

Segregation and Integration as Challenges for Hegemony Projects in Violent Conflicts

*A historical-materialist study of the conflict system
on the southern Philippines*

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Abstract

English

The dissertation explores the question *“how and why have political projects and consequently defining conflict explanations changed over time on the southern Philippines?”* The guiding reasoning is thereby that the strength of political movements in violent conflicts depends on their ability to integrate some and segregate other social groups in material, ideal, and institutional terms to form an internally consistent constituency; according to serve the historical interests of each social group and the needs of the movement to compete with other movements in the ongoing political violent process. This logic results from the applied theoretical approach: historical materialism gets used as framework for the explorative analysis, combining elements of historical processes and social structures methodologically via social group network and process descriptions, brought together in a comparative analysis. The empirical insights are then used for the development of generalizations and a grounding of the theoretical approach for conflict studies’ purposes.

Deutsch

Die Dissertation erforscht die Frage: *Wie und warum haben sich politische Projekte und daraus folgend definierende Konflikterklärungen auf den südlichen Philippinen über Zeit gewandelt?* Die leitende Argumentation ist dabei, dass die Stärke einer politischen Bewegung in Gewaltkonflikten abhängig ist von ihrer Fähigkeit, soziale Gruppen in materieller, ideeller, und institutioneller Form zu integrieren bzw. auszuschließen, um so eine intern konsistente Gefolgschaft zu formen, welche sowohl die historischen Interessen jeder sozialen Gruppe erfüllt als auch den Notwendigkeiten der Bewegung im fortlaufenden politisch-gewalthaltigen Prozess nachkommt. Diese Logik resultiert aus Einsichten eines historisch-materialistischen Ansatzes der als Rahmen für die explorative Studie verwandt wird und damit Elemente historischer Prozesse und sozialer Strukturen kombiniert, methodologisch über die Beschreibung von Netzwerken sozialer Gruppen und historischen Prozessen, zusammengeführt in einer vergleichenden Analyse. Die empirischen Einsichten werden dann für die Entwicklung von Generalisierungen und einer Erdung des theoretischen Ansatzes für Konfliktforschungszwecke verwendet.

dedicated to my grandfather in deepest sympathy

Bruno, who passed away many years ago, was a blue collar worker with probably few connections to my writing; to theoretical models, methodological approaches, and scientific terms. However, his life taught me the harm ethno-political conflicts can do; and at the same time how resistant people can be, keeping their warmth and empathy for other people albeit societal hostility. My grandfather was born into an inter-ethnic family, with his father an Italian-speaking railroad worker and his mother a German-speaking post officer in the 1920s. Both parents died young, his father, my great-grandfather, crushed between two railroad wagons and his mother followed several months later due to illness. My grandfather, a five year old boy and now an orphan, was brought to relatives, who lived in the neighbouring, predominantly Italian speaking province. My grandfather's following years were defined by fascism in his host community as much as in school, vilifying him as a German outsider on the height of Italy's black-shirt nationalism. He left his shelter and made it as an agricultural labourer even to France before he returned to the province he was born in. There he met his future wife, my grandmother, descendent of a German-speaking family, educated in the so called "Katakombenschule", underground schools in German language to defy Italian fascism. It has been the early fifties and even though Fascism in Italy and National-Socialism in Germany were smashed by partisans and allied invasions, the inter-ethnic tensions in my home province continued to be hostile and would soon lead to insurgent bomb attacks against vital electricity pools and counter-insurgency measures by the Italian military police and intelligence service, including torture and murder. But as love normally does not care much about political borders, my grandparents fell in love with each other. A scandal at that time: marrying the Italian enemy. After being shunned as a German under Italian fascism due to his German-speaking mother, my grandfather was now considered Italian, having an Italian-speaking father. Thus, he was unbearable to part of my grandmother's relatives. However, my grandparents were strong enough to overcome this harsh time, dealing with the struggle of ostracizing and hostility by nationalists on all sides with passionate humanity. My grandfather continued his work as a local land and later on factory labourer. His hard work and his open heart calmed his inner-family foes and made him a respected and loved member of the local community. His daughter, my mother, continued the family tradition and married my father, descendant of a Ladin speaking family with its own history of being segregated and integrated throughout history. My grandfather's story was not present for me during his life time. I just knew him as the always friendly and calm grandpa who I remember never angry and who took

long hikes with me and my brother through the Alps, explaining patiently all our children's questions.

Just years after his passing my mother told me his story. It successfully prevented that I let myself as teenager get involved into an ethnic friend-foe youth culture, still alive in my province. Presently, during the last years, the shaking of a local autonomous multi-ethnic society by global developments, which include pressure on local industries and governmental institutions, produced renewed tensions, which we thought to have overcome outside the mentioned youth culture after slow but steady peaceful developments of the 1970s to 1990s. Bigotry on German and Italian sides is back on the agenda and conquers large parts of our society in an unholy alliance with xenophobia against recent immigrants. Grandfather's story highlights thereby, that interethnic clashes produce, next to histories of heroic struggles by great leaders for century old immortal nations, above all victims among the masses. This is the political background of the research presented in the following pages. The project explores an area where people experienced inter-ethnic violence on a scale exceeding my grandfather's story by uncountable times. The research is guided by the conviction, that the "ethnic story" is, although politically powerful, an oversimplified, inconsistent, and destructive explanation for societal conflicts with limited help for conflict handling. To look beyond the ethnic story is an inevitable necessity for a progressive and peaceful development of societies. To leave one's own society helps thereby to open one's own perspective and the results might be helpful in a mutual exchange of political possibilities, for one's own provenance as much as for the area analyzed. To remember my grandfather's story including its happy ending remembers at the same time the human side of the even greater tragedy of murder, rape, and expulsion of people on all sides of violence on the southern Philippines. Thereby I would like to include them in my dedication.

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Then I would like to thank all the people who supported me in my research on the Philippines as hosts, interview partners, and facilitators. They provided me not just with information, but

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In Davao City Heike introduced me to inspiring people, who passionately work for a progressive future of their country, against the harassing by private interests and hostile public institutions. At a peace and development conference I met furthermore with proponents of the Young Moro Professionals. As much as their struggle for "good leadership" sounded odd for a central European student with his academic anti-elitist background, as much it was fascinating to see young, skilled, and clever people work hard for a better future of their communities, overcoming with an open mind and heart the narrowness of years of violent conflicts.

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i. Executive Summary

The project *Segregation and Integration as Challenges for Hegemony Projects in Violent Conflicts* focuses on the question how and why have political projects and consequently defining conflict explanations changed over time on the southern Philippines?

To answer it, a historical materialist approach will be used: its ontological understanding is that political agency gets constrained *and* enabled by historical structures at each point in time, which vice versa will change these historical structures for the future. Accordingly, the strength of political projects in violent conflicts depends on their ability to make use of existing historical structures; in other words, to integrate some and segregate other social groups in material, ideal, and institutional terms to form an internally consistent constituency according to serve the historical interests of each social group and the historical needs of the active movement to compete with other movements in the ongoing political violent process. The term *historical* implies thereby, that the characteristics as well as the configuration of social groups in an evolving social space change over time and thus change the factors to be considered by political movements, mentioned above, bringing with it a possible change of conflict explanations.

The approach guides the research implemented along the analysis of social group networks and political processes. Due to the high benchmark regarding data, the study is considered explorative, with further validating research needed in follow-up projects. Thus, aim is not to give a one-sentence or bullet-line answers to the research question, but to outline the social complex which influences this change of conflict explanations. The outcome of the research project will be presented in eight chapters of this book.

The first chapter starts with a short project introduction. It presents the research context, followed by the research question. The following paragraphs outline its different dimensions and address scientific and political relevance. The second section presents the empirical space, in which the research question is situated, while the third section presents with historical materialism a possible base for a theoretical approach combining in a dialectic way different aspects of violent conflicts; followed by section four, which outlines overall methodology and paper structure; fore-closing the more detailed elaborations of theory and methodology in chapter two. It concludes with some precautions on demands and scope of the project. This includes a discussion on the constraints of theory transfer and the role of Western science in the countries of the Global South.

The second chapter outlines the theoretical base and methodology, used in the project. It starts with presenting the historical and philosophical background of this approach: the usage of it by Antonio Gramsci to analyze the conflict-ridden social environment of Italy's post-WW1

crisis between progressive and conservative forces parallel to the differences between the industrialized north and the feudal-agrarian south on the one hand; on the other hand by International Political Economy analyzing developments of world orders throughout the time of colonialism and post-colonialism in the last two centuries including questions on transnationalism nowadays. Then, meta-theoretical questions, including concepts of dialectics, structures, and processes in human development will be discussed to grasp the holistic demand of the project. This forms the base for the more concrete theoretical concepts: the text starts with discussing the production of social structures in the components of material base, social ideas, and institutions. This includes a discussion of the mutual relation between these social structures and political struggle, introducing consent and force as dual power mechanisms to stabilize social hierarchies out of these social structures. After this block of presenting elements of society formation and integration, the chapter continues by focusing on questions of political crises and revolutionary struggles, challenging social structures and hierarchies. Here, the differentiation between wars of manoeuvre and wars of position is essential. Following the research question, a specific focus will be put on the role of direct violence and external influence in crises, including current insights from conflict studies. To conclude the theoretical part of the chapter, two more issues will be addressed: to understand the drivers of this political struggle, the organizers of politics, in Gramscian terms labelled “intellectuals” and their role in different forms of social knowledge production, i.e. politics, must be conceptualized. Furthermore, the characteristics of (interrelated) different spaces will be addressed with insights gathered by Gramsci and IPE: external influence on local hegemonies, outward projection of hegemony, and transnational hegemonies; at the same time, voids in these works regarding transnational and violent hierarchies in non-OECD countries should be highlighted. The second, shorter part of the chapter will discuss the methods used to employ these theoretical concepts in a heuristic way. It will outline a three-dimensional approach: the use of time-sensitive network graphs to grasp historical structures, conflict process descriptions to grasp actor-forced historical development, and finally the comparative analysis of inductively derived hegemony projects. The chapter gets concluded by describing the different data sources (primary and secondary written sources plus expert interviews) as well as ways of IT-based data management and processing.

This broad second chapter is followed by two straightforward empirical chapters. Chapter three is divided by a matrix combining social structure components (the mentioned material base, social ideas, and institutions, augmented by a cross-cutting focus on direct violence) and time spans encompassing the key periods of the ongoing political conflict: its mythical past as reference, the pre-violence situation, the outbreak of violence with the declaration of martial law and following dynamics of war and peace. This chapter will show the diverse interests of and links between social groups throughout the conflict, breaking up the idea of a dyadic ethnic conflict. Interests and alliances integrate social groups and segregate others, far bypassing the simple idea of ethnic loyalty. Questions of direct violence can be handled in all three components. However, as it is a key part of this research, it gets highlighted as a fourth aspect of social structures, which actually transcends the previous three. The results match the developments in the other components: the production of violence is far from being dyadic between two ethnicities throughout most of the time; except for the time after the immediate outbreak of the official political conflict. This encompasses intra-social group violence as much as support in the production of violence cross-cutting official conflict lines.

To find out more about these dynamics, chapter four opens up another matrix; this time, the time spans get matched with hegemony projects: the liberal-post-colonial hegemony project, the national-liberal anti-colonial counter-hegemony project, the religious-national counter-hegemony project, the socialist-tri-people anti-colonial counter-hegemony project, and finally the non-project in a crisis of hegemony; all categories are analytical and derived inductively. This chapter gives an insight not just into the structural developments outlined in the previous chapter, but above all on the political decisions of proponents of the different hegemony projects throughout the conflict process. It shows, that programs, alliances, and actions were the outcome of strategic decisions under the circumstances of historical structures; i.e. the later constraint and enabled these decisions, however, they did not determine them. This chapter shows the possibilities of political action and prevents a reverse reading of history from its outcome, which always would support an understanding of a pre-designed path of human development.

Chapter five will summarize these insights for the empirical situation of the southern Philippines. The first part discusses the efforts and its outcome of integrative and segregate activities by the different hegemony projects in a comparative manner. The second part of the chapter addresses the empirical questions of chapter one: this encompasses the insight of a parallel rather than consecutive development of secular and religious-integralist ideologies; the successes and failings of secular counter-hegemonies due to organizational skills and intellectual elitism; the diverse role of religion in politics, its long-term engagement and ambiguous democratization effect; the qualitative change for secessionist hegemony projects accepting autonomy over independence; the failure of progressive movements to handle double-colonial situations; and last but not least the challenges of self-reproducing situations of violence.

Chapter six and seven use the insights from chapters three to five to address questions from chapter one and two on a generalizing level and thereby ground the extension of the historical materialist approach towards violent conflicts in the periphery. Chapter six addresses questions of hegemony, conflict, and crises on a macro level. After recapitulating hegemony and counter-hegemony elements in Minsupala, it starts with analyzing colonialism as a foreign induced crisis, rather than the implementation of a foreign hegemony, as superficially analyzed by IPE. This crisis has several characteristics: the end of a former hegemony by new external rulers, the alteration of internal social structures, different forms of colonialism and the change of spatial dimension of regional societies. In the second part the development to post-colonialism gets analyzed as a passive revolution. Potential local rulers out of the pre-colonial hegemonic ruling class get incorporated into a new hegemony characterized by the integration of the former colony into a world order under the leadership of the former colonial master. However, rather than being a local copy of a global hegemony, this passive revolution produces double or multiple hegemonies: connected but different systems of rule in global and local social spaces under the formula of development towards liberalism. Furthermore, the role of local peripheral areas as providers of natural resources in a highly capital-intensive global economy and its incomplete integration into this hegemony leads to superfluous social groups; together, double/multiple-hegemony and superfluous social groups pose constant elements of tension in the passive revolution of post-colonial global integration and finally lead to an overall crisis. The liberal hegemony reacts, next to economic development programs, with cultural retreat in combination with the usage of force, aggravating the underlying ten-

sions leading to the crisis. Meanwhile, revolutionary movements struggle to go beyond rejectionist ideas and establish new hegemony projects with different outcomes: failing of intellectualist anti-colonial projects, long games of religious-integralists, and socialist movements struggling to cope with multiple colonialism. The chapter concludes and summarizes with discussing the chapter title elements for the 21st century: hegemony, conflicts, and crises in post-colonial spaces. It concludes, that colonialism is still shaping the periphery; not (just) by an ahistoric moral responsibility for a destroyed society, but as the trigger of specific social developments towards the mentioned double/multiple-hegemony with its embodiments in material, ideal, and institutional components of society. The conflicts between the ruling local and global social groups on the one hand and the subordinated local groups on the other intensify due to historical progress. A return to the original conditions of passive revolution via development liberalism is impossible, while small quantitative hegemonic offers are not sufficient any longer. The organic crisis finally escalates with counter-hegemony mobilization and organization by new classes; the latter born out of the liberal development hegemony and now hindered by its constraints: new professionals and intellectuals deriving from the subordinated classes.

Chapter seven discusses the dynamics of this crisis and above all the consequences of violence in more detail. After a recapitulation of revolutionary methods applied by different movements in Minsupala, it starts with discussing the role of violence in colonial intervention and passive revolution: rather than implementing a social order, based on the consent of the overall majority of society, colonial intervention and post-colonial ruling is characterized by a limited consent into a national hegemony and its institutions; and a constant threat or actual use of direct violence to force compliance of society to its elite rulers is necessary. In this situation, counter-hegemonic forces have to address the question of direct violence more imminently than opposing social groups in consent-oriented societies, in the last resort for immediate self-protection. Thereby, however, the necessary combination of wars of position and manoeuvre, highlighted by Gramsci, might get threatened as much by success and failure of these counter-hegemony violence efforts. The third section generalizes insights on the production of violence; the role of external support, as much from abroad as from traditional elites, in anti-colonial struggles; and of intellectuals organizing this violence production. Then follows an analysis of mutual influence and consequences of violence and hegemony projects; highlighting the possibility of hegemony projects to channel widespread violence towards dyadic violence, but at the same time being threatened due to the compromises made to production and conduct of violence. The section furthermore points at the risk to confuse violence alliances with integrated hegemonic movements. The paper argues that political choices by the respective hegemony projects' leaderships for one or the other strategy are central. A strong sign for the failing of hegemony projects is then the development of a self-reproducing violence system; violence escalation step models can not grasp this mingling of different forms of violence any longer. However, far from being a loss for all social groups, *lords-in-war* profit from this situation; and with their widespread influence over violence production networks, they are a key element for the reproduction of violence in a political field which could not be filled by a coherent hegemony project. The chapter concludes by summarizing the insights along hegemony, crisis, and persisting violence and ends with the analysis that due to violence hegemony struggles might lose their transitional and transformative character, leading to

cyclical violence in a persistent violence system; and dyadic peace processes fail to grasp this dimension of contemporary conflicts.

The paper concludes with chapter eight. It summarizes the answer to the research question and puts the key results in perspective and links them to scientific developments in IPE and conflict studies. Starting with the project of a Philippine hegemony based on the idea of liberal development the study highlights that the crisis in Minsupala has been the consequence of the failing of a postcolonial passive revolution. In this crisis, the counter-hegemonic movements have developed and the continuing process combines crisis and dynamics of the violent conflict. The social ideas and thus the conflict explanations of each respective hegemony project have thereby been quite stable over the last forty years of violent conflict. Their strength, however, differed on the level of national and international political leaderships as well as throughout the wider local population, with different strategies in place. Current changes of local practices point at a more thorough hegemonic change in Moro areas and an organic influence of the NR-AC project. However, just the next years and the consequences of the current peace negotiations will show how stable this project can be outside the streamlining circumstances of an insurgency and if the outcome of the peace process will stabilize the conflict explanation of a struggle between faith-based cultures.

Following from these insights and as well from the overall study, the chapter then reflects, what can be learned in regard to research of conflicts in peripheral spaces. The aim is thereby to grasp the link which connects different dimensions of a violent conflict: hegemonic formation, space in form of periphery as well as global integration, resulting crises and its handling by non-violent and violent strategies of political movements, the organization of these struggles including the alteration or development of public institutions, and finally the conduct of violence; synthesized in the analysis of the development of a conflict system.

The chapter and with it the book concludes with some remarks on future research projects and normative expectations.

ii. Zusammenfassung

Das Projekt *Segregation und Integration als Herausforderungen für Hegemonialprojekte in Gewaltkonflikten* stellt die Frage wie und warum sich politische Projekte und daraus folgend definierende Konflikterklärungen auf den südlichen Philippinen über Zeit gewandelt haben.

Um dies zu beantworten wird ein historisch-materialistischer Ansatz genutzt: sein ontologisches Verständnis ist, dass politisches Handeln durch historische Strukturen zu jedem Zeitpunkt beschränkt *und* ermöglicht wird; und dieses Handeln umgekehrt wiederum die historischen Strukturen für die Zukunft verändert. Entsprechend ist die Stärke eines politischen Projekts in Gewaltkonflikten von der Fähigkeit abhängig, diese existierenden historischen Strukturen produktiv zu nutzen; in anderen Worten, einige soziale Gruppen zu integrieren und andere zu segregieren, sowohl in materieller als auch in ideeller und institutioneller Hinsicht, um eine intern konsistente Gefolgschaft zu formen um damit den historischen Interessen jeder einzelnen sozialen Gruppe wie auch den historischen Notwendigkeiten des Wettbewerbs der aktiven Bewegung mit anderen Bewegungen im andauernden politischen Gewaltprozess Genüge zu tun. Der Begriff historisch impliziert dabei, dass sich die Charakteristiken als auch die Konfiguration sozialer Gruppen in einem sich entwickelnden sozialen Raum über Zeit verändern; folglich verändern sich die genannten Faktoren, welche eine politische Bewegung berücksichtigen muss, was wiederum zu einem Wandel der Konflikterklärungen führen kann.

Dieser Ansatz leitet die Forschung, welche entlang der Analyse von sozialen Gruppierungsnetzwerken und politischen Prozessen umgesetzt wird. Aufgrund der hohen Datenanforderungen wird die Studie als explorativ verstanden werden, was zu ihrer Überprüfung zukünftige Forschung in anschließenden Projekten notwendig macht. Dementsprechend ist das Ziel nicht eine Antwort in Form eines Satzes oder einer Aufzählung in Hinblick auf die Forschungsfrage, sondern die Darlegung des sozialen Komplexes welcher den Wandel von Konflikterklärungen beeinflusst. Die Ergebnisse dieses Forschungsprojekts werden in acht Kapiteln dieses Buchs dargelegt.

Das erste Kapitel startet mit einer kurzen Projekteinführung. Es präsentiert den Forschungskontext, gefolgt von der Forschungsfrage. Die anschließenden Absätze skizzieren deren verschiedene Dimensionen und adressieren die wissenschaftliche wie politische Relevanz. Der zweite Teil präsentiert den empirischen Raum, in welcher die Forschungsfrage angesiedelt ist, während der dritte Teil historischen Materialismus als Basis für einen theoretischen Ansatz für die dialektische Kombination verschiedener Aspekte von Gewaltkonflikten umreißt; gefolgt von Teil vier, welcher die allgemeine Methodologie und den Buchaufbau skizziert und damit einen Einblick in die detaillierteren Ausführungen zu Theorie und Methode in Kapitel zwei erlaubt. Das erste Kapitel schließt mit einigen Einschränkungen hinsichtlich der Erwartungen

sowie des Umfangs und Geltungsbereichs des Projekts. Dies beinhaltet eine Diskussion der Herausforderungen und Beschränkungen eines Theorietransfers sowie der Rolle westlicher Wissenschaft in Ländern des Globalen Südens.

Das zweite Kapitel legt die in diesem Projekt genutzte theoretische Basis und Methodologie dar. Es startet mit einer Präsentation des historischen und philosophischen Hintergrunds des Ansatzes: seine Nutzung durch Antonio Gramsci zur Analyse der konfliktreichen sozialen Umwelt in der italienischen Krisenzeit nach dem 1. Weltkrieg zwischen progressiven und konservativen Kräften parallel zu den Unterschieden zwischen industrialisiertem Norden und feudal-agrarischem Süden auf der einen Seite; und auf der anderen Seite durch die Internationale Politische Ökonomie in ihrer Analyse der Entwicklung von Weltordnungen während der Zeit von Kolonialismus und Postkolonialismus in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten; inklusive Fragen bezüglich einer möglichen, gegenwärtigen transnationalen Entwicklungsphase. Darauf folgt eine Darlegung meta-theoretischer Fragen inklusive Konzepte von Dialektik, Strukturen und Prozessen in menschlicher Entwicklung, um damit den holistischen Anspruch des Projektes zu erfassen. Dies stellt die Basis für die angewandten theoretischen Konzepte dar: der Text beginnt mit einer Diskussion der Produktion von sozialen Strukturen in den Komponenten materielle Basis, soziale Ideen, und Institutionen inklusive der Diskussion von gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen diesen sozialen Strukturen und politischen Kämpfen. Dabei werden Konsens und Gewalt als duale Machtmechanismen zur Stabilisierung sozialer Hierarchien, resultierend aus diesen sozialen Strukturen, besprochen. Auf diesen Block bezüglich der Elemente von Gesellschaftsformung und -integration folgt die Fokussierung auf Fragen politischer Krisen und revolutionärer Kämpfe, welche soziale Strukturen und Hierarchien herausfordern. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Bewegungs- und Stellungskampf ist hier grundlegend. Der Forschungsfrage folgend wird dann ein spezieller Fokus auf die Rolle direkter Gewalt und externem Einfluss in Krisen gerichtet, inklusive Forschungsergebnisse der gegenwärtigen Konfliktforschung. Der theoretische Teil des zweiten Kapitels wird mit zwei Querschnittsthemen abgeschlossen: um die Antriebskräfte dieses politischen Kampfes zu verstehen, müssen die Organisatoren von Politik, in Gramscianischen Begriffen „Intellektuelle“, und ihre Rolle in den verschiedenen Formen sozialer Wissensproduktion, d.h. Politik, konzeptualisiert werden. Zusätzlich werden die Charakteristiken von verschiedenen (zusammenhängenden) Räumen angesprochen; mit Erkenntnissen erarbeitet von Gramsci wie IPÖ: externer Einfluss auf lokale Hegemonialprojekte, Projektion von Hegemonie nach außen und transnationale Hegemonien. Gleichzeitig sollen die Lücken in diesen Arbeiten hinsichtlich transnationaler und gewalthaltiger Hierarchien in der nicht-OECD-Welt hervorgehoben werden. Der zweite, kürzere Teil des Kapitels beschreibt die genutzten Methoden, welche eine Operationalisierung dieser theoretischen Konzepte als heuristischen Rahmen erlaubt. Ein dreidimensionaler Ansatz wird vorgestellt: die Nutzung zeit-sensitiver Netzwerkgraphiken um historische Strukturen zu erfassen, Konfliktprozessbeschreibungen um die Akteurs-getriebene historische Entwicklung zu erfassen und schließlich die vergleichende Analyse induktiv generierter Hegemonialprojekte. Das Kapitel endet mit einer Beschreibung der verschiedenen Datenquellen (primärer und sekundärer schriftlicher Quellen plus Experteninterviews) sowie angewandter Möglichkeiten IT-basierten Datenmanagements und Datenverarbeitung.

Diesem breiten zweiten Kapitel folgen zwei empirische Kapitel. Kapitel drei ist unterteilt durch eine Matrix welche Komponenten sozialer Strukturen (die erwähnte materielle Basis, soziale

Ideen und Institutionen, erweitert um einen quer liegenden Fokus auf direkte Gewalt) und Zeitspannen, welche die zentralen Perioden des andauernden politischen Konflikts darstellen, kombiniert: mythische Vergangenheit als Referenz, die Situation vor Gewaltausbruch, Ausbruch von Gewalt mit der Ausrufung des Ausnahmezustandes und folgende Dynamiken von Krieg und Frieden. Dieses Kapitel wird die diversen Interessen und Verbindungen zwischen sozialen Gruppen während des Konflikts aufzeigen und damit die Idee eines dyadisch-ethnischen Konflikts aufbrechen. Interessen und Allianzen integrieren manche soziale Gruppen und segregieren andere, ohne sich dabei an die einfache Idee ethnischer Loyalitäten zu halten. Fragen direkter Gewalt können in allen drei Komponenten aufgegriffen werden. Weil es sich allerdings um einen zentralen Teil dieser Forschung handelt, wird sie als vierter Aspekt sozialer Strukturen besonders hervorgehoben, der eigentlich die ersten drei als Querschnitts- Thema durchdringt. Die Ergebnisse stimmen mit den Entwicklungen in den anderen Komponenten überein: die Produktionsstrukturen von Gewalt sind über die meiste Zeit weit davon entfernt, eine dyadische Konfrontation zwischen zwei ethnischen Gruppen darzustellen; mit Ausnahme der unmittelbaren Zeit nach Ausbruch des offiziellen politischen Konflikts. Die Gewaltproduktion umfasst Gewalt innerhalb einzelner sozialer Gruppen wie umgekehrt auch Unterstützung bei der Produktion von Gewalt durch soziale Gruppen, welche damit die offizielle Konfliktlinie durchbrechen.

Um mehr über diese Dynamiken zu erfahren, wird eine weitere Matrix in Kapitel vier aufgezo- gen: diesmal werden die Zeitspannen mit den verschiedenen Hegemonieprojekten kombiniert: dem liberal-postkolonialen Hegemonieprojekt, dem national-liberalen anti-kolonialen Gegenhegemonieprojekt, dem national-religiösen anti-kolonialen Gegenhegemonieprojekt, sowie dem sozialistischen drei-Völker anti-kolonialen Gegenhegemonieprojekt und schließlich dem nicht-Projekt in einer Hegemoniekrise; alle Kategorien wurden analytisch-induktiv gewonnen. Dieses Kapitel zeigt nicht nur die strukturellen Entwicklungen deren Ergebnisse im vorherge- henden Kapitel dargestellt wurden, sondern vor allem die politischen Entscheidungen von Akteuren der verschiedenen Hegemonieprojekte während des Konfliktprozesses. Es zeigt, dass Programme, Allianzen, und Aktivitäten das Ergebnis strategischer Entscheidungen unter den Umständen historischer Strukturen sind, d.h. letztere beschränken und ermöglichen diese Ent- scheidungen, allerdings determinieren sie diese nicht. Dieses Kapitel zeigt damit die Möglichkeiten politischer Aktivität und beugt so einem Rückwärts-lesen von Geschichte von ihrem Ergebnis her vor, welches immer ein Verständnis eines vorgegebenen Pfades menschli- cher Entwicklung unterstützen würde.

Kapitel Nummer fünf fasst diese Einsichten für die empirische Situation auf den südlichen Phi- lippinen zusammen. Der erste Teil diskutiert die Anstrengungen und daraus folgende Konsequenzen integrierender und segregierender Handlungen der verschiedenen Hegemo- nieprojekte in vergleichender Weise. Der zweite Teil des Kapitels adressiert die empirischen Fragen aus dem Eingangskapitel: dies umfasst die Einsicht in eine parallele anstelle einer kon- sekutiven Entwicklung säkularer und religiös-integralistischer Ideologien; die Erfolge und Misserfolge säkularer Gegenhegemonien aufgrund organisatorischer Fähigkeiten und intellek- tuellem Elitismus; die unterschiedliche Rolle von Religion in Politik, das langfristige Engagement ihrer Aktivisten und deren unklarer Demokratisierungseffekt; die qualitative Ver- änderung sezessionistischer Hegemonieprojekte, welche Autonomie als Ersatz für Unabhängigkeit akzeptieren; der Misserfolg progressiver Bewegungen bei der Bewältigung

doppelt-kolonialer Situationen; und nicht zuletzt die Herausforderungen der Selbstreproduktion von Gewaltsituationen.

Kapitel sechs und sieben nutzen die Einsichten aus den Kapiteln drei bis fünf um Fragen aus den Kapiteln eins und zwei auf einem generalisierenden Level zu adressieren und dabei die Erweiterung des historisch-materialistischen Ansatzes hin zu Gewaltkonflikten in der Peripherie zu erden. Kapitel sechs spricht Fragen von Hegemonie, Konflikt und Krisen auf dem Makrolevel an. Nach dem Rekapitulieren von hegemonialen und gegenhegemonialen Elementen in Minsupala startet es mit der Analyse von Kolonialismus als extern induzierter Krise, was der historischen Entwicklung eher gerecht wird als das Verständnis von Kolonialismus als der Implementierung einer externen Hegemonie, wie von IPÖ-Studien analysiert. Diese Krise hat mehrere Charakteristiken: die Beendigung einer vorhergehenden Hegemonie durch externe Machthaber, die Umbildung interner sozialer Strukturen, unterschiedliche Formen von Kolonialismus und der Wandel von Raumdimensionen regionaler Gesellschaften. Im zweiten Teil wird die Entwicklung zum Postkolonialismus als passive Revolution analysiert. Potentielle lokale Herrscher aus der pre-kolonialen hegemonial herrschenden Klasse werden in eine neue lokale Hegemonie integriert, welche charakterisiert ist durch die Integration dieser ehemaligen Kolonie in eine Weltordnung unter der Führung der vorhergehenden Kolonialmacht. Allerdings handelt es sich dabei nicht um die lokale Kopie einer globalen Hegemonie, sondern diese passive Revolution produziert duale oder multiple Hegemonien: verbundene aber unterschiedliche Herrschaftssysteme in globalen und lokalen sozialen Räumen werden über die Formel einer *Entwicklung* in Richtung Liberalismus verknüpft. Zudem führt die Rolle lokaler peripherer Gebiete als Lieferanten von natürlichen Ressourcen in einer kapital-intensiven globalen Ökonomie und die unvollständige Integration in eine globale Hegemonie zu überflüssigen sozialen Gruppen für die globale Hegemonie als solche; zusammen stellen duale/multiple Hegemonien und überflüssige soziale Gruppen ein konstantes Element von Spannung in der passiven Revolution postkolonialer globaler Integration dar und führen letztlich zu einer umfassenden Krise. Die liberale Hegemonie antwortet, neben ökonomischen Entwicklungsprogrammen, mit kulturellem Rückzug in Kombination mit der Anwendung von physischer Gewalt. Dadurch werden die zugrundeliegenden Spannungen, welche zur Krise führten, noch verstärkt. In der Zwischenzeit kämpfen revolutionäre Bewegungen damit, über lediglich zurückweisende politische Ideen hinauszukommen und neue Hegemonieprojekte zu etablieren. Mit unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen: intellektualistische anti-koloniale Projekte scheitern an fehlender lokaler Verankerung, langfristig agierende religiös-integralistische Bewegungen arbeiten gerade daran, und sozialistische Bewegungen haben mit der Bearbeitung multipler Kolonialismen zu kämpfen. Der Schlussteil des Kapitels fasst die Ergebnisse mit einer Diskussion der Elemente der Kapitelüberschrift für das 21. Jahrhundert, Hegemonie, Konflikt und Krise in postkolonialen Räumen, zusammen. Das Kapitel schließt damit, dass Kolonialismus immer noch die Peripherie prägt; nicht (nur) als eine zeitlose moralische Verantwortung für die Zerstörung einer Gesellschaft, sondern als der Auslöser einer spezifischen sozialen Entwicklung hin zu der erwähnten gegenwärtigen doppelt/multiplen Hegemonie mit ihren Ausprägungen in materiellen, ideellen und institutionellen Gesellschaftskomponenten. Die Konflikte zwischen den herrschenden lokalen und globalen sozialen Gruppen auf der einen Seite und den untergeordneten lokalen Gruppen auf der anderen wurden aufgrund historischer Prozesse intensiviert und eine Rückkehr zu den ursprünglichen Konditionen der passiven Revolution, sprich dem Entwicklungsliberalismus, ist nicht mehr möglich, während kleine quantitative he-

gemoniale Kompromissangebote nicht mehr ausreichend sind. Die organische Krise eskaliert letztlich mit gegenhegemonialer Mobilisierung und Organisation durch neue Klassen; diese entstanden aus der liberalen Entwicklungshegemonie selbst und werden jetzt durch deren Beschränkungen zurückgehalten: neue Angehörige freier Berufe und Intellektuelle aus den nicht-herrschenden Klassen.

Kapitel sieben folgt dann mit einer detaillierteren Diskussion der Dynamiken dieser Krise und vor allem der Konsequenzen daraus resultierender Gewalt. Nach einer Rekapitulation der durch die verschiedenen Bewegungen in Minsupala angewandter revolutionärer Methoden startet das Kapitel mit einer Diskussion der Rolle von Gewalt in kolonialen Interventionen und passiven Revolutionen: anstelle einer Implementierung einer sozialen Ordnung, basierend auf dem Konsens der breiten Mehrheit einer Gesellschaft, charakterisiert koloniale Intervention als auch post-koloniale Herrschaft der beschränkte Konsens in eine nationale Hegemonie und ihrer Institutionen; eine konstante Androhung oder Anwendung von direkter Gewalt zur Erzwingung von gesellschaftlicher Compliance zu den elitären Machthabern ist deshalb notwendig. In dieser Situation müssen sich gegenhegemoniale Kräfte mit Fragen direkter Gewalt dringender beschäftigen als oppositionelle soziale Gruppen in Konsens-orientierten Gesellschaften; in letzter Konsequenz zum unmittelbaren Selbstschutz. Dabei allerdings kann die notwendige Kombination von Bewegungs- und Stellungskampf, hervorgehoben durch Gramsci, sowohl durch Erfolg wie durch Misserfolg dieser gegenhegemonialen Gewaltanstrengungen bedroht werden. Der dritte Teil generalisiert Einsichten in die Produktion von Gewalt; die Rolle externer Unterstützung, sowohl aus dem Ausland als von traditionellen Eliten, in einem antikolonialen Kampf; und von Intellektuellen, welche diese Gewaltproduktion organisieren. Darauf folgt die Analyse gegenseitiger Einflüsse und Konsequenzen von Gewalt und Hegemonieprojekten; die Möglichkeiten von Hegemonieprojekten zur Kanalisierung von weitverbreiteter Gewalt hin zu dyadischer Gewalt werden dabei hervorgehoben, aber zur selben Zeit auch die Bedrohung dieser Hegemonieprojekte durch die Kompromisse, welche durch die Anforderungen von Produktion und Einsatz von Gewalt notwendig werden. Die Arbeit weist zudem auf das Risiko hin, pervertierende Gewaltallianzen mit integrierten Hegemoniebewegungen zu verwechseln. Nach Überzeugung dieser Forschung sind politische Entscheidungen der Führungen der jeweiligen Hegemonieprojekte für die eine oder die andere Strategie zentral. Ein starkes Zeichen für scheiternde Hegemonieprojekte ist dann die Entwicklung von selbst-reproduzierenden Gewaltsystemen; wobei Gewalteskalationsmodelle das Zusammenspiel verschiedener Formen von Gewalt nicht mehr erfassen können. Allerdings, weit davon entfernt für alle sozialen Gruppen ein Verlust zu sein, profitieren *Lords in War* von dieser Situation; und mit deren breitem Einfluss über Gewaltproduktionsnetzwerke sind sie ein zentrales Element in der Reproduktion von Gewalt in einem politischen Feld, welches nicht durch ein kohärentes Hegemonieprojekt gefüllt werden konnte. Das Kapitel schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse hinsichtlich Hegemonie, Krise und andauernder Gewalt und endet mit der Analyse, dass aufgrund von Gewalt Hegemoniekämpfe ihren transitiven und verändernden Charakter verlieren können, was zu zyklischer Gewalt in einem persistentem Gewaltsystem führt; und dyadische Friedensprozesse scheitern daran, diese Dimensionen gegenwärtiger Konflikte zu erfassen.

Die Dissertation endet mit Kapitel acht. Es fasst die Antwort zur Forschungsfrage zusammen und setzt die zentralen Ergebnisse in Perspektive und in Bezug zu den wissenschaftlichen Ent-

wicklungen in IPÖ und Konfliktforschung. Beginnend mit dem Projekt der philippinischen Hegemonie basierend auf der Idee liberaler Entwicklung hebt die Studie hervor, dass die Krise in Minsupala die Konsequenz einer scheiternden postkolonialen passiven Revolution ist. In dieser Krise entwickeln sich die untersuchten gegenhegemonialen Projekte und der daraus folgende Prozess kombiniert Krise und Dynamiken des Gewaltkonflikts. Die sozialen Ideen und daraus abgeleitet die Konflikterklärungen jedes einzelnen Hegemonieprojekts hielten sich dabei relativ konstant über den Konfliktzeitraum der letzten vierzig Jahre. Ihre Stärke allerdings variierte sowohl auf dem Level nationaler und internationaler politischer Führung als auch unter der breiteren lokalen Bevölkerung. Gegenwärtige Veränderungen lokaler Praxen deuten auf einen stärker hegemonialen Wandel in den Gebieten der Moros aufgrund eines organischen Einfluss des NR-AC Projekts hin. Allerdings werden erst die nächsten Jahre und die Konsequenzen der gegenwärtigen Friedensverhandlungen zeigen, wie stabil das Projekt außerhalb der vereinheitlichenden Umstände einer Rebellion sind und ob das Ergebnis des Friedensprozesses die Konflikterklärung basierend auf der Unterscheidung von religiösen Gruppen festigt.

Ausgehend von diesen Einsichten sowie der gesamten Studie reflektiert der zweite Teil des Kapitels was daraus in Hinsicht auf die Erforschung von Konflikten in peripheren Räumen gelernt werden kann. Das Ziel ist dabei, die Verknüpfung verschiedener Dimensionen von Gewaltkonflikten zu verstehen: Hegemonieformation, Raum in Hinsicht auf globale Integration, resultierende Krisen und Strategien politischer Bewegungen zu ihre Bearbeitung, die Organisation dieses Kampfes inklusive der Veränderung oder Entwicklung öffentlicher Institutionen und schließlich die Anwendung von Gewalt; synthetisiert in der Analyse der Entwicklung eines Konfliktsystems. Das Kapitel und damit das Buch schließt mit einigen Anmerkungen zu zukünftigen Forschungsprojekten sowie normativen Erwartungen.

iii. Abbreviations

| | |
|-----------|---|
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| ARMM | Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao |
| AFP | Armed Forces of the Philippines |
| BDA | Bangsamoro Development Agency |
| BIAF | Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces |
| BIFF | Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters |
| BMA | Bangsa Moro Army |
| BMLO | Bangsamoro Liberation Organisation |
| CHDF | Civilian Home Defence Forces |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CNI | Commission on National Integration |
| CPP | Communist Party of the Philippines |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| emph.add. | emphasis added to the original quote |
| FFF | Free Farmers Federation |
| FPA | Final Peace Agreement (between GoP and MNLF in 1996) |
| GoP | Government of the Philippines |
| GT # | Gramsci translation, original quote can be found in Annex B by number |
| HUK | Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon (People's Army Against the Japanese) |
| ICG | International Contact Group |
| IMT | International Monitoring Team |
| IPE | International Political Economy |
| IR | International Relations |
| LGU | Local Government Unit |

| | |
|----------|--|
| MILF | Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| MIM | Mindanao Independence Movement |
| MNLF | Moro National Liberation Front |
| MNLF/RG | Moro National Liberation Front/Reformist Group |
| MNLF/C15 | Moro National Liberation Front/Council of Fifteen |
| MOA-AD | Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain |
| MRO/MRLO | Moro Revolutionary (and Liberation) Organization |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NDF | National Democratic Front |
| New MNLF | New Moro National Liberation Front, MNLF splinter group and later on re-named to Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| NPA | New People's Army |
| o.t. | own translation |
| OIC | Organisation of the Islamic Conference |
| OICs | Officers in Charge |
| OPAPP | Office of the Presidential Adviser to the Peace Process |
| PKP | Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas |
| RCC | Regional Consultative Commission |
| RP | Republic of the Philippines |
| RSM | Rajah Solaiman Movement |
| SPCPD | Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development |
| SZOPAD | Special Zone on Peace and Development |
| TNC | Transnational Company |
| UP | University of the Philippines |
| US | United States |
| WW2 | World War Two |

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1 Introduction

1.1 Project Sketch

1.1.1 Context

The scrambling of the Soviet Union and with it the end of the systemic struggle between US-led liberalism and USSR-led real-socialism brought with it amongst others two expectations: a more peaceful world with a reduced amount of violent conflicts; and the end of ideological history with the final victory of liberalism. While the first expectation had to be revised soon after, the second position has remained strong over the last two decades. Mirroring this public perception, one of the main concerns of conflict studies has become the management of conflicts out of perceived traditionalist backlashes inside a general liberal development of the globe. This has found its political complement in the reduced influence of leftist thinking, silenced by failed socialist and anti-colonial experiments and marginalized in front of a *perceived* global struggle between the liberal's free world and anti-modern reactionaries' global jihad. With political and scientific explanations struggling to handle these developments towards a more peaceful and progressive future, a renewed broad perspective on violent conflicts linking political developments in general and conflict dynamics in specific is needed.

Sometimes, to look at a challenge from the margins of the big picture provides a change of perspective and with it a possible re-evaluation of the situation. This has been the idea behind this dissertation: a new perspective, by looking at a widely forgotten conflict at the margins of global relations with a theory at the margins of social sciences; the aim not an instant recipe for universal peace, not to be found in a single complex local struggle anyway, but tools to analyze and reject the limited political choice between status quo and conservative revolution.

Thus, the paper discusses the conflict system on the southern Philippines, at the margin of the Philippines and at the margins of Islamic and Liberal political projects; as far from Washington D.C. and Brussels as from Cairo and Riyadh; and at the same time deeply connected with these global cores. The conflict between the Philippine government and several rebel groups literally links the 1960s' with the new millennium, extending over several decades and turning into several political directions at several points in time. A conflict system, which attracted all familiar political terms, from "anti-colonialism" to "terrorism" to "religious war" and at the same time transcending all these terms in a complexity not to be captured by single-phrase approaches.

The theoretical framework to be used derives mainly from Antonio Gramsci, a progressive thinker and activist born in Sardinia at the margin of the Mediterranean country at the margin of Europe. His approach is at the center of some theories discussing questions on the Global South; however, still at the periphery of the bigger debates on global International Relations and conflict studies; a step towards emancipating human development, continuing decades of successful progressive social science.

1.1.2 Research Question and Scope

The general question of the thesis can then be stated as follows: how and why have political projects and consequently defining conflict explanations changed over time on the southern Philippines?

Thereby, and to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci, to tell the history of a rebel movement one has to tell the history of its country as well as its and the country's embedding into the development of a global order¹. As outlined in the next chapter, historical materialists' ontological understanding is that political agency gets constrained *and* enabled by historical structures at each point in time, which vice versa will change these historical structures for the future. Accordingly, the strength of political projects in violent conflicts depends on their ability to make use of existing historical structures; in other words, to integrate some and segregate other social groups in material, ideal, and institutional terms to form an internally consistent constituency according to serve the historical interests of each social group and the historical needs of the active movement to compete with other movements in the ongoing political violent process. The term *historical* implies thereby, that the characteristics as well as the configuration of social groups in an evolving social space change over time and thus change the factors to be considered by political movements, mentioned above, bringing with it a possible change of conflict explanations.

Thus, to address the research question it is necessary to analyse the development of historical structures in interaction with social and political processes and to ask: which structural and process-related factors as well as systemic interaction between them influence the development of political projects so that defining conflict explanations change. This encompasses, according to the theoretical framework, developments in material, ideal, and institutional components of society in general and developments in production and application of violence in specific. Thus, aim is not to give one-sentence or bullet-line answers to the research question, but to outline the social complex which influences this change of conflict explanations. This will be operationalized along the synthetic analysis of social group networks and political processes. Due to the high benchmark regarding data, the study is considered explorative, with further validating research needed in follow-up projects.

The research question can be differentiated along its scientific dimensions of explanation: a meta-theoretical, a generalizing, and an empirical dimension; while the used theoretical approach demands to discuss furthermore the political implications of the study as well.

Regarding the meta-theoretical dimension, questions on historical structures in violent conflicts have to be discussed, i.e. how are human will and political agency connected to demands and requirements regarding violence in a society. The theoretical arguments used here are process and structures; they will be discussed as essentially interlinked but not equal phenomena. Furthermore, it has to be discussed if, and if yes how, physical violence alters the linkage.

¹ The original quote, again referred to in chapter two, is: "Hence it may be said that to write the history of a party means nothing less than to write the general history of a country from a monographic viewpoint, in order to highlight a particular aspect of it." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 151 / GT-05) Quotes from Gramsci's works will be presented in English translation in the main part of the thesis; original quotes in Italian language can be found in Annex B, page 415 onwards.

These questions will first be discussed in the state-of-the-art and later adapted in the final theory-grounding chapters.

Along the generalizing dimension the thesis will discuss the question on hegemony in peripheral areas. Regarding broader social developments in the Global South, three theoretical arguments have to be analyzed. First, the question of consent and violence in the production of social hierarchy: how does a social hierarchy get stabilized and which role do consent and violence play in this stabilization. Second, which space does this social hierarchy encompass and how is stabilization interlinked with a change of this space, i.e. the integration and segregation of social groups into and from this space? Third, these questions must be related to the global and national periphery, in which the researched violent conflicts take place, and to the role of postcolonialism as a process of uneven systemic integration into a liberal world order. Furthermore, focusing more concrete on conflict explanations in ongoing violent conflicts, developments of political projects to alter social hierarchies will be differentiated and their commonalities and differences will be analyzed along hegemony projects, intellectual leadership, and interests as well as social ideas, material constraints and demands, and institutional path dependences as a heuristic framework. It will be discussed first in an analytical state-of-the-art in chapter two and later on grounded via the empirical insights of the research project in the last three chapters; it is considered as the core of the thesis. Due to its explorative character, further evaluation after the end of this project is necessary, thus the validity of the results is considered medium, nonetheless the processing of a broad data base.

The empirical dimension encompasses in three steps detailed description and analysis of conflict lines in the southern part of the Philippine state. Step one is a time-sensitive description of social structures, step two the description of conflict processes along four political projects, and step three the synthesizing analysis of societal networks and political histories as well as the comparative analysis of these political projects.

Finally, as will be discussed in the theory chapter, a scientific analysis is always part of and driven by a political struggle. So is this work. The author is driven by the political question, why secular-emancipatory projects lost its popularity and the current powerful counter-part to liberal globalism seems to be religious regionalism; acknowledging that overlapping exists.

Thereby I acknowledge the superior in depth work of other research projects as well in theoretical terms on the one end and in empirical terms regarding the cases on the other: the strength of the paper is to cross the borders of these empirical and theoretical debates and fill some of the gaps between.

1.1.3 Scientific and Political Relevance

These dimensions of the paper address at least three different audiences: social scientists, local and global peace and development professionals, and progressive social movements.

Researchers analyzing violent conflicts in globally peripheral areas can explore a rare approach to a forgotten conflict. This includes broad empirical data on material, ideal, and institutional aspects of the violent conflict system on the southern Philippines and the methodological approach to sort it: the presentation and juxtaposing of data from process and structure descriptions; the usage of several layers of social group networks to describe historical struc-

tures; and the comparison of different hegemony projects towards each other and as well towards the social structures as a whole.

The theory grounding part addresses thereby above all two debates: the influence of violence onto the development of liberal-hegemonic structures in areas of the global periphery and vice versa the influence of global and local liberal and counter-liberal hegemonic developments onto violent conflicts. While further proof is needed in consequent projects, it is believed that the developments on the southern Philippines are instances of broader regional and global developments. This includes arguments on nationalism and secessionism, the development of Islamic-integralist political groups and liberal counter-activities, transformation of rebel group and conflict societies, the development of hybrid formal and informal public institutions, post-colonial crisis structures, and the development of spaces transcending a hierarchic order of local, national, and international levels.

Thus, the challenging endeavour is to work on an approach to bridge conflict studies and its insights into the production of violence out of social conflicts *with* broader political science, development studies, and international relations theories working on social conflicts as consequence of broader social developments: combined the link between social developments and the production of violence.

This links to the second audience: while the dissertation does not comprise policy advice, the analysis points at some challenges for peace and development professionals. The multi-perspective approach might help to break out of day-to-day conflict-readings and challenges, allowing the development of new ideas to overcome conflict dynamics. Furthermore, the used approach tries to highlight, how problem-solving activities might impact broader social developments; for example the reliance on local security arrangements *for* the development of public institutions or the focus on the conclusion of peace negotiations *for* the risk of a return to war by splinter groups.

Last but not least, the findings should enrich political discussions on de-secularization tendencies, i.e. the strengthening of religious-integralist political projects in recent times, and a possible strengthening of secular-emancipatory projects. Thereby, progressive social movements can reflect own shortcomings regarding the support of marginalized communities in global capitalism and possible cooperation with competing social movements.

1.2 Minsupala

The geographical region focused on encompasses the southern part of the Philippine territory, i.e. the island of Mindanao and the western islands of the Sulu archipelago and Palawan, henceforth called Minsupala². The dissertation as a whole can be described as an in depth case

² This term with its close resemblance to local, undisputed geographical terms, is rarely used, however it avoids the political implications of predefining terms as “Moro Land” or “southern Philippines”, which just have to be discussed in the following chapters. Over the decades the conflict system and involved social groups analysed here have been pushed more and more towards the western part of the encompassing territory, as discussed in the empirical chapters. The study, however, will stick to the term with society rather than territory as focus of analysis. Furthermore, current political projects still refer to the historical extension of Minsupala.

study of this area (Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004). Inside the book, the area *is* the case when analysing the social structures of the conflict area as a whole in chapter three; while it becomes the background and general reference for the comparative analysis of hegemony projects in chapters four and five, which take over the role of units of analysis; more details on this can be found in the methodological part of the next chapter.

Frequent occurrences of organized physical violence have defined the region since centuries, conducted by Spanish and US colonizers as well as by local strongmen. However, the *official* violent conflict discussed in this thesis between *the Moro*³ and *the Philippine authorities* can be dated back to the beginning of the 1970s. Battle deaths are as usual difficult to access. The international data sets on war count between 30,000 to 100,000 battle deaths (Lacina/Gleditsch 2005, Sarkees/Wayman 2010), not included civilians. The latter form some more ten thousands of victims plus hundreds of thousands of displaced people over the last forty years (Rivera 2008). These unimaginable numbers hide the tragedy of every single death, of parents losing their children, of children growing up as orphans, of destroyed homes and rice fields, of hunger and fear. Furthermore, behind these data is hidden a complicated web of actors, conflict lines, and interests; including most of the questions discussed in conflict studies. Therefore, on the one hand it is a confusing case to research; on the other hand exactly this apparent confusion prevents quick answers like ethnic violence (Huntington 1996), religious war (Seul 1999; Körner 2009), greedy warlords (Collier and Hoeffler 2004b), failed states and/or terrorism (Rotberg 2002). Furthermore, an analysis of this web will show, that reasons, triggers, dynamics, and factors of violence are intertwined, which makes a call for peace a void notion used frequently by all relevant parties with antagonistic intentions.

Even though some of the reasons and triggers of the ongoing conflict are widely acknowledged, the continuing outbreak of violence coupled with a continuing failure of decades of ongoing peace negotiations suggest that the complexity has not yet been addressed sufficiently⁴, not so much in highlighting different relevant points than in combining them. As history is always history politics, too, each introducing summary of the last violent decades contains a political judgment – above all as the struggle for the *correct* history is a key moment of the violent conflict itself. Thus, little agreement exists even about the most important historical events: resistance against Spanish colonialism vs. pirate raids, national development vs. internal colonization, massacre vs. tragic collateral damage, fraud vs. misunderstandings. Neither does an agreement exist on the definition of conflict actors: Moros vs. Filipinos, Christians vs. Muslims, colonialists vs. colonizers, patriots vs. imperialists; this as a point of precaution before the following paragraphs and even the detailed descriptions in the empirical chapters.

Minsupala is characterized by its geographical position as an archipelago with over 2,500 islands. The area encompasses around 100,000 sq km, i.e. a third of the Philippine republic and slightly smaller than South Korea. The population numbers are volatile and part of the conflict; as will be shown in the paper. Currently, over twenty million people live in more than four hundred municipalities. The area neighbours the Southeast Asian mainland in the Northwest, China in the Northeast, and has close maritime borders to the archipelagic states of Malaysia and Indonesia in the South and Southwest; and last but not least it is integrated into the Phil-

³ The term is an explicitly political creation; more information on the term can be found in chapter four.

⁴ Assuming thereby, of course, that knowledge can facilitate improved peace processes.

ippine archipelago extending to the North. The separation into small islands coalesces with the inclusion into a maritime space and this interplay characterizes the history of the region. Political systems developed throughout the last centuries with key positions in a Southeast Asian space and via trade routes even beyond (Tan 1993: 12-13). The role as a link between China and the Middle East led to an integration of Arabic influences in form of sultanates starting from the 15th century and Chinese immigrants with a key function in the economic sphere (Tan 1977: 20; George 1980: 19).

Thus, different from the smaller communities of the northern islands of nowadays Philippines, the strong sultanates of the South were able to resist Spanish colonial penetration. The latter started in the 16th century, with Spanish authorities declaring the north under the rule of the Spanish crown, named the Philippines. However, the superiority of the south became a winners-course: the Spanish answer was a sea blockade, which scrambled the sultanates in economic and consequently in social and political terms (Ahmad 2000a: 11) over a harmful period of three centuries. Furthermore, a social fault line developed between north and south. As Spain sold the Philippines to the USA in the treaty of Paris 1898, the southern islands have been integrated into the document; as highlighted by southern secessionists an illegal act according to international law (Interview D). Different from the Spanish crown, the US were able to militarily subdue and occupy the southern islands (Silva 1979: 18-32; Rodil 2003: 39-44). A series of settlement projects followed with different target groups: American veterans, Japanese companies, and last but not least Filipinos from the north. After the Philippines' release into independence, the immigration of the latter gained momentum. The two decades after WW2 turned the population ratios upside down: from now on the immigrated settlers from the northern islands have been, even though with ambiguous strength, the majority in all statistics (Tuminez 2007: 80).

As the developments before, this was of course no local, autonomous event. Two key concerns on the national level of the late 1950s were civil unrest by farmers and the attraction of new export possibilities. Resettlements to Minsupala seemed to be the solution for both: land for farmers and dissolution of civil unrest on the one hand; and the transfer of labor to the south for international investment projects on the other. Integration into a global market became then the ultimate credo of the new president Ferdinand Marcos in the 1960s. In his first years he tried to centralize the state into a „New Society“ (Marcos 1974), overcoming the decentralized structure of the Philippines. Finally, based on the armed forces and backed by the US administration he led the Philippines into a modernisation dictatorship, characterized by cronyism and lavishness by his family and allies.

Parallel to this development of integration into a global liberal-capitalist system, the worldwide anti-colonial movement of the 1960s found its embodiments on the Philippines, too: in a Maoist movement against the colonial bond between the Philippines and the USA on a national level and a renewed resistance movement of the indigenous people of the south against northern settler colonialism. The proclamation of martial law by President Marcos on September 21, 1972, meant the final escalation and transformation of political conflicts into an organized violent conflict. However, far from being dyadic, a whole system of conflict lines developed with a broad spectrum of conflict actors. While the insurgents split up into several groups including traditional forces opposing Marcos' modernisation policies, the state's national and local agencies followed separate and sometimes contradicting paths, too. Legalized

paramilitary groups, illegal vigilantes, civil society groups, spiritual groups, local businesses, and criminals add from the ground. Globally, international governmental actors like single states (Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, USA, et. al.) as well as international organizations (e.g. Organization of Islamic Conference/OIC, Association of Southeast Asian Nations/ASEAN, etc.) got involved. Transnational cooperation and private support structures have had their play as well. This system of conflict lines and actors and their development has to be analyzed in this dissertation.

After increasing pressure to calm this multifaceted opposition to his rule, Marcos favoured peace negotiations with the southern secessionists while retaining the use of military force against the Maoist national-democratic movement. Mediated by the OIC, a peace agreement was signed by the Moro National Liberation Front/MNLF and the Philippine government in 1976. However, its implementation has been controversial and the MNLF continued its struggle, hindered by internal factionalism leading to the establishment of several splinter groups. The end of Marcos' dictatorship, however, has been forced by the increasing strength of the national-democratic underground and the fear of Marcos' tacitly collaborating forces; export-oriented business, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and the United States were concerned that the oppositional movement might not just sweep away Marcos' government, but lead to a full-blown Maoist revolution. This situation led to the abandonment of Marcos and the success of a liberal People Power Revolution under the leadership of Cory Aquino, widow of the assassinated former Senator Benigno Aquino (cp. in detail Collier 1998). Thus, the traditional forces brought back the state of locally rooted "political dynasties" (Cruz 2010).

This turn to a renewed formal liberal democracy led to the establishment of an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao/ARMM, another round of peace talks, and the signing of the 1996 Final Agreement on Peace with the MNLF. However, its impact was meager and a former splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front/MILF, took over the lead, with an adapted program and strengthened grass root structures. Clashes continued and outburst to war situations in several instances including an "all-out-war" under President Estrada at the turn of the millennium. Currently, negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government start into their 15th year, and history is pressing as war-favoring factions inside the military and in new splinter groups like the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters are on the verge to smash the talks again.

1.3 Adaptable Approach: Historical Materialism

Historical Materialism is a framework, which, regarding the research complex outlined above, should be able to bring together dispersed insights and thus provide the demanded possibility of cross-cutting discipline borders towards a multi-perspective, holistic approach. As a long-used scientific strand, different applications and different schools with different theoretical complexes have been built which not always might be consistent. This work uses mainly two sources: the writings of Antonio Gramsci and the adaptation of his work by International Political Economy. While in general IPE offers an up-to-date approach, its current usage leaves voids which might be filled with insights from Gramsci's original work. Gramsci wrote during and on the tumultuous situation in Italy after WW1. The feudal South of Italy has been in a dialectic integration process with the industrialized North, where a strongly organized proletariat

pushed for a socialist revolution. IPE discussions are based on contemporary research of the expansion of liberalism on a global scale. The latter's aim has been a critical approach on the development of global capitalism, more agency-oriented than the static World System theory.

This combined approach should help to discuss our research questions. Structure and process are discussed in a dialectic way, focusing on social structures as developed out of human activity and vice versa enabling and constraining human activity at the same time. As a social science approach, it focuses on social groups as actors, discussing the relation between these groups. Their existence and mutual relations are closely related to production processes. However, the production process is not considered as solely focussed on economic relations, but it integrates the production of ideas and institutions as well. This open approach with Marxist background encompasses the production of social hierarchies as well. Ruling of social groups over other is not just a form of violent subordination, but based, at least in some socio-economic systems, on a broad social consent on the general production process, accepting wage labour and interest-driven capital investment, public schooling, and majority elections, defining a political system as hegemonic. Empirical evidence has been derived mainly by OECD-countries, i.e. countries, in which a liberal, government-backed capitalism evolved, expanded and restructured over time. Gramsci's own historical background is more ambiguous, with the Fordist capitalist model adapted in North Italy's industries, while a more feudal mode of agricultural industry with absent landlords on the one hand and small tenants and land labourers on the other hand characterized the Italian south. Thus, in his work, space becomes a central feature (Jessop 2005). The relation between the Italian North and the Italian South resembles the current global North-South division to be discussed in this paper as much as the division between the Philippine centre and periphery.

To discuss these broad topics, the approach uses a triangular design, encompassing material base, social ideas, and institutions as the areas of social interrelations. While these areas are strongly linked to structural questions, human activity is mainly discussed along political activity balancing intellectual leadership and the common sense of different social groups. This focus is already a hint on a general argument of the approach: political activity has to be organized for an immediate and at the same time sustainable, i.e. structure-changing effect. The political processes on the Philippines have thus to be analyzed under terms of historical structures as well as organized political processes, out of it the term *political project*.

Thereby, the approach considers itself as political. This is based on the assertion that "theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose". (Cox 1981: 128) Thus, neither the research focus, nor the research process can be regarded as isolated laboratories. Social science is political in all its components. Only the form of the process of writing inside a scientific institution like a university distinct from a primarily political institution like a party, government, or activist group gives a certain liberty of try-and-error methods. In the end, however, each society-related text, a political statement as well as a dissertation, has to take position: to defend current social structures, to alter them or to overcome them. This transparent self-awareness is the "critical" part of critical science, maybe even more than the decision of which position to take. Furthermore, historical materialism as a political program means to reject notions like "this is given" or "this has always been like this". Historical materialism believes in the possibility of social progress; however, without the deterministic trust of, as the great Eric J. Hobsbawm phrased it, the long 19th century into the force of history. It is determined to take

side for the oppressed and to constantly question the power of the rulers. It is materialist in the sense, that it is not satisfied to hand over this concern to an idealist utopia, but to analyse current realities and realistic options to develop them. As mentioned, social science is strongly related to society and the constant interaction is a pre-research influence as well as a post-research duty.

This concerns the two research backgrounds to be used in this paper as well and it will be the basic challenge of this research project: transfer the used approach over space and time to a region and adapt it without forgetting its origins. This includes a changed capitalist system compared to Gramsci's times and a different establishment in the global South compared to the OECD-focused IPE, including rent economies, hybrid colonial-liberal-indigenous social ideas and institutions. This furthermore includes a much higher incidence of violent suppression of opposition by state organs as well as by countering/resisting agents. A third point is the changed role of space. While in the European context, space has been formed by national borders since two centuries, this understanding of space gets challenged in my research by disputed national borders as much as by transnational developments in the analyzed region.

1.4 Overall Methodology and Paper Structure

The concepts of historical materialism can, however, nonetheless these challenges be a heuristic framework: they will be used as guiding hints. This framework will sort the empirical data, described in two chapters and analytically summarized in a third one. The two following grounding chapters will link the concepts more strongly to developments in the Global south.

1.4.1 Structures and Processes

The two describing chapters will focus on social networks in the first and on political processes in the second. Both chapters will neither show different realities or subsystems of reality, nor are they the same in different words. Rather they analyze history from different perspectives and crosscut history with different layers. Analysing society *and* political projects means analysing political projects *in* society.

The study conducts the analysis along three crosscutting dimensions: one dimension encompasses historical structures; one dimension the historical process; and one dimension the differentiation of hegemony projects on the level of collective actors. This already starts with the data sorting. The first key empirical chapter will cut the conflict structure into components and consequently inside into time periods. The second chapter turns the analysis around and focuses on the historical process of political movements, following their activities along the same dimensions as the historical structures have been analyzed before. However, while the first chapter shows a comprehensive picture of the conflict structures in form of networks extending over the local arena and its national and global connections, the second chapter focuses solely on the respective movements with a more detailed process tracing. Under process tracing the paper understands here a multi-perspective view in social developments. Thereby actor-oriented histories do not gain explanatory power through the description of cause-and-effect-mechanisms employed in traditional process-tracing, but by the confrontation of different angles of historical processes and additionally a confrontation with the cross-sector structural network pictures. This confrontation will be the content of the analytical

summary in the third empirical chapter, which then forms the base of the final adaptation of the theoretical approach and the re-discussion of the mentioned voids.

The theory-grounding part will be divided again into two chapters, tracing developments on the macro and micro level. On the macro level the developments of societies running through stages of hegemony and societal crises will be outlined. Thus, the study will analyze the societal situations, which again will interact with the micro-dynamics of violence. This encompasses the discussion of relations between local and global developments with a strong focus on colonial intervention, following changes in historical structures, and the development of hegemony projects. On the micro level we will follow then the dynamics of societal developments once they reach a situation of a fundamental crisis of the societal system altogether; with a strong focus on the usage of violence in efforts to shape the development of such a society. This leads finally to the discussion of the relation between tactics and strategies to overcome or reproduce a crisis.




Figure 1: Research dimensions

1.4.2 Research Production and Writing

It is necessary to highlight that the project methodology and the writing structure differ considerably. The project methodology followed a series of project cycles, starting even before the official work on it: the author came from political work to (critical) political theory, continued from there to empirical analysis and back to theoretical conceptions and so on. During the specific project period, the cycles were similar. The political question on expanding identity-based struggles and the disappearing of more socio-political struggles, respectively its transformation from the latter to the first, can be analyzed on the Philippines. Terms of International Political Economy seemed to be a good start, but during an earlier project in 2006, it turned out that the concepts necessary are too far from peace and conflict studies. This older project thus stopped with a comparison of current research approaches and the possibilities of a historical materialist approach based on Gramsci (Sottas 2006). Based on the results of this project, the project design for the dissertation has been elaborated. An in depth analysis of the state-of-the-art in International Political Economy has been done and assumptions, terms, and concepts sharpened. Further insights into economic questions could be gained during a research project in 2008 on costs of war (Bozzoli, Brück and Sottas 2010). What followed was the elaboration of a first overview on the empirical situation in Minsupala. Furthermore, a short field research has been conducted in September 2009. Combining these insights, the proper field research has been planned: empirical aims outlined, methodological questions addressed, resource persons contacted, questions formulated. Starting from May 2010, the rest of the year was defined by the empirical material. Field research during several weeks and several stays in Manila, Davao City, and Cotabato City has been conducted and data gathered. This data has been transferred into electronic storage and catalogued for further work. A first analysis has been conducted and preliminary generalized results presented at several conferences during the first half of 2011. With the resulting conceptual remarks a return to the final sorting of the empirical material has been done in summer and autumn 2011. 2012 has been used for the discussion of generalizations and adaptations of theoretical concepts, demanded at the project start, before writing up this text during the second half of 2012 and early 2013.

The writing structure resembles the cycle historical-materialist concept → empirical analysis → theory discussion and adaptation, but does shortcut the iterative project cycles outlined above. Thus, while the general structure of the thesis equals the project procedure, information gathered in later stages of the project might be used in the previous chapters if necessary for explaining the argument and shortcutting the learning process of the author for the reader. Repeating from before, the thesis discusses in the second chapter in detail the theoretical base, its genesis, assumptions, terms and tools and addresses some empirical insights from OECD-focused analyses as far as it is relevant for a further understanding of this project. Chapters three and four will then present the specific data of this project. Chapter five summarizes the insights in an analytical way, tracing integration, segregation and violence processes of social groups by the analyzed political projects. Chapters six and seven encompass the theoretical development. The first discusses historical materialism and in specific the notion of hegemony in a neo/post-colonial space. The latter chapter discusses resistive struggles and the danger of perpetual violence systems. Chapter eight will conclude the thesis with a summary of the project results and an outlook for their appliance in scientific terms.

1.5 Reflection on Progressive Revolutionary Projects

I would like to conclude this introduction with a short reflection on the relation between political scientists (in the double sense of the word) and conflict studies, as a point of precaution to avoid the shortcomings of Western scientific engagement, discussed in debates on Orientalism and post-colonialism (Williams and Chrisman 1994: Part II/127-190; Loomba 1998). As Pasha (2005) formulated it in a critique on Gramscian IPE's engagement with the non-OECD-world, the danger even for critical theory is twofold: on the one hand a simplifying approach to the non-OECD-world which understands it as mere recipient of political and economic developments in the capitalist core; on the other hand the romantic view of this capitalist periphery as the place for heroic resistance against capitalism and its imperial core. In both cases, it resembles the "Orientalism"-critique that *the other* is derived by one's self image and demands: in the first case as the area to extend one's own strong civilization, in the second the hope of salvation from one's own degenerated civilization.

This danger is even more present in peace and conflict studies, as while there might be similarities in capitalist and liberal-state structures between the Global North and the Global South, there is little we can learn from political conflicts in the Global North which might resemble the harsh conflict situations in some violent conflicts in the Global South. Picking up the two images of *the other*, thus conflicts would either be deviations from the global expansion of liberal capitalism or the revolution to overcome this same system. While progressive liberal theories can be criticized along the first argument, progressive revolutionary theory is prone to fail with the second, repeating the failure of missing self-reflection regarding revolutionary projects at the first half of the 20th century in Europe.

During the early heydays of progressive revolutionary projects, in the middle of the 19th century, their innocence and positive outlook resembled the liberal euphoria over technological and social developments. With government and bourgeoisie visibly on one side and workers and the newly developing workers movement on the other, the roles were clearly divided. The workers- and soldiers-councils in the October revolution were their last expression. However, the innocence as well as the self-portrait of agents of positive human development got its first severe punch with the nationalist support of war funding in several European state budgets by social democrats before World War I and after that the switch of part of the socialists to the extreme right, as most exemplary shown by Mussolini, the "duce" (leader) of the Italian fascist dictatorship. Meanwhile the revolutionary governments in eastern Europe showed centralizing tendencies with an increasingly uniform ideology, purges of critics as counter-revolutionaries, and few mechanisms to integrate and use critical thinking, leading in some countries from the proletarian dictatorship to state terrorism, i.e. from the ruling of a proletarian majority over a non-proletarian minority to the ruling of a government-elite, organized in the state party, over the majority of the population. The anti-colonial movement saw similar developments. Again with the background of violent conflicts in form of revolutionary or counterrevolutionary struggles, some movements degenerated to static systems, ruled by state-elites and excluding the majority of the population from the political process of decision making. Some struggles lost their progressive demands completely and ended in catastrophes, as the Democratic Kampuchea regime under the ruling of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.

While conservative commentators use these historical examples as proof of the inhumanity of progressive projects and the necessity to prevent their ideas by legal and military means, the aim to mention them in this paper is a different one. I remain convinced that societal and more narrowly political developments have to accompany economic and technological progress. From a historical materialist perspective it is a key moment to balance societies without recurring to violent means to stabilize these increasingly fragmented societies. This gives progressive approaches their legitimacy. Thus, to discuss failings of progressive movements, including socialist and anti-colonial ones, has not the aim to cover up the failings of global liberal capitalism including its “democratic wars”. To see symptoms of those liberal failings, some reflected screening of major newspapers is sufficient. However, I believe, that for the advancement of progressive developments learning from the successes and failures of progressive movements must necessarily complement the critical analysis of liberal degeneration.

This includes above all the discussions of suggested strategies to achieve social change during the earlier periods of progressive movements. Gramsci did this in an extraordinary way at an early stage for the European workers movement, which was unable to notice the dangers of fascism. Similarly, such a reflection has to be done on the experiences of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles as well as its supporting theories in peace and conflict studies. The key term thereby is revolutionary violence, and in a more broad perspective the development of hegemony projects and their integration and segregation policies regarding different social groups. The risk is hereby to condemn violence from the convenient chair of a European university as much as upside down scholars of the 1970s demanded out of the same chairs the use of revolutionary violence from their supposed comrades in the South. Thus, a scholar who is not personally engaged in the local struggle against daily oppression and human rights violations should restrain from suggesting or judging on the use of physical violence. However, and on the contrary, this precaution is not a demand of restraining from the analysis of conflict system outside the OECD-world altogether. In a world, where the Global North is deeply engaged in societies with violent conflicts in a direct or indirect way, scientists can and have to do research on the possible gains and risks of organized physical violence, and highlight possible alternatives. This should be the guideline for this book.

A further reason for the necessity of progressive scientists to continue to discuss violence is their muteness when it comes to questions of ongoing violence in the 21st century. The anti-imperialist stance of non-interference into sovereign nation-states is as simple as much as it does not value progressive traditions of global solidarity. The first argument includes two debates. The first debate regards the changed global environment. During the Cold War Era, non-interference allowed countries to balance interventions by both blocks with more or less success depending on the governments’ indebt to Moscow or Washington. In an era where even People’s-Republics like China or Laos enter the World Trade Organisation, the possibility of independence from global developments becomes a myth. Thus, the challenge for progressive activists is not a simple demand on non-interference but supporting interferences to the advantage of possible, even if temporary, allies and opposition to interference which hinders progressive developments. However, taking these steps raises the information demands substantially, which necessitates the mentioned debate on violence. The second debate encompasses social movements against authoritarian rulers. Most of these rulers have been

anti-traditional and sometimes anti-colonial activists in their heydays. However, their subsequent development not just involved a renewed collaboration with their former colonial masters, but at the same time an increasingly repressive stance against the own unsatisfied population. The leaders of the Baath-parties in Syria and Iraq are a case in point. Progressive debates on the developments from Iran, Iraq via Libya to Syria were thus sometimes rather unsophisticated and decisions to value more the originally revolutionary aims of these leaders or their current degeneration done out of gut instinct rather than political-theoretical arguing.

Concretized, there are two debates which have to be influenced by progressive scholars. One is the question on just and unjust wars in the name of human rights and the other one the use of violence by social movements resisting different forms of suppression.

The debate over just wars is binary shaped. Proponents of just war theory follow a traditional idealist discussion. They start with the assumption that there exist universal human rights, consequently these human rights have to be respected universally. The question is then, what happens if a government does not respect these human rights? After years of legal debate, a UN Commission published the paper Responsibility to Protect (Sovereignty 2001). In it the authors argue, that the traditional international law of sovereignty and non-interference into domestic affairs of a country is just valid as long as a government protects its own people. When a government cannot meet that commitment, it loses its right to rule over the people of a nation and foreign troops can interfere to uphold universal human rights for the domestic population. This necessity to intervene to protect civilians is of course no new idea, and most interventionist wars of the last century started with the argument of defending the people in the other state. At this point just war theory (Walzer 2000) comes into play as it outlines a series of safeguards to be respected to make a foreign intervention into a domestic conflict a “just” cause. Rather helpless, progressive critics did mainly point out, that states selectively intervene into conflicts and if R2P or Just War Theory would be respected to the point, a lot more interventions would have to take place. Which then easily could be rejected by the argument, there exists no capability to intervene everywhere where it would be necessary, but and at least it is a start to engage with the most imminent problems. What is needed, is a more in depth discussions of foreign intervention by a critical realist stance, i.e. built on the progressive principles of freedom, equality, and solidarity to analyse the consequences of (possible) interventions and their outcome. Otherwise the absurd situation evolves, that progressive movements, out of fear of their own weakness, stick to conservative dogmas of essentialist nation-states and an international system developed in the 17th century.⁵

The second debate which has to be addressed by critical theory is the relation between social movements and violence. As outlined above, during the heydays of anti-colonialism, the Western Left has at some point euphorically embraced revolutionary violence and afterwards shied back from its own briskness, leaving the analysis of violence to day-to-day instinctive decisions and ideological loyalty. However, questions on violent resistance continue and are more complex than ever, from clashes of the black bloc with the police in the global North to local rebel groups in the global South up to conducted violence by transnational religious-integralist

⁵ For the record: even after such an analysis, the US-intervention in Iraq can still be condemned, not because of their push to oust a ruthless regime, but their failure to facilitate a progressive development, inherent already right in the planning phase.

movements. General pacifism is as useless as romantic calls for violence along the binaries introduced at the beginning. Progressive debates have to replace the binary scheme of either-or with dialectical methods to find alternatives. To put it bluntly, speeches and actions of some US presidents and president candidates have been as annoyingly reactionary and simple-minded as the ones of its Iranian counterparts⁶. There is no need for progressive scholars and activists to choose side in these struggles, but there is a pressing need to find alternatives. That is why progressive engagement with violence is needed. This way, progressive movements should come back into a condition to pursue a pro-active political engagement in peace and conflict questions, rather than being reactive on big government decisions.

The first task of critical theory is thereby to find the voids in the mentioned binary discussions. While for the Philippine majority, including their imperialist “bridgehead” (Galtung 1971: 91) in the Moro provinces, the problem is a question of missing work ethics and economic development in the backward part of the country, for the Moro nationalists the problem is the intruding enemy. The problem comes in both analyses from outside: either from sectarian terrorists or from colonial intruders. The question is then not just where these parties disagree with each other in regard to the pronounced conflict. This is fairly obvious since decades, leading to the recurring deadlocks during peace negotiations. Thus the more interesting question is which part do the parties let aside altogether? Some answers should be found in the following chapters. This additional information can then be used to suggest positioning for one or the other party, reject both, or suggest alterations of the conflict parties.

This approach should help to bridge the structure-process dilemma of progressive approaches. Historical-materialist core aim is to change social structures to the better in a sustainable and long-term way. On the other hand it has to deal with critics on its short-term failures. As one of my students put it: “Can you reject an intervention for human rights just to avoid that intervening countries use the intervention to consolidate their power?” Was the intervention of the People’s Republic of Vietnam to oust the Democratic Kampuchea regime to condemn because it cemented Vietnam’s leading role on mainland Southeast Asia? Interestingly and against political loyalty, anti-imperialist doctrine would have to say yes, R2P would have to say no. Historical materialism would probably conclude no as well, but not from a pre-defined dogmatic idealism but from an analysis based on the very few principles of freedom, equality, and solidarity. Such an open analysis should be done in this paper, too: Side with the government? Side with the traditionalist rebels? No, the aim is to find the pressure points to support progressive groups to push the whole conflict into a progressive democratic direction.

⁶ This sentence does, obviously, not imply an equidistance to the activities of each respective political agent.

2 Theoretical Base and Methodology

To answer the question on changing conflict explanations and political projects under the circumstances of enduring physical violence in the global periphery, this chapter will outline the framework which guides the structure of the empirical analysis and which will be re-discussed in the final chapters of the text to capture the generalized insights from the empirical part of the study. Thus, this chapter will describe the theoretical approach along the following string of issues from the more abstract to the more concrete:

- *meta-scientific questions*: philosophical background, theory production and theory transfer;
- *structure and process* in social development;
- *society formation and integration*: establishment of social and political hierarchies and their relation to material, ideal, and institutional production processes; *consent and violence* as dual power mechanisms to stabilize social hierarchies out of these social structures;
- *political crises and social change*: wars of manoeuvre and wars of position as means of struggle including a focus on the characteristics of direct violence, its production process, and external influence as analyzed by conflict studies;
- the *organizers* of political struggle: the role of intellectuals and their role in different forms of social knowledge production;
- and last but not least the role of *space*, its change and following influence on social crises.

The second, shorter part of the chapter outlines in more applied terms how research question and theoretical background have been translated into project methodology, collected data, and its analysis.

2.1 Historical and Philosophical Background

The concept to be used has to travel a long way, from the struggles of the 19th and beginning 20th century at the European periphery over the intermediate step of global analyses of international political economy back down to the grounds of transnational politics in countries of the Global South. This travel has to be accompanied by some considerations.

2.1.1 Historical Binding of Theory and Critical Realism

All of the included debates argue a connection between knowledge and history, including the writing of an author and its ties to the author's place and time of work. This is the result of a rejection of social ideas as something outer-worldly, ideally or divine, just to be discovered by intellectuals. Sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, the debates refer here to a writer, at first sight seemingly disparate to progressive theory: Niccolò Machiavelli, famed for his brutal and immoral policy-advice. A short insight into his work should help us to resolve this contradiction and highlight, how his writings are the base for a critical realist political analysis.

Politics in the formation of the Italian nation state was a key topic for Niccolò Machiavelli, as later on for Antonio Gramsci; even though at Machiavelli's life time Italian unity would have to

be a utopia for another 350 years. The Italian peninsula of the 16th century was in a similar turmoil as four centuries later. Although the Italian city states as Florence, Milan, or Venice have become cornerstones in international trade of the era, their influence declined during the life time of Niccolò Machiavelli. Next to structural reasons, e.g. changes in the international economic system with a strengthening of the future colonial empires, warfare on the peninsula was one major challenge. Violence has defined struggles within and between the regional forces, i.e. competition for leadership inside the city states and competition between these states; with conflicts further fuelled by the offensive papal state, geographically encompassing nowadays Rome and the adjacent central Italian provinces. Furthermore, changing alliances with several European powers as the French and Habsburg monarchies opened up minor local struggles to larger European power games and their normative claims for God and Monarchy.

Against the religiously underpinned war propaganda of his time, Niccolò Machiavelli promoted a radical realism: “it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it” (Machiavelli 2002 [1532]: C15). Thus he opens up a modern debate which in different forms has engaged politics as much as political science throughout history: the struggle between idealism and realism. With priests reigning intellectual work in Europe at his time, idealism had a big advantage: with God as “the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end” (Jones 1966: Revelation 22,13), idealism just could triumph over the in-between earthly reality. In the centre were the writings of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. What combined them and similar writers of the era was the existence of God as the source of life and thus of law: His Will offered the solution for human kind. A good political order must be close to this Will and thus the establishment of this order is right. Following this line of argument, the usage of violence and war is justified if used to establish God’s will. Thomas Aquinas follows Augustine in the topic of “just war” and defines that:

“In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. ... Secondly, a just cause is required ... Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.” (Aquinas 1920: Q40/1)

Both authors stick thereby to the catholic dogma of the Pope as God’s representative on earth and thus the highest authority to decide on good and evil, peace and war; during Machiavelli’s time the latter became a constant element of political affairs.

For this philosophy as much as for its earthly beneficiaries Machiavelli’s writings came as a frontal offence. He rejected all notions of an utopian *good* as a helpful guidance to reign: Machiavelli demanded from a ruler to “to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity” (Machiavelli 2002 [1532]: C15). While on first sight it looks as a *carte blanche* for the conservation of a rulers’ position, a more careful reading reveals its subversive character: Machiavelli redirects the focus of social analysis away from the ideal Go(o)d, to be revealed by the clerics as His earthly deputies, to the pits of every day Italian political life, visible to everyone. Politics becomes more than the nasty necessity diffusing from the pure ideals; it becomes an art in itself. The trust in the analysis of reality and the art of politics brings hope for a man-made peace rather than an idealist utopia. Realist analysis becomes a revolutionary moment: a sharp weapon against ruling systems is the highlighting of their shortcomings.

We outlined now in quite detail the rejection of idealist assumption of universal ideas. However, this does not mean a support of its anti-thesis: the assumption that just the engagement with historical events is viable and that any idea derived from a specific political analysis is meaningless for the analysis of any other context.

This has been discussed intensively in a debate about the usage of Gramscian historical materialist analysis in International Political Economy. Critics attacked IPE, that their scholars “have failed to engage critically with some of the key premises underlying their appropriation of Gramsci” and that “IR scholars have been content simply to ‘apply’ Gramsci ...[while]... it is not at all clear that his conceptual categories can be meaningfully ‘internationalized’” (Germain and Kenny 1998: 4). Answers were prompt (Murphy 1998; Rupert 1998) and tried to prove above all that the specific concepts (state, civil society, transnational social relations, etc.) were valuable for International Relations, contrary to the challenge by Germain and Kenny as being used without reflection.

Adam Morton offers a more thorough discussion of the meta-theoretical issue of the link between social ideas and its production in a specific time and geographical area. Morton argues

“...that any ‘reading’ of Gramsci based on a self-reflexive purpose, rather than a representative interpretation, cannot objectively reveal a ‘true’ or ‘real’ Gramsci; thus no ‘correct’ reading can be produced. After all, any understanding of Gramsci’s writings is circumscribed by specific interests and purposes while also, particularly in this case, relying on the interpretative injunctions of translated texts, no matter how rigorously they may be compiled.” (Morton 2003: 119)

In other words, even the engagement with ideas and their original production is already shaped by the background of the researcher; an insight which the constructivism debate termed “double hermeneutics” (Giddens 1984; Ulbert 2006). The simple anti-thesis to idealism, the seemingly unprejudiced analysis of reality, taps into the same trap: the analysis of reality is as dependent on the researcher and thus ambiguous as the analysis of eternal ideas if considered as the revelation of the real truth.

The problem of grasping reality with ideas produced out of this reality can thus just be addressed by focusing on the synthetic relation between the two, rather than starrng at the two opposites. Morton refers to Stuart Hall when demanding of “thinking in a Gramscian way about the history of ideas and present-day problems rather than simplistically believing that Gramsci has the answers or holds the key to particular problems” (Morton 2003: 121). This can be extended to the production of ideas in general: ideas developed along specific historical situations and their analyses are unlikely to explain us other historical situations. But analyzing these different historical situations through a lens sharpened by the analysis of other historical situations can be helpful and raise the validity of an analysis.

Here the epistemological concept coincides with the ontological understanding of the used approach: historical materialism is an approach to address the relation between past and present. Previous works and ideas and current interests and points of view are combined and guide a researcher when addressing a new historical situation. This new historical situation, meanwhile, is, too, the outcome of current social activities and past developments, the world is not defined in relation to an ideal, but the world is a world in becoming; shaped by the past but with different open paths to go. The approach relies thereby on the assumption of a link

between past and present not as a simple path dependence, where the present is determined by the past, but an active present which is constraint *and* enabled by our past.

To conclude with Machiavelli's realism and span the link to Gramsci, we can quote the latter on his discussion of the first's approach:

"The basic innovation introduced by the philosophy of praxis into the science of politics and of history is the demonstration that there is no abstract 'human nature', fixed and immutable (a concept which certainly derives from religious and transcendentalist thought), but that human nature is the totality of historically determined social relations, hence an historical fact which can within certain limits, be ascertained with the methods of philology and criticism. Consequently, political science, as far as both its concrete content and its logical formulation are concerned, must be seen as a developing organism. ... Machiavelli's style is not that of a systematic compiler ... quite the contrary; it is the style of a man of action, of a man urging action, the style of a party manifesto." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 133-4 / GT-01)

2.1.2 Knowledge Transfers and Normative Theory

The problem of reality-bound theory in new historical situations presents itself now up-side-down: how can a concept emancipate itself from its original production. While Germain and Kenny warned of "dangers of removing thinkers from their contexts and 'applying' their frameworks in ways that bear only partial resemblance to their original meanings" (Germain and Kenny 1998: 13), the opposite is similarly dangerous: forgetting about the close links between our own analysis and scientific production of the past which shapes our thinking in the present. This has been discussed extensively in debates on Orientalism and post-colonialism (Williams and Chrisman 1994: Part II/127-190; Loomba 1998).

The core argument here is that knowledge about non-European spaces had always had a specific political function for European political systems itself. Far from being mere descriptions of reality, starting with the early beginning of travel literature, binaries have been developed in describing *us* and *the other*: modern vs. traditional, technology-oriented vs. nature-oriented, democratic vs. despotic, Christian vs. heathen, normal vs. exotic. Despite some romantic notions, e.g. in the hailing of the nature-orientation of the "noble savages", most of the time these descriptions establish a normative hierarchy between the good Europeans and the bad barbarians. Even more so there exists a *historical* hierarchy: *they* have to be developed to where *we* are already, justifying in the end colonial integration and subjugation. While the instrumental use of orientalist ideas was all too obvious in light of the excesses of colonial masters throughout the history of colonialism, the specific moment of the Orientalism- and Postcolonialism-debate is, that these figures got incorporated into the canon of Western thinking and influence knowledge production, including scientific production, in a hidden way up until today (Said 1994). This makes it so dangerous, even for critical approaches.

As Mustapha Kamal Pasha formulated it in a critique on Gramscian IPE's engagement with the non-OECD-world, the danger for IPE's approach is twofold: on the one hand they neglect the non-OECD-world; the approach understands the latter as a mere recipient of political and economic developments in the capitalist core. On the other hand this capitalist periphery gets romanticized as the place for resistance against capitalism and its core (Pasha 2005). In both cases, it resembles the "Orientalism"-critique that *the other* is derived by one's self image and

demands: in the first case as the area to extend one's own strong civilization, in the second the hope of salvation from one's own degenerated civilization.

Taken together, we are presented with a double challenge: use a theoretical approach by being cautious on the differences between the historical production of the theoretical approach and the reproduction of this approach in a different historical situation on the one hand; and on the other hand to uncover the continuing underlying prejudices which follow the reproduction of theory originating from an area of domination over the other. These concerns should be addressed by outlining the original production of the used approach and by keeping in mind the normative challenges of scientific production by the global core about the global periphery. As Robert Cox famously phrased it: "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose." (Cox 1981: 128) Thus, this paper intends to fulfil the demands on critical theory, i.e.

"critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory ... does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. ... Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts ... Because it deals with a changing reality, critical theory must continually adjust its concepts to the changing object it seeks to understand and explain." (Cox 1981: 129)

As outlined above as the ontological understanding of the approach and as the normative stance of the author, structural *changes* and social *progress* are considered as valuable aims of politics as much as of political science, possible with this approach as

"[c]ritical theory allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world. ... In this way critical theory can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order." (Cox 1981: 130)

2.1.3 Gramsci and the Anti-Determinist Philosophy of Praxis

An author, who followed this approach to the point, was Antonio Gramsci. He has been a writer and activist at a crossroad of modern European history, the beginning of the 20th century between WW1 and the rise of fascist movements which peaked in WW2. Gramsci was born in the Italian periphery, on the island of Sardinia. Through scholarships he finally ended up in Turin, one of the centres of Italy's industrialized northern regions, hosting its largest car manufacturer FIAT (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino). While himself a philosophy student at the »Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia«, his non-academic life has been characterized by political engagement with the industrial proletariat of the city and especially its immigrants from his home island and other peripheral Italian regions, i.e. the islands Sardinia and Sicily and the southern Italian mainland. He worked as a journalist and editor for progressive newspapers and magazines and was in the forefront of the workers' organization during the *Biennio Rosso*, the promising two years of Italians proletarian movement.

Italy has been politically ahead of central Europe in rise *and* fall of a possible proletarian revolution, which socialists all over the continent have been expecting since its first spring in 1848. Gramsci, as other activists of the era, has been encouraged by the Bolshevik takeover in Russia. Italy followed close by. Workers have been organized in the CGL, the confederate trade

union, and above all on factory level along more radical councils. But from the beginning this locally strong movement has been weak on the national level.

In organizational terms, its political representation, the Socialist Party has been divided along reformist and revolutionary aims. While considering himself a radical and being active in the split of the communist party from the socialists, Gramsci came to the conclusion, that Lenin's military takeover was no option in Italy, following an analytical comparison between the Soviet Union and the central and southern European states. The difference he found in civil society, or what he termed the extended state, which integrated political society, i.e. government, and civil society. While the Tsarist regime in its final years purely relied on state repressive organs, Italy's political society has been "shielded" by a strong, conservative civil society, institutionalized above all in the Catholic Church, but furthermore in newspapers, employers' associations, and reformist trade unions. Without first conquering this civil society, any revolutionary movement addressing the political society was doomed to fail.

In socio-geographic terms the workers movement remained – despite the role of nationwide internal migration – a northern phenomenon. The rural proletariat of central and southern Italy has been neglected by political organizations and was by itself unable to develop own institutions and shake off the influence of landlords and Catholic Church. This failure of social integration by the progressive movement has been a key topic in Gramsci's work,

“that of bringing the Southern question forcibly to the attention of the workers' vanguard, and identifying it as one of the essential problems of national policy for the revolutionary proletariat.” (Gramsci 1978 [1926]: 240 / GT-02)

Similar to processes of colonialism

“ideology has been disseminated in myriad ways among the masses in the North, by the propagandists of the bourgeoisie: the South is the ball and chain which prevents the social development of Italy from progressing more rapidly; the Southerners are biologically inferior beings, semi-barbarians or total barbarians, by natural destiny; if the South is backward, the fault does not lie with the capitalist system or with any other historical cause, but with Nature, which has made the Southerners lazy, incapable, criminal and barbaric - only tempering this harsh fate with the purely individual explosion of a few great geniuses, like isolated palm-trees in an arid and barren desert.” (Gramsci 1978 [1926]: 241 / GT-03)

Again similar to later writings of Galtung (1971) and Fanon (1981 [1961]) on intellectuals and elites in the global South, in the Italian periphery this understanding of the Southern Question has been taken over by the peripheral elites: the »Southernists« considered it as a national question of catch-up development of a backward region; to be dealt with together with the northern elites. In this alliance they were able to prevent a revolutionary alliance, pushing southern lower classes against the »proletarian aristocracy«, amongst others as strike-breaking militias and army units, a further junction to the road of fascism:

“Everyone remembers that, in fact, when Mussolini [the future Fascist dictator, S.S.] left *Avanti!* [the socialist newspaper; S.S.] and the Socialist Party, he was surrounded by this cohort of syndicalists and Southernists.” (Gramsci 1978 [1926]: 250 / GT-04)

This internal division between north and south got furthermore covered by colonialist aspirations of the fascist regime. Creating a romantic history of Italy as the successor nation of the Roman Empire, the catch phrase has been “*mare nostrum*”, our sea, considering the shores of

the east Mediterranean Sea as naturally belonging to Italy. The fascist regime's army attacked and annexed parts of northern Africa, including nowadays Libya and Ethiopia, and promised these lands to the southern »braccanti«, landless peasants, as an imperialist solution to the latter's poverty. Internally, the new alliance between northern bourgeoisie and southern landlords, making use of a disintegrated class of peasants and land labourers smashed the organization of the proletarian movement. Under the leadership of fascism, total national unity and corporatism was forged and civil society organized and subdued into the new fascist mass organizations, complemented by a renewed cooperation with the Catholic hierarchy.⁷

Gramsci analyzed this organizational and social development as a consequence of failings in political and theoretical work by the workers' movement: it had stagnated in conceptual terms during the 1920s, with its reformist strand integrated into mainstream politics and its radical strand under restraining pressure from Moscow's 2nd International; the latter by itself under internal pressure from the counter-revolutionary white movement inside the USSR and external pressure from the capitalist empires, not to mention the deficiencies of revolution itself. Seeing little room for further revolutionary developments, both, reformists and Moscow with its local allies, focused on stabilizing their current positions. Thus, reformist socialists and revolutionary communists had to trust on the material force of history to achieve further revolutionary developments, while manoeuvring through current challenges on a day-to-day base with little theoretical analysis and guidance. Their rivalry over the same targeted constituency, the proletariat, on the way to a predefined socialist revolution made them overlook the creativity of the leading social forces to re-invent themselves in concert with a new political movement: fascism in its different versions, from traditionalist-conservatives in Spain and Austria to conservative-revolutionaries in Italy and Germany. What Gramsci called "materialismo volgare" (vulgar materialism) (Gramsci Q11 §20/1489) – in political terms the passive waiting for a determined revolution out of economic crisis – led, in combination with the mentioned failure to unite northern and southern lower classes, to the defeat of the workers movement, the rise of Mussolini's fascism, and Gramsci's incarceration as a political prisoner of the new regime.

It was in prison that he was writing on his main, even though unfinished work: the prison notebooks got published posthumously in several edited, comprehensive or shortened, forms (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971; Gramsci 1978 [1926]; 2001 [1929-35]). They contain several debates and theoretical discussions along the political development of the proletarian movement and the Italian national state, which are relevant for our research question and will be outlined in the following parts.

2.1.4 International Political Economy

In the following decades, Gramsci's work got disseminated into different debates. In Italy itself, Gramsci's heritage was a battle ground inside the development of the communist party. On a global level, his work got appropriated by International Political Economy in its search for new answers to global questions transcending the static International Relations theories of its time.

⁷ Until then the relation between the Italian state and the Catholic Church was tense, as during the unification of Italy, the Vatican got deprived of its vast territory in central Italy, which got integrated into the new nation-state.

One of its first proponents, Robert Cox, worked as research director of the International Organisation of Labour during the late 1970s. After the oil crisis of 1973 and increasing pressure onto the industries of the OECD countries following the prosperous days of socioeconomic growth of the 1960s, a further centrepiece of the global system has been steadily weakened: the leading role of the United States of America. This historic development put into crisis the strongest scientific model for the international system at that time: neo-realism (Waltz 1979). Cox tried to explore a more flexible understanding of global developments, opening up possibilities of interference by political and social forces (Cox 1981; 1987). He followed economic histories over the last centuries and explored the strengths and weaknesses of seemingly overwhelming empires: the British crown during the 19th century and the United States around the middle of the 20th century. With Gramsci as theoretical backup, he deduced answers on questions of power in the global system from their rise and fall and projected it to developments of the late 20th century. This turn to economic histories opened up the rather static development debates categorizing the world into centre and periphery, while avoiding the liberal-political idealism of sovereign, independent states. Later on, IPE focused on discussing neo-liberalism and tried to explore the development of post-national, i.e. transnational classes (van der Pijl 1998; van Apeldoorn 2002; van der Pijl 2007).

Finally, while the economists around Cox continued to focus on the economic powers in the OECD areas, diplomats Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, extended the range of the approach and focused on the world outside the OECD, exploring international relations between states of North and South (Augelli and Murphy 1988; 1993). Social scientists followed, with Adam D. Morton focusing in his Ph.D.-thesis on creative local developments inside Mexico reacting to global economic developments: while some social groups adapted and collaborated with the interests of OECD-powers, others resisted and successfully challenged global pressures. Thus the decade-old system of the Mexican Institutionalized Revolution scrambled on the national level, opening up the country for new developments, even though not necessarily progressing the cause of the lower classes (Morton 2000). Have the OECD-analyses been rather straightforward and still quite deterministically deducting from capitalist developments, this focus-redirected studies to integrate more complex situations, like state bureaucracies, mixed economies and institutional adherences, external influences, etc. (Abrahamsen 1997; Pasha 2005). It brought back the initial intention of the approach to escape economic determinism in favour of a more *open* Marxist approach (Bieler and Morton 2003).

2.1.5 Dialectics

Bringing these diverse historical backgrounds and research insights together, is a challenge to be addressed by a methodological approach which lies at the core of historical materialism: dialectics.

First, these diverse social analyses use dialectics as a methodology. Dialectics is hereby understood of confronting two items with each other and exploring thereby not just their differences but above all their underlying connections. Thus, we can empirically explore the existence of seemingly antagonistic opposites, for example peace villages in a war-torn country, while avoiding splitting them up in percentage-continuums. When we explore the dialectic relation between the peaceful villages and war developments, e.g. which function might the firsts have for the latter, we might end up with a more complex understanding and conse-

quently more comprehensive policy suggestions by using a dialectical understanding. If we just outline a continuum with 70% war-torn and 30% peaceful villages, we end up with a policy-target to have a quota of 60 to 40. Later on we might then wonder, why by reaching this benchmark the violence incidences increased in the 60% war-torn villages.

Secondly, this dialectical approach is used to engage material and ideal factors with each other, forming the core advantage of historical materialism in highlighting that neither are ideal factors materialized in insufficient earthly bodies (the Catholic philosophy or a strict idealistic reading of Hegel), nor is human history singularly determined by material developments (the Feuerbach philosophy). Human history is considered to be the outcome of a constant struggle between material and ideal developments and just the analysis of this struggle, i.e. relation, can raise our understanding of development.

Furthermore, this dialectical approach focuses on the struggle between social groups, i.e. classes, as the mover of history. This struggle is seen as something creative, out of which humanity can develop progressively. Thereby, both Gramsci and IPE, have to deal with the insight that the optimistic outlook of 19th century has to be qualified. Neither leads the bourgeois-proletarian struggle directly to socialism, i.e. the outcome of the struggle cannot be determined from its beginnings, nor is the outcome necessarily a progressive development toward a more free and just society, as the massacres of WW2 or purges in post-colonial societies have shown. These insights, starting with Gramsci, show that the neglected analysis in progressive theory of organized direct violence as a specific characteristic of society is a serious void.⁸ For long time, the understanding of violence has been of direct violence as a simple *instrument* of power to be used against or by resistance. Thus, violence has been seen as quantitatively altering the game, with the conflicting party having more violence capabilities speeding up or slowing down the historical development to revolutionary change. Qualitatively, violence would not distract from conserving or revolutionizing societies. However, this understanding neglects that in its dialectic relation with other forms of social production, the production of violence can change the overall social struggle as such.

Lastly, this reflection on the optimism of earlier progressive theory and politics demands an engagement with progressive political utopias. They resulted on the one hand out of this believe in human progress and on the other hand out of the necessity to provide a motivating path for the political movement as such: “Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes” (Cox 1981: 130). However, the strict adherence to solely implementing the scientific predefined path of revolution by political movements, bringing with it the suppression of critical reflection as a counterrevolutionary danger, led to failings of progressive projects all over the globe. Historical materialism has thus to continuously apply the reflection on the changing environment not just on ruling social settings, but as much on alternative social models. This demands the constant dialectical engagement (not its denial) of theoretical frameworks and political utopia with the ongoing social development, including its possibilities and restrictions.

⁸ Different than structural violence, which has been a constant argument since the breakthrough works of Galtung (Galtung 1969; 1971; Galtung and Hoivik 1971).

2.2 Meta-Questions: Structures and Processes

The ontological and epistemological question on the relation between political ideas and historical structures as well as its analysis mirrors the meta-theoretical question on structure and agency by historical materialism. Current political analysis already deals with both, structure and agency. However, mostly as distinctive areas: here the socioeconomic structural problems which can be solved with massive (foreign) investment; there the insurgents which can be dealt with with political power-sharing for the leaders and DDR for the rank-and-file. The interplay of these elements, however, has to be a serious concern, grasping the interrelated impact on society.

2.2.1 Historical Structures

The used approach tries to prevent the distinct treatment of structure and agency as factors for social development as much as it tries to prevent to produce a hierarchy between the two, with one determining the other. The cornerstone is thereby “the historicist method [...which...] is concerned with perceiving historical structures that characterize particular epochs and are themselves the result of collective human action over time.” (Bieler and Morton 2001: 17) Similar discussions can be found already in previous dialectical accounts since Hegel. Karl Marx formulates it in one of his more famous phrases: „Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht aus freien Stücken, nicht unter selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar vorgefundenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen“(Marx 1972: 115), i.e. men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; not under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. Bieler and Morton follow Gramsci and use the notions of realm of necessity and realm of freedom as interlinked components. All approaches have in common that human will is restricted *and* enabled by current and past social realities, which again have been developed by human activity. While leaving the freedom of choice to the political present, the amount of current choices is delimited by historical developments. A social movement has the political freedom to choose between competing at elections, trying to topple a government by a general strike or even a putsch. But all these choices need preliminary works and if a social movement has no apparatus to address the masses to vote for the chosen party, or no expertise on organizing strikes or no connection to the military apparatus, these single choices cannot be made. During different circumstances, they might be made, but probably unsuccessful, as participating in rigged elections or trying a putsch in an overwhelmingly accepted liberal democracy. The movement might, however, postpone their aim of a power take over in favour of developing some of the preconditions for these choices so that the choice can be made at another time. This does not just include material or institutional conditions as in these examples, but ideal as well. As long as there exists no understanding of the historical development of local social structures, best practice models might fail, even if they worked out well in other instances. A good example is the undertaking of Cuban backed revolutionaries in Bolivia in the 1960s, where unfulfilled assumptions about the cooperation with local peasants and resistance institutions led to a rapid mission failure.

What does that mean for research? As structures are not a given but a produced set of circumstances, the researcher has to take into consideration its development over time. At the same time at a certain point of history, the analysed human action is constrained by these previous

developments, so it is necessary to differentiate between these enabling and constraining factors and the open decision for one or the other choice or the planning of future developments, considered as human will. The method suggested here is to trace historical developments and try to figure out if and how the outcome of human action changes society in just a cyclical, short-term way or has a more organic, long-term impact.

2.2.2 Human Agency and Collective Actors

Approaching human action, we have to reflect throughout some lines on the political actors researched by this project, which is positioned somewhere between political science and sociology. Social groups as levels or classes have been determined by social analysis along objective characteristics as income level, sector belonging, function in labour division, etc. However, this determination of research objects says little about the actor qualities of the so fixed groups, i.e. their ability to act in a collective manner. Thus, the above mentioned dialectical challenge between structure and agency manifests itself in the production of social groups as well. Social groups are the outcome of production processes, intentional as well as collateral, and on the same time need to achieve a level of political cohesiveness to be able to act collectively, outlined in more detail below. At this point it is necessary to state, that these production processes of social groups are by themselves not distinct from the overall social production processes: rather than resembling static ideals, they are historical elements in a constant state of becoming. Thus, this research project will try to analyse traces of social groups on an earlier stage of their development and continue with an analysis on inner structural changes over time in relation to overall social developments. As Gramsci puts it in regard to political parties:

“Hence it may be said that to write the history of a party means nothing less than to write the general history of a country from a monographic viewpoint, in order to highlight a particular aspect of it. A party will have had greater or less significance and weight precisely to the extent to which its particular activity has been more or less decisive in determining a country’s history.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 151 / GT-05)

Thus, conglomerates of people will be recognized as social groups as soon as they have appeared inside their social environment as a distinct social group, i.e. on the ideal level labelled either by themselves or by others as a social distinct group and having different positions in the material production process. The establishment of institutions reproducing these social groups is meanwhile not necessary but a supporting cause to consider a group of people as a social group. Consequently, the definition of social groups cannot be pre-determined but has to be elaborated, following the overall historic-materialist methodology, just in an iterative engagement of theory and empirics as well as social structures and political agency.

The question is then, are classes and social groups distinct terms or interchangeable? Gramsci uses both terms; Cox refutes the usage of class as an overused and thus distracting term. Neo-Gramscians closer to political science or cultural theory reject the term including its content altogether as an overly economically deterministic concept. However, on the other hand, refuting at least an engagement with the term leads to what Morton describes as the reconstitution of a “liberal pluralism within which the normative aspects of class analysis are diluted and, increasingly, emptied”. By focusing on the *plurality* of social actors over different forms and levels (states, bureaucracies, IOs, NGOs, military, etc.) we end up with a “sanitised

view ... which – crucially – fails to recognise class relations prevalent within and across territorial scales”, quoting Althusser a “critical rationalist idealism”(Morton 2006: 62-63). Thus, opening up class analysis should not be mixed up with neglecting social hierarchies, i.e. existing societal power structures. The approach used here assumes, that hierarchical power structures exist and can be described. Even though power is considered relational, this research is not convinced that power is so fluid that ‘having’ power cannot be analysed. Considering power as fluid and omnipresent does not overcome a static understanding of society, rather it stabilizes it, as it deprives social actors from the possibility to challenge power positions of social groups. Again, here just a historical dialectic analysis can prevent either the objectified presentation of a static structure or of a personalized treatment of power and not-power in moral good-vs.-evil terms.

2.2.3 Organic History, Non-Organic Developments, and Interim Events

The question for both, historical structures as well as social groups, is then, which developments are moments of structure and group formation and which are moments with just a short-term influence? Again, there cannot be a pre-defined list of developments, thus just a heuristic outline is possible. Gramsci divides on the impact-line between organic and cyclical developments when he discusses crises in the parliamentary system.

“A common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural. ... In the first case there is an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second an exaggeration of the voluntarist and individual element. The distinction between organic ‘movements’ and facts and ‘conjunctural’ or occasional ones must be applied to all types of situation; not only to those in which a regressive development or an acute crisis takes place, but also to those in which there is a progressive development or one towards prosperity, or in which the productive forces are stagnant.”
(Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 178 / GT-06)

An organic crisis changes social structures while a cyclical crisis maybe a symptom of an organic crisis, but by itself does not change the parliamentary system or even might stabilize it. The latter happens, if the engagement of society with these cyclical crises distracts from the conflicts which might lead to an organic crisis. Election campaigns for example present people a choice, integrating them into the political system and thus attracting their consent to it. As competitive presidential elections in the US might be, all major candidates are united in presenting themselves as defender of the overall system, thus stabilizing it. Thus, even an impeachment process, rather than destabilizing a system threatened by corruption, stabilizes a system by pointing at the ability of self-cleansing. However, the last example already points out, that similar processes might have cyclical or organic consequences, depending on the historical situation: while the ousting of the German president on corruption allegations was just a cyclical crisis, solved by the election of a new president, similar processes of ousting presidents in Honduras and Paraguay led to broad protests and civil-war-like developments.

Gramsci uses the term organic for two more debates: he divides between organic and non-organic intellectuals and between organic developments of a national society and non-organic influences from outside (see below for details). These several usages give us an understanding of organic history and interim events in Gramsci’s reading. Organic developments are developments which necessarily take place in *all* spheres of society; thus, they link horizontally,

parallel or lagged, institutional, economic, and ideal production processes. Furthermore, organic developments are vertically linked to the history of a society. Non-organic events meanwhile are deviations from either of these two elements: they are either confined to one sphere of society, e.g. the political, and as they do not become manifest in other spheres, their short term character gets exposed; or they interfere from outside rather than being developed internally over time, thus facing a higher chance of not connecting to current social structures. While organic developments have an obviously long-term progressive impact on society, for example urbanization due to industrial developments, interim events have a rather unpredictable outcome, ranging from no impact via short-term irritations to full-blown (counter-) revolutions. The argument, that long-term developments have to take place in all social spheres, is thereby a necessary indicator for the sustainable impact of an interim event; even though not a sufficient reason. Taking the most prominent contemporary example of an interim event: the intentioned crash of four airplanes into the Pentagon building and the World Trade Center towers. Would the terrorist background of the crash not have led to developments in all components of society, it would have been a tragic moment in history, but with probably no more consequences than some additional security inspections in the aviation industry and the private grievance of the victims' relatives. Meanwhile, by triggering a range of developments, from the "war-on-terror" on the level of ideas, tightened security measures which increased the economic costs of international trade, the extensive defence budgets leading to fiscal deficits and redirected public spending, the reference to a "time of collective defence" according to article 5 of the NATO treaty and consequently NATO's role in the war in Afghanistan, etc. 9/11 gets considered a revolutionizing event. Nonetheless, a historical materialist approach can never be satisfied with analysing a revolutionizing event as a moment of historical change at will. A historical-materialist analysis always demands to link the impact of an interim event to an analysis of organic developments in global and local society.

2.2.4 Social Production

The assumption, with which the approach operates to analyze organic developments, is that relevant social processes have to be produced and reproduced. This implies that a society and its characteristics do not exist or flow naturally⁹. Neither does nature. The approach rejects any reference to naturalized notions of society. This does not mean that stars or rivers just exist because of human kind, but it means that they get their relevance for society just by its integration into a social production process.

Secondly, we are talking about *social* production processes, i.e. the focus is not solely on economic production processes. Socialist theory of the early 20th century in its different variants deducted from the 19th century Marxist writings a reading of social production processes, which emphasized the overall importance of economic production processes with other processes either being irrelevant or determined by the first. Against this unidirectional understanding, historical materialism sees an ongoing interaction between different social processes. As outlined below, ideas get produced as much as institutions. Their development might be to a certain extent independent from each other and they can be analyzed as differ-

⁹ In combination with these assumptions it gets clear that the usage of the term "organic" differs distinctly from the essentialist usage by authors like Spengler (2006[1918/1922]).

ent areas of production with their own characteristics, but they integrate together and are strongly interlinked in forming society. Above all, their social strength just develops in relation to production processes in the other areas. Social strength again is time related: a material, ideal, or institutional production is socially strong if it is able to shape and/or change social structures sustainable for an extensive period. The argument is thereby, that the stronger the impact on a society as a whole, the lesser the re-production efforts of the single components have to be, as their reproduction gets supported by processes in the other areas. Thus, an ensemble of material, ideal, and institutional structures will face lower reproduction costs. Examples can be found on a broad area: The idea of bringing Italian middle-class children to state-run boarding schools is strongly supported by a financially necessary integration of parents into paid work and state-backed rules and regulations for these schools, giving parents the confidence of doing the right thing. Meanwhile, taking children from Australian Aborigines for re-education to state-run boarding schools just happened against strong resistance by the targeted families and the consequent use of force by state institutions.

Thirdly, the term social production process helps to understand that material as well as ideal and institutional productions are in seldom cases individual processes; they normally include labor divisions. Ideas or political activities might be connected and expressed by single individuals, but they just become relevant as part of a broader social production process, involving printing houses and bureaucracies, readers and followers.

Last but not least, there is no *final* production. Social processes are fluent and so are social productions; their impact just develops in relation to an altering society. Thus, social elements like language or laws have not just to be produced, but constantly reproduced. This divides historical materialist analysis from essentialists like Huntington (Huntington 1996; 2004); the latter acknowledge, different from biologist racists, that culture is socially produced, but neglect that a culture's present impact can just be understood in its current reproduction in relation with society. Culture can never be understood as an object, but just as one moment in current social struggles extending over all components of society. Furthermore, the need of reproduction does not mean that production and reproduction are necessary conscious activities, even though often they might be and might be sustained by institutions, e.g. common rules and regulations. Social productions can be as much a collateral outcome (the cold war prisoners dilemma as an outcome of the production of nuclear weapons), an unconscious adaptation process (we follow people in a cue to get to the concert hall entrance), or in reference to previous experiences (we teach our children similar as or different than our parents taught us).

This last differentiation points to a necessary precaution. Even though the assumption is, that just *fitting* developments lead to long-term impacts, it would be wrong to understand social and political alterations as the outcome of grand designs. Rarely one social group might be influential enough to form social change along their own intentions in the broad spectrum of social spheres. These explanations are a deterministic, reverse reading of history. 'Grand Design'-theories assume a deterministic outcome and neglect the possibility of multiple historical possibilities. Historical Materialism tries to take seriously the latter; out of the experiences of the shortcomings of 'vulgar materialism'. Thus, when I talk here about the necessity of ensembles of development in different spheres, I do not highlight a, probably impossible, facilitation of parallel developments in all spheres by a social group; I emphasize rather that successful

socio-political projects, planning and choices, are able to connect to existing historical structures while unsuccessful ones fail on this task; not to mention "butterfly-effects", good luck, or bad luck at instance. Taken together, the understanding from a historical-materialist perspective is that the effect of a social production is long-during, when ability and luck (virtue and fortune in Machiavelli's terms) meet with constraint and choice of current historical situations. It needs a politician like Barack Obama with his charismatic talents to preach "yes we can", but at the same time the phrase was just successful because he preached to a country which after years in decline desired nothing more than a new start. His inability to establish this idea in material and institutional terms, however, threatens his political project.

Thus, to trace long-term developments we have to look out for fitting developments in the different components of social production: the material base, social ideas, and institutions.

