized content (conflict). Chapter six discusses methodological implications and chapter seven highlights my contributions.

## 2. Epistemologies for studying political ideas in a different culture

The focus on ideas was driven by the Ideas scholarship in comparative politics and international relations, and emerged as the attempt to not take interests as given, as a rationalist account of action would do (Blyth 2003). The henceforth evolution of the Ideas scholarship shows that the causal role of ideas on politics and policy remains a thorny subject for being difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the unequivocal value of ideational research remains its ability to map and show the spread of ideas (Blyth 2015). This focus considers how ideas spread and in what forms and why. Thus, instead of the causal role of ideas on politics, the causal role of politics on ideas is useful for understanding political interests *via* ideas. For these aims and more, 'ideas matter' (Schmidt 2008), but if transferred to South Korean politics, a practical obstacle emerges: How can we map and show the ideas and thereby understand actor interests in the politics in a foreign culture? While a purely cultural approach neglects the political framework of ideas, a purely political approach fails at the gates of linguistic and cultural barriers required to understand ideas.

In order to study political ideas in South Korean discourse, the first question is how to access the ideas within South Korean discourse over time. When studying political ideas in South Korea, the researcher faces political ideas that live and evolve within their foreign context and culture. To understand political ideas in a foreign culture is no trivial

task: It includes having to understand the origins of particular ideas, the range of possible interpretations by actors, as well as the structures that embed actors and shape their interests and interpretations. Some kind of prior strategy is advisable to help one understand ideas as the product of their environment, with the added difficulty of the foreign language and culture.

Epistemology deals with obstacles to our human understanding and the way of building on prior knowledge to arrive at additional knowledge. More stringently, we could say that epistemology concerns itself with “issues such as the degree of certainty we might legitimately claim for the conclusions we are tempted to draw from our analyses” (Hay 2006, 83). The foremost obstacle for building analyses of South Korean political ideas is the linguistic and cultural barrier, which negatively affects the certainty we can claim of the form and content of ideas. This obstacle can be exemplified by a comparative setting: The accessing of political ideas would be relatively menial for the study of politics in the researcher’s own culture and language. One possible method would be to read numerous texts and identify the most dominant ideas. Contrarily, if political ideas are embedded in and shaped by the structures and actors in a different culture, the same task demands additional considerations before claiming some certainty for the meanings of ideas in their context.

Why is a discussion of epistemology so important, and which value does it add? The preferred epistemology influences *how* to research political ideas in a foreign culture, which forestalls at least two hazards in the case of South Korea. Ideational data in a foreign language is vulnerable to misinterpretation, and political polarization increases the risk of sample bias. For example, misinterpretation and sample bias occur if only progressive ideas or only conservative ideas are accessed, or if the researcher takes as

objective truth one camp's strategic defamation of the opposing camp. Hypothetically, such mistakes are likely to stem from misunderstanding the ideas embedded in structures and actors in a foreign culture, and thus by getting lost in translation.

Epistemology thus guides the researcher's choice and application of data. In the following, I will portray simplified ideal types of the two relevant disciplines, which yields the benefit of distinguishing the advantages and disadvantages of two respective epistemologies. Thus, I distinguish between cultural approaches "from the bottom" by the area studies and the distanced approaches "from the top" by political science. While area studies strive to directly understand foreign textual sources, political science engages with utilizing simplified data with the aim to yield generalizable conclusions that hold for theories across political science. As will be argued, the study of political ideas in a foreign culture is greatly helped by combining both epistemologies. Their relative differences are revealed when we consider *what their conditions are of acquiring knowledge about the research subject*, which is the working definition of epistemology (Hay 2006). Differences lead to different methodological choices, depending on what the trajectory considers to be reliable data and methods.

The following overview of previous studies outlines epistemologies in various fields of area studies and political science that have been employed for studying interests and ideas in politics. In political science, the notion of translation describes the spread of ideas internationally, whereas the notion of interpretation describes the spread of ideas domestically. They represent a special research attention on the deviations of ideas that are caused by actors and structures in a foreign culture. What we as area studies scholars understand to be the meanings for ideas can be grossly misdirected by the domestic politics in a foreign culture. This effect is demonstrated by the objections of area



scholars to concepts in social science and in ordinary discourse. To understand relative epistemologies means to avert these hazards. This overview aims to arrive at a research strategy for political ideas in a foreign culture, and subsequently at the most appropriate data choice and method.

## **2.1. Area studies**

How do area studies approach the foreign context in order to understand ideas and acquire valid knowledge? The epistemological principles of area studies value how thoroughly the researcher is informed about the foreign country. A high degree of context knowledge makes it difficult to accept more sweeping modes of inquiry and readily available data, especially quantitative data. As a result, methods are often devised “from the ground up” in order to reveal cultural differences that normally remain shrouded behind numbers. This inclination approximates the native experience but does not assimilate it. The aim of approximation invites the combination of various disciplines in order to render cultural differences visible. Such approaches therefore often emphasize the problem and effects of Western-centric categories. This stance stems from the epistemological principles of area scholars.

Due to the primacy of cultural context knowledge, area studies tend to object to common social science approaches that accept quantitative positivism. Empirical data in the area studies diverges from simply using or creating more statistical data. Rather than statistical data itself, the manner of using standard statistical data despite best contextual knowledge strikes area scholars as uncritical. In an ambitious installment on development studies by international and domestic scholars regarding South Korea, economists from the U.S. and South Korea utilized statistical data for causal inference (Mason 1980). Area scholars went on to criticize the manner of this study, stating that the author-economists

were not equipped to discern historical causalities (Moskowitz 1982). This neglect seemed to stem from the aim of wanting to portray South Korea as a developmental example. To add substance to this point, the studies were funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and were jointly carried out by the government-owned Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID). From the outset, the study aimed to investigate the Korean development process and the U.S. contribution to it (Steinberg 1982). This goal led participating researchers to interpret problems and issues with a developmental perspective that paid dues to developmental agendas<sup>7</sup>. To the sensitivities of Korean studies scholars, concepts such as “stability” or “instability” were used uncritically throughout the study and represented futile efforts in the face of reality that was much more complex<sup>8</sup>. Using uncritical terms for characterizing justified conflict meant that problems caused by modernization become obscured, even though their reflection matters for the success of the modernization project in South Korea and the lessons learned for other struggling countries yet to be modernized. For this reason, the shock-changed paths of “Korea's society and its desires, political sensitivities, tensions, and frustrations” embody a source of vital information and data (Moskowitz 1982, 86). Seeing a number of uncritical concepts occur throughout the study, Moskowitz even alludes, perhaps surprisingly, that the superficial usage of cultural concepts may be attributed to

---

<sup>7</sup> Aside from the interests of participating U.S. institutions, the South Korean side was subject to constraints of their own. KDI supplied talented South Korean scholars whose moral obligations stemmed from “a parastatal organization in a centralized and controlled nation” and who were to “examine dispassionately a process that is at the heart of national policy” (Steinberg 1982, 93).

<sup>8</sup> Moskowitz equates the futility of these concepts with the concept of “Confucianism” as an all-purpose concept in the Asian studies, where it is often used in place of a better explanation.

the participation of domestic South Korean economists. Being native South Korean citizens and children of their times, their “knowing” of South Korean “facts” is based on every-day experience and acculturation. Thus, domestic scholars take for granted the fundamental facts about South Korean society, history, and culture that help readers perceive causal connections. Essentially a communicative failure, it fails to facilitate understanding for outside observers. Their economist background conglomerates with cultural neglect and reinforces discipline-specific assumptions of which concepts lead to legitimate knowledge and why.

The above example is a reverse illustration for the particular attitude of area studies to “one of Korean studies' great problems: the extent of continuity and the extent of change in Korea's social system as Korea became modern” (Moskowitz 1982, 73). Being a historian, Moskowitz underlines the challenges for researchers in the economic sciences to consider the history of the country. In this argument, area studies face the challenge of understanding and rendering visible that macro patterns depend on myriad contextual factors.

From this illustration, culture emerges as the main asset of area studies, alongside a specific mode of which data and method to regard as valid and why. The cultural perspective infuses the various disciplines that agglomerate under the umbrella of area studies and invites area scholars to combine disciplinary insights into one intellectual project. As an instance for merging the cultural perspective with disciplines, cultural sociology provides an approach for understanding Korean politics (Helgesen 2014). Aiming to analyze amalgamation processes between foreign and South Korean values. Helgesen discerns attitudes and values via surveys and combines political science, sociology, social psychology, and the cross-cultural study of social issues. Helgesen

justifies this mix of disciplines by referring to social psychologist Geert Hofstede and his belief that the intellectual access to foreign cultures requires a transgression between social sciences. This methodological choice stands on epistemological principles: If researchers accept the divisions of labor as they stand in the social sciences in the U.S. and Europe, they allow Western ethnocentrism into social science research (Hofstede and Hofstede 2001). This argument claims that political scientists and sociologists in the Western social sciences operate with ethnocentric symbols, concepts, and categories.

In contrast to Hofstede's focus on institutions, Helgesen sees a chicken-and-egg relationship where institutions reflect culture as much as cultures reflect institutions. He anchors this argument by invoking authors as diverse as Berger and Luckmann (2005), Douglas (1986), and North (1990b), who would tend to concur that structures shape minds. In a reversed attempt, Helgesen focuses on political culture. Thus, he chooses to focus on the effect of culture on institutions and to neglect the co-constitutive relationship where institutions and culture affect each other. This example suggests that area scholars tend to view institutions as culturally embedded and place primacy on contextual knowledge before political conclusions.

Another author who Helgesen cites is the political scientist and sinologist Lucian Pye, who marries a stronger emphasis on behavior with the notion of combining the several disciplines of the area studies. According to Pye, a focus on political culture forces the researcher to explore behavior with the combined advantage of all relevant disciplines (L. W. Pye 2001). He claims that institutionalization follows from regularized power relationships that turn into structures. And thus, institutionalization leads people to accept structures that are essentially patterns of behavior. Pye applies this lens to analyze the peculiarities of modernization processes in Asian countries. He identifies paternalistic

power structures as the commonality between Asian countries and develops a generalizable approach based on contextually formed conditions. By starting his analysis from a general model of Asian power, Pye aims to dissolve culture-blind ethnocentrism. Ironically, Pye ends up reinforcing ethnocentrism as a result of establishing paternalistic power structures as a given category for Asian countries. The problem of using Western-centric symbols, concepts, and categories is not effectively solved. Consequently, his generalization invites concerns about stereotyping. This example underlines the dilemma and trade-off between the cultural perspective and the aim of generalization, leaving open the question of how the two modes of inquiry can complement each other. Helgesen aims to tackle this dilemma by locating himself in the extension of the classical political culture approach of the 1960s that Sidney Verba pioneered. By doing so, he seeks to distance himself from the modern “project of operationalizing culture” that deters from cultural inquiry as the primary aim by installing generalization in its place (Helgesen 2014, 14).

Cultural approaches for studying South Korean politics neglect the political role of ideas at a cost. Like many Korean studies scholars before him, Helgesen locates the lineage of political Left-Right classifications in South Korea in the adoption of foreign models in the South (US liberal democracy) and North (Soviet communism) Koreas after World War II. However, Western ideological concepts populate academic observations and South Korean political discourse (Hong Song-min, 2008; Kang Chong-in, 2014; Kim Jongtae, 2011) and so it happens that many domestic South Korean scholars insist that “liberal democracy” is an insufficient concept for explaining political reality in South Korea. The uncritical usage of ideological concepts in fact embody the “Western-centric textbook stance” that Helgesen criticizes (2014, 7). Seeking to express the ideational structures and processes specific to South Korean politics, South Korean scholars have suggested

discourse analysis, with the aim to detect meanings that actors propagate under the helm of ideas (Bak Haegwang, 2007, 2002; Ryu Ungchae, 2010; Shin Jinwook, 2011; Shin Jinwook and Kim Young Min, 2009; Lee Kee-Hyeung, 2006).

The pervasiveness of Western-originating ideological concepts impacts the data that scholars encounter firsthand. To illustrate this ripple effect, I refer to South Korean domestic scholars. They have observed that Western-originating ideological concepts affects daily political discourse in the spoken word and written text, as political camps utilize ideological concepts that linger from the Cold War system (Kang Won-Taek, 2005, 2003; Shin Jinwook, 2008). The amalgamation of Western-originating descriptive categories and empirical reality presents the true reason for a focus on ideas in South Korean politics. The categories of ideas, which are used as concepts that describe the politics of South Korea, should be understood as indicators that mirror the spread of actual meanings that exist in the empirical field in a foreign culture, embedded in and shaped by actors and structures. From this standpoint, Western-derived concepts are demoted from their analytical utility and become subject to analysis.

The above illustrated culture-based approach of the area studies takes ideas as a given, and normally would not strive to distinguish descriptive concepts from the actual ideas, meanings, and interests of political actors. For example, the ideas inherent in the concepts of *Left* and *Right* need adjustment to the actual meanings that exist in the field and constitute the particularly *South Korean* manifestations of *Left* and *Right*. The area studies approach reserves this possibility with their focus on local peculiarity and culture, but would benefit from a focus on the constitution and spread of ideas. Compared to Helgesen's approach, who uses surveys to seek out non-political aspects and "alternative views on the basics of human existence" (2014, 8), a focus on political ideas in a foreign

culture remains on the political level and highlights local traits under the cover of familiar concepts. Compared with many area studies approaches with a direct focus on culture, such an approach is less directly cultural but nevertheless satisfies the area scholar by acknowledging the peculiarities, cultural or otherwise, of Korean politics.

Area studies are the formation of area expertise as an academic “umbrella discipline”, and descend from historical circumstances. In the United States for example, Japanese Studies proliferated during World War II, as the U.S. government nurtured area specialists in universities in order to gather information on the enemy in times of war and prior to deployment in Japan (C. Johnson and Ijiri 2005). The demand for policy-related scholarship led to the National Defense and Education Act (1958), which funneled funding into the area studies. Other authors add emphasis on earlier flows of private funding in the 1920s-30s, especially from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations (Teti 2007). In this manner, public and private funding aimed to generate policy-relevant implications and to infuse U.S. politics with expert knowledge on countries of foreign policy interest. On the other hand, area studies in Germany and Europe started from pre-established studies on civilizations (Basedau and Köllner 2007). Due to these historical roots on both continents, area studies had to reinvent themselves due to changing global politics (Katzenstein 2001). Teti (2007) tells a constructivist account and yields present-day implications for epistemologies in the area studies. In his Foucauldian account, the organization of knowledge in U.S. universities embedded area studies in a hierarchy of power relationships. This hierarchy placed area studies underneath the disciplines even before the creation of the umbrella term ‘social sciences’. Thus, the disciplines spearhead the hierarchy as theory-making producers of universal and scientific knowledge: the “triumphant instrumentalist, universalist and scientific definition of what counts as

knowledge” (Teti 2007, 124). Consequently, the “areas” are epistemologically subservient to collect “facts” for the disciplines. This construction was originally designed for reaching universal knowledge. In contrast, the institutional development in Europe launched upon the traditional strengths of studying ancient civilizations. As a result, they forged Orientalist representations of areas as a unitary object, which establishes reification that is known as ‘exceptionalism’. In academia, exceptionalism entails that context, culture and tradition are tools of access that only a few experts command. Soon after the Cold War, European academia converged towards the U.S as the center of power. As a result, European area studies converged towards realism and further adopted the scientific hierarchy of their U.S. counterparts. Thus, the intellectual gap between the ‘humanistic’ area studies and the ‘scientific’ disciplines was born also in Europe. Additionally, the social sciences had become increasingly quantitative since the 1960s, creating a methodological divide<sup>9</sup> (Katzenstein 2001).

As a result, area studies are caught in a limbo between the two opposing streams. Yet, a possible consensus is that detailed and accurate knowledge on foreign countries is a necessary empirical asset for global problem-driven inquiry. Accordingly, area studies went through “crisis” in the early nineties. In retrospect, the crisis has been discussed, deconstructed, and defied. One observer suggests that the “division of intellectual labor

---

<sup>9</sup> As corollary to this dichotomization of area studies versus social science, the reifying and supposedly non-scientific epistemologies of the area studies were attacked from within area studies themselves. The end of the Cold War threatened the legitimacy of area studies and sparked a discourse about the ‘crisis of area studies’ in the 1990s. Social sciences marginalized area specialists, and graduate studies increasingly shifted away from regional study and towards theory and methods (Bates 1997b). The resistance of area studies against social scientific universalization was publicized during these crises, where some of the most vocal critics were area scholars themselves.



between Area Studies and Disciplines produces both the sense of 'crisis' in Area Studies, and the very idea of interdisciplinarity" (Teti 2007, 118). This reading implies that the divisions within and outside area studies stem from their intellectual and political reproductions, rather than from theoretical clashing. Others recount that area studies was continuously criticized since the 1960s, for "its lack of attention to explicit comparisons and testable propositions and for its proclivity for analysis that privileges a presumed and insufficiently analyzed cultural uniqueness of a particular country or region" (Kohli et al. 1995, 14). Teti's analysis is valid because the organization of area studies is interspersed in relation to the disciplines, which was true then as it is now. Lambert (1990) describes that genuinely interdisciplinary work in the area studies tends to occur at the juncture between anthropology, history, literature and political science, leading to a kind of historically informed political anthropology that is based on materials in local languages. Area specialists in the social sciences are enriched by contact with humanists, but are often automatically positioned at the "soft" end of the social science spectrum. This has led to strong methodological criticism from area specialists on the "hard" end of the spectrum (Bates 1997b). Closer to the present, the emphasis on cultural differences is viewed as outdated in the U.S., and universal theories and toolkits are sought instead. At the same time, postmodernists criticize the adherence of area studies to the "scientific" principles of the disciplines (Szanton 2004).

Often, disparate area studies can be reflective mirrors for all or most area studies. Teti (2007) urges readers to yield implications for area studies when he attributes three kinds of stances to Middle Eastern studies: the hermeneutic understanding of Middle Eastern politics that is grounded in the language, culture, and history; the disciplinary derivations that build on Western-centric models of the disciplines; and most recently the

post-Orientalist scholarship that critiques politically problematic assumptions of mainstream Middle Eastern studies. Regarding stances, the mainstream in the social sciences is often sidelined in area studies. Contrary to the preferred modes in much of social science today, mainstream area studies often oppose social scientific reductionism. Much room for tension exists between area studies and social science, even though they are inseparable.

As the globalization of scholarship and world societies induce a new demand for area knowledge, a re-definition of area studies is called for (L. W. Pye 2001). Some area studies have decentralized from U.S. or Eurocentric ties and integrated newer scholarly streams such as post-structuralism. Latin American Studies serves as a fitting example. Alvarez (2011) observes that Latin Americanists are increasingly transdisciplinary due to the beneficial funding opportunities for interdisciplinary research and also due to growing exploration and research questions. In parallel, the intellectual landscape changed and critical forms of theory emerged, leaving area studies the choice to enter into dialogue. Alvarez appeals to “remake the field” of area studies by departing from Western-centric assumptions and including the input of diasporic and domestic scholars. Diasporic faculty teaches the next diasporic generation, which adds to the diversity of epistemologies in the area studies. Latin American studies demonstrate that area studies unanchored from American political power with the end of the Cold War. The conceptual boundaries of area studies under the U.S. hegemony were redrawn by globalization and affected how we know the world (Wesley-Smith and Goss 2010).

One way to view area studies is “an organized intellectual project in an era of globalization” that challenges conventional conceptions within area studies and understands local specificities within the global context (Wesley-Smith and Goss 2010,

11). This sentiment is supported by scholars who see fruitful returns in bridging the gap between area studies and political science (Basedau and Kollner, 2007). Area studies and “deep” knowledge contribute to the body of empirical social science data and advance theory development. Accordingly, scholars with area studies expertise argue for “historically and culturally contextualized social science” (Katzenstein 2001, 790). The task of area studies is to enrich social science with empirical data (Basedau and Kollner 2007) and in-depth descriptions that are “vital stepping stones for deriving at concepts that can travel and for developing comprehensive theoretical and analytical frameworks” (Basedau and Kollner 2007, 14).

Studying the foreign context requires area expertise, empirical evidence, and interpretive methods<sup>10</sup>. The one “right” approach for cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary contextual knowledge is impossible to define due to the diversity of disciplines within the umbrella of area studies. For this reason, the memberships of scholars are not dichotomous between area studies or social sciences but are matters of degree.

One way to bridge epistemologies is to convert contextual knowledge in the area studies to the language of social science (C. Johnson 1997; Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg 1955). Actually bridged are philosophical differences of explication and understanding, for example narrow empiricist induction in area studies versus deduction in social science (Eun Yong-Soo, 2012). In recent times, comparative politics has defined itself by large-N cross-national studies (Boix and Stokes 2009); the *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* views them as the traditional comparative enterprise and small-N methods as complementary. Small-N methods are seen to provide internal validity and to complement

---

<sup>10</sup> See Katzenstein’s exposition on comparative politics (in Kohli et al., 1995).

large-N methods that provide external validity (Gerring 2012). Further major methods include extensive field work. Apart from the above, the *Handbook* does not discuss how to integrate contextual knowledge and inclines towards cross-national studies in comparative politics. Yet, the editors reserve minor implications in two instances that invite contextual knowledge. Firstly, adjoining Adam Przeworski's views on unobserved effects, the editors add that case-studies can indicate which particular variable to observe. Secondly, they point out that in Robert Bates' two-step strategy for comparative research, *verstehen* as in the apprehension and understanding of a particular time and place comes first and precedes explanation. Additionally, they portray Elinor Ostrom's theory of sociological agents as an advancement that overcomes "cultural approaches under the aegis of modernization theory" (Boix and Stokes 2009, 8). The quote reflects the viewpoint that the outdated Western-centrism of modernization theory taints the perspective of cultural approaches.

Among the dominant modes of epistemology in comparative politics, journals on comparative politics reflects a greater portion of one-N studies (Munck and Snyder 2007). Nearly half (45.7%) of comparative politics journal articles are single-country studies. Including studies on entire regions, "area studies is still the dominant form of research in comparative politics" (Munck and Snyder 2007, 25). Scholars of comparative politics diverge also in the methods of theory generation. The field currently lacks a single dominant paradigm and options range from rational choice paradigms to pluralistic competition or even paradigm-free midrange theorizing. Comparative scholars traditionally use inductive methods and engage less in deductive or formal methods in the style of economics. For methods, comparative politics shows a bias towards qualitative research but also harbors quantitative challengers and pluralists with mixed methods. An

analytical overview of three leading comparative politics journals- *Comparative Political Studies*, *Comparative Politics*, and *World Politics*- reveals that one fifth (20.3%) of all studies deal with East Asia. Virtually all articles (95.6%) are empirical and do not generate theory. Strong emphasis lies on producing descriptive knowledge and on the empirical support of causal arguments. Some informally deductive theorizing exists but the inductive approach outweighs<sup>11</sup>.

The relationship between area studies and political science is not straightforward. In the Anglo-Saxon and German spheres, area studies are not considered an independent discipline but an interdisciplinary research context, although area studies can transmit impulses towards comparative politics (Holbig 2015). Anglo-Saxon studies in this context are limited “apparently due to the substantial research efforts required, which individual researchers are only rarely able to perform” (Holbig 2015, 8), while area studies in Germany struggle with a “collective identity crisis and the urge for scientific self-assertion” (Holbig 2015, 10). Judging from this account, an independent conceptualization of area studies is overdue. One development has been to apply social science strategies,

---

<sup>11</sup> The preference for inductive epistemologies in the Korean studies can be explained by using a two-sided coin as metaphor. Including Korean studies departments abroad, the study of South Korea inhabits dual faces. On the one side of the coin, Korean studies is an academic subject in departments outside of Korea. On the other side of the coin, social science research on South Korean phenomena encompasses several disciplines in universities inside of Korea. Both sides of the coin bundle two avenues of resources for the Western-based Korean studies researcher. The predicament is that the two sides of the coin do not complement each other but diverge in their epistemologies and how to know what is there to know, since political research inside South Korea can often rest on narrative methods or anecdotal evidence by taking contextual knowledge for granted (more on this argument follows in the mapping of domestic literature in chapter three). It should be added that the coin’s faces embody two different things- the study of a country on the one side, and a country’s field of social theorizing on the other.

which led to new forms of study, such as comparative area studies (Ahram 2011; Basedau and Kollner 2007).

Another development employs cultural studies strategies informed by various “turns”, among them the interpretive, reflective, postcolonial, and translational turns (Bachmann-Medick 2006). These turns provide impulses for re-defining area studies by shifting standard epistemic positions. This strategy does not force-fit categories and concepts onto the foreign field but seeks to gain insight on their social constructions and practices. Area studies that “step out of their own disciplinary and epistemic enclosures and open themselves up to interdisciplinary and transcultural collaboration” (Holbig 2015, 15) call for engaging with domestic scholars and sources.

## **2.2. Political science**

Political science gradually arrived at the hidden life of ideas in the politics of foreign cultures. Diffusion studies and institutional theories show that ideas are translated from one context to another, which has implications for the researcher’s epistemology. For instance, the researcher misleads himself if he assumes that ideas are transplanted into a foreign culture, instead of translated and re-interpreted in contingent and dynamic form. The proven *translation* of ideas hints at *interpretation* among domestic actors, which merges the insights of translation with conceptual analysis and contextual political analysis. This overview therefore discusses epistemologies of the translational, conceptual, and contextual approaches.

By the early 1960s, the social science paradigm was pulled into two directions: on the one front, “the striving for generalizable findings that would place the discipline on more solid scientific foundations” and on the other, emphasis on “respecting the particular

and hence a stress on contextualization” (L. Pye 2006, 799). Comparative politics came to see significant differences within generalized categories across countries and sought to identify the unique and distinctive in each culture. Pye recounts that this drift in political science caused tensions with area specialists, who pursued the access to foreign cultures and traditions by investing time-intensive immersion. Tensions receded in the 1960s to 1980s when comparative politics in the United States received increased funding by federal governments and foundations, which broadened academic opportunities also for area studies. Ever since, comparative politics has undergone many transformations. Its development favored complexities over generalizations while stressing concrete and specific descriptions.

The epistemological stance in political science evolved from modernization theories to fragmentation and to a renewed appreciation for contextualization. Taking the concept of “equality” as example, Eun Yong-Soo and Pieczara note that “we should first ascertain different meanings that the term has here and there” (2013, p. 373). They emphasize the need for “drawing out the different meanings that a concept implies” (Eun Yong-Soo and Pieczara, 2013, p. 373). Regarding the different meanings of concepts across countries, Pye has set a precedent by stating that “the distinctive and specific also arises in trying to use sample survey questionnaires in different cultural contexts” because “cultural contexts can change the meaning of the questions” (L. Pye 2006, 804). In the same vein, Peter Katzenstein notes that “comparative research is a focus on analytical relationships among variables validated by social science, a focus that is modified by differences in the context in which we observe and measure those variables” (Kohli et al. 1995, 11). These insights all underline that contextual knowledge alters our way of seeing meanings that differ in East Asia from the West. This knowledge ensures internal validity

for studying politics in a foreign culture.

Western-centric concepts in political science taint the explanatory quality of eventual generalizations. U.S. American political science deploys concepts, theories, and experiences that root in European experience, and projects them onto East Asia with due consequences (Kang David C., 2003). According to Kang, comparative politics seems progressive for mingling with area studies, but this impression is limited because comparative politics considers phenomena in East Asia that compare to the West. Examples are formal institutions, causes and consequences of regime styles, and the contents and processes of policymaking.

The comparability between politics “here and there” arises from abstract universal principles. However, countries proffer partial aberrations from universal validity, for example when beliefs and actions are “affected by ideas, ideologies, and foreign models” (K. Weyland 2002, 72). Weyland cites empirical evidence: Brazil’s redesign of electoral and party institutions was driven by a sentiment of “democratic libertarianism” imported from abroad. Similarly, the expansion of rights in Latin America today was driven by cross-country emulation due to external pressure from international financial institutions and urgent economic problems. Internally, the opening of floodgates to neoliberal reforms was driven by social learning and the spread of neoliberal ideas. The spread of ideas at the heart of such dynamics show that ideational politics comes in the form of perceptions, attitudes, norms, and cognitive models.

The spread of ideas reveals ideational shifts across countries, but the respective literature displays common limitations regarding to the domestic dynamics in foreign countries. For example, the literature on policy diffusion inquires whether globalization impacts national policies (Covadonga Meseguer and Gilardi 2009) but zooms out of



domestic conditions to zoom into international conditions instead. The reason is that researchers often operate under the expectation that policy convergence will arise in the economic policies of interacting countries. To this aim, scholars embrace the idea of rational learning (C. Meseguer 2005) and focus on economic policies (Hall 1989), which catch on especially fast due to the “spread of liberal economic ideas and policies throughout the world” (Elkins and Simmons 2004, 171). As a result, theories of policy diffusion are attuned to the interactions between state actors (B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2007; B. A. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006) and adopt the rational learning approach where policy transfer resembles a policy transplant. In contrast, area focused studies have shown more ambiguous forms of diffusion that took place from the Western civilization towards East Asian modernization, emphasizing evident and complex processes where ideas undergo translation, mostly over long periods of time (Westney 1987; K. G. Weyland 2005). Clearly, knowing the national context of countries enables researchers to acknowledge that ideas are translated. Substantiating this argument, the channeled learning approach uses a sociological lens and regards that policymakers recognize apparent successes of policy models in other countries and use it as cognitive shortcut to draw attention (Hall 1993; Hall 1989). Hall’s studies demonstrate that political mechanisms in foreign countries cause a translation of ideas via discourse as a conduit, involving political actors and structures alike.

Actors and their contextual structures surely matter in the domestic arena, especially if the context is political. Actors may trigger the translation of ideas by evaluating salient issues and policies, whereas salience depends on the cultural and historical context (Bélanger and Meguid, 2008; Budge, 2015; Cox and Béland, 2013; Dolezal et al., 2013; Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013; Kwon Hyeok Yong, 2008; Maor,

2014; Martin, 2015; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). Naturally, ambiguity is inherent in ideas, but political actors can find this ambiguity attractive. The European Union has experienced this phenomenon by attempting to add flesh to the idea of the “European Social Model” (Jepsen and Pascual 2005). Political actors competed to interpret this loosely specified idea, which resulted in dispersed policy suggestions brought forward by various groups. Crucially, these political actors interpret the idea according to their backgrounds, motivations, and perceptions. This observation gives way to a feature that distinguishes heavily interpreted ideas from others: Interpretation is most competitive for one-positional issues that parties cannot oppose, such as *eliminating corruption*, where actors adjust and modify the content by relatively marginal degrees (Budge 2015). Since one-positional ideas are unavoidable fibers of societal fabric, political actors are led to interpret productively by altering or constructing content. Goalposts for how to interpret ideas in a politically effective manner are given by external factors such as elections or economic shocks and by internal factors within the historical, institutional, and cultural constitution of the domestic context (Cox and Béland 2013; Zakharova and Warwick 2014).

Another approach in the diffusion literature is that the rational choices of actors in the global political economy accelerate shared ideational developments between countries (Brinks and Coppedge 2006). Capitalism spreads across the world (Streeck 2009) and policy responds to market failures (Hall 1989), seeks orientation in peers (Jackson 2001), or adapts to local effects of liberal expansion (Levi-Faur 2005; Covadonga Meseguer and Gilardi 2009; C. Meseguer 2005). Such a backdrop of political economy is inclined to favor rational choice approaches that expect maximization in societal settings, including politics (Pierson 2000b; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Studies

with this inclination view normative emulation and opportunism as causal mechanisms of policy diffusion (Gilardi 2012; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2007; B. A. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). This perspective extends the assumption of maximizing actors further to the political realm (North 1990a). Due to the individualistic nature of the rational choice assumption, this approach neglects contextual underpinnings for its described processes, ignoring the conditions of acceptance in the domestic context of foreign countries. In order to assert a new idea, political actors depend on social and cognitive legitimation, and being political actors, will pay dearly even if they dared to ignore domestic conditions. Relevant process are scrutinized from a discursive, ideational, or constructive angle (Douglas 1986; F. Fischer 2003; K. Weyland 2008) in order to consider potential hurdles to the diffusion of ideas, including the question of why some ideas “stick” in some countries but not in others (Hall 1989; Schmidt 2010; Streeck 2009).

Hinting at the due role of the domestic context, political ideas can become translated without explicit coercion from outside. When the EU implements a new norm, EU member countries and candidates adopt it. When countries outside this boundary decide to adopt it as well, they present an external effect despite the absence of direct incentives or rewards (Börzel and Risse 2009). External diffusion nurtures its own set of processes such as socialization, persuasion, or emulation. These matter especially for East Asian research if we consider the fast economic opening of the region and the political consequences (Kim Sunhyuk, 2011).

Contestation between domestic political actors can catalyze indirect forms of learning. For instance, actors may trigger ideational translation by emulating policy “models” abroad, aiming to boost their impression of performativity by projecting lesson-

drawing or mimicry (B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2007). Sociologist analyses of isomorphism seem relevant but have tackled structures rather than actors (P. J. DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Another promising approach is to differentiate functional emulation from normative emulation (Börzel and Risse 2011) in the following scenario: Functional emulation is triggered by decreasing economic performance and prompt political actors to seek models in “successful” regions or countries; and yet the precondition is the normative attraction of “successful” models. Functional emulation can catalyze domestic political actors but depends on normative acceptance by the domestic public. Translations are therefore shaped by social, historical, cultural, and political reasons. The contextual specificity of ideational translation is part and parcel for the analysis of a country’s political ideas.

Political actors are cognizant of the context and seek out applicable policy (D. P. Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). Their conscious selection is an act of lesson drawing (Robertson 1991; Rose 1993). Additional circumstances constrain voluntary selection (Evans 2009). Domestic political institutions enable and constrain the diffusion of ideas (D. Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Despite all possibilities contained in policy transfer (Marsh and Evans 2012), the concept is overly reductionist and linear for examining domestic actors’ incentives (Dussauge-Laguna 2012; James and Lodge 2003). Thus, the concept is expanding (Benson and Jordan 2011). As a promising angle, policy-cycle “games” determine how and why actors borrow ideas (D. P. Dolowitz and Marsh 2012). Overall, scholars agree that contextual accounts of domestic political actors contribute to understanding diffusion.

Political ideas branch into translational differences across East Asia, which is most apparent in diffusion studies, where the source of an idea is clearly defined. East

Asian countries translate ideas from the West and arrive at heterogeneous outcomes that hardly form a universal pattern (Chan 2009; Kostova and Roth 2002; Westney 1987). Thus, theories of typified “East Asian models” usually clash with empirical observations (Cumings, 1984; Kim Pil Ho, 2010; Zhang and Whitley, 2013). Comparisons of translated ideas indicate contextual cognitions at play.

The emergence of cognitive perspectives for studying East Asian countries leads us to the literature of new institutional theory. New institutional theory regards actors as constrained and enabled by institutional settings. Frameworks show critical junctures where institutional change occurs due to pressure (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck 2009; Thelen 1999). Society and history influence actors who possess limited power to catalyze ideas. By considering the relevant context, the goals and incentives of actors are predictable to some extent. Context constrains yet enables the interpretation of political ideas for institutional aims. Aims are in turn shaped by domestic context and demands. Political actors gain increased abilities in new institutional theory, which has split into “thin” and “thick” forms, where the “thin” form stands for rationalist analysis and the “thick” form for social structures, sectors, coalitions, institutions, and ideological constraints (Kohli et al. 1995).

Ideational interpretation includes symbolic, cognitive, and national-institutional interpretation (Béland 2009). Whereas new institutional theory considers communicative and interactive capacities (Fligstein and McAdam 2012), little of this notion has been applied to micro-level ideational interpretation. Macro-level cognition has been discussed in the form of cognitive setups (Douglas 1986), institutional logics (Scott 1994), and isomorphism of cultural systems (Meyer et al. 1997). In contrast, micro-level cognition scrutinizes processes (Zucker 1987). Macro- and micro-level cognitions are not mutually

exclusive: Cognitive models derive from global linkages but also from close contact to prior adopters (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006).

Despite the micro-level focus, the consideration of local cognition does not negate abstraction and generalization, which is most clearly shown in rational choice approaches but is not limited to them. Abstract models have been applied to rational motives and choices in the study of politics in foreign cultures (Bates, De Figueiredo, and Weingast 1998). Contrary to widespread belief, rational choice models can be complemented by norms, ideas, and culture (Elster 2000; Greif 1998; Greif 1994; Levi 2000; North 1990a). Complementarity is even necessary (Blyth 2003) due to the explanatory power of locality. Localization processes are implied in the *cognitive setups* by Mary Douglas (1986): In her argument, ideas are accepted in a culture if they match cultural setups of cognition. This lens anticipates locality and the conditions posed towards ideas. Even after the institutional demand for ideas causes idea transfer (Robertson 1991; B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2007), the domestic processes that subsequently follow require local acceptance and agreement (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999; Douglas 1986; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). Terms of acceptance and the “stickiness” of some ideas over others reflect institutional logics (P. DiMaggio 1997; Thornton and Ocasio 2008).

As a further element of cognitive structure, political actors are embedded in the political culture of their country (Almond and Verba 1980; Inglehart 1988). If an idea manages to pass through the strict filters of contextual constraints, translation enables an idea to fit with domestic culture. For example, legal diffusion studies show that “the process of adopting or borrowing various devices, implements, institutions, or beliefs [...] offers one plausible way of capturing the processual character of the movement and translation of law” (Brake and Katzenstein 2013, 745); more importantly for my point, the

precondition is the local perception of “American legal approaches as useful in the construction of legal environments conducive to economic growth” (Brake and Katzenstein 2013, 746), and then translation integrates an idea into the existing structure (Bachmann-Medick 2009; de Jong 2013; Freeman 2009; Langer 2005; Lee Eun-Jeung and Mosler 2014; Mukhtarov et al. 2013; Stone 2012).

Ideational interpretation is subject to even finer dimensions of structure if we consider political camps in a country setting. Estimations of ideological spectrums “remain purely conceptual and impossible to observe physically” (Benoit and Laver 2012, 195); ideas are interpreted differently by different actors, but the twist is whether we can relate interpretations back to political actors and political camps. Benoit and Laver state that our best option is to check *a priori* assumptions about political dimensions as part of investigative analysis. This seemingly innocent advice has repercussions for the study of politics in a foreign culture: In order for us to gain access to the landscape of ideas, political actors, and structures in a foreign country, the body of insights from the area studies inform our *priori* assumptions.

Cultural understanding and knowledge, once we have it, help us see ideas in relation to structure. Interpretation manifests in meanings and their contents indicate what is considered compatible and appropriate for the context. Meanings also show us cultural norms and historically determined constraints. Ideas therefore produce meaning, but to decipher them we need cultural knowledge- which is a unique advantage among the toolkit of area studies.

Culture and meaning “are in many respects interchangeable” (Berezin 2014, 141). Culture and meaning have been operationalized in various fields that call for rigorous cultural methodology. Cultural sociology aims for rigorous methodology because cultural

approaches are overly contingent (Berezin 2014; P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013) and instead turn culture into an independent variable that alter the meaning of familiar concepts. Towards a self-reflection of concepts in the social sciences, German researchers have appealed for the “cultural turn” to connect area studies and the disciplines (Holbig 2015). In the same vein, Bachmann-Medick (2012) notes that translation studies experienced a “translational turn” that became an analytical category in the social sciences: With the onset of global “contact zones”, text discloses power relations, intercultural negotiations, and hybridization. In collective systems of meaning, “culture as text” illuminates social life as organized signs and symbols, representations, and interpretations, and leads to an understanding of culture as “a constellation of texts”; text is understood as social practice and culture as its representation. This approach transcends the classical, literary meaning of translation. We can call this form of translation “cultural translation” as an analogy for sociological understanding based on interpretation (Geertz 1980). Translation is no mere transfer, but a “process of negotiation between texts and between cultures, a process during which all kinds of transactions take place mediated by the figure of the translator” (Bassnett 2002). Thus, translational approaches can give rise to differences that are anchored historically, socially, or culturally.

Translational approaches reveal contextual complexity by disassembling the concept’s composition (Bachmann-Medick 2009). History and context are essential for disclosing translated meanings in “the spheres of action and conceptual systems of non-European societies” (Neumann and Nünning 2012, 23). In the words of Bachmann-Medick, concepts *open up transculturally*. Below, I show three applications that follow a closely similar approach.

In the first example, postcolonial roots are traced in the political history of



subaltern countries by considering the translation and displacement of modern European categories and terms, such as “proletariat” (Chakrabarty 2009). A translational approach locates the differences, margins, and interstices of concepts. When the meaning differentials are finally known, the cultural profile of the studied country becomes communicable to a wider audience.

In the second example, Frank Schaeffer observes democratization effects, guided by the translated meanings of the concept “democracy” in the French- and Wolof-speaking Senegal (2000). Through conceptual analysis, he finds interconnected local meanings, actors, and structures, which includes the effect of domestic political contestation: After the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1974 “intense rivalries developed between the ruling party and the opposition, prompting each to define this French concept in ways beneficial to its interests”; and in “their rivalry to lend exclusive legitimacy to their understandings of *démocratie*, both ruling and opposition parties have tried to disseminate their opposing views to the broader, mostly non-French speaking population” (F. C. Schaffer 2000, 80).

In the last example, Lee and Mosler (2014) study aspects of translation in cross-national knowledge diffusion. They state that their perspective is post-positivistic by rejecting the notion that political knowledge becomes transplanted to another country in its original and pristine form, which is an overly linear kind of understanding persistent in the respective literature. A focus on translation’s role in political dynamics offers explanatory potential regarding actors and institutions in a country, about which they write that it “speaks of the importance of the particular contexts between which ideas travel and in which policy ideas are modified and new meanings created, always in reflecting related political struggles” (Lee and Mosler, 2014: p.7). Identifying a suitable instance for this

phenomenon, they set eyes on single policies and laws that have been translated from Germany to South Korea. South Korea has been quite open to seeking foreign ideas and exemplifies translation effects. To this aim, Lee's chapter investigates the model of German unification in a German-South Korean knowledge network by politicians and scientists. She elucidates cultural difference as the core subject of translation and observes actors who follow institutionalized goals.

The above studies utilize the translational approach to derive insights on domestic structures and actors in foreign countries. Regarding structures, the studies illuminate interpretations that exist in the field and are held by varying groups, political camps, party politicians, or voters. Regarding actors, the studies show how interpretation is generated and why. With a similar perspective, translation is a central concept in knowledge transfer studies (Freeman 2009). For Freeman, translation is ubiquitous because different sets of policy advocates recast "claims as questions and positions, interpreting and converting them into decisions, programmes and instruments. This process is continuous, as ideas and purposes move between actors and locations and are replicated at different levels of organization" (Freeman, 2009: p.431). Replication and translation are equal goals for institutional actors.

The analysis of interpretations often requires discursive data. Structures around the discourse are just as important as for interpreting interpretations. Especially politicized discourse emerges from relationships and motivations of actors, which is strength and caveat of discourse as data. Schmidt and Radaelli warn of treating "discourse as an object by dissecting texts and deconstructing speeches, thus missing the basic fact that political discourse may conceal substance under rhetorical smoke" (2004: p.193). Concepts are often idealized for institutional aims of political discourse, as the studies by

Schaeffer and Lee & Mosler show. The structure that produces discourse is even more important if the contextual parameters are more opaque to the researcher, which is the case in area studies. Schmidt and Radaelli appeal that discourse must be validated by the interpretations of political concepts, by political actors, and by public response.

Politics and structures in foreign cultures alter research concepts to the context, which is counterintuitive. Usually, the designated purpose of social science concepts is for comparing units via properties or characteristics (Sartori 1991; Sartori 1970). According to Sartori, the primary question is *which property is comparable*. Following his principles, concepts that imply many properties commit the failure of *conceptual stretching*. As an example, the concept of *ideology* has been “stretched to a point of meaninglessness” and is “deprived of all heuristic validity” (Sartori 1991, 249). An alternative to conceptual stretching is to alter and deconstruct the *standard* content of concepts to fit East Asian politics (Eun and Pieczara 2013). Over-stretching impedes the validity of empirical study in East Asian politics (J. Johnson 2003). Concepts for empirical study must be internally valid by making theoretical sense and externally valid by harmonizing with other sources of data. Goertz (2006) has distinguished the *standard* and empirical levels of concepts as basic and secondary levels. The basic level denotes theoretical propositions and the secondary level denotes the constitutive dimensions that are found in empirical reality; the theoretical characteristics of a concept therefore guide the secondary dimension’s observations in the field<sup>12</sup>. Gerring (1999) also terms this dimension *properties* or *attributes*. Because everything needs a name, all of the above dimensions subsume under a conceptual label. The use of concepts leads to various associations under the same label and causes battles over terms and definitions. Our experience with area

---

<sup>12</sup> The third dimension down is then the indicator/data/operationalization level (Goertz 2006).

studies lend emphasis the notion that social science concepts are not “fixed entities in semantic space” but rather “pragmatic, and often temporary, expedients” (Gerring 1999, 390). New contexts require the adaptation of analytic categories of thought, and comparative studies aim to prevent premature categorization or inappropriate modification (Collier and Mahon 1993). Categories change when faced with new contexts, and nowhere is this more evident than in the study of foreign cultures. Concepts are containers for our theoretical assumptions and canvas for this exercise. Traveling concepts are the realistic challengers to our *standard* theoretical assumptions.

Remembering her 1957 survey field work in South India, Rudolph describes encountering the “imperialism of categories”, where researchers “export homegrown concepts and methodologies to alien places” despite their inception in American politics (Rudolph 2005, 6). This experience leads her to conclude the following: Theory, if it wishes to be valid for politics in foreign cultures, should be constructed from below by accounting for situated knowledge, meaning local knowledge and practice. She suggests instead an epistemology alternative from so-called *Universalist* knowledge that contains imperialist categories. Envisioning such an epistemology, Rudolph highlights empirical and interpretive approaches by area studies as beacons of “situated knowledge”. When investigating a culture different from one’s own, a reversal of the “imperialism of categories” is beneficial for conceptual analysis “from the bottom up”<sup>13</sup> as in the above study by Schaffer on the concept of democracy in Africa. Terms and categories used by political actors in the field become subject to political analysis. This conceptual strategy aims to analyze institutions by taking seriously the ordinary words and categories used by

---

<sup>13</sup> An approach “from the bottom up” harmonizes with the second and third dimensions of social science concepts that contain the empirical reality of the foreign culture.

actors in every day processes and by connecting language to social practice (F. Schaffer 2005).

Excursions into translational and conceptual approaches render one conclusion clear: context matters. Contextual effects are the goal of studying of political ideas in a foreign culture<sup>14</sup>. Political ideas show that “part of what exists in our world, ontologically, comes into being through these sorts of social construction” and thus “we need an epistemology suited to understanding those mechanisms of social construction” (Tilly and Goodin 2006, 9). This contextual approach helps to deal critically with viewpoints in area studies and political science<sup>15</sup>. Tilly and Goodin suggest an epistemology that considers structural origins of ideologies. The contextual approach regards that “ideologies develop” with the possibility that they consist of “stories that falsely present the existing order as either morally or rationally just, or else simply inevitable” (Antony 2006, 70). Even incorrect “facts” about a foreign culture subsist due to the scarcity of and the reliance on experts. This point is crucial for foreign political structures and actors with dense barriers for the researcher in linguistic, cultural, or historical forms. The chain effect of such barriers is addressed by Hay (2006) who establishes a causal chain that starts from ontological assumptions and affects epistemological and lastly methodological choices. Due to the causal chain, ontology directs the researcher to all subsequent strategic choices. If misled researcher assumptions go unexamined, epistemological and

---

<sup>14</sup> Contextual political analysis involves ontology (the analyst’s understanding of political processes ), epistemology (the evidence available for empirical examination of political processes), and empirics (the processes themselves) (Tilly and Goodin 2006)

<sup>15</sup> The “role of a philosophy of politics is to try and spell out those presuppositions or prejudgments, to hold them up to the light of critical reflection, and to make up our minds on whether or not they should be maintained” (Pettit 2006, 36)

methodological choices are epiphenomena that follow from ontological assumptions. This same hazard lurks in the study of politics in a foreign culture, where assumptions regarding the contextual structures of politics lead to defenseless research designs. With this background, suggestions for designing contextual political analysis also apply to the study of politics in a foreign culture as follows: The ontology of difference (*the world is experienced differently and in culturally and temporally specific ways*) leads to epistemological skepticism (*different subject-positions inform different knowledge claims*), and culminates in deconstructivist methodology (*silencing strong knowledge claims*)<sup>16</sup> to “avoid claiming empirical license for ontological claims and assumptions” (Hay 2006, 87).

Summing up, the contextual approach is geared towards identifying ideational ingredients that are deeply rooted in the field’s context. This advantage is even more valuable if context doubly matters, as is the case for studying political ideas in a foreign culture: The political context entails structures and actors that produce political frames in the field (Polletta and Ho 2006). A frame can indicate political structures and actors in the field by highlighting political contention in that contextual setting, where a frame is a “delimited ideational package” and discourse “the sum total of talk produced by an organization, institution, or society at a given point in time” (Johnston 2002; Polletta and Ho 2006, 191). With this role, frames evolve over time as persuasive devices and interpretive frameworks that are built into discourse. These considerations show the close relation between frames, ideologies, and discourse. A contextual approach helps to analyze causal interactions in this relationship.

A last aspect regards methods and methodology for the task of studying political

---

<sup>16</sup> Specifically, this example suggests a postmodernist mode of inquiry in contextual political analysis.

ideas in a foreign culture. I pointed out that area studies and political science embed epistemological differences that shield them from each other. At the same time, the core principles of either discipline cannot be violated if research wants to be taken seriously. For instance, East Asia-focused political scientists insist that social scientific standards must apply to the study of East Asian politics (Kang David C., 2003) in the form of falsifiability, generalizability, and clear causal logic. This can be understood narrowly as formal methods: The more formal is a model in political science, the more it constitutes a deductive method (Fiorina 1975). Deductive approaches are however most appropriate for well-defined and amply theorized settings (i.e. democratic countries) (K. Weyland 2002), but for which East Asian politics does not apply. The tenor for theory testing among area scholars is that more empirical work is needed in order to amass testable knowledge (Eun Yong-Soo and Pieczara, 2013). Implicit understandings of a concept become invalid for the foreign culture and conceptual meanings become ambiguous. Eun and Pieczara offer a twofold suggestion: turning theoretical meaning into variables of theoretical meaning, and synthesizing theory with the Asian experience. This is followed by concept testing, refining, adjusting, and developing (Basedau and Kollner 2007, 17). We could understand this procedure as concept reconstruction “from scratch” or “from the bottom”. Contrary to its merely partial role for social science concepts in general, this procedure is an area studies-informed and area studies-leveraging answer to conceptual stretching (Collier and Gerring 2009; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2011; Goertz 2006; Collier and Mahon 1993) and concept formation (Gerring 2012).

We can see the dilemma between field study and theory testing in the literature on developing countries (Geddes 2002). Geddes lists as problems the need for language training, field work, little subjection of knowledge claims to rigorous reality checks, and

combining country expertise with the use of tools. Additionally, theoretical scarcity impedes theory testing<sup>17</sup>. This common problem arises when studying new democracies because the effects and variations of democratic institutions are little understood. Geddes concludes in an overall outlook that “most empirical work on identity and ethnicity has been descriptive or interpretive, while most models and rational-choice arguments have not been supported by systematic arrays of evidence” (Geddes 2002, 369). We can conclude that empirical work on new democracies lacks its own models and its own theories.

Regarding models and theories, institutionalism must be carefully adopted for studying politics in a foreign culture. Bevir analyzes that institutionalists believe in “inductive empiricism” and “ascribe a real existence and causal powers to objects such as institutions and structures”, by which they “remain wedded to formal, ahistorical classifications, correlations, and mechanisms” (Bevir 2008, 53). Regarding institutionalism’s reliance on classification methods, Crouch notes that institutional theories largely depend on labels and types (Crouch et al. 2007). Labels and types are distinctions with analytical roles, but also fulfill discursive roles. In the analytical role, they classify institutional characteristics i.e. by identifying institutional change as a shift from one type to another. In the discursive role, they enable communication and understanding as essential terms for phenomena i.e. by explaining whether a country’s economic policy is “Keynesian” or “neo-liberal”. This differentiation of roles foreshadows that institutional

---

<sup>17</sup> Geddes states specific theoretical deficits as follows: Effects of institutional legacies from authoritarian governments, effects of institutional contributors and high personalism, clientelism, and corruption in competitive democratic systems, and effects of institutional variations in presidential elections and party system development. These topics are equally relevant for East Asian politics.



theory comes attached with problems of discursive language. Terminology can occur within discourse, where labels are used less critically and veer between necessary connotation and careless confounding of contextual content. Additionally, institutional comparisons aim broadly and tend to generalize political ideas.

Across divided schools, assumptions, and origins within the comprehensive body of literature, institutionalism enables comparisons based on the institutions of countries (Hall and Taylor 1996). This approach has pulled weight for cross-country comparisons where emergent institutions are on center stage. At least since new institutionalism, theories emphasize structural actors and the “sociological turn” introduced cultural and informal institutions. Such developments model political actors as structure-adhering yet idea-shaping. Historical institutionalism embraces cultural-conventional approaches and allows for strategic behavior of politicians who are structural satisficers. Rational choice institutionalism addresses behavior under uncertainty. Sociological institutionalism looks at ideas as institutions with inherent malleability and stress not to crudely generalize implicit assumptions (Scott 1994; B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2007).

Reflecting these lines of thought, the dissatisfaction with the limits of the rational choice paradigm has sparked ample innovations within the paradigm and led to the “ideational turn” in rationalism. This approach reacts to the assumptions within rational choice and zoom into what was not modeled before, which are namely ideas, interests, and beliefs (Blyth 2003). With ideas shaping actor interests and actors shaping ideas, the various forms of ideas have stepped into the spotlight. Weyland (2002) portrays how rational choice criticized structural, institutional, and cultural approaches for lacking “microfoundations” that are calculations and decisions of individual actors. Contrary to such criticism, actor interests are in fact shaped by “supra-individual, collective factors,

such as prevailing cultural norms and ideas as well as institutional structures” (K. Weyland 2002, 74). Weyland suggests that rational choice approaches loosen their commitment to simplified assumptions. Rather than a grand design of universal laws of politics, contextual study is most adequate for understanding the content and role of ideas in the politics of a foreign culture.

This chapter has overviewed possible epistemologies in the area studies and political science for the study of ideas in a foreign culture. Epistemology in this sense is the researcher’s perspective and expectations regarding the idiosyncratic life of ideas in the politics of a foreign culture. Political ideas in a foreign culture are complex objects due to a) the contextual effects of actors and structures on ideas in the field and b) the ambiguity of concepts in the empirical discourse, which we tend to know in a second-hand manner but whose meanings often diverge due to contextual factors that one only can see by first-hand knowledge. Having established this epistemological principle for the study of political ideas, what remains is to measure the spectrum of ideas and to investigate which broadly accepted meanings exist at what times. This epistemology, by accepting that the context determines the spectrum of meanings therein, illuminates the contemporary context of South Korean politics and its challenges since democratization in 1987.

### **3. Theory and Model: Discursive polarization in South Korea**

The previous chapter schematically characterized typical epistemologies in area studies and political science as two existing modes of studying 'politics in a foreign culture'. In these respective modes, area studies and area-focused political science navigate the combined intricacies of politics, language, and culture. For the sake of differentiation, I have portrayed these modes as the frog's-eye (e.g. the immersive approach) and the bird's-eye views (e.g. the generalizing approach). In either mode, the examination of political actors often avoids a closer explication of political ideas, which is however, according to my argument, the key to understanding political actors.

In this sense, the aim to study the politics in a foreign culture arrived at the surprising insight that words and numbers oversimplify to the same extent, by dealing with ideas in the same positivistic manner. Statistical constructs that measure culturally mismatched concepts resembled verbal concepts that are geared to capture Western-based notions in an East Asian context. Such practices of gross simplification were owed to the geographical, cultural, and linguistic distance to the studied country, which leaves the deeper disambiguation of actor-led politics in the hands of a few 'experts' on the country in question. If this epistemological distance is left unilluminated for long, I find reason for concern. Without being given access to the ideas that shape political dynamics, how can we be truly sure that we are not being read horoscopes from tea leaves?

In this chapter, I devise theoretical underpinnings for how to study ideas in political camps by combining the frog's-eye and the bird's-eye views. I suggest discourse analysis as a magnifying lens for ideas that move and are moved within a political context. Discursive theories offer a suitable epistemology for the study of ideas in foreign context that are potentially unknown, but potentially knowable. In this sense, discourse analysis necessitates prior knowledge about the context of discourse. Pathways of ideas are contingent on the political context of South Korea, which is extremely polarized in a constant fashion since democratization in 1987, according to South Korean scholars.

To this day, South Korean political discourses feature entrenched symbols and meanings that hark back to post- and pre-democratization politics. Before navigating ideas amidst these contextual woods, I will first map the literature of South Korean domestic scholars on political polarization, and then map their insights on polarized political camps. Then, I will introduce two theories that together explain how polarized camps produce frames. Lastly, I will integrate the theories in order to propose a theory of discursive polarization, which models the ontology of frames in relation to political camps.

For mapping the literature on political polarization and political camps, I consult a fairly comprehensive pool of books, studies, and anthologies. Notably, the topic of polarization is more often dealt with by books written in Korean than in academic papers or other publications written in English, and target a broad South Korean audience which includes extra-academic readers. Such publications aim to paint in broad strokes the overall picture of South Korean politics by explaining polarization to South Korean readers who experience it firsthand via 'everyday empirics'. As result of mapping, I find that scholars hold the following views on polarization and polarized political camps:

On the subject of polarization, South Korean domestic scholars examine

polarization from historical, discursive, and behavioral angles. I catalogue their insights into three categories of “origins”, “patterns”, and the “current state” of polarized politics, which align after another and narrate a diachronic continuum from past to present. These sampled insights verify the ongoing continuity of political polarization in South Korea, and largely agree that polarization is structurally caused and sustained.

On the subject of political camps, a puzzle emerges from the varying dimensions of empirical polarization. Domestic scholars ascribe the nascence of polarized camps to ideological conflict that is historically rooted, but also in the ideological ambiguity of “progressive” and “conservative” camps. From this mapping, it appears that “ideology” in South Korean politics is attributed contradicting roles on two dimensions. According to domestic scholars’ accounts, ideology is pronounced and extreme in the rhetoric of political camps, but ambiguous and center-right when political camps advocate policy issues.

Having gathered contextual factors from mapping domestic viewpoints, I synthesize a theory of polarized discourse where ideas are distinct between competing political camps and range within political camps from typical to less typical. I draw concepts from two theories that explain and empirically demonstrate the role of ideas for political competition. The first concept, *hegemonic discourse*, views grand political discourses as ‘empty signs’ without fixed meanings, for which camps generate meanings in ongoing competitive projects. The second concept, *discursive institutionalism*, outlines discursive institutions that political actors recognize, acknowledge, and reproduce faithfully most of the time.

Hegemonic discourse by Nonhoff (2006) regards how hegemonic discourses can become established (which he exemplifies by the social market democracy discourse in

Germany) within discursive projects. Actors compete in discursive projects by generating specific discursive formations that strive to become hegemonic discourses. Applied to the South Korean context, two polarized hegemonic projects compete via discourse. In extension to the original theory, they can also be seen as two hegemonic discourses on their own, due to rigid polarization and their mutual isolation.

Discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2008) defines discourse as the product of text (what is being said) and context (who is saying it and why), which applies institutional theory to various types and levels of ideas in discourses (Schmidt 2014). This theoretical framework can be used to trace ideas as institutions that are enabling and yet constraining. Applied to the South Korean context, this framework can isolate the stability from the change in frames that represent South Korean political camps.

