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Alliance Politics Under Unipolarity
European Influence on Transatlantic Military Interventions

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1.1 Puzzle and Research Question

Two days after the terrorist attacks of September 11 the former secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, declared to the gathered media: “The mission determines the coalition. And the coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission. The president has stated the mission” (Rumsfeld 2001). For some observers he was merely stating a fact of life: under the conditions of unipolarity, the United States was powerful enough to pursue military interventions alone. After the Cold War, the United States generally chose to intervene militarily in concert with other states but it has dominated the direction and policies pursued in these missions.

For others, Rumsfeld’s statement was nothing short of a revolution and an affront since, as former German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer remarked, “Alliance partners are not satellites” (Fischer 2002). Fischer’s admonition represents a widespread view that there is something special about the transatlantic relationship that should and, indeed, does grant European allies a disproportionately high say over US policy-making.

This thesis takes issue with both the claim to US dominance and the claim to European guaranteed influence, since the post-Cold War record is at odds with both. First and foremost, there is variance between different cases of military interventions. European allies exerted considerable influence on US policy-making during the military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. They affected different aspects of US policy in these interventions, ranging from the overall goals for the mission, the diplomatic strategy, or tactical decisions. Yet, European allies did not have the same impact with regard to US decision-making on Iraq in the 1990s and in 2003. Second, one can also observe variance within cases. For example in Kosovo, the Clinton administration pressured reluctant European allies, such as France and Germany, into using force against Milosevic without a UN mandate authorizing military action. However, once the mission commenced these allies affected military implementation to a considerable degree. Lastly, the extent of influence can vary between different European allies. France and Britain called the tune in Bosnia; in contrast, Germany remained largely on the sidelines. Whereas French and German opposition rolled off
the Bush administration’s back, the British government was closely involved into
decision-making on Iraq.

Two prominent structural explanations for allied decision-making in wartime cannot
account for the process and variance in current transatlantic interventions (see section
1.4). Structural realists have argued that because of its military preponderance the
United States prevails over its European allies: the US calls the tune and its policies
determine the course and content of transatlantic military interventions (Krauthammer
1990; Wolfforth 1999; Jervis 2009). Yet, the ‘preponderance perspective’ is unable to
account for the significant influence that European countries have sometimes held.

US behavior in military interventions is at variance with the central claim that the
most powerful actor pursues these missions alone or as it pleases.

By contrast, the ‘security community perspective’ would expect European allies to
have a continued influence over the United States despite an increasing power gap. As
the transatlantic alliance is a community of values among democracies, policies
should not be decided unilaterally or in opposition to allied preferences (Risse-
Kappen 1995; Ikenberry 2009). Allies work out their differences to reach a reasoned
consensus and to act in concert. While the security community perspective aptly
captures the social structure of the transatlantic alliance, it is not sufficient to explain
why allies have influence in some cases but not in others.

Against the background of these structural explanations, this thesis focuses on
interactions between allies and raises the following research question: how and under
which conditions are European allies able to influence US policies of military
intervention?

The answer to this research question is both of theoretical and practical relevance.
Military interventions are least likely cases for Europeans to exercise influence on the
United States. In contrast to defensive warfare, current military missions seem to be
wars of choice more than wars of necessity, as the security challenge posed by the
target is diffuse and a sustainable public justification must be created in each case.

One would expect that the state with the strongest military capabilities would dictate
the course of action. These military endeavors come with a number of tough questions
on legitimacy, legality, and practicability. As security, international reputation as well
as blood and treasure are at stake, it is surprising that the United States has been
willing to compromise on its preferred course of action.
Although the past twenty years have seen an enormous increase in military interventions, few theoretically informed accounts have dealt with allied decision-making during such military endeavors. The literature has paid “less attention to how alliances actually function during wars. This is a significant gap in our understanding of both alliances and war, one that is becoming pointedly clear as states increasingly set about building coalitions before undertaking military action” (Weitsman 2004: 6). This gap in theoretical analysis is troubling, as military missions have become part and parcel of the transformation that the transatlantic alliance has undergone over the past twenty years. Gradually, NATO has moved from an organization entrusted with collective defense to a provider of collective security. Transatlantic allies today debate how to counter threats such as humanitarian crises, state failure, weapons proliferation, terrorism, and energy security. Oftentimes, such discussions entail the question of the use force. It has even been argued that NATO’s very survival can best be explained with reference to its ability to perform new functions in light of new security challenges (Wallander 2000; Skalnes 2000; Waltz 2000).

While pursuing military interventions in defense of common interests has become a central part of the alliance’s endurance, the discussions on these undertakings have not always been harmonious. These disagreements on military interventions have been discussed in the context of a more general pattern that constitutes transatlantic relations. Much scholarly attention has been paid to the reasons for the increasing transatlantic divergence on military and other issues (Kagan 2002; Katzenstein 2002; Danchev 2005). Another strand of literature has focused on the question whether the United States has taken a “unilateralist turn” and has turned away from international law and institutions (Ikenberry 2003; Patrick/Forman 2002; Skidmore 2005; Malone/Khong 2003; Foot et al. 2003). Additionally, scholars have analyzed the effects of these disagreements on international order (Risse 2003; Risse 2008; Ikenberry 2008). In contrast to this literature, I am interested in understanding how allies solve disputes that inevitably arise when states use armed force as part of an alliance. In particular, I seek to explain the role played by allies that are less powerful in military terms.
1.2 Alliance Politics under Unipolarity: the Argument and Findings

Three components make up the theoretical and methodological argument proposed in this thesis.

First, I develop a more fine-grained understanding and measurement of what influence means in the context of current military interventions. To go beyond the generalizations described above and to map the variance in allied influence, it is necessary to develop a more precise definition of the subject under study. Allied influence can extend to different types of policies in military interventions (1.3). European allies may exercise influence over principal, political, and tactical aspects of the use of force. Using this measurement to map the dependent variable reveals that European allies were able to exercise at least some influence in all cases. At the very least, negotiating with European allies determined the timing of US military interventions. Beyond this general issue of timing, no two missions are exactly the same. Each case reveals that influence varied over time and extended to different dimensions of the use of force. Lastly, this more fine-tuned analysis points to significant differences within the European camp. With the exception of Operation Desert Fox against Iraq in 1998, the British government affected US policy-making in every case at least in one policy dimension. France’s and Germany’s patterns of influence are less consistent and elevated.

Second, I argue that a theoretical framework that focuses on the interaction between allies is better equipped to explain the variance in European influence than structural explanations, such as neorealism or the security community perspective. Existing theoretical attempts to map interactions, such as the soft-balancing literature, are theoretically inconsistent and difficult to apply empirically (1.4.3). This thesis develops the framework of alliance politics to detail both the process of decision-making within alliances during wartime, and the conditions under which less militarily powerful allies prevail over their hegemonic alliance partners. The framework is premised on the assumption that the manner in which smaller allies seek influence is intimately linked to the question of the conditions under which they can be successful.

I develop a typology that maps strategies of influence with the aim of answering how allies try to have an impact on US policy-making. Essentially, allies’ strategies are based on three main sources of influence. First, the hegemon’s sensitivity to the
material costs of military interventions implies that allies can gain leverage over US
decision-making by banking on their *issue-specific power* in the context of a given
military intervention. Further, the hegemon may have an interest in the long-term
credibility of international institutions that it shares with allies. These established
institutions provide allies with *voice opportunities* to articulate their preferences and
circumscribe the hegemon’s actions. Lastly, even the most powerful states will seek
legitimacy for their military actions. Allies can gain influence over a hegemon during
military interventions by appealing to the norms of the community and US identity as
a member of the transatlantic alliance. These various appeals rest on the *power of
persuasion*.

The case studies reveal equifinality: each case displays a distinct mixture of strategies
employed by European allies and different instruments may thus lead to success.
Whereas strategies based on persuasion and voice opportunities were ubiquitous in all
cases, issue-specific power resources were only brought to bear in the Balkans and
not in the Iraq cases. I find that the power of persuasion and the exchange of
arguments among transatlantic allies are crucial because such argumentative
processes can establish a common rationale for military action. This thesis also shows
that today’s military interventions are debated within a dense institutional context that
encompasses many formal and informal institutions beyond NATO. European
diplomats skillfully bring a great variety of these institutions into play to voice their
opposition and restrain US action. With regard to issue-specific power, allies
contributed crucial military assets in all four cases but it was only in the Balkans that
they were able to condition these contributions to specific demands.

The theoretical framework also seeks to account for the variance in allied influence. I
identify and test three potential *scope conditions* that enable or limit the chances of
Europeans successfully exerting influence on the United States. For one, the *intensity
of threat* that the target poses to the United States could be central. As the US could in
principle fight alone given its overwhelming military capacities, an ally’s issue-
specific power comes into play when Washington becomes wary of the costs
involved. Cost-sensitivity is assumed to decrease with the intensity of threat that the
target country presents to the United States.

Further, the *unity of the US domestic scene* with regard to a particular military
intervention and the characteristics of the US decision-making process are decisive.
Allied attempts to persuade the US government rest on the assumption that European
allies find domestic ‘access points’ for their arguments. If an administration is internally divided on the goals and means of a specific military intervention, allies can exploit these differences and tip the domestic balance in their favor. If a US administration can count on congressional and public support, the influence of allies should also decrease.

Lastly, the unity of European allies is an important condition for successful European influence. Intra-European cooperation increases the leverage of European allies, since the latter can pool their military resources and give more credence to the use of their voice opportunities. Additionally, it becomes more difficult for the US to play allies off against each other.

The analysis of the four cases reveals that there is significant European influence but only under certain conditions. Even with elaborate strategies, European influence is not guaranteed. I find that two conditions are central to the success of allied attempts to affect US policy-making. If a US government is united in its policies on a given military intervention, the ability of European allies to affect US decision-making is significantly diminished. This effect is amplified if a given US administration can be sure of widespread domestic and congressional support for its policy choices.

Moreover, European influence depends on the degree of unity among European allies. If European allies are split in their policy recommendations and demands, they are less likely to have an impact on US policy-making. Finally, I argue that the third conditions-intensity of threat perception – cannot account for the variance in European influence. While insurmountable perspectives exist with regard to the targets of military interventions, these differences are not based on objective criteria of threat as defensive realists posit. They are the product of political construction, a factor that European allies are more likely to influence if the US domestic scene is split and Europeans are united.

Third, I argue that applying the alliance politics framework comes with methodological consequences. The empirical test of the analytic framework is based on four case studies: the intervention in Bosnia (1993—1995), the intervention in Kosovo (1998—1999), the limited aerial bombardments of Iraq in 1998, and the US-led intervention against Iraq in 2003. These cases show an interesting variation in the dependent variable: Bosnia and Kosovo represent cases in which European allies exercised important influence on US policies of military intervention. In contrast, both Iraq cases, European proposals for a change in policy or outright European
opposition were largely ignored. In my analysis, I combine different case study methods. In the case studies, I seek to uncover the process of how allies exercise influence. I use the method of structured and focused comparison to derive comparable information on all cases. I use process tracing to uncover which strategies were used by European allies and how they interacted with each other. In a comparative perspective, I seek to establish whether conditions conducive to allied influence in the successful cases have indeed been absent in the instances of failure. The empirical analysis rests on the use of a wide secondary literature, primary documents, and interviews with US policy-makers.

1.3 Mapping the Subject of the Study
Research into European influence on US policies of military intervention falls into the realm of alliance politics. In the literature, alliance politics is used as a catch all term for different aspects of the internal dynamics of alliances.¹ I mean to use it in a more narrow sense. An alliance exists between two or more states if there is “a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence” (Walt 2009: 86). Politics usually refers to the procedural dimension of decision-making, which aims to mediate interests through conflict and consensus. Alliance politics depicts the process by which members of an alliance choose certain policies and which of the allies prevails in this process. I am interested in the workings of this process during military interventions. Expanding on the definition by Pearson and Baumann (1993: 1), I define military intervention as the threat or movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.

In accordance with the standard definition, interventions consist of purposeful dispatches of troops and must be distinguished from regular troop movements or exercises. The issue in pursuit of which troops are deployed may vary from regional stabilization and humanitarian motives, to disarmament or others; military interventions differ from war because they do not represent territorial conquests (Pickering/Kisangani 2009; Jentleson et al. 1992). This study diverges from the

¹ Alliance cohesion, burden-sharing, etc. are usually mentioned under the alliance politics rubric, see Snyder (1997); Weitsman (2004); and Cimbala/Forster (2010).
regular definition of military interventions in that it includes the threat of troop movements and, thus, encompasses elements of coercive diplomacy. I have expanded the definition based on the assumption that processes of intra-alliance decision-making on the use of armed force kick in well before the deployment of troops and usually encompass discussions on whether force against a third state should be threatened in the first place. Consequently, military intervention is a coercive act for a circumscribed political goal. I would argue that it ends with major combat operations and that it differs from other forms of military engagements by outside powers in another nation’s affairs, such as peacekeeping, post-conflict resolution, or nation-building.

While these definitions provide us with a clearer picture of the subject of this study, they do not help to identify empirically alliance politics or its outcomes. Three aspects are central to specifying the dependent variable, allied influence on US policy choices.

First, this thesis seeks to explore the process of allied decision-making. It is assumed that strategies of influence-seeking and their outcomes are best observed in the context of intra-alliance disputes. Influence logically presupposes conflict, since without initial disagreement there would be no need to seek influence and the accommodation of policies (Risse-Kappen 1995: 13).

Second, we have to elaborate in more detail the subject of such intra-alliance disputes. Most accounts of the topic diagnose small or no European influence on US policies of military intervention because they lump together different dimensions of the use of force assuming that failure to influence in one dimension implies failure to exert impact in all. I argue that the empirical realities are more accurately captured by distinguishing three dimensions of the use of force. The dimensions remain an

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2 Christensen defines coercive diplomacy as “the use of threats and assurances in combination to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries” (Christensen 2011: 1). For alternative definitions see George (1991: 5) and Art (2003: 5).

3 UN peacekeeping is defined as “the deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area with the consent of the parties to the conflict in order to: stop or contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement.” See UN Department for Peacekeeping [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml] [last accessed May 12, 2013]. A RAND study defined nation-building as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy” (RAND 2008). Conflict resolution begins in a situation “where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent conflict” (Wallenstein 2009: 1).
analytical distinction and in reality, they are discussed concurrently and in connection with each other.

(a) In the principal dimension of the use of force, allies debate the question whether force should be used at all against a third country. The issue of legal justification and authorization is tightly coupled to this debate.

(b) The political dimension of the use of force deals with the question of political purpose. Military interventions are fought for specific political aims rather than territorial conquest. Yet, allies may differ as to which political objectives are legitimate, desirable, and achievable through the use of armed force.

(c) Military interventions comprise of a tactical dimension in which allies have to settle on the conduct of operations. There is nothing inevitable about military campaigns but they involve a number of choices; for example, what are considered acceptable risks to soldiers, the acceptable level of civilian casualties, the allocation of resources and equipment, and the selection of targets.

This distinction is helpful both for the analysis of process and outcome. In terms of process, it helps us to uncover precisely over what allies have disagreed and in which dimensions allies have sought to exercise influence over the United States. With regard to the outcome of alliance politics, one can observe whether allied influence has varied over the dimensions of military interventions.

Third, several scholars have suggested measurements of the success and failure of allied influence-seeking. Influence is understood here “as a relationship in which the behavior of actor A at least partially causes a change in behavior of actor B” (Baldwin 2002: 178). Failure of such influence-seeking would imply that the United States goes on with its preferred policies of military intervention despite allied objections or proposals for modification (Pressman 2008: 6). Success is less readily assessed. I use Risse-Kappen’s (1995) definition and approach. Accordingly, we can speak of European influence on US policies of military intervention if US policies change and resemble prior European demands or represent a compromise between European and American positions. Because it is highly unlikely that the United States will follow the demands of its allies completely, compromise should also be taken as a successful outcome of influence-seeking. However, some conditions must be met: compromises must reflect the core demands of the allies, they should reflect an agreement of more that the least common denominator, and all allies should comply with the agreement. Of course, such policy changes could correlate with European demands but might
well be caused by other explanatory factors (Risse-Kappen 1995: 14-15). In the case of recent military interventions, one such explanation particularly comes to mind: the role of domestic political considerations. In each case study, I will thus assess how the unity and dynamics of the US domestic scene can account for varying degrees of European influence.

1.4 Literature Review

Research on alliance politics under unipolarity is situated in a wider literature that explains the formation and actions of alliances. Picking up on the puzzle introduced above, I will argue that empirical realities pose particular problems to two kinds of structural explanations. Structural realist explanations of the structure and power distribution within the international system could not account for the varying degree to which European allies were able to exercise influence (1.4.1). While research on the transatlantic security community captures the social structure of the relationship between the United States and Europeans, the approach is insufficient to account for the actions of European allies and US behavior (1.4.2). Recent realist attempts to develop a framework for studying allied interactions and their outcomes are theoretically inconsistent and difficult to implement empirically (1.4.3).

1.4.1 Structural Realism, Unipolarity, and the Insignificance of Allies

Military interventions lie at the heart of security policy in today’s democracies. As Colin Powell remarked: “America never looks for opportunities to exercise power except in defense of vital national interests. We do not use force to burnish our reputation.” Structural realists claim an explanatory prerogative for issues of vital security. Military interventions, they claim, provide very little room for European influence on the United States.

Unipolarity, according to structural realists, explains the pattern within current alliances (Walt 2009; Jervis 2009). Accordingly, the international system has been unipolar since 1990: “If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will” (Brooks/Wolforth 2002: 21). The United States commands a more complete portfolio of military and economic power resources than any of its historical predecessors (Wolforth 1999/2002; Brooks/Wolforth 2002; Jervis 2009). A structural realist reading cuts the story of allied influence rather short: “Today the United States has no great power rivals, less need for allied support, and thus a greater
capacity to go it alone” (Walt 2009: 94). There are several reasons why allies are said to have less influence on the hegemon’s foreign policy decisions. First, the purpose of alliances is to combine their members’ capabilities in order to increase their security (Snyder 1997). Under unipolarity, the abundance of material power resources enables the strongest state to provide for its security without relying on allies. Even in cases where allies could meaningfully contribute, the unipole would be powerful enough to pursue its policy preferences unilaterally given that its preponderance makes it less sensitive to costs (Jervis 2009: 195; Ikenberry et al. 2009: 15).

Second, maintaining a system of stable alliances under bipolarity is a tool of security competition. Hence, even great powers have to fear being abandoned by their weaker allies (Snyder 1997). Because of this fear, allies can extract concessions from their alliance leader (Risse-Kappen 1995). Unipolarity largely removes the threat of abandonment and gives the superpower more leeway in its alliance relationships. Thus, the unipole can choose freely among partners as it sees fit and in accordance to its policy preferences (Walt 1995; Daalder/Lindsay 2003; Krahmann 2005).

Thirdly, allies are largely deprived of the means to change the conditions of unipolarity. Structural realists would assume that former allies would balance against the concentration of power (Waltz 2002). Yet, the extent of American preponderance makes the formation of a counter-balancing coalition unlikely (Wolforth 2001): challengers would like fail to pool their resources, as each of them has a strong incentives to pass the buck and the burden of security provision (Walt 2009; Wolforth 1999).

In conclusion “[i]t follows from the propensity of states to use the power at their disposal that those who are not subject to external restraints tend to feel few restraints at all” (Jervis 2009: 198). Yet, this core structural realist argument is at variance with the empirical evidence from military interventions after the Cold War. In the majority of cases, the United States has intervened alongside others states, has sought the blessing of international organizations, and allies have tried to have an impact on US behavior (Kreps 2011; Dixon/Corbetta 2004).

1.4.2 The Transatlantic Alliance as a Security Community

Social constructivism and historical institutionalism converge around the assumption that unipolarity is not the right starting point when it comes to alliance politics in the
transatlantic context.⁴ The transatlantic alliance, according to this view, constitutes a specific social structure, a pluralistic security community.

Central to the concept of the security community is the notion that transatlantic allies can rely on the expectation of peaceful change. This fundamentally transforms interactions between allies, as they do not face a security dilemma when they try to settle their differences in international affairs. The ‘security community perspective’ has emphasized the importance of the specific transatlantic institutional and normative context in terms of the ability of weaker allies to restrain the United States. Most prominently, Risse-Kappen has argued that the transatlantic alliance constitutes a “community of values” governed by mutual trust, predictability, and a sense of a “we feeling” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 30, 31). In the transatlantic case, the community of values is strengthened by a high degree of economic interdependence, and institutional and societal linkages (Adler/Barnett 1998; Ikenberry/Deudny 2000).

Indeed, transatlantic allies form a pluralistic security community by any empirical measure. As democracies, transatlantic allies share common values, such as the rule of law, human rights, and constitutional checks and balances. In foreign relations, they have unequivocally committed themselves to the respect of international law and to the spread of their values (Risse 2008: 275). Joint identity reaches beyond abstract values: political elites as well as public opinion identify with each other and hold a considerably high regard for each other over time.⁵ Transatlantic allies are connected to each other because of economic interdependence and common institutions; they are each other’s largest trading and investment partners (Cooper 2011: 2; 3–6).⁶ Institutionalization spans beyond the economic realm. NATO has expanded in

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⁴ Of course, these are wide-ranging and distinct traditions, and their specificity is not disputed here. In contrast to historical institutionalism, constructivism is more of an analytical tool than a substantive theory of international relations, see Fearon/Wendt (2002) and Risse (2003a). Historical institutionalism has also been described as a rather eclectic research program that exists in a rationalist and a sociological variant. For a discussion of ‘new institutionalism’ see Hall/Taylor (1996); Thelen (1999); and Hall (2010). While authors such as Ikenberry and Deudny are more focused on the peculiarities of Western order and emphasize the United States’ strategic calculus in creating it, Risse and Adler/Barnett treat security communities as an analytical concept that is applicable to different regions. See Ikenberry (2009) and Risse (2008). However, with regard to the transatlantic context most of their findings converge.


geographical terms, and has taken on new functions (Wallander 2000). Despite, the occasional use of ‘coalitions of the willing’ in Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2001), and Libya (2011), NATO remains an important anchor for security policy. Over the past twenty years, the organization has enlarged its portfolio of functions as well as its membership. Thus, transatlantic allies interact in a “thick institutional context” characterized by a joint identity as capitalist democracies, a “complex interdependence among societies, and a high degree of international governance structures creating social order among the community members” (Risse 2008: 275).

Based on this thick institutional context, the security community perspective would lead us to assume that European allies have significant influence over US policies of military intervention. European allies can exert influence on US policies because of joint consultations, various institutional contacts, and transnational coalitions. Members of a security community form their interests together; they abide by the rules of their joint democratic institutions, and generally view direct allied interference in domestic decision-making processes as legitimate (see section 2.3).

Indeed, the existing literature on Cold War transatlantic relations has found European impact even in cases where US vital interests were at stake, such as the Korean War, and during test ban negotiations (Risse-Kappen 1995; Sherwood 1990; Richardson 1996). Granting allies a say over one’s policies is not merely a matter of strategic expediency but part of the United States’ self-image – it is the appropriate thing to do. The “thick institutional context” of transatlantic relations is a constant, thus the security community perspective alone cannot explain the variance between cases. There is broad scholarly agreement that the advent of unipolarity has changed nothing about the texture of the transatlantic security community: across the Atlantic, democratic values are still widely shared, disputes are settled peacefully, and economic interdependence is as high as the level of institutional contacts (Ikenberry 2008; Risse 2008).

The empirical record, however, suggests that despite the density of institutional contacts and frequent consultations, allies did not always succeed in influencing US policies of military intervention. Hence, the security community argument alone is not sufficient to explain particular policy choices.

Further, I would posit that the security community perspective in its original formulation faces difficulties when attempting to account for the process with which allies settle disputes. “Using material power resources to strengthen one’s bargaining
position should be considered illegitimate among democracies” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 38). When it comes to military interventions, the interaction between European allies and their US counterparts involves tough bargaining as well as more consensual dispute management.

1.4.3 Amending Structural Realism: the Soft-balancing Debate

The fallout over Iraq in 2003 and the highly public opposition to US policies prompted realist scholars to amend their hypothesis of unchallenged US primacy. Despite the conspicuous absence of traditional balancing behavior, so they argued, the underlying logic of the balance of power theory was still at work under unipolarity: “Second tier great powers have been pursuing limited, tacit, or indirect balancing strategies largely through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining in international institutions, short of formal bilateral and multilateral military alliances. These institutional and diplomatic strategies, which are intended to constrain U.S. power, constitute forms of soft-balancing” (Paul 2005: 58).

Three components make up the analytical core of the soft-balancing argument. First, soft-balancing is based on balance of threat theory. Hence, states do not balance against power concentration per se. It is only when the hegemon acts aggressively and unilaterally that it can expect opposition from weaker states (Voeten 2004; Paul 2005: 51-57; He/Feng 2008: 366).

Second, and in contrast to traditional balancing behavior, states can pursue a myriad of non-military actions under the rubric of soft-balancing. This includes using their veto power within the UN and other international institutions (Walt 2005: 130; 160-178; Pape 2005); signing treaties of strategic partnerships (Paul 2005: 53; Oswald 2006), or using economic measures to counter the US (Pape 2005: 37; He/Feng 2008; He 2008).

Third, what distinguishes these actions from average diplomatic behavior is the specific intention with which they are undertaken. Soft-balancing is essentially a countervailing strategy. With regard to French, German, and Russian opposition ahead of the Iraq war 2003, Joffé has asked, “What was their purpose? To save Saddam Hussein? No, of course not. It was to constrain American power, now liberated from the ropes of bipolarity” (Joffé 2003). Soft-balancing is a precursor to more structural balancing against the concentration of power (Pape 2005; He/Feng 2008).
It is to the credit of the soft-balancing concept that it places interactions between allies and strategies used by those in opposition to US behavior in the center of attention. Yet, for reasons of conceptual clarity and empirical validity, the soft-balancing approach provides an unsatisfactory analytical tool.

The soft-balancing argument is the product of significant *conceptual stretching*. The problem is not, as Brooks and Wolforth argue, “the failure to consider alternative explanations” (Brooks/Wolforth 2005: 74). Rather, the concept of soft-balancing stretches too far to incorporate alternative explanations into its causal model. Proponents of the soft-balancing argument have taken in views that openly contradict the theory their concept is based on: “Balancing against a unipolar leader is possible but it does not operate according to the rules of other balance of power systems” (Pape 2005: 16). It may well be true that the unipolar leader is constrained by the rules of international institutions or by attempts to deny its actions legitimacy, as soft-balancers argue. Yet, pursuing strategies of non-military action is neither a rational strategy, nor is it likely to be successful under the basic assumptions inherent to balance of power theory. In such a realist view, international institutions “matter only at the margins” (Mearsheimer 1994: 7) and because they reflect the distribution of power, they are unlikely to change it with the help of their procedures (Grieco 1988). States that balance to ensure their survival would thus be ill advised to focus on such strategies. The same can be said for soft-balancing arguments that center upon the notion that weaker states can place pressure on the hegemon by denying the legitimacy of its actions. Legitimacy may be at work in today’s international system but it is still incompatible with basic structural realist assumptions; instead, it can be better explained with a constructivist understanding of international politics (Kupchan 2011). By encompassing many competing arguments in one’s own explanation, soft-balancing becomes both hard to falsify and a highly inconsistent theoretical argument.

A second and related problem concerns the question of the validity of the soft-balancing concept. Its two most prominent critiques (Brooks/Wolforth 2005; Lieber/Alexander 2005) have argued that current work on soft-balancing fails to provide a compelling operationalization for its hypotheses: “The link to balance of power theory is what gives the soft-balancing argument its dramatic punch. Take away that link, and soft-balancing collapses into a portentous sounding term to describe conventional policy disputes and diplomatic bargaining” (Brooks/Wolforth 2005: 76). Countervailing intentions, according to soft-balancing, provides this
essential link. Yet, “to search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. […] History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy” (Morgenthau 1993: 2). Realist scholars have consistently failed to explain how these intentions should be uncovered empirically and how to differentiate between cheap talk and actual interests. Giovanni Sartori has described this problem for concepts that are designed for narrower purposes and then extended to fit new and contradictory empirical data: “[T]he net result of conceptual straining is that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision. It appears that we can cover more – in travelling terms – only by saying less, and saying less in a far less precise manner” (Sartori 1970: 1035).

Proponents of the soft-balancing argument rightly note that European influence on US policies of military intervention needs to be researched on the basis of allied interaction. Yet, the concept is inconsistent and a rather poor guide to empirical analysis. The typology developed in the next chapter aims to provide a remedy for both of these weaknesses. Three distinguishable theories provide the basis for the development of different strategies of allied influence-seeking. Specifying three distinct types of strategies makes it possible to trace what European allies do to influence US actions and how these strategies interact with one another. I have also tried to make the hypotheses more amenable to empirical research. Allied strategies can be distinguished based on whether they seek to engage or resist the United States. In principle, strategies of engagement are based on the assumption that allies contribute to military interventions and attach conditions to these contributions. Allied strategies of resistance rely on the possibility to refuse support for US policies. A detailed section on operationalization details expected empirical observations for each strategy.

Summing up the arguments of this brief literature review, I identify the following limitations. Both structural realism and the security community are unable to account for the variance in outcomes: while in some cases the US acted alongside of allies and gave into their demands, it acted alone and in accordance to its preferences in other cases. Existing accounts also show limitations when it comes to explaining the process of decision-making during military interventions. The soft-balancing argument is unhelpful because it lumps together different strategies of influence-seeking in a broad rubric while providing insufficient guidance on empirical analysis.
1.5 Structure of the Study

The next two chapters develop appropriate theoretical and methodological tools to research alliance politics in this context. In Chapter 2, I develop the theoretical framework of alliance politics in a two-step process. First, the typology of different strategies of influence-seeking is introduced. I use three strands of literature each of which identifies a major source of allied influence and details how allies are likely to interact during war-time. Defensive realism highlights the importance of the costs of military endeavors. In a bargaining situation with the United States, European allies can alleviate or increase the costs of such missions. Thin institutionalism points to the crucial role played by the myriad of formal and informal institutions in which transatlantic allies interact and negotiate over military interventions. Thick institutionalism emphasizes that the social context of a security community provides allies with specific avenues to influence US decision-making based on the power of persuasion. Second, the theoretical chapter discusses three scope conditions for allied influence: the intensity of threat, the unity of the US domestic scene, and the degree of unity among European allies. Chapter 3 introduces the selection of cases and the methods chosen to analyze them. I will combine within-case comparison, cross-case comparison and process tracing to analyze both, the interactions between allies in detail and to identify conditions that are conducive to success.

Chapters 4 and 5 apply the framework of alliance politics to two in-depth case studies into military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. Both cases studies follow a similar pattern. After an initial analysis of intra-alliance differences, I trace the development of US policies of military intervention against the background of these differences. I argue that branching points delineate several phases of each military intervention: policy changes usually take place at times where previous approaches to settling conflicts have run into a dead end and where the situation on the ground worsens. After mapping changes in US policies, I turn to how these changes can be explained and the extent to which allies influenced these changes. To that end, I analyze which strategies European allies have used in each phase of the intervention to make their impact felt on US policy-making. In a last step, the discussion turns to the conditions present or absent that help explain why European allies were able to influence US policy over time or in different dimensions of the use of force.
While both cases count as successes examples of influence-seeking, the differentiation into the three dimensions of military interventions discloses important differences between the two. In the Bosnian case, allies were able to have an impact on the principal, political, and tactical dimension at least to some degree. In the Kosovo case, only the UK can claim to have had limited influence on the principal decision to threaten force while France and Germany were pushed into military action. All three allies, though, did have an impact on the political purpose of the military mission and its implementation. I argue that the intensity of threat or threat perception cannot explain why the United States at times ignored the demands of its European allies. Rather, the high degree of European unity and the high fragmentation of the US domestic scene explain the extent of European influence.

The analysis of cases in which allies largely failed to gain influence is undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7. These chapters examine whether the mechanisms and conditions responsible for allied influence in the successful cases were indeed absent in the failed cases. Both case studies on US engagement in Iraq (in 1998/1999 and in 2002/2003) are structured similarly to the previous chapters to provide for a structured and focused comparison. The analysis of alliance politics in these cases reveals three central findings that run contrary to the widely held view that when it comes to Iraq the primacy of US national security objectives turned transatlantic relations upside down. First, I argue that European allies used essentially similar strategies in the Iraq and in the Balkans cases and that there was nothing special in their opposition to US policies of intervention. Second, in both Iraq cases individual European allies can claim some limited form of influence on US policy-making. The French were able to delay the use of force in 1998 and the British had a significant role in defining disarmament as the official political purpose of the intervention in Iraq in 2003. Third, I argue that it is not a higher level of threat or perceived threat that drove increased US unilateralism in the Iraq cases. Rather, in both cases, European allies were split on the right course of action and that significantly diminished their leverage vis-à-vis the US administration.

Chapter 8 draws together the findings of the four cases studies and summarizes the findings in various categories. I start out with a comparison of what European allies have been able to influence in each of the cases. It becomes clear that no two cases are the same and that influence not only varies across the dimensions of the use of force but also over time. A further comparison of European allies reveals that the
United Kingdom indeed seems to have a ‘special relationship’ that grants British officials unprecedented levels of access and say in US decision-making. A comparative assessment of strategies of influence-seeking highlights the particular importance of strategies based on persuasion and voice opportunities, whereas issue-specific power did not play a constant role. Lastly, I discuss the extent to which the alliance politics model can explain the variance across cases and the reasons why the intensity of threat perception is not an adequate explanation for this variance. This thesis ends with an outline of future avenues for research.
2. Alliance Politics: Strategies of Influence-seeking and Scope Conditions

I argued in the introduction that the concept of the security community adequately captures the social structure in which European states and the United States interact: transatlantic allies share a dense institutional environment and are linked to each other by an active transnational community. Most importantly, they can still count on the expectation of peaceful change: allies solve their disputes without resorting to force. Yet even within a security community, allies face disputes over policy and harmony is no automatism. Beyond the expectation of peaceful change, the security community perspective is indeterminate with regard to how allies settle their disputes and how particular policy choices are made.

In order to explain how policy disputes are settled and when European allies prevail, it is necessary to look beyond structural explanations and focus on allied interactions. In the following, I further develop a framework of *alliance politics* to explain European influence on US decision-making and map interactions between allies. A focus on interactions between allies is based on the assumption that the way in which smaller allies seek to influence a hegemon is intimately linked to the conditions under which they can be successful. A thorough analysis of the strategies of influence-seeking helps identify the conditions for success.

In a first step, I develop a typology of different strategies of allied influence-seeking. I identify three main sources of influence of allied strategies: the hegemon’s sensitivity to the material costs of military interventions, the hegemon’s interests in the long-term credibility of international institutions, and lastly the hegemon’s quest for legitimacy. Strategies of allied influence-seeking rely on these three sources, as the next section details.

In a second step, I develop hypotheses about the international and domestic conditions under which these strategies – either alone or in combination – are likely to yield results, and hence cause a change in US policy. I argue that three scope conditions are likely to be relevant: the intensity of threat emanating from the target of the intervention, the degree of unity among smaller allies, and the degree of unity within US domestic politics. This hypothesis is tested in the case studies that follow.
2.1 Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking – a Typology

In a first step, I construct a typology to differentiate various strategies of allied influence-seeking. Typologies are used to order a complex set of empirical phenomena and to group empirical observations based on the constructions of types along at least two characteristics. The literature distinguishes descriptive from explanatory typologies (see Collier et al. 2012; Elman 2005; Bennett/George 2005: 207-208). The typology developed here is a descriptive typology since its cells map out a broader concept. With regard to soft-balancing theory, I argued in the previous chapter that our present analysis of allied interactions is hampered by lumping together different dynamics of allied interaction under general types and due to limits in operationalization. In order to research and compare allied interaction in different cases, a typology of allied strategies of influence-seeking needs to clearly specify various strategies and create types amenable to empirical research. Consequently, the typology I construct emphasizes the descriptive thickness of typologies but also conceptual clarification. Hence, three existing strands of literature on the internal dynamics of alliances provide the starting point for the construction of the typology: defensive realism, thin institutionalism, and thick institutionalism. Each theory clearly specifies the first building characteristic of the typology: the source of allied influence over the hegemon. The second criterion used to distinguish strategies is the mode of action. I argue that different strategies can be based on either resisting or engaging the hegemon. Based on the three theories, the typology helps to provide answers to three questions: what is the source/foundation of allied influence? Which strategies can we expect allies to follow? And how can we observe these actions empirically?

2.1.1 Defensive Realism: Sensitivity to Costs and Issue-specific Power

Defensive realists have prominently argued that even smaller allies may sometimes prevail in a bargaining situation with the hegemon. The basic reason for allied influence is that even the most powerful state in the system will be sensitive to the costs associated with military interventions. Defensive realists assume that states strive for security and not for power per se within the international system. In case of

7 Within the construction process there is an evident trade-off between the ordering function of typologies, hence the degree of generalization of types, and their descriptive function, hence the ability of typologies to capture empirical phenomena (Bailey 1994: 4; Collier et al. 2012).
the hegemon, state action is guided by the goal of preserving its primacy in the long-term (Walt 1987; Taliaferro 2000: 136-141). Current military interventions are rarely fought for direct security reasons or in response to attacks and, thus, pose important trade-offs between short-term military gains and long-term economic and military advantages. Some measures to increase short-term security may have unintended consequences that actually decrease a state’s security over time (Glaser 1997). Accordingly, even powerful states are sensitive to the short-term and long-term costs of their security policies.

Military interventions are a case in point. While a successful unilateral military intervention may increase the short-term security of the hegemon, fighting alone comes with tremendous costs, in terms of personnel and finance. For example, in the largely unilateral mission in Iraq that began in 2003, the United States shouldered the majority of the costs. It spent more than six-times the costs of its few allies: a total of US$255bn in 2005 (Wallsten 2005) and reached up to an estimated US$823bn in 2011 (Belasco 2011: 10). Over 4000 US soldiers lost their lives during the war, and over 30,000 were wounded. Moreover, defensive realists assume that the United States as the hegemon has global interests and interprets its security interests extensively (Gompert et al. 1999): “when a country is as strong as the United States is today, its leaders inevitably will be tempted to pursue far-reaching objectives” (Walt 2005: 57). Hence, if the United States commits unilaterally to a given military intervention, this deployment of military, political, and financial resources creates opportunity costs. Even the hegemon’s resources are finite and they cannot be readily used in a different theater once they are bound to a given military intervention. When President Obama wanted to focus US forces on the intervention in Afghanistan in 2009, he found them overstretched and deployed elsewhere. Opportunity costs are likely to be high in current military interventions. Irrespective of whether a mission has been led by the UN, their complexity and, hence, their costs have risen steadily since the 1990s (Schimizu/Sandler 2002). In addition, mission creep is ubiquitous: military interventions have often transformed into longer peacekeeping engagements (Chestermann 2004; Caplan 2005).

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Given these manifold costs, acting within an alliance is an attractive option if the hegemon seeks to preserve its international status and tries to avoid military endeavors that threaten its economic base. Of course, generating and maintaining an alliance to fight a military intervention is a costly practice. Still, allies can reduce the overall costs for the hegemon if they share the burden of the mission. Consequently, the hegemon’s cost-sensitivity and its ability to forego short-term gains through unilateralism is the reason why small allies can gain influence over the policies of the hegemon during military interventions.

**Contributing and Balkiing: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking**

Defensive realists would characterize the prevalent mode between European allies and the United States as a case of bargaining. How can allies capitalize on the United States’ cost-sensitivity in a situation in which power is unequally distributed? I argue that by alleviating some of the costs of military interventions and by contributing specific assets of value, European allies can improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. In short: European allies can exploit their issue-specific power (Risse-Kappen 1995; Keohane 1971).

The concept of issue-specific power needs to be further specified. For realists, power hinges upon the relative distribution of material capabilities: “By far the majority prefers a definition of ‘power’ as the capabilities or resources, mainly military, with which states can influence one another” (Wolfforth 1993: 4). Material indicators to measure power include military, economic, and technological resources, but also the size of the population, and the location of territory (Wolfforth 2009; Schmidt 2005; Schweller 1994). The perception of this distribution of these material capabilities is more important than their actual content (Rose 1998: 157-160; Walt 1987). A corollary of this observation is that the impact of relative material capabilities is contingent on the issue at hand and the way in which states apprehend their position: “[D]ifferent elements of power possess different utilities at different times. […] States possess different conversation ratios and comparative advantages […]” (Wolfforth 1993: 306-307).

Although the United States could easily pursue most military missions without the input of its weaker European allies, the latter may draw on specific comparative advantages: “It is possible that a weak nation possesses an asset of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable” ( Morgenthau 1993: 201).
In a bargaining situation with the United States, allies can try to exploit their issue-specific power to prevail in policy disputes. Hence, if alliance politics is a process of asymmetric bargaining between allies, a weaker ally may overcome the disadvantages in relative power by exploiting material resources particularly valuable to the hegemon.

Allies can use two modes of action, resistance or engagement, to make use of their issue-specific power. *Balking* is a strategy that denies material support for specific policies of the hegemon in military interventions. The strategy of *contributing*, however, offers material assets to the hegemon and ties these offers of cooperation to certain conditions (for a similar point see Ikenberry 2003).

**Operationalization**

This section seeks to operationalize issue-specific power in the context of military interventions and outline what we should expect to observe empirically if the strategies set out above are at work.

First, cost calculations are likely to play a large role in US officials’ decisions on military interventions. Such calculations could be expected to embrace estimates in terms of finance, the number of soldiers necessary to complete the intervention, the risks posed to the soldiers in battle, the likely duration of the intervention, as well as the anticipated duration and costs of the post-conflict phase.

Second, consistent with the defensive realist conception of issue-specific power, the strategies of balking and contributing rely mostly on economic and military resources. Economically, individual financial contributions to specific military interventions can be quite significant. For example, during the Gulf War in 1990, Arab and European allies paid for the majority of the financial costs.10 Allies can *contribute* or *balk* economic resources: they can offer financial support for a mission of the United States or additional funding for their own troops in case they fight alongside the United States. Last but not least, allies can grant or withhold financial aid for the post-conflict phase. The burden of reconstruction looms large on the horizon, when transatlantic allies negotiate over the policies of military intervention.11 Hence, the

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11 For example, the Balkans are a case in point: the United States financed and staffed less than a fourth of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia from 1996 to 2003, see US Department of State Background Note Bosnia, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm> [last accessed May 10, 2012].
actors left to clean up the dishes of military interventions can demand a say over how these military interventions should be conducted. Tracing balking or contributing strategies requires analyzing which financial assets have been refused, promised, or granted by allies. In a second step, I ask whether such contributions were tied to explicit or implicit demands by allies. European allies may hold military assets of great value to any intervention. Balking in military terms can be seen in the denial of access to military bases or territory. Turkey’s refusal to permit US forces to cross its territory to invade Iraq in 2003 is one prominent example (Kelley 2005). I would also speak of balking in cases where allies straightforwardly refuse to commit their own troops to a mission or refuse to provide equipment to their own forces or to multinational units.

In a contributing strategy, allies place restrictions on the use of their forces in military interventions. This phenomenon has been recently discussed under the term ‘caveats’. These written or sometimes informal limits upon the conduct of state’s soldiers can have significant effects on the way mandates of military missions are formulated and executed. The German refusal to deploy troops to south Afghanistan during the ongoing ISAF mission has been widely discussed (see Auerswald/Saideman 2009: 2).

Hence, engagement while placing conditions on the use of military force can take place on different levels: it can focus on the formulation of the mandate for troops, or it can determine its execution – be it the location of force, the rule of engagement, or the process of targeting the enemy.

2.1.2 Thin Institutionalism: Commitment to Cooperation and Voice Opportunities

A contending view to the realist interpretation of alliance politics is institutionalism. From this perspective, whether allies have influence on the hegemon during military interventions crucially depends on the institutional characteristics of the alliance. Institutionalist approaches converge on a general definition of international institutions as “a set of rules meant to govern international behavior. Rules, in turn, are often conceived as statements that forbid, require and permit particular kinds of action” (Beth/Simmons 2002: 194).

While different institutionalist approaches agree on what an institution is and that it matters to the influence of allies, they differ sharply on how institutions matter for allied influence. Depending on how the operating mode of institutions is
conceptualized, distinct strategies of allied influence result. Two such ‘schools’ are discussed in this thesis because they shed light on the different aspects of institutional relations between allies. Following the distinction by Katzenstein, I refer to them as “thin” and “thick” institutionalism (Katzenstein 1995).12 Thin institutionalism is based on a rationalist logic that treats institutions as “facilitating solutions to coordination problems” (Katzenstein 1995: 12); institutions loosely connect actors and constrain their action.13 Why can international institutions be a source of allied influence on US decision-making during military interventions? Especially in the transatlantic context, allies interact in a dense web of institutions that have been designed to overcome problems of collective action: “If the international arena is one in which still anything goes, regimes will arise not because state actions are circumscribed but because the actors eschew independent decision-making” (Stein 1985: 117). Military interventions pose problems of cooperation and coordination for transatlantic allies. Transatlantic allies are members of several institutions in which solutions to problems are based on rendering their independent decision-making. For example, free-riding and burden-sharing can cause serious problems. Moreover, the transaction costs of cooperation in military interventions are high and may be a serious impediment to joint missions. Fighting in wars requires decisions on strategy and assets, such as command and control, and the alignment of the deployed personnel and equipment (Stein 1985; Cimbala/Forster 2010). Transatlantic allies also face coordination problems in determining the right political and tactical course of action in military interventions. Determining the goals of an intervention is additionally complicated by the fact that goals come with distributional consequences (Krasner 1991: 339).

International institutions provide forums to overcome these problems of cooperation and coordination. Furthermore, the set of rules institutions provide can act as an instrument of influence for allies over the hegemon in two main ways. First,

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12 Each ‘school’ is based on a number of assumptions concerning the logic of action and interaction between allies and the intensity with which institutions are able to have an impact on allied behavior. Choosing such a rather ‘sloppy’ terminology instead of existing differentiations among institutionalist schools, such as regime theory and research on security alliances, the concept of ‘security communities’ has clear advantages in the context of this thesis since it means the insights from these different schools can be integrated in a coherent and consistent manner.

13 In contrast, thick institutionalism presumes that a dense web of connections exists between allies at the governmental and social level. Allies’ interactions are not based on instrumental calculations but on a sense of obligation. Institutions provide the normative context for this behavior and help define what constitutes a state’s interest (see next section).
institutions provide a framework for negotiation between allies, and their rules prescribe responsibilities and decision-making procedures (Keohane 1985: 158-164). In doing so institutions predetermine the extent to which the European allies will at least have an opportunity to advance their preferred policies of military intervention. Institutions grant allies ‘voice opportunities’. Second, institutional norms go beyond the mere opportunity of claiming a contrary opinion to the hegemon, since they clearly specify which states can voice and vote on particular issues (Beth/Simmons 2002: 192-193; Haas 1980). Hence, they often grant “protection for weaker states […] and the effectiveness of an established rule-making procedure requires that powerful states respect those arrangements” (Abott/Snidal 1998: 16). Pre-existing rules for decision-making processes and standard operating procedures for the planning and execution of military missions may have an impact on state action and enable allies to tie down the hegemon (Kay 2004). European allies may prevent the US from acting freely and indiscriminately even in matters of the use of force.

Crucial to this concept of the power expressed through institutions is the question as to why a hegemon would abide by international rules if that meant changing its preferred policy course. Policy conflicts present the strongest state with a trade-off: it can opt for the short-term gain of going it alone and see its preferred policy course enacted despite the opposition voiced by allies in international institutions. Or the strongest state fears the costs incurred to its reputation associated with ignoring international rules and provides other actors the opportunity to propose alternative courses of action and subdues itself to the decision-making procedures of specific international organizations. It is assumed that even the hegemon has a strong incentive to comply because breaking and bending established rules and ignoring the legitimate demands of partners undermines the long-term credibility of international institutions. The hegemon has an interest in the long-term credibility of these institutions since “international politics is characterized by the expectation of future cooperation” (Oye 1985: 12). This “shadow of the future” (Axelrod 1984) has an impact on the hegemon’s decision-making. Disregarding the voice opportunities of allies questions the hegemon’s reliability. If allies cannot be sure of the hegemon’s cooperative behavior today (and as such, in the future), there are fewer incentives to abide by the rules of international institutions in future situations of cooperation (Stein 1990: 22). A lack of reliability provides other states a strong incentive to ignore the rules of international institutions once compliance conflicts with their interests. If
the hegemon takes a long-term interest in the immense benefits of repeated and institutionalized cooperation, then each cooperative move is an important means of preserving international institutions. In the long-term, institutions unfold all their merits from reducing transactions costs, to providing information about states’ intentions and reducing uncertainty (Keohane/Martin 1995: 45-48; Krasner 1982: 190-192; Martin/Simmons 1998: 743).

**Binding, Blocking, Forum-Shopping: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking**

The United States has a long-term interest in the credibility of international institutions and, thus, an incentive to comply with their rules. The following paragraph details how allies can use this commitment to institutionalized cooperation to their advantage in specific policy disputes. I argue that the concept of voice opportunities is central to understanding allies’ strategies. Voice opportunities “may be defined as institutional characteristics whereby the view of partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just expressed but reliably have a material impact […]” (Grieco 1996: 288).14 International institutions lend legitimacy to the opposition declared by allies to specific US policy proposals and they open up space in which opposition and alternatives can be discussed. Thus, I argue that allies can basically use three strategies to exploit voice opportunities.

A strategy based on engaging the hegemon will be called *binding*,15 when weaker allies use institution’s decision-making rules to shape US policy choices in the principal, political, and tactical dimensions. The latter provide allies with the ability to propose policy solutions, to voice their ideas in processes of planning, financing, and implementing military interventions. Hence, European allies can lure the United States into a course of action more in line with their wishes.

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14 Initially, Joseph Grieco introduced the concept as a realist critique of neo-liberal institutionalism. Seeking to explain the evolution of the European Monetary Union he claimed that trying to exercise voice opportunities is a second-best option for states, as they face high costs when opting out of cooperative institutions (ibid.: 289). In this view, states seek to gain voice opportunities by creating rules that favor egalitarian decision-making structures or special privileges for groups of states. Institutionalists have correctly claimed that this concept of ‘voice opportunities’ and binding is fundamentally incompatible with Grieco’s own realist core tenets (see Grieco 1996: 2286-288; Legro/Moravcsik 1998: 8). If one assumes that effective voice opportunities exist, one also has to assume that institutions are not epiphenomenal to state action. Instead, state action becomes highly consequential and central to any explanation of the process and outcome of politics within institutions.

By contrast, *blocking* uses existing decision-making rules to veto policy proposals by the hegemon or at least to procrastinate the implementation of decisions. This strategy rests on the assumption that unilaterally ignoring the resistance of allies constitutes a breach of existing institutional rules.

A third strategy cuts across the two modes of action.\footnote{To a certain extent this strategy provides a weakness of the typology. Ideally, types should be constructed as mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (Collier et al. 2008: 175-159). I would argue that it is more important to represent all types of possible actions even if the criterion of mutual exclusiveness is violated.} The strategy of *forum-shopping* takes advantage of the fact that not all institutions are created equally and that different institutions grant special privileges to different states or groups of states. This strategy is applicable when allied governments deliberately bring up the issues of military intervention in institutional settings in which they have stronger voice opportunities. Sometimes new institutions may be created for this purpose. The phenomenon of forum-shopping has been extensively researched to explain policy changes in domestic and comparative politics: state and non-state actors dissatisfied with a certain policy seek new venues to raise the issue in a different institutional setting: “if successful, a change in venue can lead to substantive policy change due in part to the participation of new actors, the adoption of new rules, and the promotion of new policy images of an issue” (Pralle 2003: 234; see also Baumgartner/Jones 1993).

As the following paragraph dealing with operationalization shows, European allies can make use of their voice opportunities in different types of institutions.

**Operationalization**

For the empirical analysis of the strategies described above, it is important to highlight two specific characteristics of the institutional context in which transatlantic allies interact. First, transatlantic allies interact in a densely institutionalized setting that ranges from highly informal institutions to several formal organizations.\footnote{The distinction between formal and informal institutions has been defined in various ways. For some, formal institutions are equated with international organizations (Abott/Snidal 1998); others have focused on international treaties (Lipson 1991). Equally, those concerned with informal institutions have analyzed specific phenomena such as Groups of Friends, Contact Groups etc. (Withfield 2007; Prantl 2008; Schwegmann 2003; Karns 1987; Manz 2007; Whiffen 2007; Krasno 1987). Both types of institutions may have specific benefits for allied influence: informal institutions are exclusive and as such may provide their members with a greater say (Harnisch 2007; Helmke/Levitsky 2004: 728-729; Prantl 2008; Krasno/Prantl 2004; Krasno 1997; Downs et al. 1998). Formal institutions, though, protect voting rights and provide influence because of their stable decision-making procedures.} Irrespective of their formality, I argue that the rules applied within informal settings such as the Quint or highly formalized arenas such as the UN Security Council enable
allied influence. Examples of prominent formal institutions in the context of this research include the UN, NATO, but also the G8. Informal institutions encompass organizations or minilateral institutions as they have recently been called, such as the Contact Group or Groups of Friends (Harnisch 2007; Choo 2005; Park 2005); but they also refer to rule-governed behavior, which is less strictly organized such as the patterned, informal consultation of a few members within existing international organizations. The most prominent example is the Quint – the directoire of France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States within European and transatlantic institutions (Gegout 2002).

Second, European allies skillfully and deliberately put these institutions into play to gain leverage over the United States. Hence, allies do not confine their attempts to binding and blocking institutions such as the UN or NATO that are explicitly charged with solving problems of cooperation within military interventions. However, attempts to voice opposition to US policies of military intervention are not limited to exclusive transatlantic institutions and often take place within institutions in which other countries, such as Russia, also have a say. To sum up: formal and informal institutions provide specific advantages for European allies. Allies can consciously pick and choose from the variety of institutions available. If allies use their voice opportunities, what could we expect to see in practice?

When European allies try to bind the United States ahead of military interventions, we expect them to use their voice opportunities deliberately to set the agenda in international institutions. Some international institutions, such as the UN Security Council, but also NATO grant its members what Aksoy has called “proposal-making power”: “States holding key positions with proposal-making power, such as the presidency, are an important component of states’ bargaining power” (Aksoy 2010: 172). Thus, European allies can shape US policy-making by proposing alternative courses of action: they can set forth draft resolutions and communiqués for the UN and NATO; they formally and informally organize support for these draft resolutions;


19 Agenda-setting has been widely researched in domestic politics, with regard to negotiations in the European Union, and in connection with the role transnational actors play in international politics (Princen 2007; Schalk et al. 2007; Risse et al. 1999).
they can also discuss policy alternatives in informal forums such as the Quint. British and French diplomacy ahead of the intervention in Libya in 2011 provides a good example: exploiting their position as permanent members of the Security Council, British and French diplomats had done most of the grunt work to draft UN resolution 1973; they also worked hard to get it accepted by the United States, but also Russia and China. Institutional voting rights also provide allies with veto powers and enable them to block certain US policy proposals. When institutions decide by unanimity or by large majorities only, allies could be expected to function as veto players – “individual or collective actor(s) whose agreement is required to produce policy change” (Tsebelis 1995: 293). In the case of transatlantic military missions, NATO and the UN are once again crucial. NATO votes by unanimity and grants every member an equal say. In addition, France and Britain are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Blocking occurs when vetoes against US proposals are issued or threatened by allies. Binding and blocking can also be used with regard to implementation if military campaigns are conducted within the context of international institutions; in this case, we might expect allies to use the complex set of rules guiding implementation. Military missions require a high level of joint planning, communication, training, logistics and intelligence. Institutional rules ensure that these important decisions are not made purely according to military automatism but are subject to political control. Command structures, in particular, serve this purpose (Weinrod/Berry 2010). Even smaller allies may have critical access to and control over these specific procedures. UN command structures, for example, are built on a case-by-case basis and states retain a high level of political control (Guéhenno/Shermann 2009). In the case of NATO, European allies can influence military planning through NATO’s standing command and control structures, in other words Allied Command Europe. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides guidance for the execution of military missions. NATO’s Military Committee develops operational scenarios, which are presented to the NAC for ultimate approval (NATO 2010: 21; Weinrod/Berry 2001). Command

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21 Institutionalists have extensively discussed the role of veto rights as tools for weaker members with respect to the institutional evolution of the European Union (see Garret/Tsebelis 1995; Slapin 2008).
and control procedures then give allies a say over a wider range of tactical decisions, such as the selection of targets or the deployment of personnel and equipment.