2.3 Production of Society

2.3.1 Production of the Material Base

As matter, the material base to be analyzed can be measured similarly to its analysis in natural science. However, relevant for historical materialism is not the understanding of matter in an independent form, but its integration into social production: "Matter as such therefore is not our subject but how it is socially and historically organized for production, and natural science should be seen correspondingly as essentially a historical category, a human relation." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 465-6 / GT-07). This redirects our focus to the production process and thus Cox differentiates two forms of material capabilities as "productive and destructive potentials. In their dynamic form these exist as technological and organisational capabilities, and in their accumulated forms as natural resources which technology can transform, stocks of equipment (e.g. industries and armaments), and the wealth which can command these." (Cox 1981: 136) Combining the two scholars, to be analysed is the historical link between the means of production (Cox) and their role in the relations of production (Gramsci).

It becomes clear, this is already a rejection of a vulgar materialism, as capitalist relations of production are not following a natural law but are outcome of specific historical developments. This is helpful to analyze countries of the global periphery as they show a different material base than central European countries analyzed by Marx and Cox regarding the means as much as regarding the relations of production. These areas show, similar to Gramsci's contemporary Italy and what the Hamburger Weltgesellschaftsansatz called "Ungleichzeitigkeit" (Siegelberg 2003), a concomitance of characteristics of capitalist relations of production (wage labour), feudal relations of production (serfdom and its modern variants), processes of original accumulation, and last but not least forced labour (slavery). At the same time this should prevent considering developments in the global south as a sheer repetition of European developments towards modernity. Not just the local circumstances, but, too, the global relations of production during the European industrial revolution were entirely different from nowadays post-colonial areas.¹⁰

¹⁰ A point little reflected by the mentioned Weltgesellschaftsansatz, leading to a modernist bias.

A second focus should be directed on Cox term “destructive potentials”, as they are a key feature of violent conflicts. It helps to differentiate popular notions of “war is irrational” or “peace dividends” and to connect it to a more relational picture of seemingly opposite war and peace economies. Destructive capabilities are part of relations of production and thus no less profitable for certain social groups than productive ones, as will be seen in the discussion on the southern Philippines.

2.3.2 Production of Ideas

Ideas, or better social ideas, describe social orientation patterns of the people of a society. They have the same function for social groups as Bourdieu’s habitus for the individual (Bourdieu 2005), i.e. they incorporate an understanding of reality into a society and allow the possibility of decision making and thus political agency. Cox differentiates two types of social ideas: intersubjective meanings and collective images of social order. While the first are “those shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour”, the second are “held by different groups of people. These are differing views as to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meanings of justice and public good, and so forth.” (Cox 1981: 136) For Cox, the later represents the possibilities of alternative social developments. Thereby, the differentiation is not so much on the quantity of people following a social idea which makes it an intersubjective meaning or a collective image. For the analysis, the more interesting point is that collective images can exist without challenging the intersubjective meaning, as outlined above in regard to debates inside a parliamentary system. The historical analysis has then to find out in regard to its area of research, when and how collective images start opposing and thus dissolving intersubjective meanings.

As the other production processes, social ideas are a synthesis of past developments and current intellectual activity. The production of ideas is thereby bound to the possibilities and constraints of their historical situation, relating to past development as much as to contemporary developments in other components of society. Thus, there are several indicators to consider during the analysis if an idea has probably a sustainable impact on a society: first, an intellectual project must be able to connect to existing social ideas, thus allowing a collective, interactive development of social ideas. Secondly, this will just be possible, if the intellectual production incorporates an understanding of past developments to connect to the overall experience of society. And thirdly, intellectual developments must connect to developments in material and institutional components of a society. Otherwise the revolutionary intellectual project, instead of becoming an intersubjective meaning, will fail and be regarded as science fiction.

2.3.3 Production of Institutions

Connecting social ideas and material base, historical materialism reaches the question of institutions. Political theory of the early 20th century discusses public institutions mainly along the (nation-) state. However, Gramsci differentiates its general meaning and talks about a narrow and an extended state. The narrow state proxies the government institutions including police, school, etc, which Gramsci labels as political society. In the extended state, this political society is augmented by civil society (Gramsci Q6 §87/761-2). This description of an extended state is

essential for the capitalist state in central Europe, while Gramsci at the same time analyses a different relation for example between state institutions and the peasants in the Italian south, which is more or less entirely based on command by the first over the later (Gramsci 1995[1927]). Cox follows this differentiated analysis and defines institution in an even broader way, based on the process of its formation: “Institutionalisation is a mean of stabilising and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations.” (Cox 1981: 136) Thus, they mirror structures in the components of material base and ideas at their point of formation. However, as much as institutions are not a given, but the outcome of social processes, after their creation they can become themselves a field of struggle between different social forces, or “stimulate the creation of rival institutions” (Cox 1981: 137). Taking Cox and Gramsci together we can see that institutions can be developed in a broad variety of forms as much as in their range, from global institutions to local institutions. A central question is thereby on the one hand the influence of singular social groups over these institutions compared to a certain autonomy by the latter and on the other hand the kind of relation between social groups and these institutions, i.e. a reciprocal relation of consent-based interactions between social groups and institutions or the domination by institutions over social groups. What they have in common is their function to bridge social groups and regulate and manage cyclical developments, thus preventing them to escalate into an organic crisis, which questions the characteristic relations between social groups altogether.

2.3.4 Consent and Force – Dual Power Mechanism

This leads us to the next point: consent and force in society. The general question in a capitalist society is obviously why the proletariat adhere to the ruling of the bourgeoisie. Gramsci builds on the power analysis of Machiavelli (Gramsci Q13). Machiavelli uses the image of a centaur to highlight, that power always integrates two components: animal force and human consent (Machiavelli 2001: 86). Gramsci differentiates two forms of power: either as ‘force’, acting dominantly, or as ‘moral and intellectual leadership’, which integrates subordinated classes in a consent-oriented way (Gramsci Q6 §37/710). The ruling social force insofar “...*dominates* antagonistic groups, which it tends to ,liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it *leads* kindred and allied groups.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 57 / GT-08; emph.add.). A social group rules hegemonic, if it uses force just for protecting a general consent against a minority in society. Additionally, a hegemonic order is able to transparently regulate what is a deviance from this order and how to deal with, including policing by force; this establishes an unambiguous line between the overall consent order of society and the ‘illegal’ or ‘antisocial’ behavior of individuals (Gramsci Q6 §37/712). This duality highlights however, that a hegemonic order is not an ideal type of a total consent based order. Analytically it is always to investigate, who is integrated how through consent and who experiences which kind of force to comply. This solves somehow the puzzle, why Gramsci seemingly ambiguously uses hegemonic as an adjective to describe consent-based practices on the one hand and to describe a social order characterized by consent *and* force on the other: a social order can never be purely consent-based, but is always based on combinations of consent and force; therefore hegemony can be used to describe all societies which are not in crisis or purely controlled by forced subjugation.

First a closer look at the development of consent: Consent is the agreement between leading and subordinated social groups based on acceptance of different levels of power inside historical structures. It originates first and foremost "...by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production" (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 12 / GT-09). This "consenso 'spontaneo'" ('spontaneous' consent) might be the result of the inability of subaltern social groups to organize themselves, but in its more sophisticated form it is above all the outcome of social struggles between active social groups; constantly revised along a continuing struggle of social groups with different power potentials. Workers' rights are a classic example of a consent agreement between employers and employees with different power potentials, in which workers' power is expressed and at the same time acknowledged that this power is not strong enough to replace the employers all together. Continuing to investigate this historical example, we can see that an increased organization of workers in material, ideal, and institutional terms raised their power, which led to adapted and increased workers' rights. These days we might experience the reverse, a further example of a non-existing historical law of progress. The implicit argument in all writings about hegemony is thereby, that an order has to demand at least the passive consent of a majority of the people to be sustainable. This analysis based in European history will be questioned throughout the following analysis.

However, before being able to struggle for consent, a social group has to develop an understanding of their demands as much as their role in society. Thus, the next question regards the interests of a social group. Adhering to the principles of historical materialism, the development of interests of a social group proxies the development of the group itself which again proxies the development of the social system as a whole. Thus, interests of a social group are neither a given, nor are they autonomously developed, but strongly linked to the position of the social group in the overall social setting.

Considering the consciousness of a social group's interests as well as of conflicts of interests with other social groups is a crucial point; not for their existence as a social group as such but for their political capability to act. This consciousness can be differentiated along several levels: on the lowest level of consciousness, the subaltern social group simply adheres to the ruling because they do not realize a conflict of interests; social hierarchy is considered as the natural order of things and belonging to their own ruler might be stronger than to similar subordinates of other rulers. This is what some theorists labelled as "false consciousness", although imprecisely extending it to the next levels. On the second level, the conflict of interests gets manifest, i.e. the subordinate people understand that there is a conflict of interests between their ruler and themselves. On the third level, the conflict leads to the political organization of the subordinate classes to intervene in the conflict of interest in a unifying manner, i.e. their consciousness becomes a political factor. In general terms: the difference between level one and two is one of consciousness, between two and three one of organization.

Gramsci's analysis of Italy saw level one and two mainly throughout the land labourers of the south. Even if the conflict between the landlords and the rural labourers got manifest every now and then, unorganized uprisings got either smashed easily or the conflict got redirected to questions of nationalism and colonialism. Meanwhile, the northern proletarian consciousness could be situated better on level three; however, reformist strands and the active conservative

ideology of the Italian state integrated a big part of the proletariat via the Socialist Party, the moderate wing of the trade union, state run schools, and the Catholic Church into the common goal of national development and economic prosperity, leading to an acceptance of the conflict of interests in favour of national unity (Gramsci 1978 [1926]).

The strength of the ruling class results thereby by extending their personal interests through adaptation onto the society as a whole. Gramsci analyses again three steps of this extending of particular interests to the common interests of society (Gramsci Q13 §7/1583-4):

- i. Production of a “*coscienza ... economico-cooperativo*” (economic-cooperative consciousness): it encompasses the specific interests of different economic sectors, as wool merchants or car-industry employers, etc.; these ideas might get institutionalized in a “*sindacato professionale*” (Gramsci Q12 §1/1523), a professional association.
- ii. Production of a “*coscienza della solidarietà di interessi*” (consciousness of solidarity of interests): the linkage of interests to develop the interests of a social group; it remains visible that it is the specific interest of a particular social group.
- iii. Finally, “one’s own corporate interests ... can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too,” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 181 / GT-10) the interests of the leading classe(s) become universalized. This does not just happen by a compromise but by the development of a universal social idea, which extends beyond the economic field, i.e. it “tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society – bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 181-2 / GT-11)

Thus, there is a difference between the cooperative interests of either an economic sector or a broader social group in the overall society (Step 1 and 2) and the development of a hegemonic system (Step 3), as the latter is not just a rational bargaining outcome inside a group, but the creative development of a “universal”, i.e. common interest.

The differentiation which Gramsci opens up is between long term interests of leadership and short term corporate interests. What at first sight might be in the general interest of a social group might not be it in the long run: following a strategy to maximize corporate interests might harm the interest of becoming a leading social force and thus undermine the sustainability of the corporate interests. Gramsci presents the example of the Italian government, planning to hand over the organization of a car factory to the workers of FIAT (Gramsci 1995[1919]). On the one hand the workers still are dependent on the capitalist economic system and the support of the state, with a high chance of failing due to its constraints and unwillingness to support the interests of the workers in the long run; on the other hand, this alliance between the reformist leaders of proletariat and bourgeoisie state will drive a wedge between the FIAT workers on one side and peasants and poor proletariat on the other. A future leading of the latter by the proletariat as a social group becomes thus unlikely, i.e. it harms the interests of leadership of the proletariat of an alliance of subaltern groups.

Thus, deducting from step three, social structures and level of consciousness of single groups alone do not determine yet the level of consent in a society. Rather it is a creative political

production, which has the ability to create consent under the constraints and potentials of social structures and levels of consciousness. Thus we reach the question of ideology as a framework of political explanation of the universal interests of a society, i.e. the political arrangement to establish a system of ruling, above all favourable to or supporting the interests of the ruling social groups but integrating the interests of subordinated groups as well. On a low level of development of consciousness by subaltern groups, ruling ideology is simply an instrument of blurring the consciousness of the subordinate classes, which by themselves adapt their own ideas to fit in passively. However, with the conflict of interests manifest, ruling ideology has to adapt and redirect the attention away from the already manifested conflict of interests to a distinct cause, i.e. ideology becomes an instrument of misleading the subordinate class. On the third level of consciousness, when subaltern groups are already politically organized, ideology loses the power of redirecting the conflict line. Its task is now to accept the conflict line but downplay its importance or even highlight it as a pushing factor in the development of a common goal.

Thus, while ideology can be considered as force in its handling of unconscious subaltern groups, it becomes a more sophisticated tool of producing consent once subaltern groups developed political consciousness and organization. Ideology becomes creative, subordinating the conflict of interests under the common interest of a society, either passively on level two or actively on level three. The production of this common interest has to take place in all three components: the material base, social ideas and institutions. What results is the hegemonic system of ruling. Its underlying aim is the consent of the majority of the social groups over the social development to reduce the necessary effort to stabilize, i.e. reproduce, the social order.

We come back to our analysis of dialectics as creatively overcoming a simple continuum. The creation of the common interest is the outcome of the struggle between the interests of distinct classes, which overcomes a simple compromise as it develops a society with an integral material structure and a universal social explanation of this structure, both stabilized in common institutions.

Thus, in regard to the relation between consent and force, the sophisticated characteristic of such a hegemonic order with a common interest is that it goes so far to integrate force and consent at the same time, reinforcing rather than challenging each other. While in a non-hegemonic society, the stability of a social hierarchy is based on force against the subordinated social groups, and thus constantly opposed by the latter, in a hegemonic society subordinated social groups embrace force as the instrument to protect society from its enemies, either from outside or inside:

The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is always to ensure that force would appear to be based on the consent of the majority expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion – newspapers and associations – which, therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied. (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 80/Footnote 49 / GT-12)

However, Gramsci argues too, that there is a second function, because while the “apparatus of state coercive power ... ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ ei-

ther actively or passively” it has been also “constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 12 / GT-13)¹¹. Thus, while the use of force in a hegemonic system is exceptional, its shadow is always present and adds an additional incentive of compliance.¹² Phrasing it the other way around, there is always the threat of exclusion from the hegemonic community, which brings with it subordination by conducted force. A current example is the term “terrorist” or “enemy of the state”, which excludes individuals even from the community of humans and thus allows the application of exceptional force.

We can conclude that coercion and consent are strongly interlinked in a society. While there is a rupture in consent during a crisis and thus an increase in the use of coercion, discussed in more details below, even during a hegemonic rule the shadow of force is always present; not just in theoretical terms, but embodied in public institutions like police and military. It is along this debate that Gramsci presents the famous formula of “State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 263 / GT-14).

This hegemonic order is expected to be quite stable. It might experience cyclical crises, but they do not touch the common consent. Gramsci names such a moment of hegemonic stability a historical bloc: a harmonious ensemble of historical structures in material and ideal terms allow the hegemonic consent embodied in the institutions of the expanded state. However, a historical bloc is under constant pressure due to the ongoing development of historical structures. This way, material compromises in material and institutional terms as well as the hegemonic intersubjective meanings on the level of ideas become constantly anachronistic and thus have to be adapted – the key task of intellectuals and their institutions (Gramsci Q10 §12-13/1571; Q13 §23/1602). If this is not possible, societies drift off into crisis.

2.4 Society in Crisis

2.4.1 Cyclical and Organic Crisis

As we saw, dialectic relations between the different components of social production, between past and present, between social structures and collective action, and last but not least between different class interests in a hierarchical society lead to a society under constant tension. As discussed these tensions can be eased or at least stabilized in a historical bloc, without that the tensions disappear. When tensions erupt into open disagreement, society experiences a crisis.

What interests us here most are organic crisis, but to understand its characteristics and prevent a confusion with several meanings of political crises, it is first necessary to differentiate it from cyclical crises. Cyclical crises Gramsci discusses along the splintered political parties in the

¹¹ Two translation issues: (i) “assicura” gets translated as “enforces”, but literally translated it would mean “guarantees”, i.e. not necessarily a pro-active engagement; (ii) “vien meno” with “has failed”, while the literal translation would be “becomes less”, i.e. “is failing”.

¹² There might be some connections here to the “shadow of hierarchy” discussed in compliance literature, e.g. Boerzel (2010).

French parliamentary system (Gramsci Q13 §37/1635). Even though in constant battle with each other they did not question the common social consent. These crises do not alter social structures, on the contrary. Cyclical crisis allow the current social structure to ease tension and thereby readapt to changing developments in one or several components of social structures. The loss of government power by one party and the takeover of the government by another in a liberal-democratic parliamentary system do not question the social system, but it re-enforces it. The change of government is legitimizing the system, supporting the argument that power is just temporarily in one party's hand and over the time all parties will be able to influence government policies directly and indirectly. In combination with considering parties as representations of the people, all people get part of the government's power, leveling social hierarchies. It gets clear, that in this case a cyclical crisis, the discontent and struggle between political parties, enforces the stability of the social structure as a whole.

Different from that, an organic crisis changes social structures profoundly (Gramsci Q13 §37/1635). According to the definition of organic in the paragraphs above, an organic crisis will develop in all components of society, i.e. it never can be a political crisis alone, but will be at the same time a crisis in material structures as much as in ideal terms. In an organic crisis, a simple return to the day-to-day functioning of the system in crisis is not possible anymore. What differentiates Gramsci's definition of crisis from vulgar materialism is, that an organic crisis is not the simple consequence of an economic crisis, in which materialists of the late 19th century hoped as a changer of history. As long as an economic crisis can be dealt with inside the ideological and political structures of a society, it must not lead to an organic crisis. Recent example has been the financial crisis of 2008, which did not lead to any fundamental changes in the social structures of Europe or the US. Economic crises "can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of national life." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 184 / GT-15), i.e. they can be used to adapt the overall social structures to recent developments and thus trigger a re-stabilization of society as a whole. Furthermore, next to the possibilities of economic crises as part of a parallel revolutionary development or as a trigger of restoring and modernizing an existing hegemony, an organic crisis can follow a material crisis, even after a cyclical improvement, if the economic crisis triggers developments in the other components of social structures which attack the existing hegemony. This understanding of an organic crisis opens up social progress to political action. Political action in a situation of material change can lead to the scrambling of an existing hegemony, bringing with it an organic crisis and out of it the possibility of revolutionary change.

Resumed, an organic crisis is the consequence of material disruptions which are interlinked with a crisis of the ideas and social institutions of a society. The leading forces are not able any longer to organize a hegemonic consent between the different social groups. This is consequence of a weakness in leadership by the ruling social forces over the subordinated groups, for example after a lost war for which it had acquired the consent of the masses, or "because huge masses ... have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution."(Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 210 / GT-16)

Intellectuals have a double role in an organic crisis: on the one hand they are part of the crisis, when they, as part of the leading classes or in cooperation with them, are not able to fulfill

their main function, i.e. producing the hegemonic compromise. On the other hand it is the task of counter-hegemonic intellectuals, to prepare for a crisis and enable a revolution by organizing the hegemonic integration of subordinated classes under the new leadership of a formerly subordinated social group.

2.4.2 Directions of Change

The consequence of an organic crisis is thereby not predetermined. Inside the national context, Gramsci analyses three possible outcomes of an organic crisis: a revolution, a restoration/passive revolution, and Caesarism.

The first option is of course the complete overcoming of the old order by a new order; created by a coalition of new social groups. New is in this case understood as a social group which has not been in power before, i.e. had not the capabilities to lead before and got strengthened just over the dynamics of history. It does not necessarily mean that this group must antedate the previously ruling classes. That would have undermined Gramsci's intention to integrate the small peasants and land laborers in a socialist coalition with the industrial proletariat against the landlords in the south and the bourgeoisie in the north of Italy.

A revolution turns the power structure of a society upside down. A subordinated social group takes over the leading role and integrates a new hegemony of further social groups. The process of a revolution is thereby a sophisticated process, as not just the overthrow of the old hegemony, but the creation of a new hegemony in material, ideal, and institutional terms has to be conducted. This includes the development of new norms and explanation models. A revolution is thus the outcome of a long-term process of intellectual and institutional development. Neither can the outcome of a revolution be pre-defined; a revolution does not implement a utopia. Political programs will and have to be adapted to the realities changing during the course of a revolution. Thus, the organic crisis is just one – even though decisive – moment in a revolutionary development.

This demanding process makes a revolution not likely, different to the hopes of vulgar materialism at that time; the latter saw a revolution as the inevitable outcome of European historic development. It underestimated the capabilities of the leading social forces to restore their rule by adapting to the changed historical structures and restore their power. Even though their former hegemony has gone into crisis, they can still rely on power factors resulting out of their previous hegemonic rule, including hold on state institutions, economic capital, and organic as well as traditional intellectuals to restore their hegemonic rule in an adapted hegemony. However, the scrambling of the previous hegemony highlighted the existence of social conflicts and "in the movement of history there is never any turning back, [...] restorations in toto do not exist." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 219-20 / GT-17) Thus, the restoration/passive revolution "is an uneasy balance between the old order, which is about to die, and the new elites, not yet born" (Abrahamsen 1997: 149). A new social contract based on an adapted compromise is needed. However, the „the full potential of progressive aspects of such profound historical change for the socially excluded [...gets...] undermined“ (Sassoon 2001). A method, which already by itself is a step away from a social consent towards violence is "trasformismo", the cooptation of the leaders of the subordinate classes (Fatton 1984), which Gramsci, too, called "corruzione-frode"/corruption-fraud (Gramsci Q13 §37/1638). This

trasformismo has been analyzed by Galtung in his analysis of imperialist strategies (Galtung 1971).

The third possibility Italy experienced during Gramsci's writing in prison: Caesarism.

“Caesarism can be said to express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic manner; that is to say, they balance each other in such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 219 / GT-18)

A third intervening party into the balance of power can act restorative or progressive, a development which can “...in the last analysis, be reconstructed only through concrete history, and not by means of any sociological rule of thumb.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 219 / GT-19)¹³ It depends if the intervening force finally supports the regressive or progressive social forces, which again depends on the specific interests of this intervening power (Gramsci Q13 §23/1602). Gramsci calculates on the progressive side Caesar and Napoleon I, on the regressive side Napoleon III and Bismarck. However, Gramsci further qualifies, that the term is a polemic formula and there is not a single person needed to lead a Caesarist process. He claims that every form of a big coalition government is already a certain form of Caesarism. A broad coalition government must not be the bulwark against dictatorship but might lead straight to it (compare opposite the function of cyclical crisis in stabilizing a hegemony) and can antedate “a more pure and permanent form” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 220 / GT-20), in Italy's version Mussolini's rise to power. Here again, Gramsci's political focus comes into play. The reason for this unfinished revolution/restoration Gramsci finds mainly in the underdeveloped intellectual capabilities of the new social forces, which are not able to facilitate a new hegemony. This can have according to Gramsci two reasons: either social groups have not established yet the necessary organic intellectuals to lead a revolutionary development or the existing ruling structures, e.g. in form of political parties, have detached themselves from the supporting social forces (Gramsci Q13 §23/1602). Thus, Gramsci analyzes Italian fascism as the outcome of the weakness, not of the strength of Italian social forces. Fascist core forces recruited themselves out of the “leftovers” (Sereni 1998: 161), mainly the veterans and the petty bourgeoisie. They balanced under Mussolini's leadership the indecisive tension between the politicized industrial proletariat and land laborers on the one side and bourgeoisie and landlords on the other (Kebir 1991: 155-173). How could the workers' movement experience such a defeat after its initial strength and avant-garde role in the central European context? Gramsci continues by analyzing methods of revolution.

2.4.3 War of Manoeuvre and War of Position

In a situation of crises Gramsci analysis two key political strategies: “guerra di movimento” (war of manoeuvre) and “guerra di posizione” (war of position). He compares thereby the struggle of the Italian communists with the struggle of the Russian Bolsheviks and the different challenges they face.

A war of manoeuvre is the direct attempt to challenge the force of the ruling system by similar force. This includes the direct takeover of power as exercised by the Bolsheviks in the October

¹³ The translation “rule of thumb” sounds vaguer than the literal translation of “schema sociologico” as “sociological schematic”.

revolution by seizing the Winter Palace. However, this is just the final push of a possible war of manoeuvre. Escalating a war of manoeuvre includes general strikes, continuing by pickets, guerrilla activities, and battles. Thus, a war of manoeuvre includes all actions which are addressed to destroy or take over the elements of force in hand of an opposing alliance of a political project. Gramsci concludes, the war of position is efficient against ruling by similar means, i.e. if a society is ruled mainly by force, using counter-force to challenge this rule is necessary.

However, while this was sufficient for the Bolsheviks to seize power from the Tsarist regime during mass actions and finally from the interim government, it proved to be ineffective during the Biennio Rosso, the factory occupations and general strikes in the Italian north 1919/1920. Here, the war of position comes into play. Gramsci analyzes that while the war of manoeuvre might be effective to challenge the ruling governmental force, it is insufficient to tackle the surrounding institutions in the extended state. These institutions can generate enough resistance in a national population to bring the war of manoeuvre to a hold and finally to its failure. For the Russian revolution this was to no concern: “a country in which the structures of national life are embryonic and loose, and incapable of becoming ‘trenches or fortress’” (Gramsci and Hoare 1978: 236 / GT-21). As mentioned, meanwhile in Italy, a broad set of institutions of the extended state protected the bourgeois ruling.

“In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying – but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country.” (Gramsci and Hoare 1978: 238 / GT-22)

In such a situation, Gramsci analyzed, it is necessary to tackle these institutions first, either by tacking them over or by putting own institution against them and in the best case replacing them. Such a strategy thus has a broad field of engagement: from the development of organizations to integrate people to the development of alternative processes of political and economic interaction up to the development of a new, revolutionary culture and mindset. This gives already a hint on the double centrality of a war of position: while the war of manoeuvre has the single aim of taking over power from the current rulers, the institutions developed by the war of position not just help to take over power from the old rulers, but additionally are central for the establishment of a new sustainable hegemony. Thus, while a short-term military takeover might be possible via a war of manoeuvre, a war of position is necessary in any case to develop an extended state to support and protect the new state from a counter-revolution or its degeneration to a new form of domination by sheer force of the new power holders. This war of position is at the beginning a costly effort and makes it necessary to “organise permanently the ‘impossibility’ of internal disintegration – with controls of every kind, political, administrative, etc., reinforcement of the hegemonic ‘positions’ of the dominant group, etc.” (Gramsci and Hoare 1978: 239 / GT-23). However, the outcome is overall: “since in politics the ‘war of position’, once won, is decisive definitively” (Gramsci and Hoare 1978: 239 / GT-24).

2.5 Role of Violence in Crisis

In violent conflicts the decision for a war of manoeuvre has been taken and the interesting question is then, how it interacts with social developments as well as possible wars of position. We discussed above the double role of violence in a hegemony: coercive against hegemony-outsiders and shadow of coercion against -insiders. During the dynamics of a crisis, coercion becomes of an even more important issue in the struggle against opponents of a hegemony project. Furthermore, violence has a key role in the precarious situation of a balance stabilized by Caesarism. Combining these insights with results of current conflict studies and thus bridging the debates, it is possible to explore the profound influence of means of violence in a crisis situation. The following paragraphs are thereby just an attempt to outline possible links between the debates, while the empirical and grounding chapters should allow a more concrete generalization on the relation between social structures and violence.

2.5.1 Conflict and Violence

To start with, even though the normative aim of the discipline as well as of this research, the term peace will not be used analytically in this work. As analysed in peace and conflict studies (Jaberg 1999) and as will be seen later on in the empirical chapters, peace can be a treacherous term, as in the 21st century everybody agrees to aspire for peace, regardless of fundamental differences, covered up by the term. The above outlined concepts of hegemony and crisis are more helpful.

Therefore, the key term used in this research is conflict. The project follows the understanding, connecting to the discussion of crisis above, that conflicts are structural disparities of interests between at least two parties, resulting from differences in their positioning in social structures and interests (Bonacker and Imbusch 2006: 69). As with social development as a whole, regarding the analysis of conflicts, too, this research encompasses solely conflicts between groups of people, including international conflicts, but neglects inter- and intra-personal conflicts.

The previous sections discussed how conflicts can escalate to a crisis or de-escalate when suppressed or integrated into a hegemonic structure. Thus, the conduct of a conflict has to be differentiated from the conflict itself. This project uses the term struggle synonymous for the wider term of conflict conduct; and violent conflict for a struggle using means of violence to succeed in such a struggle. The development of these violent struggles will be labelled as conflict dynamics. In relation to the historical-materialist approach, we have thereby seen that a struggle does not necessarily destabilize a society. Cyclical conduct of conflicts can help to stabilize a society. Furthermore, in the long run, struggles are the main drivers of social development, already present in the use of dialectics as the base of the theoretical approach.

Thus, the research project traces throughout the following chapters which influence violence has on these struggles. Violence is thereby understood as the physical conduct or threat of physical conduct of violence against people. Although theoretically close to the works of Galtung and other authors of critical peace studies (Senghaas 1977), this research project does not use the notion of structural violence and tries to grasp social hierarchies with the outlined Gramscian terms focusing on an integrated understanding of social processes, including the conduct of violence, and historical structures, including the production structures of violence.

At the same time, it uses the notion of war in a limited way, too. As it will be shown, the understanding of civil war as the violent conduct of a dyadic conflict between two factions struggling for control over the government helps little in the analyzed conflict system. Thus, the research project focuses on a conflict *system*, where several social groups and hegemony projects struggle with each other, using strategies and tactics of violence.

Consequently, the core question regarding social configurations of conflict struggles is to ask: what is the link between the production of social structures, conflict, and violence? We know that there is a link between ideologically polarized societies, horizontally or vertically, and the outburst of physical violence. However, the causal direction is ambiguous. Some studies suggest that the existence of essentialist vertical divisions like religion or ethnicity lead to the outburst of physical violence (or at least raise its risk). Revolutionary studies highlight the role of horizontal divisions before the outbreak of revolutions. Vice versa, other studies put again, that organized violence or its assumed future conduct leads people to perceive a need of protection which can be acquired by subordinating themselves to the seemingly dominating conflict line and bandwagon with the “own” community, thereby collaterally polarizing societies (Kaldor 1999; Kaufman 2001). Furthermore, authors highlight that thus political conflicts can get instrumentalized for particular gains (Oberschall 2000). Thus, as both causality directions can be supported by empirical evidence, for conflict studies the question to address is twofold: the obvious and more straightforward question is to ask, how a society gets divided into the proclaimed conflict parties; the more difficult question to address is, how social patterns outside the immediate conflict configuration interact with the conflict configuration itself. For example: if cultural categories of ethnicity define the official conflict line, how do they interact with non-matching social group networks in economic terms?

2.5.2 Production of Violence

Current research highlights that the use of physical violence develops its own dynamics which put actors with violence capacities in a core position from where they influence social structures. What remains unclear is how sustainable these dynamics change social structures. Andreas’ Balkan analyses (2004a; b; 2005) show for example, that in Sarajevo it was possible to push back organized crime, a key factor during the civil war, after the peace process started; while in other areas of the Balkans organized crime prevailed and its proponents took over key ruling positions in post-war society. This suggests that the question cannot be answered by focusing on dynamics of physical violence alone but by merging them with questions on social configurations before, during, and after conflict struggles.

This issue has been addressed by debates in conflict studies regarding the economic demands in the production of violence. Jean and Rufin published an edited book, ‘*Économie des guerres civiles*’ (1996), and emphasized the key role of the economy of war in civil wars, outlining different forms of organization and requirements for the conduct of violence. A series of case studies in the volume support their argument that material constraints and possibilities matter in dynamics of conflicts.

A World Bank research group continued by examining with quantitative methods the relation between macroeconomic data and violence (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004b). They concluded that structural opportunities to stage a rebellion are essential, amongst other low level of alternative income opportunities and absent state forces

to militarily suppress a rebellion as positive incentives; the effects can be seen in regards to the start as well as the continuing of a violent conflict. Further research pointed out that different resource possibilities lead to different forms of rebellion: while “loot-able” resources as surface mining and drugs favor a rebellion as well as spoilers during peace processes, stationary resources as onshore oil resources need greater sophistication and thus organization, while offshore oil is beyond a rebel group’s reach altogether (Ross 2004). A series of critiques where responding, forming the ‘greed vs. grievance’-debate, which on the one hand highlighted the complexity of single cases over the econometric models (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003) and on the other hand criticized the modest reflection of neo-classical micro-economic assumptions of the rationally, self-centric deciding individual in a given global environment (Cramer 2002). Consequently, method triangulation has been used to understand in more details general links between the production of violence and the perpetration of violence.

Weinstein focused on organizational issues as transmission mechanisms between macro-economic features and rebel group developments: an organization based on short-term economic incentives for its recruits demands lower investments into internal and local external relations, provided that material resources are available in abundance; but the leadership will have serious troubles to sustain discipline and consequently is constraint in the implementation of strategic political aims of the leadership; while an organization based on social, long-term incentives allows a more coherent political agency, including a reduction of indiscriminate violence against civilians; in exchange for higher demands on rebel-civilian relations, in other words commitment and incentives for civilians to join or support the rebel movement (Weinstein 2007). Consequently, used force against civilians jeopardizes rebel-civilian relations and is difficult to countervail.

Meanwhile, next to these material and organizational structures in the organization of violence, the conduct of violence itself has an impact on the production of violence: in a life-threatening environment the role of force and protection are decisive factors in the choice to comply and cooperate with a conflict party, which has again an influence on recruitment and support structures as well as on the possibility to acquire combat-relevant intelligence. In other words, if one party is able to punish by force the support of another party, the barrier for people to join the opposing parties is high, which reduces the strategic-targeted possibilities of the opposing party, leading to more indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006) and in a spiral to increased search for protection and the mentioned bandwagon-strategies by local populations.

Finally, these elements together in connection to broader social structures including the global level can lead to a self-reproducing violence-based conflict system (Keen 1998; Andreas 2004b), producing forms of force-based rule outside the official state structure, including warlords (Leander 2003; Mehler 2003; Reno 2003; Schlichte 2004; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2006).

2.5.3 Perpetrators of Violence in Social Development

To analyse these conflict-specific agents and its connection to the broader social structures, Gramsci refers to the discussion on armed forces, which might offer limited insights into current violence agents, but the method of analysis can strengthen the research framework. He analysis Spain and differentiates it from „countries ... potentially Bonapartist” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 216 / GT-25), of which of course Italy under Mussolini was a prime example.

In Spain the lower ranks were passive and dispersed and thus they followed in general the orders of their generals. Thus the generals again could be used as an instrument by the state and the ruling social groups behind to retain the public order against rebelling social groups. As an instrument they were not able to project own interests as a social group, let alone an ideology, onto the society as a whole, which would replace the existing ideology of the ruling classes. Thus, the use of direct violence to restore order did not alter profoundly the overall structure and concept of society, even though the necessity to use the armed forces is an indicator of the poor integrative power of the hegemonic concept of the Spanish ruling class.

Meanwhile, in Italy, the strong integration between the official armed forces, which were based on conscription of the rank-and-file, and the active rural labourers after the experiences of WW1 kept the armed forces out of the social struggle in the crisis of the bourgeoisie state. An ordered intervention by the government on behalf of the ruling social groups might otherwise have risked a horizontal rupture between the generals and the rank-and-files. However, this kept the Italian crisis not more peaceful, on the contrary. The strongest opponents of social change at that time have been medium and big rural landowners. Different from the manufacturers, they had a smaller margin of possible compromise with their tenants and day-labourers and additionally they used to order rather than bargain, characteristic of the feudal relations of production. Opposition against them was thus double threatening, not just in an economic way but undermining their feudal right of superiority. With the armed forces neutralized and the tension in the countryside raising, they moved with own means of violence into the vacuum of force as a

“bureaucratic military class ..., by military means, stifles the ... movement in the countryside. In this struggle, it finds a certain political and ideological unification; it finds allies in the urban middle classes ... reinforced by students of rural origin now living in the towns; and it imposes its political methods on the upper classes, which are compelled to make numerous concessions to it, and to allow some legislation favorable to its interests. In short, continuing to maintain itself under arms amidst the general disarmament, and brandishing the danger of a civil war between its own troops and the regular, conscripted army if the ruling class shows too great an itch for resistance, it succeeds in permeating the State with its interests, up to a certain point, and in replacing a part of the leading personnel.”
(Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 216 / GT-26)

This is obviously a reference to the Fascist thugs which terrorized Italy before their takeover. The rural ruling classes allied with the urban petty bourgeoisie and its WW1 officer veterans. This development helps us to understand more intimately the potential relation between Caesarism and violence. In this case, a “military-bureaucratic” class develops, which is able to diffuse its own ideology onto a whole society, rather than just being an impartial arbitrator between two opposing alliances of social groups. Gramsci quotes the war minister of the Fascist regime, which elaborates that the Fascist army was able to extend its own authoritarian disciplinary system onto the whole Italian society (Gramsci Q13 §23/1611), i.e. a profound militarization of Italian society. Thus, rather than being an instrument of government, of the political society, direct violence becomes the basis of society as a whole.

While Gramsci used this question to discuss the Fascist development in Italy, it can be used to explore relations between the production of violence and the development of a society in every situation where violence is used to push a political agenda. It is thus just one historical

example and highlights the need to analyse the dialectic relation between the production of violence in the war of manoeuvre and struggles by wars of position.

2.5.4 Consequences of Violence Regarding Broader Social Developments

Thus, next to the influence of social structure on the production of violence and the perpetrators of violence, as a third point the consequences of violence on broader social developments have to be analyzed. On the material side conflict research shows that violent conflicts alter the economic structure of a society profoundly. The most obvious point is the reallocation of material capabilities to the industrial production of violence, i.e. weapons factories, allowances for recruits, etc. Furthermore, fiscal policies get adapted, transferring public economic and social investments into violence-related sectors (Gupta et al. 2004). Secondly, the short-term pressures outweigh concerns on long-term development on the supply side. Thus, protection and trust mechanisms on resource gathering get suspended and replaced by forced extractions. This includes looting, production, and trade of illegal goods and unsustainable natural resource extraction as broad scale logging and mining (Jean and Ruffin 1999 [1996]; Ross 2004). Combined with the destructive force of the conduct of violence, thirdly, on the outcome side we see a general decline of economic growth, reduced educational and vocational skills including brain drains, high public expenditures on the treatment of wounded veterans, etc. (FitzGerald 1987; Collier 1999; Arunatilake, Jayasuriya and Kelegama 2001; Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006; Bozzoli et al. 2008). Theories of 'creative destruction' (Sombart 1913), which regard war as a cleaning mechanism to overcome crusted societal structures and thus becomes an economically constructive process (Organski and Kugler 1977; Van Raemdonck and Diehl 1989), have become meanwhile a minority position in the debate.

On the ideological side, conflict literature addresses path dependences along the issue of polarized societies, in which identities are fortified during conflicts. They address above all the question, how the population adapts to conflict dynamics as insecurity, destroyed social institutions, etc. by following one of the conflict defining ideologies, thereby hiding multiple identities (Kaldor 1999; Kaufman 2001). This overlaps with questions on experienced injustice, war traumata, lost trust into social structures, and general information insecurity. Post-conflict research analyses possibilities to address these issues, for example through inter-religious dialogues, truth- and reconciliation commissions, peace zones and peace communication, etc. (Garcia 1989; Tuano 2005; Kaufman 2006; Neumann 2009).

This already leads to the issue political science post-conflict-reconstruction is concerned with most: the construction and reconstruction of institutions; in its simpler term nation-building. As mentioned before, leaving aside some researchers which have focused on inter-state wars, the current literature regards violent conflicts as a destructive process regarding institutions, too. This concerns different levels of institutions, from inter-individual institutions on a local level to broad governmental institutions on a national and international level. It is captured in the phrase of "failed states". Two qualifications have to be made. First, missing legal, governmental institutions do not mean that no alternative governance institutions would exist: traditional institutions, pseudo-traditional institutions, warlord-rule, etc. fill up the governmental void. This question has been addressed for example by the DFG Research Center 700 (Risse 2012). As will be seen later in this paper, hybrid private-government institutions are even more puzzling; because they challenge the implicit assumption of institution reconstruc-

tion that post-conflict institutions could be built on a tabula rasa (Boege et al. 2008). The analyzed conflict is a valuable example. Before turning now to deducted methodology and the analyzed violent conflict system, two cross-cutting issues have to be addressed: intellectuals and space in violent conflicts.

2.6 Cross-Cut I: Intellectuals – Organizers of Society

The paper already outlined that there exists a social relation between the production of ideas and further social production components, i.e. institutions and material base. The approach discusses the characteristics of ideas and above all its production by different social groups even further, central in Gramsci's prison notebook 12 and 13 (Gramsci Q12; Q13).

Gramsci differentiates the origin of production of ideas along its degree of specialization and its role in the overall production process. Thus he is able to solve the puzzle of acknowledging that every individual produces intellectual output on the one hand and the social need of "intellectuals" on the other:

"This means that, although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist. ... When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals" (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 9 / GT-27)

Thus, he argues, rather than differentiating people along their production of intellectual output (which leads to the elitist thinking, that some people are more intellectually able than others), it is their function of producing knowledge to organize society in the overall production process, which differentiates *intellectuals by profession* from other social groups.

2.6.1 Good Sense and Common Sense

Before we follow this argument and concentrate on intellectuals by profession as organizers of society as much as opposition to an existing hegemony, we will have a short look on the general activity of intellectual production.

With a progressively democratic development in mind, Gramsci was sceptical of the elitist conception of intellectualism in all spheres of intellectual production. He discussed this for example on the conception of high culture and popular culture. To be politically effective, "[t]he philosophy of praxis had two tasks to perform: to combat modern ideologies in their most refined form, in order to be able to constitute its own group of independent intellectuals; and to educate the popular masses, whose culture was medieval." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 392 / GT-28) As an institution, the Catholic Church has been the strongest to be able to combine high and popular culture. However, the Catholic hierarchy has been careful to keep distance between the two moments and rejected tendencies to bridge the distance between the cleric hierarchy and the people by parish priests and layman activists. Meanwhile, the aim of the philosophy of praxis has to be to bring these strata together in a dynamic way, i.e. "continually to raise new strata of the population to a higher cultural life" (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 397 / GT-29)

That is the reason why it is necessary for the philosophy of praxis to engage and be part of popular thinking in a dialectic way to comply with the above mentioned double task. The field

to work on is thereby the “senso comune”, the common sense. The common sense as the framework of thinking is the historical accumulation of past developments.

“Every philosophical current leaves behind it a sediment of ‘common sense’; this is the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not rigid and immobile but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 326 Footnote 5 / GT-30)

Thus, different than the perception of being conservative and related to the past, the common sense is highly flexible and above all the image of social development, as it is able to constantly incorporate new aspects and thus provides the traces of the organic development of a society.

Now, to develop the common sense it is necessary to reflect its development over past generations, which again is the function of philosophy: “Philosophy is criticism and the superseding of religion and ‘common sense’. In this sense it coincides with ‘good’ as opposed to ‘common’ sense.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 326 / GT-31) Good sense is another term for philosophy and both are defined by one key function: reflection. This reflection is not confined to a certain profession, but it is a task for every individual.

Taken together, common sense and good sense as framework of every-day thinking establish a conservative and revolutionary situation at the same time; not just in its internal relation between elements of past philosophies and the constant adaptation to new daily challenges, but at the same time in its relation with ruling or revolutionary hegemonies. A ruling hegemony necessarily clashes with the ambiguous sediments of the common sense, as tensions evolve between the unitary hegemonic conception of society and the inclusion of manifold present and past elements of the common sense. A hegemony is thus never able to completely penetrate the common sense of the masses and thus allows spheres of autonomy and opposition. At the same time, revolutionary movements have to struggle with similar problems: as the common sense incorporates elements of the present hegemony as further sediment, revolutionary movements can not establish their ideology in an opposing open space, but, too, have to constantly interact with this existing framework of thinking. The lever is the mentioned good sense, the activation of reflection on figures and procedures of the common sense as related to past hegemonies. Just then it is possible, that people emancipate themselves from elements of the past in an active way and are ready to take over new conceptions of thinking.

2.6.2 Production of Hegemony by Organic and Traditional Intellectuals

A whole group of people function thereby as coordinators between this complex common sense and the unitary hegemony of a current society, pushing people to comply with the later by taking over modes of thinking at least compatible if not identical with the existing ruling hegemony. Depending on their relation to the ruling social groups, Gramsci differentiates between organic and traditional intellectuals.

Organic intellectuals are products of the development of the current hegemony itself. During the establishment of this hegemony, new forms of intellectuals get produced, which are central to the overall production process. Examples are “the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 5 / GT-32) in a capitalist system. They get produced by the hegemony itself, i.e. by a capitalist defined schooling system, the exposure and interaction with the busi-

ness sphere, the solving of problems through the development of institutions; finally all activities in the organization and reproduction of the system. Gramsci mentions, that the ruling social group itself, i.e. in this case the capitalist manufacturer, has to have already some intellectual knowledge on organizing society, while the organic intellectuals differentiate into several disciplines, i.e. aspects of the ruling system: lawyers, economists, journalists, etc.

However, even though the development of these organic intellectuals is essential due to their specific knowledge for the specific hegemony, it does not start with a tabula rasa, neither. "Categories of intellectuals [are] already in existence and [...they...] seemed indeed to represent a historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 7 / GT-33)¹⁴. Gramsci mentions as the most typical examples of these *traditional intellectuals* in Italy the clerics of the Catholic Church. They fulfill key services in philosophy, morality, schooling, etc. They are intellectuals once bound to the hegemony of feudalism, but where able to survive the end of feudalism by transferring their services to the new rulers. Characteristic for this group of intellectuals is its distance to the ruling social group, which leads to a certain autonomy in their intellectual production as well as a "spirito di corpo", i.e. an internal group loyalty. This includes politicians: "Indeed it happens that many intellectuals think that they are the State, a belief which, given the magnitude of the category, occasionally has important consequences and leads to unpleasant complications for the fundamental economic group which really is the State." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 16 / GT-34) Means, of course, autonomy is not independence: traditional intellectuals are dependent on links to social groups to integrate into the overall production sphere, last but not least for material sufficiency.

Gramsci notices along the intellectuals of rural origin that traditional intellectuals have a further function and advantage over the organic intellectuals closely bound to their hegemonic ruling social group: they are able to put "into contact the peasant masses with the local and state administration ... because of this activity they have an important politico-social function, since professional mediation is difficult to separate from political." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 14 / GT-35), in other words they link common sense and hegemony. Thus, they help to integrate social groups into a national society, which are distant to the hegemonic social formation; in the Italian example the capitalist industrial production. Furthermore they present a visible target for possible individual progress and development for the rural lower classes: at least one of their sons could become an intellectual, "thus becoming a gentleman and raising the social level of the family" (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 14 / GT-36) as a whole. This double connection forces a strong bond between peasants and traditional intellectuals.

Gramsci observes that the production of intellectuals, organic as much as traditional, is not indiscriminate over all classes, even though a public school system might exist: the origin of intellectuals from specific social groups let conclude with a high probability its further specialization. In Italy, the rural bourgeoisie produces mainly state officials, while members of the urban bourgeoisie can be found mainly as technical intellectuals in industry. Due to the different production structures in the Italian north and south, a geographical component gets added to the differentiation of intellectuals.

¹⁴ Hoare/Smith use "categories of intellectuals" where the literal translation reads "social categories"; as Gramsci later on uses "categorie intellettuali" as well, Hoare/Smith's translation might just have tried to avoid confusion.

He then follows that while the function of social groups in the material production process is immediate (the entrepreneur which develops businesses, the worker who produces goods, the farmer who harvests fruit, etc.), the function of intellectuals is always mediated, controlling meta-processes which allow the functioning of the whole system: the bigger the distance between the specific material production process and the overall organization of society, the bigger the autonomy of the involved intellectuals.

In this detached sphere of general organization of society, Gramsci opens up the above mentioned distinction between civil society and political society, the first defined by its production of social consent, while the second is defined by its function of domination, i.e. the usage of force against opposition. This highlights the extension of intellectual roles in a society, which includes not just engineers and lawyers, professors and journalists, but politicians and bureaucrats, policemen and soldiers, “a great mass of functions which are not all justified by the social necessities of production, though they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 13 / GT-37)¹⁵ in sustaining the hegemonic system as such.

2.6.3 Role of Intellectual Revolutionaries

While a situation of hegemony reproduces constantly its relation between intellectuals and the overall production system, crises pose a special challenge to this relation. Gramsci discusses it along the role of the “modern prince”, i.e. the communist party in the revolutionary struggle. The key question is which relation does evolve between the intellectuals and the connected social groups.

Gramsci highlights that it is the task of revolutionary social groups on the one hand to attract traditional intellectuals to support their struggle and on the other to develop own organic intellectuals:

“Every new social organism (type of society) creates a new superstructure whose specialized representatives and standard-bearers (the intellectuals) can only be conceived as themselves being ‘new’ intellectuals who have come out of the new situation and are not a continuation of the preceding intellectual milieu.”
(Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 452-53 / GT-38)

The paradox is of course, that exactly these intellectuals are needed to organize the political cohesion of such a group. The understanding is again linked to a historical, dialectic development, where the party has to be in constant interaction with the social groups, so that the social groups form the party and the party activates the political participation of social groups. Gramsci is completely aware of the risks of detachment between intellectuals and social groups, i.e. in this case between the political party and its constituency. Thereby he divides the concerned relation in the constituent social group, the broad mass of party members, and the bureaucracy of the party. He prefigured the problems of socialist parties by naming the bureaucracy as the most conservative and thus most serious threat for the progressive relation between these parts of the movement: “if it ends up by constituting a compact body, which stands on its own and feels itself independent of the mass of members, the party ends up by

¹⁵ Hoare/Smith add “of functions” to Gramsci’s original version. In Gramsci’s passage “great mass” could as well refer to intellectuals, of who he was talking in the sentence before.

becoming anachronistic and at moments of acute crisis it is voided of its social content and left as though suspended in mid-air” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 211 / GT-39).

Thus he warns of a literal interpretation of Machiavelli’s “Principe”, considered as the role model of a successful political party:

“The modern prince ... cannot be a real person, a concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognised and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already provided this organism, and it is the political party – the first cell in which there come together germs of a collective will tending to become universal and total.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 129 / GT-40)

Gramsci hints to the dialectic relation between the party and the collective will of the people, in which the party is the expression of this evolving will of which “the modern Prince is at one and the same time the organizer and the active, operative expression” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 133 / GT-41). He warns that in a modern society the trust in a single person to act as such a prince is dangerous, as it destroys the critical sense, necessary for a progressive development (cp. the discussion on Caesarism above). He highlighted these developments in his direct opponents, Mussolini and Hitler, but probably figured the developments in Russia under Stalin similar.

This connects us to the role of political actors in violent conflicts in the Global South after WW2. Early anti-colonial movements of the 20th century have mostly been supported and conducted by urban social groups, organized in state-bureaucracies including the military and the few industrial complexes (Fanon 1981 [1961]; Schmidinger 2004), thus by a minority, leading to elitist or militarized states after a successful anti-colonial struggle. There is further empirical evidence, that while revolutionary in name, old elites were successful in dividing their resources to bet on several conflict parties at the same time, thus ending up in either outcome on the winner’s side, for example in the Philippines or in Laos. As grassroots alternatives can be considered Maoist revolts in Southeast and East Asia as well as Islamist movements in the Middle East and Central, South and Southeast Asia. The key Maoist tactic copied in several conflicts is the protracted war, based on the rural masses and conducted out of the country side, taking over the cities just after the complete control of the rural area (Guerrero 1970). Meanwhile, working with the urbanized rural poor, the religious groups established alternative social institutions, challenging the governmental top-down-approach.

Coming back to the original discussion of the existence of intellectuals as a profession, but not of non-intellectuals, Gramsci concludes his discussion with an emancipatory understanding of social development regarding intellectuals. The task of

“creating a new stratum of intellectuals consists therefore in the critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in everyone at a certain degree of development, modifying its relationship with the muscular-nervous effort towards a new equilibrium, and ensuring that the muscular-nervous effort itself ... which is perpetually innovating the physical and social world, becomes the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world. ... In the modern world, technical education, closely bound to industrial labour even at the most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the new type of intellectual.” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 9 / GT-42)

What Gramsci has in mind is a new form of “active participation in practical life” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 10 / GT-43), i.e. a more organic link between intellectual and material activity, overcoming the traditional division between intellectuals and economic producers. Similar attempts can be found in the curricula of socialist countries, which obliged students to participate in industrial and rural activities. New forms in the material world support such a development, as the increasing permeation of technology forces this closer relation between intellectual and manual activity anyway. In this last picture, however, he has again the industrialized Italian north in mind, and less the still feudal-agrarian south. This spatial question will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Combining insights into hegemony and political organizations, this research will use the term hegemony *project*, if the inter-subjective development of hegemonic structures should be noted; hegemony *movement* will be used if the focus is on the involved people; hegemony *leadership* encompasses the intellectuals, whose main function is the development of a hegemony project and is therefore synonymous with hegemony *intellectuals*; and hegemony *constituency* encompasses the potential social groups integrated in the explanation of a hegemony project.

2.7 Cross-Cut II: Space – Segregation and Integration

Space is a key element in the work of Gramsci and the debates of International Political Economy, with differences on scale and explicitness of its treatment. We can differentiate it along the directions of its influence.

2.7.1 External Influence: Passive Revolutions in Italy and Africa

The first direction of spatial influence is of outside influence into a national development. Gramsci and following scholars used hereby the term of passive revolution, which we already discussed above: a decisive change of social structures, however, blocked in its full development by restoring the previous social hierarchy. One mode of passive revolution is thereby the integration of leaders of possible revolutionary social groups into the old hegemony. However, we said little on the reasons of such a development. It is just possible if the intellectuals of a potential revolutionary social group get detached from the latter. This again is highly likely, when the development of a society gets changed by external influences, rather than an internal organic development.

Gramsci discussed it by comparing social developments in the US and Italy after the integration of “Fordism” in factories in the Italian north, i.e. industrial production structures originating from the US. He notices, that even though material structures were thus similar between the two countries (leave aside the Italian south), however, their cultural and institutional settings were characteristically different. He concludes that while the US established a society based on immigrants and little pre-existing institutions, the Italian industrial developments were initialized by outside invention, which had to cope with existing social structures in the peninsula, overcoming

“‘intellectual’ and ‘moral’ resistance, and [therefore, S.S.] takes place in particularly brutal and insidious forms, and by means of the most extreme coercion. ... European ‘tradition’, European ‘civilisation’, is ... characterised precisely by the ex-

istence of such classes, created by the 'richness' and 'complexity' of past history. This past history has left behind a heap of passive sedimentations produced by the phenomenon of the saturation and fossilisation of civil-service personnel and intellectuals, of clergy and landowners, piratical commerce and the professional (and later conscript, but for the officers always professional) army." (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 281 / GT-44)

The key point is thus, that an outside intervention, in this case via innovations in the sphere of industrial production, leads to struggles between social groups and necessarily to a different outcome than these innovations had in the society of origin. In the Italian case, the national society and its new shape due to the industrial developments had still to integrate "old" classes, the land owners, the clerics, the state bureaucracy, etc. The consequences could be felt not just in material structures, for example the continuing alimentation of these social groups out of the industrial production profits, but as much in the continuing influence of Catholic philosophy or the institutional challenges of the Italian state towards the passivity of the Italian south and the Papal state.

A second point of reference for Gramsci is the distance between Italian intellectuals and the Italian nation. Their attachment to French philosophy and their understanding of themselves as cosmopolitans rather than Italians prevents a strong connection.

"in Italy the intellectuals are far from the people, i.e. from the nation and are meanwhile bound to a tradition of caste, which has never been destroyed by a strong popular or national political movement from below: the tradition is libertarian and abstract and the modern type of intellectual feels himself more bound to Annibal Caro or Ippolito Pindemonte than to a farmer from Puglia or Sicily. What does the fact that the Italian people prefer reading foreign writers? Means that they take over the intellectual and moral hegemony of these foreign intellectuals than to their compatriots, i.e. that there does not exist in the country an intellectual and moral national block, not a hierarchical and even less an egalitarian." (Gramsci Q21 §5/2116 o.t. / GT-45)

Gramsci saw the problem in the detachment of the intellectuals from the concerns and developments of the subalterns of Italy, rather than in a missing nationalism by the people, as for example complained by fascist propaganda. Gramsci blames the liberals to have neglected their historical role in developing a national philosophy to satisfy the demands of the people and modernize the Italian state. Accordingly, there develops

„the most striking paradox of many monopolistic tendencies of nationalistic and repressive character: that while constructing great plans of hegemony, not being aware of being the object of external hegemonies; ... they confine themselves in nationalistic exaltation for not feeling the weight of the hegemony of which they dependent and by which they are oppressed.“ (Gramsci Q23 §57/2253 o.t. / GT-46)

Thereby it is necessary to highlight, that this analysis of external intervention is not normative as such. Non-organic developments pose a challenge for societies, as they bring local structures into imbalance which leads to necessities of adaptations and in the worst case to an increased use of direct violence. However, they, too, might initiate changes in a society, which is stuck in a blocked status. They might therefore have the same consequences as Caesarism, by handling a situation in which local social groups stand against each other in a trapped "catastrophic" situation. Of course, this Caesarist intervention comes with its own price and

challenges. Abrahamsen follows democratisation attempts on the African continent in a cooperative effort by local forces and international institutions (Abrahamsen 1997). She challenges the “dichotomy between internal and external causes of democracy” (Abrahamsen 1997: 130) She follows Cox that the global configuration conditions national structures, however highlights that the relation is bidirectional. Thus she rejects the implicit idea of world system theorists, that the periphery is a helpless victim of global developments. Even slave trade and colonialism “did not only happen to Africa, it was also used and given definition by Africans themselves” (Abrahamsen 1997: 140). Meanwhile there are few doubts on the structural consequences of international influences up until today. Abrahamsen mentions above all the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s, which led in consequence to protests in several countries. She argues, that SAPs again were consequences of conservative turns in Western countries, pushing international organizations “from Keynesian development economics to neo-liberalism” after “[t]he Reagan Administration criticised the Bank for promoting socialism and undermining capitalist development” (Abrahamsen 1997: 145). Thus, if international institutions propagate “good governance” in the 1990s, it is necessary to put them into context and analyse corresponding interests. Thus, there might be diverging interests between the push for government reform by international institutions on the one hand and local protesters on the other. Furthermore, as elites have been closely incorporated into the global system – compare Gramsci’s analysis of *trasformismo* – African lower classes’ protests have the same problem as the protests of Italian land labourers in the south: the lack of political leadership; and thus can not extend over

“‘anarchic’ turbulence’, as sporadic rioting, looting, and delinquency, deprived of clear theoretical consciousness and a sense of an overall political purpose. It is thus important to note that the concept of the passive revolution does not so much stress the essential passivity of the masses, but rather their inability to challenge their energies in ways which can prevent a decisive compromise between elites.” (Abrahamsen 1997: 150)

However, liberal hegemonic ideology remains an ambiguous moment in this passive revolution. It is of course a tool of pretending to unite diverging interests of different social groups and hiding at the same the elite-masses-gap in developing countries strongly connected to international policy programs. On the other hand, this liberal idea is not just false conscious, but becomes in its obvious tension with local situations a “fertile ground for counter-hegemonic ideas” (Abrahamsen 1997: 150) and aspirations.

Taken together, integrations of space via passive revolutions restore the power of former hegemonically ruling social groups. However, a passive revolution is always a precarious situation with an inherent element of crises and thus presenting pressure points for counter-hegemonic struggles.

2.7.2 Outside Projection: Pax Britannica and Pax Americana

Projections towards the outside find few mentioning in Gramsci’s works, but they are a key element in Cox’ work on world orders. He analyzes mainly two developments: the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana.

The Pax Britannica developed out of the City of London. The British hegemony developed its characteristics in the three components of social structures: expansive capitalism based on the

role of manufacturers combined with the sea power of the British navy; liberal norms including free trade, gold standard and free movement of capital and persons together with the “spread of British prestige” based on the theory of a harmony of interests between all parts of society; and while

“there were no formal international institutions, the ideological separation of economics from politics meant that the City could appear as administrator and regulator according to these universal rules, with British sea power remaining in the background as potential enforcer.” (Cox 1981: 140).

The theory of harmony of interests meant thereby that pursuing one’s own interest coincides with the interest of society and vice versa. E.H. Carr, however, elaborates in detail, how this hegemony declined due to increasing economic competition between states and a shift in liberal theory versus social Darwinism, which led finally to the catastrophes of two world wars (Carr 2001 [1940]) and to the end of the Pax Britannica, while Cox mentions the material decline of the British empire compared to the US and Germany, the rise of protectionism and the League of Nations replacing the City of London (Cox 1981: 140).

Meanwhile, the Pax Americana got established after World War II, in an attempt to contain the influence of the USSR. Cox follows again the components of social structures and identifies the strength of US corporations, a “revised liberalism of Bretton Woods” and formal institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and NATO.

Cox titles the more generalizing paragraphs with “Internationalization of the State”:

“such an internationalised policy process presupposed a power structure, one in which central agencies of the US government were in a dominant position. But it was not necessarily an entirely hierarchical power structure with lines of force running exclusively from the top down, nor was it one in which the units of interaction were whole nation states. It was a power structure seeking to maintain consensus through bargaining and one in which the bargaining units were fragments of states. The power behind the negotiation was tacitly taken into account by the parties.” (Cox 1981: 145)

He furthermore elaborates, that internationalization did not just have consequences for the international orders, but for the internal organization of states as well, favouring institutions as the ministries of finance and the prime minister offices, as much as export oriented industries and direct investment institutions in the economic sphere. This again had consequences for class structures, dividing manufacturers and workers in export-oriented and domestic-focused industries. (Cox 1981: 146-8) Cox thus establishes a relation between three levels: social forces, forms of state and world orders (Cox 1981: 138), influencing each other. However, critical is thereby, that even though an interrelation is mentioned, this interrelation gets tricky when applied to a global society: arguing a harmony between these three components to form a hegemony, it hides, that the establishment of the Pax Britannica was different for the social groups in England and the social groups in the Ceylon colony, as much as forms of state were different in Westminster and the African colonies.

2.7.3 Diffusion and Integration of Space

Thus, the last, most complex spatial issue is the diffusion of social structures over previously distinct spaces, in other words the integration of spaces into a new common space, as much as the segregation of spaces from a previously common space.

For Gramsci, the key development to discuss is the integration of the Italian nation after the process of Garibaldi's military unification. As outlined above, the Italian peninsula was socially divided between an industrialized north and a rural-agrarian south. The northern part was characterized by the main struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat, with moderate influence of urban petty bourgeoisie and moral guidance by traditional intellectuals out of Catholicism. Local state institutions form a field of struggle, where intellectuals of the urban petty bourgeoisie bound to these social groups struggle for influence. Meanwhile, the southern part is characterized by large landowners and peasants, but above all by an intermediary social group, which Gramsci calls rural bourgeoisie. They are small landowners, renting out farms to peasants, which allow this rural bourgeoisie a modest living. Their income got invested either into consumption, savings in national banks, which again invested in the northern industry, and above all into the education of sons and daughters to integrate them into the state bureaucracy or the Catholic Church. Thus, while an economic dependence existed on behalf of the peasants to the land owners, the latter provided little economic incentives or political "leadership", but based their rule over the peasantry on economic rent extraction and political domination. As they formed big part of state officials, the state in the south was not a field of struggle, but the instrument of the rural bourgeoisie which allowed them to implement their private interest, i.e. the securing of their rent by policing activities of the state.

This spatial division between north and south cross-cut the classic socialist concept of division and social struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat and opened up a whole new series of political options for all social groups involved:

"bourgeois democracy ... had to choose: either a rural democracy, i.e. an alliance with the Southern peasants, a policy of free trade, universal suffrage, administrative decentralization and low prices for industrial products; or a capitalist/worker industrial bloc, without universal suffrage, with tariff barriers, with the maintenance of a highly centralized State (the expression of bourgeois dominion over the peasants, especially in the South and the Islands), and with a reformist policy on wages and trade union freedoms." (Gramsci 1978 [1926] / GT-47)

Here it is clear again, that by introducing the spatial element of the north-south-question, the political struggle changes profoundly with consequences for the theoretical conception: in a dyadic struggle bourgeoisie vs. proletariat, cooperative interests and universal interests are rather similar, leave aside the question on how to dissolve the bourgeois individuals after the revolution into the social group of proletariat.¹⁶ However, by integrating the southern social group into the national struggle for power, cooperative interests and universal interests become profoundly distinct and if the proletariat should become the leader of a new hegemony,

¹⁶ Here is the right point to note that during all the Italian socialist debates, the discussion was never on an annihilation of the individuals of the antagonistic social group, but always just the dissolution as a collective actor and the diffusion of individuals into new social structures.

it has to overcome its cooperative interests in favour of universal interests: the main argument of Gramsci's spatial discussion. Thereby, the task is a double one: to fight against the prejudices of the northern proletariat, prepare them for an alliance with the southern peasants and prevent northern bourgeoisie-proletariat "parasitic" compromises to the disadvantage of the southern peasants, and to detach the dispersed and fragmented peasants of the south from the leadership of the rural bourgeoisie in favour of organic, pro-peasant intellectuals, which can lead the peasants into an alliance with the northern proletariat.

To summarize it in conceptual terms we can see the following elements: moving alliances between different, spatially separated social groups; different functions of northern and southern social groups in the overall social system; different relations between the state and the different subaltern social groups; and last but not least a fragmented national ideology. The spatial relations are of profound political character and so are questions of deeper integration of these spaces to a national society. Vice versa, Gramsci highlights that while these spatial relations have to be analyzed to understand the development of the nation, i.e. the overall social space, as a whole, they have profound influences on the struggle in the distinct spaces as well. Thus, unconnected progressive strategies for each space as such will fail in the overall society: short term advantages for the workers on the backs of the southern peasants will result in a deepening division and the possibility for the bourgeoisie to use the peasants of the south in army units against the workers, while a simple agrarian reform on land division in the south will fail without integrating questions on the availability of northern industrial farming tools and loans to overcome the seasonal threats of agriculture.

Thus, throughout Gramsci's writings, there was no doubt that the dispersed spaces of the peninsula all belonged to the same national space and the question was always on *how* to integrate them and never on *if* to integrate them; questions posed until today regarding global integration. Furthermore, different than the two previously discussed sections, we see here integration between different, but not necessarily hierarchic spaces, which allows us a more open approach to global integration than the core-periphery discussions with a western focus. Nonetheless this integrative approach, two ambiguous points remain thereby.

2.7.4 Space and Violence

The next paragraphs will have a look at insights from conflict studies into the relation between space and violence. Early on it was already recognized that, even though characterized as internal conflicts, most current violent conflicts do not exist in a vacuum and thus researchers introduced an inside and an outside: conflicts get affected by the outside via foreign governmental or diaspora support of conflicting parties in diplomatic, material, and technical terms (Byman et al. 2001). Furthermore international organizations interfere either on one of the sides, on their own side, or facilitate developments as mediators; sometimes combining all three. Aid and developmental support might be essential to support the local society and post-conflict rebuilding (Collier and Hoeffler 2004a; Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward 2005); on the other hand, these means might have a conflict-prolonging effect (Collier 2005). Upside-down, internal conflict developments affect other countries: as civil war spillovers (Murdoch and Sandler 2004) or as breeding-ground for international terrorists (Rotberg 2002), thus influencing global developments as tightened security measures, higher trade costs, diverted tourism

flows, etc. (Brück 2006) Just slowly space-related research brakes up the internal-external dichotomy by highlighting conflict-internal differences.

Focusing on the local level, recent research analyzed the relation between space and violence conduction, based on improved availability of event data with geographic information in connection to violence. It is the necessary consequence of quantitative research when conflict studies leave the national level and turn to “local or substate level[s]” (Chojnacki et al. 2012: 397). This data can enrich discussions we mentioned before, for example regarding the availability of natural resources in a local area as a factor for and in violent conflicts. Furthermore, tactics of violence can be investigated quantitatively. Kalyvas (Kalyvas 2006), for example, analyzes the “Logic of Violence in Civil Wars” based on its geographic distance to strongholds of one or the other conflict party, stating that incidences of indiscriminate violence against civilians is highest where parties have little information for selective violence but still enough influence to carry out violent activities, i.e. that means in the neighborhood of the opposing party’s stronghold.

Next to global-local and territorial questions, important for this project is the question on transnational developments, too. While the nation-state system continues to be effective, it gets altered by developments subverting its clear-cut shape, by the International Criminal Court as much as by global organized crime or transnational concepts of civilizations; thus diffusing even in geographical notions question of inside and outside.

Last but not least on this level, what is known about the relation between analyzed conflicts and their situation on the periphery of a global socioeconomic system? We know from quantitative studies, that conflicts of the last decades took place by a far margin out of OECD-countries, leaving aside the nationalist conflicts following the scrambling of the socialist systems in Eastern Europe and some fading long-term conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Basque country (Chojnacki 2006). This suggests a relation between the conflicts and the global position of the affected areas. However, while anti-colonialism and proxy-war-theory offered explanations until the late 1980s, the enduring conduct of war at the periphery puzzles. The essentialist school around Huntington has argued that currently the *true* local vertical conflict lines show up as they do not get concealed by the bipolar system anymore. As discussed elsewhere this is theoretically, empirically and politically unconvincing (Sottas 2006). The Weltgesellschaftsansatz (Jung, Schlichte and Siegelberg 2003), strongly borrowing from Weber, meanwhile states, that these conflicts are temporary resistance conflicts against the development of a global liberal system, steaming from traditional forces, and thus necessarily to be overcome in a capitalist-rationally regulated society . Both approaches are quite deterministic in their expected outcome: eternal clashes of civilizations in the first, liberal peace in the second version. Questioning the predetermining assumptions of both approaches, a more open approach is favored. Questions on the specific, functional role of these areas and their conflicts in a global system should be asked (Loomba 1998), instead of discussing them as disturbances of an in general more peaceful because more rationally-regulated liberalism. While theories on neo-colonialism point at continuing needs of economic zones of cheap natural resource extraction and, in cultural terms, of the existence of the oriental other to certify one’s own chooseness (Williams and Chrisman 1994; Stevenson 1998), research on imperialism has highlighted the collaborating role of elites of center and periphery in reproducing the system (Galtung 1971).

2.7.5 Voids I: Changing Space and the Periphery

Although extensive knowledge from these debates, serious shortcomings in the understanding of relations between current violent conflicts and space remain. One is the assumed *given* existence of a national space. Gramsci's Italian nation state already existed formally and was never questioned by Gramsci as such. On the other hand, his understanding was not of a static nation state; that the historic development leads to a nation becoming is a core element of his works; including the development of national institutions. From this ambiguity, three critical topics for this study can be deducted: the boundaries of conflict parties, the boundaries of a society, and the development of a global and regional transnational space transcending these boundaries.

The boundaries of conflict parties: other than generally assumed in news reporting about conflicts, conflicting social groups are never a given or a fixed unit. This assumption of differentiable conflict groups was a reasonable analytical category discussing inter-state wars – with its well criticized limits. However, turning the focus from fixed nation-states to intra-state wars or transnational conflicts, the definition of conflicting parties becomes itself a scientific discussion. Conflict parties have been divided along ethnic lines, geographic lines, class lines, religious lines, etc. Thereby several actors are again involved in this struggle for definition: the scientific community, political, military, and economic leaders and groups, legal institutions, and last but not least the ordinary people and their lives themselves. So the prominent post-modern critical point, that there exist no natural groups of people to be the basis of a definition of conflict parties as well as the highlighting of the influence of scientists in its formation is right. However, it is not a sufficient concept to explain the existence of bounded groups in violent conflicts at certain times and areas. Therefore it has to be explained how before and during a violent conflict parties are formed throughout a constant process of integration and segregation of people. Thereby we can separate analytically the formation of a conflict party as a constituency and in a narrow sense of a capable-of-acting group. The assumption of this work is that these two processes are strongly interrelated in a politico-economic sense. They might be supportive in some cases and antagonistic in others. We can borrow here from Gramsci on the development of social groups as well as intellectuals as much as from Cox on the development of social structures in general on the one hand and institutions as amalgams of social power relations in specific. Furthermore, information from the debate on ethno-political conflicts can help: the influence of myths, symbols, ideology, economic incentives, external labeling, forced integration, and search for protection (Kaufman 2001; Brubaker 2004; Gilley 2004).

With these questions in mind we proceed to another level: the discussion of societies/nations as a whole. While for Gramsci the nation-state was in constant making, its boundaries and central institutions as such were already existent, so the question was above all on its development. For an analysis of post-colonial nation-states this analysis of its development has to be extended to the establishment of the state itself. While it seems to be a rather small difference for the used approach with its sophisticated and flexible analysis of different aspects of state, it is of course a key change to the general assumption in political science of the existence of a state and, as well, a challenge to the state-institutions-bound concepts developed by Gramsci, so for example the notion on the extended state. However, the approach allows having a closer look on the relation between formal state institutions and further social

institutions in postcolonial environments. If we consider not the terms as such, but rather the characteristics and functions of them, Gramsci's concepts are still highly useful, so in this case the differentiation between institutions to command (the political society) and institutions to lead (the civil society).

The last point to mention here is the dissolution of space and geography in an increasingly transnational structure of global relations. All concepts discussed until now are strongly territorially bound, with spaces on different hierarchical levels, integrating each other. However, what we have to consider in the postcolonial world of the 21st century, are societies which dissolve the narrow relation between space and territory regarding two moments: migration and white spots.

Migration opens up relations between different spaces all over the globe, which are highly political influential, but transcend geographical borders. Conflict theory discusses this above all in regard to the influence of diasporas on local conflicts (Byman et al. 2001). However, more points have to be added: the war economy discussion as much as later on the new war theory bring global shadow structures into the picture: conflict networks, along with the production of violence, get integrated into the global economic system (Andreas 2004b). Finances by business and kinship get invested into the production of violence, by the provision of weaponry, training, and allowances. It results in the control of certain spaces, which are then able to develop to business opportunities: natural resources and internationally illegal goods with a high profit margin; i.e. diamonds, drugs, oil and gas, timber, wildlife, trafficking, and violence training (Ross 2004). The profits get than again internationalized through the smuggled export of mentioned productions and reach through money laundering the overall global economy (Kaldor 1999). Secondly, ideas migrate between spaces as well. Theories to explain social developments and policy advices including lessons learned are brought from one space to the other, via books, people and lately electronic means. Importantly, this integration of space is again no one-way lane. A dynamic relation develops between the space of origin and the space of destination, personified in the bearer of the information. Additionally, it triggers the development of new information in its destination and as most information these days is reciprocal, space moves closer together in an exponential way. Thirdly, new institutions develop out of these relations, not mediated any longer by the foreign affairs related departments of state institutions. These might be transnational NGOs and political groups as much as trade norms or the hawala system for cash transactions over space.

However, while integrating global spaces, bypassing the international sphere with its emphasis on borders and sovereignty, these spaces lead to new segregations as well: white spots. As soon as the narrow relation between territory and space has been given up in favour of more fluid global spaces, it is possible that geographic areas, which before have been by territorial definition part of a certain space, become now white spots on geographical maps, as the fluid spaces simply bypass or fly over these territories. Thus, while we are wearing the latest Italian fashion, eat Japanese Sushi, dance Latin American Salsa, all at a South African beach, certain areas in sub-Saharan Africa or Central Asia reach us only during charity shows on Christmas time, while for the rest of the year we can not make out any connections to these people living in the white spots of our global map. While these non-spaces are the consequence of the detachment of space and geography, it leads in its opposite to the annihilation of spaces in geographies claimed by other spaces: while we simply forget about the people in the white

spots, in other spots these people are obstacles for broader spaces claiming the territory. Indigenous people all over the globe can narrate the stories of displacement from sites rich in natural resources in favour of material gains by national and global enterprises, or other people tell stories of displacement from home territories and genocide in favour of ethnic homogeneity. Here, Gramsci and IPE provide not more than a broad heuristic framework and specific analysis is still needed.

2.7.6 Voids II: Ruling and Violence in the Periphery

This encompasses furthermore a main focus of this research project: the role of violence in social relations and obviously, too, in regard to the role of space in these relations out of historical materialist analysis. The challenge is to synthesize violence and consent approaches in a multifaceted spatial integration process between centre and peripheries as outlined in the previous section.

Current debates in International Political Economy focus on hegemonic elements of current social orders. Thus, the main question posed is, how do social structures support consent of the broad population to a capitalist system, which is based on a continuing social hierarchy. This has been an even more challenging question on the global level, where above all during the 1950s and 1960s the neo-realistic approach dominated scientific explanations. According to the latter, global order is defined by relative power capabilities of single states, measured in material indicators like GDP, nuclear warheads, tanks, etc. measured in comparison to other states; alliances are temporary and the core aim of states, defining their behaviour on the global stage, is survival in an insecure and potentially hostile environment (Waltz 1979). This stability-aiming approach, outcome of the insecure power-balance between the US and the USSR got challenged amongst others by Cox, which discussed global order as something historically developed; and with it the consent to its rules of games (Cox 1981). Consequently, his article has been reprinted in an edited book with several IR approaches challenging the dominance of the neo-realistic approach (Keohane 1986), opening the debate amongst others to liberal-rationalists (Moravcsik 1997) and liberal regime theory (Keohane 1984) as well as constructivist theories (Wendt 1992). Cox is able to integrate elements of these analyses, even though he stresses their shortcomings on analysing the historical development and change of structures. This part is, what puts Cox further than the until then singularly prominent IR progressive Immanuel Wallerstein (2000); in the latter's world system theory, he highlighted the hierarchical order between centre and periphery, however, in a rather static way with few hints on possible pressure points for political actions in the periphery.

The critique is now (Pasha 2005), that Cox' approach overemphasizes consent and neglects that outside the OECD-world, local governance as much as the implementation of global orders are strongly bound to the use of direct force. There are several approaches, trying to explain this strong reliance on violence: Marxist analyses use the notion of primitive accumulation and see the forceful detachment of rural peasants from their lands as another historic example of revolutionary change to capitalism, where the rural population loses their means of production and get consequently integrated as workers into the new capitalist system (Shilliam 2004). Meanwhile, liberals argue, that violence in the periphery is mainly the result of rejectionist fights by traditional forces against the introduction of modern, rational forms of governance (Siegelberg 1994). Critical Peace Research focused on structural violence imposed

on the periphery by the imperialist world order (Galtung 1971) and revolutionary violence to resist it (Dencik 1977). The most imminent discussion of violence, from a socio-psychiatric perspective, comes from Fanon, who in his "Wretched of the Earth" (Fanon 1981 [1961]) discusses different forms of violence: by the colonial master against dehumanized slaves, as individual hatred by the colonial master; as a system of governance based on the violent division and subjugation of the colonial slave by the colonial master; inter-tribal violence as diverted violence impulses of helpless desires of resistance against colonialism; then destructive violence by the slave against the master as a form of catharsis for individuals, thus "it frees the native from his inferiority complex and from despair and inaction"; and at the final moment violence as an instrument of collective action to overcome the colonial system and as such the genesis of a new nation state.

These accounts highlight the key role of direct violence at the periphery of the capitalist global order, in relation (sic!) to the latter, i.e. they have to be analyzed as part of the global order rather than another, distinct system. Thus, IPE shows a serious void in integrating direct violence, even though the approach as such seems to be fitting to carry out such an analysis.

Again we can return to Gramsci's original works and surprisingly find similarities to Fanon's descriptions on the role of violence, even though Gramsci focuses more strongly on feudal relations and the necessity of progress on political consciousness and organization for collective action. This he elaborates, mentioned above, on the one hand in regard to the rulings by landlords and rural bourgeoisie in the Italian south, which is defined by feudal domination rather than by capitalist exchange relations based on market bargains.

"The large landownership has remained outside of free competition and the modern State has respected the feudal essence, devising legal formulas, like the one of fideism, which de facto has extended the endowments and privileges of the feudal regime. ... The farmer always lived outside the dominion of the law, without judicial personality, without moral individuality: remained an anarchic element, the atom independent from the chaotic turmoil, constraint just by fear from police and devil." (Gramsci 1995[1919]: 92-93 o.t. / GT-48)

Thus, direct violence by local administrators as much as by policing government institutions guarantees the compliance of the peasants. Their reaction meanwhile struggles with the limits of missing consciousness of presenting a collective group; they act as individuals bound to the soil as much as to the master as the owner of the soil:

"The mentality of the peasant has therefore remained that of the serf of the soil, who turns violently against the 'gentlemen' on certain occasions, but is unable to think of himself as a member of a collective (the nation for the owners and the class for the proletarians) and to perform a systematic and permanent activity towards changing the economic and political relations of social life. The psychology of the peasants was, under these conditions, uncontrollable; the real feelings remained hidden, confused and involved in a system of defence against exploitation, purely selfish, without logical continuity, materialized largely in sneaking and pretended servility. The class struggle is mingled with banditry, with blackmail, with the burning of the forests, with the "sgarrettamento", the bloody killing of opponent's livestock, with the abduction of children and women, with the assault on the town hall: a form of basic terrorism, without sustainable and effective consequences." (Gramsci 1995[1919]: 92-93 o.t. / GT-49)

The peasants' violent reactions resemble thereby the individualist actions in the colonies, described by Fanon, in the stage before becoming a collective action to overthrow the colonial system as such. Thus, we can see that violence outside the capitalist core is not just used at a different ratio between consent and violence. Violence plays a qualitatively different role in a different socio-political system, which still is bound via various linkages to the capitalist core. These qualitative differences in the global hegemony have to be explored.

2.8 Methods

These theoretical insights have now to be translated into a methodology to carry out an empirical analysis of the conflict system in Minsupala. As outlined in chapter one, I have done this by a three-dimensional approach: a comparison of hegemony projects in relation to social structures and political processes.

2.8.1 Comparative Analysis Along Inductively Derived Categories

According to an overview on the gathered empirical data in combination with the research question, a heuristic differentiation between the following hegemony projects in Minsupala can be made:

- *LP-PC*: Liberal Philippine (neo/Post-)Colonial Hegemony Project
- *NL-AC*: National Liberal Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project
- *NR-AC*: National Religious Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project
- *ST-AC*: Socialist-Tri-People Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project
- *NP-CH*: Non-Project in a Crisis of Hegemony

The complex terms are highlighting that all projects are connectable to broad historical developments on a regional and global level, empirically as well as analytically; however, showing local specifics, which prevent a sharp differentiation of the hegemony projects from one another.

In the first project phase the four hegemony projects have been identified along their primary institutional molding (Republic of the Philippines/RP, Moro National Liberation Front/MNLF, Moro Islamic Liberation Front/MILF, Moro Revolutionary Organization/MRO). In depth empirical work, however, showed, that this identification is misleading, above all between MNLF and MILF, which showed different assignments depending on the historical point of time (above all at the end of the 1960s, when both hegemony projects, NL-AC and NR-AC have been represented by the MNLF altogether).

A multi-perspective understanding of these hegemony projects as much as their relation to the Minsupala social system as a whole should be the result of the following three chapters. Their description is based on a differentiation along the other two dimensions, i.e. the relation of these hegemony projects (a) to historical structures as much as (b) to political processes which will lead in the end to a comprehensive picture which enables to address the commonalities and differences in regard to these dimensions. It is thereby possible, to analyze these hegemony projects in a comparative manner which will be the main focus of chapter five, the last and summarizing empirical chapter.

In the component of the material base, we trace relations between different social groups and categorize relations if they are primarily non-violent related or violent-related. Violent-related relations can encompass relations which either contain goods necessary for the production of violence or goods which get transferred under the use or threat of violence. Non-violence related relations encompass all other material relations, which are just indirectly usable for the production of violence. In the component of social ideas, we follow the flow of ideas, grouped along the five analytical categories of hegemony projects, i.e. NL-AC, NR-AC, LP-PC, ST-AC, and NP-CH. It is thereby necessary to analyze the direction of information flows, reciprocal relations in the production of information as well as the channels of information exchange. The components of institutions have been divided in relations of a) memberships in institutions; b) legal equi-level relations, e.g. bilateral treaties; c) legal subordinated relations, e.g. the president under the constitution; d) elective relations, e.g. the population and the president; e) informal/unwritten relations, which however, might have a legal character, as the non-codified traditional adat law. Out of these relations follow different kinds of institutions: formal organizations with the subgroup of military organizations, informal organizations, and legal frameworks. Finally, in networks of violence, the differentiation of relations has been made between violent activities against each other and support in violent activities against third parties.

As the networks are too complex to scaling them down to include them into the paragraphs of the following chapter, all networks as well as a graphic legend of the differentiations outlined above, can be found in annex F.

2.8.3 Conflict Processes: Agency-Oriented Structural Change

In a second approach conflict processes will be traced: Not one overall conflict history will be shown, but the conflict processes have been traced along the single hegemony projects. Thereby the project will add to the “objectified” structures of the first part in chapter three an agency oriented second part in chapter four, which allows a research focus above all on collective action and the political production of hegemony projects. As mentioned already in the first chapter, this project understands under process tracing a multi-perspective view on actor-oriented histories, which gain explanatory power by the confrontation of different angles of historical processes. This differentiates it from the more common understanding of process tracing as the description of cause-and-effect-mechanisms from a historic point A to a historic point B.

For both chapters, the following table outlines the time spans. The span ranges have been made according to the pre-analysis; as an empirical-analytical tool, their margins are fluid. The table shows that I do not intend to write a history of Mindanao. I will deliberately leave the years before WW2 to historians and regard it just insofar, as it plays a role in current political arguments. According to the outlined theory, all of our past has traces in the present and can influence current developments. However, a differentiation has to be made between an awareness of history on the one hand and the focus on histories analyzed in centuries and millenniums as the explanation for current developments. The latter has more often than not the intention of developing myths, supporting current political developments (Anderson 2006). In this understanding, histories will be analyzed in this project: the centuries before the

present as base for current historical structures, but at the same time above all as mythical bases for the different hegemony projects.

| <i>HP</i> <i>Time Spans</i> | Pre-Independence | Pre-Martial Law | Martial-Law I: War Years | Martial-Law II: Post-Tripoli | People-Power | New Millennium |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| YEARS | < 1935/46 | 1935/46-1970 | 1971-1976 | 1977-1985 | 1986-2001 | > 2001 |
| LP-PC | Mythical past | Independence and Unity | New Society and Resistance | Anti-revolutionary re-integration | Liberal-democratic revolution | Oligarchs, Terror & Democracy |
| NL-AC | Mythical past | Development & opposition | Freedom Fighters | Betrayed peace | New Democracy – new Chance? | Second failing of peace and MNLF? |
| NR-AC | Mythical past | The Middle-Eastern Origins | Integration with the MNLF | A new MNFL: Islamic Liberation | Development of hegemony | Islamic Independence after 9/11 |
| ST-AC | Mythical past | HUK Rebellion Colonialization | CPP/NDF | Mindanao Commission | Factionalism | Civil Society |
| NP-CH | Mythical past | Collaboration | Support of violence | Defection and reintegration | Partial setbacks | Return to power |

Table 1: SIVC Time Spans

The following five time spans break current history up in roughly 15-years time periods, except from the eventful 1970s; adapted to key historical junctions. For the liberal-postcolonial project this is of course first of all independence, with all its constraints, followed by the martial law years, separated by the Marcos' regime peak in the mid-70s, the reinstatement of liberal-democracy in the 1980s, and finally the tumultuous present after the revolutionary Presidents Aquino and Ramos, with the governments of Estrada, Arroyo, and Aquino III. The national-liberal anti-colonial project developed in the later half of the pre-martial law period; they were the freedom fighters of the early war years, and continued this war after a failed peace process in the mid 1970s. The liberal-democrat revolution opened up a new window of opportunity, leading to the peace agreement of 1996; however, the new millennium saw the decline of the NL-AC project and the scrambling of its main institutional form, the MNLF. The national-religious anti-colonial project developed during the same time in the pre-Martial Law era, however, geographically mainly at universities in the Middle East. NR-AC proponents united with NL-AC proponents in the early war years, but left the MNLF body after the failed peace process and started their own political project. Returning in the mid-1980s, they developed themselves to be an alternative to the still leading nationalist-liberal movement and finally took over the revolutionary lead in the new millennium. The development of the socialist-tri-people movement was in its origins in Manila timely similar to the other projects, however, its effect in Minsupala was lagged for a short decade, as the first part of the 1970s it remained a

rather northern phenomena. However, at the end of the 1970s, the Maoist revolutionaries rose to become the most powerful anti-LP-PC movement in the Philippine south, and extended their influence into the weakened NR-AC/NL-AC regions. The scrambling after the liberal revolution however led to decreased influence and following factionalism. Currently, ST-AC proponents can mainly be found in civil society structures.

Summarized, the empirical part of the thesis will

1. start with a discussion of historical structures focused on Minsupala;
2. continue with a process analysis of the conflict dynamics differentiated along the four possible hegemony projects and one non-project structured by time-periods;
3. and conclude with a comparison of structural and process influences on the hegemony projects, using findings of 1 and 2.

Thus it can show the internal as well as external dynamics of the hegemony projects, base for generalizations which will be developed in the final two content chapters for a grounding of theory.

2.9 Data

To develop social networks and process descriptions, a data triangulation has been used, as no single type of data sources could offer enough information. The base has been the vast amount of insights from existing research projects. Newspaper articles have been used exceptionally, if there was no other information source available. Secondly, statistical data and legal documents augmented this knowledge base. Finally, expert interviews have been used to fill voids of information, but above all to position and contextualize the other information sources.

2.9.1 Analyses and Reports

The collection of publications for this research project encompasses around four hundred texts on the conflicts in this area (books, book sections, scientific articles, reports), of which three hundred and fifty have been quoted, to be found in the bibliography.

The first prime local historian is Cesar Majul, during the 1960s dean at the University of the Philippines (UP), whose book *Muslims in the Philippines* (Majul 1973) is regarded as the base of nationalist Moro history. A second distinguished UP historian is Samuel Tan, native of Sulu, who published a series of analysis on different aspects of Moro-Filipino relations throughout several decades of work (Tan 1977; 1993; 1995; 2008). Currently, regularly analyses come from Rudy Rodil, a Mindanao born son of northern settlers and professor at Mindanao State University (Rodil 1992; 2000; 2003; 2007; 2009) and De La Salle university professor Rizal Buendia (Buendia 1993; 2004; 2005; 2007). Investigative journalists Marites Dañguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria provided a broad set of detailed information in their book *“Under the crescent moon : rebellion in Mindanao”* (Vitug and Gloria 2000). Finally, Patrizio Abinales, Filipino scholar at major international universities, departed from the official conflict lines and searched for structural reasons underneath (Abinales 2000). All of these books and analyses are based on decades of working and engaging with the conflict lines in Mindanao.

From an external perspective, detailed conflict descriptions have been based on broad experience in conflict histories and long-term local research. The first distributed detailed analysis onto a global audience has been written by US-scholar Lela Garner Noble, who followed the development of the MNLF from its beginnings and is generally cited as reference (Noble 1976; 1981). Second reference is Thayil Jacob Sony George, Indian journalist, whose book "Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics" offers an early multi-perspective analysis (George 1980). Kadir Che Man, a scholar from Thailand and activist of and in the Thai south, produced ten years later a detailed comparison between the Thai struggle and the Moro struggle, providing further detailed information on the conflict background and involved political actors (Che Man 1990). Last but not least the most detailed anthropologist account comes from US-scholar Thomas McKenna, who after years of research into a local community in Cotabato City published "Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines" (McKenna 1998), complementing the conflict descriptions with a detailed ethnographic analysis of its dynamics in the supporting rank-and-file communities.

Third group of writers are political actors themselves, who published widely on the conflict and provide interesting, even though obviously partisan information. Nur Misuari, MNLF chairman, published several documents on the MNLF struggle, and spread his ideas furthermore via presentations throughout the globe (Misuari 1973; 1975; 2008). Abraham Iribani, MNLF's peace emissary, complemented his writings by a detailed account on the MNLF peace process (Iribani 2006). Meanwhile, on side of the MILF, chairman Salamat's ideas got presented in a MILF-edited book of his speeches and interviews (Salamat 2002), while the MILF mostly refers to his book "The Bangsamoro Mujahid: his objectives and responsibilities", soon to be republished. His background and a general analysis of his ideas can be found in "The Political Thought of Salamat Hashim" (Lingga 1995), a biography written by Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga. Lingga got presented to me as "the historian of the Moros", is member of the MILF-peace panel, executive director of the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, and regularly publisher and commentator (Lingga 2002; 2006a; b; 2007; 2008). Finally, a long term MILF information officer and peace panel member published under the pen-name Salah Jubair the inside story of the MILF development (Jubair 1999; 2007). The classic work on the ST-AC side is "Two Hills of the Same Land: Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem", written under the pen-name Rad Silva (1979). On part of the government, there are accounts of a former General (Abat 1994), describing the struggle of the Armed Forces in the 1970s and President Ramos published his "story of the GRP-MNLF peace negotiation" (Ramos 1996).

The broadest varieties provide several edited books of the last two decades. The first paraphrases the old settler-catchword: "Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise" (Turner, May and Turner 1992). This book traces socioeconomic, institutional and violence-related questions in Mindanao at the turn of the decade. An international-local cooperation has been "Accord: Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition" (Stankovitch and Carl 1999) published by London based Conciliation Resources, connecting conflict and the peace process of 1996, with a revision on peace developments four years later (Stankovitch and Carl 2003). "Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines" (Gaerlan and Stankovitch 2000) is published by the progressive Institute for Popular Democracy and has a strong focus on violence in connection with socioeconomic questions. A more pronounced internal reading of the conflict has been the aim of "Muslim perspective on the

Mindanao conflict: the road to peace and reconciliation” (Rasul 2003), published at the Asian Institute for Management and containing policy related analyses and recommendations. A voluminous account with a broad document appendix followed with “The Moro Reader: History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People” (Tuazon 2008b). It has been published by the Center for People Empowerment in Governance, based on the UP Campus Diliman, out of the irritation that “some of the modalities of crisis resolution being pushed either tended to obfuscate the fundamental issues or were driven by goals that made peace even less promising” (Tuazon 2008b: 11). The latest Philippine-wide account on armed groups is: “Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines” (Santos and Santos 2010b), funded by Geneva-based Small Arms Survey. It provides detailed histories of the major armed groups, governmental as well as non-governmental, and collected broad statistical data on violence-related questions.

While the above mentioned literature forms a strong base, it can be complemented with a variety of local and international analyses, published as single articles and reports in different forums. Publications have been included into the literature list, if they discussed the Mindanao conflict in more than just a side reference. For the overall majority, the conflict situation in the Moro areas has been the framework for the article, some extended the analysis either onto a regional scale (focusing on the relation with external actors) or onto the national scale (regarding questions of Filipino national development with impacts onto the Moro areas). As mentioned, over four hundred analyses have been included.

General discussions of the topic encompass around fifty analyses, i.e. around 13%, of which more than half are general conflict descriptions for a non-informed audience. The rest split between multi-perspective analyses and policy-oriented analyses.

Material concerns have been the main concern for around 30 articles, with a third generally discussing questions on territory and resources, another third in specific on land and resettlement, and the last third sharing discussions on socioeconomic overviews, data, and poverty.

A stronger focus on ideas has been used in around 50 articles, of which more than a fifth discusses ideas in Minsupala in general, questions on Islam and Moros as well as ethno-politics comprise another fifth each; the rest discusses questions on liberation, Philippine nationalism, and Lumad.

The group institutions and political actors comprise over 180 articles, of which a third is literature on the Maoist revolution and thus at the border of the presented analysis; the MILF follows with a fifth of articles; discussions on the MNLF in specific just around 10, however, as the former main rebel group they have been characterized in many of the other articles. Questions on government institutions are discussed in around 15 articles, the same amount of articles, in which questions of the ARMM and the consequences of the Peace Agreement of 1996 have been raised. Legal questions encompass around 20 articles; discussions of patrimonial politics and clans encompass around 15 articles, another 15 articles on conflicts between rival clans.

Around 70 articles focus on the dynamics of violence. A third of these analyses cover a broad spectrum, from gender questions to war traumata, child soldiers, etc. Another fourth engages with conflict transformation and post-conflict management, including analyses of counter-

insurgency and DDR programs. A similar amount of analyses, each another fourth, engages with terrorism as well as warlords and criminality.

The last part of literature concentrates on external actors, encompassing around forty articles. They encompass questions equally shared on consequences of historical colonialism, transnational Islamic movements, Islamic states' interventions, and US military presence.

Most works can be situated in between descriptive and empirical-analytical approaches. Few use theoretical approaches of peace and conflict studies or put their findings into broader international debates. Out of the latter, a recurring theme is neo- and anti-colonialism (Tan 1977; Bauzon 2008; Wadi 2008). They discuss the influence of US colonialism and later on global capitalism on the local conflict, and at the same time analyze forms of inner colonialism by the central Metro Manila region and the periphery of Minsupala. As a long-term conflict, it has become interesting for military studies as well (Bernardo 1997; Chalk 1997; Harber 1998; Chalk 2001; Byler 2005; Amarille 2006; Klempp 2006). Due to the military writings publishing origins, the first should be treated in a same careful manner as actual actor-accounts described above. Even more ambiguous are the linked questions of transnational Islam and post-9/11 terrorism (Yuchengco 2003; Wright-Neville 2004; Ramos 2005; Asia 2008; Jones 2008). This writings are under criticism for a lack of data transparency and in general for the subsuming of local violent activity under the regional label "Jemaah Islamiyah", which again gets integrated globally as an Al Qaeda branch (critical Pospisil 2005a). Finally, a series of books transcend the official conflict line and try to explore the links between missing or ill-functioning institutions and local violence in the Philippines as a whole (McCoy 1994; Sidel 1999; Abinales 2000; Kreuzer 2005; Torres 2007). Accordingly, there exists a huge reservoir of empirical knowledge, which can be used by this research project.

2.9.2 Interviews

This knowledge reservoir has been complemented with expert interviews conducted on the Philippines. These have been accomplished between September 2009 and July 2010. 28 different persons have been interviewed, three of them twice.

Interview partners had mainly either an academic background or came from civil society organizations (CSOs). As former rebels switched to CSOs in their later years, and CSOs try to support causes which coincide with causes of the rebel groups, the distance is small; no active guerilla units have been visited. Security measures regarding the confidentiality of the retrieved data have been taken, even though most of the information is not compromising for the interviewees. Nonetheless, the interviewees will be anonymized in this publication. The interviews have been conducted in a qualitative manner. Questions have been prepared according to the characteristics and possible knowledge of the interview partner. Depending on the interview situation, notes have been taken and/or a data recorder has been used. There has been no aim on representativeness; the information gathered from interviews plays the role of "creative thinking triggers" in this paper. Interviewees have been found mainly along two ways: the snowball-system starting from my connection to Civil Peace Service (ZFD) and academia. Furthermore, authors have been addressed directly if contact details have been found online or via other interview partners.

2.9.3 Further Data

During the decades of conflict, a series of legal texts have been produced, which can be used for this research. These can be differentiated into constitutional texts, negotiation results, and peace contracts and resolutions by local and international institutions. Conflict-specific codes have been found in relevant monographs and editions. For Philippine legal texts the LawPhil Project by the Arellano Law Foundation (www.lawphil.net) as well as the Chan Robles Virtual Law Library (<http://www.chanrobles.com>) have been a great help. Although these texts can be regarded as the most “material”, they, too, have been checked against their historical background and their content analyzed accordingly.

The same applies to the “materialism” of socioeconomic databases. Here the basis is above all data from UN organizations and international economic organizations like World Bank and IMF; additionally to mention is the Philippine Human Development Network with a series of disaggregate data. The Philippine administration offers data, too, including the powerful Commission on Elections.

The political actors themselves have their publishing organs, as well. The insurgents have published their own newsmagazines and for the recent periods sophisticated websites have been produced. To mention is above all www.philippinerevolution.net for the National Democratic Front and www.luwaran.com as the online news organ of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which furthermore publishes Maradika as their printed newspaper. The recent split of the MNLF, formerly publishing the newspaper Mahardika, can be traced along internet products as well, with several small blogs and websites competing for representing the MNLF.

Civil society organizations have high-profile publishing strategies, too, from social media accounts, blogs and websites to more traditional forms as newsletters, working paper series and magazines. Highly visible is thereby the Institute for Autonomy and Governance, based at the Notre Dame University in Cotabato City, which publishes next to others the “Autonomy and Peace Review”.

Finally information from renowned Philippine news agencies have been included occasionally, including several daily newspapers plus the Mindanaoawn news-project www.mindanews.com and on the national level www.newsbreak.ph.

2.9.4 Data Storage and Processing

To handle the huge amount of data, information technology has been used. As the processed data is mostly qualitative data, standard scientific programs did not fulfill the expectations. Therefore, relational databases have been used in combination with existing programs. Three areas can mainly be identified: interview material, data from secondary sources, and time-sensitive network analysis. Interviews have been transcribed with transcription software. Atlas.ti was used to categorize the interviews.

This approach was first used for the secondary material as well. However, the huge amount of time-sensitive data in combination with the necessity to not just organize the content of secondary material but its form and framework as well, led to the conclusion, that the most flexible option would be the introduction of a local database with an adapted data structure to capture sources as well as content. This database has been developed in MSAccess. Next to include the standard information on scientific sources (title, authors, publisher, publication-

type, abstracts, etc.) it was possible to categorize the sources with tags. Furthermore, extracted data could be saved either as time-sensitive information or as time-insensitive information, automatically connected to its source. This extracted data could again be categorized along its form (theory, methods, empirics, hypotheses, etc.) and content (links to the different hegemony projects). To simplify the coding process, the sources have been linked with pdf-files, if available, and these linked documents can be shown directly in the data sheet. The resulting data could then be sorted and filtered in several ways and then published in automated, structured reports. These reports again were the basis for the thick descriptions of historical processes.

For the network analysis, a quantification of data was considered several times with several procedures of coding; however, in the end the size of the project in relation to the value added prevented it. The different dimensions and nodes would have summed up to a total of over 100,000 possible network edges, choosing their values on a scale between four to six connection levels, depending on the edge type. Even after deleting rather easily impossible connections (e.g. the Spanish Crown does not have any influence except for TS1 and thus can be deleted including all connecting edges for all networks TS2-TS6), still several ten thousand edges would have had to be coded. Test runs have been done for important components and time frames and a code book written, a possible base for future projects in a similar direction. Promising are further standardized algorithms between quantitative and qualitative analysis, for example the generation of comparison graphs. This means that a generated graph does not display the coded absolute level of each edge, but it shows changes between two graphs, for example violence in TS3 and TS4 with orange edges highlighting an increase and green highlighting a decrease in the level of violence relations between specific social groups. The combination of quantitative data in relational databases allows furthermore an easy bridge between different software packages with diverse statistical network tools, for example ORA and yEd. However, as said, for practical reasons, in the end I decided for a qualitative way, in which the network graphs helped me to organize information in a figurative form.

Thus, for the time-sensitive networks, the yEd Graph Editor has been used. This editor allows the drawing of nodes and edges as well as the labeling and formatting of both of these networks elements. The networks comprise 58 nodes and sub-nodes with directed edges (node-links) extending over four components, two to four component types, and six time spans outlined above. The yEd Editor offers several routines to structure graphs and improve its layout to facilitate an easier understanding of complex graphs. As good as yEd is for developing single graphs, as basic it is to manage and compare the underlying data. yEd uses GraphML to store information. ML stands for "Markup Language", similar to "HTML" (HyperText Markup Language). This list-based data storage form makes it difficult to handle the included information in a flexible way. However, it makes it easy to develop an interface. Thus, again I recurred to databases. This time the choice was a MySQL database. For once, it is possible to use PHP not just to connect the database with yEd, but furthermore it is possible to provide the developed tools online, as PHP is the standard website programming language nowadays. yEd provides furthermore a program module to include GraphML files directly into a website. Thus, a series of web-based options could be developed, including a comparison feature to search for and show different graphs next to each other. All this helped to discover information structures inside the broad data as much as for a structured description of it.

3 Social Structures in Minsupala

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the social structures on the Philippines, differentiated along the components of historical structures, augmented onto a cross-cut focus on violence relations. The underlying network graphs can be found in the annex. The networks have furthermore been split up along time categories, mirroring the theoretical approach, that historical structures are not a given, but constantly produced and reproduced. The single sections will describe network nodes and relations. Thereby, the text evolves progressively, i.e. once the historical structures are described for an earlier period, the next sections will describe changes of these structures and not repeat the whole network structure. Thus, it might be useful to read the text together with the graphs in the annex.

3.1 Material Base

As outlined in the previous chapter, the material base encompasses the socioeconomic structures of an analyzed society as well as the material capabilities of social groups and might be “productive” but as well “destructive” (Cox 1981: 136). Thereby, not the ideal definition of matter is relevant, but matter which got “socially and historically organized for production” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 465-6 / GT-07), i.e. the role of matter develops over its integration into social structures as a whole. This is the framework for the empirical sorting of data in the following paragraphs, which puts a special focus on the differentiation between economic structures defined by relations of consented exchange and relations of force.

3.1.1 Pre-Independence

The material base of the Southern Philippines has a long and shifting history. The Pre-Independence-time-span can be divided in another three subgroups: the regional prime phase, the phase of Spanish colonial pressure and the phase of American colonial ruling.

The immediate pre-colonial era is characterized by a society, based on agriculture as well as on maritime trade throughout Southeast Asia, connecting China with India and the Middle East. A complex economic system integrates oversea trade, coastal area seafarers and fishermen, lowland rice production and market spots, and highland hunting grounds and forest production. This labor division defines a Southeast Asian space rather than a territorially bounded nation state (Hayase 2007: 16-37).

Local communities are defined along their position in this economic system. Coastal and highland communities are characterized mainly by the number of connected families following a leader. For low land communities this includes land issues. Here the similarities are the strongest to the feudal communities in Europe. These communities in the mentioned regional labor division are again divided into layers with different rights and tasks inside the community. On top is the ruling family led by a Datu. He does not own the land in a capitalist sense; however, he is responsible for its allocation and due to the hereditary status of this position, the ruling family can establish itself as a social group different from the lower groups. The opposite strata are the local peasants, the “endatuan” who have received land from the Datu’s allocation, returning the giving in taxes and labor days. (McKenna 1998: 71) Furthermore they enjoy his protection, a win-win-situation at first sight. As McKenna, however, notes, a peasant can just

formally leave the Datu, as he would not find any other Datu to give him land without provoking inter-Datu clashes (McKenna 1998: 63). Thus, his subordinated position can hardly be described as a chosen one. In between are the *dumatus*, a category of peasants who are not obliged to deliver tribute to the Datu. The fourth social group is regarded the lowest: slaves and bondmen (McKenna 1998: 50-51). However, "material conditions of life for *banyaga* slaves were not appreciably worse, and were in some cases better ... than for the average commoner". Their location at the Datu's residence allows them to participate more closely on his wealth, regardless of their lower rank. (McKenna 1998: 66) As mentioned the regional power position of the Datu depends on the number of followers who either take part in trade affairs or agricultural production. Lowland Datus form thereby the power centers as gatekeepers between oversea trade, lowland production, and highland production. (Ahmad 2000a)

This system is so strong, that the Spanish colonizers are not able to penetrate the southern part of the targeted archipelago. Thus they have just settled in the North of the future Philippines, transforming the local communities into a Spanish colony. In the following decades Spanish colonizers interfere into the southern regional system and block Southeast Asian sea routes. (Majul 1973) Thus, trade ties for the southern communities are cut and the regional socioeconomic system scrambles. Lowland Datu compensate their reduced incomes with slave raids. (McKenna 1998: 74-75) Targets of these raids are communities in the Spanish controlled islands and highlanders. The colonizers send at the same time indigenous forces against the South. Thus, now a strict border divides north and south. The second victims of slave raids and plunder are highland communities. This development establishes a further front line (Interview Y). It destroys the second leg of lowland trade: the source of tradable forest goods. Summarized, regional trade relations are now replaced by relations of force. This system of forced resource extraction however has its limits and in general is doomed to dwindle. Winners are Spain, who takes over part of the interregional trade, and the nearby Dutch colonies, main buyer of slaves (Ahmad 2000a: 11).

The third phase alters the material system again and brings the southern communities under direct colonial rule. The US has taken over the Philippines after settling peace with Spain in 1898. The American acquisition in the treaty of Paris includes the southern islands. In material terms it is again a shift as American armed forces crush resistance from the Datus, ban slaving and prohibit the carrying of arms. Thus they revoke the local elites from their two remaining capabilities besides from local agriculture: means of violence and slave trade, leaving them in a precarious situation. A new economic system gets established by the Americans in their first external nation building. In charge is a local military administration. Datus' resistance gets analyzed as missing social development and bringing the local communities up to the level of modern civilization is the official core mission: educational programs are one leg, colonial settlements the second.

The first strategy targets the elites. In its broad term, the educational programs of the first decades are rather unsuccessful; the local elites resist these efforts, considering them as means of colonization. However, for the persons which cooperate, it becomes a success story. The graduates turn into the hardly needed local links for the colonial administration and in the following decades they can be found on the highest political positions. This means in return economic gains as well. American legislation declares all former land allocations illegal and the registration of land necessary for its possession. The Datus which adapt fast and know the

relevant administrative steps have an immense advantage over the rest of the local population, thus re-strengthening their positions after their previous losses.

The second tactic for nation building is settler colonialism. A series of resettlement programs have been developed. Targets are several: former American veterans, Zionists, and finally northern Filipinos. Japanese companies, American veterans and some Philippine peasants develop punctual settlements in the northern and eastern parts of the southern archipelago. For the involved persons it is a good deal: the fertile grounds on the southern islands allow cash crops, in combination with American trade links a new cornerstone of a prosperous economy. The islands are now integrated into the global colonial-capitalist system, with the natural-resources-rich islands providing the necessary commodities for the capitalist centers, starting with rubber for Japanese companies and later on palm oil, pineapples, timber and ore for US-dominated Transnational Companies (Tuazon 2008a: 82-83).

3.1.2 Pre-Martial-Law

The post-colonial Republic of the Philippines gets established between 1935 and 1946, starting with a Commonwealth and then granted independence after World War II.

Three key structural changes can be observed: settlements, access of indigenous elites to public funds, and a new intellectual elite. The first and the last mean the establishment of new social forces on the southern Philippines, the second a realignment of an existing social force.

Settlement programs during colonial decades mentioned above were economically successful, however, rather modest in its extent; this changes rapidly after formal independence in 1946. The central government supports resettlement of northern peasants into the south as ways to tackle two challenges at the same time: gaining access to the resources of the fertile southern islands and counter an insurgency in the north, called the Huk-Rebellion. The Philippine government intensifies resettlement by organizing the openings of rural colonies in the South: "Ex-Huks and 'reformed' criminals found attractive homesteads in the south. The army administered these special settlements until the end of the 1960s." (George 1980: 118) Settler influx remains not confined to these government programs. Private settlements follow soon and in just twenty years the population structure on the southern islands changes completely. Mindanao has become the "wild west in the south" (May 1992b), the last frontier.

Not just that migration influx increases from 19,000 to 96,000 per year, i.e. by a factor of 5, compared to pre-independence-days, but furthermore migration into the traditional Moro centers Lanao and Cotabato soars, with the latter experiencing an increase by factor 34 (Wernstedt and Simkins 1965: 92). A projection of this level of influx with a continuing concentration on rural homesteading a 10 acres sees an exhaustion of free arable land in 1972, qualifying that average Filipino household land sizes are smaller (Wernstedt and Simkins 1965: 102) but not considering land concentration and crop farming by TNCs.

While the few settlers of the early century integrate into the local communities, the new settlers fail to adapt to local customs, e.g. to the payment of "kawali or levies in kind" (George 1980: 115), "maybe they have been more aggressive" regarding settling in what they consider to be "virgin lands" (Interview G). They are now a majority and they do not need to *integrate* into an economic system: they *form a new* one and bring with them the necessary components: labour force in form of settlers, capital in form of government funds and international

investments, and trade links via international companies. The dynamic material capabilities of the local population are low and irrelevant. Their cooperation on the export of locally accumulated resources is their only dynamic capacity.

| <i>Province</i> | Net Migration (1903-1939) | % of Total Mi- gration | Net Migration (1948-1960) | % of Total Mi- gration |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Agusan | 33,014 | 4.7 | 92,971 | 7.4 |
| Bukidnon | 7,104 | 1.0 | 105,002 | 8.4 |
| Cotabato | 34,306 | 4.9 | 410,065 | 32.7 |
| Davao | 144,990 | 20.7 | 379,309 | 30.3 |
| Zamboanga (Sur) | 58,163 | 8.3 | 243,633 | 19.5 |
| TOTAL | (277,577) | (39.6) | (1,230,980) | (98.3) |
| Lanao | 163,209 | 23.3 | 164,694 | 13.2 |
| Misamis Occid. | 104,123 | 14.9 | -43,895 | -3.5 |
| Misamis Orient. | 26,103 | 3.7 | -131,882 | -10.5 |
| Surigao | 43,963 | 6.3 | -13,055 | -1.0 |
| Zamboanga (Norte) | 84,126 | 12.0 | 45,307 | 3.6 |
| TOTAL | (421,524) | (60.2) | (21,169) | (1.8) |
| MINDANAO | 699,101 | 100.0 | 1,252,149 | 100.0 |

Table 2: Net Migration to Mindanao, 1903-1939 and 1948-1960 (by Province); Source Wernstedt/Simkins (1965: 92)

This leads to the second structural change: the realignment of the local traditional elites. As mentioned above, they have been first stripped from their overseas trade connections and later on from the slave trade, as well. The structures of post-independence open up new possibilities: rent-seeking by providing land and political-administrative services, e.g. land titles and licenses, to national and international companies. The shift from communal land to the Torrens system, i.e. titled land owned by individuals, has been introduced by American legislation. However, just now as the “frontier” begins to fill up, land possession and not just its ownership becomes crucial (Collier 1998: 36). Thus, land titling becomes more important and further binds the acquisition of land, or its keeping, to political influence, making land and political-administrative influence interrelated scarce goods. The part of the local elite which understands the new system becomes the gatekeeper (Silva 1979; George 1980). Active members of the Moro elites can raise their accumulated capabilities by exploiting the shifting situation, i.e. they collect land titles faster than others and thereby amass land, formerly used by peasants on the basis of the communal lands system (Ahmad 2000a). Their dynamic capabilities are the organizational capabilities to balance interests and capabilities of (post-)colonial external actors and local population. In its accumulated form, these material capabilities are political positions in the new governmental system: from city counselors and mayors to provincial governors to congress seats. These positions guarantee an advantage in information and decision power regarding public projects and land dispersion. Additional income results from the control of pork barrels (Boncodin et al. 2007: 37). Of course, in this discussion there

should not be forgotten, that settlers elites' and colonial masters' material capabilities exceeded Moro capabilities by far.

