Barbarian Beasts or Mothers of Invention
Relation of Gendered Fighter and Citizen Images

with a specific case study on Southern Sudan

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Magna cum laude
To you Meret!
you rule my world
Acknowledgement:

To those staying with me in times of tension.
And those who kept me happy.
To all my friends who brought life and fun to me and my house.
To my family who hardly ever asked why this is still going on but never gave up believing it will be done.

To the women in Sudan who took me in – regardless, who talked to me – in spite of, who inspired me with their clarity and power, who kept their friendship over all these years, who questioned and criticized and challenged.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between fighter and citizen status

Monrovia – trucks with armed young men and women enter Monrovia. More than 3 million people died in the last four years of conflict related causes in north-eastern Congo, more than 60 percent of the fighters are assumed to be under the age of 18, hundreds of girls and women are amongst the fighters. New attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda target mainly children. Girls and boys are abducted and forced – in turn – to abduct their siblings, kill their neighbours and commit acts of spectacular violence against those they care for.

In the new generation of African Wars, children play an active part in fighting. Whereas we see and hear about cruel acts of violence committed by young boys, we increasingly see and hear about marauding girl gangs, however, most often – their acts of violence are overshadowed by the forced sexual slavery and rape by male gang members and insurgency leaders.

The line between civilians and fighters is becoming more and more blurred. Civilians – as in the war in Darfur in western Sudan – became the main, and sometimes the only target. However, the switching from civilian life into militarized life, from the life of the farmer, the unemployed civilian into a member of an armed group and back is not only known since the Genocide in Rwanda. Mainly young men – and more and more women – use and are forced to use – ‘fighter’ as a lifestyle, as means of survival and income.

Many war leaders do not consider civilians as the population that is fought for or the population that should be protected from the enemy. The population is not understood as the rightful citizens of a state or territory. Civilians are easy targets for looting, rape and recruitment. Beyond that they are considered a nuisance who should be dealt with by the international humanitarian community.

For the international humanitarian community, civilians in conflict regions are mainly perceived as victims of the wars, in need for humanitarian interventions. For the globalized political and economic world, civilians in conflict areas are not considered citizens, are denied human rights or are described as a group of lost people that are kept on a mere survival level. Serious interest in their citizen status, their abilities, their interest, their needs, perspectives, desires and aims is hard to detect.

The question remaining is not only, if there is a difference between new war leaders and rebel leaders of ‘just wars’, independence or guerrilla struggle. An important factor is the definition, perception and reality of citizenship. How is this definition linked to the concept of state and what – if any – is the relation between fighter and citizen status? In many conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, the status of fighters in society, and further in the

power and elite structure of formal or informal leadership conglomerates, appear to be the entry ticket. The ‘cake’ is not shared with somebody who did not take up arms, who did not fight, neither in the Democratic Republic of Congo, nor in Sudan today. Citizenship, however, seems to have an aura of idealist vision but hardly any evidential reality.

The question of citizenship, representation, and participation however is of essential importance in the transformation from a conflict to a post-conflict state. In the formation of society the definition of citizen and the respective role, rights and duties will determine the future developments of newly emerging states, post-conflict societies, political traditions, and the very stability of the state and government.

It is troublesomely striking that the definition and model of the fighter has much more reality to it than that of a citizen. It is equally alarming, that the majority of states in eastern and central Africa and the Horn of Africa are lead by former insurgent-leaders turned into head of states. Museveni in Uganda, Kagama in Rwanda, Afwerki in Eritrea, Zelawi in Ethiopia, Kabila in DR Congo, Bashir and the late Garang and now Salva Kiir in Sudan, reflect a tradition of militarized leadership with control as a leading topos of their leadership and an almost paranoid fear of the uncontrollable citizen and the potential of their democratic representation. Leading a country in military fatigues, does not only communicate a victorious insurgency, stability, and military strength. It denotes further that militarized logic and thinking are still prevalent, hierarchical decisions are normative, and military bonding is the essential glue for elite networks.

The international community however is equally confusing in their messages. Where democratisation is one of the leading benchmarks in almost all western foreign and aid policy, the reality of authoritarian leaders is happily accepted as the need for a strong leader to bring the nation out of the chaos of conflict. By the strong support for strong leaders the unhindered legacy of power taken by military means is deeply inscribed in African policy and state building discourses and realities. This leaves significant marks on social structures and hinders the struggle of the population to get out of the spiral of violence, war and authoritarian regimes.

Democracy is a potential threat. Paternalistic forms of leadership are widespread and civilians are not trusted to be ready to decide upon their own fate. State structures are cohesive and intelligence and security is tense. Although in some of these states women were part of the armed forces, gender role models are strict and masculinity is deeply inscribed in militarized leader – and thereby role-model – identities. Regardless of their achievements during the war, women become national archives, references to the ‘golden times of pre-colonial authenticity’. They are victims of the war, and keepers of the family but they are hardly acknowledged as active agents of war, experts of survival or support-troops. If they were directly involved in the fighting, such as in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda or largely kept out of it like in southern Sudan, they

\[\text{For the most recent examples of a top-down installation of government, consider the Sudan and the D.R. Congo. The formula of “Whoever has the gun will become President or Vice President” was the leading idea of western and international negotiation technique. In the case of Darfur, the leaders of the then-newly established rebel groups (SLA and JEM) made it quite clear in their founding statements that the example of Machakos showed that only those who held the guns would be called to the negotiation table and become part of the government.}\]
are not encouraged to continue with their militaristic appearance or identity after the conflict.

Whereas in the new wars, no hopes are raised by war-leaders for the civilians to have political long term gains out of the struggle, in the wars aiming and/or resulting in the formation of the states mentioned above, those hopes were raised and used as reasons for the conflict. By talking to women inside southern Sudan, the expectations are high. They want to gain independence; to have education for their children, to settle down again, to continue normal life, to regain family-, and community structures. Political motives were mainly mobilising women to actively join the struggle, in whatever form they were allowed to.

This thesis tries to establish the link between fighter and citizen status and its respective gender dimension.

Although Sudan is part of the public discourse mainly since the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003, this work is focussed on the conflict in southern Sudan.

The thesis covers the time from the beginning of the insurgency in southern Sudan up the beginning of the negotiations between the SPLA/M and the government in Khartoum. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) marks the end of this work. Now the consequences of closely knit gendered soldier and citizen relations need to be analysed.

New wars

The conflict between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the various regimes in Khartoum might be described as one of the last pre-‘New’ Wars.

The conflict started before the end of the cold war and subsequent breakdown of military-political networks between capitalist and communist supported African states. Although the conflict shows multiple elements, defining ‘New Wars’ its main significators: Fragile or failed states, locally restricted military power, direct link to the world market by various militia leaders, and possibly, most important, the end of ideological discourses are not constitutive for the Sudanese conflict.

The conflict in Sudan is less of a new war as defined by Mary Kaldor below, but rather a ‘classic’ anti-colonial war against state-internal colonial structures. The conflict was aimed to end the oppression of the central Sudanese hegemonic elite and to gain real independence for the marginalized areas.

In difference to new wars, the conflict in Sudan carried political ideas of leadership and state. This implies an interest in citizenship models and an idea of political power that is more complex than that of a new war warlord, interested in personal enrichment but not in running a state.

As Mary Kaldor\(^3\) described in her introduction to, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, it is the blurredness of violence, wars, and organized crime that inform ‘New Wars.

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\(^3\) Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press,
Simplistic unhistorical one-to-one comparisons of Feudal Europe in the struggle for the emergence of the nation state and current African conflicts or ‘New’ wars have a desideratum not to be overlooked. Current New wars placed in globalized economies, direct access to the world market and technological as well as information interconnectedness leaves an African New War leader in a different spectrum than a feudal or anti-feudal ‘Junker’ (donzel) before the Westphalian Peace.

In most new wars, particularly in the most recent outbreaks of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, the use of violence is not to be distinguished any more between direct, military, personal or domestic violence and no clear line can be drawn between structural violence and direct violence. Impoverishment is leading to more direct violence, direct violence and its effects such as internal displacement and forced migration leads to further impoverishment. The majority of the 3.5 million people who died in eastern Congo since the war of 1996 died from the effects of war. This fact describes a more complex and brutal new war reality, in which the survival of people is meaningless, humanitarian aid used as tool for public relations by the belligerent, and the loss of life of an unarmed individual not considered contrary to the conduct of war, but a necessary und unimpressive effect of chaotic power structures.

But those who profit from the use of spectacular violence are neither poor nor powerless. In difference to the heroic status of fighters in liberation struggle, those who commit or are forced to commit acts of spectacular violence, atrocities, and participate in crimes against humanity in New wars are less likely to gain enduring status in their home communities.

What is problematized in this work is the divergence between local terminal power through the access to arms and the widening gap between short-term power and citizen rights.

In the case of southern Sudan, the new models of ‘New’ wars are blending into an older model of insurgency that claims interest in obtaining state control and the establishment of functioning government and state structures.

Unlike the images of female fighters of the then called liberation armies in Latin America or Africa, who provoked a wave of sympathy and communicated an idea of strength, the newly emerging images of women involved in the various conflicts currently taking place in Africa are desperate, painful, weak, and hopeless.

The images of female fighters in western media have changed in recent years. We have seen Nicaraguan and Eritrean female fighters portrayed as brave heroines. The drugged out gang-style girls and women, mounted on trucks dressed like in Gangster Rap Videos, which were portrayed from Liberia and Sierra Leone, did not communicate serious political convictions but the ongoing western phantasy of African Amageddon.

This assessment is equally true for male fighters, the drugged out children in northeast Congo, the hungry barefoot fighters in southern Sudan, the indifferent regular soldiers in northern Uganda. To become a fighter is not a career option any more, nor does it
seem to follow an ideological call for justice and independence. Any reference to a highly appreciated traditional fighter or warrior image is a mockery to the reality of current fighter and soldier realities.

By understanding the corrosion of states, the meaninglessness of citizen status in a failed or collapsing state, and the economic interests fuelling these wars, possible explanations and recommendations can be drawn. Beyond classical political instruments of analysis, such as war, states and economy, aspects of gender in a given society and the transformation of those roles are important to analyse. To understand the level of complete desperation, transformations in gender roles, and erosion of communities and social texture, multi-layered contextual analysis is needed. If children grow up in a brutalized surrounding where weapons appear to be the only regulatory means of power, yet they are carried by those who do not even have a status in the former society structure – namely children – who are now in a position to command and kill adults, then the distinction between structural and direct violence is blurred.

Further, in the approximation to understand and categorize female fighter status, a western scholar has to take into account, that our image of female fighters, as well as the image of women in general and women in Africa in specific, is informed by specific routines of exclusion, dehumanisation, exoticism and orientalism. The longing for a powerful female fighter image or on the contrary the ideal of inherent female peacefulness, may not be the same in southern Sudan as it is in the West. Historicity of domesticated women, femmes couvertes, docile housewives, and peaceful mothers arrives from a specific post-feudal, post-enlightened western context and might not correspond with the experience of people elsewhere.

However, the diversity in realities and history cannot lead to cultural relativist differences in rights. The universal understanding of equality and the ‘right’ to citizenship is fundamental and cannot be argued ‘away’ on the basis of cultural relativism. The right to participate in shaping one’s own life and one’s political environment is essential for everybody. The conditions for citizen-rights however, are not provided for in a dictatorship or clientele-warlord-patrimonial setting. How exactly the idea of participation and the principle of equality of human beings and their universal human rights has to be modelled into a political system, will not be the main focus of this work. The question of citizenship here is based on a more general understanding of participation and not exclusively connected to western models of democracy.

For this work I use a patchwork approach as my methodology to include the different cultural meanings and the complexity of the reality of fighter-citizen relations and their gendered dimensions. By problematising the gendered fighter and citizens status I encountered three main dilemmas.
Dilemma 1: the absence of

The first dilemma is ‘the absence of’. In my research, which I started 1996 with an eight month research expedition to southern Sudan and Eritrea the main ‘absence of’ became apparent in researching the status of female fighters in southern Sudan. Female fighters, known as a phenomenon from many other anti-colonialist wars, where mainly absent in southern Sudan. This is not to say that women did not take leading roles in the community, but as far as the insurgents of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement were concerned, women were not recruited into active warfare. By continuing my expeditions to southern Sudan yearly and by staying in contact with the insurgents due to my work, this ‘absence of’ manifested itself into more of a strategy rather than a coincidence. What consequences this ‘denial of access’ rather than pure ‘absence of’ has and possibly will have for the status of women in southern Sudan, will be discussed and analysed in this paper.

The second dilemma of ‘absence of’ is the absence of a state in southern Sudan. Although formally the regime in Khartoum was sovereign for all Sudanese, in actual fact, this did not apply to the majority of people in southern Sudan, most of them under the control of SPLA/M. SPLA/M took over state-like functions in southern Sudan in order to interact with the international aid agency world. Both, SPLM as well as the international humanitarian agencies under Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) actually adapted state-like services and interventionist modules, yet neither has any formal state authority to do so.

In this paper, I will discuss the absence of state as well as the authoritarian regime as a repetitive mechanism of conflict. The discussion on citizen rights however will be based on more general thoughts of citizenship and can only act as a preparatory comment to the state-in-formation in the case of Sudan.

In the framework of the Peace Negotiations between the northern Sudanese regime in Khartoum and the leadership of the southern insurgents of SPLA, known as the Machakos peace talks, started in 2002 under the auspices of IGAD, the first concern regarding the population in a post war southern Sudan, was the Demobilization and Reintegration of fighters. Current talks about Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Reconstruction and Resettlement (DDRRR) clearly indicate that the first group to be thought of and provided for in the new state will be those who are actively recognized as soldiers. By this, the demarcation of active involvement and active yet unrecognized participation in

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4. At this time, I was working as a researcher for Amnesty International on the eastern Africa team at the International Secretariat in London; in that capacity, I visited Sudan frequently, while continuing my own research and networking.

5. The largest humanitarian-aid project in the world, Operation Lifeline Sudan, started in Sudan in 1989.

the conflict, is set and will have implications for further status, power and citizen allocations.

Ruda Gaizanwa\(^7\) establishes an account of new nation regimes. By building new nations on the institutions of colonialism and slavery, she claims, serfdom and domestic subordination of women are inevitable. Gaizanwa compares the new nation regimes with those of the post-French Revolution and alerts to the fact that the knowledge and value system is shaped by the pre-Enlightenment:

> In spite of their potential for freeing the labouring classes from oppression and subordination by the ruling classes they were rebelling against, the enlightenment philosophies did not transcend the contours of class, race and gender, which were themselves important in shaping the thinking of the philosophers.\(^8\)

In a Nation-in-building, such as in southern Sudan this will have serious implications for the transitional period. Inner state apartheid, authoritarian regimes in Khartoum, militarized and non-democratic leaderships in the insurgent movement in southern Sudan are markers for the difficulties of a new start, based on this very legacy. The internal colonization prevalent in Sudan creates similar problems of any possible situating of the self, outside the realm of the humiliating and undignified description by the other.\(^9\) This creates difficulties in the formation of the state, as well as in the formation of a citizen identity. In Sudan, where internal colonization of northern regimes against the southern population was never stopped or interrupted by democratic leadership, the legacy of discriminatory identity formation will not be outdone quickly. As Frantz Fanon\(^10\) described it in the realm of identity formation by colonization; “The elements to construct a ‘denegrified’ character from the white man who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” resembles the situation in southern Sudan.

For women in southern Sudan the recognition as a full citizen will be countered by two identity formations based on exclusivist models. First, like anybody else in southern Sudan, the decolonization from the oppressive system by the central elite will play an essential role in identity formation and second, their status as non-acknowledged participants of the war, created by their exclusion from potential active participation in the SPLA, will be a determining factor for their citizen rights. The latter will be an issue in the unified Sudan as well as in the case of two separate state entities. To establish a position as a female citizen out of a matrix with two ‘absent’ co-ordinates is, what I want to discuss in this work.

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\(^8\) Ibid.


Dilemma 2: Theory

Inevitably there is some variety of theoretical reference needed, to situate the complexity of the topic. According to the different chapters and their specific focus a mix of theoretical discourse will be established. The dilemma here is not to present the various theories and to discuss them thoroughly, but to breach and interweave them into a sensible patchwork.

Since my main interest is to analyse the positioning of citizen and fighter images in conflict situations with a strong emphasis on its gender dimension, there is a need to filter through very different knowledge backgrounds.
Assuming that the understanding of international relations and state formation as well as war and conflict analysis is quite regionally specific, although claiming to be universal, the use of various theories can only work in establishing tools to imminently question those theories. In countering theories such as international relations theory with a critical feminist perspective or war theories with a more regional analysis inherits the dilemma of multiplicity. In my understanding, it is essential to think of theories as inclusive and as open as possible yet not to dominate the local reality with abstract theoretical constructions based on western foundational myths.
Just to establish an example of this dilemma: the paradigms of the realist school in International Relations Theory as established by Hans Morgenthau are questioned by feminist IR theorists such as Anne Tickner by criticising abstract concepts of security and conflict – as derived from liberal state theorists such as Thomas Hobbes – with the aim to alter the notion of security to a more inclusive notion, including survival and security from domestic violence. This is not a work of adding to, but a question of transforming. If those two concepts can then further be detected in the reality of insurgency leaders and e.g. civilian women in southern Sudan, it adds an interesting and crucial spin to theories of international relations.

First, one must conceptualize what notion of community/individual the leaders have and what notion the civilians are bound to. What notion of community/individual the international discourse is based on and – not to forget – what notion the author/writer wants to establish. Dealing with identity formations that are partly formed by isolated truth constructs with universal claims, such as in Thomas Hobbes Leviathan or what Donna Haraway\(^\text{11}\) describes as “Reproduction of the Self from the Reflection of the Other” on the side of the normative western discourse. And those at the other end of the spectrum, evolving from, what Masolo\(^\text{12}\) calls a post-colonial African Identity, which in his words, seem “as natural rather than imagined and politically driven” with a normative claim to authenticity disregarding the power position of those who define this identity.
The dilemma here cannot be untangled by bringing these thoughts in line, but by cautiously contextualising them and situating them in their historicity and in their power, gender, time, and regional dimension. Consequently, the result is less of a manual to solve problems of gendered citizenship, but to understand how the notions are constructed.

The classical dilemma many theorists as well as politicians and war leaders are facing seems to be dualism. As Mudimbe describes this for the picture formed by western theorists of a pre-European Africa, it still seems to be a dominant polarization:

First the Hobbesian picture of a pre-European Africa, in which there was no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society; and the Rousseauian picture of an African golden age of perfect liberty, equality and fraternity.

For both, a non-western theory as well as feminist theory, the problem of representation and appropriation of images as real, political agents, is a major dilemma, both in criticising colonial or androcentric concepts as well as in establishing speaker positions.

Similar problems are encountered in the universal claim of liberal feminism, homogenising the experience and reality of some women into a concept of essential femininity. This goes both ways, liberal feminists claiming the western experience of women in the military to be universally valid as well as some feminist conflict theorists claiming an inherent female peacefulness.

Whereas for theorists such as Holmes and Hicks-Stiehm, the problem lays in the limited access of women into the military; for theorists such as Boulding and Elshtain, the biggest dilemma is society’s lack of appreciation of care and mother-roles. Feminist conflict theorists such as Enloe tend to victimize women in military environment, whereas a small body of literature exists on female fighters in African wars, whose involvement in armed struggle is described as a heroic enterprise not to be questioned from outside.

What Donna Haraway calls the informatics of domination in the transition from ‘old hierarchical dominations to scary new networks’, is part of the dilemma faced in this work. In order to examine the gendered relations between fighter and citizen images, with a specific example from southern Sudan, several hegemonic projects are to be analysed and deconstructed. One potential for conflict are the different denominations, historicity, biases and believes embedded in each project. Claims of representation,

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truth, authenticity and integrity emerge from theories embedded in western, andocentric, authentic-traditional hegemonies.

One of the objectives of this work is to decentralize notions of authentic truth systems. Be it the construct of woman as an essential unity, war, as a universal concept, citizenship as an individualist category or tradition as an authentic representation of identity.

As I pointed out above, in relation to the dilemma of international relations theory, deeply imbedded in a western tradition of political thought, similar dilemmas appear within the various schools of feminist theory, postmodernist approaches of deconstructivism, and claims to authentic tradition.

Whereas the socialist school of feminist theory enables to detect structures of alienation, but falls short to explain gender appropriations in pre-industrialized, community based societies, radical feminist theory, re-inscribes gender dichotomies by emphasising the fundamental differences between man and women. Haraway describes this dilemma by contrasting a constructed identity with one that is based on alienation: “To be constituted by another's desire is not the same thing as to be alienated in the violent separation of the labourer from his product.”

In the specific case of radical or essentialist conflict theory feminists, the internal peacefulness and lastly embedded innocence of women is universally claimed, regardless of differences in gender roles and identity formations in non-western societies. Christine di Stefano highlights the trap of essentialized commonality by elaborating on the, “differences between women on the basis of race, class, culture, sexuality, are sufficient to override feminine communality. A feminist standpoint like the feminist movement is potentially oppressive and totalizing fiction, just as humanism has been.”

Gayatri Spivak broadens this dilemma of the standpoint epistemology or more general claims on human discourse. As epistemology is needed to form a mental image or to approximate understanding of experience of ‘the other’, a deconstruction of the notion of the ‘Other’ is simultaneously necessary. For Spivak there are three shifting concepts of human discourse, language, world, and consciousness resulting in the understanding that human textuality is not only as ‘World’ and ‘Selves’ but in ‘World’ and ‘Selves’. Whereas essentialist concepts help us understand the concepts shaping the individual explain a certain functionality of the world, they are restricting the ‘Other’ into a status of conceptualized being without any subject status. This results in a silencing of the ‘Other’, be it women, non-white, non-western, or any combination thereof.

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16 Ibid., p. 201.

However by making the ‘Other’ heard, the guards of essentialism, hegemony and power of definition must be put up again. As Spivak points it out: “The Nativist argument that says ‘do not question third world mores’ is of course unexamined imperialism.” What Spivak dismisses as cultural relativism becomes important when interpreting aspects of gender roles and fighter and citizen images claimed by elites yet even by the community in southern Sudan itself.

It is highly unlikely that the lack of potent positioning in the public sphere by women in southern Sudan reflects their inability to make decisions or to be in a position to become ‘republican’ citizens. However, epistemology might function as a justification strategy of the hegemonic thought. As Chandra Mohanty argues for the need of a de-essentialisation of notions of women or third world, the idea of the imagined community becomes virulent:

The idea of imagined community is useful because it leads us away from essentialist notions of third world feminist struggle, suggesting political rather than biological or cultural bases for alliances. It is not colour or sex, which constructs the ground of the struggle; it is the way we think about race, class gender.

In contrast to the dilemma of essentialist notions of gender, race or third world, another dilemma emerges by using deconstruction as a belief system rather than a method. Again, Gayatri Spivak discusses the shortcomings of deconstructivism if a change in the political program, reality and thinking are needed:

Deconstruction alone cannot found a political program. A mere change of mindset, however great, will not bring about revolutions. Yet without revolutionary change of mind, revolutionary programs will fall into the same metaphysical bind of idealized and reparable intention and context that Derrida plots in speech act theory.

I would like to conclude that both – strategic essentialism as well as deconstructivism are necessary and bring with them a multitude of epistemological structures that are essential, in order to enlarge the knowledge of experience and realities we are dealing with when analysing gender, war or citizenship concepts. Since there is no true, essential authentic identity or experience that is not informed by the world and selves, I would argue it continues to be inevitable to make use of de-contextualisation as a method to describe and discuss human experiences and their politicisation. Truism, purism and authenticity will not be helpful in scanning the surface of difference and diversity. Political concepts, aims and ideals will continue to be important to create

21 Ibid., p. 4.
meaningful discourses and imagined communities with more and more various voices participating in the discourse.

Dilemma 3: Text

For an approximation of the quite complex realities, I encounter in this work, I chose to work with various forms of text. Whereas theory is helpful to structure and analyse political dimensions of war, citizen concepts, and more broadly, the various constructs of gender roles or fighter images, it does not reach far enough to understand what images are constructed, what desires inform constructs of ‘Others’, how different people describe their realities, and how those realities finally enter the field of discourse and analysis and have informed the theories mentioned above.

To be able to describe and to form an image of how women perceive their existence and how they position themselves in the realm of conflict situations, it was necessary to engage in a thorough field research. I conducted about sixty interviews with women in various locations in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, with Sudanese women in the east African Diaspora and with men and women from different insurgency factions, various organisations, and decision making bodies. I travelled to southern Sudan several times, starting with a six month research period from late 1996 to mid 1997. I was working with an indigenous women’s peace organisation, the Sudan Women’s Voice for Peace which enabled me to travel to different areas in southern Sudan and work with various women in eastern and western Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and the Nuba Mountains. Proceeding from Sudan, I conducted interviews with about thirty female former EPLF fighters in Eritrea in 1997. I returned to Sudan in 1998 in order to present some of the empiric material I collected and to discuss the work in process with a number of women in Nairobi as well as further in various locations in southern Sudan.23

Although this work is not empirical and the interviews are used as expert interviews to exemplify ideas and hypothesis I discuss, without this large body of empirical material and the epistemological gravity of the descriptions, assessments and analysis people provided me with in these interviews, I would not have been in a position to establish theoretical lines to connect the complexity of reality and theory.

For a large part of my work I was interested in the concept of female fighters and the various images they carry. The body of literature for such an analysis is restricted and polarized. There is work on the victim status of women in war on one side and almost glorifying accounts of heroic female liberation fighters on the other. There is quite a substantial analysis on the involvement of women in western armies and women’s status during and after the second World War. What is largely lacking, is further

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23 Meeting at SWAN (Sudan Women Association Nairobi), an NGO in Nairobi concerning the diaspora of southern Sudanese women. In 1998, I organized a meeting there and invited about sixty women from different areas in southern Sudan to discuss the outcomes and first-draft findings of my dissertation research.
analysis of the status of fighting women in the African context and its contextualisation in western texts and literature.

In conclusion, I found it important to adopt various forms of text, from colonial literature, ethnological and anthropological descriptions, historic material on western female fighters as well as mythological texts from ancient Greek anecdotes and characterisations of female violent goddesses.

The work with women in southern Sudan and Eritrea brought about the questions discussed in this paper and tackled the need for a broader analysis. This research is informed by the situation of women in southern Sudan and my struggle with understanding and analysing their particular situation. Evolving from a more descriptive empirical concept, I came to the conclusion that it is not only necessary to understand the complexity of the situation, it is important to reflect on my own gaze, informed by western theory, the analytical concepts used to describe current wars and most of all—to be aware of the differences and diversities in description and analysis of both.
II. FEMINIST POSITIONING ON GENDER CONSTRUCTS
II. FEMINIST POSITIONING ON GENDER CONSTRUCTS

Becoming Subject

By becoming subject I would like to focus on the construction of gender and gendered bodies. This is necessary for the further analysis in this thesis. In approximating the correlation of gendered citizen and fighter images, the construction of gender and its binary definition is essential.

Assuming that gender is the cultural construction denoting ideas about appropriate roles for men and women in a society. In this thesis the body plays an enormous role in becoming the location for gendered images of soldier, citizen, mother and caretaker. Since the body is such a dominant subject matter, the correlation between the sexed body and culturally defined gender roles call for a closer examination. I take Judith Butler’s thoughts as enormously productive for such an encounter:

If gender consists of the social meanings that sex assumes, then sex does not accrue social meanings as additive properties but, rather, is replaced by the social meanings it takes on; sex is relinquished in the course of that assumption, and gender emerges, not as a term in a continued relationship of opposition to sex, but as the term which absorbs and displaces “sex”, the mark of its full substantiation into gender or what, from a materialist point of view, might constitute a full desubstantiation.

As Joan Scott \(^{(25)}\) states, gender is about relationships and is thereby caught in a polar construct of we-other, sex or politics, family or nation and women or men. This social connotations and the internalization of gender roles by individuals shows the experience of a gendered body in a specific society yet it does not reveal the motivation of this relationship. Gender can be used to describe and analyse historical dominant structures in given societies, yet the reason of power hierarchies build on gender dichotomies are based on a multitude of explanations.

I think it quite useful to start this analysis with an introductory thought by Judith Butler \(^{(26)}\) questioning the impossibility of pre-discursive gender (and truth) constructs in general. By assuming that gender as well as other social categorizations is created by the ongoing discursive practice in a society, it renders necessary to examine this discursive practice further. This will be the exercise throughout this thesis.

The underlying dilemma is the question of the subject. There are several feminist theories of how the category of women or female gender constructs is informed. The main folding lines are a) the assumption that women is the absence, the lack of (the penis), the ‘Other’, the one that is not man \(^{(27)}\) and b) woman is the symbol of

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\(^{(27)}\) See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *The Spivak Reader*, p. 54; French poststructuralist and
locatedness of essentialist substance, not to be transcended. The theories informing those two approaches argue on very different convictions, mainly out of an understanding that the difference in gender is one constructed in a relation, that there is no one without the other.

I do not want to explore the extensive body of literature and theory on the subject but use a historicized understanding of the construction of gender to be able to read the exclusion and becoming subject, to bridge the call for ‘strategic essentialism’, for women as a category in order to be able to formulate political interests and the understanding of gender as a performative practice, an unfixed part of multiple identities.

As Judith Butler points out the problem with the normative subject setting:

For the most part, feminist theory has taken the category of women to be foundational to any further political claims without realizing that the category affects a political closure on the kinds of experiences articulated as part of a feminist discourse. When the category is understood as representing a set of values or dispositions, it becomes normative in character and, hence, exclusionary in principle.

This statement reflects the critique of feminist theory articulated by Black, Third World and Non-Middleclass feminists, stating that the feminist theory using women as a category, based on female epistemology is exclusive and restricted, reflective only on the experience of white, middle class western women but universalized and used as an foundational category for the situation of all women, worldwide. As bell hooks argues “this forceful integration into this essentialist category of women is corrupting”. And as a further result, continues the inscription of the western white individual as the centre. Or, as Chandra Mohanty translates it into a political positioning: “Defining women [Third World Women] in terms of their problems, achievements sets them in relation to an imagined free white liberal democracy.” Simultaneously a great number of ‘third world feminists’ criticize the evocation of the ‘death of the subject’ by post-modernists. By giving up on the subject, the identity as


See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (New York: Knopf, 1953); Sulamith Firestone; cultural feminists such as Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978).

A term coined by Gayatri Spivak.


women as a political force, oppression, marginalization and political dominance seems to become random. As Paula M. L. Moya specifically criticizes Judith Butler and Donna Haraway she denounces post-modern approaches on difference as another hegemonic normation:

Typically, postmodernist theorists either internalise difference so that the individual is herself seen as “fragmented” and “contradictory” (thus disregarding the distinctions that exist between different kinds of people), or the attempt to “subvert” difference by showing that “difference” is merely a discursive illusion (thus leaving no way to contend with the fact that people experience themselves as different from each other). In either case, postmodernists reinscribe, albeit unintentionally, a kind of universalising sameness (we are all marginal now!) that their celebration of “difference” had tried so hard to avoid.33

Knowledge of diversity and difference can only be established with the knowledge of a multitude of epistemologies. It is not necessarily the process of situating of the self by female feminist epistemology that is problematic; it is the universalistic claim of the essence of what is to be a ‘women’ deriving from a specific, dominant epistemology of the white middle class western woman.

Yet again in the need to formulate a politically operational subject, feminists propose some sort of essentialism for the purpose of political activity. Following the construction of women as defined by absence, Spivak calls for the ‘risk of essence’ or strategic essentialism to formulate a subject as a mobilizing agent. “The strategic use of an essence as a mobilizing slogan or masterword like woman or worker or the name of a nation is, ideally, self-conscious for all mobilized. This is the impossible risk of a lasting strategy.”34

What is important to differentiate here is the problematization of the subject as a political agent, aware of the risk of essence and the claim for materialist feminist standpoint theories constructing the category of women. 35 This often results in restrictive generalizations.

Both the subject as well as the feminist standpoint could be described as a socio-economic or political position from which reality can be understood and political agency and emancipatory action can be undertaken. The main difference here lies in the conclusions out of the observations of gendered roles. Whereas an essentialist understanding such as the feminist standpoint theory claims the biological difference, reproductive biology as the dividing line between the gender constructs of man and woman, when women’s experience becomes ‘antithetical to abstract masculinity’ the deconstruction of the discursive articulation of the subject asks for the mechanisms


and articulations of the discursive and social practices, questioning their gendered
pre-setting.
Here Hartstock argues along with the majority of Marxist-, Cultural-, Eco-, Psychoanalytical-, and Peace-Feminists on the basis of the sexed body as the
asymptote of gendered social inscriptions. As Hartstock explains the feminist
standpoint epistemological position:

The concept of a standpoint epistemology structures epistemology in a particular way.
Rather than a simple dualism, it posits a duality of levels of reality, of which the deeper
level or essence both includes and explains the “surface” or appearance, and indicates the
logic by means of which the appearance inverts and distorts the deeper reality. In addition,
the concept of a standpoint depends on the assumption that epistemology grows in a
complex and contradictory way from material life. Any effort to develop a standpoint must
take seriously Marx’s injunction that “all mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their
rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice”.36

By following the critique of bell hooks and others, Hartstock’s approach could be read
as a provider to establish a theory of Third World Feminism, generalizing the abstract
masculinity into an abstract western dominant pattern. Yet here exactly, as Iris Marion
Young37 explains, Hartstock as well as Nancy Chodorow and Sandra Harding fall
short to establish such a universal category by failing to distinguish between ‘categories of
gender differentiation and male domination’ since they base their
assumption on western-middleclass specificities such as the public-domestic divide
and the conjugal relationship as the main locus of patriarchal domination.38
And further by establishing a male and female psychogram, a subject identity, they
inscribe a universalising claim of homogeneity and truth. Judith Butler discusses the
critique of the subject and its fragmentation as oppressive:

Clearly, the category of women is internally fragmented by class, colour, age, and ethnic
lines, to name but a few; in this sense, honouring the diversity of the category and insisting
upon its definitional nonclosure appears to be a necessary safeguard against substituting
a reification of women’s experience for the diversity that exists. But how do we know what
exists prior to its discursive articulation. (...) Indeed, the political critique of the subject questions whether making a conception of
identity into the ground of politics, however internally complicated, prematurely forecloses
the possible cultural articulations of the subject-position that a new politics might well
generate.39

The questioning of the Enlightenment, the Cartesian subject formed on the ‘man of
reason’ and its destabilization and deconstruction by postmodernism and feminism
alike led to a more general dispute on the existence of the subject but also bears the

36 Ibid., p. 464.
37 Iris Marion Young, “Is Male Gender Identity the Cause of Male Domination?”, in Mothering, ed.
38 For a critique on this assumption, see Suad Joseph, ed., Gender and Citizenship in the Middle
possibility of the loss of the subject as a political agent. Not, that the political agent as the custodian for representation would be a less problematic realm. The issue becomes even more problematic when dealing with the construct of African women in war situations.

Various factors are at stake here, one is the almost exclusive external research, the other is the large tendency to use unifying descriptors applied to the situation of women in war. Researchers tend to focus on the suffering of women as victims of war\textsuperscript{40}, or, in the alternative, discuss their active involvement in armed struggle as a form of unchallenged liberation.\textsuperscript{41} There are rather rare examples of more complex analysis of women's different positioning and involvement in armed struggle.\textsuperscript{42} This does in no way undermine the effort of creating visibility of women in conflict. The problem of the outside description on women and the lack of positions and analysis established by the women in the conflict areas themselves, leads to a rather obscure circle of analysis. The research on women in war becomes largely based on research done by others – mainly western women – without a reflective mechanism of dominant assumptions about these women – and without possible interventions by the women themselves.

**Mix of Methodology**

As already touched upon, approximating an understanding of gendered citizen-soldier constructs in a specific area of crisis by working with feminist de-constructivism, requires a mix of methodology. This mix cannot be random and derives from a critique of various paradigms: Postmodernism, Feminist theories, International Relation theories, Conflict theories as well as the acclaimed representation of assumed authentic speakers positions and voices.

For reasons of feasibility and clarity of this thesis some of the theories referred to as important in the mix of methodologies can only be touched upon briefly – others will be established throughout the thesis.


Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson develop a description of feminist post modernism by relating to the similarities in the respective form of social criticism. In accordance with the above problematized questioning of the pre-discursive establishment of gender, postmodernism calls for a social criticism, which is pragmatic, ad hoc, contextual and local. Whereas feminists of different political spectra agree in questioning the grant narratives in establishing a universalistic concept of gender, based on one generalized, yet restricted and exclusive feminist epistemology, by homogenizing the category of women, essentialist feminism tends to establish another grant narrative.

To make use of the postmodernist criticism of grant narratives, Fraser and Nicholson lead through the paradigms of postmodernist plural, local and immanent legitimation processes. By following Lyotard through his Postmodern Condition the critique of the grant narratives – as formulated in the Enlightenment story of gradual but steady progress of reason and freedom, modernized in Hegel’s dialectic of spirits or Marx’s “drama of the forward march of human productive capacities via class conflict culminating in proletarian revolution” – are described as modern approaches to the problem of legitimation. “Each situates first-order discursive practices of inquiry and politics within a broader totalizing metadiscourse which legitimates them.”

This corresponds with a critique of essentialist feminism. To think around the modern construct of identity, yet not to lose the concept of agency, feminist approaches on gender identities should continuously question standardized understanding of gendered knowledge and history production. Gendered modern foundationalist epistemologies could be deconstructed through the same post-modern mechanisms of contextualized, local and plural criticism. Thereby the universalized truth construct of justice legitimation of meta-narratives could become what Lyotard describes as the justice of multiplicities.

The problem becomes one of the subject itself, since even by the multitude of epistemologies local mini-narratives will be established. As Fraser and Nicholson reading through feminist analysis of the category of women, aiming to “identity causes and constitutive features of sexism that operate cross-culturally.”

As their analysis continues, they state the problematic process of gender constructions in trying to establish a normative subject, ‘women’, for reasons of social agencies and legitimized by the need to change and transform real existing dominant structures of gender hierarchies.

They tacitly presuppose some commonly held but unwarranted and essentialist assumptions about the nature of human beings and the conditions for social life. In addition, they assume methods and concepts that are uninflected by temporality or historicity and which therefore function de facto as permanent, neutral matrices for inquiry.


45 Fraser, “Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism”, p. 22.

46 Ibid., p. 27.
Such theories then, share some of the essentialist and a historical features of metanarratives: They are insufficiently attentive to historical and cultural diversity, and
they falsely universalise features of the theorist's own era, society, culture, class, sexual orientation, and ethnic, or racial group.

Again I consider post-modern theory as a method to question, look behind and deconstruct essentialist assumptions. To contextualize social constructs such as gender has to be done by assessing the multitude, by being plural and local in description as well as by acknowledging subject formations as political agencies.

Although it might seem a contradiction, I consider the enlargement of episteme with a careful analysis of their contextual knowledge production and the deconstruction of their acclaimed dominant truth a productive mixture of analysis.

As for the concrete case of gendered identity constructs based on a militaristic paradigm of exclusive relations between fighters and citizen status, this requires a complex set of analytical strains.

If the societies given roles for men and women underwent dramatic changes, as it is the case in a longstanding civil war such as in southern Sudan, it is important to describe the newly emerging and appropriated roles. If then further, the dominant discourse of gender roles in this society almost seems contrary to what is evidently real, this requires a contextual analysis of the normative setting. If then further, the dominant pattern builds a direct link between fighter status and the entitlement to fully participate in society formation as a citizen, this militaristic logic has to be de-constructed.

It tells us mainly two things: If women would have been included in the military sphere, this would enable them to gain citizen status as well as it would transform their life with all the implications on society known from similar examples. If transformation from a militaristic towards a civic thinking would be the aim, demilitarization of society and its set gender roles would enable a re-definition of gender roles and value systems attached, that would be more inclusive to all members of society and would give way for agency to develop independent from military positioning.

Although foundational categories of gender are highly questionable, the relational aspect of gender dichotomies and their inherited aspect of dominance have to be reflected. As Jane Flax defines the relational character of gender, I would like to draw attention to the discursive aspect of this relation, which will be reflected throughout the thesis.

“Gender relations” is a category meant to capture a complex set of social relations, to refer to a changing set of historically variable social processes. Gender, both as an analytic category and a social process, is relational. That is, gender relations are complex and unstable processes (or temporary “totalities” in the language of dialectics) constituted by and through interrelated parts. These parts are interdependent, that is, each part can have no meaning or existence without the other.

Gender relations are differentiated and (so far) asymmetric divisions and attributions of human traits and capacities. Through gender relations two types of persons are created: man and woman. Man and woman are posited as exclusionary categories. One can be only one gender, never the other, or both. The actual content of being a man or woman and the rigidity of the categories themselves are highly variable across cultures and time. Nevertheless, gender relations so far as we have been able to understand them have

\[47\] Ibid.
been (more or less) relations of domination. That is, gender relations have been (more) defined and (imperfectly) controlled by one of their interrelated aspects – the man.

For an understanding of the non-essential constructedness of gender, Flax’s assumption of the relational aspect as the main production unit of gender is pioneering. It questions the essence of the category yet, gives way to a critical analysis of the dynamics, the reality of relations, which create them.

As touched upon above the claim of formulating a feminist empiricism, a standpoint as a pool of female voices aims to re-write history, making the silenced voices heard. The notion of unmediated truth therefore is called into question, yet by establishing the notion of the silenced voice a parallel form of knowledge is promulgated. As Anne Sisson Runyan and Spike Peterson argue, in standpoint epistemology, the tendency is towards inscribing a binary gender vision, yet with promulgating the inversion of the knower. Being critical towards the androcentric bias they tend to highlight the gynocentric form of knowledge. This ‘unsubstantiated faith in women’s access to a higher truth’ is creating a mini-narrative, one that does not question the relations and dynamics of the position of the speaker, but the sex of the speaker as the decisive factor.

As I would like to concentrate here on the construction of gender categories with a reference to the reality of women in war and their gendered situatedness in various roles and scripts, I would like to come back to Judith Butler and her inherent warning of repetitive masquerades of playing the ‘others’ script as a political stagnation. If women – as in the understanding of liberal feminists – calling for equality become the I, the subject, by transcending their position of the ‘Other’ in playing the role of the dominant subject – the men – the tendency for a political stagnation is high. A similar tendency can be foreseen by exchanging androcentric with gynocentric truth constructs. I would like to quote Rosi Braidotti here with her reference of the practice of ‘as if’. This narration of ‘as if’ appears to be a dominant practice in circumstances of war. In Braidotti’s reading the practice of ‘as if’ is a simultaneous recognition and denial of certain attributes or experiences.

In male-stream post-modern thought, fetishist disavowal seems to mark most discussions of sexual differences. (...) in a feminist perspective, I prefer to approach ‘the philosophy of ‘as if’,” however, not as a disavowal, but rather as the affirmation of fluid boundaries, a practice of the intervals, of the interfaces, and of the interstices. In other words, the element of repetition, parody per se, or impersonation that accompanies the practice of “as if” cannot constitute and end to itself. The practice of successive poses or masquerades per se has no automatic subversive effect; as Judith Butler lucidly warns us, the force of

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the parodic mode consists precisely in striving to avoid flat repetitions, which bring about political stagnation.  

Analysing the complex gender relationships by reading the interfaces, by using discourse analysis to approximate knowledge constructions the status of women as the icon for the ‘other’ remains a vibrant denominator. Similar to what will be discussed in the native/settler dilemma is the description of women as the native. The ambiguity of transgression as a form of change and approximation yet at the same time a political stagnation, will be closer examined in the history of woman warriors, female soldier impersonators, violent women and Amazonian fe/male fantasies. This will allow an analysis of restriction as well as give an idea of the multitude of identity formation potentials.

Although Butler argued on the discursive practice in the construction of the sexed and gendered body, the body in its material existence nevertheless appears to be the proof of existence of theoretical categories. Whereas anti-essentialists argue that the monocausal homogenizing attempt to define the gendered body is exclusive and restrictive, based on dominant (such as western, middle class) experience. Some feminists fear the loss of theoretical categories such as gender, patriarchy or women as agents of change and political activism by “the move from grand theory to a specific, historically grounded, else gendered account”.

Some post-modern or post structural feminists locate the dilemma on the very essence of the essentialized body as the locus of gender discourse others criticize the neglect of the body as the locus of inscription in post-modern theory. “Those who seek to deny the body, who deal only in abstractions (...) will be writing in one sex alone as their standards.”

Since the gender-free, the unsexed body is the masculine. Or, as Rosi Braidotti elaborates on in her critique of Gilles Deleuze’s theory of becoming-woman as the new philosophical subject:

Insofar as man, the male, is the main referent for thinking subjectivity, the standard-bearer of the Norm, the Law, the Logos, woman is dualistically, that is, oppositional, positioned as the “other”. The consequences accordingly are that: (a) there is no possible

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51 Ibid., p. 6.
52 I will discuss this further on the construction of the violent, sexualized image of African women by colonial travelers and explorers.
54 Here the differentiation between postmodernism and poststructuralism becomes an issue. See Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism,” in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Seyla Benhabib a.o. (New York: Routledge, 1995). p. 39. Butler writes here: “I don’t know about the term ‘postmodern,’ but if there is a point, and a fine point, to what I perhaps better understand as poststructuralism, it is that power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms, including the subject position of the critic; and further, that this implication of the terms of criticism in the field of power is not the advent of a nihilistic relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, rather, the very precondition of a politically engaged critique.”
becoming-minority of man; (b) the becoming-woman is a privileged position for the minority-consciousness of all.

And further

The problem is also how to free “woman” from the subjugated position of annexed “other”, so as to make her expressive of a different difference, of pure difference, of an entirely new plan of becoming, out of which differences can multiply and differ from each other.\(^{56}\)

What I like to problematize with this excursion is the fragile and multiple approximations to the matter – the body – by its materialistic, essential, deconstructive, dissolving descriptors and definers.

Although we assume that culturally gender roles are constructed socially and therefore are transformable, this social construction essentializes the body in a binary sex. Not properly sexed bodies are dehumanized. As Judith Butler states on the subject of gender construction:

> What I would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return to the notion of matter, not a site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter.\(^ {57}\)

For an analysis of such a complex matter as such of women in southern Sudan and their participation in the war, and how this might be related to their prospective citizen status, the question of representation is multiple. The discourses inscribing icons of identities on them are plural in their appearance, yet largely linear and singular in their hierarchical claim to power. Whereas feminist standpoint epistemologists claim a re-writing of (her)story, colonized people such as the southern Sudanese call for equality in acceptance of difference. Whereas the institution of war making calls for a militaristic simplification of society and gender lines the nationalist mobilizes claim a system of authentic traditions\(^ {58}\) – again based on clear gender roles, a pure authentic origin and simultaneous progress towards modernity. Claiming of space, knowledge and public fora seems to leave southern Sudanese women out – yet in the establishment of all these claims they are referred to as adequately represented. Women are involved in these relations as well as reduced to a mirrored image to the dominant norm.

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Again I am not interested in producing an authentic category of southern Sudanese women but in deconstructing this very categorization a mix of methods, including their voices is inevitable.
II. 1. GENDERED CITIZENSHIP

(…) Daß keiner ‘glücklich genannt werden kann, der nicht an öffentlichen Angelegenheiten teilnimmt, daß niemand frei ist, der nicht aus Erfahrung weiß, was öffentliche Freiheit ist, und daß niemand frei oder glücklich ist, der keine Macht hat, nämlich keinen Anteil an öffentlicher Macht.

Hannah Arendt, Über die Revolution

For many who believed that women were more inclined than men toward pacifism, and that this would help secure the peace, women’s inclusion in armed forces has been a disturbing historical development. As democratic states have linked citizenship to war participation, women have embraced that participation to show their patriotism and to promote their bids for citizenship.

Angela Woollacott

In highly militarised states, where the military is the government, women’s exclusion from military participation effectively blocks them from political participation as well.

Francine D’Amico

To elaborate more precisely on the correlation of fighter and citizen status and it’s gendered dimension a number of critical issues need to be considered. In a situation such as currently prevalent in Southern Sudan the question of state and its relationship to the individuals only exists in approximation, in imagined terms. Since the main political as well as military power in the South only claims a state-like structure and power position, the actual responsibility as well as the rights of a state are not (yet) redeemed. In a strong formalist sense this could be seen as a stumbling block to the debate of the correlation of fighter and citizen status. Yet, in my understanding it is essential to discuss the potentiality of individual-state relations regarding rights and duties of citizens and state powers before or in the transgressive progress of group formations on the way to build a state apparatus.

The issue of citizenship in Southern Sudan would formally have to be referred to their status as citizens in a united Sudan, governed by the sovereign government in Khartoum. Yet since the insurgency which started the struggle for a change of regime in 1983 in fact controls most of the territory of what is considered Southern Sudan, since it is the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army which is claiming the political governance and since it is the SPLM/A recruiting and excluding fighters into their units, the debate is solely focused on the preparatory attempts to formulate a state-idea by the SPLM/A. This is becoming increasingly manifest, since the Machakos Peace Talks predict the inevitable challenge for the SPLM to be the main political force in

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62 IGAD peace negotiations began in August of 2002 in Kenya. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the Machakos I Preliminary Agreement state clearly that during the
the nation-state-building process for the South, or whatever is defined in the Protocol as the ‘New Sudan’. 63

I mention the current Sudanese situation here because for any dynamic or democratic republican model of citizenship being a citizen is no pre-political identity. Therefore the ground rules currently laid out by the Sudanese leaders will determine the permeability of the identity of citizenship for all members of society. Whereas now citizenship for southern Sudanese men and women is solely determined by ius solis (citizenship on the basis of territory, where one is born) and ius sanguinis (determined by blood) – the changes discussed in the peace negotiations will ultimately propel the formula of a civic republican tradition into the talks. Since there, the engagement, the practice – not a persons status and relation will constitute the citizen, citizenship and possibly some form of national identity, it is crucial to reflect on the gendered dimension of society settings right now.

As it is widely discussed in feminist International Relation theory as well as in debates on gender and nationalism and the gendered citizenship discourse neither is the formation of a nation, the processing of a state nor the relation of citizens and their state a gender-neutral realm. Feminist International Relations theorists argue that the beginning of the nation-state is embedded in the history of pre-state rules of kinship, the rule of the father or brother, or the sexual contract in general 64. Further, feminist conflict theorists re-reading the history of the citizenship discourse argue that the idea of the nation is an idea imbedded in the fulfillment of its highest aims, the Hegelian Kriegsstaat. 65 Elshtain elaborates that:

interim period of six years from the signing of the final peace agreement, Sudan will be governed in turns by the present Government of Sudan and the SPLM. By region, the presently ruling parties will build their constituencies and seek to prepare for a referendum to determine Sudan’s future as a confederal, federal or separated state. In those areas where it has claimed the rights of a quasi-government, the SPLM is now responsible for delivering the political infrastructure necessary to fair and just elections and for building a state or nation-state. (Machakos Protocol (20th July 2002 [cited 01-02-2006 2006]); available from http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/documents/default.asp?s_DocType_id=3&s_DocSummary=).

63 Here the negotiators are not making progress, since the formulation of the “New Sudan” constitutes parts of eastern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and other so-called marginalized areas as components of SPLM’s constituency.


65 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice,” in Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. Spike Peterson (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp.142. Elshtain discusses the understanding of state, nation, citizenship and war, using as examples: Plutarch’s Spartan mother, who asks for victory rather than the well-being
War-constituted solidarity is immanent within the state form. But the state, hence the nation, comes fully to life only with war. Peace poses the specific danger of sanctioning the view that the atomised world of civil society is absolute. In war, however, the state as a collective being is tested, and the citizen comes to recognize the state as the source of all rights. Just as the individual emerges to self-conscious identity only through a struggle, so each state must struggle to attain recognition.

The question I will pursue in this chapter is then to detect the link and difference — if there is any — between those who fought in a war as acknowledged fighters and the citizen status they gain to the status given to the non-fighters.

In order to be able to argue precisely in what way the formation of citizenship rights as well as the state in general is taking place in Southern Sudan and how far this has gendered dynamics which are strongly linked to the war-discourse of masculine fighter images and feminine care-taker models, I would like to examine the various definitions of citizenship and their gendered dimensions.

As most theorists agree, the idea of citizenship is a combination of the legal status, the juridical citizenship which ‘constructs the subject of law’ in combination with the set of practices, including political, economic and cultural practices which determine the transforming and dynamic part of the constitution of the citizen.

Besides the definition of a citizen as a subject of law and a subject set in social, political practices, Claire Snyder distinguishes three forms of citizenship as I mentioned above. Her ideal is the citizenship of civic practices. The continuous re-production of citizenship by civic practices is encountered by two more static forms, that of the *ius solis* (citizenship tied to the place of birth) and *ius sanguinis* (citizenship based on blood lines). For my understanding of citizenship in the context of militarized societies and the gender dimension of citizenship only the performatively constructed identity as a citizen can be productively analysed. Nevertheless a possibility of hegemonic divisions of citizenship models might be created exactly along the lines described by Snyder — since the tendency to ascribe women citizen rights on the basis of *ius solis* and *ius sanguinis* is wide spread and denies them the rights of democratic citizenship while fulfilling international standards of citizen rights.

By this definition it is evident that the question of the autonomous individual needs to be reflected again. In the wake of a similar discussion feminist conflict- and international relations theorists argued, that there is no such idea(l) as an independent, autonomous individual, disconnected from time and space, circumstances, personal relations, state formations or position of knowledge. As Suad Joseph describes it as

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66 Ibid., p.143.
67 Joseph, ed., *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East*, p. 3.
the impossibility of. “The citizen as an individual with undifferentiated, uniform, and universal properties, entitlements, and duties.”  

Pnina Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis highlighting the homogenizing attempt in classical and modern definitions of citizenship by recognizing modern citizenship as a “political imaginary and as a set of commonsense assumptions and practices’ which is ‘inserted into a social field, an arena of competing, heterogeneous and partially overlapping discourses’.”

While criticizing the mainstream definition of citizenship and its unreflected connotation of a masculine, exclusive public sphere in contrast to the feminine(zed) private domain, it is crucial to ask if the public-private divide should be dissolved, if ‘feminine virtues of care’ should be encouraged or if the gendered quality of the distinction rather than the distinction itself should be dissolved. There is a vast body of contesting literature on this topic that I would not want to discuss here in length, partly because the main focus of this debate is based on the model of the modern welfare state and its transformation. This is not the discussion I would like to highlight in this text, since it does not reach the folding lines of the state under construction that we are faced with in Southern Sudan.

Yet to sum up the debate of gendered citizenship the main dividing line is the understanding, reflected in the works of Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick and Jean Bethke Elshtain claiming a feminized understanding of citizenship based on what they would describe as ‘feminine values of care’. What we understand as the private sphere in their understanding should become the dominant factor for citizenship, ‘maternal thinking’ , ethics of care rather than ethics of justice and the idea of social feminism based on the ethics of care would formulate the new shift of citizenship including the right to become and the practices to act as a citizen.

The various critiques on this concept are ranging from a criticism of the value of caretaking as the entry ticket into citizenship as simply inscribing the public/private...
gender divide to the understanding of citizenship as active articulation rather than ethical morality. Mary Dietz contests the assumption of maternal thinking and mothering as a prerequisite for democratic politics. She argues on the basis of the distinctiveness of mothering as well as on the unequal relations between mother and child that could not become the form and foundation of democratic citizenship. 75

Carol Pateman elaborates on the dilemma of liberal citizenship theories by their undisputed acceptance of the patriarchal construct of the public sphere, the political realm based on what she had defined as the ‘sexual contract’, the rule of the father (or brother). Demanding equality does not break through the gaze of patriarchal values of the masculine citizen, which – in the wake of enlightenment and post French Revolution became open to many men on the expense of the exclusion and barging of women.

For Pateman motherhood has to play a role in the relevance for citizenship. As she argues this needs a construction of citizenship acknowledging both specificity of womanhood as well as the universal humanity of men and women.

A view that gives due weight to sexual difference in a context of civil equality, requires the rejection of a unitary (i.e., masculine) conception of the individual, abstracted from our embodied existence and from the patriarchal division between the private and the public. 76

Chantal Mouffe 77 would reject the essentialist notion of the sexed body as a determining factor in the construction of citizenship and apply a concept of citizenship where sexual difference is not a distinctive factor. For Mouffe citizenship would be described as following:

The view of radical and plural democracy that I want to put forward sees citizenship as a form of political identity that consists in the identification with the political principles of modern pluralist democracy, namely, the assertion of liberty and equality for all. It would be a common political identity of persons who might be engaged in many different purposive enterprises and with differing conceptions of the good, but who are bound by their common identification with a given interpretation of a set of ethic-political values. Citizenship is not just one identity among others, as it is in Liberalism, nor is it the dominant identity that overrides all others, as it is in Civic Republicanism. Instead, it is an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty. 78


77 Ibid. pp. 539.

78 Ibid., p. 540.
With Mouffe’s definition the notion of articulation becomes a striving issue – yet the possible critique of her definition is implicit in the writings of ‘southern’ feminists, arguing that until there is no access to the fora of articulation, arguably in the public sphere, the ideal of the active, republican citizen – Mouffe is introducing – will not be realistic for many post-independent countries.

The broader conflict of essentialist standpoint epistemological gender constructs and those contextualising a multiple and shifting identity position might be settled with – what Gayatri Spivak calls ‘strategic essentialism’. To de-essentialize homogenic notions of identity constructs yet to acknowledge the author’s position and the specific context of genealogy and knowledge position of the agent.

I would argue here that the notion of citizenship has to be read in the set of patterns of identity location of any individual and member of a society and therefore is not only competitive in participation but equally in the sense of belonging. Therefore it is not enough to study the formation of a state and its communication channels to its citizens, via legal procedures – or further via international procedures where individuals become members of the international community. But it is constitutive to study carefully the local and communal construct of belonging, dependency, power and resistance in the formation of a person’s identity. Suad Joseph positions this shifting and multiple identities of the ‘Subject’ in her elaboration of the care/control paradigm of kinship. 79 The shifting identities of Subjects in a communal system is highly entangled with what Smith names the ‘civic myth’ whereby, as Joseph paraphrases: “The ‘civic myth’ which underlie notions citizenship in most states often conceal inequalities or attempt to justify them on the basis of family, religion, history or other cultural terms.” 80

By this stating that there is no clear cut beginning of the notion of citizenship in emerging states but that the historicity of what constitutes power structures and peoples positioning in the communal system or the pre-state setting is politicized and in many ways highly gendered.

Reflecting the changes in discussion of identity from a universalized androcentric model towards one reflective of difference and diversity, the problem becomes not less muddy. Specifically in an environment where difference and diversity might be seen as a ticket to cultural relativist excuses of internal power regimes, the discussion Ruth Lister presents is of great importance. Lister reflects the various models of citizenship and the justified feminist critique towards them. Her central question is if: “(...) a concept originally predicated on the very exclusion of women can be reformulated so as satisfactorily to include (and not simply add) them (on); and whether, in doing so, it can give full recognition to the different and shifting identities that women simultaneously hold.” 81

To formulate a definition of citizenship that is inclusive of the various epistemologies and differences yet highlights the emancipatory ideal of a universal citizenship as a


potential to participation and with access to universal human rights strikes me necessary in this discussion. In the specific discussion on the correlation of fighter and citizen status with a special reference to the situation in southern Sudan I would like to borrow Sylvia Walby’s argument that both is necessary, a gendered analysis of citizenship as well as the centrality of citizenship to gender relations. In the light of a newly to be established state-formation out of the daily practice and with the personnel of an insurgency it is important to claim universal citizen rights as well as to highlight the political practices of participation in building a democracy.

Chantal Mouffe along with Mary Dietz and others argue on the civic republican position by emphasizing the active part a citizen needs to play. Beyond the rights of a citizen, in the words of Chantal Mouffe a citizen should be somebody “Who acts as a citizen, who conceives of herself as a participant in a collective undertaking.” A definition that would qualify for Claire Snyder’s definition of the democratic citizenship.

To understand the contrast between women’s political representation and restriction in active citizenship and their strong position in forming and informing community life has to be studied in the context of conflict, insurgency rule and nation building in particular. Approximating the various concepts of citizenship and their different historicity and genealogy becomes a useful practice in order to understand why it is so important to think along both lines, the emancipatory potential of universal citizenship as well as the different and diverse realities informing those debates.

I would like to come back to structural notions of gendered citizenship as discussed in various non-western environments such as the concept discussed by Suad Joseph, in her discourse on the care/control paradigm of the kinship. Although Suad Joseph is specifically discussing the notion of citizenship in Arab states, I would argue that her construct of kinship is a valid systemic descriptor for the current status of society arrangements in Southern Sudan as well. Here I will solely concentrate on the construction of kinship and not indulge further in the historicity of religion playing a vibrant part in Joseph’s concept but is of fairly minor importance in the current southern Sudanese situation.

Whereas Joseph argues on the difference of Western state models in difference to Arab state models as one based in the individualized citizen and the other based on the family, I would argue for the case of Sudan that the individual has a role in the community and kinship line that does not allow her or him to transgress easily into the model of individual citizen but is far closer to the model of a family-based state formation. Joseph defines the idea of the ‘Arab’ citizen subject as “a patriarch, the head of a patriarchal family, legally constituted as the basic unit of the political community who accrues rights and responsibilities concomitant with that legal status.”

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84 Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition, 1.
The important point here in the comparative closeness with the situation in Southern Sudan is the status defining a person’s position in society rather than a contract – as the founding idea of modern liberal states theory. Whereas the modern idea of the individualized citizen is transcending her/his links to family, tribe, region or village and, in the words of CB MacPherson, becomes a ‘possessive individual’ – the status based idea of citizenship takes more and diverse steps in the communication between the individual and the state via those exact links and identity formations.

This by no means meant any inclusion of women in the idea of possessive individuals, according to the Enlightenment liberal state theorists of the seventeenth century. As Joseph quotes Carole Pateman here arguing that the transition from status to contract is linked to ‘the replacement of family by the ‘individual as the fundamental ‘unit’ of society.’ Since women were not entitled to have access to reason and rationality they would not be included in the contract between the individual and the state. Consequently they failed to gain status as individuals altogether, which might be explicit in the notion of the femme couverte, the women as part of a male individuals dependency group. This – following an argument by Cynthia Enloe – is still the case in militarized contracts in western states, where the wife of a soldier becomes part of the military command, without gaining status and rights as an individual.

As in difference to the patriarchal family based citizenship where the right of the father is the ruling element, in the western liberal citizenship model the father’s right was only exchanged and enlarged by the rights of men as men. In both spheres of the world, this might have changed and the acceptance of the contract between the individual and the state as the bases of citizenship is enshrined in most states constitutions. Yet in understanding and analysing the difficulties for women to gain full citizenship right has to be seen from different perspectives, based on status or on contract.

**Civic Myth**

I would like to introduce the discussion on civic myth, as described by Smith and elaborated on by Joseph, since it enables us to understand the constructed rather than the organic process of citizenship in nation states. Civic myth seem to be necessary building stones in the unifying process of nation state building, since assumingly no nation is based on a homogenous group of people.

No modern state consists of a homogeneous, stable, “natural” national community residing within never-contested political boundaries. Yet the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) of the nation legitimates itself through stories that constitute its members as belonging to a shared political collective with an imagined common history. Civic myth or citizenship are appealing because they “create the most recognized political identity of the individuals they embrace” by supporting citizenship

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laws that “literally constitute – create with legal words – a collective civic identity” (Smith 1997, 31). A civic myth of citizenship tells a tale of an a priori foundational unity, woven through acknowledged and unacknowledged differences, of which the state, its laws, and its leaders are its political embodiments. For previously colonized states, civic myth and citizenship laws invariably import culturally alien ideas.

Similar to the creation of the civic myth of citizenship in order to set identity markers in a to be unified society building a nation, the civic myth of kinship functions on similar terms. Since the competition of power between kin groups and states are intrinsic in nation-state formations the question to be discussed here is whose power is prevalent in what state. As Joseph argues for the case of Western states where the state succeeded in appropriating the functions of kin groups and diminishing their power and control over their members, she states further, that the Arab states tended to re-inscribe the ‘discipline of extended kinship systems into the structures of governance.’

By stating this fundamental difference Joseph finalizes her critique on the insufficiency of western feminist explanations of gender citizenship dichotomies. Whereas Western feminist tend to focus on marriage, husband/wife relationships as the core of patriarchal inequality, the extended kin with its care/control paradigm was absent from most analysis. As she cites Carol Pateman and Susan Moller Okin, the focus was on the ‘distinctive asymmetric vulnerability of women in gender structured marriages’ as the main barrier to equal citizenship. Joseph argues that in Lebanon, and I would argue, in Southern Sudan as well, the marriage/sexual contract is not necessarily the strongest link of gender dichotomies but that the patriarchal extended kin social order that is rooted in the balance of ‘nurture and discipline’ – what Joseph calls the care/control paradigm – has much more influence and ground in understanding gender imbalance in citizenship.

Keeping this important difference in mind, the association of gendered citizenship with any militarized modulation needs to be reflected in the tension between the individual and the community. The relational, connective notion of citizenship as referred to by Suad Joseph imply that the person’s status in society much more than his or her contract based links with the state defines citizenship. And further, the rights and duties of citizenship based on relational rights emerge from the relationship the person has. For the possibility of changes in the life of the individual, but moreover his or her rights and possibilities as and of active citizenship this has deep implications. The subject status of the individual, enabling a person to interact with the state and to fulfil

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88 She makes the interesting argument that the Catholic Church played a decisive role in transforming kinship in Europe by acting as a state – changing and inscribing the elementary family rather than the extended kin.

citizenship rights and duties is conflicting with the relational status oriented identification of this person in the group of kin and community. Whereas it is foreseeable that the emerging state construct in Sudan or in southern Sudan in particular, will inscribe the right of the citizen on his and her individual contract position with the state on the bases of nationality – the actual identification of the self will lay in the relation and the status in the community and kinship in particular. As Joseph formulates:

Relational rights imply that a person’s sense of rights flows out of relationships that s/he have. By being invested in relationships one comes to have rights. As a basis for citizenship practices, relation rights require citizens to embed themselves in family and other sub-national communities such as religious sects, ethnic, and tribal groups to gain access to the rights and privileges of citizenship. 

Following Joseph’s argument marks the dilemma of the formulation of citizenship notions as introduced by Chantal Mouffe, since the republican model of active citizenship requires a separation between the rights of the individual as in a citizen and those rights rooting in relations and a persons’ status. As for Mouffe citizenship is a form of political identity consisting in the “(...)identification with the political principles of modern pluralist democracy, namely, the assertion of liberty and equality for all.” The separation of public and private, state and community, ethnic group, kinship and state might not be active in the understanding of citizenship as discussed by Suad Joseph. Yet in the embryonic state of civil society formations in southern Sudan this seems to be a dilemma openly worked on – at least in some groups. For an overall assessment the question of separation of private public realms is and undoubtedly will be of great importance.

**Gendered Citizenship**

If rights are not perceived as individual rights of a subject but more of the rights established by the relational status of the individual in sub-national groupings, the underlying issue of the rights to define status, rights and access to rights will now be of a conflicting nature handled in the public sphere but more of an integrated sphere. Power positions found in private, family, kinship and ethnic communities will be dwelled on in the understanding of the public, the state, and the political sphere. The strategies of engagement will require a more complex activity based on a multilayered identity, reflecting contradicting roles and positions of the individual.

Considering the reflections of Foucauldian theories of power/resistance by Eleanore O’Goreman the complexity of this becomes more physical but might also give light to the dilemma discussed on Joseph’s assumption of the kinships care/control paradigm. In Foucault’s understanding of the relational notion of power with resistance as an

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implicit category the dynamics of the individuals positioning in simultaneous conflicting power constrains gains an active momentum. As O’Gorman states: “Subjectivity becomes a shifting terrain of struggle such that models of identity are claimed, reclaimed, and refused.” Yet with the end of the notion of the ‘revolutionary subject’ there is no end to the actual power of the one defining what a revolutionary subject is and who might qualify for it.

While women gain various subject positions during a war and thereby might be able to claim a number of speaking positions even after, the character of power might nevertheless hold on to an exclusive hierarchical one-dimensional speaking position. The gains in visibility, organizing skills, social interaction, decision making power and general rise on self-esteem women might achieve through their active participation in struggle might be countered with the relational sense of rights of the individual in a care/control communal system. Here the definition of active participation and ‘natural’ support might correspond with the access and restrictions to access to active citizenship as laid out by the power-holders and keepers. What O’Goreman describes in the following as a perspective on revolution thereby might have different effects reflected by a person in her/his understanding of individual rights and by somebody embedded in relational status based citizenship notions.

O’Gorman lays out a perspective where social relations will dominate relational power positions:

In building a poststructuralist perspective on revolution, we come to an understanding of social relations in war that challenges any attempt at meta-narratives of power (patriarchal militarism) or categories of being (fighter, mother, prostitute). These multiple positions, along with a terrain of conflict marked by discursive practices of power/resistance (which do not demarcate political and non-political spaces), allow us to map out the ways in which women, through resistant subjectivity (refusal to be categorized), negotiate and renegotiate their relationship to war at an everyday and local level.

Where Eleanor O’Gorman calls for the disestablishment of the public/private divide, in order to overcome the hierarchical centre-periphery dichotomy one has to carefully analyse the constitutive commonalities between public and private, which Suad Joseph draws our attention to. Specifically if a state is weak – or as in the case of southern Sudan nonexistent or in the wake of formation – the liberal ideal of statehood and the assumed citizenship model might lead to a form of frustration resulting in tendencies to rejuvenate and/or concretize other forms of responsibility, care and control. In reflecting the shortcomings of both models, liberal individual based citizenship as well as communitarian citizenship models, both rely on women as the unacknowledged links of society. Whereas the liberal idea derives its universal claim of emancipatory rights from one (western) experience, the communitarian model denies difference and diversity and instead of placing the state as the agent of protection places the family, kinship or community which might, as Joseph showed, be equally
restrictive in integrating women and women’s epistemologies in their definition of citizenship.

Yet both models provide space for women to engage themselves and claim public space. The notion of women as in need of protection by either the state or the commune seems to be the unifying link of both models in denying women access to their full citizenship.

Southern Sudan: Citizen Perspective

Two dilemmas might emerge from the specific situation in Southern Sudan, regarding gendered models of citizenship. One might originate from the colonial and further more from the internal hegemonic system of central Sudanese dominance and southern Sudanese identity as to be identified by the hegemonic power. As Homi Bhabha is discussing the distinct inscription of dual positions of citizenship as inclusive and exclusive in the colonial native/settler duality. The native/settler distinction might be transferred to gender relevant issues regarding citizenship. As Bhabha is elaborating on the fact that the natives will be identified by the settlers:

What these repeated negations of identity dramatize, in their elision of the seeing eye that must contemplate what is missing or invisible, is the impossibility of claiming an origin for the Self (or Other) within a tradition of representation that conceives of identity as the satisfaction of a totalising, plentudinous object of vision.95

I refer to Bhabhas’ debate on the identity construct of native/and settler in the colonial discourse, since it entails at least two aspects of the topic discussed in this thesis. First it reflects on the possible trap of a simple mimicry in citizenship construction – further more – state construction by the upcoming southern Sudanese political power by its intangledness with northern Sudanese standards and identity constructs of the ‘Other’. Second it hints to a gender dilemma in the south placing women in the overall category of settlers (yet without the power of the settler) by allowing her space and status in her surrounding but denying her personhood and full right. By patrilinear marriage women would mainly be invited in the husbands’ household, yet never gain full personhood or kinship rights in her environment. Yet at the same time, by leaving her kinship and bearing children to the new kin losing her full rights in her house of origin.

The third topic Bhabhas introduction of the native/settler paradigm is the question of authentic memory. By generally giving the settler the power to produce text on the native and therefore to identify the native, it takes the power from the native to identify her/himself as well as to describe the settler. This question of authentic memory production is one of constant importance in my thesis. As Bhabha elaborates on the process of identification, the Sudanese structures can be partly read through his gaze:

First: To exist is to be called into being in relation to an otherness, its lack of locus. It is a demand that reaches outward to an external object and as Jacqueline Rose writes, it is the relation of this demand to the place of the object it claims that becomes the basis for identification.96 This process is visible in the exchange of looks between native and settler that structures their psychic relation in the paranoid fantasy of boundless possession and its familiar language of reversal: "when their glances meet he [the settler] ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive, "They want to take our place." It is true for there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler's place."97 It is always in relation to the place of the Other that colonial desire is articulated: the phantasmic space of possession that no one subject can singly or fixedly occupy, and therefore permits the dream of the inversion of roles.

Second: the very place of identification, caught in the tension of demand and desire, is a space of splitting. The fantasy of the native is precisely to occupy the master's place while keeping his place in the slave's avenging anger. 'Black skin, white masks' is not a neat division; it is a doubling, dissembling image of being in at least two places at once that makes it impossible for the devalued, insatiable évolué (an abandonment neurotic, Fanon claims) to accept the colonizer's invitation to identity: you're a doctor, a writer, a student, you're different, you're one of us.98

Bringing Bhabha's location of identity together with what Patricia MacFadden alerts us to regarding what she defines the two building blocks of citizenship, the personhood and authenticity, the position for women in a multiple colonized place such as southern Sudan in the process of gaining full citizenship rights becomes a rocky road to travel.

As MacFadden discusses on the example of Zimbabwe the dominant structure would place people as part of kinship and family ties, not necessarily describing them as individuals. One of the clear markers of this assumption is the fact that marriage for example is less between two individuals but more between two families – and in terms of extended family formations, between two kinship lines. If then women are passing from their original family in the one of her husband, where they as individuals are not in a position to accumulate power unless passing it through her children, the transformation into citizen rights will become specifically problematic for women.100

To sum this dilemma up, it seems as if civilians in general, who might have been living according to rules and laws outside martial law might not transform into the same citizenship rights basis as soldiers do. The native/settler as well as the gender topoi regarding citizenship remind on Cornelia Visman's comparison of the declaration of

98 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 44.
100 The fact that marriage between women occurs in some ethnic groups in Southern Sudan does not alter this problem, since the woman who is getting married to a woman (who herself either cannot bear children or is in a very respected position) does not receive any rights – again only through her children. She can claim social and political status and influence in family and community matters through her male children. On woman-to-woman marriage, see Francis Mading Deng, Dinka Cosmology (London: Ithaca Press, 1980); Sharon Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Conradin Perner, The Anyuak – Living on Earth in the Sky (Schwabe, 1994 [cited 01-03-2006 2006]), available from http://www.schwabe.ch/docs/neu00-01/Perner.htm.
people and citizen rights, differentiating between human beings and the citizen. Following her argument, the Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen drafted in the 1789 French Revolution and becoming the changing document for the era of enlightenment, reason and citizenship rights divide the protection by rights into one protecting the right of the human being and one protecting those of the French citizen. As the French citizen (only male) were encouraged to speak out about their rights – and thereby being in power to identify and lead themselves, the former rights were written on behalf of human beings claiming universal rights and building the basis for self-authorization, yet not defining themselves as the subjects of rights.

**Militarized Gendered Citizenship**

The merging of militarized citizens and the gender dimension of citizenship rights in general and in the case of Southern Sudan in particular will be less of an eruptive struggle, but more of a shifting and interwoven inclusive development. In the case of militarized communities and even more in militarized state formations, this denial can go even further and brings essentialist descriptors of femininity and masculinity to the forefront of access and/or denial.

As Claire Snyder describes the crux as the parallel constitution of citizenship and masculinity out of the participation in civic and martial practices.

More specifically, the Citizen-Soldier functions as a prescriptive ideal that calls for male individuals to engage in the civic and martial practices that constitutes them as masculine republican citizens. At the same time, the masculine character of the ideal undermines the participation of female individuals in civic and martial practices because these practices constitute not just citizenship but also masculinity.

While considering the aspects mentioned above, it has to be reflected as well that the imagined community Anderson is talking about might not be the goal nor the reality of a state formation. Or in the specific case of Sudan, the historical knowledge of nation building through a war, uniting its fragmented regional soldiers might not occur in Sudan. As the regionalization in Southern Sudan seems to be as important than the kinship relations the building of a we-group as Southern Sudanese might not even be the goal of the SPLM nor any other political grouping aspiring national power. The dilemma emerging from this is many folded and makes it quite complex to discuss gendered citizenship models.

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102 Snyder, *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition*, p. 2.


104 see various historical descriptions of wars, such as the pre-World War conflicts in Germany uniting the fragmented regional communities and their soldiers regional identity into a unified national identity.
The male bonding of soldiers and fighters – as discussed by liberal feminist conflict theorists such as Cynthia Enloe and others, introduced before – as the core of newly emerging citizenship models might therefore not hold its entire expectations. It seems clear that the exclusion of women from an important public sphere, as reflected in the military or insurgency leads to their exclusion later on in nation building attempts and the inclusive gender citizen model. Yet if the male bonding amongst the fighters might not lead to their claim towards representation of the nation state, the question of identity and representation has to be combed through more tightly. What conclusion can be developed from this shift in liberal state theorist assumptions and what gender dimension does this carry? Would the focus then have to be shifted to more regional questions of representation and citizenship or for that matter – more kinship based ideas of identification of the individual and what are the repercussions from this on the assumptions of male bonding militarism?

As a general assumption Anne Tickner bases her analysis of International Relation theory regarding citizen status on hegemonic masculinity. As Tickner states: “Building the notion of hegemonic masculinity, the notion of the citizen-warrior depends on a devalued femininity for its construction.” Under masculinized citizenship she subsequently understands the historical line from the Ancient Greek state to Machiavellis’ warrior prince to Hans Morgenthaus’ negative, unavoidable characteristic of human nature. As Tickner draws the line:

The militarised version of citizenship, similar to the ‘manly’ behaviour (...) can be traced back to the ancient Greek city-states on whose history realists frequently draw in constructing their analysis. For the Greeks, the most honoured way to achieve recognition as a citizen was through heroic performance and sacrifice in war. The real test of manly virtue or ‘arete’, a militarised notion of greatness, was victory in battle. The Greek city-state was a community of warriors. Women and slaves involved in the realm of ‘necessity’ in the household or the economy were not included as citizens for they would pollute the higher realm of politics.

By excluding women from most military functions and status the ideal of the manly virtue of course can grow uninterrupted. What Machiavelli distinguished as virtue and fortuna is reflected quite clearly in most post-conflict societies in regard to gendered citizenship. A dilemma here is not only the act of fighting, the status of the warrior-citizen but the resuming power of definition. Whereas the reality masculine man and feminine women is questioned through feminist literature, research on male

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107 Anne Tickner, (1992) pp. 37. refering to Brown (*Manhood and Politics* and Jean Elshtain suggesting that in Athens and Sparta the notion of heroic sacrifice was extended to women who died in childbirth producing citizens for the state. Following Elshtain in her thoughts the sacrifice of mothers would also be redeemed by their sacrification of sons in the battlefield. See Elshtain, "Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice”; p. 142.
and female fighters, war-proneness of men and women and is reflects as a highly contested construction in the reality on southern Sudan itself – the power of definition resulting out of the gendered dichotomy of ratio-emotio, culture-nature, protector-victim seems almost undisputed.

As Machiavelli\textsuperscript{108} points out, the ideal citizen is the masculine warrior involved in manly activities – triumphant in war, occupied with honour and liberty in civic life, independent in his critical thinking and manly in his personal relationships. Bearer of the culture of virtue. Whereas women, the feminine ‘Other’ is stuck in the capricious and unpredictable nature of fortuna. This very fortuna is not only a power left for women, but a power man are called upon to struggle against in order to maintain autonomy. Resulting from this obsession with masculine values and rejection of feminine ‘accidents’ the struggle for real existing women to gain momentum in a post-war dynamic becomes enormously difficult. Yet even by basing his Citizen-Soldier ideal as virtues of masculinity, Machiavelli distinguishes between the virtue and the vices. Participating in martial practices as Citizen-Soldiers might bring out patriotism, selflessness and fraternity, at the same time patriotism might turn into conquest, selflessness into conformity and fraternity into chauvinism. The masculine virtue turned into combative armed masculinity with no greater good.

Snyder’s résumé in her reading of Machiavelli is important for the reflection of citizenship construction in southern Sudan with the exclusion of women from the major military fields.

\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textsuperscript{108}}}}

\textit{(...) we must recognize that manhood for Machiavelli is actually constituted through engagement in politics. In other words – turning Brown on her head – politics constructs manhood. (...)}

What I am suggesting, then, is that if men’s natures are subject to social construction through political practice, then so are women’s. Women are not essentially more dependent, natural, and corporeal than men. To the contrary, they remain that way – partly at least – because of exclusion from civic and martial practices. Consequently, the \textit{citizenship of civic practices} contains the democratic potential of including female individuals in republican citizenship: Perhaps female individuals could become republican citizens alongside ‘men’ if they began to engage in the same civic and martial practices. At the same time, however, as we will see, the democratic potential of the \textit{citizenship of civic practices} is undermined when the primary civic practice constitutive of citizenship is service in the civic militia, because the martial practices inherent in the civic militia produce a particularly combative form of \textit{armed masculinity} that ultimately undermines the mutuality entailed in the idea of republican citizenship.

The dilemma, Snyder is alerting us to, is crucial to understand the complexity of female Citizen-Soldiers. Neither the inclusion of female individuals into the civic militia nor the exclusion of women from the construction of masculine soldiers guarantees the fulfilment of the democratic republican citizenship.

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\textit{\textbf{\textsuperscript{109}}}

\textit{Ibid., p. 31.}
The warrior citizenship Tickner is alerting to will most likely emerge in the aftermath of war in southern Sudan. Yet to assume that the masculine ideal of citizenship might be singularly based on the warrior status appears much too short sided. The changes in skills, responsibilities, self-awareness and claiming public sphere for women in this particular society will have a transformative effect on the hegemonic attempt to define citizenship. How deep and profound this will keep women in the scene and include them in decision making processes and opening space for women in the public sphere can impossibly be judged from now. Another factor fragmenting Tickner’s monolithic notion of warrior citizenship might lay in the status of warriors after the war. Whereas one can assume that the focus will be on the victorious, heroic achievements of the fighters, it is as well likely to assume that atrocities committed in the name of male bonding comradeship will not fully be sanctioned by the society.

Although the tendency of post-war societies and the secret contract of just warriors and beautiful souls is based on silence and ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ as a way to reintegrate fighters back into civil life is quite strong – brutality and atrocities might not be included in this contract. The enactment of what is culturally defined as masculine by women during a war might alter the cultural construction of masculinity and femininity. Since I assume gender not to be a category bound by biological factors but enacted and re-enacted by the gendered practices of man and women along cultural gender norms – the change – and partly reversal of these norms will bring change. Although exactly by excluding women from martial and civic activities this possible gender shifting – and thereby loosening of strict categorical Soldier-Citizen constitutive might result in a much more solid, less transparent and transformative model of citizenship based on masculinity. What Judith Butler described as a possibility to highlight the artificiality of normative gender settings – the subversive transgender performance of women acting out male scripts – might exactly fire back if power holders command much stricter gender roles. Again, in the long term, the glimpse of the understanding of the artificiality of gender norms will be carried on and bear the possibility of change. If one is aware of he/his rights – the denial of those rights becomes more and more problematic. Engagement in politics is constructing manhood the exclusion from civic and martial practices is constructing womanhood. Thereby civic and martial practices have to be inclusive and subsequently will change the notion of masculinity and femininity – not vice versa.
II. 2. FEMINIST CONFLICT THEORY

Demystification of security, protection, war logic, state and nation

Origin of Feminist Conflict Theory

To study the core values of International Relations theory and its foundational assumptions on the individual, family, society, states and nation – a bundle of these values have to be scrutinized. International Relations (IR) theory is of fundamental importance to the theory of feminist conflict studies. Not only the IR theory as it emerged in the aftermath of the two world wars of last century but the building blocks and theories of state, citizenship and security the western idea of IR theory is based on. As with the studies of state theorists such as Hobbes\textsuperscript{110}, Locke, Machiavelli\textsuperscript{111} and in a more remote sense Rousseau\textsuperscript{112} feminist conflict analysis argues against the normative masculinist state and social contract paradigm given by those founding authors. The ‘state of nature’, claimed to be one where men stand against men and war can break out any time lays the groundwork for the IR triangle of paradigms, security, sovereignty, realism. As with feminist conflict theory as well as postcolonial studies these assumptions, coming from an Enlightenment notion of reason and modernity, are discussed as the beginning of the modern subject.\textsuperscript{113}

For the understanding of gendered fighter and citizen images, a reflection of IR theory and its critique by feminist IR theorists is inevitable. I would argue that the assumptions on war, security and politics of IR theorists – and political military strategists – might be modelled from different conflict-realities, yet share some basic agreements.

As Rousseau defines reason – more as a skill than as a virtue – in the framework of rational thinking, requiring separation of knowledge from the object of study – and thereby gives the newly emerged modern male subject the attribution of autonomous – the becoming of the individual. Hobbes is defining the state of nature in similar terms, by describing men emerging as mushrooms, who come to full maternity without any kind of engagement with each other.\textsuperscript{114}


\textsuperscript{112} Jean Jaques Rousseau, \textit{Emile or on Education}, trans. Allan Bloom (London: Penguin Classics, 1991). Rousseau is questioning womens’ access to reason and rationality, therefore disproving their potential right to citizenship.

\textsuperscript{113} The discussion on modernity is elaborated further in the chapters about war. Here in brief, the becoming of the subject, man becoming the center of the universe, overcoming the predetermined object status given by god or the monarch, is important for the understanding of state theory as well as the exclusion of women from the subject status.

\textsuperscript{114} See here Anne Tickners discussion on state and IR theory. Anne Tickner. “Identity in
Anne Tickner follows this thought up to the six principles of Realism she detects in the writings of Hans Morgenthau, the main representative and initiator of realist school in IR.¹¹⁵ Her conclusion is that based on the Hobbesian understanding of autonomous individuals, for IR war can break out any time, therefore IR theory needs to study and prepare for wars in order to prevent them. Whereas feminist thinkers questioning the notion of the modernity ideal of linear progress and the existence of the stable and coherent self, reflected in the above mentioned construct of reason as a universal and transcendental quality and the producer of truth¹¹⁶ – feminist conflict theorists ask precise questions on the relationship between states and societies, the individual and security.

As Jane Flax questions the enlightenment chain of reason-autonomy-freedom, Terry Eagleton¹¹⁷ still detects in this progressive dynamics a teleological understanding. Even though man is the autonomous subject, the understanding of history seems determined and pre-set without the people in it. The basic lack of analysis of social relations becomes one of the main elements in feminist conflict theory. As Rebecca Grant¹¹⁸ calls for the analysis of the blind spots, of the closed doors, the neglected spheres. Since IR studies maintained to reflect the state sphere, based on the model of the male citizen with full access to the public sphere and universalized this epistemology, a complete reshuffle of IR has to take place. Not only to take into consideration the knowledge and history of those who were denied access to the sphere of reason, public realm and public action, but the consequences of their absence (or better silenced presence) for the universalized claim of knowledge and truth in IR. As Grant reflects: “When women are absent from the foundation theories, a source of gender bias is created that extends into international relations theory.”¹¹⁹

I would argue this is not only a question of gender bias but also a larger question of claiming universalized truth systems. Whereas Christine Sylvester¹²⁰ is questioning

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¹¹⁵ See Anne Tickner “Hans Morgenthau’s principles of political realism: a feminist reformulation”. In: Rebecca Grant, Kathleen Newland (eds.) Gender and International Relations. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1991), pp 27ff.


the location of truth in the feminist conflict theories themselves, Marysia Zalewski\textsuperscript{121} is questioning the interest of IR theory to transform, as well as the contribution of IR to feminist theories in general.

Basic Assumptions of International Relations and Feminist Conflict Theory
Interrelatedness of violence on all levels of society

The correlation of violence in the private and public sphere is widely discussed in feminist theory as well as in conflict studies. The conclusion thereof is the intrinsic link between direct, structural and cultural violence.\textsuperscript{122}

For this understanding it is essential to elaborate on the interconnectedness of military and civilian society and to explore the gender dimension to it. Militarization of society, politics, thinking and the life of the individual can be detected across cultures and their expression. Science and knowledge, history, canonical agendas of university, war reporting and violence legitimising media, language, initiation rites and standardized masculinity constructs, cultural catalogues of virtues and definitions of strength, weakness, creation of prisons, psychiatries, of teenager penitentiaries, the police, military and paramilitary groups, militias, ritualized killing, domestic violence, rape, pornography\textsuperscript{123} and urban gun culture are just a list of aspects. These manifestations can be seen as filters through which the establishment and legitimation of violence can be described and analysed.

For all these cultural expressions militarization is seen as a method against unruliness, chaos, lack of control and as a guiding principle to anticipate and accordingly deal with conflicts. Militarization is used as a legitimate tool to control and structure the construct of a functioning ‘civilization’. The immanent connection between those patterns and the military as an institution and a culture, a value system and a state formation has been studied by feminist conflict scholars and questioned by conservative political scientists and politicians\textsuperscript{124}.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{123} In this sense, rape and pornography not only understood as a personal violation and a violent industry, but also as a means of politics, military tactics and foundation mythology for the invention of societies and civilizations.
\textsuperscript{124} The tendency to believe in a quick fix for solving rather than transforming conflicts is becoming more obvious since the second Gulf war. Military solutions are mainstreamed and welcomed as dominant means of politics. Not only do states and treaties tend to support war as a way of peace enforcement and keeping, but even humanitarian agencies, such as the UNHCR tend to use more militaristic strategies to organize their refugee camps and ensure their servicing.
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Translated into IR theory, Anne Tickner\textsuperscript{125} declines this on three levels of analysis: The Individual, the State and the International System. According to Tickner the ‘political man’ is based on the understanding that whenever people meet there is a struggle of power. While society condemns violent behaviour resulting from this struggle this violence is channelled into war as the legitimized violence. Tickner elaborates widely on the construct of masculine citizen-soldier and the exclusion of women from this construct. The ‘Masculine State’ as a result of the notion of the masculine citizen-soldier is described by neo-realists as “(...) a state acting according to a higher rationality, independent from human agency”\textsuperscript{126}. Referring to the emergence of the modern state out of war, bringing along collective historical memory of the citizen-soldiers as the founding prerequisite of the nation. The International System as a consequence of these constructs is therefore based on the realist perspective of ‘war of everyman against everyman’ where any interaction leads to domination and submission. The gendered dimension of this realist perspective is then a dichotomy inscribing masculinity and femininity not only in the fabric of war itself but also in the fabric of society in general. Tickner states, based on Margaret Higonnett and others\textsuperscript{127}: “War is a time when male and female characteristics become polarized; it is a gendering activity at a time when the discourse of militarism and masculinity permeates the whole fabric of society.”