Lastly, European allies may go *forum-shopping* to increase their voice opportunities with the United States. A significant characteristic of today’s institutional order is the existence of overlap. If allies forum-shop we would expect them to engage with one or several institutions about their problems with a particular military intervention; it is likely that they would opt for the institution(s) that provide them with the biggest say over policy. Since institutions unfold different constraining effects depending on their characteristics, states deliberately try to choose between them in order to increase their say in decision-making. Allies can bring up military interventions in the deliberations of different international institutions, organize support for their positions within such institutions, or they can try to create new institutions to deal with certain aspects of a military intervention.

2.1.3 Thick Institutionalism: Reputational Costs and the Power of Persuasion

The thick institutionalist argument borrows insights from social constructivism and historic institutionalism. These approaches differ in three respects from the thin institutionalist approach. Katzenstein has captured the essence of these differences in arguing that thick institutionalism “is concerned with both states and social structures, not with just one of them, and it looks at social sectors, political coalitions, […] and ideological constraints” (Katzenstein 1995: 12).

Thick institutionalism goes beyond the observation that institutions constrain the behavior of their members. Rather, transatlantic institutions form a specific social structure – a pluralistic security community – that constitutes each member’s identity. The notion of a security community goes beyond the assumptions of democratic peace theory, which also holds that democracies rarely fight each other (Russett/Oneal 2001). “The distinctive feature of a security community is that a stable peace is tied to the existence of a transnational community” (Adler/Barnett 1998: 31).

According to Risse-Kappen and Adler and Barnett, four characteristics are central to the notion of a security community. First, states within a security community share a

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22 Of course, these are wide-ranging and distinct traditions whose specificity shall not be disputed. In contrast to the two institutionalisms, constructivism is more of an analytical tool than a substantive theory of international relations (see Fearon/Wendt 2002; Risse 2003a). Historical institutionalism has also been described as a rather eclectic research program which can come in rationalist and in a sociological variant; for a discussion of the “new institutionalism” (Hall/Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999; Hall 2010).
common identity and common values. As democracies, transatlantic allies are committed to the rule of law, human rights, and constitutional checks and balances. Second, democratic states reproduce their domestic norms in their international interactions with each other. Hence, multilateralism and diffuse reciprocity are constitutive norms of a security community. Third, within a security community interactions are manifold on the inter-governmental level but also on the transnational level. These interactions are driven by common values and constitute the transnational community. Fourth, security communities are characterized by a high degree of institutionalization reflecting joint identity, dense interactions, and diffuse reciprocity (Adler/Barnett 1998: 30-32; Risse-Kappen 1995: 29-31).

While members of the community may count on the expectation of peaceful change, security communities are not “meant to be idyllic instances of international relations, free from political and social conflicts” (Pouliot 2006: 120). The introductory chapter highlighted that beyond this expectation most of the current work on security communities is fairly indeterminate with regard to how allies solve their disputes.23 Still, from the original core of the security community argument one can extrapolate specific strategies of allied influence-seeking. Three assumptions are relevant. First, states are not treated as unitary actors. States and societies are the relevant actors in international relations. Second, material factors do govern international relations, but social factors are viewed as more important. Third, the role of institutions is conceptualized differently. European allies and the United States interact within a social structure that constitutes their identities as members of a democratic community (Burch 2002; Finnemore 1996: 333; Wendt 1995; Adler/Barnett 1998: 14).

23 With the exception of Risse-Kappen (1995), allied influence in concrete policy disputes has not ruled prominently in the research on security communities. How norms are diffused and internalized was a central focus of early work, which focused on socialization and the logic of appropriateness (Finnemore 1998). Within the security community paradigm, some have focused on how security communities spread through the shared practice of self-restraint (Adler 2008). Others have sought to identify factors leading to the genesis or absence of security communities in other regions, such as Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Adler et al. 2006; Acharya/Tan 2006; Franke 2008). The historical institutionalist debate has centered on the characterization of the current order (Hurrel 2006; Ikenberry/Wright 2008) and the role of the US as a provider of institutional goods (Cox 2004; Ikenberry 2004; Bachevich 2004).
Consultation, Shaming, Trans-governmental Coalitions: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking

In which way does membership of a security community impact on allies’ ability to influence the hegemon? Sharing a constitutive set of norms – hence “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996: 5) – opens the path to mutual persuasion. Allies share these collective expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior for an ally, should a dispute arise.

The expectation of peaceful change, the joint normative background and frequent interactions between members of the security community are particularly conducive to certain forms of interaction. Allies not only bargain, they argue. Arguing implies that allies justify their policy positions in military interventions by providing reasons for their proposals and decisions. In order to be acceptable, these reasons refer to the shared normative background of the security community. If European allies want to challenge the validity of certain US policy proposals in military interventions, they need to refer to some external authority. This phenomenon has been termed the “triadic structure of arguing” (Saretzki 1996; Ulbert et al. 2004). Other allies or domestic audiences can serve the purpose of the jury that has to decide on the legitimacy and conformity of certain justifications (Risse 2000: 21-27; Deitelhoff 2006: 95). Allies, however, not only challenge each other’s normative claims but are also open to the “better argument” (Risse-Kappen 1995; Risse 2003b). As a consequence, allies can change the policies of the hegemon because they can present “the better argument” and elicit behavior by the hegemon that is consistent with their demands and claims. The success of arguing rests on social influence and reputation costs: Because even the hegemon deems itself a member of the security community and seeks the appreciation of this group. “The legitimacy of the audience is a function of self-identification” (Johnston 2001: 501).

Social influence is also applied in Schimmelpfennig’s conception of ‘rhetorical action’ which draws on both the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. Rhetorical action takes place when actors whose policies deviate from the community’s norm are “brought to focus on their collective interests and honor their obligations as community members” (Schimmelpfennig 2001: 63). In this case, the reference to norms and their violation is used strategically to convince actors of the need to return to pro-norm behavior. Müller and Risse have convincingly argued that this conception is inconsistent. If at least one side can be persuaded if normative arguments are employed strategically, “both speakers assume that the audience is predisposed towards communicative, not strategic action. From the speakers’ perspective, the use of arguments is strategic, i.e. purely instrumental. From the audience’s perspective, however, the interaction is communicative” (Müller 2004: 404; see also Risse 2003a).
Arguing is not only a specific form of interaction but is geared towards a distinct outcome: “the prevalence of arguing, which involves a change in at least one of the actors’ strategies or preferences, will be referred to as persuasion” (Risse/Kleine 2010: 711; Italics PF). Successful arguing leads to reasoned consensus: allies seek to coordinate their policies based on a shared understanding of the situation with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable consensus (Risse 2000: 9; Müller 1994). Allied strategies can again be distinguished based on the modus in which they engage or resist the United States.

The first strategy is consultation as co-determination (Risse-Kappen 1995: 36). Based on the constitutive function of shared norms, Risse-Kappen has argued that consultation norms among members of a security community not only regulate behavior, but they shape the way in which actors define their interests and preferences. For democratic allies “consultation should mean co-determination” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 35; see also Adler/Barnett 1998: 43).

The second resisting strategy is delegitimization and shaming. Persuasion presumes that institutions provide allies with their identity as members of an in-group. The norms embedded in institutions prescribe what counts as legitimate behavior (Adler/Barnett 1998: 36). As such, norms render some actions possible, place limits on individual action, and order the relationships between group members (Schimmelpfennig 2001). Arguing as a mode of action presumes that in a situation in which there are conflicting preferences over policy, each actor will seek to interpret its preference in terms of the normative context of the community. Every actor in a community seeks legitimacy for his or her actions. Because “legitimacy is by nature a social and relational phenomenon” (Finnemore 2009: 61) it can only be granted by the relevant reference group and not be imposed by material power. In turn, denying legitimacy to certain policy options proposed by the hegemon can become a weapon of the weak within a security community.

Such delegitimization of US policy choices involves deliberate actions by allies. Inconsistencies between policy options proposed by the hegemon and community

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25 The process of persuasion involves that actors are in principle ready to dispose certain identities and interests within a given discourse. While initially the concept was focused on the change of identities, recent research has been more modest. Persuasion is no longer exclusively associated with a change in actors’ identities: “Human actors engage in truth seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus, challenging the validity claims involved in any communication” (Risse 2000: 1-2). For a further discussion of the arguing concept, see for example Saretzki (1996), Müller (2003), Risse (2000; 2003); Deitelhoff (2006).
norms must be convincingly portrayed as such. This effort has been examined with the concepts of framing and shaming. Framing is undertaken to “fix meanings, organize experience, alter others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems” (Barnett 1999: 25; see also Keck/Sikkink 1998: 897). Shaming involves going public with the frame one has constructed: “[I]t means the public exposure of illegitimate goals and behaviors” (Schimmelpfennig 2001: 64). Because being shamed involves high reputation costs for the hegemon, such attempts at delegitimization can lead the hegemon to change its policy.

Lastly, allies can build *trans-governmental coalitions* to advance their preferred policies inside US decision-making channels. Within a security community, the argument goes, contacts are manifold and span the governmental and societal level.\(^\text{26}\) In Keohane and Nye’s seminal definition, trans-governmental relations are defined “as sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments” (Keohane and Nye 1974, 43). Accordingly, a trans-governmental coalition can be described as an organized network among sub-units of different governments that seeks to advocate a specific policy position within the respective domestic context. As collective identities do not stop at borders, officials from different states in a security community interact frequently and with a sense of mutual loyalty and understanding (for a similar argument see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2007: 3-4).

Moreover, the democratic governance of the security community’s members provides fertile ground for the allies to exert influence on the hegemon for a number of reasons. First, the genesis of trans-governmental coalitions is more likely because officials from all levels of government connect internationally. Here, joint policy proposals between allied officials can emerge. Second, national officials can advance these joint proposals, because democratic decision-making often implies competition between ideas and factions within government even when it comes to the use of force. Consequently, trans-governmental coalitions provide allies indirect access to the

\(^\text{26}\) Similarly to the strategy of forum-shopping, the building of trans-governmental alliances cuts across the two dominant modes of action. Coalition building can also take place at the societal level or between non-governmental and executive actors; such coalitions are called *transnational* coalitions (see Risse/Ropp/Sikkink 1998). The realm of military interventions and the allied politics associated with it remain under relatively tight governmental control.
internal decision-making process of the hegemon (Risse-Kappen 1995: 38-39). Summing up, because European allies and the United States are partners within a security community, the United States is in principle open to persuasion by allies. If European allies seek to appeal to the US identity as a member of the security community, they can use consultation as co-determination, shaming and trans-governmental coalitions to influence US policy choices in military interventions.

**Operationalization**

Directly observing *consultation as co-determination* may be difficult because consultations are likely to take place behind closed doors. Timing is of essence to the empirical observation of this strategy: in the context of this dissertation, consultation as co-determination is assumed to work when US policymakers take into account European preferences and concerns before making a decision about their own strategy (Risse-Kappen 1995:36). Two empirical measures can be taken as indicating co-determination. A first sign of co-determination occurs when US policymakers consistently refer to allies and their positions within internal deliberations. A further indicator of co-determination exists when US policymakers enter a discussion with their allies with a position that is open to modification in principle (Risse-Kappen 1995: 36).

An analysis of *delegitimizing and shaming* requires an examination of the normative context of transatlantic military interventions and communication between allies. With regard to military interventions, the UN Charter, NATO’s Washington Treaty and practice, but also international humanitarian law provides a shared normative context for the interaction between transatlantic allies. Shaming implies that allies consistently refer to these norms and frame US proposals and actions as inconsistent with these norms. Hence, I will analyze how allied governments portray American policies or proposals of military intervention and how they depict the latter in relation to the shared normative background.

The community perspective assumes that allies are well positioned to connect with US officials in *trans-governmental coalitions*. With the help of such coalitions, allies are assumed to get a seat indirectly at the table of US domestic discussions on military intervention. Based on similar interests and perceptions of the situation we can assume that these officials work out a common position (Keohane/Nye 1974; Risse-Kappen 1995). Because military interventions are not only debated within the
executive, such coalitions can also include officials from international organizations and the US congress. Hence, if trans-governmental coalitions exist, American officials use their backing by allies as a bargaining chip in internal deliberations. Detecting trans-governmental coalitions implies coming to terms with informal and usually highly personalized contacts (see Eilstrupp-Sangiovanni 2007; Hollis 2010). Research aimed at identifying such networks must rely on detailed interviews, primary data such as the minutes of meetings, and other detailed historical accounts. Lastly, if the power of persuasion is at work between allies, we might expect a specific outcome: the solution should neither be forced upon weaker allies nor should it represent the least common denominator. If allies solve their disputes mainly through arguing and persuasion, then the outcome should be a reasoned and robust consensus. Three empirical indicators can be given for such a consensus. First, the solution found to the intra-alliance dispute must respond to the demands of both sides and evidence must point to the willingness of all parties to adjust their policies (see Risse-Kappen 1994: 41; Gelpi 2003: 15-16). Allies usually define diplomatic red lines with regard to political and military aspects of any intervention. If such red lines have been crossed, we can take this as an indicator of a reasoned consensus. Second, consensus is more robust if allies do not undermine the agreement by actions inconsistent with the word and spirit of the document (Ulbert et al. 2004). Third, justification matters: a consensus is more robust if allies use similar arguments to defend their decision, if these arguments refer to the shared normative background and if they are used consistently in front of different audiences (Risse/Kleine 2010: 712).  

The following two tables summarize the outcomes of this chapter. The first table depicts the typology of allied strategies of influence-seeking that I have developed, and the second table lists strategies and their operationalization.

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27 Arguing is also regularly associated with outcomes that are concluded fairly early and have a problem-solving character (Risse/Kleine 2010; Elgström/Jönson 2000; Odell 2010). In the cases under scrutiny, neither adjective is readily applicable. In contrast to many more technical negotiations, military interventions have no clear-cut solution that can be viewed as problem-solving or creating value for each member of the alliance. Moreover, allies decide to act militarily with the intention of developing a positive outcome, although they cannot know for sure whether their chosen military strategy will bring peace and security.
Table 1. Typology: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Allied Influence</th>
<th>Mode of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Realism: Issue-specific Power</strong></td>
<td>Engagement, Resistance, Cutting across the two modes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States are rational, unitary actors that join in alliances to aggregate capabilities. The hegemon is cost-sensitive with regard to military interventions. Allies can exploit their issue-specific power.</td>
<td>Contributing, Balking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thin Institutionalism: Voice Opportunities</strong></td>
<td>Binding, Blocking, Forum-shopping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational actors design institutions to overcome collective action problems. Institutional rules are sticky and can be used to restrain even powerful actors. Allies seek to exploit the voice opportunities granted by international institutions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thick Institutionalism: Reputation Costs</strong></td>
<td>Consultation as Co-determination, Shaming, Building Trans-governmental Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied states are not conceptualized as unitary actors. They interact in the context of a security community with a common identity, transnational ties and joint institutions. Allies seek to invoke the power of persuasion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Overview of Strategies and their Operationalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies of Influence-seeking</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Balking**                     | - denial of access to bases and equipment  
|                                  | - threats to withhold troops  
|                                  | - withholding funding for common budgets and deployments  
|                                  | - withholding financial contributions for reconstruction |
| **Contributing**                | - establishing caveats as part of mandate, rules of engagement, or force structure  
|                                  | - offer funding for troops  
|                                  | - offer funding for post-conflict reconstruction  
|                                  | - European allies tie such offers to political concessions by the United States |
| **Binding**                     | - setting agenda in institutions: calling for meetings, organizing support for resolutions  
|                                  | - formulating mandate for military interventions: drafting proposals etc.  
|                                  | - using command and control rules to make proposals on how to use force |
| **Blocking**                    | - vetoing or threatening a veto to existing proposals for mandate  
|                                  | - vetoing or threatening a veto of a campaign plan |
| **Forum-shopping**              | - attempting to transfer issues to an institution with more favorable decision-making structures for allies |
| **Consultation as co-determination** | - consulting with counterparts prior to the definition of interests and red lines |
| **Shaming**                     | - seeking to portray US action as incompatible with the norms of the security community |
| **Building trans-governmental coalitions** | - entertaining close contacts with counterparts to advance own position within US decision-making process |
2.2 Scope Conditions for Allied Influence

In the previous section, I developed a typology of allied strategies of influence-seeking. In their various actions, allies are basically able to tap into three sources of influence: they can exploit the hegemon’s cost-sensitivity; they can use the hegemon’s long-term commitment to institutionalized cooperation; and lastly, they can build on the reputation costs associated with pursuing policies deemed illegitimate by the security community. These strategies describe the process by which European allies seek to change US policies of military intervention. In short: allied strategies detail how influence-seeking is done, but not why influence is successful. In order to explain why allies’ strategies work in some cases and not in others, I identify the conditions necessary for allied influence-seeking.

These conditions are intimately related to allied strategies and their effect is only understandable with reference to allied action. As the strategies employed by allies do not explain the variance across cases, only a thorough examination of allied strategies can identify the conditions conducive to allied influence. Again, I draw on realist and institutionalist alliance literature to highlight three conditions that could be relevant for allied influence. Each of these conditions is said to relate to the three main sources of allied influence: the hegemon’s cost-sensitivity, its interest in long-term institutional cooperation, and the fear of reputation costs. Three conditions are identified as relevant: first, the threat and challenge posed by the military intervention may be important. Second, the degree of unity of allied opposition has an impact on their ability to gain leverage with the hegemon. Lastly, the degree of domestic unity within the United States is crucial to the success of allied influence.

2.2.1 The Intensity of Threat

As I argued in Chapter 2.1, the success of allied strategies that invoke the issue-specific power of European allies or their voice opportunities in international institutions depends on the extent to which the United States is primarily motivated by long-term considerations. Cost-sensitivity is going to be felt more acutely if the short-term gains of an unconfined military mission are weighed against the long-term costs of providing the burden of such missions alone. Additionally, complying with the rules of international institutions is a function of long-term thinking: disregarding allies’ voice opportunities comes with short-term benefits in that the hegemon can pursue its preferred policy course without making concessions to others. Disregarding
the rules of international institutions, however, creates direct problems for the
hegemon and international institutions in the long-term since “laws, rules, and
institutions have a legitimacy of their own in contemporary politics that derives from
their particular rational-legal, impersonal character” (Finnemore 2009: 60). Ignoring
voice opportunities disqualifies the hegemon as an unreliable partner and harms the
impartial reputation of international institutions. Whether allies succeed in
instrumentalizing their issue-specific power and voice opportunities depends on the
decision-calculus of the hegemon. Thus, under which conditions will the hegemon be
motivated by such long-term considerations?

The realist alliance literature answers the question of time-horizons that has long
puzzled scholars: “Unfortunately, there is no deductive theory available to decide
under which conditions great powers should behave in a far sighted way” (Risse-
Kappen 1995: 20). Different strands of realist thinking converge on the view that a
state’s time-horizon is a function of the security environment: long-term
considerations come into play when the central security interests of a state are not
threatened by the target of a potential military intervention. There are several realist
variations to this core theme.

Structural and offensive realist scholars stand at one end of the spectrum when
claiming that in a world of international anarchy time frames are naturally rather
short. Structural realists, such as Waltz, would argue that because uncertainty is a key
feature of the international system, states must ensure their survival and they have an
inherent interest in increasing their short-term security. Considerations about the long-
term security take second place: “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if
survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and
power. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their
positions in the system” (Waltz 1979: 126). Offensive realists posit that states seek
more than security; they seek power as a positional good. From this perspective, the
short-term maximization of power and security become even more plausible as the
international system will be unforgiving to positional losses. Military interventions
are costly endeavors and in the case of defeat may decrease a state’s relative
capabilities. Still, offensive realists hold that short-term security trumps economic
concerns (Mearsheimer 1994: 10; Mearsheimer 2001; Brooks 1997: 452; Schmidt

For an overview and comparison of different realist strands see Fraenkel 1996; Brooks 1997; Schmidt 2005.
2005: 527). As discussed in Chapter 1.3.1, allies have few things to add or counter this incentive.

Accounts of alliances by defensive realists represent the other end of the spectrum of realist thinking. External threats motivate state behavior whether in forging alliances or during the management of policy disputes within them (Walt 1987; Weitsman 2003). States have an interest in cooperating when the security environment is relatively benign and no prevalent threats exist (Brooks 1997: 466). If the target of the military intervention is not a salient threat to the security of the hegemon then the potential future costs of unilateral military intervention will weigh heavily on the calculus of the hegemon. Allies can then exploit this sensitivity to the material and reputational costs of an intervention (see Chapter 2.1.1).

Within this defensive realist camp, the question of salience has been analyzed and defined in different ways. In his discussion of bargaining theory, Risse-Kappen claims that the salience of a particular security issue is a function of the “intensity of preferences” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 21; Papayanou 1997). Snyder also argues, “the parties’ interest in the specific issue [...] is a major determinant of alliance bargaining power” (Synder 1997: 170). Preferences for a certain outcome are said to be more intense the more the security issue threatens survival. Recently, Pressman has further developed the idea of the decisive importance of the intensity of preferences. He argues that the “allies’ hierarchy of national security objectives directly shapes their stance on the restraint attempt” (Pressman 2008: 16, italics in original). In this view, the hegemon will not only adopt a short-term perspective if a contested policy of military intervention threatens its survival. Rather, if the policy dispute with allies concerns an issue that is a prioritized national security objective, the hegemon will discard the long-term benefits of cooperating with allies and not grant them influence over its policies (Pressman 2008: 16).

Both Risse-Kappen and Pressman readily admit one central weakness to the ‘intensity of preferences’ argument. Defining non-tautological empirical indicators to measure the balance of interests and preferences between allies and for each state is extremely difficult other than analyzing the negotiation behavior of governments or the outcomes of negotiations (Risse-Kappen 1995: 21, Pressman 2008: 142). Yet, actual behavior may easily be misleading, for example, because rhetoric may deliberately exaggerate reasons for or against a given military intervention (Thompson 2012).
For the empirical analysis undertaken as part of this thesis, it is more useful to return to the defensive realist core idea that the intensity of the threat determines the level of allied influence. Building on Walt’s balance of threat theory, defensive realists have equaled the actual threat with the threat perception of US policy-makers based on the assumption that the latter are more relevant for policy choices (Kreps 2008: 551-553; Walt 1987). Accordingly, the main hypothesis is:

*If the hegemon perceives the target of the military intervention as a major threat, allied influence is likely to decrease.*

In light of a major threat, time-horizons are short: the immediate benefit of going alone outweighs the potential benefits of having allies contribute to the military mission or preserving the credibility of international institutions. Thus, allied strategies seeking to exploit issue-specific power and voice opportunities are unlikely to succeed.

For the sake of theoretical consistency, the realist argument on the power of threat perceptions needs to meet two conditions with regard to its operationalization. First, threat perceptions must be distinguishable from other motives to intervene in a third state. Political rhetoric alone may be a poor indicator of the threat perception because “advocates of a war will naturally claim that the threat is serious and urgent in order to rally support” (Thompson 2012: 21). For the intensity of threat argument to be more than an ex post explanation, we need to establish some objective measure of threats and their intensity (Thompson 2012; Risse-Kappen 1995).

Second, the defensive realist argument is only consistent if a government’s threat perception is related to an actual measurable threat with distinct material indicators. This reference to material factors as affecting threat perceptions differentiates the defensive realist hypotheses from constructivist arguments about the importance of perceived national security interests and threats. For example, the literature on the phenomenon of securitization argues that perceived threats and interests are the product of a deliberate act of social and discursive construction (Buzan et al. 1998; McDonald 2008). Balzacq defines securitization as “a pragmatic act, i.e.: a sustained argumentative practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb it” (Balzacq 2010:75). According to securitization theory, the characteristics of a discourse, its participants, and the
historical threat associations are conditions that facilitate the intensity of threat (Waever 2000: 252).

Defensive realists, by contrast, do not hold that politicians have wide discretion in what can realistically be perceived as a major threat. Rather, Walt notes the four most relevant material factors for the level of threat, such as the aggregate power of the opponent, geographical proximity, “specific offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions” (Walt 2009: 89). In a recent contribution to the literature, Kreps has provided a useful typology to measure the intensity of threats to the United States.29

“A relatively safe, predictable security environment makes it a reasonable bet that if the intervening state conserves its resources by acting multilaterally, it will be in a position down the road to enjoy the fruits of those conserved resources; thus, time-horizons are long” (Kreps 2011: 30). The typology of threat intensity takes into account three factors (Kreps 2011: 30-31). First, the level of threat increases when the target of the military intervention poses a direct security problem to the wellbeing of the United States. ‘Directness’ can be measured by the capacity of the potential target to threaten the hegemon’s homeland by studying a mixture of geographical distance and the target’s military capacity to project force. If the target poses such a direct threat to US survival, allied influence should decrease.

Second, the level of threat according to Kreps is defined by the urgency or immediacy of the challenge. Immediate threats should stem from previous or imminent attacks or threats of attack. Allied influence should decrease if the target country of the intervention has immediately attacked or poses an immediate challenge. Leaders can be expected to perceive a higher degree of uncertainty and a need to act, depending on the immediacy of the challenge.

Third, the level of threat perception varies with the type of security challenged posed by the potential target of the intervention. The threat should be more immediately felt if a country militarily threatens the United States and less so, if long-term US economic interests are affected by the challenger. Allied influence should thus decrease if the target of the military intervention poses a direct military challenge to the US.

29 Kreps analyzes under which conditions the United States opts for unilateralism versus different forms of multilateral cooperation in military interventions. She argues that the more direct the threat the less likely the United States will be to opt for “full multilateralism,” hence the blessing by international institutions and full allied influence during military operations. See Kreps (2011).
2.2.2 Unity among European Allies

The three theoretical schools upon which allied strategies are based all identify the extent to which European allies are able to form a unified opposition to US policies as an important scope condition for success. Further, the three approaches agree that unity is not a categorical but rather a continuous variable: full consensus on each position is rarely achieved in international politics and unity always remains a matter of degree. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

*The greater the degree of unity among allies, the more influence they should be able to wield over the hegemon.*

While unity is singled out as an important condition for the success of allied strategies, this is done for different reasons. From the perspective of defensive realists, unity among European allies increases the value of their issue-specific resources: “[J]oining forces with others is a way of improving one’s bargaining position in global negotiations, whether the issue is trade […] or even issues of ‘high politics’ such as the use of military force” (Walt 2005: 127). There is a straightforward rationale behind this assumption. As discussed in section 2.1.1.2, the bargaining power and leverage over the hegemon that smaller allies have is a function of two factors. First, issue-specific power relates to the relative distribution of material capabilities in a given bargaining situation. Pooling their material power resources improves the relative position of smaller allies vis-à-vis the more powerful partner. Second, unity among smaller allies also affects the costs of military intervention: the price of going to war increases with every ally that withholds cooperation or demands concessions in exchange for the contribution of money and soldiers (Pape 2005; Layne 2006). Additionally, if Europeans refuse to provide material support in a unified manner, they will decrease the potential of the US to punish non-cooperation because of the rising costs of such measures (Bobrow 2008: 270).

According to thin institutionalism, unity among European allies is also relevant for those strategies that rest on invoking institutional voice opportunities. Reminding the United States of its obligations as a member of specific international institutions or blocking US proposals in international organizations does not ensure that these obligations are honored, as Washington may disregard controlling and voting rights. As shown in section 2.2, the concept of voice opportunities assumes that the United
States complies to institutional rules and procedures because it values their long-term benefits. Institutions are, thus, costly signals of intent to cooperate with allies in the future. If the United States breaks with allies, its future reliability may be questioned (Fearon 1997; Morrow 1994; Gelpi 1999: 114-115; see section 2.1.2).

The degree of unity of opposition should affect the decision-calculus of the United States when it weighs the benefits of going alone and pursuing its preferred policies compared to changing the policies for the sake of preserving the long-term credibility of international institutions. The more unified the opposition, the more the US has to fear from being seen as unreliable. Having some partners that agree to the US policy position provides political cover and eases the reliability problem. On a more practical note, allied unity should also affect individual strategies based on voice opportunities: binding and blocking often rely on specific quorums for decision-making in international institutions. It is more likely that unity would ensure that the necessary quorums would be fulfilled.

The notion that members of a security community can influence each other using social influence and inflicting reputation costs for norm-deviant behavior builds the core of the thick institutionalist argument on influence-seeking (Finnemore 2009; Johnston 2001; Ulbert et al. 2004). “An actor will be sensitive to arguments that her/his behavior is consistent or inconsistent with their self-identity as a high-status actor. This sensitivity ought to depend as well on who is making these arguments. The more the audience or reference group is legitimate, that is, the more it consists of actors whose opinions matter, the greater the effect of back-patting and opprobrium” (Johnston 2001: 501). If the United States strongly identifies as a member of the transatlantic community, arguments by European allies that portray US policies as inconsistent with the norms of the community should hurt particularly.

The success of allied attempts to change US policy-making by delegitimizing and shaming US actions should depend on the degree of European unity in pursuing these strategies. Shaming rests on the ability of allies to show that the hegemon’s policy choices are incompatible with existing community norms. This phenomenon has been described as “norm resonance” (Payne 2001: 43-44). Benford and Snow have elaborated that norm resonance depends on “the credibility of the proffered frame and its relative salience” (Benford and Snow 2000: 619). Yet, which policies are illegitimate is a matter of degree and argument in itself. The credibility of the frame and the salience of a particular line of argument significantly depend on the coherence
and consistency of those actors that seek to shame another actor. Consequently, allied unity matters greatly for the ability to deny legitimacy to the policy choices of the United States. If the United States can make an argument that its actions are consistent with the norms of the community and is able to elicit some European support for these arguments, disunity among European allies will make it harder for opponents to inflict reputation costs on the United States.

The following discussion operationalizes the concept of European unity in two steps. First, it clarifies what is meant by Europe in the context of this thesis. The case studies and in depth analysis of allied strategies will be limited to Europe’s ‘big three,’ the UK, France and Germany. Thus, I first analyze the extent to which these three countries have presented a unified position. While an in-depth analysis of all European partners is beyond the capacity of a single thesis, Europe, of course, is more than these three countries and other European allies have sometimes played an important role in swaying the United States in a different policy direction. Moreover, the arguments on the role of unity put forth above suggest that the effects of united opposition should be stronger when more European countries are involved. Thus, I assess which other European countries supported specific actions by the three transatlantic allies in their attempts to restrain the United States. In particular, common statements and actions by the European Union are viewed as an excellent indicator of the degree of European unity.

Second, the operationalization of European unity needs to specify the reference object of unity. Measuring European unity begs the question: ‘Unity in terms of what?’ I argue that the condition of European unity can only be understood in reference to allied strategies of influence-seeking. Measuring the degree of unity essentially implies assessing which strategies have been pursued by more than one European ally and in coordination.

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30 The next chapter elaborates on the reasons these three countries were selected.
2.2.3 The Unity of US Domestic Politics

A final scope condition takes into account that allied influence may depend on specific characteristics of the US domestic debate on a given military intervention. The main hypothesis is:

*If the US domestic political scene – comprised of an administration, congress, and public opinion – is united around a certain set of policies of military intervention, the success of allied strategies of influence-seeking is less likely.*

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that allied strategies of influence-seeking face three domestic hurdles: the US administration, congress, and public opinion. The first hurdle to allied attempts to restrain policies of military intervention is the administration. As with any bureaucratic decision, policy choices in military interventions stem “from an amalgam of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially on any particular issue and who compete to advance their own personal and organizational interests as they try to influence policy” (Clifford 1990: 162). In attempting to influence US administrative decision-making two aspects are particularly relevant. First, the ultimate decision about the deployment of US military power rests with the president as the commander in chief (Fisher 2008: 170-171). This discretionary power lends particular importance to the style of presidential decision-making. Depending on the leadership style, “the president can minimize the influence of other political actors and guide the process to ensure that his own view and policies prevails” (Sarkesian et al. 2003: 87; Nelson 2008: 165). Second, policies of military intervention are debated and prepared by the National Security Council (NSC). In statutory terms, the NSC consists of the vice president, and the secretary of state and defense as the president’s main security advisers; usually the national security advisor is also part of the NSC. In a wider advisory circle, the NSC draws on the head of the Central intelligence agency (CIA) and joint chief of staff. The national security staff is supposed to work as an additional advisory unit to the input provided by the State Department and the Pentagon. Again, each president has leeway to determine the workings and set-up of the NSC and the role fulfilled by individual participants (Sarkesian et al. 2003: 105-110; Whittaker 2008). Of course, different personal constellations and different operating modes of the NSC provide European allies with a varying degree of access. In particular, a leadership style that discourages
differences of view and opinion among national security officials is likely to lead to less access points for European allies. Since any US decision to use armed force is subject to public scrutiny and in need of public justification, allies may well face domestic hurdles in addition to the US administration. In making decisions about military interventions, the latter will weigh allied policy preferences against those of congress and public opinion (Resnick 2010: 154-156; Putnam 1988).

The power of congress, as a second domestic hurdle, hinges on its institutional capacities, partisan voting behavior and the effect of elections. While the US constitution grants the executive the authority to initiate military action, the leeway of the president as commander in chief is not unlimited. The US War Powers Resolution requires the approval of congress for military campaigns lasting more than 60 days. Moreover, congressional approval is also required if funding is to be provided for US missions (Auerswald 1997). Although congress cannot veto a presidential decision on the use of force, “Congress may threaten ex post action to derail a president’s foreign policy venture” (Brule 2000: 465). The existing literature has identified a number of factors that increase congressional salience in decisions over the use of force, such as partisan politics or electoral cycles (Gowa 1998; Howell/Pevhouse 2005; Hildebrant et al. 2012). The executive cannot easily build or rely upon a cross-party consensus in national security issues.

As a third hurdle, public opinion plays a large role in debates over the use of force since current research demonstrates that the US public is not altogether indifferent, uneducated, and open to manipulation on matters of foreign affairs.31 Jentleson has coined the term “pretty prudent public” to describe the US public as generally attentive to issues of the use of force (Jentleson/Britton 1998). A large body of literature has discussed the conditions under which the US public supports military action and the wide impact the public mood has on administrative decision-making (Jentleson/Britton 1998; Eichenberg 2005; Hildebrandt et al. 2012; Baum 2004). Again, there are different reasons why the degree of unity in the domestic scene and the interplay of the three groups of players matters to the success of allied strategies of influence-seeking.

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31 This does not preclude ‘rallying effects’ as a window of opportunity for the executive to exploit high approval ratings and steer public opinion in a certain direction (Kreps 2011: 39).
Defensive realists could argue that the degree of unity of US domestic politics influences the extent to which a given administration will be sensitive to the costs of military interventions. If a given US administration enjoys widespread support for its policies of military intervention, it could be expected to be less sensitive to the costs of unilateral action. In turn, if domestic actors are split on the right course of action this could be expected to increase allied influence. Allied strategies exploiting the sensitivity of the US to the material costs of interventions is likely to be more successful in situations in which a given administration has to persuade the public and congress of the merits of intervention.

Allied strategies based on issue-specific power are based on the assumption that sharing the burden is important to the United States. Indeed, various authors have argued that the distribution of costs and the positive role that allies can play are especially important to ensure the support of the US public. Tago, for example, argues that the US government is likely to seek endorsement by international institutions and cooperation by allies to win over public opinion: such multilateral action implies operational burden-sharing and the latter makes military interventions appear less costly to the US public (Tago 2005; Eichenberger 2005: 145-146). As Holsti comments “most Americans prefer that the country works actively with others, most notably with allies, to cope with the plethora of security, humanitarian, and other issues that have surfaced in recent decades. Burden-sharing is probably the best term to describe predominant public preferences on a wide range of international undertakings, whereas going it alone, the essence of unilateralism, is the much less popular path” (Holsti 2004: 267). It follows from the general preference for burden-sharing that allied strategies of influence-seeking based on issue-specific power should be more successful in situations where the US domestic scene is split and the administration cannot count on unfettered public support.

Further, the degree of unity of the US domestic scene should have important effects for strategies resting on reputation costs and the power of persuasion. Grieco et al. have recently argued that the US administration often seeks the approval of allies and international organizations to gain endorsement of military action by the US public because such international approval acts “like a second opinion from a trusted outsider” (Grieco et al. 2011: 56; also Eichenberg 2005: 145-146; Jentleson/Britton 1998). If congress and public opinion are split on the use of force, the support of allies may be crucial to gain legitimacy and public support for a certain course of action.
Consequently, in such a situation allied strategies based on persuasion and shaming are likely to be more successful.

Lastly, European strategies, such as consultation as co-determination or transgovernmental coalition-building, bank on the openness of US administrative decision-making: European diplomats hook on to a domestic debate and with the help of their arguments tilt the domestic balance in their favor. Thus, these strategies presuppose two characteristics of the US decision-making process: first, there has to be some degree of internal debate within the US administration on how to pursue a military intervention. Second, European allies need to have access points to participate directly or indirectly in this discussion. In consequence, European influence can be expected to be more successful in cases where a US administration has not firmly settled on a course of military action but where different branches of the US government disagree. Lack of unity in itself is not enough for Europeans to succeed: the structure of US decision-making needs to provide access points for European allies, and their counterparts in the US need to have some significant say in internal debates.

As the above discussion has shown, unity in domestic politics refers to the relationship between congress, public opinion and the government on the one hand, and the internal degree of unity within an administration on the other. Hence, the following two hypotheses can be formulated:

1. **Allied strategies should be more successful if a given administration, congress and public opinion are not united around policies of military intervention.**

2. **Allied strategies of influence-seeking should be more successful if a given administration is internally split on the right course of action.**

How can one measure and assess these two hypotheses? Various publicly accessibly documents provide insights into the question as to whether an administration faces a split public sphere in parliaments and society. Congressional hearings and public statements by senators and representatives represent a rich repertoire of the parliamentary debates and opinions. Further, the analysis takes into account whether congressional legislation was issued or put forth to counter an administration’s policy or even allied influence. Opinion polls are used to assess the position of the US public on different policy dimensions with regard to military interventions.

The second hypothesis requires an examination of presidential leadership style and the characteristics of the NSC decision-making process. The success of allied influence-seeking depends on the function of the NSC in three ways. If NSC decision-
making is deceitful, European allies have no opportunity to object to US policy choices on military intervention (Pressman 2008). If the decision-making process in the NSC marginalizes officials that entertain trans-governmental coalitions with European allies, the latter are less likely to tip the balance of arguments in their favor. Lastly, if all the members of the NSC – the president’s senior foreign policy advisors – are unified around policy proposals for military intervention, it will be very hard for European allies to break apart this system or to persuade the US national security establishment to adopt a different course of action. In conclusion, I argue that consultation as co-determination and trans-governmental coalition-building are more likely to work if a US administration has not already firmly and unanimously settled on policies of the use of force.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have constructed a framework for analyzing alliance politics. It is based on the assumption that a more thorough understanding of the process of allied influence is needed. Based on the insights of defensive realism, and thin and thick institutionalism, this chapter has examined three distinct sources of allied influence. In making their case, European allies can resort to their issue-specific power, to the voice opportunities provided by international institutions, or to the power of the joint transatlantic identity. Yet strategies of allied influence-seeking do not always lead to influence. I have put forth hypotheses on three scope conditions for allied influence that will be tested in the case studies that follow. The empirical analysis will examine the role of the intensity of threat emanating from the target of the intervention, the importance of the degree of unity shown by European allies, and the significance of domestic unity within the United States. The next chapter outlines the research design and sources used in the case studies as well as the operationalization of the hypotheses developed here.
3. Case Selection and Methods of Analysis

In the chapters that follow, I analyze alliance politics and its outcomes with the help of the analytical framework elaborated in the previous chapter. This chapter builds the bridge between the theoretical hypotheses and empirical analysis: I explain my selection of cases, the methods used to analyze these cases, and the use of sources.

3.1 Case Selection

I am interested in how transatlantic allies have solved their disputes regarding military interventions since the Cold War. In particular, I focus on how European allies have sought to influence US policies, and when they have been successful in prevailing over the United States. Chapter 1.3 clarified that in the context of this thesis military interventions include the threat of force but exclude peacekeeping activities. This results in a range of cases consisting of military interventions that have been threatened or conducted by transatlantic allies since 1990. Table 3 lists the interventions as defined by these criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf War</td>
<td>1990—1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1993—1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1998—1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this list, I have selected four cases for empirical analysis based on the following criteria. First, I chose cases in which the existing secondary literature identifies significant policy disputes between allies. As outlined in the introductory chapter, intra-alliance disputes and their settlement represent a particularly conducive unit of analysis for a study of influence. Thus, I exclude the Persian Gulf War and the
implementation of Iraq no-fly zones from 1993—1998 because of the high degree of allied agreement they display. Additionally, military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was not marked by significant allied disagreements. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article V and European nations promised their support. While the latter were irritated that the Bush administration had not asked for material support in the early military campaign, Europeans did not challenge the US approach or its justification of the intervention.

Second, I have excluded recent cases, such as the intervention in Libya or the ongoing debate on intervention in Syria. Gathering data on allied strategies and tracing the process of influence-seeking requires detailed data and triangulation of different types of sources. In both cases, these types of data were not readily available.

Third, I have limited my analysis to strategies used by Europe’s three biggest members: France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. All cases include transatlantic policy disputes with at least one of these countries. In limiting my analysis to these three states, I hope to improve the basis for cross-case comparison. Research into the strategies of all European allies would far exceed the limitations of this study. Because of the differences in their bilateral relations with the United States and their general approaches to military interventions, examining the strategies of these allies should lead to interesting perspectives.

Thus, the empirical cases under review are the interventions in Bosnia (1993—1995), Kosovo (1998—1999), Iraq (1998), and Iraq (2003). While in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo allies were able to influence US policies, they failed to do so in the two Iraq cases. In general, the selected cases show variance in the dependent variable. This variance will allow us to examine the conditions under which allies are able to influence US policies of military interventions.

### 3.2 Methods of Analysis

The empirical analysis combines a number of essentially comparative case study methods to assess both sides of my research questions: how do allies seek influence and under which conditions are they successful.

Generally, the study follows the logic of ‘structured’ and ‘focused’ comparison that is used to provide for within-case and cross-case comparison (George/Benett 1997: 69-71). The case studies are focused in the sense that they deal with one specific aspect of these military interventions: the settlement of intra-alliance disputes. Thus, I am
not interested in a number of other facets usually discussed with regard to these cases, such as the motives for intervening or the reasons behind the success of an intervention. The structure is provided by the development of a general questionnaire that reflects my research interests and that enables the systematic collection of qualitative data. In my case studies, I ask the following questions:

1) How did US policies of military intervention develop in light of intra-alliance differences?
   - What were the major initial disagreements between allies?
   - Did the US stick to its initial policy position?
   - Did allies find a compromise on all or some dimension of the use of force?

2) How did allies try to influence US policies of military intervention?
   - What evidence can be found for each of the strategies of influence-seeking?

3) What conditions were present when allies influenced US policies?
   - Which of the three conditions was present as predicted and helps to explain the outcome?

In a first step, I use two in-depth cases studies to grasp the details of how allies seek to influence US policies during military interventions. The two successful cases of influence-seeking – Bosnia and Kosovo – are used also to identify scope conditions for success. The two cases provide a very small N to assess both, the functioning of various allied strategies and the significance of three scope conditions. At first glance, military interventions provide a picture “of a multiplicity of conditions, a compounding of their influences on what is to be explained and an indeterminacy regarding the effect of any one condition or several conditions in combination” (Smelser in Satori 1994; 21, italics in original). The organization of the in-depth case studies combines a variety of methods to increase observations and highlight the role of different conditions.

First, I use within-case comparison to increase the number of observations and to control for a number of context factors (Lijphart 1975: 158-168). In order to assess the development of US policies over time and the influence of allies’ strategies, I have divided the cases up in different phases. Each phase is delineated by what I call branching points, which have two characteristics in common. (1) Branching points
occur at times where developments in the conflict make abundantly clear that previous policies of military intervention are either completely discredited or can only be continued at large costs. (2) Such moments of crisis, thus, present a window of opportunity to alter policies; I expect this to provide the best opportunity to observe how differences between the United States and European allies are played out. The within-case comparison also follows the structured and focused questionnaire to generate comparable data from each case. Thus, the comparison of different phases within a single case should help identify the conditions under which allied influence is successful.

Second, I use process tracing to uncover how allies seek to change the course of US policy. At the outset of the study, I argued that in order to explain allied influence on US policy interactions between allies need to be examined. In the previous chapter, I developed a typology of different allied strategies of influence-seeking based on three distinct sources of influence. These strategies can be conceived of as different pathways or mechanisms by which allied influence comes about. Such mechanisms spell out “how, by what intermediate steps, a certain outcome follows from a set of initial conditions” (Manytz 2003: 3-5; also Gerring 2010: 1500, italics PF). Process tracing is a method that is “particularly strong on questions of how and interactions” (Checkel 2005:6) and is, thus, used to analyze the interplay between transatlantic allies and identify scope conditions (Checkel 2005: 4-5; George/Benett 1997: 21; 206). Process tracing has clear advantages in the context of my research. For the matter of practicality, I assume that the three theoretical approaches provide competing hypotheses of influence-seeking. The process tracing method enables the examination of the potential for multicausality, interaction effects, and equifinality (Ragin 2004; George/Benett 1997; Gerring 2004). Indeed, I use the two in-depth case studies to construct an argument about the way in which allies influence the hegemon and under which conditions this is possible.

In a second step, I test the plausibility of the argument identified in the two in-depth cases. I use a cross-case comparison with two cases in which European allies failed to have an impact on US policy-making; both Iraq cases represent the failure of allies to significantly influence US policies of military intervention. Again, I use the method of structured and focused comparison to enable a controlled comparison of the cases. I first assess whether allies have departed from their strategies of influencing the
United States. Then, I examine whether the conditions conducive to allied influence in the positive cases were indeed absent in the negative cases. The number of military interventions that have occurred since the Cold War is fairly small and, hence, it could well be argued that the four selected cases are not completely independent of one another. These cases could be connected through explanatory variables: many of the same officials were involved in the Balkans cases and many similar issues arose in these two cases. Hence, variation in the two instances would be smaller. Furthermore, cases could be related to each other because of their outcomes. The process of alliance decision-making in one military intervention would than inform how allies and the United States make decisions in following interventions. I use process tracing to uncover if and to what extent each of these two possible links played a role and how any such dependence may account for smaller variation.

3.3 The Use of Sources

The empirical analysis probes several sources of evidence; each of these sources comes with characteristic advantages and disadvantages. I have sought to triangulate – check evidence of one source against another – and probe the evidence as systematically as possible. The first source of evidence is an extensive secondary literature for each of the cases. Works in this category include journalistic accounts, work by historians and political scientists, as well as memoirs published by key decision-makers. The existence of these detailed works was quite helpful to conduct research into the context of military interventions and identify major differences between European allies and the United States. Allied strategies of influence-seeking are discussed but do not usually form the focus of these works. Especially in the context of the two in-depth studies, I supplement this material with newspaper articles: journalists with good access to policy circles can provide detailed insights into the dynamics of closed-door negotiations.

To supplement these data, I analyze recently declassified primary documents from the Clinton and Bush administration. For the Bosnian case, these documents include a study of US diplomacy commissioned by the State Department, which draws on extensive interviews with participants and classified material (see State Department 1997). In the Kosovo case, I draw on declassified memos exchanged between President Clinton and Tony Blair. For both of the Balkans cases, decisions taken by
the US National Security Council and the deputy NSC have been partially published in electronic form by the Clinton library at the Clinton Presidential Center in Little Rock/Arkansas. There has also been a mandatory declassification regarding the US military intervention in Iraq 1998, including presidential talking points, cables, and conversations with advisers and foreign leaders. The Iraq 2003 case has been subject to an extensive US and British parliamentary investigation concerning the use of intelligence (Butler 2004). More importantly, the British parliament established the Chilcot Inquiry in July 2009 to review the British decision to go to war. In this context, extensive interviews by all UK participants and a declassification of primary documents have been undertaken. Additionally, the National Security Archive at George Washington University has analyzed and published declassified records from the George W. Bush administration, including talking points, deliberations in the NSC and memos by different US departments. I have also drawn on additional primary sources, such as official documents and speeches of American and allied officials in all four cases.

Lastly, I conducted interviews with former officials from the Clinton administration and selected German officials. These diplomats and military personnel were personally involved in the military interventions discussed in the empirical analysis. The interviews were very helpful in gaining stronger knowledge about the context of military interventions and the sequence of certain events. However, there were also limits to the value of the information obtained through interviews. Some interviewees were quite selective in their recollected of certain events and were often biased in the ways they presented information due to their own involvement in the policy-making process. Wherever possible, I have checked the insights gained in one interview by probing other interviewees about certain events and against other types of sources.
4. NATO’s Intervention in Bosnia

For the transatlantic alliance, the outbreak of Bosnia’s civil war coincided with major changes in European security and with the period of re-invention of NATO’s rationale in the world and the role of the US in Europe. Already, allies collectively and individually had engaged in the Persian Gulf War and in Somalia. But Bosnia was altogether a different matter: it blended elements of a war of aggression with elements of a civil war. Any military engagement would not be peacekeeping in the traditional sense of the word. European allies and their American counterparts lacked a blueprint and normative guidelines for how to deal with this form of humanitarian catastrophe.

In light of the novelty of the situation, it comes as no surprise that the three European allies differed with the Clinton administration on the principal, political, and tactical dimension of the use of force. I argue in this chapter that European allies were eventually able to influence US policy choices in the principal and political dimension as the United States overcame its initial reluctance to intervene in the Balkans. European allies played a large part in the redefinition of US goals in Bosnia that contributed to this decision. Furthermore, US policy in the political dimension mirrored earlier European proposals to solve the Bosnian war: they were based on a peace agreement that would provide all of the belligerents with large political gains if they were to trade in their arms. With regard to the tactical dimension of the use of force, European allies successfully resisted the implementation of massive air strikes until the summer of 1995. Yet with the advent of NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force, Europeans bowed to US pressure when it came to tactical issues: the Clinton administration was able to push through its preferred policy of heavy air strikes.

This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the conflict (4.1). The section that follows discusses initial differences between European allies and the United States on each dimension of the use of force (4.2). Based on this introduction, I examine the development of US policy in Bosnia over time (4.3). I then analyze European strategies of influence-seeking (4.4) and the conditions conducive to this influence (4.5). The final section (4.6) sums up the conclusions of the case study.
4.1 Introduction to the Conflict in Bosnia

The war in Bosnia evolved as a consequence of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For the international community, “the dissolution of Yugoslavia became a laboratory rat in experiments of collective international diplomacy” (Gow 1997: 31). Outside actors lacked a common assessment on the causes and dynamics of the war (Woodward 1995: 199-222; Weller 1992). Against this background, this introductory chapter briefly reviews the causes and main actors of the conflict as well as their strategic and tactical goals. The Bosnian war showed characteristics of both a civil war and an international conflict; much of the conflict was “about statehood, sovereignty, self-determination and, effectively, the meaning of ‘nation’” (Gow 1997: 67). The Yugoslav dissolution brought up the question of self-determination with regard to three ethnic groups – the Serbian, Croat, and Muslim populations in Bosnia. Because of the geographical and demographic situation in Bosnia, they were mutually exclusive. In late 1992, war broke out between the three parties in defense of their competing claims to territory (Burg/Shoup 1999: 62-79; Woodward 1995: 82; 226-227).

In hindsight the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, and supported by Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, must count as the instigators of the civil war. Not only had the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) provoked Bosnia’s constitutional crisis, but Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav National Army units undertook initial hostilities. Strategically, the SDS aimed to create a ‘Greater Serbia,’ in which a Bosnian Serb region would merge with the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). To enlarge its territory, the SDS also justified the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslim population (Thumann 1996: 16; Talbott 2002: 82). Milosevic’s support was vital for the SDS: it lent legitimacy to its goals, ensured economic supply for the Bosnian Serb republic, and contributed to its military strength (Burg/Shoup 1999: 65; 101-105; Bert 1997).

32 For three comprehensive and balanced accounts on the dissolution of Yugoslavia see Woodward (1995); Burg/Shoup (1999); Silber/Little (1996). Some authors underline the structural conditions of the war, such as the economic and legal conditions of Yugoslavia, financial austerity and public hardship, as well as the loss of strategic significance (Woodward 1995; Gow 1997). Others point to the crucial role of nationalist leaders capitalizing on alleged historic hatred and grievances (Caplan 1998; Silber/Little 1996).

33 Most of its people had mixed ethno-national identities and many were bound to each other by marriage. Even more importantly, Bosnia rarely consisted of geographical areas inhabited and governed by one ethnic group alone.

34 Former Yugoslav units were transformed into SDS units retaining heavy weapons and artillery that largely accounted for the Bosnian Serbs’ military superiority.
The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) displayed a similar process of outside attachment and internal radicalization. Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, had successfully installed the radical Mate Boban as the HDZ’s new leader. Croatia provided not only political but also economic and military support (Ramet 2006: 436). Several times during the war, the Bosnian Croats shifted their alignments, as they saw their aim of Croat autonomy within Bosnia served best with varying partners. Clearly, Bosnian Croats were also trying to carve out as much territory as possible for a future Croat republic. While between 1991 and 1992 the HDZ and President Tudjman emphasized partition, the outbreak of hostilities in late 1992 forged a fragile Muslim-Croat military alliance that held until January 1993. It was not until 1994 that this alignment was re-established and that Croats agreed to fight for their political sovereignty within a Bosnian federation (Burg/Shoup 1999: 101-104; US Department of State 1997: 49-54).

An internal split between a nationalist faction and a more moderate one was also apparent among the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA); however, the extent to which Bosnian President and SDA leader, Alija Izetbegovic, was committed to nationalist goals or to a truly multinational democratic Bosnia remains disputed. Lacking an active outside patron for most of the war, Bosnian Muslims had very little heavy equipment or trained forces to systematically counter Bosnian Serb military superiority (Burg/Shoup 1999: 66-69; Paczulla 2004: 256; Greenberg/McGuinness 2000).

The Bosnian conflict was a three front war with multiple, largely opportunistic and fragile alliances; it was fought with extreme brutality and high civilian casualties (Bert 1997: 46). Depending on the estimate, the war turned between one-third and two-thirds of the population into refugees or internally displaced people (Silber/Little 1996: 244-275; Burg/Shoup 2001: 170).