To summarize, this chapter applies the text- and context-centered epistemology of discourse analysis in order to study the ideas that are typically found in South Korean polarized politics. Then, it maps secondary sources that offer insight on polarization and political camps in South Korea. Lastly, I propose a theory of discursive polarization by integrating the concepts of hegemonic discourse and discursive institutionalism, which explains how the polarized political context leads to distinct and continuous frames within competitive discourses.

### **3.1. Discursive epistemology**

The previous chapter reviewed diffusion studies and institutional theories, where the researcher objectifies policy dynamics in order to classify them (Zittoun 2009). This objectification reduces policies to “facts”, and therefore to arbitrary abstractions of instruments, laws, and institutions. In contrast, the discursive approach to ideas takes the

opposite angle by regarding “facts” as contingent ideas that various actors produce for various political aims. The discursive approach aims not to induce “facts” as tools for analysis (i.e. concepts and categories) but subjects them to analysis in order yield ideas that constitute facts.

As the starting point of any inquiry, epistemology concerns the question of what can be known and claimed, and with which degree of certainty. A discursive epistemology trades objectification for interpretation and thus facilitates the study of ideas. Political discourse subsists on the variety of ideas and integrates actors, their interests, and ideas. By accounting for this variety of ideas instead of objectified facts, the certainty rises for knowing what can be known and claimed.

If discursive epistemology embraces the variety of ideas instead of facts, does it trade off precision and predictive power? I argue that this is not so. Specific advantages arise from accounting for variety among ideas within a distant political culture, one that is essentially foreign to the researcher<sup>18</sup>. As demonstrated in before chapters, area studies face a large geographical, linguistic, and cultural distance to the studied case. Among the practical consequences of this distance were Western-centric concepts that potentially do not measure what they are expected to measure. With such uncertainty present, selecting and focusing on only one among several contesting interpretations is risky. In other words, an objectifying and generalizing approach is likely to suffer “normative and subjective biases of the investigator” because policies are “subjective constructions”; and thus “no

---

<sup>18</sup> The question of whether this stance of heightened epistemological self-reflection is advisable for the purpose of studying politics far and near is a question better addressed by contextually inclined political scientists and theorists who welcome a focus on ontology and epistemology (Goodin and Tilly 2006) and also by political methodologists (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008).

objectifying logic can grasp them without simplifying, reducing and twisting their reality”<sup>19</sup> (Zittoun, 2009, p. 70). As discursive epistemology instead entails, accounting for the landscape of interpretations forces the area scholar to think for herself and to not take facts for granted. The area scholar thus benefits from applying discursive epistemology if she considers the subjectivity of actors “there” while critically examining our objectified meanings “here”. With an additional focus on ideas, discourse analysis gains an epistemological corrective that is attuned to the unexpected contingency of ideas “there”. The discursive epistemology that I apply in this dissertation seeks to explain the polarization phenomena of South Korean politics by accounting for the viewpoint of “their” ideas.

### **3.2. Mapping South Korean scholarship**

The goal of discussing epistemology, as I did in the previous section, is to identify a suitable methodology for answering a specific research question. This direction is intentional for conducting contextual political analysis (Hay 2006). In my previous review of epistemologies for studying politics in a foreign culture, I have suggested the stylized scenario that an area-focused political scientist<sup>20</sup> will position herself between the epistemology of immersion or generalization. Thus, I suggested that this scholar could theoretically choose any ratio between deep understanding via cultural and linguistic immersion on the one end of the spectrum, or the analyzing of patterns that are shallower but more comprehensive on the other end of the spectrum. However, my argument

---

<sup>19</sup> Facing notable epistemological distance in the case of area studies, an alternative is to acknowledge that the mapping of ideas is valuable in itself and to ask related questions, for example “how these interpretations serve the participants as a power” (Zittoun, 2009, p. 70).

<sup>20</sup> Or alternatively a comparative political scientist, or area scholar, which I do not distinguish here



emphasized that the study of ideas in South Korean politics benefits from a balanced combination of both epistemologies, which led to my description of discursive epistemology.

As the next step, mapping the political structures and actors in South Korean politics is prerequisite for determining the methodology required. In this sense, domestic South Korean scholarship and area studies is an essential portal to South Korean politics. The proffered prior knowledge on South Korean politics, and the explanatory limitations that the prior knowledge holds, guide towards a theoretical framework and the choice of methods<sup>21</sup>. Characteristic traits of South Korean politics can be learned from Korean-language publications that seek to popularize and communicate perspectives of viewing South Korea's contemporary politics. A rare English-language example is provided below by Choi Jang-Jip (2012), a senior political scientist who is widely cited in South Korea. The following is my paraphrasing of the lecture notes titled "Democracy in Contemporary Korea: The Politics of Extreme Uncertainty", delivered at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University in October 2012:

*"The South Korean political regime underwent democratization in 1987, but South Korean political camps lack institutionalization and therefore man those ideological trenches that remain from the Cold War structure.*

*As result, South Korean politics is extremely polarized between progressive and conservative camps. The most glaring and dominant*

---

<sup>21</sup> Theoretical framework and choice of methods are interrelated and result in methodology. By definition, methodology "relates to the choice of analytical strategy and research design which underpins substantive research" and "is best understood as the means by which we reflect upon the methods appropriate to realize fully our potential to acquire knowledge of that which exists" (Hay 2006, 83)

*form of politics in South Korea is rhetorical politics.”*

At first glance, the expressed discontent about domestic politics in the above paraphrase reminds of any other democratic system that allows free speech. Across most countries, popular dissent features complaints that politicians are all “talk and fluff”. Rhetorical contestation is unmissable part of party politics and even a necessary element by highlighting current policy problems and providing information about candidates (Mayer 1996). Forms of rhetorical contestation in American politics are amply researched: “Spin” by politicians privileges presentation over policy (Moloney 2001), rhetorical lying is never off-limits for presidents (Kellner 2007), political challengers utilize negative campaigning (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995), and partisan taunting between congress members can be downright offensive (Grimmer, King, and Superti 2014).

Looking deeper however, the above paraphrase ascribes a special role to rhetorical contestation. Numerous South Korean scholars would agree that polarization is perhaps the most acute ailment of contemporary South Korean politics (Choi Jang-Jip, Pak Chan-pyo, and Pak Sang-hun 2007; Choi Jang-Jip and Pak Sang-hun 2006; Choi Jang-Jip 2013; Kang Chong-in 2009; Kim Yong-myong 2010; Song Ho-gun 2014)<sup>22</sup>. Progressive political scientists often wield this argument as social and political critique against conservative and progressive camps in one strike.

As I will show below, this body of literature carries a strong normative tone when attributing polarization to the failures of political parties as democratic institutions<sup>23</sup>. The

---

<sup>22</sup> I refer to additional scholars in the following two subchapters, and present a tabular map of their categorized arguments in Appendix A.

<sup>23</sup> Among these instances, scholars highlight polarized political discourse by relating hostile rhetoric to political perceptions, suggesting that polarized discourse may cause the reproduction of

prevalence of normative judgement in the domestic political science literature makes more sense in light of the background factors of South Korean academia. South Korean social science looks back on a short history as an independent academic enterprise since the end of authoritarian rule only three decades ago<sup>24</sup>. Shin Kwang-Yeong and Han Sang-Jin (2015) outline the importation and internationalization of social science in South Korea: During the autocratic regimes and the following democratization movements in the 1980s, social science in South Korea served as a referential body of theories to fuel activism against oppression. Only during the 1990s did the role of the university change from democratizing agency to knowledge producer. Comparative and area studies began to flourish in Korean academia, partly due to the influx of European and U.S.-trained scholars, and partly due to increased state funding towards globalization, which was a slogan coined by the central government at that time<sup>25</sup>. In evaluating the present, Shin and Han find that South Korean social science has not grown truly international due to

---

polarized politics. This argument is a smoking gun by pointing at a relationship between rhetoric and polarization, but essentially evokes more questions than it answers, for example: How exactly does political rhetoric relate to polarization between political camps? How can we study the link between ideas and political camps? The first question concerns the role of ideas in South Korean politics. The second question asks how to study polarized ideas in longitudinal political discourse, and calls for methodological solutions. Both questions are answered by this dissertation as its central aim.

<sup>24</sup> This line of argument may strike sensitive minds as condescending: Ideally speaking, do not the social sciences in all democratic countries aim towards the pursuit of knowledge? That may be true, but the trajectory of academic branches differs from country to country and takes time to unfold.

<sup>25</sup> The year 1993 can be marked as “the moment when the Kim Young Sam government publicized its goal of ‘New Korea,’ ‘Internalization,’ and ‘Globalization’”; “the ‘Declaration of Globalization’ was made in October 1994 and followed by the ‘Globalization’ discourse until November 1998, when the regime was terminated by the Asian Financial Crisis (Kang Myungkoo 2000, 444).

having neglected theoretical aims of science. They state that “social science in South Korea has not focused on the discovery of scientific truth” but instead on “debunking and criticizing the hidden dimension of injustice” in domestic institutions (Shin Kwang-Yeong and Han Sang-Jin 2015, 79). While acknowledging that South Korean modern history justifies an explicitly normative focus, on the other side of the coin, I would argue that unpaid historical bills cannot forever camouflage the neglect of social science principles in the social sciences<sup>26</sup>.

The mapping of domestic literature will show that many impassioned fingers of South Korean political scientists point at discursive politics in South Korea. To illustrate this convergent focus and its inherent coherence in viewing polarization is the aim of mapping the literature. This resounding tendency justifies that we as area scholars-cum-political scientists also start paying attention to discursive politics in the polarized politics of South Korea. If the shown critical mass of scholarly attention does not suffice as motivation, then the attention (and frustration) paid by South Korean scholars to discursive politics at least points at a need for theories that describe the South Korean polarized political discourse to non-Korean audiences.

I proceed to sample an array of political science books and anthologies that discuss polarization. Some authors from this pool of literature deal more heavily with discourse than others. The resulting mapping of the literature aims to be comprehensive

---

<sup>26</sup> A more positive point has been made recently, but nevertheless complements this argument: “Democratization has ‘normalized’ the environment for political studies. With democratization, Korea’s political science has made remarkable progress in terms of quantity and quality. The influence of political scientists on institutional politics has also increased. Based on such academic achievement, it is time that Korea’s political science had the task to make theoretical contributions to the outside world from Korea’s own experiences” (Kang Won-Taek 2016, 133)

but represents a sample nevertheless. I grant preference to books that were published in the past 10 years, considering that more recent books enjoy the benefit of hindsight and concurrency for the purpose of evaluating polarization in contemporary South Korea. Aside from polarization, a second theme manifests as consistent context of South Korean politics: the ambiguity of the self-titled labels *progressives* and *conservatives* in relation to South Korean political camps. I will map a separate body of literature that focuses on this aspect of political camps.

Taken together, the two bodies of literature relate the two themes of polarization and political camps but seldom explain their causal relationship, leaving open the question of how ideological ambiguity is a possible cause of polarization. The ambiguity of the ideological attributes “progressive” and “conservative” for South Korean political camps is partially owed to volatile shifts of party organization during the democratization history, and also to the number of politicians who extemporaneously switch their allegiances between parties (Mosler 2015). Such ideological ambiguity casts doubt on whether political parties in South Korea emerge as collective assemblies around ideology and policy orientation. Indeed, scholars argue that this demonstrated ideological ambiguity is caused not by political culture but by the path dependency of party power relations and by rent-seeking politicians (Chong Chu-sin 2011; Lee Jong-kon 2014; Yi Yong-hun 2000). Ideological ambiguity across political camps also manifests in the non-alignment between rhetorical frames (as seen in medial discourse) and political representation (as seen in policies and agendas). This ideological ambiguity suggests that camps are politically closer to each other than is implied by their exterior rhetoric. This implication substantiates the below cited South Korean scholars in their claim that political parties in South Korea engage in political competition out of self-interest.

### 3.1.1. On polarization

Appendix A shows all mapped categories of the literature pool that I cite below. In my sample of South Korean publications, discursive polarization as a theme is distributed among books and one edited symposium publication (Song Ho-gun 2014) by domestic political scientists, which includes two economists who provide political evaluation on socioeconomic policies. To map these book publications, I catalogue relevant content into criteria that add up into a narrative of the origins, patterns, and current state of discursive polarization in South Korean politics. These three criteria in each mapped publication narrate a diachronic continuum of polarization by historical background factors first, developments second and impact on polarization at last. The resulting overview illuminates the causality, dynamics, and implications of polarization. These insights are often phrased as social and political critique, and convey concerns regarding the extremity of polarization in South Korean politics. The categories of origins, patterns, and current state compose a three-step causal argument: Origins are historical, patterns are behavioral, and their causal interaction renders the bleak diagnosis of the current polarization in politics<sup>27</sup>.

Most sources agree to the following origin: Polarization is sustained by ideological cleavages that stem from Japanese colonialization, North-South division, the Cold War and anti-communism, and dictatorship. In a culmination of aforementioned events, democracy was achieved in 1987 and democratic institutions were firmly established. Key causal origins are the ongoing ideational structures that were shaped before and during democratization: Progressive parties carried radical ideology in rebellion to autocratic

---

<sup>27</sup> The described causal chain resembles path dependency (Pierson 2000b) that entails increasing returns, self-reinforcing mechanisms, and feedback processes.

oppression (Yi Kab-yun 2014), and the first democratic elections of 1987 constructed the binary of “democracy versus anti-democracy” (Chong Chin-min 2008). These ideological legacies have remained stable for various reasons: Due to the prolonged division of the peninsula, political value systems are rooted in the Cold War system, stopping new values and ideologies from emerging<sup>28</sup> (Song Ho-gun 2014); despite these polarized origins, the contemporary party system is in fact a single conservative monopoly that is historically rooted in anticommunism (Kim Man-gwon 2013); ideological conservatism defines the ideological spectrum of parties, despite ideological contrasts between parties (Choi Jang-jip 2013); and to this day, political participation in South Korea is monopolized by ideology-based organizations and networks (Chang Hun 2013). Ideological legacies maintain polarization in the form of ideational structures, which are different from institutional structures in a material sense. Ongoing ideational structures can be traced in the language of political contention in the public sphere, where the historical antagonism between ideologies is clearly visible to this day (Choi Jang-jip 2008).

Next are the behavioral patterns of the 25-year long pathway of democracy in South Korea. Behavioral patterns show that unstable inter-party structures repeat interest-based dynamics, where party politics markedly centers around individuals and personality cult (Chong Chin-min 2008); the conservative party system is never dissolved but re-arranged and reproduces structures (Kim Man-gwon 2013); competitors approach politics as a zero-sum game even though the political structure does not coerce this behavior, and polarizing behavior became established due to negative returns during the autocratic

---

<sup>28</sup> The division of the peninsula makes some positions impossible: for example, one cannot be a “communist” in mainstream South Korean politics. What is excluded from the discourse shapes the existing discourse by limiting it. One mechanism of such limitation is *Othering*, for instance by labelling opponents as “anti-democratic” whereas “we” are democratic (Hanssen 2016).

regimes (Kang Won-Taek 2005). Due to these behavior-shaping reasons, ideological identities are incoherent: “Conservative” and “progressive” are invalid attributes due to vague identities and indeterminate ideologies (Song Ho-gun 2014); party institutionalization within a narrow ideological spectrum limits the role of representation (Choi Jang-jip 2013); the leading conservative and progressive parties are equally extreme and nurture a hostile relationship (Yi Kab-yun 2014); parties bear no coherent identity and lack distinct policy content (Chang Ha-song 2014); actors interpret and evaluate policy through the lens of ideological normativity (Chang Hun 2013); and prefixes of “pro-” and “anti-” create ideological hostility between the two camps (Choi Jang-jip 2008). Clearly, the interests that motivate behavioral patterns are non-ideological. Ideational patterns are replete with ideological references, but policies show little ideological differentiation. The high contrast between strong ideology in the “origins”-arguments and non-ideological behavior in the “patterns”-arguments is striking<sup>29</sup>.

Lastly, scholars assess the combined outcomes of historical origins and behavioral patterns in the current state of polarized political discourse. One diagnosis offers policy implications: Parties will need distinct ideology and policy in order to facilitate voting by differences and political competition by the content of policy (Kang Won-Taek 2005), especially because parties must converge even more towards the center before elections<sup>30</sup>. Other scholars mix assessments with personal frustration: Judging by the current political structure, fair capitalism and practical democracy seem distant in South

---

<sup>29</sup> Compared to democratic, democratized, and emergent democratic politics over the world, this is no novel political insight. In this sense, the focus of this dissertation is the Korean-ness of political ideas and their discursive-institutional roles.

<sup>30</sup> According to the median voter theory by Anthony Downs (1957), which has been challenged and extended by various theories since the 1990s, as overviewed by Fiorina (1999).



Korea (Chang Ha-song 2014); established political powers dominate and thus conservative hegemony prevails, with no reformist alternatives in sight (Kim Man-gwon 2013); while the leading Korean parties have grown more and more identical to each other due to their lacking intellectual capacity to imagine alternative values (Choi Jang-jip 2013).

In a most similar manner to this dissertation, some scholars highlight the need for tailored approaches to explain polarization in South Korea, arguing that the South Korean ideological divide has a distinct particularity (Yi Kab-yun 2014); that policy planning processes are abused for performing ideological stand-offs (Chang Hun 2013); and that leading parties use ideology as rhetorical resource instead of competing via policy contents (Choi Jang-jip 2008).

### **3.1.2. On political camps**

What is the South Korean ideological divide, and how does it polarize South Korean politics? The literature offers disconnected evidence. For one, polarization among political camps is more severe than polarization among voters. Further, the progressive and conservative camps are not what they claim to be, comparable to containers with labels that diverge from the actual content<sup>31</sup>. Although the trajectory of political camps successively saw historical, geographical, and socioeconomic shifts of political cleavages among voters, the polarization between political camps has remained oddly constant. The first democratic elections in 1987 caused the former polarization between “democracy

---

<sup>31</sup> If we considered ideas as institutions, we can also view political ideologies in South Korea as weak institutions that lead to window-dressing. This category, albeit without an ideational focus, has been identified by Latin America scholars among the variations of institutional strength (Levitsky and Murillo 2009).

versus anti-democracy” to shift towards a polarization of political camps by regionalism (Chong Chin-min 2008). Since then, regionalism as political demarcation has been gradually substituted by social class and other new values, which has led to complex re-alignments (Kim Jung Hoon 2013; Pak Chan-uk and Kang Won-Taek 2013; Ryu Jaesung 2013).

Constantly, policy competition reveals low ideological distinction. The leading parties espouse policies that represent the middle and upper classes, ignore socioeconomic distribution, and concentrate on growth policies. In light of this empirical reality, the Downsian model of the shift to the median cannot explain such a constant median (Choi Jang-Jip, Pak Chan-pyo, and Pak Sang-hun 2013). Both camps represent the same economic classes and barely identify as progressive and conservative in terms of actual policies<sup>32</sup> (Chang Ha-song 2014); both camps are part of the conservative hegemony by their economic ideology and socioeconomic policies (Choi Jang-jip 2013).

In the eyes of the cited South Korean scholars, polarization is an outcome of competing political camps with poorly developed progressive and conservative ideologies (Choi Jang-Jip 2002; Choi Jang-Jip, Pak Chan-pyo, and Pak Sang-hun 2007; Choi Jang-Jip and Pak Sang-hun 2006; Choi Jang-Jip 2013). As result, all South Korean parties are ideological hybrids<sup>33</sup> and position on the right or center-right (Ho Kwang-sok 1996). This clustering on the right spectrum represents hegemonic conservatism in South Korea. Hegemonic conservatism stems from the historically protected conservatism in South

---

<sup>32</sup> Chang evaluates this failure of representation by the Left as moral neglect, and describes the progressive party as a “human networks party” that prioritizes political competition over representation.

<sup>33</sup> Hybridity of ideology by political parties in turn affects voter preferences and creates “mixed up” ideological stances in voters (Kim Youngmi 2011, 131).

Korea<sup>34</sup>, but also from turbulent regime changes and frequent disruptions in the development of political institutions (Ho Kwang-sok 1996). Ho Kwang-sok claims that an ideological typology of South Korea is impossible because ideology played little role in forming the party system structure. Informal elements such as factionalism, which are not conducive to party institutionalization, took its place instead<sup>35</sup>.

Kim Youngmi (2011) finds that parties are guaranteed support by specific groups<sup>36</sup>, which reinforces office-seeking politicians, encourages factionalism, and deters policy reforms. She agrees that the persisting “ideological conflict is rather the result of the low level of party institutionalization” than of distinct party philosophies (Kim Youngmi 2011, 123). Ideology is strong but hollow, and thus “what is taking place is a political conflict over power between the ruling party and the opposition party on specific issues” (2011, 135). As ideologies in South Korea are mere labels, the conservative hegemony is not truly conservative. Instead, Kim Youngmi characterizes camps as follows: Conservatives in South Korea do not hold conservative values but are merely reactionary. Progressives in South Korea do not hold leftist ideology but are center-right<sup>37</sup>.

---

<sup>34</sup> Among many other scholars cited here, Kim Youngmi (2011) highlights further roots of hegemonic conservatism: the national experience of colonization by Japan after WWII, then the Cold War that implanted ideological polarization between the two Koreas, then lastly the American-led reconstruction that antagonized left-wing activists.

<sup>35</sup> The same applies to the parliament and legislation. Ho Kwang-sok even evaluates party activities within the parliament until 1996 to have been non-competitive and united in hegemony.

<sup>36</sup> In a similar sense, David Kang (2003) views the regional cleavage between voters as the result of rational choice and effective preferences.

<sup>37</sup> Kim Youngmi utilizes cross-camp quantitative surveys to demonstrate that their positions converge, and substantiates that parties are ideologically vapid by exemplifying qualitative accounts from pundits and newspapers.

Given the cultural and historical specificity of South Korean politics as premise, the labels “progressive” and “conservative” are ideas that have migrated from the Western world to South Korea. Being imported ideas, their emergent meanings in South Korea are contingent, which is a central tenet of translational approaches in political science (Schaffer 2000; Eun-Jeung Lee and Mosler 2014). In other words, “progressive” and “conservative” in South Korea cannot be *naturalistic concepts* that detach “meanings from their holistic and contingent contexts so as to embed them in mechanistic explanations”, and ignore the historical and cultural “specificity of the various objects to which they refer” (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 507). From here my argument follows that “progressive” and “conservative” are mere labels in South Korea, and their true contents unfold out of political discourse.

By viewing labels as explorative tools, they illuminate translated meanings that have empirically shifted in what the concept denotes. During this process, social science concepts and discursively popularized (“ordinary”<sup>38</sup>) concepts merge. This involves sociological processes of where these language signs originate and who disseminates them. Political concepts of Western origin in South Korea correlate with the hegemonic dominance of South Korean political scientists who trained in the United States but work in South Korea (Hong Song-min 2008). In this processual scenario, academic scholars disseminate concepts and public discourse adopts them as labels for the South Korean versions of ideology. As a popular example, the question of whether the idea of “liberal democracy” in South Korea is progressive or conservative becomes multi-dimensional and reflexive (Kang David C. 2009).

---

<sup>38</sup> Accordingly, ordinary language has been highlighted as a social science tool for concept specification (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Gerring and Barresi 2003; F. C. Schaffer 2014)

Looking even farther backwards, the history of imported political labels in South Korea tells how South Korean intellectuals embraced terminologies at different points of time, often for reasons of fashion. After the 1945 liberation from Japanese colonialization, popular dynamics embraced Western political terminologies, which were less useful for denoting South Korean ideologies but rather for imitation, legitimization, and politicized contention (Chin Tok-kyu 2011). Seeds of ideological divide proliferated during this era and led to the importation of Western ideas that promised to sort out the past and set goals for the future. Liberation laid bare the pro-Japanese networks among South Koreans that had sided with the colonial infiltrator, who had distributed power relationships during colonization. Additionally, the U.S. temporary government enabled the persecution of suspected communists, which in turn created public sympathy for Leftist intellectuals. In this atmosphere, Chin Tok-kyu states, imitating and ceremonially citing a largest possible number of Marxist literatures sufficed as currency. The Left monopolized the labels “progressive” and “democracy” but also used them as smokescreen to hide that their progressive ideology was poorly defined (Song Ho-gun 2014). In contrast, the label “conservative” was less used by conservatives for denoting themselves but more so by the Left in a derogatory fashion, who intended to devalue the Right's ideology and monopolize moral superiority<sup>39</sup>.

Due to the prolonged autocratic rule that followed afterward, ideological differentiation by the two polarized camps slowly emerged after democratization and fully emerged during the 2012 elections (Kim Jung Hoon 2013). This evolution bore light and

---

<sup>39</sup> More complex histories can be drawn if political terminology is traced back to the South Korean enlightenment. See i.e. Kang Chong-in (2002) for the strategic intentions behind the conservative adoption of “liberal democracy”, or Pak Myong-gyu (2009) for a South Korean application of Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte*.

shadow for South Korean politics: On the one hand, ideological distinction was necessary for voters' decision-forming and policy competition; on the other, the spike of ideological differentiation brewed political and social polarization to an extreme extent (Kang Won-Taek 2010). The incumbency of "progressive" governments in two terms from 1998 to 2008 coincided with the increase of extreme discursive polarization and discursive antagonism between the two camps<sup>40</sup> (Chong Hung-mo 2009). Due to this period's sunshine policy as rapprochement policy towards North Korea, ideological radicalism in South Korea originally appeared most strongly in discourses about Inter-Korean relations. In contrast, it appeared more weakly in discourses about socioeconomic issues related to everyday living. The most prominent polarization did therefore not arise around socioeconomic policies and socioeconomic inequalities, but around the issues of Inter-Korean relations, Korea-U.S. relations, and historical responsibilities rooted in Japanese colonial times and the Cold War (Choi Jang-jip 2008).

To this day, such unsettled conflicts of modern history can be traced in today's progressive discourse (Choi Jang-Jip 2009). Before democratization in 1987, discourse equipped democratization activists with progressive ideological tendencies and morals that served to represent, convey, and unify their aims. They geared this discourse at the mass public with the intent to address them as acting subjects. In Choi Jang-Jip's evaluation, this discourse survived as particular political and democratic views in the present progressive politics: It permits no concession or compromise, is ideologically

---

<sup>40</sup> Chong Hung-mo suggests that political party polarization and the lack of parties representing the middle ground is a reflection of "the middle class under threat" since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/8. (Chong Hung-mo 2009)

radical, and militant in its means<sup>41</sup>. Choi Jang-Jip emphasizes the redundancy of this discourse for the progressive camp, where the formerly activist leadership has struggled to maintain internal cohesion since democratization. Seeing that the progressive camp has repeatedly split into myriad interest groups, which obstructs the majority building necessary to gain leadership, the progressive camp is criticized for causing progressive deadlock<sup>42</sup>.

Based on above assumptions, polarized camps are likely to display ideology on two dimensions: convergent and divergent. On the one hand, the convergent dimension accepts neoliberalism without restraint or alternative<sup>43</sup>. On the other hand, the divergent dimension stresses ideological rhetoric and historical symbols. The divergent dimension can be well observed by political frames in the media. For example, Shin Jinwook (2014) examines South Korean policy-learning discourses about German policies and conducts a

---

<sup>41</sup> Choi Jang-jip explains that the South Korean democratization movement contains a reformist vision and narrative that enmeshes elements from history and politics, moralism, nationalism, and growth optimism. At times of electoral competition, proponents of this kind of democratic idea emphasize the reformist thrust against an anti-democratic government, leading to anti-political and anti-party sentiments that contradict the present democratic institutionalization (Choi Jang-jip 2008).

<sup>42</sup> As a progressive political scientist, Choi Jang-jip feels that this news has failed to reach ears in the progressive camp. In his critique, the progressive camp's habit of backward recursion to the discourse of the democratization repertoire contradicts the democratic procedure of conflict-solving, which is now the rule of the game in town.

<sup>43</sup> Choi Jang-Jip and Pak Sang-hun (2006) observe that strong rhetoric projects a reformist image during elections and the honeymoon phase, only to eventually grow dependent on *chaebol* industries.

content analysis of newspaper articles<sup>44</sup>. A polarized discourse emerged between polarized camps that the sampled newspapers represent; the study shows that polarized interpretations spring from the overarching ideological discourse<sup>45</sup>. Especially the unification discourse draws heavily from historical antagonisms between camps. Thus, empirical analysis of an ideologically polarizing discourse such as unification will illustrate the divergent dimension of political ideology.

### **3.3. Hegemonic discourse**

In the following, I introduce the first discursive theory that explains the above findings and models the South Korean discursive polarization. I therefore outline Nonhoff (2006) and his theoretical framework for analyzing the formations and forms of hegemonic discourse. I will then apply this framework to the South Korean context in order to model extremely polarized camps and convergent discourse.

Hegemonic discourse is the successful outcome of a *hegemonic project*, in which actors compete to own a discourse in times of confusion or realignment. Nonhoff studies the discourse of “social market democracy” in Germany as a hegemonic project that eventually encompassed differing political positions as a hegemonic discourse<sup>46</sup>. With its

---

<sup>44</sup> The German unification is salient as a policy model in South Korea. As an illustration, the online website of the Ministry of Unification devotes an extra section to publications and policy papers that deal with the German unification. (Ministry of Unification, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/>)

<sup>45</sup> Shin Jinwook then discusses mediating actors and their effect on policy: He refers to Johnson and Hagström (2005) and their model of ideational transfer, where the meaning of existing policy is dislodged and newly constructed for a destined context.

<sup>46</sup> Regarding the final qualities of hegemonic discourse, Nonhoff underlines three features of the current discourse on “social market democracy” in Germany: Affirmative references to social



appeal of being “good for all”, this discourse is an imaginary sign that can only exist as an abstractly general claim, and cannot have particularly defined attributes. Nonhoff argues that such a discursive sign with unfixed meanings enables the integration of contrary positions. The manner in which political actors compete in hegemonic projects is by articulating discursive formations that are geared to answer to a universal need.

Hegemonic projects can be understood as paradigms that fix the political positions of political actors within the paradigm, which is necessary for their own good if they wish to remain politically relevant. Nonhoff defines the concept of hegemony in three traits: dominance, discursiveness, and embeddedness in politics.

Regarding dominance, the notion of hegemony is not ascribed to actors or groups of actors, but instead to discourse; namely, to discourse that encompasses ideational elements which disparate groups perceive as their common will. Discursive hegemony is the result of processes where participants arrange and re-arrange ideational elements. Nonhoff deconstructs hegemony on the ideational level and finds constellations of socially shared meaning. Thus, dominance is the continuous pattern of articulating a certain arrangement among ideational elements. It is not a fixed state but dynamic and continuous practice. This is easy to accept if we consider that elements of our public political discourse are updated by external events.

Regarding discursiveness, Nonhoff sees discourse as a practice of incessantly articulating discursive formations. Most importantly, social market democracy is a symbolic reality that is yet to be created. On this symbolic level, political actors arrange

---

market democracy by political and social groups; ability for consensus on social market democracy in the broader public; quasi-legal status that influences the German economic order.

symbols into combinations that yield specific meanings. Hence, discourse is a practice of meaning-making that generates sense and meaning throughout continuous articulations. Change and stability are non-conflicting features of hegemonic projects. All hegemonic projects are affected by the relationality, flexibility, and contingency of every discursive articulation.

Regarding embeddedness in politics, Nonhoff sees discursive hegemony as the cemented a network of discursive elements in the political discourse. Nonhoff stresses the limitations of linguistic signs and the impossibility of immovable objectivity or singular historical origin. This explains why political discourses negotiate a general sign via contestation and conflict. In other words, a hegemonic project is an empty placeholder that must be filled with symbolism, and repeatedly so, via political practice. Political actors thus compete to assert a dominant representation of the general sign. In this perpetual process, their goal is to achieve the highest possible resonance from subjects who embrace the self-identification offered by a particular discursive articulation.

The discursive epistemology is gleaned from Nonhoff's theory, which is that no ultimate meaning of a discursive sign can be claimed by metaphysical, objective, or historical approaches; even historical origins can be constructed. From an anthropological view, the social market democracy discourse in its current form is contingent not least on Christian social ethics, which influenced the liberal perspective of the socially embedded man. However, it is not the only source for the idea of social market democracy, and there is no unitary reading of the concept. Thus the meaning of social market democracy is pluralistic by structural relationships, volatility of articulation, and the manifold context of discourse. This approach considers the multitude of ideas in the process of negotiation. In the following, I apply this process to the polarized discourse of South Korean politics.

Hegemonic discourse as framework offers a discursive epistemology for the study of polarized discourse. Political context and its actors convey various interpretations; when various interpretations exist, all meanings are equally correct or equally wrong from the relativizing viewpoint<sup>47</sup>. This viewpoint matters for the discursive epistemology of knowing the spectrum of ideas in South Korean discourse, where polarized actors insist on their righteous interpretations as legitimation for political power. Considering the interpretational differences between political camps in South Korea, continuously polarized meanings sustain polarization. Thus, discursive epistemology is well-suited for exploring the qualitative and quantitative variety of ideas in hegemonic projects.

When applying this framework to South Korea, the boundary conditions of Nonhoff's applied example differ by some contextual aspects. For example, Nonhoff bases his theory on liberal and pluralistic democracies. South Korea is a democracy since 1987, which is brief when compared to Germany's history of democracy. The theoretical caveat is difficult to estimate due to the globally small number of comparable countries that experienced democratization in a similar manner to South Korea.

Thus, I argue that the hegemonic discourse framework is able to integrate the South Korean profile as follows. Due to the young history of democratic consolidation, many social and political ideas in South Korea are essentially imported ideas of unfixed meaning and remain as inherently contested hegemonic projects. A contrast lies between the dense historical context that surrounded the social market democracy discourse of the 1940s and 1950s in Germany and the recent nascence of analogous discourses in South Korea. The social market democracy discourse shows that ample time, active

---

<sup>47</sup> Tomas Marttila (2015) calls this viewpoint "epistemological relativism".

development, and external alignments of events are necessary for hegemonic discourse to establish. The South Korean case can be seen as a prior stage to hegemonic discourse, akin to an unestablished hegemonic discourse, and therefore a hegemonic project. At this stage, actors follow an offensive hegemonic strategy and divide the discourse into antagonistic discourses. Further, the trait of dominance from the framework of hegemonic discourse creates a different pattern in South Korea. Contestation between discursive elements establishes discursive networks, but in a reverse manner to the eventually hegemonic social market democracy discourse, which cements polarization. In this sense, South Korea's status quo provides numerous hegemonic projects in empirical flesh. As a country that has experienced successful but recent democratic transition from an autocratic past, South Korea is an interesting case for the framework of hegemonic discourse and does not contradict its propositions.

Viewed as an additional case for applying this framework, the young democratic history and extreme polarization in South Korea create different hegemonic strategies than in the hegemonic project of social market democracy in Germany. The contingency that drives discursive formations emphasizes the need for a contextual adaptation of the analytical framework. The previous mappings of domestic literature have served this need.

The main difference between Nonhoff's empirical case and South Korean polarized discourses is therefore the historical and political context. When Nonhoff deals with the social market democracy discourse in Germany, he discusses the transition of a hegemonic project to the status of hegemonic discourse. For the context of a younger democracy that is South Korea, it must be stressed that the transition from a hegemonic project to hegemonic discourse does not imply that an immature phase of political development was succeeded by a mature phase. South Korean discourses that are not

yet hegemonic occupy the framework of hegemonic discourse as special cases. This shift of emphasis within the framework remains upon Nonhoff's theoretical pillars of the origins, processual formations, and possible forms of hegemonic projects. As special cases, South Korean political discourses extend the framework with the effects of a brief democratic history and political polarization on hegemonic projects. Amplifying these insights, cases of South Korean political discourses present hegemonic projects that lead to polarized outcomes<sup>48</sup>. Thus, the main contribution of the South Korean case will be to show that hegemonic projects can solidify as hegemonic discourses within polarized camps, which models the extreme polarization of South Korean politics as camps that steadily reproduce polarized discursive formations.

### **3.4. Discursive institutionalism**

In the framework of discursive institutionalism, discourse is a product of *text* and *context*. In terms of institutional theory, *text* resembles the notion of agency for the ability of producing discourse while *context* resembles the notion of structure by the structure-giving ability of meanings, which sentient agents recognize as their context of rules and norms. In order to apply institutionalism to discourse analysis, Schmidt (2008) utilizes a pragmatic notion of discourse. She suggests that the concept of discourse minus postmodernism can be analytically useful for political scientists:

*“Discourse, as defined herein, is stripped of post-modernist baggage to*

---

<sup>48</sup> For arguing the applicability of hegemonic discourse theory for South Korean polarized discourse, I additionally refer to Nonhoff's two characteristics of nodal (e.g. shared but contested) discourse: Nodal discourse is plausible (by representing a shared goalpost in the form of salient and valent discourses), and occurs regularly in important institutional contexts (i.e. in election campaigns). Both of these characteristics have been found in South Korean discourses that I exemplify (economic democratization) and examine (unification and welfare) in this dissertation.

*serve as a more generic term that encompasses not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed. Discourse is not just ideas or “text” (what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was said). The term refers not only to structure (what is said, or where and how) but also to agency (who said what to whom)” (Schmidt 2008, 305)*

This is a suitable stance for taking seriously the role of ideas, while considering interactive processes and agents to be formative for the role of ideas. Engaging with the role of ideas also oversteps limitations of the three branches of institutional theories (Hall and Taylor 1996) by adding possible causes of institutional change and continuity. As such, discursive institutionalism is a fourth branch among institutionalisms which superimposes the three existing branches. Schmidt explains that the application of discursive institutionalism benefits from theoretical proximity to one of the three institutionalisms: historical, rational choice, or sociological institutionalism. She suggests discursive institutionalism as an additional explanation to the structural constraints that are inherent in the three institutionalisms. By implication, discursive institutionalism works best when the structures (which would be contextual factors) of discourse have already been identified.

The incorporation of structure and agency highlights the institutionalism in discursive institutionalism. The institutional role of discourse is evident because discourse must “make sense” in order to be successful. Further, ideas must be persuasive and convincing within a particular ideational setting. And thus, “the discourse itself will be patterned in certain ways, following rules and expressing ideas that are socially constructed and historically transmitted” (Schmidt 2008, 313). In this sense, ideational

settings are institutions, and discourse leaves textual patterns of a particular ideational setting. Due to its contextual dependency, discourse is a potent indicator for actor strategies over space and time.

For the study of ideas in the politics of South Korea, discursive institutionalism alters the ontological (“what institutions are”) and epistemological (“what can we know about institutions”) premises of the three institutionalisms (Schmidt 2008). Due to the indigenouslyness of socially constructed and historically transmitted ideas, analyses of political ideas in different cultures have been exclusive to “experts”, or obviated via methods that are positivistic or Western-centric. Instead, discursive institutionalism offers a discursive epistemology for what we can know about ideas in South Korean politics. In this sense, in the past 25 years since democratization, South Korean politics has generated textual patterns that have captured the political context of South Korea. The theoretical framework of discursive institutionalism is an analytical sieve for various ideas that populate a specific discourse, and the analysis of past textual patterns yields coherent accounts of ideas and their development. In this framework, ideas display continuity and change because discourse plays an institutional role by constraining yet enabling the content of ideas (Schmidt 2011; Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2008).

Two spheres constitute parallel spheres of policy discourse: Apart from the coordinative sphere where policy talk between policymakers is complex and technical, discourse also unfolds in the communicative sphere, where policy talk is simple enough for bite-sized digestibility in media, such as newspapers. In both spheres, but most commonly defined for media in the communicative sphere, *frames* transmit political ideas that permeate society. A frame is “a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on” (M. Rein and Schon 1993,

146). For studying the polarized discourse of South Korea, the communicative sphere is the most explicitly polarized level of analysis, being the sphere for “presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general public” (Schmidt 2008, 310). It is therefore likely to offer more polarized content than the coordinative sphere between policymakers, which accords to the mapped literature that regarded both camps in the neoliberal policy spectrum. The communicative sphere is the stage for hegemonic projects and for divided hegemonic discourses, which are pursued by strategic actors who rely on rhetoric and nominal ideology more than on policy ideas for the goal of political contestation<sup>49</sup>.

Sentient actors and meaning structures are co-constitutive and are glued together by twofold actor abilities: “background ideational abilities” and “foreground discursive abilities”. While background ideational abilities enable actors to sense an existing meaning context and generate appropriate discourse, foreground discursive abilities enable actors to adapt to events and introduce change. The two spheres of discourse- the coordinative and communicative spheres- feature different actors and audiences and follow different goals and logics<sup>50</sup>. Both abilities of actors matter equally for shaping the form and content of discourse, as actors can reproduce the meaning context or introduce

---

<sup>49</sup> Schmidt also suggests a causal chain: Policy elites generate ideas in the coordinative sphere, and political elites in the communicative sphere frame them for the mass media and public to adopt.

<sup>50</sup> In reality, as Schmidt concedes, the two spheres are not cleanly segregated from each other. For example, discursive coalitions (which are an important instrument of coordinative policy discourse) can act in alignment with communicative logic by seeking to persuade the public about the cognitive necessity and normative appropriateness of ideas.



necessary change when doing so is politically adequate<sup>51</sup>.

How does structure arise from discourse? Like all institutions, discourse requires cognitive and normative pillars and ensures that continued discourse adheres to appropriateness. Schmidt points out a constraining effect of preceding communicative discourses. Expectations of appropriateness enforce consistency and coherence from political actors and therefore prompt the reproduction of existing meanings. This effect can arise if the cost of searching for new ideas is higher than adjoining existing political meanings, which creates path dependency (Pierson 2000a).

Reversely, how does agency arise from discourse and cause either change or continuity? Agents sense a meaning context that embeds them (via their “background ideational abilities”) and react in a sentient manner to the meaning context, for they depend on legitimacy and convincingness that in turn depend on established meanings and cognitive norms. At the same time, agents also follow communicative logic (via their “foreground discursive abilities”), which differs according to the context and the events at that time. Context-dependent communicative logic is the key to finding out why discourse changes at times, by offering insight to agents’ discursive choices.

Thus, I arrive at the application of this framework onto South Korean polarized discourses. Extremely polarized discourse ultimately reflects the structuring effect of institutionalized ideas, for example in the form of frames that are so perpetual that they

---

<sup>51</sup> Ideas therefore adapt to external necessity differently across spheres; an example is the Eurozone crisis and the necessity it posed for politicians to respond to the people in one way and to the markets in another (Schmidt 2014).

embody the meaning context<sup>52</sup>. Background ideational abilities enable actors to sense existing institutions, which I identify in long-term polarized frames that persist in the meaning context. Existing frames in polarized political discourse maintain the cleavages between polarized camps<sup>53</sup>. In turn, foreground discursive abilities are where I identify changes within frames that occur despite their partaking in the meaning context. Some discourses have non-fixed meaning by being “young” discourses, such as the early discourse on social market democracy, the discourse on acid rain and climate change (M. Hajer and Versteeg 2005), or political discourses in the young democracy of South Korea<sup>54</sup>. Such discourses are “continuously contested in a struggle about their meaning, interpretation, and implementation” (M. Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 176). This competitive atmosphere invites a critical look at the politics of problem definition and framing, and “of rationality in constant tension with sources of bias”, which leads to argumentative and rhetorical performances (M. Rein and Schon 1993, 3). A critical look can be achieved by comparing an actor’s discursive articulations with the social constructs to which he belongs<sup>55</sup> (M. A. Hajer 1993).

---

<sup>52</sup> While discourse is structural by rules of appropriateness, some ambiguity is allowed (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). Schmidt and Radaelli exemplify ambiguity with the “double discourse” on agricultural policy, which the EU defended and reformed at the same time.

<sup>53</sup> This dissertation stops short of actual policy diffusion and the actual enactment of policy agendas (Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2011).

<sup>54</sup> In a more universal understanding of frames, political discourse is by nature an argumentative context that creates counter-arguments (Billig 1996).

<sup>55</sup> Typical manifestations are discourse coalitions, which are groups of actors who share a set of social constructs and form actor networks (M. Hajer and Versteeg 2005; M. A. Hajer 1995). Discourse coalitions are more likely when discourse is flexible, which is not the case in the extreme polarization of political camps in South Korea. In the case of Acid Rain in Britain, four elements led to the convergence of discourse across domestic actors (M. A. Hajer 1993): 1. *Strategic*

Also importantly for studying political ideas in a different culture, discursive institutionalism generalizes human rationality: “norms are intersubjective and discursively constructed and, as such, can for the most part be understood across cultures even when they are not shared” (Schmidt 2008, 321). This phrase embodies a new approach to studying political ideas in a different culture: It reasonably simplifies the complexity of indigenous institutions, and only requires context and text in order to examine discursive institutions.

### **3.5. Model ontology of frames**

The contextual mapping has been conducted and the theoretical concepts have been identified. What remains is to model the context of polarized discourse prior to the analysis of ideas in South Korean polarized discourses. In order to model the empirical space of South Korean political discourse, the concepts of *hegemonic discourse* and *discursive institutions* suggest how discourses can be viewed as political poles that contain different frames for talking about converged discourses.

- *Hegemonic discourse* explains that political camps use frames as a hegemonic strategy within hegemonic projects, which means that political camps strive to fill the un-fixed meanings of specific discursive signs (i.e. social market democracy). Such discourses are hegemonic projects and mutually exclusive across political camps because:

---

*deliberations*: All actors consciously followed prevailing definitions of the problem and their symbolic appeal, which distracted from finding a more fundamental solution. 2. *Institutionalized patterns*: All discourse coalitions reflected the dominant institutionalized context of the past, which engendered discursive bias. 3. *Reproduction*: The strength of the symbolic position and normative appeals made ideological change difficult. 4. *Issue position*: Due to the issue's pervasive implications for most levels of governmental activity, the new discourse would only succeed with acceptance from the highest level.

- Camps nurture frames within the own camps (in other words, camps nurture homogeneous sets of interpretations within camps).
- Frames are reproduced within political camps.
- *Discursive institutionalism* describes levels and types of ideas that political camps proffer in line with their political aims. Frames in both camps stay politically legitimate by continuing already existing frames, but have some degree of freedom to change, for example by reacting to external events (such as a financial crisis) with timely and appropriate interpretations. Change consists of switching which frame to emphasize over other frames, or of updating and adapting the content of a frame.

Both concepts describe the political utility of ideas from the viewpoint of political actors, and trace the contextual role of ideas by analyzing textual discourses. Contextually “indigenous” ideas at the heart of South Korean politics are by definition culturally complex, laden with references, and require “deep” understanding, which transcends the mere command of language and draws from the skillset of area studies. Lingering ideological references from the past include the autocratic history, the antagonism of democracy versus anti-democracy, and the remaining Cold War structure on the divided peninsula. These historical stations have enabled monuments of unprecedented economic and political growth, but also have left scars of social inequality and political struggle. These negative externalities are still unresolved and manifest as two contrasting forces of interpretation in form of the progressive and conservative camps.

As result in recent times, we see a contradictory development that belies and confirms political polarization at the same time. The polarized camps increasingly converge in parts (by increasingly sharing valent discourses and emphasizing their pressing urgency) while growing more and more antagonistic in other parts (by differentiating from the other with the use of aggressive and hostile framing).

Encompassing the above old and new traits in one, I will model discourses within camps as poles that marry idiosyncratic frames with valent discourses. The original concept of *hegemonic discourse* by Nonhoff (2006) analyzed a quasi-completed<sup>56</sup> case of hegemonic discourse (e.g. the social market democracy discourse in Germany). In contrast, South Korean political camps obstruct the completion of hegemonic discourse by maintaining their own hegemonic discourses<sup>57</sup>. More precisely, these camp-wise hegemonic discourses can be understood as hegemonic frames for the following definitional reasons. Frames in medial discourses, ergo the *communicative sphere* in the sense of Schmidt (2008), convey political differentiation and establish frames of references, structures of meaning, and interpretation patterns. It is in this sense that I claim that political camps nurture parallel hegemonic discourses within camps.

In frames, discursive formations enjoy a constantly reproduced status. The most frequent frames are also the most characteristic for camps. A continuous frequency of specific frames also leads to the institutional role of frames as argued by Schmidt (2014). Especially those valent discourses that symbolize an abstract goal that no serious political actor dares to oppose (i.e. *peace* or *social market democracy*) accelerate the gears of frames, through which actors seek to increase their political currency. Thus, discourses in this sphere of communication especially generate frames that converge, contrast, or collide<sup>58</sup>.

---

<sup>56</sup> This 'completed' status can only be of a temporary sense in the theory by Nonhoff, as the discursiveness of issues necessitates that actors perpetually generate new discursive formations.

<sup>57</sup> In the sense of political sociology, 'camp government' is the force that organizes South Korean political actors (Choi Jang-jip 2012)

<sup>58</sup> Does discourse contribute to political polarization or does polarization lead to polarized discourse? This is either a causal chicken-and-egg question, or a discourse-theoretical question.

As text within actor-strategic contexts of communicative logic, frames can be stable or flexible<sup>59</sup>. As a hypothetical example of one political camp, the frame of achieving national wealth through industrial growth or the frame of overcoming the current crisis through job support could remain constantly relevant for the discourse about creating employment over many years; conversely, these frames could instead steadily decrease/increase in relevance. Stability and change always present a twofold contingency for frames<sup>60</sup>. Continuing the above example, the normative frame of achieving national wealth through industrial growth may increasingly grow 'outdated' and less frequent than the cognitive frame of overcoming the current crisis through job support from the state; in turn, the shift of emphasis from the one frame to the other may be triggered by the Asian Financial Crisis or the impending presidential elections.


Figure 2: Model ontology of frames, discourses, and political camp finally illustrates how various topical discourses (e.g. unification, welfare, economic democratization, or employment) embed various frequencies of distinct frames within one political camp. Frames are ways of interpreting the social and political challenges inherent within topical discourses, and are therefore generated by political camps for salient and valent discourses. The most frequent frames at a particular time are also the most characteristic for polarized camps and their contextual strategies at that particular time.

---

<sup>59</sup> Frames temporarily fix signifiers and can integrate new elements with elements from the past (Campbell 2004).

<sup>60</sup> The causal influence of discourse stems from 'good' discourse that is 'transformative' (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004); namely from the strength of cognitive arguments, resonance of normative arguments, adequacy of information, relevance or applicability of recommendations, and the coherence and consistence of ideas.

Figure 2: Model ontology of frames, discourses, and political camp



## 4. Theory testing: Measuring frames in South Korea

In the previous chapter, I posited levels of frames in South Korean discourses, which were distinct by newspaper and supported camp. This chapter describes the method which will render measurable the frames within discourses. The method uses a quantitative approach to derive statistical word-relationships and triangulates with qualitative validation. By using a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach, frames can be evaluated for their continuity of both content and frequency over time. The considered data duration is almost the entire period (1990-2014) of democratized politics after 1987.

This chapter will first explain the main method, *topic modeling*, which clusters textual data into quantitative patterns<sup>61</sup>. At the same time and due to the quantitative processing of human-made text, qualitative validation of the automated output is a standard prerequisite for drawing conclusions from this method. I also explain further standard procedures of validation that I will conduct. Secondly, I explain my case selection of two discourses (unification and welfare), which is based on variation across the dimensions of ideological polarization and salience. Thirdly, I introduce my data that

---

<sup>61</sup> The technical protocol of the array of software used and credits can be found in Appendix B.



comprises all articles from two newspapers<sup>62</sup> (*Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo*) that contain either keyword (unification or welfare). Lastly, I present the workflow for data analysis.

#### 4.1. Method: Topic Modeling

Topic modeling is an automated procedure for coding the content of large text corpora<sup>63</sup>. In the technical vocabulary of topic modeling, “topics” are groups of words that are likely to statistically co-occur across documents, and are thereby likely to embody coherent “topics”. Among several existing topic model algorithms, latent Dirichlet allocation (hereafter LDA) is a probabilistic topic model that generates the following process: It assumes for each document a distribution over topics; for this distribution over topics, a topic is chosen for each word in the document; lastly, a word is chosen from that topic’s distribution over words (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003). Its computational logic has been likened to the political context of the real world: “Intuitively, the process resembles a candidate deciding which policies to emphasize in her manifesto and in which proportions, and then choosing words based on these proportions” (Catalinac 2013, 13).

A recent special issue on topic modeling in the cultural sociology journal *Poetics* takes a rigorous look at topic modeling from the social science perspective, and then differentiates against traditional content analysis with manual methods (Mohr and Bogdanov 2013). In technical terms, LDA is “a statistical model of language” (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). In practical terms, the manual for using LDA is as follows:

---

<sup>62</sup> I refer to prior studies that affirm and name South Korean newspapers that align in partisan orientation with polarized camps in South Korea. The newspapers chosen here represent the left and right of the political spectrum.

<sup>63</sup> In the language of classical content analysis, the researcher “codes” categories by manually assigning meaningful chunks of text to categories that he has specified.

- **Goal:** Automated coding produces categories (topics) without the researcher having to code categories beforehand.
- **Settings:** The researcher experiments with the number of topics to model until she judges that a final number of topics yields meaningful topics<sup>64</sup>.
- **Output:** The program returns twofold output that consists of
  - Words that co-occur frequently, which the researcher can now label as a category
  - The numbered weights of these categorized words across all processed documents

For social science research, topic modeling yields substantive interpretability (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). Carefully implemented, topic modeling can be an additional lens for structures of meaning, and is meant to complement the researcher's expert knowledge about the text and context of the corpus. As a fast and heuristic method that facilitates text exploration, LDA has been implemented in various social science disciplines (Bonilla and Grimmer 2013a; Mohr et al. 2013; Mohr and Bogdanov 2013; Ramage et al. 2009; Roberts et al. 2013; P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013), including comparative political science and Japanese studies (Catalinac 2014; Catalinac 2013), which poses as a best-practice example for this dissertation.

How is this method a legitimate shortcut for exploring foreign-language content analysis, where potential pitfalls additionally include cultural and linguistic blind spots? The methodological literature on topic modeling strongly emphasizes validation and leaves it unequivocally clear that topic modeling cannot replace the qualitative prior knowledge by the researcher (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Quinn et al. 2010). For the same reasons that make it efficient, topic modeling requires extensive validation that

---

<sup>64</sup> This requirement involves several experiments with topic models of differing numbers as setting until sensible output is reached.

draws from expert in-depth knowledge about the studied subject and country, bringing it closer to a qualitative approach akin to the area studies. Yet, by revealing the content of large corpora quickly, and by partially pre-empting the researcher's categories of thought, topic modeling enables research strategies that leverage these advantages. This marginal innovation provides reason to justify the implementation of text-as-data methods.

Regarding how to understand topic models from foreign-language text, cultural sociology offers language-based pointers: Words are relational because they are neutral until associated with other words and thereby gaining specific meaning (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). Affinities between topic modeling and cultural sociology therefore stem from the natural relationship between words and language, which applies to all languages including the Korean language. This language-blind logic implies that words combine into distinct meanings and represent political frames by political camp.

The following sub-chapters briefly elucidate the advantages and caveats of topic modeling for analyzing polarized discourse in South Korean politics: the implications of using unsupervised content analysis, how prior studies have applied topic modeling for finding frames, and the validation standards that seek to *partially* alleviate these caveats.

#### **4.1.1. Unsupervised content analysis**

Why do political scientists open up to the idea of topic modeling (Catalinac 2013; Grimmer 2010; Grimmer and Stewart 2013)? Its appeal for political analysis is the analyzing of political ideas in texts, without necessarily knowing which ideas are to be expected. The first step of unsupervised content analysis statistically estimates specific meanings from the texts, instead of the researcher specifying topics (thus, coded categories) in advance. This feature makes topic modeling an unsupervised method by definition, which delays the entrance of previous assumptions by the researcher. Due to

this unsupervised trait of topic modeling, “the subjective moment of the procedure” (thus, coding categories) is delayed to post-modeling by counting *first* and interpreting *second* (Mohr and Bogdanov 2013, 560). This can be an advantage by momentarily avoiding personal expectations regarding the content of the corpus, and by enhancing the explorative potential to arrive at unexpected findings.

The unsupervised trait of topic modeling also implies specific advantages for researching the manifestations of ideology in the South Korean discourse. Hand coding may be infeasible or inadvisable when scaling hidden traits (such as ideology) that cannot be directly measured but must be inferred by the researcher (Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012). Ideology is of central concern for this dissertation: As elaborated in previous chapters, polarized political discourse in South Korea is infused with ideology that varies per discourse, making it more difficult to measure. In the previous chapters, the mapping of domestic literature has shown that most political scientists converge in viewing extreme polarization in South Korean politics, where ideological polarization roots in South Korea’s modern history. On the other hand, scholars have also stated that polarized discourses on socioeconomic policies do not feature distinct ideologies<sup>65</sup>. Scholars who face similar contexts have suggested topic modeling for analyzing social constructs and symbols within discourse, arguing that topic modeling creates a chance of added objectivity by delaying subjective interpretation until the generated topics are to be labeled (Mohr and

---

<sup>65</sup> For instance, policy suggestions across presidential terms and political camps have been unmistakably neoliberal in character, regardless of the claimed orientation by party (of course, this example inevitably singles out the progressive party). For this reason, scholars note that political competition in South Korea is less catalyzed by ideology and rather by power politics and cartel politics (Choi Jang-jip 2002; Choi Jang-Jip, Pak Chan-pyo, and Pak Sang-hun 2007; Choi Jang-jip 2013; Song Ho-gun 2014).

Bogdanov 2013). In other words, topic modeling can be said to delay the researcher's subjectivity until he arrives at counted but unlabeled categories, as only then he can interpret and label the categories<sup>66</sup>.

For researching framing in South Korean politics, the topic modeling method can avert inclinations or preconceptions regarding polarized camps. As contextual polarization divides textual content into distinct epistemes in South Korea, academic research has not been completely free and independent. Epistemes in the empirical field influence the subjective interpretations of researchers who are part of society and hence are located inside the same epistemes<sup>67</sup>. Frames schematize social cognition and construct reality (Gamson et al. 1992; Gamson and Modigliani 1989) from which the researcher himself cannot be completely independent. After all, members of society rarely reach full awareness of the institutions and cognitive norms that surround them (P. DiMaggio 1997). Topic modeling is based on co-occurrences of words and disregards complexities of language such as "syntax, narrative, or location within the text" (Mohr and Bogdanov 2013, 547). Syntax, narrative, or locations within the text likely are major rhetorical instruments of political polarization, and they are statistically disregarded to an advantage. If the researcher is able to read texts while minimizing bias that is known or unknown to him,

---

<sup>66</sup> Additionally I would add that this circumstance can also facilitate the interpretation of interpretations, which is the definition of the interpretive approach to political science and social science. This approach displays interesting similarities to the discursive epistemology that I have propped, which I will not discuss in this dissertation.

<sup>67</sup> If political polarization is entrenched in South Korea so that party and media embody homogeneous camps, the researcher encounters double hermeneutics. Coined by Anthony Giddens, double hermeneutics describe how social theorist perennially stops short of completely separating his empirical impressions from his theoretical assumptions (Giddens, 1984). By partaking in society himself, the social theorist is embedded in societal influences.

framing across texts is likely to emerge more accurately.

#### **4.1.2. Measuring frames**

A frame can be represented by a set of meanings, which political actors reproduce as characteristic frames. In comparable implementations of political analysis, the choice of words has been explained as a function of party orientation (Monroe, Colaresi, and Quinn 2008). Clustered words in political texts have indicated political intention and the strategies of political actors (Lowe and Benoit 2013; Wilkerson 2015). These and further aims have been approximated and critically discussed at length<sup>68</sup> (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Quinn et al. 2010). Frames emerge out of political word choice while discourse is also structured by word choices<sup>69</sup>. As the political landscape of South Korea divides into camps, topic modeling is adequate for portraying differences between word choices. Prior studies that use topic modeling have demonstrated that South Korean newspapers align with the political camps that they support (Kang Beomil, Song Min, and Jho Whasun 2013). Indeed, Kang et al show that South Korean newspapers actively utilize framing, contextualization, and association.

