Chapter 2

Task Assignment and Organizational Form

2.1 Introduction

Looking at real-world firms and organizations, we observe very different organizational forms. Some firms have centralized, function-based structures with, for example, a huge marketing department which markets all the products produced by the firm. Others incorporate decentralized, process-based structures with more or less independent units, also called profit centers, which are entirely responsible for a certain product, including manufacturing, marketing and any other task. Which form is optimal under certain circumstances? Beginning with Chandler (1962), a lot of literature deals with the potential advantages of the different forms. Besides multiproduct firms, there are further applications. Any kind of organization or institution deals with task assignment or composition of teams.\(^1\)

This chapter compares process-based and function-based organizational forms within the framework of a simple task assignment model. We con-

\(^1\)Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) apply the idea of M- and U-form to planned economies. While the Soviet Union had a centralized structure with ministries for the different industries corresponding to the functional areas, the Chinese economy is organized in decentralized regions corresponding to the processes.
Consider an organization or firm which undertakes two independent projects (e.g. distributes several products) each of which requires contributions from two functional areas (e.g. manufacturing and marketing), resulting in four tasks to be done. The focus of the chapter is on the substitutability resp. complementarity of the functions. A principal contractually assigns the tasks to two agents. The task assignment determines the organizational form. Under the function-based or unitary form (\(U\)-form), each agent is in charge of one function, e.g. marketing. Under the process-based or multidivisional (multilevel) form (\(M\)-form), each agent is in charge of a process, e.g. one of the products. The agents exert costly effort on the tasks they are assigned to, but effort is noncontractible. It might be unobservable to a third party or unverifiable in court. Moral hazard occurs so that the principal needs to provide incentives in order to induce the agents to spend effort. The agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liability. Either the agents cannot conduct any payments due to wealth constraints or ex post payments cannot be enforced so that the agents could break up the contract and walk away instead of paying. The principal faces a trade off between rent extraction and surplus maximization which occurs in our model under both organizational forms. The agents’ effort choice is a noncooperative game designed by the principal through the payment scheme.

The output of the projects is assumed to be the only verifiable variable on which payments can condition. Under the \(U\)-form, each agent’s payoff depends on both agents’ actions, free riding can occur. Under the \(M\)-form, the payoff is independent of the other agent’s actions so that incentives are more

\footnote{Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) as well as Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005) show that it is never optimal to split a task among several agents. Our model implicitly assumes that tasks cannot be split.}

\footnote{This moral hazard problem was introduced by Sappington (1983) for a single agent.}

\footnote{Winter (2004) shows that it might be necessary to discriminate between the agents if a unique Nash equilibrium in which all agents exert effort is desired. To avoid related issues, we assume that the principal can pick the equilibrium of her choice in the case of multiple equilibria. As a justification, think of the principal announcing the effort levels of her favorite equilibrium and the agents following her recommendation because they cannot gain from deviating unilaterally.}
effective.\(^5\) On the other hand, we assume the \(U\)-form to provide some cost savings. If each agent is specialized in one functional area, his effort costs are lower if working on a task from this area.\(^6\) For example, the agents are a marketing director and a technical engineer specialized in manufacturing. A slightly different interpretation is to assume economies of scale so that an agent working on two tasks from the same function has lower costs than an agent working on tasks from different functions. The principal’s trade off is to balance between cost savings under the \(U\)-form and more effective incentives under the \(M\)-form.

We show that the more effective incentives under the \(M\)-form might outweigh the potential cost savings from the \(U\)-form if the functions are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. If there is a lot of complementarity between the tasks of a project, it is not expensive to provide incentives. Increasing incentives on one task results in increased incentives on the complementary task. The \(M\)-form’s advantage of more effective incentives is less important and the \(U\)-form is optimal. On the other hand, if there is a lot of substitutability, it is sufficient for the principal to induce high effort on one task per project. Incentives play a minor role and the \(U\)-form is optimal. Only in case of a low degree of substitutability and a low degree of complementarity, the \(M\)-form might be optimal.

The more effective incentives under the \(M\)-form result from the assumption that there is a measure for the output of a project but no measure for the output of a function. It looks reasonable to assume that it is quite easy to measure the impact of a certain product on the firm’s profit but rather hard to measure the impact of a functional area. As Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) point out, this can lead to a team problem as described in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) under the \(U\)-form. Even if the project output reveals that

\(^5\)Corts (2005) applies the term individual accountability to the \(M\)-form and team accountability for the \(U\)-form, which nicely reflects this issue.

\(^6\)Note that the term specialization refers to the agents’ effort cost functions in our model, while Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) use it do describe that a task is not split among several agents.
there was shirking, the principal cannot detect who has shirked. Different from the $M$-form, free riding is possible under the $U$-form. As Holmstrom (1982) shows, the principal can solve the moral hazard in teams by breaking the budget balance condition. This enables a payment scheme which gives each agent a marginal reward equal to marginal costs for the efficient effort choice. In our model, limited liability prevents the agents from such payments. Due to the additional possibility of free riding, moral hazard is more severe under the $U$-form than under the $M$-form.\footnote{Similarly, Goldfain (2006) compares several organizational forms of a research project. Hiring a team of agents, which is comparable with our $U$-form, allows to gain from synergies but weakens the incentives in her model.}

Under the $M$-form, a multitask problem as analyzed in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) can occur. An agent who has to exert unobservable effort on several tasks allocates effort among the tasks in a way which optimizes the signal on which his wage is based. If this signal is only partially aligned with the organization’s objective, this allocation is inefficient. Under the $U$-form, payment schemes are more flexible since the principal can influence the effort on every single task instead of whole projects only.

Our model is closely related to Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005) and Corts (2005) who analyze a trade off between the efficient allocation of risk and the provision of incentives.\footnote{The trade off is similar to the classical moral hazard model of Holmstrom (1979).} Following Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005), the only difference between the two forms in our model is the task assignment. The informational structure is the same for both forms. The trade off in Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005) is between a multitask problem solved under the $U$-form and a more efficient risk allocation under the $M$-form. Different from them, we have no correlation between the outputs, no functional asymmetry or cross-product externality which could favor either form. Our model does not incorporate a multitask problem, but allowing for asymmetries or externalities could create such a multitask problem and shift our results towards the $U$-form, as in Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett (2005) and Corts (2005). Different from these papers, our agents are
risk neutral but protected by limited liability. Similarly, Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) impose an upper bound on penalties when analyzing the organizational form.

Winter (2006a) considers a task assignment model with sequential effort choices. The key implication of the sequentiality is that some but not all agents' effort choices are observable to the other agents. If effort choices are complementary, early-movers whose effort is observable to the followers are easier to incentivize than late-movers. If an early-mover shirks, all the followers shirk as well so that early-movers have a strong incentive to work hard. As a result, late-movers, who are the ones with the unobservable effort, receive larger incentive payments. In case of substitutable efforts, all agents receive the same incentive payment. These results carry over to our model. Under the $U$-form, an agent's effort choice is unobservable to the one in charge of the other task of the project so that, comparable to late-movers, incentives are hard to provide and larger overall incentive payments are necessary. Under the $M$-form, effort choices are observable to the one in charge of the other task since it is the same person and incentives are easier to provide. In case of substitutability, these differences vanish and, as long as there are no cost savings under the $U$-form, the forms are equivalent. Observability does not matter and incentive payments are the same for both forms.

As Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) emphasize, the assignment of tasks is not necessarily the only difference between the two organizational forms. While the $U$-form is used to represent a centralized structure, the $M$-form describes a decentralized organization with several independent units. To reflect this differences requires complex hierarchies as in, for example, Hart and Moore (2005). Our model does not explicitly describe (de)centralization, but the cost savings under the $U$-form as well as the more effective incentives under the $M$-form might well be viewed as a result of different levels of centralization.
In Qian, Roland, and Xu (2006), the different levels of centralization imply differences between the two forms concerning the informational structure and the ability to coordinate actions. The top level manager has different roles under the different forms, which is also the case in Aghion and Tirole (1995). Based on the difference between formal and real authority as introduced in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and its predecessors, the model of Aghion and Tirole (1995) shows that information acquisition increases the principal’s overload under the $U$-form compared to the $M$-form. Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) also consider a model in which the available information about the agents’ performance is different for $M$- and $U$-form. The $M$-form enables more effective incentives if it provides more precise information. Winter (2006b) studies the impact of information about the other agents’ efforts due to collocation and also finds that the $M$-form can provide more effective incentives. In Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2007), the organizational form impacts the communication of private information, which is important for the possible implementation of synergies. Private information or communication do not occur in our model, the synergies are due to the organizational form itself.

Most of the literature mentioned above simply assumes constant marginal returns to effort. Qian, Roland, and Xu (2006) assume complementary functions and substitutable projects, but follow a team-theoretic approach as discussed in Marschak and Radner (1972). That is, they abstract from any incentive problems and focus on coordination and communication. Winter (2006b) considers incentives, but also assumes complementary functions and substitutable projects. In difference, our contribution is to explicitly model how effort spent on one functional area affects the marginal returns to effort of the other functional area and study the impact in the context of incentives.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes a model which covers the different organizational forms and analyzes the benchmark case of contractible effort for exogenous as well as endogenous

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9This is in line with the overload considerations of Williamson (1975).
assignment of task. The case of noncontractible effort and exogenously given organizational form is analyzed in section 2.3 for the $M$-form and in section 2.4 for the $U$-form. In section 2.5, the assignment of tasks is endogenized in order to find the optimal organizational form. Section 2.6 concludes. The proofs are deferred to section 2.7.

2.2 The Model

This section describes the model assumptions and studies the benchmark case of contractible effort.

2.2.1 The Assumptions

Consider a principal who undertakes two projects $A$ and $B$. On each project, two tasks from different functional areas $S$ and $T$ have to be performed. This results in the four tasks $AS$, $AT$, $BS$, and $BT$. We refer to $AS$ and $AT$ as the $A$-tasks, $AS$ and $BS$ as the $S$-tasks and so forth. For example, each project might represent a product while the tasks are production and marketing. For exogenous reasons, e.g. time constraints, the principal cannot work on the projects herself but hires two agents $\sigma$ and $\tau$. In principle, both agents are able to do each of the four tasks.

The timing is as follows: The principal offers a contract to the agents. The contract assigns the tasks to the agents and determines a payment scheme. If effort is contractible, it is determined in the contract. The agents accept if their participation constraints are fulfilled. In case of noncontractible effort, the agents choose their efforts simultaneously. Projects are undertaken, private costs occur and project outputs are realized. The payment scheme is executed. The details are given in the remaining section.

We assume that each task is assigned to exactly one agent. For each task he is assigned to, an agent chooses how much effort to spend on this task. To keep things simple, we assume a binary effort choice. The agent chooses
between high effort $e_h$ and low effort $e_l$ with $e_h > e_l > 0$. Denote with $e_{AS}, e_{AT}, e_{BS}, e_{BT}$ the effort spent on the respective tasks and with $e_i^{S}, e_i^{T}$ the sum of effort agent $i$ spends on the $S$-tasks resp. the $T$-tasks. If, for example, agent $\sigma$ is assigned to the tasks $AS$ and $BS$ and exerts high effort on both tasks, we have $e^{S\sigma} = e_{AS} + e_{BS} = 2e_h$ and $e^{T\sigma} = 0$.

The agents incur private, unobservable effort costs which are assumed to be linear. The cost functions are

$$c_\sigma(e^{S\sigma}, e^{T\sigma}) = \alpha e^{S\sigma} + \beta e^{T\sigma}$$
$$c_\tau(e^{S\tau}, e^{T\tau}) = \beta e^{S\tau} + \alpha e^{T\tau}.$$  \hfill (2.1)

We assume each agent to be specialized in one function meaning that his effort costs on tasks with this function are lower. The parameters $0 < \alpha < \beta$ reflect the agents’ specialization. For agent $\sigma$ it is less costly to spend effort on the $S$-tasks than on the $T$-tasks, while for agent $\tau$ it is the other way around. The smaller $\alpha$, the higher is the level of specialization. One possible interpretation is that the agent is more familiar with one of the functions and therefore needs less time to undertake the respective tasks. In this setting, we have to assume the principal to know who is specialized in which function if she wants to benefit from the specialization. A similar idea is to assume some economies of scale so that an agent working on tasks from the same functional area has lower costs than an agent working on tasks from different functions. This does not require the principal to know the agents’ abilities, but adds some notational complications with respect to the cost functions.\footnote{If three tasks are assigned to one agent, the question arises which of the tasks are the low-cost tasks for this agent. No matter how this question is answered, such a solution turns out to be dominated with respect to the principal’s payoff as well as the overall surplus.}

Up to some permutations, the results do not change.

Each project either succeeds or fails. If project $A$ is successful, the principal receives an output $X > 0$. In case of failure, no output is generated. The success probability of project $A$ is $\pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})$ which depends on the
effort spent on the $A$-tasks. It is

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_A(e_l, e_l) & = p_l , \\
\pi_A(e_h, e_l) & = p_m , \\
\pi_A(e_l, e_h) & = p_m , \\
\pi_A(e_h, e_h) & = p_h .
\end{align*}
$$

Since the success probability is determined by the sum of effort spent on this project, the principal does not care about how a certain amount of effort might be allocated among the $A$-tasks. There is no multitask problem à la Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Due to the binary structure, the sum of effort is equivalent to the number of high effort levels. The success probability does not depend on who spends effort on the project. The agents' specialization (resp. the scale economies) is reflected by the cost functions but does not influence the project output. Furthermore, the project is symmetric in functions. In case of one $A$-task undertaken with high effort and the other $A$-task undertaken with low effort, it makes no difference which of the two tasks is undertaken with high effort.

We assume

$$
1 > p_h > p_m > p_l \geq 0
$$

so that $\pi_A$ increases in the sum of effort spent on the $A$-tasks. Given $AS$ is done with low effort, switching from low to high effort on $AT$ increases $\pi_A$ by $p_m - p_l$. Given $AS$ is undertaken with high effort, a switch from low to high effort on $AT$ increases the success probability by $p_h - p_m$. If

$$
p_m > \frac{(p_h + p_l)}{2}
$$

we have $p_h - p_m < p_m - p_l$ and marginal returns to effort are decreasing. In this case, we define the two tasks to be substitutes. In case of

$$
p_m < \frac{(p_h + p_l)}{2}
$$
marginal returns to effort are increasing and the two tasks are \textit{complements}. To simplify calculations, we set

\begin{equation}
    p_l = 0
\end{equation}

The two projects are completely identical so that project $B$’s output is also $X > 0$ resp. zero and its success probability function $\pi_B(e_{BS}, e_{BT})$ is analog to $\pi_A$. This implies that the $A$-tasks are substitutes if and only if the $B$-tasks are substitutes and we can consider the functions $S$ and $T$ itself to be substitutes resp. complements. Note that the output of a project depends neither on the other project’s output nor on the effort spent on the other project.\textsuperscript{11} To avoid rather uninteresting corner solutions, we assume $p_h X > (\alpha + \beta) e_h$.