International engagement before 1993 was marked by the lack of a blueprint for the actions of outside actors. While on both sides of the Atlantic the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia was a source of concern, the sense of urgency greatly differed. For the United States under President Bush, the conflicts in the Balkans were not a priority (Woodward 1995: 155; Bert 1997): “The bottom line in this crisis, however, is that the world community cannot stop Yugoslavs from killing one another as long as they are determined to do so” (Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Johnson in Paulsen 1995: 38). Europe viewed the Balkans as a priority. Willing to prove the
capacity of the newly founded Common European Defense and Security Policy, they took on the early conflict management. However, the dissolution of Yugoslavia did not prove that “the hour of Europe” had come in international crisis management (Greenberg/McGuinness 2000).35 Within the United Nations, however, the two sides of the Atlantic had been cooperating on Bosnia even before 1993: the UN Security Council (UNSC) had established a complete arms embargo and strict economic sanctions were placed on Yugoslavia, hence, Serbia and Montenegro (UN Doc. Res. S/713). In 1992, the Council extended the mandate of its military mission in Croatia – UNPROFOR – to the territory of Bosnia (UN Doc. Res. S/743; UN Doc. Res. S/770).36 While the Security Council rejected Bosnian Muslim pleas for a preventive military force (Burg/Shoup 1999: 203-204), it established a no-fly zone over the entire territory of Bosnia, which was enforced by NATO (Operation Deny Flight, UN Doc. Res. S/781). In mid-1992 diplomacy shifted away from an exclusive European dominance. The International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), co-sponsored by the EC and the UN, took on the task of mediating between the parties in the so-called ‘Geneva talks’ (see Owen 1995). The outcome of these efforts was the first comprehensive draft peace agreement, the Vance-Owen peace plan. The detailed analysis of intra-alliance bargaining starts with allied reactions to this peace initiative in 1993 (see section 4.3).

4.2 Allied Approaches to the Bosnian Conflict

The complexities of the Yugoslav and Bosnian theatre left room to interpret the dynamics on the ground differently. Indeed, because of its intricacies, the US secretary of state, Warren Christopher, once called Bosnia “the problem from hell.” Allies differed sharply in their perceptions of the belligerents and the dynamics of the Bosnian war: “Part of the problem […] is that every player interpreted the crisis not in local terms, but through its own historical lenses” (Ramet 2005: 78). As a consequence of these diverging interpretations, policies on each dimension of the use of force differed between European allies and the United States. In making this claim,

35 The shortcoming of early EC/EU crisis management cannot be discussed here. For a detailed review see Gow 1997: 45-50; Woodward: 164-178.
36 These two resolutions established an airlift into Sarajevo; UNPROFOR was to operate as a military support for the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies. UNSC Res. 770 empowered states to take all necessary measures to deliver humanitarian relief, such as escorting convoys. Overall, 54 UN resolutions had been issued on Yugoslavia by the end of 1993.
I do not imply that the US administration was a monolith in its policy vision on Bosnia; indeed, later in the chapter I highlight the importance of internal division within the Clinton administration. Additionally, the positions of European allies developed over time. In order to analyze potential European influence on US policy, however, it is necessary to discern a ‘going in position’ that also formed the basis for allied disagreements on Bosnia.

Within the Clinton administration, the Bosnian conflict was viewed largely as a war of aggression led by Serbia and its proxy, the Bosnian Serbs, who engaged in an unlawful campaign of ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims. It was clear that the United States would have to stand against such injustice: “Bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a policy the world will tolerate […] Our answer must be a resounding no” (Christopher 1993). President Clinton, in particular, adhered to an understanding of the conflict that portrayed it as an inevitable outcome of age-old hatred and “ethnic furies” (Gow 1997: 218; Drew 1994: 144).

This perception led the United States government to be *principally reluctant* to use military force in the Balkans. Bosnia could easily turn into a second Vietnam where pursuing a morally right cause resulted in military disaster: “This thing is a no-winner, it’s going to be a quagmire. Let’s not make it our quagmire” (Senior government official in Drew 1994: 155). This principal reluctance was closely linked to a certain preference in the *tactical dimension* of the use of force. If US soldiers were to be deployed at all in the Balkans, then the US only advocated forms of military intervention that posed the least risk to its soldiers. Air strikes were preferred; in contrast, the deployment of ground troops in a combat role remained out of question: “At this point, I would not rule out any option except for the option I have never ruled in, which was the question of American ground troops” (Clinton in Daalder 2000: 14). Because the Clinton administration perceived the Bosnian Muslims largely as victims of Serb aggression, it would not accept just any peace agreement. The ultimate *political purpose* of US engagement in Bosnia was preserving the unity and integrity of the Bosnian state and assisting the beleaguered Bosnian Muslims. Neither in terms of territory nor in terms of political authority should a peace agreement reward Serbian aggression (Daalder 2000; Owen 1995).

This perception and approach stood in marked contrast to the views held by the governments of the United Kingdom and France. Both governments were much more
reluctant to identify culprit and victims in the Bosnian war. “It has been agreed, for instance, that we must face the grim fact that there are no wholly innocent victims among those responsible for policy in the former Yugoslavia. That innocent victims exist can be seen only too clearly, but those on all sides who are driving policy forward have a responsibility” (Hurd 1993: § 856). The extremely aggressive role played by the Serbs was not denied but there was no preferred treatment for Croats and Bosnian Muslims (Gow 1997: 175; Major 1992; Kuusisto 1999: 108-112; President Mitterrand in Sobel 2003: 110).

This perception of the conflict had a great impact on how these two countries positioned themselves on the different dimensions of the use of force. On the principal dimension, the two countries did not reject the use of force outright rather they demanded more active US engagement. In tactical terms, however, they sharply differed with the Clinton administration. Concerned with the safety of UN troops in Bosnia and the integrity of the UN, both countries were reluctant to support the call by the US for air strikes and demanded some significant US ground presence (Simms 2001; Owen 1995; Wood 1994). Both governments consistently emphasized the purely humanitarian character of the UN mission in Bosnia (Bodenstein 2002: 202-207; Lanxade 1993; Rifkind 1993, Tardy 1999): UNPROFOR should be a humanitarian operation based on consensus, neutrality and non-coercion.

In terms of the political purpose of any military intervention, France and Britain remained deeply skeptical about one-sided military interference (Simms 2000: 7-9; Sharp 1997). With utmost clarity, Douglas Hogg rejected intervention when explaining to Izetbegovic “there is no cavalry coming over the hill, there is no international force coming. The only way this killing is going to stop is by negotiation.”37 Thus, both governments favored a political solution that was acceptable to all parties. This alleged pro-Serb stance earned the UK much criticism from the US: “It was not merely that Britain had no permanent allies, as Palmerston had famously asserted, just permanent interests; it appeared, at times, to have no permanent principles either” (Hall/Rengger 2005: 78). Both the UK and France supported solutions accommodating Serb war gains and also sought to minimize the extent to which Serbia was offended and hurt by international actions (Simms 2001; Gow 1997: 182ff; Lepick 1996: 78; Eyal 1993: 65).

37 Cited in “American killed as snipers attack Panic’s convoy,” The Independent, August, 14 1992.
The German government found itself boxed in between the extremes of the US position and that of its European partners (Heimerl 2004: 349). In light of its own history of unification, the Kohl government strongly supported the principle of self-determination in the case of Croatia and Slovenia. However, the German handling of the Bosnian case would make clear that it “had no consistent Balkan policy whatsoever” (Calic 1996: 59). Bonn recognized Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs as the instigators of violence, and hence its interpretation of the conflict came much closer to the United States than to that of its European allies (Beck 2008: 192-203; Kirste 1998: 38). Yet, the German approach to Bosnia appeared to be less motivated by its particular perception of the conflict than by the experience of isolation after the recognition of the Yugoslav republics. In fact, the Kohl government straddled the fence and supported both competing Anglo-French and US initiatives.

On the principal and tactical dimension of the use of force, one could argue that Bonn never rejected military intervention or the forceful use of air strikes. Yet, similar to the UK and France, the German government framed the Bosnian war largely as a humanitarian crisis. Germany became the largest donor of humanitarian aid (Calic 1996: 70); some suggest this outstanding, humanitarian commitment was a consequence of the limitations regarding its military contribution. For domestic purposes, Germany was the country least willing to commit its own forces to such a military endeavor. In April 1993, Chancellor Kohl stated in front of the German parliament, “Those who plead for the deployment of German ground troops to the former Yugoslavia should know that the federal government will not concede to their demands under any circumstance” (in Kirste 1998: 42). When it comes to the political purpose of military intervention, most accounts agree that the Kohl government was more willing to find a solution more amenable to Croats and Muslims (Witte 2000; Kirste 1998; Beck 2008). However, the German government officially supported the consecutive peace plans negotiated under ICFY auspices and voiced considerable empathy for its European partners and their concerns (Beck 2008; Maull/Stahl 2002: 92). In conclusion, one could argue that because of its self-imposed principal and tactical limitations, Germany remained a marginal player in Bosnia. Thumann

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38 The Kohl government’s policy of recognition has received much academic attention, e.g. Thumann (1997); Calic (1996).
39 In 1994, Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled that the German Armed Forces were allowed to take part in missions out of the area of NATO given they were implementing UNSC mandates and under a multilateral umbrella (see Stein 2002).
pointedly comments: “What The Times wrote in 1869 about the Prussians seemed also true in the 1990s: they are always in place if wise counsel is required but are missing when something is to be decided; they are brilliant on conferences but absent where there is fighting. […] Germans seemed to have learnt well the Bismarck lesson that the Balkans were ‘not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier’” (Thumann 1997: 582).

In a stylized way, the following table depicts the main differences between the allies.

Table 4. Summary of Allied Approaches to Bosnia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Principal Dimension</th>
<th>Political Dimension</th>
<th>Tactical Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Reluctant</td>
<td>No acceptance of Serb war gains; Bosnian unity; to the benefit Bosnian Muslims</td>
<td>Air strikes; no ground troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Reluctant</td>
<td>No acceptance of Serb war gains; Bosnian unity</td>
<td>Comparable to US, but no German forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes, but with limitations</td>
<td>Bosnian unity, but acceptance of realities on the ground/Serbian demands</td>
<td>Safety and neutrality of UN troops; full-scale intervention (including air forces) with US participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes, but with limitations</td>
<td>Bosnian unity, but acceptance of some Serbian demands</td>
<td>Safety and neutrality of UN troops, full-scale intervention (including air forces) with US participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 The Development of US Policies

Initially, the United States’ approach to the Bosnian war was based on two red lines: no ground troops and no peace agreement that would accept the partition of Bosnia and Serbian demands. By the summer of 1995 both of these red lines had been overstepped: the US was prepared and willing to send ground troops and the Dayton Agreement provided major political concessions to Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. These changes in US policy did not come over night but are (in part) the outcome of European influence on the US exerted during the two years preceding the intervention in 1995. In the following, I argue that US policies on military intervention go through three distinct phases. In a first phase (between February and June 1993), European allies were able to prevent the use of air strikes by the United States. In a second phase, transatlantic allies reached a lasting compromise on the political dimension of the use of force (between July 1993 and July 1994). In a final phase, the United States overcame its reluctance to use force while at the same time it held sway on its preferred policy of air strikes (between November 1994 and August 1995).

4.3.1 1993: Dropping ‘Lift and Strike’ – Clinton’s Deferral to Europe

Many had anticipated increased transatlantic cooperation on Bosnia with the advent of the Clinton administration in early 1993. Yet, as the following section shows, this was not the case. The US failed to gain European support for its policy proposal of ‘lift and strike’ and transatlantic allies reached a mere least common denominator compromise on the policies of safe areas.

Before the Clinton administration undertook its first policy review in April 1993, transatlantic allies had reached a branching point in Bosnia for mainly two reasons. First, US and European proposals were blocking each other. In January 1993, Europeans had rallied around the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). This plan reflected European preferences for a limited military engagement and an acceptable peace for all parties: it proposed putting an end to violence, containing a regional expansion of the conflict, and preserving Bosnia as a multiethnic state. The plan put forth a cantonization model for the future Bosnian state and accepted that the

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40 The plan was named after the two co-chairs of the ICFY, Cyrus Vance and David Owen, who negotiated and drafted this first comprehensive peace plan to stop the Bosnian war from mid-1992 to January 1993.
belligerents would therefore trade territory. The success of this model was heavily dependent on international military and political enforcement (Owen 1995: 89-93). In contrast to its European allies, the Clinton administration provided lukewarm support for the VOPP. Washington made it clear that it would not impose any solution with the help of US ground troops; rather, it argued for increased humanitarian action (Paulsen 1995: 107). Furthermore, the Clinton administration criticized the VOPP for its alleged acceptance of Serb war gains (Burg/Shoup 1999: 234).

Second, locked in these competing and mutually undermining positions, allies could not deal with the outbreak of heavy fighting after the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the VOPP in April 1993. The Bosnian Serbs intensified the brutal shelling of Bosnian cities (Woodward 1995: 268; Shoup/Burg 1999: 140). In addition, renewed and heavy fighting broke out in Herzegovina among Bosnian Muslims and Croats (ibid.: 138; Paulsen 1995: 116). Increasing violence, and its public media attention, heightened the sense of urgency within the international community.

Against this background, by late April 1993 the Clinton government had agreed on a two-pronged strategy named ‘lift and strike’ (Drew 1994: 149-151). Its core logic was to level the playing field among the warring factions. The UN arms embargo was to be lifted to provide Bosnian Muslims with weapons of self-defense, and the UN no-fly zone would be vigorously enforced by NATO and would be extended to include attacks on Bosnian Serb forces. The US preference for air strikes is indicative of the principal reluctance to use force. US soldiers were not going to put their boots on Balkans soil. The administration envisaged a “cost-free way for the United States to have an effect on the war” (senior policy-maker in Burg/Shoup 1999: 250). Finally, ‘lift and strike’ did not clearly stipulate the political purpose for which force was to be used. As some observers correctly pointed out, its assumptions undermined the

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41 The plan foresaw a delegation of authority to the local level but also international monitoring of human and minority rights, the right of refugees to return, and the prevention of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat cantons to seek a de facto merger with Serbia and Croatia. For a detailed discussion see Owen (1995, Ch. 3); Burg/Shoup (1999: 252-262).
43 In the West, the crisis in Srebrenica was interpreted as a deliberate move by the Serbs to undermine what was left of the Vance Owen negotiations. In the case of Sarajevo, a last minute cease-fire had stopped NATO from its first enforcement of the no-fly zone (Burg/Shoup 1999: 141).
44 Lifting the arms embargo was premised on the understanding that the UN arms embargo established against all of Yugoslavia in 1991 had particularly negative effects on Muslims. Bosnian Serbs relied on the personnel and weapons of the former Yugoslav Army, while the Bosnian Croats could rely on support by Croatia.
VOPP. The US proposal envisioned that Bosnian Muslims would be able to re-conquer territory. Hence, "it seems fair to infer that the plan of intervention, if such it can be called, anticipated a change in military possession well beyond that contemplated in the Vance-Owen plan" (Tucker/Hendrikson 1993; also Bert 1997: 192-197).

In May 1993, US secretary of state, Warren Christopher, traveled to European capitals and NATO headquarters in an attempt to persuade allies to accept the proposal. According to media reports and contemporary witnesses, Germany among others was generally supportive of the idea. France and the UK, however, rejected the US proposal outright. The Clinton administration failed to overcome the resistance of Paris and London. Instead of ‘lift and strike’ transatlantic allies adopted policies of military intervention that present a compromise between the US wish for more forceful action and European and Russian concepts of containment: the safe area approach.

In May and June 1993 after abundant bilateral meetings among French, British and American officials (Owen 1995: 167-173) and an international summit bringing together Europe, Russia and the US, allies reached a compromise on the principal, political, and tactical dimension of the use of force. This compromise is codified in what allies called the Joint Action Program (JAP) and UN Security Council resolutions 836 and 844.

In the principal and tactical dimension, the United States followed the French and British proposal to create ‘safe areas’ around major Bosnian cities. The concept of safe areas was meant to ease the acute humanitarian suffering, instead of using force to change the balance of forces. In military terms, the adopted safe areas concept provided a face-saving solution for all sides: “nothing has been ruled in or ruled out” (Russian representative in UN Doc. A/54/549: 25). In line with American wishes for a more robust military posture, the UNSC authorized the use of “all necessary measures” and authorized NATO to implement this with air power (Burg/Shoup

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46 The ad hoc summit took place in Washington between May 22 and 23, 1993 bringing together the UK and France as major troop contributors, Spain as president of the EU; Russia and the United States (see Gow 1997: 248).

47 The concept called certain areas to be free from attack and a 20km exclusion zone of heavy weapons was to be established (Burg/Shoup 1999: 264).
1999: 255; UN Doc. Res. S/836, § 10-11). At the same time, French and British opinion strongly informed the way in which force was to be used; the resolution called for a mere symbolic reinforcement of troops and for air strikes to protect UN troops under a double-key command arrangement involving the UN and NATO (Sharp 1997: 19; Gow: 165; Burg/Shoup: 254-55: Tardy 1999:67).

In terms of political strategy, the JAP and subsequent UN resolutions provided a compromise that did not violate the diplomatic red lines set by any of the allies. The JAP states that negotiations should build on the “Vance-Owen process. [...] To the extent that the parties decide to implement promptly mutually-agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen plan this is to be encouraged” (JAP 1993, Italics PF). In return for the face-saving formula of the Vance-Owen process and given the limits on any extensive use of military force to the benefit of the Bosnian Muslims, Europeans and Russians no longer clung to the implementation of the VOPP (Merimée in Bethlehem et al. 1997: 287; Hannay in ibid.: 304).

Not only the language but also the implementation of the joint decisions made clear that allies had found only a least common denominator compromise. For one, the US did not back any of the UN resolutions with additional troops or material. Eventually, additional troops were provided by France and the UK. While countries had written a potentially far-reaching mandate for UNPROFOR, only such countries were willing to contribute forces that had a very limited understanding of what these troops should do (UN Doc. Res. S/844; UN Doc. A/54/549: § 43; § 94-98). Second, as UN ambassador Albright stated: “Let me speak plainly. The United States voted for this resolution with no illusions. It is an intermediate step – no more, no less” (Albright in Bethlehem et al.: 1997: 295). The Clinton administration continued to support lift and strike explicitly and implicitly (Walker in ibid.: 303; Burg/Shoup 1999: 263).

4.3.2 1994: Partitioning Bosnia – Transatlantic Convergence on Political Purpose

In this second phase of US policy development, which stretched roughly from June 1993 to July 1994, transatlantic allies converged on the political purpose of military intervention in Bosnia. The United States agreed to a plan based on partition and the partial acceptance of Serb war gains.

Again, a branching point predates these changes in US posture. Diplomatic and military measures had failed to solve the conflict in late 1993 and early 1994 and, thus, this led to the call for a renewal of the military intervention in Bosnia. In the
political realm, successive negotiations under the auspices of the ICFY had failed. Two consecutive peace plans – the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and the HMS Invincible Proposal – were based on the idea of a Union of Republics. The concept of a federation envisaged the partitioning of Bosnia with Bosnians gaining 30% of the territory, Croats 16%, and Serbs 54%. Military implementation of the plans would have required up to 40,000 international troops (Burg/Shoup 2001: 270-276; Silber/Little 1996: 303-308). Both initiatives failed because the parties could not agree on a map and because Muslims remained deeply skeptical about a plan of de facto partition (Paczulla 2005; Owen 1995: 194; Gow 1997: 256).

In the military realm, no real progress was visible either. Although NATO had decided on the command and control mechanisms for the provision of air support for UNPROFOR, France and the UK as the biggest UNPROFOR contributors restrained the actual implementation of air strikes. The UN double-key decision-making structure “assure[d] broad collective responsibility for air strikes, clear warning of their imminence, and constraints upon their intensity” (Bowman 1993: 5). This restraint was exercised even as the situation on the ground significantly deteriorated for civilians. Serb forces attacked major cities, like Sarajevo and Gorazde in spring 1994 (Gow 1997: 261). Not only the suffering of the Bosnians, but also increasing attacks on the UN underlined the limitations of this approach to military force. When the UN failed to agree to more robust air strikes in Gorazde, Serbs reacted by taking hundreds more UN personnel hostage (Silber/Little 1996: 324-344). Allies, thus, faced an intractable situation: a bulk of peace initiatives faced the opposition of the warring parties, meanwhile the war created ever more casualties and refugees, and the hostage crises symbolized the sharply decreasing credibility of the UN forces on the ground.

In reaction to this deteriorating situation, European allies had sought to reinvigorate negotiations under the auspices of the ICFY by offering clear economic incentives for

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48 Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Cyrus Vance as co-chair of the ICFY in mid-1993. The plan presented by Owen and Stoltenberg built on an earlier proposal for partition by Milosevic and Tudjman. Negotiations over changes were made at the ship HMS Invincible giving the final document the name Invincible Proposal (Woodward 1995: 308-316; Owen 1995, Ch. 5).

49 See “Decisions taken at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9th August 1993,” [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24145.htm] [last accessed November 21, 2011]. Paulsen reports from a NATO source that these debates had been as “bitter and rancorous a discussion as have ever taken place in the alliance” (Paulsen 1995: 156).

Serbia to comply and punishments if Bosnian Muslims declined to find peace (Beck 2008; Kinkel/Juppé 1993). In contrast, US policy proposals in the second half of 1993 reflect earlier preferences. The Clinton administration appeared to advocate a political solution to the benefit of Bosnian Muslims lending only token support to the ICFY peace plans and thus greatly contributing to the perception of the Bosnian Muslims to hold out for a better peace deal (Ludlow 1995: 13-14; Burg/Shoup 2001: 280; Woodward 1995: 310). At the same time, the Clinton administration was unwilling to help the Bosnian Muslims with force in any form other than air strikes; it further remained deeply skeptical about European efforts to provide economic incentives to Serbia and Croatia (Clinton 1994; Paulsen 1995: 159-163).  

Faced with diplomatic and military stalemate paired with a deteriorating situation on the ground, transatlantic allies together with Russia founded the Contact Group (CG) as an informal institution to coordinate policies of military intervention in Bosnia. The formation of the CG was testimony to the fact that these major powers wanted to work together in Bosnia. However, previous differences carried on into the CG’s negotiations and a cohesive political and military strategy was the outcome not a precondition of policy coordination. The CG was tasked to provide new impetus to peace discussions by providing proposals for a map and constitutional principles for the future Bosnian state. The Contact Group’s plan was presented to the parties in July 1994; it can be considered a robust compromise between allies in at least one dimension. In terms of the territorial division of Bosnia the plan represented a “major change of heart” (Daalder 2000: 30) in US policy. It accepted Bosnian Serb war gains and a bifurcation of the Bosnian state with 51% of the territory provided to the Bosnian-Croat Federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs. In the most contentious issue to the parties, the US moved away from its defense of Bosnian Muslims’ claims towards a position that was congruent with earlier European and Russian proposals. After presenting the plan to the parties Warren Christopher claimed in the press conference that the solution provided for “a reasonable, viable degree of territory, amount of territory, for the Bosnians and reasonable from the stand point of the Serbs as well. [...] it would be a mistake of truly historic proportions for either of the parties [to] reject this proposal” (cited in  

51 At the same time, the Clinton administration sought to re-establish the alignment between Croats and Bosnian Muslims to reduce the number of parties in the conflict, readjust the military balance on the ground, and establish Bosnian Muslims’ territorial and constitutional bottom-line for future negotiations (Daalder 2000: 26); also interview with James O’Brien.
Ludlow 1995, Part 4). This time the US shift in policy position turned out to be more than verbal support for the sake of international agreement. The 51-49 division, however, was upheld until the end of the war and the US put extreme pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to accept it.\textsuperscript{52}

Although significant alignment could be forged on the map, other issues, such as military implementation and economic incentives, remained contested among allies.\textsuperscript{53} Europeans and Russians argued for a clear signal to the Serbs that sanctions would be relieved if they signed and complied to the peace plan, whereas the US remained skeptical. In contrast, US officials put much more emphasis on a reinforcement of safe areas and an eventual lifting of the arms embargo should Serbs fail to comply. This, in turn, met the resistance of other CG members for different reasons. While the UK was principally opposed out of a concern for the safety of its troops, France was ready to agree to lift the embargo if UNPROFOR forces withdrew from Bosnia. Russia remained opposed; and Germany reportedly remained cautious (Ludlow 1995, Part 1-3; Schwegmann 2003: 96-136).

In summary, it could be argued that the United States moved towards the direction of earlier European proposals for peace in Bosnia. The Contact Group plan envisioned partition into federal republics (Contact Group 1994).

4.3.3. 1995: Coercive Diplomacy and Dayton – US Leadership

In a final phase of the war, stretching from late 1994 to fall 1995, the Clinton administration overcame its principal reluctance to use force in Bosnia and to commit ground troops to such an endeavor. In the diplomatic realm, the US takes on the lead in negotiations. I will argue that despite this leadership, US policy choices in the principal and political dimension cannot be understood without reference to the position of European allies. This is less so with regard to the tactical dimension of military intervention: here the United States and its preferred policy of air strikes prevailed.

The decisions to pursue coercive diplomacy – a mixture of the targeted use of force and a renewed effort to create a comprehensive peace deal – were preceded by yet another branching point: prior diplomatic initiatives had been unsuccessful, Serb


militias appeared to have launched their final attacks on civilians, and lastly the credibility of outside actors was being put increasingly on the line.

On the diplomatic front, repeated attempts to restore the CG plan after its initial rejection by the Bosnian Serb parliament in summer 1994 had proven unsuccessful. The parties were neither able to fully agree on the map nor were constitutional issues settled. Consequently, the initial unity of the CG fell apart: due to pressure from the Republican dominated US congress, by November 1994 the Clinton administration stopped enforcing the international arms embargo. This move caused serious friction with Russia, France, and the UK. These countries continued to argue for clear incentives to be provided to the Serbs to accept the plan (Schultz 2003; Bildt 1998: 19-21). Even when the US directly negotiated with the Serbs and appeared to offer some of these incentives, the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the plan in February 1995 (US Department of State 1997: 6-8).

Bosnia meanwhile was driven deeper into war. The Bihac crisis provides an example en miniature of the more general dilemmas of international military intervention. Most of the fighting had taken place between the Bosnian Fifth Corps and several Serb formations around this safe area in western Bosnia in 1994. When the Serbs encircled the town and flew air raids from nearby air-bases in Krajina, NATO and the UN yet again failed to provide a robust response. NATO flew pin-prick air strikes but due to UN resistance blinked in the light of Serb aggression (Leurdijk 1996: 54-59). The pattern of increasing Serb violence and the simultaneously increasing vulnerability of UNPROFOR and NATO continued after a cease-fire had calmed the situation by winter 1994. The cease-fire had broken in March 1995 with the Bosnian Muslim army making initial advances in central Bosnia. In what was to become a pattern, Bosnian Serb forces reacted with merciless attacks and shelled Bosnian cities (Burg/Shoup 1999: 324-326; Leurdijk 1996: 67-75). Moreover, Bosnian Serbs put even more emphasis on developing a “counter-coercive tactic” that was to limit the threat of air strikes: hostage taking (Gow 1997: 267). In fact, Bosnian Serbs took 400 UN personnel hostage in late May 1995 after the UN generals had given order to bomb Serb ammunition depots.55

54 Serbian-occupied territory in Croatia.
55 The Bosnian Serbs reacted not only by seizing Bihac but by directly attacking and threatening UNPROFOR with hostage-takings. Thus, by the end of 1994 it became increasingly clear that the UN mission in Bosnia had lost any deterrent effect and its concept of safe areas was doomed to complete
In the early summer of 1995, the deep-founded dilemmas UNPROFOR was facing could no longer be ignored: the parties on the ground were exploiting the void of serious diplomatic initiatives by increasing the violence. Because of the disparities between its ambiguous mandate and the limited military capabilities, UN forces became ever more vulnerable to the audacious attacks of Bosnian Serb forces: “UNPROFOR now finds itself obstructed, targeted by both sides, denied re-supply, restricted in its movements, subjected to constant criticism” (UN Doc. S/1995/444). Reports by the UN Secretary General discussed the future options for UNPROFOR and the specter of withdrawal was repeatedly raised by its biggest troop contributors (Cimbala/Forster 2010: 111-114).

As a reaction to the hostage crisis and the humiliation of Western troops by Serbian forces, the newly elected French President, Jacques Chirac, called for a reinforcement of UNPROFOR in May 1995. Indeed, after an agreement on support had been reached within the CG and in NATO, France, the UK and the Netherlands deployed five brigades to reinforce UN troops (Bildt 1998: 24).\textsuperscript{56} The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) had not yet reached its full troop strength and operational capacity when the situation on the ground came to a head: on July 11, 1995, Serb forces overran Srebrenica massacring more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys in the following days (Brunborg et al. 2003). Although the extent of the atrocities in Srebrenica was not made public at the time, it was clear that Bosnian Serbs had undertaken decisive attacks on Muslim enclaves and safe areas (Daalder 2000).

Srebrenica was a galvanizing event. Nevertheless, the massacre itself had no unifying effect. Whereas President Chirac called for UNPROFOR to retake the town, the British advocated a partial withdrawal of UN troops, and the US continued to favor air strikes (Daalder 2000; Leurdjik 1996; Halberstam 2001). The eventual policies pursued by transatlantic allies demonstrate the influence of European allies on US policies but also the limits of that influence.

First, the Clinton administration overcame its principal reluctance to use force and deploy ground troops in Bosnia because of European influence. In December 1994, the president decided American troops would assist a UN withdrawal if necessary

with up to 20,000 ground troops (US State Department 1997: 2). Bringing UN troops home would take several months and would have to be decided by August in order to be successfully completed before winter (Gow 1997: 274). With UNPROFOR troops increasingly beleaguered, the US administration’s primary concern was that its European allies would decide to withdraw in light of domestic pressure and the high costs to their troops (Daalder 2000: 68-71). Hence, US internal policy review in July 1995 “was a little different because now people were saying ‘we have to go in there anyway, so now that we have military assets on the table – how does that change the diplomatic discussion.’”

Facing a situation of diplomatic and military stalemate and the specter of the unpopular rescue mission of European UNPROFOR troops, the United States administration rallied around an approach linking the robust use of force with diplomatic steps (US State Department 1997: 11-19; Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 127-128). The imminent failure of the European-led UNPROFOR mission and NATO’s credibility was one of the factors driving the US decision to take on a leadership role.

Second, and in contrast to European influence on the principal decision to use force, the US prevailed with regard to the tactical dimension of the eventual military intervention. In the course of two international summits in London on 21 July, 1995 and two subsequent meetings by NATO in July 25 and August 11, 1995 the US was able to carry its point on air strikes. First, allies decided to pose a final ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs that any further attacks against safe areas would be met with robust and substantial air strikes. In line with American thinking, the strikes were meant to punish Serbian transgressions and to eventually bring them to the bargaining table in a weaker and, hence, more accommodating position (Daalder 2000: 102-106).

Furthermore, for the strikes to be effective the US argued that restrictions on their use and the cumbersome dual-key decision-making process would have to be abandoned. Indeed the London summit agreed that the UN key and potential veto

58 Interview with James O’Brien and James Pardew.
59 See also “Defense Chief Sees Little Air Strike Risk,” Los Angeles Times, February 14, 1995; Again Germany remained almost totally excluded from these debates because of its restrictions on troop deployments, see “A Very Cautious Watch on the Rhine,” The Washington Post, June 22, 1995; interview with Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger March 30, 2012.
would be delegated to the local UN commander. Additionally, hostage taking should not prevent the implementation of airstrikes; and attacks on Bosnian Serbs would not be confined to the immediate vicinity of safe areas (Perry 1995; Claes 1995a; 1995b).\footnote{US clarity eclipses British caution,” The Independent, July 22, 1995; “Last Chance: Allied Effort to Save UN Operation,” The Guardian, July 20, 1995; “Clinton Now Tries to Define Role for the U.S. in Bosnia,” New York Times, July 23, 1995.}

NATO’s eventual Operation Deliberate Force, lasting from August 30 to September 14, 1995, entailed significant European contributions but only limited European influence. In total, NATO flew over 3,500 sorties with 300 aircraft, dropping more than 1,000 bombs. Planes from the US, UK, France and Germany operated alongside allies from the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Turkey (Forage 2002: 212). As many observers have noted, the conduction of the air campaign was clearly limited by its political context: casualty aversion and troop protection were utmost goals (Gentry 2006). In the words of the commander in chief, General Ryan “every bomb is a political bomb” (in Owen 2001: 68). Targeting lists were therefore carefully selected and reviewed constantly and risks to NATO’s pilots were kept to a minimum (Dittmer/Dawkins 1998; Owen 2001; Forage 2002). European influence on these tactical decisions remained limited.

Third, with regard to the political dimension of the use of force the United States took on a leadership role. Yet, much of the substantive positions taken in the final US internal policy review were a new approach for the country but represented hardly anything new to the Europeans (Bildt 1998: 82).\footnote{For a detailed discussion of the inter-agency process see Daalder 2000: 85-113. In mid-July 1995 and after an extensive policy review taking in all relevant inter-governmental positions.} US policy went through three distinct and critical phases in summer 1995. In July, a policy review in Washington prepared ‘the endgame strategy’; from mid-July to the end of September, Richard Holbrooke and his team constantly negotiated with the belligerents during a process of ‘shuttle diplomacy’: and finally, peace negotiations took place in Dayton, Ohio producing the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia.\footnote{US diplomats have written their own intensive accounts see U.S. Department of State (1997); Holbrooke (1998); and for a special emphasis on the role of Russia see Talbott (2003).} From the vantage point of previous intra-alliance differences, the US final diplomatic effort brought the country much more in line with its European partners: the Clinton administration accepted significant changes to the CG map to ensure defensible borders and to accommodate
Serb wishes. Previously, the US had rejected such proposals: “The French, the British and the Russians would be only too happy to accept the Serbs’ redrawing of the map in the eastern half of the country and press for a realistic settlement that would leave Sarajevo and central Bosnia in Bosnian Government hands, but the United States and Germany won’t accept it.”

By summer 1995, the US had accepted the de facto partitioning of Bosnia and the creation of a Republika Srpska in the confines of the Bosnian state. Furthermore, the Dayton peace agreement permitted each Bosnian federal entity to entertain special relationships with the neighboring countries of Serbia and Croatia (Holbrooke 1998; US Department of State 1997; Silber/Little 1996). With the exception of the relief of sanctions for Serbia, “the diplomatic dimension of the US effort to end the war brought the United States more closely into alignment with the approach taken earlier by its European allies and, in the end, produced an agreement that closely resembled earlier European and contact group proposals for de facto partition” (Burg/Shoup 1999: 318). Because the thrust of the US argument was in line with European views, which focused on an achievable peace, it comes as no surprise that they agreed to the proposed strategy.

The argument that the Europeans significantly influenced US diplomacy in Bosnia stands somewhat in contrast to the mainstream literature. It has often been argued that the US not only took on a leadership role, but also dominated the final diplomatic moves. In particular, the chief diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, was accused of deliberately sidelining his European counterparts (Auswärtiges Amt 1998; Neville-Jones 1996). However, as participants have suggested, Holbrooke’s flexible negotiation was also welcomed by European allies. Instead of being driven by moral claims, “Holbrooke was a practical diplomat. He was focused on terminating the war […] and he was willing to make a lot of compromises […]. So he was idealistic in the sense that he saw the suffering and he wanted to end the war, but he was practical in


66 Interview Ambassador Daniel Server and Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger.
European allies had long accused the Clinton administration of claiming the moral high ground in Bosnia, while staying aloof and ignoring the facts of war. In that sense, it seems plausible that they had little problem in delegating much of the negotiations to the United States. Thus, the US must certainly be credited for taking on leadership in this final phase of the Bosnian war. Nonetheless, leadership does not necessarily mean total dominance of the conduct and direction of international interventions. Diplomatically, the United States was needed as it was the only party with sufficient leverage and credibility to push the belligerents into an agreement. The solution it advocated, however, remained in many crucial parts path-dependent on earlier European proposals.

Summing up this discussion on the dependent variable, the development of US policy in Bosnia suggests a differentiated picture of European influence. While the United States adapted its policies to those of its European allies in the principal and political dimension of the use of force, it dominated tactical implementation in Operation Allied Force.

### 4.4 Alliance Politics: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking

In this section, I use the typology developed in Chapter 2 to analyze how European allies have used different strategies to influence US policy-making (see sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3). It becomes clear that various strategies have been used in conjunction in each of the three phases of US policy-making. Section 4.5 turns to the questions of which conditions explain the different degrees of European influence over time and the dimension of the use of force.

#### 4.4.1 The Power of Persuasion and the Definition of US Goals in Bosnia

In the following, I argue that European allies used the power of persuasion to co-determine US goals in Bosnia. Allied influence on US goals and interests in Bosnia was premised on the fact that decision-making on Bosnia took place in the wider context of redefining the US role globally and in Europe after the Cold War. As one senior official aptly remarked, “It wasn’t policy-making. It was group therapy – an existential debate over what is the role of America etc.” (in Drew 1994: 150).

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67 Interview James Pardew and Strobe Talbott February 10, 2011.
Indeed, persuasion appears to have played a large role in the US decision not to pursue its preferred policy of ‘lift and strike’ in May 1993. European allies used a number of strategies based on the power of persuasion.

First, European allies tried to *de-legitimize and shame* the US absence from the Bosnian theatre and Clinton’s announcement that a deployment of US ground troops was out of the question. The concept of de-legitimization entails that European allies construct a consistent argument against a US proposal that is based on the constitutive norms of the alliance. In the case of ‘lift and strike’, France and Britain argued that the US policy contravened norms of equality and burden-sharing. Such norms are embodied in the transatlantic relationship; and NATO, in particular, provided the basis for such strategies. For example, NATO’s article V underlines the norm that transatlantic allies provide jointly for their common security. While the norm has never implied an equal share of burden, the latter was violated by free riding on the provision of security (Cimbala/Forster 2010: 9-33; Kupchan 2011). The French and British governments deliberately framed the reluctance of the US to send ground troops to the Bosnian theatre as a case of free riding. Applying air power selectively, they argued, not only implied that the United States was not providing its fair share; much worse, the US proposal was viewed as potentially putting British and French UNPROFOR troops in danger of Serb retaliation (Wood 1994: 144; Sharp 1997: 24; Gow 1997: 179; Kramer 1994: 47-45). “Therefore, neither does one need constantly to receive lessons, the advice ‘Allez-y’ expressed with so much vigor and virtue by those who are not going […] The United States wants to go in the air but not on the ground. Is that how you would stop the aggressors? And does it fall to France, associated perhaps with several Indians or several Afghans [as UN peacekeepers], to redress the wrongs?” (Mitterand 1993a) An analysis of debates in national parliaments as well as in the UN and other international institutions demonstrates that French and British politicians and diplomats consistently used the argument of US free riding and hypocrisy (Major/Mitterand 1993; Major 1993; Ladsous in Bethlehem et al. 1997: 419; Hannay in ibid.: 421; Kuusisto 1999; Simms 2001: 122-134; Hasenclever 2001: 374, 406).

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68 Interview by the author with Daniel Hamilton. February 17, 2011.
Second, European allies resorted to consultation as co-determination when Secretary of State Christopher traveled to Europe to gain support for ‘lift and strike’. While the president had preliminarily settled on the proposal, a definite decision had not been made. The Clinton administration had repeatedly postponed a policy decision on Bosnia and was caught up in internal differences on the United States should take (see section 4.5). Christopher, in his own words, traveled to Europe in “listening mode”.\textsuperscript{69} Behind the scenes, the French and British used the opportunity to make the fierceness of their resistance known and to persuade the Clinton administration to change its policy on lift and strike. During the three-day trip, Christopher met his counterparts in London, Paris and Bonn (Halberstam 2001: 227-229). Their accusation of US free riding resonated well with the Clinton administration, as “the Americans are fair minded people” (Ambassador Renwick in Simms 2001: 70). In these consultations, Europeans were granted a right to co-determine policy because the Clinton administration put high emphasis on unity within the transatlantic alliance (Drew 1994; Daalder 2000). As Republican observer Richard Perle remarked: “It was an exchange all right: Warren Christopher went to Europe with an American policy, and he came back with a European one” (in Halberstam 2001: 229).

Third, during the first two years, the Clinton administration remained deeply divided internally as to the best military and political approach in Bosnia. Some sources report that allies made good use of this situation by forming trans-governmental coalitions. For example, the British had unusually good access to the US government and were aware of all proposals circled within the administration (Simms 2001; Sharp 1997). In particular, the military establishments joined forces in opposing ‘lift and strike’ and the deeper engagement it eventually could have implied for US forces: “And there was also a peacekeeping aspect to this that the US military absolutely opposed. When you start talking about peacekeeping and blue-helmets, they want nothing to do with it. That is not their job. I think there was a certain element of that. And then there were certain attitudes in the military that I think kind of mirrored those from the Europeans.”\textsuperscript{70} The conjunction of internal opposition in his own administration and European resistance led President Clinton to drop the ‘lift and strike’ proposal.

\textsuperscript{70} Interview by the author with James Pardew; for similar remarks on trans-governmental gamesmanship see interview James O’Brien, Daniel Server and James Dobbins February 7, 2011; see also Simms (2001, Ch. 2).
However, it should be stated that these allied strategies did not lead to a reasoned and robust policy consensus as the concept of persuasion would lead us to expect. The United States undermined consecutive European peace plans and continued to fancy lift and strike for domestic purposes (Allin 2002; Paulsen 1995: 118). Additionally, during 1993 and 1994, the level of trust between European heads of state and the newly elected President Clinton was reported to be very low: US diplomats called their British counterparts the new “skunks at the garden party” and different sources point to the rancorous decision-making within the alliance (Simms 2000: 60-64).

1995: Saving Bosnia – Saving NATO

Between late 1994 and summer 1995, the United States gave up its reluctance to use military force in Bosnia and to provide a share of the peacekeeping force. I argue that this turn was the outcome of a redefinition of US interests in Bosnia. This redefinition had two components – the restoration of US leadership in Europe and the transformation of NATO’s role in European security. How did European allies affect this restatement of vital security interests by the United States?

The constant shaming and de-legitimation of the United States for its rhetoric of action and track record of abstinence had a long-term effect on NATO as an institution. Sir Richard Vincent, the British chair of NATO’s Military Committee, put it in a nutshell: “I was aware that if this was all that NATO could deliver after the Cold War, then what the hell were we paying for?” (in Simms 2001: 106).

In parallel to the Bosnian conflict, transatlantic allies had been struggling to define the purpose of NATO after the Cold War. It seemed that NATO’s future role in European security would be inevitably judged by how well it handled Europe’s biggest security problem at the time: the conflict in the Balkans (Swigert 1995: 8). European obstinacy to US proposals and the constant reminder that it was US free riding that had plunged NATO into this crisis began to hurt the Clinton administration’s wider agenda (Holbrooke 1998: 65). Crawford argues that the Bosnian debacle seriously undermined the US leadership in NATO and the US project to establish the latter as the dominant security institution in Europe in 1994: the US advocated NATO enlargement, launched the Partnership for Peace and underlined NATO’s principal willingness to go ‘out-of-area’ (Crawford 2000; Simms 2001: 106; Petras/Morley

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71 Interview with James Swigert February 25, 2011.
72 Interview with James Dobbins.
NATO’s apparent inability to stop the bloodshed and the ubiquity of disagreement among allies was starting to harm the very fabric of the transatlantic alliance.

Against this background, allies “made a difference in US policy insofar as its interests in preserving NATO as the principal security organization in Europe caused the USA to advocate NATO air strikes” (Jakobsen 1995: 390). The concept of *consultation as co-determination* implies that allies can get an indirect seat at the US decision-making table. Accordingly, one can speak of allied influence if US policy-makers take into account the objections and interests of their European allies when formulating their policies of military intervention. Halberstam and others have noted that “the endgame strategy” as devised by national security advisor, Tony Lake, and his staff deliberately followed a carrot and stick approach towards all belligerent parties to overcome European hesitance (Halberstam 2001: 312; US State Department 1997).

Much more, by summer 1995 the alliance argument became a trump card for those who wanted to overcome US reluctance to engage in Bosnia. With the specter of UN withdrawal imminent, Clinton’s Bosnia policy became an increasing liability. In February 1995, the administration published its doctrine of ‘engagement and enlargement’. The spread of democracy, the active leadership of the United States, and European stability was now declared “vital to our own security” (White House 1995). Yet for years, the administration supported the Bosnian cause rhetorically and condemned Serbian atrocities in the harshest terms. At the same time, its actions had lacked far behind its rhetoric. In 1995, it was the French president who most ardently shamed and framed US inaction as a lack of leadership, while Chirac offered to retake the encircled and besieged Srebrenica by force placing his British and US counterparts in an uncomfortable position. 73 Apparently, he had chilled ambassador Albright’s “to the bones” with his comment – “I believe the Atlantic Alliance has no leadership.” 74 Media reports as well as other sources point to the impact Chirac’s appearances had on President Clinton. Clinton feared that the French president may easily trump him in a bid over leadership in Europe and, hence, French shaming

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73 Chirac traveled to Washington on June 14, 1995 to discuss Bosnia; the UK Foreign Secretary did so on July 18, 1995; and the EU Special Envoy Bildt arrived there on August 2, 1995; Archives of the US State Department report that Clinton called Chirac, Major, and Kohl at crucial points of the decision-making process (US Department of State 1997: 17; 1-25; 31-38)

strategies clearly moved the president closer to tougher action (Halberstam 2001: 316-318; US Department of State 1997: 4-10; Robinson 2001). Hence, advocates of a more forceful policy, such as Albright and Lake, argued that continuing indecision threatened the ability of the US to lead in the world and in Europe in particular (US Department of State 1997: 11; Chollet 2005; Simms 2001: 105-108; Daalder 2000: 65-68). “I believe we have a fundamental strategic interest in NATO and an expanding NATO that can help bring stability farther and farther East in Europe. And if we were going to do this [use force in Bosnia, PF] in a way that didn’t blow NATO apart then we had to bring along the Europeans. And that finally happened in ‘95” (Lake 2000).

While European diplomats were excluded from the process of reformulating US policy, their previous arguments remained the center core around which the US discussion evolved. The concern for the future of NATO and US standing with its alliance partners was the key driver for a change in the willingness of the United States to use force.

From this section, it is clear that European allies relied on the power of persuasion to change the course of US action. They deliberately framed US policy proposals as illegitimate and as violating central principles of equality and burden-sharing that are constitutive of the security community. Moreover, they had plenty of access points for their arguments since they built trans-governmental coalitions and used consultation to co-determine the definition of US interests and goals in Bosnia. However, we have to turn concrete institutional settings and issue-specific power to understand European influence on the political and tactical dimension of the use of force.

4.4.2 From Restraint to Accommodation: The Importance of Issue-specific Power

Before Operation Deliberate Force, European allies influenced the tactical implementation of international intervention by successfully resisting the extensive use of air strikes. This successful restraint, I claim, can be clearly explained with

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76 Ironically, while the United States was intervening in Bosnia for the sake of its standing in Europe, advocates of this position also firmly believed they had to exclude European diplomats from the process to be able to push through air strikes (US State Department 1997, Chapter 1; Pauline-Neville Jones 1996; Auswärtiges Amt 1995). Yet, when Lake and his NSC Staff traveled to Bonn, London, and Paris in the beginning of August to sell the new plan of US engagement, they found European allies in perfect agreement and support (US Department of State 1997, p. 45-46).
reference to allied issue-specific power. With a view to missing domestic support and the strategic uncertainty about US priorities after the Cold War, the Clinton administration had tied its hands early on. Ruling out the deployment of ground troops symbolized US sensitivity to the costs of an engagement in the Balkans and made the United States dependent on European contributions to keep the situation in check. European allies used various strategies that rested on their issue-specific power to exploit the cost-sensitivity of the US.

1993—1994: Resistance to air strikes

France and Britain had chosen to provide the two largest contingents to UNPROFOR to underline their leadership claims in Europe. From 1993 to 1995, France more than doubled its number of troops from 1,840 in 1993 to 4,500 by the end of the mission; Britain followed suit with roughly 2,600 in 1993 and 3,405 in 1995. Over the course of 1993 and 1994, these troops provided a compelling source of leverage over the US. However, it is important to note that it was less their strength than the weakness of the UNPROFOR troops which made them a source of influence: “I don’t think that the fact that they had troops on the ground in what was generally conceived as an ineffective operation gave them a lot of leverage. What gave them a lot of leverage was the willingness to keep those troops on the ground under the configuration.”

In 1993, London and Paris balked and linked the condition of the future presence of their troops with UNPROFOR to a withdrawal of the US ‘lift and strike’ proposal. (Bert 1997: 202; Gow 1997: 175; 178): “We told them until we were blue in the face. We said we can’t do ‘lift and strike’, especially lift. […] There was nothing Christopher could have done to get a different outcome” (British diplomat in Drew 1994: 155). In the eyes of the US ambassador to NATO, allies used their troops as a bargaining chip: “we have troops there and that helps to stop the bombing, not because we have troops there you cannot bomb” (Hunter in Simms 2001: 81). Indeed, in 1993 both the UK and France threatened to withhold their future military cooperation and withdraw their troops from UNPROFOR (Maull/Stahl: 94; Wood 1994).

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78 Interview with Ambassador James Dobbins.
During 1994, France and Britain bowed to US pressure and issued ultimatums against the Serbs three times. Yet, the restrictive implementation of these threats and the overall practice of defending safe areas were shaped by European allies in contrast to US visions. The two European allies had pursued a strategy of contributing more troops to defend safe areas. The concept dispersed the lightly armed troops all over the country and made them extremely vulnerable to attacks and hostage taking (Leurdijk 1996: 64; Wesley 1995). The fact that France and the UK were willing to put their forces at great risk increased their influence on debates about the military aspects of the use of force and unmasked demands by others as mere verbal gambits. Hence, the increased French and British military contribution was tied to a condition: their forces would follow a humanitarian mandate and a traditional, neutral peacekeeping approach. During 1993 and 1994, the French and British government shared a core set of three arguments against US proposals of using robust air strikes: air power alone would not suffice to cajole the Serbs into an agreement; lifting the embargo would inevitably strengthen all forces on the ground; especially without clearly stated political goals, this instrument was likely to prolong and intensify the conflict rather than helping to end it (Simms 2001: 65-69; Paulsen 1995:126-127; Owen 1995: 18). In consequence, the UK and French governments foresaw two dangerous scenarios for their troops. Either those forces already on the ground would be in danger of Serbian retaliation or those forces deployed to finish the job begun by air would find a situation in which traditional peacekeeping was impossible and where they would have to engage in combat (Gow 1997: 178; 180-181; Woodward 1995: 297; Tardy 1999: 66).

Because of their large contribution, the UN dual key arrangement gave French and British generals a veto over the implementation of NATO air strikes. In what was to become a pattern, NATO opted under US pressure for more robust air strikes but was restrained by the double-key command arrangements. In line with the strictly neutral interpretation of the mandate, British and French generals rarely conceded to an extensive use of air power (Leurdijk 1996: 39-56; Cimbala/Forster 2010: 102-103).

Having ruled out sending its own ground troops the US had to give in to European resistance to ‘lift and strike’ and to subsequent calls for stronger military action by air. The vulnerability of UN forces was the bargaining chip used by France and the UK to halt this course of action. Strategies based on the power of persuasion were thus reinforced by European allies’ issue-specific power: The ability to shame the United
States based on burden-sharing logically presupposed that allies themselves were actually providing a large part of the burden of military intervention. France and Britain were easily able to support this claim with reference to their beleaguered UN troops.

**1995: Accommodating the US Position**

In summer 1995, the specific way in which allies used their issue-specific power certainly helped to overcome the principal reluctance to the use of force; yet the impact on the implementation of NATO’s air operations remained limited. French and British strategies of last-ditch contributions to saving the UN mission in Bosnia were a powerful tool to push the US towards some kind of action. The hostage crisis in May 1995 had elicited a similar pattern to that of the earlier years. France and the UK further contributed military resources and deployed the RRF.79 While the RRF was designed as a last minute effort to make UN troops more capable of opposing Serb aggression, clear limits were attached to their deployment. France and the UK made it clear to the US that should the RRF project fail this would trigger a withdrawal of their UN contingents (Burg/Shoup 1999: 338-341; Silber/Little 1996: 356). In the press conference announcing the RRF, British Prime Minister Major stated: “That is why, for so long as British troops can carry out their duties without undue risk to their lives, I shall want to see them continue to play their role in UNPROFOR. But let me add also, if the warring parties make it impossible for the United Nations to carry out their mandate, then of course we would have to consider withdrawal” (Major 1994).80 The specter of withdrawal and the US commitment to assist such evacuation sparked a renewed effort inside the beltway to change US policy.

Still, the United States managed to overcome European resistance to air strikes. Therefore, despite a similarity in European strategies of issue-specific power, European influence varies in 1993 and 1994 compared to the summer of 1995. As I argue in section 4.5, this variance in the success of European strategies of balking and contributing is dependent on the degree of unity among European allies. When the

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UK and France split over the right course of military action in 1995, the US pushed through its preferred option of a war by air.

4.4.3 Finding Alternatives to US Proposals: the Power of Voice Opportunities
Whereas UNPROFOR troops were a brilliant source of resistance to specific US proposals for tougher action, these actions can only be fully acknowledged in the context of the main institutions in which allies debated Bosnia policy. The analysis below highlights how European allies used their voice opportunities in international institutions to reinforce their resistance to air strikes by proposing alternative policies. Strategies based on the rules governing institutional decision-making were crucial for European influence on the political dimension of the use of force.

1993: Britain and France – The Institution’s Special Members
Before the period examined in this study, France and Britain intentionally shaped the institutional context in which the Bosnian war was to be negotiated; both opted for the EC and the UN in order to restrain their partners across the Atlantic and in Europe (Gow 1997: 175-178). They spearheaded ICFY efforts and it was France that brought Bosnia before the UN Security Council in 1992 (Sharp 1997: 20; Owen 1995; Wood 1994: 130; Lepick 1996: 80). The UN and the EC acted as “power multipliers” (Treacher 2000: 26) because of the veto power and the permanent membership in the UNSC held by France and Britain (Wood 1994: 129).

In early 1993, the two allies used UNSC membership to block US ‘lift and strike’ proposals. France and the UK “acted as a brake on policies and draft resolutions considered to be too provocative to the Serbs” (Wood 1994: 141) and the UK even threatened to cast a veto in the Security Council (Jakobsen 1995: 382; Simms 2001: 71).

Membership in the UNSC was the premise for French and British efforts to bind the United States to a compromise in line with allied demands. The agenda-setting opportunities provided to the two countries by their elevated institutional position in the Security Council were used to champion the concept of “safe areas” (Owen 1995: 164; Woodward 1995: 307). Initially, France introduced the idea and organized support for it in the Security Council: “My government on May 18th issued a memorandum on the concept of safe areas. […] This must be understood as a positive contribution to the process begun by the Vance-Owen Plan, which remains the basis
for any settlement. [...] [troops shall help by] deterring attacks, monitoring by occupying key points on the ground.” (French UN Ambassador Merimée in Bethlehem et al. 1997: 287)

Beyond introducing the idea and using their proposal-making power, the French and British crucially shaped the formulation of three important paragraphs in the resolutions: First, UN resolution 836 tasks UNROFOR to “deter attacks against the safe areas” by a mere symbolic presence instead of providing forces to defend safe areas. Second, the mandate ties the use of tougher military measures by air to the defense of UNPROFOR troops, not to the defense of the Bosnian population. Third, the mandate also limited the practical implementation of the use of air power. Based on British and French demands, close air-support was subject to a dual-key solution by which NATO can only act in “close coordination with the Secretary General and UNPROFOR” (UN Doc. Res. S/836: §9-10; UN Doc. Res. S/844: §5). Based on these binding efforts, allies were able to restrain US policy for most of 1993 and 1994.