The third structural development results out of new possibilities for part of the local youth, mostly sons and daughters of local elites, but including some students with a poor economic background as well. Central government scholarships as well as scholarships from Middle Eastern countries allow them to study in Manila respectively the Middle East. Having left the southern islands, they detach themselves from the local structures and form a new intellectual elite, based on external funding. The Philippine Commission on National Integration provides at that time around 750,000US\$ (George 1980: 97) for scholarship programs:

"The CNI graduates, most of them from non-elite backgrounds, gradually constituted themselves as a new professional elite in their home communities. The shared experiences of the more than 8000 Muslim CNI scholars studying in Manila between 1958 and 1967 also profoundly affected Muslim politics after 1968" (McKenna 1998: 140)

Furthermore,

„[b]etween 1955 and 1978 the government of Egypt, as part of the pan-Islamic programs of Gamel Abdul Nasser, granted more than two hundred scholarships to young Philippine Muslims, the great majority of whom studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo ... A number of those students were scions of datu families, but many others were not, and the scholarships thus became another avenue for ordinary Muslim students to gain higher educations“ (McKenna 1998: 144)

Saudi Arabia offers additional education possibilities for individuals, mainly after pilgrimages of the latter to Mecca, exemplified by the later MILF chairman Hashim Salamat (Lingga 1995: 24); however, most students go to Cairo (Gomez 2000: 78). In comparison, the pre-independence educational program by the Americans reached less than hundred elite students. The trained students encompass the whole academic spectrum, from medical doctors to engineers to historians and Islamic scholars. This new social group not just liberates itself from the tight social relations of the southern islands, but finds new long lasting relations with northern Philippine students and Islamic scholars from African, Middle Eastern and Asian regions. These relations provide the students above all with dynamic capabilities in form of organizational knowledge and latter on necessary regional links to shelter and supply.

As influential this third structural change would be for the local social structure and as big a threat it would be to the local elites, at this time it changes little for the indigenous peasantry. They remain locked in an unproductive agricultural environment, dependent on the goodwill and patronage of the local elites.

3.1.3 Martial-Law I

With the end of the 1960s, the "Golden Age" of modernization by settlement with the support of local collaboration has ended on the Southern Philippines (and thus for some Moro activists the "darkest era in Moro history" (Interview E)). The network in general does not show new social forces: local and settler elites, local and settler peasantry, highlanders, students, and international investors have shown up already some years before. Even their relations have not change in qualitative terms. What has changed is quantity. The last frontier literally has filled up. Further pressure comes with increased cash crop production by successful settlers

and northern investors (Muslim 1994: 91). Scarcity of goods is the new threat. Have open conflicts been avoided before by pushing “the frontier” deeper (allocating the modernization burden to the highlanders and to the sustainability of nature), now they break out in the lowlands at every corner. Quarrels for land have become daily business and electoral competition for government connections has increased. This situation of competition for land has induced not just conflict between settlers and indigenous people, but intra-elite rivalries as well. Furthermore, fear of being overtaken “by the others” rise: indigenous people see themselves pushed out from their own land and settlers fear the hostile “wilderness” far from home.

Thus what has changed in qualitative terms is the material system of violence. The control of government positions has been necessary for the acquisition of land in the previous decades, now it is for the direct control of material capabilities for the production of violence, too. These capabilities result out of the political control of local police forces, subordinated to the mayors, and direct control of paramilitary forces. However, if not available, there are alternatives. Weapons from the Huk-Rebellion as much as from the armed resistance against the Japanese invasion during World War II are widely available and thus illegal, i.e. not registered, *vigilante groups* spread around the region, producing their cruel reputation by cults and violence excesses (May 1992a). Has the rule of law been threatened in the decades before by patron-client-networks and corruption, it is now by sheer violence.

On the other hand, the insurgency has developed its own material complex of violence production. Students from Manila and the Middle East have used their organizational capabilities to form their own forces: the Moro National Liberation Front and its military arm, the Bangsa Moro Army. Materially they get supported by the local elites as well as oversea governments, mainly in form of the federal state of Sabah in western Malaysia and Libya in the Middle East (Tan 1993: 78; McKenna 1998: 204-205). Further support comes from the Organization of Islamic Conference, which members are the main suppliers of Philippine energy resources and thus a powerful player added. Thus, the re-integration of the southern Philippines into a global space has taken another step. However, foreign support should not be confused as the instigation of the revolt, as done by some Philippine commentators. On the contrary, the influence of foreign powers, above all in the form of the Organization of Islamic Conference, constrains the rebel groups to lower their aspiration to conform to the aims of their foreign supporters (Interview G). A genuine local monetary income possibility for the insurgency is solely the collection of the zakat via local religious teachers, a kind of religious tax, which gets used for the revolutionary struggle (Interview O). The local population supports the rebel groups further with shelter and recruits.

Finally, the central government itself sends a big portion of its military to the southern islands, making it sixty years after the end of the US-military ruling a militarized zone again. In the mid of the 1970s it is clear, that no military victory is possible for neither the insurgency nor the central government troops. As Middle Eastern countries have ties to both conflict parties, they are the likely mediators and rightly facilitate a peace agreement in 1976, signed in Tripoli.

3.1.4 Martial-Law II: Post-Tripoli

The Post-Tripoli-time is defined mostly by three changes, again two regarding the existence of social forces and one regarding relations between them.

The first change regarding social forces is the split of the insurgency elite. The outbreak of war several years earlier combined three factions: students from Manila, students from the Middle East and part of the traditional elites. Following the unsuccessful peace attempt this anti-government alliance dissolves again in each respective part, with rebel soldiers following one or the other faction. In their public statements the leaders highlight the differences in ideological terms, close to their material origin, i.e. the Middle East faction complaining about the secularist tendencies of the leading Manila faction and the elites complaining about missing respect of the younger generation for their centuries old reputation. A different explanation is that the split occurs between the three main ethnic groups: Tausugs, Maguindanaos, and Maranaos. True is, that the respective leaders come from the mentioned different ethnic groups, and true is, that with them their main bases are in the geographic areas of these ethnic groups. However, true is, too, that second row officers are mixed across these groups, with bases spread all over the islands, and that there are accounts that whole families split up between these factions, crosscutting the argument of ethnic division. This dissolution of unity leads to not just political rivalries between the leaders of the factions, but to clashes between troops on the ground, too.

The second change in the network is the result of this factionalism: an alteration of relations between the divided insurgency, their opponents in the central government and armed forces, and their local and foreign supporters. The central government strengthens above all its relations to the traditional elites and elite returnees, supporting them with government positions, concessions, and funds (McKenna 1998). Furthermore, offers get made to the Middle Eastern faction, as they are regarded as having more moderate demands (Vitug and Gloria 2000). The support network relations update too: Above all traditional elite support for the insurgency goes to nearly nil (McKenna 1998). On the contrary, their private security forces clash now with insurgency troops (as well as sometimes with the AFP as well). The Middle Eastern students, mainly Islamic scholars, are able to secure the Zakat via their connection to the local religious establishment (Interview O) and some support of more conservative countries. Furthermore, they constrain their participation in the military struggle in favor of community work (McKenna 1998). The main insurgency faction retains the material support of Libya and the support of the OIC on the diplomatic front. At the fringes of these factions, missing support leads to increased criminal violent activities. On the other hand, Manila can secure a more favorable stand with Middle Eastern countries, opening up diplomatic missions (Tan 1993) and Malaysia retreats as an active supporter of the military struggle after political changes in the federal state of Sabah and a silencing of Philippine government claims of ownership of this territory (Noble 1977).

The third structural change is the strong establishment of the Maoist insurgency with their roots in the northern islands. The mentioned increase of cash crops replacing self-sufficient peasantry is the structural base for the Maoist insurgency. Settlers-becoming-agricultural laborers organize themselves with help of parish churches and get integrated into the Maoist struggle. New People's Army-Fronts open up in the country side all over Mindanao and local cells in the towns and cities see a strong increase in the number of followers (Collier 1998). This splits government forces, which operate now all over the islands and not just in the area of the indigenous rebels and brings relief to rebels in the Moro areas. Tactical cooperation on

the edges between the two insurgencies continue, even though no intensive cooperation comes into being (Molloy 1985).

All together, the breakup of the insurgency front leads to an increasing complexity of the network with fluid conflict lines and above all an anew rise of particularistic violence, similar to the situation before the outbreak of war.

3.1.5 People-Power

This confusing situation just gets heightened after the end of the dictatorship in 1986, the following peace process with its peace agreement in 1996. This process brings with it several structural changes, starting with a series of new social groups, changes of existing social groups, and a redirection of network relations.

The three main new blocs of social groups are Afghan veterans, splinter groups, and international and local aid and development organizations.

Afghan veterans are the collateral outcome of the cold war power play between the USSR and USA in central Asia. Around seven hundred Moro men have been fighting along other international fighters on the side of the anti-communist coalition (Interviews T and X), supported by Pakistan, the US and the Middle East. The insurgency leadership in exile has established necessary links probably via their Pakistan connections, where some of their proponents have lived for several years (Salamat 2002: 68). Returned to the southern Philippine islands, they have a double impact: on the one hand they augment the fighting strength of the insurgents (Interview T) and on the other hand, part of them forms their own rebel group, the Abu Sayyaf.

This already is the second change: rebel defectors form either their own rebel groups or criminal gangs, mostly at the edge between political and private aims. Abu Sayyaf and the Pentagon Group are two prominent examples, reaching an international reputation. The groups reach up to several thousand followers (Santos and Santos 2010a: 368), armed with high tech weaponry (Santos and Santos 2010a: 364ff.). Their main income sources are kidnapping-for-ransom activities and protection money. They are the bridge back to traditional elites, who use them occasionally as their own income source in case of blocked other income, e.g. lost elections (Interview ZE).

Finally, after the end of the Marcos dictatorship, the aid and development community becomes a new visible actor, above all with added local NGOs. While international governmental organizations such as UN agencies have been working in the country since decades, above all leftist Anti-Marcos fighters, which have turned their back to armed insurrection, facilitate the establishment of a large amount of local aid and development NGOs. This leaves the Maoist insurgency with a lack of intellectual leadership (Interviews P+N). The increased influx of international agencies in quantitative terms leads to what some experts label a "peace industry" (Interviews R and ZE), with competition for funds coming from national and international sources and the opening up of a new market for local service industry, including security services.

The major change of existing social forces regards the insurgents. As part of the 1996 agreement, several thousand rebel soldiers have been integrated into the AFP and the police (Santos 2010b). However, the agreement does not encompass all former rebels and even cohorts included consist partly of men who never have been part of the rebels fighting force but have

entered the DDR¹⁷ take-over lists via personal connections (Santos 2010b: 168-169). Part of the remaining forces switches to the second insurgency faction, which intensifies its military campaigns after it has been left out in the peace agreement on the one hand and gets under stronger pressure by the AFP on the other, now that the main faction rests its arms. Meanwhile the main faction's leadership has been integrated in regional and local government structures.

These additional social forces and changes of existing ones have updated network relations as well. The main faction keeps its international relations; it connects additionally to the patronage-sources of the Philippine state. Meanwhile, the Middle Eastern faction of the insurgency has not been able to establish support from the OIC and furthermore analyzes the modest outcome of the peace agreement of the main faction as consequence of foreign supporters' pressure onto the rebels. In consequence, they rely on two support sources: non-governmental external support (Salamat 2002: 52-54) and local support. As mentioned, their connection to the local communities has secured them the Zakat (Interview O). Furthermore, their community approach provides them with local loyalty, i.e. shelter, allowance and recruits. Weapons come from own small-scale production, augmented by bought weapons, partly internationally (Salamat 2002: 68-69), partly from the AFP via paramilitary groups (Salamat 2002: 102) (Interview T).

Further splinter groups link with several parts of the violence market, thus augmenting its size. Additional clients from the aid and development community have the same consequence from the demand size. In its legal form, paramilitary units, the *Cafgus* (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units) and *CVOs* (Civilian Volunteer Organizations), have several thousand members in the ARMM (calculated from Kraft (2010: 192, 195)¹⁸). They get not just used in the local arena, but outside the ARMM as well; for example under the name of "People's Liberation Organization" Moro mercenaries attack worker- and peasant movements in neighboring Davao (Collier 1998: 85). Therefore, material violent capabilities of the local elites get used to defend themselves against potential rivals as well as on the violence market, hired to protect national and international governments and businesses.

3.1.6 New Millennium

In material terms the new millennium does not change profoundly the social networks in Minsupala. To mention is the dissolution of one local social group and changes on the global level, which affect relations on the local level as well.

The dissolution regards the social groups of revolutionary Manila-educated students, the former main rebel faction. After having been integrated into the governmental structure in the period before, they now completely dissolve as an autonomous social group. Their individual members disperse into different other social groups. While their leader Misuari is under house

¹⁷ DDR stands for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and is regarded as a standard concept of handling rebel groups and above all their individual members after the end of a violent conflict. This includes the production of alternative income opportunities for former rebel soldiers, with the integration into an official armed force as one option.

¹⁸ Kraft provides nationwide numbers. The numbers related to the ARMM are downsized in proportion to population numbers. As violent incidences are above average in the ARMM, the real numbers should be even significantly higher.

arrest after a failed rebellion, the second line officers have been integrated into the group of traditional elites. Lower rank officers and rank-and-file are now to be found either in the ongoing rebellion of the second rebel movement, criminal splinter groups, or in great part as simple peasants, their point of origin.

Some of them start to experiment with new medium scale productions and services, e.g. seaweed and Islamic banking; in cooperation with younger generations of the elites, educated in Manila and abroad, in combination with governmental reconstruction allocations, peace industry, and increased foreign investment. Over-sea remittances above all from the Middle East are a further income-source, similar as for the rest of the Philippines. Young Moros can score with Arabic skills. At the same time the common experience of subordination under Middle Eastern employers aligns some of them with non-Moro workers (Interview Q), while others continue to bridge Minsupala with intellectual developments and resistance in the Middle East.

For the insurgency as such, a change of the structures on the global level influences network links on the local level. After the retreat of the USSR from Afghanistan and a series of attacks against US targets during the 1990s, the plane attacks against targets in the US on September 11, 2001, mark the final termination of links between the US and Islamic militants and the start of a “war on terror”. Under these circumstances and the consequent threat to the insurgency of getting dragged into this new global conflict, the insurgency cuts its few links to regional Islamic militants and tries to integrate the US into the peace process. The national level is aware of this precarious situation for the insurgency and uses it occasionally against the insurgency, at the same time worried to drag an escalated global war onto Philippine territory. Furthermore, the formal opponents cooperate in their efforts to contain the splinter groups and criminal activities.

3.2 Ideas

The next component to be described is the complex of social ideas; which, as outlined in chapter two, are social orientation patterns of the people of a society. Cox differentiated analytically “intersubjective ideas”, accepted by the vast majority of society, and “collective images” (Cox 1981: 136), political ideas of social orders struggled for by different social groups, in other words the rules of the game vs. strategies to win the game. Like the material base, no “idealistic” analysis of such ideas is relevant, but their analysis in relation to their integration into the broader historical structures of their period. The necessary description of historical ideas as base for such an analysis will be done in the next paragraphs.

3.2.1 Pre-Independence

The pre-colonial era on the Southern Philippines is characterized by a quite coherent localized system of intersubjective meanings. Its cultural origin has been a combination of local traditions and belief-systems with Arabic influences via overseas trade.

Independent local communities form society at large, centered as mentioned around a “datu” who rules over his followers: he has a wide range of tasks and privileges, from allocation of communal land to court rulings to religious guidance. “Sanctified inequality” (McKenna 1998: 56) between people is based on genealogy, which links the ruling “Datu” via the first mythical Islamic migrants to Mohammad. This genealogy has been written down in the so called “tarsil-

las". However, while relevant for inter-elite definitions of relations, the coercive measures used by Datu to control their followers translate on the ideological level into mystical tales of supernatural violence-related powers obtained by specific rulers (McKenna 1998: 58).

While Islamic religion does not penetrate the uplands at all, were people stick to older forms of believe, in the lowlands Islamic rules differ from their Arabic origins. Islamic ideas develop a hybrid form with older believe systems. The ideas follow their bearers, the Arabic traders; the latter integrate into the local communities, directly by marrying local women. Thus, Islamic legitimacy and more mythical descriptions of power explain and justify feudal inequality, which further differentiates society upwards to (paramount) sultans and downwards to ulipun, i.e. unfree "debt-bondsmen", and slaves, not related by kinship to the local community (McKenna 1998: 50-51). However, they don't overcome local traditions and therefore, a variety of ethnicities, based on language, history, and economy stands in sharp contrast to the 20th-century concept of a Bangsamoro, a Moro nation, unifying the Muslim people of the southern islands.

The term Moro meanwhile gets established during Spanish colonial efforts with a negative connotation. The colonial enterprise of the Spanish Crown is backed by two interwoven belief systems: feudalism and Catholicism. The Spanish Crown legitimates its ruling by divine law and its colonial efforts receive its legitimacy from the same origin. Thus, catholic missionaries arrive with the first Spanish ships. However, these colonial missions are far from altruistic. While Columbus named his first conquered island San Salvador (Holy Savior), the colonizers of the Southeast Asian archipelago name their new conquests the Philippines after King Philip II, already a hint on the more earthly related intention of the colonizers. As history seems to repeat, the colonizers label the resisting people of the South "Moro" after the Moors which the Catholic Spanish Crown evicted from the Iberian Peninsula just some decades before. With Spanish colonizers unable to penetrate the southern islands, Spanish Catholicism is it neither. But they lay the base for the next centuries of ideological conflict explanations: Filipinos vs. Moros, Catholics vs. Muslims. Until today costume festivals lasting several days (George 1980: 44), called Moro-Moro, celebrate Catholic victories over their Muslim enemies. "Catholic ideology was the source of Philippine unity, of integridad nacional. ... The integrity thesis fused religion with nationalism and made it seem natural – indeed dutiful – for a patriotic Filipino to be also a fervent partisan of Spain and its church." (George 1980: 45)

American colonialism conquers the islands at the end of the 19th century; however, in the first years they are similarly unsuccessful in transferring ideas of liberal development onto the people of the southern Philippines. At the beginning, even local elites boycott American schooling, fearing that general American knowledge would bring with its material technical expertise an ideological threat of the local traditions. However, at the end the local elites gain the most of American education, being able to understand the new governmental system, its legal loopholes included. From now on, they are the representatives of a cultural minority in a national state.

The latter is the biggest regional impact of colonial penetration: in pre-colonial times, local diversity coincided with a general openness in a Southeast Asian Maritime Space. The establishment of confined colonies, and later on of a nation state, cuts the southern islands from this space, narrowing the ideological openness of its inhabitance as well.

3.2.2 Pre-Martial-Law

Independence of the Philippines by itself has brought little change to the general ideas floating throughout the peninsula. The first President of now formally independent Philippines after 1946, Manuel Roxas, mentions in his inaugural address the continuing relation and indebtedness to the US colonizers:

“We are to be a free nation largely because we were aided in that direction by the love of liberty and the goodwill of the American people. If we succeed as a nation, if we are able to survive as a nation - and of course we will - we will have America to thank. I bear witness to the fact that America stands ready to help without selfishness, without motive except to reward us for our loyalty and to advance in our land the great cause democracy and freedom. ... I find no dream of empire in America. While cognizant of power, America, as a nation, is troubled in the use of that power by an earnest and heartfelt desire to advance not the cause of greed but the cause of freedom.” (Manuel Roxas, Manila 1946)

While the French colonies on the Southeast Asian mainland struggle to get their independence and thereby develop ideological systems based on pre-colonial national histories and progressive theories, the Philippine establishment stands loyal to their former colonial masters and their social ideas. Thus, the Philippines remain a corner stone of the US-led “Free World” in Southeast Asia. Liberalism, modernization, and anti-communism are its base. This allows an open trade regime which favors foreign investments by American and later on transnational companies to develop the country.

The idea of modernizing a backward society by a liberal economy, individual entrepreneurship and trade, characterizes the treatment of the southern Philippines, too. This coincides with the adapted ideas of Moro leadership, after years of American training. They see themselves as the leaders of a community to be developed, however, not giving up ideas about their avant-garde position:

“These leaders, many of them belonging to the Muslim royalty that traces its lineage from the first Muslim sultan in Maguindanao, Sharif Kabungsuwan and Abu Bakr in Sulu, have contributed for the progress of the Muslims. These leaders were reared and educated by the Establishment. They are fully aware of the singular role they play or they can play in fashioning a respectable place for the Muslims under ‘Philippine Sun.’” (Glang 1969: 68-69)

Thus, they try to integrate the old concepts of Datuism with liberal concepts of representativeness and government-sponsored development:

“The datus represent an institution long the object of honor and reverence of the Muslims and as such they become the direct object of their homage. The leadership of the datus offers the possibility of being utilized as the instrumentality of the government in the prosecution of its programs and policies. They can serve as advisors in Muslim affairs so that those in the government may be helped to fashion out a more Muslim-oriented measure, one that is grounded on a firm understanding of their nature and feelings.” (Glang 1969: 71)

They furthermore represent the demand for order: “There is ... a feeling among many Christians that only a Muslim official can maintain a degree of peace and order among the Moros.” (Hunt 1974: 200).

Meanwhile and several years delayed compared to other countries of the region, anti-colonial thinking spreads on the Philippines outside the official state policy. With the elites bound to the US, these ideas just develop in a new generation; it does so in Philippine universities. Thus, anti-colonial ideas become not just directed against an outside “imperialist force”, but subversive against the own collaborating government, too. Moro students raise similar concerns, augmented by the question on the treatment of the Moro by the Philippine majority and its government. Two geographical centers of Moro student activities can be observed: the University of the Philippines Diliman in Manila, and the Middle Eastern university of Al-Azhar in Cairo with their respective articulations

What unites the thinking of these two intellectual strands is the common experience of their proponents of a local community under pressure and chauvinistic prejudices against them by the Philippine government in specific and the settler population in general in their home region (Lingga 1995: 25). By studying local histories, they furthermore get sensible for ancient achievements as well as current shortcomings of the local population and their leaders. However, they develop above all the framework of a nation independent from the Philippines, based on a history of resistance against the penetration by the northern islands, the Moro Wars (Majul 1973). While the traditional leaders have talked about “Muslim Filipinos” since decades, the new activists appropriate the swearword “Moro” for themselves, claiming freedom for the Bangsa Moro, the Nation of the Moro.

Moro students in Manila are mainly connected to other students at UP, thus getting engaged with leftist ideas and anti-colonial liberation struggles of the region, e.g. General Nguyen Giap’s victory against the French colonial army in Vietnam (Tan 1977: 206). The second Philippine insurgency, by the Communist Party of the Philippines, develops its indigenized Maoist approach of a protracted people’s war in the same buildings on the UP campus. Thus, the Bangsa Moro concept which gets developed in Manila is strongly secular-based. Even though Islam as one of the unifying Moro-national characteristics is prominently placed in the slogan “people, homeland and Islam” (Misuari 1973: 11), it is just one (and the last) point. The Moro nation is defined by culture, territory, and national loyalty. However, differences with leftist non-Moro students show up, too, as there is little space for the aspirations of Moro students in the Maoist revolution against “American imperialists and its puppet state.” Thus the CPP mentions in its program the Moro cause with some meager sentences on the right of people on self-determination; however, the program does not discuss settlers’ involvement in the sidelining of indigenous people.

Cairo again offers Moro students one of the most international student bodies outside Western campuses. Thus they get involved into discussions about conflicts and revolutions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Cairo itself is a center of struggle, a revolutionary state after Nasser’s takeover and on the other hand repressive against criticism from communist and Islamic opposition. Future MILF ideologue Salah Jubair states as the most influential international events on Moro students in Cairo: “1) the June 5, 1967 Arabic-Israeli War; 2) the 1968 aborted but bloody coup attempt in Indonesia; and, 3) to a lesser degree, the rise of student demonstrations in Indonesia and Malaysia in 1968” (Jubair 1999: 146). While Filipino students study anti-colonial armed struggles all over the global South with a socialist outlook, Cairo based students study Islamic scholars. Works of Syed Qutb and Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi are their main readings (Lingga 1995: 24-26). Thus, their focus is on Islamic renewal:

“We did not mean by liberation as that of going to take arms against the government. The original idea is to launch reform programs, and if we could achieve what we wanted by not taking arms, that was preferable.” (1986 interview with MILF chairman Salamat 2002: 30)

However, as much as the CPP indigenizes Maoist concepts, Middle Eastern students take local history into account. This Moro history clashes again with ideas of the settlers. Their mythical arrival in the Philippine south is a story of settling in a virgin land: they have made the jungle arable, being hard and honest working men coming to the frontier with nothing than a plow in their hands, being now proud of their pioneering achievements (Interview G). Concepts of Datuism are alien to them and to pay a traditional levy on their harvest to local Datu sheer robbery by the latter (George 1980: 115).

3.2.3 Martial-Law I

The 1970s bring four changes with it: a slight change of the official Philippine ideology, a beginning spread of communist ideas throughout the settler communities, a more pronounced support of Islamic ideas by Arabic states, and a confrontation of insurgency ideas with a set of new partners.

President Marcos redirects the Philippines liberal ideology regarding two topics: internal opposition and foreign policy. He propagates the foundation of a New Society (Marcos 1974) to overcome obstacles to modernization. A revolution from above, a modernization autocracy as proposed by some American scholars, should bring the Philippines onto one level with neighboring countries like South Korea or Singapore. Thus a strong state has to suppress any dissident, i.e. traditional as well as communist, ideas. In his foreign policy he stresses the Philippines' position as a newly developing country, forging stronger ties with other southern countries, mainly in the Middle East, the Philippine oil source; with his neighbors in Southeast Asia; and the People's Republic of China. Most articulated the Marcos government is in its support of Arabic states during the 1973 oil crisis and its anti-Israel/pro-Palestine stand.

The internal redirection stands in a bidirectional relation to the development of communist ideas mentioned above. Have they been confined throughout the sixties on campus movements and protests throughout the capital, they now spread out to the countryside; following the Maoist strategy. This includes the Philippine south; even though it has to compete with ideas of settler frontier colonialism mentioned above. The challenge of settlers in the jungle is to overcome natural obstacles, not “semi-feudal” landowners, as discussed by the Maoists (Guerrero 1970). However, farm labor on cash crops in large land holdings increase while peasants get more and more under pressure to provide their land for cash crop development projects: ideas of labor organization and labor rights finds fertile ground. Anchors in the local communities are Parish churches. With a lack of priests, work by laymen in these churches is essential. The high echelons of Catholic orthodoxy sit in Manila, far from the frontier. Thus, while church and government elites cooperate in the capital in their fight against communism, in the southern islands liberation theology becomes a link to the Maoist insurgents (Collier 1998).

On the international level, religion is the official ideology which unites several countries to develop a stronger stand between the struggle of US and USSR. States having citizens with Islamic creed join together, triggered by the lost war of 1967 against Israel. Stripped from the

religious argument, opposition to the new Jewish state would be their only common ground, e.g. conservative US-ally Saudi Arabia has little in common with revolutionary Libya regarding other ideas. Thus, Islamic Diplomacy becomes the buzz-word for involvement in different conflicts all over the region with Islamic communities involved:

“the conception of diplomacy is more of a peaceful settlement of difference by negotiation, conciliation and arbitration in accordance with the Islamic principles. ... Islamic diplomacy is clean, open and stress scrupulous adherence to promises even in inveterate enemies. ... It does not deny domestic interest, but safeguard such interest by not harming others. ... the ideal of Islamic diplomacy is maintained if an entity like a state does not operate strictly within the paradigm of the national interest.” (Wadi 1993: 25-28)

The Palestine/Israel topic remains thereby at the forefront of international involvement. Involvement in the cause of “Muslims in the Philippines” (OIC 1972) has started soon after. Thus, a more integrated Islamic community develops on two levels: on the transnational level by Islamic scholars discussed in the previous time span and on the international level by states with Islamic citizens.

The southern Philippine islands are at the fringe of all these discussions: the most eastern outline of Muslim communities, the most southern citizens of the Filipino state. Thus, ideas have to travel far from the campuses of Cairo and Manila. Their bearers, as the Arabic merchants several hundred years ago, have to integrate into a local system and their ideas become part of the local discourse and transform themselves at the same time. The insurgency targets mainly three audiences.

The first targets to attract are the local elites. The nationalistic highlighting of a glorious traditional society fit with the elite’s reference to their inherited ruling positions. Nationalist critique on the collaborating role does less. Therefore, internal criticism by the students regards solely the operative level, i.e. the behavior of single members of the elite, but not their right to rule; they are rather silently voiced. However, the nationalist idea of citizens in a democracy (or in the mythical pre-colonial egalitarian community) as well as fundamental Islamic ideas about equal men under the sole leadership of Allah are subversive to the “sanctified inequality” and the naturalized unity of Datuism und Islamic leadership, a continuing tension in the relation between insurgency and traditional elites.

The second target is the community of Islamic states, stressing Islamic unity. Combining Islamic diplomacy and national interest, the relevant governments have, however, mixed feelings regarding the secessionist aims of the insurgents: sovereignty and territorial integrity have to prevail for the safety of their own rule, thus difficult to deny to the Philippine state. Furthermore, any connection to Maoist thinking is a sacrilege for the broader community and thus an element of distrust against the young leadership.

The third target of the Moro insurgency is the lowland peasantry, with mixed success. They define themselves by far smaller geographical units than the theoretically developed concept of a Bangsamoro: their local community headed by a datu, the “inged” (McKenna 1998: 24), or maximum their ethnicity. Their religious activities are modest, too: “There is, for example, no evidence for any significant increase in attendance at communal prayers or of an enhanced political role for clerics”, Islamic understanding is based on the teachings of local imams, with little regard for the sophisticated Islamic debates in Cairo (McKenna 1998: 135). Thus, alto-

gether, the exchange of ideas with the local population is modest throughout the first war years. Not just, that martial law constrains bigger gatherings and the diffusion of ideas different from Marcos "New Society", but the involvement of the students in war activities prevent them from directing energy to intellectual engagement with the local population. This is even truer for the two other neglected targets: the highlanders and the settler peasants.

3.2.4 Martial-Law II: Post-Tripoli

The years after the failed Tripoli-Agreement see a fundamental increase and transformation of one social group, a quantitative change of a second social group, and a change of relation between the core social groups of the insurgency movement.

The first development regards the Maoist insurgency. Its rise in the south with an unexpected increase of the number of followers lead to two changes regarding ideas: First, due to the numbers of newcomers and the additional constraints of guerrilla war in a dictatorship, the previously strong demands on ideological training of recruits get relaxed by CPP and NPA; so do background checks on the new recruits. Secondly, the regional leadership develops its own ideas and strategies. This encompasses above all the role of the so called "white areas", the cities and bigger towns, in the overall struggle. In the orthodox party strategy, white areas are supposed to support the guerrilla in the red areas, the countryside, by providing information and supplies. Once the guerrilla would have complete control over the red areas, in a final push it would overthrow the reaction in the cities and take over power. However, with an increasing strength in Mindanao's cities due to the dissatisfaction with President Marcos, the regional leaders reason that the role of Mindanao's city are actually just concentrations of the countryside and thus can be considered part of Maoist fighting ground. Successfully they develop different forms of mass actions.

Furthermore, their strength lets them outreach to the Moro cause. On the one hand they open up relations with the Moro insurgency, even though getting rejected by the latter's leadership. Thus, they try to disseminate their ideas directly to the Moro communities. However, while they gain support by the indigenous highlanders, they find few acceptance for their ideas in the lowland indigenous communities. Explanations on the level of ideas are three: a throughout conservative Moro society, a non-reflected and thus persistent Filipino chauvinism in the Maoist movement combined with its liberation theology base, and a bad reputation for communist persecution of Muslims in the atheistic USSR (Molloy 1983: 22). However, the first and the last argument would count for the Catholic population as well.

Meanwhile, the split of the Moro insurgency reduces the necessity of their proponents to compromise their ideas with the other factions. This argument counts mostly for the Middle Eastern faction. After breaking from the Manila-faction, they pursue ideas more closely to their own studies. On the national level they open up for a political settlement in return for the possibility of a cultural renovation. On the regional level they distance themselves from Libya and connected to more conservative countries and non-governmental supporters; amongst others in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. However, the main change is their increased dissemination of Islamic ideas throughout the Muslim population on the southern Philippines. Different to the locally trained Imams, they get the title of Ustad, as Islamic scholars returning from the centres of Islam in Mecca and Cairo. They establish Islamic schools, give sermons and Arabic language classes, and establish Sharia courts. On the other hand they learn from the

local population, adapt to local structures, and engage more and more in community work. All these circumstances lead to a more favourable ground for the strengthening of Islamic ideas. The Manila-faction is more constrained. As they try to keep foreign support alive, they do not reject Islamic notions or adapt concepts by the Maoist insurgency. This foreign-oriented ideological work limits their influence on the local masses. While the secular concept of a Moro nation, transcending local ethnicities as well as integrating willing settlers, gains ground just slowly, a resistance identity against the Northern intruders has been welcomed by the local population. Meanwhile the elite's faction readapts to the official discourse of development and protection of the Muslim Filipinos in a national society, with peace and order becoming synonyms for governmental cooperation.

3.2.5 People-Power

Four major changes can be seen in the network regarding social ideas after the end of Marcos' dictatorship: restoration of Philippine democracy in an era of liberal peace, the development of the concept of an autonomy for the Bangsamoro, the return of Afghan Veterans and the rise of radical Islamist ideas, and finally grass root approaches facilitated by nongovernmental organizations, including a stronger focus on non-Muslim indigenous people.

The end of President Marcos brought with it an end to his understanding of a New Society as formal state ideology. However, changes on the overall ideology of the Philippines are few. All in all the New Society has not altered general ideas on economic liberalism and modernization. While the anti-Marcos opposition was strongly based on intellectual work by people related to the Maoist insurgency, the final takeover has been let by the conservative elites with approval by the US government, which realized early enough the political death of their former protégé. What has changed in comparison to the Marcos years is that liberalism gets extended onto civil society once again. On a global level, similar changes occur. The breakdown of the Soviet Union leads to the golden era of liberalism in the 1990s and the Philippines try to be its best example. President Ramos' "Philippines 2000" strategy encompasses the relevant concepts and terms:

"[I]n the past ... the economy had been governed largely by politics instead of markets. ... [W]e now know that development cannot take place in our country unless we put our house in order. And this — to me — means accomplishing three things: One, restoring political and civic stability. Two, opening the economy: dismantling monopolies and cartels injurious to the public interest, and levelling the playing field of enterprise. Three, addressing the problem of corruption and criminality." (Ramos 1993)

Peace is thereby instrumental to economic development.

The same global scenery pushes the insurgency from the other side. The Middle East aligns with the United States in their common war against Iraq in 1991 and "Indonesia provided the leadership of the 'ASEAN factor'", as the ASEAN region "experienced a sense of development and prosperity ... The spirit for peace was high" (Adam 2002: 103-104). "[A]highly prized ASEAN unity' cannot be allowed to be jeopardized by an otherwise Philippine internal problem." (Wadi 1993: 207; referring to a comment by Peter Gowing). The states aligned under the banner of Islamic diplomacy want peace.

Thus, a compromise has to be found between the unitary nation of the Philippines and the Bangsamoro, viable for a political solution. It gets found in the combination of autonomy and development. However, the concept of the Bangsamoro is still in its utopian stage, i.e. few concepts, above all regarding government and economy, have been established. Thus, economic questions in the peace agreement (MNLF/GRP 1996) follow Ramos liberal agenda and the autonomy agreement is detailed but rather powerless, as shown in the consecutive years. The dream of independence gets replaced by the dream of multilane highways and a 'new Hong Kong' (Misuari quoted in Harber 1998: 80).

This weakening of revolutionary ideas throughout the peace process and already the acceptance of peace negotiations before is fertile ground for more radical ideas. Together with other international fighters, Moro men did not just fight the communists in Afghanistan but adhere to a puritan form of Islamic renewal. After the retreat of the Soviet Union, civil war in Afghanistan continues, leading to the takeover by the Taliban. Meanwhile, the international fighter brigades against the communists return to their places of origin and continue their struggle in the respective countries. The battle-hardened Islamic scholars are the nucleus of violence-oriented groups on the regional stage. On the Philippines they found their own rebel organizations, the Abu Sayyaf and try to attract people frustrated from the peace process, in direct competition with the Middle Eastern faction. However, while the latter highlights its mass base and overall connection to the Muslim masses, e.g. in regional assemblies with several hundred thousand people, the former considers themselves as an Islamic avant-garde.

Meanwhile, after the 1996 peace agreement between the main faction and the Philippine government, the Middle Eastern faction takes over the struggle for independence. In the late 1970s still demanding a moderate autonomy they now call for an Islamic state, denouncing the second failing of a peace agreement with the Philippine government. They can count on a strong support of the local population and the not-integrated veterans, which have little comprehension for the big dreams but small outcome of rebels-became-politicians of the main faction.

Contrary to the Moro insurgency, the Maoist insurgency does not lose followers *due* to peace negotiations but to *outstanding* negotiations. After helping to oust Marcos from power, connections to the new government break rapidly down again. While the broad anti-Marcos front became an intersubjective meaning throughout the nation, except from Marcos home region and some army units, the Maoist insurgency has to readapt now to a changing world. The Maoist concept gets questioned after even the PR China introduces measures toward a market economy. However, the chairman of the Communist Party stands firm and lines out how to continue the struggle: "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors" (Liwanag 1992); Moro peace negotiations he considers as capitulation (Santos and Santos 2010a: 337). A series of long-term comrades however "reject"¹⁹ his analysis and leave the movement either to form their own splinter groups or, more often, switch to legal activities. Against the notion of socialist centralism they forge now grass root developments in their NGOs, a "de-radicalization similar to South American developments" (Interview P). With focuses on development and peace they can connect with international organizations and funds, tapping discourses about human security, protection of indigenous people, sustainable development, etc. This leads to

¹⁹ Thus they get labeled as "rejectionists".

another development: non-Muslim indigenous people distance themselves from the Moro cause, claiming their own development process (Interview Y), directly undermining the Moro notion of talking for all indigenous people of the southern islands. In the Moro areas, too, above all peace NGO's spread, partly as Moro advocacy groups, partly as interfaith-dialogue groups.

3.2.6 New Millennium

The new millennium sees the dissolution of one social group and a change of discourse in two clusters of social groups.

The former main faction dissolves, with their member aligning with different political factions on the national level or retreating to local positions or NGOs. As a unified voice producing ideas for social change they disappear from the network and with it weakens the idea of a secular Moro nation integrating all territories of the former sultanates.

Meanwhile the Middle Eastern faction adapt to their new role as leading insurgents and thus to the negotiation process with the Philippine government. Furthermore they carry on the nationalistic rhetoric of the dissolved Manila faction, even though leaving behind its secular understanding. However, while the later faction never adapted their anti-colonial terminology of the seventies, the new leaders read the national and international discourse of their opponents well (Interview H). They adapt to the NGO-community by taking up the notion of ancestral domain, overcoming the problem to establish a territorially bounded nation in an archipelago, which in the meantime is materially dominated by settlers and their successors. They have redefined the notion of "Right to Self-Determination" by claiming its possible double meaning: external RSD, meaning secession, and internal RSD, i.e. self-government inside a federal state. As the first is out of reach, the second understanding of RSD is now the negotiation base (Interview C). As a term they use the notion of Bangsamoro Judicial Entity, claiming ruling power over their own Muslim constituency. They continue to refer to an Islamic government and to Islamic traditions of ruling, but they distance themselves from local and regional puritan groups like the Abu Sayyaf.

This again is consequence of the strongest current global discourse topic: anti-terrorism. After 9/11, they not just deny ties with terrorist groups, but help pursue them in the name of rule of law and human rights. Contrary to the anti-American sentiments of the terrorist groups, the Middle Eastern faction even send a letter to the American President George W. Bush, asking for his initiative in a peace process with the Philippine government. The insurgency invites regularly the US to participate more strongly, as they are expected to push the national level for peace due to security and economic reasons. Furthermore the insurgency argues, that it is the duty of the US to clear the mess, they have left due to its colonial policy (Lingga 2006b). Interestingly, this is a conflicting argument with Philippine anti-colonial sentiments, where ideas get put forward, that the US would support a Moro secession to get in return the right to use the new Moro state as a military hub for their presence in the region. (Docena 2007; 2008)

The national level sends meanwhile ambiguous signals regarding this new discourse, trying to use it in an instrumental way. On a global level, the Philippines stand strong at the US side, for example sending symbolic numbers of troops to Iraq. Regarding the local insurgency, however, the inclusion of it into this global discourse is ambivalent. The reason is simple: once the insur-

gency gets integrated into the discourse of war on terror, they have to be labeled terrorists and thus a political settlement of the conflict drifts out of sight. Therefore, the official line is to keep the currently strongest insurgency faction out of the discourse by demanding from them to distance themselves from the terrorist splinter groups like Abu Sayyaf. The Islamic-nationalist faction has done that right from 9/11 on and thus the ideological struggle in this area is a continuing discussion, if this distance is kept satisfactory. Newspaper and local politician play regularly the “bad cop” in the “good cop-bad cop-game” and discover far-reaching links between the insurgency and global terrorism, which the national level can use then as a moment in the ongoing peace negotiations.

The Maoist insurgency has meanwhile broadened its spectrum of activities, including participation at elections. However, the ideological struggle continues, with some of the former comrades complaining, that the leadership in exile has missed to adapt to the changing circumstances of the 21st century (Quimpo 1993). While the movement lost a series of individual intellectuals, it is an ongoing debate if the insurgency thereby lost its intellectual capabilities (Interview ZB) or is still able to attract potential generations from universities (Interview P).

3.3 Institutions

Institutions are, compare chapter two, in Cox’ words, “amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of ideas and material capabilities”, (Cox 1981: 137) while Gramsci grasps them in relation to the state as the complex of the enlarged state encompassing “political society + civil society” (Gramsci, Hoare and Smith 1971: 263 / GT-12). Thus, the next section will describe formal and informal social institutions as well as their relations with society and each other; put in place and consequently influential in Minsupala throughout the analyzed decades.

3.3.1 Pre-Independence

During the colonial era, two sets of institutions are competing with each other: local traditional institutions and colonial institutions.

Local traditional institutions stabilize social relations inside and between local communities. On the smallest level these are family/clan structures. The more formal institutions are closely linked to the above described system of Datuism. Islam has a defining role in this system; however, it is not an exegesis of the Koran, but a combination with the customary Adat-law which forms local regulations. Which influence Islamic law has on the Adat-law is not just a historical but a political question. While UK scholar Hooker states that “[c]ompromise syncretism and localized sophistry are the norm rather than the exception” (Hooker 1983: 21), the Moro scholar Mastura defines Adat-law as “a supplementary source within the system of Islamic jurisprudence” (Mastura 1994: 467) Both sentences can describe the same historical reality, but the political implication is either a local community adapting an inflow of ideas or a local community as part of a broader community with a possible political reference. Leaving these differences aside, these institutions regulate all aspects of society, from questions on communal land to family relations to conflict resolution. The specific codes vary from area to area. In the sultanates the codes find a broader unified application and accumulate local communities. Above all four have a regional Southeast Asian relevance: the sultanates of Buluan and

Cotabato in central Mindanao, the sultanate Sulu on the western islands, which includes part of nowadays Malaysia, and finally the Pat a Pangampong a Ranao in the area of Lake Lanao, an egalitarian assembly of lords. There is no institution encompassing all Muslim indigenous people of the region; obviously, as to encompass all Muslims indigenous people of the region, it would have to include nowadays Malaysia, Indonesia, parts of Thailand and further communities in the West of the open maritime space.

Colonial isolation by the Spaniards and later colonization under the USA and the Philippine government weaken traditional institutions and add new institutions. As mentioned, Spanish colonial institutions do not reach the southern islands during colonial attempts by the Spanish Crown, but as they already penetrate the northern islands, they will get introduced on the southern Philippines by settlers during the following periods. The duality of state and Catholic Church in Spanish colonialism can be felt until today with the influence of the Catholic Church on Philippine politics. A small, but highlighting example is that government documents get dated with the words "In the year of our Lord ..." up to the present, not to mention more direct influences of the Church for example regarding family planning or during the ousting of President Marcos.

When the American military conquer the southern islands, they put their own institutions in charge. The so-called Bates agreement which recognizes the governance powers of the Sultan of Sulu gets abrogated after the military defeat of resistance against the new colonial masters in the northern islands. Afterwards, the southern islands are directly controlled by the US-military for more than a decade with Americans forming big part of the administration. Existing laws get accepted, however, just as a secondary reference. Carriage of arms and slave trade has been abolished. The most serious consequence for the future decades, however, is the introduction of the Torrens system. The traditional system of communal land allocated by the Datu to peasants gets explicitly declared void. All land is now national property and a land title is necessary to transfer it to a private individual owner (Jubair 1999: 121). To understand the new US-modeled system, education programs get introduced, targeting the local elites.

3.3.2 Pre-Martial-Law

The postcolonial time sees a series of new institutions and with it organizations. For the future insurgency, no less than five sets of institutions are relevant.

First, with the transfer of power from colonial to internal institutions, the American system of liberal democracy gets introduced. Philippine politicians elaborate a constitution during 1934, which becomes effective in 1935, with Manuel Quezon as the first President. After the interruption of Japanese occupation during World War II, formal independence becomes declared in 1946. The 1935 constitution (Philippines 1935) continues to serve as the basic institution of the Philippine state until 1973. Several elements are relevant. First, in Article I the national territory is defined as according to the Treaty of Paris. The treaty between the US and Spain included the unconquered southern islands, promulgated in the constitution. Secondly, several terms as "The Filipino people" or the "patrimony of the nation" in the preamble highlight the unitary character of the state. Different histories are not mentioned, nor are minorities. Thirdly, a Congress forms the legislative, with a smaller Senate and a larger House of Representatives, the latter elected out of the provinces. The executive is formed by the directly elected President and his or her administration. The Supreme Court forms the third pillar in the divi-

sion of power. To assure appropriate elections, a Commission of Elections is defined in Article X with broad competencies: "All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest election". The Armed Forces of the Philippines are under the command of the President, who can use them not just against foreign attacks, but

"to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law." (Philippines 1935: §7 Sec.10(2))

Regarding economic terms the constitution continues the Torrens system and highlights that all key resources should belong to the state. Its usage is the sole right of Filipino citizens and companies with a Filipino majority ownership (Philippines 1935: §14).

However, the special relation between the former colonial master and the now independent republic continues. Based on a pre-independent agreement between the President of the US and the Philippines, ratified by the respective national legislators in early 1946, the constitution got amended and states that

"the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines." (Philippines 1935)

The rest of network changes follow this new national and international setting.

Although subordinated to a unitary constitution, local institutions, formal and informal, remain strong. Moro elites adapt and until the late 1960s they are not just able to secure elections in their old fiefdoms, but in the new settler communities as well (Tan 1993: 41-42). The first-past-the-post system with its strong links to local communities favors the easy adaptation of traditional institutions; both institutions, traditional and liberal, request necessarily strongholds in the local communities, from which higher political positions can be aspired for, from provincial governor to district based members of congress (Beckett 1994: 304-305). This defining role of local roots and institutions encompasses the security sector as well. Local "bosses" (Sidel 1999) throughout the Philippines establish their own violence organizations. These private armies sometimes get their legal blessing by connecting them as paramilitary groups indirectly to the local AFP or police units. The direct use of these governmental agencies for the particular interests of the local ruler is a third possibility for local control of violence. Three vigilante groups get special prominence in the Moro areas: the "Ilagas" at the hand of settler elites, and the Barracudas and the Blackshirts at the hand of Moro politicians. Furthermore, above all during elections of the late 1960s and beginning 1970s, the Philippine Constabulary, part of the AFP, has a reputation of aligning with settler candidates.

Based on his own Blackshirts, local politician Matalam establishes the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) following his ousting as provincial governor, i.e. from the government institutions. The MIM is short lived; several years later Matalam gets integrated by President Marcos as Peace Adviser into the state again and Matalam dissolves the MIM. However, before that the MIM institutionalizes a connection between Moro students and part of the local elite, setting unintentionally an institutional base, from where a radical united insurgency could start of.

Until then the institutionalization of the student movement in the Middle East as well as in Manila has been weak, even though a series of organizations have been established. There are many student organizations, but no single force. Gutierrez (2000d: 310) mentions for Manila alone the “Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations, Muslim Progress Movement, Philippine Muslim Nationalist League, Muslim Students’ Association of the Philippines, Muslim Lawyers’ League, Muslim Youth Assembly, Bismillah Brotherhood, Al Muslimin Fraternity, and Sulu Muslim League”. Further organizations evolve in the Middle East and students are organized in non-Moro activist groups, too; the latter encompass above all socialist groups on UP campus. The MIM is the first platform outside the campus where Moro student organizations can attach to.

The last two relevant institutionalizations happen on the international level. After the lost 1967 war against Israel and an attack against the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, in a summit in Rabat in 1969 heads of states and government representatives of 24 African, Middle Eastern and Asian states plus observers from the Palestine Liberation Organisation announce the establishment of a “permanent Secretariat” which gets established a year later and evolves into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC 1969)²⁰. Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia the non-communist states of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand found the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967 “to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region” (ASEAN 1967). Indonesia and Malaysia are founding members of both organizations.

3.3.3 Martial-Law I

The war areas see above all the establishment of institutions by the leading two insurgencies and the suspension of some government institutions including congress.

The latter is the consequence of President Marcos’ declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972, who:

do[es] hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” (Marcos 1972b)

²⁰ Renamed into Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2011.

The next day he issues General Order No. 1 and proclaims “that I shall govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire Government, including all its agencies and instrumentalities” (Marcos 1972a). Internationally this move gets accepted and the main foreign relations remain stable during this period, even though the reference to the insurgency as a pretext is questionable, as analysed for example by the Nixon administration in a classified US National Security Study Memorandum:

“[T]he communist insurgency ... clearly does not have that capability [to overthrow the Philippine Government] at the present time. ... The martial law declaration was a serious gamble ... should [Marcos] fail ... the Philippines will deteriorate to a point close to chaos and/or revolution. We believe it is in our interest that Marcos make progress toward his announced objectives.” (Nixon 1972)

The martial law finally pushes the radical opposition into underground activities. The Maoist insurgents establish three institutions: the avant-garde in the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA) as their military arm and the National Democratic Front (NDF) as their fore-front organisation. The CPP has been established already before martial-law by young Maoist radicals; a splinter group from the Moscow-loyal Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. Jose Maria Sison, scholar at the Politics Department of the University of the Philippines, takes over the chairmanship of the Central Committee. Along Maoist theory, the Philippines have been divided in red and white zones. In the red zones the NPA establishes guerrilla fronts, while the white areas are designated to support these guerrilla fronts (Collier 1998). Meanwhile, the NDF tries not just to integrate Maoist activists, but according to their national-front strategy all people who fight fascism, in the form of Marcos dictatorship, and imperialism, i.e. US bases and TNCs on the Philippines. This includes the nationalist bourgeoisie. However, the NDF mainly encompasses civil society organisations, churches, and agricultural and trade unions. In Minsupala these organisations have above all the institutional backing of the local Parish churches. Thus, the Maoist activists are able to transform their academic revolutionary ideas into a broad social movement. Their success is based on the engagement with the communities as well as the violent indiscriminate targeting of the local population by government troops.

The later is the sole base of the Moro insurgents in the local population. The Moro National Liberation Front gets probably founded at the beginning of the 1970s, even if their official history claims 1968, thus antedating the MIM. Its leadership integrates the students from the Middle East and Manila as well as part of the traditional elite, mainly their younger generation. Nur Misuari, former scholar at UP, chairs the MNLF. Their armed wing is the Bangsamoro Army (BMA). The leadership is organized in a Central Committee and decentralized revolutionary committees in the different provinces. However, they have to base their groundwork on local leaders. Different to the Maoist insurgency, there is nearly no community work going on, with the leadership mostly in exile in the Middle East. Leftist Moro activists have few possibilities and some of them leave the area to work with the CPP in other parts of the Philippines (Interview ZE+P).

3.3.4 Martial-Law II: Post-Tripoli

As with ideas and material base, the institutional structure of the Moro insurgency is characterized in this time span by the failed Tripoli agreement. The previous time span has been the

sole period in the Moro history, in which an anti-Filipino movement was institutionally united. This unity breaks up now once again.

But first of all the Tripoli Agreement itself is an institutionalized compromise between the insurgency and the Philippine government, which is still a reference point for the insurgents up to the present (Interview X). Furthermore, it is backed by the OIC as a partisan mediator in the struggle. The document agrees in general on devolution of power from the national level to the representatives of a Moro community. However, it fails at the unitary conceptualization of the state and in more concrete terms on the constitutionally demanded plebiscite (compare next chapter). While the MNLF retreats from the proposed joined implementation of the agreement, President Marcos interprets the agreement according to his own interests and establishes Region IX and Region XII as two separate autonomous regions.

As the three allied social groups dissolve in consequence, they form their own institutions. Before, a takeover of the chairmanship by the leader of the Middle Eastern faction fails. Thus, the Manila-faction controls the MNLF/BMA and keeps hold on their relation with the OIC. In 1978 the OIC enhances its status, deciding “by acclamation, to give the status of ‘Observer’ to the Moro Liberation Front as an exceptional case which should not form a precedent for other Organizations in future.” (OIC 1977a: §17)

Thus, the OIC rejects appeals by the Middle Eastern faction to oust the MNLF leadership in their favour. The minority faction thus founds the “New MNLF”. After a couple of years of stabilization, in 1984 the “New MNLF” renames itself “Moro Islamic Liberation Front”: “The word ‘national’ was permanently dropped in favour of ‘Islamic’ to emphasize the Islamic ideological line which [chairman, S.S.] Salamat originally and invariably espoused during the founding years of the revolution.” (Lingga 1995: 29) Their military arm gets labelled Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, even though at this time they play just a secondary role. Of much greater importance is the influence of the Ulama, the community of Middle Eastern educated Islamic scholars, which engages in local communities by establishing madrasas, Islamic schools, and later on in broad community work. They form the base of the MILF and are at the same time their strongest link to the local population:

“[T]he ulama play vital roles in ‘recruitment, organization, agitation, legal front activities, ideological formation, conflict adjudication and propaganda dissemination.’ The ulama are seen as the vital link between the MILF leadership and the Moro population, especially because of their roles as mosque administrators and directors of madrasah schools.” (Gutierrez 2000e)

Furthermore, the MILF establishes camps, which are “in addition to being military structures, ... economically productive communities that are also places of worship for MILF mujahideen” (Gutierrez 2000e: 152). They form model communities of a future MILF led Islamic state. Thus, the MILF consolidate their connection with the local population, following 25- and 50-year-(sic!)-plans (Salamat 2002).

The ulama is the biggest offence to the third group: the traditional politicians, as they challenge the traditional view of seeing Islam and Datuism as a combined unitary concept. They

“did not directly challenge the myth of sanctified inequality ... instead, they disputed the claim that nobility was the single criterion for politico/religious for politico-religious leadership. This argument was presented in a gradual and indirect manner by emphasizing populist aspects of Islamic doctrine and by

supporting 'good datus' – those few who meet the ulama's criteria for Islamic leadership." (McKenna 1998: 204).

Even if the ulama already has adapted and tamed their criticism to local power structures, "[m]embers of the traditional nobility, including those who supported the separatist movement, viewed the efforts of the new Islamic teachers (ulama) as unwarranted tampering with cherished local customs and an attempted usurpation of their traditional religious authority." (McKenna 2002: 547) Thus, their main proponents in the rebel movement, Pendatun and Lucman, chair the BMLO, while Dimas Pundato forms the MNLF-Reformist Group with mainly members of the Maranao ethnic group. While the BMLO dissolves with the death of their elderly proponents (Santos 2010d: 65), Dimas Pundato is the "first casualty" on government efforts and "accepted the directorship of the Office of Muslim Affairs along with other perks that came with a patron-client relationship" (Tan 1993: 50-51) under the Cory Aquino government in 1987²¹. Academic scholars critical of the government relate these later movements to counter-insurgency efforts:

"In July 1977, as the AFP resumed its military rampage, a proclamation issued from Saudi Arabia announced the creation of the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) as the 'true organization of the Moro people.' It was headed by Sultan Harun ul-Rashi Lucman, an ex-congressman and one of the biggest landowners in Mindanao, and Macapanton Abbas, an ex-bureaucrat who once headed the "Task Force for Southern Philippines," the civilian arm of the Marcos regime's anti-MNLF forces in Mindanao. Detailed documentary evidence that became available later establish incontrovertible links between this organization, the commanders of the AFP and the US intelligence agencies." (Ahmad 2000b: 35)

Meanwhile, with the increased strength of the Maoist insurgency in Mindanao and the continues reluctance of the MNLF to engage more directly with the CPP and NDF, leftist Moro activists found the Moro Revolutionary Organization under the umbrella of the NDF. Two guerilla fronts have been established in Lanao/Misamis "under the leadership of the Central Mindanao Regional Party Committee for the Communist Party of the Philippines." (Gutierrez 2000d: 325) However, they are not just under pressure from the AFP but from local Moro rulers as well, as one former activist recalls: "We have been quite strong organizing the Moro community, but when it became clear that we would be successful, the killings began. This destroyed our attempts and since then the left organizing politically the Moros vanished." (Interview N).

3.3.5 People-Power

The ousting of power reinstates the liberal democratic institutions of the Philippine Republic. For a transition period, the new President Cory Aquino declares her government a revolutionary government outside of the former constitution with her as "President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the sovereign mandate of the people"; thus she promulgates a Provisional Constitution in which "the President shall continue to exercise legislative power" (Aquino 1986). She appoints officers in charge for otherwise elected government officials and a Commission to form a new constitution. This new constitution has been adopted by a plebiscite on February 2, 1987.

²¹ For transparency reasons: other commentators judge Pundato in much more favourable terms.

Regarding the institutional landscape of the Moro insurgency, it instigates two network changes: the establishment of an autonomy region and the establishment of a series of non-governmental organizations. In the violence sector one aspect doesn't change regardless the new constitution and another establishes independently of it. Finally, the new situation favors a new institutional arrangement between the insurgency and the Philippine government: the Final Agreement on Peace of 1996.

Before an agreement with the MNLF can be reached, Article X of the new constitution stated:

“There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.” (Philippines 1987: §10, Sec.15)

Two years later, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao gets proclaimed following a process involving the presidentially appointed Regional Consultative Commission and later on Congress (Basman 1989). The consequent electoral offices are filled with traditional politicians and the institution is an intermediary between local government units and the central government.

The second outcome of the new constitution and the reinstatement of liberal rights is the establishment of a broad amount of non-governmental organizations, part of it internationals, but the majority local groups. In the Moro areas they absorb above all leftist activists who resign either from the Maoist struggle in the rest of the country or from the defunct MRO. This opens the possibility for public advocacy work for the Moro cause and a more diverse discussion of possible developments (Interview Q).

Although the new constitution integrates lessons from fifteen years of experienced dictatorship, for example a chapter on human rights and the subordination of the armed forces under civilian control, local governance structures prevail. This encompasses on the one hand the dominant relation between local elites and electoral offices, regardless of the constitution stating that “[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties” (Philippines 1987: §2, Sec.26). The second point encompasses vigilantes and paramilitary groups:

“Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.” (Philippines 1987: §18, Sec.24)

However, with peace agreements with the insurgents stalled, the President has reinstated paramilitary forces amongst others as *Cafgus* (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units) and CVOs (Civilian Volunteer Organizations) and

“vigilante groups were officially endorsed during 1987 variously by the secretaries of Defense and Local Government, the AFP chief-of-staff, the president's military affairs advisor, and even by the president herself, who in March 1987 acknowledge NAKASAKA [an anti-communist vigilante group in Digos, Davao del Sur, S.S.] as a 'manifestation of people power' and in October of the same year said of Alsa

Masa [an anti-communist death squad in Davao City, S.S.], 'We look up to you as an example.'" (May 1992b: 136)

The last constitutionally critical development relevant for the violent conflict regards the relation to the United States. The constitution states:

"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State." (Philippines 1987: §18, Sec.25)

A regarding agreement did not pass the Senate hearing in 1991 and US bases had to be closed. However, the government bypassed the prohibition of military bases by signing the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1998 that states that: "from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines" (Siazon 1998).

Independent from the constitution, another development happens in the violence sector. Counterinsurgency operations intentionally and peace process(es) unintentionally led to a breakup of conflict institutions. The spectrum of these splinter groups ranges from radical breakaway factions of rebels to terrorist groups to criminal groups with particular interest. They act independently, together with transnational actors, or with local elites. The common characteristic is that they do not respect government, rebel, and joint institutions, thus becoming spoilers to the peace process.

This includes the key institutional arrangement of the period: the Final Agreement on Peace (MNLFG/GRP 1996). The outcome is threefold: a modified ARMM; the creation of a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), covering the areas mentioned by the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, i.e. 14 provinces and 10 cities; and the establishment of an appointed Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to head the latter. The MNLFG get reserved informally a series of seats in ARMM offices, including the governorship by political pressure of the President onto local political figures to abstain from their right to stand as electoral candidates, thus allowing the MNLFG cadres victories as lone candidates. Thus, they are able to take over the ARMM government and control the relevant offices over the years. However, they still have to deal with multi-layer federative relations between local and provincial as well as national agencies, where the MNLFG is not represented. Furthermore, misunderstandings regarding national budget support along a reluctant congress are structural constraints for the MNLFG take-over, next to internal issues described in the next chapter. The MNLFG faces even bigger obstacles in the SPCPD, as the SZOPAD area encompasses a majority of provinces with broad settler populations sceptical of a MNLFG leadership, long time portrayed as their intimate enemy. The council gets created and appointed as an executive branch by the President, allowing Misuari to take over this position as well. However, it has mainly coordinating functions towards existing national and local line agencies, all of which reluctant to accept another commanding layer. Thus, the margin of manoeuvre is mainly extended by international donations, including World Bank projects (Abubakar 2000). At the end of this transitional institution, the provinces covered have to decide in a plebiscite to opt for integration into the ARMM.

The last change can be seen regarding the increasing autonomous role of highland peasants. These indigenous people, neither Islamized nor Christianized during the previous centuries, show after the end of the dictatorship an increased level of cooperation and inter-tribal organization. This leads at the same time to emancipation from the main insurgencies, which until now could claim to represent them as well, either as victims of Manila- or US colonialism. The ideological change from the more secular-nationalist to the more religious-nationalist rhetoric of the Moro insurgency adds an element of division, even though the MILF continues to claim to speak for all indigenous people, neglecting that their understanding of the term Moro does not extend any longer to the tribal groups as it is now linked on an ideological level to the Islamic creed as well.

3.3.6 New Millennium

The new millennium sees a further increase in factions inside the insurgency, leading to the disappearance of a strong MNLF and growing tensions inside the MILF. Furthermore, network links get reworked: the MILF cuts public links to radical splinter groups and transnational militant groups and agrees on institutional frameworks with the Philippine government. Furthermore, civil society is able to establish links into the insurgency as well.

The MNLF cannot consolidate its power in the modified ARMM and as core social group in Minsupala. After an initial takeover from the local elites with the MNLF chair as ARMM governor and a series of MNLF members in the ARMM assembly, just some years later the MNLF loses nearly all relevant seats in the local political arena, including the ARMM governorship (Gutierrez 1999; Bacani 2005). The SPCPD fails with its economic aim of development as well as its political aim of attracting the non-Muslim population to vote for integration into the ARMM. During the last months as governor of the ARMM, there are already signs of frustration with Nur Misuari's performance and a possible move to retire him against his will. This precludes the final break-up between him and the MNLF's second row after he stages a rebellion just shortly before Election Day. In consequence, the MNLF/Council of 15 split from Misuari. Two network relations are the key to this development: while Misuari loses big part of his officers, the rank-and-file remain loyal to him (Interview E). Furthermore, he is able to remain the contact person of the OIC. Meanwhile, the MNLF/C15 integrate smoothly into the governmental system and thus win key positions such as the mayoralty of Cotabato City and the ARMM governor position for another two legislative periods. However, with Misuari in detention, the movement is without leadership and little public presence.

Therefore, the MILF is even more in the centre of public and government awareness. The institutional cooperation with the government increased layer by layer. An Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities on 18 July 1997 marks the start, followed by a General Framework of Agreement of Intent, 27 August 1998, an Agreement on peace, June 22, 2001. While these agreements have still been bilateral agreements with international facilitation, the "Implementing guidelines on the security aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001" on August 7, 2001, creates two institutional bodies, opening the government-rebel negotiations: the OIC Monitoring Team, later on labelled International Monitoring Team (IMT), allows representative of OIC member states to "observe and monitor the implementation of all GRP-MILF Agreements" (Art. 6); meanwhile, the Local Monitoring Team to oversee the cease-fire does not just include representatives of national government and MILF, but additionally

local governments and NGOs as well as the “Religious sector” (Art. 5), nominated by the negotiation partners. The IMT gets extended to European observers later on in the peace process, in combination with the establishment in 2009 of the International Contact Group (ICG), involving members of the OIC, the European Union and its member states as well as INGOs.

In March 28, 2003, the formation of the Bangsamoro Development Agency in close relation to the MILF gets the blessing of the government and forms a direct address partner for development issues by international and national aid and development activities. While a Memorandum of Agreement in 2008 could have considered a breakthrough in the negotiations, it gets scrapped by the Constitutional Court. Even though the negotiations teams continue to meet after a short break, and then regularly after the election of the new President, Aquino III, any further common position papers between the government and the MILF do just reiterate previous statements. Nonetheless, in October 2012, a first breakthrough could be reached by signing a “Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro”. It includes as key provisions the replacement of the ARMM with a new entity labelled as the “Bangsamoro, the draft of a Bangsamoro Basic Law, and an implementation phase of three years. Further details on the implementation of the agreement have still to be negotiated and it is not yet clear, how the other nodes of the network will react.

Meanwhile relations between the insurgency groups develop. While the MNLF never publicly agreed on any alliance with the communist insurgency, the MILF signs a paper of “higher level of unity, cooperation and alliance against the Manila-based neo-colonial and reactionary puppet government and its US imperialist master” in a declaration of alliance, published in an NDF Editorial of their newspaper *Ang Bayan* in the first edition of January 1999. However, the different dynamics of the two peace processes produce tensions between the agreement partners. Above all the MoA-AD gets harsh criticism from the NDF, denouncing an agreement with President Macapagal-Arroyo, one of NDF’s concept of the enemy due to her low human rights record.

The plane attack on September 11, 2001, in the US pushes further institutional integration between the negotiation partners on the one hand and a dissolution of links between the MILF and regional groups on the other hand. While the MILF never denied having contacts to regional and global Islamic militant groups during their history, i.e. from the 1970s to the 1990s, the outcome of these contacts are ambiguous and open to interpretation. While some journalist and Filipino politicians saw a big regional Islamic conspiracy with terrorist transnational training camps all over Minsupala, the MILF denied at all time any decisive outcome of these contacts. However, with 9/11 dominating not just the global but increasingly the local discourse, the MILF sees the need to distance itself from regional groups on US terrorist lists as much as from the increasingly troublesome influence of local criminal groups, undermining the reputation of the MILF in regard to control over its territory as well as in its ideology of becoming the political leader of the Bangsamoro. The outcome is the 2002 Joint Communiqué between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which states, that they “have agreed to the isolation and interdiction of all criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups, including so-called ‘lost commands’ operating in Mindanao” (Art. 1), that they form “ad hoc joint action group against criminal elements” (Art. 4), going so far that “The MILF may request the assistance of the AFP or PNP in the conduct of operations against such criminals inside MILF areas/communities” (Art. 6.).

Thus, currently, the network is characterized by an increasing institutionalization of relations between different social groups. However, while this is true for the core of the conflict network, at the fringes increasing factionalism looses parts of society to a low-institutionalized area.

3.4 Violence

The following section describes the social network regarding violence relations. Violence is, as outlined in chapter two, understood in a narrow sense as the perpetration or the threat of perpetration of physical violence. It differentiates mainly two kinds of relations: links defined by actions of violence against the respective other social group and links as mutual engagement to facilitate violent actions against a third social group.

3.4.1 Pre-Independence

Four relations of violence can be observed in time span one: violence between colonizers and local population, violence between lowland elites internally, violence between lowland elites and lowland and highland peasants, and violence between the lowland elites and the northern population.

Violence between the colonizers, i.e. through the colonial armies, and the local population starts with the influx of expeditions by the Spanish crown into the archipelago in the 16th century. Military overweight enables the Spanish crown to occupy the northern islands. There, communities are smaller and less strongly organized, while the southern islands with its broader and thus stronger sultanates resist. However, violence incidents are not clear cut between colonizers and locals. The different sultanates and Datu use occasionally Spanish military support to fight each other (Tan 1977: 26), thereby weakening their resistance against the intruders. Still, Spain is not able to penetrate the south and “shifted strategy to the neutralization of Muslim Mindanao by destroying the vital role of Sulu and Maguindanao in the trade pattern.” (Tan 1993: 13) This finally succeeds with the introduction of gun boats which enable the Spanish fleet to control the Sulu seas and thus interrupting sea routes of the local rulers (McKenna 2002: 543). American colonial violence turns out to be more effective. Their first target is the resistance of Filipino nationalists in the north, while the south gets calmed by the Bates-treaty. After its abrogation, the American military administration forces a military “pacification campaign” (Byler 2005). Moro communities answer with the retreat into fortified communities. At several occasion, US military overrun these forts and the consequence are a series of massacres with a high civilian death toll (cp. single accounts in Rodil 2003: 39-44). To tackle this high-casualty resistance US forces try to attract local allies (Tan 1977: 90-91), similar to Spanish colonialism, and since 1903 integrates local individuals “in constabulary and scouts units led by U.S. officers,” too (Byler 2005: 44). The ban of firearms by General Pershing in 1911 instigates a peak period of violence which lasts until the battle of Bug Bagsak in 1913 which leaves several hundred Moros death; afterwards resistance ceases.

Spanish and American colonizers thus are able to exploit a second violence relation: conflicts between rival clans.

“There was ... no cohesiveness among all Muslim groups in the struggle aggravated by political differences, dynastic quarrels, and cultural-linguistic

backgrounds. The Sulu or Maguindanao sultanate never did succeed in becoming recognized in the same way that the Caliph was regarded as the 'ruler of Islam' in the Muslim world. The Muslims Maranaos, Magindanaos, Tausugs, Samals, and Yakans and other Filipinos spoke mutually unintelligible languages. The jihads lacked unity and were mainly confined to independent Muslim groups." (Tan 1977: 27)

These rivalries can lead to violent clashes between the different factions. These clashes are labelled "ridos". They are referred to as ancient forms of conflict processes, including rules of conflict regulation. Thus, blood has to be revenged by blood or alternatively blood money. The primordial explanation by some ethnologists and anthropologists, however, should be read carefully, as much as interpreting local usage of the term as a proof of its traditional value (Rixhon 2007). Its cyclical peaks correlating with missing institutions hint at the explanation that ridos are conflict institutions just in absence of alternatives.

A third relation of violence exists between the local elites and the lower classes, lowlanders and highlanders. Local peasants are under the rule of Datu and as outlined before bounded to a sophisticated legitimating structure, including land allocation and heritage reputation. However, scholars doubt the claimed consent formed by these factors. "The datos as a class had, more or less, a monopoly upon military force and action." (Mednick 1974[1957]: 23) This prevented peasant from quitting the consent: "Both leaving one's current datu and joining another were risky undertakings because of the advantages and interests held by datos collectively" (McKenna 1998: 63). Upland communities lived long time in a symbiotic relationship with lowland communities, as forest products were a welcome trade good. However, after the decline of trade due to colonial interception, upland communities became targets of slave raids, antagonizing lowland and upland communities.

A similar development characterizes the last relationship, which brings us back to the start. Slave raids against northern communities increase with the destruction of trade in the south during Spanish colonialism. At the same time, northern indigenous have been used by the Spanish army as local expedition troops against the south. This bi-directional relation escalates due to the conflict dynamic, with the Spanish army as winner.(McKenna 1998: 77)

However, as said, these conflicts calm down after the first one and a half decades of American administration. Once World War II begins, the US army fights along with Philippine and Moro guerrillas against the Japanese invaders. (Tan 1977: 186) This guerrilla war floods the southern islands with weapons, arms base of violence incidents throughout the archipelago during the following decades (Bernardo 1997: 31; Harber 1998: 44).

3.4.2 Pre-Martial-Law

After Philippine independence, again four key violence relations can be observed: US-Philippine cooperation, the inner-Philippine HUK-rebellion, the Philippines/Malaysia dispute, settler-indigenous disputes and with it an involvement of the public security sector.

As US-Philippine relations do not alter significantly in the economic nor ideational sector, relations in the security sector remain stable as well. US-Philippine cooperation starts soon after independence with two agreements on Military Bases and Military Assistance. The agreements of 1947 allow the stationing of military advisers inside the AFP as well as the usage of permanent military instalments by American forces, above all Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Naval

Complex. A mutual defence agreement gets signed in 1951 and states that “[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.” (MDT 1951, Art. IV), next to the joint capacity development including necessary aid (MDT 1951, Art. II); at the same time, several thousand AFP combat troops participate in the Korean War. Ten years later, again a several thousand men strong AFP batch will participate in the Vietnam War on US side. While the strength of provided Philippine troops is negligible compared to US involvement, US bases on the Philippines are crucial.

A communist rebellion is the perceived key threat during the 1950’s on the Philippines as well. Peasants rebel throughout the northern islands in what is to be known as the HUK-rebellion under the leadership of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. This rebellion gets suppressed militarily and ends in a complete defeat of its insurgency structures. Meanwhile, to ease tensions over land concentration in the northern islands due to an increase of large landholdings, the immense resettlement programs to the south start during these years. What should ease one conflict would fuel the next in a few years time. (Abinales 2000: 123) The handling of this rebellion by the government gets supported by American advisers which assist the AFP in counterinsurgency efforts at the height of the global confrontation between the USA and the USSR.

Meanwhile, at a second international conflict line, the US abstains from getting involved, as it regards a further ally: Malaysia. Sabah, at the western end of Malaysia, is a disputed territory, result of colonial rearrangements of national borders. Sabah has been part of the Sultanate of Sulu, but then be leased to British North Borneo Company; from there on several legal acts have confused the situation. Sulu had to hand over part of its territory to the Spanish Crown at the end of the 19th century; however North Borneo, i.e. Sabah, was not included. Spain again handed the Sabah territory formally over to Britain, without actually owning it; and Britain declared it a British colony, against the intervention of the US. In 1962, the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu declare the Philippine government as the formal owners. When one year later Sabah has been integrated into the newly independent federal state of Malaysia, the Philippine government breaks diplomatic relations. Tensions get severe when several years later a plan by President Marcos covers newspaper front-pages: saboteurs have been trained by the AFP to infiltrate the area and prepare a take over by the Philippines (Noble 1977).

During this training, several recruits from the Moro provinces have been killed. A central government agency has massacred Moro people, the mythical trigger to the current conflict (cp. chapter 4): the Jabidah-massacre, as it is known today. However, it is just one violent incident of dozens, which shatter the southern islands. Increased settler influx leads to broad conflicts. This does not just encompass peasant settlers, but capital investments as well:

“[T]imber licensing agreements (TLAs) and franchises were awarded to big loggers, most of them with foreign capital, as well as livestock breeders. As a result, indigenous peoples, both Moro and non-Moro, lost possession of their ancestral lands along with their traditional hunting grounds. This led to armed uprisings against loggers and ranchers. Armed uprising incidents which took a while to quell were those of the Higaunons in northern Mindanao against the Nasipit Lumber Company and of the B’laans against a big-time cattle rancher in South Cotabato in

the late 1960s. These areas would later become a mass base of the New People's Army as well as of the MNLF and MILF." (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 141)

The elites react and form their own paramilitary groups. Christian paramilitary groups, calling themselves "Illagas" ("Rats") commit a series of massacres on Muslims (Werble 1996: 16-22). Muslim groups, e.g. Blackshirts and Barracudas, retaliate with no lesser brutality. However, this description out of the following secessionist war blurs the particularistic interests of the individual owners of these "goons": "the Illagas ... were financed largely by timber merchants who sought Muslim lands for their logging operations" (Ahmad 2000b: 29) while the Blackshirts and Barracudas are "armed gangs organized and maintained by Muslim politicians and warlords" (Gutierrez 2000d: 313). In the unclear situation, political influence over administration and local armed forces can be a key to success, thus competition over political positions rises as well. Thus, even before the development of an insurgency, the AFP get dragged into clashes, mostly on the side of Christian politicians and sometimes changing sides and becoming politicians themselves as with Col. Carlos Cajelo, former member of the Constabulary and later on governor of Cotabato.

"It went from bad to worse very quickly. ... [However,] It did not overrun all the towns. As a matter of fact it was highly selective. It confined itself to those places with a significant proportion of Muslim and Christian populations, and to those towns where rivalry between Muslim and Christian politicians were most intense. These were observably confined mostly in land settlement areas. The general atmosphere of disorder opened plenty of room for bandits. Personal scores were settled. Military officers and men took their sides. Politicians secured themselves. The general masses, both Muslims and Christians, were caught in the crossfire and fought their own little battles." (Rodil 2003: 136)

3.4.3 Martial-Law I

The Martial-law era sees three changes regarding the network of violence: a unification of anti-government violence, the expansion of an external support network, and an increase of the public security sector.

While clashes related to the Muslim Independence Movement have been labelled by some commentators as the beginning of the Moro insurgency, it still has been carried out by their chairman's private army, the Blackshirts. A political-military Moro movement transcending individual clan interests can not be observed until the establishment of the MNLF and the BMA, even though the MNLF can not be dissociated from developments around the MIM. The first batch of recruits starts its training abroad in 1969 and returns home in 1971 (Rodil 2003: 137-138). 300 recruits follow in the second round. Further on, they are able to integrate private armies and gangs into their ranks (George 1980: 210) and attach to Datu families via their "junior members" (McKenna 1998: 192-3). BMA and AFP engage in smaller skirmishes starting from the end of 1971, but just throughout 1973, the conflict escalates to a full-scale war. MNLF fighters account between 14,000 to 60,000 soldiers (George 1980: 213), while the AFP engages between seven and seventeen battalions on the southern islands, an amount of around 10,000 soldiers plus estimated 25,000-30,000 armed civilian forces (George 1980: 213; Collier 1998: 142). The latter nearly lose the war according to one AFP general (Abat 1994), as the MNLF can rely on a broad popular support: "most of the villagers in war-affected communities were involved in the struggle" (Santos and Santos 2010a: 331-332). Furthermore, "[a]s the

government's campaign against Muslim insurgents intensified, military attacks on Muslim civilians multiplied, further alienating ordinary Muslims from the Philippine state and solidifying their identification with the rebellion." (McKenna 1998: 192) Due to their training, MNLF's initial tactics are oriented at conventional warfare, leading to heavy losses and disadvantages against the US-equipped AFP, however they change to "a war of manoeuvre and mobility" (Ahmad 2000b: 30-31) and thus gain superiority. With the ceasefire in 1976, the war has cost 50,000 (May 1992b: 130)-60,000 (Mercado Jr. 1992: 162) lives, 200,000 (May 1992b: 130)-300,000 (Mercado Jr. 1992: 162) refugees, and costs of about 5 billion US\$ (Gutoc 2005: 159).

Essential for the historical dynamic of events is the external support structure of the Moro insurgency, even if not the reason for the conflict. The first support can be gained from Sabah (Noble 1976). Sabah's Chief Minister Tun Mustapha supports the rebellion, himself an ethnic Tausug, which leads the former Sulu sultanate. Malaysia's central government has little control over the strong autonomous state and due to the territorial tensions with Manila little motivation to go against Mustapha's actions. The first training camps are not in Sabah itself, but at the Malaysian-Thai border. Just with the ousting of Mustapha from power, Sabah's support decreases. However, in the meantime, the MNLF is able to establish a connection to their future patron: revolutionary Libya. Of help are high ranking Moro politicians (McKenna 1998: 155). The MNLF is just one of many revolutionary groups Libya supports in its attempt of a pan-Islamic movement. The MNLF receives financial resources, weaponry, and training, transferred over sea via Sabah (Che Man 1990-79). Further resources can be gained from Saudi Arabia and other member-states of the OIC, after the OIC urged support for the MNLF by its members.

These developments lead to an increase of troops in the southern Philippines. As "the United States shoulder most of the islands' external defence burden ... resources can be devoted almost entirely to the suppression of the internal 'subversive threat'". (Collier 1998: 148) Nonetheless, the conflict in the south is a heavy burden for the Philippines budget. "[A]t one point in 1973 during its war with the MNLF the Armed Forces ran out of ammunition" (Rodil 2000: 2). However, it secures a steady influx of sources into the armed forces, including military aid from the United States. For the careers of individual officers, Mindanao becomes a valuable opportunity to enhance their careers. Body counts are supporting promotions; thus, prospective future officers leave for Mindanao (Interview B). With the main conflict actors successful in their conduct of violence, peace needs pressure from the victims and sponsors: local population, outside supporters and the Philippine treasury. They are the structural factors which lead to peace negotiations and the signing of the agreement of Tripoli in 1976.

3.4.4 Martial-Law II: Post-Tripoli

The agreement of Tripoli did not hold violence operations for long. Minsupala experienced during the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s a double development: the split of the Moro insurgency breaks cooperative links between local and international social groups and the rise of the Maoist insurgency adds another dynamic to the local violence system.

First to the Moro insurgency: the few years of MNLF control on the one side and AFP control on the other over the conduct of violence broke up soon after the failing peace process. On side of the MNLF this regards less the split of the Middle Eastern faction, which did not engage in own skirmishes, but above all the split with the lowland elites. While the MNLF faced con-

tinuous pressure from the AFP, above all elite officers and their followers have defected to become private violence entrepreneurs as paramilitary groups, i.e. Civilian Home Defence Forces (CHDF). The MNLF faces now not just the national forces with mainly non-Moro recruits, but their own former comrades. The latter are able to establish themselves as alternative security sources, having good connections not just to the rebels, but as well to the military and thus an advantage over the MNLF in protecting communities as middle men (McKenna 1998: 179). Therefore, the MNLF looses with its officers recruits *and* communities. At the same time it is interesting to see, how motionless the MNLF faces this problem. While the communist insurgency treads defection to the government like treason and thus punishable by death, there are no accounts on large-scale punitive actions by the MNLF. However, it is not known if this is consequence of different norms or different capabilities, i.e. is there no intention to punish the defectors or no possible way with the little control the exiled leadership has over its commanders. The loss of the leadership of the insurgency brings back the situation of the pre-war era: skirmishes between and inside different social groups with a key role for paramilitary and vigilante groups.

At the same time, a second war-theatre opens up: the landing of the Maoist insurgency in Minsupala. As explained before, the shift from frontier settlements to increasingly export-oriented agricultural businesses transformed farmers into agricultural labourers either as employees or tenants. Their situation worsens and above all they are now dependent on agricultural companies in a broadly unregulated employment relation. Organization in trade unions gets facilitated by the parish priests and increasingly by Maoist activists so that in the second half of the 1970s, the national revolutionary movement rises in Minsupala at a breathtaking pace. Different from the Moro insurgency, the target of military activities is not just the government, but at the same time local elites and international companies. Different, too, is their support structure: even though there exists an international solidarity network and some funding from foreign sympathetic sources, the Maoist insurgency bases its strategy mainly on a self-sustainable course, wary of colonial interference of all kind. Thus, its relation to the settler peasants is crucial, following Maoist tactics to attract the broad population to the revolutionary goal. The difference in Minsupala between larger towns and villages is thereby marginal as the towns are no industrial production centres, but just administrative and processing extensions of agriculture in the country side (Collier 1998). Thus, the local Maoist blur the sharp distinction between city and countryside made in Maoist theory as much as the directives of the national central committee. The insurgency has strong links to villages and towns with the possibility of mass actions at the beginning of the 1980s. At the same time, this leads to an increase of vigilante tactics by local elites and the use of private military services by transnational companies. The Armed Forces follow a counter-insurgency tactic, including DPAs, Deep Penetrating Agents, integrating into the insurgency and undermining the latter's struggle by sabotage and spy actions.

Last but not least a glimpse at another geographical area, where social groups involved in Minsupala fight another battle: after the USSR moves into Afghanistan, the US and the Middle East support resistance against the communist government in Kabul by financing local and international conservative, religiously-inspired fighters against the Afghan central government. The battles extend into Pakistan, were refugees arrive from Afghanistan and catch up with international donors and volunteers, proceeding goods and fighters into Afghanistan. Around 700

Moro fighters take part in this struggle (Interview T). The head of the Middle Eastern faction, Hashim Salamat spends so much time there that he becomes fluent in Urdu. Commentators denouncing relations between the MILF and Al Qaida refer to a meeting between Salamat and Osama Bin Laden during this stay in Pakistan, not denied by Hashim Salamat, but accompanied by the credible statement that hundreds of meetings took place between political actors, volunteers and supporters of all kind throughout his time in Pakistan, without any special attention to Bin Laden. Thus, while the US support the Philippine Army in Minsupala against the Moro movements, both are involved in a broad alliance against the USSR several hundred kilometres away.

Summarized: while the Maoist insurgency develops a new dynamic in Minsupala throughout the second half of the martial law period, the Moro insurgency split in organizational, ideological, military, and geographical terms.

3.4.5 People-Power

As much as the end of the bloc confrontation on a global scale brought little relief for local violent conflicts, so did the end of the confrontation between dictatorship and opposition on the Philippines, even though it has had a qualitative impact on its development.

The end of the USSR and the consequent developments are important for the local theatre above all in two aspects: the end of (indirect) relations between the US and militant Islamic anti-communist forces on the one hand and the escalation of rivalries in the Middle East apart from the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict.

The relation between the US and the Afghan opposition decreases with the defeat of the communist government in Kabul; the latter is consequence of the retreat of USSR support forces. The region loses US interest after the end of global power games; as to be seen later on a strategic error of risk analysis. This triggers a short- and a long-term consequence for Minsupala: the decreasing support of the international volunteers leads to their return to their respective home countries and regions. The Moro volunteers return as well and integrate into the local insurgency. They bring back with them military skills as much as regional connections to comrades in arms. This leads to a fast rise in the military hierarchy of the local rebel groups as “commanders” as much as to an increased military might by the local insurgency (Interview T). The government is thereby confronted not just with a strengthened fighting force, a characteristic the MILF did not show before, but additionally with a fusion of militant scholars and militant fighters.

Outside the MILF this leads to the foundation of the Abu Sayyaf characterized by radical rhetoric, terrorist activities against civilians, and regional cooperation. The founder of the Abu Sayyaf is without controversy Abubakar Janjalani, Middle Eastern graduate. However, here, the agreement on the group already stops. While there is little known on the background of Abu Sayyaf, various stories have reached the public, including the theory, that the AFP themselves formed the Abu Sayyaf together with American intelligence services. While there is little proof on that, it seems that the AFP was at least reluctant to engage against the Abu Sayyaf in the beginning, welcoming a further split inside the opponent insurgency. This would explain why the AFP has not been able over years to control the small group of people. A second explanation is, that soon after its formation the Abu Sayyaf transformed themselves to a franchise

brand, with people acting under the name of Abu Sayyaf to add reputation to kidnappings and thus increase ransom sums. While Abu Sayyaf published a series of revolutionary pamphlets at the beginning of their activities, now income generation through kidnappings seem to have overcome any political aim. Furthermore it would be misleading to think of the Abu Sayyaf group as a small band of people who conduct kidnappings throughout the whole process, from the actual kidnapping to the final handover of ransom. The multi-million dollar kidnapping business in Minsupala has become a broad system of labor division, which includes high ranking public figures in politics and business down to ordinary drivers and spotters and a vast technical equipment on the highest standard (Niksich 2002).

Long-term consequences has the increasing tension between some of these international Afghan volunteers and the US army, including mutual hostilities in the Middle East and northern Africa; it will later on escalate to the "war on terror" and thus affecting the local conflict dynamics in Minsupala. Issue is thereby an alleged cooperation in training issues between local insurgents inside and outside the MILF with other regional insurgents. The scale of cooperation is thereby open for debate. While agreement exists that training camps hosted non-Filipino fighters on Philippine soil, the involvement of local groups in these training camps is unclear. At least it is an exculpatory argument, that the porous Philippine border with its long coastlines towards nearby Indonesian and Malaysian islands allows the illegal transfer of international fighters without having necessarily broad support by local forces.

Meanwhile, a second global development influences the Minsupala conflict system: the US in cooperation with conservative Middle Eastern countries put pressure on revolutionary governments of the region, now that the latter are out of the US-USSR-power play. This gets demonstrated by the war against Iraq and by punitive actions against Libya, the main supporter of the Moro insurgency. Acknowledging their limits in confronting the lone superpower, Libya starts retreating from the support of violent insurgencies to calm down potential conflicts with the US and so do more conservative governments as Saudi Arabia. This means a blow against the more radical demands of the MNLF and the push for a development toward a peace agreement on the part of the OIC.

On the local level a series of changes occur to network relations regarding violence. While the MNLF already lost its military moment with the failed 1976 peace agreement, they are able to demonstrate their continuing military strength throughout a series of rallies in Minsupala cities after the take-over by President Cory Aquino in the mid 1980s. However and even though the peace process gets delayed and has to overcome misunderstandings and differing interests, the level of hostilities between the BMA and the AFP comes to nearly nil and leads after the peace agreement to an integration of part of the BMA forces into the AFP. From the remaining part of rebel soldiers, some get integrated into the BIAF, the MILF armed forces, and continue their struggle with the government forces. During the 1990s the hostilities between BIAF and AFP escalate and lead to a series of skirmishes, put on hold every now and then after negotiation agreements, but never sustainable. Major fights break out regularly over the years. With part of their former BMA comrades now in the armed forces, this leads to the absurd consequence that Moro soldiers fight each other. Including the splinter group, factional violence rises between the different social groups in the conflict setting: AFP, BMA, and BIAF commandos; private armies and vigilante groups; criminal and terrorist groups; inter- and intra-family conflicts. Thereby, the conflict reasons overlap, with political struggles dividing families and

family rivalries leading to escalations between political forces, similar relations between criminal actors and private interests and political forces. Altogether, although showing a successful peace process in terms of general indicators like signing of a peace agreement and DDR programs, the conflict networks further complicate throughout the post-dictatorship years. Election times are thereby the most dangerous periods.

The second major insurgency in Minsupala faces similar challenges: while the dictatorship led to a unified anti-Marcos movement which the Communist Party could lead due to their organizational skills and local roots, this unity breaks up after the restoration of liberal democracy and the broadened opportunities of political engagement from elective politics to civil society engagement next to the remaining armed struggle. The second pressure factor is the successful undermining of the movement by government counter-insurgency agents, not just by effectively exposing underground officers, but by sowing internal distrust, thus leading to internal hostilities and an implosion of a formerly unified organization. The main split occurs between “reaffirmatists” and “rejectionists” of the traditional strategy on the national and local level, but additionally local splinter organizations, forging own battles and peace negotiations with the government. Thus, here, too, we have a rising complexity of the violence network, even though the main rebel group tries to close ranks by disciplinary actions against defectors. However, these exalted acts of violence just highlight the lost leadership over the struggle.

The retirement of part of the activists from the armed struggle to above-ground civil society activities lead to another development: the increased incorporation of civil society organisations, local and global, into the conflict. This includes local peace advocates, monitoring groups, and peace villages. Thereby the consequences are different for the two insurgencies: while the Maoist insurgency loses intellectual capabilities to the civil society organisations, the Moro insurgency gains, as progressive cadres which left the Moro areas to fight alongside the Maoist insurgency, now return to their regions of origin and support the development of the Moro struggle inside of the civil society. A similar disparity can be seen on global links. While the Moro peace negotiations integrate a series of global civil society organisations as for example the US-funded Asia Foundation and London-based Conciliation Resources, the international solidarity groups of the NDF split or retreat after the local split of the Maoist insurgency. While this does not say anything about absolute levels, it is a definitive change regarding relative integration between civil society and the respective rebellions, leading to a relatively stronger political moment in the Moro struggle and a relatively stronger military moment in the Maoist struggle.

3.4.6 New Millennium

The new millennium, as noted before, is characterized by the war against terror on the global level. This leads on the local level to an increased involvement of US military personnel on the side of the AFP, after the region gets included into US public rhetoric as the “second front in the war on terror”, following the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. Active battle engagement is constitutionally not allowed, but US soldiers get integrated as advisers, which can lead in battle situation to an informal activation of these troops in the local struggle due to self-defence purposes. Similar situations can be expected from the conduct of joint training manoeuvre in areas, where a clash with insurgents during these trainings is highly likely. After the fixed US

military bases have been closed in the previous time span, the visiting armed forces agreement leads to a renewed involvement of US troops in the archipelago, however, on a far more flexible base, which allows their engagement in areas of high conflict density.

To avoid the integration of MILF areas into such situations, mutual agreements allow joint operations of APF and MILF commandos against third parties, i.e. criminal and splinter groups, conducted during several occasions. At the same time, the relation between the Moro insurgency and the government is continuously defined by an alteration of peace negotiations and violent clashes. As mentioned already in the previous time span, the complex network leads to escalation dynamics which are influenced by a variety of conflict factors, thus bypassing structures of responsibility written down in peace agreements. Thus, clashes with the main rebel forces occur on repeating occasions after local skirmishes the MILF central command does not take responsibility for, but for which they are made responsible by the Philippine armed forces, so in 2000, 2003, and 2008. This highlights three points: the rapid activation of AFP violent activities as a sign of interests inside the armed forces of a continuing escalation or at least mistrust against diplomatic developments of the struggle; a continuingly low implementation strength of the MILF central command of hierarchic orders down to the rank-and-files; and the further danger of more radical splinter groups of younger generations breaking away from the central command.

We can now go on to discuss the political developments and activities connecting these cross-sectional networks in the next chapter, before bringing them again together in chapter six.

4 Historical Processes in Minsupala

This chapter provides five longitudinal sections to trace the historical development of the violence system on the Philippines. Five longitudinal sections in one social space seem odd. However, history has been developed as well as experienced differently by different actors in this social space. Thus, these *different paths* in history can and have to be traced. Thereby, they are not regarded as different histories, but different aspects of one and the same reality. The following descriptions should be understood as descriptions of an inter-subjective reality; and thus the longitudinal sections focusing on single movements are not the stories *by* the movements; these stories can be found elsewhere (Abat 1994; Iribani 2006; Jubair 2007).

The next paragraphs have several aims: first, to highlight the social causes behind political decisions and the results of political actions in a process of history; second, the interplay of the social structures described in the previous chapter with collective agency described here in detail should be seen; and third, the differences between the single movements and their actions should be shown. The analytical outcome will then be outlined in the next chapter.

4.1 LP-PC: Liberal Post-Colonial Hegemony

“...the greater number of our students who come into college bring with them very disturbing conclusions, // one most common example being that we should view the Spanish colonizers as friends of the Filipino people because it was they who brought Christ and Christianity to our shores. This is a clear case of miseducation that has continued to bug our educational system and must be analyzed objectively from a historical perspective.” (Rodil 2003: 20-21)

4.1.1 The Mythical Past: Colonial Development

History in liberal writing of the (southern) Philippines is a story of modernisation. This encompasses several stages: partial colonialism under the Spanish crown, which has not been able to control the peripheries of the archipelago, a failed revolution, and the following integration into the US colonial empire.

As described in the previous chapter, the Philippines have been divided in several small indigenous communities, sprawled across more than 7,000 islands in the eastern part of Southeast Asia. The geographical division led to different cultures and local traditions, some penetrated by seafarers as the Arab merchants, leading to the adoption of the Islamic faith by the southern communities. National liberal history starts later, with the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan in 1521²². In this time, the colonial modernisation project has to be geographically divided. While for the northern islands the colonial period is an ongoing project of several centuries, in the south the change of colonial rulers from Spain to the US meant not just a change of colonial master, but a change from anti-colonial resistance to colonial subjugation and extension of the northern colonial project to the south. Keeping this in mind, we can consider the start of the Philippine colonial project with the integration of the archipelago into the Spanish empire as new colonies in 1565; the colonial masters named their new possessions after King Philip II the

²² In European school books a tragic hero, on his way to circumnavigate the globe for the first time, murdered by indigenous people on the Philippines.

“Philippines”. Two interlinked Spanish institutions forced colonization: the state apparatus of the crown and the friars of the Catholic Church. Subjugation and conversion of the locals went hand in hand. Thus, they did not just conquer soil, but Spanish colonialism changed the local society into a new class structure based on their connection to the colonial mother land: people coming from the Iberian Peninsula (“Peninsulares”); Spaniards born on the Philippines (Insulares); Mestizos, i.e. children of mixed, Spanish and local, parents; baptised indigenous people; and finally non-baptised people. The latter lived in remote areas, either in the hills or in the South. Spain created its colony, trying to unite the islands under the ruling of the (monarchical) state *and* the Catholic Church. “[O]pposition to Catholicism’s political role constituted, not blasphemy or crimes against religion, but sedition and other offences against the state.” (George 1980: 45) However, even if Catholic backing was a strong ideological and institutional support for Philippine unity, ideology remained precarious as the islands economical base did not materialize into a similar unity. “Spanish colonial-era states preserved indigenous local strongmen as subcontracted agents of the state and introduced derivative and discretionary state power as new bases for local strongman authority.” (Sidel 1999: 15)

Meanwhile, most related to this dissertation, Spanish colonialism could not penetrate the southern islands, ruled by Islamic sultanates. Several forts got established, e.g. in Zamboanga in the northwest of Mindanao, but they never lasted long, with some exceptions on the northern shore of Mindanao. The clashes between the Philippines and the southern tribes escalated into a vicious circle of colonial expeditions versus the south and southern slave raids against the northern communities. Filipino natives got integrated in the colonial forces and thus supported the colonial administration in protecting the Philippines against the southern sultanates’ aspirations. However, this should not mislead to the picture of a dyadic conflict, even though portrait as such by colonial propaganda: northern Filipinos resisted the Spanish subjugation when possible and in the south the colonizers managed to integrate some local rulers, thus fighting jointly against other southern communities. There was “no cohesiveness among all Muslim groups in the [anti-colonial, S.S.] struggle aggravated by political differences, dynastic quarrels, and cultural-linguistic backgrounds” (Tan 1977: 26-27). The situation remained precarious, until the colonizers introduced “steam-powered gun boats in 1846” and could contain the south by controlling the local seas (McKenna 2002: 543). The victory over the southern slave raids are remembered in local traditions until today in the “Moro-Moro-Games”.

Nonetheless these successes, the 19th century ended in turmoil. The base of the first nationwide Philippine revolution had been the “learned” middle class, the “ilustrados”, leading several uprisings against the Spanish crown. Attempts to integrate the southern sultanates into these revolutions failed, due to non-response of the addressed southern rulers. General Emilio Aguinaldo declared independence on June 12, 1898, not recognized neither by Spain nor the US, even though the latter supported local uprisings against its international competitor. In the end, history decided on the global level: just six months later, December 10, Spain and the US settled their differences in the treaty of Paris, with Spain selling the Philippines to the new colonial empire. Article III states:

“Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-

seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty."

(Day et al. 1899[1898])

This geographical area included the resisting islands of the South, i.e. Mindanao and the islands of Sulu Sea. Thus, the Philippines became the first and only US colony in Southeast Asia. As the local anti-colonial revolt continued against the new rulers, from 1899 to 1902 the US military was sent to the Archipelago to end the insurgency. This ended in several ten thousands of deaths, even if numbers are difficult to estimate (Gates 1984). Parallel, the US agreed in the so-called Bates-Treaty of August 20, 1899 to respect the autonomy of the Sultanate of Sulu and pay allowances to the sultanate in exchange for the acknowledgment of US sovereignty. Thus, military pressure from the South was prevented until the nationalist uprisings in the North could be calmed down. However, "American officers serving in the southern Philippines grew frustrated with the Sultan of Sulu and other Moro leaders and began agitating for direct U.S. rule" (Byler 2005: 41). In the American public it was highlighted, that the local people would not want to modernize and abolish slavery; "a strong party of Moros made hostile by the passage of the anti-slavery law" (NYT 1904) has been blamed for hostilities against the advancing US army. The "pacification effort" (Byler 2005: 43) in the South started after the abrogation of the Bates Agreement by the US and continued up to 1913 (critical Rodil 2003: 39-44; Abreu 2008: 20).

In a telegram sent on March 2 by Secretary Taft to Gov. Wright the Governor was instructed to notify the Sultan of Sulu and the dattos that in view of their failure to discharge the duties and fulfill the conditions imposed upon them by the agreement they had forfeited all right to the annuities and "to all other considerations moving to them under the agreement"; that the treaty was abrogated and held for naught, and that as residents of the Moro Province in the Philippine Archipelago they were subject to the laws enacted therein under the sovereignty of the United States.

Figure 3: "Abrogation of Bates Treaty" New York Times, March 14, 1904

Once the US was in control of their new colony by suppressing the military opposition in north and south, they started its integration into broader US control. While the north was considered substantially modern, the south was considered backward, and thus special attention had to be given to modernize it for a smooth integration into the Philippine society and into the American sphere of influence. Five programs can be traced: resettlements of farmers from the northern islands; large-scale investments by American companies; the creation of a national bureaucracy; the establishment of a governmental school system; and the introduction of new laws and regulations.

The first broad based resettlement effort by the American government happened in the years 1911/12, as a grass hopper infestation and a following decline of rice harvest has been the stated reason by General Pershing to call for “for the importation of homesteaders from the overpopulated Philippine areas.” (quoted in Rodil 2003: 110) Canvassers were sent out to attract potential settlers in northern communities. The first agricultural colony of the Cotabato Valley in central Mindanao was populated by fifty persons, supported by the government with training, tools, and capital. The resettlements at this time, were, however, still modest in comparison to later developments.

Next to the resettlement of farmers, international companies expanded their activities into the southern islands. BF Goodrich arrived in 1919 to open rubber plantations, fruit company Del-Monte in 1925, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. followed in 1929 (Abreu 2008: 23). In the Davao region above all Japanese companies moved in by investing in Abaca plantations (Rodil 2003: 114).

A key change in regard to Spanish colonialism was the abolishment of the dual power system between the clerics and the state officials. The US established a secular national bureaucracy: “Elected municipal mayors retained their Spanish/era discretionary powers over local law enforcement, public works, and taxation, winning complete independence from parish priests and full authority to appoint municipal police forces.” (Sidel 1999: 16) Due to missing local skills, above all northern Filipino bureaucrats supported the US rulers in the southern islands, from a secular-modern perspective bureaucracy an efficient and unproblematic act. However, Filipino culture remained deeply connected to Catholicism, and thus the new nation and with it its bureaucracy “was anchored on Christian norms so that its policies mirrored an orientation considered 'enlightened' but which in fact was 'Christian'”(George 1980: 87) A further institutional change was the introduction of a national political system in the 1930s. With it, a power transfer strengthened the role of the national legislator on the costs of the locally elected mayors and governors, as they could influence with their information advance in Manila the nationalized administrative bodies, from pork barrels for public work to the school and constabulary hierarchy (Sidel 1999: 16).

Schools were a further issue of arguments in the south²³. Far from considering it neutral bodies, schools have been understood by local elites as an effort to destroy the local cultures and with it their ruling legitimacy. Meanwhile, part of the American administration around School Superintendent Edward Kuder saw schools as a vehicle to *strengthen* an Islamic identity, over-

²³ In the north colonial schools were reality already since three centuries and thus no new development was connected to the US takeover.

coming thereby local divisions and allowing the Moro population a catch-up with the northerners to be able to engage in a common nation state. Thereby, “[t]he Islamic content of that identity was ... rationalized – even sanitized – to conform with Western assessments of Islam’s ‘favorable’ aspects” (McKenna 1998: 132-133) There are no accounts, that this analysis was shared with and by Datus. On the contrary, they prevented their people to attend public schools as far as they have been able to resist. However, soon it turned out that people who attended the American/Philippine schools were able to engage with the new administrative system and thus gained not just general school knowledge but political and economical profits. Therefore, it became attractive to attend the new school system.

A last step to modernization and towards the adaptation of international liberal standards has been the introduction of US codes and regulations into the Philippine administrative system. A centre piece has been land allocation. Public land act #926 declared all unregistered land as public and open for homestead, sale and leasehold on behalf of the state. At the same time, public land act #718 declared null and void all traditional land grants which were without governmental consent (Abreu 2008: 23). These measures were based on the Regalian doctrine, according to which the state is the sole owner of the nation’s land as long as it does not sell it to private individuals or companies, registered in the state’s files (Rodil 2003: 103). With land as the base of an agrarian based society, being close to the Philippine administration became a core concern for business development.

All these programs proceeded steadily and thus the southern islands were, according to the US administration, as ready for independence as much as the northern islands, when in 1935 the Commonwealth between the US and a Philippine government got established. There were some appeals by southern traditional elites, opposing independence and calling for the US to keep the southern islands as colony for some more years in a petition to the US congress. However,

“[t]he conceptual sweep of the proposition, the mastery of the American political system reflected by the petition, and the sheer unreality of the // Muslim organizational solidarity it presupposed suggested the involvement of enthusiastic American officials in Mindanao who were probably carried away by visions of a piece of the South Seas that would be forever America.” (George 1980: 67-68)

In the end, Muslim elites participated at the Philippine Constitutional Convention in 1934 and “Alauya Alonto, called upon their fellow delegates not only to cease calling Muslims Moros [a Christian swearword at that time, S.S.] but also to accept Muslims as part of the Filipino nation” (Buendia 2007: 6) The underlying topic of these colonial development projects, starting from Pershing’s call for settler colonialism, has been all way along the image of an empty land. Thus, in 1936, first Philippine President Quezon addressed the first National Assembly:

“The time has come when we should systematically proceed with and bring about colonization and economic development of Mindanao. A vast territory with its untapped natural resources is a temptation to interfering nations that are looking for an outlet for their excess population. ... If we resolved to conserve Mindanao for ourselves and our posterity, we must bend all efforts to occupy and develop it.” (Quezon 1936)

An interfering nation at this stage of history in all Southeast Asia has been Japan, opening up the next decisive development: the invasion of the Philippines by overrunning the American

bases. What followed has been a collaborative guerrilla war between local anti-Japanese forces and US support against the Japanese controlled new regime. In the south, traditional Muslim elites led the successful struggle, including Rashid Lucman, Domacao Alonto, and Salipada Pendatun (Tan 1977: 186). With the withdrawal of the Japanese, the US returned for a short time as colonial masters, but soon would grant independence to the Philippines.

4.1.2 New State after 1946

In 1946 the Philippines were released into independence, which however did not mean a break with the former colonial master. This period has been characterized by continuing special relations with the United States, inner colonialism enforcing a stronger integration of the periphery into the newly independent nation-state and escalating social struggles along vertical and horizontal conflict lines; with all three developments interrelating.

Independence brought with it a new phase in formal political autonomy for the Philippines, but not in economic terms (cp. Chapter 3). The equal treatment of American and Filipino citizens and companies in economic terms meant an immense advantage for established American companies over the relatively poorly established Philippine Business sector. They favoured on the national level a pro-export, open trade policy and a nationalized system of law to ease the facilitation of investments. In return, the US supported the Philippines in terms of reconstruction efforts, development aid, and military support, shouldering most of the Philippines external defence needs.

In the south, with Japanese collaborators ousted, Muslim allies could regain their political positions.

“Prominent political families in the Muslim South, that were simultaneously wielders of traditional power, were actively involved in postwar national and local elections. In Lanao, the Alontos, the Lucmans and the Dimaporos, were politically active families. Later, the Tamanos, the Pangandamans, and the Morohomsars joined the political arena. Also, in Cotabato, Maguindanano political families like the Sinsuats, the Mangelens, the Pendatuns, the Piangs, and, later, the Matalams and the Masturas participated in the contests for positions in the government. The Sulu archipelago bred the Kirams, the Abubakars, the Tulawis, the Rasuls, the Sangkulis, the Annis, and later, the Tans and the Loongs. Other smaller clans had also begun transforming politics into often bloody interfamilial feuds. However, what contributed to the integration’s dynamic quality was the successful involvement of Christian and non-Muslim // families in the electoral process [by the ruling Muslim families, S.S.]” (Tan 1993: 41-42)

Christian settlers in the late 40’s and beginning 50’s were politically inexperienced. They came from the lower levels of northern society, different than ten years later, when northern elites started to penetrate the south with large investments and land purchases. Not able or willing to provide their own political structures, these first settlers relied on the local traditional elites; they helped the latter winning elections and thus gained their local benevolence and support (Abinales 2000: 137).

Thereby, the share of the local elites in economic production was, with some exceptions, little. They relied on external introduced rents, for example American reconstruction payments after WW2, which went directly to the traditional elites close to the former colonial administration

(Abreu 2008: 28). The local economy was meanwhile built up by the mentioned American companies, Chinese merchants and Filipino farmers:

“In the emerging multiethnic society, the Chinese maintained control over the rice and corn trade and over much of the general retailing in Cotabato City. But, being barred from politics, their participation in that realm was confined to backing candidates. Christians predominated in banks, national and international companies, and the professions, while gaining an ever-increasing representation in primary production. Maguindanaon, while slowly gaining foothold in the legal professions, were concentrated in the rural sector. Most remained small holders or tenants, often producing little beyond what they needed to subsist. But there were numbers of progressive, midsized farmers, and some big owners who, as they prospered, diversified their interests in rice and corn, cattle, coconuts, logging, and transportation. The big Christian owners followed a similar strategy with the result that, although there was pervasive conflict over land and concessions, there were no lobbies around particular industries.” (Beckett 1994: 293).

The civil servant positions remained in the hands of northerners, as already thirty years before. It was a time of precarious peace with few disturbances during the first decade of the newly independent republic (Tan 1993: 20). “None of the public Islamic assertions of Muslim elites during this period directly challenged the legitimacy of the new Philippine state to rule Muslims”, as in broad terms they gained an easy earned rent during this time (McKenna 1998: 136-137).

However, the development of liberal institutions did not catch up with business intensification. The legal processes of land titling did not go as smooth as necessary and led to a series of quarrels. Corruption, imbalanced information spreads, and lacking education where the underlying problems. From a modernist perspective factors to be dealt with during a necessary transition period towards a more developed country: In a pre-modern society, personal loyalties counted more than the state law. Thus, public offices have been regarded as rent income opportunities, “the main draw for many who ran for office” (Abinales 2000: 130). Muslim elites cashed in on the land titling process and licences in collaboration with “Christian prospectors, industrialists, loggers, and politicians”(Tan 1977: 196) Furthermore, the introduction of a national level of politics including elections provided the opportunity for the local elites of trading local commitment to the state as well as votes for aligned national administrations for pork barrels and administrative favours (Abinales 2000: 132). This connects to the second problem: information regarding governmental development projects got not shared evenly. People with connections into the relevant department of public works could get information on target areas way before they got published. Thus, these people bought seemingly worthless miles of land; just to sell it for a multiple of its purchasing price after the implementation of government’s development projects. The biggest problem however was on the educational site. Local people did not understand the new laws and thus have not been aware of its consequences. While they stuck to their traditional system of land allocation, they ignored the necessity to complement it with acquiring land titles to comply with public regulations. Thus they became squatters on land which they worked on since generations. Obviously, this situation became a problem when the legal owners of land titles showed up and thus “the system of land distribution was creating more problems for the cultural communities than expected” (Tan 1995: 5-7). In combination with the mentioned widespread use of private violence entrepreneurs, from single armed thugs to small private armies (George 1980: 139), this became an explosive situa-

tion. A further development in the 1950s has been the increasing logging business. It severed an already problematic development. Low land settlements pushed the indigenous people further into the forests. Now the logging companies caught up, leading to a series of land-related skirmishes between the logging companies and the removed Muslim and non-Muslim peasants and hunters (Rodil 2003: 114-115).

This local situation got fuelled by developments in the north. Out of resistance against the Japanese invasion and under increasing pressure by international investments, a rebellion sparked in the northern rural areas: the HUK rebellion. The Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon (People's Army Against the Japanese) has been a rurally based faction of the broad anti-Japanese alliance during WW2. Philippine independence however did not stop rural unrest; liberal reforms did not go far enough to crash the old landlord system, established during Spanish colonialism and harassing peasants and land labourers throughout the countryside. Thus, the latter continued their previous fight against the Japanese now against landlords and consequently against government institutions, which tried to enforce national law and provide security to the land owners. Thereby the HUK movement was closely connected to the Moscow-oriented Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) under the leadership of Secretary General Jose Lava; thus the HUK got considered by the administration as the armed wing of the communist party, connecting the local struggle with the global conflict between the two superpowers. The Philippine government could thus count on the support of the United States, themselves in the hot phase of the Cold War era with the USSR. Several hundred US Special Forces joined the Philippine security institutions under the US favourite and former guerrilla commander Ramon Magsaysay, first minister of defence in the Philippine administration and then winner of the 1953 presidential elections. Antedating a future American president, Magsaysay's policy was "complete force or complete fellowship". The latter meant social assistance and that is the link back to the south: northern HUK defectors got promised land in the south and were, together with US and Philippine veterans, among the first bulk to resettle into colonies in Mindanao administered by the Philippine army. (George 1980: 117-118)

In this increasingly heated situation, a local struggle got national prominence: the Kamlon Uprising. Kamlon has been a former anti-Japanese guerrilla leader on Sulu islands with around 300 armed followers. What started as local quarrels out of "inter-Muslim feuds and unresolved land problems" (Tan 1993: 20) expanded to regular skirmishes with Philippine constabulary and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In 1952 Kamlon met with President Magsaysay to agree on peace (Time 1952), but soon later, the clashes continued. This local unrest, however small, was expression of a continuingly growing unrest in the south. Thus, the Philippine congress reacted with a special committee to investigate the situation of the Muslim Filipinos in 1954, led by the prominent Muslim elite politicians Domacao Alonto of Lanao, Datu Luminog Mangelen of Cotabato, and Sultan Ombra Amilbangsa of Sulu (George 1980: 96). This committee assessed the situation of the Muslim population on the southern islands and suggested possibilities of improving their situation. The outcome focused mainly on educational issues. It took another couple of years until the Commission on National Integration (CNI) got established in 1957, supporting Moro students with scholarships for their studies at the University of the Philippines in Manila, and the opening of Mindanao State University in 1962. Any further possibilities in more material terms as infrastructure development, state enterprises, housing projects, etc., which were inscribed in the CNI statute (Congress 1957), were according

to George (1980: 96) not used, due to “administrative inefficiency and corruption which had grown alongside political democracy in the country.”, while McKenna analyses as a broader development:

“In this respect, the postcolonial Philippine government continued the practice established during the American period of ‘developing’ Philippine Muslims not by providing them the material resources of the West, but by endeavouring to remove (by the selective provision of university educations) the cultural disabilities perceived to be impeding their advancement and, indirectly, that of the Philippine nation.” (McKenna 1998: 142)

Thus the postcolonial situation did not change in respect to the general idea, that there are a series of development steps to be proceeded; with the US in the lead, the Philippines as a whole following, and the southerners at the most far end. With this perception, there was no struggle of interests between Christians and non-Christians on an equal base, but a government trying to support the non-Christians on a lower step of development to catch up. The ideological combination of modernism, state, and Christianity, and the classification of Non-Christians as pre-modern was encoded in legal texts, when for example in the CNI Republic Act the addressed were “the Non-Christian Filipinos or National Cultural Minorities” (Congress 1957). It can thus not be too much of a surprise when some officials, forgetting about political correctness, proposed as the simple solution the conversion of all Muslims to Christianity (Capal-Guro 1996: 34). The slightly more sophisticated official policy meanwhile followed the US model: education and Christian resettlement.