Frame continuities since democratization will be discerned by their continuous mass and coherent content over time, while accounting for evolution and adaptation. While the conservative ideology has enjoyed (and arguably still enjoys) original

---

<sup>68</sup> The emphasis lies on “approximated”. Unsupervised content analysis methods, as described here, deal with natural language-generating processes that can never be really known, simulated, or checked (Lowe and Benoit 2013). How one can deal with this fact adequately is the topic of numerous methodological studies, many of which are cited in this chapter.

<sup>69</sup> The logic of constantly updated text structures is in accordance with how political discourse updates in the real world. The theory behind topic modeling is Bayesian statistics, which updates a *priori* statistical beliefs with ongoing information to posterior values.

hegemonic status in South Korean society, the radical ideology of the progressive camp has become (and arguably still struggles to be) a hegemonic project in its own right. Ideological institutionalization in frames, the persistence of polarized political rhetoric, and their endurance despite changing values point at institutionalized ideas in South Korean politics. The notion of institutionalized ideas fits my case well. Being institutions, their analysis benefits from data that is organizational (newspaper discourses) and historical (since democratization) (Hall and Taylor 1996). Incremental changes indicate the realistic difficulty of breaking off from a specific path to which groups of individuals adhere (Mahoney 2000). Stability as well as change of institutionalized frames will therefore be present in newspaper discourse, which reproduces institutionalized frames through public discourse<sup>70</sup> (Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2014). Frames therefore require quantitative measurement and qualitative validation as proof for the continuity of their meanings. In purely technical terms, “counting” and “reading” categories determines when and how frames can be seen as continuous or as changing.

Topic modeling is made useful for this dissertation by equating topics to various levels and types of frames in newspaper discourses. Frames entail networks of association (Johnston 1995) and “a set of discursive cues (words, images, narrative) that suggests a particular intention of a person, event, organization, practice, condition, or situation” (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013, 593). And so, “different media frames are promoted by different institutional actors as a way to try to influence the course of public discourse or the shape of political debate” (Mohr and Bogdanov 2013, 548). In light of

---

<sup>70</sup> Schmidt defines the communicative and the coordinative spheres, the latter being where politicians actually interact on a common basis. In my case, this latter analytical sphere would concern the discourse of the parliament or a political party, which exceeds the scope of this dissertation.

frames, topic modeling resembles the reverse-engineering of the intents of the author(s) in producing the corpus (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). For example, every news-story can contain just one topic as an indicator for a singular message (Bonilla and Grimmer 2013b). With a looser concept of frames, the frequency and compositions of topics can depict “scenes” and moods employed by state rhetoric (Mohr et al. 2013). These examples highlight the instrumental role of topic modeling as a tool. It can never substitute the deep case knowledge of the researcher, who is responsible for the identification and interpretation of meaningful topics, and it is up to her to operationalize the relationship between topics and frames in a manner that fits the research aim.

#### **4.1.3. Validation**

Topic modeling demands that the researcher is already familiar with the corpus and wants to view the corpus “in a different light and a different scale” (Mohr and Bogdanov 2013, 560). If the corpus is in Asian language, substantial area expertise is crucial (Catalinac 2014). In addition, reliability and validation are essential to topic modeling in general (Grimmer 2010). More than mere triangulation, the aspect of validation is essential also for deriving analytic conclusions from topic modeling that satisfy the standards of area studies.

Topic modeling requires various measures of validation. Human coding and computer classification share the assumption that the substance of heuristic topics is known to the researcher *a priori* (Quinn et al., 2010). Topic modeling resembles normal content analysis by tracking topics over time within documents. At the same time, topic modeling replaces some of the necessary tasks for manual text analysis and entails implications. Quinn et al. state the necessary tasks for manual text analysis as twofold: Firstly, the researcher relies on previous assumptions on the substance, number, and



subdivisions of topics. Secondly, the researcher codifies rules and keywords, and then assigns documents or text passages to categories. In contrast, topic modeling is an automated method that requires minimal assumptions and cost for arriving at preliminary output which combines the above two tasks. However, precisely due to these minimal assumptions before and while analysis, ex-post measures for ensuring validity are more extensive than is required for manual or hybrid methods (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).

Validation measures can include semantic validation (Grimmer and King 2011) and predictive validity, where external events explain sudden increases of a topic (Grimmer 2010; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Quinn et al. 2010). Semantic validation entails reading a number of documents with high likelihoods of a topic (Quinn et al. 2010). General validation frameworks for topic modeling have been outlined in methodological studies and should be closely followed<sup>71</sup>. A study that looks at the spectrum of text-as-data methods particularly evaluates two validation measures for topic modeling (Grimmer and Stewart 2013): semantic validity and predictive validity<sup>72</sup>. By comparing topic modeling to other clustering processes for semantic modeling, and by correlating spikes

---

<sup>71</sup> Partially relevant is Lowe and Benoit (2013) who deal with scaling methods, but devise a framework that is generally applicable for all text-as-data methods. For scaling, they suggest a validation design where valid positional estimates and meaningful estimates of uncertainty correspond with human judgement of similarities and differences. In short, they place emphasis on human interpretive and qualitative validation. Human validation establishes the correctness of estimates and the semantic validity of modeled topics.

<sup>72</sup> It does not predict what will happen in the future, but looks backward to discern a correlation between data behavior and exogenous factors. "Predictive validity refers to an expected correspondence between a measure and exogenous events uninvolved in the measurement process. The term is perhaps a confusing misnomer, as the direction of the relationship is not relevant." (Quinn et al. 2010, 222) In short, predictive validity concerns whether the measurement results reflect the real-world events at the measured time.

of topics with exogenous events, they provide examples for adequate validation. The main takeaway of their study is that validation procedures are to be customized for individual applications, goals, and contexts. Most directly relevant is a study that engages with validity measures for topic modeling<sup>73</sup> as unsupervised method in order to save time and human cost (Quinn et al. 2010). According to this study, validity in topic modeling takes five forms:

1. Semantic validity (Are the meanings and compositions of topics coherent?)
2. Convergent construct validity (Does the measure match with existing measures?)
3. Discriminant construct validity (Does the measure not match with existing measures?)
4. Predictive validity (Is there correspondence between measures and external events?)
5. Hypothesis validity (Can the measure be used to test hypotheses?).

From the traditional viewpoint of manual content analysis, semantic validity is the most important form of validity (Krippendorff 2004). For topic modeling, the umbrella term that is *external* validity is arguably the most important form, in order to ensure whether the quantitative output makes sense with the “external” real world<sup>74</sup>. Apart from the above broad types, Quinn et al demonstrate various forms of validation in detail and extend the notion of semantic validity. 1) “Intratopic semantic validity” is to check if output keywords are successful at describing the documents assigned to each topic. 2) “Metatopic

---

<sup>73</sup> In particular, Dynamic Multitopic Models, with similar implications for validation.

<sup>74</sup> Foreign-language political discourse generates an additional purpose of validation. If domestic secondary sources on polarization are primary reference for area studies scholars, empirical manifestations must be tested against the assumptions embedded in those references. This dissertation addresses this aspect by mapping domestic sources and using their insights for prior modeling *and* later validation.

semantic validity” concerns the relationship between topics. These relationships form metaclusters and show which topics are highly interrelated by the use of language in particular groupings. For example, constitutional discourses use language that is abstract, ideological, and partisan, whereas social policy discourses references societal problems, suffering, and need.

These standards are important but do not exclude other means. For instance, when the quantity of interest is the raw increase in word usage before and after a terror alert, topic modeling becomes a measure of attention (Bonilla and Grimmer 2013b). These correlations are additionally validated via surveys that regard the public perception of terror threats and the subsequent economic pessimism. Another implementation sees topics as frames and utilizes them for predictive and external validation by evaluating increases in conflict frames after external events (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). The examples demonstrate that topics can indicate attention, which in turn facilitates the validation of one’s topics.

Additional contextual means of validation relate to the political characteristics of newspapers and regions. DiMaggio et al show that the variation among sources depends on the extent of editorial conservatism (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). Thus, they validate that different newspapers employ different frames for the same discourse, which reflects differing missions and possibly political orientation.

Applying the above standards to this dissertation, the operationalization of topics as newspaper frames invites the following validation procedures. These are: semantic validation by topics that stay coherent across time; predictive validation by utilizing control topics that correlate to external events; and hypothesis validation by testing the variation

of frames according to campaigning effects and formative events<sup>75</sup>. These measures will be applied to the modeled topics in the empirical evaluation. Validation is worth the effort: Once validated, the topics can serve “reflexively as evidence about the state of the world” (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013, 596). All of the cited authors go to great lengths to remind that these methods rely on oversimplified models of the text-generating process, which makes them essentially wrong rather than right. Validation is the only way to reap benefits from text-as-data approaches, especially with complex text such as foreign-language textual data with domestic political themes. Proponents of text-as-data do not tire of emphasizing and instilling a cautious, conservative, and justifiable manner of using these methods, and one is best advised by following in their footsteps.

#### **4.2. Case selection: One short-term and two long-term discourses**

As elaborated, we can expect an effect of political camp on the shaping of frames. South Korea is a *de facto* two-party system where progressives compete against the powerful conservative camp. In this manner, ideas can be distinguished in terms of progressive or conservative political camp. This distinction is made easier by self-constraining factors where the desire to polarize shapes rhetorical choices. Political camps in South Korea differ little in their ideas on a substantial level, but collide strongly on a rhetorical level (Choi Jang-jip 2012).

---

<sup>75</sup> Another possible measure of predictive validation, which I do not discuss in this dissertation, could be predictive validation by the crucial external event of 1997/1998, where the Asian Financial Crisis affected South Korea and brought about neoliberal restructuring alongside fundamental changes of the socioeconomic environment, possibly shifting the environment and prevalence of discourse.

In order to measure the discourse of polarized politics, I select two discourses that represent the spectrum of political discourse: welfare and unification. My cases share the criterion of overarching salience and valence, which induces parties to converge in varying manners. Although high polarization and convergence within the same discourse seem like an oxymoron, South Korean domestic political scholars emphasize a duality between frames and true character of political camps. Further, they imply that this duality has increased in recent times and point to the 2012 election campaigns. High polarization shows in political frames that are radicalized. High convergence on the other hand appears in the aims that camps mutually claim to represent, such as increasing welfare, reducing social polarization, reforming the chaebol, and so on (Choi Jang-jip 2012). Observing this, Choi Jang-jip finds that the stated aims of parties negate their ideological labels (conservative or progressive) and reduce campaigns to rhetoric over substance<sup>76</sup>. Apparently, rhetoric changes more often than substance and sustains the frames of reference, structures of meaning, and interpretation patterns of polarized camps at the same time. My case selections should then cover several types of possible variation in the discourse, in order to ask: Do frames change and how do frames change despite polarization?

Figure 3: Relationship of camp, discourse, and frames with empirical example shows three dimensions where variation can occur: the salience of an issue for a camp, the valence of an issue, and camp-specific frames for issues. Thus, the selected cases should feature varying camp attention, newspaper attention, and frames over time. On the one hand, the literature suggests that the unification discourse has always been very

---

<sup>76</sup> Viewing the Korean party system as underdeveloped, Choi Janj-jip employs the term “deinstitutionalization” (of political party as democratic institution).

different between camps. In contrast, the 2012 presidential campaigns converged in socioeconomic discourses: “All of the candidates now are as one in proclaiming their support for a strengthening of the welfare state, resolving social and economic polarization, cutting college tuition in half, reforming the chaebol, and promoting economic democratization” (Choi Jang-jip 2012, 7). Generally speaking, the leading progressive party leans towards liberal-progressive or center-left while the conservative party is clearly conservative or right-wing (Choi Jang-jip 2012, 8), but they are just labels and betray the “dissociation between ideology and a party’s real character” (Choi Jang-jip 2012, 9). For political camps that converge in their “real characters” and discourse, frames signal political differentiation.

**Figure 3: Relationship of camp, discourse, and frames with empirical example**




Table 2: Longitudinal variation of discourse illustrates the long-term traits of discourses as identified from the mappings in the previous chapter. Issues are convergent while frames are divergent by two polarized camps. On a long-term scale, competitive meanings have occurred for the discourses around unification and welfare. Frames are constrained by political polarization and enabled by political competition at the same time: Research has shown that the deliberation of unification has been limited by antagonistic


political frames between progressive and conservative camps (Shin Jinwook 2014). In turn, welfare has long been a central idea for the modernization project of South Korea and branched into various meanings (Kwon Huck-Ju 2014).

**Table 2: Longitudinal variation of discourse**

Unification
Broad acceptance but split by ideological polarization. Decreasing in importance and ideological extremism.
Welfare
Increasingly, the conservative camp jointly shares this issue with the progressive camp. The conservative camp tended to associate negative meanings while the progressive camp tended to associate positive meanings.

Figure 4: Article weights in three newspapers shows the output of articles that contain respective keywords on a relative weight scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is the combined weight of all articles ever published and electronically available by all three newspapers during this time frame. The *unification* discourse is a prime example of polarized South Korean political discourse. *Welfare* has steadily risen in political purport, which makes it an essential discourse for political camps. The contrasting trends of the two discourses *unification* and *welfare* are captured in the output fluctuation of newspaper articles (across progressive, centrist, and conservative newspapers *Hankyoreh*, *Hankook Ilbo*, and *Chosun Ilbo*) that pay attention to these discourses. Judging by this measure, the two discourses represent distinct types: While the *unification* discourse has steadily dropped in article output, the *welfare* discourse has steadily risen

**Figure 4: Article weights in three newspapers**



Overall, these two cases represent varying attentions of discourse over time and look back on differing trajectories. Both discourses are influenced by conservative hegemony due to the Cold War legacy of anti-communism and state-led economic liberalism during the early autocratic regimes. Apart from this shared origin, socioeconomic policies have increasingly felt the pressure of South Korea's growth, the slowdown of growth, and various questions of wealth distribution. The historically rooted conservative hegemony resulted in a narrow neoliberal spectrum, and welfare-related policies have long been neglected as a result (Choi Jang-jip 2013). Compared to the early years of democracy, ideological differences in socioeconomic representation grew more distinguishable, hinting at the institutionalization of socioeconomic conflict over the growing inequality (Kang Won-Taek 2010).

### **4.3. Data collection: Two newspapers**

Table 3: Comparison of newspaper sizes illustrates the operational sizes of the two newspapers *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo*. Studies have shown that leading newspapers in South Korea are partisan and echo the political camps that they support



(Kang Beomil, Song Min, and Jho Whasun 2013; Park Chang Sup 2015). Relationships between major newspapers and political camps are analogous by orientation (Won-Yong Kim and Dong-Hoon Lee 2004). All newspaper articles were collected that contain the keyword “welfare” or “unification” in the body and/or the title from the two newspapers *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo*, which represent the spectrum from progressive to conservative and boast the highest distribution volumes in each camp. A summary of the complete<sup>77</sup> database of articles that were published from 1990 to 2014 confirms the fact that the conservative and heritage-rich *Chosun Ilbo* is the largest newspaper (1,282,458 articles) and that the progressive *Hankyoreh* is the smallest newspaper (395,364 articles).

**Table 3: Comparison of newspaper sizes**

Newspaper	Articles 1990-2014
<i>Hankyoreh</i>	395,364
<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>	1,282,458




Table 4: Selected article volumes by newspaper and discourse shows the total number of articles collected, which amounts to 103,064. The collected articles were simplified for machine readability by removing morphemes<sup>78</sup> that are endemic to the Korean language. For preprocessing textual data, the main challenges included the input

<sup>77</sup> This is owed to the fact that article digitalization for both newspapers began in 1990.

<sup>78</sup> Morphemes are grammatical conjugations of Korean words that attach to verbs, nouns, and adjectives.

and processing of Korean text by the programming language and software<sup>79</sup>. However, these are surmountable obstacles for the automatic analysis of Asian language text (Catalinac, 2014).

**Table 4: Selected article volumes by newspaper and discourse**

<b>Article count</b>	<b><i>Hangyoreh</i></b>	<b><i>Chosun Ilbo</i></b>	<b>total</b>
<b>Unification</b>	16,629	34,933	51,562
<b>Welfare</b>	15,757	35,745	51,502
<b>Total</b>	32,386	70,678	<b>103,064</b>

#### **4.4. Data analysis**

So far, prior studies have established that political camps utilize historical ideologies as resource, which results in the recurrent reproduction of ideologies. The analysis of recurrent patterns in textual discourse depends on counting the frequency of categories in 103,064 documents and benefits from computational methods.

Generally, topic modeling is used to find differences between newspapers, politicians, or camps. Since studies have often derived the relative differences between political camps by using this method, they tended to implement topic modeling on one corpus containing various sources from all political orientations. Further, the topical structure of the corpus was evaluated for the effect of metadata, such as author or date, by how they correlate with the topical structure (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2014; Roberts et al. 2013). In contrast, I use topic modeling on separate corpora to find variation *within* camps. Six different corpora of text each contain one discourse (*unification* or *welfare*) from one newspaper (*Hankyoreh* or *Chosun Ilbo*). The polarized context of South

---


<sup>79</sup> This involves encoding conventions that differ between Korean (euc-kr) and English (unicode).

Korean political discourse presupposes the influence of newspaper on topics. Date remains a central influence on the variation of topics over time.

Under the hood of topics, specific word combinations indicate recognizable meanings and interpretations. While individual words are descriptive and general in meaning and purpose, such as “economy”, “growth”, or “debt”, their relative combinations create contextual meanings, such as “national growth policy”. Word combinations must be validated for semantic (*do the words make sense together?*) and internal (*are they real existing frames?*) coherence. Validation needs prior knowledge in terms of likely or typical meaning structures and interpretation patterns in camps.

Figure 5: Deductive validation of inductively modeled frames illustrates this combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to arrive at properly validated frames. The first step yields topics and labels them inductively, then validates them by referring to frames that previous literature deduced from the respective discourse. According to the below validation schema, I validate “topics” from the quantitative step by referring to the frames that the qualitative literature suggests to be camp-typical. I follow the footsteps of recent implementations (Catalinac 2014; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Mohr and Bogdanov 2013; P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). In particular, an implementation of topic modeling analyzes manifesto documents of Japanese political candidates (Catalinac 2013). Catalinac specifies a lowest possible number of models that produce a clear relation to the discourse in question and yields topics that suggest the content of interest. For the validation of topics, she uses qualitative interpretations of each topic by reading “ten manifestos with the highest probability of belonging to each topic and using characteristics of the candidates discussing each topic to demonstrate that they cohered with various facts about Japan” (Catalinac 2013, 14).

**Figure 5: Deductive validation of inductively modeled frames**



The validation of quantitative modeling is as follows. I model all topics, read the topic twenty assigned articles, and label topics according to frames that can be expected, based on the previous qualitative mapping of the political context in South Korea. When labeling topics, I conduct semantic validity at the same time by checking whether the words indicate coherent topics. Thus, meanings must seem realistic in relation to the meaning context. I conduct several experiments with varying numbers of topics until I arrived at sufficiently coherent topics that make sense in relation to particular camps and discourses. Lastly, two validation steps conclude quantitative modeling. For hypothesis validity, I test whether election campaigning and incumbent parties have an effect on frame variation.

Further, I categorize validated frames. Discourses converge across the two political camps due to “convergence frames”, which occur in both newspaper discourses. As a second type of frame, “divergence frames” occur in one camp’s discourse but not in the other. Thus, they are unique to a camp’s discourse and highlight the values that one camp emphasizes most. As a third type, “conflict frames” attach easily to political persons,

parties, and elections that polarize the camps. The normative tone and intent of these conflict frames are synonymous to the polarized political landscape of South Korea.

Divergence frames are relatively characteristic for a camp's manner of associating, reasoning, and interpreting the welfare discourse. In other words, they can be understood as individual paradigms that relate to welfare. They are not unique in an absolute sense but depend on the model. Their role is political differentiation between the polarized camps, but they also may be subsumed into other frames. Thus, the following findings are not mutually exclusive between camps. Divergence frames with large weights allow insight into the differences of interpretation between camps, which form their own recurring elements within the welfare discourse. Divergence frames with smaller weights are not mentioned here but in the Appendix, which does not diminish the significance of their content for the distinctiveness of camp discourses.

Conflict frames are explicitly political frames that appear across camps due to elections, parliament debates, party politics, agendas, and platforms. They are political camp frames in the purest sense by expressing political support and taking positions. I regard it as a type of frame that is most directly affected by political competition for positions. At the same time, conflict frames can be political in the correct sense by introducing various meanings of welfare into the discourse.

Meanings in topics stay constant enough to be able to measure frames. This check for constancy has already been done in the above findings, when the above topics in months with high proportions were evaluated for internal and semantic validity. Topics showed coherence over years and merited the label, but constancy is somewhat flexible: While the label remains justifiable over time, the meanings indeed adjust to contemporary events, such as elections, scandals, crises, and many more.

## 5. Empirical validation and evaluation

My analysis inquires whether, how, and which frames vary within *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo* discourses over time under the constant influence of polarization. Thus, this chapter operationalizes meanings that indicate polarization, and also operationalizes meanings that indicate ideas, followed by meanings that indicate mutual attention. Thus, I first conduct qualitative validation on quantitative topic modeling results, then apply a categorization scheme on the results in order to differentiate polarization, ideas, and mutual attention.

To recap the methodical approach, the topic modeling method discovers frames by statistical word relationships, and has been implemented in news framing research as a tool for “reverse-engineering” the intents of authors (P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). Applied to frames as discursive institutions, the method allows a focus on continuous meaning structures that adapt to different political situations over time. In a broader context, this method lets frames emerge instead of determining frames beforehand from the literature of area studies and political science, which seldom focuses on South Korean discourse. The discourses on *unification* and *welfare* in particular possess high salience in both s but to inverse degrees over time, and illustrate varying effects on polarized debate. Thus, I analyze over 100,000 news articles that contain either the keyword *unification* or *welfare*, and collect them from two partisan newspapers that have been shown to echo their supported (Kang Beomil, Song Min, and Jho Whasun 2013; W. Shin 2016; Yoon 2013). Accordingly, all articles are collected from *Hankyoreh* to represent the progressive camp and *Chosun Ilbo* to represent the conservative camp. Thus, all cited newspaper articles in this chapter will be from the database of one of either newspaper as indicated.


Studies that implement topic modeling in the social and political sciences emphasize one point above all others: Quantitative text analysis depends on thorough validation. Therefore, this chapter devotes ample attention to validation measures in subchapters one (regarding frames in unification discourses) and two (regarding frames in welfare discourses). Following prior methodological guidelines on topic model validation, I conduct a mix of the following measures: *Semantic* validation checks the coherence of words that compose modeled topics, *internal* validation checks the coherence of such modeled topics with the sampled corpus, *predictive* validation checks the correlation of patterns to external events, and *external* validation checks the accordance of patterns to the empirical context of the modeled topics (Quinn et al. 2010; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; P. DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013).

The word compositions of frames will be shown as in the example of Figure 6: Frames shown as labeled word compositions. Firstly, I conduct semantic and internal validation by reading the top twenty sample articles with the highest proportion for each frame. As already described in the previous chapter on methods and data, I use this method to validate 30 frames in the *Hankyoreh* and 30 frames in the *Chosun Ilbo* discourses about unification; then 57 frames in the *Hankyoreh* and 55 frames in the *Chosun Ilbo* discourses about welfare. Throughout, I utilize tables for a qualitative presentation of frames<sup>80</sup>. The tables display the raw Korean words alongside translated English words and labels. Topics are shown in descending order of frequency.

---

<sup>80</sup> As mentioned before, Appendix B provides the technical protocol of methodical steps undertaken for the presented quantitative output. Additionally, the complete topics and categories are found in Appendix C.

**Figure 6: Frames shown as labeled word compositions**



Secondly, I conduct predictive and external validation by interpreting in- and decreasing frame patterns by political events that have shaped them. However, it would be a superfluous exercise to discuss all frames in depth, as some frames are more significant than others in quantitative weight and qualitative meanings in regards to the research objective pursued (*Are ideas constrained by polarization?*). In the following sections therefore, I focus on a subjective selection of most relevant frames and demonstrate their fourfold validation in depth. In particular, I aim to build an analytical narrative by selecting several sets of frame pairs that display comparative patterns which are homogeneous, heterogeneous, or inverse to each other.

Lastly, I channel the empirical implication of frame pairs by bundling them into frame *types*, as an interpretive means for differentiating the three categories of mutual attention, ideas, and polarization. This analytical schema therefore devises the categories of *convergence* frames (indicating mutual attention), *divergence* frames (indicating ideas), and *conflict* frames (indicating polarization). The schema foots on the following criteria: Convergence frames are similar across newspapers, divergence frames are unique in



each newspaper, and conflict frames describe polarized political actors. This categorization scheme assumes that frames in issue-specific discourses are interpretations that can agree, argue, or conflict with the frames of the opposing newspaper.

In more detail, discourses converge in mutual attention and salience across the two political sides and are indicated by the *convergence* frames. I regard frames with minor aberrations as equal if they feature similar words and meanings. *Divergence* frames occur in one newspaper's discourse but not in the other. Thus, they are unique to one newspaper's discourse and highlight the values that one emphasizes most. *Conflict* frames are assigned to articles that indicate explicit polarization by denouncing the opposing camps, or by mention such events where polarized dynamics have blocked policymaking coordination. The normative tone and intent that is often found in articles assigned to conflict frames are therefore most indicative of the polarization between political sides of South Korea. The cross-checking guideline for determining frame types is illustrated below in Analytical categories for cross-checking frames.

**Figure 7: Analytical categories for cross-checking frames**

<i>Hankyoreh</i> frames	<i>Chosun Ilbo</i> frames	Analytical category
"problem solving"	"problem solving"	Convergence frames
"social values"	"public values"	Divergence frames
"political candidates"	"political candidates"	Conflict frames

Lastly, the results are used to examine two questions: Does political polarization inhibit political ideas instead of developing them in the form of deliberation? How are political ideas affected by polarization that increases during presidential election campaigns? Using the final analysis results that have passed through all the above steps

of validation and evaluation, I compare my findings to previous literature on the two discourses and highlight their contribution as method and epistemology.

## **5.1. Validation of frames in the unification discourses**


### **5.1.1. State actor frames**

This chapter explains how the two newspapers differ in their selective framing of summit talks that take place between the heads of state of both Koreas. North Korea is the most enigmatic country in the world, and its isolation is a black box of uncertain threat. Most scenarios of unification posit that unification must be facilitated by international state actors, particularly the South and North Korean state actors, who are the center of a security architecture network between great powers. The spheres of state actors include two-party talks between the two Koreas and also six-party talks between international actors (the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia).

Figure 8: State actor frames shows that the two newspapers each have two frames that refer to similar events: Summit talks and North Korean leadership ranks. Word compositions are shown in Table 5: Words in state actor frames. However, the newspapers use the “summit talks” frame with different intentions that are diametrically opposed: While *Hankyoreh* pushes a frame of peace but loses momentum due to the increasingly worsening relations towards the North; on the contrary, *Chosun Ilbo* gains momentum by pushing a frame that portrays North Korea as threat. The first frame “summit talks” deals with inter-Korean summit talks between the heads of state in each Korea. *Hankyoreh* frames emphasize positive and mutually respecting meanings of unification as in peaceful co-existence, non-aggression, and exchange; on the other hand, *Chosun Ilbo* frames entail negative and tension-filled meanings of unification as in nuclear

containment and risk management. The frame “North Korean leadership ranks” is composed of words that point at high-level officials in the central party, its committees, and its national defense. As the isolation by the North and South Korea’s hardline stance towards the North increases over time, the observation of North Korean power structures becomes more important in both newspapers. This frame especially rises in 2009 for *Hankyoreh* and in 2010 for *Chosun Ilbo*, which was coupled with provocations by North Korea and the heightened need to judge the intents of North Korean leadership ranks. *Chosun Ilbo* begins a stronger representation of this frame in 2010 in order to portray North Korea in the light of an enemy that must be carefully watched and contained in its potential of threat.

**Figure 8: State actor frames**



**Table 5: Words in state actor frames**

<b>label</b>	<b>Most likely word relationships</b>	<b>Korean words</b>
<b>summit talks (Hankyoreh)</b>	Talks, agreement, South-North, discussion, joint, government, contact, consultation, conversation, summit, position, meeting, North Korea, propose, summit, talks, relations, unification, measures, suggest	회담 합의 남북 논의 공동 정부 접촉 협의 대화 정상 입장 회의 북한 제안 정상회담 관계 통일 방안 제의
<b>North Korean leadership ranks (Hankyoreh)</b>	North Korea, Workers' Party, Secretary, Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung, Chairman, Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, reported, comments, homeland, defense, Jong Il, Pyongyang, South Korea, North, National, Defense, Commissioner	북한 노동당 김정일 김일성 비서 조선 위원장 중앙 위원회 보도 국방 주석 인민 조국 국방위원장 북 부장 대남 평양
<b>summit talks (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	North-South, summit talks, President, Minister, North Korea, North, Korea, summit, meeting, Kim Jong-il, Kim Dae-jung, unification, government, northern, Ministry of Unification, policy, chairman, nuclear, summit	회담 정상 대통령 남북 북한 대북 정상회담 정부 장관 북 통일부 관계 김대중 김정일 통일 위원장 정책 남북정상 회담 핵
<b>North Korean leadership ranks (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	Kim Jong-il, North, Korea, party, secretary, Kim Il-sung, Pyongyang, Chairman, Director, Central, People's, power, National Defense, Committee, death, Kim Jong-un, assemblyman	김정일 북한 노동당 비서 김일성 평양 위원장 부장 중앙정은 인민 조선 김정은 황장사망 권력 국방 위원회 위원

The *Hankyoreh* frame “summit talks” is high from 1990 onwards, where the German unification took place, sparking in Korea a strong and hopeful expectation of unification. Additionally in 1994, the death of Kim Il-sung triggers the hope that North Korea will destabilize, and that this will lead to unification. It then peaks in 2000 during the first ever summit talks between South Korean President (then Kim Dae-jung) and North Korean leader (then Kim Jong-il). The period of 1990 to 1991 was formative for the aim of peaceful coexistence and unification since the inter-Korean policy under the Roh Tae-woo government of 1987 to 1992. This period also witnesses both Korea’s simultaneous entry as member states in the United Nations and underlines the historical “golden time” of

unification that seems to have come for the two Koreas. In this frame therefore, high-level talks negotiate mutual terms of agreement for non-aggression (“South-Korean agreements fail to adopt non-aggression”<sup>81</sup> October 19, 1990). Due to the principle of peaceful unification and coexistence, the frame is also assigned to state-level deliberations on unification from either Korea’s perspectives: For instance, a German-style unification where the South absorbs the North is an implication that North Korea rejects, which is respected by the South Korean government as given (“South Korean government will explicitly rule out absorptive unification”<sup>82</sup> August 4, 1991). This frame peaks in 2000 and reflects that the ailing conservative camp could not stand up to the popularity of the progressive camp under President Kim Dae-jung. Thus, the next summit talks in 2007 under President Roh Moo-hyun receive much less framing as the progressive camp is weakened.

In contrast to this greatly diminished peace-based frame for state-level efforts towards unification, the frame “North Korean leadership ranks” increases in attention towards North Korea under conservative President Lee Myung-bak. It therefore rises in 2009 in reaction to North Korean nuclear tests and North Korean reactions to international sanctions<sup>83</sup>, which reflects that the frame for state-led peaceful unification has become rather powerless.

Interestingly, *Chosun Ilbo* starts to use the frame “summit talks” fervently at a later

---

<sup>81</sup> 3-Ch'ahoetam 12-wöl11il Söul sö kaech'oe/ Nampukhapüi/ Pulkach'imsönön ch'aet'aek silp'ae

<sup>82</sup> Hüpsut'ongil paeche palkhikilo/ Chöngpu, 4-Ch'akowiküphoetam sö kichoyönsöl t'onghae

<sup>83</sup> “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association”.

Arms Control Association. Accessed May 10, 2016.

<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>

point than the progressive newspaper. This can be explained by the intent of the conservative camp to react to the summit talks of 2000 under the progressive president and the controversial sunshine policy, and subsequently as political strategy in 2007, shortly before political elections in 2008. Unsurprisingly then, the frame drops immediately in 2008 and until 2012 when its political utility wears out. Thus, the frame is most important for the conservative camp during the inter-Korean summit talks and six-party talks in 2007 and includes the nuclear problem. While nuclear issues were debated in the 2000 summit talks already, the conservative newspaper increases its framing strongly in 2007, which underlines its intention to portray North Korea as threat. The *Chosun Ilbo* frame that describes “summit talks” refers to inter-Korean but also to international summit talks that pursue the aim of committing a recalcitrant North Korea into peaceful behavior. Due to the nuclear proliferation and armed provocation of North Korea after the South Korean sunshine policy, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame peaks in 2007, when the summit talks between President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il took place. The continuity of this frame’s intent is already visible in earlier instances of international summit talks, which first involves the general influence and participation of great powers such as China, Japan, and Russia (“Kim Il-sung may have hinted at his readiness for summit talks”<sup>84</sup> October 20, 1990) and later grows into the leverage potential of summit talks for the nuclear issue (“Agreements between Minister of Unification and Kim Jong-il”<sup>85</sup> June 18, 2005).

In order to support the threat-based frame by which to portray North Korea, *Chosun Ilbo* applies the frame “North Korean leadership ranks” after 2010 on news about changes in North Korean leadership structures. It corresponds with the decrease of

---

<sup>84</sup> "Kim Il-sŏng Chŏngsanghoetam ũihyang kamchi"

<sup>85</sup> [Chŏng Dong-yŏng Kim Jŏng-il "6/17 Habŭi"]

reporting assigned to the frame “summit talks”, which reflects the hardline stance towards North Korea under the recent *Chosun Ilbo* Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. Examples are the signs of power succession in North Korea (“Kim Jong-il seizes full power”<sup>86</sup> July 14, 1994) and predictions of the shift in power networks under Kim Jong-un (“How will the power structure in North Korea change?”<sup>87</sup> December 16, 2013).

In both newspapers, the “summit talks” frame experiences sudden increases in 2013 and 2014, when North Korea respectively announces further nuclear tests and then launches armed provocations towards South Korea. The possibility of summit talks between the leaders of state is considered under President Park Geun-hye<sup>88</sup>, but is soon vanquished under the toxic hostility between the two Koreas.

### 5.1.2. Civic-level frames

Figure 9: Civic frames (*Hankyoreh*) are frames that refer to civic-level actors, which regards how civic-level frames adjust to external events. Word compositions are presented in Table 6: Words in civic frames (*Hankyoreh*). “Cultural events” in *Hankyoreh* point at unification-themed public events that address citizens, families, and children. “Events and awards” in *Hankyoreh* refers to foundations and institutes that honor and discuss persons who have contributed to unification by their actions, thought, or research. *Chosun Ilbo* frames feature comparable frames as follows. “Cultural festivals” refers to public performances that celebrate traditionally ethnic arts and culture, or pay homage

---


<sup>86</sup> “Kim Chŏng-il chŏnkwŏn changak”

<sup>87</sup> Pukhan kwŏnlyŏk kuto ōttŏhke pakkwilkka/ Hwang Pyŏng-sŏ tang chochikchitopu pupuchang, Ma Wŏn-ch'un tang chaechŏngkyŏnglipu pupuchang, Kim Chŏng-ŭn “kŭlimcha suhaeng” pukak

<sup>88</sup> Mundy, Simon. “Park Geun-hye open to summit with Kim Jong Un”, *Financial Times*, January 12, 2015

to the wish for unification. “Academic events” in *Chosun Ilbo* regards unification-related research across several disciplines that is discussed and presented in universities and institutes. Thus, I have selected comparable pairs of civic-level frames across the newspapers: “Cultural events” in *Hankyoreh* is similar to “cultural festivals” in *Chosun Ilbo*, while “events and awards” in *Hankyoreh* is comparable to “academic events” in *Chosun Ilbo*. The point is to take these frames as indicators for specific civic reactions, as observed in the cultural arts and research in the public spheres, and interpret their patterns in relation to the different “summit talks” frames of each newspaper.

**Figure 9: Civic frames (*Hankyoreh*)**



**Table 6: Words in civic frames (*Hankyoreh*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>cultural events (<i>Hankyoreh</i>)</b>	Cultural, events, unification, performance, prepare, memorial, park, children, festival, exhibition, schedule, participate, various, citizens, participation, play, peace, conference, topics	행사 문화 통일 공연 마련 기념 공원 축제 전시 어린이 다양 놀이 시민 예정 참가 평화 주제 대회 참여
<b>events and awards (<i>Hankyoreh</i>)</b>	Unification, theme, culture, peace, foundation, professor, Korea, host, chairman, co-hosted, president, center, research, institute, <i>Hankyoreh</i> , attend, commemorative, discussion	통일 주제 교수 재단 평화 문화 한국 주최 이사장 공동 한겨레 대표 회장 센터 연구소 기념 참석 참여 토론



Before, the above findings on *Hankyoreh* state-level frames presented the stunted development of peace-based frames on the state level since 2006, when North Korea's nuclear tests were first conducted and the progressive camp was ailing under faction disputes. The civic-level frames of *Hankyoreh* increase in exact contrast to its peace-based state-level frame, because its civic-level frames are an easier way to convey peaceful unification and emotional appeals. "Cultural events" and "events and awards" thus increase especially in 2006 when tensions of North Korean threat were high and peace-based state-level frames of *Hankyoreh* were weak, reflecting an influx of civic-level frames that sought to ease the mounting public tension. It therefore increases again in 2010 after the armed provocations of North Korea, which escalated inter-Korean relations to an unprecedented extent. By providing emotional counter-framings of unification, the *Hankyoreh* frame "cultural events" is assigned to cultural symbols of the will towards unification. The role of unification in this kind of civic discourse is well illustrated by community activities and public events. For example, a regional Moon Festival is dedicated to "societal integration" and features a pair of Korean totems that wish for civil peace and national unification<sup>89</sup> ("Wishing for harmony between regions"<sup>90</sup> February 19, 2008). In another example, publicly sponsored events for children recommend an exhibition about children in North Korea ("Educational places to go"<sup>91</sup> July 27, 2009). Lastly, sports and recreational events are held in the spirit of wishing for unification ("Women for unification run marathon"<sup>92</sup> June 13, 1993).

---

<sup>89</sup> "Minchup'yŏnghwa yŏchangkun", "Minjok'tongil taejanggun"

<sup>90</sup> "Yŏnghonam hwahap ilwŏchusosŏ"

<sup>91</sup> Hamkkehanŭn kyoyuk- kyoyuksosik/ Hamkke kapwayo

<sup>92</sup> T'ongil kiwŏn yŏsŏngtŭl "chakŭn malat'on"

Further, the *Hankyoreh* frame “events and awards” refers to lectures and honorary distinctions of contributions for future unification, which are organized by universities, foundations, public and civic research institutes. This frame is applied as an extension of the above role of cultural frames for easing domestically felt tension. Intentional framing for peace-based unification is especially noticeable if we consider that the *Hankyoreh* newspaper company itself organizes and sponsors numerous events through its *Foundation for Unification Culture* (“Accepting nominations for the 14<sup>th</sup> *Hankyoreh Unification Culture awards*”<sup>93</sup> May 16, 2012).

Figure 10: Civic frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) and Table 7: Words in civic frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) show a contrast to *Hankyoreh*. The *Chosun Ilbo* frames “academic events” and “cultural festivals” grow inversely to each other. The frame “academic events” increases sharply in 1996 two years after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. During this era under President Kim Young-sam’s term, the dominating theory of North Korean collapse eventually enabled streams of research on how to prepare for unification. This development was helped by a surge of North Korea-related data and also by the awakening of socioeconomic interest<sup>94</sup>. In contrast to the steadily increasing frame for


---

<sup>93</sup> Allim/ che14hoe Hankyŏlet’ongilmunhwasang ch’uch’ŏnpatsŭpnita

<sup>94</sup> Chun Hyun-joon states that published research monographs in 1996 increased by 60% in comparison to the preceding year, and that this high number continued to 1997. He explains that this growth in research volumes are related to changes in the North Korean regime structures: During the term of President Kim Young-sam, the theory of North Korean collapse was popular and was further bolstered by Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994. This led to an increase of research in preparation for the possible event of unification. This trend is reflected also in the large proportion of economic research (14 volumes under the Roh Tae-woo government, followed by 116 volumes under the Kim Young-sam government). While the nuclear issue posed a risk for inter-Korean relations nevertheless, several South Korean companies had expanded to North Korea at that time,

academic research for unification preparations, the frame of cultural appeals for unification steadily decreases. Cultural appeals in the frame “cultural festivals” concern national and ethnic identity and the longing for harmony between brothers, but become less important than socioeconomic arguments for why unification is needed and how South Korea can prepare to maximally benefit in that case.

**Figure 10: Civic frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 7: Words in civic frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>academic events (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Professor, Korea, Institute, National, Unification, Research, Institute, Seoul National University, policy, committee, Chairman, President, topic, Center, Korea University, Yonsei University, Womens University, college, foundation	교수 한국 통일 연구원 연구 연구소 서울대 주제 국제 회장 이사장 정책 위원 센터 고려대 여대 연세대 재단 대학
<b>cultural festivals (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Performing arts, cultural, events, anniversary, unification, memorial, music, festival, singing, competition, playing, concerts, held, various, citizens, tradition, prepare	공연 행사 주년 통일 문화 예술 음악 축제 노래 연주 무대 기념 대회 음악회 다양 전통 마련 시민 개최

and spawned much research on economic trade between South and North Korea. (Chun Hyun-joon 2015)

Thus, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “academic events” refers to universities and research organizations that approach post-unification scenarios, policy consequences, and policy preparations from various disciplinary angles. This frame embodies a strong and effective argument for unification and provides a socioeconomic lens for viewing the national gains from unification. Examples include the Research Association for Administration on the unification outlook (“Conference on the North East Asian situation”<sup>95</sup> September 25, 1997), the Korea Development Institute on economic integration at unification (“Conference on economic strategies in the case of unification”<sup>96</sup> June 27, 1997), and the Korean Association of International Studies on reviewing the state unification policies of President Park’s first term (“Conference on policy prospects”<sup>97</sup> February 24, 2014).

In contrast to the steadily increasing *Chosun Ilbo* frame on socioeconomic research, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “cultural festivals” increases in 2000 during the summit talks between Kim Jong-il and President Kim Dae-jung, irrespective of this newspaper’s general neglect of peace-based and emotional frames for unification. This fact reflects that the cultural frame of *Chosun Ilbo* does not collide with or contradict other frames, but is able to frame a seminal event such as the 2000 summit talks in neutrally cultural and ethnic-national terms. For example, it is assigned to unification-themed cultural festivals offered by cities (“Unification arts festival will be held in the next days”<sup>98</sup> April 26 2002), or

---

<sup>95</sup> Tongpuka chöngse haksulhoe

<sup>96</sup> T’ongil si kyöngche chönlyak haksulhoe

<sup>97</sup> [P’üllacha] Hankukkukchechöngch’ihakhoe / Asanchöngch’aekyönkuwön kihoekhaksulhoeüi kaech’oe oe

<sup>98</sup> Ŭijöngbu “t’ongil yesulche” 30-il~ naetal 3-il yöllyö

commemorative street fests across cities that are held by the Ministry of Culture and Sports on a public holiday (“Street play for National Independence day”<sup>99</sup> July 29, 1995).

Overall, the following can be said in regard to civic-level frames in both newspapers: Civic-level frames concern special meanings of unification that are framed differently according to each camp’s overall framing intent. Unification can be portrayed as a cultural project of peace and through emotional symbols, as seen in the frames “cultural events” and “cultural festivals”, which each refer to the sustaining of perspectives on how to strive for unification and why. Thus, unification can be portrayed as the idealization of national unification as per folklore and ethnicism. However, we have seen that this kind of frame is of different utility for each newspaper, with *Hankyoreh* being the more fervent user of this frame, reacting to tensions that detriment the frame of peaceful state actors.

In reverse manner to the health of inter-Korean relations, the cultural frame in *Hankyoreh* and the socioeconomic research frame in *Chosun Ilbo* increase over time. These trends are camp-discourse frames because the public desire for unification actually decreases over time<sup>100</sup>. Thus, the growth of these frames implies that civic-level frames seek to select and sustain particular forms of unification discourse. In particular, the increasing cultural frame of *Hankyoreh* can be explained by the reproduction of cultural, emotional, and ethnic appeals for peaceful unification , which rebounds against the deterioration of the political discourse. For this reason, it notably increases during escalating tensions, such as the 2006 nuclear tests and the 2010 armed provocations by North Korea.

---

<sup>99</sup> Naetal 15-il Kwangpok kilnoli haengsa

<sup>100</sup> Kim Byung-ro et al. 2014, 135

### 5.1.3. Highlighting diverse state roles in *Chosun Ilbo* frames

In the *Chosun Ilbo* newspaper discourse, the role of the state is the key facilitator of unification. This wide focus on state roles complements aforementioned *Chosun Ilbo* state-level frames that portray North Korea as a threatening state actor. The following frames therefore elucidate further the conservative camp's stance towards North Korea, who is to be deterred and contained by the unyielding stance and the strategic positioning of the South Korean government. *Chosun Ilbo* frames accordingly underline diverse roles of the state, and I present their framing intents by pairing diverse frames that address inter-Korean treaties, state strategy, deterrence, and lastly economic joint projects.


Figure 11: Treaty frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) and Table 8: Words in treaty frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) show three frames that relate to inter-Korean basic treaties. "South-North agreements" refer to inter-Korean treaties<sup>101</sup> and particularly the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) in December 1991, followed by the Agreement on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in February 1992. "Summit preparations" is highly correlated by referring to the South-North high-level talks that were required for reaching inter-Korean settlement on the two fundamental agreements. As third frame in this set, "peace on the Korean peninsula" relates to inter-Korean reconciliation. It is part of the state-level rhetoric towards North Korea that asks for its cooperation in order to reach mutual agreement. All three treaty

---

<sup>101</sup> Though fleeting, this period was formative, as "inter-Korean relations moved cautiously toward government-to-government contacts" and the basic agreement was "the most important declaration of North-South cooperation and coexistence since the 1972 Joint Communiqué, and was far more detailed than the 1972 agreement had been" (Armstrong 2005, 7). These developments were enabled in part to the unprecedented economic gap that opened between the flourished South and the famished North amongst collapsing communist states around the world.

frames rise simultaneously in 2000, the year of the seminal summit talks, where Kim Jong-il and President Kim Dae-jung fix further principles for peaceful unification in the form of the June 15th North–South Joint Declaration.

**Figure 11: Treaty frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 8: Words in treaty frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>South-North agreements (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Civil, settlement, talks, two Koreas, joint, primary, mutual, exchange, agreements, peace, summit, declaration, North Korean, nuclear, cooperation, agreement, discuss	회담 합의 남북 남북한 공동 관계 기본 상호 선언 북한 교류 협정 평화 정상 협력 합의서 논의 한반도 핵
<b>summit preparations (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	North, Korea, North Korea, Pyongyang, inter-Korean, high-level, talks, Panmunjom, delegation, Unification, national, representatives, contact, North Koreans, north, Minjok, Kim Il-sung, visited, Ministry of National Unification, Working	북한 북측 평양 남북 회담 판문점 대표단 통일 대표 접촉 민족 고위급 북한측 북 조국 김일성 통일원 방문 실무
<b>peace on the Korean peninsula (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Unification, nation, anniversary, Korean, peninsula, divided, Koreas, North, Korea, Peace, national, reconciliation, efforts, democratic, society, citizens, free, exchange, joint	통일 민족 남북 평화 북한 분단 주년 한반도 남북한 노력 국가 화해 사회 국민 자유 민주 북 교류 공동

The *Chosun Ilbo* frames “South-North agreements” and “summit preparations” reflect state-level actions for fixing terms of cooperation from a weakened North Korea in

the early 1990s. *Chosun Ilbo* pushed this frame due to the conservative government at that time, the conservative turn of the country, and the ubiquitous discourse at that time regarding an imminent collapse of North Korea<sup>102</sup>. This atmosphere was partially aided<sup>103</sup> by the German unification in 1990. However, this frame swiftly is muted under progressive governments from 1998 to 2008. The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1991 is a treaty where mutual principles are negotiated and form the basis for economic exchange and non-aggression (“Keynote speech by prime minister”<sup>104</sup> December 13, 1990). As a fundamental principle of cooperation, this basic treaty indeed leads to extended agreements to denuclearize and to organize inter-Korean subcommittees (“Framework for peaceful coexistence established after half a century”<sup>105</sup> February 20, 1992). Further, this frame rises in 1994 in reaction to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994, which was another result of the weakened North Korean position<sup>106</sup>. They further rise slightly in 2007 as a sign of the 2007 summit talks, but very insignificantly so, which reflects that the conservative camp has followed a stance of its own and decided to show

---

<sup>102</sup> This prediction of North Korean collapse was widely spread in the 1990s (Lee Sang-keun 2008).

<sup>103</sup> In the early days of post-unification of Germany, the subsequent unification discourses in South Korea was mainly constituted of emotional elements such as admiration and envy, concern about Korea, and resolutions to achieve the same. However, these discourses soon incorporated the consequences, costs, and conflicts of German unification, creating debates between the conservative and progressive camps (Ahn Doo-soon 2011).

<sup>104</sup> Kang Yǒng-hun Ch'ongli kichoyǒnsǒl

<sup>105</sup> Panseki manüi p'yǒnghwakongchon t'ül malyǒn

<sup>106</sup> “The 1990s were a decade of disaster for the DPRK , beginning with the collapse of every communist state in Eastern Europe, proceeding to a crisis over international inspections of DPRK nuclear energy facilities that nearly led to war with the US in June 1994, the death of Kim Il Sung in July, and finally a series of natural calamities that pushed North Korea’s ever-precarious food situation into full-scale famine” (Armstrong 2005, 8).



little reaction towards President Roh's efforts. This is supported by the fact that the conservative candidate in the 2008 presidential elections pursued no peace frame, but instead a frame of economic growth. Clearly, these frames have lost utility due to the changed terms of cooperation and the nuclear and armed provocations by North Korea. Thus, their diminishment reflects that *Chosun Ilbo* has changed course towards framing North Korea not as a cooperation partner, but as an uncooperative source of threat that must be put into place. Otherwise, these frames have no presence in the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse, which effectively promotes no frame in this direction by burying it.

In a related sense to principled cooperation, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame "peace on the Korean peninsula" appeals for cooperation and rapprochement from North Korea. This appeal is directed towards North Korean leaders who determine the future of nuclear proliferation ("President Kim's speech for National Liberation Day"<sup>107</sup> August 16, 1994, and "President Park says true liberation is only achieved at unification"<sup>108</sup> August 16, 2013). The frame also rises in 2014 and frames the intent towards unification by the Park Geun-hye government. Thus, this frame that asks for North Korean cooperation and acquiescence is flexible regardless of progressive or conservative Presidents and their sharply differing northwards policy; however, *Chosun Ilbo* uses it selectively and rarely, depending on the goals that are pursued. In the Park Geun-hye government, these goals are South-led unification and socioeconomic gain, which are continuations of the early 1990s governments and their goals in the case of immanent North Korean collapse.

Figure 12: Strategy frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) and Table 9: Words in strategy frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) show two state strategy frames that illustrate the shifting conservative


---

<sup>107</sup> Kim Taet'onglyöng Kwangpokchöl kyöngch'uksa

<sup>108</sup> Pak Taet'onglyöng "chinchöngghan Kwangpok, t'ongilttae wansöng"

emphasis on North Korea issues. “Strategic policy” refers to cooperative possibilities between the two Koreas, by considering how to proceed in the face of changing North Korean conditions and its potential intentions to cooperate. “Nuclear negotiations” is then assigned perceptions of handling the potential, but not definite, nuclear threat that emanates from North Korea.

**Figure 12: Strategy frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 9: Words in strategy frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>strategic policy (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	System, maintenance, policy, changes, toward North Korea, relations, strategy, improve, north-south, orientation, possibilities, access, context-aware, directions, inside, reforms, attitude	정책 변화 체제 관계 대 북 전략 유지 남북 개방 개선 자세 가능성 상황 인식 방향 내부 접근 개혁 태도
<b>nuclear negotiations (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	US, Secretary, North, Korea, North Korea, nuclear, talks, unified, government, diplomacy, resolved, North Korean, ambassador, Washington, state, international, policy	미국 핵 북한 장관 북 한 국 정부 통일 회담 외교 협상 대북 한반도 워싱턴 정책 국무부 대사 해결 국제

The “strategic policy” frame peaks in 1994 due to the triggered expectations for North Korean instability after the death of Kim Il-sung in this year. The frame assesses the North Korean position and intentions in order to adopt a suitable strategy for cooperation.

Thus, this frame is high during the Basic Agreement of 1991 and also in 1996, where North Korea attempted to negotiate terms with the United States in the Four Party Talks<sup>109</sup>. However, the negotiations between North Korea and the United States failed and South Korea's closeness to the United States was problematized. For example, as North Korea was afraid of absorptive unification, South Korea needed a strategy to change North Korea's perception of South Korea-U.S. relations ("Negotiating North Korea policy by setting gradual goals"<sup>110</sup> April 19 1996). It briefly rises in 2000 during the summit talks but diminishes greatly overall. This shows that cooperative strategy is no more needed, as South Korea later defines North Korea as the "main enemy"<sup>111</sup> and a hostile power. In this frame, strategic policy faces the challenge of identifying North Korea's true intentions ("Two-faced North Korea"<sup>112</sup> May 24, 1992). Assessments of North Korean perceptions and intentions can only be estimated by the government's informed judgement of North Korean leadership actions ("Kim Il-sung's New Year's speech and Inter-Korean relations"<sup>113</sup> January 4, 1993) or by the surrounding powers ("China will actively support the Kim Jong-il system"<sup>114</sup> July 15, 1994). This frame stresses that unification strategy is a multi-layered game that is based on state-level evaluations of North Korean intents

---

<sup>109</sup> "Pukhan Chöngpo P'ot'öl : Nampuk Kwankye Chisik Kwanli Sangse Poki" 2016

<sup>110</sup> Pukchöngch'aek hapüi... tankyechök mokp'yo sölchöngül

<sup>111</sup> "Candidate Moon remarks that denoting North Korea as main enemy is inappropriate- Ministry of Defense replies this is common procedure" (Mun Chaein "Pukhan chuchök p'yoki puchökchöl" palön e kukpangpu "Kichon Kukpang Paeksö p'yohyön yuchi pangch'im") *Joongang Ilbo*, October 30, 2012

<sup>112</sup> Tu ölkul üi pukhan (Sasöl)

<sup>113</sup> Kim Il-söng Sinnyönsa wa nampukkwankye (Sasöl)

<sup>114</sup> Kim Chöng-il ch'eche Chungkuk i chökkük topnünta

(“Differences between past governments and their North Korea policies”<sup>115</sup> February 12, 1999).

In further highlighting risk and state action, the “nuclear negotiations” frame peaks in 1994 in reaction to North Korea’s withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)<sup>116</sup>, and depicts the ensuing chain of international concerns and sanctions. The frame refers to the problem of nuclear isolation by North Korea, especially when it suspended its membership from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1994. This decision bars nuclear inspections by external experts, and only the following negotiations and the settling of the “Agreed Framework” between the United States and North Korea in October 1994 revives inspections and nuclear transparency. Any following usage of nuclear power entails sanctions by the UN and member countries (“Sanctions will follow if fuel rods are forcefully replaced”<sup>117</sup> May 8, 1994) and jeopardizes the Non-Proliferation Treaty (“South Korea and United States collide regarding peaceful usage of nuclear power”<sup>118</sup> August 12, 2005). In this frame, nuclear proliferation is an imminent threat of war and the highest possible risk. Thus, the binding ability of the state is of paramount value.

Figure 13: Deterrence frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) and Table 10: Words in deterrence frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) show which emphases have grown over time. In accordance to the

---

<sup>115</sup> Kwakö chöngpu wa Taepuk chöngch'aek ch'aichöm


<sup>116</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency. “Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards” Accessed May 13, 2016. <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisories/fact-sheet-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>

<sup>117</sup> Yönllyopong kyoch'e kanghaeng ttaen chechae

<sup>118</sup> “Puk p'yöngwachök haek iyong pochang” Han/Mi chöngmyön ch'ungtol yangsang

decrease of negotiation frames, deterrence frames project realistic threat and the state's role of powerful deterrence in the frames "military" and "nuclear risk". These two frames increase steadily over time and peak at corresponding events: "military" refers to South Korean military and US military stationed in South Korea<sup>119</sup>; it peaks when framing the armed provocations by North Korea in 2010, specifically the supposed sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and the subsequent shelling of a South Korean Island. Thus, the importance of US military support is emphasized in the face of actual threat by North Korea. "Nuclear risk" frames nuclear and missile developments in North Korea and includes tests, missiles<sup>120</sup>, nuclear weapons, development, and possible weapons of mass destructions.

**Figure 13: Deterrence frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



<sup>119</sup> Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, July 9, 1966, U.S.-S. Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677

<sup>120</sup> Together with nuclear weapons, missiles pose a basket risk: "North Korean missiles have become a far more prominent problem than was the case when the Agreed Framework was signed. It implicitly puts the missile problem on the agenda" (Armitage 1999, 7).

**Table 10: Words in deterrence frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>Military</b> <b>(<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	US, Department of Defense, military, war, troops, trained, division, naval, vessels, unified, security, force, commander, North Korean, army, combat, defense, force	군사 작전 전쟁 부대 국방부 미군 사단 해 군 통일 훈련 척 병력 안보 국방 공군 전투 북한 사령관 육군
<b>nuclear risk</b> <b>(<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	North, American, nuclear, missile, weapons, circumstances, likely, threaten, Korean, Peninsula, nuclear weapons, development, tests, launched, unified, security, situation, mass, warfare, systems	핵 미사일 무기 미국 북한 상황 위협 가능 성 핵무기 한반도 개 발 실험 발사 통일 사 태 대량 안보 전쟁 체 제

The “military” frame highlights that the state holds the power of deterrence whenever necessary, especially due to its alliance with the U.S. military. Thus, it legitimates both the state’s role of defense and the stationing of U.S. forces since the Cold War. Due to its support of U.S. military presence, this frame is best understood as counter-framing in the context of anti-American sentiments and as affirmative framing in the case of North Korean deterrence. Thus, this frame peaks in 1996 after violations of the armistice agreement by North Korean troops and infiltrations by North Korean naval patrol crafts<sup>121</sup> . Abnormal behavior by North Korea leads to immediate joint measures against potential invasion (“Reinforcements by 20,000 US soldiers as first countermeasure to signs of threat”<sup>122</sup> April 9, 1996). In 1999 and 2002 respectively, the First and Second Battles of Yeonpyeong Island took place at the Northern Limit Line

<sup>121</sup> See also Fischer, 2007

<sup>122</sup> Chinghu tankye ch'öt choch'ilo mikun 2-man chüngwön

(NLL), the maritime boundary between the two Koreas<sup>123</sup>. Further in 2002, a U.S. armored vehicle ran over two South Korean schoolgirls. A U.S. court martial finds both of the accused U.S. soldiers not guilty, and this incident leads to a national wave of demonstrations regarding the “revision of SOFA<sup>124</sup>”. The spirit of anti-Americanism reaches its peak around this time<sup>125</sup>, and creates a “large nationwide, coalition-building movement” among the Korean public, possibly incited by political entrepreneurs who sought to strengthen the platform of the progressive presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun<sup>126</sup>. Political tension in the form of anti-Americanism indeed polarized the progressive and conservative camps of South Korea. As one illustration, President George Bush’s “axil of evil” speech of 2002 and his disapproval of the sunshine policy directly offended the Kim Dae-jung government, but simultaneously confirmed the reservations that the South Korean conservative camp held towards the sunshine policy<sup>127</sup>. Thus, this *Chosun*

---

<sup>123</sup> These incidents spark doubt amongst the public opinion whether the sunshine policy works in a behavior-correcting manner or not (Jason Kim and Herman 2012).