The project output is assumed to be verifiable so that payments can condition on it. Denote with $v_j$ an unconditional transfer payment from the principal to agent $j$ and with $w_{ij}$ a payment from the principal to agent $j$ paid if project $i$ succeeds.\textsuperscript{12} The whole payment scheme is given by the vector $W = (v_\sigma, w_{A\sigma}, w_{B\sigma}, v_\tau, w_{A\tau}, w_{B\tau})$. We assume the agents to be of limited liability, maybe due to wealth constraints, so that all these payments have to be nonnegative. We refer to $v_j$ as agent $j$’s basic wage and to $w_{ij}$ as his success premium on project $i$. The principal and the agents are assumed to be risk neutral. Their payoff functions are composed of their expected benefits resp. payments and the private costs so that they are given by

\begin{equation}
    U_\sigma = \pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})w_{A\sigma} + \pi_B(e_{BS}, e_{BT})w_{B\sigma} + v_\sigma - \alpha e^{S_\sigma} - \beta e^{T_\sigma},\quad (2.7)
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
    U_\tau = \pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})w_{A\tau} + \pi_B(e_{BS}, e_{BT})w_{B\tau} + v_\tau - \alpha e^{T_\tau} - \beta e^{S_\tau},\quad (2.8)
\end{equation}

\textsuperscript{11}In the example of a multiproduct firm, this is the case if the products are, with respect to demand, neither complementary nor substitutable. This is realistic in huge firms that produce very different products like, for example, food and computers.

\textsuperscript{12}This payment scheme is equivalent to paying each agent for each project a wage which depends on the success or failure of this project. To verify this, rearrange the payoff functions. Furthermore, neither the principal’s payoff nor the surplus can be increased by using a more advanced payment scheme.
and

\[
U_P = \pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})(X - w_{A\sigma} - w_{A\tau}) + \pi_B(e_{BS}, e_{BT})(X - w_{B\sigma} - w_{B\tau}) - v_{\sigma} - v_{\tau}.
\] (2.9)

The agents’ outside options are assumed to be zero. The principal offers a contract to the agents who accept if and only if their participation constraints \(U_{\sigma}, U_{\tau} \geq 0\) are fulfilled. A contract consists of an assignment of tasks and a payment scheme. If effort is contractible, it is determined in the contract as well. In case of noncontractible effort, the agents choose their efforts simultaneously. Given the assignment of tasks and the payment scheme, this is a noncooperative game and we assume the agents to play a Nash equilibrium. Given an assignment of tasks, denote with \(e_i\) the vector of efforts agent \(i\) has to choose. For example, if agent \(\sigma\) is assigned to \(AS\) and \(AT\), we have \(e_{\sigma} = (e_{AS}, e_{AT})\). The equilibrium conditions are

\[
\begin{align*}
  e^*_{\sigma} &\in \text{argmax}_{e_{\sigma}} U_{\sigma}(e_{\sigma}, e^*_{\tau}) \\
  e^*_{\tau} &\in \text{argmax}_{e_{\tau}} U_{\tau}(e^*_{\sigma}, e_{\tau}).
\end{align*}
\] (2.10)

For notational simplicity, we widely omit the asterisk. The equilibrium outcome is anticipated by the principal. When she designs the contract, in fact she designs the game by choosing an assignment of tasks and a payment scheme. In case of multiple equilibria, the principal determines which equilibrium is played. The principal offers a contract which maximizes her own payoff subject to the agents’ participation constraints, the equilibrium conditions and the limited liability constraints. Such a contract is called optimal.

Overall expected surplus is

\[
S = \pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})X + \pi_B(e_{BS}, e_{BT})X - \alpha(e^{S\sigma} + e^{T\tau}) - \beta(e^{T\sigma} + e^{S\tau}).
\] (2.11)

An assignment of tasks together with a combination of efforts which maximizes the surplus is called first best efficient. We denote with \(S^{M2}\) the surplus.
generated if the $M$-form is implemented and the two low-cost tasks are executed with high effort. $S^{M0}$ and $S^{M4}$ denote the surplus if no resp. all tasks are exerted with high effort.\footnote{Due to the symmetry, it is obvious that these are the only interesting effort allocations.} Analog notation is used for the $U$-form.

The following sections analyze and compare different assignments of tasks, which describe different organizational structures of the principal’s firm. We restrict our attention to situations in which each agent is in charge of two tasks.\footnote{Any other organizational form within our framework can improve neither the principal’s payoff nor the surplus.} If one agent receives both $A$-tasks while the other agent gets both $B$-tasks, this is called multidivisional form or $M$-form. In our example, this form describes an organizational structure along product lines. Instead, if one agent receives both $S$-tasks while the other one gets both $T$-tasks, the structure is called unitary form or $U$-form. Each agent is in charge of a specific function, which we assume to be his low-cost function.\footnote{This is in line with the idea of scale economies determining the cost functions. In case of specialization, assigning each agent to his high-cost tasks could be viewed as a $U$-form as well but provides the analog results but with higher costs.}

\subsection*{2.2.2 Contractible Effort}

This subsection studies the benchmark case of contractible effort. Lemma 2.1 and 2.2 take the organizational form as exogenously given, while Proposition 2.1 endogenizes the assignment of tasks.

\begin{lemma}
Let the tasks be exogenously assigned according to the $M$-form. Exerting high effort on all tasks maximizes the surplus if and only if

\[ p_m \leq \bar{p}_m \leq p_h - \frac{\beta (e_h - e_l)}{X} =: \bar{p}_m \]

while spending high effort only on each agent’s low-cost task maximizes the surplus if and only if $p_m \geq \bar{p}_m$. The maximum surplus under the $M$-form is

\[ S^M = \max\{S^{M2}, S^{M4}\} \geq 0. \]

\begin{proof}
See section 2.7.
\end{proof}
Due to the symmetry, the surplus-maximizing number of high effort levels per project is the same for both projects. If a project is executed with low effort on all tasks, it fails for sure since $p_l = 0$ so that a negative surplus is created. If $p_m$ is small enough so that the functions are sufficiently complementary, it is surplus-maximizing to have all tasks done with high effort. Otherwise, it is better to have only one task per project done with high effort. Under the $M$-form, this should be the low-cost tasks in order to minimize the costs.

**Lemma 2.2** Let the tasks be exogenously assigned according to the $U$-form. Exerting high effort on all tasks maximizes the surplus if and only if

$$p_m \leq p_h - \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{X} =: \tilde{p}_m$$

while spending high effort only on one task per project maximizes the surplus if and only if $p_m \geq \tilde{p}_m$. The maximum surplus under the $U$-form is

$$S^U = \max\{S^{U2}, S^{U4}\} \geq 0.$$  

**Proof:** See section 2.7.

Again, it is surplus-maximizing to perform all tasks with high effort if the tasks are sufficiently complementary. Otherwise, performing one task per project with high effort maximizes the surplus. Exerting low effort on all tasks creates again a negative surplus. Comparing the $M$- and $U$-form, the critical value of $p_m$ is smaller in case of the $M$-form because the additional costs from having two instead of one high effort levels per project are higher under the $M$-form. Now endogenize the organizational form.

**Proposition 2.1** Overall surplus is maximized if and only if the $U$-form is implemented together with the surplus-maximizing effort levels from Lemma 2.2. If effort is contractible, the principal implements a first best efficient solution.

**Proof:** For any given effort combination, the expected output is independent of the organizational form, but effort costs are minimized if the $U$-form is chosen. Since efforts are contractible, there is no need to incentivize the agents. The principal can set the success premiums to zero and choose basic
wages which make the agents’ participation constraints binding. She always extracts the whole surplus so that it is her objective to maximize it.

If effort is contractible and the organizational form is endogenous, first best efficiency is always reached. The $M$-form is never efficient due to the higher effort costs. In difference to the $U$-form, the $M$-form does not allow to gain from the agents’ specialization resp. the scale economies.

### 2.3 Multidivisional Organizational Form

From now on, we assume effort to be noncontractible. This section studies the impact of the multidivisional organizational form or $M$-form. Each agent is in charge of one of the projects. Without loss of generality, we assume that agent $\sigma$ is assigned to the $A$-tasks and agent $\tau$ to the $B$-tasks. Throughout this section, we take this assignment as exogenously given.

