THE CONCEPT OF SUFFICIENCY IN ARGUMENTS FOR JUSTICE

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For Alex

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Abstract

Sufficiency is treated in current debates about justice as a distributive principle. As a distributive principle, sufficiency is said to involve the distribution of a discrete good towards a threshold line, at which point sufficient well-being is reached. Further distributions above the threshold line are either of less or no moral significance.

This dissertation argues that the current understanding of sufficiency in debates about justice, as a distributive principle, is incorrect. Rather than being a distributive principle, sufficiency describes a general relation between means which meet their ends. As a general relation between means and ends, sufficiency has no substantive structure, but takes whatever form is required for means to meet their ends. Sufficiency is therefore not a principle of justice in itself, but instead is always about finding sufficient means for a deeper theory of justice. Therefore, seeking sufficiency in arguments for justice demands the clear articulation of a goal of justice and the thorough theorization of means to reach this goal.

The dissertation then applies the correct understanding of sufficiency to the educational justice debate. It shows that understanding sufficiency correctly improves arguments for and against educational adequacy. Supporters of educational adequacy argue for sufficient education for equal democratic citizenship. Thus, their argument should clearly articulate the goal of democratic citizenship and the nature of the sufficient education to reach this goal. They should not be limited by an incorrect conception of sufficiency as a distributive principle. Looking at the work of democratic education theorists, the dissertation argues for how theories of the sufficient democratic education for equal democratic citizenship can be further developed.

Abstrakt

Suffizienz wird in den aktuellen Debatten über Gerechtigkeit als Verteilungsprinzip behandelt. Als Verteilungsprinzip beinhaltet Suffizienz die Verteilung eines diskreten Gutes anhand einer Schwellenlinie, mit der ein Standard für ausreichendes Wohlbefinden festgehalten werden soll. Weitere Verteilungen oberhalb der Schwellenlinie sind entweder von geringerer oder keiner moralischen Bedeutung.

In dieser Dissertation wird argumentiert, dass das derzeitige Verständnis von Suffizienz in Debatten über Gerechtigkeit als Verteilungsprinzip falsch ist. Suffizienz ist kein Verteilungsprinzip, sondern beschreibt eine allgemeine Beziehung zwischen Mitteln, die ihren Zweck erfüllen. Als allgemeine Beziehung zwischen Mitteln und Zwecken hat die Suffizienz keine inhaltliche Struktur, sondern nimmt die Form an, die erforderlich ist, damit die Mittel ihre Zwecke erfüllen. Suffizienz ist daher kein Gerechtigkeitsprinzip an sich, sondern es geht immer darum, ausreichende Mittel für eine tiefergehende Theorie der Gerechtigkeit zu finden. Das Streben nach Suffizienz in Gerechtigkeitsargumenten erfordert somit die klare Formulierung eines Ziels der Gerechtigkeit und die gründliche Theoretisierung der Mittel, um dieses Ziel zu erreichen.

Die Dissertation wendet in einem Folgeschritt das richtige Verständnis von Suffizienz auf die Debatte um Bildungsgerechtigkeit an. Sie zeigt, dass auf der Grundlage des neu konzipierten Verständnisses von Suffizienz Argumente für und gegen Bildungsadäquanz umstrukturiert und verbessert werden können. Die Befürworter der Bildungsadäquanz argumentieren für eine ausreichende Bildung, die für eine gleichberechtigte demokratische Bürgerschaft wiederum

unerlässlich ist. Ihre Argumentation sollte daher das Ziel der demokratischen Staatsbürgerschaft und die Art der zur Erreichung dieses Ziels ausreichenden Bildung klar formulieren. Diese Argumentation sollte nicht durch eine falsche Vorstellung von Suffizienz als Verteilungsprinzip kompromittiert werden. Mit Blick auf die bestehende philosophische Auseinandersetzung zur demokratischen Bildung wird in der Dissertation argumentiert, wie Theorien der ausreichenden demokratischen Bildung für eine gleichberechtigte demokratische Bürgerschaft weiterentwickelt werden können.

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<u>Introduction</u>

The goal of my dissertation is to rectify the use of the concept of sufficiency in debates about justice. The first three chapters aim to explain the way that sufficiency has been used in the literature, to show that this usage is incorrect, and to argue for the correct way to understand sufficiency. The final two chapters apply the correct understanding of sufficiency to the educational justice debate. In doing so, I aim to demonstrate how the correct understanding of sufficiency improves the arguments for and against educational adequacy in this debate.

In Chapter One, I argue that sufficiency is being used as what I call a "telic distributive" concept in distributive justice debates. Telic Distributive Sufficientarianism (TDS) views sufficiency as a distributive pattern with its own inherent characteristics. According to both the supporters and critics of TDS, sufficiency involves distribution of a good towards a threshold, above which distributions are of less or no moral importance (Casal, 2007). I then discuss how the TDS understanding of sufficiency has made sufficiency vulnerable to at least three major criticisms. I argue that one of these criticisms cannot be overcome without appealing to other fundamental principles and theories of justice that are not telic distributive principles. This leads to a contradiction for supporters of TDS. They end up arguing that sufficiency is the fundamental principle of justice, while at the same time they invoke other principles and theories of justice that claim to be more fundamental than sufficiency.

After introducing the common understanding of sufficiency (TDS) and some of its problems in Chapter One, in Chapter Two I show that there are theories of justice that use the concept of sufficiency in a different way. These theories argue not for sufficiency as a principle of distributive justice in itself with its own inherent characteristics, but for sufficiency as any distribution which realizes the goal of the deeper theory. One of the theories that has treated sufficiency in this different way is relational egalitarianism.

Starting in Chapter Two and throughout the rest of the dissertation, I focus on relational egalitarianism in order to use it as an example of a theory of the just society which uses the concept of sufficiency in the way that I argue for. I argue that the main proponents of relational

egalitarianism view relational egalitarianism as an interpretation of Rawls's theory of justice. I thus call the relational egalitarianism that these theorists argue for Rawlsian Relational Egalitarianism (RRE). RRE says that the goal of justice is the establishment of a society of reciprocity and mutual respect because of the equal moral worth of humans. Because of its fundamental concern with equal relations, RRE gives a subordinate place to distribution – distributions of goods within a theory of the just society as RRE work instrumentally towards sufficiently realizing the goal of relational equality. It is important to clarify that I do not argue for RRE as the best theory of justice in my dissertation. Rather, I focus on RRE to show how sufficiency works within this theory and thus to gain an understanding of the correct way to use sufficiency. The consequence of this is not just a better understanding of sufficiency, but also a better understanding of arguments for RRE, including arguments for educational adequacy that come from an RRE perspective.

In Chapter Three, based on the example of theorists who argue for sufficient distribution from out of their deeper theories, I argue for a new definition of sufficiency. I call the new understanding of sufficiency, Sufficiency *for* a Deeper Theory (SFDT). This different understanding of sufficiency does not treat sufficiency as a distributive pattern with its own inherent characteristics, but instead as a relation between means and ends. Sufficiency takes the form 'Sufficient X *for* Y' and it occurs within theories of justice when sufficient means are theorized to realize the goal of a just society. This takes sufficiency beyond a sole focus on distribution as the means of reaching a goal. Sufficient means encompass all of the practical and theoretical requirements of sufficiently instantiating the goal of justice, including distributions of goods.

In Chapter Three I do not only argue positively for a new understanding of sufficiency. I also argue that this is the correct understanding of sufficiency by providing further negative arguments as to why the TDS understanding of sufficiency is incorrect. Using illustrative examples, I show why sufficiency in itself cannot act as a principle of distribution, nor of justice generally, and how sufficiency is in fact fundamentally shaped by a goal and the means available of reaching this goal. My aim in Chapter Three is to disabuse theorists of the illusion of sufficiency as a principle of distribution or justice in itself. Once it is understood that sufficiency

does not work as TDS, it is possible to move ahead with theorizing how sufficiency in fact works and with applying the correct understanding of sufficiency to debates about justice.

This is what I endeavour to do for the remainder of my dissertation. At the end of Chapter Three, using RRE as an example, I explain the structure that sufficiency takes when it is argued for as SFDT from within a deeper theory of justice. I argue that looking at how sufficiency works within RRE, we can see that there are multiple levels of argument for sufficient means for ends that occur within a theory of justice. At the top level there is an argument for the sufficient means for the ultimate goal of justice, in this case relational equality. At this most general level, the means that work sufficiently to reach the end of relational equality I call 'spheres of justice.' These spheres consist of the basic elements of society, such as human capabilities and institutional functions. I do not wish to provide a complete theory of the structure of a just society. I simply want to identify some of these spheres to use as examples of how sufficiency works at the most general level of finding the means for the ultimate goal of a theory of justice.

Within each sphere of justice, there is a lower level of sufficiency in which the goal of sufficiency is the sphere of justice and further means must be theorized. Using the example of the sphere of justice of the capability for democratic citizenship, a means towards sufficiently realizing this goal is democratic education. Thus, sufficiency for relational equality will require the theorizing of the sufficient education for the capability of democratic citizenship. Once the sufficient democratic education has been determined, then sufficient means of instantiating this form of education will need to be determined. The structure of sufficiency thus keeps cascading down from the highest goal of the just society into ever greater detail and substantiveness. Political philosophy takes place at the upper levels of the goal of justice and the spheres of justice.

The correct understanding of sufficiency as SFDT thus structures theories of justice by requiring the theorization of the sufficient means for the realization of goals at various levels working down from the ultimate goal of the just society. In Chapters Four and Five, I apply the correct understanding of sufficiency to debates about educational justice in order to show how this understanding improves these arguments. I begin Chapter Four by showing how both the

proponents and critics of educational adequacy have viewed adequacy in a TDS light, as a distributive pattern with its own inherent characteristics. According to these theorists, educational adequacy is assumed to consist of the distribution of educational goods towards a threshold above which further distributions are of less or no moral importance (Anderson, 2007; Brighouse & Swift, 2009; Satz, 2007). Debra Satz argues that a concern with more equal distribution of educational resources above the threshold should be included, but this alteration of the argument reveals that she still thinks of educational adequacy as being about distribution of educational goods towards a threshold.

Despite these theorists viewing educational adequacy as TDS, I argue in Chapter Four that Anderson and Satz are in fact making SFDT arguments for the adequate (sufficient) education for equal democratic citizenship. As was argued in Chapter Two, both Anderson and Satz approach justice from an RRE perspective, in which distributions are grounded in a deeper concern with relational equality. Their concern with educational adequacy grows out of the deeper goal of relational equality in the same way as I describe sufficiency as SFDT is structured in Chapter Three. Both Anderson and Satz wish to educate towards the capability of democratic citizenship so as to create relationally equal democratic citizens. Thus, their argument is not for adequacy as a principle of distributive justice in itself (TDS), but for the adequate (sufficient) education for the capability of democratic citizenship for a relationally equal society.

Once adequacy is understood correctly in the educational justice debate, I argue that both adequacy's supporters and critics will be able to make more effective arguments. The critics of adequacy will no longer be arguing against TDS, but will contend with the SFDT arguments that Anderson and Satz are in fact making. Anderson and Satz will no longer be confined to thinking of adequacy as a matter of distribution towards a threshold and will be free to theorize the adequate education for their goal of equal democratic citizenship.

In Chapter Five of my dissertation, I argue further for how Anderson and Satz can improve their arguments for educational adequacy through an understanding of adequacy as SFDT. I argue that by fully contextualizing their arguments for educational adequacy within their broader goal of sufficiency for a relationally equal society, Anderson and Satz will treat this argument as part of a

larger argument for the sufficiently just society. This grounding of their arguments will give direction to their theorizing of the adequate education. I then look at the theories of democratic education of five leading theorists of education to show how their theories provide SFDT arguments for the sufficient education for democratic citizenship. Using central features of these arguments, I show how Anderson's and Satz's arguments can be improved upon so as to give more robust accounts of the adequate education for equal democratic citizenship for relational equality.

In this dissertation I aim to rectify the understanding of sufficiency in debates about justice in order to improve arguments for justice that involve sufficiency. I apply the correct understanding of sufficiency to the educational justice debate to show how an SFDT understanding of sufficiency will improve the arguments within this debate. I aim to prove that providing an adequate education to students is not like filling a cup with water to a certain threshold. This is because the goal of sufficiency and the means available of reaching sufficiency dictate the nature of sufficiency; there is no fundamental structure of sufficiency, such as distribution towards a threshold. In the case of the goal of educating adequately for equal democratic citizenship, this will require not the distribution of a discrete good until this is realized, but the theorization of a suitable education for the attainment of this goal. Within the adequate education, distributions will occur (and they may include distribution towards thresholds), but these will simply be part of and instrumental to the larger theory of the adequate education for democratic citizenship.

Chapter One: Telic Distributive Sufficientarianism and its Criticisms

Introduction

In Chapter One, I begin by arguing that supporters of sufficiency in debates about distributive justice take what I call a "telic distributive" approach to sufficiency. Since its origin in the work of Harry Frankfurt, sufficiency has been viewed as a telic distributive theory. This may seem uncontroversial, but it is an important fact, the significance of which has been overlooked both by those who criticize and those who defend sufficiency. Thus, in Chapter One I aim to establish that supporters of sufficiency are telic distributive and to show the significance of this.

The first section of Chapter One provides a definition of telic distributivism and shows how sufficiency has been developed as a form of this approach to distributive justice. The telic distributive approach to sufficiency that its supporters have taken makes it vulnerable to several serious criticisms. In Section 2, I outline three major criticisms of sufficiency as they have been developed in the literature and show how they are attributable to the telic interpretation of sufficiency itself.

Finally, in Section 3, I conclude the Chapter by surveying attempts to defend sufficiency against these criticisms. I argue that attempts by supporters of sufficiency to overcome one of these criticisms are incoherent. Here I show that sufficiency's defenders attempt to incorporate external concepts and theories of justice into their understanding of telic sufficiency. I argue that this creates a contradiction.

A contradiction arises because these theorists want sufficiency to remain foundationally a telic distributive pattern of justice, while at the same time invoking foundational principles and theories from external sources that contradict this telic foundation. Thus, a contradiction arises between what is most fundamental: a sufficient distribution or the external principles and theories being called on by defenders of sufficiency in order to overcome its critics. Chapter One concludes that supporters of sufficiency as a telic distributive approach to justice have not been able to save sufficiency from at least one of its major criticisms. This is a criticism which results from a problem with the telic distributive approach itself. Thus sufficiency, taken as a telic distributive approach to justice, is proven to be incoherent.

Section 1: Sufficiency Originally Developed as a Telic Distributive Approach to Justice

Sufficiency as a fundamental principle of justice was first introduced by Harry Frankfurt in his 1987 essay "Equality as a Moral Ideal." In this essay, Frankfurt argues that there is nothing morally important about distributive equality, or how well-off someone is in relation to another person. He states that:

> […] what *is* important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have *the same* but that each should have *enough*. If everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequences whether some had more than others. I shall refer to this alternative to egalitarianism – namely, that what is morally important with respect to money is for everyone to have enough – as the "doctrine of sufficiency" (Frankfurt, 1987: 22-23)

According to Frankfurt, what matters morally, and thus what those who care about justice should really be concerned with, is not how much someone has in relation to others, but whether people have "enough."

Frankfurt developed the doctrine of sufficiency in response to a position he called "economic egalitarianism" (Frankfurt, 1987: 21). This position is one in which economic equality is seen to have "considerable moral value in itself" and not just for its instrumental benefits (Frankfurt, 1987: 21). Although Frankfurt offers an alternative to "economic egalitarianism", his "doctrine of sufficiency" replaces one distributive principle with another. Rather than placing fundamental moral importance on an equal distribution, Frankfurt places it on a distribution that is "enough". This focus on instantiating a certain pattern of distribution in the world, by which the justice of actions and institutions can be measured insofar as they contribute to this pattern, has been called consequentialist or telic (Anderson, 2010: 22; Parfit, 1997: 204). Throughout this dissertation the term 'telic distributivism' will refer to the idea that instantiating a certain distributive pattern defines an account of justice. According to telic distributivism, the justness of the actions of people and institutions should be assessed based on their contribution towards instantiating this pattern of distribution in the world.

Telic Distributive Sufficientarianism (TDS) has two distinguishing features:

1) The concept of "sufficiency" or "enough" is taken to represent a distributive pattern, which has certain characteristics that are integral to it (for example, all supporters of TDS think that the concept of "sufficiency" entails a threshold towards which discrete goods are distributed)

2) A welfare-consequentialist viewpoint is imputed to sufficiency. This means instantiating a distributive pattern involving distribution towards a threshold is fundamental to justice and the threshold of sufficiency is assumed to be met at a point of well-being. The welfare-consequentialist view assumes that we know what well-being is well enough to focus on how best to distribute towards it. Levels of well-being are depicted in terms of numbers on a cardinal scale.