<sup>124</sup> SOFA stands for the Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement.

<sup>125</sup> In 2003, two legal scholars write: “Crimes by U.S. service members and, by extension, the Korea SOFA have increasingly become a controversial issue in Korea, and the accident that killed the two girls served as a catalyst for the recent explosion of such popular demands” (Jung Youngjin and Hwang Jun-Shik 2002, 1105).

<sup>126</sup> Indeed, the thrust of public anti-Americanism in regards to Cold War deterrence structures, which corresponds to anti-conservatism, enabled Roh Moo-hyun to win the presidential elections of 2002 (Lee Yoon-Ho Alex 2003, 217).

<sup>127</sup> The sources of anti-Americanism are complex, but all are intertwined with ideological cleavages of South Korea. Kim Seung-Hwan overviews them as follows: Firstly, the media played its part of multiplying resentment towards the United States, by their framing of a controversial gold medal loss of a South Korean short-track skater to an U.S. competitor, followed by discriminatory remarks of the talk show host Jay Leno; secondly, the changing demographic structure, where the younger generations do not possess shared Cold War experiences and therefore are less willing to

*Ilbo* frame reflects the increasing efforts of the conservative camp to portray the United States Forces in Korea in the light of due necessity for the interest of security. The increase of this frame over time therefore intends to counter opposing frames that reproduce anti-Americanism and pro-Northwards sentiments as embodied by the sunshine policy.

Most importantly, the “military” frame peaks momentarily at two formative instances in 2006 in 2010. In 2006, North Korean tests of short-range missiles and its subsequent carrying out of nuclear tests prompted counter-signaling measures in the form of joint military exercises; in this manner, South Korean and U.S. military signal their constant readiness for physical deterrence and the alliance with greater powers<sup>128</sup>. Again in 2010, ROK-US joint military exercises symbolized deterrence against North Korea who was suspected to have torpedoed and sunk a South Korean vessel, killing 47 crew members<sup>129</sup> (“Antisubmarine bombs and self-propelled artillery”<sup>130</sup> August 6, 2010). In

---

tolerate U.S. domination despite the U.S.-ROK alliance; thirdly, ideological anti-Americanism has previously existed among leftists and extremists. Since the 1980s and 1990s, these groups have identified with the North Korean political ideology and demanded the expulsion of U.S. forces from the South (Kim Seung-Hwan 2002).

<sup>128</sup> Also in 2006, “the United States and the ROK reached a bilateral agreement to transfer wartime operational control of military forces from U.S. to South Korean command”, which was planned to take place by 2012 but “has been postponed until December 2015, with political pressure on both sides to renegotiate if not defer these plans indefinitely” (Hwang Balbina Y. 2016, 6). The deferring of these plans is in the intention of the conservative camp, which succeeded the government reigns after 2008 and is in stronger favor of stationing U.S. forces in South Korea than the progressive camp.

<sup>129</sup> Determining the culprit of this attack has remained controversial fodder for polarized politics, as North Korea has never fully admitted its conduct: “Immediate suspicion was cast on the North, with most members of the Lee Myung Bak government believing it was a North Korean torpedo. A



November of the same year, North Korea bombarded civilians and military stationed on a South Korean island, which escalated tension to the most serious levels after the Korean War<sup>131</sup>. Ramifications of this event clearly mobilized this frame, which shows clearly in the frame's increase in 2010. Overall, this frame posits war as constant reality and reinforces the parallel reality of state-led deterrence in South Korea, both as commander of defense and facilitator of allied defense against North Korean threat. This frame reflects the conservative camp's stance towards the U.S. alliance and the U.S. military in South Korea; the frame aims to defend the U.S. presence on the peninsula under domestic tensions that oppose it<sup>132</sup>.

The frame "nuclear risk" provides a second insight towards shifting and increasing frames for unification by the conservative camp over time. In parallel to the necessity of allied military defense in the face of a misbehaving and unpredictable North Korea, the frame "nuclear risk" is the emphasis on domestic and international binding power on North

---

subsequent investigation by an international team concluded the same, although the North has strongly denied any responsibility" (Jason Kim and Herman 2012, 8–9).

<sup>130</sup> Pata esŏn Taech'ŏnham p'okloe... Yŏnp'yŏngtoe sŏn K-9 chachup'o pul ppumŏ

<sup>131</sup> These two events prompted the signaling of solidarity by President Obama and Secretary Clinton. Thus, "US responses to North Korea's provocations have been treated primarily as an opportunity to show solidarity with its alliance partners in Northeast Asia" (Snyder and Byun See-Won 2011, 77–78).

<sup>132</sup> An entry on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges the social character of SOFA as follows in 2007: "It is related to national emotions and is easily incited. Especially since the schoolgirls' deaths, stationed U.S. forces also share concerns regarding political backlashes and the spread of anti-American sentiments". Further, it considers critical perspectives in South Korea: "SOFA is an institutional mechanism that backs the privileged status of U.S. Forces in Korea. It is critically perceived as unjust and subject to revision, as conflicting with our country's legal order, and as mirroring the nature of relations between South Korea and the United States due to its relation to our autonomy and independence".

Korea due to justified dangers. The determining of causal connections of what propelled the North Korean nuclear crisis is highly connected to ideological values of a newspaper and leads to starkly differing interpretations<sup>133</sup>.

In a quick overview, I highlight the points of time where this frame becomes activated. It increases in 1991 by reporting on the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, where both countries agreed not to engage in nuclear weapon activities or possess related facilities<sup>134</sup>. In 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which unleashed diplomatic crises. Reaching resolution in 1994, the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework was created that sought to freeze and eventually eliminate nuclear facilities in North Korea<sup>135</sup>. In 1996 and 1997, the first and second rounds of U.S.-North Korean missile talks take

---

<sup>133</sup> This gap of interpretation can be illustrated in how newspapers determine why the Agreed Framework failed: while a conservative newspaper posits that North Korea disposed of the Agreed Framework in order to test nuclear weapons, a progressive newspaper points out as the primary cause the “axis of evil” definition by President Bush and thus the breaking of agreed terms (Choi Jong-hwan, Kwak Dae-sup, and Kim Sung-wook 2016).

<sup>134</sup> The declaration had five elements: 1) No nuclear weapons on the peninsula including U.S. owned weapons; 2) to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes; 3) no related facilities, which is the part that North Korea later violated by attempting to repossess at Yongbyun; 4) to conduct mutual inspections; 5) and to establish the Joint Nuclear Control Commission for the purpose of above mentioned bilateral inspections (Kim B. K. 2001).

<sup>135</sup> Alongside the Agreed Framework, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is founded to build two light water reactors. In fact, KEDO “was not at its core a technical or a construction organization but a political one” (Kartman, Carlin, and Wit 2012, 8). The Kim Young-sam government welcomed KEDO with high hopes and enthusiasm. The then-Deputy Executive Director of KEDO is quoted as follows: “Almost all in the ROK government and most media agreed that South Koreans should have leading positions (in KEDO) ... because they believed there was too much political damage from the Agreed Framework negotiations” (Kartman, Carlin, and Wit 2012, 19).

place<sup>136</sup>.

From 2002 to 2004, nuclear risk undergoes serious crises while the sunshine policy continues under the progressive government of President Kim Dae-jung. In 2002, North Korea was addressed with hostile rhetoric by President Bush and issued several threats<sup>137</sup>. Meanwhile, President Kim Dae jung's insisted that the sunshine policy was without alternative and dismissed his Foreign Minister as a sign for his disapproval of President Bush's statement<sup>138</sup>. As North Korea is suspected to develop nuclear weapons and reactivates nuclear facilities, the Agreed Framework is disposed. From 2003, a series of Six Party Talks begins to settle mutual agreements; however, they are terminated five years later due to non-cooperation by North Korea, while the "nuclear risk" frame only pays limited attention to them. Causes and stances to this nuclear crisis are interpreted in polarized ways, whereby the conservative stance tends to regard the sunshine policy as a failed attempt to dismantle the Cold War logic of inter-Korean relations<sup>139</sup>. In the following

---

<sup>136</sup> "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association" Arms Control Association. Accessed May 10, 2016.  
<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2009>

<sup>137</sup> "After October 2002 North Korea issued several threats including a resumption of long-range missile tests, the proliferation of nuclear materials to other countries, and the testing of a nuclear weapon" (Niksich 2005, 3).

<sup>138</sup> Due to the Foreign Minister's closeness to the U.S. government; among further fallouts in the domestic South Korean realm, "student demonstrators and civic groups organized anti-U.S. protests and one radical student group occupied the offices of the American Chamber of Commerce" (Gross 2002, 3).

<sup>139</sup> Further, the nuclear crisis took place during the transition of government from Kim Dae-jung to Roh Moo-hyun, who was inexperienced in foreign and nuclear affairs; thus, from this perspective, the Kim Dae-jung government can be criticized for undermining the early signs of nuclear development in the 1990s and neglecting due measures in its sunshine policy (Chun Sung-hoon 2007).

Roh Moo-hyun government, the certified certainty of North Korean nuclear weapon development, in conjunction with the Six Party Talks, led to a gradual convergence between the government's stance and the U.S. approach<sup>140</sup>.

Along the above string of escalating events and worsening nuclear risk, the weakened legacy of the sunshine policy strengthened the conservative frame of "nuclear crisis", which mirrors the U.S. approach to North Korean nuclear risk. It naturally peaks in 2006 by framing the first nuclear tests by North Korea, then again in 2009 at the second nuclear tests, and in 2013 at the third nuclear tests<sup>141</sup>.

Figure 14: Stakeholder frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) show three frames that regard alternative state strategies of involving North Korea into economic relations to produce further binding dependencies. Table 11: Words in stakeholder frames substantiates these frames by showing word compositions. "Urban industrial planning" refers to South Korean city planning in areas proximate to the North Korean border, which expects the possibility of unification by expanding accordingly. "Economic special zones at risk" points to inter-Korean special economic projects, such as the *Kaesong Industrial Complex*, and frames how these efforts are thwarted by North Korean provocations that hold these projects as ransom. "Economic development" is then a frame that connects unification with economic development for both Koreas. It therefore emphasizes socioeconomic gains, from which South Korean citizens can profit, should unification take place and should South Korea be prepared.

---

<sup>140</sup> Chun Sung-hoon 2007

<sup>141</sup> "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association" Arms Control Association. Accessed May 10, 2016.  
<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2009>

Figure 14: Stakeholder frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)




Table 11: Words in stakeholder frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
urban and industrial planning ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Construction, projects, promoting, regional, development, urban, facilities, construction, scale, environments, complex, create, unified, metropolitan, residents, planned, road, household	건설 계획 사업 지역 개발 도시 시설 추진 공사 조성 통일 단지 규모 환경 도로 가구 예정 주민 수도권
economic special zones at risk ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	North Korea, Kaesong, inter-Korean, Kaesong Industrial Complex, Cheonan, government, actions, North, Korea, Unification, Ministry, officials, suspended, South Korea, North Korean, provocations, Commission, officials	개성 북한 개성공단 공단 남북 북 통일부 정부 천안 조치 대북 당국자 북측 위원회 관계자 도발 대남 중단 통
economic development ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Economy, social, development, field, challenges, country, century, era, policy, reforms, promoting, growth, strengthened, central, market, presents, companies, establish, institutions	경제 분야 사회 발전 과제 국가 세기 정책 개혁 성장 추진 시대 강화 중심 시장 제시 기업 마련 제도

Economic cooperation as a means to restoring peace is not a new idea in South Korea, at least since the 1990s and the Basic Agreement of 1991, which was created at a time of extreme famine in North Korea. These aims were further promoted during the sunshine policy, and the main achievements include the *Mt. Keumkang* tourism project since 1998 and the *Kaesong Industrial Complex* since 2002. In both projects, South

Korean capital and management conduct economic activities in North Korean areas. Driven by the sunshine policy, inter-Korean trade volumes since their admission in 1988 grew from 13% in 1998 to 26% in 2005 compared to North Korea's total trade volumes<sup>142</sup>. Thus, trade volumes as well as economic exchange and economic support grow especially due to the sunshine policy under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. However, these achievements are little mentioned by *Chosun Ilbo*; its reactions to progressive economic policy over the ten years of progressive governments are muted. It however activates alongside worsening inter-Korean relations, by applying a negative frame on economic special zones.

By preparing for the possibility of unification with economic resources, unification creates stakeholders in both Koreas. The aim is create a binding incentive for North Korea, while ensuring economic prosperity for South Korea in the long run. Such preparation starts with domestic urban planning, as shown by the frame “urban and industrial planning”. In South Korea, the urban planning of national infrastructure and territories close to the border often include the prospect of unification in their plans (“Complete overhaul of transportation network”<sup>143</sup> January 12, 1995). Such economic development can be understood as preparation for “efficient” unification, among other goals (“The true road towards internationalization”<sup>144</sup> January 11, 1993). As this frame is relatively unaffected by political orientation, it increases both under the progressive Roh Moo-hyun and the conservative Lee Myung-bak governments.

---

<sup>142</sup> National Archives of Korea. Accessed May 12, 2016.

<http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=007093&pageFlag=A>

<sup>143</sup> Kikan kyot'ongmang chŏnmyŏn chaep'yŏn

<sup>144</sup> Chinchŏngha kukchehwa ūi kil (Sasŏl)

In more recent years, the frame of economic development *for* unification has evolved to economic development *through* unification. This is shown by the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “economic development”. It creates a connection between economic gains, jobs creation, and growth that could be stimulated by unification (“After unification, helping North Korean refugees to start businesses in North Korea”<sup>145</sup> March 28, 2014). In this sense, President Park devised the agenda “unification bonanza” that suggested an economic incentive for unification. This logic has been continuously expressed in this initiative, which she first mentioned in her 2014 New Year’s press conference<sup>146</sup> and further elaborated in addresses towards domestic citizens. In this initiative’s rhetoric, the background assumption is that North Korea is likely to suddenly collapse at some point, as was the case in East Germany; the likening of unification’s consequences to a bonanza suggests that the benefit of unification will outweigh the costs of unification or the costs of staying divided. Accordingly, this frame rises in 2014, when this initiative is first proclaimed, as *Chosun Ilbo* mentions it in a positive light.

Towering over economic development frames is the inter-Korean relationship that can escalate and put inter-Korean economic projects to an abrupt halt. This manifests clearly during the Lee Myung-bak government, which turns away from the sunshine policy and places primacy on denuclearization in exchange for economic assistance<sup>147</sup>. North

---

<sup>145</sup> “T’ongil hu t’alpok ch’öngsönyön Pukhan nae ch’angöp topketta”

<sup>146</sup> “Unification will become big bonanza only with thorough preparation”, *Donga Ilbo*, January 7, 2014.

<sup>147</sup> The Lee government proclaimed the following points in the “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” plan: The ties to the U.S. alliance, direct criticism of North Korean human rights violations, humanitarian aid in exchange to adequate monitoring of humanitarian aid, and lastly denuclearization as condition for economic assistance. “In short, South Korea’s provision of

Korea's acceptance of these changed terms was difficult and deteriorated inter-Korean relations. Thus, every inter-Korean escalation put special economic projects at risk, and the frame "economic special zones at risk" illustrates that North Korea uses them as leverage for blackmailing. The frame therefore increases in 2009 and 2010 after armed provocations by North Korea, causing inter-Korean stalemates on political and economic dimensions alike. The stakeholder strategy is thought to have a small degree of leverage due to the North Korean dependence on economic income ("Blackmailing by threatening to close down the *Kaesong Industrial Complex*"<sup>148</sup>, May 26, 2010). However, under high military tension it is often ineffective for inducing North Korea to cooperate ("North Korea says: "Stop military provocation if you care about the *Kaesong Industrial Complex*"<sup>149</sup>, May 6, 2013). The frame then increases in 2013 after the 3<sup>rd</sup> nuclear tests that take place during President Park Geun-hye's government. Its increase at this time suggests that the Park government faces the same challenges as the preceding government, and does not repeat the sunshine policy. However, the successive increase of the "economic development" frame in the following year also suggests that her North Korea policy is nevertheless framed as an updated aim<sup>150</sup>.

#### **5.1.4. Collective memory and political triggers in *Hankyoreh* frames**

As shown above, the conservative frame of the state role diminishes the role of

---

economic aid to the North will be reciprocal in nature and linked to the abandonment of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program" (Kim Hong Nack 2008, 6).

<sup>148</sup> [Ch'önanham taepuk chechae] "Kaesöngkongtan to tatül su itta" Hyöppaksöng mesichi

<sup>149</sup> Puk "Nam, Kaesöngkongtan kökchöng toemyön kunsachök topal chungchi hala"


<sup>150</sup> As an external fact that might have led to this frame dynamic, the coupling of principled relations and economic development corresponds to her proclaimed *Trustpolitik* (Kang David C. 2013).



culture, which forms a contrast to the emotional interpretations of unification in the progressive newspaper and therefore the increase of cultural frames. State-level policy mobilizes value frames in *Hankyoreh* that connect with the historical implication and cultural meaning of unification.

Figure 15: Co-existence frames (*Hankyoreh*) show the *Hankyoreh* frames “one Korean nation” and “South-North family reunions”, which underline the progressive interpretation of unification. Table 12: Words in co-existence frames substantiate these frames. “One Korean nation” refers to peaceful cooperation, trust, and the co-existence of two countries that belong together as one. “South-North family reunions” refer to the events that inter-Korean state actors facilitated as mass-scale meetings between the families who were and still are tragically kept apart by the throes of war and prolonged division of the country.

**Figure 15: Co-existence frames (*Hankyoreh*)**



**Table 12: Words in co-existence frames (*Hankyoreh*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>one Korean nation (Hankyoreh)</b>	Minjok, South-North, division, division, peace, reconciliation, North Korea, unification, Korean, peninsula, North, exchange, South Korea, state, South-North, Koreas, system, war, era, peaceful, reunification, declare, efforts	민족 남북 분단 평화 화해 북한 통일 한반도 북 교류 남한 국가 남북한 체제 전쟁 시대 평화통일 선언 노

		력
<b>South-North family reunions (Hankyoreh)</b>	Delegation, visit, Pyongyang, northern, southern, South-North, unification, ceremony, Minjok, arrival, attend, reunions, North, Korea, chairman, separated, families, visiting North Korea	평양 북쪽 남쪽 남북 행사 대표단 방문 통일 호텔 도착 상봉 민족 공동 북 참석 북한 이산가족 위원장 방북

The frame “one Korean nation” emphasizes the sustaining of peace between the two Koreas. It is fairly high before the first summit talks and during the high hopes for unification in the early governments; it peaks in 2000 when the first summit talks are successfully conducted and heightens expectations for peaceful coordination with North Korea. However, it fails to hold up equally in the following years and barely increases during the next summit talks in 2007. Compared to its high in 2000, this frame merely disappears and *Hankyoreh* fails at establishing this frame. Examples are appeals that the South Korean government should approach North Korea in a trust-building and autonomous manner that breaks free from the influential interests of the international stakeholders (“At the turning point of national history”<sup>151</sup> June 13, 2000). Another example equates education about unification with education about peace, in order to avoid war or war-like animosities that will entail casualties (“The Korean War as opportunity to educate about peace”<sup>152</sup> June 23, 2003).

In turn, the frame “South-North family reunions” peaks in 2000, then increases marginally at the following family reunions that take place every year from 2001 to 2007, then in 2009 and 2010, and lastly in 2014<sup>153</sup>. It however steadily mutes down while

<sup>151</sup> [Sasŏl] Minchoksa ūi chŏnhwan chŏme sŏsŏ

<sup>152</sup> [Yi Sang-sŏn ūi hakkyo iyaki] “6-25” lŭl p’yŏnghwa kyoyuk kyekilo

<sup>153</sup> Statistics Korea. Accessed May 14, 2016. <http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/>

neglecting some years where family reunions took place. Its gradual insignificance mirrors that of the above frame “one Korean nation”, which is symptomatic for these frames that expound peaceful co-existence on the grounds of history and kinship values.

Both frames “one Korean nation” and “South-North family reunions” peak in the year 2000, when the first summit talks between the inter-Korean heads of state are joined by the first family reunion meetings. However, both frames die down over time and are diminished by conservative frames; thus, they fail to dominate against mounting pressures from the *Chosun Ilbo* frames that negate the cultural and emotional appeals of *Hankyoreh* frames.

Figure 16: Civic struggle frames (*Hankyoreh*) are further frames that illustrate great differences between the progressive and conservative frames, by emphasizing civic and civil levels for the meaning of unification. Table 13: Words in civic struggle frames substantiate these frames. To illustrate, I show the frames “demonstrations” and “modern Korean history”, which refer continuously back to civic struggles during the democratization movements and their battles against the dictatorial and autocratic regimes. Thus, the decline of these frames from their high presence reflects the decline of authoritarianism over the years, to which the progressive stance is clearly defined. While frames that refer to precise historical happenings naturally decline over time, they can be enlivened by framing, as the “modern Korean history” frame shows in 2012. Both frames are related to unification by connecting it to unsettled history and emotional battle cries at state violence and its inflicted injustices. The fact that these frames are able to connect to unification is an illustration of the wide-spectrum applicability of emotional frames in regards to deep-seated Korean issues, and the progressive camp’s willingness to do so.

Figure 16: Civic struggle frames (*Hankyoreh*)




Table 13: Words in civic struggle frames (*Hankyoreh*)

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>demonstrations</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Assembly, unification, civil, police, protest, rally, competitions, hundred thousand, square, Jongno, student, demands, nationwide, area, sitting, protest, members, belonging, Gwangju	집회 시위 경찰 시민 백여명 통일 대회 천 여명 광장 종로 학생 요구 농성 전국 항의 지역 소속 회원 광주
<b>modern Korean history</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Democratization, authoritarian, regime, democratic, merits, people's, politics, military, movement, president, Chun Doo-hwan, national, struggle, restoration, Gwangju, Park Chung-hee, event, powers, Yushin	정권 민주화 독재 민 주 공 대통령 항쟁 운동 군사 민중 정치 국민 투쟁 전두환 유 신 광주 박정희 사건 세력

The previously high frame “demonstrations” is decreased by the year of 1998. This reflects that major problems with settling the past had been solved. Particularly, the May 18 Gwangju Uprising of 1980 was an act of covert state violence, where a military junta realized its violent succession of power after the assassination of Dictator Park Chung-hee, killing thousands of civilians who took to demonstration against the Chun Doo-hwan government in the Southern town of Gwangju. Under the new military regime,

the true happenings of this incident were kept under covers<sup>154</sup>. The truth eventually and gradually became institutionalized in the public mind, with the Roh Tae-woo government renaming it as the “Gwangju Democratization Movement” and the Kim Young-sam government granting legislation to the Special Act on Gwangju Democratization Movement (Gwangju Special Act). This frame peaks in 1995 at the time of organized civic protest: The One Million Signature Movement in mid-September 1995 was launched by about 60 civic associations and political activist groups who demanded the legal rights for punishment<sup>155</sup>. Thus, this frame’s decrease by 1998 can be explained by two main factors: the establishment of truth initiatives and truth commissions that led to the institutionalization of historical retribution, coupled with the entering of democratization activists into government, for which Kim Dae-jung is a representative example. Further, this frame increases in 2008 by reporting on the nationwide candlelight demonstrations that arose in protest against the Lee Myung-bak government’s decision to import U.S. beef via the Free Trade Agreement, which overrode public fear and risk of mad cow disease at a cost. In many readings of this event, the progressive framing has been interpreted as protest against conservative hegemony<sup>156</sup> and unfair terms by the United

---

<sup>154</sup> “The military regime gave the May 18 Uprising a variety of labels, ranging from “the Gwangju Incident,” or a “riot,” to “a civil war instigated by impure forces intending to topple the government,” and depicted the Gwangju citizens as a mob or criminals” (Ahn Jong-cheol 2002, 115).

<sup>155</sup> This nation-wide civil action eventually enabled the arrest of former President Chun Doo-hwan, and led to the passing of the “Special Act on the Statutory Limitations for the Crimes of Disrupting Constitutional Order” in December 1995 (Ahn Jong-cheol 2002).

<sup>156</sup> In other words, “the deepening of neoliberal restructuring by the new conservative regime formed the underlying causes of these intense conflicts” (Lee Seung-Ook, Kim Sook-Jin, and Wainwright 2010, 359)

States<sup>157</sup>. Thus, parts of the progressive framing of demonstrations share the same elements as the progressive framing for unification as the overcoming of Cold War structures. In this sense, it is related to modern Korean history, especially by emotional undertones.

Similarly to the “demonstrations” frame but more continuously in content, the “modern Korean history” frame is laden with references to past dictatorial presidents and distinct interpretations of modern Korean history and its rulers. Again, such frames show the ability of reproduction at later times. This connotation is well illustrated by the increase of the frame “modern Korean history” during the presidential election campaigns in 2012. It framed the presidential candidacy and eventual victory of Park Geun-hye, who was portrayed as not only the physical, but also the political descendant of her father, the late autocratic President Park Chung-hee.

Figure 17: Political struggle frames (*Hankyoreh*) show two frames that underline recent repercussions of modern Korean history: “red labeling” and “political persecution”. Table 14: Words in political struggle frames (*Hankyoreh*) substantiates both frames. Red labeling can be understood as the practice of anti-communism that has prevailed as a remnant of the Cold War structures that prevail in Korea, propped by the ongoing division and de facto situation of war. Due to this contextual constant, red labeling still sustains to this day the legitimacy of identifying and persecuting pro-North persons and organizations.

---

<sup>157</sup> In other words, “while the protests initially emerged in response to fear of health risks and criticism of the unfair terms of the beef deal with the United States, their later development was intertwined profoundly with how the state dealt with the conflicts as well as how public opinion responded to them” (Lee Jung-Eun 2012, 405)

In parallel, “political persecution” concerns non-converted long-term prisoners<sup>158</sup> who suffered just or unjust persecution under the past history of espionage and counter-espionage in the ideological dichotomy of divided Korea. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission<sup>159</sup> was enacted by the South Korean Assembly under President Kim Dae-jung from 2005 to 2010 and sought to investigate state violence that occurred since the period of Japanese rule to the present time. The historical roots of state violence behind these initiatives are intertwined with the past autocratic regimes and their legacies in the contemporary conservative camp, which is less critical about state crimes of the past. For these reasons, the reconciliation of modern Korean history remains an active challenge<sup>160</sup>, with the main difficulty being the conservative hegemony. Thus, the progressive camp still

---


<sup>158</sup> “The south Korean authorities announced that the number of north Korean spies that they arrested or killed after 1961 is about 3,000. After the military coup of 1961 led by Park Chung Hee, about 182 were put to death under the charge of violation of the National Security Law. At least two thirds of them were allegedly known as north Korean agents. Like invisible men, it was very difficult to find records on them. What most victims of capital punishment and all the long-term prisoners did in south Korea were these things; spending one or two days at home in the south; meeting with relatives or friends; or merely crossing the border.” (Han Hong-gu 2011, English abstract)

<sup>159</sup> Its mandate was as follows: “The Commission was tasked to investigate incidents regarding human rights abuses, violence, and massacres occurring since the period of Japanese rule to the present time, specifically during the nation’s authoritarian regimes. The mandate covered approximately one century and started with the beginning of Japanese rule over Korea and ended with the fall of the authoritarian regimes in South Korea. The Commission was tasked to screen petitions received by individuals, investigate and decide cases, and recommend measures to help establish truth and reconciliation.” (United States Institute of Peace, “Truth Commission: South Korea 2005”, Accessed May 15, 2016, <http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-korea-2005>)

<sup>160</sup> “The Commission must answer questions beyond individual cases and also investigate a second type of truth – the historical and societal truth that includes the background, cause, situation, perpetrators, mechanism of killing, death toll, identification of victims, and legal responsibilities of the governments involved” (Kim Dong-choon 2010, 7).

seeks responsibility for this issue from current representatives of the conservative camp.

**Figure 17: Political struggle frames (*Hankyoreh*)**



**Table 14: Words in political struggle frames (*Hankyoreh*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>red labeling</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Forces, claim, criticism, freedom, -ism, Republic of Korea, <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> , regime, democratic, media, democracy, North, state, politics, professor, Korea, logic	세력 주장 비판 자유 주의 대한민국 민국 보수 대한 정권 민주 언론 민주주의 북 교수 국가 정치 한국 논리
<b>political persecution</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, ikhwan, memorial, hospital, bereaved, family, denied, prison, long-term, prisoner, renounce, events, at the time, prison, release, imprisoned, deceased, son, died	문익환 익환 목사 병원 추모 가족 유족 부인 장기수 전향 감옥 사건 당시 석방 교도소 아들 수감 고인 사망

Red labeling has been decried and defended from the polarized political camps, and the progressive camp naturally disperses arguments of anger and dissatisfaction<sup>161</sup>. Thus, red labeling bears similarities to McCarthyism but differs from its continuity and

<sup>161</sup> The red labeling frame has been described as an ideological specter that is anachronistic, and the recent conservative regimes have been criticized for modifying and abusing it for political purposes (Seon U-hyeon 2014); as threatening for democracy in South Korea (Kim Jong-in 2014)



modified usage over time. Labels carry various names, including “pro-North”, “following the North”, and “pro-North Leftist”<sup>162</sup>, which are primarily used as a discursive weapon by the conservative camp in order to apply a scarlet letter to political dissidents. Progressive retorts usually point out that these labels possess an undeniable power to exert language-based violence in the South Korean context, which the conservative camp knows too well and abuses accordingly.

The interpretational continuities of historical controversies are the most characteristic of frames in the *Hankyoreh* unification discourse. The frames “red labeling” and “political persecution” underline this point and highlight their currency even in recent times by their increase under recent conservative governments. These issues are political problems in the eyes of the progressive camp; they are not part of a national strategy and embody a characteristic difference when compared to the conservative camp. For this reason, these frames are found dominant and relatively exclusively in the progressive discourse.

The *Hankyoreh* frame “red labeling”, is a defense mechanism to the acts of red labeling. Thus, it increases under progressive governments of 1998 to 2008 in order to shield Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, who are vulnerable to such attacks of ideological framing. Tellingly, this frame is rather silent in the preceding conservative regimes before 1998. Especially the sunshine policy, as a friendly stance to the North, becomes increasingly subject to conservative framings of “pro-North” red labeling, which the *Hankyoreh* frame “red labeling” increasingly counteracts until 2008. It increases again in 2012 as the progressive camp reacts to Park Geun-hye, the daughter of a former

---

<sup>162</sup> See Chung Chang-hyun (2011)

dictator. In this frame, the national ideologies of liberal democracy and peaceful unification are harmed by oppressions of public opinion and friendliness to the United States (“National identity gets stretched”<sup>163</sup> July 1, 2008). Oppression is enacted by the color-labeling of persons as “red” and thus loyal to North Korea (“How can we justify that clearance of ideologies is needed from presidential candidates”<sup>164</sup> October 8, 1997), which is a practice that re-occurs regularly during election campaigns (“Let us boldly stand against the color logic”<sup>165</sup> June 20, 2012). The oppressive mechanisms that ruled the divided peninsula since 1945 operated their gears upon such powerful dichotomies, and left behind countless prisoners of political persecution. The increase of both frames in 2012 can therefore be explained by the references to political oppression and persecution, which were activated in *Hankyoreh* by the candidacy of Park Geun-hye<sup>166</sup> as the updated embodiment of the late autocratic President Park Chung-hee.

The frame “political persecution” is relatively low under progressive governments of 1998 to 2008 where long-term prisoners were gradually released. Thus the frame increases slightly in 1999 after President Kim Dae-jung started to pardon non-converted

---

<sup>163</sup> [Yulek’a] Kosaeng hanŭn kukka chŏngch’esŏng

<sup>164</sup> “Hupo sasang kŏmchŭng t’olonhoe” lani (Sasŏl)

<sup>165</sup> [Yi Chong-sŏk k’allŏm] Saekkkallon e tangtanghi massŏcha

<sup>166</sup> Red labeling remained a large ideological debate: “2013 was a year that not only marked the first year of the Park Geun-hye registration, but also witnessed the so-called ‘Following-North’ frame (in ideological conflicts) taking shape and gaining influence. The primary function of this frame, is in fact not to energize the animosity against the North (North Korea) primarily, but to be used in attacking opponent political factions with the accusation that it is indeed helping the ‘enemy.’ From the standpoint of all conservative parties throughout the Korean society, any faction ‘following the North’ should be regarded essentially as an anti-ROK (Republic of Korea) element and should be crushed for that reason alone.” (Kim Jong-in 2014)

long-term prisoners, either releasing them or sending them to North Korea for good<sup>167</sup>. With the onset of the conservative Lee-Myung-bank administration, this frame rises again, and peaks with the candidacy of Park Geun-hye by conjuring up the autocratic past and portraying her as a manifestation of its lasting issues. This frame therefore includes state crimes under all dictatorial regimes, including the People's Revolutionary Party Incident under Park Chung-hee, which imprisoned protesters under spying allegations<sup>168</sup> (“PRP victims remain in our hearts as flowers”<sup>169</sup> October 5, 2012).

Overall, the unresolved problems of the political past flare up in form of these two frames. This is clearly visible in 2012 as a means to negatively frame the candidacy of the political figure Park Geun-hye. These frames personify Park Geun-hye as the continuity of this violent legacy by stressing not only her biological lineage, but also by conjuring up a political lineage.

### **5.1.5. Political ideology: Dealing with modern history**

Figure 18: Ideology frames and Table 15: Words in ideology frames show how polarized camps deal with the complicated past of South Korea. For both *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo*, I show respective versions of the two frames “ideology” and “independence movement”. In the progressive *Hankyoreh*, the frame “ideology” relates to unification by emphasizing the ethnic kinship between the two Koreas. This notion of kinship can be supported by evoking the national independence movements of Korea during Japanese

---


<sup>167</sup> See Kim So-hee (1998)

<sup>168</sup> This incident has been described as “judicial murder” by the human rights monitor of South Korea. (Park Sang Kyul, “Judicial Murder or Spy?” Human Rights Monitor South Korea. Accessed May 15, 2016. <http://www.humanrightskorea.org/2012/being-a-spy-or-the-judicial-murder/>)

<sup>169</sup> Kkoch'i toen Inhyöktang hüsaengcha tül

rule, which is represented by the frame “independence movement”. In this sense, the progressive camp tends to consider the independence activism<sup>170</sup> since 1919 as the hallmark of founding the Korean nation, especially in light of the Korean Provisional Government<sup>171</sup> that set up unofficially in Shanghai in 1919.

**Figure 18: Ideology frames**



<sup>170</sup> See Shin Gi-Wook (2013)

<sup>171</sup> “It is widely known that the movement for Korean independence during the Japanese colonial period centered in and around northeastern China. Bands of Korean freedom fighters are said to have resisted the Japanese military in that region. The Korean Provisional Government (hereafter KPG) set up in China after the March 1, 1919 independence movement.” (Park Jung-Sun and Chang Paul Y. 2005, 17)

**Table 15: Words in ideology frames**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>Ideology (Hankyoreh)</b>	Socialist, -ism, economic, century, social, reform, growth, change, era, culture, democracy, system, development, reality, democratic, structure, market, oriented, professor	사회 주의 경제 세기 사회적 개혁 성장 변 화 시대 문화 민주주 의 체제 발전 현실 민 주 구조 시장 중심 교 수
<b>independence movement (Hankyoreh)</b>	Japanese, history, liberation, war, movement, independent, ethnic, Korean, Japan, modern history, at the time, revolution, Kim Ku, Rhee Syng-man, historical, baekbeom, anti-Japanese, independence, movement, Korea	일제 역사 해방 독립 민족 조선 일본 전쟁 운동 현대사 당시 이 승만 혁명 김구 역사 적 독립운동 한국 백 범 항일
<b>ideology (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	Democratic, -ism, forces, democracy, freedom, Chosun Ilbo, political, ideology, Hankyoreh, democratization, regime, critics, argue, authoritarian, leftist, movement, system, reform	주의 세력 민주 민주 주의 사회 보수 자유 이념 진보 정권 정치 민주화 비판 체제 좌 파 주장 독재 운동 개 혁
<b>independence movement (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	Japan, Republic of Korea, independence, movement, history, anniversary, founding, peoples, Minjok, government, establish, independence, liberation, war, Korean, teacher, Rhee Syng-man	민국 대한민국 대한 독립 주년 역사 일제 운동 민족 건국 광복 해방 정부 한국 전쟁 이승만 조선 선생 수 립

The *Hankyoreh* frame “ideology” includes discussions about what are progressive and conservative ideologies in South Korea. Its main mode of doing so is by othering the conservative ideology, in order to argue how the progressive ideology should have to be. This frame notably increases during the two most recent presidential election campaigns, by mobilizing against the conservative camp and candidates, which shows that the political identity and competitiveness of the progressive camp depends on othering and differentiation. In this frame, the progressive camp faces crisis and must self-criticize its own outdated paradigms (“The movement of social companies and cooperatives lacks

fundamental critique about capitalism”<sup>172</sup> December 23, 2013). The progressive camp had fought for democracy but lost its alternative discourse after institutional democratization in the 1990s, and must now regain a new progressive discourse due to the crisis of neoliberalism and political retrogression under conservative President Lee Myung-bak (2007-2012) (“Academic conference on uncompleted democratization: The need for an integrated discourse that represents the progressives”<sup>173</sup> October 21, 2010). Appeals for soul-searching in the progressive camp function by othering the conservative camp, which stands for past autocratic oppression and growth-driven ideology. To break out of the repressed society for good, the progressive ideology seeks to re-assess and re-formulate values of democracy, freedom, and social market economy (“The task of the South Korean progressives”<sup>174</sup> May 18, 2004).

As shown above, progressive ideology reproduces historical antipodes in order to describe its own identity. The frame “independence movement” refers to an even earlier point in history: pre-liberation activism under Japanese colonial rule, which predates the decades of South Korean autocratic regimes. Thus, this frame denounces key conservative figures of that time, such as the first President Lee Syng-man (“Organized murder under the cloak of anti-communistic regime security”<sup>175</sup> April 15, 1992) or defends the ideological leaning of key activist figures (“*Baekbeom* was not a Rightist nationalist”<sup>176</sup>

---

<sup>172</sup> “Sahoechokkiöp/ Hyöptongchohap untong chaponchu üi künpon pip'an kyölyö”

<sup>173</sup> Haktanhyöp “5/ 18-kwa miwan üi minchuhwa haksultaehoe/ chinpo tamlon moa ttolttolhan taep'yo sönsu lül k'iwöla

<sup>174</sup> Ch'angkan16-tol-kiko/ Hankuk Chinpo selyök üi kwache

<sup>175</sup> ”Pankong chöngkwön anpo” naekön chochikchök amsal/ soksok pökyö chinün Paek Pöm amsal kuto

<sup>176</sup> Paek Pöm ün “uik” minchok chuüicha anita/ To Chin-sun Kyosu nonmun chuchang

November 2, 2002).

The conservative *Chosun Ilbo* frame “ideology” displays clear activity under the progressive governments from 1998 to 2008, which reflects its attacks towards the progressive Presidents and their adherence to the sunshine policy. These attacks shift into the national founding controversy under conservative governments since 2008, which shows in the increase of the “independence movement” frame. This results from the attempt to shed the original sin of pro-Japan legacies under conservative governments.

In the conservative camp, the above understanding of national founding is undermined by the counterargument that the first South Korean president Rhee Syng-man founded the nation by his office in 1948. This interpretation has been propped by the New Right, found its way into textbooks used in schools, and inflamed the existing ideological controversy between polarized camps. From the progressive camp’s perspective, such efforts by the conservative camp decouple the independence movements from the founding of South Korea, and intend to restore legitimacy to pro-Japan groups which include former President Rhee Syng-man<sup>177</sup>. This controversy alighted in 2008 under conservative President Lee Myung-bak and further in 2014 under President Park Geun-hye. In this conservative interpretation, the National Liberation day of August 15, 1948 established the divided state of South Korea by founding the state, instead of founding merely a government that produced the division of Korea<sup>178</sup>. Thus, this interpretation de-emphasizes the contextual background regarding the creation of South-

---

<sup>177</sup> “New Right denies provisional government that even Rhee Syng-man acknowledged” (Yi Sŭngman to inching han imchŏn nyulait ūn puchŏng), *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, October 14, 2015

<sup>178</sup> “‘Every country as a founding day’ versus ‘denying independence movements and the provisional government’” (‘Kŏnkuk chŏl ŏptnŭn nala ŏpsŏ’ vs ‘Toklip untong imsi chŏngpu puchŏng’) *Hankook Kyungjae*, August 14, 2014

North division, and instead emphasizes that South Korea became independent<sup>179</sup>.

These frames illustrate the democratic journey of South Korea, which passed through several stages in modern Korean history. Japanese colonial rule was followed by the Korean War, then dictatorial rule, and finally absolved by democratization. These subsequent struggles shaped different ideologies of the progressive and conservative camp respectively.

In contrast to the *Hankyoreh* version, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “ideology” actually others ideology as a whole, and therefore is more muted overall. By applying the label “progressive” on progressive ideology, this frame confounds the activist and radical factions of the progressive camp. It further extends suggestions on what should be proper progressive ideology. Pragmatic progressive factions are considered acceptable, but only if they purge extremist left-wingers (“Advice to those who seek to form a new progressive party”<sup>180</sup> March 21, 1990). Such progressive reformist factions give up vested political interests (“Key reformist politician states that the *Democratic Party’s* framework is inadequate for winning general elections”<sup>181</sup> August 8, 2003). Both camps are pro-unification, but the conservative camp labels the sunshine policy as anti-unification, while the progressive camp labels critique of the sunshine policy as anti-unification (“State secretary comments that the only anti-unification forces are pro-North Korean forces”<sup>182</sup> July 20, 2001). Its increase in 2004 and 2006 are related to two emergent political

---

<sup>179</sup> “Why the fight over Liberation Day versus National Founding Day?” (‘Kwangpok Chöl’ kwa “Könkuk Chöl’ wae ssau nün köya), *Ohmynews*, August 13, 2008

<sup>180</sup> Chaeya chöngtang ch’uchin e tangpu hanta (Sasöl)

<sup>181</sup> Yi Chae-chöng “Minchutang t’ül lonün ch’ongsön mot ikyö”

<sup>182</sup> Yi ch’ongli “Pan t’ongil selyök ün ch’inpuk selyök ppun” Palön p’achang



organizations which the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse titled as the “New Right”<sup>183</sup> (“the New Right movement”<sup>184</sup>, November 23, 2004) and the “New Left”<sup>185</sup>.

Figure 19: State-centered ideological struggle frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) shows the very recent impact of ideological controversy in the form of the “National Security Act” and “civic movements”. Table 16: Ideological struggle frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) substantiates both frames. The frame “National Security Act” concerns the abolishment of this act, as its original function as anti-treason law is increasingly considered to enable state violence against free citizens<sup>186</sup>. However, the question of whether to abolish splits sides, with civic organizations in stronger support of abolishment than the general public<sup>187</sup>. Due to the conservative legacy of the National Security Act (NSL), actions for its abolition were first raised by the progressive Presidents during progressive governments; thus the reason why this frame appears more clearly in the conservative discourse is due to my topic model and does not accurately represent the external reality.

---

<sup>183</sup> Chayu Juŭi Yöndaŭ, which can be translated into “Solidarity for Liberalism”

<sup>184</sup> New Right untong

<sup>185</sup> By the “New Left”, the *Chosun Ilbo* newspaper framed the newly formed think tank (Chohŭn Chöngch'aek P'ölöm, which can be translated into “Good Policy Forum”) that aimed for “new policy paradigms for a sustainable progressive camp”. Interestingly, *Hankyoreh* denounced the purported rise of the “New Left” as an act of strategic framing, which sought to legitimate the *raison d' être* of the “New Right” by conjuring a centrist-progressive turn. This position is presented in an article on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006 in *Hankyoreh*, titled “But we aren’t the New Left, why do you call us so?” (*Hankyoreh* 2006)

<sup>186</sup> See Kraft (2006)

<sup>187</sup> “The National Human Rights Commission also points out that North Korea is recognized as an independent country by more than one hundred nations, and it argues that South Korea needs to acknowledge North Korea's identity as more than just an “anti-state organization.”(Kraft 2006, 641)

Figure 19: State-centered ideological struggle frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)




Table 16: Ideological struggle frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>National Security Act (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	North Korean, National Security Law, State, Security, Law, Unification, ethnic, homeland, group, activities, alleged, transfer, North, Union, reunification, praise, Kim Il Sung, student, organizations, violation	국가 북한 보안법 국 가보안법 통일 민족 조국 단체 활동 북 협 의 이적 연합 조국통 일 김일성 학생 위반 조직 찬양
<b>civic movements (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Unification, Movement, ethnic, group, Minjok, United, Democratic, convention, protests, nationwide, solidarity, rally, event, jointly, participating, members, representing, police, headquarters	단체 통일 운동 시민 민족 연합 민주 시위 대회 전국 연대 집회 행사 공동 참여 대표 본부 회원 경찰

The “National Security Act” frame increases starkly in 2012 in reaction to a scandal that involved the National Intelligence Service (NIS). An employee of the NIS was arrested as she was manipulating public opinion online. This incident sparked allegations from the progressive camp that the NIS was operating as the right hand of the conservative candidate Park Geun-hye. For the progressive perspective, this incident

affirmed how state violence was still legitimated by the NSL<sup>188</sup>. Thus, this *Chosun Ilbo* frame was sorely needed in order to react to the wave of progressive outcry. This is a shift from previous years, when this frame illustrated explicit breaches of the NSL by student organizations in 1991 (“Student Committee members investigated”<sup>189</sup> July 10, 1991) and 1994 (“Charges suspect orchestration behind the Korean Students’ Association”<sup>190</sup> June 2, 1994). From 2004 on, the possibility of abolishing the NSL becomes tangible as a new progressive government began in 2003, followed by the legislative election victory of a progressive party in 2004. However, this window of opportunity closes by 2006, which shows in the increase of the conservative frame. Its increase catalyzes emphasis on North Korean nuclear activities which culminate in 2006 due to nuclear tests<sup>191</sup>.

The *Chosun Ilbo* frame “civic movements” deals with interest groups that argue for democratic goals, anti-state violence, and the abolishment of the NSL. Its peak in 2003 can be explained with the increasing criticism against civic organizations after the Roh Moo-hyun government took office<sup>192</sup>. Interestingly, crucial events of civic mobilization are not reported by this frame, including: the killing of two schoolgirls by an U.S. armed

---

<sup>188</sup> The National Intelligence Service Act of 2014 states the following: “Criminal investigation on the crimes of insurrection and foreign aggression provided for [...] in the National Security Act”.

<sup>189</sup> Chŏngch'aekwi kwanlyŏn susa

<sup>190</sup> Hanch'onglyŏn paehu chochong hyŏmŭi

<sup>191</sup> Even under this government, various advocacy coalitions debated around the NSL without reaching conclusions; external constraining factors that strengthened conservative frames were North Korean nuclear activity and withdrawal from the Six Party Talks in 2005 and North Korean missile tests in 2006 (Son Hwa-Jeong 2011).

<sup>192</sup> From this perspective, points of criticism were the partisan nature of civic organizations, their biased focus on political issues, their activist methods, lacking professionalism, and the neglect of civic demands (Park Byung-ok 2007).

vehicle in 2002, the opposition against the impeachment of President Roh in 2004, and the citizens' demonstrations against imported U.S. beef in 2008. Not reporting on these events via the "civic movements" frame means that *Chosun Ilbo* did not assign this meaning to these nationwide movements. In the successive conservative governments, this frame decreases by rarely mentioning civic movements. In contrast to the peaking "National Security Act" frame that shields the NSL from progressive allegations in 2012, the "civic movements" frame remains muted in *Chosun Ilbo*, which can be understood as a complementary framing strategy.

## 5.2. Validation of frames in the welfare discourses

What is welfare in South Korea? The meaning of the word and concept “welfare” differs from Western understanding in the sense of European social policy<sup>193</sup>. In Korea, welfare encompasses the everyday livelihood of ordinary people, social policy, human rights, and inequality. By posing as such a broad concept, welfare appears during election discourses and affects it tremendously. This chapter unpacks the wealth of meanings that the South Korean political discourse appends to welfare, and points out comparative differences between camps in the two newspapers *Chosun Ilbo* and *Hankyoreh*.

Figure 20: Welfare convergence frames show that the frame “welfare policy agendas” became a substantive frame in the recent years. Table 17: Words in welfare convergence frames substantiate these frames. In order to highlight that frame intensities can be independent from the number of articles, the figure displays the number of articles that contain references to welfare in bar graphs on the right vertical axis (“Count of articles”).

---

<sup>193</sup> The comparison to the “Western” model in the sense of European-style comprehensive welfare is continuous in the literature. Before the Asian Financial crisis, there “was general hostility to Western ideals of the “welfare state” within successive South Korean governments” (Shin Chang-sik and Shaw 2003, 334). After the crisis, extensions to the state welfare system were considered by many as “an apparent advance of the Korean welfare system towards a more westernized model of a welfare state” (Kim Yeon-Myung 2006, 1).

Figure 20: Welfare convergence frames




Table 17: Words in welfare convergence frames

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>welfare policy agendas (Hankyoreh)</b>	Park Geun-hye, President, Lee Myung-bak, pledged, Nuri, presidential, Welfare, Hannara, representative, national, unity, government, economic, policy, political, candidate	이명박 대통령 박근혜 대선 복 지 누리 공약 누리당 한나라 대표 정부 후 보 경제 정책 국민 통 합 정치
<b>welfare policy agendas (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	President, Park Geun-hye, bakgeun, welfare, policies, pledged, one trillion won, free, elections, government, fiscal, budget, funds, promote, economic, Nuri Party, Nuri, National, Party	조원 공약 정책 대통 령 박근혜 박근혜 복지 무상 대선 정부 국민 누리 경제 누리당 재 정 확대 예산 재원 추 진

The “welfare policy agenda” frame increases due to political competition over converged welfare platforms during the 2012 presidential election campaigns, where welfare became the main agenda of the conservative camp. This development reflects economic contextual factors: at least since the Asian Financial Crisis, Korea’s growth rates slowed and neoliberal employment restructuring awakened the demand for social welfare nets. In this environment, the conservative camp has successfully coupled high growth with welfare policies, which shows in the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “welfare policy agendas”. The high weight of this frame shows that the progressive camp managed to dominate with this frame, and implies that its welfare policy discussion was well articulated. On the other hand, the *Hankyoreh* frame peaks during the 2012 presidential election campaigns, but ceases at being a reactionary frame to the political opponents and fails to dominate with an own policy discussion. It decreases after the progressive presidential candidate’s loss in December 2012. In contrast, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame peaks in the following year after the election of Park Geun-hye by invoking policy details and discussions. Both frames drop instantly after their successive peaks, showing that the *Chosun Ilbo* limited its focus on the government’s welfare policy to its first incumbent year.

In both newspapers, the frame increases steadily from 2008 on. Examinations of the sample articles show that the progressive camp began to promote a heavy emphasis on “cost-free” welfare provisions as early as 2008, which sparked rebuttals from the conservative camp. Both frames refer to the leading conservative party (the *Hannara Party* was renamed to *Saenuri Party* during the 2012 election campaigns) and candidates. The *Hankyoreh* frame includes references to the earlier conservative President Lee Myung-bak (2007-2012), which is due to the welfare policy debates between the Lee and Park factions during the Lee Myung-bak government.

Thus, the *Hankyoreh* frame explains pre-campaigning groundwork by Park Geun-hye, who prepared for candidacy by expanding the conservative welfare policy platform to an unprecedented degree. This frame increases first in 2008, well before the 2012 presidential elections. Article samples confirm that conservative factions emerged around the welfare platform between the incumbent president Lee Myung-bak and the former party representative Park Geun-hye. The *Hankyoreh* frame predominantly highlights negative aspects of this conservative debate. For example, it probes whether Park Geun-hye omits the need to raise taxes for her welfare aims (“Two scenes surrounding former party representative Park Geun-hye”<sup>194</sup> *Hankyoreh*, December 25, 2010). Her upgraded notion of welfare was criticized from the opposing faction as a populist race against the progressive party (“Finding cracks in the internal resistance towards pro-people platform”<sup>195</sup> *Hankyoreh*, August 5, 2010). Welfare populism was criticized by the incumbent President (“President Lee’s speech and his reasons for repeatedly shunning welfare populism”<sup>196</sup> *Hankyoreh*, August 16, 2011).

The *Chosun Ilbo* frame is similar to the *Hankyoreh* frame, with the exception that the *Chosun Ilbo* frame emphasizes budget and taxation issues more strongly. The *Chosun Ilbo* frame reflects that tax raises were debated for the generous welfare agendas of parties (“For feasible welfare agendas, raise the surtax”<sup>197</sup> *Chosun Ilbo*, November 1, 2012). Around the 2012 presidential election campaigns and the election of Park Geun-hye, the frame addresses that political camps had over-promised welfare provisions and

---

<sup>194</sup> Pak Kün-hye chön taep'yo tullössan tu p'ungkyöng/ Kongkyök hanün ch'ini

<sup>195</sup> Hannala “ch'insömin” anp'akk pip'ane “t'ümsae ch'atki”

<sup>196</sup> Yi Taet'onglyöng 8/15-kyöngch'uksa/ “Pokchi p'op'yullichüm” kötüp pip'an wae

<sup>197</sup> “Pokchi kongyak silhaeng halyömyön pukase 10%-esö 12%-lo



under-emphasized the tax hikes necessary to finance welfare (“All three candidates never mention tax raises”<sup>198</sup> *Chosun Ilbo*, November 9, 2012). After Park obtained presidency, the conservative camp and government are held accountable (“campaign agendas on welfare were exaggerated, and agenda adjustment is necessary instead of attempting to prevent tax raises”<sup>199</sup> *Chosun Ilbo*, October 10, 2013). Agenda failure became obvious in the government’s ensuing attempts to implement tax reform (“Tax radius debated between taxing only the rich vs. including the middle classes”<sup>200</sup> *Chosun Ilbo*, August 12, 2013). Overall, the frame documents a maelstrom of political competition that turns into a race for welfare promises. Overall, the above comparison shows that the *Chosun Ilbo* frame established a focus on policy while the *Hankyoreh* frame stayed on politics.

### 5.2.1. Problem spotting frames

This chapter elaborates the differences and traits of each newspaper’s frames for the evaluation and implementation of welfare policies. While the progressive frames stretch onto diverse foci, the conservative frames remain focused.

Frames for policy evaluation and implementation are able to illustrate how newspapers relate the responsibility of welfare provision to public actors and government. For this purpose, I select the frames “problem assessment” and policy implementation”, which occur in both newspapers in similar forms<sup>201</sup>. While convergent across newspapers,

<sup>198</sup> Pokchi e 100-cho isang tō ssüntamyō... chūngse yaeki anhnūn se hupo

<sup>199</sup> Na Sōng-lin (Saenui chōngch'aekwi puūichang) “Taesōn pokchi kongyak ilpu kwahaetta... chūngse pota kongyak chochōng haeya

<sup>200</sup> [Seche kaep'yōnan hup'okp'ung] “Puchaman ollyōla” “Chungsanch'ūng to yakkan puntam”... chūngse pōmwi ch'ungtol

<sup>201</sup> Subtle differences between frames are caused by orientation differences but also by modeling.


the frames do behave differently. Further, the *Hankyoreh* frame “policy implementation” tends to refer to nation-scale policies whereas the *Chosun Ilbo* frame tends to apply to local policies, which is another result of wide versus focused frames.

### 5.2.1.1. Frames in Hankyoreh

The following two graphs show how the progressive newspaper makes frames for policy evaluations. As I will explain, *Hankyoreh* tends to focus on the meta-level frame of problem assessment, mainly consisting of observations on how to improve welfare policy.

Figure 21: Evaluation vs. action frames (*Hankyoreh*) and Table 18: Words in evaluation vs. action frames illustrates two frames. The first frame “problem assessment” talks of observation and reflection, and evaluates existing welfare policies. On the other hand, the frame “policy implementation” relays reports of policy action by focusing on implemented policies. As mentioned in the foregoing chapter, the decrease of “policy implementation” suggest that the progressive camp fails to frame distinct welfare policies; the increase of “problem assessment” in 2012 in turn points at evaluations of the conservative camp’s welfare policies.

**Figure 21: Evaluation vs. action frames (*Hankyoreh*)**



**Table 18: Words in evaluation vs. action frames**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>problem assessment</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Possible, process, method, changes, solving, evaluation, effort, solving, various, recognition, meaningful, society, situations, central, role, institutions, goals, participation, results, expectations	가능 과정 방식 변화 해결 평가 노력 다양 인식 의미 사회적 상 황 중심 역할 제도 목 표 참여 성과 기대
<b>policy implementation</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	promotion, plan, established, government, policy, measures, introduced, enforcement, measures, reviewing, expansion, plans, announced, support, information, system, improvement, committee	계획 방안 복지 마련 추진 정부 방침 대책 검토 확대 내용 지원 개선 위원회 제도 예 정 발표 시행 도입

The *Hankyoreh* frame “problem assessment” articulates how to improve welfare policies in the next government, as it increases in the presidential election campaigns of 1997 (followed by Kim Dae-jung’s election), and 2012 (followed by Park Geun-hye’s election). The frame also evaluates policy plans, for instance in the year 2000, which marks the middle of term in the Kim Dae-jung government: The highest-ranked articles in 2000 show that his agenda of “productive welfare” was re-assessed, as it was deemed too ambiguous a policy guideline by political and public actors.

Generally, the *Hankyoreh* frame “problem assessment” portrays welfare as a task to be solved from myriad professional perspectives. Diverse political actors are involved in policymaking, assessment, and evaluation. One example is the decentralization agenda before and after the election of President Roh Moo-hyun (2002-2007), which sought to distribute administrative rights and resources to local governments. This agenda aimed for tailored welfare needs and the reduction of unintended deadweight loss caused by policies and provisions (“Regional decentralization is more urgent than the division of

central power”<sup>202</sup> December 17, 2002 and “Regional decentralization must not reinforce welfare inequality”<sup>203</sup> October 25, 2003). This shift is preceded by emphases on local governments, whose autonomy is argued to be vital for tending to regional welfare adequately (“Let us first enhance information access for local societies”<sup>204</sup>, September 9, 1994 and “What to prepare for the start of regional politics”<sup>205</sup> January 12, 1995). Another example is the provision of housing to serve low-income groups but also overall citizens (“Where is the citizen in the discussion about integrating the Housing Corporation and the Land Development Corporation”<sup>206</sup> January 5, 2009 and “Observations on the Project Housing debate”<sup>207</sup> April 7, 2010). This frame calls upon the capacity for policy evaluation and welfare provision to the central and local governments. Civic actors such as research institutes contribute to the assessment of problems (“Anniversary speech by vice president of labor research institute”<sup>208</sup> August 26, 1992). Industry actors are involved via corporate social responsibility (“Increasing the quality of social contributions by a systematic approach”<sup>209</sup> January 26, 2006) or employment welfare.