The building blocks of International Relations theory as reflected in a highly gendered understanding of the individual, the state and the citizen are still considered the fundament of current descriptions of citizens and their interrelation as well as their relation to formal powers.\textsuperscript{128}

Violence and the militarization of a state, the legitimization of the use of force and the connection between sexism and the war system is not only discussed by International Relation strategists but in various texts, poems and literature that crosses time, culture and country\textsuperscript{129}. Writers such as Elise Boulding\textsuperscript{130}, Jean Bethke Elshtain\textsuperscript{131}, Cynthia Enloe\textsuperscript{132}, Sarah Ruddick\textsuperscript{133} or Betty Reardon\textsuperscript{134} based their analysis and researches

\textsuperscript{125} Tickner, Gender in International Relations. Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, pp. 36.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 41.

\textsuperscript{127} Tickner, Gender in International Relations. Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, p. 47. Margaret Randolph Higonnet et al., eds., Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

\textsuperscript{128} Marysia Zalewski is critizising IR theory as continuously rejecting gender as a dimension in their analysis and asks the question of what IR theory can actually bring to a broader understanding of feminist theory. Zalewski, *Feminist in International Relations: What Impact on the Discipline?*, pp. 23ff.

\textsuperscript{129} Kassandra, Antigone, Sozaboy, Three Guineas, a.o.


\textsuperscript{131} Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); see also Just War Theory (1992), Women, Militarism and War (1990)

\textsuperscript{132} Enloe, Does Khaki Become You?: The Militarization of Women’s Lives.

\textsuperscript{133} Sarah Ruddick, “The Rationality of Care,” in Women, Militarism and War: Essays in History
mainly on the assumption, that society made men violent and women more likely to be non-violent, by constructing man and women in different fields of social interaction, by sanctioning and supporting the use of violence differently for men and women, by gendered patterns of upbringing and the situation of these roles in society. Yet as discussed in following chapters, this notion is under question. I will problematize further, since not only women who were and are fighting in wars claim to be as violent and aggressive as their male colleagues, but also the whole construct of dualist gender constructs assigned with violence levels is quite narrow. ¹³⁵

Women accepting their roles as ‘beautiful souls’ are not by degree pacifist or against the just warrior. Dichotomized gender roles are constructed, internalized and accepted as complementary rather than oppositional. Hierarchies in societies are multilayered and have to be acknowledged as mutual dynamics. In the context of violence this amounts to the privilege given to man in society on the basis of masculinity. Women are victims of the acts of direct violence but in their feminine gender roles might profit from dichotomies in ensuring their power as enabler. The internalized concept of gender differences and the belief in the beautiful soul versus the just warrior has to be seen as a mutually accepted concept. The internalized peacefulness and silent support system for the ruler, the definition giver, the obedience under the law of the father and brother at any time, without even recognizing it as the law of the father, might reflect more on the internalized construct of security.

One praxis in theorizing gender and domination is that of questioning the constructing of knowledge and to ask, how gendered, racially informed or power oriented is the phenomenology in practice. As Ellen Ziskind Berg ¹³⁶ describes: “Phenomenology claims that social phenomena are not objective things apart from our knowledge of them; rather they are dependent on our knowledge of their attributes and requirements and on our acting appropriately in light of that knowledge. They live in and through our consciousness.”

The myth of security and protection is not spun by power holders but interwoven with social and cultural fabric that is highly gendered yet extremely diverse and far away from a one-size-fits-all-format of oppression.

For radical or difference feminist there is hardly any question in the difference between man and women and in the system of dominance this implies. Yet their understanding came under fundamental critique by African-American women as well as women, not part of the white western world. ¹³⁷

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¹³⁵ For the discussion of violent women see chapter 3 following, reflective of a mythological, historical as well as current political analysis. See further Eileen McDonald, *Erschießt zuerst die Frauen* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), on female torturers and female fighters.


¹³⁷ For the criticism of difference or radical feminists, see Bell Hooks, Chandra T. Mohanty.
For the conditioned maintenance of gender inequalities in a patriarchal society, difference feminists such as Betty Reardon gives a few explanations, how men and women, differently deal with fear and violence, that is, how they are conditioned and condition themselves to use violence and/or to submit to it. “Aggression and submission are also the core of the basic relations between men and women, accounting, many believe, for women's tolerance and male chauvinism.”

Susan Brownmiller bases her ideas of male dominance in Against Our Will on rape. Rape in her understanding used as an ongoing, continuing threat, to keep women in line, silent and submissive. Carole Pateman translates this into her thesis of the sexual contract as the basis for societies where she speaks about contract theory as “(...) it is also a sexual contract that institutes political right in the form of patriarchal – masculine – power, of government by men, a power exercised in large part as conjugal right.”

This social conditioning and legitimation process becomes problematic, when mixed with essentialist beliefs about universal assumptions. As Reardon writes about the connection of gender relations and war legitimation, mainly according to the use of violence, she points out that. “Such readiness appears to derive from two sources: first, permission, or social and/or political legitimation to carry out violent and aggressive impulses, and second, dehumanization of the other in the relationship.”

The just warrior and the beautiful soul are not just dominant constants and guarantees in a state of emergency – in times of war – but create and guarantee the norm of gender roles and their power structures in society in general terms. The politically fabricated Cartesian dualism of mind-body, culture-nature naturalizes gendered oppositions. The interconnection of the use of violence, sexuality and militarism is fundamental for constructing a soldier or fighter image in the sense of moral mothers versus virile boys, or sexy female soldiers or guerrillas and potent male marines. The war system, the logic of virility and obedience, the threat of rape in the constitution of patriarchal power and the military male bonding is based on sexism, moreover on misogynist views and positions. Yet, the situation is more complex, the world is more diverse and therefore there is a need to locate this matrix of interrelated violence into different localities and societies.

To transfer these assumptions to a conflict in a place whose history is not grounded in western culture requires an analysis of standardized masculinity, imbedded in the military society, drawn and constructed out of the western ideal of masculinity, based on the master-slave, the dominant ruler, the superior bearer of reason. What do the western masculinized soldier standards trigger, when imposed on the former colonized, the ‘Other’ the feminized, naturalized, inferiorized. The approach of feminist

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140 Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*, p. 40.
conflict theorists is diverse and fragmented, specially, when criticizing the dominant narrow discourse of male-centred international relations and discourses on the militarization of society as too short sided. The criticism towards international relations as not explanatory enough, through consciously or unconsciously leaving out the experiences of the non dominant subject. It obviously shapes a culture, if the people who identify themselves within this exclusivist Subjectivation, would come from a culture, that, by cosmology, mythology, spirituality and history has not been part of the dominant culture. How gendered notions have promoted, created and sustained the state and the military varies by context.

The important point, feminist conflict theorists make, is that there is a vital and violent connection between the state of militarization in a society and the rate of male violence against women. Not only in the context of sexualized visions and sexual services, that are part and parcel of the military apparatus itself \(^\text{141}\) – or in language that is used, as Carol Cohn referred to - but in the sense of accepting violence as a proper norm, as a regulation, control and a necessary variant of disciplining the loose, chaotic, organic, non disciplined other – the dark, unpredictable nature, the women.

**Power and Control: How to create a myth**

Several assumptions on security, violence and safety are taken for granted within IR theory. As Anne Tickner identified the building blocks of IR theory, I would like to discuss those constructs further: One point of critical reference is the question on power as a solid structure, regulating dominance and submission in a hierarchical vertical order. In following the structural description of power by Michel Foucault \(^\text{142}\), power and control mechanism are described on a rather horizontal level, on the different nervous points and knots where power appears and the process of mutual creation of power and resistance. This is not a ridiculization of the victims or a denial of dominant structures or differences such as victim and perpetuator. Foucault describes power and dominance deviant from a static, sovereign point of control but rather on the normation mechanisms of society through punishment, laws and restrictions. Foucault elaborates on the dynamic of the mechanism of people submitting, supporting or resisting against this structure of normative dominance \(^\text{143}\). With Judith Butler \(^\text{144}\) I would agree that there is no pre-discursive truth or history, so people or elites of people create


\(^{143}\) Just to mention two examples, that would show, how important the process is becoming in the observation of the power structure. One example would be the ‘vorauselnde Gehorsam’ of German Citizens, willingly fulfilling a task, that did not even had to be articulated or verbalized, but was assumed and fulfilled. The main point of interest in this concern would be the fact, that resistance and refusal would not ead to punishment. See Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).

normative settings by discursive practices not by static laws. \textit{Mittäterschaft} discussed by Christina Thürmer Rohr would exemplify the mutual but not equal equilibrium of gender roles in power. \textit{Mittäterschaft} describes the inscribing, active and passive support, non-resistance to and applauding of the dominant system. It describes the willingness to use the same language, the same terminology that describes and creates a certain violent behaviour, as well as the active involvement and support for the act of violence and its legitimization, by unquestioned supply and completion.

Here the construct of power turns into violence-against, if the person resists. As Hinrich Fink-Eitel refers to the problems of exchange relations he argues that because people can articulate themselves unlike commodities they are exchanged with the power of the structurising force turns into violence against the person if the person disagrees.

To avoid this resistance, one mechanism of power is control. One factor of control would be what could be described as the maternal ethos, another the purification of the warrior. As Nancy Scheper-Hughes argues: “There is a maternal ethos of acceptable death, without which political violence and wars of all kinds would not be possible.”

For Ruddick as well as most of the critiques of masculinistic militarism and IR theory the complete lack of the involvement of the reality, the body, the person, the victim, the human being is fundamental for their criticism. The total abstraction of the aim (dead bodies) from the vector (killing), the purification of the vector by beautifying speed and other aesthetics patterns and the denial of the consequences of military thinking, resulting out of a language of techno-masculinity builds the core critique.

By using purified vectors (arms, strategies) the actor (soldier, defence intellectual, warrior) becomes purified as well.

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\textsuperscript{145} See the extensive discourse on \textit{Mittäterschaft} by Christina Thürmer Rohr, as discussed in the concluding chapters. Christina Thürmer-Rohr, “\textit{Mittäterschaft Der Frau: Analyse Zwischen Mitgefühl Und Kälte}”, in: \textit{Mittäterschaft Und Entdeckungslust}, ed. Studienschwerpunkt ‘Frauenforschung’ am Institut für Sozialpädagogik der TU-Berlin (Berlin: 1989).

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{149} The term of techno-masculinity was coined by Cynthia Enloe.

Myth of Protection and Security

Men don’t protect you any more

Jenny Holzer

According to the latest report on human security, the Human Security Centre provides a useful and all encompassing definition of Human Security:

Human security is a relatively new concept, but one that is now widely used to describe the complex of interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide and the displacement of populations. The distinction between human security and national security is an important one.

While national security focuses on the defence of the state from external attack, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from any form of political violence.

Human security and national security should be—and often are—mutually reinforcing. But secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples. Protecting citizens from foreign attack may be a necessary condition for the security of individuals, but it is not a sufficient one. Indeed, during the last 100 years far more people have been killed by their own governments than by foreign armies.

All proponents of human security agree that its primary goal is the protection of individuals. But consensus breaks down over what threats individuals should be protected from.

Proponents of the ‘narrow’ concept of human security, which underpins the Human Security Report, focus on violent threats to individuals, while recognizing that these threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity.

Proponents of the ‘broad’ concept of human security articulated in the UN Development Programme’s 1994, Human Development Report, and the Commission on Human Security’s 2003 report, Human Security Now, argue that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.

For feminist peace and conflict researchers the problem of legitimised and gendered use of violence starts long before the critique on the institution of legitimised use of violence.

Feminist conflict researcher renders from social norms in societies to ideological foundations of international relation. As Ann Tickner refers to the understanding of issues of security and protection that are crucial for a feminist reflection:

Challenging the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children, and others stereotypically viewed as ‘vulnerable’, feminists point to the high level of civilian casualties in contemporary wars. Feminist scholarship has been particularly concerned with what goes on during wars, especially the impact of war on women and civilians more generally. Whereas conventional security studies has tended to look at causes and consequences of wars from a top-down, or structural, perspective, feminists have generally taken a bottom-up approach, analysing the impact of war at the micro level. By so doing, as well as adopting gender as a category of analysis, feminists believe they can tell us something new about the causes of war that is missing from both conventional and critical

But there is another side to the changing pattern of war, and women should not be seen only as victims; as civilian casualties increase, women’s responsibilities rise. However, war makes it harder for women to fulfil their reproductive and care giving tasks.\footnote{Ann Tickner, \textit{Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 48.}

The appeal to protection in war extends from soldiers to mothers. “Thou shall protect the bodies of the children.”\footnote{Ibid., pp. 48-49.} Is an appeal beyond the military command.

The conclusion Holly Cullen draws from her analysis of conflict and war is that “Civilians are either biological women or men who are weak and therefore gender women.”\footnote{Elshtain, \textit{Women and War}, p. 93.} Taken this idea further, the conclusion would be that during a war all civilians are woman by gender. This does not only reflect the protection paradox that mobilizes men to war but makes them kill more women than other men in the end, but equally reflects the exclusion imbedded in the military myth. If civilians are women by gender, soldiers are men by gender.

Contrary to the notion of security that is used in the dictum of military language, security in feminist conflict theorists speech does imply a less abstract understanding of state, nation and inhabitants that need to be protected in order to feel secure. Based on the reality of the majority of people, security cannot be solely described in an international relations context. In reality where more than 80% of war casualties in conflicts since the Second World War are civilians,\footnote{Holly Cullen, “The Feminisation of the >Civilian<: The Case of Conscientious Objection to Military Service”, in \textit{Krieg/War: Eine Philosophische Auseinandersetzung Aus Feministischer Sicht}, ed. Wiener Philosophinnen Club (München: Fink Verlag, 1997), p. 94.} the notion of security as inscribed in legitimising the military changes fundamentally.\footnote{According to the UN Human Development Report of 1995 “Human Development Report: Gender and Human Development.,” ed. Oxford University Press (New York; Oxford: UNDP, 1995). http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1995/en/. Accessed 2006-01-05, p. 46, the increase in civilian casualties from about 10 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century to 90 percent at its close stands crossly against the numbers of women as members of the worlds regular armies, estimated at two percent. In the 2005 Human Security Report, the relation between battle death and civilian death is broken down for Sub-Saharan Africa and provides a quite detailed reference. http://www.humansecurityreport.info/figures/figure4.1.pdf. Accessed 01-04-2006.} Betty Reardon as a scholar of peace and conflict studies with a radical or essentialist feminist background defines security as follows:

\begin{quote}
Real human security lies in the well-being we experience when we’re protected against harm of all kinds: when our basic needs are met, when we experience human dignity and
\end{quote}
human rights, and when we have a healthy natural environment capable of sustaining life.

Reardon’s definition is including most aspects that are vital and empowering for the quest of feminist conflict studies. The definition derives from claims articulated by women in the developing world and is matched by ecofeminists. Security is the basic need for those outside the mainstream power of the time. Security, or even more the lack of security, becomes a vital part in almost all discussions on the impact of violent structures, of patriarchal, masculinistic dominated and defined spheres of life, identity guarantee, knowledge and power. Security was and is one of the main issues for pacifists and groups that are struggling against the legitimized use of force, anti-militarists, people against the military and national armies, leagues against the ‘right’ to bear weapons, people that do not believe that violence can be eradicated by the dynamic of arms race, be it in inner city neighbourhoods or international relations settings. As with the interconnectedness of institutionalized and private violence, these notions of security are ridiculized by the gatekeepers of power.

Myth of Caretakers

The other side of the security and protection discourse coin is the creation of women as caretakers. The notion of the female caretaker is used by both sides, the military, to legitimize the monopoly of the use of force for men as well as by difference and liberal feminists, creating the possible peaceful solution on the back of the care taking women.

I will reflect this construct of the caretaker critically, since both discourses are based on the dichotomy of gender as an essential truth construct, making changes only possible in the realm of ‘bringing women or feminine virtues in’ in order to make the world more peaceful or the military a more cosy place. They neglect the differences amongst men and women as well as the reality of aggressive women. Moreover, they deny the caretakers function as an emotional reproductor as well as political mobilizer for the soldier.

As Birgit Rommelspacher alerts to a virulent problem with the caretaker construct when she states that empathy for the we-group is not necessarily valid for the ‘Other’. “Dasein-für-andere heißt nicht notwendig Dasein-für-alle”

Translation A.W.

158 Reardon, “Women or Weapons?”, pp. 316.
Sara Ruddick bases her idea of the ‘rationality of care’, that is, the re-valuation of care, not as a predominantly moral and emotional private work but as the essential rational approach, that needs to be the fundamental texture of all, public and private activities in society. Ruddick compares motherhood to the artist, stating that neither mothers nor artists could easily destroy creations, because they are so much more directly connected, less abstractly creating. Ruddick reflects the possibility of violence for women, but due to women’s internalized role as caretakers, they don’t need – and possibly have no access to – make use of violence.

As Ruddick states:

Most women and men support organized violence, at least in ‘emergencies’. Certainly, women have not absented themselves from war. Wherever battles are fought and justified, whether in the vilest or noblest of causes, women on both sides of the battle lines support the military engagements of their sons, lovers, friends, and mates.

Ruddick points out a different, if not secret knowledge of women. Referring to a statement by Olive Schreiner, saying that “No woman who is a woman saying of a human body, ‘It is nothing’ ... on this one point, and on this point almost alone, the knowledge of woman, simply as woman, is superior to that of man; she knows the history of human flesh; she knows its cost; he does not.” Even if Ruddick in the following text is trying to reshuffle and re-contextualize the meaning of rationality by questioning ratio in the masculinist construction of the term, referring to a history of irrational usage of reason in the name of unquestionable rationality, she is still sticking to an essentialist notion of caring as a genuinely female virtue. Laura Kaplan, referring to a similar definition of care taking by Carol Gilligan problematizes the emotional and relational aspect of this definition which reflects on the quote by Rommelspacher above. Kaplan argues that the “Ethical commitment that emphasizes relationship and responsibilities over abstract universal principles of justice.” gives way to differences in care taking on the bases of relations rather than a universal principle. She exemplifies this by arguing that the ‘needy warrior becomes closer than the faceless, nameless stranger.’ And further “Caretaking as a relationship between specific persons in which the one caring is motivationally displaced in the one cared for” – the effect of ‘I want what you want’.

Ruddick is not the only feminist conflict theorist, who mixes essentialist, even biologist notions of femininity and masculinity with an uninterrupted historicity. For Ruddick – the

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161 Ruddick, “The Rationality of Care”.
162 Ibid., p. 230.
165 Ibid.
alienation of femininity equates the alienation of women in order to construct and erect the masculine virtue and the military thinking – leads to a devaluation of maternal thinking and caring labour against the dominant concept of reason.

Cultural or difference feminists replace but not deconstruct gender hierarchy. They tend to place moral superiority as a feminine virtue. Ulla Holm lists the gendered results of the essentialist gynocentric and androcentric approach, males become the main enemies and/or just warriors. Females become innocent victims and pure and beautiful souls.\(^{167}\) Elise Boulding \(^{168}\) points out the escape from violence and the trap of patriarchal gender images by focusing on what she would call a practicalist idea of reason, based on the praxis of caring. Kaplan consequently develops the dichotomic logic further by arguing that by accepting the archetypes of women as caretakers, one supports the logic and praxis of patriarchal militarization.

Feminist peace theorists that find hope in the ideal of the caretaking woman are grounded in patriarchal gender distinctions, fail to challenge adequately the patriarchal dualism that constitutes the self by devaluing the other, and the practice of caretaking about which they speak may be easily co-opted into the service of war.\(^{169}\)

Bringing the caretaker into the analysis of real wars and post-war situations, Cynthia Enloe \(^{170}\) points out that after occupying important roles (during a conflict), women still have the primary responsibility for child care and home management and concludes that any participation that perpetuated the sexual division of labour delays the expectations of transformation. Here the logic of the caretaker as a predominantly female virtue is limiting the possible options for a general transformation.

**Public and Private Divide: How to produce the protection-caretaker myth?**

One dilemma the caretaker notion is reproducing, it leaving the caretaker in the private realm as well as giving the soldier the public space. Claiming public space could be described as a main objective of feminist strategies. Public space or sphere as the domain of decision making, positioning of power and representation denies or enables positioning women as citizens. This reflects a general discussion of gender roles in society as well as a more specific question of the role of women as citizens and soldiers.

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As related to the grant narratives and the change in the private/public divide in the western world as a result of the Enlightenment, Seyla Benhabib notes. “The historicization of the private realm signifies that, as the male ego celebrates his passage from nature to culture, from conflict to consensus, women remain in a timeless universe, condemned to repeat the cycle of life.”¹⁷¹ Here the dilemma becomes apparent. Whereas public sphere increasingly becomes a male sphere, the private sphere remains female. This bears at least two major conclusions. Either the public sphere has to be opened up for women – yet remaining shaped according to an excusivist male model. Or the private sphere – not shaped according to an independent female model – has to become a more important realm. A dividing line along which a large body of feminist theory is positioned.

Acknowledging the historicity of the private/public divide as well as the political hegemonic gender system that is still affiliated with it – I consider it important to deconstruct the political and social functionalities of those spheres.¹⁷² In the understanding of equality feminism, the public sphere or dominant space has to be influenced by introducing marginalized epistemology. In the reading of essentialist cultural feminism claiming the public sphere would require a reform or complete change of that sphere from one that is shaped according to masculinity as the referential model to one that would be shaped on the model of femininity. I consider the de-construction of power-dynamics in the build up of this divide as a fruitful method.

In Hannah Arendt’s analysis of ancient democratic speech and discourse behaviour and the resulting power regulations, respect and representation in the polis, the public sphere is amazingly clear:

> The space of appearance of the polis is such that it calls upon everyone to show and ‘original courage’ which is nothing else but a ‘consenting to act, and speak,’ to leave one’s sage shelter and expose one’s self to others and with them, ‘be ready to risk disclosure.’ This would be the first political condition for revelation: demonstrating who I am, and not what I am.

¹⁷³ The liberal feminist approach accepts rules and regulations of the public space and calls for visibility of the experience of the ‘Other’ in this space. This claim is based on the unquestioned principle of equality using the same language and codification and the same claim to reason and rationality. Women can communicate in the public realm by learning the language and by arguing on the internalized foundation of the public realm. The other approach uses the ‘Otherness’ of language and values as such as rationality, security and representation by the internalized or empowered ‘Otherness’ in language and communication. This ‘Otherness’ is based on the assumed different but yet homogenous experience as women. Be it the pre-verbal articulation as Irigaray is


¹⁷² This analysis is elaborated on in the following chapter on gendered citizenship.

formulating in Speculum\footnote{174}, or, as in Sarah Ruddick’s description of the language of the caretaker, the bodyworker.

I am referring to a model that combines the necessity of representation of marginalized epistemology but challenges the foundation of the public sphere along it’s dominant construction that by definition excludes the experience of ‘the Other’. In all this questioning the history of the authentic becomes as important as to be wary of the new authenticism away from diverse and multiple heterogeneity.

What was described as the experience of the periphery before breaks the silencing exercise of the dominant discourse. In the language of post-colonial studies this amounts to decentralizing rather than shifting the center-periphery dichotomy. By questioning the legitimation of the idea of the centre, constructed in the exclusive claim to reason, rationality and power, the establishment of another centre would be paradox.

The understanding of control does not deliver fixed strategies and solutions. Control is not a strict matter of power and static essentialist social hierarchies. Control has to be observed from different perspectives on different oppressive levels. If control is described as a tool of power rather than the core essence allocated to a specific group of people, the relational rather than linear concept of power and violence can be discussed.

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II. 3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE GENDERED BODY

The body seems to be the primary force to constitute difference. Body fulfills all the requirements to construct notions of authenticity and normation. In feminist conflict theory the body is a focal point in reflecting soldiers, caretakers, victims, mothers and war planners. I would like to go one step back and introduce a number of questions Judith Butler is asking in problematising the category of women as the agent of feminism:

But is there a political shape to ‘women’, as it was, that precedes and prefigures the political elaboration of their interests and epistemic point of view? How is that identity shaped, and is it a political shaping that takes the very morphology and boundary of the sexed body as the ground, surface, or site of cultural inscription? What circumscribes that site as ‘the female body’? Is ‘the body’ or ‘the sexed body’ the firm foundation on which gender and systems of compulsory sexuality operate? Or is ‘the body’ itself shaped by political fora with strategic interests in keeping that body bounded and constituted by the markers of sex?

The sex/gender distinction and the category of sex itself appear to presuppose a generalization of ‘the body’ that pre-exists the acquisition of its sexed significance. This ‘body’ often appears to be a passive medium that is signified by an inscription from a cultural source figured as ‘external’ to that body. Any theory of the culturally constructed body, however, ought to question ‘the body’ as a construct of suspect generality when it is figured as passive and prior to discourse. 176

I make use of this lengthy quote because it entails a number of issues relevant, not only to the discourse of feminist conflict theories, but as a more general reflection on categories derived from bodies, seen as incorporations of authentic truth. In the following chapters the invention of the female fighters in the elaborates of imperial travellers as well as the colonized body seen through the lens of post-colonial theories will reflect on Butler’s questioning of pre-discursive cultural categories.

As Susan Bordo reflects on the body as an epistemological metaphor for locatedness, I would like to specify this location in distinguishing the location of the gendered bodies as soldier bodies, caretaker bodies and female soldier bodies.

Ruddick refers to the body as the commonality between caretakers and militarists. “Both militarists and caretakers, unlike philosophers, do their work among bodies. Both are ambivalent about the bodies they work among. Each of them conceives of the body as sexual and sharply gendered.” 177


177 Ruddick, „The Rationality of Care.“ p. 241
The body, more precisely the sexualized body is quite significant in feminist conflict theory. In the discussion on conflict, war and violence the body needs its own space and discussion. I would like to link some of the concepts of gender constructions used in the previous chapters as well as the equally highly sexualized body-discourse basic for colonialism and dominant praxis of identity-construction to that of the feminist conflict theorists. Carol Cohn\(^{178}\) refers to the sexualized imagery used by defence intellectuals to describe their creations. ‘Orgasmic whumps’ for the release of a bomb, ‘Oppenheimer’s baby’ delivered as ‘the first cry of a newborn world’ are sexualized language describing use of lethal weapons, but even more, using birthing and parenting metaphors that were thought to be the monopoly of the caretaker. In Cohn’s writings on the language used by defence intellectuals in order to describe their emotional (dis-)connection, care and concern towards the lethal products of their nuclear creation there is a tangible combination of the body with the technology of weapons.\(^{179}\) As Klaus Theweleit describes the men-machine-body-synthesis the body becomes the means for release and the tool for death – the own and that of the enemy: “The crucial impulse behind the regeneration of the machine seems to be its desire for release – and release is achieved when the totality-machine and its components explode in battle.”\(^{180}\) The experience of body – used as a way to create ones own truth by transforming the body, as it is true in torture\(^{181}\), rape and killing or wounding. The sexualized territorial dialogue between fighting parties is using bodies as the matrix to inscribe their claims and territorial rights. War tactics such as mass rape, rape, sexual enslavement and forced sexual servitude as well as forced marriage are using the body to be marked as non-masculine, non-citizen. The territorial dialogue from male to male is a linguistic tool as well, naming and inscribing the proprietary matter of the owner on the body by calling women: “our women” or “we are using their women”. The cruel idea of using the female body as the blank canvas, the male body of the perpetrator as the ink for the contract signed with male creators

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\(^{180}\) Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol. 2, Male Bodies. p. 155

\(^{181}\) For further reference see Klaus Theweleit on torture and sexualized body in Klaus Theweleit, „The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War,” in Gendering War Talk, ed. Angela Woollacott Miriam Cooke (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).
on the other side\textsuperscript{182}. They are communicating not on the territory of the women’s bodies, but writing on the body as the symbol for the power of the earthly territory.\textsuperscript{183} The construction of the body, as a discourse, and as a physical work in shaping oneself along gender image lines is significant for the war machine and the military in old, new as well as post-modern wars. The accounts of rape of women by women are quite rare. However, they are stressing the act of rape as a method of war and a construction of the masculine body through humiliating the feminine body.

**Soldier Bodies**

The body of the soldier at least the pre-post-modern-technical-cyborg-soldier requires meeting certain standard of masculinity. Activity, virility, sportiveness, strength are part and parcel of what one expects from a well-trained soldier. In regular armies this body is shaped in the boot camp, the military training, in guerrilla groups, it is more the need to feed the fighter, than the training, that gives this soldier/fighter bodies a significance that values this body higher than those of civilians.\textsuperscript{184} The body and the physical appearance become important in regular armies. To ensure the strict dualistic gender division – sexed bodies are formalized. Women who appear to be ‘too masculine’ will face problems with accusations of homosexuality. Even though the soldier body requires the standard image of masculinity.

Along this line of ready made body images, which include significant and fatal as well as powerful exclusions, the body images along race/exotism/colonialist manifestations become equally crucial.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{182} See Carol Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). As Carol Pateman argues the sexual contract, the ownership over women’s bodies is the basic formation of the state. Whereas there is a shift from status to contract based citizenship – a shift from the father’s ownership towards the brothers ownership of female bodies – and more explicit, their denial of autonomous citizenship.

\textsuperscript{183} Different articles on rape as a method of organized war crime and communication between enemy man, see „Women and War,“ *Peace Review* 8, no. 3 (1996, September).


\textsuperscript{186} For further readings on body images, raciology and the need of uniformed bodily appearance there is some research available in respect to the race ideology of Nazi Germany. In terms of Sudan it is interesting to compare the photographic work of Leni Riefenstahl. Her aesthetization of blond blue eyed German Aryan superheroes whom she installed as role models in her photography on the Olympiad in 1936 and the aesthetization of the tall, powerful,
As Judith Hicks-Stiehm argues cohesiveness is the necessity of bonding (of soldiers). Cohesiveness can neither accept gay men nor women.\textsuperscript{187} The soldier body is constructed as a masculine body in the boot camp or military training is described in opposition to the caretaker body constructed as female as well as the wounded body, seen as de-masculinized.

For Sara Ruddick the body is the central business of war. Humiliation, destruction and killing of the enemy body used as an aim and injury as the symbol and motivations for continuation, revenge and re-invention of war after generations. The body, as seen by Carol Cohn's reporting from the inside of defence intellectual worlds, becomes important in terms of inscription, attributing, naming, possessing weapons, killing machines, bombs. Bombs will be described as ‘fat boy’, ‘my boy’, ‘dicke Erna’; the act of explosions, lethal hit, actual killing time is compared with bodily, sexual reactions such as ejaculation or giving birth. Disarmament is described as castration. “(...) to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff”, “releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump” or “face it, the Russians are a little harder than we are”\textsuperscript{188} These deep and conspicuous connections are part of the analysis of feminist conflict theorists and their claim, that there is no clear cut between the use of violence in private and the use of violence in war. There is a connection between the understanding of masculinity and security in sexual terms and the understanding and promoting of security and necessary defence in military terms.

The act of creation, or what radical feminists like Mary Daly or Klaus Theweleit and feminist conflict theorists like Sara Ruddick would call ‘womb envy’, which leads to a god-like understanding of men as creators of abstract life, or as creators of self-perpetuation by big blasts, is explored further by Klaus Theweleit. In his thesis about the need to re-win lost wars as the primal motivation for starting new wars, he argues as follows:\textsuperscript{189} “To become innocent again, you have to kill. That’s one of the giggling rules of male logic. Women give birth to something different from themselves. Men give birth to themselves living in New World Orders. Men are re-born by killing.”

This quite essentialist logic still has some thrilling ideas in it, and linked to Ruddick’s understanding of war as a trafficking in bodies, and the sexualized language of aggressive wrestling Nuba men or the self purifying Nuba men whom she portrayed in the 70s. Further, the raciology of Immanuel Kant is a very informative work written by somebody who, at the same time wrote the basic work on pure reason. Parts of Immanuel Kant’s raciology, that was part of his anthropology curriculum for at least 30 years at the University in Königsberg, is the article by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, „The Color of Reason: The Idea of Race in Kant’s Anthropology,” in Postcolonial African Philosophy, ed. Emmanuel Eze (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997).

\textsuperscript{187} Stiehm, „The Effect of Myths About Military Women on the Waging of War.” p. 100
\textsuperscript{188} All quotations are from Carol Cohn, „Clean Bombs and Clean Language,” in Women, Militarism, and War, ed. J.B. Elshtain, Tobias, S (Savage, Rowman&Littlefield, 1990). p 35
\textsuperscript{189} Theweleit, „The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War.” pp: 284
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid. Further, Klaus Theweleit, Der Knall (Berlin: Stroemfelder, Roter Stern, 2002).
defence intellectuals, Cohn described, the body issue becomes crucial to decode war-textures.

Theweleit bases his description on essentialist male-female dichotomies, yet his definition of bodily transformation, of killing as a male experience of creation as part of war logic and gendered military thought is challenging. War, according to Theweleit, ranks high among the male ways of giving birth. Lost wars morphs victorious masculine soldiers in some sort of women. How female soldiers and fighters are re-masculinising themselves he fails to discuss, since in Theweleit’s understanding women are positive creators by giving birth to real children as well as by taking care of others.

Cohn describes this self-realization of a defence intellectual who openly referred to the direct consequence of his daily product of labour as of how many people would possibly die through the use, as a realization of painful de-masculinization.

Several colleagues and I were working on modelling counterforce attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments. At one point, we remodelled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being thirty-six million immediate fatalities, there would only be thirty million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying ‘oh yeah, that’s great, only thirty million.’ when all of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, ‘Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking – Only thirty million! Only thirty million human beings killed instantly?’ Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. I felt like a woman.

To follow along the Theweleit and Cohn thread of male birth and creation, it is interesting to remark, that almost all ‘successful’ bomb dropping was congratulated as an act of giving birth. The first atom bomb was referred to as ‘Oppenheimer’s Baby’, the hydrogen bomb labelled as Tellers Baby. His responding telegram to Los Alamos in 1952 was the short announcement: ‘It’s a boy’.

But not only do male experts and physicians give birth to babies, they create new worlds, cosmos and universe. The trinity test for the first atomic bomb was observed and documented by William T. Laurence who wrote: “The big boom came about a hundred seconds after the first flash – the first cry of a new-born world.” And General Grove’s cable to the US secretary of war, conferencing in Potsdam, Henry Stimson, was even more enthusiastic: “Doctor had just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the little boy is as husky as his big brother. The light in his eyes discernible from here to highhold and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm.” Cohn refers further to the witnesses and creators of the atomic bomb test, the trinity and she is labelling it nuclear priesthood. “It was as though we stood at the first day of creation.” Oppenheimer even quoting Krishna’s word in the Bhagavad Gita: “I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds.”

191 Cohn, „Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War.“ p. 227. Cohn quotes a story told to her by a white male physicist, who assured that after this experience he made sure that he never blurted out anything like that again.

192 Cohn, „Clean Bombs and Clean Language.“ p. 42
Theweleits’ assumptions on male creation process as one of re-birthing by killing, and by creating the peak of masculinist desire: the male couple creates the new world is also a way to overcome the embeddedness in bodily reality and pain, as a reality of giving birth by women. Or, in a similar, yet less gendered description, Susan Faludi, author of Backlash answers Barbara Ehrenreich on her request on origins and History of the Passions of War: “(...) Everything from war to religion to men and women’s relations to violence is rooted in our struggle to combat the original human trauma of BEING HUNTED – and to remake ourselves as the HUNTER.”

The idea of the clean creation, the white noise instead of the filthy bloody process of human females giving birth, brings along many other mystifications and desires of male creation myth the silencing of violent women, bloody war rites and the cleansing and clearing of male militarists and violence promoters in the dominant agenda of security demagogues and arms, weapon system and target precision small talk. The expertship of clear surgery and clean operations instead of bloody, striking, brutal, violent, beastly war action is becoming more and more the accepted image of the soldier and its mission.

Although in the case of southern Sudan this is not entirely true. Here the image of the hunter, rather than the creator is important.

The acceptance of the bloody reality of war, as well as of hunting creates a different body imagery of fighters in places such as southern Sudan. Yet, the exclusive cycle, the priesthood of defined masculine bodies in both, the group of hunters as well as the group if fighters, assumes similar ideals of strength and the aura of impermeability of this group.

Talking to female former fighters of the SPLA, the difference between the ideal and the reality of this group and their body imagery is precisely the reason for the exclusion of women from active battle. “Because we saw them (the men) being killed and wounded and we saw them crying and weeping for their comrades and brothers, this was what they did not want us to see.”

Caretaker Bodies

The construction of the caretaker body is possibly the most obvious resort on the caretakers’ peaceful image. The mother, nurse, keeper of the house, wife, cheerer,


195 Yet there is a broad body of literature discussing the institution of motherhood as the central marker of women’s positioning in war. See: Inger Skjelsbaek, „Is Femininity Inherently Peaceful?: The Construction of Femininity in War,” in Gender, Peace & Conflict, ed. Dan Smith Inger Skjelsbaek (Oslo: PRIO, 2001). Sara Ruddick, Betty Reardon, Cynthia Enloe, Carol Gilligan, Nancy Chodorow are all constitutive authors on motherhood as a caretaker training and possibility to less violent societies.
prostitute, camp-follower and mourner are all easily co-opted for war mobilization. Mothers are turned into ‘soldier-production units’, nurses become either de-sexualized and angelic restorers of masculinity and keepers of domestic moral or they are turned into loose women spreading castration fears. Wives take over tasks formerly ascribed to men to free their men for the fighting; they give emotional support and the guarantee that ‘home will be unchanged upon return’. The caretaker body is extensive and extensively used. Even the mourners of the dead – a potential sign for resistance against war and killing – can be used by propaganda or initiated by the women themselves into a cry for revenge and retaliation.

The visual but silent image caretakers are ascribed during war renders them into victims, spectators and prizes of war, but rarely as agents. Therefore the image of the women warrior becomes distressing, intriguing and compelling for many. Even for the imagery of female soldiers, the caretaker theme is used. As Nira Yuval-Davis refers to the functionality of the Israeli women’s corps it not only had to function to raise the morale of the male soldiers, but to make the army a ‘home away from home’.

**Female Soldier Bodies**

If war is the cornerstone of masculinity, the *rite de passage* from boyhood to manhood, then how does military training and war affect the female warrior body?

Although our image of female soldiers and warriors is not only marked by transvesting women dragued in soldiers uniforms which accompanied western military history — the imagery of the fighting women strongly

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196 Vesna Nikolié-Ristanovic, „War, Nationalism and Mothers,” *Peace Review* 8, no. 3 (1996). p. 360. Similar topoi can be found in all war-propaganda from the Ilillas to the Nazi-Mutterkreuz to the rape and forced impregnation of Nuba women in Sudan by pro-government militias to ensure ‘northernized’ children. Interviews conducted by the author with Nuba women in December 1996. Archive of the author.

197 Florence Nightingale effect. Patients falling in love with the ‘secular saint’ and nurse Florence Nightingale.

198 There is a wide variety of Nazi propaganda material on the Soviet women, in specific on the female soldiers of the Red Army (Flintenweiber) but as well on the nurses accompanying the army. Illustrierter Beobachter 34 (1941), Armeooberkommando (ed.) *Mit unserer Armee in Rußland*. (Paris. 1943), Erich F. Berendt. *Soldaten der Freiheit* (Berlin. 1935)

199 D’Amico, „Feminist Perspectives on Women Warriors“.


201 Women in Men’s clothes are known throughout the centuries. Historic and visual evidence suggest that women decided to take on men’s cloth for several reasons, to avoid rape, poverty, prison or a normal life of a woman. There are several well-known women such as Anne Bonny, Mary Read or Mother Ross. Yet the history of women transvesting into men in order to join the armed forces has several thousand more examples. See Rudolf Dekker and Lotte van de Pol, *Frauen in Männerkleidern: Weibliche Transvestiten Und Ihre Geschichte* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1992).
comes with a masculine connotation. The female soldiers body is shaped in the same training units, boot camps and battlefields as their male comrades and colleagues, yet for them to reach the ultimate goal, the masculine body bonding with other masculine bodies for the cohesive fighting unit, seems unreachable. The unity of citizen-soldiers is not more osmotic than centuries ago. At least in the old and the new wars. Slight changes might be seen in what Hables Gray describes as post-modern wars with its cyborg- rather than – citizen-soldiers making way for a more technical, less bodily identified masculine soldier image. One that is easier for women to morph into.

The critique on the victimization of the caretakers, elaborated by Laura D. Kaplan intermingled with the documentation on future simulations of war, shown by Grey lead to a different setting and rooting of soldierly virtues. Yet it does not change gendered soldier images. The changes will and are taking place on the public relation surface, the media, communication, the restructuring of international relation codification, but not at the core, not by questioning war as a means of politics, nor by masculinist fighter idea(l)s.

I would like to shortly introduce the changes in the historic idea(l) of the female predator, the female bloodthirsty ruler and deity to exemplify that women who are using force and violence had not always been forced to cross gender lines and become masculine moreover the feminine imagery was not always connotated with care and peacefulness. This issue will be discussed in detail in the following chapters on gender constructs in war. Besides the political, economic, social and cultural interests that have changed and shaped the imagery of gender throughout the centuries the locus of those changes appears to be the gendered or sexed body. As Judith Butler questions the pre-discursive existence of the sexed body I am interested in the discursive shaping of the masculine warrior image.

The methods of how to bring about change to the masculine soldier ideal differ immensely. Even amongst liberal feminists the attempt to transform the soldier image into a more gender neutral one by 'brining women in' knows at
least two directions. One: Women who participate in the military manage to show their capacity to fight like men. The other: Women who participate in the military will add femininity to the gender soldier image and smoothen the masculinist ideal out. Yet for all the gender dichotomy based on its sexed body origin is the anchorage of their reflection. This makes it easy for women to be present(ed) or disappear according to the current political needs – since they seem to continuously represent the bodily manifestation of the deviation. Not the construction of soldiering is under question, but the construction of the gendered soldier body. Since masculine soldier bodies are accepted as the norm, female fighters will continuously be seen as a challenge to the norm – not as an equally odd phenomenon of people re-producing themselves as a military body, functioning according to abstract commands, disconnected from their normal social rationality.

The recourse of the female soldier body starts with the constitution of the female as an archetypical victim. Elise Boulding is placing her ancient tragedy of perpetuators and victims on the founding myth of Zeus the rapist, ruling over a pantheon of other heroic rapists and developing a gender structure of man and women out of this founding myth. According to this notion, Zeus inspires men and women are forced to submit to their rapists. Barbara Ehrenreich presents alternative history. She is an archaeologist of ancient, pre-modern and modern changes in the portraying of female figures. Ehrenreich portraits the various sides of women as sacrificers, sacrifices and bloodthirsty goddesses calling for sacrification. In her exemplification the dominant assumption of hunting as the sole motor of human evolution is questioned. Ehrenreich refers to war as a religious factor of sacrification. From pre-modern gods and goddesses, who prefer meals of meat, the biblical fight between herders and farmers on the example of Cain and Abel

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204 Especially in the coverage of post-9-11 the female soldier disappeared from the public image. No portrays of female soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan. From the thousands of US soldiers currently deployed all over the world in anti-Terrorist operations, we only get the rare images of special-forces members in complete mimicry of the conditions in the field, bearded and turbaned special forces in Afghanistan mimicking the authentic native – playing the ultimate cowboy and Indian game, sans la femme.


206 Ehrenreich, Blood Rites. Origins and History of the Passions of War.

207 As well as others, such as Fatima Mernissi, The Forgotten Queens of Islam. (London: Polity Press, 1993). Zimmerman, Tailspin: Women at War in the Wake of Tailhook.
to the Aztecs and their call for meat sacrification to dictators such as Emperor Bokassa who was happily portrayed as a cannibal. The sheer image of their bloodthirstiness as a foundation of fear and power.

But what, when the predator had a women’s face? Ehrenreich is referring to the earliest deities, who, against their description as caring mothers did not always have a nurturing appearance as earth mothers. They were presented as the keepers and bearers of the snake, reigned in company with the lion, serene or leopard. The early depiction of the huntress is that of a consumer of sacrificed offerings, an anthropomorphized version of the predator beast. Ehrenreich’s comment on the findings make it clear that the question is how gender roles were constructed, communicated and perceived not so much what was true or not:

We do not know what, if anything, these fierce goddesses have to tell us about the status of actual women in the cultures that worshipped them. But our concern here is with human attitudes toward violence, and it is striking that images associated with Bloodshed and predation could once have been ‘gendered’ in a way opposite to what we are used to: that there was a time, apparently in many disparate cultures when imagination gave the beast a human FEMALE form.

That in Aztec, ancient Greek, Egyptian, Indian, Sumerian history femininity is associated with the life-giving, does not prevent those images of female deity presiding over the hunt and wild animals.

Using examples of violent women, but even more, presenting historical periods when women would not have been restricted to the care taking, peaceful role, shows the arbitrariness of gender construction along the interest of the respective dominant system. Essentialist assumptions about the nature of man and women seem to lead into another mystical creation and enactment.

Tanit, one of the Greek goddesses also known as Astarte, received child sacrifices at Carthage. Kali, an Indian goddess is still accepted as a violent female goddess, her necklaces of skulls roped in a tiger skin are constant reminders of her bloodthirsty character. The Cretan goddess with her double axe is known a sign for powerful and martial women. The history of the Amazons as a mythical group of female warriors presents another topic. Regardless of their real existence, history from

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209 Since the double axe became a sign for labris and the symbol for lesbians – the re-claiming of violent female characters has a new dynamic. Labrys as the double-potency, the labias, the symmetrical genitals, from whom Luce Irigaray will state a few centuries later in the French feminism of the late 70s, that the two lips have the dialogical power and by this be carriers of a parallel language, hidden and invisible, a language which is only potentially discovered and used by women.

210 Reflected here in length in following chapters.
Homer to Bachofen reflects on their example the powerful military force as well as the refusal of feminine virtues. Amazons as they are portrayed would qualify in the modern discourse of gender orientation as gender crossing. In their gender roles as well as the transformation of their female sexualized body.

It is not surprising that during the European witch-hunt – as well as in the modern armies of the United States in the late 1990s – the image of the lesbian women is portrayed as a criminal character. The main threat is competition with men or their lack of interest in men as objects of desire, but their lack of interest in conforming to social standards of femininity.

Barbara Ehrenreich counter argues the internalized and inbuilt peacefulness of women and shows how even the maternal caring figure is supporting, cheering and pushing others to be violent and how they benefit from these violent acts.

As Ehrenreich writes about the changing definitions of gendered violence:

By classical times, and certainly in our own time, the associations between masculinity and violence, femininity and nonviolence, had hardened into dogma.” and further “The primordial goddess – huntress of beasts and consumer of blood – had to be prettified as a seductress, like Aphrodite, or a motherly figure with a passion for gardening, like Demeter or Cerces.

What Ehrenreich portrays will not fit into violent powerful images of women established by Plato, sketched out in his idealization of Sparta with man and women as equally trained guardians. The violence Ehrenreich refers to, is undirected, unruly and not structured under rules of law and in the interest of a state. This portrayal of female aggression and violence as undirected and non-strategic might be another factor, why they fail to be included in the canon of legitimized male violence.

Ehrenreich criticizes the denial of acceptance of violent female imagery: “Feminist scholars try to create gentle feminine figures. The generating, nurturing and creative powers of nature – not the powers to destroy – were given the highest values.”

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211 Gottesbeweise for witches, who had to prove that they are no lesbians, by proving sexual contact to men – and by this proving their shamming sins, or lack of virginity innocence – is still a usual system in the US military of the day. Because it equals a dishonorable discharge from the military if one is coming out as a lesbian, or if one cannot prove not guilty in being ‘accused’ as a lesbian, this still leads to mayor consequences in this persons’ life. How far the issue of illocutionary hate speech can become reality, is been described by Judith Butler in her book: Judith Butler, Hass Spricht: Zur Politik Des Performativen (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 1998). Where she is inquiring in the practice of hate speech using Austins model of Sprachakttheorie.


213 Ehrenreich, Blood Rites. Origins and History of the Passions of War, p 101


As exemplified with Kali, who, by Mackenzie Brown\textsuperscript{216} is labelled as the Mad Mother and has the blood tripping from her mouth, the blood tripping mouth and the misogynous paranoid image of the castrating vagina dentata does not only have a long history but a visible imagery. This is reflected in the tattooed blood drops dribbling around Maori and north African Nomad women’s mouth and extended to the ambiguous visibility of lipstick. It is the sexualized sign of female seductiveness and the inbound of real femininity\textsuperscript{217} as well as a symbol for blood, a wound.

Conceptualising the sexualized male and female body in the context of war became prevalent in the second Gulf war of 1991. The media discourse on female US soldiers in the Gulf War was ambivalent. Reporting on the ‘bad mothers’ leaving their babies behind, and showing these very same women as symbols for American freedom and liberty. Female soldiers were portrayed as role models and a rightful provocation to the ‘backward’ Saudi Arabian society. Both images had been sexualized and embodied. There were sexy looking smiling female soldiers, casual in their Khakis and shades, sitting on a jeep and laughing and astonished wide eyed Arabian youngsters in the background, dressed in their gallabias. Modernity meets Dark Age.

The first bodily image of the bad mother is known as the ground principle of the fear and degradation of the Amazons. As Valeria E. Russo writes about the fear and fascination of the Amazons as mainly a topic of female power as women seizing power by using arms– as the most unequivocal expression of general power in masculinistic system of reference. “The result is not just negation of the basic prerequisites of the ‘polis’, but the persecution of the male sex and the degradation of the human race itself. Women becomes dangerous and awesome as being armed, but also as being sexually potent, not subject to control of reproductive choices.”\textsuperscript{218}

The active refusal of the sexed body goes beyond the rebellion of gender roles. By cutting off one breast the chain of gendered symbolism is broken. The Amazons took away a crucial part of feminine identity – even though this might have just been a trope developed by male writers. Through making the possible bodily performativity of gender concepts obvious, by inscribing the codification on one’s own body, the self controlled and self-determined act is portrayed as maybe the worst and most un-human part of the mythology of the Amazons. As Russo describes it: “Moreover, they are always depicted with no breasts, or a breast bare; but this amputation cuts into the female body the visible mark of the bad woman and the bad mother.”\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{216}Mackenzie Brown, „Kalie, the Mad Mother,” in The Book of the Goddess, Past and Present, ed. Carl Olson (New York: Crossroad, 1994).

\textsuperscript{217}One reason, why Israeli and US army recruiting posters highlight, that some of their best soldiers wearing lipstick. By this reassuring the real femininity of real women in the army.


\textsuperscript{219}Ibid.
Two major topics are triggered by Valeria Russo’s remark; the trope of women taking over the control of their own body, sexuality and gender definition and women as capable fighters. It seems that in contemporary wars this image was actively re-defined. The lipstick female soldier in regular armies as well as the breastfeeding female rebel in liberation movements re-inscribed a socially controlled female gender role. On this basis the role of women as warriors might be added or taken according to the needs of war.220

The concept of the earthy, natural, bloody femininity even clashes with the bloody business of war. In the careful creation of warfare and soldiers activities as a rational necessity for protection and security, neither the unruly character of female violence, nor the bloody existence of the female body in menstruation and child-birth, nor in effect the construct of femininity as part of nature, rather than culture, can be accepted. What seems like a blatant irrational paradox determines the status of women as fighters and soldiers as well as the construct of femininity as either peaceful or irrationally violent.221

220 Postcards of Sandinista female fighters carrying a gun and a baby. The examples of Eritrean female fighters of the EPLF as mothers. Cynthia Enloe, Eleanor O’Gorman and many others refer to the image of the rebel female fighter with the baby stripped on her back or front and the AK47 in her hands.

221 The fear of bloody, dirty, un-virginly femininity has a recent example in the medication policy of the second gulf war within the US army. For the fear of unhygienity, the medical personal was instructed to deliver the anti baby pill to all female soldiers throughout the entire time of the fight, in order to stop the female soldier from menstruating. Allegedly the army was fully aware that the combination with this hormones and the medical cocktail that all soldiers got to prevent chemical and/or biological outfall could be lethal. See report by Muir, Arms and the Woman. Further information acquired from a workshop on the post gulf war syndrome by the mercenaries magazine ‘Soldiers of Fortune’ that I attended in Las Vegas in 1995. A US army nurse gave an insight report on the medical treatment of US soldiers during the gulf war and focused on the mixture, especially female GIs had to take for the sake of hygienic reasons. Nurses who refused to administer this mixture had to leave their operation team and faced disciplinary punishment.
III. WAR
III. WAR

Magic Bulletism – Digital Realism

The final stage of the fabrication of the human thing consists of the destruction of people’s sense of their uniqueness and the methods are numerous.
Bat-Ami Bar On, on Arendt on the Technology of Genocide

War is the continuation of politics by other means.
Lenin

War is in no way supernatural but a mundane process governed by necessity.
Mao Tsetung

State of war: The period of time when you can’t be convinced of the opposite, then you are in a state of war.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan

Any further examination of the topoi of WAR\textsuperscript{222} needs clarification and methodological explanation. The subdivision, introduced below enables the discourse to reach into connected and neighboring fields. It is meant to broaden narrow definitions of war and to inform thoughts and descriptions of WAR rhizomatically\textsuperscript{223} by reaching out to interrelated fields. Interestingly enough, in neither of the texts written by two famous war strategists, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War nor Clausewitz’s On War a coherent definition of war is given. They focus on strategies and warfare rather than defining the underlying logic of why war is fought and why it is accepted. The general logic of war and the changes in the mode of warfare due to a globalized war economy will be part of the unique history of the war in Sudan.

This chapter tries to combine various aspects of war, such as war and formation of the state, reason for and logic of war, as well as the changes in reading the history of war and it's dimension, conception and justification.

There are a number of factors that seem to build the inherent driving force for these aspects. Power, dominance and control are not only the building blocks for the conception and reality of states and state formation, power, dominance and control are as equally basic concepts of war as non-institutionalized violence.

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\textsuperscript{222} I will use the definition of war according the definition of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF). Krieg ist ein bewaffneter Massenkonflikt, der die folgenden drei Merkmale aufweist: a) bei mindestens einer der in die bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen verwickelten Gruppe handelt es sich um Regierungsstreitkräfte, b) die Kriegsparteien zeigen ein Minimum an Organisation der Kampfhandlungen, auch wenn dies nicht mehr meint als strategisch geplante Überfälle; c) die bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen zeigen ein gewisses Maß an Kontinuität und sind nicht bloß gelegentliche Konfrontationen, das heißt, beide Seiten agieren nach einer erkennbaren Strategie. Klaus Schlichte, “Kriegsverläufe Und Kriegsursachen – Formwandel Kriegerischer Konflikte Nach 1945,” in Konflikt Und Gewalt: Ursachen – Entwicklungstendenzen – Perspektiven, ed. ÖSFK (Münster: agenda, 2000). p. 201

\textsuperscript{223} Term is borrowed from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Rhizom (Berlin: Merve, 1977).
Power

Power is typically a causal notion: its application produces results.
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. 1995

Michel Foucault, whose definition of power is relevant not only for historians but for sociologists as well, starts his digression on power with the notion of the right to life and death, The sovereign’s, or for that matter, the father’s, right is the right to give life and to take it. Foucault identifies the transformation in the concept of power from a power of inhibition and discipline, towards a power of control.

Die Macht war vor allem Zugriffsrecht auf Dinge, die Zeiten, die Körper und schließlich das Leben; sie gipfelten in dem Vorrecht, sich des Lebens zu bemächtigen, um es auszulösen. Nun hat das Abendland seit dem klassischen Zeitalter eine tiefgreifende Transformation dieser Machtmechanismen erlebt. Die ‘Abschöpfung’ tendiert dazu, nicht mehr ihre Hauptform zu sein, sondern nur noch ein Element unter anderen Elementen, die an der Anreizung, Verstärkung, Kontrolle, Überwachung, Steigerung und Organisation der unterworfenen Kräfte arbeiten: diese Macht ist dazu bestimmt, Kräfte hervorzubringen, wachsen zu lassen und zu ordnen, anstatt sie zu hemmen, zu beugen oder zu vernichten.” (Power was mainly the right of access to things, time and bodies and finally life; it peaked in the prerogative to take life in order to destroy it. The occident experienced a deep transformation of this power-mechanism since the classics. Absorption tends not to be the main form of power any more, merely an element amongst others that are targeted to push, strengthen, control and observe, to maximize and organize the subjugated forces: this power is meant to create forces, to let them grow and organize instead of hindering, bending or destroying them. Translation A.W.)

In a strictly military formulation, control is an essence of war. If modern war was C2 (command and control), postmodern war, since the late 80s, has become C4I2 (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability).

I find this interpretation of power very useful, not only to understand the modus of reasoning and rationalization of war but for a better understanding of the personal, social, cultural and psychological aspect of the acceptance of monstrosities – such as

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224 Michel Foucault, Der Wille Zum Wissen: Sexualität Und Wahrheit 1 (Frankfurt: Surhkamp, 1992).p. 162ff
war – as a normal integral part of life.\textsuperscript{228} Or, as Hans Morgenthau, the realist scholar of international relations states in his introduction to ‘national power’: “Everybody understands that the individual seeks power.” It is his concept of power, that Ann Tickner\textsuperscript{229} questions in her criticism of the founder of the realist school of international relations. According to Morgenthau’s principles of political realism, Tickner identifies the concept of interest defined in terms of power as the main signpost of realism: “(...) concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.”

Power in these definitions is understood as the founding principle of human organization – the mainstream tendency is clearly one of hierarchical power that is based on a vertical model of ‘power over’ rather than ‘power with’. This assumption is influential and normative in almost all state formation theories, international relation theories as well as legitimizing conceptions of conflicts and war. Power in these examples is negotiating the promises of security and stability as a bargain for those who are subjugated.

In Foucault’s reference it is power that constitutes the subject, not the subject-relation that constitutes power. Comparing the juridico-discoursive\textsuperscript{230} to Foucault’s power concept clarifies this shift: Juridico-discoursive assumptions on power: 1) power is possessed (for instance, by individuals in the state of nature, by class, by the people); 2) power flows from a centralized source from top to bottom (for instance, law, the economy, the state); 3) power is primarily repressive in its exercise (a prohibition backed by sanctions). Foucault’s assumptions are 1) power is exercised rather than possessed, 2) power is not primarily repressive, but productive, 3) power is analyzed as coming from the bottom up.

I am using this model, since it opens a new dimension in understanding and discussing the logic or war as well as the more specific case of women’s loyalty to repressive military guerrilla movements. Foucault’s model is asking fundamental questions such as why would we continue to obey a purely repressive and coercive form of power? The traditional idea of power as control over is transformed into a disciplinary model of power. Rather than humanistic assumptions on the pre-social individual endowed with inalienable rights or based on the identification of an authentic human interest, Foucault gives accounts of the ways in which certain institutional and

\textsuperscript{228} For a more basic concept of power see the discussion in Rommelspacher, \textit{Dominanzkultur}. pp. 23. Rommelspacher is discussing the concepts of power as multidimensional and refers to the synergetic effect of the concept of Michele Foucault and Norbert Elias.


cultural practices have produced individuals. Normalization and social control are therefore effective means of productive power, since the society is in a process of constant developing and establishing normative behavior. Power here is based on its utilitarian aspect rather than invented by a dominant class.

To begin a debate on war with a discussion on power is not unusual in political science, although the concept of power is hardly ever questioned, it is mainly distinguished into ‘power and state’ and ‘power and war’. Power, in the Foucauldian sense of dynamic of power relations rather than dynamic of subjects is then a fluid issue rather than a stagnant truth. With this in mind the descriptions of Hobbes’ state of nature or Machiavelli’s inevitable equation of state and power can then be questioned as constructs. They still describe reality and are obviously influential in modern international relations theory, yet using the Foucauldian parameters as tools to question and deconstruct power definitions allows for a more critical understanding.

Power State – State of Power

The state could be described as the center of power, whereas conflict, war and aggression are mechanisms. The relation between men are power relations, whereas revolutions, wars, guerrilla movements, coup d’états would be power techniques. The reference to state here is taken from David Held’s 231 collection of state-characteristics given by scholars of the modern state:

All modern states are nation-states – political apparatuses, distinct from both ruler and ruled, with supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territorial area, backed by a claim to a monopoly of coercive power, and enjoying a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens. 232

Held further addresses the distinct innovations of a modern state in differentiating the question of territoriality, control of the means of power, impersonal structure of power and legitimacy from those issues in non-modern states.

The fundamental understanding and acceptance of war as a ‘state of nature’, as part of the emergence of nation-states, as intrinsic to human relations is of course relevant. These concepts, which are specifically reflected on in international relations theory have been discussed from various feminist standpoints and will be reflected on in chapters that deal specifically with Africa and Sudan. Here I would like to keep the formal discussion short. Theorists such as Hobbes, Rousseau or Kant describe a conflicting relationship amongst people as foundational to human beings. Their solution is to formulate contract theories (Hobbes, Kant) in order to avoid the state of


nature of man against man. Kant explains in Zum ewigen Frieden\textsuperscript{233} [Towards eternal peace] how to reach a state of de jure peacefulness, which nevertheless is no guarantee for de facto peace.

Der Friedenszustand unter Menschen, die nebeneinander leben, ist kein Naturzustand (status naturalis), der vielmehr ein Zustand des Krieges ist, d.i. wenngleich nicht immer ein Ausbruch von Feindseligkeiten, doch immerwährende Bedrohung mit denselben. Er muß also gestiftet werden; denn die Unterlassung der letzteren ist noch nicht Sicherheit dafür, und ohne daß sie einem Nachbar von dem andern geleistet wird (welches aber nur in einem gesetzlichen Zustand geschehen kann), kann jener diesen, welchen er dazu aufgefordert hat, als einen Feind behandeln. The state of peace amongst men who are living close to each other is not a natural state, which would be foremost a state of war, that is not necessarily the breakout of animosities but the everlasting threat of war. He (the state of peace) has to be made, because to refrain from animosities is no guarantee. And without one neighbor guaranteeing security to the other (which only can be done on a legal bases), one neighbor can perceive the other, whom he invited to guarantee, as an enemy. (Translation A.W.)

This introduction will focus on the concept of power and discipline, on how war, violence and conflict is portrayed and idealized as normative. Why is peace seen as a weltfremde Utopia? And on an even more disturbing note – why, if conflict is the fundamental state of nature – women at least for the era of enlightened modernity are categorized as inherently peaceful? In this chapter, the focus will not be on gendered citizenship and gendered soldier or fighter images, but will try to collect information from the margin for a better understanding of the center: the dominant logic of war.

The state as the locus of power, and again, war as the mechanism to keep power or to gain power is of course highlighted by Nicolo Machiavelli in his Prince, the authoritarian power based sovereign.\textsuperscript{234} “Das Fundament aller guten Staaten ist ein gutes Heerwesen. Wo es fehlt, kann es weder gute Gesetze noch irgend etwas anderes Gutes geben.”

With this statement Machiavelli installed himself as one of the foundational modern war theorists. The structure of war resembles the state structure for him. He even goes further in comparing the nature of the two as one\textsuperscript{235}:

Many argue now of the opinion that no two things are more discordant and incongruous than a civil and military life. But if we consider the nature of government, we shall find a very strict and intimate relation between these two conditions; and that they are not only compatible and consistent with each other, but necessarily connected and united together.

The state here is the institutionalized case where men gain power, use power and loose power. Power then is the secret logic of politics; it’s the precious good that is dealt with in

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\textsuperscript{233} Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden (Hamburg: 1992). p. 58

\textsuperscript{234} Machiavelli, quoted after Ulrich Albrecht, Internationale Politik: Einführung in Das System Internationaler Herrschaft (München; Wien: Oldenbourg, 1999)., p. 131

\textsuperscript{235} Machiavelli, The Art of War, quoted after Hables-Gray, Post Modern War, p. 111. Interestingly the feminist assumption of the interconnectedness of civilian and military structures, violence and images of masculinity had been denied and ridiculized, especially by traditional realist political scientists. Machiavelli’s assumption however has never been questioned under this aspect.
political trade. The subject, the trader constructs the political class in the institutionalized shell of the state.

Another quote that reveals why war is used as such a rational, normative option in contrast to peace as a utopian impossibility is by Helmuth v. Moltke. Moltke, a Prussian general, in a letter to a human rights lawyer, goes beyond the political necessity, the rule of nature and the natural aggressive and violent relation amongst human beings; he describes the virtues and values, the ethic beauty of war.


(Eternal peace is a dream not even a nice one and war is a chain in gods world-order. In war the most precious virtues of mankind develop: courage and renunciation, dutifulness and willingness to make sacrifices at the risk of one’s life. Without war the world would go to pot in materialism. [A.W.])

Moltkes description touches upon the idea of beauty, righteousness and eros in war that has stayed undisussed in political science analysis of war. Yet it leads us to the missing link between the normality of war as a solution, the acceptance of military logic and the acceptance of violence in general and of violence by men in particular. Or, as Sara Ruddik would call it; the justification on organized violence as disclosing the hidden violence.

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III. 1. TECHNIQUES OF STATE FORMATION

Western political science appears to have a clear position on the highly developed idea of the state. It is seen in decline but still a symbol of the mastership of a political ideal – from Plato to the UN: The ability of man to live together lead by ratio rather than the irrational, selfish barbarian interest. Although the selfish interest is the driving force for the state as a regulatory mechanism. The acceptance of a sovereign and a state of culture and discipline rather than the state of nature is fundamental for this concept. The Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ is the accepted horror of independent individuals, of man against man is a driving force for international relations and war-theorists.

There are quite a number of interesting debates concerning how much the civilized state had to create the barbarian ‘Other’ (nature, women) to exist. As Pierre Clastres questions, and as one should ask in looking at the problems in the process of nation building in Sudan in particular, the process of state building is clearly more based on power politics in the international realm than to the ideal of Plato’s Polis.

The assumptions on the relation of power and state system with war system as defined above is mainly based on a western, European understanding of political systems and state. War as the intrinsic part of state formation is illustrated in history. State is defined as a military-economic question, war defined as law of nature. Krippendorff argues with Kautsky that: “Aus Kriegen sind die Staaten hervorgegangen, auf kriegerischer Macht beruhen sie bis zum Aufkommen und Erstarken der modernen Demokratie, die den Staaten einen ganz neuen Charakter gibt. Aber bis heute läßt sich kriegerische Macht aus dem Wesen des Staates nicht wegdenken.”

The question for this work is to analyze how fundamentally different the structure is in Sudan and if the authorization given above would make sense in another context? If the nature of the state is conservation rather than transformation the effect of war needs closer examination. In the Sudanese context state formation clearly roots from

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war and the continuation of war. In Sudan one could construct the two models as informing the state formation. Whereas the collective memory of state formation is based on the Mahdia, the struggle of the Mahdi against the British colonialist intruders, the collective memory in southern Sudan remembers the Mahdia differently. Southern fighters were used on both sides as military manpower, not to struggle for their liberation, their independence, but to fight for the power of the Ansar sect for power over all of Sudan or to fight for the British for their rule over Sudan. As historical fact in southern Sudan, the Mahdia was a time of slavery. Slavery of northern Sudanese slave traders and southern Sudanese slaves. While the north kept the tribal state economy running for their interest and profit by selling and enslaving their southern fellow countrywomen and men. Whereas in Northern Sudan the idea of state formation is based on the struggle against outside intruders under a single leader, for the south the approach to state and state formation was never an active step but a forced reaction to changing political realities.

For the history of ethnic groups in Southern Sudan, slavery or forced labor for one's own profit is not part of reality. That does not say that the exploitation of a person, forced labor or abduction would be impossible. The disconnected understanding of people as anonymous working masses, rather than individuals with their place in the community pattern would not work in the tightly knit net of community understanding in the South of Sudan. That has to be taken into consideration when thinking about Nation Building, the State, armies and the war machine. In the case of Sudan the imbalance between North and South is a constant factor for the analysis of the war. I made this point for two reasons. One reason is to deplore more on the warrior status and the change towards a state soldier. Secondly to lay the groundwork of for the interconnection of state, war and economy in its gendered and class dimension that will be the major part of this work.

If fighting or working for somebody else's profit is not part of the culture and if alienated work in general is neither as well as loyalty to one leader is not the concept of war and warrior status has to be closely analyzed. As Janna Thompson points out in her elaboration on the warrior status, war might affect people that are not part of the warrior class like a natural disaster. In her analysis of war from Middle Ages till the 18th Century Europe she writes: "(...) Most people would not have known or cared whether their rulers were at war or not."

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242 The struggle of the 'Great Mahdi' who fought against the British Colonizers and is seen as a hero for the Northern Sudanese, but is not seen as heroic in the South, for is involvement and support of the Slave trade that made the Northern Sudanese the Slave traders of the Southern Sudanese Slaves.

243 Ansar is the Muslim sect of the Mahdi, a prophetic figure to liberate Sudan from external oppression. The Ansar later becomes the main foundation for the Umma party, always led by the successors of the Mahdi. The current head of the umma party and last president of the Sudan, Sadiq al Mahdi, is the great grandson of the Mahdi.

In the case of Sudan this is only one part of the approach to war and warrior status. Since the concept of war was anticolonial, not connected to sovereign state leadership, informed by slavery and deeply internalized differences between the north and the south as slave traders, slaves, as enemies of the colonial rulers and yet the allies the concept is more complex. Whereas the central northern part and the people of the Ansar sect could consider the concept of war and warrior in terms of following a leader – the Mahdi against the invasive colonial powers, for the people in the South this just meant a change in faces of rulers but not of the concept of being ruled.

As Christopher Clapham\textsuperscript{245} describes the emerging of an insurgency in southern Sudan, he remarks on the society and cultures there as: “In southern Sudan, they (the insurgency) where based in cultures which had provided generations of anthropologists with case study material on stateless societies.” In Sudan with the exception of the ruling riverian central Sudan, the idea of self-rule and the use of the chief as a mediator seems to be closer to what Deleuze/Guattari\textsuperscript{246} described as nomadic system, than what we understand as state. It is important to note that stateless does not mean the absence of all mechanism and regulation. What Deleuze and Guattari describe as the nomadic system underlies a strict societal regulatory apparatus. David Held\textsuperscript{247} clarifies in his introduction to ‘The development of the modern state’ some preliminary definitions that are quite helpful for a further understanding of ‘primitive’, ‘modern’, state and stateless societies:

States are historical phenomena, constructed under particular conditions, and far from fixed or “natural” entities. In hunting-and-gathering communities, in small agrarian culture, and in the regions wandered by semi-nomadic or nomadic peoples there has been no recognizably separate state or political organization. Today, there are still many communities which anthropologists refer to as “stateless” – communities such as the Jale people of the New Guinea highlands, the pastoral Nuer of the South Sudan, the M’endeuili and Arusha of East Africa. “Stateless”, however should not be taken to mean the absence of any mechanism of regulation or government through which decisions affecting the community can be made and disputes settled. A diverse array of such mechanisms has existed, from family and kinship structures to the rules and norms of custom or tradition, and to the established power of a chief (a warrior or priest, or both), often assisted by a council or court.

The smaller political settings with more flexibility in external-relations but maybe more static, conservative understanding for internal relations needs examination. The status and role of the chief in the different societies in Southern Sudan has changed drastically over the years and has slowly regained more status in regulating conflicts after being denied most power in the early stages of the armed struggle. The interesting point here would be the different approach in rule, security and protection that the state on one hand and chieftain on the other would promise to provide. In Southern Sudan, the abstraction of the state does not necessarily only stand for the

\textsuperscript{246} Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
\textsuperscript{247} Held, „The Development of the Modern State..“ p. 55ff
ruling government in Khartoum but could be equally used for a hierarchically set of rules for governance, such as the Shilluk Kingdom\textsuperscript{248}. The chief had to defend his position by means of persuasion. He owned nor carried weapons and had no army, which could be used, against his own people. Otherwise, even if the chief had a monarchical lineage and was chief by birth, the people had the right to kill him, secretly and openly.\textsuperscript{249} As Pierre Clastres describes it in an analysis of Power in primitive Societies\textsuperscript{250}, it is not the hierarchical imperative that makes the value of a wise chief, but the reflection on the state the society is in. The chief situates the society, rather than leads it. „Dem Mund des Häuptlings entströmen nicht die Worte, welche die Beziehung Befehl-Gehorsam sanktionieren, sondern der Diskurs der Gesellschaft über sich selbst.” (The chief’s mouth does not pour out the words sanctioning command and obey, but the discourse of society about itself. Translation A.W)

Following the argument Ann Tickner raises in an article on man, state and war\textsuperscript{251}, the possibility of the state turning from protector against the outside into a threat of internal security – the state mechanism with the leader as first man in arms bears an immanent threat of state terror as a purpose of power. Whereas the chieftdom in southern Sudan could only exist on the basis of consensus – and would turn from a star into a nothing, since the chief would be without the power of the war machine.

As Deleuze and Guattari describe the position of the chief „The chief is more like a leader or a star than a man of power and is always in danger of being disavowed, abandoned by his people.”\textsuperscript{252} In this sense, the protocols of interviews with Dinka chiefs, conducted and recorded by Francis M. Deng\textsuperscript{253}, as well as Nelson Mandela’s\textsuperscript{254} biography support this thesis. The cooption of chiefs by state authorities or armed groups with a claim to quasi-governmental authorities can be studied in Sudan in the following chapters. From the almost absolute denial of their power by the SPLA in their beginning\textsuperscript{255} in the early eighties to the chief’s current more twofold

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{248} More on the political structure of the Shilluk see, Peter A. Nyaba, „The Chollo Predictament: The Threat of Physical Extermination and Cultural Extinction of a People” (paper presented at the International Conference on Sudan, Durham (U.K.), September 2000).
  \item \textsuperscript{249} Francis Mading Deng, \textit{Dinka Cosmology} (London: Ithaca Press, 1980).
  \item \textsuperscript{252} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.}: 357
  \item \textsuperscript{253} Deng, \textit{Dinka Cosmology}.
  \item \textsuperscript{255} Although Douglas Johnson argues against this version of history, but might focus too much on northern Bahr el Ghazal in his argument. See Douglas Hamilton Johnson, \textit{The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, African Issues}. (Bloomington Kampala: Indiana University Press ; Fountain Publishers, 2003).
\end{itemize}
status. Chiefs in southern Sudan are again decision makers, mediators and monitors of their community, they also play a role in the SPLM/A structure. Chiefs are involved in matters of distribution as well as in the selection of members of the community for recruitment.

Not only the status but also the rules and regulation of leadership seem to be different in the context of chiefdom than in the state apparatus. They lead to the important understanding that this chiefdom is not equivalent with monarchy. Maybe the different, more multiple and conical rather than linear and progressive understanding of dispute and debate creates these deep differences. While in the polis majority rules, in the southern Sudanese village nothing is decided unless there is consensus. The idea of argumentation, based on competition and ranking, as inscribed in the western ideal of state is almost contrary to the long palaver, the repetitive discussion that lead the African, at least the Dinka and Transkei Chief to a final argument, solution or outlook.

The important question here, as in the model of democracy in Athens, is who has access to this decision-making fora and who is considered a full member of the group. Or, in Foucault's term, in what way is power here used differently? This is not the space to discuss the shortcomings of chiefdom models of representation. In a state of war the dominant logic usually restricts the possibility of consensual decisions. In the case of Sudan with more than 4 million people internally displaced or outside the country as refugees, the dominant rule is the rule of war. Consensual decision-making is in decline and militarized, authoritarian decision making is the norm. Nevertheless it is crucial for an understanding of the war in Sudan to describe the fundamental differences in community structure, leadership and rule.

By taking a look at different Southern Sudanese societies it is almost impossible to even detect the idea of the subject or to base it on individualism. The war, by destroying communities and disrupting entities, dislocating members of communities and destroying collective memory, caused an enormous change in the situating of the self in Southern Sudan. Neither the understanding of the population nor the chief, would lead to a state formation, human organization or even a discourse on society, that would not depart from a point of the lineage rather than individual.

At the same time connectedness and roots in a community is a mobilizing factor for armed conflicts, raids and attacks, mainly because of the motive of revenge. Tightly knitted community networks are also a fertile ground for mobilization and recruitment, since it does matter what the family and/or neighbors think. On the other hand, connectedness with lineage mainly guarantees caution with fair and ethical ‘warfare’ according to one’s fighter code of conduct. As Sharon Hutchinson elaborates extensively in Nuer Dilemmas a traditional code of conduct connected to a

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256 Interviews with various chiefs and people about the role of their chiefs in Bahr el Ghazal, Western Upper Nile and Equatoria in 1996, 1997 and 1999. The question of state and society in Africa will be discussed further in the chapter on military rule in Africa.

257 In almost all interviews with active female fighters for the EPLF in Eritrea community was seen as the main mobilizing factor. Specifically if influential people in the community were recruited, or if women came for recruitment, peer pressure what unavoidable for the remaining men.

258 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State.
embedded relationship of the individual in familial lineage prevents fighters from atrocities and abuses, since they always have to face not only the remaining enemy population but also their own ancestors as well as the ancestors of the person they killed. Though this is not the reality in war in Sudan now.

Lineage is used here as a means of placing the self in a continuum, rather than a terminated sequence of life. The person is informed and connected to those who lived before and is connected and accountable to those who will come after. The SELF is bigger than the sum of its parts in the worldliness of DASEIN. SOSEIN is an important aspect of the belief system. To bury the dead in the middle of the compound to be in daily conversation with them and to consult them in many decisions demonstrates the idea that the ancestors are part of life and part of the continuum of the SELF. This completely different form of human interaction needs to be taken into consideration, not only for differences in policy but also concerning differences in the idea and reality of military formation and strategies and understanding of war in general.

After debating the possible origins and initiations of war or the war machine and before debating the different types of war there are some more aspects to be taken into account. Different types of human organization, power and identity are essential discursive paradigms to war. According to Deleuze/Guattari\(^{260}\), those differences in the form of organization are also shaping the kind of war machine and military strategies. They define the three forms as lineal, territorial and numerical. Clan or ethnic group would be categorized as lineal form of genealogy. Even with the greatest segmentation, the most fragmentation, the belief to follow the ancestor line would not be disrupted. Even if number plays a role in this society, it is not the same role as numbers play in the military formation of a state army, in a territorial organized society. With the linear lineage of the clan and ethnic group, the earth, beside the ancestor line is one of the major points of structuring of life and grouping. „The earth is before all else the matter upon which the dynamic of lineage is inscribed, and the number, a means of inscription: the lineages write upon the earth and with the number, constituting a kind of geodesy.”\(^{261}\)

In difference to the clan, the state follows and installs territorial principle as its dominant determining factor. Not in understanding soil or earth as an organizing principle. As a means and not a matter. „Property is precisely the deterritorialized relation between the human being and the earth; this is so whether property constitutes a good belonging to the State, superposed upon continuing possession by a lineal community, or whether


\(^{260}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.

\(^{261}\) Ibid. p. 388
it itself becomes a good belonging to private individuals constituting a new community.\textsuperscript{262}

The territorial aspect leads beyond the states’ organization of disciplining the citizens through the military. Standardization by means of correction is an essential founding principle for the organization of all levels of society. The organizing principle is not based on individual or communal needs. States interest (or the leaders interest) are multiplied through discipline, becomes the identification pattern for each member of the state. The state and state formation is an important tool to reflect and distinguish different forms of war and war machines that even differ in the same mode of warfare or military grouping.

The interest of the clan war-machine is aimed on the extension of territory/power over a conceivable ground and a countable number of people. It has a direct goal with which most members of the clan or ethnic group agree. In the case of the majority of inter-tribal warfare in Sudan it is the question of water sources and grassing land for the cattle. The wars against Dinka and their northern neighbors, the Rizeigat or Murahaylins or the Dinka and Dinka raids or the Dinka-Nuer inter-tribal wars are all based on the desire or necessity to get more land, more cows, more women. The war machine of the state has an interest in fulfilling the desire of the ruling elite. That is not necessarily and in many cases fundamentally opposed to the needs of the population.

One could argue that the society that does not desire a state is more protected from the type of wars that evolve out of territorial interest and ambition for power and control. But since the war in Sudan is based on an understanding of the state by both angles, the regime in Khartoum as well as the SPLA, the aims and desires of the initial communities may not be reflected in the state-formation process of the north nor the insurgency of the south. Communities that do not internalize the concept and interests of the state might even create greater problems for their members. The communities that do not desire statehood should not, however be transfigured as pacifist or less violent, the motivation to wage a war or start a fight just seems to differ quite radically. Since war is depriving people from innocence in their desire, it might leave them unprepared for modern wars as well as modern state structures and intensify ‘innocent’ belief and desire for old structures, the past – that is in fact neither real nor valid in a state of war. The high occurrence of self-proclaimed spiritual movements, such as Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, its predecessor the Holy Spirit Movement lead by Alice Lakwena, and the spiritual blessings and horrific loyalty tests of Charles Taylor’s rebels are preached and implemented easier in a pre-state society, an ‘innocent’ structure. If people believe in their past and traditional structures but live in a completely different reality of new values and structures, insisting on the goodness of the old values might put them in a situation of passive apathy, where the desire for a strong leading force gives them what they miss – the past.

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.388
The implication of this hypothesis would be that people have to inform themselves, make use and possibly get involved in the hegemonic discourse. In the practical example of Southern Sudan, southerners would have to become citizens of Sudan, rather than members of their tribes or communities in order to act and react in or against the present reality of war and power.
III. 2 STATE FORMATION AS THE END OF INNOCENCE

Men go to war for a variety of individual reasons – adventure, honor, fear, comradeship, protection of ‘home and hearth’ – but socially organized legitimate violence needs a common goal in which the individual soldier can believe and which he shares with others.  
Mary Kaldor

Western observations, be they political, ethnological or anthropological, describe the decision for innocence as a constant of ‘primitive societies’. The decision against the state is read as inability rather than active refusal of an existence with a state. This is part and parcel of the major difference and of the struggle between North and South Sudan. The north with its political and social schemes based on the Islamic umma and its active involvement in British colonial administration, is far more settled in the idea of a state than the south. Following a ruler rather than a chief, as the Mahdia, in 19th century Sudan, is part of the political structure in the north. The party that claims to be the legitimate leading party, the umma party, mainly based on the followers of the Sunna Muslim Sect of the Ansar, is the party of the direct followers of the great Mahdi, the liberator and terminator of the British imperial forces under Lord Kitchener. The rationale of the umma party therefore is clearly based on the understanding of being the only legitimate state founder combined with a claim of authority for leading religious functions. It is almost the opposite of the Dinka structure of individual responsibility, chieftain and community decision. Both Sudanese state paradigms differ from the idea of state as found in the western concept of the Greek polis and also in actual democratic states. The modern forms of society organization, the states, are dependent on a clear, hierarchical stratification of society. It seems impossible to picture the state without the different power fields and authorities in terms of class and gender. The Greek polis as well as the modern state needs either the ‘barbarian slaves’ or Free Trade Zones in order to insure ones own standard of democracy. The state in Sudan needs internal hierarchies, based on lineage or religion. The economic factors inherent in ‘us and them’ philosophy function more closely in terms of lineage loyalty than in western examples of state formation.

263 Mary Kaldor, New& Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). p. 25. Why individualistic utilitarian calculations are not enough to justify risking death. (Mary Kaldor in arguing on the positivist concept of state interest that at large would be the driving force for successful armies).

264 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Disorder as Political Instrument, ed. African Issues, Africa Works (Oxford: James Currey, 1999). base their ideal of state on Weber’s model of the modern state, the disfunctionality of African states reflect the incapability of the population to convene and build a real state, no thought is spent on different models of pre-state societies possibly working in parts of Africa as well. Krippendorf, Staat Und Krieg: Die Historische Logik Politischer Unvernunft., is using the same assumption of failure rather than possible alternatives.

265 The struggle of the ‘Great Mahdi’ who fought against the British Colonizers and is seen as a hero for the Northern Sudanese, but is not seen as heroic in the South, for is involvement and support of the Slave trade, that made the Northern Sudanese the Slave traders of the Southern Sudanese Slaves.
Changes in the Dimensions of War

Because there is no pure ethnic group, community or nation there is a constant flux of mutual influence. Chinese black powder influenced war strategies all over the world, as did the war tactics of Sun Tzu on the Prussian military logic of Clausewitz. History of science and knowledge, in the European context, cannot be seen without the intermingled and highly influenced histories of Arabic (algebra, poetry), steppe-nomadic Asian (war machine, man-animal-warrior technique, metallurgy), Syrian, African (pyramid math and astrology) empires. Tribes and worlds, speed and barricades, mobility and phalanxes are as essential in the understanding of war as the image of soldier, feudal warrior, slave-soldier and tribal warrior.266

War does not only appear to be the decisive factor for the well being or suffering of people, it seems to become the deciding factor in international politics. The face of war has changed since the tactical and lethal games of feudal princes or the era of Sun Tzu, the master of war, (600 B.C.E.) in China. The consequences, the routine and the mechanisms have changed as well as the regulatory approaches to handle war, to solve wars or to manage crises.

The first factor of five for successful wars, which Sun Tzu267 established in his book, the ‘Art of War’ is moral law. Moral Law, according to Sun Tzu is: people in complete accord with their ruler. The same factor, that later would substantiate all just war arguments, the complete accord with the sovereign, underlines the arguments of Locke, Kant and other advocates of social contracts. War is far from an exclusive means of politics. War is not only used to regulate questions of territorial presence or power over labor. War became a regulative method used for almost all crises. The use of a retaliatory feuding, such as cattle raids carried out by influential forces, lead to wars. War can be triggered by individuals – as in Kosovo or Liberia, by beliefs of individuals – as in Sudan or Afghanistan and by the reversal of welfare into direct link of national resources to feudal arms-trade – as in Somalia, to mention a few examples. But war needs a foundation, needs an atmosphere, an acceptance of a particular logic to start and to be nourished. There is no need to mobilize an army, no need for a government, and no need for failed negotiations to use war as a means of politics. The war in Liberia does not involve armies, but gangs; the war in Sudan does not involve two states, but one.

266 John Keegan, Die Kultur Des Krieges (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1997). (A history of warfare. New York, London: Alfred Knopf. 1993) Keegan is referring to the massive changes from the Assyrian army in the 7th Century, BC the phalanx as a barricade, the banning of gunpowder by Japanese Samurais in fear of power loss. The history of the Mameluke army using young non-Muslim men, trained for war, as well as the warrior state of Sparta. The fundamental changes with the invention of gun-powder and the mobility of cannons in the change of war concepts.

War does not need an army, it does not even need sophisticated arms – for the genocide in Rwanda machetes fulfilled the purpose of killing almost one million people in the course of only a few weeks.

The shift from statesmen who regulated old wars towards influential decision makers, peace brokers and conflict managers is evident in many wars. More and more wars are set and stopped (or transformed) by outside negotiators, by grassroots groups or by the denial of war-prolonging services of the international players such as the NGO and UN-agencies.

Information workers and NGOs become internationally paid, locally active players in wars that are only superficially described as national wars. To quote Mary Kaldor again on the role of NGOs in political as well as socio-economic dimensions of the globalization (and regionalization) of wars:

Parallel to the changing nature of governance has been a striking growth in informal non-governmental transnational networks. These include NGOs – both those which undertake functions formerly undertaken by governments, e.g. humanitarian assistance, and those which campaign on global issues, e.g. human rights, ecology, peace, etc.

This issue will be discussed in length in the following chapter on the case of SPLA and the influence of the international NGO community on the internal administration. In light of the introductory phase of war, rebel techniques for just war legitimization, there are three rough rebel lines to be separated. One technique is to give the power over governmental tasks and functions to the international arena of NGOs and UN-agencies. The mechanisms used are; a) neglecting of those fields of political, economic and social administration, b) expectation of complete humanitarian service c) control over the distribution and d) acknowledgment as the facilitators of this emergency-situation regulations. The rational is the lack of capacity, since the main focus of the rebel is the militaristic rebel technique of armed conflict. Two other rebel techniques concerning the functions of a government could be drawn from the example of EPLF and the EZLN. EPLF was trying to simulate and practice government like functions in the parallel-universe of the liberated areas. The intention of EZLN in Chiapas is twofold: to make the government in power face their administrative government tasks while at the same time, before negotiating with the government the EZLN is trying to run a referendum on various issues to represent the people in whose name they fight.

The various forms of support, interference and influence the international world exerts toward the rebel techniques used in governmental tasks are quite different.

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269 Ibid.

270 To strengthen this argument, one must only follow the official statements of the SPLA insisting on the logic that peace in Sudan is only to be gained by further fighting.
In simplified terms it seems that in the case of SPLA, OLS is replacing, in part, the function of SRRA. For EPLF after the end of the last war, the government functions been executed by the ex-guerrilla then government in power. In quite an unexpected and unusual political move, the Eritrean government rejected international NGO support on the basis of unwanted interference in internal politics. For the EZLN it seems that international support or interference is not based so much in NGOs but more in political support via the Internet, as well as through the support of political activists.