Resettlement into the South had a double advantage: the extraction of resources from the rich nature in the South helped develop the Philippines as a whole to catch up to Western powers ahead in development; and at the same time the new colonies could be an example for the local population on how to develop to catch up with Christian Filipinos. Furthermore, as outlined above, the idea of frontier colonialism in an untouched and virgin land did not just find their comparison in the myths of US settler colonialism in the American “Wild West”, but in Christian mythology as well. The myth of reclaiming land under the harsh circumstances of a wild nature with nothing then the own hands and simple tools, of individual entrepreneurship, can be found until today as the basic legitimisation for settlers’ land possession in Mindanao (Interview G), even though the vast purchasing of lands by rich northerners in the 1950s and 60s crosscuts this mythical development story. Furthermore, the national system relied during the development process on the “legitimization for these actions provided by the participation of Moro elites in the national system of patronage and spoils”(Pabico 2008). Education would enable Muslim Filipinos to engage in the national economy in the future and vice versa educated Muslims were needed as links between the local communities and the government as a whole. In the first ten years, under the CNI scholarships 8,000 students, “most of them from non-elite backgrounds, gradually constituted themselves as a new professional elite in their home communities” (McKenna 1998: 140)

The idea of frontier colonialism and national development came under pressure during the 1960s, when land was widely divided among indigenous and settlers. Instances of land grabbing became more serious as there was little place for local people under pressure to move and further expansions by beginning landlordism had to be conducted on the backs of removed people. (Muslim 1994: 61) This development was strongly bound to national and

international developments: the development of a supra-regional, i.e. national elite, strongly linked to the now independent administration, and increased investments and profit absorption by large transnational companies:

‘With accumulation occurring increasingly at the national and trans-national levels rather than the regional level, the traditional local oligarchy could no longer afford to compromise with workers and tenants over wages and rents; naked coercion became more widespread as the local elite and the rising class of bureaucrat capitalists competed in extracting resources from peasants and workers’ (Collier 1998: 39)

Now, a long-term consequence of WW2 should come into play in a substantial way. When WW2 was over, the islands were not just flooded with weapons (Bernardo 1997: 31), but with small armies under the control of single local leaders:

‘The story has yet to be told of the early Filipino ‘robber barons’ who would stop at nothing while amassing their fortunes. Their practice often put colonial cruelty in the shade. In the sugar baronies of the Visayan Islands especially, slave labour and inhuman living conditions came to be taken for granted. The ‘oligarchs’ made unbridled use of armed thugs. What achieved notoriety in the present-day Philippines as private armies first sprouted in the sugar country under the patronage of powerful families which were usually concerned with politics as well.’ (George 1980: 138)

Thus, when the Philippines got granted political independence from their former master, the new liberal democracy had to deal with a widely militarized society (Harber 1998: 44). Now, that social conflicts spread due to the closing frontier in the south, escalation into armed clashes needed just small triggers.

4.1.3 New Society under Marcos

At this point it is necessary to address the development of the liberal postcolonial project on the national and international level in regard to its national sovereignty. Throughout the decades, the Philippines struggled to follow the Western world in creating a unified nation state, outlined in its constitution. Following several threats, described in the next paragraphs, Martial Law has been the answer of the government to save the liberal hegemony, accompanied by an increasing focus on good foreign relations.

Externally, the Philippines struggled to stabilize its border. Sabah, encompassing North Borneo, a region at the Western border of Sulu Sea, has been claimed by the Philippines as part of the Sulu sultanate, which has been integrated into the Philippine nation state. Its integration in a federal Malaysia at the beginning of the 1960s after the retreat of the former British colonial master could be perceived as a direct attack against the territorial integrity of the state. (Noble 1977) The discussions about the Spratley islands in the Southchina Sea have been another contentious border issue.

Under these circumstances, the increased demand of secessionism by the southern islands was the most direct attack against the idea of a unitary state. In the south, external and internal failure of the new state collided:

‘[M]igration eventually created a politically fragile context in which communal conflicts as well as class tensions were now imminent. This outcome might have been avoided had the frontier been managed. But the Philippine state, with all its

postwar predicaments, was unable to carry out economic development or managed migration. State resources were dissipated by corruption, mismanagement, and the inability of government settlements to take off, undermining the government's reputation and exposing the fundamental inadequacy of the state as an actor in southern Mindanao." (Abinales 2000: 123)

Additionally, the state was challenged by a communist insurgency, raising against the nepotism of landlords; which by themselves hardly subordinated under the national state, heritage of Spanish colonialism.

Therefore, President Marcos could count on the support of parts of society when declaring Martial Law in 1973, based on a rational conclusion: Martial Law would be the only way for "the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines" and prevent the enemy to "overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence" in "an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines" (Marcos 1972b). At this time the alliance between the export oriented sector and US investors which formed the support base of President Marcos did not foresee yet that the establishment of Martial Law allowed Marcos later on to centralize "institutional patronage" with a strong reliance on the most national institution per definition, the Armed Forces. (Abinales 1998: 103) In the first days of martial law, the state's political checks-and-balances were eliminated, oppositional media were closed, political and civil society groups smashed, and its members incarcerated. In the following months and years Marcos established a police state, which forced any political opposition underground and provided institutions for armed domination of society a key position inside the ruling structure. This escalation led to the transfer of political struggle to the military field. Even though this was the most visible and probably strongest characteristic of his regime, Marcos put effort into a political legitimacy of his ruling as well. In 1973 he passed a new constitution and one year later published his ideas on a "New Society" (Marcos 1974), combining elements of national class-crossing cooperation, international investments and economic modernization, with anti-communism. Supporting institutions were created, including mass organizations, while his main support remained the national Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Nonetheless these inner-Philippine non-violent support strategies of the regime, the main targets of Marcos political activities were potential foreign critics, who he could not control by force. Thus, Marcos was actively engaged in foreign policy. This included obviously a continuing effort on good relations with the US and in the regional arena with the states of the anti-communist ASEAN. However, a series of additional states have been addressed throughout the years. With its immediate neighbour, Malaysia, Marcos was able to agree on an anti-smuggling cooperation, while after a short escalation during the Jabitah massacre affair in the 1960s (c.p. below), the Sabah argument as a potential hostile issue could be kept out of the Malaysian-Philippine agenda (Noble 1976: 408). Later on, Marcos intensified its efforts for good relations with states of the Non-Aligned-Movement, and last but not least even visited Moscow. While it might have increased diplomatic troubles with Philippines main patron, the US, it helped to undermine the allegations of the Maoist underground, if even Mao Tse-Tung supported Marcos (George 1980: 263-4).

In regard to the problems in the south, above all his attempt for positive diplomatic relations with countries of the OIC has to be mentioned. Diplomatic missions were established in a se-

ries of Middle-Eastern countries, filled with Muslim elites, thus winning friends on two fronts at the same time. He tackled the existing threat of hostile relations with key Philippine trading partners, above all regarding oil imports, by publicly taking side in Middle Eastern conflicts on part of the Arab states:

“Taken together, my statement of 21 October and 8 November 1973 constitute an expression, at the highest level tier of this new Philippine policy which comprised the following principal elements: A condemnation of forcible Israeli occupation of Arab lands which is tantamount to an act of aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The restoration of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. (President Marcos quoted in Rodil 2000: 5)

With this global backing, Marcos was well-equipped in dealing with the southern secessionists. The local elites played their part in this detachment of the insurgencies from foreign governmental supporters. Marcos supported the proclamations of royalty by traditional elites, thus delegitimizing the revolutionaries’ claim of leadership above all in monarchies of the Middle East. (McKenna 1998: 231-2) A case in point has been Marcos’ welcoming of the self-coronation by former anti-Marcos politician Rashid Lucman as Paramount Sultan of Mindanao and Sulu, result of the latter’s break with the insurgency. This coincided with the formal recognition of fifteen other sultans throughout the south as well as the recognition of Datu Mahakutta Kiram as Sultan of Sulu. (Gross 2007: 191-2) Furthermore, Marcos supported local Muslim culture. Amongst others he financed the construction of Masjid Al-Dahab, the “Golden Mosque” in the Philippine capital to welcome a planned visit by the Libyan President. More substantially, in 1974 Marcos instated a Commission to review Philippine inclusion of Islamic law, which led to Presidential Decree 1083 in 1977. This regulated above all family relations and the establishment of Shari’a Courts and was established in cooperation with Muslim legislators. (Mastura 1994)

4.1.4 End of the New Society

These successes, however, were increasingly undermined by a growing internal opposition; in the south as well as on the national level. While the beginning of Marcos dictatorship under the martial law decree has been welcomed by part of Philippine society and international allies, the increasing influence of Marcos cronies in politics and economics as well as its hostility against any criticism pushed the liberal opposition closer to the revolutionary underground, agreeing that Marcos has become the core problem rather than the solution for the liberal crisis of the state. Already in the late 1970s, some liberal opposition groups considered to join the military struggle against the regime. The situation escalated finally in 1983. Liberal opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr., left the country into US exile in 1980 after seven years of imprisonment. Upon his return on August 21, 1983, he got shot the moment he left the airplane at Manila International Airport. Even though Marcos rejected any allegations of involvement, the assassination triggered the final integration of internal and external opposition against Marcos, including a distancing from the US government.

The situation in the south helped little. During the peace negotiations (details in the second section), Marcos could achieve several tactical victories. The solutions in the peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front were bound by the Philippine constitution, including a

plebiscite on border changes. Thus, the implementation of the agreement failed due to the lack of support by the settler majority in the autonomous area to-be. Marcos could claim to have protected the constitution and at the same time giving the Moro population the opportunity to participate in the political development of their destiny. The break from war during the negotiations together with the unsatisfying outcome broke the united resistance against the government and increased factionalism threatened the insurgency from within. Thus, the military could be repositioned against the second threat, the Maoist insurgency. Furthermore, the regime was able to attract part of the now divided insurgency with reintegration funding and political positions in local government structures newly created.

However, these short-term successes could not hide that overall there was no progress to be seen: the broad population in the Muslim areas considered the regime and above all the military as their worst enemy (Bucoy 1984) and in the rest of the south the local socialist underground became the strongest chapter of the movement in the whole country. The integrated new politicians/former insurgents were not convinced neo-democrats but attracted by pork barrels and accordingly little successful in improving the living conditions in the south, as this was not even on their agenda. They just received local support when they kept the government institutions at bay (McKenna 1998). Even though Marcos focus on big infrastructure projects, on average areas of indigenous people showed a twentieth of kilometres of roads compared to national numbers, just every fifth indigenous family could use save water and every eighth electricity (Gonzalez 2000). Thus, social resentment continued and the aim to bring the insurgency to an implosion failed as well. Even though militarily weakened, the insurgency still controlled substantial local forces in vast tracts of the south and could use international influence to trouble the relation between the government and vital international partners, as the oil-providing Middle Eastern states. Marcos failed on all fronts and the situation threatened to turn down the whole idea of a liberal-democratic country in favour of a socialist revolution.

4.1.5 New Democracy after Marcos

Just an end of the dictatorship would open up a new era for the liberal hegemony project. A liberal restoration prevented a deterioration of the situation into a socialist revolution, followed by decentralization and consequent peace initiatives in the south, finally leading to the peace agreement of 1996.

The developments outlined above highlighted a necessary change, expressed now even by former allies internally and increasingly externally. Following rigged snap elections in on February 7, 1986, in favour of President Marcos, a wave of protest united the opposition. Two institutions switched side publicly: Marco's Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and AFP Vice-Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos detached both from their superior and led a mutiny inside the AFP. At the same time, Catholic Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin called onto the Philippine people for the defence of liberal democracy. The showdown happened on EDSA, the main road through Metro Manila, when on February 22 mainly middle-class people flooded the streets, thereby literally dividing pro- and anti-Marcos soldiers. Brought-in tanks from outside the city where stopped by students, clerics, and other protesters, not giving space to the advancing tanks. Marcos' last resort to bomb rebel camps in the city by using the Air Force had just the consequence, that the pilots joined the mutiny as well. Cory Aquino used the situation and

took the oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines on February 24 in a Manila club house, outpacing Marcos by several hours. The next day Marcos accepted his defeat and left on a US helicopter into exile in Hawaii (David 1986). The new President Aquino declared the establishment of a revolutionary government as well as a revolutionary constitution to end the Marcos era, i.e. both had no elective but a revolutionary legitimacy. To overcome this provisional situation, she appointed a Constitutional Commission to draft a constitution, which the commission concluded in the same year. A plebiscite was held a year after Marcos' ousting, on February 2, 1987, with an overall approval rate; the new constitution took effect nine days later.

Opposition was shown by the main revolutionary parties; the communist led NDF as much as the MNLF called for a boycott of the plebiscite. Furthermore, tensions inside the AFP did not disappear. Several factions run unsuccessful coup d'Etat attempts, including Marcos loyalists but as well the "Reform the Armed Forces Movement" by defence minister Enrile, the faction which supported Aquino during the ousting of Marcos. Marcos family itself returned after his death three years later, continuing their political aspirations out of their home region Ilocos Norte with his widow Imelda as well as his son Ferdinand, Jr. being elected back into political positions. Not to forget that even though a dictatorship, Marcos relied on a series of local allies, which now got dismissed by Aquino. Out of power, they formed a strong opposition against the new government. In Mindanao, Marcos-loyal governors, amongst others from Davao del Sur, Zamboanga del Sur, and North Cotabato, formed the Mindanao Independence Movement, not to confuse with the 1960s' Muslim Independence Movement; this cross-faith regional platform declared that "The Manila government is perceived as a foreign power" and it was the intention of the movement to "establish the Federal Republic of Mindanao" (quoted from May 1992b: 137). This expressed not just dismay over Aquino, but as much a general resentment against the dominance of Metro Manila over socioeconomic processes in the south (Tan 1995: 10-11).

Furthermore, elite rivalries reappeared, as the common enemy in form of President Marcos deceased and although the constitution was remarkable different from the earlier constitutions, its implementation derailed its intention and led to the restoration of the pre-Martial Law system, with a strong focus on patronage politics and strong local power-centres: "[T]he effective reinstatement of pre-martial law electoral and representational structures" (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 278).

Nonetheless, one development was remarkable different and opened up new possibilities for a liberal democratic development: information spread easier and more widely and a lot of underground activists reappeared, developing a vivid civil society (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 277). New political activities could be established. In the Moro areas, new political formations challenged the traditional power structures. In Maguindanao Zacaria Candao was elected provincial governor against the traditional elite's candidates, supported mainly by non-traditional forces, including the MILF and the Ulama (McKenna 1998: 254/266). In Lanao del Sur, the local movement against a hydropower project led to the formation of Ompia, which

got its chairman Mahid Mutilan elected mayor of Marawi City and later provincial governor based on the religious sector and the Maranao masses (Gonzalez 2000: 120)²⁴.

Next to these indirect effects onto the situation in Mindanao, the most direct impact came from the new government's stronger decentralized approach. This could be seen already in the constitution which mentioned the establishment of two autonomous regions for the Cordilleras²⁵ and the Moro areas. Right from the beginning, the Aquino government tried to integrate the allies against the Marcos regime. Above all to the Moro activists the regime had long-lasting connections. Already during the late 1970s, the liberal opposition under the husband of the new President approached the MNLF, meeting Misuari during several occasions. The elite opposition from the liberal party, until then working above-ground, explored amongst others possibilities of armed resistance, while avoiding collaboration with the Maoist insurgency. While the plan itself never carried out due to exposure by the regime, diplomatic channels remained open over the years (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 35-36). Thus, when Cory Aquino stand for elections 1986 she could rely on the MNLF's endorsement, coordinated by her husband's younger brother, who met with Misuari a year before in exile. Thus, the situation was ripe for peace, once Aquino took over power. However, she still had to struggle with the military cabinet members, who were worried about the MNLF's attempts and not keen to give in to their battle enemy, which they saw in their last military breathing nonetheless. However, MNLF shows of force convinced the cabinet of having a continuing problem and Cory Aquino approached the problem in a proactive way by meeting Nur Misuari in his home island. On January 3, 1987 they signed the Jeddah Accord as a step toward a peace agreement (Santos 2010d: 67).

Although high expectations on both sides and a generally sympathetic atmosphere, stumble blocks were visible right from the beginning. The MNLF was against the provision of an autonomy contained in the draft of the constitution, regarding it as a unilateral move bypassing the MNLF. Furthermore, the MNLF, remembering the 1976 impasse, was not keen on putting the negotiations again to an expected defeat during a plebiscite and demanded instead an autonomy grant by the public authorities. This, however, did not take into account the Philippine constitutional provisions, which tight the Manila government; Cory Aquino responded by offering the leadership of a provisional autonomous council to Misuari. The MNLF, however, demanded continuously the implementation of the 1976 agreement, leading to a stalemate. (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 36-40) The government proceeded simultaneously by multiple paths to appease the local situation (Santos 2010d: 69). One step was the Balik-baril programme, aiming at collecting loose weapons widespread in the local populations after decades of war and social struggle. This programme, however, was rather unsuccessful due to its perception as a counter-insurgency measure (Quilop 2010:249).

More successful was the implementation of the autonomy measures noted in the new constitution, accepted previously in a nationwide plebiscite. The President created at the end of 1987 the Regional Consultative Commission, appointing 52 members to draft a law to implement the Muslim autonomy sketched in the constitution; 26 members were of Muslim faith.

²⁴ Widely regarded as an honest politician and peace advocate with integrity, Mahid Mutilan died in 2007 due to a car accident.

²⁵ The Cordilleras are a mountainous area, which has not been penetrated by Spanish colonialism either.

While the work of the RCC already had to overcome obstacles due to mistrust between the members inside the RCC, their members were less than happy to see that the Congress re-worked their draft in a substantial way without further consultation (Basman 1989). The outcome was again put under a plebiscite in 13 provinces in the Philippine south, leading to the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, including four provinces out of thirteen: Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao in central Mindanao and Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, the islands at the south-western end of the archipelago. Surprisingly, Moro dominated Marawi City opted in a close race against the ARMM, while all settler-dominated provinces and cities rejected the ARMM by a far margin (Madale 1992: 183). The MNLF rejected the plebiscite, too. However, altogether it was a success, keeping in mind that the Moro conflict was just one of many challenges the government had to face during this period. The coup d'États were mentioned above and out of the military came, too, the harshest opposition to a soft handling of the MNLF, thus Cory Aquino was under constant pressure to balance interests. She even endorsed the re-establishment of paramilitary groups against threats from the continuing insurgencies (May 1992b: 139-140). Further demands on general decentralization got encoded in the regulation of the national police, which handed over operative control of police units to the local mayors in 1990 (Kreuzer 2007: 14) and in the Local Government Code of 1991, which increased the financial leeway of local government units (Rivera 2008: 48).

When her closest ally, General Ramos, took over the leadership of the country, after getting elected President in 1992, the liberal democratic institutions, though still contested locally every now and then, had a strong grip on the national level. Furthermore, the military retreated to their barracks, accepting at least for a decade the new liberal rule. Thus, the country could look forward and the aim of the new government was the implementation of its Philippines 2000 programme: economic development by liberal reforms. This included a definite solving of the conflicting situation in the Philippine south: “[T]he first — and foremost — requirement of economic development is stability, which is the long-term predictability of the social system. This is why we are seeking a comprehensive and lasting peace.” (Ramos 1993). The military conflicts scared international investors, Ramos’ main target to enhance national economic development (Werble 1996: 72). He created the National Unification Commission in September 1992, which led to consultations all over the country to incorporate the interests of all stakeholders (Santos 2010d: 69). Meanwhile, the President already approached the MNLF even before his election. In a secret trip to Tripoli, he met Muammar Qaddafi and discussed options for peace with the MNLF, next to discussing general business and investment options (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 26-27). Soon after his election, peace negotiations with the MNLF resumed. The President himself as a retired general had a good overview on the conflict dynamics and as well a pretty complex picture of the challenges of his opponent Misuari, who “was apparently trying very hard to perform a balancing act in front of three audiences: his internal constituency within the MNLF, the whole Mindanao community, and the member-states of the OIC” (quoted in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 43). His approach was thereby twofold: economic development for the region and political concessions to the MNLF. The first fit in the government overall approach of economic development of the Philippine periphery. This was not just a way to improve the living conditions of the poorer part of the Filipino people, but above all a way to tap the huge reservoir of natural resources still available in and around the southern islands, making the Philippines attractive for global private and public investors. The second was a necessary price to pay for the appeasement of the region. It would have to be

achieved by an increase of political positions to integrate the MNLF leadership and a DDR program to integrate military commanders and rank-and-file. This would allow them to retire without losing face, after it was visible, that most structural reasons already hinted to the MNLF's defeat: reluctance of international donor states to continue to support a violent struggle, factionalism inside the MNLF, retreat of local elites support, and in general exhaustion of the MNLF cadres after decades of military struggle (quoted in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 44-45).

Nonetheless, the negotiations would take another couple of years to shape out the structure of the final peace agreement²⁶. It was based on three pillars: an enhanced ARMM to be headed by the MNLF leadership, a transitional development program in form of the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), controlled by the MNLF, and a DDR program for the lower ranks of the MNLF. The main negotiation partners were Misuari on the one side and Ruben Torres on the other, both former university colleagues and political activists on the UP campus in Quezon City. Ramos' Lakas party pushed the local elites not to run against Misuari and thus Misuari became elected ARMM governor in September 1996 while at the same time taking over as President-appointed chairman of the SPCPD. This development came not without further struggles with local politicians, mainly on side of the settlers, which had few reasons to welcome the former guerillas as leaders of the ARMM, let alone the SPCPD. However, political-instrumental interests were strongly involved in their opposition; the actual authorities of the SPCPD meanwhile were few. As a coordinating development agency it had no legislative rights and thus no possible harmful influence on the local population, regardless if natives or settlers. For experiences inside the MNLF see the next section.

For the Philippine government and the existing local government units the peace agreement had little impact. Even though some positions had to be left to the MNLF short-term which meant middle term a rising competition for the future elections, long-term the non-MNLF politicians outweighed their new colleagues in understanding and playing the rules of the political game in local politics. Thus, the MNLF cadres which were not able to integrate into the Philippine political system by adaptation lost out and thus there was no threat of change to the system as a whole.

The integration of MNLF ranks into the Armed Forces of the Philippines had a more direct impact; the DDR program targeted the integration of 5,750 soldiers, next to 1,500 to be integrated into the National Police force. Next to the general prejudices inside the AFP against Moros, resembling similar feelings in the overall Philippine population, and administrative delays, two questions arose: on the one hand, part of the MNLF fighters missed the entry requirements of the AFP, i.e. age, literacy, and height requirements. These problems were solved by waiving the requirements and establishment of literacy classes and placement tests (Ferrer 1999). On the other hand, an obvious question was on the loyalty of the new integrated soldiers, as the AFP continued to fight against MNLF splinter groups. Interestingly there were no signs of loyalty issues (Santos 2010b). Problems arose with more wither expectations regarding the DDR process: a complete demobilization of the MNLF soldiers and a reduction in private weaponry possession, both aimed at an increased monopolization of violence in the hands of the state. A complete demobilization failed due to two reasons: the agreed number

²⁶ For a detailed account of formal and informal talks see (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 26-102) Part One, for first-hand-accounts see (Ramos 1996) and (Iribani 2006).

of integrated rebels was not high enough to encompass all MNLF fighters. Secondly, the lists were widely populated by people who either never fought for the MNLF or entered the MNLF fighting force just when the DDR program was already on the horizon. Thus, while non-fighters entered the ranks of AFP and PNP, a substantial part of fighters returned to MNLF splinter groups. The reduction of arms failed as well: the government had little means in hand to retrieve illegal weapons without an unviable massive use of force for household searches. Furthermore the sales of weapons continued. By their new legal profession, the now official soldiers had the right to possess arms. So the returned weapons via the DDR program were simply replaced by more modern weaponry. Furthermore government funds were used to acquire weapons to equip soldiers and police men, above all if used for security purposes surrounding the new MNLF politicians. Thus, to a certain extent they became army units in debt to the people who provided the weaponry, leading to a further increase of the phenomenon of private armies. Summarized, while the operative implementation of the peace agreement in regard to DDR question was a success, the broader expectations of a reduction of the violence system were not met.

The implementation of the political and development parts of the agreement over the years was then rather difficult. Three issues can be highlighted: missing skills by the former rebels, clientelism and corruption, and coordination problems with other state agencies.

The first issue encompasses several obvious as well as not so visible dimensions: the MNLF leadership which was now to be integrated as administrative leaders of the ARMM and the SPCDP spent their last three decades either underground or abroad.

“It was a matter of trust in the revolutionary bureaucracy. We had no receipts. Our expenses were written at the back of cigarette labels. ... I had a very hard time because a lot of our people came to seek help and I had to explain that they’re used to the revolutionary type of bureaucracy, the fast one. Here, we had to deal with an auditor for petty cash. Everything had to be properly documented.” (Former MNLF ARMM Budget Director Natchai quoted from Vitug and Gloria 2000: 88)

Thus, they had to learn the new administrative rules fast and there was little help from outside, as the former ARMM rulers left in dismay. Furthermore, the ARMM bureaucracy was not the MNLF and interests differed on the different levels, thus the new MNLF leadership had to learn how to control its serving bureaucratic agencies. A third point refers to the incorporation of external support: to strengthen the MNLF’s expertise, sympathetic experts were brought into the political hierarchy, for example Parcasio, former MNLF legal counsel, who joined the MNLF during the peace negotiations and subsequently became executive secretary, running the ARMM when Misuari was absent from his office²⁷. Old MNLF cadres were disappointed of seeing him outranking them. (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 86) These challenges came atop of the existing expertise problems inside the ARMM: inefficient procedures and their inadequate implementation, lack of skilled human resources, internal rivalries, absence of information systems, and inadequate logistic facilities to address the geographically widespread areas covered by the ARMM (Gomez 2003).

²⁷ Which happened regularly, as he spent much time to attract national and foreign support.

The second issue was the most highlighted and heatedly debated one: clientelism and corruption. The ARMM was from its beginning not different from other local government units in the Philippines, of which many are struggling with clientelism and corruption in combination with local dynasties, blurring the line between private and public interests. Even before Misuari took over, the former ARMM governors tried to fill the ARMM with own people, turning over to Misuari an ARMM with an inflexible, inefficient, and partisan bureaucracy (Bertrand 2000: 45). Constantly over three fourth of the budget went into salaries and overhead costs (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 89). The takeover by the MNLF was not able to change this, some commentators say, it went from bad to worse as it had to include a further factor: the demand of a peace dividend by the former rebels for their hardship in decades of fighting in the jungles as much as from ordinary people, who lost years, finances, and lives of family members and friends to the war. Thus, the new leadership had to struggle with broad expectations from their constituencies as much as from rank-and-file. There was no plan for short-term economic development in the ARMM. Central was the idea of economic growth leading consequently to a rise of living standards; after all, a market-based policy. However, this was in no way adequate to fulfill the immediate aspirations of the local communities. Thus, getting short-term commodities by the new government in form of small-scale funds and public employment opportunities was an obvious reaction. Obviously, the better connection to the MNLF, the easier to catch such opportunities, leading to a public perception of the ARMM as the pork barrel source for MNLF members (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 85-6). Additionally to these troubles, there were constant accusations against the leadership, of using their new positions for their own gains and a picture becoming symptomatic was the blame to Misuari, of hosting international audiences in five star hotels in Manila and abroad, while his followers continued to live in huts on the islands. While the facts in this picture are not to deny, it is of course a political question, if the attraction of international investors in a high-class environment is for the good of the local people or not. It fit however, with the national Philippine policy on economic development: international investment would enable the country to catch up with the developed world and were thus the *sine qua non* of Ramos' as much as of Misuari's approach.

The third problem was the interaction with existing government agencies all the way from President and Congress via line agencies to local government agencies, including provincial governments and local mayors. The formulation of the ARMM was right from the beginning an additional layer which has been squeezed into the existing three-level administrative structure of national institutions, provinces, and towns. With little own project possibilities, as seen above, the ARMM was mainly a coordination and to some extend legislative agency with few own implementation capacities, above all in socioeconomic terms. Thus, for the other agencies, the picture of the ARMM was one of a politically interfering institution of little use. Accordingly, there was little mutual interest in these institutions to bring the work of ARMM to a success, including institutions dominated by the Moro constituency, i.e. mainly traditional politicians. A bigger visible investment deal out of the peace agreement has been a project by the World Bank, the Szopad Social Fund Project. With a budget of 10M US\$ one of the smaller WB projects; but due to the support of mainly small-scale investments it was able to reach a several hundred local projects (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 268-271). Furthermore, international donors announced together with the SPCPD reconstruction and development projects worth 500M US\$ (Bertrand 2000: 46). However, the role of SPCPD in these projects was small; WB for

example had to open its own local office, as the SPCPD officers had no experience in handling social fund applications.

Taken all these problems together, with the transitional period of three years going to an end, criticism of Misuari's leadership did not just continue from outside, but additionally grew from inside the MNLF as well. Meanwhile, Ramos, Misuari's premium supporter on the national level, handed its presidency over to Josef Estrada, which was far less keen on supporting the former Moro rebel leader and not the least won its presidency by portraying himself as a strong defender of the nation against oligarchs as much as against insurgents. In this situation the Philippine national government hoped on a change from within and put its stakes on a transition of leadership from Misuari to a new, more inclusive and cooperative group of MNLF people. First and foremost there was the general perception, including Misuari's own, that more time was needed, thus elections were postponed for a year. The plan was then to allow Misuari to step down before any election, thus without the prospect of losing the position due to an electoral defeat. Instead, Parouk Hussin, former MNLF foreign minister and now assistant secretary in the Office of the President for Muslim affairs in Manila, could take over an interim governorship and compete later on in the postponed elections. The flaw in this plan: Misuari showed no sign to give up his live project to an alliance of second-line-leaders and the national government. He gathered his commanders in a meeting in August 1999 and after three days received their signature of declaration of support (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 95-96). Nonetheless these setbacks, the Philippine institutions continued its path outlined in the peace agreement with the MNLF.

Meanwhile, the peace process with the MNLF was just but one of several challenges for liberal democracy in the south. Two more developments should be discussed here: the negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the increasingly disturbing security situation in the area. Soon after the transition to the Aquino government, the MILF demanded negotiations with the national government. However, due to the already unclear situation and the negotiations with the MNLF, in which the MNLF demanded to be the lone Moro representative, there was no serious attempt to engage the MILF neither by the government nor by national media (McKenna 1998: 241), even though the MILF agreed on a dialogue in 1988 under auspices of Maguindanao governor Candao (Dictaan-Bang-oa 2004: 164-5), who owed his electoral victory to MILF support. It was treated as it appeared at that time: a small splinter faction, similar to other failed MNLF splinter factions at that time: "We didn't see anything more than a small armed group, surviving after the split" (Gen. Filler, former AFP deputy chief of staff, quoted in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 113) Just at the beginning of the 1990s, the government realized the growing potential of the MILF and the AFP estimated the MILF strength to 5420 fighters (Ferrer 2005: 5), i.e. to a good third of the MNLF's fighting force at that time. However, Ramos focused exclusively on the MNLF until the signing of the 1996 agreement and any military approach would have threatened the slowly improving situation. The situation escalated in 1997 when fighting in the first half of the year between the MILF and the AFP left several hundred people dead. In July the first document was signed by MILF and government representatives, the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. One year later followed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent, outlining the framework for peace negotiations. When President Estrada took over from Ramos, he stuck to his predecessors' policy and formed a new peace panel to negotiate with the MILF. The second worrying issue was the increasingly instable security

situation due to small splinter groups, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities. The end of the communist regime in Afghanistan led to the return of a couple hundred fighters to the southern islands and the formation of the Abu Sayyaf Group. Even though at first seen as a further break-up of the insurgency, the seriousness of threat by radical Islamic fighters outside the MILF became apparent after uncovering an assassination plot against Pope Paul II during his visit in Manila in 1995. Next to these more global concerns, the years of violent struggles in the south led to increasing criminality, including kidnapping-for-ransom activities and.

4.1.6 Failing Democracy: EDSA II and its Aftermath

The new millennium, which started for the liberal democracy on the Philippines more or less with the election of Joseph Estrada in 1998, highlighted again the shakiness of the liberal hegemony, after the era of *Final Peace Agreement* and *Philippines 2000* under the Ramos Presidency. Three major directions of threats to the hegemony can be highlighted: threats from economic crises and international terrorism from the global level, renewed pushes by the insurgency from the margins, and undermining of the hegemony by elites from within. These three lines will be traced in the next paragraphs in a parallel way.

The whole region experienced a shock, when in July 1997 starting from Thailand a financial crisis swept over Southeast Asia. The Philippines were under the less affected countries, due to financial reforms during the early 1990s (Noland 2000), however, the crisis still had a serious impact. The Philippine Peso lost half of its value during the next four years and the GDP declined. Fidel Ramos handed over the presidency, after an attempt for constitutional change to allow him another term in office was exposed earlier on and thus failed. Estrada was insofar a new phenomenon in Philippine politics, that even though himself having a long political career, he was able to portray himself as an ex-actor able to overcome the old system to the advantage of the poor masses, based on his prominence in modern media. While the method changed, the consequences did not: Estrada continued the pork barrel system, characterizing the traditional political system as much as the low importance of political parties and ideologies (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 280-1).

A second characteristic was important for the development in the south: he combined his pro-poor image with the image of a tough defender of national interests, not just against foreign interference, but as much against threats from within, i.e. the Moro insurgency. As noted above, while the MNLF experienced their integration into the local government system, the MILF gained prominence and took over the military struggle against the Philippine government. Although agreements have been signed since the start of Estrada's Presidency, tensions continuously heightened. In 2000, Estrada called out an "All-Out-War" against the MILF and overrun a series of camps, including the MILF's main base, Camp Abubakar, which before have been defined as sanctified territories of the MILF in the ceasefire agreement. Several factors might have led to the outbreak of violence, but in a defence of Estrada's decision, Senator Honasan gives an uncompromising reason: "The presence of the MILF's secessionist camps was by itself an affront to national sovereignty that no self-respecting government would have for long tolerated" (Honasan 2000: 238)²⁸. Further remarks in escalating counter-insurgency

²⁸ Estrada's National Security Adviser Aguirre uses similar words (Aguirre 2000: 230); quoted in the section four.

tactics by the AFP hint, that quite early on the Estrada government favoured a military solution against the MILF. Meanwhile, the MILF had acquired considerable strength after the MNLF integrated into the government system. The Estrada action was condemned by civil society, but welcomed by settler hardliners. The actions taken encompassed all clichés of bad government behaviour: bomb attacks by intelligence forces blamed to the MILF as fake triggers to start a war, the use of intelligence from peace negotiations for military purposes (one ceasefire agreement encompassed an annex with geographical data on MILF camps, supposedly to outline the borders not to be violated by the AFP (Kreuzer 2003:39-40)), and following the victory cultural provocation of the opponent by celebrating a pork-BBQ in the overrun main camp by the President and his general near the ruins of the camp's main mosque (Cohn 2007: 21)²⁹. The war affected more than 20,000 families according to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (Dictaan-Bang-oa 2004: 159) and 7,5B Philippine pesos (roughly 180M US\$) were spend by the AFP for waging this war (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 139).

It should be a short-living success. Not even a year later, Estrada had to leave office due to what has been labelled People Power II. What has happened: Estrada was espoused of being corrupt and an impeachment trial was forced in congress. However, loyal senators used administrative regulation to bring the process to a halt. In consequence, "a coalition of civil society groups, segments of big business, media, and the Catholic Church, and reformers within the military and civilian bureaucracy" (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 281) brought thousands of protesters onto the streets of Manila and forced his removal from power – regardless of Estrada's crimes, at least an "extra-constitutional" (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 282) process, which led to a series of struggles with the urban poor over the coming months. His vice president and rival³⁰, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, took over and Estrada has been jailed a few months later for corruption. The process itself showed again the detachment between local politics and national politics in Manila. As one interviewee commented: "If millions of people protest in Mindanao, nobody cares, but if thousands of people protest in Manila, they change the government" (Interview X)

The new president promised to change the style of leadership from her predecessor and called an "All-out-peace" in regard to the Moro insurgency. This led to renewed negotiations with the MILF and the signing of a new Tripoli agreement already on June 22, 2001. The agreement included a series of concrete working points, amongst others joint ceasefire monitoring teams with the inclusion of neighbouring countries, support of internal refugees, and the necessity to further discussion on traditional land issues (Kreuzer 2003: 42-43). Even though in August 2002 the negotiation panels were still able to agree on a jointly condemnation of kidnapping-for-ransom groups and procedures of common engagement against them, as well as the formation of the Bangsamoro Development Agency under the control of the MILF to foster reconstruction and development work, this policy of peaceful conflict engagement did not last long. Developments on an international level again played their own part: on September 11, 2001, half a year after Arroyos take-over, attacks on the World Trade Center led to the "War on Ter-

²⁹ Even if the activity would not have been considered as an intended provocation, it at least showed cultural disrespect against the constituency which the MILF was to represent.

³⁰³⁰ Vice Presidents get elected separately and are not necessarily former running mates of the elected President.

ror”, with the Philippines on its forefront. It opened up the discourse on terrorism on the Philippines as well. The first and foremost target subsumed under the label “terrorists” was the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Sulu region. A series of intelligence authors and investigative journalists highlighted links between Al Qaida, the regional Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, even though evidence is rare and other indicators link the ASG with local elites as much as with intelligence operations of the Armed Forces (compare the last section of this chapter). Thus, the conflict with the Moro insurgents got renewed international attention after a couple of years of silence following the signing of the FPA in 1996. Previous to the “war against terror” discourse, two phenomena prelude this new international development: in 1998 the Philippine government signed the Visiting Armed Forces Agreement with the United States, ratified by the Philippine Senate in 1999. This agreement reopened the interrupted decade-old security-related cooperation, which was brought to a halt with the closing of the two US military bases in 1991 by nationalist forces in the Senate. The new agreement did not reopen the bases, but allowed US military personnel to enter the Philippines for trainings (Siazon 1998). While at first sight a reduced form of cooperation in comparison to the previous base agreement, it actually allowed the US military a more flexible cooperation, as it was not any longer necessary to sustain a fixed base with mobility constraints of the forces (Tuazon 2008a: 86). Over the next decade, trainings would be held in security-relevant areas of the Philippines, including hot spots in the southwest. The second event bringing the conflict in the south into the global discourse was a kidnapping-for-ransom event in 2000, where tourists got kidnapped from a nearby Malaysian resort and after weeks got released with help from a Libyan foundation led by Gaddafi’s son, which paid a ransom worth several millions US Dollars.

Thus, soon after Macapagal-Arroyo’s People Power II, tensions rose from several directions: an international discourse on Islamic terror threat, a worsening security situation due to splinter groups and organized crime, a continuingly strong MILF which got dispersed due to the 2000 war but by far not beaten, a military structure interested in a military control of the conflict system, and last but not least a rapid declining of the President’s public support. A first sign was the rise of killings against leftist activists, which “increased noticeably” after 2001 (Kraft 2010: 187). In October 2001, the President officially allowed the arming of CVO members (Kraft 2010: 196). At the same time, the US increased its support for the AFP, amongst others with the provision of modern rifles and military training (Quilop 2010: 236). There were at least 500 U.S. soldiers employed at any time, increased manifold during manoeuvre session (Tuazon 2008a: 86). This support was furthermore outnumbered by non-military aid, mostly invested in war-torn areas of Mindanao and Sulu (Pospisil 2005b).

Meanwhile, the development in regard to the MNLF took another decisive turn: ARMM governor and MNLF chairman Misuari tried his chances to pull out from his integration into the government establishment by staging a rebellion in his home base in Jolo in November 2001. Although enjoying considerable support during the fighting, the overall aim of a renewed insurgency under the MNLF leadership failed and Misuari fled to Malaysia, just to be handed over back to the Manila government and set to house arrest at the beginning of 2002 for the years to come. Now the original plan, described above, could proceed: the second line of the MNLF, to be known as Council of 15, declared Misuari chairman emeritus, and agreed together with the Macapagal-Arroyo government to support Parouk Hussein in becoming ARMM governor in the November 2001 elections. At this time, the ARMM already was organized by the

new Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao, which was passed in August 2001 after plebiscite approval in the former ARMM provinces plus Marawi City and Basilan (Ferrer 2005: 4). However, it should be a short-term success for the MNLF, the broad MNLF base was still supporting Misuari (Interview E), while the C15 members would loose out in the following elections (compare the next section on a detailed account).

Although the shortcomings and mistakes of Misuari's ruling, both developments, the increased militarization of the discourse along the "war on terror" as much as the pushed split of the MNLF, can be seen as a shift from a strategy of negotiated integration to a strategy of counter-insurgency style, the "predominance of the military as well as military solutions in addressing not only terrorism but also social rebellions and internal armed conflict" (Gutoc 2005: 165). While in consequence the Maoist insurgency in form of the New People's Army was immediately put as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" on the US watch list, followed by similar moves in Europe, the MILF was still kept out of the discourse as negotiations were still on the table. However, that should not last for long:

President Macapagal-Arroyo's shift from a strong pro-peace policy to a (domestic and global) war rhetoric in 2002 can be perceived as a strategic move aimed at earning political capital via a strong alliance with the United States. Also, it could be interpreted as an abandonment of leadership over internal national security policies in favor of the defense and military establishment. Because President Macapagal-Arroyo was put in power irregularly and with the support of then Estrada's Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes, the president acted particularly beholden to him (Ferrer 2005: 15).

In February 2003 the AFP went against the MILF in its second broad offence after the 2000 war. This was even more disturbing as on February 10, one day earlier, the government peace panel presented a draft peace agreement to the Speaker of parliament and the President of the senate. Furthermore, the development plan of the Bangsamoro Development Agency, supported by international donors, was just starting to take off. However, a success of the envisaged development would have threatened local interests by the ruling elites of Moro traditional families, settler landlords, and the remaining integrated MNLF leadership and thus their complaints added to the national and international discourse on terrorism, in which the MILF was integrated in an escalating frequency (Kreuzer 2003: 46). Thus, the day after the presented peace agreement draft the AFP started a broad military offensive, under the leadership of defence secretary Angelo Reyes; during the war three years earlier AFP chief of staff. The effect of the military offensive mirrored the developments of 2000: even though the AFP was able to disperse the MILF and destroy their camps, the MILF lost little of their fighting strength and returned with guerrilla-style hit-and-run offensives. After more than five months the government and the MILF agreed on a renewed ceasefire.

The following years brought little change to the local developments and the focus of the liberal democracy was onto the national level: the 2004 elections were claimed by President Arroyo, but irregularities undermined her legitimacy and thus of all the following government work. However, the military stood at her side and so did a series of local influential politicians. The south became once more infamous, as Maguindanao delivered a decisive block vote in favour of the President and her allies in 2004 and 2007. Vice versa, Macapagal-Arroyos withdrawal of support for the MNLF allowed the Ampatuans, a traditional family with known authoritarian tendencies, ruling already Maguindanao Province, to take over the governorship of the ARMM.

Thus, when the peace negotiations with the MILF led to the Memorandum-of-Agreement on Ancestral Domain in 2008, the MILF was dragged into a battle between the outgoing President and a broad alliance of opposition. This opposition brought together the most unlikely groups: while radical Christian settler elites denounced the MoA-AD as a give-in to the Moro enemy, on the national level elite opposition against the President met with progressive opposition of legal and underground movement. On the national level, the main concern was that the implementation of the MoA-AD would lead to the necessity of a constitutional change, which would be used by the President to drop the ban on re-election and would allow the extension of Macapagal-Arroyo's ruling to another period. The petition of settler politicians in front of the Supreme Court was accepted by the latter, and the government representatives did not sign the prepared documents. In consequence, skirmishes between single commanders of the MILF and the AFP broke out and led to the third broader military escalation in the new millennium. The consequence was a further breakdown of negotiations and the security situation in the south was worse than ten years before, when Estrada took over the presidency. The level of vigilante groups and extra-judicial killings in the provinces reached Marcos' martial law heights. The question on Macapagal-Arroyo's political development was finally sorted out by an out-of-politics event on the national level: the first post-Marcos President, Cory Aquino died in summer 2009, and a broad wave of nostalgic remembrance of the People Power Revolution swept over the country. When her son Benigno Aquino III declared his aspirations for the presidency, it was clear that any move by Macapagal-Arroyo to stay would have to resort on massive electoral fraud and force. Her presidency ended in Mindanao with a characteristic showdown: the Ampatuan massacre. A relative of the Ampatuan patriarch, Esmael Mangudadatu, wanted to stand up in elections against the son of his former protégé, Andal Ampatuan jr. Due to death threats by Ampatuan Sr. he hesitated to enter the Ampatuan controlled area, where Mangudadatu was supposed to file his election documents. Thus, he sent his wife together with a series of journalists in a convoy, while he himself stayed at home, expecting respect by the Ampatuans for females and media. However, goons and local police controlled by the Ampatuans stopped the convoy and killed all 58 people, including Mangudadatu's wife and three sisters as well as media representatives, drivers, and lawyers. This same patriarch, responsible for the massacre, was the President's close ally in her landslide victory in the province, which allowed her to stay in power five years earlier (hrw 2010).

Thus, expectations were high for a national renewal of liberal democracy, after Benigno Aquino III won in a landslide victory the elections in May 2010. Liberal groups as well as civil society raised high expectations. Aquino promised a new start, although the new President has to act under the same structural constraints as his predecessors. Thus, his high expectations could not be fulfilled and in some areas he can show little improvement, for example in regard to continues extra-judicial killings of progressive activists. However, until now it is too early to comment on his success to renew his attempt to restore a liberal hegemony.

For the Philippine south, two key developments should be highlighted, combined in the President's "comprehensive approach" (ICG 2012)³¹. Soon after his ascendancy to power, President

³¹ The program actually encompasses three components, next to the two described here an evaluation of the MNLF's 1996 agreement. As up until the conclusion of this research it produced little output, let alone outcome, it will just be mentioned shortly at the end of the next section.

Aquino installed a new peace negotiation team to talk to the MILF. Next to a series of meetings with the MILF negotiation panel, hosted by Malaysia, the government team held a series of consultancy meetings with various sectors of the southern islands. After the grand-scale failure of MoA-AD by his predecessor, the new approach should be pragmatic in developing reachable goals. At the same time Aquino Jr. mirrored his mother's approach to Misuari in the 1980s by meeting with MILF chairman Ebrahim Murad in Japan in 2011.³² While acknowledging the government's open cooperation regarding form, the MILF negotiation team was little pleased by the small-scale approach regarding content. The government's three-for-own proposal (massive economic development, political settlement with the MILF, and cultural-historical acknowledgment) stood against the MILF's Draft Comprehensive Compact, which heavily borrowed from the failed MoA-AD. Above all the intention of the government to talk about a reformed ARMM instead of a Bangsamoro sub-state, as claimed by the MILF, led to serious discontent on part of the MILF. The original intent of the government of having an agreement in short time, not the least to tackle the increasing problems of the MILF to control its commanders and younger generations (Interview M), could thus not be fulfilled. However, during the last months, the peace panels have overcome the stalemate, even though serious issues are still to be handled. Thus, the "Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro" has been signed in October 2012, which outlines a replacement of the ARMM by a new entity, labelled Bangsamoro. The procedures of implementation however have still to be outlined; a crucial process as learned from the previous peace agreements.

Meanwhile, the President initiated a postponement of elections to the ARMM to coincide with national elections from 2011 to May 2013. This synchronization of elections would not be that notable, would it not have a further impact: elected officials could not extend their term, rather the President has been allowed to instate Officers in Charge (OICs) by the Philippine congress. The idea behind is, that thus it would be able to allow a clean start and reform the ARMM to get rid of practices of corruption and electoral fraud. Taking this argument together with the high expectations into Aquino's political manoeuvring, liberal Moro groups welcomed the move and some of them participate as OICs in several branches of the ARMM. Obviously the move is difficult in two aspects: first, it shows the relative weakness of the ARMM as an autonomous body, if the President is able to manage this same institution. Secondly, to replace elected officials with appointed OICs has an authoritative character neglecting the check-and-balances of a liberal democracy. As with the peace negotiations with the MILF, the outcome still has to be seen. Next to tense content issues inside the negotiations, any broad concessions will meet strong opposition not just from settlers but reservations from non-Muslim indigenous people, Muslim traditional elites, and the remaining cadres of the MNLF, too (ICG 2012). Up until now it is just visible, that President Aquino explores a new path to develop the liberal hegemony on the Philippines as a whole and in the south in specific.

³² Which again produced an even bigger outcry than his mother's meeting in the published opinion in Manila. Up until now, Aquino acted surprisingly unimpressed by this combined opposition of political rivals, military hardliners, and hawkish media commentators, which harshly criticized his action regarding two further events, too: his unbiased analysis of a military incident which cost the life of 19 marines, caused by an unordered campaign against the MILF by local AFP commanders; and the development of a leadership training facility for the MILF, promised already by his predecessor.

4.2 NL-AC: National Liberal Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

“Indeed, aside from being a spontaneous reaction to the wave of massacre and genocide against our people, the Moro National Liberation Front and the Bangsa Moro Army could be justly ailed as a part and a culmination of such long chain of protest, being the final struggle of our people for their national freedom and survival. This is the last and only hope. It is either our people will triumph or the perish.” (MNLF chairman Misuari 1975: 7)

4.2.1 Mythical Past: Anti-Colonial Resistance against Spain and the US

The Moro nationalist modern history starts a hundred years before the liberal modern history, with the strong sultanates of the South; then threatened by Spanish colonialism, but resisting; finally subdued by the US army and integrated into the Philippine nation state against their will.

In the centre of the history of the modern nation are the sultanates and its fight against the Spanish colonizers (Majul 1973). In 1380 the “arrival of Karimul Makhdum in Buansa (embraced by modern Jolo)” is mentioned in a local genealogy (Ahmad 1998: 2) and generally considered the starting of Muslim culture in Minsupala. The founding of the Sulu sultanate has been related to the “coming of Raja Baginda [...] in the latter half of the 15th century” (Abreu 2008: 18), George (1999: 19) mentions the same date, however as founder “an Arab, Sharif Abu Bakr” and Lingga (2008: 99) notes “Sultan Shariff ul-Hashim” as Sulu’s founder. Abreu (2008: 18) further mentions “Sharif Kabunsuan” as the bearer of Islam to “Central Mindanao around 1515”, Lingga (2008: 99) agrees, spelling its name “Shariff Muhammad Kabungsuwan”.

In the nationalist understanding, it was a time of good and just governance, stretching from the Sulu Sea all over to Mindanao. According to Abreu’s (2008: 17-18) studying maps in London, the political influence “extended to what is known today as Brunei, as well as the provinces of Cebu, Panay, Mindoro and Ilocos” in the Philippine north. Mednick states “Moro boats carried trade goods into the northern islands of the Philippines. They also ranged as far west as the Persian Gulf and as far south as New Guinea.” (Mednick 1974[1957]: 13). Thus, the sultanates have been key nodes in the maritime trade ranging all over Southeast Asia going as far as the Arabian peninsula in the West and China in the east. While people in the north remained isolated, Minsupala was the Italy of the east, with prosperous merchant cities and professional ties: “the size and degree of organization of the units which are created clearly set the Moros off from all other Philippine peoples” (Mednick 1974[1957]: 16).

These political units were based on tradition and Islam. The latter had its origin in the Arab merchants, engaging with the local elites and thereby founding the empires of Mindanao (Tan 1977: 20). However, Islam never overruled tradition (Mednick 1974[1957]: 19). While the northern people were “Hispanized; the Muslims were never Arabized”, thus they “achieved a sense of identity which Catholics did not” (George 1980: 27). Its political system was hierarchical organized: “a pyramidal arranged hierarchy of authority and sanction which serves to join almost any number of villages or settlements into a single political unit” (Mednick 1974[1957]: 18), with its peak in the Sultans’ power. It was “economic interdependence, monopolies of military power, kinship, and territory, plus the system of authority implicit in Islam which combined to weld units of leader and led into a system of political organization” (Mednick 1974[1957]: 25).

The Spanish colonizers, arriving several decades later, tried to subdue the local people. After getting hold of Manila, the “Moro Wars” (Majul 1973: 191) began: four centuries of fierce attacks against the Sultanates; however, unsuccessful. What followed was a winner’s curse: “The failure of Spanish efforts to obtain [...] the control over the Brunei-Manila trade by conquest of the Muslim South [...] shifted strategy to the neutralization of Muslim Mindanao by destroying the vital role of Sulu and Maguindanao in the trade pattern” (Tan 1993: 13). Thus, Spain was able to destroy the link between “land ownership and merchant capital [...] Entire populations migrated from flatlands and rich valleys to remote mountainous terrains [...] the dominant classes strengthened their social position in their new role of leaders of the anti-colonial struggle. In addition, the militarization of the datu was further enhanced...” (Ahmad 2000a: 11) What remained was a war-torn society, deprived of its former socioeconomic structure, only fortified by violence capabilities and a history of resistance.

The next blow came with the end of Spanish hold over the Philippines. After the defeat of the Spanish fleet, Spain ceded in the Treaty of Paris “the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands” to the US, including the Moro islands of Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan – even though Spain never had effective control over these territories and therefore could not be seen as the possessor of it (cp. the above section); a legal fraud and the first big treachery against the Moro by foreign colonizers in the eyes of Moro nationalists (Interview F).

The second blow followed soon after. In the Bates-Agreement of August 20, 1899, the new colonizers accepted the local ruling and independence of the Moro with the latter; a form of the Sulu sultanate’s hospitality: “The Christians evoked hostile reaction only when they clearly threatened the position of Islam and injured the interest of the religious Muslim elite”, otherwise they were welcomed by the local rulers (Tan 1977: 95). However, just five years later the Bates agreement has been unilaterally abrogated by the USA, claiming that the local rulers would not have fulfilled their obligations. Religious prejudices were included in public statements: “As the Moros are Mohammedans, there is more than ordinary difficulty in governing them” (NYT 1904). The coming years saw a brutal “pacification campaign” (Rodil 2003: 39-44; Byler 2005) with which the US military subdued the local resistance (Glang 1969: 3). The most infamous is the massacre of Bud Dajo:

“The 790 U.S. troops who assaulted Bud Dajo used naval cannons against the 800-1,000 Moro resistance fighters who were mostly armed only with meleé weapons. In the end, only six of the hundreds of Moro resistance fighters holding Bud Dajo as a stronghold survived, while there were 15-20 casualties among the U.S. troops” (Remollino 2008: 177).

Accordingly, in Minsupala the Bates Agreement has been seen not as a document abrogated because of Moro failures, but as a stalling tactic to avoid a two-front war with Moros in the South and Filipino revolutionaries in the North (Interview F). The attacks following the abrogation have been resisted by local leaders with devastating effects. The local war tactic to bunker all people in the forts of the Datus led to massacres and a high civilian death toll. The final military campaign started in 1911, when General Pershing, Governor of the Moro Province, “announced a new law requiring Moros to surrender their firearms and forbidding them to carry edged weapons. Many Moros, for whom weapons were precious possessions, refused to give them up, and fighting broke out”; it peaked in the massacre of Bud Bagsak in Eastern Jolo,

where 500 Moros including 50 women and children refused to surrender their weapons and got killed under Pershing's attack (Byler 2005: 44).

Parallel to the dying military resistance, a "policy of education and attraction was perfected by the Americans for their own brand of colonial rule" (Bernardo 1997: 30). The introduction of schooling by the new administration was not well seen by the traditional rulers (Tan 1993: 18), the idea of "the development of a self-conscious Philippine Muslim identity among a generation of educated Muslim elites" (McKenna 1998: 132) considered as ignorance of existing identities and mistrusted as an effort to destroy local cultures.

Furthermore, "internal colonialism" (Wadi 2008) began: settlers-colonialism was used by the military government as an economic aim as well as a counter-insurgency mean. Thereby, the indigenous people have been sidelined all along. The reason was mainly a rewriting of the land-related legal codes. During the Sultanate-times it has been organized as communal land under the authority of the Datu. The US introduced a series of laws, introducing the liberal system of individual or corporative land ownership and nullifying the previous ownership system:

| Document | Year | Description |
|--|------------------------|--|
| Land Registration Act No. 496 | 1902 | Declares all lands subject to the Torrens system and empowers the state to issue a parcel of land to any legitimate claimant |
| Philippine Commission Act No. 178 | 1903 | All unregistered lands becomes part of the public domain; only the state has the authority to classify or exploit these lands |
| Public Land Act 926 | 1903 | Setting up of homestead and resettlement areas, opening Mindanao to landless peasants and corporations planning to set up plantations |
| Mining Law | 1905 | American citizens and corporations have the right to acquire public land for mining |
| Public Land Acts | 1913 /1919 /1925 | Fertile lands considered by the State as unoccupied, unreserved or unappropriated public lands would be available to homesteaders and corporation irregardless of their occupancy by indigenous people |

Table 3: Philippine Land Regulations early 20th century; Source: Rovillos/Morales (2002: 9-10)

Turning a blind eye on the new legislation, i.e. sticking to the tradition of communal land, and information deficits regarding the first, led to a disadvantage of the indigenous people in general and the illiterate lower classes in specific (Linao 2001: 29). Next to this indirect discrimination, Lingga highlights that there were direct discriminations, too:

| Hectares Allowed For | Homesteaders | Non-Christians (Moros and Wild Tribes) | For Corporations |
|----------------------|--------------|--|------------------|
| P.L.A. 1903 | 16 | (no provision) | 1,024 |
| P.L.A. 1919 | 24 | 10 | 1,024 |
| P.L.A. 1936 | 16 | 4 | 1,024 |

Table 4: Land allocation regulations for homesteaders and indigenous people; Source: Lingga (2008: 105)

The sizes in the second column of the table have been exclusively reserved for non-Christians, which sounds like positive discrimination. However, the sentence of negative discrimination follows, in positive words: "any non-Christian inhabitant may at any time apply for the general

benefits of this Act, *provided the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is satisfied that such inhabitant is qualified to take advantage of the provisions of the same*" (PhCongress 1919, emphasis added).

What followed was the "darkest time in Moro history" (Interview E), i.e. decades of collaboration between the Moro elites and the American and later Philippine government: "The Muslim masses were left alone to themselves" (Glang 1969: 3) and the "the datos seldom bothered to maintain the decorum or meet the obligations that went with their position" (George 1980: 99). The only resistive acts of this time are two petitions to exclude Minsupala from Philippine independence in hope of a separate independence later on; the locals have been supported by American investors with their own interests in rubber plantations and logging (George 1999: 67-68; Rodil 2003: 114-115). As unhappy as the Moros have been with the American colonizers, they feared the take over by the Filipinos even more. The latter have been enemies since centuries, engaging together with the Spanish colonizers in campaigns against the Moros of the South. Thus, better a colonial US-administration than a colonial Filipino-administration.

4.2.2 Moro land in an Independent Philippine State after 1946

This plan remained unsuccessful. The Philippines became independent and Minsupala has been included. Resettlements, perceived as northern colonialism, forced a material integration, following the formal one; meanwhile, new local professionals developed out of modernization attempts, having the capabilities to re-organize resistance against the central government.

At the beginning of the period, the outlook for the region was still prosperous. The territory remained part of the international agenda. Moros have been active in anti-Japanese resistance during WW2, led by collaborating elites like Lucman, Alonto, and Pendatun (Tan 1977: 186). The following American reconstruction aid raised governmental resource influx for the local leaders even further, and tamed Moro elites aspirations for independence (Tan 1993: 20).

However, socioeconomic problems were on the edge. After the war-years troubled by a peasant-rebellion (the Huk-Rebellion) in the North, the Philippine government intensified resettlement and organized openings of rural colonies in the South: "Ex-Huks and 'reformed' criminals found attractive homesteads in the south. The army administered these special settlements until the end of the 1960s." (George 1980: 118) While the few settlers of the early century integrated into the local communities, the new settlers failed to adapt to local customs, e.g. the payment of "kawali or levies in kind" (George 1980: 115); "maybe they [, the new settlers,] have been more aggressive" regarding settling in what they considered to be "virgin lands" (Interview G). The problem of land titles rose to new heights, mostly in disfavour of Moros. Governmental force, i.e. military and police became seen as instruments of a Christian takeover. This view has been supported by activities of the civilian administration as even though "Moros and Christians share the top elective and appointive offices and political alliances cross ethnic lines. In the lower echelons, Moros have little participation because of lack of men with technical training" (Hunt 1974: 201). After settlers already dominated the "modern sectors of business and administration", now they controlled most of the arable land, too (Kreuzer 2003: 11).

Economic relations bring members of the various groups into contact, but usually in a definitely structured pattern. Farm labor is provided by mountain tribesmen,

Moros, and to some extent, by Christian Filipinos. Small independent farmers are usually Christians while the big landlords are Moro datos, Chinese mestizos, Spaniards and Americans along with Christian Filipinos. Agricultural processing is usually in the hands of the Chinese, although some Moros work as buyers of palay. Chinese control most other businesses, but Christian Filipinos predominate in barbershops, drug stores and local agencies for national concerns. Professional activity and government employment are also mainly confined to Christians. Most fishermen are Moros and they also form a large proportion of the stevedores. When Moros enter business, it is usually as operators of goldsmith shops or restaurants and lodgin houses catering to their own group. A few Moros have entered the transportation business, especially river transport between Dulawan and Cotabato. (Hunt 1974: 197)

The decades of undisturbed collaboration ended with “the famous Kamlon rebellion in Sulu and the Tawan-Tawan rebellion in Lanao in the early 1950s” (Adam 2002: 42). The House of Representatives appointed a special investigation committee with the respected Moro leaders Alonto (Lanao), Datu Mangelen (Cotabato), and Sultan Amilbangsa (Sulu) as members (George 1980: 96). The result of the investigation was the creation of the “Commission on National Integration” (CNI).

“The CNI could start industries, set up irrigation systems and dams, engage in agriculture, establish schools, contract loans and form credit institutions, grant scholarships, provide training in local government - in short, do anything it considered necessary to further the development of minorities. With imagination and verve, such a brief could have worked wonders for Muslims in perhaps a generation, making national integration a reality. But it was not long before the CNI got bogged down in the administrative inefficiency and corruption which had grown alongside political democracy in the country.” (George 1980: 96)

However, the effect on the regional history should not be underestimated. Nearly 75%, or at that time around 750,000 US\$ (George 1980: 97), went into scholarship programs:

“The CNI graduates, most of them from non-elite backgrounds, gradually constituted themselves as a new professional elite in their home communities. The shared experiences of the more than 8000 Muslim CNI scholars studying in Manila between 1958 and 1967 also profoundly affected Muslim politics after 1968” (McKenna 1998: 140)

One of them has been Nur Misuari (Arguillas 2001: 103), future leader of the secessionist insurgency. Himself of poor background, he became an instructor for sociology at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, in Manila. There he got engaged in an active student community. Global movements for change had their local components in the Philippines. The Huk-Rebellion of peasants and WW2 guerrilla veterans has been militarily crushed by the Armed Forces with US support in the northern islands; however, social unrest remained a strong component. Questions of class structures coincided with questions of colonialism and post/neo-colonialism. The UP campus has been a nucleus of scientific and political engagement all the time through. Thus, the CNI students took part in discussions, in mobilizations and in the organization of student groups. A new intellectual Moro elite got trained, different from the old traditional elite and different, too, from the American trained daughters and sons of this nobility, the modern Moros collaborating in Philippine state institutions. Manila was home to future prominent figures like the mentioned Nur Misuari, furthermore to Ghadyali Jaafar, Mohagher Iqbal, Alunan C. Glang, Michael Mastura, Farouk Hussin, and Tham Majoorsa. (Gutierrez

2000d: 309-310). Thereby the fragmentation of movements into hundreds of small political organizations, troubled the Moros as well: Gutierrez mentions as examples

“Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations, Muslim Progress Movement, Philippine Muslim Nationalist League, Muslim Students' Association of the Philippines, Muslim Lawyers' League, Muslim Youth Assembly, Bismillah Brotherhood, Al Muslimin Fraternity, and Sulu Muslim League”; (Gutierrez 2000d: 310)

These are just Moro organizations. Misuari, the future insurgency leader, has been furthermore engaged in the *Kabataang Makabayan*, a leftist movement and root for the later Maoist revolution on the national level. However, accommodation between Moro and Filipino students has been difficult from the beginning. There was little recognition of the specific problems of Mindanao by the students born in the North and Filipino chauvinism regarding the backwardness of the Moro did not halt before UP students. Thus, people around Misuari started to distance themselves from the leftist national movements and focused on the role of inner colonialism in the suppression of Moro people inside the Filipino state. Soon it was clear that to gain political weight, an alliance with the traditional elite was a viable alternative to the socialist students of the north.

Vice versa, the traditional elite could need further support to balance their declining influence on Mindanao. The volatile situation in the South aggravated.

“The increased incidence of land grabbing in the 1960s is more a product of the strong drive for further agricultural expansion that emphasized large-scale production of cash crops during the period when Mindanao as a frontier area had closed. ... In many instances, members of minority groups were subjected to various forms of harassment like the burning of their crops. Others were mercilessly murdered by the goons of some of these land grabbers.” (Muslim 1994: 91)

This was related to the unprecedented increase of migrant influx described above in combination with the amassment of land by single landlords. This situation of competition for land has induced not just conflict between settlers and indigenous people, but intra-elite rivalries as well. Old gentlemen's agreements of areas of influence got abandoned and so did the tradition of settlers to elect Muslim elites as political representatives to control the Moros. It became clear to the traditional elites, at least in a positive reading of their actions, that an accommodation with the Philippine state during a continuing settler influx and discrimination of the local population could not last longer.

The Moro mythical trigger was the *Jabidah* massacre.³³ The actual happenings remains unclear until today, but this does not change its key ideological impact, with 28 Moro recruits killed and their deaths covered up by Philippine Armed Forces. Back to the beginning: since more than a decade the Philippines were struggling with Malaysia about the ownership of Sabah. Following the order of President Marcos, a small team under the lead of Maj. Eduardo Martelino and his operation officer Cirilo Oropesa organized the covert “*Oplan Merdeka*”. The aim: infiltrate Sabah and persuade local people to organize for secession and support a possible invasion by official Filipino Armed Forces. Military intelligence seeking and sabotage was

³³ The information in the following paragraph are a summary of the most recent and detailed reconstruction of related events in Vitug/Gloria (2000: 2-23)

another aim of the infiltrators.³⁴ Tausug speaking people, i.e. mainly people from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, have been recruited for this operation, able to communicate on both sides of the sea in their native language. They should form a commando unit named “Jabidah”. Their trainers had oversea experience from the Korean and Vietnamese wars, in which the Philippines engaged as loyal allies of the US. In a Sulu base camp, the local congress man, Salih Ututalum, “addressed the trainees, encouraging them to do well. I urged them to behave properly and to keep faith with the government” (cited in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 10). “On December 30, 1967, anywhere from 135 (Aquino's count) to 180 (Oropesa's count) recruits boarded a Philippine Navy vessel in Simunul bound for Corregidor” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 11), an island part of Cavite province close to Metro Manila. The trouble began with a ghost, who hunts the Armed Forces of the Philippines until today: mismanagement. Food and accommodation for the recruits were bad and salaries not paid, while the superiors lodged in luxurious hotels in nearby Manila. Just few months after their arrival, a group of men wrote a petition to President Marcos to sort the situation. This action has been seen as mutiny by the recruits' superiors, which consequently discharged the first. However, it did not stop with demobilization. 28 recruits have been killed, depending on the source either as a line-up-killing or as a shooting after a runaway of these recruits (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 2-23). As important as it is for the involved persons to shed light on the actual events, for a decade old mythical event, single facts remaining unclear change little on the overall picture. The obvious point is that the cover up did not work, and the events made it up to the front pages of national newspapers. In consequence, Moro student protest soared in Manila and elsewhere (Gutierrez 2000d: 309). Later on, Misuari acclaimed March 18, 1968 as the founding date of the Moro National Liberation Front, even though its materialization took another three years (Arguillas 2001: 102).

A more imminent but even less related event to the Jabidah-Massacre has been the foundation of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). In Cotabato Province in central Mindanao, a successful tandem had ruled far over a decade: Congressman Salipada Pendatun and Governor Datu Udtog Matalam, representing the two versions of the traditional elite (McKenna 1998: 131). Pendatun, the protégé of American educator Edward Kuder, resided in Manila and married a Christian woman: the modernized Moro; Matalam represented the local traditional Moro elite, ruling the province from “Pagalongan, the private stronghold ... for fifteen years” (George 1980: 134). Though different in style, they adapted to the Philippine government and integrated into the system successfully. However, the elections of 1967 saw two dangers: on the one hand, support by Christian settlers for traditional elites got more and more volatile, switching their political allegiance to their own kin; on the other hand, President Marcos Nacionalista Party fought an unrecorded intense battle with their Liberal rivals, party platform of Pendatun/Matalam. Thus, Pendatun turned his back on Matalam; he enlisted himself for Cotabato Province's governorship, this *with* Matalam's approval, and later on stepped down in favor of his vice-running-mate Simeon Datumanong to keep his congressional seat, this *against* Matalam's previous conditions (George 1980: 131-134). On May 1, 1968, and thus just some weeks after Jabidah, “Matalam signed a ‘Manifesto’ in Pagalongan, Cotabato which called for the establishment of an Islamic state, which would include all Muslim areas of the

³⁴ The official version disseminated in and after congress hearings, has of course been different; preventing diplomatic trouble in Southeast Asia and most of all with Malaysia, the administration characterized all operations as counter-insurgency operations against communist agents.

southern Philippines and would be known as the 'Republic of Mindanao and Sulu'."(McAmis 1974: 45). McAmis continues: "The measurable response on the part of most Muslim Filipinos was disinterest. It was thought to be the ploy of a disgruntled Muslim politician who had lost his reelection bid to a fellow Muslim. However, the response on the part of Christians in Cotabato was apprehension and fear." (McAmis 1974: 45)

Tensions in the region heightened; fueled by this mix of structural changes, interrelated conflict reasons, and existing means of violence. Thus, facing a tightened political and economic competition, more and more traditional elites joined the anti-Manila-resentments. A group of (ex)congressmen and senators, Domacao Alonto, Rashid Lucman, and the mentioned Salipada Pendatun tried to develop a united resistance under their leadership (Jubair 1999: 151-153). This was the vehicle Nur Misuari was looking for. He connected to Rashid Lucman, who again was "closely acquainted with Tun Mustapha, then Chief Minister of Sabah, an ethnic Tausug who had many relatives in Sulu" (Arguillas 2001: 102).

Malaysia now got its revenge on President Marcos' "Oplan Merdeka". Organized via the Lucman-Mustapha-connection, the first batch of 90 volunteers left the Philippines to "the forests of Malaysia along the Thai border. The group consisted of 67 Maranaos, 8 Maguindanaos, and 15 Tausug-Samals", including Nur Misuari (Arguillas 2001: 102). They "travelled to Palau Pangkor in the State of Perak in Malaysia in the first quarter of 1969, trained for more than a year and returned home in the early part of 1971." (Rodil 2003: 137-138) A second group, the Batch 300 followed (Lingga 1995: 28). Trainers have been provided by the Malaysian government (Noble 1976: 409)

While Jabidah was the local and somehow regional triggering event, the massacre of Manili finally pushed the conflict onto the global stage:

"The most shocking event in Cotabato was the massacre of seventy // Muslims, men, women and children in a mosque at Barangay Manili in the town of Carmen on 19 June 1971. The Muslims were allegedly invited to gather at the Manili mosque for a peace conference. Once inside the building, more than twenty Ilagas blasted them with 12-gauge shotguns and grenades. It shocked the whole nation, the perpetrators were known but nobody was held accountable. It also added a religious dimension to the conflict. That was not going to be the last mosque to be desecrated. It was this incident, which he saw on BBC TV newscast, that reportedly pushed Libyan Col. Muammar Kadhafy to give all out support to the Bangsamoro struggle." (Rodil 2003: 136-137)

The following integration of Libya into the conflict meant a qualitative change of conflict relations. According to former Libyan Prime Minister Jalloud, his country spend "U.K. 30 million pounds to arm and train Filipino Muslims" (Rodil 2000: 26). This was not a single Libyan foreign policy act. A series of other nationalist-anti-colonial struggles got supported with income from Libyan oil exports. One day, the MNLF would share an office building with several other "liberation groups" in Tripoli (Interview S). The first deal has been made between Colonel Gaddafi and the Lucman/Alonto/Pendatun-delegation (Gonzalez 2000: 114). "Evidence suggests that Rasid Lucman was the principal link at this time with both Tun Mustapha [then governor of Sabah, S.S.] and Muammar Kadaffi." (McKenna 1998: 155)

However, at that time "certain traditional leaders such as Datu Udtug, were [already] repudiated for their opportunism" (McKenna 1998: 155) by the young radicals around Nur Misuari.

Still holding positions inside the MIM, “[w]ithout Lucman's knowledge ..., Misuari had already organized the more radical Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Here Misuari was chair, and Abul Khayr Alonto, vice-chair” (Gonzalez 2000: 113). Further founding members of the MNLF were Muslim Sema, Al-Jabbar Narra, Dambong Sali, Abdurahman Jamasali, Alavez Isnaji, Hussein Mohammad, Al Caluang, and Al Hai Murad Ebrahim (Ferrer 2005: 3). The MNLF did not fail to notice the ambiguous role of the traditional elites; “[t]hey were not impressed by the claims to lost glory of aristocratic families discredited by their own weak leadership.” (Gutierrez 2000d: 311) Above all the ideologists of the movement regarded the alliance with the elites as temporary and instrumental – just as much as the elite regarded the youngsters as willing cannon fodder in their power struggle with the central government. International assistance loosened this bond a little. In consequence the MNLF betrayed the elite’s expectation of their own sanctity, cashing in the first remittance Gaddafi’s support (Capal-Guro 1996: 37).

4.2.3 A New Generation of ‘Freedom Fighters’

The split between the old elite and the new radicals brought the first back into their collaborative role with the Philippine state and the latter even farther into the underground. Over the period, university intellectuals transformed into political leaders; a renewed violent struggle started after decades of collaboration; and international relations became again a central element of the Moro-Filipino struggle.

The old elite did not stick long to their public radicalism. MIM-founder Matalam publicly denounced the insurgency and received from President Marcos the position of Advisor for Muslim Affairs, as the young generation did “not listen to and cooperate with the datus of Lanao, Sulu, and Cotabato.” (quoted in McKenna 1998: 162). Lucman stayed longer at the side of the MNLF, being an archenemy and direct rival of Marco’s crony Ali Dimaporo in Lanao, member of the Muslim traditional elite himself. Lucman became “Chairman of the Bangsamoro Advisory Council and Senator Salipada Pendatun Vice Chairman, thereby relating themselves to the MNLF” (Arguillas 2001: 104). They continued their effort to sideline Misuari and regain control over the insurgency, however failed. In 1974 Lucman enthroned himself Paramount Sultan of Mindanao and Sulu, congratulated by President Marcos.

For the young radicals it was the possibility to establish their own vision of a Moro future:

“The MIM was misnamed: Mindanao is not our nation, because Sulu and Palawan are also included. Also, Muslim Independence Movement is not right because that is not our nationality - there are Muslims in other countries and not all the people here are Muslims. The correct name is Moro, because that is our nationality ... This is not a religious war. Christians can also be Moros ... I can't give you an accurate answer [about the kind of governmental system the MNLF plans to establish]. We've got to get the consensus of the majority of the people on that.” (Commander Ulangutan quoted in Noble 1976: 417)

This already presents the first and longstanding achievement by the MNLF: to wrest the name “Moro” from Filipino chauvinism and refill it with a new, positive content: the nation to be. Nation and territory have been the key issue of the *National* Liberation Front. While the label until then summed up different ethno-linguistic Muslim groupings, it was the MNLF who first introduced the idea of an inter-ethnic common nation, the Bangsa Moro (Buendia 2007: 7).

The MNLF presented their goals in a letter to the Organisation of Islamic Conference with the following words:

“The principal objective of our people and Revolution is the acquisition of their complete national sovereignty and independence, which means that there shall never be any end to the struggle until our people shall become master of their national destiny. Our people strongly believe that only complete national freedom and independence can guarantee their survival, the integrity of their homeland and the fate of Islam in this part of the world. Otherwise, their future shall remain uncertain and bleak.” (quoted in Misuari 1975: 20)

Misuari uses regularly the catchwords “our people, our homeland and Islam” (e.g. Misuari 1973: 11, 40, 58). Activists are furthermore painstakingly detailed on their legal conclusion to show the fulfilment of international law definitions of “nation” and thus their right to self-determination, outlined in the UN-Charta (Interviews A, C, D, E), i.e. the institutionalization in the sultanates, the non-submission under Spain, their long anti-colonial history, etc. Thus, the movement connects to a global discourse: that of the anti-colonial struggle. “[I]n the collision between our forces and that of the enemy, we have proven beyond doubt that the forces of freedom and independence are much more invincible than the forces of colonial oppression and tyranny. This confirms the anti-colonial experiences of the peoples of the world.” (Misuari 1973: 39)

“Together with the BMA, the MNLF is considered [by themselves in their 1974 manifesto, S.S.] the principal instrument for achieving the primary goals and objectives of the Moro Revolution. Likewise, this Manifesto outlines the strategy for attaining the preferred alternatives: 1) organizing and relying on the masses for support; 2) forging unity with all oppressed sectors in the society – peasants, workers, intelligentsia, small merchants and artisans, Muslims, Christians, nature-worshippers and nonbelievers; and 3) forging unity and solidarity with the Islamic and Third World countries and groups that share the MNLF cause.” (Bucoy 1984: 77)

The question on traditional institutions and collaboration, prominent in anti-colonial discourses, however, remained rather hidden. Referring to an indigenous past, “emphasis on traditional Muslim political institutions, particularly the long-defunct sultanates [...was...] a logical correlate”. That “contemporary datus were chided for slipping from the high standards of their heroic forefathers” was an obvious issue, but “the MNLF hardly addressed issues of internal social transformation” (McKenna 1998: 164-165). At stake was the positive reference to the independent past as much as the alliance with the current leaders.

Two more themes appear regularly, one in official statements and one in external analyses: Islam and Communism. Islam is one of the three buzzwords mentioned above. However,

“[t]he Bangsa Moro people, though majority of them are Muslims, yet there are some, particularly among the indigenous inhabitants who belong to other religions, including animistic religion, Christianity, etc. Some of them are paganistic. Nevertheless, they are part of us, part of the Bangsa Moro nation. In fact, many of our Muslim people trace their origin to them. Besides, their cultural and social practices are very akin to those of the Muslims. As such, they are an integral part of the Bangsa Moro people and are generally sympathetic to the Bangsa Moro Revolution. As a matter of fact, not a few of them are actually heroically fighting side-by-side with the Muslim freedom fighters.” (Misuari 1975:35)

Non-Muslims have been integrated prominently into the central committee of the MNLF (Gutierrez 2000e: 159). This puzzle of Islam as a key cultural factor and Moro as a nation to integrate different faiths can be solved by a secular understanding of Islam. It becomes clear from the quote, that Islam is understood as a local cultural component, one of several. The sometimes wholehearted embracement of Islam and referring terms and concepts in speeches, above all directed to the OIC, should be analyzed carefully: it is the ideological connection to the OIC, nothing more and nothing less (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 46). That includes references to Zionism and related influences in the Philippine government, thus rhetorically equating the Moro with the Palestine struggle:

“Excellencies: Allow me to reaffirm our unity and solidarity with our Palestinian brothers, our Turkish Cypriot brothers, our Eritrean and Ethiopian Muslim brothers, our Patani brothers and all just cause of oppressed Muslims in the world. Let me also express our unity and solidarity with all the *anti-racist and anti-Zionist forces* in the world. Our salute to our Djibouti brothers for their glorious *victory against moribund French colonialism*. Finally, our prayers to the memory of the great King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz, (Allah Yarhamu), for this initiative to bring the Islamic World together and making Islam a living force in the world today!” (Misuari 1977: 14; emph. add.)

On the other end there is depicted a connection of the MNLF in general and Misuari in specific with communism. Misuari has rejected any connection with Marxism, as an ideology as well as in its institutionalized form, the National Democratic Front. Meanwhile, his opponents have portrayed the picture of Misuari as a hidden communist: “Misuari's reputation as a campus Marxist was used by the datus to spread the word that the MNLF was a camouflaged communist conspiracy against religion” (George 1980: 202). For this project it is irrelevant, what is the “true” believe of Nur Misuari. Two things are clear: Misuari knew from his studies, teaching, and involvement in university politics communist history, ideas, and techniques and could gain a knowledge advantage from it (Interview F). The story of his admiration for Nguyen Giap (Tan 1977: 206) seems reasonable; however, the Vietnamese was above all a legendary anti-colonial *war* hero, defeating the French in *Đien Biên Phu*, and less famous for communist theoretical developments. And secondly, Misuari did everything not to get mixed up with communist rebel forces, even if on commando-level there have been some alliances between forces of the Maoist New People's Army and BMA forces (Grossman 1986). He rejected a possible cooperation in every public forum and refused to meet NPA emissaries even during times of military hardship (Gutierrez 2000d: 346). Common interests between NPA and MNLF would have been there, in socioeconomic questions as in military terms as well: the mentioned description of “land grabbing, and the disappointment of the broad masses toward government failure to solve social, political and most of all, economic problems” as a conflict reason (MNLF commander quoted in Noble 1976: 409) could be out of a NDF pamphlet; members of MNLF and NDF knew each other from common pre-martial law political activities (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 143); and at the edge of NPA and BMA zones of influence, coordination was necessary.

The theoretical arguments and ideology have been one point, establishing them on the ground another. Although military training has begun already, Misuari still run for a seat in the 1970 elections of a constitutional assembly. This could have still been an opportunity for non-violent ways to alter Moro history. However, rigged elections left Misuari without chance. (Harber 1998: 48) Furthermore, individual and inter-group violence already swept over the region for

some years, with the mentioned political and economic competition, increasing. Thus, the MNLF could link with local violence entrepreneurs throughout the beginning of the 1970s (George 1980: 210). A date often mentioned as the start of rebellion has been October 21, 1971, as several hundred people attacked Marawi City, targeting a Constabulary unit, a strategic bridge, and Mindanao State University including its radio station; the latter the insurgents used to disseminate secessionist propaganda. Three days later, military forces crushed the uprising, supported by units from nearby Iligan City (George 1980: 204-205). However, the background of the attackers has been unclear until today, with a variety of explanations: from MNLF commands up to a counter-insurgency tactic by the armed forces to blame the MNLF. Even later on, "Moro resistance efforts in the last quarter of 1972 and the early part of the 1973 were largely localized and uncoordinated" (Muslim 1994: 160-161). It should take another couple of months and skirmishes until a full-scale war escalated. Up until then, the MNLF was one of the ordering forces, even preventing massacres on Christians (George 1980: 207).

September 21, 1972, brought a qualitative change for the Philippines as well as for the insurgency with it. President Marcos declared martial law, officially starting his years as Philippine dictator. Next to the communist insurgency, the Moro struggle has been the second announced reason for this move. This closed the door to any legal opposition. The MNLF concluded their organizational stage,

"ha[ving] parallel political and military structures. The political structure consists of a central committee of about twenty, a political bureau, a propaganda and intelligence bureau, and provincial and barrio committees. The Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) has a field-marshal under but not directly supervised by the central committee; field-marshals at the provincial level; and zone-commanders at the municipality level. 'Home defense' units supplement the BMA units." (Noble 1976: 412)

The BMA has been the strong military arm against the intruding Armed Forces of the Philippines at hand to the MNLF. 17 AFP-battalions have been transferred to the South and 30,000 civilians have been armed by the government, trying to tackle key offensives by the MNLF, which hit Cotabato in March 1973 and Jolo in February 1974 (Collier 1998: 142).

"The MNLF suffered heavy casualties throughout 1973 because it lacked combat experience, and because its training had stressed conventional warfare and static defense. Thus, it tended to create fixed bases and to try to hold them with relatively large contingents of up to 1,500 combatants. Such tactics relied on concentrated firepower and conceded in advance the advantage of mobility to the AFP, whose personnel moved in helicopters, vessels and troop-carriers." (Ahmad 2000b: 30)

However, nonetheless these backlashes the MNLF was at its height, and had centralized violence as well as the non-legal representation of the local people at hand.

"No longer was the south reeling under the impact of hit-and-run gangs. Holding it at bay now was a well-organized and purposeful insurrectionary movement. Its operational sophistication was impressive. Its leaders, new entrants on the national stage, were found to be not self-seeking political warlords but men of academic eminence and a background of political convictions. It had ideological overtones such as were totally absent in pre-martial-law clashes. Above all, it was not directed against Christian communities; its enemy was the national government." (George 1980: 193)

Meanwhile local authorities fled to bigger cities, leaving the political void to insurgency structures. (Gutierrez 2000b: 50) Thus, the MNLF were in complete control of the conflict from the Moro side: “The MNLF [...] controlled political and military training, propaganda, and diplomatic contacts with Muslim, primarily Arab, states.” (McKenna 1998: 157)

However, this shows already the future weaknesses of the MNLF, too: as much as they controlled the overall conflict and its external connections, as unstable and diverse has been its local support. “The idea of fighting for the Bangsamoro – for a nation of Philippine Muslims united by culture and history – was but one of those motivating factors [to support the MNLF, S.S.] and, if we use the popular songs and stories of the rebellion as indicators, not an especially potent one” (McKenna 1998: 286). Institutionally “[t]he MNLF never controlled all of the rebels fighting the government and was, in fact a loosely knit group, with the borders between those fighters who were members of, aligned with, or exterior to the MNLF never very clear. ... [A]most all ... members ... of the central committee ... were in Tripoli by 1974” (McKenna 1998: 157), “university men who were given specific portfolios in shadow-cabinet style. This barely included the grassroots commanders who were fighting in Mindanao” (George 1980: 230). Civilians relied on the protection by insurgent force, as attacks from government forces and paramilitary units continued rather indiscriminately against every possible insurgent. But this connection was not a primordial given, but an actively chosen one (McKenna 1998: 192). BMA fighting units rested on local organisational structures,

“tough local leaders who only understood power within their limited localities and who, for their own reasons, had turned against the government. They understood little about revolution and less about Misuari's intellectual exercises, but they found their paths crossing those of the MNLF. Typical of this breed of local chieftains were Usman Sali and Al Caluang. ... Men like Usman Sali, Al Caluang and other 'field marshals' in charge of various rebel territories were power centres in themselves, mostly moving under their own steam. In the environment of Islamic revolution and martial law, they all became part of the seemingly centralized liberation front. But Misuari's hold on them was dependent more on the supplies he could send them from overseas than on his dream of a political movement for a new order in all Mindanao.” (George 1980: 230)

The MNLF Central Committee “contended itself with setting broad policy outlines and organizing external support, leaving local leaders to make their own decisions.” (Nagasura T. Madale quoted in Gutierrez 2000b: 51). Local people followed their local connection, i.e. protectors, and if these defected, they went mostly with them.

Thus the MNLF was in an ambiguous situation. As an essential gatekeeper between external resources and local units as well as the coordinator of the rebellion in organizational and ideological terms they have been the key to the insurgency. On the other hand, they have been in a constant dependence to foreign and local forces. Considering the external component as crucial, Misuari “spent most of his time in the Middle East and the Muslim world, shuttling between conferences and meetings with Muslim leaders whenever possible.” (Tan 1993: 78-79) On the diplomatic front, the Organisation of Islamic Conference would become their essential ally; next to Libya and Malaysian Sabah under Tun Mustapha. Itself a new organization, founded after the embarrassing defeat of the Arab nations in the 1967 war against Israel, the OIC took up the Moro cause as a key issue. In their Jeddah conference of 1972 they passed resolution 12/3, stating that “[t]he conference ... expresses serious concern over the plight of

Muslims living in the Philippines” (OIC 1972). One year later, in resolution 4/4 of the Benghazi conference 1973, they already expressed “deep concern over the reported repression and mass extermination of Muslims in South Philippines” and urged a mission of the Libyan Arab Republic, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Somalia to investigate “reported persecution and genocide campaigns.” (OIC 1973) This mission was a failure in the eyes of the MNLF. President Marcos took the emissaries to a tour throughout Mindanao, convincing them of no genocide plans by his government. However, resolution 18/5 of the Kuala Lumpur conference 1974 had two compensating gifts for the MNLF. For the first time they get mentioned in the urging of the Philippine government on negotiations “with Muslim leaders, particularly with the representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front”. Furthermore the “Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency” has been established (OIC 1974), a possibility to channel further support to Minsupala.

The OIC as an intergovernmental organisation had few pressure possibilities against the Philippines; their single countries, however, had. When the OPEC countries in 1973 issued its oil embargo related to the Israel/Palestine-conflict, Marcos has been fast in redirecting Philippines foreign policy position regarding the Middle East, “unmistakably supportive of the Arab position.” (Rodil 2000: 4) At this point, the MNLF had to realize that connections of Moros and Middle Eastern states are not primordially bond. The MNLF had to compete with the Philippine state on the level of diplomacy in the Middle East, too. President Marcos strengthened Philippines international relations, opened embassies and missions in Middle Eastern countries. The OIC in return did not fail to recognize the sovereignty of the Philippines and regarded the Moro question as finally an internal issue throughout its involvement with the Moro cause.

Meanwhile, on the ground, the MNLF switched tactic. After the initializing mistake of fighting a conventional war with fixed bases, the MNLF moved now to guerrilla warfare (Ahmad 2000b: 31). They had according to different sources between 14,000 to 60,000 fighters at hand, fighting against seven battalions, i.e. 10,000 soldiers of the AFP, and 25,000 to 30,000 paramilitary forces (George 1980: 213). At the mid of the 1970s in the MNLF’s eyes the sun shone again over Mindanao and to paraphrase an AFP-general (Fortunato 1999) the MNLF could cheer “the day we nearly won Mindanao”.³⁵

4.2.4 Betrayed Peace and its Aftermath

This pressure by the MNLF armed forces against the AFP resulted in “a stalemate, obliging the Philippine Government to negotiate a cease-fire and a peace treaty” (McKenna 2002: 544). The period was therefore opened by a peace agreement, which, however, failed and led to renewed clashes, internal factionalism, and the loose of control of the MNLF over a unified Moro struggle.

“Public opinion, both domestic and international ... and the heavy financial costs of pursuing military actions against the MNLF” (Werble 1996: 100) turned against Marcos’ intention to find a military solution. Less clear is the acceptance of peace negotiations by the MNLF, who was already militarily on a winning track: “It could be the devastation of Moroland, the martyrdom of 50,000 of its fighters, and the death of 20,000 Moro civilians or pressure from the OIC itself.

³⁵ Fortunato’s book is titled “The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao”.

But it did and the negotiation changed the configuration of its political goals.” (Rodil 2003: 138) Furthermore, the war destroyed what has been available on local infrastructure and displaced several hundred thousand, of which several ten thousands stranded as international refugees in nearby Sabah (May 1992b: 130; Ahmad 2000b: 26), causing increasing local impatience and potential diminishing support for the MNLF. Peace negotiations started under the official auspices of the OIC with a meeting of the two conflict parties in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on January 13-17, 1975. However, “the O.I.C., through the Quadripartite Committee, was so limited in power that for the conciliation to continue, it had to request other parties to continue the conciliation process” (Wadi 1993: 195). Thus Libya and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia became the driving forces behind, having different agendas themselves, representing radical and conservative forces inside the OIC.

For the Philippine regime, the topic had to be solved. As convenient as the conflict was as a legitimating reason for martial law, it turned out to be an uncontrollable factor for Marcos’ government; even more so as opposition on the national level grew stronger. Getting rid of the problem included all possible options, including bribing the movement’s leaders:

“At one point [during a negotiation meeting in Jeddah 1975, S.S.], a disturbed [MNLF deputy chairman] Salamat Hashim approached Dr. Majul and said that a member of the government panel delivered the message that Pres. Marcos was offering him (Hashim) the governorship of the whole Cotabato Province (what is now Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat). He was visibly very angry and resentful that the offer was made to him. ... Members of the MNLF panel ... all assumed that this was a move by Marcos to sow division among MNLF leaders and weaken the MNLF panel.” (Rodil 2000: 17)

The MNF meanwhile was not prepared for negotiations:

“By refusing to discuss the points put forth by the government panel ... the MNLF panel served notice that they were willing to disregard everything but their pre-occupation with the ‘political solution’ to the entire Muslim problem ... It was on account of this pre-occupation that the MNLF panel did not seem prepared to discuss any social or economic plan for the rehabilitation and development of the Muslim peoples; they were not even prepared to discuss anything having to do with the political and administrative aspects of greater local autonomy for these areas.” (Rodil 2000: 20)

It was unclear, if the MNLF was willing to find a solution or merely regarded negotiations as a concession to their international donors. “To try to negotiate, but not to expect to solve the problem, could easily be seen as the motivating force behind the MNLF in facing the GRP in the negotiations” (former Libyan Ambassador to the Philippines, Adam 2002: 97). Their demands to accept autonomy was high, which would lead in government’s eyes to a secession under different name: total control with own legislative, executive and judicative bodies, including an own army to be formed by the then-former BMA. With a differentiated ideology missing, the MNLF could not provide a reduced alternative to their original aim, secession.

Meanwhile, the influence of Libya on the outcome of the negotiations was out of question: “The Leader Col. Muammar al Qathafi, at this time, was considered very influential in guiding and shaping the decision of Nur Misuari.” (former Libyan Ambassador to the Philippines, Adam 2002: 80). “Throughout the negotiations, [Libyan Minister for Foreign Affairs] Dr. Ali Treki was the dominant figure, in his role as conference chairman. The RP panel was actually negotiating

with him, not with Misuari. Misuari himself was totally subservient to Treki, and was allowed to speak only three times during the entire conference” (Rodil 2000: 45).

Thus, the negotiations got taken out of MNLF hands and became an international struggle between several forces. Libya itself and the OIC as a whole were under pressure by conservative and Southeast Asian OIC members, facing their own insurgency problems. Indonesia, OIC as well as ASEAN member, has been a loyal partner of the Philippine government throughout the decades, with its prime minister publicly blaming the MNLF for its “disproportionate demand” (quoted in Rodil 2000: 24). Malaysia’s support stopped “at one stroke” after Tun Mustapha has been overthrown in Sabah (George 1980: 264). Saudi Arabia was not keen to weaken the key US ally in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, Libya stood against these pro-Philippine forces, threatening to release the MNLF to possible communist sponsors as Vietnam and Cambodia (Rodil 2000: 37). At the end stood a “plan of action”, elaborated by the Committee of Four and put forward by the OIC in their 6th meeting in Jeddah, as the basis for a final negotiation between the Philippine government and the MNLF (OIC 1975).

The conclusion of an agreement was in sight and as negotiations stalled, President Marcos sent his wife to Tripoli in December 1976; a week later delegation leader Carmelo Z. Barbero signed for the Philippine government, Nur Misuari for the MNLF, Ali Abdusaalam Treki for Libya as representative of the Committee of Four, and Amadou Karim Gaye for the OIC.

It seemed a near-to-perfect deal for the MNLF:

- areas of autonomy include 13 provinces: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan (§2);
 - integration of BMA forces into the AFP (§3/2) and special regional security forces (§3/8);
 - Islamic Shari'ah laws in own courts (§3/3); right to own educational (§3/4), administrative (§3/5), economic, and financial system (§3/6); own regional legislative and executive bodies (§3/9);
 - Muslim representatives in the national Supreme Court (§3/3), in the central government and all other organs of the state (§3/7);
 - a reasonable percentage from mines and minerals revenues (§3/10);
 - a ceasefire monitored by a Joint Committee, general political amnesty, release of political prisoners, return of refugees, and freedom of movements and meetings (§3/13);
 - a provisional regional government appointed by the Philippine president, preparing elections and administrating the region until its conclusion (§3/15).
- (Barbero et al. 1976)

For the Philippine Republic, the important points were few, even though essential: acceptance of “the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity” (§1) and the competences for foreign policy (§3/1) and defence policy (§3/2) (Barbero et al. 1976). The main success, however, was hidden in an administrative-sounding Trojan horse in point §3/16, included upon a call by President Marcos with Barbero (Gutierrez 2000a: xvii): “The Government of the Philip-

piners shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement” (Barbero et al. 1976). This included Constitution Article XI Sec. 2, which brought the Tripoli agreement to its collapse: “any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose” (Philippines 1973). As expected by Marcos, no majority was to be found for such a plebiscite: settlers outweighed indigenous people in most of the above mentioned provinces and to achieve their votes was an invincible challenge for the MNLF. Furthermore even part of the traditional elite stood against the idea to allow the MNLF an overall victory, with their constituency voting against a possible autonomy. The MNLF boycotted the provisional government as well as the plebiscite. In September 1977, talks between the MNLF and government finally collapsed (Rodil 2000: 65). The MNLF returned to their original demand:

“We would like to assure your Excellencies that we shall always listen to your wise counsel and to continue to cooperate with you. But if the Philippine Government will continue to violate its pledges and commitments to our people and the Islamic Conference, then we will be forced to revert to our original demand for complete national freedom and independence of the Muslim national homeland of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Palawan. Therefore, we ask you, Excellencies, to exert all your efforts and influence to compel the Philippine government to fulfill their commitments to our people and the Islamic Conference.” (Misuari 1977: 8)

However, nonetheless these strong words, the nationalist Moro movement passed its peak. Throughout 1977 clashes erupted. The MNLF organized military parades in urban areas as show of forces, the AFP responded with new military campaigns (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 134). The ceasefire followed the destiny of the negotiations and broke down in October 1977, when the AFP “resumed full-scale activities” (Noble 1981: 1102). However, military pressure was the smaller problem at this moment.

The MNLF scrambled from within. The first to challenge Nur Misuari was Salamat Hashim. He announced an “Instrument of Takeover”, trying to oust Misuari as chairman, supported by “Al Haj Murad, Ghazzali Jaafar, Mohagher Iqbal, Abukalil Yayha, and Amelil Malaguio, all from the Maguindanao Moro group” (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 136). 57 leading officers of the Kutawato Revolutionary Committee sent a petition to the OIC as well as to the Muslim World League, another pan-Islamic institution, asking to support the replacement of Misuari by Hashim (Rodil 2000: 65). Furthermore traditional leaders Rashid Lucman, Domacao Alonto, and Salipada Pendatun supported this move (Gutierrez 2000axviii). Lucman send a “confidential note”, mentioning “that Misuari’s ideology had taken the Marxist-radical line and thus would not be in the best interests of Islam and Muslims in the Philippines.” (Tan 1993: 45) However, no one was able to topple Misuari and therefore left the MNLF. The split found its international materialization: Misuari stayed with his Libyan hosts, while Salamat Hashim moved to Egypt to chair the “New MNLF”, hosted now by “Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Gaddafi’s arch foe.” (George 1980: 262) However, as Hashim was not eager to please the traditional elites neither, Lucman established the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization, settling down in conservative Saudi Arabia, another of Libya’s rivals. “Macapanton Abbas, an ex-bureaucrat who once headed the ‘Task Force for Southern Philippines,’ the civilian arm of the Marcos regime’s anti-MNLF forces in Mindanao” became the BMLO’s second head, a move which, at least, pleased counterinsurgency professionals in the AFP (Ahmad 2000b: 35). The former front was now dispersed over three countries even in exile. However, both new groups were unsuccessful to

take over the support by the OIC. In this difficult time it was one of the few successes for the MNLF: they got an OIC observer status in the Tripoli OIC meeting and were considered as “the legal representative of the Muslims movement in southern Philippines”, while the Philippines got blamed for the breakdown of the peace process (OIC 1977b).

Another factor came into play: the anti-Marcos coalition. The national elections 1978 brought no change due to massive cheating by the government. “[T]he moderate forces identified with the late Sen. Benigno Aquino Jr. flirted with the thought of arming themselves.” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 35) Furthermore, the rising communist-led resistance threatened the traditional opposition leaders from a second front. Thus, the “MNLF proved to be a more acceptable ally” to fight Marcos (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 35). Norberto Gonzales, chair of the Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas, contacted the MNLF (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 36). Even though no operative plan got implemented, a base for future cooperation has been laid out and a continuing connection established.

However, this was just a moment of relief. On the local front, the MNLF leadership lost more and more control of their commanders. Above all in Maguindanao commanders aligned with the Salamat-faction, while in Lanao some followed the BMLO. Furthermore, Marcos counter-insurgency tactic bear fruits: next to a general charm offensive, Marcos “legalized barter trade with Borneo and codified Muslim laws” (George 1980: 266), the regime integrated collaborative high level traditional leaders into the political system as well as in his patron-client-networks. “The first casualty” was Dimas Pundato who formed the “Reformist MNLF” and then defected to become director of the Office of Muslim Affairs (Tan 1993: 50). Most prominent, former MNLF vice-chairman Abul Khayr Alonto surrendered to the AFP with 2000 men in March 1978, (Ahmad 2000b: 36). Furthermore Marcos supported defectors on the command-level with government positions and licences. Most famous were the Magic Eight in Sulu, defecting leaders who got a broad spectrum of benefits, including “cash, firearms, ammunition, amnesty, and immunity from criminal prosecution, as well as import licenses used in the lucrative barter trade in the region ... They became civilian authorities with paramilitary powers in a war-torn province” (Gutierrez 2000b: 55). However, most defectors have not been that successful, returning to low-level violence activities as warlords and criminal gangs (Rimban 2003), bringing the conflict area back to its pre-war situation: battles with the AFP were rare, while hit-and-run and kidnapping-for-ransom activities raised (Kreuzer 2003: 30). Some were even joining as vigilante groups the fight of settler landlords and AFP against peasant organizations in the nearby Davao region, e.g. “Kapitan Inggo” and his “People’s Liberation Organization – Armed Forces of Justice”, a group of 200 “heavily armed men”, patrolled in Mandug, interrogated and arrested people, relying on the support by the AFP. (Collier 1998: 85).

What helped retain a constant local support for the Moro insurgents were the continuing counter-insurgency-measures by the AFP: they targeted insurgents and civilians alike. A resource control has been introduced: “Each Muslim family, regardless of size, was allowed to purchase two kilos of rice and one-fourth kilo of sugar daily, while medicine of any kind, from antibiotics to aspirin, could be purchased only with the permission of the army.” (Ahmad 2000b: 27) Even though class issues did not show prominently in MNLF propaganda, according to a survey conducted in the 1980s, their support base was considerably higher in the unemployed population than within office/clerical employees (Bucoy 1984: 134-137). Nearly 50% of the respondents favoured an end of datu predominance. And even 84% chose the statement

“There should be a popular revolution to put an end to the control of the few in our country” (Bucoy 1984: 122). People even crossed inter-confessional lines, with more than 70% agreeing on the sentence: “The Moro people like the Christian masses, presently suffers from the oppression of foreign and Christian capitalists that control the resources of the country.” (Bucoy 1984: 109) Even considering methodological limits of the mentioned study, a thesis at UP with constrained resources, it is a hint which contradicts the published opinion that in Moro society people are so conservative that any question of social change is out of mind of the general population. Finally the study reveals that the MNLF was still the Moro’s favourite representative (Bucoy 1984: 127).

A further possibility to acquire support got missed by the MNLF:

“According to a member of the General Command of the new People's Army (NPA), efforts were made in the early '80s to set up a strategic coalition with the MNLF. On a fund- and arms-raising trip to Libya, the NPAs were asked by their hosts about their willingness to formalize this coalition. However, Misuari, who was then in Tripoli, made himself scarce as a coalition with the communists would jeopardize the MNLF's relations with conservative Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia.” (Gutierrez 2000d: 346)

Nonetheless, as traditional leaders already turned their backs on the MNLF, its leadership loosened their anti-NDF position regarding the local level. Furthermore, “In 1980, Representatives of the ... NDFP ... and the MNLF were together in the indictment of the Marcos dictatorship at the First Session on the Philippines of the Permanent Peoples Tribunal (PPT) in Antwerp, Belgium.” (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 144) “In addition to Philippine colonialism, MNLF statements have also stressed the role of U.S. imperialism in such exploitation. ... The sharpening of the anti-imperialist stand of the MNLF might indicate some current redirection of the Moro struggle from a strictly religious-oriented movement to a broader nationalist, anti-colonialist one.” (Bucoy 1984: 71-72) However, for a lasting solution it was too late and the MNLF central command not ready for a revolutionary turn.

The MNLF had thus to rely continuously on international support. They could acquire training possibilities in Syria and with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Further fighting experience Moro fighters got in Pakistan and in nearby Afghanistan. In the latter around 700 Moro fought as Mujahiddins against the Soviet Union, with more or less equal proportions deriving from the MNLF and Salamat faction (Interviews D and T). “[I]n the process, [they] forged lifetime solidarity linkages with various Islamic leaders and militants from different parts of the Muslim world.” (Rivera 2008: 81) Furthermore, the MNLF addressed international organizations and Misuari lectured on different stages around the world:

“The United Nations and other world organizations also became a convenient fora for the presentation of the MNLF position. The UN High Commission for Refugees, Amnesty International, Islamic Development Bank, Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami (World Muslim Congress), Rabitatul Alam Al-Islami (Islamic Call), World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and World Forum of Muslim Minorities (WFMM) in London were among the MNLF’s stages. The WFMM through its Secretary General, Dr. A. Abo Rased, on March 24, 1988 sent an appeal to the OIC to admit the MNLF as a full member. But the more effective tools in the internationalization process were Misuari’s lecture circuit and talks with heads of state.” (Tan 1993: 84)

However, finally again a development on the national level altered the course of Moro history: the People Power Revolution.

4.2.5 A New Chance for Peace in a New Democracy?

Corazon Aquino took over power in 1986 and expectations on change were high. While the early hopes for an overall accepted autonomy failed, new negotiations led to the 1996 agreement, defining this period; however, its implementation in the second half of the period continued to be challenging.

Against advice from her surroundings which saw the MNLF already on their knees, the new president met Misuari on September 5, 1986 in Jolo. "We had a very good discussion". (Misuari 2008: 123) Beforehand, meetings have been conducted throughout the years since the first contact in 1979. Now was the time to act. On the international level, "Muammar Al-Qathafi harbored the idea that President Aquino was a product of a peoples' revolution. Because of this, it was believed that a constructive negotiation could be started with President Aquino. Hence, he cautiously prevailed upon Misuari to talk peace in 1987 on what was later on bannered as 'Give Peace a Chance.'" (Adam 2002: 84). Already in January 1987, a cease-fire agreement could be reached.

However, everyday politics were more difficult. Aquino's revolutionary government replaced all over the country Marcos' elected and appointed officials with appointed officers-in-charge. In the Moro areas this did cost many MNLF-defectors their job, while "many [new appointees] were unacceptable to the Moro" (Gonzalez 2000: 118-119). Furthermore, several mutinies and *Putsch*-attempts by Marcos-loyal forces distracted attention from Minsupala. Finally, the new government might have been the result of decades of emancipatory struggles, but the government resembled pre-Marcos governments with ambiguous ideas about Minsupala. Above all the military establishment refused to give in to their decade old enemy (Santos 2010d: 69). This contrasted with the attempt by the overconfident MNLF not to repeat errors of Tripoli 1976 and to retain a hard stance in detailed negotiations (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 38).

The negotiations started with talks in Zamboanga on February 9, 1987. The government offered a transition council and a plebiscite afterwards, the MNLF insisted on "the outright creation of an autonomous region by an executive order to be signed by Aquino," based on the Tripoli Agreement. The government tried it with "a draft declaring the government's 'long-term' commitment to grant autonomy to eight provinces"; the OIC could go along with it; however, the MNLF stood ground. (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 39).

The talks collapsed and before a settlement between the MNLF and the new government could be reached, Article X of the new constitution stated:

"There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Philippines 1987: §10, Sec.15)

The MNLF has been sidelined, the autonomy not any longer the outcome of a peace negotiation process: "The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representa-

tives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies” (Philippines 1987: §10, Sec.18). And the same section repeated the MNLF problem of 1976: plebiscites in provinces and cities would have the last word on integration of constituencies into the autonomy framework. The timeframe given by the constitution was 18 months.

Accordingly the MNLF boycotted the referendum on the new constitution, leading to an overall approval in Moro provinces (Mercado Jr. 1992: 164) with a considerable lower turnout. Consequently, the MNLF did not get involved in the formation of the RCC and the drafting of the organic Act, passed by Congress two years later. Military clashes were sporadic (Harber 1998: 57), but the MNLF “had full control of rural areas and some cities in Lanao del Sur. It established a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) to settle political and personal disputes, including *ridos*. The PRG also provided livelihood assistance and imposed a new system of taxation.” (Gonzalez 2000: 121) A continuing problem were internal factions: the ceasefire agreement alienated Melham Alam, the MNLF chief of staff, and Parouk Hussin, MNLF’s foreign minister. They feared to be outmanoeuvred by the government (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 41). On the international level, Misuari’s lectures got more offensive. “[D]uring the Second Plenary Session of the 8th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on February 18, 1989 ... he revealed the probable secret collusion between the Aquino government and the Zionist Club International to train young Christian Sabahans in the Hacienda Luisita [an Aquino family’s property, S.S.] with the blessing of [Manila based] Jaime Cardinal Sin.” (Tan 1993: 85) More than ever the MNLF needed support from abroad. At this time, the MNLF miscalculated the dynamics of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Its stance of neutrality disappointed Saudi Arabia, which reduced its support. (Tan 1993: 51)

However, again it was not the MNLF which altered the situation in a qualitative way, but the national and international level. Change came with the election of former AFP Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos as the new President of the Philippines: “Ramos recognized that social stability was the key to economic development of the nation, and immediately upon assumption of office set out to seal agreements with rebel groups.” (Harber 1998: 45) “Investors fear could only be overcome with peace arrangement with the MNLF. Moreover, President Ramos is also eyeing Arab money being poured into the area” (Werble 1996: 72). In September 1992 he created the National Unification Commission, organized consultations on the provincial and regional levels, institutionalized through Executive Order 125 in September 1993 (Santos 2010d: 69). In the same year peace negotiations with the MNLF started again.

On the international level, liberation wars became out-of-date after the end of the bloc-confrontation as well. “Indonesia provided the leadership of the ‘ASEAN factor’”, as the ASEAN region “experienced a sense of development and prosperity ... The spirit for peace was high” (Adam 2002: 103-104). The MNLF patrons in the OIC wanted peace, too, even though they remained firm with the Philippines unwillingness to base their negotiations on the Tripoli Agreement. Libya was struggling with the US after a series of bomb attacks allegedly been planted by Libyan agents against Western targets in the second part of the 1980s. With the start of the new year, a cease-fire agreement was signed “under intense pressure from Libya” (Harber 1998: 62)

The MNLF on the other hand was not on the rise any longer. “Misuari, for his part, was simply tired of it all. ... He was not getting any younger and his fighting crew was not getting any

meaner” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 44). This was true for his comrades as well, while the younger generation already started to realign to the more prosperous Islamic movement (see next section). Thus, in the following two years the negotiations proceeded successfully and ended in a compromise between the demands by the MNLF and the Philippine offers and legal constraints: the governorship of the existing ARMM for Misuari and the establishment of an appointed Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to head the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) for the MNLF, covering the areas mentioned by the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, to be chaired by Misuari as well. The way to there was difficult, with different interests all along. Two-level-games have been played, with negotiators rejecting proposals, blaming their constituencies. Different negotiators did not agree on their own party’s positions. Misunderstandings crossed the negotiation table. Finally, the deal has been settled on a personal level by back-channelling through personal connections, the mentioned UP connection between Torres and Misuari; the ambassadors of Libya and Indonesia were involved, representing the pressure of Libya, the OIC, and ASEAN. The deal was settled even before the final signature: Misuari enlisted for the ARMM governor elections on July 8, 1996 (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 47-59) The MNLF, with the leadership of ARMM and SZOPAD in hand, could prove their governing capabilities and convince the local population of the advantages of an autonomy under a qualitative new leadership. An extended autonomy could then be institutionalized in an amendment of the ARMM after a plebiscite. (Harber 1998: 62-64) On September 2, 1996, the “The final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement” (MNLF/GRP 1996) got signed in Malacañang.

However, again the implementation was the real test. As much support the MNLF might still have had in the overall indigenous population, as weak was his stand against three strong interest groups: the traditional Moro elites in general, the local government units and bureaucracy in specific, and the settlers’ population as a whole.

The latter feared the SPCDC, although its limited influence. Local settlers’ politicians fuelled the situation with misinformation. Their personal interests and the instrumental character of their speeches were obvious; nonetheless their propaganda found easy ground in a population affected by decades of violence. Vigilante groups surfaced once more, recalling the ghosts of the 70s: “Ilaga movement, Ituman group and the Pulalian group, all based in Southern Mindanao which are being supported by prominent officials identified as Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Alvin Dans, South Cotabato Re. Daisy Avance-Fuentes, Mayor Gonzalod de Pedro of Sultan Kudarat and former Mayor Eddie Juanche of South Cotabato.” (Werble 1996-89) On the national level, congress politicians prevented a strengthening of the SZOPAD by neglecting financial support. Meanwhile, the MNLF did little to address the settlers’ fears, except from general appeasing announcements. On the contrary, their reliance on personal networks to govern their new constituency just alienated the settlers’ population even further.

This again was not just confined on settlers, but indigenous officers and politicians alike. The MNLF took over an overblown ARMM bureaucracy, consequence of Misuari’s predecessors’ patronage politics (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 78-80). The bureaucrats feared for their revenues. So did the politicians on the provincial and municipal level (Vitug and Gloria 2000-83) which were afraid of an ARMM centralizing their resources . This was not altered by the fact that material reality was the other way around: the ARMM’s resources outside their immediate

administration expenditures were few, even more so compared to the other locally spend fiscal resources. Investment funds either were channelled by Congress to their own members in form of pork barrels or directly to the local government units, undermining the MNLF's possibility to conduct their own policy (Boncodin et al. 2007).

Finally, after the troublesome history between the traditional elites and the MNLF, the latter could not hope on much support from the first. The other way around, the traditional elites had little to gain from a successful MNLF. Even more so, as the MNLF enlisted now their own people for local elections and got in direct competition with the existing patronage networks (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 101).

The MNLF itself was after 25 years of struggle mainly a military organisation and not prepared for the task of running a government bureaucracy. "We were taken in and literally swept off our feet," so Misuari before the OIC (quoted in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 101). They integrated their own people into the system, a necessary step against the hostility of the old bureaucracy and at the same time seen as a continuing of old-style-patronage politics. "Technical skills" were lacking and had just to be learned:

"During our rebel days, my task was also partly administrative. But the difference is the bureaucracy. This one is slow. ... Everything had to be properly documented. ... It was a matter of trust in the revolutionary bureaucracy. We had no receipts." (ARMM budget director Natchai, MNLF veteran, quoted in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 88)

But it was not skills alone. For many rebels it was time to share the peace dividend after decades of hardship in the jungles. (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 85-86) "[W]hat puts Misuari down are the workings of his followers. These followers were once MNLF combatants who think that they are still in the state of struggle. So any opportunity that comes their way, particularly money, taking and spending such are just considered natural." (Baser Latip, Provincial Administrator Basilan and MNLF veteran, quoted in Linao 2001: 106).