A large dip occurs in the *Hankyoreh* frame “policy implementation” in 1997 due to the Asian Financial Crisis and decreases constantly ever since, suggesting that this frame

---

<sup>202</sup> Waenyamyön t'olon/ Chipang punkwön i pokchi pulp'yöngtǔng ūl kanghwa haesöya

<sup>203</sup> Waenyamyön t'olon/ Chungang kwönlyök punchöm pota chipang punkwön i tö siküphata

<sup>204</sup> Chiyök sahoe chöngpolyök put'ö k'iucha/ Chöng Se-kyun (Töpulö saengkak hamyö)

<sup>205</sup> Muösül chunpi haeya hana: 6 (Chipang chach'i ponkyök kaemak: 8)

<sup>206</sup> Waenyamyön/ Chukong, t'okong t'onghap nonli e kukminün itna

<sup>207</sup> [Kiko] Sip'üt'ü nonchaeng ūl chik'yö pomyö

<sup>208</sup> Notong Yönkuwön Yi Wön-tök Puwönchang kaewön 4-tol kinyöm t'olon palp'yo

<sup>209</sup> Kiöp sahoe konghön/ ch'ekyechök chöpkün t'onghae sahoe konghön chil nop'icha

is related to welfare spending. Further, the decrease of this frame signals the failure of the progressive camp to respond to welfare demands. In contrast to the above “problem assessment”, which denoted reflection on causes and consequences of policy, “policy implementation” is planned, implemented, and conducted welfare actions. Affirming this chapter’s introduction about the wide meaning of welfare in South Korea, this frame combines the concept of welfare with myriad areas. They range from employment welfare (“Livelihood protection benefits in times of need, government promises for next year”<sup>210</sup> September 25, 1996) to child safety (“Children's safety measures announced” May 2, 2002), housing (“Government revises comprehensive mid- to long-term plan for housing”<sup>211</sup> October 23, 2007) and recycling (“Ministry of environment will increase food recycling rate by 50%”<sup>212</sup> September 29, 1998). In most cases, the Ministry of Health and Welfare is involved in the planning of policies (“Pursued enactment of anti-discrimination law for disabled people”<sup>213</sup> June 23, 2003). Committees are often organized to react to policy needs. Their output tends to take the form of “comprehensive plans” that targets the welfare of specific groups (“First meeting on elderly welfare measures”<sup>214</sup> October 1, 1991). For instance, the output of a committee may increase the welfare of disabled workers (“Disabled welfare plan confirmed”<sup>215</sup> February 24, 2003). Reflecting the emergent status of welfare policy in South Korea, these standing committees may be

---

<sup>210</sup> Saengkye konlan haeto saenghwal poho hyet'aek/ Chöngpu, naenyön put'ö

<sup>211</sup> Chöngpu, chungchangki chut'aek chonghap kyehoek koch'inta

<sup>212</sup> Ŭmsik ssüleki chaehwalyong 50%-lo nop'inta/ 2002-nyön kkachi 3340-ök t'ucha

<sup>213</sup> Changaein Ch'apyöl Kümchipöp chechöng ch'uchin

<sup>214</sup> Noin ch'wiöp kihoe hwaktae/ Chöngnyön yönchang kwönchang k'ilo/ Noin taech'aek ch'öt hoeüi

<sup>215</sup> Changaein pokchikyehoek hwakchöng

broad in their stated goals, such as *Committee for the pursuit of national welfare*<sup>216</sup> (“Range of livelihood subsidies to be expanded” June 1, 1996). Policy plans tend to focus on the weakest groups with the most urgent needs, such as women, working women, toddlers and children, the disabled, and the elderly. These examples imply that standing committees, special committees, and task forces were common modes of responding to perceived policy needs selectively, regardless of the orientation of incumbent government.

Figure 22: Action-related frames (*Hankyoreh*, stacked graph) and Table 19: Words in action-related frames show two related frames: “Public officials” (who head departments in the Ministry of Health and Welfare), and “public administration” (actors, organs, committees). Both frames are needed to describe welfare policy and serve to prove the decrease of the “policy implementation” frame. Policy implementation is represented as actors in the “public officials” frame, and as institutions in the “public administration” frame. Both frames show the same pattern and mirror that the frame of policy implementation decreased. In particular, all three frames drop in 1997 at the Asian Financial Crisis and the draining of state budget, and then gradually diminish together over time.

---

<sup>216</sup> Kukmin Pokchi Ch'uchin Wiwŏnhoe

Figure 22: Action-related frames (*Hankyoreh*, stacked graph)




Table 19: Words in action-related frames (*Hankyoreh*)


label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>public officials</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Blue House, personnel, secretary, senior, president, Ministry of Health and Welfare, welfare, chairman, Rep., Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Dae, Chief of Staff, Minister, the people, committee, chairman, Prime Minister	장관 청와대 대통령 수석 인사 보건 보건 복지부 복지 의원 노 무현 비서관 위원장 김대중 총리 비서실 장 실장 의장 국민 위원
<b>public administrations</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Administration, executive, branch, officials, government, health, agency, planning, committee, appointed, central, committee, welfare, organization, economy	행정 부처 업무 공무 원 인사 정부 보건 관리 기관 기획 조직 복지 정책 관 임명 위원회 중앙 위원 경 제

### 5.2.1.2. Frames in *Chosun Ilbo*

Figure 23: Evaluation vs. action frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) show very similar frames as above, but in different patterns. Table 20: Words in evaluation vs. action frames substantiates. The *Chosun Ilbo* frame “problem assessment” and “policy implementation” remain in a constant trend over time if compared to *Hankyoreh*. Similarly to *Hankyoreh*, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “policy implementation” is a factual reporting frame but focuses on

local governments, especially on progressive local governments, which implement progressive welfare policies.

**Figure 23: Evaluation vs. action frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 20: Words in evaluation vs. action frames**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>problem assessment</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Point, out, level, government, institutions, situations, potential, effect, entire, burden, cost, concerns, policy, experts, solve, part, process, approach, methods	상황 정부 지적 수준 제도 가능 부담 가능성 효과 전체 우려 비용 해결 전문가 정책 부분 과정 방식 방법
<b>policy implementation</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Welfare, plan, promotion, measures, operating, period, provide, increased, support, business, conduct, policy, configuration, regional, planning, policy, announced, installation	계획 추진 복지 방안 운영 마련 기관 지원 확대 사업 분야 예정 방침 지역 구성 실시 정책 발표 설치

The *Chosun Ilbo* frame “problem assessment” increases in 2013 due to the free school meals initiatives of local governments; it assumes a critical stance regarding the cost and tax burden of such provisions. This frame discusses the externalities of welfare reforms and policies. An early example is the political inter-party debate on integration versus separation of health insurance funds, which stalled policy decisions (“Dilemma for



the Ministry of Health and Welfare”<sup>217</sup> December 27, 2001). Further, the pricing scheme of medical insurance deterred young doctors from certain fields and caused a shortage of surgical specialists (“Doctors won’t touch surgeries”<sup>218</sup> November 5, 2003). Nine years later, medical fee regulations are said to cause overtreatment by doctors and distrust by patients (“Comprehensive expense system is no panacea”<sup>219</sup> June 28, 2012).

After 1997, the frame “policy implementation” does not notably decrease in *Chosun Ilbo*, which speaks of its continued attention to this frame. This is due to focusing on local government initiatives. Out of twenty top articles, only three refer to central government (“The disabled may vote from home”<sup>220</sup> June 1, 1996; also “Some government departments delayed in delivery”<sup>221</sup> January 28, 1996). This frame is assigned to planned or implemented policies on the self-governed city or local level. Accordingly, the policy impacts are of local size (“Lowest income support program will start for two districts”<sup>222</sup> April 25, 2007). Changes can be implemented towards bettering the efficiency of providing welfare services in local government offices, for instance by integrating the administrative offices of smaller district units (“About 300 village offices to be integrated”<sup>223</sup> June 8, 2007).

An inverse relationship develops between the frame “policy implementation” and

---

<sup>217</sup> Pokchipu üi tillema

<sup>218</sup> [Susul k'al an chapnün üisatül]

<sup>219</sup> [ach'imnontan] manpyöng t'ongch' iyakün anin p'okwal sukache

<sup>220</sup> Changaein chip esö t'up'yo

<sup>221</sup> Ilpu puch'ö öpmu ch'uchin puchin


<sup>222</sup> Muchikae p'ülochekt'ü 2-tankye Wölp'yöng 2-tong, Pöp 1, 2-tong sönchöng

<sup>223</sup> Chönkuk tongsamuso 300-yökae t'ong p'yehap toel tüt

the frame “problem assessment” in 2004, when local “policy implementation” frames outweigh by reporting on welfare initiatives by local governments. In 2011, this trend is reversed and the “problem assessment” frames outweigh local frames. This trend reflects that *Chosun Ilbo* started to discuss welfare policies on the national level, starting since 2011 via the campaign agenda of Park Geun-hye.

Figure 24: Trend of local action bolstering policy action (*Chosun Ilbo*) offers the same validation as in the *Hankyoreh* discourse above. I select two additional frames, “city public services” and “city economies”, in order to show the increasing local content of the “policy implementation” frame from 2004 to 2009. Local governments became important for the welfare discourse because they spend more on welfare. Then, conservative actors started to disagree with universal and cost-free welfare in recent years<sup>224</sup>. Ever since the integration of welfare into the conservative platform since 2010, *Chosun Ilbo* abruptly muted focus on local welfare in order to emphasize conservative welfare policy. Table 21: Words in local action frames substantiates with words.

**Figure 24: Trend of local action bolstering policy action (*Chosun Ilbo*)**




<sup>224</sup> “Free welfare policies must be reconsidered, says governor” *Yonhap News*, November 5, 2014 (Hong Jun-p'yo musang pokchi chŏngch'aek chŏnpan toetola pol sichŏm)

**Table 21: Words in local action frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
city public services ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Incheon, Bucheon, Incheon City, free, education, welfare, recruitment, target, application, operating, participation, center, Bucheon City, cultural, program, society, women	인천 부천 인천시 모집 무료 교육 복지 대상 신청 운영 센터 참가 부천시 강좌 문화 프로 그램 홈페이지 사회 여 성
city economies ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Urban, development, business, environment, culture, local, economic, development, industrial, construction, market, composition, tourist, attraction, promoting, civil, administration, enable, traffic	도시 환경 문화 지역 발전 사업 개발 경제 조성 관광 유치 건설 시장 산업 추진 행정 활성화 시민 교통

Figure 25: Health policy externalities vis-à-vis evaluation frame (*Chosun Ilbo*) offers an alternative explanation for policy externality in the “problem assessment” frame, by showing two health-related frames. Table 22: Words in health policy frames substantiates. The frame “medical treatment” relates to medical provisions and policy by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which respond to needs or covers for blind spots within existing policy. In turn, the frame “healthcare” also refers to recommendations by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. As the number of health policies increase, policy externalities increase; the chart demonstrates the need to evaluate externalities.

**Figure 25: Health policy externalities vis-à-vis evaluation frame (*Chosun Ilbo*)**




**Table 22: Words in health policy frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>medical treatment</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Hospital, patient, medical, treatment, health, care, physicians, health, welfare, surgery, Department of Health and Welfare, agency, specializing, hospital, beds, disease, center, family	병원 환자 의료 치료 보건 진료 의사 건강 복지 암 수술 보건복지 부 병상 질환 입원 기 관 전문 센터 가족
<b>healthcare</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Health, Welfare, Department of Health and Welfare, health, cigarette, smoking, , treat, mental, illness, prevention, Professor, promote, youth, sports, drinks, disease, nutrition, stress	건강 보건 복지 담배 보건복지부 치료 예방 정신 질환 금연 흡연 운동 술 교수 증진 청 소년 질병 영양 스트레 스

Figure 26: Socioeconomic quantification vis-à-vis evaluation frame (*Chosun Ilbo*) shows two quantification frames, “demographic change” and “economic figures”, which are assigned to outlooks, projections, and calculations regarding national macroeconomic factors. Table 23: Socioeconomic quantification frames substantiates. The frame “demographic change” portrays the rapid aging of South Korean society; the frame “economic figures” depicts state financial capabilities for welfare spending. These frames offer a second alternative explanation for the trend of the “policy assessment” frame. When reporting on policy evaluation, specific socioeconomic figures supply concrete facts.

**Figure 26: Socioeconomic quantification vis-à-vis evaluation frame (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 23: Socioeconomic quantification frames**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>demographic change</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Population, welfare, society, as a whole, average, increase, rate, Korea, South Korea, country, level, analysis, published, targets, while, senior, researcher, economic, aging	인구 복지 전체 사회 평균 한국 나라 수준 우리나라 비율 증가 노 인 연구원 반면 대상 분석 발표 경제 고령화
<b>economic figures</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Government, financial, crisis, welfare, dollar, economic, growth, enterprise, market, policy, financial, situation, world, national, product, national, investment, spending	경제 위기 정부 재정 복지 달러 성장 경기 시장 기업 정책 금융 국가 투자 상황 세계 국민 생산 지출

The frame “demographic change” increases in 2013 by framing the planned elderly pension, but is constantly accompanied by the “economic figures” frame. Thus, the frame of financing remains connected to policy needs and evaluations in the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse. Examples are the declining birthrate that result from financing gaps (“Cost burdens that deter from childbirth”<sup>225</sup> December 16, 2010), or the inefficiencies of the law that reimburses employers of disabled workers (“Employer incentives are being spent on ludicrous items”<sup>226</sup> March 6, 2014). Overall, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “policy assessment” differs from the *Hankyoreh* frame by addressing policy externalities in detail.

### 5.2.2. Idea frames

In this chapter, I contrast progressive and conservative frames that contain ideas and values. The progressive *Hankyoreh* considers welfare as human right and demands its institutionalization. In turn, the conservative *Chosun Ilbo* frames welfare as selective support and helping the needy.

<sup>225</sup> [Kiko] “Ch’ulsan kip’i putamkŭm”

<sup>226</sup> [Palŏntae] “Changaein koyong changlyŏkŭm”, ŏngttunghan yongto e mossŭke haeya

### 5.2.2.1. Progressive ideas

Figure 27: Contrasting ideas of state responsibility and local action (*Hankyoreh*) examine ideas and values in the role of state. Table 24: Words in contrasting ideas of state responsibility and local action substantiates. The *Hankyoreh* frame “government role” denotes responsibility and accountability for national-level welfare policies. Thus, it ascribes an intervening role to government and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. In turn, the “local government” frame applies to the welfare agendas of regional elections and local governing bodies.

Figure 27: Contrasting ideas of state responsibility and local action (*Hankyoreh*)




Table 24: Words in contrasting ideas of state responsibility and local action (*Hankyoreh*)

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>government role</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	government, situation, point out, people, solving, demand, measures, social, responsibility, country, concern, risk, status, realistic, cause, damage, policy	정부 상황 지적 주장 국민 해결 요구 대책 사회 책임 나라 우려 위험 상태 현실 적인 원인 피해 정책
<b>local government</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Government, administrative, council, area, residents, market, regulations, Seoul, branch, citizen, welfare, budget, local, government, heads, wide, local, elections, project	자치 단체 주민 지역 행정 의회 시장 복지 시민 조례 서울시 지사 예산 지방자 치단체 단체장 광역 지자 체 선거 사업

These frames are concerned after 2010 with the question: How to institutionalize free school meals? The increases of both frames at different times in recent years are documentation of ensuing controversy. The “local government” frame peaks in 2010, when the debate on free school meals caught heat. However, it fails to materialize and promote the viability of this initiative. Most noted was the debate around free school meals between 2010 and 2012. This debate created staunchly conflicting positions between local government actors (“Elementary school meals may become cost-free in city district”<sup>227</sup> December 24, 2010) and local political representatives (“Seoul city council faces high noon surrounding free school meals”<sup>228</sup> July 1, 2011) who argued over comprehensive versus selective forms of welfare provision.

The frame “government role” in turn frames public policy gaps where the government should engage with. It fails to frame the school meal debate on this level and only after the passing of the 2012 presidential elections. In examples of how this frame appeals to state provisions, reluctance to medical reforms must be overridden by the government (“The government must not back down”<sup>229</sup> August 17, 2000). The government is also responsible for health insurance policy that creates wrong incentives for doctors and negative externalities for patients (“Most doctors carry out defensive diagnoses, being sensitive to medical dispute” November 27, 1992 and “Suspend the senseless selective treatment rule” December 4, 2007). Delinquencies caused by structural problems of society can be improved by policy initiatives by the Ministry of

---

<sup>227</sup> Taechŏn Yusŏng-ku “Ch’otŭng musang kŭpsik ulilato mŏnchŏ...”

<sup>228</sup> Sŏul-si - Ŭihoe, musang kŭpsik “oetali kyŏkto!”

<sup>229</sup> [Sasŏl] Chŏngpu nŭn mullŏ sŏchi malla

Health and Welfare (“Are police-patrolled alcohol controls fine as they are?”<sup>230</sup> July 20, 2012) who can also prevent antisocial crimes committed by isolated members of society (“Antisocial crimes- do we have social healing mechanisms?”<sup>231</sup> October 22, 2008). Maltreatment of weak groups also calls for the government’s role, such as child abuse in nursery facilities (“Child abuse occurs 12.6 times daily”<sup>232</sup> April 29, 2006), discrimination of disabled children by kindergartens and schools (“Kindergartens that reject disabled children”<sup>233</sup> October 8, 2002), and elderly housing policies that malfunction (“Troubles gather for elderly housing scheme”<sup>234</sup> September 6, 2010).

Figure 28: Value and paradigm frames (*Hankyoreh*) make apparent the progressive perspective of institutionalizing welfare as right. I select the frames “social values” as ideas of why to institutionalize welfare) and “distributive growth models” as ideas of how to institutionalize welfare. Table 25: Words in value and paradigm frames substantiate. “Social values” is a bookish frame that seeks to view modern Korean society through the humanistic lens of human welfare. More pragmatically, “distributive growth models” are visions, reforms, strategies, and paradigms. The pragmatic “distributive growth models” frame contains specific ideas for welfare institutionalization, but is muted after the 2012 presidential elections.

---

<sup>230</sup> Nonchaeng/ Kyōngch'al ūi ūmchu t'ongche, itaelo chohŭnka

<sup>231</sup> [Sasŏl] “Mutchima pŏmchoe”, sahoechŏk ch'i-yu changch'i nŭn itnŭnka

<sup>232</sup> atong haktae halu 12.6-kŏn palsaeng

<sup>233</sup> [Sasŏl] Changae ōlini iphak kŏpu hanŭn yuch'iwŏn

<sup>234</sup> Su ōkwŏn naekoto 60-sal miman ipchu pulka... “silpŏ chut'aek” sikkŭl sikkŭl



Figure 28: Value and paradigm frames (*Hankyoreh*)




Table 25: Words in value and paradigm frames (*Hankyoreh*)

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>social values</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Century, human, society, social, life, world, culture, values, personal, freedom, meaning, national, community, care, spirit, representations, modern, country	세기 인간 사회 세계 삶 사회적 가치 개인 문화 국가 공동체 의미 자유 주의 정신 시대 나라 현 대 표현
<b>distributive growth models</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Economic, disparity, labor, market, policies, social, welfare, professor, national, crisis, country, now, distributed, polarization, care, welfare, state, capital, South Korea	경제 성장 시장 정책 사 회 교수 국가 위기 복지 나라 분배 노동 기업 양 극화 격차 주의 복지국가 자본 한국

The frame “social values” relays emotional concepts that become clear from its constituting words above. Its words are abstract and include universal values that are “good for all” but are not conducive to concrete policy discussions. Overall, this frame identifies welfare as human right and dignity. Most of the top article samples in “social values” reviews books and humanistic symposia, which entails the paraphrasing of social critiques. European philosophy and social theories are predominant and intend to enable a humanistic understanding of welfare. Examples are the Foucauldian governmentality of neoliberalism that constrains Korean welfare discourses (“Consulting Foucault on life-

controlling neoliberalism”<sup>235</sup> February 22, 2012) and Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of fluid modernity that disassembles societal stability in Korea (“Mental instability as symptom”<sup>236</sup> May 19, 2012). This frame posits that the true meaning and value of welfare has been distorted and ridiculed in South Korean discourse (“Following the river of welfare to the sea of progressivism”<sup>237</sup> February 12, 2009). It projects that citizens of Korea want a fair state that provides social welfare (“Pragmatic politics without principles is toxic”<sup>238</sup> January 1, 2008). Past uprisings against authoritarian rule opposed social brutality and appealed to the state to protect families (“The family and how civil troops dreamt of it”<sup>239</sup> May 7, 2008). For state welfare that follows social values, the frame refers to traditional origins of values (“Korean social values today derive from filial piety towards the mother”<sup>240</sup> September 15, 2006), retrieves the ethics of community spirit that have become lost (“Community spirit trashed”<sup>241</sup>), and tends to welfare needs that arise from fast social change (“Accepting myself and ourselves is a continuing battle”<sup>242</sup> April 25, 2009). This frame also observes the South Korean welfare discourse to critiques neoliberal values that oppose social values in South Korean society (“Generational

---

<sup>235</sup> Onŭlput’ö "Misyel P’uk’o simp’ochiöm”/ Salm t’ongche hanŭn Sinchayuchuüi... P’uk’o eke taeänül mutta

<sup>236</sup> [K’ülit’ik] Menpung ilanŭn chinghu

<sup>237</sup> [Kaekwŏn nonsöl wiwŏn k’allŏm] Pokchi üi kangül ttala chinpo üi patalo

<sup>238</sup> [Sesang ilkki] Wŏnch’ik öpsnŭn silyong chŏngch’i nŭn yuhae hata

<sup>239</sup> [Sesang ilkki] Simin kuni kkum kkun kachok

<sup>240</sup> [Hankyŏle wŏnhyŏngchil minchok munhwa sangching 100] (8) Hyo, chongmyo wa chongmyo taeche

<sup>241</sup> Ssüleki ch’ölöm pŏlyöchin kongtongch’e üisik

<sup>242</sup> [21-seki chinpo chisikin chito] Aksel Honet’ü Axel Honneth/ „Nalül, ulilül inchöng hala“... T’uchaeng ũn kyesok toenta

dichotomy in welfare debate is policy demagogy”<sup>243</sup> May 15, 2013).

In contrast, the frame “distributive growth models” contains concrete policy ideas for institutionalizing welfare, but shows a rapid decrease after the 2012 elections by failing to sustain the frame amidst materializing welfare policy dynamics after President Park’s election. It refers to possible policy ideas in form of the European welfare model (“New Right and Centrist-reformist scholars discuss”<sup>244</sup> March 30, 2006), the Third Way between neoliberalism and social democracy (“Progressive scholars seek state strategies”<sup>245</sup>, September 19, 2007), and the Welfare State (“Finding the Korean welfare paradigm”<sup>246</sup> May 3, 2007 ). This frame reflects the search for policy paradigms by applying ideas and models to the South Korean context (“Can Sweden not be benchmarked?”<sup>247</sup> May 20, 2011). In this frame’s focus on scholarly output lies a critical awareness of the unique structural challenges in South Korea (“Chan Ha-joon: We need larger framework of democratic control over chaebol”<sup>248</sup> August 22, 2012).

However, Figure 29: Policy emphasis frames (*Hankyoreh*) shows values in action that are inconsistent. Table 26: Words in policy emphasis frames (*Hankyoreh*) substantiates. I select two *Hankyoreh* policy frames that compress values into policy guideposts: “increasing tax for welfare” and “market regulation”. These frames translate values into action by establishing distinct emphases for welfare policy. Both frames

---

<sup>243</sup> “Setae kan t’uchaeng ün hōkuta”

<sup>244</sup> Sinuik- chungto kaehyōk „Pak Chōng-hŭi“ lo matchang

<sup>245</sup> Chōngkwōn kyoch’eki “kaehyōk selyōk ūi kukka chōnlyak” mosaek


<sup>246</sup> Hankuk sik pokchi p’aelōtaim ch’achala/ Ch’amyōyōntae naeil ch’ōt semina

<sup>247</sup> Kungkūm hapnita/ Sūweten ün pench’imak’ing taesang i toel su ōpstako?

<sup>248</sup> Chang Ha-chun “Chaepōl e taehan tō k’ün t’ūlūi minchuchōk t’ongche p’ilyo

convey policy ideas for the institutionalization of welfare. As I showed earlier in the welfare policy discourse of 2012, both camps emphasized market regulation in order to lend viability to their welfare agendas. The below graph demonstrates that the progressive frames did not sustain their values and were merely reactionary to the conservative challenges in 2012.

**Figure 29: Policy emphasis frames (*Hankyoreh*)**



**Table 26: Words in policy emphasis frames (*Hankyoreh*)**

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>increasing tax for welfare (<i>Hankyoreh</i>)</b>	One trillion won, financial, resources, tax, income, tax, reduction, tax burden, government, tax, expenditure, budget, economy, expanded, taxation, system, increase	조원 재정 세금 재원 조세 소득 정부 소득세 지출 예산 부담 세수 감세 과세 확대 경제 규모 세제 증세
<b>market regulation (<i>Hankyoreh</i>)</b>	Economic, reform, corporate, financial, conglomerate, president, regulatory, structure, strengthening, political, challenges, promote, fair, trading, mitigate, the people, Reconciliation, Policy, Management	개혁 경제 기업 재벌 대통령 규제 강화 구조 금융 공정 과제 정치 추진 국민 조정 정책 완화 거래 경영

The *Hankyoreh* discourse increasingly de-emphasizes market regulation and emphasizes tax raises. At the 2012 presidential elections however, *Hankyoreh* momentarily changes its frames. It de-emphasizes the frame “increasing tax for welfare”, which is clearly visible in the sudden drop in 2012 and betrays the importance of this frame for the progressive camp. Instead, the previously neglected frame “market regulation” is selected only in 2012 to frame welfare policy ideas of the progressive camp. This election-dependent behavior is an old pattern of the progressive camp: While “increasing tax for welfare” dips during the presidential election campaigns of 1992, 1997, 2007, and 2012, “market regulation” behaves inversely by spiking in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2012. Despite both frames being essential for the institutionalization of welfare, the progressive camp fails to coherently frame its stated goal by being inconsistent and reactionary.

The frame “increasing tax for welfare” speaks of the need to increase taxes. Financing welfare is among the greatest political challenges for welfare institutionalization, with welfare expenditure aching under the pressure of low birth rates and high aging. This frame is assigned to critical stances towards the tax policy under *Chosun Ilbo* President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) and towards the suppressed tax agenda during and after the presidential election campaigns by *Chosun Ilbo* President Park Geun-hye (2012 to present). In 2008, the tax reduction policy by President Lee Myung-bak is compared to Reaganomics and criticized for inviting large public debt in the near future (“Largest tax reduction scheme in history will lead to cuts in welfare spending and aggravate economic inequality”<sup>249</sup> September 2, 2008). By 2010, the global economic crisis has increased

---

<sup>249</sup> Sasang ch'oetae kamse an palp'yo/ Kamse match'wŏ chich'ul chulikettanŭnte... “pokchi chich'ul” sakkam yangkŭkhwa tŏ simhwa

public spending, multiplied public debt, and constrained the welfare budget under President Lee Myung-bak's "small state, pro-industry" tax policy ("Why people are talking about withdrawing tax reductions for the rich"<sup>250</sup> October 28, 2010). The tax reduction policy therefore harms the state budget and negates the efficiency of policies for ordinary people ("Even national research institutes appeal for withdrawing tax cuts"<sup>251</sup> September 8, 2010). Debates about taxing the rich take place in the National Assembly between *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo* parties, but end fruitlessly due to the resistance of the *Chosun Ilbo* party ("Taxing the rich was all hot air"<sup>252</sup> December 28, 2011). During the 2012 presidential election campaigns, the welfare agenda by the *Chosun Ilbo* further suppresses the need for tax increases behind overly optimistic tax revenue projections ("Tax revenues would never suffice for the implementation of the *Chosun Ilbo* party's welfare agenda"<sup>253</sup> August 9, 2012).

The frame "market regulation" is equally critical about the government's turn towards economic policies for market deregulation, which come with the cost of neglecting economic imbalances between companies ("Economic policy shifts towards growth as central aim"<sup>254</sup> February 7, 1990). Subsequent economic plans are revised towards improving fair competition in the market but still are at risk of emphasizing growth over fairness ("The plan was prepared in short time and requires further work, says public

---

<sup>250</sup> "Pucha kamse ch'ölhoe" wae kölon toena/ Nalatpit, pokchi yesan appak e / "Sesu ch'ukso" silhaeng ölyöwö chyö

<sup>251</sup> "Ch'in sömin- kamsec höngch'aek yanglip ölyöpta"/ Kukch'aek yönku kikwan to kamse ch'ölhoe chuchang

<sup>252</sup> Pucha chüngse, kyölkuk mal chanch'ilo kküt'natta

<sup>253</sup> Saenuli pokchi kongyak ihaeng en sesu t'aepuchok

<sup>254</sup> Kyöngche chöngch'aek söngchang wichulo sönhoe/ Minchu Chayu Tang

official who led its implementation”<sup>255</sup> July 3, 1993). The *Hankyoreh* presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun (2002-2007) differentiates his policy agenda by proposing strong measures for *chaebol* reform (“Candidate Roh debates”<sup>256</sup> October 9, 2002). In 2012, the market regulation agenda by *Chosun Ilbo* president Park Geun-hye (2012 to present) does not tackle *chaebol* ownership structures but concentrates on implementing fair market competition (“Park Geun-hye states she will retain current *chaebol* structures and only regulate cross-shareholding”<sup>257</sup> July 11, 2012).

### 5.2.2.2. Conservative ideas

Compared to progressive ideas, which ideas are characteristic for the conservative camp? The conservative idea of welfare is composed of social charity for the needy, private voluntary aid, and philanthropic values. The following six graphs illustrate the institutions, the continuities, and the changes of frames that reflect conservative welfare values.

Figure 30: Corresponding frames for locally provided welfare (*Chosun Ilbo*) show two frames for public institutions that provide (local-level) welfare to citizens: “city planning” and “local welfare facilities”. Both frames refer to local government provisions of welfare, either as part of city planning and housing complexes (“city planning”) or expansions and constructions of welfare facilities that cater to the elderly, children and teenagers, the disabled, or women (“local welfare facilities”). Both frames display analogous patterns and

---


<sup>255</sup> "Tchalpün sikan kyehoek malyön ilpu mihüp"/ Sinkyöngche chaköp ch'ongkwäl Kim Yöng-t'ae Kihöekwönch'akwan

<sup>256</sup> No hupo Kyöngsillyön t'olonhoe/ "Kümkamwichang, Kongchöngwichang to insa ch'öngmunhoe"

<sup>257</sup> Pak Kün-hye, hyönhaeng chaepöl kucho nwatun ch'ae/ "Sinkyu sunhwan ch'ulcha man kyuche haketta"

proportions in the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse. Table 27: Words in corresponding frames for locally provided welfare (*Chosun Ilbo*) substantiates.

**Figure 30: Corresponding frames for locally provided welfare (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 27: Words in corresponding frames for locally provided welfare (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>city planning</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Residents, facilities, planning, area, construction, site, preparation, welfare, park, city, development, environment, built, around, road, district,	시설 계획 주민 지역 부지 조성 복지 사업 공사 공원 도시 개발 건설 주변 도로 일대 환경 지구 만평
<b>local welfare facilities</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Elderly, welfare, facilities, size, ground, operations, center, built, underground, space, building, comprehensive, plans, install, total, floor, area, planned, welfare, culture, places	시설 규모 복지 지하 노인 지상 운영 센터 건립 종합 공간 건물 예정 계획 복지 관 문화 설치 연면적 개소

The above frames of local welfare provisions decrease sharply under the conservative Lee Myung-bak government, crowded out by the central government’s focus on economic growth<sup>258</sup>. The turn towards economic growth remarkably diminishes the

<sup>258</sup> “Lee won a landslide victory in the December presidential election with his so-called 747 plan, under which he pledged to increase annual economic growth to a rate of seven percent, double per-capita income to US\$40,000 in 10 years and elevate the South Korean economy to the world’s seventh-largest.” (“Lee takes another step back from 747 plan” *The Hankyoreh*, August 20, 2008)



frame of local-level welfare<sup>259</sup>. The frame “city planning” demonstrates that local welfare facilities are important for city planning projects. In other words, city governments must consider welfare improvements for residents when refurbishing their cities. Sample articles for this frame mention parks, apartment complexes, waste processing complexes, funeral parks, and the transformation of a former red-light district into a commercial and residential area.

The local-level provision of welfare services is in the frame “local welfare facilities”. This frame refers to the building of large community welfare centers under the helm of city governments. They are meant to serve groups such as the elderly, women, and disabled persons. To give examples, a six-story community center for women includes cultural and leisurely facilities such as a gym and club rooms, but also a post office and community office (“Songpa women’s center opens”<sup>260</sup> May 25, 2001). In another example, a welfare center for the rehabilitation and autonomy of disabled people is planned to offer rehabilitation treatment, job rehabilitation, physiotherapy, consultation and more on three stories (“Uiwang city establishes disabled welfare center”<sup>261</sup> May 31, 2005). The government of a city with an elderly population over 8 percent plans to establish and build several new welfare centers across its districts. These centers offer subsidized treatment and sports facilities that target the needs of the elderly (“Yongin city pledges to provide a

---

<sup>259</sup> As always, the change of frame must be distinguished from the actual shift of external factors. The Lee government’s welfare policy is later assessed to have not reduced welfare expenditure but to have reduced the systemic ability of welfare provision (Kim Kyo Seong and Kim Seong Wook 2012). Overall, the Lee government’s welfare policy shows more continuity from previous progressive governments’ policies than change (Kim Soon-yeong 2011).


<sup>260</sup> Songp'a Yösöng Hoekwan mun yölö

<sup>261</sup> Üiwang-si, changaein bokchigwan köllip

comfortable life for the elderly”<sup>262</sup> May 11, 2009).

Figure 31: Local investment frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) and Table 28: Words in local investment frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) explains where local budgets come from in order to provide welfare expansions. If local governments implement welfare provisions, the welfare directives and funding budgets are shared by local governments. The following chart offers two frames that represent shared burdens. The frame “research and development for economic growth” refers to investment in health and welfare-related development projects in local regions. Applied research and development projects are partially state-funded expenditures where the Ministry of Health and Welfare participates as stakeholder. In turn, the frame “budget” describes financial burdens that are distributed in local development projects. It illustrates that budget has increasingly become a shared responsibility for local governments since the Asian Financial Crisis 1997.

**Figure 31: Local investment frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



<sup>262</sup> [Sutokwön III] Yongin “Noin i salki p’yŏnhan kot mantül ketta”

**Table 28: Words in local investment frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>Research and development for economic growth (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Information Technology, industry, development, enterprises, science, tech, support, domestic, investment, world, strategic, business, communication, training, institute, century	기술 산업 개발 연구 기업 과학 분야 정보 지원 첨단 투자 국내 세계 전략 사업 연구소 육성 통신 세기
<b>budget (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Budget, projects, funded, welfare, trillion, municipal, government, organized, social, groups, next, year's, budget, increased, investment, fund, special, account	예산 사업 복지 지원 재정 조원 규모 편성 정부 자치 사회 예산안 단체 내년도 증가 재원 투자 특별 회계

As consequence of the 1997 Financial Crisis, the welfare system has expanded institutionally but public expenditure has remained extremely low<sup>263</sup>. The institutional expansion and expenditure sharing is demonstrated by the gradual increase of local investment and budget frames after 1997.

In the frame “research and development”, welfare is highlighted by state funding for health-related research, facilities, and development. Such large-scale projects require national-level funding entirely or partially, which is provided by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. To provide incentives, the Ministry appoints and rewards applied research (“Ministry of Health and Welfare awards 43 innovative pharmaceutical companies”<sup>264</sup> June 19, 2012) and selects cities for building large medical research clusters among many applicants (“Two cities chosen for state of the art medical complex”<sup>265</sup> August 11, 2009). The Ministry may also collaborate with regional governments to invest in trade

<sup>263</sup> See Park Yong Soo (2008)

<sup>264</sup> "Hyöksin hyöng cheyak kiöp" Pokchipu, 43-kot sönchöng

<sup>265</sup> Taeku Sinsö, Ch'ungpuk Osong e “ch'ömtan üilyo pokhap tanchi”

exhibitions (“Bio-EXPO will exhibit biology and other fields”<sup>266</sup> November 19, 2001), chooses a regional hospital to intensively invest in a cross-regional hub for clinical testing (“Clinical testing center chosen”<sup>267</sup> May 8, 2009) or invests in research institutes (“Natural resources research lab opened”<sup>268</sup>). In some cases, welfare is tangential to the matter. For example, local governments may recognize a brain drain of STEM graduates due to lacking welfare conditions provided by regional companies. Thus, they devise a partially state-funded strategic industry in order to hold back talent for the local economy (“Region plans to raise human resources for strategic project”<sup>269</sup> February 8, 2011).

“Budget” indicates how local governments finance welfare and welfare-related plans over the years. In 2005, Cheju Island proposes a budget plan that includes expenditures for promoting tourism and improving social welfare; the estimated budget surpasses the previous year’s actual budget by 10%. While budget subventions from the state treasury will likely increase, the prolonged economic slowdown suppresses autonomous tax revenues by the local government (“Next year’s budget allocates large sums to social welfare and regional development”<sup>270</sup> November 14, 2005). In 2009, projects in the social and welfare fields are transferred from the national budget to the local governments and impose financial burden to provinces and cities; this change shifts the administration of taxation from central to local governments, which adds to the decline

---

<sup>266</sup> Osong paio eksüp'o naenyön 9~10-wöl kaech'oe saengmyöng tüng 5-kae chönsikwan

<sup>267</sup> [Pusan, Kyöngnam] Tonga Tae imsang sihöm sent'ö sönychöng

<sup>268</sup> Ch'önyön chawön yönku kikwan 3-kot tongsi kaewön

<sup>269</sup> [Honam] Chönpuk, chönyak sanöp incha 2000-myöng yangsöng


<sup>270</sup> Naenyön to yesan 1-cho 1100-ök wön sahoe pokchi 2112-ök wön, chiyök kaepal 2315-ökwön paechöng

of state-distributed tax revenues and decimates local welfare budgets (“Financial burden rises for social welfare”<sup>271</sup> January 13, 2009).

The above graphs have illustrated that *Chosun Ilbo* frames avoid highlighting central government provision of welfare, either by focusing on local welfare provision or on central government’s growth agendas. Then, what makes these frames characteristically conservative? Which conservative values lie at the root of the understanding of welfare provision?

Figure 31: Local investment frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) offer evidence for conservative values behind welfare. The frame “public values” highlights individuals and private institutions that enact small and symbolic contributions to marginalized groups. The frame “volunteer work” on the other hand reports actions of communitarian welfare, where citizens organize themselves in order to help marginalized groups of society. Table 28: Words in local investment frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) substantiates.

**Figure 32: Public values and compassion frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



<sup>271</sup> Sahoe pokchi chaechöng putam chüngka

**Table 29: Words in value and compassion frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>public values</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Social, welfare, nation-state, effort, nations, recognize, role, social, change, development, institutions, meaning, solving, environmental, awareness, capabilities, era, Korea	사회 노력 나라 복지 국민 국가 역할 인식 사회적 변 화 발전 해결 시대 우리나라 라 환경 제도 의미 의식 능력
<b>volunteer work</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Elderly, welfare, facility, volunteer, activities, volunteer, neighborhood, volunteers, local, volunteers, love, volunteering, cost-free, impaired, social, welfare, Social, Welfare, Facility, Member	봉사 자원 노인 시설 활동 사회 복지 봉사활동 이웃 봉사자 지역 자원봉사자 사랑 자원봉사 무료 장애 인 사회복지시설 복지시설 회원

The frame “public values” minimizes the role of state, which explains its decrease after 1997 when welfare expansions were first implemented nationally. Reflecting an inverse relationship, the frame “volunteer work” increases when “public values” decreases and vice versa. This is apparent from 1997 to 2010. The two frames substitute each other: “Volunteer work” is a continuation of the frame “public values”, but turns public values into pragmatic action. Thus, these two frames are in the same welfare paradigm and reinforce each other.

From the interchanges between value and charity frames in the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse, the continuity between pre-welfare values and welfare as charity is evident. The frame “public values” emphasizes the individual member of society and her integration into society, which involves their ready cooperation. This emphasis stems from a conservative paradigm that appeals to the public role of citizens and local units for taking initiative and improving society overall. It frames self-responsibility on individual and local levels for providing as well as seeking welfare. Thus, the frame “public values” is complementary to the frame “volunteer work” by civic welfare organizations.

The *Chosun Ilbo* frame “public values” assumes a hands-on, and communitarian approach to welfare as a goal for society. As such, it contrasts against the progressive social values that evoked Western thinkers and complex ideas of humanism. An early article from 1993 tells us that there is no perfect welfare state in the world and personal goals are crucial (“Between welfare and happiness”<sup>272</sup> October 14, 1993). Private industries can contribute to social sharing and exchange by assuming the competency of social contributions (“Now is the time when social contributions belong to the skillset of companies”<sup>273</sup> July 10, 2008). Expectations towards state welfare have increasingly served for political differences between young and old generations and created generational conflict, which the state should help to solve (“Generational disconnect prevents know-how transfer and leads to national loss”<sup>274</sup> January 1, 2013). Occurrences of family suicides should remind us that the Korean tradition of communication and empathy is important to sustain the welfare of weaker members in society (“Revive tradition of communication and empathy to stop suicides”<sup>275</sup> March 12, 2014). Overall, this frame subsumes welfare into public values and societal integration, for which the state provides an orderly platform, but which assumes equal responsibility from the individual in society.

“Volunteer work” in the sample consists almost entirely of civic organizations that provide local services to the elderly and underprivileged. These services mostly revolve

---

<sup>272</sup> Pokchi wa haengpok sai

<sup>273</sup> [T'aehwakang t'ongsin] Sahoe konghön to kiöp üi yöklyang in sitae ta

<sup>274</sup> [2013 sinnyön t'ükchip] [Setae kaltüng ch'iyu hacha] “Setae tanchöl ün nohau chönsu maka kukkachök sonsil


<sup>275</sup> [Palöntae] Chasal makülyömyön sot'ong kwa kongkam üi chönt'ong sallyöya

around a combination of social outreach and food donations. For example, an organization that is devoted to welfare and composed of housewives will collect funds and purchase Korean cabbage, from which the volunteers prepare and ferment *Kimchi* in large volumes, which typically takes hours and is regarded as a labor of love in Korean food culture. A typical output of Kimchi prepared in volunteer work serves around 600 to more people who are considered neglected groups, such as the elderly and households where the children are the main breadwinners for various reasons. Such volunteer services often include the word “love” in their initiatives as a symbolic value for this most essential staple food that practically all Koreans consume daily. Other examples of volunteer work are the serving of traditional rice cakes at holidays and the distribution of free coal for heating. In yet other examples, elderly welfare centers may cooperate with social welfare organizations in order to provide better service. In all, this frame depicts a particular type of volunteer work that intends to integrate easily isolated groups into society by transmitting familial empathy and Korean community spirit.

Figure 33: Origin and continuity of public values (*Chosun Ilbo*) shows that frame “public values” is itself a continuation from earlier conservative values. The frame “conservative economic reforms” is assigned to economic policies under Presidents Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) and Kim Young-sam (1993-1998). Sample articles discuss policies of liberalization, deregulation, and wage stabilization to cope with complex economic challenges. The frame “conservative economic reforms” is therefore most present during the terms of Presidents Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam, later decreasing close to zero. Table 30: Words in related value frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) substantiates.



**Figure 33: Origin and continuity of public values (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 30: Words in related value frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>Conservative economic reforms (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	President, Kim Young-sam, enterprise, reform, economic, stability, competitive, price, structure, national, development, planning, board, monetary, adjustment, promote, regulatory, improvement, sector	개혁 경제 안정 김영삼 기업 대통령 물가 경쟁력 국민 구조 금융 완화 조 정 추진 규제 개선 개발 기획원 부문

Although conservative economic reforms integrated welfare, their aim was to legitimate policies for economic growth and wage stabilization to assuage the labor movement<sup>276</sup>. The frame “conservative economic reforms” stems from the period before the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, which faced different economic challenges than today. The uprising labor movement called for industrial stabilization via wage stabilization (“Attempting to induce an early agreement on wage negotiations”<sup>277</sup> January 20, 1990). Emerging economic inequalities were addressed by welfare and redistribution policies

<sup>276</sup> Welfare spending decreased under these economic reforms, due to the turn towards conservatism by the middle classes after political democratization. Further, the government policy reduced taxes in lieu of increasing welfare spending (Ha Yeon-Seob 1997).

<sup>277</sup> "Imkūm hyōpsang choki t'akyōl yuto t'olok" No Taet'onglyōng notongpu chisi

(“Public concepts law will be enacted as planned”<sup>278</sup> July 6, 1990). However, the governmental commission that pursued equality and welfare was quickly replaced after two years, its place taken by a new commission that aimed to deregulate companies for propelling economic growth (“Increasing global competitiveness has ceased at policy rhetoric”<sup>279</sup> December 26, 1990). Aiming for globalization, South Korea prepared for membership in the WTO by opening its domestic markets (“Re-arranging industrial structures prior to opening and expansion”<sup>280</sup> July 19, 1990). The frame conveys a series of economic reforms that sought to automatically solve welfare by promoting economic policies. It continued to frame the budget strategies of the governments of Presidents Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam.

Figure 34: Helping and volunteering (*Chosun Ilbo*) explain frames of helping the poor. Conservative welfare frames were tied up with economic reforms and public values until 1997. This year saw the Asian Financial Crisis and presidential elections, when economic conditions worsened and the need for welfare rose to be permanent. This tectonic shift shows clearly in frames related to the weakest groups of society, “low-income groups” and “family, family values, elderly people”. Table 31: Words in helping and volunteering (*Chosun Ilbo*) substantiates.


---

<sup>278</sup> Kongkaenyöm pöp kyehoek taelo ch'uchin

<sup>279</sup> Chöngch'aek kuho lo küch'in kyöngchaenglyök kanghwa

<sup>280</sup> Kaepang hwaktae taepi sanöp kucho chae chochöng

**Figure 34: Helping and volunteering (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 31: Words in helping and volunteering (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>low-income groups (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Basic, life, support, target, low-income, household, welfare, levels, society, pay, elder, care, home, residents, subject, beneficiaries, business, offers	생활 지원 기초 저소득 가 구 복지 사회 계층 대상 대상자 사업 수급자 노인 보호 지급 가정 주민 제공 혜택
<b>family, family values, elderly people (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Father, son, mother, family, children, living, husbands, grandmother, school, friend, Kim, parent, dreams, mother, live, alone, study	아이 아들 어머니 생활 가 족 아버지 학년 남편 할머 니 친구 부모 꿈 김씨 학 교 혼자 공부 엄마 삶 아 내

The above illustrates that frames “low-income groups” and “family, family values, elderly people” peak during presidential terms but not during presidential election campaigns. The frame for low-income groups decreases until 2012 but is caught midway by the welfare-touting frame during the presidential election campaigns. The frame for families, family values, and elderly people recovers from 2008 under the Lee Myung-bak government in order to appeal for a self-helping society.

The *Chosun Ilbo* frame “low-income groups” peaks at 1998, 2004, and 2009,

reflecting the framing of temporary safety nets. The need for livelihood protection skyrocketed from 1997 to 1998 after the Asian Financial Crisis, whereupon the Ministry of Health and Welfare provided relief subsidies (“Recipients of livelihood program increase by 130,000 next year”<sup>281</sup> December 24, 1997). The Ministry soon extended temporary subsidies to the still uncovered unemployed (“Livelihood costs of low-income unemployed will be supported”<sup>282</sup> April 17, 1998). Articles from 2004 further document monetary and material subsidies for low-income groups, such as the heavily disabled. These local-level subsidies were administrated and organized by local and city governments all over the country. Further samples from 2009 continue this pattern but extend the target groups to the families of low-income persons, for example if the child is at risk of discontinuing her studies due to unforeseen loss of income (“Special support for crisis-ridden families starts today”<sup>283</sup> February 3, 2009).

“Family, family values, elderly people” peaks in 2004 and is assigned to articles that portray individual families, persons, and personal fates in a compassionate light. They relay the hardships of marginalized individuals from a personalized perspective on children or single mothers living in poverty. This frame conveys hope while emphasizing the importance of family values in a brutish world, and appeal for members of society to help and care for each other. However, it rarely addresses responsibility or blame towards the government, nor does it criticize the lack of a Welfare State.

Figure 35: Helping and donating (*Chosun Ilbo*) demonstrates how the above introduced frame “volunteer work” compares to private industry contributions in the frame

---


<sup>281</sup> Naenyŏn saengpocha 13-man myŏng nŭlŏ

<sup>282</sup> Chŏsotŭk silchikcha saengkyepi chiwŏn

<sup>283</sup> “SOS wiki kachŏng t’ŭkpyŏl chiwŏn” onŭlput’ŏ

“charity donations”. The following Table 32: Words in helping and donating (*Chosun Ilbo*) substantiates that this frame refers to *chaebol* and large-size companies as a main source of donations towards the needy. It reports neutrally about the large-scale donations that industry actors have given.

**Figure 35: Helping and donating (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 32: Words in helping and donating (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
charity donations ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Social, welfare, contributions, neighborhood, joint, fundraising, donation, Social Welfare, Foundation, supports, organizations, sharing, love, President, raisers, transfer, funds, deposited, the needy	사회 복지 모금 공동 기부 이웃 성금 사회복지 재단 사랑 회장 모금회 전달 나눔 단체 지원 기탁 기금 불우

The frame “charity donations” constantly rises over the years and correlates with the increases of “volunteer work”. However, the emphasis on “charity donations” remains high even after 2008, when the growth-based focus of the central government rises. This reflects a strategic use of the donating frame and conveys that industry actors are responsible for welfare contributions even when the state and individuals cannot provide. Even with the decrease of the frame “volunteer work”, the conservative idea of welfare is

sustained by *Chosun Ilbo* frames with continuous frames.

### 5.2.3. Focus on welfare/social policy and policymaking

As shown so far, welfare ideas differ between minimalist (conservative) and maximalist (progressive) conceptions. These ideas had however very little effect on policymaking in South Korea. To show policymaking under political polarization, I demonstrate frames of policymaking in welfare bill legislation between political actors. The following frames constitute the analytical category of *conflict frames*. The *Hankyoreh* frame decries that the power hegemony is tilted towards the conservative camp, and negates the conservative camp's actions and values, which represents political polarization.

Figure 36: Welfare committee frames show the frame "National Assembly". The *Hankyoreh* frame "National Assembly" reflects political networks and strategies in the National Assembly. It peaks notably in 2000 to report about the pharmaceutical reform, which was met with three consecutive strikes by medical and pharmaceutical professionals until it finally passed in 2000<sup>284</sup>. In contrast, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame "National Assembly" demonstrates political competition for positions in committees. This content shows in the frame's peak in 1998, when the unemployment policy committee was established in order to deal with the Asian Financial Crisis. Table 33: Words in welfare committee frames substantiate.

---

<sup>284</sup> Kim Hak-Ju and Ruger 2008

Figure 36: Welfare committee frames




Table 33: Words in welfare committee frames

label	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>National Assembly (Hankyoreh)</b>	Hannara Party, parliamentary, committee, meeting, passed, health, care, bill, Democratic Party, amendment, submitted, welfare, democratic, process, affiliated, health, Health and Welfare Committee,	국회 의원 위원회 회의 통과 한나라 보건 법안 복지 민주당 개정안 제출 한나라당 처리 민주 소속 여야 보건복지위 열린
<b>National Assembly (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	Congressional, Democrats, Democratic Party, Member of Parliament, Hannara Party, welfare, Chairman, national, congress, conference, audit, welfare, affairs, parliamentary, audit, committee, chairman, parliament, nationals, Committee of Health and Welfare	의원 국회 한나라 민주당 한나라당 보건 위원장 회의 감사 국민회의 국정 정부 보건복지위 국정감사 위원 의장 나라 국민 국회의원

The *Hankyoreh* frame “National Assembly” centers on the Health and Welfare Committee of the National Assembly, which screens and passes bills for the Ministry of Health and Welfare. It often frames that welfare bills are delayed due to unresolved disputes over other bills, which cause deadlock between political actors<sup>285</sup>. This frame contains explicit criticism against assembly members of the conservative party. For example, the conservative party replaces its committee chairman due to his misalignment with the platform, which the frame decries as disreputable (“Partisan assignment of standing committees”<sup>286</sup> August 11, 1999); at other times, the frame calls opportunistic the absence of conservative assembly members during provisional assembly, which causes the delay of welfare bills (“Assembly committees at standstill”<sup>287</sup> July 14, 1997). This frame transmits polarized interpretations of political actions in the National Assembly. It portrays welfare as blocked by the party power interests of conservative politicians.

In the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “National Assembly”, the emphasis is different. The frame “National Assembly” is assigned to the competition among party members who seek positions in coveted standing committees. Some committee positions are more popular than others, leading to the neglect of less popular committees. The frame laments that this bias overlooks field-related expertise and limits the capacity of policy evaluation.

---

<sup>285</sup> Despite personal and institutional factors that affect standing committee legislations in the South Korean context, not all deadlocks should be viewed as the result of political polarization. A study has applied the theory of standing committees and found that bill legislations are affected *mainly* by the pursuit of party interest, but *also* by the pursuit of constituency interest and the pursuit of good public policy (Park Yun-hee 2014).

<sup>286</sup> [Ch'wichae p'a'il] tangli tanglyak sangimwi paechöng

<sup>287</sup> Yötang üiwöntül “Kyöngsön k'ongpat” e/ Kukhoe Sangimwi mapi



The distribution of committee chairs is subject to various factors<sup>288</sup> but mostly to political preferences and party association. The popularity of committees fluctuates to some degree. In 1996, committees with possible impact on regional problem solving and people's livelihood (including Health and Welfare) were most popular, while less popular committees struggled to meet the member threshold ("Legislation-Judiciary Committee, Administration Committee, and Communication Committee fall short"<sup>289</sup> May 5, 1996). The distribution of committee chair positions is crucial for competitive party strategies ("Incumbent and opposition parties tug at most rewarding committees"<sup>290</sup> August 10, 1998). In 2000, the Communications Committee and Tourism Committee become popular, while the Health and Welfare committee is attractive for politicians with former professional expertise ("To each his own"<sup>291</sup> May 2, 2000). Another article shows that the pursuit of coveted committee chairs invites deadlocks between parties if they break tacit agreements of seat distributions ("Camps collide over conceding essential committees"<sup>292</sup> June 7, 2000). In 2002, the unpopularity of the Health and Welfare Committee leads to an imbalanced party member ratio, with eight member from the conservative and only three from the progressive party ("*Hannara Party* and *Democratic Party* elect committee chairs after birthing pains"<sup>293</sup> July 12, 2002).

---

<sup>288</sup> A study on committee assignment additionally points out the Korean custom of parliamentary seniority, political agendas of that time, and the political situation of the respective party (Ga Sang-jun 2009).

<sup>289</sup> Pöpsa- Haengchöng- T'ongsinwi chöngwön mital

<sup>290</sup> Yöya altcha sangwi chul taliki

<sup>291</sup> Sisi kakkak

<sup>292</sup> "Altcha sangwi yangpo mothae" yöya kyöktol

<sup>293</sup> Hannala, Minchu Sangimwiwönchang chint'ong kküt'e sönych'ul

#### 5.2.4. Framing of interest groups as actors for social policy

Framings of interest groups show how policymakers deal with public and civic actors. I highlight a frame where political reforms conflict with an entire professional field's interest groups. The frame “public deliberations” is assigned to political negotiations around legislative bills, and includes other coordinative actions in central political institutions. It declines during presidential election campaigns. Controversial policy negotiations are framed only *during* presidential terms for institutional reasons: The presidential system is likely to affect political strategies.

Figure 37: Interest group frames (*Hankyoreh*) and Table 34: Words in interest group frames show the frame “public deliberations” in *Hankyoreh*. It frames controversies between public and political actors. These can be tug-of-war negotiations between parties in the National Assembly, but also between the Blue House and the incumbent party (“*Hannara Party* overturns party platform twice”<sup>294</sup> July 19, 2000). Prominent debates arose regarding the national pension plan (“National pension controversy must focus on essence”<sup>295</sup> November 24, 2004), the passing of bills regarding medical welfare (“Background behind the government announcement of emergency measures in the case of medical strike”<sup>296</sup> August 17, 2000), but also regarding ministerial candidates that the President suggests for the Ministry of Health and Welfare (“Blue House startled at backlash”<sup>297</sup> January 4, 2006). This frame is also assigned to public deliberations

---

<sup>294</sup> [Ch'wichae p'ail] tanglon tu pön twichipün Hannalatang


<sup>295</sup> [Sasŏl] Kukminyŏnkŭm nonlan, ponchil e chumok haeya

<sup>296</sup> Chŏngpu “üilyo p'aöp taech'aek” paekyŏng / Ŭi-chŏng chŏngmyŏn ch'ungtol wikikam kocho

<sup>297</sup> Tanghwang han Ch'ŏngwatae “Tŭlöwa yaeki hacha”... Chŏngüichang ipkakk kachi panpal halchul molla

between private actors and government with societal implications. For example, a conglomerate chairman endows generous donations to a disabled welfare organization as a reaction to governmental accusations of tax evasion (“How to create money that is supposedly not there- Why Chairman Jung suddenly switched course”<sup>298</sup> November 22, 1991). Other references concern a public-to-private realm, for example in the case of union strikes that negotiate for better terms of welfare (“Asiana labor union rejects final revision draft”<sup>299</sup> June 16, 1993).

**Figure 37: Interest group frames (Hankyoreh)**



**Table 34: Words in interest group frames (Hankyoreh)**


labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
public deliberations (Hankyoreh)	Claims, demand, objection, welfare, controversial, comment, criticize, decision, concerns, opposition, government, position, officials, meeting, situation, possibility, promote, attitudes, suggest	주장 요구 반대 복지 논란 의견 비판 결정 우려 반발 정부 입장 관계자 회의 상황 가능 성 추진 태도 제기

<sup>298</sup> Ŏptatŏn ton” öttöhke mantülö naelkka/ Chöng Chu-yöng Hoechang panghyang küp sönhoe anp'akk

<sup>299</sup> Asiana nocho ch'oechong suchöng an köpu

Next, Figure 38: Interest group frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) and Table 35: Words in interest group frames (*Chosun Ilbo*) show the “public deliberations” frame in *Chosun Ilbo*. Overall, the frame is assigned to policy struggles where the Ministry of Health and Welfare is key actor among negotiations between government, public, and professional actors. As seen in the behavior of the *Hankyoreh* frame, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame dips at presidential election campaigns, specifically in the years 1997 and 2012. The year 2000 sees a peak due to the medical strikes and bill negotiations. The frame increases *during* all presidential terms, except during the Roh Moo-hyun term 2003-2008.

**Figure 38: Interest group frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**



**Table 35: Words in interest group frames (*Chosun Ilbo*)**

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>public deliberations (<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>)</b>	Conference, admission, requirements, determined, opposition, claims, government, welfare, officials, agreed, opinion, backlash, Commission, announced, plans, discussed, situation, consultation, raised	입장 반대 주장 회의 요구 결정 복지 관계자 의견 정부 합의 반발 위원회 발표 논의 예정 상황 제기 협의

In line with the welfare discourse, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame mostly refers to pharmaceutical and medical bills and their painstaking negotiations. This includes the

integration of health insurance funds, over which the parliament argued for years (“Ruling and opposition parties tug over funds negotiations”<sup>300</sup> December 27, 2001 and “*Hannara Party’s attempt to pass bill fails miserably*”<sup>301</sup> June 26, 2003). Most prominently, medical strikes occur throughout articles assigned to this frame, and culminate in negotiations between medical, pharmaceutical, and government representatives<sup>302</sup> (“Medical crisis may glimpse an emergency exit”<sup>303</sup> September 8, 2000). More recently, the Korean Pharmaceutical Association entered negotiations with the parliament to discuss the vendor rights for emergency medication (“Korean Pharmaceutical Association may retract previous agreement on granting vendor rights”<sup>304</sup> January 25, 2012).