Starting with Frankfurt, all of the major contributions to the literature on sufficiency contain these two features and thus can be labeled "TDS". The remainder of this section will give a brief overview of these major contributions to the development of a concept of sufficiency in debates about justice and will show how these accounts of sufficiency contain both these features of TDS.

Frankfurt meets the first criteria of TDS by arguing that there is a certain concept of "enough" and that the goal of theorists of distributive justice should be to determine its specific features. He states that:

> the very concept of having an equal share is itself considerably more patent and accessible than the concept of having enough. It is far from self-evident, needless to say, precisely what the doctrine of sufficiency means and what applying it entails. But this is hardly a good reason for neglecting the doctrine or for adopting an incorrect doctrine in preference to it. Among my primary purposes in this essay is to suggest the importance of systematic inquiry into the analytical and theoretical issue raised by the concept of having enough, the importance of which egalitarianism has masked (Frankfurt, 1987: 24).

Thus, Frankfurt places the concept of "enough" at the centre of his "theory of sufficiency" and encourages future theorists to try to work its exact nature. This indicates that Frankfurt believes "enough" to have characteristics internal to it as a distributive principle, which he hopes can be worked out.

Frankfurt acknowledges the difficulty of clearly determining the nature of such a distribution stating that, "[c]alculating the size of an equal share of something is generally much easier – a more straightforward and well-defined task – than determining how much a person needs of it in order to have enough" (Frankfurt, 2015: 15). Thus, Frankfurt treats the doctrine of sufficiency as being fundamentally about distributing "enough," in the way that egalitarianism is about distributing equally – as a telic distributive theory.

The second feature of TDS, the welfare-consequentialist perspective, is also met by Frankfurt. With regard to how to calculate sufficiency, according to Frankfurt "[i]n the doctrine of sufficiency the use of the notion of 'enough' pertains to meeting a standard rather than to reaching a limit. To say that a person has enough money means that he is content, or that it is reasonable for him to be content, with having no more money than he has." (Frankfurt, 1987: 37). Thus, to determine what sufficiency means in the doctrine of sufficiency according to Frankfurt, one must determine the point at which subjective contentment is instantiated through the distribution of money (or some other good) to each individual in society. Although contentment signifies the threshold point at which a sufficient level of well-being is reached in Frankfurt's doctrine, Frankfurt does not provide an extensive account of the nature of contentment. Frankfurt simply argues that contentment is reached when a person no longer has an "active interest in getting more" (Frankfurt, 1987: 39). Thus, for Frankfurt, a sufficiency threshold of contentment is met when a person is no longer actively interested in acquiring more money.

Following Frankfurt's introduction of the doctrine of sufficiency as an alternative to distributive egalitarianism, sufficiency has been further developed as a telic distributive theory. Further attempts to clarify sufficiency have involved combining sufficiency with one or more separate

telic distributive positions: equality and priority. With regard to priority, Derek Parfit presented this alternative to telic distributive egalitarianism, which he called the "priority view," (Parfit, 1997). Rather than focusing on an equal distribution or on having enough, Parfit argued that priority in distribution should be given to those who are worse off. Unlike egalitarianism, the priority view is not concerned with the relative well-being of individuals. For egalitarianism this specifically takes the form of whether one has the same amount as everyone else. Instead, prioritarians seek to improve the lot of those who are worse-off not because of their relatively worse state, but because of the "absolute levels" of their well-being (Parfit, 1997: 214).

This concern with absolute levels of well-being and a lack of concern for relative well-being is also held by telic distributive sufficientarians. However, prioritiarianism differs from sufficientarianism in that it applies to all people up and down a scale of well-being. There is no one privileged sufficiency line at which people have 'enough,' and thus priority primarily applies. Referring to Frankfurt, Parfit says that "[s]ome people apply this view only to the two groups of the well off and the badly off. But I shall consider a broader view, which applies to everyone" (Parfit, 1997: 213). Thus, the priority view seeks to improve the lot of the worse off without identifying and privileging a point at which people have enough.

Following Parfit's development of the priority view, some theorists sought to elaborate and argue for Frankfurt's sufficiency doctrine by combining sufficiency with priority. Roger Crisp, in his 2003 article "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," argues against the universal scope of Parfit's priority view and instead for a sufficiency threshold positioned at the level at which an impartial, compassionate spectator's compassion runs out. Crisp argues against priority in its universal concern for those who are worse off and instead argues for a lack of concern above a sufficiency threshold. Thus, Crisp combines priority with sufficiency by allowing for priority below the sufficiency threshold.

Crisp takes a TDS approach to sufficiency. He aims to determine the nature of sufficiency by arguing that sufficiency is a distributive principle which involves a morally significant threshold towards which goods should be distributed. Crisp meets the second criteria of TDS because he views sufficiency as existing within the same welfare-consequentialist universe that Frankfurt and Parfit describe in their accounts of sufficiency and priority. This perspective assumes an

abstract, cardinal scale of well-being, on which all individuals can be measured in terms of their instantiated distribution of welfare or contentment.

Yitzhak Benbaji also attempts to develop the doctrine of sufficiency from the TDS perspective by invoking the priority view. Benbaji sees sufficiency as an adaptation of the priority view (Benbaji, 2005). He states that "[s]ince Frankfurt's goal is mainly critical, his positive case for sufficiency is incomplete; he does not develop the basic idea [of the doctrine of sufficiency] into a definite ethics of distribution" (Benbaji, 2005: 310). Benbaji argues that, like prioritarians, "sufficientarians are committed to a cardinal scale that measures a person's condition, which yields interpersonal comparability. But their doctrine has a further commitment [...] sufficientarians claim that there is a morally privileged utility threshold such that only regarding people below this threshold are the priority considerations relevant" (Benbaji, 2005: 317). Thus, the problem for sufficientarians is to identify this "privileged utility threshold." Benbaji, argues that the threshold, what he calls "the priority line," "exists, even if we don't yet know its exact location and character" (Benbaji, 2005: 324). He argues that the threshold should be based on needs, but admits that this is only a "starting point" when attempting to make a "distinction between good and bad lives" (Benbaji, 2005: 332). Thus, although Benbaji identifies the sufficiency threshold as what distinguishes sufficiency from regular prioritarianism, he is not able to give an exact account of it.

In her 2007 article "Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough," Paula Casal provides a thorough clarification and critique of the doctrine of sufficiency from a TDS perspective. Casal notes that, while egalitarianism and priority have both been clearly articulated, we still lack a clear understanding of sufficiency. The account of sufficiency that Casal provides has become the standard TDS definition of sufficiency used by both its proponents and critics.[1]

 Casal's standard definition is TDS because it attributes certain characteristics to the concept of "sufficiency" in discussions of justice. These characteristics are: taking sufficiency as a distributive principle in itself, viewing justice as concerned with instantiating a certain distributive pattern, and taking this distributive pattern to be concerned with reaching a threshold at a certain level of well-being. Casal claims that the structure of sufficiency as a distributive

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[1] See Huseby, 2010; Shields, 2012; Segall, 2016.

pattern involves two theses – a positive thesis and a negative thesis. The positive thesis states that what really matters in terms of distributive justice is not that goods are distributed equally, but that people have enough. The negative thesis holds that once people cross the sufficiency threshold of "enough," benefits to these people no longer matter. In her description of the negative thesis, Casal states that:

> [s]ufficiency, equality, and priority are not mutually exclusive principles but might instead be combined in hybrid views. Crisp's hybrid, for example, combines sufficiency with priority by granting lexical importance to benefiting those below rather than above a critical threshold and then attaching priority to less advantaged individuals in the former category. Other hybrids might affirm a more moderate version of the positive thesis, by attaching much greater, although nonlexical importance to benefiting those with less than enough or by endorsing prioritarian reasoning above as well as below the threshold (Casal, 2007: 299).

Casal argues that, although these views can be combined, sufficientarians such as Frankfurt and Crisp maintain what she calls the "negative thesis," that benefits to those above the threshold do not matter. She states that she will "therefore restrict the label 'sufficientarian' to views that endorse not only some version of the positive thesis but also the negative thesis's rejection of egalitarian and prioritarian reasoning at least above some critical threshold" (Casal, 2007: 299). According to Casal, the positive and negative theses are thus necessary and sufficient conditions for sufficiency as a distributive principle. To be a sufficientarian one must hold the positive thesis that there is some critical threshold of "enough" which needs to be met in order to achieve justice and the negative thesis that any benefits above this threshold are of no moral consequence. Sufficiency may be combined with equality or priority insofar as this is compatible with these two theses.

Following Casal, Robert Huseby attempted to further develop the sufficiency doctrine from a TDS perspective (Huseby, 2010). Huseby accepts both the positive and negative theses as they are described by Casal (Huseby, 2010: 179). He also affirms the consequentialist, distributive view, stating that he understands sufficiency to be a:

telic principle according to which we can evaluate outcomes based on a limited amount of information concerning especially the number of individuals and their welfare levels. The principle is meant to apply to all human beings at all points in time. It is not restricted, for instance, to a present collective of persons bound together by nationality, coercive institutions, or cooperative projects. The principle has a very wide scope. (Huseby, 2010: 179)

Huseby views sufficiency as a telic principle and thinks that this principle requires both the positive and the negative theses as presented by Casal. In addition, Huseby argues that sufficiency requires not one, but two thresholds, a "minimal" and a "maximal". The minimal threshold guarantees "basic means to subsistence" and the maximal threshold "equals a level of welfare with which a person is content" (Huseby, 2010: 180-181). Huseby's description of sufficiency therefore combines Benbaji's understanding of the sufficiency threshold as relating to needs with Frankfurt's concern with reaching a level of contentment.

I have surveyed the contributions of the main theorists to the development of sufficiency as a principle of justice following Frankfurt's introduction of the concept. From this overview it is clear that sufficiency has been approached by these theorists from a TDS perspective. Sufficiency is understood by these theorists to be a distributive principle with certain characteristics that are integral to it. These theorists also take a welfare-consequentialist perspective which views sufficiency as a distributive pattern that is fundamental to justice and aims at a threshold of well-being or contentment.

Supporters of TDS seek to instantiate a certain distributive pattern in the world as the meaning of justice. The focus of these theorists is to determine the nature of sufficiency as a distributive pattern and it is assumed that a threshold will involve the achievement of a certain level of well-being or contentment. Supporters of TDS assume that concepts such as well-being or contentment will be worked out, but well-being or contentment are not the focus of their theorizing – creating a theory of sufficient distribution is their goal. This approach to sufficiency, because it places a distributive principle of sufficiency at the centre of a theory of justice, can be called 'telic distributive sufficientarianism' or TDS.

Section 2: Criticism of Telic Distributive Sufficientarianism

Telic Distributive Sufficientarianism (TDS) has been heavily criticized. Liam Shields, a proponent of TDS, states that "attempts to develop sufficiency as a fundamental moral and philosophical ideal have been widely regarded as unsuccessful" (Shields, 2012: 101). Shields outlines three major criticisms that have been levelled at TDS, which must be overcome if it is to be considered a viable 'fundamental moral and philosophical ideal.' These criticisms are:

> [that] principles of sufficiency are implausible because they sometimes require benefiting the better-off by small amounts rather than benefiting the worse-off by large amounts; they are indifferent to objectionable inequalities; and they appeal to a threshold when no such threshold can be specified in a non-arbitrary and unambiguous manner (Shields, 2012: 101-102).

These three criticisms are seen by critics of TDS to show that it is not a viable theory of justice. Thus, proponents of TDS must be able to overcome these major criticisms.

The first criticism has been presented by Richard Arneson, a leading critic of TDS. This criticism holds that TDS calls for giving small benefits to those who are better-off instead of large benefits to the worse-off. Arneson states that under a "strict sufficiency doctrine," an absolute or "lexical priority" is to be given to bringing as many people as possible above the sufficiency threshold (Arneson, 2005: 27). This lexical priority leads to the neglect of those who are too far below a sufficiency threshold to be brought to that level. Thus, if a person is just below the sufficiency threshold, a small benefit to them will be prioritized over a large benefit to a worse-off individual who will not be able to reach the sufficiency threshold even with the large benefit.

The second major criticism of TDS is that it is indifferent to significant inequalities amongst those who are above the sufficiency threshold. This objection arises when sufficiency is said to require what Casal has called the "negative thesis," that benefits to those above the sufficiency threshold are of no moral importance. Critics of TDS, such as Arneson, Casal, and Larry Temkin, have pointed out that certain distributions above the sufficiency line may still be unjust, even if they are not of the same moral importance as bringing people to the point of a sufficiency threshold (Arneson, 2000; Casal, 2007; Temkin, 2003). In order to demonstrate how distributions

above a sufficiency threshold may be of moral importance, Casal gives the example of patients in a hospital who are all being provided with sufficient treatment. The hospital then receives a "fantastic donation, which includes spare rooms for visitors, delicious meals, and the best in world cinema." Casal argues that if the hospital "administrators then arbitrarily decide to devote all those luxuries to just a few fortunate beneficiaries, their decision would be unfair" (Casal, 2007: 307). Thus, critics of TDS like Casal maintain that TDS fails to account for the unjust nature of some distributions above the sufficiency threshold.

The third criticism of sufficiency listed by Shields, that a sufficiency threshold cannot be "specified in a non-arbitrary and unambiguous manner," (Shields, 2012: 102) has been articulated by Casal. Casal states that "perhaps the most pressing problem" for defenders of sufficiency is to specify a threshold at which to measure sufficiency in a way that is neither ambiguous nor arbitrary (Casal, 2007: 312). This problem is of central importance because securing enough of some goods is crucial to the theory of sufficiency, and critics do not think supporters of TDS have successfully specified what exactly "enough" means (Goodin, 1987) (Arneson, 2002, 2010) (Casal, 2007).

Soon after Frankfurt's introduction of the sufficiency doctrine, Robert E. Goodin pointed out the difficulty of specifying a "threshold notion" of sufficiency. He criticized Frankfurt's standard of subjective contentment defined by a lack of "active interest." Goodin highlighted that "[b]y that standard, the 'discouraged worker' who has given up looking for a job is deemed 'contented'" (Goodin, 1987: 49). Paula Casal criticizes Frankfurt's "specification of sufficiency" as "too ambiguous to be satisfactory" (Casal, 2007: 313). Casal points out that whereas Goodin interpreted the standard of no longer having an active interest as too low, she sees this standard as "a very high threshold," stating that she "doubt[s] having met a person satisfied in this sense" (Casal, 2007: 313). Goodin and Casal's opposite reactions to Frankfurt's contentment standard highlight the ambiguity of this subjective standard.

Roger Crisp attempted to specify the sufficiency standard in a non-ambiguous way in his 2003 article "Equality, Priority, and Compassion." In order to avoid ambiguity, Crisp based his idea of sufficiency on "the notion of an impartial spectator" who is compassionate (Crisp, 2003: 756-757). Using the compassion of an impartial spectator, Crisp thinks he can clearly identify the

point at which sufficiency is reached. When the spectator's compassion runs out for an individual that person has a life that is sufficiently good. Rather than being concerned with sufficient distribution of money for contentment, as was the case with Frankfurt, Crisp is concerned with the distribution of sufficient well-being. He argues that "[c]ompassion for any being gives out [...] when that being has enough welfare" (Crisp, 2003: 763).

Reflecting on when he thinks the impartial spectator's compassion will "give out," Crisp states that "my own intuition is that, say, eighty years of high-quality life on this planet is enough, and plausibly more than enough, for any being" (Crisp, 2003: 762). Although Crisp is able to avoid ambiguity with this standard for sufficiency, Casal points out that he "succumbs to arbitrariness" with his "astonishing remark [that] 'eighty years of high-quality life' [...] is 'more than enough for any being,' so seventy something should suffice." (Casal, 2007: 313). Casal maintains that Crisp's portrayal of when compassion gives out clearly fails to non-arbitrarily specify the level at which sufficiency is reached.

All three criticisms of TDS identify weaknesses that are the result of the telic distributive approach to sufficiency. The first two criticisms arise when one takes sufficiency to be an abstract distributive pattern, which consists of a threshold that is of central moral importance to justice. This understanding of sufficiency leads to the first criticism, of benefiting the better off ahead of the worse off because it requires prioritizing reaching a threshold of distribution above all other aims of justice.

This is similar to the 'leveling down' criticism of telic distributive egalitarianism. According to this criticism, strict distributive egalitarians is wrong because it prefers a situation in which all people are equal, but doing badly, to a situation of inequality in which some, or even most are doing well. This is because for telic egalitarians an equal distribution is of the highest moral importance.

Similarly, for telic distributive sufficientarians, reaching a certain distributive pattern is at the heart of their conception of justice. For them, it is better to get those who are almost at the sufficiency threshold over the threshold, even if this is only one person, than it is to help many people below the threshold who, despite receiving distributive goods, could never reach the

threshold of sufficient distribution. Both telic egalitarianism and telic sufficientariansim, when viewed in their pure form, prioritize a specific pattern of distribution above all other goals of justice. This can lead to counterintuitive situations in which many or even most people are worse off.