The institutional structures of SPCPD and SZOPAD, created by Executive Order 371, did not help. Itself a rather powerless agency with few resources and despised from all sides, their internal and external relations were not defined, thus "creating pressure on the MNLF to perform in the midst of confusion, ambiguity and widespread mediahype about the SPCPD. ... There is pressure to perform, but the SPCPD is not given the necessary wherewithal to deliver." (Peace veteran Jun Mercado quoted in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 101)

Thus, the MNLF leadership did what they have been best during the last decades: work on their international networks to promote investments in the region which should triple down the social hierarchy and leave some reputation for the MNLF (Gutierrez and Guilal 2000: 273). Having neither an ideological nor an operative program, big dreams were offered: "We should practice thinking big for our homeland." Misuari stated before the SZOPAD Consultative Assembly (quoted in Gutierrez 2000c: 232). This included airports and multi-lane highways. All difficulties brushed aside, Mindanao would become 'a new Hong Kong' (Misuari quoted in Harber 1998: 80).

4.2.6 Second Failing of Peace and the End of the MNLF?

However, as much as these dreams might fit with international investors, they were irrelevant for the local population, including demobilized MNLF rank-and-file soldiers. The current period is the most difficult for the movement since its foundation fifty years ago. Further factionalism haunted the movement and a return to revolution failed as much as a joint engagement in liberal-democratic politics.

The movement's leadership lost its good reputation towards their followers. Furthermore, they alienated supportive forces in civil society "progressive church people, and reform-minded elements in the business, media, and academic communities", critical of Ramos liberal development framework (Rocamora 1999: 175): "Misuari may have been blindsided by the fact that he was dealing at the other end of the negotiating table with one of the chief architects and promoters of the neoliberal agenda in the Philippines – Ramos." (Bauzon 2008: 77) Promised money for the SPCPD got not released by the national government. The "almost a saint" (MNLF veteran Pundato quoted in Vitug and Gloria 2000: 45) representative of the Moro nation, Misuari, became "part of the problem", ripe to get ousted by an alliance of the new government with "key leaders of the MNLF" (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 95-96) in 1999. At that time, it was getting clear, that the peace agreement was going to fail. The outcome of three years of ARMM and SZOPAD was near to null.

The senate prepared in the meantime an Organic Act for the new autonomous region as planned already in the peace process (Ferrer 2000). Misuari was "conspicuously absent in the public hearings on the draft autonomy law conducted by the Senate in Mindanao in 2000" and furthermore got declared as president of a "Bangsamoro Republic" by the Fourth Bangsamoro People's National Congress in April 2001 (Ferrer 2001: 3). Contrary to Misuari's local support, his second line in the central committee broke with Misuari and firm now in AFP terms under the label MNLF/ Committee of 15; their leader, Parouk Hussin, became the candidate for the ARMM governorship, favoured by the new President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

On November 19, 2001, Misuari loyal forces retaliated. The Council of 15 as well as the Philippine administration underestimated him, "nobody took his threats really seriously" (Ferrer 2001: 3). But for the bulk of the remaining MNLF rank-and-file, Misuari was still their leader, over which the Council of 15 had little influence (Interview E). They occupied the ARMM complex in Zamboanga City and attacked army camps in Sulu; over hundred people died. However, it was not the start of a new war, but at maximum a show of force. Misuari fled to nearby Sabah, where he got arrested five days later. It took just two months for the OIC member and former MNLF supporter Malaysia to turn Misuari over to the Philippine government. The latter charged him with rebellion and put him under detention. The MNLF fighting force has been dissolved: part of it moved to the MILF (see next section) and other violence actors (see section five), part of it got integrated into the AFP and PNP and part was successfully demobilized and had returned to a civilian life. The remaining fighters were just a glimpse of the strong fighting force the BMA used to be in the 1970s.

The November 2001 incident was just the first indicator of the fading influence of the MNLF as a political force in Mindanao. Council of 15 members could acquire some government positions, e.g. Parouk Hussin became ARMM governor for one term until 2005, Muslimin Sema Cotabato City Mayor and his wife congress representative. However, most positions got lost

throughout the next elections to the traditional elites, starting with the ARMM governorship which Zaldy Ampatuan took over; his family fought on the side of the government against the MNLF forces right from the beginning in the 1970s.

What remains of the MNLF is a wide constituency (Santos and Santos 2010a: 331), above all in Sulu, where the MILF has little influence (ICG 2012). However, politically they got ousted from their own country: "The OIC's annual Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) remains the most important political and diplomatic arena for the MNLF, above even the Philippine Congress." (Santos and Santos 2010a: 335) The little attention President Aquino has given to the evaluation of the 1996 agreement, even though announcing it as part of his comprehensive approach, is the latest indicator that at the moment there is little hope for the nationalist-liberal movement to return to regional political influence. Thus, the question will be which part of its ideas will be carried on by the religious-national movement, which we will outline now in the next section.

4.3 NR-AC: National Religious Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

"The MILF is the realisation of the ideas, efforts and sacrifices of Bangsamoro students in the Middle East who banded together and clandestinely organised themselves in 1962. Those students were kindled and unified by the common feelings concerning the usurpation of their legitimate and inalienable rights to freedom and selfdetermination, and that the usurpation of Moro land was a plot against Islam and the Muslim people in the area. Furthermore it was a wanton design to destroy their identity and to liquidate them. Those students urged their counterparts in the Bangsamoro homeland and the Bangsamoro people in general to return to the fold of Islam and fight against the aggressors. They exhorted them to follow the path of Allah and launch Jihaad in the Way of Allah." (Salamat 2008: 240)

4.3.1 Mythical Past: Anti-Colonial Resistance against Christianity

The mythical past of the religious-national counter-hegemony does not differ strongly from the secular-nationalist project. Both highlight the centuries of war between Spain and the US against the Moro sultanates after the latter's establishment in Minsupala. What differs of course by definition is the role of Islam in the overall framework; its role for the origin of the Bangsa Moro and during the integration into the liberal system.

The extension of the Islamic creed onto its most eastern strongholds during the 15th century was no effort of missionaries, but "a consequence or an incident of Arab or Chinese trade" (Tan 1977: 20); different from the Catholic faith in the later Spanish colony. Even though some Christian historians write about "coercion and all manner of depredations" (quoted in George 1980: 17), the idea of an unintended diffusion is more sound. It accounts for the specific evolution of Islam in Minsupala as a hybrid form between local traditions and Islamic influences. "In short, the real teachings of Islam never did penetrate Muslim Filipino consciousness" (Tan 1977: 21), even though it is arguable what the real teachings are; other writers divide between Islamization, which took place, and Arabization, which did not. While some consider the Moro-Spanish wars as a time of Islamic unity (Majul 1973), even this can be doubted, as Islam was not able to bridge rivalries between groups with different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds (George 1980: 21-22). Thus, a series of instances of "folk Islam" (George 1980: 25)

developed all over the region. While for the proponents of an Islamic history the common culture is the base of the Moro nation, others highlight that not *because* of a single culture but *nonetheless* a fragmented culture a Moro society could evolve due to their strong socio-economic institutions: "the Moros were a single society, though not a single culture" (Mednick 1974[1957]: 16). As these institutions peaked in the sultanates and the sultan was officially the highest religious authority as well (Mednick 1974[1957]: 18), there are however historical fragments on which to base a united Islamic ideology.

Thus, while its inner coherence was ambiguous, Islam as the unifying principle was already at that time an outside label put on the local people collectively. The term "Moro" was coined to term the southern resistance by Spain not because of some historical linkages between the people of Northern Africa and the indigenous people of Minsupala, but because of their supposedly common believe as rivals to Spanish Catholicism. And after centuries of Spanish colonial efforts to root Catholicism in the Philippine society, for Christian indigenous people, "Muslim", or in its degrading version "Moro", became the common denominator for the indigenous people in Minsupala.



Figure 4: "America Abrogates Treaty with Moros." In New York Times, March 14, 1904

As the Americans took over, it was again the Islamic believe, which categorized northerners and southerners. While Islam was first used to support negative stereotypes about the southerners (fierce warriors, back warded slave-traders; cp. before), the Islamic religion was later on seen as a vehicle to overcome backwardness due to ethnic divisions and traditionalism. The idea was to establish a strong Islamic identity which would be self-conscious enough to engage with modern ideas and catch up with the Christian north (McKenna 1998).

Once integrated in the liberal-democratic system, Islam became the vehicle of the local elites to establish their position as intermediaries between a Christian majority and a Muslim minority in the South. Their common denominator was now “Muslim Filipinos” (Glang 1969). Thereby they portrait a double picture of Islam in the southern provinces: there was the possibility of a modern Islam, embodied in the collaborating elites; however, the overall masses stuck to their old believes and were not ready to integrate into a national body, thus the elite’s intermediating effort was needed. However, after four centuries of Islam in Minsupala, it was far from being the corner stone of local communities: “According to a 1954 Congressional Committee Report, 80 percent of Muslims were ‘ignorant’ of their religion and only 10 percent could read the Q’uran.” (Ferrer 2010) Attendance at Friday services was low (McKenna 1998: 57), and local religious teachers were referred to by the Sanskrit “guru” (McKenna 1998: 202).

It was just in the 1950s, that proselytizing efforts increased in Minsupala due to two developments: the local elite had to support their image as the legitimate representative of the Muslim minority and with an increasing influx of investments after WW2 in form of the mentioned US reconstruction and Japanese compensation payments, channeled through the same elites, they had the finances to do so. Thus, they invested in the construction of local mosques and Islamic schools (May 1992b: 130), as well as in pilgrimages to the holy sites in the Middle East. Above all the first ones became important factors in unintentionally raising the religious consciousness of the lower classes which could use these public facilities.

4.3.2 Origins in the Middle East

To this elite-based, rather instrumental support of religion a second moment in Islamic proselytizing was added: an increase of Islamic teachers, trained in the Middle East, above all in its intellectual centre, the Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

This encompassed Middle Eastern missionaries and later on above all local scholarship holders to Saudi Arabia and Egypt (McKenna 1998: 204). The facilitation went via Senator Alonto, who again became Philippine ambassador to Egypt (Morales 2010). It is in this environment, where the national-religious movement institutionalized their beginnings. The young scholars and the local elites complemented each other’s needs: while the first had knowledge and thus religious legitimacy, the second one exchanged it for material goods in their reach:

“Many of the Muslim groups were linked directly with Muslim politicians. Almost always these politicians had traditional bases in the clans for which they were the datus (chieftains); frequently they had achieved regional recognition as guerrillas in World War II; and most had wealth gained through landholding, timber concessions, legal or illegal trade, and political brokerage. They used Muslim organizations to consolidate or enlarge their political bases. Chartering pilgrimage ships, attending Islamic conferences, and building mosques served similar functions.” (Noble 1976)

These developments got complemented by international developments, as mentioned. The hosts of Minsupala students in the Middle East were themselves part of a turbulent history in a region which was situated at the fault line of the US-USSR cold war. Neither was there an Islamic unity between the countries of Northern Africa, the Arab Peninsula, and Persia, nor was it internally. In Egypt President Nasser fiercely tried to prevent a growing of the Muslim Brotherhood, established at the beginning of the century, while in his foreign policy tried to integrate with other Arab countries, backed by USSR support. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia forced

economic and political ties with the US. Regionally they pursued a “Pan-Islamic Policy” which peaked in the establishment of the “Muslim World League” (Catong 2004: 63) with its headquarter in Mecca. What brought these seemingly antagonistic forces together was again their suspicion against Israel and the Palestinian topic, including the refugee question after the latter were expelled from the territory of the new Jewish state. It was the official reason for the founding of the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1967. The term Islam was involved in all these developments, even though with different connotations. The Minsupala students were part of it and took their own impressions back to their islands of origin.

Exemplary is the life of later own MILF leader Hashim Salamat. He was “born on July 7, 1942 in the Municipality of Pagalungan, Maguindanao” (Lingga 1995: 23). Son of an impoverished datu family he joined a pilgrimage to Makkah in 1958, and stayed behind, to study with Sheikh Jawawi. One year later he enrolled in Al-Azhar and got his master degree in 1969 (Lingga 1995: 24-25). It was the time of anti-colonial revolt not just in Africa and Asia, but so in the Middle East, too. The university offered a broad range of ideas: “Since the Salafi Movement under Rashid Rida and eventually Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb was gaining sway, some of the scholars eventually adopted the literalist interpretation of Wahabbism, although a huge percentage went mainstream Sunni Islam” (Morales 2010). Lingga names Qutb and “Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi of Jamaati Islami” as essential influences to Hashim Salamat (Lingga 1995: 26), the MILF website states that “his worldview of on Islamic polity draws heavily ideas of Hasan al-Banna and echoes those of Sayyid Qutb on social justice” (MILF 2012). What seems important for the future Moro Islamic leaders is not necessarily the literalist interpretation of historical texts, but the integral approach, making Islam the base of a political approach to address current developments (Salamat 2002).

It was there where he engaged in the Egyptian student movement, which fought against colonial interventions by the former colonial powers France and UK as much as against the secular Egyptian government of Nasser, which lost war after war against the state of Israel:

As a student in Cairo, Salamat was an active student leader. As such, he was exposed to various revolutionary trends, both Islamic and secular, which Cairo was known for at that period. This exposure acquainted him with the burning issues and problems of the contemporary Muslim world. More significantly, this brought him awareness of the colonial oppression his Muslim brothers and sisters were suffering back home, an awareness that gradually transformed him from a scholar to an Islamic revolutionary later on in his life.” (Lingga 1995: 25)

He could connect the Middle Eastern experiences with developments in Minsupala. Salamat became president of the Philippine Muslim Student Association and Secretary-General of the Organization of Asian Students (Lingga 1995: 26), while Gutierrez refers to him as chair of the Philippine Student Union in Cairo. Important is, that a series of future Minsupala leaders studied together, next to Salamat: Abdulbaki Abubakar, Mahid Mutilan, Ibrahim Abdulrahman, Khalifa Nando, Yossop Abbas, and Giapur Ali, all to be political and religious figures of Minsupala during the following decades (George 1980: 229; Gutierrez 2000d: 310).

In Minsupala tensions heightened and so did assaults against Muslims. Fear of cultural overrun got supported by reckless national politics:

“In 1950’s General Bulogio Balao, the then Chief of the AFP publicly announced that the motive of the government is to convert to Christianity the Moros of Min-

danao and Sulu. This was further tightened by the visit of the Pope in the 1960's and the government promise to convert Mindanao in twenty years time."(Capal-Guro 1996: 34)

4.3.3 Integration into the MNLF

Salamat and his colleagues returned to Mindanao in the 1970s. In this period the religious-nationalist movement integrated with the liberal-nationalist, subordinating their ideas under the organizational skills of the later as well as the necessities of a violent conflict. Therefore, little is known on specific differences to the developments regarding the NL-AC movement described in the previous section.

Salamat himself organized the Batch90 training in Sabah and later the Batch300 training, being formally a provincial librarian of North Cotabato, to "cover his mission" (Lingga 1995: 28).³⁶ "Using his contacts and connections in the Middle East, Salamat was instrumental in bringing to the attention of the Muslim world the cause of the Bangsamoro struggle, thus gaining for the MNLF moral, political and material supports." (Lingga 1995: 29)

Muslim organizations formed either around "Indonesian, Arabian, and Egyptian missionaries"(Noble 1976) or around the Minsupala returnees from the Middle East, which later would engage in the coming revolutionary war; even though not leading it from the beginning, (McKenna 1998: 546-547). While some might not have been willing to engage in politics, others lacked in skills. What people from Manila had in advance was their training on UP campus on political organizations: "Misuari was a Maoist trained community organizer and thus able to organize a power base" (Interview F). The Middle Eastern trained scholars had to step back into the second row during the joint fight against the above outlined military fight against the Philippine government and its local Christian vigilante groups.

4.3.4 New MILF

This period characterized by the low-profile subordination under the NL-AC leadership was soon over and the proponents of a NR-AC movement were again in control over their own development. After the short schism struggle, the period was characterized by the NR-AC movement's preparatory activities; on the local level by increasing community development activities and on the regional level by forming essential transnational contacts and experience. This led to first political successes in the early post-Marcos elections, even though still under the shadow of the NL-AC movement.

The breakdown of the Tripoli-Agreement and of the connected ceasefire agreement reopened the political game. While for the international as well as national actors, it was just one of several processes to be dealt with, for the Moro revolutionaries it challenged their previous work fundamentally. Losing the peace process after nearly winning the war was a serious blow, and a simple return to the beginning seemed impossible to not just a few. The revolutionary alliance between the different factions inside the MNLF broke apart. The religious-nationalist movement embodied in the Salamat faction set out to lead the revolution. The struggle started

³⁶ The story has been told differently by McKenna 1998: His support by the local elites was rare, he first just became librarian and afterwards happily caught the opportunity to join the Moro Independence Movement.

over the questioning of Misuari's leadership. Opponents complained his authoritarian style. A first public argument took place: "Salamat stood up and successfully challenged Misuari for the MNLF chairmanship at a meeting in Mecca during the 1977 Hai pilgrimage. Misuari refused to recognize the election and went off to Tripoli, while Salamat went to his new base in Cairo." (George 1980: 262)

It continued with lower-rank activities; in September 21, officers of the Kutawato Revolutionary Committee send a letter to OIC and Muslim World League demanding the recognition of Salamat Hashim as the MNLF chairman (Rodil 2000: 65). This was just the prelude to the main blow. Continuingly unable to find a compromise, Salamat announced an 'Instrument of Takeover' on December 26, 1977. Crucial were the senders as much as the recipients of the document: Salamat Hashim, Al Haj Murad, Ghazzali Jaafar, Mohagher Iqbal, Abukalil Yayha, and Amelil Malaguiook were all members of the MNFL central committee, i.e. the inner core of the MNLF (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 136). They enjoyed furthermore the support of key traditional leaders Rashid Lucman, Domacao Alonto, and Salipada Pendatun. The recipient again was the OIC, i.e. the main international body backing the MNLF. Misuari reacted and charged Salamat with treason. In February 1978 Salamat Hashim got expelled from the MNLF altogether (Ahmad 2000b: 36; Gutierrez 2000a: xviii). The unusual attempt by the MILF to put internal matters into the hands of external patrons got rejected by the OIC. When mediation efforts on its part fail, the OIC stuck to Misuari. Even though Egypt favored Salamat over the Libyan backed Misuari, Cairo prevented Salamat from departing to Egypt to the OIC meeting in Dakar/Senegal in April 1978, not wanting to fuel the conflict with Libya further. Accepting the defeat, the proponents of the 'Instrument of Takeover' left the MNLF to found the "New MNLF", thus not just rejecting Misuari, but at the same time the traditional leaders, which tried to integrate the faction into their own organization, the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (George 1980: 262; Gutierrez 2000a: xviii).

In the following years the Philippine government tried to convince people around the "New MNLF" to surrender, however with little impact, compared to their successes with the traditional elites. Meanwhile the New MNLF would have been open for a moderate settlement. Already in the original peace negotiations Salamat pushed for autonomy instead of secession (Gutierrez and Guilal 2000: 280). However, no substantial agreement could be reached between the New MNLF and the Philippine government at this time. While the MNLF continued the military struggle with the Philippine government, still in 1986 Salamat Hashim told a reporter: "The MILF may not be well known in Manila and in many parts of the Philippines"; however, he continued with an evenly relevant point "but actually it is popular among the Bangsamoro people and even in the outside world, especially in the Muslim world" (Salamat 2002: 30). The reason for this can be found in the New MNLF's refocus in strategy: while the MNFL continued their high-profile war, the New MNLF focused on a long-term plan of taking over power, with a short-term focus on the development of community support structures.

On the local level the religious-nationalist movement ten years after their return from the Middle East still had to get a hold in ideological and institutional terms. McKenna (1998: 205-206) regards the conflict responsible: "While numbers of Middle East-educated clerics returned to the Philippines in the late 1960s, they were almost immediately engulfed in the armed conflict of the 1970s." Thus, at the beginning of the new decade, the ideas brought from the Middle East have not penetrated the local communities yet: Islamic education was

rudimentary; Arabic not spoken or understood including in prayers; mosque attendance rates low; people drank alcohol and believed in local spirits (McKenna 1998: 205-206). In a local study in Marawi City merely “7% mentioned that Moros fight in order to preserve their Islamic faith, their Islamic culture and their traditional way of life.” (Bucoy 1984: 115) This changed after the reduction on military activities in the region. Military and political forces of the New MNLF retreated into the mountainous areas at the borders of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and Bukidnon. The Abdurahman Bedis Military Academy got established, free from AFP harassment. Camp Abubakar, the future headquarter, became slowly the show-case of the movement, with commercial structures, weapons factories, schools, and a law and order system according to the Ulama’s teaching (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 137-138).

Meanwhile, the Ulama, encompassing all Middle Eastern trained *ustadzes*³⁷/teachers, increased its influence by regular teaching and praying in the local communities. They opened up Islamic schools, policed Islamic behavior, e.g. the banning of alcohol and gambling as well as the encouragement of weekly Friday prayers, and established networks with local community leaders and the local imams. Parallel to local political institutions of the movement, judicial alternatives to the governmental court system got established: from Barangay Reconciliation Committees to District Shari’ah Courts. They even became involved in community development. “As a revolutionary alim, Salamat loves the poor and the oppressed of whatever creed or belief. This being so, he has made it a part of his personal commitment to Allah to struggle for social justice whether this is realized through the victory of the jihad or through martyrdom.” (Lingga 1995: 31) While the MNLF exiled leadership with their secular-nationalist ideas were far, the proponents of the religious-nationalist movement worked on the ground:

“We have barrio chairmen in the villages, municipal chairmen in many Muslim municipalities. In some municipalities, the MILF chairman is more influential than the mayor. The mayor controls only the poblacion, but the MILF municipal chairman controls all the villages. Also, presently we have our own courts. Even Muslim employees working in government go to our courts.” (Interview with Midweek, 10 December 1986; Salamat 2002: 36)

This is not to say, that they entered an empty field. The Ulama had to struggle with local beliefs and differing ideas and interests of local imams and traditional elites. Furthermore, they had to learn community building activities and could just slowly earn the trust of the people. However, with patience, successes of increased integration between the local communities and the Ulama were visible (McKenna 1998) / (Interviews B, P).

On the international level the proponents of the national-religious movement continued their activity in political and intellectual network building. Salamat moved to Pakistan around 1982 and lived there for several years, becoming proficient in Urdu (Rivera 2008: 41). In 1984 then the New MNLF got renamed into “Moro Islamic Liberation Front” (MILF). Salamat’s biographer notes: “The word ‘national’ was permanently dropped in favour of ‘Islamic’ to emphasize the Islamic ideological line which Salamat originally and invariably espoused during the founding years of the revolution.” (Lingga 1995: 29) It was furthermore possible “to gain the attention of the Muslim World League (MWL) and the Muslim World Congress (MWC)” (Buendia 2007: 8) Salamat did not forget the MNLF’s patron neither in highlighting the outstanding characteristic

³⁷ The spelling in Latin letters has been copied from (McKenna 1998).

of the new organization; in a letter to the OIC secretary general he wrote "All Mujahideen under the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) adopt Islam as their way of life. Their ultimate objective in their Jihad is to make supreme the WORD of ALLAH and establish Islam in the Bangsamoro homeland." (quoted in McKenna 1998: 208; *emph.* in the original) However, the bond between MNLF and OIC prevented a stronger support for the MILF. Officially the MILF did not show further embarrassment. On the contrary, according to their ideology they seek for transnational rather than international support, as they have analyzed the influence of foreign national interests in any governmental involvement into the conflict:

"You see until this time, we are not seeking support of any Muslim government because we know that no government will support any struggle, or any group of people without some conditions. At least you have to follow their policies and we do not want that because we want full independence. That is the reason why we are not seeking support from any Muslim country but we are seeking support from all Muslims all over the world, even in America, and even in Britain." (Interview with BBC, 7 February 1999; Salamat 2002: 68)

Alternatives existed. As tensions in Afghanistan heightened, around seven hundred volunteers, with equal shares from MNLF and New MNLF, collected battle experience in the civil war between the Moscow-backed communist government and the US/Middle-Eastern backed Mujahideen (Interview T). They should become a valuable asset in the future battles of the 1990s. It is at this time, that sources talk about emerging ties between Salamat and future terrorist cells. Salamat has not denied contacts; however he denied lasting influence or strategic cooperation. This argument sounds plausible, considering the multi-faceted actors-list in Pakistan's refugee camps at the border to Afghanistan, including the US. Furthermore, the MILF intensified their efforts for a self-sustainable struggle: "Our war materials factories are producing M-79s and are capable of converting Garand rifles into M-14s. Also, we are producing ammunition. The work is still very slow, but it is better than nothing." (Interview with Midweek, 10 December 1986; Salamat 2002: 37). On the local front the MILF was able to monopolize the revenue out of the zakat, the religious duty of every believer, after the split from the MNLF due to their close connection with the Ulama and thus intermediary to the local imams (Interview O).

To underline their Islamic character furthermore, the MILF established an institutional setting by adding religious consultancy as well as decision making bodies to the military and political structure: the MNLF is at least in theory bound by the congress (until 1990 it was in session just twice, in 1974 and 1986) and has added to the key role of its chairman, who appoints again the Central Committee members, a secular Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal. Meanwhile, the MILF central committee and its chairman rely on religiously guided bodies, i.e. bodies under the inclusion of the ulama: the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal responsible for all judicial matters and the Majles Shura as the policy formulation council (Che Man 1990: App. 4).

During the liberal restoration period of 1986/87, the nationalist-religious movement engaged the first time successfully in local politics. In Lanao del Sur, it was the Ompongan o Muslim sa Pilipinas a Iphuthagompia a Ranao (Ompia) which started as a movement against a hydropower project at Lake Lanao, transformed into a party in 1987, and brought Mahid Mutilan the mayoralty of Marawi City and later on the governorship of Lanao del Sur – an outstanding vic-

tory in a region ruled since decades by the traditional politicians of the Dimaporo and Lucman families (Gonzalez 2000: 120). In neighboring Maguindanao it was Zacaria Candao who was able to get the endorsement by the religious-nationalist movement against the local traditional elites. On the platform of his Islamic Party of the Philippines (IIP) he became governor of Maguindanao for two terms and took later on over as governor of the new Autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao. However, McKenna mentions, that Candao was careful to balance the reformist Ulama with the endorsement by some "traditional cultural authorities ... to signal ordinary Muslims that a vote for him would not be a vote to abolish all of local tradition but only its autocratic and abusive elements" (McKenna 1998: 241-252). The movement was far from hegemonic: "His need to provide Western (or Westernized) amusements in addition to Islamic presentations reveals something about the limited success of the Islamic renewal efforts of the ulama in the previous eight years." (McKenna 1998: 254)

These restrictions to their successes, the MILF had to feel on the national level, too. After Cory Aquino's takeover the MILF stood ready for a peace process. They agreed on first talks with the Philippine administration, demanding as meeting point either Camp Abubakar or Candao's Office in Cotabato City. Furthermore they requested to be included in the peace negotiations with the MNLF as a separate entity and the supervision by the Muslim World League (Dictaan-Bang-oa 2004-165). However, they were to be disappointed rapidly. The MNLF was nationally and internationally much more prominent and Misuari was careful in keeping his position as the lone representative of the Moro struggle, certified by the OIC. The meeting between Misuari and Aquino in 1986 was just the final point in publicly clarifying the government's priority list. The MILF answered with sporadic clashes, but primarily continued with its effort in establishing connections to the local communities.

4.3.5 New Lead in the Moro struggle

Their long-term engagement should soon bear fruit. Based on their productive activities over the last period, the movement could take over the lead of the struggle against the central government once the MNLF has been integrated via the 1996 peace agreement; leading to first skirmishes and following negotiations with the government at the end of the period.

According to Vice-Chairman Jaafar the MILF adopted a 50-year program in 1980, but already fifteen years later they have become a main force in Minsupala (Gutierrez and Guilal 2000: 277). Two developments coincided in mid 1990s. On the one hand, their promotion of a religious-nationalist ideology got reflected in people's behavior. In a limited study, Capal-Guro interviewed MNLF (!) fighters' wives. Even among them, the amount of answers "It is my duty as a Muslim" was double as high as the answer "I support the Bangsamoro" (Capal-Guro 1996: 81). The madrasah system "has become the great educational and religious-propagating institution in the country" (Ahmad 1998: 3). "Symbols of the Islamic faith - like long beards and veiled women - are much more openly displayed, and with obvious pride and zeal." (Gutierrez 2000d: 336)

The second development was the MNLF-government peace agreement of 1996. Although encompassing a broad DDR-program, at that time MILF Vice Chair for Military Affairs Murad Ebrahim estimated a doubling of his fighters from 8,000 to 15,420 in the years 1996 to 1999 (Santos 2010b: 178-179). However, more important was the local support. With the integration of the MNLF into the government system and their limited success after the first years in

office, the MNLF lost their credibility as the leader of the revolution. The provision to delete any religious element from the SPCPD/SZOPAD description to gain the support of the Christian majority was a stepping point for the religious-nationalist movement to blame the MNLF of trading their identity for political positions and economic investments (Werble 1996: 91-92). The MILF countered with their first “Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly”, taking place in Sultan Kudarat, 3-5 December 1996 and counting a million people (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 138; Lingga 2008: 102). At the same time they opened Camp Abubakar in a PR campaign to civil society groups, including churches, mass media, academe, traditional politicians, and NGO communities. (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 138). On 23 October 1999, Rallies for Peace and Justice were held in several cities of the islands with hundreds of thousands of Bangsamoro participants, demanding “to establish a government in accordance with our political culture, religious beliefs and social norms”. (quoted in Lingga 2008: 102).

Materially and institutionally, the MILF was prepared to lead. Next to the above mentioned institutions, the MILF has established shadow-governments in 13 provinces and claimed a potential armed force of 100,000 to 130,000 people, even though these numbers do not mirror the actual fighting force which Murad as well as the AFP put to around 15,000 in 1999, but includes a broad reserve force (Gutierrez and Guilal 2000: 273). They could rely on a broad range of modern weaponry, not just from own production, but traded from the AFP.

We have the same firearms with the government military because we buy from them. (laughs) You see although the military is very oppressive and abusive, but at the same time they are also kind to us because they are selling their firearms to us. (laughs) We thank them for that. You see we have the same Armalite, M-14, mortars, 81mm, 60mm, m-60 machinegun, all the same, with the exception of RPG-2 which we are making, we are manufacturing.” (Interview with JJI Press Japan, February 1999; Salamat 2002: 102)

Thereby the trade goes normally not directly from the AFP to the MILF but through AFP affiliated paramilitary forces (Interview T).

“The MILF has started to issue its own birth certificates and passports - basic documents needed to register as a voter, to get a job, to contract marriage, to qualify for social security or to travel. ... host-country [i.e. Philippine, S.S.] documents are for transacting business; 'home-country' documents are badges of loyalty.” (Gutierrez 2000d: 335) During the years of groundwork not just a grassroots network has been developed, but during a constant interaction with the local communities a detailed political program. At this time, the MILF submitted their first position paper to the Philippine government to lay out their position regarding agenda points to address (Gutierrez and Guilal 2000: 284):

- ancestral domain claims of Muslims and highlanders in Mindanao
- displaced and landless Bangsamoro peoples
- destruction of properties and war victims
- human rights violations
- social and cultural discrimination
- corruption
- economic inequality
- exploitation of natural resources
- agrarian reform

It is worth highlighting next to the obvious point of tackling cultural discrimination, the broad agenda, which was outstandingly different from the rather narrow and catch phrase approach of the MNLF. With the terms of “ancestral domain” they connected to the overall national and international discourse on indigenous people, while with human rights violations to the discourse of international humanitarian law (Ferrer 2010: 17). Furthermore, the latter as well as topics on natural resources and agrarian reform matched with the agenda of the Communist Party of the Philippines closer than with the MNLF, even though the religious-nationalist movement remained firm anti-communist. Their aim is not a revolutionary way towards a post-capitalist classless society but back to the “myths of communal land ownership and egalitarian classlessness within Moro society” (Ahmad 2000a). This highlights the resistance-element of the religious-nationalist ideology. It is Christian colonialism which disturbed Moro development and thus the fight against this colonialism is the primary concern on the way back to a harmonious society.

On July 18, the government and the MILF signed an “Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities”, followed by a “General Framework of Agreement of Intent” on 27 August 1998 as the base for peace agreements. At this time, it seemed a matter of time to conclude the second negotiation process after already concluding with the MNLF.

4.3.6 Islamic Independence in a Post-9/11 Era

However, things turned to the worse at the beginning of the new Millennium; over the next decade, NR-AC movement and government switched between violent encounters and negotiations back and forth, leading to a currently promising negotiation stage; under the constraints and possibilities of a renewed internationalization of the struggle.

“Any responsible and self-respecting government will not allow rebels to endanger the lives of hundreds of innocent people and overpower duly elected local civilian governments. Hence, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) launched operations to free these towns from the rebels, and protect the civilian population. While the government is committed to exhausting all peaceful and political means to address the conflict in Mindanao, we cannot close our eyes to the armed challenge of the rebels to the Constitutional order, or let the rebels continue victimizing our people through terrorism and other illegal actions. Accordingly, the government must take decisive action. Hence, the AFP pushed them up to their camps – which used to be the launching pads for MILF atrocities. The military actions were carried out, camp after camp, until ultimately, Camp Abubakar was overrun.” (Estrada's National Security Adviser Aguirre 2000: 230)

When the military started to attack, they were well equipped with intelligence. Months before the government negotiated with the MILF about the acknowledgement of their camps; for this matter information on their position and size have been shared with the government peace panel. These information were now in the hands of the military, which easily overrun most of the camps (Kreuzer 2003: 39-40). On 9 June 2000, the military finally overrun Camp Abubakar. This destroyed the MILF's operation bases and dispersed their units. However, the strength of their social structure is shown in their fast recovery.

“Foremost of its programs is Islamization, which implements various activities promoting awareness and practice of the true Islamic teachings. It established connections as strengthening of organization, military build-up, and self-reliance. These were known as the ‘Four-Point Program of the MILF’ which is being imple-

mented until now. Presently, the MILF has achieved considerable progress. We have established 46 Mujahideen camps all over Mindanao and organized a hundred twenty thousand-strong Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces with about 60 per cent armed and another 200,000 reserve forces. Likewise, political committees were organized in about 80 per cent of all Bangsamoro communities serving as a parallel government vis-à-vis the Philippine government in the Muslim areas" (Salamat Hashim, Darrusalam, Camp Abubakar, November 3, 2001, quoted in Adam 2002: 73)

Short term, however, it was a *national* event which prevented further military clashes: President Estrada got ousted due to corruption allegations, where even the war theatre in the South could not distract the Manila middle classes anymore.

A year after the fall of Camp Abubakar the MILF was back with an impressive show of force: the Second Bangsamoro People's Consultative Assembly on 1-3 June 2001 attracted again over a million of people. MILF-related writer Lingga notes 2.6 million delegates which declared that "the only just, meaningful, and permanent solution to the Mindanao Problem is the complete independence of the Bangsamoro people and the territories they now actually occupy from the Republic of the Philippines." (Lingga 2002) Some days later, on June 22, the new Philippine government under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the MILF signed an "Agreement of Peace between the GRP and the MILF" in Tripoli, Libya.

The timing was unforeseeable right, as just months later, 9/11 set Islamist terrorism onto the global agenda and marked the end to an unofficial cooperation between liberal and Islamic forces in their fight against communism. What Al Qaida has been for the ruling liberal regimes on a global scale, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has been for Southeast Asia: the embodiment of terrorism. The group has its stronghold in Indonesia, where it allegedly got founded in the second half of the 1990s. Later on JI extended its operations to the Philippines. The archipelago was included into Mantiqi III area, the designated JI training zone (Jones 2005: 170). JI cadres established a military academy in the MILF area of influence in central Mindanao and operational connections to the Abu Sayyaf Group. However, JI did not intervene into the local struggle, except when their camp got into crossfire during the 2000 Estrada-All-Out-War (Jones 2005: 175). The relationship to local violence actors is thereby ambiguous. Connections are documented with several factions in Minsupala and JI-connected persons spotted in the area. However, talking about any links in criminal activities the situation gets blurry. Sources, including intelligence, from the side of the Philippine government are to be handled carefully. Their dissemination of information regarding "terrorism" has been known for being partisan regarding the usefulness of this information for their own agenda setting (Santos 2010c: 104). The most agreed cases seem to be bombings in the first half of the 2000's as the outcome of cooperation between exponents of Jemaah Islamiyah, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a group of Muslim converts based mainly in Manila. The MILF's involvement is confined to the mentioned provision on training ground and even that changed after 9/11. However, a difficult issue for the MILF in specific and the peace process in general is the MILF central command's capability to control and thus withhold any local commander from cooperation with JI members (ICG 2003: 26), of which some might have long term connections as colleagues in the Afghanistan operations in the late 1980s and early 1990s (ICG 2003: 17). All in all there are few signs that cooperation between MNLF or MILF and regional terrorist group is in any kind essential for the religious-nationalist movement in productive terms. It is

different for groups which dropped any reference to the nationalist cause all together, or never had a connection, as for example the Abu Sayyaf Group which refers stronger to the Sulu empire than to a Moro nation and even more so for the RSM, which ideological base as well as its followers have nothing to do with the Moro movements in Minsupala whatsoever.

Agreeing that there is neither much information nor much reason for cooperation between regional or global terrorist groups and the religious-nationalist movement, 9/11 was nonetheless a dramatic event for the local resistance as it added another element to the conflict discourse. For the Philippine government, it became a joker in the peace negotiations. Putting the MILF on any terrorism list would allow the government to extend US military support onto its military fight with the MILF. Word got round of a "Second Front in the War on Terror" (Gershman 2002). The ASG were already on the list and the AFP received support from US Marines in the joint Balikatan exercises in 2002 and 2005³⁸. When the government faced increasing opposition on the national level, the MILF started to become mentioned more often in connection to the global terrorism discourse.

The MILF recognized this danger for their political aspirations and reacted with a series of measures. Just weeks after 9/11, MILF chairman Salamat Hashim expressed his condolences to the American people in a letter to the American president George W. Bush. Furthermore, the MILF agreed in 2002 to cooperate with the Philippine authorities in preventing kidnappings and perpetrating criminals. In a Joint Communiqué the negotiation partners agreed "to the isolation and interdiction of all criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups, including so-called 'lost commands' operating in Mindanao." Next to the general statement that these criminal activities hinder the peace process, the document outlines concrete points of cooperation, including the handover of "an order of battle containing the names and identities of criminal elements ... suspected of hiding in MILF areas/communities" by the Philippine authorities to the MILF, the establishment of an "ad hoc joint action group", a "quick coordination system" and that the "[t]he MILF shall block the entry of criminals into MILF areas/communities. The MILF may request the assistance of the AFP or PNP in the conduct of operations against such criminals inside MILF areas/communities" (Gonzales and Ali 2002) The MILF continued its effort to prevent joint government/US actions against the MILF by trying to incorporate the US into the peace process. In 2003, shortly before his demise, Salamat Hashim wrote a second letter to the US President:

"The Bangsamoro People have always looked upon your country, the United States of America, and its people, with esteem as a great champion of freedom and democracy. ... In view of current global developments and regional security concerns in Southeast Asia, it is our desire to accelerate the just and peaceful negotiated political settlement of the Mindanao conflict, particularly the present colonial situation in which the Bangsamoro people find themselves.

We are therefore appealing to the basic principle of American fairness and sense of justice to use your good offices in rectifying the error that continuous to negate and derogate the Bangsamoro People's fundamental right to seek decolonization. ... For this purpose, we are amenable to inviting and giving you the opportunity to assist in resolving this predicament of the Bangsamoro People." (Salamat 2003)

³⁸ American soldiers are not allowed to directly interfere in violent confrontations, as long as they do not act in self-defense. This formulation of course opens up a broad grey area in which to be active in.




Figure 5: General Order 06/2909, "MILF Condemns Kidnappings", June 29, 2009

Nonetheless these efforts on part of the MILF, the AFP overrun a series of MILF in an escalation of the conflict a few weeks later, as described above. A second setback was the death of chairman Salamat Hashim on July 13, 2003, shortly before a renewed ceasefire on July 19. Although some rumours about internal struggle over the leadership succession, the MILF presented a commonly accepted decision in former vice chairman for military affairs, Ebrahim Murad, as the new MILF chairman some weeks later. Murad is a civil engineer, who has got considered by the government as a pragmatist. Throughout the following years, the joint plans against criminality have gotten implemented and BIAF and AFP have carried out activities against criminality and terrorism (Liow 2006: 23). Furthermore, peace negotiations continued under the auspices of Libya and later on Malaysia. Although geographically the obvious facilitator, Malaysia kept out long time of the negotiations, due to possible conflicts of interests regarding the Sabah territory as well as the joint membership with the Philippines in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. However, after Middle Eastern countries were at the core of peace facilitations between Moro movements and the Philippine government for decades, regional countries engaged stronger in the new millennium. An important step forward was the implementation of the International Monitoring Team with officers from Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya to oversee the ceasefire. Malaysia hosted then formal peace talks in April 2005 and since then has been the first address for the MILF-GPH peace negotiations.

After the 2003 war, the situation calmed down for a couple of years. Skirmishes throughout the region happened, but were mostly locally confined. Above all they were less politically motivated than struggles over local political command. These struggles did mainly result out of turf fights between several strong traditional families, called *rido* (Torres 2007). If these families were linked to one or the other conflict party, MILF, AFP, and police forces got dragged into the battles. Furthermore, some Moro elite families considered the rebels as potential rivals and above all between the Maguindanaoan Ampatuan clan and the local MILF chapter, violent fights arose. First, the Ampatuans played, similar to other elite families, both sides throughout the decades, engaging in Philippine local politics while at the same time supporting the MILF. This has changed after an alleged MILF killing of Saudi Ampatuan. (Kreuzer 2005: 18). Furthermore, following serious human rights abuses by the Ampatuans and their private armies, victims and their family members searched for protection in MILF communities (hrw 2010: 11). The struggle with the MILF went so far, that the Ampatuans allegedly ordered bombings, blaming the MILF, and later on receive money and weapons from the national government in an effort to suppress terrorism. (hrw 2010: 32)

Being tired of harassment by Philippine authorities in form of armed forces and local rulers, popular support for the MILF's struggle continued. In a general consultation from May 29 to 31, 2005, the MILF claimed 3 million attending people, with commentators assuring that at least several hundred thousands were present (Liow 2006: 13). For 2007, the AFP estimated the MILF's strength at 11,769 fighters and thus as the strongest rebel group in the country. (Santos and Santos 2010a: 349) The same year, the MILF welcomed a visit by Kristie Kenney, US Ambassador to Manila (Pabico 2008: 4). With this knowledge of potency on behalf of the MILF, the negotiation panels agreed in 2008 on the "Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001", in short MoA-AD. It contained provisions on territory, resources, and governance; since the 1970s the key

areas of argument. The agreement would have been a far-reaching breakthrough, including provisions and terms for most of the contentious issues of the last four decades of conflict.

However, as mentioned in the first section, the Philippine Supreme Court prevented a signing of the document and later on rejected the Memorandum all together as not reconcilable with the constitution. Even though the actual triggers were political interests of the elite claimants, it highlighted a structural issue of the peace process: even though the national-religious movement could claim a strong base in its direct constituency, it failed to address the broader mass of involved stakeholders, amongst other the non-Muslim indigenous people, the settler peasants, and the Philippine population as a whole (Ferrer 2010). At this moment, however, the most serious concern was to keep in line MILF commanders which were embarrassed by the development. Soon after the Court's ruling, skirmishes broke out between AFP units and three MILF field commanders, which led to renewed widespread battles and displacement of people. Consequently, the following talks were restrained to security issues, leaving aside more substantial issues outlined in the MoA-AD. With the new presidency of Benigno Aquino and a new government peace panel, new movement came into the peace process (cp. section one). While the government side tried to step back from the substantial impact of the MoA-AD to prevent new quarrels with the Supreme Court, the MILF central command had to provide their commanders an explanation, why a continuous negotiation with the government should make sense, looking at the history of dishonest manoeuvrings over the last decade. Thus, it was not too big of a surprise, that in 2011 a splinter group developed: the Islamic Freedom Movement, encompassed above all by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters under Commander Kato, one of the local commanders involved in the 2008 skirmishes. Though several rounds of negotiations and initial benevolence on both sides to return to a common operation, the BIFF was not integrated into the MILF command structure anymore. The BIFF is not essential to the BIAF fighting force, but it is a series threat to a lasting peace after a potential peace agreement and it furthermore highlights the weakness of the MILF central commands, both factors in the ongoing negotiations with the government. This will on the one hand push the MILF to work hard on a rapid conclusion of the negotiations; on the other hand it will probably prevent the MILF from giving in to a flawed peace offer by the government. Currently, negotiations between MILF and government are promising, with a framework signed, which outlines several steps towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict, including the replacement of the ARMM by a 'Bangsamoro', shared wealth, and political autonomous control in an area encompassing the ARMM plus some smaller localities (GPH/MILF 2012). The timeframe is tight, as a transitional authority should conclude its work before the next national presidential elections in 2016 and it has to be seen if the other power centres in the Philippine government system will support the eagerness of the President. The MILF learned from the failings of its comrades in the MNLF, and while Aquino's presidency ends in 2016, the national-religious movement is just half way through in their 50-years plan outlined in the early 1980s.

4.4 ST-AC: Socialist-Tri-People Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

The following two chapters address margins of the political conflict and as such will be handled in a shorter form than the main hegemony projects outlined in the last sections. Nonetheless, they form an important part of the conflict *system* in Minsupala, without which not just important puzzle pieces of a comprehensive conflict overview would be missing, but without which

small but essential factors in progress towards a more peaceful society would be overlooked. We start with what I labeled socialist-tri-people anti-colonial hegemony project, following progressive intellectuals' call for a tri-people approach (Rodil 2010: 2):

“By tri-people we refer to the Moros or Muslims, the Lumad and the migrants, mostly Christian settlers and their descendants, the greater number now belonging to the second, third or fourth generations and are already homegrown Mindanawons; also, other migrants who are not Christians. The grouping is loose and there is plenty of overlaps in between but the designations are popularly used in the region.”

Rodil states furthermore that the concept “did not emerge in our history until around the early 1980s” (Rodil 2010: 4); this just refers to the official connotations, as for example the argument in “Two Hills of the Same Land” follows the argument, that all people on the Philippines share a pre-colonial history with “One Common Bond” (Silva 1979: 7). The book has been a key document to foster stronger revolutionary ties between the national-democratic movement and the Moro population (Interview ZE). I follow this trace and encompass political aspirations for a joint anti-colonial struggle under this term, which thus encompasses the national-democratic movement but is not confined to the Communist Party of the Philippines.

4.4.1 Colonial Destruction by Divide-et-Impera

This political project promotes the view that there existed a pre-colonial time, where people shared the maritime space around the archipelago and were not categorized in the three big blocks which define current politics, i.e. Moros, Indigenous, and Settler/Descendants, before being torn apart by colonialism:

Historically there is sufficient evidence that we have been ... victims of circumstances not of our own making, least of all for our own benefit. All the peoples of the Philippine archipelago ... originated from the same Malayo-Polynesian stock, in short, that ‘the peoples of the Philippines were basically one people’”. (Silva 1979: 7)

The author continues by quoting ethnographic works stating archipelago-wide similarities, regarding language and customs. There existed differentiations mainly between lowlanders and highlanders with different socioeconomic functions, but they “formed a single trading community, or a common market tied together by the rules of supply and demand.” (Silva 1979: 8-10).

What split this community was the divide-et-impera tactic of the Spanish conquistadores. Right from the beginning, the Spanish army was able to use locals to subjugate not yet conquered territory. Silva attributes this to a “lack of consciousness as one people” but even more so to

“the success of the Spanish masters in implanting and nurturing the seeds of disunity and hatred among the people. ... It is important, therefore, that Christianization, anti-Moro propaganda ... and the Spanish-Moro wars must never be viewed outside the context of Spanish colonization”. (Silva 1979: 13).

That this has little to do with religious or national differences he furthermore highlights in regard to the use of divide-et-impera tactics by the Spanish Crown between different Muslim rulers as well as between different northern Filipino Christianized rulers (Silva 1979: 14-17). The US colonizers followed the Spanish example and continued to support some local rulers selectively, while breaking the resistance of others by force. Finally a policy of attraction broke

anti-colonial resistance, above all based on financial support, study tours, and scholarships (Silva 1979: 18-24). While agreeing with Moro historians up until this point, the progressive intellectual departs when discussing the famous letter of Moro datus asking to remain a US colony instead of departing with the Philippines into independence. While Moro scholars refer to it as an expression of anti-Filipino resistance, to Silva the nine pages “serve to illustrate what American colonization had been able to accomplish by that time” (Silva 1979: 24), which included the paragraph in which the Moro Datus write that

“[t]he Moros (Islam) of Mindanao and Sulu can be compared to a small child lost in the thick forest who does not know where to go. The Americans are equivalent if not more than our fathers and mothers who taught us the right thing to do. ... It is not the legally right that parents should abandon their child when the child can’t yet live out in this cold and cruel world” (quoted from Silva 1979: 26)

However, right from the beginning there were attempts to tackle this colonizing tactic, so for example in a blood compact between chiefs of Maguindanao and Leyte, using a pagan tradition pre-historic as much to Christianity as to Islam. During the first Filipino revolutionary attempts against the Spanish and later on US colonizers at the end of the 19th century, revolutionary leader Aguinaldo, for example, approached the Sultan of Sulu in 1899 referring to “the bonds of fraternal unity” with “ties of race, interests, security and defense in this region of the Far East” (Silva 1979: 11). However, at this moment in time there was no interest shown on part of the Sultan and the US convinced him to sign the Bates agreement, which helped the US to avoid a two-front-war and allowed them to subjugate the northern rebellion and the southern resistance subsequently (Silva 1979: 32-33). It took another fifty years until cooperation against colonialism would develop again.

4.4.2 Colonialism Reloaded and Resistance Formation

Meanwhile colonialism opened up the local economy to free trade between the United States and the Philippines. This has been according to the movement’s analysis the reason for resettlements and consequent conflicts in Minsupala and accordingly, a joint anti-imperialist stance has been necessary. However, at this stage, anti-colonial intellectuals in the universities of the capital and local peasant organization have not mutually integrated their struggle yet.

In the contemporary Philippine stage of economic development, the common market led to unbalanced trade affairs between the two countries, with the Philippines mainly exporting raw material and unfinished goods, while the United States delivered finished goods to the Philippines. This is the background under which anti-colonial analysis has been made in regard to the resettlement program towards Minsupala:

“When American colonizers therefore spoke of the exploitation of the vast natural resources of Mindanao or its agricultural development, it could not be viewed outside the context of free trade between a colonizing country and a colonized country. Land has become a key issue in the Mindanao problem and to understand it correctly, we must not see it in isolation from basic patterns of development purposely created to accomplish imperialist ends.” (Silva 1979: 40)

Out of this analysis, the resettlement programs were above all a way to open up Minsupala “for the massive and systematic exploitation of the vast natural resources”. (Silva 1979: 48) Furthermore, the activist points out that

“it was not the numerous small settlers, most of whom came on their own, who assumed the lead role in this drive. Having been themselves eased out of Luzon and the Visayas by the pressures of economic privation resulting from inequitable land ownership patterns, their main concern, as a rule, was to own a family-size farm lot. It was the few members of the country’s politico-economic elite, the big corporations, and the opportunist elements from the Moro elite, who played the principal role. Naturally too, it was they who benefited most from the opening up of Mindanao.” (Silva 1979: 48)

This has not just been the consequence of economic possibilities by large investors, but by administrative fraud as well. Silva quotes Secretary of Agriculture Benigno S. Aquino, stating that “whenever a road was to be constructed through an undeveloped section, homesteaders flocked in rapidly, to find only too often that influential persons who had been privately informed of the construction even before it was begun had taken up the choice lands on both sides of the road” (Aquino quoted in Silva 1979: 53)

This differentiation between small-scale resettlements and large scale colonial occupation would be the main argument of the leftist movement throughout the following decades: the Moro conflict between Filipinos and Moros is first and foremost a conflict deriving from colonial penetration and thus the common enemies have to be the colonial powers and their local collaborators in form of indigenous elites. The small-scale settlers in Mindanao are by itself victims of colonial subjugation and eviction, sharing the fate of the Moro peasants. They cleared land for homesteads, but then had to deal with land titling processed far away in Manila in addition to land speculators in Minsupala itself: both were much easier to control for large-scale investors connected to the national centre. Further contentions were timber licensing agreements for investors and large-scale livestock breeders, which resulted in the dispossession of small-scale farmers. Eventually, this led to several smaller armed incidents throughout the region (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 141).

However, until the late 1950s, there are no accounts available on common resistance between local peasants and settlers against first the American administrators and later on the Philippine government in Minsupala. This changed just far away from the southern islands. Due to the mentioned Commission on National Integration scholarships, a young generation of people from the South met with progressive activists on the University of the Philippines campus. A series of bibliographical accounts hints to strong ties in student activities regardless of the geographical background of the individuals. Key persons were united on campus, amongst others the future leader of the Communist Party, Jose Maria Sison, future MNLF leader Nur Misuari, future MILF ideologue Mohagher Iqbal, and future government peace negotiator Ruben Torrens. However, soon it got clear that there existed differing views on the problems in Minsupala. The leftist activists recognized the specific problems of the Moro people, highlighted their bravery in anti-colonial resistance against the Spanish crown, and accepted the right of self-determination on part of the Moro people. However, following the above outlined arguments, the basic and foremost problem was to overcome the colonialist system and just in a second step the Moro people could decide for genuinely independence – a step probably not necessary any longer, as the relation in a post-colonial situation would be marked by friendship and cooperation (Interview ZF). Most of the Moro activists had a different perspective and analysis. Thus, there were different priority lists, dividing the activists and leading to the establishment of different political organisations – even though one has to keep in mind the general

organizational factionalism in the student movement over small ideological differences. Secondly, different political analysis came into play regarding the international system. While there was broad scepticism among Moros in regard to the treatment of (Muslim) minorities in socialist countries, vice versa there was scepticism how progressive activists were treated in countries with a Muslim majority. These differing views escalated to violent clashes during the state visit of Indonesian General Abdul Harris Nasution in Manila:

“Actually the confrontation in 1968 was not pre-planned. The Moro students were set to welcome Gen. Abdul Harris Nasution, the man who was highly regarded as the successor to Pres. Ahmad Soekarno. While the Moro students were at the Manila International Airport (MIA) waiting for General Nasution to disembark, another group of militant students identified with the pro-communist Kabataang Makabayan (KM) protested his visit and started hurling invectives, such as ‘Nasution: Butcher of Indonesia,’ ‘US puppet, go Home!’ and other stinging insults. Consequently, the pro-Nasution and the anti-Nasution demonstrators clashed, hurling stones, bottles and Molotov bombs that resulted in several injuries on both sides.” (Jubair 1999: 147)

Nonetheless, cooperation and dialogue existed between the different factions and progressive discussions were crucial for the development above all of organizational skills on part of Moro movements. They have been interested in the “modalities of political power”, i.e. tactics of organization and struggle to acquire power (George 1980: 198), which included studying the Vietnamese as much as the Chinese anti-colonial history. The new skills did not just allow a strong political formation of the Moro movement, but additionally resulted in the political overweight of Manila-trained activists over activists from the Middle East (Interview F). How far this connection led to the inclusion of more ideological elements of Marxist ideology into Moro activists’ thinking remains unclear. Next to accounts of these campus-based connections and study-groups of socialist revolutionary activities, used as indicators for the socialist doctrine of the MNLF, public documents as much as policy of the MNLF throughout the following decades do not provide any hint of Marxist elements in the MNLF ideology.

Thus, socialist elements came to Minsupala mainly not via Moro activists, but via the organization of settlers with support by progressive parish priests. With the increasing tension between small-scale settlers and big investors as well as the consequent desperation of the first, settler started to organize in farmers organizations (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 140):

“With accumulation occurring increasingly at the national and trans-national levels rather than the regional level, the traditional local oligarchy could no longer afford to compromise with workers and tenants over wages and rents; naked coercion became more widespread as the local elite and the rising class of bureaucrat capitalists competed in extracting resources from peasants and workers” (Collier 1998: 39)

A key organization was the Free Farmers Federation, which got support by the Church in form of financial support but even more so in form of “moral support which galvanized peasants’ faith in the righteousness of their actions.” (Collier 1998: 115):

“The local dioceses were frontier Churches, made up primarily by such migrant populations. It was a young Church, most of its workers – bishops, priests, and religious – being much younger than their counterparts in the rest of the country. Since Mindanao was a frontier mission area, most of the foreign religious congregations – who were to bring the new ideas from the West to the Third World

Churches – were assigned to the dioceses of Mindanao-Sulu. [And] despite difficulties of communication due to bad roads and... facilities, Mindanao-Sulu basically [is] just one big island. This helped facilitate contacts.” (Karl Gaspar 1987, quoted from Collier 1998: 143-144)

The economic situation in the areas populated mainly by natives was similar. But the activists of the Moro nationalist movement shied away from openly adopting a Marxist position. Several groups to be involved in the movement had reasons for that. The Moro peasants were considered conservative, following traditions rather than revolutionary theories, and stories about anti-Muslim activities in communist countries have been widely spread, for example through a Maranao folk tale titled “Red Star over Islam”(Molloy 1985: 831). Potential supporters of the Moro nationalist movement in the group of Moro elites were obviously neither keen to support a potentially Marxist revolution, nor were the more conservative supporters abroad, e.g. Saudi Arabia. Last but not least, the young Moro activists had their problems with the partly chauvinistic attitude towards and analysis of the Moro issue by socialist comrades (McKenna 2008). Thus, socialist ideas remained at maximum hidden in the Moro discourse.

4.4.3 Going Underground

In the next period, two elements were crucial: the beginning of the nationwide military struggle and the joining of academics and peasants.

Were the 1960s characterized by increasing organization of farmers in Minsupala, mainly through union-like organizations as the FFF, the 1970s pushed the movement underground, as the government started its violent campaign against any dissent with the proclamation of Martial Law. Secondly, the Church’s support of farmers was increasingly under pressure by the government and above all by the Catholic hierarchy with a strong anti-communist stand in Manila. Nonetheless, the parish churches remained the only possibility for aboveground dissent, as the Marcos regime considered the Catholic Church as an ally (Collier 1998: 142). The socialist national-democratic insurgency in Minsupala was still weak in numbers and furthermore suffered heavy losses. Between April and September 1974 the NPA got nearly annihilated in Mindanao (Collier 1992: 207). Meanwhile, the key military battles in the first half of the 1970s occurred between the AFP and the MNLF.

In the rest of the country, the insurgency developed its characteristics: the Maoist idea of a protracted people’s war. The fight for political power first had to be won in the countryside, after which it was possible to take over the cities. Thus, the latter had a secondary role in the ongoing military struggle, i.e. they were responsible for supplying finances and weaponry for the rebels in the countryside. In the countryside the New People’s Army, was organized in guerrilla fronts, embedding themselves in geography and rural population. The organization of party and army was thereby copied from Lenin: cadre-based and well trained. New members had to pass a series not just of military, but as much of ideological trainings and were selected to according criteria. The students involved in the struggle had to adapt to live in the countryside and at the same time revolutionary activities like support and training of farmers was essential. The education effort thus went in both directions: students got a crash course in rural activities, while they provided ideological and organizational training to people from the countryside.

The first guerilla fronts in Mindanao got established in Davao City in 1972 and later in Zamboanga and Davao provinces (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 142), i.e. the Southeast and Northwest of Mindanao, where the centers of agribusiness investments were located. This was not welcomed by the MNLF:

“Days before the declaration of martial law in September 1972, leaders of both the CPP and MNLF held a secret meeting in Manila. Misuari, head of the MNLF panel, stood strongly that Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan constituted the Bangsa-moro homeland, and thus should be off-limits to any organizing by the Leftist revolutionary movement.” (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 143)

In publications the MNLF made a clear distinction between the Maoists and themselves, being ‘God-fearing people’ and having nothing to do with communists. Any NPA attempts of a military alliance were rejected by the MNLF Central Committee. (Noble 1976: 416-7) This continued to be the official MNLF position, even though on the ground a more pragmatic approach was used by field commanders and BMA and NPA “maintained liaison on common areas of operations.” (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 143) Similar to the above outlined personal relations allowing back-channeling throughout the MNLF-GRP peace process, here, too, existed pre-Martial Law personal relations between NPA and BMA commanders; Abreu and Tuazon mention for example NPA commander Jess Maranan and MNLF Commander Roger Galo in Davao Oriental (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 143). Thus, around the mid-seventies, the socialist movement in Minsupala could rely on a social network of churches, labor unions (Collier 1998: 155), and links to the Moro movement. While confined by the hierarchical Leninist decision making structure, the movement was freer in its local alliances and political development, as due to the grassroots-structure, and the understanding of an indigenized version of Maoism, made them less dependent on external support structures than the MNLF: “From Marcos to the State Department to the Pentagon, it is agreed that not only is the NDF fiercely independent of foreign manipulation, but that the foreigners who count aren’t very interested in manipulating it.” (Grossman 1986: 26) Even though Maoist China provided support in the early years, in 1975 Mao himself guaranteed Marcos that he would never support an overthrow of the Philippine regime after the Philippine government opened up to stronger diplomatic ties with the Non-Aligned Movement (George 1980: 263). Thus, the relation between the MNLF and the socialist movement remained ambiguous, but open.

4.4.4 Rising Power

While the second half of Marcos’ regime saw a steady decline of its power, the socialist movement climbed higher and higher; with Minsupala at the forefront of its rise. Attempts to expand this development towards the Moro communities, however, failed in general; even though smaller successes could be noted.

The strong rise of the progressive movement in Minsupala came the moment the Moro separatist struggle was already in decline after the failed MNLF peace process of 1976. This had several reasons, amongst others the increasing tension between peasants and land laborers with national and international investors, lagged consequence of the above described filling up of the frontier; increasing dissatisfaction of local elites with the Marcos regime, its cronies and the increasing possibility of transnational profit extraction (Collier 1998: 172); and delays of the NPA development due to the initial focus on the Luzon area, outgoing of the UP Diliman campus in Quezon City/Metro Manila. But now Mindanao became the center of revolutionary

struggle against the Marcos regime. There were more people joining the underground movement than weapons available. (Collier 1998: 152) In the bigger towns, prayer rallies demonstrated the power of the oppositional movement (Collier 1998: 199) as much as intensive fighting in the countryside. With the Moro movement fading, the AFP redirected their machinery towards the NPA in the eastern and northern parts of Minsupala. During this time, the NDF intensified its attempts of cooperation with the Moro movement. Delegations were sent again to the MNLF central command, however, were rejected with the answer that they would be the next enemy should they succeed with a socialist revolution (Interview J). Vice versa, “[t]he Party now only had a handful of Moros in its ranks, despite the fact that the Moro people constituted at least one-fourth of the population in Mindanao” (Head of the United Front secretariat of CPP-Mindanao, Nathan Quimpo, quoted in McKenna 2008: 127) A Moro committee was founded inside the CPP in 1979, however there was no consensus in regard to a possible autonomy for the Moro areas under a future liberated Philippine state (McKenna 2008: 127).

Furthermore, the politics of attraction by the Marcos regime and the integration of Moro rebel renegades into the government system as paramilitary groups, increased security issues for the socialist movement, as these paramilitary groups were used against progressive activists and NPA guerilla fronts alike. In Davao, one group became known as “Philippine Liberation Organization”, harassing farm labor unionists and alleged NPA sympathizers and organizing strike-breakings (Grossman 1986: 17). They joined “lost commands” of the armed forces, containing former soldiers and constabulary members, which, “conducted ... unofficial but apparently condoned” campaigns against the two insurgencies (May 1992b: 131-2). By crossing territories between Moro and NPA areas, it seems that the policy of divide-et-impera was used by these paramilitary groups, too, extending to the spread of terror the insecurity, who is who’s friend and foe. A group, described in several accounts is the mentioned PLO. Its leader was a certain Kapitan Inggo, alias Karsolo Abubakar, an alleged MNLF defector to Marcos. Together with 200 armed men he engaged in the Davao slums of Agdao and Mandug. Amongst others, he supposedly killed a local news editor and shot into a strike picket (Chapman 1988: 172) In 1984 he introduced his group as members of the MNLF-BMA, supported by the AFP, and now in charge of sitios Uyon Uno and Uyon Dos, parts of Mandug. He patrolled under the eyes of the AFP the area, detained residents and interrogated people for connection to the NPA, later on claiming to be the chairman of “People’s Liberation Organization – Armed Forces of Justice” (Collier 1998: 85).³⁹

Meanwhile, the NDF tried to organize their own structures in the Moro territory in a cooperative effort between Moro and settler progressive activists. This came above all after a shift in the work of the Moro committee in 1983. With little successes on the attempts to cooperate with the MNLF, “direct organizing of Moro youth and students for purposes of launching the propaganda movement among Moro masses and of developing Moro cadres” (Quimpo quoted in McKenna 2008: 127). This involved the foundation of a series of student organizations as the

³⁹ His further career is difficult to assess, not to be verified sources claim him in kidnapping-for-ransom activities (Philippine News Agency 12121147 December 12, 1997), as goon for local politicians, and related to security arrangements of the US based mining company Echo Bay (<http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200405/terrorism/>). PNA claims its surrender to the AFP, while the US magazine article claims his death during a shoot-out.

“Moro Nationalist Youth League, the Organization of Moro Youth for the Ummah, the League of Moro Students, and the United Moro Muslims Association.” (McKenna 2008: 129)

“From 1983 on, at least, National Democratic efforts were based not on the desire to undermine MNLF leadership ... but to exploit a gap in the development of Muslim unarmed struggle. NDF cadre sought to fill that gap with organizations and ideas that would supplement the leadership of the MNLF and move the thinking of Muslim students and intellectuals closer to the NDF’s revolutionary line.” (McKenna 2008: 128)

Thus, these NDF organizations were mainly active in the bigger towns and the university campus. With the dissemination of NDF’s ideology they tried to include questions of social and economic justice into the broader discourse of Moro struggle for liberation. McKenna critically marks, that articles got written anonymous or under cliché Moro names, which he relates to a possibly majority of non-indigenous writers in these publications (McKenna 2008: 130). In the further paragraphs, McKenna uses his ethnographic work to analyze the impact of the NDF efforts onto Moro students in Cotabato City. He notes a general failure of NDF efforts due to three reasons: first, the NDF propaganda was strongly influenced by Catholic liberation theology. Approaching Moro students, interfaith dialogue and discussion of Islam from a Catholic perspective was prominently placed, while these Moro students would probably have been more prone to discuss politics rather than get lessons from Christians on Islam. Secondly, the NDF followed – probably unknowingly – the American and Philippine approach some decades earlier: they invested predominantly into education, while neglecting the more material needs for political organization and community development. Thirdly, the NDF was not able to liberate itself from the Philippine chauvinism towards indigenous people, leading to a patronizing attitude towards local activists; while unaware to external NDF activists, clearly visible to the latter. (McKenna 2008: 139-142)⁴⁰ Thereby, Moro people would have been open to progressive social critique. As mentioned above, in a survey among people in the Maranao region 72% of the respondents agreed with the sentence that “The Moro people like the Christian masses, presently suffer from the oppression of foreign and Christian capitalists that control the resources of the country” (Bucoy 1984: 109)

A more proactive, revolutionary organization under the official roof of the NDF was the Moro Revolutionary Organization, founded in the 1980s as well (Grossman 1986: 18). The MRO was able to establish two guerilla camps in the Lanao-Misamis area (Gutierrez 2000d: 325). From the beginning the MRO struggled with multiple oppositions against it: government institutions, local elites, and BMA. Thus, as soon as the MRO became more successful in the Moro territories, the ruling forces started to organize counter-revolutionary activities, including extrajudicial killings of activists. Thus, the initial success could not generate a shield against conservative reaction, but rather led to a fast decline of the MRO. The Moro activists either retreated from the political struggle or moved to support the NDF in other parts of the country, where it was strong enough to guarantee a still insufficient but at least partial protection. (Interview N)

⁴⁰ McKenna adds a note to his article which is worth mentioning here: “Several of the martial law activists whose efforts I discuss and critique in this chapter are acquaintances of mine whom I admire, whose everyday courage I deeply respect, and to whom I owe a genuine debt of gratitude. ... This is a story about cultural problems rather than personality problems in political struggles.” (McKenna 2008: 143)

Meanwhile, the years of contact between the insurgency fronts allowed on the international level a first concerted activity: in front of the Permanent Peoples Tribunal in Antwerp, Belgium, they charged the Marcos regime (Abreu and Tuazon 2008: 144)⁴¹ of violating the rights of the people, expressed in a series of international documents, amongst others the UN Charta, the human rights declaration, and the Geneva conventions. Next to introductions by Filipino academics Joel Rocamora and Walden Bello, both working in Berkeley/California at that time, the tribunal formed by an international panel, listened to sector-representatives from the Philippines as well as to Louis Jalandoni for the NDF, Victoria de los Reyes for the NPA, and Abdurasad Asani and Hatimil Hassan for the MNLF. The documentation of the process formulates that the Philippine and Bangsa-Moro people are forging a common struggle against the Marcos government and the broader colonial system controlled by the US, while acknowledging that a “campaign of genocide” differentiates the Moro from the Filipino people’s experiences. The tribunal concludes a series of violations by a “neocolonial system”, which does not just prevent the free development of the Philippine people, but is as much the underlying reason for the treatment of minorities by the government, including the Bangsamoro people. Furthermore, the Marcos regime in collaboration with the United States would along Martial Law, violate the civil and political rights of Philippine and Bangsa-Moro people. The Marcos regime would have lost its legitimacy to rule and MNLF and NDF should be considered the international legal representatives of the Bangsa-Moro respective the Philippine people. The tribunal appeals to the United States administration to stop any support for the Marcos regime and recognize the MNLF/NDF representation. Furthermore, the right of self-determination for the Bangsamoro people gets acknowledged by the tribunal as much as by the NDF (Popoli 1980).

4.4.5 Factionalism

Thus, while the early 1980s saw the rise of the NDF in general and some smaller fruits in the intention to develop a socialist complement to the secessionist efforts of the Moro nationalists, the same decade saw serious frictions and the decline of the socialist movement towards the end of the decade. Throughout the consequent years, the movement struggled with schism and deathly internal fights.

Already the different approaches towards urban action – a no-go for the dogmatic Maoists who favored the protracted war in the country-side – led to serious arguments between the central committee and strong urban committees in Manila, but as well in Davao City. The latter argued that a more pro-active approach should be used in the cities, involving mass-actions, strikes, and in some cases participation at elections to use possibilities of disseminating the NDF’s ideology. Some of these activities, autonomously taken by local NDF urban committees were at the beginning quite successfully but of course risked at the same time the opening of the underground to public exposure.

⁴¹ The Tribunal was formed as a civil society tribunal to investigate crimes against human rights perpetrated by states in 1979, supported by the Lelio Basso International Foundation for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, which again is named after an Italian criminal lawyer and socialist politician, active in the resistance against fascism and later on in the constitutional assembly and parliament during the early years of liberal-democratic Italy.

This was the background to the first disastrous event, foreclosing the decline of the NDF in Mindanao. The rapid growth of the NDF in Mindanao led to a relaxation of education and background-checks of the formerly strictly Leninist cadre-organization, above all in the cooperation programs with church organizations. The counter-insurgency units of the Armed Forces used this to infiltrate the ranks of the socialist movement. The broadness and depth of infiltration could never be established, but the exposure and killing of some underground activists heightened suspicions and mistrust inside the movement. On the operational level, the institutional weakness of and missing organizational skills in the Mindanao Commission of the CPP were related to the neglected educational cadre work and finally responsible for the tragedy to come. MindaCom established a “caretaker group”, which started in 1985 the operation “Kahos” (Kampanyang Ahos/Garlic Campaign) to investigate and target possible government agents. A later NDF investigation states three major failures: incompetent investigation teams, the use of torture, and missing coordination between the zones of investigations. Rumors about the indiscriminate targeting of activists by the caretaker group spread fast and led to a dynamic of panic among the movement activists of getting involved, retreat by thousands of activists from the movement, and thus a heightened suspicion on part of the caretaker group, expecting an even broader collaboration of activists and government. The consequences were 606 tortured and killed activists and cadres as well as 6,000 people resigning from the movement when Kahos finally was declared concluded in 1986. (All information from a detailed account in Abinales 2008)

This purge, however, was just the beginning of the decline of the Maoist movement on a national level. From outside, the support of counterinsurgency measures including vigilante groups by the US led to a massive crackdown, once the envisaged peace talks between the NDF and the new Aquino government failed (Collier 1998: 267). Meanwhile, the end of the Marcos regime and the difficulties of the NDF to continue its struggle against a now more open regime, led to internal discussions on the right path to proceed. In this difficult situation, the movement found no way to handle different political positions in a productive way, but the leaders of different factions resorted to blame the other factions and dogmatize the own position. The faction around CPP founder Jose Sison published its own account under the heading “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors” on how to proceed:

“we must always measure ourselves according to these principles ... 1) the repudiation of modern revisionism and adherence to the following: 2) theory of Marxism-Leninism, 3) class analysis of Philippine society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, 4) general line of a new democratic revolution, 5) leading role of the working class through the Party, 6) theory of people’s war and the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, 7) concept of a united front along the revolutionary class line, 8) democratic centralism, 9) socialist perspective and proletarian internationalism.” (Liwanağ 1992)

Sison further on blamed the Mindanao Commission on leaving these principles by focusing on urban actions and thus carrying the final responsibility for the Kahos catastrophe. Meanwhile, the “Rejectionists” rejected the dogmatic document and noted, that the Philippine society as much as the global environment changed since these principles were already outlined in the early documents of the movement in the late 1960s. Thus, new ways of thinking and acting should be sought for (Abinales 2010).

4.4.6 Multiple Struggles Combined

Even though the internal struggle of the progressive movement continue and political opinions differ between the various factions, the situation seem to be more settled currently than during the height of the schism of the early 1990s. The movement expanded its range of political activities and might play a key role in the development towards a more peaceful future; even though activists still struggle with violent threats from outside and within.

The NDF in Minsupala is now divided over certain geographical spheres of influence (Interview J) and growing again (Interview I). Above all, a premiere happened in 1999: the NDF and the MILF agreed to cooperate in an official strategic alliance, after the MNLF and NDF leadership finally broke in open hostilities, i.e. after Sison declared Misuari's acceptance of the 1996 agreement as a betrayal. In the NDF/MILF alliance, the NDF states that:

“The NDF assures the MILF that it recognizes and respects the identity, integrity and way of life and culture of the Moro people and is against any form of national oppression, discrimination, chauvinism and coercion against them. The NDF guarantees the right of the Moro people to self-determination, extending to their right to secede from a state of national oppression and to establish their own state or choose federation or local autonomy under the People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines.

The NDF recognizes their right to a Moro homeland and to a system embodying the Moro people's social, political, economic and religious aspirations under a leadership that they so elect. In line with the principles of unity of the revolutionary movement, the NDFP assures the MILF that any understanding between the two movements shall be conducted within the framework of recognition and respect for each other's identity, integrity, principles and program and on the independence and initiative of each organization.

It is expected that through the continued and regular meetings of authorized representatives from both sides and, if necessary, of representatives from the highest and most basic levels of the organization, the objective of further consolidating and developing the revolutionary alliance between the Filipino people and the Moro people will be advanced.” (CPP 1999)

Even though a break through, the parallel struggle still proved to be difficult, above all during the second part of the Arroyo Presidency. The progressive movement saw any attempt of changing the constitution as a threat of a renewed dictatorship, this time by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Thus, the progressive movement was strictly opposed to a “charter-change” to allow the implementation of the MoA-AD. This again brought with it resentment on part of the Moro insurgency, but as well on part of Moro civil society organizations. Similarly, the CPP is suspicious of any further peace agreements by the MILF and remarks that just in a socialist republic would a genuine autonomy be possible, addressing the structural issues in Minsupala (Interview ZF).

Meanwhile, outside the formal NDF/PPP/NPA structure in the Moro areas of Minsupala progressive activists play an increasing role in civil society organizations, which started their development with the end of the Marcos regime. Statistics on civil society organizations on the Philippines have to be treated with care, as the spectrum of “CVOs” is wide, including political groups, single-issue-groups, local cooperatives, up to business-financed propaganda group (Niklas and Werning 2006). Nonetheless, it is visible, that civil society groups play a more

prominent role in the peace processes. They engage in interfaith dialogues, enhance peace zones, engage as local ceasefire monitors, mediators, and political pressure groups towards the political partners of the peace process (Rood 2005). For certain functions, they are even included as institutions into negotiation documents, so for example the mentioned ceasefire committees. Furthermore, they get considered as sector representatives and thus get invited to public hearings and discussions to provide knowledge and opinion to political processes. Thus, they are able to influence political ideas, in discussion of existing ideas as much as sometimes by filling voids of knowledge of the addressed political actors. Thirdly, progressive movements get involved in elections as well, even though only part of the institutions are open for party lists, while they are rarely strong enough to win a majority-win-seat.

Progressive Moro activists were thus able to be present in official institutions. While the MNLF failed to use this potential in civil society, the latest Aquino-government searches the cooperation with progressive groups and individuals and integrated some of them into the appointed officers-in-charge for the delayed ARMM elections. These political alliances are thereby not without risk and some progressive commentators warn of cooptation mechanisms, in the end to the advantage of the liberal regime and to the disadvantage of the progressive movement. The high number of extra-judicial killings of progressive activists, from media persons to labor organizers, since the end of the Marcos-regime is a hint, that the political environment is still defined by power structures which resort to physical violence to protect their positions (Kraft 2010: 187), not penetrable by NGO activities. That the NPA and CPP have been considered as Foreign Terrorist Groups in the US and Europe since 2002 onwards just added to the discourse of considering progressive activists as terrorist threats to the state, cultivated in military (Interview L) and vigilante groups. The activities of these latter forces will be traced in the next and last section of this chapter.

4.5 NP-CH: Non-Project in a Crisis of Hegemony

The previous tracing of political projects are in line with the idea of hegemonies as political projects in the making. Their aim is, along our theoretical framework, the establishment of a stable social hierarchy, based on a mixture between leadership by universalizing particular social interests and violence as a last-resort to protect the consent of the broad majority of the members of this hegemony. Thus, there is an underlying assumption of a proportional relation between crisis, violence, and instability on the one end of the spectrum, and hegemony, consent, and stability on the other, i.e. with the movement from a crisis situation towards a hegemonic situation, the usage of violence to suppress dissent reduces in favour of broad consent and reduced opposition leads to a more stabile social situation. The consequent assumption is then, that it is in the interest of a leading social group to achieve such a hegemony to be able to stabilize its own ruling.

Empirical analysis of the situation in Minsupala shows now an interesting development: traditional elites, loosing their ruling position due to colonial intervention, do not establish a new form of hegemony but connect to different explanations of ruling; accepting thereby inconsistencies. Later on, some settler elites and rebel renegades joint in. In varying alliances with other social groups and by the usage of physical violence they were able to stabilize their ruling, while an end to the social crisis in the region is not visible. Thus, there seems to develop

the paradox of a hegemony of crisis, intercepting the hegemonic attempts of the political projects analyzed in the four previous sections. Before we analyse this puzzle on a generalizing level in the next two chapters, the empirical information which leads to this puzzle should be outlined in a similar manner than the political projects above.

4.5.1 Resistance vs. Collaboration: Dealing with Colonial Powers

As discussed in the second section, relying on historian's information, the Datuship and Sultanate system, while incorporating physical violence, can be considered a hierarchical society, stabilized by a material labour division, an ideological explanation, and institutions to regulate and smooth smaller conflicts deriving from non-structural changes. With the arrival of the Spanish colonizers, this system started to scramble, even if for a long time the Spanish soldiers were not able to directly occupy Minsupala. However, even though the successful attempt of Christianizing the northern islands, it would be misleading to analyze an antagonistic development between north and south; the strength of local power holders continued in the north, too, as "Spanish colonial-era states preserved indigenous local strongmen as subcontracted agents of the state and introduced derivative and discretionary state power as new bases for local strongman authority" (Sidel 1999: 15)

What differentiated the southern islands was the general isolation Minsupala experienced over the following decades due to a constant threat of their sea routes by the Spanish fleet. Thus, different to the open culture related to the maritime transregional system of previous times, society "withdrew into a cultural-religious shell" (George 1980: 84). Furthermore, the military blockade of Minsupala reduced the regional power of the southern sultanates, but ironically raised, for a short time, their internal power position (Ahmad 2000a: 11), as they were the only ones with the financial and military means to protect the population against the colonial invasion (Mednick 1974[1957]: 23).

Thus, right from the beginning, the perpetrator-victim perspective has to be qualified on internal power shifts. Furthermore, quite from the beginning single leaders choose to cooperate with the new European forces in the region to gain advantage over local rivals (Tan 1977: 26-27). This went so far, that internal family rivalries dragged in external support, not unlike situations Machiavelli describes for Italian city states in regard to neighbouring European powers as the Spanish and French monarchy. The situation at first changed little with the take-over by the United States as the colonizer of the Philippine archipelago:

"The external powers were used by Muslim groups or datuships in the elimination of feudal enemies or local oppositions. Whether this integration provided the Muslims with the desired support in local disputes was difficult to see. But the obvious benefit it gave to the colonial government was in the fact that the intervention of Americans and Filipinos in Muslim internal conflicts allowed the government to initiate and preserve the 'divide et impera' policy in relation to Muslim societies. This kept Muslim groups and leaders divided // consciously or unconsciously and, paradoxically, with the help of some Muslims." (Tan 1977: 90-91).

The sultan of Sulu signed the mentioned Bates agreement, thus allowing the US army to conquer the rebellious islands step by step. However, after subduing the northern independence movement, the US "pacification" campaign, i.e. the violent suppression of any attempts of resistance on part of the southern leaders, at the beginning of the 20th century was a decisive

blow against the rulers of the south and finally ended any hegemonic attempt of the social group of Datus to preserve the traditional system and resist colonial subjugation. Meanwhile, the cooptation into the colonial system went through different channels. Starting from 1903, Moros were recruited into the constabulary and scout units of the US army (Byler 2005: 44). Two years later, an educational program should attract Moro leaders to the new system. The foundations were laid by the first superintendent of schools of the Moro province, Najeeb Saleeby. He argued that “[i]t is in the Americans' interest, in fact, to unite the Moros *under their traditional leaders* in order to initiate a "process of gradual development” (quoted in McKenna 1998: 105; emph. add.). While attempts to follow this suggestion remained little during the following years of direct US colonial administration, it would be the basis for a decisive development starting in 1924 with Edward M. Kuder as new superintendent. His educational program of personally training young scions of important families produced, as intentioned, a group of people who would participate in the liberal system soon to be established (McKenna 1998: 108-110). They would become to represent the role models of future Moro traditional leaders: liberal-modern representatives in their engagement with Philippine state institutions, while still representing the sanctified inequality in front of their local communities. With some fluctuations, prominent family names (Alonto, Lucman, Dimaporo, Sinsuats, Piang, Mastura, Abubakar, Tulawi, Rasul, Annis, etc.) can be traced up until today's political candidates lists (Tan 1993: 41-42).

Next to political influence, the education of the elites helped them with a second issue: the transition from the Adat-based feudal land organization to the liberal Torrens-system, i.e. a state-backed land-titling system. As outlined above, the transition was to the disadvantage of the indigenous people with little understanding as well as connections to the Philippine bureaucracy. The newly trained elites could use, however, their skills and connections to their advantage: on the one hand blocking too energetic external land speculators, and on the other hand acquiring land, tilt by local peasants:

“Sometimes datos were appointed to dignified though largely decorative posts. Sometimes large tracts of lands were given to them. The favours never percolated down to the community. But, to the privileged few, they were a strong enough reason to spend all their time currying favour // with the government - which meant neglecting, and sometimes violating, the interests of their own people.” (George 1980: 94-95)

Community land titles were written under the datos' names and later on sold for profit or given to the government for development projects, thus raising the prices of own land next by (George 1980: 116). Leaving aside the differences, one can generalize with Sidel the situation at the onset of independence as follows:

“The subordination of municipal, provincial, and national agencies of the state apparatus to elected officials, the onset of primitive capital accumulation, and the expanding role of the colonial state in the economy together facilitated the emergence and entrenchment of colonial/era bosses in a variety of localities and at different levels of state power.” (Sidel 1999: 17)

4.5.2 Installed Democracy and Possibilities of Wealth

This was the first step to a return to political influence, coinciding with the partial independence of the Philippines in 1935 formal independence eleven years later. Thus, four decades

after the abrogation of the Bates agreement and the following subjugation by American troops, the elites were back in track, combining economic power over land with political power in the new established liberal institutions and traditional power over their constituency.

One more power factor could be added following a global tragedy: means of physical violence; previously lost during the ban on firearms in 1912. It was the result of WW2, i.e. on the Philippines the invasion by Japan. While Tokyo installed a regime in Manila, which declared martial law over the archipelago, guerrilla activities by Filipinos together with US support challenged the invasion. The Muslim guerrilla movements stand close by and prominent names were among its officers: Rascid Lucman, Domacao Alonto, and Salipada Pendatun (Tan 1977: 186). While the Japanese troops left a few years later, the war structures remained: private armies under the control of local leaders, being able to use the large amount of free floating weaponry to their own advantage (George 1980: 136-137). The situation of general insecurity instigated furthermore a vicious circle of arms build-up (Harber 1998: 44). The organisation of policing via local government structures added another component strengthening the position regarding violence of local rulers. One more consequence of WW2 has to be mentioned: the post-war time brought Japanese reparation payments and US reconstruction help into the Philippines; disseminated were these finances via existing channels and thus via the collaborating Moro leaders: "A big chunk ... went into the pockets of these Moro leaders." (Abreu 2008: 24) Lastly, they profited from the low level of education of their followers, playing the two levels against each other:

"For a primary interest of the *datus* was to make sure that the inherent contradiction between their hereditary privileges and the people's democratic rights would not be exposed. Their fear that education might do just that was the reason many *datus* turned against schools; the Christian ethos of the schools proved a convenient excuse. Showing no interest in developing an adequate system of their own, *datus* stuck to the *Madrasah* tradition which at best imparted basic instruction in Quranic knowledge and no more. It was as though Muslim leaders had a personal stake in keeping Muslim masses backward. This was a direct infringement of Quranic instructions. Islam's emphasis on scholarship was always strident." (George 1980: 99)

With these different instruments of power, the Moro traditional leaders were the one tackling the settlers' influx in the post-WW2 better than the lower classes. Some of these families were able to disperse over a series of municipalities, controlling as a family alliance vast tracks of land. Vice versa, these families therefore became interesting for national politics, as they could control a broad voting community. Examples are the *Sinsuats* in lower Maguindanao and the *Ampatuans* in upper Maguindanao (Beckett 1994: 304-305). In this atmosphere of symbiotic profit, there was little interest on part of these elites to instigate any conflicts with the national government and vice versa:

"Through elections, strong men and state developed a relationship based on mutual interest. Strongmen benefited from access to the state and its resources and from the political networks state positions opened up to them. The weak state also found value in the strong men, not only in establishing its authority on the frontier, but in demonstrating that political ambition was best served through the norms, procedures, and practices of the state." (Abinales 2000)

Thus, the only nation-wide registered conflict, the mentioned *Kamlon-Uprising*, was "triggered largely by inter-Muslim feuds and unresolved land problems," (Tan 1993) as much as smaller

armed conflicts “between feuding families ... in Sulu ... the Kirams, the Abubakars, the Rasuls, and the Annis.” (Gutierrez 2000b: 64)

This stable situation, however, did not hold long, with the described influx of settlers and investors. The tightened situation favoured a continuing divide between smaller peasants, loosing out increasingly, and bigger landowners, using their power to amass further land:

Christian prospectors, industrialists, loggers, and politicians, in collaboration with the Muslim elite, dispossessed the Muslims and other non-Christians of their lands through torrens title frauds, tedious application procedures, and costly legal processes.” (Tan 1977: 196)

The closing of the frontier and increased land disputes escalated the threat by private violence: “the pace-setters were the Christians ... often bringing ruffians from the north ... Muslim leaders quickly followed the example” (George 1980: 140-141). These private armies could encompass “1,000 well-armed fighters” and were “the real status symbol, the ultimate stamp of entrenched power” (George 1980: 139). Did the settlers support the Moro politicians in the WW2 aftermath due to “lack of cohesive blocs in the Christian community [and because t] here is also a feeling among many Christians that only a Muslim official can maintain a degree of peace and order among the Moros” (Hunt 1974: 200), now the position of the Moro elites was threatened once again, this time by settler elites ready to take over their power. One advantage remained, to the Moro elites: “While their numbers were not as substantial as the settlers’, this bloc voting made them an attractive pool of voters for any candidate aspiring to national office.” (Abinales 2000: 128) Furthermore, a split along the Moro-Settler-line as to be seen in central Mindanao and the south-western islands, was no law of nature: in 1963 in Lanao del Norte Muhammad Ali Dimaporo became governor in an alliance with Arsenio Quibranza; Quibranza followed as governor when Dimaporo became Congressman two years later. The alliance got further fortified by the marriage of Muhammad Ali’s son Abdullah and Arsenio’s daughter Imelda (Gomez 2000: 105). During the early 1970s, the two father’s in law became fierce rivals and resorted to ethnic violence, but Dimaporo remained a key political figure in the predominantly settler province over the next years and their children (in law) became both provincial governors in the following decades.⁴²

4.5.3 Balancing Revolution and State

During the following period, and with the engagement by traditional elites, violence got channelled into a dyadic conflict; which finally runs out of control for the traditional elites, even though they continued their practice to engage with all different political actors involved.

In the early seventies, fighting broke out between interest groups and got more and more framed in ethnical terms:

“These initiatives by Moro and Christian politicians [to train and equip groups against the other group] easily connected with the popular sentiments of their respective constituencies. Before long Moro raids were answered with Christian raids, Christian killings with Moro killings. Soon the situation became a chicken and egg problem. Who started what? Either side quickly pointed accusing fingers

⁴² The indigenous-settler family has held the provincial governorship since 1963, except the immediate post-People-Power period from 1986-1992. Currently, Abdullah and Arsenio’s son Mohamad Khalid is ruling the province, after taking over from his mother in 2007.

at the other. The small fire swept wildly about and turned into a raging conflagration almost impossible to control.” (Rodil 2003: 136)

However, even though the used language of justification in these activities was similar to the propaganda of the new revolutionaries, the interests of the traditional Moro elites differed in substantial terms: in the post-war-years the elites have been integrated in a for them all in all favourable system (Tan 1993: 43), recognizing that a return to the pre-colonial era was not a viable option and a democratic revolution not in their group’s interest. *Their* problem was the increased competition deriving from the new settler elites and their political manoeuvrings were instrumental to this issue (George 1980: 199-200). A favourable stance with the national elites could help. Even when military pressure against Moro communities by vigilante groups and government forces heightened between the 1960s and early 1970s, the elites thus continuingly cooperated with the national government, even though they stretched out their hands to the insurgents, as well. The foundation of the Muslim Independence Movement and its rapid dissolution a few years later with the integration of its leader Matalam into the national government has to be seen in light of these developments. And consequently, the traditional elites lost the direct control over the insurgents (Gutierrez 2000d: 311), with the latter shortcutting their gatekeeper role to foreign support structures.

However, a passive and two active levers remained to push the crisis development in for them favourable directions, or at least prevent directions to their disadvantage: the general social conservative ideas of the states represented by the OIC, their own local troops inside the revolutionary movement, and their continuing influence over the local population.

Firstly, even though the OIC supported the MNLF and after years of lobbying recognized them as the principal representative of the Bangsamoro, they never gave any hint that they would support dissolution of the Philippine territorial integrity. Thus, any future Bangsamoro autonomy would have to deal with the national government, a relation on which the traditional elites outmatched the expertise of the revolutionaries by far. Furthermore, even though essential sponsor Libya propagated its “Green Socialism”, the OIC in general with its diverse member-states could not be regarded as a revolutionary organisation and neither its policy suggestions to the MNLF. On the contrary, its integration into the revolutionary dynamics prevented the MNLF from leaning towards a social revolution or cooperation with the social revolutionaries of the NDF. This proved to be an effective shield against the potentially threatening concepts of the counter-hegemony movements.

Secondly, even though the intellectuals from Manila and the Middle East were able to secure external funding, leadership positions inside the MNLF, and the general role on the development of a Bangsamoro ideology, the local elites retained a substantial position in providing recruits. Most of the recruits have been young Moros “led by traditional and secular elites” (Santos and Santos 2010a: 332) with “[t]he old leaders, firmly entrenched, continued to rule over family networks that included many of the MNLF leaders themselves, and to command the loyalty of their constituents.” (Gutierrez 2000d: 314) It were the “junior members of datu families [...who...] choose active rebellion.” (McKenna 1998: 162).

Thirdly, the traditional elites were not immobilized in the local arena. This reached from the mentioned own violence capabilities in form of private armies to influencing the discourse in the local communities to the continuing connection to Philippine administration agencies. The

main argument against the insurgency, and above all Misuari, was the warning about a Maoist revolution, supposedly hidden behind the Islamic-National rhetoric of the MNLF, which would distort the Philippine Muslims' aspirations for development and a better treatment by the Philippine government; sought for by the traditional leadership as representatives in national institutions. Thus they provided public statements in favour of the regime and against the rebellion. These encompassed key family names: early on the Sinsuats, the Ampatuans, Matalam, and later on Pendatun (McKenna 1998: 162).

Thus the traditional elites were able to support the rebels to a certain extent, retaining the image of a representative of the Muslim minority, and at the same time cooperating with the government against the revolutionaries. The last went so far, that in Maguindanao former MIM leader Udtug Matalam signed, according to Salamat Hashim, an affidavit against them, which forced him and his followers underground to prevent detention by the Philippine Army (McKenna 1998: 157). In Lanao, politicians Lucman and Alonto continued to be strong supporters of the MNLF, even though the latter's neglect of their traditional leadership role; but less against the government than against a local Moro fellow and political rival, Dimaporo, who enjoyed the benevolence of President Marcos. Dimaporo meanwhile was a firm enemy of the MNLF, outspoken against the movement in public and cooperating with the AFP in material terms (Bentley 1994: 254).

4.5.4 Return to (Traditional) Order

When the leadership of the MNLF failed to bring the peace negotiations of 1976 to a breakthrough and the movement scrambled from within, the traditional elites were back in track via several strategies: attempts to control the insurgency and defections with profitable awards to re-integrate into the government system.

Some of the elites tried once more to take over control over the Moro-Filipino struggle. Thus, they supported first Hashim Salamat in his intention to wrest power from Misuari. As Salamat, however, did not succeed and furthermore proved to be as difficult to control as Misuari (Gutierrez 2000a: xviii), the elites answered by the foundation of own groups, i.e. the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization, headed by Sultan Harun ul-Rashi Lucman, Macapanton Abbas, and Salipada Pendatun (Ahmad 2000b: 35; Gutierrez 2000a: xviii), as well as the MNLF Reformist Group, headed by Dimas Pundato (May 1992b: 130). These organisations, however, failed as much as Salamat Hashim's "New MNLF" to gain the OIC's support, even though Saudi Arabia hosted the BMLO. Accordingly, their field of operation returned mainly to the local/national arena.

And here, without international backing, for most of the elite's rebellious members it turned out to be more advantageous to return to the legal political sphere. McKenna accounts for central Mindanao, that "[t]he most notable feature of the traditional elite leadership of the rebellion in Cotabato was its rapid rate of defection. Datu commanders surrendered earlier and in greater numbers than any other rebel leaders. ... By 1980, virtually all members of the traditional elite had abandoned the rebellion." (McKenna 1998:162-3) Similar accounts can be made for the other regions. In Sulu, the "Magic Eight" and their followers "were given cash, firearms, ammunition, amnesty, and immunity from criminal prosecution, as well as import licenses used in the lucrative barter trade in the region." (Gutierrez 2000b: 55) In Maranao,

one of the three key founding MNLF members, Abul Khayr Alonto, surrendered with 2,000 soldiers to the AFP (Ahmad 2000b: 36).

As the front line between MNLF and AFP blurred, the elites could start harvesting the fruits of the rebellion; the rebellion “awakened the government to the urgent need to realize integration by more substantial concessions to the Muslim leadership, not necessarily to the Muslim masses” (Tan 1993: 47). Thus, throughout the following years, while the core MNLF resumed its fight against the government, the traditional elites got attracted by concessions and pork barrels in different forms:

“several Muslims from the traditional elite found themselves in prominent national and local positions, - a fact which caused the political integration of prominent Muslim families of Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu into the national leadership. This political concession was strengthened by the subsequent share of Muslim leadership in the economic resources through trade, commerce, agriculture, and other revenue-generating schemes.” (Tan 1993: 47)

Thereby, the inner-elite power system could change: in Sulu the Magic Eight gained from the situation, that former government officials fled the countryside from war to move to the safer cities of Mindanao or up north to the national capital. “With civilian officials, traditional elites, and the old Tausug royal families conveniently out of the picture, the Magic Eight grew from relative obscurity to become the major players in Sulu. They became civilian authorities with paramilitary powers in a war-torn province.” (Gutierrez 2000b: 55) This, however, does not mean that they outplayed all the old families:

“Today there are four key families that matter in the politics of Sulu - the Loongs, the Tulawies, the Tans, and the Annis. The Loongs, along with their Magic Eight allies, are relatively newcomers in politics compared with the three other families. For that matter, many Magic Eight leaders, some people say, were once mere ward leaders of Sulu's dominant families.” (Gutierrez 2000b: 65)

Meanwhile, in Maranao the situation was more complicated, as the Dimaporo family, key Marcos' ally, opposed the deal with Abul Khayr Alonto, scion of their arch-rival family. Thus, Alonto appointed a representative for his position as Speaker of the regional assembly during a step-visit to the region and immediately returned to Manila (Noble 1981: 1105). While in central Mindanao, Datu Guiwan and twelve other datu commanders already defected in 1973, arranged by the patriarch of a key elite family, Simeon Datumanong, BMLO leader Salipada Pendatun defected to Marcos just in 1980. Meanwhile, Peping Candao, son of a local politician and brother to later governor Zacaria Candao, defected in 1975. (McKenna 1998: 162-3) In these situations conflict rivalries prominent from the pre-martial law era continued on a higher level:

“A reputation for violence becomes both capital and basis of economic power. Under such conditions, it becomes easy for one to reinvent himself as a new warlord. Violence becomes an inevitable instrument for governance and the settlement of differences” (Gutierrez 2000b: 80)

For the national regime it was a successful strategy: “Marcos, through his local leaders, was able to gain almost complete control in the two autonomous regions.” (Mercado Jr. 1992: 162) This included even the insurgency: “he checked the renewed uprisings by withdrawing troops from the most disputatious areas and handed over control to armed factions loyal to local Muslim warlords” (Harber 1998: 54). Furthermore, it opened up possibilities towards the Mao-

ist insurgency. First, the again available AFP troops could be deployed to eastern Mindanao and secondly, they could get support from Moro surrendered troops, hired as paramilitary forces (Grossman 1986: 17).

“In a sense, it was the co-optation of the Muslim elite by the government that had seriously blunted the Muslim secessionist or separatist struggle, especially after the creation in 1957 of the Commission on National Integration (CNI) and in 1968 of the Mindanao State University (MSU), which gave the Muslim leadership the sense of importance they had been seeking, as well as the venue to project their political and intellectual profiles in Philippine society.” (Tan 1993: 47)

As mentioned before, the MNLF reacted helplessly towards these defections and were no threat for their former members (McKenna 1998: 185); if the defectors took care on the security of their local constituency, they even could count on the benevolence of local communities (McKenna 1998: 196). This does not mean that the population overwhelmingly embraced the influence of the local elites and the retreat of the insurgents, as a protection-focused hypothesis might imply. In a local survey, more than half of the respondents agreed with the remark that “the rule and predominance of the traditional Moro datus should end” and more than 80% went with the sentence “There should be a popular revolution to put an end to the control of the few in our country” (Bucoy 1984: 122) But all in all the martial law era ended with a positive balance for the local elites as a social group, and McKenna accounts for central Mindanao:

“On the whole, traditional elites appeared to have survived martial law and the Bangsamoro Rebellion with little permanent damage to their political capabilities. With effective one-party rule and an increase in development funds channeled from the central government to Cotabato, the political positions of many collaborating datus were, in fact, more secure and potentially more profitable than before martial law.” (McKenna 1998: 217)

4.5.5 Claiming Peace and Fighting Elections

This close arrangement with the Marcos government proved to be difficult during the immediate People Power Revolution time. Nationwide, former Marcos-allies were replaced by the Aquino-administration with officers-in-charge. In Minsupala this meant a replacement of traditional elites and defectors (Gonzalez 2000: 118-9); later on, they had to share influence with the national-liberal leadership and the national-religious movement turned out to become a new, more fundamental challenge; last but not least further actors became influential: local violence entrepreneurs, defectors from the dyadic violent conflict. However, all in all the developments throughout the next fifteen years should bring the traditional elites back to power.

At the beginning, though, prospects were dismal. Next to the anti-Marcos stance of the new administration, the latter’s anti-authoritarian liberal programme might have brought the elites into trouble. Most of all, the implementation of the attempt to abolish the infamous paramilitary defence forces installed under Marcos would have been a strong blow against the capabilities of the local elites, i.e. their private armies. However, Aquino stepped back rapidly and the vigilante groups continued their activities with an endorsement by the highest government echelons (May 1992b: 136). Thus, paramilitary units were now amongst others regulated as “Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units” (Aquino 1987). The reform of the police and its regulation in the foundation of the Philippine National Police code (Congress 1990) and

the Local Government Unit code (Congress 1991) reinstated the role of local government units in the operative control over local police forces. And last but not least, the next regular elections brought Moro traditional leaders back into electoral offices and thus returned their influence onto local government units.

Meanwhile, the peace process with the MNLF continued; on which the traditional elites had little influence via the MNLF, as most of the elites defected as mentioned in the previous period. Thus, a favourable outcome with strong concessions to the MNLF was not in the interests of the elite as a social group. Accordingly there was little commitment and even less help to the negotiations and the following implementation years as described above. The leadership of the ARMM was given over to the leaders of the MNLF only under pressure by the Ramos presidency; meanwhile, the traditional elites kept their control over the provinces and most of the towns in the areas covered by the ARMM (Rocamora 1999: 171). The ARMM remained thereby foreign to the local communities. According to a survey, not even half of the population in the ARMM in the year after the 1996 peace agreement was sure about the existence of the ARMM and merely 7% answered to know the ARMM structure of government (Bernardo 1997: 86). With the MNLF not able to develop a different era in the ARMM against the existing structures, the elites did little else than wait until the MNLF failed.

A more long-term problem developed meanwhile with local opposition under the leadership of foreign-trained Islamic clerics, above all in central Mindanao. In Lanao del Sur and in Maguindanao they lost the governorship to candidates supported by the Ulama. In Maguindanao, Zacaria Candao collaborated with the Ustadzes, thus indirectly the MILF, and new urban professionals, supporters of the insurgency as well, to compete successfully in the local elections. It was thereby a difficult act of balancing between a revolutionizing alliance between independent Ulama and professionals and the continuing influence of traditions and with it the local traditional elites in the communities. Thus, while actively campaigning against the endorsed candidates of the elites, Candao was careful to integrate some traditional dignitaries as spokespersons into his own campaign. (McKenna 1998: 252) Nonetheless, it showed a new possible form of politics apart from traditional forms of clientelism and "it remains to be seen whether Cotabato's political families, which have endured the changes of the last century, will survive this new challenge" (Beckett 1994: 307)

While the described developments focused above all on the profiteers of elites out of the crisis situation, during the eighties another phenomenon became increasingly more prominent. Local ex-rebellion commandos became freelance violence entrepreneurs, ranging from local bandit-groups to warlord-like structures. Two categories can be differentiated: criminal groups and splinter groups, even though the line can not be drawn conclusively. The Pentagon-Group and other local criminal structures have been founded by former rebels, which defected during counter-insurgency operations on part of the Philippine government beginning from the mid 1970s. These defections got facilitated as with higher-level defectors mostly by economic incentives. However, if these incentives have not been invested fruitfully, these defectors were soon again without economic base and little experience except their violence capabilities. There are no accounts of returning defectors into the overall insurgency command structures; thus, they had to start using their violence capabilities for private gains. Rimban (2003) outlines it along the biography of the meanwhile killed Faisal Marohombsar, former MNLF soldier, which defected in the late 1980s and became security officer at the Mindanao State University

in Marawi City; during this time he already cooperated with the Pentagon group and later on became its leader.

While these groups never claimed any political program except a reference to social banditry, splinter groups and local commandos highlighted differences to the insurgency leadership for their autonomous activities. The most visible and infamous one has been the Abu Sayyaf Group, founded by Afghanistan returnees at the beginning of the 1990s officially as an answer to the peace engagement of the MNLF. It remains unclear which role counter-insurgency operations of the AFP played in its development, but a series of incidences make it a reasonable conclusion that at the beginning the AFP regarded it at least as a welcoming development of splitting and thus weakening insurgency forces; accordingly, it did not prevent a growth of the movement at its beginnings (Santos and Dinampo 2010). Meanwhile, connections to local terrorist groups are highlighted by some commentators and researchers (Jones 2005; Banlaoi 2009).⁴³ The number of members of these groups varies between several hundred and several thousand (Santos and Santos 2010a: 396). This connects to the question of membership altogether, as with their low-level of institutionalizations, numbers of involved people may alter on a daily basis. Their main income sources are kidnapping-for-ransoms, above all against Filipino-Chinese families (Interview B), summing up to several million dollars in central Mindanao over the last two decades (Santos and Santos 2010a: 396). Meanwhile, the ransomed sums by the Abu Sayyaf Group get estimated up to 35 million US\$ (Santos and Santos 2010a: 368). While Abu Sayyaf above all at the beginning still produced propaganda material, this ceased after the demise of its early leadership (Santos and Dinampo 2010). Nonetheless, a reference to the neglect of the region by the Philippine state remains a constant argument used by these groups to legitimize their activities (Frake 1998; Rimban 2003).

Two more issues have to be mentioned: one is the persistency of this development. Even though leaders of the Pentagon as well as the Abu Sayyaf Group have been killed by government armed forces they have continually been visible throughout Minsupala. Similar to discussions on Al Qaida on the global level, this gets explained as a franchise system: with new groups claiming the name of the original violence entrepreneurs to take over their reputation. Secondly, in many cases these phenomena should not be understood as independently operating local groups; they are integrated in a wide net of labour-divisions where local groups form just one part in a bigger criminal complex, where the biggest share of surpluses gets allocated to elites throughout the country. This connects these developments to the overall question of local elites in the crisis of hegemony (Niksch 2002).

4.5.6 Integrating the Enemy – Overcoming Revolution

The new Millennium brought no change out of the crisis, on the contrary. The global war-on-terrorism and its local stage in Minsupala increased the power of local executives and the role of violence in government-society relations (Kreuzer 2007: 15). President Macapagal-Arroyo allowed one month after 9/11 the legal carrying of arms by members of Civilian Volunteer Organizations (Kraft 2010: 196), local militias; this did not just encompass small firearms, but as well grenade launchers (Kraft 2010: 197). Later on she decreed the involvement of police

⁴³ But as the topic and its underlying data is a sensitive issue, no further analysis should be provided in this paper

forces in anti-terrorism campaigns of the AFP. While the letters of these legal codes saw checks-and-balances and a general cooperation between several levels of the administration, on the ground the hypothesis gets supported that part of AFP and PNP are “under the control of local clans” (Kreuzer 2005: 21) Thus, with both local forces under the control of traditional elites, this gave them a further lever in the violence market. Meanwhile, the number of extra-judicial killings roared nationwide after 2001 (Kraft 2010: 187).

Thereby, the own insurgency got considered by Moro elites a bigger threat than settlers:

The aim of securing power also explains why, in certain circumstances, the Muslim guerrillas are perceived as being more of a threat than the Christian elite, who rule in the neighbouring provinces. Neighbouring Muslim and Christian elites try, as a rule, not to get under one another’s feet, but instead respect each other’s areas of influence. (Kreuzer 2005: 19)

Therefore, local governance is once more the

“domain of the old competing clans with their respective allies among national powerbrokers. This dependence on national patronage and lack of authenticity as a mechanism that provides an even playing field among political contenders (inter-clan, inter-class, inter-tribal, inter-religious), aide from fiscal constraints and lack of capacity, gives the institution a permanent yet transitory nature” (Ferrer 2005: 24)

These permanent structures however get challenged once a more pronounced ideological conflict explanation is able to penetrate the social discourse. This has partly been the case during the early 1970s, when the successes of the MNLF realigned the communities for a short time to a new leadership, and starting from the late 1980s even more so by the locally active Ulama. Thus, as mentioned in the previous period, the national-religious movement became an increasingly ideological problem for the traditional elites.

“Some of [...the powerful Muslim families...] see a danger to their traditional secure position as aristocracy in the ideology of the MILF and reject the MILF version of Islam in favour of a stronger integration of Islam with local practices and traditions, which would also ensure them a dominating role in the future.” (Kreuzer 2005: 18)

Thereby, above all in the core area of MILF operations, central Mindanao, tensions rose increasingly between the ruling Ampatuan-family and the MILF. The Ampatuans have been at the peak of their local power, being a close ally of the President, and controlling in mid-2000 a series of municipalities in Maguindanao, the governorship of this province, as well as of the ARMM altogether. Clashes became more frequent after the Ampatuans blamed the killing of one of their family members to the MILF in 2002 (Kreuzer 2005: 18). Thereby, several dimensions of conflict intertwined and the term “Rido” got prominently included in the local peace research literature (Torres 2007). The substance of the term is a shift towards a focus on blood feuds conducted between different families, rather than political conflicts. The reasons vary:

“Conflicts that have their roots in rido arise from a variety of causes: the electoral system (19.2 percent of cases), land disputes (14.7 percent), livestock theft (10.5 percent), chastity crimes (10.1 percent), and suspicions of different sorts (5.5 percent). A number of studies cite 218 cases of rido between 1970 and 2004, with half of them resolved mainly through mediation. In all, 811 deaths, 369 injuries, 46 arrests, and 6 disappeared persons have been recorded.” (Boada 2009: 8)

The argument is, that often local skirmishes are related to quarrels between local families which get explained in political terms and thus drag in insurgency and government forces, escalating the conflict over the initial quarrel. Thus, if family members engaged in violent confrontations with local rivals are either part of the insurgency or the administration forces, these institutions get involved into the skirmishes. This phenomenon is visible all over Minsupala, where local families compete for influence. Especially dangerous have been election times, which often led to confrontations.

The most outstanding incident involves again the Ampatuans and marks at the same time the meanwhile fall of this family. When a former protégé, Ismael “Toto” Mangudadatu, wanted to challenge one of the Ampatuans for the provincial governorship, his wife’s convoy with the election candidacy documents got ambushed and over fifty family members and media personal killed. In consequence, all the higher echelons of the Ampatuan family have been arrested, awaiting their trials in an ongoing judicial investigation. The plan itself is mad enough, but how could one believe to hide the massacre of over fifty highly visible people in broad daylight after a more or less announced murder? This incidence has a much broader implication, as it was not the action of a single person, but a coordinated action involving tens of people including the highest police and military personnel of the province; thus, the massacre is just the tip of the iceberg; the iceberg itself is the violent system, which brought all the involved people to proceed with the massacre: the close relationship between the Ampatuans and the public armed forces; the key alliance with President Arroyo; the alleged election frauds, in which the Ampatuans’ province, Maguindanao, brought Arroyo the votes for her second term as well as a favourable majority in congress; the Ampatuans’ request, which initiated the Presidential decree allowing the arming of volunteer militias; and last but not least not prosecuted human rights abuses in Maguindanao over years (hrw 2010). However, as shown throughout the last sections, this is no specific Maguindanaoan problem:

“In all five of the Suriin provinces, there is a dynastic political family like the Ampatuans and a hatchet man – or two or three – like Andal Ampatuan Jr. Until Monday, none have been foolhardy enough to slay all their enemies in one fell swoop. The usual modus operandi is to knock them off one at a time and as quietly as possible.” (Tizon 2009)

The biographies provided in McCoy (McCoy 1994) show, that it is not even a Moro issue, but a broader issue of the Philippine state. Nonetheless, in its ferocity, the Ampatuan massacre was unprecedented, highlighting the problems in the ARMM as well, which has been governed by an Ampatuan scion since 2007.

Thus, when new President Aquino announced his plan to postpone ARMM elections and replace the elected officers with officers-in-charge for the transition period, he could count on the support by civil society organizations, which denounced the failed system of the ARMM. The interim-governor Mujiv Hataman was later on called “certified Ghost buster” by the President for supposed exceptional anti-corruption successes. It remains to be seen, if these activities change the structural reasons for failures of the ARMM. Even though announced as a definitively just interim appointment, Hataman, by himself related to a power faction in Basilan, just recently got announced as the President’s favourite in the ARMM governor elections of 2013. Meanwhile, all governors and most of the mayors in the region joined the President’s liberal party, emphasizing the instrumental function of political parties in the region; the families remain the key forces in the local political arena (ICG 2012).

5 Analytical Summary: Combining Structures and Processes in Minsupala

The following analysis will be conducted along a combination of insights from chapter three and four: the graphs from chapter three will be modified to elaborate the integrational and segregational characteristics of each analyzed hegemony project. The analysis starts from the ideational network which allows categorizing social groups as insiders or outsiders, depending on their involvement into the ideational network of the hegemony project. The analysis will then follow in two separate graph sequences the development over time of the network; first inside the group and then of this group in relation to outside social forces. By analysing it over time, it is possible for social groups to switch between inside and outside depending on the time period to be analyzed. The analysis will use the information from chapter four to understand the development from one chart to the other.

