Memories of Violence, Dreams of Development

—

Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes

Dissertation zur Erlangung des Dr. Phil. in Politikwissenschaft

Eingereicht von
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an der
Freien Universität Berlin
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2015
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Acknowledgments

Many thanks to: the members of ANFASEP and the communities of Santiago de Lucanamarca and Putacca for their hospitality, for answering my many questions and for sharing their histories, knowledge and perceptions with me – without them this work would never have been possible; the staff of COMISEDH and Asociación Paz y Esperanza for sharing their information and self-critically looking into their project work with me; Prof. Dr. Sven Chojnacki of the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science at the Freie Universität Berlin, and Prof. Dr. Dr. Hans-J. Giessmann, Director of the Berghof Foundation, Berlin, for supervising this work and giving me many insights into my work’s topic; Mr. Jefrey Gamarra from the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga for his knowledge and remarks during my fieldwork in Ayacucho; the Berghof Foundation for financing my research with the Georg Zundel Grant; the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for financing my fieldwork in 2011; Gloria Huamaní Palomino, Noel Yauri Gálvez and Ana María Ascarza Mendoza who accompanied my fieldwork as research assistants, translated from Quechua to Spanish and vice-versa during interviews and transcribed the interviews in Quechua into Spanish; Maren Sass for her tireless work and helpful comments in proofreading the final version of this study; the Ponce de León and Villavicencio Pimentel families for providing me with food and shelter during my time in Ayacucho; my wife Liliana Villavicencio Pimentel whom I adore for always supporting me during the six years of research and writing and for calmly bearing my sudden changes of mood during this long time.
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<td>ANFASEP</td>
<td>Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú / National Association of Relatives of the Abducted, Detained and Disappeared of Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>APCI</td>
<td>Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional / Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>APRA</td>
<td>Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana / Revolutionary American People’s Alliance</td>
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<td>APRODEH</td>
<td>Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos / Association Pro Human Rights</td>
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<td>CAD</td>
<td>Comités de Autodefensa / Self-Defence Committees</td>
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<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social / Episcopal Commission for Social Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEH</td>
<td>Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico / Commission for Historical Clarification</td>
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<td>CMAN</td>
<td>Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel para el Seguimiento de las Acciones y Políticas del Estado en los Ámbitos de la Paz, la Reparación Colectiva y la Reconciliación Nacional / Multi-Sectoral High Commission for the Implementation of the Actions and Politics of the State in the Areas of Peace, Collective Reparation and National Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNMH</td>
<td>Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica / National Center for Historical Memory</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDDHH</td>
<td>Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos / National Coordinator for Human Rights</td>
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<td>CNRR</td>
<td>Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación / National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>COMISEDH</td>
<td>Comisión de Derechos Humanos / Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>CONADEP</td>
<td>Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas / National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons</td>
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<td>CONEP</td>
<td>Concilio Nacional Evangélico del Perú / National Evangelical Council of Peru</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Consejo de Reparaciones / Reparations Council</td>
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<td>CVR</td>
<td>Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación / Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>DED</td>
<td>Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst / German Development Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia</td>
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<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<td>EED</td>
<td>Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst / Evangelical Development Service</td>
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<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional / National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>EPAF</td>
<td>Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense / Peruvian Team of Forensic Anthropology</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEDEFAM</td>
<td>Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos / Latin American Federation of Associations for Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONCODES</td>
<td>Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social / Social Development Cooperation Fund</td>
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<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independiente / Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Court of Human Rights</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>Inter-American Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICMEMO</td>
<td>International Committee of Memorial Museums for the Remembrance of Public Crimes</td>
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<td>ICOM</td>
<td>International Council of Museums</td>
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<td>ICOMOS</td>
<td>International Council on Monuments and Sites</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICTJ</td>
<td>International Center for Transitional Justice</td>
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<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDS</td>
<td>Instituto de Diálogo y Propuestas / Institute for Dialogue and Proposals</td>
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<td>IEM</td>
<td>Instituto Espacio para la Memoria / Space for Memory Institute</td>
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<td>IEP</td>
<td>Instituto de Estudios Peruanos / Institute for Peruvian Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEI</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática / National Institute of Statistics and Informatics</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>InWEnt</td>
<td>Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung / Capacity Building International</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTI</td>
<td>Lingua Tertii Imperii / Language of the Third Reich</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC PQNSR</td>
<td>Movimiento Ciudadano Para Que No Se Repita / Citizens’ Movement That It Shall Not Happen Again</td>
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<td>MIMDES</td>
<td>Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social / Ministry for Women and Social Development</td>
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<td>MIR</td>
<td>Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria / Movement of the Revolutionary Left</td>
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<td>MLAL</td>
<td>Movimiento Laici America Latina / Latin America Lay Movement</td>
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<td>MMM</td>
<td>Memory, Memorials and Museums Program</td>
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<td>MOVADDEF</td>
<td>Movimiento por la Amnistía y los Derechos Fundamentales / Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRTA</td>
<td>Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru / Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Programa al Repoblamiento / Refugee Return Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Partido Comunista del Perú / Communist Party of Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCP-SL</td>
<td>Partido Comunista del Perú – por el Sendero Luminoso de José Carlos Mariátegui / Communist Party of Peru – along the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Plan Integral de Reparaciones / Comprehensive Reparations Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRONAA</td>
<td>Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria / National Food Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>PRONAMACHS</td>
<td>Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuencas Hidrográficas y Conservación de Suelos / National Programme for River Basin Management and Soil Conservation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<td>PUCP</td>
<td>Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú / Pontifical Catholic University of Peru</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUV</td>
<td>Registro Único de Víctimas / Victims’ Registry</td>
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<tr>
<td>SER</td>
<td>Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales / Association for Rural Education Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIE</td>
<td>Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército / Army Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>SIN</td>
<td>Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional / National Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SINAMOS</td>
<td>Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social / National Support System for Social Mobilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUTE</td>
<td>Sindicato Único de Trabajadores en la Educación / Teacher’s Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFV</td>
<td>Trust Fund for Victims</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMSM</td>
<td>Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos / National University of San Marcos</td>
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<td>UNSCH</td>
<td>Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga / San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University</td>
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<tr>
<td>USHMM</td>
<td>United States Holocaust Memorial Museum</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZFD</td>
<td>Ziviler Friedensdienst / Civil Peace Service</td>
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1 Introduction

It was a bright and sunny Saturday morning in June 2007 when I first visited Putacca, a small village in Peru’s Ayacucho region, notorious as the region most affected by the civil war that had tormented the country in the 1980s and early 1990s. I had travelled to Ayacucho upon invitation by two German development advisers I had previously met at a workshop in Lima. They both worked in Ayacucho’s capital Huamanga with ANFASEP (Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú), Peru’s oldest victims’ association, comprising mostly Quechua-speaking women whose family members had been disappeared during the conflict at the hands of the military. Despite the highly volatile context, ANFASEP had fought for truth, justice and reparations since the early 1980s, constantly under threat by the state’s security forces, who accused them of helping the ‘terrorists’, while at the same time resisting the Shining Path guerrillas, who pressurised and infiltrated social organisations. In 2005, ANFASEP inaugurated their own memorial museum in the upper floor of their association’s house displaying clothing, personal objects and photos of those who had disappeared. The activism of these humble, elderly women, who spoke Quechua much better than Spanish and were often illiterate, impressed me. Still, while wandering through the small exhibition I felt reminded of forms of representation that appeared all too familiar to me, the scion of a German upper middle class family always interested in history.

On this particular Saturday, we wanted to visit another memorial museum my friends had been told about. There were six of us altogether, the two development workers and me, along with three members of ANFASEP’s youth organisation. After driving for two hours in the German development cooperation’s pickup truck, first along the paved road towards Lima, and then along dust roads, stopping several times along the way to ask locals for the direction in exchange for taking them a way in the back of the truck, we finally arrived in Putacca at about 11 in the morning. Putacca was indeed tiny, with only few crooked mud brick houses assembled around a ridiculously oversized square lined by two or three side streets. Rubbish was lying on the dusty roads and some cows and sheep were grazing on the square. The village seemed to be empty with hardly a person in sight, but the entrance to the museum was clearly marked with a colourfully painted façade. As we entered through a gate into a small yard where we suspected the entrance to the building, we encountered about thirty people gathering in the yard, most of them women traditionally dressed in their best garments. Our arrival was greeted cheerfully and we were invited to take a seat with them. The few men present led the meeting and it soon turned out that it was the monthly assembly of the local
victims’ association. We were officially welcomed by the president of the association and the development advisers and ANFASEP members responded by stating the purpose of our visit and our gratitude for the warm welcome. I stood aside watching the scene while one of the ANFASEP members translated to me what was being said in Quechua. As the assembly proceeded, we entered the community’s small memorial museum, guided by one of the campesinos who had attended the meeting in the yard. The small museum, consisting of only one room, displayed traditional clothing, pottery and agricultural tools – the memory of how the community used to live, as was explained to us. Four paintings showed the community life before, during and after the conflict. Several half-burned objects and photos bore witness to the violence. Slogans written across the walls in Quechua and Spanish reminded people to remember the past and traditions so as to create a common sense of identity, provide good mental health and work jointly towards progress in the community. Finally, we were invited to sign the museum’s guest book, being the first visitors in nearly a year since the inauguration.

I left the museum somewhat puzzled. The neatly arranged museum space with its exhibits, colourful paintings and encouraging slogans seemed so alien in this setting, to these apparently humble Quechua-speaking peasants with their traditional clothing, their hands and faces marked by a life of hard work on the fields. In the face of this community’s evident poverty, the memorial museum appeared so out of place! Whose idea had it been to bring a museum to this community? What was its aim? Why did the locals accept it and how did they use the museum? Did the museum really serve the community, as the slogans in the exhibition suggested, or was it rather made to please the eyes of foreign visitors such as us? These were some of the questions that struck me on the way back to the city of Ayacucho that day. As it turned out, I would make the same trip to Putacca back and forth a few dozen times more over the next five years.

### 1.1 Research Outline

Since at least the late 1990s, there has been a broad consensus in the global community that after gross violations of human rights and political violence, that is, in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian setting, there is a need to address the past in one way or another. Perpetrators must be held accountable in domestic trials or in international or hybrid tribunals in order to restore faith in the state’s institutions. The full truth about past evils must be disclosed to the public, to acknowledge victims and integrate their stories into the national narrative. Truth (and reconciliation) commissions have been the preferred means to this end and are believed
to not only have a positive effect on those bereaved, but to also help re-construct societies or communities by creating a new shared narrative of the past or at least a more tolerant view towards the beliefs of others. Reparations for victims of human rights violations – be they material or symbolic – are meant to ‘repair the irreparable’, dignify victims and restore their trust in society, while institutional reforms ensure that the past does not repeat itself. The idea is that, taken together, justice, truth, reparation and reform, and, to a certain degree, vetting and amnesty, will lead to something like the healing or reconciliation of individuals and societies, to sustainable peace, and even to social and economic progress. These interconnected concepts, mechanisms and goals form the basis of what is now routinely referred to as ‘transitional justice’: the principle that shall guide societies in transition from armed conflict or authoritarian rule to re-construct their social fabric and re-integrate into the family of civilised, democratic and free states (Kritz 1995; Minow 1998; Rotberg & Thompson 2000; Teitel 2000; Biggar 2001; Bloomfield et al. 2003; Borer 2006a; Roht-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena 2006; Hayner 2011). Thus, transitional justice has evolved into one of the leading concepts of international relations (Bell 2006).

In terms of this transitional justice paradigm, Peru has been an assiduous pupil: While its transition to democracy after the sudden breakdown of Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian regime in 2000 was among the latest in Latin America, its record of transitional justice is a particularly strong one. Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación – CVR) operated between 2001 and 2003, gathered around 17,000 testimonies and held public hearings in several regions on various topics. It investigated 73 cases of human rights violations in detail and passed its results on to state authorities for prosecution. In its massive nine-volume report, the commission not only re-traces the country’s course since its first democratic transition in 1980 and the downfall of the Fujimori regime in 2000 – a period marked by the violent insurgency of the Maoist Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru – MRTA), the state’s brutal counter-insurgency strategy, and the country’s final decline into authoritarian rule and endemic corruption – it also distributes blame far beyond the actors directly responsible for the massive human rights violations during these two decades, carving out historical and structural causes of the conflict, and, making the ignorance and subliminal racism that characterised Peruvian society at least indirectly responsible for the 69,280 fatal victims of the civil war. Further, it made far-reaching recommendations for individual and collective, material and symbolic reparations, institutional reforms and the exhumation of the roughly 4,600 clandestine burial sites it had registered. Not surprisingly, Priscilla Hayner
(2011) lists Peru’s Truth Commission among the five strongest of its kind and Juan E. Méndez (2006, p.138) praises it as the “new paradigm in truth commissions”.

In the aftermath of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission memorialisation initiatives, such as commemorations, exhibitions, the construction of museums and monuments for victims of the civil war or the preservation of sites associated with atrocities, has become a field of intense activity. One of the reasons for this activity had been the truth commission itself. It had recommended symbolic reparations such as the creation of ‘places of memory’ in order to acknowledge and dignify victims, offer opportunities to heal, educate towards a more tolerant and democratic society, and symbolically frame the liminal process of political (and social) transition and reconciliation (CVR 2003g, pp.115–121). It was also the commission that had created the photo exhibition Yuyanapaq (Quechua for “to remember”) to visually accompany the publication of its report in Lima in August 2003. Since then, Peru’s ‘memoryscape’ has become intensely dotted with permanent and travelling exhibitions, memorial museums and monuments to the victims of its deadly conflict, from the upper middle-class neighbourhoods of Lima to the most remote indigenous communities in the highlands of Ayacucho, the region most affected by the violence.

Indeed, the recommendation to create memorials as symbolic reparations and the plethora of memorialisation activities that followed in Peru were nothing new for a transitional justice context. From the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in Chile (1990-1991), to the South African exemplar (1995-2002) to some of the most recent examples of truth commissions in Liberia (2006-2009) or Ecuador (2008-2010), the preservation or construction of places of memory such as monuments, museums, plaques or public parks, is a common feature in truth commissions’ recommendations for symbolic reparations. On a global level, symbolic reparations, including memorialisation activities, have been mainstreamed into UN documents on the rights of victims of gross violations of human rights to remedy and reparation since the 1990s (van Boven 1993; Joinet 1997; Bassiouni 2000; Orentlicher 2005), culminating in the adoption of the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005.

As symbolic reparations, places of memory at the localities where atrocities were committed, museums, monuments and the commemorative activities surrounding them, are considered to have a high importance for all the concepts revolving around transitional justice, whether it be topics of justice, truth and acknowledgement or the healing and reconciliation of individuals and entire societies, even non-recurrence, peace and democracy. By preserving evidence,
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visualising and informing about the past or even contributing new research, places of memory constantly lobby for justice to be served. They also represent the truth about the past, granting victims and survivors public acknowledgement, which in turn may help assist their recovery from trauma while giving them a place to mourn the loss of their loved ones. Memorials and museums can give marginalised victim populations a place to voice their opinion, thereby empower them, improve their skills and provide a source of income. For societies as a whole, they may present a new joint narrative of the past that helps re-build the nation’s damaged social fabric. Where no single narrative of the past can be developed, places of memory may function as a space where the past can be discussed openly and democratically between different social agents to provide more tolerant views towards others’ opinions. Places of memory as forums for debate about the past are considered crucial, especially at the level of local communities, where victims and perpetrators live side-by-side. Be it locally or nationally, the past represented in a museum or memorial is seen as a tool of education towards a peaceful society in which the past cannot repeat itself in the future (Hamber & Wilson 2003; Naidu 2004; Hamber 2006; Naidu 2006; Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; ICTJ Colombia 2009; Impunity Watch 2011).

These are some lofty goals, indeed. The concept of transitional justice as a whole has already been harshly criticised for being a tangle of generalised but unproven assumptions on dealing with past atrocities to achieve peace and prosperity (Mendeloff 2004; Thoms et al. 2008; Weinstein et al. 2010). While earlier debates assumed a decision had to be made between truth and justice, and that justice may have a negative impact on peace, the understanding of transitional justice today is one of a ‘holistic approach’ that presumes that truth, justice, reparation, reform, amnesty and memorialisation must be consciously coordinated and/or sequenced to mutually and effectively enforce one another (Roht-Arriaza 2006; Fischer 2011; Gready 2011). But until now, few efforts have been made to test these hypotheses, evaluate their mechanisms and measure their impacts (Mendeloff 2004; Thoms et al. 2008; Dancy et al. 2010; Olsen, Payne & Reiter 2010; Olsen, Payne, Reiter, et al. 2010). The call for further research, therefore, is frequent (Thoms et al. 2008; Backer 2009). This is especially true for memorialisation initiatives in transitional justice processes. Most authors agree there is an apparent lack of conceptualisation on what places of memory are supposed to achieve exactly, what contributions they can make, and if they actually have helped reach the envisaged goals within a holistic transitional justice approach in the past (Naidu 2006; Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; Hamber et al. 2010). This lack of research and conceptualisation is attributed to the marginalisation and underestimating of memorialisation initiatives as belonging to the soft cultural sphere and thereby not creating any hard political facts (Brett et
Another factor is the repeated notion that the preservation and construction of commemorative sites and the activities surrounding them are spontaneous (Naidu 2006, p.1; Hamber et al. 2010, p.398), an “instinctive practice”, an “age-old phenomenon” (Impunity Watch 2011, p.9) and a common feature of humankind (Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.3; Hamber 2009, p.87). The problem with this view is that memorialisation initiatives are thus perceived as something that happen anyway, sooner or later, and that they are therefore somehow part of the process. This implicitly ignores the question of who wants to achieve what with a memorial and instead assumes that memorialisation occurs somewhat naturally, out of a deep psychological necessity, making its contributions and benefits a fact that is not to be challenged.

This study aims to fill this important research gap. It begins by analysing the theoretical assumptions postulated in the field of memorialisation, highlighting the global consensus that has developed on the role of places of memory when applied in transitional justice processes. It then bridges the gap between these theoretical assumptions and their practical realities by carefully studying cases in which memorialisation initiatives were implemented in Peru, a country whose transition to democracy was massively influenced by the transitional justice paradigm.

Indeed, the creation of museums and monuments as well as the preservation of former sites of atrocities are no new phenomena. Still, what is surprising is that lately, they have become associated with the promotion of such inclusive goals as healing, civic dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation when applied as part of a transitional justice process. Rather the opposite is true: Historically, modern nation-states have extensively created such places as representations of their peoples’ common past, reminding them of the sacrifice to be made for the unity of their fatherland. Even today, commemorative sites play a significant role in the prolongation of conflict or even outright war when they symbolically feed a culture of perceived victimisation, humiliation or superiority vis-à-vis an enemy-Other (Gillis 1996; Bar-Tal 2003; Volkan 2006). Beyond that, the assumptions on memorialisation initiatives in transitional justice processes seem to ignore much of what is taken for granted today in the study of memory and remembrance: Memories are always constructed by different social agents in accordance with their viewpoints of the present and aspirations for the future. Further, what is remembered and how it is remembered changes over time with changing social and political frames of reference. Thus, as different agents have different memories of the past and these memories may change over time, conflicts evolve about the ‘true’ meaning of the past (Assmann 2006b, p.330). And as museums, monuments and commemorations cast in stone a specific view of the past in public space that stands for specific social values, they
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easily become battlefields of memory or so-called ‘culture wars’ (Dubin 2006) in which different social agents fight heavily over the meaning of the past and the values attached to it. For transitional contexts, this means that different groups of memory entrepreneurs – old and new elites, security forces, victims’ groups, human rights NGOs, international donors – struggle hard to represent their version of events as ‘truths’ in the public arena and marginalise opposing narratives, while simultaneously legitimising their own vision of society for the present and future. Memory then becomes a legitimising resource opposing agents rely on, and places of memory as seemingly authoritative and durable structures in space are often the focal points of this process, thus becoming sites of conflict and contestation themselves (Jelin 2002; Jelin & Langland 2003). They can be used for the mobilisation and self-legitimisation of different social groups, depending on which narrative of the past is projected upon them: “Memorial-making shall [...] be understood as a construction process in which rivalling support groups seek to enter the public arena to articulate and defend their interpretation of the past in terms of a politics of representation” (Pieper 2006, p.26).

Thus, in a post-conflict or post-dictatorial setting, a complex and constantly contested structure of places emerges to which different agents attach different meanings and values via their discourses and actions – a ‘geography of memory’. This in turn means that the specific geography of memory within a community, a city or an entire country is always an expression of different – and not seldomly, vested political – interests and conflictive negotiation processes, the concrete outcomes of politics of memory. Places of memory are then always the expressions of the actions by various social agents that construct geographies of memory from differing positions of power to implement their goals for the present and future. As spatial representations of the past and the meanings and values attached to it, memorialisation initiatives both actively structure and are structured by the actions and discourses regarding the past in a given society.

Peru is a good example for this constellation: The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report tried to present a balanced account of Peru’s internal armed conflict, equally distributing the blame for human rights violations from 1980 to 2000 between the Shining Path guerrilla and the state’s security forces. Still, it has not managed to create a common narrative for national reconciliation, nor to “narrow the range of permissible lies”, to say it with Michael Ignatieff’s words (Ignatieff 1996, p.113). The continuity of political and administrative personnel as well as popular support for the Fujimori regime after the transition in 2000 has led to the constant contestation of the work and narrative presented by the CVR and human rights organisations. The debate about the past in Peru is highly polarised and, especially in Lima, monuments and museums created in memory of the victims of human
rights violations have become sites of struggle over who to commemorate in which form. This shows that, despite the rather positive effects places of memory are thought to have in transitional justice theory, memorial sites in Peru are far from being consensual places. While most authors do admit the danger of conflict over the meaning of memory at museums and memorials, they also argue that these conflicts can be managed and facilitated, and may even become fruitful as part of a public debate on the past that can contribute to democratic citizenship and tolerance (Minow 1998, p.140; Jelin 2007, pp.139–140; Hamber et al. 2010, p.417; Impunity Watch 2011, pp.22–23). Still, it remains questionable whether this kind of dialogue is really possible in polarised societies in which memorialisation initiatives are only used as stages to reinforce one’s own perspective of the past. Indeed, “[...] there is a thin line between beneficial memory initiatives and very ugly processes” (Impunity Watch 2011, p.23). Thus, the task of this study will also be to closely examine the politics of memory that take shape in memorialisation initiatives within transitional justice processes and lead to specific representations of the past in space. This will be done by analysing the different and often conflicting meanings that a heterogeneous set of agents – intergovernmental organisations, development agencies, non-governmental organisations, governments or the local population affected by human rights violations – attach to places of memory, and with which they structure the discourse on the past.

Another feature transitional justice processes have recently been criticised for is the growing standardisation of a ‘transitional justice toolkit’ that is applied globally, regardless of specific national and local contexts. In this criticism, transitional justice is denounced as a Western liberal model, remorselessly imposed in a neo-colonial way on societies after conflict and authoritarian rule to help them ascend from barbaric incivility towards a state of enlightened democracy (Lundy & McGovern 2008; McGregor 2008; Hazan 2010; Hinton 2010; Shaw & Waldorf 2010). It is a process largely spearheaded and mainstreamed by a few highly mobile global experts, from the conference rooms and offices of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) or the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) (Oettler 2004; Oettler 2008; Kritz 2009). Once again marginalised in this process is the affected population transitional justice mechanisms are supposed to serve. Categorised as traumatised victims, locals are perceived as lacking agency and in need of outside intervention (Edkins 2003; Becker 2006; Hamber 2009). Thus, the geography of memory produced in the transitional justice discourse and promoted by human rights activists and international experts is largely an imaginative geography of powerful perpetrators and powerless marginalised victims.
Indeed, a 2004 UN report criticises the lack of consultation, participation and ownership that locals are offered in transitional justice processes (United Nations Security Council 2004). Since then, a tendency to integrate local experiences and indigenous mechanisms into the transitional justice process has become visible: In Rwanda, the integration of customary law in the Gacaca trials drew wide attention, and in Sierra Leone and East Timor, truth commissions designed local community consultation and reconciliation processes. Nevertheless, the danger remains that, although reaching down to the local level, such processes are rather the expression of the old top-down mentality of transitional justice adapted only slightly to local realities and designed, once again, in the interests of experts and elites. Further, what is taken to be ‘the local’ voice is often that of local elites and national or local NGOs rather than that of ‘ordinary people’. Local communities are often perceived as generally victimised populations speaking with one voice, an attitude that ignores the complex consequences of violence as well as the power relations between different local agents, their expectations and aims. But locals are never devoid of agency, neither in the face of political violence, nor in the face of transitional justice measures imposed upon them. There is also no clear-cut gap between global mechanisms and local effects of transitional justice. What is now a globally standardised tool was once a specific local or national initiative. And locals adapt to, integrate, transform, negotiate and resist transitional justice mechanisms and discourses according to their own local contexts, beliefs and goals, which then reflect back to the global level. This happens sometimes in favour and sometimes completely against the goals envisaged by transitional justice promoters in a process of constant global-local interaction (Lutz & Sikkink 2001; Sikkink & Booth Walling 2006; Lundy & McGovern 2008; McEvoy & McGregor 2008; McGregor 2008; González 2009; Hinton 2010; Shaw & Waldorf 2010).

Not surprisingly, it is at this level of hybrid integration and adaptation in specific localities where a major research gap has been detected (Pouligny et al. 2007, p.3; Lundy & McGovern 2008; Backer 2009, p.51).

Both the criticism of standardisation as well as the research gap at the local level are also true for the role of places of memory in transitional justice processes. Transitional justice as a whole and especially “the global rush to commemorate atrocities” (Williams 2007), visible in a boom of memorialisation initiatives at national or local levels all across the world, can be seen as the expression of a specific “regime of memory” (Radstone & Hodgkin 2005) as the zeitgeist or macro-discourse of relative stability that structures our attitudes and actions towards the past. The current regime of memory that has developed since at least the end of the Second World War, and has gained even more momentum after the end of the Cold War, leading to what Natan Sznaider and Daniel Levy (2007) call a “cosmopolitan memory”, sees
the remembrance of past atrocities and their victims as crucial to avoiding the future repetition of violence. This regime of memory also builds upon and reinforces specific representations of the past, many of which have been developed in the realm of Holocaust remembrance since the 1960s. The figure of the innocent victim and the banality of evil as well as the use of testimony, photography and personal objects that link the lives of those victimised to current experiences in order to allow for secondary witnessing and empathy have become common features of monuments and memorial museums across the globe. Introduced by leading institutions in the field of memorialisation such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), the current paradigm of memorialisation sees the past as a learning device from which lessons can be abstracted in order to harness society against present and future intolerances, injustices and incivilities (Bickford & Sodaro 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that memorialisation has become part of the global transitional justice agenda. Memorialisation has prominently been integrated into the work of the International Center of Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and with the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, a specialised globally operating INGO has emerged that functions as hub for a network of institutions and experts in the field of memorialisation. Expertise and financing for national and local places of memory are provided by foreign experts, governments and international non-governmental organisations, all of which add to the growing standardisation of the form and function of representing past atrocities. This may lead to the same problematic imposition of memorialisation initiatives on local populations as already observed with other transitional justice measures. Local victimised populations are then perceived as isolated and unable to represent themselves in public space, in need of guidance to form their representations of memory and voice their demands in a cosmopolitan memory culture. The danger in this is the top-down imposition of a “Holocaust identity” of memorialisation (Naidu 2004b, p.16), of standardised representations of victimhood and neat victim-perpetrator dichotomies on local settings characterised by complex grey zones of past violence and present cohabitation.

Peru is no exception. While the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission was largely an elite-led undertaking, it also made some remarkable efforts to go local, for example by carrying out regional public hearings, which introduced the South African experience to the Latin American context, and by installing regional offices. It found that 75% of all casualties of the conflict spoke Quechua or another indigenous language, which showed that it was especially the rural, indigenous populations of the Andean highlands and Amazonian lowlands that were most affected by the political violence of the 1980s and 1990s – a fact that in part explained the much higher number of victims established by the CVR compared to
earlier estimates. Since these populations were so remote, historically marginalised, largely undocumented and of no importance to ruling elites in the coastal capital, their death and disappearance had never been fully realised in the metropolis. Therefore, the Truth Commission included a concept of reconciliation in its report that saw the integration of these populations as full citizens into the Peruvian democracy as one of the major concerns for the future of the country (CVR 2003j, p.266).

Definitely, this conclusion is as much honourable as it is crucial: It addresses some of the underlying issues such as exclusion, poverty, injustice and racism that characterise Peruvian society and that had also contributed to the conflict. However, it also ascribes a generalised victim status to all those who happen to be indigenous and live in the mostly rural areas of the Andes. This ignores the fact that the conflict was a highly localised one, involving the active participation of the local population, a constellation where there is no easy answer to who is victim, perpetrator or bystander (Theidon 2004). Not surprisingly, Ayacucho, origin and centre of the Shining Path insurgency and the region most affected by the conflict, has become the main focus of assistance to the victimised population in the aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

But the process of dealing with past war and authoritarian rule officially began in the capital Lima only after the installation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2001, whereas local communities in the regions most affected by the conflict had already had to deal with issues such as the re-integration of former combatants as well as the cohabitation and even the reconciliation of victims and perpetrators since the conflict had begun to die down in the Andes by the late 1980s. The neatly ordered, but abstract sequence of truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation are rather disconcerting in such a complex local setting characterised by poverty and an ongoing struggle for economic survival, especially when they arrive somewhat belated to the experiences of people on the ground (Huhle 2004).

The issue of memorialisation in the aftermath of the commission’s work fits well into this picture. Indeed, Peru is very much part of the hybrid cosmopolitan memory culture as is easily visible in the debate on creating a national memorial museum in the capital. It is a project demanded by the Peruvian human rights sector and heavily pushed for by the German government, while initially resisted by the Peruvian state (Weissert 2012). The globalised mechanism of building memorial museums and monuments for the victims of past atrocities also rapidly spread to the most affected and remote regions of Peru, with seven small memory houses built since 2005 in the region of Ayacucho alone. While these monuments and small memory museums often use local artisanry to depict the conflict, they also heavily rely on forms of representation and commemoration that Western eyes are accustomed to: Names of
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victims, their photographs, clothes and personal belongings are a common feature in these places of memory. They are all initiatives introduced to local victims’ associations and indigenous communities by Peruvian human rights organisations with foreign expertise and/or donorship, and thus constantly run the risk of reproducing the power relations and stereotyped representations of victimhood the initiatives actually intend to fight.

Still, the local population is far from powerless and passive in this process. Local memorialisation initiatives are rather a process of complex interaction, in which the local population re-interprets and even contests the narratives of transitional justice and the representations of victimhood introduced to them by outside stakeholders such as the Truth Commission or national and international activists and experts. Instead, the local population uses, ignores or transforms places of memory according to their own interests (Kansteiner 2002, p.180). They attach different meanings to them and use them as expressions of their own discourses and narratives, sometimes in line with the intention these places were originally built for, sometimes contesting them. Places of memory are the more or less fruitful result of an encounter – sometimes nearly of a third kind – of different actions and discourses on dealing with the past, some from within, some from outside the community. It is these places of memory – monuments and small museums – that become an expression of the community’s politics of representation in transitional justice processes.

“Perceptions of the past – and especially of the traumatic past – play a pivotal role in shaping many different aspects of contemporary global politics” (Bell 2006, p.29). The global set of memory politics, of which transitional justice is one of the most prominent policy fields, transcends international relations, and places of memory – museums, monuments and the actions surrounding them – are their concrete expression. Thus, exploring the complex interrelations between global and local agents that create hybrid representations, along with the actions and discourses that make and are remade in local memorialisation initiatives forming politics of memory and representation, is meant to contribute considerably to the study of transitional justice as a pivotal concept of international relations. It focuses on how a specific transitional justice mechanism, namely that of memorialisation, is played out at the local level, and gives important insights on which role places of memory can and cannot play as a transitional justice tool in general, and at the local level in particular. The aim of this study, then, is to highlight the ‘glocal’ politics of memory that become visible in the creation of local places of memory. By analysing three different memorialisation initiatives containing small memory museums in the highlands of Ayacucho, the region most affected by the Peruvian civil war, I want to show how local memorialisation initiatives are created and utilised by different social agents from within and without the community in an ongoing
process of adjustment, transformation and resistance to deal with the past and represent themselves for the future. This involves tracking down the narratives, aims and assumptions that influenced the creation of these places of memory, and, thus, the representation of the past in these places. Further, as different agents with different aims and assumptions were part of this construction process, the aim is also to visualise the negotiation processes and the power relations that were part of this construction process. Finally, it is necessary to analyse what meanings different social agents attach to the memorialisation initiatives, how they use them according to their own standards and aims, and how this differs from the original expectations.

1.2 Research Methodology

To highlight the process of structuration inherent to the memorials and museums in rural spaces of Peru, this study analyses the process of the social construction of places of memory and the meanings different social agents attach to these places in their discourses and actions. As its main focus is to understand and re-construct the perceptions of the agents that take part in these processes of structuration, standardised quantitative methods are of little help. Instead, qualitative research methods are considered more effective to explore the subjective and collective geographies within the politics of memory at stake here (Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005, p.34).

Indeed, the aim of qualitative social research is to capture the diversity and differentiation of social processes in their entirety (Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005, p.107) by a complete examination of specific cases (Gläser & Laudel 2004, p.24). The understanding of social reality as well as the processes, patterns and structures of social agency are at the heart of qualitative social research. Therefore, it is of primary importance to describe the structures and relations of the social processes under scrutiny from the social agents’ perspective (Flick et al. 2003, p.14; Lamnek 2005, p.4). One of the main assumptions of qualitative research is the social construction of reality through the social interaction and everyday interpretation of living conditions by social agents. This social reality is a reflexive and recursive process structured through social communication (Flick et al. 2003, p.14). Thus, it is not possible to observe ‘objective reality’. Instead, the premises of openness in the investigation and flexibility of the methods’ applicability shall guarantee a complete understanding of the research topic (Lamnek 2005, pp.26–27).

As there is a considerable research gap concerning the topic of memorialisation initiatives in rural settings in transitional justice processes, this study is designed in an exploratory fashion.
Little data is available on the role of places of memory in transitional justice processes. Most of the literature on places of memory is rather descriptive and anecdotal, presenting isolated cases and lacking critical analysis (Williams 2007, pp.22–23). The analysis of memorialisation initiatives in Peru presents the reader with the case of a rather consolidated transitional justice process some twelve years after the end of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2001-2003), thus allowing conclusions to be drawn about the process in general and the construction of places of memory in particular. The research is set in Ayacucho, the region most affected by the internal armed conflict (1980-2000), home to the indigenous rural population most victimised in the war and presenting the highest number of memorial sites next to the capital Lima, thus offering a wide array of different cases.

Three cases were selected to be analysed according to the methodology of exploratory case studies. In exploratory case studies, cases are selected according to their explanatory power in regard to the research topic. Thus, they may present extreme or rather typical variations of the topic. Still, it is important to analyse these cases in a holistic and, if possible, complete way to gain a realistic image of the social world (Lamnek 1995, pp.5–22).

The cases selected for the study are:

1. The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP
   The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP, which stands for the Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú (National Association of Relatives of the Abducted, Detained and Disappeared of Peru) was the first museum to commemorate the victims of the internal armed conflict in Peru and presents a rather prominent case in Peruvian memory politics as one of the first victims’ associations in the country consisting mostly of women who predominantly speak Quechua. A proto-museum of memory, it had a major influence on the representation of the affected population in other places of memory in the region and uses features rather typical for the globalised form of the ‘memorial museum’ (Pieper 2006; Williams 2007). Thus, the museum of ANFASEP has an important explanatory function about how a specific form and discourse of memorialisation within a transitional justice context was introduced into and proliferated within the region of Ayacucho. But it also differs from the other two cases selected as it is a place of memory in an urban setting, which allows for conclusions about the success of memorial sites in urban vis-à-vis rural settings.

2. Memorials in the community of Santiago de Lucanamarca
   Santiago de Lucanamarca presents the case of a memorialisation initiative in an emblematic site of memory. The small village in Ayacucho’s Huancasancos province
became known for the massacre of 69 peasants by the Shining Path in 1983. The case of Lucanamarca also appears prominently in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report and is referred to frequently in Peru’s polarised memory politics by the media and politicians. Thus, Lucanamarca offers insights on how memorialisation is played out in a rural setting in the case of an emblematic site of memory that has gained prominence beyond its particular local context.

3. The **Centro de Memoria** in Putacca

The **Centro de Memoria** represents the case of an intervention by a non-governmental organisation (NGO) by the ‘community museum’ approach (Camarena & Morales 2006). Putacca is a community less affected by the violence of the internal armed conflict and was not part of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s investigation. Thus, Putacca differs from the **Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP** due to its rural setting and from Lucanamarca as it shows a memorialisation initiative without being a prominent case in Peruvian memory politics.

The three cases selected for this study – two in a rural setting and one in an urban setting as well as two prominent cases in Peru’s transitional justice debate and one less prominent case – present major differences in their designs, their forms and the extent of victimisation their populations suffered. Still, they also share many similarities, such as the massive influence of NGOs and international donors in these memorialisation initiatives, their forms of display and the narratives and discourses of transitional justice surrounding them. Thus, the selection of these case studies allows for tracing how forms and discourses of transitional justice have been introduced in local contexts in Peru, leading to a ‘glocal’ geography of memory as well as documenting the processes of negotiation, interpretation and transformation of meanings among a heterogeneous set of agents that make politics of memory and representation – and with these, places of memory – from different positions of power. Selecting cases from the region of Ayacucho and especially from a rural setting guarantees an in-depth analysis of the cases through the easy accessibility of all agents involved in and/or affected by the memorialisation initiative, while at the same time overcoming the research gap on rural places of memory.

The methods used during research include expert interviews, problem-centred interviews, group discussions and participatory observation. Expert interviews were especially used with representatives of organisations and institutions that had participated in the creation of places of memory. They were conducted with the help of an interview manual that included the most important questions on the research topic. The questions were not asked in a pre-determined order. Rather, the interviewer used the guide in a flexible manner, working through the
research topic according to the flow of the conversation (Gläser & Laudel 2004, p.39). An expert may be any person in an organisation or institution with special knowledge about the processes or structures at the centre of the investigation (Meuser & Nagel 1991, p.444). No person is an expert per se, rather, the status of an expert is attributed by the researcher according to their research topic, and is therefore relational (Bogner & Menz 2005, p.46). Expert interviews are especially useful to re-construct social situations and processes as well as to stress the perceptions and world views that determine social agency (Gläser & Laudel 2004, p.11; Bogner & Menz 2005, p.38). These perceptions, discourses and world views that structure places of memory are of primary importance for this study.

Indeed, when understood in the broadest possible sense, everyone is an expert for all social contexts he or she takes part in (Gläser & Laudel 2004, p.9). Thus, the members of victims’ organisations or community members who participated in the construction of memorial sites may also be perceived as experts, as they acquired specific knowledge about the process. Still, not only the community members and members of victims’ organisations who had taken part in the construction of the places of memory at stake were interviewed. Rather, the task was to analyse the perceptions and attributions of meaning to the places by all segments of the population within these communities or organisations. Thus, in the case of members of victims’ organisations and community members, problem-centred interviews were conducted that served to obtain biographical data in regard to a specific problem statement with the help of an interview guide (Flick 2002, p.135). For the representatives of institutions and organisations involved in memorialisation initiatives and for the members of victims’ organisations and community members, different guiding questions were used. In total, during fieldwork in 2010 and 2011, 34 expert interviews with representatives from national and international human rights organisations, international donors and academic institutions as well as 74 individual interviews with community members were conducted. Further, another 17 expert interviews and 28 interviews with community members or members of victims’ organisations held during previous fieldwork in 2008 were also integrated into the sample.

Finally, a total of 12 group interviews were carried out in a second stage of fieldwork. Group discussions serve to obtain information about the opinions and attitudes of individual participants or of the group as part of a larger social entity (Lamnek 1995, p.134). Participants were therefore sampled according to their age (younger and older community members), sex (male, female) and function (community authorities) in order to distinguish how different social groups within the same communities perceived places of memory. Thus, in the case of ANFASEP, group discussions were organised with older as well as young members of the organisation. In Lucanamarca, group discussions were held with older male and female
community members, community authorities, younger community members as well as university students from Lucanamarca studying in the city of Ayacucho. In Putacca, group discussions were organised for older male and female community members, younger community members as well as community authorities.

All interviews and group discussions were digitally recorded and transcribed. Those conducted in Quechua were transcribed and translated into Spanish by a research assistant. All interviews and group discussions were analysed according to the methodology of qualitative context analysis in which the text is analysed according to a pre-existing schematic of research questions using a system of categories to dissect the hermeneutic unit into smaller units for analysis (Mayring 2003, p.471). In structured content analysis, the researcher predetermines the set of codes to be used for the analysis of the text in advance. This set of codes is used to filter those text elements from the hermeneutic unit that are relevant for the research questions. The codes are first tested on the hermeneutic unit and may be adjusted during the further text analysis (Mayring 2007, p.83). The aim of this approach is to work out the shared structures, perceptions, world views, interpretations and beliefs inherent in the interviews and group discussions (Meuser & Nagel 1991, p.464).

The last element of the research methodology was participatory observation. Indeed, as the research was also aimed at determining the use of places of memory in Peru, participatory observation of commemorative ceremonies and visits to memorials were indispensable. Participatory observation further served to accompany interviews, as this may help to compare the statements of those interviewed with their actions, thus enabling a more profound understanding of the research topic (Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005, p.125).

The fieldwork in Peru was organised into three phases. During the first phase in May 2010, expert interviews were conducted in Lima with representatives of human rights organisations, international donor agencies, academic institutions and former members of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This phase served to obtain information on the context of the work of the Truth Commission and various organisations on places of memory. Further, it served to gather information about the existing places of memory in Ayacucho for the selection of possible case studies. Archives and libraries were also visited to research literature and documents. The second phase of fieldwork lasted three months between June and August 2010 and took place in the region of Ayacucho. Here, the final case studies were selected and individual interviews with community members and members of victims’ organisations as well as expert interviews with the local staff of organisations involved in the construction of places of memory were conducted. The third and final phase of fieldwork lasted three months between March and May 2011 and served to organise group discussions
in the three places of memory selected as case studies. Two Quechua-speaking research assistants, one male, one female, helped translate during the interviews and group discussions and transcribed the recordings. During the second and third phases of fieldwork, the research team remained in the communities of Lucanamarca and Putacca for up to ten days to conduct interviews and group discussions.

While this research methodology allowed for a holistic approach and an in-depth analysis of the cases, it was not without its shortcomings. Indeed, in an environment of poverty as in the communities of Ayacucho, people often expect a direct return for being interviewed or participating in a group discussion. Time is precious when people have to look after their fields and animals, especially when the story to tell is about the painful past. Thus, in many cases I opted for offering food, free meals or schooling materials to secure the community members’ participation. Still, all three cases, ANFASEP, Lucanamarca and Putacca are of some prominence and had already received visits by researchers and/or human rights organisations. Many of the people I interviewed had already told their story on other occasions, which could be seen in a certain standardisation in their answers. A tiredness of being interviewed was visible in all three cases, with some people declining the request for an interview stating that they had been interviewed so many times before by foreigners, had not received anything in return and would continue living in poverty. Especially when interviewing direct victims of the civil war, conversations rapidly became highly emotional due to the questions on what and where to remember. This proved to be highly stressful both for the interviewees as well as for the interviewers. In such circumstances research indeed risks narrowly exploiting the pain of others to obtain academic knowledge.

Especially the organisation of group discussions proved to be a challenge. On average, three attempts were necessary for a successful group discussion to unfold, as participants could not be easily persuaded to be present in a certain place at a specific time. Finally, the differences in the perceptions of places of memory by different groups of age and sex turned out to be minimal or insignificant. Thus, they were analysed in the same way as individual interviews.

Interviews and group discussions were conducted in Spanish and Quechua. Some expert interviews also took place in German. This involved several steps of translation. Still, every translation is also an act of interpretation, thus including the danger of distorting the words originally spoken by those interviewed. This is especially the case with the interviews conducted in Quechua that were translated into Spanish. The Spanish translation was then once again translated into English when writing the thesis.
1.3 Structure of the Text

The text of this study is divided into three main sections: The first section (chapter 2) presents the reader with the theoretical framework of this work. The second section (chapter 3) introduces the reader to the context of the study: the Peruvian civil war and the country’s transitional justice process. Finally, the third section (chapter 4) contains the empirical work on memorialisation initiatives in Peru that underline the theoretical assumptions made in chapter 2.

The theoretical chapter is organised around the three concepts central to this study: memory, place and transitional justice. Thus, chapter 2.1 explores the role of memory and remembrance in society, and especially the political implications of a globalised memory culture that are at the root of transitional justice. Chapter 2.2 combines the concept of memory with that of place that, taken together, form places of memory or memoryscapes. Subsection 2.2.1 highlights the political functions that places of memory had and have in history while subsection 2.2.2 describes the different forms these places take in different situations. Finally, subsection 2.2.3 describes how massively the new paradigm for building places of memory is influenced by the global transitional justice context. Chapter 2.3 focuses on the concept of transitional justice and begins with a detailed description of the content and aims of a holistic transitional justice approach (2.3.1), while subsection 2.3.2 describes the criticism that the concept and the implementation of transitional justice have sparked. 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 introduce places of memory into the transitional justice context. While the first of these two chapters describes the different applications places of memory have had in transitional justice processes, the second chapter focuses on the contributions that places of memory are believed to have for different transitional justice aims. Finally, chapter 2.4 presents a theory about the political geography of memory that combines the elements of memory, place and politics introduced in previous chapters with the theory of structuration that form the theoretical background of the present work.

In the second section, chapter 3 provides the reader with a description and analysis of the Peruvian civil war and the subsequent transitional justice process that form the context of this study. As the focus is on places of memory in indigenous communities in Peru’s Ayacucho region, chapter 3.1 highlights the relations between communities and the Peruvian state that had a major influence on the armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s, but also on the forms and functions memorialisation initiatives have assumed in this region. The subsequent two chapters focus on the Peruvian civil war in the 1980s (chapter 3.2) and the authoritarian Fujimori regime in the 1990s (chapter 3.3), thus, the events remembered in the
memorialisation initiatives at stake. Chapter 4.3 introduces the work of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the entity that provided major input on how the Peruvian civil war is remembered and memorialised. Further, this chapter also shows the massive influence of the globalised transitional justice paradigm on the Peruvian context. The chapter on the truth commission is divided into two subsections, one on the task, work and results of the commission (chapter 3.4.1) followed by a critical analysis of its work (3.4.2). Chapter 3.5 closes the section on the Peruvian context with a detailed balance of the country’s transitional justice process and the current political discourse on the past in the country.

The third and final section of this work (chapter 4) presents the empirical data on three case studies of places of memory in the Andean department of Ayacucho/Peru, the region most affected by the internal armed conflict. Still, before that, it is necessary to show how the work of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission directly influenced the creation of museums and monuments to war victims in the country (chapter 4.1) as well as to describe the memoryscape that has evolved in the country’s transitional justice process, along with its forms and agents (chapter 4.2). Subsequently, chapters 4.3 to 4.5 contain the analysis of the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP in the city of Ayacucho (chapter 4.3), the memorials in the community of Santiago de Lucanamarca (chapter 4.4) and the Centro de Memoria in the community of Putacca (chapter 4.5). All of these empirical chapters contain an analysis of the events that led to the actual memorialisation events, a description and interpretation of the forms and narratives of each museum or monument, an analysis of the process of memorial-making involving a set of heterogeneous authors and agents and the way the local population makes sense of the memorials, integrating them into their own actions and discourses. Chapter 4.4 on the memorialisation initiatives in Lucanamarca also contains a section on the commemorative ceremony that takes place in the village on the date of a massacre committed by Shining Path insurgents. All of these chapters further contain a short résumé that summarizes the findings from each case study.

Chapters 5 and 6 – the conclusion and epilogue – re-visit the research questions posed in the introduction and summarise the findings of the work laid out in the above-mentioned chapters.
2 Theoretical Framework – Towards a Theory of the Political Geography of Memory

From Psychology to Cultural Studies and Anthropology, from History all the way through Political Science to Geography: the topic ‘memory’ is definitely *en vogue* and transcends the various disciplines to such a degree that Kerwin Lee Klein begins his journal article on the scientific memory discourse with the rather ironic exclamation “welcome to the memory industry” (Klein 2000, p.127). Indeed, many authors diagnose a memory boom since the late 1980s and early 1990s, caused by events such as the 50th anniversary of World War II, new debates on the meaning of the Holocaust, waves of democratisation in Latin America and finally the end of the Cold War that led to a re-surfacing of suppressed memories in the former member states of the Warsaw Pact. Since then, memory has become one of the main discourses in the social sciences and a powerful background for debates, controversies and conflicts on how to interpret the past to explain the present and provide advice for the future (Misztal 2003, p.2). While some authors criticise that many topics that once were addressed under other concepts such as ‘myth’, ‘tradition’ or ‘heritage’ are now subsumed under the label ‘memory’ (Klein 2000, p.128; Olick 2008, pp.24–26), memory studies have now entered into a phase of academic institutionalisation, observable in the foundation of the journal Memory Studies in 2008 or in the recent publications of several handbooks and compendia on the topic, such as those edited by Pethes and Ruchatz (2001a), Erll and Nünning (2010), Gudehus, Eichenberg and Welzer (2010a) or Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy (2011). This clearly shows that memory studies are in the process of canonisation.

It has become commonplace to refer to memory as a social and collective phenomenon, reconstructed from the present and constantly changing needs of society. Depending on the field of research, different aspects of social and collective memory are highlighted. Thus, Cultural Studies ask how different media produce and reproduce notions of the past, while Political Science seeks to understand how versions of the past are manipulated or instrumentalised for political purposes and Geography examines the role of spatial structures in constructing and representing a narrative of the past. It will therefore be the task of this section to highlight the connections and interdependencies between collective memory and remembering on the one side and politics of the past in transitional justice as well as places of memory on the other side. These insights will then be synthesised to generate a theory on the political geography of memory. Therefore, the first chapter of this section will introduce the most important concepts and theories in the realm of memory and remembering, which I will use during the rest of this
work. After this introduction, we will turn to the connection between memory, politics and place, highlighting the interdependence of these concepts and their importance for the politics of memory after human rights violations.

2.1 Memory and Remembrance

The literature on memory and remembrance is manifold and steadily growing to such an extent that Olick even speaks of a “metastatic growth” (Olick 2008, p.26). Nevertheless, the handbooks and compendia mentioned above as well as the journal articles by Olick and Robbins (1998), Klein (2000) and Kansteiner (2002) and the book by Misztal (2003) offer a good overview of what is at stake. Still, the problem already starts when defining the basic concepts of memory and remembrance. While Pethes and Ruchatz’ dictionary on “Gedächtnis und Erinnerung” (memory and remembrance) in German refuses to outline a definition, stating that the use of the terms memory and remembrance varies too much from discipline to discipline (Pethes & Ruchatz 2001b, p.8), Gudehus et al. (2010b, p.vii) term *Gedächtnis* (memory) as “the receptive system for the storage and recall of any form of information (e.g. data, abilities, emotions)” and *Erinnerung* (remembrance or remembering) as “the process of recalling this information”. Unfortunately, these definitions are as simple as they are vague. For the agency-oriented approach of this thesis, it is therefore important to emphasise that remembrance is a psychological activity in which, consciously or unconsciously, the information stored in one’s memory is processed in different ways and with different outcomes (Schischkoff 1991, p.185).

The study of memory is populated with a large amount of ‘adjective memories’, from individual, to social, collective and cultural or even cosmopolitan memory. Any overview over basic concepts and theories on memory and remembrance therefore should start with Maurice Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory. Since Halbwachs’ groundbreaking work “Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire” of 1925, it has become a scientific convention that memory is a rather social thing: While it is the individual that remembers, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of remembering is framed by the social groups the individual belongs to, such as family, religious community and social class. It can be said that according to Halbwachs, a social group and its memory form a kind of symbiotic relationship in which neither can exist without the other. The memory of a shared past binds the social group together and constitutes the members’ group identity, while simultaneously reflecting back on how the group members

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1 Originally in German: “Das System zur Aufnahme, zur Aufbewahrung und zum Abruf jeder Art von Informationen (z.B. Daten, Fähigkeiten, Emotionen”).

2 Originally in German: “Der Abrufvorgang dieser Informationen”.

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Theoretical Framework – Towards a Theory of the Political Geography of Memory

perceive the past. The social group, therefore, cannot exist without its collective memory and the collective memory ceases to exist with the demise of its social group. Further, collective memory always re-constructs the past according to the ever-changing needs of the present. Halbwachs finally highlights that the collective memory of social groups is always anchored in time and space. Time and space “localise” the memory of groups and form its most important points of reference. It is not possible to remember without referring to time and space (Halbwachs 1985). Jan Assmann (2005, pp.38–42) summarises Halbwachs’ assumptions in three basic principles of collective memory:

1. Collective memory always has a reference to time and space (“localisation” in Halbwachs’ terms), while not necessarily in a historical or geographical sense. Certain dates and specific places become markers of the identity of a social group and provide an appearance of stability over time and space by constituting its history and homeland.

2. Collective memory is always attached to a group. A social group cannot exist without a shared notion of the past that provides a sense of security and longevity for the present and orientation for the future. Hence, the group forms a community of memory.

3. Collective memory cannot represent the past as such but rather re-constructs the past according to the needs of the ever-changing frames of reference in the present.

Aleida and Jan Assmann, who both draw heavily upon Halbwachs’ ideas, further divide collective memory into communicative and cultural memory. Recent memories that are shared by individuals in direct contact with their contemporaries form the communicative memory. The communicative memory may span over three to four generations or some eighty to one hundred years (Assmann 2005, p.50). Beyond this time span, it becomes necessary for the group to externalise its memory in symbolic media such as images or monuments to preserve it permanently. This cultural memory contains those parts of the memories of a collectivity that have not been experienced by the group members and must be backed up mediatically. The formation of the cultural and therefore collective memory is therefore not an accidental matter, but instead depends on an active process of memory-making by the group. It is the social group as a community of memory that has to decide which pasts must be preserved and how, and it is with signs and symbols that represent the past that groups such as societies, cultures, nations, states and other communities form their identity. Symbols in space, such as monuments and museums, or performances in time, such as anniversaries and
commemorative rituals stabilise the group’s identity and legitimise its existence (Assmann 2006a, pp.34–35).

This is precisely where memory becomes a matter of politics. Duncan Bell (2006, p.12) sees memory as crucial in shaping national and communal identities, which in turn influences group interests, national foreign policy positions and even the evolution of international norms and institutions. Myths of heroic victories and defeats in a past stylised as glorious are the typical forms of representation of the memory of the nation. They serve the purposes of creating a unified shared identity, legitimising its present status and orienting towards the future. The vision of the group’s common past and common ancestry which is manifested in its collective memory is characteristic for what Anderson (1991) calls an “imagined community”. The rather artificial character of collective memory and the signs and symbols attributed to it is also inherent to Hobsbawn and Ranger’s (1983) concept of the “invention of tradition” during the creation of the modern nation-state throughout the 18th and 19th century.

The legitimising character of collective memory, combined with its constructed nature, make it prone to manipulation and distortion. Further explosiveness is added to the topic of collective memory by the idea that differing notions of the past can easily be instrumentalised in conflicts and wars between different social, national, ethnic or other groups: “Wars are fought from memory, and they are often fought over memory, over the power to establish one group’s view of the past as a legitimate one.” (Schröder & Schmidt 2001, p.9)

Barbara Misztal (2003, p.56) calls this the “presentist approach” to memory, in which the past is seen as manipulated to serve dominant present interests of ruling elites to define and sustain national communities, establish social cohesion and legitimise authority. The main instruments for this task are censorship and celebration or organised forgetting and remembering. Still, Michael Schudson (1995) argues correctly that a diametrical opposition of remembering and forgetting is misleading. As a process of encoding, storing and strategically retrieving information that is shaped socially, psychologically and historically, memory always contains forgetting and distortion. He defines four different processes that underline the distorting and selective character of memory of which the intentional instrumentalisation of memory to serve present interests is only one. Even the sheer distance over time makes an event blurrier and less emotive in memory (distanciation). To be transmitted over time, memories must be packed into a consistent narrative with a relation useful to the present. The configuration of this narrative itself is again socially structured (narrativisation). Further, we only remember what we are socially conditioned to remember and the versions of the past most likely to be remembered are those that can rely on traces, such as artefacts and records,
and are supported by prestigious and powerful institutions, such as archives or museums (cognitivisation and conventionalisation).

Various scholars also criticise the notion of memory as a freely malleable matter with no connection to real events in the past. People agree at least on some memories of an event over a given period of time, which therefore limits the manipulability of the event (Appadurai 1981, p.201; Schudson 1995, p.348; Misztal 2003, p.69). While an Orwellian “newspeak” is the extreme case of instrumentalisation under perfect totalitarian laboratory conditions, the intentional distortion of memory is much more difficult in real life. Still, some totalitarian states of the 20th century, such as the Nazi regime in Germany or the Soviet Union, had at least some ‘success’ in distorting their population’s memory. This is shown prominently in Victor Klemperer’s *Lingua Tertii Imperii* (Language of the Third Reich – LTI) in which the author analyses the manipulative use of language by the Nazi regime (Klemperer 2006). But what contains at least some truth for the Third Reich or the Stalinist Soviet Union is not necessarily valid for pluralistic democracies. Further, memories must not always solidify and legitimise the present constellation of society, but may instead be conflictive and contest the social order (Misztal 2003, pp.59–61). Jan Assmann (2005, pp.79–80) for example distinguishes between a “founding memory”\(^3\) that legitimises the present conditions and naturalises the power of the ruling elites in an imagined community and “counter-present memories”\(^4\) of presently marginalised actors that question the hegemonic master narratives and try to de-legitimise them while pointing out alternative paths of action for the society’s future development. With this, he inadvertently draws the same assumptions made a bit earlier by the Popular Memory Group, who, drawing upon Marxist, feminist and post-colonial theory, call for the revision of history-making in the name of previously marginalised groups. They distinguish between a “dominant memory” and a “popular memory”. The former is linked to the political system, central state institutions and the schooling system as well as the modes of academic production and various dominant media made and re-made in the realm of the public while the latter stands for the oppositional sense of the past produced on an everyday basis which is not represented and institutionalised publicly but circulates in daily talk and narratives in the realm of the private. The Popular Memory Group argues that memory is a complex cultural product in which public and private, dominant and opposing narratives and representations compete and struggle. No relation between dominant and popular memory is forever fixed, but rather remains open to contestation and conflict. In their view, struggles over memory are an essential part of political activity (Popular Memory Group 1982).

\(^3\) Originally in German: “fundierende Erinnerung”.

\(^4\) Originally in German: “kontra-präsentische Erinnerung”.
It thus becomes obvious that there is no absolute and everlasting dichotomy between dominant and popular or founding and counter-present memory, especially in democratic, pluralistic societies where a multitude of stakeholders can more or less freely express their group memories and fight over their interpretations of the past according to their power positions. These memory entrepreneurs may co-opt each other’s discourses and forms of representation or contest them. They may form alliances on different scales and over different periods of time or set oneself symbolically and discursively apart from their adversaries (Ashplant et al. 2000). Still, even in this complex interrelation and multi-vocality of different memory agents, discourses and representations refer in one way or another to powerful macro-narratives and discourses that remain relatively stable over a given period of time and are subject only to very slow change. These “regimes of memory” (Radstone & Hodgkin 2005) supply us with basic forms and figures of memory that structure our discourses and representations of the past that in turn stabilise the dominant regime of memory.

So memory is never a monologue. At any given time, a multitude of different and often conflicting versions of the past exist in society. They are either in dialogue, in opposition or might even exist in parallel without any interaction. But which of these versions of the past becomes the predominant narrative depends on how much social, political and symbolical capital it can (re)assemble under the given social circumstances. This shows that memory is structured by power relations which in turn influence the notion of the past in a given present. Memory is therefore a resource that stakeholders use to derive legitimacy from, and this resource is characterised by scarcity as the past is not infinitely malleable and agents must battle over its control from different power positions (Appadurai 1981; Alexander 2009, p.12).

A good example to highlight this notion in the context of this work is to have a look at countries in transition from authoritarian rule or civil war. During a dictatorship or civil war, it is normally the official governmental version of the past that is predominant in the public while counter-narratives exist in the private or semi-public realm of resistance movements, family and friends or circulate via rumours, jokes and gossip. Retrospectively presenting a military coup d’état or a dirty war as having saved the nation from the turmoil of democracy, emerging civil war and terrorism as has happened in so many countries of Latin America is a typical example of a founding memory used especially by the military (Agüero & Hershberg 2005). The counter-present memory in this case – as a form of resistance against the dominant

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5 Pierre Bourdieu (1997) distinguishes between economic, cultural, symbolic and social capital that tend to accumulate and form distinct fields of power from which social agents negotiate.

6 Here, I refer to loosely to Foucault and his idea of “counter-memory” (1977).
vision of the past – is the emphasis on human rights violations and other abuses committed by the regime in the past and present. National and international human rights activists stand today at the forefront of this counter-present memory movement and accentuate claims for truth, justice and reparations for the future (Jelin 2010, p.65).

In the context of a political transition from dictatorship and/or civil war to peace and democracy, both the number of political agents who gain access to the public space of debate as well as the debatable topics themselves increase. In this environment, differing versions of the past enter the public arena and create a political combat zone in which different memory entrepreneurs fight from different power positions over the interpretation of the past and the lessons to be learned for the future (Jelin 2002, pp.48–49). In this process of conflicting collective memories and the differing interests attached to them, the memories of formerly marginalised social groups are often also up-valued. Among the memory entrepreneurs active in such a process of political transition are victims and human rights groups as well as political parties and movements, the media, researchers and artists. Different agents promote specific memories in the public arena pursuing different goals. The military or the old elites might try to use a relativising version of the past as a plea for impunity while human rights and victims’ organisations will emphasise past abuses by those in power to call for recognition, justice and reparations for victims, the healing of individuals and collectivities and the creation of a democratic regime and a culture of peace for the future (Ibid., pp.130–131).

Andreas Huyssen sees in this need to constantly deal with the memories of past injustices – along with the growing heritage industry, new developments in and the spread of museums and museum architecture, controversies about monuments and commemorations, the retro wave, a rise in biographical and autobiographical literature, an obsession with self-recording, self-measurement and self-portrayal of personal pasts in the internet and elsewhere, and the increased use of the past for nationalist, ethnic and chauvinist politics (Huyssen 2000, pp.23–25) – a symptom of a ‘crisis of temporality’ in which the past increasingly invades the present in a time when the grand narratives of progress and development for the future have become obsolete (Huyssen 1995, p.6; 2000, p.36; 2003, p.2). This simultaneous existence of different pasts with different expectations towards the future creates a merger of time in which past, present and future converge into what Koselleck (2004) calls “futures past” while Huyssen (2000; 2003) speaks of “present pasts”.

Huyssen even goes on to diagnose Western society with a memory boom or a cult of memory since the late 1980s and early 1990s. He sees this as a reaction to the acceleration and
disembeddedness of society in time and space in the Second Modernity, an attempt to create a secure identity anchored in the past in the shoreless complexity of globalisation: “As spatial barriers weaken and space itself is gobbled up by time ever more compressed, a new kind of malaise is taking root in the heart of the metropolis. […] The faster we are pushed into a global future that does not inspire confidence, the stronger we feel the desire to slow down, the more we turn to memory for comfort” (Huyssen 2003, p.25). Space-time-compression and the modern media landscape turn present into past at an accelerating rate. This creates an incomprehensible mix of past, present and future in which a return to local memory makes time and space once again tangible for individuals as well as collectivities (Ibid., p.28).

While some authors see globalisation as “entirely memoryless” (Smith 1990, p.190) and as contributing to an “age of forgetting” (Todorov 2001, p.12), Huyssen (1995, p.9; 2000, pp.27–28; 2003, p.18) speaks instead of a fear of forgetting that characterises postmodern Western societies, who counter the processes of globalisation with obsessive remembering. In this way, memory culture has itself become a part of globalisation and is deeply influenced by the global flows of commodities and people in a “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2000), the globalised mediascape and the improvements of communication technology in the “network society” (Castells 1996). Still, memory has not become global or universal. The site of collective memory is still the nation or local level, not the globe, while only the preoccupation with memory has become a global phenomenon (Huyssen 2000, p.26). Here, Huyssen coincides very much with Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, who speak of cosmopolitan memory in which certain components of particular group memories become disembedded and universalised to be re-embedded in new particular contexts. In this situation, specific memories become both local as well as global frames of reference. I may therefore speak of the “glocalisation” (Robertson 1995) of memory. In this post-modern phase of memory, the nation-state is no longer the sole guardian of memory but instead must share its power over the interpretation of the past in a context of transnationalisation and global media networks with groups of people all over the world (Levy & Sznaider 2007, pp.22–23). Brian Conway (2008) for example shows how local memory entrepreneurs managed to re-frame the Bloody Sunday in Derry from a particular, local event represented in the language of Irish nationalism into a “translocal” event. This was achieved by de-contextualising it from its former nationalist interpretation and re-framing it in the language of globally valid human rights with analogies to injustices elsewhere in the world, thereby also adapting to the changing global discourse in a post-national environment.
But the central and universal symbol of cosmopolitan memory is the remembrance of the Holocaust, which represents the ultimate crisis of modernity and thus provides a frame for action in the Second Modernity. The Holocaust offers such a potential for universalisation as it presents a truly transnational crime: “Given the transnational nature of the crime, one that not only pulled together and concentrated millions of victims in the bureaucratic machinery of death, but also unleashed a centrifugal effect of scattering the families of victims over five continents, it is to be expected that this mega-event should find its resonance in transnational memory” (Assmann 2010, p.97). Still, what seems to be so obvious is actually the result of a long and difficult evolution of a concept that just began in the 1960s, accelerated with a higher media resonance in the 1970s and 1980s until it became the main point of reference and comparison for all human – and frequently, also natural – tragedies of our time. While the Holocaust began as a particularly Jewish tragedy, it was integrated into the Western narrative of progress, first as a marker of distance between the West and the forces of evil, later as the final marker of decay of the narrative of modernity and as a re-starting point towards the globally valid norms of human rights after the end of the Cold War (Alexander 2002). This process, achieved by the de-contextualisation of the event from its original social and geographical space, its symbolic extension, its emotional identification via different forms of media representation and dramatisation, and its use as a rhetoric figure for analogies and models, had its peak around the beginning of the new Millennium (Assmann 2010). Nowadays, the multitude of Holocaust comparisons show how easily the ‘memory figure’ of the Holocaust is extracted from its original environment and is politically instrumentalised in totally different contexts. The presence of discourses on historical truth, and guilt, compensation and reconciliation in different societies all over the globe make it all too clear how much we believe in needing to learn from the universal catastrophe of the Holocaust (Huyssen 2003, p.95; Levy & Sznaider 2007, pp.243–245). The frequently repeated mantra ‘never again’ (in Spanish nunca más) with its explicit and emphatic reference to the Holocaust, which is so frequently accentuated after dictatorships and civil wars, demonstrates how easily local memory discourses become embedded in a global memory culture in which the Holocaust functions as a transnational prism (Huyssen 2003, pp.95–99). The Kosovo War, in which the Holocaust was explicitly used as a point of reference to legitimise Western military intervention, marked a new quality in the universalisation of lessons learned from the Holocaust (Levy & Sznaider 2002, p.99). The new Millennium saw the Stockholm Holocaust Conference organised by the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research that thought to create an institutionalised global memory community with
shared social values, standardised education tools and a common political agenda that derived its legitimacy from the Holocaust remembrance. Further, January 27, the day of the liberation of Auschwitz was declared the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, both by the United Nations and by the European Parliament (Levy & Sznaider 2002, p.100; Kroh 2006; Eckel & Moisel 2008, p.9; Assmann 2010, pp.101–105). And during the ceremony for the British Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2001, Holocaust survivors were joined by survivors of the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda, war survivors from Bosnia and Kosovo and representatives of discriminated minorities such as homosexuals and disabled persons (Eckel & Moisel 2008, p.21). This once again shows how the Holocaust as a “global icon” (Assmann 2010, p.113) is de-contextualised and re-embedded to serve new social and political contexts. Still, although the European countries on whose soil the Holocaust was perpetrated form the main body of the Task Force and some countries, such as Spain, have become members of the Task Force even though they have no direct connection to the sites and consequences of the Shoa, this memory has not spread much beyond Europe. Indeed, Jeffrey Alexander (2002, pp.58–59) points out that the universalisation of the Holocaust is a rather Western phenomenon. Beyond the West, it remains limited to the literary and intellectual elites that take part in the discourse dominated by Europe and North America. Yet while the Holocaust might still be a global point of reference and the modes of its representation show clear signs of standardisation across countries, the event itself is remembered very differently in different countries (Young 1993). The Western memory hegemony even leads to conflict, especially within Eastern European countries, where the international emphasis of the Holocaust memory clashes with memories of repressive communist regimes that are seen as much more important for the history of these nations (Eckel & Moisel 2008, p.20). This can even elicit a counter-memory that overtly opposes the memory of the Holocaust, such as the Anti-Holocaust Conference organised by Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in November and December 2006 that assembled representatives of thirty countries to build a predominantly Arab counter-alliance against the Western Holocaust memory community (Assmann 2010, p.113).

This clearly shows that, while activists and politicians across the globe have understood the symbolic meaning and social significance of the Holocaust analogy to claim support for and solidarity with oppressed peoples and marginalised victim groups (Alexander 2002, p.59) which may at best lead to the memory of past injustices being used to teach sympathy and recognition of the Other as well as respect for globally valid human rights (Misztal 2010, p.37), the universalisation of Holocaust memory may not always have a positive effect. As a
frame of reference for any kind of trauma in a “post-traumatic age”, be it war, AIDS, child abuse or abortion, the Holocaust is first and foremost a powerful political tool to legitimate one’s own political claims and attain moral authority (Assmann 2010, p.114). Referencing the Holocaust may legitimise military intervention in a conflict as much as it may also legitimise non-intervention. But the dichotomy of scrupulous perpetrators versus passive, defenceless victims implicit in the Holocaust metaphor simultaneously functions as a powerful appeal to the world public to testify and remember (Assmann 2006a, p.115). Holocaust remembrance and the obligation to commemorate and memorialise past injustices elsewhere has created a distinguishable task in the diffuse process of globalisation and a last assurance in the new and uncertain world of the Second Modernity (Levy & Sznайдer 2007, p.240).

### 2.2 Memoryscapes – Memory, Place and Politics

What we can assume about the term ‘memory’ – that there is a boom of this concept – is also becoming true for ‘places of memory’. Many authors agree that we are currently experiencing a rapid growth in memorialisation activities – that is, in the preservation of specific sites, buildings or even entire landscapes associated with the past and the construction of museums, memorials and other spatial markers of memory, especially when they are associated with past atrocities and human rights violations. It is not surprising then that there is also a growing body of literature on “places of memory” (Till 2003), “memorial landscapes” (Dwyer & Alderman 2008) or “memoryscapes” (Bickford 2005; Muzaini & Yeoh 2005), especially when these spaces are part of a “difficult heritage” (Logan & Reeves 2009; Macdonald 2009). Owen Dwyer and Derek Alderman (2008) notice that these kinds of places are normally referred to metaphorically in three overlapping categories: as texts, arenas and performance. When analysed as texts, the message, narrative or discourse about the past that some authors build into the landscape and the retrieval and re-interpretation of this information by different recipients stands in the fore. When treated as arenas, power struggles among political agents over the meaning of the past surrounding specific places are accentuated. Finally, when the focus is on performance, it is the bodily performance of human agents that gives meaning to place in reference to memory. All of these three categories will be important for the task of this chapter: To outline the very political relation between memory and place and the forms these memorialisation processes may take at different stages. Still, before embarking on this journey, it is important to have a closer look at some of the concepts that guide the chapter: namely, place, space and landscape.
As already mentioned, there has been much talk about a memory boom in the social sciences and Bachmann-Medick (2007, p.381) even speaks of a “mnemonic turn” built on the myriad of publications on cultural memory. She sees this as one of the newer developments following several other turns, among others very prominently a “spatial turn” (Bachmann-Medick 2007; Döring & Thielmann 2008). Therefore, the preoccupation with places of memory represents the powerful merger of these two ‘turns’. Still, memory is not an easy concept; nor is space. What space really stands for and how it is integrated into (or excluded from) different social theories is very much disputed. Some geographers such as Gerhard Hard (2008) and Benno Werlen (2008) harshly criticise the notions of space used in other disciplines such as Sociology and Cultural Studies as naïve and rather backward compared to the developments in Geography since at least the 1980s. But even in Geography, the discipline traditionally engaged with spatial categories, concepts such as space, place or landscape are far from undisputed. “Place, it really is a messy concept […]” states Lynn Staeheli (2003, p.167) and Phil Hubbard (2007, p.41) adds: “Though the concepts of space and place may appear self-explanatory, they have been (and remain) two of the most diffuse, ill-defined and inchoate concepts in social sciences and the humanities”.

Place is often associated with notions of the concrete, stable and authentic, while space is seen as abstract and in motion (Tuan 2008). Tim Cresswell (2004, p.10), drawing in part on humanist geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan (2008) and Robert Sack (1997), describes place as space that is socially constructed through the meanings human agents attach to it. This definition hints at the least common denominator in the employment of the concept ‘space’ (or ‘place’): that place and space are social constructs (Pred 1984, p.279; Harvey 1993, p.5; Staeheli 2003, p.162; Cresswell 2004, p.30). This very much owes to Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) work on the social production of space. Nevertheless, it remains contested if, how, and to what extent physical space and the social construction of space mutually influence each other (Massey 1993). I will come back to this discussion in chapter 2.4 in detail. For the purpose of this chapter that seeks to explore what places of memory are, what forms they can assume and for what purposes they are constructed and used (both physically and socially) it is sufficient to understand concepts, such as space or place, landscape or geography, as part of a complex process of interaction, as constantly being made and at the same time multi-layered as agents attach different meanings to them, and finally, as representations and codes of power relations that are constantly fought over (Massey 1997; Staeheli 2003, pp.162–163; Cresswell 2004, p.37; Hubbard 2007, p.47).
2.2.1 The Functions of Memorialisation

The importance of the relation between memory and space is already emphasised in Maurice Halbwachs’ work. Halbwachs refers to this relation as the “localisation” of memory in time and space. Time and space are dimensions of the frames of reference that discursively bind a group together. It is only possible to remember something when the group already provides a frame for the memory via its localisation in language, time and space. A shared discourse and shared references to time and space create a common world view in which a group refers to its past and which only then makes collective memory possible (Halbwachs 1985, pp.368–369; Middleton & Brown 2011, p.48). In the process of localisation, a social group inscribes its collective framework into its living space, which autopoietically reinforces the group’s characteristics and persistence (Middleton & Brown 2011, pp.40–41). In Halbwachs’ eyes, space, collective memory and group identity form an inseparable unity of coherence (Assmann 2005, p.39).

Still, it is the French historian Pierre Nora with his concept of “lieux de mémoire” – normally translated as realms of memory – who most prominently draws upon the relation between memory and place. “Lieux de mémoire” are a product of the acceleration of time in the age of globalisation in which “milieux de mémoire” – naturally given milieus of memory in which memory is still a lived experience – faint and disappear. In modern – as opposed to traditional and primitive – societies, the institutions and values that had originally bound memory such as the family, the church, the school or the nation-state, lose their importance. Places of memory are then the last attempt to fix memory over time in concrete structures. Lieux de mémoire always have a material, a symbolic and a functional level of appearance and may not necessarily be places in a topographical sense. Museums, monuments, archives and built ensembles are as much lieux de mémoire asanniversaries and festivals, texts and other artefacts (Nora 1989). Nora’s national lieux de mémoire of France encompass such different elements as the Eiffel Tower, Jeanne d’Arc or Verdun – geographical places, historical or mythical personalities and events, national institutions and material symbols (Nora 1996-1998). Similar lists of national lieux de mémoire have since been created for Germany (François & Schulze 2009), Italy (Isnenghi 2010) and the United States (Hebel 2010).

The anchoring of memory in time and space also becomes apparent in the transition from communicative to cultural memory within collective memory as described by Aleida and Jan Assmann. Communicative memory is based upon direct communication between human beings via language and agency. But as the life span of communicative memory is limited to that of the human body, its content needs to be fixed somehow in order to transcend into long-
term cultural memory and become communicable over longer periods of time. Different institutionalised symbolic media, therefore, secure the persistence of cultural memory in time and its durability over time. Places of memory such as monuments, memorials or museums stabilise cultural memory in time while repetitive performances in rituals, commemorations and anniversaries make it accessible to future generations over time, thereby reinforcing collective memory’s ability to generate group identity and orient the actions of its group members (Assmann 2005, pp.56–57; Assmann 2006a, pp.32–35). Similar to Nora’s line of thinking, Aleida Assmann (2006b) considers physical places to be only one way in which memory is mediated. She also includes texts, imageries and the body itself in the “spaces of memory” in which cultural memory materialises. Further categories of places that transmit memory are: sacred places at which the presence of God can be experienced, places of family history, and national memorials. Her final category – “traumatic places” – is associated with the most gruesome crimes against humanity, and is therefore beyond understanding.

In all the above-mentioned accounts, from Halbwachs and Nora to Aleida and Jan Assmann, the authors make a connection between collective memory, place and identity. Places of memory stabilise time, make the past tangible and thereby assure the members of a group of their collective rootedness in the past. They are part of political processes in which different identity groups deliberately use places of memory to create group cohesion, to legitimise and represent the group’s right to exist and to claim territory. Unsurprisingly, most authors see a massive proliferation of memorialisation activities during the phase of nation-building at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century (Gillis 1996; Mitchell 2003; Till 2003; Hoelscher & Alderman 2004; Johnson 2008). In the 19th century, the sacred geography of places and pilgrimage routes that characterised medieval Europe and where encounters with God were remembered, was increasingly substituted by a secularised geography devoted to venerating the emergence of the nation-state (Johnson 2008, pp.320–321). Established by national elites in a top-down decision-making process, places of memory represent the unity of state, territory and its people that characterises the nation-state as an imagined community (Anderson 1991). Official places of memory fix this historic relation of state, territory and people in time and place, symbolising stability and institutional continuity while legitimising present power relations. Monuments and memorials at battlefields and elsewhere venerate the great men and fallen heroes of glorious victories and traumatic defeat in highly masculine spaces. National museums display the achievements, superiority and civilising mission of the nation with regard to its enemies (Gillis 1996; Till 2003). Some places and even whole landscapes such as the Rütli in Switzerland, Masada in Israel or the image of ‘father Rhine’ in
Germany become the expression of the typical character of the nation. A scenery for historic and mythic events, they symbolise the nation’s unity or mark the imagined homeland of a people (R. J. Kaiser 2002, pp.234–235; Smith 2003, p.140). Places of memory anchor the past in space and thereby contribute to the demarcation of territory in which space is nationalised and the nation is territorialised. As concrete and seemingly timeless markers, they naturalise the history of the nation and make it seem unalterable (R. J. Kaiser 2002, p.232; Smith 2003, pp.134–135; Till 2003, p.189).

The connection between places of memory and identity politics, nationalism, boundary-making and territorial claims makes them prone to becoming important instruments in ethno-nationalist conflicts and outright war. In war, territories are often claimed with the argument that a group had a deep historical connection to it, being their original historic homeland, the cradle of the nation or their original area of settlement. Meanwhile, the opponent is characterised as an intruder or occupying force that must be driven out of the space that is sacredly bound to one’s own group (Schetter & Weissert 2007). The Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds), as a pivotal place of memory in Serbian nationalist imagery, is for many Serbian nationalists still one of the most important reasons for claiming that Kosovo is an indivisible part of the Serbian nation (Sundhaussen 2008).

Indeed, war itself is normally one of the most important triggers for memorialisation and memorials and commemorations may significantly contribute to a culture of violence in protracted conflicts. The creation of memorials for the heroes and innocent civilian victims who died in war, as well as the commemorations surrounding them establishes a narrative about the conflict – normally one in which the own victimisation and righteousness is emphasised while the opponent is perceived as inhuman and unjust. Such a “victimhood nationalism” (Lim 2010) supported by places of memory is a powerful instrument for internal disciplining that helps justify the conflict and the ultimate sacrifice of dying for the sake of the nation (Bar-Tal 2003; Hutchinson 2009). Such a deeply biased memorial landscape of one-sided victimisation can be observed in Bosnia, where different ethnic groups still prefer to commemorate those whom they lost in the war separately and with differing narratives of victimisation that in themselves already carry the seed for future conflict (Duijzings 2008). The same is true for Northern Ireland, where even today Republicans and Loyalists create separate and highly chauvinistic memorial landscapes, staging their own narratives of heroic struggle and victimhood in public space and thereby continuously reinforcing segregation (Graham 2011).
It has become obvious that places of memory are not as innocently bound to the past as they often seem to be. Instead, they are the focus of very present struggles over the use of the past for the present and the future. While nationalist elites may construct memorials to monopolise the past and use it as an instrument of power for group coercion, it is rather doubtful that this goal is ever achieved. Different social groups perceive the past and capitalise on it differently and may therefore contest the narratives that the state intends to impose with an official memorial. This is even more so the case in pluralistic democracies in which a multitude of narratives and perceptions of the past co-exist among individuals and social groups. One and the same place of memory may have a multitude of meanings depending on the observer. Even such a highly symbolic place as a former concentration camp may have very different meanings and will be used quite differently depending on the viewpoint of the visitor. A survivor will have totally different associations with the place and their purpose for the visit will be totally different from that of an ordinary tourist, a youth group or an official state delegation (Assmann 2006b, p.330).

Further, what may be a monument to a national hero for one group might be the depiction of an oppressor or perpetrator to a group holding a subaltern counter-memory. Such counter-present or popular memories may also create their own places and rituals to challenge and compete with dominant hegemonic accounts of the past in public space. Nuala Johnson (1995) illustrates this constellation by showing how the memorial landscape of early 20th-century Dublin consisted of parallel representations of the British colonial past and Irish nationalism. Rather often, the places of such subaltern memories may reflect the power relations between hegemonic and marginalised accounts of the past. In this case the representation of subaltern memories will be situated in rather marginal locations connected to the dwelling places of the holders of this memory and may move to more central positions when they gain higher legitimacy. Thus, while there has been an overall boom in commemorating the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, many streets named after Martin Luther King, Jr. are often side streets located in poor black neighbourhoods (Alderman 2006).

Indeed, places of memory are part of a multi-vocal landscape of competing narratives about the past. Different groups may claim the same place of memory and try to impose upon it their own reading of the past or establish alternative places. They do so because a vision of the past cast into the stone of a monument, memorial or museum anchors this past as a legitimate one in public space. Therefore, places of memory contain a massive symbolic capital that can be used by different groups to lobby for their political goals in the present and
future of society based on their representation of the past. This further shows that places of memory are both the result and the focus of conflict in which different agents fight to establish their own versions of the past as dominant in the memorial landscape or at least to alter the prevailing constellation. As we have seen, which agent is able to represent its version of the past in the public arena depends on the current power relations. Still, these power relations may change, which again has implications on the narratives of the past built into the political landscape. Apart from being conflictive and multi-vocal at any given point in time, places of memory are therefore also malleable over time. Berlin’s memorial landscape is a good example for this process of memorial change and adaptation over time, as it simultaneously displays the ruins and remnants of the past intermingled with present readings and representations. Memories from different epochs, the German Empire, the Weimar Republic, the Nazi Regime, the division in East and West, and finally its reunification, all exist parallel to one another, overlapping and changing along with the political framework, thus forming a palimpsest to which new meanings may continuously be added (Huyssen 2003; Till 2005).