The effort choice game of the agents is very simple under the $M$-form since there is no interaction between the two agents’ decisions. We have $e_{Aj} = e_{j\sigma}$ and $e_{Bj} = e_{j\tau}$ for $j = S, T$. The equilibrium conditions boil down to the agents’ incentive constraints

\[
(e_{AS}, e_{AT}) \in \arg\max \pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})w_A - \alpha e_{AS} - \beta e_{AT},
\]

\[
(e_{BS}, e_{BT}) \in \arg\max \pi_B(e_{BS}, e_{BT})w_B - \beta e_{BS} - \alpha e_{BT}. \tag{2.16}
\]

An effort combination fulfilling these conditions is also called incentive compatible. It can be implemented by the principal through the appropriate design of the contract, that is, the appropriate choice of the payment scheme.

**Lemma 2.3** Consider project $A$. Let $v_\sigma$ be large enough to ensure agent $\sigma$’s participation. If $(\alpha + \beta)p_m < \alpha p_h$, he always chooses the same effort level for both $A$-tasks. The principal can implement high effort on both tasks if and only if

\[
w_{A}\sigma \geq \frac{(\alpha + \beta)(e_h - e_l)}{p_h}. \tag{2.17}
\]
If \((\alpha + \beta)p_m \geq \alpha p_h\), high effort on both tasks can be implemented if and only if
\[
\frac{\beta(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m} \geq w_{A\sigma}.
\] (2.18)

In case of
\[
\frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_m} \leq w_{A\sigma} \leq \frac{\beta(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m},
\] (2.19)
the principal can implement high effort on the low-cost task \(AS\) and low effort on the high-cost task \(AT\). Symmetric results hold for agent \(\tau\) and project \(B\).

**Proof:** See section 2.7.

Given the participation constraint is fulfilled, an agent’s decision is determined by the success premium he receives for his project. If the agent exerts high effort on exactly one task, he does so on his low-cost task. If the tasks are highly complementary or the high-cost task is relatively cheap so that \((\alpha + \beta)p_m < \alpha p_h\), the agent never exerts different effort levels on his tasks.

**Lemma 2.4** Take the \(M\)-form as given. If the principal implements low effort on all tasks, she receives the whole surplus and her payoff is
\[
U^M_{P0} := -2(\alpha + \beta)e_l < 0.
\] (2.20)

If \((\alpha + \beta)p_m \geq \alpha p_h\), she can implement high effort on the low-cost tasks. She extracts the whole surplus and receives
\[
U^M_{P2} := 2(p_mX - \alpha e_h - \beta e_l).
\] (2.21)

If she implements high effort on all tasks, she extracts the whole surplus if and only if
\[
p_m \leq \hat{p}_m := \frac{p_h(\alpha e_h + \beta e_l)}{(\alpha + \beta)e_h}.
\] (2.22)
Her payoff is

\[ U^M_P := 2 \left( p_h X - \max \left\{ \frac{p_h \beta (e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m}, (\alpha + \beta) e_h \right\} \right) \]  

(2.23)

**Proof:** See section 2.7.

If the principal implements low effort on all tasks or high effort on the low-cost tasks only, she receives the whole surplus. The principal covers the agents’ costs in expectation, but does not need to provide further incentives. If the tasks are sufficiently complementary, this holds true also if the principal implements high effort on all tasks. Complementarity strongly incentivizes the agents and the principal can extract the whole surplus. But if there is little complementarity, she has to provide further incentives to implement high effort on all tasks. Due to limited liability, that means she has to offer the agents a positive share of the surplus.  

**Proposition 2.2** Under the M-form, there is a unique critical value \( p^*_m \) so that the following holds:

(i) If \( p_m \leq p^*_m \), it is optimal for the principal to implement high effort on all tasks.

(ii) If \( p_m \geq p^*_m \), it is optimal for the principal to implement high effort on the low-cost tasks only.

(iii) It is

\[ 0 = p_l \leq \tilde{p}_m \leq p^*_m \leq \bar{p}_m \leq p_h \]  

(2.24)

where \( \tilde{p}_m \) is the kink of \( U^M_P \), that is, it is the largest \( p_m \) for which the principal can implement high effort on all tasks without offering the agents a positive rent share. \( \bar{p}_m \) as defined in Lemma 2.1 is the maximum \( p_m \) for which high effort on all tasks is surplus-maximizing.

\[ ^{16} \text{Under unlimited liability, the principal could always combine an incentive compatible success premium with a basic wage which makes the participation constraint binding since she could, if necessary, choose a negative basic wage.} \]
(iv) If the principal implements an optimal effort combination, her payoff
\[ U^M_p := \max\{U^{M2}_p, U^{M4}_p\} \] is positive.

**Proof:** See section 2.7.

If the tasks are highly complementary (so that \( p_m \leq \hat{p}_m \)), the principal can maximize the surplus (given the M-form is used) and extract it completely. Due to the complementarity, it is surplus-maximizing to implement high effort on all tasks. If there is less complementarity (so that \( p_m \geq \hat{p}_m \)), it is still surplus-maximizing to implement high effort on all tasks. But the principal can no longer extract the whole surplus. Alternatively, the principal can implement high effort only on the low-cost tasks which creates a smaller surplus but enables her to extract it completely. The principal faces a trade off between surplus maximization and rent extraction due to limited liability. As long as there is enough complementarity (so that \( p_m \leq p_m^* \)), this trade off is solved in favor of surplus maximization. High effort on all tasks is implemented. The principal receives a smaller share but of a larger surplus. But the less complementarity (resp. the more substitutability) is present, the harder it is to incentivize the agents and the smaller is the principal’s rent share if she implements high effort on all tasks. At the same time, the surplus created if she implements high effort only on the low-cost task differs less from the surplus created if all tasks are performed with high effort. If there is enough substitutability (so that \( p_m \geq p_m^* \)), the trade off is solved in favor of rent extraction. The principal implements high effort only on the low-cost tasks and extracts the whole surplus. If there is even higher substitutability (so that \( p_m \geq \bar{p}_m \)), it is surplus-maximizing to have high effort on the low-cost tasks only and the trade off vanishes. The following section shows similar results for the U-form.

### 2.4 Unitary Organizational Form

This section studies the impact of the unitary organizational form or U-form in case of noncontractible effort. Each agent is in charge of the tasks from the same function, which we assume to be his low-cost task. Agent \( \sigma \) is assigned
to the $S$-tasks and agent $\tau$ to the $T$-tasks. Throughout this section, we take this assignment as exogenously given.

Again, there is no interaction between the projects. An agent’s effort choice on one project is independent of his choice on the other project. Different from the $M$-form, there is some interaction between the agents. If the functions are sufficiently complementary, an agent who knew the other agent’s effort choice on a project would prefer the same effort level on this project. In equilibrium, the agents choose the same effort levels on a project. In case of sufficiently substitutable functions, each agent prefers an effort level different from the other agent’s choice and in equilibrium, we have different effort levels on a projects’ tasks.

**Lemma 2.5** Let $v_\sigma, v_\tau$ be large enough to ensure the agents’ participation. The principal can implement high effort on both $A$-tasks if and only if

\[ w_{A\sigma}, w_{A\tau} \geq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m}. \]  

She can implement high effort on $AS$ and low effort on $AT$ if and only if

\[ w_{A\tau} \leq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m} \text{ and } w_{A\sigma} \geq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_m}. \]  

The principal can implement high effort on $AT$ and low effort on $AS$ if and only if (2.26) holds with $w_{A\sigma}$ and $w_{A\tau}$ interchanged. Symmetric results hold true for project $B$.