The Commodification of Killing

The psychological side of war may not have changed so much over the centuries; yet, the number of people exposed to this ‘psychological’ trauma has increased tremendously. War has lost its monolithic, monstrous singularity and become an omnipresent reality. This is true in reality and in medial representation. More people are exposed to the first and more people get used to the dominant logic through the second. The limits of war are waged in completely different patterns. While the bestiality and brutality of war could be measured in the number of civilians killed in an armed conflict, the number of war casualties does not seem to be a viable measurement. Low intensity, civil war types of conflict are portrayed, and undoubtedly really are brutal, while high-tech, postmodern wars appear to happen almost without blood. Even though the number of civilian casualties might be in no relation.

Another aspect of post-modern war that of the exterrioriality of the message the war is aimed at should not be overlooked. Its victims are more often civilians and its target group is either the international community or individual states. As Robin May Schott defines postmodern war and its affects on writings on war, it is the spectactorship, the spectacular violence and the global audience that makes this new warfare postmodern: “Postmodern wars are fought by and for the media. Hostage-taking, hijacking, videotaping of rapes to be aired on the evening news, creates a theatricalisation of violence.”

The effect of machines and computer simulations on defense intellectuals and soldiers are described in detail in Carol Cohen’s reports on the theme.

In more general terms and with regard to what is portrayed as the public image of war, Hables-Gray remarks on U.S. military armed encounters in the last decade. The two main benefits for soldiers who have been replaced by machines are described in

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terms of the real physical as well as psychological dimension of killing. “The confirmed killing of thousands of civilians in Iraq would constitute a terrible war crime if they had been killed by solders with knives or hand guns.” The assumption made here would lead to the thesis, that there is no valid separation in wars fought by state armies of civilized democracies, versus brutalized armed marauding gangs, massacring civilians for no reason. The public image of these fighting parties seems to be the decisive factor.

The War Machine

In the reading of feminist conflict theorists the war system as well as militarism is predominantly based on coercion and the assumption of unequal value among and between human beings. Militarism is therefore the communication of the assumption that military values and policies are conductive to a secure and orderly society. Since war still is fundamentally about killing, the role of the body in war, the war of pleasure and of emotional dysfunction has to be taken into account. I consider these aspects as fundamental in understanding political developments. Since the core concern of my thesis is the representation of women in guerrilla war in Sudan, this sideline discourse will be kept brief. There is a body of debate in feminist conflict theory on the consequences of war on the individual and the psyche of the self, which I consider relevant, but leads too far to be discussed here. This chapter will not define and qualify the differences between regular armies, guerrillas, rebels, revolutionary war, low intensity conflict, internal war, war of independence and the like. In this chapter the ideological frame, the emotional destruction, the bonding and the cuts of social relations are central. The idea of grouping and mapping different war strategies and how they are interwoven with civilian strategical techniques are relevant for the understanding of specific wars. This linkage becomes even more relevant when reflecting the gendered dimension of civilian-fighter relations in war, pre- and post-war situations, and the transition from war to post war becomes more blurred. According to Klaus Theweleit, every post-war phase of a lost war is the preparation for re-winning a nation’s strength. America’s way of re-winning the Vietnam War was described by Susan Jeffords as The Feminization of Loss – a civil war. Its main rule: women lose, men don’t. So, whoever made that mistake of losing the Vietnam War: he had to be brought into some humiliating connection with femininity. Jeffords called that civil war for re-winning the Vietnam War the Remasculinization of America.

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274 Betty Reardon quoted after Runyan, „The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversion of Ir Theory.“ pp. 82.

275 Klaus Theweleit, Carol Cohen, Barbara Ehrenreich and the non-conflict theory oriented feminist debatents such as Carol Gilligan and Nancy Chodorow all link the experience of killing, active use of violence, mutilation of another body to the establishment of the dis-embodied self. I consider this psychological oriented approach as quite important, nevertheless I do see the restrictions of this thesis.

276 Theweleit, „The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War.“ pp. 284
Since general questions of what makes human beings violent or why there are wars do not really lead to an analytical understanding. The moment of change, the decisive second from preparation to actual war might bring some clarification. War is not discussed as the direct result of violence. Both, war and violence are part of a logic that needs to be examined. The transformation from a non-war condition is imbedded in the internalized war-logic in all spheres of society, private, public, national, international; with war-logic as an acceptance of the possibility of war. The damping of consciousness to be empowered to use violence, to identify with the ‘class’ of those who are entitled to take power and who assume the use of power through violence their inherited birth right as man.

Logic of War

It is the environment, the atmosphere, and the roughness of people, the fear and anger in their faces and the change of direction and life decisions that indicate war. As Ken Saro Wiwa writes in Sozaboy there is no real imagination of what war would be like, and the ones coming back and telling stories are telling stories, that those staying at home will not be able to understand. They don’t have the receptors for images coming from this parallel existing universe: war.

As John Keegan writes in the introduction to Die Kultur des Krieges:

Der Krieg unterscheidet sich schon deshalb vollkommen von Diplomatie und Politik, weil Männer ihn führen müssen, deren Werte und Fähigkeiten nicht die von Politikern oder Diplomaten sind. Sie gehören einer anderen, sehr alten Welt an, die neben der Welt des Alltags existiert, aber nicht zu ihr gehört. (War differs from diplomacy and politics because men are leading it, whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They belong to another world, a very old world that exists parallel but does not belong to this world. Translation A.W)

Saro Wiwa’s main character is eager to become somebody. Paradoxically, he chooses to become this somebody by becoming nobody, a number in the headcount of armed soldiers. Saro Wiwa describes the preparation and the discourse that creates the idea of war, which finally leads into a concrete encounter, a real war.

Chris Hables Gray formulates war as a discourse, as a conversation, between the different parties in the conflict. A conception of the enemy is important if war is to survive. Following Michele Foucault’s idea of systems of power and knowledge, war could be defined as a discursive system of power and knowledge, the discourse based on a shared understanding and acceptance of power. An understanding of the political logic of warfare, of the gendered-social predisposition of masculinity and femininity as a collective motivation and of a hidden or open understanding of the economic dimension of war. It is faulty to assume that the cultural, political and

277 Ken Saro Wiwa, Sozaboy (München: dtv, 1997).
278 Keegan, Die Kultur Des Krieges. p. 18
econmic aspects of war are debated openly in relation to war. But it is safe to assume that the standard preparation and repetition of the logic is imbedded in the national or global discourse.

Legitimate actors, soldiers and decision makers and the understanding of the necessity of militarized enactment of masculinity as the leading form of being, functions universally. Claiming rationality while at the same time showing irrationality and helplessness because there seems to be no sophisticated way to solve the problem than to send people into war has to be based on foundational patterns and paradigms inside a society. It is necessary that the majority understands war or at least by those who are the power-keepers of information as a productive solution, as something else than an irrational, sadistic act initiated by somebody who feels threatened and now convinces others to die in his name.

As Michael Ignatieff illustrates in his book ,The Warrior's Honour, it is a quite complex fictional notion, that must be repeated in it's absurdity, that makes people fight each other. He is linking the fiction to the constitution of the myth of a solid and pre-existent identity, a national identity that is, which is necessary in order to create the enemy as the other. Condensed in a formula, Ignatieff's assembly line of fictional identity works in four steps. Note here the causative order: first the collapse of the overarching state, then Hobbesian fear, and only then nationalist paranoia, followed by warfare.

How do people know it is war, are they told on TV, by others, do they wait for attacks – does the atmosphere in the village, town or country change? As we know from the genocide in Rwanda, the media, in this case broadcasting, played a major role in mobilizing and recruiting. They aired inflammatory programs in the week prior to the killings as well as during the massacres. Even where an official media is lacking, war is spread through word of mouth faster than through fired bullets. The ritual of official declarations of war are not only a sign from the past in Africa; NATO did not consider it important to officially declare war against Yugoslavia in 1999, although one of the Preconditions of what would count as war, a formal declaration is essential.

And why do people join wars, insurgencies and revolutions? Is it out of economic considerations only or is repression what leads to the decision to join an insurgency?

The fine line between the frontlines or civilian life does not exist any more. The ones shooting are not the ones who are trained soldiers, everybody can take part in a war and nobody plays by the rules.

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280 Ibid. p.45
In an official document on behalf of the 50th anniversary of the Geneva Convention – the International Committee for the Red Cross voiced their concerns for the decreasing authority of the Convention. Binding standards, rules or war and codes of conduct are hardly considered or followed any more. What could be considered common law and intrinsic in all domestic law; not to kill civilians, not to torture women and children, not to attack civilian targets is hardly considered by consensus in any of the actual conflicts.

On the contrary, part of counterinsurgency tactic is to target the civilian population, since in highly politicized and idealized wars civilians are potentially the enemy. As one Contra commander explained before going into an ambush: “Pirucuaco is a derogatory term, meaning rabid dog, we used for the Sandinistas, so in effect Surdo was saying “If you kill a woman, you’re killing a Sandinista, if you kill a child, you’re killing a Sandinista.” And off we went to kill women and children.

Wars have changed and the link between violence on and off the battlefield becomes much more obvious. To distinguish the action of a soldier from a blatant criminal act becomes less legitimate. It is yet still the institutionalization of violence and the monopolization of this institutionalized violence that distinguishes war parties from marauding criminals. Interesting in this context is the refusal of the United States to subscribe to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the regulation of accountability of individual soldiers. In the history of UN peace keeping missions the conduct of individual soldiers amounts to crimes punishable by the ICC (torture and rape) have increased. The international community is opting for international legislation that calls for the accountability of soldiers on peace missions. The United States are the only country refusing to subscribe to this act, they claim soldiers cannot be held responsible for individual acts by international law but only under US military law. This attitude is widespread in modern wars, individual soldiers don’t consider themselves responsible, the army is backing them even when clearly committed severe human rights violations. A question of common interest, state interest or national aim is less and less likely the motivation of the fighters. The change from just war legitimation inspired by religious and spiritual righteousness or revolutionary arguments to pure war are dominant in the analyses of war. In the reality of war, pure war, the deep penetration of war into culture, politics, economy and dominant logic is rare.

Mary Kaldor distinguishes in her book on globalized violence in a global era, New & Old Wars, the adequate and inadequate motivations of warfare. Not only state interest but also individual utilitarian calculations are not enough to justifying death.

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282 http://www.icrc.org/
284 Pure war is interpreted along the definition of Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer, Der Reine Krieg (Berlin: Merve, 1984). as well as Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict.
In an interesting analysis, Kaldor detaches war-logic from state interest. The old motivation of war in the realm of a national war economy does not count any more.

War, as van Creveld points out, is a proof that men are not selfish. No individualistic utilitarian calculation can justify risking death. The main reason why mercenary armies were so unsatisfactory is that economic incentive is, of its nature, inadequate as a motivation for warfare. The same is true of 'state interest' — a concept that derives from the same school of positivistic thinking that gave rise to modern economics. Men go to war for a variety of individual reasons — adventure, honor, fear, comradeship, protection of 'home and hearth' — but socially organized legitimate violence needs a common goal in which the individual soldier can believe and which he shares with others. If soldiers are to be treated as heroes and not as criminals, then heroic justification is needed to mobilize their energies, to persuade them to kill and risk being killed.

In the wars we are facing today and partly in the case of Sudan, it is not true anymore, that soldiers kill the unknown, intruding enemy. The people that kill and die in war are more alike than direct opponents. In many cases they either had been living together rather harmonically or fought next to each other. Paradoxically, even under these conditions, the numbers of volunteers are plenty. Mobilizing people to die for a hierarchical authority, such as a king, knight, emperor, or for more abstract reasons, such as a tribe, city, country or nation does not seem to be a major obstacle.

To obey and follow goes beyond the pure individualistic interest of men to become the most wanted, strongest, most fearless and toughest one within their group.

I would like to split the following thoughts into four different categories.

**Changes in Speed and Space**

"In the war of mechanical speed against human reactions, bodies are the only real losers."

Chris Hables Gray

Barbara Ehrenreich, in her book Blood Rites, draws a line from hunting and religious sacrifices to legitimized bloodshed in war. One aspect that Ehrenreich’s analysis shares with many other theorists of war is the transformative factor of speed. The increasing speed of the bullet, the speed of information impacted on our understanding of war and the world in general. From gathering to hunting, the ability to be mobile and the ability to insert speed to a tool, such as the spear and the arrow becomes the foundation not only for a progressive understanding of time and space but possibly as well a change in gender dynamics. Paul Virilio and

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Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on the connected transformation of societies and the evolution of what Deleuze/Guattari call ‘the linkage of the state and the war machine’. Initially Deleuze/Guattari place the idea of the war machine in nomadic living, a non-state organism, one that is connected to trade and interaction with others. The evolution and progress of a military system, on the other hand, has to be seen in close connection with the formation of towns.

People of the steppe are not known for political, economic or social regimes but for innovations in war, such as weapons, strategies and technology. Though the introduction of gunpowder and cannons mark a limit to the nomadic war machine since they imply an economic investment only a state apparatus can afford. Towns exist through fluctuation of people, information, goods, plagues and innovations. The nomadic tribe is contrary to the state as a form of exteriority, whereas the state forms and controls the interiority. That does not only explain why nomads have not really seemed interested in state-based conceptions of a political system but says more about the horrendous problem of the state in dealing with nomads. The state as a system of control, correction, power and unification needs structured unifying identity yet in addition considers the nomads as a part of its inhabitants.

Using the nomad as a signifier for guerrillas and the formation of rebel armies, the similarity lies in their mobility. Their formation is fueled by economic transactions rather than taxation, rules and regulations of state formations. War machine is used here as a term is not meant to situate war as intrinsic to the nomadic system, it refers more to the chronological understanding of war machines and describes the differences in method and form of wars. Deleuze/Guattari question if the object of the war machine has to necessarily be war?

Speaking like Aristotle, we would say that war is neither the condition nor the object of the war machine, but necessarily accompanies or completes it; speaking like Derrida, we would say that war is the ‘supplement’ of the war machine. Finally, speaking like Kant, we would say that the relation between war and the war machine is necessary but ‘synthetic’.

I am using this quote because it is important to consider when discussing the meaning of warfare in southern Sudan temporally as well as in its gendered dimension. The war-machine in Sudan defines a different reality than the type of war people are currently opposing in the north. The war-machine is much more connected to a structure of social organization where initiation to different stages of personal

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290 Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*. Braidotti has an interesting, yet deeply problematic understanding of a changing society that bases its identity not on the state or on the fiction of national identity any more, but situates itself in non-territorial understanding of identity and belonging. For an overwhelmingly huge number of people in Africa and for more than 4.5 million people from Sudan this is reality – that they did not necessarily choose. Even if the critical point in Braidotti’s exemplification of identity shifts is its exclusivist, rather Eurocentric reading, the reality shift she describes and the question of regulation and situation is true even for people that are forced to become nomads. It is an important point widely discussed in my research in southern Sudan, where the majority of people had to leave their place of living at a time at least once, and where the positive and negative aspects of transforming identities had been vividly discussed.

responsibility, proving one's ability to take part in battle and trials of strength are more the issue than attack and defense of a state. Deleuze/Guattari describe the war machine as an invention and necessity linked to the nomads, who do not obey state law, boundaries, the police, prison system nor the militarized principle of the state:

Every thought is already a tribe, the opposite of a State. And this form of exteriority of thought is not at all symmetrical to the form of interiority. Strictly speaking, symmetry exists only between different poles or focal points of interiority. But the form of exteriority of thought – the force that is always external to itself, or the final force, the nth power – is not at all another image in opposition to the image inspired by the State apparatus. It is, rather, a force that destroys both, the image and its copies, the model and its reproductions, every possibility of subordinating thought a model of the True, the Just, or the Right (Cartesian truth, Kantian just, Hegelian right, etc). 292

I refer to this model not only to explain the deeper idea of the war machine and its beginning as a force and means unsynchronized with formulas in the state apparatus, but also as a means for the preparation of fighters and soldiers according to a code of conduct, an order of discipline. This is a war influenced by the wide connections of the nomads, the mappings, the exploring and expanding aims that are of a temporary interest. However even if rebel groups use decentralized military tactics, their ultimate goal, the takeover of state structures in their understanding of the state and their means of control is by no means connected to the nomadic pattern. Though the mechanisms used to achieve this goal have similarities with the war machine of the nomadic description.

It was, as Deleuze/Guattari argued, a war machine invented and installed out of the need of territorial protection, the fear of losses and the fear of intruders. The war machine did not start from a fortress but perhaps from the back of a horse.

I would like to link this idea of the origin of war with different spectrums of society influenced by unique socioeconomic aspects, political and technical inventions.

It is remarkable how war historians seem to be caught up in the logic of war, since most references simply describe and analyze the efficiency of war related command decisions.

Speed/Space/Time

Speed was mentioned above as a fundamental factor in the methodology of warfare. The understanding of time and space is closely linked to this factor. The current debates on post-modern warfare, primarily the media as an internal factor of military logic and Gidden's 293 notion of time-space distanciation as the founding principle and perpetuation of modernity, might reflect on the meaning and transformation of time and

292 Ibid. p. 377.

space in the Sudanese context. Virilio\textsuperscript{294} elaborates on the relationship of speed to the military not only in the military hierarchy of battlefield formations but also in the connection of speed with wealth and wealth as the primary ground for war. Virilio uses ‘democratic’ as a model for military priority – the production of speed. He asserts that war is contingent on basic preparation for war. In this preparation, the fortification of the city,\textsuperscript{295} construction of an organized army, discipline and strategy – the element of uncontrollable auto-dynamic mechanisms is inherit. The tendency towards ecstatic moments with an explosive venting is immanent to war. For Virilio, since war is political, the ‘Steigerung zum Äußersten’ (Clausewitz) is inhibited. If war becomes less political (but possibly entirely economic) the total venting will reach total destruction.

The time and space factor becomes important for those who are not affected by the war and might continue their life without any outside influence. It is, however, an important factor for those who are affected by the war. The ‘absent other’ as Anthony Giddens calls the agent of social relations in post-modernity becomes standard in the reality of the southern Sudanese.

In pre-modern societies, space and place largely coincided, since the spatial dimension of social life are, for most of the population ... dominated by ‘presence’ – by localized activity...

Modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction. In conditions of modernity...locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them. What structures the locale is not simply that which is present on the scene; the ‘visible form’ of the locale conceals the distanced relation which determines its nature.\textsuperscript{296}

Speed is one of the relevant factors for the progress of military techniques and the transformation of the war machine, implying that time plays a great role in understanding and contextualizing being. For western models of state formation, based on the Greek polis, the cut or the severing of the individual from the lineage is a fundamental given. For Plato and his ideas about the guardianship-machine located in Sparta\textsuperscript{297} the initial disruption of family loyalties for possible male and female guardians is essential. The importance of lineage, bonding between people or understanding of human organization in Platos’ writing is based in Athens, not in Sparta.\textsuperscript{298}

\textsuperscript{294} Virilio and Lotringer, \textit{Der Reine Krieg}, p.47.

\textsuperscript{295} The reference to Deleuze, Guattari and their digression on the city/state and nomadic war machine is interesting in this context.


\textsuperscript{298} Interestingly in difference to his understanding of guardians as man and woman alike, the gendered setting of Athens as the political center of the ancient Greek State model is different. In Athens, unlike Sparta, women are situated in the private sphere, the house, the family with the children and caring labor. Men’s sphere – as the exclusive group of wealthy Greek man of certain families and social standards – is the public, where public covers education, science knowledge, expertise, carpentry, politics, rhetoric and love. (As for the art of poetry and emotional relationships it was mainly male homosexual relations that are mentioned. Heterosexual sex and relations had been seen as purely economical entities and means of
In an elaboration of Deleuze/Guattari, war would be a mechanism of preservation of state as well as status. \(\ldots\) War maintains the dispersal and segmentary of groups, and the warrior himself is caught in a process of accumulating exploits leading him to solitude and a prestigious but powerless death.\(^{299}\)

Warrior tradition and initiation is crucial for the understanding of the war in Sudan. How modern warfare changed a holistic and complete social setting and value system based on the shared hermeneutics of time, Dasein and power. These changes are not only fundamental for individual, gendered citizenship and warrior images. The changes in warfare or despite a nation state, the transformation of speed in warfare and its ethics are essential. Not only who is in power and on what basis, but also the changes in the concept of power, rule and leadership as well as loyalty need to be studied and conceptualized in the case of the war in Sudan. Wars fought over the access to grazing land, limited in time on an inter-tribal bases with strict regulations of compensation towards the other tribal war party clashed with inner-state war on the question of political power and territorial rule. How did this affect the warrior image and the understanding of state, nation and leadership? The dimension of war economy as well as the interest of international proxy wars as a transformatory factor have to be taken into consideration. All these are questions that need to be asked in order to understand the war. Is the gap of cognition taken into consideration by analysts and the people themselves and is this gap functionalized by the leaders to confirm and strengthen their power?

By the gap of cognition I am aiming to what Jana Thompson described when referring to feudal systems of warrior classes. With a limited awareness and a directed and controlled information flow, it is inevitable that the majority of people in places like Sudan are not aware of the international factors of the war. Some might not even be aware of the dimension of the war the country or the people concerned. For the leaders of the war the range of cognition is quite different. Leading figures are quite often trained in the West. They have lived abroad, been educated either in one of the former colonial powers or the United States. At best they could be considered to be well aware of the differences between western concepts of state and the concepts of community in their countries of origin. Yet they could also use their knowledge to reinstate traditional values against the decadent influences of the West, as Hassan al Turabi\(^{300}\) is preaching in Sudan. He makes use of western methodology, collective memory and the role of leaders in traditional society settings. It seems quite tempting to use the power of knowledge and restrict others from participating or benefiting from it. Unless there is the need for change in the society, politics, by marriage and family bonding. The understanding of family in Southern Sudan is as well not necessarily connected to love but to the economic entity as family represents. The myth of complete and complementary unities in heterosexual couples as basis of family and society had not existed persistently.

\(^{299}\) Clastres after Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, p. 357

\(^{300}\) Hassan al Turabi, leader of the Muslim brothers and intellectual architect of the 1989 military coup under General Omar el Bashir. Turabi is the founder of the National Islamic Front and mentor of many Islamist groups in Sudan.
either from an historic understanding of the chief as a disposable leader in a system rejecting the state and/or from rejection of the colonization that was far from installing a democratic system, but focused on destroying the nomadic war machine and replacing it with a state apparatus war machine, the abuse of power by the leaders seems to continue. Concepts are used as they serve the purpose of the moment: Afro-Marxism with neo-capitalism, repressive traditionalist identity patterns with formal democratic leadership claims.

Changes in Economic and State Dimension

“(…) Hinter diesem Krieg steht der Massenbankrott, steht das Massenelend, steht die Massenarbeitslosigkeit, die große Hungersnot. (Widerspruch von rechts) Das wollen sie bestreiten? (Zuruf von rechts: Nach jedem Krieg wird es besser!)”
August Bebel, Rede vor dem Reichstag, 2. Marokkokrise 1911

(Behind this war we see the mass bankruptcy, mass misery, mass unemployment, and famine. (Dissent from the right) You want to disagree? (Shout from the right: After every war it gets better) Translation A.W.)

“Where the army is, prices are high; when prices rise the wealth of the people is exhausted. When wealth is exhausted the peasantry will be afflicted with urgent extraction. With strength thus depleted and wealth consumed, the household in the central plains will be utterly impoverished and seven-tenth of their wealth dissipated.”
Li Ch’uan

“If war drags on without cessation men and women will resent not being able to marry, and will be distressed by the burdens of transportation.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War p. 74

One aspect of war that is fundamental and influential but still not the main reason for the majority of people to participate in war is the economy. The part of the economy I would like to focus on is the economy of the war machine. The economy for this reason becomes an aspect of the war, rather than the war being situated with in the economy. There are many sectors of private capitalist economy or internationally owned economic structures that are linked to war. The fuel of the war machine is directly linked to each and every aspect of the economy in Sudan. Oil as well as agricultural schemes, humanitarian aid as well as private business, taxation as well as development aid, diplomatic relations as well as the de-localized, non-nationalized military-industrial complex. Administration, policing, bureaucracy, the banks, schools and industry are tremendously interwoven with the war. Innovations are tailored for war, mapping, cartography, vehicles, technical innovations, transport have to proof their usefulness in war before given to the civil population.
War economy is replacing political economy. Economic changes play a fundamental

302 There is an endless number of technical innovations and discoveries used for military purposes. From space travel to teflon, from the telephone to the computer.
role for changes in war. Because of the primacy of war, the changes in the economy serve the needs of war.

For Virilio and for Foucault the existence of a war discourse is linked to economic changes in society. For Foucault, who is more focused on the progress of control, bureaucracy and the state, the enlightenment and the era of reason plays a pressing role in the legitimization process of police presence, whereas war is described as the policy of the exterior. For him the question of conservation of power structures and the installation of new ones, all in the name of rationalization, is linked to an understanding of normalization and control. War logic is a self-legitimizing process by basing itself on the columns of ratio and progress. Economic dynamics play an increasing role in the institutionalization of the state apparatus of control and war. For the development of war, military and the state the economy of the war machine plays a big role.

In Sudan the main economic aspect in 1999 is the exploration of oil and the question of capacity and sustainability. In other countries in the region, such as DRC, Angola or Eritrea, Ethiopia, the war is fought over access to resources. As almost all analysts agree, oil is exacerbating the conflict in Sudan. The report of the CSIS task force on US-Sudan Policy is basing its recommendation on reports by human rights groups on the connection between oil and human rights violations in Sudan.

Oil is fundamentally changing Sudan's war. It is shifting the balance of military power in favor of Khartoum. It has prompted Khartoum to focus its military efforts, including forced mass displacements of civilians, on oil fields and the pipeline. Oil has also become an integral element of Khartoum's external partnerships with states and corporations. At the same time, however, the internal coherence and strength of the government in Khartoum remains uncertain and Sudan remains poor.

To link the war-machine with the economy, Deleuze/Guattari differentiate between nomadic and state-war-machines. The question in relation to Sudan, where there seems to be mixture of both with a tendency towards the nomadic machine, would be whether the nomadic war-machine is a functional model in the tight net of global economy. Without a state-based interest the nomad war-machine in DRC would not function. It becomes more and more irrelevant where the state is based, where the cities are built or where the war-bureaucracy is developed. The fighter, soldier and


Peter Verney, "Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan," (Hebden Bridge: A Sudan Update Report, 1999).
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/
warrior are seen as prolonged means of enforcement rather than as personalized guarantors of the idea of the state or the community. 306

Economic dimensions here are multifaceted and range from technological and industrial power as production units towards the changes of a national economy tailored according to the needs of war or an economy as a reason for war. Some of the key facets of modern economy are directly traced to military demands (railroads, roads, steel production), not necessarily for an actual war but as an optimizing factor in preparation to war. For modern wars, technical development and innovations are mainly established in a militarized context. Military spending is extremely high. Military laboratories and scientific projects, unlike civilian projects normally have more money to spend. Technical novelties such as the Internet are often military spin-offs. The effort that is made to keep the war machine producing is on the average higher than the effort to educate or even feed the population of a state or to invest in medical or social research. This does not greatly differ between western democracies and third world dictatorships.

Whereas from the period of the twelfth to the nineteenth century, Michael Mann calculates that the English state spent between 70 and 90 percent of the English financial resources. Resources "were continuously devoted to the acquisition and use of the instruments of military force, especially in international wars." 307

According to the Human Development Report 2000308, Sudan’s military expenditure increased from 149 million US$ in 1985 to in 1996, 397 million US$. That is an increase of military expenditure in percent of GDP from 3.2% in 1985 to 4.3% in 1996. Although on a comparative basis this does not appear to be too high, the former Minister of Finance, Abdel Wahab Osman, announced in 1999 that oil revenues will bring an income of 1.2 billion US$ annually, the military expenditure since the first shipment of oil from Sudan is growing tremendously.

306 Virilio, Deleuze, Guattari as well as Thompson debating the economic aspects of the state based war-machine on the understanding of the European war and nation structure. City and protective measures against the untimely factor of the nomadic war-machine needs a certain economic structure. From the feudal warrior class to the fragmentation of life and living conditions as well as identities armies could be developed. The army is a reference of protected people and territory.


309 Abdel Wahab Osman, Reuters, 4 January 2000. The arms trade to Sudan is non transparent, since the EU arms embargo is still in place and most of the shipments are from China, Malaysia and Eastern European countries. For further information see Lora Lumpe, Running Guns: The Global Market in Small Arms (London: Zed Books, 2000).TV documentations by Damien Lewis (BBC) as well as reports from SIPRI, BICC, Omega as well as Amnesty International (MSP).
Eros of War

The Eros of war sometimes seems far fetched, in representations by the media and in oral, war-related history it is quite obvious that the Eros of war is, on the contrary, quite central. Violence as a widely used means of power has been discussed at length in decades of feminist literature as well as in conflict studies.310

Soldiers, defense intellectuals and military experts alike mention the excitement, beauty and the eroticism of the speed and the sounds of war. Though the issue of the Eros of war is hardly considered worth political analysis. For J. Glenn Gray, philosopher and soldier pleasure and attraction of war lies in camaraderie and the delight of destruction.311 Or, as Negeste,312 one of the demilitarized active EPLF fighters said: “War was life in full. It was the only time, when every minute made sense, when all were one and when the idea of the individual was not there. It was a strong life and it made us strong people.”

The spectacle of warfare, the choreography of troops and tactics, the beauty of explosions is not something only soldiers experience. Combat high is the excitement of totality and fundamental solutions and what makes people cheer in front of a TV screen during the nightly bombardment of Baghdad. For Paul Virilio313 war, the preparation and the spectacle are one; “War can never break free from the magical spectacle because its very purpose is to produce that spectacle.”

There is an important difference between the sexualization of war and the eros of war, as the sexualized emotion of killing and combat high.

The use of sexualized or sexy language appears to be informed by different purpose; for the defense intellectual the sexiness in language comes with the abstract, sanitized language of facts and numbers in order not to speak the unspeakable, the effect and impact of ones own creation. The sexualized use of the language of killing as well as the description of the killer is more closely linked to the domesticated act of killing and to bringing it in line with the rules of enactment of full masculinity.

As Carol Cohn reported of her one-year experience at an intellectual defense think tank, the use of a militarized, masculinized language is essential for the maintenance and continuity of a constructed myth of war and killing as a surgical solution. In the quote, she is referring to physicist working on war scenarios.

Several colleagues and I were working on modeling counterforce attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different developments. At one point, we remodeled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being thirty-six million immediate fatalities,

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310 I would like to refer to chapter entities 2 and 4 for these debates. Militarization of the life of civilians will be discussed throughout subchapters 6.


312 Interviews conducted during my field research in Eritrea from March to May 1997.

there would only be thirty million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying, “Oh yeah, that’s great, only thirty million,” when all of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, “Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking – Only thirty million! Only thirty million human beings killed instantly?” Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.  

And further Cohn analyses:

They use language that is abstract, sanitized, full of euphemisms; language that is sexy and fun to use; paradigms whose referent is weapons; imagery that domesticates and deflates the forces of mass destruction; imagery that reverses sentient and non-sentient matter, that conflates birth and death, destruction and creation.

The equation of killing with procreation is discussed in various contexts. While Theweleit or Cohen would argue that killing, or being the destructive creator of a successfully fired bomb, is an act of masculine creation, of giving birth.

To become innocent again, you have to kill. That’s one of the giggling rules of male logic. Women give birth to something different from themselves. Men give birth to themselves living in New World Orders. Men are re-born by killing. They always stand up. Resurrected out of something that dies around them. You have to deal with that logic or metamorphosis when dealing with war. War ranks high among the male ways of giving birth.

Although Theweleit’s concept is based on a very biologist and essentialist understanding of gender, I find it useful to take another look on the construction of militarized logic based on masculinity. Masculinity, in my understanding, does not necessarily correspond with real existing man nor does it exclude women.

**I am Become Death, Destroyer of Worlds (Shiva)**

Oppenheimer’s Baby, [First atomic bomb], Oppenheimer, named father of the year by the American Baby Association, “Privileged to witness the birth of the world” [witness of the first Trinity test], “Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the little boy is as husky as his big brother.”

Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves’ official cable reporting success of the same test to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson

For Dave Grossman, a Lieutenant Colonel of the US army who wrote a book on killing, it is a question of sex, not of creation: “In a way, the study of killing in combat is very much like the study of sex. Killing is a private, intimate occurrence of tremendous

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314 Cohn, „Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War.“p. 227
315 Ibid.
316 Cohn, „Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals..“: 687-718. Theweleit, „The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War.“pp. 283
317 Theweleit, „The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War.“p. 284
318 Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society.p.2f
intensity, in which the destructive act becomes psychologically very much like the procreative act.” And he asks further, “Where does this curiosity come from? Robert Heinlein once wrote that fulfillment in life involved ‘loving a good woman and killing a bad man’.”

The gun as a bride, death in war as the ticket to paradise to meet and marry virgins is all well known popular militarized soldier knowledge. For Grossman, the taboo of talking about the quite normal reluctance to kill, the reluctance to act in a direct aggressive manner is comparable with the taboo not to publicly discuss ones impotence. Grossman elaborates further on the linkage between sex and killing — again as a purely masculine project. Both sex and killing are considered initiation markers for the adolescent man. Both are almost universal rites of passage to manhood.

Dorothy Dinnerstein[^320] analyzes the parallel pattern drawn here as the ambivalence of war-making men. “In externalizing the negative part of their feelings onto a group or object that is held in low value, that lacks power, and that is traditionally marginalized, even ‘ignored or scored’ — women being a prime example.” But also the act of killing is described as an orgasmic, sexual act. Again Grossman[^321], “Many men who have carried and fired a gun – especially a full automatic weapon – must confess in their hearts that the power and pleasure of explosively spewing a stream of bullets is akin to the emotions felt when explosively spewing a stream of semen.”

So what happens to women, when they ‘spray’ the bullets? Do they get excited from death and destruction and how does this affect their limitation in gender roles concerning their bodies as well as their politics? How important the body becomes as a symbol and unifying creator of militarized masculinity will be discussed in length in following chapters by encountering the construction of the male as well as the female body in the context of militarization.

[^319]: In a weekly show on Khartoum TV the widows of ‘martyrs’ are shown and tell their stories of their dead husbands in paradise. ‘The sweet smell of dead martyrs, when they go to heaven and get married with the virgins – only a martyrs corpse can smell so sweet.’ (Notes I took from one of these shows in Khartoum, February 2000)

[^320]: Dorothy Dinnerstein, *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* (Harper& Row, 1977). Since the nineteen-ninties the discourse about domestic violence and its intrinsic connection to institutionalized violence was presented in various reports and documentations. In the field of human rights, the issue of human rights as women’s rights becomes increasingly important.

[^321]: Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society*.p.136. Grossman is elaborating further on the symbolism of pornographic shoots, comparing the grip of an erected penis with that of a gun. The shoot on the women’s/victim’s face as an act of dominance and symbolic destruction. The broader issue of sex and war, rape as a military tactics and sexualized militarism as a means to construct militarized masculinity is discussed in length in the previous part of this work.
III. 3 MODELS OF INSURGENCIES

Similarities and Distinctions between War and Revolutions

Civil war

„Bürgerkriege sind essentiell weiblich. Tumultartig, konfus, exzesshaft.“
Krondorfer, Birgit, Krieg/War, 1997, p. 163

„Zapatistas using a combination of traditional and cyber-guerrilla tactics and strategies.“
Hables Gray: 1997

Revolution:
“Terms, such as revolution do not have any essential linguistic let alone religious inherent meaning.”
Fred Halliday: 1999

Resistance:
“Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”
Michel Foucault

As mentioned in the previous chapter, war as a means of politics is not that different from revolution as a means to political change. Both legitimize and institutionalize violence. In the theory of state formation and in state-centered approaches, the right to self-defense is given to the sovereign state and war is seen as a legitimate means to keep or achieve state sovereignty. Whereas self-defense is prevalent for states, the right to self-determination that all peoples have is often axiomatic for revolutions and insurgencies. Whereas war is still labeled as conflict of power and legitimacy between states, revolutions might be defined as conflicts of power and legitimacy within states.

As Fred Halliday sums up the distinctiveness of revolutions: “In addition to being about states and movements, revolutions are also about ideas.”

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322 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 1: An Introduction, p.95. Foucault’s concept of power has a quite important impact on the question of state-subverting revolutionary movements. In this logic, the subversion of something that is resisting is almost impossible because of the interiority of the logic of resistance in the logic of dominant power.

323 From the Hobbesian logic to stamp out violence by the use of violence in the state of nature to Montesquieu’s right to war, specifically for smaller states for the purpose of self-defense, Ulrich Albrecht in his introduction to international relations discusses the issue of war and warfare as an intrinsic state logic in length for formal wars in chapter six. Albrecht, Internationale Politik: Einführung in Das System Internationaler Herrschaft.

324 Article 1 of the UN charta, Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as Article 1 of the The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as well as in the African Charta for Peoples Rights.

325 Fred Haliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Houndmills, London: MacMillan, 1999). p. 10
The history of insurgencies, at least in its written documentation, is mainly a history of armed struggle that was waged as a consequence or claimed as a necessity to achieve political, social and/or economic changes. Insurgencies; such as revolutions, wars of liberation or guerrilla warfare are not fought for the art of war, they are fought as a means of change. Based on this assumption the definition and analysis of wars of liberation or revolution are ideological. For those who are against the changing the status quo, revolutions lead to a chaotic, unruly Hobbesian state of nature, for those who are sympathetic to the changes, revolutions shape the hope for a just world.

There is an almost mythical moment of autodynamic power inscribed in revolutions. As the revised, yet still prominent statement of Theda Skocpol\textsuperscript{326} “revolutions are not made, but happen” the character of a mass phenomena, started by an elite group is a reappearing phenomena. As Fred Halliday quotes Engels on this matter in a precise description of this phenomena:

“People who boast that they have made a revolution always see the day after that they had no idea what they were doing, that the revolution made does not in the least resemble the one they would have liked to make. This is what Hegel calls the irony of history.”\textsuperscript{327}

Autodynamic moments in political analysis tend to formulate a vision of participation of ‘the people’, an ideal of representation, even though this may not be the case at all. Acknowledging the semi-problematic tendency of terminology to resort to ideological ballast in describing armed conflicts is quite interesting in itself. In the following chapter I would like to discuss the various significatory terms, as well as their usage, for different purposes. After more general remarks, the specific African focus will be integrated.

In the previous chapter, general questions on war and its historical, political as well as military transition was discussed in this section I will concentrate on war as an attempt to change a society. While Thucydides foresaw the danger of the revolt (epanastasis) through innovation (neoterismus), Halliday describes the two biggest challenges revolutions implement on states as the ethical challenge in regard to sovereignty and the challenge to vertical security, the security between states.

The discourse on revolution, guerrilla, liberation movement and other ideological descriptions of armed conflict is long and quite often politicized in a dichotomic manner of imperialist versus revolutionary or socialist concepts. Theda Skocpol\textsuperscript{328} argues that revolutions are not made, they come, while Farideh Farhi\textsuperscript{329} discusses the ideology of

\textsuperscript{326} Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

\textsuperscript{327} Engels to Zasulich, 23 April 1885, in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, c.1956) p.460. In: Haliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power.p. 8.

\textsuperscript{328} Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China.

\textsuperscript{329} Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana; Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
revolution. Ideology here is not a system of ideas but a social process involving knowledgeable actors. Cultural practices, orientation, meaning systems and social outlooks play a role in the making of revolutions.

The description of insurgency keeps a neutral momentum in subsuming various rebel movements and methods and forms of changes –revolutionary movements, liberation armies as well as predatory gangs – yet their specific identification is full of ideological ballast. For the movement described in this research, none of the definitions could be described as long-lasting and true specifications, since the movement, as well as its political, social and military orientation, changed and changes. Douglas Johnson addresses this issue in his analysis of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA): „SPLA is all classifications: separatist, reformist, state-consolidating, state-subverting insurgency.“

**Just War**

The tradition of the ‘just war’ theory has aimed at identifying those conditions which make it morally legitimate to wage war. The concept was developed by the Christian Church. Over the centuries this position was elaborated in detail, and divided into the theory of jus ad bellum – what makes it right to go to war – and the theory of jus in bello – what is right to do in war. More recently the concept has be seen in conventions of international law, as stipulated in the Geneva Conventions. Typical conditions laid down for jus ad bellum were that war may only be waged for a just cause, it must be a last resort, there must be a formal declaration of war, and there must be a reasonable hope of success. The two most important conditions for just in bello were that the means employed should be ‘proportional’ to the end desired, and that it was not permissible to kill ‘the innocent’.

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331 Douglas Johnson, , *The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the problem of factionalism*, in Ibid.p. 53

332 I would argue that the concept of just war is universal and not solely a Christian model. The Islamic concept of *jihad* is a just war concept even though the conditions might be defined differently. See: Ulrich Albrecht, “Gerechter Krieg,” in *Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch Des Marxismus*, ed. InkrIT (Berlin: Argumente Verlag, 2001.)

Albrecht argues that it is quite unlikely why such a universal problem, such a fundamental question should have one single religious origin.

333 The Geneva Conventions and additional protocol state codes of conduct such as

- Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
The main reference for a definition of ‘just war’ is that of Aurelius Augustinus. He defines three preconditions for ‘just war’. (1) the just cause, iusta causa, the suspicion of injustice; (2) a ‘just war’ has to be declared by a legitimate authority, auctoritas; (3) a ‘just war’ is carried out with the right intention, intentio recta. For example, cruelties must be terminated. A ‘just war’ cannot be fought for other reasons such as annexion of territory.  

Justification for wars based on the right to self-defense and self-determination can be understood with similar logic. Yet, while the right to self-defense of states is the fundament of state contract theories, the right to self-determination is stipulated in the UN charter for all peoples. In a pragmatic reading Just war theory is condemning war in general through allowing it in principle. The principles of how a war should be fought, the, jus in bello, is incorporated in almost all customary laws, religious principles, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or the African Charta on Human and Peoples’ Rights as well as in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols. The Geneva Conventions, unlike other international human rights treaties and conventions, such as the Convention against Torture (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are binding for governments, in specific to those who signed and ratified the treaties, but not for armed groups that are not formally in power. Exceptions for non-state actors are specified in the provisions. 

For the realist school of international relations ‘just war’ justification is a basic column – but what does ‘just war’ legitimization mean for revolutions, liberations and rebellions – if as described, this logic is state immanent? What consequence does Jean Bethke Elshtain’s critique of the realist school have as critique on revolutionary movements?

State sovereignty is the motor that moves the realist system as well as its (nearly) immutable object. Struggle is endemic to the system and force is the court of last resort. It cannot be otherwise, for states exist in a condition of anarchy in relation to one another. Wars will and must occur because there is nothing to prevent them.

It appears that not only in terms of internal mobilization, but in the literature on revolution and liberation movements the concept of ‘just war’ re-emerges. Either portrayed as a historical necessity, or based on the right to self-defense, not only of

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334 Translated after Augustinus in Albrecht, „Gerechter Krieg.“. In the following Albrecht refers to seven conditions for a just war.

335 Ruddick, „Notes toward a Feminist Peace Politics.“: 114

souvereigns but also of people, liberation movements and revolutions also use the discourse of ‘just war’.

Political and military dimensions

The terminology of war, armed struggle or conflict signifies the kind of conflict, the model of struggle amongst groups, states, people or power-holders in general. These descriptions do not carry ideological weight, they are explanatory in a descriptive rather than an analytical mode. They describe the type, not the form of warfare. While a civil war can be fought with regular military tactics it can also be fought as insurgency and counter insurgency, with guerrilla tactics or open frontline fighting. Samuel Huntington defines four different types of warfare: (1) **total war**, (2) **general war**, (3) **limited war**, and (4) **revolutionary war**. Revolutionary warfare is seen as a purely military term, with no ideological dimension. For my purposes, the focus is on revolutionary war, which Huntington defines as: “the struggle between a non governmental group and a government in which the latter attempts to destroy the former by some or all means at its command, and the non-governmental group attempts by all means at its command to replace the government in some or all of its territory.”

For most writers revolution, rebellion, insurgency, liberation and guerrilla war are descriptive explanations of the reason and the motivation for armed struggle. The difference between war and what is defined above is mainly founded in the military aspect of state formation – and the military aspect of activities against the state army. The ideological dimension in the notion of revolution, liberation and guerrilla is based on political judgments on the justness of the armed activity and/or the unjustness of the state. Revolution, which stands for most radical and far-reaching change is therefore defined as a complete turning around, that aims for major changes not only in the ranks of leaders of military but in the political, economic but also in the societal structure of the state.

For other authors, such as Fred Halliday, the term revolution or revolutionary warfare intrinsically describes not only the type but also the form of warfare. In his definition revolution is: „Major political and social transformation in the context of a contradictory

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337 There is a major shift between the right to self-defense of the sovereign or the sovereign state - as defended by Sun-Tzu, Hobbes, Maquiavelli or Immanuel Kant – and the right to self-defense for people – even inside a state. This right is claimed by Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Castro, Ho-Tschi Minh as activists but also introduced in the catalogue of international human rights standards as the right to self-determination of people. Michael Walzer argues in Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977). on war as the ultimate last resort – but yet as a resort with moral obligations but with moral legitimation.

modernity involving mass participation and the aspiration to establish a radically different society.\textsuperscript{339}

Such full-fledged revolutions are rare in history, yet, the use of the term and the terminology of what is understood as revolutionary, is widespread. Almost all liberation struggles and wars of liberation from colonial dominance or imperialist oppression are labeled wars of revolution.\textsuperscript{340} This implies more of a moral positioning rather than an analysis of warfare and pursuit of fundamental social changes by these various forces. In a non-ideological way, Fred Halliday groups both revolutions and wars as major factors of change. \textit{\textbf{\textit{For much of modern history, revolutions have been a major factor, along with war, in the formation of world politics.}}}\textsuperscript{341}

Neither for theorists or activists of revolution is the question of violence or war a critical issue. They agree on the necessity to fight a power system based on military strength with its own weapons, although with different tactics. The right to self-defense, later the right to self-determination becomes the leading mobilizing force from Fidel Castro to the ongoing peace negotiations between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the government of Sudan.\textsuperscript{342} Yet the meaning and the context of these two are different. The first struggling to be an international and internationalist example of the right to self defense and determination – for all people oppressed by imperialism, the latter is strictly aiming for a national settlement in the realm of internal politics.\textsuperscript{343}

For Ernesto Che Guevara\textsuperscript{344}, one of the leaders of the Cuban revolution of 1959, as well as a guerrilla-movement-trainer in various countries, including the Congo and Bolivia, a revolutionary movement was based on a clear political ideology. Guerrilla war for Guevara was a peoples war, and by this, intrinsically an anti-imperialist war.

\textsuperscript{339} Haliday, \textit{Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power}. p. 21.

\textsuperscript{340} It appears there is no consensual definition of revolutions. Whereas the quite conservative list of revolutions in the \textit{Dictionary of Politics}, ed., (London: Penguin, 1992). lists only the big three, the French, Russian and Chinese revolution others, such as Fred Halliday Haliday, \textit{Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power}. or John Foran, ed., \textit{Theorizing Revolutions} (London, New York: Routledge, 1997.) list almost all politically motivated uprisings and liberation wars as revolutions.

\textsuperscript{341} Halliday, \textit{Revolution and World Politics}. p. 3. Hannah Arendt, \textit{On Revolution} was using this description for the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{342} Fidel Castro in his famous court defense 1953 ‘\textit{History will abslove me}’ defends the right to revolt. His main defense column was based on the American Declaration of Independence, further more he quoted Milton, Montesquieu, Locke, Paine and others. Six years later he claimed his right to revolt successfully in overthrowing Batista on 1 January 1959 and taking power in Havana.

\textsuperscript{343} I am using those two examples since they mark the two extremes of what would be subsumed under revolutionary warfare. The speech of Fidel is a marker in the internationalization of the right to self-defense and self-determination. Both are fundamental rights acknowledges by state theorists such as Hobbes, Machivelli, Montesquie or Plato. The legitimation of self-defense is further leading to the problematic debate of just-war legitimation.

For him revolutionary warfare meant guerrilla tactics. His comprehension rested in Lenin’s historical materialist argument, that stated who acknowledges class-struggle has to acknowledge revolutionary warfare.

An essential ingredient for the idea of guerrilla and revolutionary warfare is the combination of competent representations – the vanguard of a society – with the aim to take over power. Ernesto Che Guevara acknowledged three fundamental lessons for revolutionary movements in the Americas:

1) Volkskräfte können einen Krieg gegen die Armee gewinnen. 2) Nicht immer muß man warten, bis alle Bedingungen für die Revolution gegeben sind; der aufständische Brennpunkt kann sie schaffen. 3) Im unterentwickelten Amerika müßten Schauplätze des bewaffneten Kampfes grundsätzlich die ländlichen Gebiete sein.345

(1) Combined individual forces can win a war against a regular army. 2) there is not always a need to wait until all the conditions for a revolution are met, the revolutionary focus may bring them. 3) in the underdeveloped Americas the scene of armed struggle categorically has to be the rural areas [translated AW]

For Robert Taber346, author of “The War of Flea: Guerrilla Warfare”, guerrilla war equals revolutionary war. Unlike Huntington, for Taber, both guerrilla and revolutionary describe more than the type, they also describe the form of war. “Guerrilla war, in the larger sense in which we have been discussing it, is revolutionary war, engaging a civilian population or a significant part of such a population against the military forces of established or usurpative government authority.”

Although there is a greater tendency for writers sympathizing with guerrilla war or revolutionary war to define these as types and forms or as form and content, the question of how to fight a guerrilla and or revolutionary war receives quite different answers. The important point for this research is the idea of the vanguard versus the people’s war, the elitist, hierarchical versus the horizontal, integrative approach. This does not involve judgment on the justness or unjustness of war or revolutionary wars in particular. As history shows, even a horizontal people’s war, such as the Maoist, Chinese revolution, has quite an elitist, authoritarian, non-transparent and non-participatory reality. The difference in the conceptualization war is nevertheless relevant, since the arguments do explain certain developments and problems.

In general the question of representation and participation of civilians is the fundamental divider between regular armies and revolutionary forces or guerrillas.

The most explicit documentation of guerrilla war is presented in the diaries and books of Ernesto Che Guevara. He discusses military tactics, awareness raising processes, security as well as internal discipline in all of the guerrilla activities he was involved in. From the diaries of the Cuban Revolution347 to the diaries of the fighting in Congo,
where he fought along side Laurent Désiré Kabila, Guevara draws a coherent line from historical materialism toward an avant-garde understanding of revolution. One that is based on the Soviet model of a centralized, high command, like that of a beehive.

For Ho Tschi Minh, another prominent revolutionary, revolution was a tactic, in which the political background was much more important. Revolution could not be understood as an elitist enterprise, it had to be seen as a movement of the people, as a movement of national resistance against imperialist occupation. Revolution, for Ho Tschi Minh, cannot be seen in as separate from a war of liberation and independence from class-systems and colonization. In his analysis of the French war in Algeria he described the war as a sign to the French working class in order to show to them their restriction and control via the colonialist wars. He linked this thought specifically to the counterrevolutionary character of the regular army, which employed northern African soldiers to fight against the colonized Africans.

Die Französische Arbeiterklasse muß wissen, daß sich der Kolonialismus gerade auf die Kolonien stützt um jeden Versuch einer Emanzipation seitens der Arbeiterklasse zunichtezu machen.

The French working class has to know that colonialism relies on the colonies to destroy every effort of the working class towards emancipation. [translation A.W.]

Guerrilla is a tactic, the communist revolution is the political background. To this extent, he corresponds with Che Guevara. As to method he differs by calling for a total mobilization of all people.

Da es uns darum geht das ganze Land zum nationalen Widerstand aufzurufen, müssen wir die gesamte Bevölkerung mobilisieren und mit Waffen versorgen. 

Since the goal is to mobilize the entire country to national resistance, we need to mobilize the whole population and supply them with weapons. [translation A.W.]

As a disciplinary method he proposes criticism and self-criticism which would take a leading role in the liberation struggle of the EPLF, but is not mentioned in the writings or interviews of the SPLA.

The leading figure for the model of revolutionary warfare as a people’s war of resistance is Mao Tsetung with his famous analogy: The guerrillas move among the people as fish move through the water.

The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in

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350 Ibid., p.35.

351 Ibid., p. 158
which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things and create the prerequisite for overcoming every difficulty in the war.

One of the leading African Revolutionaries, Kwame Nkrumah, describes the setup of an African revolutionary struggle in a similar way. Since peasants are the overwhelming majority in the population they must be the main targets for mobilization. Their participation holds the most potential for revolutionary action. The guerrilla fighter as an exceptional species of fighters and as a revolutionary agitator more than a militarized civilian is concept outlined in Robert Taber’s quite enthusiastic and positivistic account on guerrillas. “When we speak of the guerrilla fighter we are speaking of the political partisan, an armed civilian whose principal weapon is not his rifle or his machete, but his relationship to the community, the nation, in and for which he fights.”

The guerrilla fighter, for Taber, marks the difference between regular and guerrilla armies as a form as well as a type of warfare. Unlike Huntington, Tabor sees the guerrilla fighter not only as a person in arms, but as a member of the society that urges for a fundamental change, the precondition of revolutionary wars. Besides the resistencia civica, the activists and saboteurs within the system in mainly urban environments of the population are key participants for a successful insurgency.

The population is the key to the entire struggle. The guerrilla who is of the people in a way which the government soldier cannot be, fights with the support of the non-combatant populace (...) Without the consent and active aid of the people, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit, and could no longer survive. (...) The guerrilla fighter is primarily a propagandist, an agitator, a disseminator of the revolutionary idea, who uses the struggle itself – the actual physical conflict – as an instrument of agitation.

This description might reflect the ideas guerrilla, but as elaborated further in this chapter, it is not an account of current tendencies in guerrilla movements and armies. While the importance of the civilian population is uncontested, the behavior of the guerrilla forces towards civilians has changed tremendously since the 1990s.

### Insurgencies

For the armed conflicts in Africa, Christopher Clapham subsumes guerrillas, liberation armies and predatory gangs under the collective description of insurgents. It seems

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a less ideologically loaded definition, yet since the vector is clearly placed from attacked to resistance, it is not a neutral term.

Clapham\textsuperscript{356} defines four different insurgencies, predominantly as a category for armed conflicts in Africa:

- **Liberation insurgencies** – independence from colonial or minority rule
- **Separatist insurgencies** – representing the aspiration/identities of particular ethnicities or regions within an existing state
- **Reform insurgencies** – seek radical reform of national government – not revolutionary insurgencies
- **Warlord insurgencies** – change of leadership, not entailing creation of state

I consider these categories useful yet they are not exclusive descriptions, since one rebel movement can change from one to the other or entail a mix of the descriptions. How insurgencies start and transform and what claim they formulate depends on various factors. To analyze their self-given definition and to compare it with more objective standards justifying the claim to a people’s movement, such as popular representation, decision-making structures, internal leadership hierarchies, access to power and relationship with civilians are helpful markers. They indicate as well in to what category of insurgency a movement could be subsumed.

**Leadership – Magician King and Justice Priest\textsuperscript{357}**

The question of the right leadership is surely one of the most discussed and non-static issues in revolutionary, guerrilla or liberation movements. Not only the changing attitude towards elite or non-elite leadership, hierarchical, authoritarian, centralized, military or civilian but the basic relationship between the leadership and the population is fundamentally important. If the leadership of a movement has to be from a specific section of society, workers, unionists, students in a socialist revolutionary ideal, peasants, the landless, indigenous people in newer forms of revolutionary movements such as the Mexican EZLN or the landless movement in Brazil, western educated and militarily trained elite as in the example of southern Sudan, Uganda or the Democratic Republic of Congo, Clan-leaders and their sons, as in Somalia or militarily and revolutionary prepared leaders like in the EPLF in Eritrea depends on the context and political ideology of the country and the movement.

Authoritarian or even dictatorial models of personalized leadership are reflected in authoritarian statutes and arrangements, leadership based on vertical power, centralized decision making with little transparency towards their co-fighters and co-founders. Examples for these scenarios can be found in movements like “Sendero Luminoso” with Guzman, the “Khmer Rouge” with Pol Poth, and would partly qualify as a description of military movements such as Laurent Kabila’s DRC army or the SPLA under John Garang. While this description is solely based on the leadership


\textsuperscript{357} Title from Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.p. 351
structure, it fails to address an important point, the abuse of charismatic and/or spiritual personalized leadership as found in movements like the Lord’s Resistance Army under Joseph Kony, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF) under Charles Taylor, or the above mentioned Khmer Rouge. This abuse of power that is solely based on the person of a leader is beyond political description but easier to identify in a more dictatorial, autocratic model of rebel movements than on more democratic ones.  

The latter seem to be much more based on a militarized concept of liberation or rebellion, since the military strategists are united in their understanding that an efficient army cannot be a democratic army. From Sun Tze to Clausewitz, the figure and authority of the sovereign (and in the case of early 11 Century Japan – the unity of god-emperor-military leader) is not to be questioned.

For Christopher Clapham the conduct of the insurgency leadership is decisive for their success, which he measures in three categories, depending on the aims of the leadership to lead a state consolidating or state-subverting movement as well as the selection of leadership.

Who are the leaders? Is the leadership dispensable?  
What is the movements or leaderships attempt to organizational matters?  
What is the relationship of the movement/leadership with the host society?  
Do people identify closely with insurgents?  
Is the relationship essentially one of control?

I consider this an important check-list for movements and leadership and will elaborate on this in the case of SPLA in the following chapters.

Clapham describes the phenomena of leaders and successful leadership as an amalgam of various factors inside and outside the society.

Central to their success is their ability to articulate common goals to which the movement is committed, and to decide the organizational structures through which those goals can be fought for and eventually achieved. Such leaders are likely in turn to look for viable models of insurgent organization and strategy among which in the modern world that of Mao Tse Tung has been pre-eminent. At its simplest, indeed, Maoism might be regarded as a ‘kit’ which, with appropriate allowance for local variations insurgent leaders can take over and apply to their situation.

I find it remarkable how matter-of-fact these assumptions of elite leadership are discussed by critics and political analysts. The military priority for revolutionary movements does not seem to be questioned even though there are different models of insurgents now existing. An example is the EZLN in Chiapas in southern Mexico.

358 I only concentrate on leaders of armed opposition movements, not on leaders in formal power. Even though Kabila as well as Taylor are/were acting presidents in DRC and Liberia right now, the claim to change the status quo was one of their mobilizing factors for the armed struggle. This claim to change is the decisive factor. Authoritarian patterns of leadership conduct to preserve power might be intrinsic in certain dictatorial settings, yet the drive and claim to change an oppressive system is hard to be related to a power driven status quo preservation as in the examples described above.

359 Clapham, African Guerrillas. Introduction

360 Ibid, p.8
The movement is based on the need to change without ruling out the need to take up arms, but equally without ruling out the option to democratically discuss the decision. The leadership, as reflected in the model Clapham is giving, is not from the elite, but from the basic sector of community; the women who do not speak the dominant language and are illiterate, peasants, intellectuals. The relation to the host society is not seen as a relation with a separate society but a relation with a society the idea of which came from the insurgency. Regular referendums in the villages that claim to be liberated territories decide the next steps of the armed movement, including the possibility to give up arms and turn into a solely political movement. This example does not seem to be widely reflected in the literature of guerrilla movements, revolutions or insurgencies in general. The paradigm is still fixed on the necessity of military strategy as the decisive factor to a successful revolution or uprising.

Douglas Johnson goes even further in his reflection of the SPLA’s acceptance of the paradigm of the dominance of the military over the political. He argues further that the internal problem of the SPLA is partly a problem of autonomy versus centralized military structures.

Evidently it is important to research the preconditions under which a guerrilla movement starts, the possibility of communication within the infrastructure, the political culture, the internal political debates, the countries economy and territorial control as well as the distribution of military presents and strength. It is equally important to consider the outside influences, bilateral relationships, the historical timing of revolutions and armed struggle. In a decade such as the 1960s, when liberation movements, anti-colonial uprisings, imperialist wars, such as Vietnam, constituted at least a semi-mainstream discourse, the cause of a liberation movement and their claim for independence and self-determination was more easily understood. Public discourse started to be critical concerning the concept of the irrefutable truths, colonialism and world dominance by the United States. Even if the majority of the population did not agree with this political type analysis, revolutionary language and the terminology of liberation was widespread and understood.

As John Foran labeled it in his catalogue for successful social revolutions, the combination of economic downturns combined with a ‘world-systemic opening for a change’ seems to guarantee successful revolutions. Multifaceted aspects of economic exploitation of the Trikont, the racist politics of colonization, and imperialist aggression against the south argued in favor of what would be described as self-defense of the oppressed. Since the internal structures had not been evaluated

361 Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) information under www.ezln.org.

362 Although Johnson is reflecting that SPLA was learning from the mistake of AnyaNya I where the military wing subordinated political wing to its leadership, Johnson analysed the internal problems of the SPLA much broader – I will come back to this. It still strikes me a remarkable example of the one-dimensional discussion of insurgencies in reference to military strategy. See chapter four Douglas Johnson, The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the problem of factionalism. In Christopher Clapham, African Guerrillas.

and analyzed, the primacy of the revolution, the uprising, the armed struggle could not be questioned without criticism of internal problems. Yet the practice of criticism and self-criticism still seems to be more of an exception than the rule. The revolution and its military secrets are prioritized and all internal criticisms are deemed counter-revolutionary tactics in support of the enemy. This serves dictatorial regimes whether in governments or in liberation movements perfectly well. With the legitimization of secrecy, transparency and accountability become second ranking issues.

The main difference between now and then might be, that the internationalization of revolutions and rebel movements made it easier to legitimize ones own movement, it shifted the political agenda of international relations. It provided equal examples of successful and horrific movements. Now political legitimization for a revolutionary movement or insurgency has to react to more global expectations of world politics, a less radicalized political culture and a almost non-existent political support and solidarity movement.

Another tremendous difference, of course, is the shift of foreign influence in national insurgencies. In the sixties, the Cold War, as well as a polarized ideological battle was fought between the main powers of the Soviet Union and the United States. This struggle was partially carried out through military and/or financial support to other countries and free ideological education to all countries in the course of bilateral relations. This era has ended.

Interestingly enough, the main support from the super powers came in the form of military training, hardware and financial or economic agreements. However, economically powerless countries and countries without a strong military stand, such as Cuba, became the main exporters of revolutionary warfare knowledge. Cuba provided military support either in terms of strategic advice, training, manpower, hardware, intelligence and ideological training of internationalist, anti-imperialist movements to a large number of African countries; including Congo, Ethiopia, Angola and the Sudan by providing training facilities for SPLA-fighters.

The military support provided by the United States was targeted to counter-socialist insurgencies rather than to build up a pro-US network amongst rebel movements.

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365 Although this support was channelled while SPLA was hosted by Ethiopia under Mengistu. Since John Garang, the leader of the SPLA had good contacts with Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian ruler, Cuba supported the SPLA. I doubt they would have done otherwise, since after Che Guevaras experience with the forces of Kabila as well as with the Rwandese fighting in Congo in 1964, Cuba was quite reluctant to support movements with no relevant interest or policy of anti-imperialism and internationalist aspirations.

366 The support and initiation of a contra initiative against the insurgency in Nicaragua was mainly aimed to stop Cuba engaging in an anti-imperialist struggle in Nicaragua. Although the Contras had more sophisticated hardware and more modern military counter-insurgency training, their attempt to stop the Sandinistas the EZLN failed. It is important to keep in mind that the specific training provided by the United States predominantly in the school of the Americas was based on counter-insurgency. This includes training in torture, low-intensity warfare against civilians who are suspected to support rebels, as well as more classic guerrilla tactics. Counter Insurgency tactics as used by the Contras as well as by the Guatemaltecan
With the changes in 1989, the fall of the Soviet Union and the changes in Eastern Europe the question of agency changes as well. While the training of fighters in Cuba was connected with agit-prop about socialist systems and anti-imperial struggle, the new deals are less political and more economical.

"Military strategy presupposes political aims. All military problems are political, and all political problems are economic." (Kwame Nkrumah)

This quote by Kwame Nkrumah, founder of modern Ghana and one of the first modern African revolutionaries, describes the exact dilemma of post-socialist insurgencies. Since there is no ideology involved except that of capitalist interest, the economic dimension becomes more and more important for rebel movements in post-1989. The analysis of changes in insurgencies shows a clear tendency in economic rather than territorial, power, political or ideological interest.

For some of the new forces, that resemble what Clapham would describe as warlord insurgencies, economic gain is the most important reason to fight. It is more important for the forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone to have control over the diamond mines than to constitute a government in Freetown. Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA in Angola and Charles Taylor’s, now-government, forces in Liberia seem to have a common goal: to keep fighting, killing and looting in order to support their lifestyle. Convincing the ‘host society’ to join in the insurgency seems to have become an utter waste of time, if this host society could be turned into a tax-paying society even outside of ones own sovereign state territory. There are reports about members of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) who are supporting the oppositional Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) in Congo to fight against the government forces of Laurent Kabila, who are collecting taxes from Congolese citizens for ‘protecting’ their territory. Reports of armed groups whose sustainable motive is to stay in control of at least a few resources rather than giving up everything are many.  

"New types of warfare do not eliminate older and even primitive forms". (Janowitz)

Mark Duffield describes this phenomena as post-modern conflict. Unlike more conservative political analysts he argues that post-modern conflicts are not state-centered any more, they are post nation-state conflicts. The aim of the leaders of these conflicting parties is not, as Clapham defines them, state consolidation or state-subversion but lacks interest in state matters altogether. Duffield defines three conflict scenarios; intra-state war, internal war and post modern conflict.

forces trained by the US fall almost entirely under the cases regulated in the Geneva Conventions as unlawful. Some amount to torture or even crimes against humanity. (In January 2001, the School of the Americas, founded 1946 in Panama as the U.S Army Caribbean Training Center, currently operating in Georgia is renaming itself into “Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.”)

Intra-state war usually associated with traditional views of the nation-state. That is, a territorial form of bureaucratic and juridical political authority where rulers govern by some form of consent. Internal war suggests conflict within the limits of this structure. That is, of forces either attempting to defend or usurp state power. Post-modern conflict, however, addresses the emergence within the past couple of decades of political projects in the South, including qualified state systems, which no longer seek or even need to establish territorial, bureaucratic or consent based political authority in the traditional sense. It reflects the re-emergence of globalized political economy no longer reliant on an inclusive nation-state competence.\footnote{Duffield, „Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection.“}

Duffield proposes a very important contrast to traditional state-centered analysis and provides tools to analyze new developments. Those tools can be used in a de-constructive manner to question more than the ideological restrictions of guerrilla and insurgency analysis that seem to trap authors in a pre-1989 international environment. Since it questions the linear causality between insurgency and state models, a critical examination of the primacy of the military becomes more likely.\footnote{Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict.}

Chris Hables Gray\footnote{The discourse of just war has to be reflected under the new reality of mainstreaming military logic – predominantly visible in humanitarian interventions and the terminology of United Nations security council speak of: peace enforcement or peace keeping.} defines in his book on postmodern war the system of postmodern war in the context of regular armies, of cyber-war, of a change in warfare which started. He argues that in the case of the Vietnam war, „The main justification for war is now peace.“ He goes further in defining the primary characteristics of postmodern war as not differently motivated than the doctrine of deterrence: counterinsurgency or low-intensity conflict. Even though this chapter focuses on insurgencies and does not discuss the wartime transformation of war in general, I found it important to mention the usage of the same terminology for two different types of war. Even more interesting, these two definitions of postmodern war reflect the changes in political ideology as well as their alignment in economic dimensions.\footnote{See Tickner, Pateman, Sylvester, Peterson and others in the previous chapters.}

What might have been considered a just-war legitimization in the context of the 1960s liberation movements, self-defense and independence, is now exchanged in the public discourse of military-logic legitimization as pure war, war for peace, war to keep and to enforce peace.

The ideology of social and political change is replaced by the universal ideology of peace, in which name, no effort can be questioned. If one fights for peace, there is no moral reason to question and stop this effort.

Feminist authors question the notion of security and peace in the realist school of international relations\footnote{More and more voices raise questions on the masculine,}.
military dominance of liberation movements and insurgencies. The ideology of peace that seems to serve every military purpose since the late 1990s is not yet questioned in its essentialist massiveness.

Warlord Insurgency – Personal Rule

In describing the emergence of autonomous warlord systems, the idea of a pre-state, feudal structure seems to be more apparent than a post-modern fragmented structure. For various countries mentioned earlier, as well as for the warlord-example par excellence, Somalia, Stephen Ellis links the economic aspect with the military, but not political interest, in his example for Taylor's forces in Liberia:

The warlord system has produced a mosaic of militia zones of control, where civilians have some degree of protection but must pay tribute in kind to the local warlord, constantly shifting frontier zones in which civilians are liable to raiding from all sides. The aim is control of people and acquisition of booty more than to control territory in the conventional military manner.

Unlike the new tendency to explain these developments with the reemergence of feudal, neo-medieval systems, which I think is very problematic, I suggest this development be connected to what Hables-Gray declares as the paradoxes of post modern war: interest without responsibility.

The industrialized countries want colonialism without responsibility; they want empire without casualties. And further 'Politics are so militarized that every act of war needs political preparation and justification. There is only the most limited war space where all important decisions are made on military grounds. Wars can only be won politically. Through military means the best that can be accomplished is not to lose.'

Reflective of more than a decade of no 'world-systemic-opening for a change', personalist rulers in repressive, exclusivist personalist states, a change from primacy of politics to primacy of the economy, this tendency of eroding nation-state models could be projected on new insurgencies. For those that started before 1989 and did not win before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tendency is either to continue in a Maoist-Leninist legacy (like Sendero Luminoso) or to abandon socialist ideals and internationalist approaches for socialist revolutions altogether. The Sudan Peoples

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372 Mainly raised by female fighters or former female fighters themselves, as in Turshen, ed., What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa.

373 Max Weber on Typologies of personal rule as traditional or charismatic domination. In Robert Jackson, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkely; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982). p. 73


375 Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict. p. 169f
Liberation Movement goes as far as labeling the Soviet Union as an example for the dustbin of history.  

**MEDIEVAL REFUGEE CAMPS**

The problem with terms such as warlords, neo-medievalism and feudal systems is their cultural, historical and ideological baggage. I don't consider it of great explanatory value to compare medieval Europe with 21st century Africa. If the leadership of guerrilla movements such as in Sierra Leone make use of global economy patterns by cutting individual deals, if they don't see their interest best reflected in state structures, and if their aim has never been the representation of the population, the question is not a backlash into feudal systems or resemblance with medieval Europe. The question has to be asked differently, since the feudal system in Europe or the medieval European system did not question state structures, but made use of some individual's privileged positions. A lack in interest in state institutions should lead to a deeper analysis of the meaning and use of states for individual armed groups in the middle of a global market.

The growing, local dependency on warlords in eroding nation-states is not that of a medieval city, it is one of international links between individuals in control of smaller patches of territory and people of interest to the international partners. Not only guerrillas, controlling diamond mines but the examples of local groups in control of free-trade-zone-macilladoras are reflecting this tendency. The growing dependency on organized groups, on locality, workplace, and of local commanders is rapid and destructive. The economic interest in conflicts and the lack of interest in state formation is not only reflected in international trade but in the flow of trade with neighboring countries and does not stop with war. Since it is not the state, a bureaucracy or an institution that is organizing and controlling the trade, the interest and profit for the individual commander, group leader or armed group is even higher.

Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou draw an impressive example for the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo in a flow chart on commodity trade from northeastern Zaire to the neighboring countries. The economic links exist despite international condemnation or sanctions. Official state ministers in charge of economy or finance are undermined by their own corrupt kleptocratic elite, as well as by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.

Africa is today linked to the rest of the world by a complex web of informal political, commercial and financial relations which generally have a strong ethnic, corporatist or

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376 Visions, programs and constitution of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. 1998
377 see Duffield, „Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection. “ p.5ff
communal element. Even when it was discredited in the eyes of the international community, Zaire, for example, continued to trade intensively with the rest of the world by means of its many privately owned air charter companies and lorry fleets. Nande traders from Kivu work in markets in Dubai and Hong Kong via Sudan and the ports of the Indian Ocean or directly by air freight, while other networks export the minerals of Shaba or the diamonds of Kasai via South Africa, Matadi or Kinshasa and import via overland road haulage from Nigeria. The Somali ethnic diaspora, in spite of conditions in the home country, still occupies an important position in transport routes throughout East Africa and Somali traders shuttle between this area and the Gulf countries, Italy and North America, while the Senegalese Mouride religious brotherhood has been closely associated with successful trading enterprises around the Mediterranean rim and on the east coast of the United States where, together with South Korean traders, Mouride entrepreneurs have taken a substantial share of the retail distribution of electrical goods.  

This example from ‘Kleptocracy to the Felonious State’ shows the extensive network and functionality of the second economy. In an interview with a number of women from various Somali women’s organizations women addressed the problems of the second economy in gender related terms:

You can buy mobile phones everywhere in Mogadishu, and it is cheap. They use it, but what is it good for, if you need food. Food is expensive, khat is expensive. The men have all they need, but they let us buy even their khat – after the khat women cannot even afford to buy milk for their children. So what is this economy good for? They have mobile phones for their business and khat for their war – why would they want to change?

Yet it has to be analyzed in a context where international aid agencies play a fundamental role as local actors (as in Sudan) in a state-like formation and in governments where human rights and juridical empowerment of the individual towards the state are not considered priority or are even eroding. This provides a fertile base for marauding gangs, warlord insurgencies and societies with a complete parallel state and economy structure.

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379 Ibid.p.24f

380 Khat is a herbal drug, grown mainly in Kenya. It has to be chewed and works similar to the chewing of coca leaves in Latin America. Somalia is the main importer of khat from Kenya and a large number of Somali men are addicted to the drug.

381 Interview in Nairobi 1999. See Faiza Warzame, „Project Paper,” (War Torn Society, 1999). According to interviews I conducted with different Somali representatives of women organizations drug abuse of Somali man is becoming a disastrous issue for the local economy. Since khat has to be imported from Kenya it is expensive. Because of the overall breakdown of the state and most regulated systems, survival and or income generating measures are the responsibility of women, since men are not likely to work in the informal sector. Many man are engaged in preserving their masculinity by joining clan militias rather than risking their masculinity in petty trade. (Interviews conducted in Nairobi, February 1999)
Refugee Camps as State Models

In Africa the question of refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) has to be considered a critical and alarming reality for a large number of people. Not only are people temporarily displaced and resettled after, but many people life on the run or in refugee camps in second and third generations.

Refugees and IDPs are a unprotected, vulnerable, marginalized group that is easy to mobilize and manipulate. Refugees are economically unstable, more likely to depend on parallel economy and not organized enough to contest unfair economic or political systems. Refugee camps in Africa provide perfect recruitment bases for armed groups. Since their internal political system is weak or nonexistent and the majority of refugees are women and children, they constitute a reality of parallel states. In eastern Africa this has a cruel and brutal history; nobody expects political representation for important decisions from refugees, they can be settled and resettled as the respective government likes, the states duty to provide security, minimal welfare and minimal human rights to the refugees and IDPs is given to the international agencies, such as UNHCR. Camps are easy to control, their internal mechanisms are hardly democratic and they provide human supply for armed conflicts, a forum for agitation and a source for forced prostitution. Their structures tend to be highly corrupt; a system of survival of the fittest rather than one of democratic participation is prevalent.

Very unlike the 60s, at least in Africa, insurgencies are encountered with a completely different population structure. What Duffield quotes in order to strengthen the argument of new-medievalism, can equally be used to describe a scenario that requires new analysis rather than old comparisons. Duffield quotes Cerny with an interesting list characterizing the international system that enables non-state actors to qualify in nation-state autonomy.

The international systems according to Cerny is characterized by

Refugee camps in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania host a considerable proportion of the population of their neighboring countries, including their rival faction members. Camp situations such as in the camps for Rwandans in Zaire and Burundians in Tanzania prolong civil wars from the country of origin. Camps in northern Uganda are used by Ugandan rebels (LRA) as well as Sudanese armed opposition for recruitment of fighters (both), for abduction of girls to be kept in sexual slavery or to be used in the actual fight (LRA). Women in all these camps report about a high rate of rape by camp personnel, security personnel as well as the smaller number of man inside the camps, there is hardly any representation of the camp population on decision-making (Interviews in Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya). The situation of internally displaced people inside the country of origin is by no means better. In interviews in the IDP camps around Khartoum, internal refugees who are staying there for more than a decade now, report about severe human rights abuses, discrimination on the bases of race, gender and religion, no access to political, social or economic rights, the denial of access to education, housing and health. See Annette Weber, „Sudan: Rape as a Weapon of War...“ (London: Amnesty International, 2004). Annette Weber, „Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda...“ ed. Human Rights Watch (New York; Washington; London: Human Rights Watch, 2003).
1) competing institutions and overlapping jurisdictions of both state, non-governmental and private interest groups 2) more fluid territorial boundaries both within and across states, the increasing inequality and isolation of various underclass and marginalized groups, 3) the growing importance of identity politics, ethnicity and multiple and fragmented loyalties, 4) contested property rights, legal statutes and conventions, 5) the spread of geographical and social 'no go areas' where the rule of law does no longer extends, 6) a growing disarticulation between the economically dynamic and technologically innovative northern regional systems and the southern areas outside.

The disparate and differentiated elements of this system combine together in a long-term 'durable disorder'. That is, with governments neither being able to solve 'root causes' nor, at the same time, allow total system collapse.

This list is useful to reflect the changes in goals, expectations and interests in insurgencies and guerrilla groups. Which is not to be seen as an isolated guerrilla position but which reflects the transformation in the international system as well.

The melange of an international system that is structuring itself as less blatantly polarized, less ideological but more economy oriented, with a mandate to peace keeping and good governance, domestic governments that are either leftovers of the old nepotic proxy-set up which decline in their authority and fail in their governmental duties, third party actors, such as international agencies or NGOs who take over a large part of state-related tasks to the transformation in insurgencies who are not necessarily following an internationalist model of revolution but might see their armed insurgency as an income guarantee, and last but not least to a societal change from more stable, less fragmented sectors of society to a population, such as in Sudan, that has four million internally displaced people and a million more external refugees.

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III. 4. ACCEPTANCE OF MILITARY RULE IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Power of definition: tradition, history, exiled experts and the international context of the war in Sudan.

Every State carries within itself the essential moments of its existence. Hegel

The presidential regime expresses the spirit of Negro-African philosophy which is based not on the individual but on the person. The president personifies the Nation as did the Monarch of former times his people. The masses are not mistaken who speak of the “reign” of Modibo Keita, Sekou Touré or Houphouet-Boigny, in whom they see, above all, the elected of God through the people. Leopold Sedar Senghor

The coup as a method of change that changes little has become endemic to Africa’s politics. Ruth First

There is no country in this region, I can tell you, that can affect us. We are professionals when it comes to war. Hussein Aideed, Somali warleader of SNC/Iqaad faction in an interview with Reuters 12 June 1999

Acceptance of military rule in the African context can be read in various ways. Acceptance is an active verb. It does not describe endurance. Acceptance means actively not to revolting against it. Acceptance presupposes an agreement with at least the structural system if not the actual reality. The acceptance of military rule of course needs to be contextualized in the history as well as politics on the continent. The history – here the history of governance and state – is closely linked to colonial rule, politics for that matter are a consequence of decolonization within a colonized heritage.

I will not discuss colonization in Africa in this chapter but try to condense the link between colonial governance with personal rulership towards the acceptance of military rule. Military rule includes military rulers as well as the paradigm of militarism as primacy in political practice. Those links are drawn from the previous chapters and the discussion of power and state. The resemblance of authority as internal to military rule and as inherent to personal rule is important to discuss to understand the acceptance. By acceptance in the African context, I do not consider Africa or the African population as an exception to the rest of the world. As discussed in the chapter on war in general, the acceptance of the dominant logic of war as a legitimate means of politics and the institutionalization of violence appears to be universal.

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384 Ruth First, “Etiology and Morphology,” in Coups and Army Rule in Africa, ed. Samuel Decalo (New York: Yale University, 1990), p. 29
Militarized rule does not only include military regimes but regimes and rules that are based on a militarized logic in conflict resolution, economy, polity as well as social structures. Militarized in the sense of hierarchical autocratic leadership that is not considering the needs and rights of the population but by authoritarianism tries to impose the interest of a cliques over all the above mentioned aspects of society.

Yet, even the supposedly clear cut term of military regime is not that pure in most cases, since the majority of military rulers reign in accordance and with support of civilian leadership and politicians as well as civilian regimes are often mixed with influential military personnel.

Nevertheless it is important to carve out the specific in the African context to understand the patterns discussed in the following chapters with the focus on Sudan. Even though African populations are no exception in the acceptance of dominant military logic, the framework of possible intervention and participation of the population on these decisions are different in various political systems. The scope for decision-making is higher in a democratic state than in an authoritarian autocracy.

As Robert Jackson defines in his work on the personal rule in Black Africa:

> A political system of personal rule is not a system which responds to public demands and support by means of public policies and actions, nor is it a system in which the ruler aims a policy goals and ‘steers’ the governmental apparatus by information ‘feedback’ and ‘learning’. Indeed the ratus by concept of governance as an activity of guiding the ship of state toward a specific destination – the assumption of modern rationalism and the policy science – fits poorly with much political experience in contemporary Black African countries. In African countries governance is more a matter of seamanship and less one of navigation – that is, staying afloat rather than going somewhere. (...) Personal rule is a system of relations linking rulers not with the ‘public’ or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and – of course – rivals. 385

Whatever the motives, roots and explanations are for military rulership the system of dominance and the authoritarian culture they imposed are widespread in Africa and have deep impacts on diminishing the quality of life, the security of the people as well as the political self-confidence of the citizens of African states. As the editorial of the Review of African Political Economy (ROAP) defines the prior goals and consequences of military rule:

> “Whatever their motives, they have inevitably imposed and authoritarian rule and culture on their societies and have invariably defended property against people. At worst, they have made life arbitrary, dangerous and violent for their citizens.” 386

Militarization in Africa and elsewhere is a concept that is intrinsically coupled with the justification of violence and the use of force as a possibility for political solutions.

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385 Jackson, Personal Rule in Black Africa. p. 18
Militarization involves all elements of life and society. It is not restricted to the barracks or the fighting forces, it imposes itself on all members of society and makes everybody a useful member and active supporter of a militarized logic. If out of conviction or as a result of fear or internalized discipline plays a minor role in this structure.

The difference between military system and military man is fundamental although the two are interlinked. The topos of the ‘military man’ is an important hinchman to implement the ideals of a military system. The status of military man yet is not quite corresponding with the highly accepted and admired system. Military man can institutionally and publicly be seen as barbaric whereas at the same time the military system can be praised as efficient. The military is necessary as symbol and reality of the enforcement of control and discipline, the military man is an icon in the symbolic order of Staatsräson and the power of the sovereign. There is no power per se with the military men, their power symbolizes the power of the sovereign, the ruler or the state. If military men take up power – as is the case with war leaders, it is not seen as the fulfillment of the pure idea of a military system but as the crude and barbaric non-military chaotic non-structure of warleaders. The military man itself – without the context of being an important building stone for the state – is considered the unsophisticated and raw notion of masculinity that is commonly despised as simple and pre-civilized.

COLONIAL RULE
BREEDING OF PERSONALIZED POLITICS

Military rule in Africa is mainly a phenomenon of the second post-colonial generation, since the first generation Africans of an independent Africa had mainly been nationalist civilians. Yet it is interwoven with the patterns of the clientele-style allocation of civil services, ministerial positions as well as the access to army positions. In many African colonies the colonizing power preferences of ethnic, urban or professional elite led to an unbalanced power distribution after independence.

Besides the enormous expectations towards the first African independent government this disparity caused impatient reactions. Either on the basis of criticism of the ruling government or on the basis of power gains for the own group.

As Peter Nyot Kok elaborates on the Sudanese example, “(...) the ethno-regional distribution of the executive power and ministerial portfolios reveal important patterns of exclusion or marginalisation whether that is under a military regime or a cabinet formed by a democratically elected Prime Minister.”

In real numbers, out of 800 public service posts vacated by the departing British and Egyptian colonial civil servants, Southern Sudanese only got four junior posts, Nubas Fur and Funj got none. Kok enlarges this ethno-regional imbalance on the Sudanese Peoples Armed Forces (SPAF), the regular Sudanese army. “Hence, although 92% of

the SPAF come from the African belt of the Sudan or from the African nationalities such as the Nuba, the Fur, the Zagawa, the Funj, the Hadendawa and the Beja, 96% of the officers come from the northern and central Sudan.\textsuperscript{388}

This is not only a recipe for popular uprising and insurgency – as the case in Sudan (or for that matter in Burundi and DR Congo) shows – it as well provides a fertile ground of internal divisions and tensions in the mid of power. In the history of Sudan, military overpowers civilian rule by large.

Further, the militarization of certain tribes and the delegation of military functions to tribal militias – as in the case of Sudan is quite dominant with the issue of abduction and enslavement by the Rizeigat and other Baggara tribes, armed and supported by the various regimes in northern Sudan – led into a re-tribalization of internal politics. Whereas ethnic identity played a role in pre-colonial eras as a construct of exclusive impermeable reference, ethnicity gained importance with colonialism and is now a main factor for enemy images and tribal mobilization. Even though previous governments, including the democratic government of Sadiq al Mahdi, did the initial arming and delegation of functions the use of tribal militias and the consequence of re-tribalization of politics is used by various political actors. The acceptance of the idea of tribes and their inherit excluding identity is used by all parties to the conflicts as well as by many politicians who are interested in easy mobilization of loyal forces and are not interested in peaceful settlements of multiethnic states. The result of this creation of ethnicity is devastating and fruitless and leaves a heritage that will be hard to challenge and change.

The status of the military under colonial rule needs further examination. What Peter Nyot Kok was referring to in the distribution of higher ranks amongst non-central-Sudanese reflects the ethnization of colonial as well as independent armies. The history of the specific situation of the army in Sudan as well as the polarization of northern and southern Sudanese in military context with the Ottoman, Egyptian as well as British army will be discussed in the following chapter.

Up until today, the composition of the national army in Sudan speaks volumes about the power constellation in the country. It also gives hints on what group is specially singled out and who is taken serious by the leadership. The origin of the Sudanese army lays in the slave trade as well as in the struggle against the British colonizers. Slaves played an enormous role in nineteen-century Africa. Manpower support from an enslaved population to fight on the side of the colonial powers against the indigenous army of a country was no exception. The tendency to enlist particular tribes in the region for use in the colonial army to fight proxy wars on the African continent and abroad were quite common.\textsuperscript{389}

\textsuperscript{388} Ibid. p. 45

\textsuperscript{389} There is literature on the composition of colonial armies and the use of certain tribes in the First and Second World War available. However, this will not be reflected in this paper since the interest here is not of a particular historical documentation,
Napoleon, disconnected with a shrinking army trapped in Egypt asked the Sultan of Darfur to send a high number of black slaves from what is now known as Southern Sudan, as manpower support for his army.\textsuperscript{390} The terror of the Turkkia, the Turkish-Egyptian colonial power from 1820 included the dimension of slavery from southern Sudan for the Egyptian army and the tremendous losses of the enslaved recruits on their journeys.\textsuperscript{391} From 20,000 captured slaves in the time of the conquest between 1821 – 1824 only 3000 survived.

The following colonizers of the region did not use slaves, but mobilized entire tribes to be their Askaris. The British in Eastern Africa distinguished between peaceful and belligerent races. Those of belligerent settings were complimentedly described with a physiognomy that is 'much closer to that of the Europeans'. The chosen tribes had been those of Wakuma, Masai and Zulu as well as some tribes from inside southern Sudan. Amongst them the colonial power representatives detected fundamental differences in their proneness for military drill. Kienan is referring to different observers described this 'phenomena'\textsuperscript{392}.

The distinctive category here was the tribal background. Semi-nomads and herders had no habitation to military drill and would be used as irregulars, leaders or scouts. Kenan infers from this that only tribes who had been used to authoritarian system of rule were willing to undergo drill and British or Prussian military style. Here it is interesting to observe the difference in the (ab)use of colonized people for colonial armies. For the First World War as well as the wars of colonial powers on the continent local men were recruited and accordingly classified as British or German. The Congolese and Rwandans for this matter were attributed outstandingly brutal, undisciplined and non-militarized – mainly because the Belgian colonial power was well known for its outstandingly brutal rule.\textsuperscript{393}

Colonial rule introduced the personalized concept of the ultimately responsible colonial governor. With the European colonization it was the only white man with full authority to whom everybody else was ultimately responsible. Yet in the last consequence, non of the colonial officers had ever been independent, they were bureaucratic officials who were subject to directives and orders from their home government. Colonial officers were expected to accustom but yet to continuously exemplify the symbol of the colonial state. This laid a pattern of personal authority towards the subordinates, since

\textsuperscript{390} V.G. Kienan, „Das Koloniale Afrika Und Seine Armeen,“ Militärpolitik Dokumentation: Die Militarisierung Afrikas: Geschichte und Gegenwart Heft 43/44. p. 26

\textsuperscript{391} Shamil Jeppie, „The Work of Conquest and Violence,“ in International Conference on Sudan (Durham: 2000).


accountability was not strength of colonial systems, yet at the same time subordinate follower of the directives and principles of the home government or crown.

For the post-colonial African rulers of the now apparently modernized states this meant a fundamental reorientation from all patterns. The traditional, pre-colonial pattern that would not fulfill the needs of the modern post-colonial state, as well as the colonial model, that was tightly linked to the home-country sovereign. The profile of the new African ruler was yet a mix of the colonial bureaucrat governor and the pre-colonial personal ruler.