The second criticism, of indifference to inequalities above the threshold, also arises out of the telic distributive sufficientarian view in which the primary goal is to reach a sufficiency threshold. Above the sufficient level of distribution further distributions are not of moral importance to telic sufficiency. What is important to telic distributive sufficientarians is reaching the sufficiency threshold. Any consideration given to distributions above the threshold is not integral to the telic sufficientarian view and would need to come from an extraneous theory of justice – such as prioritarianism or egalitarianism. This leads to the possibility of gross inequalities above the threshold, for which the telic distributive sufficiency view alone has no remedy.

Finally, the third criticism regarding the arbitrariness and ambiguity of thresholds also arises from the telic distributive approach to sufficiency. This criticism arises from the second feature of TDS, the welfare-consequentialist perspective, which involves a distribution towards (or of) well-being, measured along a cardinal scale. As a telic, welfare-consequentialist view, TDS aims at a just distribution of well-being (Brown, 2005: 203). As has been pointed out by critics of sufficiency such as Arneson and Casal, it is impossible to pinpoint an exact threshold at which a person reaches a sufficient level of well-being in a way that is neither ambiguous nor arbitrary. Those who base their understanding of well-being on a subjective standard, such as Frankfurt and Huseby, fall victim to the problem of ambiguity. It is impossible to know when we have reached a sufficient level of subjective contentment. This could be a very low or a very high standard depending on the desires and needs of each person. Some try to overcome the ambiguity problem by inserting an objective standard, such as Crisp with his idea of an impartial compassionate spectator. However, whatever the level of sufficient well-being chosen, e.g., for Crisp, the level chosen by his impartial spectator, even if it is objective and thus not ambiguous, it will be arbitrary without a deeper argument as to why this threshold matters.

The first two criticisms of sufficiency can be overcome by taking a hybrid, rather than a strict, telic distributive approach to sufficiency. This involves incorporating other telic distributive principles such as priority and equality below and above the threshold. By adding equality or priority above and below the threshold, a telic distributive sufficientarian is able to overcome the first two criticisms while remaining within the telic distributive framework. What is required to overcome these criticisms is to relinquish a 'strict' approach to TDS by combining TDS with other distributive principles. Most supporters of TDS do not take a strict approach to sufficiency, and include priority or equality above and/or below the threshold in order to overcome these criticisms.

However, even if supporters of TDS combine it with other telic distributive views above and below the threshold, and thus are not 'strict' telic distributive sufficientarians, they will not be able to overcome the ambiguity and arbitrariness of thresholds problem. Adding more distributive patterns above and below the threshold does not help one to locate the threshold. The problem of the threshold arises from the second feature of TDS, the welfare-consequentialist perspective, which judges justice based on each individual's outcome of aggregate well-being on a cardinal scale of well-being. Within this perspective it is impossible to identify an all-important threshold of well-being in an unambiguous or non-arbitrary manner. Thus, this feature of TDS leads to the third criticism and forces supporters of TDS to look beyond the welfare-consequentialist perspective in order to overcome the problem of identifying a threshold.

Section 3: The Incoherence of Defenses of TDS against the Ambiguity and Arbitrariness of Thresholds Criticism

Theorists who wish to defend TDS against the third criticism, that a threshold cannot be located that is not ambiguous or arbitrary, are forced to look beyond the welfare-consequentialist perspective in which a threshold is an outcome for an individual located within a cardinal scale of well-being. Defenders of sufficiency have attempted to do so by combining sufficiency with deeper reasons or separate principles of justice, which they claim are "sufficientarian" reasons. Despite this collaborative approach, which combines TDS with other principles or theories of justice, none of the defenders of sufficiency renounce their telic interpretation of

sufficientarianism. They maintain the TDS perspective of sufficiency, which views it as a basic principle of justice.

A tension arises in these attempts to defend sufficiency. The tension arises between transforming sufficiency into something different, which is not vulnerable to the criticism of the arbitrariness and ambiguity of thresholds, without giving up on the TDS understanding of sufficiency entirely. In their pursuit for reasons upon which to found a threshold, defenders of sufficiency as TDS are forced to embrace theories and principles which are not part of the welfare-consequentialist view of sufficiency, while still attempting to hold on to the TDS way of understanding sufficiency. This leaves their theories of sufficiency in a strange limbo between TDS and a different perspective. This different perspective does not view sufficiency fully in the TDS way, as a telic pattern of distribution that is foundational to justice, but instead sees it as a pattern of distribution embedded within a more fundamental theory. Since the ultimate goal is no longer to instantiate a pattern of distribution this theory is no longer telic distributive.

This section will survey the arguments of four defenders of sufficiency to show how they combine the telic doctrine with other theories. The section will begin by looking at two theorists, Liam Shields and Dick Timmer. I will first show how each theorist is able to overcome the first two criticisms by combining telic sufficiency with other telic theories of distribution. I will then show how, in order to overcome the third criticism, both theorists seek external theories upon which to ground a sufficiency threshold. In this way, they argue that their versions of TDS are immune to the arbitrariness and ambiguity of thresholds problem (Shields, 2012; Timmer, 2022).

Both Shields and Timmer propose alterations to the classic TDS model of sufficiency as provided by Casal of the positive and negative thesis. Shields' version of sufficientarianism maintains the positive thesis Casal introduced, that emphasizes the importance of people achieving well-being above a certain threshold. Instead of combining this positive thesis with the negative thesis, that distribution above the threshold is not of moral importance, Shields combines the positive thesis with what he calls the 'shift thesis.' The shift thesis argues that the sufficiency threshold signals a "change in the nature of our reasons" to help people. It holds that "once people have secured enough there is a discontinuity in the rate of change of the marginal weight of our reasons to benefit them further" (Shields, 2012: 108). Shields thinks the shift thesis

combined with the positive thesis as he describes it will "render sufficientarianism distinctive from prioritarianism" because rather than simply a diminution in the weight of our reasons, there is a shift in the rate of change in our reasons to provide a benefit at some "threshold" point where we have reached sufficiency.

According to Shields, when sufficientarianism is held to consist of the positive thesis and the shift thesis, it is able to overcome both the first and second objections cited above. The first objection was that sufficiency leads to giving small benefits to the better-off over large benefits to the worse off. The second objection is its indifference to inequalities above the threshold. The first criticism is avoided by "attaching priority to the worse-off below the threshold," (Shields, 2012: 111) and the second objection is avoided by attaching priority above the threshold, only at a different rate. Thus, Shields' depiction of sufficientarianism moves sufficiency close to a classic prioritarian view. The only difference that remains between sufficiency and priority is the existence of a threshold point of distribution at which a shift in the weight of our reasons to prioritize helping people diminishes.

Despite altering sufficiency by adding priority above and below the threshold to overcome the first two criticisms, Shields requires something more in order to defeat the third criticism. In order to identify a sufficiency threshold that is neither arbitrary nor ambiguous, Shields argues that you need to find what he calls "sufficientarian reasons." If we find certain reasons for a shift in the rate of priority which meet a list of criteria that Shields provides, then he states that "we should conclude that there is likely to be a shift and that the prospects for sufficientarianism are good" (Shields, 2012: 112). He thinks that finding these reasons is the best way to identify a sufficiency threshold. According to Shields, sufficientarian reasons must be "non-instrumental", "satiable", "avoid a high threshold", "non-egalitarian", and "weighty" (Shields, 2012: 112-113).

Similar to Shields, Timmer wants to defend sufficiency against its critics by defining it in a different way. Timmer argues that "sufficientarianism combines three claims: (1) a priority claim that we have non-instrumental reasons to prioritize benefits in certain ranges over benefits in other ranges [this is a separate concept from prioritarianism as introduced by Parfit]; (2) a continuum claim that at least two of those ranges are on one continuum; and (3) a deficiency claim that the lower a range on a continuum, the more priority it has" (Timmer, 2022: 299).

Timmer argues that by depicting sufficiency as requiring these three claims, defenders of sufficientarianism are able to overcome the major criticisms that have been levelled at it. Key to Timmer's theory of sufficiency is his idea of 'range principles,' which he says can indicate "that within a range above or below the threshold, the distribution should be egalitarian, prioritarian, maximin, utilitarian, track justice in transactions, follow a relational conception of justice, and so forth" (Timmer, 2022: 304-305). According to Timmer, the three claims listed above which sufficiency requires, "are compatible with any type of range principle" (Timmer 2022: 305).

Timmer argues that when depicted this way, it is clear that sufficiency can avoid the criticism that it requires small gains just below the threshold to be prioritized over large gains below (what he calls the "absolutism objection" (Timmer, 2022: 308)) and the indifference objection. He says this is because these objections are not "to sufficientarianism as such, but to metrics, range principles, and priority rules that certain sufficientarian views posit" (Timmer, 2022: 312). He argues that these objections do not defeat the prospects for sufficientarianism. This is because there can be versions of sufficiency that do not require lexical priority to go to those who can get above the threshold and which are not indifferent to inequalities above the threshold.

With regard to the arbitrariness and ambiguity of sufficiency thresholds, Timmer argues for a "political interpretation of sufficientarianism, as opposed to a natural interpretation." He thinks this allows sufficientarians to overcome criticisms about the plausibility of locating a sufficiency threshold (Timmer, 2022: 312). Timmer thinks that sufficientarians have been making a mistake by treating sufficiency thresholds as things that can be found in nature, and argues that they should instead be arguing for sufficiency thresholds as being part of the most plausible accounts of justice. He uses Frankfurt's account of sufficiency as a means of illustrating this distinction.

Timmer argues that Frankfurt's idea of a sufficiency threshold at the level of contentment with the amount of money one has can be viewed either as subjective contentment, which he calls "natural sufficientarianism" (how it has been traditionally viewed in the literature by theorists such as Casal), or as presenting a level of money that society deems a reasonable person should be content with, which he calls "political sufficientarianism" (Timmer, 2022: 315). Under the natural reading of contentment as being subjective, Frankfurt's idea of a threshold is open to the ambiguity criticism. However, according to Timmer, under the political reading it is possible to

define what level of money a reasonable person should be content with according to a certain theory of a just society. Timmer states that:

> This distinction between natural sufficientarianism and political sufficientarianism is crucial. I will argue that political sufficientarianism is immune to the sceptic's charge of non-existing thresholds, whereas natural sufficientarianism is not. Moreover, political sufficientarianism enables sufficientarians to respond to objections to indifference, absolutism, responsibility, and arbitrariness with much more force than natural sufficientarianism (Timmer, 2022: 315-316).

Timmer thinks that 'political sufficientarianism' is able to overcome these objections because it does not attempt to locate an intrinsically existing, natural sufficiency threshold, such as a good enough level of subjective contentment or well-being. Instead, political sufficientarianism seeks something less difficult to justify - a threshold which is important to a certain theory of justice. Timmer therefore promotes political sufficientarianism as a means of overcoming the major objections that have been levelled at sufficientarianism.

In their efforts to defend telic distributive sufficientarianism against the first two criticisms, Timmer and Shields both attempt to reformulate the principles that make up the sufficiency doctrine. Shields combines his version of the 'positive thesis' and the 'shift thesis' and Timmer combines his priority, continuum and deficiency claims. Both of these depictions of sufficiency continue to describe it in terms that are telic distributive, i.e., as a pattern of distribution in the world by which the justice of all actions and institutions can be measured insofar as they contribute to instantiating this pattern. They both describe an ideal pattern of distribution, which, in the case of Shields, places a shift within an otherwise prioritarian view, and in the case of Timmer, combines different 'ranges' of distribution, which are divided by a threshold. However, both Shields and Timmer realize that justifying a sufficiency threshold in a way that is not ambiguous or arbitrary requires something more than what telic distributivism can provide on its own. Thus, unlike egalitarians or prioritarians they must appeal to "sufficientarian reasons" or "political sufficientarianism."

Shields looks for "sufficientarian reasons" with which to support sufficientarianism by justifying the "shift thesis." He gives an example of a sufficientarian reason in his book *Just Enough: Sufficiency as a Demand of Justice*. There he argues that "autonomy, understood as a deliberative capacity, constitutes part of the conditions of freedom, and thus, we have a reason to provide people with sufficient autonomy that does not apply to promoting autonomy further" (Shields, 2016: 45). Similarly, Timmer seeks to support sufficient distribution with external theories of justice which he argues are "political sufficientarian." He does not argue for a certain theory of justice, but instead claims that his version of telic distributive sufficientarianism can be supported when it is found in any theory of political justice. Both Shields and Timmer require external theories of justice to locate a sufficiency threshold that is neither arbitrary or ambiguous. Thus, they require theories of justice beyond the scope of telic distributive sufficientarianism to make telic sufficientarianism tenable.

In addition to Shields and Timmer, David Axelsen and Lasse Nielsen also look beyond the scope of TDS in order to ground a sufficiency threshold (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015, 2017). Writing together, these theorists argue for a concept of "freedom from duress" upon which to found TDS. They state that "the ideal of freedom from duress aims at securing sufficient possibilities in central areas of human life for everyone to enable the freedom to live a successful and autonomous life" (Axelson & Nielsen, 2015: 412). Expanding on this ideal, they have also argued for a general "capabilitarian approach" to sufficiency, which would aim at achieving "sufficient capabilities in each relevant area of human life" (Axelson & Nielsen, 2017: 52). They state that they wish to argue for the "sufficiency principle within a capabilitarian framework of social justice revolving around a categorization of central human capabilities that we believe most capabilitarians would accept" (Axelson & Nielsen, 2017: 57). They identify "three broad categories of central human capabilities," those "related to biological and physical human needs," "capabilities related to fundamental interests of a human agent," and those "related to fundamental interests of a social being" (Axelson & Nielsen, 2017: 48).

While arguing for the embedding of sufficiency within the concept of freedom from duress and a broadly capabilitarian approach, Axelsen and Nielsen continue to refer to sufficiency as a telic distributive principle. They state that:

In its most basic form, a distributive ideal of sufficiency involves a positive thesis, that bringing people above some threshold is especially important, and a negative thesis, that above this threshold, inequalities are irrelevant from the point of view of justice. The positive thesis is rather uncontroversial, and many non-sufficientarians accept it in some form or certain contexts. The acceptance of the negative thesis is, on the other hand, distinctively sufficientarian. Egalitarians and prioritarians alike explicitly reject it, because they believe that high-level inequalities are a concern of justice. The sufficiency principle that we wish to defend revolves around a special variant of these theses, based on the claim that justice requires making everyone free from duress [...] (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015: 407-408)

It is clear from the above quote that Axelsen and Nielsen see sufficientarianism as a telic distributive pattern, alongside egalitarianism and prioritarianism. They describe it in the same way it has been described since Casal, as involving a positive and a negative thesis. They see their concept of freedom from duress as adding to the basic idea of telic distributive sufficientarianism. Thus, they see themselves as creating a "variant" amongst different ways of interpreting the positive and negative thesis that have been developed in the literature on telic distributive sufficientarianism.

The foregoing expositions of the defenses of telic distributive sufficientarianism show a growing tension, or even a contradiction. The contradiction is between a desire to understand sufficiency as though it is a self-sufficient telic theory of justice (TDS), and a need to embed sufficiency within a broader theory of justice in which one can justify and understand a sufficiency threshold. Theorists defending sufficiency feel the need to embed sufficiency within these external theories because the welfare-consequentialist worldview of TDS does not provide the means of identifying a threshold that is not ambiguous or arbitrary.

Thus, defenders of sufficiency bring in external theories that will justify such a threshold. However, by adopting these external theories, these theorists bring in competing principles to what was once a self-sufficient, telic, principle of justice – sufficient distribution or distribution towards the 'good enough' level of well-being. The welfare-consequentialist worldview aims to establish a certain distribution because it thinks this is the ultimate aim of justice. The external

theories and principles that these theorists adopt break from this welfare-consequentialist perspective which places a certain distribution at the heart of an account of justice. What they describe when they argue for the addition of outside reasons, concepts, or theories, is for something that is no longer "telic" distributive justice. The pattern of distribution is no longer at the foundation of the account of justice, but has become part of a more fundamental theory. Theorists like Shields, Timmer, Axelsen, and Nielsen create a contradiction when they argue that sufficiency is at once a telic distributive pattern, foundational to justice, while also being grounded within an external theory to which it is not fundamental.

Conclusion

Chapter One reveals a fundamental incoherence in the TDS approach to sufficiency. Supporters of TDS are not able to identify a threshold that is unambiguous and non-arbitrary without invoking external theories of justice. These external theories, however, do not view a distributive pattern as fundamental to justice. Thus, a contradiction arises in which supporters of TDS, by invoking such theories, must claim that sufficiency is both a fundamental principle of justice and not a fundamental principle of justice. Within the TDS model, it is not possible to identify a threshold in a way that is unambiguous and non-arbitrary without invoking external theories which undermine the telic distributive universe in which a distributive pattern is fundamental to justice. As this contradiction arises from a problem with the TDS approach to sufficiency itself, it indicates that for sufficiency to work as a concept within arguments for justice, it must be approached in a different way from telic distributivism.