**Proof:** See section 2.7.

Under the $U$-form, the principal disposes of more effective instruments compared to the $M$-form. She can target single tasks instead of whole projects only. Therefore, she can always implement any effort combination. But since we do not have a multitask problem, this turns out not to be a comparative advantage of the $U$-form.
Lemma 2.6 Take the U-form as given. If the principal implements low effort on all tasks, she receives the whole surplus and her payoff is

$$U_P^{U_0} := -4\alpha e_l < 0.$$ (2.27)

If the principal implements high effort on exactly one task per project, her payoff is

$$U_P^{U_2} = 2(p_mX - \alpha(e_h + e_l))$$ (2.28)

and she extracts the whole surplus. If she implements high effort on all tasks, she extracts the whole surplus if and only if

$$p_m \leq \tilde{p}_m := \frac{p_h e_l}{e_h}.$$ (2.29)

Her payoff is

$$U_P^{U_4} = 2 \left( p_hX - \max \left\{ \frac{2p_h\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m}, 2\alpha e_h \right\} \right) .$$ (2.30)

Proof: See section 2.7.

Proposition 2.3 Under the U-form, there is a unique critical value $p_m^{**}$ so that the following holds:

(i) It is

$$U_P^{U_2} \geq U_P^{U_4} \iff p_m \geq p_m^{**}$$ (2.31)

with equality if and only if $p_m = p_m^{**}$.

(ii) It is

$$0 = p_l \leq \tilde{p}_m \leq p_m^{**} \leq \hat{p}_m \leq p_h$$ (2.32)

where $\hat{p}_m$ is the kink of $U_P^{U_4}$, that is, it is the largest $p_m$ for which the principal can implement high effort on all tasks without offering
the agents a positive rent share. \( \hat{p}_m \) as defined in Lemma 2.2 is the maximum \( p_m \) for which high effort on all tasks is surplus-maximizing.

**Proof:** See section 2.7.

There are parameter constellations for which \( \frac{U^{U2}}{P}, \frac{U^{U4}}{P} < 0 \) so that the principal prefers to cancel the projects. If a cancellation is impossible, she might prefer to implement low effort on all tasks even though this generates a negative surplus. We skipped these details and restricted the proposition to the results we need later on for a comparison of \( M \) - and \( U \)-form. Besides, the results are quite similar to those of the \( M \)-form with \( \hat{p} \) instead of \( \hat{p} \) and \( \tilde{p} \) instead of \( \hat{p} \). For \( p_m^{**} < p_m < \hat{p}_m \), limited liability creates some distortion. To implement high effort on all tasks would create a larger surplus, but the principal had to share it with the agents. If \( p_m \notin (p_m^{**}, \hat{p}_m) \), first best efficiency is reached.

### 2.5 Optimal Organizational Form

In this section, we endogenize the organizational form. When the principal designs the contract, she chooses the assignment of tasks which is in fact the organizational form. We restrict our analysis to a principal who chooses between \( M \)-form and \( U \)-form since any other organizational form can increase neither the surplus nor the principal’s payoff. The \( U \)-form allows the principal to gain from the agents’ specialization resp. the economies of scale, while the \( M \)-form provides more effective incentives. To see the latter, suppose for the moment \( \alpha = \beta \) which eliminates the effects of the specialization.

To implement high effort on one task per project, it is sufficient to cover the agents’ costs without providing further incentives and both forms result in the same payoffs. But under the \( M \)-form, the principal needs smaller expected wage payments to incentivize the agents to exert high effort on all tasks. Incentives are more effective under the \( M \)-form so that this form is optimal. But if there is some specialization (resp. scale economies) so that \( \beta > \alpha \), the \( U \)-form provides some cost savings. A trade off occurs between
effort costs (which favor the $U$-form) and incentives (which favor the $M$-form). The following Lemma compares the organizational forms for given effort combinations.

**Lemma 2.7** If the principal implements high effort on exactly one task per project, her payoff under the $U$-form is always larger than under the $M$-form, that is $U^U_p > U^M_p$. If the principal implements high effort on all tasks so that she receives a payoff $U^M_p$ under the $M$-form and $U^U_p$ under the $U$-form, there is a unique critical value $p^I_m$ so that the following holds:

(i) If $\beta > 2\alpha$, it is $U^U_p > U^M_p$.

(ii) If $\beta = 2\alpha$, it is $U^U_p > U^M_p$ if $p_m < p^I_m$ and $U^U_p = U^M_p$ if $p_m \geq p^I_m$.

(iii) If $\beta < 2\alpha$, it is $U^U_p \geq U^M_p \iff p_m \leq p^I_m$ with equality if and only if $p_m = p^I_m$.

(iv) If $\beta \leq 2\alpha$, it is $\hat{p}_m \leq p^I_m \leq \hat{p}_m$.

**Proof:** See section 2.7.

To implement high effort on one task per project, the principal can simply cover the agents’ costs and does not need to provide further incentives. Since effort costs are smaller under the $U$-form, this form is preferred. Given that high effort on all tasks is implemented, the cost savings under the $U$-form might be outweighed by the more effective incentives under the $M$-form if there is not too much specialization or complementarity. To endogenize the effort combination, the following lemma is helpful.

**Lemma 2.8** Remember that the principal’s payoff is $U^M_p$ if she implements high effort on all tasks under the $M$-form and $U^U_p$ if she implements high effort on one task per project under the $U$-form. There is a unique critical value $p^H_m$ so that $U^M_p \geq U^U_p$ if and only if $p_m \geq p^H_m$ with equality if and only if $p_m = p^H_m$. It is

$$p^I_m \leq p^H_m \iff p^I_m := \frac{2\alpha(e_h - e_l)ph}{(\alpha + \beta)e_h} - \frac{\beta e_h - 2\alpha e_l}{X} \geq 0.$$ 

(2.33)

**Proof:** See section 2.7.
Proposition 2.4 The $U$-form is optimal if and only if
\[ 2\alpha \leq \beta \quad \text{or} \quad p_m \leq p_m^I \quad \text{or} \quad p_m \geq p_m^{III}. \]
(2.34)

The $M$-form is optimal if and only if
\[ 2\alpha \geq \beta \quad \text{and} \quad p_m^I \leq p_m \leq p_m^{III}. \]
(2.35)

Proof: See section 2.7.

If there is a lot of specialization resp. economies of scale (so that $\beta > 2\alpha$), the $U$-form is always optimal independent of the complementarity of the tasks. This is different in case of a more moderate level of specialization. First, consider the case $p_m^I \leq p_m^{III}$. If the tasks are highly complementary (so that $p_m < p_m^I$), the principal optimally chooses the $U$-form and implements high effort on all tasks. The complementarity strongly incentivizes the agents. As long as $p_m \leq \tilde{p}_m$, she extracts the whole surplus, while in case of $\tilde{p}_m < p_m < p_m^I$ she has to offer the agents a positive share. As soon as $p_m > p_m^I$, she still implements high effort on all tasks, but prefers to use the $M$-form. The generated surplus is smaller than under the $U$-form, but due to the more effective incentives she can extract a larger share. But if there is too much substitutability (so that $p_m > p_m^{III}$), it is no longer profitable to implement high effort on all tasks. The principal implements high effort on one task per project. The comparative advantage of the $M$-form is lost and the $U$-form is optimal. In case of $p_m^{III} < p_m^I$, the $M$-form is never optimal. If there is so little complementarity that a principal who implements high effort on all tasks prefers the $M$-form, this is already enough substitutability to make it profitable to implement high effort on one task per project and again the $U$-form is optimal.