To structure the outline and to allow a comparative analysis, we will use thereby guiding questions, deriving from the theoretical framework and presented in the following table:

| | Material Base | Social Ideas | Institutions | Violence | Synthesis |
|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| <i>Integrated social groups and relations</i> | Which network of material flows did the hegemony project encompass out of the complete social network at that time span? | Which ideas had to be handled with by the hegemony project by integrating social groups and relations? Which role play the core ideas provided by the hegemony project's intellectuals in the overall envisaged network? | With which institutions did the hegemony projects cooperate? Which from the hegemony project independent influence did these institutions have on the network? | Which internal violence production structures exist? Which cooperation and confrontations are characteristic? | Which are the social group integrated by the hegemony movement? Which groups actively engage in the hegemony movement? Which groups oppose the hegemony movement from inside? |
| <i>Segregated social groups and relations</i> | Which social groups and relations were excluded from this network and what influence did that have on the material base of the hegemony project? | Which social groups and relations got excluded by the hegemony projects ideas and vice versa, which ideas got excluded or weakened by the exclusion of social groups and relations? | Which institutions were outside the hegemony project, while shaping at the same time the society in Minsupala? | Which external relations are defining the violence structure internally and vice versa (internally/externally)? | Which social groups are segregated from the hegemony movement? How to they engage with the hegemony movement? |
| <i>Political decisions shaping the network</i> | Which political decisions of the leaders of the hegemony project were crucial for shaping the network characteristics regarding material flows? | Which political decisions of the leaders of the hegemony project were crucial for shaping the network characteristics regarding social ideas? | Which institutions were created or crucially influenced by the hegemony project? | Which decisions escalated / deescalated the violence dynamics of the network? | Which influence does the leadership have on the development of the hegemony movement? Which influence the constituency? |
| <i>Political decisions shaped by the network</i> | And which political decisions got shaped by this network configuration of material flows? | And which political decisions got shaped by competing social ideas of the network configuration? | Which institutions shaped the decisions and activities of the hegemony project? | Which external dynamics led to an escalation / deescalation? | Which developments were shaped by the existing network characteristics rather than political decisions? |

5.1 Integration and Segregation Over Time

5.1.1 Liberal-Philippine Post-Colonial Hegemony Project

When the Philippines got independence in a two-step approach with the constitution of 1935 and formal independence in 1946, the liberal post-colonial hegemony encompassed a broad material network, which was above all characterized by the export of local agricultural production via the national capital towards the United States, while investments, aid, and finished goods went the other direction. Energy in form of oil was increasingly imported from the Middle East. To Minsupala, a double network got developed, on the one hand via the integration of local traditional elites into the government system and on the other hand via the resettlement of people and investments. Furthermore, the hegemony supported students, who were critical towards the LP-PC hegemony. The network was thus quite inclusive. However, lowland and highland peasants had mainly to rely on small triple-down effects via the local elites in return for block votes, thus stabilizing local patronage politics; additionally they lost increasingly land towards settlers, investors, and elites. Of key importance was of course the political decision to foster resettlement towards the southern islands; second decision was to integrate the southern communities via elite cooptation, rather than broad social investments; and last but not least the decision to provide scholarships for developing a modern work force was decisive for future developments. These decisions were shaped by the material possibilities provided by the fertile land and seas in the south and by the strong linkages to US administration and investors as global market linkages.

During these years, the liberal modernizing ideas of the hegemony were strongly established throughout the network, including anti-communism, stability and order, and individual entrepreneurship. In the south additionally the idea of frontier colonialism can be added. Alternative ideas to handle with came from two directions: remaining feudal ideas in the south and in the northern countryside; and socialist ideas, first during the HUK rebellion, and above all during the 1960s on the university campuses. The diffusion of liberal ideas in the south was above all facilitated by bureaucracy, settlers, and investors, rather than by organized intellectuals, even though schooling shared increasingly part of LP-PC's attempt. The liberal-Philippines idea was integrating all social groups on the defined Philippine territory; however, it differentiated on a modernization scale, considering people in remote areas as less ripe for liberal modernity. The general oligarchic tendency with its exclusion of lower classes weakened the liberal idea of equality of individuals at birth. Crucial for liberal ideas was of course the development of the Philippine constitution on the one hand and the close cooperation with the United States on the other; meanwhile, the decision to focus on elites led to the acceptance of traditional ideas throughout the countryside. Except from schooling there is no sign of intensified efforts in establishing liberal ideas over alternative ideas during that time.

The LP-PC was thereby engaged in a series of institutions, locally and internationally. Internationally, during the first decades after independence, continuing relations with the former colonial master were stabilized through bilateral treaties with annexed treaty institutions. Furthermore, the Philippines were integrated as a founding member of the ASEAN with neighbouring allies of the US. Internally, the LP-PC hegemony based their ruling not just on

liberal institutions, but furthermore on engagement with traditional institutions. The more formal Adat Law and Datu institutions in the south were thereby as acknowledged as the informal-feudal ruling power of local dynasties in general. The Catholic Church played a key role all the way since the Spanish colony. While LP-PC could use these institutions for its own gain, above all the local institutions were able to prevent the liberal state to penetrate local communities on the one hand and influence national politics on the other. During the post-war era, except from these connected institutions, little influence could be seen from autonomous institutions outside the hegemony project regarding the south. The Communist Party (PKP) was of course influential during the HUK rebellion in the north and student organizations were vocal in the capital, but the only serious challenge for the LP-PC in the south were private armies with their mentioned ambiguous role between being a *supportive* and an *alternative* institution to the state's ambition. While influenced by US advice and pressure, the Philippine government system was in the end the decision of people adhering to the LP-PC project. This included crucially the first-past-the-post electoral system for Congress, the formally strong role of the President, and the unitary state ideology. This institutional setting, and above all its implementation, was, however, too, shaped by the oligarchic interests leading the LP-PC hegemony. While the national decision not to extend the government monopoly on violence was owed to a missing strong national institution of violence – the Armed Forces relatively weak –, it, too, was the reliance of the LP-PC on the oligarchy, rather than a strong centralized social group. This missing national interest supporting the LP-PC was visible in questions of violence as well, relying on international and local structures. Production of violence in the international sphere was done by the US, and even coordinated internal central violence production, e.g. counterinsurgency operations against the communist HUK rebellion, which was strongly shaped by US advisers in support of the AFP. Meanwhile, locally, violence production was dependent on the resources of local supporters/representatives of the LP-PC, i.e. local police, paramilitary forces, and vigilante groups. Parallel, attacks against the LP-PC were less directed against a national body, as being the outcome of attacks between local strongmen. This included the south, where national institutions were long time not involved in the skirmishes between leaders of natives and settlers. Thus, leaving aside the Japanese invasion, violence structures and dynamics were shaping the hegemony from within, rather than from outside. The Philippines' involvement in the Korean War was nominally, while the conflict over Sabah addressed a liberal ASEAN ally, leaving next to WW2 the HUK rebellion as the only serious anti-LP-PC struggle over the period of nearly forty years since the 1935 constitution. Decisions shaping this structure were the reliance on external US military support, amongst others in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty; the decision to smash the HUK rebellion was done in a collaborative anti-communist effort between national and US government. *Indirectly*, the little managed resettlement programmes were responsible for increased tensions in the south, while it was the acceptance of the non-existent monopoly of violence, which was the *direct* responsibility regarding the violence escalation on part of the LP-PC.

Taken together, the LP-PC tried to integrate all people living on Philippine territory. However, there was a geographical differentiation between the periphery and the centre, with de-facto neglect of the periphery and vice-versa autonomy for the local rulers. While a general phenomenon, it was even stronger regarding the native inhabitants of Minsupala. Furthermore, there was a social differentiation, with a strong integration of elites, while lower classes were just connected to the LP-PC hegemony via patronage politics of the local elites. Support and

opposition came thereby necessarily from within. The elites played the ambiguous role of leaders and central proponents of the LP-PC, while at the same time neglecting and even opposing its integrative aim regarding the two mentioned dimensions. Intellectual opposition came from students, at the same time forming part of the LP-PC in scholarship programs, government schools, and universities. Due to the integrative character, there are formally no local outside groups to oppose the LP-PC, but the weak integration of peasants led to the HUK rebellion and there is furthermore a geographic dimension: with an increasing distance from the capital the sense of belonging to the hegemony decreases. While the geographical and cultural differentiations in combination with continuing colonial structures of localism were strongly shaping the weak establishment of the LP-PC, it was above all a missing national LP-PC social group and leadership, next to US advisers, which held the LP-PC in a precarious dependence on the support of local elites.

The transformation during the next period, institutionalized in martial law and 1973 constitution, changed some aspects of LP-PC, while formally still adhering to its principles. Thus, the material relations of the hegemony did not change much under the Marcos regime. International and local relations resembled the pre-Marcos-time, even though Marcos promoted stronger nationalist politics internally and externally. This led to a series of economic reforms, centralizing material power, and the establishment of a stronger national development policy, including infrastructure projects. However, the government still had to rely on local implementation and thus on local structures. A long-term structural change was an increased redirection of material flows toward Marcos core supporter, the Armed Forces, and thus a national institution. A key material change LP-PC had to deal with was the closing of the frontier in Minsupala, which stopped further resettlement programs, and led to hostilities and finally the insurgencies against the LP-PC government. Meanwhile, the regime stuck to the key ideas of the LP-PC hegemony, even though it highlighted the necessity of a stronger modernization effort. Furthermore, law and order were a key topic throughout the period, on base of which other core LP-PC ideas, for example free press and speech as well as habeas corpus, were put on hold via martial law. These developments were expressed in the catchphrase of Marcos' "New Society". Stronger than in the previous decades, opponents to the hegemony were categorized as enemies of society and thus excluded. Several strategies were thereby used. Secessionist ideas in the south were handled with a classical divide-et-impera approach. While parts of the secessionist claims were integrated as local cultural phenomenon, for example by the codification of Islamic Law and the acknowledgment of local royalties, political ideas of secessionism were as violently suppressed as socialist ideas on the national level. By this alienation of a younger generation the LP-PC hegemony admitted at the same time the limited power of the idea of national integration including political opposition during this period. Political decisions played thereby a key role in these developments, first and foremost the proclamation of martial law. It not just limited the range of LP-PC ideas, but furthermore discredited LP-PC ideas in an increasing part of the population. It claimed thereby above all intentions of protecting LP-PC against hostile ideas from outside – secessionism and Maoism – which however, can be doubted at least at the beginning of the period.

The institutions the LP-PC had to deal with regarding the national development remained the same as in the previous period. Regarding the south, two key developments, however, can be mentioned: the role of the OIC as mediator towards the secessionist insurgency, and the in-

creasing bilateral relations between Middle Eastern countries and the Philippines. These two developments were essential in facilitating and concluding negotiations with the MNLF. At the same time, the OIC was supporting the insurgency in diplomatic terms, while financial and military support by a broader group of member states was provided after urge by the OIC. The OIC had the distinct feature of integrating governments opposing a global liberal hegemony as Libya as well as conservative US allies, as Saudi Arabia. Outside the LP-PC were placed the new underground organisations of the socialist and Moro movement: CPP/NPA/NDF and MNLF/BMA, organizing and pooling resistance against the LP-PC. The crucial institutional decision to the previous period has thereby already been mentioned: martial law which extended the role of the President in disadvantage to other government institutions, including local rulers. Clear winners were the national Armed Forces. However, this did not replace the necessity of the LP-PC to connect national and local ruling structures. With no loyal national bureaucracy at hand, institutionalization of national-local relations was based on the informal development of personal connections between the national leadership and local power figures, thus undermining the idea of a strong central state and development of a more modern LP-PC; reproducing previous clientelist politics. On the international level, LP-PC had to adapt to the institutionalization of Islamic governments' foreign policy. However, its pro-relations-politics by developing bilateral as well as OIC-relations led to substantial influence of the Philippine government in these institutions. Before the integrational efforts of the LP-PC towards these external institutions, the latter were rather one-sidedly supporting the insurgency, while during the following negotiations they exerted a moderating influence on the MNLF. In regard to violence structures, the martial law era saw a shift from broad internal violence towards a dyadic power structure between the insurgencies on the one hand and the government on the other. While internal tensions continued, they were kept checked by the martial law institutions. Meanwhile, external relations escalated. Thereby, martial law initiated a vicious circle. It pushed opposition against the LP-PC out of LP-PC's public discourse into the underground and into open hostilities, expressed by the insurgent groups against government agencies. Retaliatory, indiscriminate actions by the armed forces against the insurgency as well as against assumed sympathisers in the wider population led to an even stronger need of the insurgency to concentrate on security issues and assured the support of the broader population in search for protection against the advancing armed forces. The decision to escalate via martial law persecution of the opposition was deliberately taken, even faking a necessary trigger. Meanwhile, decisions to deescalate via peace negotiations and external diplomacy were more the result of external dynamics, i.e. military setbacks and financial constraints.

Summarized, during the first martial-law period, LP-PC saw a sharp decline in the consent-based integrational capabilities of the hegemony, towards peasants and students as much as towards natives in Minsupala, answered by a strong resort to violent integration. This has to be qualified by middle- and upper-class groups, including traditional elites in Minsupala, which supported the law-and-order policy of the regime and/or could use the altered and strengthened clientelist networks. They have been engaged in the LP-PC hegemony next to the Armed Forces. Traditional elites, which were not able to connect to the new clientelist networks, opposed the leadership from within the hegemony, while not joining the anti-hegemonic opposition. Sporadic cooperation with the latter, above all in Minsupala, have mostly been instrumental and stopped after a possibility to connect to the regime's pork barrel network. The explicitly segregated groups were the activists in the two insurgencies; however, indis-

criminate military actions against the civilian population in the countryside led to an increasing segregation of peasants as well, against the continually inclusive propaganda of the regime. The escalating strategy of the regime was thereby deliberately taken. As elections were postponed, no formal support by social groups was needed, even if tacit approval by gaining groups, i.e. protégés including the military, the Catholic Church, and the US, could be considered. Strong tackling of this policy by social groups was otherwise prevented by Divide-et-impera politics, even towards military units. Meanwhile, structural issues like capitalist trade structures and the closing frontier continued to constrain LP-PC's options of exploitation and redistribution, thus the increasing wariness of the hegemony about counter-hegemonic movements from the beginning.

Over the second half of the martial law era, this wariness moved from a focus on the secessionist and Maoist insurgency more and more towards the regime itself. In general, material flows inside the LP-PC hegemony did not change substantially, above all in regard to participating social groups, but it aggravated in terms of material flows. The regime's clientelism was now strongly influencing the country's development, struggling with increasing debts. At the same time, publicity about human rights violations forced the US to reduce military support. Vice versa, while there was no change on segregated groups, social groups at the margins moved increasingly towards the insurgency. The regime's deliberate policy was thereby a crucial element; no essential structural internal or external material network change in disadvantage of the regime could be traced. On the ideational level, little change can be traced in regard to oppositional ideas from external groups, i.e. secession and Maoist democratic revolution, internally the leadership had to deal with increasing opinions, that the New Society is not to the advantage of a LP-PC hegemony. Vice versa, the ideas of a New Society lost more and more support even in its initially supporting social groups. The continuing resort to violence with its peaks in the murder of Aquino II and the rigged elections of 1986 were discrediting its acclaimed protection of the LP-PC. Last but not least it was the supporters' redefinition of the relation between the New Society and liberal ideas, declaring the first incompatible with the second, by local Elites, Catholic Church, and the US, which meant the end of a New Society LP-PC. This failure of the regime to consolidate the LP-PC was expressed in the missing development of institutions in this period. The external institutions were meanwhile continuing their political work, regardless of setbacks by Marcos' divide-et-impera politics. The regime answered by establishing and reviving existing institutions, including legislative elections. However, the visible resort to election fraud prevented the attempt of reintegrating part of the opposition and politics was taken out of the hands of the regime. Focusing on the violence structure, internal conflicts regained prominence, above all against the traditional liberal opposition to Marcos, which considered in retaliation cooperation with the violent insurgencies; during the last weeks of the regime internal conflicts extended even onto police and army units. Thereby, ten years earlier, the regime was able to reduce substantially the military capability of the secessionist. However, the Maoist insurgency got stronger and stronger, even though in the early 1980s, the regime could use its growth to infiltrate the opposition. In the second half of the martial-law era, no political decision towards de-escalation is visible. Reintegration deals with single commanders have to be considered as counter-insurgency tactic. It was this escalation even against the traditional opposition, which together with the fear of a communist revolution led in the end to the removal of the regime by LP-PC proponents themselves during the People Power Revolution. This revolution con-

cludes the general development of LP-PC during this period. Strong LP-PC proponents rethought their support strategy and finally removed the regime as an obstacle to a continuing LP-PC hegemony. Thus, after years of tacit acceptance of the regime, they returned to play an active role inside the LP-PC movement, thus balancing the external opposition to the hegemony. During the end of the regime, they are thereby able to reintegrate part of society, which previously switched to the counter-hegemonic insurgencies. While the secessionist insurgency followed this realignment with benevolence, the Maoist insurgency missed to recognize the substantial change in the LP-PC movement. While the realignment of traditional politicians, the Church, and the US were decisive for the restoration of the LP-PC's hegemonic strength and deliberately taken, they were influenced by the perspective of a switch of the LP-PC constituency towards the support of a social revolution, which would have ended the LP-PC ruling altogether.

The following period is then characterized by the attempt of reworking the LP-PC hegemony. On the national level the general LP-PC material network did not change, even though the regime's patronage network was again replaced by the more fluid pork barrel system in combination with the liberal democratic institutions. Furthermore, small attempts in carrying out a land reform strengthened peasant's income situation at least short term. In the south, the second half of this period following the successful peace process was characterized by an influx of reconstruction and development aid, including the development of a peace industry. This integrated former rebels into the LP-PC network as well as increased the number of engaged international aid agencies. At the same time, criminality became a substantial part of the system. This opened up a new system of material flows: finances in form of ransom, protection money, and private security investments were channelled from local business, international investors, and aid agencies towards organized crime and/or private security, involving local elites, former rebels, and soldiers. Still excluded were the rebels who fought either alongside the Moro splinter groups or in the communist insurgency and thus could not gain from the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF. The decision for a political solution to the conflict in the south was thereby essential for the following influx of investments. The other way around it was the demand for security by international investors, which was a key argument in the President's support of a sustainable peace. Meanwhile, the situation of criminality was amongst other reasons a long-term consequence of the divide-et-impera counterinsurgency tactic employed against the Moro insurgency and neglect of the local people's need. With the new openness of the system, the LP-PC hegemony had to deal again with competing ideas as demands for land distribution and acceptance of indigenous peoples' rights, including demands of Moro rebels and civil society. However, these ideas could be integrated into the liberal discourse for change and modernization. With the People Power Revolution, the LP-PC was able to regain intellectuals, which it lost during the Marcos regime. Vice versa, this reduced the exclusion of social groups, now confined on Moro radicals and the communist insurgency. The decision to open the public discourse by reinstating liberal rights as freedom of speech and political organization was thereby essential to integrate different political ideas of modernization into the hegemony as collective political images rather than opposing them as possible counter-hegemonic inter-subjective ideas. Efforts of integrating previously excluded peasants and indigenous people via political reform programmes were triggered by the idea of the need of government involvement and protection of excluded groups. The LP-PC showed thereby openness to cooperate with external institutions by strong cooperation with

international organizations as the OIC and ASEAN. This reduced the independent role above all of the OIC, which supported previously the insurgency unilaterally again after the failed agreement of 1976. It was furthermore able to integrate the MNLF into the LP-PC via the 1996 agreement, thus ending its secessionist efforts and influence in Minsupala. Still outside the LP-PC remained the Moro splinter groups and the CPP/NPA/NDF, even though part of the communist insurgency switched to civil society or legal political groups, thus integrating into LP-PC. The key new institutions created by LP-PC were on a national level the reinstating of liberal-democratic institutions, including a new constitution, with to a certain degree free elections, and in the south the establishment of the ARMM and later on the SZOPAS, SPCPD, and DDR programs. Important for later developments should be the decision to close the US military bases, while afterwards allowing US armed forces' integration via the Visiting Armed Forces Agreement. Vice versa, the OIC, Libya, and MNLF were crucial in the outcome of the FPA 1996, and civil society organisations efforts extended to the national level. This reduced the level of political violence in the LP-PC hegemony. However, violence still was essential in three areas: organized crime, inter-elite violence, and counterinsurgency violence against Moro splinter groups and NPA. Furthermore, extrajudicial killings and private armies still harassed progressive development. Furthermore, Violence cooperation structures inside the LP-PC became even more complex between factions in the military, former rebel soldiers, private armies and security groups, insurgents and its splinter groups, criminality, and local police. Externally, above all the failed integration of part of the insurgency and the return of Afghan veterans escalated security threats for LP-PC and led to a continuing reliance of the LP-PC on the complex and ambiguous security sector. Obviously, the decision for a renewed peace process with the MNLF led to de-escalation. Meanwhile, the decision not to interfere with private armies, reinstate paramilitary groups, and no substantial peace process with the Maoists led to continuing high levels of violence. On the other hand, above all the influx of Afghan veterans, but as well the re-affirmative policy of the CPP, was not in the hands of the LP-PC leadership. Taken together, the post-Marcos period was characterized by a renewed attempt to integrate most people living in the archipelago into the LP-PC hegemony. This facilitated not just the engagement of elites, but as well via civil society organisation peasants and indigenous people and last but not least former rebels. Extrajudicial killings and violent threats against progressive groups still hindered a stronger inclusive LP-PC attempt. At the edge was organized crime, with strong connections to local LP-PC proponents, while the continuing Moro and Maoist insurgency remained excluded, continuing on their part the fight against the LP-PC hegemony, however, with different strategies from military encounters to community work, highlighting failing efforts of the LP-PC to fully integrate peasants and indigenous groups. The end of the Marcos regime saw again more factionalism in the LP-PC leadership with strong regional turf interests. Nonetheless the leadership was able to come to key decisions, amongst the most important the 1987 constitution and the peace agreement of 1996. Influence by the wider constituency increased due to a general opening and the increase of civil society work. On the other hand continuing regional strongholds as well as international interests forced the national leadership to compromises which circumvented progressive aspects of the new constitution. Similar aspects threatened the 1996 peace agreement and prevented a strong modernization of the LP-PC.

The current period of the LP-PC started with the election of President Estrada, shortly before the turn to the new millennium. The material network did not qualitatively change from the

previous period, even though the Asian crisis marked the end of the golden neo-liberal Ramos years. Quantitatively, internal battles over access to patronage networks increased again during the following presidencies. This is true for Minsupala as well. Here it is above all important to highlight, which change did *not* occur: contrary to the intention of the peace process, the ARMM failed to establish an autonomous network of material flows. The crucial non-decisions regarding this development were based on little interest on a strengthening of the ARMM from all sides, except from the MNLF. It has to be seen if the decision by the current President to reform the ARMM by appointed officers will substantially change the regional system. The previous two presidents followed in their decisions the existing network characteristic, trying to accommodate local elites and the Armed Forces. The LP-PC hegemony had interestingly thereby above all to handle anti-liberal tendencies from within. In Minsupala it continued to accept local dynastic rulings, clientelism, and violent suppression of opposition. The continuing neglect of demands by Moro and peasants led to a continuing strength of the ideas of the insurgencies, and in Moro splinter groups to a radicalization. Vice versa, the discourse of terrorism led to a renewed exclusion of opposing ideas and to a closing of society by equating Moros with terrorists and thus excluding them from the hegemony project. The leadership's activities were essential in escalating or de-escalating this discourse, so by using the terrorism discourse in speeches or by pushing or pulling opposition groups onto or from terrorist lists. The decisions were thereby shaped by international events like 9/11 and the following global wars but as well by internal events like increasing opposition to the ruling Presidents. Regarding institutions, the LP-PC proponents continued to cooperate with regional and global institutions, including ASEAN, OIC, and the US. The International Monitoring Team and Malaysia as main facilitator in the handling of the MILF insurgency have been new and successful developments in stabilizing the political conflict situation. So did several agreements with the MILF, while the MoA-AD failed due to internal LP-PC opposition. Contrary to previous periods there are no signs that these institutions acted independently from the Philippine government in Minsupala. From outside insurgencies and splinter groups and at the edge criminality and local despotism continued to harm the LP-PC hegemony. The latest development was the influence of transnational violence entrepreneurs, who declared Minsupala as training and retreat zone for their violent activities, thus regularly escalating the local conflict situation and triggering a stronger engagement of US troops. The government reacted by creating cooperative institutions not just together with the US, but with the political insurgency as well. Turning to violence, after the deescalating developments in the 1990s, violence production rose again during the current period. The LP-PC leadership even increased the influence of paramilitary groups by legally allowing their arming. The situation remained all in all confusing, with several forms of violence mixing; this included possible connections between transnational groups and local armed groups. Thus, the border between external and internal violence was again strongly porous. The decision by the leadership to switch between "all-out-peace" and "all-out-war" tactics add to the confusion and to an escalation of violence; so did the open embracement of local authoritarian leaders. Furthermore, different interests in the LP-PC movement, from local settler elites, the military, business groups, etc. challenging a weak government led to unclear policies towards the peace process. Clearly from outside, the dynamics of terrorism/war-on-terrorism escalated the situation. Thus, in the current period again tendencies of dissolution of the LP-PC hegemony are visible, with few groups actively engaging for a strong LP-PC hegemony. Ironically, the former Maoist insurgents, now returning to political

parties and civil society, seem to be the strongest activists supporting the LP-PC hegemony. Opposition from the little integrated groups remain stable, with the exception of terrorist groups, independent from the insurgency, which escalate the situation. The missing of a strong national LP-PC leadership, with governments above all supporting their particular interests, weakens thereby the whole hegemony. The constraints in Minsupala remain thereby the same: export-oriented aggro-business and resource extraction businesses in combination with widespread, rent-based patronage-networks.

5.1.2 National-Liberal Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

The NL-AC movement in the pre-insurgency period, at that time still encompassing mainly intellectuals, was connected to a quite simple network of material flows: the proponents derived from lowland elites and peasants; income got generated mainly via scholarships of the Philippine and Middle Eastern governments as well as patronage support from local elites; and technical skills were developed via connections to other student organizations, above all the socialist movement on UP Diliman Campus in Quezon City. There are no accounts on strong material linkages to lowland or highland peasants, except individuals' origin. This is especially peculiar, as these groups have been the main target of the movement's ideology. In return, this meant a heightened reliance on the mentioned external support structures. Although this allowed the movement a rapid rise, it was not the only option, as the development of the socialist movement showed. The decision to rely on external sources, in regard to the ideologies main encompassed social group, was deliberately taken by the leaders of the movement, above all by approaching local traditional elites which facilitated further resources via overseas connections. While there is no possibility to differentiate between genuinely taken and instrumental decisions, the situation at least coincided with just a tacit acknowledgement of the traditional elite's failings. The social ideas of the movement, the Bangsa Moro, encompassed as social groups lowland elites and peasant, as much as highlanders and settler peasants; the latter if they would engage in the revolutionary struggle. The ideas were developed by the intellectuals of the movement and had to compete with a series of different ideas: on the traditional side the concept of local communities ("inged") and families, the concept of ethnical affiliation, and the faith-based definition and equation of Moros and Muslims; on the post-colonial side the idea of an ethnic minority to be represented and developed in a liberal Philippine state. The idea of a secular Bangsa Moro nation excluded obviously the Philippine state, including its security forces and bureaucracy, while as mentioned not necessarily settlers from northern Philippine territory. It excluded on a direct base any further foreign countries, too, obviously not being part of the Bangsa Moro. This weakened above all the influence of core Philippine values as liberal democracy and liberal development on a national level and the integration into the US lead block of the "Free World". It limited, too, the influence of Middle Eastern ideas, as they had to adapt to the local characteristics of the Bangsamoro. Furthermore excluded got ideas of an internal social revolution, connected above all with progressive northern students. Thus, two strategic decisions should be highlighted: the at least nominally secular definition of the Bangsamoro, allowing to integrate all people living on the Minsupala territory, and secondly the rejection of any socialist ideas. For the later, three explanations could be provided: mistrust in socialist ideas as anti-Islamic, adaptation to conservatism of the local population, and prevention of exclusion of local leaders and foreign donors. Meanwhile, there are no signs that at that time the NL-AC social ideas got altered to adapt to the men-

tioned competing ideas. The NL-AC movement engaged with student organizations in Manila and the Middle East. At that time, these institutions had no independent influence on the development of the network in Minsupala. On the local scenery they cooperated with the Muslim Independence Movement. The military arm of the MIM, consisting mainly of private armies of the involved traditional elites, was active in the area without control by NL-AC activists, segregating people along ethnic, faith, socioeconomic, and family lines. Furthermore, a series of institutions shaped Minsupala with no influence of the NL-AC movement: governmental and traditional institutions; this encompasses the complete legal security sector as well. Meanwhile, the organizations founded by the NL-AC movement were still not expression of a singular movement, but rather a series of projects going in a similar direction. Their target was the organization of intellectuals, rather than the penetration of the NL-AC constituency. Even though officially dating back to 1968, the MNLF was no factor at this time. In the MIM the NL-AC movement, considered as the young generation, was an important factor, even though there are no signs that at this time they outweighed the influence of the involved traditional politicians. Vice versa, there are no signs, that the decisions and activities of the movement at that time were related to influence by cooperative or external institutions.

The movement had at that time no direct violence structures under their control, except the indirect relations to the private armies of MIM involved politicians. At the same time, internal violence between social groups targeted by the movement encompassed rivalry between lowland elites, land grabbing against lowland and highland peasants, and land grabbing between these groups; mainly settler peasants vs. lowland peasants and lowland peasants vs. highland peasants. Conflict lines were mixed vertically and horizontally, peasants being involved in private armies of elites against other communities, while others were at the same time victims of these elites. Violence to external constituencies was even worse, i.e. between lowland and settler elites and settler elites against all forms of peasants. Here, the security sector was involved as well, next to private armies increasingly the public security institutions mainly on the side of settler elites and foreign investors. The NL-AC activists were confronted with an in general confusing violence structure, where the shaping between internal and external social groups to the hegemony project had no material influence on the violence structure. Thus, being rather isolated from the violence dynamics of Minsupala, decisions of the NL-AC activists regarding violence were little relevant throughout this period. Just at the very end of this period the decision was taken to pursue military training by a small group of cadres in Malaysia. Vice versa, the increasing hostilities in the region were pushing the movement towards a military strategy, as electoral strategies were not able to compete against a biased system.

Combining these elements, the NL-AC movement at that time integrated in its core above all intellectuals in Metro Manila with traditional elites throughout all three components of social structures. In a secondary way lowland peasants were integrated as well, from which some of the intellectuals originated and which were at the core of the social idea of a Bangsa Moro. In a third layer, highland and settler peasants were integrated into the Bangsamoro idea, however, no material or institutional integration can be seen in time span two. External relations existed to governments and student organizations. In this network, just the intellectuals were actively engaged as an NL-AC movement, while local elites influenced the movement for particular interests, rather than leading it. The actual targeted constituencies, the peasants of Minsupala, were not engaged and little aware of the conceptual elements of the NL-AC pro-

ject, developed outside the region. Segregated from the NL-AC movement were above all government, external investors, and settler Moro-opponents, including vigilante groups. While there was public opposition against the MIM and active engagement of paramilitary groups against indigenous people, political and military struggle was rather multi-faceted and not targeted especially against an NL-AC movement. The intellectuals themselves were at that time not confronted by strong opposition, except riot police during student activities. Summarized, the movement at that time was strongly shaped by the intellectuals' analysis, which again had been triggered by the local situation; but the movement was not shaped in a mutual engagement between intellectuals and constituency. The impact of the movement on the overall constituency was thereby still close to nil during this period.

This should substantially change during the next period. The material network already visible in the previous period stabilized now in a regular pattern, adding to external and elite support increasingly support by local communities in form of shelter, allowance, and recruits, as the NL-AC activists integrated into the local struggle by leaving Manila. Vice versa, the exclusion of government institutions became more visible. An ambiguous field is the wider NL-AC Moro constituency: non-Muslim indigenous people and settlers were integrated in the higher echelons of the leadership and assaults against settler peasants were prevented during some occasion by MNLF commanders; but local violent dynamics pushed settlers towards the Philippine armed forces, augmenting the strength of the opposed Philippine state. The key decisions regarding the material network were thereby taken already in the previous period and not changed during this period, while the decision to focus on the military struggle was forced by the repressive climate created by local paramilitary and government forces during that time. The ideas to be engaged with were thereby the same as in the previous period and there are little signs that neither the leadership spent much time in a stronger dissemination of counter-hegemony ideas nor that the targeted constituency took over the secular definition of a Bangsa Moro, even though the MNLF published its own newspaper "Maharlika". The inclusive framework of a secular definition of the Bangsa Moro got weakened by the de-facto little integration of non-Muslim communities into the struggle on part of the insurgency. The decision for such a framework kept a possible door for settler and non-Muslim indigenous groups open; however two decisions prevented a further integration: the decision to rely on foreign Islamic government support and consequently the necessity to stress a connection between the Bangsamoro and these states via faith. Secondly, and partly for the same reasons, the exclusion of socialist ideas was deliberately taken, even though hostile propaganda claimed otherwise. The necessity to highlight Islamic values and to be tacit on social issues involving local elites was owed to the essential relation to traditional elites and intellectuals from the allied NR-AC movement, while this decision was, contrary to superficial accounts, less related to seemingly Islamic attitudes of the local population. The main institution the NL-AC movement cooperated with was on the international level the OIC and its member states. While they engaged with the issue of Minsupala mainly via the NL-AC movement, diplomatic approaches by the Philippine government opened up new channels of influence for these external institutions. Locally, the NL-AC activists had to cooperate with traditional institutions: traditional elites provided fighting units; with the consequence that the leadership had to share its command towards these units with the local interests of the providing elites. Outside the hegemony project were government and settler institutions, with a key role for the AFP, compared to the previous period. Crucial NL-AC institutions were of course the MNLF and its armed wing, the BMA, even

though shared with proponents of the NR-AC movement. Furthermore the MNLF was able to monopolize its role as Moro representative at the OIC and thus crucially influenced its development. Above all in the later part of this period with the commencing of peace negotiations, however, these external institutions, the OIC in general and the Libyan Foreign Ministry in specific, not just pushed for a ceasefire but additionally forced the MNLF to a switch from the demand of Moro independence towards the demand of autonomy, protecting the territorial integrity of the Philippine state; after the NL-AC movement was able for several years to structure the confusing violence production structures in central Mindanao and the western islands towards a dyadic conflict between the BMA and the AFP. The overall force of this conflict with ten thousands of victims restrained other conflict lines active in the previous period. Military support by external countries was thereby crucial. This included the negative side of international-war like tactics, engaging large platoons against the AFP, leading to vulnerability against the dominant air- and sea-power of the AFP, while the internal structure of shared command over local units led sometimes to communal clashes, undermining the overall strategies. The decision to follow the broad-engagement strategy was thereby essential in escalating the conflict, as much as the decision to switch to guerrilla tactics changed the violence structure. The third relevant military decision in this period was then the acceptance of a ceasefire and peace negotiations. External factors impacting the violence dynamic was right from the beginning the involvement of government forces on side of settler vigilante groups, the following proclamation of martial law, and the consequent deployment of thousands of AFP troops in Minsupala. At the end of the period, external pressure on the NL-AC activists as well as economic pressure on the Philippine regime led to a de-escalation in form of the peace process. Taken together, this was in this analysis' classification one of two key periods for the NL-AC movement. It was able to integrate locally elites and lower classes, as well as intellectuals from the NR-AC movement, all of which actively engaged at least in the military struggle. Furthermore, it could rely on a strong integration of external support. Only the targeted non-Muslim communities could just marginally be integrated, with part of it supporting the government forces, nonetheless the continuingly openness of the movement in its social ideas. The leadership has had strong influence, above all in two ways: it was able to deploy forces to prevent assaults from government forces towards local communities and it was able to monopolize essential material flows as gatekeeper between external support and local insurgency structures. It was thus able to focus the conflict system onto the conflict line between government and MNLF and on the military side the switch of military strategies once the original form turned out to be ineffective. On the other hand the constituency, above all in form of the local elites, forced a clear distinction to the Maoist insurgency in the rest of Minsupala and put on hold any demands of internal social change. The decision to engage in a peace process was meanwhile strongly forced by the overall network characteristics.

This turn from a deliberately driven development towards subordination to structural constraints was characterizing the post-1976 period. The failed peace agreement prevented an opening of material flows from the government, while the factional splits of the MNLF constrained material flows as well; with no additional essential sources to cope. The latter could internationally felt with Egypt and Saudi Arabia switching support to the NR-AC activists and a splinter group of the traditional elites. Essential for keeping NL-AC's leadership in the insurgency was thereby to retain the support of Libya and the OIC, partly by threatening to approach socialist governments for support. Locally, the increasing defection of units engaged

by traditional elites and the monopolization of religious duties by the NR-AC proponents were weakening the NL-AC movement. The political decision to reject the government's implementation of the peace agreement was essential as well as the decision to not accommodate demands of a stronger share of command power with allies in the MNLF, leading to the split. Vice versa, the reduced material network did not stop the NL-AC activists from continuing its military struggle with the government. Meanwhile, on part of ideas, the split brought essential differences inside the Moro movement stronger to light: traditional elites and the NR-AC activists represented by the Ulama and the faction around Salamat Hashim challenged the claim of the NL-AC movement to be the lone representative of the Bangsa Moro. Meanwhile the demand of complete independence was strengthened once again and appreciated by local population experiencing continuingly hostilities perpetrated by vigilante groups and AFP. Stronger autonomy from local elites and the Ulama allowed a more vocal demand for internal social change, even though the movement still had to accommodate its foreign supporters and thus no visible above-local cooperation with the Maoist movement was viable; neither was a public rejection of traditional internal power structures in Minsupala. The same decisions that were responsible for the change of the material network changed the network regarding ideas as well: the split from traditional elites and NR-AC proponents. Meanwhile, there are now political decisions visible caused by new or strengthened competing social ideas. Regarding institutions, externally the developments did not lead to a substantial change, even though first contacts with the national liberal opposition should become important in the next period. Internally, cooperation with traditional elites, Ulama as well as local Imams was severed by the split. On one occasion, cooperation with the NDF was visible, in front of the People's Tribunal; however, the general line of distancing the NL-AC movement from the Maoist insurgency remained intact. This left all these institutions plus the LP-PC institutions outside the hegemony project, influencing society in Minsupala. The movement did not react by creating new institutions but continued to rely on existing ones. Vice versa, no external institutions led to substantial changes of decisions and activities. The violence production structures in the area targeted by the NL-AC movement were thereby confusing as during the pre-martial law period; augmented by the increased violence structure out of the dynamics of the first war-period: political splinter groups were now engaged as much as increased criminal groups; partly related to defections by local commanders. The strength of the NPA in Minsupala increased the necessity to cooperate on a local level at border areas between the zones of influence of the BMA and the NPA. Meanwhile, splinters and defectors engaged in internal skirmishes and added to the general confrontation with the AFP. However, this was due to unclear or overlapping zones of influence, and not due to punishment actions against defectors. External relations did thereby not change the violence structure substantially during this time. For later on an opposite development should be influential: MNLF soldiers engaged in the insurgency against the communist government in Afghanistan. For this period, however, next to the decision to return to war, no decision for escalation or de-escalation in comparison to the first war-period took place; the general weakness of the movement led to the de-escalation. Taken together, the period following the failed peace process was a substantial blow to the attempted integration of a NL-AC hegemony. While still local population, insurgency, and external actors engaged in the movement, quantitatively it was on retreat, while internal opposition led to factionalism and later on open competition. This segregated big part of the traditional elites as well as religious institutions. Meanwhile, attempts of cooperation by the socialist movement

were consistently rejected; which then formed alternative institutions above all among students in the area. The influence of the leadership was accordingly decreasing, while vice versa, no strong influence of the constituency is visible, leading to a quantitative detachment from the local communities. This is enforced by the independent strategies of the concurring hegemony projects.

The People Power Revolution brought the NL-AC movement again atop of developments via the peace process with the new Philippine government. Two developments are relevant: external governments were increasingly reluctant to extent their support to the insurgency, including the NL-AC main supporter, the Libyan government; on the other hand the conclusion of the peace process brought the insurgency into the network of governmental resources, including pork barrels. Thus, local development and DDR programs supported the MNLF leadership as well as rank-and-file. However, the leadership in the MNLF failed to channel the resources in a way to bind the local constituency to the NL-AC movement. Furthermore, while the distribution of resources among the leadership and rank-and-file allowed to compensate for the reduced income via external means, it was little sustainable and once the leadership lost electoral offices it lacked basic resources. Crucial decision during this period was of course the signing of the peace agreement, but above all the following decisions once in control of ARMM and SZOPAD: the focus on long-term development projects based on foreign investments and the support of close followers by diverted government resources left little margin for material flows towards the broader envisaged constituency. The dependence on government means approved by a reluctant congress hindered material flows as well as lacking bureaucratic skills, leading to an inefficient use of resources. The peace process had furthermore above all consequences for the ideational network: the switch from independence to autonomy and the integration into the political system of the Philippines meant an increasing competition with alternative ideas. The leadership of the NL-AC was thereby not able to provide a coherent picture on how a Moro autonomy should develop inside a Philippine state, resorting to classical liberal development policies promoted by the Philippine national government. This excluded at least short-term the core constituency, the Moro lower classes, as well as critical civil society groups; with the latter's exclusion, the leadership lost potential enrichment of its ideal capabilities. The decisions right from the acceptance of autonomy to the liberal development agenda propagated by the Ramos presidency were thereby taken by the NL-AC leadership, following ideas propagated by its opponent rather than from an own system of social ideas. On part of institutions, the most important development was the integration into government institutions. While the governorship of the ARMM and the chairmanship of the SPCPD allowed a strong influence on these institutions, national agencies and provincial and municipal positions remained in the hands of mostly traditional and settler elites, shaping society in a much more effective way than the intermediate institutions ARMM and SPCPD could do. Meanwhile, local communities were increasingly outside the hegemony project, helping the MILF to take over the insurgency leadership. Further splinter and criminal groups had increasing influence onto local communities, above all in areas where the MILF as an alternative was less strong, i.e. on the western islands. While the SPCPD has been especially created, the ARMM had been already installed before. In both institutions the NL-AC leadership had to compromise with other factors, in the SPCPD with settler representatives and in the ARMM with a bureaucracy still loyal to their former traditional elite bosses. Meanwhile, NL-AC violence was limited during this time. Right at the beginning the BMA organized a show

of force with rallies of soldiers throughout Minsupala with the intended effect of preventing a military solution of the insurgency problem, favoured by the AFP and its representatives inside the Philippine government. The following fifteen years, however, remained relatively free of violent hostilities between the BMA and the AFP, with single units engaged in local violence between concurring families. Meanwhile, while direct external government military support ceased, the integration of several hundred Afghan veterans would have increased the military capabilities; which, however, was not used. The peace agreement brought then with it a broad DDR program, incorporating former soldiers into the Philippine armed forces. However, this did not mean a total demobilization of NL-AC forces. On the one hand, splinter groups refused to oblige with the FPA provisions. But even for integrated forces, this meant not necessarily the disposal of private weapons and loyalties to former commanders, now in political positions, remained intact. However, on the other hand there are studies on the success of the DDR programs which highlight, that there were little loyalty conflicts, with former BMA soldiers fighting even against former comrades now rebel soldiers in splinter groups. The underlying decisions were the mentioned show of force, the signing of the peace contract, and the upholding of an unofficial force by the now into the Philippine government integrated leadership. The shortcomings of this second peace agreement led meanwhile to a constraint of the expected de-escalation, as splinter groups continued the NL-AC military struggle or moved to the NR-AC movement altogether, while other units and individuals organized in criminal groups, maintaining a high level of insecurity in Minsupala. Taken together, after the peak of the NL-AC leadership in the first war-periods and the fall in the following period, this period gave the movement another chance, bringing with it several important government positions of Minsupala. However, the NL-AC movement was not able to make use of these changed circumstances. While the integration into the government system met opposition from all sides except the President, on the other hand the movement lost its main supporters in lower classes and civil society groups as well as neglected rank-and-file, leaving the NL-AC activists with part of the insurgency structure, brought into the government system, and diplomatic support from the OIC. Little remained from the former integration; highlighting that previously it was based on a quite instrumental alliance between social groups, rather than a hegemonic leadership; the absence of support after the peace agreement was answered with a switch of allegiance. Thus, the influence of the leadership over the movement remained strong; with the price of reducing the size of the movement considerably. The remaining rank-and-files were meanwhile successful in claiming part of the peace dividend, thus leading to the perception that the MNLF in government was not different from traditional pork barrel politics. The development of the NL-AC hegemony project was of course dependent as well from the overall weakness in a broader network defined by regained strength of the LP-PC, reduced external support, and increasing pressure from the NR-AC movement.

All these factors should lead in the current period to a nearly disappearance of the NL-AC movement. Several lost elections throughout the new millennium cut the NL-AC movement from its previously newly acquired material flows. With external support coming to a hold, the movement was left with little resources, except in some strongholds of western Minsupala, where support from the population remained high and grey areas towards cooperation with splinter and criminal groups evolved. Meanwhile, all other previously integrated social groups were not part of the network any longer. The split from Misuari allowed the C15 faction to retain for short term connection to government sources, but further losses on the ballot boxes

closed these options as well. Only individual MNLF figures, as Muslimin Sema, could evolve into a successful political career, but it is doubtful if these individuals provide continuing support for an NL-AC counter-hegemony project. Thus, neither the decision of Misuari to resort to violence once again nor the decision of the C15 to break with their former leader changed the decline of NL-AC's material network. Only the membership in the OIC still highlights the former strength of the movement. Regarding ideas, there is no strong push of a secular Moro nationalism to be seen any longer, with the current main conflict lines drawn between traditional, liberal, and religiously defined projects. However, the NR-AC movement took over from the NL-AC project the idea of a specific anti-colonial development of the Bangsamoro, differentiating them from transnational Islamic movements. The ideas of a secular alliance of colonially exploited people regardless of faith are present in the progressive movement, while the LP-PC highlights its improvement in the protection of minorities. Political decisions have no visible influence on the development of a NL-AC hegemony project. The OIC has remained thereby the main platform for institutional cooperation, in which the core question remains if and how to integrate the MILF; vice versa, the OIC demands steps for integration between MNLF and MILF, until now with little success other than proclamations of good-will on both sides. The last cooperation process has proceeded with the Philippine government on an evaluation of the 1996 agreement, however, with no visible outcome until now. These institutions, the NL-AC activists cooperates with, as well as all other outside institutions active in Minsupala were shaping society with no visible influence on part of the NL-AC movement. Own institutions other than the splinter C15 group were not founded neither. The MNLF resorted again to violence at the beginning of the period, but although it led over a hundred people death, the activities stopped few days later and ended in the incarceration of Misuari. Local MNLF commands on the western islands remain an influencing force in the violence structure integrated in a local pattern of official armed forces, private armies, and criminal groups. The only prominent decision was the attempt of escalating to a renewed rebellion in Jolo with the mentioned failing. Taken together, the NL-AC movement has been scrambling during the current period with little support left except from local communities in the former strongholds in western Minsupala. While two factions struggle to represent the MNLF above all towards government and OIC, the movement is little visible in the overall social and political process in Minsupala. The two factions furthermore represent different levels, with the C15 encompassing most of the former leadership, while chairman Misuari can count on the loyalty of remaining rank-and-file. While the C15 is closer to the government, Misuari can still count on the support of the OIC, thus giving Misuari a small advantage over the other faction. However, as mentioned, influence of both groups remains marginal in regard to the development of a NL-AC hegemony.

5.1.3 National-Religious Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

Turning to the NR-AC movement, the material network in the pre-martial law period was rather limited. While most of the NL-AC activists relied on Philippine government scholarships, the NR-AC activists were supported mainly by scholarships towards the Middle East; even though part of future NR-AC leaders were inscribed in the University of the Philippines as well. Returning home, like the NL-AC activists, NR-AC activists referred to local elites for support. No differentiation is possible regarding its origin, both, NL-AC and NR-AC activists came from indigenous families. The NR-AC proponents could rely on cooperation with other scholars in the

Middle East, however, little knowledge on political organization could be gained from this cooperation. The exclusion of secular groups led thereby to reduced possibilities of acquiring this knowledge from an alternative source. Three decisions were crucial: reference to external support, similar to NL-AC activists; uniting with the NL-AC activists in a common struggle for anti-colonial liberation; and the acceptance of the NL-AC's leadership. While the second decision was more deliberately taken, the third decision was a reaction on the stronger expertise of the NL-AC activists in political organizing. Different from external perception, returning to Minsupala, NR-AC activists could not build on an already conservative Islamic population, as shown by ethnographic works; they had to compete like the NL-AC movement internally with traditional feudal ideas, adapted Islamic ideas, and strong local belongings. While Islam might have been an easier understandable concept for the local population than the secular definition of a Bangsamoro by the NL-AC project, the definition of Islam differed between the young dogmatic scholars and the local population. As for the NL-AC movement, traditional concepts of leadership were a difficult terrain for the NR-AC movement: while it considered it part of Moro history and culture, their understanding of Islam saw all Muslims equal in front of God. Explicitly excluded were by their faith-based definition of the Bangsamoro all non-Muslim groups, even though the movement sometimes includes the non-Muslim indigenous people into their claimed constituency. In its radical form, this excluded, too, non-practitioners among Muslims. The aim of a peaceful independence got thereby tackled by these exclusions, as settlers and non-Muslim natives became nominally foreigners in Minsupala. The decision to align with the NL-AC activists, however, weakened a dogmatic position during this period. As ideas were not widely spread during this time by the NR-AC activists, there was, however, no necessity neither to alter own ideas. Institutionally the NR-AC movement was strongly based on cooperating with other Moro oppositional institutions as well as foreign Islamic institutions. This included university groups in the Middle East and locally above all traditional institutions and the MIM with their own interests described above. Meanwhile, governmental institutions strongly influenced the development in Minsupala with no influence by the NR-AC hegemony project at that time. The NR-AC movement, similar to the NL-AC movement, was above all successful in creating student organizations, with a limited range towards the targeted social groups. Vice versa, the possibilities and activities were strongly shaped by the cooperating institutions. No autonomous NR-AC violence production structure existed during that time and even the elaborated conflict lines of the NR-AC movement did not cover much of a reality: even though the local population was in disadvantage to settlers and increasingly biased national government intervention, faith played still a small role in the confusing conflict scenario of the 1960s. The decision to participate in military training starting from the end of the 1960s can be regarded as a decision to escalate; however, the overall situation of violent insecurity in Minsupala was already so tense, that influence on escalation was little. Thus, during this time the NR-AC movement was little successful in integrating broad social groups into the hegemony movement, confined on the student activists. They compete thereby with NL-AC and LP-PC hegemony projects over the same social groups. Vice versa, due to their little visibility, there was no active engagement from outside neither. Suppression of radical Islamic student groups in Cairo were probably the strongest experiences of directed force against them. Accordingly, their influence was high on the internal circle of the movement, but low on the general targeted constituency. The same can be said vice versa. The NR-AC movement in this period was still a small group of people in a broad and diverse society.

This did not change much over the second period to be analyzed. By integrating with the NL-AC activists into the MNLF, material networks were shared as well as the relevant decisions (cp. above). The first possibility to acquire own sources came during the peace negotiations, when the regime tried to bribe Hashim Salamat into defection; however, he rejected. In the area of ideas the NR-AC project had obviously to compete with the secular ideas of the NL-AC project. However, as the activities focused on the violent struggle with government forces, the rivalry did not break out substantially. Some were worried about a drift of the alliance towards socialist ideas, but the NR-AC activists could rely on Misuari's fear to lose Middle Eastern support. Furthermore, throughout the communities the NL-AC's conflict definition did not ground, while the faith-based conflict description was present in public discourse, with an increasing dynamic in some war-torn communities. However, the NR-AC activists were not able to influence the alliance's policy any further, part due to the strong hierarchical leadership by Misuari. Thus, the decision to stay in the informal alliance was decisive, but with little outcome for the movement on ideas which would have extended over the NL-AC ideas of Moro independence. The same is thus visible for the institutional dimension: the NR-AC hegemony project was part of the MNLF, however subjugated to the leadership of Misuari, i.e. the NL-AC hegemony project. No independent institutional development of the NR-AC movement versus the NL-AC project made an impact during this period. All the same is true for the violence dimension where no differentiation from the activities of the NL-AC movement described above can be traced. Thus, during the first insurgency period, NR-AC and NL-AC activists were actively involved in violent activities against the government armed forces, with support by local communities in return of protection against indiscriminate violent attacks by the AFP. However, no further development of NR-AC hegemonic structures was visible during that time. The influence of the leadership is thereby small towards the other involved groups and the most NR-AC exclusive development, the religious conflict definition by local population, was advancing independently of its leadership.

This changed substantially during the next period. The failed peace process undermined the NL-AC's core argument for leading the revolution: its political expertise. The split brought with it the necessity to develop own autonomous networks. First, the NR-AC movement failed versus two groups: it neither could attain substantial attention from the Philippine government nor could it pull the OIC onto its side. However, as the OIC represented diverse and internally quarrelling countries, the NR-AC activists, after leaving the MNLF in Libya, could establish good connections to Egypt and later on to groups in Pakistan. Furthermore, they could take over the Zakat, thereby not just tapping an income source, but connecting to local communities via the local Imams. During the latter phase, this became essential, once the NR-AC activists started attempts of community work. In general, the retreat from the armed struggle during the following years reduced the necessity of financial flows. The main setback was the exclusion from the OIC, which left them with a serious void of diplomatic backing and international prominence. The first essential political decision was obviously to break from the MNLF. However, not less substantial was the decision not to copy the continuing MNLF struggle but to readjust the struggle towards reduced military confrontation in favour of community building. The neglects by Philippine and international actors after the split from the MNLF were thereby certainly external circumstances favouring this strategic turn. In the component of ideas it was thereby able to promote its ideas without constraint compared to previous alliance necessities. Nonetheless, the NR-AC movement still had to deal with local ideas not just regarding

traditional and liberal structures, but as well with a different interpretation of Islamic doctrine throughout the local communities including the locally trained Imams. Continuingly excluded were the Philippine administration as well as settlers and highlanders due to the faith-based definition of Moro. Thus, prevalent ideas of social revolution in these groups could not be tapped. The decision not to attack traditional elites directly constraint a more open and radical development of ideas in this area, even though the Islamic scholars, knowing the integralist revolutionary works of for example Sayyid Qutb, were well aware of the shortcomings of the elites' position in society. However, already the teaching of the Ulama undermined the position of these traditional elites, as they until then were controlling the local Imams and via them the interpretation of Islam; while the NR-AC proponents promoted Arabic proficiency to allow individual reading of the Koran. Cooperation with the imams was thereby still an important activity, as the latter enjoyed a good reputation among the local communities and were able to translate and mediate between local believes and the ustadzes' dogmas. Furthermore, as mentioned, on the regional level they continued to cooperate with some governments as well as some Islamic groups with whom links existed since common university studies in Egypt. Outside the influence of the NR-AC movement, liberal hegemony, traditional institutions, and the NL-AC insurgency continued to shape society in Minsupala as well as international relations towards the OIC and its member-states. The most visible institution created by the NR-AC proponents was meanwhile the New MNLF, renamed later to MILF and the armed wing BIAF with offices in several locations of the region, including Egypt and Pakistan. Locally they started to add schools and later on a justice system which paralleled public institutions. Vice versa, the Imams were influencing NR-AC hegemony project's decision by mediating and coaching them towards the local population. Thus, the first time over decades the local communities were the attempted targets of a hegemonic integration based on consent rather than force. Younger generations joined the movement by participating in school and community development projects. Small opposition came from traditional elites which saw their position, correctly, undermined by these newly developing structures. However, there are no signs of serious opposition, neither from inside nor from outside. It seems that during this period the traditional leaders, MNLF, and government did not grasp the revolutionary development under way. Thus, the leadership was able to take decisions deliberately, constraint only by the rejection of some dogmatic measures by the local communities, opposing diametrically local cultural practises, for example regarding gender segregation. The general tension in Minsupala and the suppressing regime hindered thereby a more open engagement as well as political participation.

This changed in the next period with the end of the dictatorial regime. In the first years of this period, it had little effect on the material network. This changed substantially with the peace process of 1996. While maintaining its existing network, the NR-AC movement could now step into the vacuum the MNLF left by integrating into the LP-PC, while at the same time not being able to pull with it the overall constituency. Thus, it could rely on new rank-and-file soldiers, switching from the MNLF, as well as former MNLF target communities, even though strongly concentrated on central Mindanao. Secondly, Afghanistan veterans added to the military capabilities of the NR-AC hegemony project. On the negative side, MNLF soldiers integrated via DDR measures into the AFP and deployed against BIAF forces, were threatening the soldiers will to fight against former comrades. Thus, political decisions did not substantially change the material network of the NL-AC movement but the external decisions of the MNLF did. On part

of social ideas no substantial break is visible, even though the NR-AC programmes were successful insofar as competing traditional and secular ideas were increasingly weakened, allowing a stronger implementation of dogmatic ideas of the *ustadzes*. This excluded however in a stronger way non-Muslim individuals and communities and weakened NR-AC's proposed policy of a peaceful coexistence of Moros and non-Moros in a future Bangsamoro state. The NR-AC movement took further over some elements of the NL-AC movement, becoming now the main proponent of territorial independence; while until then a focus on Islamic renewal of individuals and local communities allowed a softer stance against political-territorial questions, i.e. a possible acceptance of autonomy, the MILF propagated now an Islamic state after complete secession. The political decision to use the retreat of alternative ideas to push for a more dogmatic doctrine was thus shaping the network characteristics. The strength of the movement allowed thereby a reduced cooperation with alternative institutions on the local level, while on the regional level it allowed cooperation with the Maoist insurgency, as nobody would have doubted the Islamic doctrine of the NR-AC movement, different from such credibility problems by NL-AC activists. Furthermore, the NR-AC movement started to engage in elections for institutions of the Philippine government, opening up further pressure points. However, these two developments were just secondary to own institutions, thus not threatening the autonomy of the movement during that period. Still, it had to compete with these institutions in Minsupala as a whole. Institutional developments of the previous period were continued and thus institutional shadow structures to the state, encompassing all areas of social life, were established in communities under NR-AC movement's control. First skirmishes with the AFP after a decade of military abstinence led thereby to a stronger focus on military issues. Above all after the peace agreement of 1996, the BIAF took over from the demobilized BMA. Conflict lines were however again ambiguous, with elite's confrontations, criminality and splinter groups interfering. Furthermore, outside sources pointed at links to regional terrorist groups. Externally, the end of the international engagement in the anti-communist Afghan war, led to stronger violence capabilities, while the skirmishes with the AFP consolidated the position of the Afghan veterans in the NR-AC hierarchy. The decision to return to the battle field was thereby taken by the leadership, even though the end of the AFP-BMA confrontation allowed an easier deployment of AFP troops against BIAF forces and thus an escalation on part of the LP-PC. Taken together, during this period the NR-AC hegemony project was able to consolidate its ruling over local communities, expressed for example during so-called consultative assemblies, gathering hundreds of thousands of Moro, thus highlighting that the NR-AC movement was carried not just by a small group organized in the MILF, but by a broad social base. Internal opposition came increasingly from local elites, realizing the power of this new movement. Externally the national government, too, starting in the 1990s, realized the potential of the movement, enhanced furthermore by the failing peace process with the MNLF. The leadership had thereby a strong role via the established institution while on the other hand regularly consultancies opened possibilities for input by its constitutions. The renewed use of military tactics was thereby shaped as well by the strength of the movement as well as the end of violent confrontation between NL-AC and LP-PC proponents.

In the current period, the NR-AC movement took finally over the leadership of the secessionist insurgency. The material base continued to rely mostly on internal support, including home-made weaponry. Support from international private donors were claimed to be an additional financial source. Supplementary weaponry got acquired on regional arms markets and above

all via middle men from the AFP itself. Any closer relation with violence organizations on a regional level were further restricted after 9/11, but there are no signs that this would have substantially weakened the NR-AC movement. Thus, there are few changes of the material flows of the NR-AC movement during this period and the only decision potentially affecting the network (stronger distancing from regional violence entrepreneurs) had little effect on the supply side. Regarding ideas, meanwhile, there were several changes over this period, due to the ongoing peace negotiations. The NR-AC idea of an Islamic community with a specific local history had thereby continuingly to compete with traditional and liberal-Filipino ideas. Added rival ideas were of a transnational Islamic community overruling local characteristics. Furthermore, changes during peace negotiations occurred, above all the switch from “external right to self-determination” to “internal right to self-determination”, i.e. from secession to autonomy; they were accompanied by hard pressure from all sides. Ideas of the hegemony project were thereby expressed in different terms, depending on the audience, inscribing into different discourses, from Islamic state to Ancestral Domain. The focus on Islam continued to exclude thereby the overall majority of people living in Minsupala; thus, sticking to the faith-based definition of Moro, it had to compromise on the territorial extension of a Bangsamoro sub-state. Even more difficult was this approach towards non-Muslim indigenous people, as they were integrated into the Bangsamoro by the NR-AC movement referring to a joint local history. This ambiguity led to a general mistrust on part of highlanders and settlers against a strong autonomy out of the peace negotiations. Regarding ideas, the leadership took several important decisions in the current period: the distancing from any transnational political Islamic activities; the acceptance of a peace solution inside the boundaries of a common Philippine territory; and the connection to the global discourse on Ancestral Domain. In general, however, the NR-AC movement was able to maintain the core ideas of a future Bangsamoro; it furthermore learned from the failed NL-AC movement to develop its program not just in general terms, but as well in more detailed demands as operational elements of the general NR-AC idea. During this period, the intense peace negotiations with the government let the latter become the key reference institution for the NR-AC movement. Cooperation with the NL-AC activists was little, even though re-union discussions were put every now and then on the agenda; missing success hindered a stronger cooperation with the OIC. Thus, government support from Islamic states in the peace negotiations were by far less important than in the MNLF-government negotiations, even though several were represented in the International Monitoring Team; the key peace negotiations facilitator throughout the decade was thereby Malaysia. During the last years, western countries were increasingly involved, sought for by the NR-AC leadership and incorporated in the International Contact Group. A cooperation agreement was signed with the NDF, however, with little material influence. Last but not least, cooperation with civil society organizations opened up a whole reservoir on intellectual capabilities. This left few institutions outside the hegemony project, encompassing mainly criminal and transnational terrorist groups. A controversial issue is the Bangsamoro Freedom Movement, a splinter group, which still forms part of the NR-AC movement by adhering to the ideas of the movement, but disagreeing with the leadership over the path to proceed. While thus the main institutions existed already from the previous period, above all in cooperation with the government new institutions got developed. Next to different documents and the mentioned international IMT and ICG, the key bilateral institution is the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), a joint organization responsible to monitor the ceasefire agreement and to be con-

sulted for exceptional military movements. Following consultations during the peace process, the Bangsamoro Development Agency and the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute have been established furthermore. Altogether, compared to the MNLF negotiations, external institutions were similarly supporting the peace process, but much less influencing the process as OIC and Libya did in the previous talks with the MNLF

5.1.4 Socialist Tri-People Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

The ongoing socialist hegemony project started parallel to the other two anti-colonial projects in the late 1950s and 1960s, even though it could build on previous experiences of the HUK rebellion under the leadership of the PKP. During this period, two developments run parallel, just to be connected in the following period. The leadership of the future movement was mainly active on the campuses of the islands, with its core at the Diliman Campus of the University of the Philippines in Quezon City. The project encompassed a limited network. While students active in the movement came from a variety of backgrounds, including nationwide traditional elites, further support came from the government in form of scholarship and university employment. Technical skills were shared with students active in the Moro movement, while at the same time knowledge of previous revolutions was incorporated. Excluded from this project was still the main target: the lower classes of the island, thus the developed social ideas were not put into practice yet. Accordingly, there were little political decisions regarding the material network to be taken. In Minsupala, meanwhile, the targeted constituency in the settler areas organized themselves with help of local parish churches in trade unions and co-operatives. While they relied on local support for allowance, technical skills were provided by the local priests and missionaries. The development of social ideas run similarly divided between campus and settler areas. On campus, during this time the most vivid internal discussions were between following a Moscow-oriented revolutionary path lead by workers in coalition with peasants, represented by the PKP, or a Maoist path with its stronger focus on the countryside, favoured by younger generations. The first one had with the PKP a stronger organizational backing among the targeted social groups. A second issue was the Moro question, which was however rather neglected and which developed its own dynamics in circles of southern students. Excluded were above all the liberal state and its elites and thus liberal and above all traditional ideas. The political decision to break with the PKP at the end of the period finally decided the struggle between Maoism and Moscow-oriented Socialism in favour of the first. Meanwhile, in the settler communities, it was Catholic social doctrine and liberation theology, which fostered communal political organization. Institution-wise the students cooperated mainly with the PKP as well as with Moro groups with its own agendas described above. Outside remained government and traditional institutions. Meanwhile, own institutions in form of student and youth organizations were many; the defining foundation however was of the Communist Party of the Philippines after the walk-out of the younger generation from the committees of the PKP. In the south, the Catholic Church was the key institution to cooperate with. Its role was thereby ambiguous, with local representatives active in the advancement of political organization, while the hierarchy in the north was conservatively backing the ruling of the oligarchy. The organized peasants and land labourers had not just to deal with government forces, but as well with private security organizations the elites had at hand. To compete with, trade unions have been created with help of the local churches. The same division was visible regarding violence structures. The organization of the CPP happened

far from their targeted and future areas of engagement. Accordingly, no internal violence production structures existed, and neither was organized violence conducted, neglecting smaller riots during demonstrations with other student organizations and police. Meanwhile, next to economic distress, increasing violence threatened peasants and land labourers in Minsupala. They have evenly been caught by inter-elite fights as well as by direct oppression and eviction by traditional and settler elites alike, with self-organisation and Church the only help. Thereby, activities remained reactive, escalated by increased tension due to the closing of the frontier. Thus, taken together, the future Maoist anti-colonial movement was split in the pre-martial law period in two parts: Maoist students focused on the university campuses in the capital on the one hand; peasants and land labourers organizing by the help of parish churches on the other. The first struggled against police during actively organized demonstrations; the second reacted against elites and allied institutions. While the leadership organized institutions to lead a counter-hegemony struggle, the constituency engaged in daily battles against the hardships in the closing frontier.

It was the next period, which brought them together; and as an active political force into the overall equation of the conflict system in Minsupala. Martial law pushed the students underground, with them following the Maoist strategy by spreading to the countryside, aligning with peasants and land labourers. This process cost time and thus the network was still limited. Outside of this network were government and traditional elites, both threads to the movement. Crucial for the network was the political decision of not seeking external support and favouring the countryside over political activity in the cities. Different to the Moro insurgency, the movement's direct opposition to the elites did not allow them to resort to that social group as a material source. Regarding ideas, the movement had to reconcile Maoist ideas with the Catholic social doctrine and liberation theology, base of the local Parish Churches. While it is difficult to say who influenced whom stronger, the general Maoist ideas of peasants' liberation via a protracted war formed the core of the movement. While elites were continually regarded as enemies, the idea of a National Democratic Front against postcolonial intervention and the Marcos' regime opened a theoretical door for the nationalist bourgeoisie. While this remained secondary in Minsupala during that time, the decision to cooperate with the Churches was crucial in establishing strong links between students and local communities. Further institutions of cooperation were trade unions and peasant organisations. As these organizations already existed before, they could act autonomously, even though government propaganda claimed that they were under the control of the CPP. Outside were mainly government institutions as well as the newly established Moro institutions. During this period, the ongoing institutional structure of the movement has been established: the CPP as a cadre organization with the NPA as military wing combined with civil society organizations under the roof of the National Democratic Front. There are no signs that external institutions directly intervened into the movement's affairs. Violence production structures augmented during this period: not just that students experienced now the oppression against the engaged social groups, but at the same time the political integration led to a coordinated nationwide insurgency against the Marcos regime. The limited violence production structure led during this period in several regions including Minsupala to serious military setbacks and the danger of extinction of the movement. While the Maoist tactic of a protracted war foresaw an escalation, during this period it was mostly the AFP in cooperation with vigilante groups which had the resources to escalate the conflict. Summarized, the key development during this period

was the integration of students, peasants and land labourers, and parish churches in one movement, facilitating a common engagement. Internal opposition came from the same social groups, engaged by elites to suppress the insurgency. Externally, government and elites remained the key opposition, militarily fighting against the movement. The movement's leadership was thereby strong, with the cadre system schooling new recruits towards the party line. However, the targeted social groups had a strong advantage in experience of acting in the countryside. Mutual engagement on the community level thus facilitated constant input by the constituency. From outside, martial law shaped the development of the movement strongly, next to continuing pressure from local rulers.

This did not prevent a strengthening in Minsupala, on the contrary: it led to the movement's peak in the second half of martial law. While the material network in the countryside remained tight and strong, additionally the movement was more and more able to engage in the bigger towns and cities as well. The increasing dissatisfaction with the regime helped thereby to integrate middle class and part of the elite into the struggle against the government. Both developments increased the material network of the movement. The decision to an evenly strong focus on the towns and cities of Minsupala facilitated this influence. Meanwhile, the decision to engage in Moro areas as well as attempts to cooperate with the MNLF were increased, but did not bear fruits and the material network just encompassed little support for leftist activists in those areas, mainly confined to university campuses. Any attempt to extend the network to indigenous lowland peasants was met with fierce resistance from government, local elites, and Moro insurgency. By extending the movements towards previously not engaged social groups, more ideas got integrated into the movement, and above all the strength in the cities led to tactical differences between the Maoist doctrine and political engagement in Minsupala. The exclusion of government and international intervention became a common bond, while core Maoist doctrines were weakened. The decision to integrate more social groups, the acceptance of an increasing neglect of schooling, and the incorporation of alternative political tactics were thereby substantial. In regard to the Moro question, the movement continued to acknowledge the right of secession for the Bangsamoro, however highlighted the common origin, just divided by colonialism, and thus before any meaningful secession, a defeat of the neo-colonial regime was to be achieved. The general institutional structure was thereby not changed, even though cooperation with wither opposition groups increased as well as the support of global solidarity groups. The Philippine government institutions used this situation to focus more strongly on intelligence counter-insurgency measures, leading to infiltrations, exposure, and liquidation of activists. Furthermore, paramilitary groups played an important role in the counter-insurgency tactics. During this period, the movement established a series of new institutions in the Moro areas, however, just short-lived. For the other areas, no substantial change of the network took place. Meanwhile, violence production structures remained high, with some middle class and elite groups increasingly supporting the insurgency due to the pervasion of the government system. While this increased potential support for the movement, the openness made the movement vulnerable to counter-insurgency measures by the government with increasing casualties. The counter-measures taken in form of the Kahos purge worsened the situation and led to a decline from within during the later part of the period. While this escalation was triggered from outside, in general the movement was strong enough to decide on local escalation and de-escalation tactics. Just in the indigenous areas it was not able to protect a social revolutionary movement. Attempts in the Moro areas failed

rapidly. Thus, this period combines peak and fall of the movement. While deepening the integration in the countryside, it could integrate increasingly social groups in the towns and cities, as well; leading to a powerful movement with a revolution within reach. This included increased activities in Moro areas, previously sacrosanct under the domination by the MNLF. However, not prepared to organize this exponential increase in power, internal centrifugal forces increased, too, providing a lever for government's counter-insurgency tactics. Thus, while the leadership had a more powerful movement at hand against the external enemy, it increasingly lost control over it from within. It was, however, an external event which finally brought these weaknesses to the open: the People Power Revolution.

With the discharge of Marcos by its former allies the movement was outbalanced, losing its arch enemy. The opening of the political system was initially not used by the movement and reduced the material network due to the abandonment of it by above all urban supporters. Crucial was thereby to refuse an engagement with the new political system, while at the same time this decision was shaped by hostilities on part of the government against the movement. To compensate losses, resort to revolutionary taxes paid by external investors and politicians increased, leading to an increased split between the wider constituency and the armed forces of the movement. The failure of the movement to lose the control over the revolutionary dynamic to the re-instated elites of the People Power Revolution led thereby to a hostile discussion pro and contra ideological pluralism, escalating into an antagonistic stalemate between reaffirmatists and rejectionists. The exclusion of the latter weakened the internal intellectual work in general and pushed the rejectionists towards cooperation with the liberal government. While the general development of a renewal of the LP-PC project was essential for the development of the movement, a series of political decisions were too: Kahos in the previous period, the general rejection of participation in elections, and last but not least the decision to command a return to twenty year old dogmas. This again alienated followers at the margins, reducing possible cooperation institutions, including global solidarity groups. Thus, institutions shaping Minsupala were increasingly outside the movement, while no new institutional structures adapted to the changed historical situation; while the new liberal institutions were a counter-argument to the continuing resort to the protracted war strategy. With the split of the movement, violence production structures split as well, with splinter groups organizing at the geographical margins as well as in the former urban strongholds of the movement. While the Moro groups were tolerant towards defectors and splinter groups as long as they did not interfere into continuing political business, the socialist movement reacted violently against defectors and assumed traitors, increasing internal conflict lines and hostilities. This escalated the violence dynamics as well as the increasing use of violence to acquire material support. Externally, the continuing hostilities by government institutions as well as paramilitary and vigilante groups, including extrajudicial killings, kept violence in the struggle on a high level. Altogether, this period was the most difficult for the movement, missing the challenge to adapt to new circumstances with fierce internal fights over the right way to proceed between reaffirmatists and rejectionists. In general, activity inside the movement thus reduced, with many activists defecting due to frustration and fear of internal rivalries. This way, more and more people were segregated from the movement, either not fitting as a whole social group into the Maoist doctrine or as individuals with the dogmatic approach of the leadership. Vice versa, a considerable part of activists left the movement and joined the liberal government, its agencies, and liberal civil society organizations. If they were continually sup-

porting broader aims of the movement, including a more social and fair development of the Philippines, they rejected the leadership's claim of the movement over these issues as well as the protracted war strategy as the path towards these aims. Thus, the leadership decided for a strengthening of its control of the movement's institutions over a possible stronger integration of sympathetic social groups. Meanwhile, the regeneration of the LP-PC project and its strength to integrate liberal-leftists ideas and groups, while continually suppressing radical opposition by violent means, was a serious distress for maintaining the movement's role in the overall development of the country.

In the current period, the Maoist movement could regain part of its strength and adapt to the changed circumstances. The material network could thereby extend to resources acquired by aboveground social and political work, including the winning of electoral positions. Thus, the movement was able to regain the support of social groups among students and progressive urban social groups, while excluding the national government executive and external liberal groups including international investments, multinational financial organisations, and US troops continued. Even in the Moro areas, new possibilities opened for leftist civil society organisations, with local Maoist activists returning. Crucial was thereby the decision to reopen the movement to urban areas after the dogmatic interlude in the previous period. The new openness and integration of aboveground tactics increased the amount of competing ideas, but at the same time it was thus able to integrate social groups along a series of different political topics. In the areas of indigenous lowlanders and highlanders, this encompassed the tripeople-approach. Two topics continued to be central, even for groups not adhering to the Maoist doctrines any longer: a rejection of US troops on Filipino soil and the struggle against landlords and national administrations. Both issues triggered conflicts between the socialist tripeople movement and Moro movements: US troops are regarded by some Moro groups as the lesser evil compared to the AFP; and peace negotiations proceeded on part of the Moro insurgency with little consideration of Filipino national politics. Crucial during this period was the increasing engagement in civil society and legislative government institutions, triggering the mutual development between different progressive ideas. Vice versa it can be said, that the core movement's institution followed the example of some splinter groups during the previous period, moving towards governmental institutions. Accordingly, new cooperation possibilities with other institutions opened up. This included civil society groups as well as party lists and legislative institutions, all of which engaged with their own programmes on the Philippines. National and most local *executive* institutions remained meanwhile outside the movement, and with it landlords and private armies. Peace negotiations went on and off with no substantial results up until now. While the core institutions remained essential, new institutions were opened up, from a series of civil society organizations, in Moro areas mainly active in peace, awareness, and development activities, to different party lists. However, continually decisions were shaped inside the movement with little possibilities for intervention by external institutions. This included the new alliance with the MILF, which was interesting news, but with little consequence for the struggles of both organizations. Nonetheless this new engagement in aboveground struggles, the protracted war strategy has been continued throughout the last years, and although some setbacks, the AFP were not able to defeat the NPA. In places where the NPA continued its successful community integration programme, they enjoyed far-reaching support. In other areas where the government combined military struggle with development programs for distancing insurgency and local population, some NPA units entered a

vicious circle compensating lack of support by extortions, alienating local communities even further and so on. The material strategy of autarkic local reproduction under increasing pressure in local communities is thereby a wider problem, blurring the lines between revolutionary support and criminality. In the Moro areas, there are no violence structures of the movement visible. While the movement is less prone on military activities with a general openness to peace negotiations, it remains an essential feature of the movement for two external reasons: dynamics in local units of revolutionary war as a professional activity with a necessity of reproduction by violent activities; and by external security threats against even aboveground activists; above all in provincial towns and countryside, including harassment and extrajudicial killings. Combined, after the schism in the previous period and the dogmatic closing of the leadership, the current period has seen an opening of political strategies, bringing with it the possibility to reach again wither social groups. Next to the core activists in the long-standing institutions of the movement, increasingly important are again intellectuals engaged in civil society organizations and activists in leftist party-lists. This does however not mean that the previous split is forgotten; serious fights between the different factions continue to haunt the movement. The opposition against the movement from outside is thereby ambiguous: while legally allowing aboveground political activities of the movement, above all in the periphery AFP and paramilitary groups financed by local elites suppress any visible direct opposition violently. The leadership is still in command of the core institutions, but has lost its absolute control, which it envisaged in the previous period by referring to a dogmatic approach. Civil society organisations might be able to forge a new mutual relationship between leaders and the constituency. Next to own developments, it was the combination of a more open political system and an increasing dissatisfaction with the performance of liberal democracy which rejuvenated the socialist movement, a framework to last over the next years.

5.1.5 Non-Project in a Crisis of Hegemony

In this last comparative part we combine all social groups essentially linked to crisis situation and violence production, taking part in local rulings, while not providing a broader political project. They derive mainly from the local elites, which due to colonial intervention lost their hegemonic rule over the region; latter on splinter groups have to be added. As has been seen in the previous chapters and will be analyzed in the next parts, there is no coherent hegemony project to be associated with these groups. Thus, different from the previous sections of this chapter, the following paragraphs will above all highlight the diversity of the network in a conflict situation, rather than a possible hegemony project. Furthermore, the analysis starts with the development of the crisis in the 1960s, rather than independence.

While the crisis of the 1960s undermined the quite stable integration mechanism of traditional elites into the Philippine government system during the previous decades, it nonetheless was an opportunity for some elites to enhance their material network. The anarchic situation of the early crisis allowed them to put their violence capabilities in use to expand their territorial possessions. They kept thereby connections to the Philippine government and the local population as well as to settlers. Crucial was thereby the decision to restrain from cutting connections with the Philippine government. The challenge was thereby to handle the balance between anti-settler and thus anti-Filipino sentiments with a continuing engagement with the Philippine administration; this added to the existing tension between political positions in a

liberal state and traditional local rule. The general idea remained of representing a cultural minority in a development process to bridge the antagonistic ideas. There are no signs, that this bridge instead of its individual parts, traditional and liberal ideas, had any importance for their connected social groups, local communities and national government. Similarly to the liberal project, no social group was explicitly excluded, as long as they did not reject the traditional elite's local rule. The essential characteristic of this rule was thereby vice versa, not to reject any ideas, but suggesting themselves as mediator between different ideas. Accordingly, the traditional elites cooperated with government institutions as well as with local traditional institutions, including the Imams, which were financed and thus controlled by them. Cooperation with Middle Eastern institutions underlined their Islamic heritage, even though collaborating with a Christian state. Thereby, they were able to function as a gatekeeper, restraining strong autonomous activities by these institutions in the local arena. At that time the only institution outside their network have been settler elites which established during the crisis their own social networks. Additional institutions were created in form of private armies, complementing their power in the other institutions. The creation of the MIM, adding to the private army of ex-governor Matalam an ideational justification, was just short lived, and rejected as soon as the network link with the Philippine government got repaired. The traditional elites could thereby resort to a violence production structure encompassing these private armies, complemented by paramilitary groups and local police forces. Meanwhile, the Philippine Constabulary was rather supporting settler elites, which encompassed a similar violence production structure in their zones of influence. Cooperation and confrontations were thereby not statically defined, but were the consequence of alliances of particular material interests with little influence of ideological positions. The decision to resort to violence to solve conflicts but as much to actively expand own interests escalated the violence dynamics in the 1960s in Minsupala. As outlined above, the ongoing moving situation of settler and investment influx was thereby the underlying social dynamic, while the actual triggers were perceived threats and opportunities, not the least election days. Thus, the traditional elites engaged in a broad network encompassing all social groups and institutions active in Minsupala; while at the same time this network was constantly changing with intra- and inter-social group rivalries on part of the elites. While individually threatened by these dynamics, no organized opposition against their role as a social group in the network can be seen. The core decision was to remain as gatekeepers between opposing blocks, developing out of the structural changes in Minsupala, being flexible to engage with different sides and disengage at other situations, as highlighted by the MIM/Matalam example. While the overall development, i.e. resettlement and investments, had a decisive impact on the situation in which the traditional elites had to act, no single social group could broadly push the elites during this decade in one direction, with any serious challenge answered by direct violence.

This changed to a certain extent during the next period. It started thereby with an extension of the material network. The traditional elites connected to the future leadership of the insurgents and used foreign connections to Sabah and the Middle East to facilitate material influx into the local arena. The bypassing of their gatekeeper position by the insurgents, with the latter directly connecting to the future patrons, sidelined them, even though still participating via local commandos. From government side, the increasing role of the AFP delimited the role of local violence entrepreneurs under the control of the elites, decreasing their role in the local violence sector. The decision to support the growth of the insurgency was thereby essential for

the future material development, even though with a negative impact on the traditional elites' local position. Meanwhile, the overall escalation of tensions, the proclamation of martial law, and the deployment of strong AFP forces were out of reach of political influence by these elites. This losing of control can be seen on the levels of ideas as well. While secession has been an easy used word by Matalam, it was never conceived as a serious option since the end of the US military campaign in 1913. The re-definition of Moro, replacing Muslim Filipino, and the open pursuing of secession by the insurgents seriously undermined the propagated role as mediators of the traditional elites as well as the position that liberal development under their leadership would be the only option for Muslim Filipinos. Meanwhile, any open following of the insurgents' rhetoric would have jeopardized their role inside the Philippine system. Thus, the idea of the traditional elites as mediators got sidelined in the increasingly political conflict between a Bangsamoro insurgency and the Philippine government. This development took place outside the influence of the traditional elite's decisions, in government meetings and academic circles, even though their toying with independence in the MIM was risky in the first place. Meanwhile, they continued their strategy to cooperate with all existing institutions involved, cooperating with the MNLF as well as government institutions; some of the traditional elites became Philippine representatives in the new diplomatic missions in the Middle East. However, similar to the developments in the other components, in this component they got sidelined as well, even though they were still controlling local government institutions; which however lost influence in comparison to the insurgencies' shadow state and the Philippine national level onto local developments. Thus, the AFP as well as the MNLF, and with it the OIC and its member states, were increasingly out of the traditional elites' realm of influence. They tried above all towards the insurgency to react with the creation of own social institutions by reinventing traditional-feudal positions with the support of the Marcos regime, even though the Philippine republican system denied any traditional titles. As said, this was tied to the overall development above all of the violence production structures on the islands. While they kept their high levels of own production structures and thus played still an important role, above all by providing recruits to the insurgency, their influence decreased due to the rise of additional violent capabilities in Minsupala on part of the insurgency and the AFP. The developing dyadic conflict reduced thereby the influence of the traditional elites to escalate or de-escalate in an already strongly escalated conflict. Thus, taken together, the escalation of the political conflict threatened the gatekeeper position of the traditional elites, as the Philippine government as well as the Moro insurgency were able to integrate social groups on each respective side, opposing each other in open warfare. While this reduced their essential position in the network, they were still used in a variety of tasks at the fringes of the political conflict and continuingly the elites were safe from direct attacks from liberal or revolutionary side. The key feature of this period is however their weakness in the effectiveness of own political decisions, with losing the gatekeeper position and being now just one of several decision makers at different tables, including the MNLF's central committee and Marcos' administration.

The failing of the peace agreement of 1976 and the subsequent renewal of the confusing pre-insurgency conflict system brought them back into the game. With the political conflict parties facing serious legitimacy problem, with no one winning the war, the elites could establish themselves again as strong partners in the local arena. The material network got extended to external support, with Saudi Arabia supporting the elites' backed break-away faction of the MNLF as well as patronage provided by Manila for each defecting MNLF unit. This recovered

some of the funds which insurgency and government directly channelled to the area outside the elites' direct reach. While these developments were strongly influenced by the failed peace agreement, the decision to diminish the support of the MNLF and to strengthen connections with the government was important. The government's program of defectors-support pushed these decisions. While the ideas the traditional elites' faced in Minsupala increased due to the factionalism of the insurgency, those lost some of their power with the schism as well as the insurgency could not define the single framework of anti-government opposition any longer. Thus, the elites' position as mediator could gain again some strength, adding to the pre-insurgency role of mediator between Muslim Filipinos and settlers as well as national government the idea of peace-facilitators between insurgency and government. This development on the side of ideas was again stronger influenced by the overall network dynamics rather than political decisions of the elites, except from the break with the insurgents' central leadership, which was next to the NR-AC break a strong blow against the attempt of the NL-AC leadership to represent a unified Moro movement against the Philippine government. This realignment towards the government can be seen on side of institutions as well, with most elites leaving the command structure of the MNLF until the early 1980s. With the political conflict continuing on a lower level, the relevant institutions, AFP, MNLF/BMA, and MILF, were still outside the control of the traditional elites, even though their weakening increased the possibility of the elites to influence them. The attempt, to take-over the insurgency by the foundation of the BMLO was meanwhile unsuccessful. With the peak of the political conflict passed, the level of violence reduced in the Moro areas of Minsupala and the internal production structures integrated under the control of traditional elites gained relative strength during this period. These structures were able to prevent severe hostilities by local AFP units against local communities under their influence as well as influx of BMA forces, if against the interests of the local rulers. The decision to split from the MNLF was as crucial as defections towards the government; the first led to the diminished influence of the MNLF, the second allowed the legal preservation and increase of violence capabilities. Decisions to escalate and de-escalate were again strongly influenced by local interests, rather than the overall political conflict in a general environment characterized by a continuing insecure local situation on a lower level of escalation. Thus, altogether, the traditional elites were back in their key role they played during the early crisis years in the 1960s, spanning their network towards all social groups involved in Minsupala. While the involvement of AFP and insurgency diminished their relative position in the local network, the continuing security threat added to the demand of local protection, provided by the local elites on exchange terms. While anti-elite opposition increased with the split and a slight radicalization of the insurgency as well as due to spillovers of the nationwide Maoist insurgency, the traditional elites were still no main target of any political force. The effectiveness of their decisions rose again, shaped by the split of the insurgency and the consequent reduction of military government efforts in the area.

The next period saw the rise of a more essential opposition, even though the post-Marcos period provided new income sources. The immediate People Power Revolutions period was a setback, as the Aquino-government replaced all Marcos-loyal government officials with own people. However, this development could be reversed along the following elections and the renewed peace efforts provided new material flows: influx of peace-related investments, the establishment of the ARMM, and an extension of the security market to protect wealthy international organizations. The takeover of the ARMM and SZOPAD by the MNLF blocked these

channels just short-term. Crucial was thereby the continuing cooperation with the national level, agreeing even to the provisions of the peace agreement of 1996. Meanwhile, additional crisis profiteers outside the immediate political conflict emerged, following a development starting with defections during the last period. Local former soldier units, government as well as rebel, started to use their violence capabilities in kidnapping-for-ransom activities. This business was characterized by a sophisticated labour division: intelligence on potential victims, provision of equipment, kidnapping, transport and accommodation, bargaining for ransom, and finally the exchange of ransom and victim. Different local groups were thereby responsible for these tasks, including regional elites, functioning mainly as investors. Increasing organized criminality in combination with increasing activity of international agencies expanded the demand for security services and thus the market dominated by local elites. Meanwhile, on part of ideas, these elites and their multi-faceted combination of different social ideas came under pressure from the increasing success of the NR-AC movement. Their integralist, community-based Islam undermined the traditional elites' argument of an essential connection between traditional ruling positions and Islam. The elites responded with denouncing the dogmas of the ustadzes as contrary to local history. Thereby the challenge increased to represent loyal liberal state representatives and devote Muslim leaders at the same time. Meanwhile, local violence entrepreneurs, while not presenting political manifests, represented some form of social banditry, legitimizing their activities by denouncing the state's lack of support, while furthermore bound by local kinship. However, no decision to crucially change or develop social ideas can be traced during this period. The elites continued thereby to cooperate with government and rebel institutions, augmented by cooperating with new external aid and business organizations, and by providing security, becoming again an essential gatekeeper for activities of these institutions in the local arena. The insurgencies continued to be outside the direct influence of these gatekeepers. Additionally, the traditional elites lost local Islamic institutions to the NR-AC movement: Islamic schools were established and/or led by the Ustadzes; and the local Imams, traditionally chosen, accommodated, and controlled by the elites, cooperated increasingly with the Ustadzes. The traditional elites did not respond with own institutions. Looking at the violence production structure, the peace process decreased confrontations between MNLF and AFP, but in general could not facilitate a decrease of the overall violence situation. Two phenomena were essential: the mentioned increased organized criminality and an increase in inter-elite rivalries in a general dynamic social situation. Essential was thereby the relation between the traditional elites and violence entrepreneurs: their private armies, local police forces, and loyal AFP and insurgency commandos and paramilitary groups. This security situation is defined by no central decision process to escalate or deescalate, but a diversified spatial spectrum with constantly changing levels of escalation and de-escalation throughout time and territory, owed to the ambiguous crisis situation and following decisions of small local groups. Taken together the war profiteers gained from the de-escalation of high-level violence during the peace process as much as from the continuing precarious security situation. Meanwhile, the grassroots-based successes of the NR-AC movement increasingly threatened their ruling position in the local communities and consequently in their relation to the government as elected representatives of the Muslim minority. Nonetheless, there was still no open critique on their ruling, except from exponents of the small ST-AC movement, allowing the elites to continue to influence local developments to their advantage.

The last period sees a deepening of the developments outlined in the previous period. With the security situation continuingly bad, and the failure of the new politicians/former rebels in the governmental system, they could tighten their local position and control most of material flows in the area, only threatened by a possible far-reaching peace agreement with the NR-AC movement. Until now, the traditional elites could rely on a series of partners in Minsupala and on the local level preventing such a development towards peace. Meanwhile, on the ideational level, opposition increased from the NR-AC movement and civil society, denouncing corruption and the use of violence by the traditional elites. As in previous periods, the traditional elites answered with claiming to be advocates of peace and order, while again no crucial change regarding ideas can be seen. Thus, while supporting President Macapagal-Arroyo throughout the first decade, they switched allegiance to her fierce opponent Aquino Jr. after his election to president. With little regard for fixed political ideologies, the traditional elites cooperated with all existing forms of institutions active in Minsupala, with the constraints outlined above, i.e. the increasing autonomy of Islamic community-based institutions. No own essential institutions have been created except changing alliances between individual elite groups over the region. The violence production structure altered little for the war profiteers, even though the involvement of US troops constrained possibilities on the western islands of Minsupala. Continuing kidnapping-for-ransom activities are an indicator, however, that the broader system is still intact. Even though private armies and inter-elite rivalries became under stronger public scrutiny, there is little effect to be seen on their actual performance. On the contrary, the presidential authorization of arming volunteer forces increased the military power of local rulers. Good connections to the national level furthermore eased these local violence entrepreneurs from problems with national agencies and just the Ampatuan-massacre got too far, so that the AFP had to intervene under national and global public pressure. Like in the previous period, no central decision has been taken by the local elites to escalate or de-escalate, but rather a day-to-day usage of the weaknesses and irregularities of the social system. The decision of the Ampatuans to escalate in 2010 was thereby the only one gaining public attention. Summarized, the current state of this non-project in a crisis of hegemony is quite stable, involving broad material, ideal, and political networks without a single project which others could oppose. This is possible due to the continuing crisis situation, which is just threatened by a far-reaching peace agreement under the leadership of the MILF. However, until now the MILF did not directly attack the traditional elites. The outcome of the ongoing peace process will be essential and it remains to be seen if the traditional elites are able to adapt as they did in the decades before. While there is no overall leadership of this non-movement, the control over local dominions is high, just threatened by escalating dynamics of inter-elite rivalries. The involved constituency has thereby little influence on the elites' development, which is rather defined by the overall structural changes and the ability of the traditional elites to use the crisis.

5.2 Comparing Hegemony Projects

In this second section of a comparative analysis of the empirical outcome, the same questions as in the previous section will be asked; however, tracing the developments over the previously separately analyzed time periods and thus highlighting the conflict dynamics regarding the different hegemony projects.

5.2.1 Liberal-Philippine Post-Colonial Hegemony Project

The main challenge for the LP-PC hegemony attempts in Minsupala has been to integrate the social groups of the islands in a vertical as much as horizontal way. The material flows were thereby qualitatively quite stable over the whole post-colonial period, with two essential exceptions: resettlement and international investment programs changed the socioeconomic structure of the islands entirely. Thereby, LP-PC struggled with facilitating a strong integration. Above all lower classes were excluded from the material network, multiplied throughout indigenous lowland and highland communities, while the traditional elites could attach to national patronage networks. This pork barrel system categorized the system throughout the analyzed periods, preventing the implementation of LP-PC ideas of market-driven modernization and rejection of local feudal dependences to strongmen's patronage. Until now, no attempts by national leaders have been successful in changing these characteristics. Essential decisions were their favourable regulations for international investments and the resettlement programs towards Minsupala. Equally important was the decision to make use of and thereby accept local power structures to implement material changes. These decisions were vice versa shaped by a missing social group with interests on a dominantly national rather than regional level. The economic structure of punctual export-businesses rather than internal value-adding networks led to little interests of horizontal integration on part of the elites; thus, national power remained mainly important for influencing rent-sharing quotes.

Liberal-national ideas have thus been throughout the periods rather weakly expanded over the territory, connecting and accepting traditional feudal social ideas not just in Minsupala, but throughout the countryside as a whole, were local dynasties undermined liberal ideas of free and fair elections. The idea to fight fire with fire and implement liberal ideas in a modernization dictatorship under the Marcos regime failed, leading to an increasing strength of alternative ideas and finally to the abrogation of the experiment. The more LP-PC failed throughout the years to fulfil its integrational attempt towards all social groups, the stronger alternative ideas became in these excluded groups, so in the student and peasant groups as well as in the indigenous communities of Minsupala, on a broad scale during the Marcos era, but in shorter periods during the post-Marcos presidencies as well, maybe except the Ramos era. The more intolerant LP-PC was against alternative ideas, the stronger got the underground/external counter-hegemonic opposition. Throughout the post-Marcos era, there seems to be an increasing openness towards alternative ideas and consequently more possibilities for alternative ideas to influence the LP-PC hegemony, as seen in acceptances of demands for cultural diversity, ancestral domains, and political autonomy for minority groups as well as small land reform programs to the advantage of peasants and land labourers.

Traditional and global institutions were thereby the main external references for the hegemony. Thereby a correlation exists between independent influence of local dynamics and neglect by LP-PC, and vice versa, the stronger LP-PC engaged with institutions, the more influence it had over the role these institutions played in the overall hegemony. Obviously, engagement came with the price of compromises. The later however, were strongly dependent on the political capabilities of the leading forces. The insurgency institutions withdrew meanwhile from the LP-PC and shaped Minsupala in their own way. Throughout the decades, the hegemony created thereby different institutions to tackle the challenges. After the first attempts on cooptation of resistance by integrating the local elites in Minsupala failed in the 1960s, the regime

reacted with martial law, i.e. a stronger command and violent approach. When these institutions pervaded the hegemony project altogether and nearly led to its collapse, a renewal was attempted with the constitution of 1987 and the peace agreement of 1996. Since then, national leaderships went back and forth in using more open, reform-oriented or closed, command-oriented aspects of the institutional setting. The expected institution to come is a peace agreement with the MILF. In general, an ambiguous handling of institutions can be seen over time: all broad and strategic institutions, encompassing organizational elements and regulations, present universal strong liberal-democratic elements; however, the implementation of these strategic documents via operative legislation, presidential decrees, and bureaucratic execution constraint the strategic openness in favour of rulers' particular interests. The leadership was thereby strongly trying to comply with regulations, while at the same time bypassing its constraints by using legal loopholes. A case in point is the regular attempt to find a way to extend the re-election limitations for presidents⁴⁴.

Even stronger than in ideological and material terms the hegemony project struggled with centralizing violence production. Externally, until today the Philippines rely on the United States' security provisions. While this relation is quite clearly regulated, regarding local violence structures, legal and illegal structures form in combination a broad grey area. This was shortly interrupted by the martial law regime. Before and afterwards, inter-elite rivalries and local despotism based on private military armies in combination with the operational control over local police forces lead to a detachment from national violence control. Was in the pre-martial law in Minsupala the resettlement and investment activities the key driver for violence structures, it is in the post-martial law era above all local turf-wars, opposed investment projects, political violence, and post-insurgency organized crime which deteriorates the local security situation. The insurgencies are thereby the moments blamed for the necessity to accept some of these local violence structures. While it was the decision to violent measures against the early rebellions which escalated violence in Minsupala, it was on the other hand the decision not to act against local violent rulers, which kept throughout the periods the violence in the periphery on a high level. The possibility to acquire external support allowed thereby above all the Moro insurgents to respond in the escalation dynamic with the government.

Taken together, the hegemony was able throughout the last decades to integrate all social groups of the island with different levels of success. It can thereby be observed, that integrational efforts were successful when local differentiations were tolerated, but at the same time combined with consent-oriented integration programs. However, integrational success was always limited, and finally the hegemony relied on the consent of the traditional regional elites and/or the middle classes in the capital. In the post-Marcos era, a still limited, but stronger integration of intellectuals and lower classes can be observed. Vice versa, the more violent-based and intolerant integrational efforts were, the more social groups detached from the

⁴⁴ While on the local level this normally can be achieved by installing a relative on the position or switching relatives between two positions, the singularity of the presidency position as well as the competitiveness with other elite families prevents on the national level such options. Thus, except Marcos, who used martial law, all such attempts via constitutional changes failed. A grey area is the two-term presidency of Macapagal-Arroyo. She got her second term by claiming that for the first term she was not elected but merely followed President Estrada as former Vice-President after his ousting.

hegemony and supported counter-hegemonic movements. This was the most structural failure of the Marcos regime and underlines the substantial effect which leadership decisions from the resettlement programs to the peace agreement of 1996 had. The influence of the wider constituency was thereby always limited, with the political decisions been generated between interests of international and local elites. Meanwhile, the LP-PC leadership, as far as existent, struggled throughout the analyzed periods with the overall network characteristics, i.e. path dependences on international and local levels: strong US connection and export orientation and local strongmen, keeping LP-PC's institutional zeal, unity of the islands expressed in all constitutions since 1935, a struggled territory.

5.2.2 National-Liberal Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

Meanwhile, the NL-AC hegemony project could rely quite early on from a complex material network with substantial resource inflows. At the same time was this network less based on mutual material exchange than on unidirectional flows, leaving the movement's leadership with a strong gatekeeper function, however completely dependent on external material flows. With the break of the alliance, the NL-AC leadership lost its monopoly over this function and thus the leadership over the rebellion. The peace process and the take-over of the ARMM governorship was a second option to retain a unique gatekeeper position, however in a multi-level government system, which led finally to the loss of this position through elections won on other levels of government. The favouring of integration of external donors over the local constituency was a constant pattern from the early attraction of Middle Eastern funds up until the negotiations with international investors during the control of the ARMM. Once external material flows reduced, the movement struggled. This was a deliberate decision of its leaders, giving priority on military security over community integration. The constant threat by the Philippine armed forces was thereby of course an essential influence up until the peace process. This argument does not count in the post-1996 periods, pointing during the ARMM governance to a lack of skills and above all to a lack of concrete social ideas how to establish an autonomous Moro system in a Philippine state.

Right from the beginning the movement was thereby in a competition with alternative ideas. In retrospect, the idea of a secular Bangsamoro nation never extended far, with emphasizing Islamic values towards external donors and the acceptance of traditional structures internally. Thus, the core ideas might have played an internal role inside the insurgency, but had little effect in the broader constituency. The lack of development of ideas could be seen during both peace negotiations, where the output could not become a compromise between two different systems, but an improvisation between the detailed Philippine government systems and the broad categorical demands of the NL-AC leadership. The acceptance of alternative ideas, to not endanger the own leading role, was thereby as crucial as the little investment in disseminating ideas towards the core constituency by the leadership. The decision to not engage with socialist movements internally and abroad, the acceptance of autonomy, and the decision for large development programs after the 1996 agreement were thus more related to the influence of alternative ideas rather than an NL-AC doctrine.

The strength of the leadership thus resulted less from the attractiveness of its social ideas or a unique material position, but from its organisational skills to balance interests of different social groups opposing the Philippine government and engage successfully with relevant

institutions internally and abroad. Just the later engagement with the Philippine government failed, losing out against stronger institutional actors inside the government network. Even though integrated by the NL-AC movement, all cooperating institutions never ceased to continue their work aside the NL-AC institutions towards their constituencies, leaving them in a continually strong position once they stopped cooperation with the NL-AC activists after the failed 1976 agreement. Government institutions remained excluded until 1996, the splinter groups starting from 1976, and the socialist institutions throughout the process, except from the early beginnings, when cooperation facilitated the acquirement of organizational skills on part of the NL-AC leadership. This was all bundled in the MNLF, which was chaired by Nur Misuari since its foundation in the late 1960s/early 1970s, even though several attempts first by splinter factions in 1977 and then by government-close second-row leaders at the beginning of 2000 tried to oust him. While the Philippine government institution as the main enemy played a crucial role as institutional opponent, throughout the time the OIC was the strongest reference for the NL-AC movement.

The main success of the MNLF was thereby seen regarding the local violence structure: with its organizational capabilities and political drive it was able to use external resources to structure the confusing violence situation in the pre-martial-law period and bundle it to a strong anti-governmental force during the early 1970s. It could during this time count on a broad alliance in the production of violence against government forces. With the failed peace attempt of 1976, this achievement lost power and internal confrontations opened up. During the following periods, the NL-AC movement was not able to structure the violence system any longer and the political conflict had to adapt to a series of concurring conflict lines. Thus, skirmishes with private armies and other factions as well as communal violence added to the battles with government armed forces. The DDR programs after 1996 did not end the internal violence production structure altogether, but it seriously reduced its geographical extension over Minsupala, leaving for the current period small strongholds in the western islands of Minsupala. The external support from foreign countries as well as private armies from traditional elites was right from the beginning essential for the upholding of a strong violence production structure, and vice versa its step-by-step reduction a serious problem for maintaining the strength of the insurgency. The five key decisions to escalate and de-escalate the conflict were thereby the going underground in the early 1970s and the return to war in 1977 as well as in 2000, while the willingness to engage in a peace process previous to 1976 and 1996 de-escalated the situation. The first of these five decisions was thereby strongly tied to the decision to connect to foreign support, allowing a rapid deployment of military forces against the Philippine government. A de-escalating effect had of course the government's decision to engage in a peace process as well, and above all during the early 1990s the unwillingness of all parties maybe except from the Philippine military establishment and some factions inside the MNLF, to continue to engage in a military struggle; to mention above all the business interests in the government and external MNLF supporters, including Libya.

Wrapping it up, the NL-AC hegemony project tried to integrate a broad front towards Philippine domination over Minsupala; internally and externally. However, this integration was based on mutual interests, while a hegemonic integration did not extend over intellectual strategies and the composition of the leadership. Nonetheless, this constraint inter-communal violence in the areas of strong influence of the movement. However, once mutual interests

could not be satisfied by the movement any longer, its leadership was questioned and the broad integration scrambled after the failed 1976 agreement. In the following years, active engagement vanished and internal opposition grew as well from traditional elites as well as from people engaged in the NR-AC movement. The peace agreement of 1996 was a lost opportunity to regain the overall leadership in the struggle against the LP-PC ruling over Minsupala by integrating civil society and the broader population of Minsupala, leading to the final decline of an organized NL-AC movement. Throughout the decades, the NL-AC project explicitly segregated just two sets of actors: Philippine national government institutions and socialist activists. While the first answered with counter-insurgency violence and peace negotiations, the second sought unsuccessfully cooperation during different periods. The influence of the leadership was thereby throughout the decades strong over the higher echelons of the movement. Meanwhile, its influence over lower rank-and-file and the wider constituency depended on its monopolized gate-keeper function regarding material flows and security. Increasingly losing this position in the second half of the 1970s, the influence weakened steadily and could neither be regained through the post-1996 years. Meanwhile, the broader constituency had little influence on the leadership's decisions, with one exception: the rejection of any idea close to social revolution by the leadership was based on the expected loss of internal and external support. Taken together, the leadership's closed functioning allowed consistent decisions with little deviations over the decades; at the same time this made the movement vulnerable and dependent on external network characteristics, over which the leadership had little influence and on which it just could act reactively. Thus, in the end, external developments have overtaken the NL-AC movement altogether.

5.2.3 National-Religious Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

Even though the NR-AC movement was integrated in a material network relying on strong foreign support before and during its cooperation with the NL-AC movement, as well, it switched tactics after the split and worked on a strong autarkic network in the following periods, based on local contributions regarding finances, allowance, shelter, and recruits, augmented by global private financial donations. Afghan veterans added to military expertise, while weaponry got acquired from local and regional markets. Cooperation with transnational violence entrepreneurs was never substantial and further limited after 9/11. Excluded from this network were non-Muslims throughout Minsupala and in some areas local traditional elites as well as NL-AC followers, too; limiting material support. The decision to detach from foreign government support was after the immediate split the consequence of continuing support for the MNLF by the OIC, but latter on considered as explicit policy to detach from foreign influence on own political decisions.

Similar to the NL-AC the NR-AC movement has struggled with the question on social reform. While implicitly present in NR-AC social ideas, it has never been addressed loudly, consequence of the key role of traditional elites in local society. NR-AC activists had thus to deal with these traditional ideas, strongly present in Minsupala. Furthermore, through its alliance with the NL-AC activists, ideas of Islamic renewal were put back in favour of anti-colonial joint resistance against the Philippine government. Later on, free from the constraints out of this alliance, local interpretations of Islam were the main internal challenge, while in the current situation, competition with different models of implementation of the right-to-self-

determination is the strongest internal struggle. Nonetheless, until now the intellectual leadership in form of the Ulama was able to abide by its core ideas. While the rejection of the Philippine government is shared with the NL-AC movement, the faith-based definition of the Bangsamoro excluded settlers and non-Muslim indigenous people, complicating a territorial solution to the conflict, thus weakening a possible acceptance of autonomy by local population in Minsupala. While the decision to ally with the NL-AC activists in the early 1970s and the integration into the military struggle weakened the dissemination of NR-AC ideas throughout the islands, the following decision to break with the NL-AC leadership and focus on community work turned the situation and facilitated a strong integration of NR-AC ideas throughout the targeted constituency. The long-term approach allowed thereby reducing compromises as well as putting short-term compromises in relation to long-term goals. Thus, the influence of competing ideas onto political decisions was reduced considerably.

The NR-AC activists were thereby throughout the struggle open to cooperation with all relevant institutions in Minsupala, even with the otherwise in central Mindanao and the western islands shunned NDF. While these institutions acted independently in the area, long-term the NR-AC movement was able to strongly influence them, except from the main MNLF supporters. Thus, while the NR-AC movement excluded more social groups from its hegemony project than the NL-AC movement, it rejected few institutions. The split in 1976 led to tensions with the NL-AC activists; however, these tensions became irrelevant with the decline of the NL-AC movement. The stronger role of the movement in the insurgency and the global pressure following 9/11 led to a distancing from criminal and transnational institutions, which continuously use the insecure situation in Minsupala for their own operations. The NR-AC activists created after the split from the MNLF with the MILF and the BIAF institutions similar to the former MNLF, but with a stronger role for internal religious institutions formed by the Ustadzes. In their camps they were afterwards able to develop enough institutions to form a shadow state based on the NR-AC social ideas, including social services and justice institutions. The peace process added then additional institutions to facilitate a development towards a peace agreement, with the latter the currently sought-for outstanding institution. Meanwhile, the creation of splinter groups highlights the current challenge for the leadership, to maintain the movement's institutional integrity.

Regarding violence, the movement shows an interesting break after the split of 1977, after previously taking part in the military struggle against the Philippine government. With the autarkic strategy, violence production structures had to be newly established up until the re-entry into the violent struggle in the 1990s, supported by returning Afghan veterans. It never had the strength of the fighting force which nearly defeated the AFP in the early 1970s; on the other hand the developments after the wars of 2000, 2003, and 2008 show the sustainability of its structures, restructuring rapidly after what always appeared as essential victories for the AFP during the skirmishes. The alliance with the MNLF as well as the split, with the consequent detachment from foreign government support, threatened thereby military capabilities of the NR-AC movement, while connections to other regional insurgents, above all in Afghanistan, helped develop the BIAF. The decentralized approach with the strength of local commanders is thereby a serious challenge for the political struggle and the political leadership. Up until now the involvement of the NR-AC leadership in the skirmishes following the abrogation of MoA-AD in 2008, were local commanders clashed with AFP units, is unclear, while the activities of the

Bangsamoro Freedom Fighters are against the expressed will of the leadership and a serious problem for the peace process. Previously, decisions to escalate and de-escalate were quite deliberately taken by the leadership, i.e. the retreat following the split, and the re-activation mainly in mid 1990s, as well as the peace process starting from 1997. Meanwhile, the wars of 2000 and 2003 can strongly be related to activities of the AFP, even though the movement was blamed of being inactive against criminal and terrorist activities in their areas of influence.

Taken together, the NR-AC hegemony project integrated mainly Muslims in Minsupala, with an extension towards non-Muslim indigenous people in a second layer, and a vow of tolerance towards settlers. The integration of elites into the NR-AC movement is thereby as ambiguous as for the NL-AC movement. Through a strong focus on community work, the NR-AC leadership could activate mutual relations and activities by the targeted social groups. Opposition derives, starting from the scrambling of the NR-AC/NL-AC alliance and throughout the previous years of strength, increasingly from local elites, fearing an undermining of their position. Meanwhile, highlanders and settlers are increasingly worried about the movement, with global discourses on war on terror and political Islam adding to the general prejudices. The influence of the intellectuals, the leadership of the MILF and the Ulama, is strong in the NR-AC movement. However, the strong relation to its constituency and the incorporation of civil society organisations allows influence by the constitution as well, even though its extension is debated. While at the beginning the movement depended strongly on outside developments and just could connect to ongoing developments and network characteristics, following the split from the NL-AC activists, it was increasingly able to long-term shape the network to its own advantage. The peace negotiations demand adaptations and it remains to be seen whether the movement is able to prevent the destiny which the NL-AC movement experienced fifteen years before.

5.2.4 Socialist Tri-People Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

Meanwhile, the development of a socialist-tri-people hegemony project is even more ambiguous throughout the last four decades. Similar to the NR-AC movement, the socialist movement tried to rely on autarkic material flows. After the initial stage of separate origins the movement could establish a strong connection between students and peasants and land laborers, lasting over the following decades. More ambiguous were urban areas, where support was strong during the peak of the anti-Marcos struggle in the early eighties, but faded after violent in-fights and an opening of the liberal system in the following years. Meanwhile, the movement struggled to establish a base in the Moro areas even during its strongest times. The current opening towards the liberal system and aboveground engagement in civil society and politics opened up new possibilities all over Minsupala, including in the Moro areas. The exclusion of wealthy social groups as well as foreign governments hindered the movement above all in the beginning to establish rapidly a strong material base. Thus, the key political decisions over time were the attempt to establish a local material network encompassing just the social groups targeted by the overall hegemony project; the integration of the wider anti-Marcos opposition; the renewed closing after the People Power's Revolution triggering the internal split; and finally the reopening in the new millennium. While these policies allowed a strong self-reliance, it led above all at the beginning to the threat of physical elimination of the movement.

On part of ideas, there was the constant necessity to handle the integration of socialist theory and local knowledge and world views. This encompassed furthermore the role of Catholicism, cooperating with parish churches and missionaries. Additionally, parallel to the changing material network, a stronger opening of the movement brought with it the necessity to handle additional ideas. These encompassed above all demands for a stronger role for urban areas, which in dogmatic Maoist strategy remained confined to be support zones for the struggle in the countryside, as well as the question if to participate in liberal elections. In the Moro areas the movement additionally had to act on the question of internal colonialism and the role of non-Christian beliefs in a revolutionary society. The dogmas of the leadership remained thereby strong over the decades, leading to the current intellectual critic of neglecting the developments of social structures over the last for decades. While not intentional, the cooperation of liberation theology, Filipino nationalism, and Maoism was a heavy burden for activists trying to engage in Moro communities. The concentration on a strategy of protracted war in an area defined by other insurgencies was furthermore limiting the possibilities in the Moro areas. Crucial decisions for the component of ideas were the break from the Moscow-oriented PKP towards a Maoist framework, the integration of liberal theology via the parish churches, and the publishing of the reaffirmatist document. Currently it remains to be seen if the opening towards urban areas and elections updates the stance on ideas as well. Above all in the Moro areas it could give the movement via civil society and political groups a lever to introduce social questions into the Moro debates.

Institutionally, the Maoist movement was an expert in cooperating with existing institutions, above all the lower branches of the Catholic hierarchy, trade unions, and farmer organizations. While they acted independently throughout the decades, its integration into the National Democratic Front allowed a mainstreaming of progressive ideas. Thereby the movement had to compete over the time above all with government institutions, but additionally with private institutions above all connected to local elites, i.e. private armies and vigilante groups. In the Moro areas, competition got furthermore enhanced by the existence of NR-AC and NL-AC institutions. Meanwhile, the mentioned NDF in a triangle with the CPP and the armed wing in form of the NPA proved to be an effective way in guiding the revolutionary movement. The further extension towards political parties and smaller society organizations after the People Power Revolution improved possibilities to attract above-ground sympathizers but at the same time challenged clear-cut decision making-procedures. While initially, the movement was still influenced by the PKP, its split helped to develop an autarkic decision making procedure with little external institutional pressure.

The internal violence production is similarly based on autarky. While this led nearly to an early annihilation of the movement, it proved sustainable over the following decades. Violence is thereby mainly used against AFP units and by the movement convicted elites and vigilante groups; even though in the latter decades violence against defectors and splinter groups was denounced in public by the government, media, and former comrades. Cooperation with the Moro insurgencies in overlapping areas of engagement was constantly happening on a low level over the decades, as well as with revolutionary movements abroad, even though both are not essential for the overall struggle. Accordingly, external relations have never been defining internal violence structures, while vice-versa the concentration on internal violence structures might have prevented a more successful engagement in the other areas of engagement.

Where the provision of support for the revolutionary forces was demanded against the will of the supporting communities, the used violence harmed the overall movement; so did the violent purge in Mindanao during the 1980s. Decisions to escalate the political struggle in a Maoist guerilla war was a programmatic point of the movement over decades, while it was organizational capable to escalate and de-escalate in certain areas at certain times. Meanwhile, the necessity to acquire support by local population escalated when the population refused shelter or allowance; in an environment characterized increasingly by a stick-and-carrot strategy of the AFP. The main external escalations were related to decisions of the AFP.