This process does not even spare such emblematic places as the former National-socialist concentration and extermination camps. Andrew Charlesworth (1994) describes the continuous modification of the former extermination camp Auschwitz-Birkenau from a symbol of communist resistance, martyrdom and victory over Fascism, to a place of Polish-Catholic martyrdom within an atmosphere of growing nationalist resistance against Communist rule from the 1970s onwards. In these narratives of Communist versus Polish martyrdom, Jewish victims initially had no place. Maoz Azaryahu (2003) tells us a similar story about the former Nazi concentration camp in Buchenwald. After the end of the Second World War, it became a shrine representing the founding narrative of Communist resistance against Fascism that served to legitimate the Socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR). After Germany’s reunification, it became a lengthy endeavour involving a historians’ commission to ‘re-orient’ the narrative presented at Buchenwald into a historically sound and politically correct account that better fitted the new reunified Germany.  

Such shifts in the memorial landscape occur quite normally after regime changes and, in the case of revolutionary upheaval, may even go hand-in-hand with an iconoclasm of the symbols of the old regime and their subsequent replacement by the symbols of those newly in power.

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7 For a good overview on the politics of memorialising the Nazi past in East and West Germany as well as after Germany’s reunification, see Peter Reichel (1995). James E. Young (1993) gives a fascinating account on the different cultures of memorialising the Holocaust that have developed in Germany, Poland, Israel and the United States.
In transitions from war to peace and from authoritarian to democratic rule that come along with a political opening, counter-narratives of the past that had long been banished from public life into the realm of the private, the diaspora or the resistance movement become publically expressible. Hegemonic accounts of the past become instable and subject to contestation as formerly marginalised agents enter into the public arena and claim legitimacy for their alternative accounts of the past and visions for the future. But change may not come quickly, as the old elites fiercely resist any re-writing of the past that endangers the status quo. In post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies, struggles over the interpretation of the past between opposing memory entrepreneurs occur nearly inevitably. Places of memory once again become the focus of this turmoil, in which different social agents want to establish their version of the past and vision for the present and future of society as a legitimate one in changing power constellations.

But the memorial landscape created in a given space must not necessarily be the result of clearly distinguishable opposing versions of a hegemonic state narrative versus a subaltern popular memory exploited by elites for power politics. Different groups and individuals create memorials and monuments often rather spontaneously out of a myriad of different reasons and may do so with or without the support of the state and other elites. Jay Winter (Winter 1995; Winter & Sivan 1999), for example, argues that the commemorative landscape created after the First World War is not so much an expression of a state-sponsored nationalist veneration of those who died at war in order to blame the enemy, but rather the result of the local agency of ordinary people that needed a place for joint mourning of their lost relatives in public space. While there are definitely instances in which state agencies impose a place of memory without much consultation, some sort of cooperation between the state and other memory entrepreneurs is the rule. When a group wants to establish a place of memory, it normally has to cooperate with the state to find a suitable terrain in public space. Further, financing must be secured for the project, which again can only be achieved by cooperating with the state and other donors. Finally, it may make sense to form a broad alliance with the state and other agents and groups to strengthen the legitimacy of the memorial project, make it more visible in the public and secure that the message to be transmitted by the place is widely recognised. The state may also take up or co-opt such civil society initiatives when seen as politically relevant or useful. Cath Collins (2011) shows for the case of Chile that most projects to commemorate the victims of the Pinochet dictatorship were brought forward by civil society, often including survivors and relatives of victims, while the financing was been largely provided by a patchwork of different state institutions. In turn, government officials co-opt
and capitalise on successful memorialisation projects such as the *Villa Grimaldi* or the *Paine Memorial* by participating in the inauguration ceremonies or attending conferences at the site. The same is true for Argentina, where the governments of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner have supported several memorialisation projects spearheaded by civil society, most prominently the *Parque de la Paz* (Peace Park) and the creation of a memory museum at the *Escuela de la Mecánica de la Armada*, both in Buenos Aires.

This will also be the case when the state wants to establish a place of memory. Without some level of consent with locals, a memorial may be at best invisible and in the worse case a focus for fierce resistance and even destruction. This can be seen in Halabja, the Kurdish city in Northern Iraq tragically prominent for Saddam Hussein’s gas attack in 1988. On the 15th anniversary of the attack in 2003, Kurdish officials built a large memorial to the victims of the attack. It was destroyed in 2006 by local residents that saw it as not fitting to the needs of the survivors and as another instance of Kurdish officials grossly capitalising on the catastrophe (BBC 2006).

Further, although accounts of the past may be highly conflicting at first site, they may still draw upon the same tropes, images and repertoires of aesthetic representation guided by a meta-narrative (Ashplant et al. 2000). Such meta-narratives or “regimes of memory” (Radstone & Hodgkin 2005) may remain stable over a long period of time and provide memory entrepreneurs with a set of assumptions, figures and forms on how to interpret and represent the past. A good example for this is the museum as an aesthetic form of representation of the past. Although associated with the authoritarian discourses of nation-building and colonialism, it continues to enjoy wide acceptance as a form of representation, even when displaying the victimhood of those suffering from nationalism and colonialism.

The loss of life in war and through other atrocities forms a powerful trigger to establish places of memory. Ex-combatants, survivors and family members of those killed in war or murdered in a dictatorship may form what Jay Winter (1995) calls “fictive kinship groups”, a group of people bound together by their common experience of loss, trauma and mourning. Often, they are at the forefront when lobbying for an accurate acknowledgement and representation of their experience in public space. This is even more so after civil wars and dictatorships in which the existence of human rights violations has been denied and victims marginalised or silenced. The demand for creating places of memory may be especially high when the remains of those perished cannot be recovered. The Holocaust is here, once again, prototypical, but also the practice of forced disappearance characteristic to so many dictatorships and civil wars, especially in Latin America, may be an important trigger for memorialisation. The
constant denial of involvement by state authorities, the prolonged search for their relatives and the impunity of perpetrators make it clear that victim groups, often supported by human rights organisations, are prominent memory entrepreneurs claiming acknowledgement for their story and legitimacy of their demands by seizing former clandestine detention centres, uncovering mass graves and creating memorials. But even if this might be a seemingly clear and just cause for public memorialisation, the creation of a place of memory will always be subject to at least some form of struggle between different social agents who quarrel about the position, form and content of the place (Jelin 2002, pp.54–57).

To add another characteristic to the already complex image presented here, places of memory are also highly lucrative. By accentuating a specific and unique past built into the landscape, memory entrepreneurs position themselves within the global heritage industry (Atkinson 2007). Agents may capitalise in two different ways on such places of memory: directly, as tourist destinations, and indirectly, by contributing to the marketing of place to promote investment, enterprise, residence or recreational activities in a place with the image of a unique past (Tunbridge & Ashworth 1996, p.59). Especially the tourism to sites associated with death, atrocities or disaster has sparked a whole body of literature termed “dark tourism” (Lennon & Foley 2004) or “thanatourism” (Seaton 1999). The visit to former battlefields, crime and massacre sites, where death and sinister pasts can be symbolically encountered, provide the tourist with an experience that is both thrilling and reassuring. Still, Erica Lehrer and Cynthia Milton (2011, pp.4–5) argue that the voyeurism and commercialisation somewhat implied in the term “dark tourism” may not necessarily underlie the visits to atrocity sites. These visits may also be carried out by people who earnestly want to learn about and from the past or want to show solidarity with victims. Indeed, investing in a place of memory that promotes acknowledgement of accountability for past atrocities may generate an important profit other than money for memory entrepreneurs: that of promoting human rights and democracy (Bilbija & Payne 2011). Still, as there are very different spatial memory products for different consumer groups, and agents may try to exploit these sites differently, politically as well as economically, places of memory or heritage sites necessarily remain dissonant (Tunbridge & Ashworth 1996).

2.2.2 The Forms of Memorialisation

Elizabeth Jelin and Victoria Langland (2003; see also Jelin 2007) distinguish between three different types of places of memory that they see as especially important for the context of the former military dictatorships in the Southern Cone. They also provide a useful classification
for illustrating the complex inter-relationship between different places of memory and their symbolism on the one hand and groups of agents and the meanings they attach to place on the other:

1. Places in which historic events took place, such as former concentration camps, battle and massacre sites, former detention and torture centres and mass graves are of special importance. As ‘authentic’ places they seem to provide a direct connection to the events that took place there and to those who lost their lives, while also functioning as physical evidence of the past. Still, as authentic these places may seem, they seldom remain untouched by the work of memory entrepreneurs. While the preservation of such sites itself involves some kind of intervention, they normally emphasise one specific narrative of the past, while downplaying others and may therefore become intensely disputed.

2. The construction of ‘inauthentic’ places such as monuments, memorials, museums or parks that honour specific events, individuals or groups is another prominent strategy of memory entrepreneurs. Although many museums and memorials are constructed ‘on site’, they must not necessarily have a direct spatial relation to the authentic places. Still, the promoters of such places will normally make sure that they at least have some symbolic relation, either by location or aesthetic design, to the events in question.

3. Finally, places of memory do not need to have a solid form. In movement and performance in space, such as during demonstrations, commemorative marches, artistic performances and public rituals, specific memories are played out. As a territorialised practice, such performances periodically confirm or disrupt the notions within an established memorial landscape, adding new meanings to places otherwise insignificant.

For the case of sites where historic events have taken place, former Nazi concentration camps are, once again, a good example. Several authors show how they have been used for different political purposes over time in different countries and thus contain multiple meanings for different social groups (Young 1993; Charlesworth 1994; Reichel 1995; Azaryahu 2003; Assmann 2006a). In Cambodia, the notorious Tuol Sleng torture centre (also known as S-21 prison) in the capital and the Killing Fields of Choeung Ek near Phnom Penh bear witness to the extreme and arbitrary violence carried out by the Red Khmer regime from 1975 to 1979. Still, most authors agree that they were designed by the state to justify the Vietnamese invasion ending the rule of the Red Khmer and to legitimise the installation of a more
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moderate Communist regime that is in power until today. Further, the display of human remains at both places is in stark contrast to the Buddhist beliefs of local people (Ledgerwood 2002; Hughes 2006a; Hughes 2006b). Former clandestine detention centres involved in the practice of torture and forced disappearance have been at the centre of many memorialisation initiatives brought forward by victims’ and survivors’ associations and human rights groups in countries like Chile and Argentina. Villa Grimaldi, a former clandestine detention centre in Santiago de Chile used by the intelligence services to detain, interrogate and subsequently ‘disappear’ alleged opponents of the Pinochet regime, became the first successful civil society initiative to seize and convert such a site into a memorial. But the half-demolished site that was due to be sold for real estate purposes could only be claimed from the Chilean state after a long and enduring struggle of survivors, neighbours and human rights organisations before it finally became the Parque por la Paz (Peace Park) in 1997 (Lazzara 2004; Schindel 2004; Collins 2011). In Argentina, the struggle surrounding the Escuela de la Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) in Buenos Aires, from which the notorious ‘death flights’ took off to throw sedated prisoners into the La Plata River alive, received particular attention. While designated to be demolished as a sign of national unity and reconciliation during the presidency of Carlos Menem, civil society fought a fierce – and even legal – battle to recover the site. In 2001, the Argentinean Supreme Court ruled the site not be demolished, as it constituted cultural heritage and was still of evidential value in ongoing judicial proceedings concerning the human rights violations during the military dictatorship (Schindel 2004; Heidhues 2008). The opposing ideas of preserving the remains of a violent past for the sake of new generations or erasing them as symbol of forgetting and reconciliation also characterises the debate surrounding the former prison of Long Kesh (a.k.a. The Maze) near Belfast in Northern Ireland. Closed after the Good Friday Agreements, it is subject to at least three different narratives of victimisation: those of former Republican as well as Unionist inmates and those of the prison personnel that became victims of targeted assassinations. The heavily disputed master plan for the conversion of the site that includes the partial destruction but also preservation of prison facilities, contains a multi-sports stadium and the creation of an International Centre for Conflict Transformation (McLaughlin 2007; McDowell 2009; Flynn 2011).

Memorials, monuments and museums, when not built at the authentic sites of events, need to employ other measures to make up for their obvious lack of authenticity. They can do so by the prominence and centrality of their location, their architectural design and size as well as the rituals and performances associated with them (Pieper 2006, p.314). Especially museums
and exhibitions use different authentic objects and media such as photography and film to provide a direct and emotional attachment to the past. As a “non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment” (International Council of Museums (ICOM) 2007, p.2), museums have the extraordinary power to present events that happened over a long period of time at very different places in a properly ordered and classified account within a single, coherent narrative, thus collapsing time and space into the neatly arranged space of the museum or exhibition. Further, as museums are associated with the process of nation-building, they are invested with the notion of official state authority and moral weight, granting full legitimacy and recognition to whatever narrative they present. It is not surprising then that especially museums and exhibitions are regularly sucked into “culture wars” in which different agents heavily fight about the narratives and forms of representations in museums (Dubin 2006). A good example for this is the Enola Gay exhibition “The End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb and the Cold War” at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington D.C. commemorating the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in 1995. For its critical stance, that included the effects of the bomb on the Japanese civilian population, it came under massive criticism by American veterans’ associations, who saw a focus on the Japanese victims as inappropriate. The exhibition was finally cancelled and the museum’s director resigned (Zolberg 1996).

The terms ‘monument’ and ‘memorial’ are normally used synonymously for any sculpture, structure or physical marker that serves in remembrance of a person, a group of persons or an event (Binder 2001, p.117; Williams 2007, pp.7–8; Doss 2010, p.38). Even more than museums, monuments and memorials must be viewed as inseparable from bodily performances and rituals that give them meaning (Binder 2001, p.119). This may be more visible during the phase of a group lobbying for a specific memorial, which often includes debates about its form and function. The inauguration of the monument then becomes the performative climax. When the memorial afterwards fails to provide any meaning for different groups of people or individuals and is not integrated into some commemorative cycle over time, they may rapidly fall into decay (Karge 2008). It is this point when Robert Musil’s famous remark “there is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument” (Musil [1927] cited in Young 1993, p.13) becomes true. Still, monuments and memorials are built as symbolic devices that represent and legitimate political claims and make identification with a certain person, group or event possible. In this respect, museums may also be seen as
monuments, as their monumental architecture and design as well as the centrality of their location in the landscape add to their representative and legitimising function. But even more so than a museum exhibition, a monument reduces complex historical processes that happened over long periods of time at very different places into a single narrative represented symbolically in an extremely compressed spatial setting. This further underlines the association of such places of memory with notions of unity, homogeneity and continuity over time and space (Lipp 1999). This extreme reduction of complexity in a monument or memorial may be as attractive to certain groups seeking to mediate a specific perception of the past in public space, as it may be irritating and offensive to those who do not share this perception. In 2000, a monument of Salvador Allende was erected on the square in front of the La Moneda Palace, the seat of the Chilean President in Santiago de Chile. With its figurative and rather conservative design and its location near to the seat of government and next to the monuments of other notable Chilean statesmen, it represented the attempt of Chilean government officials to normalise the memory of the political figure Allende and integrate it into a continuum of great historical persons in Chilean history. Still, this representation did not fit with the controversial role Allende plays in Chilean political life, where his figure is rather that of Socialist martyr or of one responsible for social chaos and conflict. Not surprisingly the monument, was heavily criticised from the political Right as well as from the Left (Hite 2004; Schindel 2004, p.161). In 1998, the small town of Alcalde in New Mexico became famous for what would later be called the “Oñate foot-chopping incident”. Overnight, the right foot of an equestrian monument dedicated to Juan de Oñate, a 16th-century Spanish conquistador who lead an expedition into the territory that would later become the State of New Mexico, had been chopped of. In a note to the local media, the persons responsible claimed to have mutilated the monument in the name of the Native Americans that had suffered from Oñate’s expedition and its consequences. Again, a monument to a personage rather popular among the Hispanic population of the region had been perceived as a blow to the face of the historical memory of Native Americans (Doss 2010, pp.313–316).

Finally, and as a last remark on inauthentic places of memory, commemorative street names are a special case. Their everyday use and visibility, as well as their deep connection to the places where people live and work, anchor narratives of the past deep in the private sphere of individuals. The re-naming of streets will be met with fierce resistance, as this is perceived as a violation of the privacy of the street’s inhabitants (Azaryahu 1996). In Germany, struggles sporadically erupt over the re-naming of streets dedicated to personalities associated with
National Socialism or the colonial past, as well as those that refer to territorial claims. While some argue for a change of street names, others see them as important markers of past historical realities and thus as worthy of upholding (Dörries 2012).

As Paul Connerton (1989) notes, it is bodily performance by which the meaning and knowledge of the past is mediated and transferred. Anniversaries and commemorations connected to rituals that cyclically re-occur over time establish stable meanings of the past and re-affirm them periodically. However, these performances do not only occur in time, but also in place. It is through performance that meanings are constructed around places, and social agents deliberately select a place to stage a performance, as the place will add to its desired symbolic effect. Sandra Petermann (2011), for example, shows that the commemorative ceremonies staged for the anniversaries of the Allied landing in Normandy gradually changed over time, adding new meanings to the place according to actual political currents. While D-Day commemorations remained an undertaking of patriotic remembrance until the 1980s, they were later integrated into the symbolic politics of reconciliation and unification among the European nations, constituting a kind of founding myth for the European Union. An extraordinary memory performance can be observed every Thursday in Buenos Aires where the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, wearing white headscarves and carrying the photos of their children disappeared at the hands of the Argentinean military regime have been holding their commemorative marches since 1977. With their performance, the central square of the Argentinean capital in front of the presidential palace is temporarily transformed from a place associated with government authority to the site of a subaltern memory and resistance (Bosco 2004). The same is true for the Argentinean city of Neuquén, where the human rights movement organised memorial marches on specific dates, such as the anniversary of the coup d’état in 1976, Human Rights Day or Mother’s Day, to protest against the military regime. With ritual performances and movement in space they occupy the public arena and by stopping at certain places significant to the human rights movement they turn spaces of everyday use into symbolically laden places of memory (Mombello 2004). One particularly alternative form of memory performance created by the children of the disappeared are the so-called escraches (Argentina) or funas (Chile), in which the domiciles of perpetrators are marked in a public and playful combination of memory, community work and art, disrupting the daily routines in the district while demanding justice (S. Kaiser 2002; Becker & Burkert 2008).

Indeed, artistic performances are of high importance in memory work as they focus on questioning established memory discourses in public space (Till 2008). To once again cite an
example from Argentina that is definitely one of the most creative terrains of memory work, the *bici* project by the artist Fernando Traverso has especially sparked attention. His painted silhouettes of lone bicycles strewn across the façades of Argentinean cityscapes are a powerful reminder to those disappeared by the Argentinean military (Hite 2012, pp.90–111). Similarly, in 1999 Guatemala City was dotted with photo collages of angels, mostly placed near buildings and facilities belonging to the Guatemalan army. These ‘street angels’ were the work of photographer Daniel Hernández-Salazar, who used them as a subtle public protest against the intolerable culture of impunity and injustice in his country (Hoelscher 2008). What all these instances of artist and activist memory work – memory marches, *escraches*, *bici* and ‘street angels’ – have in common are their intention to performatively disrupt established moral geographies of memory. Moral geographies are described by Tim Cresswell (1996; 2007) as naturalised geographical imaginations according to which certain objects, actions and bodies are appropriate in certain places and not in others. They form subtle social rules of behaviour in space that define what is “in place” or simply “out of place”. Any infringement of these rules is therefore considered a transgression.\(^8\) The memory work described above can thus be seen as deliberate acts of transgression that disrupt and question the dominant moral geographies of memory normally in place, partially replacing them with alternative visions.

2.2.3 A New Paradigm of Memorialisation

The search for alternative forms of expression and representations of historically suppressed or marginalised accounts of the past is one of the most notable features of the memory boom several authors have diagnosed since at least the 1980s, and which is most visible in the massive proliferation of memorials, monuments and museums. In many accounts, the constant reference to the past visualised in places of memory is interpreted as countering the dissolution of time and space in liquid modernity: “In that sense, local and national memory practices contest the myths of cyber-capitalism and globalisation and their denial of time, space, and place” (Huyssen 2003, p.28). Andreas Huyssen even sees the spectre of “hypertrophy” (Ibid., p. 3), “obsession” (Ibid., p. 16), “inflation” (Ibid., p. 30) or an “excess of memory” (Ibid., p. 95) in the proliferation of commemorations and places of memory. With this rather pessimistic view he follows Pierre Nora, who sees the disappearance of traditional milieus in a post-national context as responsible for the obsessive nostalgia associated with the creation of places of memory. But not only the quantity of memorialisation activities

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\(^8\) A good example for a moral geography, also used by Cresswell, is the association of the female body with the home, where it is considered “in place” and away from public space, where it is believed to be “out of place”.
seems to have grown, the wheel of commemoration also appears to turn at an accelerating pace: Only three weeks after the attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, curators held their first expert meeting to discuss how to proceed with the artefacts left over by the disaster. A first exhibition displaying parts of the WTC building, airplane and car wreckage along with personal belongings of victims was created for the first anniversary of 9/11, and in London a memorial for the victims of the terrorist attacks on July 7, 2005 was inaugurated after only seven weeks (Williams 2007, pp.128–129). While the acceleration of historical time in the Second Modernity may definitely have some influence on the growing and ever more rapid creation of places of memory, Erika Doss (2010) sees the current “memorial mania” as an urge to control narratives about the past in increasingly pluralistic – we could also add fragmented – societies in which self-interest groups fight over recognition and prestige as a part of identity politics.

Still, the current memory boom is not without precedent. Many authors (Till 2003, pp.292–293; Winter 2006, p.18; Doss 2010, p.24) – as described above – see the first rapid expansion of memorialisation activities evolving around the age of nation-building, colonial and imperialist expansions throughout the late 19th and early 20th century. As part of the invention of traditions, monuments and memorials depicted the heroes and martyrs of history in a triumphant and progress-oriented way that provided no space for differing narratives of the past. Monumental designs were figurative and highly gendered, representing the ‘great men’ of the nation’s past while female figures appeared only as allegories of the nation or of virtues. The 19th century also saw the birth of national museums with their classical monumental designs and neatly ordered progressive narrative of the past that objectified national identities. Museum exhibitions were ordered progressively, from past to present and from primitive to complex, based on classification systems that included temporal, racial and gendered hierarchies. They gave the visitor the possibility to feel like part of an advanced national culture at the top end of human history while creating distance to culturally more primitive others (Macdonald 2003, pp.3–5; Till 2003, p.293). The national museum thereby became the future model for all political entities with the desire to represent their own ideologies in public space (Tunbridge & Ashworth 1996, p.63).

Tony Bennett (1988; 1995) traces the emergence of the public museum to the same period as the reformation of the carceral system – both 19th-century disciplining institutions of state authority, although obviously in different ways. The disciplining quality of the public museum first became visible in its power to provide order to all things, all times, and all
places in the museum’s limited space and make it subject to the controlling vision of the museum spectator. Further, the museum functioned as an institution of public instruction, being both a panopticon and a spectacle at the same time. While visitors had the power of vision over the objects displayed, they were also part of a crowd under constant surveillance by fellow visitors (and the museum guards), thereby (self)regulating their behaviour in the museum space. At the same time, museum visitors became subject to a knowledge transfer in which they subtly internalised the aesthetics, values and objectives of those in power. The museum can therefore be perceived as the soft approach to making governable citizens, not by disciplining and punishing, but by showing and telling. In this sense, it is rather ironic that Colombia’s national museum, founded in 1824, is now housed in a former penitentiary called El Panóptico, constructed in the 1870s, and shares many of Jeremy Bentham’s visions for a modern prison building. Still, the only prisoner left is history itself. The exhibition begins in the cellar with artefacts from the pre-Columbian period, slowly ascending through the history of Colombia until reaching the top floors of the building. The exhibition ends with the so-called Bogotazo, the violent political riots in Bogotá following the assassination of the popular political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 that marked the country’s decline into civil war. Here, Colombian history ends, giving way to a very own Colombian crisis of representation in the face of decades of political violence and civil war since.

Indeed, such crises of representation in the wake of the atrocities of war are often responsible for changing long-established forms of commemoration. The First World War triggered the first changes in the authoritarian memorial culture of nation-building and imperialism as the unprecedented scale of death demanded new approaches. Relatives of fallen soldiers demanded the public recognition of their loss. For the first time, ordinary, individual soldiers became worthy of commemoration, often visible in the list of names accompanying a monument. While still figurative and gendered, representing male sacrifice and female mourning, World War I memorials were less triumphant. More of an expression of fatigue and acceptance of duty to the fatherland, they were both patriotic and pacifistic, as the ultimate sacrifice they represented should not be allowed to happen again. Even commemorations in the inter-war period served the purpose of teaching younger generations about the horrors of war and the need to act for peace (Winter 1995, pp.93–97). It is not surprising then that this period also saw the creation of the first peace museums that overtly criticised the nationalist frenzy of war and sacrifice, such as the Anti-Kriegsmuseum (Anti-War Museum) in Berlin, founded by Ernst Friedrich in 1925, or even before World War I, the
International Museum of War and Peace in Lucerne, Switzerland, founded by the railroad tycoon and pacifist Jan Gotlib Bloch in 1902 (Muzaini 2008, p.1489).

Europe’s rapid industrialisation provided the basis for another development in opposition to official state memorialisation efforts: While German *Heimatmuseen* (homeland museums) functioned largely as local additions to the grand narrative of the nation (Macdonald 2003, p.4), the spread of folk museums in Europe from the 1890s onwards marked the first instances of representation of subaltern identities and classes, whose material cultures were seen to be threatened by the development of national mass cultures in the age of industrialisation (Tunbridge & Ashworth 1996, p.40). While even these local museums were curatorial projects of social elites made for the people without being ‘of the people’ (Ibid., p. 39), peace and folk museums as well as the changes in memorial design and meaning after World War I were a foretaste of developments in the sector of memorialisation that were to unfold on a larger scale after World War II and the Holocaust.

The genocide of six million European Jews may indeed be seen as point of departure for the coming-into-life of a new paradigm of memorialisation: one that acknowledges the historic suffering and sense of loss of those that had been excluded from public representation in uniform narratives of the past while using the memory of past atrocities to vaccinate societies against future tragedies. George Santayana’s famous remark “he who does not remember the past is destined to repeat it” has become the universal slogan for all that is new about today’s places of memory (Bickford & Sodaro 2010). But while the atrocities of World War II in general and the Holocaust in particular were already in their own rights powerful incentives to create places of memory, they are not the sole explanation for the rush to memorialise the past that struck Western societies from the 1980s onwards. Already prior to the 1980s, waves of decolonisation and democratisation along with the formation of movements of national minority groups, such as the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, had challenged the uniform national and imperial accounts of the past and pluralised the composition of memory entrepreneurs in the public arena. The 1980s then saw the emergence of a global human rights movement and the collapse of the Iron Curtain, accompanied by the third wave of democratisation and the undeniable presence of immigrant cultures in Western societies. This further added to a situation in which grand narratives of the past increasingly came under pressure, both by new and confident agents from beyond the national scheme as well as by the changing global political context itself. This was intensified by an ongoing sequence of human tragedies that provided new incentives for memorialisation, from the military dictatorships and dirty wars in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, to the Balkan wars and
Rwandan genocide in the 1990s, and finally the terrorist attacks of 9/11. With the global flow of people and information, wars and natural disasters became more visible and tangible, adding to a sense of insecurity in a global risk society (Beck 1992). The solid and apparently immobile structure of places of memory then assure us that past traumata may be represented and overcome, and manifest humanity’s clear task in the unstable context of the Second Modernity: to remember and not repeat (Williams 2007, p.50)!

The new purposes of acknowledging past injustices and traumata while providing the basis for the non-repetition of past tragedies, projected on places of memory by a multitude of heterogeneous memory entrepreneurs in an increasingly pluralistic public arena, meant the development of a new language of representation and civic engagement in monuments, memorials and museums. The figurative and triumphant designs used for memorials during the phase of nation-building, now seen as expression of nationalist frenzy that inevitably leads to mass murder and extermination, have given way to minimalist representations that evade any direct and easy interpretations. Rather, they disrupt traditional aesthetics of experiencing space and time to evoke the dissociative effects of trauma, and negate the possibility to fully understand the loss of life and integrate it into a coherent storyline (Doss 2010, p.146). Peter Eisenman’s design for the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin that consists of 2,700 concrete stelae of different height and placed over an uneven terrain stands for instability and disorientation, and finally the impossibility to understand (Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe n.d.). The ruptured structures characteristic for the memorial architecture of Daniel Liebeskind have a similar meaning, while the voids he integrated into Berlin’s Jewish Museum mark the presence of absence (Huyssen 2003, pp.104–108) – a spatial metaphor dominant in modern memorials (Doss 2010, p.143).

Another prototype of the new trends in memorialisation is Maya Lin’s 1983 Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington D.C. It consists of two black gabbro walls half sunken into the surrounding terrain that meet at an angle of 120° and display the names of the 58,272 American soldiers who were killed or went missing during the Vietnam War. Maya Lin’s design is reminiscent of an open wound in the landscape and has served as a model for the representation of trauma in totally different contexts: Most notably, Buenos Aires’ Monument to the Victims of State Terrorism (Monumento a las Víctimas del Terrorismo de Estado) is made up of a fragmented wall of names cutting through the terrain of the Parque de la Memoria.

Even more radically, artists from the counter-monument movement, such as Horst Hoheisel, overtly oppose monumental forms that provide any meaning. Rather, they argue for
‘vanishing monuments’, bottom-up art projects or deliberately no monuments at all as they are always the expression of power relations and will obscure memory in the end (Hoheisel 2009). Still other memorials are based on the assumption that trauma may be represented and healed. Design elements such as reflecting pools or soothing flows of water and neatly arranged groups of trees along a pre-determined pathway through the memorial symbolise a therapeutic rite de passage or pseudo-religious pilgrimage from unconceivable trauma towards reflection, healing and closure or even forgiveness and reconciliation (Huysseen 2003, pp.104–108; Williams 2007, pp.94–96; Doss 2010, pp.133–147).

The naming of victims – such as at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial or the Monument to the Victims of State Terrorism in Buenos Aires – has become a common feature, both of memorials and museums. Once a privilege reserved for statesmen and great national heroes, the naming of ordinary individuals can be seen as the democratisation of the memorial practice. Naming allows for a proper identification and recognition of those individuals that meant to be erased from history by their perpetrators. Further, it creates empathy as names stand for real people with an own biography, and not an anonymous mass of bodies (Bickford & Sodaro 2010, p.73; Doss 2010, pp.151–152).

Changes in style and practice can also be seen in museums, especially since the 1980s. This is the consequence of “new museology” (Vergo 1989) that self-critically engages with the biased and authoritarian categorisations, forms of display and narratives previously used in museums. New museum practices included an opening of the curatorial process to public consultation, providing space for participation and the insight that displayed objects may have multiple meanings according to context. Therefore, even national museums have increasingly turned to forms of display that allow for multiple readings and emphasise dialogue and the plurality of society. This deconstruction of uniform national grand narratives in public museums was accompanied by the creation of a whole range of small-scale museums dedicated to minority, migrant or oppressed identities representing pasts that had found no room in traditional museums (Macdonald 2003; Kratz & Karp 2006; Macdonald 2006). What all these instances have in common is that they see the creation of museums not as an end in itself, a simple storage of discrete information about the past, but as serving vital purposes for the present and future of society such as acknowledgement, social inclusion, the healing of trauma, and education towards a more tolerant and democratic society. In this sense, new museums form “tactical museologies” (Buntinx & Karp 2006) with specific addressees and aims to contribute to social change.
One museum form that has become especially prominent during the 1980s and 1990s is what Katrin Pieper (2006), citing Susan Sontag (2003, pp. 87–88), calls “memory museums” and Paul Williams (2007) refers to as “memorial museums”. They are museal institutions that serve the double function of being a memorial and an exhibition site for the display of socio-political targets for the future. As national, state-run or at least state-associated institutions, they serve the purpose of commemorating the victims of past atrocities while using the traumatic past as a platform to address current social and political topics, such as different forms of discrimination and racism, as well as to foster dialogue, tolerance and democratic culture (Pieper 2006, pp.23–25). Often, they also function as archives, research centres and conference venues, contributing to the creation and exchange of knowledge as well as the clarification of the events concerned (Williams 2007, p.21). Prominent exemplars include the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington D.C., the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles, the Jewish Museum Berlin, the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre in Rwanda or the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago de Chile. Their exhibitions focus on authenticity, witnessing, experience and performance to make the past comprehensible and to create empathy with the victims. The use of photographs that either display past atrocities or the faces of victims emphasises that the past really did happen, and that it happened to real people with a name and a face, just like us. The same effect is created with the display of clothes and personal belongings as well as the use of personal testimonies of victims and survivors, all of which have become indispensable exhibition elements. In memory museums that are installed at the sites where the events took place, the museum or memorial space itself functions as evidence of the past and as a possibility to personally experience it. If memorial museums are created independently of ‘authentic sites’, experience of the past is created through other design elements and arrangements, such as replica or the re-constructions of rooms, prisons and torture cells. A visit to such a place is sometimes also seen as a positive way for those personally affected by an event to master their trauma, or as part of a ritual of pilgrimage and revelation for those who seek knowledge about the past. The importance of the knowledge derived in the memory museum is further emphasised by cross-references to current instances of injustice, atrocity and genocide. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, for example, has already housed exhibitions on former Yugoslavia and Darfur. The lesson is clear: By learning about the past, the visitor is called to action to prevent future atrocities (Williams 2007).

While memory museums rather constitute a top-down official endeavour, museal spaces dedicated to subaltern memories and identities have increasingly enriched the memoryscape...
from the bottom up. In these cases, museums provide minority groups with a space in which they can confidently represent their culture and history, previously considered unworthy of exhibition, and where they can voice the demand of becoming fully accepted and recognised in society. On a grassroots level, the creation of museums and exhibitions may even be used deliberately as an instrument of social inclusion and cohesion, community empowerment and development. Community museums can form bottom-up projects in which local people actively participate in designing the museum, selecting the objects to be displayed and the narrative to be told. Reversing the power relations in traditional museums, in which powerful elites decided who was to be displayed how, they give the historically marginalised the possibility to gain control over the representation of their own history and develop a sense of pride and belonging. The lack of permanence and expertise these spaces sometimes possess is of minor interest, as the project’s emphasis lies on the process of jointly creating community and developing new skills and capacities (Crooke 2006). The District Six Museum in Cape Town, established in 1994, is a good example. Once a multi-ethnic community, the population was forcefully re-settled in the 1970s and early 1980s as part of the apartheid policy, while the district itself was largely bulldozed. The museum emerged out of a campaign against the commercial re-development of the area in the late 1980s and became part of a movement to re-claim the district in the name of those who were forcefully removed from it. The museum uses oral history, photographs and other audio-visual media, original street signs of the district as well as a full map of the district covering the museum floor to recall the once vibrant community life. The exhibition is also interactive, allowing the visitors to change or add information to it. Seen as a space where the former (and future) residents of District Six can come together to share experiences and memories, it contributes to an ongoing process of re-creating a shattered community while providing a space for social mobilisation against apartheid and its consequences (McEachern 1998; Crooke 2006, pp.174–175; Rassool 2006). A new impulse of memorialisation emerged in the 1980s from the Mexican state Oaxaca, where indigenous rural communities became increasingly reluctant to leave their rich cultural heritage to the care of centralised government institutions. Encouraged by two anthropologists, Teresa Morales Lersch and Cuauhtémoc Camarena, local indigenous populations began to create their own museos comunitarios (community museums) and took the representation of their cultural heritage into their own hands. Camarena and Morales see community museums as an important instrument of self-empowerment for rural indigenous communities struck by the loss of traditions and values under cultural globalisation and weakened by the migration to the United States. Their approach to creating community
museums includes extensive community dialogue that enhances local mechanisms of decision-making and strengthens group cohesion, thereby equipping locals with the tools to better manage internal conflicts and resist external pressures. Community meetings and workshops also create and enhance capacities and form communal leadership. The display of the community’s rich cultural heritage is meant to create a new pride and sense of belonging, especially among the younger generations, and functions as social capital and as a source of resilience, thus reinforcing the community’s social fabric endangered by globalisation. Further, when integrated into national and international tourism circuits, community museums also provide new sources of income, directly via the museum, or indirectly, via the sale of local craftwork in or along the museum. Finally, the community museums of Oaxaca are also a sort of ‘window to the world’ that contribute to regional, national and even international exchange and place the community within the framework of global civil society (Camarena & Morales 2006). Ironically, the creation of the museos comunitarios in Oaxaca, although intended as a form of local resistance against cultural globalisation, used the Western instrument of the museum as the choice form of representation and relied heavily on funding by international donor agencies, such as the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), and on international expertise. Also, their integration into the (global) tourist economy seems rather paradox. Under the auspices of Camarena and Morales, the idea of museos comunitarios in indigenous rural communities spread from Oaxaca throughout Mexico, and finally throughout the Americas (Healy 2003). Although museos comunitarios adapted to local peculiarities, they had themselves become a product of cultural globalisation. When it spread to Guatemala in the late 1990s, local Maya and human rights activists added a new feature to the community museum idea: Sites such as the Museo Comunitario Rabinal Achí or the Centro Histórico y Educativo Río Negro Riij Ib’ooy are not only places for the representation and preservation of rural indigenous identities and cultures, but also places for the commemoration and recognition of the mostly indigenous victims of the 36 years of Guatemalan civil war. This double function of commemoration and identity formation serves the re-construction of the community’s social fabric devastated by the civil war (Museo Comunitario Rabinal Achi 2002; Centro Histórico y Educativo Río Negro Riij Ib’ooy n.d.). Here, community museums become invested with meanings and forms of representation, such as the display of photos and

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9 Teresa Morales is described by Kevin Healy (2003, pp. 16–17) as: “The daughter of a Spanish father and a North American mother, Morales had grown up in Mexico City, graduated from Dartmouth College and received a Fulbright grant for advanced anthropology studies in Mexico where she met her husband [Cuauhtémoc Camarena].”
personal belongings of victims, that are very familiar to memory museums built in other contexts of societies after wars and atrocities.

Indeed, this shows that even if places of memory are created deliberately as forms of resistance against the processes of globalisation, they remain themselves an integral part of it. Specific forms of memorialisation may always arise from very local contexts and may nevertheless travel through global networks of information and expertise and gain importance to people far away from their original settings (Jelin 2002, pp.14–15). This could already be observed in the spread of memory and community museums and their respective forms and functions as well as in the abstract and minimalist monumental language of memorials. Even the counter-monument movement is increasingly becoming globalised, as Horst Hoheisel promotes counter-monument initiatives across the globe and has become an expert in great demand in this field. The performances of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina also had a major impact on the global human rights movement, sparking similar memory performances by bereaved relatives in other parts of the world. The reason for this globalising trend lies in the power of places of memory to be structures that are seen to emit authority and legitimacy while conveying multiple meanings to different agents over time. As such, they may simultaneously convey local and national meanings while being integrated into a transnational memory culture built on an increasingly globalised language of memorialisation.

It comes as no surprise then that the memorialisation of the Holocaust has become the main point of reference for a cosmopolitan memory culture, and Auschwitz is probably its pivotal place of memory (Levy & Sznaider 2007). With its meaning as one of the emblematic places of the extermination of the European Jews, it is universalised and re-integrated into different local and national narratives, as the reminder and focus of German Vergangenheitspolitik (politics of the past), the symbol of Polish martyrdom, the Israeli self-conception of ‘never again us’ and the United States trope for the ‘Good War’ (Young 1993). Thus, Auschwitz or the Holocaust respectively serve as a global icon of war atrocities, racism, state terror and genocide perpetrated by ruthless criminals upon defenceless civilian victims, as the ‘original template’ by which all present and future instances of violence in very different settings are measured in order to legitimate a whole range of claims, from globally valid human rights, demands for truth, justice and reparations for victims, to calls for military intervention, as in the case of the Balkan Wars (Levy & Sznaider 2007, p.195; Assmann 2010, p.114).

The simultaneity of particular and universal meanings of the Holocaust is nowhere clearer than in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). Situated thousands of kilometres away from the sites where the genocide of the European Jews had taken place, at a
location on Washington D.C.’s Mall of America, it integrates the Holocaust into the monumental memoryscape of the American nation with its central narrative of freedom. It uses the specificity of the Holocaust to promote universal values that offer guidance in the wake of present and future human rights violations. During its inauguration in 1993, it already became a stage for international cross-referencing when Elie Wiesel used his speech to call for action in the war in Bosnia, and in a public ceremony on the first anniversary of 9/11, Holocaust survivors read out the names of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the Holocaust Museum (Pieper 2006, pp.192–194). Similar approaches to the universalisation and re-particularisation of the Holocaust narratives can also be seen at the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Beit Hashoah – Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles and the myriad of local Holocaust museums in the United States, from El Paso, Texas to Terre Haute, Indiana, and elsewhere. The Anne Frank Foundation, in itself already a transnational organisation with permanent exhibitions in seven countries, has also developed the travelling exhibition “Anne Frank – a History for Today” that has been shown in forty countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. It especially addresses young people and encourages them to reflect upon their own experiences of discrimination and ways to behave more tolerant towards others (Anne Frank Stichting n.d.). But a reference to the Holocaust is also made rather implicitly in totally different contexts: East German curators provided advice for the creation of the Tuol Sleng Museum in the former S-21 prison in Cambodia’s capital Phnom Penh. The display of photos of the mutilated bodies of prisoners, panels after panels of photos of the faces of victims and piles of clothing closely remind the visitor of the Nazi concentration camps. These images were thus of prime importance to frame the Red Khmer rule as genocide (Hughes 2006b; Williams 2007, p.175). The Kigali Memorial Centre as the central state-run memorial museum to the Rwandan genocide came into being in 2004 with the massive help from the British Aegis Trust – a private foundation dedicated to the remembrance of the Holocaust as a way to prevent future genocides – that had already created the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre (1995) in central Britain, which was inspired by Yad Vashem in Israel. Rwandan officials had visited several Holocaust memorials and museums and finally asked the Aegis Trust to design a memorial for the Rwandan genocide in 2003. Within a year, Aegis raised the necessary funds and created the exhibition for the memorial based on the model of its Holocaust Centre. The exhibition panels were even designed and produced in Britain and

10 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2007, pp. 180–181) also criticise that the iconography of the USHMM rather corresponds to Christian and not to Jewish ideas. They see this as a measure to guarantee a better identification of the Christian majority of American society with the museum. On the creation of the USHMM see also Edward Linenthal (1995)
later shipped to Rwanda. The Kigali Memorial Centre thus recalls the Rwandan genocide, but also integrates it into the larger history of genocides to prevent its re-occurrence. Once again, it uses texts, photographs, films, artefacts, testimonies, lists of names as well as human bones and clothing to make its point (Sodaro 2011; Kigali Memorial Centre n.d.; The National Holocaust Centre and Museum n.d.).

These examples bear witness to transnational networks in which experts and institutions of memorialisation exchange knowledge and experiences, and in which funding is provided, adding to a growing standardisation as different institutions cite each other’s forms and functions. Increasingly, these networks are being institutionalised, creating hubs of memory work. Founded back in 1946, the International Council of Museums (ICOM) today is a network of 30,000 museum professionals with 117 national committees that has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. It creates museum standards and enhances exchange and research. The International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), founded in 1967 and associated with UNESCO, has similar aims for different types of heritage sites. Again, ICOM also has 31 international committees for specific museum types, one of them being ICMEMO, the International Committee of Memorial Museums for the Remembrance of Public Crimes. Just founded in 2001, it is the answer to the unprecedented boom of memorial museums. The entity of a memorial museum is defined by ICMEMO as follows:

“*These institutions function as museums with a stock of original historical objects, which generally includes buildings, and work in all the classical fields of museum work (collecting, preserving, exhibiting, doing research, providing education). Their purpose is to commemorate the victims of state and socially determined, ideologically motivated crimes. They are frequently located at the original historical sites, or at places chosen by the victims of such crimes for the purpose of commemoration. They are conceived as memorials admonishing visitors to safeguard basic human rights. As these institutions co-operate with the victims and other contemporary witnesses, their work also takes on a psycho-social character. Their endeavours to convey information about historical events are morally grounded and aim to establish a definite relationship to the present, without abandoning a historical perspective.*” (Brebeck 2001, pp.3–4)

This definition once again reflects the double function of the commemoration of victims and the aspirations towards a peaceful future in which human rights are universally respected, also entrusting it with the aura of a facility for trauma work. ICMEMO sees itself as “a forum for communication, co-operation and information exchange, between museums, professional museum workers and others concerned with Memorial Museums” (ICMEMO 2007, p.1) and contributing to research and fundraising.
While ICMEMO is integrated into the broader range of intergovernmental organisations via its connection to UNESCO and is mostly made up of state-run or state-associated institutions, the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience has become the most important global network for civil-society initiatives of memorialisation. It was founded in 1999 by various public and civil society entities: the District Six Museum in Cape Town (South Africa), the Gulag Museum in Perm (Russia), the Liberation War Museum in Dhaka (Bangladesh), the Lower East Side Tenement Museum (USA), the *Maison Des Esclaves* on Goree Island near Dakar (Senegal), the United States National Park Service, *Memoria Abierta* (Argentina), Terezin Memorial (Czech Republic), and the Workhouse (United Kingdom). The organisation was founded with the support of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Open Society Institute as well as the Trust for Mutual Understanding and has its main seat in New York (Williams 2007, p.104). It unites a heterogeneous array of heritage sites, memorials, museums, governmental and non-governmental organisations using, managing or promoting the memorialisation of such diverse topics as the Holocaust, slavery, genocide, civil war, dictatorship, racism, immigration and labour conditions to stimulate dialogue on pressing current and future social issues, and to build a culture of human rights and democracy:

“Sites of Conscience may tell stories of mass atrocity or daily, individual struggles. They may preserve cultural or environmental resources. Each in their own way, Sites of Conscience seek to serve as significant new tools for building lasting cultures of human rights and democracy. By initiating new conversations about contemporary issues through a historical lens, places of memory can become new centers for democracy in action. But the power of historic sites is not inherent; it must be harnessed as a self-conscious tactic in the service of human rights and civic engagement. Sites of Conscience play this critical role.” (International Coalition of Sites of Conscience 2012a)

The coalition is further subdivided into five regional and two thematic networks, each coordinated by one of its founding members, and each with an own slogan that reflects the regional issues currently at stake in memorialisation work: The African Sites of Conscience Network, led by the District Six Museum wants to use “Histories of Citizen Action to Develop Post-Colonial and Post-Conflict Democracies”; the Asia Sites of Conscience Network, led by the Liberation War Museum in Bangladesh, promotes “Cultures of Peace, Pluralism, and Justice”; the European Sites of Conscience Network endorses “Cultures of Tolerance and Democratic Value by Addressing Xenophobia and Exclusion”; the Russian Sites of Conscience Network wants to build “an Anti-Totalitarian Culture”, and the Latin America American Sites of Conscience Network encourages “Debate through the Construction of Memory of the Recent Past” coordinated by *Memoria Abierta*, the NGO with the leading role in memorialising the Argentinean military dictatorship. Its two thematic
networks focus on immigration sites and Indian boarding schools, while a sixth regional network, the Middle East and North Africa Sites of Conscience Network, was set up in January 2012 as a direct response to the Arab Spring. All in all, the Coalition of Sites of Conscience is comprised of more than 300 sites and institutions for which it provides funding and training opportunities as well as programme and evaluation models, and functions as a platform for the exchange of expertise and experiences (International Coalition of Sites of Conscience 2012b).

Even at the grassroots level of the *museos comunitarios*, an international network reaching over the Americas was institutionalised with the help of the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) in 2008. Just like the other networks, it offers programme tools as well as funding and capacity-building opportunities (Red de Museos Comunitarios de América n.d.).

Finally, memorialisation is also rapidly conquering the virtual world, paradoxically making use of the same global communication technologies that Andreas Huyssen sees as one of the reasons for our obsessive escape into memory. Most memorials and museums have their own websites offering detailed information on their exhibitions and programmes, thereby becoming a place visible at every time and from any place. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum even offers a full virtual tour through the Peace Memorial Park and its Museum (Hiroshima Peace Site n.d.). *Memoria Abierta* has created a virtual, interactive map of the clandestine centres for torture and forced disappearance across Argentina (Memoria Abierta n.d.). Often, memorials provide lists of names of the victims the space is dedicated to, such as in the cases of most Holocaust memorials and the 9/11 Memorial (Doss 2010, pp.151–152). Other memorials are plainly virtual places of memory without any corresponding site in the ‘real world’. And Anne Frank has more than two million followers on Facebook (Facebook n.d.)!

Indeed the new museums and memorials have become more open, inclusive and dialogical. Nevertheless, even the new museums rely on objectification and narrativisation, presenting at least in part a pre-fabricated order of things and events that helps frame a mediated narrative about a specific topic. This may be necessary as monuments and museums do not have unlimited space available for their representations. They also have to compete for the attention and empathy of crowds of visitors with diverse backgrounds, which may make some simplification of the narrative seem tolerable. In the end, all places of memory are ‘tactical museologies’ that serve specific ends and therefore emphasise some aspects and leave out others, even if their aims are as progressive as tolerance, peace and democracy. The District Six Museum, for example, has been harshly criticised for its massive nostalgia that
romanticises the community life in the old district while sparing out poverty, over-crowding and criminality (Dubin 2006, p.490; Williams 2007, pp.84–86). In community museums, participation may also lead to distortion. In the worst case they may even help form and empower communities that are themselves based on exclusivity and sectarianism (Crooke 2006, pp.183–184). The inclusion of the dispossessed and unrepresented in memorialisation processes is still a great success story. But when transnationally operating expert and funding networks largely determine the forms and functions of subaltern memories, places of memory may no longer serve empowerment, but rather solidify the subaltern status and ‘Otherness’ of those concerned. Indeed, making these memories and people part of a monumental or museum-like display may only emphasise their perception as exotic outsiders. No matter what we do, even the new museums stick to the idea of progressive social change directed towards its public and therefore maintain the air of a 19th-century disciplining institution.

While new memorials and memorial museums use the past for the purpose of commemorating forgotten victims, positively working through trauma and fostering democratic culture, often by using abstract forms of representation, they do not do so exclusively. As Erica Doss (2008; 2010) describes in the case of the United States, a large part of the local and national memorial cultures across the globe are still persistently figurative, triumphant, gendered, and convey a militaristic message of national superiority. Even rather subaltern memories may be presented in traditional ways, thereby becoming integrated or transformed into grand national narratives. This is the case for the above-mentioned figurative monument to Salvador Allende in Santiago de Chile (Hite 2004). The Civil Rights Movement in the United States is also often presented as a history of leadership by great men, visible in the numerous monuments to Martin Luther King, Jr. The mass movement itself and the daily resistance and struggles, albeit difficult to represent, are largely absent in the memoryscape (Dwyer 2000, pp.664–665). Even the performances of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina are carried out in a traditionally gendered way: The mothers represent themselves as traditional female housekeepers wearing headscarves and mourning their disappeared children they once had nurtured. Still, it was especially this deeply gendered language that made their representation powerful (Taylor 1994). Indeed, subaltern memories may gain acceptance and legitimacy only via traditional narratives and forms of representation, as these are already familiar to society and thus enable comprehension. The (sometimes too) easy equation is: An identity or a history represented in the traditional institution of a museum or monument must be a legitimate one!
New and abstract forms of memorialisation may also be rejected by those affected by an event, as they see them as not fitting their experience. James E. Young (1993, p. 3) cites a Holocaust survivor with the words: “We weren’t tortured and our families weren’t murdered in the abstract, it was real.” Others may also want to see their relatives represented as national heroes and martyrs having died for a patriotic cause, rather than as defenceless victims of human rights violations. Further, the balanced accounts of the past and the progressive narratives of working through trauma and creating a more just, inclusive and tolerant society may not apply to the perception of the past and the future aspirations of many citizens. They may be seen as liberal manipulations of stories that should better be told in an unequivocal way with clear distinctions between good and evil, us and them, and make a call for patriotism and national unity instead of opening up old wounds (Doss 2010, pp.240–244).

And as many people simply have different aesthetic tastes and historical perceptions, and are increasingly willing and able to express their disagreement, even the new dialogical places of memory are sucked into intense waves of public outrage and conflict typical for culture wars (Dubin 2006).

Finally, the aesthetics and progressive narratives of new places of memories may also be used in a way totally in opposition with their envisaged goals. The context-less accentuation of universal victimhood in these places is often seen as an instance of de-politicisation (Williams 2007, pp.135–136; Doss 2010, p.152; Jelin 2010, p.70). Instead, I would like to argue, places of memory remain deeply politicised spaces, or at least make themselves vulnerable to political manipulation. Erika Doss (2010, p. 153) harshly criticises the post-9/11 memorial landscape, with its strong emphasis on victimhood that provides no information on the perpetrators or the overall context of the terrorist attacks, as contributing to a perception of national innocence that, in the end, justifies revenge and military retribution. The same danger is visible in the Kigali Memorial Centre that presents the Rwandan genocide as a discrete event in time and space with a clear beginning and end, making colonisation and a few bad individuals responsible for the collective victimisation of the Rwandan nation. It thereby not only obscures the historical background of the genocide, but also serves to harness the militaristic and repressive policy of the present Kagame regime, that does not seem interested in any democratic reforms (Sodaro 2011). Good memorials can serve bad intentions!

Altogether, places of memory reflect a complex image in which global networks and forms of memorialisation, and local processes of commemoration mutually replenish each other, creating a diffuse ‘glocal memoryscape’ of conflicting meanings and interests. In this memoryscape, places of memory are both local and global, particular and universal. They are
material places that constitute imagined spaces and transport hegemonic narratives while remaining ambiguous and malleable, connecting socio-political processes with historical facts and a wide range of different performances into a powerful, hybrid structure in which past, present and future overlap: “Nation-building exercises; colonial expansion of the non-European world; ethnic and class identity formation; all embrace an imaginative and material geography made sacred in the space of remembrance and continuously re-made, contested, revised and transmitted as fresh layers of meaning attend to them” (Johnson 2008, p.321). It is especially in this new paradigm of memorialisation, built on the remembrance of victims of human rights violations, aspiring to avoid the repetition of future crimes against humanity as well as promote dialogue on the past and democratic values, where the aims of memorialisation and transitional justice overlap, forming a powerful merger of instruments and places useful for countries after conflict or authoritarian rule.

2.3 Transitional Justice and the Politics of Memorialisation

Defined as “the process designed to address past human rights violations following periods of political turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict” (Olsen, Payne & Reiter 2010, p.1) or the “set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law” (Roht-Arriaza 2006, p.2), transitional justice has become one of the guiding concepts of global politics. Promoted by states, intergovernmental organisations and institutions, donor agencies, development cooperation and a thick network of global, national and local civil-society organisations, transitional justice is an endeavour which normally includes some form of accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations, the full disclosure of the truth about the crimes committed, reparations to the victims, institutional reform, and in some cases, amnesties to ease the way to democracy, peace, reconciliation, healing and even development. Indeed, transitional justice is described as an industry (Gready 2011, p.5) with some 2,300 books and articles published on the topic by 2010, the International Journal on Transitional Justice founded in 2007, and numerous university programmes, conferences and workshops across the globe (Olsen, Payne & Reiter 2010, pp.2–3).

Building on the principles of international humanitarian law and human rights developed after the Second World War, transitional justice developed as a reaction to the specific situation that the democracies of the so-called ‘third wave of transition’ faced in the 1980s and 1990s, before it developed into what Teitel (2003) calls the “steady state phase of transitional
justice”. Today, transitional justice is a global phenomenon and its mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions, reparations or official apologies can be found far beyond regions that have recently experienced internal warfare or authoritarian rule. Indeed, some have argued that the term ‘transitional justice’ is rather misleading, as it contains many mechanisms that have little to do with legal accountability in a strict sense, and as it confronts societies with their past far beyond a discrete transitional phase of democratisation (Roht-Arriaza 2006, pp.1–2). Issues such as the Holocaust, slavery or the injustices done to the indigenous populations of Australia or Canada have been or are being addressed in pretty much the same way as much more recent human rights violations. This shows that transitional justice very much characterises the regime of memory that has developed since the Second World War, focusing on the remembrance of past crimes for their non-recurrence in the future. Memorialisation initiatives – the preservation and construction of places of memory, such as sites associated with human rights violations, museums, monuments and memorials as well as the commemorative activities surrounding them – are clearly part of this regime of memory, as already outlined above. But the issue of memorialisation is also present in the transitional justice debate, slowly claiming the status of an own transitional justice mechanism as part of a holistic transitional justice approach. Still, the exact contribution memorialisation can make to other transitional justice mechanisms and goals is rather unexplored. The purpose of this chapter is then first to briefly outline the current debates surrounding transitional justice and, in a second step, to delineate how memorialisation fits into this debate and how it is thought to contribute to different transitional justice mechanisms.

2.3.1 The Transitional Justice Toolkit

The past is indeed a powerful repertory for politics. It legitimises present actions and future visions, founds identity and community and is used for social mobilisation. In the form of memory politics, history politics or politics of the past it is a common feature of all political systems (Frei 1996; Leggewie & Meyer 2005). Transitional justice is thus currently one of the dominant forms of memory politics. While some authors see instances of what now comprises the realm of transitional justice having already arisen in ancient Athenian democracy (Elster 2004) and others trace it back to at least the 14th century (Roht-Arriaza 2006, p.2), transitional justice actually builds upon the principles established after the Second World War and the Holocaust which first became visible in the accountability of perpetrators in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. But although the United Nations human rights system was established directly after the war, it remained paralysed throughout the Cold War.
By the late 1970s, in a global atmosphere of détente, a broad shift of norms took place: The International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were adopted, the UN Human Rights Committee was strengthened and regional human rights treaties and systems, such as the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) were created. At the same time, national and transnational networks of human rights NGOs and activists started appearing and gaining strength, thereby further adding momentum to the cause of human rights (Barahona de Brito et al. 2001; Lutz & Sikkink 2001; Sikkink & Booth Walling 2006). The decline and collapse of the Soviet Union led to the end of proxy wars and to growing pressure on authoritarian regimes supported by the superpowers. A wave of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy and from war to peace during the 1980s and early 1990s was the result. Especially in Latin America, democratic successor regimes had to accommodate strong veto players to secure peace in their young democracies, while also having to react to the strong calls for justice and truth raised by civil society, who was horrified by the common practice of forced disappearance. Thus, the Truth Commission was born (Teitel 2003, pp.75–79).

Ruti Teitel (2003, p.80) sees a rhetoric of nation-building and reconciliation that trades justice for truth and peace as characteristic for this phase of transitional justice. This tension is finally dissolved in what she calls the “steady state phase of transitional justice” reached in the late 1990s (Ibid., pp.89–94). Promoted by powerful intergovernmental organisations and institutions such as the UN or the International Criminal Court (ICC), the discourse of transitional justice has gone global, reaching even the centres of world politics. Transitional justice mechanisms are now even applied in cases where conflict is still ongoing, such as in Colombia, or in others where the violations in question have long passed, such as in the case of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the United States. But once part of the extraordinary euphoria that characterised the ‘end of history’, despite the genocide in Rwanda and the war in former Yugoslavia, transitional justice is now in danger of becoming a tool of the powerful, selectively applied when truth and justice fit the goals of the United States in its global war on terror (Hazan 2010).

Since the first practical instances of transitional justice in the 1980s, much theorising has been done. While the term ‘transitional justice’ only appeared in the early 1990s, the 1988 Aspen Institute Conference on “State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon” and Neil Kritz’ publication series “Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes” from 1995 marked the consolidation of the concept and its integration into the repertoire of law and international relations (Weinstein et al. 2010, p.33). Although most authors see the
development of a standardised toolkit of transitional justice, there is still some confusion as to what exactly comprises a transitional justice mechanism and what the overall goals of transitional justice are. Alex Boraine (2006) defines accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, institutional reform and reparations as the key pillars of transitional justice. Juan E. Méndez (1997) considers accountability, truth, reparations and vetting or purging to be the principles of transitional justice while Neil Kritz (2009) states that all transitional justice programmes should serve the objectives of establishing the truth about the past, achieving justice, promoting institution-building and reform, and thus leading to durable peace.

What becomes clear in these definitions is that the legal accountability of perpetrators, or ‘retributive justice’, is the origin and backbone of the concept of transitional justice. Indeed, Ruti Teitel’s definition of transitional justice as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterised by legal responses to confront wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” (Teitel 2003, p.69), bears witness to the dominance of a legal approach in transitional justice matters. Still, this predominance has not always been that clear. Legal accountability was at times seen as threatening to a fragile democracy and peace. In Argentina, the commanders of the military junta were first put on trial and later amnestied by Carlos Menem while in South Africa, justice was prominently traded for truth and testimony. International tribunals, such as in the cases of former Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – ICTY) and Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – ICTR), or the hybrid tribunals such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and finally the International Criminal Court (ICC), seemed to be a way out of the dilemma that the impossibility of domestic prosecutions in new and fragile democracies posed. Especially with the ICC, the primacy of retributive justice has been re-established beyond the ‘peace versus justice’ debate. But also domestic trials, e.g. in Argentina, Sierra Leone or East Timor are experiencing an upsurge in transitional justice processes again (Lutz & Sikkink 2001; Roht-Arriaza 2006).

Retributive justice against the perpetrators of human rights violations is often hailed as a clean break with the past in which a new democratic regime distances itself from the evil deeds of its predecessors, shows its commitment to the standards of due process and rule of law, and hence, the values important for the new society to be built. It also affirms that the claims of victims are taken seriously, thereby contributing to their re-integration into wider society. Indeed, victims of human rights violations are seen to have a right to justice and to a trial carried out properly. Trials serve a number of purposes: Not only can victims’ testimonies
contribute to establishing unshakable facts about the past, due processes may also acknowledge the victims’ suffering, recognise their rights to reparation, and help them work through their trauma. Furthermore, trials are also thought to contribute to deterrence, as the crimes committed are marked as intolerable and perpetrators face an international context in which human rights violations are prosecuted globally. Finally, retributive justice may contribute to durable peace and reconciliation when the legal authorities carrying out the trial are perceived by all parties as legitimate and neutral (Méndez 1997; Roht-Arriaza 2006, p.6; van der Merwe 2009).

The problem is that the judiciary in a country struck by a dictatorship or an internal armed conflict is often weak, biased, incapable of setting up a trial that follows international standards or simply non-existent. Trials are also lengthy and extremely costly, which may overstretch the resources available, especially when facing high numbers of perpetrators awaiting a fair process and victims awaiting justice. All this renders the rulings in such trials as illegitimate in the eyes of many. International courts may solve some of these problems. Still, they may be perceived as remote and insignificant for the situation in a given country. Their judgement may also be labelled as foreign interference in domestic issues. For victims, trials may also have negative consequences. A lengthy process in which much of the evidence is under the control of or has been destroyed by those who perpetrated the crimes, as well as attacks by the defence on the credibility of the victim can be an extremely frustrating experience. Further, the formality of a trial reduces the role of the victim to that of a witness answering very specific questions (Roht-Arriaza 2006, pp.7–8; van der Merwe 2009, p.121).

The full disclosure of the truth about past human rights violations was an important demand made by victims and civil-society organisations, especially in Latin America, where clandestine practices of torture and forced disappearance were a common feature of repressive regimes. This practice left family members behind in a state of profound uncertainty and marginalisation while severely disrupting the fabric of society. At the same time, powerful veto players made the prosecution of perpetrators without endangering a fragile democracy difficult to say the least. This demanded an alternative path that stabilised peace and democracy while granting victims the right to truth and integrating their unheard stories into a public account of the past. Truth commissions have been the most prominent mechanism for this task and have – at least since the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission – been equated with transitional justice processes in general. Indeed, they are seen to have extraordinary power and to be a sort of panacea for helping countries overcome their difficult past. Priscilla Hayner (2011) counts forty different truth commissions that took up their work...
between 1974 (Uganda) and 2009 (Mauritius, Solomon Islands, Togo, Canada, Kenya). The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) counts 33 truth commissions and another 12 commissions of inquiry (USIP 2011). While these numbers only refer to official, state-sanctioned commissions, in some cases such as in Brazil (1985), Uruguay (1989) and Guatemala (1998), the church or civil-society organisations have provided alternative truth reports whenever the government was either unwilling to set up an own commission or to provide an alternative to official commissions.

Due to the sheer number of truth commissions instated so far, there has now been a learning process of some 35 years on what actually constitutes a truth commission and how it works best. However, their focus has shifted considerably. While they once substituted justice with truth in difficult transitions to democracy, this is no longer the case.\(^{11}\) Many truth commissions are now sequenced with trials against perpetrators, or trials and truth commissions take place simultaneously. And while truth commissions were initially only meant to clarify the facts about a specific violent period or event in the recent past of a country, they now routinely have much broader goals, reaching as far as the reconciliation of society. Truth commissions are now normally named ‘truth and reconciliation commissions’.

Still, these commissions also harbour great differences: Some named perpetrators, others did not; some held public hearings in which victims and perpetrators could testify, others collected information rather quietly; some published reports with detailed recommendations for reparations and institutional reform while others were severely limited in their scope due to political pressures. Despite these differences, there are also some features all truth commissions share, visible in Priscilla Hayner’s (2011, pp.11–12) definition:

“A truth commission
1. is focused on past, rather than ongoing, events;
2. investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time;
3. engages directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their experiences;
4. is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report; and
5. is officially empowered by the state under review”.

Alex Boraine (2006) cites four forms of truth which were used by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and which he sees as important in any process of truth recovery. First, there is the dimension of objective, factual or forensic truth. A trial is probably best suited to establish factual or objective information about the past using

\(^{11}\) It is important to note that the Argentinean case often cited as an example in which justice was traded for a truth commission actually did have both a truth commission as well as trials against the members of the military junta. Amnesty laws were only passed later on due to pressure by junior officers, while the members of the junta were pardoned during the government of Carlos Menem (Sikkink & Walling 2007, pp.306–307).
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evidence, but the reports of truth commissions can also establish facts about past human rights violations, especially when listing victims and naming those responsible. This may be a first relief for victims’ relatives, as it publicly and officially contradicts long-held silences and denials about the crimes committed and combats revisionist views, narrowing the range of permissible lies (Ignatieff 1996, p.113). Indeed, the reports of truth commissions can provide not only an authoritative account of past gross violations of human rights but may also, when outlining the historical causes and effects of those crimes, re-write history and provide a new national narrative. Provided by a seemingly neutral commission, this narrative may become accepted by all warring factions, thus uniting former adversaries and finding its way into the new collective memory of a rebuilt nation. This is the contribution to the task of nation-building that truth commissions are thought to make, as is most visible in the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its promotion of the narrative of the Rainbow Nation. The newly established facts about the past are then seen to constitute a lesson that guides the future cohabitation of all people within the nation without repeating the errors of history (Rotberg 2000; Andrews 2003; Chapman 2009b).

The second dimension of truth is that of personal or narrative truth. Not all truth commissions integrate public hearings into their methodology. But when they do, public hearings in which victims – and in some cases, perpetrators – testify, are seen as highly important for restoring the dignity of those affected by giving them an official public forum to voice their own memories of the events. Further, by telling their own story or listening to the stories of others, victims can relate their experiences and re-integrate it into the broader flow of events, a process that is seen as positive in overcoming trauma. The mediated process of testifying also makes the victims and the effects of human rights violations visible to the wider public, which may create empathy and emotional understanding, thereby re-integrating isolated victims and underlining the necessity for change (Boraine 2006, p.21).

The third dimension of social or dialogical truth sees the process of truth-seeking as one that enacts all the values that are to be installed for the sake of a peaceful future, such as transparency, democracy and participation. Indeed, it is a truism that there is never one single notion of the past in a country after authoritarian rule or conflict. Some even consider conflict over memory in a transitional society to be normal and necessary (Becker 2006, p.251). The process of truth-seeking should therefore be as broad and inclusive as possible to reconcile different visions of the past (Llewellyn 2006). Where this is not possible, a truth commission may at least open a space for democratic dialogue and negotiation that creates awareness and
respect for the viewpoints of others, thus re-constructing the nation as a community in dissent (Lefranc 2004).

Finally, the dimension of healing or restorative truth refers to the reparatory function of a truth process. It raises awareness for past wrongdoings and may thereby create the insight in the public that these crimes must not be repeated. Further, truth commissions normally make recommendations about reparations and reforms in their reports, thereby encouraging policies that support the non-repetition of human rights violations, which in turn restores the trust of victims in the state and its institutions. Finally, truth commissions not only create knowledge about the past, but also acknowledge past crimes and the suffering of those affected by them, sometimes even achieving the acceptance of responsibility by the persons and institutions implicated in the crimes. This further restores the dignity of victims and may contribute to healing (Boraine 2006, p.21).

Although truth is seen to have widely positive effects, both for survivors as well as for societies as a whole, we should be rather cautious with the concept, especially when naively applied. Truth commissions should never be seen as neutrally apart from politics, but rather as an integral part of the political negotiation of and conflict over the past. They are as much the result of political power constellations as they can also affect these power constellations in favour of or to the disadvantage of political players. Establishing ‘the truth’ with the help of a truth commission can be as threatening and unacceptable to some stakeholder, and thus to peace in society, as otherwise trials can be. The capacity of a truth commission to deliver the truth depends on the scope of its mandate, the time period to be examined, the crimes to be investigated as well as the time, staff and budget granted to fulfil its tasks, all of which are negotiated or installed by political agents with their own interests. The narrow focus on specific human rights violations examined over only a specific period of time may exclude other crimes that happened in the same period, and excludes all crimes that happened before and after the period in question (Lanegran 2005). This may severely hamper a commission’s capacity to make conclusions about broad and ongoing historical patterns of structural violence and injustice, instead reducing ‘political violence’ to a discrete episode in history that has no deeper roots and is irretrievably over (Hamber 2006b, p.218). Some truth commissions, due to their limited time and resources, also focus on a few events deemed to be representative of the period in question. This however may distort the overall pattern of violence, as it may focus only on spectacular events, while the everyday practices of repression and structural violence experienced by a much greater number of persons are neglected (Chapman 2009b, pp.99–100). The emphasis on victims’ testimonies for truth-
seeking may also be misleading. Many of those who testify are only family members of the victims, and since they were not eyewitness to the crimes in question, they are only able to provide information about their personal experience of loss and suffering, not about the crimes themselves (Ibid., p.98). Further, the context in which victims testify as well as how and what they are asked also influence the emergence of ‘truth’ (Borer 2006b, pp.23–24).

Indeed, there is no one truth about the past and it is rather unlikely that a truth commission can deliver it. A truth commission’s report may be only one among many voices about the past, and it may be one that is heavily contested and rejected, or simply ignored. It is therefore doubtful that the report of a truth commission can create any consensus about the past. Criticising the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Brandon Hamber and Richard A. Wilson (2003, pp.144–145) also warn that subordinating a truth process under the goal of reconciliation resembles nationalist rhetoric in the language of human rights. The result may be an exclusivist version that neglects opposing notions of the past for the sake of national reconciliation. Even when the focus is instead placed on creating democratic dialogue and respect for the views of others, it is rather unclear how to achieve this in highly polarised political contexts (Chapman 2009b, p.96).

While truth commissions are often hailed for their victim-centred approach – as opposed to the perpetrator-centred approach of a trial – as having a potentially cathartic and healing affect, they may also result in the opposite. For some it may be relieving to publicly tell their story, for others it can be re-traumatising, especially when there is no psychological follow-up care available (Roht-Arriaza 2006, p.5). On top of that, only few victims are selected to testify at all (Chapman 2009b, p.107). Further, speaking out is not the only strategy to overcome trauma. Staying silent may be just as much a coping strategy after the experience of mass violence (Lykes & Mersky 2006, p.606). Speaking about one’s fate may also have a (re)stigmatising effect, especially when related to sexual violence (Ibid., p.616). It is also clear that truth commissions raise victims’ expectations of justice, reparation and reform to be delivered. But the commissions themselves have no empowering mandate that allows them to carry out their recommendations. Rather, they are dependent on the good will of the respective governments, who often simply reject or ignore findings and recommendations, delay processes or only deliver part of what is necessary – another painful experience for those who have waited for so long (Hayner 2002, pp.168–169).

Reparations were once the final humiliation the victors of war imposed on those defeated. This logic has been thoroughly reversed after the Second World War and the Holocaust. Now, not the victors are rewarded a reparation for their war expenses, but the victims for their loss
and suffering. First instances of this new paradigm were the German reparation payments to Holocaust survivors and the state of Israel in the 1950s. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reparations can be found in practically all global and regional human rights treaties and instruments, in humanitarian law and international criminal law (Shelton 2005, p.11). Awarding reparations to individual victims of human rights violations has long been a practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and since 1988, also of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) (Cassel 2005, p.191). The right to reparation was also integrated into the Rome Statute for setting up the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Shelton 2005, p.12). Here, victims can be awarded reparations via the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), set up by the international community. Beyond international jurisdiction, reparations are frequently called for in the reports of truth commissions. Indeed, reparations awarded to the victims of human rights violations are now seen to be central to a holistic transitional justice approach, as they bind together all other transitional justice mechanisms (de Greiff 2006a, p.461), and are believed to have positive effects both on individual victims as well as on societies as a whole (Hamber 2006a). It is a transitional justice measure highly internationalised and mainstreamed since the United Nations Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights declared in 1988 that all victims of human rights violations had a right to restitution and compensation. Several experts were appointed to draft studies and reports on the rights of victims of human rights violations – most notable are those by Theo van Boven (1993), Louis Joinet (1997), Cherif Bassiouni (2000) and Diane Orentlicher (2005). The result of 15 years of study and negotiation, the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law” were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, condensing the jurisdiction that had evolved in courts and truth commission over the past 25 years and setting the standard for all future acts of reparation.

The “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law” (United Nations General Assembly 2005) define that all “persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or substantial impairment of their fundamental legal rights, through acts of omission that constitute gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law” are entitled to a reparation. This also includes those only indirectly affected by the crime,
namely the “immediate family or dependents of the direct victim”. These principles distinguish between five different forms of reparation:

1. **Restitution**: Aims to restore the victims to their *status quo ante*, that is, their original situation before the crime occurred, regarding for example their liberty, citizenship, place of residence, employment or property.

2. **Compensation**: Refers to monetary reparations for physical and mental harm, lost employment and education opportunities and social benefits, material damages and loss of earning including earning potentials, moral damage as well as costs of legal and expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services.

3. **Rehabilitation**: Includes the right to medical and psychological care as well as to legal and social services.

4. **Satisfaction**: These measures include the cessation of ongoing violations, the full and public disclosure of the truth, the search and identification of those who disappeared, judicial and administrative sanctions against perpetrators, the inclusion of an accurate account of the past in educational material as well as symbolic measures such as the official restoration of the dignity and reputation of the victims, public apologies, the acknowledgement of the facts and the accountability, and commemorations and tributes to the victims.

5. **Guarantees of non-repetition**: Refer to measures that make the recurrence of the crimes committed impossible, most notably via institutional reforms or public education. They include civilian control over security forces, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, human rights education or the installation of mechanisms for the prevention and monitoring of conflicts.

These principles show a very broad understanding of reparations in which individual grants or monetary compensations – the traditional idea of reparations - are only one possibility. Symbolic reparations, such as public apologies by heads of state, the building of museums and memorials or the naming of public facilities and streets after victims are seen as important measures for recognition and acknowledgment. Service packages for medical or psychological treatment, education and housing can make good directly what has been destroyed, and collective reparations in the form of development projects acknowledge that harm was done to entire communities and can tackle underlying structural injustices (de Greiff 2006a, pp.468–470). Reparations are first and foremost directed at the victims of human rights violations who are not only assisted directly with pay cheques and services, but,
also receive a form of material and/or symbolic recognition for their suffering. It also shows the state’s willingness to make a material and symbolic change and re-integrate victims into society. This in turn has a positive impact on victims’ trust in state institutions and may increase their sense of citizenship, thereby also contributing to healing through the victims’ re-connection to society (Hamber 2006a, pp.565–567).

Further, although guarantees of non-repetition are primarily directed at victims in order to restore their trust in the future, they also represent a form of reparation that has positive implications for society as a whole, as it lays the foundation for reconciliation and lasting peace (Ibid., pp.566–567). Indeed, as reparations also include the right to equal and effective access to justice, the prosecution of perpetrators, the right to truth, and institutional reforms, they encompass and contribute to all other transitional justice mechanisms. It is therefore emphasised that reparations should be closely coordinated with other transitional justice measures to really make a difference (de Greiff 2006a, p.467), and should further be timely, easily accessible, in correspondence to victims’ needs, provide for ownership and tangibility, be non-discriminatory and linked to assigning responsibility for crimes (Rombouts et al. 2005, p.487). Brandon Hamber (2005) also reminds us that reparations have the difficult task of repairing the irreparable, as no compensation can bring back those who have been murdered or forcibly disappeared, nor can they heal the deep physical and psychological wounds inflicted. Therefore, all reparations are symbolic. The necessity to carefully balance different measures of reparation – material and symbolic, individual and collective – against each other and against other transitional justice measures, such as truth and justice, is crucial. Further, the context in which reparations are awarded and the discourses surrounding them are just as important as the reparations themselves (Hamber 2006a, p.580).

The expectations for reparations are high, but they are also fraught with problems. The first problem posed is that of accessibility to reparations. Reparations by international courts such as the IACHR are often substantial. Still, many victims have neither the information, nor the monetary means, nor the support networks necessary to bring their case to court and uphold it even in the case of appeal. In many cases, the sheer amount of victims would overburden the courts, and individual compensations of up to $200,000, as is normally awarded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, would drain any state treasury. Reparation programmes are better suited to meet the necessities of large groups of victims in a timely way, albeit with the disadvantage of considerably lower compensations (de Greiff 2006a, pp.456–459). But even then, reparation programmes might be too costly for weak states evolving from a conflict and facing much more pressing needs, such as achieving political and economic stability. And...
although most truth commissions have recommended reparation programmes, only few
governments have followed these recommendations. In some cases, the need for reparations
was simply ignored (El Salvador, Haiti), while in others, reparations were first only delivered
to a limited group of victims (Chile) (Hayner 2011, pp.167–177), and in Guatemala, only the
members of the notorious self-defence committees were able to successfully lobby for
reparations (Schotsmans 2005, p.126). Reparations in Argentina and South Africa came late
and were delivered in a political context where they seemed rather a measure to silence than
to acknowledge victims (Hayner 2002, pp.175–176; Hamber 2005, p.144). Sometimes,
governments also try to get away cheap by focusing on symbolic measures or selling
development projects as a form of reparation (de Greiff 2006a, p.466). Indeed, collective
reparations are often criticised for providing basic goods and services, such as adequate
housing, health care or education, that people are entitled to anyway (Rombouts et al. 2005,
p.461). Further, collective reparations are not linked clearly to the recognition of specific
victims and therefore lack any psychological impact (Hamber 2006a, p.574).
But also the positive psychological impact is debatable. In an environment of poverty,
 improving the living circumstances of some may cause envy in the eyes of others (Rombouts
et al. 2005, p.463). Further, the victims of different human rights violations will receive
different reparations according to the gravity of the crime and the level to which they are
affected. Some victims might even be excluded totally from reparations due to ethical,
monetary or political considerations. This necessarily creates a hierarchy of victimhood that in
turn may cause a situation in which different victim groups enter a “battle over
acknowledgement” (Honneth 1994) or a “competition of victims” (Chaumont 2001), fighting
over who is a more legitimate or deserving victim (Barkan 2005; Rombouts et al. 2005,
pp.469–475). Finally, reparations may become part of paternalistic politics that reduce people
to the status of passive victims in need of care, which may deprive them of their capacity to
agency and reinforce their stigmatisation (Mani 2005, pp.66–67; de Greiff 2006a, p.469).
Institutional reform is another important mechanism of transitional justice, although one that
is often overlooked in the shine of the holy trinity of truth, justice and reparation. Still,
civilian control over the military, a functioning judiciary, a just and accessible health and
education system or human rights education are among the most important measures to
maintain peace and democracy for the future. They are seen as the key to making significant
changes for creating a society in which the repetition of human rights violations is made
impossible, or at least unlikely. While the call for institutional reform is frequent in the reports
of truth commissions, despite a few exceptions (El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Liberia), the
recommendations of truth commissions are not mandatory and the implementation of institutional reforms were left to the goodwill of the governments. The implementation and effect of institutional reform still remains one of the most under-researched topics in transitional justice (Hayner 2011, pp.190–194). Finally, while the vetting or purging of personnel implicated in or related to crimes from public posts is seen by some as a legitimate transitional justice mechanism and was carried out mainly in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Communist regimes (Roht-Arriaza 2006, p.5), the granting of blanket amnesties, once a prominent mechanism in negotiated transitions, is now largely ruled out and not seen as a legitimate transitional justice mechanism, at least in the long term.

Transitional justice aims both at the individual and the collective level, and seeks to contribute to positive change towards recognition, acknowledgement, healing, reconciliation, stable peace and development, all of which are inter-related. None of these concepts, of course, is self-explanatory and all of them are ambiguous and fuzzy, in desperate need of further explanation. The public acknowledgement of past human rights violations and the recognition of the victimhood of individuals and whole groups through truth, justice and reparations lie at the core of transitional justice. They are seen as a first step towards re-integrating those suffering from trauma and official denial back into society and granting them the full status of a citizen (de Greiff 2006a, pp.460–461). About 25% to 40% of all survivors of violence are believed to suffer from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) such as self-blame, vivid re-experiencing of the event, fear, nightmares, feelings of helplessness, hypervigilance, depression, relationship difficulties, feelings of social disconnectedness, anxiety or substance abuse (Hamber 2009, p.19). However, the concept of PTSD is criticised for treating trauma as a mental disorder isolated in the mind of individual victims that can be ‘healed’ or at least treated with medication and individual psychotherapy (Lykes & Mersky 2006, pp.595–596). But people in wars and under authoritarian rule experience violence on a regular, everyday basis. It is this kind of violence directed at destroying public institutions and social relations that severely damages the norms, values and principles that hold together the fabric of a society. This results in insecurity, mistrust, disconnectedness, social polarisation, the erosion of social relations, a loss of confidence and the blurring of the boundary between life and death (Hamber 2009, pp.22–25). Social psychologists, such as Ignacio Martín-Baró (2006) and David Becker (2006) have therefore emphasised that trauma is instead a social and political process. The historical, cultural, social, political and even economic context in which trauma is formed, maintained, and sometimes even passed on inter-generationally is as important as the traumatic event itself. However, the emphasis on social relations and political
contexts in the formation of trauma does not mean that something like ‘collective trauma’ is possible. Trauma is always an individual process. Still, in a context of widespread and massive violence, many individuals may become traumatised, which in turn severely affects society as a whole.

When trauma is marked by the impossibility to integrate a traumatic event into one’s own biography, and therefore by the destruction or fragmentation of memory, the full disclosure of the truth can help relate and re-integrate traumatic experiences by constructing a narrative around them. Indeed, all mechanisms of transitional justice may be part of a liminal process in which traumatic events are concretised and defined, but thereby also contained and banned as something of the past, while reparations and reforms restore confidence in the future. Trials can also re-direct the self-blame of victims towards those responsible. Public recognition and the delivery of reparations can also re-connect victims to society and the state and may help form new relations with the social and political environment, thereby helping overcome isolation, disconnectedness and distrust (Becker 2006; Hamber 2006a). This is also a process seen as crucial in many concepts of reconciliation.