Some theorists have argued for theories of justice that happen to included arguments for a sufficient distribution towards their goal.[2] In these cases sufficiency is not argued for from a telic distributive perspective, but it arises out of a deeper theory as a way of understanding how to distribute towards the end of that theory. These theorists' use of sufficiency does not follow the definition of TDS. They do not view sufficiency as signifying a certain distributive pattern with specific characteristics. They also do not approach sufficiency from a welfare-consequentialist perspective which places a distributive pattern at the centre of justice and which aims at a threshold of well-being which exists on a cardinal scale. The next chapter will explore

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[2] See Anderson, 1999; Nussbaum, 1990, 2006, 2011; Ripstein, 1999; Walzer, 1983.

one of these theories in detail, namely relational egalitarianism. It will look at how relational egalitarian theorists have argued for relational egalitarianism. Within these arguments some relational egalitarians have seen the need for a sufficient distribution of certain goods. Rather than "sufficientarian reasons" these theorists give "relational egalitarian" reasons for a sufficient distribution. What is important to and definitive of this theory is not that it uses "sufficiency" but that it promotes relational equality.

Chapter Two: A Non-Telic Distributive Approach to Sufficiency – Sufficient Distribution
Grounded in a Deeper Theory

Introduction

Chapter One provided an account of the telic distributive approach to sufficiency (TDS). It also showed how this approach to sufficiency leads to a criticism which cannot be overcome without leading to a contradiction. Chapter Two lays the groundwork for exploring an approach to the concept of sufficiency different from TDS. In Section 1 of Chapter Two, I look at theories of justice which invoke an idea of sufficient distribution, but which do not treat sufficient distribution from a TDS perspective. Instead, these theories ground sufficient distribution within their deeper theory or purpose. Sufficient distribution in this case is not a fundamental principle of justice, but is whatever distribution will bring about the ultimate end of these theories of justice.

Section 2 of Chapter Two looks in particular detail at one of these theories: relational egalitarianism. It does so in order to show more clearly how proponents of this theory have approached sufficient distribution from a non-TDS perspective. I argue that supporters of relational egalitarianism, including Elizabeth Anderson, Samuel Scheffler, and Debra Satz, approach distribution from a perspective that seeks distributions that achieve their ultimate end of relational equality. These relational egalitarian theorists ground a concept of sufficient distribution within their deeper theory and do not treat sufficient distribution as telic distributive principle of justice.

Finally, in Section 3, I further explore what this grounding of sufficient distribution within a theory entails. I do so by arguing against Christian Schemmel's call for a principle of egalitarian distribution that has "intrinsic" importance within an account of relational egalitarianism. Contra Schemmel, I argue that distribution in the accounts that supporters of relational egalitarianism provide cannot be of "intrinsic" importance, because distribution for these theorists is necessarily of instrumental importance towards sufficiently instantiating their deeper goal of relational equality.

My goal in Chapter Two is not to give a comprehensive argument for what this new, grounded, approach to sufficient distribution is that we see emerging within theories like relational egalitarianism. In Chapter Two, my goal is to give an exposition of a certain theory, namely relational egalitarianism, in order to show clearly how sufficient distribution works within this theory. By doing this, I identify the essential feature of the approach to sufficient distribution that relational egalitarians take: that they subordinate distribution to the deeper end of their larger theory. By identifying this essential feature of the grounded approach to sufficient distribution that relational egalitarians take, I lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive argument for this different approach to sufficiency. I will argue for what the nature of this approach to sufficiency is in Chapter Three.

Section 1: Sufficient Distribution Grounded in a Deeper Theory

Some theorists have been labeled 'sufficientarian' and treated as though they are telic distributive sufficientarians by critics of TDS (Arneson, 2002). However, these theorists do not approach sufficiency in the same way as supporters of TDS. These theorists do not attribute to sufficiency the two features of TDS introduced in Chapter One: 1) That sufficiency signifies a distributive pattern with its own internal characteristics, and 2) A welfare-consequentialist perspective that places reaching a threshold at the center of an account of justice and which places this threshold at a point of well-being to be located along a cardinal scale. Most of these theorists do not even use the term 'sufficiency'. Rather, they simply approach distribution within their broader theories from a perspective of needing to sufficiently distribute towards their deeper goals.

In this way these theorists implicitly develop a concept of sufficiency from out of broader political and social theories or principles. Sufficient distribution in this context arises out of a deeper theory and is not thought of by itself as a separate principle. It is always sufficient distribution *for* the purpose of the theory of which it is a part. These theorists ground the need for sufficient distribution upon a deeper theory or principle that is most fundamental to their conception of justice and not a principle of sufficient distribution in itself.

Theorists who have been labeled supporters of TDS, but who in fact ground sufficiency within a deeper theory include: Elizabeth Anderson, Martha Nussbaum, Michael Walzer, and Arthur

Ripstein (Arneson, 2002). Anderson is the only theorist within this group who explicitly uses the term "sufficient" to describe her approach to distribution within her greater theory of justice (Anderson, 1999: 319). Her theory of democratic equality invokes a sufficiency standard to measure the distribution of capabilities to function as an equal democratic citizen (Anderson, 1999). Nussbaum takes a sufficientarian approach by seeking to meet thresholds of capabilities in her theory of justice (Nussbaum, 1990, 2006, 2011). Nussbaum is concerned with providing a sufficient level of basic capabilities for all humans to live with dignity, and she defines these capabilities using an objective list of well-being. Walzer, as part of his theory of complex equality, argues that citizens require sufficient income in order to be full members of a democratic society (Walzer, 1983). Finally, Ripstein has argued for the need for a sufficient distribution of "primary goods" in the context of tort and criminal law (Ripstein, 1999: 273). Ripstein argues that people cannot be held to the reasonableness standard used in both these areas of law if they are not given sufficient primary goods to maintain their autonomy.

In all of the examples listed above, what is most fundamental is some other principle or good, e.g., democratic equality, a dignified life, democratic membership, or autonomy, and not a sufficiency principle. In these cases, a concern with sufficient distribution develops out of a more fundamental conception of justice and not as a principle of justice in itself. In this way, sufficiency is grounded within a deeper theory or principle.

Supporters of TDS might invoke Nussbaum's theory of capabilities for human flourishing (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015) or the idea of sufficient autonomy (Shields, 2016) in order to provide the means of determining a threshold. Yet, these ideas are external and secondary to their fundamental principle of sufficiency as TDS. This is not how the theorists listed above approach sufficiency. In the arguments of those who ground sufficient distribution within a deeper theory, goods such as human flourishing and autonomy are what is most fundamental and not a pattern of distribution. Sufficient distribution towards these goods develops out of their accounts of justice merely as a means to achieving the ultimate good of their theory.

These theorists thus do not understand sufficiency as including the two features of TDS. They do not invoke sufficiency as an abstract distributive principle with its own specific qualities (with the partial exception of Anderson, which I will address in a following section), nor do they take a

welfare-consequentialist perspective in which reaching a certain distributive threshold along a cardinal scale of well-being is fundamental to their conception of justice. Instead, these theorists put forward a conception of justice and argue that certain goods should be distributed towards the goal of achieving this understanding of justice. They do not argue that this distribution has any inherent worth regarding justice on account of it being 'sufficient' distribution.

All of the theorists listed above use sufficiency in a way that is different from TDS by grounding it within a deeper social or political ideal. However, I will only explore one of these theories in depth: relational egalitarianism. By focusing on relational egalitarianism and its treatment of sufficiency, I will show how sufficient distribution is grounded within this broader theory.[3] The next section will thus look at relational egalitarianism as it has been argued for by its leading supporters in order to begin to understand the role of sufficient distribution within it. Through an exposition of relational egalitarianism, I aim to reveal how sufficiency can be grounded within a theory of the just society.

Section 2: Relational Egalitarianism

Recent accounts of relational egalitarianism have grown out of a desire by scholars, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler, to reorient arguments for equality towards a focus on equal status between citizens and away from equal distribution of goods. Their accounts of relational equality began with Anderson's criticism of a variant of telic distributive egalitarianism known as "luck egalitarianism." Luck egalitarians argue that the best form of egalitarianism is one which distributes some good equally (ex. resources, primary goods, opportunity for welfare), while upholding an ideal of personal responsibility. Personal responsibility can be maintained, according to luck egalitarians, if society is only responsible for

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[3] Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued for the existence of "relational sufficiency" (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2021). However, his view differs from the sufficiency grounded in relational egalitarianism that I address in this chapter and thus I do not include it in my discussion of sufficiency in the context of relational equality. Whereas relational egalitarians, like Anderson, Scheffler, and Satz, argue for sufficient distribution *for* relational equality, Lippert-Rasmussen's conception of "relational sufficiency" is one "in which everyone relates to one another as having sufficient social and moral standing" (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2021: 82). Thus, in the same way that the supporters and critics of distributive sufficientarianism (TDS) seek "sufficiency" as a goal in itself, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the goal of "relational sufficiency" is sufficiency in itself. His view of "relational sufficiency" is thus closer to TDS than to the grounded form of sufficiency I introduce in this chapter.

remedying inequality that is caused by "brute luck," such as loss caused by nature or accident. When loss is caused by a person's own choice, this is called "option luck" and, according to the luck egalitarians, it should not be the responsibility of society to compensate for this loss as this would undermine personal responsibility (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Dworkin, 1981).

Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler have argued persuasively for relational egalitarianism as a superior alternative to distributive egalitarianism, including luck egalitarianism. Rather than focusing on the equal distribution of some good and personal responsibility, relational egalitarians argue that equality requires relationships of equal status between members of a society (Anderson, 1999; Scheffler, 2003). Distribution of a good, according to relational egalitarians, is only important in insofar as it works to enable and maintain relationships of equal status.

In her essay "Equality," Anderson discusses relational equality generally and states that "[o]n this view, 'equality' refers to egalitarian ideals of social relations. Egalitarians aim to replace social hierarchies with relations of social equality on the ground that individuals are fundamentally moral equals" (Anderson, 2012: 40). She discusses various "egalitarian social movements" in which "[e]galitarians begin by analyzing the particular social hierarchy they oppose and offering grounds for objecting to it. They then propose various remedies – institutions and norms embodying particular ideals of social equality in the domain in question" (Anderson, 2012: 41). According to Anderson, relational egalitarianism is a broad term that can encompass many different forms of egalitarian social relations. Anderson mentions various "models of equality" such as "communes, state communism, anarchism and syndicalism, companionate marriage, multiculturalism (in some guises), republicanism, democracy, socialism, and social democracy" (Anderson, 2012: 40). All of these forms of equality, despite their differences, are forms of relational equality because they aim to replace hierarchy in status with equality of status.

Anderson advocates for a particular form of relational equality, which she calls "democratic equality" (Anderson, 1999). Her argument for this form of relational equality begins with her interpretation of the ideal of "the equal moral worth of persons," which she argues involves two claims, one negative and one positive. The negative assertion denies any kind of hierarchy based

on "birth or social identity." The positive claim "asserts that all competent adults are equally moral agents; everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise moral responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of justice, to shape and fulfill a conception of the good" (Anderson, 1999: 312). These positive and negative claims, as interpretations of the equal moral worth of persons, act as the basis for "claims to social and political equality" according to Anderson (Anderson, 1999: 313). The negative claim provides the foundation for the abolishment of "oppression" and the positive claim acts as the basis for the establishment of "a social order in which persons stand in relations of equality" (Anderson, 1999: 313).

The positive aspect of Anderson's interpretation of the equal moral worth of all persons involves the Rawlsian claim that all "competent adults" have the capacity to guide their actions based on a sense of "moral responsibility" and in accordance with "principles of justice". This leads her to further argue that equal moral agency provides a foundation for social and political equality, which she interprets positively as a "democratic community" (Anderson, 1999: 313). Anderson states that a "[d]emocracy is here understood as collective self-determination by means of open discussion among equals in accordance with rules acceptable to all" (Anderson, 1999: 313).

According to Anderson, this understanding of "democratic community" requires a contractualist ethic (Anderson, 1999; 2010). She states that "[c]ontractualism is the view that the principles of justice are whatever principles free, equal, and reasonable people would adopt to regulate the claims they make on one another" (Anderson, 2010: 22). Democratic equality arises, according to Anderson, when members of a democratic community act based on principles of justice that they have developed freely and equally. She states that "democratic equality regards two people as equal when each accepts the obligation to justify their actions by principles acceptable to the other, and in which they take mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted" (Anderson, 1999: 313). A relationally egalitarian society, or a democratic community, is thus one in which all of its members adhere to principles that they have freely and equally agreed to together.

With regard to what principles of justice members of a democratically equal society would agree to, Anderson argues that "[i]n liberal democratic versions of social contract theory, the fundamental aim of the state is to secure the liberty of its members [...] the fundamental

obligation of citizens to one another is to secure the social conditions of everyone's freedom" (Anderson 1999: 314). According to her, the goal of liberty is best interpreted as requiring the "social condition[s] of living a free life" which are that "one stand in relations of equality with others. To live in an egalitarian community, then, is to be free from oppression to participate in and enjoy the goods of society, and to participate in democratic self-government" (Anderson, 1999: 315). The principles of justice that free, equal, and reasonable people will contract to are therefore the principles that will enable them to maintain the social conditions of their freedom and these will be principles that uphold relational equality.

Anderson argues that the best way to "understand the egalitarian aim to secure for everyone the social conditions of their freedom" is "in terms of capabilities" (Anderson 1999: 316). Thus, to act in accordance with principles of justice that have been agreed to by everyone in a state of freedom and equality, is to act on principles that would secure the social conditions of freedom. This is done by creating a situation in which every member of a democracy has the capabilities they require to participate in society and in democracy, i.e., be free practically.

In order to determine which capabilities are most important for functioning as an equal citizen, Anderson brings back the positive and negative claims of social and political equality. She states that "[n]egatively, people are entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary to enable them to avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive social relationships," and "[p]ositively, they are entitled to the capabilities necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in a democratic state" (Anderson, 1999: 316). With these negative and positive goals in mind, Anderson then identifies "three aspects of individual functioning: as a human being, as a participant in a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a democratic state" (Anderson, 1999: 317). Anderson argues that in order to achieve freedom according to the negative and positive goals of social and political equality, individuals will need to be able to function at these three levels.

While discussing the capabilities that will be necessary to enable functioning at the three levels, Anderson states that "democratic equality guarantees not effective access to equal levels of functioning but effective access to levels of functioning sufficient to stand as an equal in society" (Anderson, 1999: 318). Thus, Anderson argues explicitly for a sufficiency standard with regard to functioning as a free and equal citizen. However, sufficiency within Anderson's theory of

democratic equality does not stand alone as a political ideal, as a sufficient distributive pattern does for telic distributive sufficientarians or equal distribution does for luck egalitarians. Instead, it is rooted in Anderson's concern with relational equality. She states in a later article that "[w]hen we reconceive equality as fundamentally a kind of social relationship rather than a pattern of distribution, we do not abandon distributive concerns. Rather, we give such concerns a rationale" (Anderson, 2008: 143). In other words, sufficient capabilities for functioning as a democratic citizen is a concern for Anderson not because she thinks "sufficiency" matters in itself, but because she is concerned with sufficient capabilities for democratic citizenship that are necessary for the instantiation of democratic equality.

In other articles, Anderson does not so clearly subordinate sufficient distribution to the needs of democratic equality. At times she is caught between treating sufficiency as fully grounded in a deeper theory of democratic equality and as a telic distributive principle. She sometimes refers to sufficiency, like supporters of TDS, as a distributive principle, which only guarantees a basic "floor" of goods needed to be treated as an equal in society, and above which distributions do not matter to justice (Anderson, 2008b: 259, 262).

Anderson's treatment of sufficiency as TDS contradicts her ultimate goal of treating sufficiency as signifying a distribution that meets the requirements of democratic equality. A contradiction arises because if what Anderson is most concerned with is democratic equality, then sufficiency should be whatever distributions are necessary for democratic equality. There should be no limit imposed on this understanding of sufficiency that would require sufficiency to signify only a basic threshold or "floor". Although Anderson seems to think that a sufficientarian "floor" meets the distributive requirements of relational equality, by invoking a telic distributive principle of sufficiency she creates a similar contradiction to supporters of TDS who invoke outside theories and principles of justice. By combining relational equality with a TDS account of sufficiency, Anderson invokes a separate account of justice that competes with her ultimate concern with relational equality. The TDS view of justice also limits Anderson's freedom to distribute in whatever ways are necessary to meet her end of relational equality. I will discuss these contradictions in Anderson's treatment of sufficiency further in Chapter Four.