Taken together, the movement was successful to integrate its core social groups, socialist intellectuals, small-scale farmers and laborers with a rather clear-cut line towards outsiders, above all in comparison to the rather open movements of LP-PC and NL-AC. The repressing features of the Marcos regime further enhanced integration attempts, including liberal-democratic opponents of the dictatorship. However, the increasing openness of the LP-PC became a problem for the movement as it was not able to discuss new options, developments, and alternatives in a productive way; the schism was the logical consequence. Thus, while the movement is still strong in its different embodiments, it has lost its integrated structure. Segregated from the group are above all the landed elites, and with the latter's influence government institutions. While there were peace attempts throughout the last two decades, the main form of engagement is military struggle and subduing, above all during the Marcos era. Land reform programs by the government tried furthermore to distance the core target social group from the movement's institutions. Meanwhile, the successes of the movement could not be extended to the indigenous areas, even though individuals with indigenous background engaged in the struggle. Attempts during the height of the movement in the 1980s were crashed between the different opponents. The opening of the political system and the stronger engagement of civil society organizations allowed the tri-people approach to work in Moro areas. The influence of the leadership has thereby been strong over the decades, with two constraints. On the one hand, the leadership's influence was based on a close connection to local communities, thus mutual learning and decision making procedures. On the other hand, above all with and after People Power Revolution, the leadership lost its influence due to a fragmentation of the movement and an increasing importance of above-ground politics. This allowed a stronger influence and autonomous decision making procedures for smaller units. The movement is thereby shaped by its opposition to the general oligarchic structure of the Philippines. Furthermore, the characteristics of the Marcos regime allowed a strong and specific engagement, expanding to an alliance of different spectrums of society, while the following openness of the LP-PC hegemony reduced these possibilities, coming back during escalating crises of the LP-PC system.

5.2.5 Non-Project in a Crisis of Hegemony

Concluding now with the war-profiteers, we can see them maintaining their position at the centre of material flows in Minsupala, combining all different social groups and institutions active in the area. Their position as gatekeeper has been challenged mainly by the political conflict, i.e. by the insurgency movements and the AFP. Accordingly, at the height of the insurgency during the first half of the 1970s, their influence on the material network was the weakest, compared to the other periods. The peace process could have threatened the mate-

rial influx, if the insurgency would have been able to develop a new material structure, which however failed. Meanwhile the continuing volatile security situation and the increasing development of a peace industry allowed the expansion of the security market, with further material flows to the advantage of the traditional elites on both ends of the spectrum: private security services and organized crime, mainly kidnappings-for-ransom. No social group was thereby excluded from the network, even though with different intensity and characteristics. The insurgency was thereby the most ambiguous group, with support from the elites during their heydays while increasingly excluded after the schism. The essential decision of the traditional elites was thereby throughout the decades to engage in material networks with no pre-defined ideological friends and foes, while vice-versa the weaknesses of integrational efforts in Minsupala in combination for the demand of coordinating compliance put them in a gatekeeper position, allowing this broad engagement with different entities.

This made it necessary to handle different social ideas, partly antagonistic to each other. Thus, the traditional elites engaged ideas of traditional “sanctified inequality”, Islam, and liberal development; they supported secession as well as counter-insurgency, mostly but not necessarily during different times. Thereby, there is no sign that a coherent own idea got developed after the end of the hegemony broken by colonial intervention. The picture of a mediator of peace between different stakeholders in the area might express their portrait self-understanding, even though not explicitly used. Thus, all social groups could find their connection in the speeches of the traditional elites, while it necessarily had to exclude dogmatic ideas, threatening their mediating role, and with it proponents of such ideas. This encompassed above all social revolutionaries and later on the Ustadzes, even though in the second case until now mutual neglect was stronger than active struggle. Crucial was thereby above all the non-decision for a single ideology but to support different ideas in front of different audiences. Vice versa, the point is even stronger: there are no signs that any of the main social ideas propagated by the hegemony movements was able to strongly influence any of the traditional elites’ decisions.

Similarly to structures in the previous two components, traditional elites cooperated with all institutions active in Minsupala, except socialist movements. This includes government and insurgency institutions, splinter and terrorist groups, international agencies and donors, organized crime, and religious authorities. While these institutions at times bypassed the control of the elites and directly influenced the area, most of these organizations were outlived by the elites. The institutions developed by the NR-AC movement currently challenge the traditional elites in their heartlands, but here future developments can not be projected yet; the AFP is one of the few national agencies next to the President to act independently on local developments. For all other institutions, the traditional elites act as gatekeepers. This leaves literally no institution outside the network of traditional elites, even though as mentioned the influence over the NR-AC institutions gets currently lost, and with it one of the essentially connected institutions, the local Imams. While being effective in working with the most diverse institutions, there are no own institutions of relevance created over the last decades. The MIM and BMLO were crucial expressions of alliances at time, but never had the institutional effect of accompanying hegemonic structures and smoothing historical changes, as they were both short-lived. There does not even exist an institution organizing the interests of the elites, even though constantly renegotiated alliances allow them to push for own interests, as currently

against a too far-reaching agreement with the MILF to their disadvantage. While this flow in and on existing network structures is strongly influenced by the development of the network itself, there were no substantial, irreversible decisions taken on external institutional pressure. The acceptance of Cory Aquino's Officers in Charge after Peoples Power Revolution and Misuari and further MNLF members as lone candidates for ARMM positions were outstanding externally pushed decisions; however, on the long view just short setbacks.

Next to their essential ability to coordinate and engage with different political actors and social groups, they are characterized by a strong influence on local violence production. This does not just include own violence forces in form of private armies, but indirectly control over local police forces and paramilitary groups, as well as influence on single units of insurgency and AFP. They could maintain this control throughout the decades, even though accepting a reduced influence during the peak of the military insurgency in the first half of the 1970s and reduced control over the Philippine constabulary, i.e. the military police, in the pre-martial-law era. The development of organized crime with the increasing fragmentation of the insurgency did not threaten but rather enhance further influence on the security market. As with the other components, cooperation is indiscriminate, while confrontations exist with local opponents in civil society or non-compliant communities and individuals. Meanwhile, inter-elite rivalries are an essential confrontation, indicating that there is no other confrontation militarily threatening these elites as a whole. The broad external relations allow thereby the resort to violence in material as well as in institutional ways, legitimized by their role as mediators focused on peace and order. Thereby, the only historical decision to escalate the conflict-situation in Minsupala was the support of the insurgency in its early years. Meanwhile, the reproduction of this escalated conflict-situation is strongly influenced on a series of local decisions to escalate by using violence to process own interests. Vice-versa, there is no substantial de-escalation project which would have altered the local situation as a whole. Similar to the other components, external dynamics and shortcomings were responsible for the constant low security situation, with the war profiteers showing a high performance to use it to its own advantage and reproduce it by providing violence services.

Taken together, the traditional elite's non-project in a crisis of hegemony addressed the broadest possible network in Minsupala, integrating social groups along common material interests, essential demands towards the gatekeepers, and their violence capabilities. With no political project, there is neither a movement for the support of the war profiteers, nor is there a strong movement against them. Meanwhile, by integrating into different hegemony projects they are able to push them to their own advantage. This is a second point on how public opposition gets prevented right from start. Only civil society organizations and the socialist movement openly attacked the position of traditional elites, answered by violence on part of the latter. Meanwhile, the currently most serious opposition comes from the NR-AC movement. While publicly being tacit about the role of the traditional elites in a future Bangsamoro, the community-based activities of the movement undermine not just the role of the elites in these communities but with it strap the elites from its main bargaining moment towards government institutions, a potentially essential threat. While no single leadership exists with the mentioned in-fights, the influence in each respective region of influence is high towards all involved partners, while above all the local constituency has limited influence over the decisions of the traditional elites. The outstanding characteristic is thereby the non-existence of

essential political decisions, with the traditional elites being able to follow the development of the network, balancing different aspirations, and influencing as gatekeepers the developments to their own advantage. They brought the art to make own history on historical structures to perfection.

5.3 Empirical Answers

Taking all this information together the project can try to give some answers onto the empirical part of the research question. This was the question on why the religious movement on the southern Philippines got prominent in the last decades, taking over the leadership in the ongoing struggle from a secular-nationalist movement, while the nationwide socialist insurrection has struggled to integrate the Moro movement into their cause? This complex of questions should be answered along seven topics, with the first three following the historical development: the relation between the NR-AC and NL-AC movements at the onset of the struggle, the reasons for its split, and the following strength of the NR-AC movement during the last two decades up until now; fourth and fifth part discuss two issues relevant for both movements individually: the question of democratic participation and the change from secessionism to autonomy during peace negotiations; the sixth part discusses the mentioned challenges for the socialist project; and the last part addresses an inductively derived problem: the continuing crisis and its profiteers.

5.3.1 Limitations

The answer to the research question in its surrounding context has thereby to be evaluated under its general limitations, of which three should be noted here. These limitations should not devalue the results of the study, but should be kept in mind when using them for future research projects and eventual policy advice.

First, the specific developments of the analyzed area: while every historical development is obviously unique, thus not qualifying generalizing science, some broader issues have to be addressed. The Philippines were the only US colony in Southeast Asia; all other regional colonies had different colonial masters with a different, specific colonial history. Furthermore, the Philippines experienced two different colonial masters, with the previous Spanish crown strongly influencing the social development in the northern areas of the future nation state, while containing the development of the southern parts. Secondly, the organized and negotiated independence process with parallel implementation of liberal institutions under the control of the colonial master has led to institutions formally ready to connect to the global liberal hegemony. Thirdly, the late integration of Minsupala into a Philippine nation and furthermore the extensive resettlement programs led to internal conflicts, exceeding standard remarks of “wrong” post-colonial boundaries. Nonetheless, this does not per se limit the trial of hypotheses in other contexts with at least some similarities, for example regarding the integration of peripheral areas into a nation state parallel to its integration into a liberal world order as in Thailand, Myanmar, China, or Russia.

The second complex of limitations lies in the different quality and quantity of data regarding the different aspects analyzed (cp. below). Due to the high demands regarding data, the collection of additional data via interviews next to available data in form of existing analyses and

data collections was constraint to several dozen interviews. Therefore, just aggregated information on economic developments in the Moro areas has been available, compared to better information on the development of Minsupala as a whole. For a refinement of the results for policy advice, more insights into practices of wealth generation by lower classes in the Moro areas would have to be gathered by open household surveys. This extends to the socio-economic but as well political situation of settlers in the areas covered by the ARMM. While there have been made hundreds of analyses regarding the political development of Moros in their struggle for independence, as well as there have been conducted analyses on the development of settlers in the struggle for more rights for peasants and land labourers towards local elites, the national government, and transnational companies, there is little known about settlers in Moro communities, far from the Maoist revolutionary fronts. Their heritage, their social structure, their attempts, their analysis of the situation, their behaviour and thinking towards natives, i.e. settlers' life with indigenous in communities where they live together or close by remain a black box in this study, too, and more information will be needed for supporting the peace process. A third data issue are overseas workers. As for the rest of the Philippines, in Minsupala they encompass a substantial factor in society. However, little is known on their political allegiance, their life abroad, where indigenous and settler people serve under common foreign masters, and their influence in local struggles. Here, future research might connect.

The third complex of limitations involves a deeper analysis of interests and internal dynamics of externally intervening governments and societies. While there is information available on the positions and activities of these countries regarding the analysed local struggles, used in the following chapters, the reasons for engagement and disengagement as well as the reasons for the characteristics of their engagement would need a more regional and global focus of analysis, evaluating the changing dynamics of governments and societies involved in OIC and ASEAN; this extends to transnational networks and organizations. As a result it would be possible to analyze more strongly, if military and diplomatic alliances so essential for the local struggle could encompass the development of a new regional hegemony.

However, nonetheless these limitations, the in depth insight into the conflict system on the southern Philippines in connection with the theoretical framework allowed explorative answers and generalizations regarding the research question, which can form a strong base for future interdisciplinary research between IPE and conflict studies.

5.3.2 Parallel developments of Secular and Religious Anti-Colonial Projects

A general hypothesis is that Islam-based hegemony projects follow dissatisfaction with secular-anti-colonial movements in the Global South, e.g. the Bath-Parties in Iraq and Syria or the Free Officers in Egypt. This seems to be the case in Minsupala, too, where the Moro *Islamic* Liberation Front took over the leadership from the Moro *National* Liberation Front. This sequential explanation, based on the assumption that like a pendulum societies swing between more religious and more secular positions, however, has to be rejected after a closer analysis.

First, religious movement and secular movement developed parallel as an anti-colonial resistance force; and anti-colonial ideas can be found in both movements until today. The broad tendency to more secular or more Islamic-integralist positions depended on social networks and places of study and not on previous experiences with the other, i.e. secular or Islamic,

concepts. While the NR-AC hegemony project got its inspiration on the campuses of Middle Eastern universities, the secular movement got its inspiration on the Manila campuses of the secular state university in close contact to the development of the Maoist anti-colonial movement. As seen from single biographies of above all NR-AC rebel leaders, this distinction is a broad category which not necessarily includes individual experiences, e.g. MILF leaders Murad and Iqbal have been trained on the Philippines and not in the Middle East, different than long-time chairman and MILF-founder Salamat Hashim. However, as the NR-AC movement has given religious institutions a more prominent role and membership in these institutions depends on an academic career in the Middle East, additional to the key ideological role of Salamat Hashim in the movement, this analytical differentiation seems to be plausible.

Secondly, there are no signs, that the NL-AC movement made much progress in dispersing their secular ideas onto the rank-and-file. The more sophisticated ideas of a Moro nation were successful on the regional and international level: in the forums of their donors; however, little efforts have been invested on the local level. Thus, there was never a genuine relation between the intellectuals of the secular movement and the rank-and-file. The 1970s were not shaped by the secular movement's ideas of a common Moro nation, but by a rejectionist identity (Castells 1997) of the rank-and-file against the Philippine government; and even more so against its Armed Forces, vigilante groups, and counterinsurgency intelligence. Intellectuals and local population were united in a common enemy and the intellectuals around Misuari were strong in two points: a) to organize necessary funds and b) organize an efficient command structure (with the first supporting the second). This strength allowed them to unite an anti-Filipino Moro movement for five years, unseen before and afterwards during the whole 20th century. However, repeating it, there are no signs that the secular intellectuals established any hegemony based on secular ideas. Thus, the local population had not to replace a secular Moro ideology with a religious one when a more sophisticated development of a broad ideological framework inside the rank-and-file started in the 1980s with the efforts of the *ustadz*es in the local communities.

Thirdly, the reason why the *religious* movement did not establish structures earlier on themselves did not have anything to do with an established secular framework neither. The delay of two decades until the 1980s was rather an organizational/institutional one, exactly the area where the NL-AC activists had their strengths. The representatives of the religious movement lacked the political skills to lead the main anti-Philippine force, the MNLF; they had not the capabilities to connect to existing grass roots in the local communities; and the armed struggle prevented the *ustadz*es from developing them through proper community work. Next to the structural constraints including the repressive system under martial law, it was, too, the political decision to align with the secular forces inside the MNLF and actively engage in the military struggle, which bound the forces of the religious movement.

Fourthly, religion has been one cultural element of the struggle against the Philippine government all along throughout the struggle of the last centuries. However, it always has been just one cultural element. It was local culture that integrated Islam, not the other way around. Thus, Islam connected to indigenous beliefs, including belief in supernatural phenomena and spirits. Still in the 1960s, participation on Friday ceremonies was few, the local Imam controlled by the *Datu*, and drinking of alcohol not banned. Neither was Islam as a cultural factor strong enough to transcend ethnic boundaries or force strong gender segregation. Further-

more, Islam has throughout the centuries been a political instrument. Local elites used it in the legitimization of their own rule: to distinguish their constituencies from the Philippine majority, making themselves to gatekeepers, influential in the establishment of the state in the local arena; as well as emphasizing their authority over communities towards the local population. Later on, the insurgency used it to connect to the supporting states organized in the OIC. Thus, Islam was part of the struggle even before the new revolutionaries of the 1960s and 70s, but it has been an ambiguous element, open for political struggles, and thus not necessarily giving strength to one or the other social group, but to the group which most effectively could integrate it in its overall hegemonic struggle.

5.3.3 Split of the Secessionist Movements

Thus, when the split of the Salamat faction from the MNLF in 1976 occurred, it was not the sudden rise of Islamic ideas as the answer to a previously secular movement which might have provoked it. There is no factor to be singled out, which could possibly explain this event. Several points struggle for primacy:

- Split as an organizational question: who is the leader and how is leadership implemented
- Split as an ideological question between former allies: secular vs. religious ideology
- Split as a network/material question: Maguindanaoans vs. Tausug

For all positions there are pro and contra examples. Misuari was probably as persistent in 1972 as in 1977. Thus, it might be a continuingly factor of disturbance on part of his officers, but one that had been accepted for some years. However, it is a good explanation, why attempts of compromises were rejected and opportunities to reforms after the failed peace agreement have been lost, augmenting the dissatisfaction of part of the MNLF and consequently leading towards its schism. Secondly, while the core of the New MNLF activists have had a religious education; promoted Islam as the base for struggle; and presented Islam as the official reason for the split from the MNLF, there were secular trained students in the forefront of the New MNLF as well, above all of course later chairman Ebrahim Murad and peace panel member Mohagher Iqbal. Turning to the explanation of an ethnically divided insurgency: while both factions did not deny their strength either in central Mindanao (NR-AC) or the western islands (NL-AC) both groups claimed to represent all Moro people in Minsupala as well as having people from all ethnic groups in their ranks. Adding the point that central Mindanao is in general regarded as the more conservative-religious region compared to the western islands (Interview Q), any possibility to extract a scientifically proven reason for the split is impossible to define.

The split occurred between a secular-revolutionary Tausug dominated leadership and a religious-revolutionary second-in-line. This would just highlight the Gramscian argument that historical developments have to be embedded in institutional, ideal, and material terms to be decisive. And that is definitive for the split, as MILF and MNLF did not find together for the next decades to come anymore. Thus, the analytical differentiation between a religious-nationalist and a secular-nationalist movement forged in this paper can not be explained by the split, but neither can it be denied. What can be explained is the persistency of the split.

5.3.4 Current Strength of Religious Movement

The split of the religious movement from the MNLF increased the possibility on a stronger religious focus, without that the religious movement would have thrown overboard all non-religious, more national/traditional anti-ideas.

Above all changed the split the strategic perspective of the movement; leaving the immediate battle against the Philippine state for a long-term establishment of hegemony in the Muslim areas of Minsupala. This decision got favoured by further structural developments: the opening of the political system after the decline of the Marcos regime and the cooling down of military activities, now concentrated on the national Maoist insurrection. This allowed the NR-AC movement to implement its strengths: the spread of religious-social ideas and the development of grass roots community structures. It could, had to, and did connect to existing local ideas, institutions, and material possibilities.

What helped the NR-AC movement with developments in all components of society was their integralist understanding of Islam. Just because they regarded social and political questions as integral part of their religion and their religious struggle, their teaching extended to all aspects of society; different than the intellectual concept of the secular movement, which easily gave up social questions in favour of cultural one, instrumentally following day-to-day practical needs. The NR-AC's involvement in legal questions, social questions, military questions, etc. additional to their cultural-religious teachings allowed them to establish the overall grassroots counter-hegemonic movement, which strengthens their influence up until today. Thereby they connected to the only local Islamic institutions: the community Imams. The latter worked as a gatekeeper and translators in a content meaning. They were furthermore helpful on the material side: they helped to organize and allow the channelling of the obligatory religious donations to the MILF.

All processes have involved struggles as well. As mentioned, Islam was an identity factor of the local population, but not the only one and additional in a specific local form. The Middle Eastern graduates could connect with their own Islamic perspective; however, they had to deal with quantitative and qualitative problems. The quantitative dimension encompassed the low level of understanding and importance of Islam in the local communities. They invested teaching efforts in that, as ultimately they have been trained for teaching the Koran and Arabic language as well, allowing their students not just to read but to understand Islamic teachings. More difficult was the qualitative dimension: breaking points between the local and Middle Eastern understanding of Islam; the later considered as the more original and purified version by the graduates. A simple replacement of local understandings by Middle Eastern teachings was out of reach for the Ustadzes. Thus, they struggled with local traditions, able to replace some while having to accept others.

But in constant engagement with these questions and the local communities they created an integrated hegemony movement involving religious activists and local non-elite population.

5.3.5 Democratization

This leads to a further reason for the success of the NR-AC project over its political rivals: it has been the first political movement to democratize Moro politics via the usage of Islamic teach-

ing;⁴⁵ even though the constraints of a potentially elitist intellectual leadership by religious teachers. Three points can be mentioned: The *ustadzes*

- forced the teaching of Arabic, which allowed the local population to understand the Koran, instead of just memorizing and reciting single *surahs*; exploring not just the points in favour of *Datu* ruling, but potentially subversive aspects as well;
- discussed social equality, challenging the traditional social hierarchy with *Datus* on top;
- directly challenged *Datu* power by sidelining them in the control of religious teaching and non-state judiciary.

This made them attractive not just to local tenants and urban poor, but as well to the slowly establishing class of professionals, white collar workers, lawyers, government officials, etc., whose development got hindered by the structural constraint of a feudal system.

Liberal democracy had never the power or maybe not even the intention to lead to a participatory decision making system. From the beginning under American rule, the local elites have been regarded as the reasonable representatives and at the same time controllers of a Muslim mass; the latter has never really been understood by the majority of the Filipinos, on the contrary regarded as a constant threat mirrored in a series of prejudices. Further on, the non-participating Muslim communities became easy to handle objects in national power games, with the local elites profiting as gatekeepers.

This has been forcefully highlighted and criticized by the secular movement, but this criticism did not translate into political action. Three reasons can be mentioned: First, the strategic decision of the MNLF to rely on external funding to establish rapidly a forceful institution able to militarily challenge the state. This bound considerable energy and led to the frequent exile of the Moro leadership, delegating the local struggle to non-politicized commanders, controlling them over the allocation of funding, less by constant (ideological) coaching. A counterexample is the Maoist movement with rather few connections to external funding. It took the latter several years to develop their strength, but this came with a strong integration between the Maoist intellectual leadership out of the Philippine universities and the rank-and-file in the countryside during the 1970s. The second reason for a missing democratization of the struggle under the secular leadership has been the same as complicated matters for the religious movement: the necessities and constraints of armed struggle and martial law during the 1970s. This is a constant factor, which even hindered the Maoist struggle in their intellectual development over the war years. The third reason is that the intellectuals of the secular movement were not able to connect to the “common sense”, the existing framework, of the local masses. While their resources helped the local population, ideal and institutional structures were missing. On the ideal level, the idea of a new secular nation formed out of the revolutionary struggle, was an up-to-date intellectual idea, to be found e.g. in Fanon’s anti-colonial writing on another continent. But it has not been connected to the mindset of local communities, for which even the Islamic community was already a far concept (different then their *inged*, the local community, and maybe their ethnicity), not talking about a nation encompassing non-Muslim indigenous people and revolutionary Christian settlers. Until the

⁴⁵ I would like to thank Henning Borchers, Victoria University of Wellington, for his supporting ideas, deriving from his research insights into religious movements in Indonesia.

1990s, the secular movement did not produce any ideas that were significant for the local population, which can be seen in the uninspired political plans during the SPCPD years, where Misuari proposed a liberal development agenda not different from the traditional elites and the Philippine government, which left the local population in misery since decades. This neglect extends to institutions mentioned above, where the secular Moro movement could neither connect; nor did it establish new grass-root institutions, which could have functioned as translators for a secular counter-hegemony project.

5.3.6 Changing from Secessionism to Autonomy

A point which the rebel groups and commentators have not discussed yet is the consequence of switching from the demand of secessionism to the demand of autonomy. This change is normally portrayed on a scale of “moderate” to “radical”, autonomy presenting the first and secessionism presenting the latter. But it is overlooked, that this change alters qualitatively the relation of the Bangsamoro with its surrounding environment. The obvious part has been discussed regarding both political options: the relationship to the non-Muslim people living in the claimed area. All Moro rebel groups highlighted quite credible that they will respect these people as a minority to protect in the new political entity. What is overlooked, however, is that opting for autonomy includes a continuing relation with the neighbouring provinces as much as with the central government. Even in a strong autonomy a constant interaction with these forces outside the autonomous area is necessary. The idea, that after drafting a legal text Moro-Filipino history is over and the former conflict parties do not have to engage with each other anymore, is at best wishful thinking and at worst a misunderstanding of politics. Taking this continuing relation seriously means, that for the time being of having an autonomous area in a national state, for both sides it is important to understand each other and engage with each other. This has not been recognized on part of the rebel groups. The complain “we signed an agreement but the problem is that the President cannot control her own politicians” (Interview X) is understandable after the failed 2008 MoA-AD-process but highlights nonetheless an underlying misunderstanding: Moro rebels and activists consider Philippine developments as internal matters of “the other”. This might be feasible as long as secession is the final aim (even if then it might be helpful to understand in detail the developments of the “enemy”); however, as soon as the final aim is a strong autonomy, the decision has been taken that the Moros will be part of the Philippine state and thus have constantly to engage with it, regardless of the many competences an autonomous body might get. Coming back to the starting argument: the switch from secession to autonomy was not just a quantitative adjustment from radical to moderate but it qualitatively altered the envisaged relation between the national government and the autonomy to be. It demands a change in strategy: the “enemy” to be fought becomes a complex constituency to be engaged with to support ones own, i.e. the autonomous body’s, political struggle with the central government. This change in strategy has been missed in both major armed Moro groups, leaving it to civil society to engage in small-scale “interreligious dialogues” which have not the power to bridge the serious void of the rebel groups in neglecting a constituency which is crucial in the development of a successful autonomy. Hence, similar than the MILF forced a long-term hegemonic change in local communities, this might be necessary on a national level as well. A majority of the Philippines has to be in favour of or at least tacitly accept a local autonomy for the latter to become a success. This might be ideologically unsatisfactory, as the success depends on the former enemies’

will, but it is the underlying consequence of accepting autonomy over territorial independence.

5.3.7 Failing Attempts to Extend the Socialist Anti-Colonial Project

While the Maoist revolutionaries established a rather successful counter-hegemonic movement over the last decades, it failed in the Moro areas considerably, even though the Moro Revolutionary Organization, later on re-founded as Moro Revolutionary and Liberation Organization tried in a concerted effort with emissaries of the National Democratic Front to organize a socialist counter-hegemonic movement in the said areas.

The general explanation is that the Muslim masses are strongly conservative and religious and thus cannot be attracted by a revolutionary program. Although this explanation by itself sounds sound and is given by locals as an explanation, too, a closer look doubts it. Even though there are no accounts of anti-Datu-action by lower classes in the pre-70-war era, neither are accounts available proving the image of a deeply religious-conservative society. Anthropological studies show during this time as mentioned above the weak establishment of religious dogmas and limited gender segregation for example during public women vs. men singing contests. But accepting that the Moro masses were tradition-oriented, a short look onto the other islands still disqualifies the above hypothesis: no data shows that Filipino rural communities, defined by landlordism and Catholicism, might be less conservative than the communities in Moro areas; and in these conservative Catholic communities one of the strongest and long-lasting Maoist revolutions on a global scale got established. Though there is few research on that question and my project was neither able to establish more than particles of information, some alternative explanations follow.

One reason has been the obvious anti-elitist stand of the movement, which triggered harsh reactions not just by the traditional elites inside the government but, too, by traditional elites' links inside the anti-hegemonic movements. During the height of the NDF in Mindanao, i.e. the early 1980s, the MRLO got founded by Moro activists in collaboration with the national underground movement. However, the stronger the new organization got, the more hostile became its environment. The elites reacted similar to the NDF in other regions of the country: with counter-insurgency violence, which led to the killing of MRLO activists. Being not prepared for a military confrontation, activists either retreated from their cooperation with the organized left and engaged from then on in civil society organizations or they left the area and fought for the NDF/CPP/NPA in other parts of the Philippines. This behaviour of the Moro elites did not just threaten the explicit leftist MRLO, but developments inside the MNLF as well; Misuari's enemies depicted him regularly as a communist. Thirdly, possible progressive streams around Misuari pre-censored themselves not to threaten their connection with local elites and conservative governments abroad. This division of forces into a broad bloc of revolutionaries who tacitly accepted traditional elites and their collaboration with the regime and a small bloc of anti-elites seriously weakened efforts to establish a ST-AC bloc inside the Moro masses and strong enough security measures to protect them from counterinsurgency retaliation.

A second explanation is the failure of the socialist movement on the national level to address the special grievances of the Moro communities as more than a "side contradiction". The published documents of the NDF and the CPP support the right of self-determination, a necessity considering the importance of anti-colonialism in their ideology. Thus, it regularly stated their

support on the right of self-determination for the Moro people. However, their understanding has since the beginning been that just a victory against the liberal Philippine government as the ‘puppets’ of US neo-colonialism can lead to the possibility of a successful articulation of self-determination by the Moro. Furthermore, no discussion of Philippine’s past atrocities against the Moro, independent of US intervention, has been visible in public statements, i.e. there is little discussion on the role and consequences of migration into Minsupala for the Moro people in public documents. Furthermore Filipino prejudices did not automatically stop in front of NDF activists, leading to non-reflected chauvinism against the seemingly conservative and backward Moros. The latter’s threatening of NDF activists just enforced this image. Thirdly, the underground movement above all in Mindanao is strongly connected to Parish churches and the ideas of liberation theology, which inserts the question of interfaith dialogue into a possible cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim leftist activists. This even extends to international politics, where for example radical student groups in Manila were divided over a visit of Indonesian President Suharto, strongly protested by socialist students, while cheered by Moro students.

Thirdly, alternating moments of strength and weakness on Moro and Maoist counter-hegemonic institutions made a stronger alliance unlikely. During the early years of struggle, the NDF was still in a stage of building up their forces in the south. There were few incentives to cooperate for the MNLF, with the mentioned problems on the other side of the balance sheet. When a decade later the picture changed, with the Moro movements struggling and the NDF on their climax, the Moro movement could have switched to the NDF. There was more than one possibility for cooperation between the secular movement and the socialist movement over the decades. The CPP/NPA had sent emissaries to the MNLF, but got rejected with harsh words, declaring them second enemies after the Philippine government. On the upper level, Gaddafi tried to facilitate a meeting of CPP/NPA cadres with Misuari during his stay in Libya, but got rejected by the later. At this time, the MNLF, which more than ever relied on external support, would have made a fundamental decision in aligning with the Maoist movement, which probably would have meant a subordination of their struggle under the leadership of the national anti-Marcos movement. The MNLF did not take that decision. All this did not prevent cooperation on the commander level, even though the MNLF leadership tried to keep it out from public.

Interestingly, a high-level signed cooperation between Moro anti-government movement and Maoist anti-government movement came into play between the MILF and the CPP in 1999. The MILF did not rely on external funding and traditional elite support in their struggle – or at least much less than the MNLF in the 1970s/80s and was strong enough to face the CPP on eye-level. Furthermore, nobody would have at any point doubted the Moro and anti-Filipino integrity of MILF chairman Salamat Hashim. Interestingly, social questions have been articulated by the MILF throughout the last years, even though the MILF criticized elites not on a structural level but blamed the moral corruption of part of the elite, which of course let them keep open a channel for future cooperation.

Currently, the question of an armed Moro-socialist insurrection seems out of sight. The new-found MRLO has not been heard of after the press releases for their constitution five years ago. A former MRO cadre talked about a handful of activists. However, the widening of political space outside the underground during the last two decades brought former leftist cadres,

either in the MRO or exiled with the NDF in other parts of the country, back to the Moro region. They engage in civil society organizations and the academic sphere. Some of them retreated to economic development organizations, but they are a strong political factor in the peace community outside the direct combatants on the government and rebel side. While not in the first row of the MILF organization, they might be able to shape the agenda, as during the continuing peace negotiations the MILF needs the support of civil society organizations not just as further mobilization networks but as much as intellectual capital. As secession from the Philippines is long time gone from the agenda, a MILF success rests on their capabilities to shape the peace process and the post-peace process agenda. The last decades showed, how tricky these processes are and how crucial thoughtful action on part of the rebels is to avoid the different intentional and unintentional traps. The other way around it is clear, too, that the MILF is the strongest possibility for civil society organization to challenge a reluctant state, for which democracy and self-determination has been an empty phrase since decades. Thus, a developing cooperation between leftist civil society organization and the MILF could lead not just to a successful peace, but to the as necessary social change in Moro communities. Having far-reaching dreams this could make the Moro provinces even to a positive example for democratic development, needed all over the archipelago.

5.3.8 Continuing Crisis and the Liberal-Democratic State

A last empirical question is of course the stability of local power structures under traditional leaders and its integration into a developing liberal-democratic state. Local bosses' (Sidel 1999) talking and activities are full of ambiguities. They praise their religious devotion; their centuries old genealogy; their creed in liberal democracy; social justice and development, while living in huge real-estates with all comforts (Kreuzer 2005). They support the revolutionaries, the military, the state and of course and most important of all peace, slaughtering people at will if they are challenging their power (hrw 2010). On the side of social ideas they are completely inconsistent and of course it is more than questionable if the local communities ever listen. However, the addressed audience is another: their counterparts in the government, the revolutionaries, and the international community as well as the constituencies of these partners (the NGO-supporters, the Philippine electorate and legal courts, the rebels' followers, etc.). All of them rely on the services of these key figures in the local political landscape, while having to integrate them into the own hegemonic framework: these speeches of peace and progress connect to the liberal idea of development, covering the criminal businesses going on underneath. Interestingly, while the counterparts get corrupted in this dynamic, the traditional elites until now are incontestable the champions of the game, as nobody dares to challenge them, thereby challenging one's own past as well as a possible future cooperation. The elites' constant ambiguity, which could be considered at first as a constant threat to their ruling, makes them immune from criticism, as long as every other political stakeholder tries to keep them on their side. The moment they would choose to stick to one or the other social idea, they would become subordinated under the original proponents of these ideas. On the other hand, it does not need a researcher to uncover these ambiguities; these are more or less open secrets, talked about at dinner tables and in interviews. The number of killed journalists highlights that a struggle is going on forced by social groups on the losing side of this tacit agreement to accept local deviations from the overall liberal framework. The threat of this local violence system towards liberal hegemony is to highlight the inconsistency of the liberal project as such,

rather than challenging liberal democracy as a hegemony project. Accordingly the liberal democracy could react by strengthening its own political project when necessary, for example the prohibition of dynasties in the 1987 constitution. However, up until now, in general the proponents of this defunct liberal hegemony were regularly able to blame and transfer responsibility for shortcomings onto the corruption of single leaders rather than a corrupt system. In consequence, we can see an iterative rising and falling of President heroes: Estrada, Macapagal-Arroyo, and Aquino were instated with similar promises of change and honesty; the first two left their office accompanied by public shaming as bad and corrupt leaders. The development of the ongoing presidency has to be seen, but already now it is visible how he struggles with the continuing structural differences between a denominative liberal hegemony and strong local oligarchic structures. In the next two chapters we will try to analyze these structures and counter-hegemonic moves against them in more generalized terms.

6 Grounding I: Hegemony, Conflicts, and Crises

After getting answers on the empirical part of the research question, the aim is now to extract generalized insights from the cases outlined and analyzed in the previous chapters and to adapt the theoretical approach outlined in chapter two. These two grounding chapters will start both with a summary of the relevant insights of the Minsupala cases, proceed in the main part with discussions of generalizing insights out of the empirical research, and conclude by summarizing the insights into the core theoretical topics of each chapter. While the next chapter will have a closer look at the dynamics of direct violence in crises situations, this first chapter outlines the societal situations in which these crises are embedded and interact with. The chapter starts with an outline of colonial interventions. Then it describes given or negotiated independence as a form of passive revolution. Section four outlines the challenges of a post-colonial passive revolution in crisis, before we discuss in section five strands of counter-hegemony projects. The chapter concludes by discussing the components of the chapter heading: hegemony, conflicts and crises in post-colonial spaces of the 21st century.

6.1 Minsupala and Hegemony Theory

This first section presents a short summary of the developments in Minsupala regarding the Gramscian notions of hegemony and crisis.

Datus led a hegemonic system in a Southeast Asian Maritime space during the 15th and 16th century. What has followed is a steady decline of this hegemony, under pressure by the colonial powers and finally militarily defeated by the US “pacification campaigns”. In a passive revolution the traditional ruling social group were re-installed as the local aide-de-camp. This crisis and the following passive revolution radically changed the role of Minsupala in the regional sphere as much as the local social structure internally. This culminated into Filipino-national liberal-democratic institutions, where the Datus continued to be the leading local figures in a collaborative alliance with the colonial powers Washington D.C. and later on Metro Manila. As seen in the chapters before, stabilization by this passive revolution was short lived. Increasing use of violence at the end of the 1960s and the consequent secessionist war starting from the early 1970s marked a renewed crisis. Until this point, the historic development can be grasped with Gramscian terminology with little efforts of adaptation. However, what follows up until the present needs a more thoroughly investigation. To recapitulate, crises in Gramsci’s and IPE’s approach have two inherent characteristics: they are transitional and transformative. These characteristics turned not yet out in Minsupala, the crisis seem to reproduce itself with no social group being able up until now to return to the transitional and transformative characteristics, i.e. force the development of a new hegemony.

Thereby, several attempts of establishing a new hegemony existed with key differences in its conceptualization in regard to material bases, social ideas, and institutions. They were neither the consequence of natural developments nor of voluntary actions, but shaped by political decisions constrained and enabled by social structures at any time. Thus, these structures and political decisions have to be taken into account.




Figure 6: Hegemony and Crisis in Minsupala – a graphical overview

6.1.1 Liberal-Post-Colonial Hegemony Project

The first to analyze is the nominative hegemony in crisis: the LP-PC project. It is the project with the most sophisticated historical structures. Over the years it could rely on a network of material flows, which not just stabilized it, but let enough revenue to finance the overall political institutions. In Minsupala, however, this was true just to a certain extent. There was a general shortage of revenue flows – via market structures as well as political institutions – towards the subordinated social groups in Minsupala. Could adaptation strategies by the indigenous population cope with material pressure by resource extraction and settler influx at the beginning, led the closing of the frontier and consequently increasing competition to an ineffectiveness of these coping strategies. At the same time, thus, the insufficient socially organized material flows became visible and led finally to violent skirmishes and the insurgency. Later on, criminality added to coping tactics, even though a big share of the profits went to the elite overlords. Therefore, the basic idea of LP-PC, that of liberal modernization with the pros-

pect of individual improvement, was not able to describe the situation for big part of society in Minsupala. From the beginning, the LP-PC social ideas were therefore augmented by a concept of elites as drivers for development. In the specific situation of Minsupala, this led to the incorporation of traditional elites into the government system, while at the same time accepting the continuing existence of “sanctified equality” and community-based loyalties toward ruling families. The problem of liberal integration was mirrored in government institutions. While the constitution propagated a unitary state, the actual implementation, including the pork barrel system, local control over violence institutions, and the acceptance of paramilitary structures, pervaded the legal text and expressed the power structures inherent to the state. The social experiment of a modernization dictatorship under Marcos as an internal revolution/restoration failed, as the regime was not able to develop the propagated New Society, leading nearly to the end of the whole LP-PC hegemony all together. People Power’s Revolution was thus a return to the pre-Marcos era augmented by a more open and stronger incorporation of opposition groups. The 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF was a similar move: the traditional pattern of cooptation of local Moro elites, augmented by small concessions of local autonomy. Both developments however were limited in their capability to stabilize the LP-PC hegemony as the structural problems of failing integration and the recourse to makeshifts in contradiction to the core principles of the hegemony of liberal-democratic development.

6.1.2 National-Liberal Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

Meanwhile, the NL-AC counter-hegemony movement struggled from the beginning to implement its hegemony project and to connect the encompassing material, ideal, and institutional structures. The obvious material network to target out of its social ideas would have been a strong local network in Minsupala, encompassing above all Moros, i.e. indigenous people and settler peasants; with settler elites and national government institutions considered as enemies. However, when the first hostilities between the movement and the government broke out, there was no local material network available which could have sustained a proclaimed anti-colonial war against the Philippines. Local population provided recruits and shelter, above all to ensure some kind of security against indiscriminate government violent actions. However, for further help the movement referred to external support. Consequently, right from the beginning there was a material dependence of the counter-hegemony project towards external governments, local elites, and via their pork barrels indirectly even towards Philippine government resources. Therefore, counter-hegemonic ideas were developed in relation to these external forces and had to cope with their interests, rather than the local constituency. In consequence, the movement overlooked, that their hegemony framework of a secularly defined Bangsa Moro rarely diffused throughout the local constituency. Thus, as material flows were weak in the internal network and derived mainly unidirectional from outside while information flows between the leadership of the insurgency and local rank-and-file plus wider constituency were limited, the performance of established institution was limited as well. Even though a differentiated network of institutions should guarantee the integration of exiled leadership and targeted constituency, the weakness of these institutions was highlighted once problems evolved. They were not able to prevent defections nor were they able to integrate sympathetic opposition in a meaningful manner. The integrational success during the first insurgency years was owed to corporate material interests between insurgency, local elites,

indigenous peasants, and foreign governments in a strong reaction against the threat by resettlement and increasing violence by government forces. It is doubtful, if the MNLF next to its nominal representation of the insurgency and its gatekeeper function, really fulfilled what Gramsci envisaged as “leadership”, i.e. the development of a universal interest of its constituency, facilitating social following based on a stable consent that the organization of society should be in the hands of a leadership representing a consistent social system; rather than integration based on mutual particular interests or violence. Interestingly, different than the LP-PC hegemony or the Maoist insurgency, the NL-AC movement was never keen in using violence to integrate social groups into its own hegemony project, shown by the relaxed handling of defections. Accordingly, the success of the NL-AC movement was based strongly on cooperative interests, but it never ruled hegemonic or dominantly over its alliance of social groups. The strongest form of mutual integration, extending over short term cooperative interests, seem to be between the NL-AC intellectuals and the Middle Eastern states, indicated in the long term support of Misuari even during setbacks after the peace agreements of 1976 and 1996. However, as no in-depth analysis of the interests of the involved countries could be done during this research, this guess is little reliable. Back to the original constituency of the NL-AC movement: the moment the NL-AC was not able any longer to bundle cooperative interests, its leadership role was questioned. Thus, as the FPA of 1996 was not used for a radical social change, the role of the leadership now integrated into the LP-PC government system as a distinct political force became obsolete, as they lost their original functions in the underground insurgency.

6.1.3 National-Religious Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

The second counter-hegemony project, the NR-AC movement, followed the NL-AC strategy by aligning with its institutions and military campaigns in the early 1970s, including the strong focus on external support. Thus, in retrospective luckily for the NR-AC, its intellectuals were not able to lead the insurgency in the pre-1976 war, nor were they able to oust Misuari afterwards, nor could they achieve an agreement with Marcos, which would have integrated them into the government system in a similar organizational stage as the NL-AC movement was still in 1996. These short-term setbacks allowed the development and implementation of the long-term plans decided on in the aftermath. Thus, when the NR-AC became the leading counter-hegemony project in the late 1980s, it could present quite consistent hegemonic structures. While it still resorted to foreign support including the global arms market to a certain extent, the key material flows were concentrated in Minsupala, according to the NL-AC leadership’s strategic aim of material autarky. This encompassed financial income via broad local support, mainly by Islamic alms, i.e. the zakat, which the movement was able to monopolize in its own hands next to recruits, shelter, and allowance, which already the NL-AC could rely on. Accordingly, social ideas have been adapted to the local context. While some aspects are still unclear, for example the framework for a broader economic system outside local communities, NR-AC ideas are widely spread throughout the targeted population. Thereby it should not be forgotten, that the ideas brought from the Middle East had to be adapted and still struggle with local traditions and customs, above all regarding dogmatism deriving from the west. The developed local institutions play a strong role in the hegemonic approach, including Islamic schools, justice systems, and local religious committees. The movement was furthermore able to connect to the local Imams, which was not just essential

to acquire control over Islamic alms, but as much for the adaptation and dissemination of social ideas. Furthermore, the NR-AC movement's integration effort did not just encompass social leadership over a strong consent-integrated constituency but as well the use of violence against deviance; not against defectors, but violence against individuals judged over according to Sharia law, including death penalties. Taken together, the NR-AC was successful in implementing a hegemonic order in parts of the south, above all on the community level. It still struggles with the integration of three potentially encompassed social groups: similar to the NL-AC, the NR-AC has difficulties to define its relations to local elites. It follows the NL-AC arguing by analyzing the current situation of the local elites as moral failing and framing critique accordingly. Similar to the NL-AC, after the 1976 agreement the movement reduced cooperation with the elites, both sides remaining mostly in a tacit acceptance of each other. Structurally, the local elites' interests would be little served by a strong hegemony of the NR-AC; aware to both sides as well. Secondly, the integration of non-Muslim indigenous people into the NR-AC is fairly nominal in its scope, with little structures extending to these communities: the stronger the autonomous political organization of the non-Muslim indigenous communities, the more it will be difficult for the NR-AC proponents to claim its integration and representation in the peace process. Last but not least there is not just a lack of integration but even a lack of a framework of integration on how to handle settlers in the areas of a possible NR-AC hegemony. The recognition of passive rights, i.e. tolerance towards Christian creeds and the non-appliance of Sharia law, is not sufficient in the long run to integrate them into a new autonomous entity. Up until now, the NR-AC movement simply neglected the challenges to deal with these three social groups and focused on its core constituency. It remains to be seen, how the ongoing peace negotiations affect the hegemony attempts of the NR-AC, with first cracks of internal dissent tearing at the overall picture of a successful hegemony project.

6.1.4 Socialist Tri-People Hegemony Project

Having a look at the third potential counter-hegemony, it is necessary to differentiate between different geographies, in which the socialist insurgency was involved. In Minsupala, the movement was, compared to the other two Moro movements, the most autarkic movement of the island. At the beginning of the struggle in the 1970s they paid a high price, being militarily not able to compete against the Philippine violence institutions and thus losing activists due to incarceration and liquidations. On the long run, however, they could rely on the support of peasants and labourers in the countryside and workers in the towns. Once established in the countryside, they furthermore could rely on revolutionary taxes. Above all the later, however, can be regarded as an external funding, as the taxed businesses and politicians are not integrated into the other parts of the hegemony project, i.e. ideas and institutions. The hegemony idea is therefore of having several stages of conflict and thus several layers of integrated social groups. While the final aim is a class-less society in a free republic, middle term the liberation from imperialist influence is a further aim, integrating parts of the national bourgeoisie as well. During the Marcos dictatorship it was additional able to integrate all "anti-fascist" forces, a uniting idea which broke away with the People Power Revolution. The movement established thereby three types of institutions, with national, regional, and local levels: the CPP, the armed wing in form of the NPA, and civil society organizations in form of the NDF and currently even extending out of it. Above all in the countryside they paralleled or even replaced the LP-PC hegemony and during the early 1980s included the towns and cities. An important support was

thereby the network of parish churches. Meanwhile, in areas dominated by the other two insurgencies, the movement remained weak. Even during the height of activities in the 1980s, the movement could attract mainly students, while in the countryside they had little means to protect the movement from violent rejection out of several directions: local elites, the other insurgencies, and the Philippine government. Internal material flows to support the movement were thus nearly inexistent, while material inflows from other regions and the national level were not substantial either. Thus, ideas of a socialist anti-colonial tri-people-alliance remained ideas with no correspondence in its targeted constituency, different to the symbiotic relation between peasants, labourers and students developed in other parts of Minsupala. Furthermore, the movement struggled with unaware path-dependences of paternalism towards the Moro communities with an under-complex picture of the atrocities committed by the Philippine majority against the indigenous people: the blaming of the colonizers' divide-et-impera politics for the conflict between indigenous people and settlers neglected, that out of this subduing colonial policy, settlers still gained stronger on average than the Moro people. Accordingly, the founded institutions were short lived as well and could not handle setbacks. Thus, while in the rest of Minsupala the movement could establish itself as a strong counter-hegemony movement, based on lower classes of society in cooperation with intellectual leadership by (former) students and the insurgency, with the usage of violence against outside attacks, internal enemies, and defectors, the movement was not able to establish a similar hegemony in central Mindanao and the western islands. The split of the movement on the national and regional level, amongst others due to the conducted violence against suspected deep penetrating agents as well as the historically fading necessity of a democratic front against an increasingly renewed LP-PC, levelled the differences between settler and non-settler areas to certain extends. This development with the increased openness of the liberal hegemony allowed an increasing strength of above-ground political activity, which led not just in the settler areas to increased civil-society oriented socialist-counter-hegemonic activities, but in the non-settler areas as well; this included the return of regionally exiled activists, which previously were working for the socialist movement in other parts of Minsupala and the Philippines. It remains to be seen if the socialist tri-people-approach engaged towards the areas with Muslim and non-Muslim indigenous as well as settler communities is strong enough to extend to the other areas of Minsupala, preventing in these areas a mere socialist-Filipino movement and thus allowing a strong support for the movement in the Moro areas all over Minsupala.

6.1.5 Non-Project in a Crisis of Hegemony

The last situation is the non-project of local elites. While not developing an own political project for a political hegemony after their defeat with the advancing colonial powers, they connected to all of the above outlined hegemony projects, while at the same time continued to stay in a strong position of local ruling. They were thereby able to position themselves as gatekeepers in the centre of a complex material network, ranging from local production to national pork barrels, corruption regarding land speculation and licenses, engagement in the violence market as security entrepreneurs for local businesses, international investors, and aid-agencies, election fraud, and last but not least criminal activities including kidnappings-for-ransom. They cooperated thereby with all social groups present, including the fiercest enemies, police and criminals, insurgents and AFP. As ambiguous as their material network was

their stance on ideas. While implicitly and explicitly referring to their right to rule due to traditional ideas, they swore on the Philippine constitution of liberal-democracy and while vowing for peace and order in the Philippine state in public speeches, supported the rebels for Moro independence underneath. Accordingly it is not surprising that they acted similarly in different sets of institutions: while being in Philippine government positions as Congress members, provincial governors, and mayors, they have been Datus towards their local communities, while other elite members were in the central committee or peace panels of the insurgents; switching of individuals between these positions has been thereby regularly visible. While its long-term stay in power hints to a quite hegemonic method of ruling, its resort to private armies and regularly use of violence to enforce direct compliance, as well as terror for indirect compliance, however, contradicts the hegemonic elements of ruling. Meanwhile, it is neither a simple dictatorship, as the rulers are integrated as mentioned in different other hegemony projects and uphold the appearance of rule of law; e.g. even though elections are won by fraud and violence, there are no attempts to abolish elections altogether. The next sections as well as the next chapter will try to grasp this development further.

6.2 Colonialism as Foreign Induced Crisis

This section will now return to the first crisis to be analyzed here to start the grounding of historical materialism regarding societies in crises in the Global South, strongly related to colonialism in the previous centuries. In its justification, the idea of colonialism has been strongly linked to the idea of a frontier: colonialist expeditions would move and expand civilization to areas of the globe, where there are either no people or if, then in a backward stage of development. Both accounts can obviously be doubted for colonial expeditions and the situation in Minsupala is a case in point; even though both justifications can be found regarding colonizing the area. The existence of the sultanates and its strong integration into global trade reject both arguments on empirical grounds: Minsupala has neither been empty nor has it been a backward system. It has been populated by sophisticated societies, which Spanish colonialism was not able to penetrate; except by military destruction. Thus, for Minsupala colonialism by itself has been in the first place not an extension of western hegemony, but the destruction of an existing society.

6.2.1 Colonial Intervention as Destructive and Productive Process

Thus we can regard a colonial intervention first and foremost as a foreign induced crisis. This is a defining difference between the European regions analyzed by historical materialism and the regions mostly analyzed by conflict studies. Chapter two already discussed that historical materialism discusses global developments mainly from an OECD-regions' perspective: the periphery either stays powerless invisible in the overall European hegemony or becomes the romantic epicentre of counter-hegemony. This analysis highlights the limits of this understanding. Neither did European colonialism simply integrate Minsupala in its own hegemony nor did the local hegemony provide the ground to be a strong global counter-hegemonic centre. The US/European hegemonies had to destroy an existing hegemony by military means. Thus, looking at western colonialism from the perspective of Minsupala, colonial intervention meant the end of internal hegemony by force and with it a blow against counter-hegemonic possibilities against outside supremacy.

This colonial intervention must not necessarily be a matter of months or years. The colonial wars on the Philippines in the northern part following Spanish invasion lasted a couple of decades; in Minsupala the colonial intervention stretches over several centuries, destroying the former hegemony; which could be described as a kind of feudal hegemony of the sultanates, lasting over several decades up to two centuries, a feudal hegemony in a maritime space of Southeast Asia. American colonial intervention by force took over from the Spanish Crown and ended in 1913 with the end of the military administration of Minsupala.

In a second line of activities, colonial intervention prepared the production of new social structures. Even though this second line *starts* lagged in comparison to the military intervention, it is not a consequent phase, but overlaps. Thus, a closer look at the modes and consequences in the different components of society highlights that the colonial intervention has been a multifaceted integration process.

In the material component, colonialism had three directions of impact: colonial intervention tried to integrate sophisticated material structures; it destroyed sophisticated structures which it was not able to take over and which would have been possible rivals to the own development; and, thirdly, it established an extractive industry for resources not (sufficiently) available in the own system. The Spanish Crown took over the geographic position of the Philippines and the trade routes which they were able to grasp on the northern part of the archipelago. The south remained a rival spot, which Spain was not able to control and consequently it reacted by destroying their trade routes. Finally, they established an extractive industry. When the US extended the Philippine territory towards Minsupala, they destroyed the remaining military material structures, and started building the extractive industry by including foreign investors. This export-oriented economy focused on minerals and agricultural products. The latter can be included into the concept of “extractive industry” as the plantation-economy was mainly dependent on the availability of land (as resource), external capital to set up the plantation and export trade routes; just a low amounts of skilled labour was necessary.

This integration on a material level got complemented by the imposition of own societal ideas. Spanish colonialism’s success would have been unthinkable without the strong role of the Catholic Church. As much as Catholicism legitimized the Spanish Crown at home, it, too, legitimized their colonial extension onto the Philippines, based on the idea of “relief” of the savages from their non-godly stage. Existing local knowledge got rejected as backward and unfaithful. Overall they have been successful; in a sustainable way: up until now the Philippine nation is attached to Christian ideas, regardless of formally secular state institutions – a problem for non-Christian minorities to be integrated into a common nation. This encompasses above all Minsupala, where the Spanish Crown failed in ideational terms as much as in material and institutional. US colonialism proceeded in spreading the ideas of liberalism in a similar fashion, even though less organized than the Catholic Church. They accepted local cultural differences and rights on an individual level, but on the societal level, traditional structures got combated, e.g. by the abolishment of slavery, the Regalian land doctrine, and liberal schooling (Laubach 1933).

Looking at institutions, the process was similar to strategies in the material and ideal component: the destruction of traditional institutions and the replacement with new institutions out of the hegemonic origin. This can be seen in land regulations following the Regalian land doc-

trine, abolishing traditional land allocation and replacing it with a public land registration system, the Torrens system. In the political sphere, the sanctified inequality legitimizing the rule of the sultanates and *datus* got rejected and liberal-democratic institutions as elections and representative government institutions got established; first under the supervision of the colonial interventionists, later on formally independent.

Colonialism is thereby an ambiguous process with up to a certain point autonomous developments in the different components of society; different actors and interests as well as societal struggles play a role in this. For Minsupala it was a crisis with a transitional and transformative character in the end; which makes the Philippines up until now one of the most strongly western-influenced societies in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, colonialism is not the simple extension of western liberal hegemony. All described elements above outline the specific characteristics the transfer and construction of social structures had, and which are substantially different from liberal hegemonic social structures in Europe and the US. The duality between a war of manoeuvre to suppress the colonized population by destroying local social structures and the war of position to integrate the area into a liberal development-hegemony adds an inherent moment of subversion into the colonial intervention: while for example Spanish rule and later on the post-colonial Philippine government is unthinkable without the stabilizing role of the Catholic hierarchy, parish churches have been an essential ally of the communist movement to fight this ruling hierarchy. The same can be said for US colonial intervention in the Moro areas. Their intervention destroyed the *Datu* hegemony. And at the same time liberal ideas of education, free speech, and democracy were at the core of the anti-colonial discourse established in the 1960s. If we understand institutions as amalgams of power relations, we can see the ambiguity of colonial intervention as well. Colonialism even as a military-based intervention is not the simple transfer of (hegemonic) institution onto the new area of ruling. US intervention established a military-led order in Minsupala and the Commonwealth institutions were, too, under the final control of the US governorship. At the same time the establishment of liberal-democratic institutions was a possibility to intervene against the colonial masters and its local collaborators.

Saying that I do not follow the modernist argument, that only colonial intervention enabled the overcoming of traditional structures; this would be an example of assuming a historic determinism by reverse reading of history. There are no indicators that the 15th century sultanates would not have been able to progress without Spanish and US intervention, on the contrary. What I argue is that colonial structures are not unambiguous and thus include breaking points, where counter-hegemonic action can intrude and alter the colonial project of integration. While ideas from the European hegemony got extended to the colonies, colonialism itself became an own discourse; interweaving European hegemonic ideas, but adapted to the demands of breaking existing hegemonies and reacting to counter-hegemonic activities on side of the colonially integrated population. Colonial intervention is not the simple transfer of a Western hegemony onto a backward society. By adapting Western structures to the local challenges, they lose their organic character, which they had in their country of origin, containing a constant element of crises.

6.2.2 Forms of Intervention

After elaborating the ambiguous process of destruction and production in colonial interventions, we should have a closer look onto how these elements of destruction and productions form out. Minsupala shows three plus one forms: direct colonialism, settler colonialism, ruling colonialism, and additionally internal colonialism.

The earlier period of colonialism in Minsupala was defined by direct colonialism: colonial power intervened in military fashion and controlled directly the development of society by establishing a hierarchical order filled down to the lower level with people from the intervening power. Thereby, their task is confined on the controlling and coordinating functions inside the intervened society.

Settler colonialism has a similar form of controlling structures by the intervening power; however, its outstanding characteristic is the expansion of direct colonial involvement in the broader production structures of local society up to the point where the local population gets replaced completely by resettled population of the intervening society.

Ruling colonialism leads us already to the next chapter, where we discuss the retreat of colonially intervening forces and with it the end of direct colonialism in favour of controlling a society's development by establishing structures compatible to the leadership by the originally directly controlling colonial master.

Inner colonialism is a fourth, special form of colonialism, which differentiates itself not by the form of control of a colonized area, but by the existence of a double master-slave situation: the slaves of one part of the colony become colonial masters in the second part of the overall colony. This adds a more complicated element to the general colonial strategy to differentiate people inside the colony according to cultural elements. While divide-et-impera strategies might still be exposed as the work of a common external enemy, internal colonialism leads to changing alliances, with a possible alliance between the second-level colonized with the first-level colonizer. This can be seen in Minsupala on several occasions: the refusal to fight together with Filipino revolutionaries during the first independence movement at the end of the 19th century, the letter by local datus to remain a colony and not get integrated into Philippine independence in the 1920s, and presently the ambiguous stance regarding American military presence in Mindanao as much as the call for American involvement in the peace process by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

6.2.3 Persistence and Change of Colonially Defined Space

Thus, colonialism complicates theoretical arguments of Gramsci as well as of International Political Economy. Recapitulating space as present in their respective analyses: for Gramsci, space was relevant in three areas: the first was the question on national integration between centre and periphery; the second was the transnational orientation of Italy's intellectuals and therefore little contribution to a national culture; and Fordism was an external intervention, altering social structures in the north, while not revolutionizing traditional forms of rule in Italy. For the core of International Political Economy, space is relevant in regard to the extension of a global world order. A national hegemony developed in a western state extends in a historical process over the globe, implementing a world order, which again shapes in a mutual process the social structures of the origin of hegemony. The periphery as a recipient of histori-

cal hegemonic structures has little role in this process, except from completely rejecting the hegemony and revolutionizing world order by developing a counter-hegemony. Now, as discussed above all in postcolonial theory, this eradiating perspective neglects the essential influence that colonialism has on the shaping of the master's countries themselves. With a focus on Minsupala, little can be added to this debate by this research project. What we should hover discuss, is, which assumptions and concepts can be altered regarding "recipients" of colonial intervention.

As seen in the previous chapters and sections, colonialism was more than an intervention into a continuing national society. It was neither a simple projection of western hegemonic orders onto colonial territories, but the development of a new specific colonial style order. Thus, Gramsci's focus in issues of diffusing and integration of spaces should be the point to start. He, too, saw the ambiguous developments of integrating different geographies into one social order, with different options at hand, resulting from different possibilities of alliances. However, as discussed in chapter two, Italy as a nation was a given space for Gramsci. This was not so for colonies. Colonialism profoundly changed concepts of space in the region and extended by far the common denomination of colonialism as drawing the "wrong borderlines". There are five space-related developments which can be derived from the Minsupala example.

First, colonialism destroyed the regional maritime space. The Spanish Crown was the first by taking over the sea, blocking trade routes essential to the regional system. The Paris US-Spanish agreement continued by incorporating the southern islands into a Philippine territory, raising national borders and thereby dividing communities who shared the local space with few kilometres of sea between islands belonging to now nation-states Malaysia and Indonesia. A lasting example is the question of Sabah, formerly territory of the Sulu sultanate and now incorporated into the Malaysian Federal State.

On the other hand, colonialism constructed new spaces. Already the establishment of a Philippine colony was a new defined space, named after a European monarch. The extension of this territory towards the south and the incorporation of Minsupala was a second move in constructing what is now the Republic of the Philippines. Furthermore, this was just one element in a broader colonial integration of master and slave territories, redirecting local communities towards single western powers, strengthening the division from former neighbours and dependence on the colonial masters.

Next to these national and global issues, colonialism shaped internal spaces in accordance to colonial demands. Colonialism has nominally integrated whole areas with borders drawn on maps. But the actual integration was focused on forts and cities, while the hinterland continued to be the realm of resistance against colonialism. The Spanish forts in Minsupala were a case in point. The establishment of settler colonies further broke up local spaces. Up until today, Manila struggles to extend its power to its periphery and especially towards the marshlands and hills in Minsupala.

Fourthly, colonialism sharpened the boundaries between these different levels of integration by different policies towards regional spaces. In Minsupala, this was linked to the development doctrine, and, ignoring liberal ideas about the legal equality of the individual, different policies were developed in regard to the level of development of respective spaces. This encompassed different possibilities to participate in politics, with years of military governorship, as well as

different types of land legislation, creating racist classes of citizenship. While this at least nominally should have allowed in the long-term a harmonization in development, on the Philippines it increased the distinction between different spaces and reproduced prejudices between them.

Last but not least the most deliberate strategy to divide local spaces was *divide-et-impera* politics. The usage of northern communities against the southern sultanates escalated to mistrust between these spaces, defining politics until today. Furthermore, rulers were set against each other as much as ethnic groups, and confessions and *divide-et-impera* politics is used as a counter-insurgency tool throughout.

Taken these different space-related developments together, colonialism in Minsupala created out of a maritime space a national territory which is characterized by its segmentation in different overlapping spaces integrated into the national and global liberal space differently along levels of integration as much as policies and interests of integration. Thus, while Gramsci analyzed the difficulties in hegemonic integration of several social groups on the single level of the national Italian state with cross-border interventions on one side or the other, in Minsupala any hegemonic attempt has to handle social developments not on one level or on two, but on different spaces forming a raised relief map rather than a standard flat map.

6.3 Post-Colonialism as Passive Revolution

The end of direct colonialism was foreseeable during the first half of the 20th century and completed nearly all over the world in the second half. If considering colonialism as a project of integration into an empire, this marked the end of a colonial hegemonic rule. For the time after independence, terms like post- or neo-colonialism have to be defined, marking antagonistically either that colonialism is over or that colonialism is reinstated in another way. Both ascribe the legal and political act of independence a defining role, saying little about material and ideal developments, as much as informal institutional arrangements between colonial and local ruling structures. However, if considering direct colonialism as a several decade long intervention into the ongoing development of a local constituency, our perspective changes and the date of independence as a defining marker in history blurs. More light gets shed on path dependencies of the colonization process; at least as long as we narrow our analysis onto areas with a negotiated or granted post-colonial independence.⁴⁶ Differentiating the phase of direct colonialism from ruling colonialism and post-colonialism, the importance of official independence fades and we can regard the internal process of colonialism as what Gramsci and others discussed under the term passive revolution. For Minsupala the end of the American military campaign in the second half of the 20th century was the key change, not 1935 or let alone 1946. This passive revolution has then two leaders: the external one and the internal one: the external one in form of the colonial master, while the internal one is the colonial bridgehead, part of the local society and at the same time link of the colonial master into this society. The formal ending of colonialism abolished the formal influence by the colonial master on the national level; the previous paragraphs showed however that ruling colonialism had already to

⁴⁶ Fanon highlighted a distinction between different types of independence; with a sole focus on the Philippines this research cannot make claims about anti-colonial revolutionary governments;

rely on local gatekeepers. Formal independence strengthened the role of the gatekeepers but did not end the unequal relation. Colonialism has under this perspective been an external intervention, redirecting a nation's historical development, with a possibly more favourable connection to the external power.

6.3.1 **Trasformismo: Collaboration of Traditional Rulers**

Following this trace, it is possible to reveal a passive revolution which tries to establish on the ruins of the colonially destroyed former hegemony a new hegemony. The kind of new hegemony depends on the kind of colonial strategy. In the, rather exceptional, case of settler colonialism, this hegemony might evolve quite autonomously from past social structures. Gramsci regarded US American society as a rather pure capitalist hegemony, as the settlers liberated themselves from the feudal structures still hunting the European continent on their way to the new continent, building a new hegemony from scratch. Even that has to be qualified, looking at traditionalist communities in rural areas of the US with a strong attachment to ideas and traditions still established in Europe. Meanwhile, US colonialism on Minsupala without a substantial resettlement of US citizens relied strongly on existing power structures. Thus, after the colonially induced crisis, which's end is marked by the termination of military administration by the US army, the colonial power reinstated/re-empowered the *datus* as new gatekeepers in this colony. This strategy thus did not lead to a revolution, but to a passive revolution characterized by the collaboration of traditional rulers. This meant that the American hegemony has not simply been transplanted onto the Moro society, but a double relationship between a local passive revolution and a global hegemony has been established. This new global-local hegemony project can then be labelled less as liberalism, but as *development to liberalism*.

The idea of development got established in several forms. Under the material component we can subsume foreign investments, increased agricultural production, the establishment of local agricultural cooperatives to increase export oriented agricultural businesses, and later on the establishment of extraction industries for mining and logging. In Minsupala this did include American enterprises like rubber and fruit companies, but as well Japanese companies, too, controlling the Abaca plantations in the 1920s. Local elites got integrated as white collar workers and business partners, but mainly as local informal rulers controlling the population, who got provided patronage, allowances, and arms; part of it then got passed on to their constituencies. On part of ideas, local elites have been given training under American tutorship and even send to the US for study tours. All this followed the colonial official idea to develop the indigenous people to a stage where they would be able to live liberalism without US guidance. In some documents this idea of steps of development was even written literally: "advanced sufficiently in civilization" is a phrase used in the public land act of 1919. On the side of institutions, this meant the legal provision of step-by-step establishment of liberal-democratic institutions.

The global-local hegemony is not identical with US liberalism, as the idea is mainly *development to liberalism*, but it includes liberal elements like a liberal democratic state. This US development liberalism is different from the more aristocratic ideas of traditional European empires: different levels of civilization exist, but just as stages, not as natural embodiments, and thus these differences can be overcome by constant development. Finally, a liberal he-

gemony is possible globally. Colonialism must adapt to this hegemony project. There is an implicit racist element in this hegemony project, but not a theoretical one. The biologist racist ideas, with its peak in Nazi Germany, could not be combined with the idea of Woodrow Wilson, who at least in theory saw the liberal equality of the individual and the potential of all individuals to gain the same modernity, the same level of development. Thus it is not possible to establish a class society based on biological racist elements, but just one based on stages of ongoing development; which means in the end that the hegemony has to have an element of development in treating US colonies.

Comparing now this passive revolution/hegemony with ideas that Gramsci had on Italy, there are two key differences to be considered: double hegemonic structures and the redundancy of whole parts of the population.

6.3.2 Dual Hegemonies Between the Local and Global Level

Revolutionizing elements in the colonial passive revolution, introduced by the US hegemonic idea, change the local society profoundly: public and private ownership of land, liberal-democracy elections, ruling by state law, national integrity, national borders, etc. However, what impedes these revolutionary moments is the informal acceptance of a continuing hegemonic rule by the *datus* over the local masses; the “dual” element in this post-crisis situation. While US and local leadership are engaged in a mutual global-local hegemonic relation based on development to liberalism, between the *datus* and the local masses relations are still essentially defined by elements of the traditional hegemony.

Of course, there is a trickledown effect, which the gatekeepers buy into their ruling by integrating themselves into the US hegemony: they inscribe themselves into institutions, material structures and ideas of this new hegemony, amongst others the elective system, the end of (bond-)slavery, the possibility to acquire land independently of the *datus*'s goodwill, free trade and export oriented production, and on the ideas of individualism, liberal possibilities of climbing the social hierarchy, not hindered by sanctified inequality, not hindered by a feudal system which legally categorizes people already by birth. On the other hand, these formal adaptations change little in the communal relations: the traditional feudal relation between the *datus* and the masses prevails, including institutions like the Adat law and the *datus* as the rightful locators of land, power, and resources.

Hierarchies due to capital-labour-division exist in capitalist systems as well and thus the outcome of both hegemonic systems might be similar, not to be discussed here, but the general ideas of the two hegemonies are antagonistic: the liberal idea of a social hierarchy and a feudal idea of a social hierarchy cannot be consistently combined. Thus, this factual combination in a passive revolution leads to tension. This visible tension has been discussed thoroughly by the Hamburger Weltgesellschaftsansatz. They follow the development argument and would argue in the Minsupala example that the *datus* as the traditional power centres are a temporary resistant element against an unstoppable modernization. However, what we see in Minsupala with the *datus* as gatekeepers is, that they are not antagonistic to the new hegemony but they integrate into the new hegemony, they cooperate, and they gain profit out of the new hegemony. While their followers, the local rural masses, are barely addressed by the US and the national Philippine government, the gatekeepers get scholarships, political power, and addi-

tional patronage. Of course, no comparison to their influence before the colonial crisis, but inside this new hegemony they are much more winners than the masses.

While the *Weltgesellschaftsansatz* would expect conflicts between the traditional elites and the perpetrators of modernity, US and later Philippine colonial power, comparably few struggles between the Datu and the US colonial power during the new hegemony established after the end of the colonial crisis in 1913 can be traced. What we see here is a constantly reproduced collaboration between the two. Meanwhile, the potentially modern classes, the labour masses, are still stuck in the traditional feudal relations controlled by the gatekeepers and earn few gains out of the new hegemony. They of course realize the existence of a new system, e.g. they have to vote at least every three years; but liberal-democratic activities are more or less a duty as labour duties for the datu have been before. As previously they helped the landlord on his harvest, in the same way they now go and put the election ballot into the box according to the demand of the same datu, providing him with the opportunity to trade block votes in the new system. The general relation of peasants with the gate keepers does not change, at least during the first half of the 20th century, and thus a double hegemonic structure persists.

6.3.3 Superfluous Classes

The second difference between Gramscian analysis of the passive revolution in Italy and colonialism in Minsupala is the existence of part of social groups which are redundant for the hegemonic integration of the colonial territory, even if they can be used in political power games. Regarding Italian development Gramsci argues that the traditional ruling classes are getting useless: What is the destiny of feudal powers after the liberal revolution? Gramsci discusses how these forces continue their existence as a distinct social group either in a passive revolution, in this case the landlords of southern Italy, or by adaptation to get a new role in the new hegemony, as for example the traditional intellectuals, in Italy the Catholic clergy, which continued as intellectuals stabilizing the society. These social classes get dragged into the present, even if they outlived their original role in a passed hegemony. They got new functions in society, but in general they are a "dying class"; this dying is understood in a social sense: their function is not needed any longer. However, as said they can transform and get either a new function as an old social group or diffuse as individuals into new social groups. This way, feudal landlords might develop into industrialists, or (in a hypothetical thinking, as a proletarian revolution did not take place in Italy) bourgeois individuals into proletarians.

This reasoning by Gramsci does not dismiss social classes on a physical base; they transform, but their single members are still here as individuals, as physical persons. What we see in the colonial situation of Minsupala is different in the sense that the masses are not needed in their physical existence. Minsupala got integrated into the colonial system for its natural resources, for its vast tracks of land, and for its geographical/strategic position in Southeast Asia. However, the local masses are barely needed as social groups in this new hegemony. They became a hindrance for investors and settlers. And, at least in the general perception of the Philippines and the US, there were even not so many of them, as Minsupala was considered an empty land. This introduces a potentially destructive and thus violent conflict into the new hegemony right from the beginning. It is difficult to establish a hegemony were big part of the population is redundant, because the idea of hegemony is to integrate mutual needed classes on the base of a power-dependent compromise, not to integrate classes which are superfluous.

This perception matches with the *kind* of colonialism established in Minsupala. A colonially induced passive revolution with an unequal integration into the global hegemony of a liberal-capitalist state can possibly be grasped by hegemonic consent-oriented terms. Such a revolution would be controlled by leading forces, which might be leading states, regions, centres in a global world order, or later on transnational classes. And similar to the proletariat in a capitalist national system, whole regions of the periphery take over the role of subordinated classes. This has widely been analyzed by International Political Economy. However, what is essentially different in Minsupala is a strategy of settler colonialism, similar to the development of the frontier in Western North America which replaced indigenous populations. In Minsupala the development extends over formal independence with similar consequences: the sidelining of the local population by settlers, which step-by-step take over all societal functions. All indicators show that natives have had few integration possibilities. They could be integrated as labourers in the agribusiness plantations, and then continue the liberal rags-to-riches story via liberal education. In the service sector, some natives found employment, in restaurants, local food markets, barter trade and smuggling, fishing, the pearl business, etc. However, most of the plantation workers are settlers and Chinese-Filipinos are traditionally strong in the trade sector. Three areas of engagement remain: first, Moro hired as overseas workers, leaving their home behind; secondly they became political objects, providing tradable block votes for the integrated local power centres in return for patronage; third, they became recruits, hired by the local power centres and armies on a whole range from military recruits, paramilitaries, private armies, and criminals; the whole arch of violent production services. All three alternative possibilities to standard liberal production functions like agriculture, industry, or services, are potentially tense in a liberal hegemony.

Thus, for questions of peace they get integrated into the new hegemony. However, this integration is not based on a mutual necessary, functionally productive compromise on the global-local level, but by putting the local population on hold by a mix of patronage and violence.

6.3.4 Inherent Element of Crisis in the Passive Revolution

Summarized, we have a global-local colonial hegemony, 1) integrating the local masses via a passive revolution leading to a non-organic, tension-lad double hegemony and 2) a non-needed population, hindering the attempt to take over land and resources by global and national actors, where capital is much more important to provide the necessary means of productions rather than the available unskilled labour in Minsupala. Furthermore, skilled workers have been transferred via a resettlement strategy.

Thus, while the aspirations of the former rulers get calmed by cooptation, the colonially induced crisis does not get solved for the peasants by the US induced liberal hegemony, but just stabilized by pulling their former leadership from opposing the intervention. During the 1950s/60s this passive revolution in Minsupala has been confronted with an escalating double crisis, result of two changing social structures.

On the one hand the co-opted local power centres slowly lost their position in the strategy of a development-based hegemony. The gatekeepers lost out by two ways: while earlier settlers, which moved to Minsupala, still sought local power centres for leadership, now numbers of settlers increased manifold, and thus there was no tight equilibrium between indigenous people and settlers anymore, which would have to be balanced by the local traditional elites.

Previously, settlers were in constant fear of the portrayed local savages, consequence of prejudices established during Spanish colonialism, just to be tackled by the strong hands of the Datus. Now, that the relational figures changed and settlers outnumbered indigenous people three to one, such protection by Datus was not necessary any longer⁴⁷. The second challenge for local traditional elites was the changing settler structure: from being mainly former soldiers and resettled poor people, new settlement activities were enterprises of national elites. With their investments, they or their deputies moved to Minsupala, becoming new power players in the south. Thus, local traditional elites were sidelined by reduced protection demands by settlers as well as the establishment of new settler elites. This way, however, the stabilizing moment of the established passive revolution was undermined and tensions between local traditional elites and the national hegemony increased. As seen in the previous chapters, this situation led to widespread violence; but not as directed fights against the new settler elites and neither in an organized common struggle of indigenous people, but as widespread violence all over: Datus against Datus, Datus against settlers, settlers against settlers, settlers against indigenous masses, settler elites against settler peasants, old against new settlers, etc. While for many people this meant destruction of life and possessions, some could make a fortune in this time, using the crisis situation to their own advantage.

The second part of the crisis undermining the passive revolution was related to the local masses and should give this widespread violence a new direction. We discussed above, how the strategy of settler colonialism had little use for local masses. But as they were physically present, they had to be dealt with, preventing harm to the overall system. Although some Moro activists claim genocide intentions of Philippine national politicians and armed forces, there are no signs that during the 1950s and '60s there were any plans on part of the administration to solve the problem of perceived superfluous people in Minsupala by an organized genocide. Not that such a strategy would lack historical references in other parts of the world. But even leaving aside moral hazards for such a plan, the Philippine government would have threatened the overall integration into a liberal world order with a genocide, undermining the hegemonic basis of liberalism; a risk unlikely to be taken in a situation where the US led Free World was under increasing pressure from a socialist alternative. Thus, next to military suppression an option was to improve integration measures and it found its embodiment in the National Commission on Integration. Their scholarships formed a new social group, professional like lawyers, engineers, and social scientists, ready for integration into a liberal hegemony; but undermining the traditional ruling of the local elites and thus the dual-hegemonic structure defining the passive revolution.

Thus, while resettlements can be considered the underlying cause of crisis, undermining the structural base of the passive revolution, it is the change of the position of the Datus and the establishment of a new class, the young professionals, which escalates these structural changes into an organic crisis of the passive revolution.

⁴⁷ The ethnicity-based security dilemma was of course most of the time a perceived one, not necessarily a material one, with few accounts of communal violence not instigated by elites.

6.4 Challenges of a Passive Revolution and Handling its Crisis

6.4.1 Attempts of Renewed Liberal Developments via Cultural Retreat

Since the crisis became visible at the end of the 1960s the national leadership reacted with a push for a renewed liberal hegemony above all by expanding material measures of development. This new liberal hegemony for Minsupala has been offered at three crucial occasions in different forms: in the 1976 Tripoli agreement; the 1987 Philippine constitution and the call for the establishment of the ARMM; and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF. If we compare these three attempts, i.e. two outcomes of peace processes and one outcome of the new constitution/local autonomy, we can trace the same idea of development as already established during the US administration.

In difference to that first development project, this time the state acknowledges Moros as a distinct cultural minority inside the state with no explicit demand for assimilation to become equals. Relating to this cultural distinctiveness, the renewed development hegemony project offers some kind of autonomy. This would, however, change little on the factual arrangements known from the first hegemonic attempt during the 1920s to 50s; as already during the first hegemony the local traditional elites had some autonomy to handle local relation as gatekeepers in a more feudal way than the global-local hegemony of liberal democracy actually was supposed to accept according to its liberal principles. The further retreat of liberal-hegemony is the acceptance that now not just in practice but legally a space is established for a different form of local ruling in a non-liberal way. It is furthermore an implicit acknowledgement that liberalism on the national level is a Western-catholic production, with Christian faith-institutions strongly shaping and influencing the development of the Philippines.

Overall, none of the three attempts to re-establish liberal hegemony in Minsupala changed considerably the underlying principles from the offers of the passive revolution some decades before and therefore missed to address the inherent tensions of this arrangement. Autonomy would legalize the mentioned exceptions, while the general guidelines remain the same: liberal development, free trade, national integrity, formal liberal-electoral institutions, etc. Accepting a national minority with different needs in support of material development and acknowledgement of local cultures and customs is no adaptation of the development paradigm or its implementation; a focus on cultural issues and formal political institutions neglects to discuss how the local power system does not fit with the national/global liberal ideas in the first place. Above all there is no offer for the professional class, which was this analysis' second change regarding social forces leading to the crisis, if not giving the new institutions the power to replace the old double-hegemonic system.

6.4.2 Continuing Violent Social Hierarchies in Post-Colonial Spaces

Accordingly, violence has to remain a constant administrative mean towards the local communities: in form of cooptation as well as in form of physical violence.

The reference to the legality of military measures should thereby not blur the picture of the overall process of a violently conducted struggle between political interests. This can prominently be shown along the core conflict issue: land. While peasants were working the soil, land

speculators with good connections to the state bureaucracy acquired the same soil, selling it to investors or keeping it as own investment. Once needed Philippine institutions were engaged to expel the peasants from these lands. Without land titling, they could be considered as squatters and thus it was the right of the proprietor as well as the Philippine government to expel them, if necessary by using physical violence. However, the reference to the rule of law is misleading, as the rule of law was not applied in the first place, were connections and bribery recognized proprietors even though they never sat foot on these lands and had no other claim on it either. As outlined above, this combination of unruly land titling in the first place and the seemingly appliance of the liberal right of property in the second phase, harmed above all peripheral areas, were indigenous communities and lower classes missed knowledge, money, and connections. If these areas were rich of natural resources, the problem became even more virulent.

Second form of violence was the repression of critique and public reveal of shortcomings of the nominal liberal order. While national politics is heatedly debated all over the country, critique on local rulers is much more dangerous, above all if these rulers have monopolized power in certain areas. Thus, in the provinces journalists and civil society activists live a dangerous life, threatened not just by illegal detention, but as well by torture and murder, conducted by local police forces or private armies. The insurgency increased the risks for activists as being labelled as insurgents and thus becoming a target for the Armed Forces of the Philippines as well.

Third form of violence is election fraud. This encompasses a broad range from fraud to physical violence. One form is vote buying. Vote buying starts with patronage networks, gimmicks during election rallies, to cash handovers for the right choice at the ballot box. To augment chances, flying voters are a further tactic: voters get carried from one election station to the next and at each station the hired people cast another ballot. Cheating on the other side of the ballot box encompasses bribing election officers to fill out multiple own ballots for the right candidate and loose opposing ballots. Another lever for the right result is to cheat during the counting process, changing the counted numbers to favour the right candidate. While such fraud can be regarded as institutional violence, Philippine elections are marred by physical violence as well. This encompasses again two sides: on the one hand physical violence is directed against the immediate political rival, shooting candidates or preventing them by violent means from filing their candidacy. The other targets are the voters themselves. The described forms of election violence happen above all in areas, where elite groups rival each other. In areas where elite groups have monopolized power to a certain extent voters vote in the desired way, declared by the local ruler; with threats of physical violence against villages presenting a different quota than asked for. These demands extend then to votes for the national level, so that the local rulers can trade local block votes to national aspirants. Infamous is the "clean slate" when in the 2007 elections in Maguindanao all senatorial candidates embraced by the local rulers won the elections in the province by a fair margin.

6.5 Revolutionary Attempts of Resistance and/or Progress

Thus, as global and national liberalism was over decades not able to outline a new strategy of liberal development to include marginalized people and had to resort to the described different measures of violence, a series of alternative options to handle the crisis developed in Minsupala along the process described in detail in the last three chapters.

6.5.1 Failing Secular-Nationalist Revolutions After a War of Manoeuvre

The national-liberal anti-colonial hegemony project offered as solution national self-determination in a secular version. The separation of Minsupala would be based on a secular basis and the project defines the Bangsamoro nation not as a Muslim minority in a general Filipino nation but bases the alternative on the anti-colonial liberation of a territory, through which the nation itself just forms in its modern version. A similar argument can be found in Fanon's writings on revolution. (Fanon 1981 [1961]) It offers furthermore a role for the new professionals-class as they might be the leader of a modern revolutionary Moro movement and nation; them as the rightful social force to lead secession, rather than the collaborators of the traditional elites, which were discredited. However, this kind of hegemony is flawed in the sense that it is strongly rejectionist (Castells 1997), defining its characteristics out of opposition to the Philippine state rather than on an own positive project. The movement developed a definition what a Moro is not, a Filipino, but the only positive definition encompassing all possible members is the fight against the Philippines. This is above all peculiar for the local peasants, as the project does not assign them any different role than the liberal hegemony. By rejecting any relations to the socialist movement while not presenting own ideas on the matter, liberal development remains at the core of the anti-colonial struggle as well. Even though such development would be enhanced, more fair and inclusive than the Filipino one, it says nothing on qualitative social change so to give the peasants a different societal position than that they already had. On the contrary, by recurring not just to the struggle itself, but to the glorious past of the sultanates, the leadership moves the discussion of local structures away from discussing it as a structural deficient system, a violent system, towards a moral discussion of the failings of the current traditional leadership. There is no public discussion of considering traditional institutions as an outdated social force; on the contrary, the *datus* get included as a factor in the future by putting the past in the centre of the definition of a new Moro nation.

Thereby, the movement created a tense inconsistency: on the one hand the new nation gets born out of the struggle against liberal hegemony including its collaborators and on the other hand is the nation's culture based on indicators coming from the mythical past. A situation, Fanon discussed along the battles in Algeria. He argued that the reference to a glorious past, he referred to *negritude*, has not the power to overcome colonialism but just the struggle against colonialism would be able to develop a new nation. This tension gets not solved by the MNLF's public positioning. The leadership had of course their reasons, with Middle Eastern monarchies and local traditional elites being an essential backing. This eased after the first peace agreement, with local elite support fading, but the movement was not able to use this new liberty. As we saw in the empirical part, this rejectionist idea should put the movement in trouble the moment they sat down to negotiate peace and accept an administrative role inside

the Philippine government. As outlined in the previous chapters, there were many single arguments on the failing of the 1996 FPA, Misuari was an absent leader, he missed the point to establish local connections, his officers did not have the technical skills to lead the sub-state, the national government was not a strong support as expected, the traditional leaders did their part in rivalling the new leadership, corruption and patronage for the own people was high in the Misuari administration, many guerrillas were looking finally for some reward of their struggle. All these are steps on the way to failure. But behind these operational challenges, structural developments have to be analyzed. The question is: why did the whole process of local autonomy fail in just five years after challenging the Philippine government over three decades in a guerrilla war?

The analysis is, that the revolutionary struggle was weak because it never broke with the liberal hegemony of the past; it tried to improve it, but that was little substance to back a revolutionary terminology. People did not support the movement nearly thirty years for having a new liberal administrator to continue the work government institutions did with more and less success over the previous years. It was the big discrepancy between the revolutionary rhetoric and the actual outcome of the peace process and the following years of “revolutionary government”, which made the clientelist politics, common all over the islands since decades, became an unforgivable betrayal once practiced by the movement’s leadership.

Thus, two hypotheses can be gained from our research: first, secular-liberal anti-colonial revolutionaries once in a governmental position fail not because of revolutionary change, but because of a lack of revolutionary change in comparison to their revolutionary rhetoric. This is opposed to socialist revolutions, where revolutionary programs led in some cases to extreme suffer for society, for example during USSR’s industrialization programs or the Great Leap Forward in China. Secondly, this development is not consequence of lack of intellectual capabilities; Misuari in exile would have had twenty years to develop intellectually programs for the Moro nation. It was the lack of cooperation with the targeted constituency, which would allow connecting revolutionary concepts with the demands and challenges of the targeted constituency. What Fanon discusses as the creative process of revolutionary independence is the common struggle, which unites leadership and followers, urban and rural people, young and old. This common struggle never took place in Minsupala, with a leadership in exile and local units fighting their own battles in their own regions with allegiance to local commanders and families rather than to the movement as a whole. Thus, programmatic and integrational deficiencies were interdependent developments, leading to the failure of the movement.

6.5.2 The Long Game of Religious Revolutionaries

Meanwhile, the national-religious anti-colonial hegemony project presented the situation upside-down: their project was more revolutionary than their language might have taught in the first years. While rhetoric of reform and moral renewal led them to consider autonomy even after the failure of the 1976 agreement, the religiously based concept is a clear break with the liberal ruling as well as with the traditional elites, the two legs of the double hegemony out of passive revolution. Even if by the war alliance in the early 1970s and by northern opponents the term “Islam” got used to portray an Islamic bloc, the understanding of Islam of the national-religious movement differs essentially from the Islam of the traditional elites. Similar to

the split of the Catholic Church in the rest of the country, religion in the Moro areas, too, had a revolutionary and a reactionary embodiment.

For the traditional elites Islam became an important factor in containing their legitimacy, understood as a cultural concept, adaptable to the liberal state. Islam as a defining identity of a cultural minority was easier to harmonize with the Philippine state than the reference to past governmental institutions like the sultanate or the communal land; accepting such institutions parallel to the liberal hierarchy would be difficult; accepting that a cultural community forms an interest group is perfectly plausible to a liberal system which accepts other interests groups as employers, unions, youth and women groups, or environmental groups, as well.

For the religious-nationalist movement, Islam became a revolutionary ideology, not just rejecting the Philippine state but with it the whole passive-revolutionary structure in Minsupala. Islam in the Moro national-religious movement differs from the ahistorical connotations which Wahabist and anti-Islamic activists share. By referring to the specific history of the Bangsa Moro the movement is able to integrate reference to a mythical past with modern elements; and undermines the sanctified inequality, traditional elites try to legitimize out of Islam. This can be demonstrated along the three components of society. It offered a new idea: to the liberal idea of individual strength, the project put the idea of strength out of moral integrity of a community. Claiming Islam as defining the community's boundaries made it easily understandable for the broad population. It was an indicator rejecting the Philippine hegemony and at the same time more understandable than the revolutionary identity of the secular movement. It was furthermore connectable to day-to-day-experiences of the local population, the common sense of the lower classes. It rejected, too, the idea of sanctified equality, with God being the only ruler of men, all people become equal in front of God. Furthermore, this idea did not remain pure propaganda, but it got diffused and inscribed into the material and institutional components as well. This had not been done "additionally" but as part of the notion of religious "integralism".

The secular revolutionary movement split up questions on institutions, on ideas, and on material development. All three have been developed separately, so it remained unclear how to deduct from the idea of a Moro nation an economic reform programme or vice versa, let alone the revolutionary institutional structure copied from Marxist liberation movements, which for all other purposes have been rejected. The idea of being a Moro does not have anything to say about how a future nation should be ruled in qualitative difference from the Philippine republic; the only blueprint available is even less attractive: institutions modelled after a hegemony passed since 300 years and which already failed once to prevail in a changing global order.

Meanwhile, the religious project can via religious integralism combine institutions, material developments, and ideas into one notion, harmonizing with each other. The described ideas harmonize with the complements on the institutional side of the hegemony project: with a judiciary based on the sacred texts of Islam, adapted to the needs of modernity; the council of religious teachers at the top of the movement; community groups, religious schools, etc. Borders become again more permeable as the religious project embraces the concept of a regional community of faith based brothers; allowing to connect to counter-hegemony movements throughout the south where Islam is a factor; without, however, forgetting the Moro specifics and characteristics. The material structures remain thereby the most fragile and am-

biguous in this hegemony project. The proponents point for example at the religious duty of giving alms and support for the weak which should ease the tension between rich and poor in a religiously based society, while referring to the outcome of the revolutionary struggle defining an Islamic material system, with no role model available in modern times. The closer relation between leadership, rank-and-file, and the targeted population in comparison to the secular Moro movement might allow what Fanon proposed for the Algerian movement: that the common struggle will develop the right idea for the post-revolutionary time.

By highlighting these advantages over the competing hegemonies, it is not the intention to claim that the movement is just successful because a wise leadership sets things right in the different components. The success of the movement is related to the ability to construct a hegemony project which is able to connect to the general tendencies of society: it overcomes the passive revolution and its main proponents, which is in crisis, and integrates the social groups on the rise in a mutual process of learning and teaching. What McKenna termed the “new professionals” are at the core of this hegemony project, not just forming the leadership of the movement, but at the same time as the social group hindered on its development by the acceptance of traditional rulers by the liberal hegemony. They have been at the core of the NL-AC as well; but that movement neglected that they alone are not strong enough to overcome traditional structures in a society still strongly characterized by rural relations with a liberal programme. Thus, we can summarize that next to a consistent hegemony project, the NR-AC was successful in combining new professionals and rural peasants in a united movement, opposing both legs of the double-layer concept of the LP-PC hegemony project. It united the two social groups which were each sacrificed by the LP-PC proponents: the national government sacrificed political liberalism for the alliance with the traditional elites and vice versa the traditional elites sacrificed material protection of the peasants from land speculators and army in exchange for the same alliance. It remains to be seen if after a peace agreement the movement is able to uphold a universal interest via religious integralism over each social group’s interests.

6.5.3 Challenge of Multiple Colonialism for Socialist Movements

As has been seen in the previous chapters, the socialist movement struggled hard in the Moro areas to further their cause. The limited amount of information and data qualifies any generalization, but one of the underlying reasons seems to be the challenge how to deal with “multiple colonialism” (Wadi 2008) and the double-hegemony outlined above.

The socialist movement on the Philippines shows three core strengths: intellectual sophistication and revolutionary-progressive offers; skills in political organization; and a community-based focus of struggle. The first two derive from the expertise of their leaders as student organizers and progress-oriented social scientists. However, as seen from the NL-AC movement, this is not enough. Thus, the third element is crucially important: the development of theory and praxis *in cooperation* with local communities in a mutual relationship. Combining case studies on the socialist movement’s successes and failures all over the country, this relationship can be extracted as the core strength of the movement nationwide (Rutten 2008).

This essential point was, however, missing in the Moro areas, partly as a structural issue, partly as shortcoming of the movement’s activities. The structural issue is the necessary two-front-war between a liberal modernization hegemony and cultural conservatism of a neglected and

suppressed ethnically defined community. With the socialist principles antagonistic to feudal structures as much as to liberal development, alliances with powerful social forces in the Moro areas have been impossible, and violent confrontations with the government forces as much as with local elite's vigilantes were the consequence.

The point more strongly in hands of the movement itself has been the challenge to grasp multiple colonialism. In the dyadic battle between imperialism and anti-imperial Maoism there was no space for the argument, that the Philippines themselves might have profited from internal colonialism, independently from the imperial overlords. This added to the general cultural prejudices, path dependences of centuries of colonial education depicting the Moros as an inferior society. Accordingly, the Moro question remained a side-issue in the overall anti-imperial struggle, overlooking the tensions inside this multiple-layer structure on the Moro areas to the possible advantage as well as disadvantage of the nationwide insurgency.

The recent development of a stronger focus on civil society and ideological openness allows new possibilities for the socialist movement to deal with previous deficiencies and put the strengths of the movement back into the game: academic sophistication and community-based participatory development of theory and praxis.

6.5.4 Transnational Resistance in a Transnational World?

One topic which can be addressed furthermore is the question on transnational hegemony. Secular nationalism was embedded into an international cooperation with other groups in its anti-colonial fight. This was by it-self no revolution of the international state system. The support by Libya and others was an international cooperation between states and states-in-becoming, as the anticipated Moro nation state. It was an international cooperation not hindered by antagonistic values; but rather than the result of common values the result of coinciding interests. The broader interests have furthermore been quite different between the actors involved, with little in common between Gaddafi's Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the OIC. There are meanwhile few signs, that Misuari or Libya was able or attempted to establish a common transnational community. This is partially different for the religious movement. The religious movement highlighted from the beginning the transnational component of developing less in cooperation with governments but by connecting to people, teachers, and movements met in exile. Secondly, complementing the autarkic attempts of the NR-AC project, just private support has been sought for, i.e. transnational relations rather than international government support. While this was, too, consequence of rejection by the OIC as well as lessons-learned from the MNLF's subordination under the demands of the OIC, it opened up a transnational development, factually transcending borders and redirecting the struggle from the inter-national oriented anti-colonial movement of the NL-AC. While this redirection might have been externally forced, it made the movement stronger on the long run, not dependent on the national interests of foreign countries.

Nonetheless, the NR-AC remained a local movement. Its strengths results out of local institutions, adaptations to local ideas, and integration of local social groups. The transnational element gets thereby blurry. The movement was formally never integrated into a transnational movement, and any indicators of cooperation in such a movement signal modest activities and results over the last decades. Taken together we can argue that the Moro NR-AC is a local movement which gains its strength from the synthesis of transnational ideas and develop-

ments with local structures and characteristics. While the OIC, nonetheless its rhetoric, remains a regional international body, the NR-AC forms part of a new transnational development integrating the region. Its characteristic is not just to bypass state institutions, but by developing out of a multitude of relations. This diversity, too, rejects the picture of transnational Islamic communities as carried by such organizations as Jemaah Islamiyah or Al Qaida. These organizations have no role in the transnational process where the NR-AC is involved. It will be interesting to see, if these processes ever institutionalize, and if yes, how. For that, we might have to wait until the Moro NR-AC is forming a local hegemony, and others might follow in other countries.

6.6 Summary

Taking together and before continuing to the dynamics of the crisis in the next chapter, the following paragraphs should outline the progress out of this study from the starting points outlined in the second chapter regarding hegemonies and their crises.

6.6.1 Hegemony in Post-Colonial Spaces of the 21st Century

What we have seen regarding hegemonies in the periphery are dynamics which resulted and are still closely connected to colonialism. Colonialism has been discussed as a destructive intervention into a society and the starting point towards a hegemonic integration into a global world order via a passive revolution.

Thereby, several forms of colonialism can be differentiated: direct colonialism based on military subduing of the colony, settler colonialism displacing and replacing existing communities, ruling colonialism by using local collaborators as colonial representatives, and finally internal colonialism, breaking up the binary structure of colonizers and colonized. Such a differentiation helps to trace the path dependences of colonialism, avoiding to discuss negotiated formal independence as a sharp break in the historic development of a society in the periphery. It furthermore allows analysing the role of local social groups in a country's development before and after formal independence.

While direct colonialism is then strongly related to the destructive moment of colonialism, replacing a pre-colonial hegemonic system by force, ruling colonialism starts early on with the production of a new hegemonic structure in form of a passive revolution, using traditional locally ruling groups to control society as a whole. This form of external influence can overlap with direct colonialism, gaining gradually on influence and does not finish with formal independence but can as a structural element extend via the form of integration into a hegemonic world order.

We have thereby seen that such integration into a world order does not mean to replace one hegemony by another. Rather the new situation develops as a hybrid situation between intervening and traditional ruling structures. This double-hegemonic system allows that while material structures, ideas, and institutions of a liberal world order become part of a local society, including global-market-oriented economies, liberal culture, and formal liberal-democratic government institutions including elections, traditional social relations and hierarchies persist, i.e. clientelism, conservative norms and sanctified inequalities, and informal institutional arrangements. Other than seen by some modernization theorists, these elements do not stand

next to each other, where modern elements would gradually replace these old structures, e.g. modern codified law traditional justice systems, but they form a hybrid system with characteristics different from liberal world order principles as much as from traditional hegemonies based on feudal characteristics. This hybrid system is characterized by the key role of traditional elites, bridging as gatekeepers national and global liberal world order with local communities. They represent those communities towards the liberal world as much as the state towards the local communities on the positive side and at the same time are able to use local communities as bargaining tokens towards the liberal national state and national resources to control local communities, with all four functions interrelated. Thus, the traditional elites get a strong position inside this multilevel governance system.

This development is further complicated by the other two forms of colonialism: settler colonialism and inner colonialism distort these multiple levels of governance even further. This is related to a change of space by colonialism. As analyzed, since colonial intervention several alterations of space have taken place: the destruction of regional spaces by the introduction of colonial borders; punctual integration of important parts of colonies, as ports and forts; and later on the production of a national space and the redirection of a society towards a colonial master and consequently a liberal world order. Settler and inner colonialism add to this alteration of spaces, with local and settler communities interacting with each other as well as the spaces of origin. If this gets furthermore enhanced by discriminating policies as well as divide-impera strategies, the developing space is far from being explainable by a territorial flat map, but presents a relief map presenting a patchwork of different spaces. This patchwork encompasses accordingly spaces of importance and unimportance and results in a situation, where whole groups of people become physically superfluous for the existing global-local social relation, an element not addressed by hegemony theory.

6.6.2 Conflicts in Post-Colonial Spaces of the 21st Century

The stability of this hegemonic order in the periphery is thereby challenged by several conflicts.

From all elements described above, forms of colonial intervention, changing patchwork spaces, and double hegemonic structures in form of a local passive revolution derive structural conflicts as inherent elements of crisis. While the arrangement promises to balance the interests of external intervention and local power players, the acceptance of a duality of hegemony does not harmonize opposed social concepts. The combination of a market-based economy with clientelist practices leads to what in general is termed as “corruption”, i.e. inefficient allocation of resources regarding to liberal economic principles; sanctified inequality is inconceivable with the liberal paradigm of human equality at birth; and block votes and fraud are not compatible with liberal free and fair elections.

This is on the other hand not necessarily a structure to be changed, but rather perceived by liberal proponents as the lesser evil in regard to other existing conflicts. This encompasses above all the existence of excluded social groups. The existence of these social groups in spaces of interest for global-local hegemonic system can be handled by force as much as by these perceived inefficiencies. Peasants and indigenous groups are present when cattle ranges, golf clubs, logging activities, and mines and hydropower dams get developed on their land and displacement and allocation have to be organized, if violence should be avoided and govern-

ments want not to be responsible for mass starvations. The integration into a liberal hegemony of these people would take not just extra resources but a supported change of local economic structures from an extractive economy towards a stronger labour-oriented economy.

This partial development, an early example in the Moro areas has been the scholarship-program of the 1950s, leads to a further conflict: the rise of new social groups outside the arrangement of a double hegemony. This new generation of white collar workers⁴⁸ as well as their enterprises are hindered by these informal arrangements between a liberal national and world order and local traditional rulers. While similarly dissatisfied with the current situation as the social groups excluded by the liberal development economy, their interests are different and thus alliances between these two groups are not a given.

6.6.3 Crises in Post-Colonial Spaces of the 21st Century

Thus, a crisis of such a passive revolution in countries of the periphery comes to no surprise. It is based not just on the structural reasons outlined above, but as well the political activity of social groups. The organic crisis has developed with counter-hegemony mobilization and organization by the new class born out of the liberal development hegemony and now hindered by its constraints: new professionals and intellectuals. Although the factionalism and dynamics of the last forty decades, it has been them who led all major movements for political change.

Secondly, the political awareness of excluded social groups has been raised as well, above all in the non-Moro areas, but as well in the Moro areas. This is visible in the increasing number of civil society organisations as well as the political outspokenness of non-Muslim indigenous groups, which have not been heard before the 1980s. Thereby, they can connect to an increasingly global civil society structure critical of the liberal development paradigm and use the tension between a liberal world order and local power structures in obtaining support for democratic and peace development activities.

Thirdly, the use of violence in the overall system to repress dissent led to a backlash and triggered political awareness rather than eliminate manifest conflict lines. Thus, rather than securing the current system, the excessive use of violence furthermore undermines the hegemonic character of the passive revolution. On the one hand it highlights the weak position of the ruling groups to handle the outlined conflicts in a productive manner, and on the other hand the usage of violence to suppress broader social dissent is not selective enough, above all with ill-trained government forces, alienating local communities even further from state institutions.

We have, however, seen that the outcome is not a straightforward struggle between suppressors and suppressed as supporters of dyadic approaches as well as conflict parties argue. In this double-hegemonic structure with different power figures involved, in combination with different interests of social groups hindered by these structures, leaves similarly to Gramsci's analysis of the Italian nation-state several possibilities for coalitions in hegemony projects open. These we have seen in the analytical categories of LP-PC, NL-AC, NR-AC, and

⁴⁸ As mentioned, a further study should analyze the role of blue collar worker and service sector employees, deployed as oversea workers in other countries, in the change of local social structures, not been done in this study.

ST-AC. While the first might have integrated global level and professionals towards a more liberal society, the NL-AC movement tried to unite all non-Filipino groups, but failed to integrate the interests of the excluded lower classes, i.e. peasants and highlanders, while being tacit on the currently collaborative traditional elites. Meanwhile was as seen the socialist movement not able to handle the multi-colonial spaces in the Moro areas, neglecting the special demands of the colonially lowest classes and thereby being surprised, that part of the Moro people referred to the imperialists in search for help against internal colonialism. Lastly, the religious-national movement has been able to form a coalition of professionals and local poor, i.e. peasants and urban labourers, which up until now seems to be the strongest counter-hegemony project.

This influence of political mobilisation and organisation in detail as well as the political process in general highlight the decisive influence of conflict dynamics. These dynamics of the crisis have not been analyzed in most of the historical materialist analyses, with the crisis being just an in-between on the way to establish another hegemonic situation. What we try to find out in the next chapter is how the dynamics of violence did not just change the possibilities to establish or make successful one of the four options of renewed hegemony differentiated in the Minsupala context, but how these developments changed the content of the struggle itself. The next chapter will furthermore trace how the crisis reproduced itself and developed a situation favourable to some social groups; not just relative to other social groups in conflict but relative to their possible position in a post-crisis situation. We can then ask at the end, how this crisis and its reproduction integrates into a global hegemony which postulates peace as the consequence of liberal development.

7 Grounding II: Dynamics of Crises

After discussing in the previous chapter societal developments through hegemony, conflicts, and crises, this chapter will now have a closer look onto the *dynamics* of an ongoing crisis and the usage of direct violence. After recapitulating in an overview revolutionary methods used in Minsupala, we start by exploring the role of violence in colonial interventions and subsequent passive revolutions. We follow then by exploring the production of violence in crisis situations and continue by analyzing the role of violence for counter-hegemony projects. Section five discusses then the reproduction of a violence system in continuing crises and its main profiteers. Concluding, we will combine this information to discuss violence in its different social situations: as form of social control during hegemony, as directed violence to overcome a societal crisis, and finally as a self-reproducing violence system prolonging the crisis.

7.1 Methods of Revolution in Minsupala

Hegemony projects try in a situation of crisis to develop or restore hegemonic control over their constituency. According to historical materialist analysis, they have to work a two-track policy: wars of manoeuvre and wars of position: the first a direct attack against existing power structures and the second the establishment of alternative hegemonic structures, including institutions, to integrate social groups in developing an alternative universal interest.

7.1.1 Liberal-Post-Colonial Hegemony Project

Focusing on the reaction of the LP-PC hegemony in Minsupala, there are three key ruptures during which the LP-PC hegemony got challenged; each time it reacted with different measures.

The first encompasses the colonial integration into the Philippine nation, the second the complete social restructuring due to the resettlement programs and the third after the end of the dictatorship. The first period was characterized by an initially strong focus on wars of manoeuvre to destroy the Datu hegemony of the south; with full force during the US military occupation and its pacification campaign. The aim was thereby not to conquer the existing institutions, but to destroy them. The implementation of alternative institutions, including the Torrens system, the constabulary, and colonial (later on Philippine) bureaucracy, can be regarded as a war of position. Further programs were the establishment of model communities, study tours for local elites to Manila and the US, and training programs for elite's sons. This turned out to be quite successful, even though in the local communities traditional institutions remained the defining structures.

The second effort to stabilize its hegemony the LP-PC hegemony project had to make after the poorly managed resettlement programs towards the south, which led to an essential restructuring of Minsupala's society. The LP-PC leadership personified by Marcos reacted by a strong war of manoeuvre, sending troops to quell the unrest. Soon however it became clear, that this strategy brought no fast success. Thus, additional measures by the regime were taken which can be regarded as a war of position. This included the establishment of diplomatic relations with external supporters of the insurgency, provision of space for Islamic family law, the acknowledgement of traditional Moro institutions, and finally the peace process. Meanwhile,

provision of pork barrels for defectors and divide-et-impera tactics to split the leadership are rather direct measures to undermine the central structure of the counter-hegemony movement and thus part of a war of manoeuvre. Meanwhile, against the nationwide opposition, Marcos focused above all on direct violence. These measures stabilized the situation for some years, but were unsuccessful in the end to cover up the insufficiencies of the hegemony under the martial law regime.

Thus, the third attempt to renew LP-PC's hegemony in Minsupala followed soon afterwards. This time, the government constrained itself in its war of manoeuvre towards the secessionist insurgency, while continuingly using violence against the Maoist opposition. Towards the competition with the NL-AC movement, it used a series of war of position measures. Thus, already in the constitution of 1987 the national leadership included provisions on a local autonomy. The establishment of the ARMM and the following peace process were further elements to extend its hegemony over the constituency previously lost to the NL-AC. While the peace agreement combined measures of co-opting the leadership with broader reform programs, during the following years just the first measurement was implemented with success.

In consequence the hegemony remained precarious, leaving space for the NR-AC movement, with which the LP-PC hegemony project currently struggles, alternating between violence and negotiations including broader wars of position activities like the support of the Bangsamoro Development Agency and recently the Bangsamoro Management Institute, which by hawkish commentators got misunderstood as give-ins, rather than attempts of integrating the insurgency into the LP-PC hegemony.

7.1.2 National-Liberal Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

Meanwhile, the NL-AC activists decided to put their weight behind a war of manoeuvre during the first years of struggle. Right at the beginning of local activities, arriving from the campuses of Manila and Cairo, the first batch of recruits was sent to military training. Additional efforts were made to connect to foreign support and to private armies of local elites. This proved to be quite successful against a hegemony, which on its part tried to solve the problem in a war of manoeuvre.

Difficulties started, when the hegemony altered its strategy and added war of position elements. The NL-AC movement was not prepared for that and easily lost ground the moment the government tried to incorporate part of the insurgency followers via concessions and good-will activities. Accordingly, it was little prepared for peace negotiations and was overwhelmed during the process with pressure from all sides. While the regime resorted to more sophisticated counter-insurgency measures, these could just prevail because the NL-AC movement has missed to establish in a war of position the trenches to protect the movement throughout its constituency. The leadership was not able to develop a strategy to counter these developments and continued to rely on the cooptation of local units by channelling external funds out of the leadership's exile. Thus they were able to continue its war of manoeuvre, even though on a smaller scale due to the split of NR-AC movement and government-defectors, and when negotiations with the LP-PC hegemony started again under the Cory Aquino presidency, they could conduct an impressive show of military force, directed towards the new President.

However, just few years after the conclusion of the negotiations, the NL-AC movement was nearly dissolved. In between, the new LP-PC leadership completely stopped any war of manoeuvre measures, making the NL-AC military capabilities obsolete, as the latter were on the other hand not strong enough to overrun the LP-PC hegemony altogether. Challenged by the transfer of the struggle to the field of a war of position, the NL-AC had little to present. Thus, while the LP-PC engaged in a broad strategy, including sector consultations by President Ramos, on part of the NL-AC, a single individual, Misuari, decided on the outcome of the negotiations via backchannel negotiations with little consultation even with his immediate officers. In the second phase, i.e. the post-1996 transition period, these missing capabilities in regard to wars of position led to the final failure.

7.1.3 National-Religious Anti-Colonial Hegemony Project

The second counter-hegemony movement changed strategy, as mentioned, after the split from the MNLF and the setbacks in attempts to negotiate with the LP-PC leadership. This included above all two decisions: retreat and establishment of grassroots towards the broader Moro population. The retreat included the setup of local structures in remote areas of Minsupala in addition to existing exile structures in the Middle East and Central and South Asia; a further element was the abstinence from military encounters with the Philippine armed forces. At the same time this tactic got complemented by increasing community work. This community work did not turn out successful from the first day. On the contrary, at the beginning the returned Islamic scholars failed consistently with their aim to spread their ideas. They had to learn community work from scratch and just then they were able to connect to the local communities.

What followed was the establishment of the variety of institutions described in the previous chapters. When they finally added elements of a war of manoeuvre in the 1990s, their war of position was so sophisticated that they could invite journalists and civil society groups to their main camp, presenting them a showcase of a future Bangsa Moro state: a functioning community with executive, legislative, and judicative institutions, a local economic structure, and a secure environment; in a region missing performance of all of these elements. Their consultation gatherings with hundreds of thousands of people were a stronger show of force than the NL-AC leadership's presentation of combat units ten years before. Thus, while their wars of manoeuvre could not compete in broad confrontations with the AFP, it was enough to keep the situation precarious for the LP-PC hegemony attempt. Meanwhile they focused continually on the war of position, with visible outcome in the communities. Support was consistent over the years and even substantial setbacks in the war of manoeuvre, as the annihilation of all main camps during the 2000 AFP offensive and the battles of 2003 and 2008 were just short term. The movement appeared in public soon after again. Even transition of power after the death of the long-term leader was managed with little effort. Thus, the movement is well prepared for further peace negotiations and the implementation of the current peace framework.

7.1.4 Socialist Tri-People Hegemony Project

The third counter-hegemony established on the national level the role model for a combined war of position and war of manoeuvre. Local community work was the basis of attracting support from the rural population, based not just on the CPP and the NPA, but furthermore on the

vast network under the NDF. This included important sector institutions, like farmer and worker organizations, which acted in a war of position quite independently above all from the NPA, which engaged in a war of manoeuvre. Additionally, it was in Minsupala possible to win the parish churches for the organization of local communities. As the Marcos regime rejected any form of legal opposition, it pushed all people opposing the regime underground, where the socialist movement was already well established.

It got problematic for the movement, when the LP-PC hegemony opened up again and the war of position extended once again aboveground with two consequences. The reaffirmatist faction demanding a continuing focus on the war of manoeuvre and the underground organization missed the fact, that the war of position in the underground could not reach the broad base which it had during the dictatorship, as people returned to refer to above-ground structures, including elections and legal battles. The rejectionist faction meanwhile had to struggle with inexperience on how to wage a war of position aboveground. However, even though declared close to annihilation already several times by the military, the movement is still visible throughout the country and the continuingly high levels of extrajudicial killings are a sad reverse indicator for the continuing strength of the movement, or at least for the fear of parts of the elites from it.

In the areas of the Moro insurgency, the development was meanwhile substantially different. The movement tried to ally with the MNLF in its struggle against the regime, however, unsuccessful. Only cooperation regarding the war of manoeuvre against the AFP could be established on a local level in overlapping zones of influence. Meanwhile, a war of position was difficult to achieve, facing security threats. It took nearly ten years until the movement was strong enough to try a war of position during the general peak of strength in Minsupala of the early 1980s. However, still there was neither the power nor the attempt to engage in a broad war of manoeuvre. The war of position led by several student organizations and the MRO tried to implement new institutions; however, the movement's war of position was not strong enough to replace existing institutions and at the same time failed to engage with them in a way to connect to them, as it was possible with the parish churches.

Thus, while the opening of the LP-PC hegemony after the Marcos regime caused distress for the activities of the socialist movement in Minsupala as a whole, in the Moro areas it opened up possibilities for a stronger engagement. In a war of position a series of progressive civil society groups and academics as well as political parties are now able to try to establish new structures, including channels to influence the peace process with the NR-AC insurgency.

7.1.5 Non-Project in a Crisis of Hegemony

Meanwhile, the active groups we subsumed under the label non-project in a crisis of hegemony show no signs of a directed war of position or war of manoeuvre. Their last strong war of position was fought against the colonial powers in the pre-independence era. This does not exclude, that single individuals joined the other movements in their wars of position and manoeuvre. But since its defeat under US colonialism they participated in wars of manoeuvre on all sides not to expand their position towards a new hegemony but rather just as an insurance against any other social group developing a strong hegemonic leadership without them.