The aim of reconciliation within transitional justice became prominent with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. But even before this, ‘reconciliation’ appeared in the official name of the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Since then, reconciliation has been included in the titles of nearly all truth commissions. Still, rather often truth commissions received an unclear reconciliation mandate, which led to the notion that a truth commission somehow automatically leads to reconciliation. Other truth commissions have struggled hard to provide the rather abstract concept with a specific meaning for their context (Hayner 2011, p.182). Reconciliation as a transitional justice goal is also often controversial due to its religious connotation and its vision of social harmony. Others criticise that reconciliation is often a strategy imposed by those in power to promote forgiving and forgetting and avoid dealing with the violent past and its consequences (Boraine 2006, p.22).

Indeed, there is a great confusion about what actually constitutes reconciliation, and a multitude of conceptions about the term exist parallel to one another. The “IDEA Handbook on Reconciliation”, for example, sees reconciliation as constituting a joint vision of the future, the re-building of relationships, coming to terms with past acts and enemies, social change, acknowledgement, remembering and learning from the past, which is to be achieved with the instruments of healing, justice, truth-telling and reparation (Bloomfield et al. 2003). Louis Kriesberg (2001, p.60) sees truth, justice, remorse and forgiveness, safety and security as important factors for reconciliation, and Siri Gloppen (2005) makes out five strategies –
justice, truth, restitution and rehabilitation, reform and oblivion – to seek reconciliation which includes individual forgiveness, the re-construction of the social fabric, peaceful co-existence, social stability as well as a common vision of the past and the future. Audrey Chapman (2009a) emphasises the role of building new social, political and institutional relationships both between former adversaries as well as between the state and its citizens which involves a new social contract built on democracy, human rights as well as the rule of law and includes mechanisms of peaceful conflict management, politics that promote a more inclusive, just and equal society, and education towards tolerance and democracy while promoting a sense of national identity. In these accounts, the vision of total social harmony is ruled out. Instead, conflict is seen as an integral part of society as long as it respects democratic, tolerant and peaceful forms of interaction (Dwyer 2003; Gloppen 2005).

Finally, all accounts of reconciliation unanimously stress that reconciliation is an extremely complex, multi-dimensional and particularly long-term process. All conceptions of reconciliation, although complex and sometimes ambiguous, involve transitional justice mechanisms often to such an extent that transitional justice can be equated with reconciliation. Although transitional justice mechanisms, such as trials or the disclosure of truth, may be divisive over the short term, they are seen as crucial for achieving reconciliation over the long term. Truth, justice, reparation and reform are seen as important mechanisms for relationship-building, both among people and between people and institutions, while enacting principles such as rule of law, democratic dialogue and tolerance. They are all seen as processes of closure that build community with some modicum of agreement about the past and joint perspectives on the future. Reparations may also contribute to reconciliation by healing or satisfying victims and re-directing feelings of revenge (Gloppen 2005).

Several authors criticise that the aim of reconciliation is too ambitious for most societies, and that peaceful co-existence is a more achievable aim for transitional justice after conflict (Afzali & Colleton 2003; Chayes & Minow 2003; Villa-Vicencio 2006). Still others prefer to speak of social reconstruction (Weinstein & Stover 2004). Yet, as both concepts place an emphasis on relationship- and institution-building, they resemble much of what Audrey Chapman (2009a) sees to be important for reconciliation. Finally, transitional justice is also thought to be a peacebuilding activity with a positive impact on achieving sustainable or positive peace, which is characterised by effective, democratic state institutions, human rights, justice, accountability, the rule of law, a just socio-economic structure and adequate health and education systems (Borer 2006b).
While Pablo de Greiff (2006, p.470) once warned that reparations cannot address structural problems such as poverty, and reparations and development should hence remain separate fields of intervention, the complementarity between transitional justice and development is increasingly being recognised (de Greiff & Duthie 2009). Poverty, inequality and underdevelopment can at least in part enable and protract violent conflicts. At the same time, violent conflict and authoritarian rule may not only cause direct economic losses for some, but also dismantle institutions and the social fabric, leading to insecurity, mistrust and greed, all of which severely damage economic and human development. Many truth commissions have addressed these issues as underlying causes of conflict and have made recommendations for reform, institution-building and specific policies to overcome them. Transitional justice mechanisms such as trials and truth commissions are also considered to enact and thereby restore those institutions, norms and values that are prerequisite for development. Further, reparations can also enable individuals or communities to take up economic activities or at least to empower themselves and develop capacities. Indeed, the Guatemalan, Peruvian and Moroccan truth commissions have recommended collective reparations that have resulted in development projects in some cases, while the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) has already set up projects for community-building, micro-credit schemes or agricultural development projects. At the same time, in an environment of intense poverty and weak or non-existing institutions, development may provide the economic and institutional resources that make trials, truth commissions and reparations possible. Further, development organisations, such as the UNDP, have been at the forefront of providing financing for truth commissions. Finally, the willingness or even the demand for dealing with violent pasts may grow in a society that is better off economically (Duthie 2008; de Greiff 2009).

2.3.2 A Critique of Transitional Justice Mechanisms

Truth, justice, reparation and reform have become the tools transitional justice processes are made of. While in earlier conceptions of transitional justice, truth and justice or peace and justice were considered to be mutually exclusive, and the debate on what effects the ICC prosecutions have in Central Africa is still ongoing, today, truth, justice, reparation and reform are increasingly seen as a mutually reinforcing bundle of activities that must be applied coherently to make a difference towards healing, reconciliation, peace and development. Hence, the call for a holistic transitional justice approach that respects the interrelations of different mechanisms is widespread (Boraine 2006; Roht-Arriaza 2006, p.8; Fischer 2011; Gready 2011, p.6). At the same time, transitional justice is often criticised for
its “naïve normativism” (de Greiff 2006b, p.181) and the “unqualified axioms and unsubstantiated presuppositions” (Borer 2006b, p.27) that guide its mechanisms. David Mendeloff (2004), for example, argues that truth-telling and justice may not necessarily result in lasting peace, that historically many societies have remained peaceful without truth, justice and reconciliation and that democracy may as well be a prerequisite and not a result of truth-telling. Increasingly, transitional justice assumptions are being tested and evaluated. Thoms, Ron and Paris (2008) see little evidence that transitional justice has any effect – neither positive nor negative – on human rights, reconciliation or healing at all. In their comparative study, Olsen, Payne and Reiter (2010) find that truth commissions, when standing alone, have a negative effect on human rights and democracy, while they seem to have a stabilising effect when combined with trials and amnesties. This very much supports the idea of a holistic transitional justice approach. But it also shows that the gap between theoretical assumptions and the effects of its practical application is only slowly being closed.

Transitional justice is also criticised for representing a transnationalised or even globalised set of mechanisms that is routinely applied wherever in the world transitions from dictatorship to democracy or from war to peace take place. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the transitional justice set of truth, justice, reparation and reform has increasingly become mainstreamed within intergovernmental organisations, visible in the UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparation or the appointment of a United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence in 2012. In 2001, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was founded under the impression of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with support from the Ford Foundation. A globally operating NGO with its main office in New York and several regional and country offices abroad, it functions as the global hub of transitional justice expertise and provides advice to international and national bodies across the world.\(^{12}\) This entails the danger of creating a ‘toolkit’ of standardised approaches worked out in the offices and conference rooms of the North and distributed mostly to the conflict-affected countries of the South by a global network of highly mobile experts, applied to local populations without much consideration of their specific preferences (Oettler 2004; Oettler 2008; Kritz 2009, p.14). Built on a teleology of evolution and progress that seeks to liberate post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies from their barbaric ignorance and transport them through a clearly delineated liminal phase of transitional justice into the enlightened state of a Western liberal

\(^{12}\) Not surprisingly, it was Pablo de Greiff, director of the ICTJ’s research programme who was assigned the first United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence.
democracy with its rule of law, civil society, human rights, culture of tolerance and free market, transitional justice comes close to portraying a 19th-century *mission civilisatrice* (Lundy & McGovern 2008; Hinton 2010; Shaw & Waldorf 2010).

The Western legalism that predominates transitional justice approaches (McEvoy 2007; McGregor 2008) and that itself has roots in the era of colonialism (Anghie 1999), the conceptions of truth-telling built on Western individualistic approaches of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy (Edkins 2003, pp.43–44) and Christian ideas of reconciliation may not respect specifically local ways of dealing with the past through silences and cohabitation or rituals of mourning and re-integration (Lykes & Mersky 2006, p.606; Shaw & Waldorf 2010, p.13). Truth commissions in faraway capitals and tribunals in other countries may generate little meaning for people who have experienced the destruction of their local worlds. Concepts of justice, truth, reparation and reconciliation formulated on an abstract philosophical level remain intangible and may not match with local understandings and more urgent needs (Hinton 2010, p.11).

Criteria for trials and reparations also may not suit the messy grey areas of local conflicts where the difference between perpetrators and victims becomes blurred. Instead, transitional justice mechanisms create a clear boundary between ruthless perpetrators and innocent victims. The tendency is to perceive local populations as collectively victimised and traumatised, as suffering and marginalised, as incapable to manage their own life, waiting for someone to listen to their story and speak for them to the outside world to relieve them from their burden. As severely damaged individuals, victims are depoliticised, stripped of their responsibility and presented as innocent in the childlike state of the *homo sacer*. Perpetrators are presented as no less psychologically damaged, demonised as insane savages, irresponsible of their deeds or as having been forced or seduced as child soldiers without their own political will and agency, themselves in fact, victims (Shaw & Waldorf 2010, pp.8–9). Transitional justice thereby produces the category of the marginalised and disempowered victim that is to be transformed into the liberal empowered citizen with the help of transitional justice mechanisms (Hinton 2010, p.8). Tshepo Madlingozi (2010) harshly criticises the practice of transitional justice entrepreneurs, not only of assigning the status of the victim to specific groups and individuals ‘from the outside’, but also of feeling entitled to speak for them as they are seen to lack the capacity to do so themselves. This results in victimisation defined as the ascription of the role of victim – “the victim of war, violence, abuse or discrimination – […] to individuals by dominant societal discourses, groups or institutions” (Fischer 2011, p.418). Victimisation reinforces disempowerment and marginalisation and perpetuates the
divide between the knowing Western expert and the obsequious and ignorant local victim in a form of cultural imperialism. What was once the *bon sauvage* has now become the innocent victim.

Transitional justice mechanisms also clearly delineate the space-time of the conflict and crimes to be investigated. Conflicts and human rights violations are represented as having a clear beginning and a clear end, with previous times portrayed as harmonious, and ongoing violence appearing to be ‘simply’ criminal as opposed to the political crimes of the pre-transition era (Hamber 2009, pp.180–181; Weinstein et al. 2010, p.36). Transitional justice is also presented as a sort of final solution, as ending all conflicts and battles over memory, releasing countries into a culture of democratic tolerance and human rights (Hinton 2010, pp.7–8). Still, as Elizabeth Jelin (2010, p.61) reminds us: “Looking at a conflictual and painful past, and searching for its meaning, is a never ending undertaking. […] While political and social actors may attempt to attain closure, in the long run the outcome is usually failure.”

Bringing perpetrators to court and paying reparations to victims, finding truths and extracting lessons for the future, as such different examples as Germany and Argentina show, can take decades, is heavily fought over and is subject to changing global, national and local political currents and societal preferences.

Approaches are also predominantly oriented towards the national level, perceiving a whole country as an undifferentiated container without regional or local differences. This may create an oversimplified narrative, although patterns of violence have varied considerably in time and space, thus creating very different experiences and needs for the people on the ground than what top-down imposed ‘blueprints’ are able to see (Pouligny et al. 2007; Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza 2008, p.144; Shaw & Waldorf 2010, p.23). It also excludes the roles of foreign powers and international economic relations, instead framing human rights violations as national tragedies (Lanegran 2005). Indeed, transitional justice is not a set of instruments that is applied neutrally, but by national and international stakeholders with specific interests and expectations towards their outcomes (Lundy & McGovern 2008, pp.104–105). Pierre Hazan (2010) denounces transitional justice as having its roots in the political zeitgeist of the late 1980s and early 1990s that saw the world entering into a global phase of transition towards liberal democracy and thus towards the ‘end of history’. Heavily promoted by the Clinton government, the discourse of crimes against humanity, that had to be exorcised with transitional justice, allowed a new interventionism under the global leadership of the United States. After the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the Global War on Terror that ensued, the circumstances have changed considerably. Not only are transitions now enforced with
hard military power instead of soft transitional justice, the scope for applying transitional justice has also narrowed due to the interests of the United States and other (re)emerging powers. This has led to an even higher selectivity in the use of transitional justice which creates what Sriram and Ross (2007) call “zones of impunity”, geographical gaps where the principles of accountability and truth-seeking are invalid or severely limited.

The lack of local consultation, participation and outreach, the tendency towards one-size-fits-all approaches and the imposition of foreign models in transitional justice processes were also heavily criticised by a 2004 United Nations report on “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies” that calls for a better assessment of national needs and capacities and for more context-related approaches. Since then, a clear tendency to ‘go local’ has become observable in transitional justice processes. As early as in 2001, the Gacaca court system was established in Rwanda, drawing upon local customary law, while East Timor’s Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (2002-2005) had a community reconciliation programme based on traditional methods of conflict resolution and re-integration. Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2002-2004) opted for a considerably large community consultation and outreach programme. Finally, the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004-2006) in North Carolina was the first example of an exclusively local truth commission (Roht-Arriaza 2006, pp.11–12; McGregor 2008; Shaw & Waldorf 2010).

Still, especially the Gacaca courts and East Timor’s community reconciliation programme have been criticised for imposing top-down invented traditions that did not fit local customs and needs as much as the interests of those in power at the national or international level. Instead of drawing upon local experience, transitional justice then only translates its mechanisms into local language and once again imposes it upon the population from the top down. Localised transitional justice approaches may also fail by bypassing the local population in favour of national NGOs or national and local elites that seem to speak for ‘their people’ on the ground, but operate from the faraway capital. This may end up in clientelism and patronage that reinforces marginalisation and victimisation (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza 2008, pp.154–155; McGregor 2008, p.60; Shaw & Waldorf 2010).

Another danger is the often romanticised notion of locals living in harmonious and homogeneous communities. This ignores the complex and often deeply unjust power relations within communities, which transitional justice community projects may deepen if applied naively (Lundy & McGovern 2008, p.112; McEvoy & McGregor 2008, p.9). As Matilde González (2009) describes for Guatemala, communities are often viewed as passive bearers of
violence inflicted upon them by outside agents. Instead, the violence was rather among or between communities, and locals were agents in this process, actively taking part in the violence, adapting to the violent environment or resisting it by different means. Thus, community is:

"a social entity with some degree of cohesion (sense of belonging) consisting of different interest groups, which are motivated by economic, political, and religious motives and by specific values and cultural perspectives. The community includes people, who participate in the struggle to protect the interests of the community. The interests of the community participants are to be found within the continuum from exploitation to solidarity" (Anckermann et al. 2005, p.138).

Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern (2008) argue for participatory community transitional justice as space for dialogue in which truth is carefully produced in an interactive process, thereby creating space for recognition and debate and giving locals direct control over the production of knowledge. While these projects rely on self-censorship and may also create new exclusions and partial accounts of the past, and although they can never substitute official recognition by the state or the legal accountability of the perpetrators, it is nevertheless hoped they can help empower local communities. Anckerman et al. (2005) develop a cascade of ‘community healing’, ‘community empowerment’ and ‘community development’ in which ‘community reflection groups’ create a space where people can jointly discuss and make sense of the past, thereby being able to relate to each other, re-build relationships and develop new capacities. Local ownership is secured by training local community promoters that manage the group processes in this methodology. This is meant to lead to “(re)establishing reliable interpersonal relationships through discussion and analysis of problems” (Ibid., p. 145), “strengthen[s] social and organizational participation and decision-making” (Ibid., p. 146) and lay the foundation for “more participatory social action as basis for locally based economic development and community welfare” (Ibid., p. 148). The aim of this community intervention programme is to re-construct the social fabric and treat victims as agents. Built on principles derived from “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (Freire 2005), “Liberation Psychology” (Martín-Baró 2006) and “Development as Freedom” (Sen 1999), these kinds of participatory community interventions see the presence in and partial management of these processes by sympathetic outsiders as potentially fruitful, as they function as mediators between local experiences and representations and the globalised discourse of transitional justice, thereby empowering the oppressed and victimised to transcend the boundaries between local and global worlds in a collaborative process of representational politics (Lykes et al. 2003).
Still, these participatory bottom-up projects may become part of the same dilemma as top-down approaches. First, it remains an outside intervention that locals do not specifically ask for. The decision when, where and for whom to intervene is made by outsiders. Second, the methodology applied, although it shows more flexibility towards local contexts, is still guided by specific assumptions about the need for truth-telling, healing as well as democratic and tolerant dialogue. Specific participatory instruments – such as setting up dialogue groups and training local community or memory promoters, creating timelines and mappings, or grassroots photo and film documentation initiatives – are themselves highly standardised tools drawing upon experiences made elsewhere. Third, the instruments applied in the process are normally not produced locally, but are pre-fabricated by the facilitators, who then define who can participate how and when. All of this severely limits the choices people can make in such a ‘participatory bottom-up process’.

Further, there is no discrete boundary between what is local, national or global (Shaw & Waldorf 2010, p.6). Local people are entangled in webs of power and interest that reach up to the national or even global level (González 2009, p.300). The history of transitional justice is full of examples in which local events and agency have profoundly transformed global norms and practices only to then reflect back on other local settings in a ‘glocal’ process (Lutz & Sikkink 2001; Sikkink & Booth Walling 2006; McEvoy & McGregor 2008, pp.3–4). Transitional justice processes, whether imposed from the top down by global elites or induced from the bottom up by sympathetic activists always enter a process of hybridisation at the local level where its aims, norms, and mechanisms become “mediated, appropriated, translated, modified, misunderstood, ignored, rejected in everyday social practice” (Hinton 2010, p.11). Inextricable from local politics and power relations, their outcome is unpredictable and sometimes totally opposed to the goals of those who initiated the process in the first place (Hinton 2010; Shaw & Waldorf 2010). What remains then, is the rather Foucauldian lesson that there is no such thing as total powerlessness. Even the most marginal victims are not devoid of power and agency as it is them who give transitional justice processes their own meaning.

2.3.3 Places of Memory in Transitional Justice Mechanisms

Periods of political transition are traditionally also the times when geographies of memory are in flux. Old representations are torn down, museum exhibitions are re-ordered and new monuments are built. Still, the boom of memorialisation initiatives in transitional societies –

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13 For a profound critique of participatory approaches, see Majid Rahnema (1990).
and especially surrounding transitional justice processes – is remarkable. One prominent example is the South African government that embarked upon re-modelling its memoryscape to serve a post-Apartheid identity-building process (Coombes 2003; Nieves 2009). In Argentina and Chile, memorialisation processes were rather initiated by civil-society activists from the grassroots level and later co-opted by governments sympathetic to their cause (Collins 2011). This resulted in more official endeavours, such as the Space for Memory Institute (Instituto Espacio para la Memoria – IEM) in Argentina and the Museum of Memory and Human Rights (Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos) in Chile. The Comarca Balide Memorial and Archive in East Timor and the Peace Museum in Freetown, Sierra Leone inaugurated in late 2012 were created as immediate legacies of truth commissions and court proceedings and document the transitional justice processes in both countries (Leach 2009, pp.149–151). In Colombia, the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación – CNRR) and the Law of Victims and Land Restitution (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras) that followed led not only to the creation of an official Memory Center (Centro de Memoria) in the capital Bogotá, it has also sparked extraordinary activity among local and regional governments and civil society to create local or regional memory houses, monuments, murals and other forms of memorialisation initiatives all across the country. Indeed, places of memory and commemorations are applied within transitional justice processes nearly as a reflex, and some authors see them as an integral part of the standardised transitional justice ‘toolkit’ (Roht-Arriaza 2006, p.2; Shaw & Waldorf 2010, p.3). The question is then: How did places of memory enter into the realm of transitional justice and what role are they believed to fulfil in this process?

The label under which memorialisation initiatives can normally be found in transitional justice processes is that of symbolic reparations. But – as we will see later – places of memory and the commemorative activities surrounding them are also considered to contribute to all other transitional justice mechanisms and aims, such as justice, truth, institutional reform, healing, reconciliation and development, thereby making them an indispensable part of a holistic transitional justice approach (Naidu 2004b; Hamber 2006a; Naidu 2006; Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; Hamber et al. 2010; Impunity Watch 2011). The story somewhat begins with the first widely known truth commission, the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons – CONADEP) in Argentina (1983-1984). Focusing on the fate of the 8,960 disappeared during the time of Argentinean state terror, the commission uncovered the archipelago of clandestine
detention and torture centres installed by the dictatorship. In its widely popular and recognised report “*Nunca Más*” (Never Again) it lists the names, locations and detailed descriptions of 340 buildings and facilities that were used by the regime for the disappearance of persons. In some cases, photographs of the buildings accompany the report (Hayner 2011, p.46). While the commission did not give any recommendations on how to proceed with these facilities, their uncovering to the public made them prone to later memorialisation initiatives by civil-society agents, often met by the embittered resistance of the military who owned the buildings and wanted to erase all evidence of their crimes from the surface of the earth (Heidhues 2008).

Nearly a decade later, the Chilean *Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación* (1990-1991), the first of its kind to be named a truth and reconciliation commission, was also the first commission to recommend symbolic reparations in detail. It called for a commemorative monument with the names of all victims and a public park commemorating “those who lost their lives, to serve as a place of commemoration and a lesson, as well as a place for recreation and for bolstering a life-affirming culture” (Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 1993, p.1059). Further, the National Human Rights Day was to be reinforced with public commemorations and rituals. The commission saw symbolic reparations as a means of publicly restoring the dignity and good names of victims, while teaching future generations about respect for human rights and thereby contributing to the non-repetition of these crimes, as well as creating national unity: “Today more than ever our country needs gestures and symbols of reparation so as to cultivate new values that may draw us together and unveil to us common perspectives on democracy and development” (Ibid., p.1058). Concerning the implementation of places of memory, the commission calls for the participation of artists and civil society as well as the consultation of victims’ family members (Ibid., pp.1059–1060).

Indeed, with this detailed call for symbolic reparations containing a clear justification for the need of places of memory, the Chilean truth and reconciliation commission set the standard for the recommendation of symbolic reparation, and especially memorialisation initiatives. Further, these recommendations were even implemented by the Chilean government. A public monument with the names of all victims was established in the main cemetery of Santiago de Chile in 1994, and the *Villa Grimaldi* Peace Park, although a civil-society initiative at first, was later supported by the state (Lazzara 2004; Schindel 2004; Collins 2011). But Latin American truth commissions would not remain the only ones to refer to places of memory. In 1992, only a year after the report of the Chilean commission, the Commission of Inquiry
investigating the crimes committed under the rule of Hissène Habré in Chad called for the erection of a monument to the victims, an official day of remembrance, and for turning the headquarters of the secret police, along with its subterranean prison used for torturing and killings, into a museum.\(^\text{14}\) Although its recommendations were never taken into account, it was still the first official truth commission to recommend the preservation of an authentic place of memory and the creation of a museum “to remind people of Habré’s dark reign” (Commission of Inquiry 1992, p.93).

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995-2002) published its report in 1998 and recommended symbolic reparations as well. In general, the commission recommended “identifying a national day of remembrance and reconciliation, erection of memorials and monuments, and the development of museums” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 1998, p.175) which it saw as important for dignifying the victims and “to facilitate the communal process of remembering and commemorating the pain and victories of the past” (Ibid.). But the commission further distinguished between the individual, the community and the national levels on which symbolic reparations were to be granted. Thus, it was decided that, on the individual level, exhumations, re-burials and ceremonies should be made available to family members and head- or tombstones offered to the families for a proper burial. On the community level, the commission recommended that streets and facilities should be re-named to honour victims or events, and that monuments and memorials should be built. The same was recommended for the national level. Further it stated that commemorative ceremonies should be culturally appropriate (Ibid., p.189). While the commission sees places of memory as a way of dignifying and publicly acknowledging victims and, even more, as a part of its nation-building strategy, it is also the first commission to ‘go local’ in the sense that it specifically addresses the community level and shows respect for culturally differing practices of remembrance. This is also very much evident in the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (\textit{Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico} – CEH) that published its report “Memory of Silence” in 1999 and recommended a public day of commemoration, the construction of monuments and commemorative parks on the national, regional and local levels as well as the assignation of names of victims to public facilities and streets. It poses that this should be done in accordance with local Mayan beliefs and also recommends the reclaiming of Mayan sacred sites destroyed during the civil war in accordance with the wishes of local communities (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) 1999, pp.61–62).

\(^\text{14}\) Ironically, the Commission of Inquiry had to set up its offices in exactly this former torture centre due to the lack of funding it received.
Still, the commission that to this day has been most engaged with the topic of memorialisation is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone (2002-2004). Artemis Christodoulou, a PhD student from Yale and an intern at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) prepared a report on “Memorials and Transitional Justice” for the commission that is annexed to its main report (Appendix 4, Part One) (Christodoulou 2004). Drawing heavily upon the South African experience, she recognises the deeply political and conflictual nature of memorials, and sees memorials as a crucial instrument to work through individual and collective traumata. Further, she sees memorialisation as a sort of prism that accompanies and supports all other transitional justice mechanisms: “For a successful memorial, remembrance lies at the centre of a network of transitional justice goals central to survivors of mass atrocity and human rights abuses, such as truth-seeking, prevention of future abuses, reparation and reconciliation” (Ibid., p.1). Her conception of a memorial is that of an educational space of democratic dialogue that enacts the values necessary for a peaceful society and fosters civic engagement and inter-personal reconciliation between former enemies (Ibid., p.3). Part Two of Appendix 4 contains a “Report on Mass Graves and Other Sites” that includes detailed descriptions and photographs of mass graves sites as well as other sites and buildings associated with killings, torture or detention throughout communities in the country. The report also lists the recommendations of the affected communities on what to do with the sites and how to remember. Many indeed call for monuments or parks (Truth & Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone 2004a), but it remains unclear if and how much communities were ‘conscienticised’ by the investigators before making these recommendations. The investigators’ mission statement gives a hint when indicating that the investigation included “advising the local community on the protection, preservation and security of the site” (Ibid., p.2). Not surprisingly then, the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, influenced by Christodoulou’s report states the need for at least one national war memorial in the capital and further memorials in different parts of the country. It also reminds that this can take on different forms, such as the establishment of monuments, the re-naming of buildings and sites or “the transformation of victims’ sites into useful buildings for the community” (Truth & Reconciliation Commission Sierra Leone 2004b, p.264). The rationale for creating memorials is:

“Memorials help define and construct a shared notion of the collective experience, imagination, and self-definition of a people. The Commission wants to emphasize that memorials are catalysts for interaction. As such, the success of a memorial cannot be measured by financial investments. Memorials are made by the people who engage with them and they engage with each other as a result of them.” (Ibid.)
Here, memorials are conceptualised as interactive arenas of community and nation-building. Further, the commission also recommends commemorative ceremonies and dates as well as the further identification of mass graves and re-burials (Ibid.).

Still, truth commissions have not been the only transitional justice bodies to call for places of memory. In some cases, international human rights courts have made similar recommendations for symbolic reparations. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was a pioneer in the development of global standards for reparations after human rights violations. Since 1989, it has ordered states to grant victims reparations in most of its cases, often as a combination of the right to access justice and information, measures of restitution, monetary compensation, rehabilitation, the satisfaction of victims and guarantees of non-repetition (Cassel 2005; Carrillo 2006; Antkowiak 2008). In 1998, the Case Benavides Cevallos v. Ecuador (I/A Court H.R. 1998, p.11) regarding the forced disappearance of a young teacher by state forces in the 1980s became groundbreaking for the court’s relation to memorialisation initiatives. It ordered the state of Ecuador, as the victim's parents had demanded, to name streets, squares and schools after the victim to restore her good name. Since then, and especially since 2001, it has become a common practice of the court to demand symbolic reparations such as the naming of streets, squares and schools after victims, the installation of commemorative plaques and memorials as well as the establishment of commemorative days and ceremonies. In some cases, state officials were also ordered to publicly recognise the crimes and apologise in the name of the state (Cassel 2005, p.204). Commemorative plaques and the re-naming of streets are often ordered in cases concerning individual victims, while in cases of massacres the court mostly recommends monuments and memorials (Antkowiak 2008, p.382). The rationale for ordering places of memory was first mentioned by the court in the Street Children v. Guatemala case from 2001. Here, the court ordered the building and naming of a school after the young victims and the installation of a commemorative plaque for them inside the building. This should “contribute to raising awareness in order to avoid the repetition of harmful acts such as those that occurred in the instant case and will keep the memory of the victims alive” (I/A Court H.R. 2001, pp.44–45). Exactly the same reasons were given by the court in the Chang Mack v. Guatemala case in 2003 (I/A Court H.R. 2003, p.130), in which the naming of a street or square and the installation of a commemorative plaque in a public place were ordered and the 19 Merchants v. Colombia case in 2004, in which a plaque and monument were to be installed (I/A Court H.R. 2004, p.125). To the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, memorialisation fulfils the role of publicly restoring the honour of the victim and thereby acknowledging it, as well as performing a wider societal
The goal of educating or conscientising the public for a future in which the crimes committed can never again happen. It thereby contributes to the measures of restitution, satisfaction and non-repetition. Further, the court often demands the consultation of victims regarding the design and placing of plaques and memorials. In some cases, such as the above-mentioned Benavides Cevallos v. Ecuador case of 1998 and the 19 Merchants v. Colombia case of 2004, the IACHR also responded to the explicit demands of family members for a place of memory. Among international and hybrid courts, the IACHR is rather alone with its practice of ordering memorialisation. The International Criminal Court can only order restitution, compensation and rehabilitation measures and it is still not foreseeable how wide this mandate will be interpreted in the future. In just one case did the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina order a contribution to the Potočari-Memorial near Srebrenica as a measure of satisfaction for victims (Nowak 2005, p.285). Once again, in Sierra Leone, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has proposed to turn part of the court’s facilities in Freetown into a Peace Museum after the proceedings have ended. It contains the artefacts, testimonies and audio-visual footage collected during proceedings, and houses the digital and print archive of the court to commemorate the victims of the war, to serve “as a reminder for new generations” and to attract tourists (Sierra Leone Peace Museum n.d.). The integration of places of memory into the recommendations or orders for reparations by truth commission and courts has also found its way into the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law” of 2005. The first draft of the principles, issued by Theo van Boven in 1993, already contained “commemorations and tributes to the victims” within the scope of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (van Boven 1993, p.52). The same formula was then used in the final draft of the prescribed principles and guidelines in 2005 under the label “satisfaction” (United Nations General Assembly 2005, p.8). Still, the reference to “commemorations and tributes to victims” is rather vague compared to the detailed recommendations about plaques, memorials and museums made by truth commissions and courts. Further, the “Basic Principles and Guidelines” subsume them under the measures of satisfaction for victims, thereby attributing them only a meaning for public acknowledgement and the dignification of victims, while many truth commissions, as well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, considered them to fulfil a double function directed at individual victims as well as societies as a whole, where they would serve to establish awareness for the errors of the past and create new communal spaces, thus ultimately contributing to the non-repetition of human rights violations.
Given the high degree of acceptance and even standardisation the topic of memorialisation has received from transitional justice bodies over the years, it is not surprising that memorialisation initiatives figure prominently within the approach of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Working closely with the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience it established an own Memory, Memorials and Museums Program (MMM), directed by Louis Bickford, to strengthen “the potential of public memorials to contribute to justice by expanding democratic space and prompting constructive civic dialogue about the past” (ICTJ 2008). After the re-configuration of the ICTJ’s programme, the topic of memorialisation was subsumed under the Truth and Memory Program that sees “architectural memorials, museums and commemorative activities [as] indispensable educational initiatives to establish the record beyond denial, and prevent repetition” (Ibid. 2015). Another internationally operating NGO that focuses on memorialisation activities is Impunity Watch seated in Utrecht, the Netherlands. It sees monuments and memorials as potentially beneficial for the fight against impunity and is closely partnered with the Anne Frank House, who itself conducts memorialisation initiatives globally (Impunity Watch n.d.).

2.3.4 The Contribution of Memorialisation Initiatives to Transitional Justice Aims

The rationale that has evolved for memorialisation initiatives in transitional justice is twofold. First, memorialisation is seen as a contribution to healing, primarily of individuals, but sometimes also of ‘wounded nations’. Second, memorialisation expands our knowledge of the past, which is indispensable for a culture of ‘never again’ and the thorough reconciliation of society. Still, the formulations in truth commissions and court proceedings regarding places of memory are rather vague and often lack a clear understanding of how exactly memorialisation is supposed to help achieve the envisaged goals (Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.10; Hamber et al. 2010, p.399). Obviously, there was broad agreement that memorialisation initiatives should somehow be part of transitional justice processes. Yet this agreement is accompanied by a lack of in-depth conceptualisation and understanding of the exact role memorialisation initiatives can and should play. They seem to be perceived as belonging to the soft and cultural sphere, devoid of any political significance (Brett et al. 2007, p.2), as ‘non-essentials’ compared to more important and influential transitional justice measures (Naidu 2006, p.1). Only recently have several authors and organisations begun to develop a closer understanding of the potential of memorialisation initiatives within the set of tools, mechanisms and aims that constitute transitional justice. Increasingly, there is an insight that places of memory and commemoration function as a symbolic kit that holds different processes and instruments
together within a holistic transitional justice process (Naidu 2004b; Hamber 2006a; Naidu 2006; Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; Hamber et al. 2010; Impunity Watch 2011). As part of a politics of representation, they underpin transitional justice mechanisms and aims and provide them with meaning. At the same time, memorialisation lacks meaning and stands alone if it is not thoroughly integrated into a consistent approach: “Memorial sites cannot, through their mere existence, achieve reconciliation, violence prevention or respect for human rights. It is only through careful design, innovative programming and evaluation, as well as through linking such processes to other wider mechanisms (for example, wider institutional human rights reform or justice processes), that sites can materially contribute to these long term goals” (Hamber et al. 2010, p.400).

Impunity Watch (2011) sees memorialisation initiatives as highly important for the aim of justice. In a society in which perpetrators of human rights violations are not prosecuted and remain unpunished, memorials, museums and commemorations can make the victims and crimes visible to a wider public and awaken a conscience for their suffering, which might then lead to a change of opinion and greater public demand to put perpetrators of human rights violations to trial (Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.9). They may thereby indirectly also contribute to the victims’ right to access justice. Further, especially memorial museums store and exhibit victims’ personal artefacts, such as clothing and other belongings, or in other cases even the weapons and instruments they were tortured or killed with. They may also archive and exhibit important documents referring to the crimes committed and have their own research units that produce further documentation. All of these artefacts and documents are in fact potential evidence that may be used in trial (Brett et al. 2007, p.29). Sometimes the site of an atrocity turned into a museum or memorial can also be considered as evidence in as much as it is a former crime scene that may serve to re-construct the course of events (Cook 2006). But trials may also function as triggers for memorialisation activities. In Cambodia, the proceedings of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) sparked a massive outreach activity by local civil society and international donors that even reached small villages and led to a plethora of memorialisation initiatives concerning the re-valuing of old and the construction of new places of memory. The Sierra Leonean Peace Museum is an example for a court being directly responsible for the creation of a place of memory, even handing over part of its facilities for the creation of a Peace Museum that would later form the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s legacy. In many cases, courts have indirectly contributed to monuments, museums and commemorations with the recommendation of symbolic reparations. Places of memory have thereby even become an emerging standard within...
international human rights jurisdiction. Finally, the trials of perpetrators themselves are “didactic monuments” (Osiel 1997) with a high symbolic meaning for understanding the past and defining the values and norms of the future. Just as for courts, it is nearly standard procedure for truth commissions to recommend the creation of places of memory as a form of symbolic reparation. In some cases, truth commissions have even installed places of memory themselves. For example, thanks to the efforts made by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, the Congo Cross Bridge in Freetown was re-named the Peace Bridge (Schabas 2005, p.305). In Colombia, the Historical Memory Group of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) was turned into the National Center for Historical Memory (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica – CNMH) with the task of establishing a museum that administers and exhibits the information, testimonies, photographs and audio-visual footage collected and created during the commission’s work (Centro de Memoria n.d.; CNMH n.d.). A similar process is also visible in East Timor. Here, the former Comarca Balide prison that was used as an interrogation centre during the Indonesian occupation was chosen as the main seat of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. After the proceedings of the commission ended in 2005, the former prison was turned into a permanent memorial, also housing the commission’s archive of documents and testimonies (Leach 2009, pp.149–151). Further, as is often the case with human rights trials, truth commissions can also spark an accompanying trend towards memorialisation led by civil-society agents. Beyond this direct or indirect connection of places of memory with trials and truth commissions, memorialisation is seen as crucial for knowing the ‘truth’ about the past. As already mentioned, places of memory exhibit evidence of past crimes and the suffering or mere existence of their victims. As authoritative structures, museums and monuments make the stories of victims an official narrative placed in public space. This in turn can combat revisionist notions of the past (Impunity Watch 2011, p.19). Further, museums and memorials can contribute to the victims’ right to know the truth, not only by publicly exhibiting their fate and the events that led up to their victimisation, but also by conducting their own research or supporting the research of others, which may then lead to the further clarification of events and the victims’ fate. Many Holocaust museums and memorials have own research facilities that help family members find out more about the exact fate of their loved ones. The Museum for Memory and Human Rights in Santiago de Chile contains a public documentation centre with an archive and a library for researchers. Judy Ledgerwood (2002, p.110) also describes how the exhibition of the photographs of inmates taken by the Khmer Rouge in the S-21/Tuol
Sleng prison that was made available to the public after the prison was turned into a memorial at the beginning mainly attracted people looking to see if they could find the portraits of their loved ones among those tortured and killed at Tuol Sleng. Due to their high importance to mobilise for or directly contribute to truth and justice, memory museums are even seen as a sort of permanent truth commission by some (ICTJ Colombia 2009).

Most clearly and directly, places of memory serve as reparation to victims and their family members, providing a place for mourning and public acknowledgment as well as contributing to their healing process. As Jay Winter (1995) shows, family members were often at the forefront of memorialisation processes after World War I, publicly expressing their grief. This is not much different after human rights violations, especially when the fate of disappeared persons is unclear or met with official denial and the distortion of facts. The above-mentioned rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights show that demands for the creation of places of memory often came directly from family members. Indeed, a survey of victims’ attitudes towards reparations conducted in different regions in the world revealed that 29% of those questioned saw a memorial for the victims as ‘helpful’ for their situation. This ranked second after the demand for monetary compensation (42%) which, according to the authors, shows the high importance of public recognition of the victims’ suffering (Kiza et al. 2006).

The public recognition of those victimised and marginalised is indeed at the forefront of many memorialisation initiatives and lies at the core of any reparation. It gives victims or their family members a clear sign that their story is not forgotten, but rather integrated into the official record and made visible in public space. Memorialisation initiatives, as Brandon Hamber (2006a, pp.570–571) puts it, bridge the gap between the often isolated and inwardly directed world of traumatised victims and wider society. It conveys a public message of society’s acceptance of responsibility, not only for the crimes, but also to not repeat them, and thereby symbolically marks a clean break with the past. This is not only comforting for the victims, but it also shows that they now have a legitimate voice, which may in the long run also function as a stimulus for regaining agency and being re-integrated into society as full citizens. Still, the sole construction and opening of a memorial is not enough. To have a real impact on the well-being of victims and constitute a reparation, the activities and discourses surrounding the memorial are as important as the memorial itself. How wider society treats the museum and whether officials and ordinary people visit the museum says a lot about the value survivors have in society and may improve their status when enacted with sympathy, understanding and solidarity.
Having a place to mourn and remember the dead is seen as a universal need of humankind (Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.3; Hamber 2009, p.87; Impunity Watch 2011, p.9). Memorialisation initiatives in transitional justice processes are then seen as important in enabling the grieving process of those bereaved (Brett et al. 2007, p.6; Till 2008, pp.108–109). Indeed, the grave is the principal place of memory and is surrounded by the ritual of a proper burial. But in cases of gross violations of human rights, the remains of those victimised may never be recovered, which may add to the traumatisation of family members that are seen as stuck in a liminal space, unable to grieve their loss and move on. A memorial or memory museum, especially when it contains the name or personal objects of the loved person, may then help externalise the inwardly roaming pain and project it onto the object that symbolises the missing person or traumatic event. Places of memory are also seen to help re-assemble the fragmented memory and shattered sense of self of those traumatised. By providing a narrative of past events, they can help those bereaved make sense of their loss, relate it to the stories of others, and re-integrate and re-order their own experience within a wider account of the past, which may in turn lead to an opening up towards and a re-connection with the outside world. The visit of a memorial or memory museum can then be seen as passing through a liminal space from the dislocation and fragmented self associated with trauma, towards mastery of the past, closure and healing (Silverman 2002; Hamber & Wilson 2003; Brown 2004; Hamber 2006a).

In fact, many memorials lead visitors along a pre-designed path, passing reflecting pools of water or trees of life intended to help come to terms with a traumatic past. Especially museums, with their clear order of objects and histories and their power to secure, construct and stabilise identities are seen as a “promising tool for therapy” (Silverman 2002, p.70). However, as Jenny Edkins (2003) and Brandon Hamber (2005, p.136) remind us, fully repairing and healing traumatised individuals is not possible. Mourning can become endless and closure may never be achieved. Survivors may also reject easy representations and interpretations of their fate and may prefer instead to emphasise the impossibility of sense-making. For Jenny Edkins (2003, p.87), a successful memorial resists providing all too clear narratives and instead represents inexpressibility, thereby ‘encircling’ trauma. This leaves the meaning of the past open to ongoing public debate, which can do more for the public recognition of traumatised victims than any official attempt at closure. Sparking dialogue and public debate about the past is at the forefront of places of memories’ contribution to institutional reform and non-repetition. Indeed, memorials and museums are important state institutions that represent the official view of the past in public space and
define the identity of the nation. After dictatorships or civil wars, there is often a need to reform these institutions, especially when, as in the South African case, the representations are based on racist ideas of superiority and are highly exclusionary. As authoritative structures, places of memory could then underpin the new values and the new, common narrative of the nation, thus contributing to a national reconciliation process. Still, the danger remains of installing new unilateral narratives of the past in public space that are as one-sided, exclusionary and top-down as the old ones (Naidu 2004b; Barsalou & Baxter 2007, pp.6–8; Brett et al. 2007, p.23). Further, there is no such thing as a single narrative or truth in post-conflict societies. Most authors instead emphasise the deeply political and conflictual nature of all attempts to memorialise the past in public space (Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.4; Brett et al. 2007, pp.2–3; Jelin 2007). The dominant conception of a place of memory is now that of a public forum that fosters democratic dialogue and debate between different or even opposing notions of the past. While some argue that this dialogue should take place based on at least some firmly established facts about the past that discredit the most severe revisionist views (Brett et al. 2007, p.7; Hamber et al. 2010, p.418), such monuments and museums establish respect for and the dignity of the victims while still leaving enough space for differing views and nuances, thus re-constructing the nation as a “community in dissent” (Lefranc 2004). The underlying idea is to create memorial institutions that enact the values and norms the new society is to be built upon and to educate the public – and especially younger generations – in empathy, tolerance and critical thinking. This will then, so the aspiration, contribute to a more inclusive and egalitarian society in which reconciliation and lasting peace prevail (Naidu 2004b; Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; ICTJ Colombia 2009; Impunity Watch 2011). Conflict is seen as a natural part of this long-term process that surrounds places of memory. It is even seen as healthy, as it shows that societies are actively engaged with their past and are willing to disrupt long-standing silences and deadlocked notions of history (Minow 1998, pp.138–140; Hamber et al. 2010, p.398). The constant debate accompanying memorialisation initiatives, according to Ruth Abram (2002), one of the co-founders of the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, helps keep the past in the public conscience and enables the comparison between the past and current situations in society, thereby functioning as a violence prevention tool. Indeed, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) even has a Committee on Conscience with a Genocide Prevention Task Force that gives out genocide warnings and monitors situations in other regions of the world (USHMM n.d.).
Finally, memorialisation initiatives are seen to have a positive impact on human and economic development. As marginalised populations engage in memorialisation activities, they regain agency and develop new skills which in turn enhance their capacity for further action and development (Naidu 2006, p.2). More directly, museums and memorials can contribute to urban renewal, the development of downtown and commercial districts, public education and tourism, thus creating employment, attracting business investment and visitors, fostering economic activity and generating gross revenue (Duthie 2008, p.300). Tourism may go on to contribute to the acknowledgement of victims and non-repetition, even across borders, as more people come into contact with the narratives of tolerance and cohesion spread by places of memory. This is especially visible in the post-Apartheid memoryscape of South Africa, where the government used places of memory both to attract tourism and encourage economic investment or urban regeneration as well as to transform society (Naidu 2003; Nieves 2009, p.199).

Similar as with other transitional justice mechanisms, many authors criticise the top-down imposition of places of memory by governments and call for more participation and ownership of the affected populations in memorialisation processes. The integration of survivors and locals into the planning and management processes of memorialisation initiatives is seen as crucial for the acknowledgment and empowerment of victims, and the only way to really give places of memory the meaning of a symbolic reparation. Further, more localised memorialisation processes can challenge and break the hegemonic memory culture imposed by national elites from above (Naidu 2004b; Hamber 2006a; Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; Impunity Watch 2011). Indeed, there is a growing tendency to ‘go local’ in the field of memorialisation, and the creation of community museums or memorials is a flourishing instrument for localised transitional justice interventions. They are seen as a local space of dialogue that (re)establishes relationships within a community as well as to the outside world and contributes to a mastery of the past, the development of new skills and the creation of new sources of income (Naidu 2004a). All of this is seen as important for local processes of healing, empowerment and reconciliation. In his analysis of community memorialisation processes in South Africa, Lazarus Kgalema (1999) even sees a possibility of direct interpersonal reconciliation between former enemies – in this case members of the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party – by creating places of memory, as they may lead to the recognition of the other side’s losses and a joint effort to represent the victims of both sides in public space. The participation of ex-combatants in this process may even function as a gesture of remorse and may thus contribute to the re-integration of
perpetrators into the community. In Australia, Lynda Kelly and Phil Gordon (2002) see the establishment of community museums in the reconciliation process with the Aboriginal population as highly important to provide a meeting place for the community, to create employment and to help keep culture alive. The chance to have their own museum where their culture is officially represented, and the possibility to teach visitors about their experience is seen as an opportunity to enhance self-respect, pride and community spirit within the indigenous population of Australia. This is also very similar to the ideas of the *museos comunitarios* of Mexico, whose methodology has also spread to post-conflict regions (Healy 2003; Camarena & Morales 2006). Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-Arriaza (2008; 2010) see the creation of local community museums in Mayan communities as important for deepening and carrying on the work of the Guatemalan truth commission. Here, community museums not only represent the experience of victimisation, but also contribute to the revival of Mayan culture by re-coding and exhibiting local cultural practices and traditions. A typical feature of these local memorialisation interventions, visible also in Guatemala, is the capacitation of local history and memory promoters or tour guides that can facilitate local processes, guarantee ownership and the sustainability of the project long after the end of outside intervention. Indeed, making those affected by trauma a visitor of, a contributor to, or a guide in a museum is seen as one of museums’ therapeutic potentials that may help victims take on new active roles and give them a sense of mastery (Silverman 2002). The presence of outsiders and the use of the rather Western museum model is, just as in other local transitional justice interventions, seen to bridge the gap between the local and global worlds of representation (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza 2010, pp.158–159). The use of a museum or memorial as a globalised form of representation ensures that the voice of those marginalised is perceived as legitimate on a national or even global level.

Parallel to other transitional justice tools, there is a growing demand for understanding and evaluating the real impact of memorialisation initiatives on their envisaged goals (Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; Impunity Watch 2011) – a task that only recently has been taken up (Hamber et al. 2010). Indeed, this is very much necessary, as most of the goals of memorialisation are rather lofty and riddled with dilemmas and contradictions. Even the connection between ‘truth’ and memorialisation is problematic. Museums and memorials have a long history of imposing or manipulating notions of the past that downplay or exclude conflicting memories and differing experiences for the purpose of creating a unified vision and identity for the nation. Equally, authorities in transitional justice processes may be tempted to create such one-sided places of memory for the goal of national reconciliation.
This may help those in power avoid admitting their own responsibility for atrocities by instead focusing on a common future. In Rwanda, memorials of the genocide first and foremost serve the interests of the ruling regime of Paul Kagame, which blames colonialism and the Hutus for the genocide. This has led to a ‘Tutsification’ of genocide commemorations in which only Tutsis appear as victims, while Hutu victims are marginalised, and the responsibility of the ruling elite for human rights violations is totally absent from any public discussion (Ibreck 2010; Sodaro 2011). Not surprisingly, Rwandan genocide memorials have a divisive effect, as they exclude the Hutu population and instead deepen the ethnic divide (Longman & Rutagengwa 2004). In East Timor, the memory politics of the post-transitional government focused on displaying a narrative of the common Timorese resistance against the Indonesian occupation and the reconciliation of the Timorese people, while atrocities committed by the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor – FRETILIN), now in power, are absent from the official memoryscape (Leach 2009). These hegemonic and unilateral narratives may be overcome by conceptualising places of memory as open spaces of dialogue that enhance critical thinking about the past. Still, even then some authoritative narrativisation may be necessary simply because the limited structure of the place cannot take into account all notions and experiences. Therefore, the ‘truths’ presented in a place of memory are always partial to some extent.

Reparation and healing are no less problematic tasks for memorialisation initiatives. Authorities might be tempted to focus on memorials and museums as a cheap form of reparation that avoids expensive monetary compensations, something the South African government has been repeatedly accused of (Naidu 2004b, p.2; Barsalou 2005, p.9). Building a monument may also be an attempt to gain control over the debate about the past and to mark a final full stop in an ongoing discussion that poses uncomfortable questions about the responsibility of those in power and the state as the locus of security in general (Edkins 2003). This may have a devastating effect on victims. Family members, e.g. in Argentina, have occasionally resisted attempts to memorialise their fate within an official politics of closure. Closure and healing may indeed never come, and it is questionable if this can be achieved by visiting a museum or memorial. The representations survivors may find there may not respond to their experience, or they may be bewildering, even painful, and re-traumatising. Gaynor Kavanagh (2002) also objects that a traumatised person visiting a place of memory has probably already developed some coping capacity and a partial mastering of his or her past. The visit to a memorial or museum may then not be a prerequisite of ‘healing’ but an effect of it. Further, the already cited study by Kiza et al. (2006) shows that while 29% of the
questioned victims see a memorial as something positive, some 24% also just want to forget what happened. For Rwanda, Rachel Ibreck (2010) describes that while memorials became a principle focus for the grieving process by creating a community of the bereaved and an impetus for activism among survivors, even among families of survivors, there was no agreement on when and how to remember, and some even experienced memorials as re-traumatising. This poses some serious questions about the alleged universal necessity to remember the past and the need for places of memory.

Memorials potentially acknowledge victimhood. But if memorials commemorate different victim groups separately, or separate memorials are created for different victim groups, it creates a hierarchy of acknowledgement. This is visible for example in Berlin, where separate memorials have been or will be built for Jewish, Sinti and Roma, and homosexual victims, thus somewhat replicating the categorisation of humans in the name of which they had been victimised (Edkins 2003, p.135). Another example is the 9/11 Memorial in New York in which the first responders, such as members of the police and fire departments who sacrificed their lives voluntarily, are inscribed apart from ‘ordinary’ victims’. This creates a dichotomy between active heroes or martyrs and passive victims sacrificed on the altar of freedom. The effect is that some victims seem to be recognised as more valuable, important or deserving than others, once again resulting in struggles over acknowledgement and victim competition. Under the current regime of memory, only those who can claim absolute innocence are seen as worthy of memorialisation, leading to a depoliticised representation of victimhood in which grey zones of victimhood and political agency are left out (Ibid., pp.9–11). Victims that are not considered to have a clean record of innocence might never become the subject of memorialisation.

The contribution of memorialisation to non-repetition, reconciliation and lasting peace is somewhat in opposition to the politicised and conflictive nature of places of memory after conflict. Traditionally, museums and monuments are seen as divisive, emphasising superiority, heroism or victimisation and thereby contributing to future conflict. But also in transitional justice settings, battles about the correct representation of the past in public space are frequent (Naidu 2004b; Barsalou & Baxter 2007; Brett et al. 2007; Jelin 2007; Impunity Watch 2011). The concept of dialogue in memorialisation may, once again, resolve some of this tension. But multiple narratives may undermine any intent to create shared values, instead contributing to a further fragmentation of society (Hamber et al. 2010, pp.417–418). It is also highly questionable if such a democratic debate or dialogue is possible in deeply divided societies where places of memory are easily dragged into culture wars. Some authors argue
that it might not be wise to start memorialising the past right after the conflict has ended, but to wait until tensions have calmed and more tolerant views of the past prevail in society (Barsalou 2005, p.9). Still, this may never be the case and instead, it may be the creation of a museum, memorial or exhibition that may spark violent reactions after a long phase of tranquillity.

The rather opposite danger to an outright culture war surrounding a memorialisation initiative may be that perceptions about the past are so irreconcilable and far apart that no debate or dialogue about the representation of the past is triggered at all (Doss 2010, p.360). Further, a memorialisation initiative may also be ill-designed and uncoordinated, failing to attract support and attention and thus resulting in the invisibility of the memorial or museum.

The phase in which a new memorialisation initiative is created, discussed, constructed and finally inaugurated is probably its most conflictive phase (Linenthal 1995; Pieper 2006). But it is also the heyday for memory, in which memorialisation initiatives receive the most public attention. The danger then is that a place of memory becomes a largely private matter after the press has left, only visited by family members, researchers and human rights activists. After all, the visit to a memorial or a memory museum is not an everyday activity and mostly attracts those who already have some kind of relation to the specific cause or to human rights issues in general. But this is not how a memorialisation initiative can make a difference to wider society and change the attitudes of people towards a more tolerant, democratic and peaceful future. Outreach programmes are necessary to get in touch with those who normally do not visit museums and memorials. Young people who have not experienced the past at stake and are therefore seen as especially in need of learning about it should be at the centre of attention (Impunity Watch 2011, p.26). But while donors are eager to provide funding in the first phase of a memorial’s existence, funding is much harder to acquire for the long-term maintenance and outreach of a place of memory when the wave of publicity has died down. Many places of memory therefore cannot afford to engage with a wider public and may even struggle for survival or become dependent on the help of governments and donor agencies (Brett et al. 2007, p.15; Hamber et al. 2010, pp.419–420).

But even when outreach programmes are in place and memorialisation initiatives do actively engage with wider society, it is not at all sure that visitors leave the museum or memorial having learned and internalised the envisaged goals of the place of memory. People enter into a place of memory carrying their own memories, experiences and interpretations with them, which may collide with the forms and functions of representation found in the museum or memorial. The outcome is quite uncertain. Brandon Hamber, Liz Ševčenko and Ereshnee
Naidu (2010) have evaluated the youth programmes of three member institutions of the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience: the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park in Chile, the Liberation War Museum in Bangladesh and the Peace School Foundation of Monte Sole in Italy. Their findings are rather mixed. While they do find that visits by school children have improved their knowledge and awareness of the past, they are sceptical about the possibility to make any statements about the impact places of memory have on such long-term goals as cultures of peace and democracy. Further, some conclusions students drew from their visits seemed to undermine the goals of the museums. Another recent study on the knowledge of history among German youth – titled “Late Victory of the Dictatorships?” – not only revealed the low levels of knowledge German students had about the Third Reich and the Communist dictatorship of the German Democratic Republic, it also gives some useful insights about the role of memorials in learning about the past. It states that the visit to memorials can potentially have a devastating effect, rather contributing to the confusion of history than to its better knowledge, when students are not prepared appropriately before their visit (Schroeder et al. 2012, pp.475–476). Finally, it remains puzzling that memorialisation initiatives are seen as “agents of change” (Sandell 2002, p.9) that aim to contribute to the social inclusion and agency of its visitors (Newman & McLean 2002), thus making citizens out of savages. This somewhat resembles the social engineering attitude of the museum as 19th-century disciplining institution.

The commercialisation of places of memory as tourist destinations may become a tricky issue as well. Survivors may see the commercialisation of the memory of their loved ones as immoral, especially when they have the impression that only the state or tourism companies profit from selling out what is actually theirs. It may also lead to resentment among victims who get the feeling that someone else is profiting from their trauma (Barsalou 2005, p.9; Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.9; Clark & Payne 2011). Even when tourism has a direct positive impact on the economic improvement of locals, it may still have negative repercussions for the aim of acknowledgement. In South Africa, anti-Apartheid museums and memorials have been integrated into the township tourism, a rather colonial undertaking given that it is about experiencing the distant and exotic world of poor black South Africans (Nieves 2009). In this context, memorials may not lead to understanding and empathy towards those affected, but may perpetuate their perception as a ‘victim-Other’, bound to the inexplicable world of the primitive townships.

Finally, as memorialisation initiatives have become part of the transitional justice ‘toolkit’, there is a growing danger of standardised representations of victimhood (Brett et al. 2007,
p.27). Powerful NGOs such as the International Center for Transitional Justice, the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, the Anne Frank House, Impunity Watch as well as a myriad of other governmental and non-governmental donor agencies promote places of memory in transitional justice processes across the globe, provide funding, expertise and standardised methodologies on how to create a successful memorial. This already becomes visible in the globalised mantra of memorialisation as a space for dialogue and democratic debate. Ereshnee Naidu (2004b, p.16) warns that this may result in places of memory taking on a “holocaust identity” that is inappropriate in the specific context and does not fit the needs and representations of the affected local populations. This probably becomes most visible in the Kigali Memorial Centre designed by a British organisation that has focused on the remembrance of the Holocaust in its work. But far beyond this example, many places of memory in transitional justice processes draw upon walls of names, abstract voids and shards, photographs and personal artefacts of victims or audio-visual testimony, developed or brought to perfection by such emblematic sites as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial or the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). The endless proliferation of a standardised set of representations of innocent victimhood that is designed to evoke a standardised set of feelings, reactions and values, and the emphasis of the common humanity of victims finally erases their human individuality, their politicised agency and the thin line between victim and perpetrator, in the end resulting in some form of superficial and easily interchangeable memory kitsch\(^\text{15}\) and empty pathos.

The solution to these problems seems to be localised bottom-up memorialisation initiatives that ensure the participation, ownership and empowerment of the local population. However, at a closer look these processes replicate the dilemmas posed on other levels. Local community monuments and museums may be even more dependent on funding and expertise by outside donors and experts than national initiatives. Many of these places are ephemeral because local people do not have the resources and time to maintain them or cannot agree on who is to take responsibility for different tasks surrounding the maintenance of such a place. Conflicts may evolve on how exactly the revenues of a community museum are to be distributed among the population, who is allowed to tell their story to tourists and who can sell local artisanry when and where, all of which may lead to frustration and resentment, even to the abandonment of the place of memory altogether. Indeed, whoever sees local communities as an undifferentiated harmonic whole and ignores local power relations may only contribute to the place of memory serving the partisan interests of local elites that impose

\(^{15}\) On kitsch and memorialisation see especially Marita Sturken (2007).
their hegemonic view of the past on the local level while silencing differing visions of the past (Brett et al. 2007, p.2). This may also impose a representation of collective victimhood that covers up the different shades of grey between victims and perpetrators as well as the agency and responsibility of the population. The result is a local population locked in the representation and perpetuation of a sense of passive victimhood, in need of outside help and support (Hamber et al. 2010, p.419). Memorialisation initiatives can also dangerously disrupt the carefully established silences and coping mechanisms that serve the cohabitation of different groups, victims and perpetrators at the local level. This may result in new conflict and even violence. In Guatemala, memorialisation processes resulted in the creation of places of accusation of self-defence committee members in neighbouring communities responsible for massacres. This led to a violent reaction of those accused, who pulled down the memorial, initiating a new cycle of memorialisation and accusation (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza 2008, p.161).

Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-Arriaza still hail particularly community museums as a “truly communal project” (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza 2008, p.158) and as so place- and time-specific that they cannot easily be duplicated (Ibid., p.165). This conclusion totally ignores the fact that the same projects the authors describe were pushed forward by a Guatemalan NGO, not by locals. Indeed, while family members often do want some form of memorialisation, the creation of a museum is probably not the first idea they have. It is rather brought to the mind of local people through ‘conscientisation’ by activists, NGOs and researchers. In the case described by Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza, local history promoters were first capacitated by an NGO and then bought to the capital to understand what a museum is. In the next step, workshops were held on the composition of the community museum’s rooms.

Community museums are thus not at all place- and time-specific, but rather a globally proliferated tool for local empowerment strategies, as the above-mentioned examples from Mexico, Guatemala and Australia show. The methodology and aims for making community museums are also increasingly standardised as the “Manual for the Creation and Development of Community Museums” by Teresa Morales and Cuauhtémoc Camarena shows (Camarena & Morales 2009). This results in places of memory that all look pretty much the same and again refer to Holocaust imagery when using victims’ testimony, photographs and personal belongings. These pre-fabricated methodologies, conceptions and representations seriously hamper the scope of participation and ownership of local people, who can only design what to put in which museum room, and not if they want a museum or not. It also neglects the fact that memorialisation forms and practices go far beyond the concrete and place-based
structures of memorials and museums. Memory may inhabit many unmarked places, visible only to those who know. Memorialisation may take shape in a wide array of religious practices or the relation to the dead and to spirits bound to or haunting specific places. It may also be not at all place-based, but happen rather through music, song or storytelling, or even in everyday conversation. The argument brought forth then is that a museum or memorial promoted by sympathetic outsiders who provide funding and expertise bridges the gap between local worlds of meaning and national or global forms of representation, creating awareness of and legitimacy for the claims of local victims (Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.13; Arriaza & Roht-Arriza 2008, pp.165–166; Impunity Watch 2011, p.27). However, if from the beginning on, the museum or memorial is seen as the only legitimate form of representation, then all other local forms of memorialisation are automatically deemed illegitimate and as part of a primitive culture, not fitting the standards and expectations of a potentially global audience. Leslie Dwyer (2010) brilliantly describes how a group of Balinese youth that had come in contact with globalised forms of memorialisation tried to create a commemorative park and an exhibition of victims’ photos to commemorate the 1965 anti-communist repression in their community. Following the assumption that those who were victimised would want to speak out and had to be represented, they were met with resistance by elder people who instead wanted to voice their memories during religious rituals, family gatherings or work. This in turn led the young activists to accuse the elderly of being backwards, ignorant and apolitical in the face of such progressive internationalised concepts. Memorialisation initiatives in a transitional justice context remain then a complex process of interaction, negotiation, adaptation and contestation of different agents with differing aims and expectations. The physical and social result of this process remains uncertain and deeply entangled in a glocal politics of representation.

2.4 A Political Geography of Memory after Human Rights Violations

As we have seen, place and memory work well together, despite – or maybe just because of – being very messy concepts. Both share a number of attributes: those of being multi-layered social constructions whose meaning changes over time. Places of memory are constructed both physically and socially by many different agents for many different reasons, while remaining ambiguous and contested. They are built and interpreted as spaces of legitimisation or contestation of the present and are considered to give advice for future actions that are derived from the interpretation of the past, thereby demonstrating their intrinsically political meaning and capacity. Indeed, places of memory are ubiquitous. Memory informs our daily
lives and there is nothing more mundane than our daily actions of remembering. Further, while we remember, we also commonly refer to spaces and places, thus creating a specific geography of memory. This already becomes evident in Halbwachs’ concept of the framing of memory by space.

In addition, “[…] human beings do ‘make their own geography’ as much as the[y] ‘make their own history’” (Giddens 1984, p.363). To Giddens, history is crucial for the structuration of society, as it dialectically connects our daily lives and actions with institutions over time and space (Ibid., pp. 362–363). But in the context of this work, we must add: Human beings do not only make their own history, they also make their own memory – and with memory, they produce geography. Memory, geography and human agency are interconnected and thereby contribute to the ongoing process of the structuration of society. Places of memory in their multi-vocality, malleability and conflictivity are then a powerful expression and medium of this process.

Anthony Giddens has been heavily criticised for the role he ascribes to space as the mere background that influences the process of structuration without being affected itself (Urry 1991, p.160; Werlen 1997, pp.166–167; Löw 2001, p.43). In contrast, most authors agree that “[…] space should be seen as produced and producing, as contested and determined and as symbolically represented and structurally organized” (Urry 1991, p.160). Still, it remains rather unclear how exactly space, place or geography contributes to the structuration of society. While John Agnew (1987) still sticks to the notion of space as a container in which the process of structuration takes place, Allan Pred (1984) thinks of place as a social product created by the appropriation and transformation of space that in turn is part of the reproduction and transformation of society. Lynn Staeheli (2003, p. 163) describes physical and social place as a context for and an object of action that is continuously produced and reproduced within the process of structuration. Further, many authors emphasise that place – or the control over it – is an important resource that invests people with power for action (Urry 1995, p.17; Dangschat 1996, pp.105–108; Staeheli 2003, p.161).

These notions have rather blurred than clarified the role of space, place and geography in the process of structuration. I will therefore go on to highlight this relation by largely drawing upon Benno Werlen’s idea of the ‘geography of everyday regionalisation’ published in detail in two separate volumes (Werlen 1995b; Werlen 1997). To Werlen, geography is an integral part of the process of structuration, since human agency and spatial arrangements interact in different contexts. Agents thereby produce geographies from different power positions, while geography affects their agency by influencing the context of action. In this process, space is as
much a condition of agency as it is a means for it and a consequence of it (Werlen 1993, p.252). Further, a specific geography at a given point in time is the product of past actions affecting present and future actions as constraints or means of agency. Still, Werlen warns us not to mistake geography with structure. Structure that is itself reproduced and transformed by agency is made up of rules and resources. Rules guide agency, while resources function as the ability to exercise power over objects of the material world (allocative resources) or the ability to exercise power over bodies of subjects in time and space. In the process of regionalisation, powerful agents invest space with meanings, thereby creating regions (we could also say places) that are materialisations and representations of the underlying principles of structuration, which are constituted by rules and resources. These places form symbolically laden contexts of agency that constitute to a certain degree the roles of agents, and at the same time may be employed by them as a powerful tool to achieve their envisaged aims. Therefore, although places are not in themselves resources, but the materialisation and representation of power relations, they may be used just like resources according to the meanings that people apply to them (Werlen 1997).

Werlen further differentiates between three types of ‘everyday regionalisation’ with two subtypes each, as shown in figure 1. The category of ‘productive-consumptive regionalisation’ refers to the locations of production and consumption, the associated decisions made by producers and consumers and the commodity flows involved. They mostly rely on allocative resources as the ability to exert control over the natural means of production and material, as well as the symbolic products themselves. ‘Normative-political
regionalisation’ refers to the laws, norms and rules that often tacitly define which agents have access to certain places, artefacts and objects, which codes of conduct exist in these places, and how they may be used (geographies of allocation), while geographies of authoritative control describe a regionalisation in which power is exercised over bodies by the creation of territory and the means to use force within it. Geographies of allocation then describe moral geographies in which it is coded what is in and out of place, while geographies of authoritative control describe the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* applied to nation-states. Finally, ‘significative-informative regionalisation’ refers to how information is gathered, mediated and interpreted in and over time and space (geographies of information), and how agents attribute meaning to space and interpret it as symbols of specific contents (geographies of symbolic appropriation). It is this latter process of symbolic appropriation of space that underlies all other forms of regionalisation. Here, meaning is encoded in and retrieved from geography by different agents from differing power positions. Space then becomes a means of communication produced by and reproducing discourse as well as the rules and power relations underlying it (Werlen 1997; Glasze & Mattissek 2009). It is here that the process of regionalisation becomes outright political. Agents produce and instrumentalise geographical imaginations and symbolic representations as a source of legitimation to achieve their own political goals. And as different agents constantly attach new meanings to different geographies, struggle over their interpretation, and strategically employ them for their own purposes, space becomes the focus of continuous conflict (Reuber & Wolkersdorfer 2001).

So what does this all mean for places of memory in transitional justice contexts?

1. Places of memory are part of geographies of production and consumption to their creation and commodification in the tourism and the heritage industry. They especially become important as a locational advantage in the struggle to attract visitors and investment or awareness for human rights violations in a certain locality and support from donors or the state. Further, places as products are also very much consumed, which often involves travelling to the site and actively observing it in a particular manner – what Urry (1995) describes as the “tourist gaze”. People visit memorials as part of a wider performance of memorialisation tied to expectations about the authentic experience of ‘true’ memory, thereby reproducing the image of the place and only making it a place of memory as a sort of “self-fulfilling prophecy of place perception” (Harvey 1993, p.22).

16 Note that Glasze and Mattissek differ from Werlen as they see discourse as the primal to agency in the process of the constitution of space and of society.
2. Places of memory are part of normative-political geographies of allocation, as they are an expression of the underlying norms that structure the current regime of memory. This macro-discourse establishes memorialisation initiatives as spaces of remembrance for the dignification of victims of past atrocities and as learning devices for the non-repetition of human rights violations. With their presence, memorialisation initiatives also reinforce the norms and forms that led to their creation. Places of memory are part of geographies of authoritative control because social agents codify their discourse about the past and their aspirations for the future in space, thereby creating territory and exercising power over people by excluding and marginalising competing visions of the past. This is especially important in the process of nation-building, that is based on the assumption of a shared past of people living in a territory, but it can equally be observed at the very local level of community memorialisation processes. Museums and memorials are especially suited for this purpose, as they are authoritative institutions that bestow legitimacy upon the views about the past and the goals for the future exhibited in them. Still, agents with different views of and aims for the past and future will not easily tolerate this. They may create their own memorials and contest or re-negotiate the meaning of existing ones to legitimise their own political claims. It is here that places of memory become as much the focus of conflict as well as a tool in the struggle over the meaning of the past and the future of society.

3. Places of memory are part of significative-informative geographies of information and symbolic appropriation. They always contain a sender who codifies information and meaning in space, and a recipient who retrieves information and meaning from the museum or memorial, thereby making them devices of communication. The agents in the sender position may have greater power, as they determine the content and aim of a memorialisation process. However, the recipients decode the information presented to them with their own schemes of interpretation, and add new subjective meanings to the place of memory that may not be in line with the intentions of the sender. Here, we enter into the geographies of symbolic appropriation, where agents invest places of memory with meaning by their actions and discourses, and use them accordingly. This leads to a constant cycle in which some agents invest places with meaning, and other agents retrieve and re-interpret their meaning, which in turn adds to a process in which the meaning of place is constantly contested, ignored, negotiated and adjusted. Further, a specific space may only become a place of memory if it is willingly
produced and consumed as such. Only by being assigned and used as signifiers and representations of a specific past by action and discourse may they become a source of legitimation and power in the struggle over the present and future constitution of society.

Geographies of memory may be found in solid representations, such as museums, monuments and memorials or in any physical structure associated with heritage. Even whole landscapes can become signifiers of the past. Performance and discourse are crucial for making the tangible and imaginative geographies of memory. As we have seen, movement in space, such as during demonstrations, commemorative marches or the above-mentioned escraches function as instances of transgression, in which the common assumptions about the meanings and usages of places are contested and performatively overwritten with differing notions of the past. This once again shows:

“Thus, place may be mobilized in many ways in any given context. […] It is this deeply held, and often conflicted, attachment of place in combination with the resources place offers that makes place such a powerful motivation for and shaper of political action, and an effective tool or strategy in political struggle” (Staeheli 2003, p.168).

This is very much true for geographies of memory, especially if we understand places of memory as sources of power, used by different agents for the legitimation and implementation of social, political and/or economic interests. For geographies of memory in societies after human rights violations, this means that memory entrepreneurs in different power positions use their version of the past, coded in places of memory, to legitimise their aims for the present and future of society. Places of memory may be employed to ensure the status quo of power relations or to contest and transform it under the principles of truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition. In this process, agents in local contexts refer to global cultures and discourses, using fragments of them for their own purposes, while at the same time their local actions constitute and transform cultures and discourses on other scales. Thus, local geographies of memory refer to discourses and practices on other cultural scales and influence them dialectically. Geographies of memory are therefore very much hybrid: a condition, a product and a medium in which local and global discourses and practices of memorialisation interact, struggle, adjust and transform.

Indeed, places of memory in Peru will be analysed as significative-informative geographies in Werlen’s sense, informed by a post-structuralist and constructivist notion of space. Thus, it will be important to look at how the specific places are built by different agents from differing power positions, and how they are invested with different discourses and meanings according to their power positions and their different frames of reference. Museums and memorials will
be analysed here as texts, performances and political arenas. Seeing them as texts will give us the chance to analyse the discourses built into their physical structure by those agents involved in their constructions, as well as the power relations of these agents. The performances surrounding these places give us an insight into what meanings agents attach to places of memory via their agency, thus reproducing in part the discourses built into them or contesting them and investing them with new meanings. Finally, places of memory in Peru are also political arenas in which struggles occur between different agents with different power positions about which discourse of the past should be represented when, where and how. This has an influence on the form places of memory take and which representations of the past become dominant in Peru. Thus, we will be able to see how typical transitional justice topics such as justice, truth, reparation, acknowledgement and healing derived from a globalised discourse are attached to these places both physically and discursively, and if these places are used by the local population according to this discourse or according to differing frames of reference. Further, it will be possible to perceive the tension between global, national and local notions and representations of the past that influence the discourses and actions surrounding places of memory in Peru.
3 From War to Transitional Justice in the Peruvian Andes

From afar, Peru’s civil war or ‘internal armed conflict’ (*conflicto armado interno*), as it would later be called by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), may seem somewhat out of place and very much against the currents of history: a radical Maoist sect that initiated an armed insurgency from the impoverished backwaters of the central Andes against the government just during the first democratic elections in twelve years and inflicted brutal violence upon the indigenous peasants it claimed to fight for, a haphazard governmental counter-insurgency strategy that was based on wrong or rather routine assumptions about their enemy and that targeted civil society, indigenous peasants that did not align with the guerrilla but with the state forces, an imminent economic and state collapse in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and finally, a total political outsider who not only won the 1990 elections, but also the war against the guerrilla, and who (re)installed an authoritarian regime in a decade mostly associated with democratisation (Stern 1998) before collapsing pathetically in a flood of fraud and corruption that had been leaked to the press. The peculiarity of the Peruvian case compared to both the military dictatorships of the Southern Cone and the civil wars in Central America, as well as the fact that indigenous peasants bore the brunt of the violence, leave much room for portraying Peru’s recent past as unique and exceptional, the exotic outcome of history in a banana – or rather potato – republic in which supposedly ‘shy, earth-bound Indians’ have been manipulated by or had fallen victim to Maoists’ and the military’s ruthlessness. The danger that arises then is of viewing this conflict as one that cannot be understood in rational terms, as it is the outcome of the irrational, of chance and of the exotic behaviours and traditions in this part of the world (Poole 1994, p.253); one can only mourn the victims and demonise the perpetrators (Stern 1998, p.2).

The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, installed during the transitional government of Valentín Paniagua in 2001, has done its best to clarify the events, causes and effects of twenty years of armed conflict and authoritarian rule in Peru between 1980 and 2000. It portrayed the individuals and organisations responsible for the violence, lent a voice to those victimised, documented the crimes committed, and re-traced the dynamics of the conflict meticulously, even at the local level. Its massive nine-volume report provided not only a full interpretation of the conflict, but also tried to extract lessons and guiding principles for the non-recurrence of a similar tragedy much in line with transitional justice exercises elsewhere, thereby challenging and correcting many widely accepted certainties about the war, its perpetrators and its victims. But in its committed search for truth, it has also created new narratives, some of which are at the verge of reinforcing old stereotypes.
It is not the aim of this chapter to re-tell the whole story of Peru’s civil war. This has been done in detail in the CVR’s nine-volume report published in 2003, and beyond. But to understand the memorialisation processes that have taken place in Ayacucho’s communities in the last ten years, it is necessary to trace the local dynamics of violence and post-violence, its antecedents and its relatedness to political processes at the national and even international level. Here at the local level is also where we can trace the origins and encounter many of the narratives cast in stone in Peru’s memorials. However, not only the conflict itself, but also its aftermath had a major influence on how the conflict is remembered in the present. Thus, an analysis of Peru’s transitional justice process, and especially of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are also part of this chapter, as they provide an important foundation for the subsequent memorialisation of Peru’s tragedy. I will close the chapter with a critical balance of the political events in Peru some twelve years after the report of the truth commission had been published.

3.1 State, Community, and Conflict in Ayacucho before the War

The region of Ayacucho, with a bit over 500,000 inhabitants by the early 1980s (INEI 1994b), was one of those Andean departments in the Central South of Peru with a long history of socio-economic marginalisation. It ranked high in all indicators for poverty, and the economic crisis of the late 1970s had even exacerbated the situation (McClintock 2005, pp.56–57). From the puna highlands of Southern Ayacucho, to the steep valley of the Pampas river in the centre of the department, from its colonial capital, founded as San Juan de la Frontera de Huamanga in 1539, residence of the archbishop, centre of the regional hacienda economy, and home to the San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University (Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga – UNSCH), to the fertile valley of Huanta in the north, and along a last mountain range towards the tropical valley of the Apurímac river on the eastern slope of the Andes, where coca and other cash crops grow, the department’s economy was (and still is) based mainly on agriculture and livestock. However, arable lands were scarce and of little productivity, and thus only allowed subsistence agriculture or the supply of local and regional markets. Ayacucho’s population had been growing rapidly, exceeding the limits of agricultural production, while the region provided few opportunities outside the primary

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17 The city and department were (re)named Ayacucho – in Quechua literally meaning ‘corner of the dead’ – in 1825 after the decisive battle in the War of Independence that took place on December 9, 1824 on the fields of Ayacucho near the community of Quinua, some 40 km from Huamanga. While the department and its capital run by the official name of Ayacucho, the province in which the capital is situated is Huamanga. Further, many inhabitants of the city continue to refer to their hometown as Huamanga. Therefore, in this work I will refer to the region as Ayacucho and to its capital as the city of Ayacucho or Huamanga.
sector (Mitchell 1991). By 1981, 63.5% of Ayacucho’s populations lived in rural areas (INEI 1994c) while at the national level, 65% of the population lived in urban areas (Ibid. 2010, p.24). Further, the department’s population is overwhelmingly indigenous, with some 71.7% speaking Quechua as their maternal language in 1993 (Ibid. 1994a). Still, this did not make Peru’s civil war a rebellion of impoverished, disgruntled, indigenous peasants as some early analysts of the conflict suggested (McClintock 1984). The Communist Party of Peru – Along the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui (as was its full name) that initiated its armed insurgency in 1980 was not a peasant mass movement, but the radical political project of a small intellectual elite that had developed in the San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University in the 1970s. But was Ayacucho’s mainly indigenous peasant population then passively caught in the crossfire between Maoists and the military – a homogenous, apolitical, malleable mass, manipulated and used as cannon fodder by two equally lethal adversaries? This is what some of the most influential publications on the conflict, such as the book edited by Steve Stern (1998) or the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, have suggested. But this would fail to explain why the insurgency could spread so rapidly, first over Ayacucho and later over great parts of Peru’s territory, and why it would last for at least twelve years.

While indigenous peasants were not the initiators of the armed struggle, they were also neither passive bystanders nor victims. They supported or resisted both the Shining Path as well as the military at different times and to varying degrees, and even became active participants in the war. The anthropologist Orin Starn (1991) has wondered why ethnographers researching Ayacucho’s communities in the 1960s and 1970s did not mention any signs of the up-coming insurgency, picking out Billi Jean Isbell’s 1978 ethnography of the community of Chuschi (Cangallo province) – ironically the village in which the Shining Path would initiate its armed struggle in 1980 – for his criticism. He argues that the then dominant structuralist approach of Andeanist anthropology still perceived the inhabitants of indigenous communities as more or less direct descendants of pre-colonial Andeans, isolated homogenous communities closely knit together by extended networks of fictive kinship, reciprocity and fixed traditions reaching back many centuries. By focusing only on the internal organisation and belief systems of supposedly closed communities, the linkages between rural communities and the urban centres, the floating identities of its inhabitants and the profound cleavages within communities were, as Starn argues, quite simply overlooked.

Indeed, life in communities was not one of perfect harmony. By the second half of the 20th century, many communities in Ayacucho were marked by growing class distinctions as well
as inter- and intra-communal conflict, while at the same time having a long history of dealing with ‘outside’ economic, social and political forces. Therefore, Peru’s indigenous population was – and still is – definitely marginalised, neglected, abandoned and often harassed by the state, but it was still not living isolated in a world apart without taking part in the political and economic life of the country. Much to the contrary, Ayacucho’s comuneros (community members) struggled constantly to be considered and incorporated into the central state as full citizens (del Pino Huaman 2008).

Even before the Spanish conquest, the Andean population had to deal with governments, economies and non-local elites of larger empires (Rasnake 1988, pp.4–5; Mitchell 1991, p.18). The system of indirect rule during the colonial period saw the re-settlement of the Indian population in reducciones (reductions), grid-like town settlements in which the population was subject to a head tribute, the colonial labour tax (mita) and evangelisation. It was a separate ‘Indian Republic’ (República de Indios) with relative autonomy over the lands they settled on and an own internal political organisation with cabildos (elders) representing the community assembly. Kurakas or caciques (nobles) and later alcaldes de indios (mayors of the indigenous people) and varayoqs (staffholders) functioned as tribute collectors and political representatives of indigenous communities, thereby establishing a tradition of intermediaries between the indigenous peasant population and the white elites (Thurner 1997, pp.7–8). These intermediaries sometimes resisted the colonial government by manipulating the amount of tax payments in favour of the indigenous population, in other cases they pursued their own goals and exploited indigenous labour. Occasionally, indigenous lands were also sold or distributed to Spanish or criollo (locals of Spanish ancestry) hacendados (hacienda owners) (Zapata Velasco et al. 2008, pp.97–102). To escape the head and labour tax, many indigenous people also left their communities and inserted themselves into the market economy, giving rise to a system of migration which also helped migrants strip themselves of the inferior ‘Indian’ status and becoming mestizos (person of mixed descent) (Thorp & Paredes 2010, p.92). Thus, as several authors show, the internal organisation of later indigenous communities did not originate from ancestral traditions, but was rather moulded as part of the Spanish colonial system of government, and subsequently altered (Remy 1994, p.113; Thurner 1997; Mayer 2002, pp.35–36).

After its independence in 1821, the new republic embraced a liberal ideology of progress based on the principles of private property, capital accumulation and free trade. It also abolished the institutionalised segregation between white and indigenous people and declared all ‘Indians’ equal citizens. But the dissolution of the república de indios also meant the
abolition of all ‘Indian’ privileges, including those over their lands. This not only led to a constant loss of indigenous lands to *hacendados* and emerging *mestizo* local elites, but also to a crisis of representation of the communities, as the old structures of intermediation were washed away with the independence. While *de jure* full citizens, indigenous peasants were *de facto* degraded to a form of second-class citizenship. But this was not accepted passively by the indigenous peasant population, who instead constructed multiple political relations to elites at the regional and national level, articulating their belonging to the Peruvian nation (Remy 1994; Thurner 1997). In the case of Ayacucho, Cecilia Méndez (2005) shows how indigenous peasants of the highlands of Huanta took part in the last royalist rebellion against the republic between 1826 and 1828, not because they were ignoramuses who were ‘seduced’ by white elites, but because this struggle was a way to be taken seriously by national and regional elites. After the rebellion, Huanta’s highland communities would go on to provide guerrilla armies for various liberal and nationalist causes throughout the 19th century, remaining actively engaged in national politics and entering into clientelist relations with the *caudillos* (populist leaders or strongmen) of the early Republican era. This gave the indigenous population an amplified space for claims making vis-à-vis the political elites. Most notably, Ayacucho’s peasants took part in the guerrilla troops – the so-called *montoneras* – formed to resist the Chilean invasion of Peru during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) supporting Peru’s two-time president and *caudillo* Andrés Avelino Cáceres in the subsequent civil war (Manrique 1981; Mallon 1995).