Basil Davidson describes pre-colonial governing structures and the failure of transferring the nation-state model under the given conditions. In chapter ‘the road not taken’ he exemplifies this statement by the forced acceptance of nationstatism as a European concept by the new African nationalists. Davidson is blaming the colonizing forces for not making an effort to establish a developmental period of adjustment. A period where the colonized elite would be given time to get informed and introduced to the European system but at the same time not rejected to re-invent the pre-colonial system. Or, as I would argue, given the time to formulate a post-colonial governmental system outside or as a multitude of the preexisting systems.

No such period followed colonial invasion. What did follow was an ever-widening conflict of sympathy and purpose between the old nationalists, standing for the resurrection of precolonial powers and prerogatives, and new nationalists for whom the old powers and prerogatives had no more value, but were mere obstructions to modernizing progress. Left to their old privileges and restored to power, the chiefs and kings could only be a drag on liberated Africa. (...) It remained that in jettisoning the heritage of chiefs and kings, the new nationalists were obliged to accept another heritage, that of the nationstatism which came from Europe. They were obliged to accept the alienation they had set themselves to oppose and reject.

The subject of nation-states needs further assessment and evaluation. If, as in the case of Sudan, the state territory includes a multitude of groups with a mostly local identification, a nation-state might not be in the interest of the population. In Sudan a common national identity as one nation is neither given nor lived. On the contrary, political forces are working towards a fragmentation and re-tribalization.

As post colonial theorists, such as Amitai Etzioni argue, western models of nation states are not suitable for Africa.

I hesitate to engage into this broad discourse of suitability and basically essentialist difference, since it works on other essentialist beliefs, such as natural and enforced, or mechanized change, which I find difficult, since they imply an essential Africanness.

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395 Ibid, p. 73

which I would denounce as well as a absolute model of natural in the realm of political changes.

Post Colonial Regimes

For the whole of Africa, the typology given by Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill and Rothchild identifies six types of regimes between 1951 and 1990:

**Administrative-hegemonic:** In this type of regime the three key institutions are the executive, the bureaucracy, and the coercive apparatus. Main policy decisions are centralized around the leader and his close advisors. Specific technical and professional decision-making is carried out in the bureaucracy (sometimes with foreign advice), and the military is generally controlled. (Kenya, Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Zambia, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria)

**Pluralist:** The relationship of public bodies to each other in this construct has been based on a notion of the separation of powers, with multiparty political institutions and fairly vibrant representative structures. Interest-group involvement in pursued as well as a fair amount of autonomous non-governmental activity. A notion of checks and balances is retained. (Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal).

**Party-mobilizing:** The party-mobilizing type of regime bears the imprint of some of the participatory elements of regimes in the pluralist category together with the monopolistic tendencies of administrative-hegemonic regimes. The ordering of public institutions in these regimes has rested on a combination of strong one-party domination coupled with bureaucratic expansion firmly under the control of an executive president. (Ghana [Nkrumah], Mali [Keita], Guinea [Sekou Touré], Zambia, Algeria [Boumedienne], Tanzania, Zimbabwe)

**Party-centralist:** Its proponents have insisted on virtually absolute central control and direction and have generally been less tolerant of accommodation with local social forces or with most external actors. The guiding principles of interaction were formulated in terms of adherence to the basic premises of the binding ideology of the party. This category in the 1970s and 1980s included the Afro-Marxist states of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Congo and Benin.

**Personal-coercive:** In these cases, the entrenchment of the regime has been predicated on the connection between a strong leader and the coercive apparatus. All other structures – the bureaucracy, the political machinery where it existed, the court system – have been subjugated to the whims of the leader backed by military force. Unlike the party-centralist countries, where a ruling clique dominates, in dictatorial regimes the predominance of the leader has precluded any firm pattern of regularized exchanges. (Uganda [Amin], Central African Republic [Bokassa], Equatorial Guinea [Nguema])

**Populist:** Reconstruction of public institutions by rearranging their interrelationship with social groups and with each other. The cornerstone has been the subordination of the administrative apparatus to direct public scrutiny. Thus, although the civil service,

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certain public corporations, and the judiciary continued to function, their activities were circumscribed for a time by the establishment of an alternate set of institutions, including public tribunals, citizens’ vetting committees, and national investigative commissions. An essential tenet of the populist regime from has been, therefore a concept of social inclusions defined in non-elite terms. (Ghana [Rawlings], Libya [Quaddafi], Burkina Faso [Sankara])

Added to the regimes, there are the various types of conflict as well as the different classification of coups. Oliver Furley’s typology of domestic political conflicts entails 5 categories: 1- elite conflict, 2- factional conflicts, 3- communal conflicts, 4- mass conflicts/ revolution, 5- popular political protest. For a more specific classification of coups, Furley is referring to Huntington and differentiates between three different coups. - the breakthrough coup, to replace the former elite, 2- the guardian coup, where the new urban middle class enjoys control but is dislodged and 3- the coup of army officers austing another group.

Despite the image of predominant personal and military rule on the African continent, the types and variations of governance in independent Africa has a broad variety. Even military rule has various dimensions and orientations. The military regime under Nimeiri in Sudan was quite different from the current regime under Bashir. Both use force for coercion, but the social strata they appeal to for support and identification is radically different. Samuel Decalo is discussing the durability of the radical military regime under Nimeiri by arguing that he mastered to integrate the two potentially most destabilizing constituencies in the urban sector: youth and labor.

The unabashed utilization of force, the binding glue of radical nationalism, the powerful appeal of the psychologically satisfying domestic and global roles allocated by Marxist dogma to youth and labor – the two potentially destabilizing constituencies in the urban sector – plus the heavy patronage that oozes from these regimes in the form of jobs in the expanding state sector certainly gives them staying power. Yet sources of destabilization are many, hence the continued heavy reliance on force.

Whereas Gen. Omar el Bashir is controlling and punishing these urban forces using fear and force, Nimeieri was at least until the early 1980s able to integrated students and workers.

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State

“On statistical grounds alone coups and military rule had become the most prevalent political phenomena in Africa. Over half the continent and – give Nigeria’s instability – up to 65 percent of its population are at any point governed by military regimes. Coups had become the functional equivalent of elections.” 400

State, rather nation-state is an essential link in the understanding of acceptance of military rule. Again the state will play a prominent role in this chapter; therefore I would like to follow from the definition of the modern state given by David Held 401:

“Apparatuses, distinct from both ruler and ruled, with supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territorial area, backed by a claim to a monopoly of coercive power and enjoying a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens.” Held uses four characteristics of states, which he calls innovations of the modern states system. This more detailed distinction between modern states, mainly nation-states and other states are quite useful for this following chapter.

1) Territoriality. While all states have made claims to territories, it is only with the modern states system that exact borders have been fixed.

2) Control of the means of violence. The claim to hold a monopoly on force and the means of coercion (sustained by a standing army ad the police) became possible only with the ‘pacification’ of peoples – the breaking down of rival centers of power and authority – in the nation-state. This element of the modern state was not fully present until the nineteenth century.

3) Impersonal structure of power. The idea of an impersonal and sovereign political order – i.e. a legally circumscribed structure of power with supreme jurisdiction over a territory – could not predominate while political rights, obligations, and duties were conceived as closely tied to property rights, religion, and duties the claims of traditionally privileged groups such as the nobility. This matter was still in contention in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

4) Legitimacy. It was only when claims to ‘divine right’ or ‘state right’ were challenged and eroded that it became possible for human beings as ‘individuals’ and as ‘peoples’ to be active citizens of a new order – not merely dutiful subjects of a monarch or emperor. The loyalty of citizens became something that had to be won by modern states: invariably this involved a claim by the state to be legitimate because it reflected and/or represented the needs and interests of its citizens.

State formation in the context of acceptance of military rule in Africa needs more specified elaboration in order to understand the tendency of military rule in Africa beyond the main dimension of colonialism as a shaping factor of post-colonial formation in Africa.

400 Ibid. p. 2.
401 Held, „The Development of the Modern State..“ p. 70.
In their critical, almost cynical evaluation of the structure of states in Africa, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz discuss various interpretations of states, from the Weberian modern state to the neo-patrimonial nepotic state. For them, the modern state as the institutional emancipation from society is not reached in post-colonial Africa, since 'the post-colonial state has failed to become differentiated from the society over which it rules.' They rather describe the African state as a neo-patrimonial and hybrid, a formation that is 'simultaneously illusory and substantial'. It is both 'powerless and strong overdeveloped in size and underdeveloped in functional terms'. For the purpose of a militarized rulership, the hybrid state appears to be quite suitable.

As Deleuze and Guattari argue, there are differences in the art of state formation, which they distinguish in Eastern and Western. In the 'Orient', they argue, the components of a state are more disconnected, disjointed, necessitating a great immutable form to hold them together: „Despotic formations“, Asian or African, are rocked by incessant revolts, by secessions and dynastic changes, which nevertheless do not affect the immutability of the form. In the West, on the other hand, the interconnectedness of the components makes possible transformations of the State-form through revolution.

This is an utterly problematic description since it carries the construct of 'Other' which Edward Said criticized as Orientalism as well as an essentialist placing of east and west, north and south as separate entities. Since there is no state in Africa isolated from the north and since the western definition of state has been enforced on African Communities for centuries, the formation Deleuze/Guattari referring to, is neither an authentic description of reality nor a cultural relativist identity pattern. It can only be used as the borderline the polarities in between the states in war are shifting and floating. Samuel Huntington in his distinction of eastern and western types of revolutions uses the same terminology with the exact opposed analysis. Huntington insists on the overarching collective memory that is determining state formation and violent uprising. To him it is inscribed in the mind of the population – the matrix people orient themselves towards. Deleuze and Guattari build their argumentation on the

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402 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, „(W)ither the State?“ in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, ed. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (Oxford: James Curry, 1999). pp. 7

403 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.

404 The term and idea of despotic formation in relation to the ‘Eastern State’ is introduced by Marx in describing Asia and taken over by Max Gluckman for the African Continent. But still, in consideration of the Historikerstreit in Germany, when Emil Nolte defines the fashist state elements as ‘eastern’, it is not unproblematic to stick to this definition. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. p. 385

405 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993). Said argues, that the ‘West’ needed to construct the ‘Other’ in the term Orient by formulating everything that is unknown, not on the side of ratio and rationality, not cultural in the enlightened understanding as intrinsic to the Occident. The Orient by this becoming a fiction of the Occident as the feared and fascinating Other.

economy of war, not the genetically implanted war-proneness of people. However for the most explanations the idea of nation and national identity is emphasized as explanatory. If not a national feeling, that is hurt by the mere existence of the other (individual, religion, ethnic) or other enemy constructs are endeavoured. As Ignatieff argues in the case of Yugoslavia, it is not ‘secular myopia’ that drives people from the Balkan in war – as Huntington explains in the clashes of Civilizations – Ignatieff asks, how to go about the inauthenticity, shallowness and fraudulence of their religious conviction – referring to militiamen of Serbian and Kroatian sides.\textsuperscript{408}

I make use of Ignatieff and his argument against the collective inscription of history as the determining factor for conflict and transfer it to the situation in Sudan. Colonialism, Crusades or Monarchies play a role in the setting and is giving the patterns of cognition of war and the means of mobilization. But none of these reasons is the entire and only reason. None of the countries are purely nomadic, purely ‘eastern’ or a state of purely colonial legacy.

The idea of revolution branches in the ideological narration of Deleuze/Guattari. It is Western in its relation to a transformation of a state and Eastern as it envisions the destruction and abolition of the state. State as one institution in the public arena that lead into territoriality and its form of human organization.

The great empires of the Orient, Africa, and America run up against wide-open smooth spaces that penetrate them and maintain gaps between their components (the nomos does not become countryside, the countryside does not communicate with the town, large-scale animal raising is the affair of the nomads, etc.): the oriental State is in direct confrontation with a nomad war machine.\textsuperscript{409}

The concept of the state was for the main part of the century in Africa virtually ignored. According to Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill and Rothchild\textsuperscript{410} during the 60s „The state was perceived as an arena of Sovereignty or Territoriality and perhaps of nation-building, but it was not seen as an interconnected set of institutions with an existence of its own.”

For the perception of the idea of the state for the majority of people in southern Sudan this would still be true – if at all there is a concept of state – not only an image of state as synonymous with enemy forces. Since the radius of identification, exchange of interests and needs is based on a local or regional rather than a state concept, the state does not play a major role in situating ones identity or political arena. But who if not the state is the forum for political debate and decision-making? What disposition does the fragmented regionally identified society give for war and warleaders as well as for peace settings?

\textsuperscript{408} Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. p. 54.

\textsuperscript{409} Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia. P.385

\textsuperscript{410} Chazan et al., eds., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.
Soldier-Ruler and Military States

“The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but we fear the very institution we create for protection.”

At the end of 1984 almost half of all African states had been under military rule. For the civilian governments the internal state security as well as the police and army played an enormously important role—sometimes even more than in military regimes.

Whereas the main actors in the independence of African states were politicians and nationalists, rarely officers, the history of government in the post-independence era is strongly connected to the rule of military. Sudan though had a military rule right from independence in 1956 and appears to be an exception, since civilian rule is an exception in the history of post-independent Sudan. Obviously military rule does not relate to militarism in the European understanding. In the assessment of Western military experts, African armies as well as African military rule is lacking militarism. Reasons given for this are based on the understanding of modern armies and modern military strategies as a precondition to militarism. Modern here does not stand for an era or a description of post-medievalism, modern here stands for the training as well as the purpose of the army and is closely linked to the army as a state protector, rather than a tribal force. The post-colonial state armies are described undisciplined and non-militaristic because of the “(1) the general absence of a modern military tradition in most African countries, and (2) the inability of military organizations to withstand penetration by sociocultural norms any more successfully than most other state organizations.”

I disagree with the simplicity of the argument and the consideration of non-militarization in armies that differ from colonial armies, and would rather argue that the army and its inherit militarization is shaping the military rule. Military regimes here stand more for the symbolic act of oversimplified models of solutions, regulations, discipline and order. Military regimes in this context differ tremendously from what was classified a military state, such as the Prussian state, where militarization of society, polity, economy, the status of discipline, punishment and control in society was a reflection of what was glorified and aestheticized in the army barracks. In both cases it is the myth of discipline, law and order, just systems and non-corrupt leadership that surrounds this regimes and joins in populist/popular support. The symbol of this myth is the power of the gun, yet the reality is far from the idea/l.

There is a fundamental difference in acceptance of military regimes in the history and the way the military ruler gained power. Military rulers coming to power through armed

411. pp. 149-178
413 Jackson, Personal Rule in Black Africa. p. 36
anti-colonial or wars of liberation are basing their regime on more moral and political ground support than militaries taking over a state with a coup d’état to claim the power for a small minority. The governments of military leaders in Eritrea, Cuba, Uganda or Zimbabwe had or still are accepted widely by the population as their legitimate heritage. Military coups such as in Sudan by Bashir or in Chile by Pinochet lack this popular support.

Henry Bienen is arguing about the poor performance in representation and bargaining in military regimes in Africa, but for almost every case he cites there would be a civilian regime with similar fundamental failures. The fact of military regimes as highly personalistic can be countered with similar examples from civilian regimes. Ras Tafari (Haile Selassie), Daniel Arap Moi or the kings of Morocco have a highly hierarchical and personalistic rulership without falling in the category of military leaders. The distinction between military and civilian regimes becomes more and more difficult. As John W Haberson describes this indistinctness:

Military regimes include within their ranks civilians in high places, while civilian governments demonstrably rely upon the military even where the latter do not formally hold power. As authoritarianism and hierarchical rule is by no means exceptional in civilian administrations, so military figures are no longer strangers – if indeed they ever were – to the practice of political institution building, agenda setting, and coalition formation with parties, assemblies, and cabinets, which is the very stuff of civilian politics  

The blurredness of military-civilian relationships is not intrinsic to African states but rather a global phenomenon. As Henry Bienen illustrates this mix, success and acceptance of military regimes depends on various factors, including the personal leadership karma.

Civilian-military relationships in Africa, as elsewhere, will be affected by the state of order in a polity, national traditions, and a country’s military doctrine. They will also be affected by the peculiarities of leadership and the importance of military factions, cliques, and ethnic relationships. As clarified above, the title does not imply a specific African matrix, intrinsically inclined to accept militarized regimes. The dominance of military and militarized regimes on the continent has to be illustrated by the specific history as well as factors such as time and space and their role in the setting of indigenous social and political systems.

If people are trained, used and socialized to accept authoritarian decisions and to personify leadership it is obviously easier to sustain an autocratic model of non-representative regimes. If the infrastructure is not allowing people to participate in decision-making, inner- and inter-state trade or education, the appeal and strength of a national identification rather than a solely regional, tribal or local is estimably very low.

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416 Bienen, *Armed Forces, Conflict, and Change in Africa*. p. 46
The irretrievable loss of old traditional social and political structures through historical and global changes, the incapacitation through colonial rule, destruction of positive identity patterns by the racist supremacy ideology of the colonial master as well as the failure of soft transitional periods of post-colonial African regimes account for various factors supportive of militarized regimes.

Civil Society

Hope for solutions to break the lineage of authoritarian regimes, such as the strengthened civil society, are considered utopian by radical critics at the present time and current stage of state formation in Africa.

As Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue in their chapter on the ‘Illusion of Civil Society’, the European state was constituted out of specific and possibly unique configurations and constellations of economic and socio-political dynamics. It should therefore not be seen as the blueprint for every other state formation or as a remedy that just has to be copied:

For this reason, therefore, we should be prepared to consider whether the informalization of politics in Africa is not likely to prove a defining feature of its socio-political order for the foreseeable future. Will there not in fact continue to be an inbuilt bias against the institutionalization of the state as we know it from the Western experience? Indeed, the current patrimonial and prebendal practices of political elites are (...) most satisfactory, at least from the micro-sociological perspective of the individuals and communities they serve. In such circumstances, then, where would the momentum to abolish or reform them come from? It is most unlikely to arise from civil society, as we shall explain in the next chapter. Hence, the notion that politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs should be the servants of the state simply does not make sense. Their political obligations are, first and foremost, to their kith and kin, their clients, their communities, their regions, or even to their religion. All such patrons seek ideally to constitute themselves as ‘Big Men’, controlling as many networks as they can.

Even though I agree with their evaluation of the current situation, I would consider their view as too short sided since change is not likely to come from political agents but from marginalized groups that are either not likely to profit from the patron-client-system or who would question the current system as intransparent and inaccessible. It will be less likely that other ‘Big Men’ questioning and challenging the informal personal politics but those whose needs are not only not covered but also not even seen and considered. To take the example of socio-political changes from civil society groups the ecofeminist movement of Indian women shows how political changes can be triggered by a group that never even claimed these changes, but insisted on the consideration of their fundamental practical needs, such as safe water and firewood.

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417 Chabal and Daloz, Disorder as Political Instrument. p. 14f.
418 I refer here to a term that was introduced by two of the leading ecofeminist theorists, Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies. Mies and Shiva, Ecofeminism.
Irrespective of the critique of the illusion of civil society, the support and empowerment of grassroots movements and organizations is vital for a longtime perspective of more democratic states on the continent. The very same argument used by Chabal and Daloz, the peculiarity and the specific circumstances leading to the formation of what is now known as the Western state could be used on the changes in politics and socio-political discourse and practices. Whereas they base their model on the linear dynamics of politics in the public sphere with political man as the determining factor, one could argue, that post-modern politics fragmentize this monolithic formation and civil society groups emerge from interest-led initiatives, rather than from an modernist political aspiration to take over and keep power. Changes in peoples’ life, the awareness of their individual as well as strategic needs are conceptualized in a heterogeneous agenda and with more fragmented political strategies.

Army Constitutes State

From a feminist perspective mainly gender images and their socially accepted, internalized and encouraged hierarchies, dominance and privileges shaping the form as well as the strength of an army and by this in reciprocitly the state. For many Africanists, it is the dominance of one ethnic group over the other that shapes and constitutes privileges in army positions as well as in state. This seems to be a proxy rivalry, since the obvious factor might be the power imbalance in ethnic hegemonial distribution, the underlying factor of gender dominance is still playing a foundational role in power dominance – in the army as well as the state alike. The difference here is that scholars who are promoting the ethnic imbalance as the main reason tend to leave out any consideration that would argue for an intrinsic link between the power structures of army and state. For most observers it is mainly to separate fields of interaction rather than an intrinsically linked construct of masculine dominance. Samuel Decalo\(^{419}\) uses the colonial patterns and unbalanced armies as foundational reasons for army rule in Africa. Decalo is arguing that an advantage and privileged position of an ethnic group leads into the advantage in state positions, power and territorial issues. Due to this assessment it is clientelism and nepotism leading to powerful armed camps primarily based on ethnic lineage.

Decalo estimates that about 1/3 of African armies were ethnically balanced in the late 60s. Meaning that the remaining majority of 2/3 of African armies would have to cope with the colonial legacy of preference of one ethnic group over the other. He gives the Sudanese example where „Every officer – in a complex multiethnic state is northern, Muslim and Arab.\(^{420}\)

With this unbalanced setting, the praxis of ongoing intramilitary strife was set. Following Mazrui’s\(^{421}\) argument of stability through modernity, Decalo uses this link of modernization and discipline as one of the factors of stability as well as support or at

\(419\) Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints*.

\(420\) Ibid. p. 5

\(421\) Ali Mazrui, „Conflict as a Retreat from Modernity: A Comparative Overview,” in *Conflict in*...
least no open revolt of military leadership in Africa. Military regimes in Africa (...) seen as examples of the most efficient type of organization for combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control.\textsuperscript{422}

Since the legacy of colonialism almost restricts the African States from aiming towards a capitalist state structure that is liberal on the surface, it tended to radical military rules of Afro-Marxist type. Ethiopia was maybe the best and strongest example. Not only for the Marxist propaganda terminology but for the non-Marxist economy and the complete concentration and centralization of the state on the military core, the military rule – without necessarily the bourgeois glamour idea of the ruler as a star. In terms of economic Marxism, it is interesting to see that the radical Afro-Marxist regimes became the capitalist heart of the Soviet state by basing their economy on military interests.\textsuperscript{423} In rather cynical words, Decalo describes these states as "Afro-Marxism is in practice little more than a not-too-controversial blend of economic etatism, cultural nationalism and anti-colonialism."\textsuperscript{424}

Even if Afro-Marxism was not the political system of the majority of countries in the 70s, it has his legendary systemic rules in the Horn of Africa and even the SPLA made use of Afro-Marxist terminology, exactly in the random blend Decalo was describing. As a common description of the political orientation of SPLA and EPLF, Robin Luckham and Dawit Bekele\textsuperscript{425} argue that the two are purely national and regional movements. "Having a genuine commitment to socialism which they are already beginning to implement in liberated areas. (...) confronts liberation movements capable of mobilising popular support around guerrilla struggle."

Even if the quote seems to blend in much better under the headline of the political understanding of the two movements, I think it is sensual to make use of it at this place because the description just seems to completely forget about the consequences of militarism and militarized thinking in and from whatever armed movement or guerrilla it originates. The means and the aims seem to be variable with no consideration of what influences a military rule might have on a political system. When stating that the basic problems concerning whom the revolution belongs to have not been resolved and have become overdetermined by the question of who possesses military forces – they seem to forget that the question of whom the revolution belongs to is contra-revolutionary by its very understanding of representation.


\textsuperscript{422} Decalo, \textit{Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints}. p. 15

\textsuperscript{423} Soviet military production, licensing and trade. African military expenditure.

\textsuperscript{424} Samuel Decalo, \textit{Coups and army rule in Africa}, 1990. p. 36

Nation State

**Nation**: A complex web of common cultural, social and economic interests among people, leading to a sense that what they share in common is greater than their regional, tribal of other differences.  

**Nation**: Collectivity of persons whose self-identification on the basis of common ethnicity, language, race and historical experience is conceptualized as the raison d'être for the expression of political identity and power.  

To summarize the issue of nation state in Africa, a reference to 16th century Europe might be helpful, although there is no direct comparison to be drawn. Whereas the state in Europe emerged out of nations, where dominant ethnic groups forcefully overpowered, integrated or excluded others, the situation in contemporary Africa is quite the opposite. Post-colonial states were constructed, boundaries given and only then ethnic groups engaged in a new round of dominance and power and started forming nations.

In the context of alternative discussions on nation state and the question of governance, there are quite a number of interesting points to consider. The distribution of actors as from international, supranational and subnational to multi-polar system, the architecture of nation-state with an imbalance in the modern understanding of symmetrical state and non-state actors have to be considered. The role of internationally acting Non-State-Actors, such as humanitarian agencies as well as human rights organizations and various UN committees have to be recognized as factional policy makers as well as the globalized economic actors. Plateaus rather than steps on a ladder reflecting the de-hierarchized, de-centralized set of political decision-making. Cerny would describe a governance gap on the bases of reduced accountability of the governing rulers towards the governed ruled as a question of New Medievalism. Mark Duffield conceptualized the understanding of post-war conflict from the asymmetric architecture of nation-states in relation to the new ruler descriptions and understanding. In differentiating post-modern conflict from internal or intra-state war, he draws attention to the old form of rulers. As in accordance to Foucault's understanding of the idea of the state itself, it is a territorial form of...

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430 Duffield, „Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection.“ p. 12
bureaucratic and juridical political authority where rulers govern by some form of consent.

Internal war suggests conflict within the limits of this structure, that is, of forces either attempting to defend or usurp state power. Post-modern conflict however, addresses the emergency within the past couple of decades of political projects in the South, including qualified state systems which no longer seek or even need to establish territorial, bureaucratic or consent based political authority in the traditional sense. 431

I think this understanding of post-modern war is as critical as the label of new medievalism. The new war-leaders initiate their warriors according to a short term interest. War booty and loot is more important than the territorial promise of the feudal elite-warrior. I would argue, that the way of post-modern war-leaders might not follow a pattern of modern, in this sense dichotomous ideals of cold war either/or political orientation, but orient themselves in various directions – but for the same aim, to take over state structures, the dominant power of governance. In most guerrilla and liberation wars in the 80s and 90s, during and after polarized political orientation, the aim of most intra-war leaders is the replications of power. The aim is the replication of the insignias that described the old power of modern times. This might be described as hyper-modernity, since it combines the icons of modernity with the marginalized social position of the ‘other’. Since the grant narrative of enlightenment and modernism is a concept based on the South as the excluded ‘other’, the take over of southern leaders as military rulers or stakeholders cannot be compared with the global actors transforming from capitalism to global capitalism. In post-modern conflict the architecture of nation state might have changed, the symmetries of power and dominance did not. 432

I would even argue that the Southern war leader – and again I think it is quite a reflection of the power-discourse by using lingua such as warlord, to highlight the medieval tendency of feudalism of the new form of leadership in the ‘South’ – is the link between the post-modern project of globalization and the identity assurance of authentic rule of traditional law. The southern war leader is neither a powerful new war-apparatus-commander nor is he (no visible she available in this post-modern times) nor a feudal prince. The war leaders such as Garang with an Ph.D. from a US University, Hussein Aideed as a US marine have the information from both worlds, they might even have the receptors to ferment the information to one but they do not have the power to play a un-grounded, floating entity that would be required as the real avatar of a post-modern leader.

In this I disagree as well in what is described as the reminiscing and resembling of new war-leader images with those of the old chieftdom-system. As Meja Mwangi describes in ‘Striving for the wind’; the absurdity of the meandering and chaotic return to the roots, to the gods of the forefathers, when the richest man in the village turns up with all

431 Ibid. p. 12
432 It is to be seen how southern war leaders will integrate themselves into the political realm, dominated and defined by northern politicians. The dispositiv of power-relations is not only based on military strength, it is now depending on knowledge of power mechanisms.
available mythic skins and furs his money could buy. Or as Jean-Francois Bayart formulates in debating the discursive genres of politics, as Businessmen like dressed African Politicians, the ‘Creolization’ of African politicians. From the perspective of people in the affected countries, such as Sudan, the question of leaving the authentic surrounding is well reflected and there is no view or trust of the returnees as the legitimate representatives of the old. „Once you are leaving the cattle camp and you get some trousers and you go to school. You can never go back and go naked to take care of the cattle." Neither in the writings of Sharon Hutchinson on the Nuer nor in the articles and books by Francis M Deng on the Dinka, is the status of a chief or, in the case of the Shilluk, of the Reth, the King, given to one of the faction leaders.

Jean-Francois Bayart reflection in ,State in Africa – The Politics of the Belly, meets a more profound understanding of external and internal dynamics, than the direction Mike Duffield is pointing with the use of ‘New Medievalism’, as a repetition of a feudal, pre-colonial chieftancy system. Duffield is quoting Reno and Ellis in their comparison of chieftanship and the currents state of the state in Africa as following:

Here, we are asked to consider the crisis as a form of ‘re-traditionalisation’ of contemporary social and political relations. Concerning Africa, Reno (1995) and Ellis (1995) have argued that warlord structures, both in their relationship to foreign companies and dependent civilians, have established patterns of political authority reminiscent of the pre-colonial chieftain system. These authors evoke such back to the future images as a counter to the evolutionary and triumphalist limitations of conventional wisdom.

In my understanding the back to the future image is too simplifying and reversed evolutionist, and I consider a debate on the reasons for the fragile state and the question of fast identity transformations as necessary. Even if some war leaders are

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435 A friend from Southern Sudan on the question of returning back to Sudan and continue the life from before the war.

436 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State.

437 Deng, Dinka Cosmology.

438 Although there are claims from Riak Machar to be a Nuer prophet.


441 Duffield, „Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection.” p. 12

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claiming spiritual powers and a chief-like representational position, the population does not award them this status.

Bayart is dividing several phases of state formation. The first phase contains the capitalization of goods and matrimonial powers, followed by the second phase of the capitalization of relations and dependants. This is followed by the capitalization of prestige and influence and the secession and justification of secession through manipulation of genealogies as the final point of corrupt, nepotic military or despotic leadership. Bayart is going further in stating that this lineage is not only seen as one possibility, but that the understanding of the state is intrinsically interwoven with corruption. “Social phenomena which western common sense interprets as 'corruption' of the state, or 'political decay' lie right at the heart of our understanding of the state.”

This understanding is very much linked with the forced and fast hybridity of African States and cultures as unfamiliar with Western, grounded understanding of state, based on superiority. The denial of the variety of historic entities and regulating structures and the colonial reading of the ‘Other’ as non-existent, rather than different, combines the relation to the western model of state with colonial structures of inferiority and colonial superiority.

The question of warleaders is more than the question of settled chiefs, fighting for their status, it is the struggle of the entire structure and practices of government. Given this and the history of denial of representation and participation of the majority of people in Africa the mixture of the western state apparatus and people’s mistrust and agony of rulers comes together. As Bayart describes the wisdom of the people, will be discussed more in the concept of loyalty. He says: „The wisdom of the ‘small people’ – particularly women – draws on almost mystical acceptance of the miseries of the human condition in order to come to terms with the power and its wrongdoing.”

The chameleon effect as a tactics of survival is studied throughout the histories of minorities, to know more about the people in power than they know about you becomes essential. In practical terms, the Swaheli expression ndiyo bwana’ directly translated Yes, Sir, means clearly no.

Further, the conceptions of modernity have been employed to facilitate colonization. The prejudices, dichotomies are constitutive for western modernity. Dual descriptions such as rational/traditional, modern/premodern are the bases of modernity and its hierarchical linear understanding of progress. For the state formation in Africa, this has the consequence, that not only the colonialist master was mistrusted, but its strategy to reign and stay in power as well.

**State-Borders**

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One of the causes to current conflicts on the African continent is the unsatisfactory nature of interstate borders. Borders here are symbolizing colonial rule and power, stand for an aspect of easy mobilization and are used as an excuse to conflict as well as for propaganda purposes to demand states of pure ethnicity.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the colonial borders and their existence as irreducible and inviolable, entailed in the doctrine of uti possedetis juris, with the justification to diminish further interstate conflicts. Yet in post-nationalist identity oriented debates the question of border becomes quiet significant. It should nevertheless become a significant issue for militarization and conflict monitoring and mediation, since the population in boarder territories is for one vulnerable but yet quite influential in trade, particularly in small arms trade. To link the issue of border populations with that of the nomad war machine, eastern Africa becomes a specific object of interest. Here tribes, and mainly semi-nomadic tribes are split between a number of countries (Beja [Sudan, Eritrea], Turkana [Kenya] Toposa [Sudan], Karamajong [Uganda] and are either neglected by the government or under permanent occupation (Turkana, Karamajong) mainly because of their unruly military and cattle raiding activities. For inner as well as inter-state conflict, these groups become quite significant, not only for small arms trade and trade in general but as well for information, border monitoring, support of rebel activities. Border populations are used for fighting and are armed to keep a territory in a certain state, according to the interest of the state or other forces. In Sudan the border population between the north and south were armed by the governments to gain grassing land, but also had been given free hand in raiding and enslaving, such as the Murahaleen **444** militias in southern Darfur and southern Kordofan. Oliver Furley argues in the case of eastern and southern Africa that the splitting up of tribes through colonial borders is echoed in their role during insurgencies.

The existence of such peoples has the effect of prolonging guerrilla conflicts, also, as guerrillas can easily cross into ‘friendly’ territory and hide among peoples either the same as or related to themselves, as Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and Zaire know to their cost. The ease with which dissidents are harboured in neighbouring countries, and guerrillas armed and trained there, is itself a cause of both internal and inter-state conflict. One example is the Acholi population in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. They can allow or discourage the crossing of SPLA into Ugandan territory as well as support or suppress the crossing of LRA fighters from Uganda to Sudan and vice versa. Small arms trade along the borders – from Somalia to DRC – is carried out by nomadic ethnic groups, split across borders of Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and monitored by the border population. Yet there is hardly any study done on the role of border populations in armed conflicts.

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What these borders as well as the status of border population means for approximating the nation-state in the African context can be studied in eastern Africa. Border populations are playing an influential role in destabilizing attempts to form a nation state that should not be neglected.

**Ethnicity**

Ethnic, (Gr. ἐθνικός) 1. Pertaining to nations not Christian or Jewish; Gentile, heathen, pagan. 2. Pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological.

*Oxford English Dictionary (1961)*

The term ethnic group is generally understood in anthropological literature (...) to designate a population which:

- is largely biologically self-perpetuating
- shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms
- makes up a field of communication and interaction
- has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.

Ethnicity is widely accepted as a construct, used for various purposes and mobilized on different basis. Politized ethnicity is clearly one of the main markers in current African conflicts. Ethnicity is described as a colonial construct for better control of precolonial fragmented and/or arcephale societies or as a mobilizer for nationalism and conflict fragmentation in post-colonial political settings. Here the factor of material ties as the marker for ethnic ties becomes a prominent discussion. For this matter is widely accepted as a root cause to conflicts, yet the question has to be asked if it is not rather the (ab)use than the existence of ethnicity by promoting it to the main factor of excluding identity construction and by this for pursuit

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446 Frederik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, the Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Bergen; Boston: Little, Brown & CO, 1969). p. 11


449 see for example Kamal Osman Salih, „British Policy and the Accentuation of Inter-Ethnic Divisions: The Case of the Nuba Mountains Region of Sudan, 1920-1940,“ *African Affairs* 89, no. 356 (1990). For gender constructions similar critique applies.


enemy image building. Ethnicity by itself does not appear to be problematic, though the politicized use of ethnicity is \(^{452}\). The promotion of ethnic hierarchies in settings where the larger national or regional identity is not important and encouraged however seems to be a guarantee for violent conflict. If ethnicity is understood as a set describing diversity and difference rather than promoting the threatening idea of ‘the other’ as the enemy, ethnicity could be seen as a neutral factor such as gender, language and culture. For the understanding of the wider identificatorial pattern, such as national identity I relate to Stephen McCarthy’s \(^{453}\) definition of a nation as “a complex web of common cultural, social and economic interests among people, leading to a sense that what they share in common is greater than their regional, tribal or other differences”.

For the Sudanese case ethnic identity is one core category of the conflict. As Francis M. Deng and Khalid M. Medani elaborate in comparing the ethnic mix of North Sudan with that of the Horn as well as Chad and Niger the self-identification of northern Sudanese is different and enormously polarized given the fact that Sudan is a multiethnic country with a conflict based on hegemonic claims.

However, unlike the people in these countries, who identify themselves as Africans, the northern Sudanese see themselves as Arabs and deny the strongly African element in their skin color, physical features, and cultural elements, even in the practice of Islam. Having been permitted by Islam and the assimilationist Arab culture to pass into the supposedly superior Arab-Islamic identity, northern Sudanese ‘Arabs’ vehemently resist any attempt by the non-Arab population to identify the country with Black Africa. \(^{454}\)

Where ethnicity is becoming a relevant tool of war tribal loyalty then builds the ground to an acceptance of an authoritarian rule. Since only the tribal leader can be trusted because all others are potential enemies, the logic of personalized rule is internalized. What is true for ones own definition of safety provided by ethnic interrelations can be accepted for other ethnic groups as well. Yet their safety at the same time becomes ones own threat. In a logic of ethnic loyalty the greater good is non existent, a bigger matrix of society, defined as regional, national or human identity, functioning in a democratic system cannot serve ones interest and provide personal security as the absolute and exclusive rule as a tribal leader would. This danger becomes quite prevalent in the case of Southern Sudan, where internal southern conflict, mobilized on ethnic grounds destroys even the notion of southern unity and leads towards an ideal of fragmented pure ethnic niches or even ethnically pure states. \(^{455}\)

\(^{452}\) On political ethnicity see Rainer Tetzlaff, Politische Ethnizität: eine unterschätzte Realität im nachkolonialen Afrika. Afrika Jahrbuch 1990

\(^{453}\) Furley, ed., Conflict in Africa. p. 3


\(^{455}\) One only needs to follow this impossibility on the Balkan, where ethnicity became the dividing line and is now the foundation of an unreal construction of purist, absolute models of society.
For all the above mentioned models of state concepts the element of competition is of prime importance. Rothchild\textsuperscript{456} proposes, the interaction between state and society is a constant engagement of rival interests along ethnic (or racial, religious, regional or class) lines. Thereby the issue of leadership arises again. The chosen leaders are intermediors and demand from the state. "Only in worst-case situations, where groups feel physically or culturally threatened by a state dominated by an ethnic adversary, does this pattern of competition alter and intense conflict emerges."

This might be explanatory for the main conflict between South and North Sudan, it is a constructed pattern used in international conflict in the south even though there is no competition for placing demands with the state. Ethnicity as a competitive mobilizing tool for war is used in Sudan as an authoritarian leadership mechanism of enforced loyalty. Ethnicity is widely used as a mobilizing factor in the internal south-south war in Sudan. Leaders introduce a construct of tribal war-proneness and historical incompatability of the hundreds of ethnic groups in Southern Sudan. As Riek Machar is commenting on the his thesis that trauma care will not be necessary in Sudan, since “Our culture is not that complex. Let’s say three quarters of South Sudan is war society, they are fighting their own war and they go back to their lives when the war is not there.”\textsuperscript{457} He then further insists that there is no tribal component in the conflict and that all is merely political. He is explaining the understanding of the inner southern Sudanese war as one made by European media with their racist agendas.

\textbf{Economy}

The economic factor of militarized regimes is vast and complex. I only aim to alert to the variety of economic dimensions, rather than discuss all of them or focus this chapter on an economic evaluation.

One main aspect for military regimes is the easy control over economic and fiscal distribution. When the military clique is the only power with access to the countries taxation, resources, accounts and major contracts, the economic and financial interest of a person or a relatively small elitist group can be guaranteed for quite some time. The cases of Mobutu Sese Sekó of Zaire, Idi Amin of Uganda, Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic and other heads of personified regimes show that it can be a profitable investment to take power by military means. It is not exclusively the pattern of military regimes to lead corrupt states that milk money in their private pockets, but the question of accountability is rarely asked in military systems. The possibility and threat of an super-security apparatus is more likely ascribed to military rather than civilian regimes.


\textsuperscript{457} Interview with Riek Machar. Conducted on 25 February 1997 in his headquaters in Old Fanjak, Southern Sudan
As discussed in the previous chapter this is not only valid for state forces any more, since smaller militia leaders can install taxation in their area of control and monopolize the resources of their command territory. As in the case of Sierra Leone or Liberia, it was and is not necessary for the rebel leaders to take state power. In order to guarantee their financial interest, a state formation is no more necessary. As Oliver Furley is relating to Paul Richards assessment of the Liberian situation it is exactly the business ventures that made both warring parties continue:

The rewards of power have been so great in proportion to any other form of activity in Africa that coups and conflicts often arise out of desperation to achieve power when no other means seem available. Politics is ‘a commercial adventure in its own right’, as Roger Tangri puts it; conflicts arise not so much out of clashes of ideologies or programmes, but for profit – often for just an elite few, for the masses take little part in this type of conflict: ‘nearly all “tribal” or ethnic conflicts are rooted in competition between individuals’, for the scarce resources of wealth, state and power.  

States as a normative formation for foreign intervention, investment, interest and control are still slightly preferred but neither necessary for arms trades nor for resource access. As in the case of Somalia arms had been imported into the country for various factions in the absence of a state, trade and export was channeled through warleaders and their factions. Nevertheless because of lack of security and bad infrastructure, the state is still the preferred form of environment for a trade-partner.

Again, even if wars are destructive and not at all fertile for any national economy, the military-economic complex (rather than industrial, which is not the case in many African states) should not be underestimated. As in Sudan, local trade as well as regional trade is interrupted for decades because of the destruction of infrastructure, the bombardment of plantations as well as their workers and factories. Since the beginning of the war in 1983 South Sudan does neither trade agricultural goods inside the South nor do they export in neighboring countries. For the large mechanized agricultural schemes in the Gezira and other areas of central Sudan, due to the war, mobilization of men, lack of investment and maintenance do not produce as much cotton and agricultural goods as in pre-war-capacities. Specifically for Sudan one needs to consider the unbalanced national economy. In the 19th Century southern Sudan was exploited for slaves and ivory by northern traders. In post colonial eras development was mainly based on central Sudan, the Gezira, not in the South. Commercial connections lay more on the collective memory of robbery and exploitation, rather than in equal trading agreements.

Yet the destruction of large parts of the economy, vast unemployment a high inflation and a very low standard of living did not interrupt the war for a day. On the contrary

458 Furley, ed., Conflict in Africa. p. 5.
459 The economy of war in Sudan as a desastrous loss-making business is described in detail in George Tombe Lako, Southern Sudan: The Foundation of a War Economy (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993). In chapter 6 Lako is giving an account of the downfall of trade, animal husbandry, agriculture, industry and tourism due to insecurity, land-mines and displacement.
military expenditure is growing. With the emergence of oil the war economy is changing. Since September 1999 the first oil shipment from Sudan with 200,000 barrels a day are guaranteed, this is an estimated income of US $500 per day in the year 2000. Production will at least double in the next years. With the first shipment arms trade with China, Malaysia, Ukraine, Slovenia, Bulgaria and others increased.

Both sides, the government of Sudan as well as the SPLA invest primarily in war supporting and war sustaining material. But even before the current military regime, the economy was largely militarized, with military aspects of war and defense as the main considerations.

As Luckham and Bekele raise the question for the entire region of the Horn of Africa, the same is true for Sudan:

In this section we consider how the collision between the New Cold War and the regional hegemonic cycles of the Horn has devastated the economic and social formations of the latter. What we wish to establish is that this collision introduced an enormous disproportionality between the accumulation of arms in the hands of the states of the region, and their ability to pay for them and that of their economies to sustain the damage of war. (...) the main reason such a disproportionality can continue is the large scale military aid provided by foreign powers. Although this has had to be paid for dearly in terms of external dependence, it has seldom increased the power of the domestic state.

For foreign strategic, territorial interest, access to resources, overflight-rights and harbor access authoritarian and/or military regimes are easier to handle and more reliant, since the deals are done between two man and not between two democratic systems with an apparatus of transparency and accountability. There is no essential change between the colonial and the post-colonial period. It is only the main parties to the economic relations and regulations and the parties with interest in African resources or strategic military positioning have changed. To the advantage of militarized regimes and those who are engaged in active conflict or war, the destruction of human beings, livestock, productive resources, infrastructure and weapons is hardly

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460 According to UNDP, the defense expenditure in percentage of the GDP grew in Sudan from 1985, 3.2% to 4.3 % in 1996. In US$ millions it more than doubled from 146 US$ in 1985 to 397 US$ in 1996. This numbers need some explanatory context: By 1996 Sudan was out of the WB and IMF since their debts had been and are not paid and estimated unpayable. Sudan did not and does not make any effort to demilitarize its economy, yet IMF and WB are currently renegotiating with the government of Sudan. Due to their support of Saddam Hussein most Western as well as Saudi Arabia and their allies sanctioned Sudan, the war was ongoing since 1983 and oil was not an economic entity in 1996. The inflation was tremendous and the GDP sinking. Money was printed by NIF cadres in the Gulf but no financial support fueled back into Sudan. Large parts of Sudan, southern Sudan and parts of western Darfur were fully covered by international aid agencies. The Operation Lifeline Sudan, a conglomerate of NGOs under the umbrella of the UN is supporting a large number of Sudanese with nutrition and medication for more than 10 years. No financial support is given by the government.

461 Although an arms embargo pronounced by the European Union is in place against Sudan, direct arms supply as well as license production is in place. There are Chinese contractors producing automatic rifles inside Sudan as well as allegations on missile imports from Iraq as well as North Korea. For reference see BBC documentation, BBC dispatches, documentation by Omega as well as Damien Lewis. Reference for the arms transfer from eastern European countries see Lumpe, Running Guns: The Global Market in Small Arms.

462 Luckham and Bekele, „Foreign Powers and Militarism in the Horn of Africa.“ p. 15.
taken into consideration in any economic evaluation. They do not even have to account for at the end of the armed struggle, neither by the international community nor by their own population.

Basil Davidson discusses the idea of the nation-state here under the conditions and interest of the colonizing powers, the project that was needed to maintain the economy, the commercial flow and control, but the internal proxy war territorial claims as well. War, in this logic was always the main and most accepted option.

Now it might be thought that the British government, eager to acquire a monopoly of commercial control over wide West African lands, but far less eager to meet an almost certain high cost of consequences, would have jumped at this offer. (the king of Asante offered concessions) But the British ministers in charge at home now wanted more than monopolist commercial control; they wanted territorial ownership. Partly to keep out the French, then pressing down from the interior lands of the Western Sudan, but even more, as most of the evidence seems to show, because a demand for territorial ownership had become an imperial obsession and even a popular cause.  

An important aspect of the economy in relevant correlation with militarization is of course defense expenditure as well as global arms trade and the economic aspect of foreign influence in internal politics and regional conflicts. Whereas there is no direct link of higher defense expenditure in military regimes in difference to civilian regimes the rate of weapons import and arms spending in African states as well as the high amount of arms lending and military support giving by outside powers on the continent – specifically from the 1960s to the mid 1980s is enormous. Since the beginning of the 80s the US became the biggest arms supplier for the continent, although its strategic, political and economic links had been less intense than those of former colonial powers such as France and Britain. Whereas from 1970 to 1976 the Soviet Union supplied ¾ of the Sudanese weapons, there was zero supply from 1977 to 1983. From 1982/83 the United States started to supply 2/3 of the weapon imports to Sudan.

For countries with similar supply patterns but ideologically firmer relationships to one of the superpowers – the increase in arms imports did not necessarily mean any increase in defense expenditure. Weapons had been delivered in exchange for resources, strategic territorial areas (USA-Egypt, SU-Ethiopia) or on a loan under the banner of internationalism (SU-Ethiopia).

The western pattern of mobilization leading into a military-industrial complex is not relevant for Africa. For most states in Africa, as well as the majority of guerrilla groups bought their military hardware as well as software outside. Hardly any industry developed on the continent leading to the construction, development and production of military items, from MIC-bombers to uniforms. Whereas western military regimes split their profits amongst the capitalist-elite of steel-, weapon- and military manufacturers, African military regimes split their profits amongst their clientele-elite – mainly their

463 Davidson, _The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State._

464 Luckham, „Militarization in Africa.“
relatives – not planning to set up a long-lasting network, but rather interested in short
term profit. There is hardly any country in Africa that would have profited by war. As
Furley discusses: “Economically, Europe has recovered and even profited by war. not
so in Africa. 'Only the killing arts have been refined'. Conflict causes the flight of capital
and a brain drain: the development of enterprise is deterred.”

This evaluation leads into the same assessment of non-militarized armies in Africa.
According to standards of militarization known in the West, where the interwovenness
is deeper and less visible, since it is not based on a plain control but yet a more
sophisticated system of internalized militarization. The spheres are less openly
connected; civilians in the West can live under the illusion of a civilian democracy with
hardly any linkage to the military sphere, or without a militarized economy or society.
On the African continent this seems to be less likely due to the existence of a very
visible presence of the military if there is a military regime. People are controlled more
openly by the military and restricted in their freedoms.

Yet the internalized identification with militarized standards and images are less
prevalent in Africa than it is in the West.

The two most important factors mentioned are economy, the failure of independent
development of national or regional economy. The other factor, as the precondition to
the failure of independent economy is the colonial structure. The colonial structure and
its tentacles is not enough and not a a-historical determining factor, deeply ingrained in
the collective memory to be efficient to describe the differences in state systems in
various African states. The definition, mentioned earlier would base the state on the
basic assumption of „the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of
governance.”

How this affects the current state of affairs is bound to a multitude of explanations, the
link to the readiness for military rule differs even more. Similar factors sometimes
leading to different outcomes. For Ali Mazrui it is the lack of modernity, the failure of
development that leads to the conflicts in Africa, whereas for David Mason it is the
rapid modernization that leads to what he calls third world revolution.
On a communal level, the economic factors interwoven with what he calls a
revolutionary state of mind, are base on the disrupting effects of rapid modernization in
agrarian societies, leading to corrosive effects on traditional patron-client network. Civil
violence as a result of the new experience of the extreme inequality of income and
land tenure as well as the awareness of the instability of the nation in the international
arena, the dependency and the minor status in the north-south power game as well as
the systemic dimension of indigenous social changes would explain the revolutions in

465 Furley, ed., Conflict in Africa. p. 11.
466 Chazan et al., eds., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. p. 49
467 Mazrui, „Conflict as a Retreat from Modernity: A Comparative Overview.“ pp. 19.
the 3rd world. Ali Mazrui gives an argument ranking Modernity on the highest level without discussing its downfalls and exploitative hierarchies. His explanation of the acceptance of military systems and the idea of conflict as a retrieve from modernity is framed in the praise of modernity as a way out. To him the problem lays in the unbalanced mixture: “Unfortunately most African countries have been culturally westernized without economically modernized – perhaps getting the worst of both worlds.”

His underlying assumption is the link between western culture (capitalist consumerism? Popular culture? Media?) and modernization. By this he seems to forget the almost causal logic of cultural imperialism as creating, downgrading and excluding the ‘Other’. In order to accomplish one’s own modern superior development and even more a modernized economy, resources and labor have to be cheap in order to free the own western modern society to engage in consumerism. He illustrates his argumentation on the examples of western taste without western skills, secularism without scientification, western consumption patterns without western production techniques, urbanization without industrialization, capitalist greed without capitalist discipline. Mazrui is not quoted here as a ridicule argumentation but to show the classical patterns of current analyses of the state in Africa. It seems to be confusing and somehow upsetting political analysts, as Mazuri, that the African state seems to go directly from pre into post-modernity. As if the African state would combine fragmented paradoxes such as non-party presidency with multi-party legislature or ecumenical rather than secular state.

I think these are rather interesting debates since they tend to follow the belief of the state as a western invention that either functions in a western – here synonymously used with capitalist way – or leads directly into dysfunctional states, here synonymous with African states.

Foreign Powers and Militarism

The influence of foreign powers and their possible interest in the militarization of the state can not be reduced to the area of proxy wars. The interest of foreign powers might be strategic, economic or military-economic. It might be based on securing a cheap labor market, a cheap nuclear dump, on selling and experimenting with

469 Mazrui, „Conflict as a Retreat from Modernity: A Comparative Overview.“ p. 22

470 Here Mazrui refers to the rather interesting comparison of the presidency of Senegal with that of the United States. Senghor who could be a catholic president in a country with 80% Muslim population as opposed to the secular USA where since 200 years presidency is monopolized with Christian presidents.

471 As happened in Somalia, where no state nor government was necessary to negotiate deals with local war leaders to use Somali territory to dump nuclear waste. During a flight from Nairobi to Berlin, an upset German engineer who was engaged in building an oil refinery in Sudan complained about the waste of land and the ignorance of the regime in Khartoum: "They could win this war tomorrow if they agree to give this useless sand to us, so we would have a place to store our nuclear waste. They would get rich and we would get rid of this nerve-wrecking waste, both would be satisfied."
weapon systems. Foreign powers have an interest in airspace, harbors, cheap and easy access to resources and ideological hegemony. Wars in the south are interesting for western powers under military aspects to test new military technology and equipment.

As trade and markets had constantly been in correlation with security and protection the link between secure resources and markets and military regimes is not too far fetched. Again, not only military regimes provide this simple pattern of self-interest, nepotism and autocratic militarization of economy, but it is more likely to make direct deals with a military ruler, than with the head of a democratic state, that is not supposed to make decisions without consulting the public. However the state as formation with guaranteed access, international links and social and economic structures as well as infrastructures was required as a necessity in global economy, but this might change.

Under foreign powers commercial enterprises should not be underestimated. Since even if on state-level relations might not be good, this does not necessarily influence trade relations. Although most oil companies emphasize in their code of conduct and ethical terms of trade that dealing with democratic governments reduces their risk and guarantee their profits, in reality dealing with a military leader or dictatorial system reduces the company’s effort to organize security. By trading with a military regime the security issue is never a real operational problem, since it is in the interest of the regime to provide security in order to guarantee a maximum of financial outcome, from examples by Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria, BP in Columbia and Talisman, Lundin and ÖMV in Sudan, human rights violations by state security forces against a critical indigenous population was and is widely accepted.

Robin Luckham and Dawit Bekele describe the hegemonic cycles, based on trade – and weapon trade in specific – as a core indicator for local hegemony in the Horn over centuries.

For centuries weapons have played a crucial role in the politics of the Horn, sustaining the hegemonic cycles in which the empires and states of the region succeeded one another. To summarize drastically, they established interplay of hegemony and demise among three types of social formation: internal empires, littoral empires and foreign enclaves. Internal empires arose in the neighborhood of export production areas and sought outlets to the sea, but the very development of trade on these new routes led either to the growth of littoral rivals or to foreign occupation of the trading outlets. Yet none of the three types of social formation were able to establish permanent control. Each had their own disadvantages that led to their eventual decline and allowed the cycle to continue.

The instability of the central empires lay in the isolation from the sources of military advantage – the world market from which they acquired the guns and luxury goods required to reproduce the state and the social formation on which it was based. The littoral empires lacked the power to control the direction of trade from the interior and the development of alternative trading routes from the exterior. In both cases, however,
the range of their power also depended on the size of the economic surplus that could be appropriated from their subjects. For a variety of reasons, power, agricultural taxation and military mobilization were kept at a decentralized level. The littoral empires were also open to attack from larger foreign empires. The latter in turn were cut off from the interior by the enormous distance, arid lowland regions and mountainous plateaus.\textsuperscript{472}

As for a less regional-historical perspective but a rather global arms-trade interest, the wars in Africa play a outstanding role. International involvement and interest as ensuring resource access have the additional dimension of the value of global arms production. The transfer of sovereignty and territorial power for the accumulation of arms is leaving the third world in an economic debt as well as in a continuum of wars and armed conflicts. Again Luckham and Bekele for the specific situation in the Horn:

Since virtually all wars since World War II have been fought in the Third World, this means that the political power embodied in weapons has been constantly used up by their destruction – supplementing the effects of obsolescence in sustaining accumulation in the arms industries. The more conflict takes place in the Third World the more ‘embodied values’ (i.e. political power) are either physically destroyed or locked up in local arms races. And this in turn means Third World states have to transfer more political power and/or accumulate surpluses to replenish the stocks that are being depleted and/or made obsolescent. So the transfer of weapons appears as a transfer of political power to the Third World or at least to its ruling classes. But this appearance hides the inverse relation of a transfer of sovereignty from the latter to the main powers. At the same time the Third World is inserted in a particular way in the world military order. It has become political and territorial space for the realization of value of global arms production. This of course, takes place at its expense.\textsuperscript{473}

For the population in many African countries this spiral of more militarization, greater profit for the ruling elite and parallel decrease in national production, welfare and development for the majority of people is standard. Not the lack of transparency, increase in military expenditure authoritarian rule is necessarily questioned. The criticism tends to be more focused on the wrong person in power, rather than on the whole interdependent structure of militarism, clientelism and poverty.

\textsuperscript{472} Luckham and Bekele, „Foreign Powers and Militarism in the Horn of Africa.“ p. 10
\textsuperscript{473} ibid.
III. 5. HISTORY AND DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY IN SUDAN

In retrospective on guerrilla movements in Sudan the long history of oppression shapes the collective memory of people. The history of servitude and oppression is a leading mobilizing factor for struggle and revolt. Oppression, anger, rage and pain might be the political as well as individual decision making factor to support an armed struggle. Yet the departing points of the armed revolution are quite different.

The wars of independence on the African continent and elsewhere had a clear determination to overcome colonial rule. The proxy wars of cold war powers for power mapping of the continent, as well as the inner state wars fought by forces armed by different African states, such as South Africa, whose apartheid regime got involved in quite a number of inner state wars, such as in Angola, Mozambique, in Namibia or Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. As in the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, there was no direct colonial rule, when the internal war broke out between the southern Sudanese AnyaNya against the northern Sudanese rulers in Khartoum, but in none of the two cases the wars and conflicts could be understood without the context of colonial rule and regulation.

Nevertheless neither in Eritrea nor in Southern Sudan conflicts broke out because of a colonial rule but because of internal oppression and conflicting interests.

As William Zartman classifies the Sudanese conflict amongst others in utterly positive and optimistic terms since based on political reasoning rather than personal interest: “These conflicts are not simply feuds between rival leaders or factions or even ethnic groups over power; more important, they are struggles over the structures and practices of government and its beneficiaries.”

As in the history of Europe the coup d’état had been a variable of political means. The idea of revolution, especially the idea of the revolution of the masses lead by a vanguard of few to lead the masses into a new world or at least another state of social development had not been too old as a construction. If the ruler of a feudal, autocratic state was one of ‘their own’ and not a foreign invading power, the idea of popular overrunning was not really

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popular for centuries, the French as well as the Bolshevik revolution might referred to as an exception.

The idea of liberating the country from oppressive rulers, the owndictators, monarchs, the own leaders and sovereigns is a relatively new idea and has to be linked to the understanding of people about their own position as citizens, not only as villains or supernumerary in a wider setting of ruling powers and monarchic politics.

Some similar question of who is representing whose history and what content and truth is represented could be asked regarding the history of the civil rights movement in the United States. Obviously in the mind of a ruling elite, specially in the South of the United States, even Martin Luther King was a terrorist, because he was preaching equal rights for people, that in the view of the Southern elite should not even have the state of a human being, leave alone the right to vote or to use the same bus or bathroom.

**Representation Vanguard**


What motive was given to subsume difference under the requirements or – finit or infinit – representation? It is correct to define metaphysics through Platonism, yet it is inadequate to define Platonism through the difference between Wesen and Sein. Plato’s first strict differentiation is one between Urbild and Abbild (representation); where representation is by no means only pretence, because it constitutes a noologic, ontologic, inner intellectual bond with the idea of the Urbild. [Translation A.W.]

This quote emphasizes that not only is representation a difficult claim to maintain, but can also be described as contrary to diversity. This thought should not lead to the conclusion that the acceptance of difference and diversity conclusively leads to the impossibility of representation. And it surely cannot be used to deny the claim of representation by insurgencies in this

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paper. Representation here does not mean political representation of others by an institution. I find the quote informative to be reminded on one origin of representation.

The victors – a statement that exemplifies both, prior truth and bold simplification – write history. Arriving at the question who feels to be entitled to represent others, who constitutes a somehow legitimized rulership? Who can claim to be the vanguard of the resistance? And who decides on what bases the means of change are chosen? What is the step from dissatisfaction and anger against existing inequalities to an armed uprising in the name of the people and for a change?

A classical denomination of revolutionary uprising, intifadas, and liberation movements is the greater good, the betterment for the masses. A social-revolutionary approach is almost intrinsically motivated by socialist, communist, anti-imperialist or nationalist motives. In difference to the coup d'état which could call for the exchange of privilege and power for just a different elite, revolutions by definition as fundamental changes are claimed to better the situation of the masses. The dominant logic for revolutionaries or liberation movements seems to be the struggle by equal means. The oppressive force is fought by force. Non-violent tactics are largely categorized as resistance hardly as revolutions or movements of liberation.

In most of the cases, such as the diaries and autobiographies of Che Guevara or Fidel Castro it is the suffering of the people in an oppressive regime. This is the analytical basis of people, in this example of Leninist vanguard revolutionist theory, when intellectuals are getting together and plan to resist the system and wage a revolution. In an oppressive state, legal means or the power of words are not considered as appropriate means for a change. The prevailing internalized and socialized idea of the ultimate power of the gun, the change by force, is deeply rooted. Taking the gun does not only seem to be an ultimate symbol of strength and determinedness. Military solutions are still considered clear cut solution. Armed uprising is an understanding of a short, clear, determined change, where in the mind of the revolutionaries, the population will not suffer, the casualties will be countable and the change will be there to come soon. Even if the history of warfare does give us the completely reversed picture – if we read between the lines of heroic martyrs, victorious battles and glorious death – people tend to accept violent means as the tools for a change.
As Barbara Ehrenreich⁴⁷⁶ might argue, this acceptance seems to lead to an deeply inscribed human error in longing for blood and sacrifice in order to seriously believe in a change, whereas without bloodshed and sacrifice of life, a change might always be questioned, not been accepted to be real, true and lasting.

Founders of movements are rather seen as the pure incarnation of the ideal of the Kantian sovereign, the Hobbesian Leviathan, the democratic politician. The idea of representing the masses and just—in the classical religious sense of servant—serve the nation by giving ones own live for the better cause.

This is a common and well-known propaganda from all regular armies and of course used by all liberation movements. Whereas in both examples one should ask, how and why people would come to the conclusion that they are speaking and acting in somebody else’s name, and fulfill the will and wish of the majority of a population, while this population might have never been asked. In a very visible form this claim to represent is made public by naming the forces popular defense forces, Volksarmee, peoples army and the like.

**NAMING OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY**

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) labels itself a liberation army, in the name of the Sudanese people. This implies their claim to be the legal representation of the people of the entire Sudan, as well as having a structure as strong and workable and legitimized as the regular army of the Sudan. It might not entirely reflect the reality. With the name liberation army, I connect a vivid political communication and mobilization of the army and the civilians in whose name the army or the armed groups are fighting. To name oneself liberation army should be connected to an idea and reality of liberation that is not only focused on getting rid of something or somebody, but to build a better world. SPLM/A reflects in its name a lot of information and political positioning. It claims to represent the people of Sudan, to fight in their name. The fact that the EPLF did not use the name army, but labeled itself forces, leads to a speculation, that they seriously identified with the identity of a liberation force, that has completely different tactics and structures than a regular army. With the name army a centralized, heavily armed and manpower-strong institutionalized apparatus of soldiers is visualized. With liberation forces, a guerrilla, the decentralized group of people is meant, that lacks arms and ammunition and fights because they are convinced of what they are fighting for and not, because it is their job.

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Regular Army – Revolutionary Force

The main difference between army and guerrilla could be classified as a difference between centralized, regular army with certain manpower, a known hierarchical structure of command and obey. A certain transparency of the manpower as well as their military expenditure legitimized and controlled by civilian state power and the aim to protect the country. The basic idea is to be the military protective force of the status quo. The mobilization is either by conscript or in the way of a professional army. The structure of regular armies is powerful but less mobile fitting into the target description. The guerrilla forces on the other hand are – at least in the beginning is quite the opposite. A guerrilla starts off with less arms and ammunition than the regular army, with a less statically and transparent structure of command and obey, with less well trained people but people with higher morals, because their reason for taking up arms was not to earn money or to serve in a regular army as a job, but to bring change for the society, and to overrun and topple the forces in power. A guerrilla has to be more mobile and decentralizes; often they rely on the armament of the regular forces, which they need to capture. Normally their manpower is less than that of the army they are fighting against.

Instead of guerrilla, that might have the sideline of nonpolitical military movement in the terms of warlord militias, the terminology of revolutionary war might be more distinct. Samuel Huntington defines revolutionary warfare as follows:

Revolutionary warfare is the struggle between a nongovernmental group and a government in which the latter attempts to destroy the former by some or all means at its command, and the nongovernmental group attempts by all means at its command to replace the government in some or all of its territory.  

For the distinction that follows his classification of different types of warfare, he concludes, that guerrilla warfare is a FORM, not a type of war. Whereas his three types of war would be determined by the destruction and casualties, when he distinguishes between total war, general war and limited war, a guerrilla war would not follow this pattern but would necessarily, by means of conviction and aim, a total and general war, by the structure of reality, it sometimes would have to be a limited war. In the case of SPLA the initial reason for taking up arms would be following the idea linked closer to the Hobbesian rule, that need and shortage (Not und Mangel) creates war, than to the conviction of Plato, who describes the reason of war as a territorial expansion goal. War in Plato’s understanding would result out of luxury, power and wealth.

The SPLA did not emerge from a system of colonial power, feudal structures, military rulers or despotic emperors. In the case of the southern Sudanese SPLA and their predecessors the AnyaNya, the reason was equally based on a internal quasi colonization and did not start for the reason of hunger revolts or territorial gains.

477 Huntington, „Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy.“ p. XV
Historical Background and the Evolution of the Guerilla

The examples of the two military units of EPLF and SPLA might be helpful in order to structurize this variety of meanings and designation that are connected to the various terms for an armed conflict.

The main comparative reference will be the Eritrean EPLF – mainly because of their model-character in publicity as well as their integration of active female fighters – at not least because of the regional proximity with each other. The differences in political agenda and communication with the civilians, their sameness in context and their potential embeddedness in the same stream of revolutionary consciousness at that time, legitimizes the comparison. The two groups started fighting in the same era, with the possibility of sharing the same knowledge on revolutionary war, liberation struggle, new African policy ideals and the post-independent identity processes. Both groups had to work on bridging the gap of different influences. Both leaders, Issayas Aferwerki and John Garang passed through western education in the US and went back to a very traditional setting.

What determines a revolutionary group, a guerrilla movement and makes rebels and liberation fighters? What is the distinguishing factor between a guerrilla or liberation movement and a non-regular army? The leader of SPLA/M, John Garang de Mabior is claiming the SPLA to be the liberation movement, representing and protecting southern Sudanese. By asking the population in southern Sudan – the SPLA would be portrayed in a wide range of rebel, ‘the movement’, army, liberation army, bandits, guerrilla and ‘those who went to the bush to fight’.Claiming to represent its people, to even fight in their name and for an objective that is claimed to be a common, then it should be asked and questioned, where the interaction between the armed and the unarmed population is taking place, to what extend and in what way there is communication, referendums, political mobilization, education, open questioning, critique and self critque. Or if even in the so called liberated areas the atmosphere is frightened and the people censor themselves or have to fear to be censored or punished for potential criticism towards the armed movement.

Whereas the EPLF, a liberation movement in neighboring Eritrea documented, explained, mobilized, discussed, published and analyzed their program and their aim in various documents and publications, hardly anything is to be found on the political self-description of the SPLM/A. There is a vast body of literature on the EPLF in Eritrea, whereas the publications on the SPLA are rare and often journalistic and rather unacademic. There are facts to collect on the historical background on the struggle of the Southern Sudanese against the North, but there is only journalistic descriptive coverage on the aim and the structure of the army and the movement. The first convention on more politically and civilian oriented questions in the SPLM took place in 1994 - ten years after the foundation of the SPLA in 1983. Yet the war in Sudan has to be seen in the longer continuum of armed struggle in the South, starting with the AnyaNaya in 1954, it is almost 40 years after the decision to take up arms against the government in the north was made.
For the EPLF this is quite different. Not only did they have political information centers in almost all countries of exile, they published newspapers and had a pirate broadcasting. Various researchers, academics, media and politically interested people had been invited by the EPLF to visit their conflict areas, to attend their meetings and international conferences and to cover the face of the daily struggle in the warzone. It was the EPLF inviting those multiplicators. In the case of the SPLA there is not only a almost complete lack of a political agenda, the approach of the movement is much more based on secrecy and clandestine, less open for coverage and without possibilities to invite multiplicators from outside or to organize media-networks, magazines, information centers in the countries of exile.478

It is important to contextualize the decision making process of an armed movement in its historical perspective. The following parts will be divided into a historical, political as well as military perspective where EPLF will stand as a point of reference for the development of the SPLA. Even if the general struggle in Sudan started earlier than the one in Eritrea, it seems that Eritrea – at least for the last few years – came to an end of war and the liberation forces transformed themselves, personally and strategically into a civilian government. So it might take the role of a leading role model figure, whereas the Sudanese struggle is an ongoing one, with no mediation leading towards an end of this devastating war is in sight.

Identity in Internal Liberation Struggle

As much as the colonizers identified themselves more and more with something, that they described as purely British or somehow European and excluded the ‘Other’ the indigenous population of the countries they colonized, it seems that the colonized recurred to similar mechanisms of pure identity constructions than those used by the colonizers. The ‘Other’ became a threat to their pure Eritrean or southern Sudanese Identity.

That seems to reflect the reality and idea of a variety of political movements and revolutionary forces, that started up at this time, and one can easily read this new nationalist identification as a deep and basic fundament of the Revolution in Algeria in the 60s. Franz Fanon in his writings about the African Revolution, as well as in his work

478 The 1st International Peace Caravan, taking place in 1996 might have been the first journey to SPLA held areas under the guidance of the SPLA that had been organized by different youth groups, human rights agencies, media and interested others, including northern Sudanese from various political parties. The International Peace Caravane, of which I was part of the organizing team, had a high level of acceptance and understanding in the SPLA. Although, reportedly the leadership had to be pressured into acceptance. The planned interaction with local NGOs and mainly women’s organizations yet did not sufficiently work out, since they had not been informed on the ground. (The initial concept of this caravan came from Fatma Ibrahim, a well-known opposition leader from northern Sudan and other women’s organizations in Nairobi. It seems as if SPLM/A had no interest in promoting independent women organizations. More than 40 participants from more than 10 countries participated and could have evoked a broad media coverage, yet the public relation interest of SPLM/A seemed to be quite low.)
about Identity (Black Skin White Mask) describes exactly this internal liberation, that was inertly necessary for the colonized people of the African continent who finally got the chance to picture themselves in a self-descriptive rather than given manner. After being enormously traumatized by a period of colonial rule. This rule did not only work in terms of exploitation of resources, cheap labor, free labor and the immense richness of land and its system of ownership implied by the colonial powers. But the underlying colonial force was the systemic indoctrination and self-assertion of the rulers by constructing, implying, teaching and believing in a system of races, that followed the one that was already in power in terms of class and gender in the ‘home-countries’ of the colonizers. The idea of race and racial differences, that came into the continent with the invaders, and also even the adventurers of the 17th century, had a deep impact on the cultures and social structures of the population.480

Whilst focusing on the development of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, it is inevitable to take a recourse back to the colonial period as well as the history of the predecessor of SPLA, the AnyaNya movements.

The history of Sudan is quite complex and could be started thousands of years before this time, when Sudan, the land of the Black was mentioned in the Bible, describing its tall inhabitants. To explain the emergence of an armed movement, this is unnecessary. It is important though to understand that colonialism in Sudan did not start with the British colonial regime in the early twentieth century. Christianization of Nubia started approximately in 543-550 by Byzantine missionaries, in 614 the attempt of an early Islamization is stopped by the Nubians. From 1300 to 1500 the Islamization of Nubia becomes prevalent, Sufi-Islam is introduced as the main Islamic school in Sudan – Sufi Islam is still the dominant Islam in Sudan today, although the Muslim Brothers under Hassan al Turabi disagree with this form of popular-liberal Islam. In 1504 the Funj empire is established and reigns until the Ottoman troops under Mehmet Ali conquer Nubia, Kordofan and Taka in 1820. In the 1860s Turkiyya


480 T.C. Boyle wrote a brilliant novel, based on the diary of a Scottish adventurer, who left Great Britain in order to explore the source of the Niger. In T. Coraghessan Boyle, Water Music: A Novel, 1st ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1981). Boyle describes with vivid excellence, how deep the uncertainty of the differences had worked on the explorer and how much he still counted and described himself and the ones that seemed to be closer to his own culture in terms of cultural and racial superiority. The interesting approach of the book by T.C. Boyle is the change in the perspective of the two different narrators. The Scottish explorer is completely convinced of his superiority and not sensible at all for the variety and richness of the cultures he meets on his trip. His counterpart is a man from Mali or Niger, whom the explorer hires in order to help him in exploring the river Niger. This man is quite settled in his own cultural and tribal identity and – by being a trader – is very literate and informed about the differences in culture and mental condition of the different ethnic groups they pass, but he also takes a look on the snorty arrogance of his employee, specially when he joins him on a trip to Europe. He describes the arrogance and the deep superiority belief, and sometimes sees through this insecurity and the desire of, what Edward Said later subsumes as ‘Orientalism’, or, in the terminology of the scholars of colonial history, as ‘exotism’. Here again, the fear of the unknown clashes the will and determination to be the ruling race, class and gender. Similar descriptions, definitions and behavior that might be describing the era of Enlightenment in regard to the distiction of dual gender settings, the invention of the fragmented person in terms of culture versus nature, described in terms of male/female. Later the same concept was used in distinguishing and internalizing differences of people according to their class.

spread southwards along the Bahr el Ghazal, Darfur and the Nilebassin. As mentioned earlier the Turkiyya, the Ottoman-Egyptian rule is known for its cruel spectacular use of violence, the increase of slavery and the exploitation of ivory from what is now known as southern Sudan\(^\text{482}\). Possibly it could also be described as an era of realization of Sudan as a somewhat national entity. Whereas under the Funj empire all ethnic groups had their own rule and hardly any interconnection, during the Ottoman-Egyptian occupation people were classified as Sudanese rather than in their tribal identity. The Turkish-Egyptian empire is using European, mainly French military experts for their training as well as large numbers from the indigenous population as well as slaves to insert into their army. Northern Sudanese Muslims under Mohammed Ahmed who then was known as the Islamic Messiah, al Mahdi, rose against the Turkiyya regime and successfully capture Khartoum in 1885. The main objective was to fight the corrupt regime. The idea of the Mahdi was that of a unified Islamic state, which continued until 1898 when General Kitchner of the British-Egyptian troops conquered the Mahdi state. During the Mahdiya, although a solely Sudanese rule, slavery continued and increased. Francis Deng remarks on a remarkable detail in how the Mahdi as well as the Mahdia was received by the South. For the border population of Northern Bahr al Ghazal, the Mahdi was portrayed as a manifestation of the Spirit of Deng\(^\text{483}\), whereas the Mahdists were seen as Arab aggressors. The mental as well as concrete split between the north and south occurred and deepened during the Mahdiya. In current references to the Mahdiya the difference between northern and southern interpretation of the era is quite strong. Whereas the reading in northern Sudan tends to describe the Mahdiya as the era of successful overcoming of any colonizing attempts, the southern Sudanese reading tends to highlight the fact of internal colonization – and even states this as a marker for further imbalance.

As Francis M. Deng concludes in his book on Identities in Sudan ‘War of Vision: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan’ when he differentiates between the evolution of a Northern Identity as based on the pressure to assimilate and the Southern Identity as one of Resistance, that the Mahdiya includes two contradictory effects on the country:

On the one hand, it provided the nation with a common vision against foreign rule and offered the prospect of independence; on the other hand, it generated internal divisions, intertribal warfare, and a general turmoil from which the country suffered much and has never fully recovered.

\(^{482}\) Shamil Jeppie in his paper Jeppie, „The Work of Conquest and Violence.“ elaborates on the use of spectacular violence under the Turkiyya. Mutilation and punishment is one of the main forms of disciplining the troops as well as the civilians. A tactic still known in Sudan, the collection of ears from enemy soldiers as well as civilians started under the Turkiyya. With the ears cut off the ‘enemies’ body the soldier could proof to the Ottoman Vice-King in Egypt that the conquest is successful. During my field-research in Southern Sudan in 1997 the cutting off of ears was mentioned several times by victims of attacks.

\(^{483}\) A Dinka deity associated with rain and lightning.

Sudan, north and south is extremely heterogeneous, there is neither a homogenous north nor south of Sudan but a variety of ethnic groups and communities. Approximately 39% of the total population of Sudanese are of Arab origin, 13% are Westerners, 6% Nubas, 6% Beja, 3% Nubien and 3% others whereas 30% of the population are Southerners. They are subdivided along linguistic lines. The largest group are the Nilotes (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Annuaq, mainly in Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and the Lakes Region), second largest group are the Nilo-Hamitics (Murle, Didinga, Baya, Toposa, Buri, mainly in Equatoria) and the Sudanics (Azande, Kreish, Bongo, Moro, Madi, mainly in south west of Southern Sudan).485

The successive colonial period under the British-Egyptian rule until 1925 and the British colonial rule until independence in 1956 fully builds on and enlarges the division in the country between north and south. Supposedly because of the slave trade where northern Sudanese traders captured and sold southern Sudanese slaves, the British rule inhibited any interaction between north and south. With the installation of the 1922 Passport and Permit ordinance free movement between the north and south of Sudan was restricted. No traders and settlers from the north had been allowed to enter into the south Islam should not be spread. Christian missionaries however were not allowed in the north but were encouraged to play a ‘civilizing’ role in the South. For Abel Alier486 the decision to keep the South as a closed district was based on the fear over the possible rise of another Mahdi that the British did not want to risk. Southern Sudanese army members were sent back to serve in the south, northern members of the armed forces as well as civilian administrators were removed.

After the Second World War the claim for independence increased, pressing the administration to change the isolation policy in the South. The British agreed that there was an urgent need to develop the South economically, educational as well as political. Britain was interested in keeping the Egyptian influence in Sudan as low as possible, they had to balance their competition for the support of Northern Sudanese leaders with the support of the Southern Sudanese leaders. In 1947 the Juba Conference took place, attended by the chiefs, junior officials, police officers as well as British administrators to decide on the future of Sudan. The discussion was aimed to clarify the conditionalities for a united Sudan. The assessment of the Southern representatives is quoted in Alier:

The South should first be afforded the opportunity to prepare herself before joining hands with the North; it needed adequate trained manpower and a degree of social and economic progress before it could determine its future; it was stressed that North-South relations had not been smooth in the past. Southern representatives alluded to the experience of slavery during the Turco-Egyptian administration and the Madhia, maintaining that it would take time to develop mutual respect and promote genuine sense


486 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Reading: Ithaca, 1990).p.20
of equality of citizenship before genuine unity was forged. They proposed the establishment of a representative body in the South which could send representatives in future to Khartoum to learn and to take part in discussion of matters of general interest to the South and the North. In short, said the Southerners, the South would require many guarantees for both its progress and the preservation move towards unity, one based on recognition of cultural and historical diversity and demands of equality of citizens.

How serious this conference was taken by the administration can be observed in the appointment of representatives for the constitutional development as a follow up of the Juba Conference. Only thirteen of the 93 members represented Southern Sudan. The Sudanization attempt was even more ridiculously unbalanced; out of 800 positions in civil and public service only six went to Southern Sudanese. The elected parliament convened in December 1955 to consider the motion on independence. Southern members of Parliament put forward a motion for a Federation. The motion on independence was passed unanimously, reference to a federal system was not further mentioned and became a crime after independence.

In 1956 the British colonizers could not counter the pressure against their rule and declared the Sudan independent. The Jamhuriya Sudan was declared on 1 January 1956, after a transitional period of ‘Sudanization’ of administration and army. Governments change thereafter quite rapidly in Sudan the majority of which had been military regimes. Gen. Abboud (1958-1964), the transitional government under Khatim al Khalifa (1964) the elected government under Mohamed Ahmed Maghoub (1965), the government under Sadiq al-Mahdi (1966-1969) and the military takeover by Gen. Jaffar al Nimeiri (1969-1985). With the intifada in 1985 Nimeiri was toppled by Gen. Sawar al-Dahab and the Transitional Military Council took over for a 12-month period to prepare for free elections. Sadiq al Mahdi and the Umma party won. On June 30 1989 General Omar el Bashir under the intellectual leadership of the National Islamic Front with its leader Hassan al Turabi took over the government in a coup and since keep the regime in Khartoum. President Beshir announced the state of emergency in December 1999 and prolonged it infinitely. He was elected President of Sudan in an election in October 2000, which most opposition parties either boycotted or could not get registration

I will not go into details and present a comprehensive view on the internal political changes in Sudan since independence but would rather focus on the political developments concerning the southern region or as far as they contribute to a better understanding of the emergence of the conflict.

Southern Parties

Southern Sudanese who had the chance to a higher education regardless of their professional position tended to enter in one way or the other into politics. Partly this could be explained by the need of the British and later of the Northern political
hegemony to present proxy Southerners and therefore everybody with a degree had a fast and easy entry into the world of politics. The main reason nevertheless is to be found with the unjust system in Sudan. Everybody who entered into higher education had to be trained in Khartoum. With the effect that – outside the isolated and thereby secure nutshell of the south – they encountered the racist and classist environment. This led into questioning the system, opposing the structure and trying to reform it. Yet because of the total neglect of the south in education, political and social development as well as economic and infrastructural led into a marginalization and it took quite some time until southern Sudanese political activists formed their own political parties. In the beginning there was only the chance to engage in the Umma party of the Ansar sect of the Mahdi family, the National Unionist Party (NUP) of the Khatmyia sect of the Mirghani family or the Communist Party of Sudan. If these parties would have had a program embracing the needs and interests of the whole of Sudan, this could have been a chance to transform the former two from religiously based parties into real political national parties, yet the religious and traditional background of the parties and their followers did not allow for a fundamental transformation.

Beyond the religious programatic of the northern political parties, the economic factors should not be overlooked. The leading political parties in the north benefited from the uneven development of north and south Sudan and had no serious interest in sharing these benefits. As Mary W. Daly explains on the particular example of the Umma party and DUP:

Beneficiaries of uneven development were almost entirely in the Northern Sudan. Leaders of popular Islam, most notably but by no means only Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, combined traditional precede with government support (including outright grants of land and money, partnerships, tax abatements, and so forth) to amass wealth. Tribal leaders, buttressed by the powers enshrined in indirect-rule statues, saw their revenues increase, while land registration resulted in formal transfer of ownership from communities to notable families. The income thus generated could be invested in modern agricultural schemes, with considerable success. Growth of an export market for the Sudan’s agricultural and animal production enriched Northern traders and merchants, some of whose surplus was invested in manufacturing and transport. Analysis of the economic elites created during (if not entirely by) the condominium shows how they dominated the political institutions created by the British during the transition to self-government and self-determination. By the end of the colonial period the dominant Sudanese (as opposed to foreign) component in the economy was an elite of merchants, professionals, and civil servants, often closely related, who have been characterized as an ‘incipient bourgeoisie.’ Although they comprised only a tiny minority, it is important for our purposes to note that they were drawn almost exclusively from the central riverain region of the North.  

By this the logic of the party was to embrace the Southern politicians and their interests only to a certain extend – since a serious southern policy would have clashed with their own very northern political and religious identification.

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The reproach towards the southern parties to be sectarian and not national has to start with the accusation that no party in Sudan could claim to have national aims and interests but all parties had been based on an ethnic, religious or regional identity – with the exception of the Communist Party, but even there the representation of Southern interests was a question of a special interest group, not an approach to base ones policy on national concerns, including southern concerns.

The Southern Liberal Party (SLP) established at the dawn of independence. One Sudanese political observer, Peter Adwok Nyaba is quite critical of this first party, calling it weak and undecided based on the ‘indifference to politics and political organization’ mainly amongst the older generation:

The action of some of its members, vacillating from alliance to alliance with northern political parties, and the name itself is suggestive of a lack total political commitment and aspirations of the South Sudanese to the cause, or to stand up boldly risking one’s neck, to defend the region’s interest. (...) Most South Sudanese would want to win little favours from their northern political colleagues by not being seen to be advocating radical ideas like separation, federation, etc.

Nyaba is further remarking that most southern political parties appeared like political artifacts, in reaction to certain political situations rather than with a strong and longer-lasting political agenda.

I would add that due to the lack of a understanding of the south as a political unit the practice of political debate, routine, agenda setting and lobbying was hardly existing in the south. With the embeddedness in local responsibilities, the focus of reactive politics, concerning southern concerns rather than southern politics in the realm of the whole Sudan continued and caused a weak political pillar.

In reflecting political moves and negotiations in Sudan it is noticeable that the reactions were extreme; either collaboration or exile. After every decade of political rulership in Sudan political activists either collaborated with the system of the day to the full or went into exile in the neighboring countries. There was hardly any attempt for internal opposition – not even amongst the Southerners themselves.

To balance this picture the history of the Southern Liberal Party reflects the oppressive mechanisms of the northern regimes and elites. Whiles representatives of the SLP were represented in the Constituent Assembly in 1958 and continuously called for Federation, the northern political hegemony instead drafted a constitution for an Islamic state and outlawed the call for a federal system. The result was prison and exile for SLP members rather than chances for internal opposition.

With the end of the military regime of General Abboud in 1964 that was handed over in a provisional government under Sir el Khatime el Khalifa the next southern political party the Southern Front (SF) came into the open. Although the SF was already active during the military regime, the SLP dissolved itself during the military regime. Due to

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the pressure by the SF, a collective of government officials, intellectuals, students – a very urban setting, Southerners were selected for the cabinet and the Supreme Court. Another political party that existed mainly in exile is the Sudan African National Union (SANU). SANU were existent in its two rival wings, one SANU inside the Sudan, represented under William Deng Nhial and SANU in exile under Aggrey Jaden. For the round table conference during the October government under el Khalifa, a group called Other Shades of Opinion (OSO) was established and represented by Ambros Wol Dhal, Santino Deng and others.

During the round table conference many diversities and disagreements between northern and southern parties emerged, one difference is reflecting the dilemma and the wide gap between the two in particular. Whereas the northern parties insisted on condemning the violence by the AnyaNya forces the southern parties insisted that state violence would have to be included in this condemnation. It shows how differently the political parties saw themselves represented by the state, since for the northern parties the sovereign status and the monopoly of this sovereign state to force and violence was unquestioned since the state acted as a northern agent. Southern parties did not consider the state in its current existence as their sovereign, representing their interest, trusting its monopoly on violence.

The Twelve Man Committee established to represent all political parties in Sudan and to make decisions concerning the country by consensus started its work in 1965. Six representatives from the north and six from the south were selected. From the south they came from SANU the Southern Front, the Sudan Unity Party and Sudan Peace Party (both formerly part of OSO). In December 1968 Southerners left the Twelve Man Committee due to unsolved disagreements. The question asked at the round table conference on what type of nation-state should be established, one reflective on the diversity of culture, race, religion or one based on a more narrow criterion claiming to unify the nation. The Draft Constitution finally set in place during Sadiq al Mahdi's time as the prime minister recommended an Islamic republic and Arabic to be the official language.

Islam, as the religion of the majority was always used as an ideological rather than religious factor in Sudanese politics. Since Christianity was regarded as the influence of colonialism, Islam was seen as the religion of the liberators. For the South, Islam,
rather than the elite in central Sudan became the dominant enemy image and religion is used by the men in power for any justification for war, even against fellow Muslims. 494

Although, as for the dissemination of news such as the result of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 political parties send their representatives to the south—in general there was hardly any active southern constituency. The construction of a political sphere practice of political culture with a nation- or even just south Sudan wide approach was not initiated.

Control and coercion by the northern governments surely plays a role in this, as does the colonial legacy. What would constitute a citizen 495 does not apply for Southern Sudanese; rather the south with its inhabitants was regarded and treated as an appendix. Political identity in the south was more shaped by a reactive politicization rather than a proactive one. For the north the destiny of the country was considered that of a family affair, it was almost a birthright for some politicians to control and own the future of the whole country. Their dominance was backed by the legitimate access to the state monopoly on violence and force. For this they continued to consider resistance in the South an anti-state attempt rather than their own use of force against the south a case of internal colonial apartheid.

Unlike in the north, internal opposition in the south or opposition against positions of Southerners towards northern policy and repressive dominant regimes was often voiced via the foundation of an armed wing rather than a political party. One example of opposition against the politics of the Southern Parties is the foundation of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in 1970, the political wing of the armed group of AnyaNya under Joseph Lagu. Although he deliberately called it movement and not force, the orientation of the movement was military and not political.

With the takeover of Nimeiri in 1969 again, political parties had been outlawed only the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was allowed in the socialist model of Nimeiris’ one party system. With the Addis Ababa 1972 peace agreement more and more southern Sudanese politicians settled back to Sudan and congregated in Juba.

A Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) was tentatively established in 1967. Aggrey Jaden became president and Emilio Taffeng, a military commander of AnyaNya his deputy. In 1969 Gordon Mayon headed the Nile Provisional Government (NPG) and later in 1969 Joseph Lagu founded the AnyaNya organization. 496 The

Still a Factor in Armed Conflict?,” *Bulletin of Peace Review* 21, no. 3.