Figure 39: Medical deliberation frames (stacked graph) and Table 36: Words in medical deliberation frames validate that the frames “medical sector” and “health insurance” increase between 1997 and 2002 in both newspapers. Thus, the framing of negotiations over medical welfare reforms validates the patterns of the “public deliberations” frames.

---

<sup>300</sup> Yöya, kõnpo chaechöng hyöpsang chultaliki

<sup>301</sup> Hannala “kõnpo t’onghap yuye pöpan” mangsin p’yokyöl halyöta silp’ae... naetal put’ö yechöng taelo silsi

<sup>302</sup> Cho argues that these conflicts were caused by discursive clashes between interest groups (Jo Byung-hee 2000)

<sup>303</sup> Üiryo sat’ae ch’ulgu poillang mallak

<sup>304</sup> Yaksahoe “sangpiyak sup’ö p’anmae” mal twichipna

Figure 39: Medical deliberation frames (stacked graph)




Table 36: Words in medical deliberation frames

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>medical sector</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Health, medicine, Health and Welfare, division, medical, doctors, pharmacists, association, welfare, medicine, hospital, pharmacy, preparation, prescription, physician, welfare, pharmaceutical, closures	보건 의약 의료 의사 분업 보건복지부 의약분업 약사 협회 복지부 의약품 약국 병원 조제 복지 제약 폐업 처방 의원
<b>medical sector</b> ( <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> )	Department of Health and Welfare, doctor, health, medicine, medicines, patient, welfare, reform, pharmacists, pharmacy, prescription, clinic, pharmacist, hospital, insurance, association	보건 복지부 의사 보건 복지부 의약 의료 분업 의약분업 의약품 환자 복지 약국 의원 약사 보험 협회 병원 처방 건강
<b>health insurance</b> ( <i>Hankyoreh</i> )	Health, insurance, National Health Insurance, health, welfare, pension, benefits, paid, subscriber, finance, corporation, pension, apply, treatment, cost,	보험 건강 보건 의료 건강보험 국민 보험료 부담 복지 연금 급여 복지

	service	부 보건복지부 공단 재정 가입자 국민연금 적용 진료비
<b>health insurance (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	Pension, National, Health, Insurance, premiums, paid, health, welfare, pension, income, financial, burden, agency, health, insurance, Ministry of Health and Welfare, hike, subscriber, system	보험 연금 국민 보험료 보건 복지 건강 국민연금 부담 공단 지급 소득 재정 건강보험 보건복지부 복지부 가입자 제도 인상

### 5.2.5. Frames as systems debates

Finally, the newspaper discourses display polarized traits in system frames. These frames are best described as “systems” due to their continuity and reproduction of past ideologies and ideological systems.

Figure 40: Systems frames and Table 37: Words in systems frames show system frames in both newspapers. The *Hankyoreh* frame “systems” contains paradigms of South Korea’s past and present. This frame contains words that describe systems ideologies, such as democracy, politics, power, democratization, dictatorship, and struggle. Most of the articles are written by or paraphrased from the critical insights of progressive scholars. However, their opinions form the core within the welfare discourse of the progressive camp. In contrast, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame “systems” morphs the political polarization onto the conservative perspective. It contains words that describe systems but minimizes ideology, such as society, economy, politics, market, freedom, and democracy. Thus it is clearly different from the *Hankyoreh* frame but does not address progressive arguments regarding the history of conservative hegemony. Instead, the *Chosun Ilbo* frame obviates progressive arguments.

Figure 40: Systems frames




Table 37: Words in systems frames

labels	Most likely word relationships	Korean words
<b>Systems (Hankyoreh)</b>	Democratic, -ism, political, regime, democracy, movement, power, dictatorial, political, system, history, advanced, countries, struggle, century, era, public	주의 민주 민주주의 정치 세력 정권 민주화 권력 독재 운동 정치적 역사 진보 체제 국가 투쟁 세기 시대 국민
<b>Systems (Chosun Ilbo)</b>	Caution, century, social, economic, politics, professor, growth, market, countries, freedom, era, Korea, claims, world, democratic, ideology, democratic, development, system	세기 주의 사회 경제 정치 시장 국가 성장 교수 세계 주장 자유 시대 한국 발전 민주주의 민주 이념 체제

The *Hankyoreh* frame describes the continuity and embodiment of systems in the conservative camps. This frame indicates that the progressive ideological system finds its values under severe threat by the continuity of anti-democratic systems. Regarding this threat as perpetual, the progressive ideology is unrelenting in emphasizing that ideology, paradigms, and political actors of polarized political camps are mutually exclusive.

Its core paradigmatic values are democracy, political equality, and socioeconomic



equality (“Hurdles as stepping stones”<sup>305</sup>, August 18, 1998). It juxtaposes these values against the past conservative governments and autocratic regimes. Democracy is in equivalence to the Welfare State and juxtaposed against capitalism and anti-communism. This frame has the following narrative: As the Cold War system that has prevailed in the form of South-North Korean division, past autocratic governments sustained oppressive regimes and rendered socialistic ideas into an illegal taboo. This frame sees the consequences of this system in the retardation of the Welfare State in South Korea today (“The anti-communism ideology that has been blocking the welfare society”<sup>306</sup>, October 17, 2002). Political camps polarize because the conservative camp propagates neoliberalism and still possesses hegemony in South Korea (“Rekindling the debate about social formation theory”<sup>307</sup>, May 28, 2005). In this frame, conservative ideology in South Korea reproduces pre-welfare values. Progressive scholars regard conservative Presidents as embodied continuities of pre-welfare values embodied by (“Distinguishing between change and continuity”<sup>308</sup>, March 8, 2008). Even more so, the conservative President Park Geun-hye embodies the continuity of past authoritarian ideology, which entails centrally led controls on civil freedom and is legitimated via values of modernization, economic development, and social stability (“The end of the *Yushin* regime is neigh”<sup>309</sup>, December 12, 2013).

---

<sup>305</sup> Köllimtol ül titimtol lo/ Pak Ho-söng Sökang Tae Kyosu, Chöngch'ihak (Nontan)

<sup>306</sup> Waenyamyön t'olon/ Pokchi sahoe kalomaka on pankong iteolloki

<sup>307</sup> ”Yöksa pip'yöng” Yölümho t'ükchip kisa / 21-seki chök “sahoe kusöngch'e” nonchaeng pulchip'inta

<sup>308</sup> [Uli sitae chisik nonchaeng] Pyönhwa, pulpyönsöng hamkke p'antanül

<sup>309</sup> Yusin üi chongmal i taka oko itta

The *Chosun Ilbo* frame peaks noticeably before and during the presidential elections 2012 when the socioeconomic and welfare agenda of the conservative camp shifted to the center. In this period, *Chosun Ilbo* increasingly engaged with systemic arguments in order to frame the revamped conservative welfare agenda. *Chosun Ilbo* deals with the continuity and change of systems, and conveys systemic arguments that are updated and appropriated. The ideological system of the conservative camp portrays ideology as the culprit for sustaining political polarization, but does not attribute distinct ideology or ideological continuity to oneself.

Combined with the above findings, *Chosun Ilbo* highlights change over continuity of systems. It portrays the polarization between ideologies as a mutual political challenge for all parties and politicians (“Populistic politicians are to blame for the deepening of conservative versus progressive conflict”<sup>310</sup> December 18, 2009). Secondly, it focuses on the socioeconomic challenges of the nation and state, but does so without evoking a continuity of the conservative ideological system behind these problems, which is a crucial difference compared to the arguments in *Hankyoreh*. This stance is flexible enough to equally condone uncritical subscriptions to neoliberalism and the demanding of social democracy despite the inchoate civil society of South Korea. Thus, this frame easily integrates scholars who criticize the ideological systems of both camps (“Professor critiques conservatives and progressives alike in foreign journal publication”<sup>311</sup> October 15, 2002), and welcome arguments of a “Third Way” for the progressives.

---

<sup>310</sup> Posu, chinpo kaltŭng p'ilyo isang chŭngp'ok toen kŏn p'op'yullichŭm chŏngch'iin tŭl t'tat

<sup>311</sup> "Sŭmokŭ" chi kiko lo posu, chinpo pip'an Yi Kŭn-sik Kyosu

### 5.3. Hypothesis testing: Explaining variations

By using the analysis and validation results, I test two hypotheses that investigate the effects of discursive polarization. The theory of discursive polarization in this dissertation derived from two parts: hegemonic discourse and discursive institutionalism.

Its first assumption is that polarized hegemonies compete via distinct frames in order lend particular claims to universal goals<sup>312</sup>. Frames can polarize or convey ideas, while these abilities may be mutually exclusive. My first hypotheses tests whether polarized frames diminish ideas in the gradually shrinking discourse on unification.

Its second assumption is that frames are institutions from the past but can adapt to political situations. While frames are reproductions of meanings, actors are able to adjust them if necessary. I have above demonstrated continuity via the validation of frames. My second hypothesis tests whether political election campaigns bring change to continuous frames in the growing discourse on welfare.

Finally, I use the test results to augment previous insights on these discourses. I seek them in South Korean domestic scholarship as well as in the area studies. Thus I explain additional advantages and insights with my empirical findings.

#### 5.3.1. Variation of unification frames

My first hypothesis is: *When polarized frames increase, ideas decrease*. It tests for a retarding effect of polarizing frames on the development of divergent ideas. To do so, I compare the averages of the frame categories *conflict* and *divergence*. As affirmed by the prior validation steps, conflict frames indicate political polarization while divergence


---

<sup>312</sup> In Nonhoff's theory, the competition of political actors is also called *discursive formations* because they arrange and combine various ideas and frames into distinctive discourses.

frames indicate political ideas. The unification discourse is suitable for this test because it has steadily shrunk over the years due to the stalled inter-Korean relations and the falling interest of voters, which hints at a dearth of ideas.

Figure 41: Polarization outweighing ideas in unification discourse shows the averages of conflict and divergence frames in both newspapers. Conflict frames mostly outweigh divergence frames in the unification discourse, except in the *Chosun Ilbo* frames until 1997 when the conservative government was first succeeded by progressive governments. In both newspapers, ideas only outpace polarization in the year 2000, motivated by the first seminal summit talks. Polarization decreased temporarily under its effect and mitigated camps' differing political stances on the sunshine policy. However, results also show that polarized framing immediately returned and became stronger, especially in the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse under progressive governments 1998 to 2008.

**Figure 41: Polarization outweighing ideas in unification discourse**



Overall, patterns hint at an inverse relationship between conflict frames and divergence frames, which supports the hypothesis. While the stagnation of inter-Korean relations must be considered as the main external factor that retards this discourse, the fluctuations of conflict frames at some election campaigns and North Korean provocations suggest discursive effects that shape unification policies.

Notable in the long run is the increase of ideas in *Hankyoreh* and the gradual decline of ideas in *Chosun Ilbo*, which suggests that the emphasis of the *Chosun Ilbo*

unification discourse has shifted from the role of state to domestic party politics. According to results, the sunshine policy that peaked in 2000 and was sustained under progressive presidents has led to lasting polarization and a decline of ideas in the conservative camp.

The results also imply how conflict frames can be discursive institutions. Polarized framing affects public perceptions, national policy, and even foreign policy by simply reproducing. The unification discourse is historically complex and prone to pronounce strong ideological positions (Yi Kab-yun 2014), such as anti-Americanism. Negative perceptions of the U.S. among the younger generations under 50 increased while positive perceptions of North Korea increased (Lee Wootae 2012), and South Korea-U.S. relations stagnated during the North Korean appeasement of Presidents Kim and Roh (of terms 1997-2002 and 2002-2007 respectively). Such sentiments are however reproduced adaptations of earlier or related frames, such as modern Korean history or ideological polarization.

The dominance of polarized frames over ideas is evident in the results. Only at rare times of opportunity, ideas are not constrained by polarized framing. The Inter-Korean Summit in the year 2000 spurred the unification discourse by demoting the state's monopoly on this issue and transforming North Korea from latent constant to official variable (Kim Hyung-joon and Kim Do-chong 2000). Ideas on unification differ in principles and policy by camp, which supports that surveyed respondents agree with the need for unification but diverge in regards to ideology or interpretative frame (Rhee June-woong 2004b; Rhee June-woong 2004a). However, unification policy remained underdeveloped, as each camp considered its ideas on unification to be absolute and mutually exclusive from the other camp (Lee Woo-young 2003).

In recent years, social debate decreased regarding Inter-Korean policy and South

Korea-U.S. relations. My findings suggest that the decreased discourse can embody an opportunity for introducing new ideas. The anti-idea effect of polarized framing decreases together with the interest in unification. A window of ideas can open if actors change frames in order to adjust to public disinterest. As evidence, the unification issue used to pose as demarcation between progressives and conservatives after the Inter-Korean Summits and during the progressive regimes by Kim and Roh in the years 1998 to 2008; this line has blurred and a substantial number of moderate ideas have emerged (Song Ho-gŭn 2014).

In the area studies literature, the unification discourse yields high returns as a security question but simplifies South Korean domestic politics to a single government actor<sup>313</sup>. The results question this approach by highlighting that domestic polarization leads to the decline of ideas and policies, including foreign policy. One notable study examines the unification discourse to question the labels “progressive” and “conservative” as found in international studies (Chae Haesook and Kim Steven 2008). They show that South Koreans that identify as “progressive” or “conservative” are convergent and moderate in their views on Inter-Korean relations. However, their finding applies to citizens and not on how and why South Korean policy discourse polarizes despite the moderate attitudes of voter bases. The theory of discursive polarization serves to show that polarized frames are taken for granted and constrain frames with new ideas. In order

---

<sup>313</sup> In general, area studies examine unification not as domestic politics but as an international issue that hinges upon the security system in Northeast Asia (Ku 2015). They describe North-South relations and South Korea-U.S. relations. The unification issue also invites references to the German unification (J. M. Chung and Nagle 1992; J. K. Jung and Rector 2014) and policy recommendations from the German perspective (C. Rein 2015).

to beat the dominance of frames that suppress ideas, the best bet is to identify suitable ideas from the pre-existing meaning context, and then to update them. While President Park Geun-hye has attempted this tactic by conceiving the term “unification bonanza”, the reception of this idea has been mixed due to a weak underlying policy development.


### **5.3.2. Variation of welfare frames**

The second hypothesis is: *Polarized frames increase during presidential election campaigns*. Based on the validations so far, conflict frames reproduce specific meaning contexts and sustain polarization. According to my validations in the previous chapters, convergence frames indicate shared foundations of welfare policy while divergence frames indicate characteristic emphases by each newspaper. To test the above hypotheses, I therefore compare conflict frames to divergence frames and convergence frames in both newspapers.

Figure 42: Election effect on welfare discourse shows that conflict frames in both newspapers peaked with notable distinction in the 2012 election campaigns. As the welfare agenda dominated the policy platforms of both camps, this pattern explains the political competition that erupted over welfare agendas. In both newspapers, conflict frames start to rise from 2009 to 2010, and the progressive newspaper frames polarization over welfare more strongly. However, in the following years until the 2012 elections, the conservative newspaper increases conflict frames more strongly and dominate the welfare debate. Its strong framing correlates with the eventual success of the conservative camp in the 2012 elections.



**Figure 42: Election effect on welfare discourse**



Overall frame patterns of both camps show differences. The *Hankyoreh* discourse has earlier fluctuations of conflict frames because the progressive camp was the original proponent of welfare policies. Compared to the extreme jump of polarized frames in 2012, divergence frames have little significance at all times. Low divergence frames indicate a neglect of ideas. This result belies the claim of the progressive camp of being the original

visionary for welfare. It also implies that polarization under high political competition begets more polarization, but does not positively impact the diversity of political ideas in the progressive camp. The benefit of polarized political competition is slim for the deliberation of ideas, values, and policies, which disconfirms parts of former theories on party competition and political differentiation.

As expected, the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse paid little attention to welfare, as shown in convergence and divergence frames. Conflict frames even slightly decrease over the years and ignore progressive demands for welfare. This is recognizable since 2002 under the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak governments when the need for welfare steadily rises. However this strategy lasts only until 2010, after which the conflict frames rise by nearly four times. Welfare debate and agenda competition is actively taken up by *Chosun Ilbo* before the 2012 elections, and peaks in President Park's first year of government. At the same time, the ensuing polarized debate over the new government's welfare policy in 2013 suppresses divergence frames. This suggests that polarized attention on welfare helps to win elections, but trades off the diversity of political ideas.

The welfare discourse confirms that polarization around welfare was a grand competition at the 2012 election campaigns, when all camps moved to the center of welfare agendas. The welfare discourse in South Korea exists in three flavors (Ch'oe T'ae-uk 2013): social services and public-private burden sharing (*social investment*); guaranteed income and welfare as human right (universal welfare); and lastly selective provisions (*liberal welfare*). In this framework, both camps propone the social investment state but differ in coverage and spending (Cho Young-hoon 2012). While the progressive camp claimed to pursue universal welfare, the conservative camp attacked universal welfare as socialist fantasy (Kim Jin-sok 2010). The comparison of *Hankyoreh* and

*Chosun Ilbo* confirms that the *Hankyoreh* discourse associates universal welfare with positive meanings, while the *Chosun Ilbo* discourse associates negative meanings (Chung Jae-chorl 2011).

Frames are discursive institutions that constrained the welfare discourse until 2009. After 2009, conflict frames continued to constrain the emergence and deliberation of diverse political and policy ideas. A long time after the welfare discourse was originally sparked by civil organizations in the 1990s, the year 2009 was a critical juncture that established welfare as a core issue and demarcated the progressive camp from the conservative camp (Shin Kwang-yeong 2012). From 2010 to 2012, the conservative camp successfully seized the welfare issue, which was an inauthentic move in the eyes of progressive pundits. However, the findings suggest that neither camp can rightfully claim issue authenticity due to their mutual neglect of policy ideas and values. The results reflect that a brief realignment of the political cleavage (Koh Won 2012) by competing parties that shuffle towards convergent discourse can bring little to no positive benefit for political and policy ideas.

In the area studies literature, the initial pool of welfare discourse studies seems large, but manual filtering reveals a scarcity of English-speaking literature<sup>314</sup>. The low

---

<sup>314</sup> Insights on the welfare discourse in the area studies are rare because international research questions do not seek them. Aside from ideational approaches, studies on South Korean welfare are concentrated towards socioeconomic variables rather than towards the political or discursive level. Further considered dimensions are limited to international factors such as globalization or neoliberalism. Yet other scholars pay attention to theoretical concepts such as the “East Asian welfare model” (Kim Pil Ho 2010) and government policy directives, such as “productive welfare” (Kim Young-Hwa 2003). Due to the salience of welfare in South Korea over the recent years, this disinterest calls for attention. Overall, the ideational focus on discourse still lacks relevance in Korean studies and beyond.

attention reflects the slow ascent of welfare as a broad discourse in South Korea. Yet, those studies that discuss the transition of policy and agendas highlight the crucial role of ideas for politics.

With the 2012 elections' welfare debate behind us, we will need more explanations for the political mechanisms of change under polarized conditions. Previous studies of polarization in South Korea have focused on the continuity of polarized frames and polarization. In contrast, I showed the polarized continuity of frames but also showed evolving and changing frames over time. On the other hand, the Asian Financial Crisis provided a major external shock but brought no change to polarized frames or polarization. Thus, the mechanism of change can be explained better by differentiating between types of frames and their effects.

The political role of the welfare discourse became crucial after the Asian Financial Crisis. The impact of neoliberalism on South Korean pensions (Jung Chang Lyul and Walker 2009) and South Korean welfare extensions (Kwon Soonman and Holliday 2007) was palpable. Domestic conditions required welfare expansions in order to legitimate neoliberal restructuring. This change was possible because the new idea of neoliberal restructuring was not yet coupled with a particular polarized frame that could subsume and negate it.

I conclude the following: Effects between frames can suppress important frames, as shown above in the low activity of divergence frames. This suggests that discourse may lead to policy change only if polarized frames do not constrain ideas. Usually, polarized frames cancel out ideas by sparking further polarization and taking up the room for ideas.

Alternatively, and reversing the causal logic, policy change can cause the evolution of frames and reshuffle meaning formations within old frames<sup>315</sup>. The trajectories of frames show that they are able to change and adjust to new political circumstances. When the Asian Financial Crisis struck, the frame of necessary welfare reforms served to legitimate reforms and to override worries about insufficient social protection funds (Kwon Huck-ju 2009). Neoliberal restructuring after the Asian Financial Crisis relieved corporations from the role of providing welfare, while the state overtook responsibility by marginal steps (Zoon Hong Kyung and Song Ho Keun 2006), as the old system of corporate welfare provisions had left out the socially weak (Kwon Huck-ju 2005). Kwon points out that the reforms connoted important conceptual changes in social policy, and observes that the idea of social rights and social inclusion took flight in political discourse after this critical juncture. Henceforth, the concept of welfare entered discursive politics for indefinite time<sup>316</sup>.

Adding to the causal explanation of external factors influencing policy and discourse, my findings contribute an understanding of how discourse influences political and policy ideas. While the Asian Financial Crisis was a seminal event of external shock, the everyday politics in South Korea revolve around the usual polarization and political competition. As we can see, political ideas are fragile and too easily undermined by polarization and competition. At the same time, polarization and competition remain important venues of policy deliberation and differentiation. However, my findings lend emphasis to the contextual factors of the democratic institutions of a country, suggesting

---

<sup>315</sup> The role of ideas in politics has been closely elaborated elsewhere via qualitative approaches (Beland and Peterson 2014).

<sup>316</sup> Kwon remains ambiguous on whether clear institutional shifts occurred.

that the balance between competition and ideas has a breaking point of “too much polarization”.

While the years following the 2012 elections will have to be examined in depth on a long range in order to reach full conclusions, these findings imply lessons for political parties as democratic institutions that polarize for the sake of polarization, and not for the sake of ideas. These ideas are crucial to developing welfare policies as desired by the voters who support parties with votes. My findings attempt to render this argument tangible in flesh by using empirical evidence over normative claims.

## 6. Methodological implications

Having conducted the text-as-data analysis of South Korean newspaper articles in the previous chapter, I arrive at explaining the advantages and limitations of this methodology for (comparative) political science and area studies. Empirical evaluations of newspaper text in the previous chapter closely examined the political context of South Korea in order to conduct validations and derive findings. The crucial step was to validate modeled topics qualitatively in the first step, to then observe frames as quantitative variables in the next step.

Having demonstrated the above, I underline that the coupling of qualitative validation and quantitative testing benefits a challenge endemic to comparative politics: Dealing with foreign data contextually, that is, in a way that does not stretch analytical concepts to the empirical politics in foreign cultures. An overstretched analytical concept, for which a famous example is 'democracy', is well known to introduce Western bias and skew findings.

The following three sub-chapters explain the challenge, the approach, and the method of my dissertation in more detail. In other words, three implications weave through my dissertation: How to objectively interpret local sources that stem from a polarized political context; how discursive epistemology can guide comparative political analysis across democracies of various vintages; and what text-as-data can contribute to the implementation of discursive epistemology.

To summarize beforehand: Firstly, using foreign-language primary sources to infer findings about politics in a foreign culture embodies epistemological (*What is there to be known?*) distance and thereby invites hidden bias. Secondly, cultural and linguistic

understanding augments the understanding of what is being written and why. One way of implementing this methodological approach is to focus on the political discourse in a foreign culture. A focus on discourse takes political ideas in a foreign culture seriously, and treats primary sources as discourses within specific contexts of political camps. Doing so applies a contextual and interpretive lens onto textual patterns and can be called *discursive epistemology*. Lastly, text-as-data can be understood as one of many possible methods to trace the dynamics between ideas and their effect on political discourse.

## **6.1. Dealing with local secondary sources**

The domestic perspective of local secondary sources is not a sanitized space of fact-checked opinions. It harbors a plethora of interpretations and discourses. Prior knowledge that one adopts from the domestic perspective must be complemented with the empirical perspective.

By considering the contexts of prior studies on polarized camps and polarization by mapping them in chapter three, I outlined why Korean political science is often normative and often critiqued for its Western-centrism. Both arguments agree that Korean political science lacks adequate concepts, theories, and epistemologies for explaining its own political phenomena.

The study of South Korean political ideas demonstrated how the ideological scale of South Korean ideas is complex, historically rooted, and ambiguous. So-called “progressive” or “conservative” political camps in South Korea contained elements similar and dissimilar to other democratic countries. Despite this difference of scale, South Korean scholars and South Korean ordinary discourse use Western-centric political concepts in a manner that could be called habitual or even hegemonic (Hong Song-min



2008; Kang Chong-in 2013a). Western scholars have observed the same in their own practice towards foreign cultures, calling this tendency an imperialism of concepts (Rudolph 2005). For the scholar of political science and area studies, the confounding of concepts and ideational scales has been described as conceptual stretching, which skews the validity of findings on politics in foreign cultures (Lane 2016; Collier and Mahon 1993; Sartori 1970).

South Korean political discourse naturally contains concepts and labels. A risk lies in relying only on qualitative Korean studies, or alternatively only on statistical data. South Korean political discourse contains plenty of concepts but little decoding of the ideational scale in South Korea. Of course, to build upon prior studies is standard academic procedure. However, the reliance on prior studies is higher and the number of studies is lower in comparison to other oft-researched countries<sup>317</sup>.

For these reasons, when studying politics in South Korea, the researcher carries the burden to validate assumptions derived from domestic primary sources. One way to validate is to gather a sufficiently large sample of sources in order to avoid sample bias. Korean studies and political science tend to read small samples of discourse or in order to contextualize discourse.

Meanwhile, several factors lead to the underestimation of this burden to validate. For example, secondary sources enable the bypassing of time-consuming immersion into language, culture, and history. Prior studies are shortcuts in this sense and enable

---

<sup>317</sup> In comparison, research on the democratic institutions in Latin America has flourished, and advanced comparative political studies on topics such as democratic consolidation and polarization. Many of the same topics apply to South Korea, which reached democratization only after dictatorial struggle and economic development.

important research questions that do not require fluency in language and culture. In the process of adopting knowledge from secondary sources, language signs bypass critical inspection. The concepts within South Korean discourse remain shielded from probing in area studies, which depend on secondary domestic sources to the largest extent<sup>318</sup>.

“Facts”, such as the real ideological scaling behind the South Korean labels “progressive” and “conservative”, often are taken-for-granted in “expert knowledge” and “area knowledge”<sup>319</sup>. The most likely manifestations of taken-for-granted facts are validity assumptions. Quinn et al. mention that the “most common form of validity” is *face validity*, which is “inherently subjective, generally viewed as self-evident by authors and with practiced skepticism by readers” (Quinn et al. 2010, 216). In comparative politics and area studies, the burden of proof is large, and taken-for-granted facts should be reason to prompt an epistemology that regards discourse with practiced skepticism.

Thus, “face validity” applies to concepts and labels that are viewed as “self-evident” due to diminished testability behind the barrier of language, culture, and history. A critical take of face validity scrutinizes the “facts” that scholars perceive from primary and secondary sources. In so doing, “practiced skepticism” is cultivated. Face validity starts

---

<sup>318</sup> If used with political intent, labels are intersubjective constructions of how to convey a subject. In this analogy, academic concepts are similar to political framing. South Korean political scientists note that the labels “Left and Right” or “progressive and conservative” has long served to depict South Korean politics as a hostile dichotomy, which oversimplifies reality and solidifies polarization (Song 2014). At the same time, ideological conflict in South Korean society is not divided between “progressives” and “conservatives”, but between diverse groups and multi-dimensional policy issue competitions (K. Yi 2014).

<sup>319</sup> “What is “familiarily known” is not properly known, just for the reason that it is “familiar.” When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest form of self-deception” (Hegel 2012, 17–18)

from South Korean scholars, is adopted by area studies, and derived by political science. Face validity in area studies and political science therefore is the result of several orders of derivation. It is weak validity due to the acculturation of domestic researchers to taken-for-granted facts<sup>320</sup>.

Face validity is precarious also because South Korean domestic scholars argue that South Korean political science is *not Korean enough*. Their argument targets the Western-centrism of normative ideals, social science theories, and concepts, which are language signs and tools that South Korean scholars imported into South Korean scholarship, a staggering number of which have gained their final degrees in the United States<sup>321</sup> (Hong Song-min 2008). Borrowed tools distort research questions, perspectives, and frameworks (Kang Chong-in 2013a) akin to cookie cutters shaped differently than the South Korean empirical reality. In parallel, a number of diasporic Korean scholars point out gaps between Western tools and Korean reality. Such voices tend to resound first from the field of international relations, which depends heavily on the standard (Western-centric) toolbox, aiming of predicting macroscopic state-actor behavior (Eun Yong-Soo and Pieczara 2013; Kang David C. 2003).

South Korean domestic scholarship seeks to restore Korean-ness. This includes to extend theories to South Korea with due modifications that advance the theory. By expanding theories to the East while avoiding cookie-cutting, it becomes possible to

---

<sup>320</sup> Due to acculturation, the South Korean domestic secondary literature presumes that the reader has experienced firsthand the empirical reality of South Korean polarization. For this reason, studies on the polarization of South Korean politics are rare in English but numerous in Korean.

<sup>321</sup> "For instance, among the 21 faculty members in the Department of Education at Seoul National University, nineteen received their doctoral degrees in the U.S. and this pattern is consistent throughout the university" (Lee Jenny J. and Kim Dongbin 2009, 632)

describe *generalities and specificities* of South Korean politics. Without this aim actively pursued, an intellectual vacuum separates the inside (South Korean domestic) and outside (area studies and political science) perspectives on South Korea.

## **6.2. Discursive epistemology for political research in foreign cultures**

In political science, epistemology is “the attempt to clarify what kind of knowledge and what kind of explanations fit the kinds of objects that are the concern of political science” (Bevir 2008, 48). The cost of learning culture, language, and political context are reason why studies on South Korean political ideas are scant. This cost is an obstacle, but its remedy pays off: As my dissertation shows, discourse is the canvas for text, context, and the dynamics of ideas. Thus, this dissertation suggests a discursive epistemology for analyzing discourses and ideas.

Discursive epistemology can stand for many possible pairings between ideational focus and empirical analysis. As illustration, this dissertation emphasized that area studies can approach the social sciences on behalf of the researched culture. Holbig (2015) suggested that area studies adopt institutionalism and reflectivism: Institutionalism describes countries but blunts the ability of categories and concepts to generate insights. Reflectivism deals with categories as intersubjective interpretations. Paired with institutionalism, reflectivism induces a focus on ideas.

For example, this dissertation has engaged with polarization and recursive frames in South Korea and showed stagnations of ideas and policies. Not only institutional change, but also policy stasis can be understood via discursive institutionalism. Policy stasis is not an inactive and passive state, but requires a substantial amount of discursive

activity (Hope and Raudla 2012). Discursive processes of legitimation, selling, and communicating can cause gridlock because “discourse is path-dependent and embedded in the historical understanding and constructions of the institution in which deliberation takes place” (Hope and Raudla 2012, 403). In this way, discursive institutionalism illuminates causal paths.

In this manner, area studies can be paired with frameworks that take ideas, interpretations, and discourse seriously. From the perspective of area studies, these toolboxes are subject to country-specific adaptation. For concepts, models, and theories of political science, area studies add validity. In this mutually helping constellation, established theories facilitate the translation of models that reflect the empirical reality of politics. A shared epistemology is “connecting link, “translator,” and provider of impulses in both directions” between area studies and political science, because they traditionally “perceive each other as separate epistemic communities” (Holbig 2015, 27). Indeed, area studies scholars are predisposed to be communicators. Alvarez (2011) notes that area studies have traditionally been a multidisciplinary enterprise, rather than an interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary one. He suggests to make use of “alternative knowledge producers” and “collaborative research methods” (Alvarez, Arias, and Hale 2011, 238).

Social scientific questions in the Korean studies are the minority in European universities. The presence of only a few social science-oriented departments indicates so. The trajectory of area studies shows that the combination of social science and area studies is yet to comfortably belong to either. The dearth of social scientific questions is an outcome of the organization of knowledge. My dissertation empirically addressed a pertinent question of South Korean politics, but asserted in chapter two and three that the

answer needs an epistemology tailored to the study of political ideas.

I found that epistemologies suited for this task are rare because they foment in between disciplinary epistemologies. Without the country's contextual background, we glean merely the periphery of domestic discourse. This, if used for inference, creates hidden bias and produces findings that are at best superficial and at worst erroneous<sup>322</sup>. In other words, the local and the foreign are complex constructs and would technically require ethnological immersion. However, the strict reliance on time-costly immersion is likely to obstruct the goals of the social scientific enterprise and hinder researchers from exploring a larger range of questions.

This gap between area studies and social science was famously pointed out in the nineties by area scholars (Bates 1997a). This line of critique targeted the negligence of "scientific" criteria in the area studies, such as testability and generalizability. However, I argue that the root issue lies not in the lack of methods but in the lack of epistemology. Without an epistemology that is aware of one's position lodged in between locally shaped perspectives, the best of methods will fail to deliver more than positivistic support of one's assumptions.

Among the fields of political science, comparative politics tend to work with qualitative methods and field work. That is not to say that political science places no importance on the skills of area- or country-specific immersion. Their high valuation of field work reflects in the predominance of qualitative studies in research of comparative politics. In contrast, positivistic variants within political science tend to converge towards

---

<sup>322</sup> The intertwining of qualitative data and discourse is predictable from alternative perspectives, such as social constructivism.

normal science and think in the logic of variables. Information naturally becomes lost when only numbers and labels remain as reduction by quantitative approaches; this is however necessary for the plurality of methods and does not stand to critique. Instead, inaccuracy emerges from *how* we utilize quantitative information. The less contextual knowledge about a country is available, the more inaccuracy lurks in using quantitative data. Inaccurate simplifications of a country in political science can lead to distorted implications, as political science analysis relies on efficiency but also on accuracy. To this aim, area studies can translate knowledge from the country's domestic scholars who target the domestic audience in their language. Further, area studies disclose the empirical reality of the country's perceptions and can identify new research questions from there.

Area studies and political science are often merged together, but differ in their demands and goals of immersion. Area studies then appears to us in dual roles. On their own, they pursue cultural description. At other times, they are subsumed into comparative politics and appear to us as the focus on a region or country. Some area studies in some locales, such as Korean studies in German academia, are nearly exclusively devoted to the solitary role. Here, the inherent approach of area studies manifests in pure form.

The consequences of an epistemological gap between inside observers (South Korean researchers<sup>323</sup>) and middle/outside observers (area studies scholars and political scientists) become apparent. The discursive aspect of politics is empirical reality and precondition for polarization in South Korean politics. Thus, one must understand the

---

<sup>323</sup> The insights of South Korean political science have not blossomed in English-speaking literature. By providing an overview of domestic studies, I sought to illustrate that their insights are not easily translated into foreign area studies or political science.

discourse in order to research discourse. In this sense, the absence of discursive approaches to South Korean politics is as natural as a language barrier between two people. When studying foreign politics, the presence of this natural barrier harbors grave ramifications. All approaches entail preconceptions as to which elements compose, sustain, and change South Korean politics. The elements that we choose to consider determine descriptions and causal mechanisms. For the study of ideas, discursive approaches to the domestic experience provide essential counterweight to simplified (but equally important) assumptions. Not only area studies but also political science benefit from discursive approaches to foreign politics because local perceptions are part and parcel of political outcomes.

### **6.3. Utility of text-as-data for implementing discursive epistemology**

In political science's value chain of ontology-epistemology-methodology (Hay 2006), epistemology shapes the choice of method. This dissertation offered a discursive approach that addresses an epistemological gap. A discursive approach, suggested for example in discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2008), considers institutional context and text of discourse. Coupled with a text as data method, this approach redressed the fact that neither qualitative nor quantitative approaches have placed primary interest in the distance between the discursive view and the empirical reality of South Korea. Thus, the method incorporated qualitative data in volumes that also constitute quantitative data. In essence, this method aimed to refine the discursive view.

The following discusses the methodological implications of text as data, a quantitative method that entails automation and computerization for processing large



amounts of text. In this dissertation, large amounts of data enabled analysis of the following three dimensions: vertical levels of ideas and intended topical arrangements (frames); horizontal spectrum of text from media in the polarized context (discursive); and longitudinal volumes of text that contain historically rooted frames (institutional).

Inherent assumptions exist in every method. Discourse analysis in this dissertation required large empirical data (quantitative and deductive) with interpretative theorizing (qualitative and inductive). Both assumptions entail how we understand the output. Some authors suggest that both epistemologies can and should be combined, seeing little reason not to bridge the quantitative-qualitative divide (Bennett 2015). From alternative positions, said divide is constructed (Barkin 2015; Barkin and Sjoberg 2015; Sjoberg 2015) and quantitative methods can even constitute “non-neopositivist methodologies” (Barkin and Sjoberg 2015, 854). From my point of view, the aim of methodology is to pragmatically combine quantitative capacities of data and the qualitative grammar of data. Both abilities are indispensable for using qualitative text as quantitative data. However, doing so must combine quantitative and qualitative strengths instead of combining weaknesses. This warning leads to validation measures, which I have discussed.

An additional reason for mixing methods is the ambition to explore the discursive institutions in polarized South Korean politics. This aim is an interdisciplinary mix of area studies and political science. On the one hand, text represents the vertical, horizontal, and longitudinal spectrum of discourse (as shown above). On the other hand, text represents the structural reality of South Korean politics and supports institutional and discursive theories with empirical evidence. To rephrase the duality of text as data, text can well be quantitative and data can be qualitative. Text analytical methods allow for the technical

possibilities.

What remains is to pay due consideration to the potentials and limitations of mixing methods to bridge area studies and political science. Through the lens of institutional theory, discursive institutions are structural as well as structure-giving for the politics of a country. The research question of this dissertation looked at camps that contest each other. Hence, the capacity to measure interpretations by numbers is necessary to give equal validity to simultaneous truth claims.

Above, I have described that my research subject was vertical, horizontal, and longitudinal. Data-driven analysis of the three-dimensional research subject requires data in masses. Recent technologies offer the basic tools for handling larger amounts of text data. Big data entails possibilities, limitations, and inherent effects on research. Big data is one of the biggest buzzwords in today's academia, and when integrated into social science, its implications become a social scientific matter. Masses of data require measurement in order to be useful for social science as description or induction of existing social conditions, eventually providing the bases for better causal inference in the social sciences (Grimmer 2015). The buzzword "big data" seeks to access data more diversely, quickly, and in larger volumes than was possible before. While the volume of my dataset only mimics the information-science category of truly "big" data, it constitutes big (in the sense of relatively large) data in political science and area studies.

How does the sheer quantity of data relate to systematic patterns between macro and micro levels? One answer is that big data enables insights from within data. To elaborate, I refer to recent methodological commentators in the field of international relations. Instead of the deductive approach that begins with hypothesis or theory, big data lends itself to inductive procedures, thus avoiding reductionism (Chandler 2015).

Chandler focuses on practical implications of open and big data, which would dispense of many predictive and preventive theoretical models in this area. For example, instead of merely testing hypotheses, processes and relations within the data can be identified and used for enhancing policy practices. In this context, he finds that big data is more useful as reflexive knowledge (measurement) rather than causal knowledge (explication).

Epistemological consequences of big data in this dissertation bear traits similar to Chandler's reflections. Firstly, access to larger data enables data to "speak for itself" (Chandler 2015, 848). As described above, my research subject contains vertical, horizontal, and longitudinal complexity and requires big data to handle these dimensions.

Secondly, Chandler states that linear theoretical models make way for observations of the empirical world that illuminate processual relations. In this dissertation, processual relations are institutions. For discursive institutions especially, institutions are discursive and textual. Hence, discursive institutions are measurable within text data. Measurable are, in the simplest sense, processual relations between words in the data, which emerge out of political reasons.

Thirdly, Chandler's states that, just like modernist approaches and their reductionist assumptions have been rejected by critical approaches (e.g. Marxist, feminist, or subaltern approaches), big data can "confirm or reinforce posthuman understandings rather than being constitutive of them" (Chandler 2015, 848). In the same sense, this dissertation observed that disciplinary approaches embed assumptions that can limit the research on ideas and politics in a foreign culture.

This last point is important for retaining the advantages of area studies and political science, which diverge in their assumptions. The mixing of methods arguably

creates a mixing of assumptions, which is a philosophical discussion where unanimous consensus among scholars is difficult to reach (Barkin 2015; Barkin and Sjoberg 2015; Bennett 2015). This problem is only a problem if empirical research is negatively affected. Whether description or causal inference, the weaknesses in human understanding exist where languages and cultures break in translation, regardless of whether the differences are linguistic or semantic<sup>324</sup>. My pragmatic take has walked the middle ground by acknowledging differences and embracing commonalities. In practice, this dissertation has sought to plant an empirical application onto gaps that are disciplinary, informational, methodological, and epistemological.

For fields that face tradeoffs between natural barriers and diverse approaches, methodological openness can pose advantages. If methods enable the understanding and communication of South Korean politics, we gain empirical data and expanded theories. Such efforts further the academic and social relevance of South Korea as field, topic, or case<sup>325</sup>. This dissertation tackled assumptions that are hereditary in fields and disciplines<sup>326</sup>. If hereditary assumptions are compared as in this dissertation, ambiguities arise as to which assumptions to trust more and why. Assumptions are dependent on approaches and disciplines, but also on the geographical location of the researcher.

---

<sup>324</sup> See for example: Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. "A tale of two cultures: Contrasting quantitative and qualitative research." *Political Analysis* 14.3 (2006): 227-249.

<sup>325</sup> South Korea as a success story for development has been amply illustrated by leaning on common statistical data. Its political dynamics post-democratization are rarely discussed by using the terms and concepts of mainstream political science, because one must first know its institutions in depth. Without clear motivation, political science does not emit the impulse to use South Korea as a case for theoretical inquiry.

<sup>326</sup> Not of interest in this dissertation were cognitive assumptions on the individual level.

## 7. Conclusion

This dissertation has shown that political variables of permanent campaigning, ruling party, and presidential campaigns lead to polarized frames, but also suggested how they limit political ideas that embody the spectrum of politics and policy. The discourse during the 2012 presidential campaigns in South Korea was mostly carried out over valence issues and shifted political discourse towards centrist welfare policy. This phenomenon was consistent with previous knowledge about low institutionalization of South Korean political parties: According to domestic scholars, the two polarized political camps lack ideological identity, represent only the middle classes, and socioeconomic policy has been neoliberal under progressive and conservative governments alike. However, domestic scholars have also remarked upon “extreme” polarization between camps, describing that polarized parties and partisan media reproduce ideological lineages in discourses about Korean unification and modern history. Taking these two observations together, we arrive at a puzzle: How are camps ideologically polarized while socioeconomic policies are homogeneous across camps? Surprisingly, polarization has seldom been connected to the institutional role of political ideas since democratization in 1987.

Polarization and policy stasis in South Korea have been explained as the combined outcome of a presidential system and low party institutionalization. However, this explanation overemphasizes stasis and neglects the role of political ideas. Thus, I have offered a new theory of discursive polarization, which seeks to explain the decimation of ideas by the continuity of polarization in political discourse. I argued that political discourse is dependent on two discursive variables: polarizing frames and idea-

conveying frames. As result, my empirical findings showed that camps in South Korea have reacted to policy ideas of the opposing camp with polarization, which trades off the space for ideas and suppresses them. This effect was found to be consistent. The act of introducing new ideas to discourses was effective for election success, but high polarization eventually discontinued the proffered ideas of the winning camp after elections.

## **7.1. Implications and discussions**

The theory of discursive polarization in this dissertation was synthesized from two parts: hegemonic projects and discursive institutions. Firstly, the theory of hegemonic projects suggested that polarized camps compete to assert discursive formations to claim their capability of an issue. Secondly, the theory of discursive institutions suggested that camps use recursive frames over time, while adapting those to external events and conveying new ideas if necessary. Thus, political discourse reproduces the existing meaning context but can adjust to situations. Taken together, the theory of discursive polarization implied that polarizing frames are reproduced by polarized camps not only at elections but at all times.

In order to test this implication, I measured and extensively validated frames in newspaper discourses. My text-as-data method mirrored the backwards-recursive trait of institutionalized frames by sampling two political discourses of two partisan newspapers over almost the entire period (1990-2014) of democratized politics after 1987, which disclosed longitudinal patterns of frames. Topic modeling as an applied method led to the demonstration that polarizing frames absorb political variables and adapt to external events. By treating discourse as text-as-data, I integrated quantitative data analysis with qualitative validation via text samples and discourse analysis. Thus, I was able to examine

how seemingly consistent polarization has actually experienced constant variation of polarizing frames and idea-conveying frames. My differentiation of three types of frames (convergent, idea-conveying, and polarizing) showed that polarizing frames play a greater role than idea-conveying frames in polarized political competition, eventually leading to constant polarization and a scarcity of ideas.

This dissertation contributes to diverse scholarly debates. Firstly, polarization in South Korea has often been taken for granted as a fact and not sufficiently explained to a wider audience that is unfamiliar with South Korean polarization. This dissertation explained and depicting the origins and outcomes of polarization on varying historical and socioeconomic dimensions, which provided a comprehensive understanding that is rarely seen in Korean research. Secondly, this dissertation conducted ideological measurement and translated South Korean ideological systems into relatable patterns, thereby highlighting the continuity of pre-democratization institutions. Ideological systems were thus translated from complex construct to an operationalized variable, which facilitates international comparisons for future studies. Thirdly, my analysis of democratic discursive institutions considered the South Korean manifestations of political concepts, which follows in the footsteps of conceptual analysis in the field of comparative politics by adding South Korea onto the map. Lastly, this dissertation conceptualized inherent challenges of studying ideas in politics by the example of South Korea. Its methodological facilitation of ideational study in foreign politics provides a sound argument for the advantages of ideational approaches in comparative politics.

### **Polarization in South Korea**

Instead of treating polarization in South Korea as a given, I applied the theoretical framework of discursive institutionalism, which extrapolates the new institutionalism

framework that regards actors and structures as co-constitutive. Thus I was able to analyze simultaneous discourses in relation to contextual aims and constraints. The ongoing discursive polarization of camps leads to hegemonic discourses in each camp and isolates political ideas. The following observation of institutionalized frames explained how polarized discourses in South Korea have prevailed and reproduced over its relatively brief history of democracy.

The meta-context of South Korean political science was found to be as follows: South Korean domestic scholars have pursued a wide array of approaches towards South Korean politics. Due to the previous difficulty of accessing political power relations under authoritarian regimes, a large share of South Korean social science scholarship is still guided by normative attempts to settle political conflicts of South Korean modern history, such as grave instances of state violence and political oppression in the past that still impact discursive and polarized politics today. I have demonstrated these ideational continuities from past to present by mapping the domestic literature on polarization, which yielded the political context from the domestic viewpoint.

South Korean political science could therefore be contextualized within international political science as follows: Firstly, some mainstream political scientists in South Korea claim that polarization is the main hurdle of contemporary South Korean politics. Secondly, many Western political scientists would not intuitively agree to the above. Thirdly, some political scientists in South Korea argue that Korean political science lacks tools for describing and communicating specific Korean traits alongside international theories. Lastly, some social scientists in South Korea claim that South Korean social science lacks fundamental social scientific principles. This overall state of research is expanded by this dissertation's description of theoretical generalities alongside local



particularities, and renders an explanation of polarization that is communicable to international audiences.

### **Ideological measurement**

In this dissertation, two varying cases of salient discourses represented historical and socioeconomic dimensions of ideological polarization within institutionalized frames. By using local text-as-data to induce the overarching context, I arrived at a model of polarized discourse that facilitated the measurement and interpretation of political ideas. Coupling discursive epistemology with text-as-data methods enabled the measurement of accurately interpreted ideologies and the analysis of their role over the political landscape of 24 years.

Thus, I showed that ideology appears in various levels of frames. In this sense, a level of political ideology may contain claims that the progressive party stands for justice and equality. On another level however, past experiences contradict this claim if we consider progressive presidents who implemented neoliberal economic policies akin to conservative presidents. As such, socioeconomic discourses featured a high level of expressed ideology in polarizing frames towards the public, but a low level of real ideological difference in policy ideas.

Such variability of ideological dimensions in various discourses led to various types of trajectories for political ideas. Various discourses possessed varying degrees of ideology and differed also by the salience of discourse. In discourses of socioeconomic matters, the degree of expressed ideology was low, whereas the discourse on Korean unification featured a high proportion of ideological arguments as living artifacts from past antagonisms. Despite the multi-leveled trait of polarized political discourse, Korean

political science rarely covered the comprehensive (in the variety of frames) and historical (in the coverage of time length) discourse at the same time. Such a comprehensive and historical perspective on discourse, as achieved in this dissertation via longitudinal ideological measurement, enables a better understanding of the role of ideas in polarized politics.

### **Conceptual analysis of democratic institutions**

This dissertation's design also aimed towards understanding *what is there to know* among existing ideas that shape South Korean polarized politics, and put forward a discursive epistemology that explicitly focuses on the variety of local interpretations. In order to highlight the advantage of discursive epistemology, I argued that non-discursive approaches project the illusion that we understand "their" ideas correctly because they were cast in a familiar objectivizing language. Thus, I suggested that area studies with a political focus and political science with an area focus pursue different approaches but converge in a problem that is surprisingly identical. Western-centric and positivistic tools let contextual ideas and meanings disappear. In order to remedy shortcomings of prior studies, I chose an approach of conceptual analysis as opposed to using concepts as positivistic variables that measure the quantity of fixed attributes over time.

When studying ideas in politics, the variety of meanings depends on political actors, who in turn depend on their political context. It is thus wrong to treat concepts, labels, and categories as if they were scientific and static (for instance in "Left" and "Right") when they are in fact discursive and dynamic. Studies on the diffusion of policies and laws strongly hint at the role of domestic actors. Political actors process ideas with the intent to react to demands of the domestic audience, or to improve their conditions amidst domestic political contestation. Some preceding approaches have married a domestic

focus with the study of ideas in politics. In particular the translational, conceptual, and contextual approaches show that the meanings of ideas are contingent on the political context. They illustrate the gap between representations of ideas and their varied meanings in the empirical reality.

My dissertation showed that meanings in political discourses emerged from combining what is known and adding what is new. However, area studies often approached South Korean politics “from the bottom” by pursuing cultural approximation, but utilized Western concepts that described ideas. I therein revealed the epistemological challenge for studying ideas in the politics of a foreign culture. Discourse analysis bridged the disparate realities of the area scholar “here” and the empirical field “there”.

### **Studying ideas in politics**

The difficulty of explaining the status quo by attributing agency to ideas is well commented upon, which justifies approaches that show patterns and structures behind ideas (Béland, Carstensen, and Seabrooke 2015; Blyth 2015; Schmidt 2016). This dissertation has outlined an avenue for understanding the patterns and roles of ideas in South Korean politics. It engaged both the perspectives of area studies or social science in order to improve contextual depth and communication for a social science audience. Thus, my dissertation investigated the role of ideas in politics, and how ideas can lead to change, due to constraints given by discourse as the context of democratic politics. Findings implied that recursive frames are detrimental to new idea-conveying frames by robbing them of opportunity. This zero-sum assumption considers the space and opportunity of discourse to be limited.

Further, the discursive institutional framework differentiates levels of ideas and

predicts their readiness to change. Thus, the contexts and compositions of frames matter for understanding the construction of politics in a foreign culture. If political discourse is regarded as *text in context*, the role of ideas in political discourse becomes subject to examination and identification. In the discursive dynamics during presidential election campaigns, the political context seems ultimately toxic for the conveying of new ideas.

Limitations of ideas in politics stress the relationship between text and context that shape political frames. In these terms, ideational change is brought by actors' discursive abilities of communication, while polarized continuity stems from historical, social and cultural factors that pose as meaning context for actors. As such, the meaning context is continued as ongoing polarization between divided hegemonic discourses. Thus, ideational abilities draw from existing institutions in form of polarized frames, while discursive abilities draw from existing institutions but also from external political and socioeconomic situations.

I have shown that ideational factors matters for understanding contemporary politics in South Korea. The role of ideas helps to understand why political polarization in South Korea is resistant against party change, systematic political institutions, shifting socioeconomic variables, and external shocks such as elections or security conflicts vis-à-vis North Korea. The results have suggested that we pay heightened attention to the role of ideas in the respective discourses of polarized political camps of South Korea. By providing empirical evidence of political ideas, I offered a substantive argument that discourse can structure meaning context with recursive frames, which attributes discourse with a substantial ability for sustaining ongoing polarization.

## **7.2. Broader debates**

This dissertation has also contributed to broader areas of research in political science that engage with the spatial modeling and textual scaling of political party competition, but also with polarization. Firstly, the topic of party competition relates broad fields of research on spatial determinations of political positions, the constitution of political cleavages among voters and political actors, and agenda-setting strategies depending on party issue ownership during political campaigns. South Korea embodies an additional case of party competition under the presidential system, with the added factor of democratic consolidation in recent times. Political competition after relatively recent democratization also lends itself to considerations of democratic quality, which is relevant for the study of emerging democracies across the world. The above represents a broad range of potential challenges for political competition and therefore contributes to the study of polarization more generally, by contribution further implications of polarization to the debate.

### **Party competition**

Spatial models of party competition in political science have come a long way since the median voter model, which has been extensively discussed in terms of expected convergence or non-convergence between parties (Grofman 2004). In the South Korean case, my dissertation has suggested convergence between camps but focused on the implications of convergence between polarized parties, which enable only short-term proliferations of ideas but increase polarization. More recent developments of spatial models have leveraged digitized possibilities to conduct positional scaling on political documents (Proksch, Slapin, and Thies 2011; Slapin and Proksch 2008). I have suggested a pathway for joining in this debate by applying text-as-data on Korean text

and inferring political positions from discourses.

Mapped political ideas also indicate the cleavages between political camps and illustrate actor-led re-alignments over supported issues. As ideas in politics are interpretations that serve interests in a political context, actors seek to assert distinctive interpretations. Media transmits political interpretations for public consumption as political frames. They are a type of idea with respective lineages in history and politics and symbolize recognizable political identities. We can categorize patterns of behavior as types of change in the context of political competition. This lends strategic intent to expressed interpretations and relatively cohesive actors.

In regards to political campaigning before elections and the implementation of agenda and policy after elections, the communicative levels of issue ownership and agenda setting hold frameworks for investigating strategic dynamics of political camps' agendas (Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2011; Damore 2004; Petrocik 1996; Sides 2007; Sides 2006; Van der Brug 2004). Also part of the communicative level is framing by media (Entman 2007; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007) for which I have contributed data on partisan media framing in South Korea. The combined effects of political camps and media that are triggered by presidential election campaigns and underinstitutionalized parties give rise to concerns regarding the quality of democracy (Morlino, Dressel, and Pelizzo 2011; Stockton 2001; Stockton 2001), for which South Korea offers ample implications.

### **Polarization**

Party polarization has implied both desirable and undesirable effects throughout the literature. Its effect on partisan attachments, party brands, and voter choices have

been noted in Latin America studies and have therefore been emphasized as important for new and developing democracies (Lupu 2013). By regarding party brands as a distinct battery of ideas and frames, I highlighted political discourse as a canvas where party brands unfold. With this approach, the improvement or decline of party brands can be explained via the quality and distinctness of various ideas.

Political actors add the flesh of interpretation to popular discourse, but are never entirely free from the old and familiar meaning context that legitimate their political identity. Interpretations are political in content, as political actors differentiate themselves from competitors and self-identify via interpretations. The political context of South Korea is a polarized political system and creates cohesive and institutional interpretations within political camps. Thus, interpretations are intertwined with previous ideas, for they provide self-identification for political camps. In future work, this trait should be compared to the perception of voters and whether they differentiate polarization as opposed to new ideas. As a possible result of ongoing political polarization, politicians and voters may be groups with different goals: the politician seeking votes, and the voter (especially the underrepresented and marginalized voter, such as laborers in South Korea) seeking improved terms of life. In such a setting, party choice may or may not reflect the median voter's preferences if polarized ideology is the main differentiation between parties. Polarized two-party competition in the United States have been linked to legislative gridlock and socioeconomic inequality (Fiorina and Abrams 2008) and found to increase partisanship among citizens in tandem (Lupu 2015). An examination of these assumptions in South Korea will benefit from the inspection of political discourse to trace ideas that could lead to policy development and implementation.

### **7.3. Outlook for polarized politics in South Korea**

This dissertation extrapolated onto discourses a framework that regards actors and structures as co-constitutive. In this mechanism, actors have the ability to generate discourse but are also sentient of meaning structures that surround them. My application utilized this concept of discourse in order to analyze simultaneous discourses in relation to contextual aims and constraints. The ongoing discursive polarization of camps constitutes polarized discourses, where each camp nurtures internal discursive formations, but also engages in hegemonic strategies against the opposing camp. As a key insight, discourse discloses that frames vary within camps despite apparent polarization between camps. Accordingly in South Korean political discourse, actors invest discursive abilities in order to continue the existing polarization. Polarized politics in South Korea therefore continue to exist in its extreme form due to the ideational ability of political actors who convey possible policy ideas by relying on existing frames and adapting them as required. Polarization is a product of recursive frames that act as institutions, which makes change difficult but not impossible.

In the playing field of South Korean politics, discursive institutions cannot radically shift and the only option for resolving polarization is to introduce new ideas. A shift in polarized behavior requires ideas as well as continued deliberation of these ideas. This perspective implies that one party's new talk about neglected groups, such as labor, may be a sign of higher institutionalization but is not equivalent to the diversity of ideas. Further, the adoption of new issues is not enough, but additionally requires a higher diversity of ideas, alongside lower polarization.



## Appendix A: Mapping the domestic literature regarding polarization

<b>Origins</b>	<b>Patterns</b>	<b>Current state</b>	<b>Author</b>
Structure-giving value systems are still rooted in the cold war, stopping new values and ideologies from emerging.	'Conservative' and 'progressive' are invalid labels, due to vague identities and indeterminate ideologies.	Parties cannot avoid converging to the center at elections, as they are voter-conscious.	(Song Ho-gun 2014)
Single-minded ideology erupted in rebellious reaction to prior oppression during dictatorship.	No Western 'contest of ideologies', but a hostile relationship between extreme conservatives and progressives.	The South Korean ideological divide possesses a specificity that must be sufficiently considered.	(Yi Kab-yun 2014)
Voter choices carry the main blame for polarization- the chance that a third party would amass enough votes is nil.	None of the two parties harbor coherent identity and they show no potential to be innovative for a fair capitalism.	A South-Korean style "fair capitalism" and "practical democracy" seem distant from the current political structure.	(Chang Ha-song 2014)
The bipolarized party system is in fact a single conservative monopoly, being the remnant of Cold War anticommunism.	The conservative-centered party system is never dissolved but re-arranged, and reproduces structures in isolation.	Pre-existing political powers dominate and conservative democracy prevails, with no reformist alternatives in sight.	(Kim Man-gwon 2013)
Political participation in South Korea is monopolized by organizations and networks based on ideology.	Participating actors interpret issues by ideological standards and evaluate the adequacy of policy by ideological values.	Policy planning and implementation processes are the stage for ideological face-off.	(Chang Hun 2013)
Ideological conservatism defines the ideological distance between parties, as legacy of Cold War anti-communism.	Party institutionalization in this narrow ideological spectrum, and inter-party competition, constrain party capacity.	Both Korean parties are now identical in lacking intellectual capacity to imagine and reason with alternative values.	(Choi Jang-jip 2013)

Korean parties are loose structures of factions and persons with resources, turning into "camps" during elections.	Not the official party organization but the camps create presidents, rule the Blue House, and lead the government.	The two parties have been colliding with hostile discourse, but little has changed, especially in economic policy.	(Choi Jang-jip 2012)
The languages of political battle over socioeconomic issues are extensions of extreme ideological antagonism.	The ideological languages of "pro-" and "anti-" are linguistic expressions of hostile politics between two camps.	Both parties use ideology as resource in order to gain power, instead of engaging in conflict over policy contents.	(Choi Jang-jip 2008)
Critical elections of 1987 and 1988 constructed the scenario of "Democracy vs. anti-democracy".	Unstable party structures repeat interest-based dynamics, centering on individuals and personality cult.	Parties are polarized by regionalism.	(Chong Chin-min 2008)
Zero-sum game behavior stems from past negative rewards, as well as from regime rigidity until 1997.	Competitors are <i>perceiving</i> politics as a zero-sum game; it is not the political structure that is a zero-sum game.	Parties need distinct ideology and policy to enable voting by differences and policy-centered competition.	(Kang Won-Taek 2005)

## Appendix B: Technical protocol and software

After stemming the Korean text into nouns via the Python computing language library KoNLPy (Park Eunjeong and Cho Sungzoon 2014), topic modeling was conducted with the tool MALLET<sup>327</sup> (McCallum 2002), then sorted into monthly averages from dated topic numbers and weights with Python code, and statistically analyzed in R. Stopwords were manually assembled and filtered out in MALLET. All scripts and stopword lists are available upon request<sup>328</sup>.