Another major supporter of relational equality, Samuel Scheffler, also argues that distribution must be grounded in a deeper ideal. Scheffler argues for relational equality first as a moral ideal, which "asserts that all people are of equal moral worth", and secondly as a "social ideal" which "holds that a human society must be conceived of as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys the same social standing" (Scheffler, 2003: 22). He argues finally for a "political ideal" of relational equality which "highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status *as* citizens" (Scheffler, 2003: 22). Scheffler thinks that these ideals constitute relational equality, and that questions of distribution must be made in light of them.

Scheffler states that "in the end, the relevant question is about the bearing on distribution of a morally-based ideal of human social and political relations," (Scheffler, 2003: 22) and thus any pattern of distribution will be decided upon based on these ideals. He goes so far as to say that advocacy for a certain distributive pattern must be "anchored in some version of that ideal, or in some other comparably general understanding of equality as a moral value or normative ideal" or else it will be "arbitrary, pointless, fetishistic: no more compelling than a preference for any other distributive pattern" (Scheffler, 2003: 23). Thus, according to Scheffler, without a deeper moral ideal such as relational equality, a distributive pattern is meaningless.

Scheffler, unlike Anderson, focuses on what he calls "distributive egalitarianism" rather than sufficiency when he discusses distribution in the context of relational egalitarianism. He states that "Rawls's theory" can show how "a plausible form of distributive egalitarianism can be anchored in a more general conception of equality as a social and political ideal" (Scheffler, 2003: 31). According to Scheffler, for Rawls:

> [e]quality is understood as a social and political ideal that governs the relations in which people stand to one another. The core of the value of equality does not, according to this understanding, consist in the idea that there is something that must be distributed or allocated equally, and so the interpretation of the value does not consist primarily in seeking to ascertain what that *something* is. Instead, the core of the value is a normative conception of human relations, and the relevant question, when interpreting the value, is

what social, political, and economic arrangements are compatible with that conception (Scheffler, 2003: 31).

Scheffler therefore thinks he is following Rawls when he argues that "an egalitarian scheme of distributive justice" should be one that best decides which "system for allocation of economic resources is appropriate to a society of equals and what bases for the assignment of benefits and burdens such a society would recognize" (Scheffler, 2005: 19). This approach leaves open the exact nature of egalitarian distribution according to Scheffler. Although Scheffler does not argue for a sufficiency standard explicitly, like Anderson does, he makes it clear that any conception of egalitarian distribution he supports is an egalitarian distribution because it is sufficient for relational equality and not because it satisfies a requirement of equal distribution.

In addition to Anderson and Scheffler, Debra Satz, while discussing the level of income equality required by a "commitment to the equal status of citizens", has stated that "[i]t is likely that there will be a range of distributive schemes that are compatible with the idea of a society where members stand in relations as equal citizens" (Satz, 2003: 229). Satz argues that the best distributive scheme to support relational equality will be one that is "chosen in the context of a fair political process in which citizens deliberate together about the social good and in which basic liberties and opportunities are ensured" (Satz, 2003: 229). Therefore, according to Satz, the exact distributive pattern is not what is important from a relational equality perspective. Instead, what matters is that the distributive scheme is "compatible" with relational egalitarianism and that it arises out of a democratic process that allows all members an equal say in how goods are distributed in their society. This perspective is consistent with the idea emphasized by Scheffler that what is most important is not a particular distributive pattern. Instead, what is most important is that a distributive pattern is grounded in a deeper moral ideal of equality, and that this ideal of equality decides the nature of a just distributive pattern.

Satz goes beyond her argument for an inclusive approach to deciding upon distributive patterns from a relational egalitarian perspective and argues for the type of distribution required by relational equality. Like Anderson, Satz thinks of sufficiency in a TDS way, as a pattern of distribution towards a basic threshold. However, unlike Anderson, she is not satisfied with sufficiency for relational equality as requiring only a basic "floor" of goods, above which

inequalities are of little or no significance. Satz sees that a sufficient distribution for relational equality will require more equal distribution than that. Thus, she argues that sufficiency and equality distributive patterns, when viewed from a relational equality perspective, should not be considered entirely distinct from one another. Satz argues that when sufficiency is rooted in relational equality, sufficiency cannot be entirely separated from a concern with egalitarian distribution. She supports her position with an account of Rawls, stating that:

> [i]n *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls embedded his analysis of income inequality in a larger theory of the implications of treating people as free and equal members of a community. According to *Theory,* so treating people requires, roughly, that people have equal liberties and rights, have fair opportunities to occupy positions of status and power, and finally, have a level of resources that secures for them a satisfactory minimum and where inequalities in those resources work to everyone's advantage. (Satz, 2010: 67)

By discussing the requirements of distribution for the establishment of equality of status according to Rawls, Satz wishes to highlight that for Rawls the "metric for thinking about the satisfactory minimum is relational; there is a comparative element in play" (Satz, 2010: 67-68).

According to Satz, this relational aspect to determining sufficiency understood in a TDS way as a "satisfactory minimum," shows that sufficiency must include a concern with distributive equality because it is grounded in relational equality. Satz states that "[o]n a Rawlsian account, we cannot evaluate a distribution simply by looking in isolation at what each person has: instead, we must look at the effect of the distribution on the ability of citizens to stand and relate to one another as equals" (Satz, 2010: 68). Satz thus argues that from a relational egalitarian perspective a concern with equal distribution must be incorporated into an account of sufficient distribution. However, she still understands sufficient distribution in a partially TDS way as being a principle of distributive justice which necessarily involves distribution of goods towards a threshold.

From the foregoing exposition of arguments for relational egalitarianism from its main supporters, it is clear that a Rawlsian understanding of justice is underlying their concern with relational equality. Anderson, Scheffler, and Satz all argue from what they claim is a Rawlsian perspective for an understanding of justice that does not place distribution at its centre, but which

is fundamentally concerned with equality of relations between members of a society. Samuel Freeman has similarly argued that "[e]quality of respect for persons" is more important than equality of distribution to Rawls (Freeman, 2018: 13). This is because equality of respect for persons:

> is owed to humans as moral persons and is grounded in their possessing the moral powers of rationality and justice. Equality of respect for moral persons, Rawls says, is exhibited by the equal basic liberties and their priority, fair equality of opportunities, and such natural duties as mutual respect. Rawls also appeals to the ideal of free and equal moral persons cooperating on ground of reciprocity and mutual respect to explain why inequalities of economic distributions are justified to guarantee the worth of the basic liberties and fair opportunities of citizens. (Freeman, 2018: 13-14)

Thus, distributive concerns are secondary to a fundamental concern with establishing equal status, or respect, between members of a society according to the relational egalitarian understanding of Rawls. Scheffler states that according to Rawls "[s]hares are fair when they are part of a distributive scheme that makes it possible for free and equal citizens to pursue their diverse conceptions of the good within a framework that embodies an ideal of reciprocity and mutual respect" (Scheffler, 2003: 28).

A Rawlsian understanding of justice which requires the establishment of a society of reciprocity and mutual respect because of the equal moral worth of humans is what is at the heart of the relational egalitarian understanding of justice. As a result, it gives distribution a subordinate place to a more fundamental concern with equal relations. Distributions are sought that are sufficient for the deeper purpose of relational equality, and in this way sufficiency is grounded within relational equality. Thus, the general approach taken by Anderson, Scheffler, and Satz, which subordinates distribution to the ultimate goal of relational equality, requires a grounded form of sufficient distribution towards the end of Rawlsian Relational Egalitarianism (RRE). I will explain further, in Chapter Three, the nature of this form of the concept of sufficiency, which grounds sufficiency within a deeper theory and is different from the traditional conception of sufficiency as TDS.

Sufficiency grounded within RRE is clearly a different approach to justice than the telic distributive approach. It is also different from an approach taken by some theorists who acknowledge the importance of relational equality (which they call social equality), but maintain that distributive concerns are fundamental to justice. David Miller argues that equality, insofar as it relates to justice, requires an equal distribution of some good, and that social, or relational, equality is a separate ideal which is not central to justice. Miller states that "there are two different kinds of valuable equality, one connected with justice, and the other standing independently of it. Equality of the first kind is distributive in nature. [...] The second kind of equality is not in this sense distributive [...] it identifies a social ideal, the ideal of a society in which people regard and treat one another as equals" (Miller, 1997: 224). Jonathan Wolff also maintains a distinction between two types of equality – one distributive and one about "the attitude people have toward each other" (Wolff, 1998: 104). Like Miller, Wolff maintains the separateness of the two ideals. He does not argue, as supporters of sufficiency for RRE do, for one ideal, a relational ideal, which underlies any concern with distribution.

In the next section I will look at the work of Christian Schemmel. He, similar to Miller and Wolff, seeks to maintain a central place for a principle of equal distribution within an account of justice while arguing for the importance of relational equality. However, unlike Miller and Wolff, Schemmel thinks that a concern with distributive equality can be incorporated into a broader theory of relational egalitarianism rather than being a totally separate principle. I will argue that this approach to distribution is not possible within the theory of relational equality as it has been argued for by supporters of sufficiency grounded in RRE. They seek a distribution that is sufficient for its deeper purpose of relational equality and not for the purpose of equal distribution in itself.

Section 3: Distribution within RRE – A Grounded Approach to Sufficiency

Christian Schemmel aims to place relational and distributive concerns together, as central aspects of social justice. Schemmel, unlike Miller, argues for relational equality as "an ideal of social justice, not a social ideal of equality independent of justice" (Schemmel, 2011: 365). However, although Schemmel argues for relational equality to be an ideal of justice, unlike supporters of RRE, he interprets this ideal of relational equality as containing within it an "intrinsic" concern

for distributive equality (Schemmel, 2021: 237-238). He argues that "given their commitment to an ideal of society as a cooperative scheme among equals, relational egalitarians ought to hold that there are intrinsic reasons of justice in favor of limiting distributive inequality in socially produced goods" (Schemmel, 2011: 366). Schemmel thinks that an "intrinsic reason" for relational egalitarians to "limit inequality" and "endorse a – defeasible – presumption of equality" is that such "a presumption expresses equal respect for participants in cooperation who jointly produce basic social goods" (Schemmel, 2011: 370).

Schemmel is particularly concerned with the goal of working out the distributive implications of relational egalitarianism because he thinks that Anderson and Scheffler have failed to do this in a convincing way. He argues that "Anderson's discussions of the topic suggest that relational egalitarianism vacates a large part of the terrain of distributive justice in favor of a minimalist, sufficiency view" and that "Scheffler, on the other hand, has not so far spelled out the distributive implications of his view on relationship equality in any detail" (Schemmel, 2011: 365). Based on these alleged failings, Schemmel strives to develop a better understanding of distribution within a relational equality view. According to Schemmel, Anderson in particular has failed to acknowledge "the intrinsic reason for limiting distributive inequality: that it expresses respect for people's equal status in the overall relationship of social cooperation" (Schemmel, 2011: 374). Thus, Schemmel aims to insert a concern for distributive equality into an account of relational egalitarianism.[4] Schemmel's principle of distributive equality does not treat distributive equality as only of instrumental value towards sufficiently instantiating the ultimate goal of relational equality, but as having moral weight in itself.

Against Schemmel, I argue that relational egalitarianism as RRE does not call for a principle of distributive equality that has "intrinsic" importance to relational egalitarianism and that there should not be a "presumption" of equal distribution according to supporters of RRE. Instead, I argue that relational egalitarians, arguing from a Rawlsian perspective, have shown that distributions within a relational egalitarian account of justice are those that would be sufficient for the ultimate purpose of instantiating relational equality. Distributions are thus of purely

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[4] Schemmel does not address Satz's efforts to argue for the importance of equal distribution from an RRE perspective. Also, he differs from Satz in his argument because he does not wish to combine equal distribution and sufficient distribution and because he argues for an "intrinsic" concern with equality whereas Satz does not.

instrumental importance and should take whatever form is required to instantiate relational equality. It is people's equal status that comes first and is intrinsic to relational equality. Distributing goods equally is only one means of concretely instantiating this already existing equal status. Supporters of RRE are concerned with what relational equality requires in terms of distribution in order to be sufficiently realized. If what expressed respect for the equal status of people was an unequal distribution, then supporters of RRE would argue for an unequal distribution. Therefore, equal distribution does not have intrinsic, but instrumental, worth to RRE theorists.

Thus, I differ from Schemmel on two accounts: 1) I think that sufficiency has an important place in a theory of relational equality, although not as TDS, but as sufficiency grounded in a deeper theory, and 2) I do not think that equal distribution within an account of relational egalitarianism as RRE has intrinsic value in itself and that there should be a presumption of equal distribution. Instead, distributions are instrumentally valuable for the deeper purpose of reaching sufficiency for relational equality and will take whatever form this requires.

Although I disagree with Schemmel's contention that sufficiency has no place in arguments for relational equality and on the intrinsic importance of distributive equality to relational egalitarianism, I agree to some extent with his criticisms of Anderson's and Scheffler's accounts of distribution for relational equality. As noted above, Schemmel contends that Anderson's understanding of relational equality only calls for a "minimalist" sufficiency standard, and he asserts that Scheffler has not described the distributive requirements of his understanding of relational egalitarianism in "any detail" (Schemmel, 2011: 365). These criticisms make sense when one looks at the surface of Anderson's and Scheffler's arguments for distribution.

As I note in Section 2 of this chapter, Anderson does approach sufficiency from a TDS perspective. She views sufficiency as a distributive pattern with internal characteristics that require distribution of some good towards a threshold above which distributions are of no moral importance (Anderson, 2007 & 2008b). She has also cited the founder of telic distributive sufficientarianism, Frankfurt, when she discusses her support for a sufficiency standard of distribution (Anderson, 2004b: 105). By portraying herself as a supporter of TDS, Anderson contradicts the implications of her own argument for relational equality as foundational to justice

on her understanding of distribution. The telic distributive principle of sufficiency (TDS) that Anderson invokes competes at a fundamental level with her stated aim of democratic equality because both claim the status of fundamental principles of justice. Moreover, not only does the telic distributive principle of sufficiency contradict Anderson's general approach to democratic equality, even if it did not, it seems unlikely that a basic "floor" of distribution would be sufficient for a society of relational equality. As both Schemmel and Satz point out, equal distribution of money and other important goods is likely necessary for a society of relational equals.

I thus agree with Schemmel on the point that Anderson should not invoke sufficiency, understood as TDS, when arguing for distribution within her account of relational equality. I also agree with Schemmel that Anderson fails to acknowledge the importance of equal distribution when she argues for sufficiency as TDS. However, what Anderson is missing is not, as Schemmel argues, an intrinsically important principle of distributive equality. What she is missing when she invokes TDS is an account of sufficient distribution that is fully grounded in her deeper theory of relational equality. Anderson clearly states that she wants sufficient capabilities and other goods for her deeper purpose of democratic equality because this is her ultimate goal. She states that "democratic equality guarantees effective access to a package of capabilities sufficient for standing as an equal over the course of an entire life" (Anderson, 1999: 319). So, there is no reason to limit herself to an account of sufficiency as TDS that predetermines the nature of a sufficient distribution. She should distribute in whatever way is necessary to bring about capabilities sufficient for democratic equality and this may include a concern with equal distribution (sufficient for relational equality).

What Anderson's argument for sufficient capabilities for functioning as an equal in democratic society really advocates for is an understanding of distribution as grounded within a deeper ideal. This leads to the need for a different view of the *importance* and *nature* of sufficiency from that of telic distributive sufficientarianism. Whereas supporters of TDS see distribution as central to their understanding of justice, Anderson should see distribution as secondary to the fundamental concern of justice with the equal status of members of a democratic society. And whereas supporters of TDS see distributive sufficiency as necessarily being separate from distributive equality, Anderson's concern with relational equality, as Satz has argued (Satz, 2010), should be

open to an understanding of sufficiency that includes a concern with distributive equality if this is what is required to instantiate relational equality.

Schemmel's criticism of Scheffler as vague is correct. Scheffler's account of distribution for relational equality only calls it an "egalitarian" distribution and fails to give a clear account of what this distribution would look like (Scheffler, 2003). However, Schemmel fails to acknowledge the larger argument Scheffler has made regarding distribution: that distributions must be grounded in a deeper principle such as relational equality. By focusing on what relational equality is, Scheffler provides a basis for an account of distribution that is sufficient for this deeper goal. Scheffler does say that he thinks such a distribution will be egalitarian. However, unlike for Schemmel, equal distribution for Scheffler is not intrinsically important. Equal distribution is only important because it will help to bring about relations of equality.