1994: Allied Compromise on the Political Dimension: enter the Contact Group

Allies agreed on a lasting political strategy within the Contact Group. There is no conclusive evidence that the formation of the CG represented a case of forum-shopping: different countries have claimed intellectual ownership for the invention of the CG. Still, none of the three European allies resisted the efforts to come together within this new forum but thought of it as serving its interests in making their voices heard (Schwegmann 2003: 88-91; Beck 2008: 209; Leigh-Pippard 1998: 307).\(^81\)

It can, however, be argued that the specific institutional setting of the CG provided a conducive context for binding the United States to a more lasting consensus (Moe 2003: 30). First, European allies benefited from the informal setting of the Contact Group, because its small size meant that consensus was more easily achieved than in a large organization, such as the ICFY (Moe 2003: 47-50).\(^82\) Even more important than sheer numbers was the actual composition of the group as it brought together the major players on Bosnia. Especially for Russia and the US, the formation of the Contact Group and the abidance by its informal rules was a signal that their entrance onto the Bosnian scene was to be coordinated with the three major European powers

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81 In the context of the EC, France and Germany had already tried to advocate a plan based on incentives and coercion for all three parties on the ground. Adopted by the EU in November 1993 as the ‘EU Action Plan’ it failed to garner US support (Beck 2008; Owen 1995, EU 1993).

82 Interview with James Dobbins.
(Leigh-Pippard 1998: 313; Schwegmann 2003). “Now, the CG was extremely valuable for the coordination of policies of the United States with its European allies but it was also very, very important in the case of Bosnia for engaging Russia in this process.” Accordingly, it appears fair to argue that the CG presented an institutional context to which the US was committed; a commitment that was lacking with regard to previous negotiations within the ICFY.

Second, a basic tenet of the CG’s procedures developed a large binding potential. Cooperation in the CG was based on the observation that previous mediation efforts had been largely undercut by the extensive system of patronage entertained by the belligerents with individual countries from the international community. Hence, the international community often found itself abused and played out. To end this system – hence, for rather instrumental reasons – CG members pledged to sustain a unified position vis-à-vis the Bosnian parties. However, first-hand accounts suggest that this quest for unity extended beyond paying mere lip service and helped allies to overcome their differences: “The driving force appeared to be the will to maintain European/Russian/American solidarity, even if this meant unwelcome compromise at potentially crucial stages of the peace process” (Ludlow 1995: 41).

The most significant decision in this regard is the territorial division of the future Bosnian state: within the CG, the US agreed to support a division along the lines of 51% for the Federation and 49% for the Serbs. In comparison to the pre-war situation, this implied an acceptance of a large part of Serbian war gains. Even in 1995, when the Federation made military advances and even among criticism from republican congress and from within the administration, (Schultz 2003; US State Department 1997: 49-57) the US stuck with this unpopular decision.

The will to coordinate specific steps and to validate them within the group was greatly assisted by the working rules the group had established. While red lines were still drawn up in the capital cities, much of the smaller daily decisions were prepared by experts and were naturally worked out in agreement (Schwegmann 2003: 106-107; Ludlow 1995: 81; Interview Swigert; Moe 2003: 57-59).  

83 Quote from an interview with James Pardew; similar views were also expressed in interviews with James Dobbins and Strobe Talbott.

84 Experts met up to three times a month between mid-1994 and summer 1995, in addition there were meetings of political directors and six foreign minister meetings in 1994. For details on informal rules and the number of CG meetings on Bosnia and Kosovo, see Schwegmann (2003): 174-178.

In late 1994 and 1995, NATO’s rules and procedures provided an important basis for allies to bind the US to policies in Bosnia. In 1995, when the withdrawal of UNPROFOR became a less distant possibility, NATO turned out to be the dominant institution for all discussions of the use of force. By 1993, NATO had used standard procedures to draw up contingency plans for such an operation, which had been provisionally approved as NATO Operations PLAN 40104 by the NAC in June 1994 (Forage 2002). Within NATO, President Chirac had officially requested such plans to be finalized by SACEUR in December 1994 (Leurdijk 1996: 65). In light of the crisis in Bihac and this request, the Clinton administration had in principle agreed to commit up to 25,000 US soldiers to such a mission. Although the administration wanted UN troops to stay as long as possible, it did not withdraw its commitment once the UN secretary general requested NATO prepare plans for an evacuation of UN troops in February 1995. Despite the extreme risks to US troops associated with such an operation, Clinton re-affirmed this commitment in May 1995: “We have obligations to our NATO allies, and I do not believe we can leave them in the lurch” (Clinton 1995). In contrast to Holbrooke, Daalder points out that the Clinton administration was well aware of the implications of this commitment and was not unconsciously bound to NATO procedures (Daalder 2000: 50-55).

In conclusion, allies have used voice opportunities either to propose alternatives to existing US proposals or to influence joint policies on Bosnia.

4.5 The Conditions for Allied Influence

The previous section demonstrated that European allies tapped into all three potential sources of influence simultaneously and in conjunction with each other. What can explain the fact that allies were more successful in determining the principal and political dimension of the use of force? What explains the reason why the US maintained its tactical preference for large-scale air strikes in summer 1995? The success of European influence rested on a high degree of European unity and a

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85 During Operation Deliberate Force, European allies devised a mechanism that would have enabled them to bind US policies. The North Atlantic Council put strict rules on the targets of the bombing campaign and approved targets along a sliding scale of political acceptability. An escalation to targets with high number of civilian casualties would have been subject to distinct European approval (Owen 2001: 61-62; US Department of State 1997: 30).
fragmented US domestic scene. Both of these conditions changed by summer 1995: France and Britain were no longer united on central aspects of the military intervention, while at the same time the US administration’s approach converged around a particular course of action.

4.5.1 The Intensity of Threat

In chapter 2, the intensity of threat perception was identified as one of the three plausible scope conditions for allied influence. As the Bosnian case studies make clear, there are limits to this explanation. Certainly, the US threat perception changed over time but not in a way that defensive realists would lead us to believe. The change in threat perception was not related to specific capabilities and intentions of the target (Bosnia); rather, it was part of a larger agenda. This agenda, however, was mainly an outcome of European influence.

If the intensity of threat perception were relevant for the success of European influence on the United States, we would expect influence in scenarios where the United States was not directly threatened by the target of the intervention. Indeed, several authors have argued that this assumption fits the Bosnian case: for most of 1993 and 1994, the Clinton administration did not consider Bosnia as a threat to vital US security interests. After his failed trip, Secretary Christopher justified the US turn-around by stating that Bosnia “involves our humanitarian interest, but it does not involve our vital interests” (cited in Burg/Shoup 1999: 265). It is mainly because of this lack of threat that the US gave in to European demands for further peace negotiations and for a restraint on air strikes instead of pursuing its preferred policy of using air strikes to punish the Bosnian Serbs while simultaneously arming the Bosnian Muslims (Paulsen 1995: 126; Gow 1997: 213; Bert 1997: 64; Chollet 2005).

Yet, there is evidence from the Bosnian case that is significantly incompatible with this assumption. The threat perception argument would lead us to assume, that the US decision to intervene in Bosnia in summer 1995 and to invest political capital to carry its point on air strikes is due to a change in threat perception. Defensive realists would argue that an increasing threat perception is due to the insecurity felt by US decision-makers. Insecurity should be felt more intensely the more the target of the intervention poses a direct challenge to the US homeland or the more a threat poses economic disadvantages to the country (see 2.2.1). There is, however, no reason to believe that the escalation of the war in Bosnia during the spring of 1995 constituted a
direct threat to US security. The war in the Balkans was far away from US territory and had no capacity to threaten US troops at home or even those stationed in Europe. Based on such a definition of threat, it is implausible to assume that a variance in threat perception explains the variance in European influence. Most in-depth cases studies of the Bosnian intervention have used wider definitions of threat. The US intervened in Bosnia because the debacle threatened its wider interests in Europe, and in order to save the credibility of NATO and thereby its own status and credibility as a superpower (Simms 2001; Daalder 2000). I do not challenge the validity of this argument. However, the previous section demonstrates that this extended US threat perception was not the condition that led to allied influence on US Bosnia policy; it was the product of it. I find that the unity among European allies and the unity of the US domestic political scene provide a better explanation of the successes and limits of allied influence on US policies in Bosnia.

4.5.2 Unity Among European Allies

An argument resorting to the degree of unity between European allies is better equipped to deal with the variance in European influence. From 1993 to 1995, European allies showed a high degree of unity and pursued strategies of influence-seeking in close cooperation. This cooperation made it particularly difficult for the United States to overcome European resistance. When marked differences became apparent in summer 1995, in particular between France and Britain, the US had an opportunity to prevail with its point of view.

The analysis of strategies of influence-seeking (4.4) made abundantly clear that there was an unprecedented level of military and diplomatic cooperation among the three biggest European allies, and between France and the UK in particular. These two countries pooled their resources as the biggest contributors to UNPROFOR and used their issue-specific power in a uniform manner, attaching caveats to the use of their forces. Douglas Hurd remarked, “the experience in Bosnia brought service cooperation between the British and the French to a new post-war high” (in Simms 2001: 111).86 Cooperation between militaries on the ground was reflected in shared and mutually reinforcing views on the essence and sense of humanitarian peace operations (Sharp

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86 The successful joint policies in Bosnia were cited repeatedly as the instigator of Franco-British defense cooperation, which ensued at particular speed in 1994 and 1995 (Hurd 1995).
Hence, France and the United Kingdom framed their arguments against the US call for air strikes in a consistent and coherent manner. This joint attempt to persuade and shame the Clinton administration was widely supported by other European countries as well (Calic 1996: 160-163). Lastly, policy coordination among the three biggest European allies was close and spanned the central institutional settings such as the UN, the EC and NATO in Brussels (Simms 2001: 113). In the political dimension of the use of force, Franco–German cooperation led proposals to be prepared that were taken forward in different institutional settings. In addition, the successful advocacy of the safe area concept was premised on the Franco–British joint use of voice opportunities within the UN Security Council.

This unity and cooperation among the biggest European allies increased the leverage they had over the United States. Furthermore, the Clinton administration was extremely sensitive to the costs of the military intervention, especially with regard to post-intervention peacekeeping. Accordingly, it could hardly ignore the pooled issue-specific power of its European allies who were willing to deploy troops in the difficult Bosnian theatre. Furthermore, the high degree of unity among European allies affected US long-term interests in the integrity of transatlantic institutions and its reputation within them. In light of unified European opposition to its preferred policies, the Clinton administration viewed decision-making on Bosnia as a bifurcated decision: “If we did do what we wanted to do on Bosnia flat out, and blow apart the Alliance – and I think it would have done that – it would have been a worse crisis in the Alliance than the 1956 Suez invasion” (Lake 2000; see also Berger 2000; Daalder 2000). The cohesive use of their institutional voice opportunities and of similar arguments in shaming and persuading the US administration increased European leverage: if the United States had wanted to pursue air strikes unilaterally or pressure allies into agreement, such action would have come with a tremendous cost in reputation and a loss of credibility for international institutions.

In summer 1995, the US prevailed over the skepticism against air strikes. One major reason for this variance in European influence can be found in the decreasing levels of

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87 In September 1993, the French and German government launched the Kinkel-Juppé Initiative. Adopted by the EU in November as the “EU Action Plan,” it was the first initiative to tie a political solution to clear incentives for both sides (See Klaus Kinkel and Alain Juppe Letter to the EU Presidency, Bonn and Paris, November 7, 1993, in Owen 1995b; Action Plan of the European Union for Yugoslavia November 1993, in Owen 1995b).
unity among European opposition to air strikes. As France and Britain were split on how to react to the ongoing Serb offensives, the United States was able to dominate the discussion on the tactical dimension.

With the change of government in France in May 1995, divisions in the Franco–British axis were becoming visible. British officials repeatedly portrayed the options in Bosnia as bifurcated – either as a purely humanitarian mission or a full-blown war and hence were staunch opponents to US policies (Simms 2001: 65-67; Major in Owen 1995: 18). The French government under Chirac became increasingly concerned about the credibility of the international organizations involved and France’s position within them. Hence, they wanted to see the UN and NATO respected in the Bosnian theatre even if that implied military escalation (Lepick 1996: 84; Wood 1994: 141-143). This ‘middle-position’ lent particular importance to France: “The French interventionist disposition allowed it to be the axis of debates on the use of force. Where the Americans strongly favored using air power against the Bosnian Serbs, and the British equally strongly opposed it, citing both the probable lack of utility and concern for their troops on the ground, the French with a cautious but forceful approach and with troops on the ground, were decisive” (Gow 1997: 165).

In July 1995, the two allies split publicly for the first time over the use of the RRF. This split had two paradoxical effects: the proposals at hand created immense pressure on the US to become involved. At the same time, the divergence between the British and the French created an opportunity for the US to successfully implement its preference for air strikes. President Chirac had firmly placed the ball in the British and US camp with this proposal to recapture and defend the remaining safe areas such as Srebrenica and Gorazde (Leurdijk 1996: 67). Rejecting this proposal, the British found themselves boxed in between allies and in desperate need of military help to save their exposed peacekeepers in Gorazde. Hence, British diplomats argued for a relocation of UNPROFOR troops to more defendable positions (Sharp 1997: 47). In light of the intra-European differences, the Clinton administration could not support the British proposal: “If […] this were a joint British-French request, I think the President would support it. […] It’s the division between London and Paris that has

made this so hard.” When the chiefs of staff of the US, the UK, and France met on July 16 to further discuss the defense of safe areas, a senior official from the Clinton administration called French and British positions irreconcilable: “One of our closest allies wants us to jump in hard, and our other closest ally says it won’t be necessary. [...] There is no consensus to base a policy on” (in: Burg/Shoup 1999: 343).

With the aim of developing a unified European position, the Clinton administration took the initiative and put pressure on the British to agree to more robust air strikes ahead of the London meeting on 21 July. Although the Major government had long rejected air strikes, it now viewed them as a more tenable option and more conducive to the safety of its troops than the French proposal (Burg/Shoup 1999: 345-346; Halberstam 2001: 306). Against this background, allies agreed to threaten robust air strikes against Serbs, and this formed the basis of NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force.  

The Franco–British position created a situation in which the United States could successfully argue for an air campaign to stop Serb advances. From a French point of view, air strikes were acceptable in order to rescue the credibility of the UN in Bosnia. For the British, air strikes were a less risky option to British soldiers than attempts to recapture lost ground with existing troops. With the French at their side, the US government no longer sought to rescue their reputation in NATO but portrayed air strikes as the most valid way of saving allied soldiers and NATO.

4.5.3 The Unity of US Domestic Politics

In line with the hypothesis formulated in the theoretical framework, European influence on US policy-making in Bosnia was more successful when the US domestic scene was divided on the questions of military intervention. From mid-1993 to summer 1995, European strategies of influence-seeking profited from internal divisions within the Clinton administration, and divisions between public opinion and congress.

In the Clinton administration, decision-making on Bosnia largely took place within the NSC’s principal committee and the committee of deputies. This meant that the administration was divided into two groups. One activist group comprised National Security Advisor Lake, Vice President Al Gore and his deputy Leon Fuerth, and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright. These officials agreed that failing states and humanitarian crises, such as Bosnia, were the new threats that the US faced now that the Cold War had ended. Because of its destabilizing potential for Europe as whole, the Balkans was of particular interest for the United States. The activist group also argued that investing political capital in the former Yugoslavia was a moral duty beyond strategic expediency (Lake 2000; Albright 2003). Although this group generally supported the use of the air force in defense of the Bosnian Muslims, there were notable differences amongst them. UN Ambassador Albright had been the most hawkish official: she coined the term “assertive multilateralism” for her general belief that the US should at times unilaterally lead or engage in UN peacekeeping efforts (Albright 1993). In Bosnia, she argued that the wider US agenda was paralyzed by the country’s inaction in the Balkans and, hence, that the US should pursue ‘lift and strike’ irrespective of the opposition of its allies (US State Department 1997; Drew 1994: 145). In contrast, Gore and Lake felt that the United States could and should not risk its relations with European allies over Bosnia and felt they had to give in to European opposition (Halberstam 2001: 284-286; Simms 2001: 87).

The rival group was largely built around Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and Joint Chief of Staff Colin Powell. In addition, Secretary of State Warren Christopher appeared skeptical about the use of force in Bosnia for most of the time. These people argued that Bosnia was hardly part of the United States’ core strategic interests in a time when major power shifts were taking place and where the US should keep a special eye on Russia (Drew 1994; Halberstam 2001: 285-295). Especially the Pentagon and the military brass remained deeply skeptical about involving US troops in an endeavor that was anything but their core mission. Frustrated over the reluctance of professional soldiers to intervene, Albright asked Powell: “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”

91 The principal committee consisted of National Security Advisor Tony Lake, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin (later Bill Perry), Joint Chief of Staff Colin Powell (later John Shalikashvili), CIA Director James Woolsey, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, and Vice President, Al Gore.
Powell later commented on that episode: “I thought I would have an aneurysm!” (Betts 2005: 9). While the reserved group supported some very limited protection of the Muslim enclaves, estimates on the air power and respective ground troops needed to implement an eventual peace agreement always ran high (Daalder 2000: 13; Halverson 1996: 14-16). Much of the wariness was best captured in the Powell doctrine: “the United States should use military force only after exhausting all other alternatives and then only decisively to achieve clearly defined political objectives.” (Daalder/O’Hanlon 1999: 130). Given that the activists could not clearly establish their political aims for Bosnia, their call for a limited but risky deployment of force, and the fact that they had not engaged in serious diplomacy, military support was not forthcoming (Halberstam 2001; Burg/Shoup 199: 251-252; Hendrickson 2004). European allies were able to exploit these divergences and tip the domestic balance in their favor because President Clinton did not decide on a firm US policy course until 1995. European diplomats had wide access to decision-making within the administration, which had been characterized by open debate with Clinton postponing definite decisions on Bosnia most of the time (Drew 1994: 150-160; Daalder 2000: 86; Bert 1997: 189-210). Given the internal divisions and Clinton’s indecisiveness “Bosnia policy hung like a strategic albatross around the administration’s neck” (Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 126). European allies exploited the lack of US initiatives with their own policies.

European strategies to resist US proposals, such as ‘lift and strike’, were supported by the obvious split between advocates of such action, public opinion and congress. Up to the mid-term elections in 1994, congress sent mixed messages. While some in the Democratic camp remained cautious over an engagement, a cross-party faction had called for ‘lift and strike’. Democratic internationalists, senior Bush administration officials, and conservative Republicans called for more US leadership in Europe, to treating action against Serbs as a general deterrent against dictators, and to take a moral stand (Drew 1994: 154; Bert 1997: 85-86; Schultz 2003; Brune 2005: 44-48). From 1993 to mid-1995, US public opinion pointed the Clinton administration in the direction of European allies: public approval of military action in Bosnia was attached to the condition of a multilateral approach and cooperation with European allies (Sobel 1998a; Drew 1994: 154). According to Bert and others, this turn to

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92 Interview James O’Brien and James Pardew.
multilateralism was connected to a more inward looking and war wary US public after the end of the Cold War (Bert 1997: 82; Daalder 2000; Paulsen 1995). As a consequence, the Clinton administration needed the support of European allies for its policies to sell intervention in Bosnia at home. Strategies tapping on the reputation costs associated with unilateralism were thus supported by the domestic divisions within the US. For Clinton to be attentive to public opinion, he would have to give in to European allied opposition on the principal and political dimension of the use of force.

The overall interests in the conflict remained rather low, support for air strikes in response to atrocities and US participation in UN peacekeeping efforts were high, yet extremely volatile (Sobel 1998 a; Bert 1997: 88-91). Especially for the period from 1993 until the end of 1994, it is hard to disentangle the potential influence of allies versus public opinion, since “a large and stable majority of Americans viewed military action as primarily the responsibility of European countries or the UN” (Sobel 1998 b: 252). Hence, strategies based on European issue-specific power that targeted the US sensitivity to the costs of military intervention benefitted from the dominant public view.

In June and July 1995, European influence diminished primarily because the Clinton administration unified around a policy change and agreed to the use of massive air force. The literature largely agrees that a number of factors led to a convergence within the administration and the mobilization of political will to change US policy in Bosnia.

First, the specter of elections in 1996 increased a sense of urgency within the administration. Renshon has aptly coined the term “permanent campaign presidency” for Clinton’s time in office (Renshon 1996: 272) to indicate the importance of public opinion and congressional moods and power relations to the president. In 1995, Clinton was still stomaching a landslide defeat in the mid-term elections in fall 1994. Republican leaders in the house and congress increasingly attacked US Bosnia policy. Due to congressional pressure, the United States had stopped implementing the arms embargo in November 1994 and in January faced increasing congressional pressure to lift the embargo on arming Bosnian Muslims (Bert 1997: 216; Barthe/David 2004: 11). Although the president finally vetoed the legislation in August 1995, congressional pressure certainly had an additional galvanizing effect on the administration. With a divided government, foreign policy had become the subject of
bitter partisan debate and the Republican presidential candidate’s advocacy for
tougher action on Bosnia was “stimulating Clinton’s decision to launch the diplomatic
effort” (Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 129).
Furthermore, Clinton was afraid that a generally inattentive public would take his
failure in Bosnia as a general sign of a lack of leadership: “Bosnia was not an issue in
and of itself. Not many Americans were likely to go to the polls in the 1996
presidential election and vote one way or another because of the events in Sarajevo or
Srebrenica. Rather, […] it appeared to suggest […] impotence on the part of the
Clinton administration not just in this, but in all matters” (Halberstam 2001: 297).
Clinton’s electoral calculations, thus, added to the feeling that the failure of
UNPROFOR and repeated French calls for more action had cornered the president in
an uncomfortable manner that required a change of US policy.
Second, national security advisor, Tony Lake, had deliberately changed the political
decision-making process by excluding Europeans and advocating a clear policy
change. The Srebrenica massacre had made abundantly clear how untenable the US
position of abstention was and that the US president was left with very few good
options. As Daalder has argued, Lake changed his role from an honest broker to a
policy entrepreneur in the inter-agency debate (Daalder 2000: 82-84). Working on a
comprehensive overhaul of US Bosnia policy for some time, Lake had used Clinton’s
frustration with the situation in summer 1995 to convince the president to adopt a new
strategy. Clinton and his national security advisor agreed that the United States would
no longer be “kicking the can down the road” (Daalder 2000: 91) but force allies into
the use of force and forge a comprehensive peace between the belligerents. Third,
having the president’s support for a change of direction in US policy, Lake was able
to prevail over the reserved group in the subsequent inter-agency process. Within this
process of drafting a final strategy, activists such as Albright gained more say over the
decision to use force and finally persuaded the skeptics in the State Department and
Pentagon. Once the US administration had united around the policy of more robust air
strikes and leadership in peace negotiations, they pressured their European allies into
agreement (Halberstam 2001: 301-331; US Department of State 1997: 1-24;
European influence on this process was diminished as Lake excluded the bureaucracy
from the major decisions, changed direction in small exclusive circles and used his
proximity to the president to gain early presidential approval. Moreover, the following
In summary: the unity of the US government provided a plausible scope condition for allied influence and helps explain why European allies were less able to forestall the US advocacy of air strikes in 1995. On the one hand, their bargaining positions had been weakened by the end of the entente cordiale between France and the UK. At the same time, the Clinton administration demonstrated new resolve and the inter-agency process marginalized forces within the administration that had supported European skepticism against a massive air campaign.

4.6 Summary of Case Study
NATO’s intervention in Bosnia has been widely hailed as a showcase of US leadership in Europe. The influence of European allies on US policy choices, thus, is easily overlooked. France and Britain, in particular, played an important role when it came to the reformulation of US policy. I argue that European allies had significant impact on the way in which the Clinton administration defined its interests in Bosnia and its principal decision to intervene in 1995. In addition, European efforts to find a settlement between the belligerents unfolded long-term effects: eventually, the United States agreed to advocate a peace agreement that provided territorial advantages to Bosnian Serbs and which entailed many of the provisions previously negotiated by European allies. Until the summer of 1995, European allies had resisted the US call for more robust air strikes. However, during Operation Deliberate Force, the US dominated the missions’ command and implementation.

Consultation as co-determination as well as shaming by European allies was an important factor in the re-definition of US interests in Bosnia and subsequent policy choices. Issue-linkage with the wider US agenda in Europe and its global leadership role was the hook on to which European arguments hung. Issue-specific power and voice opportunities were exploited, especially by France and Britain, in order to block concrete tactical and political US proposals and to formulate their own alternatives. The three types of strategies appeared to mutually reinforce each other.

However, European allies have not always been able to influence US policy to the same extent. Two conditions account for this variance in European impact over time. In 1993 and 1994, levels of European influence-seeking were high because France, Britain, and Germany were united in their opposition to US policies. At the same
time, the Clinton administration had been hamstrung by internal divisions and divisions between public opinion and congress. These divisions helped allies to ‘tip’ the domestic decision-making process to their favor. This balance radically changed in 1995, when President Chirac moved away from the UK’s cautious stance on the use of air power and ended a long period of European unity. In the US, Tony Lake managed to rally the president and the administration around a course of engagement and tougher action. These two developments explain why European allies were less able to influence the final implementation of Operation Deliberate Force and were largely excluded from the final negotiations with belligerents. Accordingly, the intensity of threat does not provide a pervasive explanation of US policy choices in Bosnia.
Table 5. Summary of the Findings from the Bosnia Case Study.

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* = outcome/process in congruence with hypothesis  
- = outcome/process in contradiction to hypothesis
5. NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo

Just three years after the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Balkans came back to haunt the transatlantic allies. Madeleine Albright had swiftly reminded her colleagues “that history is watching us and history will not be kind if we do the same in Kosovo.”93 Indeed, the lesson of Bosnia had been learned and transatlantic allies were adamant that they would cooperate, ensure the US led conflict management, and avoid public displays of differences. Yet, the Kosovo crisis presented a set of thorny questions: nobody disputed the sovereignty of Serbia and nobody openly supported Kosovar independence at the time. Finding a pretense for military intervention turned out to be most difficult question. Sustaining an air campaign in the wake of Western public skepticism and increased ethnic cleansing led NATO to suffer a “near death experience” (Allin 2000). Worst of all, widespread international support was not ensured as an increasingly confident Russia looked for ways to make its influence felt again in Europe.

In this chapter, I argue that the military intervention in Kosovo represents another case of significant European influence on US policy-making. However, this positive attribution means different things depending on the European ally and the dimension of the use of force in question. I find that a coalition existed between the US and the UK and that they placed pressure on the remaining European allies to accept the principal decision to use force in fall 1998. Reluctant European allies, France and German in particular, did have an impact on the timing and the definition of the political purpose for which force was to be used, both ahead of and during military action. Lastly, because Operation Allied Force was defined as a test case for NATO, all three European allies were able to restrain the United States in many tactical questions.

The analysis is structured as follows: after an introduction to the Kosovo conflict (5.1), I analyze the main differences between transatlantic allies (5.2). I then turn to an analysis of US policy developments in light of these differences (5.3). In line with my analytical framework, I ask how European allies have tried to influence US policy-making (5.4) and which conditions were conducive to that influence (5.5). Finally, I present a short summary of the case study (5.6).

5.1 Introduction to the Conflict

According to Tim Judah, Kosovo was a “catastrophe waiting to happen” (Judah 1999: 5). Indeed, many observers predicted that Kosovo would be the first region in the Balkans to face violent conflict. Although the outburst of violence was delayed, several developments led the situation to spiral into conflict.94 Kosovo was of high symbolic importance to Serbs and ethnic Albanians or “Kosovars”.95 Whether it is the famous Serbian victory over the Turks in the Battle of Blackbirds or the founding myth of Albania’s national movement in the 19th century, Kosovo holds a special place in nationalist legends and in national historiography for Serbs and Kosovars (Bayerl 2001: 35; Silber/Little 1996: 72; Judah 1999:7). Competing claims to the territory have been fueled by reference to these national myths.

During communist rule, the Yugoslav federal system kept these competing claims in a delicate balance. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (FRY) constitution granted Kosovo the status of an “autonomous province.” As such, Kosovars enjoyed great autonomy in the province’s governance and at the same time had a right to co-determine Yugoslav politics.96 This relative freedom under Tito’s rule had reined in tensions between Serbs and Kosovars. Starting with Tito’s death in 1980, a number of developments caused a crisis to develop in the federal system. Even before the FRY’s dissolution between 1989 and 1990, economic and demographic developments pitted the two ethnic groups in Kosovo against each other.

During the 1980s, austerity pressures had particularly affected Kosovo as Yugoslavia’s poorest region. Because of the economic situation, ever more Serbs emigrated from Kosovo. Together with a high Albanian birth rate, this trend led to an increasing demographic imbalance. By the beginning of the 1980s, Kosovo Serbs made up only 10% of the population of Kosovo (IICK 2000: 13).

Against this background, a climate of mutual mistrust emerged: the Kosovo Serb minority felt increasingly beleaguered and discriminated. Similarly, Kosovars faced a crackdown on peaceful protests and the progressive limitation of their political and

94 This brief chapter does not attempt to give a comprehensive review of the Kosovo crisis. For an introduction see Silber/Little (1995); Judah (2011); Caplan (1998); and Calic (2000).
95 I use the terms ‘Albanian Kosovars’ and ‘Kosovars’ interchangeably.
96 Kosovo was not granted the status of a republic because Kosovars were regarded as a national group – a minority having their principal homeland in Albania. In contrast, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia were regarded as republics made up of nations; Montenegro was the second autonomous province (Caplan 1998: 798).
personal rights by the Yugoslav authorities (Judah 1999: 8-12; IICK 2000: 13). This climate was exploited by nationalist leaders. In particular, Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to political power was intimately linked to his skillful instrumentalization of the Kosovo issue. A great deal of his popularity was owed to public appearances in Kosovo where he portrayed himself as the leader who would return the land of Kosovo to a strong Serbian state (Silber/Little 1995). Not surprisingly, Kosovo was the first province to fall victim to Milosevic’s plans for centralization in 1989. He had purged the communist Kosovar leadership and amended the FRY’s constitution; this abolished Kosovo’s autonomy and considerably strengthened Serbia’s grip on power (Silber/Little 1995: 73-76; Steindorff 1999: 198).

In reaction to Serbian attempts of domination, Kosovo declared its independence in 1991. In contrast to the three republics – Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia – this declaration did not lead to violent conflict at the time. Under the aegis of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovars chose peaceful resistance. Rugova explained the decision in favor of non-violence because “the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out” (in Judah 2001: 318). Instead of granting such a pretext, Albanian Kosovars chose to erect a parallel state. Between 1991 and 1997, they established state institutions, an educational system, a prospering black market and informal economy, and they even collected taxes (IICK 2000: 15-17; Calic 2000). With Serbian and international attention drawn to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, the situation in Kosovo remained stable but precarious. Gross human rights violations against the Albanian population happened on a regular basis; as a response, armed attacks on Serbian security forces occurred on a sporadic basis (Judah 2001: 135-145).

By 1997, the delicate balance in Kosovo had tilted towards violence for a number of reasons. In Serbia, Milosevic had come under pressure domestically, both from democratic and nationalistic forces. Again Milosevic’s preferred vehicle to gain political support was increasing repression in Kosovo and invoking the myth of greater Serbian unification (IICK: 19).

Prior to 1997, the Kosovo conflict had not been in the center of international attention. The lack of international support had a profound impact on the domestic situation in Kosovo: “The ending of the war in Bosnia had brought no end to the crisis in Kosovo. This fact alone had been a blow to Rugova’s prestige: he had spent four years telling his people, in effect, that they must be patient until the international
community imposed a final settlement in ex-Yugoslavia, in which their interests would be respected” (Malcolm in Bellamy 2001: 53).

Observers have characterized international reactions as a “pattern of neglect” (Caplan 1998) or a mere “absence of prevention” (Bellamy 2001). This neglect largely resulted from the assumption that the tensions between Serbs and Albanian Kosovars were a human rights and humanitarian issue and not a case of a legitimate claim for national independence. Transatlantic allies accepted the Serbian view that Kosovo was an integral part of Yugoslavia and refrained from granting the Kosovars the right to secede (Caplan 1998:747-749; Troebst 1998; Bellamy 2001: 3). As a consequence, much international attention was focused on observation missions to monitor the human rights situation under the auspices of the CSCE/OSCE (between 1992 and 1993) and the UN (since 1995). In addition, transatlantic allies concentrated on improving the living conditions of the Albanian population (Bellamy 2001: 30-36, 53-55; Troebst 1998: 32-60).

Although the Serbian record of oppression was well documented, the international community did not seriously try to find a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. The 1995 Dayton accords were concluded without the presence of a Kosovo delegation and without any mention of the conflict. Milosevic’s consent and clout with Bosnians Serbs was viewed as too important to overbear the agenda with the problems of Kosovo (Bellamy 2001: 52-54; IICK 2000: 21; Caplan 1998: 750). This favorable climate towards Serbia continued after 1995. The European Union recognized the FRY in 1996 and alleviated its sanctions; in contrast, the United States maintained an “outer wall of sanctions”97 against the FRY because conditions in Kosovo had not improved (Troebst 1998: 74-77; Bellamy 2001: 55-58).98

Thus, Kosovar’s hopes to internationalize the conflict were significantly dampened. This frustration proved to provide fertile soil for the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Founded in 1993 mostly by radicalized Kosovars in exile, the KLA became better organized and equipped in 1997. Weapons were bought and smuggled after the breakdown of the Albanian state in 1997 (Judah 2001:114-136; Steindorff: 198; Webber 2009: 449). By late 1997, Kosovar resistance was no longer peaceful:

97 These sanctions concerned limited travel visas for the Serbian leadership and membership of the FRY in international economic organizations such as the World Bank (Bellamy 2001: 55).
98 US support for Kosovars had its limits. While both, President Bush senior and President Clinton threatened to use force on behalf of the Kosovars, this threat never materialized (Bellamy 2001: 50; Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001).
the KLA committed paramilitary attacks and engaged in occasional skirmishes with Serbian security forces (Judah 2001: 136-140).

The Serbian military police reacted to the growing levels of violence with large-scale retaliatory attacks. On March 5, 1998, Serb forces massacred 58 members of the Jeshari family with close ties to the KLA, among them ten children and eighteen women. The massacre was widely reported in European and US newspapers and international human rights groups sharply criticized the Serbian onslaught (Bellamy 2001: 72). Although it was not the first attack of its kind, it sparked a new form of international involvement in Kosovo that led NATO to end Serbian rule over Kosovo with a military campaign lasting 78 days.

5.2 Allied Approaches to the Kosovo Crisis

Before we turn to differences between transatlantic allies, three fundamental commonalities must be noted. First, transatlantic allies suffered from “Bosnia syndrome” (Bellamy 2001: 61). Governments across the Atlantic agreed that a repetition of the Bosnian debacle and disunity should be avoided. This time, European allies did not demand an exclusive leadership role for Europe. On the contrary, US leadership and its clout with the factions in the Balkans were widely accepted. Second, allied perceptions of the belligerents did not differ fundamentally, but rather in degree. Third, transatlantic allies jointly assumed that coercive diplomacy would be needed to get an agreement between the parties. As a consequence, differences between allies were severe, yet they pertained less to the fundamentals of conflict resolution and more to the right ingredients of coercive diplomacy.

In the Kosovo conflict, cleavages ran across a simple Atlantic divide pitting the United States against its European partners. In many important respects, the UK and the United States argued for the use of force whereas Germany and France remained skeptical. Yet, as the subsequent discussion will show, there were also important differences between the US and the British.

With regard to the principal dimension of the use of force, the Clinton administration had been generally inclined to use limited air strikes since the late summer of 1998.99 This assessment stemmed from a view that Milosevic’s leadership was the central

99 As section 5.5.2 shows, there were serious divisions within the Clinton administration on which course to pursue in Kosovo. Consequently, this summary of the US position is somewhat of an analytical simplification, but this was necessary to carve out the main differences between the US and its European allies.
cause of violence and that only force would keep him from using violence in Kosovo (Ramet 2000; Barthe/David 2008; Albright 2003). Most importantly, the US government argued that a UN resolution to authorize military action was desirable but by no means necessary. Russia, so the argument in the Clinton administration went, should not be allowed to veto US and NATO policy. Moreover, humanitarian concerns were sufficient to justify US military action (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 44-45; Albright 2003).

Politically, differences between the allies only existed in degree, as the United States had not committed itself to support Kosovar independence. During the conflict, the US tried to walk the thin line between incorporating the KLA and not taking sides in the conflict too obviously (Katulis 2000). Transatlantic allies essentially diverged with their US counterparts over how clearly the use of military force needed to be linked to the equally clear political goals and demands of both the Kosovars and the Serbs. On the tactical dimension of the use of force, the US government had been prepared to escalate NATO’s air war at an earlier stage with the aim of hitting strategic targets. Together with France and Germany, the administration was less willing to use ground forces. All European allies demanded a peacekeeping contribution from the Clinton administration although it had not been willing to send such troops.

When Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, took control of the Kosovo dossier in summer 1998, he led his country with an “interventionist impulse” (Daddow 2009; Dyson 2009; Hodge 2006: 155-158). A number of reasons have been given for why Britain became the leading advocate of military intervention. The British establishment felt the Kosovo crisis provided an opportunity to underline the importance of NATO; the conflict presented a welcomed instrument to claim leadership in Europe. Furthermore, standing up to Milosevic’s policies was popular with the British public and enjoyed bipartisan support. Last but not least, Kosovo became a showcase for Blair’s claim to pursue an “ethical foreign policy” and it was Blair’s personal convictions that drove much of the policy (Daddow 2009; Hodge 2006; Dyson 2009). As Britain’s chief of defense staff, General Charles Guthrie, put it: “He feels, I think, evil triumphs when good men do nothing” (in Daddow 2009: 553).

On the principal dimension of the use of force, the British government had advocated threatening military force against Milosevic even before the United States. Richardson and Clarke argue that the British government at times dragged along an
overall reluctant US administration. In order to forge international consensus it had lobbied about this threat and at times even closed off diplomatic options (Richardson 2000: 145; Hodge 2006: 158; Clarke 2001: 80). In September 1998, the US and the UK closed ranks around the idea of threatening force and jointly sought to persuade their European partners of the wisdom of doing so.\footnote{“NATO raises its pressure on the Serbs,” \textit{The New York Times}, October 12, 1998; “This is not a time to back down,” \textit{The Guardian}, October 9, 1998.} In marked contrast to its US counterparts, the British vehemently underlined the necessity of UN approval for military intervention in Kosovo.

In terms of \textit{tactical decisions}, the UK was in favor of a more robust approach than the United States. From the beginning, the British position was that an eventual deployment of ground troops into a possibly hostile environment should not and could not be excluded. In this view, ruling out ground troops from the beginning would be mistaken and signal a lack of resolve on NATO’s part to win the war (Richardson 2000: 147; Clarke 2001: 85). Blair’s personal conviction and lobbying for such an option “provoked high anger from the President Clinton, widespread bafflement from the French, and a questioning of his judgment from some cabinet colleagues” (Dyson 2009: 47).

\textit{Politically} there were no marked differences between the US and UK. However, the UK was less inclined to support the KLA’s quest for independence both in terms of the overall stability in the Balkans and in terms of the precedence this would set. The UK championed the view that Serbia should be provided with the perspective of becoming part of the “European family of nations” and be supported in this course economically and politically (Clarke 2001: 83).

The German government supported US initiatives, yet its commitment was somewhat uneasy and accompanied by attempts to stake out its own position.\footnote{This approach remained unaffected by Germany’s change of government in fall 1998 (Rudolf 2000; Miskimmon 2009: 563).} A bipartisan consensus identified the outflow of refugees as a particular problem for Germany. As a consequence, Berlin was interested in a long-term solution and thus sought to refrain from taking sides in the conflict too obviously (Hyde-Price 2001a: 109). Germany’s approach to the Kosovo crisis is understandable only from the vantage point of the country’s larger international standing: preserving the image of a reliable transatlantic ally was the main motive behind Germany’s support of US initiatives (Friedrich 2005: 55-56). The German Foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, justified the
decision in favor of military intervention claiming there would be “no German Sonderweg.”

With regard to the principal dimension of the use of force, German governments accepted the basic rationale of coercive diplomacy: in order to enable serious negotiations, Milosevic would have to face pressure including military threats. Still, for most of 1998 the German government argued that military intervention would have to be approved by the UN Security Council (Varwick 2004: 98-99). Indeed, Berlin’s eventual participation in the military mission marked a watershed for its security policy. This uneasiness with the use force was also visible in the German position on the tactical dimension of military intervention. Successive German governments argued for a limited military campaign. The use of German ground troops was ruled out from the beginning but even an air campaign was to be limited in its destruction and duration (Hyde-Price 2001a: 112; Friedrich 2005: 93-95). Volatile domestic support accounted for this position as much as strategic calculations: the destruction of Serbia’s infrastructure would likely delay its integration into European structures and markets, and its reconstruction would likely have to be paid for by European allies (Rudolf 2001; Duke et al. 2000: 133-135).

In terms of defining the political purpose of the intervention, Germany insisted on the inclusion of Russia and foresaw a different timing of initiatives than the United States. In summer 1998 and in early 1999, Germany favored Dayton-style negotiations (Hofmann 1999). Additionally, during Operation Allied Force (OAF) the German government urged timely diplomatic outreach and the formulation of clear political goals. German political offers and solutions were marked by the country’s interests described above: first, any political solution had to be acceptable to the Serbs and offer them a long-term vision of reconciliation and integration into European structures. Second, any solution would have to re-integrate Russia and re-establish the authority of the United Nations (Hyde-Price 2001a: 115; Miskimmon 2009: 565).

Two overarching perspectives determined the way in which the Kosovo crisis was framed in French politics. First, the handling of the Kosovo crisis was tied to questions of France’s future status in international affairs. Second, the indiscriminate violence in Kosovo was linked to the future stability and nature of Europe. The French government not only feared that violence would spread to other countries in

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the region, but Serbian actions in Kosovo were depicted as a flat contradiction of European norms. In the French view, the battle over Kosovo was a struggle over human rights, European values, and even European civilization (Grundmann et al. 2000). As early as 1998, the French government had harshly criticized the use of force against the Albanian population and the repression these people faced. Still, France remained equally suspicious of the KLA and its demands for Kosovar independence (McAllister 2001: 93-94). The French perceptions of the conflict, hence, were remarkably convergent with those of the United States and its European allies. Yet, when it came to principal decisions, Paris remained skeptical with regard to any precipitous use of force. In the beginning of the crisis in 1998, the French had cautioned against military intervention on the grounds that it would be disproportionate given the level of violence in Kosovo (Duke et al. 2001: 130). With the deteriorating humanitarian situation, President Chirac supported the threat of force: “I have the same will about Kosovo, the same determination. We cannot accept the ethnic cleansing policies. We cannot. And we have to be very firm […] to Serbs and to President Milosevic, including military action” (Chirac 1998). This principal agreement to threaten force was by no means an unconditional commitment. The French government was most intent on ensuring authorization by the UN Security Council, as this would help ensure international (including Russian) support for NATO action. The French feared that military intervention without prior UN authorization would set a precedent and possibly open the way for the future instrumentalization of NATO as a tool of US power (Fortmann/Viau 2000; McAllister 2001: 94; Ehrhart 2000).

Along similar lines, France supported OAF but with some differences on military tactics. French politicians were anxious to portray their approach as directed against Milosevic’s policies of ethnic cleansing: “[W]e are not the enemies of the Serbian nation, which has a legitimate right to be offered a future in a democratic Europe. […] France has decided to participate in allied military action implemented by NATO. To what have we committed? To an air strike, first of all, intended to exert pressure on military targets and reduce ability to harm” (Jospin 1999). The French, thus, were against any escalation of the war against Serbia, whether this meant strategic air strikes or the use of ground troops (Fortmann/Viau 2000; Bryant 2000: 35; Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 158). At least partly, this position was premised on the volatile domestic situation. Despite governing in cohabitation, the French executive
remained united and supportive of the allies’ overall approach. Still, a massive debate
was being conducted within the left-wing parties that supported the prime minister.
Public opinion was generally supportive, though volatile (Macleod 2000: 125; McAllister 2001: 96-97).

France agreed with its European and US allies on the type of political solution
envisioned for Kosovo: the FRY’s integrity would not be called into question as long
as Serbia granted and implemented substantial autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians.
French opposition to US policy can be noticed in matters of timing and the details of
certain diplomatic initiatives. Together with its German counterparts, France had
already opted for a negotiated solution in the summer of 1998 and advocated a last-
ditch diplomatic effort in January 1999 (Rouleau 1999). The French government
prided itself on playing a major role in the initiation of the Rambouillet conference,
which it co-hosted together with Britain. Most observers, however, note that apart
from the symbolic role of a chair, there was no distinct and meaningful French profile
during the negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris (Fortmann/Viau 2000: 96-97).

Table 6. Summary of Allied Approaches to Kosovo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Tactical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Vigilant</td>
<td>No independence; no status quo.</td>
<td>From limited air strikes to a full-blown air campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN authorization unnecessary</td>
<td>Punishment of Serb transgressions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Reluctant</td>
<td>No independence; no status quo.</td>
<td>Limited air strikes; no ground troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN authorization necessary</td>
<td>Comprehensive peace; no punishment but incentives for all belligerents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Reluctant</td>
<td>No independence; no status quo.</td>
<td>Limited air strikes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN authorization necessary</td>
<td>Comprehensive peace; no punishment but incentives for all belligerents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Vigilant</td>
<td>No independence; no status quo.</td>
<td>Full-blown air campaign and ground troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN authorization necessary</td>
<td>Punishment of Serb transgressions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 The Development of US Policies in Kosovo

US policies in Kosovo went through four distinct phases. After a deterioration of the situation on the ground, the Clinton administration urged its transatlantic allies to accept a NATO threat of force despite the lack of clear UN authorization. Admittedly, due to European pressure the United States delayed the use of this threat in search for a final diplomatic solution between late January and March 1999. During OAF, the United States was prepared to escalate the air campaign earlier than its European allies. At the same time, the political solution to the war was also due to European input to US policy-making.

5.3.1 1998: In Search of a Strategy

This first phase of US policy development stretches from initial international reactions to the Jeshari killings to the threat of force against Milosevic in September and October 1998. In this phase, the principal question whether transatlantic allies should threaten force and how such a threat could be justified took prevalence. In this dispute, the United States largely prevailed over hesitant European allies, such as France and Germany. The UK can claim some influence in finding a legal justification for military action.

The initial international reaction to the outbreak of violence in Kosovo was marked by an unprecedented degree of transatlantic cooperation and Russian consent. In March 1998, the Contact Group convened and condemned the violence by both sides. Allied diplomacy followed a three-pronged approach to the crisis. First, the allies tried to increase the pressure on the Serbs by tightening sanctions on the FRY. In March 1998, the UN Security Council voted in favor of resolution 1160, which established an arms embargo against the FRY (UN Doc. Res/S/1160). Despite Russian opposition, transatlantic members of the CG subsequently denied Yugoslav officials visas and banned foreign investment in the country (Schwegmann 2003: 136-137; Contact Group 1998b; EU 1998).

Second, allies agreed with Russia on the foundations of a political solution. The formula held that neither the status quo nor independence for Kosovo would be acceptable (CG 1998a). To this end, members of the Contact Group had jointly and individually explored the basis for negotiations between the parties (Troebst 1998: 65-68). In June, President Yeltsin of Russia had secured a gentleman’s agreement with Milosevic that foresaw a ceasefire and the initiation of serious negotiations (Boysen

Third, within NATO allies began developing a contingency plan for an eventual operation in Kosovo (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 34; Butler 2001). NATO had also conducted a large-scale air exercise in the Balkans based on the assumption that a show of force would deter the Serbs from escalating the violence.\(^{103}\)

By the summer of 1998, transatlantic allies were facing a branching point in their engagement in Kosovo as international measures had not stopped the war and the prospects of international unity were fading. In June 1998, the KLA made major advances and controlled up to 40% of Kosovo’s territory, but Serbian forces launched an exceptionally brutal counter-offensive in late July and August (Judah 2000: 167-170). The ensuing battles lasted until September and increased the number of refugees to more than 50,000, with the number of internally displaced people rising to 170,000 (UN Doc. S/1998/834: § 12-13; UN Doc. S/1998/912: §6-7). With fall and winter approaching earlier than usual in the Balkans, transatlantic allies faced the specter of a massive humanitarian crisis: “[T]he unfavorable publicity generated by refugees was to have an extraordinary impact in galvanizing Western opinion in favor of doing something” (Judah 2001: 171). The United States concurred with its European allies that current mediation efforts had failed and a change of policy was necessary (Petritsch et al. 2004: 122).

At the same time, the prospects for an international consensus on how to move forward looked rather dim. France, Germany, and other European governments favored a diplomatic solution without resorting to the threat of military action. They argued that the eventual use of military force would have to be premised on a UN Security Council resolution and explicit Russian consent. Yet, the Russian government had made it clear that it would veto any potential Security Council

\(^{103}\) Operation Determined Falcon included reconnaissance and airborne warning and tanker aircraft, along with helicopters. These forces participated in the demonstration of airpower over Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This was intended to show NATO’s capability and rapidly project force into the region. See “Statement by NATO Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana, on Exercise Determined Falcon,” Brussels 13 June 1998 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-080e.htm> [last accessed May 21, 2013].
resolution stipulating military force (Judah 2001: 182; Boysen 2001: 123). In contrast, the UK had long been in favor of military action. In light of increasing Serbian atrocities, the Clinton administration converged around the view that only a threat of intervention would cause Milosevic to take negotiations and political offers seriously. It was time to move to diplomacy backed by force (Clark 2001: 133-134; Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 52-55).

The crucial dispute regarding the principal dimension of the use of force revolved around the legal basis for such action. The allies had split into three camps on this point. France and Italy demanded a UN resolution as a basis for action but had hinted early on that they would act without it in exceptional circumstances; Britain also favored a UN resolution. Once this option had been foreclosed, the UK and Germany sought to find an alternative legal justification and dogma to legitimize intervention. By contrast, the United States considered a UN resolution desirable but not necessary for NATO action (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 45; Friedrich 2005: 47-58).

In September and October, the US set out to forge an allied consensus on the use of force against Milosevic (NSC 1998b, 1998c). Initially, the US supported the UK in lobbying for a robust UN resolution authorizing the use of punitive measures (Petritsch et al. 2004: 122; Bellamy 2001: 88). When it became clear that Russian public opposition could not be overcome, the US pressured its European allies to refrain from seeking UN blessing. The US National Security Council pressed the president “to call Prime Minister Blair to urge the UK to change its strategy of seeking a UN Security Council resolution to authorize NATO action despite Russian opposition” (NSC 1998d). The State Department used bilateral contacts to overcome resistance by France and the newly elected German government and to fathom the Russian room for informal maneuver (NSC 1998d-f). Once Russia had signaled its consent to military action at least informally,104 the United States finally managed to overcome European resistance against the threat of force (Albright 2003: 470-472).105

Within a few weeks, transatlantic allies had taken a number of decisions that demonstrated the success of US efforts. On closer inspection, however, these

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104 To be fair one must say that the international conditions for a UN resolution were difficult and all allied governments knew this. At a CG meeting at Heathrow Airport in London on October 8, 1998 the Russian foreign minister made it clear that his country would oppose any resolution authorizing the use of force. At the same time, however, Russia would be willing to support tough wording and would eventually not oppose a NATO intervention in all but rhetoric (Petritsch et al. 2004: 134-136).

decisions also reveal the uneasiness with which they were taken and the fragility of allied consensus.

On September 23, 1998 the UN Security Council voted in favor of Resolution UNSC 1199 co-sponsored by France and the UK. Under the provision of Chapter VII, the resolution defined the continuing violence in Kosovo as a “threat to international peace and security” and called upon both parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and enter serious dialogue. It repeated additional demands made by the CG and the Milosevic-Jeltsin agreement. Should there be no compliance with the international community’s demands, the Security Council stated it would “consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region” (UN Doc. Res. S/1199; Petritsch et al. 2004: 128-129).

The resolution was a breakthrough in that it invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and had garnered Russian support. Consent was bought dearly with deliberate ambiguity in the formulation of the resolution. When it came to its interpretation, divisions were well apparent. The United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Chapter VII provided sufficient legal basis for military intervention; with a view to US domestic opposition, however, officials took great pains to point out that no such decision had yet been made (Albright 1998b; Cook 1998). In contrast, the Russian Ambassador to the UN stated that “no use of force has been authorized by the Council at the present stage” (Lavrov 1998). Not only Russia but also France and Germany remained opposed to the idea of automatism for military action (Hendriksen 2007: 149).

Within NATO, US Defense Secretary Cohen had been trying to bring along the alliance to a more resolute stance (Cohen 1998). On September 24, 1998 NATO agreed to issue an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) for both a limited air strike and a longer phased air campaign. An ACTWARN allows NATO commanders to formally identify necessary forces and approach members for contributions. Yet, Javier Solana cautioned: “let me stress that the use of force will require further decisions by the North Atlantic Council” (Solana 1998a). Not even three weeks later, on 13 October 1998, NATO had taken these further decisions and had answered the

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107 In a press briefing after the NATO had issued its ACTWARN, the US secretary of defense reiterated his new line of thinking: “I believe that the incredibility of NATO really is on the line that one cannot continue to prepare for possible military action or indeed threaten military action unless one is prepared to carry it out.” See Cohen (1998).
principal question of military intervention in the affirmative: should Milosevic not comply within 96 hours, NATO had given order for the execution of its campaign plans (Solana 1998b, 1998c).

The United States and the UK’s arguments for the use of force largely prevailed over those of their hesitant allies, such as France and Germany. NATO firmly decided that force should be used against Milosevic if there was no peaceful way of resolving the conflict. British action, as detailed later in this analysis, contributed greatly to the construction of a legal justification for action. Further, European approval to the Activation Order (ACTORD) may have been premised on the understanding that it would likely not be enacted. In October, the United States had dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to Serbia who claimed to be on the verge of a major agreement with Milosevic (Bellamy 2001: 89). Indeed, equipped with a robust ultimatum, Holbrooke gained Milosevic’s assent to an agreement settling the immediate humanitarian crisis on October 13, 1998. For the moment, transatlantic allies had avoided both an internal split of the Alliance and war with Yugoslavia.

5.3.2 1998—1999: Diplomacy backed by Force

A second phase of US policy in Kosovo stretches from the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement in October 1998 to the end of March 1999: diplomacy backed by force. In this phase, European allies exercised influence on the political dimension of US Kosovo policy: the Clinton administration delayed the use of force in search of a political solution that was more comprehensive than the state department had envisioned.

This further development of allied policies took place against the background of a branching point reached in mid-January 1999. US-led mediation efforts had avoided humanitarian catastrophe but had not brought the parties closer to peace. The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement was a measure to buy time and avert “an emergency within a crisis” (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 49). Milosevic pledged to fulfill existing UN demands and develop a framework for a political settlement by early November 1998. Second, the ceasefire agreement was to be verified by a diplomatic mission, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).108 The agreement suffered from major

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108 Accordingly, NATO provided air surveillance through the “NATO Kosovo Verification Mission”. In a separate agreement with the OSCE, the FYR pledged to allow the presence of up to 2,000 unarmed OSCE verifiers under the “Kosovo Verification Mission” (KVM). In addition, the OSCE was to
shortcomings. On the military side, it left the difficult issue of verification to an ill-equipped, understaffed, and unarmed KVM (Bellamy 2001: 109-110; Petritsch et al. 2004: 146-147). Because the agreement had been forged only with the FRY, the KVM was in no position to control the movements of the KLA once Serbian forces had withdrawn (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 57-59). That the agreement had been devised without consultation or even incorporation of the Kosovar side proved to be a major stumbling block for its political provisions. Negotiations under the aegis of US ambassador, Christopher Hill, were based on principles that the Kosovars only partially accepted (Weller 1999a: 349). The diplomatic track struggled to establish a credible and unified Albanian negotiation team. In November and December, several draft peace agreements were presented to the parties but ultimately failed to garner their support (Petritsch et al. 2004: 152-154; Bellamy 2001: 101-109).