Previous studies that implement topic modeling on political documents have often had the aim to scale political positions; different article sources would be modeled as one large corpus in order to determine the positional differences between sources. However, this dissertation aimed instead to determine each newspaper's various topics, and thus models each newspaper discourse corpus separately, albeit with the same topic numbers. As result, some limited comparability between newspaper corpora is reached, but the lack of some topics in some corpora should be not taken as face value but as a possible outcome of topic models. Thus, the implementation in this dissertation should not be taken for granted as a measure of comparison between corpora, which I emphasize

---

<sup>327</sup> I used the option of hyperparameter optimization, which produces "weight" values over 1 by allowing some topics to be more prominent than others and thus allowing greater differentiation between topic distributions.

<sup>328</sup> In chronological order over three years, I thank Jung Hoon for coding foundations, JinYeong Bak for constantly helpful support and data scraping, Norman Hein, Su-in Kim, Jae-won Kim for expert troubleshooting, and Christian Blum for more efficient scripts.

throughout the dissertation's validation of findings.

For both discourses about unification and welfare, I chose 65 topics for modeling each newspaper article after some experimentation. All topics of one corpus together have the weight of 1. Among the 65-topic outputs, I manually validated each produced topic by reading the top twenty articles assigned to each topic. As result, I was able to filter invalid topics that contained more than 20% of irrelevant articles in the twenty article sample. Especially the word "unification" led to a high number of invalid topics, due to the universal meaning of the Korean word "unification" that can be used in the sense of "integrate" and "to unify". Thus, I filtered out invalid topics which were found as follows: 30 in the *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo* unification discourses, 8 in the *Hankyoreh* welfare discourse, and 10 in the *Chosun Ilbo* welfare discourse.

# Appendix C: List of validated frames

## 1. *Hankyoreh* unification frames

### 1.1. Conflict frames

Frames	Highly correlated words	Original Korean words
<b>government role</b>	Government, citizens, situation, claim, demand, circumstances, responsibility, stance, unification, accuse, concern, status, decline, action, point out, behavior, reaction, critique, media,	정부 국민 상황 주장 요구 사태 책임 태도 통일 비난 우려 상태 거부 행위 지적 행동 대응 비판 언론
<b>ideology</b>	Socialist, -ism, economic, century, social, reform, growth, change, era, culture, democracy, system, development, reality, democratic, structure, market, oriented, professor	사회 주의 경제 세기 사회적 개혁 성장 변화 시대 문화 민주주의 체제 발전 현실 민주 구조 시장 중심 교수
<b>national spirit</b>	Back, then, life, world, time, unification, movement, land, era, history, university, pain, chest, living, death, human, dream, society, spirit, memory	당시 삶 세상 시절 통일 운동 땅 시대 역사 대학 고통 가슴 생활 죽음 인간 꿈 사회 정신 기억
<b>civic movements</b>	Union, alliance, movement, the, people, unification, democratic, citizen, public, solidarity, represent, national, social, chairman, of, the, Standing, Committee, participation, committee, activism, -ism	단체 운동 연합 민족 통일 민주 시민 공동 연대 대표 전국 사회 상임 협의회 의장 참여 위원회 실천 주의
<b>nuclear politics</b>	US, nuclear, North, Korea, North, Washington, minister, international, development, State, Department, peninsula, foreign, relations, United, Nations, Bush, ambassador, to, North, Korea, nuclear, missiles, ambassador	미국 핵 북한 장관 한국 북 워싱턴 부시 한반도 국 제 개발 국무부 외교 유엔 대북 대사 미사일 국무 핵 무기
<b>US-ROK military</b>	US, Department of Defense, US forces, US military, war, weapon, peace, agreement, United States, withdraw, military, training, base, operations, troops, stationed, unification, defense	미군 군사 주한 주한미군 전쟁 국방부 평화 무기 미 국 협정 훈련 군사적 철수 기지 작전 통일 주둔 부대 국방

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>independence movement</b>	Japanese, history, liberation, war, movement, independent, ethnic, Korean, Japan, modern history, at the time, revolution, Kim Ku, Rhee Syngman, historical, <i>baekbeom</i> , anti-Japanese, independence, movement, Korea	일제 역사 해방 독립 민족 조선 일본 전쟁 운동 현대사 당시 이승만 혁명 김구 역사적 독립운동 한국 백범 항일

## 1.2. Convergence frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>summit talks</b>	Talks, agreement, South-North, discussion, joint, government, contact, consultation, conversation, summit, position, meeting, North Korea, propose, summit, talks, relations, unification, measures, suggest	회담 합의 남북 논의 공동 정부 접촉 협의 대화 정상 입장 회의 북한 제안 정상 회담 관계 통일 방안 제의
<b>family values</b>	Family, unification, child, mother, father, son, tears, chest, hometown, friends, parents, kids, love, school, phone, book, world, sibling, living	통일 가족 아이 어머니 가슴 고향 친구 아버지 아들 눈물 부모 애 사랑 학교 북 세상 생활 형제 전화
<b>events and awards</b>	Unification, theme, culture, peace, foundation, professor, Korea, host, chairman, co-hosted, president, center, research, institute, <i>Hankyoreh</i> , attend, commemorative, discussion	통일 주제 교수 재단 평화 문화 한국 주최 이사장 공동 한겨레 대표 회장 센터 연구소 기념 참석 참여 토론
<b>East Asian security architecture</b>	United States, International, Japan, diplomatic, relations, China, economic, cooperation, Korea, Asia, Korean, Peninsula, regions, world, countries, Northeast Asia, Russia, security	미국 일본 국제 외교 중국 관계 경제 아시아 한반도 세계 지역 협력 한국 국가 개국 나라 동북아 러시아 안보
<b>economic figures</b>	Economy, development, dollars, invest, manufacturing, enterprise, one hundred million US dollars, capital, industry, market, domestic, trade, volume, business, technology, million, total, international, exports	달러 경제 투자 생산 기업 억달러 개발 산업 시장 무역 자본 국내 기술 사업 규모 수출 천만 총 국제
<b>Ministry of National Unification (1990-1998)</b>	North-South Korea, exchange, visit, Pyongyang, contact, Ministry of National Unification, promotion, plan, approve, government, North and South Korea, North, South, collaboration, application, civilian, authorities	북한 교류 남북 방문 방북 추진 통일원 접촉 승인 정부 계획 평양 남북한 협력 신청 남한 북 민간 당국

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>cultural events</b>	Cultural, events, unification, performance, prepare, memorial, park, children, festival, exhibition, schedule, participate, various, citizens, participation, play, peace, conference, topics	행사 문화 통일 공연 마련 기념 공원 축제 전시 어린이 다양 놀이 시민 예정 참가 평화 주제 대회 참여
<b>North Korean refugees</b>	South Korea, Japan, China, North Korea, North Korean defectors, Koreans in Japan, unified, government, Japan, overseas, immigration, ethnic, Korean, community, activities, visit, embassy	동포 재일 한국 일본 북한 중국 북 국내 탈북자 통일 해외 입국 정부 재일동포 사회 민족 활동 대사관 방문
<b>religious events</b>	Christian, church, pastor, Catholic, religion, Korea, Buddhist, monk, council, peace, unification, movement, priest, Council of Churches, Protestant, Christian, missionary, prayer, believer, Jogye, Order	교회 기독교 목사 종교 한국 불교 통일 평화 천주교 스님 협의회 신부 교회협의회 운동 개신교 조계종 기도 선교 신자

### 1.3. Divergence frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>one Korean nation</b>	Minjok, South-North, division, division, peace, reconciliation, North Korea, unification, Korean, peninsula, North, exchange, South Korea, state, South-North, Koreas, system, war, era, peaceful, reunification, declare, efforts	민족 남북 분단 평화 화해 북한 통일 한반도 북 교류 남한 국가 남북한 체제 전쟁 시대 평화통일 선언 노력
<b>South-North relations</b>	South-North, vis-à-vis, North Korea, relations, North, Korea, North-South, relations, policy, talks, government, summit, president, dialogue, North, Korean, peninsula, cooperation, peace, summit, talks, nuclear, policy toward North Korea, Ministry of Unification	남북 대북 관계 북한 남북 관계 정책 회담 정부 정상 대통령 대화 북 한반도 협력 평화 정상회담 핵 대북 정책 통일부
<b>red labeling</b>	Forces, claim, criticism, freedom, -ism, Republic of Korea, Chosun Ilbo, regime, democratic, media, democracy, North, state, politics, professor, Korea, logic	세력 주장 비판 자유 주의 대한민국 민국 보수 대한 정권 민주 언론 민주주의 북 교수 국가 정치 한국 논리
<b>South-North family reunions</b>	Delegation, visit, Pyongyang, northern, southern, South-North, unification, ceremony, <i>Minjok</i> , arrival, attend, reunions, North, Korea, chairman, separated, families, visiting North Korea	평양 북쪽 남쪽 남북 행사 대표단 방문 통일 호텔 도착 상봉 민족 공동 북 참석 북한 이산가족 위원장 방북

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>Modern Korean history</b>	Democratization, authoritarian, regime, democratic, merits, people's, politics, military, movement, president, Chun Doo-hwan, national, struggle, restoration, Gwangju, Park Chung-hee, event, powers, <i>Yushin</i>	정권 민주화 독재 민주 공 대통령 항쟁 운동 군사 민 중 정치 국민 투쟁 전두환 유신 광주 박정희 사건 세 력
<b>parliament debates</b>	<i>Hannara Party</i> , parliament, member of parliament, unification, meetings, <i>Democratic Party</i> , opposition, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, country, process, claims, State of the Union, chairman, discuss, commission, representative	국회 의원 한나라 통일 민 주당 한나라당 여야 회의 외교통 야당 나라 처리 주 장 국정 여당 위원장 논의 위원회 대표
<b>economic special projects</b>	<i>Kaesong</i> , inter-Korean, Ministry of Unification, <i>Kaesong Industrial Complex</i> , <i>Mt. Keumkang</i> , north, south, tourism, project, modern, North, cooperation, government, officials, agree, economic, cooperation, commission, officials, authority	개성 통일부 남북 공단 북 쪽 금강산 개성공단 남쪽 관광 사업 현대 북한 협력 정부 협의 당국자 위원회 관계자 경험
<b>demonstrations</b>	Assembly, unification, civil, police, protest, rally, competitions, hundred thousand, square, <i>Jongno</i> , student, demands, nationwide, area, sitting, protest, members, belonging, Gwangju	집회 시위 경찰 시민 백여 명 통일 대회 천여명 광장 종로 학생 요구 농성 전국 항의 지역 소속 회원 광주
<b>political persecution</b>	Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, ikhwan, memorial, hospital, bereaved, family, denied, prison, long-term, prisoner, renounce, events, at the time, prison, release, imprisoned, deceased, son, died	문익환 익환 목사 병원 추 모 가족 유족 부인 장기수 전향 감옥 사건 당시 석방 교도소 아들 수감 고인 사 망
<b>performance arts</b>	Works of art, music, film, song, artist, performances, unified, cultural, arena, South Korea, Art, Director, production, planning, literary, audience, concert	작품 예술 작가 공연 음악 영화 노래 문화 통일 무대 한국 미술 창작 감독 관객 문학 제작 기획 음악회
<b>student movements</b>	Students, united, nation, united country, <i>Chongryon</i> , Chairman, university, Students' Union, conference, headquarters, National Security Act, <i>Jeondaehyeop</i> , national, unification, constrain, home, country	학생 통일 조국 민족 연합 총련 대학 대학생 의장 대 회 본부 총학생회 대협 국 가보안법 전대협 보안법 조국통일 구속 국가
<b>unification observatory</b>	Gangwon, Gangwon-do, zone, Paju, Gyeonggi-do, Goseong, Unification Observatory, tourist, tourism, DMZ, departure, village, local, roads, unarmed	강원 경기 강원도 통일 전 망대 관광 고성 지대 파주 경기도 통일전망대 지역 도로 비무장지대 관광객 출발 마을 일대 비무장



Frames	Highly correlated words	Original Korean words
sports	Tournament, Olympic, team, uniform, soccer, player, World Cup, stadium, cheering, Busan, Korea, sports, team, coach, athletic, woman, world	경기 대회 축구 선수 통일 팀 올림픽 월드컵 아시아 경기장 북한 선수단 스포츠 응원 부산 체육 여자 감독 세계

## 2. Chosun Ilbo unification frames

### 2.1. Conflict frames

Frames	Highly correlated words	Original Korean words
national spirit	Unification, nation, world, Korea, boast, express, best, moments, ground, head, instead, how much, reality, there, feeling, shape, next, era	나라 세상 한국 세계 통일 순간 땅 머리 최고 자랑 현실 시대 얼마 대신 표현 다음 느낌 거기 모양
government role	National, government, argue, critics, blame, situation, demand, responsible, conduct, regime, political, situation, speech, media, behavior, wrong, attitude, events	국민 주장 나라 정부 비판 비난 책임 행위 사태 요구 정권 상황 정치 언론 발언 행동 잘못 사건 태도
nuclear risk	North, American, nuclear, missile, weapons, circumstances, likely, threaten, Korean, Peninsula, nuclear weapons, development, tests, launched, unified, security, situation, mass, warfare, systems	핵 미사일 무기 미국 북한 상황 위협 가능성 핵무기 한반도 개발 실험 발사 통일 사태 대량 안보 전쟁 체제
ideology	Democratic, -ism, forces, democracy, freedom, Chosun Ilbo, political, ideology, Hankyoreh, democratization, regime, critics, argue, authoritarian, leftist, movement, system, reform	주의 세력 민주 민주주의 사회 보수 자유 이념 진보 정권 정치 민주화 비판 체제 좌파 주장 독재 운동 개혁
civic movements	Unification, Movement, ethnic, group, <i>Minjok</i> , United, Democratic, convention, protests, nationwide, solidarity, rally, event, jointly, participating, members, representing, police, headquarters	단체 통일 운동 시민 민족 연합 민주 시위 대회 진국 연대 집회 행사 공동 참여 대표 본부 회원 경찰
military	US, Department of Defense, military, war, troops, trained, division, naval, vessels, unified, security, force, commander, North Korean, army, combat, defense, force	군사 작전 전쟁 부대 국방 부 미군 사단 해군 통일 훈련 척 병력 안보 국방 공군 전투 북한 사령관 육군

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>National Security Act</b>	North Korean, National Security Law, State, Security, Law, Unification, ethnic, homeland, group, activities, alleged, transfer, North, Union, reunification, praise, Kim Il Sung, student, organizations, violation	국가 북한 보안법 국가보안법 통일 민족 조국 단체 활동 북 혐의 이적 연합 조국통일 김일성 학생 위반 조직 찬양

## 2.2. Convergence frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>summit talks</b>	North-South, summit talks, President, Minister, North Korea, North, Korea, summit, meeting, Kim Jong-il, Kim Dae-jung, unification, government, northern, Ministry of Unification, policy, chairman, nuclear, summit	회담 정상 대통령 남북 북한 대북 정상회담 정부 장관 북 통일부 관계 김대중 김정일 통일 위원장 정책 남북정상회담 핵
<b>family values</b>	Father, son, family, home, life, mother, age, at the time, unification, husband, friend, married, women, age, kids, love, tears, hospital	가족 아들 아버지 생활 고향 어머니 통일 당시 시절 남편 친구 여성 결혼 출신 나이 아이 사랑 눈물 병원
<b>academic events</b>	Professor, Korea, Institute, National, Unification, Research, Institute, Seoul National University, policy, committee, Chairman, President, topic, Center, Korea University, Yonsei University, Womens University, college, foundation	교수 한국 통일 연구원 연구 연구소 서울대 주제 국제 회장 이사장 정책 위원 센터 고려대 여대 연세대 재단 대학
<b>East Asian security architecture</b>	China, Japan, Korea, US, diplomatic, relations, peninsula, international, Asian, both countries, country, world, Northeast Asia, regional, economic, cooperation, countries, Russian, security	일본 한국 미국 중국 관계 한반도 국제 아시아 외교 국가 세계 지역 양국 동북아 협력 경제 나라 안보 러시아
<b>economic figures</b>	One hundred million dollar, economic, investment, cost, one trillion won, market, scale, financial, trade, domestic, bank, capital, levels, Korea, industry, outlook	달러 경제 억달러 기업 투자 시장 조원 생산 비용 수준 은행 자본 규모 금융 무역 국내 한국 산업 전망
<b>Ministry of National Unification (1990-1998)</b>	North and South Korea, North Korea, government, supports, projects, promoting, cooperation, Ministry of National Unification, rice, dollar, exchange, programs, approved, planning, policy, level, economic, cooperation, agreement	북한 남북 지원 대북 정부 협력 통일원 추진 사업 교류 계획 쌀 달러 승인 예정 경험 협의 방침 차원

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>North Korean refugees</b>	North Korea, North Korean, human rights, group, kidnapped, Chinese, government, resident, family, South Korea, repatriated, prisoners, escaped, ensure, social, support, Unification	북한 북 탈북자 인권 주민 가족 중국 정부 납북 단재 남한 송환 한국 포로 통일 부 지원 확인 탈출 사회
<b>investigations</b>	Incident, investigation, alleged, criminal, allegations, at the time, redemption, District, Prosecutors' Office, indict, Unification, trial, court, sentenced, prosecutor, violation, judicial, police, chief	사건 검찰 수사 혐의 구속 당시 형사 의혹 기소 통일 지검 재판 부장 선고 법원 검사 위반 사법 경찰
<b>North Korean leadership ranks</b>	Kim Jong-il, North, Korea, party, secretary, Kim Il-sung, Pyongyang, Chairman, Director, Central, People's, power, National Defense, Committee, death, Kim Jong-un, assemblyman	김정일 북한 노동당 비서 김일성 평양 위원장 부장 중앙 정은 인민 조선 김정은 황장 사망 권력 국방 위원회 위원
<b>cultural festivals</b>	Performing arts, cultural, events, anniversary, unification, memorial, music, festival, singing, competition, playing, concerts, held, various, citizens, tradition, prepare	공연 행사 주년 통일 문화 예술 음악 축제 노래 연주 무대 기념 대회 음악회 다양 전통 마련 시민 개최
<b>early democratic politics</b>	<i>Democratic Party</i> , representative, highest, democratic, parliamentary, committee, <i>Minjadang</i> , Kim Young-sam, Kim, <i>Pyeongmindang</i> , Unification, members, opposition, party, governor	민자 민주당 의원 대표 위원 자당 민주 최고 국회 김영삼 민자당 김대중 통일 최고위원 총재 야당 민자당의 평민당 당내

### 2.3. Divergence frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>peace on the Korean peninsula</b>	Unification, nation, anniversary, Korean, peninsula, divided, Koreas, North, Korea, Peace, national, reconciliation, efforts, democratic, society, citizens, free, exchange, joint	통일 민족 남북 평화 북한 분단 주년 한반도 남북한 노력 국가 화해 사회 국민 자유 민주 북 교류 공동
<b>economic development</b>	Economy, social, development, field, challenges, country, century, era, policy, reforms, promoting, growth, strengthened, central, market, presents, companies, establish, institutions	경제 분야 사회 발전 과제 국가 세기 정책 개혁 성장 추진 시대 강화 중심 시장 제시 기업 마련 제도
<b>perception surveys</b>	Our country, Korea, National, Unification, country, social, consciousness, symptoms, resolve, differences, conduct, target, manner, while, recognize, full, reality, point out, life	나라 사회 국민 우리나라 통일 의식 수준 현상 대상 방법 차이 해결 실시 생활 전체 반면 인식 현실 지적

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>international input</b>	Asia, countries, South Korea, France, World, US, UK, Japan, Germany, Europe, united, New York, domestic, international, originate, local	미국 세계 한국 영국 개국 아시아 프랑스 통일 뉴욕 유럽 일본 독일 국제 국내 벨 각국 출신 현지 포
<b>early democratic presidents</b>	President, Kim Young-sam, government, public, administration, reform, electoral, power, ruling, National, Economic, Kim, opposition, politicians, political, unity, cabinet, Minister	대통령 정치 국민 김영삼 선거 권력 정권 개혁 국정 공 집권 경제 김대중 야당 정치인 총리 내각 정치적 통일
<b>South-North agreements</b>	Civil, settlement, talks, two Koreas, joint, primary, mutual, exchange, agreements, peace, summit, declaration, North Korean, nuclear, cooperation, agreement, discuss	회담 합의 남북 남북한 공동 관계 기본 상호 선언 북한 교류 협정 평화 정상 협력 합의서 논의 한반도 핵
<b>urban and industrial planning</b>	Construction, projects, promoting, regional, development, urban, facilities, construction, scale, environments, complex, create, unified, metropolitan, residents, planned, road, household	건설 계획 사업 지역 개발 도시 시설 추진 공사 조성 통일 단지 규모 환경 도로 가구 예정 주민 수도권
<b>Ministry of Unification (1998-present)</b>	North-South, unification, North Korea, talks, Pyongyang, south, separated, families, <i>Mt. Keumkang</i> , modern, business, agreement, reunion, ministerial, government, minister, visit, North, Korea, Northern	통일부 북측 남북 북한 금강산 관광 이산가족 남측 평양 회담 사업 현대 합의 상봉 정부 북 장관급 장관 방북
<b>nuclear negotiations</b>	US, Secretary, North, Korea, North Korea, nuclear, talks, unified, government, diplomacy, resolved, North Korean, ambassador, Washington, state, international, policy	미국 핵 북한 장관 북 한국 정부 통일 회담 외교 협상 대북 한반도 워싱턴 정책 국무부 대사 해결 국제
<b>North Korean ideology</b>	People's, -ism, war, Kim Il-sung, South Korea, revolutionary, socialist, struggle, communist, Soviet, social, system, ideology, authoritarian, regimes, Northern, national, liberation	김일성 주의 전쟁 인민 북한 혁명 남한 사회주의 공산 소련 사상 사회 투쟁 체제 정권 북 독재 민족 해방
<b>economic special zones at risk</b>	North Korea, <i>Kaesong</i> , inter-Korean, <i>Kaesong Industrial Complex</i> , <i>Cheonan</i> , government, actions, North, Korea, Unification, Ministry, officials, suspended, South Korea, North Korean, provocations, Commission, officials	개성 북한 개성공단 공단 남북 북 통일부 정부 천안 조치 대북 당국자 북측 위원회 관계자 도발 대남 중단 통

Frames	Highly correlated words	Original Korean words
<b>summit preparations</b>	North, Korea, North Korea, Pyongyang, inter-Korean, high-level, talks, <i>Panmunjom</i> , delegation, Unification, national, representatives, contact, North Koreans, north, <i>Minjok</i> , Kim Il-sung, visited, Ministry of National Unification, Working	북한 북측 평양 남북 회담 판문점 대표단 통일 대표 접촉 민족 고위급 북한측 북 조국 김일성 통일원 방 문 실무
<b>Korean War veterans</b>	War, War Memorial, veterans, survivor, President, Medal, Army, national, veterans, memorial, recruited, attend, anniversary, Veterans' Association, deceased, soldiers	참전 전쟁 유족 추모 용사 회장 육군 훈장 재향 국립 충원 참석 주년 유공자 기 념 군인회 고인 재향군인 회 군인

### 3. *Hankyoreh* welfare frames

#### 3.1. Conflict frames

Frames	Highly correlated words	Original Korean words
<b>political elections</b>	Political, parties, candidates, running, democratic, Member of Parliament, support, <i>Democratic Party</i> , presidential, election, voters, elected, opposition, national, <i>Hannara</i> , forces, <i>Hankyoreh</i> , vote	선거 후보 정치 정당 민주 당 총선 대선 지지 민주 출마 의원 유권자 당선 진 보 투표 야당 국민 한나라 세력
<b>National Assembly</b>	<i>Hannara Party</i> , parliamentary, committee, meeting, passed, health, care, bill, <i>Democratic Party</i> , amendment, submitted, welfare, democratic, process, affiliated, health, Health and Welfare Committee,	국회 의원 위원회 회의 통 과 한나라 보건 법안 복지 민주당 개정안 제출 한나 라당 처리 민주 소속 여야 보건복지위 열린
<b>welfare policy agendas</b>	Park Geun-hye, President, Lee Myung-bak, pledged, <i>Nuri</i> , presidential, Welfare, <i>Hannara</i> , representative, national, unity, government, economic, policy, political, candidate	이명 이명박 대통령 박근 박근혜 대선 복지 누리 공 약 누리당 한나라 대표 정 부 후보 경제 정책 국민 통합 정치
<b>ideological systems</b>	Democratic, -ism, political, regime, democracy, movement, power, dictatorial, political, system, history, advanced, countries, struggle, century, era, public	주의 민주 민주주의 정치 세력 정권 민주화 권력 독 재 운동 정치적 역사 진보 체제 국가 투쟁 세기 시대 국민

### 3.2. Convergence frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>women, children, nursery</b>	Female, child, child-parent, family, child, care, home, child, care, facilities, baby, infant, toddler, protective, social, welfare, parenting, support, couple	여성 아이 어린이 보육 가정 아동 부모 가족 시설 출산 자녀 유아 육아 복지 양육 지원 부부 보호 사회
<b>Religion</b>	Buddhist, monk, religion, Christian, Church, Pastor, Catholic, Catholic, parish, priest, <i>Jogye</i> , Order, Protestant, bishop, Buddhist, temples, Cathedral, believers, denomination	교회 불교 종교 스님 기독교 목사 천주교 가톨릭 조계종 신부 교구 사찰 성당 조연현 신자 주교 개신교 불교계 종단
<b>schools and education</b>	School, education, Education Office, elementary, school, parent, teacher, student, grade, High School, Middle School, classes, high, learning, Ministry of Education, high school, teachers, operating, kid, meals	학교 교육 학생 학년 교사 학부모 교육청 초등학교 고교 학습 고등 수업 중학교 교육부 운영 아이 고등학교 교원 급식
<b>economic figures</b>	Economic, financial, crisis, recession, welfare, quarter, inflation, forecast, increased, government, deficit, decreased, total, dollar, currency, investment, growth	경기 위기 경제 금융 분기 침체 복지 물가 상승 전망 증가 정부 적자 통화 투자 성장률 총 감소 달러
<b>city planning</b>	Construction, building-scale, city, corporation, planning, area, business, development, environment, setup, create, welfare, park, residents, erected, vicinity	시설 건설 건물 규모 도시 공사 계획 지역 사업 개발 건립 공원 주민 조성 설치 도로 환경 복지 주변
<b>international countries</b>	Dollar, One hundred million dollars, US, President, welfare, 10000, British, world, congress, New York, Washington, Republican, Obama, Bush, government, reports, pounds, maximum, war	달러 미국 대통령 억달러 복지 만달러 세계 영국 의회 워싱턴 공화당 뉴욕 오바마 부시 보도 파운드 전쟁 최대 정부
<b>labor unions</b>	Workers, labor, union, labor union, chairman, democratic, trade, unions, Confederation of Trade Unions, strike, collective, wage, bargaining, union, members, nationwide, struggle, dismissal, request	노조 노동 노동자 노총 노사 조합 위원장 민주 파업 민주노총 단체 임금 조합 원 전국 노동조합 교섭 투쟁 해고 요구
<b>low-income groups</b>	Basic, life, support, household, income, guarantee, tier, welfare, recipient, governments, target, low-income, person, living, supply, cost-of-living, elderly, health care, payments	생활 기초 지원 가구 보장 계층 복지 소득 대상자 저소득 정부 수급자 대상 생계 수급 생계비 보건 지급 노인

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>civic actors and think tanks</b>	group, citizen, participate, society, solidarity, movement, welfare, representing, public, Korea, committee, NGO, union, chairman, debate, council, topics, activities, professor	단체 시민 참여 사회 연대 운동 복지 대표 공동 한국 위원회 시민단체 연합 위원장 토론회 협의회 주제 활동 교수
<b>orphans, families, elderly</b>	Grade, school, friends, boy, child, family, lives, life, father, parent, mother, age, dream, world, alone, help, husband, study, mom	아이 가족 삶 생활 학년 학교 친구 아들 어머니 부모 아버지 세상 나이 꿈 도움 혼자 남편 공부 엄마
<b>East Asia</b>	Japan, Korea, China, Korean, international, migration, foreign national, domestic, workers, Philippines, Vietnam, Asian, countries, overseas, visit, Tokyo, USA	일본 한국 중국 외국인 한국인 국제 이주 국내 동포 노동자 아시아 나라 해외 도쿄 방문 출신 필리핀 베트남 미국
<b>films, TV, books</b>	Book, writer, welfare, program, broadcast, Republic of Korea, introduce, various, literary, fiction, television, movie, produced, published, work, plan, women	방송 책 복지 작가 민국 프로그램 대한민국 다양 영화 소설 텔레비전 소개 대한 문학 출판 제작 기획 여성 작품
<b>epidemics</b>	Health, welfare, Department of Health and Welfare, infected, patients, manage, disease, outbreaks, national, headquarters, prevention, confirmed, virus, welfare, specialize, treating, infectious, diseases, measures	보건 복지 환자 감염 보건복지부 발생 질병 국내 관리 확인 본부 예방 바이러스 복지부 전문 치료 전염병 대책 양중
<b>elderly care</b>	Social, welfare, facilities, senior, volunteering, operating, area, free, volunteer, activities, Welfare Center, community, center, family, life, general	노인 시설 사회 봉사 자원 운영 복지 지역 관 봉사자 복지관 무료 활동 주민 센터 자원봉사자 가정 생활 종합
<b>facilities</b>	Social, welfare, center, education, counseling, program, provide, operating, support, professional, activities, targeted, professional, help, various, youth, organizations, recovery, plan	교육 센터 프로그램 상담 복지 사회 지원 전문 활동 운영 제공 대상 직업 도움 청소년 다양 기관 계획 회복
<b>sports</b>	South Korea, Olympic, football, tournament, game, player, sports, Pro, Baseball, World Cup, team, stadium, welfare, Hotel, Asia, international, participation	선수 대회 경기 올림픽 한국 스포츠 축구 체육 프로 월드컵 팀 경기장 복지 호텔 야구 세계 참가 국제 아시아

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>health insurance</b>	Health, insurance, National Health Insurance, health, welfare, pension, benefits, paid, subscriber, finance, corporation, pension, apply, treatment, cost, service	보험 건강 보건 의료 건강보험 국민 보험료 부담 복지 연금 급여 복지부 보건복지부공단 재정 가입자 국민연금 적용 진료비
<b>welfare for the disabled</b>	Mental, retardation, disability, welfare, facilities, disabled, rehabilitation, severe, human, rights, perspective, wheelchair, life, special, education, groups, support, visually, impaired, uncomfortable	장애인 장애 시설 복지 지체 사회 정신 재활 중증 시각 인권 휠체어 생활 특수 시각 장애인 교육 단체 지원 불편
<b>demographic change</b>	Country, our, country, South, Korea, population, development, average, economic, growth, rate, based, analysis, entire, society, organization, while, researchers, announce, cooperation	나라 우리나라 평균 수준 인구 개발 한국 전체 사회 기구 증가 경제 비율 기준 분석 반면 발표 연구원 협력
<b>commentary</b>	Country, media, efforts, how, much, society, newspaper, report, back, then, worry, world, articles, events, chest, situation, personnel, there, expectation, opportunities	나라 언론 노력 얼마 현실 사회 신문 보도 당시 걱정 세상 기사 사건 가슴 상황 인사 거기 기대 기회
<b>charity donations</b>	Social, welfare, foundation, jointly, raising, donations, neighbors, love, sharing, activities, support, social, services, deliver, organizations, welcome, donations, fund, sponsored, children	복지 사회 모금 재단 공동 기부 이웃 지원 사랑 나눔 활동 사회복지 천만 성금 전달 단체 후원 기금 어린이
<b>problem assessment</b>	Possible, process, method, changes, solving, evaluation, effort, solving, various, recognition, meaningful, society, situations, central, role, institutions, goals, participation, results, expectations	가능 과정 방식 변화 해결 평가 노력 다양 인식 의미 사회적 상황 중심 역할 제도 목표 참여 성과 기대
<b>public officials</b>	Blue House, personnel, secretary, senior, president, Ministry of Health and Welfare, welfare, chairman, Rep., Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Dae, Chief of Staff, Minister, the people, committee, chairman, Prime Minister	장관 청와대 대통령 수석 인사 보건 보건복지부 복지 의원 노무현 비서관 위원장 김대중 총리 비서실장 실장 의장 국민 위원
<b>laws, legislations, regulations</b>	Regulatory, amendments, based, limited, information, law, enforcement, target, period, provisions, apply, including, procedures, applicable, legislation, recognize, current, obligations	규정 개정 기준 제한 내용 대상 시행 법률 기간 조항 절차 적용 인정 입법 신청 포함 의무 해당 현행



<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>North Korea, defense, military</b>	North and South Korea, North Korea, peaceful, reunification, defense, war, military, security, cooperation, North, Korea, nuclear, talks, US, soldiers, inter-Korean, relations, Ministry of National Defense	북한 남북 평화 통일 한반도 북 국방 전쟁 협력 국방부 군사 안보 회담 미군 대북 핵 관계 군인 남북관계
<b>medical sector</b>	Health, medicine, Health and Welfare, division, medical, doctors, pharmacists, association, welfare, medicine, hospital, pharmacy, preparation, prescription, physician, welfare, pharmaceutical, closures	보건 의약 의료 의사 분업 보건복지부 의약분업 약사 협회 복지부 의약품 약국 병원 조제 복지 제약 폐업 처방 의원
<b>breaches and corruptions</b>	Prosecutors, investigate, alleged, incidents, police, restraint, John Doe, welfare, violations, confirmed, suspicions, million, illegal, at the time, criminal, act, corruption, complaints, process	혐의 수사 사건 검찰 경찰 구속 복지 아무개 위반 확인 의혹 천만 형사 행위 과정 불법 당시 비리 고발
<b>cultural performances, festivals</b>	Cultural, performances, film, festival, artistic, events, arranged, musical, pieces, Korea, exhibition, center, theme, song, debut, child, welfare, invited, artists	문화 공연 행사 예술 축제 영화 마련 음악 작품 한국 전시 노래 무대 어린이 복지 초청 회관 주제 가수
<b>employee housing</b>	Furniture, rental, housing, pre-sale, residential, construction, supplies, moving, equilibrium, city, construction, district, estate, complex, rent, value, business, areas	가구 주택 아파트 임대 주거 분양 건설 평형 공급 입주 도시 부동산 단지 공사 지구 임대주택 값 사업 지역
<b>healthcare</b>	Hospital, patients, health, care, health, welfare, doctor, specializing, diseases, cancer, surgery, hospitalization, wards, Ministry of Health and, Welfare, disease, prevention	병원 환자 치료 의료 보건 복지 의사 진료 건강 질환 전문 수술 입원 암 병상 기관 보건복지부 질병 예방

### 3.3. Divergence frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>government role</b>	government, situation, point out, people, solving, demand, measures, social, responsibility, country, concern, risk, status, realistic, cause, damage, policy	정부 상황 지적 주장 국민 해결 요구 대책 사회 책임 나라 우려 위험 상태 현실적인 원인 피해 정책

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>local government</b>	Government, administrative, council, area, residents, market, regulations, Seoul, branch, citizen, welfare, budget, local, government, heads, wide, local, elections, project	자치 단체 주민 지역 행정 의회 시장 복지 시민 조례 서울시 지사 예산 지방자치 단체 단체장 광역 지자체 선 거 사업
<b>social values</b>	Century, human, society, social, life, world, culture, values, personal, freedom, meaning, national, community, care, spirit, representations, modern, country	세기 인간 사회 세계 삶 사 회적 가치 개인 문화 국가 공동체 의미 자유 주의 정신 시대 나라 현대 표현
<b>everyday life</b>	Usually, clothing, hair, office, building, space, instead, eating, female, gift, things, normally, how, weekends, vicinity, bus, floor, guest	평소 머리 옷 공간 건물 사 무실 식사 여성 대신 선물 방법 물건 가게 주말 주변 버스 보통 바닥 손님
<b>funerals</b>	Weight, bereaved, family, night, driving, hospitals, John Doe, memorial, park, son, funeral, <i>Yeongdeungpo</i> , police, operation, at, the, time, death, deceased, cremation	무개 가족 유족 박아 병원 박아무개 종로 아무개 장례 아들 추모 공원 경찰 영등포 고인 화장 동작 당시 죽음
<b>animal welfare</b>	Ecological, wooden, sea, animals, natural, environment, wild life, protection, Jeju, village, forest, land, animal, welfare, movement, organic, breeding, chickens	마리 동물 자연 환경 나무 바다 생태 생명 보호 제주 야생 마을 사육 유기 운동 숲 땅 동물복지 닭
<b>distributive growth models</b>	Economic, disparity, labor, market, policies, social, welfare, professor, national, crisis, country, now, distributed, polarization, care, welfare, state, capital, South Korea	경제 성장 시장 정책 사회 교수 국가 위기 복지 나라 분배 노동 기업 양극화 격차 주의 복지국가 자본 한국
<b>information technology</b>	Internet, phone, service, use, information, communication, computer, electronics, online, site, providing, mobile, broadcasting, system, mobile, phone, soft, South Korea, Free	정보 인터넷 통신 전화 이용 서비스 컴퓨터 전자 제공 사 이트 휴대 방송 온라인 한국 시스템 휴대전화 복지 소프 트 무료
<b>life science ethics</b>	Science, technology, Biotechnology, research institute, human, development, cells, ethics, professor, Seoul National University, United States, experimental, gene, cloned, animal, health, use	연구 과학 기술 생명 공학 세포 윤리 교수 개발 연구소 인간 미국 실험 유전자 보건 서울대 복제 동물 이용
<b>economy and values</b>	Development, industrial, development, enterprise, sectors, build, economy, create, local, environmental, education, center, supported, investment, projects, fostering, cultural, promotion, plan	발전 산업 개발 기업 분야 경제 환경 지역 중심 사업 교육 지원 투자 육성 추진 문화 계획 창출 구축

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>market regulation</b>	Economic, reform, corporate, financial, conglomerate, president, regulatory, structure, strengthening, political, challenges, promote, fair, trading, mitigate, the people, Reconciliation, Policy, Management	개혁 경제 기업 재벌 대통령 규제 강화 구조 금융 공정 과제 정치 추진 국민 조정 정책 완화 거래 경영
<b>food products</b>	Food, retail, sales, consumer, products, manufacturing, company, import, price, manufactured, products, supply, market, value, large, consumption, using, smart, safety	식품 판매 유통 소비자 제품 수입 가격 업체 생산 제조 품목 시장 공급 사용 마트 안전 값 대형 소비
<b>government inspection</b>	Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, Korea, rural, farmers, agricultural, technology, trade, food, industry, rice, marketing, authority, ocean	농림 농업 수산 한국 농민 공사 농촌 농 기술 무역 식 품 산업 쌀 농어촌 농산물 유통 해양 공단 농어
<b>chaebol employee welfare and social contribution</b>	Companies, Group, management, company, Hyundai, Samsung, Electronics, employee, welfare, division, president, President, S., conglomerates, four, won, official, car	회사 기업 그룹 경영 업체 삼성 현대 직원 전자 사업 사장 회장 복지 국내 대기업 에스 사원 자동차 관계자
<b>increasing tax for welfare</b>	One trillion won, financial, resources, tax, income, tax, reduction, tax burden, government, tax, expenditure, budget, economy, expanded, taxation, system, increase	조원 재정 세금 재원 조세 소득 정부 소득세 지출 예산 부담 세수 감세 과세 확대 경제 규모 세제 증세
<b>Surveys</b>	Surveyed, respondents, answer, survey, analysis, conducted, while, entire, welfare, ranked, assessment, replied, next, level, professional, study, entry, way, research	설문 대상 응답 설문조사 분 석 응답자 순위 복지 실시 반면 전체 평가 다음 수준 대답 전문 항목 방법 연구
<b>Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service</b>	Complex, litigation, labor, welfare, disasters, court, ruling, workers, administration, industry, recognized, against, industrial, accident, compensation, claims, court, application, Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service	소송 공단 근로 근로복지공 단 재해 판결 법원 복지 산 재 상대 인정 산업 행정 노 동자 산업재해 청구 보상 재 판부 신청

## 4. Chosun Ilbo welfare frames

### 4.1. Conflict frames

Frames	Highly correlated words	Original Korean words
<b>welfare policy agendas</b>	President, Park Geun-hye, bakgeun, welfare, policies, pledged, one trillion won, free, elections, government, fiscal, budget, funds, promote, economic, <i>Nuri Party</i> , Nuri, National, Party	조원 공약 정책 대통령 박근혜 박근혜 복지 무상 대선 정부 국민 누리 경제 누리당 재정 확대 예산 재원 추진
<b>ideological systems</b>	Caution, century, social, economic, politics, professor, growth, market, countries, freedom, era, Korea, claims, world, democratic, ideology, democratic, development, system	세기 주의 사회 경제 정치 시장 국가 성장 교수 세계 주장 자유 시대 한국 발전 민주주의 민주 이념 체제
<b>National Assembly</b>	Congressional, Democrats, <i>Democratic Party</i> , Member of Parliament, <i>Hannara Party</i> , welfare, Chairman, national, congress, conference, audit, welfare, affairs, parliamentary, audit, committee, chairman, parliament, nationals, Committee of Health and Welfare	의원 국회 한나라 민주당 한나라당 보건 위원장 회의 감사 국민회의 국정 정부 보건복지위 국정감사 위원 의장 나라 국민 국회의원
<b>public deliberations</b>	Conference, admission, requirements, determined, opposition, claims, government, welfare, officials, agreed, opinion, backlash, Commission, announced, plans, discussed, situation, consultation, raised	입장 반대 주장 회의 요구 결정 복지 관계자 의견 정부 합의 반발 위원회 발표 논의 예정 상황 제기 협의

### 4.2. Convergence frames

Frames	Highly correlated words	Original Korean words
<b>financial loans, credit support</b>	Bank, credit, finance, loan, stock, investment, fund, companies, financial, institutions, real, estate, agencies, now, trading, business, assets, property, tax	금융 은행 자금 대출 신용 주식 투자 기금 회사 부동산 기업 기관 이자 금융기관 거래 사업 자산 재산 세금
<b>sports</b>	Olympic, football, tournament, game, players, professional, sports, Korea, World Cup, Stadium, sports, team, welfare, baseball, championship, appearances, participation, international, representative	선수 대회 경기 올림픽 축구 스포츠 프로 한국 월드컵 경기장 체육 팀 복지 야구 참가 출전 우승 국제 대표

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>charity donations</b>	Social, welfare, contributions, neighborhood, joint, fundraising, donation, Social Welfare, Foundation, supports, organizations, sharing, love, President, raisers, transfer, funds, deposited, the needy	사회 복지 모금 공동 기부 이웃 성금 사회복지 재단 사랑 회장 모금회 전달 나눔 단체 지원 기탁 기금 불우
<b>Books</b>	Chosun, era, history, books, welfare, culture, writer, literary, fiction, century, Korea, Japan, World, Countries, anniversary, poet, teacher, works, museum	책 역사 복지 시대 조선 문화 작가 문학 세기 한국 일제 나라 세계 소설 주년 시인 작품 선생 박물관
<b>religion</b>	Buddhist, monk, religion, Christian, Catholic, community, church, pastor, bride, Korea, Jogye, Order, cathedral, Catholic, faithful, missionary, diocese, welfare, inspectors, love	교회 목사 불교 사회 천주교 기독교 스님 종교 신부 한국 가톨릭 조계종 성당 교구 복지 신자 선교 사랑 사찰
<b>employee housing</b>	Complex, pre-sale, residential, construction, supplies, households, house, apartment, for rent, welfare, housing, corporation, tenants, balanced, city, charter, area, real estate,	가구 주택 아파트 임대 건설 분양 주거 공급 복지 단지 공사 입주 평형 임대주택 도시 전세 부동산 만가구 지역
<b>laws, legislations, regulations</b>	Amendments, regulation, health, welfare, enforcement, legislative, assembly, amendment, prohibits, government, passed, laws, limiting, current, provisions, enacted, regulations, allowing	개정 내용 규정 복지 시행 보건 국회 개정안 입법 정부 금지 통과 법률 제한 규제 허용 제정 현행 조항
<b>epidemics and diseases</b>	Health, welfare, Department of Health and Welfare, food, patient, safety, occur, infection, control, ensure, national, disease, prevention, drug, US, headquarters, announced	보건 복지 보건복지부 안전 발생 환자 검사 식품 감염 관리 복지부 국내 예방 질병 의약품 본부 확인 미국 발표
<b>medical sector</b>	Department of Health and Welfare, doctor, health, medicine, medicines, patient, welfare, reform, pharmacists, pharmacy, prescription, clinic, pharmacist, hospital, insurance, association	보건 복지부 의사 보건복지부 의약 의료 분업 의약분업 의약품 환자 복지 약국 의원 약사 보험 협회 병원 처방 건강
<b>healthcare</b>	Health, Welfare, Department of Health and Welfare, health, cigarette, smoking, , treat, mental, illness, prevention, Professor, promote, youth, sports, drinks, disease, nutrition, stress	건강 보건 복지 담배 보건 복지부 치료 예방 정신 질환 금연 흡연 운동 술 교수 증진 청소년 질병 영양 스트레스

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>labor unions</b>	Hyundai Motor, labor, union, labor, wages, companies, business, confederation, trade, unions, workers, welfare, Korea, factory, workers, strike, hikes, Daewoo, group	노조 노사 노동 임금 회사 기업 현대 자동차 경영 근로자 노총 복지 파업 그룹 직원 한국 공장 인상 대우
<b>public officials</b>	Minister, Ministry of Health and Welfare, presidential, Blue House, senior, HR, appoint, government, appointed, Deputy, Prime Minister, economic, planning, Secretary, Health and Welfare, policy, cadre, Roh	장관 대통령 청와대 인사 수석 복지 보건 정부 실장 임명 총리 차관 경제 비서관 기획 정책 보건복지부 노무현 출신
<b>public transport</b>	Bus, transportation, vehicles, installed, underground, telephone, charges, uncomfortable, facilities, disabled, citizen, card, service, station, local, residents	이용 버스 교통 차량 복지 요금 전화 설치 지하철 불편 시설 사용 시내 주민 서비스 카드 장애인 시민 은행
<b>health insurance</b>	Pension, National, Health, Insurance, premiums, paid, health, welfare, pension, income, financial, burden, agency, health, insurance, Ministry of Health and Welfare, hike, subscriber, system	보험 연금 국민 보험료 보건 복지 건강 국민연금 부담 공단 지급 소득 재정 건강보험 보건복지부 복지부 가입자 제도 인상
<b>events, exhibitions, services</b>	<i>Chosun, Ilbo</i> , Internet, site, homepage, date, of, broadcasting, newspapers, phone, welfare, program, Introduction, Korea, Computer, Press	조선 일보 조선일보 인터넷 정보 홈페이지 일자 방송 복지 전화 사이트 신문 기사 프로그램 한국 내용 소개 보도 컴퓨터
<b>local welfare facilities</b>	Elderly, welfare, facilities, size, ground, operations, center, built, underground, space, building, comprehensive, plans, install, total, floor, area, planned, welfare, culture, places	시설 규모 복지 지하 노인 지상 운영 센터 건립 종합 공간 건물 예정 계획 복지관 문화 설치 연면적 개소
<b>medical treatment</b>	Hospital, patient, medical, treatment, health, care, physicians, health, welfare, surgery, Department of Health and Welfare, agency, specializing, hospital, beds, disease, center, family	병원 환자 의료 치료 보건 진료 의사 건강 복지 암 수술 보건복지부 병상 질 환 입원 기관 전문 센터 가족

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>Asia</b>	Foreign, countries, Japan, Korea, China, International, Domestic, International, USA, World, Asia, South, Koreans, visiting, foreign country, local, Vietnamese, Hong, Kong, Philippines	일본 한국 개국 중국 외국 인 국제 해외 미국 세계 국 내 한국인 외국 나라 방문 아시아 현지 베트남 콩 필 리핀
<b>international countries</b>	European, countries, UK, Germany, France, World, US, dollars, New, York, Washington, Prime, Minister, federal, union, President, press, social, euros	미국 달러 영국 독일 유럽 개국 세계 프랑스 뉴욕 대 통령 연합 국가 장관 워싱 턴 총리 연방 보도 유로 사 회
<b>schools and education</b>	Elementary, school, students, grade, teacher, secondary, school, education, High, School, parents, learn, lesson, primary, school, children, support, local, youth	학교 교육 학생 학년 교사 초등학교 교육청 고교 학부 모 고등 중학교 학습 수업 고등학교 초등 아이 지원 지역 청소년
<b>public administration</b>	Administration, officials, Ministry, health, welfare, Commissioner, economic, planning, project, management, organization, central, government, safety, construction, industry, Head of Section, cultural, institutions	행정 공무원 부처 보건 복 지 기획 업무 관리 조직 국 장 경제 중앙 안전 건설 자 치 산업 과장 문화 기관
<b>low-income groups</b>	Basic, life, support, target, low-income, household, welfare, levels, society, pay, elder, care, home, residents, subject, beneficiaries, business, offers	생활 지원 기초 저소득 가 구 복지 사회 계층 대상 대 상자 사업 수급자 노인 보 호 지급 가정 주민 제공 혜 택
<b>foreign politics</b>	Presidential, election, political, parties, supporting, ruling, regime, welfare, reform, policy, forces, opposition, national, democratic, Prime, Minister, <i>Democratic Party</i> , political, candidate, elections	선거 정치 대통령 집권 정 권 복지 정당 정책 지지 세 력 야당 개혁 국민 총선 후 보 정치적 총리 민주당 민 주
<b>cultural performances and festivals</b>	Cultural, events, arts, performances, welfare, music, festival, song, contest, exhibition, hall, stage, arrange, various, artwork, artists, invited, play, movies	공연 문화 행사 예술 음악 복지 노래 축제 무대 마련 다양 작품 회관 대회 전시 연주 영화 가수 초청
<b>national defense and military</b>	Army, soldier, defense, forces, defense, naval, Air Force, four, soldiers, war, veterans, service, officers, working, operation, country, training, military, headquarters	육군 군인 부대 국방부 사 단 장병 전쟁 공군 국방 해 군 복무 참전 장교 작전 국 가 훈련 사령부 미군 근무

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>commentary</b>	Country, date, national, governments, responsible, incorrect, media, reports, indicated, social, welfare, officials, insist, country, situation, articles, criticizing, situation	일자 국민 정부 나라 책임 언론 잘못 보도 복지 사회 지적 국가 사태 내용 기사 주장 공무원 비판 상황
<b>welfare for the disabled</b>	Mental, retardation, disability, visual, disability, rehabilitation, visually impaired, community, welfare, paralyzed, wheelchair, welfare, severe, cerebral, Korea, special, hearing, discomfort	장애인 장애 지체 시각 재 활 정신 복지 사회 시각장 애인 마비 시설 휠체어 복 지판 중증 한국 특수 청각 뇌성 불편
<b>breaches, crimes, corruptions</b>	Prosecutors, alleged, restraint, welfare, investigation, police, uncovered, corruption, court, criminal, proceedings, relative, ruling, party, at, the, time, of, check, illegal, staff	혐의 검찰 복지 사건 수사 구속 경찰 법원 적발 비리 형사 소송 상대 판결 확인 불법 관계자 당시 직원
<b>policy implementation</b>	Welfare, plan, promotion, measures, operating, period, provide, increased, support, business, conduct, policy, configuration, regional, planning, policy, announced, installation	계획 추진 복지 방안 운영 마련 기관 지원 확대 사업 분야 예정 방침 지역 구성 실시 정책 발표 설치
<b>family, family values, elderly people</b>	Father, son, mother, family, children, living, husbands, grandmother, school, friend, Kim, parent, dreams, mother, live, alone, study	아이 아들 어머니 생활 가 족 아버지 학년 남편 할머 니 친구 부모 꿈 김씨 학교 혼자 공부 엄마 삶 아내
<b>North Korea</b>	North Korea, inter-Korean, North Korean, unification, peace, North, Korean, nuclear, security, summit, diplomacy, Minjok, international, welfare, systems, economic, cooperation, China	북한 남북 통일 북 평화 관 계 핵 안보 대북 한반도 회 담 경제 협력 중국 체제 외 교 민족 국제 복지
<b>economic figures</b>	Government, financial, crisis, welfare, dollar, economic, growth, enterprise, market, policy, financial, situation, world, national, product, national, investment, spending	경제 위기 정부 재정 복지 달러 성장 경기 시장 기업 정책 금융 국가 투자 상황 세계 국민 생산 지출
<b>civic actors</b>	Civil, society, organizations, representing, exercise, Committee, Chairman, outreach, union, solidarity, association, chairman, joint, regional, civil, society, members, Korea	단체 시민 운동 참여 사회 대표 위원회 회장 복지 활 동 연합 협의회 연대 시민 단체 지역 위원장 공동 한 국 회원



<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>children and orphans</b>	Child, care, for, children, birth, parents, adopted, children, home, baby, infant, child, welfare, facilities, nursery, couple, family, parenting, women	아이 아동 어린이 보육 부모 출산 가정 입양 유아 자녀 시설 어린이집 복지 야기 가족 부부 육아 여성 양육

### 4.3. Divergence frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>safety</b>	Police, scene, accident, damages, welfare, safety, emergency, incident, police, rescue, fire, disaster, recovery, disaster, risk, fire, areas	사고 경찰 발생 피해 안전 현장 복지 사건 긴급 상황 경찰서 구조 복구 소방 재난 화재 지역 위험 참사
<b>elections survey data</b>	Members of Parliament, representing, <i>Democratic Party</i> , presidential, election, candidate, running, welfare, <i>Hannara Party</i> , Democratic, <i>Uri</i> , mayor, National, civic, general, elections	후보 선거 한나라 의원 민주당 대표 출마 복지 한나라당 대선 우리당 열린 시장 민주 열린우리당 정치 국민 시민 총선
<b>product chain</b>	Manufacturers, factory, price, imported, products, distribution, company, manufacturing, agricultural, exporters, million, consumer, market, quality, agricultural, supply, farmers	생산 업체 제품 유통 공장 판매 가격 수입 제조 농업 수출 천만 회사 소비자 시장 농 공급 농가 품질
<b>budget</b>	Budget, projects, funded, welfare, trillion, municipal, government, organized, social, groups, next, year's, budget, increased, investment, fund, special, account	예산 사업 복지 지원 재정 조원 규모 편성 정부 자치 사회 예산안 단체 내년도 증가 재원 투자 특별 회계
<b>volunteer work</b>	Elderly, welfare, facility, volunteer, activities, volunteer, neighborhood, volunteers, local, volunteers, love, volunteering, cost-free, impaired, social, welfare, Social, Welfare, Facility, Member	봉사 자원 노인 시설 활동 사회 복지 봉사활동 이웃 봉사자 지역 자원봉사자 사랑 자원봉사 무료 장애인 사회복지시설 복지시설 회원
<b>employment</b>	Employed, workers, labor, jobs, now, hiring, professional, workforce, unemployed, , welfare, corporation, wage, employees, company, workplace, Department, of, Labor	고용 취업 근로 근로자 일자리 기업 채용 직업 근무 인력 복지 공단 임금 직원 노동 실업 업체 직장 노동부

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Highly correlated words</b>	<b>Original Korean words</b>
<b>professors appointed to public positions</b>	Professor, Department, Seoul National University, Korea University, College, Doctoral Studies, graduate, Korea, University, graduate, school, Yonsei University, Ewha Womans University, Ewha, Social, Research, Fellow, American, Chung-Ang University, United States	교수 학과 서울대 여대 연구 대학 한국 박사 연세대 대학원 고려대 이화 사회 졸업 이화여대 연구원 위원 중앙대 미국
<b>waste reduction, re-using, businesses</b>	Food, vendors, sold, goods, market, dining, restaurants, operating, waste, food, products, prepared, using, guest, clothes, store, large, price, meals	음식 판매 용품 시장 식당 쓰레기 음식점 업체 운영 제품 식품 마련 가게 사용 손님 옷 대형 가격 식사
<b>city economies</b>	Urban, development, business, environment, culture, local, economic, development, industrial, construction, market, composition, tourist, attraction, promoting, civil, administration, enable, traffic	도시 환경 문화 지역 발전 사업 개발 경제 조성 관광 유치 건설 시장 산업 추진 행정 활성화 시민 교통
<b>Research and development for economic growth</b>	Information Technology, industry, development, enterprises, science, tech, support, domestic, investment, world, strategic, business, communication, training, institute, century	기술 산업 개발 연구 기업 과학 분야 정보 지원 첨단 투자 국내 세계 전략 사업 연구소 육성 통신 세기
<b>counseling</b>	Female, family, counseling, family, social, services, marriage, pair, youth, violence, child, protection, training, center, parent, couple, male and female, children, call	여성 가정 상담 가족 결혼 사회 복지 쌍 폭력 청소년 보호 아동 부모 부부 교육 센터 자녀 남녀 전화
<b>public values</b>	Social, welfare, nation-state, effort, nations, recognize, role, social, change, development, institutions, meaning, solving, environmental, awareness, capabilities, era, Korea	사회 노력 나라 복지 국민 국가 역할 인식 사회적 변화 발전 해결 시대 우리나라 환경 제도 의미 의식 능력

# Bibliography

Ahn, Doo Soon. 2011. "Tokil T'ongil Kwa Kyöngche T'onghap Kwachöng E Taehan P'yöngka: Hankuk Önlon E Pich'in T'ongil Pangsik Kwa T'ongil Piyong Nonüi Lül Chungsim Ülo." *Kyöngsang Nonch'ong* 29 (3): 1–26.

Ahn, Jong-cheol. 2002. "The Significance of Settling the Past of the December 12 Coup and the May 18 Gwangju Uprising." *Korea Journal* 42 (3): 112–38.

Ahram, Ariel I. 2011. "The Theory and Method of Comparative Area Studies." *Qualitative Research* 11 (1): 69–90. doi:10.1177/1468794110385297.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1980. "The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study."

Alvarez, Sonia E., Arturo Arias, and Charles R. Hale. 2011. "Re-Visioning Latin American Studies." *Cultural Anthropology* 26 (2): 225–46. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1360.2011.01097.x.

Antony, Louise. 2006. *The Socialization of Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Armitage, Richard L. 1999. "A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea." 159. Strategic Forum. National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies: DTIC Document.

Armstrong, Charles K. 2005. "Inter-Korean Relations in Historical Perspective." *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 14 (2): 1–20.

Bachmann-Medick, Doris. 2006. "Cultural Turns." *Neuorientierungen in Den Kulturwissenschaften* 2: 26.

———. 2009. "Introduction: The Translational Turn." *Translation Studies* 2 (1): 2–16. doi:10.1080/14781700802496118.