But despite their role in Peruvian nation-building and their ardent support for the young republic, the indigenous population was nevertheless made responsible for Peru’s defeat during the War of the Pacific, considered too uncivilised and ignorant to understand the concept of nationhood and fight for the right cause (Klarén 2000, p.198). The period following the war with Chile, known as the Aristocratic Republic, saw the re-consolidation and stabilisation of power relations in the Andes – much to the delight of the ruling oligarchy of landlords, who considered the armed indigenous peasants a threat (Thorp & Paredes 2010, pp.101–102). The state’s willingness to enforce the old order with brutal violence was soon made clear to Ayacucho’s indigenous peasants. In 1895, Huanta’s peasants once again rebelled, this time against a new salt tax imposed upon them by the central government. The rebellion was crushed by a punitive expedition of government forces applying a merciless scorched earth campaign that left some 5,000 dead. In the eyes of the elites of the capital, always in fear of a major indigenous rebellion since the Túpac Amaru uprising in Cuzco in

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18 Meanwhile, in the province of Cangallo peasants had aligned with the revolutionary forces during the struggle for independence (Zapata Velasco et al. 2008, pp.133–136).
the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the Huanta uprising once again had shown the savagery of the ‘Indian hordes’ (del Pino Huaman 2008, pp.176–179; Heilman 2010, pp.36–37). The same year, in 1895, the Peruvian Congress passed a constitutional amendment according to which men had to be literate to vote (Klarén 2000, p.206). This effectively excluded the indigenous population from any direct political articulation and participation (Mallon 1995). Considered unworthy of full citizenship, indigenous peasants now had to rely even more on the brokerage of intermediaries to which they turned to make themselves heard on other political levels. In some cases these intermediaries were the local \textit{hacendados}, who had a direct patron-client relation to ‘their’ indigenous serfs, while in other cases this role was filled by a local \textit{mestizo} elite who had ascended from the inferior status of an ‘Indian’ by migration, the accumulation of relative wealth and their ability to read and write Spanish, which in turn qualified them for local government posts, such as \textit{alcalde} (mayor), \textit{gobernador} (governor) or \textit{juez de paz} (justice of the peace). Not uncommonly, these local elites would then misuse their monopoly of local political power and their ability to read and write Spanish for their own personal gain, e.g. by illegally buying or selling community lands or rustling cattle, thus amassing even greater political and economic power and reigning with nearly total impunity thanks to an incompetent and corrupt local judicial system (Heilman 2010). This system of \textit{gamonalismo} – derived from the word \textit{gamonito}, a sort of parasitic plant, and standing for the rule of local strongmen exploiting indigenous peasants – is diagnosed by Jaymie Patricia Heilman (2010) for the village of Carhuanca (Vilcashuaman province) in Ayacucho, where a group of \textit{mestizo} landowners of relative wealth managed to exploit their indigenous neighbours for several decades by effectively building on their networks of clientelism and fictive kinship (\textit{compadrazgo}), or with corruption, intimidation and even murder. She describes indigenous peasants’ experience of the state in Ayacucho during the Aristocratic Republic as characterised by “rule by abandon”: “Rule by abandon implies governance that operates on a principle of intentional and detrimental neglect instead of dominance or hegemony and that reinforces state rule through sporadic bursts of violence” (Ibid., p.9).

But the Aristocratic Republic also saw the strengthening of intellectual \textit{indigenismo}. \textit{Indigenismo} intellectuals considered the indigenous peasants of the Andes to be the original offspring of the Inca Empire, bearers of an age-old civilisation, and only degenerated and brutalised by Spanish colonialism and ruthless \textit{gamonales}. While the ‘Indian’ had long been imagined as a savage threat to the ruling elite, tameable only with a \textit{mission civilisatrice} focused on schooling and improved hygiene, they were now re-imagined in a romanticised way that emphasised their supposedly age-old traditions and moral virtues. Still, \textit{indigenismo}
was a movement of white or mestizo elites situated at the coast, far away from the dwellings of the indigenous peasants they re-imagined as better Others. Most importantly, indigenistas did not see the indigenous peasants as capable or deserving of self-representation, but rather in need of paternalistic protection and mediation by intellectual outsiders, and thus as having to be represented by others. This notion became official state policy during the government of Augusto B. Leguía in 1920 (Heilman 2010, p.46). He created an Office of Indigenous Affairs (Dirección General de Asuntos Indígenas) within the Ministry of Labour and Indigenous Affairs (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Indígenas) as state agency to which indigenous peasants could direct their grievances (Castillo Castañeda 2007, p.20) and created a Day of the Indian (Día del Indio) as a symbolic recognition of the incorporation of the indigenous population into the Peruvian nation. Further, the new constitution of 1920 recognised the legal figure of the comunidad indígena (indigenous community), re-establishing the autonomy of indigenous peasants over their lands (Klarén 2000, pp.245–248; Thorp & Paredes 2010, p.118).

But while new laws and state institutions gave the indigenous population more immediate access to the structures of the central state, they remained excluded from any direct participation and representation in it. This gave rise to the self-emancipatory Tiwantinsuyo Movement – named after the official title of the Incan Empire – that had its origins among the indigenous peasants of the southern departments of Cuzco and Puno, but was also embraced in Ayacucho (Heilman 2010, pp.42–43). The Comité Central Pro-Derecho Indígena “Tiwantinsuyo” (Central Committee Pro Indigenous Rights “Tiwantinsuyo”) founded in Lima in 1920 became the officially recognised representative for indigenous claims vis-à-vis the government demanding better schooling and healthcare in the highlands, better working conditions on haciendas, the return of indigenous lands and the right to elect local authorities (Klarén 2000, p.248). In some regions, especially in Southern Peru, but also in the Cangallo and La Mar provinces in Ayacucho, the movement grew even more radical, occupying haciendas without governmental consent. This soon sparked a violent reaction by the central state, which not only crushed the rebellions, but also banned the Tiwantinsuyo Movement, thereby silencing a promising tool for peasants to organise themselves and articulate their goals of equal citizenship (de la Cadena 2000, p.88).

Official indigenismo soon became lip service and the indigenous population was abandoned and left to the rule of gamonales (Klarén 2000, p.249). This abandonment was also made possible by the economic development of the country. The guano boom during the mid-19th century had shifted the economic centre to the coast, only interrupted by the wool boom of the
late 19th century. The modern export-oriented economy built on foreign capital that emerged under Leguía’s government only benefited the hegemony of the coastal elites situated in the capital Lima. As the sierra had no resources to offer and no voters whose demands had to be taken into consideration, it could easily be neglected (Thorp & Paredes 2010, p.110). Further, the indigenous legislation had not empowered the indigenous peasants but had cemented the racial order, limiting their social manoeuvring space to the highland indigenous communities, where they remained represented and mediated by state experts and agencies that only acknowledged their racially and culturally inferior status (de la Cadena 2000, pp.40–41). The indigenous rebellions of the early 1920s had also reinforced the stereotype of the highlands as a natural home of a savage indigenous culture, still too irrational and primitive to deserve full citizenship, and opposed to the economically and culturally progressive coastal areas with its glittering capital (de la Cadena 2000, p.88).

Still, indigenous peasants relentlessly used all possibilities at their hands to articulate themselves and attain the state’s assistance for being granted the status of a comunidad indígena with its privileges of land rights, in order to improve their living conditions and to defend them against the expansion of haciendas and abusive authorities. From the 1920s on, and in many cases even before then, community representatives flooded state institutions and the legal system with petitions, travelling to provincial and departmental capitals, and even to Lima, to make themselves heard. Ponciano del Pino (2008) describes this ‘search for the government’ for the highlands of Huanta where personeros – elected community intermediaries – demanded the state’s help against the constant encroachment of haciendas upon their lands. In the case of the highlands of Huanta, these intermediaries were mostly muleteers, transporting goods within the province, while others had done military service, which had even brought them to Lima. As such, they had acquired at least some contact and experience with state institutions, had learned Spanish and with it the ability and legitimacy to raise their voice. In the case of Carhuanca (Vilcashuaman province) it was the class of literate, often abusive mestizo landowners – elites at the local level, but still considered inferior Andeans by the coastal elites – who demanded the state’s attention for improving their community, although it was mostly them who benefited from these improvements (Heilman 2010). Still, this search for government acknowledgement and support remained mostly inconclusive until the 1960s (del Pino Huaman 2008, pp.21–22).

Among the improvements most demanded by indigenous peasants in Ayacucho and elsewhere was access to schools. Education meant Spanish literacy with which they could avoid being cheated by literate persons who used their knowledge to strip the illiterate of their lands. It
enabled them to contact state authorities directly, without the use of intermediaries, and finally take part in elections and become full citizens (Heilman 2010, p.53). Thus, education became synonymous with achieving progress (Ames 2000). Spanish literacy meant ascending from the status of an ‘ignorant Indian’ to that of a mestizo. As Marisol de la Cadena (2000, p.29) shows, the racial divide between ‘Indian’ or ‘white’ in Peru is not so much based on phenotype as it is based on grades of education, economic occupation and area of residence. Since the Aristocratic Republic, the ‘Indian’ was conceived of as an illiterate, and therefore ignorant, agriculturalist highlander, while mestizos were seen as “incompletely educated highlanders, residents of cities or rural towns, and petty merchants” (de la Cadena 2000, p.323), still subordinate to the more higher educated and thus often whiter coastal elites. Hence, the process of mestizaje is a form of social whitening – or rather ‘de-indianisation’ – that allows for upward mobility involving education and/or migration, without totally denying indigenous roots that had been rehabilitated, even promoted by intellectual indigenismo. These permeable racial boundaries, that permit social advancement through education and economic success while still identifying with an Andean heritage, are also considered one of the reasons for the lack of a strong indigenous movement in the Peruvian Andes until today (Ibid.).

But the achievements of ‘de-indianisation’ also mean the possibility to distance oneself from those left behind as illiterate ‘Indians’ and to justify claims of superiority. The enduring logic of this relation is described by Mary Weismantel (2001, p.xxx) as follows: “In the isolated, unimportant places about which most ethnographers write, such claims to white superiority are tremendously important. They allow bus drivers, shop keepers, mayors, and school teachers in tiny communities high in the mountains to re-write the misery they inflict upon their rural neighbours into yet another triumph of the white race.” For those peasants who could afford sending their children to school and not to work in the fields, education and Spanish literacy meant achieving a higher grade of citizenship, even becoming local notables and intermediaries for their community vis-à-vis state institutions. This in turn gave them the possibility to exercise power over their illiterate neighbours, exploiting indigenous labour and thus reproducing the dominant race distinctions and system of abuse in the country (Heilman 2010, pp.99–104; Thorp & Paredes 2010, p.67).

Apart from education, migration became the other great topic for Ayacucho’s peasants throughout the 20th century. As the coast became the focal point of an export-oriented boom economy, and the economic framework for agriculture in the sierra was hampered due to cheap food imports had begun in the Leguía government (Thorp & Paredes 2010, pp.114–
seasonal or permanent labour migration accelerated – mainly to the coastal areas, especially to the capital Lima, but also to the Apurímac valley on the Eastern slope of Ayacucho’s Huanta and La Mar provinces, where the climate permitted the cultivation of tropical cash crops, among others most notably coca.¹⁹ This trend was exacerbated by the massive population growth from the 1940s onwards that overstretched the availability of arable lands and led peasants to abandon the farming economy partially or permanently and to diversify their sources of income and/or migrate to urban areas (Mitchell 1991). Migration and an evolving market economy intensified the ties between indigenous communities and the centres of power on the coast. Migrant associations appeared in Lima and functioned as lobby groups for their communities of origin. Remittances made capital available in communities and further added to growing class distinctions and inequalities with its unequal distribution within communities (Heilman 2010).

Indeed, several ethnographies (del Pino Huaman 2008; Heilman 2010; González 2011; La Serna 2012) that re-constructed the situation of indigenous communities in Ayacucho before the outbreak of the Shining Path insurgency have described the growing cleavage between a local mestizo elite, with their monopoly over formal political power to which they were appointed by provincial authorities due to their literacy in Spanish, and an illiterate peasantry feeling disempowered in the face of abusive local mestizo authorities. The ethnographers that researched Ayacucho’s communities in the 1960s and 1970s had already found a seemingly strict separation of rural societies between indios (Indians), comuneros or runas (Quechua for “people”) on one side and their mestizo, misti (Quechua for “mestizo”) or vecino (neighbour) counterparts on the other side. In the community of Huancasancos (Huancasancos province), Ulpiano Quispe (1969) sees a clear social division between a mestizo minority that speaks Spanish, dresses ‘Western’, has the biggest and best agricultural terrains and the greatest herds of cattle, consists of teachers or merchants, and is often appointed as local authorities, and the majority of indigenous community members that speak Quechua, dress in traditional clothes, are small-scale agriculturalists or herd the cattle of the mestizos and are integrated into the socio-religious varayoc hierarchy, while being excluded from formal politics. The same “rigid separation” or even “polarisation” between comuneros and vecinos in the 1960s and 1970s is described by Billie Jean Isbell (1978) in Chuschi (Cangallo province) and William P. Mitchell (1991) in Quinua (Huamanga province).

Still, what especially Quispe and Isbell did not notice was the permeability of the boundary between mestizos and comuneros with education, and the interrelation of these seemingly

¹⁹ To read more about the development of the Apurímac valley, see especially Sala i Vila (2001).
separate groups through ties of direct or fictive kinship by godparenthood (*compadrazgo*). Thus, *mestizos* were not an ‘outside force’ as Isbell describes, but an integral part of Ayacucho’s rural society, intimately related to their indigenous neighbours through ties of kinship and clientelism. But these intra-communal class distinctions were also a powerful source of conflict. Due to their monopoly over formal political and judiciary power, local *misti* elites could amass land and cattle at the expense of community lands, and they could do so unpunished because of the unresponsive and corrupt judicial system and their local networks of clientelism and patronage that secured support among their indigenous neighbours and further fragmented communities. This is exactly the situation that Jaymie Patricia Heilman (2010) described in the case of the community of Carhuancaca (Vilcashuaman province). Similarly, Olga González (2011) described the illicit land seizures by a local strongman in her ethnography of the community of Sarhua (Víctor Fajardo province) and Miguel La Serna (2012) shows how a self-proclaimed *mestizo* even rustled the cattle of his neighbours in Chuschi (Cangallo province).

Indeed, *mestizos* often felt exempt from the civil-religious prestige hierarchy according to which married men could amass prestige and ascend to the post of an indigenous authority or *varayoq* by taking over responsibilities (*cargos*) during religious *fiestas* of patron saints. This hierarchy – effectively a patriarchal gerontocracy, as it excluded women and unmarried men – was still intact in the more isolated communities of the highlands of Huanta. Here, *varayoqs* oversaw and enforced the distribution of communal resources and community members’ obligation to participate in *faenas* (communal works), such as cleaning the irrigation canals. But most importantly, they settled disputes within the community and upheld moral order. As La Serna (2012, pp.46–49) describes for the community of Huaychao in the highlands of Huanta, disputes among community members or breaches of the community’s code of conduct – for example by rustling cattle or committing adultery – would be resolved by publicly flogging both sides, asking for forgiveness, and in some cases demanding the payment of a reparation and a libation ceremony before the patron saints, after which both sides would agree to forget about the incident. In some communities, this system of indigenous authority and customary justice would function parallel to the system of state-appointed official authorities. But in the cases of Carhuancaca, described by Heilman (2010), and Chuschi, also described by La Serna (2012), local *mestizo* elites had effectively subordinated the *varayoq* system under their own rule. As non-indigenous local elites, they

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20 Good descriptions of this civil-religious hierarchy and its alteration and partial disappearance for communities in Ayacucho can be found in Isbell (1978) for the community of Chuschi (Cangallo province), and in Mitchell (1991) for the community of Quinua (Huamanga province).
would not participate in the civil-religious hierarchy, but rather sought to control it by using *varayoqs* as a sort of local police force against their adversaries within the community, or to control indigenous labour with *faenas* in their own interests. They also saw no necessity to further respect the community’s codes of conduct or rules of reciprocity, often ridiculing indigenous authorities. This rendered the *varayoq* systems in Carhuanca and Chuschi ineffective and illegitimate, leading to their abandonment. Thus, communities were left without any mechanism of conflict resolution in the face of many unresolved conflicts, as both the formal judiciary of the state as well as the community’s system of customary justice were perceived as absent, incapable, corrupt and illegitimate.

But not only conflicts within communities were left unresolved, Ayacucho’s communities also had a long history of inter-communal conflicts, some of them reaching back several centuries. These conflicts normally evolved over community boundaries, an issue that became more pressing from the 1920s onwards when communities could register themselves as *comunidades indígenas* at the Office of Indigenous Affairs and had to do so by providing a detailed map of the community’s territory with the exact delineation of its boundaries. One of the most spectacular of these boundary conflicts, with even pre-colonial roots, was that between Chuschi and its neighbouring community of Quispillaccta in the province of Cangallo that left several dead in the 1960s. It involved several armed incursions into the opponent’s territory by both communities, cattle rustling and the pillaging of homes (La Serna 2012). Equally, a land dispute between Sarhua (Víctor Fajardo province) and its neighbouring communities left two dead in the 1970s (González 2011, p.41). Thus, while deadly violence among Ayacucho’s communities was rather the exception, it was not totally absent either. The impunity with which these crimes were treated also led to a prevailing resentment between communities.

Many of these inter- and intra-communal conflicts had been ignited from the 1950s onwards due to the increasing politicisation of class distinctions and the fight for land rights as part of the international emphasis on the oppression and exploitation of peasants after the Cuban Revolution. Peasant unions were formed, often under the advice of activists of leftist parties, and in the southern departments of Puno and Cuzco, land invasions took place. An agrarian reform became a pressing issue and, with the election of the young architect Fernando Belaúnde to the Peruvian presidency, this goal seemed to be within reach. Being the first presidential candidate to campaign in the *sierra* and speak with *comuneros* face-to-face, he established the populist appearance of a president with direct relations to the needs of the people on the ground, often even receiving delegations from remote villages in the
presidential palace, where they could hand their petitions directly to him. His presidency was marked by a vision of national development built on large infrastructure projects, especially in road-building and irrigation. With his public works programme *cooperación popular* (cooperation of the peoples), locals would actively participate in the process of bringing progress to their communities and thus to the country, providing a sense of recognition and inclusion to indigenous peasants that was unprecedented in Peruvian history (Heilman 2010, p.120 ff.). It was Belaúnde’s presidency then that brought the *comuneros’* search for the government to a first conclusion (del Pino Huaman 2008, p.21).

Also in Ayacucho, thousands of peasants mobilised in anticipation of a major agrarian reform and founded the *Federación de Campesinos de Ayacucho* (Peasant Federation of Ayacucho) in June 1963. But the major agrarian reform would not come, as Belaúnde could not push through his reform bills against his adversaries’ resistance in Congress. Further, Belaúnde’s presidency was also marked by a continuity of state repression against any threats to the government’s authority. Land invasions of *haciendas* in Puno and Cuzco were brutally put down by the military. In 1965, the *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left – MIR) staged a guerrilla insurgency against the government it saw incapable of any meaningful reform. Although the insurgency was weak, had little hold among the local population and collapsed within a year, military repression was massive, leaving some 8,000 Peruvians dead by 1966 (Heilman 2010, pp.123–124). Ayacucho was spared most of this violence (Zapata Velasco et al. 2008, p.167) although the equally ill-fated *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army – ELN) under Héctor Béjar operated in the La Mar province in 1965 before it was decimated by the Peruvian military (Sala i Vila 2001, p.217). For Ayacucho’s peasants, Fernando Belaúnde’s government had awakened dreams of recognition and citizenship that would never be fulfilled: The agrarian reform never came, and still worse, the public works programme was misused by local mestizo elites to extract labour from their poorer indigenous neighbours, which only exacerbated conflicts in the communities (Heilman 2010, pp.145–147).

Preoccupied with the government’s inability to find a solution to the pressing land issues and peasant mobilisation, a reformist wing within the Peruvian Armed Forces ousted Belaúnde in an unbloody coup in 1968 and established the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (*Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas*) under General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The military junta then indeed established a radical land reform in 1969 and created the *Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social* (National Support System for Social Mobilisation – SINAMOS) to which peasants could direct their land demands. Further, the
military government also re-valued Peru’s indigenous heritage, making Quechua and Aymara official languages, with television and radio programmes presented in both languages. The comunidades indígenas were re-named comunidades campesinas (peasant communities) as the term ‘indigenous’ was seen as discriminatory, and their internal organisation was reformed by creating an asamblea general (general assembly), a directiva comunal (directive council) and several specialised committees.\footnote{On the creation and internal organisation of comunidades indígenas and comunidades campesinas see also Bonilla (1987), Degregori (1998) and Castillo et al. (2007).} Authorities would now be elected and monitored by community members. Further, the law of peasant communities also prohibited the selling of communal lands and the amassing of lands by individuals. SINAMOS agents travelled the country to explain the reforms to the local population and help them acquire land titles and be placed in the registry of peasant communities. But although these reforms were among the most radical worldwide, they had some major flaws, especially concerning the department of Ayacucho (Heilman 2010, pp.149–156; La Serna 2012, p.105).

As elsewhere, expectations in Ayacucho towards the military’s agrarian reform were high. Unfortunately, it had only a few positive effects for Ayacucho’s peasants. Many haciendas had already been dismantled and sold to their former serfs or were incorporated into communities, since the agricultural production in Ayacucho could not compete with products from other regions. Thus, there was little land that could be distributed. Where haciendas still existed, the military proved to be unaware of the peasants’ demands, implementing their reforms from the top down without consultation and with little sense for local power relations and grievances. Instead, it preferred the establishment of large-scale cooperatives meant to boost agricultural productivity. But Ayacucho’s peasants preferred splitting up haciendas into individual smallholdings instead of being squeezed into the straitjacket of a large cooperative, where they were often subject to the rule of government-appointed mestizo technicians and supervisors that mostly reproduced the relations of servitude on haciendas. Further, only the former serfs of a hacienda became part of the cooperatives – a fact that ignored the land claims of neighbouring communities. Conflicts over land rights between cooperatives and communities became common (Heilman 2010, pp.165–166; La Serna 2012, pp.106–107).

While the reform of the comunidades campesinas did democratise the internal organisation of communities, it did so in a top-down fashion that rendered the traditional varayoq authorities useless. Further, as Ponciano del Pino (2008, pp.92–94) shows in the community of Uchuraccay in the highlands of Huanta, this politicised the internal organisation of communities, leading to internal fragmentation and polarisation. Conflicts within the community were no longer handled within the realm of traditional authorities and conflict...
resolution mechanisms, but within the highly confrontative atmosphere of politicised state institutions and the judiciary. Similarly, Olga González (2011, pp.119–121) observes a weakening of traditional authorities and thus of mechanisms to deal with conflicts in the community of Sarhua (Víctor Fajardo province), due to the reforms of the military government. The breakdown of both the power of *hacendados* and of traditional authorities led to the expansion of the power of the emerging middle class of local *mestizo* elites that in turn usurped key positions within the communities (Isbell 1992, p.64; Thorp & Paredes 2010, p.141; La Serna 2012, pp.108–109). Governmental repression was also not absent during the time of the military government. In 1969, the government tried to weaken the gratuitousness of secondary schooling by imposing high monetary penalties on all students who failed a course by the end of a school year. This sparked a massive protest among students and their families in Huamanga and Huanta, which was also supported by peasant movements. On June 21, clashes between protestors and police shock troops – the so-called *Sinchis* – sent in from Lima left approximately 20 civilians dead in both cities (Degregori 2010, p.51 ff.).

As the reform policies of the military government failed to show the desired effects, the support for more radical leftist parties grew, and massive protests struck Peru by the mid-1970s (Thorp & Paredes 2010, p.141). In 1975, the already severely ill Juan Velasco Alvarado was ousted by a more conservative wing within the Peruvian military under General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, leading to a conservative setback for the reform policy. While declaring a return to democracy by 1980, Morales Bermúdez halted many of the reforms of his predecessor, even taking some of them back. Governmental agencies and institutions, even police forces, were withdrawn from Ayacucho, leaving the region to its fate while a severe economic crisis struck Peru (Heilman 2010, p.173). This crisis not only struck Ayacucho with great force (Isbell 1992, p.64), it also hampered the future prospects of many young people that had studied at the re-opened San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University (Mitchell 1991, p.1; Degregori 1998b, p.130). People in Ayacucho once again felt abandoned, with their dreams of progress that they had developed throughout the 1960s and 1970s betrayed (La Serna 2012, p.107). Thus, when the Shining Path insurgency began in 1980, it did not strike Ayacucho’s communities without precedent. Violence, both structural and physical, applied by the state and by local *mestizo* elites within and between communities, was part of the historical experience of Ayacucho’s indigenous peasants (Poole 1994, p.250). As Elizabeth Jelin and Ponciano del Pino (2003, p.4) point out, the violence and repression to come were not that ‘new’, but were rather integrated and made sense of within the communities’ historical trajectory that involved much older local struggles, conflicts and internal divisions,
but also an ample and ambiguous experience with different oppressive and protective state institutions. It is this historical sediment on which the violence that unfolded in Ayacucho between 1980 and the mid-1990s must be interpreted.

### 3.2 Death in the Andes - The Internal Armed Conflict in Ayacucho

In May 1959, 74 years after its closing amid the turmoil of the War of the Pacific in 1885, and 282 years after its initial founding in 1677, the *Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga* (UNSCH) was re-opened in the city of Ayacucho. In the two decades to come it would be the focus of the region’s aspirations to catch up with the progress of the rest of the country, leading to the massive influx of agricultural technicians, development experts and intellectuals – some with very radical ideas. In the highly politicised atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s, this turned Huamanga – once the centre of the region’s feudal economy and seat of the clergy – into a minor hotbed of the radical left. Among its intellectuals was the philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán, who had arrived to Huamanga in 1963 from Arequipa. He established himself as one of the leaders of the Maoist faction within the local base of the *Partido Comunista del Perú* (Communist Party of Peru – PCP), even travelling to China probably during the mid-1960s together with some of his closest followers. Guzmán became closely involved in the internal quarrels and splits within the Communist Party, leading his faction away from the PCP after a dispute about possibly collaborating with the military government that he perceived as fascist and a continuation of the ‘feudal bureaucratic corporative state’ that had to be destroyed by the use of arms. From 1969 on, the *Partido Comunista del Perú – por el Sendero Luminoso de José Carlos Mariátegui* (Communist Party of Peru – Along the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui – PCP-SL), alluding to Peru’s famous Marxist intellectual and founder of the Communist Party, established itself in the San Cristóbal University, especially within the teacher-training programme, and within the Teachers’ Union (*Sindicato Único de Trabajadores en la Educación* – SUTE). Still, the PCP-SL could never take full control of all university committees and of the mass movements within the region of Ayacucho, where it was marginalised by other leftist parties. Thus, by 1975 Guzmán and his party withdrew from the public scene, dedicating themselves instead to the elaboration of the party’s rigid ideology and the formation of a structure of party cadres. During this time, Guzmán also laid the foundation for what would develop into his “Marxism-

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22 “Death in the Andes” is also the English title of Mario Vargas Llosa’s novel “Lituma en los Andes”, published in 1993.
Leninism-Maoism Gonzalo thinking\(^{23}\) (*Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo pensamiento Gonzalo*), finally seeing himself as the “fourth sword of Marxism” by the end of the 1980s (Degregori 2010).\(^ {24}\)

From 1976 on, the Shining Path prepared for war. Guzmán and his followers saw revolution – the total destruction of the old regime and its replacement by the “new democracy” – not as a possibility but as destiny (Poole & Rénique 1992, p.50; Poole 1994, pp.256–257). Thus, the strategy of the Shining Path and its leader Abimael Guzmán was a historical necessity that could not fail. It saw itself as the revolutionary vanguard that would inspire the proletariat – rural peasants and urban workers – to follow them on their way to destiny. Guzmán perceived the situation of peasants in Ayacucho and Peru through the eyes of the writings of José Carlos Mariátegui, who had characterised Peru’s society as semi-feudal in the 1920s (Fumerton 2002, pp.46–47). This view was affirmed by the writings of the agronomist and later high-ranking Shining Path member Antonio Díaz Martínez (1969), who saw Ayacucho’s peasants as on the brink of revolution. The PCP-SL not only considered Ayacucho’s peasants to be in the same situation as in the 1920s, an analysis that was slightly out-dated, but also perceived all signs of modernisation, such as peasants’ integration into the market economy, commerce, migration and the economic success of individual peasants as a deformation of the Andean society – traits whose bearers had to be eliminated in order to allow for the natural evolution of autochthonous Andean socialism. Indeed, the Shining Path – like many other leftist parties of the 1970s – replicated the conduct of earlier *indigenismo* thinkers, who saw indigenous peasants as incapable of taking political action independently. Thus, indigenous peasants had to be led by the superior intellect of the PCP-SL cadres, who supposedly knew best what was best for them (de la Cadena 1998, pp.52–54; Degregori 2010, pp.190–192). Not surprisingly, indigenous peasants could mostly be found among the rank-and-file of the party, but not so much in leading positions.

The Shining Path’s ideology was one that venerated violence. Guzmán saw violence as the leading force in Peruvian history, in need of being systematically applied by the party to achieve change. Thus, it was not the political work and the creation of a popular mass movement backing the PCP-SL that were important, but rather the purifying and quasi-religious resort to violence and martyrdom. The PCP-SL’s *nuevo estado* (new state) or *nueva democracia* (new democracy) were to be built upon a bloodbath that washed away the viejo

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\(^{23}\) *Camarada Gonzalo* – and later, as victory seemed to be inevitable *Presidente Gonzalo* – was Guzmán’s nom de guerre.

\(^{24}\) For more information on the emergence of the Shining Path and its ideology, see also Degregori (2011).
**estado** (old state) and its representatives (Poole & Réniq 1992, pp.53–56; Poole 1994, pp.258–261; Gorriti 1999, pp.103–106).

The Shining Path recruited many of its militants among university students with rural backgrounds that had flooded to the San Cristóbal University in the 1960s and 1970s. They were often the first within their families to achieve a higher education and thus a higher social status within their communities, but were still discriminated in the city due to their rural origins. The PCP-SL provided these students in need of a new identity with intellectual leadership and a strong ideology (Degregori 2010, pp.167–168). Jefrey Gamarra (2010) stresses that these students were not the sons of poor indigenous peasants when they arrived in Huamanga, but belonged to the local social stratum of *misti* elites – often seen as *gamonales* by their neighbours – who had sufficient capital to send at least one son to the university of Huamanga. This is also shown by Miguel La Serna (2012) for Chuschi, where a local cattle rustler and *gamonal* accumulated enough capital to provide for higher education for his son, who would later become a *Senderista* – a militant of the Shining Path. As the Shining Path controlled the university’s teacher-training programme and the region’s teachers’ union, recruitment was strongest among teachers. Especially within the teacher-training programme, many students came from the communities of the Pampas river basin in central Ayacucho. By 1976, these students – then already Shining Path militants – graduated and were sent back to their region of origin, where they started working as teachers or offered voluntary help to communities. Due to their authoritative position as teachers and their familiarity with the region, they could build trust within communities and carry on the work of conscientisation and recruitment for the PCP-SL, especially among secondary school students. Not surprisingly, the communities of this region – now part of the Cangallo, Víctor Fajardo, Vilcashuaman and Huancasancos provinces – were among the Shining Path’s strongholds in the early 1980s (Degregori 2010, pp.179–180).

In 1978, the PCP-SL openly prepared for war. It did so, once again, very much against the currents of history. The late 1970s saw a massive popular movement against the then more conservative military government, a movement all leftist parties except the Shining Path actively took part in. Still, even the most radical leftist parties that had considered the resort to armed insurgency throughout the 1970s participated in the elections for a constitutional assembly in 1979 and in the general elections of 1980. The 1980 elections brought the once ousted Fernando Belaúnde back to presidency, and was the first election with universal suffrage in Peruvian history. Further, leftist parties won a considerable amount of the votes. Abimael Guzmán, however, saw these elections as a restoration of the bureaucratic capitalist
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oligarchic state, and the leftist parties participating as revisionist traitors to the cause. The Shining Path launched its first (symbolic) act on the eve of the general election on May 17, 1980 when they burned the ballot boxes in the community of Chuschi (Cangallo province) (Hinojosa 1998).

During the first two years of the insurgency, the PCP-SL was able to expand throughout Ayacucho nearly unhindered. The new Belaúnde government did not perceive the Shining Path as a major threat, but at best as a regional phenomenon, with which the police could easily deal. Further, Belaúnde, who had been ousted by the military in 1968, was understandably reluctant to send in the military (Obando 1998, p.387). In addition, the police forces were neither sufficiently equipped nor in sufficient numbers to be a match for the highly mobile PCP-SL fighters, who attacked wherever they wanted. Thus, the Shining Path was able to carry out some highly spectacular attacks, such as the raid on the prison of Huamanga, where it freed a number of high-ranking Senderistas, the attack on the Vilcashuaman police station, and several short occupations of smaller towns throughout the region in 1982. It thereby followed the Maoist dogma of guerrilla warfare, to ‘encircle the cities from the countryside’. These attacks won the Shining Path the respect, and even admiration, of parts of the urban populace that experienced the police forces as abusive and repressive: a fact clearly visible during the funeral of the young poet and Shining Path member Edith Lagos – killed in a skirmish with police forces – that was attended by several thousand spectators in Huamanga in 1982 (Gorriti 1999).

Still, the Shining Path’s advances in encircling the cities from the countryside would not have been possible without the active support of indigenous communities in Ayacucho. Much has been written about the initial support for and later disillusionment with the Shining Path among Ayacucho’s peasant population in the early years of the insurgency. According to Carlos Iván Degregori (1998b), whose account was also influential in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the PCP-SL could establish itself in many communities due to its indoctrination campaigns via teachers and other young militants in the late 1970s. In the zones it considered liberated (zonas liberadas) it established comités populares (popular committees) as new institutions of community organisation, often presided by young, but inexperienced militants from the same community, who could bypass the traditional age hierarchy and play a meaningful role by exercising power in their community. The Shining Path also established a new moral order in the communities by punishing abusive mestizo authorities, cattle rustlers, adulterers or drunkards, by publicly flogging them or shaving their hair. It knowingly exploited the grievances and cleavages of the local population when it
punished *gamonales* and cattle rustlers, distributed the cattle of richer communities and individuals to the poorer ones or led land invasions. With their often violent – but seemingly just – behaviour, so Degregori, the Shining Path assumed the role of patron in the community, conquering the vacant power position left behind by the retreat of the *hacendados* in the 1960s. The PCP-SL thereby effectively replicated a power relation the local population was used to and which it was therefore ready to accept. Still, Degregori goes on to explain, the Shining Path remained an external force to the communities, whose ideology was only accepted, but never internalised. Therefore, communities’ resistance grew when the PCP-SL became more violent and started applying the death penalty in its *juicios populares* (popular trials) and increasingly clashed with traditional forms of authority. With the beginning of the military’s brutal counter-insurgency in 1983, Degregori (1998b, p.143) describes Ayacucho’s communities as caught up in the crossfire of two “objectively external armies” that fought each other “from opposite extremes”.

Drawing upon their respective fieldwork in Ayacucho’s communities, Jaymie Patricia Heilman and Miguel La Serna criticise Degregori’s account of an apolitical and passive indigenous peasantry exploited by the Shining Path. For the case of Carhuanca (Vilcashuaman province), Heilman (2010) shows that the long tradition of radical party politics within the community, the constant abuses by *mestizo* notables and the abandonment by the state made the PCP-SL’s radical ideology a rather rational choice for *comuneros*. While he admits that only a few indigenous peasants actively joined the Shining Path in their armed insurgency, Miguel La Serna (2012) stresses that the array of actions with which peasants actively supported the guerrilla was ample and included providing food and shelter for the insurgents, serving as runners or informants and participating in their meetings. He argues that the new order and violent forms of justice established by the guerrilla were not only passively accepted but very much embraced by a rural population that had to live with the constant abuses by and impunity of local strongmen. Even the violent deaths by cutting alleged perpetrators’ throats or crushing their heads with stones – the PCP-SL’s preferred form of execution in *juicios populares* – was welcomed as a legitimate form of bringing those individuals to justice whom the population perceived as incorrigible. Thereby, as Miguel La Serna shows for Chuschi (Cangallo province), it was not only the Shining Path who exploited the peasants’ inter- and intra-communal conflicts, but also the peasants themselves who used the guerrilla to violently settle scores within their community or with neighbouring communities. According to Mario Fumerton (2002, p.301), the Shining Path’s moralisation campaign was used by community members to get hold of the possessions of their richer
neighbours by accusing them of being *gamonales*. Thus, there were multiple links between the Shining Path’s policy and the objectives of indigenous peasants. Not surprisingly then, some communities, especially in the Pampas river basin, supported the PCP-SL at least tacitly up to the early 1990s (Theidon 2004, p.35).

In late December of 1982, Peru’s civil war entered a new phase. After two and a half years of hesitation, Fernando Belaúnde finally sent in the armed forces to combat the Shining Path insurgency. This coincided with the PCP-SL’s decision to go one step further in its guerrilla strategy and violently strengthen and expand its control over the peasant population, brutally sweeping away any resistance to its rule and executing all individuals associated with the *viejo estado*. Not surprisingly, it is also this moment in which the resistance of peasants against the Shining Path grew and the *comités de autodefensa* (self-defence committees – CAD) or *rondas campesinas* (peasant sentries) appeared. Thus, the conflict became militarised and the two years of 1983 and 1984 were those with the highest death toll in Ayacucho, equivalent to the number of deaths during the entire rest of the conflict (CVR 2003, pp.67–71).

Great parts of the departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac had already been declared as in a state of emergency by mid-1981. In late 1982, the armed forces took control of these emergency zones, establishing a *comando político militar* (political-military command) that administered the state of emergency without civilian control. This state would gradually extend to other regions, until more than half of the Peruvian population lived in emergency zones by the early 1990s. From 1983 to 1984, General Clemente Noel was in charge of Ayacucho’s *comando político militar*, applying an orthodox counter-insurgency strategy according to which the Shining Path was a peasant movement. Thus, the military concentrated on brutally eradicating the support it suspected among the region’s civilian population, just as it had done with the small guerrilla cells in 1965. Further, most conscripts sent to the highlands as well as the officers in charge were from coastal Peru, bringing with them their racist prejudices and fears of the savage indigenous Other that could not be trusted. This culminated in a brutal reign of terror, including forced disappearances, summary executions and massacres (Tapia 1997). The archipelago of clandestine centres for torture and disappearance, such as the army base *Los Cabitos* or the *Casa Rosada* in Huamanga, the stadium of Huanta, or the counter-insurgency base in Totos (Cangallo province), built up by the armed forces, are brilliantly described by the journalist Ricardo Uceda (2004). The sites of mass graves or massacres, such as in Pucayacu near Huanta or Accomarca, and the notorious
botaderos de cadaveres – places at which the armed forces would occasionally dump the mutilated bodies of the disappeared – became markers of the countryside.

Meanwhile, the Shining Path had hardened its approach towards the peasant population gradually from mid-1982 onwards. It now imposed their vision of the nuevo estado more relentlessly upon the communities it believed to have liberated from the old regime. To cut off the cities from their supply, the PCP-SL closed down rural markets and prohibited peasants to travel to the cities. It thereby effectively cut off not the cities but the communities, depriving the peasants from the few possibilities they had had to gain surpluses and ignoring the ample relations that had developed between cities and communities thanks to migration in previous decades. Communities in turn were supposed to become totally self-sufficient and produce surpluses only to support the party in its guerrilla war. The Shining Path also introduced a new system of authority in the communities, often presided over by young and educated community members. However, these young militants often came from the class of rural elites perceived as gamonales by their poorer neighbours – a fact that often revived old conflicts within communities. Fiestas and the drinking of alcohol were as much prohibited as the traditional varayoq system of hierarchy and authority, all believed to be opium for the people by the PCP-SL. The party now grew even more violent, killing all representatives of the viejo estado as well as those it suspected to collaborate with the armed forces and sweeping the countryside for all representatives of the old regime, often applying the death penalty in juicios populares. When the military arrived in a community, the Shining Path militants would retreat to the puna highlands, leaving the population unprotected in the face of the armed forces’ repression. The PCP-SL’s theoretical assumption was that the armed forces’ massive violence against the civilian population would only add to the popularity of the guerrilla’s struggle against the ‘system’. But as the party proved unwilling to protect its new clients against the military, the Shining Path’s authority and legitimacy in communities was instead undermined. All of this led to the peasants’ growing resentment of and resistance against the Shining Path. It also showed the PCP-SL’s misperception of the situation of indigenous peasants in rural communities, the clumsy grounding of its policy, and the inflexibility and short-sightedness of its ideology it proved incapable of adjusting to reality throughout its struggle (Degregori 1998b; del Pino H. 1998; Fumerton 2002, pp.78–79; Theidon 2004, p.30).

In early January 1983, incredible news reached Lima. It was reported that peasants in the community of Huaychao in the highlands of Huanta had risen against the Shining Path and killed seven militants. To get to the bottom of the story that was believed to be a mere act of
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war propaganda made up by the security forces, eight journalists representing some of the most important newspapers and magazines of the country started their journey to the highlands of Huanta, departing from Huamanga on January 26, 1983 along with a guide. Tragically, they never made it to Huaychao: The eight journalists and their guide were hacked to death by the comuneros of Uchuraccay, that had mistaken them for Senderistas in the midst of the peasants’ violent mobilisation against the Shining Path (CVR 2003h, pp.122–182; del Pino Huaman 2008; La Serna 2012).

The death of the journalists made the ongoing war in the Andes – until then considered as of little importance for those living Lima – painstakingly visible to the whole country. As the details of the incident remained unclear to many and an at least indirect involvement of the security forces was suspected, a government commission presided by the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa was sent to Uchuraccay to investigate the facts. The commission’s report stated that the indigenous peasants had indeed mistaken the journalists for Shining Path militants, but further attributed the killings to the intrinsically violent culture of the indigenous peasants that, according to the commission, had been living isolated from civilisation since pre-Hispanic times. The commission thereby reinforced many of the racist assumptions about the ‘savage indigenous culture’, according to which the peasants could not be held wholly responsible for their acts of violence as they presumptuously lived in ignorance of the basic rules of civilisation. Indigenous peasants taking up their arms autonomously and seeking political solutions violently was an idea alien to the commission’s conceptions of the indigenous Other (Méndez 2005, pp.1–5; La Serna 2012, pp.7–8). Ponciano del Pino (2008, p.38) also shows how the peasants themselves played on these assumptions, presenting themselves as humble and ignorant Quechua-speakers who had not understood the situation they had gotten themselves into.25

Although there is still much discussion on exactly how and why the peasants rose up against the PCP-SL in the highlands of Huanta, and shortly after in La Mar, several authors point to the fact that these communities were comparably isolated in terms of market integration, had experienced little emigration, and had therefore not gone through a process of class formation and alienation as the communities of the Pampas river basin had. Further, they had a strong

25 An enormous body of literature is available on the case of Uchuraccay, and the discussion on what really happened on January 26, 1983 has never really ceased. Apart from the analysis of the events in the original report of the Uchuraccay commission (Vargas Llosa et al. 1983), the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2003b) has investigated the case in detail. Ponciano del Pino’s (2008) ethnography of Uchuraccay and Miguel La Serna’s (2012) book on the neighbouring community of Huaychao have added many details. A discussion of the Uchuraccay commission’s (and therefore Vargas Llosa’s) use of racist clichés can be found for example in Cristóbal (2003), López Maguíña (2003) or Mayer (2012). Anke Laufer (2000) also accuses Mario Vargas Llosa of having re-used his experiences with and prejudices towards indigenous peasants as a member of the Uchuraccay commission in his 1993 novel “Lituma en los Andes”, in English “Death in the Andes”.
regional identity reaching back to their insurgency against the early republic, as well as strong kinship ties within and between communities and a largely intact and still legitimate system of traditional authorities. The Shining Path was late to arrive in this region – probably only in 1982 – and had not provided any previous conscientisation work as it had in the communities of the Pampas river basin. It introduced its ideas violently, presenting a major threat to the way of life in these communities, and was thus violently rejected (Coronel 1996; del Pino 1996, p.138; Fumerton 2002, pp.82–83; Theidon 2004, pp.30–31; La Serna 2012, p.192). Still, this interpretation is not totally persuasive. For the case of the community of Uchuraccay, del Pino (del Pino 2003, pp.25–26) shows that even in these seemingly homogenous communities violent conflict was not absent and facilitated the Shining Path’s initial entry. Further, it remains unclear how much of the peasants’ decision to combat the PCP-SL was influenced by the security forces’ previous appeal to the communities to take action against the insurgents.\(^{26}\) Finally, after the arrival of the armed forces in Ayacucho and their massive and brutal display of force, it became obvious to many communities who the stronger adversary was and thus the better ally to side with (Fumerton 2002, p.307; Theidon 2004, p.31).

The events in the highlands of Huanta marked the beginning of the organisation of indigenous peasants against the Shining Path that would occur especially in the provinces of Huanta, La Mar and Huamanga. These peasant self-defence organisations first referred to themselves as *montoneras*, following the example of the peasant guerrillas in the War of the Pacific. Later they were named *rondas campesinas* after the peasant vigilant committees that had developed in the highlands of Cajamarca in Northern Peru in the late 1970s,\(^ {27}\) or *comités de autodefensa* (CAD). The creation of CADs soon became part of the military’s official strategy, also accompanied by the policy of strategic hamletting that concentrated the dispersed rural population and made them subject to the military’s surveillance. *Rondas campesinas* gradually expanded their control of the rural territory, pushing back the Shining Path into more remote zones of the highlands and the jungle. In the Apurímac valley, the CADs evolved into a strong paramilitary organisation that had purged the region of the PCP-SL’s presence by the late 1980s (Fumerton 2002). Often, it was former local Shining Path *mandos* – those installed in their communities as new authorities by the party – who turned against the PCP-SL and became leaders of *rondas*, exploiting their knowledge of the party’s strategy (del Pino H. 1998, p.169). Still, while being a decisive factor in the fight against the insurgents,

\(^{26}\) La Serna (2012, p.192) sees the *comuneros* of Huaychao as having acted on their own behalf, but admits that police forces had made previous calls to resist the Shining Path in the region.

\(^ {27}\) For more information on the origin and role of the *rondas campesinas* in Cajamarca, see Starn (1999).
the CADs never contributed to an escalation of violence comparable to the case of Guatemala (Coronel 1996, p.106; Starn 1998, p.245; La Serna 2012, p.192). The indigenous peasants used the rondas campesinas instead as a new vehicle in their ‘search for the government’. Displaying themselves as peasant patriots that fought the Shining Path in the name of the government, they found a new way of establishing close relations with the Peruvian state and its armed forces, and thus a means to request being recognised as full Peruvian citizens (Fumerton 2002, pp.330–332; del Pino Huaman 2008, p.23; La Serna 2012, pp.210–212).

However, although the military did support the creation of rondas campesinas, they did not do much to defend the indigenous population against the increasingly violent attacks by the Shining Path. The rondas were only armed from the late 1980s onwards, and had little more to defend themselves against the insurgents than sticks and stones. The PCP-SL, incapable of realising its failed policy, deemed the peasant self-defence committees as mesnadas (armed goons) who were employed by the government, and therefore a legitimate target to be annihilated. Under constant attack, the population would retreat from their communities at night to hide in caves. In other cases, whole communities were abandoned and the population moved to larger towns of the region or even to the coast (del Pino H. 1998, pp.166–167; Fumerton 2002).

In the communities of the Pampas river basin, the rondas campesinas’ creation was mostly pushed forward by the armed forces, but it never developed into a permanent institution as it did in Ayacucho’s northern provinces. Support for the Shining Path was stronger here, as was the fear of reprisal by the party when forming rondas. Still, as Olga González (2011, p.45) shows in the case of the community of Sarhua (Víctor Fajardo province), even here peasants took action against the Shining Path, killing their local PCP-SL mando to show their alignment with the government. The community of Sarhua – as well as some other villages of the region – also tried to embark on a strategy of neutrality, agreeing in its community assembly to be hospitable to both the insurgents and the military when they came to the community. Depending on who entered the community, they would present a different set of village authorities, pretending to have organised themselves in a comité popular for the Shining Path or in a ronda campesina for the armed forces. But this was no secure method to avoid the wrath of belligerents. Both the Shining Path and the armed forces often disguised themselves as their adversaries to expose hidden PCP-SL militants or soplones (informers), who they would subsequently execute or ‘disappear’, as Caroline Yezer (2007, p.32) shows for an anonymous community in the Pampas river basin.
So, at first sight Ayacucho’s indigenous communities in the early 1980s were ‘entre dos fuegos’ – caught between two lines of fire – of two external enemies. But the picture becomes more complicated at a closer look. In the face of the peasants’ re-alignment with the government forces, the communities closed their ranks against the Shining Path. This was accompanied by the lynching of all individuals – and often also their families – associated with the Shining Path within the communities (Theidon 2004, p.175). While both Mario Fumerton (2002) and Miguel La Serna (2012) describe the founding of the rondas campesinas as a success story, they have to admit that the ronderos (members of the peasant sentries) often misused their new power and government support to get rid of adversaries and raid neighbouring communities, accusing them of being bases de apoyo (support bases) for the insurgents. Mario Fumerton (2002, p.86) even describes the brutal cleansing of communities of supposed Senderistas as a witch-hunt. While communities had initially used the Shining Path to re-visit previous inter- and intra-communal conflicts, they now did so with the military’s support for the rondas campesinas, underlining their support for the Peruvian government with violent activism (Fumerton 2001, p. 95; La Serna 2012, pp.190–191). Thus, as Kimberly Theidon (2004) emphasises, Ayacucho’s peasants were never passively caught between the line of fire of two external forces. Instead, the violence often played out in the intimate space of communities and not rarely involved direct kinship ties between victims and perpetrators. The Peruvian civil war was indeed a fratricide.

3.3 “El Chino nos dio la paz”28 – The Fujimori Era

By the mid-1980s, the level of violence in Ayacucho had decreased. The campaign of the armed forces and the expansion of the rondas campesinas had severely decimated the Shining Path. However the party was all but defeated and now started to expand beyond Ayacucho to the southern, central and northern parts of the Peruvian Andes.29 In addition, from 1982 onwards a new player appeared in the war: the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement – MRTA). Its origins lay in the failed guerrilla attacks of 1965, and it had slowly split away from the radical leftist parties that had participated in the elections of 1980. Having emerged from the intellectual circles in Lima,

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28 “The Chinese gave us peace” was shouted by Fujimori supporters when attacking the 5th anniversary of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Report at the Ojo que Llora memorial in Lima. “El Chino” – “the Chinese” – is Alberto Fujimori’s nickname.

29 For more information about the PCP-SL in the central sierra see Manrique (1998), for Southern Peru see J. L. Rénique (1998) and for Northern Peru see Taylor (2006). Further, Volume IV of the report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides a detailed description of the dynamics of the war in the different regions affected (CVR 2003c).
and with its ‘Castro-ist’ stance, it presented a force and aim contrary to that of the Shining Path. Still, it never reached the same importance as the much stronger and more brutal Shining Path, and occasionally fights between the two guerrilla groups occurred.\footnote{The MRTA was of no importance to the regional scenario of Ayacucho. For more information on the MRTA, see especially Volume II of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR 2003b).}

By 1984, the Peruvian Armed Forces had also slightly changed their strategy in Ayacucho, shifting from outright indiscriminate violence to selective repression and attempts of winning over the hearts and minds of the civilian population. The fact that recruits from the \textit{sierra} now dominated the ranks of the military contributed to gaining the highland population’s trust (Degregori 1998b, pp.146–147). Further, by 1985 the newly elected president Alan García from the \textit{Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana} (Revolutionary American People’s Alliance – APRA) tried to expand civilian control over the armed forces. However, this only worsened civil-military relations, and the armed forces answered by limiting their actions against the Shining Path to a minimum, thereby facilitating the PCP-SL’s expansion. The rebellion of \textit{Senderista} prisoners in Lima’s jails in 1986 that was bloodily put down by the García government, and the appearance of the \textit{Comando Rodrigo Franco} – a death squad operating out of the Ministry of the Interior – also characterised the counter-insurgency between 1985 and 1990. García’s economic policy of nationalisation ended in a disaster of recession and hyperinflation by 1988. At the same time, Abimael Guzmán considered the time ripe to declare the strategic equilibrium in the Shining Path’s revolution had been achieved, and expanded the PCP-SL’s campaign of terror to the capital. State collapse seemed imminent (Obando 1998, pp.389–393).\footnote{For more information on the campaign of the Shining Path in Lima’s \textit{barriadas} (shanty towns), see Burt (1998).}

The 1990 presidential elections saw the run-off between the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, candidate of a centre-right coalition of parties, who prepared the population for inevitable and severe structural adjustment measures, and Alberto Fujimori, an agrarian engineer of Japanese descent, who lobbied for a softer approach to the economic crisis of the country. Fujimori skilfully portrayed himself as the son of hardworking immigrants – a man of deeds, not of words – thereby making himself the representative of the \textit{cholo}\footnote{\textit{Cholo} is a pejorative term for a person of Andean origin and/or physiognomy. At the same time, however, it can also be used as a nickname or even with pride. Thus, Alejandro Toledo, the first elected president after Alberto Fujimori, is also known as “\textit{El Cholo}” due to his Andean background.} middle classes that had emerged out of the mass of migrants with an Andean background that had settled in Lima throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Vargas Llosa, who often made a highbrow impression, became increasingly associated with the white oligarchy that had always ruled and in the end ruined
the country – a *pituco* (snob) detached from the real needs of the people and representative of the corrupt political class (Oliart 1998).

Nevertheless, after his election Fujimori introduced the drastic structural adjustment measures – the so-called *fujishock* – he had promised to avoid. Further, he established close relations to sectors within the armed forces that he co-opted and that would remain loyal to him throughout his government. This was especially the task of Fujimori’s adviser and *éminence gris* Vladimiro Montesinos, who re-organised and presided over the National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional – SIN) and the Army Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército – SIE). Alberto Fujimori’s government was also the first to develop a clear counter-insurgency strategy to combat the Shining Path, which included sentencing PCP-SL suspects by anonymous judges – the so-called *jueces sin rostro* (judges without a face). But as Fujimori was not backed by a party apparatus, and his political movement was instead based on his charismatic leadership, his legislation faced stiff opposition in Congress, where he had no majority to support him. When his political projects came to a halt, Fujimori used his close ties to the military to carry out a coup d’état on April 5 1992 – the *autogolpe* or self-coup – dissolving Congress and bringing the judiciary in line. The Shining Path responded to these new developments with a series of car bombings and attacks in Lima – including the car bomb on Tarata Street that killed 25 and wounded up to 200 persons on July 16. But on September 12, Abimael Guzmán and the majority of the Shining Path leadership were caught by anti-terror police forces in a safe house in an upper-class Lima neighbourhood. Beheaded and left without its leadership and ideological guide, the Shining Path’s actions soon collapsed, and although some factions of the PCP-SL continued the insurgency, the guerrilla ceased to pose a threat to the government by the mid-1990s (Obando 1998). Alberto Fujimori skilfully capitalised on Guzmán’s capture – that was rather the result of persistent police work – to justify his drastic anti-terror measures and authoritarian government and present himself as the man who pacified the country. Thus, even the actions of the *Grupo Colina* death squad, part of Montesinos’ army intelligence network that committed, among many others, the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres, were pardoned. In June 1995, an amnesty law was passed that assured impunity to all members of the security forces involved in human rights violations (Burt 2006).

In 1993, a new constitution tailored to the needs of the president was adopted, and Alberto Fujimori was triumphantly re-elected in 1995. The style of government in Peru under Alberto Fujimori has sparked the attention of many political scientists and has been characterised as a “degenerate delegative democracy” (O’Donnell 1994; Thiery 2006), “competitive
authoritarianism” (Levitsky & Way 2002), “electoral authoritarianism” (Carrión 2006) or “neopopulism” (Crabtree 2001; Burt 2006). The way in which Vladimiro Montesinos coerced great parts of Peru’s political class, the business sector and the media with an ingenious network of corruption, fraud and blackmail has been especially spectacular (McMillan & Zoido 2004; Conaghan 2005). Due to the nearly total control over the media under Fujimori’s government, Peru was listed ‘not free’ by the Freedom House Index in 1998 and 1999 – at that time, the only other country on the American continent apart from Cuba to receive this label (Thiery 2006). Any meaningful opposition was effectively silenced by Fujimori’s state apparatus, either with corruption or coercion. Civil society had already been severely weakened throughout the 1980s due to the attacks of both the Shining Path, who considered all forms of political and social engagement revisionist and thus part of the old state to be eliminated, and the military, who failed to see a difference between social and political activism in general and the PCP-SL in particular. Aside from being targeted with violence and threats by entities such as the Grupo Colina, as well as legal measures and smear campaigns by the government-controlled judiciary and media, political opponents and civil-society activists were also discursively silenced during the Fujimori regime – who described them as ‘stooges’ or accomplices of the Shining Path terrorists. Whoever spoke out (against the government) was therefore a terrorist (Burt 2006; 2007).

Meanwhile, Ayacucho’s population became acquainted with another feature of the Fujimori regime: its use of clientelism. Part of the government’s counter-insurgency policy was not only selective violence, the consequent support for and equipping of the rondas campesinas and, after the capture of Abimael Guzmán, the Law of Repentance (Ley de Arrepentimiento) that offered Shining Path members the re-integration into society in return for turning themselves in with weapons or information, it also massively invested in rural infrastructure and micro-development projects to win over the population’s hearts and minds (Palmer 2012, pp.142–143). Alberto Fujimori himself often travelled to remote villages affected by the civil war, listened to the demands of the peasants, distributed food and clothing, and inaugurated public works, thereby creating a direct connection to the people on the ground and installing himself as a benevolent protector and advocate of the indigenous population (Oliart 1998). These politics of patronage were carried out by governmental agencies such as the food programme PRONAA33, the rural development programmes PRONAMACHS34 and

33 Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria was the National Food Assistance Programme.
34 Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuenca Hidrográficass y Conservación de Suelos was the National Programme for River Basin Management and Soil Conservation.
FONCODES\textsuperscript{35} and the Refugee Return Programme (Programa al Repoblamiento – PAR), rewarding rural populations most loyal to the president, but also re-establishing the state’s direct responsibility and recognition long demanded by the population in Ayacucho and elsewhere (Stepputat 2004, pp.256–257; Thorp & Paredes 2010, pp.172–173).

But the time immediately before and after the breakdown of the Shining Path insurgency not only saw the massive influx of state help, Huamanga also developed into a NGO-hub with international, governmental and non-governmental organisations providing funding for local NGOs and employment opportunities for a new middle class of aid workers (Yezer 2007, pp.160–161). In this atmosphere of post-conflict re-construction, the discourse on development and poverty alleviation flourished and was capitalised upon by the local population, who portrayed itself as especially poor and deserving (Mayer 2002, pp.320–322). Indeed, representing oneself as being poor, having been caught between the lines during the civil war and/or having fought heroically in the name of the government in a \textit{ronda campesina} became the best and often only way to receive direct governmental (or NGO) attention in the 1990s – including sometimes a visit by the president himself.

\subsection*{3.4 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR)}

Soon after his 1995 re-election, it became increasingly clear that Fujimori would try to hold on to power even after the end of his second term. In 1996, he introduced a law in Congress that enabled him to run for a third term in 2000, the Law of Authentic Interpretation (\textit{Ley de Interpretación Auténtica}), thereby violating the new constitution he himself had instated. The law was adopted in Congress, which was largely loyal to Alberto Fujimori, although some votes had to be bought with bribes by Montesinos. Judges opposed to the law in the Constitutional Court were dismissed and replaced by loyal judges (Root 2012, pp.37–38). But the political costs for this move were high. As the guerrilla threat had in the meantime decreased, the urban middle classes were no longer willing to accept just any measures by the government. For the first time in years, anti-government protests could be observed in the capital. Further, Fujimori’s economic policies – while contributing to a rapid economic stabilisation in the first years – failed to provide much-needed employment, which created further resentment (Youngers 2003, p.314). Thus, by the mid-1990s the Fujimori government for the first time was met by a notable opposition that, interestingly enough, was centred around a highly professionalised and unified network of human rights activists and organisations – one of the most successful ones in the region (Ibid., p.13).

\footnote{Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social is the Social Development Cooperation Fund.}
The roots of Peru’s human rights network lay in the late 1970s, during the second phase of the military government characterised by a conservative turn that was met with massive protests and strikes. Most of the human rights organisations of that time, such as the Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social (Episcopal Commission for Social Action – CEAS), were linked in one way or another to the Catholic Church and were influenced by the ideas of liberation theology. Thus, the focus of the human rights movement at the time lay – apart from its work for political prisoners – on social rights (Youngers 2003, p.29; Root 2012, p.44). This changed with the outbreak of the civil war in 1980. Organisations such as the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (Association Pro Human Rights – APRODEH) or the Comisión de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Commission – COMISEDH) now focused more on ‘classic’ human rights and worked with the affected population in the Andes while the work of Catholic organisations was increasingly constricted by the extremely conservative bishops in the emergency zones. Even then, the Peruvian government and military accused human rights activists and organisations of being the legal branch of the Shining Path, or at least its useful idiots. At the same time, the activists were also being threatened by the Shining Path, who tried to infiltrate their movement. Still, the human rights movement rejected any partisan political interests, and denounced the violations both on the side of the state’s security forces as well as on the side of the Shining Path, thereby underlining its political independence. In 1985, some 50 human rights organisations founded the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Coordinator for Human Rights – CNDDHH; hereafter Coordinadora), the national umbrella association for human rights organisations. This not only allowed for a high degree of internal coordination within the human rights movement, but also for concerted action vis-à-vis the Peruvian government and public. Further, it facilitated the contact and lobbying work with international agents such as Amnesty International, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the United Nations and the U.S. government with which the Peruvian human rights movement could build on during the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, through the creation of the Coordinadora, the Peruvian human rights movement profited from a strong internal/domestic and external/international integration (Youngers 2003).

Nevertheless, in many instances the movement reproduced the dominant social divides. The movement’s leadership was mostly of a white/mestizo, urban, middle-class background and the bigger Lima-based organisations dominated the agenda, while organisations from the provinces worked under precarious situations and were often ephemeral. While the homogenous leadership of urban intellectuals allowed for a high degree of professionalisation,
the most affected population – indigenous peasants – were not represented in the movement (Ibid., p.123). This situation worsened in the late 1980s and early 1990s when human rights activists came under direct threat by the death squads Comando Rodrigo Franco and Grupo Colina and had to withdraw from the regions most affected by the civil war (Ibid., pp.20–21). After Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1992 and especially after his 1995 re-election, the Peruvian human rights network managed to effectively channel the growing international preoccupation with the state of democracy in Peru, acquired funding from international donors and profited from the concessions the Fujimori government had to make to the increasingly discontent Peruvian public and to international pressures. It used its new manoeuvring space to successfully lobby for domestic legislation against torture and domestic violence and for women rights, and led a campaign for the release of those innocently imprisoned under Fujimori’s draconic anti-terrorism laws that led to the pardoning of 513 individuals. By 1996, the Coordinadora was accompanied in its fight by the Defensoría del Pueblo – the Ombudsman’s Office – which Fujimori had founded under pressure from the World Bank, but which rapidly emancipated itself from the government and recruited many of its staff from the human rights movement. Still, as domestic courts remained closed to cases of human rights violations due to Fujimori’s amnesty laws, human rights activists turned to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose sentences put Fujimori under even more pressure. Fujimori even withdrew Peru unilaterally from the court in 1999, causing him an international mediatic disaster. Thus, amidst an atmosphere of wide-spread corruption and manipulation of the judiciary and the media, the Peruvian human rights movement gained a high reputation and legitimacy, turning itself into one of the most influential agents in the fight for democracy. Even the government’s constant accusations and smear campaigns against human rights organisations could not destroy their reputation (Youngers 2003; Root 2012).

In 2000, Alberto Fujimori ran for a third term, which he eventually won. Still, the elections were so obviously manipulated that massive street protests immediately struck the country. Led by opposition candidate Alejandro Toledo and supported by the Coordinadora, the March of the Four Suyos (Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos)36 tried to impede Fujimori’s swearing in. While the Organization of American States failed to officially recognise Fujimori’s electoral fraud, it did install a national dialogue space (Mesa de Diálogo) in Peru to broker for democratic reforms and new elections between the government and opposition groups. The Peruvian human rights movement was strongly represented by Sofía Macher, the

36 The Inca Empire’s name in Quechua was Tawantinsuyo which means as much as “four provinces”. Thus, the March of the Four Suyos drew on this Inca terminology.
Coordinadora’s chairwoman, as well as the ombudsman Jorge Santistevan (Root 2009, pp.462–464). But before the Mesa could reach an agreement, the first of hundreds of so-called vladivideos was leaked to the press in September 2000. The following weeks and months, the Peruvian public could observe the release of video after video showing presidential adviser Vladimiro Montesinos bribing politicians, judges, military officers, businesspeople and media representatives, making evident the immense network of corruption and blackmailing on which the government had relied. Montesinos was immediately fired and fled the country while Fujimori, already facing an impeachment proceeding, held on to his office until November 2000. On November 19 2000, while on travel in Japan, Alberto Fujimori faxed his resignation to the Peruvian Congress, which responded by declaring Fujimori unfit for office and installing Valentín Paniagua as an interim president on November 22 (Root 2012, pp.38–41).

The videos discredited not only the whole political class of the country, but also the judiciary, military and large parts of Peruvian business as well as the notorious yellow press. Within this power vacuum created by the government’s rapid collapse, the human rights sector appeared to be the only legitimate force in Peruvian politics. Not surprisingly, Valentín Paniagua, an elder statesman from Belaúnde’s centrist Acción Popular Party, without any political ambitions of his own, turned the interim government into the spearhead for democratic reform and appointed prominent human rights advocates in key government positions. As prime minister, Paniagua installed the former UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. His minister of justice became the founder of the Comisión Andina de Juristas (Commission of Andean Jurists) and UN diplomat Diego García-Sayán, and Susana Villarán, former chairwoman of the Coordinadora in the 1990s, led the Ministry for Women. Thus, human rights activists could now lobby for transitional justice measures both from within as well as outside of the government while facing practically no resistance from former government officials, whose power had evaporated. At the same time, the members of Congress were much in favour of transitional justice measures, as it gave them the chance to distance themselves from the predecessor government and to further discredit their political opponents. Thus, by late 2000, a working group was installed to elaborate the terms and functions of a future truth commission – a step that human rights groups had been calling for since 1998 (Laplante 2007, p.435; Root 2009, p.460).

Still, a truth commission would not remain the only transitional justice mechanism Peru was to undertake. During the rule of the interim government, Peru signed the Rome Statute and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance, while it pressured the OAS to create
better measures to respond to member states that violated democratic and human rights principles. The interim minister of justice Diego García-Sayán, was confronted with a judicial system that had been totally corrupted during the era of Alberto Fujimori. García-Sayán removed several judges while re-instating many of the judges relieved of their office by Fujimori for opposing his politics. Further, the interim government accepted several of the verdicts the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had issued against Peru. Among these was the sentence that nullified all verdicts the so-called jueces sin rostro had issued against terrorism suspects in military courts during the 1990s. As these tribunals violated the rules of due process, the interim government and its successors faced the tremendous task of re-opening all cases against each terrorism suspect convicted in the 1990s, including Abimael Guzmán and other Shining Path leaders. In March 2001, the IACHR issued its sentence on the Barrios Altos massacre case, nullifying Fujimori’s amnesty law for police and military personnel. This paved the way for overall legal accountability in Peru. The military remained paralysed and unable to react: The interim government had already purged or arrested some 486 officers associated with corruption or drug trade. In April 2001, another vladivideo was aired showing some 100 officers from the armed forces’ high command swearing to Fujimori personally in 1999. The armed forces’ high command immediately issued a statement asking for forgiveness and declaring loyalty to the interim government, after which the entire high command of the Peruvian Armed Forces collectively resigned. Thus, by 2001 Peru found itself in a rare historic moment that enabled the use of a wide array of transitional justice measures, both truth and justice, while facing little or no effective resistance to deal with its civil war (Root 2012).

3.4.1 Task, Work and Results of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR)

While the interim president Valentín Paniagua was sceptical of installing a truth commission, fearing to endanger the legacy of his former mentor Fernando Belaúnde, the political moment was too favourable and the pressure from the national and international human rights networks too big to resist. From December 2000 onwards, a government working group elaborated the framework for a future truth commission in consultation with civil society as well as national and international experts, including the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) (Root 2012, pp.54–57). On June 4 2001, the Peruvian Truth Commission was installed by presidential decree and equipped with the following tasks:
a) Analyse the political, social, and cultural conditions as well as the behaviours which – from society and state institutions – contributed to the tragic situation of violence through which Peru has passed;
b) Contribute to the clarification – through the corresponding jurisdictional organs when and if appropriate – of the crimes and human rights violations committed by the terrorist organisations and some state agents, determine the whereabouts and the situation of the victims, and identify if possible the presumed responsibilities;
c) Elaborate proposals for the reparation and dignification of the victims and their family members;
d) Recommend institutional, legal, educational and other reforms as guarantees of prevention, with the aim that these be processed and taken into consideration via legislative, political, and administrative initiatives; and
e) Establish mechanisms of compliance with its recommendations (CVR 2003d, pp.37–38; see also Garcia-Godos 2008, pp.72–73).

Thus, the commission would not only investigate the events between May 1980, the beginning of the Shining Path insurgency, and November 2000, the downfall of the Fujimori regime, including the human rights violations committed by both sides, and make recommendations for reparations and reforms, it would also analyse the structural reasons and attitudes that enabled the Peruvian turmoil – a task reaching far beyond the usual terms of earlier truth commissions. Further, it would identify responsibilities for the human rights violations and hand over cases to the judiciary, leaving no space for amnesties. The crimes the CVR had the right to investigate included murder, kidnapping, forced disappearance, torture, sexual violence and forced displacement while it was also designated to determine if acts of genocide had taken place during the civil war (González Cueva 2006, pp.75–76). For these ambitious tasks the commission was given a working period of 24 months with a budget of some $11,7 million37 of which 55% were provided by the Peruvian state and 45% by international donors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU), the Ford Foundation as well as the governments of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. UNDP was given the task to oversee the budget (Reisner 2004, p.76; Drha 2007, p.77). To acquire information, the CVR was entitled to interview public officials, request information from state entities, carry out inspections and provide for measures of protection for witnesses.

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37 According to Hayner (2011, p.36), it was $13 million.
Most notably, it could hold private and public hearings, making it the first truth commission in the Americas to do so (González Cueva 2006, p.78; Hayner 2011, p.36).

Seven commissioners were originally assigned to the Comisión de la Verdad: Salomón Lerner Febrés, a philosopher and rector of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (Pontifical Catholic University of Peru – PUCP), Peru’s most renowned private university, presided the commission. The other commissioners were:

- Congresswoman Beatriz Alva Hart from Fujimori’s political movement Cambio 90,
- Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, director of the Comisión Andina de Juristas,
- Father Gastón Garatea Yori, chairman of the Mesa de Concertación para la Lucha contra la Pobreza (National Roundtable for the Fight against Poverty),
- Carlos Iván Degregori Caso, professor for anthropology at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (National University of San Marcos – UNMSM) in Lima and member of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (Institute for Peruvian Studies – IEP),
- Alberto Morote Sánchez, former rector of the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH),
- Carlos Tapia García, journalist and terrorism expert.

The newly elected president Alejandro Toledo supported the commission, but augmented the number of commissioners to twelve and one observer. The commissioners added were:

- Rolando Ames Cobián, sociologist,
- Monseñor José Antunez de Mayolo, Salesian and former diocesan of Ayacucho,
- Luis Arias Graziani, retired air force general and President Toledo’s security adviser,
- Reverend Humberto Lay Sun, member of the Council of Evangelical Churches,
- Sofía Macher Botanero, chairwoman of the Coordinadora.

Additionally appointed as an observer was Monseñor Luis Bambarén Gastelumendi, chairman of the Episcopal Conference of Peru.

Further, Toledo added the term ‘reconciliation’ to the commission’s name, which thus became the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission – CVR). Toledo was probably urged to this step by religious leaders without having a clear idea about its meaning. This further complicated the commission’s work as automatically public fear arose that reconciliation meant forgiving ‘terrorists’ (González Cueva 2006, p.78; Root 2012, p.74).

To carry out its work, the commission established collaborative agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Defensoría del Pueblo and with the Coordinadora (Hayner 2011, p.36). Thus, it could build on the expertise and the information
previously gathered by the human rights organisations who would also carry out part of the CVR’s
fieldwork. Further, consultants from the International Center for Transitional Justice assisted the
commission’s work (Root 2012, p.75). At its peak, the CVR had a staff of up to 500 people working in 13
offices across the country to gather testimonies and information (Hayner 2011, p.36). Together, they
gathered nearly 17,000 testimonies from survivors and family members, from pardoned former
prisoners, members of the self-defence committees, political leaders, military personnel and from
incarcerated members of the Shining Path and the MRTA. The commission held eight public hearings
in various cities in which 422 survivors or family members testified in public (Root 2012, pp.75–76).
Further, it conducted six hearings on specific topics and held seven public assemblies (Drha 2007, p.88).
The CVR also carried out in-depth studies on the dynamics of the war in five regions and on 23
representative histories of the conflict in different localities. Finally, it investigated 73 specific
cases of human rights violations in detail, of which 47 would later be handed over to the
judiciary for further investigation (Root 2012, p.91). It also collected information on 4,664
clandestine burial sites, but could only carry out exhumations in three localities (Ibid., p.86).
On August, 28 2003, a bit more than two years after its installation, the Peruvian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission handed over its massive nine-volume report to President
Alejandro Toledo. One day later, the report was presented to the public in a ceremony on the
main square of Ayacucho, the capital of the region most affected by the civil war. Volume I of
the report contains the main concepts and methodology of the commission as well as a
summary of the conflict and the crimes committed (CVR 2003e). Volume II describes the
main agents of the conflict and their responsibilities: the Shining Path, the MRTA, the
military, the police and the self-defence committees (CVR 2003b), while Volume III is
dedicated to the role of the three governments, the state institutions, political parties and
social organisations during the internal armed conflict (CVR 2003f). Volume IV contains the
description of the regional dynamics of the war (CVR 2003c) and Volume V examines the 23
representative histories of the conflict (CVR 2003h). Volume VI gives an overview of the
types of human rights violations committed during the conflict (CVR 2003d), and Volume
VII contains 73 emblematic cases of human rights violations (CVR 2003i). Volume VIII
analyses the origins and consequences of the war and summarises the main conclusions of the
CVR’s work (CVR 2003j). Finally, Volume IX provides the recommendations thought to lead
to the reconciliation of Peruvian society (CVR 2003g).

38 According to Drha (2007, p.81), the CVR had up to 600 staff members and was supported by up to 4,500
volunteers.
The presentation of the commission’s results contained many known aspects of the conflicts, but it also presented at least two major surprises. The first surprise concerned the number of fatalities reported by the CVR: While the commission had counted 23,969 individual persons killed or disappeared during the conflict in its investigations, it estimated the total number of fatalities around 69,280 – a number the CVR had elaborated together with the Human Rights Data Analysis Group of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. This by far exceeded all earlier estimations that saw the number of fatal victims of the conflict to be at about 25,000 (Root 2012, p.88). The commission attributed this number to the fact that the majority of victims were indigenous peasants that lived in small villages and hamlets high up in the Andes, had never possessed a birth certificate or any other form of documentation, and were therefore ‘invisible’ to the state and the rest of the Peruvian population (CVR 2003e, pp.123–124). The commission found that 75% of all fatal victims spoke Quechua or another indigenous language and 40% of the victims were from the region of Ayacucho. Taken together, the highland departments of Ayacucho, Junín, Huánuco, Huancavelica and Apurímac made up three quarters of the war casualties (CVR 2003j, pp.245–246). One of the main conclusions of the CVR’s report was, thus:

“The CVR has established that the tragedy that the populations of Peru, rural, Andean, and from the Amazon lowlands, Quechua and Asháninka, poor peasants with low levels
of education, suffered, was neither felt, nor taken into account by the rest of the country; this reveals, in the CVR’s judgement, the hidden racism and prevailing attitudes of disparagement in the Peruvian society nearly two hundred years after the birth of the republic.” (CVR 2003j, p.246).³⁹

The second big surprise that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission unveiled concerned the responsibility for the human rights violations committed. According to the results of the CVR, it was not the state’s security forces who were the main perpetrators of violence – as most human rights organisations had assumed over the years. Instead, the commission made the Shining Path responsible for 54% of all deaths and disappearances reported (CVR 2003b, p.23), while state agents, under which it subsumes the police, the military, the self-defence committees and paramilitary groups, are made responsible for 37.26% of the fatal victims (CVR 2003e, p.56). Interestingly, the CVR makes the Shining Path responsible only for 46% of the estimated – not reported – 69,280 fatal victims, but provides no numbers for the responsibility of the state agents for the estimated number of victims (CVR 2003b, p.23). Still, while the commission sees the PCP-SL as the main perpetrator in the conflict, it sees the armed forces – while having the right and duty to defend the young democracy – as responsible for an indiscriminate use of violence that constituted “in certain places and moments of the conflict […] generalised practices and/or systematic human rights violations”⁴⁰ (CVR 2003j, p.251). Especially the armed forces are made responsible for the great majority of the nearly 8,000 cases of forced disappearance and the ‘only’ 538 cases of rape registered by the CVR (Drha 2007, pp.63–64).⁴¹

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission saw the PCP-SL’s decision to pursue an armed insurgency against the state and its democratically elected government as the immediate reason for the war. But it also regarded the internal armed conflict as having developed out of a set of structural issues, such as racial, gender and age discrimination, along with poverty and an unequal distribution of wealth between the capital and the historically marginalised Central Southern Andes, and finally the frustrated expectations for modernisation and progress among the youth in the region during the 1960s and 1970s (CVR 2003j, pp.28–30). The social exclusion of the indigenous, campesino, Andean and Amazonian Peru that becomes apparent

³⁹ Originally in Spanish: “La CVR ha constatado que la tragedia que sufrieron las poblaciones del Perú rural, andino y selvático, quechua y asháninka, campesino, pobre y poco educado, no fue sentida ni asumida como propia por el resto del país; ello delata, a juicio de la CVR, el velado racismo y las actitudes de desprecio subsistentes en la sociedad peruana a casi dos siglos de nacida la República.”

⁴⁰ Originally in Spanish: “[...] en ciertos lugares y momentos del conflicto [...] prácticas generalizadas y/o sistemáticas de violaciones de los derechos humanos [...].”

⁴¹ Human rights organisations had originally assumed to find much higher numbers for sexual violence during the internal armed conflict. The fact that ‘only’ 538 cases of rape were registered during the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but the Victims’ Registry found a much higher number of cases of sexual violence years later, points to the fact that the CVR’s methodology of collecting testimonies had flaws and had not encouraged women enough to come forward with their stories.
in the invisibility of the civil war victims from these parts of the country is, according to the CVR, the main structural cause for the conflict and also the main hindrance towards reconciliation in the country. To bridge this gap between the two Perus, one coastal, modern and white or mestizo, the other Andean or Amazonian, indigenous and socio-economically excluded, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission developed a vision of reconciliation that emphasises the elaboration of a new social contract between the Peruvian state and all strata of Peruvian society to repair the social fabric destroyed during the conflict. The aim was equal citizenship for all and “the construction of a country that positively identifies itself as multi-ethnic, pluri-cultural and multi-linguistic” (Ibid., p.266).42

Further, the CVR saw a close relation between reconciliation and justice. It defined four dimensions of justice: Moral justice is created by uncovering the truth about the crimes committed during the conflict, legal justice involves the prosecution of those perpetrating the crimes, reparatory justice is achieved by the compensation of those victimised, and social and political justice prevents the re-occurrence of the events with reforms on different societal levels. Truth is both precondition and consequence of the process of reconciliation, and the truth presented in the CVR’s final report thus was to reconcile the conflictive and fragmented memories of the past in Peruvian society, opening up the path towards the future (CVR 2003e, pp.42–44).

To achieve its final aim of reconciliation, the CVR presented a bundle of recommendations for reforms and reparations in Volume IX of its final report. Among the institutional reforms meant to prevent the re-occurrence of the events, are: a greater presence of state institutions across the national territory, better access for the population to legal justice, greater civilian control over the armed forces and the intelligence services as well as a reform of the codes of conduct of police and military, the reform of the military justice system, and of the educational system to teach democratic values and respect for human rights. Further, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission created a Comprehensive Reparations Plan (Plan Integral de Reparaciones – PIR) containing six forms of reparations meant to complement each other as an integral whole:

1. Symbolic reparations, such as public acts of acknowledgement of the crimes committed and the creation of places of memory, were to frame the process of reparation and reconciliation by recognising victimhood and creating public space for memorialisation, thereby contributing to the re-construction of the damaged social fabric of Peruvian society.

42 Originally in Spanish: “[...] la edificación de un país que se reconozca positivamente como multiétnico, pluricultural y multilingüe.”
2. Reparations in health, especially in the form of psychological treatment, were meant to repair the psychological damage of those traumatised by the war, but were also directed at communities as a whole, once again to help re-construct the social fabric. Further, the PIR envisaged improved access to the state’s health services that was free of charge for those physically injured during the war.

3. Reparations in education in the form of scholarships or exception from fees were to compensate for the lost opportunity of the affected population to access education during the war.

4. Reparations in the form of the restitution of civil rights comprised measures such as legally settling the status of the disappeared, restituting those innocently convicted, and providing access to formal documentation for the undocumented population as well as legal advice for civil war victims.

5. Economic reparations in the form of lump sum payments or pensions were to compensate for the material and moral damage of the war and to give those affected by the war better future prospects.

6. Collective reparations, in the form of infrastructure, institutional or economic development projects, took into account that the conflict not only affected specific individuals, but communities as a whole, whose social, economic and institutional capabilities were severely damaged.

The CVR deemed these reparations not only to be a concrete way to compensate for damages and losses of the direct and indirect victims, but also, considering that reparations are always trying to repair the irreparable, to be a first step by the Peruvian state to implement the envisaged new social contract. Further, it also proposed a National Plan of Forensic-Anthropological Investigations (Plan Nacional de Investigaciones Antropológico-Forenses) to unearth the fate of the nearly 8,000 disappeared individuals (CVR 2003g).

3.4.2 A Critical Review of the CVR’s Work and Conclusions

Indeed, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s nine volume final report is probably to this day the most in-depth and authoritative account of what happened between 1980 and 2000 during the internal armed conflict and of the conditions that lead to Peru’s turmoil. It gave the mainly indigenous victims of violence a public forum to raise their voice for the first time in history, expressing the respect and dignity that had been withheld from them for many years, while encouraging and empowering them to demand justice and true citizenship. It further not only amassed information to support its narrative, but also provided
clear evidence for future prosecutions and a detailed reparations plan to lay the groundwork for a true politics of inclusion for the population affected by the war in general, and for Peru’s indigenous population in particular (Degregori 2004, pp.82–83; Laplante 2007, p.434; Laplante & Theidon 2007, p.238; Root 2012, p.97).