Similarly, no war of position is visible where they would have created new institutions. Meanwhile, however, they were able to take over a series of institutions by other hegemony projects; above all local government units. Their immediate intervention was needed twice in periods, where other social groups tried to occupy these government institutions. During the late 1960s, they resorted to a war of manoeuvre against political rivals. The founding of the MIM could be counted as part of a war of position; however, its short-lived existence doubts a serious attempt to engage in a strategy of alternative institutions. The second time was the take-over of the ARMM by the MNLF. This time, the traditional elites did not engage in a war of manoeuvre, even though the non-cooperation with the ARMM and SZPD can, similarly to a general strike, be considered as a reduced form of such a struggle. This time, essential pressure was lower, as the local government units were still in the hands of the traditional elites and the ARMM had de facto little influence. Thus, they showed patience and once the protection by the national government over the MNLF faded, they were able to regain the influence in the ARMM via elections easily. A substantial change of the ARMM during the current negotiations with the much stronger NR-AC movement in comparison to the NL-AC movement in 1996 would threaten the traditional elite's local ruling, thus a third and this time again stronger intervention might be necessary. Which style this intervention might have, remains unclear. The recent join to the Liberal Party of the President by all provincial governors and most mayors of the ARMM might be a first move in a war of position to prevent an outcome against their interests, i.e. a substantial change towards a hegemonic situation, might it be LP-PC or NR-AC led.

Based on these summaries and the broader descriptions in the previous chapters, we can now continue to discuss general situations and concepts, starting with a discussion of violence previous to the current crisis.

7.2 Violence in Colonial Intervention and Passive Revolution

7.2.1 Colonial Violence During Outside Intervention

We developed in the previous chapter an understanding of colonial intervention as a war of manoeuvre in destroying existing hegemonic institutions. What differs from the Gramscian concept is that in his European analyses, the aim of revolutions and restorations was always the takeover of power in an existing state. In Minsupala's colonial history direct violence was not intended to takeover existing institutions but to destroy and replace them. This translated into the siege-strategy of blocking the sea routes by the Spanish fleet and the military invasion by US troops. In the following years of direct military rule in Minsupala, violence was used as the main form of social control and to continue to break resistance; for example tackling the refusal of locals to comply with the prohibition of carrying of arms. Interestingly, the Spanish tactic did not succeed, as it even strengthened the role of local rulers, rather than destroy them. Meanwhile, the United States were successful in breaking the influence of local rulers in favour of American conquerors after total destruction of resistance and subsequent military occupation.

The second essential characteristics of colonial violence are divide-et-impera tactics not just on the level of cooptation of leadership, but regarding the violence system as well. Thereby, verti-

cal conflict lines have been introduced or strengthened. The most visible violent conflict line has been developed between northerners and southerners, when northern indigenous people have been integrated into the Spanish colonial army to attack the southern shores. In Minsupala, this broad conflict line further got augmented by the usage of local divisions between ethnic groups and families to further the colonial cause. Prominent examples have been in Maguindanao the violent fight between the upper and lower river sultanates, with the Spanish crown as the overall gaining third party. The Bates treaty is the classic example of American dividing of anti-colonial resistance. However, the Philippine national government learned well from the colonial masters and used these tactics to split insurgency institutions throughout the last decades, too. Counter-insurgency tactics including agent provocateurs, foisting own bomb attacks on insurgencies, and bribing units into defection can be considered a further element of divide-et-impera tactics. While all these different tactics have been successful in weakening the organized resistance against the other party, it rarely reduced the overall social crisis, except in the US case, where the resistance experienced total defeat. In all other cases the increase of the amount of conflict organizations by these tactics led to a more confusing conflict system with an exponential amount of traps for a peace process.

7.2.2 Internal Violence After the Transition to Liberal Democracy

As soon as the initial colonial intervention ceased and the transition to an independent liberal-democratic system started in the second decade of the 20th century, physical violence became the exception in colonial and post-independence ruling for nearly five decades. However, after the annihilation of strong Datu resistance against the invasion, it was not the liberal institutions which controlled the local communities, but the traditional elites continued to exercise control over the population as gatekeepers to the demands of the colonial rulers and afterwards the national government. Accordingly, control of violence was back in the hands of the former rulers, even though complemented by national violence institutions. Thus, the post-intervention period saw not a transition to liberal hegemony, where compliance due to direct violence gets replaced by compliance due to market structures and consent into the system, but the outsourcing of control to these gatekeepers, which in their own dominion have continued to practice feudal rulings.

With this limited implementation of consent-oriented institutions, liberal hegemony as much as it does not regulate control *over* local communities, so it does not regulate relations *between* local groups. Thus, conflicts over land and local influence have continually been conducted by violent means. The structural reasons of a closing frontier due to resettlements has been augmented by readily available weapons in the aftermath of WW2 and the decision to resort to self-administered justice via private armies and influence of local government institutions. These violent conflicts can lead to a vicious cycle of violence with revenge as an accepted propagated reason for engagement. One should however be careful with an orientalist reading of these violent struggles, locally called “rido”, as a century old practice of conflict resolution, even if done so by scholars and practitioners alike. The sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao as well as the more equal round of lords in Maranao show that there were forms of hierarchies and regulations to control power in these hierarchies in pre-colonial times. Meanwhile, the escalation of inter-elite violence during election periods is a strong proxy for the hypothesis, that inter-elite violence is a current process related to the local implementa-

tion of a liberal-democratic system and its deficiencies, rather than a culture of violence. Accordingly, the level of violence rose during the crisis starting with large-scale resettlements in the 1950s and has been on a high level since then. The insufficiency of the liberal system to regulate land conflicts based on an overall agreed system of rules and regulation, including the monopolization of violence in agreed governmental institutions, led to the violence developments in the 1960s outlined in the previous chapters.

In this situation, the liberal system of a level-based government hierarchy from town mayors to presidencies filled according to election results did not fulfil the liberal expectation of a peaceful way to control transitions of power. In Minsupala elections have triggered communal violence over decades. With liberal hegemony not implemented in local communities, so were liberal institutions not the key to regulate society, but they have developed their own dynamics. With electoral offices in the administration being an essential factor in overall socioeconomic success, elections which create political hierarchies become an essential struggle rather than a harmonizing conflict resolution. While conflicts over land normally encompass the question on how to draw borders between two dominions on a two-dimensional map, conflicts in the political hierarchy are fought for control over the whole designated area. The competitions in Minsupala start with the control of mayor positions in local towns up to provincial and regional governors peaking in congress representative offices. If now two rival elite families compete in a province for the provincial governorship, the winner has political control not just over the own territory but as well over the whole territory of its competitor. The electoral majority-system enhances this tension. Thus, in consequence, electoral competition becomes not a struggled compromise of interests, but a further element in subverting the hegemony aspirations of liberalism and, with the exception of the early 1970s, the main trigger of local skirmishes.

Furthermore, we can see already during this initial stage of crisis of the passive revolution a development which would become a key characteristic of the following dynamics of the continuing crisis: the uncertainty of the non-functioning of the liberal-system does not just lead to conflict resolution mechanisms based on violence, but the constant usage of violence creates the possibility to expand one's own interests via violent force. Economic relations of exchange get replaced by economic relations of force, i.e. a form of looting. This moves violence from being a mean to stabilize a social system to become the central characteristic of a social system. The profiteers of such a system will prefer continuing violence and a continuing weak state. Thus, violence has not the effect of state making by war, but the continuing of its failure. This will be discussed in the after-next section, while the next section starts with an analysis of violence production by hegemony projects in an organic crisis.

7.3 Production of Violence in Organic Crises

7.3.1 Production of Violence by Hegemony Projects

While public and scientific attention turns to conduct of violence as the embodiment of an escalated conflict, developments in Minsupala highlight, that it is necessary to differentiate between conduct and production of violence, with the first just being one part of the wider system of violence production. This system includes a whole range of components we dis-

cussed on social structures as a whole: dynamic material capabilities, e.g. military tactics, military logistics, etc., and accumulated material capabilities, e.g. weapons, supply lines, markets, etc.; on the ideal side the explanation of violence and its intended effects and in the institutional component the establishment of institutions to regulate and conduct violence. Thus, the production of violence is strongly linked to the production of (in)security in general.

The key characteristic of violence production on side of the LP-PC movement has been two-fold: the external reliance on support by the US government and the internal reliance onto support of local rulers. The external reliance does above all encompass protection from common enemies. Internally, the US supported the training and equipment of troops against insurgencies, starting with the HUK rebellion and currently with several hundred military advisers in Minsupala, additionally to regular war manoeuvres. On the national level, the production of violence relied on financial support by fiscal budget as well as state violence's institutionalization in form of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Two additional national institutions are to be mentioned: the Commission on Election with special powers during election periods, taking over from local violence forces, and the Philippine National Police. The second one is the successor of the military police organized as Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police, which encompassed all local police forces. The 1990 merged organization is now under the supervision of the department of the interior and local government. The merging made it a hybrid institution, with the operational control delegated to local authorities. This is the link to the key element of local government units in the production of state violence by equipping and controlling local police forces. Auxiliary paramilitary forces, voluntary units, and private armies augment the spectrum of violence institutions under the control of local office holders. If the AFP's lack of resources gets balanced by local office holders, local AFP units can become loyal instruments as well. These material structures are based on the idea that the government is protecting the nation and its people against its external and internal enemies. This encompasses further key issues to protect: the government, territorial integrity, and the constitution. With the increasingly independent role of the AFP, this issue of protection got extended so far, that in Minsupala AFP officers claim for themselves the role of mediators between the conflicting parties (people, local government institutions, national government), rather than being themselves a conflict party (Interview ZB). The legitimization of martial law shows thereby, that the nation as a whole stands above single individuals, as individual rights as habeas corpus were suspended.

If we have a look on the production of violence by the counter-hegemonic movements in Minsupala, it is possible to trace that above all the NL-AC movement and its early allies relied for the production of violence largely on external support, including training grounds in Malaysia, the Middle East, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and the provision of financial and technical support by Sabah and Middle Eastern states. Additionally this foreign support was initially just able to be acquired via the help of local elites with necessary connections. This second element of rather external support, local elites, extended furthermore to the provision of recruits loyal to local rulers. Thus, the opponents of the Philippine government were as much as the Philippine government dependent for the production of violence onto foreign and local existing external violence production structures. This changed with the NR-AC movement's establishment of local support networks, while the Maoist insurgency focused on an autarkic strategy right from the beginning, with the mentioned little success in Moro areas. Both latter move-

ments focused on the development of community institutions, allowing the acquisition of recruits, shelter, allowance, and financial assistance. Looting of military storages and take-over of overrun military units are the main source of arms, next to acquisition of violence capabilities on private weapon markets and home-made utilities as gasoline-mines.

Main target of explained violence of all movements have been Philippine government institutions, legitimizing violence as a defensive action against suppression by these agencies. All movements carried out furthermore policing activities, above all by NR-AC and ST-AC movement with a strong connection to local communities. In case of the Maoist movement, this encompassed punishment actions against defectors and landlords, while the NR-AC movement encompassed next to general judiciary the enforcement of religious rules. Different to vigilante groups and terrorist groups, all three counter-hegemonic movements distanced themselves from violence against civilians and referred to the Geneva Convention, with accounts of preventing communal violence. Meanwhile, this does not rule out non-explained violence against civilians as well as violence for extortion reasons.

All movements created with BMA, BIAF, and NPA their separate security institutions, augmented by policing units in conquered areas. While a formal command hierarchy has been established, loyalty was not singularly directed towards the higher command and autonomy of single commands was quite strong, depending on recruitment, training, and background of units. Above all in the BMA, material flows were strong incentives to follow hierarchical commands, with the leadership channelling material support from external sources. This made command strongly dependent on constant provision of these material flows. NPA and BIAF added elements of ideological trainings, which seem to be successful on continuing loyalty with few accounts of broad defections, which marred the BMA.

As they were of essential importance for the violence production in Minsupala, we will discuss now in more in-depth the two core support groups of violence production in Minsupala, external to the single hegemony projects.

7.3.2 Global/Regional Influence

External influence encompasses three sources: the US, governments organized in the OIC, and private supporters, including regional violence networks.

As outlined in the paper so far, the US government was the essential military supporter of the Philippines since independence. Regarding external relations, there was little dispute to be seen over the years, with Philippines supporting the US with bases in its Asian wars and Philippine troops in Vietnam and Korea. Two issues highlighted difficulties: first, territorial disputes amongst allies; this has been an issue regarding Sabah, which is acclaimed by Malaysia as well, and the dispute about several islands in the South China Sea, acclaimed by the Philippines against several adjoining states. In both cases the US are reluctant to side with the Philippines. Secondly, while the previous President Macapagal-Arroyo in general approved the US administration's foreign policy, it unilaterally and against US will withdraw its support forces in Iraq in an attempt to free a Filipino truck driver, kidnapped on duty. Internally, relations between the US and the national government are much more dynamic. The crashing of the HUK rebellion was a joint move in a general tense anti-communist global climate. Meanwhile, the Marcos' human rights performance led to tensions between the two countries and setbacks for the

military cooperation. The misbehaviour of American troops, above all gender-related crimes, in and around their bases on the archipelago became a tense issue, as bilateral agreements saved US perpetrators from prosecution by Philippine authorities. Current debates have been on US anti-terror lists and Philippine government's concerns which Philippine insurgents to put or not to put on such a list, implicating its possible treatment during peace negotiations. All in all, however, there seems certain uniformity in interests between US and Philippine governments regarding security developments on the islands.

This cannot be said about the interests of the Islamic governments in the OIC and the NL-AC movement. While the OIC governments supported substantially the MNLF's military struggle against the AFP, it never appreciated the secessionist aim of the MNLF, early on demanding negotiations with the Philippines under the acceptance of Philippine national integrity. It denied the allegation of genocide in the Moro areas as well as rejected demands for economic sanctions against the Philippine government. Furthermore, it always kept diplomatic channels open towards Philippine governments and prevented the MNLF from becoming a member of the OIC. Lastly, just Islamic states far from the Philippines showed strong affection for the Moro movement, while Malaysia and Indonesia were far more reserved, except Tun Mustapha's government in Sabah; an argument which does not deny their key role as facilitators of peace agreements. Even though the OIC and scholars suggest the existence of a special Islamic Diplomacy directed towards Islamic cooperation, mediation, and peaceful conflict resolution, at least this research project could not find prove for relations differing from non-Islamic international relations. The pressure on the MNLF as well as the timing of support and reduced support hint a strong relation to the individual governments' interests rather than to a special role of Islamic diplomacy. Taken together, the support of the Moro national-liberal movement was as essential as was its role in the outcome of the struggle. It put its weight not just against any secessionist solution, but as well against any demand for social revolution. The extradition of Misuari to the Philippine government by Malaysia has been just the most recent example.

Non-governmental violence networks are the third element in external support. This encompasses a broad spectrum, from private donors to training in foreign battles, to cooperation and membership in regional violence circles. All of them have been relevant for the local insurgency to a certain degree. Learning from the failures of the NL-AC movement, NR-AC proponents not just set on a strategy of autarky, but even complementary strategies should not rely on external government structures; they tried to connect to private donors and the regional arms market only. Secondly, the participation of Moro recruits in the battles on the Afghan-Pakistani border provided them with battle experience, of advantage in the local struggle. And thirdly, even though just limited data is available, short term cooperation with regional violence circles would have opened additional opportunities. Similarly to cooperation with governments, the disadvantages outweigh however the advantages; in a global situation, where these circles have become the main targets in the war on terror, cooperation by the NR-AC movement faded over the last decade. Afghan veterans meanwhile highlight a development which can already be traced in the governmental support structure: these external military elements change the power structure inside the revolutionary movement. Next to the key role of the actual conductors of violence, the gatekeepers who control the flow of military capabilities enter the essential core of the movement, being able to decisively influence the movement's political decisions.

In all cases there is a *diverting effect of essential foreign support*: the focus was much stronger on relations between the insurgents' leadership and its foreign donors than on relations between the leadership and the local commanders, let alone local communities. The residing of the leadership in foreign capitals just increased the distance to local commanders and communities, a relation already precarious due to the latter's double loyalties to the movement as well as to local power structures around families, ethnicities, and elites. Continuing this policy of attraction of foreign support after the 1996 peace agreement rather than engagement with local communities was then one essential factor in the current decline of the NL-AC movement.

7.3.3 Influence of Traditional Elites

The second key factor of influence is the local class of traditional elites. In section five we will discuss in detail their special role as an own social group during the dynamic of crisis. While they never led the insurgency during the last decades, they were an essential element in the production of violence. As already outlined above, they had several instruments of violence at hand: from the local police to paramilitary forces to private armies. Thus, they have been the key to local control; right from their cooperation with the US colonial authorities after their defeat against the US military. Even if under the Marcos regime the AFP have become a stronger national institution, local authorities play throughout the last decades a prominent role in every-day state-production of violence (Abinales 2000); with national and US institutions exclusively focusing on insurgency strongholds. Thus, the national state relies on local backing, and any national activity against a local ruler can expect challenging resistance.

These traditional elites play thereby an ambiguous role, because at the same time they supported the insurgents, at different times openly and secretly. With the MIM they were responsible for the first local Moro insurgency organization; later on facilitated connections to Sabah governor Tun Mustapha; and were essential for connecting the NL-AC with Libya. Their younger generations were active in the struggle against the AFP, and so were part of their unofficial violence capabilities, i.e. private armies.

Thereby, they remained a volatile factor for both sides, with changing allegiances. The government had to experience that with the foundation of the MIM by Matalam once out of his government office, while the rebel group experienced it starting with the same Matalam denouncing the rebellion and returning to the government by taking over a position offered by Marcos. Above all since the failed 1976 split, elites left the insurgency step by step, while continuing to support local units if to their own advantage. The instrumental usage of violence capabilities is thereby the outstanding characteristic; which includes risk spread by supporting all sides. Vice versa, their strong capabilities in local violence production makes them an interesting partner, nonetheless their ambiguity.

7.3.4 Role of Intellectuals

Meanwhile, next to these two essential external as well as ambiguous support structures, at the core of the rebellions is the young generation of natives who have studied in Manila and the Middle East. What they have in common with the above two directions of influence is their strong connection to external developments, with nationalist anti-colonial ideas developed in Manila and the idea of Islamic renewal borrowing its intellectual core from scholar activity in

Egypt. Both strands have been brought forward by “organic intellectuals” in the Gramscian sense, if we focus on the origin of its bearers. However, their long stay abroad distances themselves, making them rather “traditional intellectuals”. Meanwhile, with few exceptions, most of the intellectuals trying to push the grievances of the Moro population towards a socialist revolution have been non-organic intellectuals in the sense that they derived from the settler majority and northern Philippine islands, rather than being natives, and furthermore did not merge with local indigenous communities.

NL-AC and NR-AC intellectuals have been crucial on the escalation of multi-dyadic communal violence towards a dyadic conflict pattern in the early 1970s. While their target has been the local peasantry, the intellectuals were essential not just in developing anti-hegemony ideas, but as well in organizing and establishing an anti-hegemony movement. The peasants were thereby little involved, even though the anti-Filipino ideas might have found a prosperous ground to flourish on. As Gramsci observed in the Italian South, the existence of grievances might lead to civil unrest, but they are not sufficient to change structures as a whole. That can be seen regarding communal violence of the 1960s and supports furthermore the argument that structural conflict reason *and* conflict activity have to coincide to escalate a conflict; regarding Gramsci’s analysis it underlines the necessity of intellectuals leading a political struggle. Thus, the developments at the turn to the 1970s were essential for the conflict, as counter-hegemony intellectuals and local structures in crisis met. This meeting can have different forms. As discussed in chapter two, Gramsci saw intellectuals responsible to evolve particular interests into universal ideas by integrating different social groups. We have seen, too, in Gramsci’s analysis as well as in the different counter-hegemony projects in the Philippines, that such a framework can have different mouldings. In the next section we will analysis in detail, which instruments intellectuals can use to forge a hegemony project and how this affects the struggles for a new hegemony.

However, what is substantial different regarding counter-hegemony intellectuals in Minsupala compared to the intellectuals analyzed by Gramsci is their key role in the production structure of violence with its strong external component. The organization of ideological structures in Italian peasantry and proletariat coincided with the organization of material and institutional resistance structures. The nationwide Maoist structure developed similarly, even though later on part of its leadership was forced into Dutch exile with similar problems than the Moro movement. Meanwhile the intellectuals of the Moro movements, except during the later phase of the NR-AC movement, had not just to organize one counter-hegemony movement and following society, but had to link internal developments with the key external partners, above all in the production structure of violence. Accordingly they spend much effort on this link; including residing geographically outside the actual conflict region, and thus far from their targeted constituency. While the exiled leadership was crucial for opening and maintaining material inflows, the geographical distance seriously harmed their ability to oversee and guide local developments. This encompassed several aspects: on the one hand they were dependent on second-hand accounts of information regarding local developments with little possibilities for monitoring and evaluating local commandos’ work. Furthermore they were little involved in ideological and organizational training and development of the movement on the ground. Thus, these commandos developed autonomy or different loyalties to local structures, jeopardizing the leadership’s effort to keep control as soon as external influx diminished.

Furthermore, the reputation of living in luxury abroad while rank-and-file have to fight in the jungles diminished ideological influence through reputation; of the leadership over the local fighters as well as over the broader local constituency.

Thus, this focus on external support structures provided the intellectuals with an ambivalent position of strength in the overall political struggle: next to their intellectual function of organizing the counter-hegemony movement, they became the core element of the insurgency as the gatekeeper to provide the necessary material input for the insurgency. On the other hand, this harmed their connection to the local social groups. This picture is upside down to Gramsci's argument. Gramsci propagated that a strong movement is dependent on a strong link between intellectuals and local communities. Meanwhile the cosmopolitanism and focus on French culture by Italian liberal intellectuals resulted in its weak position in the Italian social system. As seen, in Minsupala the orientation towards the Middle East was crucial in the violence production structure as well as in the strengthening of the intellectuals own position in the overall political struggle. In the long run, however, Gramsci's hypothesis should prove correct. Similar to Italy the focus on external structures distanced intellectuals and targeted constituency and seriously harmed their ability to oversee and guide local developments the moment external support has not been as a crucial element in the struggle any longer. This encompassed several aspects: on the one hand they were dependent on second-hand accounts of information regarding local developments with little possibilities for monitoring and evaluating local commandos' work. Thus, these commandos developed autonomy or different loyalties to local structures, jeopardizing the leadership's effort to keep control while external influx diminished. Furthermore, the reputation, even though not necessarily the fact, of living in luxury abroad while rank-and-file have to fight in the jungles diminished ideological influence of the leadership over the local fighters as well as broader local constituency. Once the production of violence ceased to be important altogether, after the peace agreement of 1996, the NL-AC intellectuals rapidly lost out.

Taken together, while the violent conflict has put intellectuals in Mindanao in a crucial position, leading the insurgency in ideological as well as material and organizational terms, the engagement in the production of violence seriously constrained the overall evolution of the counter-hegemony projects. The next section will now analysis in more details the overall relation between the hegemony projects and violence.

7.4 Violence and Hegemony Struggles

After we discussed the use of violence to stabilize a passive revolution and described the production of violence by struggling hegemony projects later on, we move to the centre of our analysis: the question on how political struggles out of conflicts discussed in the previous chapter interact with the structures and dynamics of an escalated crisis. Thereby we can differentiate the influence of such a hegemony project in regard to political violence, vice versa the influence of violence on the development of a hegemony project and combine it in analysing its consequences for hegemony structures in Minsupala as a whole.

7.4.1 Influence of a Hegemony Project onto Violence

The first link to be analyzed is the influence of a hegemony project onto the *production* of violence. A hegemony project during a crisis can not resort to means of violence already existing. In an iterative process and similar to Gramsci's demand of production of own hegemonic institutions, a *hegemony project has to connect to external violence networks parallel to the increasing production of own violence capabilities.*

This combination can be observed for all hegemony projects in Minsupala. The LP-PC project had thereby the favourable position to be connected to the US and its violence capabilities; the latter having a similar hegemonic structure as sought for in the Philippines as a whole, as well as having similar interests in Minsupala in specific. However, this share of hegemony ideas does not extend to the collaboration with local elites and their private armies as well as with vigilante and paramilitary groups, not corresponding to LP-PC ideas of rule of law and accountability. Training and military reforms improved the performance of the armed forces over the decades; however, the continuing reliance on paramilitary forces shows the failure of developing a stable violence production network.

For the counter-hegemony projects these problems have even been stronger. The NL-AC movement and early on the NR-AC movement relied heavily on external support, as much from governments abroad and local elites. With no own violence production networks at the beginning of the conflict available, this was not surprising, but it is remarkable that the NL-AC movement continued to rely on this external support and developed little own violence capabilities, apart from recruits and shelter from communities. The disconnection of the NR-AC movement from the MNLF and with it from external support forced them to connect to different external sources, regional and local arms markets, but above all to develop own violence capabilities, in form of small-scale arms factories and strong community support. Meanwhile, the socialist movement followed a different strategy, strongly focusing on an autarkic production of violence right from the beginning based on community support and a step-by-step escalation along a guerrilla war strategy; even though some donations and skills have been acquired from sympathetic supporters with a similar hegemony project abroad, as well. Later on, involvement in extortion measures and revolutionary taxes from politicians and companies added to the external network. The strategy of autarky including the acquisition of arms by looting police and army units, meant above all at the beginning a serious physical threat of elimination.

Thus, all hegemony projects had to rely on external networks with partners not corresponding to the own hegemony constituency. This jeopardizes explanations of all hegemony projects, as will be discussed in the next subsection; but additionally the cases in Minsupala show the *precarious situation of these relations, depending on the interests of the external partners*: local elites were not just supporting the LP-PC project, but rebels and criminals as well, foreign donors of the NL-AC had diplomatic relations with the Philippine enemy, arms markets need constant financial input of the NR-AC, and politicians and companies might retaliate with violence rather than paying revolutionary taxes to the ST-AC. Meanwhile, the development of internal production of violence structures was a slow process for all hegemony projects, balancing demands of immediate activation and sustainability.

If we continue now with the analysis of the *conduct* of violence, hegemony projects in Minsupala had the intended effect: that of *channelling violence* from widespread communal violence, prevalent in the 1960s, to a more discriminate, targeted form of violence towards the perceived enemy in the 1970s. This strongly depended on the power of the hegemony projects to monopolize the lead of the struggle; again dependent on a variety of factors: While for the NL-AC leadership it was its gatekeeper position in channelling money, for NR-AC and ST-AC leadership the allocation of material benefits was augmented by community work and ideological training. With increasing fragmentation of the counter-hegemony movements, this ability got lost and forms of criminal violence and communal violence increased throughout Minsupala. All hegemony projects were thereby rejecting certain forms of violence, referring to their own hegemony project. This included a rejection of deliberate attacks against civilians, the use of terrorist means, and criminal activities. Not just the government, but rebel leaders as well, signed up to international conventions, and MILF and Philippine government even agreed on joint operations against criminal perpetrators. Similar to their channelling capabilities, these rejections were however undermined during moments of weakness. All sides were involved in urban bomb attacks against civilian buildings, harassment of local communities, and persecution of perceived civilian traitors and enemy sympathizers. This furthermore means not a reduction in violence during skirmishes controlled by hegemony projects, on the contrary. During the height of the dyadic conflict in the 1970s more people died and got displaced than in any other period. What changed afterwards, however, was that it got again unclear, who was behind violence activities and why.

7.4.2 Influence of Violence onto the Development of a Hegemony Project

We turn the relation now upside down and ask for the influence of violence onto the hegemony project itself. Again it is possible to differentiate between production and conduct of violence but furthermore we will differentiate between the influence on leadership, constituency, and opponents of the hegemony project.

Outlined in the previous subsection, hegemony projects are engaged in connecting to external violence production structures and in the development of own internal violence production structures. The preliminary hypothesis would then be that *internal structures are more favourable to a hegemony project than external structures, as external structures open up the hegemony project for external, i.e. non-organic, influences*. The Minsupala cases support that argument. Which influence did these external relations have for the leadership? The national government had above all to turn a blind eye towards the local elites, allowing local violent-feudal systems of governance, against the principles of a LP-PC hegemony expressed amongst others in the constitution. The red line was thereby overstepped just once by local elites in the last decades, when the national government interfered after the Ampatuan massacre in 2009. Nonetheless, direct influence of these local violence entrepreneurs onto national political decisions was moderate. This was different for the NL-AC leadership. The NL-AC leadership spent most of the time outside the countries in the capitals of their respective supporters, maintaining close relations to their external supporters, but thereby getting distanced from the developments in Minsupala and losing control over the development of an actual hegemony project. *The political outcome was therefore dependent on the political demands of external supporters, rather than a consequence of a mutual engagement of movement leadership and*

constituency. This challenge was smaller for the leadership of the NR-AC and the ST-AC movements, with close connections to local developments, even though the Maoists had to struggle with a geographically far bigger area of engagement.

Meanwhile, the strengthening of *internal violence production changes the balance of power inside the leadership*, with factions close to internal violence institutions gaining from their essential position. This is most visible in the LP-PC movement, with the essential position of the AFP in the decision making process. A visible expression is the key role of the AFP to suppress any opposition against the regime, but even more so later on during the successful People Power Revolution and then during several coup-attempts against the national government. This situation is enhanced in Minsupala, where the AFP not just followed orders by the national government, but developed an autonomous role with an essential weight for the decisions of the government. This influence encompasses not just material and institutional advantages over the political leadership, but the AFP has been able even on the ideal level to portray themselves as the strong protectors of the nation, compared to a weak political leadership. Meanwhile, the close cooperation between political and military leadership in the insurgency movements prevented such independence of military factions on the highest levels, with the NR-AC even currently led by the former deputy chairman for military affairs. However, the insurgencies struggled to control their military commanders on the lower levels. Above all in the NL-AC movement, with the local commanders being the main and most visible actors of the struggle, just indirect control was possible. The NR-AC movement with its broader grassroots-network allows a stronger control of military elements, but the split of the 105th base commander highlighted the possibility of autonomous activities by local commanders inside the NR-AC movement as well, a problem raised during the latest peace negotiations.

For the constituency of the respective hegemony projects external support had meanwhile a more ambiguous effect: on the one hand external support relieved them in a general time of hardship. Thus, the NL-AC was able to provide support of local communities rather than burden them with revolutionary taxes. For the national government, no clear assessment can be made. Meanwhile, NR-AC and ST-AC movements' close connection to communities in combination with their autarkic strategies meant an additional burden for local communities, i.e. the acquisition of the zakat in the NR-AC case and revolutionary taxes and support in the Maoist case. On the other hand, the dependence of violence production from local communities allowed a closer and thus more sustainable relation with the local communities, giving them a more prominent role in the hegemony struggle. Meanwhile, NL-AC and LP-PC proponents remained distanced from the communities and loyalty was strongly bound to material influx. Once these hegemony projects were not able to provide material support any longer, encompassing security, too, communities turned to other political actors.

Finally, there remains the question on the effect of external and internal violence production onto opponents of each hegemony projects. The most visible effect of external support is the possibility for opponents to denounce a hegemony project as an instrument of different interests; with the hegemony project itself just used as a cover up. Thus, the LP-PC has been denounced from the Maoist insurgency of being a puppet of the interests of the US and the local elites, rather than a liberal democracy. Meanwhile, the Maoists have been blamed of being criminals using extortion for private gains, rather than being a political project improving the living conditions of the targeted poor. The struggle of the NL-AC movement again has been

denounced as an instrument of external attacks against the territorial integrity of the Philippines, used by hostile governments as Malaysia, distorting the in general harmonious relation between people of the Philippine nation. Finally, above all after 9/11 the NR-AC movement struggled to reject allegations of being a branch of global Islamist terrorists, being financed by Osama Bin Laden and Jemaah Islamiyah. Furthermore, external relations opened up new possibilities of tackling the threats by a hegemony project. Thus, the Philippine government struggled with allegations of human rights violations, constraining support from the US. Meanwhile, the government opened up diplomatic missions in the Middle East, preventing any radical support of the NL-AC movement. Global measures against weapon markets and private financial flows as well as local joint US-Filipino anti-terror manoeuvres were directed against the NR-AC, legitimized by anti-terrorism policies. Meanwhile, provision of security to bigger companies was a mean to strike against external material flows of the ST-AC movement.

Taken together, connection to external violence production makes a hegemony project vulnerable to attacks on the level of ideas as well as of material flows. Vice versa, as outlined above, internal violence production was in all cases not strong enough to compete with opponents of hegemony projects. Thus, the Philippine government had serious problems to control the insurgencies in Minsupala, while the core of the Maoist insurgency was nearly annihilated in the first phase of the struggle. The NL-AC movement had to react to ongoing violence in the Moro areas, conducted by vigilante groups, private armies and public violence institutions against the local population. Exceptional is the case of the NR-AC after its split from the joint struggle inside the MNLF. The retreat into spaces not penetrated by its opponents because of invisibility or misestimating by the future opponents gave them time to develop internal violence institutions.

Turning to the effect of the *conduct* of violence, regarding leadership the main hypothesis is that the dynamics of violence threatens the general political struggle of the leadership from two sides: *security issues* and *time constraints*. For the LP-PC project with its broad institutional backing in form of the Philippine administration time for the conduct of violence can not be highlighted as an essential issue, even though the struggle of Cory Aquino to secure the government from coup attempts made stability a core government issue, taking time from other issues, as shown by a stronger focus on economic policy issues of her successor with the security situation stabilized. Vice versa, the conduct of violence was a mean of the Marcos regime to stay in power, allowing martial law to prevent political transition. For the insurgency, questions of security and time constraints were more imminent. As the students from Manila and the Middle East got immediately involved into the armed struggle in Minsupala, there was no time to develop local institutions to connect to their constituency, seriously hampering the sustainability of the hegemony project. As said, just the military retreat of the NR-AC movement gave them the space to establish a more profound hegemony project. The ST-AC explicitly tried to combine political and military struggle, but scholars blame the meagre intellectual development of the movement amongst others to the demands and constraints of the military struggle.

For the constituencies in Minsupala the conduct of violence has four consequences: intra-communal divisions, prevention of harassment, retaliation, and crossfire insecurity. The first consequence could be seen already during the early 1960s and intensified since the 1970s. The

conduct of violence along publicly expressed conflict lines divided people from each other to become enemies along these official conflict lines, harming previous relations criss-crossing these lines. Even though the inclusiveness of all hegemony projects, with limitations for the NR-AC, tried to prevent the extension onto communal conflicts, the conduct of violence led in the end to a deepening of splits between above all settler communities and indigenous communities. Secondly, the conduct of violence could prevent in some instances harassment by opposite groups. Ethnographic works in Maguindanao (McKenna 1998) coincide with more general conflict literature (Kaufman 2001) in showing that protection against other armed groups was an essential factor in joining and supporting violence actors. Meanwhile, the conduct of violence threatened communities with retaliatory actions by opponent groups. Local communities experienced this above all by the AFP in the 1970s, which indiscriminately targeted the local population as sympathizers of Moro and Maoist insurgencies. This again connects back to the second consequence, evolving into a vicious circle. Last but not least, up until today, local communities are regularly victims of cross-fire, caught in between military struggles, leading to deaths as well as broad evictions, emphasized by the high number of internal refugees in Minsupala.

7.4.3 Hegemonic Movements vs. Alliances

Summarized, the struggle in Mindanao had ambiguous effects on the forging of a future hegemony. The integration of different social groups during the successful war-waging of the early 1970s points to the argument that a war might integrate social groups and leads to state building, a point argued by Tilly (Tilly 1985) as well as by Fanon (Fanon 1981 [1961]).

However, the empirical situation shows some key differences too. In regard to Tilly's argument the essential difference is the way on how to finance war. Tilly argued that the conduct of war needs a financial base; this financial base in European wars has been taxation of citizens, which then linked the government with the citizens in a mutual relation. As such the war tightened the link between government and social classes. Meanwhile, in Minsupala the targeted constituency has been involved in the war in a different manner. They did not need to provide the essential financial base of the insurgency, which was provided externally. They supported war in providing most of the individual recruits of the MNLF. However, even this provision of fighters was often just indirectly, as commanding officers of local elites were an intermediary between the rebels' leadership and the recruits. So what Tilly described as the central connection for transforming war making into state making, taxpayers and government, has not turn out in the Moro areas of Minsupala as the financiers in this scenario are foreign donors.

The double step from the central committee level via the elites to the local recruits lead furthermore to the situation that Fanon's argument of nation building via a common anti-colonial struggle side-by-side does not match neither, as loyalty of many recruits belongs first and foremost to their elite officers and just in a second step to the central committee. A further indicator is the defection of whole commands, once traditional elites answered to the regime's policy of attraction. Meanwhile, the most visible development close to Fanon is the community work of the ST-AC and the NR-AC movements, with the deficiencies outlined in the previous descriptions. For the ongoing struggle it is still too early to evaluate, if their struggle has a hegemony-building effect. For the Philippine government itself, its conduct of wars with little effect on the security of the wider population until now had negative consequences. With the

most sophisticated institutional structure in hand, a change in favour of the LP-PC project could be possible, but until now there are few indications for that.

Thus, Minsupala shows different developments of integration and segregation of which not all are based on a sophisticated hegemony project as Gramsci had in mind regarding a proletarian-peasant revolution in Italy. To engage jointly in a war against the Philippine government, integration and segregation as friend and foe logic was successful to develop an alliance, while the NL-AC ideology did not ground into targeted communities. The different groups integrated along a common enemy, the Philippine government as “the other”. The outcome of the peace processes of 1976 and 1996 highlight, too, that a movement that bases its glue only on an integration and segregation framework of cooperate interests, might be strong during a violent conflict, but weak in establishing a counter-hegemony project during peace talks and transition periods. Strength in a “war of movement” is not strength in a “war of position” and at least during the 1976 process one can see that a focus on strengthening the first one can undermine the strength of the second. Thus, alliances in a war of manoeuvre are not necessarily the pre-stage of a hegemonic integration by a war of position. The integration of external governments and local elites did not just strip the movement from its only concrete demand; it concealed the movement’s failure in integrating its core constituency. The integration/segregation logic furthermore extended to the movement’s constituency. Security concerns of the local population allowed the rapid establishment of an integration/segregation framework in an intuitive way without touching the question of ideology. The local support of the rebellion has been extended by a constant existence of threat to the local population due to indiscriminate counter-insurgency and local-elite-lead paramilitary violence. Therefore the success of the new-elites has been based on the re-production of the integration/segregation-framework during violence operations. As soon as the Philippine government resorted to a more sophisticated counter-revolutionary strategy, moving the battle from a war of movement to wars of position, the alliance scrambled and the NL-AC intellectuals lost the leadership over its constituency. The 1996 agreement was insofar the conclusion of this development, after which it lost its integrative power even over the remaining immediate followers of the MNLF. We have seen, that the NR-AC and ST-AC movements followed a different tactic, and the following years will show, if their focus on a war of position leads to the expected sustainability of the movements’ projects.

7.4.4 Choices to Make

One more point can thereby be highlighted: while violence production structures are related to general production and power structures, mirroring in the case of Minsupala the strong role of the US as well as of local elites in society as a whole, the movements had a choice to make. It was the choice for immediate production of violence and to confront the Philippine government on a military ground in a Gramscian war of movement, which the MNLF made under the impression of government atrocities in a general climate of violence. The result was impressive, in just two to three years the MNLF was able to develop from a student group into a fighting force which brought the Philippine army to a stalemate. This came, however, to a price: with the integration of foreign governments and traditional elites, the MNLF had to accommodate their interests ever since. The rapid success was based on the connection of own to already existing production of violence structures; either by old forces or by external forces.

Both sources have been tapped by the MNLF. Similarly, the Philippine government made the choice to rely on local sources in all the mentioned forms. However, different from the MNLF, the Philippine government and the local rulers form part of the same interest group anyway, so difficulties of convergence are less. Meanwhile, the choice of the other two hegemony projects was to rely on an autarkic strategy. Both movements paid a price as well: the Maoist activists lost at the beginning of their insurgency a considerable part of the initial movement, while the NR-AC after the split from the MNLF was not able to claim control over the insurgency for another twenty years. However, on the long run they were able to catch-up with the other two hegemony projects in regard to violence production, with far less necessity to accommodate external interests other than the core target groups of each respective hegemony project.

7.5 Self-Reproducing Violence Systems

The ongoing violence after forty years of struggle is the most obvious indicator of the general failure of all the hegemony projects until now to establish a new system based on a general consent. This section will thus analyze the reproduction of a violence system, which encompasses not just victims, but profiteers as well.

7.5.1 Dissolving Step Models and Mingling of Forms of Violence

Revolutionary theory as well as the analysis of conflicts focus on step models of escalation, for example the Grammar of War by the Hamburger Weltgesellschaftsansatz (Siegelberg 1994), from hidden conflict lines to manifest conflicts to war. The first analyzed periods in Minsupala follow this scheme of escalation and intensification, from underlying conflict lines since the early 20th century to increasing manifest conflicts in the 1960s to war during the first half of the 1970s. Revolutionary theory can furthermore explain why it took time to escalate the conflict: even though the crisis was already manifest, the old leading social group was co-opted into the new hegemony and other social groups did not develop or connect to a possible counter-hegemonic leadership. The traditional elite's counter-hegemonic attempts are inconsistent, visible in single leaders who rebel once losing their connection to hegemony institutions, but return to them as soon as they got offered a possibility (ex-governor Matalam became presidential adviser on Muslim affairs, Rascid Lucman Paramount Sultan, endorsed by Marcos, etc.). The new social group of young professionals changes the crisis development essentially by channelling the different conflict structures into a dyadic conflict between government and rebel group. Thus, until then the development fits into revolutionary step-models: crisis, violence by old classes to suppress opposition to restore hegemony, replaced by a counter-hegemony forcing back the old classes, and it follows the usual tracks of increasing violence in conflict stages according to conflict theories up to the final dyadic system. However, with the failing peace process this situation of structured violence fragmentizes and dissolves the step model: what follows is not simply a step back into a lower level of escalation, still explainable by the step-model, but the continuing crisis gets transformed via the dynamics of the struggle.

Thus, what evolves after the failed peace process and the scrambling of a unified counter-hegemonic movement is a mix mingling several forms of violence next to the continuing dyadic

violence: *ridos*, violent struggles between local families, are not just enhanced by the institutional void due to weak governance structures, again consequence of the dyadic conflict; they reproduce the dyadic conflict, when members of local factions are engaged *on different sides* of insurgency and government forces. Inter-family struggles become portrait as dyadic struggles, dragging in further dyadic forces, not related to the respective *rido*. If *rido* dynamics develop *inside* a party of the dyadic conflict, this challenges the leadership's control and undermines negotiation attempts, where the opposite party in the dyadic conflict demands the insurance of a ceasefire. Meanwhile, on the community level, communal violence encompasses unorganized violence between local communities, based on sentiments and propaganda out of years of conflict experience, with a variety of small triggers possible. One trigger can be the instigation by local elites, which continue their paternal command violence towards local communities, already present before the 1970 war. The increased availability of violence structures enhances their force, connected to the importance of paramilitaries and local police under their command. This command violence meanwhile develops towards organized crime as soon as it connects to kidnapping-for-ransom activities; i.e. violence gets not just used to sustain the own dominant position in a local arena, directing it towards the own constituency; but criminal violence is directed against outsiders to extract direct profit. From kidnappings the trace leads to the next form of violence, which got mainly prominence through the Abu Sayyaf Group, i.e. terrorist violence. Their rank-and-file are again linked to the dyadic conflict, acquiring violence skills either from rebel or government soldiers, or from both.

Thus, what we see is the dissolution of a step-model of escalation of dyadic violence towards a network of violence reproducing itself on a low level. Its specific form is just possible in the grey area between a hegemony in crisis and an escalated dyadic political conflict.

7.5.2 From War Lords and Lords in War

At the core of this self-reproducing low-intensive crisis situation are lords-in-war. I use this term to differentiate groups which often get subsumed under the term "warlord". The image of the latter is thereby one of a general who uses his military might out of a conflict situation to control a certain territory. The profiteers, however, in Mindanao are twofold: there exist these kinds of warlords above all on the level of "commanders", especially the military well-trained Afghan veterans. Additionally and more critical to a possible peace process are the landlord-elites which establish their position inside the conflict and profit from it, but are as a social group not created by the conflict itself. As seen throughout the last chapters, they are an integrated part of the national administration and the regional economy. War is a decisive instrument to hold up their power, but not the only one.

The term warlord has been used in different contexts. Scientifically it has originally been used to analyze violence entrepreneurs in historical China (Sheridan 1966; Gillin 1967; Chi 1969). Current media refers above all to warlords in Afghanistan. Previously, conflict studies used the term to refer to developments in Africa, for example William Reno (Reno 1997; 1998). In a theoretical overview, Giustozzi (Giustozzi 2005: 15) highlights above all the following characteristics for a warlord definition: political ruling based on violence, regularly appliance of violence, little or no political legitimacy, neo-patrimonial behaviour towards the addressed community with little institutionalization, profit orientation deriving from violence involving

activities, origins in rebel movements or government troops with no revolutionary ambitions⁴⁹. In Minsupala this points above all to 'lost commands' of insurgency and AFP: bandit groups with no political aims, except from the portray as social bandits (e.g. Pentagon group), rebel splinter groups with ambiguous political aims, blamed for following mainly a criminal agenda (e.g. Abu Sayyaf), and local-autonomous commandos, which consider themselves as part of the movement, but act independently of the central leadership, i.e. outside its hierarchical command structure. As described in the previous chapters, warlords in the Philippines use their violence capabilities to acquire material profits via kidnappings-for-ransom and claims of protection money, with no other productive capabilities. Thereby they rely on their embedding in local communities. The latter's protection is next to references to Islam the main argument in the little political communication done by warlords. Furthermore, these local networks are the only form of institutionalization. Thus, reproduction is strongly related to the conflict situation and the missing capacities of rebels' and governmental institutions to regulate the conduct of violence in their respective areas of influence.

Thus, the development of warlords out of the insurgency is the result of integrational weaknesses of insurgency structures and divide-et-impera tactics of counter-insurgency operations of the Philippine government. In general terms it is a question of missing assertive institutions, on part of the government as well as on part of the rebel leadership. This is consistent with general findings on warlords (Rich 1999). The influence of warlords is insofar structurally unstable and threatened by a strengthening of institutions by political actors. Such measurements have already been part of earlier peace agreements with the support of local governmental institutions, either in the hands of the central government or an autonomous administration in the hands of the former rebels. Meanwhile, DDR programs were directed towards either an integration of rebel soldiers into the governmental armed institutions or their demobilisation and integration into civil socioeconomic structures (Santos 2010a). As described above, both of these aims failed after the 1996 agreement. Reasons can be found in operative mistakes, for example not enough financial means, slow procedures, incompatible structures between rebel- and military organization (Santos 2010b). However, just the broader context can give a more profound answer. The attempt could just work in combination. The demobilisation had to fail, as the local violence market remained attractive and more peaceful structures as alternatives have not been built. An interest on that have another group, we described in the previous chapters and which, in distinction from warlords, we might term lords-in-war.

These lords-in-war are the traditional elites we discussed in detail and which developed their position as gatekeepers, being engaged with all other relevant forces in Minsupala. Different than warlords, their material background consists of a broad spectrum of activities, from economic investments, networking, and corruption in government positions to land speculation. These different activities, conducted for decades before the current violent conflicts, were augmented in the violent situation by engaging in violence: they engaged in the provision of security and organized crime, backed by a broad network of violence instruments, including

⁴⁹ Giustozzi referred to warlords as individuals, while this book refers to social groups. Accordingly, individual characteristics have not been included: charismatic leadership towards the subordinated armed followers and autonomous control over this force.

local police forces, rebel and AFP units, as well as vigilante forces. While this engagement was highly competitive between different elite groups, it turned out to be stable. As seen, this, however, does not mean the provision of a consistent hegemony project, on the contrary: each audience gets addressed with different explanations for the legitimacy of their influential position; accordingly, they are connected to different institutions, too.

While the elites rarely engaged directly in the peace process, they have been able to use the results to their own advantage and to adapt flexible (Interview E). Three peace offers by the Philippine government have been implemented – in all three the rebel groups have been sidelined after short time. The autonomous institutions created by Marcos after 1976 and Aquino in 1989 were right from the beginning in the hand of the local elites, while they had to wait for a couple of years until they took over the renovated ARMM of 1996. The elites were able to reject another time an intervention into their sphere of influence. The ongoing peace process with the MILF is little different. The local elites are not actively represented in the negotiations. They denounced of not being part, while trying to prevent a far-reaching legal power shift towards the insurgency (ICG 2012).

7.5.3 Cyclical Violence in an Institutional Vacuum

What warlords and lords-in-war have in common is that their conduct of violence is not an organic development, but it is cyclical. That means the conduct of violence is not directed towards structural change, but stabilizes the status quo, and with it the crisis situation. Political rhetoric about social banditry by some warlords does not change that. Similar to the tenants rebellions in Italy's south they lack a direction (Gramsci 1995[1927]), even though they officially rebel against the ruling order, which differentiates them from the lords-in-war. Violence becomes an outlet for socioeconomic unrest. Some ransom payments and local ad hoc aid stabilize a in general social unstable situation. Conduct of violence by lords-in-war has a similar effect. They stabilize structures, which are not based on capitalist, consent-oriented surplus-extraction and neither on a romantic-egalitarian indigenous farmer community. These are structures based in primary accumulation of natural resources in a formally democratic state characterized by colonial legacies (Sidel 1999: 18). Accordingly, the liberal state does not fulfil its western ideal of having a peace-supporting function regarding direct violence.

The division of warlords and lords-in-war blurs thereby on the ground. Long term warlords can transform into lords-in-war and vice versa warlords are convenient chess pieces for the lords-in-war's power games. The differentiation helps however to highlight, that the juxtaposing of state and warlord as two antagonistic categories are concealing local hybrid structures. These structures are not a quantitative compromise, a mix between governmental institution and warlord. These institutions become a qualitative different synthesis: lords-in-war combine formal and informal capacities and practices to a hybrid local institution, which is "making" the state in the local arena (Abinales 2000); even though not along a classical academic model. The lords-in-war are an essential component of the postcolonial liberal double-hegemony in crisis.

The political struggle between hegemony projects becomes thereby just one dimension in the complex power game of local lords-in-war and national elites. Just during the escalation of the insurgency towards a dyadic war in the early 1970s the power of the lords-in-war have been threatened; overwhelmed by the drive of the young generation. However, since 1976 the insurgency could not seriously threaten their position; this includes the 1996 agreement, which

right from the beginning was not designed to undermine their power. Thus, they continue to be so strong that it is apt to claim that “They Own the People” (hrw 2010) in some areas of Minsupala. The reason for that is that the violent conflict enhanced the elites’ power, as they have become the key allies for all relevant social groups not just in political and economic matters, but in military concerns as well.

7.6 Summary

Summarizing the insights, we can differentiate results regarding the relation between violence and hegemony projects, linking peace and conflict studies with broader discussions on social developments in countries of the global South.

7.6.1 Hegemony Violence

The analysis of hegemony structures and violence in the southern Philippines showed a clear difference to the development of hegemonic structures analysed by Gramsci regarding Europe and International Political Economy regarding a regional hegemony encompassing OECD member countries and world orders as a whole.

The first element of violence traced in the analysis of Minsupala is the destructive as well as creative force of colonial intervention, which shaped social structures up until today. This includes the destruction of local hegemonies as well as a regional area, creating at the same time by force a national state as well as the implementation of liberal government structures.

At the same time we saw, that this development is not the replacement by and implementation of a new liberal hegemony, mirroring hegemonic structures in the countries of origin. A double hegemonic structure evolved via a by Gramsci called a Passive Revolution. Thus, two different components of violence remained central, which in liberal hegemonies generally should be reduced: violence as command of compliance and violence as suppression of dissent. Both forms of violence are present in liberal hegemonies, however against deviations from the general consent. In Minsupala, commanded compliance on behalf of local traditional elites remains a key feature of society, in what Sidel called “bossism” (Sidel 1999). Secondly, violence against dissent is quantitatively more widespread than in liberal hegemonies and qualitatively not confined to joint actions between judiciary and police, but strongly in the hands of individuals with possible but not necessarily executive government legitimacy.

This ambiguity of a nominal local liberal system leads as seen to a non-functioning of liberal conflict resolution mechanisms, as elections and the judicial system. Accordingly, conflict resolution is strongly based on self-administered justice outside of formal government institutions. In some cases, traditional or revolutionary institutions, i.e. elder councils and mediation or judgments by the Ulama, are able to step into the void and facilitate for example blood money to stop vicious circles of violence. However, more often than not, vigilante revenge dynamics lead to a generally high-level of violence in conflict dynamics. The analysis of this research argues that this dynamic is not based on a century-old tradition, in the local context called rido, even if labelled so by local figures, too, but specific to the ambiguity of a passive revolution encompassing a synthesis of old and new social structures.

As outlined in detail above, this encompasses above all the liberal conflict resolution mechanism per se: elections; which is why election periods show a higher risk of violence. The argument here was, that the essential influence of electoral offices not just in political-strategic terms but in immediate command-power- and economic profit-terms in combination with no political structures of interest grouping as well as no securing of minority interests lead to antagonistic winner-looser struggles, rather than a liberal negotiation of interests. Accordingly, with essential interests at stake, the use of violence rises.

This leads to a further insight: the usage of violence for economic gains instead of profit generation by exchange of values. This is closely related to the economic structure as a whole: after the destruction of the regional economic system due to colonial intervention, the development of new economic structures was broadly in the hands of outside entrepreneurs, from transnational companies to resettled farmers and land labourers. Rents in form of national government assistance and commissions for administrative services, i.e. licences, land registration and allocation, etc., became a key income source for local elites, with a small trickle-down-effect via clientelism including block votes. External entrepreneurs widely participated in and profited from this system where external entrepreneurs and local gatekeepers cooperated in the commanded appropriation of economic values in form of land and natural resources from local communities. Corruption and public and private violence forces could provide land and security without a necessary slow and costly engagement with these communities. From this perspective, recent developments regarding kidnapping-for-ransom and protection money from external groups are just an extension of a system based on commanded expropriation structures instead of mutual economic exchange structures; as unequal the latter may be in any liberal-capitalist system.

Thus, taken together, from the beginning the formal liberal system established after colonial intervention via a passive revolution, incorporating local elites and external entrepreneurs, used violence to stabilize a promoted hegemony which de facto lacked the consent-based production structures visible in liberal hegemonies of the OECD system. With an intensification of the inconsistency of this system due to increased integration into the Philippine and global liberal system via resettlements and foreign investments, the collapse of these stabilization mechanisms was a matter of time, leading to the current organic crisis starting in the 1970s with an even more complex dynamic of violence production and conduct.

7.6.2 Crisis Violence

The beginning of the crisis was characterized by an intensification of the conflict violence patterns outlined already above as part of the passive revolutionary system all along. This included above all intensification of violence regarding local conflict management and electoral violence, but increasingly, too, as an instrument of gaining economic profits via land grabbing. Just with the emergence of the MNLF and the escalation via the proclamation of martial law, these multifaceted violence dynamics got channelled into a dyadic conflict between the MNLF and the national government and its subordinated administration.

However, it would be wrong to understand this conflict as violent struggle between two groups which use their own violence production to provide elements for the conduct of violence versus the antagonistic other, an assumption carried on from inter-state conflicts. As analysed above, the violence production structure was not confined on internal structures and

is not singularly defined by this dyadic conflict presentation of the Moros under MNLF central committee versus the Philippines under Marcos. Next to the leadership, there are five elements relevant for the production structure of violence on both sides as well as above and below both sides of the official conflict line.

Three elements are external to the official conflicts: foreign states, traditional elites, and transnational support. Foreign states, in the Minsupala case member states of the OIC, ASEAN, and the United States engage on both sides, while not closing communication channels to the official other side. Thus, above all the engaged members states of OIC and ASEAN found themselves in multiple positions, supporting the MNLF diplomatically and militarily, engaging in diplomatic relations with the Philippine government, and facilitating as mediators between the conflict parties. Even though strongly committed to the Philippine government throughout the decades, the United States have been accused, too, of having their political side-interests in the conflict, favouring a weakening of the Philippine nation to find a further willing supporter in form of an autonomous Moro entity. All these states were moderating the conflict by pushing for mediation, while at the same time allowed an escalation by the provision of military support. Different integration mechanisms on a global scale with competing hegemony projects on this level as well led to ambiguities regarding the support of local violence dynamics. An even more confusing role, as described above, had local elites, which tried to continue their role as gatekeeper by favouring both sides at one time or the other. Lastly, Minsupala is an example of the influence of transnational support structures, from diasporas to regional violence entrepreneurs, global arms markets, and training grounds in foreign conflicts, but as well private security arrangements financed by foreign investors. These structures transcend the nation-based world order and with it global conflict regulations based on *international* relations.

Two key moments are internal to each of the dyadic conflict parties: the role of local commanders as well as of local communities. The analysis showed that local commanders are embedded in a complex violence structure where the conflict party's leadership is the core, but by far not the only essential element; the commandos develop autonomy from the leadership with several options for loyalty decisions throughout the conflict development. This is above all true for rebel commanders, but can be said as well for government forces, above all local auxiliary troops under the influence of local elites, indigenous' and settlers' alike. Their loyalty is little bound to the respective leaderships, above all with central government and MNLF leadership geographically far away and little ideological and institutional binding. This leaves above all compliance due to material support. Accordingly, the weakening of material support relative to alternative sources of material support led to realignments of loyalty. This extends to the second internal factor in the production of violence in the dyadic conflict: local communities. For the insurgencies, they have been the key support group regarding recruits, food, and shelter. Vice versa, the indiscriminate targeting of local communities by government forces led to an increasing support of the insurgency. As with local commandos, this support was not uniformly bound to one or the other group. In the diversified violence production structure of Minsupala with a series of relevant forces, a change of material relations, i.e. protection by vigilante groups, a more respectful manner towards civilians by government forces, or perceived out-of-proportion demands of the insurgency could move communities towards alternative sources of protection.

However, the study, comparing approaches by different movements, highlighted, too, that commandos' as well as communities' loyalty is not singularly defined by short-term material incentives, might it be protection or economic gains. If bonds between leadership and commandos and communities are closer, by institutionalization of constant and regular relations as well as ideological understandings, short-term material benefits are not any longer the only incentive and defining factor for alignment to conflict groups. This brings us to the relation between hegemony projects and these violence production structures.

In regard to the role for hegemony projects on production and conduct of violence, the results show limited insights. We can see regarding violence production structures that a more sophisticated hegemony project might lead to a more limited and discriminate choice of violence production structures. This could be argued above all for the Maoist movement, which strongly favoured local production structures, even if that meant a high vulnerability at the beginning of the insurgency. Similar arguments can be used for the religious-integralist movement to a certain extent, even if the limitation of external support was rather the consequence of lessons learned out of the MNLF experience as well as restricted possibilities due to competition with the MNLF for the same donors, than hegemonic dogmatism. However, all movements at certain points compromised and sought for help from external sources. Regarding the conduct of violence, violence connected to hegemony projects seems to be more discriminate, i.e. directed versus a defined enemy. However, this does neither mean that there have been no collateral damages nor that these discriminate actions have been constant over the evolving dynamics of the conflict. Several developments can be highlighted here: we learn from the MNLF case that a strong autonomy of local commanders with loyalties based on material incentives were difficult to control and defectors lost to criminal causes. Furthermore, the strong influence of local dynamics on violence activities mix up violence connected to the political cause of a hegemonic movement with private conflict dynamics as land conflicts. In case of the Maoist movement, two elements get addressed: hegemony projects were in harsh times not able to prevent the use of violence to enforce support by local communities; and neither could the hegemony project prevent the escalation of internal conflicts due to unskilled institutional management. This leads to the liberal armed forces with similar problems: liberal ideas of rule of law and the monopolization of violence did not prevent the Philippine government to accept paramilitary forces, vigilante groups, black counterinsurgency tactics, and authoritarian rule of local elites. Secondly, lack of training, bad management, and unsophisticated strategies and tactics undermined attempts of discriminate action.

Turning the relation upside down, i.e. looking at the consequences of violence for hegemony projects, further elements of distorting violence in supporting hegemony projects can be found. First of all and most obvious, the integration of external support structures into the production of violence demands the acceptance of compromises regarding the development of the hegemony projects. In the Minsupala case, this encompassed the replacement of secession by autonomy on part of the Moro insurgency, moderation on criticism towards local governments and elites by national government as well as Moro insurgency, prevention of a stronger cooperation between Maoist and Moro movement, little progress on inclusion of non-Islamic inhabitants of Minsupala, etc. Secondly, violence-related groups have increased strength in the institutional dynamics. This encompasses local communities: the stronger local communities were integrated into the support of the fighting force, the stronger their political

influence on the hegemony movement and vice versa. Strong external support in violence production could therefore diminish the role of core social groups of hegemony movements and thus diminish the organic development as a mutual process between leadership and followers. Which consequently produced two more problems for the movement: it could be accused of being solely an instrument of external forces trying to use the movement for their own gains, as “colonial puppets”, “Islamic terrorists”, etc.; and this external support opened an additional front line, as shown by the intervention of the national government in the Middle East to the diplomatic disadvantage of the insurgency as well as the blockage of support for the Marcos regime by the US after global public discussions on human rights violations. Extending to the actual conduct of violence, our analysis shows above all that security and time issues threaten the political struggle; and vice versa the retreat from military struggles, when possible, allowed a more productive development of hegemonic structures in what Gramsci calls a war of position. Furthermore, even though intellectual concepts of hegemony projects were rather inclusive, with liberal Filipino, Moro secular-nationalist and Maoist propaganda targeting most of the population in Minsupala, the conduct of violence led to communal divisions, undermining the inclusive hegemony framework. Even for the religious-secular movement, which by definition excluded settlers from their political framework, it harmed their proposed concept of tolerance of choice for settlers. The analysis could not find any sign that this division was intentionally forced by the leadership of the different hegemony projects, but it was visible and therefore to a certain extent accepted as an unavoidable development. This encompasses above all activities by local vigilante groups and counter-insurgency and terrorist activities on all sides. This threatened local communities, which therefore had to balance their support for a hegemony project with the immediate security needs, pushing hegemony projects to accept external military support, thereby acquiring support by local communities. As seen, this incentive based exchange of loyalty is however not the same as consent-oriented support of a hegemony project and therefore volatile regarding relative security gains in a changing system of conflict dynamics. This includes protection from crossfire insecurity, which alienates local communities from all parties involved and therefore prolongs the crisis.

Concluding this analysis of the role of crisis violence, it remains to remark that out of this analysis results the hypothesis, that hegemony projects have choices to make even though social structures constrain and enable production and conduct of violence; choices between working on alliances or hegemony projects. The essence of Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony projects is the essential focus on a war of position, i.e. the development of a consent-based and institutionally backed system, integrating several social groups, with internally controlled violence used only against marginal deviations. The recurrence to external violence and an inclusion of local social groups above all via material incentives including security might be in the short term essential, but the resulting alliances between different social groups should not be mistaken for being a hegemony. Consequently, a group leading a strong alliance in a violent conflict does not necessarily hegemonically represent all integrated groups in a peace process; in the post-violence phase, the violence-based elements forging this alliance simply vanish. Thus, for some social groups, an end of the violence-phase might not be a favourite option altogether. This will be the core hypothesis of the last part of this analysis.

7.6.3 Persisting Violence Systems

The first element of our analysis has been that the idea of a step model of escalation does not help in the Minsupala case and has to be replaced by the analysis of a violence system. This is partly true for the transition from widespread low-level violence during the early crisis in the 1960s to a strongly dyadic conflict in the early 1970s; but even more so for the time after the failed peace agreement of 1976 and ever since, where too many involved actors distort the picture of a dyadic conflict and negate the international perception of the conflict of a dyadic conflict solvable by dyadic peace negotiations.

In this violence system, it is necessary to analysis a network of violence production structures, violence activities, and violence consequences. Next to political violence connected to hegemony projects, the study identified four more types of violence: inter-elite violence regarding economic and power conflicts; communal violence and ethnically defined retaliatory violence; paternalistic command violence subduing communities by local bosses in a strongly feudal relation; and last but not least extractive violence on a broad scale from land fraud and eviction of communities for business development projects to kidnappings-for-ransom and projection money.

One social group is involved in all these types of violence and occupies a central node in this violence network established over the last decades: lords of war. The study analysed their specific characteristics and sophisticated integration into the social system, which differentiates them from warlords, discussed elsewhere as the expression of a violence system. Lords of wars are defined by their non-commitment to a single hegemony project, meanwhile cooperating with all relevant actors in the field. Their violence capacities are an essential element and incentive for other groups to connect with, but their cooperation far more complex than a simple exchange of violence services for material benefits. They connect to these political actors in all analyzed components: they provide material incentives and vice versa gain materially from these relations, but furthermore they get integrated into the relevant institutions, into government electoral offices, as advisers to the insurgency, as traditional authorities in communities; this even encompasses the component of ideas, even though it seems to be difficult to bridge the antagonistic positions posed by the hegemony projects: cultural-sensitive peace and mediation for development are central catchwords which allow to connect liberal development with cultural-minority-requests and own interests as gatekeepers. Obviously, all of these elements, from the material to the ideal, would be threatened by a substantial peace agreement and the development towards a more democratic system; might it be liberal- or Islamic-inspired, let alone socialist aspirations of revolutionary change. Accordingly, while being the central element of the social network as well as the violence network in Minsupala, there are little prospects for the traditional elites in a peaceful progressive development as long as they are not able to substantially change their role in a local system; a possibility which, the other way around, is limited in a still violence-torn area.

Therefore, combining the weakness of hegemony movements with its dependency on groups whose strength is characterized by their role in the production of violence, political violence with its aim of transition towards a revolutionary new hegemony or the reestablishment of a former hegemony gets replaced by a production structures which reproduces violence as its essence. The failing of a peace process is thereby inevitable if this conflict system is misunderstood as a dyadic conflict.

8 Work Just Started

The last nearly four hundred pages encompassed general research aim, theoretical framework and methodology, its use for an analysis of different aspects of a conflict system on the southern Philippines; and finally generalizations regarding broader social developments in areas experiencing violent conflicts and the dynamics of violence in social struggles. The aim of these final pages is now to summarize the answer to the research question and to put the key results in perspective and link them to scientific developments in IPE and conflict studies. The chapter and with it the book will be concluded with some remarks on future research projects and normative impacts and expectations.

The study started with the general observation, that the post US-USSR-conflict research generation was amongst others confronted at its beginning with a double claim: the expectation of peace and the end of ideological struggles. The violent conflict in Minsupala seems to be a counter-example and the analysis of its development should have facilitated a better understanding of local conflict developments in the periphery of a liberal world order, following the question on how and why have political projects and conflict explanations changed in an explorative study. In few words: both arguments regarding violent conflicts in the 21st century have to be rejected in the Minsupala case. Indirectly, the end of the globally dominating political fault line pushed the peace prospects in the 1990s: amongst others the decrease of external funding by Libya and the global-liberal pressure for a stable investment climate were essential factors leading to the liberal 1996 agreement. However, the agreement failed and violence continued throughout the last two decades. Furthermore, the static picture of a dyadic proxy war is misleading from the beginning; in Minsupala not two but at least four different hegemony projects struggled for power.

Starting with the project of a Philippine hegemony based on the idea of liberal development it is necessary to state, that not the counter-hegemony movements brought the hegemony into crisis but just during the ongoing crisis, the counter-hegemony movements developed. As analyzed in chapter six, the crisis itself has been the result of the shortcomings of postcolonial passive revolution: forced integration into a global capitalist system, neglect of demands by local communities, and the control of consequent imbalances by cooptation of elites and the use of force. With traditional elites playing an ambiguous role, above all two social groups reacted: a young generation of mainly academics, hindered in their development by the liberal-traditional alliance, and the lower classes, evicted from their socioeconomic networks. The attempts to restore the liberal-Philippine hegemony had then to address two complexes: these causes of the crisis and the consequences of its dynamics, i.e. the development of movements struggling for a replacement of the current hegemony in crisis as well as the escalation of violence in this struggle. The liberal analysis of the struggle remained thereby rather uniform: the conflict would derive from deviations from the path of liberal development; thus better education, an increase in economic investments, and the overcoming of pre-liberal prejudices would solve the underlying crisis. Meanwhile, political movements using violent means have to be brought back to the field of law by DDR measures. The political activities of the leadership of the liberal hegemony, meanwhile, regularly referred to non-consent-oriented measures, i.e. the use of direct violence against opposition. If limited to confront illegal organizations it would have been covered by the liberal project; but above all two developments undermined

the hegemony attempt further: first, indiscriminate violence against civilians, encompassing injuries, rape, and murder, as well as evictions and population control measures; and second the acceptance and legal support of local despotic structures of ruling, including private armies and nepotism. Whenever these force-based strategies prevailed in the overall policy of the Philippine government, its conflict explanation of fighting a struggle in defence of a development-oriented liberal society blurred; and vice versa.

The project of a territorially based independence of Minsupala from the Philippine core got established under the premises of anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and '60s and propagated its necessity by referring above all to these force-based strategies; not as unfortunate deviations from a liberal, consent-oriented development hegemony, but as expression of the attempt of colonial domination of Manila over Minsupala. The connection of the NL-AC proponents to the global anti-colonial movement was thereby not just defining in ideological issues, but at the same time allowed the acquirement of organizational skills and material support in a global network. Thus, it was able to organize the rejection of intruding violent forces in Minsupala and ideologically explain the necessity of struggle to the global supporters, for example during the sessions of the OIC. Meanwhile, ethnographic research has shown that the project failed to diffuse its ideas throughout the local population. Accordingly, its strength declined once the organizational and intellectual skills towards the global anti-colonial network reduced its importance. In the local arena this was the consequence of alternative counter-hegemonic possibilities; a decrease of force-based strategies and a more consent-directed approach of the ruling institutions towards the local population; and finally due to different operational demands after its integration into local political institutions. On the global level the integration of the governments-based anti-colonial network into a seemingly uncontested liberal world order reduced the role of the network for the NL-AC. Thus, while its official conflict explanation remained uncontested inside the movement, the explanation lost its societal influence with the decline of the movement itself. None of the mentioned developments were thereby inherent to the counter-hegemony project; which highlights its core weakness: the link between the political project and the addressed social constituency. It emphasizes that a strategy based on the provision of material incentives, which includes military protection, has few tactical possibilities once the provision of these material incentives becomes reduced either from supply or demand side.

This has been recognized by the second hegemony project developed on the same university campus in Diliman/Metro Manila: tri-people socialist anti-colonialism; a project which could link similarly to global anti-colonial developments from Beijing to Havana, but which followed an autarkic strategy right from the beginning. It has been strong in its intellectual capacity to analyze the role of global and national orders in local situations as well as the establishment of mutual links between intellectuals and urban and rural workers; based on a hegemony struggle including the dissemination of ideas and the establishment of common institutions. In the Moro areas of the Philippines it failed, however, to address the spatial dimension of the political struggle: it considered the Moro masses automatically as natural followers and the former colonial master as the common enemy. That the Moro masses did not follow this analysis has not been the consequence of false consciousness, but of different interests not grasped by socialist anti-imperialist theory: the three-level-colonial situation thwarts the dyadic socialist analysis. In combination with strong anti-communist propaganda and the challenges of wide-

spread violence, the movement's conflict explanation failed with the movements' own failed establishment in Moro areas. However, this might change to certain extents in the future: the end of viable secessionist strategies requires the development of new tri-people approaches and the increased prominence of civil society activists opens up a new forum for progressive ideas in Moro society.

This finally leads to the development which triggered the currently most heated debate in security-focused international relations, next to the rise of China: the strengthening of Islamic religious-integralist political projects over the last decades. As outlined above all in chapter five, it is, however, misleading to match current strength with current development: the concepts as well as the origins of its proponents can be traced back to the heydays of anti-colonial struggles. The Islamic integralist hegemony project is thereby, other than the secular secessionist anti-colonial project in Minsupala, essentially different from the Philippine liberal hegemony. Its genuine development links the social groups left out by double-hegemonic structures in the liberal periphery: new professionals and urban and rural poor. While the liberal anti-colonial project, even though directed against Western countries, still supported a liberal hegemony, religious-integralist movements propose a different hegemony project, rejecting, similarly to the socialist project, the notion of an *ideological* end of history. Its strong focus on moral-religious renewal develops thereby ambiguous opportunities to link to existing political structures. On the one hand it reduces the importance of territorial borders, allowing a potential integration into a broader nation state as seen by the offer of accepting an autonomy in the late 1970s and again during the last years by the MILF; on the other hand, in its maximal version, no institutional setting which is not based on religiously defined structures is acceptable. This presented the political project with a much more difficult starting position in its beginnings in the 1960s and '70s, not connectable to existing local and global ruling structures. The increasing prominence of its ideas in Minsupala just developed with long-run community work after the schism from the MNLF and the temporary retreat from engagement in the conduct of violence. Its conflict explanation linked thereby to the anti-colonial reasoning of the liberal-anti-colonial movement, officially rejecting the notion of a religious conflict and connecting to broader global debates like indigenous rights and ancestral domain. However, deducting from the faith-based conflict resolution suggestions, which include specific rules and regulations for people with Islamic creed, the understood fault line is faith.

Although the alternating strength of these counter-hegemonic political projects, it does not imply that one of them might be successful in putting through a new hegemony. What it however implies is that the crisis of the late sixties has been what Gramsci calls an "organic" crisis; a crisis not over yet. Thereby, the crisis of the postcolonial passive revolution is not necessarily a crisis of liberalism per se, but it is a crisis of the double-hegemony developed in Minsupala after colonial intervention, which accepts the existence of traditional-feudal relations in local arenas, compensating for the weaknesses of the transfer of the liberal hegemony project from the land of the master to the land of the colonial slave, including the development of an ill-functioning liberal administration; the lasting legacy of colonialism. Every future hegemony attempt in Minsupala has to answer the fundamental challenges of the crisis: how to integrate new professionals as well as lower-class labourers and peasants and at the same time tackle the interests of the established traditional elites in front of an economic system based on small-scale farming and a strong extractive industry. This can be transferred to the global scale,

posing the question on which hegemony projects have which interests and which tools in hand to establish a hegemony which integrates peripheral areas in a substantial way.

Summing up, the social ideas and thus the conflict explanations of each respective hegemony project have been quite stable over the last forty years of violent conflict, with variations in presenting them to different audiences in highlighting different priorities. Their strength differed thereby on the one hand throughout national and international political networks and on the other hand throughout the wider local population. Current changes of local practices point at a more comprehensive hegemonic change in Moro areas, which leads to the hypothesis of an organic influence of the NR-AC project, different from the NL-AC project which declined in rapid time. However, just the next years and the consequences of the current peace negotiations will show how stable this project can be outside the streamlining circumstances of an insurgency and if the outcome of the peace process will stabilize the conflict explanation of a struggle between faith-based cultures.

Following from these insights and as well from the overall study, the question is then, what can be learned in regard to research of conflicts in peripheral areas. The focus on two different scientific strands, historical materialism and IPE on the one hand, conflict studies on the other opens up two possibilities to contextualize the insights. The first would be to differentiate both strands and highlight for each respective discussion the lessons-learned from this research. However, as the intention was to integrate the two strands rather than just address two different audiences, the next paragraphs will be structured in connected topics. The aim is thereby to grasp the link which connects different dimensions of a violent conflict: hegemonic formation, space in form of periphery as well as global integration, resulting crises and its handling by non-violent and violent strategies of political movements, the organization of these struggles including the alteration or development of public institutions, and finally the conduct of violence; synthesized in the analysis of the development of a conflict system.

The first point to address is the formation of hegemony in the global periphery. This research argued similar to other historical-materialist writers that postcolonial structures can be regarded as a passive revolution, consequence of the destruction of a local hegemony by colonialism. As seen throughout the previous chapters, this passive revolution has been based on the idea of *development liberalism*: the establishment of an economic system based on private property and integration into a global production process, with international investments into local resource extractions and low labour demands; the idea of development towards a liberal society, and the establishment of liberal-democratic state institutions. As this project has been implemented from outside, local traditional elites have been chosen for being the anchors of these developments. The acceptance of perversions of institutions and a deviance from the idea of liberalism derived from two directions: the bargaining process with local elites, admitting them a special role inside the system, and the internal tensions of this project, above all capital demands prevailing over labour demands and the consequent discrepancy between the liberal claim of complete national integration and the existence of economically *superfluous*, and, even worse for investments, *interfering* classes. Thus, we have seen that a perceived liberal hegemony in the periphery functions qualitatively different from liberal hegemonies in the global cores; contrary to the propagated idea of development, which argues

just a historic-quantitative difference to *more developed* systems. This highlights that even though a global liberal order propagates a hegemony similar to developments in the global core, extending even to the centres of the periphery, it is based in the periphery of the periphery on a different social system. Supporting insights from Abrahamsen (1997) and Morton (2000), this leads to tensions between the hegemonic-ideal claims and the socioeconomic and institutional developments, which just partly can be compensated by the cooptation of local elites. Thus, during the passive revolution, the widespread use of policing force has been accepted by the subaltern groups, but there is no sign that this force has been understood as a common protection against outsiders; thus not as a *consent-based* policing force. Development liberalism presented a universalized interest of the nation to catch-up with the global core, but it was not able to integrate the national periphery, were cooptation policies short-cut long-term integration policies; based on a solidarity of interests (Gramsci Q13 §7/1583-4) of the proponents of the ruling international, national and local elites.

Two moments undermine such a stabilizing arrangement. On the one hand, the attempts to legitimize it not as domination but as the expression of a universal consent-based hegemony, force the rulers to offer at least small incentives to the subordinated classes, for example in form of scholarships, to underline the development aspect of the system. This leads to a spiral in which a new self-conscious social group emerges, exposing the exclusive alliance underlying the propagated hegemony. The integration into a global world order, on the other hand, not just allows the transfer of hegemonic ideas and elite alliances, but as well the transfer of counter-hegemonic ideas: a core ideological influence for counter-hegemony attempts and a possibility to integrate into global counter-hegemonic networks. Galtung's analysis of imperialism (1971) has thereby to be revised: the structure of a core which connects in star-form to several peripheries, restraining cooperation between these peripheries, dissolved with the anti-colonial movements of the 1960s, allowing South-South cooperation as well as counter-hegemony cooperation between social groups in South and North. We can therefore conclude that the propagation of a global-local hegemony, even if covering non-hegemonic, forced-based domination, can instigate a dynamic of hegemonic change. *Trasformismo*, the cooptation of local potential leaders, can prevent the development of counter-hegemony projects and the escalation of a crisis, but it cannot prevent the crisis as such.

The research project addressed thereby a crosscutting theme which increasingly becomes an issue in IPE and conflict studies: space. If as outlined, a hegemony gets implemented and functions differently in postcolonial space, consent and violence interact differently as well in each of the respected spaces as well as in the relation between spaces. On a global level liberalism experienced decades of successes and setbacks in a cyclical way; overall its hegemonic integration process was a success, while liberal democracy in Minsupala has been in an organic crisis since the 1960s, following a short, post-colonial time of a stable passive revolution. Accordingly, violence to stabilize the situation has been a phenomenon for decades. This local crisis did thereby not organically threaten the global liberal hegemony; different than violence' consequences for *local* developments.

This research project can thereby add some spatial aspects to IPE approaches: the concept of territorially defined areas as well as their accumulation into levels from local to global has been undermined by empirical developments. The study has shown that local, national, international, and transnational actors meet and engage in different networks, thereby creating

spaces where the nation-state is just one of several. While this aspect has some specific current characteristics, these multiple spaces are influential all the way back to colonial and pre-colonial times. This qualifies some current discussions on the “retreat” of the state in a global neo-liberal development and highlights the multiple presence of spaces into which political struggles are embedded. The study has mentioned as current characteristics above all the existence of superfluous groups of people in an environment still strongly defined by extractive industries; these people have little connection to the broader national and global production networks, while at the same time sharing territories increasingly integrated into global production systems. Thus, they become more and more vulnerable, as their hegemonic integration into a liberal world order via production networks does not take place. Together with limited colonial destruction of previous hegemonies, this leads to the second characteristic: multiple hegemonies develop hybrid versions at the intersection of these spaces; different from the hegemony project on a global scale and in the respective countries of the liberal core, but as well different from previous social structures. The development idea drifts off into crisis when these described tensions out of integration and segregation of multiple spaces become tighter than easier, betraying the development aspect of the propagated hegemony.

This crisis developed, as seen, in Minsupala during the late 1960s. Thereby, the developments resemble Gramsci’s analysis of the Italian South as well as conflict study concepts: conflicts are not equal to conflict escalation. Different from later political perspectives, during the 1960s the crisis was present to the people, but it was not yet clear, what the actual conflict was about and how violent conflict lines would evolve, as violent activities criss-crossed throughout society. Violent incidences became more common, but they have not been politically directed, which explains the core involvement of private violent agents, while the nationally controlled military was still no major factor. Thus, the study argues that macroeconomic crisis factors can lead to (communal) violence, but they are not sufficient for the explanation of the development of a violent conflict.

It thus resembles the (Neo-)Gramscian analysis of such communal violence as riots with little historic consequences; missing political organization and thus direction (Gramsci 1995[1927]; Abrahamsen 1997). The involvement of elites in using violence to implement their own interest regarding property rights, including theft, eviction, and murder has further indirect consequences fuelling a crisis: increasing concentration of land in the hands of few and increasing demand for protection; but they do not develop a political conflict neither. This needs the organization of revolutionary answers to grievances with different political explanations and suggestions for a way out, outlined above. Meanwhile, two pre-violent conflict connection points continue to be a factor for political movements, too: personal gains for conflict agents and security demands by the population. While not inherent to the crisis itself, they are key concerns in violent conflicts. All involved agents propose thereby to secure followers and justify recurrence to violent means via security demands. Taken together, the eruption of violence itself is related to the crisis of the passive revolution including the ineffectiveness of public institutions; the development of a political violent conflict strongly related to intellectuals able to explain and streamline grievances to develop a hegemony project.

Once violence erupted, political movements have to develop a structure to be able to sustain their role in the violent conflict. This leads to the complex of violence production, overlapping with the needs to develop a movement. In Minsupala violence production got facilitated via

different systems: the Philippine government relied on own resources to sustain the AFP, US support, and semi-private security arrangements, including paramilitaries and private armies. The MNLF referred to foreign government sources for finances, weapons, and military training, as well traditional elites and their local connections to acquire recruits and material support; last but not least local support sustained the movement until the peace agreement in 1996. The latter has been at the centre of the MILF, which had international connection, but much more strongly than the MNLF followed an autarkic strategy, similar than the nation-wide Maoist movement.

These developments have been the core issue of Weinstein's analysis of the organization of rebellions (Weinstein 2007). His argument has three steps: first, the non-existence or existence of material resources allows to organize a movement via social respectively material incentives, thus leading to "activist ...or... opportunistic rebellions" (Weinstein 2007: 7-10). Secondly, an organization based on material incentives has difficulties to sustain discipline in its ranks because of the low barrier to split from the central movement, forcing its leadership to allow "indiscipline in order to maintain their membership" (Weinstein 2007: 7-10); while social incentives are based on long-term reliance and therefore more stable, with more possibilities to sustain discipline. On the third step, this leads to increased indiscriminate violence against civilians by movements based on material incentives and low levels of discipline, while movements based on social incentives try to avoid violence against civilians to not jeopardize their connection to popular support and they have the measures to force their rank-and-files to comply with this strategy. My research supports the argument of different strategies of organization having an influence on conflict dynamics, what has been called production of violence in this book. The connection between MNLF and local strongmen as well as the government's alliance with defecting militia leaders regularly got out of control of the respective leadership, leading to the worst massacres in the four decades of violent conflicts as well as to the foundation of criminal organizations characterized by kidnapping-for-ransom. At the same time, some qualifications have to be made.

First, the availability of material resources is not stable over the dynamics of conflicts and furthermore has to be organized via production processes. With the consequence that the leadership has to be constantly involved in the organization of these resources; if not part of the internal hegemony project, this activity is not a sustainable investment and just supports the hegemony project on a short-term base. Furthermore, if resources derive from external sources, political movements have to adapt to the demands of these sources, including eventually political demands; thus, rebel movement's leadership has to continually analyse the trade-off of different strategies of resource allocation. In the Minsupala case the MNLF had to accept autonomy and Marcos had to resign after withdrawal of support by the US and the Catholic Church. Thereby, both hegemony projects were looking for alternative resources, the MNLF for example by threatening to refer to Iran and Vietnam, and the Marcos government by attaching to the non-aligned movement and countries of the Middle East. That all these plans had little consequences point to Weinstein's argument that once an incentive-based strategy has been chosen, a strategic redirection becomes unlikely. However, deducting from the development of the NR-AC movement, other organizations might learn from these experiences and develop different structures, taking over the struggle in the long run.

This leads to the second qualification: while in a resource-scarce environment the reliance on social incentives is the only option, a resource-rich environment leaves theoretically both options open. Weinstein argues that material-incentive-based organizations have an advantage due to their rapid expansion and thus they “crowd out the development of activist organizations” (Weinstein 2007: 329). This gets supported by the strength of the MNLF in comparison to the communist movement during the first half of the 1970s. However, this research argues, that this early advantage fades over time: over a long-lasting conflict dynamic and even more so after a peace agreement, resource-based incentives might get reduced, leading to a scrambling of the movement without sustainable impact and thus without changing the underlying organic crisis. The outcome follows Gramsci’s argument, that for a movement to be successful, a war of position must complement the war of movement, not conducted by “opportunist rebellions” (Weinstein 2007: 10). Accordingly, a continuing or re-emerging of the violent conflict is likely. This presents an opportunity for “activist rebellions”. Its focus on the development of a movement based on social incentives by establishing grassroots support networks, by the dissemination of ideas, and by the development of local alternative institutions proved to be successful in the long run, even though the final test will be the transfer of the revolution into a non-violent political system. It shows, that there remain possibilities for third parties in seemingly dyadic political conflicts, always presumed that potential activist rebellion movements get not physically annihilated throughout the first period of violent conflict; a danger posed to the early socialist revolutionaries. If such a destruction of constructive opposition is the case, a continuing violent system, described below, becomes more likely: as the opportunist rebellion does not address or even worsen the organic crisis; and fewer activists are able to work on a transition of the crisis.

This leads to the role of the conduct of violence in overall organic crises; this research supports the analysis of Weinstein on the danger of using large-scale violence against civilians for activist movements. In Minsupala, this can empirically be traced above all in regard to the Maoist movement, which in some areas got into the trap of increased violence due to forcing compliance by the local population in situations of retreat during the 1990s (Rutten 2008). The argument can be further extended to governments: if governments refer to indiscriminate violence against civilians in their counter-insurgency tactics, it further demolishes the bond between population and public institutions and thus increases the threat of people switching to the insurgency; making regular use of violence against civilians by government forces necessary to prevent this, i.e. the same danger of a violence spiral exists for governments as well. This leads to the specifics of a secessionist conflict: if the hegemonic aim is ethnic homogeneity, then large-scale violence against civilians *of the other side* might not jeopardize activist movements’ strategy. This changes, however, if the movement defines their constituency territorially rather than along essentialist identities or the moment a rebel movement accepts autonomy over secessionism. In these cases civilians are or will become again part of the broader constituency and thus the conduct of violence against civilians becomes a barrier for hegemonic success; a difficult issue for a long-running secessionist conflict and a barrier for constructive conflict resolution.

Historical materialism is similarly interested in the influence of violence on the relation between constituency and movement, referring to the distinction between wars of position and manoeuvre and the reservations towards a strong focus onto violence institutions in regard to

a sustainable development of a hegemony project. As could be shown in this study, this is even more important when external support regarding violence is available: it can lead the organizers of political struggles to confuse military and hegemonic power; a serious mistake with as shown devastating consequences once the opponent is able to transfer the struggle from the battlefield to the political struggle for broad economic, ideal, and institutional support by the targeted society. Where this study exceeds the insights of above all Gramsci on this matter is the analysis of the development of a self-reproducing violence system, the last topic to be addressed here, combining all mentioned insights in a synthetic manner.

The study showed that in a crisis where violence becomes a central mean of political struggle, the development and success of hegemony projects is difficult and sometimes even unlikely due to the high demands in regard to violence production and the development of spoilers in resource-rich environments, consistent with Weinstein's analysis. At the same time, hegemony projects are more sustainable than others, if they can integrate society along mutual material networks, a social idea explaining these networks, and institutions to organize these networks, including the application of violence. The measurement of success is thereby difficult; the study used several proxies, from election results to network references to public mobilization of people. Meanwhile, there were no signs, that victories on the battlefield could be translated into longer periods of stability where compliance would not have to be continuously backed up by force, i.e. a continuing crisis is essentially linked to the limitations of hegemony projects. This should be a strong reservation against the idea, that the absence of a hegemony project can be blamed to barriers, which just have to be destroyed by military means to allow the hegemony project to hold sway, for example insurgents, bandits, governments, etc. It is furthermore a warning to confuse material incentive-based alliances with a hegemony.

This is even of more importance once a crisis evolved into a conflict system. The current continuing of decades-old violent crises and the increasing availability of information regarding economic structures in the production of insurgency violence made the argument prominent, that what currently happens is the transition from political violence to instrumental violence for particular purposes (Kaldor 1999). This research, however, shows that this argument can not grasp the relation between political and individual, structural and dynamic-related dimensions of a conflict system.

Instead, this study has argued that due to the specific dynamics of violence of a dissolving dyadic conflict, a dyadic step model is not helpful any longer, while a network-based interests-model can help to continually trace patterns of violence production. An escalation step-model based on a dyadic conflict would analyse the dissolution of large-scale dyadic violence as a de-escalation of conflict and crises. However, not the development towards more peaceful political relations can be seen, but the development of a self-reproducing conflict system. It is characterized by a network of violence actors, where each actor tries to move the overall network into respective directions favourable to their own political and particular interests without being willing or able to destroy the violence network as such. Giving up dyadic conflict descriptions does thereby not necessarily mean to replace it conceptually with the analysis of self-centric, ahistorical and apolitical actors. Next to the critical argument that political factions still continue their struggle, even violence profiteers are embedded in and bound to historical social structures, including political institutions. Summarized, it is necessary to analyse the hybrid developments of groups and interests in a violent conflict system, rather than a con-

tinuing analysis of political dyadic groups or an apolitical violence profiteers. This includes the understanding, that conflict dynamics and development of social crises are not distinct periods. Thus it is necessary for IPE to analyze the consequences of conflict dynamics in crises for the development of hegemony and counter-hegemony projects in more depth, rather than understanding them as breaks in between. Meanwhile, conflict studies have to constantly link conflict dynamics to the development of the crisis, continuing over the conflict period. In the Minsupala case, this meant that land evictions continue, getting further fuelled by violence, and local traditional elites got incorporated into government structures even more strongly during the violent conflicts, with its peak in the Ampatuan massacre of 2010. This is a precaution, too, in the analysis of hybrid states and traditional institutions.

Which covers furthermore the notion of failing states, i.e. the absence of ideal state institutions. Next to reference to dynamics of violence, one argument is thereby that the model of a liberal-democratic state has never been implemented in the colonial periphery, not even during the times of passive revolutionary situations. However, as seen, this historical-quantitative analysis does not grasp the complexity of institutions and its developments. The state and its administrative institutions are present. However, they are not the only ones: insurgencies try to establish their own revolutionary institutions; some quite nominal, but if based on a war of position (Gramsci) or social incentives (Weinstein) they can have a strong influence on everyday life of local communities. Traditional institutions form a third set of public institutions. Sometimes one set of institutions replaces the other, but more often than not, they exist parallel, competing with each other or even developing new hybrid and unique characteristics, as shown by the relation between traditional and local government institutions. Thus, a violence system shows not a lack of institutions, but rather multiple institutions with different capabilities and scope, as no political project is able to monopolize its institutional influence. Governance takes place in several spaces in overlapping and mutual influencing forms. These insights can be connected to compliance and governance research and might enrich the failed state debate to move from the binary retreat-thesis to the analysis of changing governance characteristics in a network of active formal and informal, legal and illegal, traditional and revolutionary, public and private institutions. The notion of hybrid developments and hybrid institutions parallels thereby arguments by a study group around Volker Boege (Boege et al. 2008). What differs in my research is a normative precaution towards traditional local institutions. Traditional institutions link to the local population but they are not necessarily a more hegemonic, i.e. consent-oriented, representation of this population than other, competing institutions. As seen at the end of chapter seven, hybrid institutions can even become a core element of the reproduction of the crisis as well as of the violence system.

This leads to the last argument to be made here. To grasp these links between crises and violence, conflict studies have to connect to wider political questions; political struggles continue to play a role throughout historical developments and setbacks as much as material constraints and demands are elements of the crises as well as elements of the dynamics of violence. In a violence system, liberal political theory boundaries between private and political get dissolved, but that does not mean the prevailing of one over the other. For ways to overcome it, thus just a synthetic perspective delivers valid insights.

This includes the increasing role of space transcending the inter-national system of the 20th century leads thereby not just to political changes but as well to necessary scientific redirec-

tions, where questions of international relations, economics, peace and conflict studies, public institutions, and political theory overlap. This does not mean a replacement of current space-concepts as for example the mentioned differentiation of territory in violent conflicts by quantitative-geographic research; on the contrary. This differentiation is essential in analyzing the development of overlapping and/or antagonistic spaces on a given territory.

The theoretical framework used in this study proved thereby to be effective in allowing a multi-perspective approach towards empirical data. Its strength results out of its possibility to capture empirical elements of crises as well as elements of the dynamics of violence in a synthetic way. This allows a dialectic engagement of connected elements: consent and force; social structures and political activities; global core and local periphery. Two future developments can be suggested here, a formal and a content one. Regarding form: the amount of data required by the approach is nearly impossible to gather by a single project. This project lasted for several years and still had mainly to refer to secondary data. Smaller studies, for example conflict development explanations based on information on business corporation networks and interests in conflict structures, are not convincing regarding the demanded multi-perspective analysis. Accordingly, the theoretical framework should proof its potential above all in bigger projects, encompassing several researchers in an interdisciplinary setting, where the approach can be used to link results from sub-projects. In regard to content, further research is needed on the relation between interests and developments in the core of the global liberal world order and developments and conflicts in the Global South; this includes the interesting question on the role of the periphery for the development and functioning of a global hegemony as well as for liberal democratic hegemonies in OECD member countries.

Methodologically, social group network analysis, which has been conducted in this project in an informal manner via descriptive network graphs, proved to have analytical potential. The focus on social groups as nodes in these networks and the consequent tracing of developments of hegemony projects as evolving units of analysis provide a structured approach in combination with the fulfilment of the demand of a holistic coverage of societal developments. Together with the above mentioned possibilities of a bigger project, a quantitative network analysis should be tested in the future. This links to the role of modern information technology. Until recently, qualitative detailed analysis was juxtaposed to uniform quantitative analysis. As information technology has gone the step from structured programming languages towards object- and data-oriented programming languages, new possibilities have opened, transcending the qualitative/quantitative divide on a higher level than a formal triangulation of the methods could do. Therefore, the exploration of forms, possibilities, and limitations of these new, IT-supported methodologies is still at its beginning.

The last suggestion, connecting to the above mentioned arguments, concerns content of peace and conflict studies. Problem-solving approaches with its productive developments over the last decades can provide a series of well-researched society engineering solutions based on respective why-questions on conflict structures and triggers as well as state weaknesses. To complement these results, further interest-based analyses should be conducted. As shown in this study, *optimal* solutions may not be congruent with political interests of social groups, let alone the dynamics of a violent conflict. Politics in specific and social developments in general are an open struggle of interests and depending on these interests just to certain extends capable of being integrated into a liberal form of conflict management. Therefore, the scientific

exploration of conflict solutions has to integrate a historical and political understanding of interests of social groups involved in a political struggle, i.e. the integration of knowledge on mechanisms and dynamics of conflicts with a broader understanding of historical social developments. This allows social stakeholders to come to transparent decisions out of several tactical and strategic choices, analyzed and provided by peace and conflict research; and these decisions are and have to be *political* in the broader understanding of the term.

To close this book with a positive outlook: what above all can be learned from Gramsci and again by this research is that violence may be necessary for defence purposes but even in that case the use of violence in a political struggle is always a sign of weakness; and consent-oriented integration a sign of strength.

Annex

A Interviews

| Interview ID | Type of Interviewee | Place | Date |
|--------------|-----------------------|----------|----------------|
| <i>A</i> | CSO/former insurgents | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>B</i> | Academic | Cotabato | July 2010 |
| <i>C</i> | CSO | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>D</i> | CSO/former insurgent | Cotabato | July 2010 |
| <i>E</i> | CSO | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>F</i> | CSO | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>G</i> | Government | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>H</i> | Academic | Manila | July 2010 |
| <i>I</i> | CSO | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>J</i> | Insurgent | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>K</i> | Academic | Manila | September 2009 |
| <i>L</i> | Government | Manila | July 2010 |
| <i>M</i> | Government | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>N</i> | CSO/former insurgent | Cotabato | July 2010 |
| <i>O</i> | CSO | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>P</i> | CSO/former insurgent | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>Q</i> | CSO | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>R</i> | International | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>S</i> | Academic | Cotabato | July 2010 |
| <i>T</i> | Academic | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>U</i> | International | Manila | July 2010 |
| <i>V</i> | Insurgents | Davao | July 2010 |
| <i>W</i> | International | Manila | September 2009 |
| <i>X</i> | CSO/former insurgent | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>Y</i> | Academic | Manila | July 2010 |
| <i>Z</i> | CSO | Manila | September 2009 |
| <i>ZA</i> | CSO/former insurgent | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>ZB</i> | Government | Cotabato | July 2010 |
| <i>ZC</i> | Academic | Manila | September 2009 |
| <i>ZD</i> | Academic | Cotabato | September 2009 |
| <i>ZE</i> | International | Cotabato | July 2010 |
| <i>ZF</i> | CSO | Europe | May 2012 |

Table 5: Expert Interviews conducted 2009-2012

B Original Gramsci Quotes in Italian Language

- GT-01:* “La innovazione fondamentale introdotta dalla filosofia della praxis nella scienza della politica e della storia è la dimostrazione che non esiste una astratta ‘natura umana’ fissa e immutabile (concetto che deriva certo dal pensiero religioso e dalla trascendenza) ma che la natura umana e l’insieme dei rapporti sociali storicamente determinate, cioè un fatto storico accertabile, entro certi limiti, coi metodi della filologia e della critica. Pertanto la scienza politica deve essere concepita nel suo contenuto concreto (e anche nella sua formulazione logica) come un organismo in sviluppo. ... Lo stile del Machiavelli non è quello di un trattatista sistematico ..., tutt’altro: è stile di uomo d’azione, di chi vuole spingere all’azione, è stile da ‘manifesto’ di partito.” (Gramsci Q13 §20/1599)
- GT-02:* “di aver imposto la questione meridionale all’attenzione dell’avanguardia operaia, prospettandola come uno dei problemi essenziali della politica nazionale del proletariato rivoluzionario.” (Gramsci 1995[1927]: 157)
- GT-03:* “ideologia sia stata diffusa in forma capillare dai propagandisti della borghesia nelle masse del Settentrione:– il Mezzogiorno è la palla di piombo che impedisce più rapidi progressi allo sviluppo civile dell’Italia; i meridionali sono biologicamente degli esseri inferiori, dei semibarbari o dei barbari completi, per destino naturale; se il Mezzogiorno è arretrato, la colpa non è del sistema capitalistico o di qualsivoglia altra causa storica, ma della natura che ha fatto i meridionali poltroni, incapaci, criminali, barbari, temperando questa sorte matrigna con l’esplosione puramente individuale di grandi geni, che sono come le solitarie palme in un arido e sterile deserto.” (Gramsci 1995[1927]: 158-9)
- GT-04:* “Tutti ricordano che in realtà, quando Mussolini esce dall’Avanti! E dal Partito Socialista, egli è circondato da questa coorte di sindacalisti e di meridionalisti.” (Gramsci 1995[1927]: 170)
- GT-05:* “Si può dire che scrivere la storia di un partito significa niente altro che scrivere la storia generale di un paese da un punto di vista monografico, per porne in risalto un aspetto caratteristico. Un partito avrà avuto maggiore o minore significato e peso, nella misura appunto in cui la sua particolare attività avrà pesato più o meno della determinazione della storia di un paese.” (Gramsci Q13 §33/1630)
- GT-06:* “L’errore in cui si cade spesso nelle analisi storico-politiche consiste nel non saper trovare il giusto rapporto tra ciò che è organico e ciò che è occasionale ... nell’un caso si sopravvalutano le cause meccaniche; nell’ altro si esalta l’elemento volontaristico e individuale. (La distinzione tra ‘movimenti’ e fatti organici e movimenti e fatti di ‘congiuntura’ o occasionali deve essere applicata a tutti i tipi di situazione non solo a quelle in cui si verifica uno svolgimento regressivo o di crisi acuta, ma a quelle in cui si verifica uno svolgimento progressive o di prosperità e a quelle in cui si verifica una stagnazione delle forze produttive).” (Gramsci Q13 §17/1580)
- GT-07:* “La materia non è quindi da considerare come tale, ma come socialmente e storicamente organizzata per la produzione e quindi la scienza naturale come essenzialmente una categoria storica, un rapporto umano” (Gramsci Q11 §30/1442)
- GT-08:* “dominante di gruppi avversari che tende a »liquidare« o a sottomettere anche con la forza armata ed è dirigente di gruppi affini e alleati” (Gramsci Q6/703)

- GT-09:* “dal prestigio (e quindi dalla fiducia) derivante al gruppo dominante dalla sua posizione e dalla sua funzione nel mondo della produzione” (Gramsci Q12 §1/1519)
- GT-10:* i propri interessi corporativi [...] possono e debbono divenire gli interessi di altri gruppi subordinati
- GT-11:* “tende a prevalere, a imporsi, a diffondersi su tutta l’area sociale, determinando oltre che l’unicità dei fini economici e politici, anche l’unità intellettuale e morale, ponendo tutte le questioni intorno a cui ferve la lotta non sul piano corporativo ma su un piano »universale« e creando così l’egemonia di un gruppo sociale fondamentale su una serie di gruppi subordinati.” (Gramsci Q13 §7/1583-4)
- GT-12:* “L’esercizio ‘normale’ dell’egemonia nel terreno divenuto classico del regime parlamentare, è caratterizzato dalla combinazione della forza e del consenso che si equilibrano variamente, senza che la forza soverchi di troppo il consenso, anzi cercando di ottenere che la forza appaia appoggiata sul consenso della maggioranza, espresso dai così detti organi dell’opinione pubblica – giornali e associazioni – i quali, perciò, in certe situazioni, vengono moltiplicati artificialmente.” (Gramsci Q13 §37/1638)
- GT-13:* “apparato di coercizione statale ... assicura ‘legalmente’ la disciplina di quei gruppi che non ‘consentono’ ne attivamente ne passivamente” it is also “costituito per tutta la società in previsione dei momenti di crisi nel comando e nella direzione in cui il consenso spontaneo vien meno.” (Gramsci Q12 §1/1519)
- GT-14:* “Stato = società politica + società civile, cioè egemonia corazzata di coercizione” (Gramsci Q6 §88/764)
- GT-15:* “solo possono creare un terreno più favorevole alla diffusione di certi modi di pensare, di impostare e risolvere le questioni che coinvolgono tutto l’ulteriore sviluppo della vita statale.” (Gramsci Q13 §17/1587)
- GT-16:* „perché vaste masse [...] sono passati di colpo dalla passività politica a una certa attività e pongono rivendicazioni che nel loro complesso disorganico costituiscono una rivoluzione” (Gramsci Q13 §23/1603)
- GT-17:* “nel movimento storico non si torna mai indietro e non esistono restaurazioni ‘in toto’” (Gramsci Q13 §27/1619)
- GT-18:* “Si può dire che il cesarismo esprime una situazione in cui le forze in lotta si equilibrano in modo catastrofico, cioè si equilibrano in modo che la continuazione della lotta non può concludersi che con la distruzione reciproca.” (Gramsci Q13 §27/1619)
- GT-19:* “in ultima analisi, può essere ricostruito dalla storia concreta e non da uno schema sociologico.” (Gramsci Q13 §27/1619)
- GT-20:* “una forma più pura e permanente” (Gramsci Q13 §27/1619)
- GT-21:* “un paese in cui i quadri della vita nazionale sono embrionali e rilasciati e non possono diventare ‘trincea o fortezza’” (Gramsci Q7 §16/865)
- GT-22:* “In Oriente lo Stato era tutto, la società civile era primordiale e gelatinosa; nell’Occidente tra Stato e società civile c’era un giusto rapporto e nel tremolio dello Stato si scorgeva subito una robusta struttura della società civile. Lo Stato era solo una trincea avanzata, dietro cui stava una robusta catena di fortezze e di casematte; più o meno, da Stato a Stato, si capisce, ma questo appunto domandava un’accurata ricognizione di carattere nazionale.” (Gramsci Q7 §16/866)
- GT-23:* “organizzi permanentemente l’impossibilità di disgregazione interna: controlli

- d'ogni genere, politici, amministrativi, ecc., rafforzamento delle 'posizioni' egemoniche del gruppo dominante, ecc." (Gramsci Q6 §138/802)
- GT-24: "poiché nella politica la 'guerra di posizione', una volta vinta, è decisiva definitivamente". (Gramsci Q6 §138/802)
- GT-25: "paesi potenzialmente bonapartisti" (Gramsci Q13 §23/1609)
- GT-26: "classe militare-burocratica che con mezzi militari soffoca il movimento in campagna ... in questa lotta trova una certa unificazione politica e ideologica, trova alleati nelle classi medie urbane ... rafforzate dagli studenti di origine rurale che stanno in città, impone i suoi metodi politici alle classi alte, che devono farle molte concessioni e permettere una determinata legislazione favorevole; insomma riesce a permeare lo Stato dei suoi interessi fino ad un certo punto e a sostituire una parte del personale dirigente, continuando a mantenersi armata nel disarmo generale e prospettando il pericolo di una Guerra civile tra i propri armati e l'esercito di leva se la classe alta mostra troppe velleità di resistenza." (Gramsci Q13 §23/1609-10)
- GT-27: "Ciò significa che se si può parlare di intellettuali, non si può parlare di non-intellettuali, perché non-intellettuali non esistono. ... Quando si distingue tra intellettuali e non-intellettuali in realtà ci si riferisce solo alla immediata funzione sociale della categoria professionale degli intellettuali" (Gramsci Q12 §3/1551)
- GT-28: "la filosofia della praxis aveva due compiti: combattere le ideologie moderne nella loro forma più raffinata, per poter costituire il proprio gruppo di intellettuali indipendenti, e educare le masse popolari, la cui cultura era medioevale." (Gramsci Q16 §9/1858)
- GT-29: "sollevare continuamente nuovi strati di massa ad una vita culturale superiore." (Gramsci Q16 §9/1862)
- GT-30: "Ogni corrente filosofica lascia una sedimentazione di 'senso comune: è questo il documento della sua effettualità storica. Il senso comune non è qualcosa di irrigidito e di immobile, ma si trasforma continuamente, arricchendosi di nozioni scientifiche e di opinioni filosofiche entrate nel costume." (Gramsci Q24 §4/2271)
- GT-31: "La filosofia è la critica e il superamento della religione e del senso comune e in tal senso coincide col 'buon senso' che si contrappone al senso comune." (Gramsci Q11 §12/1378)
- GT-32: "tecnico dell'industria, lo scienziato dell'economia politica, l'organizzatore di una nuova cultura, di un nuovo diritto, etc." (Gramsci Q12 §1/1513)
- GT-33: "categorie sociali preesistenti e che anzi apparivano come rappresentanti una continuità storica ininterrotta anche dai più complicati e radicali mutamenti delle forme sociali e politiche" (Gramsci Q12 §1/1514)
- GT-34: "Anzi, avviene che molti intellettuali pensino di essere lo Stato, credenza, che, data la massa imponente della categoria, ha talvolta conseguenze notevoli e porta a complicazioni spiacevoli per il gruppo fondamentale economico che realmente è lo stato". (Gramsci Q12 §1/1522-3)
- GT-35: "a contatto la massa contadina con l'amministrazione statale o locale ... e per questa stessa funzione ha una grande funzione politico-sociale, perché la mediazione professionale è difficilmente scindibile dalla mediazione politica." (Gramsci Q12 §1/1521)
- GT-36: "cioè diventare un signore, elevando il grado sociale della famiglia" (Gramsci Q12 §1/1521)

- GT-37: “masse imponenti, non tutte giustificate dalle necessita sociale della produzione, anche se giustificate dalle necessita politiche del gruppo fondamentale dominante.” (Gramsci Q12 §1/1520)
- GT-38: “Ogni nuovo organismo storico (tipo di società) crea una nuova superstruttura, i cui rappresentanti specializzati e portabandiera (gli intellettuali) non possono non essere concepiti come anch’essi ‘nuovi’ intellettuali, sorti dalla nuova situazione e non continuazione della precedente intellettualità.” (Gramsci Q11 §16/1407)
- GT-39: “se essa finisce col costituire un corpo solidale, che sta a sé e si sente indipendente dalla massa, il partito finisce col diventare anacronistico, e nei momenti di crisi acuta viene svuotato del suo contenuto sociale e rimane come campato in aria.” (Gramsci Q13 §23/1604)
- GT-40: “Il moderno principe ... non può essere una persona reale, un individuo concreto, può essere solo un organismo; un elemento di società complesso nel quale già abbia inizio il concretarsi di una volontà collettiva riconosciuta e affermatasi parzialmente nell’azione. Questo organismo è già dato dallo sviluppo storico ed è il partito politico, la prima cellula in cui si riassumono dei germi di volontà collettiva che tendono a divenire universali e totali.” (Gramsci Q13 §13/1558)
- GT-41: “il moderno Principe è nello stesso tempo l’organizzatore e l’espressione attiva e operante”(Gramsci §13/1561)
- GT-42: “creazione di un nuovo ceto intellettuale consiste pertanto nell’elaborare criticamente l’attività intellettuale che in ognuno esiste in un certo grado di sviluppo, modificando il suo rapporto con lo sforzo muscolare-nervoso verso un nuovo equilibrio e ottenendo che lo stesso sforzo muscolare-nervoso ... che innova perpetuamente il mondo fisico e sociale, diventi il fondamento di una nuova e integrale concezione del mondo. ... Nel mondo moderno l’educazione tecnica, strettamente legata al lavoro industriale anche il più primitivo o squalificato, deve formare la base del nuovo tipo di intellettuale.” (Gramsci Q12 §3/1551)
- GT-43: “mescolarsi attivamente alla vita pratica”(Gramsci Q12 §3/1551)
- GT-44: “resistenze ‘intellettuali’ e ‘moralì’ e avviene in forme particolarmente brutali e insidiose, attraverso la coercizione più estrema. ... La ‘tradizione’, la ‘civiltà’ europea è ... caratterizzata dall’esistenza di classi simili, create dalla ‘ricchezza’ e ‘complessità’ della storia passata che ha lasciato un mucchio di sedimentazioni passive attraverso i fenomeni di saturazioni e fossilizzazione del personale statale e degli intellettuali, del clero e della proprietà terriera, del commercio di rapina e dell’esercito prima professionale poi di leva, ma professionale per l’ufficialità. (Gramsci Q22 §2/2141)
- GT-45: “in Italia gli intellettuali sono lontani dal popolo, cioè dalla ‘nazione’ e sono invece legati a una tradizione di casta, che non è mai stata rotta da un forte movimento politico popolare o nazionale dal basso: la tradizione è ‘libresca’ e astratta e l’intellettuale tipico moderno si sente più legato ad Annibal Caro o Ippolito Pindemonte che a un contadino pugliese o siciliano. ... Cosa significa il fatto che il popolo italiano legge di preferenza gli scrittori stranieri? Significa che esso subisce l’egemonia intellettuale e morale degli intellettuali stranieri che a quelli ‘paesani’, cioè che non esiste nel paese un blocco nazionale intellettuale e morale, ne gerarchico e tanto meno egualitario.” (Gramsci Q21 §5/2116)
- GT-46: “il paradosso più stridente per molte tendenze monopolistiche di carattere nazionalistico e repressivo: che mentre si costruiscono piani grandiosi di egemonia, non ci si accorge di essere oggetto di egemonie straniere; ... si accaniscono nell’esaltazione

nazionalistica per non sentire il peso dell'egemonia da cui si dipende e si è oppressi.” (Gramsci Q23 §57/2253)

- GT-47:* “democrazia borghese ... doveva scegliere: o una democrazia rurale, cioè una alleanza coi contadini meridionali, una politica di libertà doganale, di suffragio universale, di decentramento amministrativo, di bassi prezzi nei prodotti industriali – o un blocco industriale capitalistico-operaio, senza suffragio universale, per il protezionismo doganale, per il mantenimento dell'accentramento statale (espressione del dominio borghese sui contadini, specialmente del Mezzogiorno e delle Isole), per una politica riformistica dei salari e delle libertà sindacali.” (Gramsci 1995[1927]: 167-8)
- GT-48:* “[L]a grande proprietà terriera è rimasta fuori dalla libera concorrenza: e lo Stato moderno ha rispettato l'essenza feudale, escogitando formule giuridiche, come quella del fidecommesso, che continuano di fatto le investiture e i privilegi del regime feudale. ... Il contadino è vissuto sempre fuori dal dominio della legge, senza personalità giuridica, senza individualità morale: è rimasto un elemento anarchico, l'atomo indipendente di un tumulto caotico, infrenato solo dalla paura del carabiniere e del diavolo.” (Gramsci 1995[1919]: 92-93)
- GT-49:* “La mentalità del contadino è rimasta perciò quella del servo della gleba, che si rivolta violentemente contro i 'signori' in determinate occasioni, ma è incapace di pensare se stesso come membro di una collettività (la nazione per i proprietari e la classe per i proletari) e di svolgere un'azione sistematica e permanente rivolta a mutare i rapporti economici e politici della convivenza sociale. La psicologia dei contadini era, in tali condizioni, incontrollabile; i sentimenti reali rimanevano occulti, implicate e confuse in un sistema di difesa contro gli sfruttamenti, meramente egoistica, senza continuità logica, materiata in gran parte di sornioneria e di finto servilismo. La lotta di classe si confondeva col brigantaggio, col ricatto, con l'incendio dei boschi, con lo sgarrettamento del bestiame, col ratto dei bambini e delle donne, con l'assalto al municipio: rea una forma di terrorismo elementare, senza conseguenze stabili ed efficaci.” (Gramsci 1995[1919]: 92-93)

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D Curriculum Vitae


English

Due to data protection reasons the curriculum vitae has not been included in the online version.

Deutsch

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E Map



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
Figure 7: Map of the Philippines; Source: University of Texas Libraries

F Graphs


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- Ideas TS1-TS6
- Institutions TS1-TS6
- Violence TS1-TS6


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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