494 The execution of Taha, the religious leader of the Republican Brothers, a reformist, modernist religious school by Nimeiri set one example of religious intolerance amongst Muslims in Sudan. The jihad Turabi announced against the people of the Nuba Mountains, including the Muslim population there is another visible signal for this intolerance

495 Def. Citizenship: Within political philosophy, citizenship refers not only to a legal status, but also to a normative ideal—that the governed should be full and equal participants in the political process. People who are governed by monarchs or military dictators are subjects, not citizens. (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 1995)

regional government in Juba faced complete different obstacles than being a representative in Khartoum. Control by the government was not as possible as in Khartoum yet the political influence in state affairs was lessened while in Juba. Just the fact that the place of political debate and decision making was not Khartoum but Juba changes the picture completely. Here Southerners were more free to discuss, the discourse had to be based on the interest and demands of the population around rather than tailored according to northern political matrix. The downside of it was a more distinct ethnic orientation. Peter Nyaba is again quite critical of the southern political elites:

Although the elite in the South presented a facade of unity on the basis of their perceived political parties, that did not stand the test of time, as tribal and sectional tendencies overwhelmed many of them to the point of neglecting the southern national concerns and aspirations. The regional government would shuffle and reshuffle the ministers not because they had failed in their task, but because of personal allegiance and how much one memorized and sang the slogan of the SSU and ‘national unity’. 497

A major problem for southern politicians during the whole era was the fact that the government they were allied with in certain ways, as southern regional governors or as members of national institutions was the one that was attacking civilians during their war against AnyaNya. After the transitional government of el-Khalifa elections were held in the North (due to security reasons, there was no possibility to held elections in the South, was the argument, the same that was used in all allegedly democratic elections in Sudan). Muhammad Ahmed Mahjoub became prime minister and announced that the south will have fifteen days to surrender otherwise the army would deal with the ‘outlaws and their supporters firmly’. What followed is a long list of massacres against civilians, the starting point was the killing in Juba, supposedly 3000 people died, followed by an attack on Wau and then further attacks in Upper Nile and large raids in Shilluk areas.

When Sadiq al Mahdi took over premiership this line of attacks continued. In one of the first incidents after he took power, the Bor incident, the attitude of different identification of northern and southern politicians became even more obvious. For the prime minister the army was the protective mechanism, whereas for the population in the south the army was the main perpetrating source.498

As the Prime Minister’s tactic was to ‘crush the rebellion while at the same time working to bring about a dialogue with those elements favoring a political solution

497 Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View.

498 Sadiq al Mahdi visited Bor and payed tribute to the fallen soldiers. “No sooner had Sadiq left the town than the army, electrified by the Prime Minister’s tears, went on a rampage. Twenty-four Dinka chiefs, including some who were detained under custody by the police, were slaughtered. When the only southern newspaper reported the incident, Sadiq ordered its prosecution. (quoted from Khaled, The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan’s Political Evolution, p. 231. 
based on the unity of the country’. Again the political agenda and the leeway for the southern politicians to manoeuvre was set and limited by the north.

Sadiq insisted on supplementary elections for the south, which were subsequently held in 1967 with the result of Umma party winning with 15, SANU 10, NUP 5, Independents 3, Unity Party 2 and 1 seat for the Liberal party. The southern front boycotted the elections stating that the state of emergency in the south ‘militated against any free elections, since candidates would be held in violation of the emergency regulations if they were to opine on the prevailing political situation in the region in the course of the campaign.’

The continuation of atrocities committed against civilians laid the basis for mistrust by the southern population towards politics allied to the north. William Deng who won the elections with SANU was a close ally to Sadiq al Mahdi and was allegedly killed by northern opponents of Sadiq in 1968.

When Jafaar al Nimeiri came to power in May 1969 by seizing power in a military coup, he announced the whole of Sudan to become socialist and autonomy for the South. A ministry for southern affairs was set up, headed by Joseph Garang. Garang himself a Southerner did not believe in the armed struggle of AnyaNya, specifically since they had financial and military backing from Israel. He considered this to be an imperialist and Zionist conspiracy. He saw the cause in economic disparity between north and south. “The cause of the southern problem was the inequality which exists between North and South by reasons of an uneven economic, social and cultural development, and that all the ills in South-North relations sprang from this situation. Consequently, for Joseph Garang the solution was development and the elimination of disparity.”

After Communist Party members and officers waged a coup against Nimeiri in 1971, the alliance with the Communist Party broke; those thought responsible for the coup were executed, including Joseph Garang. Abel Alier from the Southern Front replaced Garang as the minister of southern affairs. Southern politicians backed Nimeiri in this decision as they did in the Libyan initiated invasion in 1976. Mahdi’s Ansar with the backing of Libya tried to seize power from Nimeiri unsuccessfully. Mahdi was tried in absentia and sentenced to death. Yet a year later Nimeiri called for reconciliation and Mahdi, as well as the leader of the right wing Muslim Brothers, Hassan al Turabi were

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499 Ibid. p. 232.

500 The list of atrocities is long, including the institutionalization of torture centers established by the government. Torture centers as the one in Kodok was used against schoolteachers, intellectuals, political activists – the majority of them civilians. (See Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan), pp.143.

501 If William Deng was killed by southern elements or by members of the armed forces – who killed a number of SANU politicians and were not controlled by Sadiq is until now not exposed.

502 Not the later leader of SPLA.

503 Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan., p.155.
appointed influential positions in the SSU government. The door was open for the traditional political parties of the north and their distinct religious national agenda.

With the Addis Ababa peace agreement the south received a push in economic development and political freedom. Nevertheless as will be described in the following sequence some of the projects did not benefit the population in Sudan. Financial mismanagement and constant changes in the government under Nimeiri led to promises not fulfilled as well as financial burdens the south could not manage. Not only financially but in technical as well as educational terms the South was still lacking behind. Whereas in 1972 of the 1641 places in the University of Khartoum 35 were held by Southerners, this number declined rapidly and was down to 9 Southerners from 1637 places in 1984. Meanwhile the southern parties and politicians split and fragmented even more.

The resumption of the Jonglei Canal project in 1974 is one issue that triggered armed resistance. It was feared that the Jonglei canal could destroy the ecological balance of the region, mainly affecting the Sudd and flood plains and by this destroying the livelihood of the people in the area. The canal was promoted to help irrigation schemes in Egypt, northern Sudan as well as newly developed projects in the South, such as the sugar project in Mongalla and Melut. Although many experts promoted the project and still promote it the public opinion towards the Canal was one of rejection based on rumors and the fact that the water would be shared with Egypt and northern Sudan. Since there was no sign of sensitivity regarding any southern interest, proposal or demand, the idea of changes in the southern Ecosystem for the benefit of the North was not going down well, since again the projected and promised benefits and developments for the region did never appear. As Abel Alier, a general supporter for the project reflects: “The first ten years of the project showed that the two governments had demonstrated more enthusiasm for getting the water into the canal in order to execute projects downstream than for providing capital investment for social and productive schemes in the South. It is imperative that all these interests should be seen as equally important and equitable catered for. If the interests of Southern Sudan are not treated with sensitivity, at least within what was agreed upon before the start of excavation of the Jonglei Canal, it will be almost impossible to make headway in future with drainage projects.” The canal project was attacked by SPLA in 1983, expatriate workers killed and it came to a standstill then.

The other huge project that changed the situation in the South as well as the relations between North and South and is to the current day one of the most influential features in the war is oil. In 1975 Chevron was granted a concession area around Muglad and Melut. Nimeiri designated only northern areas to Chevron later changing his tactic.

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505 Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. p. 234.
506 Oil exploration started in 1959 with Agip’s concession in the Red Sea area. Further companies followed but without any result.
Chevron was given concessions in Upper Nile and subsequently renamed the area into Unity, which later he wanted to re-demarcate as northern Sudan. Later concessions given to Total covered undisputably southern regions such as Bor, Pibor and Kapoeta. Yet for the Chevron fields around Bentiu Nimeiri decided to name the fields UNITY fields, later on the whole area Unity state. To undertake this move to finally demarcate the area and claim it to be northern territory Nimeiri used the military. By exchanging the staff at the Bentiu garrison from southern to northern soldiers and commanders he laid ground for a struggle that is continuing until today.\textsuperscript{507} Besides the attempt to change borders for the benefit of the northern Sudanese regions, the same problem occurred with the oil as with the Jonglei Canal: changes take place in the South and have an impact on the population, the social structure and the environment but they hardly share any promising benefits for the region. Abel Alier, at this time Minister for Southern Affairs remarks on the demarcation issue:

The first was the boundary issue in the middle of 1980 (…). Officials in Khartoum had attempted to transfer the rich oil, agricultural and grazing lands of Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal to Northern provinces merely by redrawing the map. Boundary changes brought the South, especially students and school children to the streets. In response to representations from both the Regional Assembly and the High Executive, President Nimeiri appointed a committee under Chief Justice Khalaffallah Rasheed to investigate and review the relevant legal corpus and advise. Included in the committee were a number of prominent Southern Region officers. The committee recommended the retention of boundaries fixed on 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1956 (as stipulated by the Addis Ababa Agreement) and the President accepted its recommendation, to our relief.

It was in the course of the work of the Khalaffallah committee that Southern representatives discovered two other matters which themselves became issues of dispute between the central and regional government: (a) that contracts between the Sudan government and Chevron governing the sharing of oil revenues unjustifiably gave the latter the lion’s share and (b) that Kafi Kengi in Western Bahr el Ghazal had been secretly leased to Chevron at the end of 1979.\textsuperscript{508}

By naming the area as Unity state, Nimeiri managed to take administration out of the hands of the southern administration into the central administration. Nimeiri called for redevision of the South from 3 into 5 administrative units, the Southern Regional Assembly rejected in 1981, Nimeiri dissolved the Assembly. Nimeiri’s plan to decentralize and grant more autonomy to regional governance led to a tribalization of politics in the south. Rather than to formulate a southern policy with distinctive regional authorities, interests of ethnic groups in opposition or at least exclusion from each other defined regional interests. Conflicts on ethnic grounds emerged and spread and none of the newly established ‘Area Councils’ could put a hold on these internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{509}

\textsuperscript{507} The struggle mentioned here is twofolded. The idea of demarcation was prevalent since the Unity oilfield, until 2000 used by the Great Nile Petroleum Cooperation (GNPC) a consortium of Talisman (Canda), Petronas (Malaysia), Sudapet (Sudan) and CNPOC (China) was cleared from the population and resettled with people from the north. The current regime is claiming that most of the oilfields in Unity state are belonging to the north.

\textsuperscript{508} The other side of the struggle was that by moving southern soldiers out of their territory replacing them with military man from the north steered the negative sentiments in the region as well as amongst the soldiers. [The commander of Bentiu garrison, Salva Kiir then became a top ranking man in the SPLA and is now Vice President of the country and Chairman of SPLA]

\textsuperscript{509} Examples of how these conflicts were triggered and escalated into armed clashes are plenty,
Their politics created not only frustration but triggered an influx in purchasing and trafficking of arms in the contested border areas of Upper Nile and Jonglei.

The perspective of southern politicians or the standpoint of southern political parties gives no hint of any unified outrage or discomfort with the regime. The dissatisfaction with unfulfilled northern promises and continuing marginalization fed into the mistrust of politicians and into the support of armed struggle. When Nimeiri finally lost his credibility in implementing the September laws in 1983 the southern elite were fully caught up in Nimeiri’s divide-and-rule tactics that the chance to a strong political opposition was long gone. With the introduction of sharia as the common law, the process of Islamization of the country was unstoppable. However, the process started much earlier by appointing the architect and leader of the Muslim Brothers Hassan al Turabi in important positions and by establishing the Faisal Islamic Bank in 1978. By this decree the financial and economic sector was islamized. Since the economy drastically declined the Islamic Banks became the mere source of finance in Sudan.

Just before he was deprived of power Nimeiri contacted Colonel John Garang and offered him a post in his ministry. Abel Alier is naming it the ‘Czar of the South’-post, negotiated by two financial tycoons, the Saudi millionaire Adnan Khashoggi and the British businessman Tiny Rowland of Lonrho. Garang was offered to become the second man of Nimeiri.

Nimeiri was overthrown by what was named after the Palestinian uprising intifada while he was on an extended visit in the United States. Spearheaded by urban intellectuals, starting with a demonstration of women against the increasing prices of living and followed by further demonstrations of students, trade unionists and professionals. The popular backing was strong enough for the alliance to force the military to auster Nimeiri and give way to a transitional government. Headed by Nimeiri’s minister of defense, General Abd al-Rahman Swar al Dahab as the head of the military council and Dr. al Gizouli Daffala as the head of the civilian cabinet. They formed the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and prepared for elections. All (northern) political parties with the exception of the Muslim Brothers formed the National Forces of the National Salvation. SPLA demanded the annulment of the September law and offered a ceasefire. The TMC did not conform to the offer nor the demand and the

some are given in Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View. p. 23.

510 For the financial mismanagement of the various regimes see Lako, Southern Sudan: The Foundation of a War Economy. For a specific focus on the maladministration of national economy for the interest of the Islamic fundamentalist groups, personal conversation with a former minister of finance in Sudan 1994. He was giving explicit details on the banking system as well as the creation of a second monetary market by paying with Sudanese pounds, that the regime in power was printing according to their need. Further on economy, Ibrahim El-Badawi, “The Tragedy of the Civil War in the Sudan and Its Economic Implications,” in Empowerment and Economic Development in Africa, ed. Karl Wohlmuth (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999), pp. 545.

511 Interestingly enough Khashoggi is now known as heavily involved in arms trafficking, Tiny Rowland was connected to the oil arrangements in Sudan. Rowland later became involved with the Nasir faction and Kerubino Kunayin Bol to intermediate for the NIF regime and offer them financial support.
national alliance issued a statement supporting the generals and distancing itself from the ‘extreme’ positions taken by the SPLM/A.\footnote{khaled}

Neither the TMC nor the national alliance wanted to tackle the September laws or secession. The constitution declared Sharia and custom to be the main source of legislation, with personal matters for non-Muslims to be governed by their personal law. SPLM took the role of southern political parties after Nimeiri. Although the war against the south continued SPLM/A met with the National Alliance in Koka Dam, Ethiopia in March 1986. The conference led into a declaration agreeing on further meetings and working out a peace process. Just the biggest northern party, the Umma party of Sadiq al Mahdi was too preoccupied by their electoral campaign and did not continue. Sadiq then won the election in June 1986 and became Prime Minister of the Sudan. It needs to be kept in mind that the South, again was not included in the elections. Sadiq al Mahdi held a meeting with Garang but they did not convene for a common solution. A temporary council for the Southern Sudan was established under the leadership of Matthew Abor Ayang but had very little influence. The de facto representation of the South was already connected with SPLM. Ayang resigned following the signing of the ‘transitional charta’, the reinvention of the September Laws under a new label.

The government continued to fight a counter-insurgency war against what they considered rebels in the south. Arming and supplying tribal militias in the border regions\footnote{khaled} as well as acting decisively against intellectuals as in the Nuba Mountains\footnote{khaled} became a pattern for the so called democratic era. In 1988 the Democratic Union Party (former NUP) of the competing Mirghani family of the Khatmyia sect signed a peace agreement with the SPLM/A in Addis. Sadiq did not respond to this agreement and his credibility started to erode. His defense minister resigned in protest against the government’s failure to act upon the peace agreement and to implement it but to boycott and sabotage it. The army reacted as well and send a memorandum to the Prime Minister criticising the lack of activity regarding the problem in the South as well as criticizing the employment of tribal militias by the government. All governments used the Murahalin, tribal militias mainly from the Baggara tribes of Misiriya and Rizeigat in Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan. A more formal inauguration of the Murahalin took place during the TMC under the then-minister of Defence, Fadallah Burma Nasir.

Besides the failure of the government of al-Mahdi another force has to be mentioned who is playing a potent role in the politics in Sudan almost from the beginning on. In 1985 the National Islamic Front is emerging, a renaming exercise from the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Hassan al Turabi. They needed to change their name possibly because it was public knowledge that they had been the main force behind Nimeiris regime since the September laws of 1983. Turabi and his followers

\footnote{khaled}{Khaled, *The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan’s Political Evolution*, p. 353.}

\footnote{khaled}{The Baggara tribes are traditional supporters of the Ansar sect and thereby the Ansar’s political force, the *umma* party under Sadiq al Mahdi.}

were lobbying for the sharia laws including the hudud-penalties such as amputation, cross amputation, death by stoning and crucifixion following death. They had also been the ones pulling the strings behind the execution of the liberal Republican Brother Mohammed Taha, who was opposing the September laws. He was tried, sentenced and executed in 1985 aged 79 for apostasy and inciting others and subverting the state.

Turabi was holding important positions throughout, for the democratic cabinet under Sadiq al Mahdi he was the Attorney General in charge for the placement of the September laws under new gaze. At this time in 1988 out of twenty seven cabinet ministers only four were Southern Christians. Finally in 1989 Hassan al Turabi managed to gain the highest power position in Sudan. With the military coup of Omar el Bashir, Turabi was the main actor in Sudanese politics. He was the intellectual architect of the coup.

SOUTH-NORTH POLITICAL MAPPING

Not only did Southern Sudan appear as an appendix as an extra problem to the issues of Sudan – in the eyes of northern politicians, governments and parties. It appears to be the same vice versa. There was no opposition, commentary or intervention by southern politicians or political parties concerning the issues of the North. Internal political quarrels in the party system of the North go uncommented and possibly unseen by the south. Whereas it should have been obvious that because of the dominance of the north even small moves in the political field in the north will have repercussions on the situation in the south the South acted as if already living in an independent state.

AnyaNya

As a more concrete and specific history of the armed struggle, I would like to combine historic facts with the understanding of warfare, raiding, resistance in particular and the use of violence in general for various southern Sudanese groups. Both Francis M. Deng and Abel Alier draw the attention to early resistance against occupation forces. These groups could be categorized as armed movements, since their aim was to keep foreign invaders out of their territory whereas the armed clashes of cattle raiders for grassing land, cattle and women amongst the Nilotes as well as between the bordering ethnic groups of north and south Sudan should not be labeled as such.

For the British rulers this form of resistance, weather against the northern slave traders or the colonial troops was seen as uncontrollable savage ritualized forms of warrior initiation. Deng cites the civil secretary of the British-Egyptian condominium rule, Sir Harold McMichael in this matter: “The troubles experienced by the government in the swampy areas of the Upper Nile, whether on the Abyssinian border or father west [are]... attributable to a mixture of the natural mistrust, based on bitter experience of the
old days, which was felt by these savages for any government of northern extraction, the incident of witchdoctors, and the zeal of the young warrior to 'blood' themselves.\textsuperscript{515}

However in the elaboration of Alier and F. M. Deng, the resistance was lead by two different categories of leaders. One category entailed religious and spiritual leaders the other category meant leaders who gained respect through brave or just actions and conflict settlements. Both authors mention the Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Anuak and Atwot, in specific as keeping up a strong resistance so the Mahdiya or later the British could not rule and reign.\textsuperscript{516}

As a reply to the 'Closed District Ordinance', the sealing off of Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills, an armed group named the ‘White Flag League’ attempted a rebellion in 1924. Before independence and after the failure to implement recommendations of the Juba conference a southern Sudanese mutiny took place. It was started by members of the Equatorian Corps in August 1955 in Torit and spread quickly all over Equatoria. Hundreds of northern Sudanese – civilians and army members – had been killed. The governor-general rejected the mutiny and called for an investigation and called for the regiment and mutineers to surrender. Officially they surrendered, but most including civilians went into the bush and continued what a British observer called a ‘Mau Mau existence’. The reprisal that followed in the south was lasting for the next seventeen years and resulted in further armed conflict. Some left the country, bandit attacks took place throughout the Fifties and small guerrilla units appeared in a local rather than united southern Sudanese context. There was no sign of a comprehensive southern Sudanese guerrilla force until the mid 1960.

AnyaNya\textsuperscript{517} attempted to capture Wau under the command of Bernardino Mou Mou in 1964 but failed and returned into the bush, again without any form of central structure, training or common goal. Local guerrillas such as the ‘Sue River Republic’ in Zande land in western Equatoria under the leadership of Samuel Abu John, the ‘Anyidi Republic’ in Bor district of Upper Nile by Akuot Atem are some references\textsuperscript{518}. The tactics had been random assaults but no military strategy or strategic unity. According to Douglas H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier fragmented guerrilla units only integrated on a provincial level and co-operated about 1970.

The unification of the AnyaNya army came about in 1970 largely because Joseph Lagu, a senior Equatorian leader, was supported by Israel through the brokerage of Gen. Idi Amin Dada, then chief of the Ugandan army, who had close personal alliances with Lagu’s tribe, the Madi. Lagu was able to offer other guerrillas supplies


\textsuperscript{516} Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, pp11. Deng, War of Visions : Conflict of Identities in the Sudan Part 2.

\textsuperscript{517} AnyaNya is referring to a snake poison. Most local guerrilla groups up until the late 1960s would use AnyaNya as their name.

and training on a scale previously unobtainable. Many young AnyaNya officers, who joined the movement as it became more unified and organized, were to note well the consequences of fragmentation and the lessons of military unity. John Garang was one of them. 519

Whereas the southern political actors started to form various movements and political parties, such as the Southern Front, the Sudan African National Union (SANU) or the Other Shades of Opinion (OSO), the armed movements hardly had any political orientation beyond the call for independence. With the change of AnyaNya into a bigger movement under Lagu the political wing, the South Sudan Liberation Movement appeared who would then become the signatory to the Addis Ababa agreement with the government of Sudan in 1972. Yet Joseph Lagu as well as the SSLM representatives did not appear to be deeply concerned nor interested in the future of the SSLM as a political party after signing the Addis Ababa agreement. 520

The predominantly northern Sudanese government made use of the British heritage of isolated but tribalized and regionalized southern Sudan; the native administration policy. The precursory model for what is now happening in the oil areas appeared in the Condominium period with arming the Baggara ethnic groups as ‘murahalin’ force under the false label of border control. They had been used as a military tactic in the 1960s by the then government-lineage of the military government under Gen. Abboud (1958-1964), the transitional government under Khatim al Khalifa (1964) the elected government under Mohamed Ahmed Maghoub (1965), the government under Sadiq al-Mahdi (1966-1969) and the military takeover by Gen. Jafaar al Nimeiri (1969-1985) and extended under Sadiq al Mahdi (1986-1989). All of them armed specific ethnic groups to fight against neighboring tribes or ethnically organized guerrilla units. 521 For observers of the situation in southern Sudan since 1991 and intensified since the production of oil in Upper Nile in 1996 this sounds horribly familiar. 522 Murahalin were used as special oilfield force during Chevrons activities and continue to play this role. They are now participating in the abduction and enslavement of their southern neighbors.

With the signature of the Addis Ababa peace agreement, local raids and conflicts did not end in the South. Although AnyaNya guerrillas should be integrated into the national army, according to the Addis Ababa agreement, local conflicts continued in the south. With further military support and the proliferation of arms conflict inside the

519 Ibid.


521 Johnson and Prunier refer to armed Nuer who fought Dinka AnyaNya in the mid 1960s, armed Murle who fought Nuer and Dinka AnyaNya as ‘national guards’.

522 Johnson and Prunier describe the situation in the Bahr al-Zeraf region at the end of the war in 1972 as one of a Nuer civil war, ‘fought out between semi-autonomous armed bands.’
Southern Sudan became increasingly complex. Whereas the political actors oriented themselves along the lines of Pan-Africanism, African Unity as the SANU – with its siblings in Kenya (KANU) and Zimbabwe (ZANU) the armed orientation became more and more fragmented along ethnic lines. Although the local police and prison service, the wildlife service and the security was almost entirely in southern hands, whereas in the national army in the south the quota was one northerner to one southerner, local feuds and their reprisals increased. The instability and conflict in neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia and Uganda made small arms proliferation a commonly available. With the peace plan and development processes in the south after 1971 the further tribalization of power positions and ethnically motivated advantages, blames of clientele system and further raids increased the acceptance and use of violent means by the various groups.

Out of frustration of either the uneven distribution of economic development or the refusal to accept the integration into the national force, often with a downgraded rank to their former AnyaNya rank, groups and individuals continued to raid. The Murle had been known for raiding Dinka and Nuer areas for cattle, these groups retaliated and the spiral of small scale arms raise started. Further mutinies took place in the 1970s, Akobo and Wau mentioned here as the most prominent ones. The reaction was quite delicate in a heated political situation such as in the south. There had been incidents when former comrades were in charge of rounding up the mutineers, since they had already been accepted in the national army and wanted to keep their position, some mutineers had been executed, many fled into the neighboring countries, namely Ethiopia and Uganda. Development efforts and failed promises led to a further localization of militias.

To name the most important projects and changes in the 1970s: the Jonglei canal project and the discovery of oil deposits. Both projects could be seen as possibilities of regional development to the advantage of the local population – yet both projects turned out to become a distinct nightmare for the affected population. Rumors of surplus Egyptian farmers to be moved to the South along the Jonglei canal caused riots in the capital Juba. Escalating this conflict of interest and profit was the attempt of the government to re-demarc the boundries between north and south Sudan – specifically in the oil rich area of Western Upper Nile. This bill was resisted and withdrawn, nevertheless students of Juba University went into protest, other towns in southern Sudan witnessed protests and demonstrations as well.

In 1974 the Derg under Mengistu in Ethiopia overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. The new government threatened the Nimeiri government in Sudan with supporting the internal enemies if Sudan would not refrain from supporting Eritrean guerrillas fighting against Ethiopia.

Some of the former AnyaNya fighters who were integrated in the national army and stationed in the South, such as Major William Nyuon Bany and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol became important figures in the history of the armed struggle of the south – Keubino in

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a specifically unglorious way. In his armed career he constantly changed sides from
anti- to pro-governmental units, where it seems his main aim was to fight and to live the
life of a warlord rather than to pursue a political aim with his struggle.
As Peter Nyaba remarks bitterly on Kerubino during Nimeiris time, he was more
interested in material outcome and Kerubino’s speciality of war booty, looting and
taking started right here:

It is unthinkable that the same people who were used by the regime to ruthlessly crush
their fellow South Sudanese freedom fighters could turn out to be those to spearhead
a revolutionary armed struggle, leave alone its socialist orientation. Kerubino and
William Nyuon were great friends whom Major General Saddiq el Bana used to amass
for himself wealth in the form of money, gold, cattle and wildlife trophies: elephant tusk,
leopard skin, etc. in return the two friends were allowed to do whatever they wanted
with the money of their units. This is how the problem of the wages for the soldiers
under the command of Kerubino surfaced in November and December 1982,
percipitating indiscipline in the rank and file and eventually the mutiny in May 1983.\footnote{Nyaba, \textit{Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View}, p. 27.}

The Southern Sudan Liberation Front (SSLF), mainly students and intellectuals who
started in the early 1980s, represented another type of rebel group. According to Peter
A. Nyaba their aspiration was a Che-Guevara-type guerrilla movement. They had
been firm in revolutionary Marxist ideology but otherwise poorly organized. The SSLF
eventually joined the SPLA. The change from a pre-modern to a post-modern society
seems to be reflected here. There is – out of various reasons, such as marginalization
– no real interest in a national identity but rather a readiness to follow local identities
and to use them in an excluding rather than unifying manner. The divide and rule
strategies by the various regimes in tribalizing the South as well as arming and
preferring certain tribes to fight against others is functioning perfectly well in Sudan
from colonial times until now. The armed groups hardly ever focused their effort and
policy towards a united identity, be it a Southern Sudanese or a united Sudanese.
Whereas political parties tended to prioritize national aims or call for the awareness
and respect of Sudan as a multicultural, multiracial, multireligious state, armed groups
continue to fight along ethnic lines. The governments using these constellations yet
base their power on the construct of Sudan as a nation and gain power and influence,
national and international from this construct.


III. 6. SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY/MOVEMENT

Officially the history of the SPLA starts with the mutiny in Bor, although ground was laid before. The promised changes and transformation in the political and social situation of Southern Sudan did not live up to its expectation. The South was quite politicized in its fragmentation, several clandestine groups appeared such as the Nationalist Action Movement (NAM), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Southern Sudan (PMSS), Movement for total Independence of South Sudan as well as movements inside the armed forces.

Some of these movements were linked to army members as well as AnyaNya cells, so the mutiny in Bor was just the sparkle, the plan was laid well before but did not turn out exactly as expected, by capturing major towns in the South and finally to oust Nimeiri. Ethiopia was monitoring the moves and kept close links with the group via the NAM cell in Khartoum under Edward Abei Lino.

Some of the smaller guerrilla groups had contacts with southern soldiers in the military based in the region. Some of the politicians in the southern regional government were involved in arming rebel members. John Garang and William Abdallah Chol had both been in the army at that time but had contacts with Akuot Atem, an AnyaNya veteran leading a famous rebel unit in Jonglei province. Samuel Gai Tut, then in the regional government got arrested with a truck of arms attempting to smuggle to some AnyaNya units. Another prominent AnyaNya member and later to become notorious warleader, Kerubino Kuanjen Bol, then major in the Sudanese army changed sides in late 1982 and supported rebel camps which he had fought just recently.

It was Nimeiris fear of a strong Southern unity with a functioning army and policing system that made him call for transferring Southern troops to the North and exchange them with Northern troops. The 105th battalion in Bor under the command of Kerubino Kunayin Bol refused their marching orders in January 1983. Col. John Garang, by this time head of the army research department in Khartoum was sent to negotiate – but stayed to continue with the mutiny. In May troops attacked Bor from Juba, the soldiers escaped to the countryside with arms, ammunition and vehicles. The marching aim was Ethiopia where the members of the 105th battalion were joined by other mutineers from Pibor, Pochalla, Malakal, Nasir, Bentiu, Ayod, Waat, Aweil, Wau, Rumbek and places such as Nzara deep in western Equatoria. AnyaNya II provided some of the logistics; they also supported ambushes on government reinforcement. Deserters, dissidents, AnyaNya fighters and ex-government allies joined forces in Ethiopia under the auspices of the Ethiopian military government, the derg under Mengistu Haile Mariam.


526 Derg is Amharic for council.
The manifesto formulated the aims and aspirations of the new army, yet the leadership struggle started right in the beginning. A number of men, senior to Garang counted on their appointment as chairmen, whereas Garang had the best contacts with the Ethiopian authorities.\(^{527}\) Whereas Gai Tut and Abdallah Chol kept the political aspirations of AnyaNya, the separation in the forefront, Garang, Nyuon and Kuanyen called for more complex strategies. At their meeting in Itang the older generation of Akout Atem and Samuel Gai Tut opted for Atem to become President of Southern Sudan. The Ethiopian authorities opted for Garang and his circle of Salva Kiir, Nyuon and Kerubino. Equatorian politician Joseph Oduho\(^{528}\) was called for the final meeting in Ethiopia as well. He was supposed to mediate between the old and young generation.

Although equipped with a manifesto, rallying for a socialist Sudan the military side of the movement was always considered its real core, there was hardly any political debate nor orientation towards what aims, changes and transformation the SPLA would like to contribute to the betterment of the situation in Sudan. The failure and thereby the sole and main orientation towards an military aim and solution is still reflected in the movement and should be considered one of the biggest obstacles in the current conflict.

As Peter Nyaba observes:

> Unlike many liberation movements the world over, the SPLM/A formation did not pass through a period of political incubation of considerable duration, in which a clear political line and ideological orientation would have evolved, and the political leadership determined according to the wish and will of the people in a democratic manner. The structural organisation of the Movement capable of leading the struggle and absorbing all the various political and ideological hues would have emerged without the pains of bitter military confrontation with AnyaNya II that marked its birth in 1983.\(^{529}\)

Military training and recruitment of youth was therefore goal number one for the newly formed movement – training camps were installed on Ethiopian territory with the help of Ethiopian trainers. A critical chapter for the newly founded SPLA at that time was the issue of child soldier recruitment. In the Ethiopian camps thousands of boys underwent military training as the ‘Red Army’. Although the number was to neglect in comparison, a number of girls received military training in Ethiopia as well. The history of what became known as the unaccompanied minors was only recently publicly known and discussed.\(^{530}\)

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\(^{527}\) According to Johnson and Prunier, „The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,“. p. 125.

\(^{528}\) Who participated at the Addis Ababa Meetings and agreement in 1972.

\(^{529}\) Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View, p. 28.

\(^{530}\) UNICEF held a Child soldiers conference with the attendance of SPLA in September 2000, where SPLA promised to refrain from recruiting children under the age of 18 years.
Military attacks and ambushes against garrisons in the South were more and more successful, and drew thousands of recruits as well as civilians who were promised a safe-area in camps in Ethiopia into the military camps of SPLA. Thousands of people died on their way to Ethiopia either because of hunger, animals, thirst or exhaustion or because they were attacked by AnyaNya II forces who fought the SPLA up to 1988. Specifically in Equatoria the national army countered the movement of civilians and increasing attacks by SPLA with counter-insurgency tactics primarily against civilians. The effect was that even more civilians joined the SPLA, whereas the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) carried out emergency relief operations for the refugees in Ethiopia.

Besides the Military High Command of the SPLA the movement set up a provisional Executive Committee, were politicians such as Joseph Oduho and Judge Martin Majier Gai assumed offices and toured Europe in a foreign mission to disseminate the aims and perspectives of SPLA in May/June 1984. On their return the first power struggle on the question of military or political primacy started. As a result both men were jailed under the pretext of misconduct. This could be seen as an early sign of the absolute primacy of the military in SPLM/A as well as the incapability to internal conflict and conflict management. Coercion was the motto of the day and continues to be until now.

The problem of political tribalization started even before by the majority of Nuer seniors leaving the SPLA to continue fighting as AnyaNya II. The misconduct of Oduho was seen in a letter he sent to the Equatorian intellectuals in Nairobi stating that the movement increasingly became a Dinka movement. While this would have been the chance to address, discuss and eradicate the problem of tribal or ethnic dominance in the SPLA the method was silencing, jailing and repressing.

Raids on a tribal bases had been dominant in Sudan for a long time, though it did not lead to the aim of overpowering or eradicating the other group. The prevalent regulations preventing excesses are described in Evans-Pritchard famous research on the Nuer:

Tribe as the largest sovereign and peacemaking group, which merely means that fellow tribesmen should not raid each other’s cattle and that they should pay compensation for intratribal injuries or killings. Members of different tribes, on the other hand, may raid each other’s cattle but they should avoid destroying granaries or killing women and children.

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Discipline and Control

Mindful of an immensely important factor, that of war economy, Georg Elwert is contesting the issue of ethnic warfare or tribal factionalization but uses the materialist category of economic interests rather than pseudo-organic tribal interests. “Not ethnic groups or clans but economic interests (from profit to pay, from proceeds of robbed loot to simple subsistence) are fighting each other in these civil wars.”

In Makier Benjamin’s evaluation this polarizing tendencies continued and manifested in the period between 1984 and 1987 when the political role of the movement was severely neglected and actively downgraded. “Emphasis on militarism was heightened leading to thriving of a security organ (the combat intelligence and later general intelligence service) responsible for much of the confusion of the movement.”

A further sign of the military orientation was the renaming and changing of the political and military wing into one Political-Military High Command (PMHC).

It has to be remembered that the socialization and initiation of SPLA took place under a militarized regime of the derg in Ethiopia. A system that had downright Stalinist tendencies with a security system and intelligence apparatus based on MfS (state security in former GDR). Ethiopian security was not only a model to adapt for the SPLA but was used to control, discipline and harass internal opponents. One example is the arrest of SPLA co-founder Kerubino Kunayin Bol in 1987. According to the reading of Douglas H. Johnson it was Mengistu who had Kerubino arrested after Kerubino discussed with him the possibility of changes in the movement removing Garang from his position. Ethiopian security handed him over to Garang who jailed him for seven years.

Not only was SPLA structured under the priority of Military over politics but build centralized structures of command. Regional autonomy was not given to any commander. In an atmosphere of open debate this could have meant a precaution against further tribalization. In the claustrophobic atmosphere of SPLA this meant further authority to a personalized rule.

A series of arrests and the installation of detention camps as well as reports on torture by the movements against internal dissidents and opponents fed the atmosphere of ‘anxiety, fear and apathy’.

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534 According to Makier Benjamin the manifesto presented to Mengistu by Kerubino was drafted by an SPLA officer Bari Wangi demanding democratic structures in the Movement. Whereas Kerubino himself had personal grievances against Garang and mainly insisted on removing him.

But not only the internal atmosphere was less enthusiastic nor reflective of a guerrilla movement claiming to represent the people of Sudan against the oppression, the image of SPLA with the local population was not much better.

Even though military victories increased and the area of control was enlarged by the handover of AnyaNya II territories to SPLA control after 1988, the discipline and morale of the troops regarding civilians was shockingly bad. There was hardly any evidence that the claim to represent all the people of Sudan was based in reality, civilians were rather frightened by SPLA troops and fighters, since their human rights record was horrendous. Not only did they demand food, shelter, grain and livestock but their conduct with the population was based on the power of the AK. Rape, murder and looting was common, hardly any education, dissemination of the aims of the movement or support for the civilians were given. Mao ZeDongs motto for revolutionary armies, to be like fish in water was truly not applicable to the SPLA. Yet again the reaction was sporadic court martial and detention for the commanders or execution for the individual soldier. There was no wider debate, change or training to prepare the fighters to respect the civilians in whose name they were fighting nor any referendum for the civilians to let them voice their opinion about the armed struggle in general and the behavior of ‘their forces’ in particular. Only in the Nuba Mountains the local commander Yussiv Kuwa Mekki called for such a referendum amongst the population and started re-structuring the groups training towards self-sustainability after many villages had been attacked, women raped and civilians killed by unruly SPLA troops. In other regions such as in the area of the Mandari of Equatoria the misconduct and human rights violations of the troops transformed into changes of allies. In current interviews with members of the SPLM/A as well as villagers in all areas of Sudan, the tendency to use civilians as natural supply and support systems prevails. With the hunger crises in 1998 and the massive food distortion by SPLA in the most affected areas of Bahr el Ghazal this attitude showed to be unchanged.536

Not only is the integrity of SPLA at stake but the long-term relationship between civilians and militaries is based on bitterness and abuse and will be hard to reconcile. Yet for the attempts by the government to divide and rule in the South this cracks and divisions between civilian and military population is perfect.

The tribalization of the situation in southern Sudan is immensely supported by this behavior of SPLA troops.537 Even though the atrocities committed by the various factions are not strictly targetted against other ethnic groups but include the abuse of the own familiar social surrounding the fact that the armed movements supposedly


537 Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View, p. 36, lists a couple of incidents specifically in Equatoria. Most examples from the mid 1980s are reporting on misconduct and reaction of ethnic groups that are reflected in current internal conflicts. See for example the problem between SPLA and the Didinga population in Chukudum who were in a major conflict with SPLA in 1999. SPLA ceased the town and planted anti-personnel-landmines, the population was caught on the hills. Subsequently SPLA claimed that the Didinga population is allied with the government and receives its arms and ammunition from the government of Sudan.
fighting in one’s name committing atrocities leads to the assumption that this has to be based on ethnic grounds.

In general the situation worsened with the split of SPLA in 1991, got better with the Civil Society Conference and its resolutions and worsened again with the fight around the oil wells and the further tribal fractionalization since 1996.538

According to my assessment after interviewing at least one hundred women in all different areas of Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains the brutality and atrocities committed by the various factions did not depend on ethnic background but rather on the individual commander and the discipline and morale of his troops. This evaluation almost strengthens the thesis of Douglas Johnson that decentralization and autonomy of the individuals is a major problem of SPLA and not the authoritarian centralization that most critiques assume. Whereas I would further argue that personal rule, undemocratic structures and a lack of communication between civilians and military as well as the neglect of politization is the bases of internal problems of SPLA as well as the fractionalization.

In the late 1980s SPLA/M grew militarily but did not reflect this growing complexity with any efforts to build a political movement or even to set up a leadership. The Political-Military High Command (PMHC), a five member body did not meet on a regular basis yet formally had the power to post commanders and personnel in different operational zones. The High Command met for the last time in early 1986 but did not formally convey before the split in 1991.

**Leadership**

There are two big elephants that are running through Southern Sudan and destroy everything. One is in Khartoum and one is in Nairobi. Why can the international criminal court not take this two men, Bashir and Garang to court so we can live in peace?

89 year old chief in Bahr el Ghaza\[539

Decisions were made on the bases of military leadership methods: one man on top decides the rest has to obey or otherwise face the consequences of disciplinary penalties. This happened to a number of senior ranks in the movement. The atmosphere was that of a lack of transparency and random decision making, anti-intellectual and anti-political, punishment and order on a personal bases rather than agreed upon in a code of conduct, the atmosphere of a strict and repressive army rather than a movement for liberation or even a guerrilla force. Since the open discourse was not appreciated and neither criticism nor self-criticism was ever part of the SPLA/M agenda but rather no discussion and no explanation, unsatisfied members had either to turn into inner migration, into silenced and silent dissidents

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538 A detailed record of atrocities committed against civilians of particular tribes would be beyond the capacity of this paper.

539 Interviewed in 1996 and 1999 by the author. The identity of the chief as well as the location is withheld out of security reasons for the interviewed.
trying to wait and see or to use strategies of sabotage and internal conflict or they had
to challenge the movement and its leader openly and either risk torture and
imprisonment or had to take the risk of an open split. Again since the atmosphere was
not one of political debate but rather individual punishment, the political debate was
shifted to personal grievances and individual power struggle.
In a mixture with the methods of Ethiopian security forces and a paranoid and bloody
weep-out of potential AnyaNya II sympathizers as counter-revolutionaries the
leadership of SPLA opted for an atmosphere of Stalinist show trial. With the formal
reconciliation and reunification of AnyaNya II forces into the SPLA the grievances,
specifically of Nuer against Dinka did not come to an end and several AnyaNya II
members did not join SPLA nor accept their leadership.540

The internal security, or as it was known the ‘Combat Intelligence’ became an
important apparatus for the leadership of SPLA. As Nyaba comments:

The ‘Combat Intelligence’, in its ruthless ‘anti-people’ mentality and methods and in
their drive to enforce strict military discipline and instantaneous obedience to the
SPLM/A leadership, created, in the Movement in general, and among the combatants
in particular, an atmosphere of mutual distrust, suspicion, fear, indifference, apathy and
outright demoralisation. This uncomradely attitude was manifest first in the training
camps and then in areas that fell under the SPLA administration. 541

To understand the support for the split in SPLA with the declaration of the Nasir faction
in 1991 the militarization, personality-cult and rigid repressive structures inside the
movement have to be studied further. Since the early jargon of socialism and
revolution was never reflected in any mission, activity or conviction of the SPLA the
personalization of revolution became almost urgent. Since the jargon was needed for
the host country and the outside world and was highly symbolic but not a jota relevant
inside Southern Sudan Garang became congruent with the cause, the cause was the
unquestionable monolithic truth. Questioning Garang was questioning the cause, the
truth and the aim, discussing the cause, the truth and the aim became synonymous
with criticizing Garang.

This explains the support for a call for democratization and dehierarchization of the
movement. The primat of the military as well as the particularly brutal training explains
why this promises were not the least followed through or even worsened in the splinter
group later on.

540 The main war-leader around the oil areas, Paulino Matiep Nhial in Western Upper Nile never
joined SPLA and continued fighting the SPLA zonal commander in the area, Gordon Kong
Chol. The situation around the oil fields in 1999 was quite similar with Paulino Matip’s forces,
backed by the government who were fighting SPLA allies such as Peter Gadet and even
non-SPLA allies and equally government supplied forces of Cdr. Riek Machar. This
assessment is based on an interview with Peter Gadet in Wucok, Upper Nile after he defected
from Paulino’s Forces in 1999 and met with several Nuer representatives of various
peace-negotiating agencies for possible reconciliation with SPLA forces, which I attended.

541 Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View, p. 49.
The orientation of the movement was purely military and personified. There has not been political education for combatants nor an orientation towards the participation of civilians in the to-be-liberated areas. The treatment of the population therefore depended on the individual behavior of the combatants not on their revolutionary understanding of the necessity of the active support role of the people in whose name they were going to fight. Military training itself was based on the understanding of a regular army with the aim to dehumanize and objectify the new recruit and to make him into a mosaic stone in a functioning apparatus of command and obey. The combatants were not trained to become the armed wing of a political and social movement to transform the old Sudan into a new Sudan, they were trained to accept the power of the gun as the ultima ratio of their doing.

Even now, after the devastating events of fractionalization and internal as well as region wide ill-humor with the movement, the signals are not read and there is hardly any preparation for changes since the self-righteousness of isolated power is still dominant. In talks with the population the dissatisfaction, frustration and mistrust towards the movement and the behavior of its combatants and leaders is prevalent and voiced openly. In talks with members of the movement the need for a change, for participatorial approaches and a less isolated hierarchical leadership is rarely heard, even though some members criticize this lack of democratization they as well as the civilians assume that there is no alternative and therefore the regime of SPLAM is still better than that of the government. This might undoubtedly be the case, yet the government was never claiming to better the situation and to talk on behalf of the population in the South, whereas SPLAM is claiming to represent the people of Sudan – at least of those in the marginalized areas.

The cadres emerging out of this structure, such as the heads for the split in 1991 nevertheless were offsprings of the same school of military primacy. Therefore even though Cdr. Riek Machar and Lam Akol were calling for a democratization inside the SPLA they hardly made any attempt to change the structure of their new movement to be, the SPLA-Nasir, and after their internal split South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) (Machar) and SPLA-United (Akol).

The radio message sent by Cdr. Riek Machar on 28 August 1991, claiming that Garang was ousted from his position and a new leadership had taken over the SPLA started a disastrous era of splinter groups, ethnic factionalism finally leading to the fulfillment of the divide and rule strategy of the government. No preparation, clandestine cell-networking or information of key officers was done, the expectation of a spontaneous uprising was not fulfilled.

Yet the timing was chosen well. The derg and Mengistu lost their stable bases since EPLF from Eritrea and the internal armed opposition of EPRDF, OLF, and others gained military and political strength. SPLA was still fully relying on the backing of the Ethiopian government, including training, hardware and territorial facilities and did not prepare for a possible change in the Ethiopian political climate and reality. In June 1991 Mengistu finally fell and was leaving the country rapidly, the new government of EPRDF and other former opposition forces however had good relations with the
regime in Sudan which was one of their supporters during the struggle against the regime of the Derg and Mengistu. SPLA were fighting alongside the Ethiopian army against internal opposition and thereby obviously took sides and became persona non grata after the successful takeover of EPRDF, OLF and others.

Not only was the rear base of SPLA collapsing with the Derg but the responsibility the SPLM had and was claiming over the refugees still in Ethiopia was not taken up. No evacuation from the camps in Ethiopia (Itang, Gambella, Buma a.o.) took place. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees were pushed out of Ethiopia and started marching back to Sudan. On the border they were received by Sudan army Antonov bombers. The plan to return back to their place of origin was scattered and most refugees who survived the aerial bombardments sought refuge in Kenya and Uganda.

This left Garang and the SPLA in a weak position and laid ground for a potentially successful coup.

Two SPLA commanders, Cdr. Riek Machar a Nuer from Upper Nile and Lam Akol Ajawien, a Shilluk from the same area issued the declaration and were behind the coup, although as already mentioned, not connected to any small or extended network of others. According to Peter A. Nyaba the only preparation for the coup was to inform the government in Khartoum. The government agreed to supply ammunition and to release AnyaNya II and government militia to support the Nasir coup.542 Although they missed out on awareness raising and explanation inside the Sudan their international public relation went quite well. BBC, ‘Focus on Africa’ aired the news that Garang had been overthrown on 30th August 1991 so the international public was well aware. The main aspects Lam Akol and Riek Machar criticized were the horrendous human rights record, the recruitment of child soldiers 543 and the lack of democratization in the movement.

Efforts to reconcile the two groups were made by various outside actors, mainly the churches finally resulted in the de facto recognition of the splinter group. Lam Akol was using the time the projected peace talks were postponed to lobby on the diplomatic parket while in Nairobi. Financial aid came from the NIF regime and again, Tiny Rowland, channeled these transactions.

As for the Zeitgeist and political developments in the post-collapse of the Berlin Wall period the signs seemed to show the direction of independence, autonomy and the end of state conglomerations on the basis of contracts or coercion. SPLA insisted on

542 Ibid. p. 90.
543 All factions in Southern Sudan made use of child soldiers, forcefully recruiting them directly or by a quota system, administrated by the local chiefs. In the governments PDF children are fighting as well, although the government denies this fact. For further information on the important topic see the Coalition against child soldiers, Oliver Furley, „Child Soldiers in Africa,“ in Conflict in Africa, ed. Oliver Furley (London, New York: Tauris, 1995).as well as several documentations by UNICEF (Children of war). In a conference in Rumbek in 2000 SPLA signed an agreement with UNICEF not to recruit child soldiers further. Further documents on child soldiers see Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
their political agenda whereas the Nasir faction used the power of the moment in calling for an independent southern Sudan. As Maker Benjamin, a former SPLA member who joined the Nasir faction and later re-joined SPLA in the post of the political advisor to Garang formulates:

The call for a united, democratic and just Sudan as stipulated in the SPLM manifesto was deemed outdated by the developments in the Soviet block, the collapse of the cold war, the Nationalist upsurge in Eastern Europe and the creation of new states of Eritrea and the Somaliland in the Horn of Africa. The birth of these countries has sufficiently softened one of the OAU pillar principles, namely the interference onto the internal affairs of the member states. The clause had been used to justify despotism in Africa and suppress internal just struggle for freedom and equality.

The call for an independent Southern Sudan was therefore a ploy used by the Nasir leaders to undercut the movement and gain quick popular support.\textsuperscript{544}

Essentially the coup failed, a new SPLA faction was in existence and many people had to suffer from the factionalization. Not only members of the military who were arrested under the suspicion of sympathizing with the Nasir faction, but mainly civilians who got between the fronts.

The first atrocity took place in Bor, where forces of mainly Nuer combatants started a massacre amongst the civilian population of John Garangs home area. Asked about the massacre, Cdr. Riek Machar denied his responsibility. But explained that the massacre took place on the order of individual commanders of the Nasir faction whom he obviously, although in his region as a former zonal commander, had not control over.\textsuperscript{545}

After the Nasir declaration in 1991 we where accused for violating human rights, particularly in Bor. We immediately impacted on our own traditional values and we imbacked on the dissemination of the Geneva conventions and also we encouraged the development the UN SSIM ground rules. I had personally participated in the dissemination. We tell our commanders that from now onwards, that violation of human right becomes personal failure of a commander, not that of a movement. Prior to this dissemination we felt, that it was the shortcomings of the movement because we had not disseminated or enlightened them on this human rights values. And the SPLA on which we where a part of it never did. So the incidences that took place, particularly the Bor and Kongor incidence, we immediately realized, that we have to do that. So it becomes a personal – if a commander is on a mission and his soldiers do it, he is responsible, he would be arrested and trial for that. We had even disseminated our traditional I values and the Geneva convention to the soldiers, so that that commanders and say that this soldiers are ignorant of the rules of combat or the humanitarian rules in combat.\textsuperscript{546}


\textsuperscript{545} In an interview I conducted with Cdr. Riek Machar in February 1997 in his then headquater in Old Fangak, just before he left for Khartoum where he finally joined the government after signing a peace agreement with the government in 1996.

\textsuperscript{546} Interview conducted with Cdr. Riek Machar 25 January 1997 in his then headqueraters in Old Fanjak, Upper Nile. With him was Prof. David DuChang, who just recently returned from the United States and joined Cdr. Riek Machar in Sudan. p. 8, line 14-28.
The political advisor of Riek Machiar at that time was Prof. David Du Chang insisted that the Bor incidence was a mere reprisal of SPLA attacks:

The SPLA managed, when the Nasir faction began, human rights was one of the main issues. The SPLA capitalized on Bor massacre. At that time it was clear, that the Bor massacre was a revaluation for what the SPLA had done at that time. Leer, his headquarters, and the people reacted and they where angry and everything that was in their way had to go. then the SPLA was lucky cause some white man had a camera and took picture of all this things. Lets talk about massacres. From the very beginning, the SPLA fought in the bush for five six years . this people from upper Nile, there where massacre, raping .looting killing from each other. And then, when they went along and they met this people the Nuer, the Nuer where massacred, next were our neighbors, the Toposa with anti aircraft, it was us next, my tribe, the Lotuko in Kapoeta, my tribe over three hundred soldiers next where the people in Bor then the Mundari in Juba, nobody in the western world is complaining about it, and the western world is only looking on Bor and saying, oh, see what they have done in Bor, Bor. Now, I have seen it with my own eyes. If you go to the SSIM soldiers, there is so much relaxation, there is so much peace. Even yesterday night (the night of the celebration before the troops had been sent away,. And I was not allowed to cross the river to see the soldiers) – you could go around and take pictures, nobody would have bothered you.547

The human rights record of the Nasir faction continued to be horrendously bad, internal power hierarchies were not more transparent than in the SPLA and there was not the slightest hint of democratization in the new faction.

These (on human rights atrocities in the SPLA) are very heavy criticisms, how can you avoid theses structures for your own movement? Cdr. Riek Machar: There is now a democratic debate, there are now institutions which people can express their views clearly without an invision, they elect their own leaders. So democracy today is lived within the movement by the people. The structures were formed. The abuse on human rights, has been stemmed out, the call for the right of self determination has been dominating the whole politics.548

The war in southern Sudan continued with the new dimension of severe ethnical mobilization and factionalization. The employment of militias and AnyaNya II forces led

to further lack of military discipline and control. Unlike Machar’s explanation the order for their forces was to take and loot whatever they wished and to explicitly attack and destroy Dinka civilian settlements. The spirale of violence and destruction escalated dramatically. Many women were abducted and taken to Nuer areas, SPLA retaliation followed immediately and was mobilized on ethnic bases.

Both movements reacted in a solely military way, there was no effort to rethink and self-reflect on their internal problems as well as the question of the conflict with the government of Sudan and possible efforts to oust and transform the people and regime in power, yet the main focus was on the south-south conflict and its military intensification. Although Cdr. Machar points out in the interview that the militarization of society was a manko in SPLA, however never seemingly challenged the militarization of his own movement.

By the way. One of the minor issues which brought the split, was, that the SPLA was made a military movement. We said, you can’t militarize a society, the civil structures must exist. Whether the chief structures they must exist, the councils must exist, it does not necessarily has to be militarized. So we do that. She (pointing to a women who accompanied us) is not trained, but is in the hierarchy of the movement. Even the church was oppressed, now the church is growing, the church is free. This are the structures.549

With the Frankfurt agreement between the Nasir faction and the NIF regime on 25 January 1992, Nasir was obviously siding with the government and waging a war against SPLA rather than for self-determination and secession as claimed in the Nasir declaration on 1991550.

The human rights record of all parties in the war areas in Sudan declined to a devastating level during this time.551 The main targets of these atrocities were civilians. Violations against the Geneva Conventions, the rule of war were committed on various levels, ranging from indiscriminate bombardments, target bombardments and shellings of civilians, summary execution of civilians and combatants while hors de combat. Torture, including rape of civilians as well as enemy and combatants of the own ranks in detention. Abduction and enslavement of women and girls by enemy forces. Summary execution of defectors, killing of unarmed civilians and combatants were widespread throughout the quickly emerging frontlines of Southern Sudan.552

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551 A detailed account with a wide range of collected evidence on this topic is given by Rone, „Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan.”
552 Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949) and the two additional protocols (1977) were committed by all southern forces as well as the Sudanese regular forces. The regular army as an instrument of the government of Sudan signatory to the GC, but not yet to additional protocol II has to obey by its laws. ICRC disseminated the GC throughout the combatants in southern Sudan, the argument of non-awareness will therefore
Besides uncontrolled and unaccounted attacks against civilians, the defection and re-integration of commanders and combatants from one faction to the other steered up confusion even more and led to a situation where men are executed by one of the forces out of mistrust or lack of current information.\(^{553}\)

For the SPLA the military situation destabilized and internal problems as well as the question of accountability and the claim to represent the people of the New Sudan had to be legitimized. In the Nuba Mountains, the zonal commander Yussif Kuwa was calling for a referendum in 1992, after SPLA forces had only been stationed there since 1989. On the bases of criticism with the conduct of the forces, he wanted to involve the population in decision making and asked in the referendum if people want SPLA to continue fighting, if they want them to turn into a pure political movement or disappear altogether, so the Mountains would be controlled by the Khartoum government, the decision was made that SPLA was to remain, although changes were asked of them concerning their conduct towards civilians.\(^{554}\) To my knowledge the Nuba Mountains was the only region in SPLA controlled areas where a referendum was undertaken. The effect is quite visible, since in the Nuba Mountains one can see SPLA soldiers planting and harvesting their own food and showing more responsibility towards the civilian population than in other areas of Southern Sudan. However complaints about SPLA misconduct and violations against civilians, women in particular, continued.

The Nasir faction was planning on a convention to resolve fundamental leadership problems and start anew of what they criticized in SPLA: dictatorship and lack of structures and institutions for mass participation. The convention never took place, but the idea was picked up quickly and mobilized the basis of SPLA. It was transformed into the Akobo peace conference where Cdr. Riek Machar stabilized his position.

There is a point about civil societies, in 1994 before this terms called civil societies by our brothers, we held a big peace conference in Akobo, reconciliation and peace conference between two Nuer tribes, that fought themselves. It was shared by one of the oldest chiefs, he was from Akobo, to chair that conference. We were all sitting outside watching their problem alone. So civil society was always with us, it is only people that killed it, that are now talking about it. Since we did not temper with it, we don’t make big fuzz about it, it is working, it is in place.\(^{555}\)

\(^{553}\) As with William Nyuon Bany, who was executed by the Nasir faction after defecting SPLA and joining Nasir.

\(^{554}\) Rape as well as abduction was a dominant pattern reported from the Nuba Mountains from both sides, the SPLA as well as the government forces. Testimonies of Nuba women on rape during war were collected by the Badya Center for Integrated Development Services. (no date available)

\(^{555}\) Interview with Riek Machar, 25, 01, 1997. p18: 41-47. The discussion on the understanding of civil society is placed in the following chapter.
The idea was taken up by Southern intellectuals in Nairobi, initially opposed by SPLA but then challenged by Kuwa and others.

The convention was initiated as the founding convention of SPLM as a real civilian and movement oriented wing of the militarily dominant SPLA/M. It was further conceptualized as a civil society forum, a platform to present, challenge and adopt legal codes and SPLA laws. The prospect was to further organize civil authority.

The convention was attended by more than 500 delegates from all fora of society as well as the international NGO community. As a result laws and codes were adopted, printed and distributed, decision making structures challenged and changed and training programs for civil society administrators were set up with the help of founders of the NGO community. The convention was quite successful and is still used to remind the leadership on the public promises they gave.556

Splits, factionalization and leadership problems continue to destabilize SPLA. Yet their position as high command of the NDA forces fighting in the east of northern Sudan is boosting their profile and morale. The second group with most manpower fighting in the east is the Beja congress557. The Sudan Allied Forces (SAF) as well as the armed wing of the New Sudan Brigade558 and smaller armed units mobilized according to their political party affiliation are further armed units under the command of SPLA.

For SPLA in the south and specifically in the oil rich areas of Upper Nile, the situation is not that stable. Currently more than 6 armed southern militias are fighting in the area with changing alliance. Apart from the southern militias regular government forces, the popular defence force, PDF as well as murahaleen are active in the area.559

556 More on the convention and civil administration in general in the following chapter.

557 The Beja Congress is an armed group, mainly formed out of Beja people. The Beja ethnic group is living in the border area of Sudan and Eritrea and Ethiopia. Bejas are semi-nomads and share close links with groups in the Eritrean lowlands, such as the Beni Amer. Beja congress was fighting alongside SPLA forces on the eastern front of Sudan. Since the Machakos Peace Agreement was signed 7 January 2005, the situation in the east of the country is alarmingly similar to that of Darfur early 2003. For further information on the Beja and their political involvement since independence see John Morton, „Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea Province, Sudan.,“ African Affairs 88, no. 350 (1985), pp. 63.

558 No information available about strength and manpower of the various groups.

559 The military map is changing every month with more and more southern militias appearing on the scene. Just in February 2001 forces from SPLA under Peter Gadet, South Sudan Libeation Movement (SSLM) under Paulino Matiep, PDF under Peter Par, the regular army, PDF, murahaleen and government allied forces of Gordon King’s Thaura Jikany (Nuer force of the Jikany Nuer group), Simon Gatwec’s GoS militia, another GoS militia of Dinka Padang Dongjol under Thon Mum, another militia under Gatluak Deng. Further allegations stating that the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) active in the oil concession areas of Upper Nile is using their own security of armed Chinese workers as well as security personnel. These allegations are not officially confirmed, yet in interviews with people who had been forcefully displaced by the PDF and government forces from the area these allegations had been voiced. (Interviews I conducted in October 1999, Interviews conducted by members of the Harker, „Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission, Prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.,“. Interviews conducted by July Flint, partly published in the Observer as well as samples of interviews conducted under the auspices of Sudan Focal Point Nairobi in early 2000.
Internal problems, fueled by tribal sentiments and ethnic enemy image construction is leading to severe problems which SPLA tends to neglect, as is the case with the situation in Chukudum, where a single incident amongst two individuals led into a massive crisis that is involving ethnic cleavages and sentiments. Even amongst the commanding structure discrepancy in leadership assessment is quite prevalent. Some commanders complain that military hardware and manpower supply is used by the leadership to discipline rather than for the best strategic use. Although the threat of further splits and factionalizations might not be given on a massive scale instability and dissatisfaction is already leading to a fragmented and non-coherent body of the only serious and more organized insurgency movement in southern Sudan.

AnyaNya II

Just shortly after the foundation of SPLA/M in Itang and Ethiopia some of the commanders who were frustrated by the Ethiopian decision to hand over the main power to John Garang left the SPLA and went back to the bush in Sudan. The AnyaNya II emerged out of the SPLA foundation and over the years turned more into a government militia, at least a military group that was armed and supplied by the government with the main purpose to fight against their fellow southern Sudanese. Samuel Gai Tut who was recommended to become the chairman of the military wing of the SPLA and was then frustrated by the Ethiopian decision to push Garang in this post had his main AnyaNya II forces based in Upper Nile. This is strategically one of the most important areas in southern Sudan. Not only did the AnyaNya II control most of the oil territories but had the power to stop potential SPLA recruiters to march into Northern Bahr el Ghazal to recruit further man into the SPLA as well as they stopped and killed recruits walking to the training camps of SPLA in Ethiopia, since they had to pass the area. According to records and reports from 1984 AnyaNya II forces under William Abdalla Chuol committed horrendous atrocities against potential recruits – mainly Dinkas from Bahr el Ghazal for the SPLA by ambushing and massacring them in the area of Upper Nile around Fangak. This later had serious repercussions on the Nuer community since SPLA forces returning through the area back into Sudan killed and looted Nuer civilians and villages.

The Chukudum crisis started in 1999 with a fight between two men, the killing of a commander. It led into a major affair whereby the ethnic origin of the majority of SPLA soldiers in the region became an issue. SPLA tried to solve the problem militarily by planting anti-personnel mines and sieging the area. This affected mainly the civilian population, then turning against the mainly Dinka-Bor SPLA personnel and supporting the local Didinga Militia. SPLA claimed that the Didinga militia received supply by the government of Sudan forces and claimed by this the area a legitimate military target. The call for peaceful settlement from various actor was ignored, SPLA reacted very late and sent a half-hearted delegation to solve the problem. The sentiment in the area is quite tribalized, Dinkas are asked to leave and the old struggle of ethnic hegemony in the SPLA is continued to be focused on. What was known as Kokora in the 1970s, the call of the Equatorians for the Dinka to go back to their areas is quite virile again now. Dinkas blame Equatorians not to sacrifice enough for the liberation of their country, since more Equatorians are getting education abroad and the number of Equatorians in the SPLA is in percentage lower than the number of Dinkas. Equatorians are blaming Dinkas to misuse their hospitality since many Dinkas settled in Equatoria without respecting the local culture and imposing their pastoralist tradition.
The fighting between AnyaNya II and SPLA was mainly held on the back of civilians in the form of low intensity counter insurgency tactics rather than in a open confrontation amongst troops. AnyaNya II was used more strategic by the government as ‘Friendly Forces’ in creating buffer zones between government and SPLA controlled rural areas. Displacement of civilians by attacking and burning of villages that is now done mainly by PDF forces was then acted out by AnyaNya II and worked as a cheap means for the government in Khartoum.

The supply by the Sudanese government got better under the Transitional Military Court after the coup against Nimeiri and the government of Sadiq al Mahdi was not only supplying but offering political legitimation for the AnyaNya in giving them a Politbüro to their disposal.\textsuperscript{561}

Clashes and atrocities between the SPLA and AnyaNya continued and were not only aimed against the respective forces but had been waged against civilians who appeared to be loyal to one of the armed groups because of their ethnicity. Retaliation against certain areas because of their ethnic make up continue to take place until today. In the case of AnyaNya and SPLA the clashes started with an attack by the SPLA against a AnyaNya camp in Bilpam right after the SPLA was founded in September 1983. In September 1985 SPLA besieged AnyaNya troops in the Malakal area – many SPLA fighters in this siege were Shilluk from the ‘Fashoda batallion’ which led to a retaliation against Shilluk villages by AnyaNya forces in 1986 and 1987\textsuperscript{562}. In 1987 Gordon Kong, then AnyaNya leader after Samuel Gai Tut who was killed by SPLA in 1985 signed an agreement with the SPLA for an amalgamation of his troops with SPLA.

In the 1980s the government of Sudan continued their policy of tribalization of militias and armed and supplied various mainly pure ethnic militias to fight against SPLA or to simply attack civilian targets by other ethnic groups. The changing governments armed the Murle and Mundari continuously. As a consequence SPLA attacked and masacred villages and places of predominantly ethnic Murle and Mundari. (Pibor town in 1984). These local tribal clashes and raids were enlarged and included other ethnic groups such as the Anuak and Turkana.

SPLA had no clear line of not attacking civilian targets and retaliated attacks on their posts quite frequently with attacks on civilians from a certain ethnic denomination. This did not only result in quite bitter and hostile feelings towards the SPLA, it provided a perfect basis for anti-Dinka sentiments by the population in this region, since the imagery of SPLA at that time was one of Dinka domination.

It further questions the honesty and respectability of a guerrilla force that claimed to represent the whole of Southern Sudan. This problem continues in lighter forms until...

\textsuperscript{561} Johnson and Prunier, „The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.“ p. 129. The term ‘Politbüro’ is taken from Johnson and Prunier.

\textsuperscript{562} Further detailed information see Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View.
and there was – to my knowledge – no effort made by the SPLA to counter the accusations of being ethnically unbalanced with a program of multi-ethnicity. SPLA rather reacts sharply to this accusation by discarding them entirely without looking into it. On paper, the SPLA manifests acknowledge and even stipulate multiracial and multiethnic society for the New Sudan.

Nasir Faction, South Sudan Independence Movement/Army and SPLA United

In 1994 the Nasir faction split. A year earlier the Nasir faction formed its own movement under the name of SPLA-United. Cdr. Riek Machar dismissed the brain of the Nasir faction, Lam Akol from his post as Secretary for External Affairs and Peace, mainly on the basis of planned conspiracies against his leadership supposedly led by Lam Akol.564

Cdr. Riek Machar continued to keep the larger forces, militarily Lam Akol only remained with a small force of mainly Shilluk. Cdr. Riek Machar’s faction was named South Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A) allegedly aiming for the separation of the South from the North.565 As Cdr. Riek Machar was planning on a civil society convention but never made any attempts for preparation, the Lafon declaration was declared founding convention of SSIM even though it was set up as a peace mediation meeting to solve the problems of internal Nuer fights in Eastern

563 The main trends of ethnic construction is the dividing line between Dinka and Nuer as well as Dinka and Equatorians. Whereas Dinka and Nuer rivalry is based on leadership struggle and the respective minority in SPLA and SPDF, the animosity between Equatorians and Dinka could be subsumed under class-discrepancy. Whereas Dinka complain that Equatorians shy away from armed struggle and rather send their children to get education than to sacrifice themselves in the war, Equatorians complain about Dinka hegemony in the SPLA. Further the civilians criticize the settlement of Dinka in Equatoria, since because of difference between agriculturalists (Equatorians) and cattle-herders (Dinka), the latter are about to occupy too much land that the Equatorians claim to be theirs.

564 Lam Akol supposedly held secret meetings with high ranking members of the Khartoum government in order to build up his own forces with the supply of military logistics, hardware and militias allied with the government.

565 For a detailed account on the establishment and disintegration of the Nasir faction leadership, the SSIM and SPLA-United, particularly on the tribal mobilization in the newly established movement Peter A. Nyaba is giving detailed inside information. In Peter A. Nyaba, 1997. Further markers of the development of SPLA-United and the later split with SSIM as well as the agreement signed with the regime are explored there. For reasons of documentation just a few will be mentioned, although they are not playing a significant role in the purpose I follow with this paper. In 1992 peace negotiations were planned in Nairobi between the SPLA factions, Cdr. Riek Machar refused to sign, since he wanted to stay in power and not reintegrate into the SPLA structure. Individuals like William Nyong, SPLA commander who joined the Nasir faction became a stumbling-block for loyalties and fuelled the conspiracy record of Cdr. Riek Machar. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol managed to escape his SPLA imprisonment and with the matchmaking of Tiny Rowland contacted the Nasir faction leaders. With him were Arok Thon Arok and Faustino Atem Gualdit. The third party that finally led into the formation of SPLA-United was Joseph Oduho, one of the senior Southern politicians and co-founder of SPLA. Oduho was killed in March 1996, his death led to a massive desertion of Equatorians from the newly founded SPLA-United. Some went back to SPLA some joined the new formation of the Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan (PRM), led by Alfred Lado-Gore. Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View.p. 124
Upper Nile. It was disastrous in Machar showing his unwillingness and incapability in just even pretending to follow democratic procedures. Since the formation of the Nasir faction several other groups emerged and split from SPLA-United and/or SSIM. The Patriotic Resistance Movement (PRM) split as an Equatorian movement out of frustration of tribal marginalization. The Bahr el Ghazal Independent Group split from SSIM but later on supported the political charter with the government in Khartoum. Further groups, founded more on paper by exiled Sudanese in Kenya and Uganda, such as the Unity of Armed and Unarmed Southern Groups and Movement (USAP) or the South Sudan Freedom Front (SSFF) and the Equatorian Defence Force (EDF). The binding factor for all of them seemed to become their approach towards the NIF government in Khartoum. Most of them signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement, some of them, such as the SSFF joined Khartoum backed guerrilla forces, such as Joseph Kony’s Lords Resistance Army, a Ugandan guerrilla operating from Sudanese territory.

The internal fighting in Upper Nile finally led to the signing of the political charter in 1996 and later the Khartoum peace agreement in April 1997. Around six armed factions, including SPLA-United and SSIM signed an agreement with the regime of Sudan; president Gen. Omar el Bashir calling for a transitional period and subsequently possibly independence for the South. In the agreement they accepted the sharia.

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566 Ibid. is reporting the conference in length as well as Maker Benjamin evaluates this meeting as one of the dividing lines in the future of SSIM. Both were members of the SSIM at that time and both attended the convention, both left the SSIM later on.

567 The Khartoum Peace Agreement was signed in April 1997 by the Vice President of the Khartoum Government, LT General El Zuber Mohamed Saleh, by Cdr. Riek Machar Teny for UDSF and SSIM/A, by Cdr. Kerubino Kuanyn Bol for SPLA/M, by Cdr. Kawac Makwei for the SSIG (later acting president of UDSF), by Thiopholus Ochang Loti for the Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF), Samuel Aru Bol for USAP and Arok Thon Arok for the Bor Group.

The peace agreement document is available at: http://www.usinternet.com/users/helpsudan/SudanPeaceAgreement.htm

568 The Lord’s Resistance Army of Kony is one of the most horrendous human rights violator. His Acholi-Nationalism connected with spirituality (Kony thinks of himself as the incarnation of a spirit) and the brutality with which the LRA is operating in their home area of northern Uganda is tremendous. LRA is accused of systematic rape, abduction, enslavement, including sexual enslavement of girls. LRA attacks areas in northern Uganda, cuts off ears and tongues of civilians, abducts girls to become “wives” of their teenage commanders. Khartoum argues that as long as Museveni is supporting SPLA the Sudan government is not willing to give up support for LRA.


570 Point 3.1.6. of the Khartoum Peace Agreement under Constitutional and Legal Matters, Religion and State the agreement states: “(A) Sharia and Custom shall be the sources of legislation. (B) on the issue of Sharia, the parties agreed on a formula under which Laws of a general nature that are based on general principles common to the States shall apply at the National level, provided that the States shall have the right to enact any complementary legislation to Federal legislation on matters that are peculiar to them. This power shall be exercised in addition to the powers the States exercise on matters designated as falling within their jurisdiction, including the development of customary law.” The Sudan Peace Agreement: http://www.sudanembassy.org/default.asp?page=documentreports_khartoum.
the constitution and the legitimacy of the regime in general against the Declaration of Principles by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)\textsuperscript{571}, a conglomerate of all opposition parties, including SPLM. All armed groups signing the Khartoum peace agreement were mainly fighting against the SPLA. Cdr. Riek Machar was given the position of Assistant President – although without portfolio. He became the President of the Coordinating Council of the Southern States, based in Khartoum. He was commander in chief for the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), again a post with hardly any budget but with a government agreement for SSDF to be the only legitimate force in the southern territory alongside the regular army and the PDF. Lam Akol became the Minister for Transport and continued to be leader of the SPLA-United although there is almost no fighting force on the ground.

Cdr. Riek Machar defended the decision to ally with the government and to even go to extend to except the paragraph in the political charter emphasizing that ‘sharia and the customs shall be the sources of legislation’ with the logic of pushing the masses to the limit only then the final break will be possible. In an interview with Cdr. Riek Machar in Old Fangak in early 1997 he commented casually on the question how he could agree to sharia as a legal basis by pointing towards the dynamic factor of escalation: “They should even amputate and Islamise more. Only then will the people react and overthrow the government.”\textsuperscript{572}

Only in 1999 Cdr. Riek Machar raised the issue of lacking budget, influence and control with the government when his forces, supposedly the main pro-government forces in the oil area of Bentiu were attacked by forces of Paulino Matiep, a former AnyaNya and later government ally. In September 1999 one of the commanders of Paulino Matiep, Peter Gadet, deserted with a number of other Matiep commanders and is now fighting alongside SPLA forces in Western Upper Nile\textsuperscript{573}. A increasing number of individual commanders separate from their former movements and start to set up small units, either financed by the government or in alliance with SPLA forces. Some, such as Matiep’s forces were hired by oil companies to guarantee the companies security.\textsuperscript{574}

\textsuperscript{571} see http://www.sudan.net.

\textsuperscript{572} In the interview I conducted with Machar a couple of weeks before the final signature under the Khartoum agreement of 1997 he was just sending of a troop contingent of approximately 6,000 combatants to Upper Nile. The area was devastated by attacks of SSIM commanders and people just recently re-settled in the area. The question of guarantees from the government to self-determination was not answered. Machar seemed to be more concerned about the internal southern struggle than with the major issue of government control and domination.

\textsuperscript{573} Similar to Riek Machar’s statements on human rights violations, Peter Gadet condemned and apologized for the devastation of Leer, Koch and other places he helped to destroy under the command of Paulino Matiep during 1999. However just a few month after Gadet split from Matiep his forces attacked, burned down, looted and destroyed villages in the area around Bentiu and he is currently known as one of the factions with the most horrendous record of human rights violations.

\textsuperscript{574} Lundin oil hired local security forces, only for a short period, since the internal fighting contributed to the insecurity rather than guaranteeing any. Annette Weber, „The Human Price of Oil,” (London: Amnesty International:, 2000).
Cdr. Riek Machar resigned from his position of the Assistant President and President of the Coordinating Council of the Southern States as well as from his Presidency of UDSF on 31 January 2000. He left Khartoum in January 2000 to return to Nairobi. The intention was to fight with the SSDF (later SPDF) alongside SPLA but not to become part of the regular SPLA force. Machar went back and forth from Sudan to Nairobi. His forces were again supplied by the government but are currently supposedly fighting other government militias. The focus for Cdr. Riek Machar seem to have changed from the aspiration to become the ruler of Southern Sudan towards the control over the oil rich area of Upper Nile. Since his return to Nairobi he lost more and more political influence since there is no political sphere he could navigate in – although weakened in manpower, he and his forces continue to be a factor to the war. In early 2001 SPLA/M and SPDF have set a committee to examine ways of cooperation but simultaneously fighting against each other. Lam Akol is still in his position as minister for transport in the Khartoum regime, his forces are still almost nonexistent but he is more influential in political maneuvering.

**Political Assessment**

As a preliminary assessment of why factionalization is tremendously increasing in Southern Sudan one argument might very well be that the leadership structure is too hierarchical and the internalized approach continues to be that of personal rule. Rather than seeking difference in political motivation splits tend to happen when leaders are seeking personal power. What Georg Elwert is naming Gewaltmarkt ‘market of violence’ becomes another, possibly even more important factor for splits. As Elwert defines Gewaltmarkt he bases the definition on the notion of Gewaltmonopol (monopoly to violence) or better on the absence of Gewaltmonopol. According to Max Weber and Norbert Elias:

Unter einem Gewaltmonopol verstehen wir, Max Weber und Norbert Elias folgend, eine Situation, in welcher eine Erzwingungsinstanz erfolgreich für ein Territorium jeden von ihr nicht authorisierten Rückgriff auf Gewalt und physischen Zwang untersagt. 975

A situation in which an authority of force successfully denies all violence and physical force that is not legitimized by the authority happening on the territory under its control.

In convergence with Gewaltmonopol violence-free-zones emerge although violence free zones do not necessarily need a monopoly of force by the state or a similar authority. As Elwert elaborates further, violence free zones exist in societies that internalize norms of the use and non-use of violence. “Historically we find violence free spheres in akephale ethnic groups, in societies without a centralized instance of power, without an enforcement structure.” He subsumes feuds under this aspect, since the rules and regulations of feuds are intersubjected with restrictions in the use of arms, the rule of war, the season of feuds. If neither the monopoly of violence nor the traditional restriction exists markets of violence are likely to emerge.

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975 Elwert, „Gewalt Und Märkte“, p. 125.
This explains a logic of the formation of factions different to the dominant one, based on the topoi of revenge, hate, emotions and tribal solidarity. The interest in a form of monopoly of a market of violence is rather extended from economic behavior and interest driven planning. Emotions are used as mobilizing elements but are not in itself a rational and structural force.

This can be short term interests such as relief benefits, long term interests such as the control over the oil territory. The means to achieve a monopoly vary from contracts with the government, individual deals with companies or semi-sovereign state structures to appear as the quasi governmental partner with the international humanitarian agencies.

For the emergence of factions around the oil rich areas of Upper Nile, a former commander of Paulino Matiep and now ally with SPLA – Peter Gadet – explained in an interview with the author in October 1999:

It was about the control over the oil fields. The government did not want Cdr. Riek Machar to be in control so they used Matiep. We were in control but the benefit did not come to our people in the area, to the Nuer. This was the reason why I left Paulino Matiep’s forces. We have to fight to get the control over the oil fields to the benefit of our people. If this is not possible right now, we have to stop them, we cannot allow them to produce and all the benefit will flow to the north. (...) As for the question who should be ruling the Nuer – this question is not to be answered by me. We have to ask the Nuer people if they want Riek Machar or if they want somebody else, but the Nuer have to decide who should be their leader. Then this leader can make decisions with the oil companies.576

This aspect not only becomes axiomatic for the aspiration to accumulate more individual power but for the entire process of individual interest driven factions. The important fact of difference of political ideas and internal criticism should yet not be used as a legitimizing argument for just personal rule driven economic behavior and activities.

As a chief in Bahr el Ghazal said on the issue of leadership: “Let them all go. All of them who are calling themselves leaders now. We did not ask them and they came, we invited them and they stayed and now, after they took everything and we are left with nothing they make us kill each other.”577

576 Interview with Peter Gadet in Wucok (Upper Nile) October 1999, a few weeks after he defected from Matiep’s forces. Gadet met a delegation of the NSCC and Nuer representatives to negotiate possible agreements to settle the internal conflict in the region and to re-align with SPLA forces. Gadet is now fighting in Western Upper Nile, mainly against his former commander Paulino Matiep, the regular forces of the government of Sudan, and recently against Cdr. Riek Machars forces.

577 Interview I conducted with the chief in Bahr el Ghazal in February 1997. (In another interview with him, that took place in October 1999 he renewed his assessment) For reasons of security his identity will not be disclosed.
Currently inter-southern warfare is exacerbating tremendously, mainly around the oil area. Mainly Nuer-Nuer fights are taking up life, displace the local population and put tens of thousands of people at risk of another man-made hunger crisis in the area. 578

Economic Factors of Armed Groups

Apart from the creation of tribal differences and the mobilization on this basis, the economic factor played a role in the aspiration of the various groups. Since war economy in southern Sudan meant mainly the relief and international humanitarian sector, all of the factions were very keen on establishing good relations and solid links with the international humanitarian community of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)579. By guaranteeing relief for their areas of control, the faction leaders managed to shift the burden of the responsibility of a civil authority to the relief agencies and fully concentrate on military aspects. All bigger factions try to engage on positive grounds with humanitarian agencies in order to keep symbolic control and command over civilian administration in the territory they militarily claimed.

Not only is the legal framework of administration playing an important role in establishing and keeping civilian support but the whole sector of Relief and Emergency as mandated by the OLS is of immense importance for the continuation of the war. Not only does the international humanitarian agencies take over state and governmental functions, such as building and maintaining schools or training and education, but they deliver food. Food becomes a double factor in the war economy, since the factions do not have to be fully responsible for the destruction of food or infrastructure, since food distribution is almost guaranteed. Beyond this they benefit from the food deliveries directly by illegally diverting food, meant for the civilian population for their army stocks.580 Since the mid 1990s and the increasing factionalization robbing relief deliveries and taking hostage of humanitarian agency personnel became another source of income for marauding war-leaders as well as individual commanders of organized armed factions.581

578 See Weber, „The Human Price of Oil“. Human Rights Watch: Letter to Secretary of State, Colin Powell, Washington, DC, March 1, 2001, alarming the Secretary on a potential humanitarian disaster in southern Sudan, urging him and the Bush administration to intervene diplomatically to use their influence amongst the southern military factions. (Further facts and evidence on oil and displacement, see Harker, „Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission, Prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.“ Rone, „Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.“

579 OLS started as an emergency program in March 1989 with projected 55 million US$, beyond the existing 78 million US$. OLS is the longest and most costly humanitarian operation ever. For the beginning of OLS see Larry Minear, Humanitarianism under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1991).

580 As has happened on a massive scale during the hunger crisis in 1998 – where hundreds of thousand of people died and SPLA diverted food from the endangered population to feed their forces. For more details, see „Famine in Sudan: The Army, Security Forces and Other Government Forces.“ (New York; Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1998).

581 The list of hostage taking is long and continuous. Humanitarian aid workers, nuns and priests had been kept hostages by all forces. Trading hostages for specific items however was started by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol by keeping ICRC workers hostage around Wau and with the negotiation of the Carter Center traded radio equipment, cars and further items for their release. Recently Gordon Kong’s pro government militia took four aid workers hostage while
The downsided for the factions when cooperating tightly with humanitarian agencies is the agencies pressure potential and political influence. Human rights violation, looting and food diversion is more closely monitored and questioned and accused by agencies. Factions are to follow codes of conduct more closely than without this monitoring unit. An armed group has to act more responsible if planning to continue cooperation with those agencies. However agencies already build a state-in-state power, their mandate is humanitarian and not political. Their scope therefore is quite restricted and they have to operate in areas where the forces in control do not adhere to human rights standards or the Geneva Conventions.

The factor of war economy should not be undervalued since not only does war become an outlet for people without any other perspective, it becomes a lifestyle and an entitlement to exist in itself. War becomes an economic factor, as long as groups keep control over a territory and are in a position to negotiate business from this position. On the other hand war implies the destruction of people, livestock, harvest, housing, reduces the possibility to education and training, destroys any attempt to establish and develop economic activities based on trade and mechanization or even industrialization. Cross-border trade becomes more risky, gray economy is growing and prices are enormous. The money raised by the armed movements is hardly used for welfare or civilian purpose but for weapons and armament – which result in even further destruction of civilian life and security. Specifically in the internal conflict amongst southern Sudanese, money is used to purchase guns and mines with the main purpose to attack and destroy the civilian population of the ‘other’ side. This in itself is such a fundamental violation of any claim to representation and providing security to its population, that no armed group can claim to be the vanguard or representative of the people, if the majority of their casualties are deliberately these very civilians.

for the first time the government of Sudan was made responsible for their relief by the Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi. (two of the hostages were Kenyans)
III. 7. THE POLITICAL PROFILE AND ORIENTATION OF THE SUDAN
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AND MOVEMENT

THE GUERRILLA IS THE MASSES IN ARMS:
RULES OF DISCIPLINE
obey orders in all your actions
do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses
turn in everything captured
speak politely
pay fairly for what you buy
return everything you borrow
pay for anything you damage
do not hit or swear at people
do not damage crops
do not take liberties with women
do not ill-treat captives
keep your eyes and ears open
know the enemy within
always guide and protect the children
always be the servant of the people

Handbook of revolutionary warfare. Kwame Nkrumah. 1968

Guerilla as Political Force

In this chapter I will examine the creation and self-imagery of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M). How is the self-imagery constructed and
how is it communicated with the population they claim to represent. Further I would like
to elaborate shortly on the type of framework of comparable groups SPLA/M place
their political understanding. International dimensions of the conflict, their orientation
and strategic alliances with other countries, interests, movements, solidarity and
support groups will be of brief relevancy in this chapter as well. The main interest here
reflects the core axiom of representation of societal needs and interests. The
legitimization of a movement that claims to be political rather than solely military has to
be studied on the movement’s agenda and realization.

This includes questions on how and why movements might change over the years
and what imagery is reflecting the political discourse at the various stages. The
process of communication and political discourse inside and outside the movements’
sphere of influence has to be outlined. Searching and scanning through their
publications, interviews and the press material the thread constitutes itself by the
transparency, the political orientation, the decision making structures and the political
argumentation, the spokespersons, leaders or representatives are giving.
What public discourse conveys the vision of SPLM/A and who is in power of defining
the essentials and core issues?
The topoi of public discourse needs to be mentioned here again, since it is inevitably important to define the locus of reality construction. Public discourse here is informed by Hannah Arendt’s definition of public and political sphere. Public or political sphere, meaning the space, territorial, in the meaning of the polis or the market place and in the meaning of power and access, that allows the citizen – as an equal among equals in a plural setting – to trade and examine arguments and exchange opinions. In the words of Judith Butler, this would be the societal discourse, der Sprechakt, creating and shaping realities of the citizens, as well as transforming them. Or in the words of a more systemic understanding of society, public space is the pool of agreements, people reach in order to be able to communicate and interact. In the last meaning the definition goes beyond contract societies. It includes communication that predates and informs legal frameworks.

It would overburden the achievable aim to use all interdependent and influential comparisons with other rebel- and guerrilla movements. But at least for the part of the SPLA I would like to consult the experiences and imageries of two other insurgencies and guerrilla movements, namely the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN).

I consider it to be fruitful to reach out to the experience, self-portrayal of these two insurgencies mentioned since they stand for a distinctive paradigm of guerrilla movements. EPLF as the one territorially close to the SPLA with similar starting positions but different developments. EZLN as an insurgency with a different starting position – raising awareness and changing governmental political and economic structures rather than overtaking a government and claiming governmental positions. EPLF and EZLN share a history of public propaganda, awareness raising and education that SPLA only used fragmentally in its initial stage and tried to revive in the civil society convention in 1994. EZLN was initiated with a heterogeneous, non-monolithic agenda whereas for EPLF the declared aim has always been the national independence from Ethiopia.

For a follow up on the definition and discussion on public space I would like to mention the work of Seyla Benhabib on the understanding of public space in the writing and work of Hannah Arendt, the liberal tradition and Jürgen Habermass. In: Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. 89 pp. Judith Butler bases her understanding of reality creation predominantly on the public discourse. In Butler, Hass Spreicht: Zur Politik Des Performativen. Judith P. Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997). Butler describes the process of naming in the public discourse as the most powerful tool in reality creation.

Zapatista Army of National Liberation, The information about Chiapas and the guerrilla movement of the EZLN are a sampling out of the information I collected and the interviews I conducted during a visit to the region in December 1995 in the area around San Cristobal de las Casas in August 1995, when the main negotiations between the EZLN and the Mexican Government took place. Partly the information come from publications, personal informants from the area and internet sites either directly from the EZLN communication unit, namely Subcomandante Marcos or the German network, that is connecting, publishing and distributing this information. Land und Freiheit; edition Nautilus. Hamburg. see further http://www.ezln, or http://www.eco.utexas.edu:80.

Simulating the State

A dominant feature in the African context is the disintegrating and collapsing state, however the majority of insurgents either use the collapsed state structure for their clientele purposes (Liberia, DRC.) or try to install a state structure as soon as possible after taking over of power (Eritrea, Uganda). The shattered image of states as non-workable in the African context does not seem to be too much of an issue for political aspirations. The tendency to mimicry a state is as strong as one to copy regular army strategies.

In questioning the takeover of state structures I am questioning the structures and their duplication, not the state in general. The issue of what kind of state insurgencies are aiming for is challenging, i.e. if self-determination is used to install a nationalist ethnically pure construct or following a modernist nation-state ideal of multiethnicity and multiculturalism.

For Sudan and more precisely for Southern Sudan the state symbolizes a continuation of a pattern of dominance, oppression and abuse from the northern elite over all marginalized people, Southern Sudan in specific. For the SPLA the eradication of the northern elite therefore is a precondition and main aim of their movements’ aspiration. Yet the state as a structural conception to frame a society is unquestioned. The implication on this is the continuation of repressive models already in place. Or, to describe it with the eyes of a feminist political analysts, if the subordination of women was the social bases of the state revolutions against that state have the potential in liberating the oppressed, but if revolutions don’t question but strengthen the state institutions that inscribed this hierarchy, the new state institutions will continue the subordination of women (or other oppressed subjects in the state) after revolutionary transformations. How and possibly why SPLM/A is simulating the state will be of interest in the following pages. Reflecting the various ideas of state and governments in Africa from chapter 4.2. the specific case of SPLM/A is used as a case study to analyze how particular dominant military structures are constructed and what effect this has on society. The question has to be asked of how the transformation is planned and what different state model SPLM/A is aiming for to replace the ‘Old Sudan’.