We have shown that a necessary condition (besides $\beta \leq 2\alpha$) for the $M$-form to be optimal is $p_m^I \leq p_m^{III}$, which is equivalent to $p_m^I \geq 0$ according to Lemma 2.7. To interpret this condition, note that $p_m^I$ is increasing in $p_h$ and $X$, decreasing in $\beta$ and $e_l$ and decreasing if $e_h, e_l$ are increased keeping $e_h - e_l$ constant. If $p_h$ and $X$ are small, it is not beneficial to implement high
effort on all tasks so that there is no need for incentives and the $M$-form is not used. To increase $e_l, e_h$ keeping $e_h - e_l$ constant does not change the equilibrium conditions for implementing high effort on all tasks, but increases the effort costs. Potential cost savings become more important, which favors the $U$-form. If $e_l$ is increased while keeping $e_h$ constant, the effort costs for implementing high effort on all tasks remain the same while $e_h - e_l$ decreases. The equilibrium conditions for implementing high effort on all tasks change, it becomes less expensive to incentivize the agents. The potential advantage of the $M$-form withers.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a simple model of the assignment of tasks, which compares different organizational forms. While the $M$-form is a process-based organizational form, the $U$-form is a function-based one. The $U$-form allows for some cost savings from the agents’ specialization or economies of scale, but on the other hand provides less effective incentives compared to the $M$-form. The $M$-form can be optimal if and only if the functional areas are neither too complementary nor too substitutable.

To summarize, the principal favors the $M$-form if the following is fulfilled: First, possible cost savings from specialization resp. scale economies have to be small, due to little specialization and generally small effort cost. Second, it has to be attractive to implement high effort on all tasks since marginal returns to effort $(p_h - p_m)X$ are large, implying that there is not too much substitutability. Third, it has to be expensive to incentivize the agents to spend high effort on all tasks, due to large marginal effort costs (driven by $e_h - e_l$) and little complementarity. Under these conditions, the incentive effects of the $M$-form outweigh the cost savings of the $U$-form.

Our main results still hold true if we allow for $p_l \geq 0$. If $p_l > 0$, the principal may have to share the surplus with the agent not only to implement high effort on all tasks but also to implement high effort on one task per
project. In case of extreme complementarity or substitutability, the $U$-form remains optimal since it is relatively easy for the principal to implement the surplus-maximizing effort combinations. In case of less extreme complementarity resp. substitutability, incentives are harder to provide so that it might be optimal to use the $M$-form. Furthermore, there might be a set of intermediate $p_m$ for which the principal chooses not to provide any incentives and implement low effort on all tasks so that the $U$-form is clearly optimal. This set of $p_m$ is empty if $p_l$ is very small or even zero.

In our model, we restrict the differences between the two organizational forms to the assignment of tasks. But the economies of scale we assume for the $U$-form might well be a result of a more centralized structure which on the other hand enables some free riding. The $M$-form provides more effective incentives since any kind of team problem is absent, which fits into the interpretation of a more decentralized structure. Even though we do not model (de)centralization explicitly, we are in line with the idea of the organizational form representing different levels of centralization.

In order to obtain clearcut results about the substitutability resp. complementarity of the functional areas, we have restricted the model to a simple one-layer hierarchy. A model with a more complex hierarchical structure which allows to model the amount of (de)centralization explicitly could provide further insights to the differences between $M$- and $U$-form and combine our results with, for example, the overload considerations of Aghion and Tirole (1995) or Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2007). Other possible extensions include sequential effort choices or collusion of the agents. These are left for future research.

### 2.7 Proofs

**Proof of Lemma 2.1:**

It is straightforward to calculate $S^{M2}$ and $S^{M4}$. Due to the symmetry, the surplus-maximizing effort combination has the same number of high effort
levels for both projects. If a project’s tasks are undertaken with different effort levels, effort costs are minimized if the agent in charge of this project works with high effort on his low-cost task. To work with low effort on all tasks creates a negative surplus. The only remaining candidates for a maximum of the surplus are $S_{M2}$ and $S_{M4}$. $\bar{p}$ is the intersection of $S_{M2}$ and $S_{M4}$ with $S_{M2} \leq S_{M4} \iff p_m \leq \bar{p}$ with equality if and only if $p_m = \bar{p}$. It is $S_M = \max\{S_{M2}, S_{M4}\} \geq 0$ since $S_{M4} \geq 0$ by assumption. ■

**Proof of Lemma 2.2:**

The proof is analog to the the proof of Lemma 2.1. It is straightforward to calculate $S_{U2}$ and $S_{U4}$. To work with low effort on all tasks creates a negative surplus. $\tilde{p}$ is the intersection of $S_{U2}$ and $S_{U4}$ with $S_{U2} \leq S_{U4} \iff p_m \leq \tilde{p}$ with equality if and only if $p_m = \tilde{p}_m$. It is $S_U = \max\{S_{U2}, S_{U4}\} \geq 0$ since $S_{U4} \geq 0$ by assumption. ■

**Proof of Lemma 2.3:**

Due to the $M$-form, we have $e_{AS} = e_{S\sigma}$ and $e_{AT} = e_{T\sigma}$. The equilibrium conditions of the effort choice game are simply the agents’ incentive constraints. For agent $\sigma$, this is

$$(e_{AS}, e_{AT}) \in \arg\max \pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})w_{A\sigma} - \alpha e_{AS} - \beta e_{AT} \quad (2.36)$$

since all other terms of his payoff function are independent of his choice. The principal can implement any effort combination which fulfills (2.36). For the agent, it is always strictly dominated to choose $e_{AS} = e_l, e_{AT} = e_h$ since the agent can reach the same success probability less costly with $e_{AS} = e_h, e_{AT} = e_l$. Straightforward calculations show that the choice $e_{AS} = e_h, e_{AT} = e_l$ is incentive compatible (that is, fulfilling (2.36)) if and only if

$$\frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_m} \leq w_{A\sigma} \leq \frac{\beta(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m} \quad (2.37)$$

Such a $w_{A\sigma}$ exists if and only if $(\alpha + \beta)p_m \geq \alpha p_h$. If this is the case,
$e_{AS} = e_{AT} = e_h$ is incentive compatible if and only if

$$w_{A\sigma} \geq \frac{\beta(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m}.$$  \hfill (2.38)

If $(\alpha + \beta)p_m < \alpha p_h$, agent $\sigma$ chooses between $e_{AS} = e_{AT} = e_h$ and $e_{AS} = e_{AT} = e_l$. The former is incentive compatible if and only if

$$w_{A\sigma} \geq \frac{(\alpha + \beta)(e_h - e_l)}{p_h}.$$  \hfill (2.39)

Due to the symmetry, everything is analog for agent $\tau$ and project $B$.  

**Proof of Lemma 2.4:**

Given an effort combination $e_{AS}, e_{AT}, e_{BS}, e_{BT}$ to be implemented, the principal faces the maximization problem

$$\max_W U_p$$  \hfill (2.40)

subject to the agents’ incentive constraints

$$(e_{AS}, e_{AT}) \in \arg\max \pi_A(e_{AS}, e_{AT})w_{A\sigma} - \alpha e_{AS} - \beta e_{AT},$$

$$(e_{BS}, e_{BT}) \in \arg\max \pi_B(e_{BS}, e_{BT})w_{B\tau} - \beta e_{BS} - \alpha e_{BT}.$$  \hfill (2.41)

the participation constraints $U_{\sigma}, U_{\tau} \geq 0$ and the limited liability constraints $w_{ij}, v_j \geq 0$.