———. 2012. "Culture as Text: Reading and Interpreting Cultures." *Travelling Concepts for the Study of Culture* 2: 99.

Bak, Haegwang. 2007. "Munhwa Yöнкуwa Tamlon Punsök." *Munhwa Wa Sahoe*, 83–116.

Bak, Seonhui. 2002. "Önlon Üi Chöngch'ichök Hyönsil Kusöng E Taehan Tamlon Punsök." *Chöngch'i Chöngpo Yöнку* 5 (1): 209–48.

- Barkin, J. Samuel. 2015. "Translatable? On Mixed Methods and Methodology." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 43 (3): 1003–6. doi:10.1177/0305829815581534.
- Barkin, J. Samuel, and Laura Sjoberg. 2015. "Calculating Critique: Thinking Outside the Methods Matching Game." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 43 (3): 852–71. doi:10.1177/0305829815576819.
- Basedau, Matthias, and Patrick Kollner. 2007. "Area Studies and Comparative Area Studies: A Primer on Recent Debates and Methodological Challenges." *Japan Aktuell* 2: 3–34.
- Basedau, Matthias, and Patrick Köllner. 2007. "Area Studies, Comparative Area Studies, and the Study of Politics: Context, Substance, and Methodological Challenges." *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 1 (1): 105–24. doi:10.1007/s12286-007-0009-3.
- Bassnett, Susan. 2002. *Translation Studies [Electronic Resource]*. Psychology Press.
- Bates, Robert H. 1997a. "Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 30 (2): 166–169. doi:10.2307/420485.
- . 1997b. "Area Studies and Political Science: Rupture and Possible Synthesis." *Africa Today* 44 (2): 123–31.
- Bates, Robert H., Rui JP De Figueiredo, and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. "The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition." *Politics and Society* 26: 221–56.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., Bryan D. Jones, and John Wilkerson. 2011. "Comparative Studies of Policy Dynamics." *Comparative Political Studies*, 10414011405160.
- Béland, Daniel. 2009. "Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change." *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (5): 701–18. doi:10.1080/13501760902983382.
- Béland, Daniel, Martin B. Carstensen, and Leonard Seabrooke. 2015. "Ideas, Political Power and Public Policy." *Journal of European Public Policy* 0 (0): 1–3. doi:10.1080/13501763.2015.1122163.
- Beland, Daniel, and Klaus Peterson. 2014. *Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives*. Policy Press.
- Bélanger, Éric, and Bonnie M. Meguid. 2008. "Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-Based Vote Choice." *Electoral Studies* 27 (3): 477–491.
- Bennett, Andrew. 2015. "Found in Translation: Combining Discourse Analysis with

Computer Assisted Content Analysis.” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 43 (3): 984–97. doi:10.1177/0305829815581535.

Benoit, K., and M. Laver. 2012. “The Dimensionality of Political Space: Epistemological and Methodological Considerations.” *European Union Politics* 13 (2): 194–218. doi:10.1177/1465116511434618.

Benson, David, and Andrew Jordan. 2011. “What Have We Learned from Policy Transfer Research? Dolowitz and Marsh Revisited.” *Political Studies Review* 9 (3): 366–378. doi:10.1111/j.1478-9302.2011.00240.x.

Berezin, Mabel. 2014. “How Do We Know What We Mean? Epistemological Dilemmas in Cultural Sociology.” *Qualitative Sociology* 37 (2): 141–51. doi:10.1007/s11133-014-9276-x.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 2005. *Die Gesellschaftliche Konstruktion Der Wirklichkeit*.

Bevir, Mark. 2008. “Meta-Methodology: Clearing the Underbrush.” *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, 48–70.

Bevir, Mark, and Asaf Kedar. 2008. “Concept Formation in Political Science: An Anti-Naturalist Critique of Qualitative Methodology.” *Perspectives on Politics* null (3): 503–517. doi:10.1017/S1537592708081255.

Billig, Michael. 1996. *Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology*. Cambridge University Press.

Blei, David M., Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan. 2003. “Latent Dirichlet Allocation.” *The Journal of Machine Learning Research* 3: 993–1022.

Blyth, Mark. 2003. “Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science.” *Perspectives on Politics* 1: 695–706.

———. 2015. “The New Ideas Scholarship in the Mirror of Historical Institutionalism: A Case of Old Whines in New Bottles?” *Journal of European Public Policy* 0 (0): 1–8. doi:10.1080/13501763.2015.1118292.

Boix, Carles, and Susan Carol Stokes. 2009. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Boltanski, Luc, and Laurent Thévenot. 1999. “The Sociology of Critical Capacity.” *European Journal of Social Theory* 2 (3): 359–77. doi:10.1177/136843199002003010.

Bonilla, Tabitha, and Justin Grimmer. 2013a. "Elevated Threat Levels and Decreased Expectations: How Democracy Handles Terrorist Threats." *Poetics, Topic Models and the Cultural Sciences*, 41 (6): 650–69. doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2013.06.003.

———. 2013b. "Elevated Threat Levels and Decreased Expectations: How Democracy Handles Terrorist Threats." *Poetics, Topic Models and the Cultural Sciences*, 41 (6): 650–69. doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2013.06.003.

Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2009. "The Transformative Power of Europe." In *The EU Promotion of Good Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood*, Paper Prepared for the ERD Workshop, Florence, April, 16–17.

———. 2011. "When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion: Exploring New Territory." *West European Politics* 35 (1): 192–207. doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.634543.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. 2008. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*. Oxford University Press.

Brake, Benjamin, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2013. "Lost in Translation? Nonstate Actors and the Transnational Movement of Procedural Law." *International Organization* 67 (4): 725–757. doi:10.1017/S002081831300026X.

Brinks, Daniel, and Michael Coppedge. 2006. "Diffusion Is No Illusion Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (4): 463–89. doi:10.1177/0010414005276666.

Budge, Ian. 2015. "Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis." *West European Politics* 38 (4): 761–77. doi:10.1080/01402382.2015.1039374.

Campbell, John L. 2004. *Institutional Change and Globalization*. Princeton University Press.

Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." *World Politics* 59 (3): 341–69. doi:10.1017/S0043887100020852.

Catalinac, Amy. 2013. "The Rise of Programmatic Campaigning in Japanese Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 78 (1): 1–18.

———. 2014. "Quantitative Text Analysis with Asian Languages: Some Problems and Solutions." *Polimetrics* 1 (1): 14–17.

Chae, Haesook, and Steven Kim. 2008. "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea."

*The Washington Quarterly* 31 (4): 77–95.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2009. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (New Edition)*. Princeton University Press.

Chan, Cheri Shun-ching. 2009. “Creating a Market in the Presence of Cultural Resistance: The Case of Life Insurance in China.” *Theory and Society* 38 (3): 271–305.

Chandler, David. 2015. “A World without Causation: Big Data and the Coming of Age of Posthumanism.” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 43 (3): 833–51. doi:10.1177/0305829815576817.

Chang, Ha-song. 2014. *Han’guk Chabonjuūi: Kyōngje Minjuhwa Rül Nōmō Chōngūi Roun Kyōngje Ro = Capitalism in Korea*. 1–p’an ed. Kyōnggi-do Sōngnam-si: Hei Puksū.

Chang, Hun, ed. 2013. *Han’guk Minjujuūi Ŭi Wigi Wa Chōnmang: Minjuhwa, Segyehwa, T’alanbohwa*. Kyōnggi-do Koyang-si: In’gan Sarang.

Chin, Tok-kyu. 2011. *Kwōllyōk Kwa Chisigin: Haebang Chōngguk Esō Chōngch’ijōk Chisigin Ŭi Ch’amyō Nollī*. Ch’op’an. Ihwa Haksurwōn Chisōngsa Ch’ongsō 6. Kyōnggi-do P’aju-si: Chisik Sanōpsa.

Cho, Young-hoon. 2012. “Transformation of the Korean Welfare State? An Evaluation on the Welfare Plans of Two Major Political Parties in Contemporary Korea.” *Kyōngche Wa Sahoe*, September, 67–93.

Choe, Tae-uk, ed. 2013. *Pokchi Han’guk Mandūlgi: Ōttōn Pokchi Kukka Rül Nuga Ōttōk’e Mandūl Kōt In’ga*. 1–p’an ed. Sōul: Humanit’asū.

Choi, Jang-Jip. 2002. *Minjuhwa Ihu Ŭi Minjujuūi: Han’guk Minjujuūi Ŭi Posujōk Kiwōn Kwa Wigi*. Che 1-P’an. P’ollit’eia Ch’ongsō 1. Sōul T’ūkpyōlsi: Humanit’asū.

———. 2008. *Han’guk Minjujuūi Muōt I Munje In’ga*. Ch’op’an. Mun Laibūrōri 3. Sōul: Saenggak ũi Namu.

———. 2009. *Minjung Esō Simin Ŭro: Han’guk Minjujuūi Rül Ihae Hanūn Hana Ŭi Pangbōp*. Ch’op’an. Sōkhak Inmun Kangjwa 4. Kyōnggi-do P’aju-si: Tolbegae.

———. 2010. “Hankuk Minchuchuūi Lūl Ihae Hanūn Pangpōp E Kwanhan Hana Ŭi Nonp’yōng.” *Kyōngche Wa Sahoe*, 93–120.

———. 2012. “Democracy in Contemporary Korea: The Politics of Extreme Uncertainty.” Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. <http://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/multimedia/democracy-korea-politics-extreme-uncertainty>.

———. , ed. 2013. *Nonjaeng Ŭrosöüi Minjujuüi: Minjujuüi Rül Ihae Hanün Munje E Kwanhayö*. 1–p’an ed. Söul: Humanit’asü.

Choi, Jang-Jip, Chan-pyo Pak, and Sang-hun Pak. 2007. *Öttön Minjujuüi In’ga: Han’guk Minjujuüi Rül Ponün Hana Ŭi Sigak*. 1–p’an ed. Minjujuüi Ch’ongsö 6. Söul: Humanit’asü.

———. 2013. *Öttön Minjujuüi In’ga: Han’guk Minjujuüi Rül Ponün Hana Ŭi Sigak*. 2–p’an ed. Söul: Humanit’asü.

Choi, Jang-Jip, and Sang-hun Pak. 2006. *Minjujuüi Ŭi Minjuhwa: Han’guk Minjujuüi Ŭi Pyöhyöng Kwa Hegemoni*. Che 1-P’an. Söul: Humanit’asü.

Choi, Jong-hwan, Dae-sup Kwak, and Sung-wook Kim. 2016. “Analysis of Media Coverage on the Nuclear Crisis of Korean Peninsula – Focused on Domestic Newspapers’ Editorial Opinions and Columns.” *Önlonhak Yönku* 18 (2). Accessed May 14.

Chong, Chin-min. 2008. *Han’guk Ŭi Chöngdang Chöngch’i Wa Taet’ongnyöngje Minjujuüi*. Ch’op’an. Kyönggi-do Koyang-si: In’gan Sarang.

Chong, Chu-sin. 2011. *Han’guk Ŭi Chöngdang Chöngch’i*. Taejön Kwangyöksu: P’ürima Books.

Chong, Hung-mo. 2009. *Han’guk Kwa Togil Ŭi T’ongil Kürigo Chöngch’i =: Korea & Germany’s Unification and Politics*. Ch’op’an. Naeil Ŭl Yönün Chisik. Chöngch’i 16. Kyönggi-do P’aju-si: Han’guk Haksul Chöngbo.

Chun, Hyun-joon. 2015. “Puntan 70 Nyön T’ongil Punya Yönku.” *T’ongil Chöngch’aek Yönku* 24 (1): 55–88.

Chun, Sung-hoon. 2007. “Pukhaek Munche Wa Hankuk Ŭi Taeüng.” *Kukche P’yöngghwa* 4 (1). [http://www.spp.or.kr/file/junsunghun\(73-108\).pdf](http://www.spp.or.kr/file/junsunghun(73-108).pdf).

Chung, Chang-hyun. 2011. “Sitae Ch’ako Chökin Saekkkal Lon, P’yön Kalüki Nüp E Ppachin Taehan Minkuk E Milae Nün Öpta.” *Minchok* 21, 48–51.

Chung, Jae-chorl. 2011. “A Critical Study on Korean Newspaper’s Social Welfare Populism Discourse.” *Önlon Kwahak Yönku* 11 (1): 371–398.

Chung, Jin Min, and John D. Nagle. 1992. “Generational Dynamics and the Politics of German and Korean Unification.” *The Western Political Quarterly* 45 (4): 851–67. doi:10.2307/448815.

Collier, David, and John Gerring. 2009. “Concepts and Method in Social Science: The



Tradition of Giovanni Sartori.”

Collier, David, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright. 2011. “Putting Typologies to Work: Concept-Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1735695. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1735695>.

Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” *World Politics* 49 (3): 430–51. doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0009.

Collier, David, and James E. Mahon Jr. 1993. “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis.” *The American Political Science Review* 87 (4): 845–55. doi:10.2307/2938818.

Cox, Robert Henry, and Daniel Béland. 2013. “Valence, Policy Ideas, and the Rise of Sustainability.” *Governance* 26 (2): 307–28. doi:10.1111/gove.12003.

Crouch, Colin, Wolfgang Streeck, Richard Whitley, and John L. Campbell. 2007. “Institutional Change and Globalization.” *Socio-Economic Review* 5 (3): 527–67. doi:10.1093/ser/mwm001.

Cumings, Bruce. 1984. “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences.” *International Organization* 38 (1): 1–40. doi:10.1017/S0020818300004264.

Damore, David F. 2004. “The Dynamics of Issue Ownership in Presidential Campaigns.” *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (3): 391–397.

———. 2005. “Issue Convergence in Presidential Campaigns.” *Political Behavior* 27 (1): 71–97.

de Jong, Martin. 2013. “China’s Art of Institutional Bricolage: Selectiveness and Gradualism in the Policy Transfer Style of a Nation.” *Policy and Society* 32 (2): 89–101. doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.05.007.

DiMaggio, Paul. 1997. “Culture and Cognition.” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 263–87.

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Vol. 17. University of Chicago Press Chicago.

DiMaggio, Paul, Manish Nag, and David Blei. 2013. “Exploiting Affinities between Topic Modeling and the Sociological Perspective on Culture: Application to Newspaper Coverage of U.S. Government Arts Funding.” *Poetics*, Topic Models and the Cultural

Sciences, 41 (6): 570–606. doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2013.08.004.

Dolezal, Martin, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Anna Katharina Winkler. 2013. “How Parties Compete for Votes: A Test of Saliency Theory.” *European Journal of Political Research*, n/a–n/a. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12017.

Dolowitz, David, and David Marsh. 1996. “Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature.” *Political Studies* 44 (2): 343–357. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00334.x.

Dolowitz, David P., and David Marsh. 2000. “Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making.” *Governance* 13 (1): 5–23. doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00121.

Dolowitz, David P, and David Marsh. 2012. “The Future of Policy Transfer Research.” *Political Studies Review* 10 (3): 339–45.

Doucette, Jamie. 2015. “Debating Economic Democracy in South Korea: The Costs of Commensurability.” *Critical Asian Studies* 47 (3): 388–413. doi:10.1080/14672715.2015.1057025.

Douglas, Mary. 1986. *How Institutions Think*. Syracuse University Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.

Dussauge-Laguna, Mauricio I. 2012. “On The Past and Future of Policy Transfer Research: Benson and Jordan Revisited.” *Political Studies Review* 10 (3): 313–24. doi:10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00275.x.

Elkins, Zachary, and Beth Simmons. 2004. “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy.” *American Political Science Review* 98: 171–190.

Elster, Jon. 2000. “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition.” *The American Political Science Review* 94 (3): 685–95. doi:10.2307/2585842.

Entman, Robert M. 2007. “Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power.” *Journal of Communication* 57 (1): 163–173.

Eun, Yong-Soo. 2012. “Rethinking Logic of Inference and Explanation in the Field of International Relations.” *Politics* 32 (3): 162–74. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01437.x.

Eun, Yong-Soo, and Kamila Pieczara. 2013. “Getting Asia Right and Advancing the Field of IR.” *Political Studies Review* 11 (3): 369–77. doi:10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00290.x.

Evans, Mark. 2009. "Policy Transfer in Critical Perspective." *Policy Studies* 30 (3): 243–68. doi:10.1080/01442870902863828.

"Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards." 2016. *International Atomic Energy Agency*. Accessed May 13. <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisories/fact-sheet-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>.

Fearon, James, and David D. Laitin. 2000. "Ordinary Language and External Validity: Specifying Concepts in the Study of Ethnicity." In *LiCEP Meetings, University of Pennsylvania, October, 20–22*. <http://web.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/eve/statebuilding/fearon-laitin.pdf>.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1975. "Formal Models in Political Science." *American Journal of Political Science*, 133–159.

———. 1999. "Whatever Happened to the Median Voter?" In *MIT Conference on Parties and Congress, Cambridge, MA, 2:1999*. <http://www.msu.edu/~rohde/Fiorina-MIT.pdf>.

Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. "Political Polarization in the American Public." *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 11: 563–588.

Fischer, Frank. 2003. *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Hannah. 2007. "North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950 - 2007." Order Code RL30004. CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>.

Fligstein, Neil, and Doug McAdam. 2012. *A Theory of Fields*. Oxford University Press.

Freeman, Richard. 2009. "What Is 'Translation'?" *Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate & Practice* 5 (4): 429–47.

Ga, Sang-jun. 2009. "Characteristics of Standing Committees' Composition in the 18th National Assembly." *Hankuk Chǒngtang Hakhoe Po* 8 (2): 67–95.

Gamson, William A., David Croteau, William Hoynes, and Theodore Sasson. 1992. "Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality." *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (Spring): 373–93.

Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. 1989. "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach." *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (1): 1–37.

Geddes, Barbara. 2002. "The Great Transformation in the Study of Politics in Developing Countries." *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, 342–70.

Geertz, Clifford. 1980. "Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought." *American Scholar* 49 (2): 165.

Gerring, John. 1999. "What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences." *Polity* 31 (3): 357–93. doi:10.2307/3235246.

———. 2012. *Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gerring, John, and Paul A. Barresi. 2003. "Putting Ordinary Language to Work A Min-Max Strategy of Concept Formation in the Social Sciences." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15 (2): 201–32. doi:10.1177/0951629803015002647.

Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2012. "Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies." *Handbook of International Relations* 2.

Goertz, Gary. 2006. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton University Press.

Goodin, Robert E., and Charles Tilly. 2006. *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford University Press.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter Mortensen. 2010a. "Issue Competition and Election Campaigns: Avoidance and Engagement." In *Political Parties and Comparative Policy Agendas: An ESF Workshop on Political Parties and Their Positions and Policy Agendas*, Manchester. <http://www.agendasetting.dk/papers/uploaded/115201044905PM.pdf>.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2010b. "Who Sets the Agenda and Who Responds to It in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Competition and Agenda-Setting." *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (2): 257–281.

Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." *Journal of Political Economy* 102 (5): 912–50.

———. 1998. "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis." *The American Economic Review* 88 (2): 80–84.

Grimmer, Justin. 2010. "A Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model for Political Texts: Measuring Expressed Agendas in Senate Press Releases." *Political Analysis* 18 (1): 1–35. doi:10.1093/pan/mpp034.

———. 2015. “We Are All Social Scientists Now: How Big Data, Machine Learning, and Causal Inference Work Together.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 48 (1): 80–83. doi:10.1017/S1049096514001784.

Grimmer, Justin, and Gary King. 2011. “General Purpose Computer-Assisted Clustering and Conceptualization.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108 (7): 2643–2650.

Grimmer, Justin, Gary King, and Chiara Superti. 2014. “You Lie! Patterns of Partisan Taunting in the U.S. Senate (Poster).” In . Athens, GA. <http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Poster/PolMethPOSTER.pdf>.

Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts.” *Political Analysis* 21 (3): 267–97. doi:10.1093/pan/mps028.

Grofman, Bernard. 2004. “Downs and Two-Party Convergence.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (1): 25–46. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711.

Gross, Donald G. 2002. “Riding the Roller-Coaster.” *Comparative Connections*.

Guinaudeau, Isabelle, and Simon Persico. 2013. “What Is Issue Competition? Conflict, Consensus and Issue Ownership in Party Competition.” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 24 (3): 312–33. doi:10.1080/17457289.2013.858344.

Ha Yeon-Seob. 1997. “Public Finance and Budgeting in Korea under Democracy: A Critical Appraisal.” *Public Budgeting & Finance* 17 (1): 56–73. doi:10.1111/1540-5850.01092.

Hajer, Maarten A. 1993. “Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain.” In *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, edited by John Forester and Frank Fischer. Duke University Press.

———. 1995. *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Clarendon Press Oxford.

Hajer, Maarten, and Wytse Versteeg. 2005. “A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: Achievements, Challenges, Perspectives.” *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning* 7 (3): 175–84. doi:10.1080/15239080500339646.

Hall, Peter A. 1989. “The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations.”

———. 1993. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State.” *Comparative Politics* 25

(3): 275–96.

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary CR Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms\*.” *Political Studies* 44 (5): 936–57.

Han, Hong-gu. 2011. “Compulsory Ideological Conversion and North Korean Agents.” *Yöksa Pip’yöng*, 200–257.

Hankyoreh. 2006. “Ö Ulin Nyu Lep’üt’ü Aninte... Wae?,” January 20. [http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/96778.html](http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/96778.html).

Hay, Colin. 2006. “Political Ontology.” *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, 78–96.

Hegel, G. W. F. 2012. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Courier Corporation.

Helgesen, Geir. 2014. *Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics*. Routledge.

Henisz, Witold J, Bennet A Zelner, and Mauro F Guillén. 2005. “The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999.” *American Sociological Review* 70 (6): 871–97.

Ho, Kwang-sok. 1996. *Han’guk Chöngdang Ch’egye Punsök: Chehön Kukhoe Put’ö Che 14-Tae Kukhoe Kkaji Han’guk Chöngdang Ch’egye Üi Hwan’gyöng Kwa Kujo*. Ch’op’an. Söul: Töllyök.

Hofstede, Geert H., and Geert Hofstede. 2001. *Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations*. SAGE.

Holbig, Heike. 2015. “The Plasticity of Regions: A Social Sciences-Cultural Studies Dialogue on Asia-Related Area Studies.” 267. GIGA Working Papers. <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/107632>.

Holian, David B. 2004. “He’s Stealing My Issues! Clinton’s Crime Rhetoric and the Dynamics of Issue Ownership.” *Political Behavior* 26 (2): 95–124.

Hong, Song-min. 2008. *Chisik kwa kukche chöngch’i: hangmun sok e sümyö innün chöngch’i kwöllyök*. P’aju-si: Hanul Ak’ademi.

Hope, Mat, and Ringa Raudla. 2012. “Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Stasis in Simple and Compound Polities: The Cases of Estonian Fiscal Policy and United States Climate Change Policy.” *Policy Studies* 33 (5): 399–418. doi:10.1080/01442872.2012.722286.

Hwang, Balbina Y. 2011. "Reviving the Korean Armistice: Building Future Peace on Historical Precedents." *Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper Series* 6 (6). [http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/balbina\\_hwang\\_aps\\_final\\_paper.pdf](http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/balbina_hwang_aps_final_paper.pdf).

Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review* 82 (4): 1203–30.

Jackson, Gregory. 2001. "The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan." *The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison*, 121–70.

James, Oliver, and Martin Lodge. 2003. "The Limitations of 'Policy Transfer' and 'Lesson Drawing' for Public Policy Research." *Political Studies Review* 1 (2): 179–193. doi:10.1111/1478-9299.t01-1-00003.

Jepsen, Maria, and Amparo Serrano Pascual. 2005. "The European Social Model: An Exercise in Deconstruction."

Jo, Byung-hee. 2000. "Conflicts between Civil Society and Medical Doctors Shown in the Doctors' Strike." *Saengmyŏng Yunli* 1 (2): 35–52.

Jobert, Bruno. 1989. "The Normative Frameworks of Public Policy." *Political Studies* 37 (3): 376–386.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1997. "Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30 (2): 170–74. doi:10.2307/420486.

Johnson, Chalmers, and Hidenori Ijiri. 2005. "JPRI Occasional Paper No. 24." <http://jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op34.html>.

Johnson, James. 2003. "Conceptual Problems as Obstacles to Progress in Political Science Four Decades of Political Culture Research." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15 (1): 87–115. doi:10.1177/0951692803151004.

Johnston, Hank. 1995. "A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata." *Social Movements and Culture* 4: 217–246.

———. 2002. "Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis." *Methods of Social Movement Research*, 62–91.

Jung, Chang Lyul, and Alan Walker. 2009. "The Impact of Neo-Liberalism on South Korea's Public Pension: A Political Economy of Pension Reform." *Social Policy & Administration* 43 (5): 425–44. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9515.2009.00672.x.

Jung, Jai Kwan, and Chad Rector. 2014. "Pathways of National Reunification in Germany, Yemen and Korea." *Pacific Focus* 29 (2): 211–36. doi:10.1111/pafo.12027.

Jung, Youngjin, and Jun-Shik Hwang. 2002. "Where Does Inequality Come From-An Analysis of the Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement." *Am. U. Int'l L. Rev.* 18: 1103.

Kang, Chong-in, ed. 2002. *Minjujuŭi Ŭi Han'gukchŏk Suyong: Han'guk Ŭi Minjuhwa, Minjujuŭi Ŭi Han'gukhwa*. Ch'op'an. Sŏul T'ŭkpyŏlsi: Ch'aek Sesang.

———. , ed. 2009. *Han'guk Chŏngch'i Ŭi Inyŏm Kwa Sasang: Posujuŭi, Chayujuŭi, Minjokchuŭi, Kŭpchinjuŭi*. 1–p'an ed. Sŏul: Humanit'asŭ.

———. , ed. 2013a. *Chŏngch'ihak Ŭi Chŏngch'esŏng: Han'guk Chŏngch'ihak Ŭi Chuch'esŏng Ŭl Wihayŏ = Political Science*. Ch'op'an. Sŏul-si: Ch'aek Sesang.

———. 2013b. Ch'aek Sesang. <https://books.google.de/books?id=kTDYmgEACAAJ>.

———. , ed. 2014. *Hyŏndae Han'guk Chŏngch'i Sasang: T'al Sŏgu Chungsimjuŭi Rŭl Chihyang Hamyŏ*. Ch'op'an. Sŏul-si: Asan Sŏwŏn.

Kang, David C. 2003a. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks." *International Security* 27 (4): 57–85.

———. 2003b. "Regional Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Korea." In *Kim, Samuel S.(Hg.), Korea's Democratization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge*, 161–80.

———. 2013. "The North Korean Issue, Park Geun-Hye's Presidency, and the Possibility of Trust-Building on the Korean Peninsula." *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 22 (1): 1–21.

Kang, Myung Koo. 2000. "Discourse Politics toward Neo-Liberal Globalization." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 1 (3): 443–56. doi:10.1080/14649370020009933.

Kang, Won Taek. 2016. "The Development of Political Science in Korea." *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 1 (2): 122–34. doi:10.1177/2057891116641520.

Kang, Won-Taek. 2003. "Hankuk Chŏngch'i Ŭi Inyŏmchŏk T'ŭksŏng." *Hankuk Chŏngtang Hakhoe Po* 2 (1): 5–30.

———. 2005a. "Generation, Ideology and Transformation of South Korean Politics." *Hankuk Chŏngtang Hakhoe Po* 4 (2): 193–217.



———. 2005b. *Han'guk Ŭi Chŏngch'i Kaehyŏk Kwa Minjujuŭi*. Ch'op'an. Kyŏnggi-do Koyang-si: In'gan Sarang.

———. 2010. *Han'guk Sŏn'gŏ Chŏngch'i Ŭi Pyŏnhwa Wa Chisok: Inyŏm, Isyu, K'aemp'ein Kwa T'up'yo Ch'amyŏ*. Nanam Sinsŏ 1443. Kyŏnggi-do P'aju-si: Nanam.

Kang Beomil, Song Min, and Jho Whasun. 2013. "A Study on Opinion Mining of Newspaper Texts Based on Topic Modeling." *Journal of the Korean Society for Library and Information Science* 47 (4): 315–34. doi:10.4275/KSLIS.2013.47.4.315.

Kartman, Charles, Robert Carlin, and Joel Wit. 2012. "A History of KEDO 1994-2006." *Center for International Security and Cooperation Da Stanford University*. [https://fsi.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/A\\_History\\_of\\_KEDO-1.pdf](https://fsi.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/A_History_of_KEDO-1.pdf).

Katzenstein, Peter J. 2001. "Area and Regional Studies in the United States." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34 (4): 789–91.

Kellner, Douglas. 2007. "Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the 'War on Terror.'" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37 (4): 622–45. doi:10.1111/j.1741-5705.2007.02617.x.

Kim, B. K. 2001. "Step-by-Step Nuclear Confidence Building On The Korean Peninsula: Where Do We Start?" *Institute for Science and International Security*, 73–86.

Kim, Byung-ro, Eun-mee Chung, Yong-suk Jang, Yong-hun Song, Won-taek Kang, and Byung-jo Kim. 2014. *2014 T'ongil Ŭisik Chosa Palp'yo*. K'olia Yŏnku Wŏn.

Kim, Dong-choon. 2010. "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea: Uncovering the Hidden Korean War." *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 9–5.

Kim, Hak-Ju, and Jennifer Prah Ruger. 2008. "Pharmaceutical Reform In South Korea And The Lessons It Provides." *Health Affairs* 27 (4): w260–69. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.27.4.w260.

Kim, Hong Nack. 2008. "The Lee Myung-Bak Government" S North Korea Policy And the Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations." *International Journal of Korean Studies* 12 (1). <http://www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2008-FALL-WINTER/chapter1.pdf>.

Kim, Hyung-joon, and Do-chong Kim. 2000. "Nampuk Kwankye Wa Kuknae Chŏngch'i Ŭi Kaltŭng Kucho." *Kukche Chŏngch'i Nonch'ong* 40 (4): 311–30.

Kim, Jason, and Luke Herman. 2012. "War and Peace in the East Sea: Reducing Tension Along the Northern Limit Line." *Issues & Insights*, Pacific Forum CSIS, 12 (13).

Kim, Jin-sok. 2010. "Pokchi Tamlon E Taehayŏ." *Hwanghae Munhwa*, December, 279–

Kim, Jong-in. 2014. "The 'Following-North' Frame in Ideological Conflicts, and Crisis of Democracy." *Yŏksa Wa Hyŏnshil*, no. 93: 209–233.

Kim, Jongtae. 2011. "The Discourse of Sŏnjin'guk: South Korea's Eurocentric Modern Identities and Worldviews." University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. <http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/24209>.

Kim, Jung Hoon. 2013. "The 18th Presidential Election and the Reconfiguration of the Progressive in South Korea: Beyond Catastrophic Equilibrium." *Kyŏngche Wa Sahoe*, March, 121–54.

Kim, Kyo Seong, and Seong Wook Kim. 2012. "Quantitative Welfare Expansion and Systemic Retrenchment: An Evaluation of Welfare Policy in the MB Administration." *Sahoe Pokchi Chŏngch'aek* 39 (3): 117–149.

Kim, Man-gwon. 2013. *Chŏngch'i Ka Ttŏnan Chari: Chayu Roun Simin Kerilladŭl I Mandŭnŭn Ch'amyŏ Minjuju'i P'ŭrojekt'ŭ*. Ch'op'an. Sŏul: Kŭrinbi.

Kim, Pil Ho. 2010. "The East Asian Welfare State Debate and Surrogate Social Policy: An Exploratory Study on Japan and South Korea." *Socio-Economic Review* 8 (3): 411–35. doi:10.1093/ser/mwq003.

Kim, Seung-Hwan. 2002. "Anti-Americanism in Korea." *Washington Quarterly* 26 (1): 109–122.

Kim, So-hee. 1998. "Pi Chŏnhyang Changkisu Yŏsŏt Myŏng Ch'ulso Hatŏn Nal." *Wŏlkan Mal*, 106–110.

Kim, Soon-yeong. 2011. "Social-Welfare Policy of Lee Myung-Bak Administration: A Retreat of Social-Welfare Policy?" *Hyŏntae Chŏngch'i Yŏnku* 4 (1): 127–152.

Kim, Sunhyuk. 2009. "Civic Engagement and Democracy in South Korea."

———. 2011. "Globalization and National Responses: The Case of Korea." *International Review of Public Administration* 16 (2): 165–79. doi:10.1080/12264431.2011.10805201.

Kim, Yeon-Myung. 2006. "Towards a Comprehensive Welfare State in South Korea: Institutional Features, New Socio-Economic and Political Pressures, and the Possibility of the Welfare State." <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/25195/1/ARCWorkingPaper14Yeon-MyungKIMJan2006.pdf>.

Kim, Yong-myong. 2010. *Tamnon Esŏ Silch'ŏn Ŭro: Han'gukchŏk Chŏngch'ihak Ŭi*

*Mosaek*. Ch'op'an. Naeil Ŭl Yŏnŭn Chisik. Chŏngch'i 26. Kyŏnggi-do P'aju-si: Han'guk Haksul Chŏngbo.

Kim, Young-Hwa. 2003. "Productive Welfare: Korea's Third Way?" *International Journal of Social Welfare* 12 (1): 61–67. doi:10.1111/1468-2397.00006.

Kim, Youngmi. 2011. *The Politics of Coalition in Korea: Between Institutions and Culture*. Taylor & Francis.

———. 2014. "The 2012 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in South Korea." *Electoral Studies* 34 (June): 326–30. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.08.013.

Koh, Won. 2012. "A Study on the Development of Welfare Issues as a Dominant Political Agenda in Korea." *Kyŏngche Wa Sahoe*, September, 12–38.

Kohli, Atul, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoerber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol. 1995. "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium." *World Politics* 48 (1): 1–49.

Kostova, Tatiana, and Kendall Roth. 2002. "Adoption of an Organizational Practice by Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations: Institutional and Relational Effects." *Academy of Management Journal* 45 (1): 215–33.

Kraft, Diane. 2006. "South Korea's National Security Law: A Tool of Oppression in an Insecure World." *Wis. Int'l LJ* 24: 627.

Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. "Reliability in Content Analysis." *Human Communication Research* 30 (3): 411–433.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Donald R. Kinder. 1990. "Altering the Foundations of Support for the President Through Priming." *The American Political Science Review* 84 (2): 497–512. doi:10.2307/1963531.

Ku, Yangmo. 2015. "Transitory or Lingering Impact? The Legacies of the Cheonan Incident in Northeast Asia." *Asian Perspective* 39 (2): 253–76. doi:10.5555/0258-9184-39.2.253.

Kwon, Huck-ju. 2005. "Transforming the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia." *Development and Change* 36 (3): 477–497. doi:10.1111/j.0012-155X.2005.00420.x.

———. 2009. "The Reform of the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia." *International Journal of Social Welfare* 18: S12–S21. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2397.2009.00655.x.

———. 2014. “Transition to the ‘universal Welfare State’: The Changing Meaning of ‘welfare State’ in Korea.” In *Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives*, edited by Daniel Beland and Klaus Peterson. Policy Press.

Kwon, Hyeok Yong. 2008. “A Dynamic Analysis of Partisan Voting: The Issue Salience Effect of Unemployment in South Korea.” *Electoral Studies* 27 (3): 518–32. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.01.006.

Kwon, Soonman, and Ian Holliday. 2007. “The Korean Welfare State: A Paradox of Expansion in an Era of Globalisation and Economic Crisis.” *International Journal of Social Welfare* 16 (3): 242–48. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2397.2006.00457.x.

Lambert, Richard D. 1990. “Blurring the Disciplinary Boundaries Area Studies in the United States.” *American Behavioral Scientist* 33 (6): 712–32. doi:10.1177/0002764290033006006.

Lane, Ruth. 2016. “Sartori’s Challenge Political Models From the Bottom Up.” *Comparative Political Studies*, April, 10414016639703. doi:10.1177/0010414016639703.

Langer, Maximo. 2005. “From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 707261. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=707261>.

Lazarsfeld, Paul Felix, and Morris Rosenberg. 1955. *The Language of Social Research: A Reader in the Methodology of Social Research*. Free Press.

Lee, Eun-Jeung, and Hannes B. Mosler, eds. 2014. *Lost or Found in Translation*.

Lee, Jenny J., and Dongbin Kim. 2009. “Brain Gain or Brain Circulation? U.S. Doctoral Recipients Returning to South Korea.” *Higher Education* 59 (5): 627–43. doi:10.1007/s10734-009-9270-5.

Lee, Jong-kon. 2014. “The Instability of Korean Political Parties: Cue-Givers and Cue-Chasing Politicians.” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 15 (1): 113–130. doi:10.1017/S1468109913000376.

Lee, Jung-Eun. 2012. “Micro-Dynamics of Protests: The Political and Cultural Conditions for Anti-U.S. Beef Protests in South Korea.” *Sociological Perspectives* 55 (3): 399–420. doi:10.1525/sop.2012.55.3.399.

Lee, Kee-Hyeung. 2006. “Situating the Multifaceted Roles of Discourse and the Politics of Discourse.” *Önlon Kwa Sahoe* 14 (3): 106–45.

- Lee, Sang Keun. 2008. "A Critical Review of the Predictions of North Korea's Collapse in the 1990s and the 2000s." *T'ongil Yŏnku* 12 (2): 93–133.
- Lee, Seung-Ook, Sook-Jin Kim, and Joel Wainwright. 2010. "Mad Cow Militancy: Neoliberal Hegemony and Social Resistance in South Korea." *Political Geography* 29 (7): 359–369.
- Lee, Wootae. 2012. "The Different Choices of South Korea: Seeds of Discord of South Korea and US Relations." *Pacific Focus* 27 (3): 443–65. doi:10.1111/j.1976-5118.2012.01091.x.
- Lee, Woo-young. 2003. "Ch'eche Suho Chŏk T'ongil Kwa Pan Ch'eche Chŏk T'ongil, Kŭ Tongil Kucho Lŭl Nŏmŏsŏ." *Tangtae Pip'yŏng*, March, 205–16.
- Lee, Yoon-Ho Alex. 2003. "Criminal Jurisdiction under the US-Korea Status of Forces Agreement: Problems to Proposals." *Journal of Transnational Law & Policy* 13 (1). [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1918500](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1918500).
- Levi, Margaret. 2000. "The Economic Turn in Comparative Politics." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6–7): 822–44. doi:10.1177/001041400003300606.
- Levi-Faur, David. 2005. "The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 598 (1): 12–32.
- Levitsky, Steven, and María Victoria Murillo. 2009. "Variation in Institutional Strength." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (1): 115–33. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756.
- Lowe, Will, and Kenneth Benoit. 2013. "Validating Estimates of Latent Traits from Textual Data Using Human Judgment as a Benchmark." *Political Analysis* 21 (3): 298–313. doi:10.1093/pan/mpt002.
- Lupu, Noam. 2013. "Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (1): 49–64. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00615.x.
- . 2015. "Party Polarization and Mass Partisanship: A Comparative Perspective." *Political Behavior* 37 (2): 331–56. doi:10.1007/s11109-014-9279-z.
- Mahoney, James. 2000. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology." *Theory and Society* 29 (4): 507–548.
- Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge University Press.

- Maor, Moshe. 2014. "Policy Bubbles: Policy Overreaction and Positive Feedback." *Governance* 27 (3): 469–87. doi:10.1111/gove.12048.
- Marsh, David, and Mark Evans. 2012. "Policy Transfer: Into the Future, Learning from the Past." *Policy Studies* 33 (6): 587–91. doi:10.1080/01442872.2012.736796.
- Martin, James. 2015. "Capturing Desire: Rhetorical Strategies and the Affectivity of Discourse." *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, Spring, n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/1467-856X.12065.
- Marttila, Tomas. 2015. "Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis: A Suggestion for a Research Program." *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 16 (3). <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/2282>.
- Mason, Edward Sagendorph. 1980. *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea*. Harvard Univ Asia Center.
- Mayer, William G. 1996. "In Defense of Negative Campaigning." *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (3): 437–55. doi:10.2307/2151970.
- McCallum, Andrew Kachites. 2002. "MALLETT: A Machine Learning for Language Toolkit."
- Meseguer, C. 2005. "Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 598 (1): 67–82. doi:10.1177/0002716204272372.
- Meseguer, Covadonga, and Fabrizio Gilardi. 2009. "What Is New in the Study of Policy Diffusion?" *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (3): 527–43. doi:10.1080/09692290802409236.
- Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State." *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1): 144–81.
- Mikhaylov, S., M. Laver, and K. R. Benoit. 2012. "Coder Reliability and Misclassification in the Human Coding of Party Manifestos." *Political Analysis* 20 (1): 78–91. doi:10.1093/pan/mpr047.
- Mohr, John W., and Petko Bogdanov. 2013. "Introduction—Topic Models: What They Are and Why They Matter." *Poetics, Topic Models and the Cultural Sciences*, 41 (6): 545–69. doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2013.10.001.
- Mohr, John W., Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Ronald L. Breiger, and Petko Bogdanov. 2013. "Graphing the Grammar of Motives in National Security Strategies: Cultural Interpretation,

Automated Text Analysis and the Drama of Global Politics.” *Poetics, Topic Models and the Cultural Sciences*, 41 (6): 670–700. doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2013.08.003.

Moloney, Kevin. 2001. “The Rise and Fall of Spin: Changes of Fashion in the Presentation of UK Politics.” *Journal of Public Affairs* 1 (2): 124–35. doi:10.1002/pa.58.

Monroe, Burt L., Michael P. Colaresi, and Kevin M. Quinn. 2008. “Fightin’ Words: Lexical Feature Selection and Evaluation for Identifying the Content of Political Conflict.” *Political Analysis* 16 (4): 372–403. doi:10.1093/pan/mpn018.

Morlino, Leonardo, Björn Dressel, and Riccardo Pelizzo. 2011. “The Quality of Democracy in Asia-Pacific: Issues and Findings.” *International Political Science Review* 32 (5): 491–511.

Moskowitz, Karl. 1982. “Korean Development and Korean Studies—A Review Article.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 42 (1): 63–90. doi:10.2307/2055367.

Mosler, Hannes B. 2015. “Die Politischen Parteien Südkoreas.” In *Länderbericht Korea*, edited by Eun-Jeung Lee and Hannes B. Mosler. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. <http://www.bpb.de/shop/buecher/schriftenreihe/211316/laenderbericht-korea?rl=0.5196858823765069>.

Mukhtarov, Farhad, Andrea Brock, Sanne Janssen, and Armelle Guignier. 2013. “Actors and Strategies in Translating Global Conservation Narratives to Vietnam: An Agency Perspective.” *Policy and Society* 32 (2): 113–24. doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.05.006.

Munck, Gerardo L., and Richard Snyder. 2007. “Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics An Analysis of Leading Journals.” *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (1): 5–31. doi:10.1177/0010414006294815.

Mundy, Simon. 2015. “Park Geun-Hye Open to Summit with Kim Jong Un.” *Financial Times*, January 12. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/36411fc8-9a2f-11e4-9602-00144feabdc0.html#axzz48vUGQxRB>.

Neumann, Birgit, and Ansgar Nünning. 2012. *Travelling Concepts for the Study of Culture*. Walter de Gruyter.

Niksch, Larry A. 2005. “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program.” In . DTIC Document. <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA480434>.

Nonhoff, Martin. 2006. *Politischer Diskurs Und Hegemonie: Das Projekt“ Soziale Marktwirtschaft*.” transcript Verlag.

North, Douglass C. 1990a. “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.” *Journal of Theoretical*

*Politics* 2 (4): 355–367.

———. 1990b. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge university press.

Pak, Chan-uk, and Won-Taek Kang, eds. 2013. *2012-Yŏn Taet'ongnyŏng Sŏn'gŏ Punsŏk =: Analyzing the 2012 Presidential Election in South Korea*. Sŏul Taehakkyo Han'guk Chŏngch'i Yŏn'guso Han'guk Chŏngch'i Yŏn'gu Ch'ongsŏ 9. Kyŏnggi-do P'aju-si: Nanam.

Pak, Myong-gyu. 2009. *Kungmin, Inmin, Simin: Kaenyŏmsa Ro Pon Han'guk Ŭi Chŏngch'i Chuch'e*. Ch'op'an. Han'guk Kaenyŏmsa Ch'ongsŏ 4. Sŏul: Sohwa.

Park, Byung-ok. 2007. “Simin Tanch'e Ŭi Sinloeto Cheko Lŭl Wihan Pangan Mosaek.” KDI-KISDI Joint Seminar. KDI.

Park, Jung-Sun, and Paul Y. Chang. 2005. “Contention in the Construction of a Global Korean Community: The Case of the Overseas Korean Act.” *The Journal of Korean Studies*, 1–27.

Park, Yong Soo. 2008. “Comparative Perspectives on the South Korean Welfare System.” *The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus* 6 (5). <http://apjif.org/-Yong-Soo-Park/2752/article.pdf>.

Park Chang Sup. 2015. “Korean Media Often Allied With Ruling Political Parties.” *Newspaper Research Journal*, June, 739532915587297. doi:10.1177/0739532915587297.

Park Eunjeong, and Cho Sungzoon. 2014. “KoNLPy: Korean Natural Language Processing in Python.” In *Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference on Human & Cognitive Language Technology*. <https://media.readthedocs.org/pdf/konlpy/v0.4.4/konlpy.pdf>.

Park Yun-hee. 2014. “A Comparative Analysis on the Passage of the Legislators' Bills in the 17th-18th National Assembly Standing Committee: A Focus on the Theory of Committee.” *Hankuk Chŏngch'i Yŏnku* 23 (2): 235–261.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study.” *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (3): 825–50. doi:10.2307/2111797.

Pettit, Philip. 2006. “Why and How Philosophy Matters.” *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, 35.

Pierson, Paul. 2000a. “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change.” *Governance* 13 (4): 475–499.



———. 2000b. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” *The American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 251–67. doi:10.2307/2586011.

Polletta, Francesca, and M. Kai Ho. 2006. “Frames and Their Consequences.” *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, 189–209.

Proksch, Sven-Oliver, Jonathan B. Slapin, and Michael F. Thies. 2011. “Party System Dynamics in Post-War Japan: A Quantitative Content Analysis of Electoral Pledges.” *Electoral Studies* 30 (1): 114–24. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.015.

“Pukhan Chǒngpo P’ot’öl: Nampuk Kwankye Chisik Kwanli Sangse Poki.” 2016. Accessed May 13. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=11&dicaryId=85&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=>.

Pye, Lucian. 2006. “The Behavioral Revolution and the Remaking of Comparative Politics.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, by Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly. OUP Oxford.

Pye, Lucian W. 2001. “Asia Studies and the Discipline.” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34 (4): 805–7.

Quinn, Kevin M., Burt L. Monroe, Michael Colaresi, Michael H. Crespin, and Dragomir R. Radev. 2010. “How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal Assumptions and Costs.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 209–28. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00427.x.

Ramage, Daniel, Evan Rosen, Jason Chuang, Christopher D. Manning, and Daniel A. McFarland. 2009. “Topic Modeling for the Social Sciences.” *NIPS 2009 Workshop on Applications for Topic Models: Text and Beyond* 5. <http://t3-1.yum2.net/index/nlp.stanford.edu/pubs/tmt-nips09.pdf>.

Rein, Conrad. 2015. “An East German Perspective on Korean Reunification.” *Strategic Analysis* 0 (0): 1–6. doi:10.1080/09700161.2015.1069981.

Rein, Martin, and Donald Schon. 1993. “Reframing Policy Discourse.” In *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester. Duke University Press.

Rhee, June-woong. 2004a. “The Impacts of the Mass Media and the Interpretive Frames on Individuals’ Opinions about the Engagement Policy.” *Hankuk Ŏnlon Hakpo* 48 (1): 28–56.

———. 2004b. “A Study on the ‘Principle-Policy Puzzle’ in the Public Opinion of the

‘Engagement Policy.’” *Hankuk Ŏnlon Chŏngpo Hakpo*, August, 291–326.

Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, and Dustin Tingley. 2014. “Stm: R Package for Structural Topic Models.” *R Package Version 0.6 1*. <ftp://200.236.31.8/CRAN/web/packages/stm/vignettes/stmVignette.pdf>.

Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, Dustin Tingley, Edoardo M. Airoidi, and others. 2013. “The Structural Topic Model and Applied Social Science.” *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems Workshop on Topic Models: Computation, Application, and Evaluation*. <http://mimno.infosci.cornell.edu/nips2013ws/slides/stm.pdf>.

Robertson, David Brian. 1991. “Political Conflict and Lesson-Drawing.” *Journal of Public Policy* 11 (1): 55–78.

Rose, Richard. 1993. *Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning across Time and Space*. Cambridge Univ Press.

Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber. 2005. “The Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Globalizing World.” *Perspectives on Politics* null (1): 5–14. doi:10.1017/S1537592705050024.

Ryu, Jaesung. 2013. “Direction, Strength, and Level of Political Ideology.” *Hankuk Chŏngtang Hakhoe Po* 12 (1): 61–86.

Ryu, Ungchae. 2010. “Tamlon Punsŏk Kwa Chŏngch’i Kyŏngchekhak Ŭi Chou Kanŏngsŏng E Taehan T’amsaekchŏk Yŏnku.” *Ŏnlon Kwa Sahoe* 18 (4): 37–73.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.” *The American Political Science Review* 64 (4): 1033–53. doi:10.2307/1958356.

———. 1991. “Comparing and Miscomparing.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3 (3): 243–57. doi:10.1177/0951692891003003001.

Schaffer, Frederic. 2005. “Why Don’t Political Scientists Coin More New Terms?”

Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2000. *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture*. The Wilder House Series in Politics, History and Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. 2014. “Thin Descriptions: The Limits of Survey Research on the Meaning of Democracy.” *Polity* 46 (3): 303–30. doi:10.1057/pol.2014.14.

Scheufele, Dietram A., and David Tewksbury. 2007. “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models.” *Journal of Communication* 57

(1): 9–20.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 303–26. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342.

———. 2010. “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘new Institutionalism.’” *European Political Science Review* 2 (1): 1–25. doi:10.1017/S175577390999021X.

———. 2011. “Speaking of Change: Why Discourse Is Key to the Dynamics of Policy Transformation.” *Critical Policy Studies* 5 (2): 106–26. doi:10.1080/19460171.2011.576520.

———. 2014. “Speaking to the Markets or to the People? A Discursive Institutional Analysis of the EU’s Sovereign Debt Crisis.” *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 16 (1): 188–209. doi:10.1111/1467-856X.12023.

———. 2016. “The Roots of Neo-Liberal Resilience: Explaining Continuity and Change in Background Ideas in Europe’s Political Economy.” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 18 (2): 318–34. doi:10.1177/1369148115612792.

Schmidt, Vivien A, and Claudio M Radaelli. 2004. “Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues.” *West European Politics* 27 (2): 183–210. doi:10.1080/0140238042000214874.

Schneiberg, Marc, and Elisabeth S. Clemens. 2006. “The Typical Tools for the Job: Research Strategies in Institutional Analysis\*.” *Sociological Theory* 24 (3): 195–227. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9558.2006.00288.x.

Schon, D., and Martin Rein. 1994. *Frame Reflection: Resolving Intractable Policy Issues*. New York: Basic Books.

Scott, W. Richard. 1994. “Institutions and Organizations: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis.” *Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism*, 55–80.

Seon, U-hyeon. 2014. “Anticommunism and Its Enemies - in the Korean Society Today.” *Sahoe Wa Ch’ölhak*, no. 28: 47–60.

Shin. 2014. “Lessons from German Reunification for Inter-Korean Relations: An Analysis of South Korean Public Spheres, 1990-2010.” *Asian Perspective* 38 (1): 61–88.

Shin, Chang-sik, and Ian Shaw. 2003. “Social Policy in South Korea: Cultural and

Structural Factors in the Emergence of Welfare.” *Social Policy & Administration* 37 (4): 328–41. doi:10.1111/1467-9515.00343.

Shin, Gi-Wook. 2013. “March First Movement of 1919 (Korea).” *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm336/full>.

Shin, Jinwook. 2011. “Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical-Emancipatory Science.” *Kyöngche Wa Sahoe*, 10–45.

Shin, Jinwook, and Young Min Kim. 2009. “The Structure and Techniques of Market Populist Discourse.” *Kyöngche Wa Sahoe*, 273–299.

Shin, Kwang-yeong. 2012. “The Welfare Politics and Welfare Discourse in Contemporary Korea.” *Kyöngche Wa Sahoe*, 39–66.

Shin, Kwang-Yeong, and Sang-Jin Han. 2015. “Internationalization of Social Science in South Korea: The Current Status and Challenges.” In *Internationalization of the Social Sciences: Asia - Latin America - Middle East - Africa - Eurasia*, edited by Michael Kuhn and Doris Weidemann. transcript Verlag.

Shin, Wooyeol. 2016. “Conservative Journalists’ Myth Making in South Korea: Use of the Past in News Coverage of the 2008 Korean Candlelight Vigil.” *Asian Studies Review* 0 (0): 1–17. doi:10.1080/10357823.2015.1126221.

Shin Jinwook. 2008. “Posu Tanch’e Iteolloki Ŭi Kaenyȫm Kucho, 2000-2006.” *Kyöngche Wa Sahoe*, 163–193.

Sides, John. 2006. “The Origins of Campaign Agendas.” *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (3): 407–36. doi:10.1017/S0007123406000226.

———. 2007. “The Consequences of Campaign Agendas.” *American Politics Research* 35 (4): 465–488.

Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2006. “Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism.” *International Organization* 60 (4). doi:10.1017/S0020818306060267.

Simmons, Beth, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2007. “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning?” *Annual Review of Sociology* 33: 449–72.

Sjoberg, Laura. 2015. “What’s Lost in Translation? Neopositivism and Critical Research Interests.” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 43 (3): 1007–10.

doi:10.1177/0305829815581632.

Skaperdas, Stergios, and Bernard Grofman. 1995. "Modeling Negative Campaigning." *American Political Science Review* 89 (1): 49–61.

Slapin, Jonathan B., and Sven-Oliver Proksch. 2008. "A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (3): 705–722. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00338.x.

Snyder, Scott, and Byun See-Won. 2011. "Cheonan and Yeonpyeong." *The RUSI Journal* 156 (2): 74–81. doi:10.1080/03071847.2011.576477.

Sohn, Yul, and Won-Taek Kang. 2013. "South Korea in 2012: An Election Year under Rebalancing Challenges." *Asian Survey* 53 (1): 198–205.

Son, Ho-chol. 1999. *Sin chayu chuŭi sitae ŭi hankuk chŏngch'i*. Sŏul-si: P'ulŭn Sup'.

———. 2004. *Pin Sure Ŭi Kaehyŏk Ŭl Nŏmŏsŏ: Son Ho-Ch'ŏl Kyosu Ŭi No Mu-Hyŏn 1-Ki Chugan Bŭrip'ing*. Sŏul-si: Imaejin.

Son, Hwa-Jeong. 2011. "Ch'amyo Chŏngpu Ŭi Kukka Poan Pŏp Chŏngch'aek Pyŏntong Silp'ae Salye Punsŏk." *Hankuk Haengchŏng Hakpo* 45 (3): 25–50.

Song, Ho-gun, ed. 2014. *Chwa, Up'a Esŏ Posu Wa Chinbo Ro: Posu, Chinbo Ŭi Kaenyŏm Kwa Yŏksajŏk Chŏn'gae*. Ch'op'an. Ilsong Haksul Ch'ongsŏ 5. Sŏul-si: P'urŭn Yŏksa.

Steinberg, David I. 1982. "Development Lessons from the Korean Experience--A Review Article." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 42 (1): 91–104. doi:10.2307/2055368.

Stockton, Hans. 2001. "Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in East Asia Lessons from Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (1): 94–119.

Stone, Diane. 2012. "Transfer and Translation of Policy." *Policy Studies* 33 (6): 483–99. doi:10.1080/01442872.2012.695933.

Streeck, Wolfgang. 2009. "Institutions in History: Bringing Capitalism Back in." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1852543. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1852543>.

Suddaby, Roy, and Royston Greenwood. 2005. "Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 50 (1): 35–67. doi:10.2189/asqu.2005.50.1.35.

Szanton, David L. 2004. *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*. University of California Press.

- Teti, Andrea. 2007. "Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area Studies Controversy." *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (1): 117–45. doi:10.1177/1354066107074291.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1): 369–404.
- Thornton, Patricia H., and William Ocasio. 2008. "Institutional Logics." *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* 840.
- Tilly, Charles, and Robert E. Goodin. 2006. "It Depends." *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, 3–32.
- Toepfl, Florian. 2016. "Beyond the Four Theories: Toward a Discourse Approach to the Comparative Study of Media and Politics." *International Journal of Communication* 10: 1530–1547.
- Van der Brug, Wouter. 2004. "Issue Ownership and Party Choice." *Electoral Studies* 23 (2): 209–233.
- Wagner, Markus, and Thomas M. Meyer. 2014. "Which Issues Do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems." *West European Politics* 37 (5): 1019–45. doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.911483.
- Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere, and Michiel Nuytemans. 2009. "Issue Ownership Stability and Change: How Political Parties Claim and Maintain Issues Through Media Appearances." *Political Communication* 26 (2): 153–72. doi:10.1080/10584600902850718.
- Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; Or, Why Legislatures, like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *The Journal of Political Economy*, 132–63.
- Wesley-Smith, Terence, and Jon D. Goss. 2010. *Remaking Area Studies: Teaching and Learning across Asia and the Pacific*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Westney, D. Eleanor. 1987. *Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan*. Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA.
- Weyland, Kurt. 2002. "Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (1): 57–85. doi:10.1007/BF02686338.
- . 2008. "Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change." *World Politics* 60 (2): 281–314.

- Weyland, Kurt Gerhard. 2005. "Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform." *World Politics* 57 (2): 262–295.
- Wilkerson, John. 2015. "Textual Analysis of Government Data: An Introduction." In *Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research*, 344–344. Dg.o '15. New York, NY, USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/2757401.2757439.
- Won-Yong Kim, and Dong-Hoon Lee. 2004. "A Study on the Relation Between News Frame Building in Newspapers and News-Producing Process." *Korean Journal of Journalism & Communication Studies* 48 (4): 351–80.
- Yi, Kab-yun, ed. 2014. *Han'guk Ŭi Chŏngch'i Kyunyŏl Kujo: Chiyŏk, Kyech'ŭng, Sedae Mit Inyŏm = Political Cleavages in Korea: Region, Class, Generation and Ideology*. Sŏul T'ŭkpyŏlsi: Tosŏ Ch'ulp'an Orŭm.
- Yi, Yong-hun. 2000. *P'abŏl Ro Ponŭn Han'guk Yadangsa*. Ch'op'an. Sŏul-si: Edit'ŏ.
- Yoon, Jiso. 2013. "Who Receives Media Attention in South Korea: Analysing Internal and External Pluralism in the News Coverage of Policy Debates." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 21 (2): 126–47. doi:10.1080/02185377.2013.823798.
- Zakharova, Maria, and Paul V. Warwick. 2014. "The Sources of Valence Judgments The Role of Policy Distance and the Structure of the Left–Right Spectrum." *Comparative Political Studies*, January, 10414013516928. doi:10.1177/0010414013516928.
- Zhang, Xiaoke, and Richard Whitley. 2013. "Changing Macro-Structural Varieties of East Asian Capitalism." *Socio-Economic Review* 11 (2): 301–36.
- Zittoun, Philippe. 2009. "Understanding Policy Change as a Discursive Problem." *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 11 (1): 65–82. doi:10.1080/13876980802648235.
- Zoon, Hong Kyung, and Ho Keun Song. 2006. "Continuity and Change in the Korean Welfare Regime." *Journal of Social Policy* 35 (2): 247–65. doi:10.1017/S0047279405009517.
- Zucker, Lynne G. 1987. "Institutional Theories of Organization." *Annual Review of Sociology* 13: 443–64.