Whereas SPLM tries to establish a government-like structure, the main destruction of civilian functions, authorities and community beliefs results out of the war. Whereas SPLM does make an attempt to acknowledge the destruction of tradition, communities, customs, beliefs, the loss of people, security, households, cattle and harvest as a result of war, the fundamental question of any justification to continue and even engage in an internal war amongst fellow southern Sudanese is almost prohibited and taboo to be asked. The leader of SPDF, Riek Machar gives a deterministic answer in stating that three quarters of South Sudan is a war society. He is placing an almost genetic disposition of Sudanese to fight as an explanation. The question of citizen status and who is to decide on the continuation of the war should not only be asked in the north-south dimension of the conflict but as along gender lines in the South as well. In analyzing SPLA/M in their militarized structure, the matter of priority here is to question the legitimization of a movement and its representation claim by asking the population about their priorities and decisions. Most insurgencies even though criticizing actual state and governmental structures are bedding their aims on state and nation state structures. Only deeply socialist politicized ones or those of war leaders who deal with the international finance and donor class on an individual bases are not putting state and nation-state as the institutional framework of their aspiration.

The simulation of the state and state structures enables insurgencies to prepare for a take over of government and by this a smooth transition of power. In the case of SPLM/A the need to act as a quasi government in a quasi state occurred with the need to interact with international actors as well as in the capacity of the only southern political actor represented in the National Democratic Alliance. To interact with agencies such as the Operation Lifeline Sudan, since 1989 an active player in the setting of southern Sudan, guarantor of state-like services such as delivering food, save water, education and training, SPLA was in need to set up a minimal rudimentary administration, since they wanted to monitor and control the work of the international agencies. OLS is on one hand taking over responsibilities that would fall under the brief of SPLM and their civil authority to proof their skills and aspirations as a quasi government – on the other hand it challenges and forces SPLM to adhere to certain

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586 I am aware of the complex problematic of this issue, since there is hardly any neutral population. The public sphere is fundamental in rural Sudanese settings as well as in the written material. Yet the women interviewed during my stay in 1996-1997 did complain about not being asked or listened to.

587 OLS was launched in April 1989 under the lead of UN but with a large number of NGOs to prevent another war related hunger crisis in which in 1988 more than 250,000 persons are believed to have lost their lives. Since the beginning of OLS two more severe war related hunger crisis took place in Sudan and for the area around the oil fields in Upper Nile another crisis is foreseen to happen in the next dry season. OLS is still operating, the mandate of the Lifeline is emergency and relief, hardly any development projects are run in Sudan. Even though it is the biggest ongoing effort of the international community to enable aid to be delivered to the needy population in war torn southern Sudan OLS aid is used by all parties to the conflict for political purposes. Blocking food delivery as well as deliberately bombing civilians and their fields to unable them to harvest, diversion of food and aid deliveries for the military as well as the purposeful channeling of aid and aid agencies in particular regions for personal and political advantages and propaganda purposes.
international standards and agreements, since OLS keeps a quasi governmental mandate for the areas under the control of SPLA.

The installment and interaction of Operation Lifeline Sudan would need its own thorough analytic digression and explanation, since it is an interesting link and actor in the political map of Sudan and the question of sovereignty, for the purpose of this paper, an extended evaluation is not possible.

I would nevertheless argue in brief that because of the long-lasting activities of OLS and therefore the permanent presence of foreign experts and personnel holding important positions in key areas of what is normally a states concern, OLS is a challenge for SPLM/A as well as a party to a political power dynamic itself. To coordinate with the various agencies and to provide a minimum of security for the expatriate workers SPLA/M has to prove respectable and gains a quasi sovereign governmental status. The importance of being accepted as a semi-sovereign state actor became quite clear in the last argument between the SPLM civil authority, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and the OLS on the issue of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Besides the content related issues that could not be resolved, the main hurdle for agencies who rejected to sign was the significance of the Memorandum as a quasi recognition of SPLM/A as the sovereign power of southern Sudan. In international relation terms this could have tremendous effects.

**Enemy Image**

SPLA/M conceptions reflect a moral world perception of good and bad, wrong and what is right. The main enemy image is clear and the aim and objective of the movement is to destroy this enemy. Since the enemy is envisioned in the ruling elite the state becomes questionable and is described as an artificial construct enforced by foreign and outside powers as well as by the national elite. Yet there is no conceptualization of how to overcome oppressive structures and what to replace them with.

In all publications the chairman of SPLM/A John Garang is repeatedly insisting that the northern elite, the class of the Jellabas has to be destroyed. He leaves it open if this should happen by military means or by political mobilization against the elite class. He

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588 Even though it is opportune for the various forces to keep a good record with the various agencies, given that they cover for most of what would be considered the states duty, or the duty of those who are in control over the population, there is an endless list of atrocities not only against foreign aid workers but much more against civilians who become the main target in the current war in Sudan.

589 The argument between the aid agencies and the SRRA went on for a good half year in 1999 and finalized in the threat by SPLA to not be able to guarantee the security of those aid workers whose agencies refused to sign the MOU. About 12 international agencies refused in the beginning, mainly arguing that a signature would equal the full recognition of SPLA as the sovereign for southern Sudan. The conflict was never really resolved. With the exception of 4 agencies all others resumed their work in Southern Sudan.
further repeats, that SPLA has chosen the armed conflict, and explicitly not the political path, that he derogatorily describes as the way of the traitors.

In the vision and program and constitution of the SPLM in 1998 this is contradicted by subordinating the SPLA, and therefore the armed struggle to the SPLM. The first of 15 point program of SPLM gives the clear priority to the political rather than the military movement. It reads: “The SPLM is the political movement charged with providing visions, guidance and leadership for the achievement and consolidation of the New Sudan. All other structures of the liberation movement, including the SPLA, shall be part of the SPLM and subordinated to it.”

One alerting sign that the movement does not empower and trust civilians in power positions was the appointment and training of mainly military personnel as the first wave of civil authority.

Not only did the movement ensure that there is no independent political, legislative or executive organ but also ensured that the style of approaching civilian affairs and conducting civilian administration and government will be based on their military chain of command hierarchy. Even though there are changes since 1994 and more civilians, including women are trained as civil authority personnel, there are still massive complains about the military style in civil authority and administration as well as the political clientele structure.

State Vision

We must die as tribes so that we can be born as a nation

With the Vision and Program of the SPLM in 1998, the movement presented a new idea on how the New Sudan would emerge -- after constituting the aim of the New Sudan in the First Resolution of the First National Convention in 1994. Resolution 1 states:

We, the people of the New Sudan, represented by this Convention, proclaim the birth of the New Sudan, which for the time being, shall consist of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile Regions (...).

In the elaborated vision of 1998 SPLM describes the New Sudan as a new nation.

590 “This Convention Is Sovereign”. Opening and Closing Speeches by Dr. John Garang De Mabior. To the First Splm/Spla National Convention., (Secretary of Information and Culture, SPLM, 1994). p. 23


The vision of the SPLM is therefore that of the New Sudan. This vision is consistent with how nations are formed. Nations are products of the historical movement of peoples. People move for a variety of reasons (...). They subsequently interact over time to become a community, a socio-political entity, and a nation or nation-state emerges. The Sudan is no exception.

For justification insurgencies quite often claim to be represented with a political wing – even if there is no difference to the military in personnel. If this is a reaction on the demands of the international community and NGO partners or if it is a genuine interest and structure of a movement is sometimes not easily distinguished.

The public persona of the statesmen internationally accepted on the international stage is without compatible to the powerful but less civilized military family member that is powerful, strong, and dangerous and sometimes goes beyond state regulations. International acceptance, meetings, agreements and negotiations with Charles Taylor or Kabila show that there is hardly any barrier to accept state representatives of a purely military caliber.

Whereas there has been a vivid discussion on a variety of alternatives for the already known forms of society, state and government in the literature on revolutions and reforms and the praxis of various opposition groups and people, guerrilla armies, and liberation movements seem to have the replacement, but not the revolution in mind, when they decide to take up arms. There might be an immense catalogue of criticism on the existing government and state, an insurgency movement promises to abolish, yet there is hardly a political communiqué or manifest of a guerrilla, that would completely question the existing ideas on state, separation of political spheres or a dissent on the understanding of public space.

This state legitimatory approach could be explained with the militarized structure of the rebel or guerrilla group that would immanently need a hierarchy in order to function. It might be a simple recourse on the priorities of the group. Priorities such as the toppling of the old regime and the political renaissance thereafter.

Possibly the position as the marginalized ‘other’ the international ‘outsider’ might be reason enough for a non-politicized movement to aim for the full acceptance in the international and/or regional community. The ground rules to play in this league are still defined by governmental and state structures and functions.

**Identity**

“The history of the Sudanese people has been one of a continuos struggle between the oppressed and the oppressors, the invaded and the invaders, between the exploited and the exploiters – from our ancient past down to the present day our

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594 Vision, Programme and Constitution of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (Splm).. p. 6
595 see definition for revolution in chapter 4.1
Sudanese people have always struggled for freedom, justice and dignity, for a better life. The interests, culture and identity of the ruling forces has been always dominant and imposed on the whole society. This has been the case in the past and is the case today.\textsuperscript{596}

The program of the SPLM remarks further that women have always been excluded at all times, mind you in history however there is no further comment on how this might be challenged or changed in the New Sudan.

In "The Call for Democracy", a documentation of the talks and manifests by John Garang there is an entire chapter titled: 'The search for Dialogue among Equals'. This chapter does not mention a dialogue amongst 'equals' amongst southern Sudanese and established representatives. The argumentative thread solely establishes northern Sudanese as reference points as to with whom the southern leadership wants to be equal with.\textsuperscript{597}

There had been changes in the interaction between SPLA and the civilians. The biggest marker of this change has been the series of conventions and meetings from 1994 to 1996, including the SPLM/SPLA First National Convention in March/April 1994, as well as the Conference on Civil Society and The Organization of Civil Authority in April and May 1996. Profound attempts to improve and institutionalize relationships between the SPLA and the population in Southern Sudan were made, yet this step has to be proven by reality and the seriousness with which the movement is implementing the recommendations.

\textsuperscript{596} Why the SPLA went to war. "This Convention Is Sovereign": Opening and Closing Speeches by Dr. John Garang De Mabior. To the First SPLM/SPLA National Convention.. p. 9

\textsuperscript{597} Mansour Khalid, ed., \textit{John Garang: The Call for Democracy in Sudan} (London, New York: Kegan, 1992). Beside the fact that there seems to be a huge urge to be accepted by those that had been criticized for their methods, understanding and raging, it is interesting, that there is hardly anything else published by the SPLA/SPLM itself. And naming the most prominent book of the movement 'John Garang speaks' shows the degree of personality cult and the identification of a whole political movement with the military leader of this movement. With the EPLF – even if there is and was a personality cult with Issayas Aferwerki – this would never had happened. And still it is questionable for what audience, for what target group a book like this would be edited and written. Assuming, that the leader and representatives know the international support and solidarity scene, the leftwing political activists and theorists, it is not really understandable, why the SPLA would wage a person oriented information. It could have been understood and assumed by the communicators of the movement, that a less open discursive but very person oriented program would – 30 years after Fidel Castro – not be an appropriate way to convince supporters.
There is only one link to a political profile of the SPLM in Chapter II point 5: Establishment of SPLM and SPLA. It reads:

The Marxist-Leninist Movement known as Sudan People’s Liberation Movement shall be the sole people’s political organization established in the interest of the oppressed working masses of the Sudanese people to liberate the country from the oppressive, corrupt and reactionary, bourgeois system of Khartoum and its armed component, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, shall present the effective arm of the movement that shall, at this initial stage, exercise the executive and judicial authority of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.

Never again would SPLA/M use the Marxist-Leninist label as a political orientation for the movement. In some selected positions of the rebels there are lists and definitions of real and potential enemies, and the reactionary AnyaNya II commanders are seen as enemies with a certain warlord interest, that stands for the self-enrichment idea. But in this early writing of 1983 the SPLM/A position did not fear any warlord system, since the logic of their struggle prohibited self-enrichment: „People’s revolutionary war, which necessarily prohibits any acts of banditry.”

With the label of peoples revolutionary war, the SPLA situated itself in the reference system of Mao Tsetung, Ho Tschii Minh and Che Guevara. No further specification of the movements political agenda and orientation, no other political standpoint or opinion was ever published or discussed. Only in this early paper, there is more to read about the future plans and ideas of the socialist orientation of the new Sudan as well as about the plan for the founding for an Institute for Revolutionary War studies. SPLM definition of socialism here corresponds with the definition of socialism developed by KANU earlier.

In the 1983 manifest, there is a passage on future prospects and the SPLM position.

Conclusion and Prospect for the Future.
27. The SPLM is convinced of the correctness of its socialist orientation. The SPLM Program is a scientific program that will solve correctly the nationality and religious questions within the context of a United Socialist Sudan, and save the country from otherwise inevitable disintegration. (...) Nevertheless, and consistent with socialist solidarity, socialist countries in Africa have historically been involved in dithering and materially assisting the African revolution in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and South Africa. The SPLM is therefore confident that socialist Africa will accord it full and unconditional support. The SPLM believes that Socialism cannot be viable for long if established only in one country. The African Revolution must spread to survive. In the struggle, the SPLM will have international significance in furthering the cause of the African Revolution and, therefore, that of the international socialist movement.

(...)
Finally, the SPLM is convinced that the necessary internal and external conditions exist to enable it to transform the Southern Movement from reaction into a genuine people’s liberation movement that will spearhead socialist transformation of the Sudan, beginning in the South where imperialism’s dependency relations are weakest, and spreading to all parts of the land.

Equipped with the scientific theory and practice, determined to persist in the struggle and given material, moral, intellectual and organizational assistance from the socialist solidarity, the SPLM will surely win!  

Even though assuming that the support by the communist Ethiopian state under Mengistu Haile Mariam and the various socialist brother-countries that supported this state, made a big impact on the SPLA and its leadership, the wording of their manifest was never reflected in the practical work nor ground communication of the SPLM/A. Their orientation might have followed the socialist path and spirit at that time. In reality the movement never made any attempt to translate this into a plan of action for the population nor did they aspire to implement any of the socialist transformation ideals. This highly politically motivated situating of the movement turned out to be merely window-dressing.

Earlier attempts by SPLA to reduce power and influence of traditional power holders such as the chiefs might lead into the direction of socialist representational models SPLA might have followed. Yet the power was not distributed further it was taken from the chiefs and given to the military commanders.

A number of years later, in the 1998 ‘Vision, program and constitution of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)’ the link to socialism was doomed a failure of history. There is no explicit political profile given, but in the introductory paragraph the Soviet Union is given as an example of failure: “The dust bin of history is filled with such examples, of which the former Soviet Union and apartheid South Africa are recent examples.”

There was no internal dialogue in the movement about this drastic political change, neither any dissemination of political programs or changes amongst the population.

For the case of the EPLF in comparison with the SPLA there seem to be no bigger possible difference, when it comes to the effort in situating oneself and ones movement in a political arena. For the EPLF the political argumentation for the split with the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) seemed to be the starting point in their history – whereas for the SPLA it seems to be enough to reiterate over decades the end of the oppression from the north.

Evidently, this left the two groups with an enormous difference in their self-understanding as well as in the imagery for the outside.

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601 And through this supported SPLA militarily and with training, such as Cuba.

602 Vision, Programme and Constitution of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). p. 5
John Garang states in his opening speech addressing the First National Convention of the SPLA/SPLM in 1994, that there was a great need for a political program to unite all the oppressed people in Sudan in the beginning of the SPLA in May 1983.

The chairman is using a distinct political terminology in mainly accessing and assuring the foundation and unification of the various political and military groups, fighting for a new Sudan. He is aiming constantly on the need to overcome the oppressive system and to struggle for the fundamental problems of the country, but never does he mention how his organization will challenge, improve and implement changes, not even what changes would be needed.

What, one could criticize, would be the use of publications, manifestations and statements, if there is an illiteracy rate of more than 90% in the vast areas of southern Sudan. Further, what would this reflect about the idea of representation and communication, if a movement is more oriented towards the intellectuals in urban exile or the international solidarity groups than towards the citizens under their influence and control. Again, this could also be seen as a trap of cultural relativism, romanticizing and anticipating, that the fact of a minimized amount of written agendas, would be read as conclusively expressing a high amount of intergroup communication, representation and reflection of the political agenda of the movement. as for the SPLA the lack of communiqués and statements reflects the lack of interest in claiming public space, in giving voice to the voiceless. The power of speech as a rebellion about silence, invisibility, oppression and devaluation is hardly ever claimed by SPLA/M. neither is communicating with and convincing the population of their just goals and political agenda nor in publicizing the point of view of Southern Sudanese to the north or the rest of the world. Dialogue and discourse are conceived as merely interference, coercion is used as a more powerful tool of imposing rather discussing positions and decisions.

Whereas the lack of written documentation might reflect the disinterest to communicate on a political level with an international political community, the lack of communication inside the area under control of a movement reflects a disinterest in representing the real needs and interest of the population. By simultaneously insisting to be the only legitimate movement representing the people of southern Sudan, it reflects a deeply arrogant undemocratic attitude.

The writings of the SPLA and specially the speeches of John Garang, explain the political self understanding of the SPLA. Most obvious this inconsistency is found in the claim for a socialist structure (1984 Manifesto of SPLA) that is later denied and changed into a call for democracy and market economy. Garang who received his doctoral degree at a University in the United States is using the US-political system as a role model for democracy.

603 “This Convention Is Sovereign”. Opening and Closing Speeches by Dr. John Garang De Mabior. To the First Splm/Spla National Convention.

604 This is not exceptional and SPLA/M shares this approach with most authoritarian systems, yet those might have never claimed to spearhead a social transformation.
Connected to Southern Sudan were he is manufacturing a tightly hierarchical leadership structure, this sounds inconsistent. In the opening speech of the national convention of the SPLM in 1994, under the topic of ‘Why the SPLA went to War’, Garang is laying out the preconditions for a nation state and by this criticizing the government for the active interruption and prevention of a similar setup in the post colonial Sudan:

Through economic, social and political interaction nations and nation-states begin to form. Contemporary examples are many. The USA and the nation-states of South America are such examples. Some of these countries such as the United States have mutated into very powerful nations, and this was not accidental but the conscious work of men and women in their interaction and interplay with various forces, economic, political, social and environmental. Underlying all dynamic, growing and successful nations are universal principles of freedom, justice, democracy, equality and unhindered pursuit of opportunity and happiness.

But in our country the Sudan, the ruling elite who took power by the time of independence have done the contrary. They instituted policies of hegemony and social, racial and religious discrimination, bigotry, injustice and restriction to self-fulfillment.

Undoubtedly, Garang is describing the institutionalized elite hegemony as a distinctly undemocratic enterprise. Yet by elaborating further, his plan of action is aimed towards the eradication of this elite by constructing the distinct enemy image of the ‘jellaba’. Though, the described mutation of the United States in the role model nation state it represents for Garang now is nowhere elaborated or explained any further.

Yet it is an interesting comparison, since it does not focus on self-determination and possible separation as the call for pure ethnic state constructs, but a call for a federal state model. It derives more from a socialist state model rather than one of the new tendency to nationalist, ‘völkische’ models of nations, as we can observe in the Balkan and former Soviet Union. The model propagated in this convention paper is conceptualizing the larger unit of people, rather than believing in fragmentized pure ethnic niches as a solution. I consider this a positive reflection of the situation, keeping in mind, that even in Southern Sudan alone, there would be no homogenous Southern Sudanese identity, fragmentation could easily lead into a Somalization of a clan structure that could not be governed. This would prolongue the interest of individual war leaders for the civilian population it would mean a continuation and intensification of the current war.

To summarize. The leader of the SPLA labels the movement as a liberation movement, placing it in a continuum of anti-colonial struggle. The thread of history of southern Sudan is hereby installed in a pure enemy image as the result of an ongoing oppression by colonial forces before and after independence.

605 Ibid. p. 13
606 For AnyaNya and later for the program of SPLA-United the problem of internal colonialism is described as the foundation of the problems in Sudan.
The invasive conduct of the northern regimes is perceived as an even deeper level of colonial humiliation than that of outside invaders such as the British, Ottomans or Egyptians. The *jellabas*, the Arab traders from the north become the icon of oppression for people in the South. As the SPLM manifesto states quite clearly:

(...) Nothing is so crucial for the success and victory of any liberation struggle than the correct and objective definition of the enemy, for it is on the basis of such definition that a liberation movement like ours can formulate correct strategies and tactics of the struggle to attain the lofty aims and ideals, and distinguish allies and friends from foes, as well as correctly formulate objectives to be achieved. Without going into great details in answering this question; the ruling social group that has been ruling our country, is popularly known as the ‘Jellaba’.  

Garang continues to describe those Jellabas in detail and explains their claim to an Arab origin with their inferiority complex. The reflection on the social build up of elite in Sudan might come close to the reality of unbalanced power, prejudice and apartheid structures in Sudan. Though not only is it problematic to use a term that is used for all Northern Sudanese by Southern Sudanese and introduce it as an exclusive enemy group, it is as well problematic that SPLA is calling for a united and New Sudan without giving any further considerations how the elite problem should be solved.

Unlike apartheid South Africa, in Sudan the end of the unbalanced economic, political and cultural dominance of the north over the south would not be changed on majority rule, it would need a transformation from inside.

This is a difficult undertaking, since the *jellabas* as a unifying expression for all northerners, are portrayed as the main enemy image, yet the final situation described as the solution in new Sudan is that of a united, new Sudan with all Sudanese. There is no proposal by the SPLA of how this imbalance could be overcome rather than the military solution and with it a change in the top level power balance. If the identity of northern and southern Sudanese is so very different and based on superior and inferior self-attribution the change neither in the north nor in the south will come with guns nor with top-down regulations. In the public awareness of southern Sudanese it is therefore not the dominance of the rulers in central Sudan as the leading reason for struggle and the main origin of fear and rage, but northern Sudanese in general.

The effect of divide and rule amongst marginalized groups in the north, used, armed and supplied to fight a private war against people in the south pays off for the ruling elite, but cuts an even deeper gap between Southerners and Northerners in general.

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607 “This Convention Is Sovereign”. Opening and Closing Speeches by Dr. John Garang De Mabior. To the First Splm/Spa National Convention. p. 14f
608 Groups such as the Rizeigat, Baggaras and Murahaleen are not effectively involved in the reign of power and dominance in Khartoum. They themselves feel marginalized by the central government. Nevertheless they are waging a war against the border population in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, gaining the women and children they capture as slaves and the loot they take as possession, but supporting a long process of enemy sentiments and hostile alienation with their direct neighbors the Dinka and Nuer.
John Garang mentions Jellabas as a social group,

Developed since the fifteenth century from elements of foreign and local traders including slave traders and who have established themselves in trading centers and towns like Dueim, Omdurman and Sennar. The Jellaba are a hybrid of different races and nationalities from the indigenous Africans, and the immigrant Arabs, Tuks and Greek, and other races, who have interacted and intermarried in the long historical process which took place mainly in the riverain Northern Sudan. 609

I quote this because I think there is quite a lot of explanation in this definition of power structures and their origin. If the domination is so deeply embedded in the social set up of Sudan, one would expect a clearer vision of how this slope of power could be changed and balanced in the New Sudan. The chairman of SPLM/A elaborates further on the dominance and the mainstream central power of the Jellabas and the marginalized, oppressed groups in the country and specially the south and his solution is finally to eradicate this group. Not only is this a quite unrealistic approach, but does not reflect in the slightest the social dynamics of power in Sudan that are based on a wide range of clientelism, ethnic superior identity structures, family and religious groups, clans and tribes as well as the victimized feeling of the southern Sudanese population that learned how to hate the Northerners but not how to live with them in one state.

**Just War Legitimation**

„There are men who assert that the contradiction between the striking and live for peace and the necessity of war is terrible, but that such is the fate of men. These for the most part sensitive, gifted men see and comprehend the whole terror and the whole madness and cruelty of war, but by some strange turn of mind do not see and do not look for any issue from this condition.“
Leo Tolstoy

The leading actors in the Sudanese conflict do not seem to be in need of a coherent explanation for their doing. Neither does the respective enemy side appear to be interested in a coherent explanation or legitimation. There is hardly any response, critique or resistance in this war agenda that would argue from a pacifist, moral or ethic position. The moral seems to be clearly on the side of the oppressed, the classical bonus for the rebels, the guerrilla, the revolutionary movement. The religious argument is used on both sides, while the jihad declaration of the current regime delegitimized itself by fighting and marauding against Muslims in all parts of the country – exactly on their identity as Muslims, with the argument of them following the wrong path. 610 For the traditional concept of jihad, this is really unacceptable, because the people that the Turabi/Beshir regime is fighting against, are the very people that follow and determine

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610 Detailed accounts on attacks on mosques and Muslims in the Nuba Mountains in „Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan.„, as well as in various interviews I conducted while staying in the Nuba Mountains in December 1996.
the face and basis of the country specially with their Volksislamischen, Sufi-orientation.

The escalation of this inner-state war has reached dimensions where there is neither any option on a code of conduct concerning the rules for *jus in bello* nor dealing with *jus ad bellum*. Neither the Geneva Convention has any reference in this war, nor is there a dimension discussed that would concern the reason and justification of war.

SPLA is justifying the War against the War with a universal and general frame of reference, that of moral, just or natural law. This follows a classic realist school theories on war, but is the essence of the realist school in general, the IR theory and the main state and society blueprints – from Plato to Cicero from Sun Zu to Immanuel Kant. There is a universal moral and law that results in a specific code of conduct or – to read this with Hobbes eyes, that leads into a conclusive transformation from the state of nature to the international hierarchies that we are living in.

Garang claims, that the SPLA will continue to struggle „*until those objectives are achieved.*“ (*The war to end war*) and reverses the offensive and defensive lines with the legitimization of the waging of war for the sake of peace. The position of the righteous man that has to go against oppression and aggression is that of a heroic and strong one, whereas the role of the aggressor and offensive strategizer is the morally leading position from beginning on – so at least in enemy image production this always has to be reversed. One should never be in the position of an aggressor, but defend what is right and true.

The main aim appears to be the universalization of ones own identity or the clear-cut stratification of a hierarchical ranking of people and their civilizations. They use the same justification as has been used by the crusaders forcing people into the truth and the right path. The whole issue is different for the SPLA. They do or would have a moral legitimization to defend their own people and resist the aggressors acts. And even in the very rudimentary definition of how Stoics would determine the rule of a universal moral law, in connection to the will of God. As the state of Nature was for Hobbes a unfriendly, potentially conflictual place, it is for Cicero a safer place exactly because it is not managed and decided by man, but by God.

(…) Law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor established by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle, which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. [Cicero 1876, quoted by Holmes 1992:204]"
Both sides base their justification patterns on an internal war logic. If one uses Michael Walzer’s term of ‘supreme emergency’, or one talks about raison de guerre as a general law if Ho Tschi Minh explains the necessity of the revolutionary guerrilla war or Mugabe defends the dialectical process in the struggle for Zimbabwe, all claim to represent or vanguard the will and the decision of the masses. All of them argue in a manner of representation, leading to heroic responsibility and using all means necessary. I don’t argue against the right to self defense, not against the right of using violence against an oppressive system. But I do want to keep in mind, that there should be a critical questioning of the use of force and violence to end violence, which evidently throughout history never really led to peace as a result. Further there is a need to take a closer look towards the different strains of legitimization and ideas of representations, mentioned in the comparison of the EZLN with the SPLA. Che Guevara writes in his essay on guerrilla warfare as a method about this question of representation and raises another few important factors for the analysis of a guerrilla:

With this quotation, three important issues are raised. First, Che argues inside a militarized logic of alienation and state of nature, where man stands against man, and where he works on a method to be victorious for a just war reason: the end of imperialism and the rule of the masses. Second, he argues on behalf of the necessity to work alongside the masses, arguing that everybody who thinks that it is possible to

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614 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.

615 Gross, ed., Ernesto Che Guevara: Ausgewählte Werke: Guerrilakampf Und Befreiungsbewegungen. p. 25 In this quotation Che Guevara is mentioning the position of the guerrilleros in a Leninist understanding of the vanguard, the leaders of the masses. He criticizes the critics who are arguing that a guerrilla-warfare would neglect the revolutionary struggle of the masses. For Che this are only two different strategies in one line of revolutionary understanding. Not really explicitly but in the undertone he differentiates between the guys with the gun and the organizers, the clandestine urban groups, the information carriers, the supporters the whole revolutionary network. Another important issue in this quote is the acknowledge and warning, that without the popular support, the masses that need to support, protect and work with the guerrilla, this guerrilla is not only in danger but heading into catastrophe.
lead a guerrilla war without the support of the masses would head directly into catastrophe and third, Che Guevara is without any doubt convinced that there is a need and right for the position of the Leninist vanguard, in the masses movement, that is more urban based as well as in the armed struggle of the guerrilla unit. The last point that contradicts with more nationalistic positions of Che, but nevertheless is a very valuable and important point is the one of the deterritoriality of the revolutionary fighters. Che writes that they as an armed vanguard of the masses could be posted in every territory with every oppressed people. This would lead to what Che himself practiced an alternative network of mercenaries. Fighters traveling around to impersonate the function of an armed vanguard.

**Vanguard SPLA**

The vanguard topos is fundamental to my critique on SPLA. In this classic understanding of guerrilla, transformation, anti-imperialism and the critique on authoritarian imperialist states is the driving force for the revolutionary vanguard. Not the petty national concerns nor personal bonds to country or people. For SPLA the armed struggle has always been closely connected to the soil and the territory. Even though the mobilizing propaganda talks about the transformation from the old in the New Sudan, no further attempts were made to organize any vanguard. Vanguard for SPLA was solely a military expression not one closely connected to the idea of mass movement.

One could argue, that this idea might be a personal special liking of Che Guevara who fought and got training with Laurant Kabila in Congo, who died in Bolivia and who got prominent as a fighter and later as inhabiting a prominent position as the financial minister in Havana Cuba, non of those countries been the country of Che Guevara’s origin, which was Argentina. But possibly as a reference to a different era, one of independence and anti-colonial struggle as an all-embracing African phenomenon, other prominent fighters embarked on the same idea.

For John Garang, even if he grew up with in this atmosphere of colonial and post colonial struggle, in the years of African socialist projects in the years of the revolutionary struggle in every part of the world, all those considerations never really seemed to be of a prominent matter for the SPLA. He would argue more in a very pragmatic military way, than in a manner that would convince what is described as ‘masses’ in revolutionary literature. Even if Garang is calling on the masses to bring a genuine, permanent and just peace for Sudan he persistently approaches the fighters. The three forces that he mentioned are 1) the SPLM/SPLA 2) the masses, organized and represented by the workers, professionals, trades and students unions; and 3) revolutionary and patriotic junior officers, NCOs and men in the army, police, prison and game wardens and fire fighters forces. From the day that Garang gave this

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616 Mugabe, Nkrumah and others. The vanguard idea originally comes from the Leninist understanding of revolution.
speech in 1985 after the fall of Nimeiri until the very present day, this never reflected
the reality of organized masses in Sudan.

The Movement and Civil Population

Definitions of Civil Society:

Civil Society was the arena of the politically active citizen. It also carried the sense of a
‘civilized’ society, one that ordered its relations according to a system of laws rather
than the autocratic whim of a despot.

Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought

Civil society is the sphere of ethical life interposed between the family and the state.

Hegel, Philosophy of Right [1821]

Civil Society is that part of the state concerned not with coercion or formal rule but with
the manufacture of consent.

Gramsci, Prison Notebooks [1929-35]

There is clearly an improvement in the relation between the SPLA and the population
in the territory under their control since the emergence of SPLA in 1983.
The population inside as well as the exiled population was raising concerns about
abuses by SPLA troops, as well as about the underrepresentation of civilians on any
level of decision making by the movement. The movement was further moved into a
mode of civilian administration as well as participatory approaches and representation
by the international NGOs active in their area of control.
There are forces in the SPLM as well as the SPLA that see the urgent need to involve
civil administration and to have a movement reflecting the will of people rather than
acting strictly towards a military plan. Yet there are other forces that see the movement
as a pure and entire military movement with any civilian representation and influence
as a distraction of the real cause. As a general observation, civilians in Southern
Sudan are not only affected by the war, in the general understanding, they are
part-takers. As the expectation towards women shows, who are supposed to support
and supply the fighters in all aspects, although they are not considered actively
involved.

Conventions

Although Garang was against a civil society convention he was persuaded and
instructed Cdr. Yuissif Kuwa Mekki to organize the convention – which was attended
by around 600 delegates from all marginalized areas of Sudan, mainly from SPLA
controlled territory.

William Outhwaite and Tom Bettomore, eds., Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social
This indicated a new start in the rather silencing, authoritarian legacy of SPLM/A. But the relevant issue here is not, who is representing what side and how are they implementing their agenda but rather how is the movement set up and therefore how accommodating is it for civilian concerns and demands.

A culture based on hierarchy, gossip rather than open debate and criticism and silencing will not be changed with a decree to democratize. As one of the insiders, Peter A. Nyaba is describing it: “Consensus must be built only after a thorough discussion by those concerned. Ideological struggle, or the battle of ideas, should be used to combat the culture of silence and gossip among the officers and men of the SPLA.” And he continues to describe what hindering factors for a culture of open debate there were and how much the SPLM/A is an obstacle to open dialogue and discourse:

A fundamental defect afflicts the South Sudanese in their political action and this has prevented the emergence of an ideology and a culture of political action. This has manifested itself in the SPLM and in the other political structures that were formed in the South. The South Sudanese do not give themselves time to analyse and evaluate issues and things are taken for granted and done on an ad hoc basis to suit the exigencies of the time. The fact that some of us are still grappling with what we are up to this time is a clear indication of that affliction. We do not, or are too timid to, ask our leaders what they mean if we do not understand what they say or do. put it another way, the leaders are not reproached, criticised or opposed in public, and few accept private or individual criticism and/or advice. A pretender goes away satisfied that his views have been accepted. It is always assumed the particular leaders will disappear and therefore a new person with new ideas will emerge. It is this that has reinforced the lack of political leadership and consistency in our political struggle over the years. It is therefore quite important that we understand the nature and complexity of the politics of liberation in order to develop according to our terms.  

I quote Nyaba’s reflections in length since they entail a number of issues that are important to reflect upon. The caution of people when approaching a power holder is quite restrained. In many meetings with women in southern Sudan they insisted on meeting them separately since they could not speak out if men of status would attend the meeting. In the meetings a number of women came forward and spoke out how it just recently changed that they would raise their voice and question and criticize. However in meetings with representatives of the civil authority or SPLA not many people would speak up and although many people would criticize the leadership and Garang in particular, in their presents they would not raise their voice. This becomes especially frustrating when people are supposed to speak in their capacity as representatives with a clear mandate to bring certain issues forward in order to improve the movement and the dialogue with civilians.

618 Nyaba, Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View. p. 168ff

619 Ibid.

620 I witnessed this on several occasions. On individual levels the criticism is quite harsh and radical and often ends in the wish that he should go but neither is there any idea of what and who could and should replace him, what this would change nor is there any of this critical tone left when meeting the leader of SPLM/A in person.
While the attempt has to be recognized as a core shift in acknowledging the presence and importance of civilians by the movement, the basic question still has to be if there is a civil society existent in a stateless area under the control of an armed insurgency, or if the reference made in the convention is one of society in general? Civil society definition as organized groups of society representing various stratas of women, youth, workers or the church.

Further if the armed insurgency is promoting the bigger influence of civil administration and authority the question remains how independent the civil society could act in countering the very authoritarian system of the insurgency?

In the first national convention of SPLA/SPLM in 1994 Resolution 14 is discussing the mobilization and participation of the population in the struggle the emphasize is on organizing the population to support the struggle. The armed struggle is clearly dominating the resolution, no mentioning of participation and decision making conception regarding non-military issues. No other resolution is attending to the topic of civilians.

Resolution 14 reads as following:

Regarding the population in the liberated areas the National Convention resolves the following:
The civil population in the liberated areas shall be popularly organized so that they fully participate in the struggle.
The population shall be encouraged to produce food to achieve self-sufficiency.
The population shall be effectively mobilized to contribute in all possible ways to the liberation struggle.
The army (SPLA) and para-military forces shall be encouraged and organized to produce most of their food requirements, and shall engage in cottage industries to produce most of their soft military requirements, such as uniforms, tyre sandals (Mutwakali), pouches, belts, etc.
A department for wounded heroes and families of martyrs shall be established to design and implement programmes to benefit families of martyrs and to provide education, skills and productive opportunities for wounded heroes for their benefit, and so that they continue to effectively contribute to the struggle.

In the civil society conference of 1996, the issue of participation is taken further and the idea of civil society introduced and explained. This for the first time acknowledges officially in a SPLM/A document the need and urgency to link with the population. Representatives of Civil Society here were from the Church, Women groups, indigenous NGOs, traditional institutions and youth organizations. The definitions given for civil society were descriptive of the relation between the various public spheres.

For a critical view on the existence and promotion of civil society in Africa see Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, „The Illusions of Civil Society,” in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, ed. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (Oxford, Bloomington: James Currey, 1999).pp.17.

In the documentation of reports and recommendations, civil society was defined as

(...) a web of associations, social norms and practices that comprise social activities as distinct from the institutions of the state and the market.; “a sphere of interaction between the household (family) and the state which is manifested in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary associations and network of public communication.”; “a group of communities living together in mutual respect of one another regardless of culture and religion, but sharing a common goal where each person has the right to participate in the development of society regardless of position, education, gender or race.

The recommendations for interaction between civil society and civil authority sent a clear signal to the movement in emphasizing the need of an independent civil society that is mandating civil authority. There is a call for minimal government and interference as well as the appeal to civil authority not to act independently of the will of the people. For the relationship between civil society and the SPLA the conference recommended civil authority as the legitimate link between the army and the people and called upon the civil society to “appreciate the SPLA as their shield and instrument of liberation and urge the SPLA to earn this status.”

To enable the civil society to ultimately shape and found the New Sudan the conference emphasizes the right to freedom of speech and association and the need for a mechanism to protect such freedom as well as respect for and protection of human rights, promote gender consciousness and the participation of women in the liberation struggle as well as highlighting the necessary commitment to transparency and democratic accountability.

On the second anniversary of the Por, Pibor and Fashalla resistance and the Ayod revolt, the beginning of the second phase of rebel war in Southern Sudan, on the 26th and 27th of May 1985 Garang’s directly approaches his fighters, cheers them up and gives a clear vision of what they are fighting for. I will quote those passages in length, because I do think that there is a dense meaning that needs to be analyzed under this topic of the political profile of the SPLA.

You (soldiers of the SPLA) are making history, you are reshaping the old Sudan of exploitation, repression and blatant sectarian injustice into a new Sudan we want, a democratic Sudan, a Sudan of equality, freedom and progress, a Sudan that will take its rightful place among the nations of our planet and contribute its due share to the progress of humankind. I congratulate you, the SPLA soldiers, the barefooted as you are, half-naked without pay or salary, hungry most of the time, always faced with all sorts of difficulties and dangers (...) In that wretched condition, you are the subject of intensive discussions in the capitals of the world. (...) Coming to the SPLA from diverse backgrounds as students, workers, peasants, cattlemen or revolutionary intellectuals, you are invincible as SPLA/SPLM; you are invincible in your organizational unity; you were invincible in your unity of purpose. In armed struggle and in your unity in wretchedness the Sudan belongs to you, and you will vindicate Fanon that the future belongs to the wretched

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Garang quotes Franz Fanon’s famous anti-colonialist writing for the wretched of the earth and contextualizes it — again — a purely military context — contrary to Fanons initial meaning. Garang does not hold this speech in rallies to mobilize and convince the civil population. As Peter Nyaba emphasizes this failure:

The evolution of correct ideas in the SPLM will not be spontaneous nor will they be supplied from somewhere ready-made. They must evolve in the course of the political debate and ideological struggle to be carried out inside, as well as outside, and at all levels of the Movement. Outside the Movement the purpose of the debate should be to enable the people to distinguish between the real and false friends and to win over more people to the liberation struggle. It is a big mistake to assume that all the oppressed whether in South Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Ingessina and even the North itself, will automatically support the liberation struggle. 624

Nyaba argues that not only was SPLA a military movement but one that restricted and oppressed open political debates amongst combatants as well.

**Personal Profile/International Profile**

In a discussion in 1989 with Sudanese in London before the coup of Beshir and Turabi took over, Garang insists on reaching out to international and internal contacts to promote the objectives of the movement and to get support from outside. This brings another dimension to the self-understanding of the movement. Internally Garang seems to be quite satisfied and sufficiently legitimized when using the wrongdoing of the North, and sometimes merging this with the question of identity and the superiority the North is playing against the South. In an interview in the late 1980s and in all sorts of comments in books and articles, he is joking with the controversial labels that people sort him and his movement under. From communist to the imperialists, from the Christian Churches to the Israeli state everything seems to be united in his movement. Pragmatism shapes the international policy of the movement, whoever supplies and gives is welcome, no political commitment given in return. Asked if he would follow the line of US allies such as Mobutu, Tschombe and Kasivubu 625 , he responds with an affirmative answer: following international contradictions and making use of them is the tactic he follows.

Col. Garang, head of the SPLA/SPLM not really seemed to question his positioning and never even raises any doubts about the legitimacy of his position and the authoritarian structures in the movement. For Garang the question seemingly is one of the right or wrong military tactic, maybe of the right or wrong position and use of skills in negotiations with the international surrounding, but not really an internal problem, not a

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625 The questioner tries to get a statement out of Garang and his connection towards the United States. He argues, that the U.S. supported Mobutu against Patrice Lumumba in Congo and the U.S. supported the overthrowing of Kwame Nkurumah in Ghana and claims that Garang now has to be mentioned in the list of Tschombe, Kasivubu and Mobutu. This in my understanding of the political setting in Congo since the 1960s is not at all comparable with whatever had been the power balances in Sudan.
question of illegitimised demand on the only legitimised representative of the people of the New Sudan.

**Militarized Profile**

“Whenever a state appropriates the war machine, it tends to assimilate the education of the citizen to the training of the worker to the apprenticeship of the soldier.”

The question why SPLA opted to give priority to the military rather than the political approach is answered in the opening speech to the 1994 convention. Beyond a quite simplistic paragraph there is no further explanation given up to why political considerations never gained further importance. The military option is introduced as an the almost natural development to a successful movement: in those early days (in 1983 after founding SPLA, remarks, author), one of the most important issues and dilemmas which faced us, and which was another source of differences was whether to make as the first and urgent priority the building of a strong disciplined army to confront militarily our enemy or whether to engage in the formation of Westminster styled cabinets in refugee camps, bushes or foreign hotels. We opted for the first. Our detractors chose the latter, and most of them ended up in Khartoum and other occupied towns with empty high military ranks, before we persuaded them back to the fold of the SPLA.

The effect described by Garang are effects normally attributed to political mobilization, such as confidence building amongst civilians, respect amongst neighboring countries and the whole of Africa as well as the build up of an immense followership.

**New Sudan, Old Elite**

Nowhere any exemplification is given on how the New Sudan would transform the old regime. No requirements and conditions are formulated (truth commission, land-reform, elections, civil structure...). The destruction of the old will be followed by changes of heads rather than changes of positions.

Yet in the 1998 visions, the eradication of the old regime as a precondition for the New Sudan is repeated. By explaining the problems Sudan is facing, the program lists dependency and backwardness, internal political problems under a new international order of ‘globalization and marginalization.’ Out of this analysis the program develops the objectives of SPLM.

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626 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. p. 399

627 „This Convention Is Sovereign“. Opening and Closing Speeches by Dr. John Garang De Mabior. To the First Splm/Spla National Convention. p. 23
“(...) This is why the first objective of the SPLM is the complete destruction of the ‘Old Sudan’ and the building of the ‘New Sudan’ in its place, in order to resolve the basic internal political problem, without which addressing other problems is impossible.”

Finally in 1998 the analysis is leading to concrete recommendations for a change and to a full plan of action. Reconnecting the solution of eradication of what is perceived as the enemy group to the simulation rather than transformation of old state structures, The chairman establishes a vision of full replacement. In his view it is the Jallabas, the Arab traders who constitute the problem, the main instrument used to implement this oppression is located in the army. Rather than attempting to change the government, in which the army is a fundamental tool, or even to transform the idea of the autocratic-theocratic government, the main aim is to replace the army.

The chief instrument of oppression is the army and other organs of cooperation and these must be destroyed. There is no short cut. This is the purpose for which the SPLA was formed, to destroy the army of the Old Sudan and for the SPLA to become wholly or partly the army of the New Sudan.

Garang then discusses the fact of the necessity for an oppressed people to take what they need and not to wait what they will be offered and ends with a key-sentence for the political understanding of the movement's profile.

Surrender is mentioned as an option. Hypothetically Garang provides an option to lay down arms. Though he does not debate possible instruments for a decision making process. The option is not given as a neutral choice but is rather judgmentally defined as surrender. Giving up – handing over – in military terms and logic this is surely only acceptable as a last option, not as a legitimate possibility deciding against armed struggle and for a political solution. Garang phrases this option as follows: ‘If the people are tired of the war and that is what they choose in this Convention, you are free to do so, only that we must call it by its correct name.’

Two things are important in this sentence. First, it seems as if the question would be one open for serious discussion in the population of Sudan, it almost sounds like the materialization for a model of political participation. But Garang keeps this out of the possible range of action for SPLA, by splitting the potential surrenders from the ‘we-group’, when he describes the decision as an outside one, by using ‘you are free to do so’.

I would like to compare this part of the speech as one of the rare occasions of potential civilian integration with one of the referendums, EZLN undertook, as well as the referendum which Jussif Kuwa, SPLA commander of the Nuba Mountains initiated in

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629 Ibid.
630 Vision, Programme and Constitution of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (Splm).
631 The first step was a referendum in the area of Chiapas, EZLNs operational base, the second step was a national and later an international referendum.
1992. This is to sharpen the receptors to understand the political ideas and differences in this understanding, reflected in the political profile of the different movements.

EZLN based the three step program of their referendum on the idea of direct democracy, epitomized in equal and egalitarian principles of citizenship. In the consultas the EZLN reiterated the stand of negotiations with the government and asked the population to form their own opinion how the group should continue.

The second question on the questionnaire read

2) should the various forces of democratization in a broad oppositional movement gather on a civic social and political level and struggle for this demands?
3) should the Mexican population implement a deep political reform that is guaranteeing democracy (...)?
4) should the EZLN change into a political autonomous force without merging with other political parties?
5) should the EZLN unite with other political groups and organizations and constitute a new political organization? And
6) should there be an appropriate representation of woman on all levels and the field of political decision making competence, on civilian and governmental organs be guaranteed?

In the first public consultation the main issue was if EZLN should continue armed struggle or transform into a political movement. Any consequences of the vote had undoubtedly followed in demobilization if wished so by the majority of the population. A similar consultation was carried out in the Nuba mountains, when Cdr. Yussif Kuwa introduced the referendum.

For the SPLA and its high command, this obviously has never been consideration to be implemented in the territory controlled by them. SPLA’s self-understanding rooted in their formation out of a mutiny. SPLA never developed the ambition to be a people’s movement at the most a people’s army. The interest and will of the people was not the main marker for decision making, whereas EZLN could not have survived without the consent and active participation of large proportions of the indigenous population in the area of their control. For this complex matter more has to be considered about the intersection of civilian and military terrain.

To use Eritrea for another comparison it again shows quite fundamental differences. Alike SPLA, EPLF is emerging out of a former armed group, yet consolidating their movement with a political constitutional manifest at the beginning of the struggle. In the following a number of national as well as highly attended international congresses of the EPLF reflected and evaluated the state and discourse of the movements profile.

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632 EZLN Referendum, printed and copied documents distributed in San Christobal in 1995. During a visit to the area in August 1995, friends translated the referendum to me. (transcription notes with the author)

633 The consulta international was written by the clandestine revolutionary indigenous committee (CCRI) of the general command of the EZLN and translated and published by Edition Nautilus.

634 There is no publication on the referendum in the Nuba Mountains so the information has to rely on an interview I carried out with Cdr. Yussef Kuwa, February 1997.

635 EPLF split from the Eritrean Liberation Front (founded in 1961) in 1973. Their first congress
However EPLF was formed with the clear objection of armed struggle much more similar to SPLA and would not have given up armed struggle via a referendum. The strategy of EPLF was to convince the population and to mobilize a mass movement as their backing, rather than basing the movements future on the will of the civilians as did the EZLN or relying fully on coercion as the SPLA appears to do.

On third March 1984, at the founding ceremony of SPLA, John Garang very prominently focused on the tactics of divide and rule, as used by the Northern regime – at this time under Nimeiri – but not holding back his criticism on the chauvinistic and secessionist movements that spread in the South. For him, very obviously a weakening of the unity of all marginalized people in Sudan was disastrous and could only play in the hands of the ruling enemy. For the aims of the SPLA he remarks:

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has been founded to spearhead armed resistance against Nimeiri’s one-man system dictatorship and to organize the whole Sudanese people under the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), through revolutionary protracted armed struggle waged by the SPLA and political support.

It is quite remarkable at this very early stage of armed resistance – and out of the history of the foundation of the SPLA – that the movement had such political aspiration. Here he is quite inspired by the language and the ideology of guerrilla movements and clearly puts SPLAM in a continuum of anti-imperialist struggle with the clear objective of social change rather than fitted in the more military-economic oriented movements of the 1980s and 1990s, such as Charles Taylor in Liberia, Senghor in Sierra Leone and the late Kabila in Congo. On the background of this early politicization it is almost incomprehensible why it took the SPLA/M another ten years before organizing their first civil convention. Contextualizing this statement on the tasks of the SPLM as a political revolutionary movement with the inner political atmosphere in the Sudan at this time, it might coincide with a growing dissatisfaction by the population with the intransparent and confused policy of Nimeiri. That might have been the dominant feeling for the North and the South, and with the intifada of 1985 Garang’s idea of the political task of the SPLM becomes more realistic.

Garang analyses the failures of the Nimeiri and the predecessor regimes in general and specially in their relation to – what he refers to as the southern third of the country. Questions of possession and property rights are prudently discussed by him in the favor of all Sudanese people. Referring to the military aspects, that triggered the

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636 The quotes by John Garang concerning the beginning of the movements are taken out of: Khalid, ed., John Garang: The Call for Democracy in Sudan.

637 Quite obviously referring to AnyaNya who split just before the official foundation and insisted on continuing their own separatist struggle. See chapter 4.3.

mutiny and followed in the armed struggle, he legitimizes the armed struggle, waged by the SPLA. Further Garang explains the necessity and logic, why the SPLA has to be a movement started by the South. The title of this part of his speech is: „SPLM, Vanguard Movement for all Sudanese.“

That again, is an interesting position, legitimizing a predominantly military oriented movement, at this time existent mainly out of former soldiers, with its vanguard sister-half, the revolutionary political movement, the SPLM. This time, he does not clearly distinct the political and the military aspect of the two wings:

From all that I have said, it is clear that a vanguard movement for the liberation of the whole Sudanese people had to have its origins in the South Sudan. Any armed struggle must have as its point of departure the immediate and genuine needs and demands of the masses of the people. [Garang: 22]

This legitimization is fundamental for the claim of representation of the masses, of the population for an armed struggle movement, that insists on liberation as its main task. The masses need to revolt and cry for an armed wing of their political statement, the armed movement needs the masses as legitimization for its armed struggle.

But Garang himself realizes this tricky part of the explanation by admitting the reversed conditions in the beginning. When there was no public uprising, no demonstrations, no masses to cry for and build and create an armed wing out of their revolt. The insurgents building the vanguard and propagate to the masses to get together and form a revolutionary movement. For the military expectation, Garang formulated right in the beginning, that there is a need for the armed struggle to spread all over the Sudan and would not stuck in the South. Because the political aim is a fundamental change and better conditions for all marginalized people in the Sudan, the way to change this needs to be shared by all of those oppressed groups.

Since a purely military insurgency is not promulgating change until now there is no political vision for a change in Sudan. The focus on military supremacy is now leading to a new frustration of the people in the South, since only participation of man in the armed struggle was propagated and since hardly any Northern Sudanese participation in the armed struggle can be registered the dominant feeling is one of paying the bill for the liberation of the whole Sudan alone. The mere focus on armed struggle further enabled the tribalization of the internal southern struggle. No overall political agenda would keep a momentum of a united political move for a change. Change in southern Sudan since the beginning of the insurgency in 1984 is merely connected with who is controlling the territory, not with changes in social and political participatorial structures.

The fact, that the armed struggle never really spread all over the Sudan seems to be one of the crucial factors for the mistrust and frustration of many southern Sudanese, military or civilian.

The political orientation and profile for the shape and alignment for the Sudan after a change, for the ‘new Sudan’, was in 1984 seen in a socialist future. Obviously the influence of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian military ruler was fundamental for this political orientation since SPLA/M dropped the socialist agenda very quickly after the fall of the Dergue and Mengistu in 1991.
Another quote from the leader and commander in chief of the SPLA makes the socialist and political aspiration of the movement at least for propaganda purposes quite clear:

The anarchy in production, the separatist tendencies in the various regions of our beloved country, the moral decay and all the ills that I have enumerated can only be solved within the context of a united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democratic and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, beliefs and outlooks. A united and Socialist Sudan can be achieved only through protracted revolutionary armed struggle. Peaceful struggle has always been met with ruthless suppression and callous killing of our beloved people. 639

Right after this enormously important message Garang goes into the military details of how many enemy forces were killed, how many helicopters shot down and how low the number of casualties were on SPLA side.

This list of encounters and results ends again, after two pages with another remark on the special understanding of socialism, the SPLM is interested in as a form for the united Sudan.

The content for our socialism cannot be determined mechanically and equated with Communism as Nimiery would like the Western world to believe. The conceptualization and particularization of Socialism in the Sudan shall unfold as the armed struggle proceeds and as socio-economic development programs are implemented during and after the war and according to Sudanese local and objective conditions. (...)

We conclude by reiterating that the slogans of the SPLA are ‘National Unity’, ‘Socialism’, ‘Autonomy’, where and when necessary, and ‘Religious Freedom’. Our belief in and commitment to these slogans are irrevocable. The SPLA welcomes and embraces all Sudanese nationalists, patriots and socialists; in short, the movement belongs to the whole Sudanese people and will fight tirelessly for their unity, peace and progress. 641

As mentioned before in the constitutional vision and program of SPLM in 1998 Socialism becomes a non-word and is replaced by democracy and market economy.

Socialism

639 Ibid. p. 23

640 Strategic language, or as Derrida would name it ‘Drammatologie’ is quite evident in military reports. Until today SPLA issues press statements with detailed accounts on military victories but hardly any remark on their own casualties. A change in the perception of the receivers can be analyzed since most recipients are people of NGO communities with aspirations of socio-political rather than military success of the movement. SPLA issues press statements just like information bulletins to their commanders and various fronts, forgetting that the receiving end is possibly hostile and frustrated by endless lists of casualties without any explanation or legitimation.

641 Khalid, ed., John Garang: The Call for Democracy in Sudan.: 25
In a manifestation for the Kenyan Party KANU in 1965 a conceptualization of the meaning of African socialism is given. I would like to introduce and use this concept, when explaining and exploring the political profile of the SPLA rather than the ideologically but even more economically dependent definition of African socialism used in Ethiopia and Eritrea at that time. In this KANU declaration, the definition of African Socialism is of pragmatic use and leads into two important directions: the rooting of post colonial and anti colonial policy and struggle in African traditions and the mixture with those traditions and a academic understanding and use of Marxist terminology.

Die Unabhängigkeit des Afrikanischen Sozialismus.
7. In dem Begriff „Afrikanischer Sozialismus“ steht das Wort afrikanisch nicht, um einen Kontinent zu bezeichnen, dem eine ausländische Ideologie aufgepfropft werden soll. Es soll vielmehr die afrikanischen Wurzeln eines Systems zum Ausdruck bringen, das in seinen Charakteristika durch und durch afrikanisch ist. (…)
8. Es gibt zwei afrikanische Traditionen, die eine wesentliche Grundlage für den Afrikanischen Sozialismus bilden — politische Demokratie und gegenseitige soziale Verantwortung. [Der Afrikanische Sozialismus und seine Anwendung auf die Planung in Kenia (1965)]

This broad definition of Socialism reflects more the total commitment to Pan-Africanism than a reference to the economic structure of a socialist model. It becomes usable for everybody, from the communist party to the one-man regimes that followed in those steps.

There are no reports on the response of the civilian population at that time, except that a large number of people joined or wanted to join the SPLA. In March 1985, two years and a few victories later, Garang renewed his assessment on the policy of Nimeiri’s regime, and appealed on the commanders of the Sudanese Army to join the SPLA and/or to build their own high command, without the acceptance of Nimeiri as a Commander in Chief, the CnC.

In a speech by John Garang of the 9th of April, commenting on the fall of Nimeiri and the usurpation of power by the transitional military court (TMC), a few more points and basics in the understanding of the SPLA become obvious. Garang congratulates the revolutionary masses, the people that demonstrated and rose against Nimeiri in the streets of Khartoum.  

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642 Rainer Falk and Peter Wahl, eds., Befreiungsbewegungen in Afrika: Politische Programme, Grundsätze Und Ziele Von 1945 Bis Zur Gegenwart (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1980). p. 219). The content and wording of that definition is not that much explanatory and differentiated, but it points on two main issues: socialism as well as democracy is not inherently western or European.

643 As almost in every history book on the occasions in Sudan, there is no remark in Garangs’ speech, that it has been an uprising started by women, demonstrating against the bread prices. As in the case of the French Revolution and in the Intifada of Sudan, the social stratification and the accompanied creation and writing of history, never mentions the initial spark. There is no reference to the situation of the women, that need to provide food for their families, those part of the population that are not enabled to participate in the public, the political sphere, but are forced to guarantee survival and the coincidence in those two cases, where women that obviously could not fulfill their task any more, have no other choice than taking the public sphere actively.
It is understandable that Garang as the leader and even more as the military leader of the SPLA/SPLM would have some reasonable doubts about the military transition court under Nimeiris’ former minister of defense General War ad-Dahab. Garang’s main point of criticism was the misuse of representation by the Generals. By a comparison to the AnyaNya II movement, the splinter guerrilla, that evaporated at the same time as the SPLA and formed itself out of the old southern Sudanese guerrilla, the AnyaNya I, he doubts the change of policy between the Nimeiri and the Dahab regime. Garang deplores more on the military takeover of the Generals, and what this means to the future of the country, but first he insists on the SPLA/SPLM as the main force in this uprising, at least in the preparation, and he continues to blame the TMC for misusing claims for representation of the population. Garang agitates in the name of the people and constructs his movement as a centerfold, as the strategic legitimized force behind the Intifada.

The SPLA, being the armed vanguard of the Sudanese revolutionary struggle, has contributed effectively to this first round in the overthrow of Nimeiri and his system. in effect, the SPLA/SPLM has been the moving central force behind the people’s uprising in Khartoum and other cities as embodied by the people in their slogans when they shouted, „Down, down with Nimeiri; we want the urgent return of Dr. John Garang.“

It is not really understandable, why Garang is using this self uplifting doubtful phrase to give evidence to the involvement and participation of the SPLA to the fall of Nimeiri. But it really does not seem to be very realistic, that the women, students, worker unionists and other people in the streets of Khartoum would cry for a return of Dr. John Garang, who in fact had never been there in a leading position. It is quite unlikely that northern Sudanese would elect him as their wanted new leader. Whereas the argument which he gives after what has been quoted here, the argument on the military victories, the stop of the Jonglei Canal project and the closure of Chevron Oil pipeline building seem to be more relevant and definitely more present in the heads and the public discourse in the North than the assumed followership of the aims and perspectives of the SPLM as a revolutionary mass movement for the whole Sudan.

To bring Garang’s words and assessments back to the profile of his own movement, it is interesting to see, that since the formation of the SPLA until now, there is a constant incantation on the topic of war to end the war, the complete catalogue of Just war...
It might be inherent in the just war logic, that even with the knowledge of the impossibility of a military decision and solution of this war in Sudan, the two parties, but specially the guerrilla movement needs to continue this mantra. Apparently without a thought on the real equivalent of destruction and death, merely as a zero sum game in a quite abstract condition of leadership discourses without a registration of the so-called represented population.

**Nasir Faction**

The splinter movement of the SPLA, the Nasir Front, later SPLA United (and after the last split, SSIM and SPLA United) portrays the situation in Sudan on a different political background. In 1994, during a period when rapprochement processes with the regime in Khartoum were already brokered but not yet finalized and signed (Political Charter 1996, Khartoum Peace Agreement 1997) Lam Akol’s SPLA-United issued a strategy paper with a strong revolutionary anti-colonial struggle impetus.

The political message sent by the SPLA United is that of a legitimization of a guerrilla war on the bases of revolutionary warfare fought against the colonial oppressors and imperialist forces.

SPLM SPLA-United strongly believes that South Sudan is a colonial territory which is being ruled by the colonial masters from North Sudan. It is therefore a classical case for decolonization in its special context. Referring to the UN charter and the UN International Covenants on Human and People’s Rights, the writer extracts four categories that enables people to demand the right of self-determination. The categories are:

- inhabitants of colonial territory
- indigenous people
- minority in an independent and sovereign state
- a people of constituent unit within a federation

Even if this statement systematizes the internal struggle of the splinter parties and tries to legitimize the struggle for an independent Southern Sudan, as opposed to the New Sudan (that is the whole Sudan, as the promoted formation of SPLM/A), the pure mentioning of Southern Sudan as a colonized territory does not really explain more on the differences of a political profile. Beside the fact that claiming oneself as in a state of

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645 For that matter a closer reading of Jean Bethke Elshtain’s reader on ‘Just War Theory would give plenty of explanations, but in this chapter I would like to concentrate on the self-portrayal of the movement. The comparison in argumentation and legitimization of the regime in Khartoum and the SPLA leadership would also be a fruitful task, specially in the reading of religious just war justification on both sides.

646 The paper is titled: South Sudan: A Colonial Territory – a case for decolonisation: The SPLM/SPLA-United calls on the international community to support the right of self-determination for the people of south Sudan. A paper on the political conceptualisation of ‘The Sudan’ conflict. 8 May 1994.

constant and ongoing oppression is more useful for a mobilization on a populist level, there is not much to say beyond the category of anti-colonial struggle.

Peter Gadet in his statement on why he overthrew Paulino Matiep argues on similar paradigms as Nasir and SPLA-United did before. The lack of political direction, dictatorial structures in the leadership and the use of ethnic differences as mobilizing grounds for hate-speech were mentioned by the dissidents. Yet in their own structures nothing was changed.

Why did we overthrow Dictator Paulino Matiep?

We have reached a decision to overthrow this senseless dictator because of the following reasons:

We have proved beyond doubt that he is an obstacle to peace, whether among the people of Western Upper Nile alone or between other Nuer groups and with other Southern Sudanese in South Sudan.

He has been the major player in allowing the exploitation of oil by the Government of Sudan.

He allowed settlement of Arab Baggara in the Oilfields areas without the consent of the people of Western Upper Nile, and we therefore consider this act as land occupation which we shall never accept whatsoever.

Repeated mass killings of Southern Sudanese oilfield workers in the oilfields, lynching of prominent politicians, spiritual leaders and influential leaders of our society in Bentiu town, Mayom, Leer and Wangkai and all with approval of Paulino Matiep.

He has been running the movement as his personal property

Lack of political direction.

In association with the NIF government of Sudan, Matiep has been denying international community with humanitarian services an access to SSUM/SSUA control areas such as operation lifeline Sudan, with the intention of being serve from Khartoum by Islamic humanitarian agencies in order to Islamize our people and claim them as part of Northern Sudanese because of oil in our land.

Both Matiep and Riek have turned their normal political differences as a means of dividing our people into tribal groups base on clans and family division.

Oilfields are extremely military targets, international companies operating the oil must leave as soon as possible, otherwise they are at their own risk.

A paper, written by an SPLA commander, who – between the years changed sides from Garang to SPLA United and back again to the SPLA of John Garang, explains in an article on the history of the movement, that the split of SPLA from what was formed as AnyaNya II right in 1984 was mainly based on the differences in the political profile and understanding of guerrilla. Makier Benjamin, the author of this draft goes beyond legal terms and military strategies to describe the understanding and spirit of the movement at that time:

Having assembled in Itang, initial attempts to draw up effective methods of political and military organization, to wage the war of liberation on modern and scientific basis were frustrated by elements of the old generation of politicians. Power struggle and lust for positions took precedence over an adoption of an overall comprehensive political strategy that would mobilize the energies of the masses in the mainstream of the liberation struggle.

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648 Operational Commander of SSUM/SSUA and colleagues in SSUM/A Commander Peter Gatdeat Yakah, „Why Did We Overthrow Dictator Paulino Matiep?“, in Statement issued by South Sudan United Movement and Army (SSUM/SSUA (1999).p. 2
A member of the old guards, Akuot Atem, with no ideological vision and organizational skills of how modern liberation movements could be handled within the complexities of the cold war setting, insisted to assume the leadership of the movement. Akout Astem’s single mindedness and obstinacy in his quest for power, backed by Gai Tut and the Nuer community, which formed the overwhelming largest group in Itang at that time, created serious huddles for smooth formation of the movement. In his desire to frame up some legitimacy for his leadership claims, Akuot Atem, with the help of Gai Tut, run partial elections conducted by the Nuer Community and declared himself the president of the Southern Sudan.

Benjamin remarks the need and urge for somebody leading the movement, who knows how to „wage the war of liberation on modern and scientific basis (...) within the complexity of the cold war setting“. This remark might evolve out of the situation after the break down of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and the end of the cold war setting – or the mere transformation and fragmentation from the monolithic power insignia. It also refers to the understanding of the movement in the beginning that clearly wanted to be seen as a modern liberation war unit. Yet, because of the fragmentation and destruction of live and communities and the military character of the SPLA even the slightest critique or remark on the need for a transparent and evident political statement and profile of the movement, is always a wish and a point of an individual but never really gets the chance to become a political discourse constructing and/or reshaping the discussion and discourse of the population concerned. Benjamin is referring to those problems later on, when he explains the further development of the movement in its different periods. As for the period of 1984-1987, as he says, there are two opposing tendencies in the movement, namely the one that’s characterized by the upward rising of popular enthusiasm and the military victories of the movement and the down grading of its political role and development.

This situation created a serious imbalance greatly responsible for the later crisis in the movement. Emphasis on militarism was heightened leading to thriving of a security organ (the combat intelligence and later general intelligence service) responsible for much of the confusion in the movement.

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650 Ibid. 1996:13
IV. GENDER CONSTRUCTS IN WAR
IV. GENDER CONSTRUCTS IN WAR

AXIOM: Female identity is outside the norm-giving centre of definition of the historical subject.
PROPOSITION: Overcoming this exterior positioning is mainly based on the acceptance of gender as a continuum rather than a dichotome construct.
PROBLEM: Performance against the centre-periphery dichotomy transforms the Self, but not necessarily the hierarchical alignment of centre-periphery, subject-object conceptualisation.

Oppression is not inevitable; it is a set of detailed practices, which can be challenged. 

Caroline Knowles

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IV. 1. THEORY: BARBARIAN BEASTS OR MOTHERS OF INVENTION?

In this chapter I will use theory and analytical tools explored in the first part of this thesis – with the reality patterns collected from testimonies, interviews and books of women in conflict. Feminist analysis is used as a methodology to analyse the concept and praxis of gender roles in conflict and the reality of women in war.

I will structure this part of the thesis by starting with the historicity of the construct. Beginning with Feminist theory and questions of identity constitution, the colonial gaze and the major projection of femininity in the writings of colonial explorers on female fighters in Africa. From the discourse spread out in the first chapter on citizenship and International relations theory I will link this to the alternative forms of epistemology of violent women and female fighters and bridge it to actual realities in current war situations. The chapter will work through the aspects of collaboration in the continuum of violence and the various gender specific legitimatory enterprises. The self-reflection of female fighters as well as the reflection of society and the judgement of the armed groups will be discussed. Conclusively I will elaborate on the possible transformative aspects of active involvement of women in armed movements and the relation between fighter and citizen status as developed in the first chapter of the thesis.

Rewriting Herstory

By using gender as an analytical tool it is significantly important to realize the interconnectedness of the triangular spheres of initiation, perpetuation and manifestation of gender roles – what could also be labelled the identity/individual, the symbolic/social and systemic/material construction and manifestation of gender.

Whereby identity marks the individual gender identification, the familiarization of body and mind with what is partly determined and informed by the symbolic as well as all the systemic. Symbolic stands for the gender roles enacted and perpetuated by customs, laws, and formations of the given society. The systemic stands for the economic and
political realities in the given society and community and the potential for the individual
to be aware and chose.
The basis for the material manifestation of gender differences cannot be overlooked
and should be kept in mind while deconstructing gender concepts and power
structures.

Women are half of the world’s population; they constitute one third of the paid labour
force, earn one tenth of world income and one percent of world property. Gender
imbalance is a universal phenomenon and can be found in all societies worldwide.
The explanations of why women are found to be less paid, less powerful, less
influential and less visible vary; yet the fact of the tremendous imbalance persists.
This tremendous imbalance defines the importance of agency for this work, yet it does
not define women as a homogenous group, neither do I aim to bring changes along
the already known gender lines. In this chapter I want to deconstruct the gender
constructs in war with a specific focus on southern Sudan. Further, the notion of
women in war and gender constructs as reflected in western feminist theory is
scrutinized, not to condemn it, but to mark the restriction of theory conceptualized in
one specific environment while claiming universal truth.
This chapter is a trial to approach the amalgam of fighter status and masculinity of
citizen ideals and male-bonding, of female support and Mittäterschaft as well as of
female crossing and female/male desires of female aggression.

To explain the self-awareness of women in Southern Sudan and Eritrea, to describe
their involvement in and suffering during and as a result of war, the concept of the
‘other’, and the relation between the ‘West and the Rest’ need to be reflected. In this
context I refer to the position and the experience of people I interviewed, their relation
to warfare and their relation to violence regarding gender initiation.

When referring to ‘the past’ one needs to be aware how fragile and political a construct
such as ‘the past’ might be and certainly becomes in times of warfare. The past
functions as the founding myth for whatever presence needs to be constructed – by
political powers as much as by the political observer or scientist. By talking about the
past it is necessary to keep the disruption of life in mind. A relatively recent history of
invasion and conquest of European powers, the previous slave trade as well as the
internal war constitutes part of Sudan as a country. In this chapter the impact of other
cultures and cultural hegemony will be reflected in the respective gender normation.

Given that the ‘authentic identity’ – the ‘untouched people’ – is a construct, one has to
consider the changes, outside influence and interaction brings to people. Even if a
community might have lived in a more or less peaceful way, in the case that they had
enough grazing land for their cattle, the invasion of the ‘Other’ by religious missionaries

651 Several statistics give evidence to these unbalanced facts, see UNDP annual reports and Joni
statistic, see Ann Tickner, Three Models of Man, in Tickner, Gender in International Relations.
Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. p. 75. Tickner refers to a report to the UN
commission on the status of women in 1981.

652 Title of an article by Stuart Hall. Hall, Held, and Thompson, eds., Modernity: An Introduction to
Modern Societies.
of all confessions, traders, colonizers, slave traders, the adventurous; or even simply
the neighbouring communities of different ethnic description, meant that it is inevitable
for peoples to react and to make decisions in a way that might have not fitted into their
previous world conception. Those are possible driving forces for a transformation of life
concepts. Changes in self-awareness and reflection on the outsider, the ‘alien’, the
‘Other’, were not restricted to one part of society alone. The painful, upsetting
experience of the Atlantic slave trade is one of the most discussed and traumatic
inscriptions into the identity matrix of the people in the African Diaspora: African
Americans and the Black British. As Richard Wright formulates it, the outcome of the
trauma of slavery is not only seen in a negative way, but in a way of forced
anti-nationalism:

*I have no race except that which is forced upon me. I have no country except that to
which I'm obliged to belong. I have no traditions. I'm free. I have only the future.*

Anne McClintock summarizes this for the field of women and colonized people as
the denial of them inhabiting history of women and colonized people as purely existing
in a ‘permanently anterior time’. They constitute the ‘living archive of the national
archaic’. McClintock combines the myth of the virgin land with the culture of dominance and
women's bodies. For the case of South Africa she uses the Voortrekker founding
myth:

The journey proceeds forwards in geographical space, but backwards in racial and
gender time, to what is figured as a prehistoric zone of linguistic, racial and gender
‘degeneration’. The myth of the ‘empty land’ is simultaneously the myth of the ‘virgin
land’ — effecting a double erasure. Within the colonial narrative, to be ‘virgin’ is to be
empty of desire, voided of sexual agency, and passively awaiting the thrusting, male
insestation of European military history, language and ‘reason’. The feminizing of
‘virgin’ colonial lands also effects a territorial appropriation, for if the land is virgin,
Africans cannot claim aboriginal rights, and the white male patrimony can be violently
assured.

The active denial of ones identity and the formation of the gendered and/or colonized
body is essential for the foundation of colonies as well as for the construction of an
enlightened, western concept of a dichotomy of male and female. Women’s bodies
and the abuse of their bodies is constitutive for a tendency in the justification narrative
of African-American masculinity as formed by the knowledge of the abuse of the
bodies of enslaved women and therefore the justified mistrust towards these

653 The complex of the alien theme as a hermeneutic usage in the African Diasporic discourse is
collected in Diedrich Diederichsen, ed., *Loving the Alien* (Berlin: ID-Verlag, 1998). As well as in Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. It is further reflected in a
variety of popular music and literature.


655 Anne Mc Clintock, „Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family,” *Feminist Review* 44
(1993). p. 67

656 Ibid. p. 69
women. But it also has an impact in gender formations of the countries and communities of origin. The historic split between northern Sudanese slave traders and Southern Sudanese slaves during the Atlantic slave trade as well as in ongoing enslavement is fundamental for the constitution of gender, race and class identities amongst the Sudanese.

For the nationalistic myth of pre-colonial authenticity, women’s bodies play an important role as the bearers of truth and the guarantee of authentic identities. The disruption of any pre-colonial identity is not only to be understood as temporary and reversible but as transformative and informed by colonial identity patterns.

To Ann Tickner the rationale of the notion of security in International Relations falls close to the invention of dichotomies in gender and race relations. Tickner refers to western imperialism as civilizing missions to teach the ‘indigenous men’ rationality, to bring them out of the ‘female zone’ of nature, the unpredicted, irrational ultimate security threat. Similar notions are elaborated by Cynthia Enloe in the field of militarized masculinity and the export of ‘Rambo’-Technomuscularity from the west to the colonies.

The question of women’s role in the building or rejecting of the nation, in fighting colonialism and supporting or rejecting gendered role models is hardly enlightened in this discussion. If the loss of history, identity and gender roles were a decisive point in the identity formation of those who were deported and sold as slaves, it could be assumed to be an equally decisive point in the lives of the ones left behind. If the involvement in anti-colonial struggle is such an essential determinator for the national identity of African men, one has to ask about the role of women. The gender separation in warrior initiation in the context of African Societies, the pre-colonial status and method of intertribal warfare and its conditional involvement of women and the role of women in anti-slavery resistance have the potential to show and explain the status of women in relation to the use of violence. Besides the historical difference of women’s experience in Sudan and Europe, the history of domestication of women in Europe, the impact of Industrialization and urban modernity has to be recognized as

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658 Abduction and enslavement of Southern Sudanese is an issue of broad discussion and opens a whole new dimension that would reach beyond the capacity of this text. For this reason I would like to highlight the most important studies done in this field and alert to the fact that even in conservative figures the number of enslaved Southern Sudanese in the north of their country ranks between 14,000 and 40,000 people. See further Ushari Mahmoud and Suleiman Baldo, Human Rights Abuses in the Sudan 1987: The Ed-Dain Massacre: Slavery in the Sudan (Khartoum: 1987), Unicef reports, Save the Children Fund reports, Jok Madut Jok, War and Slavery in Sudan (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001)


an influential tool in the colonizing/civilizing process and is necessary to keep in mind when comparing western feminist descriptions of gender with gender formations in other realities. Furthermore the daily-life reality of society in Southern Sudan has to be considered.

This requires a different frame of reference than the idea(l) of the western, civilized, unarmed, passive-aggressive, domesticated housewife. As many critics of the middle class white feminist theory argue; it is an exclusivist approach that tends not only to leave out women of the ‘Third World’ but women that are of different class or racial backgrounds as well. In constructing the homogenized notion of the global sisterhood the masculine narration based in the silencing and the white feminist theorists re-enacted invisibility of women. The response by the excluded ‘Others’ is vast and ranges from standpoint feminists, womanists to the postmodern subaltern.661

The history of invasion and disturbance plays a significant role in the reflection on the relation of women to war in Africa, in particular in Southern Sudan and Eritrea. By being aware of the measurement and paradigms used for the categorization of involvement in war and armed conflict, it is moreover useful to take a look at the conditions of life on an everyday basis, which might not be necessarily connected to war.

The reason for reflecting on differences and the complex context of historical phases is to point out that the values departing from a specific class, culture and civilization background are not to be universalized and have to be taken into consideration while judging and formulating criteria for the assessment of another culture. The problems of the ‘femmes couvertes’ or of the suburban middle class objectified housewives are fundamentally different to those of women in Sudan.663 However the power structures in hegemonic subject placement have to be reflected. Who defines the identity of women in Southern Sudan? On what basis are they build and in difference to which masculine identity pattern?

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662 Phoolan Devi, the female Indian rebel/robber comes to mind in this respect, where in the western definition of patriarchal Indian society, the success of such a female bandit would not be designated, even more, the pure existence of a figure such as the revenge seeking, bloodthirsty Phoolan, the incarnation of Kali, would be completely impossible in imposing our imagination onto the ‘Other’.

663 See the wide range of literature and critique on the white women’s movement by scholars such as Bell Hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, Rudo Gaidzanwa, Valentine Moghadam, Chandra Mohanty, Angela Davis and others.
The West and the Rest: Normative Subject Placement

"A feeling of inferiority? No, a feeling of non-existence. Sin is Negro as virtue is white."  
Frantz Fanon  

As Fanon refers to the dominant structure of race as a non-issue as the invisible, gender can equally be described as a discursive not a biological category.  
If gender is not an issue it does not mean it is not a problem. I would quickly like to summarize how a discourse of exclusion is incapable of reflecting a complex condition. If women are a visible reality in war, yet are neither included in the strategies of the conflicting parties nor reflected in the political analysis the result is not only a blind spot but also a false analysis. Gender is tranformatory rather than additive. If women’s epistemology is missing, the questions to be asked are naturally incoherent. This is the essential problematic aspect with work on women’s status or position. Exactly because women are not the subject – but rather the referential object – the narration is stuck in the normative frame.  
The question of gender awareness could equally be the question of claimed gender neutrality. Keeping in mind, that the construction of the ‘Other’ is based on the devaluation of the ‘Other’. To simplify: the one in power and in a position to speak, to define and to implement the norm would be the one who constitutes the ‘Other’ by projecting ‘Them’ as not like ‘Us’. The interesting point in claiming gender neutrality by conservative thinkers  
and those of the Realist School in international relations theory, is that there is no question to become a subject, to become visible, to become a Self, exactly because all the normative subject can see and describe is rooted in its Self as the eternal I. The normative position of the centre defines the periphery and the minority. In the discourse of Identity the construction of the ‘Other’ is diverse. It is internalized and essential for sexism, imperialism, colonialism, orientalism, exoticism, primitivism, anthropology and folkloric discourses.  
By these patterns of domination, those in privileged positions can play around with transcending this subject status, but will always see the position of the ‘Other’ and the attempt of the ‘Other’ to become a subject – as an addition rather than a transformation. It subsequently could be accepted as a new variety of the diversity of life, but not as the influence of the ‘Other’ as a basic transformative and shifting influence, that would in the end least force the ‘I’ and ‘We’ to become aware of their privileged status of normative power. As

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665 Here I am referring to Stuart Hall in his article on Identity stating that: Different genetic strains and pools are as widely dispersed within as between what we call the race. Yet the unscientific character of the term race does not negate how racial logics and racial frames of reference are articulated and deployed. In Hall, Held, and Thompson, eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies. pp. 596

666 For Morgenthau or Huntington, gender is not an issue. Not because they are gender blind, but because they use masculinity and men’s experience as a norm and keep femininity and women’s epistemology invisible.

much as the liberal and radical white middle class feminism cannot accept the transformation rather than assimilation of all marginalized ‘Other’ women, the dominant subjects of a specific community will not allow transformation of gender identities.

Southern Sudanese male members of the insurgency movement, the SPLA continue to constitute ‘the authentic identity’ of Southern Sudanese women. For they have no interest to face real challenges on their hegemonic status in this society. Normgivers do not realize that self-awareness – women becoming subjects – is not something separate from their reality, but is rather imbedded and intermingled in their own status, their own reality and their own subject construction. The expectation from their evaluation and assessment of the state of the earth, mankind, and reality is therefore singular and subjective. It is still mainly up to a concept of masculinity of what is valid and true for everybody, because masculinity is clearly the category ascribed with higher values. From the position of the normative subject, reality seems to be gender neutral although reality is not without divided roles for other gendered bodies. Due to this, normgivers are not challenged to think about gendered soldier image, gendered International Relations, a gendered state.

Similarities of constituting the ‘Other’ can be found in Colonial constructs of race, ethnic groups or gender roles. For a concrete illustration of a cross fertilizing construct and the consequential power shift, the example of the change of status of Nilotic women in Southern Sudan is of interest. As John Burton elaborates:

If Nilotic women shared an equivalent status with men prior to colonial rule, then the exogenous system of administration encouraged and ultimately perpetuated a system that made them entirely subordinate to men. At the time, local colonial officials and administrators were instructed to select the appropriate men to assume minor governmental roles as ‘chiefs’, and these individuals were in turn directed to select one or a number of sons to be sent off to mission schools. In this setting they were instructed in English and in the rudiments of ‘civilization’. These and a variety of other schemes envisioned to promote social change and ‘progress’ necessarily excluded women from participating.

The normative subject, the signifier is of course not essentially male. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty criticises, it is the western feminist, the upper class African-Asian feminists who construct the ‘Other’ by taking themselves as the ‘Norm’. In the specific realm of militarized masculinity Cynthia Enloe is alerting to the imperial project, where the colonial notion of masculinity had to be accepted and internalized:

The British government is an old hand at militarisation. (...) then the officials had to persuade thousands of male peasants and nomadic herdsmen that their manhood would be enhanced within their own families and communities if they would enlist in the newly created, British-controlled armies. Finally the officials had to

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668 In some cases men were explicitly subordinate to the. See for example, R.G. Lienhardt. “Nilotic Kings and their Mother’s Kin”. In: Africa 25 (1955) footnote in John W. Burton, “Independence and the Status of Nilotic Women,” Africa Today 28, no. 2 (1981)

669 Ibid. p. 57

devise complex formulas for marriage and child-rearing to permit the soldiers to feel respectable as husbands and fathers, yet not burden the British military with too many noncombatants. 671

The basic question for the following chapters is that of the existence of the identity and imagery of the female fighter. Are women necessarily forced to create their identity as part-time masculine? Do they, as the distinctively anti-feminist conservative military historian Martin van Creveld suggests, female war-leaders and warrior deities loathe weak femininity and side with strong masculinity? Or is the involvement of women in armed struggle a transformative gender performance? 673

Van Creveld cites Athene, as symbolizing the attitude of mythical warriors as well as of real warrior-queens:

Der Männer Art ist, abgesehen von Ehe, mir besonders wert; recht bin ich meines Vaters Kind. 674
The man’s kind is – beside of marriage – much worth to me, rightly am I the child of my father.
[Translation A.W.]

But rather than the feminine might be the ‘unmarked continent’, the masculine is the position of the speaker, the centre of the universe the norm giving eternal position of truth.

If one accepts this, there are at least two possibilities to read into this statement. One is the acceptance of the entire dichotomic structure of thought that is not only reflected in Hegel’s Dialectic, but also even more so in the majority of mainstream theory as well as in many feminist theorists’ work. A second option would be to use those definitions and normations as descriptive elements in elaborating and challenging belief systems and norms in their context. Methodologies that Judith Butler calls critical practice. Here, reality formations are based on a binary principle and questioned as using the dualistic dichotomous code system that links masculinity to attributions such as activity, culture, strength, power and legitimized use of violence, rationality and the like and coding femininity as opposite or as the ‘lack of’. It is necessary to focus on something beyond those descriptions caught up in a gender dichotomy.

This explains the practice of questioning and deconstructing rather than a ‘solution-oriented’ strategy of re-enacting new absolute models of gender identities. „So, how would it be better if there are women fighting alongside men?“ and „But there


672 Martin van Creveld, Frauen Und Krieg (München: Gerling Akademie Verlag, 2001)

673 Performance, here understood in the reading of Judith Butler

674 Creveld, Frauen Und Krieg

675 Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness., and Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race

is a change in awareness and self-esteem by women who participated in war and active struggle." Talking about solutions can only possibly become an issue after asking questions, deconstructing assumed realities and constructs of truth. A militarized society is necessary for an armed struggle; the acceptance of hierarchies, authorities and the use of force and violence are constitutive to justify wars. Femininity alongside masculinity plays an important part in this formation. The end of an insurgency becomes a point of relief and normalization.

Construction of Gender Identity

Regardless if one believes in gender as social construct, a discursive system or an essential, biologically determined truth. All rely on speech as action – Sprache als Handlung. All are constructing normations of a dichotomy of gender where one gender is constructed out of reflection, the lack, or in difference to the other. The moment of continuum of gender is non-existent. This brings the question of gendered fighter images and possible changes through active participation of women in the military sanctum into a dilemma.

This binary assumption of gender only allows for women to transcend or cross their own gender and partake into the other – the crucial binary and polarized creation of gender and fighter images is not in question. Unless the continuum rather than the static plurality is accepted, women can only become part-time man by becoming fighters, the fundamental assumption of militarization as a collective constitution of masculinity is not questioned.

For Miriam Cooke, gender and war are both non-static, dynamic constructions, yet the interesting observation is that both are negotiated and constructed as normative, monolithic truth regimes. Both are created as a dichotomized understanding of necessary dominance and subordination. “Both, gender and war are highly fluid and negotiable structures within which meanings are constantly constructed and deconstructed.”

In the logic of war and militarization the aspect of constituting masculinity is core, it’s side-product, and the constitution of femininity has to be seen in direct relation. As Virginia Woolf said, during World War II “No, I don’t see what’s (to) be done about war: Its manliness; and manliness breeds womanliness – both so hateful.” If men and women are trained and socialized into their gender roles, there is no justification for essentialist argumentation – as if there were be a gap between ‘trained life and identity’ and ‘real identity’. Liberal, equality feminists would argue that women, by openly being socially connected towards peacefulness, caring, and connecting, could overcome this and struggle for whatever they want. They would need the same rights as men to fight and protect their country, to make use of all the masculinist


678 Schott, „Gender and Postmodern War.“ p. 55
attributions and thereby to claim the highest label of a first class citizen. Women would have the right to be women, but act like and prove themselves as men, by this gaining another identity as women, which would give them more masculine attributes. This might lead into a quarrel of power positions and the assessment of real masculinity if masculinity as an attribute were under question by women using it and acting just like men. This would give rise to a transformation of power positions between real existing men and women, without questioning and doubting the system of dominance or obedience and without questioning the higher ranking of masculine attribution. Women could then choose to become more vertical-power-oriented and obtain jobs in higher esteemed, and valued positions: at the top in politics, the state, and the military. Men would have no need to transgress their own masculine identities because they are not challenged, even more so, they are cherished and mirrored and used as the essence of identification.

The use of force would be less and less under question. Foundational concepts of life, of the state, and society, of creation and sovereignty, of protection and stability would be left within the Realpolitik position. The only change would be, that there are more women at the top of multinational corporations, militaries and state machinery.

From an equality feminist perspective, by women proving their ability to take over any task that had been labelled as masculine, they would not necessarily lose their femininity. In this way they would infiltrate the old power structures and smooth them out. This is definitely the hope of many women-oriented peace theorists. Their socially constructed identity patterns would then become more valued, since in the rapid changes of modern powerplay, management, and leadership concepts, the so-called ‘feminine’ skills of social caring and connecting would become more and more important. In the long term – men would either have to learn additional feminine social skills or would become power dinosaurs.

Again, the system and it’s structures that might be the foundation for the hierarchies themselves, the texture, the pattern, the language, and the inscription would be the syntax, and the semiotics of exactly that valuing and ranking system would not be challenged.

In the same understanding of the problematic ideology of dichotomies that is only able to produce and reproduce dichotomies, it is all surface maculate it does not scratch the system of static power and dominant manifestation.

In questioning hierarchies and problematising the valid models of identification comes the problem that Terry Eagleton mentions, reflecting on the problems of postmodernism 679. He questions of the necessity of an acting subject (handelndes Subjekt), because only a subject that has a standpoint can reflect on the order of things (Ordnung der Dinge 680) without getting lost in their semantic attics of meaning. The problem with this very necessary questioning of meta narratives by post-positivist

679 Terry Eagleton, *Die Illusion Der Postmoderne* (Stuttgart; Weimar: Metzler, 1996)
approaches is the assumption that there is always a system of reference for those becoming subjects, led and oriented by one’s own experience, fear, and power.

Gayatri Spivak\(^{681}\) is helpful with her concept of strategic essentialism, reflecting on the reality and politics of gender bodies. In the context of women in war this means strengthening and empowering the knowledge and acknowledgment of activities of women – the subaltern. At the same time questioning the very structure placing them at the margins.