By the end of 1998 – and in January 1999 – the security situation in Kosovo had become far more tense. Both sides were engaged in ambushes, deliberate political kidnappings and killings, and brutal attacks against civilians (Bellamy 2001: 112-144). The December report by UN Secretary General Annan noted that “the situation in Kosovo has not significantly improved and there are alarming signs of potential deterioration” (UN Doc. S/1998/1221: §4). Allies confined themselves to condemning the violation of the cease-fire by both sides but refrained from taking action, least to enact NATO’s ACTORD (Department of State 1998). In this atmosphere of growing tension, another massacre happened in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999. Almost under the direct observation of the KVM, Serb paramilitary forces killed 45 civilians. Extensive media coverage of this event generated a public outcry and displayed the futility of previous international efforts (Hendriksen 2007: 161-165). For the transatlantic allies, Racak proved to be a focal point in the search for a new direction of policy. In the case of Washington, the massacre happened amid an ongoing policy review. For the European allies, it became unmistakably clear that the violence had moved to another level. Yet, the allies proposed different policies in response to the massacre.

The United States and Britain argued that Serbian forces had crossed a threshold and that air strikes should be used to punish Milosevic’s decision to attack Racak


The ‘Hill Plan’ envisioned a far-reaching devolution of authorities to the local level. For a detailed discussion of these negotiations, see Bellamy (2001): 108-110; Weller 1999a.
Deliberations in the NSC deputies’ committee foresaw a punishment of Serbian forces and a denigration of their capacities. Politically, air strikes should have been used to restore the “status quo ante plus”: a return to the Hill proposal and partial local implementation (NSC 1999a-e). France and Germany, by contrast, argued that force should not be used to punish one side only. They argued that NATO’s power should be deployed with the aim of formulating clear political objectives that went beyond a restoration of the status quo (Friedrich 2005: 64-72; Duke et al. 2000: 130). Eventually, the Clinton administration agreed to give diplomacy a last chance and was willing to negotiate a more far-reaching interim agreement between the parties (Albright 2003: 474-475; Jurecovik 2000: 56). From a US perspective, this effort took Europeans “at their word, and upped the ante” (Rubin 2000).

On January 29, 1999 the CG met in London to announce the latest strategic consensus: the parties would be invited to Rambouillet in France where peace negotiations should begin on February 6, 1999 and be concluded seven days later. The agreement for Kosovar autonomy should be based on the ‘Hill Plan’ for an interim period. This agreement would have to be accepted by a certain date. In a noteworthy addition to the US plan, sanctions and benefits were stipulated clearly for both parties: only if the Kosovars would sign the agreement, while the Serbs refused to sign the agreement would NATO be prepared to use force (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001:72-74). In conclusion, it can be argued that the United States delayed the use of force to garner European support. The US also agreed to find an interim settlement between the parties that would go beyond the status quo ante.

European allies had successfully demanded that force should not be used to punish Milosevic but to forge a political agreement. While the tactics of negotiations in Rambouillet followed this line, European member states appear to have had little direct influence on them. Ahead of the conference, the CG presented the parties with non-negotiable principles (CG 1999a, 1999b; NAC 1999). The British and French foreign ministers held the symbolic post of co-chairs of the conference, while actual negotiations were largely conducted by the designated CG negotiators: Christopher Hill for the United States, Wolfgang Petritsch for the EU, and Boris Mayorski for Russia. In addition, the US team of legal experts guided much of the substance of the negotiations with their drafts (Weller 1999a).
To wrap up these arguments, the United States went an extra mile diplomatically to gain European support for air strikes and to find a solution. It delayed the use of force in January 1999 and was willing to extend the Rambouillet negotiations despite Serb blockage. At the same time, negotiations were largely US-led and European allies seemed to have had less direct impact on the course of these negotiations.

5.3.3 1999: Operation Allied Force

The collapse of peace talks brought transatlantic allies to another branching point. At the time, “it seemed almost a foregone conclusion that Rambouillet would succeed” (Judah 2000: 197), but the conference was in many ways ill-omened. Weller notes that the parties were far from exhausted militarily and showed no willingness to compromise and come to the bargaining table (Weller 1999a: 250). The Serb delegation had blocked and undermined serious negotiations for most of the time. Even when the United States revised a first draft of the peace agreement to accommodate Serb demands, the Serbs eventually rejected it. By contrast, the Kosovar delegation, which was under immense international pressure, signed the Rambouillet accords on March 18, 1999 (Judah 2000: 197-226; Weller 1999a; Petritsch et al. 2004). With Serb rejection of the peace agreement and the advancement of Serbian forces along Kosovo’s borders, NATO’s credibility was irreversibly on the line. The failure of the Rambouillet conference initiated the next phase of US policy in Kosovo. Operation Allied Force (OAF) started on March 24, 1999 and lasted 78 days until Serbia’s capitulation on June 3, 1999.

In the uniform view of transatlantic allies, Milosevic’s rebuff of the Rambouillet accords necessitated military action. As Secretary General Javier Solana put it: “Let me reiterate we are determined to continue until we achieve our objectives: to halt the violence and stop the further humanitarian catastrophe” (Solana 1999 March). Attacking Serbia under the pretense of humanitarian intervention entailed implicit principles guiding the military conduct of the campaign. For one, avoiding losses among the civilian population was an utmost priority especially to European countries but also to the United States. Second, the limitation of NATO casualties was an implicit, yet overriding concern for all NATO members (Roberts 1999; Gallis 1999; Cordesman 2000: 89-9).

Over the course of the campaign, the US found itself at odds with its European allies over tactics. First, the issue of an escalation of the air war pitted the United States and
Britain against Germany, France, and other European allies. Second, the issue of ground troops divided the supportive British government from the rest of the alliance. Thus, maintaining NATO’s unity came at a price for the United States’ policy. While eventually the course of the campaign followed US thinking, the timing and weight of the air effort were co-determined by European allies. In its evaluation of OAF, the Pentagon paid tribute to the role played by allies. “Admittedly, gaining consensus among 19 democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise. However, the NATO alliance is also our greatest strength. It is true that there were differences of opinion within the alliance. This is to be expected in an alliance of democracies, and building consensus generally leads to sounder decisions” (Cohen/Shelton 1999). European allies exercised considerable influence on the tactical dimension of the use force. Due to resistance, especially by France and Germany, the escalation of the air campaign against Serbia moved slowly and remained within clear limits. In its advocacy of ground troops, however, the UK failed to convince both the United States and its European allies.

Operation Allied Force underwent three different phases in which allied approaches on tactics gradually converged.\(^{110}\)

In a first phase from March 24 to March 27, 1999 allies largely agreed on tactics but their mission failed to achieve the intended results. NATO’s air strikes were aimed at command and control as well as taking out Serbia’s air defenses. The scope of these attacks was quite limited because the United States and its European allies felt confident that a limited bombing operation would be sufficient to bring Milosevic to the bargaining table (Arkin 2001; Naumann 2000; Short 2000). Because of the concerns for collateral damage, the Clinton administration introduced a tight political approval process for individual military targets in which the president personally approved politically sensitive targets involving high casualty rates (Clark 2001: 201; Hendriksen 2007: 22).

\(^{110}\) These phases differ markedly from the original campaign plan that NATO had developed for OAF. Since June 1998, NATO’s structures had reworked its Operations Plan 10601. This graduated air campaign had envisioned three phases depending on the types of targets. In phase 1, NATO planes would denigrate the FRY’s command and control system and establish air superiority. In phase 2, NATO would focus on Serbia’s forces operating in Kosovo and limit their ability to attack the civilian population. In a last phase, attacks would also be flown against targets north of the 44º parallel targeting military and political installations all over the FYR, including in Montenegro and Belgrade (Arkin 2001: 3-4).
Yet, the limited air campaign failed to achieve its objectives. As one observer described it, the attacks “caused no serious inconvenience for the Serbs” (Lambeth 2001: 24) and only 53 targets were actually hit. The limited attacks on Serbian air defenses, airfields, and some of the forces in Kosovo did nothing to prevent ethnic cleansing or the forceful expulsion of Kosovar Albanians. While the Yugoslav army secured certain regions, paramilitary units were responsible for deliberate killings and shootings (Judah 2001: 240-249). “Having justified its attack on Yugoslavia as necessary to halt the campaign of ethnic cleansing, NATO found itself conducting air operations largely irrelevant to that purpose” (Arkin 2001: 9). As the allies assumed that the campaign would come to a fast conclusion, there was neither consensus nor a campaign plan for a situation in which hostilities were to last longer than 48 hours (Arkin 2001: 5; Naumann 2000). The failure of initial strikes caught NATO leaders off guard.

As a reaction, a second phase lasting from late March to NATO’s Washington Summit on 23 April, 1999 entailed a gradual escalation of the air campaign. During this phase, tensions between the US and allies increased. European allies managed to restrain Washington from an early escalation of the air war. The political and military leadership in the United States had become more supportive of ‘strategic’ air strikes (Clark 2001: 225; 235-237). Such strikes rested on the assumption that the center of gravity for Milosevic was less with forces in Kosovo and more in Belgrade itself. Attacks would be aimed at central civilian and military infrastructure along with Serbian political headquarters. Such strikes were associated with greater risks for pilots as well as extensive collateral damage (Leurdijk 2001: 79; Lamb 2002). Secretary of Defense Cohen and President Clinton pushed for the approval of other alliance leaders to no avail: “We tried to be as aggressive as we could in trying to move as quickly as we can to get these various targets. But it was hard to get that consensus [in NATO] until after the summit” (Cohen 2000). As a consequence, strikes on strategic targets during this phase remained limited in number and scope (Lamb 2002: 13).

European allies did not completely forestall an escalation of the bombing campaign. By the beginning of April, allies had agreed to strike targets from phase 3 without formally deciding that OAF had progressed to that stage. Only selected targets were chosen in what became known as “phase 2 plus” (see Arkin 2001: 10—12; Clark 2001: 223-224); NATO targeted bridges across the Danube and oil refineries (Lambeth 2001: 32).
While efforts to restrain a broadening of the air war were successful, British calls to gear US war efforts towards sending ground troops were unsuccessful. Ahead of NATO’s summit, Prime Minister Blair had failed to convince the Clinton administration of the need for a ground invasion (Hodge 2006: 163; Richardson 2000: 149).

NATO was unable to strike significant successes against Serbia’s forces for a number of reasons. Bad weather had hampered NATO’s pilots as had Serbian tactics: military equipment and personnel were easy to conceal and in the open civilian infrastructure was being used as a shield (Cordesman 2000: 118). In order to avert NATO and civilian casualties, NATO’s rules of engagement permitted planes to fly only above 15,000 feet and prohibited air strikes near civilian infrastructure (Roberts 1999: 22). However, these rules rendered NATO aircraft almost incapable of inflicting severe damage on Serbian forces. The campaign was “insufficient to accomplish the desired end. And hanging together in a losing effort was no great virtue” (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 136). Internal differences and the timid approach to the war brought NATO to the brink of defeat.

In a third and final phase, the United States and Britain convinced reluctant European allies of the need to expand the air effort. Still, its implementation was delayed until late May. With the imminent failure of the war in sight, NATO’s 50th anniversary summit between April 23 and 25, 1999, which was held in Washington, was a turning point. Given the apparent internal differences within NATO, and Washington’s refusal to send ground troops, Milosevic had always believed that he could divide allies and wait out the war.112 The summit was to prove him wrong. NATO’s leaders decided “we will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail” (NAC 1999c). Given the stalemate on the ground, a further escalation was the consequence of this renewed sense of purpose. In the immediate aftermath of the summit, NATO’s tactical air strikes finally began to have some impact.113 Furthermore, NATO began striking strategic targets that had previously been spared, such as the Belgrade power grid and industrial infrastructure in late May (Lambeth 2001: 39-41; 53-54; Cordesman 2000).

112 Interview with General Klaus Naumann, November 2, 2012.
113 This had less to do with the decisions taken in Washington by allies and more with the weather and increasingly sophisticated efforts by the KLA. Clear skies facilitated the identification of targets and the strengthened KLA drove Serbian forces out of their positions.
Even with these additional strikes, capitulation by the FRY did not seem imminent. Hence, the third phase saw an increased discussion over and planning for an eventual deployment of ground troops. Initially, Clinton stated he had “no intentions to put our forces into Kosovo to fight a war” (Clinton 1999) owing to the lacking of support from both reluctant allies and a skeptical congress (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 130-135). Military estimates acted on the assumption that a decision on deployment would have to be made by early June to have troops in and out of Kosovo before the harsh winter in the Balkans (Clark 2001: 285). Loose planning for such an operation took place in three channels: a secret NATO channel, an informal US planning cycle, and a British planning channel (Clark 2001: 252; 299-301; Cordesman 2000: 229-230; Lambeth 2001: 38-43). Before a decision on the forced entry of NATO troops could be made, Milosevic capitulated in light of the increasing attacks on his country on June 2, 1999. NATO officials, of course, praised air power as having forced Serbia’s capitulation. Many commentators, however, have argued that the implicit threat of a ground invasion caused a change in Milosevic’s calculus (Cordesman 2000: 229; Lake 2009; Byman/Waxman 2000). On June 3, NATO concluded a military-to-military agreement with the FRY and terminated Operation Allied Force on June 9, 1999.

European allies influenced tactical decisions to varying degrees. In the second and third phase, France and to a lesser extent Germany were able to restrain the escalation of the air campaign, which had been particularly advocated by the Pentagon. In its advocacy of the deployment of ground troops, the British government had failed to convince the Clinton administration in the first two phases of the war but British arguments gained some traction in Washington during the final phase of the mission.

5.3.4 1999: Force backed by Diplomacy

Madeleine Albright described Operation Allied Force as “force backed by diplomacy” (in Clark 2001: 253). In parallel to ongoing military actions, transatlantic allies struggled to define concrete political objectives for the bombing campaign.

As General Naumann put it, OAF’s ultimate goal was diplomatic as its “aim was to bring him [Milosevic] back to the negotiation table. […] Our politicians wanted to use the military instrument to more or less convince him that it’s better to continue to negotiate and to seek a peaceful solution” (Naumann 2000). However, initially OAF
took place in a diplomatic wasteland. Transatlantic allies formulated their political goals in remarkably vague terms.
The Clinton administration outlined three objectives: to demonstrate NATO’s unity and determination, to deter Milosevic from pursuing policies of ethnic cleansing, and to damage his capabilities to do so (Clinton 1999). Tony Blair emphasized the quest for substantial Albanian autonomy, whereas Chirac pointed to the imminence of the humanitarian tragedy. In contrast, the German government appeared most eager to define palpable political demands and conditions under which the bombing would stop and negotiations could be resumed. Initially, Bonn had called for a halt to the violence and the return to the Rambouillet agreement (see Auerswald/Auerswald 2001: 719-725).
The redefinition of NATO’s political objectives became all the more important when the first phase of OAF failed to prevent a mass expulsion of Kosovo’s Albanian population. To a certain extent, these events rendered the Rambouillet accords unacceptable to the Kosovars as the accords had foreseen a significant Serbian police and army presence. Could Albanians be asked to live with and under the control of their former tormentors? Moreover, if the intervention could not stop the killing what was NATO’s justification for pursuing the bombing campaign? Defining the political end-state of the war, thus, quickly became a subject of negotiations among allies. Coming to terms with the political dimension of the use of force took place in three separate but intertwined tracks.
First, the ‘alliance track’ can be described as the effort among transatlantic allies to redefine the political purpose of bombing as well as the concrete procedures to terminate the war. In practice, NATO needed to reformulate the terms it was stipulating to Milosevic for an end to the bombing campaign. Furthermore, allies were searching for an approach to the future governance of Kosovo and asking how such an approach could be legitimized internationally. Both in the context of the CG and NATO, the German government played a leading role in defining such a political end-state and in binding the Clinton administration to specific commitments.
From April 3 to April 6, 1999, transatlantic allies rolled out the framework of the diplomatic end-game strategy. Based on a German initiative, European CG states clarified their core demands on the FRY: a verifiable return of refugees, while Serb forces would have to leave; an international security presence to secure the settlement and the commencement of talks on a political settlement based on the Rambouillet
accords (Department of State 1999; Albright et al. 1999). During NATO’s Washington summit, three important aspects were added to these demands. Transatlantic allies envisioned the establishment of an “international provisional administration” to govern Kosovo and secure its autonomy. On the procedures of terminating the war, NATO declared its demands would not be subject to negotiations by Belgrade, hence a peace by diktat. At the same time, allies agreed to seek a UN Security Council resolution to impose the deal on the FRY (NAC 1999b, 1999c). As shown below, the German government had an important effect on US decision-making at the time in that it focused discussions on tangible political goals and processes.

The second track is best described as the ‘Russia track’. Again, the Schröder government nudged the United States into reinforcing negotiations with Russia over Kosovo. However, to a certain extent Bonn pushed doors that were already open in Washington. By late April 1999, all allies had recognized the need to engage with Russia for three reasons. First, the Kosovo campaign had caused alienation between Russia and the West. Russia had harshly criticized the bombing campaign, had left the CG, and at times working-level diplomatic contacts had broken down. Russians drew an analogy between Kosovo and their own problems in Chechnya. “Kosovo, in short, was shaping up to be a substantiation of all the Russian’s reasons for fearing NATO and opposing its expansion” (Talbott 2003: 309). Second, Russian support for an eventual political solution was essential if pressure was to be placed on Milosevic. If Milosevic had no reason to believe he could rely on Russia’s military or diplomatic support, his increasing isolation would change his calculations. Third, Russia was needed to find a solution to the war under the auspices of the United Nations; only with Russian consent would a future settlement in Kosovo receive the blessing of the international community as a whole (Segbers/Zürcher 2000; Gobarev 1999).

Since NATO displayed unity during its Washington summit, Russia was looking to escape from its isolated position. Given Russia’s dire economic situation, Yeltsin had no interest in breaking relations with the West over Kosovo completely (Talbott 2003). How did European allies have an impact on US policy towards negotiations with Russia? Clearly, there is a mixed record. On the one hand, direct negotiations with the Russian government on the terms of Serbia’s capitulation and the implementation of a NATO military presence were conducted largely in bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russia (Talbott 2003). On the other hand,
the German government instigated these negotiations and together with the British played an important role in the G8, where the terms of a UN Security Council resolution were pre-negotiated between the West and the Russian government. On May 6, the foreign ministers from the G8 countries agreed on principles guiding the search for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis. It is within G8 talks on June 8, 1999 that UN Resolution 1244 was negotiated, the resolution that finally terminated the war against the FYR on June 10, 1999.

The third track of the diplomatic endgame can be called the ‘Serbian track’. A troika consisting of an EU, a US, and a Russian envoy delivered the terms to the Serbian government. Amid increased discussions and preparations for a NATO ground deployment, US envoy, Strobe Talbott, and his counterpart, Victor Chernomyrdin, agreed on the conditions for Serbian capitulation. These conditions were brought to Milosevic by the Russian and European envoy to the troika in what Chernomyrdin called the “hammer and anvil” strategy114 (Talbott 2003: 307-309). Faced with international isolation, an increasingly capable KLA, and the specter of a full-scale invasion of his country, Milosevic accepted the terms delivered by Chernomyrdin and Atthisaari on June 3, 1999.

Assessing the impact of European allies on US decision-making in this final phase of the Kosovo intervention remains difficult. At the same time, decision-making between transatlantic allies does not appear to have been plagued by particularly deep divisions. In contrast, the main negotiations to end the intervention took place in the context of the “Russia track”. Here, the palpable input of individual allies is spurious as is the extent of the mediating role that the EU envoy, Matthi Atthisaari, played for his US and Russian counterparts. Still, as section 5.4.2 highlights, Germany is widely credited with taking much of the diplomatic initiative.

5.4 Alliance Politics: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking

European influence on US policies in Kosovo mainly varied depending on the dimension of military intervention under consideration. The United States supported by the UK prevailed in its principal support for military action over skeptics such as France and Germany. All three European allies, though to different degrees, had an

114 The Russian envoy Chernomyrdin coined this phrase when he hinted at Russia’s consent in principle to pressure Serbia into agreement. While Chernomyrdin would be the “hammer,” Atthisaari would join him as the “anvil”. This double strategy would divert domestic pressure from the Russian mediator.
impact on the political and tactical decisions during the US military intervention in Kosovo. In this section, I turn to the strategies of allied influence-seeking with regard to each dimension (5.4.1-5.4.3).

5.4.1 The Limits of Persuasion: US Pressure and the Principal Decision to Use Force

With regard to the principal decision to use force, European allies used strategies based on the power of persuasion to influence US policy-making. In general, it can be observed that the ‘Bosnia syndrome’ had an impact on the choice of strategies. Since transatlantic allies wanted to avoid a public fall-out over Kosovo, shaming and de-legitimization were less prevalent. Instead, decision-making took place behind closed doors. Indeed, consultation as co-determination was a prevalent strategy for all three European allies in an effort to jointly determine their interests in Kosovo. In March 1998, the UK called for the revival of the Contact Group so that the West and Russia could develop a joint position on Kosovo. One of the lessons European allies drew from Bosnia was that timely consultation with Washington ensured more effective crisis management (Bellamy 2001: 69; Hendriksen 2007: 89-123). Informal consultations in the Quint\(^{115}\) were most important in that regard: “Consultative processes in this case are usually concentric circles with a core group, a larger group, and then the next somewhat larger group. […] There would first be a consultation amongst the Quint as to what one wanted from other international institutions. And then the institutions were put into play on the basis of a concerted view among the major, most influential countries as to what they wanted these major institutions to do.”\(^{116}\)

Such consultations took place frequently, on high political levels, and in various institutional formats: the Contact Group’s political directors met monthly to discuss Kosovo in addition to meetings at the expert and ambassadorial level. Importantly, foreign ministers involved in the CG met eight times during this period to make decisions at the highest political levels. These consultations were flanked by bilateral visits and consultations in NATO.\(^{117}\)

\(^{115}\) The participating states are the United States, Germany, France, Britain, and Italy.

\(^{116}\) Interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, February 7, 2011.

In spring and summer 1998, these consultations had two important effects on US policy-making. First, transatlantic allies had consulted each other before they defined their interests and, hence, before they came to jointly define their general goals in Kosovo: the violence in Kosovo was portrayed as a humanitarian disaster and a refugee crisis. The United States and its European counterparts concurred that war in Kosovo was central to allied security because of its destabilizing potential for the region. The Kosovo conflict was framed as a test case for the future of European security, more generally. Both the European Union and NATO were in transformation at the time and the latter was still in search for a renewed purpose. Allied leaders argued that a successful resolution of the Kosovo conflict would be a litmus test for the future role of NATO in European security and stability (Duke et al. 2000; Philips 2012: 89-90; Butler 2000; Bellamy 2001: 67-69; CG 1998a, 1998c; NAC 1998).118 That allied leaders consistently used these interests as a justification for their action in Kosovo indicates the success of consultations and co-determination.

Second, prior to September 1998 France’s and Germany’s opposition to air strikes played an important role in internal US deliberations. In early summer 1998, the US State Department called for a unilateral air campaign if necessary or for intervention with a coalition of the willing (Hendriksen 2007: 134-135). In the end, the Pentagon, and Sandy Berger as national security advisor, prevailed. They argued that any unilateral effort would undermine NATO, hence, the very reason behind US engagement (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 30; Cohen 2000; Berger 2000): “The idea of us using force over the objection of allies […] is just fantasy-land. Allies do not do that to each other” (official in Hendriksen 2007: 135). In conclusion, frequent consultations in spring and summer 1998 informed the definition of the transatlantic allies’ goals. Up until that point, US decision-making had tipped in favor of the more reluctant allies. This changed in September 1998, however, as the argument of the more hawkish State Department and the British gained ground. The Serb summer offensive benefited those inside and outside the administration arguing for the use of force. A trans-governmental coalition, including the US Secretary of State, General Clark (as NATO SACEUR and head of US European Command), and the British Prime Minister championed the idea that Milosevic would only budge once he faced

118 Interview with James Dobbins February 7, 2011.
immediate NATO attack. This trans-governmental coalition successfully lobbied for more resolute action through US channels (Richardson 2000: Leurdijk 2001: 64; Albright 2003: 468-470; Halberstam 2001: 399; Clark 2001: 128-136).\textsuperscript{119} Yet, there were clear limits to the power of persuasion: neither close trans-governmental cooperation nor constant consultation ensured that the United States gave into European demands to seek explicit Security Council authorization for the intervention.

The previous chapter argued that allies brought up the issue of a UN mandate for intervention in Kosovo in informal consultations in an effort to convince the US of the necessity of such intervention. The British government did not only bet on the power of persuasion but also sought to bind the US with the help of institutional rules. Thus, it sought to use its position as a leading member of the UN Security Council when in June 1998 it drafted a resolution authorizing “all necessary measures” (Petritsch et al. 2004: 122). Apparently, this resolution never made it to the UN’s floor due to US and Russian opposition (Albright 2003: 465). Instead, the UK eventually presented the draft of UN resolution 1199, which garnered US and international support. In the end, the Blair government failed to convince the United States that action could not be taken without an explicit mandate from the UN. The United States sought to “counter allied strategies seeking a further United Nations Security Council resolution specifically authorizing force” (NSC 1998 Oct.). Albright reportedly told her British counterparts “to get new lawyers” instead of insisting upon a UN resolution (Rubin 2000). Instead of building a robust consensus in close consultations, there were open divisions among the allies. In contrast to the US position, German and French officials had drawn a red line on the legal basis of military action.\textsuperscript{120} Several accounts claim that the final decision in favor of NATO action was only possible because immense pressure had been brought to bear on the new German government (Joetze 2001). Foreign Minister Fischer reported that his government had been given “15 minutes to decide about war and peace” (in Hofmann 1999: 5).

Once again, the United Kingdom proves to be the exception in this case. The British formulated and supported UN resolution 1199, which served as both the political

\textsuperscript{119} Interview with James O’Brien February 21, 2011.
narrative and the legal interpretation to justify NATO action (Bellamy 2001: 88; Roberts 1999: 106). The British resolution had built “a bridge with their arguments on which the rest of the NATO alliance could walk across together” (General Naumann in Hendriksen 2007: 149). Tony Blair was the most outspoken advocate of the principle of humanitarian intervention as a basis for NATO’s action in Kosovo. Clinton concurred with Blair’s analysis that instability and humanitarian crisis posed a threat to Western security at large: “Most of us have this vision of a twenty-first-century world with the triumph of peace and prosperity and personal freedom, with the respect for the integrity of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities […]. This vision, ironically, is threatened by the oldest demon of human society – our vulnerability to hatred of the other. In the face of that, we cannot be indifferent at home and abroad. That is why we are in Kosovo” (Clinton in Chollet/Goldgeier 2008: 213). For the red-green German government, the reference to the moral duty of preventing ethnic cleansing and to acting against gross human rights violations was the essential ingredient in garnering support among its pacifist supporters and the wider skeptical German public (Maull 2000; Hyde-Price 2001). After a ten-hour session of the NAC, the secretary general concluded that there was sufficient legal basis for military action (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 45). This face-saving solution could be enacted only because reluctant allies converged on the rationale of humanitarian intervention and, hence, did not use their veto power either in the UN or within NATO. Ultimately then, European allies’ power of persuasion had an impact on how interests were defined across the Atlantic. The United States and the UK successfully pushed other allies into threatening Milosevic with a NATO ACTORD. The UK played a special role since its support strengthened those in the United States calling for military action. Furthermore, the UK crafted the Alliance’s compromise on the legal justification for war.

5.4.2 The Power of Persuasion and Voice Opportunities: The Political Dimension

In October 1998, the United States pressured its allies into issuing NATO’s threat to start a bombing campaign. Nonetheless, this chapter argues that European input remained relevant to the political dimension of US policy-making both ahead of and during OAF. In January 1999, European allies used close consultation as co-determination to delay the US use of force against Serbia and to clarify its political goals. Because the
credibility of NATO was one of the main driving forces behind US policy and because NATO had made no final decision on the use of force by the fall, allies were able to shape the answer to the Racak massacre. This event led some in the US administration to favor punitive strikes against Serbia; in addition, US senior diplomats had been skeptical of another attempt to find a negotiated settlement since the parties had proven obstinate to a solution (Hendriksen 2007: 167; Holbrooke 2000). The position of European allies played an important role in internal US deliberations between January 15 and January 19, 1999 during which Albright traveled to Europe to rally support for the plans of the US. During these consultations, Europeans demanded that the use of force must be linked closely to a clear political strategy and objective: “If it was going to end up in military intervention, it was important to show that we had exhausted the diplomatic track. And it was also important to show that any form of military action would be in service of an eventual political settlement. […] The idea of Rambouillet was a European idea.”

Furthermore, seeking Russian acquiescence for air strikes and Russian assurances that NATO-Russia relations would not be spoiled irreparably was essential in gaining European agreement. Secretary Albright successfully gained tacit Russian support on a bilateral trip to Moscow (Albright 2003: 476-480; Rubin 2000; Clark 2000: 162).

The eventual strategy of having a last-ditch diplomatic effort that was less guided by the idea of punishing Serbia but rather by using force to gain political concessions from both, the Serbs and the KLA. It required the United States give up some of its bias towards the Kosovar Albanians. Once Rambouillet failed, it provided a convincing rationale for military action to which European allies stuck until the end of OAF.

Strategies of consultation as co-determination remained an essential tool for European allies to determine the political solution to the war. During the entire duration of OAF, the foreign ministers of the Quint coordinated their positions through daily telephone conferences. Within the framework of these consultations, the German government set out to forge consensus on a new peace initiative. A first German informal paper formulated three concrete demands on the FRY: an immediate halt to hostilities and the withdrawal of Serbian policy and military units; the safe return of all refugees, and an immediate start of negotiations on the basis of the

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121 Interview with Ambassador Christopher Hill, November 7, 2012.
122 Interview with James O’Brien, February 22, 2011.
Rambouillet agreement (Joetze 2000: 100). Hence, Germany was able to influence the way in which peace was achieved: “Fischer who had this firebrand reputation – he was enormously important in catalyzing agreement among the allies because he was very smart and he could discern where the agreement was.”

The German government further used binding in its capacity as president of the G8 and the EU at the time. After having presented its road map to the CG, the German government used its agenda-setting power to find backing for the initiative within the EU. At an extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of EU states on April 8, 1999 the European Union endorsed the five demands that Serbia would have to fulfill to stop the bombing campaign (EU C/99/94; Jurekovic 2000: 63-65). Since Russia had left the Contact Group, the West needed an alternative forum to include the Russians in negotiations. Some German diplomats claimed that it was their idea to use the G8 as a “camouflaged Contact Group” (Friedrich 2005: 102). Indeed, the so-called Fischer plan presented on April 10, 1999 to the Quint entailed further procedural elements – finding agreement with Russia in the G8 and ending the war through a UN Security Council resolution (Joetze 2001: 106; Friedrich 2005: 103). It is difficult to ascertain whether the G8 idea has indisputably German roots since Russian and US diplomats also claim to have used every possible institutional channel to restart negotiations (Talbott 2003: 315-318).

Still, Madeleine Albright acknowledged Fischer’s role calling him “an unexpected and, thus, very important ally” whose proposal was adopted by NATO only with “minor revisions” (Albright 2003: 496). I thus conclude that Germany did have an impact in steering the direction of US policy in the political dimension.  

5.4.3 The Power of Voice Opportunities and Issue-specific Power: the Tactical Dimension

In their efforts to restrain the United States during the course of Operation Allied Force, European allies resorted to strategies based on their specific voice opportunities within NATO and the issue-specific power they brought to operations.

123 Interview with James O’Brien; Interview with Strobe Talbott February 10, 2011.
124 The US rejected the concept of a bombing pause. Additionally, within the G8 process, the UK played an important role in finding a wording for the final UN resolution to which Russia and the US could agree (Joetze 2001).
NATO’s rules and procedures granted European allies voice opportunities, which the latter used to bind and block US policy proposals during the planning as well as the implementation of the mission.

First and with regard to planning, NATO’s standing procedures and rules enabled allies to bind the US as they since according to the institution’s rules allies could restrict the selection of military options on which OAF was based. Because allies, and the US in particular, had framed Kosovo as a test case for NATO, its rules became ever more influential: “Once having decided to threaten force in fall 1998 via NATO, the US could not make that threat as clearly credibly given the lack of consensus in NATO to make it operational” (Kay 2004: 259). In June 1998, NATO’s defense ministers tasked military authorities with developing “a full range of options with the mission […] of halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression and expulsion in Kosovo […].” (NATO 1998b). The Military Chairman, General Klaus Naumann, presented these options to the NAC in July and August ranging from preventive options, to traditional peacekeeping, to forced entry options with ground troops linked and an air campaign (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 33-34). According to various sources, European allies were the main driving force in excluding a further study of forced entry options against the FRY’s agreement. Because within the NAC decisions are made by consensus, European allies ensured that only the preventive options and the limited air campaign were discussed in further detail (Clark 2001: 133; Hendriksen 2007: 145; Kay 2004).

Precluding the preparation for certain military options had two effects on US policy. For one, it strengthened those in the administration arguing in favor of the likely success of a limited air campaign and fortified the overall approach of gradualism within the Kosovo campaign. Further, it left NATO somewhat unprepared for a situation in which limited airpower would not coerce Milosevic to return to the bargaining table. A US decision to react to this with an escalation involving ground troops rather than expanding the gradual air campaign would have been potentially costly for the credibility and cohesion of NATO. Either the Clinton administration would have had to break NATO consensus by pushing and planning for ground troops or renegotiate military scenarios with the allies.

Second and during the actual implementation of OAF, European allies used the established command and control procedures to block the US from rapidly escalating the air campaign. In its review of OAF, the Pentagon acknowledges that its command
structure only partially built on existing NATO procedures, developed ad hoc in order
to meet military requirements, and was complicated by parallel US and NATO efforts
(Cohen/Shelton 1999). Two characteristics of this command structure stand out (see
Table 7). First, the United States maintained a separate command for its forces
arguing that allies lacked sufficiently safe communications (Peters et al. 2001: 56).
Second, in an effort to streamline its decision-making, allies delegated their authority
for the selection of targets to NATO’s Secretary General Solana. The NAC would
only make an explicit decision when the campaign should move into the next phase
with new types of targets (Henriksen 2007: 24-26; Lambeth 2001: 25). From this
formal arrangement, it could be concluded that the United States was fairly
independent in its mission and that direct political authority over tactical decisions
remained limited. However, the actual practice of these procedures rightly earned
OAF the title of a “war by committee” and provided ample room for allies to restrain
the United States.
How did decision-making during the mission work? Because OAF was an air campaign, targeting became the center of political attention and attempted control. In a primarily US-driven effort, targets were selected for the air campaign in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza (Clark 2001: 201; Lambeth 2001: 27). The commanding general presented target sets for review in US and NATO channels on a daily basis. In these reviews, allies separately reassessed the potential collateral damage, risk of casualties, and other political concerns.
In the case of NATO, this meant Solana and Naumann would brief the NAC on the overall conduct of operations and, if necessary, report their reactions back to Clark. However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that all 19 NATO allies influenced this process equally, as the principle of equality of NATO members would suggest. Important decisions were made by a directoire limited to the United States, France, and Britain: “After the internal military review, the target approval process passed through the White House, the British prime minister’s office and the French presidential administration.” In a wider circle, the process involved military officials and diplomats engaged in the Quint, the defense ministers, and the chiefs of staff (Hendriksen 2007: 21; Cordesman 2000).

Through this chain of command, France and Britain in particular, exerted considerable influence on the campaign by blocking targets. The unwritten codicils for decision-making gave allies an effective tool to constrain the way in which force was used by NATO and the United States. Despite the parallel command structure, US planes rarely hit targets that had previously been disapproved of by major European allies (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 121). The French government played the leading skeptic and made the widest use of its veto power. On strategic and domestic grounds, the French opposed strategic strikes against Belgrade until late in the operation. Strategically, French officers argued that Milosevic would give in only if he had something to lose; moreover, the French sought to spare Montenegro (Clark 2001: 256; Fortmann/Viau 2000; Ignatieff 1999). Domestically, Paris was particularly concerned with the negative backlash associated with high civilian casualties. However, “as a result of the summit, Washington had become even more active on the targeting issue bearing down on the French reluctance to strike the electrical power grid. By April 28 there were again rumblings in Washington to strike the electrical grid regardless of the opinion of other nations. I hoped not” (Clark 2001: 274). Accounts consistently claim that due to French resistance, NATO attacked Belgrade’s infrastructure and civilian buildings late in the campaign and only with utmost care (Clark 2001: 352-355; Arkin 2001: 16). At this point, there can be no complete overall assessment on which allies blocked which targets. There is, however, overwhelming evidence in the literature that other

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125 “Target Selection Was Long Process,” Washington Post, September 20, 1999. Germany reportedly was less eager to determine decision-making on targets and remained overall less successful in claiming such an influence at a later stage (Friedrich 2005: 90).

allies – including the Germans, Dutch, and occasionally the British – vetoed strategic strikes in Belgrade, the attack against crucial bridges, or attacks against military infrastructure with a high propensity towards many casualties (Ignatieff 1999; Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 121-125). Secretary of Defense Cohen has pointedly admitted the huge effect of these rounds of coordination: “Acting unilaterally, I would say that’s precisely the kind of air campaign that you’d want – hit fast and hard, and cripple Milosevic’s forces as soon as possible. The difference here, of course, is that we’re acting as an alliance” (Cohen 2000).

OAF has generally received negative reviews in the literature. NATO had been insufficiently prepared for the mission, had been guided by naïve assumptions, and due to the huge military discrepancies between allies and the complicated chain of command, NATO as an institution did not lower the transaction costs for waging war (Hendriksen 2007; Kay 2004). From the perspective of allied influence, however, NATO’s rules and procedures provided European allies with ample possibilities to restrain the United States. I argue that this effect of allied influence was reinforced by the issue-specific power that allies brought to OAF. The issue-specific power argument holds that allies can gain leverage over tactical decisions because they command valuable military assets. Attaching conditions to the use of military assets ensured European influence over the targeting process in the air-campaign and the deployment of a US peacekeeping mission. There is evidence on the importance of European influence on the debate of a ground invasion but it remains inconclusive.

With regard to the air campaign, European allies had chosen a strategy of contributing both militarily and economically to the endeavor. Operation Allied Force revealed major European military deficiencies and, accordingly, the burden of the campaign was shared highly unevenly. The United States shouldered the major effort. While thirteen European countries provided up to 327 planes, the US contributed 650 planes. Europeans and the US contributed to the long-term costs of economic reconstruction within the Balkan Stability Pact. It seems that this measure was the least divisive of all and hence is not further considered. Apart from these specifics, Europeans, it was agreed, would shoulder the majority of the burden of reconstruction and that gave them some form of general clout. Interview with Daniel Hamilton, February 17, 2011; Joetze (2001), pp. 173-182. Ahead of OAF, allies had significantly contributed troops to Operation Determined Falcon and to the stabilizing missions in neighboring Macedonia and Albania, see Fact Sheet Operation Determined Falcon <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-080e.htm/> [last accessed November 30, 2012].
aircraft and most of the precision-guided weaponry. Sixty percent of all sorties were flown by US airplanes; significant European deficiencies in intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications became apparent during the operation (Lambeth 2001: 166-170; Gallis 1999: 15; Peters at al. 2000: 53-68). According to estimates at the time, due to the costs of providing the aircraft, US spending on the operation ran to US$2 billion compared to only US$1 billion for its NATO allies (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 238).

Although European contributions were dwarfed by those of the United States, they were still of military value. France, for example, was the largest European contributor in terms of aircraft and sorties. French aircraft flew important supportive missions as well as strike sorties (Fortmann/Viau 2000: 98; Cordesman 2000: 37). The restrictive rules of engagement necessitated attacks with precision-guided munitions; only Britain and France could contribute to such strike sorties (Cordesman 2000: 43). The UK, as the second largest European contributor, also shouldered 80% of European air refueling capacities. Germany deployed aircraft for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and reconnaissance missions as well as reconnaissance drones. Germany and the UK belonged to the six countries in which US aircraft were based during the Kosovo war (Peters et al. 2000: 18-25). In addition, allies also contributed valuably to the overall performance by flying combat air control and SEAD missions (Peters et al. 2000: 28-32). Most importantly, apart from US stealth aircraft all forces were based in European member states. Cordesman concludes that “one central fact is clear, the war was truly an allied operation. The US could not have begun serious air operations without access to European air bases and the support of all the NATO countries” (Cordesman 2000: 60). Hence, these contributions alleviated some of the burden from the United States. Allies were able to capitalize on these contributions by attaching conditions to their use. These restrictions caused the conduct of OAF to deviate from traditional US air force doctrine. The cooperation with allies prevented the US air force from banking on its advantages in speedy and continuous operations and its overwhelming level of force. Most importantly, NATO and US forces operated under strict rules of engagement: allied aircraft flew at medium altitudes only, hence above 15,000 feet, due to the high casualty aversion among allies (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 122; Gallis

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128 Fact Sheet “Operation Allied Force” US Department of Defense, June 21, 1999
In addition, individual allies placed special caveats on the use of their forces. Each of the European contributing nations retained national control over the targets attacked by its aircraft (Peters et al. 2000: 26). In addition, the British demanded and were granted a say over the strikes flown by US B-52 bombers starting from British bases (Short 2000). These rules of engagement had two effects on the implementation of NATO’s gradual approach to the air campaign. For one, they made the process of target approval harder for the commanding general and, second, they meant that aircraft would not necessarily be used as effectively and efficiently as they could have been. Such decisions either delayed strike packages or meant that the United States had to fly particular attacks alone.

Issue-specific power played a crucial role in determining the US peacekeeping role in Kosovo. Due to resistance in congress, the Pentagon had refused to commit any troops to such a mission until January 1999. European allies reacted to these statements with a contributing strategy. Britain had pledged to send up to 13,000 peacekeepers to KFOR, Germany up to 8,000 soldiers, and France 7,000 troops. However, these contributions were clearly tied to equal commitments by Washington. The magnitude of the European peacekeeping role would depend on the willingness of the US to deploy troops to the theater as well. However, behind closed doors, US officials are said to have committed their own peacekeeping troops ahead of the conference in Rambouillet (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 74). In 2001, the French provided the largest contingent to KFOR, followed by the US and Germany on almost equal levels and then followed by Britain (Cimbala/Forster 2005: 140).

It is clear that European allies have used their issue-specific power when it came to the debate about ground troops as well. The effect of these strategies, however, remains inconclusive not least because the Clinton administration never formally decided whether to deploy ground troops. The German government balked on the idea of a ground invasion since Schröder feared intense domestic opposition to such a deployment (Hyde-Price 2001: 112; Miskimmon 2009: 565; Rudolf 2000: 138). Macleod notes that the French government publicly denounced the deployment of ground troops while at the same time debating it internally. Daalder and O’Hanlon

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suggest that in the event of an invasion, France would have signaled its preparation to send troops (Macleod 2000: 122; Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 158).

On the contrary, the British government had been the only ardent advocate of ground troops. The UK had forged a *trans-governmental coalition* with US General Clark. Blair had given General Clarke political backing to pursue secret planning on an option for ground troops and to lobby for such a deployment within the US chain of command (Clark 2001: 252-254; 260-264; Arkin 2001: 16-17; Byman/Waxman 2000: 24). Ahead of NATO’s Washington Summit and amid NATO’s apparent failure, Blair personally and publicly raised the stakes of not intervening with the full spectrum of NATO’s force. In a widely recognized speech in Chicago, Blair stated: “Just as I believe there was no alternative to military action, now it has started I am convinced there is no alternative to continuing until we succeed” (Blair 1999). Although NATO never formally planned for a ground invasion, Daalder and O’Hanlon claim that “Blair’s continued and dogged lobbying to join him in promoting such a strategy were important” in moving Washington towards plans for a ground invasion (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000: 141; 156-157). At a crucial, secret meeting of defense ministers in late May 1999, the UK pledged to commit about one-third of the necessary troops (Bellamy 2001: 207; Joetze 2001: 132). As only the US, France, and Britain commanded forces capable of undertaking such an invasion, the British strategy of contribution considerably upped the ante. Some observers have suggested that while an official decision had not been made before capitulation, the British lobbying for an invasion had had a positive effect on the administration (Leurdijk 2001: 90-92; Daalder/O’Hanlon 2000:155-161; Blair 2000).  

In the preceding sections on strategies of allied influence, I argued that invoking the power of persuasion did not prevent the United States from pressuring its reluctant European allies into threatening force without a UN mandate. However, close consultations and institutional avenues ensured European influence on the political dimension of the use of force. Lastly, NATO’s rules and allied issue-specific power were exploited successfully by European allies to restrain the United States’ pursuit of Operation Allied Force.

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130 In an interview with the author, General Klaus Naumann confirmed that the British plea for a more public planning of a ground invasion created an implicit threat to Milosevic. It is likely that this threat was central to Milosevic’s decision to capitulate. Interview with Naumann, November 2, 2012; see also Cordesman (2000) and Byman/Waxman (2000).
5.5 The Conditions for Allied Influence

The unity of the US domestic political scene and the degree of unity among European allies help explain the varying degrees of success in European influence-seeking. I argue that the intensity of threat perception, by contrast, provides a less plausible explanation for this variance.

5.5.1 The Unity of US Domestic Politics

The US domestic scene and the unity within an administration and between a government and the wider public sphere, public opinion and congress helps explain the mixed picture when it comes to allied influence over the principal decision to use force.

I claimed above that the British government, with its ardent support for military action, benefitted from existing differences in the US domestic scene and built influential trans-governmental ties from spring to late summer 1998. Initially, the US administration had been internally divided as to the right course of action. Whereas the Pentagon and national security advisor Berger remained opposed to military action, the State Department had consistently argued for the use of force.

The Pentagon had been quite skeptical of yet another peacekeeping deployment. The military doubted the strategic importance of Kosovo when compared to other potential US commitments. Because of the immense costs associated with military post-conflict resolution and the debate about budget cuts and the post-Cold War restructuring of the military, the issue of priority setting had become even more acute.

Within the US military, the so-called ‘Powell Doctrine’ was still regarded as a valid benchmark for US military engagements. During early 1998, neither the international situation nor the conditions in Kosovo fulfilled its requirements. A viable political end-state as well as a clear exit strategy was not in sight. International support for intervention was not forthcoming due to the legal concerns. Not all military options were thought through. The military cautioned that an air power only approach might easily lead into a quagmire (Halberstam 2001: 423-425; Clark 2001: 109-114; Cohen 2000). Sandy Berger had also argued against the excessive threat or use of military force during 1998. The level of atrocities did not warrant an international military response against a sovereign state. With upcoming mid-term elections, and the president’s preoccupation with impeachment, the potential costs of a military engagement were high (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 30, Berger 2000).
Those advocating military action also faced wider domestic opposition, since in 1998 “engagement in southeastern Europe rests upon a weak domestic political foundation, including a great deal of public apathy and ignorance, considerable congressional skepticism” (Nation 1998: 38). Furthermore, the Lewinsky scandal and fierce congressional opposition had put Clinton in a position of weakness in the fall of 1998. As a Washington-based European diplomat told the New York Times, “you’d have to be deaf, dumb, blind and a mental defective not to see that Clinton has been weakened in his capacity to lead, at home and abroad.”

In internal debates, Secretary of State Albright used the stasis connected with the Lewinsky scandal and the weakness ahead of elections to argue for forceful US actions in the Balkans (Singh 1998: 72). Her argument for a more robust policy was threefold. First, the future of the Balkans were intimately linked to the United States’ future role in Europe and its claim to worldwide leadership and to NATO’s credibility. Second, the imminent problem in Kosovo was its destabilizing potential for the Balkans. Third, Albright singled out Milosevic as the problem. Only with a credible threat of force looming over him, would the latter be willing to negotiate a meaningful political settlement. Apart from the immediate effects on the Balkans, Albright claimed, stopping Milosevic would set a precedent for the future behavior of other rogue state leaders. From this line of reasoning, it followed rather clearly that force must be threatened and one must be prepared to use it. Additionally, denying Russia a veto over NATO’s actions was a logical consequence of this position (Albright 2003: 462-470; Ikenberry 2000: 89; Buckwalter 1999).

By late summer 1998, this internal debate had been decided in favor of the position advocated by Albright and the British government: “Principals agreed that it is essential to re-establish the credibility of a possibly use of force by NATO” (NSC 1998a). Furthermore, principals decided to press NATO to implement plans for the air campaign in light of growing Serbian atrocities (NSC 1998 a-g).

A confluence of factors led to the balance to tip in this direction. Allied support for a threat of military force was growing amid progress in the Security Council on a resolution condemning the fighting in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security. Daalder and O’Hanlon report that Berger had been swayed when, after the massacre in the town Gronje Obrinje on September 26, 1998, the “atrocities

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“threshold” had been crossed (Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 43). Given the Clinton administration’s conviction that a carrot and stick approach was necessary to spread democracy and ensure international peace, the situation in Kosovo “made it impossible for the United State to sit by and watch the violence unfold” (Ikenberry 2000: 89).

Once the administration had unified around a course of action and had rejected passive options, the influence of allies diminishes. Even British calls and demands to have military action justified by a UN resolution were ignored by the now united Clinton administration (NSC 1998f, 1998g).

The lack of unity within the US domestic political scene is also apparent when it comes to the tactical dimension of the use of force and helps to explain why allies were so successful using strategies based on the long-term interest of the US in NATO and its sensitivity to the costs of military intervention. This division benefited allies and their reluctance to escalate the air war.

Based on Albright’s and Berger’s council, the administration opted for a very limited form of warfare that relied solely on air power and the technological advantages of NATO and the US, in particular. Air strikes were meant to be precise and tailored to their limited political objectives, whereas ground troops were ruled out early on. The Clinton administration’s political leadership, hence, favored a seemingly cost-free way of waging war. With a view to domestic caution and allies’ hesitancy, utmost priority was placed on protecting the forces under deployment, and a limited utilization of allied capabilities (Halberstam 2001: 423-425). Bacevich notes that in pursuing such a strategy, the administration took “radical departures from military convention – renouncing the most ordinary instruments of combat, reviving the long-discredited principle of gradual escalation, avoiding any mention of victory as an objective, indeed avoiding the term ’war’ altogether” (Bacevich 2001: 156).

It comes as no surprise that this approach was deeply resisted within the Pentagon and that the latter correctly felt its influence on the president was limited (Bacevich 20001; Reed 2005; Halberstam 2001). Internal discrepancies within the US chain of command reinforced the strategy of incremental air war and limited bombing. For example, the commander in chief for allied and US air assets, Lieutenant General Short, would have preferred an air campaign more in line with traditional US air force and Pentagon thinking: “We use force as a last resort, so when the decision for the use of force is made, then we need to go in with overwhelming force, quite frankly,
extraordinary violence that it make an incredible impression on the adversary” (Short 2000). However, General Clark, who placed more emphasis on maintaining allied unity than quick battle effectiveness, frequently overruled Short’s advice (Clark 2001: 225; 235-237).

Not only was the administration internally split, the Clinton administration could not count on unfettered public support for Operation Allied Force. In 1999 after the massacres in Racak and during the beginning of OAF, public opinion only narrowly supported the mission. However, this support would have quickly faltered if the US had suffered casualties or ground troops had become part of the picture (Singh 2001; Gallup 1999).

Congress sent mixed messages of support and fierce opposition with regard to OAF. Democrats largely supported their beleaguered president, whereas the Republicans were split internally as to the right course of action. In the US senate, a number of conservative interventionists from the GOP had supported the threat of force, a limited air campaign, and had at times even argued for more robust action (Chollet/Goldgeier 2008: 219; Ramet 2000: 373). Thus, the senate had voted in favor of air strikes on March 23, 1999 even before military action began. Within the GOP faction in the house, budget conservatives and isolationists held more sway. Those Republicans doubted that Kosovo involved US national interests and, thus, deserved military engagement. Wary of extensive military missions, they also opposed any deployment of US ground troops in a combat or in a peacekeeping role (Chollet/Goldgeier 2008: 220; 224; Daalder/O’Hanlon 2001: 162-163). Still, senators and representatives from both parties were adamantly opposed to the deployment of ground troops even after the mission started. The Clinton administration had to defend itself against the accusation that it had no viable plan or political goals for the operation (Chollet/Goldgeier 2008: 218-219; Ramet 2000: 376-378).

These various internal divisions and the lacking unity within the US domestic scene were conducive to strategies of allied influence-seeking. The open split within the administration gave European allies access to internal debates. Given the lack of clear public support for the administration’s participation in OAF, the Clinton

134 Yet, this opposition never coalesced to a coherent movement: while the house failed to signal a vote of support for the deployment of ground troops and in a tie vote for the air campaign, it did mobilize the necessary funds for the mission and even a US peacekeeping role.
administration had to be extremely sensitive to share the burden of the mission with allies. In turn, the US sensitivity to costs made it easier for European allies to use their voice opportunities within NATO and capitalize on their military contributions to OAF and nation-building in Kosovo in order to shape military tactics.

5.5.2 Unity among European Allies

As Chapter 5.2 noted, important differences existed between the three major European allies and unity was not always given. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that although the degree of unity between allies may have been sufficient in some cases, it was not necessary for allied influence. With regard to the principal decision to use force, the UK had limited influence on the US administration in that its support bolstered those that advocated military intervention.

The remaining empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that the greater the degree of unity among European allies the more effective the latter will be in influencing US decision-making.

The second central dispute in the principal dimension concerned the question of legal justification for an intervention in Kosovo. Here, internal European divergences made it easier for the United States to enforce its preferred course of action. Each European ally faced particular dilemmas. For Britain and to some extent France, threatening force with a shaky legal basis was a lesser evil compared to doing nothing in light of Serb atrocities. In fall 1998, the UK under Blair had advocated the use of robust force; at the same time, the insistence on Security Council approval threatened to make the British government’s earlier claims less credible. The French government was afraid of the precedent of an unauthorized use of force; but on the other hand, the French were equally preoccupied with the challenge Milosevic presented to European and international institutions. It seems that the inexperienced German government would have been the most likely candidate to veto transatlantic action. However, with tacit Russian approval, and the British and French leaning towards some action, the US found it easy to put pressure on Schröder and Fischer (Richardson 2000, Daddow 2009; Albright 2003).

By contrast, the three European allies largely agreed when it came to the political and tactical dimensions of the use of force and jointly pursued strategies of influence-seeking. For example, the three European allies unequivocally demanded that the use of force should be tied to a political solution that took into account Serbian concerns.
about sovereignty as much as the Albanian quest for autonomy. All three allies requested that the implementation of NATO’s threat be delayed in favor of a last-ditch diplomatic effort (see 5.4.2).\textsuperscript{135} It can well be argued that this consistent European argument upped the reputation costs for the Clinton administration of ignoring European wishes for an extended diplomatic effort. Similarly, the success of Germany’s efforts to champion a roadmap for peace negotiations was premised on gaining wider European support. At a special European Council meeting between April 14 and April 15, 1999 Germany sought and gained acceptance of its peace plan by its European partners. Not least because the German plan also put forth a long-term approach to the reconstruction of the Balkans, much of which was to be financed by the EU, the backing by European members made it hard for the United States to ignore the German proposal (Joetze 2000: 110; Duke et al. 2000; McAllister 2001; Friedrich 2005).