Still, and not surprisingly for such an ambitious project with limited time, financial and personnel resources, the CVR also had some major flaws and shortcomings. While the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission had learned from former truth and reconciliation exercises elsewhere in the world, it also could not avoid committing similar methodological errors as its predecessors had. Eduardo González Cueva (González Cueva 2006, pp.78–81), himself once part of the CVR team, criticises the absence of a central research directorship, which led to conflicting research methodologies within the CVR and left the synthesis of the findings to the editorial committee of the final report. Further, he criticises the selection of cases for the in-depth studies of the patterns of violence: While these should have shown that the violence applied was part of a systematic strategy, the CVR instead chose events that showed the spectrum of violations. The events selected where rather isolated from one another and had already received in-depth media coverage long before, and thus provided no new insights. The commission was also criticised for not including violations that were not directly part of the conflict, such as the forced sterilisation of thousands of indigenous women during the 1990s.

The anthropologist Wendy Coxshall (2005, pp.208–209) criticises the field research methodology of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as dispersed over the whole country, leading to time- and personnel-related problems. This resulted in intensive short-term field trips that could only capture snapshots, but would not lead to a deeper understanding of what had happened at the local level. In her eyes, only prolonged ethnographic fieldwork would have been the right methodological option for the CVR. Still, while this argument might be valid for an anthropologist used to years of intensive field work in a single community, it was definitely neither an option for nor the main goal of the Truth Commission, which instead had to take advantage of a rare historic momentum to investigate the patterns of a civil war that had lasted over twenty years and had deep historical roots.

In her study of an anonymous community in Ayacucho, Caroline Yezer (2007; 2008), challenges the CVR’s method to collect testimonies in communities with standardised questionnaires and its idea that this would be welcomed by peasants and would lead to the healing of communities. The community described by Yezer ended up refusing to give any testimonies to the CVR’s personnel after rumours that the Truth Commission was a betrayer
to the peasants. Among the reasons Yezer brought forth for this behaviour was the anger of many people that they were only subject to guided interviews in private and could not tell their fate to a wider public. Further, the CVR’s interview campaign in the community fell into a period of police harassments against community members as part of the War On Drugs. In this atmosphere of ongoing structural violence of the Peruvian state against its indigenous citizens, the Truth Commission only seemed to be one more disappointment to the hopes of the peasants. Finally, and most importantly, the interviews were not experienced as healing, but as an extractivist act for which the interviewed received nothing in return but an insecure future prospect of reparation and reconciliation, which in turn damaged the carefully constructed silences that had upheld community life after the conflict. Yezer goes on to relate that the CVR’s personnel explained the population’s rumours about and rejection of the truth commission’s work as a typical symptom for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), thus portraying the population as mentally ill and leaving no space for them to rationally challenge the CVR’s work.

Similarly, Kimberly Theidon (2004) criticises the CVR’s and many of the human rights organisations’ conception of a linear process of testifying leading to healing and reconciliation among the Andean population. She shows how ‘trauma talk’ (*estar traumado*) was artificially induced by NGOs and the state’s health personnel dispatched to the region in many communities, obliging the population to express their suffering in terms of the Western individualist concept of PTSD, to be treated with talk therapy. Yet this collides with a society that treats mental and physical suffering as inter-related and as linked to the social environment of a person. Excessive remembering is here seen rather as an illness to be treated by a *curandero*, a traditional healer, by different rituals that enable a person to forget and liberate themselves from the past. Theidon also describes the act of *pampachanakuy*, which she translates as “to bury something among us”, often also promoted by evangelical churches in the communities of Ayacucho. This ritual of reaching a conciliatory agreement between parties, including erasing the bad memory from the social sphere and enabling peaceful cohabitation and the re-construction of social ties, was often used to re-integrate former combatants of the Shining Path back into communities. Still, to those to be re-integrated into communities, this also meant physical punishment, such as flogging and permanent surveillance by their neighbours, including the obligation to participate in self-defence committees to prove their loyalty.

This process, also described by Ponciano del Pino (2008), Olga González (2011) and Miguel La Serna (2012), cannot be described as a form of ‘true’ reconciliation involving forgiveness
in the Christian sense of the word. The conflict is only banned from the social sphere, repairing only the integrity of the community, not of the individual. Hate, distrust and resentment may go on to be maintained privately and can occasionally erupt. But this shows that in many communities of Ayacucho, silence over the past is the desired norm, and memory and testimony, promoted by the CVR, instead could endanger the carefully reconstructed social fabric in those communities (Gamarrá 2002, pp.32–33). This notion is also underlined by a study conducted in 2006, three years after the CVR, in which participants in different parts of the country were asked if they thought it was better to remember or to forget the past in order to avoid a repetition of the violent events. While in Lima 57.3% of the persons questioned opted for remembering, in Ayacucho 64% opted for forgetting the past. The author of the study, David Sulmont (2007, p.25), interprets these results as showing that the most affected population in Ayacucho still did not have the resources and capacities to work through and overcome their trauma, and thereby automatically values remembering as the desired norm over forgetting. Instead, the outcome of his study may just as well point to the cultural differences between a Westernised coastal society that appreciates the Freudian value of working through suppressed traumata versus a more traditional Andean society that embraces forgetting and silence to guarantee its integrity.

Another line of criticism of the Truth Commission’s work refers to the use of public hearings. The CVR did not allow Shining Path or MRTA members to testify during the hearings, as it feared that they would use it as a public stage for propagandising. Ironically, the CVR then tolerated the ex-president Alan García to use the same space for his political propaganda of publicly denying his and the military’s responsibility for human rights violations (Root 2012, pp.82–84).

Most importantly, the public hearings were meant to give a voice to the voiceless indigenous population and to teach the ignorant coastal white/mestizo elites about their forgotten fellow citizens in the Andes and Amazon basin (Coxshall 2005, p.210; Root 2012, p.77). Laplante (2007) and Laplante and Theidon (2007) certify that the hearings had an overall positive effect, as they had fulfilled a therapeutic function for those testifying and brought about catharsis, recognition, empowerment and solidarity. Still, Kimberly Theidon (2004, p.110) also criticises the hearings for reproducing the typical dichotomy between male activism and heroism and female passivity and victimisation: In the hearings concerning the peasant self-defence committees only men testified, although women participated in the rondas campesinas as well. Women were rather presented to the public in the pose of the crying victim.
As Franka Winter (2009) points out, the victims who testified during the hearings were not only handpicked by the commission, but also had to rehearse their speeches before the hearings to achieve clarity and avoid any incoherence in their testimony. Further, the testimonies were subjected to time limits, and restricted to the pre-selected topics of the hearings, both of which were often rigorously enforced by the commissioners. Thus, survivors were not at all free to tell their truth, but were rather bound in a straightjacket of norms imposed upon them by the commission and the previous analysis of the validity of their testimonies by the commissioners, all of which meant to make the speech of the voiceless, traumatised, indigenous peasants digestible to a white/mestizo audience. Winter concludes that this practice instead confirmed the dominant power relations of superior white/mestizo elites who were granting the right to talk to the indigenous peasant and thus reproduced, stabilised and legitimised the state of the subaltern Other instead of overcoming inequality and empowering the indigenous victims of war. While former commissioner Carlos Iván Degregori (2004, pp.82–83) vigorously rejected accusations of the CVR showing any paternalistic behaviour during the hearings and instead stressed that the truth commission had altered power relations and enabled survivors to demand their rights not as subaltern victims but as equal citizens, Wendy Coxshall (2005, p.211) equally criticised the commissioners for performing the role of the white/mestizo power broker common in the Andes, thus translating the indigenous demands to the central state and leaving no space for direct interaction between the victim and the state.

Indeed, the central goal of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission was to provide an equal place for the indigenous population in Peruvian society. Unfortunately, it seems to have done so nearly in the same way as the indigenista elites a century before: by representing the indigenous Other without granting them agency. Although there were representatives from academia, the churches, human rights organisations, and even from Alberto Fujimori’s political movement and the Peruvian Armed Forces among the commissioners, victims’ organisations were not represented in the CVR, and thus were only subject to private testimony and public hearings. Further, there was only one Quechua-speaker among all the commissioners, while Limeños (residents of Lima) dominated among the commissioners (Hayner 2011, p.36). Thus, even the CVR’s composition reinforced the dominant social divides of the country and appeared as the project of the capital’s white/mestizo elites.

Even more important is the way in which Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission constructed a lead narrative of a rural indigenous population innocently caught between the
lines of two equally brutal adversaries – the Shining Path on one side and the state’s security forces on the other:

“The communities were besieged by both warring factions searching for terrorists or traitors. To identify them without doubt and avoid giving the community members the chance to cover their alignment up, one side dressed up like the other. At the beginning the communities opted to receive the PCP-SL; but in this moment, they became literally trapped between two lines of fire” (CVR 2003e, p.89)

While this correctly describes the dynamics of the conflict at least in a certain period of the war, this narrative spares out much of the protagonism of indigenous peasants: The brutal intra- and intercommunal conflicts and the participation in and/or alignment with one or the other warring faction. Paradoxically, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself does find some lines to confirm that indigenous peasants were not only passive victims, but also agents:

“In this way, by the mid-1980s, more and more peasants saw themselves involved in the war. The notion of a peasantry in the crossfire adjusts less and less to reality. Now, they are agents within the war and the peasant war against the state propagated by the PCP-SL led, in many cases, to violent confrontations between these same peasants” (CVR 2003g, p.290)

Although the CVR admits here to the complexity of the conflict and the active role of the rural population in the war, it sticks to its main tenor of a civilian population passively caught between the lines using the expression entre dos fuegos – in the crossfire – a total of 44 times in its final report.

But why does the Truth and Reconciliation Commission stick to this main narrative of passive victimhood – the same one that it contradicts in several passages of the exact same text? One explanation may be the racist stereotypes of ‘intrinsically violent Andeans’ in Peruvian society. Both Kimberly Theidon (2004, p.21) and Ponciano del Pino (2008, pp.5–6) refer to the dilemma of writing about the violence indigenous peasants in Ayacucho inflicted upon their neighbours without re-affirming these stereotypes. Representing indigenous peasants as passive victims rather than active perpetrators of violence may indeed have been a consideration during the writing of the CVR’s final report, as this portrayal increased empathy

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43 Originally in Spanish: “Las comunidades fueron asediadas por ambos combatientes buscando terrucos o mesnadas. Para identificarlos sin dudas y evitar el disimulo de los comuneros, unos se disfrazaron de los otros. Al inicio, las comunidades optaron por acoger al PCP-SL; pero, en ese momento, quedaron literalmente atrapados entre dos fuegos.”

44 Originally in Spanish: “De esta manera, a mediados de los años ochenta, cada vez más campesinos se ven involucrados en la guerra. La noción de un campesinado atrapado entre dos fuegos se ajusta cada vez menos a la realidad. Ahora son actores de la guerra y la guerra campesina contra el Estado que había propagado el PCP-SL concluyó, en muchos casos, en enfrentamientos entre los mismos campesinos.”
with the affected population. Unfortunately, this happened at the cost of reinforcing another stereotype: that of the ‘tame and passive Indian’.

Another explanation for the CVR’s main narrative and its focus on passive victimisation may be the limited resources it had at its disposal for analysing the situation in the communities of Ayacucho. Obviously, it extracts much of the information on indigenous communities in Ayacucho from literature written throughout the 1990s as well as from the testimonies the CVR gathered during its field trips. In retrospect on his own work as a researcher in Ayacucho in the 1990s, Ponciano del Pino (2008, p.2) remembers that, due to security concerns field trips at this time were short, leaving time only for interviews with community leaders and other notables and thus leaving the interviewers with no choice but to rely on the interviewees’ often epic and patriarchal stories of war and violence. Further, researchers often naively took these stories at face value, not considering that their interviewees were rather spokespersons for a silence that made cohabitation between victims and perpetrators in a community bearable. With its short field trips and focus on testimony, the CVR seems to have replicated the same naive research methodology.

Kimberly Theidon (2003, pp.68–69) warns not to create a binary opposition between an official memory, to be replaced with the popular memory of the subaltern indigenous victims of war, thereby neglecting the existing power relations in the communities of Ayacucho. Franka Winter (2009, pp.95–96) further highlights that the testimonies collected from survivors in Ayacucho rather reflect the negotiation between truth, authority and economic interests that was adapted to the special situation of testimony before the Truth Commission, and the fears and aspirations people associated with this process. In his study of the community of Uchuraccay, Ponciano del Pino (2008, pp.82–89), shows that the villagers at first did not want to give their testimony to the CVR, fearing to be portrayed once again as the ‘savages’ who had killed eight journalists and their guide back in 1983 and could thus be charged and taken to court. Instead, in the course of two community assemblies they decided to present one coherent narrative about the times of violence in Uchuraccay and handed over a list of their 136 war victims to the commission, thereby emphasising their victimisation at the hands both of the Shining Path and the military. Interestingly, for a short period these community assemblies also lifted the silence over the lynchings community members had committed against their neighbours who sympathised or collaborated – or were at least believed to do so – with the PCP-SL. Their family members, often still stigmatised and humiliated, would now demand the recognition of their loss within the community and were finally granted permission to put their lynched family members’ names on the list of victims
to be presented to the CVR. Thus, although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission might have naively accepted the stories of passive victimisation the communities presented to it without questioning them, its mere presence opened a space for discussion over the violent past that – sometimes and at least temporarily – led to the recognition of the victims long silenced in the communities.

The case of Uchuraccay described by Ponciano del Pino was no exception among the communities of Ayacucho. Indeed, many communities agreed on which story to tell before testifying in front of the commission. The narratives they presented hid the population’s active involvement in the war and rather showed an innocent civilian population caught in the crossfire between the Shining Path and the Peruvian security forces. Even the PCP-SL militants or sympathisers lynched by their fellow community members are not displayed as agents of their own will, but rather as naive victims, innocently deceived by forces alien to the community. These narratives of victimisation, by projecting the agency of violence to allegedly outside agents such as the Shining Path and the military, and by highlighting the indigenous peasants’ sacrifices as fighters for the state in the rondas campesinas, serves two main purposes: First, the narrative of innocent victimisation reflects the negotiations within the community that enabled the cohabitation of victims and perpetrators by ‘forgetting’ the community’s involvement in acts of violence. Second, the narrative does not only secure coherence inside of the community, but serves also as a representation vis-à-vis outside agents such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Theidon 2004). ‘Telling the truth’ about one’s own agency, about support for the Shining Path or the lynching of community members would have clearly been counterproductive for demanding the reparations and development projects the CVR was expected to deliver. Self-incrimination was further very unlikely, given the still dominant anti-terrorism discourse of the Fujimori era and the CVR’s mandate to contribute to prosecutions. As a result, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – whether consciously or unconsciously – reproduced these narratives in its final report, thus creating a narrative of passive victimisation and obscuring the agency of those it wanted to free from their subaltern status. As Jemima García-Godos (2008) vehemently criticises, even the members of the Peruvian Armed Forces and the peasant self-defence committees were mostly portrayed as victims in the CVR’s final report. Further, this narrative also draws attention away from why and how indigenous peasants participated in or collaborated with the Shining Path and thus from a precise analysis of the causes of war.

Still, to defend the CVR’s project, the commission was well aware that, given its limited budget and time, it could only make the first step towards providing truth, justice and
reparations. Thus, it saw the narrative it provided about Peru’s violent past not as definitive, but as to be continuously augmented with new information:

“‘Truth’ is a perfectible narrative. The narrative of the CVR refers to events that have occurred in the history of Peru and to social processes linked to a conflictive and fragmented memory. We propose a narration that is, while recovering our memory as a country, directed towards the future, and should therefore be continued and enriched with the participation of civil society, the state, and those entities to be created for overseeing the compliance with the recommendations of the report. The important thing is that the narrative contains in itself the criteria that permit its continuous completion; we consider that in it there will always be place to include new testimonies of victims still unknown, as well as new perspectives of analysis or criticism which contribute to its continuous rewriting.” (CVR 2003e, p.42)\textsuperscript{45}

Indeed, for my analysis of the Peruvian internal armed conflict and the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I can now build on such insightful publications as those by Kimberly Theidon (2004), Caroline Yezer (2007; 2008), Ponciano del Pino (2008), Jaymie P. Heilman (2010), Olga González (2011) and Miguel La Serna (2012), all of which use long-term ethnographic field research methods and/or research in local archives to uncover the agency of indigenous peasants in Ayacucho’s communities and the silence constructed around it. Unfortunately, these new publications are mostly received in academic and intellectual circles in Peru and elsewhere, and do not have the publicity and impact equivalent to that of a truth commission’s report. Thus, it is likely that new insights about the Peruvian civil war will remain limited to the space of universities and research centres without influencing a wider public. What remains then is the narrative of an innocently victimised and passive indigenous population in need of constant representation and help by the state and NGOs – thus, the white/mestizo elite of the country.

3.5 Twelve Years Later – Drawing a Balance of the CVR

While Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is praised as being one of the strongest of its kind, and its recommendations and reparation plan are perceived as one of the most extensive and integral to-date (González Cueva 2006, p.70; Hayner 2011), the CVR’s balance some twelve years after the publication of its report is at best mixed (Root 2012, p.166). As all other truth and reconciliation commissions before, the Peruvian CVR faced the major

\textsuperscript{45} Originally in Spanish: “«Verdad» es un relato perfectible. El relato de la CVR se refiere a sucesos ocurridos en la historia del Perú y a procesos sociales ligados a una memoria conflictiva y fragmentada. Proponemos una narración que, al recuperar nuestra memoria como país, se proyecta hacia el futuro, y debe por eso ser continuada y enriquecida con la participación de la sociedad civil, el Estado y los organismos que habrán de crearse para vigilar el cumplimiento de las recomendaciones del Informe. Lo importante es que el relato contiene en él mismo los criterios que permiten su perfeccionamiento constante; consideramos que habrá lugar en él siempre para acoger nuevos testimonios de víctimas aún desconocidas, así como nuevas perspectivas de análisis o de crítica que contribuyan a su reescritura continua.”
obstacle that it could not enforce the recommendations it handed over to its society, but depended on the political constellations at the time of submitting its report. While in 2001 at the start of the CVR, any opposition towards a truth and reconciliation project was weak, by 2003 the tides had turned. With the end of the interim government and the CVR, human rights activists were no longer in power positions, and the old political elites had re-consolidated. In the 2001 presidential elections, former president Alan García had come in second after Alejandro Toledo, and his APRA party won a considerable number of seats in Congress. By 2006, Alberto Fujimori’s political movement, now led by his daughter Keiko, had also recovered from its scandals, successfully making the governments dependent upon the votes of its members of Congress. Finally, the Peruvian Armed Forces had returned as a powerful veto player with close ties to those governing the country. Thus, only five days before the submission of the CVR’s report, the military’s representative in the truth commission, the retired air force general Luis Arias Graziani told the commission’s president Salomón Lerner that he would only sign the report under reservation, criticising that the CVR was placing the armed forces at the same level as the PCP-SL and exaggerating the number of victims (Ibid., pp.93–96). This move already cast a shadow on the CVR’s recommendations and forecast the kind of problems under which the legacy of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission would suffer.

Still, at least initially, Peru made some notable steps forward in establishing justice for human rights violations in the courts. In January 2003, the Peruvian Constitutional Court ruled that all proceedings under Fujimori’s anti-terrorism laws had to be re-opened, as they had violated rights and the rules of due process. Thus, in the years to come, the Peruvian justice system faced the enormous task of arranging new trials for some 2,500 convicts, including Abimael Guzmán and other PCP-SL and MRTA leaders. This immediately provoked fear among the Peruvian public that ‘terrorists’ would be freed. But not only were the trials now fair and transparent, most of the accused were convicted again, although often with reduced sentences. Most importantly, Abimael Guzmán and other Shining Path leaders were tried between 2005 and 2006 and convicted to life imprisonment, now also using new evidence gathered by the CVR. Only 142 prisoners were found innocent and released. Still, their rehabilitation was met with fierce resistance from the Peruvian public and politicians who went on to harass and accuse them of being terrorists. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Alejandro Toledo’s prime minister, even spoke of 10,000 terrorists freed by the courts, accusing the judiciary and Paniagua’s interim government of being weak in the face of terrorism. Thus, although Peru has gone a
long way to restore the rights of those who were falsely convicted, the persistent anti-terrorism discourse in the Peruvian public impedes any real rehabilitation (Ibid., pp.102–108). The next big challenge for Peru’s courts came in 2005 when Alberto Fujimori travelled to Chile, presumably to prepare his return to Peru and candidacy for presidency in 2006. Although obviously assuming that Chile was a safe haven for human rights violators, Fujimori was arrested upon arrival and extradited to Peru in 2007 to face charges of corruption and human rights violations. Fujimori was tried between 2007 and 2009 in a fair and unpolticised proceeding, and was finally found guilty for the abuse of authority, corruption and human rights violations, especially those committed by the Grupo Colina death squad. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Thus, Peru was the first country to try and convict a democratically elected head of state for human rights violations before its own courts (Burt 2009; Root 2012, pp.119–124).

Yet apart from the rather spectacular proceedings against Abimael Guzmán and Alberto Fujimori, trials concerning human rights violations during the internal armed conflict are rare and proceed at a painstakingly slow pace, often ending in the acquittal of alleged perpetrators, especially when they are members of the military. By 2005, 22 of the 47 cases handed over to the judiciary by the CVR had entered into the phase of trials. But of the 252 arrest warrants concerning these cases, 209 were never enforced due to procedural errors (González Cueva 2006, p.89). By December 2011, 60 court cases had been initiated from the 47 handed over by the CVR, but only 8 had resulted in final sentences. In 194 further cases concerning human rights violations during the 1980s and 1990s, only 16 had completed the entire legal process and half of them awaited appeal (Root 2012, pp.109–111).

One of the obstacles the justice faces in Peru is first and foremost the lack of political will, also resulting from the new strength of the armed forces as a veto player. Not only do the votes of 138,000 military personnel bear a considerable weight in politics, by the mid-2000s the armed forces had also re-established their public image as the saviours of the nation against an ongoing terrorist threat, making trials against their staff a rather unpopular matter. Human rights trials against military personnel are routinely denounced by politicians and the conservative media as the result of a weak court system and reckless communist human rights organisations controlled by foreign powers, who demoralise the troops in their ongoing battle against remnants of the Shining Path in the coca-producing valleys of the Huallaga and Ene river. Further, the borders between the military and Peruvian politics are rather permeable, allowing the armed forces to directly influence politics. When Alan García, was elected President in 2006, despite accusations of his responsibility for human rights violations during
his first government from 1985 to 1990 - and thus obviously averse to human rights trials – he appointed the former admiral Luis Giampietri as his vice president, the same admiral who commanded the 1986 prison massacre, in which hundreds of mutinous inmates of several prisons in Lima accused of being PCP-SL members, were killed. With Ollanta Humala, another retired military officer accused of human rights violations during the internal armed conflict even ascended to presidency in 2011. Not surprisingly, the armed forces have until today successfully lobbied against any reform of the military court system, thereby creating legal uncertainty about where to prosecute alleged human rights violators among the security forces and delaying proceedings (Ibid., pp.111–116).

Another obstacle for human rights trials is the weak and inefficient judiciary in Peru. While special human rights prosecutors have been installed following the recommendations of the CVR, they are totally understaffed for the task at hand. Many cases pursue human rights violations in the early 1980s in remote rural areas, making it difficult to find reliable witnesses and hard evidence. Further, the military and the Ministry of Defence refuse to cooperate by disclosing the documentation or the names of those responsible to civil courts. And as the court system is highly centralised, with proceedings often taking place in Lima, convictions mostly result from cases that concern crimes committed in Lima, where the evidence and witnesses are easier to obtain or were previously documented by the local press. In cases concerning indigenous victims from remote rural areas, impunity is still the rule (Ibid., pp.117–118). Last but not least, only 25% of the 1,500 victims implicated in human rights cases have a legal representation – often by human rights organisations – while all military personnel implied are provided with defenders by the state (González Cueva 2006, p.89).

Even when witnesses and evidence are available, courts often tend to acquit those responsible among the military. In the case of a human rights activist disappeared in the highland town of Huancavelica, the court ruled that the activist was clearly the victim of forced disappearance committed by the Peruvian Armed Forces. Still, it refused to make any one person directly responsible for the crime, acquitting the former political-military chief of the Huancavelica region and current mayor of the district of San Borja in Lima. It thereby also followed the main argument of the Peruvian Armed Forces and its supporters, namely that human rights violations committed by the military were isolated phenomena and not part of a strategy, and thus spared higher-ranking officers from any responsibility (Burt & Rodríguez 2012). Further, the government routinely interferes in matters of the judiciary, pressuring and even removing judges and prosecutors from their posts (Root 2009, p.473). In August 2013, a
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minor scandal rocked the country, when the liberal newspaper *La República* published the recording of a conspirative lunch meeting, in which the chief of the administration of justice (*Poder Judicial*), the minister of justice and the delegate of the Peruvian government to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pressured the judge in the ‘Chavín de Huántar’ case, which concerned extrajudicial executions during the freeing of hostages taken by members of the MRTA in the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima in 1996, to rule that no such executions had taken place. They urged the judge to do so with the argument that otherwise, this would deteriorate the image of the Peruvian state. Unfortunately, the judge Carmen Rojas found in her verdict that at least one of the MRTA members had been executed extrajudicially after the liberation of the hostages. But as in the case of the disappeared human rights activist described above, the verdict negated any chain of command leading to this crime. Thus, the three persons accused of the crime, Fujimori’s adviser Vladimiro Montesinos, the chief of the armed forces Nicolás Hermoza, and the commanding officer Roberto Huamán were acquitted. The judge was subsequently removed from her post (Sifuentes 2013).

In the case of the reparations recommended by the CVR – and strongly demanded by the victims of the war – the picture is not much different. Many human rights activists considered Alejandro Toledo, once the main oppositional candidate in the last years of the Fujimori regime and president at the time of the submission of the truth commission’s report, to be their ally. But Toledo at first remained silent upon receiving the report, and then made a public statement in which he apologised for the human rights violations in the name of the state. Unfortunately however, in the same statement he emphasised that he himself had not been governing the country at the time the violations had been committed, and hence was not directly responsible for any of them. With this statement, he stripped his apology of any sincerity and symbolic meaning (Guillerot & Magarrell 2006, pp.58–59).

The Toledo government remained slow in taking action. Some six months after the submission of the CVR’s report, the government created the *Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel para el Seguimiento de las Acciones y Políticas del Estado en los Ámbitos de la Paz, la Reparación Colectiva y la Reconciliación Nacional* (CMAN) – the Multi-Sectoral High Commission for the Implementation of the Actions and Politics of the State in the Areas of Peace, Collective Reparation and National Reconciliation – as an entity to oversee the implementation of the truth commission’s recommendations (Ibid. 2006, pp.62–63). A year later, the *Plan Integral de Reparaciones* (Comprehensive Reparations Plan – PIR) became national law. Further, a law to establish the judicial state of the disappeared and a law on the
protection of internally displaced persons was passed through Congress. Thus, the recommendations of the CVR counted on a solid legal foundation, obliging the state to implement them (Ibid. 2006, pp.89–92). But despite this prerequisite, the Toledo government never implemented any of the recommendations, instead granting the military a much higher budget and thereby leaving no money for reparation measures. By the time the CVR submitted its report, Toledo was already highly unpopular due to corruption scandals in his government. Thus, he obviously thought it opportune to side with the now once again highly popular military instead of further endangering his public standing with unpopular human rights and reparation measures (Root 2009, pp.469–471).

The law on the reparations plan PIR also had a major flaw: It deliberately excluded all former members of subversive groups – the PCP-SL and the MRTA – from being beneficiaries of reparations, even if they had been subject to human rights violations (Root 2012, p.131). This was very much in line with the public feeling that demanded taking a hard stand against terrorists. Still, this violated international law and further ignored the large grey area in the rural highlands where an – at least – initial support for and membership in the PCP-SL had been common and was subsequently and mostly brutally put down by the state and the peasants themselves (Theidon 2010, p.93). But it was the CVR itself that laid the groundwork for this perception of victimisation when it named the events in Peru between 1980 and 2000 an ‘internal armed conflict’ instead of a civil war, which would have granted combatants of the PCP-SL and MRTA rights under the Geneva Convention (Root 2012, p.134). Still, the CVR had intended to include members of the subversive groups in its reparations scheme if they had been subject to human rights violations (CVR 2003g, p.111). But according to the reparations law, this would not be the case anymore. Thus, relatives of people who had participated, however marginally or briefly, in the ranks of the MRTA or Shining Path and had been subsequently disappeared or extrajudicially executed by the armed forces or lynched by their village community, would never see one cent.

When Alan García was elected President in 2006, the second time after his disastrous rule from 1985 to 1990, chances of advancing on the reparations issue seemed rather dim. Still, García implemented the Consejo de Reparaciones (Reparations Council – CR) that created the Registro Único de Víctimas (Victims’ Registry – RUV). Its task was to register all individual victims and communities that had suffered from human rights violations during the 1980s and 1990s and to whom collective and individual reparations were subsequently to be delivered (Fingscheidt 2007, p.19). By the end of 2011, 5,697 communities had been registered and were thus entitled to collective reparations. It also registered some 2,228 rape
victims, a much larger number than had been found by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Further, the RUV counted 27,190 dead or disappeared victims, of which only 18,397 had been noted previously by the CVR.\footnote{By June 2013, Ramírez Zapata (Ramírez Zapata 2013) had counted 183,350 beneficiaries of reparations listed in the RUV.} Still, the number of nearly 70,000 casualties estimated by the commission was not reached. Several reasons for this may be listed: First, the RUV did not register members of MRTA or PCP-SL who were killed or disappeared; second, since in many cases some thirty years had passed since the crimes had been committed, there were simply no family members alive that could list their relatives in the registry; and third, people might have already lost faith that they would finally receive a reparation and would not come forward (Root 2012, pp.134–136).

Further, as members of the subversive groups were excluded from the Registro Único de Víctimas, especially victims of state violence had to go through a slow and painful process of clearing themselves of any possible connection to the Shining Path and the MRTA to prove their absolute innocence. The process thereby contributed to a cycle of false accusations and re-victimisation for victims of the state’s security forces and their family members (Laplante & Theidon 2010, p.307). At the same time, members of the armed forces and self-defence committees were listed in the RUV without further investigation, although their death or injury in active duty was not a human rights violation. Their service for the state was seen by the CVR and reparation law as sufficient to be included in the reparation scheme, and their innocence was simply assumed upfront (Root 2012, p.133).

Individual monetary reparations were never paid in the five years of Alan García’s government. Instead, the government sped up the process of granting war victims, who were often lacking official papers, identity documents and thereby giving them better access to state services. Further, the individuals registered in the RUV would receive a subsidised health insurance, which was unfortunately often not at all adequate for victims in need of psychological treatment. García instead advanced on the issue of collective reparations, awarding some 1,600 communities with projects equivalent to the amount of €25,000 each. However, these projects – in form of basic infrastructure or the donation of livestock – often covered services that the state was obliged to provide to its citizens anyway, and thus did not distinguish itself from any other form of development projects. People in the communities were often unaware that the projects were meant to repair the damage done during the civil war, and Alan García used them instead to demonstrate his own benevolence towards a poor, rural population, thus strengthening clientelistic ties and his own popularity (Ibid., pp.136–138).
Finally, after much pressure from human rights organisations and victim groups, Alan García passed a presidential decree in June 2011 – just a month before leaving office – that enabled the payment of individual monetary reparations. But the decree also contained some major setbacks. It limited the time for victims to register with the Registro Único de Víctimas, setting a deadline for December 31, 2011. Afterwards, victims would still be able to register, but would no longer be recognised as beneficiaries of the reparations programme. Further, the decree determined that, for example, rape victims would have to wait until turning 65 to be able to access indemnification. Even worse, parents of murdered or disappeared persons would only be able to access monetary reparations at the age of 80 and could only do so, according to the decree, if they received no other support from family members (Vignolo 2012). Thus, the state seems to be trying to avoid any payments while victims simply die away in wait of reparations. Further, from the beginning on it became clear that the government perceived reparations to the victims of Peru’s civil war as just another poverty alleviation programme – a logic that is also very visible in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which equates victimhood with being a poor, indigenous peasant. Indeed, reparations in Peru are not seen as the acknowledgement of a person’s rights as a citizen before the state, but as just another form of social assistance to the rural poor (Ulfe 2013, pp.16–17). Finally, the sum considered to be paid to the beneficiaries amounted only to 10,000 Peruvian Sol (€2,500-3,000), whereas relatives of members of the self-defence committees killed in action would receive nearly four times the amount, and in cases involving the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, sums of up to $30,000 were paid out to survivors (Vignolo 2012).

Alan García left the question of monetary reparations to his successor, Ollanta Humala, who assumed office in July 2011 after his narrow victory over Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of the imprisoned Alberto Fujimori. Humala first seemed sympathetic towards the reparations issue, as it fitted into his agenda of a ‘great transformation’ towards social growth. Victims could now access the governments scholarship programme Beca 18 more easily, and the state also began with the payment of individual monetary reparations. Still, when the government took a conservative turn by the end of 2011, while in search of support from liberal and Fujimorista (supporters of Fujimori) members of Congress, the topic of reparations was rapidly dropped and became a mere lip service. Until July 2013, only 17,652 persons or 23% of those entitled to a monetary reparation had actually received the sum (Fowks 2013).

In the light of the reluctance and slowness of the central government to embark upon any real politics of reparation, human rights organisations as well as regional and local governments
have often stepped in. At the local level, municipalities have installed offices for the Victims’ Registry, have set up mental health projects and created places of memory as symbolic reparations. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily a sign of an independent politics of reparation among local governments, but instead owes its existence to the presence of specialised NGOs that instruct regional or local authorities and make funding from international sources available. These local reparation politics then tend to rapidly collapse after the end of a specific project, when the NGO retreats or when international donors withdraw their funding – which is increasingly the case in a country with continuously high growth rates such as Peru. Thus, local reparation initiatives may create some relief in the short term, but remain rather unsustainable in the long run (Barrenechea 2010).

The process has been equally slow in case of the exhumation of the 4,644 registered clandestine burial sites. By 2011, only 1,200 bodies were recovered, of which only some 600 could be identified. Legal uncertainty and unclear legal responsibility have impeded any quicker action in this topic. Further, where exhumations did take place, communities were often not involved in the decision-making process, leading to the uncontrolled re-surfacing of long-silenced conflicts in communities. In other cases, no action was taken by authorities, although evidence about the whereabouts was clear and family members demanded exhumations (Root 2012, p.141). Finally, conflicts between the responsible authorities within the legal system and the Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (Peruvian Team of Forensic Anthropology – EPAF), the main specialised NGO in the field of exhumations, have thwarted any joint and concerted approach in the search for the disappeared since the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (González Cueva 2006, p.84).

Indeed, due to the continuous right-wing majority in Congress and the new power of the armed forces, none of the institutional reforms demanded by the CVR were implemented. The military could successfully lobby for keeping up its separate military justice system, thereby adding to a continuous legal uncertainty in cases of human rights violations (Root 2012, pp.111–113). Initially, there was an attempt to include the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in school curricula, but passages concerning the responsibility of the armed forces for human rights violations were diluted. Further, the new schoolbooks were only distributed in highland regions, not at the coast, which was apparently seen as a measure to prevent the resurgence of violence in the highlands, whereas it was not considered necessary to learn from the past at the coast. Finally, the initiative was shut down due to pressure from the Ministry of Defence and later the García government, who saw it as an insult to the armed forces (Ibid., pp.146–148).
But most importantly, the narrative of the CVR could not persuade the Peruvian public that human rights and democratic values were of any major importance for their everyday lives and the future of the country. Indeed, the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had a difficult standing straight from its publication onwards, as politicians of all sides, as well as the church and the media criticised it in unison, portraying it as exaggerated and biased towards the armed forces. By 2003, politics had normalised and human rights activists were no longer in a position that enabled them to have direct influence on the political discourse. Further, as the CVR was installed without a previous peace agreement with any of the subversive groups, but rather with the background of an all-out military victory over the MRTA and the PCP-SL, there was no need for any compromise in politics (Theidon 2010, p.95). Peruvian politics are mostly characterised by a ‘business as usual’ attitude that refuses to take into account the violent past of the country and the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, instead opting for a policy of rapid economic growth built on the exploitation and export of raw material as the solution to all problems of the country. Still, this extractivist economic model has not at all erased the socio-economic cleavages between the two Perus, but has deepened them instead. While the coast profits most, the Andes and the Amazon region bear the brunt of the disadvantages of raw material extraction, such as environmental pollution. This has resulted in further violent conflicts over the resources and benefits for the local population affected by mining (Root 2012, pp.152–157).

Paradoxically, while the past seems to be of little interest for a population that wants their share of Peru’s economic bonanza, the country is in desperate need of learning from its past, as messages of anti-democratic values, contempt for human rights and racist attitudes against Peru’s indigenous population prevail in politics and in the public, and the government continues using deadly force against its citizens with impunity, especially when defending its preferred economic model against any kind of opposition. Thus, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Minister of Economy and later Prime Minister during the presidency of Alejandro Toledo and presidential candidate in 2011, would later claim at a conference that protests against the free trade agreement with the United States were due to the lack of oxygen among the population living in the Andes. This statement clearly implied that in his eyes, Peru’s indigenous population was physically not able to think properly and that its opinion was thus not of any importance (Adrianzén Merino 2011). Even worse, during the presidency of Alan García, massive protests arose in the Amazon region against laws proposed by the government to increase private investment in the Amazon, and with it the exploitation of its mineral resources. García responded not by calming the situation, but by publishing a number of
essays in Peru’s most respected newspaper *El Comercio* in 2007 in which he not only accused all opponents of his neoliberal policy as backward communists, but also reinforced the common racist prejudice of the indigenous population being a major obstacle for the development of the country as they halted investments and growth that all Peruvians could benefit from by protesting against mining, oil and gas extraction projects. The conflict finally exploded on June 5 2009, when clashes between indigenous protesters and anti-riot police near the town of Bagua in the Department of Amazonas left 10 civilians and 24 police officers dead (Hughes 2010; Drinot 2011). Alan García further issued a decree in 2010 that allowed the deployment of the armed forces against social protests, thereby once again enabling the declaration of emergency zones in which – reminiscent of the 1980s and 1990s – the military enjoyed extensive privileges vis-à-vis the civilian population and elected authorities (La República 2010). Finally, Alan García repeatedly accused NGOs of generally being under foreign ‘communist’ influence. Thus, his government created the *Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional* (Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation – APCI) with the task of supervising and monitoring NGOs, which authorities actively used to harass organisations critical of the government (Fingscheidt 2007, p.27).

Since then, governments have routinely used deadly violence to enforce its economic model against the resistance of the affected – mostly indigenous – population, while clearly favouring corporate interests. This reached a peak with 67 civilian deaths due to police and military violence in social protests during the five years of Alan García’s rule (2006-2011).

But also the government of Ollanta Humala – which once had started with a promise of a ‘great transformation’ and ‘social inclusion’ – rapidly adjusted to the neoliberal policy of its predecessors, contributing to the death of 27 persons in social protests in just the first two years of his rule. Further, the Humala government is still hesitating to apply the Law of Previous Consultation (*Ley de Consulta Previa*) that allows indigenous peoples a right to be consulted in case they are affected by any legislative or administrative measures, including the designation of mining projects (Reyna Hidalgo 2013). Finally, authorities routinely denounce social and political protests and demonstration as infiltrated by the Shining Path, thereby legitimising the use of deadly force (Root 2012, p.152). This has resulted in the use of the same politics of fear once installed during the Fujimori regime, according to which all forms of opposition against the government and its institutions are by definition ‘terrorist’ (Burt 2006; Theidon 2010, p.99).

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that both the political movement of Alberto Fujimori as well as the armed forces could rapidly re-surface in Peruvian politics. Despite the
CVR’s disclosure of human rights violations and corruption in his government, the public remained convinced that it was Alberto Fujimori and the armed forces that had saved the country from turmoil, crushed the menace of insurgency and stabilised the economy. This, and Fujimori’s business-friendly policy combined with paternalistic social relief programmes in the 1990s, secured him and his political movement a stable base of supporters long after the meltdown of his government. Thus, even imprisoned, Fujimori remained one of the most popular politicians of the country. Meanwhile, his movement, now led by his daughter Keiko Fujimori, won a high number of seats in Congress during the 2006 and 2011 elections, while Keiko Fujimori was beaten only narrowly by Ollanta Humala in the 2011 presidential run-off. The Fujimorista block in Congress actively supported the García government and was awarded with several ministerial posts in return. Even the current Humala government has to take into consideration Fujimorista votes in Congress in order to secure its law projects. This has catapulted the political movement of Fujimori back into the centre of mainstream politics and made its discourse socially acceptable again. Thus, the Fujimori movement lobbied for pardoning and releasing Alberto Fujimori from prison – a measure a majority of Peruvians seemed to favour. When President Ollanta Humala rejected this bid in June 2013 (La República 2013b), Fujimori’s supporters immediately began to lobby for granting Fujimori – said to suffer from a minor form of cancer and depression – house arrest (Rivera 2013).

Back in politics again were also the Peruvian Armed Forces that could build on long-standing relationships with Alan García’s APRA party, the Fujimori movement and Ollanta Humala’s Partido Nacionalista Peruana (Peruvian Nationalist Party). In an environment of rampant corruption among elected officials and, in consequence, low approval rates for all democratic institutions, they could position themselves as honest fighters for the fatherland. Their rationale has always been that Peru’s armed forces never committed systematic human rights violations and, if human rights violations were ever committed by the armed forces, this was only due to a few bad apples among the troops and, after all, probably the necessary price to pay for saving the country from the hands of ruthless, genocidal terrorists (Root 2012, p.114; pp.125–127). The armed forces have done much to (re)establish and defend this discourse in the media and thus in the public sphere, accusing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of being a treacherous smear campaign set up by the political left to damage the image of the military (Morán Reyna 2006). In 2010, the armed forces also published their own ‘truth report’ “En honor a la verdad” (In Honour of the Truth), in which they re-affirmed their version of the war against terror, emphasising the sacrifices of the troops in their honest battle.
for democracy and denying to be responsible for any systematic human rights violations (Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú 2010).

This discourse has proved to be useful for all sides – politicians, militaries and media alike – in the ongoing fight against the remnants of the Shining Path in the coca-producing Huallaga and Ene valleys in the eastern slopes of the Andes. Between 2005 and 2010, attacks by the Shining Path had ended the lives of up to 300 persons, among them members of the military and police as well as civilians (Palmer & Bolívar 2012), and human rights violations by the armed forces also continue to occur in these emergency zones (Fowks 2013). Still, the Humala government seems to have – at least militarily – won the upper hand in this battle: The PCP-SL front in the Huallaga valley was broken up and its leader Comrade Artemio was arrested in early 2012 (La República 2012b), while the leadership of the Shining Path front in the Ene valley was decimated considerably in August 2013 (La República 2013a).

At the same time, the ideas of the Shining Path are all but dead and go on to exist in some parts of Peruvian society, such as in state universities. In 2009, the Movimiento por la Amnistía y los Derechos Fundamentales (Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights – MOVADDEF) was founded by the lawyers of Abimael Guzmán and managed to gather some 150,000 signatures for its registration as a political party. Ironically, it lobbies for the pardoning and release not only of the Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán, but also of his adversary Alberto Fujimori (Palmer & Bolívar 2012). While the registration of MOVADDEF as a political party failed for the 2010 regional elections, the Humala government has proposed a Law of Negation (Ley de Negacionismo) that sanctions the denial of ‘terrorist violence’. Not only may this law be used to silence critics of the government when using – as is usually the case – a random definition of terrorism, but also, according to the law, the negation of human rights violation committed by the state against its own citizens will, of course, remain permitted (Giusti 2012).

This socio-political environment resulted in a highly distorted human rights discourse in Peru, visible for example in the reparation law that denies members of the subversive groups the right to reparations, even if they have been subjected to human rights violations. Kimberly Theidon (2004, pp.233–234; pp.255–257; 2010) criticises that the perception of victimhood in Peruvian society, apparent not only in the reparations law, has contributed to a discourse that only recognises victims without moral taint, those who are absolutely innocent. Hence, only the innocent have human rights, and violence against anyone with a moral flaw – no matter how minor – is legitimate. This is a very useful discourse for the state and the armed forces, and one that impedes any change towards a more just and equal society. This dichotomy
between absolute victims and brutal Shining Path perpetrators, with whom reconciliation is not possible, is very easy for the coastal elites who do not have to deal with grey areas and cohabitation as the communities of the Andean highlands do. It demonises the Shining Path and casts its followers forever out of society, thereby making any real debate about why people had joined the subversive groups impossible. Any attempt to understand the reasons for their violent insurgency and tackle its roots is rapidly denounced as a form of sympathising with terrorists (Root 2012, p.157). Thus, as recognition and reparation in the Peruvian transitional justice discourse come only for those perceived as absolutely innocent, it is not surprising that people in the rural regions most affected by the war further opt for silencing their political agency and protagonism, instead adopting the role of the passive victim caught between two deadly outside forces (Theidon 2004, pp.232–233; Theidon 2010). But the CVR was not blameless for the low acceptance of its findings and recommendations in the public and in politics. Indeed, the commission proved to be highly self-referential, predominantly addressing a national and international human rights and victim community. This already became clear during the public hearings organised by the CVR in which mostly victims and their family members, human rights experts and foreign observers were present, while the general public did not participate. And while all hearings were televised, no one saw them. The massive nine-volume report of the CVR was also hardly digestible for a larger public in its full length, especially for the sectors of Peruvian society not used to reading or not even able to read. Even the shorter version of the report “Hatun Willakuy” (Quechua for “great story”) still contained nearly 500 pages. Only 1,000 copies of the full report were finally printed and distributed mainly among the CVR staff and experts. Thus, even among public officials the knowledge about the findings and recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission turned out to be extremely low. This also led to the persistence of many prejudices about the commission and its report among the public, which could easily be reinforced and exaggerated by politicians, the military, and most importantly, the media (Laplante 2007, p.444).

Indeed, the Peruvian media landscape has proven to be a crucial factor in the CVR’s failure to make a difference. It is not only overtly conservative to rightwing, but also highly concentrated. The Grupo El Comercio newsgroup in the hands of the powerful Miró Quesada family has a nearly absolute monopoly over the Peruvian media, owning most of the newspapers and biggest television channels. Despite its conservative orientation, it was long sympathetic with the goals of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, defending it against attacks from the right. Unfortunately in 2008, Martha Meier Miró Quesada – once a
congressional candidate for the Fujimori movement in the manipulated elections of 2000 – took over responsibility in Grupo El Comercio. Since then, the different media of the company have joined the chorus of voices that condemn the CVR as biased against the government and the armed forces. It even openly supported the candidacy of Keiko Fujimori during the 2011 presidential elections. Among the remaining media, many had already been corrupted by Vladimiro Montesinos during the Fujimori regime, and seem to remain faithful to Fujimori and the armed forces (Weissert 2012, pp.87–89). Thus, newspapers such as Diario Correo, Expreso and La Razón have defamed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, along with its commissioners and human rights organisations as being a branch of the Shining Path trying to weaken the armed forces, receiving large salaries to line their own pockets and exaggerating the number of victims (Barrantes Segura & Peña Romero 2006, pp.23–25).

Media coverage was already very limited during the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and was instead focused on technical issues or criticising the CVR’s work, while its revelations remained unreported. The same happened during the trial against Alberto Fujimori, which the ex-president used to propagandise in the media while the content of the trial was not covered. Since then, the media has focused very much on the health condition of Fujimori, thereby supporting his and his family’s petition for pardon or house arrest (Laplante & Phenicie 2010). Indeed, media coverage of human rights trials is practically absent in Peru. This is even more serious considering that these trials now and then do bring new details about the past to light and question the discourse of the security forces, who negate their involvement in systematic human rights violations. In the Accomarca massacre case, the accused officer Telmo Hurtado Hurtado clearly pointed to a strategy of human rights violations by the armed forces during the early 1980s. Yet only a few online media tied to human rights organisations reported on the case, while the Peruvian mainstream media remained silent (Burt & Best Urday 2012). Thus, Lisa Laplante and Kelly Phenicie (2010, p.228) characterise Peru’s media as deeply interconnected with the vested interests of the political elite of the country. Self-censorship, sensationalism, smokescreens, political bias and even open political propaganda that revives conflict and is used to protect perpetrators have defined the media in Peru ever since the Fujimori regime.

But has the CVR then at least led to a “growing victims movement [that] is beginning to cultivate a population of conscious citizens who vigilantly serve as collective memory-keepers as well as watchdogs for future risks of repression”, as Lisa Laplante (2007, p.435) puts it? Indeed, when Alan García tried to promote a new amnesty law in 2010, clearly serving himself and his military friends, large sectors of the Peruvian society arose in protest,
forcing García to withdraw the law project. The same year, Susana Villarán, ex-chairwoman of the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, won the municipal elections in Lima, becoming the mayor of Peru’s capital. However, her government came under constant attack by the Peruvian media, leading to continuously low approval rates. In March 2013, her government was subject to a plebiscite for her removal from office – a so-called revocatoria – which she won. However, most of the city councillors of her political movement were voted out.

Victims’ organisations experienced an enormous boom with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Their number grew from 24 in 2000 to 118 in 2004, mostly in expectation of the promised monetary reparations. But as these were continuously delayed, the victims’ associations dissolved as rapidly as they had been created (Guillerot & Magarrell 2006, p.111). Indeed, many of the victims’ organisations were and still are highly dependent upon projects by human rights organisations. Thus, human rights organisations have a highly paternalistic relationship to victims, often acting as spokespersons for them. In some cases, NGOs or municipalities even founded victims’ associations artificially, to create a demand for the projects they wanted to carry out. This resulted in the paradox situation of victims being fabricated to fit projects instead of projects being tailored to fit the needs of victims. In this process, victims once again were given no voice. Not surprisingly, NGOs in Ayacucho and elsewhere are viewed with distrust by the affected population as merely profiting from the pain of others. Further, as less and less money is available for projects by international donors due to the booming Peruvian economy, NGOs can no longer assist their victim clientele. Finally, many of the young and often highly educated leaders of the victim movement abandon their victims’ organisations to move on and pursue careers in politics or NGOs, profiting from the skills they attained in project trainings (Barrenechea 2010).

In summary, while the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission is perceived as one of the strongest of its kind in an international perspective (González Cueva 2006, p.70; Hayner 2011), it has largely failed to impact the society it was designed for. Still, Peru’s transitional justice process may have made a difference at the regional level, as it has influenced new legislation in international bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) (Root 2012, pp.167–170). Further, many of the former staff of the CVR are now internationally respected transitional justice experts, working for the International Center for Transitional Justice or the International Crisis Group, and thereby influencing similar processes in other regions of the world. The ex-commissioner Sofia Macher was even named Deputy Chairwoman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the Solomon Islands in 2009.
4 Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes

Not surprisingly for a country that has applied such a wide array of transitional justice measures, memorialisation initiatives in the form of places of memory and commemorations have mushroomed all across Peru. This is clearly a legacy of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which in itself was a highly symbolic memorialisation performance that recommended additional symbolic reparations and installed places of memory – though few – itself. However, the peak of memorialisation activities came after the truth commission, approximately between 2004 and 2010, and reflected the conviction among civil-society actors to contribute to the implementation of the commission’s recommendations for reparations in light of a largely passive and unwilling state as well as the availability of funding and technical assistance from foreign donor agencies.

Memorialisation initiatives have often been very creative, with the building of museums and monuments just one of the many shapes these initiatives may take. Peru’s memoryscape is also populated by murals, public theatre performances, memory books and all kinds of different modern and traditional art forms. While a great part of these memorialisation activities take place in the capital Lima, the highland regions most affected by the war have also been at the centre of attention from the beginning on. Activists sought out regions such as Ayacucho because they were following the CVR’s indications that it was especially the rural indigenous poor who had suffered most. Thus, even small rural communities benefited from memorialisation projects. These memorialisation projects normally adhered to the same model: Human rights organisations and other NGOs propose and realise the places of memory with funding and often also technical assistance from foreign donor agencies. The affected population is integrated into the projects in a participatory way, but the NGO activists remain in control of the form of representation of victimhood. As Elizabeth Jelin (2011) criticises, memory in Peru is made by well-meaning outsiders for – not by – the affected population, introducing standardised and homogenised representations of victimhood and suffering, and reproducing dominant power relations. But while the forms of representation are introduced by outsiders, the affected population may and will still use the memorials created for them according to their own schemes of interpretation, sometimes in line with the goals of transitional justice activists, sometimes diverting from them.

In this chapter, I want to illustrate the dynamics of memorialisation initiatives in Peru using three case studies from the region of Ayacucho: the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP in the city of Ayacucho, the memorials created in the community of Santiago de Lucanamarca (Huancasancos province) and the Centro de la Memoria in the community of Putacca
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(Vinchos district, Huamanga province). But before doing so, I will first highlight the influence of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the creation of places of memory as a transitional justice mechanism in Peru and give a short overview of memorialisation in Peru in general.

4.1 The Legacy of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission had a major influence on the creation of Peru’s post-conflict memoryscape, first by including symbolic reparations into the recommendations for reparations in its report, and secondly by using highly symbolic performances during its work and creating places of memory itself. From the beginning, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission saw its own work as highly symbolic, as an act to acknowledge victimhood and to establish those victimised as citizens within Peruvian society. This approach was then to be continued by the implementation of reparations. Thus, for the commission, all forms of reparation are first and foremost symbolic and serve the recognition of victims, the (re)affirmation of their citizenship and the re-establishment of the damaged social fabric of the country:

“All the acts of reparation are oriented towards acknowledging the ways victims were affected throughout the internal armed conflict in Peru, and to affirm the condition of individuals and citizens, of all those who suffered the violation of their fundamental rights. Thus, all measures of reparation are symbolic, as they express the recognition of the dignity and the rights of the victims. Focusing on the symbolic incorporates the development and re-establishment of trust among citizens, as it fosters an attitude of reaching out among members of a political community that saw itself fragmented as a consequence of the violence.” (CVR 2003b, p.115)

Further, the CVR’s reparation plan also contains an entire chapter on symbolic reparations that are considered to frame the whole process of implementation for all other types of reparation: health, education, the restitution of civil rights, or economic and collective compensation. According to the CVR, symbolic reparations have a strong pedagogic implication, as they create a frame of interpretation for the Peruvian civil war, and thus help construct a society calibrated for non-repetition:

47 Originally in Spanish: “[…] todos los actos de reparación están orientados a reconocer la forma como las víctimas fueron afectadas durante el proceso del conflicto armado interno en el Perú, y afirmar la condición de individuos y ciudadanos de todos aquellos que sufrieron la violación de sus derechos fundamentales. Así, toda medida de reparación es simbólica pues expresa un reconocimiento de la dignidad y derechos de las víctimas. Lo simbólico como enfoque, incorpora el desarrollo y el reestablecimiento de la confianza entre los ciudadanos, pues fomenta una actitud de acercamiento entre los miembros de una comunidad política que se vio fragmentada como consecuencia de la violencia.”
“Proposing an entirety of explications which make intelligible and interpretable what happened will contribute to the basis of a preventive system against the repetition of the tragedy. Asking ‘why did it happen?’ should be the point of departure for ‘never again’.” (CVR 2003b, p.115)

Further, symbolic reparations also have a psychological dimension, as they are seen as an important step in the process of mourning:

“At the same time, it is necessary to start the collective and incomplete process of mourning […] to generate, in some way, relief from the suffering caused by the violence.” (CVR 2003b, p.116)

Finally, symbolic reparations are seen as a measure to mark the transition to democracy and the rule of law, and with it the creation of a new social contract:

“[…] these processes shall provide the opportunity to extract from the traumatic events […] lessons that permit the construction of a new social imagination, in which human rights are more than just words. […] This form of reparation has the value of a transitional process, from a context of rampant violence to one which searches to re-establish the rule of law.” (CVR 2003b, p.116)

In the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report (CVR 2003b, pp.117–121), symbolic reparations are subdivided into four components:

1. Public gestures
   a) A statement of support for the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the President of the Republic
   b) An apology in the name of the state by the President of the Republic
   c) Letters of apology sent by the state to all victims and their family members
   d) Public ceremonies for the explication of truth at emblematic places of violence in the presence of state representatives.

2. Acts of recognition
   a) The recognition of all victims of the conflict in form of a remembrance day installed by Congress
   b) Public rehabilitation of the innocently imprisoned with public declarations by the Supreme Court and public ceremonies

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48 Originally in Spanish: “Proponer un conjunto de explicaciones que hagan inteligible e interpretable lo ocurrido contribuirá a sentar las bases de un sistema preventivo contra las repeticiones de la tragedia. El ¿por qué pasó? debe ser el punto de partida del nunca más.”

49 Originally in Spanish: “Al mismo tiempo, es necesario iniciar el proceso colectivo e inacabado de duelo [...] para proporcionar, en alguna medida, alivio al sufrimiento causado por la violencia.”

50 Originally in Spanish: “ […] estos procesos deben dar la oportunidad de extraer del acontecimiento traumático [...] enseñanzas que permitan la construcción de un nuevo imaginario social, en el que los derechos humanos no sean letra muerta. […] Esta forma de reparación tiene el valor de un proceso transicional, entre un ámbito de violencia desenfrenada y uno donde se busca restablecer el imperio de la ley y el Estado de Derecho.”
Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes

3. Commemorations or places of memory
   a) The creation of places of memory in the country’s cemeteries in form of plaques or other forms of commemoration, and the designation of special areas in the cemeteries where victims of the conflict may be laid to rest
   b) The creation of memorials or public parks in memory of the victims in Lima and all regions affected by the conflict

4. Acts that contribute to reconciliation
   a) The closing or conversion of all places associated in collective memory with the use of violence by state agents
   b) The closing or reform of military and anti-terrorism prisons.

Thus, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had already recommended in a very concrete way the whole scope of memorialisation initiatives, from commemorative ceremonies, the installation of plaques and other physical places of memory, to the preservation of emblematic sites associated with human rights violations. It even mentions the creation of casas de la memoria – memory houses – to be built as symbolic and pedagogical sites for the preservation of memory. Further, the CVR states in its reparation plan that, while it is preferable that the state remain responsible for the symbolic reparations mentioned, civil society could also develop memorialisation initiatives:

“The propositions for symbolic reparations presented are those considered to be assumed by the state. Nevertheless, this does not limit the development of other initiatives by civil society, which should be assisted by the state.” (CVR 2003b, p.121)\(^5^1\)

However, the recommendation to create memorialisation initiatives may not only be found among symbolic reparations. Within its recommendations for health reparations, the CVR stresses the need for psychological community interventions to help re-build the damaged

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\(^{51}\) Originally in Spanish: “Las propuestas de reparación simbólica presentadas son aquéllas que se considera que el Estado debe asumir. Sin embargo, ello no limita el desarrollo de otras iniciativas desde la sociedad civil, a las que el Estado debería brindar facilidades [...].”
social fabric and communal networks destroyed during the conflict. Among the measures the commission recommends to strengthen the mental health of affected communities is the recuperation of historical memory:

“The CVR recommends the initiation of processes to regain the historical and collective memory of communities affected by the internal armed conflict. The aim is to contribute to the restoration of identity and roots for those who feel they have lost their own past. […] The CVR recommends that the regained historical and collective memory should be presented to the affected communities with the active participation of the population, its organisations and its leaders, and in the form they themselves decide upon.” (CVR 2003b, p.124)

These recommendations are indeed of special importance, as many community interventions by NGOs and foreign donors followed them and created local historical memory projects under the assumption that the affected rural population was a homogeneous collective of traumatised people with just one, uniform perception of the past and in need of an identity.

The symbolic reparations recommended by the CVR actually contain several objectives that are part of an international consensus on the importance of places of memory, such as the public acknowledgement and visibilisation of victimhood, the derivation of lessons to construct a society in which the repetition of the crimes committed is no longer possible, and the creation of a liminal space that helps the affected population and finally the whole nation work through their trauma and mourn their losses. Of course, this is not a mere coincidence. It was the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), together with the human rights organisation Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (Association Pro Human Rights – APRODEH), that elaborated the first draft for the commission’s reparation plan and organised exchanges with experts from other countries, thereby becoming the CVR’s most important source on the issue of reparations (Guillerot & Magarrell 2006, pp.29–30). Further, many of the commissioners and personnel who worked with the CVR had a strong human rights background and were often familiar with the internationalised transitional justice discourse and the current debate on places of memory, as the former commissioner and anthropologist Carlos Iván Degregori remembers:

“How did the idea arise? Basically, the idea came from the people that already had been working in the topic of human rights, that came from the National Coordinator of Human Rights […]. We asked for advice or talked with people who had been working in Argentina, Guatemala and Chile, above all; also a bit in El Salvador, but mainly Argentina, Chile and Guatemala. Thus, the idea also came from there; and from people

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52 Originally in Spanish: “La CVR recomienda iniciar procesos de recuperación de la memoria histórica y colectiva en las comunidades afectadas por el conflicto armado interno. La finalidad es contribuir a devolver identidad y raíces a quienes sienten que han perdido su propio pasado. […]. La CVR recomienda que la memoria histórica y colectiva recuperada sea presentada a las comunidades afectadas con participación activa de la población, de sus organizaciones y líderes, y bajo la forma que ella misma decida.”
who had studied the issue of memory and the importance of places of memory in Peru, and we all had read that ‘Les Lieux de Mémoire’, by Pierre Nora, so it’s a mix [...] . That’s where it came from. The truth is, at the beginning it was pretty top-down. It’s true! We who know the importance of places of memory are going to construct a monument!” (Interview with Carlos Iván Degregori on July 1, 2008)

Thus, Degregori admits here that the idea for symbolic reparations was rather top-down, derived from international standards and even Pierre Nora’s “Les Lieux de Mémoire”. While this is mostly confirmed by other interviewees who worked with the commission, many also recall requests for the creation of places of memory made in the testimonies gathered by the CVR from the affected population:

“When you look at the victims’ testimonies, in more than one case you can find requests for symbolic reparations. You do not only find material requests: ‘Have them give me back the tractor they blew up!’ or ‘Have them re-construct the health station they destroyed’, no, there are also people who say: ‘I want a monument that commemorates my husband who was a governor or a municipal agent!’ So, that’s one side, and on the other side [...] there was the idea from other countries that there should be symbolic reparations.” (Interview with Javier Torres on June 6, 2008)

This statement by Javier Torres from the NGO Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales (Association for Rural Education Services – SER) and former consultant of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was also confirmed in interviews with José Coronel (Interview on August 1, 2008), the former representative of the CVR in the region of Ayacucho, and Isabel Coral (Interview on June 10, 2008), the former director of the Programa al Repoblamiento (Refugee Return Programme – PAR) during the transitional government. Thus, while a large part of the recommendations for symbolic reparations were formulated in consideration of international standards, there was at the same time a very local demand for memorialisation initiatives by the affected population.

53 Originally in Spanish: “Como surgió la idea? La idea surge en realidad de las personas que ya venían trabajando en el tema de derechos humanos, que venían de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos [...]. Pedimos asesoría o conversar con gente que había trabajado en Argentina, en Guatemala y en Chile sobre todo; también algo en El Salvador, pero sobre todo Argentina, Chile y Guatemala. Entonces también de ahí llegó la idea. Y también de gente que en Perú había estudiado el tema de memoria y la importancia de los lugares de memoria y habíamos leído todo esto de Pierre Norá sobre ‘Les Lieux de Memoire’, entonces es una mezcla [...]. Desde ahí surgió, pero al principio la verdad era muy, algo así como de arriba y abajo. Lo es cierto! Nosotros que sabemos la importancia de los lugares de memoria vamos a construir un monumento!”

54 Originally in Spanish: “Cuando uno revisa los testimonios de los victimas en más de un caso uno encuentra pedidos de reparaciones simbólicas. O sea no sólo encuentra pedidos materiales: ‘Que me devuelvan el tractor que dinamitaron!’ o ‘que reconstruyan la posta que destruyeron’ no!, sino hay también gente que dice ‘Yo quiero que haya un monumento que recuerde a mi esposo que era teniente gobernador o agente municipal!’ Entonces eso por un lado y por otro lado [...] había la idea de otros países de que tenían que haber reparaciones simbólicas.”

55 It would have been of great interest to analyse the testimonies gathered by the CVR regarding the demand of the affected population for memorialisation initiatives. However, considering the time available during my fieldwork, it would have been impossible to look through the nearly 17,000 testimonies.
But the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission did not only recommend the creation of places of memory, it was also the author of several memorialisation initiatives. But above all, the commission considered its work in itself to already be a type of performative memorialisation, as it created a space for the public representation of victimhood:

“Well, for us, for the commission, the fact alone that the victims could give their testimony and for the first time ever talk in public about matters which until that very moment had been kept private because they could not be expressed in public, for us, this was already the first level of symbolic reparation; giving them their public voice, especially, with public hearings.” (Interview with Carlos Iván Degregori on July 1, 2008)

This was further underlined by the fact that the CVR had signed up the theatre group Yuyachkani for its outreach work before, during and after its public hearings. Yuyachkani, which is Quechua and can be translated as “I am remembering”, is a Lima-based theatre group that has been committed to political theatre and social activism since the 1970s. Their members, while mostly from the cultural elite of the country, have learned Quechua and have specialised in intercultural work. For the CVR, Yuyachkani conducted workshops, staged social and street art interventions to create awareness for the commission’s work and to accompany the performance of giving testimony to the CVR. Yuyachkani’s social interventions were considered important to turn ordinary public space into ritual places for reflection and healing, both for the affected population as well as for casual bystanders, thus functioning as a space to mediate between the CVR’s objectives and the local population (A’ness 2004).

Further, the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was publicly presented for the first time in Huamanga, the capital of the region most affected by the internal armed conflict. On the eve of the presentation of the report, members of NGOs and victims’ organisations had laid out flower carpets on Ayacucho’s main square – a tradition rather known from Easter celebrations in the Andes. The next day, the commissioners were seated on a stage in the shape of a retablo de Ayacucho on the city’s main square. Retablos de Ayacucho were originally small portable altars used for the evangelisation of the indigenous population during colonial times, but are now known as a typical example of Ayacuchano craftwork, often depicting Andean festivities or everyday life in the Andes. Finally, a concert by several known huayno artists was held on the main square in the evening after the report’s

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56 Originally in Spanish: “Bueno, para nosotros, para la Comisión el hecho mismo de que las víctimas puedan dar su testimonio y hablar por primera vez en público de cuestiones que hasta ese momento habían sido sobre todo guardadas en el ámbito privado; porque no se podían expresar en el ámbito público, para nosotros era ya eso el primer nivel de la reparación simbólica; de darles voz pública a través sobre todo de las audiencias.”

57 Huayno is a traditional genre of music and dance in the region of Ayacucho.
presentation (Milton 2007a, pp.150–154). Thus, in another performative memorialisation initiative, the CVR had tried to capture the attention of the local Andean population by using their typical cultural representations. This is further underlined by the fact that several artists from Ayacucho, most notably the Jiménez family, had used the retablo genre to artistically represent the civil war (Toledo Brückmann 2003; Ulfe 2011; Golte & Pajuelo 2012). Likewise, local huayno artists, such as Carlos Falconí, had written songs about the Peruvian armed conflict (Vergara Figueroa 2010).

But the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was not only responsible for memory performances during its work. In several cases, very concrete places of memory were created by the commission itself. Even during the work of the commission, the Programa al Repoblamiento, a state entity and part of the Ministry for Women and Social Development (Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social – MIMDES), that also provided part of the commission’s budget, had installed monuments in the capitals of all regions affected by the war. One of these monuments is the Monumento a la Madre (Monument to the Mother), installed on a crossing near the main entrance to the San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University (UNSCH) in the city of Ayacucho. It is a statue of an Andean woman looking towards the sky with a white dove in her hands, symbolising the fight of women and their role as mothers during the war (MC PQNSR n.d.). However, the monument is placed in a rather inhospitable place: on the separating strip of an alley, where it is easily overlooked. Further, the dove in the mother’s hands has long since disappeared.

In the city of Huánuco, the CVR created a mural in memory of its work. A commemorative plaque was placed at the entrance to the auditorium of the National University of Huancavelica to remember the CVR’s public hearing held in this building, and another plaque, situated in the pavement of Huamanga’s main square, was installed during the presentation of the commission’s report and calls for carrying on the CVR’s work in truth and justice(MC PQNSR n.d.).

Still, the CVR’s most prominent and visible legacy has been the photo exhibition Yuyanapaq, which was inaugurated some three months before the presentation of the commission’s report in a 19th-century mansion in Lima’s Chorrillos district. The exhibition’s authors had searched for over a year in public and private archives, amassing 1,700 photographs on the conflict, of which, after conversations with victims and the photographers, they finally chose 300 to be shown to the public. The place chosen to house Yuyanapaq – which means as much as “to remember” in Quechua – was the Riva Agüero mansion once built for one of Lima’s richest families, but which now partly lays in ruins. Placing the exhibition in a semi-decayed 19th-
century building should, according to the exhibition’s creators Mayu Mohanna and Nancy Chapell, establish a powerful analogy between the mansion and Peruvian society after the internal armed conflict. The exhibition was organised in 27 rooms according both to specific cases and general topics examined by the truth commission, thus creating a “sanctuary of truth”. White, semi-transparent strips of cloth hung from the ceiling were to represent “the slow process of healing” that the visitor and, analogous to this the whole Peruvian society, would undergo while passing through the exhibition. At the end of the tour, visitors entered the room of testimonies and from there stepped out onto the building’s veranda overlooking the Pacific Ocean, where they would find peace in the soothing sight of water (Mohanna & Chappell 2006).

When designing *Yuyanapaq*, the CVR clearly had in mind that it’s massive and often academically abstract report needed some kind of visual and emotive support in a concrete place to prepare the public for the truth to come. Thus, *Yuyanapaq* not only presented visible proof of what the commission had written in its report, it also aimed to create empathy with the conflict’s victims – also, but not only by the use of Quechua – and thus evoke an emotional response in support of the CVR’s work from the visiting public. However, with its rather cheap use of metaphors – a building in ruins equalling a wounded nation, white cloth equalling the wounded but healing social fabric and the ocean/water equalling peace and reconciliation (or forgetting?) – the exhibition created a narrative of social trauma, of a nation and a people psychologically wounded in their entirety (Saona 2009, p.211), a very common topic in the global memoryscape which Marita Sturken refers to as “memory kitsch” (Sturken 2007).

Nevertheless, *Yuyanapaq* was remarkably successful, receiving some 200,000 visitors in the 19 months it was open to the public in Chorrillos (Mohanna & Chappell 2006, p.170). In March 2005 the exhibition closed, but it re-opened in July 2006 – just as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had demanded in its recommendations for symbolic reparations (CVR 2003b, p.121) – in Peru’s National Museum in Lima. Since November 2006, the exhibition has been administered by the Centro de Información para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos (Information Centre for Collective Memory and Human Rights), an independent body of the Defensoría del Pueblo, the ombudsman’s office that oversees the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s archive and makes it permanently available to the public. Further, *Yuyanapaq* also has moving exhibitions that have been shown in the regions most affected by the war and have also been displayed internationally (Saona 2009, p.222).
4.2 Peru’s Memoryscape

Memorialisation initiatives in Peru have been manifold. They have taken on very different forms, some performative and ephemeral, others concrete and lasting. Some places of memory have received much attention, even becoming the centre of open conflict over the interpretation of Peru’s violent past, while others have been rapidly forgotten about and have disappeared shortly after their making. In most cases civil-society agents, normally human rights organisations, have been at the forefront of these memorialisation activities, often acting together with victims and – in some cases – regional or local governments. Thus, it seems as if Peruvian civil society had indeed followed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s appeal to take part in the delivery of symbolic reparations. But while the CVR demanded that the state take primary responsibility for reparations, Peru’s national governments have not taken any notable steps towards delivering symbolic reparations, remaining indifferent or even hostile to the subject. In the light of the passivity of the state, human rights organisations, who in most cases had been close to or had actively supported the truth commission, shouldered the responsibility of embarking upon projects of symbolic reparations. Only in some cases were they supported by regional and local governments.

Peruvian human rights organisations indeed embraced the discourse of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission:

“I think that for the cases of the disappeared, places of memory have a very important role because they do not have [a place] where they can physically remember their dead, their family members. [...] I understand the importance to have a place where you can go and visit your family, because I believe he is there, although it is only his mortal remains, but he is there. So the process for those who have disappeared never ends until they find their family members, I think the possibility to have a place to remember is very important, also psychologically for them, [...] as a way to alleviate the pain. Further, it is a collective memory, too. They are not alone.” (Interview with Rosario Narváez, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, on May 6, 2010)

“Normally in our countries we have very fragile memories, not only very fragile democracies, but also very fragile memories. So, places of memory focus, let’s say, on the sense of testifying and remembering this anywhere [...], and there are further functions: the dignification generally. Memorials are born very close to the fight for justice, for reparation, for dignification, for acknowledgment, and they accompany this fight. [...] and in our countries they also have the function of being a place for encounters, a place that accompanies greater struggles, and after that there are other

58 Originally in Spanish: “Yo creo que para los casos de los desaparecidos los sitios de memoria cumplen un rol muy importante porque ellos al no tener donde recordar físicamente, recordar a sus muertos, a sus familiares. [...] entiendo este la importancia de tener un sitio donde puedas ir y visitar a tu familia, porque creo que está allí aunque sea restos, está allí. Entonces el proceso para los desaparecidos que nunca cierra hasta que no encuentren a su familiar, creo que la posibilidad de tener un espacio para recordar es bien importante, hasta psicológicamente para ellos, [...] para una forma de aliviar ese dolor. Además es un recuerdo colectivo también. No están solos.”
functions which refer more to the questioning of the present, which basically, I think, is the great power which all memorials or places of memory have, that they could, starting from the immediate past and the tragedy of this immediate past, question the empty present, and they should have this capacity [...]. But the memorials which conceive to, let’s say, have the task to stay with the past and above all look towards the future, it is these memorials that will have the greatest impact on the life of a society.” (Interview with Rosa Villarán, Movimiento Ciudadano Para Que No Se Repita, on May 5, 2010)

Thus, in the eyes of these two civil-society representatives, Rosario Narváez from the human rights organisation APRODEH and Rosa Villarán from Movimiento Ciudadano Para Que No Se Repita (Citizens’ Movement That It Shall Not Happen Again – MC PQNSR), cited above, places of memory serve first to acknowledge victims and give them a place where they can find catharsis after their traumatic experiences. Second, they also have a wider function directed towards the whole society as places of learning that prevent the repetition of past atrocities in the future. These expectations towards memorialisation initiatives are not only very much in line with the recommendations made by the CVR, but are also commonplace in the globalised conception of memorials and memorial museums.

The other element that made the memorialisation boom in Peru possible was the availability of funding that came mostly from foreign donors, both NGOs and official development assistance. For instance, the German-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund (Fondo de Contravalor Perú Alemania) designed a line of funding for local reparation initiatives in the regions of Ayacucho and Huancavelica from 2005 on in response to the approval of the Plan Integral de Reparaciones (Comprehensive Reparations Plan – PIR) in the Peruvian Congress and the creation of the Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel (Multi-Sectoral High Commission – CMAN). NGOs, victims’ organisations and district municipalities could apply for the funding of projects on the subjects of community mental health, collective memory and the strengthening of institutional capacities, which often included memorialisation initiatives (Apel 2007).

The memorial that up to today has probably received the most attention in Peru, is the Ojo que Llora (Eye That Cries) situated in the Campo de Marte park in the district of Jesús María in

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59 Originally in Spanish: “Normalmente en nuestros países, sí tenemos memorias muy frágiles, no sólo democracias muy frágiles sino también memorias muy frágiles. Entonces los lugares de memoria tiene una digamos foco en el sentido de dar testimonio y recordar eso en cualquier lado, [...] , y ahí en adelante hay otras funciones: la dignificación generalmente. Los memoriales nacen muy, digamos, atareados de la lucha por la justicia, por la reparación, por la dignificación, por el reconocimiento, y las acompañan. [...] entonces también tienen en nuestros países esa función de ser un lugar de encuentro, un lugar que acompañe luchas mayores, y luego hay otras funciones que también están ya más referidas al cuestionamiento del presente que básicamente, yo creo, que es la gran fuerza que tienen todos los memoriales o los espacios de memoria, que podrían a partir del pasado inmediato y la tragedia de ese pasado inmediato interpelar a un presente vacío y que deberían tener esa capacidad [...]. Sin embargo los memoriales que se conciben para poder emprender una tarea que debe quedar con el pasado y que sobre todo mira al presente y al futuro, son esos los memoriales que van a tener mucha mayor incidencia en la vida de la sociedad.”
Lima. The *Ojo que Llora* was a private initiative by the Dutch-Peruvian artist Lika Mutal, who was inspired by the CVR’s report and managed gaining support from former officials of the truth commission, human rights activists and even several companies willing to provide funding. Mutal, very much influenced by Buddhist conceptions of self-reflection and reconciliation, designed a central stone in the form of an eye that spills water. It is surrounded by a labyrinth of 42,000 stones designed after the labyrinth of the cathedral of Chartres. Of the stones placed at the *Ojo que Llora*, 27,000 carry the names of the victims identified in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. According to Mutal, the central stone stands for the Inca earth goddess *Pachamama* who cries over the loss of her children, while the visitor of the memorial is meant to walk through the labyrinth as a pilgrimage in search of forgiveness, cleansing and reconciliation (Hite 2007, pp.119–121). Further, according to Cynthia Milton (2007b, p.157) the twelve circles of the labyrinth also stand for the sky and earth, and the meandering paths represent the Huallaga river that became the grave of many victims of the conflict.

While the design of the memorial is full of cliché-like metaphors such as, once again, the use of water as a symbol for reflection and reconciliation, the representation of a crying mother-goddess standing for the maternal quality of suffering vis-à-vis masculine violence, and the eternal victimisation of Peru’s indigenous population (Hite 2007, p.122), thus making it part of the global memory boom (Drinot 2009, p.18), the memorial has been embraced by the Peruvian human rights community. Victims’ family members gather here during vigils, remembrance ceremonies take place on the Day of the Dead, the Day of Human Rights and at the anniversary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Milton 2011a, p.169).

Still, the *Ojo que Llora* is also the centre of ongoing polemics about the interpretation of Peru’s violent past. It began when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the names of some 40 *Senderista* inmates of the Castro Castro prison who had been killed by security forces during the suppression of a prison riot in the early 1990s should be included in the *Ojo que Llora*. The memorial was re-named ‘the monument to terrorists’ by the right-wing press after journalists found out that some of the names of the *Senderistas* killed at Castro Castro were, indeed, already among the names inscribed on the memorial’s stones, as they had been copied from the list of victims in the CVR’s final report. The right-wing sector of Peruvian society, including the mayor of Jesús María, called for the demolition of the monument, while human rights groups marched to defend the memorial, unveiling the different discourses that exist in Peru about its violent past and about who qualifies as a deserving victim. Further, the *Ojo que Llora* was attacked and severely damaged several
times. Only shortly after the extradition of Alberto Fujimori to Peru, unidentified attackers overpowered the memorial’s watchman, destroyed part of the central stone and the labyrinth with a sledge hammer and spilled orange paint – the colour of Fujimori’s political movement – over the monument (Hite 2007; Drinot 2009; Milton 2011a; Milton 2011b; Hite 2012). In 2008, during the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, held at the Ojo que Llora, Fujimori supporters attacked the ceremony, tramping over the photographs of victims laid out at the memorial and shouting “El Chino nos dio la paz!” – “The Chinese gave us peace!” Thus, while the Ojo que Llora was originally created to honour the victims of the Peruvian tragedy, evoke reflection among visitors, and facilitate reconciliation as well as a shared sense of the past, it has instead become a symbol for the irreconcilability of discourses about the violent past in Peru (Milton 2011a, pp.174–175).

Figure 4: The Ojo que Llora memorial, Jesús María, Lima.

Source: Markus Weissert.

60The author witnessed the attack himself as he was accompanying the commemorative ceremony. “El Chino” – “the Chinese” – is Fujimori’s nickname used by his supporters affectionately! Note also, that Fujimori is of Japanese, not Chinese, descent.
The polemic about the *Ojo que Llora* flared up once again in 2009. Human rights activists had long dreamt of the possibility of uniting the *Ojo que Llora* with the photo exhibition *Yuyanapaq* in a single built structure. After much lobbying by human rights organisations, the German Ministry for Development and Economic Cooperation agreed to donate two million euros to the Peruvian government for the construction of a memorial museum, obviously in total ignorance of the ongoing conflict over the *Ojo que Llora*. Peruvian government officials were quick to reject the German donation, pointing out that Peru needed development assistance instead of museums, while the right-wing press once again attacked human rights organisations and German officials for supporting a ‘monument to terrorism’. Finally, Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa stepped in to defend the idea of a memorial museum, and the Peruvian government finally gave in to the pressure and accepted the donation and subsequent creation of a museum. Vargas Llosa himself was appointed as the head of the commission to decide over design and content of the future *Lugar de la Memoria* (Place of Memory) by President Alan García. Nevertheless, it remained impossible to unite *Yuyanapaq* with the *Ojo que Llora*, as the mayor of Jesús María refused to provide a plot of land for the construction. An alternative construction site was then found in the Miraflores district close to the Pacific Ocean, and until 2010 the design of the future museum building was selected by the commission. The visitors would enter from the seaside, make their way up through the exhibition from the bottom floor and finally step out onto a terrace with a view over the Pacific Ocean on the top floor. Thus, the design not only showed similarities with Berlin’s Jewish Museum in its pathway, but also once again used the combination of water/ocean and memory/reconciliation as one of its main metaphors. But while the construction of the museum building was finished by mid-2013, the inauguration of a permanent exhibition was continuously postponed until 2015. In the meanwhile, it was decided that the photo exhibition *Yuyanapaq* was to remain in Peru’s National Museum at least until 2026, making it even more unclear what the *Lugar de la Memoria* would present to its audience in the end. Further, the museum commission initially failed to integrate the population affected by Peru’s civil war – one of the main targets of its efforts – into its decision-making process. Thus, the creation of the *Lugar de la Memoria* appeared to be a mere elite process that constructed memory for, but not with the affected population, and excluded victims and their family members once again from making any decisions concerning the history of their country and their own representation (Weissert 2012). Only after 2013 were participatory workshops finally held that granted the affected population a say.
While the *Ojo que Llora* and the *Lugar de la Memoria* are definitely the most spectacular of Peru’s places of memory, several other memorialisation initiatives, performative and immobile alike, have received less attention and have often been at the brink of oblivion. In many marginal districts of Lima home to Andean migrants, small parks, crosses and sometimes simple monuments have been created in memory of the civil war and their victims. One of these monuments, the *Monumento a la Verdad* (Monument to the Truth) in the district of Villa María el Triunfo, an uprooted tree on a traffic island inaugurated on the fourth anniversary of the CVR and representing the uprooting of Andean migrants who fled their homes during the internal armed conflict, was destroyed by the district municipality in 2010 (MC PQNSR n.d.).

Figure 5: Final design of the *Lugar de la Memoria*, Barclay & Crousse, Lima.