**Gender Struggle**

In Sudan, oral history is the motor of historicity. There is no concept of absolute truth formulated by one person valid for the entire society, but a concept of transformation of values and history by narration. If, the belief in majority rule is not basic and truth is to be found in communication and agreement rather than in commands, the reflection from my position would differ from the self-awareness of the people I am speaking of.\(^{682}\) The European descriptions of so-called ‘authentic societies’ are mainly found in reports of the early 20th century, written by scientists of the colonial empires defining a structure that either mirrors the one they know or is a major projection shaped according to the cultural knowledge of the writer. Besides the scientist's interest in knowledge, the economic interest of the donor – the sending state – should not be forgotten. The colonial state was mainly interested in an understanding of the ‘Other’ as a precondition to rule and control. However, this is no scientific research based on the comparison of ethnic differences throughout the decades, but research about changes in women's awareness and self-reflection resulting from the war and their involvement therein. Their roles as assistants, as victims, as supporters, and as executors in this war are the reference positions from which I would like to describe their transformation and changes.

As the structuralist anthropologist Lévi-Strauss argues, or as Fanon wrote on the issue of race, the question of understanding is more about the closer look, the questioning, and the deconstruction of what is described as tradition, truth, gender setting, and power rather than the proclamation of a stable gender concept that can be compared with the current situation. I prefer a hermeneutic approach, whereas Fanon puts racism as an almost inseparable part of culture: “Racism is never a super-added element discovered by chance in the course of investigation of the cultural data of a

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\(^{681}\) Spivak, „In a Word: Interview.“ p. 356

\(^{682}\) In Nelson Mandela's autobiography; Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, this issue becomes important. He reflects on institutions of decision-making processes and comes to the conclusion that positions and values are linked to the public agreement. But then, like the ancient Greek polis, the decision makers are chosen only within a group of certain prestigious men. No women and no non-elite men take part in decision-making.

\(^{683}\) Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race.*
The social constellation, the cultural whole, is deeply modified by the existence of racism.\(^{684}\)

The same is true for the issue of gender in war. The questions are: what is the identification and self-description of women in a struggle, how would they be measured and valued by the armed movement, and how transformative are these identifying patterns in term of prior and post-struggle/post-war phases.

To investigate gender awareness in a guerrilla movement, it is not only important to ask if a guerrilla movement by itself has a gendered understanding and awareness of gender differences. Since there is hardly anything notably published on the question of gender, or the status of women in the SPLA, all I can use to argue my point is based on epistemology, on interviews and talks I had with people in Southern Sudan.

In the current situation in Southern Sudan there is hardly any hut or village in the country that has not been affected by the war. Most places lack men in great numbers and women were forced to take over tasks that even had fallen under a gender taboo before the war.\(^{685}\) The transformation of gender roles due to the war is inevitable. Since gender concepts are not ‘outside of’ but part of any decision and self-identification, gender dimension becomes an intrinsic issue. For women who were married when the war broke out, the question was different than for younger women who grew up during the war.

War is not something to come as a tidal wave taking away all that has been before. It is still spring and winter in a war and there might not be a single sign of war in every-day life. Decision and awareness might arise from various points. It could be as a result of a war attack that made people run away and flee to another place with unknown codes of conduct and unknown places for gender performances. Or it could be because people decided on their own to take an active stand and join the fighting.

As Hadas, a young women from the Eritrean highland close to Keren, described in a talk in a place for female former fighters, it was a decision against the traditional gender setting, that made her join the EPLF:

I grew up with my parents, and my brothers and sisters and knew from very early on, that I would not want to stay in this position my mother had. Then I had heard about the guerrillas, recruiting close to our place, so I decided to become a fighter. That was a decision I did not tell my parents. I knew they would be proud of me to do something for our country but I knew, they would never never allow me, since none of my brothers had joined and I would be the first out of our family. Now, to me it was more a decision to leave the role my mother had.\(^{686}\)

\(^{684}\) Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution*. p. 33 [1964]

\(^{685}\) I often heard in interviews that women had to take over tasks of harvesting or ploughing that were taboo for women before the war.

This motivation, often articulated by Eritrean fighters, had hardly been expressed by any of the Sudanese women. There, gender awareness was based on the realization of the lack of men and the consequence of the need and the ability of women to fill the gap in the civilian ordinary life. As Rose, a middle-aged women living in Eastern Equatoria, who is originally from Bahr El Ghazal, describes in an informal talk after a community meeting, her process of gender awareness was very much linked to the painful experience of direct encounter with enemy forces.

There we had been living in a small community. My husband did not come back from the cattle camp that he had to visit to see about his cattle. He did not come back and others did not either. We managed to cultivate and we sent other people to report about the situation in the cattle camp. Those returned and reported about that there was destruction and hardly any cattle left. So we had to decide what to do. Normally you do not decide like this, on your own there are people to be asked and the elders to debate if one is going with an unknown destiny. Some of the men in the village argued, that we are staying here and protect our village and our cattle left. Some women did not agree. Since those women had not been married to those men but had their husbands lost or elsewhere, some of the women decided to leave and to walk away from the war. So it was some women walking away and had their children and some of their animals. Now this could not happen before. Women walking away. Only with their children with them. This was the beginning of this war and now there are no men and no cattle left, and where are we going?

I start with these examples, because the awareness of gendered roles is not reduced to that of a fighter, and is not congruent with the actual war or struggle in its traditional sense of active force. But the gender awareness and possible changes are quite likely to happen in phases of armed struggle, violent changes and reformations of political structures. Even if a person was not part of the movement, did not support the movement, nor made a decision to side up with one or the other, the consequences of change and struggle become a form of discourse, and a social as well as political reality. If one lives in an environment of war, the understanding of citizen, civilian, support, and resistance and the concept of stable national, tribal, ethnic, or religious identity patterns will be shaken.

It is important to recognize the mode of representation people are socialized in and with what kind of decision people are confronted. If a woman such as Hadas seeks and finds the opportunity to become a fighter with the possibility to overcome gender roles available to her before, she signifies a completely different situation and environment for decision-making than in Roses’ situation. Even if the result might be similar, there is quite a personal difference between one woman looking for an alternative with a complete awareness of the insufficiency of the gender role trap that she envisages in her home village, and another who is torn out of her loved surrounding by an enemy attack that turns her life and the gender roles upside down. The two examples point out, that it might not be enough to see and describe the result of a war, to praise the war and the struggle as an agent of change that guarantees a rise in the self-esteem of women. Simply because women prove to themselves and to

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the society that they are capable of taking over all tasks that men were in charge of before, does not change a society’s perception of gender roles.

This line of argumentation becomes ineffective, since it follows the normative system, the valuation of gender specific tasks, and a dichotomic approach towards men and women. In stating that women ‘proved to be as good as men’, the standard of masculine superiority are uncritically perpetuated. Yet the understanding of the change in self-esteem marks a vital point in this report since the correlation between self-esteem and citizen status becomes stronger.

There was no doubt, neither in the interviews with various women, nor in the answers of the military leaders, that there was change in the conceptualization of gender in their region, but there was a great variety of explanations of and ‘solutions’ for that change. South Sudan is still in a state of emergency, in a war and changes are not necessarily seen as a build up for a post-war civilian life. The statements of women at a community meeting in the Nuba Mountains show, that the acceptance of traditional roles are weakening. Polygamy and the marriage of old men to young girls is perceived as wrong. However, although they wish for a different life for their daughters, they accepted the war as a reality that does not allow for changes.

Judith Butler describes in ‘Haß Spricht’ the transformation from a victim status to the victims existence and difference as the object of irritation. ’Those who are inscribed and denounced by assaultive speech become the object of obscenity and anger from the supporting state structures.’ In Sudan, it is not only men who choose to marry more than one wife, its the women, who try not to become the object of irritation. 

688 Butler, Haß Spricht: Zur Politik Des Performativen. p. 79. Butler mentions the case where there was a burning cross in the garden of a Black family and the legalistic approach, which sees the Black family as the object of irritation and the basis of the “understandable” legitimization of the attack. What is wrong with this picture is not the excitable (hate) speech committed against the family, but that the family – by being black – becomes an obstacle and an irritation for the norm. Here the KKK members and the legal apparatus are axiomatic paradigms built on the normative understanding of white citizens. The finding of fighting words was dropped by the investigative court since placing the burning cross was seen as an act falling under the 1st amendment, the right to freedom of speech. In the case description the racial categorization of the victimized family turns into the reason for the attack. Butler writes referring to Mari Matsuda, if a person is threatened because of (and not on the basis of) the race or belief, this makes the identification the causal cause of the person’s menaced status. In: Charles Lawrence and a.o., eds., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment (Boulder: 1993). pp. 32. The victim of assaultive Speech turns into a stateless person, at least into one that is not protected by the laws of the state that bases citizenship on exclusion. This is equally valid for plenty of cases that concern women. The example mentioned of women in the Nuba Mountains plays exactly into the same logic. It is not the men who use and abuse their right to dominate over and control the life of multiple women as their property. It is not the accusation of immorality on women, the abolition of possessive rights both of which, these women would quickly mention on the issue of slavery, but would never think of as an issue in their own ownership relations. Here again the object of outrage would be the women. These women would like to mention the fact of domestic slavery, but they would rather keep quiet because they could cause trouble in mentioning the oppressive system towards their oppressors. They are quite right in expecting this based on historical events but are quite wrong in expecting the oppressor’s move to revolt in favor of the oppressed and eradicate themselves as oppressors.
Historicity

The reduction of the problem to an exclusive problem of patriarchal power structures would be simplistic and fiercely contested by feminists and womanists from the area. To summarize part of the argument of womanists for the construction of African gender roles one cannot ignore the role of colonial powers in constructing and implementing some of those roles.

Rhonda Cobham lays out in her essay on Nuruddin Farah’s book ‘Maps’ that there is hardly any reference to gender settings in pre-colonial Africa:

No one can know for sure exactly how precolonial societies imagined sexual identity or constructed social categories of gender. Early anthropological accounts of gender and sexuality in African societies reveal more about the anthropologist’s assumption than they tell us about those of their subjects.

She refers also to the example of powerful Igbo (Nigeria) women who earn a masculine status and are then allowed to take wives and establish lineage in their own names. Western theory would have introduced the notion of dichotomy, the underpaid labour done by women and the divide and rule system which lowers the potential of African men and women by racialising and oppressing, devaluing and denying the right to be a subject. Colonialism inscribed it’s own gender system based on the enlightened dichotomy, enforced by a master-servant truth dialectic. The claim to ‘authentic’ societies, gender roles and traditions has to be carefully scrutinized.

Since life and history are dynamic rather than static it is impossible and unlikely that people can re-connect with identity models of previous centuries. Moreover the question has to be asked who is claiming this authentic truth and how representative is that claim. Who has access to decision-making and to the definition of this authentic tradition? The call for tradition often comes as political mobilization in the interest of a specific group in power less likely from the group identified as the guarantees of tradition itself.

689 See the growing debate on African Feminism versus Womanism. The term womanism was coined by Alice Walker. The Nigerian Feminist Chikwenye Okonjo Ogonyemi elaborated on the concept of womanism, as a unifying possibility to include the struggle of race and class with men in a struggle against gender inequalities. According to Susan Arndt Susan Arndt, Feminismus Im Widerstreit: Afrikanischer Feminismus in Gesellschaft Und Literatur (Münster: Unrast, 2000). Arndt lists a number of identity patterns, describing the womanist.


691 Ibid. p. 43

692 For Islamic societies this debate is elaborated by various feminist scholars, when questioning the interpretation of the Quran by male scholars and by reflecting their own moral misbehaviour. One representative of this debate is the Egyptian feminist Naw al Sa’dawi, The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1982), Sa’dawi Naw al., Women and Islam.
Gender is as much an issue of authenticity as a truth regime as it is a political position. When looking at the situation in Eritrea or Zimbabwe one has to ask if and why the women of these movements join the blessing and cheering of the authentic truth constructs of the respective movements. In most cases these definitions are in the hands of powerful, non-feminist men, who define and visualize the paradisiacal world of the pre-colonial Africa in gold and equality, but construct the gender dimensions according to the dichotome setting he or (less likely) she had learned in his/her own time. The search for authenticity, realness, and the truth leads into absolute models of thinking and tight identity corsets.

Military Masculinity and the Threat of Female Soldiers.

You and I know women bleed and they have babies. Men don’t. No matter how much self-discipline there is, the instinct to reproduce is well known. Males must protect their method of reproduction. A female protects hers by staying out of wars and raising her offspring. This is also a part of God’s Plan.”

Sergeant from Raleigh, North Carolina

“Being a woman in the army is a Catch-22 situation — pay men the slightest bit of attention and you’re a whore, ignore them at all and you’re a dyke. So whaddya do?”

These self-assessments of female soldiers as well as assessments by their male comrades refers to a use of sexualized imagery and the vision of militarized masculinity that can only be threatened, if not destroyed (read: made effeminate), by the involvement of female soldiers. Chris Hables Gray discusses the issue on the background of un-gendered Cyborg soldiers; he refers to the power of the ‘basic tropes of war’ as ‘the hatred for the feminine’. As reflected upon in the example from female combatants in Liberia, this hatred and the pressure to overcome all connections to femininity is not only valid for male soldiers, but must be exercised by female soldiers as well.

Although the quotes above are referring to a regular army, the situation does not differ completely amongst insurgents. Based on the interviews in Southern Sudan, Eritrea, Uganda, DR Congo and Darfur and the reading of texts as well as movies dealing

693 One example and strategic positioning is the non-autonomous status of the NEWU (New Eritrean Women’s Union) that has still been part of the ruling party, the former fighters committee. In terms of liberal feminism, this might even be a progressive symbol, since in this status the NEWU has much more influence in the politics of the party. In Realpolitik rhetoric this is completely right. But if the system the party is based on and framed in is a hierarchical power structure, there is no great hope for the Women’s Union to change realities and shift issues in the dominant discourse that the party would not agree with. The example of Zimbabwe is more accurately based on the observations in the movie “Flame” which portrays the war and post-war situation of two female liberation fighters.


695 Muir, Arms and the Woman. p. 155

696 Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict. p. 175

697 Initially the interviews were conducted during an eight-month research mission to southern Sudan and Eritrea in 1996/1997. Due to various positions with Amnesty International, Human
with the issue of female comrades, these quotations might also be true for a large number of militarized men who are encountered by militarized women. The fear might be more than losing the exclusive man-only bastion, the right to carry a gun and the notion of the soldier as the protector. It might be even more: the loss of a militarized masculinity that is quite sexualized as it is connected to the erect gun as well as to the understanding of the soldier as a hard-body, exercised, vital, virile and, due to the corporal experience of war, connected to the notion of a soldier’s sexuality as rough and tough. Losing the privilege of full potency to the particular potency of uniformed women might be a reason for the refusal of men to fight alongside women in almost all struggles, wars, and armed conflicts or allowing women this power of displayed and brutal sexuality.

The admiration of men in uniform as described by many conflict theorists is not only due to his gender or sex but due to the fact that by wearing a uniform, carrying a gun, power is represented. The man in uniform seems to be the purest form of a patriotic just war fighter, the protector for the right cause. Symbolized in the uniform, the thrill of the person is his transgressive status. The man in the uniform is nomadic, he is not anchored and he carries the suggestion glance of his heroic and thrilling death with him.

For women in uniforms this seems to be even more true. It is interesting to see how groups of students in peace seminars react to pictures of women parading in combat or in training. Even people who do not have patriotic convictions have trouble with feeling attracted or having at least some kind of affinity to these pictures. Even if it is a portrayal of a regular army battalion, it shows an image that seemed to be forbidden and hidden and in the end not even taken as true or possible: the imagery of a group of powerful, armed women.

Rights Watch and the Ecumenical Network on Central Africa, I had the chance to collect interviews in various locations from 1997 until 2005 ongoingly.

There are plenty of visual examples of women in combat and of female soldiers in the issue on war by COLORS, the magazine of United Colors of Benetton, No. 14.
IV. 2. PRAXIS: WOMEN’S ROLES IN WAR

For actual warfare the duties of all members of the community seem to be well defined. In southern Sudan with women taking a role as carriers, and those who care for the wounded and dead. Moreover the moral support and maintenance of war spirit is the task of women. “Leek women, moreover, continued to accompany their menfolk to battle where they encourage them with shrill war cries, retrieved spears, and most important, protected and carried away the wounded.” As for certain groups of Dinka in Sudan, women would protect wounded fighters by throwing themselves onto their bodies so they would not be killed. As Francis M. Deng explains:

Women keep close behind their fighting men, gathering the fallen spears and handing them back. When men are speared and forced to the ground, women fall on them to protect them from the enemy. Dinka ethics of dheeng and war ethics require that a person thus covered by a woman not be harmed.

In a report on the southern Sudanese ethnic group of the Zande by Major R.G.C. Brock, from 1918, the author discusses hunting and warfare of the Zande and refers to the fact that the chief always goes with his wives and sends them as prey for the animals he is supposed to shoot. Brock also remarks, that „When Avungera Chiefs, who have rifles, go shooting, their rifles are always carried by their wives.”

Sharon Hutchinson researched the change in fighting and the tradition of Nuer woman to accompany their husbands to battle. This custom stopped with the introduction of rifles and guns among the Nuer, who used spears before:

Consequently, it was no longer safe for eastern Jokany [sub-group of Nuer] women to accompany their sons and husbands into battle: “It is awful”, one eastern Gaajak [Nuer sub-group] exclaimed, “Today the dead and wounded are left to the birds.”

For southern Sudanese war was a direct encounter of one group against the other, initiated men from one ethnic group trying to kill others from similar age groups. Even though the killing is the fundamental method of warfare, exorcising the spirits of those killed and possibly paying compensation to their group was perceived as equally important. As an example from the Acholi:

When the fighting was over, those who had succeeded in killing someone else were christened with their spear names and for three or four days devoted themselves to exorcising the spirits of the people they had killed. This was done by fastening bells to their arms to drive off the spirits and by smearing their bodies and

699 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State, p. 137


701 Major R.G.C. Brock, „Some Notes in the Zande Tribe as Found in the Meridi District (Bahr El Ghazal Province),“ Sudan Notes and Records 1 (1918)

702 Ibid. p. 257

703 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State., p. 141
Women as Recruitment Cadres

“Once my husband said to me, ‘the revolution or me?’ And I told him, ‘The revolution!’”

An example by an Eritrean woman exemplifies the use of women as mobilizers of members of the enemy forces. This was a high-risk job – as one can imagine in case of failure. Amrit Wilson refers to the experience of a recruiter in a report told by Asmaret Abraham. In her description it becomes subsequently obvious which tasks an urban guerrilla cadre or cell is supposed to cover:

I used to distribute leaflets among Ethiopian soldiers because we were trying to recruit Eritreans who were in the Ethiopian army. Once I was asked to give a letter to an army lieutenant in Shagreni, a small village with several bars, about 19 km from Asmara. I went there and got talking to some of the soldiers. They were Eritrean soldiers in the Ethiopian army, trained by the Israelis as an anti-guerrilla force. They asked me where I was going, and I said: Asmara. They said: The way you are dressed you will be in trouble in Asmara. I said: I was only joking; really I want to meet Lieutenant Teklai. They told me: You won’t find him. But I insisted that I must meet him. In the end they took me to a bar and asked me to have a drink. I took a soft drink and sat and waited. He did come to meet me and I gave him a letter, but when he saw the EPLF stamp he was afraid and said he could not read it in front of the others. Where could he meet me later? I told him a place where I would be waiting with two comrades. After some time he came there and met the three of us. He decided to join the EPLF; he brought his gun and a bag of bullets and came away with us.

This reflection on mobilization tasks and fields carries more information than various operational duties for women. It touches upon the embedded gender images and how they can be used in conflict to mobilize others. It is interesting though that the image of the masculine men seems of less significatory mobilizing effect than then militarized image of a female fighter. For both, men and women this seems to have an alarming message, yet one that is quite contradictory: whereas for men female militarized mobilizers threaten their masculinity, the very same image delivers a desire and option of possible strength for other women.

Urban guerrilla tactics and warfare provides for more niches women can engage in. In intelligence and clandestine cell coordination no frontline training is required and no passage into ‘masculinity’ is necessary. As a transformative dynamic – urban guerrilla tactics – because they are closer linked to the population and society at large – have a bigger impact on gendered concepts in society rather than the more isolated and less visible frontline posts. Women’s active involvement in urban guerrilla is more widely recognized. In Sudan, there is no urban guerrilla warfare on the side of the SPLA.

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704 Capt E.T.N. Grove, „Customs of the Acholi,” Sudan Notes and Records 2, no. 3 (1919) p. 164
705 Maria, a 54 year old coordinator for cultural activities and former FSLN fighter in Nicaragua. In. Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight – Arms to Protect, p. 216
The understanding I encountered mainly was a mix of tradition and restriction of why women could and should (and want) not join. As a commander in Bahr el Ghazal explained: “Our women do other things. It is a traditional issue not to involve women in the armed struggle. The support of women is equally to what the men in the field are doing.”


Interview with Cdr James Adiang, Interview, January 16th 1997
IV. 3. ASSESSMENT OF FEMALE FIGHTERS

Gender Awareness during the Struggle

The old belief that women are too soft to stand the trials of the battlefield has finally been put to rest. Eritrean women fighters have over the past fifteen years, seen action ranging from minor skirmishes to full-scale, bitter battles. They have been exposed to end boldly withstood every danger imaginable. They have inspired their comrades and terrorized the enemy. They have commanded men and proven themselves effective and efficient. All this, without losing their capacity for love and care. It is an achievement with few parallels in the history of modern warfare.

Eritrean women: EPLF information department photography section)

The Blood of the Others

Alive, I read the poems of the dead,
I who laugh and cry and can shout
„Patria Libre o Morir!“
on the back of a flatbed truck
the day we enter Managua.

I read the poems of the dead,
watch the ants in the grass,
my bare feet, your straight hair,
the curve of your back
after hours of meetings.

I read the poems of the dead
And fear this blood that fuels our love
Does not belong to us.
La Sangre de otros / Gioconda Belli

Women who once „knew their place“ may take up arms against a government trying to keep them there.
(Barbara Seitz, Linda Lobao, Ellen Treadway)

What constitutes a female fighter? Do women situate themselves different than the armed insurgencies define them? Who qualifies as a fighter and what is the glass ceiling? Are there any gender attributions to the female fighter or is it just a women fighting?

Those questions need to be addressed in order to approach explanations of how women are defined as fighters and what implications this might have to their status as citizens.

As the examples in Southern Sudan and Eritrea show, all women I interviewed with or without practical front-line experience would consider themselves as female fighters. As nurses, intelligence officers, secretaries or media personnel women describe


themselves as female fighters. Whereas in Eritrea the use of weapons and the front-line duty was an important issue for the identity of demobilized female fighters in Southern Sudan, the fact to be part of the movement dominated the actual deployment.

Women in uniform carry much more information than the sex of the fighter. This chapter tries to deepen the knowledge about the involvement of women in armed struggle, assess their self-reflection and the recognition by the movement as well as by the respective society more generally. Before wondering about how and why women get involved in the different layers of armed struggle and how this involvement is perceived, I would like to draw the attention to the fact that the rules and values of ‘normal life’ do not necessarily apply to a war situation. However war does not erupt out of nothing and does not end into full peace – the value system of pre-war as well as post-war is informed by the behaviour and social functions during the war and vice versa. Power structures and authorities might shift yet authority and power is not questioned per se.

Assignments

For the female EPLF fighters in Eritrea the free choice of assignments was a clear indicator for the acceptance of women across the movement. In Sudan this question was unanimously rejected as one non-informed of military orders and standards. In the discussion with the Southern Sudanese female former fighters there was honour and pride in the fact of being officially recognized and labelled as active members of the SPLA. On the other hand, some of the women did not seem to be too happy that there was no active involvement of women in the armed ranks and they tried to play this fact down by stating the need for active SPLA women to fulfil other tasks. Or, by arguing that there are currently women in training for the SPLA who would certainly be able to get combat experience and full recognition. It did not occur to be an issue fully debated by the women. Some women insisted on their existing military ranks – even if they had no impact on their lives:

We are still military women. And because of this we have to wait for orders. It is not for us to decide what is important for the movement, what battalion should be mobilized, and what people should be recruited. We wait for our orders and if this means we have to follow the SRRA, this is our task. We will go and mobilize our women as supporters.711

The problem of acknowledgment of women’s participation is complex and not easy to unwind. Since not only is the SPLA/M not very supportive of female fighters and the involvement of active women into their ranks, but the women themselves are caught in the very same structures. Therefore even by knowing that there is no real gain of recognition by keeping military ranks they would insist on the importance of these, rather than challenging the whole setting, questioning the lack of women in the structures and the lack of recognition of women’s participation in general. The

711 Interview with Ajith Chol Atem, February 1997
militarized logic of the importance of ranks seems to work even for those who obviously do not gain anything from this system.

It seems as if, by being in the situation and sharing the historical moment, one is already participating and is part of change. The changes are palpable – it is not a distanced but self-made history – even if all one can do is ‘cover your head or bury the dead’. Despite the pain and suffering in war, making history is a powerful feeling and experience and should not be taken out of the frame in the debate of the situation and personal placement of women in war.

Those days of the war were the best time in my life. I cried when I learned about our victory. I exactly remember this day. I was stationed near the Sudanese Border, and they gave me a radio call and I left my place, ran onto a hill and started crying. I did not want to go back, I did not want this war to be finished. I did not want another life. Now, I know it is not fair and we should be happy, but there is so much guilt, why did my best friends die, why not me? Why did I survive this war and not the others? Now we have to face this reality. Everybody is alone, on her own. This individualism, all this problems of everyday life, you have to start thinking about really unimportant things, like how to dress your daughter or yourself, since the neighbors are watching. Really, I miss living on the edge and I miss knowing what I do makes sense, is important and is not selfish.  

Imagery and portrayal of female fighters varies from conflict to conflict. In Eritrea during the war the imagery of female fighters became that of heroic role models. Long parades of proud looking women in uniform, admired by boys and girls alike standing and watching, cheered by the civilian women on the side and greeted with respect and appreciation by the male fighters and civilians. Booklets published during the war by the women’s union of the fighting forces, the EPLF, portray women as comrades, as civilians, as fighters; women as capable of doing everything men can do, women as the better mobilizers and educators.

In Asmara’s bookshops where hardly any variety of books is exposed, there are booklets available with photographs of young women with an AK 47 by her side, sitting and smiling and talking to a group of elder women, teaching them about the goals of the EPLF. Other pictures show women at a blackboard teaching rural women in literacy classes. They report proudly on the EPLF’s achievement building a factory for sanitary towels, pasta and sandals, praising this project, not ashamed that guerrillas use their minds and awareness for the comfort and needs of its female fighters.

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712 Interview with Negeste, March 1997. For her security I will not unveil her full identity. She was a fighter herself, engaged in the EPLF since a very early time and is now living with her husband and daughter in Denden Camp in Asmara. I never taped an interview with her but we had plenty of informal talks and she agreed to let me memorize them in my memo book and use them later as quotations.

713 Only a couple of years after the war ended, the positive rush had changed and the masses of female fighters parading on international women’s day were replaced by masses of traditionally dressed women.

714 Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, “Eritrean Women,” (Port Sudan; As-Salam Press: Information Department Photography Section, unknown, 1980s) Also the publication of the National Union of Eritrean Women, Voice of the Eritrean Women (unknown, 1980s). There are more publications, one is ‘mousana’, an Arabic magazine, as well as publications in the countries of exile, such as “Stimme der Eritreischen Frau” (Voice of the Eritrean Woman)
There is hardly anyone in Eritrea who is not able to tell the story of an unbelievably brave woman, of a well-known heroine, of an unforgotten martyr.

Then there is Sudan, where many women had and have to run from one part of the country to the other to flee from enemy forces or from forces they did not even know were the enemy, since in some areas of Southern Sudan the factions are changing alliances frequently. The imagery we receive in the West is that of a starving skeleton, with a dead baby on her breast, that of a person too weak to rebel against the abuse, too weak to take sides, too weak to fight. There is no leaflet or booklet published by the guerrillas on the achievement and the bravery of the women in Sudan, there is no parade of female fighters, almost no women in the eclectic fantasy uniforms of most of the SPLA soldiers, no women with a rifle. There is hardly a woman in a prominent place in decision-making or politics – there is no recruitment of women for the armed struggle.

Even the well known rhetoric and appraisal of the women as the mother-symbol who becomes a signifier of patriotic nationalism, a token for earth and territory, a symbol of the key keeper of the collective memory, is missing in Sudan. There are no booklets published on the hardship, achievements and aims of the SPLAM in general. As the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) secretary of Mapel, Ifisio Kann Uguak explained: “We asked the women in a workshop on gender in society: ‘What is your role in society and do you see your role as equal to men?’ The women said: ‘no’.”

The public self-assessment of women in Southern Sudan differs from what day to day reality reflects. It is women who make decisions and move the families, women who are heads of households. Yet it is women who describe themselves as uneducated and not good enough to talk and make decisions, not enlightened enough to govern a community and not strong enough to protect themselves. Although this dilemma is not specific to Southern Sudan and is increasingly countered by other voices, I would argue that this attitude is still the predominant one. To visualize this I would like to give one example of a women’s meeting in Maridi.

There is a paradoxical perception of attribution and reality in many encounters with communities in conflict. One example mentioned before is the perception of legitimized gender specific escape from attacks in Darfur. Another example I came across was during a women’s meeting in Maridi, southern Sudan. In the women’s meeting in Maridi, a number of politically active women were on the panel and very decisive and organized women of all ages in the audience of about fifty. In addition there were about five men, mainly of younger age, two of the elders and the chief. The discussion concentrated on the struggle for the acceptance of women representatives in the public sphere concerning organizational matters of the communities, such as the committees for the distribution of food, the market, the construction and the family. The women gave precise needs assessments, knowing exactly what should be done. The only comment they received from the men’s side was: Look at those uneducated

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715 Interview with Ifisio Kon Uguak, January 1997.

716 The meeting was organized by the Sudan Women’s Voice for Peace organization and chaired by Mama Kwezia, who at this time was a representative of the Executive Council of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The meeting took place in February 1997.
women – why do we have to listen to them? In this particular meeting one woman felt so insulted that she stood up and told the man to either shut up or leave the place. This was an exception, since in many other meetings, women would tend to reiterate the assessment by pointing to their deficits on formal education rather than to their strength in organizing and managing skills.

How do women identify with the cause of the struggle? How much does the movement involve and represent women and whether this has implications on their position in society. Being a fighter is thereby considered only one form of active involvement. According to the experiences of women in conflicts and armed struggles it becomes evident that the introduction of women into a formerly purely male sphere – as well as the consequences of as their acknowledgment as citizen – makes quite a difference in women’s self-esteem and their acceptance by society in power positions and in general.

As Doris Burges argues that by setting up grass-root initiatives, gaining organizing skills and practicing presence in the public sphere, the involvement of women in war brings about changes in social and political power. This reflects upon the transformatory power of transgression of the private to the private to the public sphere. Yet it does not give rise to the assumption that women becoming fighters would transform gender roles on long-term bases. Moreover it shows how limited the participation of women in armed struggle is if there are no parallel changes and transformations in gender roles in the society at large.

The interest here is how these changes are translated and transferred into the society and specifically how to keep those changes in a post-war situation? As Theresa Victor, a woman from Gogrial in southern Sudan, interviewed in Mapel described the changes: “A long time ago it was enough to pound dura and get food, but in the meantime we saw and heard too many bad things, now we have to get education for our daughters.”

For her the result of war and conflict is to get involved to make it possible for her daughter’s generation to raise their voices and to become part of any decision making process.

Motivation

Especially for younger women and specifically in times of war where people feel the pressure to take sides and be active for their cause, the power of the uniform and the gun seems to have a remarkable attraction. What motivates women to take up arms? Does this decision transform their lives and if yes how?

Besides the political and personal reasons of oppression that makes women join armed struggles it frequently involves the wish to carry guns and to operate on a


718 Interview with Theresa Victor, February 1997; October 1999
different gender status. The image of the fighter, the masculine man appears to be a mobilizing factor for both, men and women. As demobilized female fighters in Eritrea complained about the fact of wearing trousers, which made them feel equal with men and which they found handy and comfortable is not socially accepted for women in the post-war era.

„There are no men or women in the field. They are all comrades. And, to tell you this, we never allowed them to lower ourselves down as women.‖ The slightest possibility to be accepted on the same turf mobilizes women to join movements of armed struggle. As a women from El Salvador explained who joined the guerrilla when she was eleven years old:

I still want to work with weapons and to relate with companeros because I got used to being just around men during the war and only wearing trousers as if I were a man. I still like being around companeras, but I prefer being with companeros as if we belonged to the same sex, that kind of thing. 720

Belonging as well as transgression should not be underestimated as reasons for women to join armed struggles. The interesting issue then is if there is a change of gender roles and images that carries on beyond the era of armed struggle. As Rozina Zega Zeab, a former female fighter said in an interview:

I was burning with national feelings. I was young and I wanted to do something. I was a member of the youngsters of the EPLF, of the Red Roses, before I was a member of the ELF. That was from 76 to 78 and we had been mainly singing and dancing. Then I was still too young to join the armed forces, they sent me to Zero school for two years and finally in 1984 I joined. For going to the school I was not happy, I cried when they told me to go to school, I wanted a uniform and a gun. 721

Some of the younger women in Sudan and all of the women in Eritrea, I interviewed, mentioned the excitement of seeing men and women in uniforms (provided that they sensed them as friendly soldiers). ‚I was young and every day I was looking at the fighters and was fascinated by the outfits and by the women carrying guns.‘ 722 As a senior member of SPLA/M stated in an interview about the situation of the recruitment of women: ‚In Northern Bahr el Ghazal the elders complained when about 200 women reported to get training and fight. The women said: ‘Get us men, unless we get men, we have to get trained, we want to go.‘ 723

Most of the women who decided to join the armed forces at a younger age did not fail to remark that the desire to wear combat and carry a gun was one of the main reasons to join the movement. Besides the political aim to overthrow an oppressive system, to

719 Interview with Rozina Zega Zeab, March 19th 1997
720 Dolores in: Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight – Arms to Protect, p. 201
721 Interview with Rozina Zega Zeab, former EPLF fighter conducted on March 19th 1997 in Asmara
722 Interview with Tsereda Tegel, former EPLF fighter, interviewed in Asmara March 19th 1997
723 Interview with Deng Alore on February 10th 1999, Kampala
protect one’s family and community, out of reasons such as revenge, or to replace a lost brother or sister. Miriam Suleiman Gabano a three star captain of SPLA gives her reasons for joining the struggle:

I left this place in 1986 and joined our forces. It was my own decision to join the SPLA. I walked out of town to join them. I never told my parents – I just left and went. I just went for the operations as everybody else. To me it was a decision that I could not stand the oppression any more. I had to do something against this oppression from the government side. I heard about the SPLA through the radio. Actually we had been walking from here (Nuba Mountains) to Ethiopia – about three month and seven days walking to join the military training. There had been many women from the Nuba Mountains receiving military training.724

In the interviews I conducted with women from the first women battalion of the SPLA – many women gave similar reasons for their initial involvement as women did in Eritrea. Most of the women joined with the understanding of the political necessity of an armed struggle against the oppressive internal colonial system of the north. But not only the political necessity, the interest in personal changes is ranking high for women to join an armed struggle. “My parents wanted me to marry, that was why I left my village and came to Asmara. I did not want to live the life of a married woman.”725 The realization and possibility to change from the group of those who are not protected any more to those who protect seems to be another mobilizing factor.726 As in the testimony of Victoria Akur Deng from southern Sudan:

We would not stand there for longer. Not again. This I told my parents, but they did not really understand. They had been there in times of the AnyaNya and the war until 1972, and then they had lived in peace. This was not something for them to understand, that I, their girl who they even sent to school, me, I wanted to join the movement. Maybe my father understood, but thought this is overdoing it, there are men in our country that can do the fighting. Why do they need you women with a gun? To me there was not much more that I wanted than getting a rifle and fighting for the liberation of my country. See, we grew up not really in war, but with the idea that we live in one country with the Northerners who would not take us as equal partners. This I heard from another relative coming back from Khartoum, supposedly our capital. But, as he said, that is the capital of the northerners and they treat you as an outsider, they call you slave and the like. I mean, I do not think that there were any other reasons than any man had for joining the SPLA.727

724 Interview in Changaro, Nuba Mountains on December 22nd 1996
725 Mebral Kiflemariam, former EPLF fighter, interviewed in Asmara March 20th 1997
726 Although this seems to be a paradox, since the realization of not being protected by the fighters leading to the desire to become a protector by becoming a fighter seems illogic.
727 Interview with Victoria Akur Deng. This very rushed group interview with about six of the women who had been part of the first women’s battalion (and the only women battalion of the SPLA so far) took place at the house of the leader of SPLA, John Garang de Mabior and his wife Rebecca, in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1997. The occasion was the celebration of the birth of the child of Rebecca and John Garang. John Garang appeared during the interview and I could ask him a few questions about the involvement, or the lack of the involvement, of women as active fighters. The interview was not planned so I did not come with any equipment,
Most of the women I interviewed joined the movement during the very early days around 1984/85. In 1984 all of us, as students, wanted to join the SPLA, with or without permission of our parents. There was one problem, since there was no easy way for a woman to get the permission of her family to study away from home that is, let's say if you went to Juba University the people in the village thought you were not a good girl any more. Then the decision to join the movement came and it was said that this is not anything a girl should do – unless she does not want to get married. Oh, this was hard but we did and we were very successful in mobilizing others. The commanders said we were a mobilizing guarantee.

The reason to join in order to gain authority, which might be a major reason for men, is arguably a dominant motivation for women to join. The possibility to step out of restricting social roles is a mobilizing factor for women as well. A great number of women who joined the SPLA already challenged the traditional gender structure by leaving their homes to get education – this freedom made them more responsive to take further risks, yet it inscribed the allegations and suspicions of those arguing for traditional gender roles, even more.

And we really went to places and saw things, men have not seen before. Even when going to military training. That was in Ethiopia. This was the Korreem (Locust) Brigade. And all of us trained with rifles, just as the men.

Barbara Seitz, Linda Lobao and Ellen Treadway exemplify additional reasons for women to join struggles in addition to those valid for men and women. They exemplify strategic and practical gender interests as playing a substantial role. Strategic gender needs refer to the abolition of subordination of women and a more balanced equality. Practical gender interests are described as everyday needs such as the lack of material goods or support for the family putting in danger the survival. The authors argue further that there is a need to distinguish short- and long-term consequences of women's involvement. As an important long-term gain they state organizational and management skills, which “prove useful in future organizing, in electoral politics, and in employment. Women acquire a sense of personal empowerment and self-esteem.

Although this would have not been appropriate anyway, because the occasion was purely celebratory. I will list the names of the women at the table and link the statement to the names. 1. Ajith Chol Atem, 2. Achuil Kuol Tiir, 3. Victoria Akur Deng, 4. Adau Diing Duol, 5. Changwok Paten Ajak. The sixth woman who took part in this interview, also one of the first women involved in the armed struggle, was Sittouna Abdallah. I interviewed her at length and will mainly quote the interview I had with her on the December 6th 1996 at the office of SMC in Nairobi.

For the chronology of the struggle in Southern Sudan and the formation of SPLA see chapter 4

Interview with Changwok Ajak in a meeting in Nairobi 1997

Interview with Adau Ding Duol, Nairobi 1997

Seitz, Lobao, and Treadway, „No Going Back: Women’s Participation in the Nicaraguan Revolution and in Postrevolutionary Movements.“ pp. 170
Subsequently, this personal growth may cause new tensions or re-negotiations of gender roles in the family.\textsuperscript{732}

The gain for women joining the armed struggle is supported in the speech of the deputy Chairman of the SPLM on the occasion of the first SPLM Women’s Conference in August 1998:

However things are now changing for women in the New Sudan. (...) Women have learnt new skills in such areas as management of small projects, improved methods of raising poultry, taking care of small livestock and processing of local products. (...) All these achievements have altered the roles of our women for better.\textsuperscript{733}

This acknowledgment by a high ranking representative of the insurgency is a new development in the armed struggle of Southern Sudan since it points to the individual and collective gains of women outside their traditional tasks. By recognizing this change the road is paved for the acknowledgment of women’s active participation in the whole society.

Self-Assessment

How do women describe themselves as fighters? What gender attributes do they assign to this position? What do they aim for and what motivates them? What do they define as fighter qualifications and how gender specific is this attribution?

Do women specify any particular problems as female fighters that might distinguish them from male fighters? Do they develop strategies and ideas to tackle these problems? I will elaborate on women’s self-assessment and ask for their recognition by the movements as well as in society in general in order to locate possible hindrance for the fulfillment of their potential.

In Eritrea most of the women I interviewed and the majority of women’s testimonies I read show, that it was almost unacceptable for women to agree to be given a no-combatant status in the armed forces. Women in Sudan hardly ever talked about this ‘burning urge’ to join the front-line fight. Their identification seems mainly based on their position in the community with an extraordinary emphasis on their position as mothers. While women in Sudan saw their status as mothers to be a natural restriction from their possible status as a fighter, the female fighters in Eritrea had sorrow feelings of failure and guilt towards their unit when they had to leave to give birth.

A number of women in Sudan explained that with childcare facilities they might join the struggle, others rejected the fighting position for women with children in general. A young woman in the Lomo mountains of the Nuba Mountains explains: “If I would find somebody who would take care of my children, I would be there. Right away. In this case of child-care, I would go.” And as Miriam Suleiman Gabano agrees:

\textsuperscript{732} Ibid. p. 170

\textsuperscript{733} Speech by Slava Kiir, Deputy Chairman of SPLM, Speech given on August 21\textsuperscript{st} 1998. New Cush, Southern Sudan
In my own experience, when they asked me to move and follow the army I had this really small child. I took it with me. But now with my husband, I am staying here and he is fighting. Now I am staying but I might leave soon. But this needs a good understanding between my husband and me. He is committed to the cause so he is supporting my decision – but this might be really rare in the families here. (...) If there were facilities to take care of the children it would help a lot of women to go and join the armed struggle. The main problem is the care of the children and the feeding system and its problems. If that would be taken care of, it would help us a lot. The burden of taking care of our children is on our back, our man just join the SPLA and go, so this is our main job to take care of our children. Therefore centres for child-care would be very helpful to us.\textsuperscript{734}

The fact that women give birth to children interestingly changes the patterns of mobilization according to the respective propaganda. For men the revolution is not necessarily excluding personal relations. On the contrary, home-front mobilization ensures that the relation will provide comfort and assistance whereas for a fighting woman, this is rarely the case. As in the example of the tremendous number of divorce cases in fighter-marriages in post-war Eritrea\textsuperscript{735} or the example of the Tamile-tiger female suicide bombers who carry a marriage contract with the Tiger’s leader as their necklace – the issue of relations and war is of tremendous importance and complication.

The right of men to abandon children for the sake of the revolution is accepted. It would not even occur as an act of abandonment rather as an act of personal and political choice. Just war requires a decision that should be made by keeping the greater common good in sight.

The almost guaranteed emotional support cushion male fighters are provided for by their remaining wives, girlfriends, mothers and sisters is largely lacking for female fighters. Quite the opposite – because they crossed into male territory – women are given a harder time to be reintegrated in society the way they are. Specifically female combatants have to show their assimilating efforts by behaving like ‘natural’, ‘traditional’ women again.

In the interviews I conducted in Eritrea, this issue was always the most painful to talk about since it seemed that it showed the women most drastically that they embarked on a myth of genderless comradeship that never lasted after the struggle – if ever it existed during the war.

The main realization for the female former fighters was the disgruntlement between their own assessment and the recognition by the society at large. As a résumé to be drawn by Eritrean fighters they emphasized the need for the Southern Sudanese women to bring their own assessment and the change inside the movement together with larger social changes.

\textsuperscript{734} Both interviews took place on December 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1996 in Changaro, Nuba Mountains
\textsuperscript{735} The alerting high divorce rate was mentioned by all women I interviewed in Eritrea and further confirmed by Eritrean feminists
\textsuperscript{736} The Eritrean women in particular had been quite bitter of this realization since to them they thought male and female fighters would recognize themselves as equals during the hardship and after yet they had to realize that the tendency of a great number of male comrades was towards a more traditional ideal of women.
In a meeting with politically active women from southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, the women argued that they have to learn from the experience of the Eritrean women. And that they would not make the same mistake the women in Eritrea, in Zimbabwe and in Angola made:

We learned from our sisters in Eritrea. We will not fall into this trap. We need a grassroots approach. We need the women to organize on the ground, to decide for themselves, to be empowered from the bottom up. What they did in Eritrea was the wrong way around: initiatives and instructions from above. This never works, except maybe for a short time. We need the women to raise their awareness and to support themselves on the ground.

Her colleague Mary Apar supported this view:

Yes, there was a lot happening in Eritrea with the women, and the literacy classes and all that was really important. We need that and we need to start doing it. We have hardly anything left in our country and even if we are rich, we will not prosper in our lifetime, so we have to go back and resettle with the resources and the knowledge we had. The main point is, we should never become a part of the movement. We, the women, have to stay independent, only then can we avoid the mistake of our sisters in Eritrea.

I asked the Eritrean women whom I interviewed what advice they would have for their sisters in Sudan. ‘Staying independent’ was mentioned most often, followed by the advice to never forget the civilian society. For the Eritreans this may have turned out to be the main problem: all of the imagery of women during the war was either that of a woman traditionally dressed or a woman in khaki, a militarized woman. The only civilian images of women had been those of victims. The consequences this has for women in the post war period are quite dramatic, since they hardly have any civilian role models outside the traditional women’s image. What the non-visibility of women in the civilian and military public space means for women in Sudan can only be speculated.

Sheila Tobias links fighter status to the gain of a full citizen status for women who are actively involved in armed struggle. She argues that women who have experience in war, which would be acknowledged as active participation, have an advantage in political roles afterwards. Yet gaining citizen status can only be guaranteed if there is

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737 Extensive talks with Mary James Kuku, Mary Apar and Carla Juan Tongun both in Germany in 1998 and earlier during my research in Sudan and Nairobi. They cover three different areas of public and political work: Mary Kuku as the coordinator for SWVP in the Nuba Mountains and the Financial coordinator for the Nuba Relief and Rehabilitation Association. Mary Apar as a member of the SPLA and was trained as an SRRA community leader, and Carla Juan Tangun as a member of the umbrella organization of all Sudanese women in Kenya – SWAN (Sudanese Women’s Association, Nairobi) as well as a politically very active women.

738 Carla Juan Tongun at an informal talk on their lobbying tour through Europe in December 1998 in Berlin

739 Ibid.

an ongoing discourse that involves the movement and the society and if there is a greater social demand, otherwise the citizen status given to women during the war will disappear after.

In her speech about women in conflict, Grace Odong, the chairperson of the South Sudan Women’s Association reflects upon the changes in the situation of women and the lack of subsequent recognition of these changes by the society in general and the movement in specific:

These situations have only been recognized in the Sudan during the conflict as conflict situations have clearly spelt out the position of women in the family. War takes men away from homes to the battlegrounds. In these situations women are in most cases separated from their husbands for very long periods. In the periods of absence women take the role of mothers, father, healers, educators, social worker etc. It, in a way made lone parents get control of the meagre resources. However, even though women get to control the resources compared to their previous share when their husbands are around, but women also gain proportionally less than men over time. The gap between women and men grows and women are relatively less well off vis-à-vis men than they were in the past. In armed struggle like the current on facing us in the Sudan, women are the ones sacrificed on the altar of the struggle.\(^741\)

The interviews I conducted in Eritrea in 1997\(^742\) reflect the post-revolutionary period and are clearly marked with frustration as well as a glorification of the time of struggle into an almost mythical narration of freedom, equality, and comradeship. For the demobilized Eritrean fighters I interviewed, wartime now appears as a paradise of comradeship, selflessness, a life filled with a just cause.

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\(^741\) Speech by Grace Odong, on the issue of women in conflict, given at the first SPLM/A women’s conference in August 1998 in New Cush, Southern Sudan

IV. 4. FROM WARRIOR QUEENS AND LEOPARD WIVES

The historical contextualization of gendered legitimate forms of violence extrapolates the trope of constructedness of ‘authentic’ gender roles. The examples of violent and bloodthirsty deities and Amazons shows that the exact opposite of what is sometime considered innate, authentic, inherent gender attributions was at one point as the dominant notion.

The existence of women as fighters, warrior women or just the imagery of bloodthirsty deities is not part of our current notion of femininity or female peacefulness. Reference to bloodthirsty goddesses is not meant to erect a line of violent women as role models for current insurgencies but should show that the definition of man and women depends on those in power at the time, and that there is no such thing as an eternal role concept or authentic gender identity.

We do not know what, if anything, these fierce goddesses (Cybele, Sekmet, Durga, Kali, Inanna, Astrate, Artemis743) have to tell us about the status of actual women in the cultures that worshipped them. But our concern here is with human attitudes toward violence, and it is striking that images associated with bloodshed and predation could once have been ‘gender’ in a way opposite to what we are used to: that there was a time, apparently in many disparate cultures, when imagination gave the beast a human female form.744

Absence of women in history

The most obvious images of gendered conflict roles would be those of warriors, fighters and soldiers. The war leading women, the Amazon battalion unites the ambivalence – the ultimate trespass as well as the impossible mythical creation. Even if there are more and more women joining the military right now, women’s active appearance in the war fields is treated as a novelty, a farce. Works on military history hardly mention women as fighters or military leaders, or as the ordering queen or empress. To look beyond this restriction is not to show how normal and acknowledged the use of force and violence by women had always been, but to remind us that the current discourse - situating women on the side of the peaceful, maternal thinking caring being - is based on post-industrial, capitalist society assumptions mainly pointing towards the role of middle class women. Yet, western Middle class women are in an overall perspective clearly a minority, it is important to take a closer look towards the history of the use of violence and force by women.

743 Homer quoted in Ehrenreich, Blood Rites. Origins and History of the Passions of War, p. 98. In the Homeric epic, she is Artemis, oh whom the poet says: Zeus has made you a lion among women, and given you leave to kill any at your pleasure.

744 Ibid. p. 98
Looking into these historical backgrounds more closely, there is much to find. ‘The forgotten queens of Islam’, violent female Khalifas of Yemen, the female security guard of the King of Dahomey – or the body guards of the Libyan ruler Jaffar el-Ghaddafi – the Amazons or noblewomen leading wars. This other history has been taken into account.

Examples of exception

Women rulers in Sudan and other African countries are not unknown. Fatima Mahmud refers to a number of rulers of Meroe (Sudan) between 284 BC-AD 115. As a more recent example of anti-colonial movements she mentions Nehanda of Zimbabwe (1863-1898).

“It could be argued that the first slave revolt was that of women slaves, the Jawari, who well before that date launched an assault on the caliphs.”

With this statement by Fatima Mernissi the idea of contextualising the status and imagery of female fighters becomes more concrete. Mernissi refers to women, who revolted before another group of Sudanese slaves set a statement with armed resistance in what is Iraq now: the revolt of Zanj. Mernissi’s description of the difference of these two revolts is led by a strongly traditional model of gender identities and refers to what I would question as the perpetuation of the myth of feminine resistance. Mernissi says:

745 Mernissi, The Forgotten Queens of Islam
746 Ehrenreich, Blood Rites. Origins and History of the Passions of War, Hacker, Gewalt Ist: Keine Frau: Oder Eine Geschichte Der Transgressionen
749 Queens and Empresses in European History, Noblewomen such as the Trung sisters of Vietnam fighting against the Chinese. See Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight – Arms to Protect, p. 157
750 Another example would be Aysha, Prophet Mohamed’s ‘favourite’ wife was personally leading an army. For more see Maria Graeff-Wassink, „Militarisation of Women and Feminism in Libya,” in Women Soldiers: Images and Realities, ed. Elisabetta Addis, Valeria E. Russo, and Lorenza Sebesta (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994)
752 Mernissi, The Forgotten Queens of Islam. p. 37
753 Ibid.
Compared to the limited impact of the revolt of the Zanj, because it was only of a military nature, the revolt of the Jawarj was deep and enduring, because it operated on the level of emotions and sex, of eroticism and sensuality.

What is important here is the difference in the understanding of the gendered body in war efforts?

By differentiating between a purely military strategy and one that would involve social changes but more ‘feminine attributed weapons of seduction’ I think two important points are mentioned. One is the concretization (Festschreibung) of female resistance tactics on an utterly gendered and essentialist method of seduction and eroticism. The other fact is the necessity of change that goes beyond military tactics. As in following the history of the Amazons and the assessment of their victories and battles, the weapon of non-assimilated and non-legitimized female behaviour was more impressive and frightening for the social structure of the chronologists than the Amazons’ actual victories in war. It is the description of unusual gendered settings that is disturbing, the acknowledgement of female fighters does not really seem to agitate and confuse the chronologists.

Amazons

The positioning of the Dahomeyan Amazons as female fighting subjects is almost impossible, given the hegemonic discourse of colonial as well as gendered history. By using the example of the Amazons – or more – the construction of this African women warrior cast by white, male adventurers and colonial authorities one can relate the implications such descriptions give for the construction of femininity in Victorian Europe. There was no direct link drawn from the Amazons to the female fighters in Southern Sudan or Eritrea but there is an underlying story woven from the Amazons to the fear of active female fighters and the possible consequences their example might have on civilian women. One of the most striking parallels is the impossibility for women to be both, female civilians and female fighters at the same time. It is either or. Multiple identity setting on the other hand, doesn’t seem to be problematic for a male identity.

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754 Ibid. p. 39


756 The foundation myth of the Dahomeyan Amazones ranks from early elephant huntresses, Ahangbé, the twin sister of King Akobo (1680-5), policewomen, the king’s guard to regular troops. It is important to note that the theory, whereby the king’s twin sister initiated the Amazon women’s army, is based on the narration that she acted up for him. Here again the sister is taking on the male role of a ruler as an emergency part-time identity and as a man (in drag) won the victory. Herefore see Stanly B. Alpern, Amazones of Black Sparta: The Women Warriors of Dahomey (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), p. 22
Men can be fathers, fighters, husbands, citizens, normgivers and rulers all at the same time. 
Kate Muir\textsuperscript{757} quotes Hippocrates’ description of an Amazon tribe, as somebody who is interested in the differences of their social traditions, initiations and settings and the fact that these women – unlike his own womenfolk – go to war:

There is a Scythian race dwelling around Lake Maeotis (the Sea of Azov), which differs from other races. Their name is Sauromate (Saramatians). Their women ride, shoot and throw javelins while mounted. They remain virgins until they have killed three of their enemies and only then may they marry once they have performed the traditional sacred rites. A woman who takes a husband may no longer ride unless she has to at time of wars.\textsuperscript{758}

Portraying the Scythian Amazons, Renate Rolle\textsuperscript{759} elaborates on the same effect and consequences, as we will see with the colonizers assemblage of the Dahomeyan Amazons. The deep fascination collides with the social understanding of femininity patterns. The Amazon becomes a respected enemy but therefore has to give up her status as a woman. Herodot introduces them in his Book IV, the Skythian book, and Pseudo-Hippokrates elaborates on them in ‘De aere, aquis, locis’.

Even Penthesilea the peacemaker quoted in the beginning is linked to an image of a leader of Amazon troops. Mentioning Amazons fulfills the task of inscribing gender standards and socializing male and female norms. It is inherent in many societies and definitely it was a core factor for the constitution of the image of the peaceful, domesticated, Victorian woman as reflected in the faces of the ‘black beastly female warriors’, the destructive Kali goddess of the Dahomeyan jungle. Many of the documents discuss the sexual nature of ‘those’ women. There are debates on the interrelation of war-grounded cruelty and the impossibility of passionate love.

It is particularly interesting to see what confusion and fear these women inflicted in the male adventurers. It seems to be a similar driving force as to what Alpen reflects on the possible reason for the ancient Greek to invent the Amazon myth:

Greek males viewed their patriarchal society as natural, orderly, civilized. It was normal for men to rule, fight, hunt, farm, exercise outdoors and control marriage and reproduction. It was normal for women to obey, marry, keep house, rear children, for girls to be virginal and wives to be chaste and modest, constant and tame. For Greek males, who monopolized public discourse, Amazon society was a topsy-turvy world, unnatural, disorderly, uncivilized, barbaric, even bestial – and therefore doomed. It was an object lesson in what could happen if Greek gender roles and values were reversed and women took charge.\textsuperscript{760}

\textsuperscript{757} Muir, \textit{Arms and the Woman}

\textsuperscript{758} Hippocrates on the Amazons, Fifth cent. BC in Ibid. p.60

\textsuperscript{759} Renate Rolle, in Schwert in Frauenhand: Weibliche Bewaffnung, ed. Gabriele Frohnhaus, Grotkamp-Schepers Barbara, and Renate Phillip (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1998), p.18

\textsuperscript{760} Hacker, \textit{Gewalt Ist: Keine Frau: Oder Eine Geschichte Der Transgressionen}. p. 130. Hanna Hacker elaborates in great length and detail on the various observations of male adventurers on the Dahomeyan Amazons. Here Frederick Forbes supports the thesis that by training in warlike cruelty the Amazons forget their libido but find perverted satisfaction in torturing their victims in the battlefield. Whereas Sir Richard Burton suspects the Amazons to tend to masturbation or lesbian love as a replacement. \textit{“In der Regel bevorzugen diese Kämpfenden célibataires die morosa coluptas der Scholaren und die Eigenarten der Zehnten Muse.”}

\textsuperscript{761} Alpern, \textit{Amazones of Black Sparta: The Women Warriors of Dahomey}. p. 8
The disrespectful, disparagement of Dahomeyan female warriors for the purpose of sharing the knowledge of the ‘beastly, unruly ‘Other’ is the exhibition in the Zoo of Frankfurt/Germany. The announcement was: “Amazon corps from Dahomey (West Africa) under the leadership of high warrior Gumma”.

Here the pure, white domesticated women back home, the ideal of a peaceful woman emerges as a prettified construct out of the imagery of bestiality, the creature of nature and predator imagery of African warrior women. The Cartesian mind/body dualism and the enlightened binary distinction between male, culture, rational, strong, protector and control on one hand and female, nature, emotional, weak, need for protection and out of control seems to be directly translated into the imagery of the Amazon women as the ‘Other’ and the possible threat of the ‘we-group’-women to fall and follow this unruly natural tendency.

As Muir reflects on this further, she assumes that, „To the colonizers, the African women seemed to be a different SEX than their British women back home.”

Or, as Hanna Hacker conjectures in her explanation of the woman warrior Dahomey, the reports reflect the irritation of crossing. Hacker goes even further in relating the ‘death of the black female warrior’ as a precondition for the narration of the white female heroine of war. Or, as in the case of mythical gender constructions in South Africa, white women stand for peace, black women for violence.

Äußerlich gleicht die Amazone allen Schwarzen; im allgemeinen hat sie eine rauhe oder männliche Stimme und wirkt wie ein Mannweib. (…); nur als junges Mädchen weist sie noch die Kennzeichen ihres Geschlechts auf.”

[The Amazons appear alike all Black; in general do they have a rough and deep voice and appears like a mannish woman. (…); Only as a young girl does she show signs of her gender. (Translation A.W.)]

From the same era, there are similarities in documents on women in Southern Sudan. The imagery used is mainly based on a non-desirable femininity: “distinctly plain and uninteresting in their appearance”, “Of purely animal consciousness” and “Incapable of a continuous strain of thought.”

Wyndham goes even further in dehumanizing descriptions of Nilotic women, mainly linked to their bodily appearance “Dinka women emerging from their huts suckling their
babies at revolting pendulous breasts, (...) they could prove to be perfect domestic pets.\textsuperscript{66}

Or as John W. Burton states: “Nuer women showed a decided bitchiness towards the world in general.”\textsuperscript{69}

Neither description gives the impression of the author acknowledging his hosts as respected human beings. Yet the description of Dahomey reveals another mosaic piece that of the women as bridges between outside and inside world. Those women seem to be in a position to be women and citizens – those listened to in the public sphere – at the same time. There is a certain cast of Dahomeyan warrior women that are named as leopards’ wives. In Hanna Hacker’s text of the female warrior, the wives of the leopards or ‘those who gave birth to leopards’ had been the section of the mothers of kings. Further, the connection of people with leopards plays a big role in warrior initiations throughout the African Continent. The \textit{Kpodjito}, those women who represent (symbolic and real) the mothers of all dead kings, had been the cast excluded from warfare but not from power. Since they represent the ancestors and the politically more relevant ancestors, as the kings’ mothers the \textit{Kpodjito} had respect and power.

The \textit{Akhosi}, the rest of the women in the king’s palace of Dahomey, recruited the Amazons in times of war.\textsuperscript{70}

In an almost euphemistic terminology Hacker analyses the phenomena of the mother institution. She refers to it as a wholeness that is able to present the inside as well as the outside to the king, who has the power over both spheres. The interpreters between the female sphere of the inside and the male outside are the Eunuchs, according to Hacker’s interpretation.\textsuperscript{71}

As Burton reflects in his report on the mission to Gelele\textsuperscript{72}, the women warriors that most pleased the king (Gezo), became part of his harem and would be named Leopard wives. The precondition of this, entering the sphere of the women – the harem – would be to give up fighting – to regress back to a pure feminine female identity and reality. This equally reflects the position Plato ascribes to the Spartan guardians, where celibacy is a prerequisite of a state loyal guardian. The renunciation of family loyalty is a precondition for all Spartan warriors, male and female.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{66} R. Wyndham, \textit{The Gentle Savage} (London: Cassell and Company. 1936) p. 131. After Ibid. p. 56

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{70} Hacker, \textit{Gewalt Ist: Keine Frau: Oder Eine Geschichte Der Transgressionen}, p. 132

\textsuperscript{71} This adds another dimension to the questioning of dichotomic gender settings

\textsuperscript{72} Richard Francis Burton, \textit{A Mission to Gelele, King of Dahome: With Notices of the So Called “Amazons,” the Grand Customs, the Yearly Customs, the Human Sacrifices, the Present State of the Slave Trade, and the Negro’s Place in Nature} (London: Tylston and Edwards, 1893). As quoted in Muir, \textit{Arms and the Woman}

\textsuperscript{73} Plato and Lee, \textit{The Republic}. Book V (457c-459d)
The relevancy here is to use dialectic ability to see these factual descriptions, this ‘doing history’ in their various contexts and eras. Moritz Winternitz, an ethnologist and Indianologist, in a speech in Prague described the strength of the African Amazons:

Bekannt ist, daß auch der König von Dahomey in Afrika sich mit einer Leibwache von Frauen umgibt, die ganz den Männern gleichgestellt sind und mit diesen an Tapferkeit wetteifern. Ihre Zahl schwankt nach den Angaben verschiedener Berichterstatter zwischen 2.000 und 10.000.

It is known that the king of Dahomey in Africa surrounds himself with female bodyguards. Those women are ranking on the same level with men and compete with them in bravery. Their number differs according to the different reporters between 2.000 and 10.000. [Translation, AW]

Beside their acknowledgement as warriors, women in Dahomey also played a part in public life:

Der König sitzt auf einem goldenen Thron mit geschultertem Gewehr. Sie tragen goldene Armreifen und Halsbänder. Höflinge küssen die Erde und sagen einer alten Frau, was sie an den König weitergeben soll.”

The king resides on a golden throne, arms shouldered. They wear golden bracelets and necklaces. Princelings kiss the ground and tell an old women what she is supposed to convey to the king.” [Translation A.W.]

And further, the late 19th century adventurist/abolitionist John Dunan, portrays the impressive force of Dahomeyan Amazons:


On his first day he spots about 6.000 female warriors. Indeed, a very energetic impression altogether. They shaved part of their skull. They wear a blue and white striped frock that reminds on the Scottish kilt, short pants and a bandolier. The next day he counted 8.000 women. Against trained European soldiers they would have no chance, but they appear martial in comparison to their male counterpart. They are clearly superior to the armies of the neighboring countries. Female army members climb a thorn hedge in an attempt to show a dramatic and bloody presentation. [Translation A.W.]

Even the question of comparability is placed in the colonial gender discourse. Dunan refers to an investigation of his majesty, asking about the possibility of British women becoming soldiers. This is declared impossible by the colonial discoverer. Interesting is the position of certain women that reach the status of mothers of the king and wives of the king. Among the Makee, an enemy group of the Dahomeyans, the expression ‘wife of the queen’ marks men, especially and honourably chosen to guide and control certain expeditions. The pattern for self-identification of the Amazons is quoted as a

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774 Hacker, Gewalt Ist: Keine Frau: Oder Eine Geschichte Der Transgressionen, p. 126
775 Snelgrave, 1735, quoted in Ibid. p. 127
776 John Duncan on an Anti-Slavery mission in Abomey in June 1845, quoted Ibid. pp. 128.
reflection of the outsider description that is labelling those women as unwomanly or as men.

One question remaining is of course, why the King of Dahomey preferred women to men as his bodyguards, his palace guards. As one can find parallels in what Muamar Ghaddafi is arguing by using female guards, the discourse goes into the naturalized notion of feminine loyalty.

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777 Graeff-Wassink, Women at Arms: Is Ghadafi a Feminist?
**IV. 5. DISCOURSE: BODY**

Body as the canvas of colonial construction of western femininity

In the context where every man is a soldier, every woman becomes an occupied territory.  

The body — in general — plays a prominent role in war and preparation to war. The body of the warrior/solider, reflecting strength and virility, the body of the women/mother/prostitute, promising home, sensuality, desire, signifying vulnerability. Body becomes the location of the essence of woman. Whereas the body is perceived as the location of the pre-existence of sex, the demarcation of in and out, the symbolic feminine natural existence. The purified, shaped, modelled body the locus where culture inscribes it’s (con)text on symbolizes the masculine. The use of this signification for mobilizing purposes is complex. The sexualised female body exemplifies the ‘Other’, the enemy as well as the desired aspect of home.

How a strict codex of honor – specifically valid for the female body of the home-front who needs to be protected from enemy atrocities – can be synchronized with the use of the female body of the ‘we-group’ for intelligence belligerent purposes is quite astonishing.

The ridiculisation of the ‘drag’ of the female body as the fighter-body, the exclusion of the woman-warrior by the exclusive masculinity of the fighter imagery is the centre of discussion in the chapter of the female fighter. The issue here is the sanctioning of the female body as a tool for fighter men.

Women’s bodies are topic of a large number of feminist work and research. The significance of the body as the canvas to mark ones territorial rights, as the symbol of authentic tradition as the guarantee of the unchanged safe and secure reality for the warrior must be considered. Body is the locus of sex differences. The female body represents the honor of the family/community/ethnic group/nation. The female body turns easily into mutilated territory, an enemy, a ‘non-we’ to be ostracized. The female body IS, it does not actively produce or create. ‘These things’ – sexual intercourse, bearing children, menstruation – happen to the female body, with or without consent. The warrior body signifies the opposite. The warrior body actively transforms itself into a fighting machine.

As Cynthia Enloe emphasizes; the ab-use of the female body constitutes the new militarised masculine family. “*Men in war almost always relate to each other in terms of rank and in a lot of circumstances, rape serves to rebond men across personal differences and hierarchies.*”

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779 See the feminist discourse on honor killings as well as the discourse on female circumcision. http://www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes/Mat_IHRM.doc.

The distinctive dividing line between militarised and non-militarised sexual violence, rape and violence in general becomes more and more blurred. Women’s bodies in wars are used as essential tools, either to guarantee ‘unity’, the stability of the we-group or to devalue the enemy. The female body is the location of desire and departure, the signifier for return and normality, the apparatus for war, love and reproduction. Devaluation of the male enemy can be achieved by abusing, taking and marking the women of the enemy – by a descriptive devaluation of the enemy as less strong than their women or by portraying enemy women as amoral, infected prostitutes. Women’s bodies in war become the battlefield on which men communicate their rage to other men, as Darius Rejali concludes from Susan Brownmiller’s analysis of the militarised rapes in Bosnia.

Whereas the male body is granted sexual needs the female body becomes mined territory. Similar considerations of control that are leading to the spreading of circumcision and infibulations of women in Sudan are raised, when denying women access to the military or fighting forces in general.

As female fighters report about sexuality amongst the fighters, the issue of female and male body becomes tremendously political. Whereas for the male fighting body sexuality is a right, for the female warrior it is the reminder of her feminine existence, something that slows her down or puts her in ‘place’. As Agnes reports from her situation in Monrovia during the war she refers to women as to their bodies:

Women were treated like gees that were battered. I would say that our bodies were exchanged for food. The rebels were in charge of all the food in the country at that time. (...) But if you wanted to live, you had to have some connection with a rebel. (...) Men feel the women are responsible for what happened, that we did it willfully. They consider us prostitutes. During that period they were helpless. They were like babies. They were not able to look after their families any more. A wife had to sacrifice herself, her marital contract, everything, to save the family, yet the men are not grateful.

The uncontrollable nature of women’s sexuality and the justified basic need of male sexuality are set in an almost universal agreement. Since the world outside of the warrior-body, the militarised masculine bonding becomes chaotic, fearsome, and feminine, a sphere that must be controlled and conquered, the female body of the militarised family is somehow an outrage, a nuisance. The moral accusations of women reach beyond the project of enemy image construction deep into the field of

781 Creveld, Frauen Und Krieg.
782 Klaus Theweleit, Männerphantasien. Theweleit refers to rumors spread by the German army that Russian prostitutes would carry STD in order to kill the enemy ‘body’. Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol. 2, Male Bodies.
784 In Muslim areas in Sudan – although circumcision is not Islamic – girls are circumcised and infibulated in more than 90%. See material from Rainbow and Sudan National Committee on Eradication of Harmful Practices (SNCTP).
785 Agnes, Monrovia. In Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight - Arms to Protect.p. 36
female fighters. As Judith Hicks-Stiehm\textsuperscript{766} describes for the case of World War II US army, an enormous slander campaign was launched to morally accuse women who were willing to join the army as being promiscuous prostitutes or lesbians. Whereas at the same time the right of men to have sexual relationships was officially regulated by providing prostitutes for the soldiers or accepting and encouraging camp followers as part of the Tross. Yet, as Cynthia Enloe\textsuperscript{767} argues, the label of the camp follower was clearly not one to ‘be part of, but one to be dependent on, one to tag along’.

Yet women’s bodies played a role in the history of resistance as well as guerrilla warfare. Women would use their bodies to humiliate attackers, as Kenyan Kikuyu and South African\textsuperscript{768} women did by lifting their skirts in order to embarrass the attackers (since age rules over gender in some cases, the embarrassment would be based on the notion of younger police or army men attacking their symbolic mothers.) By showing their backs or even their sexual organs, the link to ‘this is where you came from’ or even ‘do you need to go back in there?’ the embarrassment had worked in these specific incidents.

As one reason to keep women out of armed struggle, women’s body read – nature – is always a main argument. Body is important in the production of the masculine soldier as well as in the campaign on the vulnerable women. Body is the locus of rape, torture and sexual slavery – all three tools used in contemporary warfare.

Rape

From the warfare cabinet: rape and sexual slavery

The issue of rape, sexual slavery and torture as modern warfare techniques can be read as indicative for the status of women as citizens as well as combatants. Cynthia Enloe distinguishes at least three forms of militarised rape:

(1) “Recreational rape” as the alleged outcome of not supplying male soldiers with “adequately accessible” militarised prostitution;

(2) “national security rape” as an instrument for bolstering a nervous state; and

(3) “systematic mass rape” as an instrument of open warfare.\textsuperscript{769}

Not only the fact and the ignoring of rape within guerrilla units but the evidence of rape as a tool of modern warfare indicates the status of the female body as constitutive for the masculine identity. Rape is used in war for different purposes. Regardless of the

\textsuperscript{766}Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman. p. 98

\textsuperscript{767}Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. p. 37. The history of camp followers is closely linked to the changes in the nature of European military and army formations. From the poor women following the army on foot to sell their goods and wash the soldiers cloths into the semi-official army prostitution supply.

\textsuperscript{768}Creveld, Frauen Und Krieg. p. 44

\textsuperscript{769}Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. p. 111
purpose, the effect it has on the women or child who is raped is devastating. As Cynthia Enloe argues for the case of rape and sexual torture it is deliberately used to destroy the women’s control over her own sexuality, to lose her feminine respectability and to reduce her into a non-person.

Rape amongst guerrillas is a taboo – mainly because the body of the fighting force needs to be conserved as gender neutral, as non-feminine. It questions the assumption of fighting women as comrades, as part-time men. It also questions the purity of the right cause, the innocence of the just war. However rape amongst combatants is a common theme and overall reality and always has a power imbalance and gender hierarchy included:

Some companeros took advantage of the girls, they’d say, “We’re here, all alone. Why don’t you come to bed with me?” and there were girls there who hadn’t had any experience, so... If you were lying down, stretched out, another man would come and lie down with you. But this didn’t happen for long. (...) We women spoke out against it. We told the people in charge that it couldn’t go on. “We’re putting in as much as you are”, we said. “we cannot allow these companeros, just because we’re here without out mothers and fathers, to take advantage of us.” And so they put an end to it.

The unifying factor for people opposing women in any forces and those declaring sex a taboo of the forces is the thread the body encapsulates for the morale. Love amongst fighters is destabilising whereas rape of the enemy women is a masculinating drive. Rape of the enemy women is again a completely different issue, since it is mainly a warfare tool of communication amongst enemy men. As Caroline Nordstrom discusses on the case of the rape and killing of children in and without war it is not only communication amongst men, but also rather a national issue:

A second reason why children are maimed, molested, and killed in war has to do with the subjugation and humiliation of the enemy. This war is a symbolic one, fought out on the physical bodies of those least able to protect themselves and least implicated in the war effort. The message in war is that if a state is so weak as to allow this to happen to its children, how can it possibly have the political and moral strength to govern a population? Mankeka sums up the relationship between (constructions of) childhood – especially that of girls.

790 Weber, „Sudan: Rape as a Weapon of War...“. During the interviews in three refugee camps in Chad, May 2004, the long term effects were mainly brought up by the women. The alerted us to the uncertainty of the women, if she will be accepted back into her marriage and community and furthermore explained, that it would be expected from a women who fell pregnant as a result of rape, that she would leave the community or abandon the ‘Jenjawid’ (the enemy) child.

791 Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives p.130

792 see the reactions on the launch of the semi-documentary FLAME about rape cases in the Zimbabwean guerrilla forces. Further reactions on the forces in El Salvador, Nicaragua and other post-guerrilla countries.

793 Esmeralda, 24, joined the FMLN (El Salvador) as a teenager. In Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight - Arms to Protect, p. 202

794 See Alexjewitsch for the forbidden love amongst red army cadres Alexjewitsch, Der Krieg Hat Kein Weibliches Gesicht p.183. For El Salvador: Love slows you down. In: Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight - Arms to Protect. As well as the immensely high divorce rate of fighter marriages in Eritrea gives an idea about the taboo of love amongst fighters.
Brownmiller and Rajali argue that rape is ensuring male identity. “Rape in Bosnia(...) has been produced not merely by a crisis in ethnic identity but rather by a crisis in male identity.” — rape however is against the code of conduct of almost all armies and insurgencies. Martial law is applied to judge the perpetrator, yet at the same time it is used as an act of spectacular violence ordered by commanders and executed by fighters. The more rape occurs in a war, the more it seems accepted as a war-related fate for women. The history of warfare includes rape of enemy women as well as rape of women of the population supposedly to be protected by the very rapists. According to two former female SPLA combatants Aroghu and Aliza, forced marriage, rape and sexual harassment was prevalent in the SPLA. Further, women who refused to give in, faced punishment, including torture.

Sexual atrocities are mentioned as brutal humiliation attacks as well as enemy image constructs. “When Riek Machar took Bor, they amputated the breasts of 50 girls.” “Kerubino’s people were given free hand to rape their mothers and sisters.” The effect of rape then goes beyond the destruction of dignity and safety for the individual women. The effect becomes an enterprise of social disruption. Specifically in places where the rape victim is constructed as both, the silent, helpless victim as well as the women of questionable morale. During field research in eastern Chad amongst refugees from Darfur, I talked to a group of Masalit refugees in the camp of Goz Amer. Men and women alike publicly agreed, that pregnancy would not be possible in the case of rape. Only if there is consent — or, as they said — if there is feeling — a woman could become pregnant. Discussing this further on the many examples of mass and gang rape used against women and girls in this conflict, they agreed that possibly in a gang rape situation a woman could become pregnant as well. However, this exemplifies the multiplicity of violations and assaults the rape victim has to deal with.


797 Although the fact is communicated by many women in Southern Sudan, this testimony is third hand. Quoted in Asma Abdel Halim, Attack with friendly weapon. In: Turshen, ed., What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa.p. 96. Refering to an article in Interpress Service of April 1997.

798 Interview with Cdr James Adiang.

799 There is an extensive report by Badya house on rape and sexual slavery by all forces. Throughout my work as a researcher for amnesty international, I was able to collect a vast number of eyewitness reports of women who either where raped or witnessed atrocities such as rape and sexual torture by all parties to the Sudanese conflict. [Archive of the author]

800 Mission as a delegate for amnesty international. The research resulted in the report: Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war......
Grandmother’s encouragement as well as societies reaction thereby is fulfilling the vicious circle. The rape victim is becoming the women with a questionable morale whose honor is only be rescued by dying, i.e. committing suicide or by revenge of her men folk by raping the women of the rapists side.

Rape as a tool in warfare includes a nationalistic aspect such as the production of children of the rapist’s nationality. The major fear of the women from Darfur was to give birth to a Jenjawid – an enemy – child. The mothers genetic line and the socialization of the child in the community of the mother played a minor role. This also reflects the minor citizen status of the mother.

In the case of Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains; slavery, including sexual slavery becomes an increasing pattern. In the army barracks of the Nuba Mountains as well as on the farms of northern Sudanese herdsmen, girls and women are kept in slavery. Reportedly they are consequently raped by a number of male members of the household and the children born out of these rapes are – by law – property of the male family. In testimonies by women who escaped their slave holders this was often the decisive argument why the women would not try to flee, since they did not want to leave their children behind. In a discussion in the then headquarters of SPLA in the Nuba Mountains, Changarro in December 1996. Women problematised the integration of women who were raped and the children born out of the rape.

As Hanan, a respected leader of the community reported, there is a tendency of a re-arrangement of ethnicity of the area as one of the reasons for the systematic rape in the government camps.

In the peace camps they give the girls to the soldiers. When they attack they take the girls and the women to carry their booty. Then they have to stay with the soldiers in their place. They say they marry them – they have a name for this – the girls have to wash and cook, clean and everything like a wife for this soldier and they have sex with the girls. They say they should not give birth to Nuba children any more.

The testimonies of rape by the government army soldiers and the soldiers of PDF and the government's southern allies as well as the forces of SPLA and their allies are endless and devastating. They also reflect on the hypocrisy of those preaching the right way to life, the tradition to take care of and the moral of the communities and their women in specific. It is not only the de-humanisation of the enemy women that is taking place here; it is as well the rape of women even of the own extended family. Rape in the extended family or within close tight communities is a deep destruction of

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801 For Sudan see the grandmothers encouragement to rather die than being raped in Asma Abdel Halim, Attack with a friendly Weapon. In Turschen, ed., What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa. p. 95. The aspect of revenge as well as the form rape is taking as a tool of communication and how wartime rape is used as a spectacle see Schott, “Gender and Postmodern War.”: 52 as well as the vast literature on Bosnian rape cases as Nikolié-Ristanovic, “War, Nationalism and Mothers.”

802 Nikolié-Ristanovic, „War, Nationalism and Mothers.” p. 361

803 The Government of Sudan named the camps ‘peace camps’. They installed the camps in the mountains, separating men and women and claiming that those camps are the only stability provided to the people of the area. See more on the ‘peace camps’ in: „Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan.”

the care paradigm of kinship. In absence of state or government, kinship and community is the focal point of relation/interrelation and communication. Kinship becomes the only known and reliable formation for security and reliable relations. Rape as a systematic weapon of war disrupts and destroys the social fabric as its consequence.

Those cases show clearly how militarised masculinity can function with full impunity outside of the normal code of conduct without the fear of accountability, shame or compensation, carried out in full impunity. Those who keep ‘their’ women in place by defining the moral superiority of the groups roles and traditions and forcing women to obey by their laws, do not seem to need to obey to those rules and regulations themselves. As Kauwtha, an 18-year-old woman testifies the horrendous violation she had to endure by SPLA forces and the fact that her relative was involved in it, exemplifies the lawlessness of militarised masculinity.

Rape was part of my daily life and I gave up. While being raped by the commander and the vice-commander daily, the two guards harassed me during the day time, which I was able to resist by doing all the cooking, washing the clothes of the commander and the others. (...) He is my relative. We are from the same tribe. He is married to my cousin. I greeted him, but he pretended not to know me. He asked me to take off my underwear, which I found strange from a relative who knows that I am married and pregnant. Suddenly he pulled me, took off my cloth and laid me down on the bed. He started raping me in a very cruel way. It was so painful, as I am circumcised, pregnant and very tired from running and grinding sorghum.

Abducted women suffer through tremendous humiliation of sexual slavery and mass rape. Those women who are able to articulate the atrocities would hardly ever talk about themselves but rather refer to a sister, cousin or friend they had heard of being raped. Children were raped as well as grandmothers and if they could not use their rape victims to carry their booty after attacking their village, they would reportedly torture and subsequently kill the women and girls. In some cases they would leave women destroyed and marked for others to see.

On our way from Western Upper Nile to Tonj we passed people dying. Dead people. We had to continue walking to find a safe place. I saw this fighter – my brother [brother does not reflect a real family relation] with a young girl. She was crying – she was on her back and they pushed a long stick into her. Into her private parts. I don’t know if this girl is still alive.

The claim to protect those who need protection is impossibly to be justified by armed groups raping and abusing their ‘own’ population. But not only the aggressor, the failure of the civilian male population is evident in wars and is leading to anger and frustration by the women towards ‘their’ men. Even more, it leads to anger and

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805 Kauwtha was abducted 1998 when she was six month pregnant while collecting firewood. She was abducted together with other women and taken to a military camp by a group of soldiers on gunpoint. Testimonies in a report on the Badya center for Integrated Development Services..

806 Achol Jok, a women in her 30s interviewed in Mapel, Southern Sudan in October 1999. Notes in possession of the author.
frustration of the men towards the women, since they feel humiliated by the rapists and aggressors 'using their women'. In a testimony by Amna, a woman from the Nuba Mountains this becomes evident:

Whenever my husband goes to the farm, three or four soldiers would come. They forced my children to stay outside the hut. They raped me one after the other. The first time, I told my husband about it and he kept quiet. Next time I complained to the chief of the tribe, but he kept quiet too. What happened to our men?

On the other hand, rape as well constitutes a narration of just war-revenge. On the rape of the 'own' women the revenge against the enemy is to rape 'their' women. Not only by the soldiers but also by the women themselves this eye for eye logic is supported.

**Female Rapists**

Rape can be seen as the ultimate humiliation and is specifically used in acts of spectacular violence, in front of the family and/or the community of the rape victim. If women rape other women, the violation of the victims body and the communication to the men of both sides is of importance. For the men of the own faction this signals, "I am like you, I overcame my womanhood and distanced myself from the same body"—the message to the men of the other side is that of utter humiliation. "I, as a woman, can control, use and abuse your women and you have no control over them nor me". However, there is a fundamental difference if women rape other women. For one they do not involve their own bodies but use instruments and women to women rape cannot lead into pregnancy. The destruction of the body is real yet the long-term consequences are based on the symbolic character of humiliation and violence in the act of rape.

As a women from Monrovia, Liberia reports about female combatants.

They were very quick to kill. The least mistake you made, you were down. Their aggression was mainly against women. They would strip you naked. They would shove the grenade somewhere up in your private parts. They would put their hands all where they're not supposed to go, saying they were looking for grenades. People would be more afraid of them, because the female combatants' temper was very quick.

It is not too surprising that female combatants would use sexual harassment and encourage rape since for both the bonding in the new family of militarised comrades is exclusive of the feminine sphere. Yet, it is interesting to follow the logic. The myth of the strength of the warrior is completely reversed by raping defenceless and helpless civilian women and children but nevertheless is becoming military semiotic symbolism, as Caroline Nordstrom names it. Continuing her analysis, Nordstrom asks two

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807 Agnes, quoted in Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., *Arms to Fight - Arms to Protect*. p. 38

808 Nordstrom, *Girls and Warzones - Troubling Questions*. p. 31
questions, first, why is it that children and women are raped and second is there a
difference between war and peace in the logic of sexual violence?
Nordstrom answers her question referring to a model of power, that is overshadowing
most relations, from individual to international.
Beyond the constructions of terror and their relationship to socio-political power,
beyond notions of purity and a nation’s morality, appears a tragic fact: children are
abused by those with more power and strength simply because they can be.

To explain: many of the world’s discourses on war, from Sun Yat Sen to Clausewitz, from
The Seven Samurai to John Wayne, revolve around the notion of a moral contest between
equals. This belief continues to pervade both popular and military ideologies. The ideology
of contests between equals appears, however to be a dangerous myth that hides a
seamier truth: violence is often conducted against those who by their very nature cannot
fight back. (?)
The underlying political-legal philosophy on which they (western political systems of government) are based
is the classical one, that there are those who have the right to expect obedience and others who have a
moral obligation to obey. Empirically, however, we have to conclude that the right of the elite to expect
obedience is a right derived from possession of the power necessary to impose values and institutions on
others.

Whereas Nordstrom is using the last part of this quote to question conflict
assessments and regulations in the field of International Relations, I find this analysis
strikingly matching to the situation of sexual violence – based on militarised masculinity
or not.

Rape as a Bond with the new Militarized Family

Rape plays more and more a role in separating civilians from soldiers, estranging
fighters from their families and communities, such as in the cases of child combatants
of the militias in Southern Sudan, the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army in Sudan,
Charles Taylor’s forces in Liberia as well as the various forces in eastern DR Congo
using child soldiers. The male recruits are forced to rape and kill their relatives to
ensure the bonding of the ‘military family’ based on the impossible re-integration in the
biological family. As bondless outcasts children can be used more easily since all
they have is the military unit. For the abducted girls the fact of sexual slavery –
euphemistically described as ‘becoming the wife of’- is widely spread. In the case of
Southern Sudan girls forced into sexual relations or marriage with commanders is
widely known, as Elisabeth Adur describes it:

809 Ibid. pp. 32. Nordstrom is referring to John. W Burton and his understanding of conflict
resolution as a function of human needs.

810 During research I undertook for Human Rights Watch in May 2003, I interviewed children in
Gulu, northern Uganda after they escaped from the LRA. In most cases they were forced to
maim, rape or kill members of their own family. Weber, „Abducted and Abused: Renewed
Conflict in Northern Uganda…“

811 During an interview in Mapel in October 1999.
“While Kerbino was fighting in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, his soldiers took small girls and abducted them and used them as wives.” Two newly recaptured child soldiers Duar Apuk Madut (13 years) and Mayen Atem Tuck (13 years) explained, “When Kerubino’s men caught us they told us to go back to our villages and take the food. We were given guns to make sure that our people would not resist us.”

As Cynthia Enloe argues for the cases of conflict in Latin America, rape is used as an initiation of comrades a separation of civilians from compatriots. Donald Horowitz takes this further and talks about rape as used as an ethnic divider and ranking system. When ethnicity is not a property but rather a relationship between groups, rape can be used to arrange superordination and subordination of ethnic groups.

**Femininity as Camouflage**

The use of femininity as a camouflage of innocence – or better immaturity - in order to fulfil important tasks for the revolution might be one of the oldest means of action for revolutionary women. The concubine, who is using her body to collect information or influence political decisions. The woman who carries a baby - the symbol of innocence – as a cover to carry guns, bombs, plastic explosives in the baby carriage or who transports information (despatches) in the diaper of the baby. Algerian women used the Hijab to cover themselves and became irreplaceable rifle carriers. They equally used to dress in a westernised, French fashion to carry out their missions. As Fanon puts it: “it is in this learning process, without a rehearsal, that she (the Algerian woman) goes out onto the street, three grenades in her handbag or the report of the battle zone activities in her bodice.”

The gender setting based on symbolism of motherhood leads to a relationship that is controlled by the children - the guerrillas. If a woman accepts to be seen as the mother of all the children of the country, she is also expected to be as daring, loving, supporting in unconditional love as would be expected by a real mother. The mother is not allowed to turn her back on the children neither is she allowed to cut the supportive relationship. It is up to the children to leave the house, not up to a loving and caring

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812 Interview in Ameth in January 1997. They were captured by the SPLA the day before and their fate was unknown. Although the SPLA commander insisted that since they are so young, all we can do is find their families and ask them to take them back. Yet it is unclear what it was that the boys did and there was no possibility to follow up the procedure. The two seemed to be very frightened and told us that they will be interrogated by the SPLA on what they did and what they knew about Kerubino’s forces.

813 Cynthia Enloe in: Rejali, „After Feminist Analysis of Bosnian Violence.”. Pp. 365-371. P. 367. Enloe argues that Rape is used as an initiation of comrades and a separation of civilians and compatriots in the conflicts in Latin America.

814 Donald Horowitz in: Ibid. pp. 365-371

mother to kick her children out of the house, or even to tell them that she is not willing and might be against their cause. The symbolism of mother as the main inscriber of female identity acts as a severe reduction of female identity matrix.

**Prostitutes: the Ideal Guerilla?**

The fiction of the body as the generic weapon of women is important for the construction of femininity and in specific militarised femininity. The status of the war-relevant prostitute is discussed in the following because of the special status the female body and its placement in public and private spheres work in wars. Unlike the militarised prostitution, sexual slavery and rape used by armies and insurgencies for ‘their own fighting body’, the discussion here is on the image of the prostitute as an active guerrilla.  