As section 5.4.3 elaborated in detail, European allies worked together to resist an escalation of air strikes through a combination of binding and attaching conditions to the use of contributed forces. This intra-European cooperation complicated the effective implementation of the air war from a US point of view. Assuming that a long-term interest in NATO guided the Clinton administration, ignoring almost uniform European resistance to escalation would have undermined the very reason for which the US wished to intervene. Thus, as is assumed by the hypothesis, a high degree of unity increases allies’ ability to tap into the long-term institutional interests of the hegemon.

The limited British influence on the discussion of ground troops is somewhat an exception to this finding. Yet within NATO, Britain was the only country openly calling for the deployment of ground troops, and without further European backing it was unable to advance its preferred course until the very end of Operation Allied Force. That British thinking was certainly prevalent in the summer of 1999 can probably be best explained with the situation on the ground. Since air strikes had up to that point not moved Milosevic and since consensus among NATO members seemed impossible to sustain for much longer, threatening a ground invasion was the only way to show final and increased NATO resolve (Richardson 2001: 148; Clarke 2001, Erhardt 2000).

\textsuperscript{135} Interview with Christopher Hill and James O’Brien.
Lastly, I would argue that the high degree of allied unity also positively affected strategies resting on issue-specific power. Given the thin domestic support, the Clinton administration was quite sensitive to the costs of military intervention in general and to the costs of economic and military nation-building in Kosovo, in particular (Clark 2001: 117-120; Singh 2001: 65; Redd 2005: 132-137). Given the US need at least to keep up the appearance of burden-sharing, uniform strategies that attached conditions to the use of allied forces and bases were successful.

5.5.3 The Intensity of Threat

A third possible condition could claim that the success of allies’ strategies of influence-seeking increases in cases where the United States is not directly threatened by the target of the military intervention. At first glance, the Kosovo case seems to confirm this assumption: a tiny geographical area located in the center Europe was a more acute problem to Europeans than to the United States and thus it should come as no surprise that allies were granted a high say over US policy. Again, it becomes clear that the US threat perception was less based on clear-cut material factors than the hypothesis stipulates. If the threat perception argument is taken seriously, it cannot explain the significant variance within the Kosovo case. The lack of allied influence on the principal dimension of the use of force and US pressure to threaten force cannot be explained with reference to an increased US perception of threat in that case. In fall 1998, Kosovo did not pose an immediate problem to the security of the United States by any measure of threat. Serbia did not have any significant offensive capabilities, offensive intentions, or pose any direct military threat to the United States. Consequently, the directness of the threat cannot explain the unilateral US push to threaten force.

Yet an increase in allied influence in the political and tactical dimension comes at a time in which one can plausibly argue that the threat emanating from Kosovo increased, even for the United States. In 1999, Serbia’s military action in Kosovo did have the potential to destabilize the region. Some have argued that Milosevic deliberately sought to destabilize neighboring Albania and Macedonia, which were put under extreme pressure by the massive influx of refugees (Schubert 2000; Troebst 2000). President Clinton alluded to these wider US interests in February 1999,

declaring “we have a clear national interest in ensuring that Kosovo is where the trouble ends […] But if we don’t stop the conflict now, it clearly will spread. And then we will not be able to stop it, except at far greater cost and risk” (Clinton in Singh 2001: 63).

The changes in the intensity of threat do not co-vary with particular US policy choices. The direct and indirect threat emanating from Kosovo was rather more limited in fall 1998, when the United States ignored European opposition to threatening force. While in 1999, when the US gave European allies a say over the political and military tactics of OAF, the threat to US interests was far greater in terms of regional stability, the credibility of NATO, and relations with Russia.

In order to explain why the United States at all intervened in Kosovo and came to perceive the war as a problem for its own security it becomes clear that the threat perception argument has to be amended. In a similar manner to the Bosnian case, the US threat perception that led to intervention was a product of a joint US and European effort to define the interests in and goals of such intervention.

5.7 Summary of the Case Study

During the Kosovo crisis, European allies exercised influence on important aspects of the military intervention. At the same time, more unilateral tendencies of the Clinton administration became apparent. Allies agreed to threaten the use of force as urged to do so by Madeleine Albright, and despite Russian opposition and without a clear UN authorization. With British support, Albright had pressed the allies throughout for more forceful action. So much so, that Operation Allied Force has been called “Madeleine’s War”. Despite clear US leadership internationally and in negotiations with Serbs and Kosovars, Europeans did not lose control over major decisions. In close consultation and with the help of institutional capacities, Europeans successfully called for last-ditch diplomatic negotiations in Rambouillet and for the establishment of clear political benchmarks for OAF. During the actual military mission, France and Britain in particular used NATO’s rules to reign in the United States on many tactical aspects of the mission.

Lastly, I have argued in this chapter that the degree of unity within the US domestic scene and the degree of unity among European allies better account for the variance in allied influence than an explanation based on the intensity of threat.
### Table 8. Summary of Findings Kosovo.

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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>Limited influence in principal decision to use force; France and Germany pressured into coercive diplomacy</td>
<td>European influence on political dimension and last-ditch negotiations at Rambouillet</td>
<td>European influence on the tactical dimension and implementation of the air war against Serbia; European influence on the content of a political solution</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Process/Strategies of Influence-seeking</strong></td>
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<td>Binding by the UK in formulating UN resolution 1199 as a compromise legal justification</td>
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<td>Issue-specific Power</td>
<td>Binding by the UK in formulating UN resolution 1199 as a compromise legal justification</td>
<td>Consultation as co-determination to determine common interests in Kosovo</td>
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<td>Voice Opportunities</td>
<td>Consultation as co-determination to determine common interests in Kosovo</td>
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<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Consultation as co-determination within daily CG meetings</td>
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### Scope Conditions

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<th>Intensity of Threat Perception</th>
<th>Unity of European Allies</th>
<th>Unity of US Domestic Politics</th>
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+ = outcome/process in congruence with hypothesis
-/+ = outcome/process partially confirms hypothesis
- = outcome/process not in line with hypothesis

On December 16, 1998 President Clinton ordered the use of force against Iraq “without delay, diplomacy or warning” (Clinton 1998c). Twice since fall 1997, France and Russia had been able to delay military intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom. Yet in December 1998, France failed to restrain the two allies from using force and failed to exercise influence on the principal, political, and tactical dimension of the use of force. I argue that this lack of French influence was due to the unity within the Clinton administration that action had to be taken on Iraq and the extreme pressure from congress to do so. Furthermore, disunity among European allies weakened France’s effort to rein in US action in the context of the UN Security Council.

The chapter will first provide a brief history of allied actions vis-à-vis Iraq after the first Gulf War (6.1) and then proceed to a discussion of US policy from Clinton’s reelection to Operation Desert Fox (6.2). It will then turn to a discussion of French attempts to restrain the US’ in its attempt to act militarily (6.3). Lastly, the chapter discusses the conditions unfavorable to French influence (6.4).

6.1 Introduction to the Conflict

When the first Gulf War reversed Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait, US President George H. W. Bush declared this to be the advent of a new world order: “We’re now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders” (Bush 1990). Indeed, the UN Security Council dictated to Iraq a ceasefire in the form of several UN resolutions that terminated the conflict and implemented the demands of the international community.

The demands far exceeded the usual cessation of hostilities, mutual acceptance of borders, and the absorption of the costs of war. First of all, Iraq had been subject to a comprehensive embargo, banning imports from and exports to the country except for humanitarian and medical supplies (UN Doc. S/Res./660). The ceasefire terms, spelled out in UN Security Council Resolution 687, extended these sanctions but permitted further exports to Iraq subject to the approval of the UN Sanctions Committee (Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 141; UN Doc. S/Res./687). Further, the resolution required Iraq to dismantle existing and to cease programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as long-range ballistic missiles. In order to
verify Iraq’s compliance, the UN Security Council set up an unprecedented weapons inspections regime. As a subsidiary organ to the Security Council, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created to conduct inspections and to oversee the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destructions (WMD); and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was responsible for nuclear weapons programs. The resolution required inspectors to have unrestricted access to Iraq’s weapons facilities. While the UN Secretary General appointed UNSCOM’s chair, the commission remained responsible to the Security Council (Malone 2006: 153-155; Texeira da Silva 2004: 206-208). The process of WMD-disarmament and sanctions were intimately linked: a lifting of sanctions depended on progress in Iraq’s efforts to disarm (UN Doc. S/Res. 687, § 22). Subsequent resolutions demanded the Iraqi government halt political violence against its population, mainly Kurdish minorities in the north and Shiites in southern Iraq (UN Doc. S/Res. 688).

Prior to Clinton’s second term in office, the United States had repeatedly threatened or used force to elicit Iraqi compliance. Two phases of US policy can be distinguished with regard to the international support that its coercive policies enlisted. In a first phase, stretching from the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert Storm to mid-1995, transatlantic and regional allies, as well as major powers largely backed US policies. The Bush government threatened to (1991) and eventually bombed Iraq (1993) because of its obstruction of UNSCOM inspections. Although resolution 688 had not been passed under Chapter VII, the United States together with Britain and France began to erect no-fly zones over the Kurdish north (1991) and the Shiite south (1992) of Iraq to protect the civilian population. When in 1994 Iraqi troops massed along the Kuwaiti border, the United States responded with the threat of force and a massive build-up of military capabilities in the region (Prados 1999; Byman/Waxman 2000). Avenging Iraqi transgressions against UNSCOM and Kuwait garnered the explicit support of regional states, transatlantic allies, and Russia and China (Thompson 2009: 96-101). Malone notes that the establishment of no-fly zones marks a notable exception, since there was no clear mandate and they were at best tacitly approved by Russia and China. Hence, “[t]he United States, the United Kingdom, and France learned an important lesson about the elasticity of the Council’s tolerance for unilateralism. […] It served as an early signal of US and UK unwillingness to give the Security Council the final say on when force might be used against Iraq” (Malone 2006: 91).
The frequent use of force only had mixed effects on Iraq’s behavior. The only clear success story was Saddam Hussein’s retreat from the Kuwaiti border in 1994. While the no-fly zone had brought relative peace to the north, the repression of Shiites in the south continued unabated. Once force was threatened, the Iraqi government backed off and allowed UN inspections. However, as high-level defections revealed in 1995, cooperation had been partial at best and the government had concealed much of its efforts in the WMD-realm (Byman/Waxman 2000; Thompson 2009: 98-100). Meanwhile the sanctions regime imposed an extremely high toll on the civilian population of Iraq (Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 1441-47).

Against this background, a second phase ensued from mid-1995 to late 1996 in which political unity waned within the Security Council and between the US and France in particular.

The 1995 revelations of Iraq’s hidden WMD program caused UNSCOM to pursue more intrusive inspections. The Iraqi regime reacted by declaring certain sites as “sensitive or presidential sites” and barred access to them. UNSCOM chair, Rolf Ekeus, made an informal agreement with Iraqi authorities to permit inspections if they were accompanied by a high-level Iraq official (Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 112-113). Yet, the deal nourished Washington’s suspicion against Iraq’s sincerity.

At the same time, France, Russia, China, as well as Egypt had argued against a further rigid application of sanctions once it had become clear that weapons inspections would go on for longer than initially expected. While the US and the UK rejected the French draft resolution aimed at lifting sanctions, a compromise was found in the initiation of the UN oil-for-food (OFF) program in 1996: through an escrow account and under UN control, Iraq would be allowed to sell oil to purchase humanitarian goods (Malone 2006: 117-119; Thompson 2009: 102-104). Still, the sanctions issue had driven a wedge between the US and other states. Ismael and Kreutz argue that France, Russia, and China “created a kind of ‘pro-Iraq lobby’ in the UN Security Council in order to weaken the sanctions and to constrain US action against Iraq” (Ismael/Kreutz 2001: 98).

A further indication of this growing rift was the criticism of the US cruise missile attacks against targets in northern Iraq. Rivalry between Kurdish factions had led Hussein to be asked to intervene on behalf of the Kurdish Democratic Party in 1996. Having committed itself to Kurdish autonomy, the United States launched retaliatory attacks. Not least because Kurdish quests for more independence met considerable
skepticism in the region and internationally, the US found itself heavily criticized for the use of force (Byman/Waxman 2000: 58-60; Malone 2006: 100).

At the end of its first tenure, the Clinton administration faced a branching point in its Iraq policies. It had threatened or used force in response to three types of Iraqi transgressions with varying success: defiance of UN weapons inspections, violations of no-fly zones, and aggressive Iraqi troop movements. Over time, the international coalition against Saddam Hussein showed marked cracks. Meanwhile the behavior of Hussein’s regime ranged from conciliatory moves to provocations to test the will and attitude of the US. Under these circumstances, Clinton’s reelection provided an opportunity to reassess US policy towards Iraq. As the next chapter will show, US policy choices on the use of force widened the discrepancy between US policies and those of some transatlantic allies, especially France.

6.2 The Development of US Policy

6.2.1 Reinforcing Containment

At the beginning of its second term, the Clinton administration reinforced its previous containment policy against Iraq. Since 1993, the US policy vis-à-vis Iraq had been part of a strategy of “dual containment”. Paraphrasing Margaret Thatcher, Secretary of State Albright proclaimed: “This is not the time to go wobbly on Iraq” (Albright 1997).

On the principal dimension, the Clinton administration argued that the use of force against Iraq was justified. Marr notes that this position was predicated on the notion that “the Gulf war had not yet been fully concluded. UNSCR 687 is a ceasefire resolution – not a peace treaty – which has not been completely fulfilled” (Marr 1998: 58). In its reinforcement of containment, the Clinton administration went beyond a narrow reading of resolution 687. Iraq would not only have to disarm its WMD capabilities but comply with all UN resolutions imposed on the country. Moreover, Iraq would not only have to change its actions but demonstrate a credible “change of its intentions before our policy can change” (Albright 1997).

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137 The containment policy against Iraq was part of the strategy of “dual containment” of both Iraq and Iran as the two major threats to US interests in the Persian Gulf. The concept rejects playing the two powers off against each other: “We reject it because we don’t need to rely on one to balance the other.” The policy was first outlined by Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs (Indyk 1993).
Hence, the administration’s political goals went beyond mere compliance with UN resolutions. Regime change had been propagated by the administration with varying degrees of explicitness. In 1993, senior policy officials in the Clinton administration announced the US would provide increased support to Iraqi opposition groups “as a democratic alternative to the Saddam Hussein regime” (Indyk 1993; also Litwak 2000: 58). By the beginning of the second term and with Albright’s insistence on seeing a change in Iraqi intentions, the administration was now more forcefully aiming for regime change in Baghdad (Thompson 2009). Clinton would keep sanctions in place as long as Hussein was in power. Washington would oppose Iraq’s intransigence “as long as it takes,” while “clearly, a change in Iraq’s government could lead to a change in U.S. policy” (Albright 1997). However, the administration ruled out a full-scale military invasion to overthrow the Iraqi regime. ‘Roll-back’ remained a long-term goal of US policy while containment was the short-term instrument to achieve it (Litwak 2000: 130-134; Davis 2006).

Tactically, military and economic policy instruments were brought to bear to implement containment. On the one hand, military assets were used to reign in Hussein’s room for maneuver and to reassure regional allies. In order to deter Iraqi attempts to harm or attack its neighbors, the United States kept a sizeable military force in the region. US naval, air, and land forces enforced the no-fly zones with up to 20,000 troops and trained with regional allies to ensure a US ‘forward presence’ in the region (Kugler 2003: 97; Department of Defense 1995: 29-35). This presence was meant to deter Iraq from further aggression. The Clinton administration sought to ensure the credibility of this deterrent by using its military instruments whenever it deemed Iraq to be in violation of its UN commitments.

On the other hand, economic tools were used to keep the Iraqi regime in a “strategic box,” as Albright put it. The United States supported a vigorous implementation of the UN sanctions regime and threatened to veto any resolution calling for the lifting of sanctions. While the US supported the OFF program out of humanitarian concerns, it placed strict controls on goods exported to Iraq, which were overseen by the UN Sanctions Committee (Malone 2006: 117; Pickering 1998). At the same time, the United States lent economic support to those seeking to undermine the Hussein regime. Sick reports that the United States had spent approximately US$15 million in covert support to opposition groups in Iraq until 1997 (Sick 1998: 7).
By insisting on a tough containment policy, the Clinton administration drew two lessons from the past. First, Hussein’s aggressive policies against his own people, his continuing threats against Kuwait, and the attempts to stall effective inspections had earned him a record of untrustworthiness. Nobody in the administration appeared to think that the current regime would ever change its aggressive intents. Second, the US had come to the conclusion that a mixture of pressure and force would be the only way to keep Iraq in check in the short-term. The US government reacted to each of the previous provocations with coercive economic and military measures with some limited success: these measures had caused the Iraqi regime to back down at least until late 1996 (Byman/Waxman 2000; Clawson 1998).

The reinforcement of containment stood in marked contrast to another overarching goal of Clinton’s Iraq policy: namely, keeping together the broad international coalition of the Gulf War to exert maximum pressure on Saddam Hussein. Even prior to 1997, the containment strategy elicited decreasing international support, in particular from France and Russia. The next sections will show how US policies of military intervention developed in light of these intra-allied differences.

6.2.2 Testing US Will – Iraq’s Defiance of UNSCOM

The relentlessness of US policy was soon put to test. Between October 1997 and February 1998, Iraq repeatedly clashed with UNSCOM. Yet, the United States and Britain delayed the use of force. Indeed, a new pattern emerged in the triangular relationship between Iraq, the US and Britain, and the remaining permanent members of the Security Council. The US and the UK demanded a tough international response to renewed Iraqi defiance of UNSCOM. In a remarkable shift from Clinton’s first term, the two countries could not gain unanimous Security Council approval for their proposals. Russia and France sought to intervene diplomatically to get inspections back on track and to restrain the US from pursuing more forceful action.

The first such branching point happened in fall 1997. Albright’s announcement of a rigid handling of the sanctions issue had stripped the Iraqi regime of any incentive to comply (Litwak 2000: 123). Indeed, in June 1997 the Iraqi government harassed UNSCOM’s personnel and threatened the security of its helicopter flights and US supporting intelligence aircraft (Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 122). In October 1997, tensions between UNSCOM and Iraq grew. UNSCOM’s new chair, Richard Butler, did not feel bound by Ekeus’ agreement and clashed with the Iraqi government over
the inspection of ‘presidential sites’. As a sign of the increasingly tense relations, the Iraqi government expelled UNSCOM’s US personnel accusing Butler as being subject to considerable US influence and bias against Iraq (Krasno/Sutterlin: 122; de Jonge Oudraat 2002: 143). In a special report published in November, UNSCOM noted the serious difficulties it faced regarding inspections: “Iraq’s full, final and complete disclosure, submitted in September 1997, is not substantially different in substance from previous versions found to be unacceptable […]” (UN Doc. S/1997/922). The standoff over UNSCOM led Britain and the US to draw up a resolution aimed at increasing sanctions against Iraq, but neither the resolution nor the use of force received unanimous support in the Security Council. Instead, after diplomatic intervention by the Russian government, Iraq was prepared to allow the return of UNSCOM in December 1997 (Thompson 2009: 108-110; Byman/Waxman 2000).

The confrontation between Iraq and UNSCOM resurfaced again in January 1998, when the regime declared additional locations as ‘presidential sites’ and restricted access to them. Again, the United States delayed the use of force in response to a diplomatic mission by the UN secretary general and bilateral diplomatic mediation by France.

In late January 1998, Butler issued a consecutive, negative report on the progress of inspections (UN Doc. S/1998/58). The United States responded with a massive build-up of military forces in the region. Clinton threatened the use of force even without unequivocal allied support and despite considerable doubts in the military establishment (Byman/Waxman 2000: 65; Litwak 2000: 134-135). At the last minute, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan secured a memorandum of understanding with the Iraqi government, which set out new rules for the inspection of ‘sensitive sites’. Inspections of these sites would be conducted by UNSCOM alongside a high-level diplomatic mission. Hence, assembling these diplomatic escorts would give Iraq time to prepare for such inspections (Thompson 2009: 111; de Jonge Oudraat 2002: 144). The US government followed this consensus but remained under no illusion that it remained a temporary measure: “God knows what’s going to happen. That’s our position.”

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In response to the crisis in February 1998 and in light of blatant Iraqi non-cooperation, international resolve momentarily hardened. In March 1998, the Security Council welcomed the Annan agreement and warned Iraq of the “severest consequences” in case of non-compliance in resolution 1154 (UN Doc. S/Res./1154). In retrospect, Madeleine Albright called the standoff “the first important test” of the international coalition against Saddam Hussein: while all governments unequivocally condemned the defiance of inspections, the US could no longer build consensus on the use of force as an appropriate answer (Albright 2003: 334). In late 1997 and early 1998, the US government had thus put off military intervention in favor of last-ditch diplomatic solutions aimed at securing inspections.

The use of force was delayed for a third time in November 1998. Previously Iraq had demanded its files be closed, and continued to limit the efficacy of UNSCOM inspections in August 1998. Indeed, inspections had made considerable progress with regard to chemical and nuclear weapons. However, some very important questions about Iraq’s biological weapons capabilities and its missile programs remained unanswered. Consequently, the United States and the UK demanded complete verification that all WMD programs had been dismantled (Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 134-135). This demand faced a certain dilemma as Kofi Annan aptly described: “I personally believe, as I think a lot of the Security Council members believe with 100 percent certainty, that Iraq being fully disarmed is never going to be possible. At the end of the day, the Council must decide whether Iraq is disarmed to the extent that is not a threat to its neighbors.”139 While some Arab neighbors and the French believed that Iraq no longer constituted a major threat, the United States sought to ratchet up the pressure (Prados 1999: 23).

Iraq initially interfered with the work of inspectors and finally announced that it had suspended all cooperation with UNSCOM on October 31, 1998. In response to the removal of UNSCOM, the Security Council adopted resolution 1205 denouncing Iraqi action as “a flagrant violation of the Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions and demanding once again that Iraq rescind its obstructive decisions” (UN Doc. S/Res./1205). Although the international community reacted to Iraq’s previous with this joint warning, it essentially remained divided on the use of force. On November 14, 1998 air strikes were called off again because Iraq appeared to have backed down

and to be complying with its obligations (Prados/Katzmann 1998; Thompson 2009: 115-116).

From October 1997 to November 1998, Iraqi non-compliance repeatedly brought the United States and Britain to the brink of using force. Last minute concessions by Baghdad or individual diplomatic initiatives averted the enactment of these repeated threats. From the perspective of the Clinton administration, this cat and mouse game between the international community and Iraq had not produced the intended policy results. Iraq had wrenched ever more concessions from the Security Council, while at the same time, international support for US action was waning and its credibility was on the line. Thus, a day after the November air strikes were put on hold, President Clinton made it clear that all options remained on the table: “We must remain vigilant, strong, and ready, here and wherever our interests and values are at stake. Thanks to our military, we will be able to do so” (Clinton 1998b).

6.2.3 Operation Desert Fox

In the same vein, Madeleine Albright made it clear that “if necessary we will use force on our time table in response to threats at a time and place of our choosing” (Albright 1998a). Operation Desert Fox, albeit with support from Britain and other regional allies, had commenced after a US assessment of its necessity, without prior consultation with the UN Security Council, and in open contradiction to the policies advocated by one of its closest allies, France.

In December, Iraqi defiance of UN inspections brought the United States and the UK to another branching point. On December 15, 1998 UNSCOM’s chair reported to the Security Council that Iraq’s promises had been yet another feint to avoid military intervention and only limited steps had been made towards full disclosure (Litwak 2000: 138-139; Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 132-135). In short, Butler found that “Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November 1998” (UN Doc. S/1998/1172).

Even before an intra-alliance debate could take place on the right course of action, the US and the UK launched Operation Desert Fox a day later on December 16, 1998. In order to forestall another diplomatic intervention by France and Russia, the US attacked Iraq without informing the Security Council (Thompson 2009: 117). The four-day campaign presented the largest military engagement in Iraq since the first Gulf War in 1991.
Rhetorically, the *political purpose* of the air campaign was limited to disarmament. Clinton announced that the strikes were “designed to degrade Saddam’s capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors” (Clinton 1998c). Blair reiterated these goals in a speech before the UK house of commons a day later (Blair 1998b). Destabilization of the regime was explicitly excluded from the list of goals, but the campaign plan speaks a different language (Litwak 2000: 139).

Divisions between the British and the US, and the French pertained to the *principal* justification of the use force. British and US officials claimed that military action was in defense of and in accordance with decisions made by the UN Security Council. In their opinion, subsequent resolutions in 1998 had warned Iraq of the “severest consequences” if it did not comply with its obligations (UN Doc. S/Res./1154 and 1205). UNSCOM’s December report stated that Iraq had not abided by the terms of these resolutions. As a consequence, so the argument went, the military strikes merely implemented the explicit will of the Security Council and the many resolutions it had passed following the ceasefire stipulated in Resolution 687 (Thompson 2009: 118-119). The remaining permanent members of the Security Council rejected this justification on several accounts: single states, in their view, could not claim to be enacting the implicit will of the Security Council nor unilaterally find another country to be in “material breach” of its obligations (Weller 1999/2000; Lobel/Ratner 1999).

Lobel and Ratner pointedly remarked that Operation Desert Fox dashed hopes for an increased role of the Security Council in authorizing force: “The U.S. position is that it will enforce Security Council resolutions by force, whether or not the Council sees fit to do so” (ibid.: 154).

**Tactically**, British and US forces attacked approximately 100 targets all over Iraq through roughly 600 aircraft sorties and 400 cruise missile strikes. There is no indication that the British disagreed with their US counterparts over tactical issues. The UK provided 24 aircraft and participated in 32 sorties, hence roughly contributing to 15% of the total missions (Youngs/Oaks 1999: 28). The United States shouldered the bulk of the effort, with US navy aircraft starting from carriers in the Persian Gulf, and US air force bombers placed in bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. While the use of Tomahawks and heavier cruise missiles was extremely costly (roughly US$750 million was spent on such ordnance), the overall effort remained limited compared to Operation Desert Storm (Cordesman 1998; Byman/Waxman 2000: 68). The selection
of targets focused on Iraq’s political and military infrastructure and included command and control structures, air defense and airports, but also sites for the storage and production of WMD (presidential sites, missile manufacturers) and economic targets.

In the aftermath, Pentagon officials claimed victory on a number of dimensions: British and US forces had duly avoided civilian casualties and the strikes had been more effective than initially anticipated – Iraq’s capacities to threaten its neighbors and to proliferate WMD had suffered a severe setback (Litwak 2000: 139). Tony Blair noted, “our objectives have been achieved. We can be satisfied with a job well done.” On balance, Operation Desert Fox turns out to have been less victorious. According to most accounts, the strikes left Iraq’s conventional capabilities intact, only marginally harmed its special forces, and did only limited damage to the capacities of its WMD-programs (Cordesman 1998; Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 16). Much more, strikes were designed to destabilize the Iraqi regime in what one observer called an “aerial assassination strategy.” Not least because of questions of the legality and legitimacy of such an attack, the military effort decreased international support for the US policy of containment. Not only major powers, such as Russia and France, but also regional states heavily criticized the campaign (Thompson 2009: 120-122; Byman/Waxman 2000:71). Lastly, the strikes did not elicit any change in Iraqi behavior nor did they contribute to regime change. Clinton’s own prediction that air strikes might “mark the end of UNSCOM” leaving the international community with “no oversight, no insight, no involvement in what is going on in Iraq” (in Youngs /Oaks 1999: 13) became reality. UNSCOM’s operations were never resumed and it was only in December 1999 that the follow-up United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) started its work.

6.3 Alliance Politics: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking

Operation Desert Fox was not a unilateral use of force in the numerical sense of the word: Britain and several Arab countries actively supported the mission, and other allies, such as Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany endorsed the use of force (Prados/Katzmann 1998). I argued in the introductory chapter of this thesis that

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influence can best be observed where differences between allies surface. While influence cannot be excluded in situations where allies largely endorse US action, this influence can hardly be traced. The concept of significant influence assumes that there are disparities to be bridged by an effort to cooperate and at least partially by changes to the course of policy. The literature does not indicate that major differences existed between the US and allies that largely supported military action against Iraq, such as the UK and Germany. Yet, US military action ran contrary to the outspoken policy preferences of one crucial transatlantic ally: France. President Chirac and his socialist cabinet opposed the rhetoric of regime change. Instead of banking on a policy of containment, France had campaigned for a policy of engagement that would lift sanctions and place less emphasis on the use of force. In the end, France failed to persuade the United States to follow this policy path.

The following section traces the background of this failure in two initial steps. First, I analyze the strategies with which French policymakers sought to influence the US position. Second, I argue that in contrast to the Balkan cases the US-UK axis never converged with the French on the underlying goals of transatlantic allies in Iraq. Instead, the respective starting positions remained unchanged in their major facets. In the following chapter, I argue that the internal unity of the Clinton administration and British support likely forestalled rapprochement between France and the US on Iraq (6.4).

France had made several attempts to soften US policy of containment against Iraq and to prevent the use of military force. French and US politicians traded their views on Iraq in regular bilateral consultations between the two presidents, but also between ministers, and national security advisors. From the timing of these consultations, it could be inferred that they were indeed intended to co-determine policies as they often took place ahead of important US policy decisions and actions. Madeleine Albright acknowledged that her trips to Paris were meant to forge a common position and in her opinion, “unity between the closest allies was of utmost importance” (Albright 2003: 336). Still, as the next chapter will show, these consultations never

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managed to bridge the chasm between the different interpretations of interests and policy prescriptions.

The institutional context, in which allies debated policies on Iraq, played a crucial role for French strategies of influence-seeking. Because the use of military force against Iraq was couched in terms of Iraqi noncompliance with UN resolutions, the Security Council became the essential institutional platform for international debates on Iraq. France used its voice opportunities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to shape US policies vis-à-vis Baghdad. French diplomacy relied on strategies of binding, organizing opposition and alternatives to US policy initiatives in the Security Council, and attached conditions to its support for US proposals. However, France shied away from blocking the plans of the US and UK and did not use its veto power or even threaten to use it.

Efforts of binding within the Security Council took various forms. For example, France used this strategy to ease sanctions on Iraq. In 1994, France had proposed a provisional lifting of sanctions in return for specific Iraqi compliance (Texeira da Silva 2004: 209). In March 1995, and together with Russia and China, it circulated a draft to lift UN sanctions. While these attempts were unsuccessful due to US and British resistance, they substantially contributed to the initiation of the Oil-for-Food program as a compromise between the more lenient French and the hardline US position (Malone 2006: 117). When the crisis between the US and Iraq came to a head in the fall of 1997, the US drafted resolution 1134 which envisioned a travel ban on Iraqi officials as a measure to tighten the sanctions regime (UN Doc. S/Res./1134). The resolution initially foresaw harsher measures but after much wrangling, France, China and Russia abstained and, thus broke ranks publicly for the first time (Texeira da Silva 2004: 211; Thompson 2009: 108).

*Binding* was not only related to the sanctions regime, it was also an instrument to avert or delay the use of force against Iraq. When the confrontation between the United States and Iraq peaked in February 1998, UN Secretary Kofi Annan found a last minute deal with Iraq on the inspection of ‘presidential sites’ offering his good offices. Good offices refers to the secretary general’s independent function as a mediator in international disputes (Franck 1995). The success of good offices is highly dependent on the extent to which the incumbent can rely on his prestige and on the unity of the international community represented by the office of secretary general. France not only rallied support behind Annan’s mission (Wood 1998: 575).
More importantly, Chirac and his senior officials used their own contacts with the Iraqi government to encourage a change in Iraqi opposition to inspections. Chirac wrote a personal letter to Hussein, hosted Iraq’s foreign minister in Paris, and sent senior French officials to Baghdad to broker a deal (Juster 1999: 109-110; Styan 2004: 378-379). In retrospect, Kofi Annan praised “those governments that had influence or could help push things in the right direction, including the French president” (in Krasno/Sutterlin 2003: 124). Annan’s initiative, which was significantly supported by the French government, delayed a US-led military strike and has been widely hailed as a victory for French diplomacy (Moisi 1999; Thompson 2009: 110).

Lastly, within the Security Council France tried to bind the United States by supporting resolutions that condemned the actions of Iraq on the condition that the use of force would be subject to further explicit authorization by the Security Council. In this regard, UN resolution 1154 and 1205 condemned Iraq’s lack of compliance with the terms of previous resolutions but stopped short of calling its behavior a “material breach” and authorizing “all necessary measures”. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in vague terms, the resolutions stipulated that in a case of non-compliance, Iraq would face the “severest consequences” (Wood 1998: 576; Hausmann 2005: 119-120). Both of these resolutions, adopted in 1998 and intended to increase the pressure on Hussein’s regime, entailed an unusual additional paragraph in which the Security Council “decides, in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter, to remain actively seized of the matter, in order to ensure implementation of this resolution, and to secure peace and security in the area” (UN Doc. S/Res./1154; UN Doc. S/Res./1205).

The interpretation of this paragraph remained contested. French diplomats argued that the Security Council had not consented to an automatic trigger for the use of force in case of Iraqi non-compliance. Rather, as French UN Ambassador Dejammet put it: “In its last operative paragraph, the text we will adopt reaffirms unambiguously the responsibilities and the prerogatives of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, responsibilities that include evaluating situations as and when necessary and making the appropriate conclusions” (Dejammet in UN Doc. S/PV.3939). Hence, the French sought to deny the coalition of the US and the UK the right to determine alone when force would be the only measure to bring Iraq into compliance (Lobel/Ratner 1999: 133). Much more, if the United States wanted to
claim it was acting on behalf of the will of the Security Council, the French argued it would have to ask for explicit authorization (Weller 1999/2000: 88-89). US and British officials did not openly contest this view but claimed that resolution 687 remained in effect and that many subsequent resolutions had found Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations (Youngs/Oaks 1999: 26). Legal scholars claim in this “creative” interpretation, the ceasefire resolution became “a loaded weapon in the hands of any member nation to use whenever it determined Iraq to be in material breach of the ceasefire” (Lobel/Ratner 1999: 125). Together with Russia and China, France was certainly successful in preventing language directly authorizing the use of force. Yet, these attempts faced severe limits given the British and US understanding that a sufficient legal basis existed. As US General Zinni bluntly put it, “I would say what we did was an enforcement of a UN resolution that the Iraqi leadership, Saddam Hussein, was in violation of, and we felt that we are legally justified in taking that action” (Zinni 1998).

Ultimately, these attempts to bind the United States neither prevented the use of force nor the tightening of sanctions against Iraq. However, diplomatic intervention by France certainly delayed implementation of US war plans, both in February and in November 1998 because French diplomatic initiatives created viable alternatives. This deferring effect led close observers and some in the Clinton administration to conclude that “the involvement of the UN Security Council has generally been beneficial to U.S. national interests – though less so over time” (Juster 1999: 114; also Thompson 2009: 117).

It is important to note that these French attempts had important effects on the circumstances in which US policy inevitably had to act. Clearly, the abstentions in the Security Council and Paris’ public advocacy of lifting sanctions sent a signal to Iraq that the United States could no longer count on unlimited international support for its policies of coercion. The boost in Iraqi foreign relations with France and other countries not only strengthened Hussein’s hold on domestic power; it concomitantly weakened his willingness to comply fully with his international obligations (Perthes 1998). French actions contributed to both sides of the problem for the US government: waning international support and unsteady will to cooperate on behalf of Iraq.
6.4 The Conditions for Allied Influence

Strategies based on institutional voice opportunities were, thus, only apt to cause delay but could ultimately not restrain the US and Britain from action. I argue in the following that the lack of French influence is not due to the more intense threat Iraq posed to US interests. Rather, there was no convergence in the definition of goals as in the Balkans cases, where allies co-determined the goals and rationale of military intervention. This continued divergence, I argue, is best understood against the background of US domestic politics: a unified US government and uniform pressures from congress. In addition, a lack of European unity decreased the leverage of French binding attempts.

6.4.1 The Intensity of Threat

Arguably, the Clinton administration ignored French resistance to military intervention because it perceived the threat emanating from Iraq as more intense. A threat is likely to be perceived as more intense, the more directly it challenges the United States. I argue that part of this hypothesis only partially captures reality. While the US did perceive the problems emanating from Iraq differently and more acutely than their French counterparts, this threat perception does not relate to the directness of the threat as hypothesized. Rather, it becomes clear that the perception of and policy proscriptions on Iraq are part of a larger discursive practice. The construction of this larger narrative distinguished the Balkans cases from the Iraq case. While in the former, allies gradually developed a common framework and perception, France and the US talked past each other in the case of Iraq.

In the literature, it has often been argued that the US decision in favor of military intervention resulted from the intensity of threat that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed to US interests (Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 183-185; Tanter 1998). In the same vein, it has been claimed that Iraq’s weapons proliferation threatened French interests to a far lesser extent (Graham-Brown 1999). Tanter remarks that “some states see peril and others perceive promise in the same situation. What is a threat to national security for Americans is a domestic economic opportunity to Europeans” (Tanter 1998: 22). For a number of reasons the intensity of threat perception is not entirely convincing.

First, according to the measures developed in Chapter 1, the threat posed by Iraq was important, yet not direct. In its Strategy for the Middle East, even the Pentagon argued that US policy vis-à-vis Iraq was primarily driven by a concern for its Middle Eastern
allies and its economic interests in the Gulf region (see Department of Defense 1995: 5-12). The persistence of aggressive regimes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the growing threat of terrorism were viewed as threatening US interests and the security of its allies. “Today the United States finds itself with vital, intertwined interests in a region characterized by conflict and instability, vast and contradictory imbalances of wealth and power, emotional religious and ideological clashes, the widespread quest for weapons of mass destruction, and an uncertain path of internal political development” (ibid.: 5). Other sources have suggested that Iraq’s capabilities at the time hardly posed a serious military challenge to US capacities to project power into the region (Malone 1999: 160; Weller 1999/2000). In justifying Operation Desert Fox, both Clinton and Blair argued that the strikes did not answer an immediate challenge to their countries. Rather, the limited strikes were meant to preempt future Iraqi attacks and to keep Saddam Hussein in check (Clinton 1998c; Blair 1998b).

Second, the intensity of threat argument would assume that the US would go it alone and grant no influence to its opponents. I have shown that there was a very limited degree of French influence in this case, in that French opposition and diplomacy had an impact on the timing of US action. If the US ignored French concerns because of the intensity of threat posed by Iraq, it is hard to explain why the US delayed the use of force in February 1998 and in November 1998. The timing cannot be explained by an acute increase in the threat posed to the US. The antecedent reports by UNSCOM and the IAEA had been quite negative about Iraq’s disarmament but nothing in the reports or in Iraq’s own actions indicates that the threat had significantly increased over the year (UN Doc. S/1997/922; UN Doc. S/1998/58).

Despite these weaknesses, the intensity of threat perception argument carries the point that perspectives on Iraq differed markedly between the US and France. I argue that these different perceptions were less based on material facts of threat and much more on how Iraq was framed and narrated as a larger foreign policy issue. In constructing such an overall narrative, France and the US were talking past each other. This lack of convergence can be seen in two dimensions.

First, the quarrel over Iraq was not only about Iraq’s disarmament. Both countries treated their relations with Iraq as exemplary for their role in an emerging post-Cold War world. In the Persian Gulf, the Clinton administration claimed a leadership role. Against the background of US global and regional superpower status, and its
commitments to peace and the spread of democratic values, the United States had an interest in the stability of the region and its Middle Eastern allies (Department of Defense 1995; Clinton 1998a). Particularly under President Chirac, France also proclaimed to have returned as an independent player in the Middle East invoking its historical record in the region (Wood 1998: 563; Styan 2006). In that sense, Iraq was to be yet another example of French attempts to prove its vision of ‘difference’ and its role as a great power. Dominique Moisi has pointedly observed that French policy towards Iraq must be read against the background of Paris’ “unique and quasi-obsessive relationship with the United States” (Moisi 1998: 124).

Second, the US and the British government used the wider narrative of confronting ‘rogue states’ to define their goals in Iraq and to justify action. Iraq, Britain and the US argued, had continuously defied international norms and its attempts at WMD proliferation constituted a serious threat to the region and the world. Furthermore, Iraq oppressed its people and broke universal human rights norms, as was the case with all other ‘rogue states’ (Lake 1994; Albright 1997). Iraq’s continuing repression presented a further threat to the norms and values the Clinton administration had sought to promote (Litwak 2000: 62). In a rare speech to the joint chief of staff and Pentagon officials, Clinton underlined the point that the threat posed by Iraq was immediate. However, Clinton also argued that the way the United States handled the crisis would send signals to what he called the “predators of the 21st century” (Clinton 1998a).

In presenting the case for eventual military action against Iraq, US government officials couched their arguments in terms of the wider foreign policy paradigm of their president: while the end of the Cold War, and globalization, harbored many opportunities for the American people, the forces of ‘integration’ could also be abused by its foes. ‘Rogue states’ such as Iraq, able and willing to oppress their people, to pursue weapons of mass destruction, and to cooperate with criminals and terrorists, were the epitome of these enemies of globalization (Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 195-197; Berger 1997).

Framing the confrontation with Iraq in terms of the rogue state debate gave US perceptions and policies a special twist. For one, the demonization of states falling into the ‘rogue state’ category was intended to serve as a tool for domestic and international political mobilization (Litwak 2000: 8). At the same time, the ‘rogue state’ rationale shaped US perceptions of the Iraqi regime. Iraq’s domestic and
international status as an outlaw “lessen[ed] faith in negotiation strategies and confidence-building measure as a means to resolve disputes. More aggressive actions [were] deemed necessary” (Hoyt 2000: 309). As the chapters above have shown, this interpretation of the Clinton administration’s goals and the problems it had with Iraq led to an increasingly rigid and bellicose policy towards Baghdad.

The French, in contrast, never accepted the rogue-state rationale. As Foreign Minister Védrine put it: “I never used this ostracizing American terminology” (Vèdrine/Moisi 2001: 13). Defining the Iraq issue as a conflict between the West and ‘rogue states’ did not garner French support for three main reasons.

Domestically, French businesses, especially the oil and armaments industry, had built strong ties with Iraq from the 1960s onward. French businesses, but also Iraqi exile advocacy groups and parliamentarians, created a domestic political climate that placed a high level of attention on Iraqi issues. Humanitarian concerns were as prevalent as vested economic interests in the country’s development (Styan 2004: 375-377). Iraqi debts to France were estimated at US$7.5 billion, French businesses had profited exceptionally from contracts under the OFF program, and French oil firms had already signed profitable contracts for extraction which could begin as soon as the embargo on Iraq was lifted (Wood 1998: 573; Styan 2006: 186). In contrast to many accounts, I argue that this domestic constellation is not to be conflated with an unduly biased position on Iraq. The French government and public ardently supported disarmament and better living conditions for the Iraqi people. Yet, these domestic factors did not lend themselves to demonizing the Iraqi regime either.

Conceptually, Chirac and his senior policy officials did not agree with US attempts to demonize the Iraqi regime and the policy of complete isolation, which stemmed from this assessment (Moisi 1998: 133). French officials did not consider Saddam Hussein to be a maniacal leader, but in part at least, they viewed him as a rational politician. In a phone call with President Clinton in November 1998, Chirac explained that, “it is in Saddam’s interest to be victim of a military strike” (White House 1998). The French president elaborated that a military strike would run counter to US interests. Because Saddam was under pressure domestically and in the region, confrontation with UNSCOM was a way “to play the martyrdom card” and fend off domestic criticism. Lastly, France opposed the ‘rogue state’ concept, as well as British and US attempts to bend international rules as a matter of principle. France’s posture towards Iraq had been characterized by a desire to uphold international rules and particularly the
prerogatives of the UN Security Council (Boyer et al. 2002: 285-289; Wood 1998: 573). Thus, 10,000 French troops participated in Operation Desert Storm and France supported the implementation of the sanctions and inspections regime. In the course of the international confrontation with Iraq, the French increasingly criticized what they perceived as US manipulation of UN Security Council resolutions in order to pursue regime change in Iraq. As a result, the French withdrew from policing the northern no-fly zone and significantly scaled down their participation over southern Iraq in 1996 (Styan 2006: 175-185). The combination of humanitarian and economic interests on the one hand, and the fixation with the privileges of the Security Council, led France (and Russia) to advocate a policy distinct from the US. Iraq was to abide by its international obligations and in return should see “light at the end of the tunnel,” and hence a lift of the economic embargo (Moisi 1998: 134-136; Juster 1999: 106-107; Malone 2006: 158).

As a result, the French rejected military force but also strongly condemned Iraq’s defiance of UNSCOM. Clearly, they thought negotiations with Hussein’s regime were possible and legitimate for the sake of regional peace and security. In the long-term the French, hence, favored a policy of Iraq’s reintegration into the international community (Wood 1998; de Jonge Oudraat 2002: 146).

In summary, the US and the British framed the Iraqi threat as a wider issue of confronting ‘rogue states’, whereas the French insisted that disarmament and the reintegration of Iraq should be the central theme of international policy. While in the Balkans cases, consultation and at times shaming among allies helped overcome differences in perception and led to a common narrative for military intervention, such a convergence did not appear in the Iraq case. I argue that the high degree of US domestic unity and public support for military action and the lack of unity among European allies prevented rapprochement between France and the US.

6.4.2 The Unity of US Domestic Politics

In the Balkans cases, European attempts to influence US decision-making benefited from domestic access points for their arguments. The US administration was split on how to handle the issue of military force and congress and public opinion were not united in favor of a particular course of action; this was in direct opposition to the position of European allies. In the case of Iraq in the 1990s, neither of these two conditions was given.
Davis reports that US policy on Iraq had been subject to bureaucratic infighting especially during Clinton’s first tenure. While a hawkish faction around Madeleine Albright and Al Gore had argued in favor of regime change, a more conservative faction around Lake, Berger, Strobe Talbott and others had been in favor of continuing containment (Davis 2006). By 1998, these internal differences had been settled via a third route. National security advisor, Samuel Berger, outlined the intra-administration consensus. The operation’s short-term goal was to degrade Iraq’s capacities to proliferate WMDs, while regime change remained the long-term goal of the administration (Berger 1998).

Accordingly, stopping Saddam’s WMD proliferation with the help of military force constituted a robust and uniform consensus among Clinton’s senior foreign policy officials. More importantly, they jointly shared the assessment that Iraq’s repeated provocations put US credibility on the line in a way that necessitated the use of force. Noticeable differences only existed with respect to what could realistically be expected of air attacks. Here, Defense Secretary Cohen cautioned against the high hopes advanced by Madeleine Albright: punitive attacks by air would not lead to regime change, but to destabilization at best. In addition, air strikes could only degrade and not eliminate the threat from weapons of mass destruction as facilities could be rebuilt by the Iraqi regime in the medium-term (Youngs/Oaks 1998: 44; Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 190-191, 200). Thus, there appears to have been no deep-running wedge between officials in the US administration on the use of force and certainly even those who were less bellicose were still in favor of containment and against making further concessions to Iraq. French officials were unable to use consultation to team up with parts of the government and advance their position simply because nobody shared their view that a relaxation of containment would bring Iraq into compliance.

French attempts to persuade the US administration to take a different course of action or bind it in the Security Council were further impeded by the domestic situation in the US. During its second term, the Clinton administration “increasingly found itself caught between the contending views of the Congress and the Security Council” (Litwak 2000: 138). While the latter pushed for an easing of sanctions, the majority in congress demanded a tougher line and a more open commitment to regime change in Iraq.
Dual containment had enjoyed cross-party consensus during Clinton’s first term. After US military facilities in Saudi Arabia were attacked in 1996, and the pin-prick US attacks against southern Iraq in the same year, criticism of US policy in the Persian Gulf grew markedly (Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 188-193; Litwak 2000: 127-137).

Only a less vocal minority with less access to policy circles argued for an easing of sanctions or minor changes to containment. Retired policy officials had called for “differentiated containment” and demanded that forceful US action “should not be conditioned on allied approval but neither should the United States be perceived as ignoring allies’ concerns or taking their support for granted” (Brzenziski/Scowcroft/Murphy 1997). A group of left-wing democrats called on the Clinton administration to ease economic sanctions against Iraq (Marr 1998: 67). Humanitarian activists sought to raise awareness of the plight of the Iraqi people and at times complicated the government’s public diplomacy efforts to make the case for the use of military force (Albright 2003: 342; Litwak 2000: 134-135). “Although public opinion polls showed most Americans would support a military strike, the opposition’s intensity could not be dismissed” (Goldgeier/Chollet 2008: 199). Still, these dissenting voices did not develop into a coalition that France could have used to tip a mighty domestic balance in favor of military action.

The majority in the republican-controlled congress favored a more forceful approach to Iraq. The seeds of this criticism had initially been sown by conservatives largely outside of government.\footnote{As an advisor to the Dole Campaign, Paul Wolfowitz had put Iraq policy on the agenda. In 1997, the conservative Project for the New American Century (PNAC) directly advocated a “rollback strategy” to President Clinton and had lobbied for their position in congress (Goldgeier/Chollet 2008; PNAC 1998a, 1998b).} The crisis over UNSCOM inspections from late 1997 to early 1998 raised doubts over the merits of the dual containment policy on both sides of the aisle in congress. Although they started from different assumptions and motivations, republican and democratic senators and representatives raised the specter of ‘rollback’ or regime change. In most of their advocated scenarios, the United States was to punish Iraqi transgressions by air, and at the same nurture and support Iraqi opposition groups (Marr 1998: 72-78). Congressional pressure heated up after the standoff with Iraq in February 1998. Over the summer, several hearings put the administration on the defensive on all aspects of dual containment policy ranging from the state of the sanctions regime, the
possibilities of overthrowing Hussein, and the threat of WMD proliferation and ballistic missiles. An analysis of these congressional debates reveals that most members of congress started from the assumption that the current policies of containment had failed and that new more forceful measures were in order. The preliminary culmination of this pressure from congress came in October 1998, when the Iraqi Liberation Act passed the House of Representatives with overwhelming majority and the Senate with unanimous vote in early October 1998. The bill openly called for regime change in Iraq and committed the US government to support democratic forces in the country. Without enthusiasm, President Clinton signed the statement into law on October 31, 1998 (Katzman 2002; Litwak 2000). Operation Desert Fox took place immediately before the vote on Clinton’s impeachment in congress on December 19, 1998 and hence some congressional leaders criticized the timing of the campaign. Despite this domestic haggling, the substance of the decision garnered considerable republican support.

The turning domestic tide explains why the Clinton administration felt that time was running out and that deferring to France would have been a costly decision. Similarly, the French could not find a partner to work with in the United States. The US administration remained steadfast in its support for air strikes and used consultations with the French to inform them about future US steps but not to change its course.

The situation was even worse in congress where the French position met deep-seated skepticism. In November 1998, Republican Senator McCain had accused the French of leaking information about an imminent US attack to Iraq and, hence, undermined US interests. This episode underlined the fact that the French would not be able to persuade members of congress to vote against the use of force. Rather, the use of US military power even without unconditional allied consent was an accepted principle in the case of Iraq.


6.4.4 Unity among European Allies

As has been shown in the previous chapters, the impact of strategies based on voice opportunities and the power of persuasion is greater once European unity is achieved. Unity among allies increases the social pressure put on Washington and complicates its diplomatic efforts to gain agreement in international institutions. The Clinton administration was sensitive to the support of allies and “the notion of abandoning the search for consensus was never seriously considered” (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 44). The French were unable to capitalize on this principal willingness to forge consensus because the United States could count on most other European allies to support action in Iraq.

Most importantly, Britain, a member of the UN Security Council, followed the US line unconditionally. British officials only implicitly supported regime change but strongly supported the use of force (Ralph 2005; Blair 1998). In a debate in the British parliament, Foreign Minister Robin Cook neatly summarized the British position: “It is therefore important that we make sure that he understands that we are prepared to go all the way, if necessary, in enforcing his compliance with Security Council resolutions. The paradox is that if we want a diplomatic solution, we have to demonstrate that we are prepared to use military force” (Cook 1998a, § 721). Within the Security Council, Britain accepted and championed those resolutions that put more pressure on Iraq (Thompson 1009: 108-110; Malone 2006: 158-159). More importantly, the British echoed the US interpretation of these resolutions: Operation Desert Fox was in accordance with existing UN resolutions. In explaining the operation to parliament, Blair reiterated the arguments of the US. In delaying the use of force, the US and the UK had gone the extra mile to avoid military intervention. Yet, “Saddam Hussein is a man to whom a last chance to do right is just a further opportunity to do wrong. He is blind to reason” (Blair 1998). This record meant that the US and the UK had to attack as they had promised: “No warnings. No wrangling. No negotiation. No last-minute letters” (ibid.). Although many states and international lawyers rejected this justification, British support meant that the United States could claim to act with important allies and in accordance with international law (Ralph 2005; Thompson 2009; Bellamy 2004: 134-135). Thompson highlights the importance of these framing strategies: “For the American and the British, the stress

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146 Many other European allies, such as Germany and the Netherlands supported the operation, see “America’s Allies Give Support to Attack,” Washington Post, December 18, 1999.
on Iraq’s failure to cooperate with UNSCOM [...] fit into a larger framing strategy of involving the UN – its mandate and institutions – as frequently as possible in order to legitimize the resort to military force” (Thompson 2009: 120). Last but not least, the British had continually supported the US military by sending ships to the Gulf and providing aircraft to Desert Fox (Cordesman 1998).

6.5 Summary of the Case Study
Operation Desert Fox presents a failure to restrain the United States from undertaking military intervention. Supported by the British, the Clinton government attacked Iraq with a massive air campaign. French attempts to turn around US thinking in private consultations and by denying the direct UN authorization of military force turned out to be foredoomed in light of British support for US measures and domestic support for military intervention. At the same time, the French failure has to be set in perspective. Chirac and his government were seriously worried about Iraq’s WMD proliferation and Hussein’s continued defiance of UNSCOM. Accordingly, the French distanced themselves both from tougher UN resolutions and from the actions of Britain and the US, but they did not play their trump card: they did not veto or threaten to veto US action. In hindsight, the dispute between France and the US over Iraq in the 1990s foreshadows many of the central issues of 2003. The French held a quiet grudge, but accused the US (and Britain) of bending international law to serve their narrow purposes, even though there was room for negotiation. The US and Britain in turn blamed the French for underestimating the threat posed by Saddam to both the region and Western credibility.

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<td>No European influence on policy formulation</td>
<td>Limited French influence on timing of military intervention</td>
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**Process/Strategies of Influence-seeking**

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**Scope Conditions**

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<td>Intensity of Threat Perception</td>
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+ = outcome/process in congruence with hypothesis  
+/− = outcome/process partially confirms hypothesis  
− = outcome/process in contradiction to hypothesis

In 2003, when transatlantic allies clashed again over Iraq, many old quarrels concerning military interventions came full circle. For European allies, the situation in Iraq in 2002 and 2003 brought up the question of the grounds on which the use of force could be justified. Since the Kosovo intervention, the sincerity of US motives had been doubted by some Europeans. In Kosovo, bending international law for the sake of avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe became an accepted rationale. Yet, from a German and French perspective, humanitarian intervention was acceptable only as an exception to the rule. While Clinton’s intervention in Iraq had already caused disputes, the attempt by the US and the UK to rally support against Iraq in 2003 was the straw the broke the camel’s back. In the French and German view, connecting the fight against terrorism with a demonization of the Iraqi regime stretched the just causes of humanitarian intervention and spreading democratic values too thin to be acceptable.

For the US, the situation in Iraq in 2003 and the European reactions to the attacks of 9/11 led to the question of the political willingness and military capability of its European allies. Officials from the Bush administration took European opposition and concerns as further proof of their long-standing belief that continental Europe was free riding on the public good of international security provided by the United States. With unmatched military power at its disposal, the US pondered why it should bother about allies incapable of matching or contributing to US military force.