Thus, unlike Anderson, Scheffler does not contradictorily invoke a telic distributive principle of justice. Instead, he argues consistently for an approach to distribution in which distribution is not a principle of justice in itself, but is instrumental towards the goal of relational equality. Whereas telic distributive egalitarians and sufficientarians make distribution central to their theories of justice, Scheffler invokes Rawls and argues that any concern with distribution is secondary to a primary concern with the equal status of members of a society. He states that his aim is to "illustrate how a plausible form of distributive egalitarianism can be anchored in a more general conception of equality as social and political ideal" and that "Rawls's theory shows us how this can be done" (Scheffler, 2003: 31). According to Scheffler,

> [f]or Rawls, people are conceived of as free and equal citizens, and the aim is to determine which principles of distributive justice are most appropriate for a modern democratic society whose members are so understood. In other words, the question is which principles of justice are most consistent, in modern conditions, with freedom and equality of persons (Scheffler, 2003: 31).

Scheffler thinks that this is the correct approach to take to distributive justice. One must first get the aim of distribution clear and then work out the distributions that would be sufficient to achieve this aim. Schemmel is right that Scheffler has not developed his theory of distribution.

However, Scheffler has laid the groundwork for developing a theory of distribution by explaining that distributions must work towards a goal in theories of justice. According to him, this goal should be the one put forward by Rawls of instantiating a democratic society in which people are free and equal.

In conclusion, I think that Schemmel is right to point out the failings of Anderson and Scheffler in their treatment of distribution in the context of relational egalitarianism. These are that Anderson claims to argue for a strict account of TDS and that Scheffler does not develop his account of the just distribution. However, I think that Schemmel fails to acknowledge the important contributions that these theorists have made to understanding how distribution works in the context of relational egalitarianism. Anderson and Scheffler (and Satz although she is not included in Schemmel's discussion of distribution in relational egalitarianism) develop an account of relational egalitarianism which follows Rawls in subordinating distribution towards the ultimate goal of relational equality. Although Anderson, and to a lesser degree Satz, still view sufficiency as TDS (as a pattern of distribution that necessarily involves the distribution of a good towards a minimum threshold) they in fact lay out arguments for sufficiency as a distribution that will take whatever form is sufficient for their deeper theory of RRE. These theorists thus argue for a theory of distribution that is not telic distributive, but which aims for sufficient distribution *for* relational equality and thus is grounded in this deeper goal.

Conclusion

In Chapter Two, I have shown that a different approach to sufficiency exists within theories that do not treat sufficient distribution as a telic principle of justice (TDS), but which treat sufficient distribution as any distribution that is sufficient to bring about the ultimate end of their theory. In the case of relational egalitarianism, unlike the TDS view of sufficiency as a telic pattern that is fundamental to justice, theorists invoke a view of sufficiency that requires any form of distribution, including egalitarian distribution, which is sufficient to achieve the goal of relational equality. This approach to sufficient distribution grounds sufficiency fully within a deeper theory. Sufficient distribution for theories such as relational egalitarianism, is not of intrinsic importance, but is of instrumental value. Sufficient distributions matter to relational egalitarians

purely because of their role in bringing about relational equality and not because some pattern of distribution is at the centre of their account of justice.

In Chapter Three, I will further develop my account of the nature of sufficiency grounded in a deeper theory. I will also argue that my account is the only coherent way to understand the concept of sufficiency within arguments for the just society, and that supporters of TDS have incorrectly treated sufficiency as a distributive pattern with its own internal characteristics. Finally, I will apply my account of sufficiency back to arguments for Rawlsian Relational Egalitarianism (RRE), in order to provide an example of what a fully developed account of sufficiency for a deeper theory should look like.

<u>Chapter Three: The Correct Understanding of the Concept of Sufficiency in Arguments for Justice</u>

Introduction

In Chapter Two I focused on non-telic distributive accounts of sufficiency, which ground sufficiency within a deeper theory. In particular, I focused on explicating RRE arguments for sufficient distribution for relational egalitarianism. The goal of Chapter Three is to explain the different understanding of sufficiency that we see emerging from non-telic arguments for justice and to prove it is the correct way to understand sufficiency. Thus, I begin Chapter Three with an account of the concept of sufficiency that emerges out of deeper theories, e.g., RRE. After providing this account, in Section 2 I argue that sufficiency has been fundamentally misunderstood by supporters of TDS. I further argue in this section that the different conception emerging from arguments that ground sufficiency within a deeper theory is the correct way to understand sufficiency. In Section 3, I argue for the importance of understanding sufficiency correctly to arguments for justice. Finally, in Section 4 I argue for what the general structure should be of a non-telic distributive argument for sufficient means for the just society.

Section 1: The Nature of the Concept of Sufficiency – Sufficiency *for* a Deeper Theory (SFDT)

The grounded approach to sufficiency we see developing out of arguments for RRE can be called "Sufficiency *for* a Deeper Theory" or "SFDT." This approach to sufficiency in arguments for justice does not view sufficiency as a distributive pattern that acts as a basic principle of justice. Instead, SFDT treats sufficiency as a concept that is integral to arguments for justice because it signifies an essential part of the structure of these arguments: that they seek to theorize practical means that sufficiently instantiate an ideal of justice. Sufficiency as SFDT is a concept that signifies a formal structure between means and ends, in which means meet their ends. The concept of sufficiency can be expressed as: 'Sufficient X *for* Y,' or sufficient means for a goal. In practice, sufficiency will take whatever shape is required by the goal and the available means for reaching that goal. Thus, sufficiency as a general concept represents a formal relationship of means achieving ends, which in practice can take many different shapes.

Anderson, Scheffler, and Satz all seek to theorize means that are sufficient *for* the purpose of RRE and thus they treat sufficiency as SFDT. There is no sufficiency existing as a lone pattern of distribution for these theorists (despite what Anderson, and to a lesser degree Satz, at times claim). Sufficiency in the case of RRE is always and essentially about sufficient means *for* relational equality (SFDT). These theorists argue for sufficiency not because their goal is sufficiency as a distributive pattern, they argue for sufficiency because they wish to find sufficient means to meet their stated goals.

The SFDT approach to sufficiency views the goal towards which a sufficient theory must strive as of central importance. SFDT is ultimately about the ideal which governs the development of sufficient means. Thus, in practice, seeking sufficiency as SFDT requires the theorization and articulation of a clear goal towards which sufficient means can then be theorized. Out of the needs of a clearly defined goal, a theory of sufficient means for realizing that goal can then be developed. Thus, in practice, sufficiency develops out of the relationship between a goal and its means.[5] Once means have been developed that realize a goal, sufficiency becomes a coherent concept. Sufficiency simply signifies the existence of means that realize their goal – it is at this point that the threshold of sufficiency is met. Without a goal, and without the development of means to achieve that goal, there is no coherent concept of sufficiency.[6]

Unless an argument is telic distributive, theorizing sufficient means in the context of arguments for the just society requires more than an account of distribution. In the case of an argument for a

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[5] The origin of the word sufficiency supports this understanding of the term. The word is made up of the combination of the Latin 'sub' (under) and 'facere' (to do, make) and means to meet the need of doing or making. ("Suffice." *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary,* Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/suffice. Accessed 6 Mar. 2024.)
Also supporting this interpretation is the logical meaning of sufficiency, that "if the conditional "$p \supset q$" is true, and p holds, then q also holds." Put another way "the truth of the antecedent [p] is in turn *sufficient* for the truth of the consequent [q]." (Brennan, Andrew, "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/necessary-sufficient/>. Accessed 6 Mar. 2024.)
[6] The everyday use of sufficiency as something lower, or just "good enough", loses sight of this actual meaning of the word. What really happens when a state of affairs is declared to be "*barely* sufficient" or "*just* good enough" is that an ideal has been lowered because it is believed that available means cannot reach the higher ideal. If there were no lower ideal created towards which available means could suffice, the term 'sufficiency' would not make any sense in this context. One would either say the current state was insufficient (because the higher ideal could not be reached) or one might give up on ideals altogether. Therefore, this use of sufficiency as "*barely* sufficient" reveals the tendency to accept lower ideals and does not indicate something integral to the meaning of the concept of sufficiency.

relational egalitarian society, distribution will play an important part in an account of the sufficient means for a relational equality, but it is not all that there is to a theory of sufficiency for this goal. The determination of sufficient means will require a theory that goes beyond an account of distribution. Such a theory will need to theorize the social structures and human capabilities required to sufficiently instantiate such a society. Within accounts of sufficient human capabilities and social structures distributions arise, but they are not of fundamental importance to justice. The SFDT approach thus explains the role of distributions within theories of justice such as RRE, which are not telic distributive. Distributions within these theories are not foundational principles of justice, but instead are one aspect of a broader theory of the means needed to sufficiently instantiate the ultimate goal of the just society.

Anderson has begun to theorize the means of sufficiently instantiating the goal of a relational egalitarian society and thus has begun to develop a fuller SFDT theory of sufficiency for this goal. Despite the fact Anderson claims to focus on distribution and to support a telic distributive sufficientarian standard, her theory is in fact an SFDT one which theorizes the nature of the capabilities sufficient for the creation of relationally equal democratic citizens. Thus, although Anderson ironically identifies herself to be a supporter of sufficiency in the TDS sense, she in practice argues from an SFDT perspective, which seeks to theorize sufficient means for relational equality. This is clear from Anderson's stated goal of identifying "capabilities sufficient for standing as an equal over the course of an entire life" (Anderson, 1999: 319). This approach to sufficiency does not view sufficiency simply as a distributive pattern (TDS), but as a theory of the nature of capabilities that will be sufficient for the purpose of relational equality (SFDT).

Anderson begins to develop an SFDT argument by first clearly articulating her goal. Anderson's goal is "democratic equality." Her conception of justice as democratic equality is a relational egalitarian reading of Rawls's theory of the just society, in which members are equal in terms of their moral powers. The "principles of justice" are those that all "free, equal, and reasonable people would adopt to regulate the claims they make on one another" (Anderson, 2010: 22). In order to find the sufficient capabilities to meet this goal, Anderson begins to go beyond an account of distribution because she must theorize both the nature of sufficient capabilities and how to develop them in citizens. Anderson thus argues for capabilities that are sufficient to

enable citizens to "stand as an equal in society" (Anderson, 1999: 318). Although she does not fully develop a theory of the nature of sufficient capabilities for democratic equality, she begins to work towards this when she identifies three levels of functioning which these capabilities must meet: as a human, as a productive member of the economy, and as a democratic citizen. (Anderson, 1999: 317) With regard to the third function, democratic citizenship, Anderson has argued in detail for the nature of an adequate education to meet this function (Anderson, 2004b; Anderson, 2007; Anderson, 2010b). Thus, she has theorized how to sufficiently develop the capability for democratic citizenship in citizens.[7]

In Section 4 of this chapter, I will return to the nature of SFDT arguments for the sufficient means to achieve RRE. There, I will go beyond Anderson's introduction of the idea of sufficient capabilities for democratic equality (her version of RRE) to develop a sketch of the structure that an SFDT argument for the sufficient means for the RRE society might take. Such a theory will theorize, as Anderson has started to do, the nature of the human capabilities sufficient to reach a society of relational equality. In addition to human capabilities, an SFDT argument for the sufficient means for RRE will involve a theory of the basic structure of society sufficient for relational equality. In such an argument, distributions will be part of a theory of the sufficient means for relational equality, but they will not be fundamental principles of justice with intrinsic worth. Instead, distributions will be explained and justified only insofar as they are the sufficient means required to meet the ultimate goal of RRE.

Before I further develop an account of the structure of SFDT arguments for the just society, I must address two important issues. In Section 2, I will explain why SFDT is the only correct way to understand sufficiency in the context of arguments for justice and why the TDS understanding of sufficiency is incorrect. In Section 3, I will argue for why sufficiency understood correctly as SFDT is an important concept within arguments for justice and must therefore be understood correctly if we are to develop correct theories of justice.

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[7] Anderson's argument regarding sufficient education for the capability of democratic citizenship will be discussed further in Chapters Four and Five.

Section 2: SFDT, not TDS, is the Correct Way to Understand Sufficiency

In Chapter One, it was revealed that the TDS approach to sufficiency leads to a contradiction. This contradiction arises due to a difficulty that is caused by the second feature of TDS: the welfare-consequentialist perspective. Supporters of TDS take a welfare-consequentialist perspective in which a threshold is sought along a cardinal scale of well-being and in which sufficiency, viewed as a distributive pattern, is of fundamental importance to justice. From the welfare-consequentialist perspective it is very difficult to identify a threshold of fundamental moral importance that is neither arbitrary nor ambiguous. This is because of the difficulty of finding such a threshold along a cardinal scale of well-being. Thus, supporters of TDS appeal to theories and principles outside the principle of sufficiency (TDS) in order to justify the existence of a threshold (Shields, 2012; Axelson & Nielson, 2015). Supporters of TDS require these external theories to provide an explanation for the existence of a non-arbitrary, non-ambiguous sufficiency threshold. They argue that by combining external theories and principles of justice with a principle of sufficiency as TDS they are able to overcome the arbitrariness and ambiguity problem because these external theories and principles provide "sufficientarian reasons" for a threshold (Shields, 2012). However, this attempt to defend sufficiency from the arbitrariness and ambiguity of thresholds problem leads to a contradiction. The contradiction is that, for TDS, a sufficiency pattern of distribution is the foundational, telic principle of justice, but it has been shown that it requires a separate, non-telic distributive, foundational principle of justice on which to base the sufficiency pattern. Thus, for TDS, a sufficiency pattern of distribution is both the most foundational principle and not the most foundational principle of justice.

The way out of this contradiction is for defenders of sufficiency to abandon their TDS perspective and to take an SFDT approach to sufficiency. Rather than viewing sufficiency as a distributive pattern that is a fundamental principle of justice in itself and contradictorily claiming that it can be combined with separate theories, these theorists should ground a concept of sufficiency *within* the separate theories they invoke. This is the approach taken by the theorists discussed in Chapter Two who view sufficiency from an SFDT perspective. This approach avoids the contradiction that arises from the TDS perspective because from the SFDT perspective sufficiency is not a fundamental principle of justice competing with a separate

theory. Instead, it is a concept that is grounded within a broader theory or principle of justice. There is thus no longer a contradiction.

Beyond the contradiction that arises due to the second feature of TDS (the welfare-consequentialist perspective), there is a more fundamental problem that results from the first feature of TDS. As was explained in Chapter One, the first feature of the TDS perspective is that it views sufficiency as signifying a distinct distributive pattern, which has certain characteristics that are integral to it. Supporters of TDS maintain that sufficiency consists of a specific threshold, which justice demands we distribute discrete goods towards in order to reach.

As was discussed in Chapter One, TDS theorists often depict this distribution towards a threshold in terms of the positive and negative theses introduced by Casal (Casal, 2007). The "positive thesis" holds that justice requires members of a society have "enough" of some good, and the negative thesis argues that once the threshold of "enough" has been reached, distributions are no longer of moral significance. Supporters of TDS often adjust the negative thesis to allow for some concern for distribution above a sufficiency threshold, but they maintain that distributions must be of less importance once a threshold is met. Supporters of TDS thus view sufficiency as a distributive pattern with its own distinct features, and they contrast this pattern to other distributive patterns such as equality and priority. As in the cases of equality and priority, the goal of justice is to distribute the relevant metric of justice following a certain pattern. In the case of telic distributive sufficiency, this pattern of distribution requires distribution towards a "good enough" line or threshold.

The first feature of the TDS understanding of sufficiency, that sufficiency consists of a distinct distributive pattern with its own intrinsic features, is incorrect. Sufficiency is not inherently a distributive pattern with its own internal characteristics. It cannot stand alone as a pattern of distribution like equality and priority and it does not necessarily consist of distribution of some good towards a threshold. I will demonstrate this fact using the imagery of distributing pieces of a pie.

If one is asked to distribute pieces of a pie equally to a group of 10 people there is no ambiguity about what is asked. Priority is a bit different; it assumes the 10 people already have varying

degrees of pie and we are to distribute more to those who have less in the pre-existing distribution. In both the cases of distributing pieces of a pie equally or following priority, we are able to make sense of what is being asked purely in terms of the ideas of equality and priority as distributive patterns.

However, if one is asked to distribute pieces of a pie sufficiently to 10 people, this request is meaningless. Sufficiency cannot stand alone as a measure of distribution or even as a concept. One would be forced to ask, "distribute pieces of a pie to 10 people sufficiently *for* what end?". Are we supposed to distribute the pie sufficiently to satisfy the hunger of the guests, to make them all happy, or to honour a certain member of the group receiving the pie? *For what* is sufficiency meant? Only by knowing the goal for which we are to distribute the pie sufficiently are we able to make sense of the request to distribute pieces of a pie sufficiently. Sufficiency means something different depending on the goal. It has no universal characteristic but takes the shape of whatever is required for the means available to reach the stated goal.

Through the basic distributive example of distributing pieces of a pie, it becomes clear that sufficiency cannot stand alone as a principle of distribution in the way that equality and priority can. Sufficiency is fundamentally and always 'sufficiency of a certain means *for* a certain end'. This concept has no substantive meaning on its own but signifies the formal relationship between means that reach their ends. There is therefore an inherent contradiction in the concept of sufficiency treated as a principle of distribution in itself. This is because the concept is essentially relational, but in its TDS conception it is abstracted or isolated from every relation and treated as an independent principle. TDS is thus an inherently contradictory concept like a round-square – a non-relational-relational.