While memorials in the capital often aim to visualise the truth about the conflict, mark the national territory with the history of the victimisation of Peru’s indigenous population, and thus try to raise awareness among a largely indifferent population about the political violence, NGOs had reached out to the affected population in the Andes from the beginning on. For the fourth anniversary of the publication of the truth commission’s final report, three *chasqui* runners (Inca messengers) travelled through Peru on foot, carrying with them a *quipu* – an Inca recording device made of strings and knots – to which the populations could add knots in
public ceremonies of mourning and remembrance (Hite 2007, p.131). The **Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense** (Peruvian Team of Forensic Anthropology – EPAF), a Peruvian NGO specialised on exhumations, organised the **Chalina de la Esperanza** (Memory Scarf) in 2010 that travelled the country and to which the affected population could add patches with the names and dates of the deceased or disappeared during the war (Hite 2012, p.61), an initiative very much reminiscent of, for example, the AIDS Memorial Quilt in the United States, or the **arpilleras** (patchwork pictures sewn on to burlap) created in Chile in memory of the victims of the Pinochet dictatorship. Further, the **Museo Itinerante Arte por la Memoria** (Moving Museum Art for Memory) has been organising art performances, small exhibitions and workshops on the internal armed conflict in public spaces all across the country since 2010 (Museo Itinerante Arte por la Memoria n.d.). It is often accompanied in its work by the **Brigada Muralista**, a collective of artists that has specialised in painting murals, often referring to the remembrance of Peru’s civil war (Miranda Francia n.d.).

Further, the NGO **Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales** (Association for Rural Education Services – SER) organised several memorialisation contests called “**Rescate por la Memoria**” (“Rescue for Memory”) in Huamanga, the capital of the region of Ayacucho, in which people could send in paintings, poems, songs and comics about the violence of the 1980s and 1990s (Colectivo Yuyarisun 2004; SER 2005a). Other NGOs embarked upon projects of reconstructing the historical memory of communities. One of the products of these projects was often so-called memory books that tell the story of the victimisation of communities. Such memory books were published in the cases of Lucanamarca (Falconí et al. 2007) and Sacsamarca (SER 2005b), both in the Huancasancos province of Ayacucho, as well as Santiago de Paucaray in the Sucre province of Ayacucho (Municipalidad Distrital de Santiago de Paucaray 2007) and the district of Anco in the Churcampa province in the region of Huancavelica (Municipalidad Distrital de Anco & SER 2007). The great majority of the above-mentioned projects were financed by the **Fondo de Contravalor Perú Alemania** (German-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund). Further, the International Center for Transitional Justice published another memory book with testimonies from six Andean and Amazonian communities (ICTJ 2011).

Concerning concrete places of memory, municipalities have re-named streets after victims of the internal armed conflict, such as in the towns of Huanta (Huanta province, Ayacucho) and Huancapi (Víctor Fajardo province, Ayacucho) (MC PQNSR n.d.). Only in a few cases has it been attempted to recover the emblematic places where atrocities have actually taken place. In the stadium of Huanta, once used as base of the Peruvian naval infantry during the 1980s and
a centre for the torture and forced disappearance, four murals were created that remind viewers of the victims, including the disappeared journalist Jaime Ayala Sulca. Several NGOs and victims’ associations also tried to achieve the creation of a memorial park at La Hoyada, an uninhabited terrain next to Ayacucho’s infamous Los Cabitos military base, on which to-date the remains of some 104 people tortured and disappeared by the Peruvian military have been exhumed.

But, apart from murals and the re-naming of streets, small memorial museums or ‘memory houses’, some of them created in remote villages, have been the most remarkable feature of the memory boom that struck Peru after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the department of Ayacucho alone, six small memorial museums were established between 2005 and 2010. The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP (Memory Museum of ANFASEP), created by the victims’ association ANFASEP with expertise and funding provided by the German development cooperation and inaugurated in October 2005, was the first to be established. Next was the Yuyarinawasi (Quechua for “Memory House”) in the town of Huanta promoted by two NGOs, the Peruvian Instituto de Diálogo y Propuestas (Institute for Dialogue and Proposals – IDS) and the Italian ProgettoMondo Movimento Laici America Latina (Latin America Lay Movement – MLAL) with funding from the Fondo Italo-Peruano (Italian-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund). A small replica of this museum was installed in the hamlet of Pampachacra near Huanta with the help of the Brigada Muralista in 2010. Another small memory museum was inaugurated in late 2006 in the village of Huamanquiquia (Víctor Fajardo province, Ayacucho) and was part of a project of the Instituto de Diálogo y Propuesta with funding from Christian Aid. The memory houses in Totos (Cangallo province, Ayacucho) and Putacca (Vinchos district, Huamanga province, Ayacucho), inaugurated in 2007, were both created within the framework of a project by the human rights organisation Paz y Esperanza (Peace and Hope) with funding from the German-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund, while the Muestra Permanente de Memoria Histórica (Permanent Exhibition of

61 Until 2011, the German government’s bilateral development cooperation consisted of three different organisations in charge of implementing projects and programmes: the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the German Development Service (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst – DED) and Capacity Building International (Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung - InWEnt). The Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst – ZFD) was managed as a separate programme out of the DED and was responsible for most activities in the field of peacebuilding and transitional justice. Thus, it was also responsible for cooperating with ANFASEP, but other organisations also had their share. In 2011, GTZ, DED and InWEnt merged into the new Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the ZFD is now managed out of the GIZ, but remains an autonomous entity. In the following, I refer to this bundle of organisations (GTZ, DED, InWEnt, ZFD) as ‘the German development cooperation’, but will specify the exact contribution of each organisation where necessary.

62 For more information on the Yuyarinawasi in Huamanquiquia, see Renzo Aroni (Aroni Sulca 2009; Aroni 2010a).
Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes

Historical Memory) in Santiago de Lucanamarca (Huancasancos province, Ayacucho) was created in the same year by the human rights organisation Comisión de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Commission – COMISEDH), again with funding from the German-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund. All these small museums share several common features, such as the pivotal role of NGOs in their creation, a similar narrative of a local population caught between the lines of the Peruvian Armed Forces and the Shining Path, and the use of victims’ photographs or clothing and local artisanry in their exhibition (Weissert 2014). Further, all of these museal spaces have remained rather marginal, always on the brink of ceasing to exist, as Renzo Aroni (2010a) shows for the memory house in Huananquiquia, whose exhibition disappeared piece by piece over the years and which never received any visits until it was closed by the district municipality in 2010.

More recently, regional governments have also started to invest in memorial museums, filling the gap between national spaces such as Yuyanapaq and the Lugar de la Memoria in Lima and the bottom-up civil-society initiatives at the local level mentioned above. Thus, the department of Huancavelica opened a memory museum on its capital’s main square in 2010 (Aroni 2010b), while the regional government of Junín started to build a memorial museum in its capital Huancayo in 2012 (La República 2012a). Clearly, these recent memorialisation initiatives have been the regional answer to the creation of the Lugar de la Memoria in Lima. But they are no less endangered, as they are subject to highly volatile local politics. Thus, Huancavelica’s memory museum never received any funding after its inauguration and thus remains closed most of the time. The memory museum in Huancayo Yalpana Wasi – Wiñay Yalpana (Quechua for “House of Memory – to Remember Eternally”), inaugurated in 2014, is to-date the most elaborate memory museum in Peru. It is housed in a newly built structure reminiscent in its architecture and exhibition of the newest designs of memorials, especially Santiago de Chile’s Museum for Memory and Human Rights. Unfortunately, its fate is no less in question. Just after the regional and municipal elections in October 2014, the newly elected authorities harshly criticised its existence. According to them, Peru’s population was still not ready for the memory of the conflict, and any display of the conflict was automatically an apology to terrorism. They therefore demanded the exhibition be removed from the building and replaced with the offices of the local district municipality. Further, the newly elected regional government of Junín failed to provide any financing for the museum in its budget. The museum has remained closed since January 2015 (La República 2015).

Indeed, the case of the local memory houses in the region of Ayacucho clearly has the air of well-meaning outsiders imposing the globalised museum form upon the local level to
represent victimhood in universal terms. Interestingly, this somewhat ignores that artists and artisans in Ayacucho had already integrated the topic of the internal armed conflict into their work from the 1980s onwards. The case of the retablos de Ayacucho was already mentioned earlier (Toledo Brückmann 2003; Ulfe 2011; Golte & Pajuelo 2012), such as the use of Ayacuchano folk music to transmit the memories of war (Ritter 2006; Vergara Figueroa 2010). Further, artisans had also introduced the topic of the political violence to hand-woven tapestries, Quinua ceramics, a style of ceramics from the village of Quinua near Ayacucho, white alabaster, known as piedra de Huamanga (Huamanga stone) in Ayacucho, or the tablas de Sarhua, paintings on wood from the village of Sarhua (Víctor Fajardo province, Ayacucho). Still, as Olga González (2011, pp.2–6) reminds us, the integration of these topics into Ayacuchano craftwork would not have been possible without the encouragement of academics and human rights organisations working in the region. Thus, the integration of narratives about the violent Peruvian past in these forms of art represents not the autochthonous expression of the local population, but rather a global human rights narrative in a local form.

### 4.3 The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP

Ayacucho, the capital of the region with the same name, is a pleasant town with a colonial centre and some 33 colonial churches which has grown much over the past years, especially during the 1980s when the rural population of the region fled to the cities, trying to escape the violence. During this time, Ayacucho, which can be translated from Quechua as “Corner of the Dead”, sadly lived up to its own name. Straight from the beginning, human rights organisations and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission focused their work on Ayacucho as the region most affected by the civil war, installing offices in the city of Ayacucho. Thus, it is not surprising that the first memory museum in Peru would be created here. Still, what indeed is surprising is that it was created by and within the rooms of the Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú (National Association of Relatives of the Abducted, Detained and Disappeared of Peru – ANFASEP), one of the country’s oldest victims’ organisations, made up mostly of women.

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63 It is interesting to note that the Shining Path also used Ayacuchano folk music to transmit its ideology (Ritter 2002).
64 For a good overview of memorialisation practices in different genres of art in Peru, see Cynthia Milton’s recently edited book (Milton 2014). For an overview of monuments, memorials and museums created in Peru, see the homepage espaciosdememoria.pe/ (MC PQNSR n.d.) with an interactive map of memory sites in Peru, created of the Movimiento Ciudadano Para Que No Se Repita (Citizens’ Movement That It Shall Not Happen Again – MC PQNSR) in cooperation with the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience.
with an indigenous, Quechua-speaking background. The museum opened its doors in 2005, becoming a benchmark for all the memorialisation processes to follow in the region and beyond. With its forms and narratives of display, as well as the major involvement of the development cooperation in the museum project, it would set the precedent for later memorialisation initiatives.

4.3.1 A Short History of ANFASEP

When the strategy of forced disappearance applied by the state forces was at its peak in 1983, family members would meet again and again during their search for their abducted relatives in police stations, lawyer’s or attorney’s offices, in front of Ayacucho’s notorious *Los Cabitos* military base, or even worse, at the *botaderos de cadaveres* – body dumps, mostly in the steep valleys surrounding the city of Ayacucho where the armed forces would occasionally dump the mutilated bodies of those they had disappeared, tortured and assassinated. Thus, a group of Quechua-speaking women, all looking for their disappeared sons and husbands organised around “Mama” Angélica Mendoza and started to coordinate their searches and presentation of charges at state offices. While the charges presented would never be followed up on due to the pressure and intimidation by the armed forces, this group of women received help and guidance by some fearless lawyers and human rights activists, leading to its official formation on September 2, 1983 as ANFASEP. Furthermore, in 1984 the mayor of Huamanga, Leonor Zamora, who was herself assassinated in 1990 by state forces, granted the women a place where they could gather on a regular basis. Later, ANFASEP would be granted a space for their meetings in the offices of the teacher’s trade union (Tamayo 2003, pp.99–102; Soto Quispe 2007, pp.27–28).

Also in 1984, a delegation of the *Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos* (Latin American Federation of Associations for Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared – FEDEFAM) visited Ayacucho and met with ANFASEP. ANFASEP would later become a member of FEDEFAM and even travel to the FEDEFAM congress in Buenos Aires the same year (Soto Quispe 2007, pp.28–29). Furthermore, the association’s members would receive training in how to deal with authorities (Muñoz 1998, p.453). Another important step in the formation of ANFASEP was the visit of Argentinean Nobel Peace Prize laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel in April 1985, who motivated the *mamas* to stage public marches for their disappeared family members following the example of the *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina (Soto Quispe 2007, p.32). Thus, by the mid-1980s, ANFASEP was integrated into the national and international human rights network, receiving attention
from several national and international bodies such as the UN Working Group on Forced Disappearance, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Tamayo 2003, pp.103–105). ANFASEP also became one of the founding members of the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH) in 1985 (Soto Quispe 2007, p.30).

Indeed, the powerful image of the public marches of Quechua-speaking women in their indigenous dress, most of them illiterate, garnered much attention for the Peruvian human rights movement. On the other hand, ANFASEP was using the increasingly internationalised human rights discourse and imagery, thus becoming able to express and represent themselves in a symbolic language already established in the international solidarity movement and thereby gaining more attention for their situation. ANFASEP’s public marches were clearly reminiscent of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, and their slogans “vivos los llevaron, vivos los queremos” (“they took them alive, we want them alive”) and “verdad, justicia y reparación” (“truth, justice and reparation”) were quite obviously borrowed from experiences with the dictatorships of the Southern Cone and the globalised transitional justice discourse.

Indeed, Hortensia Muñoz criticises that FEDEFAM and other human rights activists induced a schematic form of activism in the members of ANFASEP that had been copied from Argentina and other places, training them “how to be a family member of a disappeared”, which included representing the disappeared and themselves as humble and poor, and without any involvement of their own in the conflict: “Thus the Peruvian organizations learned a methodology for protest. They constructed a common homogeneous discourse marked by the style of FEDEFAM, even when this discourse did not fit with all of the Peruvian reality” (Muñoz 1998, p.453). ANFASEP members learned to represent themselves as caught in the crossfire, and their family members as absolutely innocent. Thus, in the organisation silences surround the subject of disappeared family members possibly having participated in the Shining Path. While officially, all disappeared family members of ANFASEP are innocent – and certainly the great majority are – I myself overheard a conversation in which one ANFASEP member accused another one of hiding that her disappeared husband was not innocent, but had been a Shining Path commander. While this may not be evidence for the presence of Shining Path members among the disappeared family members of the ANFASEP mothers, it at least clearly shows that the notion that only the absolutely innocent are rightful victims leads to conflicts even within the organisation and among the affected population.

As the great majority of the disappeared were men, ANFASEP was made up mainly of women – mothers, sisters, and wives of those abducted. Further, as the state’s counter-insurgency strategy was directed mostly against men, the participation of men in ANFASEP
would have been too dangerous, both for the participating men as well as for the organisation as a whole (Laynes Luján 2006, p.159; Soto Quispe 2007, pp.35–36). The increasing activism of ANFASEP and the continuous difficulty for the women to make a living for their family in the absence of their bread-winning husbands or sons led to the problem of a growing number of unattended children that had to be cared for. With the help of several NGOs and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel himself, ANFASEP created a soup kitchen for their children in 1985. When ANFASEP finally acquired a building of their own in 1991, again with the help of human rights activists, local NGOs and artists gave workshops in craftwork and art, teaching the ANFASEP children music, dance, painting, and local forms of handicraft (Soto Quispe 2007, pp.33–37).

ANFASEP meticulously paid attention to the neutrality of their organisational space amidst the ongoing turmoil and fought back at any attempts made by the Shining Path to infiltrate the association, in order to avoid being targeted by the armed forces. Nevertheless, the members of ANFASEP were routinely defamed and stigmatised as ‘mothers of terrorists’ by the government. This got even worse when Alberto Fujimori himself publicly accused “Mama” Angélica Mendoza, ANFASEP’s leader, of helping Sendero Luminoso. This severely debilitated the organisation during the 1990s when Angélica Mendoza had to go into hiding for several years and many members left the organisation as they did not see any possibility to capture any attention by the state (Muñoz 1998, p.460; Tamayo 2003, pp.106–107; Soto Quispe 2007, pp.37–39).

After the fall of the Fujimori regime, ANFASEP re-gained strength with the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to which many members gave their testimony. The commission even visited ANFASEP’s offices and acknowledged the importance of the organisation for the Peruvian human rights movement in its final report. At the same time, many of the ANFASEP children had become university students and skilled artists – probably the greatest achievement of the mamas – and founded their own organisation, the Juventud ANFASEP (ANFASEP Youth). Apart from volunteering for the work of the CVR, the Juventud ANFASEP members rather saw their role in helping the mothers to achieve their aims of justice and reparation, publicly supporting and strengthening their organisation (Soto Quispe 2007, pp.42–46).

While ANFASEP managed to maintain itself with the help and solidarity of the national and international human rights network, Ana María Tamayo (2003, pp.109–111) notes some clear weaknesses of the organisation. Thus, ANFASEP was led most of the time by “Mama” Angélica Mendoza in an often authoritarian way. The main power circle that directs the fate
of ANFASEP is made up of Quechua-speaking women from rather marginal neighbourhoods in the city of Ayacucho. Although ANFASEP had and still has members from rural areas in the region of Ayacucho, these are often marginalised within the organisation as they cannot attend the meetings regularly. Further, as illiterate Quechua-speaking women far away from the power centre of the country, ANFASEP remained dependent on brokerage mostly by Peruvian human rights organisations with their Spanish-speaking urban middle-class activists in order to be taken into account (Muñoz 1998, p.456). Nevertheless, ANFASEP created a physical space of solidarity, mutual help and consolation for many in the darkest hours of their lives. This led to a shared sense of community and identity among the organisation’s members that helped maintain ANFASEP over time (Tamayo 2003, p.113).

During my fieldwork I experienced ANFASEP as a severely weakened organisation, but not without life. By 2007, the German Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst – ZFD) had installed two short-term development advisers in the organisation in order to strengthen both ANFASEP as well as Juventud ANFASEP. As a result, ANFASEP was democratised: Angélica Mendoza was awarded the honorary presidency of the organisation, while the president and the board would now be elected democratically by all members. Still, help by national and international activists and donors, while not disappearing totally, became more and more scarce, making some ANFASEP members fear they would be forgotten. While most of the members of ANFASEP have received their victim certificate by the Victims’ Registry, only few have received a monetary compensation, and judicial cases involving the fate of their disappeared loved ones proceed at a painstakingly slow pace, if at all. Many members have grown old, have become seriously ill and have even passed away without receiving a reparation or information about the fate of their family members. Juventud ANFASEP is not faring any better. First, a major conflict with the head organisation ANFASEP led to the expulsion of the youth organisation from the offices of ANFASEP in 2008. Indeed, the confident appearance of their children – many of them with university degrees and trained by NGOs and foreign development organisations – and their interference with and emancipation from the aims of their mothers led to an understandable fear that the youngsters would take over the organisation. While this conflict has calmed down over time and one Juventud ANFASEP member has even become part of the board of the mothers’ organisation, 65 many of Juventud ANFASEP have left Ayacucho to work in other regions of the country. Others have used the organisation – as the mamas had feared – as a stepping-stone to pursue a career in the NGO sector or even in politics.

65 According to ANFASEP’s statute, children of ANFASEP members can only become full members of the organisation and assume responsibilities when their mothers have died.
4.3.2 Visiting the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP*

Indeed, what was inaugurated on October 16, 2005 in the city of Ayacucho was not just the small memorial museum of ANFASEP, but an entire memorial complex surrounding the little building where the organisation has its offices. The ANFASEP building is situated only a few blocks outside the colonial centre of Ayacucho, in a quiet residential area, where it clearly stands out from its surroundings: The whole façade of the two-story building consists of a mural that depicts the history of violence in Ayacucho and the creation of ANFASEP. It shows the violence of both the Shining Path and the state forces, with the civilian population caught in the middle. Even a chopped-off foot is clearly visible on the façade of the building. The population fleeing from the countryside as well as the public marches of ANFASEP with Angélica Mendoza at the forefront and the children studying in the soup kitchen are also shown on the mural. One of the sides of the buildings carries a quote by “Mama” Angélica Mendoza in Spanish: “We will never forget until we find justice. It has been 22 years, where are all the disappeared? Are they alive or are they dead? Where are their remains?” Just underneath the gutter of the building, not easy to make out, the photographs of the disappeared family members are integrated into the mural (Laynes Luján 2006, pp.161–162). The small park situated in front of ANFASEP’s building was re-named *Parque de la Memoria* (Memory Park) by the municipality of Ayacucho during the inauguration of the museum. It contains a sculpture made of 600 kg of solid metal in its centre, designed by the local artist Wari Zárate. The sculpture itself has three panels, the first of which represents the past: a blindfolded person screaming, caught in the crossfire between the Shining Path, represented by a hammer and sickle, a large knife and a stick of dynamite, and the armed forces, represented by a machine gun. The second panel represents the present: The skulls and bones stand for exhumations, an open book with a writing hand represents the report of the truth commission and scales represent the justice to be achieved. The last panel represents the future: A broken gun out of which a plant is growing and a dove flying from opening hands stand for peace and reconciliation (Laynes Luján 2006, pp.160–161; Soto Quispe 2007, p.52).

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66 Originally in Spanish: “Nunca olvidarémos hasta encontrar justicia. Durante 22 años ¿dónde están todos los desaparecidos, están vivos o están muertos? ¿Dónde están sus restos?”
Figure 6: Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP, Ayacucho.

Source: Markus Weissert

Figure 7: Sculpture by Wari Zárate in the Parque de la Memoria, Ayacucho.

Source: Markus Weissert.
Figure 8: Mrs. Lidia Flores (left) and Mrs. Angélica Mendoza (right) in the courtyard of the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP.

Source: Markus Weissert.

Figure 9: Replica of a mass grave, Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP.

Source: Markus Weissert.
Figure 10: Clothing of victims, *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP*.

Source: Markus Weissert.

Figure 11: Photos and histories of victims, *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP*.

Source: Markus Weissert.
The ground level of the ANFASEP building, which opens directly to the street and once held the “Adolfo Pérez Esquivel” soup kitchen, is now normally rented out to small restaurants to generate at least some income for the association. Thus, the visitor enters through a side door into a small courtyard, the ‘sanctuary of memory’. It contains a rural kitchen fuelled with firewood, occasionally ignited during ANFASEP’s anniversaries and celebrations. One side of the courtyard contains an altar with several spaces for flowers and candles that can be used by the association’s members for joint or personal commemorations. This space also holds a wooden cross with the inscription “No Matarás” (“Thou shalt not kill”) (Laynes Luján 2006, p.163). This cross was first used during a public march of ANFASEP during the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ayacucho in 1986. Unfortunately, the mothers were blocked by security when trying to reach the city’s airport where the Pope was holding mass (Soto Quispe 2007, p.30). But the wooden cross is still used by ANFASEP during its public memory performances. Across from the altar, metal panels carrying the names of the disappeared are attached to the building’s wall facing the courtyard (Laynes Luján 2006, p.163).

A steep staircase leads to the building’s first floor that contains an assembly room where the members of the organisations gather every 15th and 30th of each month. Three separate offices, each with files on administrative matters and information on judicial cases involving ANFASEP members, are also on this level. Another steep staircase leads the visitor into the second floor that finally contains the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP. It only consists of one large room and a corridor. Entering the museum, the visitor first encounters a section with panels displaying texts and photos taken from the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the exhibition Yuyanapaq in Lima that describe the conflict and the human rights violations committed. This section also contains a replica of a mass grave and a torture cell. The next section within the same room exhibits personal objects of those disappeared, donated to the museum by the members of ANFASEP. A panel is assigned to each object with a photograph of the disappeared or murdered person, a short description of the person’s life and the circumstances of their death or disappearance, as well as why the object was important and kept by their family members (Laynes Luján 2006, pp.162–163). An especially stunning object displayed in one of the showcases is an orange t-shirt. According to the accompanying panel, one of the ANFASEP members, Lidia Flores, found the remains of her husband in one of the military’s body dumps, and although her husband’s body had been severely mutilated by wild dogs and pigs, she could identify him because of the orange t-shirt he had been wearing. This part of the exhibition is also accompanied by several works of art, mostly in the style of local artisanry. A Quinua ceramic figure of an armed soldier kicking a
humble peasant, a *retablo de Ayacucho* displaying the conflict, the creation of ANFASEP and the visit of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and another work by Wari Zárate, an allegory of the two evils – the armed forces and the Shining Path – facing each other (and catching the civilian population in the middle) stand out.

After leaving the room, the visitor enters into a corridor with a huge photograph of ANFASEP’s founder, “Mama” Angélica Mendoza. In a small showcase under the photograph, the visitor finds the last note of Angélica Mendoza’s son Arquímedes, smuggled out of the military base, in which he tells his mother that he is alright, but needs money and a lawyer. At the time of writing, only a copy of this note was exhibited in the museum as the original actually serves as evidence in the judicial proceedings of the “Cabitos 83” case concerning the use of Ayacucho’s military bases *Los Cabitos* as a clandestine centre for torture and forced disappearance (Rosel 2012). Thus, it is the only case known to the author of an object exhibited in a museum that was also used as evidence in a legal proceeding in a transitional justice context. Indeed, the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP* is then not only a mere storehouse for objects that represent the truth about the past, but has actively contributed to the process of justice – although with an open outcome – by preserving and displaying evidence in a judicial sense.

The exhibition of the small museum ends in the corridor. The left side of the corridor is covered with a timeline listing ANFASEP’s achievements, while photographs of the association’s members hang on the right side of the corridor. Many photographs have a black ribbon attached to them, reminding the visitor that many victims of the war have passed away without attaining justice or receiving a reparation. In a small shop opposite to the museum’s entrance on the second floor, the women sell handmade knitwear and embroideries – for many the only way to make a living.

The museum receives visitors during ANFASEP’s opening hours, which are weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. During weekends, both the association’s offices and the museum remain closed. Entrance to the museum costs two Peruvian Sol (approximately €0,50) and a trained member of ANFASEP or *Juventud ANFASEP* offers visitors a guided tour through the museum space, often adding personal experiences and details to the exhibition and able to answer visitors’ questions. In 2008, at least two guides, one from ANFASEP and one from *Juventud ANFASEP* would normally accompany visitors through the exhibition. But even then, visitors could not always be tended to, as the guides were busy making a living or studying at the university. This situation was even worse by 2010 and 2011. Guided tours through the museum were rather an exception.
During my last visit to the museum in May 2014, no guides were at ANFASEP and there was also no one to whom I could have given the two Sol entrance fee.

The *Museo de la Memoria* also has a guestbook in which many visitors have left their impressions and wishes, many of them bearing witness of the deeply moving effect of the exhibition. Still, what becomes obvious when looking through the guestbook is that a great part of the visitors are foreigners. Joseph Feldman (2012, p.499) counts five to ten visitors to the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP* a day, 60-70% of whom are foreigners. The rest of those visiting the museum are mostly domestic tourists, while only very few *Ayacuchanos* come to the museum (Milton & Ulfe 2011, pp.226–227; Feldman 2012, p.499).

A small survey conducted between June and August 2008 assessing 74 visitors to the museum confirmed these findings: 59% of the visitors were foreigners and only 39% were Peruvians. With just 16%, visitors from Ayacucho itself were a small minority. Even more revealing was the reason for visiting Ayacucho the visitors from out of town mentioned. More than a third were tourists, but 17% had come to Ayacucho to explicitly visit human rights and development projects. Another 17% had come to the city to study at a summer school from the University of Boston. Finally, 8% of the persons questioned were in Ayacucho to do volunteer work and a further 3% had even come to do research themselves.

Figure 12: Origin of visitors to the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP*.

Source: Own survey, June – August 2008.
This shows that, while some visitors indeed had had no previous knowledge about the conflict and had come to the museum rather unprepared, nearly half of the visitors belonged to a group that we might call ‘memory tourists’ – persons with previous knowledge about the conflict and/or a background in human rights activism, as well as studies or research interests in this field. Feldman (2012, p.503) equally concludes that it is rather uncommon for Ayacuchanos outside of the human rights circle to visit the museum. Foreigners without human rights connections in Peru normally find out about the museum from the local tourist office or from their guidebooks – a source of information ‘normal’ Ayacuchanos do not access.

This visitor profile – well-educated foreigners, often with a human rights background versus very little visitors from Ayacucho itself – also has serious implications for the meaning of the museum. Thus, the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP is a rather self-referential place that strengthens the association’s connection to, but also dependence on, the international human rights movement and well-meaning foreigners. While this may boost solidarity with and support for ANFASEP by people with influence, the idea of places of memory as spaces of learning towards a culture of ‘never again’ comes short, as Peruvians remain a minority among visitors. Still, Milton and Ulfe (2011, p.227) argue that, according to the museum’s guestbook, most visitors, foreigners and Peruvians alike, do get the message of ‘never again’. Further, in recent years ANFASEP has been able to establish a stable relationship at least with

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**Figure 13: Reason listed for visiting Ayacucho (of visitors of the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP).**

- **Tourism:** 36%
- **Studies:** 17%
- **Visiting development or human rights projects:** 17%
- **Research:** 3%
- **Volunteer work:** 8%
- **Other:** 3%
- **Family visit:** 2%

Source: Own survey, June – August 2008.
some engaged teachers and university lecturers in the city who take their students to the museum regularly.

4.3.3 Creating the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP*

Several years after the inauguration of the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP* it becomes more and more difficult to re-construct how the museum exactly came into being. Different perceptions exist on who had which idea and if the ANFASEP members were the original authors, or if the museum was an initiative imposed from the outside (Milton & Ulfе 2011, p.219). Still, it is clear that the museum was borne from the memory boom surrounding the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the testimonial book *“¿Hasta cuándo tu silencio?”* (“How long will your silence last?”), promoted by the German development cooperation and edited by Heeder Soto Quispe, once a member of *Juventud ANFASEP*, the process of creating the *Museo de la Memoria* is described as having originated with the creation of a ‘memory mural’ by *Juventud ANFASEP*, several NGOs and art students on one of the façades of ANFASEP’s office. In 2002, for the international Day of Human Rights, *Juventud ANFASEP* activists designed and built a nearly two-metre high *retablo de Ayacucho* presenting the time before, during and after the civil war. ANFASEP members participated with photos of their disappeared relatives that were integrated into the *retablo*. This *retablo* can now be found next to the entrance door of ANFASEP’s assembly room on the first floor of the building. While these initiatives introduced new forms of memorialisation to ANFASEP, the idea for the museum slowly came into being as the association’s members wanted to find a place to keep and exhibit their old banner with their slogan *“vivos los llevaron, vivos los queremos”* and the little wooden cross with the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” written on it (Soto Quispe 2007, pp.48–49). As one of the members of ANFASEP recalls:

“Yes, during the [presentation of the] final report of the truth commission [in Ayacucho] we organised a vigil, held a vigil on the Plaza de Armas. During that time I was part of the directing board of ANFASEP. Then we talked which of them [we should use], we had older banners and we also had new ones. So one of the women said ‘We shouldn’t carry the other white banner anymore because it’s old’. But Mrs. Angélica [Mendoza] said: ‘But this old one is the one we began with. We can take that one. How can we leave the old one? It will be the final report of the truth commission, so the old one has to be there!’ That’s what she said. So I said: ‘For our banners and for our cross that we always carry with us, there should be something where we can store them, we could even store it in a museum’ I said. Well, but there was no place, but from that moment onwards we thought about keeping our old things in a place where no one could touch them. From then on I thank Mr. Dr. [ANFASEP’s legal adviser]. They began to think, where, how? So at first, we thought about making a sort of hotel in the
Still, in Heeder Soto’s account of the creation of the museum, it was not directly the ANFASEP members who came up with the idea for a museum. The initial idea was to place the old banner and cross in a showcase in the assembly hall, and when the mothers proposed this to a delegation of German development experts in order to obtain financing for the showcase, the Germans transformed the idea into a whole memory museum. While ANFASEP members would always make the important decisions on what to display in the museum exhibition, they were always assisted by German and Peruvian advisers (Soto Quispe 2007, pp.50–51).

Indeed, many ANFASEP members I interviewed mentioned the decisive influence of advisers in the creation of the museum, or even attribute the idea of the museum entirely to them:

“About this memory museum, we ourselves had the idea, us in the directory board. So, we made the decision to create the museum because we have among our possessions their clothing, their histories, what they had been studying, what they had been writing in their note books and also their work, their clothing and so on. So, to put it there, from the others, from the fields, there is also different clothing to put there in the museum and also different testimonies there. We did this with the guidance of doctor [ANFASEP’s legal adviser], our adviser. So, we coordinated with him, and we did it, and we were helped by the DED [German Development Service], Mr. [German peace adviser]. He was more agile and he committed us, he oriented us, like that, like that. ‘This is how you will do this’ he said. So we coordinated with them when we did this.”

(Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 56 years old, on June 13, 2008)
“Here, Dr. [ANFASEP’s legal adviser] had the idea to do it. He had the idea to make it because we wanted to set up a hotel because here we can set up a little hotel to have an entrance fee. This was the idea we had, but then the executive board kept meeting. We always worked with [German peace adviser], the German, on this. So we talked with him, that’s how we finished, we did it, why cannot we make a museum because all the photos of the disappeared, of those that claim, it could be that way, like that, that’s how we talked. It was with conversations like that we got here, that’s how we did the museum.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 56 years old, on June 20, 2008)

“Well, the idea for the museum that now exists is the initiative of doctor [ANFASEP’s legal adviser], who is the adviser of the association. To him we owe this initiative to have a museum in memory of the memory of the disappeared, assassinated, tortured.” (Interview with a male member of ANFASEP, 70 years old, June 23, 2008)

In these statements, ANFASEP members emphasise the importance of two advisers as well as of the German Development Service (DED) for the creation of the Museo de la Memoria. A German peace adviser for the DED’s Civil Peace Service who worked at the Programa al Repoblamento (PAR) in Ayacucho established contact with the association during the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Funds from DED’s Civil Peace Service also paid a legal adviser for ANFASEP – a lawyer from Ayacucho referred to by ANFASEP members as ‘doctor’ in the interviews (Interview with former German peace adviser on May 4, 2012). Thus, by the time the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was underway, ANFASEP had established a strong relationship especially with the German Development Service. ANFASEP’s former legal adviser, who accompanied the association actively during this time, then describes the origin for the idea for the museum as follows:

“They presented the final report of the truth commission on August 28 and 29, 2003. The truth commission had organised a demonstration, a vigil on the Plaza de Armas for the presentation of the report. So, for the presentation of the report they [ANFASEP] made their banners and the executive board of ANFASEP had a new banner and began to take the new banner with them and left behind an old banner which they called ‘The Fighter’, a banner which had accompanied them during their whole history, which was patched together from various used bags and which you can now see in the museum. So, then we started to discuss how it would be possible for them to express themselves, how they can put aside a banner that had fought alongside with them. This should be in a special place, with due respect, but you cannot let go of it. Take your new banner, but also take the old banner. It should be in a special place, together with the cross. We thought of a corner, where the blackboards are. We should set up a showcase to display

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69 Originally in Spanish: “Aquí tenía la idea el doctor […], tenía idea de hacer porque nosotros queríamos hacer un hotel, porque aquí podemos hacer un hotelcito para que haya entrada. Entonces esa idea teníamos, pero en ahí siempre reuníamos así junta directiva. En eso estábamos trabajando con […] de alemán. Entonces con él hemos conversado así. Entonces así estabamos terminando, estamos haciendo, ¿Por qué no podemos hacer un museo?, porque todas las fotos de los desaparecidos de los que están reclamando puede a haber así, así así estábamos conversando. Conversando de ahí hemos llegado hasta aquí, así hacemos el museo.”

70 Originally in Spanish: “Bueno, la idea del museo que ahora existe, es la iniciativa del Doctor […], que es asesor de la asociación. A él se le debe esta iniciativa de tener un museo, de la en recuerdo de memoria de los desaparecidos, asesinados, torturados.”
the banner and the cross. That's how the idea was born! And little by little: 'Why can’t we display photographs and other things?' So, that’s how the idea was born: to keep the things of memory; and the ideas for the museum started to grow. So these were the initial ideas and the mamas said: 'Ah, damn! That would be good! We can’t put aside our banner, or cross, that have always accompanied us in the fight.' That’s how I suggested it to them in fact, and the people started to understand and marched with their old banner ‘The Fighter’ at the front and later with the new one. From then on, we had the idea to keep [the things] in a special place, we had wanted to put them in a showcase, not necessarily in a museum.” (Interview with ANFASEP’s former legal adviser on August 18, 2008)71

Here, the adviser rather confirms the account of the ANFASEP member cited above. The idea for the museum evolved out of the need to keep and store the association’s old banner, an idea the legal adviser, according to himself, had great stakes in. Further, with financial help from the German embassy, ANFASEP had just built the second floor of their building in which they wanted to create overnight accommodations for ANFASEP members who came to the monthly assemblies from outside Ayacucho and had no place to sleep – hence, the ‘hotel’ many ANFASEP members talked about in their interviews. In changing the conception of the second floor from a place for accommodating ANFASEP members to a memory museum, the influence of outsiders was once again crucial:

“In any case, then I said: ‘I think it is not very reasonable to build an overnight accommodation that will be used only twice a month for one night, and then there will have to be people to keep everything clean and maybe even have to do the washing. Why don’t you just buy twenty mattresses, put them somewhere in a corner and when someone comes and wants to stay overnight, they can sleep there.’ And that’s where the first idea for the museum appeared, when I said: ‘Wow, you have so many things, from twenty years of fighting for truth and justice. With your cross you have gone on so many marches. You have this banner, made from flour bags’ where ANFASEP was written on, which they wanted to throw away at some point because they had gotten a new one. ‘Keep that! That’s history! This has accompanied you for years!’ And then, in conversations with Mama Angélica [Mendoza] and [ANFASEP’s legal adviser], this idea somewhat came up, why we shouldn’t create a place of memory, where the objects...”

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71 Originally in Spanish: “Presentaron el Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad el 28, 29 de agosto del año 2003. La Comisión de la Verdad se ha organizado una movilización, una vigilia en la plaza de armas para la presentación del Informe. Entonces para la presentación del Informe hicieron sus banderolas y la junta directiva de ANFASEP entonces tenía una banderola nueva y empezaron a llevar la banderola nueva y descartaron una banderola viejita que llamaron ‘La Guerrera’, una banderola que les había acompañado durante toda su historia, que era digamos cosido de varios costalillos usados, la que ves en el museo. Entonces ahí empezamos a discutir cómo es posible que se expresen, dejen de lado una bandera que ha luchado junto con ustedes. Esto debería estar en un lugar especial, guardado con mucho valor así que no pueden dejar esto. Lleven su banderola nueva pero también [...] la banderola viejita. Esto debería estar en un lugar especial juntamente con la cruz. Bueno [...] guardar en un lugar especial y pensamos en un rincón donde están los pizarros mayormente deberíamos armar una vitrina donde colocar la banderola y la cruz. Y así nació la idea! Y poco a poco: ‘¿Por qué ahí no podemos dejar la fotografías y otras cosas más?’ Entonces y desde ahí nació la idea de guardar las cosas de recuerdo y empezaron a crecer las ideas del museo. Entonces, éstas han sido las ideas iniciales y las mamás; ‘¡Ah, caramba! ¡Sería bien! No podemos dejar al lado nuestra banderita, nuestra cruz que siempre nos ha acompañado en la lucha!’ Así yo se lo propuse eso y en realidad y la gente empezó a entender y marcharon con su bandera ‘La Guerrera’ a la cabeza y luego con la banderola nueva. Desde ahí teníamos la idea de guardar en un lugar especial, en una vitrina queríamos poner, no precisamente museo!”
of memory of ANFASEP’s twenty-year fight for truth and justice could be kept, so that these things are not lost. [...] So, that’s where the idea first came up to create some kind of memory room, where you can exhibit something. I think, the word ‘museum’ hadn’t been mentioned yet, but then after a while, the word ‘museum’ also came up.” (Interview with former German peace adviser, on May 4, 2012)\textsuperscript{72}

Indeed, it becomes evident that the museum was not at all an idea the members of ANFASEP had all by themselves, but one that slowly developed throughout the conversations the mothers had with each other under the influence of their advisers. This process, however, was still not easy, as the idea of a museum was met with resistance by some of the members. Here, the advisers also used pressure to persuade the mamás to agree to the museum plans when financing for the project had been acquired from the German embassy:

“I do not recall if we first did a study or if we first had a conversation with the executive board of ANFASEP, where some women were sceptical, others were against it, others maybe were in favour and others said: ‘Can’t the money from the embassy just be paid out directly to us?’ [...] Then I said: ‘This cannot be paid out! That is already absolutely certain! So if you want it, then you can only apply for it for some sort of construction work. You can put up a place to accommodate your members or you can create a museum, a museum, where you can exhibit all the things you did.’ Mama Angélica was very much in favour. She really jumped at it, [ANFASEP’s legal adviser] too, and among the mamás there were only a few who really warmed up to the idea. But one also has to say, that none of them had ever visited a museum before in their whole life.” (Interview with former German peace adviser on May 4, 2012)\textsuperscript{73}

“Well, the mamás didn’t really have these expectations, we had these expectations, those who were accompanying [them], especially me and [German peace adviser]. The authors of the museum were actually me and [German peace adviser], and later others. The mamás didn’t understand it at first, but they accompanied [the process] positively

\textsuperscript{72} Originally in German: “Auf jeden Fall hatte ich dann gesagt: Ich finde das wenig sinnvoll, eine Übernachtungsstätte zu bauen, die alle 14 Tage mal für ‘ne Nacht benutzt wird, und dann gibt es Leute, die das ganze sauber halten müssen und vielleicht Wäsche noch waschen. Warum kauft ihr euch nicht einfach 20 Matratzen, legt die irgendwo in eine Ecke und wenn jemand da ist, und will übernachten, dann kann er da übernachten. Und da ist dann die erste Idee von dem Museum gefallen, wo ich sagte: ‘Mensch, ihr habt so viele Sachen, seit 20 Jahren am Kämpfen um Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit, mit eurem Kreuz habt ihr so viele Marchas gemacht. Ihr habt dies Banderole, aus Mehlsäcken zusammen genähte Banderole’, wo ANFASEP draufstand, das sie dann auch irgendwann mal wegschmeißen wollten, weil sie dann ein neues bekommen haben. ‘Hebt das auf! Das ist doch Geschichte!’ Das hat euch doch auch hier über Jahre begleitet! Und da, im gemeinsamen Gespräch mit Mama Angélica und mit […], ist dann so die Idee entstanden, warum nicht so einen Ort zu schaffen der Erinnerung auch, also wo so die Erinnerungstücke drinnen sind von dem was ANFASEP die 20 Jahre eben für Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit gekämpft hat, dass diese Sachen nicht verloren gehen. […] So, und da entstand dann erstmal so die Idee, irgendso ein Erinnerungsraum zu machen, wo man irgendwelche Sachen ausstellt. Ich glaub, das Wort Museum gab’s da erstmal noch gar nicht und dann kam irgendwann auch dieses Wort Museum auch auf.”

and they managed to understand. At first there was resistance to bring their things, secondly they didn’t understand that this would be a space of vindication, of identification and then we had a lot of work to persuade them, lots of work to convince them to bring their things. Little by little they brought their things. The extreme part was, for example, that Mama Angélica didn’t want her little paper to be exhibited in original and it was an enormous job for us to convince her to exhibit it in the place where it is now. So, it has been very difficult from the beginning, but the mamas understood and said: ‘This is ours! Let’s keep going!’ And as you can see, they appropriated [the place], make it known, comment on it and defend it.” (Interview with ANFASEP’s former legal adviser, on August 18, 2008)

Thus, as the two advisers admit, the idea for creating a place of memory in the form of a museum at ANFASEP came from outside the organisation and was met by several problems, such as the financial needs of the association’s members, who instead wanted the project money paid out to them directly, the fact that none of them had ever visited a museum before and thus initially could not envision what had been proposed to them. Finally, their reluctance to donate their private memory objects to a place in which they would be visible to the public posed another problem. This is also reflected in the statements by ANFASEP members:

“We nearly didn’t participate in this. Some mothers said no, that it was no use to us because we wouldn’t eat it nor would we wear it and we wouldn’t benefit from it, but others said that it is a good thing with the museum. ‘We will make our family members that have disappeared known, the visitors that come will know what has happened in Huamanga!’ I want to especially thank the German cooperation, the development workers from Germany for helping us with this museum, to improve this place. I think it is the only country that has helped us a lot.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 50 years old, on June 31, 2008)

“Well, in reality, how should I say this, the construction of the museum, I think we didn’t have the leadership in this. This idea, we hadn’t thought of creating a museum, but our legal adviser who was also integrated with us in our understanding and had our trust, at some point, while talking personally with him, he suggested it to me and he had also suggested it to others and with them we started developing the idea, and well, and somehow it worked out, let’s say, not that well, it’s more or less an idea with a tendency...”

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74 Originally in Spanish: “Ahora, las mamás tenían ésta expectativa no en realidad, esta expectativa lo teníamos nosotros quienes acompañábamos, especialmente yo y [...] Prácticamente los artífices del museo fuimos yo y [...] y otros posteriormente. Las mamás no lo entendieron a un primer momento, pero si acompañaron positivamente, lograron entender. En un primer momento, había resistencia para atraer las cosas, segundo lugar, no entendieron bien que ésto sería un espacio de reivindicación, de identificación y luego, bueno, teníamos mucho trabajo de persuasión, mucho trabajo de convencimiento para que traigan sus cosas. Poco a poco han ido trayendo. El extremo por ejemplo que la señora Angélita no quería exhibir su papelito en original y nos ha costado un trabajo enorme para convencer que lo exhibe ahí en un lugar como es. Entonces ha sido bastante difícil en un primer momento pero luego lo entendieron las mamás y dijeron: ‘¡Esto es nuestro! ¡Vamos avanzando!’ Y como ves, ahora se han apropiado, difunden, comentan, lo defienden.”

75 Originally in Spanish: “En eso casi no hemos participado. Algunas mamás decían que no, a nosotros no nos importa porque eso no vamos a comer ni vestir, no nos vamos a beneficiar, pero otras decían que está bien con el museo: ‘Vamos a difundir a nuestros familiares que han desaparecido. Los visitantes que van a venir van a saber que ha pasado en Huamanga!’ Más bien agradezco a la cooperación alemana, a los cooperantes de Alemania que ellos nos han apoyado para este museo, para arreglar este local. Creo que es el único país que nos ha dado bastante apoyo.”
To overcome initial resistance to the museum project, the two advisers had to sensitise the mothers. The first step was to visit all the museums in the city of Ayacucho with the ANFASEP members to give them an idea of how a museum space was organised, and which objects were displayed how. Later, in a workshop with ANFASEP’s members, the organisation’s timeline – later placed in the museum’s corridor – was constructed to visualise the association’s achievements (Interview with former German peace adviser on May 4, 2012).

Further, the artist Wari Zárate, who had a long-standing relationship with ANFASEP and had already supported the organisation in the past, and a historian from the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH) in Ayacucho, were both contracted by the German Development Service to conduct a first feasibility study for the museum. This study was to contain all major design attributes of the museum, such as the subdivision of the museum into one part explaining the civil war, and one part for the memory objects such as clothing and the timeline in the corridor. A local architect, who also was consulted for the design of the memorial museum, would further introduce the idea of the memory sanctuary in the building’s courtyard. Finally, the historian would have the idea to suggest the re-naming of the Parque Maravillas in front of the ANFASEP building to Parque de la Memoria, in coordination with the municipality of Ayacucho (Interview with former German peace adviser on May 4, 2012). Thus, all the important design elements of the museum and the features surrounding it were introduced by consultants and advisers.

Still, the German adviser stresses that all museum elements were intensely discussed with the ANFASEP members and that it was the mamás who had made the final decision on what to put where:

“And then it slowly took shape and it is important to say that the processes that took place there all passed through the executive committee. Well, maybe not all of them took part, but some of the active ones from the executive committee. Some of the youth were also there, but in the end, it was the mamás who made the decisions. Nothing was done that they hadn’t decided upon themselves.” (Interview with former German peace adviser on May 4, 2012)
Thus, all ideas that the advisers had introduced were discussed in assemblies, giving the ANFASEP members the chance to add details or develop new ideas. For example, Wari Zárate’s first sketch for the paintings on the building’s façade was rejected by the mothers as too abstract. As a consequence, more figurative depictions of the violence of the 1980s and 1990s were integrated into the painting. The next sketch handed over to the ANFASEP members was criticised for not containing the history of the association’s soup kitchen (Interview with former German peace adviser on May 4, 2012).

The case of the photographs and clothing of the disappeared or murdered family members deserves some special attention. While the idea of exhibiting these memory objects, especially clothes, came from ANFASEP’s advisers and constitutes a rather globalised feature of places of memory, this bears a certain similarity to the Andean tradition of laying out the clothes of a deceased individual at their home after their burial for five to eight days after which the clothes are washed or burned (Muñoz 1998, p.466). During the night vigil before the presentation of the truth commission’s report in Ayacucho, this ritual was symbolically performed by ANFASEP members on the city’s main square (Milton 2007a, p.17). Still, this did not mean that the ANFASEP members would be easily persuaded to exhibit the clothing of their loved ones in the museum:

“In the beginning they considered the photographs, the writings, the objects and the things they kept of their loved ones to be something private, something only for them, and which was not to be shared and not to be taken to ANFASEP, and even less to the museum. […] Leaving it in the museum practically meant abandoning our family member.” (Interview with ANFASEP’s former legal adviser, on August 18, 2008)

ANFASEP members finally agreed to hand over the memory objects to the museum after long discussions with their advisers. In the end, the museum received more objects from ANFASEP members than could be exhibited in the museum space. Thus, an agreement was reached that the exhibition would change from time to time so that all ANFASEP members would have the possibility to have their memory objects shown in the exhibition (Interview with former German peace adviser on May 4, 2012). Unfortunately, this was never done and the exhibition has remained the same since the inauguration of the museum.

The frequent meetings of ANFASEP members with their advisers to determine the exact design of the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP slowly led to the appropriation of the
process and its product – the museum – by the association’s members. Thus, the participation had an empowering effect on the mothers, who felt that the creation of the museum was their own effort:

“Those who came from other countries helped, but it was the idea of all of us, so that our children and grandchildren could see the photos of the disappeared and our photos, too; so that they would know that their grandfather or their father had disappeared, and ours, so that they knew that we had been here!” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 60 years old, on June 30, 2008)\textsuperscript{79}

On the other hand, not all the ANFASEP members could participate in the decision-making process for the museum. Only a small circle, consisting of the association’s executive committee and some members from the city of Ayacucho took part actively, while especially members from out of town were largely excluded. Here, the museum-making process rather reinforced the existing power structures within the association:

“We only obeyed when they led us [to do something]. I thought it would be okay.” (Interview with a male ANFASEP member, 77 years old, on July 15, 2008)\textsuperscript{80}

At the same time, it was especially the members of Juventud ANFASEP who supported the process and also donated works of art for the exhibition. Apart from the German Development Service (Deutscher Entwicklungsdiensit – DED) and the German Embassy, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and the Peruvian Ministry for Women and Social Development (Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social – MIMDES) also contributed financially to the €25,000 museum project (Ketels 2005).

The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP was finally inaugurated on October 15, 2005 in attendance of the German ambassador to Peru, the former truth commissioner Sofía Macher and the president of the region of Ayacucho. To guarantee wide attention for the museum inauguration, the German development cooperation and the Peruvian Ministry for Women and Social Development held an international expert conference on “Historical Memory and Peace Culture” at the same time in Ayacucho (Goedeking 2005). Thus, the inauguration ceremony that was also covered by the national press became an important event of national and international public acknowledgement for the members of ANFASEP. In an odd coincidence, Alan García himself, who was in town at the time, heard about the inauguration and asked ANFASEP for a meeting, which took place three days later (Ketels 2005). While this meeting would not lead to any substantial outcomes such as an apology on the part of the

\textsuperscript{79} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Los que venían de otros países ayudaron, pero la idea fue de todos nosotros, para que nuestros hijos y nietos vean las fotos de los desaparecidos y nuestras fotos también; para que sepan que su abuelo o su papá ha desaparecido y de nosotros para que sepan que nosotras hemos estado aquí.”

\textsuperscript{80} Originally in Spanish: “Sólo cuando nos mandaba, obedecíamos nosotros. Yo pensaba que iba estar bien.”
former (and shortly afterwards new) president, it still showed the enormous attention the museum inauguration created for ANFASEP in particular and for war victims in general.

4.3.4 Making Sense of the Museum

While the advisers finally convinced the mothers to create the museum, the members of ANFASEP went through their very own process of appropriating the museum space and thereby making sense of the museum for themselves and their organisation. They had their own expectations for the process and created their own meanings that did not necessarily coincide with those envisaged by the organisation’s advisers.

For the representatives of the German development cooperation, especially the Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst – ZFD) in charge of the project, the museum was to visualise past atrocities and trigger a debate about the past in the society of Ayacucho:

“It is our interest to guarantee the lasting visibility of the topic in Ayacucho, and with it, promote an impact towards a productive debate with the past, successfully working through that what happened to reach, big word, reconciliation. I don’t really like this concept in relation to ZFD’s work because it is a very distant aim, [...] but it should be an element in the process.” (Interview with Director of the Civil Peace Service in Peru, on June 30, 2008)81

Further, by depicting especially the atrocities committed by the armed forces, the museum would also question the discourse of the military as liberators and serve as a place for education. For ANFASEP’s former legal adviser, the museum is first and foremost a place for the public acknowledgement and vindication of those who suffered:

“We have to declare our solidarity; people have to understand the claims and demands of these mothers, of these people who have suffered, because this pain really did occur. In this sense, I think that the existence of a museum, or better yet, of a sanctuary, is vindication, is acknowledgement, is making evident this history that happened and that little by little is becoming invisible.” (Interview with ANFASEP’s former legal adviser on August 18, 2008)82

Here, he emphasises the importance of the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP as a space that exhibits the truth about the conflict and that generates knowledge, educates the population

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81 Originally in German: “Unser Interesse ist, dass eine dauerhafte Sichtbarkeit des Themas in Ayacucho gewährleistet ist und das damit eine Wirkung in Richtung produktiver Beschäftigung mit der Vergangenheit, erfolgreicher Bearbeitung dessen, was passiert ist, mit gefördert werden kann in Richtung, großes Wort, Versöhnung. Den Begriff mag ich im Zusammenhang mit unserer ZFD-Arbeit nicht so sehr, weil das doch ein sehr fernes Ziel ist, […] ein Element auf dem Prozess dorthin sollte es sein.”

82 Originally in Spanish: “Hay que solidarizarnos, hay que entender el reclamo y la demanda de éstas madres, de ésta gente que sufrió; porque éstos dolores realmente ocurrieron. En este sentido, yo pienso que la existencia de un museo, de un santuario más bien, es reivindicación, es dignificación, es más bien hacer patente de la historia que pasó, que poco a poco se está invisibilizando.”
towards the non-repetition of the events while also serving to create income for ANFASEP with tourism:

“Well, I had quite high expectations in the sense that the museum would be first of all a place where you provide the evidence, the denunciation of the events of the violation of human rights that have happened here, secondly, that this place would serve as a space for education, of proliferation and of pedagogy for the non-repetition of what has happened, and thirdly, we thought that this should be a place of investigation, of knowledge, of studies, of sociologists, of historians of the violence that happened here. Fourthly, we thought that this should be a tourist attraction, principally for people who are interested in getting to know what happened in Ayacucho and that it could also make ANFASEP known, generate own income.” (Interview with ANFASEP’s former legal adviser, on August 18, 2008)\textsuperscript{83}

The expectations for the museum held by those who had introduced the idea to the association oscillate between truth, acknowledgement and education for non-repetition, all of which are rather typical transitional justice aims applied globally in places of memory. Indeed, this coincides to a large degree with what ANFASEP members attributed to the museum in interviews and group discussions.

Figure 14: Number of personal interviews and group discussions with members of ANFASEP in which participants mentioned one of the following concepts.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{axis}[
    xbar, 
    y axis line style = { opacity = 0 },
    axis x line = none, 
    axis y line = none, 
    xmin = 0, 
    xmax = 15, 
    symbolic y coords = {truth, acknowledgment, empowerment, outside help/income, solidarity, visit by foreigners, non-repetition, healing, trauma/grief, tourism}, 
    ytick = data, 
    yticklabels = {truth,acknowledgment,empowerment,outside help/income,solidarity,visit by foreigners,non-repetition,healing,trauma/grief,tourism},
]
\addplot coordinates {
    (15,true) 
    (14,acknowledgment) 
    (12,empowerment) 
    (10,outside help/income) 
    (8,solidarity) 
    (7,visit by foreigners) 
    (6,non-repetition) 
    (4,healing) 
    (3,trauma/grief) 
    (2,tourism) 
};
\end{axis}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Source: Own survey, 2008-2011.

\textsuperscript{83} Originally in Spanish: “Bueno, yo tenía bastante expectativa en sentido de que el museo fuera en primer lugar el primer lugar donde se haga la muestra, la denuncia de los hechos de la violación de los derechos humanos que han pasado aquí, segundo lugar, que este lugar sirva como un espacio de educación, de difusión y de pedagogía para que no se vuelva a repitir lo que ha pasado, y en tercer lugar pensamos de este, debe ser un lugar de investigación de conocimientos de estudiosos, de sociólogos, de historiadores de la violencia que pasó aquí. En cuarto lugar pensábamos de que esto debería ser un destino turístico, principalmente de gente que está interesada conocer lo que pasó en Ayacucho y que pueda generar también alguna difusión importante de ANFASEP, generar ingresos propios.”
Truth, acknowledgement and empowerment as well as the museum as a site of commemoration rank especially high among the organisation’s members. But also non-repetition, solidarity, the visits from foreigners and the generation of income or receiving help from others through the museum are important. For ANFASEP, the museum is most of all a space that exhibits evidence, and thus depicts the truth, therefore leading to a public acknowledgement of what has happened and of the suffering of the family members:

“This is a museum where the clothing is, where what has happened is true. It is not a lie, and to me it is the truth of the family members who have suffered and, yes, it becomes known!” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 50 years old, on June 31, 2008)  

“We have set up this museum because it was very important to make known to all, local, national and international about the violations of human rights here in Peru, before with the governments of Belaúnde Terry and Alan García, who is the current president, it was a barbarity, an internal war, an internal conflict. The innocent people, we have been kidnapped, disappeared, detained, beaten. So, in the museum it was necessary to make evident that during the life of the republic, that in Peru, although it was a democratic government, but they declared war on the innocent people. It shows the real events, that actually happened during two centuries [decades]. This is why we continue this memory museum of ANFASEP.” (Interview with male member of ANFASEP, 58 years old, on June 20, 2008)

While the museum exhibition represents the truth of ANFASEP’s members regarding the conflict, the visitors to the museum contribute to the acknowledgement – a debt the Peruvian government still owes society:

“The government has never recognised the Peruvians who died in the conflict. Here, we have something like memory in the museum. So national and international visitors can find out.” (Group discussion with ANFASEP members on April 20, 2011)

“This museum has to last until the end, until we die. The others will stay with the museum and will carry on the history of our family members so that the authorities know, the authorities. Let’s hope the president comes. The president, too, can find out how it is going, how we family members are doing.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 56 years old, on June 23, 2008)
Thus, while Peruvian and foreign tourists who visit the museum can contribute to the acknowledgement of the atrocities committed against the members of the association, true acknowledgement is demanded from the state agents who, in the case of ANFASEP, bear the main responsibility for the crimes committed. The museum is thus also seen as a way to make this demand visible to the public. Interestingly, most ANFASEP members interviewed especially emphasise the importance of foreigners visiting the museum:

“I think it is so that the foreigners get to know what has happened to us. Well, they say that in the museum they tell what has happened to us, that’s what they say.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 76 years old, on June 30, 2008)

“I hoped that there would be something like a memory in this museum so that all the foreigners from other countries could see, so that they see our photos of our family members. We also hoped that the authorities would come to see how they have been because they were the ones that made them disappear.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 56 years old, on June 23, 2008)

When asked why the presence of foreigners was so important to ANFASEP, a female member of the association told me:

“Because the foreigners, we always trust them and they too, they also trust us, the foreigners, because they come and see our situation, how we are.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 56 years old, on June 23, 2008)

Insisting on whether visits from foreigners were more important than those from Peruvians, the same ANFASEP member told me:

“This could be because they also create propaganda, they talk, they mention it. It could be. Yes, until now, the others, for example the DED [German Development Service] has never abandoned us. They always communicate with us, they come, they console us, they recommend us to do some activities. That’s how we have been working with the DED and also with the Red Cross.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 56 years old, on June 23, 2008)

Thus, it is very clear to ANFASEP members that the presence of foreigners in the museum and in the association strengthens the ties of solidarity that have developed over time. Further, especially foreign visitors serve as multipliers that can spread the word, can make financial

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88 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Piens que es para que las personas que vienen del exterior sepan lo que nos ha pasado. Bueno, dicen que en el museo cuentan lo que nos ha pasado, eso dicen.”

89 Originally in Spanish: “Yo esperaba que haga pues como un recuerdo en ese museo para que vean todos los extranjeros de otro país que ven, que ven todo nuestro sus fotos de nuestros familiares, también de los autoridades esperábamos para que vengan a verlo, cómo han estado, por qué se lo han hecho desaparecer, eso.”

90 Originally in Spanish: “Porque a los extranjeros, siempre confiamos con ellos y nosotros también. También ellos tienen confianza con nosotros, con los extranjeros porque vienen a ver nuestra situación cómo estamos.”

91 Originally in Spanish: “Puede ser porque ellos también se hacen propaganda, hablan, mencionan, puede ser, si hasta ahora los demás por ejemplo DED no nos dejan, siempre nos está comunicando, vienen, nos consuelan, nos sugiere alguna cosa para hacer algo, actividades. Así hemos trabajado con DED y también de Cruz Roja.”
resources available for the association and can have a positive influence on ANFASEP’s aims of truth, justice and reparations:

“I said, maybe they will see the museum as a memory, maybe the people that come from other places can help us, I said.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 68 years old, on July 15, 2008)\footnote{In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Yo decía quizá viendo como un recuerdo el museo, los que vengan de otros lugares nos puedan apoyar decía.”}

“With their knowledge they can help us with the laws and that way we can sue the current government and they could take part in helping us to demand as Alan [García] took part in the events of disappearance and death in his previous government.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 58 years old, on July 15, 2008)\footnote{Originally in Spanish: “Con ese conocimiento ellos nos puedan apoyar en cuanto a las leyes y de esa manera se pueda acusar al gobierno actual y que sean parte en ayudarnos a exigir, ya que Alan fue participe de los hechos de desaparición y muerte en su anterior gobierno.”}

But ANFASEP members also envision the \textit{Museo de la Memoria} as a place that educates future generations about the atrocities committed in Ayacucho and thereby contributes to the non-repetition of these events. While foreigners are seen as the most important target group that can secure the survival of the association with their resources, the local population, especially school children, are seen as crucial for the aim of non-repetition:

“It is like a memory, that the clothes are here that we have left and that the students and professionals on the local and national level that visit the museum learn [about them].” (Interview with a male member of ANFASEP, 58 years old, on June 20, 2008)\footnote{Originally in Spanish: “Es como un recuerdo que aquí estan las ropas que hemos dejado y que se enteren los estudiantes o profesionales a nivel local como nacional que visitan el museo.”}

“The museum has been implemented so that never again this political violence can repeat itself. Those who come after us, the 15 or 16 year-olds don’t know why, how this political violence happened, so the youth can reflect. When they see it, they can reflect on these atrocities.” (Group discussion with ANFASEP members on April 20, 2011)\footnote{Originally in Spanish: “El museo se ha implementado para que nunca más se repita esta violencia política. Los que han venido, jóvenes de 15 ó 16 años, no saben por qué, cómo ha pasado esta violencia política, para que puedan reflexionar los jóvenes, cuando ven reflexionan de éstas atrocidades.”}

But memorial museums always have the dual function of reaching out to the public to foster a debate about the past, while at the same time providing a space for the commemoration of those who have been directly affected by the atrocities. Indeed the \textit{sanctuario de la memoria} (sanctuary of memory) in the courtyard of the building provides the \textit{Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP} with a space made especially for this purpose. Several members of ANFASEP mentioned that the sanctuary was used especially during the anniversary of ANFASEP when they would gather there, light candles, pray and sing in memory of their loved ones. But not only the courtyard serves as a place of commemoration for the members of ANFASEP, the
exhibition in the second floor with the photos and personal objects of the disappeared is also a commemorative space, at least to some:

“We thought that the photos of our sons and our photos could be hung up there, and that they’d serve as a memory. We have even put their clothing there, so that we could look at them and contemplate and remember.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 58 years old, on July 15, 2008)

“Well, it has this meaning because to me, it seems as if all the disappeared were here, all our family members are here, where we have cried and so on, because even I sometimes get tired and say I’ll stop, but I can’t stop because I think he is here, he is present in this place, because I, how can I say this, it is what I want, because I love this place, this organisation.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 43 years old, on June 17, 2008)

Especially this last testimony shows that, apart from housing the Museo de la Memoria, ANFASEP’s building is in itself an important place of memory. It is here that the mamas meet twice a month, talk about their cases, plan their next steps in their fight for truth, justice and reparation and thereby create a strong bond between them that encloses the memory of their deceased or disappeared loved ones – a community of memory:

“Yes, sometimes I come and I pray for them and I see the names of my two brothers and I say ‘I hope that I can find my brothers’ because it is not easy to forget. If they were buried in the cemetery I would be fine with bringing them flowers or holding a mass. I would be calm, but since I can’t find anything and I don’t know anything about them I am worried. I can’t stop. Sometimes I say ‘I won’t go to the meetings anymore’, but I can’t. I always have to attend the meetings. If not, I feel bad.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 50 years old, on July 31, 2008)

Thus, for the members of ANFASEP, the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP and their association’s building as a whole is a place for commemorating their loved ones. It is a place that displays the(ir) truth and acknowledges the atrocities committed, thus sensitising the population and contributing to a collective notion of ‘never again’. As the space unites the transitional justice concepts of the disclosure of truth, public acknowledgement and guarantees of non-recurrence in a single place it should, at least in theory, have a healing

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96 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Nosotros hemos pensado para que las fotos de nuestros hijos y las fotos nuestras puedan estar ahí pegada y que sirvan de recuerdo. Incluso hemos colocado sus ropas para que viendo eso podamos pensar, y recordar.”

97 Originally in Spanish: “Bueno, este significado tiene porque para mi, parece que están acá todos los desaparecidos, todos nuestros familiares donde que hemos llorado acá y todo eso porque hasta yo a veces me canso y digo voy a dejar. Pero no puedo dejarlo, no puedo porque yo pienso que él está acá, él está, está presente acá en este local porque eso yo, como te digo, yo, es lo que quiero, porque quiero este local esta organización.”

98 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “¿Sí!, a veces vengo y rezo por ellos y veo el nombre de mis dos hermanos y digo ‘Ojalá que encuentre a mis hermanos’, porque no es fácil olvidar. Si estuvieran enterrado en el cementerio tal vez me conformaría llevando su flor o haciendo su misa. Yo estaría tranquila, pero al no encontrar nada y no saber nada de ellos, yo me preocupo, no puedo dejarlo. A veces digo ‘Ya no voy a ir a las reuniones’, pero no puedo, siempre tengo que asistir a las reuniones, sino me siento mal.”
effect on ANFASEP’s members. Indeed, many interviewees mentioned that with the museum they felt at peace and had gained greater strength to go on in their fight:

“Yes somewhat, because seeing what we have, soothes the pain we have in our hearts a bit.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 58 years old, on July 15, 2008)  

“They didn’t even bother to talk about how my husb and had disappeared’, I said. But now that we have this museum, even tourists come. And they ask ‘Why? Yes, we knew that there was terrorism, but we didn’t know how the government had responded. They didn’t tell us.’ So, I’m more at peace, more confident, or let’s say I have more strength to go on.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 43 years old, on June 17, 2008)

Thus, especially the acknowledgement of their truth and the possibility to tell this in a specific space, thus influencing people’s point of view about the conflict, has a positive, empowering and even soothing effect on some members of ANFASEP. But this is not a general effect. Other ANFASEP members mentioned that they avoided the museum, as they would sometimes hear steps or strange noises in the museum although nobody was there. Here, the museum functions rather as a space for the uncanny. Others stated that seeing the photos and clothes of their and others’ loved ones would upset them:

“I cry, and also some of the old friends from ANFASEP have died and when I see their photos I cry. I am sad, and so that I don’t cry anymore I won’t go upstairs.” (Interview with a female member of ANFASEP, 55 years old, on July 30, 2008)

Indeed, to many ANFASEP members the museum is not a place of commemoration at all. In a traditional and mostly catholic environment, having a proper burial for a family member is of paramount importance. Without a grave to visit, many ANFASEP members told me that on important commemorative anniversaries dates they preferred celebrating mass or lighting a candle next to the photograph of their disappeared loved ones at home instead of going to ANFASEP. Others also recalled their repeated journeys to the botaderos de cadaveres, the sites where the military would occasionally dump bodies of disappeared persons, and their need to assist the exhumations in the hopes that they would finally find the remains of their loved ones and be able to bury them. Thus, it is not surprising that many ANFASEP members have embraced the idea of creating another memorial at the La Hoyada site, a small valley near Ayacucho’s airport and the Los Cabitos military base where between 2005 and 2010 the

99 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “¡Si! algo, porque viendo esto que tenemos, un poco calma nuestro dolor en nuestro corazón.”

100 Originally in Spanish: “De mi esposo nisiquiera ya hablaron como ha desaparecido’, yo decía. Pero ahora que tenemos este museo hasta vienen los turistas. Ellos pues preguntan, no, y dicen ‘¿Por qué? Sí, nosotros sabíamos que había terrorismo, pero no sabíamos como ha respondido el gobierro. No nos dicen!’ Entonces, sí, más calmada, más este, más aliento, o sea más este fuerza tengo para poder caminar más adelante.”

101 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Lloro, incluso algunas amiguitas antiguas del ANFASEP ya fallecieron y viendo sus fotos lloro. Tengo pena y por no llorar ya no subo.”
remains of some 107 victims of the military were exhumed. In the eyes of many mamas, this emblematic site of memory where human rights violations have actually taken place and where they see a certain chance that their loved ones have been buried, suits the commemorative purpose more than their museum.

But there are also openly critical voices among the members of ANFASEP. One of the crucial points is the museum exhibition itself, especially the display of the memory objects. Although it was planned that the objects exhibited would rotate so that all members had the chance to have the clothing of their loved ones displayed, the exhibition has never changed since the inauguration of the museum. Thus, what is presented at the museum is the truth of just some ANFASEP members, while others remain excluded from representing their stories:

“But in this museum, not everybody’s clothing, photos or other things are there. For example, in my case, I don’t have any clothing or photos, nothing. We didn’t bring it. As the space is small, it couldn’t be exhibited and they gave me back his photo and other clothes. So, we are there imaginary. We always remember our family members, but I don’t exactly have clothing [exhibited in the museum].” (Group discussion with ANFASEP members on April 20, 2011)

Indeed, the museum exhibition reflects the power relations within the association:

“The negative part about the museum is that it proves the power that some members can maintain in the organisation […]. Apart from that, not all the representations of memory are present. It is only half of it, the most important ones such as the ripped apart t-shirt or a scarf they used to wear, and also the persons that influenced other persons so that their memory would be represented.” (Group discussion with members of Juventud ANFASEP on May 14, 2011)

It was a rather small group surrounding the executive committee of ANFASEP that was closest to the process of making the museum and that could thus influence which memory objects would be placed in the museum. Further, as the human rights organisations and other NGOs have less funding available for supporting a victims’ association like ANFASEP, the association’s members have become aware of their dependency on outside help:

“The NGOs with the projects, they had us participate in workshops. Because they had advisers, he arranged some things here and there. That’s how we made our museum.

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102 ANFASEP and several other human rights and victims’ organisations have been fighting for years to create a memorial at La Hoyada. While they have gained support from the regional government and several other state institutions, the site has become subject to real-estate speculations in the rapidly growing city of Ayacucho, a fact that has prevented any progress in the matter.

103 Originally in Spanish: “Pero en este museo no están de todos sus prendas, fotos, otras cosas, por ejemplo en mi caso no tengo ni prenda, ni foto, nada, no hemos traído. Como es pequeño el espacio no se ha podido exhibir y me lo devuelvo como su foto y otras prendas. Entonces nosotras estamos imaginariamente, siempre nos recordamos de nuestros familiares, exactamente no tengo ninguna prenda.”

104 Originally in Spanish: “La parte negativa en el museo, es que evidencia el poder que algunos socios pueden mantener en la organización […]. Además, no todas las representaciones de la memoria están presentes. Solo están la mitad, las más importantes como el polo destrozado y una chalina que trajeron, y también las personas que influenciaron algunas personas para que su memoria sea presentada.”
When we asked for a special project, he came for that, for what lacked at ANFASEP, and according to that they approved for paying for the light, for the workers, for everything.” (Group discussion with the executive committee of ANFASEP on April 13, 2011)\textsuperscript{105}

“Do you know why it got worse? There is no help for the NGOs like there used to be, and for us there is already no help from the NGOs. Before, we had help from APRODEH, the Red Cross and with that we helped [ourselves]. That’s why we started having problems. We aren’t getting help anymore.” (Group discussion with the executive committee of ANFASEP on April 13, 2011)\textsuperscript{106}

While the museum, with its entrance fee and the little museum shop, was meant to create a source of income for the association, rather the opposite has occurred. The maintenance of the museum exhibition, the wall paintings on the building’s façade and the sanctuary of memory depend on occasional contributions from sympathetic organisations or individuals. Thus, the museum is also a financial burden for ANFASEP, one the organisation feels it is being left alone with:

“We are thinking […] about what to do in our case. For example, the museum maintained itself, the entrance fee covered the costs, but as the entrance fee dropped, we couldn’t pay the expenses.” (Group discussion with the executive committee of ANFASEP on April 13, 2011)\textsuperscript{107}

“But to abandon it without a budget, without painting, without a watchman or a permanent guide, that’s pretty fucked up, that is!” (Interview with a former member of Juventud ANFASEP on June 10, 2010)\textsuperscript{108}

Further, some ANFASEP members also mentioned their worries about the perception of their association. As most ANFASEP members had been affected by the violence of the state forces rather than by that of the PCP-SL, the museum has a slight inclination for displaying the crimes committed by the military. However, this runs the risk of being perceived as supporters of the Shining Path. Indeed, several interviewees stated that they had overheard conversations in which people referred to ANFASEP as the ‘house of terrorists’ because of the literary depiction of violence on the building’s façade. This stokes their fear of being isolated and stigmatised even further in their society of Ayacucho.

\textsuperscript{105} Originally in Spanish: “Las ONGs con los proyectos nos hace participar en talleres. Como tenían asesor gestionaba por aquí, por allí. Así hicimos nuestro museo. Cuando pedíamos un proyecto especial venía para eso, para lo que falta en ANFASEP y de acuerdo a eso aprobaban para pagar luz, para los trabajadores, para todo.”

\textsuperscript{106} Originally in Spanish: “¿Sabes por qué bajó? Ya no entra ayuda como antes a las ONGs, igual a nosotros ya no nos entra ayuda de los ONGs. Antes teníamos ayuda de APRODEH, Cruz Roja y con eso nosotros ayudábamos. Por eso llegamos a tener dificultades, ya no recibimos ayuda.”

\textsuperscript{107} Originally in Spanish: “Nosotros estamos pensando, cómo en nuestra caso ¿Qué hacer?, por ejemplo se mantenía sólo el museo, las entradas cubrían los gastos, pero como bajó su entrada no podemos solventar los gastos.”

\textsuperscript{108} Originally in Spanish: “Pero abandonar sin tener un presupuesto, sin pintado sin guachiman, un guía constante, es bien jodido, eso!”
In the case of the members of Juventud ANFASEP it is important to note that they see the museum as a space made for their mothers, not for them. As students or young professionals that grew up speaking both Quechua and Spanish and have thus moved up socially, they see their role mostly in morally and professionally supporting their mothers’ organisation. This goes hand-in-hand with a patronising stance towards the older Quechua-speaking ANFASEP members. More and more, ANFASEP youth are assuming the role of brokers that translate their mothers’ demands into a – in their eyes – more understandable language of memorialisation and human rights activism. However, this also includes the danger of further isolating the older ANFASEP members, pushing them into the role of passive victims that cannot express themselves according to international standards.

4.3.5 Summary

The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP was the first memorial museum to be created in Peru and has therefore been the model for many of the memorialisation initiatives that followed. It uses forms of display rather typical for a globalised memory culture, such as the display of clothing and other memory objects of those victimised, as well as their names and photographs to acknowledge victimhood, represent truth, create a commemorative space for victims and to serve the purpose of non-repetition. It thereby unites the typical characteristics of a memorial museum (Pieper 2006; Williams 2007).

As a space belonging to an association of Quechua-speaking older women, the museum creates a proximity to those affected by human rights violation unknown in other memorial spaces. Still, it is clear that the museum only came into being thanks to the ideas and massive support of the German development cooperation. The members of ANFASEP appropriated the museum space over time and use it for the purpose of commemoration and acknowledgement of their truth of the conflict – an aim very much in line with the expectations of ANFASEP’s foreign and domestic advisers. But the museum is also used by the association’s members to consciously strengthen ties with the human rights movements and with foreigners who can support ANFASEP morally and financially. At the same time, the museum has reinforced the association’s dependency on contributions and help from NGOs, international development agencies and human rights activists.

The museum’s visitors are mostly foreign tourists who may serve as multipliers to support the organisation’s causes. However, this does not advance the museum’s aim of being a place to educate the local and national population about the past in order to avoid the repetition of the crimes committed. This would indeed need more Peruvian visitors and an outreach strategy.
Despite these problems, the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP* – along with the exhibition *Yuyanapaq* and the memorial *Ojo que Llora* in Lima – is probably the most important and elaborate memory site to-date.

### 4.4 Memorialisation Initiatives in Santiago de Lucanamarca

It is a nine-hour journey to Santiago de Lucanamarca. The minibus takes its passengers from Ayacucho over the Toccto pass down into the steep valley of the Pampas river. Passing the provincial capitals of Cangallo and Huancapi, it makes its way up over another mountain plateau to descend into the basin of the Carapo river, just to make its way up once again to Huancasancos, the capital of the province with the same name. From here, someone might take you with them in their car to Lucanamarca, which is still another hour away. Santiago de Lucanamarca – or simply Lucanamarca – is the tiny capital of a district with seven communities and 122 hamlets with a total of 2,675 inhabitants, and lies picturesquely on a hilltop overlooking a steep valley at 3,489m. It feels a bit like the end of the world, as the area is only scarcely populated and a vast *puna* separates Lucanamarca from the more populated coastal region of Ica in the south. The rugged terrain of the district only allows for subsistence agriculture, but the *puna* grasslands to the south enable extensive sheep and cattle breeding. Although the village has a health post and even a secondary school, work opportunities are scarce and a great part of the population migrates to the coast permanently or seasonally. During the rainy season from December to March, Lucanamarca appears to be a ghost town as many villagers seek work in the export-oriented irrigation agriculture in the coastal region of Ica, while those who remain behind look after the cattle in the remote highland cattle farms (Falconí 2007a, pp.13–15).

But despite of this remoteness and marginality, Lucanamarca has become one of the most important emblematic sites of memory in Peru: On April 3, 1983, members of the Shining Path killed 69 peasants, women and children in the village. This massacre, committed against the same population it claimed to fight for, exemplified for many the ruthlessness and cruelty of the PCP-SL. However, as we will see, the ‘truth’ is much more complicated. Lucanamarca gained prominence during the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and received the complete spectrum of transitional justice mechanisms: It was selected as one of the emblematic cases to be studied in detail by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the victims of the massacre were exhumed and re-buried, it received a

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109 Between 2011 and 2015, the roads connecting Huancasancos to Ayacucho and to Ica were paved, which considerably reduces the time to get to Lucanamarca.
presidential visit and pardon, the investigation in Lucanamarca was used in the trial against Abimael Guzmán and other Shining Path members, collective and individual reparations were handed over by the state, a documentary was filmed, and finally, Lucanamarca was the subject of an NGO memorialisation initiative.

4.4.1 A History of Violence

A voyage to Huancasancos and Lucanamarca is also a trip into what was once one of the focal points of the Shining Path insurgency, a ‘liberated zone’ over which the guerrillas had total control in the early 1980s. Lucanamarca’s society has been historically marked by social inequality, a result of the dominant economical occupation of extensive livestock breeding. The whole province of Huancasancos was known for its high-quality ranching of sheep that connected it to the markets in the coastal region of Ica and supported a small elite of wealthy ranchers who possessed great terrains and numbers of livestock, making them able to monopolise political posts in the province and send their children to university in Ayacucho. This small elite was faced by a much greater number of subsistence farmers who would occasionally be able to earn some extra income by working as underpaid shepherds for the land owners (CVR 2003c, pp.48–49). Lucanamarca became an independent district in 1965 and was able to register as a peasant community during the agrarian reform in 1969, thus weakening the influence of the landowners in their own village. While the former elite still remained in political power positions, it lost its ability to establish consensus among the district population, resulting in an increasing alienation between the population and their economic and political elites (Ulfe 2013, p.27).

The Shining Path began its recruitment work in the area by the late 1970s via the teachers working at Huancasancos’ Los Andes secondary school. Ironically, it was especially the sons of the local elites they were most able to convince – those who had better access to higher education and were well aware of the inequality, the lack of opportunities and the absence of the state in their area. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Shining Path would organise secret ‘popular schools’ in the communities of the region, including Lucanamarca, but the guerrilla did not appear publicly until 1982. In 1982, the police station of Huancasancos was closed, leaving no further state presence in the area. The Shining Path now appeared publicly and armed in big groups in the communities, replacing authorities with youngsters from the villages they had instructed in secret, capitalising on the pre-existing dissatisfaction with the inequality of the living conditions among the population. Thus, when the PCP-SL made its first public appearance in Lucanamarca in September 1982 and
appointed several of the village youth as new authorities, they rapidly gained the support of a
great part of the community’s population (CVR 2003c, pp.51–52; Falconí et al. 2007, pp.74–
89; Ulfe 2013, pp.33–34).
The PCP-SL imposed a strict new order in Lucanamarca, the negative implications of which
the population would soon begin to fear. Between September 1982 and January 1983, the
Shining Path assassinated at least nine people considered thieves, drunkards, cattle rustlers or
abusive landlords. Further, Lucanamarca, like many other communities, had a long history of
conflicts over land and livestock with neighbouring villages that were now re-ignited. The
Shining Path installed a policy of re-distribution of wealth, giving away Lucanamarca’s sheep
and cattle to the poorer communities down the Carapo river basin, much to the anger of
Lucanamarca’s population. Another point of contention was the popular trial and subsequent
public execution of three members of the wealthy Huancahuari family in January 1983, who
had been accused of being abusive landlords (CVR 2003a, p.56; Falconí et al. 2007, p.92).
In February and March 1983, the populations in the neighbouring districts of Sacsamarca and
Huancasancos rebelled against the rule of the PCP-SL, killing the Shining Path leaders of
their communities. This also swung the balance in Lucanamarca. In secret meetings, the old
authorities of Lucanamarca made the decision to turn against the guerrilla, many of whose
members were part of their own community or even family members, and to establish contact
with the state forces. In coordination with the old village authorities, police forces carried out
a surprise attack on a Shining Path meeting in Lucanamarca on February 24, 1983, killing the
PCP-SL commander of the area and some 16 other guerrilla members, many of whom were
only teenage recruits from the secondary school. This marked the end of the Shining Path’s
dominance in Lucanamarca. The authorities of Lucanamarca would now coordinate with the
neighbouring communities to hunt down and kill any PCP-SL elements within their own
population who had gone into hiding in remote areas. This culminated in the lynching of
Olegario Curitomay, a young man from Lucanamarca sympathetic to the guerrilla’s cause
who had been appointed an authority in the village by the PCP-SL. He was dragged to the
village’s main square, brutally beaten, set on fire and finally shot by his fellow community
members (CVR 2003d, pp.37–38; Falconí et al. 2007).
The lynching of Olegario Curitomay as well as the death of the area’s Shining Path
commander “Nelson” during the attack on February 24 triggered a reaction by the PCP-SL’s
central committee, who sent a punitive expedition to show that it did not tolerate any
rebellious elements among the population. Thus, on April 3, 1983 a group of about sixty to
eighty\textsuperscript{110} Senderistas, probably led by Hildebrando Pérez Huarancca and Víctor Quispe Palomino\textsuperscript{111} made its way to Lucanamarca, killing any person it met on its way. By the end of the day, 69 Lucanamarquinos, among them many children, lay bludgeoned to death at several sites in the highlands of Lucanamarca, as well as in the village’s streets and the main square next to the church. According to several statements, a little boy finally ended the massacre by telling the Shining Path members that he had seen the Armed Forces arriving, which made the guerrilla abandon Lucanamarca in a hurry (CVR 2003d, pp.38–40; Falconí et al. 2007, pp.110–115).