The principal cannot gain from choosing $w_{\sigma B} > 0$ or $w_{\tau A} > 0$. These payments do not incentivize the agents and the participation constraints can be ensured via $v_{\sigma}, v_{\tau}$ as well. We set $w_{A\tau} = w_{B\sigma} = 0$. Due to the symmetry, the principal can choose $v_{\sigma} = v_{\tau} := v$ and $w_{A\sigma} = w_{B\tau} := w$. Given an effort combination to be implemented, it is optimal for the principal to choose the smallest $w \geq 0$ which ensures incentive compatibility and the smallest $v \geq 0$ which ensures the agents’ participation. To find $w$, see Lemma 2.3. We plug this $w$ into $U_{\sigma} = 0$ and solve for $v$. If the result is nonnegative, it is the optimal basic wage and the agents’ participation constraints are binding. If the result is negative, we set $v := 0$ and the participation constraints are not
To implement low effort on all tasks, it is optimal to choose \( w = 0 \) and \( v = (\alpha + \beta)e_l \), which results in a payoff

\[
U_{PM}^{M0} := -2(\alpha + \beta)e_l < 0
\] (2.42)

which equals the generated surplus. Let \( p_m < \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \). According to Lemma 2.3, it is impossible to implement different effort levels for an agent’s tasks. To implement high effort on all tasks, it is optimal to choose \( w = (\alpha + \beta)(e_h - e_l)/p_h \) and \( v = (\alpha + \beta)e_l \). The resulting payoff is

\[
U_{PM}^{M4c} = 2(p_h X - (\alpha + \beta)e_h) \geq 0
\] (2.43)

Let \( p_m \geq \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \). To implement high effort on all tasks, it is optimal to choose \( w = \beta(e_h - e_l)/(p_h - p_m) \) and \( v = \max\{0, (\alpha + \beta)e_h - p_h w\} \). The resulting payoff is

\[
U_{PM}^{M4} = 2 \left( p_h X - \max\left\{\frac{p_h \beta(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m}, (\alpha + \beta)e_h\right\} \right),
\] (2.44)

which has a kink in

\[
\hat{p}_m := \frac{p_h (\alpha e_h + \beta e_l)}{(\alpha + \beta)e_h}
\] (2.45)

and equals the generated surplus if and only if \( p_m \leq \hat{p}_m \). Since \( \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) < \hat{p}_m \), we can combine \( U_{PM}^{M4c} \) and \( U_{PM}^{M4} \). A principal who implements high effort on all tasks receives a payoff \( U_{PM}^{M4} \).

But if \( p_m \geq \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \), the principal can implement high effort on the low-cost tasks only. To implement this, it is optimal to choose \( w = \alpha(e_h - e_l)/p_m \) and \( v = (\alpha + \beta)e_l \).

\[\text{\footnote{Under unlimited liability, the principal could also choose a negative } v \text{ and therefore ensure that the participation constraints are binding.}}\]
The payoff is

\[ U_P^{M2} = 2(p_mX - \alpha e_h - \beta e_l) \]  

(2.46)

which equals the generated surplus.

**Proof of Proposition 2.2:**
Due to the symmetry, it is optimal for the principal to implement the same effort combination for both projects. There are three candidates for an optimum: low effort on all tasks, high effort on the low-cost tasks, high effort on all tasks. To find the optimum, compare the payoffs from Lemma 2.4.

Consider the payoffs as functions of \( p_m \). For the moment, make the ad hoc assumption that it is never optimal to implement low effort on all tasks and compare the two remaining candidates. It is optimal to implement high effort only on the low-cost tasks if \( U_P^{M2} \geq U_P^{M4} \) and \( p_m \geq \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \). The function \( U_P^{M4} \) is continuous and has a kink in \( \hat{p}_m \). \( U_P^{M4} \) is a positive constant for \( p_m \leq \hat{p}_m \). It is monotone decreasing in \( p_m \) for \( p_m \geq \hat{p}_m \) and approaches \(-\infty\) for \( p_m \to p_h \). The function \( U_P^{M2} \) is continuous and monotone increasing in \( p_m \). It is negative for \( p_m = 0 \) and positive for \( p_m = p_h \). Therefore, we have a unique intersection \( p^* \). We have \( U_P^{M2} \geq U_P^{M4} \) if and only if \( p_m \geq p^* \) with equality if and only if \( p_m = p^* \). For \( p_m = \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \), we have \( U_P^{M4} \geq U_P^{M2} \) so that \( p^* > \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \) and \( U_P^{M2} \) can be implemented whenever \( U_P^{M2} \geq U_P^{M4} \). In summary, high effort on the low-cost tasks is optimal if and only if \( p_m \geq p^*_m \) and we have shown (ii).

Remember that \( \bar{p}_m \) is the intersection of \( U_P^{M2} \) and \( 2(p_hX - (\alpha + \beta)e_h) \). Since \( \bar{p}_m \geq \hat{p}_m \), we have \( \hat{p}_m \leq p^*_m \leq \bar{p}_m \), which is (iii). At the intersection \( p^*_m \), \( U_P^{M4} \) is decreasing.

If \( p_m < \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \), high effort on the low-cost tasks only cannot be implemented. If \( \alpha p_h/(\alpha + \beta) \leq p_m \), we have \( U_P^{M4} \geq U_P^{M2} \iff p_m \leq p^*_m \). Together, it is optimal to implement high effort on all tasks if and only if
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$p_m \leq p^*_m$, and we have shown (i).

The principals payoff is $U^M_P := \max\{U^M_{P2}, U^M_{P4}\}$. $U^M_P$ has its minimum in $p^*_m$ and $U^M_{P2}(p^*_m) \geq U^M_{P2}(\hat{p}_m) \geq 0$ implies $U^M_P \geq 0$. Our ad hoc assumption is justified and we have also shown (iv).

Proof of Lemma 2.5:

Due to the $U$-form, we have $e_\sigma = (e_{AS}, e_{BS}), e_\tau = (e_{AT}, e_{BT}), e_{AS} + e_{BS} = e^{S_\sigma}$ and $e_{AT} + e_{BT} = e^{T_\tau}$. The equilibrium conditions can be rewritten as

\[
\begin{align*}
    e^*_{AS} &\in \arg\max_{e_{AS}} \pi_A(e_{AS}, e^*_AT)w_{A_\sigma} - \alpha e_{AS} \quad (2.47) \\
    e^*_{AT} &\in \arg\max_{e_{AT}} \pi_A(e^*_AS, e_{AT})w_{A_\tau} - \alpha e_{AT} \quad (2.48) \\
    e^*_{BS} &\in \arg\max_{e_{BS}} \pi_B(e_{BS}, e^*_BT)w_{B_\sigma} - \alpha e_{BS} \quad (2.49) \\
    e^*_{BT} &\in \arg\max_{e_{BT}} \pi_B(e^*_BS, e_{BT})w_{B_\tau} - \alpha e_{BT} \quad (2.50)
\end{align*}
\]

For notational simplicity, we suppress the asterisk. Consider project A. Given $e_{AS} = e_h$, agent $\tau$’s best response (which maximizes his payoff because it fulfills (2.48)) is $e_{AT} = e_h$ if and only if

\[
p_h w_{A_\tau} - \alpha e_h \geq p_m w_{A_\tau} - \alpha e_l \quad ,
\]

which is equivalent to

\[
w_{A_\tau} \geq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m} \quad .
\]

If $w_{A_\tau} \leq \alpha(e_h - e_l)/(p_h - p_m)$, his best response is $e_{AT} = e_l$. Given $e_{AS} = e_l$, agent $\tau$’s best response is $e_{AT} = e_h$ if and only if

\[
p_m w_{A_\tau} - \alpha e_h \geq -\alpha e_l \quad ,
\]

which is

\[
w_{A_\tau} \geq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_m} \quad .
\]
If \( w_{A\tau} \leq \alpha(e_h - e_l)/p_m \), his best response is \( e_{A\sigma} = e_l \). Agent \( \sigma \)'s best responses are constructed analog. Combining the agents’ best responses shows that there is a Nash equilibrium with \( e_{A\sigma} = e_{A\tau} = e_h \) if and only if

\[
\begin{align*}
    w_{A\tau}, w_{A\sigma} &\geq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m} .
\end{align*}
\]

An equilibrium with \( e_{A\sigma} = e_h, e_{A\tau} = e_l \) exists if and only if

\[
\begin{align*}
    w_{A\sigma} &\geq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m} , \\
    w_{A\tau} &\leq \frac{\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_m} .
\end{align*}
\]

For an equilibrium with \( e_{A\sigma} = e_l, e_{A\tau} = e_h \), replace \( w_{A\sigma} \leftrightarrow w_{A\tau} \) so that the agents change their roles. Due to the symmetry, everything is completely analog for project \( B \).