Access to the public sphere and the public standing of a prostitute is often exceptional in a society with a strict gender code. By allowing the prostitute exclusive access to the public sphere, the public sphere becomes (if it has not been one before) a marked no-go area for the rest of women. For guerrilla groups to make use of prostitutes combines this double-bind image of the innocent female (by definition of sex/gender women are no security threat) with the potentially lethal warrior image. In general it exemplifies the more crucial fact of exclusion from informal politics that women normally are subjected to.

As Hannah Hacker describes with great accuracy when talking about the prostitute women as a duellist:

Häufig waren es Halbweltdamen, Schauspielerinnen und Prostituierte, denen Duelhandlungen zugeschrieben wurden – Personen also, die zu posieren wüßten, die gleichsam gewohnheitsmäßig etwas anderes darstellten, als sie waren, Frauen im Zwielicht des Exhibitionismus/Voyeurismus, öffentliche Frauen eben, die keine Geschlechtssehne mehr besaßen, Subjekte der ‘Halbwelt’, wo Überschreitungen und Ausschreitungen zu Hause waren.  

Quite often it was the demimondaine, actresses and prostitutes who were ascribed with duellist activities – a person thereof who knew how to pose, who as it were habitually perform something they are not. Women in the twilight of exhibitionism/voyeurism, ‘public’ women who had no personal sex-honour, subjects of the ‘demimonde’, where excess and riot are at home. [Translation A.W]

And further, when Hacker is asking the core question of this research

Frauen, die sich im Regelsystem Duell eine Subjektposition öffentlich anzeigenn versuchten, waren in der Tat ‘mitten unter uns’, allein schon deshalb, weil sie im öffentlichen Raum agierten; nur, waren sie da noch Frauen?  

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817 Hacker, *Gewalt Ist: Keine Frau: Oder Eine Geschichte Der Transgressionen.* p. 44

818 Ibid. p. 45
Women who tried to publicly appropriate the position of the subject through the system of duels regulations indeed have been ‘amongst us’ alone because they acted in public space, but, have they then be still women?

[Translation A.W.]

The combination of both, the innocent women’s image and that of the lethal warrior keeps the number of women with access to the public sphere limited, keeps prostitutes an exclusive group and guarantees no further societal (or symbolic) transition in a given society. The status of the prostitute is not turned into an attractive role and the societal discourse on private matters and sexuality tends to become public in war.

The remaining question is, how to construct the exclusive status of the revolutionary prostitute without questioning the morale code of gender restrictions in society in general? Or, in the words of Thapur Sarachi for the case of India: “Women mobilized to the streets have to distinguish themselves from women on the streets.”

When discussing issues of gender in the context of non-western societies, one has to remain alert, that the imagery of non-western women in general has a history of sexualisation throughout the centuries.

For the colonial forces the sexualisation of the African women’s body was constant and continuous. Black women were and are constantly constructed as sexualised. The African female body either became the locus of fertility or they were described as oversexed or as prostitutes. For the colonial rapporteurs the women of the Dahomey kingdom as well as the women of the Mau Mau uprising were distinctly sexualised in their description.

The figure of the prostitute in a war environment and the prostitute as a model used for building and destroying the myth of heroic fighters is not only popular but also well known. We find a wide range of women that use their body to execute the enemy. Judith beheading Holofernes, the leader of the enemy troops, Salome, Dalila, Pandora, Lilith, and Cleopatra might also be listed. For Simone de Beauvoir, this list nevertheless is more of a myth in the constitution of feminine contradictions. She writes:

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820 Namibian women were described as prostitutes, see Sander, Gilman in Donald and Rattansi, eds., Race, Culture and Difference, p.172
821 In several traveller accounts the offer by a male host to give the wife to the guest is reported with surprise. The ‘use’ or – culturally legalized rape – as the right of the guest however is enacted and described as a form of communication with the male host
822 This tendency of the Black female body as a source of sexuality and fertility lasts until modern colonialist travelers. In Schwazer Sudan, the author, Oswald Iten tells an anecdote when he was making use of the body of the wife of a Sudanese man he was interviewing. The author refers to it as if it would be a sheer normality for him to use a women’s body when offered by the male host. Oswald Iten, “Schwarzer Sudan,” (Kreuzlingen: 1978).
823 Cynthia Enloe refers to policies towards militarised prostitution in all her writings. In specific she works on the militarisation of women’s lives in the context of army bases, male soldiers and in warzones. See here the wide body of literature by Enloe.
This myth is so vague and contradictory that it is impossible to get to its communality: Dalila and Judith, Aspasia and Lukrezia, Pandora and Athene, the woman is Eve and Madonna in one. She is an idol, servant, source of life, force of darkness; she is prey of man and his ruin.  

The more objectifiably high ranking of prostitutes means that they are allowed to enter and to be present in the halls and spaces of power. In this sense, of masculinist power held by men in their separated space, collectively known as public space. The history of temple prostitutes, Geishas, and high-class prostitutes tells this story of dependency and power. There is an unusual potency and acceptance of the rationality of ‘sacred’ prostitution. But nevertheless this does not lead to a social acceptance (or even visibility) of prostitutes as subjects of society and/or the state.

Public space contrary to the private space is supposed to be the locus (kairos) of decision making, arguing, and talking. A public space in democratic myth has the connotation of something open, permeable for different opinions and views, as well as for representatives in persona of this democratic diversity of opinion. This has to be called a myth, since neither in the official political arena can we find a somehow equal proportion of representatives (women make up less than 10% of parliaments in a world survey), nor women in the key positions of power (military, foreign and internal ministry, economy), positions of finance (neither in free enterprise nor in ministries of finance and economy), in careers of public opinion (media, editors, chief editors), or in the space of populist public opinion (the bar or coffee house). Or, in the words of Amrit Wilson:

In this male world of drinking and social and political discussion (which included both Eritrean and Ethiopian men) the only woman present was the bar-woman – there to sell her body, but present nevertheless – the potential guerrilla fighter in more senses than one.

In Wilsons’ analysis, the question of why prostitutes seem to be potentially the most successful and best guerrillas is answered by their direct encounter with their oppression as women. I would doubt this, since many more women experience oppression and not only because the prostitute is taking money for selling her body makes her a pure victim of male oppression. Nevertheless, in the logic of enemy image construction and recruitment, the position of a prostitute is close to the core. As a woman with presence a prostitute in a bar has the possibility to anticipate debates and is definitely trained in sensing patriarchal hierarchies among men that is an important strategy to shadow and fight enemies in male-bonding constellations. By her appearance and the open agreement of her being purchasable, she has easy access to men and a very intimate and the customer feels sometimes emotionally strong connection. In an interview with Nebiat and with a friend of hers commenting, she tells her story to Wilson:

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824 Neither in Germany nor in the U.S. (where prostitution is illegal) do sex workers have official status or the right to social security or pension.

In this period (1974 to 1976) I started secretly working with the fighters who were entering town – buying commodities for the field and distributing political pamphlets. (...) At this time there was a powerful Ethiopian colonel. The EPLF wanted to kill him. (...) The EPLF asked me to help get rid of him. To do my assignment I forced myself and started dating him. He was always very careful; he always had guards around him. (...) It took me six month of study to carry out my task. After this six month, I succeeded in trapping him in my bar and the fighters liquidated him. I had made all the preparation. I had told the EPLF the time and the place, sold some of my belongings and got my car ready to escape. On Sunday afternoon, he came to my bar and I brought him some drinks. We sat for a while; then I said I would bring a cassette and play some music. I went into the bar and told the EPLF men waiting there that everything was ready – they could follow me. They came out and shot him. After that I could not stay on in Asmara. I took my son and I left. I came to the field.

I find the story of Nebiat remarkable and it seems to be a topic that appears in all revolutionary heroin narratives.

A story from the same continent seems to be very alienating, but points towards the question of recognition and appreciation, as Tabitha Kanogo, a Kenyan women already formulates while telling the story:

Prostitutes were involved in the struggle in various ways, but their contribution was nearly always denigrated by being portrayed in the context of their sexual flexibility rather than their political commitment. There is evidence, however, to suggest that their image was unfair and that prostitutes made an active political contribution.

In her example Kanogo refers to the Mau Mau uprising and the role Kikuyu women played in this anti-colonial struggle.

An important point that should not be overlooked is the power prostitutes have because of their control of sexuality. This could be understood as a factor in the construction of the 'pure, non-sexual' women at home, constructing the fantasies regarding sexually disastrous enemy women. The question of control of sexuality, power over sexual organs, and personification of the threat of the deity of sexuality (blood shedding, destructive and endless) brings this issue back to various readings on war, violence, and gender. The fear of the vagina dentata, the disparaging of the female enemy as whores, the excitable speech against sexually active women is the

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Ibid. p. 84

827 When lecturing at the European Peace University, the student body that I teach in seminar is from diverse background and from all over the world. If we start talking about the myth of heroes and heroines and the stories they heard about their countries’ revolutions and uprisings, almost all can tell a story that equals that of Nebiat. Students from Nicaragua insist that one of their heroes of the Sandinista revolution was a bar-woman, shooting the Somoza-militias by herself, the Colombian students know stories about undercover guerrillas working as prostitutes, the students from various places of the Indian subcontinent tell stories about prostitutes who became dacoits, rebels, and scared the feudal landlords. In none of those countries prostitution is seen as a honorable job and all of the students agree, that the social ranking of a prostitute is one of the lowest. These women appear in a light of heroism, yet there is no doubt that the use of women’s bodies is fully legitimate for the effort of a just war and at the same time a women using her body is still considered outrageous

It is not only the prostitute but also the enemy woman and the fear of the mythical sexual power that is inscribed in the imagery of the prostitute. The belief of deliberate contracting of venereal disease by prostitutes that are potentially working for the enemy side is as well a part of this sexualised enemy imagery. But certainly not only the enemy image was/is sexualised. The liberation warrior is marked as sexy and the assemblage of women in arms has a connotation of loose, sexualised women. This imagery possibly works in two directions. As long as one’s ‘own’ female soldiers are sexually accessible, they strengthen the masculinity patterns of their male comrades. In addition, if they resist, the sexualised female fighter turns into a challenge for the masculine male soldier. In an ambivalent way, D’Amico highlights the status of female soldiers.

(...) Service women are also valuable because they boost the morale of male troops with their ‘nurturant socialization’ and their availability for sexual service.

In Theweleits’ reading, it is the ‘proletarian whore’ that is becoming the internal enemy beside the monstrous Flinterweiber of the Red Army, the women that castrate with their guns, and not, as the proletarian whores do, with their sexuality.
Prostitutes as allegorical symbols for sexualised women’s bodies, used and abused in war are as well used as an insult. Women who were imprisoned, captured as prisoners of war (POW) were accused of low moral, insulted as prostitutes as women who are not real.

The myth of castration – as well documented in the writings on various Amazons, the Dahomeyan female warriors, deities, and the Kikuyu women of the MauMau uprising – peaks in the record of real castration as part of the initiation rite of the female Amazon soldier. “Die Genitalien getöteter Gegner nahmen sie manchmal als Kriegstrophäe mit.”

As for a fighter, the enemy woman becomes the emasculated menace. As Hacker and Alpern narrate, citing the Dahomeyan system and the castrating, celibate Amazons, Amazons do not only practices the castration praxis in myth. Castration as framing the ultimate threat to masculinity. Castration has to be seen as a myth in line with insensitive females, women transgressing their biological sex-predetermination such as related to the Dahomeyan Amazons again as ultimate paradox of un-feminine women, such as Dahomey women soldiers frequently shown with freshly beheaded enemy heads.

### Menstrual Blood as Initiation

Another topos in the realm of unruly natural femininity, which acts as a threat to steel-hardened, militarised masculinity, is menstrual blood. The re-evaluation throughout history is interesting. As Ehrenreich writes, the period linked to the moon cycle has had a powerful connotation whereas in modern militaries it becomes a problem of troop hygiene.


838 Reference to Initiation. Specifically in Sudanese societies a girls first menstrual blood is part of her initiation process to become a fully accepted member of society. With her first menstruation girls are leaving the sphere of childhood behind. In some ethnic groups, at least before the war, this was marked by tattoos and skin carvings.

839 In a superficially contrary understanding, the measures taken by the US army during the Gulf War could be mentioned. There it seemed to be more the fear of unruly nature, of menstrual blood, the old myth of impurity of women during their menstrual period, that forced the female combatants to permanently take contraceptive pills. This might not be strange under normal circumstances, yet in relation to the almost lethal medication intake of the U.S. soldiers, this became a factor that made military nurses quit their job because they had been refusing to give this medical cocktail. There are reports on this incidents in books by Muir, *Arms and the Woman*, and Schneider, *Sound Off! American Military Women Speak Out*) as well as memos on a speech given by a US military nurse who was active in the Gulf War, at the Soldiers of Fortune Convention in Las Vegas 1995. The memo is in possession of the author. I am aware that speeches delivered in a convention such as the mercenaries, right wing annual meeting do not make the most serious source. But since the US military did not open their Desert Storm files, it was at least information that was impossible to get through other media or publications.
To people who lacked even the concept of a ‘scientific explanation’, it may have seemed that women’s cycles control the moon, or else that the divine presence that is the moon expresses itself through the bodies of human females. (...) It does seem likely, though, that the synchronization of menstruation among women, and its further synchronization with the lunar cycle, could have sufficed to make menstruation an event of some public significance, if not an occasion for ritual observance.

The moon-cycle refers to a position of power that Mary Daly conceptualizes in her exposition on patriarchal religion. Furthermore it is linked to women’s warrior initiations. Ehrenreich quotes Camilla Power below with an example of the linkage of a Kung girl’s first menstruation equated with her enactment as a hunter:

Of the Kung girl (upon her first menstruation) people say, ‘she has shot an eland’. ... A similar metaphor is used by the Hadza for menarche: ‘She has shot her first zebra!’. Among the !Xo, this is ritually enacted. On the final day of seclusion, a gemsbok brown-skin shield is hung at the back of the menstrual hut, and the maiden is helped by the mistress of ceremonies... to shoot arrows against it.

Kanogo also mentions menstrual blood as an essential ingredient in ritual initiations for the Mau Mau uprising.

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840 Ehrenreich, Blood Rites. Origins and History of the Passions of War. p. 105
841 Daly, Gyn/Ecology. The Methaethics of Radical Feminism.
842 Ibid. p. 106
843 Kanogo, Kikuyu Women and Mau Mau. p. 86
IV. 6. GENDERED CONFLICT ROLES

It is the nature of womanhood to heal the wounds of the fighter
Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas

Es wirkt lächerlich an einem Mädchen, wenn es sich um Politik kümmert.
Sophie Scholl, 28. Juni 1940

Man should be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior; all else is folly.
Friedrich Nietzsche, 1883

„Who was Phentesilea? Clearly, I have not done justice to her, nor she to me. With her piercing eyes and cutting tongue, for me she was a little too sharp. Every appearance, every phrase of hers was a challenge to someone or other... The inhabited world, as far as we knew it, had revolted against us, with ever more cruelty, ever more fervor. Against us women, said Phentesilea. Against us humans, retorted Arisbe.

Phentesilea: The men will be satisfied.
Arisbe: You call them satisfied at reducing themselves to butchers?
Phentesilea: They are butchers. They are just doing what turns them on.
Arisbe: And us? What if we became butchers too?
Phentesilea: We do what has to be done. But it does not amuse us.
Arisbe: Ought we to do what they do in order to demonstrate our difference?
Phentesilea: Yes.

Aeno: But that’s no way to live.
Phentesilea: Not to live. But to die, yes... I rebuked Others keep your company... Cheek!, shrieked Penthesilea. And you are the one to say that! You, are neither fish nor flesh! A little more and we’d have been tooth and nail at each other... Until now, I had forgotten all that.

Valeria Russo translation of Christa Wolf

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844 In her material collection for the three Guineas, Woolf wrote on the questions of killing, nation, and representation: “Political Credo: why should I kill women? To kill women as a logical necessity (that is, if strength/power is the basic law behind all life, then women should feel the urge to kill women, just as men kill men), but I wouldn’t. Women do not need war. – No political party is possible right now... Why should brotherly love (compassion) stop where the canal ferry leaves? What has England done for me? Nothing. Now we all pay for the male leisure time. Certainly this would not have been the last. Let us push the real important things.” [Translation (A.W.)] quoted after: Sybil Oldfield, Frauen Gegen Den Krieg: Alternativen Zum Militarismus 1900-1990 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1992). p. 120.

845 Sophie Scholl was part of the resistance against Hitler and the Nazi terror. The group was called ‘Die Weiße Rose’ and was mainly active in Munich by distributing anti-Nazi leaflets. Sophie Scholl was executed by guillotine in February 1943 at the age of 22. The guillotine is the destiny for those claiming the inclusion of women in claims such as fraternité. Olympe de Gauche, one of the revolutionaries of the French Revolution and other female demanders of the power of decision-making died under the guillotine.

Inauguration of the Male Warrior/Citizen

To indulge into the specificity of gendered fighter images is an attempt to deconstruct and contextualize the (restricted) variety of gender roles that seem to appear in conflict situations. By examining the models of femininity apparently offered and publicly inaugurated and inscribed I hope to get closer to the underlying aspects of those almost universally used gendered conflict roles of women as mothers, fighters, whores and keepers.

Construct and inauguration of the male warrior body, the citizen-soldier is the prime factor discussed in this chapter. Was there ever a different image than that of the just warrior and the beautiful soul? What could the historic examples of Amazons or cross-gender female fighters teach us to understand the tendency of women to collaborate with fighting men – and with violent man in general? How is motherhood used as a mobilizing factor for guaranteed loyalty? And how can motherhood and prostitution play similar roles in mobilizing forces, sustaining support as well as in enemy intelligence? What is the functionality of initiation and military training, and what gender aspect is inscribed here to guarantee gender divisions in times of preparation to war, during war and after war? What is the role of the body in this polarized construction, the body of the just warrior as well as the body of the beautiful soul?

Those questions are essential to understand not only the cleavage between the roles of man and women in the insurgency in Sudan but moreover exemplify a greater interest in gender systemification for functioning patriarchal societies. In order to broaden one's imagery of reality of war and conflict there is a need to look beyond the trenches and the front-line, since those are exceptional places rather than the norm in the daily life of war. The issue of gendered use of violence plays a role in this chapter. Given that the phenomenon of the legitimate use of violence is universally divided along the gender line it is yet to be linked to the specific context of the wars in question.

Legitimized use of violence

If women commit 6% of crimes of violence, gendered use of violence is a crucial factor for the role of women in war.

Education in general is engendered in terms of enforcing and restricting the use of violence, or the acceptance of aggression as part of a person's psychological and social action and interaction, the socialization of gendered attribution plays an important role. It seems perfectly right for boys - in their development towards the image of strong, hardened, active men - to use violence and aggression, it is almost universally accepted. The contrary is true for girls in their development towards the ideal of soft, obedient, caring, reactive, or passive women. Whereas boys seem to be pushed to live out their aggression publicly, girls are restricted and punished if they do.

Consequently it appears to be normal for men to use aggression and violence against others. To involve others in the act of violence is a taboo for women in general. Child murder and husband-kilings are highlighted as abnormal when perpetrated by women, whereas domestic violence, wife beating, and warfare are seen as an extrapolation of civilization if done by man.

How fundamentally this expectation can change in exceptional circumstances was made clear to me when asking female former fighters in Eritrea about their relation to violence and the use of it. A standard answer is exemplified in what Lemlem Zwede said in an interview:

“The Ethiopian prisoners of war were afraid to be guarded by women. They preferred men to guard them, since we women would be cruel. I would say to my comrades, why feed them and keep them, since they killed our people. Why not shoot them right away?”

The use of violence in the socialization of boys and men is not based on a free choice but permanently challenged by society. The ongoing threat of not matching the standards of masculinity and manliness is definitely not easy to cope with for all men. Whereas it might not be easier for a man to resist these attributions of masculinity, or even to actively transcend them, it is a struggle from the position of the privileged normative subject towards a floating, reflective, un-located object status. Unless a man is not visibly and actively crossing these lines he will always have at least the assumed possibility to cross back into power positions. If a man openly resigns from his power insignias both sides will punish him. This is done by ridiculing, assaultive speech of demasculinization. From the side of the ‘Other’ who are lacking a subject status, he would be treated with astonishment and mistrust. How could somebody who is in a power position cross into the sphere of denied subject status, of the self as a projected ‘Other’?

The reverse, women crossing into masculine identity territory, can be studied throughout history. In general it is widely registered as a farce an/or an enormous presumption. Many of these crossings are based on the connotation of soldier as masculine. As van Creveld argues, women serve as individuals not as a group since military membership is not constitutive for women or femininity. It is only allowed for a

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849 Lemlem Zewede, interviewed in Asmara 5 April 1997

850 I will not go deeper in the feminist discourse on becoming a subject. For further reading see Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies.; Helen Cixou and Julia Kristeva and the psychologically oriented debate by Chodorow. Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory; and Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development and the moral theory of Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics.

small number of individual women who either accept to reintegrate back into their societal normative status or is perceived as having a 'problem with their sexuality.' Participation of women in the military does neither challenge nor change the constitutive setting, the dichotomy of gender roles and their social attribution. Femininity and therefore women are defined as 'deficiency' (not only) in the military context.

Rather than listing the names of the known warrior queens, nationalist patriots, revolutionary feminists and feminist pacifists, I would like to list the possible tasks and roles that we know women took, and take over in times of emergency, in times of war, and in the continuity of their regular life. Women work in underground movements, they hide, feed, nurse, nurture and heal guerilla fighters and soldiers. They carry information, print and distribute leaflets, they organize clandestine cells, safe houses, women's groups and communities for support. Many uprisings, revolutions, and riots started with bread riots organized by women out of practical gender needs - the pressure to arrange the survival of their families. In various feminist readings the French Revolution was initiated by women marching for cheaper bread prices, milkmaids thwarting the plan of the government and with the fisher women from the market, as did the fall of Nimeiri start in Sudan in 1985 with women marching for cheaper bread prices.

Is it a task or job women do as a result of the war as a reaction to it, is it a task they do in preparation for it, or is it something they had done before and will continue doing after a war? Is a camp follower an itinerant with an enlarged catchments area or is it a job only possible in relation to war? Is the collection of enemy information by a prostitute making the prostitute an informer or the revolutionary subject a prostitute?

Fighter roles should enlarge the understanding of women's involvement in war as well as questioning the parameter of women as victims and women as truth tellers. Women are created by and create the social environment they live in, the question here is: what direction and restriction is imbedded in the structure.

"The fact that women are representationally absent from his-story does not mean that they are/were not significant social actors in history." 

The issue of gendered fighter images entails a broad variety of sub-issues. Historical examples of dissident women transgressing into male soldier formations, as well as narration of female fighters and bloodthirsty female characters, are rare. The

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852 Creveld, Frauen Und Krieg.
853 These tasks are described in the literature of all liberation movements. Bertold Brecht wrote about a camp follower in Mutter Courage.
descriptive part draws a formula of women's and men's roles in society, in armed struggle, the analytical part asks why those gender patterns are currently prioritized as normative settings.

In narrating various reports on the Amazons I like to clarify two important topics: One is the mere existence of armed women and their presumed high status in their society of origin. The second interest is discourse analysis – how are the narrators discussing Amazons and what gender image is carried by this description. This includes the creation of myth and antipode of feminine fighter imagery.

In analysing this status and the intrinsic positioning of women outside the warrior status and by this the public realm I consider it necessary to ask the question of women's collaboration with men and their 'Einrichtung in bestehende Verhältnisse'/ uncritical arrangement with given conditions.

Cyncia Enloe elaborates on the issue of the image of the femme couvert, the women whose citizen rights are only guaranteed through her husband. She finds this pre-French Revolutionary model again in current military institutions. The order outlined for the armed man contains the unspoken order for the woman. This includes the task of welcoming unconditionally the homecoming, the task of obeying and not questioning, the reality of and need to cope with the continual flow of death – in the family or around.

**Mittäterschaft / Collaboration**

In the continuum of violence from interpersonal violence to state violence, the intrinsic supporting system of collaboration, encouragement and silence for the violent acts and legitimations of violence is fundamental.

Collaboration of women with fighting men is expected throughout centuries and places. In times of war, as in everyday politics, women are supposed to follow what men decide. But why do women co-operate if there is hardly any added value or gain for them? War reinsures masculinity in man and is a constitutive factor for their masculine identity on the basis of the devaluation of (their) feminine identity. Women here can only 'gain' by crossing gender barriers and find acceptance and acknowledgment by the state and in public not as feminine women but as cheap replacement of men. Whereas war is described as the field of honour on which masculinity is proved superior to femininity and sets norms and standards for manhood, it is at best reactive on femininity but

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857 It goes without saying, that wives of military man do not get extra payment by the military for following their commands, nor for the recreative support, the emotional backing and the housework they do.
neither creates nor constitutes identity matrix for women. Or as Janna Thompson describes it, the identity of man in war is based on the exclusion of women:

War also provides other attractions: the comradeship of men under arms (which undoubtedly gains its particular character and closeness from the exclusion of women), the feeling of being all equal in the face of danger (although hierarchies of armies reflect class hierarchies), the opportunity to escape a mundane and dreary existence, to see the world, to receive an education.  

The silent work of women in war seems to be a prerequisite for the notion of the heroic man in war. Or, as Sandra Harding asks:

How would our understanding of men’s activities in domestic life, warfare, or the economy be expanded and transformed if it were structured by questions and concepts arising from those activities assigned predominantly to women that make possible men’s participation in domestic life, warfare, and the economy?  

Christina Thürmer-Rohr subsumed unquestioning obedience and loyalty with the perpetrator, the fighter, the leader, and the decision maker as *Mittäterschaft* – as collaboration. She does not refer solely either to the act of war or the situation of women in a conflict, but goes beyond stating a principle that describes more the unquestioned acceptance of domination, hegemonic structures, and praxis. In perpetuating the myth of manliness or of heroic masculinity, women involve themselves actively in the logic of the violator and the perpetrator, and more the key position of gendered dualism.


Women become accomplice of men’s action by perpetuating the mystification of men, by preparing men physically and psychologically for his big and smaller action and his certainty of power on providing the daily basis. Love, admiration, applause and the bonus of trust, the acceptance of his privilege, his protection-, decision-, and judgment right. The acceptance of his plans of life, communication and knowledge, the silencing and forgetting of one’s own objection of ones own will and the soft and persistent trial to put him and one’s self back in ‘normality’, patching up of domestic strife as well as the calming down of outbreaks of violence. [Translation, A.W.]
And further:

Mittäterschaft heißt mit dem Täter – Loyalität mit dem Mann und seiner Gesellschaft, Zustimmung zu seiner Herrschaft, auch noch in ihren abgetakelten Formen und in den Formen des Attentates auf alles, was tatsächlich oder vorübergehend zum Untertan gemacht werden kann.
Collaboration means with the perpetrator – Loyalty with the man and his society, support of his power, even in its shagged out form and in the form of assassination on everything what could be made subject, for real or transitory. [Translation A.W.]

I quote this at length because I think Thürmer Rohr touches upon fundamental points in the mainstreamed reality of patriarchy.
However, in Thürmer Rohr’s analysis perpetrator and collaborator roles are personified and rigid roles assigning to man and woman rather than explained as the gendered power relations they exemplify. The outcome is an almost essentialist understanding of male and female. The notion of Mittäterschaft as a concept of structural power is nevertheless useful. The importance of the above quotation lies in the focus on the general, everyday life aspects, and the absolute acceptance of hierarchies.

As Elise Boulding develops the concept of Mittäterschaft for what she discusses as preparation to war, she distinctly sets her focus on socialization as the means to inscribe gender roles: “The same socialization that prepare boys to be soldiers and policemen, Co-opt women as mothers, wives and sisters into that preparation process.”
Collaboration with men obviously is not only victimizing women but is part of the constant transformation of gender labels. It is important to counter authentic truth regimes claiming that there is a traditional and never changing image of men and women in countries actually involved in war. The changes societies undergo because of war is an enormous dislocation of people, truth systems, and gender markers have to be studied. In broader terms the changes and redefinitions of values and gender roles in a country in war, such as Sudan could be compared to what Anthony Giddens locates as the difference between traditional and modern societies:

(...) Modernity by contrast, is not only defined as the experience of living with rapid, extensive and continuous change, but is a highly reflexive form of life in which ‘social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character.

The clusters of information on cultural practices as well as gender characteristics currently circulating in Sudan are significantly different to those of the last decade.
I make use of this particular discourse in order to highlight the flux

861 Ibid. p. 12.
862 Elise Boulding. Women and social violence.
863 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp. 37
and the constructedness of gender roles in relation to the use of violence. By juxtapposing these two epistemes – the Amazones as seen by colonial male adventurers and the current female fighters as seen by a female western political science researcher – I want to extrapolate the rigidity of essentialist identity constructs and deconstruct them along their normative framework.
V. COLLABORATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL SOULS
V. COLLABORATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL SOULS

Men seeking power and women protect men from the consequences of power seeking.

The link between classical insignias of sovereignty and citizenship, between protective power and heroic, selfless martyr qualities are masculine attributes. The figure of the prostitute carries the vulnerability and degradation of the female body as a signifier.

Men consider the unmentioned reality of sexual service of women a natural task. It is associated with — forced or voluntarily — the food supply, emotional nesting, the upbringing of martyr children, and the washing of clothes. Women take care of the wounded, build safe houses, and host the endangered heroes. Women carry information and guns, food and ammunition, keep the social community structures alive and fulfil the tasks of symbolic morality. They are kept in the rear and follow dictates of military strategies, even if one is not personally linked to the armed struggle.

Elise Boulding makes a case for women playing a key role in conflict resolution. She points out women’s position in war as Marketenderinnen (camp followers), prostitutes, food carriers, and as peacemakers through the role of brides. Women, with men use their bodies as symbols of power, possession, and territoriality, had been married off for the sake of conflict resolution. Barbara Seitz, Linda Labao and Ellen Treadway base their observations on the reports of the Latin American Left before 1970 who praised the guerrilla women on the land for their housekeeping, cooking, and domestic duties. Whereas Elise Boulding shapes women as peacemakers, Francine D’Amico categorizes women in war as victims, spectators, and the prize of war. Besides these two symbolic duties, women have also been the cause of war. Women’s role as bystanders and supporters of their fighting men is documented in different societies. Francisco de Goya named a painting ‘Las mageres don velor’ (Women giving courage 1810-1815).

Interestingly, the prostitute has a place in almost all war-myth and is kept there as a heroic example whereas the ‘we-group’ women who had to experienced rape by the enemy forces are seen as ‘damaged goods’ in many societies. For the colonial history, sexualising the body of the ‘Other’ becomes a prime mobilizer in creating the identity of the pure, Victorian women of the ‘we-group’.

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865 See here the whole diverse and broad body of text of radical feminists such as Sulamith Firestone, Mary Daly, Andrea Dworkin a.o.
868 Giving courage or (heart), Goya had a very active form of support in mind, since the painting shows two women killing French enemy soldiers.
869 See traveler protocols. The sexualization of the black women in Gilman Sander in Donald
Mothering the Frontline

“A Spartan woman had five sons in the army and was awaiting news from the battle. A slave arrives; trembling, she asks him for the news. ’Your five sons were killed.’ ’Base slave, did I ask you that?’ ’We won the victory.’ The mother runs to the temple and gives thanks to the gods. This is the female citizen.”

“The first success in fighting against the US forces was in propaganda; the second was the combination of combat and propaganda – with guerrillas behaving in the day like mothers and sisters, and when night came we went to destroy their posts.”

“I felt that my children and the LTTE were the same.”

One of the significant roles women play in war is that of the mother. In this way they become a symbol of tradition, nation, unity, strength, connectedness, moral superiority, loyalty, not only actively in the wars I am referring to where ‘mother’ is a visible symbol, but also on the home-front of the silent wars. The role of the caretaker is important for their own perception as well as a mobilizing factor. In the logic of collaboration caretakers are essential for a functional, uninterrupted enforcement of military logic and war. The caretaking women, as the desired and highlighted symbol of peacefulness and connectedness with life, as the formal opposition but actual completion to the death bringing soldier is deeply embedded in this very logic. As Laura Kaplan argues, in holding caretaking as a model of virtue is obscuring the role of caretakers as war supporters:

I argue against a species of feminist peace theory that unfolds as follows: Women’s psychological development prepares them to be connected caretakers. Men’s psychological development prepares them to be individual competitors. The prevalence of this masculine mentality is a major psychological cause of war. Therefore, war can be averted by promoting the feminine mentality.

and Rattansi, eds., Race, Culture and Difference. p. 72


Xot, a widow in her 50s, took an active part in fighting in and around Saigon. In: Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight – Arms to Protect. p. 169.


The importance of the role of women as mothers does not only appear in times of war. The basic assumption of women in rural areas in Africa is that they do not count as a complete human being until they give birth to their first child. However, this notion has changed over the last years, at least in the urban centres. Not only are there more and more married women who do not have children but the self-esteem of girls, either through education or change in social discourses according to gender questions, is such that they do not necessarily feel useless if they have not given birth to a child. It is true that the reproductive task is considered fundamental for the survival of the family and that the value of a woman in the ranking of social status is pretty much measured on the number of her children, but many examples show that this positioning is changing. Especially in interviews with former fighters in Eritrea, the question of having a child or not was less connected to their self-esteem or what they consider their own social value to be, rather it was a much more practical and strategically planned decision. During the war every child born was considered an unwanted break in the woman’s fighting duty and after the war a child was seen more as a sign of hope and new life than directly connected to the status of the women.

Kaplan, „Woman as Caretakers: An Archetype That Supports Patriarchal Militarism.“ p. 123
In discussing the concept of motherhood in relation to war it is not only important to point out the complementary pattern of just warriors and beautiful souls but to emphasize the implicit violence that is inherent in the war-mother construct.

As the nineteenth century feminist Mary Wollstonecraft summarizes the similarity between warrior men and care-taking, coquettish women, they have ‘manners but no moral.’ Another core role of the ‘mother’ in war is that of her justification of violence, or what Scheper-Hughes calls the ‘maternal ethos of accepting death.’ And moreover, pushing for the masculine ideal of warriordom, martyrdom and protector. It is women creating and narrating the hero and his stories. It is women separating the weaklings from the ‘real man’, encouraging their daughters to choose the latter and punish their sons to become the first. It is mothers teaching their children longing and admiration to become (the wife of) a man in uniform.

When asking women in southern Sudan what stories they tell their children they would talk about the martyrs and heroes. Only some women said that they decided to talk about the time before the war, so the children would have at least an idea that war was not always there.

The justified form of female aggression is that of revenge and hatred against the enemy. These feelings mobilize women to either get involved in the struggle or to endure whatever ‘their’ side asks from them. It does not really seem to contradict the image of peaceful women and active peacefulness is much more of a threat to the parties involved in the conflict.

Remembering a meeting in Zagreb in 1993 a nationalist women’s group demonstrating used the trope of motherhood to dehumanize the enemy side. “The UN is supporting the Serbs. Those soulless people who do not even have mothers.”

Women socialize battle ready sons and docile daughters. Women produce themselves as martyr mothers and set standards of masculinity by defining and supporting martyrdom. Women are weepers and occasions for wars. By guaranteeing the tensionless and smooth home front, the actual care taking during war, the reception and re-integration as well as preparation in post/pre-war eras, their care-taking activity becomes easily militarized. Care-taking women and military man are the full coin of war; only together do they complete the model narrative of warfare. It is not only control of men over women that connects the two sides of the war coin, the mother and the military man. It is the maternal ethos that sends children to war, encourages men to fight and accepts death as part of the foundational myth, the national destiny, the life cycle.

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875 See Wollstonecraft quoted in Ibid. p. 130


877 There are countless reports on violent reactions of ‘mothers’ against enemies. Case studies from Latin America are described in detail in Irene Matthew, „Daughtering in War: Two Case Studies’ from Mexico and Guatemala,” in Gendering War Talk, ed. Miriam Cooke and Angela Woolacott (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

878 Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace. p. 241
As a TPLF\textsuperscript{879} song indicates, it is more a question of age than a question of gender of who is involved in what way, since there is not a gender specification for the ones who are praised. Only the position of the speaker/singer seems to be identified as the position of the mother. Mainly the lyrics seem to be between the generations:

We see their footprints in the dust.
Did they pass by—
Our children?
The sound of distant firing
Guides our footsteps
As we bear them food.

We hear the distant firing of their guns
And we must follow.
Be strong, our children!
We are bringing food and drink to you.
Can a needle sew without thread?
Can children fight without their mothers’ support?\textsuperscript{880}

(TPLF song)

The use of motherhood as a national task becomes obvious in many insurgencies. What might seem like a voluntary support effort by women during the war becomes a clear call to the ranks in postwar societies. The responsibility women have to take over in war is going beyond blood bonds it includes the ‘we-group’, the attacked population sometimes even across ethnicity. In almost all stories by Sudanese women they referred to their responsibility for the community. If enemy forces attack a village, there is no selection of ‘my family, and the rest’ but one rescues as many people as possible and relies on the responsibility of the others to do so as well.

In Darfur, however, the flight pattern appears to be highly gendered. Interviewing women and men in refugee camps in eastern Chad\textsuperscript{881} it became obvious, that there is a gap between the perception and reality of threat and its reaction to it. Whereas people would explain why women would be responsible to escape with the children and elderly, and why the men would have to escape on their own for their safety, in reality men and women were attacked indiscriminately.

As Chief Angiel Agon Arak\textsuperscript{882} of the Southern Part of the river Kir told in a meeting with displaced people in Ameth, he considers all of the displaced people around his people. Not in terms of ‘power over’ but ‘responsibility for’. Another example of the

\textsuperscript{879} Tigrinya People’s Liberation Front. Ethiopian insurgency against the Derg and Mengistu.

\textsuperscript{880} Hammond and Druce, eds., \textit{Sweeter Than Honey: Ethiopian Women and Revolution: Testimonies of Tigrayan Women}, p. 70

\textsuperscript{881} Mission as a delegate for amnesty international to three refugee camps in Chad in May 2004. The results of the interviews are collected in Weber, „Sudan: Rape as a Weapon of War...”

understanding of communal rather than family responsibility is found in the case of Mapel, a well functioning town that could luckily avoid direct attacks but became one of the centres of the severe hunger crisis with hundreds of thousand of victims in 1998. The people of Mapel shared everything with the displaced people from Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Women, when asked how they can endure the fact that they do not have enough food for their own children because they share it with internally displaced people, the people responded with astonishment to the question. As Hanan, a woman who hosted me, said: "If there are people in need, dying next to your door, you will be the next to die if you don't share". These cases communicate the understanding of active involvement of others that is not based on the 'organic relation' of mother-child in the biological sense. The support these women (and man) give each other is grounded in the belief in community and lineage, not on individual and family bonds that would not reach beyond blood relation as a field of responsibility. The examples showed, that the measurement of what counts as active involvement and what is considered a natural task and mother-child bonding needs a sensitive contextualization.

Tebisa Nyakayn Kek referred to maternal thinking as a precondition of peace. Maternal thinking, not as a gender criteria of women in general because of their potency of reproduction, but maternal thinking as a result of motherhood and raising children. Yet at the very same time and in the given circumstances the lack of male skills in peace was never questioned as an issue to challenge and change. A man cannot think about peace, because he's not with the children, but a mother always is.

Yet the aspect of the female caretaker, the peaceful women are easily absorbed in any war rhetoric. As Kaplan points out, the caretaker is not constructed outside the militarization of society, nor does the caretaker question gender patterns in patriarchal ranking orders:

If the archetype of woman as caretaker follows patriarchal classification of persons, then it would make sense that, in practice, caretakers play patriarchally defined roles. As the classification of persons under patriarchy supports militarism as well in at least two concrete ways. First, a caretaker may find herself in a relationship with responsibilities to a warrior, and her understanding of her role as caretaker may require her to fulfil those responsibilities. Second, caretaking is often enacted within public institutions, by women in the roles of (for example) teacher or nurse. In a militarised society, these institutions come to serve military aims as well.

To relate the humanist approach of helping and sharing to its potential to be abused is important. It is not the activity of sharing and caring that is actively supporting the frictionless course of the war. It is rather the (a)buse of humanist actions as part of the

883 I conducted a wide range of interviews there as well as having informal talks. During my field research 1996 and 1997 I stayed in Mapel for a number of weeks and returned back to Mapel in 1999 during a field research for amnesty international.

884 Both quotations out of the memory book Sudan II, referring to a meeting in Old Fanjak, Upper Nile province. Record of the meeting on the 25th of January 1997. (property of the author)


886 Ibid. 129
war-machine that makes the war-makers responsible. It is the bigger question of vulnerability of caring activities and their abuse that produces a discourse of injustice, cruelty and devaluation of life and human beings by those who have normative power and control. The rejection of the caretaking role, the communal principle of sharing as the moral basis of society cannot be condemned as war supportive and/or prolonging means. It is the responsibility of those in power, with the knowledge of those fundamental constitutive acts in a society, not to abuse them as war supportive activities.

The picture changes if there is scope for active resistance to the absorption of the caretaker’s functions in the war apparatus. If women and mothers resist to mobilize their children and to feed the fighters, they are seen as un-social, as traitors and supporters of the enemy by the dominant discourse of war makers counting on a passive caretaker ideal.

Janna Thompson is questioning the role of women as peaceful and peacemakers in explaining the preparation for the martyr’s mother’s role, for the mobilization of children.\textsuperscript{887} Thompson is concerned with the question what emotional investments men and women have in war. As for masculinity war functions as a matrix and assurance of identity. For femininity war would then work as an insurance of the right role of woman as collaborators or it would work as the entry gate to the world of masculinity by providing the space of activity previously forbidden for women. It could as well function as an enabler of women’s projection on men’s life. By using motherhood as a widely known concept of women’s involvement in war, or of their fulfilment of war tasks, a whole debate in feminist conflict theory emerges.

Laura Kaplan argues that taking on unquestioned pride in motherhood plays into the dominant discourse and reasoning of war. Since it extrapolates the division of peaceful, caring motherhood versus active, aggressive manhood, the justification of the later is founded on the acceptance of the former. Kaplan states that by accepting gendered attribution, the war machine is frictionless aided. In Southern Sudan this is relevant to situate the status of war. If, as an early traveller to Sudan, J. G Millais observed on the status of Dinka women (...) it is a mistake to suppose that the latter (Dinka Wives) have no voice in the affairs of life. On the contrary, they are often the prime movers in all things except wars.\textsuperscript{888}

However, even if women have the responsibility to make decisions in all aspects of life due to the absence of men in war, there is no status attached to that. The highest status is given to war related decision-making and this, by definition is the role of men.

\textsuperscript{887} Thompson, „Women and War.“ p. 68

Forced Reproduction as Female National Heroism

A woman’s decision to motherhood becomes utterly politicized in times of war. The praise and decoration of mothers as producers of children who will become, or at least are potentially counted as future soldiers, fighters, cannon fodder, martyrs, protectors and the like, is not only used by dictatorial, absolutist, repressive regimes. Jaclyn Cock, in her book about women’s involvement in the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa, quotes such a propagandistic phrase:

Another source of resistance is political. For example it was reported that in 1986 young girls in Durban were told that African girls had to fall pregnant; every woman – married or not, at school or not – must be pregnant by February... to replace the black people killed in the struggle last year. An informant said, ‘They have threatened to search our handbags for contraceptives.’ Since forcing reproduction onto/into women’s bodies is nothing new, the way this works is interesting.

The regress from citizen to mother status takes place in nationalist propaganda; here women’s identity is suddenly changed from pure motherhood to that of a citizen of a nation state. Motherhood is becoming and active symbol of unity. As Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic explores in the case of former Yugoslavia, the nationalist propaganda changed the identification of women. Now they became mothers and as mothers citizens of a nation state. Women protesters became traitors because as ‘mothers’ their role was to support the politics of their sons. The construct of women as mothers could possibly not be described more drastic than in the Christmas message of the Patriarch of Yugoslavia: “Stop killing unborn babies, bear more children and learn from mothers who lost their sons and not regret not bearing more sons.” This is a clear call to the arms of the home-front, directly appealing to women to make use of their body for war efforts.

Motherhood becomes nationhood with the heroic mother as the carrier. The refusal to carry on with this, to bear more children in this war has taken many roads.

For southern Sudan, Jok Madut Jok refers to a new trend amongst Dinka women to secretly abort foetuses and claim the miscarriage on duony kon ‘the broken back’. He states quite clearly that the pressure to bear more children is there from the SPLA as well as from the women’s husbands on leave. Yet, the women are left to

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890 Nikolié-Ristanovic, „War, Nationalism and Mothers.” pp. 359
891 Sharoni, „Middle East Politics through Feminist Lenses: Toward Theorizing Intifada. International Relations from Women’s Struggle.” Sharoni discusses the nationalizing of mother constructs in the Palestinian discourse and quotes Sahar Khalifa referring to Ben Gurion calling upon the women of Israel to increase their birth rates. “Increasing the Jewish birth rate is a vital need for the existence of Israel, and a Jewish woman who does not bring at least 4 children into the world is defrauding the Jewish mission.” Similar quotes are known from almost all struggles as well as from the propaganda of regular war machines.
892 Jok Madut Jok, „Militarism, Gender and Reproductive Risk: The Case of Abortion in Southern Sudan” (papers, 1997).
893 In some informal talks with women in southern Sudan, the women would talk about how their
themselves to provide for the children and see how many children are killed in or as a result of war or how their children are forcefully recruited. Their decision becomes an act of resistance to the normative military discourse and reality. Yet might in most cases be the only possibility to ensure the survival of those whom these women are responsible for.

Initiation/Training/Warfare

As Dengtiel Kur, a lawyer of the South Sudan Law Society explains in an article about customary law, armed movements currently often misuse initiation in order to legitimize the recruitment of children:

Children are initiated into men at ages below fifteen and may go into combat and lose their lives in armed conflicts.

Another enduring practice of some communities is the initiation of male children into manhood. The practice is popular among communities such as the Latuka, Nuer, Dinka and Murle. According to these communities, initiation is very important as it is intended for education of the youth. It must be borne in mind that these communities do not read nor write. They pass their values and customs through folklore and specific activities and practices. Such activities and practices require the organization of people into groups, as there are activities that must be done by women, children, adult men etc. according to custom this should not be automatic. Boys ought to become men through a rite of passage. Once they have ritually become men, boys assume new duties in their communities. They are expected to behave like adults and do all that is required of adults. They will also know what their rights are vis-à-vis other groups and members of their communities and how to demand them. Divisions of people into groups or age sets determine their rights and obligations.

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the custom of initiation but some activities done under its cover violate human rights. If a community initiates boys under fifteen into manhood they are considered as ‘men’ and therefore as possible fighters. This has been exploited by SPLA commanders seeking to recruit more troops.

As Ifisio Kon Uguak mentions in an interview in Mapel1997: “You go to the forest for 15 days to fight each other and then they are ready to join the army.” He explains the system of recruitment further as one of the chief’s decisions, but prepared by the initiation as well as in the daily game of war played by children with wooden guns.

Initiation as well as training and preparation for warfare are highly gender aspects of social formations. The militarization of gender roles is intrinsic in dichotic gender constructs. As Cynthia Enloe describes:

husbands would insist for their wives to become pregnant. This almost functions as a chastity belt.

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895 Then representative of the civilian wing of the SPLA, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). In an interview on 17 January 1997.
Men have to be socialised from boyhood to see their masculine identities tied to protecting women while tolerating violence. Women have to be prepared from girlhood to admire men in uniforms and to see themselves as bandaging the wounds inflicted by violence rather than wielding it.

Similar to the formation of state; based on a male epistemology and more specific the formation of states out of armed struggle and the narratives of male warriors the male experience and narration is the ultimate measurement for describing world in general. In order to be counted as a potential contributor to the dominant epistemology initiation takes place universally. It is the transcendence of the body from essential femininity, the departure from the female sphere into the public sphere for those with a male body. Becoming a warrior is overcoming womanly-labelled attributes, as Sarah Ruddick is stating. Interestingly the ritual is using male bondage to form a new family/loyalty bond that is beyond the female sphere or, as reported from rituals from the Aztecs to Hawaiian cultures, simulating the act of birth – men giving birth to men – the umbilical cord with the female/domestic sphere finally cut.

Initiation in general is not only connected to war or warriordom, but marks the passage from child to a responsible member of the community. Initiation is distinctly gender specific – the symbolic role of gender expectations are largely initiated to the body and the person through initiation. Masculinity is becoming the entry card into citizenship and is produced on the exclusion of femininity as well as on the legitimated use of violence. Violence is interrelated at all levels of society and legitimized violence forms the bases of the state monopoly to violence as well as the warrior-citizen. As Ann Tickner argues on this disorder:

Feminist theories draw our attention to another anarchy/order distinction – the boundary between a public domestic space protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law and the private space of the family where, in many cases, no such legal protection exists.

And further on a criticism on the UDHR she states:

By definition, the term civil and political rights applies to the public sphere and thus tends to reinforce the public/private divide.

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897 Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace. p. 234
898 In the discussion of Klaus Theweleit and Carol Cohn, the male creation myth by destruction is closely linked to womb’s envy. Borth discuss the simulation of childbearing by bombdropping and Theweleit would go further and describe the act of killing as re-gaining life. In his analysis the male creation myth also functions as a devaluation of the actual childbearing done by women.
900 Ibid.
Many forms of initiation are connecting the step into the full membership of the public sphere of society – or what could otherwise be described the step on becoming a full citizen – with the access and responsibility to the rights and duties of warriors. The definition of citizenship is shaped and defined on the bases of exclusive masculinity. Ann Tickner argues that this exclusion goes beyond the state into the international sphere:

Building on the notion of hegemonic masculinity, the notion of the citizen-warrior depends on a devalued femininity for its construction. In international relations, this devalued femininity is bound up with myth about women as victims in need of protection; the protector/protected myth contributes to the legitimation of a militarised version of citizenship that results in unequal gender relations that can precipitate violence against women. Certain feminists have called for the construction of an enriched version of citizenship that would depend less on military values and more on an equal recognition of women’s contribution to society. Such a notion of citizenship cannot come about, however, until myths that perpetuate views of women as victims rather than agents are eliminated.

Initiation as well as warrior-citizenship formation is quite gender specific. Whereas girls pass into womanhood by their bodily functions such as the first menstruation, boys pass into manhood by proving something, by stepping out of a sphere into a new arena. For women the mere being is the measure, for men it is the production, the acting as well as the being. Initiation is the invitation to partake in a particular sphere known to an exclusive group.

Whereas initiation along age groups is a full concept of citizenship including potential warrior tasks – the initiation in a strictly military sense might use the symbols and language of initiation but does not guarantee the initiated his or her status in society. Yet military training is quite closely linked with general attributes important for initialization. Bonding within an exclusive group, going through a rites de passage, a transformation from one stage of life to the other such as age groups or for that matter, boot camps. The use of extreme pain, spectacular violence, inscription of marks on the body, the final cutting loose from the sphere of the mother – or women in general – is used in both, initiation and military training. The body itself is seen as part of the sphere of nature/woman and is becoming the enemy for soldiers.

For initiation and training it is indispensable that the women of the respective society or surrounding are accepting this division and transformation as well as accepting their less powerful position.

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901 Tickner, Gender in International Relations. Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. pp. 58

902 This of course is a quite general statement and bases itself on the informal talks and ethnographic writings as well as biographic accounts of African writers. Although there are quite sophisticated rites de passage, initiations into secret societies for man and women and the like the general understanding of initiation is combining the symbolic level of gender roles with the body and the identity functions of a person.

903 Yet Ruddick, „The Rationality of Care.“ argues that for caretakers the body is becoming the enemy as well for her control transforms into domination.

904 For initiation in southern Sudan see various anthropological descriptions such as Francis Mading Deng for the Dinka, Sharon Hutchenson and Evans-Pritchard for the Nuer and Jok
The production of militarized masculinity and masculine military is discussed by Ruth Seifert elaborating on the construction of the link between masculinity and the nation state. Although she argues for the specificity of nation state standing armies, the link is quite obvious in insurgencies as well.

The creation of the warrior body, the male body is based on the exclusion of the female body, overcoming womanly attribution bonding with non-female spheres. As Carol Pateman argues on the necessary exclusion of women from the full warrior-citizen status: “Women cannot be integrated into a sphere when the definition of that sphere implies their exclusion.” Leaving behind the domestic sphere, the domain of the mother, the protection of the mother by bonding with other men to form a new body, that of the unity of warriors. It is almost paradox for women to enter the sphere as warriors, since the creation of the new identity is based on the exclusion of women. Women might enter in drag but not as women to stay women. Besides the division of man from women, initiation and combat training is further more dividing man from boys. Those who pass the rites de passage are therefore entitled to higher levels of respect as well as instructed with new responsibilities. Yet again the group possibly entering this new level is restricted to men. To return back to the Amazons of Dahomey, a group of women trained as warriors, they would seclude themselves in the group of Amazons not daring to pass back or to partake in daily life as women nor claim their right to a civilian existence. According to historic reporting women enter the sphere of warriors by committing themselves solely to this existence. Irreversibly they leave their socialized gender role behind and pass as man. For men it is encouragement and the basis of their male status to be in a position to be both, warrior as well as a civil man. Women would as a result fight as men whereas men would increase their masculinity by fighting.

As Ehrenreich writes, warriors constitute a tribe and even beyond constitute a group transcending nationality or class. “In a sense, warriors everywhere constitute a tribe unto themselves, transcending all other tribes and nations.”

This universal function of initiation into warrior hood is clearly replicated in military training. As Cynthia Enloe remarks, the army is just taking and cultivating what is already introduced by initiation.

Madut Jok on the link between militarism and gender in southern Sudan. For examples of gender and basic training see the discussion in the United States on women in the army.

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907 Hacker, Gewalt Ist: Keine Frau: Oder Eine Geschichte Der Transgressionen. p. 133

908 Ehrenreich, Blood Rites. Origins and History of the Passions of War. p. 142

909 Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War. pp. 52
The result of both is the militarization of masculinity as well as the masculinization of the military. Not only is the image of masculinity strongly connected to a military ideal of warrior but also the mere image of warriors is intrinsically interwoven with masculinity. The initiation of girls into women could be linked to the discourse of caretakers as collaborators, since the initiation is more based on supportive rather than on positions of norm giving status. Both the caretaker as well as the initiated women is trained to accept and tolerate violence by and from men as well as accepting the militarization of caretaking.

For the meaning of initiation in southern Sudan, Francis M. Deng is quite clear about one of the aims of initiation in stating, “Initiation ceremonies give maximum value to courage, aggressiveness, and violence.” I would like to add here, that almost universally neither aggressiveness nor violence is seen as the virtue or the right of women.

For the current situation in Sudan there seems to be two opposite movements of initiation and training. One might be bound to the cultural connection of initiation as explained above and strongly connected to responsibility for action. The other ‘initiation’ would be that of training in the various southern insurgency groups, trying to cut the link between the fighter and the community and strengthen the link amongst fighters. Training songs, such as the one example given for the SPLA can be found for all armed groups in the south and reflect more of the general understanding of militarized masculinity as a complete different mindset to that of the initiation with its induction into the ethic of life and war.

According to Sharon Hutchenson almost all SPLA trainees had a graduation song sung when handed over their rifles: “Even your father, swear on him! Even your mother, swear on her! Your gun is your food, your gun is your wife.” For the disrespect of women and the domestic sphere attacks on women, rape as a means of warfare, forced sexual services and forced support by women from the various armed groups are of an incredible high number. Even if ill treatment of women and girls decreased, there is no emphasize on the rights of women, no education and training of women and no support of women by the various armed groups. The only aspect those groups used from the traditional initiation is the ‘right’ to spectacular violence, male aggression and violence but without the responsibility of the initiated man.

As known from other wars as well, the increase in fighting and the length of the war is leading to a failure of men in taking care of their traditional roles of protectors and providers for the family. Out of this frustration about the failure to fulfil their male tasks and in accordance with the militarized masculinity offered in military training and

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910 Deng, *The Dinka of the Sudan*. p. 68
911 Hutchinson, *Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State*. p. 11
912 A large number of women interviewed as well as published material by human rights organizations (amnesty international, human rights watch) mention those abuses against women.
combat propaganda domestic violence is increasing and attacks and abuse of women as well as a lack of respect for them become more widespread.

**Enemy Image**

For the creation of an enemy image gender is important. To raise the moral of the troop the enemy has to be on an equal level, since nobody wants to fight an ‘army of women’. For civilians as well as for the enemy image as a mobilizer for moral superiority, the enemy is likely to be portrayed as weak as a woman, loose and without moral. Valeria Russo however places the question of the gendered enemy and how unlikely it is to have a feminine enemy image. The enemy has to be active in order to be an equal participant of the fight or struggle, since an unequal, openly weaker enemy diminishes the self-image of the we-group. For that reason the German soldiers in the Second World War had to feed the image of the Russian female pilots as those of witches and loose women of questionable even non-human origin, since acknowledgment of the women pilots as real and normal fighters and enemies would have demoralized the troops and de-masculinized their performance.

In what Miriam Cooke mentions in the Algerian case, visibility is an important step. But if only those actions count that are considered constitutive for building a post-conflict society, praxis without visibility and participatory discourse will not become praxis in the post conflict society. By ‘bringing women in’ the transformation is short sighted and additive rather than transformative.

913 Visiting a women’s ‘peace room’ in Zagreb in 1994 on the high of the war against the former Yugoslav army the women would talk about Serbian soldiers as those who have no mothers.

914 Russo, „The Constitution of a Gendered Enemy.“

915 For further insight information Theweleit, *Männer Phantasien: Frauen, Fluten, Körper, Geschichte. Bd. 1*. Theweleit mainly writes about the semiotical, psychological, poetic, and political meaning of what Freikorps Officers wrote and talked about in their remembering of war, the enemy, women, and the thread of what Theweleit calls the ‘red flow’ (Soviet Union as well as blood). In the discussion, the differentiation of the white and the red woman, the white nurse (Florence Nightingale) and the red nurse (the bloodshedding, menstrual, sexual, bestial, active and uncontrollable woman) is not only a crucial part of Theweleits records, it seems to be a sensitive and important link between the meta narrative of the Enlightenment, the enlightened/dark, culture/nature, man/woman, colonizer/colonized dichotomies. Beyond this, differentiation marked a middle class feature of women, based on the de-naturalization of women as sexed, natural, real, strong human beings. The ideal of the white women, the post-industrialized, French-speaking, waist-corsetted puppet who becomes more a furniture than a person as the incarnation of the controlled, bound, dependent possession. This might be mainly based in the logic and understanding of the white, Christian middle, upper class or the army ranks of Freikorps and class related ranks, but the urge to control and transform seems to be a wider and broader concept than this of the enlightened occident. This contextualization is rich and almost endless but should at least become part of the ongoing side-line of the written text. There is no need in this work to go deeper in the sexualized metaphors and its psychoanalytical reading, but as a crucial difference of western armies, colonizing armies, and the liberation movements I refer to in this article, I do think, it is a crucial thought at least.

From a different angle describing the same Russian women pilots, Swetlana Alexijewitsch records the views and evaluations of these Russian fighter pilots – and the process of invisibilization of their work after the Second World War. Alexijewitsch, *Der Krieg Hat Kein Weibliches Gesicht, Mascha-Nina-Katjuscha: Frauen in Der Roten Armee 1941-1945*, ed. Deutsch-Russisches Museum Berlin-Karlshorst (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2002).
Astrid Albrecht-Heide discusses this gendered attribution in an essay on ‘the peaceful sex’ 916 by selecting the space and the means of aggression and the social measurement thereof. Albrecht-Heide refers to the private, less visible, less open use of violence by women and the fact that acts of violence carried out by women might not even be classified as violence since the only victim of this act is the women herself. If history would have been written in the interest of a more diverse group of people, we would definitely find other approaches to violence and peacefulness and it might not be as polarized in gendered dichotomous attributions. 917

Maybe the Dahomeyian woman warriors have a stronger connection to the reality of the women in Southern Sudan or Eritrea than the cross-dressing Caucasian women in the wars in Europe and the U.S.

Yet without any doubt, there are great differences in self-esteem and the way women see themselves taking over masculine connoted attributes of the use of force and violence. It became evident in the interviews I conducted in the two countries that there is a transformation of the way women understand and perceive themselves if there is normal contact and acknowledgment of them as participants of change. Although women in Sudan had a hard time considering themselves as active participants, the women who took active part in combat in southern Sudan complained that their experience is hardly representative.

Even if there is constant dialogue and challenge and a huge variety of activities organized by women, since there is no such thing as a legal and written acknowledgment of their work in the manifestations of the movement, it will be hard to install themselves as active contributors and actors in the time after the struggle. This turned out to be the main lesson given by the Eritrean interviewees when asked, what message they would convey to the women in Sudan.

**Active Recognition**

Unless women in Sudan claim their active participation to be acknowledged now and unless they struggle to become active participants in a change of society as a whole, not only in the structures of the movement, they will face a tremendous backlash after the struggle. In not setting the tone of gender roles in civilian life their roles will be defined by others and imposed upon them. It can hardly be expected that roles, rules and regulations in and of a society will be redefined after a struggle since the excuse of


917 During a training in conflict mediation by the Sudan Women’s Voice for Peace group in February 1997 (in Lokkichokkio, Border of Sudan and Kenya) this issue was raised. The number of husbands killed in cold blood increased tremendously during the war. In a workshop women explained that conflict resolution mechanisms such as chief courts seemed to be inadequate for the current situation. Women would feel overpowered and the ruling felt unjust against them, since the court system settles domestic problems on a family level and tends to force the women’s side to pay retribution if the husband is not satisfied with her work. Women in the workshop mentioned this procedure to be unfair, given that they already keep the responsibility for the family.
Sachzwänge, Realpolitik, reality formation and not a critical discourse will have priority. It is quite unlikely that ideas of power and domination would be given up and the floor would be free for a real participatory approach where every woman and man in the country could state their opinion and air their idea(1)s, if this was not initiated during the struggle.

In an assessment of a representative of the conservative realist school, Francis Fukuyama, Realpolitik is not only what is seen as the main locus of power but as a fundamentally ‘male thing’: „In other words, females chimps have relationships; male chimps practice Realpolitik.”

For the actual example of women and their involvement in revolutionary or liberation movements, the question of Realpolitik or the revolutionary agenda should be the first step in measuring a movement’s willingness to change. If the movement is initiated by men and the agenda set before women got involved, the entry position for women is not ideal.

In the example of SPLA the hegemony is clearly with an exclusive model of participation and decision-making. The agenda and the structure are set and the possibility of transformation from within appears to be quite limited. The examples for a transformation from outside as in various splinter groups and breakaway movements did not show any other understanding for representation or democratic formations but a struggle for power positions of the elite of those splinter groups.

In EPLF and SPLA, the military bonding of the founding fathers was the first step. In the case of the SPLA it was the mutiny in Bor and Pachalla in 1983, for the EPLF it was the split with the ELF in the 70’s. The civilian process, the transformation of social structures and gender roles was not part of the founding myth of the movements.

Not challenging the basic understanding of a revolution or liberation movement – only concentrating on the visibility of women is a significant problem of many insurgencies. As Seitz, Lobao and Treadway describe for a number of insurgencies and their relation towards gender:

It should be noted that women’s visibility in revolutionary movements does not guarantee their subsequent status will improve, as was shown in the case of women in the Mau Mau movements and the activists against the Shah of Iran. The Cuban revolution is another example.

Cynthia Enloe is concluding on the gender awareness of liberation armies:

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919 Seitz, Lobao, and Treadway, „No Going Back: Women’s Participation in the Nicaraguan Revolution and in Postrevolutionary Movements.“

920 Ibid.
One such lesson might be that liberation armies are not automatically non-sexist merely because they are non-static, decentralized and reliant on women. Second, the sexual division of labour employed in a liberation army – and the rationalizations used to justify those divisions – might be best resisted during the revolution because, if allowed to persist, they are likely to become a deceptive part of the revolutionary mythology and the basis for the new state’s demobilisation of women. Third, that the demobilisation process may be especially dangerous for women when it is carried out in a post-war period marked by the creation of an even stronger new state military force, no matter how justified such a military force may be.

As a consequence of this lesson learned, Cynthia Enloe says:

Therefore, women’s efforts to make the liberation war itself a site for revolutionary change in relations between women and men will be aided or undermined by the structural transformations that occur during the liberation war itself.

In Eritrea there seemed to be an understanding and propaganda that the responsibility of all Eritreans would develop, rather than just that of an elitist revolutionary vanguard. Besides, as the translator – a female fighter herself – argued, there was a neutral, non-gendered mobilization.

Negeste: At least when I joined, and that was after women like Worku did, there was no difference for men and women, both had been welcomed, both had the same training and in the critique and self-critique sessions that we had regularly, the question of gender-specific tasks had always been an ongoing debate. For example, in the beginning, when women went for military training, they should not care for what would have been known as women’s tasks. Even afterwards, if you had been seen in the kitchen, or with some cleaning items or whatever – as a woman – you would have to face a special session in the critique and self-critique debates. This was not a revolution for women or for men and we did not really fight for our rights as women, because all the comrades knew that the new society would be a different one with no differences between men and women.

Q: But, it turned out not to be like this. At least after the war you had to realize this. You never doubted this during the struggle?
Negeste: Yes after the war. But no, there was no difference during the war. There were comrades – nothing else.

This very understanding of genderless frontline comrades can be found in all wars and seems to imply a hope by the female soldiers for their own full integration. As Chris Hables Gray quotes a female U.S. soldier in Saudi Arabia during the war: “There aren’t any men or women here, just soldiers.” It would be interesting to hear how male warriors would measure this and if just soldiers really include women.

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922 Ibid.
923 Quoted from the memos of interviews and informal talks I conducted and had in Eritrea in spring 1997. In possession of the author.
924 Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict. p. 175
Movement Recognition

My interest here is to connect women’s self-assessment with the recognition by the movement and the society at large. How does the movement recognize the active participation of women? Are women actively denied access to the sphere of decision making of acknowledged participation? Are cultural constrains keeping women from collaboration? Are those in power using those constrains instead of challenging and changing them? What are the recommendations from the women themselves? What is the reaction of the movement?

In a policy documentation of women’s issues in the SPLM/A the lack of acknowledgment and recognition of women’s activities is recognized in the preamble. Yet there are no recommendations stated for a change:

Recognizing, that women have contributed significantly to the struggle for the liberation of our people from the oppressors in addition to the women’s great support to the Movement, yet we are marginalized in all effective decision and policy-making processes.

By stating this injustice the self-assessment and awareness of women in Sudan is concise and confronts the decision-making bodies by claiming more representation and power on all levels.

The reaction so far is friendly in words but lacks true commitment for the recognition of women in all spheres of society, politics and the military. On the occasion of the first SPLM women’s conference the deputy Chairman Salva Kiir mentions the role of military women in SPLA and moans the lack of recognition and representation but fails to give any further explanation of why their number is (kept) so small:

The women of the New Sudan have played and are playing a great role in the military struggle. Since the start of the Movement women were recruited into the army but were few in number and they mainly participated in taking care of the wounded. In 1986 the first five officers were graduated in shield three and from that time up to now there are more than 20 female officers and their role has been as effective as men in the field. However, our women have had minimal representation in the decision making of the SPLA as compared to the man.

There are active female fighters in the SPLA and no law denies women access to any ranks in the movement. However, more women seem to join the armed struggle in areas where the command structure is unclear or less centrally organized. However,
the movement does not recognize nor challenge constraints identified by women. Some of the barriers could be subsumed as cultural constraints, lack of childcare facility and the demobilization of female fighters.

Demobilization

For some of the members of SPLA the lack of female recruits is seen as an error but one that would be too late to change. "It was a failure not to recruit women -- now it is too late to change the attitude." Three of the people interviewed reflected upon the lack of female recruits as a consequence of earlier demobilization of female fighters. Bangnot Amom, Sittouna Abdalla, and Makier Benjamin all gave their assessments as to why the SPLA either never recruited women after this start or why the active female fighters were demobilized in the first place. The discussions circled around the effect of female fighters on their male comrades. They concluded that men either felt threatened or emasculated having women fighting alongside them. "The rumour that women had been demobilized because they would run away when there are wounded is wrong. It was because the men did not want to see when they cry."

Sittouna A. Osman head of the New Sudan Women’s Association reflects on the ‘disappearance’ and small number of female fighters as a more general problem in the movement.

Actually in the movement – the head of the movement – they realize this. And even in the NEG (New Executive Council) we realize this. And still there are some elements that do not want to see what women do and what we see. So they think of it as a revolution inside. But in the community, I think this is where we have to put more effort. Because most of our men they see us as women that do nothing. For example with the Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace, they would say: ‘Hey, what peace are you talking about, what peace

international Weber, „The Human Price of Oil.“ I investigated extensively and made several trips to the area, including a longer interview with the then leading rebel commander in the area Peter Gadet.

928 Statement made by Walid Hamid, then the Representative of Jussif Kuwa, the Governor for Southern Kordofan in the SPLA/M in Dec. 1996, Nuba Mountains. ( I accompanied the Representative for a number of days in the area. We had intensive discussions on various issues and were able to follow up on some throughout the years.)

929 Bangnot Amom was interviewed during a ceremony for finalizing leadership training as a civil administrator in New Kush in December 1996. Sittouna Abdalla was at the time of the interview president of the Sudan Women’s Federation as well as the representative of women in the Executive Council of the SPLM. Makier Benjamin was at the time of the interview in Dec. 1996 secretary of Cdr. Garang. He took part in the Nimule battle and remembered the situation.

930 Bangnot Amom, Chief Coordinator of Family Affairs in the SRRA in an interview in New Kush, 15,12,1996. Interview by the author.

931 Sudan Women’s Voice for Peace is a women’s NGO, non-partisan and interfactional. The logistical office is based in Nairobi, members are in all areas of Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. I volunteered with the organization for three month inside Sudan and attended a number of their meetings and workshops on peace education and conflict management.
do you bring, and how?’ So they do not take women seriously. They do not recognize the role of the women, and that is where we have to put more effort.

I do not know the real percentage of female fighters in the SPLA, but maybe you can say 7%. There are not too many women freedom fighters. But there were before. In 1984 there was one women’s battalion. But after that they never organized as female fighters. But they are still there in the army. These women got training – not as officers, only a few of them. So we have a number of officers, more than 30, but they are not active in their role. I don’t know why. In this workshop on officer training, they said maybe they forgot to enrol them in the movement. I don’t know, the blame comes from different areas. Now there are more women joining the training. In Equatoria, for example, they get military training in the movement. Although they are not really active. I mean they are not passive but not as active as the men. They do not go to the frontline and fight. But also we have some women who have been trained as nurses. Sometimes they go but not many of them. If you compare it to the Eritrean movement, it is nothing, what the women do by way of fighting itself it is nothing.

The quotes by SPLA/M representatives state, that southern Sudanese women played a great role in the current war. However the movement fails to present any factual evidence nor initiates any debate about the need for acknowledgment, recognition and representation of women and their activities.

**Cultural Constrains**

Cultural constrains are not only signified by traditional social gender concepts. Cultural constrains might as well be enforced by political norm-givers. By analysing the recognition of women’s activities by the political and military movement those constructs will be scrutinized.

As Francine D’Amico discusses the gender of war, war appears as something clearly located in the masculine sphere, in the male domain. As for women, she says: “Women are denied agency, made present but silenced.” It is inevitable to question further if cultural constrains are not more political decisions. The simultaneity of one who is present but silenced needs further investigation in the context of Southern Sudan. The question of how an insurgency movement recognizes the participation of women in the armed struggle will not only reflect upon women’s self-assessment but will mainly determine the future position of women in society. It is the movement claiming to educate, change, challenge and transform the society from an oppressed one to a liberated, free, democratic and participatory society. Therefore they is a determining factor for the image of female fighters as well as the future impact of this image on society. Again, the Deputy Chairman of SPLA/M, Salva Kiir is quite clear in his analysis of women’s situation and the failure of the movement. Again his statement does not reach further in discussing ideas of how to overcome this restriction:

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932 The interview itself took place in Nairobi on 6th December 1996 at the office of Sudan Medical Care. At that time Sittouna Abdalla was the head of the Sudan Women Association, and a minister for women and education in the SPLA.

933 D’Amico, „Feminist Perspectives on Women Warriors.“. p. 379
Women have traditionally been regarded merely as reproducers and family raisers. Their economic production has been approached in isolation from other social groups such as men and the youth. And in Sudan the women have borne the brunt of the conflict, being left to look after the families, and support their male members who are active in the struggle and all this has been taken for granted by many men. In addition many of our women have fought and died side by side with us on the many fronts.

The fact that cultural constrains are not static but dynamic and changeable becomes tangible in the comparison with the situation in Eritrea. A member of the Executive Council of the SPLM/A and the Chairperson of the New Sudan Women Federation, Sitouna A. Osman pointed on cultural constrains that keeps women from joining, and compares them to similar experiences in Eritrea. She embarks on the differences and gives solutions of how those obstacles could be overcome if the political will would be enforced.

It is actually from the cultural point of view not that different. When I talked to the Eritrean women before, they said:

You know, our culture was like that. You do not leave the compound as a woman; you do not have much to say as a woman in the traditional society. You cannot let your girl go out of the family. It is the same for us. But when I talked to the head of our movement, the argument was the nature of the war itself. It is a guerrilla war. You come, attack, and leave the place and it is not suitable for women. And the women, when they come to the movement and start to fight, if you ask them, they say they really came by their own initiative and they realized the objective of the movement and they realized the discrimination they faced in the country. That is why they joined – but then, after they join, what happens? Maybe the mobilisation is not right for the women, according to the nature of the war. Some elements in the culture of girls do not allow them to join in the same role. In that women’s battalion they played the same role, but after that – I don’t know what happened, but maybe later in the war they put it all on the women themselves, on their cultural point of view. They think they have to get married, they have to have kids, and they have to stay at home. In the Eritrean movement before, they didn’t allow the girls to marry. And maybe this was one point, that they succeeded in having the women just fighting and not getting involved in these family affairs.

For the male SPLA leadership Sudan was not to be compared to Eritrea:

The Eritreans have a completely different system of education and mobilisation. Everybody had to help to win. Since there was more literacy and a different understanding of gender in Eritrea before, it is not something easily compared with the situation in Southern Sudan.

The arguments – given by the women inside Southern Sudan – were quite different. Their main reason for calling women to arms was their essential disapproval of forced
recruitment of school-aged boys. “It is better for us when we go and fight than SPLA taking our children and force them to die.”

Women in SPLA/M

For women who joined the SPLA as active fighters none of the cultural or political constrains qualify as arguments for the lack of female recruits. The barriers they identified were all based on gender constructs that have no justification and have to be challenged and changed. During the first SPLM Women’s Conference in 1998 some of the active female members of SPLA called upon the SPLA to recruit women indiscriminately. In the further discussion the obstacles keeping women out of the SPLA were identified as following:

Men look down upon women despite women’s significant contributions,
Marriage responsibilities (can affect women’s involvement in the military),
Negative attitudes against women, biological (pregnancy) factors vs. front line (pregnancies) (sic!)
Nepotism and favourism,

Lack of proper education,
Abuse of power (by men),
Sexual harassment

The recommendations given by the working group on women in the military were as followed:
Develop the army into a modern one to accommodate women soldiers (as in other countries),
Military production unites such as signals should include women,
Attitudes against women to change, encourage and motivate women,
Women should be included into the police, prison and wildlife services etc.

The recommendations given by the active fighters are clearly decisive and strong. To them it is obvious that the movement has to change in order to fully integrate women. Furthermore they call for the integration of women beyond war-related posts. They aim for a longer re-structuring of gender roles and name the obstacles hindering women to fulfil their potential.

War, drawing in primarily male combatants and targeting adult men as potential threats, brings harsh pressure to bear upon women’s role as central providers of physical and emotional support to dependents, old and young; they also become family heads, but

937 Mary, a middle aged women from Wau interviewed in Mapel, October 1999.
938 Speech originally planned by Cdr. Ager Gum, then delivered by Mawlana Dhol Acuil, speech given on 22 August 1998, New Cush, Southern Sudan.
rarely community leaders. In Cambodia today 60% of the population are women, and of that, 30% are widows.

Most women pointed to the need for changes in gender roles in their respective communities or the society at large. However, for most of the women war justified an in-build hierarchy of issue priorities. The struggle had to come first before one could concentrate and think of any other issue. The perception here was quite static and manifest rather than processual and transformative. Social and personal changes had to wait until the political way for changes was paved.

As Bangnot Amom, who just received a leadership training certificate from the SRRA, answered me in an long interview at the then military headquarters of the SPLA in Southern Sudan, New Cush in the midst of December 1996:

We stay calm in this struggle. This struggle we have to win for us, our children, our country. First, to liberate our land and start living in peace with each other. Then comes the second struggle we have to start and this might take much longer. This will be the war against men. Men who not or do not want to understand that women are not lesser than they, that whatever men can do, women can do, and that women have been taking care of the survival of our people. There is the war to come to fight men about the status of women, our tasks and the respect these men lack.

The next war is for us. For the involvement of women in decision making processes, for visibility, respect. It was the women that were left over in this war and we managed to fulfil every task, and after the war, this has to be recognized.

Miriam Suleiman Gabano communicated a similar understanding when she said:

I believe as a woman we have two battles to fight. One against the Islamists and the other against men. So our contribution to the SPLA is part of the other battle, now the man are attacked and women show what they are capable of. Now they have to see how much we do, so nobody can say that we are not doing anything. I think, I hope and pray that man will change. In war and after the war.

As discussed by women in post-war analysis of insurgencies all over the world: to gain full recognition by the movement as well as by the society at large during the time of struggle rather than after the war is important.

The fundamental issue for the purpose of women’s recognition by the society in general seems to be the communication and awareness-raising process during and after the struggle. Not to hierarchize between militarized and gender needs specifications of a society. Nobody will be awarded with a citizen status. Specifically not if the recognition of one’s involvement and support for a post-war society is undervalued, un-discussed and invisible. By keeping social changes unchallenged for the time ‘after the revolution’ – there might be no agent to bring forward those changes.

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939 Oxfam, working paper of 1996. Cover and additional information lost.
940 Interview with Bangnot Amom 15 December 1996 in New Cush, New Sudan.
941 Interview with Miriam Suleiman Gabano, 22.12.1996, Changaro, Nuba Mountains
When support includes building roads and laying mines, there is no clear line separating support from combat – but there is still an ambivalence felt by most women as well as men about women using violence in cold blood or inflicting brutality.

If asked what women would do to support the SPLA or how else women would function in the SPLA structure, the supportive structures and tasks were recognized. Questioning Sittouna Osman on this issue, she gives a very positive image of voluntary support for the movement by the women, this is partly in contradiction of my overall impression inside the Sudan where women would rather want SPLA/M stay out of their lives. Or, as in many cases, forced to provide support and fulfill militarized ‘natural tasks’ as by cooking, washing and cleaning for the fighters. Yet I found it important to include the positive image given here, since this reflects very much the official line of the movement regarding the women’s participation and status.

Actually all women are willing to do all the work for the movement by themselves. From carrying arms and ammunition to the front, to preparing food, to taking care of the wounded heroes, all of this on a voluntary basis. In all of the areas the women are willing to do this.

When women join the movement, they realize they are just like the men. The majority of the people that join the movement realize what happened in the Sudan, and that is why they joined the movement, to protest. So they know of the objective of the movement it is the only solution. This is the only way to liberate you. In the movement we realize that fighting is not the only way, that we have a lot of options. Peace talks for example. But for anything that happens within, or instigated by the neighbours, we see that the only way is to choose armed struggle. But there has to be negotiation, talks. Now some of the women put their voices together to voice about peace, so the Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace is this new women’s’ group for peace now. If it were not like this you could not manage to get these women together in the refugee camps to support and join, they realize that war is the only way, they have to follow. But still we also have to practice the other option to bring peace forward.

The dualism of active/passive, taking part or becoming protector or in need of protection is one of the most dominant discourses when talking about women and war. Regardless of the actual reality men are continuously portrayed as protectors – women as victims. For both groups this has tremendous consequences in creating a self-imagery. For the symbolic gender dimension of feminine and masculine identity patterns this enforces the role of men as aggressors, as militarized threats. The role ascribed to women as victims does both, takes away the power and social significance of their activities as well as gives them the status of those ‘who don’t need to take political responsibility’, since they are and will remain helpless victims. By not resisting this role, women allow militarized men to make use of their victim status to make decisions on their behalf and to legitimate further aggression in the name of protection.

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942 Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Warnock, eds., Arms to Fight – Arms to Protect., p. 6
943 Interview with Sittouna A. Osman, head of the (NSWA) New Sudan Women’s Association, 6 December 1996, Nairobi. NSWA is not independent from SPLM.
944 Ibid.
The waging of tasks falls under this militarized logic so women’s tasks and roles can easily be subsumed under ‘natural’ rather than recognized as active support.

Loyalty and the organization of communities to feed and shelter, cloth and hide fighters are not really discussed as relevant to the war in Southern Sudan. Both the women and the movement devalue support as non-active. Only the refusal of support is recognized as an active position against the movement rather than a political statement on its own. It is not the right of a citizen to be non-partisan or of women to prioritize the survival of their families to that of forced support to the soldiers. The endless accounts of women reporting about maltreatment, rape, looting and abduction by all parties to the conflict, including SPLA is brutal evidence of this.

However little acknowledgment women receive for their daily support, the enemy side does not distinguish between active and supportive involvement. As in the case of the FLN, the Algerian Revolution forces, the movement and the ‘enemy’ side measured the involvement of women quite different. Whereas FLN hardly had any female fighter registered, the French army accounted for all fighters despite their sex. I quote these results, because they show how contradictory images and realities become in a war. Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas is discussing the discrepancy of portrayal of the glorious Algerian revolutionary women – as Frantz Fanon would mythologize them – and what a study done by a former Algerian revolutionary reveals about the lack of recognition of women by the revolution. Since there is no official recognition of women in active positions or ranks in the respective liberation army, the experience of plenty of guerrilla wars show that there is no recognition of women’s roles and hardly any push for a transformation of gender roles afterwards.

After decades of struggle and war it becomes problematic to differentiate between war support and daily tasks, between the preconditions and the results of the war. In the interviews with women from Southern Sudan the issue of support was widely discussed. Even the question of marriage, dowry, motherhood and polygamy has been subsumed under ‘support for the SPLA’ in some places, whereas those topics were used as examples of why one would like the SPLA to withdraw from an area by others.

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945 As elaborated on by the Chairperson of Sudan Women’s Voice for Peace, Anisia Achieng on the case of women in Lafon who refused to support the forces of SSIM with food and were forced to do so.


948 Ibid. P. 175

949 See for example the analysis of Mozambican women in Urdang, And Still They Dance. Women, War and the Struggle for Change in Mozambique.
As far as the recognition of women's roles and participation by the society at large is concerned it is important to reflect if the movement and the combatants are living in a reality exclusively build around them or if they interact with society. It has to be considered, if the role models used by the movement are based on the roles in society at large and vice versa. The recognition of actively involved women depends very much on the recognition and valuation of women in society.
VI. CONCLUSION
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The institution of fighters and warriors underwent tremendous changes in the last two decades. Specifically in the African context, the institution of the warrior as the protector and defender of a certain age class is almost completely eradicated. The transformation from a male warrior, bound to strict codes of ethical conduct in warfare into a Rambo-for-the-poor type of reckless, unethical killer, loyal to various warlords but not to his home community, had a significant effect on the ideal of masculinity and femininity. It had an effect on the social status of warriors and will possibly do reputational damage to masculinity in general. It equally had consequences to the fighter-citizen link.

Whereas for the initiated warrior, fighting was part of his positioning in the communal political and social life and a means to gain status as a responsible citizen with certain rights to decision making – the situation for the modern fighter/rebel is different. The fact that somebody participates in the current conflicts hardly raises his social status in the community.

The notion of male warriors deteriorated through the predominant reality of warriors and fighters as thugs, bandits, drugged-out child soldiers, irresponsible members of society nobody really wants to be affiliated with.

Since the conflicts and the tactics and aims of war have changed from liberation and independent struggles to self-perpetuating ethnic hate campaigns and resource wars, the victims have changed as well. Although the victims of wars since 1945 were mainly civilians, since the collapse of the Cold War and the beginning of New or asymmetric wars, civilians are almost the only targets.

Ethnic cleansing, rape, spectacular violence, mutilation, abduction of children became the main warfare tactics of current armed formations. Frontline encounter with enemy forces diminished into a side-show.

However, the conflict analyzed in this work – the war in southern Sudan – is a transitional type of conflict. From clear liberation aims of southern Sudanese insurgents, supported by society as respected warriors, the incidents of indiscipline and endemic use of violence against civilians increased.

The changes in warfare and in the reputation of fighters has major implications for a concept of citizenship as well as on the recruitment or joining in of women. Whereas for the Eritrean women I interviewed, joining the EPLF was motivated by the aim to gain independence for Eritrea and to change and develop the Eritrean society. Non of this was used as rhetoric by former LRA fighters, whom I interviewed in northern Uganda in 2003. Their ordeal circled around forced abduction and being forced to abduct other children, sexual slavery, clubbing fellow children to death, burn their families alive or cut their parents lips. Only a few could name an objective for the struggle: to buy a car, to live in a big house in Kampala to have nice clothes.

They felt that reintegration was hardly possibly for themselves, and neither the men nor the women expected to be seen as respected members of their society on return.
Even though in southern Sudan demilitarization and reintegration of fighters might not be a smooth process, the majority of fighters has access to more than the majority of civilians. Many of the SPLA forces still have the reputation of liberators and heroes.

Besides psychological problems and a possible increase of violence by demobilized fighters, there is no sign that they will be stripped of their social status, yet it is even more likely that their fighting record will grant them a higher social status than those who were not there during the struggle, or those, whose work was not actively acknowledged: Women.

Although the tendency in the region and possibly the future of southern Sudan needs a thorough analysis of previous roles and positions of fighter and citizen roles and status, the research done for this work is largely based on a conflict that was fought as a classical war of insurgence against an oppressive system.

Given this, the reflection on the gains and losses for women in this conflict and the corresponding gender aspect underlying the different realities of men and women are embedded in this scenario.

Whereas it can be easily suspected that involvement of women in new wars in the region might not contribute to an advancement of their status as citizens, given that citizenship and participation in decision making is not an aspect any more in the lives of the majority of people living in conflict areas without any functioning state or government.

As stated before the collapse of the state and the economically driven, self-perpetuating excess of spectacular violence at state in eastern DR Congo, Rwanda during the genocide or northern Uganda, might be the worst case scenario for southern Sudan. As of now, the involvement of women or rather the denial of acknowledged involvement in the SPLA and the political texture in southern Sudan at large will have severe consequences for their status in post-conflict southern Sudan.

Other than their neighbors in Eritrea, there was hardly any interest in the transformation of society and amelioration of women’s status therein by the insurgents in Sudan. Since the armed movement is the government of the day, the situation of women and the stability of the country will be at stake if the purely militarized fighter aspect will be the ruling image.

The ambivalence of gender dimensions and the reduction of gender to women was clearly an aspect of great disturbance throughout my research and analysis. However, by trying to question normative assumptions and adding women’s epistemology, I tried to show the enormous power of transformation by reflecting meanings from diverse backgrounds, schools of thoughts and topics of international relations and war and conflict studies.
This work does not assume to give solutions and gives no direct guidance for peace. The question asked in the beginning: is there any correlation of fighter and citizen status? Has been discussed thoroughly and from various angles.

The different fields of theory, discourse and reality analyzed in this work are academically strictly compartmentalized entities. Cross-sectoral research and analysis is rare.

However, in order to understand the logic and interlinkage of conflict dynamics, international relations, gender aspects and culturally specific meanings, it was necessary to go into depth and elaborate at length.

If we are dealing with post-conflict societies, demobilization and reintegration, it is mandatory to analyze gendered fighter and civilian perceptions during the struggle.

If we are working in the field of international relations, a thorough and critical discourse of normative settings and assumptions, such as state, nation, citizenship and civil society, is needed.

These questions and dilemmas are not occurring in sequences but coexist in the formation of life.

Working on wars and conflicts, on human rights and feminist theory for many years, it was important to me to combine this expertise and to explore various truth systems further.

What is the outcome, the conclusion of years of work in Africa, with Africans, in the field of international relations, human rights, the international community, feminist theories and conflict studies?

The easy answer is: no easy answers given.

For the longest time, I felt, when working in Africa, questioning Sudanese or Eritrean people about their roles in war and the gender aspect of it, in a loop of restricted access codes. As if not sharing a common language. Speechact theory was of no help, neither was the reference to a self-evident tradition. And then both were.

I fell out with comparative studies and grant theories. Essentialist truth systems and cultural relativist excuses. I struggled with the constant self-questioning and the permanent need of self-positioning.

There is a strikingly simple conclusion for this thesis:

There is nothing that cannot be changed and almost everything has a different cultural meaning somewhere else. Masculinity or femininity are no pre-given static realities – nowhere. What is considered feminine in a post-enlightened, post-modern, post-industrialized West, might not resemble the definition of femininity or expectation on women in the South. What might have been a heroic fighter status of essential masculinity a mere decade ago in Sudan or DR Congo, might have changed into the core image of a degenerated, threatening non-person today.
A child might not be considered a child any more after being involved in active war. A child might lose the essential trust in his or her parents and might not feel protected by adults, after watching other children killing grown ups. A man might not feel masculine and strong any more after watching his wife and daughters being raped in front of him – a woman might not feel protected by men after living through years of war, attacked and threatened by her brothers, uncles and neighbors.

Civilians might not have any hope in governments after being displaced, exploited and neglected by their government for decades.

The international community, policy makers, humanitarians and Western scholars might not see anything than despair and hopelessness in places of continuous conflict, mass displacement, ethnic cleansing and ongoing warfare. The population of this place might not see anything than misunderstanding, arrogance, disrespect, hypocrisy and means of survival in this international community.

There is a need for self-reflective positioning, as well as a need to learn more about the respective cultural meanings of a specific place.
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