Although it cannot be coherently thought of in this way, supporters of TDS attempt to argue for sufficiency as a distributive pattern with its own internal characteristics. This is why they must engage in endless debates about the nature of sufficiency. Whereas debates in the realm of equality and priority are about the correct distributive good (the "Equality of What?" debate for

example[8]) supporters of TDS struggle to determine the nature of the distributive pattern for which they are advocating. Since sufficiency in fact is not coherent in practice without a deeper theory, TDS theorists have erroneously emphasized sufficiency as a pure, telic distributive pattern. The nature of sufficiency is that it is a concept that describes the structure of means meeting the end of a deeper goal or theory, and thus one must first develop such a theory for sufficiency to be coherent. By arguing for "sufficiency" by itself, these theorists have forgotten the "*for* Y" which is fundamental to the idea of sufficiency. After realizing they cannot make sense of sufficiency on its own, they then look for external principles and theories to support it. Rather than grounding sufficiency within these theories, however, they claim to combine sufficiency as an independent principle of distributive justice (TDS) with separate theories and principles of justice (Shields, 2012; Axelson & Nielson, 2015).

As stated above, what the supporters of TDS fail to realize is that sufficiency cannot stand on its own as a principle of justice because it is not a self-sufficient, independent principle in itself. Sufficiency takes any form that is necessary for means to meet their end. What matters to sufficiency is the end towards which sufficient means must be theorized. There is no set formula for how to reach sufficient means for a goal – whatever means reach the goal will be sufficient. In the case of the goal of filling up a glass of water for example, sufficiency will take a form that looks close to what the supporters of TDS claim a universal pattern of sufficiency looks like: distribution of a good (water) towards an absolute threshold. Water will be distributed up to an absolute and clear threshold of a full glass. However, sufficiency does not take the form of distribution towards a threshold because of the nature of *sufficiency* in this example, it takes this form because of the nature of the *goal* of filling up the glass. The goal and the means available to reach that goal dictate the nature of sufficiency. Distribution of discrete goods towards a strict threshold may be what is required of some goals and means in order to reach sufficiency, but that is not because of the nature of sufficiency but because of the nature of those goals and means.

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[8] This debate began with Amartya Sen's problematization of the metric of egalitarian distribution in his 1979 Tanner Lecture, "Equality of What?". For further contributions to the debate see Ronal Dworkin (2000). *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.; G.A. Cohen (1989). On the currency of egalitarian justice. *Ethics*, 99; R.J. Arneson (1989). Equality and equal opportunity for welfare. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, 56(1).

In contrast to the simple goal of filling up a glass with water, the goal of creating a society of relational equals will involve more than the distribution of some discrete good towards a strict threshold line. It will involve the theorization of the structures of society and of the characteristics and capabilities of citizens needed to sufficiently reach the goal of relational equality. The nature of the goal dictates the whole picture of what sufficiency requires. Sufficiency is shaped by what is required to meet a goal. There is no "positive" and "negative" thesis inherent to the concept of sufficiency, because sufficiency will not always require distribution towards a strict threshold, and when it does, it may require further distributions above a threshold. Whatever is necessary for the instantiation of a goal is what will be required of sufficiency. In the case of sufficiency for relational equality, sufficiency will not simply consist of distribution towards a threshold, but of a broad and complex theory of the social structures and human capabilities that will instantiate the goal of a relationally equal society.

Since sufficiency is not coherent as an independent distributive principle with its own characteristics, but is a formal concept that signifies the relationship between means that meet their ends, and which must be grounded in a theory in order to be coherent, those who argue for sufficiency from an SFDT perspective have approached sufficiency in the correct way. The different structure we see emerging from arguments that ground sufficiency, what I have called SFDT, is how we should understand sufficiency because these theorists approach sufficiency as the locating of sufficient means to reach their ends. As there is no "sufficiency" by itself, but only "sufficient means (X) *for* a goal (Y)", anyone concerned with sufficiency must be concerned with a deeper issue: *that for which* they wish to find sufficient means. They are concerned with debating the merits of a broader theory of justice, which involves theorizing sufficient means for its realization.

Section 3: The Importance of Getting Sufficiency Right

Because sufficiency cannot stand alone as a principle of justice, it might be inferred that sufficiency is of little importance. This would be the wrong conclusion to draw from understanding the nature of sufficiency correctly, as SFDT. Frankfurt was right that sufficiency matters, but he was wrong in how he approached it. By treating sufficiency as though it is an independent principle of justice, which consists of the idea of getting "enough" of something,

Frankfurt started the discussion of sufficiency off on the wrong foot. As argued above, there is no distributive principle of "enough" or "sufficiency" with its own inherent characteristics that we can use as an alternative principle of distributive justice to equality. Moreover, Frankfurt was wrong to attribute moral weight to the concept of sufficiency. The goal of sufficiency is what makes sufficiency morally right or wrong, not the concept of sufficiency in itself. This can be observed through the example of the goal of sufficiency as obtaining "enough" guns for a dictatorship to maintain its power. In this case sufficiency, or "enough," is not a good thing because the goal is not a good goal. It is thus not the concept of "enough", that has moral weight, but the goal for which we wish to obtain sufficient means.

What Frankfurt should have argued is that there is no universal nature of sufficiency, but that seeking sufficient means for our ends is fundamental to arguments for justice. It focuses us on the job of theorizing justice and away from prioritizing distributive patterns alone. Sufficiency matters not because it is a basic principle of justice with its own internal characteristics, but because it reveals the basic structure of how to argue about justice. Thus, although Frankfurt did not approach sufficiency in the right way, because he treated it as an independent principle of justice with its own content, he was right that sufficiency is an important concept to arguments for justice. Sufficiency is not important because it is the goal of justice in itself, as Frankfurt argued, but because it places the focus of justice on theorizing a goal and on theorizing the means of reaching that goal.

Applying sufficiency, understood as SFDT, is particularly important in the context of non-telic distributive accounts of justice. This is because it focuses non-telic distributive theorists on developing clear, achievable, 'threshold goals'[9] and on fully theorizing the means of achieving these goals. In the case of telic-distributive accounts of justice, such as telic egalitarianism and telic prioritarianism, the goal and the means of the achieving the goal are clearly laid out: the

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[9] I use the term 'threshold goal' not in the TDS sense of an absolute line that must be exactly located along a cardinal scale of well-being and distributed towards, but in the sense of a goal that is clearly enough defined so as to function as a measure for the theorization of means to sufficiently achieve it. Such a threshold is not an exact line, but a more general conception of a goal that can be further theorized and striven towards. Thresholds are frequently used this way in law and public policy. Defending the ability to locate thresholds in the context of her argument for capabilities, Martha Nussbaum states that "the history of constitutional interpretation in many nations shows, I suggest, that the incremental specification of a threshold of capability is possible and gives real political guidance" (Nussbaum, 2000: 126).

goal is instantiating certain distributive pattern and this goal is achieved by distributing some good according to this pattern. In a non-telic distributive account of justice, such as RRE, the goal and the means of achieving the goal must be theorized as they are not pre-defined like a distributive pattern. Seeking sufficiency as SFDT in the context of non-telic distributive theories of justice places the focus on first theorizing a clear threshold goal, and then on theorizing the means of achieving this goal. This is what theorists like Anderson, Nussbaum, Risptein, and Walzer do within their non-telic distributive theories of justice. They are sufficientarian in an SFDT sense because these theorists put forward clearly defined threshold goals, which they then theorize the means of reaching. By structuring their theories around sufficiency as SFDT in the form of threshold goals and the theorization of means to achieve such goals, these theorists make their theories more practical and achievable.

Understanding sufficiency correctly will also explain the place of distribution within non-telic accounts of justice. Within a non-telic distributive theory such as RRE, the SFDT approach makes it clear that distributions involved in such a theory are not telic principles of justice, but are means towards the ultimate end of the theory. Distribution is a tool that is explained and justified through the ends of a theory of justice. We can thus see clearly the role that distribution within theories of justice that are not telic distributive plays. Distribution works to instantiate sufficiently the goal of the theory and is instrumentally important. Therefore, any distributions that reach the goal will be acceptable in the pursuit of sufficient means for the ultimate goal of justice. Distribution is only one part of a theory of sufficient means and it must fit into the whole picture of what the sufficient means are for instantiating a goal of justice. This is the picture that theorists like Scheffler, Anderson, and Satz paint when they interpret Rawls as putting forward the ultimate goal of a society of relational equals. Distributions in this Rawlsian relational egalitarian (RRE) understanding of the goal of justice work towards the ultimate end in an attempt to reach sufficient means for a relationally equal society. Distributions are not of intrinsic importance, but are part of the means required to sufficiently achieve the goal of relational equality.

Understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT provides clarity that goes beyond distribution and applies to all of the practical means necessary for the instantiation of an ideal. Sufficiency understood correctly within the context of non-telic distributive theories reveals the importance

of fully theorizing the practical means of instantiating goals of justice as well as explaining the place of distribution within these theories. Understanding sufficiency as SFDT means understanding that inherent to arguments for justice is the theorization of sufficient means generally (means that go beyond distributions) which are able to meet the end of justice. Within this general theory of sufficient means, distribution will play a role, but it will not be all of the theory. Sufficiency understood properly as SFDT thus calls us to look beyond distributive issues in arguments for the just society that are non-telic distributive and to theorize sufficient means more broadly.

Finally, by looking beyond distribution, sufficiency understood correctly as SFDT frees us in the context of arguments for justice that are non-telic distributive to understand the goal and structure of these arguments. Theorists such as Anderson, Nussbaum, Ripstein, and Walzer have been labeled "sufficientarians" in a TDS sense (Arneson, 2002), however, by taking an SFDT perspective one can see that this misconstrues the goal and structure of their arguments. These theorists are not confined by the requirements and limits of telic distributive principles of justice because their ultimate goals are not telic distributive. They each seek sufficient means to reach their goals, and these means may involve distributions, but these distributions will take whatever form necessary to meet the ultimate end of their theories.

In conclusion, sufficiency understood correctly as SFDT is particularly important in the context of non-telic distributive accounts of justice. Structuring such theories of justice around SFDT encourages the development of clear, threshold goals, towards which sufficient means can be theorized. Understanding sufficiency as SFDT also explains the role of distribution within such theories as instrumental to the ultimate ends of those theories. The correct understanding of sufficiency also opens non-telic distributive theorists up to the theorization of further means, beyond distributions, of reaching their goal. For example, sufficiency in the context of arguments for the RRE society will require the theorization of human capabilities and social structures sufficient for such a society. Finally, sufficiency understood as SFDT prevents the misattribution of telic distributive intention to non-telic distributive theorists.

In the next section I will develop my account of SFDT in more detail by arguing for the general structure that an SFDT argument will take in the context of a non-telic distributive account of justice. I will show how this structure is taking shape in Anderson's SFDT argument for RRE.

Section 4: The Structure of SFDT in Arguments for Justice

The concept of sufficiency as SFDT holds that sufficiency is incoherent as a substantive, distributive principle of justice in itself, but that it is a concept which signifies a relationship between means and ends. In particular, sufficiency signifies means that have reached their ends. Therefore, sufficiency never exists on its own but is grounded in a theory of means reaching their ends. Sufficiency should be expressed as 'Sufficient X (means) *for* Y (ends)'. The structure of sufficiency as SFDT is revealed through the working out of sufficient means (X) in the light of the requirements of their goal (Y). This structure will take whatever shape is necessary to achieve a goal, and thus it could take many different forms.

In the context of arguments for justice that are non-telic distributive, working out sufficient means in the light of the goal of justice will take different forms depending on the goal of justice chosen. However, whatever the goal of justice chosen, some aspects of the argument for the sufficient means for the goal of justice will likely be the same. This is because, regardless of the goal of justice, such arguments for sufficient means will have to bring an abstract goal into concrete reality and they will also have to deal with the subject matter of human capabilities and the functioning of major social institutions.

From these two general features required by arguments for the sufficient means for the just society, two general features of the structure of SFDT for the just society can be inferred. The first feature is that sufficiency will work at multiple levels, from a level of high abstraction down to a level of concrete detail. Starting with the general goal of seeking sufficient means for the just society, sub-goals must be identified as the means to achieving this abstract goal. These sub-goals will function as the means towards the higher goal of justice, as well as goals in themselves, for which sufficient means must be theorized. Thus, the structure of an SFDT

argument for the just society works at multiple levels. Working from a goal of justice down towards ever greater practicality and specificity.

From the second feature of arguments for sufficient means for justice, that they must theorize sufficient human capabilities and institutional functioning, a further aspect of the structure of SFDT arguments for justice can be inferred. Within these cascading levels of sufficiency, working from abstraction to concreteness, at a level just below the ultimate goal of justice will be a level of the theorization of sufficient human capabilities and institutional functioning for the just society. As they are not the ultimate goal of justice, but shape the general structure of the just society, these means/goals sub-structures can be called 'spheres of justice.' [10] These spheres of justice indicate the major means which must be met sufficiently to reach the ultimate goal of justice, but they also act as goals within their own spheres. They are similar to what Rawls refers to as the "basic structure of society" in that they include "the main political and social institutions of society" (Rawls, 2001: 10). However, unlike Rawls, I include human capabilities among these basic spheres of the just society.

The general structure of arguments for the sufficient means for the just society will therefore involve first the clear articulation of the ultimate goal of justice and then the theorization of the sufficient means for reaching this goal, which will require the theorization of the major spheres of justice. Within the theorization of the sufficient means for the spheres of justice, further sub-goals will develop, which will involve the theorization of sufficient means to meet these sub-goals. The theorization of sufficient means for ever more specific and practical goals will work

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[10] These spheres of justice in a non-telic argument for sufficiency for the just society are different from Michael Walzer's "spheres of justice" (Walzer, 1983). Walzer's spheres contribute to the overall goal of a form of relational equality in which there is "no more bowing and scraping, fawning and toadying [...] no more masters, no more slaves" (Walzer, 1983: xiii), and so in this way he is similar to relational egalitarians such as Anderson. However, Walzer's spheres contribute to equality indirectly rather than directly. In SFDT there is an ultimate goal such as relational equality, and a sub-set of sufficient means are theorized to achieve this good directly (such as capabilities and institutional functions). Walzer on the other hand wishes to attain his good of relational equality, or a lack of domination, not by theorizing the sufficient means to reach this goal directly, but by encouraging a radical pluralism of spheres of distribution in society. He advocates for a multitude of important societal goods as their own spheres of distribution. He thinks that if each of these spheres is governed by its own distributive criteria, one which arises from the particular social meaning of the good in question, a pluralism will arise that will lead to a lack of domination, which he calls "complex equality" (Walzer, 1983: 6). Thus, equality arises indirectly, as the result of the autonomous functioning of the various spheres of distribution in society. This is different from a view in which a certain means such as capabilities are theorized towards a sufficiency threshold of achieving a certain end such as relational equality.

its way down until a theory of sufficient means for the just society is sufficiently specific to instantiate its goal of the just society.

There is thus an 'Upper Level' of sufficiency in which X (the means) can be understood as a sphere of justice working towards Y (the goal) of a just society. Multiple Xs, or spheres of justice, make up the integral parts of the just society. Spheres of justice consist of both human capabilities and institutional functions. Thus, sufficiency in the context of the just society demands that we have sufficient human capabilities and institutional functions for a just society. These human capabilities and institutional functions, taken together, sufficiently make up the just society. In an RRE theory of justice, these human capabilities will include, for example, the ability to be a democratic citizen and to be healthy. The institutional functions in an RRE theory of justice will include the function of the legal system to treat all people as free and equal, and the function of the economy to provide the material means to maintain a society of free and equal citizens. These separate spheres, although they each have a separate goal, will impact each other and must work together towards sufficiently reaching the goal of the just society. All of these spheres of human capability and institutional function taken together create sufficient means (sufficient upper-level Xs) towards the goal of a just society (upper-level Y).

The lower, second level, of sufficiency occurs within each of the spheres. Thus, the capability or function that provides the goal of a sphere acts as both an upper-level X (means) and a lower-level Y (end) in the argument for a sufficiently just society. The sphere of justice, defined by a human capability or institutional function, acts as an upper-level X (means) towards the higher goal of a just society, but as a lower-level Y (end) within its own sphere. Within each sphere of justice, there is at least one primary tool or means (lower-level X), which must be sufficiently developed to instantiate the capability or function of the sphere (lower-level Y).

The examples I have provided above of human capabilities and institutional functioning for an RRE society are clearly not exhaustive of what sufficiency requires for the goal of RRE. My goal is not to provide a complete theory of the just RRE society or to argue for RRE. Rather, my goal in providing these examples is to develop a picture of how sufficiency, as SFDT, structures a theory of justice generally. Here I provide a chart that shows the general structure of sufficiency

in arguments for justice. The goal of the chart is to clarify the structure that an argument for the sufficiently just society takes and to show clearly how sufficiency works at multiple levels. I use RRE as an example within this chart.