\textbf{Proof of Lemma 2.6:}

The proof is quite analog to the proof of Lemma 2.4. Given an effort combination \( e_{AS}, e_{AT}, e_{BS}, e_{BT} \) to be implemented, the principal faces the maximization problem

\[
\max_W U_P
\]

subject to the equilibrium conditions (2.47)-(2.50), the participation constraints

\( U_{\sigma}, U_{\tau} \geq 0 \) and the limited liability constraints \( w_{ij}, v_j \geq 0 \).

Due to the symmetry, the principal can choose \( v_{\sigma} = v_{\tau} := v \) and \( w_{A\sigma} = w_{B\tau} := w_1 \) and \( w_{B\sigma} = w_{A\tau} := w_2 \). Given an effort combination to be implemented, it is optimal for the principal to choose the smallest \( w_1, w_2 \geq 0 \) which fulfill the equilibrium conditions and the smallest \( v \geq 0 \) which ensures the agents’ participation. To find \( w_1, w_2 \), see Lemma 2.5. We plug these \( w_1, w_2 \) into \( U_{\sigma} = 0 \) and solve for \( v \). If the result is nonnegative, it is the optimal basic wage and the agents’ participation constraints are binding. If the result is negative, we set \( v := 0 \) and the participation constraints are not
To implement low effort on all tasks, it is optimal to set $w_1 = w_2 = 0$ and $v = 2\alpha e_t$. The resulting payoff is

$$U_{P^M}^0 := -4\alpha e_t < 0,$$

which equals the generated surplus. To implement high effort on exactly one task per project, it is optimal to choose $w_1 = \alpha(e_h - e_l)/p_m, w_2 = 0$ and $v = 2\alpha e_t$. The payoff is

$$U_{P^U}^2 = 2\left(p_m X - \alpha(e_h + e_l)\right),$$

which equals the generated surplus. To implement high effort on all tasks, it is optimal to choose $w_1 = w_2 = \alpha(e_h - e_l)/(p_h - p_m)$ and $v = \max\{0, 2\alpha e_h - p_h w_1\}$. The resulting payoff is

$$U_{P^U}^4 = 2\left(p_h X - \max\left\{\frac{2p_h\alpha(e_h - e_l)}{p_h - p_m}, 2\alpha e_h\right\}\right),$$

which has a kink in

$$\hat{p}_m := \frac{p_h e_l}{e_h},$$

and equals the generated surplus if and only if $p_m \leq \hat{p}_m$.

**Proof of Proposition 2.3:**
The proof is quite analog to the proof of Proposition 2.2. $U_{P^U}^4$ is a positive constant for $p_m \leq \hat{p}_m$. It is monotone decreasing in $p_m$ for $p_m \geq \hat{p}_m$ and approaches $-\infty$ for $p_m \to p_h$. The function $U_{P^U}^2$ is continuous and monotone increasing in $p_m$. It is negative for $p_m = 0$ and positive for $p_m = p_h$. Therefore, we have a unique intersection $p^{**}$ with $U_{P^U}^2 \leq U_{P^U}^4$ if and only if $p_m \leq p^{**}$ with equality if and only if $p_m = p^{**}$, and we have shown (i). Remember that $\tilde{p}_m$ is the intersection of $U_{P^U}^2$ and $2(p_h X - 2\alpha e_h)$. Since $\tilde{p}_m \geq \hat{p}_m$, we have $\tilde{p}_m \leq p^{**} \leq \hat{p}_m$, which is (ii). At the intersection $p^{**}, U_{P^U}^4$ is decreasing.  

\[\Box\]
Proof of Lemma 2.7:

Since $U_p^{U^2} \geq U_p^{M_2}$, a principal who implements high effort on one task per project always prefers the $U$-form. Now consider a principal who implements high effort on all tasks. In case of $\beta > 2\alpha$, we have $U_p^{U^4} > U_p^{M_4}$, which is (i). Now let $\beta \leq 2\alpha$. It is straightforward that $p_m \leq \hat{p}_m$. For $p_m \leq \hat{p}_m$, it is $U_p^{U^4} > U_p^{M_4}$ and both functions are constant. For $p_m \geq \hat{p}_m$, it is $U_p^{U^4} \leq U_p^{M_4}$ with equality if and only if $\beta = 2\alpha$. Both functions are decreasing. For $\hat{p}_m < p_m < \hat{p}_m$, $U_p^{M_4}$ is constant while $U_p^{U^4}$ is decreasing. It is implied that for $\beta < 2\alpha$, there is a unique intersection $p_m^I$ with $U_p^{M_4} \geq U_p^{U^4} \iff p_m \geq p_m^I$ with equality if and only if $p_m = p_m^I$ and we have shown (iii). For $\beta = 2\alpha$, we have $U_p^{U^4} > U_p^{M_4}$ if $p_m < \hat{p}_m$ and $U_p^{U^4} = U_p^{M_4}$ if $p_m \geq \hat{p}_m$. This is (ii) with $\hat{p}_m = p_m^I$. Combining the properties of $p_m^I$ for $\beta < 2\alpha$ and $\beta = 2\alpha$, we get (iv). ■

Proof of Lemma 2.8:

Since $U_p^{U^2}$ is strictly increasing, negative at $p_m = 0$ and positive at $p_m = p_h$ while $U_p^{M_4}$ is decreasing, positive at $p_m = 0$ and approaches $-\infty$ for $p_m \to p_h$ we have a unique intersection of $U_p^{M_4}$ and $U_p^{U^2}$ which we denote with $p_m^{II}$. It is straightforward to calculate

$$p_m^I = p_h \frac{(\beta - \alpha)e_h + 2\alpha e_l}{(\alpha + \beta)e_h}. \quad (2.62)$$

Furthermore, there is a unique intersection of $U_p^{U^2}$ and $2(p_h X - (\alpha + \beta)e_h)$, which is

$$p_m^\dagger := p_h - \frac{\beta e_h - \alpha e_l}{X}, \quad (2.63)$$

so that

$$p_m^\dagger - p_m^I = p_m^I = \frac{2\alpha(e_h - e_l)p_h - \beta e_h - \alpha e_l}{(\alpha + \beta)e_h} \frac{X}{X}. \quad (2.64)$$

There are two cases to analyze. If $U_p^{M_4}$ is strictly decreasing in $p_m^{II}$, we have

$$p_m^I \leq \hat{p}_m < p_m^{II} < p_m^\dagger \quad (2.65)$$
and $p'_m > 0$. If $U^M_4$ is constant at $p''_m$, we have

$$p''_m = p'_m \leq \hat{p}_m$$

so that

$$p''_m - p'_m = p'_m.$$  

(2.67)

In summary, we have

$$p''_m \geq p'_m \iff p'_m \geq 0.$$  

(2.68)

Proof of Proposition 2.4:

The $M$-form guarantees a payoff $U^M_4 \geq 0$ so that it is never optimal to implement low effort on all tasks, which results in a negative payoff. It is $U^M_2 < U^U_2$. The $U$-form is optimal if and only if $\max\{U^U_4, U^U_2\} \geq U^M_4$. The $M$-form is optimal if and only if $\max\{U^U_4, U^U_2\} \leq U^M_4$. The results follow from Lemma 2.7 and Lemma 2.8.