On the day after the massacre, the population of Lucanamarca accused the parents of Olegario Curitomay of having informed the PCP-SL about the violent death of their son at the hands of his own neighbours. After a communal assembly, they were executed and their possessions, land and cattle were distributed among the population (Ulfe 2013, pp.70–71). Finally, on April 5, the political-military commander of Ayacucho, General Clemente Noel visited Lucanamarca accompanied by journalists, and thus made the massacre a public matter (Falconí et al. 2007, p.123). Wounded survivors were transported to the hospital of Ayacucho and the armed forces finally embarked upon hunting down those Shining Path members who had possibly committed the massacre. A group of twenty Senderistas was caught way down the Pampas river basin and two PCP-SL members from Lucanamarca were brought to the community to confess in public, after which they were disappeared by the armed forces. This also showed that the massacre was at least in part committed by people from Lucanamarca itself (CVR 2003d, p.41).

After the massacre, a police station was installed in Lucanamarca. But while this offered some security from further Shining Path retaliation, community members described the police as no less abusive than the PCP-SL. The population remembers the police as drunkards and cattle rustlers responsible for beatings, rapes and several murders in Lucanamarca. Further, in December 1984, three community leaders were disappeared by the armed forces when they travelled to the counter-insurgency base in Pampa Cangallo to give their testimony for accusations made against them. Between 1984 and 1992, several people were assassinated or disappeared in Lucanamarca, often under unclear circumstances. In total, some 160 people lost their lives during the internal armed conflict in the district (Falconí et al. 2007, pp.125–137; p.160).

\textsuperscript{110} Volume V of the truth commission’s report speaks of 80 Senderistas, while volume VII counts 60.

\textsuperscript{111} Víctor Quispe Palomino is probably also responsible for several other Shining Path massacres, and still leads remnants of the guerrilla in the valleys of the Apurímac and Ene rivers in Ayacucho’s remote North.
The report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission characterises Lucanamarca as a community whose values had been altered by the conflict to such a degree that in the end, neighbours and members of the same family would end up killing each other, leading to the total destruction of its social fabric. This had serious implications, lasting even until today, as victims and perpetrators have to live side-by-side while conflicts among community members remain latent (CVR 2003c, p.68). Indeed, Lucanamarca is a community where silences have been constructed around the exact circumstances of the involvement with the insurgency and the deaths of many of the community members. Especially those who had family members who participated in the Shining Path and were murdered by the community are condemned to remain silent, while still being stigmatised and harassed by the community as possible terrorists (Ramírez Castillo 2012, pp.125–126). These community members do not participate in the public life of the community, often living in Ayacucho or at the coast and only returning to the community to avoid being expropriated of their possessions. María Eugenia Ulfe (2013, pp.69–70) also found during her fieldwork in Lucanamarca that community members would rather focus on telling about the massacre and the violent death of Olegario Curitomay, while leaving out the killing of other members of the community before and after the massacre. During my fieldwork, I found that many community members would emphasise the abuse committed by both the PCP-SL and the police, describing Lucanamarca’s population as caught between the lines without their own active involvement in the insurgency – thus, as passive victims in the storm of history who had only by chance become the victims of one of the worst massacres committed by the Shining Path. In this case, the community members that had become involved with the PCP-SL are presented as humble young men that had been deceived by the party or forced to participate. But there are also dissident voices that question this story of collective victimisation. They come especially from community members who do not live in the village anymore, but have migrated temporarily or permanently to Ayacucho or Lima. In their statements, the community’s involvement with the guerrilla is openly admitted and the community members involved with the Shining Path are seen as socially engaged – but in the end, misled – leaders who had only wanted the best for their community (see chapter 4.5.3). In another statement, a Lucanamarquino living in Lima accused the community members of having used the PCP-SL to settle scores and strip the wealthier community members of their possessions (Interview with a Lucanamarquino living in Lima on June 10, 2011). Indeed, in a community that much distorted by violence, there is also no single narrative about the past.
4.4.2 Transitional Justice in an Andean Community

During the work of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, human rights organisations were subcontracted to carry out the collection of testimonies in several regions, as the CVR only had limited staff and experience at the local level. In the Huancasancos province of Ayacucho, it was the Comisión de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Commission – COMISEDH), a human rights organisation founded in 1979 during the end of the military regime, that was to collect victims’ testimonies and that visited Lucanamarca for the first time in July 2002. The information it gathered about the 1983 massacre and the history of the internal division in the community were of such impact that COMISEDH presented the case to the CVR for further investigation and for exhuming the 69 community members killed in the massacre (Interviews with COMISEDH staff members on June 26, 2008 and July 9, 2010). The truth commission then selected Lucanamarca as one of the emblematic cases of violence that would be investigated in detail during its work. Along with its team of forensic anthropologists and the office of the attorney of Huancasancos, the CVR and COMISEDH urged the chief public prosecutor of Peru to carry out the exhumation of the massacre’s victims. The exhumation was then carried out in Lucanamarca in November 2002, and the remains were investigated in Lima during November and December of the same year. On January 10, 2003 the CVR organised a public ceremony of reburial in Lucanamarca. Community members carried small white coffins with the victims’ remains to the cemetery, where they were introduced into a pavilion of grave niches – newly constructed for the purpose with money from the Ministry for Women and Social Development (MIMDES) and the German Development Service (DED) – named Ángeles de Lucanamarca (Angels of Lucanamarca). The President of the Republic himself, Alejandro Toledo, arrived later by helicopter. In an act of staged indigeneity Toledo was carried to the village’s main square on horseback wearing a poncho typical for the region, apologising in the name of the state for the crimes committed and promising development projects.

For the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the case of Lucanamarca was of high importance as it represented atrocities committed by the Shining Path and not the armed forces. Indeed, the CVR had selected Lucanamarca as one of its emblematic cases to counter its critics who considered the commission to be a leftist endeavour to blame the armed forces for the conflict (Ulfe & Ríos 2012). But the CVR’s focus on the victims of the massacre of April 3, 1983 and their family members left out all the other victims: those that had been killed by the Shining Path before and after the massacre, the victims of police and military
brutality and especially those murdered by their fellow community members. Thus, for many the Truth and Reconciliation Commission rather cemented the divides within the community:

“It resulted in a division when the commission only called the family members of the victims, and not us as well. If it would have called us, too, we would know something. That didn’t happen. Only the family members of the victims gathered. That’s why this division appeared from one side.” (Group discussion with women from Lucanamarca, 29-60 years old, on April 16, 2011)  

Nora Ramírez Castillo (2012, p.127) even finds evidence of a re-traumatising effect of the truth commission’s work. Indeed, a staff member of COMISEDH who was present during the re-burial ceremony described the CVR’s work to me as an “invasion”, when up to forty workers of the commission, government institutions, NGO staff and press descended upon the community (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on August 6, 2010).

But to the family members who could finally hold a formal Christian funeral for their relatives that had previously been buried in a hurry after the massacre directly at the sites where they had been slain, the exhumation and subsequent re-burial meant an act of closure (Ramírez Castillo 2012, p.127):

“Yes, of course, on the one hand it opened the wounds because while we were already forgetting our family members, of course the wounds opened, to once again remember as if it was today. On the other hand, it was obvious we had to bury them like a Christian, because since our grandparents we have had the desire to bury [the dead] washed, the body clean. On the one side it was this, because when the terrorists killed them with all that blood like animals, we buried our family members with all their clothing on, but when they were exhumed everything was clean.” (Interview with a woman from Lucanamarca, 45 years old, on July 22, 2010)

“When they were buried in the fields, it was far away like a disappeared. Sometimes we went there, sometimes we didn’t. But when they brought him to the cemetery we could talk to them as if they were alive. We pray, we bring them flowers. With this we are more or less calm.” (Group discussion with women from Lucanamarca, 29-60 years old, on April 16, 2011)

Apart from the possibility to embark upon rituals of closure for those directly affected by the violence, the presence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission arose expectations of new attention from the state for the village, of progress in the form of reparation, infrastructure,

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112 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Se dió el divisionismo cuando la Comisión sólo llamaron a los familiares de las víctimas y no así a nosotros. Si nos hubiera hecho llamar, nosotros también sabríamos algo. Eso no pasó. Sólo se reunieron los familiares de las víctimas. Por tanto, apareció el divisionismo de una parte.”

113 Originally in Spanish: “¡Sí! ¡Claro!, de una parte abrimos las heridas porque cuando ya estábamos olvidando a nuestros familiares, claro que se abrió las heridas, otra vez recordar como si fuese hoy día, de otra parte también era claro que como cristiano sepultar, porque desde los abuelos tenemos el deseo de enterrar bañando, no, limpiecito el cuerpo, no. De una parte era eso pues porque cuando mató esos terroristas con toda la sangre como animales hemos enterrado a nuestros familiares con toda la ropa encima pues pero cuando exhumaron ya era limpio todo pues no.”

114 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Cuando estuvo enterrado en el campo, lejos era como desaparecidos, a veces íbamos o no, pero cuando lo trajeron al cementerio le hablamos como si estuvieran vivos, damos oraciones y los ponemos flores, con eso más o menos nos ponemos tranquilos.”
better education and healthcare (Ramírez Castillo 2012, p.128). In 2000, the Programa al Repoblamiento had constructed around thirty new houses for former village authorities and their families affected by the conflict (Ulfe 2013, p.63). In 2006 the German embassy donated a fully equipped bakery to the community, to be managed by the victims of the conflict. A conflict immediately arose within the community over which victims should be granted the privilege to work in and profit from the bakery. In the end, the bakery never became functional and the machinery is slowly rusting away (Ramírez Castillo 2012, p.129). Lucanamarca also received a project of collective reparation in the form of a trout farm installed in a lagoon in the highlands above the community. Unfortunately, this project was as ill-fated as the bakery and was abandoned soon after its inauguration, as the district municipality was unable to arrange for the sustainable management of the farm. Finally, thirty years after the massacre, the first individual monetary reparations were handed over to affected Lucanamarquinos in 2012 (Ulfe 2013, pp.64–66). Of course, none of the family members of the Senderistas lynched by their own community are eligible for individual reparations. The topic of reparations has instead created a victim competition over who is most affected and who was killed by whom (Ramírez Castillo 2012, p.129). Indeed, the reparations are seen as a further divide in the community, as only certain individuals profit while the community as a whole does not receive the help and attention it had expected from the CVR’s work and the government’s promises:

“In the end we are all affected by the violence, the whole population. Here, the government is classifying the people, it is dividing the society. Those affected, we are all affected, we are all victims. Now, the government is considering only a few, that’s all, practically selected, they’re forming two bodies. So, others are offended with this. We are all victims [...]. How many things happened then, both by the Shining Path and by the police. So, we are all victims. Individual reparations are bad. I agree with the collective reparations, but not with the individual!” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucananamrca, age unknown, on June 22, 2010)\textsuperscript{115}

“The division, one of them is, those that have been affected, so to speak, by the massacre, [...], they constructed them [burial] niches, they have even constructed houses for the affected. They have their houses. On the other hand, the others who have been affected by the armed forces or the police are abandoned. And that’s a division!” (Interview with a male community member living in Ayacucho, age unknown, on July 07, 2010)\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{115} Originally in Spanish: “En sí pues, todos somos afectados de la violencia total de la población, aquí el gobierno está clasificando a la gente, está dividiendo a la sociedad. Esos afectados, todos somos afectados, todos somos víctimas. Ahora el gobierno que considera unos cuantos no más, casi escogidos, está formando dos cuerpos. Entonces otros están con esto, resentidos. Todos somos víctimas, […], cuántas peripecias he pasado esas fechas, tanto con el Sendero, tanto con los policías, entonces todos somos víctimas. Está mal reparación individual, con colectivo estoy de acuerdo, pero con individual no estoy de acuerdo.”

\textsuperscript{116} Originally in Spanish: “La división, uno de eso es, los que han sido afectados, o sea, con el masacre, sus difuntos han sido, le han construido sus nichos, inclusive se ha construido viviendas para los afectados. Lo tienen
“It depends because even before that the truth commission, the CVR, had been participating. They did more activities before, when they exhumed the deceased that lay in different places in mass graves and all that. That’s when even President Alejandro Toledo came. So, there were more activities, more significant ones even, and the government was present, but they didn’t do anything good!” (Interview with a woman in Lucanamarca, 24 years old, on June 23, 2010)

It becomes increasingly clear that the community had awaited a return for the eruption of memory provoked by the CVR’s work in the form of tangible development projects for Lucanamarca. As these have failed to materialise, people are growingly frustrated and accuse the truth commission and COMISEDH of having betrayed and exploited them:

“There was a rush in the CVR during the time of President Paniagua, juicy salaries, where they would earn five thousand, six thousand, seven thousand. What a shame, right? In reality, they have done more, they have benefited more by earning five thousand, six thousand Sol per month, instead of helping the persons who have really suffered, who really want. What a shame, with some projects others make money with the suffering of others, who remain the same, the same. Instead they still make them remember.” (Interview with male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on July 20, 2010)

Apart from truth, reparations, exhumations and re-burial as well as a presidential apology, Lucanamarca would also be involved in the delivery of justice as a transitional justice mechanism. The information gathered in the testimonies and the exhumations in Lucanamarca was used in the trial against Abimael Guzmán and the leading cadres of the PCP-SL. Guzmán himself openly admitted in an interview in 2008 that he himself had ordered the Lucanamarca massacre as revenge for the killings of Shining Path members by the peasants. The leader of the Shining Path was tried between 2004 and 2006 and was finally sentenced to life imprisonment. Three hand-picked survivors of the massacre were brought to Lima to give their testimony. Ironically, one of the alleged eyewitnesses of the massacre had not even been in Lucanamarca during the atrocities – a fact that was never to be revealed during or even after the process.
Still, justice did not have a comforting affect in Lucanamarca. During the trial against Abimael Guzmán, tensions rose in Lucanamarca as the victims of the massacre feared retaliation by former PCP-SL members. Even worse, inspired by the work of the CVR and the trial against Guzmán, an adoptive sister of the murdered Olegario Curitomay filed a lawsuit against several community members for the murder of her (and Olegario Curitomay’s) parents. This caused outrage among the massacre victims’ family members who had just buried their loved ones. Several family members of the Lucanamarquino murdered by their own community had to leave the village due to the constant death threats they received (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010). This situation was also exacerbated by the shooting of a documentary film by Héctor Gálvez and Carlos Cárdenas, who accompanied the CVR’s work in Lucanamarca and the subsequent trial against Abimael Guzmán. The documentary stars several family members of murdered PCP-SL members from Lucanamarca who tell their truth of the events, thereby questioning the history of the community’s unilateral victimisation (Ramírez Castillo 2012, p.133).

4.4.3 Constructing Memorials in Lucanamarca

After the end of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the human rights organisation Comisión de Derechos Humanos (COMISEDH) continued working in Lucanamarca. The first step in COMISEDH’s work was to build up and formalise a local victims’ association, named Asociación de Familiares de Víctimas de la Violencia Política del Distrito de Santiago de Lucanamarca (Association of Family Members of Victims of the Political Violence of the District of Santiago de Lucanamarca). In 2006, COMISEDH formed a strategic alliance with the victims’ association and the district municipality of Lucanamarca to apply for funding from the German-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund (Fondo de Contravalor Perú Alemania). Two consecutive projects were then carried out by COMISEDH in Lucanamarca: The first one, “Towards Justice, Peace and Reconciliation: Re-construction of Historical Memory in the District of Santiago de Lucanamarca” (“Hacia la justicia, la paz y la reconciliación: Reconstrucción de la memoria histórica en el distrito de Santiago de Lucanamarca”) began in May 2006, followed by “Process of Recovery of Memories in the District of Santiago de Lucanamarca. Strengthening Spaces of Dialogue and the Recognition of Memories” (“Proceso de recuperación de memorias en el distrito de Santiago de Lucanamarca. Fortalecimiento de espacios de diálogo y reconocimiento de memorias”) in 2007, both funded by the German-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund (Falconí 2007a, p.18).
The idea of COMISEDH was to overcome the social divide within the community provoked by the violent confrontations of the 1980s and 1990s by creating a dialogue on the past, thus leading to the mutual acknowledgement of different perceptions of the past among the population of Lucanamarca and making peaceful cohabitation possible. In the long run, this dialogue was aimed at re-constructing the damaged social fabric of the community. This in turn was to enable the creation of common future prospects in Lucanamarca long inhibited by prevailing hate and mistrust – a form of local reconciliation (Falconí 2007b). For this purpose, COMISEDH not only worked in Lucanamarca and all the other communities in the district, but also with the Lucanamarquinos residing in the cities of Ayacucho, Ica and Lima. Lucanamarquinos were first sensitised to the topic with radio programmes in Spanish and Quechua as well as with local competitions in painting, songwriting and poetry about the time of violence. Further, community members were capacitated in human rights issues and the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In personal interviews and collective workshops, the population was encouraged to tell the history of their community, focusing not only on the time of violent conflict, but also on the time before and after the civil war, including also their desires for the future. The project was concluded in 2007 with “Public Assemblies of Collective Recovery of Local Memories” (“Actos Públicos de Recuperación Colectiva de Memorias Locales”), in which the results of creating a common history of Lucanamarca were presented to the community members and those residing in the cities. This resulted in a semi-official historiography published by COMISEDH as “Lucanamarca: Memories of Our Community” (“Lucanamarca: memorias de nuestro pueblo”). The book recounts the history of Lucanamarca from its founding myths to the political violence and the time after, and emphasises the community’s resources and dreams of future development told by the villagers. It also contains the paintings and songs about the time of violence created for the public contests during the project as well as a list of the 126 fatal victims from the population of Lucanamarca, including those that had supported the PCP-SL (Falconí et al. 2007).

During the execution of the project, two COMISEDH staff worked and lived in Lucanamarca permanently. A third project staff member was recruited from Lucanamarca’s victims’ association to guarantee good ties to the local population. The district municipality let COMISEDH install a project office in the municipality’s building on the village’s main square and allowed the NGO to use the municipality’s radio to transmit a programme on memory in the district (Falconí 2007a, p.18). Further, the Civil Peace Service (Ziviler
The creation of memorials was initially not part of the project, but was finally considered after the end of the project in 2007. A first step was the creation of the *Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias* (Permanent Community Exhibition of Memories). The exhibition was installed in a room on Lucanamarca’s main square belonging to the municipality. The idea behind the exhibition was to return to the population in a visible way what they had worked out during the workshops on the recovery of memory. Thus, the exhibition contained old press photos that had been taken after the massacre and parts of the testimonies that were gathered from the population during the work of COMISEDH. Further, the drawings and song texts that the population had elaborated during the project and that reflected the conflict in the village were exhibited. Finally, the *Muestra Permanente* contained drawings that the anthropologist and *retablo* artist Edilberto Jiménez – one of COMISEDH’s staff in Lucanamarca – had made, inspired by the population’s testimonies. Small replicas of the exhibition were also installed in all of the communities of the district. The decision for what to put in the exhibition had been made by COMISEDH and the president of the local victims’ association (COMISEDH staff member, personal communication, April 29, 2014).

In 2008, the *Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias* was still situated in the room on Lucanamarca’s main square. But it was impossible to find the person with the key for the door, so that I was only able to take a glimpse through a small gap in the door. However, as the municipality needed the room to install the office of the justice of the peace, the exhibition of the small memory house had to be moved. At the same time, a group of women around the wives of the Canadian and the Finish ambassadors in Peru donated books to the village to set up a community library. The library and the *Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias* were finally united in a single room in a street near the village’s main square (COMISEDH staff member, personal communication, April 29, 2014).

When I visited Lucanamarca in 2010 and 2011, the exhibition was still accessible together with the library, but only the drawings about the time of violence made by the population and Edilberto Jiménez were still in the room, while the photos and testimonies had disappeared. As I was told by COMISEDH staff, both the library and the exhibition had disappeared completely by 2012, as the community and district authorities had no interest in maintaining it. As many books had already been stolen from the library, COMISEDH opted to donate the remaining books to the library of Lucanamarca’s secondary school (COMISEDH staff member, personal communication, April 29, 2014).
Still, the Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias was not the only place of memory COMISEDH would install in Lucanamarca in the course of its memory project:

“The topic of the monument actually was a matter that came up little by little during all these meetings. There was a type of workshop. In all the communities it was pointed out: ‘If our dead are at these sites, it would be convenient to have a way to remember them. So, along with them we processed all of these petitions and this information that came up and the victims’ organisation was the one who made a formal petition to do it.’” (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010)¹¹⁹

Thus, while those participating in COMISEDH’s workshops during its memory project had mentioned the desire for some kind of memorial for the victims, the idea to construct memorials in Lucanamarca actually came from the NGO itself. But as there was originally no budget for creating places of memory, COMISEDH petitioned for financing with a letter written by Lucanamarca’s victims’ association to the German Development Service (DED). Finally, the DED and the Embassy of Finland granted COMISEDH the money to erect memorials in Lucanamarca. The design for the memorials was then elaborated by COMISEDH in consultation with the victims’ association, the district authorities and the school teachers. The first idea of the villagers was to construct memorials at all sites where community members had been killed during the massacre on April 3. But the budget would not amount for such a large quantity of monuments. Further, many of the massacre sites were far away and could only be reached by foot or on horseback. Finally, it was opted to construct only two memorials. The first monument, in the form of a simple cement cross with the inscription “In memory of the victims of the massacre of April 3, 1983” was built only a few metres away from the road to Huancasancos, in a place called Muylla Cruz in the highlands above Lucanamarca, where the Shining Path had killed seven peasants who were doing maintenance work on the road. It was agreed that the second memorial should contain the names of Lucanamarca’s victims and would be placed in the centre of the community’s main square. But the municipality had just re-designed the main square and built a little fountain in the centre. So the mayor suggested to instead place the monument on a side street, which was rejected by the family members. Finally, it was agreed to place the monument on one of the sides of the main square (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010).

The design for the monument was developed by the COMISEDH staff member Edilberto Jiménez and then discussed with the victims’ association and village authorities. COMISEDH

¹¹⁹ Originally in Spanish: “El tema del monumento en realidad fue un asunto que fue surgiendo poco a poco en todas estas reuniones, habían una especie de talleres. En todas las comunidades se fue señalando: ‘Si, nuestros muertos están en tales sitios’, que era conveniente que había forma de como recordarlos. Entonces, nosotros conjuntamente con ellos fuimos procesando todas esas peticiones y está información que iba surgiendo y la asociación de víctimas fue la que hizo una petición formal para hacer esto.”
wanted the monument to be designed according to the supposedly indigenous traditions of the community (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010). Thus, the final design of the monument resembled an *apacheta*, an Andean stone monument that can often be found on mountaintops or passes. Further, a white cement dove was placed on the top of the pyramid-like structure. Once the exact place and design of the memorial had been established, a discussion evolved on the topic of which victims should be placed on the monument. COMISEDH strongly suggested writing the names of all of Lucanamarca’s victims on the monument, including those that had been PCP-SL members and had been killed by the community. Resistance to this idea was strong at the beginning, but one of the teachers of the secondary school finally convinced the rest of the population by stressing that even those who had taken part in the Shining Path were human beings, subject to their own errors, and in any case as much members of the community of Lucanamarca as the others who had died during the conflict in the village:

“In meetings they wouldn’t say anything against the teacher. He explained that they have to be, that they are human beings. So, better that they are all [included], everyone who has died during this time of violence, everyone! But only those from Lucanamarca, not from other places! If a Lucanamarquino was a Senderista, he shall be there! If it is a Lucanamarquino killed by the Senderistas, let his name be there! That was his argument. Without forgetting one dead from the oldest to the child, but make sure everyone is there.”  

(Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on August 06, 2010)\(^{120}\)

Thus, it was agreed that the monument would carry the names of all the victims of Lucanamarca, those killed by *Sendero Luminoso* during the massacre on April 3, 1983 and in other incidences, those killed and disappeared at the hands of the state’s security forces, and those who had participated in the PCP-SL and had been murdered by their fellow community members. But the *Senderistas* that had died in Lucanamarca without being from the community would not be commemorated in the monument.

However, there is another version on how this compromise was achieved. According to the president of the victims’ association, during the discussion of whose names to place on the monument, he one day had an encounter with a woman whose father had taken part in the PCP-SL and had subsequently been lynched by the population. Bursting into tears, she told him that a few days ago one of her children had accidentally dropped a stone on the house of a neighbour that lived downhill. The neighbour accused her of having thrown the stone at her house on purpose. She threatened her that the population would no longer accept the presence

\(^{120}\)Originally in Spanish: “En reuniones ya no dijeron contra el profesor. Explicaba que necesitan, que es un ser humano, entonces que mejor estén todos, todos que han muerto en esta época de la violencia, ¡Todos! Pero basta que sea Lucanamarquino, ¡No de otro lugar! Si un Lucanamarquino está como Senderista, ¡Que esté ahí! Que un Lucanamarquino que ha muerto por los Senderistas! ¡Que esté ahí su nombre! Esto era su rollo. Sin olvidar un muerto desde lo ancianito hasta el niño, pero que estén todos.”
of the sons and daughters of terrorists in the community and that one day they would also get rid of her. The sobbing woman added that, although she had been threatened, she could not complain to the village authorities as this would only worsen the situation. The president of the victims’ association was startled by this account, and during the next meeting he proposed the integration of the names of former PCP-SL members from the community into the monument:

“So, this made us reflect a bit. For me, one could say, to maintain my proposal and my opinion, it was something that helped me a lot, and when we had the assembly, I effectively proposed it. If our parents were wrong, which fault do we children still, have to remain enemies, to continue blaming each other, to remain seeing each other indifferently, effectively as enemies [...] We cannot inherit this to our children. What we’re looking for is a topic of pacification, to forget this past. By departing from this bad, ungrateful past that cost us life, blood, destruction, we search for another vision, we search for new horizons, that this bad example, that this bad moment that we had to live through, we bury it there. We won’t forget it, but by departing from this experience we start to walk towards a new destination, another direction. But this memory will always be there, it will always be present, and it will always be present because we see it there. This is what happened to us because we made a mistake. So, the new generation that comes after us, so that it will not make the same mistake again. So this is a very fundamental symbol for us to try to search for our development.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on July 16, 2008)\textsuperscript{121}

According to this statement, the names of former Senderistas were placed in the memorial out of a vision of cohabitation and reconciliation. To achieve a state of closure that also guaranteed the non-repetition of the events, the president of the victims’ association re-interpreted the Shining Path members among the population as having been deceived by outside forces, thereby integrating them into the pantheon of the community’s victims.

\textsuperscript{121} Originally in Spanish: “Entonces eso nos hizo reflexionar un poco. Para mí fue una, se puede decir, para mantener mi propuesta y mi opinión, fue algo que me ayudó mucho y en la asamblea cuando tuvimos efectivamente planteé esto. Si nuestros padres se equivocaron, los hijos, que culpa ya tenemos de seguir enemistados, de seguir culpándonos, de seguir viéndonos como indiferentes como enemigos efectivamente [...] Eso no se puede transmitir como herencia a sus hijos. Lo que se busca es un tema de pacificación, olvidar ese pasado, pero que a partir de ese pasado malo, ingrato y que nos costó vida, sangre, destrucción nosotros buscamos otra visión. Busquemos nuevos horizontes, que ese mal ejemplo, que ese mal momento nos tocó vivir, lo enterremos allí. No nos olvidemos, pero a partir de esa experiencia empecemos a caminar con otro rumbo, otra dirección, pero que ese recuerdo siempre va a estar, siempre va a estar presente, y siempre estará presente porque miremos esto. Es lo que nos pasó por habernos equivocado. Entonces la nueva generación que viene ya no, que no se vuelva a equivocar, entonces eso es un símbolo para nosotros muy fundamental para tratar de buscar nuestro desarrollo.”
Figure 15: View of Santiago de Lucanamarca.

Figure 16: Burial niches for the massacre victims, cemetery of Lucanamarca.
Figure 17: *Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias*, Lucanamarca.

Source: Markus Weissert.

Figure 18: Drawings in the *Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias*, Lucanamarca.

Source: Markus Weissert.
Figure 19: Memorial cross at *Muylla Cruz*, Lucanamarca.

Source: Markus Weissert.

Figure 20: Memorial with victims’ names on the main square of Lucanamarca, commemoration on April 3, 2011.

Source: Markus Weissert.
The monuments were then in great part built by the members of the victims’ association. For this purpose, COMISEDH encouraged the family members of the victims to bring their own flat stones from the river on which the names of the victims could be written. Family members would eagerly pay attention that the names of their killed relatives were written on the stones they had brought from the river. Another group of family members insisted that the names of former Senderistas be placed on the backside of the monument and not on the sides visible from the village’s main square. The two monuments were finally inaugurated during the anniversary on April 3, 2007 in attendance of the Finnish ambassador and the chairman of the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH) (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010).

COMISEDH officials emphasised that the process of constructing the memorials was highly participatory:

“We said that we had a really small budget and the idea was also a bit that they, the population, would actively participate in the process. The idea was not to bring something from Lima and install it there, but that it was something really taken over and worked on by them.” (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010)\textsuperscript{122}

While a continuous dialogue had indeed taken place with the victims’ association and district authorities, it is still evident that the initial idea for building monuments in Lucanamarca, as well as for all the major design elements, was introduced by the NGO rather than by the population. This was partly due to time constraints, as the budget had to be spent quickly. Thus, a prolonged discussion about whether or not, and what kind of memorial to build, was not possible. One COMISEDH staff member I interviewed even termed the monuments an “imposition” (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on August 6, 2010). This process design also becomes visible in several statements by the Lucanamarquinos involved:

“Elaboration of this project? No, no, no, no, those [people] from COMISEDH, they already had it. So, especially for those who were interested, they made us bring flat stones and inscribe the names of every family member on the stones, nothing else!” (Interview with a female inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 21, 2010)\textsuperscript{123}

“They themselves must have placed it because we didn’t demand it. This must surely have been done by COMISEDH, because people from other places wouldn’t have put his name [on it]. The workers of COMISEDH must have placed it, it wasn’t the people

\textsuperscript{122} Originally in Spanish: “Dijimos que teníamos un presupuesto realmente pequeño y la idea era un poco también que ellos, los pobladores, participasen activamente en todo este proceso. La idea no era llevar algo de Lima e instalarlo ahí, sino que fuese algo que realmente fuese asumido por ellos y trabajado por ellos.”

\textsuperscript{123} Originally in Spanish: “¿Elaboración de ese proyecto? No, no, no, no, ahí de COMISEDH ya lo tenían ya. Entonces, más que nada a los interesados, nos ha obligado de llevar piedritas planitas y poner de cada familia su nombre encima de esa piedra grabado, nada más!”
While district authorities and the victims’ association were integrated into the decision-making process, the rest of Lucanamarca’s population was not. Further, the victims’ association was mostly the lobby group of those who had lost family members during the massacre on April 3, and thus did not represent the other victims of the conflict in the community. Although family members of murdered Senderistas were invited to participate in the creation of the monument, most of them rapidly dropped out of the process, probably because they saw it as an endeavour for the massacre victims (Interview with COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010). This became even clearer when interviewing the daughter of a former Senderista in Lucanamarca in 2010. Although three years had passed since the inauguration of the monument, she did not know that the name of her father was inscribed on the monument, and she would not believe me until I showed it to her (Interview with the daughter of a Senderista on July 21, 2010).

4.4.4 Making Sense of the Memorials

COMISEDH’s historical memory project in Lucanamarca had the objective to create spaces of dialogue to reach a form of communal reconciliation in the long run. Thus, the creation of the Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias and the two monuments reflects the NGO’s desire to provide this objective with a physical and durable place in the community:

“The idea was, in order to make a step towards reconciliation, to try to document the different versions of history that existed in the village, in the community, departing from the idea that the first step towards being able to communicate within the community again is to have at least an idea of the fact that there are different versions of our history and maybe managing to get away from ‘My [version] is the right one and the others are lies’, but to support in the village that a concept develops that there are different versions of history and all of them are valid somehow.” (Interview with Ulrich Goedeking, Director of the Civil Peace Service in Peru, on June 30, 2008)\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{124} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “De ellos mismos habrán puesto porque nosotros no hemos exigido. Eso habrá hecho seguramente COMISEDH, porque los que vienen de otro sitio no hubieran puesto su nombre, los trabajadores de COMISEDH habrán puesto eso, no ha sido la gente del pueblo.”

\textsuperscript{125} Originally in German: “Es war der Ansatz, um in Richtung Versöhnung einen Schritt zu tun, war der, wir versuchen verschiedene Versionen von Geschichte zu dokumentieren, die im Dorf, in der Dorfgemeinschaft vorhanden sind, ausgehend davon, dass der erste Schritt dahin, überhaupt wieder miteinander gesprächsfähig zu werden, innerhalb der Dorfgemeinschaft, ist zumindest eine Vorstellung davon zu haben, es gibt verschiedene Versionen von unserer eigenen Geschichte und vielleicht zu schaffen, davon weg zu kommen ‘Meine ist die richtige und die anderen Lügen’, sondern vielleicht im Dorf zu unterstützen, dass ein Begriff davon entsteht, es gibt verschiedene Versionen der Geschichte und alle haben irgendwo ihre Berechtigung.”
Indeed, placing the names of all victims of the community on the monument had the aim to acknowledge and make official the full tragedy of a community in which neighbours had killed each other:

“What had happened is that of course we knew that there was a division in the village and, let’s say, we could also have only inscribed the names of the 69 persons who had died in the massacre. But this somehow negated all the other events that had occurred there. Of course they wanted it to be acknowledged that the biggest part of the Senderistas that had died there were because of the actions of the organised community members themselves. But it was also kind of the idea to acknowledge that in this moment when the armed conflict occurred, a number of things happened that made the community members come into conflict with one another. But this didn’t mean that in the future the community members should be in conflict, that they should obviously acknowledge what had occurred, but looking towards the future, try to be a more united community and in some form reconcile. This was a bit the idea that was behind this. And also in part a sort of recognition also of those persons, as well as their family members that had been cast out for so long.” (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010)\(^{126}\)

Further, COMISEDH officials also stated that they had imagined the monuments to serve one of the classic aims of memorialisation initiatives, namely that of contributing to the non-repetition of the events:

“The idea was a bit that the monument meant to be a sort of milestone, like a signal, like a mark that something had occurred here, not necessarily that this signal, that this mark would explain what had happened and why it occurred. It simply occurred! Something occurred here and it definitely changed the lives of many families in Lucanamarca and this was supposed to remain here as a permanent and lively memory that had occurred should not repeat itself in the future. It sort of started from this idea.” (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 27, 2010)\(^{127}\)

Figure 5 shows the meanings villagers attached to the places of memory in Lucanamarca in interviews and group discussions. The statements about the attached meanings refer uniquely to the monument with the names of Lucanamarca’s victims on the village’s main square, as the Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias and the cross at Muyla Cruz were only

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\(^{126}\)Originally in Spanish: “Lo que pasa es que ya de hecho sabíamos que en el pueblo había una división, y digamos, podría haberse puesto sólo los nombres solo de las 69 personas que fallecieron en la masacre. Pero eso un poco desconocía todos los otros eventos que habían ocurrido ahí. Que de hecho ellos querían que reconocieran, ya que la mayor parte de Senderistas que fallecieron ahí, fueron por acción propia de los propios comuneros organizados. Entonces, pero era un poquito la idea de tratar de reconocer que en este lapso en que ocurrió el conflicto armado, ocurrieron un conjunto de cosas que hicieron que los propios comuneros se enfrentaran. Pero esto no significaba que en adelante ellos debían ser enfrentados, que se debía obviamente reconocer que había ocurrido, pero un poco mirando al futuro, tratar de ser de verdad una comunidad más unida y de cierta forma reconciliar. Era un poco la idea que estaba detrás. Y también en parte como una especie de reconocimiento también a estas personas, tanto sus familiares que estuvieron relegados durante mucho tiempo.”

\(^{127}\)Originally in Spanish: “La idea era un poco que el monumento significase como una especie de hito, como una señal, como una marca que aquí ocurrió algo, no necesariamente que este señal, que esta marca explicara lo que pasó y por qué ocurrió esto. ¡Simplemente ocurrió! Ocurrió algo ahí y definitivamente cambió las vidas de muchas familias en Lucanamarca y que esto permaneciera como un recuerdo permanente, vivo de que esto que ocurrió no debería volver a repetirse en futuro, un poco partiendo de esa idea.”
mentioned in very few interviews and group discussions – a sign that these places of memory were largely invisible to the population.

Figure 21: Number of personal interviews and group discussions with persons from Lucanamarca in which participants mentioned one of the following concepts.

![Bar chart showing the number of mentions for various concepts.](chart)

Source: Own survey, 2008-2011.

Nearly all people interviewed mentioned the importance of the monument as a sign of acknowledgement of Lucanamarca’s victimisation. Further, the monument also serves commemorative purposes. The monument as a site for non-repetition, truth, reconciliation and closure are also rather typical transitional justice aims of places of memory. What seems to be more unusual at first site is that the monument is also perceived as a contribution to the progress of the community, while some also mention that the memorial provokes sadness. Finally, for some Lucanamarquinos the monument has no meaning at all.

Indeed, the monument with all the names of the victims in a central place of the village officially represents the victimisation of these individuals, contributing to the satisfaction of the family members:

“Of course, this monument would be like a recognition in itself, like a symbolic act for all those who died in the massacre as well as all those who have disappeared. Of course, we don’t see the presence of my father anymore, but with this symbol he remembered maybe a bit more, it’s something like that for me, a representation of what my father was, with his name to always see him.” (Interview with a son of a disappeared person in Lucanamarca, 42 years old, on June 21, 2010)\(^\text{128}\)

\(^{128}\) Originally in Spanish: “¡Claro!, ese monumento sería como un reconocimiento en sí, como un acto simbólico para todos los que han fallecido en el masacre, como todos los que han desaparecido. ¡Claro!, la presencia de mi padre no lo vemos, ya no, pero a través de ese símbolo que está de repente un poco más recordado, algo así sería para mí, un represente de lo que es mi padre, con su nombre al verlo siempre.”
This is also true for the family members of murdered Senderistas who for the first time feel that their victimisation is being represented:

“For me it is good because the names of all those who have died are there. Before that, the family members of those who had died in the massacre felt they had more rights and felt prouder, but when they put all the names on the monument I was happy.” (Interview with a female family member of a former Senderista in Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 19, 2010)\(^{129}\)

But the monument does not only bear importance for those who have lost close family members, but also for the rest of Lucanamarca’s population. In their accounts, the monument does not necessarily stand for the representation and acknowledgement of the victimisation of individuals, but for the victimisation of the community as a whole:

“Well, the only memory we have in the main square in memory of the sixty and something dead, 69 exactly and more, no, […], but for me I think it is an unforgettable memory in which one has constructed this monument in merit of this great tragedy which we had.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 19, 2010)\(^{130}\)

“It is a history, well, which the village of Lucanamarca has suffered, well, this massacre. So, to remember with the passing of time that Lucanamarca has suffered the massacre on April 3, well, innocent people died at the hands of the subversion. Blood has been shed here as it was a war between Peruvians. So, therefore they had this monument made, to remember this very big day, the 3\(^{rd}\) of April. They have shed blood, innocent blood in different places.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 23, 2010)\(^{131}\)

It is interesting that here, the focus moves again to the victims of the massacre on April 3, 1983, while the presence of the other victims, especially those killed by the community, is silenced. Further, as in the case of the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP in Ayacucho, acknowledgement is something that Lucanamarquinos expect to be delivered by outsiders, especially foreigners:

“No, it’s good, it’s good of course, of course it’s good. Any stranger who comes, has the monument in his sight. They have it as a distraction, they come close and ask the peasants about the massacre and look for testimonies, how it was, and I think it is good

\(^{129}\) Originally in Spanish: “Por mi parte está bien, porque de todos los que han muerto está sus nombres, antes los familiares de los que han muerto en la masacre se sentían con más derecho y más orgulloso, pero cuando pusieron todos los nombres en el monumento yo me alegro.”

\(^{130}\) Originally in Spanish: “Bueno, es el único recuerdo que tenemos en la plaza principal en memoria de los 60 y tantos muertos, 69 exactamente y muchos aún, […], pero para mí creo que es un recuerdo inolvidable en la que se construyó ese monumento en mérito a ese gran tragedy que hemos tenido.”

\(^{131}\) Originally in Spanish: “Es una historia pues, que el pueblo de Lucanamarca ha sufrido pues esa masacre. Entonces para recordar con el tiempo, con el correr del tiempo que Lucanamarca ha sufrido la masacre el tres de abril pues, que acá murieron la gente inocente por los manos de la subversión, acá derramó sangre, como una guerra pues habido, entre peruanos. Entonces que para eso es lo que se mandó hacer el monumento para recordar ese día tan grande, el tres de abril. Han derramado la sangre, sangre inocente en diferentes sitios.”
here in the centre, yes, it is good.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 49 years old, on July 21, 2010)\textsuperscript{132}

“I’d say, it makes us happy that we have the recognition from other international countries. It gives us consolation. Among ourselves we cannot give each other this consolation.” (Group discussion with women in Lucanamarca on April 16, 2011)\textsuperscript{133}

The population of Lucanamarca has understood that their village, thanks to the massacre and the attention created by the truth commission and COMISEDH, benefits from victimisation. The monument represents this victimisation to the outside world, but only by attracting the visits of strangers that can function as multipliers, and thus directing more state or NGO attention to the community.

“To have it present that the victims are, how should I put it, like a memory, to have it there, the victims that have been victimised in the massacre of ’83 and we also always remember, and thanks to them also this office of COMISEDH has come to our population, and thanks to that we can have any kind of help from this office and from other countries, in any form, this reality that we have lived before, make it present in the here and now, helping in any form the well-being of the community.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 29 years old, on July 21, 2014)\textsuperscript{134}

“The effect that it caused is that these three NGOs, organisations have ensured that Lucanamarca is known to the world. Because of that, the authorities have it easy to conduct any project in favour of Lucanamarca. So, since they can do projects as Lucanamarca is an emergency zone, they can attend to us with more ease, with more prudence, with more work, this is what they have achieved in general, these three works.” (Group discussion with students from Lucanamarca in Ayacucho on May 20, 2011)\textsuperscript{135}

Thus, the monument casts Lucanamarca’s victimisation in stone and is at the same time deeply tied to the dreams of development the population of Lucanamarca has. The representation of victimisation visible in the monument emphasises Lucanamarca’s right to receive development projects and to be taken into account by the Peruvian state it long felt neglected by. But in the current discourse on victimisation in Peruvian society, only those

\textsuperscript{132}Originally in Spanish: “No, ¡Está bien!, ¡Está bien claro!, ¡Sí está bien!, cualquier foráneo que viene tiene a la vista al monumento. Lo tienen como distracción, se acercan, y preguntan a los paisanos de la masacre, y buscan testimonios, ¿Cómo ha sido?, y yo creo que está bien acá en el centro, ¡Sí está bien!.”

\textsuperscript{133}Originally in Spanish: “Yo diría, nos da alegría que tenemos reconocimiento de otros países internacionales, nos da como un consuelo. Entre nosotros mismos no podemos darnos ese consuelo.”

\textsuperscript{134}Originally in Spanish: “Para tenerlo presente que esas víctimas fueron en ese entonces, como este que te podría decir, como un recuerdo, tenerlo ahí, las personas que fueron victimados en el masacre del 83 y siempre recordamos también, y gracias a ellos también ése oficina de COMISEDH ha llegado a nuestra población, y gracias a ello podemos tener cualquier apoyo de esa oficina, y de otros países, de cualquier forma. Esa realidad que hemos vivido antes, hacerlo presente en la actualidad, apoyando de cualquier manera en el bienestar de la comunidad.”

\textsuperscript{135}Originally in Spanish: “Efecto que ha causado es que esas tres ONG, organismo han hecho que Lucanamarca sea conocido mundial. Por eso las autoridades tienen la facilidad de hacer algún proyecto a favor de Lucanamarca. Entonces, como pueden hacer proyectos, como Lucanamarca es zona de emergencia, pueden atender con más facilidad, con más cautela, con más trabajo, eso es lo que han logrado a nivel general esos tres trabajos”
who are absolutely innocent are deserving victims – rather the opposite of what is the case for the highly complex history of violence in Lucanamarca. Therefore, Lucanamarquinos re-interpreted the monument that is meant to represent this complex history in a way that embeds it in silences about the community’s involvement with the Shining Path and thus its own protagonism in the war, in favour of a history of collective victimisation that qualifies Lucanamarca for further NGO and state attention. There are basically two different ways in which community members make the monument a representation of their own collective victimisation.

In the first version, the presence of community members that were part of Sendero Luminoso is acknowledged, but it is emphasised that they had been forced to join the guerrilla or were deceived by the PCP-SL:

“This is like a symbol to search for peace. [...] There have been ideologies, things that cannot adapt to our reality. So, there are innocents, maybe by force they made them take part, to be a participant in this movement, right? In this case it was the Shining Path, MRTA, they, no, they had intentions, but in the end it had a foreign ideology, this was not born in Peru, but these were ideologies from other countries, from other continents, something that was not adequate for our reality. That’s why they fell, innocent [...] So, in this monument [...] it is the symbol for those that have become victims of this movement, in any way innocent or not innocent, there they are.”

(Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 29 years old, on July 21, 2010)\textsuperscript{136}

“There are no contradictions any more. All the terrorists as well as the civilians have died. They are equal because the culprit is Abimael [Guzmán], it’s him who made them get involved. Of course, some boys by force, by force they were involved, they dragged them in. Some escaped to not get involved, but some obeyed because they would kill and if they didn’t accept, they killed the people. [...] Whoever didn’t accept would get his throat cut. Out of fear many people accepted, got involved in this politics. But now, to not have anything of it, because of this we united [all of them in the monument], so that it is with the terrorists, with everybody, with the police who killed the terrorists, with everybody, everything is there and also with the terrorists who died, there they are in the list and on the monument.”

(Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 22, 2010)\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{136} Originally in Spanish: “Esto es como si fuera, como un símbolo de buscar la paz, [...]. Han venido ideologías, cosas que no se adaptan a nuestra realidad. Entonces hay inocentes, de repente a la fuerza los han comprometido a ser partícipe del movimiento ¿no?, en este caso sendero luminoso, MRTA ellos no, ellos han tenido un propósito, pero ese fin ha tenido una ideología extranjera, no. Está tampoco nacido de acá, del Perú, sino son ideologías de otros países, de otros continentes, no, cosa que no estaba adecuado pues a nuestra realidad. Entonces no estaban preparados pues, para ese nivel. Entonces por eso ha caído, inocentes [...]. Entonces es un monumento [...] que es símbolo a ellos que han sido víctimas de este movimiento, de todas maneras inocentes o no inocentes por ahí están pues.”

\textsuperscript{137} Originally in Spanish: “Ya no hay contradicciones. Todos terroristas como la gente civil, ha muerto, son iguales porque el culpable es Abimael [Guzmán] el que lo ha comprometido. Claro, algunos muchachos a la fuerza, se han comprometido a la fuerza, lo han jalado. Algunos se han escapado para no comprometerse a esto, pero algunos obedecieron porque ahí daba muerte pues y si no aceptaban, mataban la gente. [...] Él que no aceptaba ya era cuello cortado. Por ahí de miedo pues mucha gente ha aceptado, han comprometido esa política. Pero ahora, para que no haya nada eso, por eso ha unido, que está con los terroristas con todo, con los policías que han matado los terroristas con todo, todo está ahí y también los mismos terroristas que han muerto, ahí pues están en la lista y el
To justify the presence of the names of *Lucanamarquinos* involved with the Shining Path in the monument, they are portrayed as humble and naïve youngsters who were forced into the guerrilla without any personal commitment. Instead, they had become the victims of betrayal by outside forces, such as “foreign ideologies” or Abimael Guzmán himself. Guilt is externalised, which allows for their re-integration into Lucanamarca’s society as victims, and not culprits:

“Well, we are all the victims, of one side or the other, because this is an internal armed conflict with different motives. It generated this dirty war, as they say, that didn’t respect the lives of children, men, women, of all kinds. So, there is no reason why we should discriminate the one or the other and consider one part more [than the other]. Lucanamarca and its inhabitants are only one, and if there are problems we are all affected.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 20, 2010)

Thus, Lucanamarca as a whole had become victimised during the political violence, but not only by the Shining Path:

“Because of that, in memory of the men that have fallen, a cross was constructed as a sign of the sacrifice of the community members of Lucanamarca in Muylla Cruz and, finally, here on our main square is a pyramid where all the names are written of all those who fell during the political violence that Lucanamarca lived through from 1980 to 2000. Here, you can find all the names, young people, women, authorities, fallen before the massacre on April 3, and after the massacre when the police forces, the army was stationed here. Here we received another massacre instead of help. This police, Sinchis we called them, without pity they called any community member ‘terrorist’ and at any time they disappeared, they killed, and we went through difficult times.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on July 18, 2008)

Thus, the community was caught in the crossfire of two equally violent forces, a narrative that, as Kimberly Theidon (2004, pp.232–233) has shown, is very common in the Peruvian Andes, and that hides the communities’ own involvement in the conflict and portrays it as a deserving victim.
In the other version, the emphasis is put on the massacre of April 3, which represents the victimisation of Lucanamarca more than any other event during the war. Here the presence of Shining Path elements within the community is silenced and the community is instead portrayed as having heroically resisted the Shining Path in the name of democracy and the state:

“From a social and personal point of view it should be a permanent memory every year because Lucanamarca is considered a hero of April 3\textsuperscript{rd} because that day there were hundreds of dead brothers from Lucanamarca […] because they died for democracy and they gave their lives. Democracy for them meant unity and respect and cooperation between the brothers of Lucanamarca, for them it was the best system of government and the active participation of all. They gave their lives to defend democracy.” (Group discussion with students from Lucanamarca in Ayacucho on May 10, 2011)\textsuperscript{140}

Indeed, if the community had been victimised because of its fight for democracy and the state, it would be an even more deserving victim. The state would then owe Lucanamarca development in return for its bravery. In this version, the victims of the massacre are declared heroes or martyrs and the death toll is drastically exaggerated: The Shining Path attacked Lucanamarca because it had resisted the guerrilla, or for no clear reason at all. The intra-communal conflicts that triggered the massacre are thus totally silenced and the community is presented as a closed unit resisting a violent external force. This goes so far, that some Lucanamarquinos even deny the presence of the names of the murdered Senderistas on the monument altogether.

It is clear that the monument represents very different truths, depending on who tells the story of Lucanamarca during the time of violence. Indeed, the monument was intended to symbolise the persistence of the different truths in the community to guarantee peaceful co-existence. Thus, the cohabitation of the different victims on the monument is seen as a first step towards peaceful co-existence in the community’s future. This is related to interpreting the monument as a reminder of the violent events, in order to help prevent the recurrence of these events in the future. Indeed, the monument here becomes a sign of closure: The victims of all sides are equally remembered in the monument, reminding the population to not engage in violence again. This improves the chance to unite again on a path of progress and prosperity, leaving the past behind:

“Yes, in effect, in the pyramid we have constructed on the square, there are all the names of those fallen in these years, ‘83 to 2000. So the dove we have is the sign of

\textsuperscript{140} Originally in Spanish: “Desde el punto de vista social y personal, sería un recuerdo permanente de cada año, porque Lucanamarca es considerado héroe del 3 de abril, porque ese día hubo centenares de muertes de nuestros hermanos lucanamarquinos[…] porque en sí, por la democracia ellos murieron y dieron la vida. La democracia para ellos significaba la unidad y el respeto, y la cooperatividad entre los hermanos de Lucanamarca, para ellos el mejor sistema de gobierno y la participación activa de todos, ellos dieron su vida por defender la democracia.”
peace despite the damage done, be it by the Senderistas, members of the military or others, this is in the past. So, from this date on we think of thinking in the present and search for a better future in which these violent events do not re-occur, instead, there should be unity of work, in all aspects, at the family level, at the level of the population. That’s the idea. We are constructing with the idea to attain peace.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 20, 2010)

“Yes, this monument was to honour the fallen, also a monument, let’s say, of pacification, of brotherhood, of unity, if it means everything that happened, it also means that it shall not repeat itself.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 18, 2010)

“Yes, more or less, of course, they necessarily have to consider, because we won’t be, with that one part of our fellow citizens, with that one part we will not be enemies our entire life, because, in the end as you have seen, no one is to blame. It was strangers who came and divided us, and well, I think, of course it is a reconciliation, and I think, that now we are like we were before, I think we are gathering strength.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 49 years old, on July 21, 2010)

The re-integration of the Lucanamarquinos involved with the Shining Path as victims into the community and the projection of guilt and responsibility onto strangers and foreign elements make closure and reconciliation indeed more likely. Still, the focus on non-repetition shows that many inhabitants of Lucanamarca also see the need to reflect and learn from the past.

While some Lucanamarquinos see a positive meaning in the memorialisation initiatives in their community, there is also much criticism. Thus, it is complained that not all of Lucanamarca’s victims are represented with their names on the monument. COMISEDH admits that indeed the family members of some victims were not present in the community during the construction of the monument and therefore could not remind anyone to inscribe the names of their loved ones on the monument. Further, having the names of the community’s Shining Path members on the monument is still violently rejected by many in Lucanamarca:

“In my way of thinking this name they put there is a mockery for us people who have suffered, or let’s say, we have lost our family members because of whom?. So, the name of this person exists [on the monument]! It ridicules those who have lost our family

141 Originally in Spanish: “¡Sí! Efectivamente, hay en el pirámide que tenemos en la plaza construido están toditos los nombres de los caídos de esos años, 83 y hasta 2000. Entonces esa paloma que tenemos, es el signo de paz que a pesar de los daños ocasionados, ya sea por senderistas, militares y otros, eso fue el pasado. Entonces a partir de la fecha pensamos pensar en el presente y buscar un futuro mejor, donde ya no se repita estos hechos violentos, más bien haya unidad de trabajo, en todo aspecto, al nivel de familias, al nivel de la población, eso es la idea. Venimos construyendo con esa idea de alcanzar la paz.”

142 Originally in Spanish: “¡Sí! Ése monumento era en homenaje a los caídos, también un monumento digamos de pacificación, de hermandad, de unión, de que si bien es cierto, eso significa de todo lo que pasó, también debe significar de que no se vuelva a repetir.”

143 Originally in Spanish: “¡Sí! Más o menos, claro, necesariamente tienen que considerar, porque no toda la vida vamos a estar, no, de que una parte de nuestros conciudadanos, una parte, no vamos a estar enemigos, porque al final de cuentas nadie ha sido culpable, sino que son personas extrañas que han llegado y nos han dividido, y bueno, yo creo que sí, claro, que es una reconciliación y yo creo que ahora estamos a lo que antes, yo creo que estamos uniendo esfuerzos.”
Indeed, having their family members’ names placed on the same monument as the followers of the movement responsible for their deaths is an offense to some of the victims’ family members. But also family members of those killed by their fellow community members object to the co-existence of all names on the monument:

“They should instead be very separated, those who died at the hands of community members. It’s convenient that someone should know how they died!” (Interview with a male Lucanamarquino living in Ayacucho, 50 years old, on August 15, 2010)

To this interviewee, the integration of the Senderistas in the monument conceals as much as it reveals. He does not feel that the death of his family members at the hands of the population of Lucanamarca is sufficiently represented in the design of the monument. Thus, the monument does not sufficiently disclose the truth. Others also outright reject the idea of public recognition by ways of a monument:

“I don’t feel repaired in any way, I hardly feel anything, but what is there? There are only the names of our dead, nothing else. With that, what should we feel? Do our family members appear because of that, well no!” (Interview with a female inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 20, 2010)

“What good does it do that they died and that my name is there on a stone, but it doesn’t make any sense, economically of course!” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 19, 2010)

Here, it becomes clear that many Lucanamarquinos expected a return for having the past dug up by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and COMISEDH. In return for remembering their past, they anticipated individual compensation or at least economic progress for their community, an expectation that has been disappointed. Having the murdered family member’s

144 Originally in Spanish: “A mi manera de pensar, ese nombre que han puesto es una burla para la gente que hemos sufrido, o sea perdimos a nuestros familiares ¿Por culpa de quién? Entonces de esa persona existe su nombre! Nos toma en burla a los que hemos perdido a nuestros familiares por culpa de ellos.”

145 Originally in Spanish: “Yo no estoy de acuerdo. De los senderos de repente un monumento aparte, de todos los senderos! No mezclar, no unir en este monumento! Eso hemos observado, pero de COMISEDH obligaron así, así de su modo lo han hecho.”

146 Originally in Spanish: “Más bien debería estar muy aparte los que están caídos por manos de los pobladores, conviene que alguien sepa como han muerto!”

147 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “No me siento de ninguna manera reparada, no siento casi nada, pero que hay pues ahí. Solo está el nombre de nuestros muertos nada más. Con eso ¿Qué vamos a sentir? Acaso están apareciendo nuestros familiares a raíz de eso, no pues!”

148 Originally in Spanish: “De que sirve que haya muerto y está ahí en una piedra mi nombre, pero no tiene sentido, económicamente por supuesto!”
name inscribed on a monument is simply not enough in an environment of poverty and the desire for economic development, as a COMISEDH staff member also admits:

“Happiness, no! I didn't see that! It is not like ‘damn, you made a potable water reservoir!’ They celebrate, are happy, relax! There weren’t such things because it isn’t, well, it isn’t what they asked for, it’s not what they want. They never asked for that. What they asked for, are more economic questions […]. ‘I am poor! I don’t have problems because of the violence. I need money! I want to live. I’m not well! I have to get well, I need medicine!’ That’s it. Do you think the monument is giving them that?” (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on August 6, 2010)\(^{149}\)

Instead, Lucanamarquinos feel that the memorialisation initiatives have only opened old wounds, thus endangering the carefully constructed silences surrounding the conflict in the village that enabled some kind of cohabitation over the years. Therefore, there is a strong desire to simply erase and forget the past:

“So COMISEDH comes here after twenty years and it begins to make us remember what this tragedy was that we had forgotten. It even asks the children that weren’t there then and doesn’t ask those that were there at the time. That’s where COMISEDH has failed. That’s exactly why Lucanamarca is divided in two.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 21, 2010)\(^{150}\)

“Well, in reality we should totally ban these, totally forget. It is like burying in the ground negative things. In reality it is not good to show it.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on July 20, 2010)\(^{151}\)

The presence of the past in the community in the form of places of memory is seen as stirring up the conflicts and further dividing the village instead of contributing to peace and reconciliation. Further, showing the past in a place of memory is considered to be a bad influence on the youth, who are considered to be easily influenced by the depiction of violence:

“It is better to forget it because sometimes they look and on April 3rd there was a massacre. So the boys see they can also do these things!” (Interview with a female inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 30 years old, on July 21, 2010)\(^{152}\)


\(^{150}\) Originally in Spanish: “Entonces COMISEDH llega después de veinte años, y luego empieza hacernos recordar lo que ha sido esta tragedia, lo que hemos olvidado, incluso hace preguntas a los niños que no estaban presentes ahí y no hacía a los que están presentes en este in situ. Ahí ha fallado COMISEDH. Por eso justamente Lucanamarca está dividido en dos.”

\(^{151}\) Originally in Spanish: “Pues en realidad se debe totalmente desterrar esos, olvidarse totalmente. Es como enterrar en el suelo cosas negativas. En realidad no es bueno mostrar.”

\(^{152}\) Originally in Spanish: “Mejor es olvidarlo, porque a veces miran y el tres de abril hubo matanza. Entonces los chicos miran ya ellos también hasta esas cosas puede hacer.”
Finally, while the monument does fulfil a commemorative function for some, others emphasise that it is much more important to have the family members buried in the cemetery than having their names put on a monument on the village square:

“I don’t know why they put it [there] because we place more value on the cemetery because the bones of the deceased are there. They are always there as if they were flesh and were living there.” (Interview with a female inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 30 years old, on July 21, 2010)\(^{153}\)

It is still interesting that Lucanamarca accepted the creation of places of memory in the community although there is obviously much resistance against their design and against the remembrance of the past as a whole:

“No! No one was opposed because it was a project with money from the outside, it practically didn’t affect anyone in the population. They simply began to construct with the money from the cooperating countries, and that’s it. We cannot oppose because it does not affect us in any way.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, age unknown, on June 21, 2010)\(^{154}\)

Thus, there was no strong opposition against memorialising the past because the community did not have to take any responsibility for the project. But this also meant that the places of memory were not perceived as being a part of the community. The memorialisation initiative was clearly imposed upon Lucanamarca from the outside without ownership by the local population, inflicting serious consequences on the sustainability of the memorials. While the Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias simply disappeared over time, the monument on the main square is also deteriorating. The names of the victims written on the monument’s stones with paint are slowly vanishing under the influence of sun and rain, while the wings of the dove on top of the monument have already broken off.

4.4.5 Commemorating the Third of April

The day for the commemoration of April 3\(^{rd}\) in 2011, 28 years after the massacre, started early with a radio programme at six o’clock in the morning. The radio programme was broadcast from the rooftop of the municipality and conducted by COMISEDH staff members who had invited the community president of the village, the justice of the peace and a representative of the district’s health station. Further, a representative of the Lucanamarquinos residing in Lima was also present. COMISEDH staff underlined the importance of commemorating the 3\(^{rd}\) of

\(^{153}\) Originally in Spanish: “No sé por qué lo ponen, porque más importancia tomamos el cementerio porque ahí están los huesitos de los difuntos. Siempre ahí está pues como si fuera su carne y estaría viviendo ahí.”

\(^{154}\) Originally in Spanish: “!No! Ningunos estaban opuestos porque como es un proyecto de dinero que viene del exterior prácticamente no afectó a nadie en la población. Simplemente empezaron a construir con la plata de los países cooperantes y eso es todo. Nosotros no podemos oponer porque no nos afecta en nada.”
April to reflect about the past and to not repeat the atrocities committed 28 years ago, while the justice of the peace talked about the history of violence in the community. His version of the war was the one in which Lucanamarca was innocently caught between the lines of two equally lethal forces from the outside, the Shining Path and the police forces, who both victimised the community. The community president reminded the audience that “we have killed each other among brothers” and that the community should unite again to achieve progress. COMISEDH staff from Lucanamarca added that the Shining Path could only enter Lucanamarca because it was poor, underdeveloped and forgotten by the state, and thus easy to deceive.

The COMISEDH staff conducting the programme asked in what way Lucanamarca had changed since the time of violence and the justice of the peace answered:

“Well, our village is known at the national and international level. Until now, we have been making good progress thanks to the presence of COMISEDH, which was in our village. Thanks to them we have been moving ahead, it even makes us remember what we don’t remember. [...] Previously we didn’t have a health station in our village. [...] So, thanks to the massacre it came. Similarly, previously there was no secondary school. To study we had to go to Huancapi, [Huanca] Sancos, to Huamanga, and only those who could, went, but now our secondary school is also in our village. Even in San José de Huarcaya there is a secondary school. In that way we are moving forward.”

(Transcript from a radio programme aired on April 3, 2011)

The representative of the Lucanamarquinos living in Lima added:

“The dead are already dead. One can only pray for their souls. We cannot make them live, we cannot remember sad, unfortunate situations. We have to be brothers. The things happened, they have happened, let us forget. From today on, we will move ahead. We shall be brothers like God’s children. Let us work together for the progress of our village.”

(Transcript from a radio programme aired on April 3, 2011)

Indeed, both commentaries show the villagers’ emphasis on development and progress. The justice of the peace underlines that only thanks to Lucanamarca’s victimisation did progress in the form of the health station and the secondary school come to the community. Thus, Lucanamarca in his eyes directly benefited from being a war victim. The representative of the community president reminded the audience that “we have killed each other among brothers” and that the community should unite again to achieve progress.
Lucanamarquinos in Lima called for closure and forgetting in order to enable development in the community.

By nine o’clock, the community’s authorities and some community members gathered in the village’s main square. Staff members of another NGO that were carrying out a memory project in communities of the same region had arrived, bringing with them another researcher who would start her fieldwork in Lucanamarca in the months to come. The Peruvian flag was solemnly hoisted over the square, while the school orchestra played the national anthem. The mayor of the district of Santiago de Lucanamarca held a short speech reminding the population that the sacrifice of those killed on April 3, 1982 should not be in vain, that the community should embrace peace and continue on in remembrance towards development. After the speech, members of COMISEDH and community authorities laid down a floral wreath – brought by COMISEDH from Ayacucho – at the monument. Flowers were also distributed among the bystanders, to be laid down at the monument.

A procession was formed that slowly moved towards the cemetery, accompanied by the school orchestra and led by the priest who had arrived from Huancasancos. While during the public ceremony at the main square only few family members of victims had been present, an increasing number of them now joined the mass that was held at the cemetery. Thus, for many family members of victims it was the religious part of the ceremony held at the cemetery that was most important, while the more political act involving the monument on the village square rather brought together political authorities and foreign visitors.

At the cemetery, people would put new flowers and other offerings into the niches of their loved ones. But also those who had not lost family members during the massacre used the opportunity of an open cemetery gate to clean the graves of their loved ones and bring them new flowers. The catholic mass was held at the cemetery’s small pavilion in Quechua, and among the names that were read out loud during the ceremony by the priest was also that of Olegario Curitomay, the young Shining Path leader from Lucanamarca lynched by the population of the community. During the mass, members of the NGO that had arrived in the morning tried to interview those who were listening to the mass at some distance from the pavilion. After the mass, lunch was served to the population and the visitors back on the village’s main square. The commemoration finished with a football tournament for all the men and a volleyball tournament for the women of Lucanamarca. In the late afternoon on the way to Huacansancos, COMISEDH staff members also lay down a flower wreath at the cross constructed at Muylla Cruz.
Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes

According to the statements gathered during the interviews, the programme of the commemoration of the 3rd of April in Lucanamarca had stayed more or less the same over the years. Still, it became clear that, once again, it had been COMISEDH who had introduced this commemorative date into the community’s festive calendar during its memory project in the village:

“Yes, because COMISEDH has organised all this, visiting the niches, the cemetery, visiting all those who have gone to the other world.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 65 years old, on June 22, 2010)\textsuperscript{157}

Even the flowers handed out to the public during the commemoration ceremony were regularly brought to Lucanamarca by COMISEDH from Ayacucho or Lima. Still, many Lucanamarquinos lamented that in 2010, no commemoration had taken place as COMISEDH had not organised the ceremony:

“Because of the organisation of the authorities, which are changing all the time and none of them has the same way of thinking, the authorities. In other years it was good, but this year it got totally lost.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 59 years old, on July 20, 2010)\textsuperscript{158}

Thus, the commemoration of April 3rd in Lucanamarca depends totally on the initiative of COMISEDH and is not carried out by the population or the community’s authorities in absence of the NGO, showing, just as in the case of the village’s places of memory, the lack of ownership of this memorialisation initiative. Still, the commemoration does regularly attract the visits of other NGOs, researchers and government institutions. This converts the commemoration into a good opportunity for Lucanamarca to display its victimisation and seek attention from outside institutions for its desire for development:

“Maybe it could, as these dates are so important, they could bring good news, maybe offer help, be it collective or individual. That’s what we are longing for, because our village of Lucanamarca economically lacks everything, and in other aspects too. Higher participation in these commemorations could help, because in the village of Lucanamarca we are in need of everything.” (Interview with a male inhabitant of Lucanamarca, 29 years old, on July 21, 2010)\textsuperscript{159}

During the annual commemoration in 2009, Lucanamarca received a visit from Minister of Defence Antero Flores Araoz, accompanied by a great number of military officials and journalists. At the height of the debate over the future construction of a national memorial

\textsuperscript{157} Originally in Spanish: “¡Sí! Porque del COMISEDH también ha organizado todo eso, visitar al nicho, al cementerio, visitar a todos que han ido pues al otro mundo.”

\textsuperscript{158} Originally in Spanish: “Por la organización de las autoridades que se están cambiando cada vez y ninguno tienen los mismos pensamientos, las autoridades. Otros años era bueno, mas bien este año total se perdió.”

\textsuperscript{159} Originally in Spanish: “Tal vez puede, como éas fechas son tan significativas, ellos traen buenas nuevas, tal vez ofreciendo cualquier apoyo, ya sea colectivo o individual. A eso estamos propensos, porque nuestro pueblo de Lucanamarca, carece de todo económicamente, y en otros aspectos también. Cuanto más participación en esos conmemoraciones podría apoyarnos, porque el pueblo de Lucanamarca somos necesitados de todo.”
Museum in Lima with funding from Germany, the Minister of Defence had chosen Lucanamarca to emphasise the heroism of the armed forces during the war and oppose any accusations that the Peruvian military had been involved in systematic human rights violations:

“[…] to also tell those who think the world has converted into a world upside down, that our armed forces are conscientious of human rights, that the excesses that were committed – because they were committed – will be punished, but in general our armed forces have recovered the peace in the country. It was them who went into this very same place of Lucanamarca to save it from terror, it was them who cooperated with the now heroic members of this community that would not let themselves be bent, it was them who assisted the wounded, it was them who helped bury the 69 fallen, it was them who helped where they could and we are grateful to these armed forces, and to these armed forces Peru owes its gratitude.” (Ministerio de Defensa del Perú 2009)

Not only did Flores-Araoz largely overstate the military’s actions in the aftermath of the massacre, he ironically also described Lucanamarca’s population as exactly the relentless hero-victims of outside terrorist forces they had not been, totally ignoring the community’s internal conflicts and the highly ambiguous relation between victims and victimisers in the village. To underline the bond between the military and Lucanamarca’s population, the armed forces had handed out t-shirts with the inscription “self-defence committee” to some men of the community in advance. The minister then addressed these men as “ronderos who had fought side-by-side with the armed forces for the pacification of the country” in his speech.

But there had never been an organised peasant self-defence committee in Lucanamarca (Interview with a COMISEDH staff member on July 9, 2010). Finally, before handing out clothes and other gifts to Lucanamarca’s population, the minister announced that the armed forces would now elaborate its own version of the events between 1980 and 2000 that should become part of Lima’s memorial museum (andina - Agencia Peruana de Noticias 2009).

Indeed, this shows that Lucanamarca has become an emblematic site of memory, but mostly for those who want to emphasise the brutality of the Shining Path vis-à-vis an innocent peasant population, thus justifying a harsh response by the armed forces. This has brought much attention to the community, but so far the population only has received petty donations once in a while.

\[160\] Originally in Spanish: “[…] para decirles también a aquellos que creen que el mundo se ha convertido en un mundo al revés, que nuestras Fuerzas Armadas son cumplidores de los Derechos Humanos, que los excesos que han habido, porque los ha habido, se castigan, pero en general nuestras Fuerzas Armadas recuperaron la paz en el país. Fueron los que ingresaron a esta misma localidad de Lucanamarca para salvarla del terror, son los que colaboraron con los hoy heroicos miembros de esta comunidad que no se dejaron doblegar, fueron los que asistieron a los heridos, fueron los que ayudaron en el entierro de los 69 caídos, fueron los que realmente prestaron todo su apoyo y a esa Fuerza Armada estamos agradecidos, a esa Fuerza Armada, el Perú le debe gratitud.”
Several COMISEDH staff members also recalled an occasion when the presence of the NGO and the usual tenor of the commemoration of April 3rd was radically questioned. During this specific commemoration, schoolchildren presented poems and discourses in the public ceremony on the main square that harshly criticised COMISEDH for its work in Lucanamarca and used a language typical for the Shining Path. Two teachers at the secondary school, who were not originally from Lucanamarca, were made out as the culprits who had incited their pupils to present the poems and speeches. The teachers were removed from their posts in Lucanamarca after pressure by COMISEDH, which also showed the major influence the NGO had acquired regarding community affairs in Lucanamarca. Ironically, one of the teachers had been the same person who had convinced the community to integrate the names of Lucanamarca’s Shining Path members into the monument on the main square.

4.4.6 Summary

Lucanamarca has become one of the emblematic sites of memory for the internal armed conflict in Peru thanks to the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the human rights organisation Comisión de Derechos Humanos (COMISEDH). The community received nearly all transitional justice mechanisms available, from the truth projects of the CVR and COMISEDH to exhumations and re-burials, followed by the trial against Abimael Guzmán. Collective and individual reparations were paid and places of memory built. COMISEDH had already accompanied the work of the CVR, and remains in the community even today to continue working with the population on the topic of memory. Since the end of the work of the CVR, COMISEDH has carried out two projects aimed at re-constructing the community’s social fabric damaged during the civil war by public acts of truth-telling. One part of these projects was also the creation of three places of memory: the Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias as a small memory house, a monument on the community’s main square containing the names of all victims of the war, including the Shining Path members from the village lynched by their own neighbours, and a cement cross at one of the massacre sites on the highlands above the village. Further, the yearly commemoration of the date of the massacre of 69 community members by the Shining Path on April 3, 1983 was institutionalised by the NGO.

While the memorials built in Lucanamarca were meant to cast in stone the mutual acknowledgement of a ‘victimisation among brothers’ within the community, leading to cohabitation and even reconciliation in the future and preventing the community from descending into violent inter- and intra-community conflicts again, Lucanamarca’s population
has interpreted the places of memory according to their own codes. Some have embraced the NGO’s vision of acknowledgement, non-repetition and reconciliation, seeing the memorial as a symbol of closure. Others use the places of memory in the community as a constant representation of the community’s collective victimisation, re-integrating the memorials into the silences constructed around the involvement with the PCP-SL and the killings among community members. Here, especially the monument in the community’s main square receives the role of communicating to the outside world Lucanamarca’s victimisation and innocence, seen as important to be accepted as worthy of receiving help in the form of reparations and state or NGO projects. This also entails the risk of a population frozen in a passive attitude of victimisation. Further, there is growing frustration over memory projects without tangible improvements among community members (Ramírez Castillo 2012).

Indeed, Lucanamarca’s population had expected a concrete ‘memory return’ from the memory work conducted in the community. The memorialisation initiatives, both by the CVR and COMISEDH, were very much imposed from the outside, a fact that has also led to the lack of ownership of the projects, visible in the deterioration or even disappearance of the places of memory in the community. Indeed, the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) and Comisión de Derechos Humanos (COMISEDH) – seen by many as one and the same institution due to their similar names – are perceived by the population as governmental initiatives for improving their community. María Eugenia Ulfe (2013) criticises that COMISEDH, with its constant intervention in the village, had become an authority in Lucanamarca, taking part in all major decisions to be made. Thus, the NGO had become the village’s dominant intermediary with the Peruvian state and the outside world in general. But over time, the constant workshops COMISEDH carried out in the community and the lack of tangible outcomes of its projects led to a massive criticism of the NGO’s work among community members, while Lucanamarca’s victims’ association, once founded with the help of COMISEDH, had ceased to exist. In a third project in Lucanamarca, funded by the European Union, COMISEDH tried to re-direct its focus, combining its memory work with technical improvements in the community’s subsistence agriculture. While this project ended in May 2012, COMISEDH managed to obtain finances for further projects with a focus on local development and continues maintaining its office in Lucanamarca even today.

### 4.5 The Centro de Memoria in Putacca

Putacca is only a two-hour minibus ride away from the city of Ayacucho, first along the paved road towards the coast, and then along a gravel road for the last half hour of the journey. The
community lies in a lush rolling countryside surrounded by eucalyptus trees, with little brooks flowing down from the hills. Putacca is categorised as a centro poblado (populated centre) – the next biggest administrational unit beneath a district – within the district of Vinchos (Huamanga province). Situated 3,550m above sea level, Putacca has a population of about 6,500 inhabitants strewn across a great number of hamlets. Only relatively few houses surround the enormous main square of the village – designed after one of Putacca’s founding fathers had visited Lima’s Plaza de Armas – while several hamlets or single houses lie some distance from the village centre. This geographical composition points to the very short history of the village, which was only just founded in the 1970s during the agrarian reform that dismantled the local haciendas. After the end of the hacienda economy, the newly created community of Putacca was named after a local plant growing near rivers and ponds, while the population now worked together in the agrarian cooperative Los Libertadores No. 256, producing especially potatoes for the coastal market, an economic activity that brought the community some economic progress (Asociación Paz y Esperanza 2007, pp.7–14). From the mid-1980s on, Putacca also profited from the Río Cachi irrigation project, whose main water reservoir is situated only a half hour walk above the village. Putacca housed the project’s main work camp between 1990 and 1997, a facility that was later handed over to the community for its use (Barrantes & Peña 2010, p.40). Today Putacca’s main economic activity is cattle farming for the purpose of milk production as well as pig breeding (Asociación Paz y Esperanza 2007, pp.28–29). The community especially comes to life on Thursdays, when a cattle market is held in Putacca and animals from Putacca and the surrounding communities and districts are sold to cattle dealers from Huamanga and elsewhere. Still there is also a very visible absence of young people in the community. Although Putacca has both an elementary and a secondary school, many villagers prefer to send their children to nearby Ayacucho for a better education. Migrating to the coast for work is also common and leaves behind a population of mainly over-forty-year-olds in the community.

While the internal armed conflict also affected Putacca, it never did so to such an extent as in Lucanamarca or in other communities surrounding the village. Despite the rather low levels of political violence in the community, the evangelical human rights organisation Asociación Paz y Esperanza (Association Peace and Hope; henceforth Paz y Esperanza) established Putacca as one of its main beneficiaries for mental health and memory-related projects. Several places of memory were constructed in the community, creating a tight bond between the local population and the NGO full of mutual expectations and misunderstandings.
4.5.1 Political Violence and NGO Intervention in Putacca

Violence against the evangelical part of the Peruvian population was a common strategy applied both by the Shining Path as well as the military during the internal armed conflict. After the assassination of seven evangelicals in their church in the province of Huanta (Ayacucho) by members of the Peruvian navy infantry in 1984, the Concilio Nacional Evangélico del Perú (National Evangelical Council of Peru – CONEP) founded the human rights organisation Paz y Esperanza, with decentralised offices all across Peru to assist victims of human rights violations and their family members during the conflict (Youngers 2003, p.103). Paz y Esperanza became an independent NGO in 1996 and centred its work on the legal defence as well as the pastoral and psychological accompaniment of victims and their family members (Youngers 2003, p.466). Like many other human rights organisations, Paz y Esperanza accompanied the Truth and Reconciliation Commission during its work, especially in the communities of Chuschi, Quispillaccta and Totos (all in the province of Cangallo). On the way to these communities, Paz y Esperanza would pass through Putacca, which enabled contact between the villagers and the NGO. When Paz y Esperanza assisted the victims’ association in Quispillaccta, victims from Putacca would also participate in the assemblies. In the end, they asked the NGO to help them establish their own victims’ association in Putacca, which Paz y Esperanza agreed to do (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on May 6, 2010).

Indeed, it seems that it was more the initiative of the community to seek help from Paz y Esperanza than the NGO’s strategic considerations on where to intervene that established the cooperation between Paz y Esperanza and Putacca. In comparison to the other communities in which Paz y Esperanza had intervened – Chuschi, Quispillaccta and Totos – Putacca had suffered a rather low level of violence during the internal armed conflict. But while some three quarters of Putacca’s population are evangelicals – mostly organised in Pentecostal movements – none of those who were interviewed considered this to be a motivation for the cooperation between the community and the evangelical NGO Paz y Esperanza.

The events of the civil war that are remembered most in Putacca are for one, the brutal murder of the community’s lieutenant governor (teniente gobernador) and the evangelical pastor on the village’s main square by members of the Shining Path, who used axes and stones to kill them. Further, on September 24, 1984 Sendero Luminoso attacked the community, burning down all the houses of the village and leaving its inhabitants homeless. The little memory book Paz y Esperanza published as a result of its work in Putacca refers to four community members bludgeoned to death by the Shining Path and the great fire of September 24, 1984 in
which the guerrilla also killed “innocent community members in passing”. *Sendero Luminoso* looted the few small shops in the village and blew up the office of the Ministry of Agriculture, the health station, the school and the community’s storehouse with dynamite. The men from the community pursued the Shining Path along with troops from the Casacancha counter-insurgency base, but they were ambushed, leaving one soldier dead and another injured. For several months, the population slept in caves and improvised shelters outside of the community to avoid being surprised by the PCP-SL once again. After the fire, a counter-insurgency base of the Peruvian Armed Forces was installed in the village and the population organised itself in self-defence committees (Asociación Paz y Esperanza 2007, pp.16–19). *Paz y Esperanza* goes on to describe Putacca’s population in the typical and ahistorical terms of victimisation, an innocent community caught between the lines of two equally evil forces: “Putacca was under pressure and threatened by the Shining Path on the one side and Peruvian state agents on the other” (Asociación Paz y Esperanza 2007, p.16).161

But *Paz y Esperanza*’s version of the time of political violence seems rather superficial and full of omissions. Rafael Barrantes and Jesús Peña (2010, p.25) who also did research on the places of memory in Putacca further mention that during the attack of the Shining Path, the community lost the documents of its communal savings, but apart from that, stick to the version presented by *Paz y Esperanza*. Neither *Paz y Esperanza* nor Barrantes and Peña mention any involvement of the community with the Shining Path or any possible reason for the attack on September 23, 1984.

Indeed, Putacca, like many other communities in Ayacucho, had initially been involved with the Shining Path. The guerrilla entered Putacca around 1983, at first holding secret meetings and finally appointing new authorities after they had obtained sufficient support from the local population (Interview with a male community member, 50 years old, on June 12, 2010). Some community members even remember being forced to help the PCP-SL in the attack against a police station. Others point to a man still living in the community who had “brought *Sendero Luminoso* into the village” and would later “turn around” (*voltear*) after the Shining Path had murdered several community authorities, selling out his own neighbours to the Peruvian Armed Forces. Thus, most community members agree that they sought help from the military not after the Shining Path had burned down the village, but already after the murder of their pastor and their lieutenant governor by the Shining Path. By request of the villagers, the military installed a counter-insurgency base in Putacca’s old school building, which it also used as a clandestine centre for torture and forced disappearance. Community members recall

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161 Originally in Spanish: “Putacca estuvo bajo la presión y amenaza de Sendero Luminoso por un lado y de agentes del Estado peruano por el otro.”
that the military brought prisoners to Putacca in trucks and helicopters and that they would hear the screams of those being tortured and raped day and night. Some even speak of a mass grave near the old school building, while others point to the fact that the military would instead kill and bury their prisoners in remote places some distance from the community (Interview with male community members on July 5, 2010, July 14, 2010 and August 11, 2010). The military is also made responsible for the forced disappearance of four villagers, while the Shining Path is accused of murdering another four community members, all of which occurred well before and not during the attack on September 23, 1984 (Interview with male community members on June 12, 2010 and July 5, 2010). During the presence of the military in Putacca, villagers also formed their self-defence committee – an act which coincided with the massive proliferation of the rondas campesinas in the district of Vinchos by mid-1984 that in turn provoked the rapid downfall of the PCP-SL in the region (Fumerton 2002, p. 93; Barrantes & Peña 2010, p. 23). The counter-insurgency base in Putacca was closed after only three or four months, leaving the village unprotected against the PCP-SL’s attack on September 23, 1984 in revenge for the community’s cooperation with the military. During the attack the papers of the community’s savings for the purchase of cattle were lost (Interview with a male community member, 50 years old, on June 12, 2010).