In this case, the transatlantic allies could not bridge these well-known cleavages and the Iraq crisis has since been termed the most severe transatlantic disagreement since the Suez crisis 50 years earlier. The eventual military intervention into Iraq largely presents a story of failure by European allies to influence US policy-making. The United Kingdom, which generally supported military action, can claim some limited influence with regard to the political dimension of the use of force. It was mainly due to British pressure that the Bush administration turned to the United Nations for approval and that disarmament became the major public justification for military action. In contrast to Britain, France and Germany eventually declined their support for military intervention under any circumstance and failed in their more ambitious attempt to restrain the United States from using armed force altogether.
7.1 Introduction to the Conflict

In the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox, the existing differences between transatlantic allies on Iraq remained unchanged; this stalled the implementation of sweeping reforms to the inspection and sanctions regime. In 1999 after an independent review\(^{147}\) and prolonged negotiations in the Security Council, UN Security Council resolution 1284 created UNSCOM’s successor – the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In a nod to French and Russian criticism, UNMOVIC was to be staffed by independent personnel and to conduct inspections and monitoring simultaneously (Malone 2006: 165-167; Thompson 2009: 127-129). Iraq capitalized on the lack of international unity and barred inspections until late 2002. The ensuing two-year gap in inspections severely affected Iraq’s relationship with the international community. Without regular inspections, the international community lacked adequate intelligence about the nature and extent to which Saddam’s regime had sought to revive its WMD-programs (Thompson 2009: 123-125).

In addition, reforms of the sanctions regime remained limited. Under the Clinton administration, some efforts had been made to ease the humanitarian situation, while at the same time the US and the UK had tightly controlled imports into Iraq. This policy had led to the accusation by France, that the US and UK were abusing the sanctions regime to contribute to regime change (Malone 2006: 119-120; Texeira da Silva 2004: 213). Prior to 9/11, the Bush administration had sought to develop the sanctions policy by introducing ‘smart sanctions’ as a way of clearly targeting the Iraqi regime while avoiding humanitarian costs.\(^{148}\) However, this proposal also failed to fashion a rapprochement of international approaches towards Iraq.

By the summer of 2001, an adaptation of containment became the international policy vis-à-vis Iraq, albeit more by default than by design. France (as well as Russia and China) remained committed to a relaxation of sanctions; and these countries envisioned that inspections would slowly turn to monitoring the remains of Iraq’s WMD-potential. Successive US administrations and their British allies continued to straddle the fence by pursuing ‘containment plus’. On the one hand, they kept within

\(^{147}\) Under the chair of the former Brazilian Ambassador, Celso Amorim, the UN had created an independent panel in order to review the future arrangements of a UN body to verify the disarmament of Iraq (Texeira da Silva 2004: 212).

the confines of the UN framework. Although the Bush administration’s disdain for international cooperation and institutions invoked intense European criticism (Moens 2004: 88-116; Forman/Patrick 2001; Skidmore 2005), no major changes were announced with regard to Iraq policy. On the other hand, both countries acted in pursuit of their long-term goal of regime change outside of the UN framework: the enforcement of no-fly zones was pursued more vigorously, efforts to support regime change in Baghdad were increased, and the sanctions regime was kept in place as tightly as possible (Thompson 2009: 125; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 93-94). Malone even speaks of a “tunnel vision” that in turn decreased allied support for tougher policies because Washington’s intentions were seriously doubted (Malone 2006: 170; Thompson 2009: 183-185). International and allied policy on Iraq, thus, remained in a somewhat precarious state where differences were not bridged but glossed over.

Throughout this thesis, I have argued that alliance politics and influence-seeking by European allies is best observed during branching points where policy approaches diverge. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York constituted such a crisis over which allied policies clearly parted. As we know today, 9/11 fundamentally changed US policy on Iraq not because there was any convincing intelligence on WMD in Iraq or a credible link to Al Qaeda. However, the attacks changed the acceptability of certain threats from a US and a British point of view. The next chapter will briefly outline how allies defined their policies vis-à-vis Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11.

7.2 Allied Approaches to Iraq

In the wake of the terrorist attacks, previously existing differences between transatlantic allies were aggravated and this affected approaches to Iraq and the possibility of a military intervention.

Immediately after the attacks, the Bush administration placed Iraq firmly in the context of the ‘war on terror’. In a process spanning Bush’s state of the union address in January 2002 to the publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002, the US position on Iraq developed as follows.

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149 According to Gordon and Shapiro, hawks in the Bush administration favoring regime change by force did not win the upper hand during a first policy review in early 2001 (2004: 94).

150 The NSS provides the fullest account of the US government’s thinking at the time. Bush had earlier elaborated parts of the strategy against Iraq in his state of the union address in January 2002 and his speech to West Point graduates in June 2002. In the literature, there has been a debate over the extent
In the view of the Bush administration, the US found itself in a position of “unprecedented and unequaled strength and influence in the world” (White House 2002: 1). The Bush administration’s security policies started from “a fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world” (Ikenberry 2002: 49) in which its primacy and military preponderance in particular was to be preserved. Sustaining primacy and guarding the nation’s security were seen as the utmost priorities (Krahmann 2005; Cox 2004).

The proliferation of WMD and potential links to terrorism was named as one of the three major threats to US security after 9/11 (Moens 2004: 165-167). The perception of a nexus between terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction gained ground in the fall of 2001, when intelligence services picked up traffic about plans to attack a major US city with a dirty bomb (Moens 2004: 165). The US threat scenarios were based on the following assumptions: terrorists would seek WMD to inflict as much harm as possible. ‘Rogue states’ willing to weaken the United States were viewed as likely comrades in arms. Hence, the Bush administration held that countries seeking WMD and potentially sympathizing with terrorists were a particular threat to US security interests (Moens 2004: 167; Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 120-121; Woodward 2004: 45-48; Rumsfeld 2002; Gupta 2008). Iraq clearly fell into that category and the Bush administration imputed Iraq to be the only country with the capacity and intent to harm the United States. In his state of the union address in January 2002, Bush declared that the alleged link between terrorists and the ‘rogue states’ of Iraq, Iran and North Korea constituted an “axis of evil”; Bush would “not stand by as peril draws closer and closer” (Bush 2002a).

In response to these dangers, the Bush administration argued, concepts such as containment and deterrence no longer sufficed (White House 2002: 15; Ikenberry 2002: 50-51). Vice President Cheney claimed, “containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists” (Cheney 2002). Hence, the US administration claimed a duty to “preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives” (Bush 2002b). Recognizing “our best defense is a good offense” (White House 2002: to which the ‘Bush doctrine’ is a revolution or more of a continuation of US selective unilateralism (Daalder/Lindsay 2003; Monten 2005; Berenskoetter 2005).

151 After 9/11, Bush did not prioritize Iraq. Rather, perpetrators of the attack and al Qaeda’s infrastructure were perceived as posing an immediate threat and were the main target (Woodward 2004: 25-26). Accordingly, states assumed to be harboring and financing terrorists were singled out as posing an immediate danger and became the focus of US revenge (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 117).
the NSS of 2002 elevates preemptive military action to doctrinal status. In response to and in anticipation of major threats, the United States proclaimed the right to use military force to forestall attacks against its territory, blackmail or threats against its allies. The notion of preemption was well received by conservative officials who prior to the 9/11 attacks had already been willing to “rely less on traditional diplomacy to advance America’s national interest than on the assertive use of military power” (Reyn 2004: 143; also Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 43-44). Additionally, these officials were not worried about the fact that making use of US military potential could be perceived as inherently dangerous (Ikenberry 2004: 9; Hoffmann 2004).

On the principal dimension, the Bush administration argued that Iraq should face military intervention if it did not fulfill the demands of the international community. The NSS stipulated that no direct UN authorization for such action was necessary. The US government should use armed force in order to preempt immediate and potential threats emerging from the terrorism/rogue-state nexus (White House 2002; Thompson 2009: 155-157). The Bush administration further argued that regime change was a legitimate political purpose of intervention, since Saddam Hussein’s regime would never change. In changing the political authorities in Baghdad, military intervention would also serve the broader political purpose of promoting universal democratic values and serve the credibility of the entire international community (Daalder/Lindsay 2003; Monten 2005). On the tactical dimension, the United States reserved itself the right to unilateral action (Bush 2002 a, 200b; White House 2002; Daalder/Lindsay 2003). The increased willingness to use force was related to the deployment of overwhelming force – hence, “fighting to win” (Dunne 2003: 286). Lastly, the Bush administration did not envision a nation-building role for US forces. Tony Blair, Britain’s prime minister, was often portrayed as Bush’s poodle (Pond 2004; Legro 2011). The poodle imagery suggests that the UK followed the US without the claim to an independent role-shaping policy. This picture is certainly wrong. Although the British shared many assumptions with the US and did not object to the use of force, the UK government staked out its own position when it came to the political and tactical dimension. As the chapter will show, the UK was only

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152 A more detailed discussion of the development of US policies will follow in section 7.3.
partially successful in prevailing with its position. Only the British prime minister concurred that 9/11 had fundamentally changed the context in which transatlantic allies should deal with ‘rogue states’ pursuing WMD (Blair 2002b; Hogget 2005): “My anxiety is that yes, we cannot take that risk, that after September 11, the calculus of risk had to change and change fundamentally” (Blair 2010: 5). While Blair and Bush agreed that the potential danger posed by Iraq had to be reevaluated in the context of 9/11, there were also remarkable differences between their positions. A former UK ambassador to Washington remarked about Bush and Blair that “they’re not coming from identical positions; they come from positions which intersect” (Meyer 2003).

Two tenets formed the bedrock of the British position vis-à-vis the use of force in Iraq. First, the British stance on armed force was deeply influenced by an attempt to preserve the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. The British approach tied its policy choices closely to those of the US, while at the same time attempting to bridge transatlantic differences (Wallace 2005; Baylis 2006). Second, the UK’s Iraq policy was deeply influenced by Blair’s vision of an ‘ethical foreign policy’. Accordingly, the Labour government’s foreign policy envisaged an international order “that would rest on the foundation of international norms and principles, on the United Nations as the locus of international legitimacy and security, an on a united western world that would propagate these principles” (Bluth 2004: 857). While the British agreed with the US on the futility of continuing containment and on the urgency of dealing with Iraq, the Labour government’s approach was based on distinctly internationalist premises (McHugh 2010: 489; Bluth 2004: 874-875; Kennedy-Pipe/Vickers 2007: 217).

As a consequence, the British government took the *principled position* that preemptive action in general and armed intervention against Iraq would not be excluded (Kennedy-Pipe/Vickers 2007: 217; Bluth 2004: 884-886; Blair 2010: 11-12). In contrast to their US partners, the British justified their advocacy of military solutions less with the threat posed by Iraq to the West (Straw 2002a). Instead, the Labor government focused on the dangers of global proliferation, the stability of the Middle East, and the gross human rights violations committed by the Iraqi regime (Blair: 2002; Bluth 2004: 871; Kennedy-Pipe/Vickers 2007: 211). From Blair’s perspective, Iraqi WMD proliferation was a problem of international order in an
interdependent world and bringing Iraq into compliance was morally right and in Britain’s best interests (Blair 2011: 22-25).

Based on this internationalist rationale, the British disagreed with the Bush administration on the political purpose behind the use of armed force. Regime change could not be the only objective advocated in public (Grainger 2002; Goldsmith 2002). Rather Iraq’s disarmament should be at the center of US and British efforts, as Foreign Minister Jack Straw advised Blair in early 2002: “[R]egime per se is no justification for military action; it could form part of the method of any strategy, but not a goal. […] Regime change is an essential part of the strategy by which we have to achieve our ends – the elimination of Iraq’s WMD capacity” (Straw 2002a). Setting out from internationalist premises and focusing on disarmament implied a subtle difference between the British and the US approach on Iraq. In principle, the UK government did not rule out the use of force against Hussein. Similarly, the British did not object to regime change as a legitimate goal; however, this could not be stated in public. Setting out Iraq’s disarmament and compliance with previous UN resolutions as the goal of British policy meant that force could only be used under certain circumstances: all diplomatic options to achieve the disarmament of Iraq would have to be exhausted and a new UN resolution would have to specifically authorize the renewed use of force.

Lastly, the British diverged from the US approach on the tactical dimension of military intervention. In late 2002 and early 2003, the UK advocated intense post-war planning. British officials feared a collapse of the state and ethnic warfare (Sharp 2003/4: 78; Cross 2009; Ricketts 2009; Boyce 2011). Additionally, the UK had been keener than the US to establish a vital role for the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq (Straw 2011: 99-101; Chaplin 2009).

France and Germany did not concur with the analysis by the US and UK of the dangers posed by Iraq. Politicians from both countries rebuffed links between Iraq and the war on terror: “We cannot reduce the problems of the world to the single dimension of the struggle against terrorism, despite its pressing importance, nor rely on the predominance of military means.”153 The post-9/11 situation did not call for a new risk assessment of international threats in general nor fundamental change to the rules of the international security game. The French reiterated that the ultimate

authority for legitimizing force rested with the UN Security Council (Coicaud et al.
2006: 236; Howorth 2003/4: 177; Soutou 2005: 117). In Harald Müller’s analysis, the
German government’s approach to international Islamist terrorism was based on a
particular “German perspective” of international order “based on multilateralism and
international law, with the United Nations playing a central role, and of a continuing
reluctance to use military instruments to achieve political goals” (Müller 2006: 267).
Germany’s continuing military restraint implied that force could only be used as a last
resort, in accordance with international law and in exceptional cases for humanitarian
purposes (Szabo 2006; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003; Kaim 2003). These premises, of
course, fundamentally differed from the Bush administration’s notion of US primacy,
multilateralism à la carte, and preemption (Müller 2006; Szabo 2006: 131; Rudolf
2006: 141).

Moreover, the French and German caution on the use of force disputed the argument
that Iraq’s disarmament should be reviewed in the context of the war on terror as the
Bush administration suggested. As Joschka Fischer succinctly said to Donald
Rumsfeld “excuse me, I am not convinced.”154 While Iraq’s attempt of WMD
proliferation was not disputed, neither the German nor the French government
perceived Iraq as a major threat to its neighbors or to the West. The success of Iraq’s
weapons proliferation was highly uncertain and links between Hussein’s regime and
Al Qaeda could not be established with any confidence (Fischer 2011: 119-122;
refusal to support military intervention stemmed from a more positive assessment of
peaceful alternatives and a more negative assessment of the consequences of armed
conflict. Paris and Berlin viewed containment as largely successful and as a valid
method of achieving disarmament. Inspections had overseen the destruction of most
of Iraq’s arsenal (Hoffmann 2004: 9; Beltran 2002; Wall 2004: 130; Harnisch 2004:
15; Schröder 2002b, 2007): “One must not be perfectionist in the inspections to a
point where it becomes unrealistic. […] This is why it was important to maintain in
Iraq the teams of inspectors and all the ongoing control mechanisms. Such a solution
was certainly not ideal but it was better than having no control at all over Iraq’s
programs” (Levitte in Cogan 2003: 197).

Initially, though, the two countries slightly diverged on the principal dimension of the use of force. The French stance over the principled dimension of military intervention developed from highly restrictive consent in 2002 to complete repudiation in early 2003. In contrast, the German government publicly voiced early and clear opposition to an invasion of Iraq breaking, as some saw it, fifty years of close German-US cooperation (Kamp 2003). Both allies, however, emphasized that any use of force required the consent of the UN Security Council since the US idea of a preemptive doctrine could easily set a dangerous precedent and start a cascade in which preemption was abused to settle international disputes by means of force (Fischer 2011: 87, 202-205; Schmidt 2005; Coicaud et al. 2006: 241).

Both countries rejected regime change as a legitimate political purpose for the use of military force, although officials did not dispute the cruel and dictatorial nature of the Iraqi regime (Beltran 2002; Müller 2006; Harnisch 2004; Dettke 2009). As President Chirac put it: “One can wish for it. I do wish for it, naturally. But a few principles and a little order are needed to run the affairs of the world” (Chirac 2002). For some time, the French government, in contrast to its German counterparts, considered disarmament a legitimate reason to use military force against Iraq, assuming that the UN Security Council would authorize such actions and unmistakable evidence of Iraq’s violations could be presented (Chirac 2002; Thompson 2009). For the French, military intervention against Iraq was initially not excluded but it was viewed as only acceptable as a last resort.

Given their preference for a diplomatic solution, tactical issues were less widely discussed. Yet, both French and German policymakers “saw little reason to infer from history that Iraq could be stabilized and democratized” (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 88). Accordingly, they consistently warned of religious and ethnic warfare in Iraq that could have a destabilizing potential for the Middle East as a whole (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 89-90; Hausmann 2005: 162-163; Beltran 2002; Schröder 2002; Dettke 2009: 162). Wolfgang Ischinger, the German ambassador in Washington, compared the discussion to the transatlantic negotiations over the future in the Balkans: “I am surprised at the rather complete absence of a viable ‘exit strategy’ debate following an

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155 Most of the literature focuses on the motives behind the red-green (German) government’s resistance focusing either on the German election campaign (Gordon/Shapiro 2004; Katzenstein 2002: 8; Fischer 2011: 42-23; Harnisch 2004: 32) or the long-term emancipation of German foreign policy (Zimmerman 2005; Forsberg 2005; Veit 2006).
attack on Iraq. It seems to me that, in this case, questions about ‘the day after’ are even more important than in the case of the Balkan conflict” (Ischinger 2002).

Table 10. Summary of allied approaches to Iraq in 2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principled</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, as last</td>
<td>Yes, as last resort</td>
<td>No, under any circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>• War on terror</td>
<td>resort (2002)</td>
<td>• UN-based international order</td>
<td>• International law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preemption</td>
<td>• Ethical</td>
<td>• No, under any circumstances</td>
<td>• Iraq poses no threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Selective multilateralism</td>
<td>foreign policy</td>
<td>(2003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Neither regime change nor disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Light footprint; nation-building</td>
<td>UN in lead role; extensive nation-building</td>
<td>Danger of state collapse and ethnic strife;</td>
<td>Danger of state collapse and ethnic strife;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>unnecessary</td>
<td>necessary</td>
<td>extensive nation-building</td>
<td>extensive nation-building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3 The Development of US Policies

Rather than providing a full chronological account of the events and decisions leading to the war in Iraq, the following section discusses the development of US policies in light of allied differences. In a first phase, the UK influenced the US definition of the political purpose and the public rationale behind intervention. In the second and third phase, all three European allies failed to have an impact on the principal decision to intervene and the tactical implementation of intervention.

7.3.1 Preparation for War and Choosing the UN Path

The Bush administration laid out its policies vis-à-vis Iraq during a first phase that spans from November 2001 to September 2002. I argue that Britain played a leading part in influencing the procedural path to the war and the public definition of the political purpose of intervention. In September 2002, the Bush administration publicly settled on disarmament as the major purpose of intervention and turned to the United Nations. Additionally, British and US officials constructed a public justification for

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156 Detailed monographs are provided by Gordon/Shapiro (2004), Woodward (2004), Thompson (2009), and Harvey (2011).
military intervention. In parallel, preparation for military intervention against Iraq took place largely in secret except for some consultation and involvement of British officials. The Bush government gradually developed the cornerstone of its Iraq policy during the first half of 2002 but it did not settle on exact procedures on how to accomplish them. Bush’s state of the union address identified Iraq as one of the major threats to US security, and Bush had already sketched out his strategy of preemption and in front of West Point graduates in June 2002 (Bush 2002a, 2002b). The ‘terrorism/rogue-state nexus’ had brought international policy to a crossroads. The containment approach was futile in light of these new dangers. Hence, Bush claimed the United States had the duty to use “preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives” (Bush 2002b). Yet during 2002, US declaratory policy was characterized by a marked ambiguity. In an interview in April, President Bush told reporters: “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go.”\footnote{“Bush: Saddam needs to go,” \textit{The Guardian}, April 5, 2002.} At the same time, senior US officials repeated that no plans for war existed at that time (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 98-99; Moens 2004: 170-173). This ambiguity was in part due to an ongoing debate within the administration as to the right goals and approach to Iraq.\footnote{As section 7.5.1 will show in more detail, an internal US debate was raging about whether further UN approval for military action was necessary whether it would be beneficial.} Secretary of State Colin Powell and the British government argued that the public rationale for military action should focus on disarmament rather than regime change and that getting UN approval was an essential prerequisite to military action. With Bush’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2002, in which he turned to the UN to deal with Iraq’s disarmament, it became clear that the British (in cooperation with the state department) had succeeded in framing the path to war in Iraq (Woodward 2004: 175-178; Blair 2010; Moens 2004: 115). In parallel to this effort of defining US political goals, British and US officials began constructing a public case for invasion based on the allegation that Iraq had the will and capability to proliferate WMD and to share them with terrorists. Betts argues that focusing on disarmament was crucial for international as well as public support: “Neutralizing WMD was a necessary condition [for public support], since no one but fanatics would have lined up behind Bush” (Betts 2007: 598). This focus on disarmament was highly consequential for the course of events. A case for military
intervention had to be built not on the evil nature of Saddam’s regime but on the proof of Iraq’s efforts to proliferate WMD and its links to terrorist organizations (Woodward 2004: 173-179).

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction nor did the Iraqi regime have any relations with Al Qaeda. Today we also know that this intelligence failure has not been a deplorable case of omission but one of deliberate construction by the Bush and Blair governments. In July 2002, Blair’s private secretary plainly acknowledged the context of US decision-making: “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” (Rycroft 2002). The case of alleged Iraqi WMDs was built on unreliable and insufficient human intelligence, and dubious satellite imaginary data. The conclusions drawn were based less on the data than assumptions about Saddam’s motivations and past failures to disarm; and the intelligence services failed to clearly communicate the weakness of their findings (Butler 2004: 104-115; Prados/Ames 2010; Betts 2007: 599-606; Phythian 2006: 404-413; Robb/Silbermann 2005). Officials reversed the traditional relationship between the intelligence services and the government. Intelligence on disarmament was used to publicly justify a decision for regime change that had been made prior and independent of the knowledge of Iraq’s proliferation efforts (Woodward 2004: 244-250; Prados/Ames 2010). As a consequence, analysts were encouraged to emphasize information validating the administration’s approach and officials cherry-picked the information consistent with the convictions of their political superiors (Phythian 2006: 415-417; Fitzgerald/Lebow 2007; Pillar 2006). Again, the United States undertook this effort in cooperation with its British partners but deliberately excluded French and German officials.

Lastly, the United States started secret military planning for a campaign in Iraq and excluded European allies from the process. Woodward reports that Bush had instructed Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks to arrange secret planning for the war as early as November 2001 (Woodward 2004: 30). The United States’ Central Command (CENTCOM) had briefed the president repeatedly on evolving plans during spring 2002 and presented the first comprehensive plan as early as July 2002 (Prados/Ames 2010). The planning effort was not only secret but also designed in a
way that would minimize US reliability on European assets, since the campaign was mainly based on “surprise, speed, shock, and risk” (Rumsfeld 2001).

Donnelly argues that two “conflicting impulses” (Donnelly 2003: 34) were at the center of the planning debate: on the one hand, the US needed to plan and deploy a force large enough to win the fight and secure peace. On the other hand, the Pentagon and other players within the US bureaucracy wanted to keep the force as small as possible for different reasons: to retain the element of surprise, prove the concept of military transformation, avoid large nation-building efforts, and lastly in order not to preclude a diplomatic solution (Donnelly 2004: 34-36; Gordon/Trainor 2006: 48-52).

Furthermore, pre-war planning was heavily influenced by the experience the Pentagon had gained since 2001 in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the plan was focused on a light footprint, speed and surprise, a reliance on superior technology and communications, and lastly joint actions by regular troops and special forces (Moens 2004: 191; Biddle 2004: 2). Much attention was paid to deployment schemes and troop numbers, whereas post-war stabilization received little attention and care (Bensahel 2006). These momentous omissions were partly premised on the assumption that the Iraqi administration would largely remain intact and that US and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators (Bensahel et al. 2008: 22-23; Dennison 2006/7: 29-30).

Given these various premises, allied contributions were not of particularly high value for the US. Only a small number of the allies would have been able to match the large US contingents, deploy them speedily, and provide high quality communications and special forces. In the first half of 2002, the Pentagon started to move forces and logistics to the region (Prados/Ames 2010; Woodward 2004: 136-140). As documents by the British government reveal, UK military officers were brought into the US planning cycle in July 2002 (Watkins 2002), but reviews generally hold that the UK did not influence the outcome of these planning efforts.

7.3.2 Seeking Compromise in the United Nations Security Council

In a second phase, which lasted from September 2002 to November 2002, the US sought international approval and negotiated a compromise with governments that opposed a war with Iraq, particularly France and Russia. In the end, UN Security

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159 Of course, the US war plan was heavily reliant on allied bases and over-flight rights. In March 2002, Vice President Cheney traveled to the region and secured this vital support early on (Woodward 2004: 11-113).
Council Resolution 1441 marked a least common denominator compromise, which did not resolve the underlying differences among transatlantic allies.

President Bush entered the UN in ultimatum mode placing the onus on action before the world community. In his speech to the UN General Assembly, he maintained: “Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant? The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective and respected and successful” (Bush 2002c). While Bush pledged to seek a new resolution to enforce the disarmament of Iraq, he also underlined that the US would turn to unilateral action in light of international inaction and Hussein’s defiance.

After seven weeks of negotiation, the Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002. The text presents a compromise between the US and the UK’s vision for inspections on the one hand, and the French proposal on the other.

The US and the UK had proposed an intrusive inspection regime with access to ‘presidential sites,’ the expansion of the no-fly and no-drive zones, and with special inspection missions by the permanent members of the Security Council. According to Moens, “the model can be called ‘inspections as verification’. […] Thus, following a ‘tell it all’ WMD declaration that the Iraqi government needed to make, the UN inspectors would be completely free to go anywhere they wanted” (Moens 2004: 178-179). The US envisioned the resolution as providing a clear mandate for the use of force: the US and British draft resolution was concluded under Chapter VII and would have permitted Security Council members to use “all necessary means” in case of Iraqi non-compliance (Thompson 2009: 141; Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 140). In contrast, the French had argued that Iraqi non-compliance would be established only if full disclosure was not provided and cooperation with inspectors was not forthcoming. Moreover, France had opposed an automatic trigger for the use of force (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 110-114; Cogan 2003: 197-203).

The eventual text of Resolution 1441 took up elements deemed crucial by both sides and represented a least common denominator. In line with the calls by Britain and the US, the resolution declared Iraq to be in “material breach with its obligations,” demanded a full account of its weapons programs, and unconditional access for inspections. Further, it threatened “serious consequences” in case of Iraq’s defiance (UN Doc. S/Res. 1441: preamble, § 1, 3, 13). Yet, the bar for Iraqi non-compliance
was defined in accordance with the French proposal as incomplete information and a lack of cooperation with UNMOVIC (UN Doc. S/Res. 1441 § 4). Paragraph 11 and 12 suggested that the Security Council would take up the matter of Iraq in case of further non-compliance (ibid. §11-12).

Both proponents and opponents of military action against Iraq welcomed the passage of Resolution 1441. “Chirac and Bush agreed on the same resolution, but had very different expectations about what that piece of paper would do” (Moens 2004: 181.) For the United States and the UK it successfully enlisted broad international support for a strong and intrusive inspection regime; furthermore, they interpreted Resolution 1441 as constituting a final opportunity and an authorization of force (Harvey 2011: 220-220). From the perspective of the French and the Russians, the resolution imposed significant restraints on US action because it focused on disarmament rather than regime change and forestalled a quasi-automatic use of force (Thompson 2009: 142-143; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 113-114; Byers 2004).

7.3.3 Diplomatic Endgame and Operation Iraqi Freedom

Resolution 1441 had delayed the question of military intervention, but by February 2003, transatlantic allies faced a branching point since “diplomats on each side of the UN debate were applying different standards (constructs) for measuring ‘success’ and ‘progress’” (Harvey 2011: 201).

Inspections had resumed in early December 2002 and continued until late March 2003. The reports by UNMOVIC’s chair, Hans Blix, did not produce definite results: Iraqi reports on its WMD programs remained incomplete, yet inspectors had been largely able to do their work. They had found no ‘smoking gun,’ and as such, no evidence of hidden weapons (Blix 2003). These mixed results elicited fundamentally different reactions from the UK and the US on the one side, and the French, Germans and Russians on the other (Thompson 2009: 144-149; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 115-118). Since the French and German government “had never expected full cooperation and were therefore not surprised when it did not materialize” (Gordon/Shapiro: 143), they argued that inspections should be given more time. In contrast, the United States and the United Kingdom propped up their preparations for war. Bush publicly stated that Hussein “is delaying. He’s deceiving. He’s asking for time. He’s playing hide-
and-seek with inspectors. [...] One thing is for certain, he’s not disarming.”

In this final phase, France and Germany failed to restrain the eventual use of armed force by the United States. At the same time, the United Kingdom failed to significantly influence US efforts to plan for the aftermath of the intervention.

Even before the reports by UNMOVIC were issued, the United States had stepped up military planning despite French and German opposition. By the end of January 2003, up to 140,000 troops had been deployed in the region; within NATO, the US had used Article IV to request consultations about how the alliance could support Turkey in case of a war with Iraq (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 118). Colin Powell reported to the Security Council on alleged Iraqi efforts to proliferate its WMD on February 5, 2003 (Thompson 2009: 147). UNMOVIC’s second report in late February 2003 “was the straw the broke the camel’s back. Bush felt completely trapped in the old ‘inspect as you can game’” (Moens 2004: 189). Even Colin Powell had concluded after Blix’ testimony that war was inevitable: “Force should be a last resort [...] but it must be a resort” (in Woodward 2004: 318).

From late January to late March 2003, the Bush administration delayed the start of military intervention in order to get a UN resolution explicitly authorizing force. Facing stark domestic opposition, Blair had called on Bush to try a last-ditch diplomatic effort at the UN. This effort, however, met resistance from France, Germany, and Russia. Russia threatened to vote against the resolution, and the US and the UK were unable to garner the nine votes necessary to pass the resolution in the Security Council during the next few weeks (Malone 2006: 197-203). Meanwhile the United States showed little flexibility when it came to negotiating benchmarks for Iraqi disarmament or wooing states on the Security Council opposed to war (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 144; Thompson 2009: 171-172; Pond 2004: 73-74).

Eventually, efforts failed to restrain the US by vetoing a UN resolution or by changing its text and make war dependent on international approval. On March 16, 2003, the leaders of Spain, the United States, and Britain met on the Azores to declare their decision to go to war. Bush, once more, underlined his unchanged interpretation of resolution 1441: “That resolution was passed unanimously and its logic is inescapable; the Iraqi regime will disarm itself, or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed

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by force. And the regime has not disarmed itself.”¹⁶¹ A vote on a second resolution was never cast. Three days later the United States attacked Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

The major combat operations of OIF achieved their immediate goal of toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in only 21 days at lower costs and higher speed than many had initially anticipated (Biddle et al. 2004). The US not only outranked its allies in numbers but it executed its war plan without significant influence by contributing allies or those states that permitted the use of bases. Three indicators lead to this conclusion.

First, the invasion of Iraq followed the Franks-Rumsfeld plan and timetable, despite the strain this put, for example, on British forces (Murray/Scales 2003: 135-136). After an early failure to decapitate the regime, the US, aided by British forces and Australian special forces, launched a full-scale invasion. In the north, special forces held the line between the Kurdish autonomous province and Iraq; in the west, Australian and US special forces captured major oil fields and missile sites to prevent an attack against Israel. The major advances on the capital were launched from the south from bases in Kuwait because Turkey had denied access and passage through its territory. While the British forces took Basra and held the southeast of the country, US forces moved north to attack the Iraqi republican guards defending Baghdad. Heavy air strikes – to destroy Iraq’s military facilities and provide close support for advancing ground troops – continued through the entire operation (Biddle et al. 2004; Garden 2003; Taylor/Youngs 2003: 21-58; Gordon/Trainor 2006).

Second, there is no indication that British officials held major objections to the way in which the Iraq campaign was executed. Gardner reports that UK commanders made no use of their “national red cards” to object to particular plans (Gardner 2004). Moreover, UK military officers had been embedded in the planning process of each service. The UK’s naval and air assets were integrated completely into the US chain of command (Gardner 2004). The British 1st Armored Division fought in a discrete geographical area in southern Iraq but was placed under the command of the US Marine Expeditionary Force; and the UK’s special forces were commanded by the US Combined Forces Special Operations Component (Carney 2003: 6-9). Murray and Scale testify to the unprecedented level of US and British cooperation which “should

put paid to the nonsense that allies can no longer fight effectively alongside the technologically advanced military forces of the United States” (Murray/Scales 2003: 153).

Third, the close military coordination cannot hide the fact that serious differences existed with regard to one tactical aspect, namely post-conflict planning. Within the British military and civilian establishment widespread skepticism existed as to the adequacy of the US effort (Short 2010: 58-63; Straw 2011: 120-123; Boyce 2011). On US preparations for a power vacuum and ethnic strife, the former British chief of defense staff notes the British were “not finding a very helpful picture in terms of their own preparations for that sort of assessment. Of course, that’s not an assessment with which they agreed anyway” (Boyce 2011: 68-69). British officials have given ample testimony to their failure to influence the US decision-making process on the post-invasion aftermath. The Bush administration’s officials refused to adequately plan for the breakdown of state institutions or commit themselves to providing the United Nations with a central role in post-conflict reconstruction (Whitley 2011: 4; McHugh 2010: 485; Bensahel 2006; Short 2010: 58-65; Straw 2011: 118-123; Blair 2010: 172-184). Judged by the accessible records, the British were closely involved in planning and executing the Iraq invasion. They claim to have had considerable influence, but where opinions diverged it seems they could not really make that impact felt.

In conclusion, the Bush administration’s policy choices in the context of the second Iraq intervention present an extreme case, since there seems to have been no European influence. Allies, such as France and Germany, did not support the principal decision to use force and could not dissuade the Bush administration from conducting military intervention. Nor did these allies share the political purpose of the military intervention (regime change). The UK must be credited since it influenced the initial US focus on disarmament and the return to the UN. However, Tony Blair did not object to regime change per se. Tactically, Operation Iraqi Freedom appears to have been an essentially all out US war with a significant UK contribution but without significant British influence.

7.4 Alliance Politics: Strategies of Allied Influence-seeking

Only the British government could claim some influence on the political dimensions of US policy vis-à-vis Iraq. This limited impact stands in contrast to the frenzy of
allied activity aimed at changing the course of US policy. I find that attempts to use the power of persuasion and the voice opportunities within international institutions were the preferred strategies used by all three European allies.

7.4.1 The Power of Persuasion and the Principal Dimension of Force

As in the previous cases of military intervention, European allies sought to influence US goals – this time in Iraq – and the principal dimension of the use force with strategies based on persuasion. Consultation as co-determination provided an important tool for the British government. No other country was involved so closely in US planning and thinking about Iraq policy. Commenting on his visit to Bush’s range in Crawford in April 2002, Blair said he had wanted to “get a real sense from the Americans as to what they wanted to do; and this would be best done between myself and President Bush” (Blair 2010: 41). Prime Minister Blair relied extensively on his personal relationship with Bush and this relationship ensured that the British government was the only one informed about US intentions (McHugh 2010: 465; Blair 2010: 40). The relationship, however, did not necessarily imply influence. As I show in section 7.5.1, the internal unity of the Bush administration explains the varying levels of UK influence on US policy.

A trans-governmental coalition between the US State Department and British diplomats ensured that disarmament was chosen to be the public political pretense for intervention. The UK’s legal advisers made it clear that disarmament and not regime change was the only legitimate goal of Britain’s policy and that a UN mandate was highly desirable (Goldsmith 2002; 2010; Grainger 2002; Woodward 2004: 162-163). Con Coughlin, Blair’s senior aide, summed up British resistance: “We knew Bush was committed to regime change but that was not something we could support publicly for all kinds of reasons. As far as we were concerned, there was a smart and a dumb way of doing it, and we believed the smart way of doing it was through the UN” (Coughlin 2006). When the issue of a UN mandate was debated within the US administration in July 2002, Blair even made a personal appeal and wrote a letter to Bush urging him to seek approval from the Security Council (Woodward 2004: 177-179). In doing so “Blair was a voice of restraint in tandem with Secretary of State Colin Powell” (Sharp 2003/4: 66-67). Powell had vociferously maintained the importance of gaining the support of allies and the world community and had found the president open to this idea despite opposition by influential cabinet members, such
as Rumsfeld and Cheney (Woodward 2004: 150-175; Harvey 2011). British arguments reinforced Powell’s persuasive power (McHugh 2010: 481-483; Bluth 2004: 879; Moens 2004: 175; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 107). Furthermore, initial attempts to secure a second resolution authorizing war in February 2003 were premised on British arguments. Blair argued that he needed UN blessing given the lack of domestic support for military actions (Blair 2010: 95). Harvey even argues that “Bush’s determination to keep Britain in the coalition was far more important to him than support of the neocons, so he returned to the UN for another round of negotiations” (Harvey 2011: 221).

US and British officials also closely consulted on the details of the military intervention and its aftermath but influence could not be ensured. Embedded British officers at CENTCOM were integrated into the mission’s military planning in July 2002 and participated in the further development of scenarios (Boyce 2002; Watkins 2002; Williams 2002; Hoon 2002). Initially, British officials were in consultation with the State Department on post-war planning and agreed on the difficulties of post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, this level of British influence was not maintained once the Pentagon took over post-war planning (Whitley 2011: Gordon/Trainor 2006: 154-155; McHugh 2010: 485).

Attempts to use consultations to co-determine US policies were also used by Germany and to a lesser extent France. At different points in time, however, the leadership of both countries concluded that the Bush administration was unwilling to grant skeptical allies a say over policy. High-level consultations between the US and Germany took place in November 2001, February 2002, and May 2002.162

According to German accounts, the chancellor and the foreign minister had clearly conveyed the limits of German support in their meeting with US counterparts: Germany could only participate in military action if strong links existed between Saddam and Al Qaeda and if such intervention would not harm the coalition of the ‘war on terror’. A military invasion would have to entail an adequate exit strategy and would need a UN mandate (Fischer 2011: 81; Molenaar 2007: 59; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 102; Schröder 2007: 159; 197). German sources also claim that Bush and others had reassured the red-green government that no decision for war had been taken and

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that such a decision would involve the prior consultation of allies (Molenaar 2007: 59; Forsberg 2005; Schröder 2007: 198; Fischer 2011: 118-123). In his memoirs, Bush refuted this version arguing that Schröder had promised his support for decisive intervention and had pledged to keep Iraq out of the German election campaign.163 These recriminating accounts only underline that attempts to co-determine policies, to gauge the interests and position of the respective ally, and to build mutual trust had utterly failed.

Despite existing official contacts, the French had been less deeply involved in consultations with their US counterparts. This lack of involvement and knowledge of US intentions explains why the US decisiveness to use force if necessary “strangely did not became apparent to the French until early January. […] Until then the French were crediting Secretary Colin Powell with trying a peaceful solution through the United Nations, although at the same time they considered that the military build-up in the Persian Gulf area being carried out by Secretary Rumsfeld was undermining what Powell was trying to do” (Cogan 2003: 206). In mid-January 2003, French officials made high-level attempts to consult and assess the US position: Chirac’s senior foreign policy advisor, David Levitte, and Foreign Minister de Villepin were presented by Rice and Powell with a fait accompli: the US decision on war had already been taken and a window for the co-determination of policies had already passed (Wall 2005: 133; Graham/Harding 2003). Former Chancellor Schröder reports a similar pattern for last-ditch German efforts in February 2003 to heal the rift in informal consultations with the State Department: “It was clear – based on whatever information – Washington had come to a completely different opinion of the situation in Iraq than what we had” (Schröder 2007: 223, PF).

At different points in the run-up to the war, the German and French governments came to realize that consultations with the Bush administration were being used to inform them of US action but not to put policy choices up for discussion. By the summer of 2002, the German government felt that the Bush administration’s increasing war mongering “reneged on an assurance” (Szabo 2006: 130) to consult ahead of important decisions. In January 2003, French officials joined the German chorus. The ensuing strategies of shaming and de-legitimization rested on a procedural and a substantial argument.

Both the French and the German government, attempted to portray US-UK action as incompatible with alliance norms. They argued that the ongoing preparations for war were failing to take into account their opposition and violated the norm of consultation within the transatlantic security community. Joschka Fischer pointedly remarked, “alliances between free democracies should not be reduced to following. Alliance partners are not satellites.”

After Bush’s speech at West Point in June 2002, the German government had complained about the lack of consultation. The importance of equal treatment and consultation ahead of important decisions became important themes in Schröder’s election campaign and German complaints about US policy in general (Harnisch 2004: 8; 16-17; Schröder 2002b; Zimmerman 2005; Forsberg 2005 Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 101-103). “Consultation cannot consist in getting a call with two hours’ advance notice and being told ‘we are marching in’” (Schröder quoted in Zimmermann 2005: 145). Although less critical in public, the French were also worried about the lack of consultation and the tendency towards unilateralism (Gordon/Shapiro 2004:120-122; Thompson 2009: 150-152). In an interview with the New York Times, Chirac pointedly captures his government’s position: “In life, you know, one must not confuse friends with sycophants. (…) It’s better to have only a few friends than to have a lot of sycophants. And I’m telling you that France considers itself one of the friends of the Americans, not necessarily one of its sycophants.”

In substance, French and German politicians criticized the US notion of preemption and its application in the case of Iraq. Pursuing military intervention without a second resolution that explicitly authorized force flatly contradicted international law and the governing principles of transatlantic allies’ international conduct (Dettke 2009: 158; Fischer 2011). Schröder, in particular, accused the Bush administration of adventurism when it came to Iraq: “Fooling around with war and military intervention – I can only warn against. We will not support it” (2002a). In January 2003, de Villepin refuted US considerations for military intervention: “Unilateral military intervention must be perceived as a victory for the maxim ‘might is right’, an attack against the primacy of the law and international morality” (de Villepin 2003a). France and Germany consistently argued that attacking Iraq was not justified given Iraq’s

partial compliance with UNMOVIC and the lack of explicit support for intervention in the UN Security Council. Only if international rules were upheld would the coalition against terrorism remain together (Wall 2005: 132; Pond 2004: 66-67). The US and the UK – as transatlantic democracies – had a special obligation to uphold international law and order: “Nothing lasting in international relations can be built therefore without dialogue and without respect for the other, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example” (Villepin 2003c).

These attempts to shame calls by the US and UK for military intervention were directed consistently to national audiences, to the US domestic audience, and to a wider international audience. French and German politicians used their speeches at the UN, the 40th celebration of the Elysee Treaty in January 22, 2003, interviews with US media and their respective domestic media and parliaments to voice their concerns (Schröder 2003a; Fischer 2003a, 2003b; de Villepin 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Chirac 2002; Pond 2004: 71-72; Walt 2005: 160-165; Bratberg 2011). The peak of these efforts came with public announcements by France, Germany, and Russia that they would not support a second resolution proposed by the US and the UK that entailed a final ultimatum and a paragraph authorizing war.166

In the end, consultations and attempts to shame the United States were to no avail. President Bush made it clear that he felt he had acted in the spirit of the UN: “I went to the U.N., as you might recall, and said, either you take care of him, or we will. […] I thought it was important for the United Nations Security Council that when it says something, it means something, for the sake of security in the world. […] The United Nations passed a Security Council resolution unanimously that said disarm or face serious consequences. And he refused to disarm” (Bush 2003).

7.4.2 The Power of Voice Opportunities: Attempts to Restrain the United States

Once President Bush had turned to the United Nations in September 2002, major allied efforts to bind and block US proposals for the use of force took place within the
Security Council. The pattern of French and British strategies is similar to those in the previous cases of military intervention, as both countries used their institutional voice opportunities to shape the principal and political dimension of the use of force. Both, the UK and France sought to use their permanent membership in the Security Council to bind the United States during the negotiations over Resolution 1441 (Dunne 2004; Walt 2005). However, the specific logic behind these binding attempts differed.

The British government tried to avoid war by building a highly intrusive inspection regime. As the former British UN ambassador, Jeremy Greenstock, put it, the UK did not believe that Bush would be restrained directly by a Security Council resolution: “It was clear to me, from the information available to the UK, that this was most unlikely” (Greenstock 2009a). Rather, the British binding strategy was meant to create conditions under which successful disarmament was possible. The UK sought to construct an inspection regime tough enough for the US to accept and lenient enough to be accepted by Iraq as well as France and Russia (Greenstock 2009a). It was hoped that if intrusive, yet fair inspections failed, international support for military action could be ensured. In order to bind US action through this mechanism, British diplomats worked to influence the language of Resolution 1441 and organized support within the Security Council (Blair 2010: 125-129; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 117; Straw 2002b; Ricketts 2002).

The French supported Bush’s turn to the UN and did not reject cooperation in the beginning. Yet, French diplomacy was directed more clearly at subduing further US action through a decision by the Security Council (Cogan 2003: 199-200). To that end, France proposed a two-step process: in a first step, Saddam would be forced to comply with a more vigorous UN inspections regime; only upon failure to comply and with a decision from the Security Council would force be used against Iraq (Chirac 2002; Coicaud et al. 2006: 238; Wall 2005: 131). During the negotiations, France did not threaten to veto US drafts but continued to lobby for its position among all members of the Security Council. The final wording of the resolution was cleared between the foreign ministers, Powell and de Villepin, in person (Cogan 2003: 199-203; Woodward 2004: 222-226). The French had argued that inspections

167 In January 2003, France, Germany, and Belgium had also blocked US efforts to enlist NATO support for Turkey in case of a military intervention; in the end, however these allies gave in to Turkish demands (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 136-140).
should not be a mere pretext for using force and that further consent of the Security Council was required; the reference to Iraq’s obligation to disclose its programs and work with inspectors, the reference to the Security Council convening to consider “the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security,” and the omission of any reference to “all necessary measures” (UN Doc. S/RES/1441; Molenaar 2007: 51; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 108-112; Woodward 2004: 220-225). Once a final text was agreed, France alongside the US and the UK ensured its unanimous adoption in the Security Council (Cogan 2003: 204). From a French perspective, the government had managed to design Resolution 1441 in a way that denied “the US the right to unilaterally declare Iraq in non-compliance and thus the ability to go to war” (Coicaud et al. 2007: 238-240).

The design of Resolution 1441 momentarily shifted the burden of proof to UNMOVIC and Saddam Hussein. Yet, its language guaranteed that disagreements would be launched over compliance (Howorth 2003/4: 183; Wall 2005): “[T]he potential for dispute over the resolution was not an accident, the document contains intentional ambiguities” (Byers 2004: 165). The US and the UK and France felt that their respective positions on the use of force had been vindicated by the resolution (Byers 2004; Thompson 2009). These diverse expectations and interpretations of the resolution help explain why the French and British strategies of influence-seeking were starkly divergent by early 2003.

In February 2003, the UK began to float the draft of a second resolution that had the potential to bind and delay US military actions. The quest for a resolution stemmed less from a desire to avoid war, but rather from the need to ensure a veil of international support in light of increasing domestic criticism (Woodward 2004: 341; McHugh 2010: 483-484). The British proposal aimed to define clear benchmarks and a timeframe by which to judge Iraqi non-compliance. These goalposts would have reconstituted international consensus, might have postponed the war, and maybe even avoided it (Greenstock 2009a; Blair 2010: 125-129; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 146-148). The British made extensive efforts to develop a particular wording for the ultimatum and enlist the support of the six undecided members of the Security Council. The British UN ambassador, Greenstock, conceded that the United States had not lent more than token support to these British efforts (Greenstock 2009a, Blair 2010: 96; 100-101; 118; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 146-157; Malone 2006: 199). As a consequence, the French and German threat of a no-vote may have been a relief for the UK: “In
London, Blair feigned shock and horror at Chirac’s intransigence but was probably delighted, as he then felt able to blame France for his failure to get another UN resolution” (Sharp 2003/4: 66).

In reaction to the military build-up in the Gulf and increasing US impatience with the state of inspections, France decided that only a public effort to block the Bush administration might be able to stall the apparent preparations for war. Germany, which had become a non-permanent member of the UNSC in January 2003, assisted in these blocking strategies. Blocking took on several forms. Initially, in their capacity as UNSC members French and German diplomats had called a meeting on terrorism on January 20, 2003. De Villepin had used the ensuing press conference to voice France’s reluctance to consider war at this stage and its inclination to veto a second UN resolution (De Villepin 2003a; Cogan 2003: 206-208; Wall 2005: 131). In February 2003, France and Germany, together with Russia, proposed the reinforcement of inspections as an alternative to war in several joint declarations (Molenaar 2007: 57; Schröder 2007: 231-238; Fischer 2011: 214). Within NATO, Germany resisted plans to protect Turkey in case of a military dispute (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 138-140; Forsberg 2005: 220). In contrast to the proposals made by the US and UK, these declarations no longer set a clear deadline for Iraqi compliance.

A proposal without a deadline on Iraq’s regime was unacceptable from the US point of view largely because of the military realities that the Franks-Rumsfeld plan had created by January 2003. Military contingency planning, which had led to a massive build-up of US forces in the Gulf, always remained ahead of diplomatic steps and crucially determined the timing of US decision-making. Sustaining forces in the region at no fixed timetable would create great costs; withdrawing forces would take off the pressure of Hussein to comply with UN inspections and would be a visible step-down and loss of credibility to the US. If, however, forces were to be used, military action would have to start by March to avoid fighting during Iraq’s hot summer (Harvey 2011; Woodward 2003: 270-271; Greenstock 2009 b: 77-80; Boyce 2011: 56-60).

168 Since the summer of 2002, the German government had articulated its unconditional rejection of a war against Iraq; Berlin would not provide its support irrespective of whether military action was authorized by the UN Security Council (Harnisch 2004: 4; Fischer 2001: 195-201; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003). In December 2002, Joschka Fischer had subtly tried to soften this particular position to gain more room for diplomatic maneuver as Germany became a non-permanent member of the Security Council in January, 2003 (Staak 2004: 212; Harnisch 2004: 18-19).
Transatlantic policy proposals turned out to be incompatible. When the UK and the US introduced the draft second resolution, France, Germany and Russia reiterated their threat to veto the resolution in a joint declaration on March 5, 2003. French, German, and Russian blocking strategies went even beyond the veto. In an intensive, personal shuttle diplomacy, the foreign ministers sought to deny the draft by the US and UK the necessary majority in the Security Council (Cogan 2003: 210-211; Soutou 2005: 121; Moens 2004: 186-189). Blocking the second resolution by threatening a veto and persuading other members of the Council to decline support eventually succeeded; in light of the lack of support, the US and the UK never put the draft to a vote in the Security Council. Yet, these attempts to block the United States did not delay or even prevent war with Iraq.

7.4.3 Issue-specific Power: The Tactical Dimension

As stated above, European allies did not have an impact on the tactical dimension of the use of force. In the case of the British government, I pointed out in section 7.4.1 that trans-governmental efforts to shape post-conflict reconstruction were unsuccessful. Interestingly, however, none of the three European allies pursued additional strategies to gain influence over US policy-making. Similarly, none of the three allies attempted to use its military or economic assets to change the course of the Bush administration.

The United Kingdom chose to contribute troops to the war in Iraq. Blair announced the participation of British troops as early as the US-UK summit in Crawford in May 2002. Subsequently, the British Ministry of Defense advised that the UK should contribute a division with up to 50,000 soldiers to fit into US planning. From the perspective of the military, the size of the contribution was clearly meant to make the UK influence felt on US planning (Webb 2002; Watkins 2002). Several authors have suggested that UK troops were essential to the war in Iraq because of the high-level of cooperation between the partners in previous missions in the country (Sharp 2003-4: 64-65) and because of the “political symbolism” they provided (Kennedy-Pipe/Vickers 2007: 208). Murray and Scales argue that without the British contribution, the invasion could not have started as early as March 2003 and would probably have lasted much longer (Murray/Scales 2003: 132).
However, British military support was not tied to political conditions or traded in for tactical prerogatives. Blair highlighted this understanding: “This is an alliance that we have with the United States of America. It is not a contract. It is not ‘We do this for you, you do this for us’” (Blair 2010: 46). Furthermore, he stated “You didn’t, and shouldn’t, do it for influence” (Blair 2010: 62). It is difficult to assess what drove Blair and others to relinquish this source of potential influence on US policy. However, it is arguable whether different British behavior would have had much effect on US military planning. Rumsfeld suggested as late as March 11, 2003 that the US could go without a UK contribution in case British domestic support for the mission was not be forthcoming (Woodward 2004: 341-343).

A similar point can be made for France and Germany. These countries decided to oppose the United States diplomatically but they did not withdraw essential military support. France had long signaled it would be willing to contribute to a mission if authorized by the Security Council. As late as December 2002, France was still offering military support under certain circumstances. Chirac had deployed the aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, to the Eastern Mediterranean in fall 2002 (Wall 2005: 131). Furthermore, a French military emissary promised, that in the event of justified military conflict, France would be prepared to contribute the same amount of troops as in the first Gulf war, hence roughly 15,000 ground troops and 100 aircraft (Cogan 2003: 205-207). Until late January, France’s forces were held ready for conflict.169

Once the Schröder government had been re-elected in fall 2002, it was desperate to heal the rift between Germany and the US. However, the red-green coalition maintained its opposition to military intervention in Iraq and would not commit any forces. At the same time, Germany wanted to restore its image as a reliable ally and to limit further damage to transatlantic relations. Thus, it decided not to balk and deny access to infrastructure crucial to the US intervention in Iraq: Germany granted transit and over-flight rights, it provided protection for US facilities in Germany, AWACS air surveillance for Turkey, as well as patriot missiles to defend Turkish and Israeli territory (Harnisch 2004: 17; Schröder 2007: 224-225; Fischer 2011: 183-195).

7.5 The Conditions for Allied Influence

Some have argued that military intervention was almost inevitable, and that important decisions had been taken prior to allies’ attempts to change the course of US policy (Moens 2004; Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 135; Thompson 2009: 136). I think it more plausible that military action by the US was highly likely but not inevitable. Why then did the attempts of the allies largely fail? I argue that the conditions conducive to the success of strategies resting on the power of persuasion and the power of institutional voice opportunities were not present. Since summer 2002, France, Germany and the UK had been faced with a unified US domestic scene. The united Bush administration excluded allies from decision-making and was largely supported by congress and public opinion. In addition, Europe was a far cry from constituting a unitary actor since European governments had split openly about the question of supporting the US war in Iraq. Moreover, France and Germany could not count on widespread European governmental support.

7.5.1 The Unity of US Domestic Politics

Both the power of persuasion and the power of voice opportunities are said to increase in situations in which a given US administration is not united and cannot count on domestic support. In such cases, European allies are able to find ample access points for their arguments and European support if needed to increase the legitimacy of their case. In addition, the US administration is likely to be more concerned about its standing in international institutions if its policies lack domestic support. In the Iraq case, European influence was so low because of the high degree of unity within the United States.

The Bush administration’s peculiar process of decision-making and the particular substance of its convictions provided little access points for European strategies of consultation and shaming.

The only remarkable exception is British influence on Bush’s decision to return to the UN in early 2002. Here, the British were able to rely on existing differences within the administration prior to Bush’s speech in the UN in September 2002. The question of UN approval for regime change and military intervention had pitted Colin Powell against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney and

\[170\] While some schedule the decision as having been taken in spring 2002 (Moens 2004), others point to July 2002, when internal policy planning was largely terminated (Thompson 2009).
National Security Advisor Susan Rice. While Powell thought it necessary to enlist international support and was more skeptical of the prospect of a quick and easy intervention, he did not resent regime change and the use of armed force *per se* (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 132-134; Rudolf 2007: 100-101). During the height of the inter-agency debate on Iraq policy in July 2002, Powell and Blair made concerted efforts to persuade the president to seek international approval for his Iraq policy. The turn to the United States and the successful conclusion of Resolution 1441 has been widely credited as the success of this trans-governmental coalition.

This initial disunity largely disappeared over the course of 2002 as the US administration came to define its goals in Iraq. Accordingly, the reasons for diminished allied influence are related to process as well as substance. Three aspects of the Bush administration decision-making process are particularly relevant.

First, Powell and others in favor of close consultation with allies became increasingly marginalized (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 57-58; Smith 2008: 98-101; Mazaar 2007). “Powell’s isolation within the administration was reinforced from the start by the fact that the people named to most of the number-two and -three spots in the national security bureaucracy dismissed his pragmatic approach to foreign policy and were close to Cheney, Rumsfeld or both” (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 58). The British failure to influence the tactical dimension, in other words, post-war planning for Iraq, is illustrative of the power of this hawkish faction. In January 2003, Rumsfeld had ensured that a small team within the Pentagon would be responsible for planning the aftermath and had successfully sidelined the State Department (McHugh 2010; Bensahel 2006). British officials have consistently emphasized that this shift was responsible for the inadequate planning and their lack of influence (Hoon 2010: 85-87; Boyce 2010: 69; Whitley 2009: 11).

Edward Chaplin, the UK’s leader of the Middle East and North Africa Department claims to have “bombarded the Americans with lots of good advice, which actually matched pretty well with what the State Department had done” (Chaplin 2009: 37) to no avail. “The difficulty that we ran into did not arise from any inadequacies in planning at the British end. It arose from this inter-agency row in Washington in the early part of 2003, which resulted in responsibility for the aftermath being moved from the Department of State to the Department of Defense” (Straw 2011: 118). Blair’s emphasis on his personal relationship with President Bush could not outweigh powerful factions in the US

Second, Bush’s “CEO-leadership style” (Daalder/Lindsay 2003), his reliance on personal instincts and loyalty led to “anticipatory compliance” (Mitchell/Massoud 2009: 277-279) and decreased access points for allied arguments. Information was filtered in a biased fashion and alternative views were not systematically presented. In this climate, the NSC became a largely dysfunctional organization where different viewpoints were not equally discussed. Rather, influential informal decision-making circles within the administration have been identified. With regard to Iraq, Vice President Cheney, with his unfettered access to the president, certainly played an important role in pushing for regime change (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 59; Mitchell/Massoud 2009: 273; Woodward 2004: 29).

Third, decision-making on Iraq took place in a climate of strict hierarchy and discipline, which enabled the administration to sustain a high level of secrecy (Danner 2005; Moens 2004). Until July 2002, the details of military planning had hardly been shared beyond a number of selected officials in the Pentagon, General Franks, the president, and to a certain extent the principals within the NSC (Woodward 2004: 100). Daalder and Lindsay report that crucial NSC meetings determining US goals in Iraq were taken without much opportunity for allies to provide their views: “During a series of secretive meetings among Bush’s top advisers, which appeared as ‘Regional Strategy Meeting’ on the private schedules of the participants so as to hide their true nature, the administration began to tackle a host of critical questions” (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 135). After traveling to Washington in July 2002, British officials felt that the major decision to achieve regime change by force had already been taken without prior consultations (Rycroft 2002).

With their supporters marginalized and many decisions being taken in secret, European allies found few access points for their arguments to revise or restrain US actions. In addition, the decision-making process gave significant leverage to members of the administration whose substantive positions contradicted European influence.

With the exception of Colin Powell, officials in charge of framing and planning the invasion did not place high value on consultation with transatlantic allies and did not fear reputational losses. President Bush and his senior security policy advisors were deeply skeptical about international institutions and the potentially entangling effect
of alliances (Ruggie 2006: 6-11; Skidmore 2005; Monten 2005). Thus, they promoted a vision of multilateralism that was geared toward achieving US goals. Richard Haass has called this vision “multilateralism a la carte”: in such a scheme, having allies on board was important only insofar as they could contribute to US objectives (White House 2002: 25-27; Pond 2004). Europe’s military weakness seemed to preclude their importance to a war with Iraq, as did the fact that the Pentagon was not planning an extensive nation-building mission in the country. The Bush administration’s take on international institutions and US leadership made it difficult for European allies to exploit reputation costs. Moreover, the long-term benefits of institutionalized cooperation were not prioritized by US officials. They regarded these as unnecessary constraints in a world dominated by the US, and studied the availability of allies on a case-by-case basis.

Bush’s vision of alliance leadership, in particular, made extensive consultation and accommodation unnecessary. Gordon and Shapiro have called the latter the “if you build they will come” doctrine (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 50). From the intervention of the 90s Republicans had taken away the lesson that European allies would follow a US lead once that was clearly articulated. It was from these same experiences that Bush’s advisors claimed to have gained their disdain for consultation aimed at changing US policy (Chollet/Goldgeier 2008; Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 214-226; Western 2005: 185-188; Rice 2000b). The assumption that success creates followers made a priori allied support less valuable. As Cheney put it, once the military mission against Iraq had been successfully completed “a good part of the world, especially our allies, will come round to our way of thinking” (in Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 135).

Hence, US decision-making was based on the assumption that a successful invasion of Iraq would create ex-post support for military action. A decrease in international reputation and a blow to the image of the US as an unreliable partner thus would be a temporary phenomenon with no impact on the country’s standing in the world.

A second substantive position that could easily disregard allied opposition reinforced this particular vision of leadership. The influence of neo-conservative ideas on US foreign policy after 9/11 has been widely debated.171 Moens notes that in defining the

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171 Claiming an influence of neo-conservative ideas and actors on decision-making affecting the Iraq issue after 9/11 does not necessarily subscribe to the widespread hypothesis of a cabal of neo-cons having captured the US state apparatus. After 9/11 different types of conservatives rallied around the dual justification of disarmament and the promotion of democracy in Iraq for quite different reasons (Reyn 2004; Smith 2008; Woodward 2004).
case against Saddam Hussein, Bush “wanted to signal that it did not pay to have weapons of mass destruction but he also wanted to be for something” (Moens 2004: 173). Inspired by neoconservative thinking, the administration settled for the spread of the universal values of freedom, democracy, and justice and this point gained common ground in the administration. After Afghanistan, Iraq was to be the next showcase of the ability of the US to effectively change the domestic politics of foreign countries (White House 2002: 1-5; Monten 2005: 143-149; Fischer 2011). In doing so, the US would once more prove that “our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense” (Bush 2002b). The neo-conservative twist to US policy vis-à-vis Iraq firmly rested in US exceptionalism (Monten 2005; Ruggie 2006; Berenskoetter 2005) and on the belief that “U.S. power is an inherently benign and redeeming force in international politics” (Monten 2005: 145). As the war against Iraq was about the promotion of universal values, because the use of US power was inherently benign, and because success and leadership would attract followership, the Bush administration saw no need to critically examine the objections of its transatlantic allies.

In conclusion, the US decision-making process on Iraq provided very few access-points for allied influence. The Bush administration placed hardly any value on approaches of multilateral accommodation in general. With the neo-conservative twist after 9/11, the US increasingly came to believe that accommodation was unnecessary because the US was working for the greater good rather than in its narrow national interests. Thus, other nations would follow the lead of the US eventually. Lastly, the decision-making apparatus kept allies systematically out of the loop of current thinking within the administration.

However, it was not merely the peculiarities of the Bush administration that impeded allied influence; the administration could also count on widespread domestic support, since critical opposition to the policies of preemption in Iraq never emerged. Furthermore, there was hardly any domestic debate about the consequences of military intervention that European allies could have latched onto.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led the public to rally around the flag and hence, “created political space for considering an attack on Iraq. […] Public support for regime change had been a well-established trend in polling data” (Western 2005: 192). Immediately after the attacks, a majority of US citizens thought it likely that Saddam Hussein had been somehow involved in them (Foyle 2004). Over the course
of 2002, the administration successfully nurtured this threat perception linking the case of war against Iraq systematically to the wider ‘war on terror’ (Western 2005 Foyle 2004; Prados 2008). Initially, this perception of a more dangerous international environment was linked to a demand that the United States tackle the problems in cooperation with other states (Kahler 2005: 87). Bush’s turn to the United Nations apparently fulfilled this demand, which meant the US government could count on stable public support for the use of armed force against Iraq after late 2002 (Foyle 2004; Jentleson2003/4).

France and Germany were unable to find partners among the US political elite and the democratic opposition.172 Scholars have pointed to three main reasons for the unusual levels of congressional support for military intervention. First, Bush’s turn to the United Nations in September took the wind out of the sails of many critics. Second, framing Iraq as part of the ‘war on terror’ invoked strong feelings of national identity, touched successfully on the new sense of vulnerability, and made it hard for democrats to criticize this dominant discourse (Krebs/Lobasz 2007; Kaufmann 2004). Lastly, the Bush government sought congressional authorization for a war with Iraq in the crucial weeks ahead of mid-term elections in November 2002. In the discussion on the authorization bill, republicans exploited the fact that they were viewed as more reliable when it came to issues of national security (Kahler 2005: 88). They effectively used the campaign to silence opposition and “denounced any Democratic opposition to, or even hesitation about, military intervention as unpatriotic, a failure to act in the U.S. national security interest, and tantamount to treason” (Pond 2004: 48).

On October 10, 2002 both houses of congress passed a resolution granting the president a wide prerogative to use the United States’ armed forces “as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq” (Congress 2002, §3).

When Franco-German attempts to shame the United States came into full swing in January 2003, domestic criticism of a possible intervention had already been muted: and faulty intelligence and optimistic scenarios for victory had been widely accepted.

172 Surprisingly, the starkest criticism of the administration’s policy was uttered in July and August, 2002 by former officials from the first Bush administration, moderate republicans, and some leading democrats, such as Al Gore. In fact, many of these critical voices reiterated European objections: Iraq would endanger the coalition on the war on terror, the stability of the Middle East; intervention would require international support to stem the likely extensive and expensive post-conflict reconstruction (Scowcroft 2002; Woodward 2004: 163-165).
There was no policy debate to be joined by European allies, and no uncertain public to be swayed by accusations of unilateralism and counterarguments.

7.5.3 Unity among European Allies

The Bush administration could not only count on steadfast domestic support but also on the endorsement of military intervention by a majority of European governments. It has been argued that strategies based on inflicting reputation costs will be less successful if European allies are not united. Denying legitimacy to particular policy choices by the United States is hampered if the latter can count on some allies and thus claim that its actions are accepted within the security community. Furthermore, the US has less reason to fear that it will be seen as an unreliable international partner that harms the credibility of international institutions if it can count on some allies to accept its actions. Franco-German attempts to shame, bind, and block the United States were thus seriously undermined by the lack of intra-European unity.

Mouritzen (2006) shows that a majority of European countries supported the Iraq war on different levels, ranging from material support to diplomatic endorsement. Only a few European Union and NATO partners joined the critical Franco-German chorus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Supporters of Intervention</th>
<th>European Critics of Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark; Britain; Poland; Albania; Bulgaria; Hungary; Iceland; Latvia; Lithuania; The Netherlands; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Spain; Estonia; Italy; Macedonia; Croatia; Czech Republic; Ireland; Slovenia.</td>
<td>Austria; Belgium; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Luxembourg; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Despite the high level of domestic criticism in almost all European countries (Mouritzen 2006; Maier/Schuster 2006), many European countries choose to publicly support Bush’s call for war in January 2003. Without consulting other European counterparts, eight EU governments published a letter of support in The Times on January 30, 2003. The letter endorses the idea of a final ultimatum against Iraq and demands transatlantic unity. On February 5, 2003 ten Eastern and Central European countries followed suit claiming in a letter that “earlier today, the United States presented compelling evidence to the United Nations Security Council detailing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, its active efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors,
and its links to international terrorism. Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction.”

These overtures presented the Bush administration with a welcome opportunity to dismiss criticism. Donald Rumsfeld famously ridiculed the opponents as “old Europe” (Rumsfeld 2003) and US officials rebutted Franco-German opposition as “blind intransigence and utter ingratitude” (Pond 2004: 69-70). In turn, attempts by France and Germany to inflict reputation costs on the US were limited as the Bush administration could claim to have significant European support.

7.5.4 The Intensity of Threat and Threat Perception

Most accounts emphasize the intensity of the threat perceived by the United States in their explanation of the European failure to influence US Iraq policy. Simply put “after the shock of September 11, Americans genuinely perceived a threat from Iraq, and Europeans genuinely did not” (Gordon/Shapiro 2004: 83). I argue that such an explanation fails to take into account that the US administration together with its British partners largely fabricated an overrated threat perception.

Usually, arguments in favor of the intensity of threat explanation rest on three pillars. First, the terrorist attacks of 2001 had created a strong sense of general vulnerability within the United States. In a time of unmatched military primacy, civilian casualties inflicted by a much weaker opponent overall were particularly shocking (Thompson 2009: 173-175). Second, some in the Bush administration inferred that the most plausible escalation of such attacks would be the use of WMD. As described above, this fear led to the construction of the nexus between ‘rogue states’ and terrorists. Proponents of the intensity of threat argument hold that the Bush administration inferred from Iraq’s history of aggressive and deceptive behavior that Iraq was likely to hold aggressive intentions towards the US and would be willing to cooperate with

173 “Europe and America must stand united,” Times London, January 20, 2003; this letter was signed by José Aznar (Spain), José Barroso (Portugal), Silvio Berlusconi (Italy), Tony Blair (UK), Václav Havel (Czech Republic), Peter Medgyessy (Hungary), Leszek Miller (Poland), Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark). “Eastern Europe: Vilnius Group Supports U.S. on Iraq,” Radio Free Europe, February 6, 2003. The Vilnius group comprises of the following countries: Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia.
terrorists (Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 81-85; Moens 2004). Lastly, the regional implications of the Iraqi threat were more intensely felt in Washington than in Europe. As the US held alliance relations with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel any escalation of tensions in the region was viewed as posing a serious threat to the US and not to Europe (Gordon/Shapiro 2004). These accounts are certainly correct in highlighting the dominant threat scenario that the Bush administration portrayed in public. It was widely shared by US democratic leaders and the US public (Harvey 2011). The British, however, disputed crucial parts of this assessment, such as the link between Iraq and Al Qaeda (Bluth 2004: 883, Harvey 2011).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the intensity of threat argument needs to be able to distinguish threat perceptions from other political motives in order to provide a consistent rather than an ex-post explanation of behavior. Yet, in the Iraqi case, threat perceptions were deliberately manipulated and decisions likely taken for different political reasons.

In the case of the military intervention in Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration has been prominently accused of “threat inflation” (Kaufmann 2004). In hindsight, we know that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction. Much more, the Bush and the Blair government knew quite well that they were exaggerating the existing information on Saddam’s programs. As discussed above, the two governments used intelligence to construct a case suggesting that Iraq posed an imminent danger. Sometimes the dubious nature of the judgments was acknowledged but it did not to change the US position. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, commented on the threat posed by Iraq: “It’s like the judge said about pornography. I can’t define it but I know it when I see it” (in Woodward 2004: 245). Kaufmann and others describe how top officials in the Bush administration continuously overemphasized worst-case scenarios when it came to Saddam Hussein’s intentions and Iraq’s capabilities to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (Kaufman 2004; Doig/Phythian 2005; Butler 2004). In terms of the plausibility of the intensity of threat argument, it is beside the point to note that US democrats supported the assessment or that the intelligence failures were understandable in the context of 9/11 (Harvey 2011; Betts 2007).

Furthermore, manipulation extended to the way in which the US and the UK interpreted reports by UNMOVIC. “Powell was trying to use Blix’s (first) report to establish Iraqi noncompliance and thus to initiate the ‘serious consequences’
threatened in the resolution” (Thompson 2009: 147). Ensuing UNMOVIC reports in February and March 2003, which speak of Iraq’s increasing cooperation and the lack of any credible information on WMD, were dismissed by the Bush administration (Thompson 2009: 148-150; Daalder/Lindsay 2003: 143; Fitzgerald/Lebow 2007). In conclusion, it seems implausible that the intensity of threat drove the US approach to Iraq or that this argument could possibly account for the lack of German and French influence. Rather, the US decision to intervene in Iraq drove the public presentation of the Iraqi threat.

7.6. Summary of the Case Study
Within the context of Operation Iraqi freedom, European allies had much less influence on US decision-making. Only the UK can be credited with having informed the political dimension of military intervention: it was largely due to British diplomacy that the Bush administration proclaimed Iraq’s disarmament as the goal of military action and went to the UN. Yet even in the context of UN-centered negotiations, France and Germany were unable to restrain the Bush administration from using force. European strategies of influence-seeking rested mainly on the power of persuasion and voice opportunities. While the British pursued a policy of ‘hugging them close’ in consultation and trans-governmental coalitions, most of these efforts failed when policies diverged. In contrast, officials in Paris and Berlin attempted to inflict reputation costs on the United States by withholding support and legitimacy for US actions in the Gulf. Within the UN, attempts to bind US action to explicit Security Council approval failed utterly.

I have argued that the unity of the US domestic scene and the disunity among European allies account for this lack of success. Once the Bush administration had marginalized US actors with a pro-European stance and ensured domestic support for military intervention, it was immune to de-legitimization attempts. Not only did French and German officials find no one to team up with, European disunity weakened their pervasive power. The United States could count on significant European support for its course and justification of military action against Iraq.
Table 11. Findings of the Case Study on Iraq from 2002 to 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>Limited British influence on the political dimension and public rationale</td>
<td>Lack of influence on the principal dimension</td>
<td>Lack of European influence on the tactical dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process/Strategies of Influence-seeking</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Voice Opportunities</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Binding US to UN resolutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blocking within UN and NATO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persuasion</strong></td>
<td>Consultation as co-determination by the UK</td>
<td>UK–US Transgovernmental coalition</td>
<td>Consultation as co-determination by the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>French and German shaming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intensity of Threat Perception</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity among European Allies</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity among US Domestic Politics</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = outcome/process in congruence with hypothesis  
+/-= outcome/process partially confirms hypothesis  
- = outcome/process in contradiction to hypothesis
8. Conclusion

In an age of unmatched US military power, how can allies with less military capabilities influence US decision-making on the use of armed force? This is the fundamental question that I have posed in this thesis. In the last four chapters, I examined four such military interventions. In particular, I set out to analyze the different strategies European allies have used to change the course of US policy in the principal, political, and tactical dimensions of the use of force. The case studies also identified the scope conditions needed for successful allied influence.

8.1. European Influence on US Policies of Military Intervention

Distinguishing between different dimensions of the use of force provides a more fine-grained picture on European influence. The distinction provides a more precise answer to the question of what exactly European allies have or have not influenced. First, in all cases under review allies had at least an impact on the timing of the use of force. In Bosnia, the potential rescue of European UNPROFOR soldiers drove the timetable. In Kosovo, the United States delayed the enforcement of NATO’s bombing threat in order to allow for a final diplomatic effort. In Iraq, French diplomacy secured a negotiated deal with Saddam Hussein; consequently, US and British troops refrained from air strikes in February and November 1998. Even during the run-up to the second Iraq war, the Bush administration’s turn to the United Nations was motivated by the will to gain allied support for such action and it eventually delayed the use of military force. In both Iraq cases, the delays did not stop the US from pursuing military intervention. Still, it would be wrong to claim that European influence was irrelevant.

Second, I argue that the two Balkans cases count as significant demonstrations of European influence, since more than one ally influenced more than one dimension of the use of force. In contrast, the Iraq cases highlight the limits of European influence. In the Bosnian case, US policy choices in the principal and political dimension cannot be understood without reference to European influence. Due to the constant lobbying of European governments, the Clinton administration finally engaged in the Balkans. Furthermore, European governments had accused the US of undermining European peace plans that were based on a division of the country that was acceptable to all belligerents. In the end, the US-led negotiations at Dayton accepted this principle of
division and thus these last-ditch diplomatic efforts were in line with earlier European proposals. When it came to the tactical implementation of Operation Allied Force, France and Britain had long resisted US proposals for air strikes. Yet in 1995, they largely lost control over tactical issues.

In the Kosovo case, the dimensions of the dependent variable display different values. Only the United Kingdom played an important and formative role in the US decision to threaten force against Milosevic. After successful British influence on the United States, the US and Britain exerted tremendous pressure on France and Germany to accept the use of force. Still, European allies were able to shape the political purpose of the intervention as the negotiations in Rambouillet were held on their request. The French and British government, in particular, restrained the United States in the tactical implementation of Operational Allied Force.

By contrast, the Iraq cases, US Operation Desert Fox in Iraq (1998) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), largely represent cases in which allies failed to influence the US. In 1998, France could not restraint the United States – supported by the UK – from using punitive air strikes against Saddam Hussein. The US and the UK did not share the French vision that tough inspections coupled with sanctions relief and the preparation of Iraq’s reintegration into the international community would solve the dispute over its WMD program.

In 2003, many of the issues of the 1990s reappeared under the auspices of a new administration and against the background of the attacks on the World Trade Center. Only the UK, under the leadership of Tony Blair, was able to exert limited influence on the political dimension of policy-making under the Bush administration. The focus on disarmament rather than regime change per se – as the political purpose for intervention – was a product of constant British advocacy. In the end, Blair did not object to ousting Saddam Hussein and had no intention of stopping the Bush administration from pursuing this goal militarily. Yet with regard to tactics (the planning of counter-insurgency operations and post-conflict reconstruction), the British government was unable to alter the overly optimistic assumptions of the US government. From the perspective of France and Germany, US policy vis-à-vis Iraq in 2002 and 2003 developed in spite of their attempts to find an alternative path to disarmament. Franco-German calls for peaceful disarmament and restraint from military action did not resonate with the US administration.
Table 12. Variation of influence according to the dimension of the use of force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of the Use of Force/Case</th>
<th>Bosnia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Iraq 1998</th>
<th>Iraq 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = allied influence  
+/− = influence was exercised by one of the allies only or influence varied over time  
− = no allied influence

As the summary above suggests there is variation among European allies. This should not be taken to imply equal influence for all three allies. Detecting and analyzing these European asymmetries provides a contribution to the security community literature, which mainly focuses on power imbalances between the United States on the one hand and Europe on the other. In addition, this thesis reveals the important asymmetries between power and influence within the European camp. When it comes to military interventions, the United Kingdom plays an elevated role, followed by France and Germany.

Table 13. An overview of influence by European allies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Iraq 1998</th>
<th>Iraq 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = influence  
+/− = limited influence or influence varied over time  
− = no influence  
n/a = differences are not known, influence could not be excluded but hardly analyzed

Clearly, the analysis confirms that there is a “special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom. Only during the Bosnian war did the conservative government staunchly oppose US policies of military intervention. In all other cases, the British government – under the leadership of Tony Blair was generally supportive of its US ally and diverged only in degree or mainly with regard to political and tactical issues. The strategic importance that the Labour government attached to
preserving its elevated status with its US counterparts affected the choice of strategies by which the UK sought to wield influence: the UK rarely engaged in resisting but rather in engaging the US. In turn, British military officials and diplomats were special access to the US decision-making apparatus. For example, in the Kosovo case, Prime Minister Blair and Foreign Minister Albright cooperated closely to forge consensus within the US and among allies to threaten force against Milosevic. Only the British were allowed into the secretive planning circles of the Bush administration and much of the British influence in this case is was due to the daily working routines and personal relationships that had developed. To a large extent, then, European influence in the context of this thesis is British influence. With the exception of the Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 1998, Britain exercised a varying extent of influence in all cases. Even in those cases, such as Kosovo and Iraq 2003, where the US fairly quickly decided on a course of action, British diplomats had privileged contact with US decision-makers and thus formidable impact.

In all of the conflicts between allies that were reviewed, French governments consistently sought a more independent position than their British counterparts. At least partially, this quest for independence is tied to the way in which French politicians have connected disputes over military interventions to larger questions of international order. These order-related issues were related to France’s own position in the international system after the Cold War. Moreover, France critically examined US policies in light of their propensity to undermine existing international rules on the legitimate use of force. This basic suspicion and opposition distinguishes French relations with the US most clearly from those of the US and the UK. Indeed, French governments more often chose resisting strategies than their British counterparts. Still, portraying French policies as in eternal opposition to those of the United States is a distortion as the case studies clearly reveal. French politicians also carefully aimed to engage their US colleagues and in many respects French input was crucial in informing US policy-making in military interventions.

With regard to the cases analyzed in this thesis, Germany trails behind in activity and influence. The country’s attempts to define and voice its own independent policy positions increased in parallel to the larger emancipation of German foreign and security policy since the Cold War. In the Bosnian case, the German government straddled the fence between its US and European partners and hardly played any significant role. The case of Kosovo demonstrates German ambitions to shape
international policies of military intervention, and capitalize on its negotiation skills to fashion a political solution to the crisis. Initially, this political desire and capacity to determine the course of transatlantic military interventions did not stretch beyond Europe: Germany played no role in the discussions about Iraqi disarmament during the 1990s. This lack of influence could be explained with resort to German diffidence and self-restraint; but as I will argue in more detail below, Germany’s lack of influence is also a symbol of the existence of more general imbalances among European partners. In line with the emancipation metaphor, the crisis over Iraq has been Germany’s coming of age: not only did the Schröder government openly oppose its US partners and side with France and Russia, but more importantly it took a firm stand on a military issue beyond Europe.

What do these outcomes and the observation of intra-European differences in strategies and impact mean for the transatlantic security community? First, this thesis puts the repeated diagnoses of the imminent demise of the transatlantic security community in perspective. The central core of the transatlantic security community – the peaceful resolution of conflicts – remains essentially unharmed (Risse 2002, Pouliot 2006). Furthermore, it shows that on this peaceful basis allies normally use strategies of both confrontation and engagement to change each other’s course of action. It is not intellectual complacency, as Michael Cox has insinuated (Cox 2005: 127), if one does not make out a structural crisis of the security community behind every policy dispute. Conflicts over policy are a normal condition of security communities. Confronting each other – sometimes resisting and engaging a partner – is not the sign of permanent crisis but rather business as usual.

Second, the findings of my research add to the existing literature on the transatlantic security community as they point to the importance of asymmetries between European allies. Most discussions of the transatlantic relationship focus on the growing imbalances between the United States and Europe (Ikenberry 2003; Kagan 2002; Anderson et al. 2008). This thesis does not attempt to refute the argument that the three Is – “identity, interaction, and institutionalization” (Risse 2002) – are constitutive and intact elements of the security community. Yet, these constitutive elements do not place all European allies on equal footing. European allies were not equally able to tap into the resources of the security community and to wield influence over the United States. For example, in line with the main assumption of the security community literature, this thesis finds that the dense institutional setting –
spanning beyond NATO and including the UN and other formats – is an important tool for alliance restraint. However, this thesis also finds that given their permanent membership in the UNSC this opportunity is used more often and more effectively by France and Britain than by Germany.

In conclusion, allies can place limits on the use of force by the United States despite the fact that in terms of military capabilities the US is hardly dependent on its European partners. Furthermore, the case studies shed light on the inner workings of the transatlantic security community and the important disparities between European allies.

8.2 Alliance Politics: European Strategies of Influence-seeking

The analytical framework of alliance politics explains European influence on US decision-making in a two-step process. First, I developed a typology of strategies of allied influence-seeking to capture how European allies sought to change the course of US action. Second, this analysis made it possible to identify scope conditions for European success (see section 8.3). I found that this typology was particularly useful in analyzing the dynamics of interaction between European allies and the United States. Strategies of influence-seeking rest on three different sources: persuasion, voice opportunities, and issue-specific power. The analysis shows that equipfinality characterized the process of allied interactions, but that more than one road leads to Rome: European allies capitalized on all of these sources by engaging or resisting the United States during military interventions.

8.2.1 The Power of Persuasion

European allies can influence US policies of military intervention by appealing to the special relationship that members of a security community entertain. In cases where the power of persuasion was at work, I expected allies to engage in consultation as co-determination, shaming, or building trans-governmental coalitions. The success of these strategies rests on the openness of a given US administration to arguments and on the ability of European allies to inflict reputation costs on the US. A comparison of the four cases reveals the following findings.

First, strategies based on the power of persuasion were ubiquitous in all cases. Even if relations were governed by mutual mistrust, as under the George W. Bush administration, European allies have sought to solve outstanding issues through
consultation and by teaming up with parts of the US executive. If such forms of cooperation have not worked, European allies have resorted to shaming US actions.

Second, each case reveals its own particular mix of strategies of engagement and resistance. In the Bosnian case, European allies used every opportunity and every available strategy to promote their argument for more US engagement in the Balkans. Behind closed doors and in regular consultations, European allies and a trans-governmental coalition including NSC officials consistently repeated the same argument: the future of the Balkans represented a test case for the future stability of Europe as a whole and, hence, appealed to the United States’ core interests. France and the United Kingdom also openly criticized and shamed Clinton’s aloofness. US inaction, they claimed, violated norms of the transatlantic security community, in other words, sharing the burdens and risks of security provision. Largely forgotten today, the Bosnian war created public outcry and a sense of crisis in NATO that readily compares in intensity with that of the transatlantic crisis in Iraq in 2003.

By contrast, in the Kosovo case, public de-legitimization was markedly absent as both sides of the Atlantic wanted to avoid displaying transatlantic disunity. In addition, and partly due to the Bosnian experience, European allies together with Russia had established especially close consultative processes to co-determine policy positions. On different levels, Contact Group countries came together daily to coordinate next steps. Among the European allies, the United Kingdom was able to form close trans-governmental ties with the State Department and push for intervention in 1998. In 1999, British diplomats, parts of the State Department and US NATO military officials advocated a ground invasion to win the stalled Kosovo campaign.

The power of persuasion played a limited role when it came to allied discussions on disarming Iraq in the 1990s and in 2002. The two cases differ with regard to the strategies used by allies. Between 1997 and 1998, France relied on regular consultations with the United States ahead of important decisions. Under the Bush administration, regular contacts and consultations were unequally distributed among the three European allies. German and French sources report that consultations decreased over time and diplomats were deliberately kept out of the loop. Only the British were closely involved in US planning for the intervention. Thus it is not surprising that the Blair government banked on trans-governmental coalitions while France and Germany resorted to de-legitimizing US actions.
Third, I found that strategies resting on the power of persuasion were particularly important with respect to the principal dimension of the use of force. In the successful cases of allied influence (Bosnia and Kosovo), persuasion helped the European allies influence the definition of US interests and goals. The exchange of arguments among transatlantic allies helped to forge a rationale for military action – a rationale vague enough for every ally to accept despite existing differences, and specific enough to provide a convincing justification for military action.

In the Bosnian case, the Clinton administration struggled to define its overall goals in the Balkans. With the help of consultations, trans-governmental coalition building, and de-legitimization, European allies helped to provide the narrative linking US intervention in Bosnia to the larger US foreign policy conception after the Cold War. The British government played an elevated role in constructing the rationale behind the Kosovo intervention. Forming a trans-governmental coalition with Albright, Tony Blair successfully advanced the notion of humanitarian intervention within the United States and within NATO.

In both cases on the Balkans, strategies of persuasion targeted a Clinton administration open to debating its course and in search of the right course of action. In both Iraq cases, where US policy had been firmly settled before exchanges took place, persuasion on the principal dimension of military intervention was to no avail.

In the 1990s, the French vision of a disarmed Iraq’s peaceful reintegration into the international community was pitted firmly against the US and UK’s justification of dealing with a ‘rogue state’. Five years later, the extensive US ‘war on terror’ was resisted by French and Germany arguments for a rule-based international order and a peaceful disarmament of Iraq. In both Iraq cases, the US administration (supported by the UK) entered discussions with allies, but on the basis of a pre-conceived policy position that could not be altered.

Table 14. The Power of Persuasion in comparative perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies based on the Power of Persuasion</th>
<th>Consultation as co-determination</th>
<th>Shaming and De-legitimization</th>
<th>Trans-governmental Coalitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRAQ 1998</td>
<td>IRAQ 2003</td>
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<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+/- = evidence of a strategy used by more than one ally  
+/- = evidence of a strategy used either by one ally only or only for a certain period  
- = no evidence of a particular strategy was found

8.2.2 The Power of Voice Opportunities

International institutions provide European allies with voice opportunities: they act as a forum in which alternatives to US policies can be elaborated and advocated. Institutional rules can be used to bind the United States to specific policies, to block US policy proposals, or allies can forum-shop to increase their leverage. It was assumed that these efforts would be successful because the United States cared about its reputation as a reliable partner and has a long-term interest in the preservation of international institutions. Additionally, allies were expected to be more successful if they were united in their attempts to use institutional rules. Drawing on the insights of the four case studies, I come to the following conclusions.

European allies have used their institutional voice opportunities in all four cases. The evidence from the case studies suggests that even in military matters the relevant institutional context stretches far beyond NATO. European allies have used a variety of formal and informal institutions to influence US policy-making.

During the Bosnian intervention, France and the United Kingdom blocked the US ‘lift and strike’ proposal by threatening to use their veto in the UN Security Council. Binding efforts in the Security Council were meant to create alternatives to this US initiative: the safe area concept restricted the way in which the US and NATO could use air strikes. Within NATO, the French government lured the US into action by making the fate of UNPROFOR a subject of NATO contingency planning. Lastly, within the newly formed Contact Group, European allies were able to capitalize on unanimous decision-making to bind the US into a political agreement on Bosnia.

Blocking efforts were absent in the Kosovo case despite the profound disagreements among allies on the principal decision to use of force. Binding played an important role in the ability of allies to shape intervention. NATO’s command and control structures enabled allies to have an impact on the military implementation of Operation Allied Force; the US preference to widen the air campaign was thus restrained. In parallel, the German government used its G8 presidency to shape the
political solution of the Kosovo intervention and to reintegrate Russia into the process.

In the two Iraq cases, European allies tried to change the US course of action by voicing their demands in international institutions. France and the United Kingdom turned to binding strategies with a discernibly different logic. The UK largely supported the idea of coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Iraq and ultimately had no intention of blocking any US government from using military force. To a certain extent, however, style and international support mattered to the Blair government. Thus, British binding strategies created diplomatic alternatives to precipitous military intervention. The use of British Security Council membership to create the most rigid inspection regime served two purposes. For one, it was hoped that unilateral US action could be avoided. Furthermore, it was assumed that by going the diplomatic extra-mile, international support for a military mission would be forthcoming in case of Iraqi non-compliance. In 1998, France had followed a similar path when it used its Security Council membership to negotiate a number of last-minute deals with Hussein’s regime. Yet, French diplomacy had been trying to bind the United States more explicitly. Due to French insistence, UN Security Council resolutions in 1998 and 2002 included a paragraph stipulating the need for the explicit authorization of the use of military force. In January 2003, France came to the conclusion that these efforts to rein in US actions had failed. As a consequence it resorted to explicit blocking of US action by threatening to veto any resolution initiating military action.

Table 15. The power of voice opportunities in comparative perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strategies based on the Power of Voice Opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1998</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 2003</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* + = evidence of a strategy used by more than one ally
* +/- = evidence of a strategy used either by one ally only, or only for a certain period
* - = no evidence of a particular strategy was found
8.2.3 Issue-specific Power

Strategies bases on issue-specific power are premised on the fact that even under unipolarity the United States will be sensitive to the tremendous costs associated with military interventions and their aftermaths. By offering material contributions or withholding troops and financial assistance, European allies can affect this American cost-calculation.

A comparative perspective on the four cases reveals, first, that balking and contributing have not been employed in all cases. Issue-specific power was only drawn upon successfully in the two cases on the Balkans. In Bosnia, France and United Kingdom used their troop contributions to impact tactical decisions. By contributing UN peacekeeping troops and by reinforcing them under difficult conditions, European allies could place restrictions on the way in which these forces would be used. This, in turn, limited the United States ability to advocate and implement air strikes against Milosevic. Having ruled out an American ground deployment, the United States went by European demands as long as they were unified. Once France and the UK split on withdrawal-options for UN troops, the US was able to prevail with its preferences for an air-campaign.

During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, all three European allies chose to contribute to the air-campaign and to the peacekeeping force as significantly as they could. While overall the US war-fighting machinery dwarfed these contributions they were still a source of leverage for European allies. Since each ally determined the rules of engagement of its own forces Europeans could trade in their contributions for a say over targeting. Further, European allies had made their peacekeeping contributions dependent on an American promise to deploy troops to Kosovo as well.

Based on the existing evidence, strategies of influence-seeking based on issue-specific power were not prevalent in the two Iraq cases. What makes the two Iraq cases so interesting is that in both cases significant contributions were made yet without attaching conditions to their use of European troops and bases. Both in 1998 and in 2003, the United Kingdom contributed significantly to military operations. Contrary to the cases on the Balkans, Britain did not tie this commitment to any specific conditions to be fulfilled by the United States. Similarly, the French signaled their willingness to contribute ground troops for most of 2002. While eventually the French did not participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, neither the French nor the German
government balked at providing the necessary military support for the US mission. Both countries granted over-flight rights and secured American bases in Europe with their armed forces. It may well be true that determined US administrations were less sensitive to the costs associated with military intervention. At the same time allies did not even bring their existing issue-specific power to bear: both administrations did not have to do without crucial British war-fighting support and other contributions from European allies. The Clinton administration did not envision a larger post-conflict military role. The Bush administration wrongly assumed that peacekeeping would not be necessary in Iraq.

Table 16. Issue-specific power in perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies Based on Issue-specific Power</th>
<th>Contributing</th>
<th>Balk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kosovo</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq 1998</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq 2003</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = evidence of a strategy used by more than one ally
+/- = evidence of a strategy used either by one ally only or only for a period of time
- = no evidence of particular strategy found

8.3 Alliance Politics: Scope Conditions

European influence is anything but ensured. The thesis shows that there is variance across cases, as European allies had significant effects on US policy on the Balkans, but they had less of a say when it came to Iraq’s disarmament. In particular, the two cases on the Balkans and the intervention in Iraq in 2003 show interesting within-case variance since European allies did not equally influence the principal, political, and tactical aspects. The degree of unity among European allies and the degree of unity of the US domestic political scene help to explain this finding. The intensity of threat perception cannot consistently account for the varying degrees of European influence. **First, the intensity of threat is not a plausible explanation for the variance in European influence.** I do not dispute that different and irreconcilable perspectives on the target of military intervention are central to understanding why some European countries lacked the extent of influence on US decision-making in Iraq that they had
with regard to the Balkans. Yet, these perspectives and perceptions were not based on objective and material characteristics, such as the directness of the military challenge. Rather, they are the outcome of a deliberate political and social construction that places military intervention in the larger foreign policy framework and the definition of interests.

The evidence from the within-case comparisons underlines the finding that perceptions and perspectives play a role but clearly not in the way defensive realists assume. The latter would argue that threat perceptions are directly related to measurable, material factors that challenge security.

In the Bosnian case, it can hardly be argued that increased US engagement and decreasing European influence in the summer of 1995 is related to an increasing challenge posed by the Bosnian conflict to US survival. Rather, the US intervened in Bosnia and invested political capital because the conflict was framed as a challenge to the wider US agenda in Europe after the Cold War. This nesting of the Bosnian issue as central to the future stability of the European continent was largely a product of European influence on the definition of wider US interests.

Similarly, a defensive realist argument on threat perceptions cannot explain the within-case variance in the Kosovo case. Here, the United States pushed its allies into threatening the use of force at a time when the Kosovo conflict did not produce large-scale violence or threatened to destabilize the region. Once Kosovo spiraled deeper into conflict with an immense outflow of refugees, atrocities, and a clear destabilization of neighboring countries, European allies increased their influence over US political and tactical decision-making. Larger foreign policy interests driving US decision-making are better equipped to explain this varying European impact than threat perception in the realist sense of the word. As in the Bosnian case, these wider US interests were a product of European influence not a condition for allied influence.

It has widely been argued that the differences in threat perception explain the lack of European influence in both Iraq cases. This explanation faces two serious difficulties: first, it is hard to establish how Iraq constituted a serious threat to US survival based on the realist typology of threats. Iraq in the 1990s at worst presented a medium threat to US allies and their economic interests in the Gulf. In 2003, intelligence on which the portrayal of the Iraqi threat was based was deliberately forged and staged by the US and UK government. Furthermore, even in these cases there is some limited European influence on US decision-making. Ahead of Operation Desert Fox, the
coalition of the UK and the US delayed the use of force in 1997 and 1998 due to French diplomatic efforts. In 2003, the British government can claim some limited influence on the political dimension of US military intervention.

A closer look at the within-case evidence suggests that the defensive realist conception of threat perception cannot shed light on the different levels of European impact but that the construction of wider interests that set a given military intervention in context is decisive. Furthermore, there are crucial differences between the cases of the Balkans and Iraq. Whereas in the Balkans, European allies had an impact on the wider definition of interests, this form of influence was almost completely lacking in the Iraq cases. The United States and the UK on the one hand and France and Germany on the other hand did not diverge because of the different level of threat they faced from Iraq. Moreover, the way that the countries interpreted the problems posed by Iraq in the context of their larger foreign policy agenda and definition of interests did not allow them to bridge existing differences.

The degree of unity among European allies and the unity of the US domestic scene can better account for the ability of European allies to affect that wider definition of US interests and policies of military intervention.

Second, the degree of unity among European allies is a sufficient condition for the success of allied influence-seeking. The more European countries pursued their strategies jointly, the more likely they were to have an impact on US decision-making. As highlighted in section 8.1 this thesis also lists instances where individual countries, the UK in particular, were able to influence US policy-making without the backing of their European partners. In general, a high degree of intra-European unity leads to a higher degree of influence over US policy-making.

For example, in the Bosnian case joint European efforts to shame US absence from the Balkans had an important impact on the wider definition of US interests and its principal decision to intervene. Strong European unity provided particular salience and credibility to their arguments; these linked resistance to US proposals for action to the wider US agenda in Europe and NATO. The US dominance over tactical issues was premised on a split between the UK and France, countries that had previously cooperated closely in Bosnia. In the Kosovo case, European influence became heard more clearly with regard to political and tactical decisions when European allies converged on a more restrictive use of force. In both Iraq cases, French (and later
German) attempts to inflict reputation costs or to bind the United States lacked the broad backing of other European governments.

The variance between the Balkans and the Iraq cases is largely consistent with the expectation that the degree of allied unity is important for the success of attempts to influence the United States. In the two successful cases, European voices were heard because they were largely uniform. The Clinton administration did not override European concerns because of the reputation costs associated with doing so. Ignoring European demands would have seriously harmed NATO and thus the very reason why the US chose to intervene in the first place. European unity promoted effective strategies based on voice opportunities and issue-specific power and they reigned in US actions in both cases.

Such concerns were absent in the two Iraq cases. Binding strategies failed because of a lack of European unity. British support alleviated reputation pressure on the US and undermined explicit French attempts to bind the US. The British prime minister tirelessly organized and ensured international support for the legal justification that sought to portray US and UK action as consistent with international law. In the ensuing war of words over the meaning and spirit of UN resolutions on Iraq, France and Germany fought a losing battle. In turn, British efforts to achieve a convergence of viewpoints among allies were sapped by the French.

Third, the degree of unity of the US domestic scene is a decisive condition for allied influence. European influence does not take place in a vacuum and cannot be understood without reference to the US domestic context. Some domestic support – whether in society, congress, or parts of the executive – increases the likelihood of European success.

In both of the Balkans cases, European allies largely benefitted from a low degree of internal unity in the US. A certain culture of administrative decision-making provided ample access points for the Europeans. The collegial and deliberative style within the Clinton administration was open to allied attempts to shape interests via consultations or to build trans-governmental coalitions, such as British-US cooperation in the Kosovo case. Second, in both Balkans cases, the US congress never emerged as a strong coherent opposition to the policies of the US administration and remained
divided on the proper course of action. Third, US public opinion in the early 1990s was focused inwards. Hence, public support in both the Bosnian and the Kosovo case was highly volatile and split when it came to the support of US military action. The need for public justification of renewed US military engagement in Europe increased the value of allies as guarantors of legitimacy and to share the burden. That in turn increased the success of European strategies of influence-seeking, which relied on the sensitivity of the US to costs and loss of reputation.

Domestic dynamics were completely different when it came to the two interventions in Iraq. By 1998, the US administration, congress, and public opinion were largely supportive of punitive actions against Saddam Hussein. The divided government had a much larger effect on US policy-making in Iraq than in Kosovo. With their victory in the mid-term elections, republicans became forceful and vocal advocates of military action against Iraq. Their disdain for the Iraqi government was widely shared by the US population, which was not even opposed to unilateral military action. Faced with this domestic situation, the Clinton administration quickly united behind the policy of dual containment and military action. French attempts to consult with the US or to persuade it of the benefits of future burden-sharing did not fall on fruitful domestic soil.

In 2003, the republicans who had driven a more robust and militaristic policy against Iraq formed the backbone of the new Bush administration. In the beginning of 2002, the administration displayed a brief lack of unity with regard to the question of UN involvement. Once French and German attempts to change the US course of action came into full swing, however, they faced a uniform and unassailable domestic scene that was supportive of military action. The threat inflation and the rallying effects of 9/11 had produced unprecedented levels of public and congressional support for military action. This further strengthened an administration whose decision-making processes provided no access points for allies and left them out of the loop.

The evidence from the cases leads to the rejection of the assumption that the degree of allied influence is dependent of the particular US administration. This somewhat oversimplified assumption contends that a benign Clinton government ensured adequate European influence whereas a self-righteous Bush administration flatly denied it. Two observations speak against this widespread reading. The varying

174 In 1998, Clinton’s will to prove his leadership amid mid-term elections and in light of the Lewinsky scandal may have played a role in pushing allies to threaten force against Serbia.
degrees of influence within the cases of the Balkans point to the fact that at times even the Clinton administration overrode European concerns when it had united around a course of action. Second, with broad domestic support and a uniform vision among government officials, Clinton did not hesitate to attack Iraq in 1998 despite French opposition.

8.4 Generalization and Future Research

The findings of this study shed light on the politically and theoretically relevant phenomenon of varying European influence on US policies of military intervention. Primarily, the study aimed to explain the empirical puzzle posed by the four cases under review: while European allies did have significant influence on US policies in the Balkans, such influence was largely absent in the two Iraq cases. To explain this variance, I constructed a framework for research into alliance politics that specified strategies and scope conditions for the success of influence-seeking. In the following, I assess how the conclusions of this study can be generalized.

A first type of generalization would apply the alliance politics framework to other cases of transatlantic military interventions. Such an extension of the research could further test the plausibility of the conclusions I have presented. Two current examples, the intervention in Libya (2011) and the ongoing debate about a possible intervention in Syria come to mind.

Preliminary evidence suggests that the framework for alliance politics applies well in the Libyan case. When the revolution in Libya started, the Obama administration was quite hesitant about another intervention. In the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.”175Only a month later on March 19, 2011, the United States in concert with a multination coalition imposed a no-fly zone over Libya. Many of the ingredients of alliance politics seem to be present in this change of US policy.

The extensive, clear, and public threats against the civilian population brought allies to a branching point where the mere condemnation of Gaddafi was not enough. On the European side, France and Britain continuously lobbied for military intervention and kept the issue at the top of the transatlantic agenda. Within the UN, they

formulated a toughly worded resolution authorizing force and worked the phones to garner international support. The French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, brought the Libyan opposition and the international community to Paris to consider further steps. In the end, the United States followed suit and voted in favor of UN Resolution 1973, which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya. Consistent with the explanation of alliance politics, French and British attempts to influence US policy met favorable conditions. First, the Obama administration was split internally. European supporters of intervention successfully teamed up with a group of ‘female hawks’: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, UN Ambassador Susan Rice, and National Security Staff Director Samantha Power who advanced the argument for military action within US channels. Second, there was at least a limited degree of European unity. Whereas Germany and others opposed intervention, they did not outright block military actions by allies and even provided the necessary military support within NATO. Third, a limited military engagement did not face consistent domestic opposition in congress or from the US public.\footnote{For an initial assessment of the Libyan intervention see Chivvis (2012); RUSI (2011); Hallams/Schreer (2012); Chesterman (2012).}

Beyond this preliminary evidence, an application of the alliance politics framework to the Libyan case would have to clarify a number of questions on which reliable evidence is still lacking. For example, an analysis of political and tactical questions would be warranted. Here, the role of non-NATO allies and their effects on alliance politics would have to be assessed. Furthermore, other external actors appear to have significantly influenced US support for military intervention, but this goes beyond the confines of the framework suggested here. In particular, the Arab League’s endorsement of the no-fly zone played an important role.

A second type of generalization would mean applying the conclusions of this study to other issue-areas. I would assume that the conclusions of alliance politics are of limited value when applied to completely different issue-areas, such as transatlantic trade or environmental issues. One of the central characteristics of military intervention is the continuing importance and prerogatives of nation states on the European side. Given this condition, it made sense to emphasize the strategies employed by individual member states and to examine their impact on US policy-making. Other issue-areas where the EU – as a supranational organization – represents the European part as a whole may exhibit different dynamics.
With some limitations, the alliance politics framework may be helpful in analyzing the dynamics within the transatlantic alliance with regard to post-conflict reconstruction or nation-building. These military endeavors share similar characteristics with military interventions. Allied disagreements can be grouped into principal questions over exit strategies and the like; the definition of political purpose; and tactical questions. It is plausible to assume that strategies of allied influence-seeking could be to determine these issues. However, I would expect strategies to be weighted differently. Since nation-building exercises have been long and costly, I would assume that allied issue-specific power plays a much larger role in these cases than in military intervention.

A last type of generalization would extrapolate the conclusions to other allies. I assume that the alliance politics framework equally applies to other European allies. The findings should be less useful when it comes to US allies outside of Europe. Strategies of persuasion are central to the alliance politics framework and decisive for allied influence on the United States. Persuasion, however, is premised on the existence of a security community. It is only because the United States accepts European voices as legitimate in its process of decision-making, that such a high degree of interference is possible. Thus, conclusions should be applicable only to countries that share a similar ‘special relationship’ with the United States.
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## List of Interviews

Transcripts are available upon request

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<td>March 2, 2011</td>
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<td>State Department / Senior Policy Adviser to Madeleine Albright and Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning (1996–2000)</td>
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<td>State Department Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans (1996)</td>
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<td>Pardew, James</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Representative to the US Negotiating Team at Dayton</td>
<td>March 14, 2011</td>
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<td>Deputy Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Democracy in the Balkans (1998–1999)</td>
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<td>Member of US negotiation delegation to the Croat Muslim Federation (1993)</td>
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<td>Swigert, James</td>
<td>Senior Deputy Special Representative on Kosovo (1998)</td>
<td>February 25, 2011</td>
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Annex

1. Summary
Since the end of the Cold War, military interventions under the auspices of the United Nations and NATO have become a prominent tool of transatlantic security policy. Yet, these military missions against third countries have not been a prerequisite for harmony. Whenever allies debated about going to war they faced serious disagreements about whether and how to do so. In light of these disagreements, this thesis poses the question how and under which conditions are European allies able to influence US policies of military intervention? I explore this question by analyzing the interactions between the United States and France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in four case studies, namely the intervention in Bosnia (1992—1995), Kosovo (1998—1999), Iraq (1998) and Iraq (2002—2003).

This thesis takes issue with two prominent accounts that have analyzed these disagreements and their solutions. Structural realists claim that because of its military preponderance, the United States has determined the direction and content of military missions. The security community literature argues that because of the specific social structure of the transatlantic relationship, European allies should have significant influence over US decision-making. The thesis starts with the empirical puzzle that the variance in European influence is at odds with both the claim to dominance and the claim to guaranteed influence.

To answer the research question, I first develop a more fine-grained understanding and measurement of what influence means in the context of current military interventions. European allies may exercise influence over the principal, political, and tactical aspects of the use of force. This precise measurement enables me to identify the variance in European influence within and across cases. Second, I set forth a two-step analytical framework of alliance politics. I design a typology mapping strategies of influence-seeking to answer how allies attempt to influence US policy-making. European allies tap into three sources of influence: the United States’ sensitivity to the costs of military interventions, the United States’ interest in the preservation of institutionalized cooperation, and the United States’ quest for legitimacy. Respectively, allies use their issue-specific power, their institutional voice opportunities and the power of persuasion to influence US policy-making. Third, the thesis tests three scope conditions for allied influence: the intensity of threat, the unity of US domestic politics, and the degree of unity among European allies.

With regard to the outcomes of the efforts to seek influence, I find that European allies had limited influence over the timing in all four cases but that influence varies among the European allies and with the different dimensions of military interventions. Within the European camp, British governments affected at least one dimension of military intervention in three of four cases. Overall, European influence was more significant in the case of the Balkans than in Iraq.
Regarding the strategies of European influence-seeking, more than one way leads to Rome: each case shows that a distinct mixture of strategies are employed by European allies and different instruments may thus lead to success. While strategies based on persuasion and voice opportunities were ubiquitous in all cases, issue-specific power was only brought to bear in the Balkans and not in the Iraq cases. I argue that the power of persuasion is particularly important in developing a justification for the use of military force and, thus, for the principal decision whether to intervene. The thesis also sheds light on the variety of institutional formats that European diplomats skillfully bring into play to voice their opposition and restrain US action.

The analysis of the four cases reveals that Europeans can significantly influence the US, but only under certain conditions. I find that two conditions are central to the success of allied attempts to affect US policy-making. If the US domestic political scene – comprising of a given US administration, congress, and public opinion – is united in its policies on a given military intervention, the ability of European allies to affect US decision-making is significantly diminished. Moreover, the degree of unity among European allies is a sufficient condition for success. If European allies are split in their policy recommendations and demands, they are less likely to have an impact on US policy-making. Finally, I argue that the intensity of threat cannot account for the variance in European influence. While insurmountable perspectives exist with regard to the targets of military interventions, they are products of political construction which European allies are more likely to influence if the US domestic scene is split and Europeans are united.
2. Zusammenfassung


Ausgangspunkt der Analyse ist die Feststellung, dass weder der strukturelle Realismus noch die Theorie der transatlantischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft die Varianz in europäischem Einfluss plausibel erklären können. Die militärische Übermacht der USA hat nicht zu einer proportionalen Dominanz in militärischen Interventionen geführt, wie der strukturelle Realismus erwarten würde. Gleichzeitig hat die soziale Struktur der transatlantischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft europäischen Partnern nicht in jedem Fall Einfluss garantieren können.


Die Ergebnisse der Fallstudien belegen, dass europäische Alliierte in allen vier Fällen zumindest Einfluss auf die zeitliche Terminierung amerikanischer Interventionspolitik hatten, wenn auch sonst der Einfluss über die Fälle und zwischen den Europäischen Partnern variiert. Insbesondere Britische Regierungen waren in drei von vier Fällen in
der Lage mindestens eine Dimension amerikanischer Interventionspolitik zu beeinflussen.

Mit Blick auf die Strategien europäischer Einflussnahme führen viele Wege nach Rom und zum Einfluss auf amerikanische Politik, wie der spezifische Mix an Strategien in den vier Fallstudien deutlich macht. Überzeugung durch Argumente und institutionelle Einflussstrategien kamen im Gegensatz zu spezifischen materiellen Beiträgen in allen Fällen vor. Die Arbeit zeigt deutlich, dass der transatlantische Austausch von Argumenten vor allem für die Konstruktion einer übergreifenden Begründung militärischer Interventionen bedeutend ist und damit für die grundsätzliche Frage, ob militärisches Eingreifen gerechtfertigt ist. Außerdem verweist die Arbeit darauf, dass heute ein ganzes Geflecht internationaler Institutionen auch jenseits der NATO von europäischen Diplomaten dazu genutzt wird, sich Einfluss auf amerikanische Politik zu verschaffen.

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