Today, Putacca has profited greatly from the Río Cachi irrigation project which is responsible for the abundance of water in the community. Apart from Paz y Esperanza, several other NGOs worked in Putacca, which resulted in the building of new ‘healthy’ houses and the existence of a small milk-processing plant for the production of yogurt and cheese which are even sold in the city of Ayacucho. By the time of my fieldwork for this study, Putacca’s health station had been upgraded to a mini-hospital, concomitant with the amplification of its infrastructure, while the village’s enormous main square, till then often used as grazing ground for animals, was turned into a park with paved paths, fenced flowerbeds and benches, in a project financed by the district municipality.

While Putacca never received a visit from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and its victims were thus not included in the truth commission’s report, all of its victims had been listed in the Registro Único de Víctimas (Victims’ Registry – RUV) by the time of research. Further, Putacca was one of the communities that had received collective reparations. A total of 100,000 Sol had been used to buy the cattle whose purchase during the 1980s had been made impossible through the loss of the community’s savings.

The narrative of the internal armed conflict circulating in Putacca shares many of the features also described by other authors. The population describes itself as having been attacked by
outside forces without a cause or having been betrayed by the Shining Path (Interview with a male community member, 50 years old, on June 12, 2010). Further, community members describe themselves as having been caught between the lines of the Shining Path and the armed forces without any responsibility of their own:

“Then, the military also began coming constantly and we saw ourselves in the middle of two fires, during the day the military, and the terrorists came at night. The military came shooting their guns, but we only had slingshots and knives. When it started getting dark around five o’clock in the afternoon, after dinner, we escaped to the mountains beneath the rocks, by six o’clock we had escaped to the mountains, to the caves.” (Interview with a male community member, age unknown, on July 17, 2010)

However, many villagers also remember their participation in the self-defence committees with much pride and emphasise their heroism.

4.5.2 Creating the Centro de Memoria

After the end of their work with the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Paz y Esperanza went on to work in the region, mostly in Totos, where the NGO installed a community radio and trained community communicators, who were given the task of passing on the community’s memory and history. Paz y Esperanza then applied for funding from the German-Peruvian Debt-Relief Fund for its project “Strengthening the Process of Recuperation of Mental Health, Revalorising Community Resources in the Communities of Totos, Chuschi and Vinchos” which was to be carried out in the communities of Totos, Quispillaccta (Chuschi district) and Putacca (Vinchos district).

The project built on the experience the NGO had already gathered in Totos. One of its principal objectives was to strengthen the local victims’ association. Further, the project had a focus on the community’s mental health, which included self-help groups and the search for mechanisms that contributed to the resilience of the population by concentrating on the capacities and strengths of the population. Thus, the memory component of the project did not serve as much to remember what had happened during the internal armed conflict in Putacca as to emphasise the rich history and traditions of the community and to strengthen a sense of belonging and self-esteem (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on June 1, 2010).

“The project aimed to strengthen mental health, and for us this meant re-gaining their history, their communal resources, as to say, for us that is, because mental health is the

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162 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Luego de eso, los militares también comenzaron a venir constantemente y nos vimos en medio de dos fuegos, de día los militares y los terrucos de noche entraban. Los militares entraban disparando sus armas, pero nosotros estábamos armados solo con hondas y cuchillos. Cuando ya oscurecía a las cinco de la tarde, luego de cenar ya escapábamos a los cerros debajo de las rocas, a eso de las seis de la tarde estábamos escapando ya a los cerros, a las cuevas.”
‘allin kausay’ [good life] and well-being with myself and with others and seeking together the development of our community. To us, it was important that they reconstruct their memory, their memory as a community, all of their history […]. So, that’s why we believe and until today I am convinced that if a human being does not have a sense of belonging, he is still not well. This sense of belonging, this sense of value, because if you remember, many people feel that during the violence they were treated like a thing, worse than an animal. So, if you win back your memory and you see that you have a great past, so beautiful, so interesting, you can even win back your sense of value. It is not like, as much as they are forgotten by the government, for as much as they are forgotten by the authorities, we are a community of resources. That’s what we wanted to show, a community with a wealth, a wealth of customs, a wealth of knowledge, a wealth of resources […]. It was like making them see again, like telling them: ‘Look, don’t think you are poor, look what you have, what we have.’ That was the aim.” (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on August 8, 2010)

Paz y Esperanza saw the community’s history as a form of resource that would help the population out of a sense of traumatisation and victimisation by creating confidence in its own capacities and the future development of their community. The NGO organised an inter-generational exchange of memories in which the community elders would recount the history of the community to school children. As a result, a small memory book with the title “Conociendo Nuestra Historia: Putacca” (“Getting to Know Our History: Putacca”) was published by the NGO. Further, a memory fair was organised, in which the population of Putacca and the surrounding communities could present their typical food, traditional clothing and dances (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on June 1, 2010).

From the very beginning on, Paz y Esperanza also had in mind the creation of a small memory house in the style of the museos comunitarios in Mexico and elsewhere, where the history of the community recovered during the project would be permanently exhibited. While it had been planned to create these museums in all of the three communities in which the NGO’s project intervened, the budget only allowed for the creation of two museums in Totos and Putacca (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on June 1, 2010).

Convincing Putacca’s population to create a museum was not an easy task and Paz y Esperanza was well aware that it was an idea brought to the community from the outside:

163 Originally in Spanish: “El proyecto tenía como finalidad fortalecer la salud mental y para nosotros era recuperando su historia, sus recursos comunitarios, o sea, para nosotros eso es, porque salud mental es el ‘allin kausay’ y el estar bien yo conmigo mismo y con los demás y buscar juntos el desarrollo de nuestra comunidad. Para nosotros que reconstruyan su memoria, la memoria como comunidad, todo su historia, […] era importante. Entonces, por eso es que nosotros si creemos y hasta ahora soy una convencida, si el ser humano no tiene sentido de pertenencia, no está bien todavía. Este sentido de pertenencia, sentido de valoración, porque si tu recuerdas, mucha gente siente que durante la violencia se trataba como cualquier cosa, peor que un animal. Entonces cuando uno recupera su memoria y ve que tiene un pasado tan grande, tan bonito, tan interesante, hasta el sentido de valor lo recuperas. No es como, por más que tienen en el olvido el gobierno, por más que tienen en el olvido las autoridades, nosotros somos una comunidad con recursos. Eso es lo que queríamos que se vea, una comunidad con una riqueza, una riqueza en costumbres, una riqueza en conocimientos, una riqueza en recursos […]. Era como hacerles volver a ver, como decirles: ‘Mira, no te creas pobrecito, mira lo que tienes, lo que tenemos.’ Esto era el fin.”
“We were thinking about houses or memory centres functioning as what their history means to them, their memory, that is to say, it is not their idea. We took them to Ayacucho so that they can visit.” (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on July 8, 2010)\textsuperscript{164}

“In these communities when somebody comes and says ‘we will work on a project with you’, they get very excited because they think it will be a productive project which will be an infrastructure project because over there, that’s what ‘project’ means. So, working on an abstract topic […] does not fit their expectations. To them, a project means investment, concrete things. […] They will prioritise the productive, more the concrete, because of their situation of poverty which is very crude, very harsh, the situation of extreme poverty, with malnutrition, hunger, the climate, it can ruin a year’s harvest. They have all the right to have a certain level of thinking, of expectations for the concrete.” (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on May 29, 2008)\textsuperscript{165}

Thus, to make the idea of a museum in Putacca interesting for its population, Paz y Esperanza had to take into consideration the villager’s desire for concrete measures that would benefit the development of the community. This was achieved by telling the villagers that a museum would also attract tourists, which in turn would contribute to generating income for the community:

“Further, they told us that it would be good to remember all the past here in the memory house. ‘Maybe later, even tourists can visit your community. When they see this, they can study your history’, they said. ‘What’s more, the tourists that see your museum, they can pay you’, they said. That’s how they made the house of the museum, because of that they brought their old clothes, their old spinning, they brought all the things they did in the old days.” (Interview with a female community member, 48 years old, on July 11, 2008)\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{164} Originally in Spanish: “Nosotros estábamos pensando en las casas o centros de la memoria en función de lo que para ellos significa su historia, su memoria, o sea no es una idea suya. Nosotros los trajimos a Ayacucho para que visiten.”

\textsuperscript{165} Originally in Spanish: “En estas comunidades cuando uno llega y dice ‘vamos a trabajar un proyecto con ustedes’ se emocionan mucho porque piensan que va ser un proyecto productivo que va ser un proyecto de infraestructura, porque allá proyecto suena eso. Entonces trabajar un tema abstracto […] no cuadra en sus expectativas. De lo que es un proyecto significa inversión, cosas concretas. […] Van a priorizar lo productivo, más lo concreto, por la situación de pobreza que son muy crudas, muy duras, la situación de pobreza extrema, la desnutrición, el hambre, el clima, te malogra toda la cosecha del año. Tienen toda la razón para tener un nivel de pensamiento, de expectativa por lo concreto.”

\textsuperscript{166} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Además nos dijeron que sería bueno recordar todo lo pasado aquí en la casa de la memoria. ‘Quizá mas adelante hasta turistas puedan visitar vuestro pueblo. Viendo eso ellos puedan estudiar la historia de ustedes’ nos dijeron. ‘Además esos turistas viendo el museo los pueda pagar’ nos dijeron. Es así como se levantó la casa del museo, por eso es que trajeron las ropas antiguas, los hilados, todas las cosas que hacían antes han traído.”
Figure 22: View over Putacca.

Source: Markus Weissert.

Figure 23: Museo de la Memoria of Putacca.

Source: Markus Weissert.
Figure 24: Paintings by Roger Tello Roca in the Museo de la Memoria, Putacca.

Figure 25: Burned photos reminding of the political violence, Museo de la Memoria, Putacca.

Source: Markus Weissert.
Figure 26: Exhibits in the *Museo de la Memoria*, Putacca.

Source: Markus WeSSERT.

Figure 27: Murals on the main square of Putacca before their deterioration.

Source: Courtesy of *Asociación Paz y Esperanza.*
Figure 28: Murals on the main square of Putacca before their deterioration.

Source: Courtesy of Asociación Paz y Esperanza.

Figure 29: Murals on the main square of Putacca after their deterioration.

Source: Markus Weissert.
Figure 30: Murals on the main square of Putacca after their deterioration. 

Source: Markus Weissert.

Figure 31: Totem of Peace and Memory on the main square of Putacca.

Source: Markus Weissert.
These prospects of development finally convinced the population of the idea for a museum. *Paz y Esperanza*’s methodology was also highly participatory, with several workshops and large community assemblies where decisions were made by the community itself, which further contributed to a sense of ownership. The next step was then to take several community authorities and members of the victims’ association to Ayacucho, where they visited the *Museo de Memoria de ANFASEP* as well as several other museums. According to *Paz y Esperanza* staff members, the villagers did not like the display of violence and the objects associated with the memory of violence in ANFASEP’s museum, but instead preferred the exhibition of historical objects of everyday life. Thus, while the initial idea for a museum came from the NGO, the decision of what to display in it came from within the community. This also included an exchange with neighbouring communities that were invited to contribute to the creation of the museum (Interview with a *Paz y Esperanza* staff member on June 1, 2010).

The *Casa de la Memoria de Putacca* – or Memory House of Putacca – was finally installed in a room within the compound of the *Río Cachi* irrigation project next to the village’s main square. It is easily visible from the main square, as the façade is painted with the depiction of a man and a woman in traditional clothing. From the main square, the visitor enters into a small courtyard and from there into the museum that consists of a single room. On the floor, the walls and in two glass cabinets, traditional clothes, ceramics, and tools are exhibited. One
glass cabinet also contains old coins. The political violence is not directly visible in the museum. Only some slightly burned photographs bear witness of the great fire on September 23, 1984. All exhibits contain small descriptions in Spanish to one side. One of the walls is covered with a series of four paintings by the young Ayacuchano artist Roger Tello Roca, commissioned by Paz y Esperanza for the museum in Putacca. The first picture shows the abuse suffered by the population during the time of the hacendados and the second depicts the community’s founding as well as the work in the agrarian cooperative in the 1970s, the latter in a very nostalgic style. The third painting shows the destruction of the village during the Shining Path incursion on September 23, 1984. In the top part of this painting, three individuals are visible: on the left side a masked Senderista carrying an axe, on the right side a soldier in uniform with a gun, and in the middle a bleeding peasant dressed in white – the colour of innocence – caught between the lines of the two evil forces. The last painting shows the vision of a peaceful and prosperous future in Putacca, with villagers letting a white dove fly. Indeed, the paintings mainly represent nostalgic clichés, of which that of an innocent civilian population victimised both by the Shining Path as well as the military, stands out, and integrates the museum in Putacca into a standardised representation of the indigenous peasants during the civil war in Peru. Paradoxically, this representation of a victimised civilian population without agency is very much at odds with the aim of re-gaining identity and confidence envisioned by Paz y Esperanza. Instead, the existence of the ronda campesina in Putacca, to many villagers a topic of much pride, is absent in the exhibition.167

The small museum does not contain any clothing or photographs of victims of the armed conflict. According to the villagers, only a few community members had photographs of their loved ones in the 1980s. Further, photographs and other objects were lost during the fire on September 23, 1984. Others also stated that Paz y Esperanza did not want them to lend their victimhood any prominence in the museum. Instead, near the entrance to the museum, where the visitor’s book is also kept, the portraits of the villagers who had helped in the creation of the museum are shown. Several aphorisms in Spanish and Quechua cover the walls of the museum, telling the visitor: “The memory centre was implemented with the aim to rescue the values and customs of our ancestors, to not forget them and to strengthen our communal identity”, “For the re-valuing of our customs, for a community with good communal mental health”, “Practicing our communal resources like the ayni [reciprocity] and the minka

167 The memory house in Totos is designed exactly the same way as in Putacca. It contains objects that refer to the history and traditions of the community as well as paintings by the same artist, Roger Tello Roca. While Totos was home to a notorious counter-insurgency base of the Peruvian Armed Forces and served as an important clandestine centre for torture and forced disappearance, this part of Totos’ history is only referred to abstractly in Roger Tello Roca’s paintings.
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[community service] we will obtain the development of our community”, “We are not ashamed of our customs, community, clothing, food and our language Quechua”, “The village is our father and mother, therefore, it is our duty to work, uniting efforts and interests to further its well-being”, “Our communal resources: learning and knowledge; we will show it to our children and we will practice it to achieve our communal mental health.” These rather indoctrinating slogans covering the museum’s walls make little sense for Putacca’s population, many of whom are illiterate.

Indeed, it is not an easy undertaking to visit Putacca’s Museo de la Memoria. While Paz y Esperanza trained several museum guides among the community’s population, only one of them still has the key to the museum. This person, unfortunately, lives in a hamlet some half an hour’s walk from Putacca. In addition, nobody collects an entrance fee from the visitors. The visitor’s book bears witness of visits mostly by known human rights activists and researchers, while there are no signs of any visits from people from Putacca itself – a difficult task anyway, given that the museum is constantly closed.

Once having established the museum, Paz y Esperanza went on to seek funding for its work in Putacca as they felt that, compared to the other two communities that had participated in the memorialisation project – Quispillaccta and Totos – the population of Putacca was more enthusiastic to participate. Putacca became one of the main project sites of the NGO in the region:

“In Putacca there was even more initiative from the people [...]. Putacca was always proposing, suggesting things, looking for us and presenting some initiatives [...].”

(Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on May 6, 2010)

This shows that Paz y Esperanza’s work in the community had established a certain dependency. To the authorities and the population of Putacca, the NGO had become the entity from which they sought money and help in realising their dream of development. To satisfy

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168 Originally in Quechua and Spanish: “Yuyaywasinchikt a qatarichirqanchik ñawpaq taytamamanchikunapa yachayninkuna ama qunqanapaq. – El centro de memoria se implementó con la finalidad de rescatar los valores y costumbres de nuestros antepasados, para no olvidar y fortalecer nuestra identidad comunal.”, “Por la revaloración de nuestras costumbres, para una comunidad con buena salud mental comunitaria.”, “Aynipi, minkapi llamkaptinchiqa llaqtanchikpas qatun kawsaytan qaypanqa. – Practicando nuestros recursos comunitarios como el Ayni y la Minka alcanzaremos el desarrollo de nuestro pueblo.”, “Ama pinqakusunchu custumbrinchikunamanta. Llaqtanchikmanta pachanchikmanta, mikuyninchikmanta chaynallataq runasiminchikmanta. – No nos avergonzemos de nuestros costumbres, comunidad, ropa, comida y de nuestro idioma quechua.”, “Llaqtanchikqa tayta mamanchikiqinam, chaymi llapallanchik llamkananchik: huk sunqulla, huk umalla. – El pueblo es nuestro Padre y Madre, por ello es deber de todos nosotros trabajar unificando esfuerzos e intereses para forjar el bienestar de ella.”, “Yachayninchikunata qipa warmanchikunaman yachachispa saqisun allin kawsay qaypanakupaq: sapaqpi aylunchikpi chaynallataq llaytanchikpa. - Nuestros recursos comunitarios como: aprendizajes y saberes enseñemos a nuestros hijos y practiquemoslo para podamos alcanzar nuestra salud mental comunitaria.”

169 Originally in Spanish: “En Putacca hubo aun más iniciativa de la gente [...]. Putacca siempre estaba proponiendo, planteando cosas, buscándonos y presentándonos algunas iniciativas [...].”
the population’s desire for concrete development projects, the NGO also carried out a project in the breeding of pigs and guinea pigs – not really a topic that *Paz y Esperanza* had much experience in as a human rights organisation. Finally, their good relation to the local population allowed the NGO to introduce a second memorialisation project to the community that was carried out between late 2008 and early 2009:

> “Thus, the way it turned out in Putacca, we had the impression that it had turned out well, the museum, and as the people were very interested to go on with this, with transmitting the intergenerational memory and all that, we carried out a small project planned for six months, but it was extended to ten months. So, what we did there was colour our history, our memory. What we did around the whole main square [...] drawings in which everyone would participate, the family, the children, the adolescents, even the elders. So, they could represent whatever they decided!” (Interview with a *Paz y Esperanza* staff member on June 1, 2010)

For this project, *Paz y Esperanza* had acquired funding from the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, one of the larger internationally operating entities specialised in the promotion of memorials. Further, the Evangelical Development Service (*Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst* – EED) of the German Lutheran Church supported *Paz y Esperanza* with a German psychologist who also worked on the memorialisation initiative in Putacca. *Paz y Esperanza*’s idea was that the population of Putacca would paint all of the walls directed towards the village’s main square with themes taken from their own history and traditions in a communal effort. The NGO would provide the paint, but it would be the population itself that would decide in workshops what to paint where, and it would be the population itself who would carry out the painting. Once again, *Paz y Esperanza*’s methodology was highly participatory, with workshops to which the entire population of the village was invited.

It was agreed that different sections of the murals would be painted by different groups, one part by the elders, another by children and adolescents, and another by the victims’ association. The workers of the local health station painted the part of the wall corresponding to their establishment, while teachers and pupils painted the walls of the secondary school on the main square. However, many community members had no experience in painting. Thus, *Paz y Esperanza* brought students from the School of Fine Arts of Ayacucho to Putacca to help the population carry out the paintings that they had agreed upon in workshops and assemblies.

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170 Originally in Spanish: “Entonces, como en Putacca resultó, nos pareció que resultó bien, esto del museo y que la gente estaba muy interesada en seguir esto, transmitir la memoria intergeneracional y todo aquello, se realizó un pequeño proyecto para la duración, que tenía 6 meses, pero se alargó a 10 meses. Entonces lo que ahí hacíamos es coloreando nuestra historia, nuestra memoria. Lo que se hizo es alrededor de todo el parque[...]: dibujos en los que estuvieran las familia, los niños, los jóvenes, todos que participaran, hasta los adultos mayores. Entonces que iban a representar lo que ellos decidan.”
The result of this joint effort, in which people of the different sectors of the community worked together, were paintings referring to customs and traditions, some of them displaying the traditional patterns used in clothes and hats. Others showed landscapes, flowers and birds of the region. But also the political violence figured prominently among the paintings in the main square. One of the paintings show Shining Path members crushing the heads of villagers with stones, another one depicts Senderistas shooting at a helicopter of the armed forces. Patrolling soldiers and armed peasants are also displayed. One wall of the main square is decorated with a metal structure forming a dove, which is also the logo of Paz y Esperanza. Interestingly, while the display of the time of violence had received little space in the Museo de Memoria constructed earlier, the representation of the internal armed conflict in Putacca now stood out among the murals. According to Paz y Esperanza staff members, it was the men of the community in particular that had wanted to paint about the conflict in their community (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on March 21, 2011).

But at first, the NGO had great problems to introduce its project to the community, as it did not match the villagers’ expectations of a development project:

“At first we started, for example, we always started with a workshop to present the project to them. The problem was how to manage the topic of the budget. It was $10,000, which is not that much, but the money raised high expectations among the population. [...] Some said ‘We shouldn’t go on with this. Let’s buy cows or let’s buy bulls’. But nobody will give you the money to buy that or give it away as a present and we explained that to them. If they don’t want the money, it simply goes back because it is just for the project. So, I had to enter into various conversations and meetings which permitted [them] to come closer and understand what the project was about.” (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on June 2, 2010)  

Paz y Esperanza’s participatory methodology would finally enable them to persuade the population and reach a consensus about the necessity to carry out the project (Barrantes & Peña 2010, p.68). Still, the final step for the acceptance of the project was achieved with pure coercion:

“And then it all turned out different because the people in Putacca then said: ‘No, we want to be paid to paint these walls.’ I then said: ‘There will be no money for you for painting the walls. It is your history. And if you want to work with your history, then you have to do something for it. It’s ok if you don’t want to, there’s no problem in giving back the project. There are so many places in the world where civil wars and massacres have taken place, and which apply for these projects, and then someone else will get...”

171 Originally in Spanish: “En un primer momento, para entrar por ejemplo, siempre entrábamos con un taller para presentarlos el proyecto. El problema era de como manejar el tema del presupuesto, eran como $10,000. No es mucho, digamos, pero el dinero en si ha causado mucha expectativa en la población. [...] Algunos dijeron, ‘mejor no avance eso, complémos vacas o compremos toros’. Pero nadie te da plata para que compres eso y los regales y le explicamos eso. Si ellos no quieren el dinero, se regresa nada más porque está solo para el proyecto. Entonces tuve que entrar en varias conversaciones y reuniones lo que permitiera acercar y entender de lo que se trataba el proyecto.”
Of course, under the impression of the threat that the NGO would retreat from the community and end its paternalistic relationship with Putacca, the community accepted the memorialisation initiative. Indeed, it showed the community that it was dangerous to not accept the projects offered to them by NGOs, even if they did not correspond with their expectations, as this could question the relation with the NGO and therefore their dreams of development they sought to achieve by being attended to by NGOs.

While the community was coerced into the project, once again, Paz y Esperanza’s methodology left much space for the community to develop their own ideas for painting the walls surrounding the village’s main square. Thus, the population not only accepted the project, they also felt it was their own achievement:

“Yes, all the people agreed on painting. It was a little important. There was nothing around the park. It was sad, not nice. With this idea, everyone came to an agreement between the authorities, community members, pupils, teachers, too, and the workers, too. [...] So, with this interest, with this enthusiasm they agreed among each other and began to make the park. Everything that exists is communal, everything that they do in the community. There are the drawings [that show] how they passed through the time of violence, how their music was, how their work was, how their artisanry was.”

(Interview with a male community member, 33 years old, on June 29, 2010)

Indeed, this statement and many others show the ownership of the project by the community members that put much effort of their own into the paintings. Still, not the entire community could participate in the NGO’s project. Ironically, it was the most marginal community members, those actually at the centre of Paz y Esperanza’s mental health focus, who could not participate in the project:

“Yes, I went, but I couldn’t participate continuously. As you see, it is not enough. Here, in the field, we don’t have time, time is not enough. In the field we have a lot to do. Also, we have to take care of our animals and there are always things to do.”

(Interview with a female community member, age unknown, on August 12, 2010)

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172 Originally in German: “Und dann ergab sich das dann aber anders, weil nämlich die Leute dann in Putacca sagten: ‘Nein, wir wollten gern bezahlt werden dafür, dass wir hier die Wände bemalen.’ Ich hab dann gesagt: ‘Geld dafür, dass ihr die Wände bemalt, gibt’s nicht. Das ist ja eure Geschichte. Und wenn ihr mit der Geschichte arbeiten wollt, dann ist es eure Entscheidung, dann müsst ihr auch dafür was tun. Gut, wenn ihr nicht wollt, ist es überhaupt kein Problem, das Projekt wieder zurückzugeben. Es gibt sehr viele Orte dieser Welt, wo Bürgerkriege und Massaker stattgefunden haben, die sich um diese Projekte bewerben, und dann wird’s halt jemand anders kriegen.’”

173 Originally in Spanish: “Ya, todas las personas se pusieron de acuerdo en pintar. Era medio importante. No había nada alrededor del parque. Era triste, no era alegre. Con esa idea se pusieron de acuerdo entre las autoridades, comuneros, alumnos, profesores también y los trabajadores también. [...] Entonces, con ese interés con ese entusiasmo se pusieron de acuerdo y comenzó a hacer el parque. Todo lo que existe es comunal, todo lo que hacen dentro de la comunidad. Ahí están los dibujos como han pasado durante la violencia, como era su música, como era su trabajo, su artesanía todo.”

174 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Sí he ido, sólo que en forma consecutiva no asistí. Así pues, como ve
This statement by one of the widows of a community member slain by the Shining Path in 1984 also shows the limits of participatory methodology that requires the continuous active participation of the local population. In an environment of poverty and the daily struggle for economic survival, people cannot afford to dedicate large parts of their time to an NGO project and leave their bread-winning activities aside. Thus, in Putacca it was those with greater economic resources or family members that could substitute them in their daily work who could participate in the NGO’s project. At the same time, community members such as the persons most affected by the political violence in the community, widowed women with little or no family support, as well as those living some distance from the village centre, could not participate continuously. Thus, the participatory methodology paradoxically excluded especially those community members the project had been aimed at. Indeed, one Paz y Esperanza staff member admitted that, while the painting of the walls around Putacca’s main square began with a great part of the community’s population involved, participation diminished considerably during the project, and only few would go on to accompany the project until the paintings were finished (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on June 1, 2010).

Further, the construction materials necessary for painting the murals raised expectations among the population. Especially the empty paint cans that could be re-used by the population became an issue of conflict, as different community members claimed they should be given to them. Finally, Paz y Esperanza agreed to buy benches for the main square in an attempt to satisfy the community’s demand for a concrete development project, manifest in the form of the built environment. But the district municipality of Vinchos already had a plan for turning Putacca’s main square into a neat park. Thus, Paz y Esperanza suggested to the community to build a monument in the park’s centre instead of buying the benches (Barrantes & Peña 2010, pp.68–69).

Once again, community members were asked to hand in their proposals for the design of the monument to be erected in the village. In an assembly it was agreed that the monument would take on the form of a man in traditional clothes and weaponry – a ‘local hero’ representing the history and traditions of the community. But in an odd twist, Paz y Esperanza ignored the community’s decision and opted instead for the design of its staff member, former ANFASEP youth activist and artist Heeder Soto Quispe – himself the son of a disappeared person. The monument, constructed by Heeder Soto Quispe himself, out of untreated parts of metal welded together, depicted an abstract dove standing for peace – and also part of Paz y Esperanza's vision for the community's future.
Esperanza’s logo – accompanied by equally abstract representations of a cow, a trout, a corncob, and an ear of wheat, standing for the community’s resources. A plaque on the concrete plinth of the monument, inaugurated in April 2009 together with the murals, told visitors: “Totem of Peace and Identity – Totemic monument dedicated to the bravery and struggle of the men and women of Putacca that overcame the adversities of the time of violence. In complete recognition of those who gave their lives to achieve peace; so that the children of this village may construct their new destiny.”

Part of the project was also the training of community guides that could show visitors around and explain to them the Centro de Memoria de Putacca. Further, Paz y Esperanza also produced a video and a website for the memory centre.

4.5.3 Making Sense of the Centro de Memoria de Putacca

Paz y Esperanza’s focus in both memorialisation projects, the memory museum and the murals, had been on mental health. According to the views of the NGO, the population affected by the internal armed conflict suffered from typical symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder such as low self-esteem, failing communication systems within the community and a severely damaged social fabric. While this may indeed be true for some of the community members of Putacca, Paz y Esperanza took traumatisation in Putacca simply for granted without conducting a prior diagnosis before beginning its project, therefore also making it impossible to find out if their projects were actually having an effect on the mental health of the population they were working with.

For the NGO, the memorialisation initiatives had the aim of helping the community reconstruct their communal identity and thus their social fabric. As both projects focused on the community’s rich history and traditions, Paz y Esperanza wanted to raise the population’s awareness of their resilience in the face of political violence and shift their attention away from a passive attitude of victimisation. The participatory methodology was to open new channels of communication within the community, and bringing the population to work together in the project was to show them that they were capable of achieving something as a community, thus also strengthening the population’s self-esteem:

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175 Originally in Spanish: “Totem de la paz y la identidad – Monumento totémico, dedicado al valor y lucha de los varones y mujeres de Putacca, quienes se sobrepusieron a las adversidades los tiempos de la violencia. Reconocimiento pleno a los que aportaron con su vida a conquistar la paz; para que los hijos e hijas de este pueblo construyan su nuevo destino.”

176 The video can be watched at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yu81N1rUNJQ (in Spanish, accessed July 1, 2015), but the website has gone offline in the meanwhile.
“The memory centre was one of the most concrete things we found which would connect them in a direct way with their history, their memory, their identity, very, very clear in reinforcing and strengthening their identity.” (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on May 29, 2008)\textsuperscript{177}

“So, we thought that it would be necessary for the village to motivate itself again, inspire, strengthen itself by remembering the beautiful things about their past, because if you talk to many of them, they cry. They tell you: ‘Before it was like this, then the terrorism came, and we were left behind like that’. So, we wanted to make them aware that it was still possible to work to recover the things that were important. We worked, for example, on the topic of self-esteem. An important need in the human being is the sense of belonging, to belong to a certain group, to belong to a place. So, if they had lost this, maybe because of that they didn’t give any importance to other things.” (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on August 8, 2010)\textsuperscript{178}

Further, especially the painting of the murals included elements of art therapy, in which the population would creatively work through their history, overcoming trauma and gaining new confidence. Still, according to Paz y Esperanza staff members, the museum and paintings also had more classic transitional justice aims such as public acknowledgement and non-repetition. The memorials were to function as the community’s visitor centre, where the village’s history could be experienced and thereby acknowledged by tourists. Explicitly, Putacca was to become a part of the local tourism circuit, adding – very much in line with the ideas of the community-museum movement – an element of development by tourism to the project, thereby also satisfying the community’s expectations of progress and the generation of income in the village. Finally, the inter-generational transmission of the memory of violence should also ensure the non-repetition of human rights violations in the community and beyond (Interviews with Paz y Esperanza staff members On May 6, 2010, June 1, 2010, June 2, 2010, August 7, 2010, and August 8, 2010).

\textsuperscript{177} Originally in Spanish: “El centro de memoria fue una de las cosas mas concretas que encontramos, que lo vincule de una manera clara con su historia, con su memoria, con su identidad, muy, muy clara para reforzar y fortalecer su identidad.”

\textsuperscript{178} Originally in Spanish: “Entonces pensábamos que era necesario que el pueblo vuelva a motivarse, a inspirarse, a fortalecerse, recordando lo bonito del pasado porque si tu hablas con muchos de ellos, ellos lloran. Te dicen ‘antes era así, después viene el terrorismo quedamos así’. Entonces queríamos hacerles concientes de que se podía todavía trabajar para volver a recuperar muchas cosas que eran importante. Nosotros trabajábamos, por ejemplo, en el tema de autoestima. Una necesidad importante en el ser humano, es la necesidad de pertenencia, de pertenecer a un grupo, de pertenecer a una tierra. Entonces, si ellos habían perdido eso, quizá por eso no daban valor a las demás cosas.”
The responses of community members (figure 7) correspond to a large degree with the aims of the NGO. Acknowledgement is once again one of the most important meanings the population attributes to the memorialisation initiatives. There are two groups from which this acknowledgement is expected to come: visitors from outside the community, especially foreigners, and the youth of Putacca itself. The acknowledgement by Putacca’s young population and future generation is seen as important for several reasons. Even during the project, Putacca’s elders had complained that today’s youth was unaware of the customs and traditions of their community and the hardships they had gone through to enable future generations a better life. The transmission of memory was thus seen as an important way to construct a joint communal identity:

“We said that today’s students will look at it to remember the old grandfathers, their clothes, their equipment, their customs and when they see this they will have something like an exam.” (Interview with a male community member, 58 years old, on May 7, 2010)\textsuperscript{179}

“To me, the museum here is excellent as a memory of how our forefathers were. We don’t know the clothes the old grandfathers wore, or which customs they had or what they used, which equipment they used for their kitchen, which clothes, of which type. We didn’t know all that. But with the museum, we became aware how our forefathers were,

\textsuperscript{179} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Dijimos que los estudiantes de ahora van a ver para recordar a los antiguos abuelitos, sus ropas, sus utensilios, sus costumbres y viendo esos como examen van a dar.”
our grandfathers, our great-grandfathers.” (Interview with a male community member, 20 years old, on August 11, 2010)\textsuperscript{180}

But there is also a need for acknowledgement of the violence committed in the community. Thus, it is felt that the next generations should also know the truth:

“They should know what happened to us. They say ‘That’s how it happened during that time’. That’s how they become aware about all that happened here, and they can also believe what really happened because the old people fear that the boys will not believe. That’s why the murals are there, it is like a portrait, like a photo.” (Interview with a female community member, 54 years old, on July 14, 2010)\textsuperscript{181}

“It is also a place at which my children can look and say that ‘It is true that my father died under these circumstances’, and that’s why they made this place of memory” (Interview with a female community member, 54 years old, on July 10, 2008)\textsuperscript{182}

Finally, this disclosure of truth and the acknowledgment by the young people of Putacca is also seen as a contribution to a lesson of ‘never again’ in the community:

“It would be serving its purpose if the new generation sees and reflects, so that from now on political violence cannot happen.” (Interview with a male community member, 20 years old, on August 11, 2010)\textsuperscript{183}

While the representation of the past directed inwardly at Putacca’s youth strengthens cohesion within the community, the representation of the past is also directed at people from outside the community. Here, especially foreigners are seen as crucial to fulfilling the community’s dream of development. Indeed, the NGO had specifically envisaged the Centro de Memoria de Putacca as a tourist attraction to generate a direct source of income for the population. This expectation is also apparent in the community members’ statements:

“To see, just like in Huamanga, they will come from other countries and they will see. There will be economic income, they will see and pay money.” (Interview with a male community member, 68 years old, on June 29, 2010)\textsuperscript{184}

“It serves more or less, but it is also a source of income because of the tourists. That way, they can come and for the community that can be an income, can’t it? When someone comes, they can contribute something to the population, [they can buy] food,

\textsuperscript{180} Originally in Spanish: “El museo para mí estaría excelente acá como un recuerdo, como fueron los antepasados. Nosotros no conocemos pues las vestimentas que se vestían los anteriores abuelos, o que costumbres tenían o que utilizaban, que utensilios para su cocina, para su ropa, que vestimenta, de que tipo. Todo eso no sabíamos. Pero con el museo nos enteramos ahora como eran nuestros antepasados, nuestros abuelos, nuestros tatarabuelos.”

\textsuperscript{181} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Deben saber lo que nos ha pasado. Ellos dicen ‘así pues habrá pasado ese tiempo’. Así también se entran ellos todo lo que pasó aquí, y también puedan creer lo que realmente sucedió, porque las personas mayores temen que los chicos no las puedan creer. Por eso están ahí los murales, eso es como un retrato, como una foto.”

\textsuperscript{182} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Es un lugar también para que vean mis hijos y digan que ‘de verdad mi papá ha muerto en esas circunstancias’ y por eso hicieron este lugar de memoria.”

\textsuperscript{183} Originally in Spanish: “Estaría sirviendo eso para que la nueva generación vea eso y reflexione, para que de aquí en adelante no pase así violencias políticas.”

\textsuperscript{184} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Para mirar, como en Huamanga van a venir de otros países y van a mirar diciendo, va a haber ingreso económico, pagando platita van a mirar.”
Apart from generating direct income, the Centro de Memoria de Putacca serves, quite in contrary to the ideals established by Paz y Esperanza, to represent the population’s poverty and victimisation to the outside world. This is done in the typical narrative of an innocent civilian population caught between the lines of two equally deadly forces; hence the representation of passive, deserving victims. Especially foreigners are the target of this representation, as they are seen as solvent, being able to contribute personally to the needs of development in the community, or as multipliers that can establish links to the Peruvian state, to NGOs or to the international community in order to attract development aid to Putacca:

“When we made these paintings, we talked, saying that the tourists will come and they will become aware of all the dead, of the blows we have received. ‘They will become aware of everything we really went through when they look at the paintings’, we said.” (Interview with a male community member, 51 years old, on June 29, 2010)

“To me, it means a visiting place where the people that visit come, and they become aware of who died in the time of violence. Further, when they see this, maybe they might become interested in helping us.” (Interview with a female community member, 54 years old, on July 10, 2008)

“Yes, Markus, as I was already telling you fairly clearly, as you are German, I would like to ask the German President, send him a strong embrace from me and my affection so that he might help us with our secondary school. Our secondary school has been destroyed by these gentlemen [from the Shining Path]. Now, it only has rustic material and I want Mr. President to help us. By tomorrow I will send a letter to Mr. President.” (Interview with a male community member, age unknown, on August 11, 2010)

Thus, the display of victimisation and its acknowledgement by foreigners are considered by the villagers to be crucial for their claims to development aid and thus to progress for their community. But also the memorialisation project itself is seen as a concrete measure of progress in the community:

“When these things weren’t here it was strange, our village was sad. There was nothing, no house or anything and it was sad. But now that we have these things, it is as

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185 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Mas o menos sirve, pero también es un ingreso por los turistas. Así pueden venir y para la comunidad puede ser un ingreso ¿no? Cuando viene alguien, pueden dar a la población, tanto en alimentación, hospedaje.”

186 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Al hacer esos dibujos hemos conversado diciendo que van a venir los turistas y se van a enterar de todas las muertes, de los golpes que hemos recibido. ‘Se van a enterar de todo lo que hemos pasado verdaderamente al ver los dibujos’ decíamos.”

187 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Para mi significa un lugar de visita a donde las personas que nos visitan llegan, y se enteran quienes han muerto en la época de la violencia. Además viendo eso quizás se puedan interesar en apoyarnos.”

188 Originally in Spanish: “Sí, Markus, como yo estoy hablando prácticamente claro, como usted es alemán, yo pediría al presidente alemán, mandarle un fuerte abrazo, además un fuerte cariño para que nos apoye en nuestro colegio. Nuestro colegio ha sido destrozado por esos señores. Ahora está solo con material rústico. Yo quiero que nos apoye el señor Presidente. Hasta mañana yo voy a mandar una cartita al señor presidente.”
if we were full, we are like an improved village now.” (Interview with a male community member, age unknown, on June 11, 2010)\(^{189}\)

“Before, we were a little ... we didn’t have a memory centre. Now I feel changed, my village, a centre of memory, it has a bit of development. It has changed from before.” (Interview with a male community member, 25 years old, on July 17, 2010)\(^{190}\)

Thus, the memory museum, the murals and the monument are seen as a concrete improvement to the village’s image and infrastructure. Still, the dependence on the work of NGOs also becomes obvious in these statements. Many villagers only participated in the project because \textit{Paz y Esperanza} had handed out free food and drinks during the creation of the museum and the painting sessions in the main square:

“When the people from \textit{Paz y Esperanza} came, we grabbed on to them because they helped us even with food, they lead us even at work.” (Interview with a male community member, age unknown, on June 11, 2010)\(^{191}\)

While having free food and beverages in return for their work was a strong incentive for participating in the NGO’s project, which is still widely remembered among the population as a concrete relief measure, \textit{Paz y Esperanza} arranged the preparation and consumption of food during the project as a communal act. Thus, community members would jointly cook and eat the food brought to the community by the NGO, thereby contributing to \textit{Paz y Esperanza}’s aim of community-building:

“We, the community, did all this work. Nobody was against it. On the contrary, we all worked gladly because they even brought us food to eat. They told us to prepare the food while we were all working. We all worked there, forming groups by our neighbourhood, each neighbourhood worked on a task.” (Interview with a male community member, age unknown, on June 11, 2010)\(^{192}\)

Thus, many community members state that the communal effort of creating the \textit{Centro de Memoria de Putacca} made them feel proud and re-united the community:

“We felt satisfied. Before that, there was not even shit. Afterwards it became beautiful here, nice, and because of that we feel content and happy. Before there was absolutely nothing and we felt very sad. After they painted the park and put the monument up it changed into something very nice and we felt happy and satisfied. As I said, there was nothing before, there were only adobe walls, there were only walls, and that had also been brought by \textit{Paz y Esperanza}. There we plastered and painted. We made little parks

\(^{189}\) In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Cuando no había estas cosas era extraño, era triste nuestro pueblo. No había nada ni casa, nada, y era triste pues. Pero ahora que existe estas cosas ya estamos como lleno, como un pueblo mejorado ya estamos pues.”

\(^{190}\) Originally in Spanish: “Antes estábamos, un poco, no teníamos un centro de memoria. Ahora me siento cambiado, mi pueblo centro de memoria, tiene un poco de desarrollo, ya cambia de los anteriores.”

\(^{191}\) In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Cuando llegaron los de Paz y Esperanza nos hemos agarrado de ellos porque ellos hasta en la comida nos han ayudado, hasta en los trabajos ellos nos han encabezado.”

\(^{192}\) In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “La comunidad hemos trabajado eso todos. No había nadie que estaba en contra. Al contario todos trabajamos con mucha alegría porque incluso nos han traído comidas para comer. Nos mandaba a preparar la comida cuando todos trabajábamos. Allí todos hemos trabajado formando grupos por barrios, cada barrio hemos trabajado por tareas.”
at each corner, we felt happy making them, re-united all together.” (Interview with a male community member, 58 years old, on July 5, 2010)\textsuperscript{193}

It seems that *Paz y Esperanza’s* aim – to re-build the community’s damaged social fabric in a communal effort of constructing places of memory in Putacca – had borne fruit after all. The highly participatory methodology, in which a great part of the community worked together for the first time in years had indeed created a new sense of community, and also had a concrete effect on individuals that stated feeling happy or proud about their and the community’s achievements. This may be interpreted as a sign that at least some individuals profited from the project in the sense that they could build their self-esteem and overcome the focus on their own victimisation. Also, *Paz y Esperanza’s* self-help groups are described as having a positive impact by many villagers. Still, any notion of individual or communal healing must be handled with much care, as many of the community members most affected during the internal armed conflict did not participate in the project on a regular basis. Many other community members equally mention that the memorialisation project awakened old fears and pain:

“I feel very sad, with a lot of sorrow. That’s how we have been. I get sad when I see these images. When I see them I cry ‘That’s how we have been, in so much pain, with so much sorrow. Where have these awful times gone?’ Some say these times will come back and I say ‘Not even God wants these times to come back.’ This life has been a very, very painful life for us.” (Interview with a female community member, age unknown, on August 12, 2010)\textsuperscript{194}

Thus, as in the case of ANFASEP and Lucanamarca, the villagers of Putacca have an ambivalent attitude towards addressing the violent past in monuments and memorials. Some consider it to be positive for community cohesion, others see it as opening up old wounds. While truth, acknowledgement, non-repetition and even healing are important topics to the villagers, the museum and murals do not serve the purpose of commemoration, as the memorials of ANFASEP and in Lucanamarca do. There have never been any commemorative ceremonies surrounding the museum or murals. Further, there are no photographs, paintings or personal objects of any of the victims in the memorials in Putacca. While some community

\textsuperscript{193} In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Nosotros nos hemos sentido contentos. Antes no había ni miércoles. Aquí luego se volvió muy hermoso, bonito por lo que nos sentimos contentos y alegres. Antes no había absolutamente nada y nos sentíamos muy tristes. Luego que pintaron el parque y pusieron el monumento ya se convirtió en algo muy bonito y nosotros nos hemos sentido alegres y contentos. Como le digo, antes no había nada, solo había paredes de adobe, solo había paredes, y eso también trajeron los de Paz y Esperanza. Ahí hemos tarrajeadon y pintado. Hicimos los parquecitos por todas las esquinas, haciendo eso nos sentimos alegres, reunidos todos juntos.”

\textsuperscript{194} Originally in Spanish: “Me siento muy triste, con mucha pena. Así habremos estado. Me apeno cuando veo esas imágenes. Viendo eso lloro ‘así habremos estado en tanta pena, tanto dolor. Dónde estarán esos tiempos tan feos.’ Algunos hablan diciendo que esos tiempos van a volver, y yo digo ‘ni Dios quiera que regrese esos tiempos.’ Esa vida era una vida muy, muy dolorosa para nosotros.”
Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes

members lament that the victims should be specifically remembered in the museum, family members of those murdered or disappeared rather refer to the cemetery or their homes as spaces of commemoration. This lack of commemorative activity may be linked to the fact that only few community members lost family members during the war. This may have contributed to an individualisation of commemorative activities in Putacca. Further, while the local victims’ association used the museum’s small yard as a meeting place in the first years of the museum’s existence and gathered there every Saturday, by 2010 the victims’ association had totally dismantled, just as in Lucanamarca and other communities.

While the overall meaning villagers attribute to the Centro de Memoria is positive and the memorialisation initiative is seen as a contribution both to transitional justice aims as well as to the villager’s very own narrative of progress, there is also much criticism for certain aspects of the project. Indeed, tourists do not visit Putacca, and the village was never integrated into the local tourism circuit. Thus, the expectation of creating a regular source of income for the community has been disappointed:

“Nothing happened, nothing changed. We only see that it is o.k. Until now what we had been thinking of hasn’t been fulfilled. It’s still missing. Not even the tourists are coming, nothing is like we thought it would be. It’s still missing! That’s why we want to improve it more.” (Interview with a female community member, 48 year old, on July 11, 2008)

Further, Paz y Esperanza had promised the community that the murals on the village’s main square would last for at least several years and had negotiated with the district municipality of Vinchos to take care of the maintenance work (Interview with a Paz y Esperanza staff member on June 1, 2010). Unfortunately, the NGO had not used an appropriate priming coat for the paint and probably also not the right paint. Only a few months after the inauguration of the murals, rain and the sun had begun to peel the paint of the walls, leaving only a chaotic mess of paint splatters, among which the visitor can hardly make out the original drawings about the time of violence and the traditions of the community. Not surprisingly, this is a reason for much discontent among the villagers of Putacca:

“Yes, it is fading. On the side it is fading more. We would like them to paint it again with paint that lasts longer. It is fading and it is peeling off. This is no good! They told us that it would last for eight to ten years, but this is not the case. We are thinking of asking them again to paint it so that it lasts longer. Now it is peeling off and the wind carries it away and it’s no good like this.” (Interview with a male community member, 68 years old, on June 29, 2010)

In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “No pasó, ni cambió. Solo vemos que está bien. Todavía no se ha cumplido lo que hemos pensado. Todavía falta. No vienen ni los turistas, no hay nada de lo que pensamos. ¡Falta! Por eso nosotros queremos mejorar más.”

In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Sí, se están borlando. Por el rincón se está borlando más. Nos
Further, the district municipality never contributed one cent to the maintenance of the murals, showing once again the difficulties of maintaining places of memory in rural areas in an environment of scarce resources.

Another source of discontent was the Totem of Peace and Identity constructed by Paz y Esperanza in the middle of Putacca’s main square. As it was established without consulting the population, it is no wonder that only few villagers understood the meaning of the monument or interpreted correctly what the abstract representations portrayed. Thus, some interpreted the dove instead as an eagle (águila), a sparrow hawk (gavilán) or a condor. Others did recognise a dove, but did not interpret it as a sign of peace, but as a bird inhabiting the surroundings of the village of Putacca. Still other criticisms included that the dove’s tail looked more like that of a rooster, and some ironically called the monument yanahuico, a Quechua term meaning ‘blackbeak’, referring to a type of black ibis that lives in the Andes and is believed to be a creature that brings bad luck. Not only the abstract form, the rusty colour also contributed to the rejection of the monument. Some villagers suggested the monument should be painted to look a bit more like the animals and plants it is supposed to represent:

“This, well, this is like a scarecrow […], it looks like a scarecrow or a condenado. It just doesn’t have a form.” (Interview with a male community member, age unknown, on July 17, 2010)

“They should put up more presentable animals, painted ones, not ones like roosters!” (Group discussion with male elders on May 14, 2011)

Finally, in August 2010, during the municipal project to construct the new park in the village centre, the Totem of Peace and Identity was taken down from its plinth and stored away in a yard belonging to the former Río Cachi work camp. The monument’s plaque on the plinth simply disappeared.

Paz y Esperanza, feeling responsible for the bad outcome of the mural project and obliged to the paternalistic relationship with Putacca, finally agreed to carry out yet another memorialisation project in Putacca. This time, the NGO installed two cement panels near the road entering Putacca and on one of the sides of the village’s main square with paintings referring to the memory and history of the community. While the cement panels had been built by mid-2011, it was still not clear what they would depict by the end of fieldwork.

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gustaría que lo pinten con pinturas que duran más. Se está borrando y se está pelando. Eso no está bien! Nos dijeron que iba a durar unos ocho a diez años, pero eso no está sucediendo. Estamos pensando pedir nuevamente para que lo pinten, para que dure más tiempo. Ahora se está descascarando y el viento se lo lleva y no sirve así.”

197 Condenados are beings of Andean mythology, often described as the undead haunting lonely travelers.

198 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Eso pues, eso es como un espantapájaros […], eso parece un espantapájaros o un condenado. No tiene forma pues.”

199 In Spanish as translated from Quechua: “Deben poner animalitos bien presentables, pintaditos, no así como gallos!”
4.5.4 Summary

While *Paz y Esperanza* had a highly participatory approach to the creation of the *Centro de Memoria de Putacca*, consisting of a small memory museum, murals surrounding the village’s main square and a monument in the middle of the same square, the NGO very much imposed the memory projects upon the population. Still, the participatory approach at least guaranteed the local population’s ownership of the project. The main aim of *Paz y Esperanza’s* work was that of re-building the community’s supposedly damaged social fabric, using memory as a resource to shift the population’s focus away from victimisation towards self-esteem and future progress. Thus, Putacca’s memory museum, murals and monument are not so much memorials dedicated to those victimised, but instead represent the rich traditions and the history of the community as a whole. Further, *Paz y Esperanza* took into account the population’s expectation of development by trying to make it a destination for tourists.

While the villager’s statements show that the memorialisation project has at least in part led to community cohesion and new confidence, the community also uses the *Centro de Memoria* for its very own purposes, countering the aims of the NGO. Thus, in contrary to the aims of *Paz y Esperanza*, they instead try to make their victimisation more visible, especially to foreigners, whose acknowledgement is seen as a means of achieving their dreams of development. Thus, acknowledgement is traded for development. This goes along with their self-representation as a poor population caught in the crossfire between the Shining Path and the armed forces. Indeed, this is also the result of the rather superficial research that *Paz y Esperanza* carried out about the community’s past that leaves out the community’s direct involvement in the civil war. What remains is a stereotyped representation of Putacca’s population as passive civilian victims without agency, thus emphasising their victimisation instead of activism.

Further, the *Centro de Memoria* never became part of the local tourism circuit and attracts human rights activists and researchers rather sporadically. Thus, it has never become a direct source of income for the population that instead continues to depend on its highly clientelistic and paternalistic relationship with *Paz y Esperanza*. Further, as in Lucanamarca, the places of memory in Putacca show clear signs of decay: The murals have been largely erased by the rain due to the low quality of paint used by the NGO, and the monument has been taken down by the villagers due to the lack of participation in and ownership of its design. This is also a clear indication of the limits of installing places of memory in a rural environment of poverty and scarce resources.
5 Conclusion or Anne Frank in Ayacucho

In August 2010, the NGO Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales (Association for Rural Education Services – SER) organised for the travelling exhibition of the Anne Frank House “Anne Frank – A History for Today” to visit Ayacucho. The two-room exhibition was shown at the cultural centre of Ayacucho’s Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga, a colonial building on Ayacucho’s main square. Visitors would enter the first room of the exhibition dedicated to the life of Anne Frank and the history of the Holocaust. Then, after passing through a corridor with white linen hanging from the ceiling – a sort of birth canal of memory – the visitor would step into the exhibition’s second room, dedicated to the memories of Peru’s internal armed conflict. The victims of Peru’s civil war could thus be seen directly alongside and in immediate comparison with Shoa victims, thereby integrating them into the globalised history and form of memorialisation built upon the remembrance of the Holocaust.

This dissertation embarked on showing how the transitional justice mechanism of memorialisation has played out at the local level in the region most affected by the Peruvian civil war, and provides insights on what memorialisation can and cannot achieve in transitional justice processes in general. By highlighting the local politics of memory in which different agents create and utilise places of memory from differing power positions and constantly (re-)negotiate the meaning of memorialisation to deal with the past and represent themselves for the future, this work contributes to the ongoing discussion of how the affected population integrates, adapts or resists globalised and standardised transitional justice tools.

In the first chapters of this book, we learned that memorialisation has been integrated into a global transitional justice toolkit. Memorialisation stands alongside and contributes to the mechanisms of justice, truth, reparation and reform in a holistic transitional justice approach. It is in this way that memorialisation efforts are considered to improve acknowledgement for victims, provide healing and closure, serve as a learning device to prevent the repetition of past crimes, and enact the values of democratic dialogue and human rights while simultaneously contributing to (re-)building local communities and fostering development. As such, memorialisation is applied in a number of diverse situations as a form of symbolic reparation and has become an indispensable part in truth commissions’ and courts’ work and recommendations.

Considering however, that monuments, memorials and museums have a long history of contributing to the representation of chauvinist and colonialist narratives, it seems rather ironic that nowadays, memorialisation is used for such progressive goals as healing, democratic dialogue and human rights. For memorialisation can even prolong violent conflict
by stabilising one-sided perceptions of the past that incite feelings of superiority or victimisation.

But it is not only their forms that give places of memory meaning. Different agents also imbue places with different meanings according to their respective perceptions, interests and positions of power. Further, the places’ meanings may change over time due to changing political frameworks. Thus, memorialisation initiatives may become the site of intense political struggle in which various agents fight over the meaning of the past to legitimise their vision for the future of their society. This might not serve dialogue and democracy at all, but instead fuel and ignite irreconcilable political antagonism.

Peru has a considerable track record of transitional justice mechanisms applied since its return to democracy in 2000. With a truth and reconciliation commission, trials against several prominent perpetrators (e.g. Abimael Guzmán, Alberto Fujimori) and collective, individual and symbolic reparations, Peru can indeed be seen as a good example for a holistic transitional justice approach. However, the country’s particular conflict constellation of a democratically elected government that defeated the insurgent groups and simultaneously became increasingly authoritarian also had strong repercussions on the transitional justice process. It led to a post-conflict situation that, after a short phase of political opening that included the application of transitional justice mechanisms, ultimately ended up stabilising the power positions of prominent actors opposed to the transitional justice process, such as the Peruvian Armed Forces and the Fujimori movement (see chapters 3.4 and 3.5). This in turn had a strong influence on how memorialisation has since played out in Peru.

The idea for places of memory in Peru was already apparent in the report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), which had followed the example set by previous commissions in other countries by recommending memorialisation initiatives as a form of reparation, and had also considered the victimised population’s explicit demand for this kind of symbolic measure. The CVR saw symbolic reparations not only as a way to acknowledge victimhood and raise awareness for the conflict – thus contributing to the non-repetition of human rights violations – but also as a way to collectively work through trauma. As a concrete community intervention at the local level, symbolic reparations were supposed to reconstruct the damaged social fabric of the poor, indigenous population most affected by the war (CVR 2003, pp.115–121).

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself installed some of the first places of memory for the internal armed conflict, such as the photo exhibition Yuyanapaq, but subsequent governments were reluctant to take the Commission’s plea for memorialisation into account.
Thus, Peru’s post-conflict memoryscape is largely the result of NGO initiatives that were supported by foreign development agencies with funding and expertise. The strong involvement of Peruvian human rights organisations and foreign donors shows that memorialisation in Peru was largely an elite-led process, and underlines the hypothesis that memorialisation has become part of a globalised transitional justice toolkit. Just as in the example of the Anne Frank exhibition in Ayacucho, this becomes clearly visible in the forms and functions places of memory have assumed in Peru and the discourses they convey. All refer in one way or another to the forms and discourses of memorialisation familiar from other parts of the world and well-established within the jargon of globalised or – as Levy and Sznaider (2007) would put it – ‘cosmopolitan memory culture’. The three places of memory analysed in this study make strong references to the transitional justice toolkit and the roles memorialisation activities are believed to play in advancing transitional justice aims (see chapter 2.3.2). Among them, the public disclosure of truth and the acknowledgement of victimhood, the re-construction of the communities’ social fabric with dialogue on the past and empowerment, the promotion of the non-recurrence of past violations, as well as the creation of sources of income for the victimised population figure prominently.

The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP in the city of Ayacucho is an example for a local memory or memorial museum (Pieper 2006; Williams 2007) dedicated to the remembrance especially of those persons who disappeared at the hands of the Peruvian Armed Forces in the region. As such, it is meant to serve as a place of acknowledgement and mourning for the members of the victims’ organisation ANFASEP, and at the same time to raise awareness among the wider public about the past in order to avoid the repetition of the same violations in the future. To do so, it displays replicas of torture cells and mass graves, exhibits photographs, clothing and other personal objects of the victims, and thereby makes use of techniques also known from museum exhibitions about the Holocaust and the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda. The display of these objects is to serve as hard evidence and thus present the “truth” about the internal armed conflict so as to achieve its and the victims’ acknowledgement by the public. With these transitional justice aims, the museum also lobbies for bringing the perpetrators to justice and for the reparation of those who were victimised. Finally, the museum is also intended to generate a source of income for the members of an organisation composed mostly of elderly, Quechua-speaking women, who often live in destitute conditions.

The Centro de Memoria de Putacca draws on a slightly different form of – at least internationalised – memorialisation, namely that of the community museum (Camarena &
Morales 2006). Here, not a specific group of victims but the community as a whole is the target. In the case of Putacca, the NGO carrying out the memorialisation initiative simply assumed the collective victimisation and traumatisation of the local population *a priori* and invested in a small memory museum, in murals and in a monument as a way to re-vitalise a sense of belonging, self-esteem and empowerment in the community by focusing not only on the community’s violent past, but also on the rich traditions of the local population. The *Centro de Memoria de Putacca* thus has the underlying aim of healing by showing the population a way out of a narrow attitude of passive victimisation into actively embracing the future of their community. As such, the memorials in Putacca were supposed to promote tourism as a source of income. In order to do so, however, it required the population’s suffering to be publicly put on display and acknowledged in the memory museum and on the murals.

Finally, the *Muestra Comunal Permanente de Memorias* and the pyramidal monument dedicated to the victims of Lucanamarca contain elements of each concept: the memorial museum and the community museum. The places of memory in Lucanamarca are dedicated to the individual victims of the conflict, but also represent the victimisation of an entire community. At the same time, they are meant to assist the peaceful cohabitation of different versions of the past in a rural community fractured by the extreme intra-communal violence that had taken place during the internal armed conflict. Thus, the monument and the museum are seen as a means of restoring the destroyed social fabric by acknowledging the different truths and the victimisation of all sides, thereby enabling a dialogue about the past. This in turn was supposed to be the foundation for the non-recurrence of violence and, in the end, for reconciliation in Lucanamarca. Especially for the purpose of reconciliation, the names of the victims of all warring factions were displayed on the monument.

All the places of memory analysed in this work tend to display the affected population as caught in the crossfire between two equally evil forces: the Shining Path and the Peruvian security forces. The local population is portrayed as a homogenous, innocent and passive group of victims without agency throughout the conflict. Thus, although the *Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP* is dedicated mostly to the persons forcefully disappeared by the Peruvian Armed Forces – and the victims’ organisation has a long history of social activism – some works of art in the small museum clearly refer to the narrative of a civilian population trapped between two lines of fire. In the case of Lucanamarca, former members of the Shining Path murdered by their fellow community members are integrated into the Olympus of victimisation as socially engaged youth that were simply misled by an outside force. Even in
the case of the Centro de Memoria in Putacca, that was actually meant to shift attention away from an attitude of passive victimisation, the population is portrayed as innocently caught between the lines, thus omitting large parts of how the conflict had developed in the community, as well as the population’s active involvement in the conflict. In doing so, it effectively contradicts the memorial’s initial purpose.

Indeed, this narrative of passive victimisation displayed in the places of memory in Ayacucho is also a result of the truth commission’s work that describes the poor, indigenous population of the Andes and the Amazon Basin as the main victims of the conflict, as innocently caught “entre dos fuegos” – between two lines of fire. This also explains why NGO intervention was very much directed at this particular segment of the population in the aftermath of the CVR’s work, and memorials were erected even in remote rural communities. Still, this narrative of an indigenous, poor and rural population innocently victimised by two outside forces contradicts current research that emphasises the active involvement of this same population in the conflict – either as Shining Path members or in self-defence committees – and in intra- and inter-communal strife (Theidon 2004; del Pino Huaman 2008; La Serna 2012).

But why then is this narrative so prominent in these places of memory despite contradicting the local population’s experience of violence? The answer is that the representation of the past in place is the result of a highly political process, in which the social agents involved not only negotiate how the past is displayed, but also calculate how this display could possibly benefit their future aspirations. Given the history of intra-communal violence during the civil war, both the human rights organisations carrying out the memorialisation projects as well as the local population contributing to them were well aware that an all too bleak display of the population’s often violent agency during the war was clearly counter-productive to the aim of re-constructing the communities’ social fabric. This form of representation also corresponded with the self-portrayal of a population that continues to reject its agency and thus responsibility for the violence, presenting themselves instead to outsiders as having been innocent bystanders. While this portrays the conflict on the local level in an ahistorical way and masks the profound ruptures within communities, attributing the violence to outside forces is also a way to secure cohabitation between victims and perpetrators within the community. This is especially obvious in the case of Lucanamarca, but is also visible in Putacca.

At the same time, the representation of Peru’s indigenous population as a passive victim is also a result of a post-conflict constellation in which authoritarian law and order as well as anti-terrorism discourses prevail, and the armed forces and Fujimori are celebrated as the
nation’s saviours. Further, the indigenous population has been historically perceived as a threat to the nation’s prosperity whenever it has raised its voice and claimed agency all too clearly. Indeed, victimhood, and with it the right to justice and reparation, are only acknowledged when presented in the form of absolute, passive innocence. Agency is instead equalled to terrorism, which results in the denial of any rights altogether (Theidon 2010; González 2011). Focusing on victimisation in the places of memory in question aimed to generate empathy with the indigenous population in order to point out its right to be accepted as victims, deserve justice and receive reparations. Any display of the local population’s involvement in violent acts, especially on the side of the Shining Path, would have meant to close the door on any future claims of justice and reparations, let alone any governmental attention.

Thus, the social agents involved in the creation of the three memorial sites studied here agreed upon the narrative of victimisation these initiatives should convey. This also explains the local population’s partial acceptance of the globalised forms and aims of memorialisation and the often stereotyped representation of victimhood. Still, it is also clear that human rights organisations and foreign donors always took the lead in the memorialisation process and remained in a dominant power position throughout the places’ creation. In the cases of Lucanamarca and Putacca, Peruvian human rights organisations that had been working in the region for many years and had accompanied the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were predominant while the funding – and to a certain degree also expertise – for the memorialisation initiatives came from international donor agencies, especially from Germany. In the case of the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP the German development cooperation took the lead. All projects also claimed to have been carried out in a participatory way, and to have respected the population’s decisions in the design of the places of memory. In the cases of ANFASEP and Putacca, this methodology proved to be fairly successful, with clear signs of ownership among the participating organisations and communities, visible in the population’s pride in their respective places of memory. However, the initial idea for creating these places of memory as well as all major design elements had been imposed by human rights organisations or development agencies, with the affected population only able to make decisions about certain details of the sites. While there was an initial resistance towards the projects among the members of ANFASEP and the communities of Lucanamarca and Putacca, the population was slowly talked into the projects. But sometimes, as in the case of Putacca, sheer coercion was also applied.
Indeed, María Eugenia Ulfe (2013, pp.31–32) harshly criticises the work of human rights organisations in the region of Ayacucho: While the work of these NGOs claims to lend a voice to the marginalised victims of violence, these voices were rigorously filtered to fit the organisations’ own agendas. In the cases of Lucanamarca and Putacca, the prolonged work of human rights organisations in the communities provided them with an intermediary’s position between the local population and the outside world. The relation between the NGO and the community had developed into clientelism and patronage, providing the human rights organisations with a stable victim population for which it could create projects and thereby justifying its own existence.

This also becomes apparent in the case of the places of memory created by NGOs and foreign development agencies. While they are meant to represent the voice of the marginalised victims of Peru’s internal armed conflict, they only do so with the help of standardised forms and discourses familiar to a globalised transitional justice audience. The idea behind this point of view seems to be that “they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Marx cited in Said 2003, p.XXVI). Thus, the places of memory described here suffer from the bias that the indigenous rural population affected by the civil war is not able to express itself in a way that is understandable to a wider public. Instead, their voices must be filtered and translated into forms and discourses a potentially international audience can comprehend. However, this proves to be highly problematic, as it denies Peruvian civil war victims the right to self-expression, instead reinforcing a relation of white or mestizo elites speaking for and deciding the fate of indigenous Peruvians. Further, staging war victims as innocent, passive individuals without agency will only lead to them being acknowledged as such, as inferior victim Others in need of help, and not as active citizens with equal rights. Thus, memorials and museums may even lead to further stigmatisation.

As we have seen in chapter 3 of this dissertation, patron-client-relations between the white/mestizo elites on the one side and the indigenous population on the other, are nothing new to Peru. They can be observed just as well in the relation between landlords and serfs in the hacienda economy as in the intellectual indigenismo movement at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ultimately abusive and meant to maintain control over the indigenous serfs in the hacienda system, or an elite-led quest for indigenous emancipation as in the case of indigenismo, these politics of clientelism held the indigenous populations of the Andes and Amazon regions back from any direct participation in national or even local Peruvian politics. Rather, political agency was transmitted through the brokerage of local and national elites. Although the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission made out the historical
exclusion of the indigenous population as one of the structural causes of the internal armed conflict and demanded full citizenship for the historically marginalised, it was still an elite undertaking that tried to lend a voice to the voiceless without conceding control over the process, its interpretation and outcome. The memorialisation initiatives created by Peruvian human rights organisations and foreign donors are then another instance in which well-meaning elites patronised the indigenous civil war victims in their representation and reproduced the historical system of clientelism and patronage between the white/mestizo elite and the indigenous population. In this way, places of memory in Peru actually stabilise dominant power relations instead of overcoming them to improve democracy and equal citizenship.

The places of memory in question may have been created by agents in unequal power positions, but that does not mean that Peru’s indigenous population remains completely without say. This work set out to research the affected population’s hybrid forms of integration, adaptation and resistance to transitional justice goals in memorialisation initiatives. While the forms the places of memory assumed in the region of Ayacucho had been introduced by well-meaning outsiders according to their own agendas, the members of ANFASEP and the communities of Lucanamarca and Putacca have been all but passive in the process of memorial-making and the use of their places of memory. They have attached their own meanings to these places and use them according to their own logic, sometimes in line with and sometimes contradicting the meanings and purposes originally intended by transitional justice entrepreneurs. By that means, places of memory are as much structured by the aims of NGOs and donor agencies as by the meanings the members of victims’ associations and communities attach to them. At the same time, the forms and the discourses they convey influence the perception of the past. In this process of structuration of place, global forms and discourses on the one hand as well as the local meanings and aims on the other mutually influence and react to one another, finally dissolving any opposition between ‘global’ and ‘local’. They become ‘glocal’ places in which the ‘local’ schemes of interpretation are just as important and powerful as the ‘global’ transitional justice aims for which they were built. This work has shown that the members of ANFASEP as well as the populations of Lucanamarca and Putacca have adapted to the narratives of the places of memory, transformed their meanings and resisted them to differing degrees, thereby demonstrating their agency in the process.

In all the cases analysed, the local population has adapted to and even embraced the transitional justice aims introduced to them by human rights organisations and foreign
development agencies to a certain degree. For many survivors, the places of memory are an important way to represent their truth, their version of the past, and seek public acknowledgement. The idea of raising awareness to avoid the repetition of human rights violations is also a prominent goal of ANFASEP members and the local populations in Lucanamarca and Putacca. This is also the case for a perception of the places of memory as sites of mourning, working through trauma and even healing, all of which figure less prominently in all three cases. Empowerment, the creation of community and the museum as a source of income are also apparent meanings in the cases of ANFASEP and Putacca. Indeed, ANFASEP members tend to attribute very classic transitional justice meanings to their memory museum. This is the case because ANFASEP is deeply embedded in the national and international human rights movement and places the classic transitional justice aims of truth, justice and reparation at the centre of its demands. But also in the cases of Lucanamarca and Putacca, the acknowledgement of victimhood and the non-repetition of human rights violations figure prominently among the meanings of the museum and symbolise the desire for overcoming the communities’ fragmentation and distrust, as well as their wish to be taken into account by the authorities as deserving victims.

There have also been clear instances of resistance by the affected population from the beginning on. The members of ANFASEP and those of Putacca initially resisted the memorialisation initiatives to a certain degree, as they feared the places of memory would not materialise into a specific benefit for them. Likewise, this resistance remained obvious in three different ways even after the places of memory had been completed, namely by their decay, ridicule and destruction. Especially in the cases of Lucanamarca and Putacca, the memorials have rapidly entered into decay. This can be in part explained by the fact that memorialisation is simply not a priority in rural settings marked by scarce public and private resources. Still, it raises the question why not even a small amount of these scarce resources are invested to buy some paint for the places’ repair. In Lucanamarca, the decision to integrate the names of Senderistas into the monument had never been accepted by a part of the population. Thus, the neglect that led to the decay of the monument represents the resistance against its intended narrative and, with this, the failure to bring together a highly fragmented community. But such decay is also the result of NGOs’ top-down approaches to memorialisation that had failed to sufficiently consider the local population’s preferences. The communities of Lucanamarca and Putacca clearly perceived the memorialisation initiatives as outside interventions and refused to assume responsibility for their maintenance. This is especially obvious in the case of the monument installed by Paz y Esperanza on Putacca’s
main square without much consultation. Interviewees in this community frequently made fun of the abstract monument and ridiculed it as a rooster or a ‘yanahuico’ (black ibis). The final destruction of the monument showed the local population’s preference for a different narrative that would also have accounted their agency. But the community’s suggestion of a monument in form of a local hero had simply been ignored by the NGO.

Finally, the communities of Lucanamarca and Putacca have transformed the transitional justice discourse inherent to the memorialisation initiatives and have attached their own aims to their places of memory. Barrantes and Peña (2010) as well as Ulfe (2013) view NGO intervention in Putacca and Lucanamarca favourably despite its major shortcomings. In their eyes, it has helped the population become aware of its rights as citizens, and thus enabled them to bargain with different state and non-state agents. At the same time, Ponciano del Pino (2008) has shown that rural communities in Ayacucho have a long history of “searching for the government” to seek progress for their communities.

Indeed, there is a considerable overlap between discourses of transitional justice and development in rural memorialisation initiatives in Peru. The population of Lucanamarca and Putacca used the representation of victimisation in museums and memorials as a way to bargain with and seek help from NGOs, foreign development agencies and the Peruvian state in the form of concrete development projects for their communities. Although they were initially sceptical about the use of the memorialisation initiatives presented to them by the NGOs, as they did not correspond with their own ideas of a development project, they ultimately accepted the projects, knowing that this was the best form of attention they could get at the moment. Not accepting the memorialisation initiatives would also have diminished their chances of getting in contact with possible benefactors, as they would have been perceived as uncooperative, which would have ultimately endangered their dreams of development. However, they now also await a concrete economic return for publicly displaying their victimisation.

Therefore, the formation of clientelistic relationships and mutual dependence between NGOs and local populations in Peruvian memorialisation initiatives is as much the result of unequal power relations as it is the outcome of the communities’ agency in the process. The populations of Lucanamarca and Putacca, as well as the members of ANFASEP, actively used places of memory to represent their victimhood for public acknowledgement, not to seek equal rights as full citizens, but to establish relations of clientelism and patronage with NGOs, the state and foreign donor agencies as passive, deserving victims in need of outside help. This relation is best believed to bring about the long-awaited progress, especially in a time of
economic prosperity accompanied by the fear of being left behind and forgotten by the rest of the country. Thus, places of memory in Ayacucho do not primarily serve the means of mourning, truth and the acknowledgment of equal rights, but are instead used to represent victimisation in its narrow and passive form for the sake of fulfilling local dreams of development in an environment of poverty and scarce resources. The memorialisation initiatives have become the leverage in the hands of communities with which they bargain for more concrete development projects with their patrons. This has shown effect: Both COMISEDH in Lucanamarca and *Paz y Esperanza* in Putacca had to re-frame at least part of their interventions as development projects due to the demands of their local clients. *Paz y Esperanza* agreed to donate benches for Putacca’s main square to overcome the community’s resistance to memorialisation and COMISEDH finally moved from memorialisation to development in their later projects in Lucanamarca. This shows how the local population of the two communities in question managed to gradually shift the memorialisation initiatives’ meanings from transitional justice to including their aims of local development.

The cases of the Museo de Memoria of ANFASEP, the memorials in Lucanamarca and the Centro de Memoria in Putacca reveal the power struggles and interdependencies among different social agents in memorialisation, and demonstrate how the hybrid integration, adaptation, transformation and resistance to places of memory play out at the local level in a political process of global-local interaction. Still, what can be learnt from such a specific case, set in the Peruvian highland region of Ayacucho, for memorialisation as a transitional justice mechanism in general?

First of all, notions of memorialisation being a “spontaneous” phenomenon (Naidu 2006, p.1; Hamber et al. 2010, p.398), an “instinctive practice” (Impunity Watch 2011, p.9) or a “common feature of humankind” (Barsalou & Baxter 2007, p.3; Hamber 2009, p.87) are highly counter-productive not only for the study of places of memory in transitional justice, but also for practitioners who want to install such places. They describe memorialisation as something apolitical, an expression of the quasi-biological needs of survivors and societies. As this work shows, however, memorialisation is a deeply political process that may involve open conflict between opposing memory entrepreneurs and political factions. But beyond this, the politics of memorialisation also become visible in the often subtle arrangements, negotiations, pressures, interdependencies and resistances that occur when social agents engage in memorialisation initiatives from different power positions. Matters of political constellations and power on all levels should be addressed and actively taken into account in such a difficult process.
Even further, the proclaimed positive effects of memorialisation on the well-being of individuals and whole societies are clearly overstated. It is still not at all understood what a place of memory requires and how it should be accompanied by other transitional justice mechanisms in order to actually have a lasting impact. The memorialisation initiatives in Ayacucho reveal that places of memory cannot by their mere presence achieve individual healing and societal change to secure a culture of “never again”. This is only possible with the constant engagement with a broad section of the population, and therefore, with professional outreach work.

The memorialisation initiatives in Ayacucho failed to look beyond the inauguration ceremony and to seek the local population’s attention on a constant basis. Instead, the places of memory in the region of Ayacucho are highly self-referential. It is not the local population who actively engages with the museums and memorials, but rather persons affiliated with the human rights movement and academia. While they are seen as multipliers who can spread the word or can personally help the organisation or community economically, social and political change towards democracy and human rights has to actively involve the local population.

Lucanamarca and Putacca receive very few visitors, and the expectation of tourism creating a new source of income, or of foreigners bringing development projects has not come to be. The failure to meet these expectations has led to waves of estrangement between the local population and the human rights organisations as well as the aims they represent. The Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP has a strategic advantage: As the museum of a specific victims’ organisation engaged in transitional justice activities in the regional capital, it is more visible and accessible, receives regular visits from activists and tourists who provide resources, and it can conduct outreach work, although on a limited scale.

In general, memorialisation initiatives in transitional justice processes need to take into account those affected by human rights violations. They should also include adequate instruments for local participation and ownership. But this special attention to the local affected population should not lead to the representation of victims as innocent, passive bystanders without agency, as it has happened in Peru. This might be helpful in creating empathy, triggering solidarity and competing for help from the state, NGOs or foreign donors, especially where agency – as in the Peruvian case – is considered to be a possible threat. But if the museum, memorial or monument does not contain a clear historical explanation and documentation of the origins of the conflict as well as of the different roles of the population in the conflict, and instead favours a simple narrative of victimhood, these places of memory cannot fulfil their aim of contributing to a society in which human rights violations are made
less likely. Where only innocence and passivity is displayed and agency and responsibility are negated, there is nothing to learn from the past, making museums and monuments mere showcases of victimisation which might even carry within themselves the seeds of future violence. Placing victimhood in public space will then only lead to a narrow and passive attitude of victimisation, impeding any social progress. Indeed, this social progress that places of memory are so firmly believed to incite in transitional justice may never materialise, and memorialisation initiatives may be just an ephemeral episode in a potentially endless struggle over the interpretation of the past to achieve prosperity for the future.
6 Epilogue or the President’s Visit

On April 12, 2012, 29 years and nine days after the massacre of 69 peasants, women, and children by the Shining Path in Lucanamarca, the community once again received an important visitor. The president himself, Ollanta Humala Tasso, elected one year earlier in a close run-off against Keiko Fujimori, had come to Lucanamarca in company of the national press to publicly re-launch the programme of collective reparations. He was now the second president of the republic after Alejandro Toledo to visit the remote community, symbolically showing the government’s care for the poor rural population victimised by ‘terrorism’. Just like Toledo, Humala was therefore dressed with a poncho and a hat typical for the area in a cheap display of indigeneity. Missing the original date of the commemoration by nine days due to his tight schedule, Humala stated:

“And this way we can eradicate these insane ideologies that wanted to enslave Lucanamarca, what a better vengeance against these insane ideologies than to make a successful city of Lucanamarca. May our success be the best way to respond to these insane ideologies, which stained this territory with blood, with pain, with death. We will overcome this, but together. We have to work hand-in-hand and how will we overcome this? With development! There is no forgetting, but there is development. We cannot stagnate in history, we have to go on because the times go on. We have to work hand-in-hand to improve Lucanamarca’s condition.” (Humala Tasso 2012)  

The president clearly played on the rural population’s dreams of development in his speech, also re-affirming that the government did not see reparations as a right granted to citizens in their condition of victims of human rights violations, but rather as another social relief programme paternalistically handed over by the president himself to the poor and needy. Further, he also emphasised the government’s perception of who was a victim worthy of the state’s care. Only those victimised by ‘terrorism’, by the Shining Path, are seen as innocent victims without any doubt, while those killed by state forces or their fellow community members were not even mentioned in the speech. This shows a strategy of publicly making invisible those victims uncomfortable to the state. Finally, Humala urged his audience to not remain in the past, but to overcome the memories of violence through prospects of future development. He thus presented economic progress as the sole solution to all problems of the country in the past, present and future.

200 Originally in Spanish: “Y podemos de esa manera erradicar a esas ideologías insanas que querían esclavizar Lucanamarca, que mejor venganza contra esas ideologías insanas, que hacer de Lucanamarca una ciudad exitosa. Que nuestro éxito sea la mejor forma de responder a esas ideologías insanas que mancharon este territorio de sangre, de dolor, de muerte. Eso lo vamos a superar, pero juntos. Tenemos que trabajar de la mano y cómo lo vamos a superar, será a través del desarrollo. No hay olvido, pero sí hay desarrollo. No podemos estancarnos en la historia, tenemos que seguir avanzando porque los tiempos avanzan. Y si nos detenemos, Apurímac nos va a superar, Huancavelica nos va a superar. Tenemos que trabajar de la mano para mejorar las condiciones de Lucanamarca.”
For Lucanamarca, this visit meant receiving new projects of collective reparation and another instance of occasional national publicity for its victimisation. Still, it is questionable that new collective or individual reparations will boost Lucanamarca’s economy, given that its population is deeply divided about the past and about the profits of victimisation, a division neither to be overcome by short-sighted development projects, nor by a president’s speech.
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Annex 1: Abstract – English

Places of memory – museums, monuments or the performances surrounding them – have become a ubiquitous feature of transitional justice processes across the globe. They are believed to make a significant contribution to such important transitional justice aims as justice, truth, reparation, acknowledgement, healing, and even development. However, there is still little understanding of the exact role and impact of places of memory in transitional justice processes, especially at the local level. Thus, this dissertation focuses on how one specific transitional justice mechanism, namely memorialisation, plays out at the local level, and gives important insights on which role places of memory can and cannot play as a transitional justice tool in general, and specifically at the local level. The aim of this work, then, is to highlight the ‘glocal’ politics of memory that become visible in the creation of local places of memory. By analysing three different memorialisation initiatives in communities in the highlands of Ayacucho, the region most affected by the Peruvian civil war, it shows how local memorialisation initiatives are created and used by different social agents from within and outside of the community in an ongoing process of adjustment, transformation and resistance in order to deal with the past and represent themselves for the future. This is done by an agency-centred approach that emphasises the complex negotiation processes between different agents that produce politics of memory and representation from differing power positions.

The dissertation shows that Peruvian human rights organisations and foreign development agencies have introduced highly standardised and globalised forms of representations to even remote communities of the Andes. Museums and memorials in Peru convey messages of the acknowledgement of victimhood, the re-construction of the social fabric and an awareness of the danger of the re-occurrence of past crimes. But they also portray the local population as being innocently caught between the lines of the guerrilla and the armed forces. The local population partially embrace the messages the places of memory carry, but also use them to emphasise their victimisation and to present themselves as passive and deserving victims in need of constant development projects. They thereby counter the envisaged goals of the places of memory meant to contribute to a sense of active citizenship by instead trying to achieve their dreams of development via clientelistic relationships with the state, NGOs or development agencies. All memorialisation projects analysed also demonstrate a lack of ownership, visible in the rapid decay of the museums and monuments constructed. This also shows the dangers of applying globalised forms and representations to an affected local population without adequate processes of consultation. While memorialisation initiatives can
be promising vehicles for achieving transitional justice goals such as acknowledgement, truth, justice, reparation, healing and development, this dissertation calls for carefully and more openly designed and grounded processes that engage the local population in a more active fashion.
Annex 2: Abstract – German


Annex 3: About the Author

Der Lebenslauf ist in der Online-Version aus Gründen des Datenschutzes nicht enthalten.