The Structure of SFDT for the Just Society:

Ultimate End

RRE Society (Upper-Level Y)

Upper-Level Sufficiency

Spheres of Justice

Capability of Democratic Citizenship (Upper-Level X/Lower-Level Y)

Institutional Function of the Democratic Economy (Upper-Level X/Lower-Level Y)

Institutional Function of the Democratic Government (Upper-Level X/Lower-Level Y)

Means to Ultimate End and End to Lower-Level Means

Lower-Level Sufficiency

Democratic Education (Lower-Level X)

Democratic Economic Laws (Lower-Level X)

Democratic Constitution and Government Structure (Lower-Level X)

Lower-Level Means

This general structure of arguments for the sufficient means for justice can be seen developing in at least one RRE argument for the just society. As stated in Section 1 of this chapter, Anderson has begun to theorize the sufficient means for her goal of democratic equality in some detail. In particular, Anderson has started to theorize the sufficient human capabilities required for her goal of democratic equality.

As stated above, Anderson argues for the ultimate goal of democratic equality. She defines this goal clearly as a society in which individuals relate to each other as equals (Anderson, 1999). A society of relational equals is a just society, according to Anderson, because it reflects the "equal moral worth of persons" (Anderson, 1999: 312). As a means to sufficiently meeting this ultimate goal, Anderson argues for sufficient capabilities. In order to be sufficient for her ultimate goal of democratic equality, according to Anderson, these capabilities must allow for "functioning as an equal citizen in a democratic state" (Anderson, 1999: 317). Anderson argues that such capabilities would thus enable "three aspects of individual functioning: as a human being, as a participant in a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a democratic state" (Anderson, 1999: 317). Anderson thus begins to argue for the nature of sufficient human capabilities for her larger goal of democratic equality. Although she thinks of herself as a TDS theorist and thus couches this argument in terms of sufficient 'distribution,' she is not arguing simply for a theory of sufficiency as distribution. She is in fact developing an SFDT argument for the sufficient means for her goal of justice. Anderson has begun to theorize spheres of justice sufficient for her ultimate end of democratic equality – spheres of human capabilities.

Within one of the spheres of human capabilities she describes, Anderson has made further strides towards an SFDT argument for democratic equality. She has focused on the capability to function "as a citizen of a democratic state," and she has theorized sufficient means towards achieving this sub-goal towards her ultimate goal of democratic equality. Anderson has developed this theory through her work on adequate education. She has argued that for democratic equality, leaders of society must have the capability to be responsive to the needs of all members in society and thus education must be sufficient for this capability, which is necessary for the broader goal of democratic equality (Anderson, 2007: 596). Thus, within the sphere of the capability to function as a democratic citizen, an argument for sufficient means for

this sub-goal develops in Anderson's theory. Anderson's theory of the capability required for democratic citizenship particularly focuses on the capability of leaders in a democratically equal society. It is clear from her argument for sufficient education for leadership in a democratically equal society that Anderson is moving from her abstract goal of democratic equality towards greater detail in her argument for the sufficient means for this ultimate goal.

Conclusion

The aim of Chapter Three was first to explain the nature of the concept of sufficiency that is emerging from theories that ground sufficient distribution and do not treat sufficiency as an independent principle of distributive justice (TDS). I argued that this grounded form of sufficiency should be called 'sufficiency *for* a deeper theory' (SFDT), and that it views sufficiency as the theorization of means that realize the goal of a just society. Sufficiency as SFDT goes beyond seeking distributions sufficient for a goal of justice, and seeks whatever practical means necessary to reach the goal of a just society.

After explaining the nature of sufficiency as SFDT, I strove to disabuse theorists of justice of the illusion that sufficiency is a principle of justice in itself. Using the example of dividing up a pie, I showed that sufficiency is not a workable principle of distribution in itself. With the example of the goal of filling a glass with water, I showed that the shape of sufficiency is not determined by the concept of sufficiency in itself but is dictated by its goal and the means available of reaching this goal. Finally, using the example of seeking "enough" guns for a dictatorship, I showed that sufficiency cannot act as a principle of justice, or the political good.

After proving that sufficiency cannot be understood as a principle of justice in itself (TDS), I argued that the correct understanding of sufficiency is as SFDT. This is because sufficiency is a concept that signifies a formal relationship between means that meet their ends and it must be grounded in a separate theory in order be coherent. Therefore, the theorists I discuss in Chapter Two who argue for sufficiency from an SFDT perspective have argued for sufficiency correctly.

Despite sufficiency not being a principle of justice in itself (TDS), I argued in Section 3 that the concept of sufficiency as SFDT is of fundamental importance to arguments for justice because seeking sufficient practical means for our ends is fundamental to arguments for justice. SFDT is

particularly important for non-telic distributive theories of justice because it encourages the development of clear and achievable 'threshold goals' of justice, towards which sufficient means can be theorized. It is also important to non-telic distributive theories of justice because it explains the place of distribution within these theories. Distribution within non-telic distributive theories of justice is of instrumental importance as it is part of the means of sufficiently achieving the goals of these theories. Beyond distributions, an SFDT understanding of sufficiency opens non-telic distributive theorists up to the challenge of theorizing more fully the sufficient means of achieving their goals. Finally, understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT prevents the misattribution of telic distributive intention to theorists who seek sufficient means for their goals, but who are not telic distributive.

In the last section of Chapter Three, I provided an account of the general structure that an SFDT argument for the just society will take. This structure involves cascading levels of sufficiency, starting with the ultimate goal of justice at the top, towards which 'spheres of justice' provide the means of instantiating this goal. Within these spheres, further means must be theorized that work to sufficiently realize the goal of each sphere. I argued that this structure is taking shape within the RRE argument that Anderson makes for the democratically equal society. Anderson seeks sufficient capabilities (spheres of justice) towards her goal of democratic equality. Within one of these spheres, the capability for democratic citizenship, she has theorized the sufficient (or adequate) education for this capability for her ultimate goal of democratic equality.

In the next chapter, I will look more closely at Anderson's argument for the adequate education for democratic equality. I will compare this argument with a similar argument made by Debra Satz for adequate education for democratic citizenship. In both cases, I will argue that these theorists are making SFDT arguments for the sufficient means for their ultimate RRE goals. However, both of these theorists think of sufficiency to some extent in terms of TDS and thus they are held back in their arguments for the adequate education for RRE because of this incorrect understanding of the nature of sufficiency. Ultimately, in order to make the best arguments for sufficient education for RRE, these theorists will need to understand sufficiency in the correct way as SFDT so as not to be restricted by the limitations of the incorrect conception of sufficiency as TDS.

<u>Chapter Four: Understanding Sufficiency Correctly in the Educational Justice Debate</u>

Introduction

Chapter Three explained the correct understanding of sufficiency (SFDT) in detail. Chapter Four applies the correct understanding of sufficiency (SFDT) to the educational justice debate. In this debate, both Anderson and Satz argue for educational adequacy, which they view as synonymous with educational sufficiency.[11] When they argue for educational adequacy, Anderson and Satz actually argue for sufficient education *for* their respective goals of democratic equality and equal citizenship (SFDT) (Anderson, 2007; Satz, 2007). However, both Anderson and Satz and their critics understand sufficiency incorrectly as TDS.

Section 1 of Chapter Four will show how the proponents and critics of educational adequacy have understood sufficiency/adequacy incorrectly as TDS. Anderson and Satz are in fact making SFDT arguments for the sufficient education for relational egalitarianism. Section 2 of Chapter Four shows how understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT helps both the proponents and critics of educational adequacy to fully argue for and against sufficient education for RRE.

Section 1: Sufficiency has been Understood Incorrectly as TDS by both its Proponents and Critics in the Educational Justice Debate

> a. *The Proponents of Educational Adequacy: Anderson's and Satz's Arguments for Educational Adequacy are caught between TDS and SFDT*

In their arguments for adequacy in the realm of educational justice, both Satz and Anderson set out an SFDT project but continue to view sufficiency as a distributive pattern (TDS). Satz and Anderson state that they want to distribute educational opportunity sufficiently towards their deeper, relational egalitarian ideals of democratic equality (Anderson) and equal citizenship (Satz). Thus, in practice they approach sufficiency as SFDT. However, both theorists continue to

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[11] The concept of educational "adequacy" arose in American court decisions on educational provision and is seen by the American courts as an alternative to equal distribution of educational resources. This legal approach to adequacy is similar to the TDS approach to sufficiency in that it views adequacy as the distribution of a resource towards a specific threshold. Although Anderson and Satz take the idea of educational adequacy from the courts, they treat it synonymously with the concept of sufficiency as TDS from debates about distributive justice. Thus, I will use the terms 'adequacy' and 'sufficiency' interchangeably.

think of sufficiency as it has been presented in the literature: as a distributive pattern with its own inherent characteristics that can be compared and contrasted to other distributive patterns (TDS).

Satz makes big strides towards supporting a view of educational adequacy/sufficiency as SFDT. However, she does not fully realize how revolutionary her interpretation of sufficiency is. She still thinks of sufficiency as necessarily signifying distribution towards a threshold. In a footnote in her article on educational adequacy, Satz quotes Frankfurt when he says that "calculating the size of an equal share is plainly much easier than determining how much a person needs to have enough" (Satz, 2007: 638; Frankfurt, 1987: 23-24). This reveals that Satz thinks of adequacy in terms of Frankfurt's "doctrine of sufficiency" as being about distribution towards a threshold of "enough" of some good. She states that "[a]dequacy approaches typically focus on ensuring some threshold level of education that must be achieved for all children" (Satz, 2007: 635).

Despite understanding adequacy in a TDS way as involving distribution towards a threshold, in her article, "Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship," Satz argues that her view of "educational adequacy" as "tied to the requirements of equal citizenship" leads to an "egalitarian conception of adequacy" (Satz, 2007: 625). She states that:

> […] if we reflect on the civic purposes that we want a conception of educational adequacy to serve, we will endorse only conceptions that contain comparative and relational elements. On my view, the idea of educational adequacy should be understood with reference to the idea of equal citizenship (Satz, 2007: 635).

Satz thus moves in the direction of SFDT in two ways: 1) she states clearly that her understanding of adequacy, or sufficiency, is what is sufficient for "the requirements of equal citizenship," and 2) she acknowledges that this form of sufficiency will include a concern with distributive equality.

However, although Satz moves towards a picture of sufficiency as SFDT, she does so while contradictorily attempting to maintain a view of sufficiency as a distinct distributive pattern (TDS). She never comes to fully see sufficiency as the theorization of means, including

distributions, to reach her goal of equal citizenship. Instead, she tries to maintain a view of sufficiency as one distributive pattern among others (TDS). In doing so, she is partially held back in her argument for sufficiency for equal citizenship by a telic distributive view of sufficiency.

This leads to two problems: 1) TDS at times seems to become almost identical to telic distributive egalitarianism (TDE) because Satz has no other language to show how sufficiency is in fact a higher concept than, and governing the use of, equal distribution. 2) where it is not overlapping with TDE, TDS leaves room for inequalities such as the use of private schools, which could undermine Satz's concern with sufficient education for equal citizenship. She states that "[e]ducational adequacy claims […] still permit the children of wealthy parents to maintain an educational advantage through schooling" (Satz, 2007: 626).

Satz sees that there is a problem with the TDS requirement of allowing for inequalities above the sufficiency threshold if those inequalities could undermine her goal of equal citizenship. She therefore qualifies her allowance of inequality above the threshold, stating that:

> Although an adequacy standard does not insist on strictly equal opportunities for the development of children's potentials, large inequalities regarding who has a real opportunity for important goods above citizenship's threshold relegate some members of society to second-class citizenship, where they are denied effective access to positions of power and privilege in the society. […] On my view […] adequacy is not only a function of the bottom of the distribution but also of the top of the distribution. Citizens are not equal when there is a closed intergenerational social elite with disproportionate access to society's positions of political and economic power (Satz, 2007: 637-638).

Satz thus alters the traditional conception of TDS to include a concern with inequalities above the threshold. By doing this, she begins to free her conception of sufficiency from the restraints of TDS. However, she still thinks of sufficiency as distribution towards a threshold.

Satz goes on to call her view of adequacy "adequacy for citizenship" (Satz, 2007: 639) and states that "adequacy looks at the democratic purposes of education, as opposed to only focusing on

providing equal opportunities among individuals" and so "adequacy is more congenial to the argument for greater integration by class and race" (Satz, 2007: 640). With her inclusion of a concern with inequalities above the threshold and her characterization of adequacy as being "adequacy for citizenship" which "looks at the democratic purposes of education," Satz in practice paints a picture of adequacy as SFDT and not as TDS. However, Satz never comes to view sufficiency clearly in SFDT terms as a concept that signifies a general relationship between the means and ends of justice and which requires the theorization of whatever means (including distributions) are required to bring about its goal. Instead, she continues to view sufficiency as a distributive pattern (TDS) and argues that when sufficiency/adequacy requires more equal distribution it "will converge with vertical equality of opportunity views" (Satz, 2007: 644).

Anderson also sets out an SFDT project of arguing for sufficient education for democratic equality while continuing to view sufficiency as TDS. In her article, "Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective," Anderson argues for a conception of a sufficient education that is rooted in her larger project of sufficiently distributing capabilities for democratic equality. Anderson thinks that for a society to instantiate her deeper goal of democratic equality, education must be sufficiently distributed to create elites who are responsive to the needs of all members of society. She states that "[o]nce we take seriously this democratic requirement of systematic responsiveness to all, we shall find that it has demanding egalitarian implications both for the composition of an elite and for how it should be educated" (Anderson, 2007: 596). In order to meet this sufficiency standard Anderson argues for fair opportunity in education, stating that:

> A just K-12 education system must prepare students from all sectors of society, and especially those disadvantaged along any dimensions, with sufficient skills to be able to succeed in higher education and thereby join the elite. This yields a sufficientarian or adequacy standard for just provision of opportunities for education: every student with the potential and interest should receive a K-12 education sufficient to enable him or her to succeed at a college that prepares its students for postgraduate education (Anderson, 2007: 597).

Thus, according to Anderson, an adequate education for the purpose of democratic equality is one that is distributed so that all students with the "potential and interest" are prepared to go to college. As Kirsten Meyer has pointed out, Anderson calls for equal educational opportunity, but this is instrumental to her deeper, sufficientarian goal of democratic equality (Meyer, 2016: 336). Regarding Anderson's argument for fair opportunity in education, Meyer states that "lesser inequality of opportunity in education is called for within a sufficientarian approach, which holds that all persons have an equal claim to reach a certain sufficiency threshold" (Meyer, 2016: 336).

Anderson's sufficiency threshold aims at creating an elite that includes members from disadvantaged segments of society, and which is responsive to the needs of all members of a democratic society. The diversity of the elite is fostered through an adequate education, which provides equality of opportunity for access to college. This in turn encourages the integration of various segments of democratic society, which Anderson argues contributes to creating a democratically equal society. In her book *The Imperative of Integration*, Anderson states that this diverse elite is intended to foster a "democracy of integration, of cooperation and communication *across group lines*, for the purpose of forging *shared* norms and goals of the democratic polity as a whole, and to that extent forging a shared identity of citizens" (Anderson, 2010b: 110).

Anderson thus lays out an SFDT project of distributing education that is sufficient for the purpose of creating a society of relationally equal citizens. However, she continues to think of sufficiency in terms of TDS, as a distributive pattern with its own internal characteristics, which include the negative thesis which holds that distributions above the sufficiency threshold are of little or no moral importance. She states that:

> Sufficientarian principles do not constrain inequalities in educational access above the sufficiency threshold. Parents who want to provide their children with more education than the minimal required to enable them to complete successfully a serious four-year college degree are free to do so, using their own private resources or by demanding that their public schools provide more (Anderson, 2007: 615).

While Anderson argues for an education that is sufficient for the purpose of creating a society of equals, she also argues for a "sufficientarian principle," which she thinks is necessarily indifferent to inequalities above the sufficiency threshold.[12] It is therefore apparent that although Anderson ultimately aims to argue from an SFDT perspective for sufficient education for her deeper goal of democratic equality, she continues to view sufficiency in terms of the telic distributive principle, TDS. Thus, according to Anderson, sufficiency involves distributing towards a threshold and must include the negative thesis that inequalities above the threshold are of no moral consequence.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that both Anderson and Satz are caught between a view of sufficiency as SFDT and as TDS. I will argue in Section 2 that this has limited Satz and Anderson in their arguments for sufficient education for democratic equality/equal citizenship. Although both theorists want to determine what an adequate education for democratic equality/equal citizenship would look like, they are limited by their incorrect understanding of sufficiency as a distributive principle with its own characteristics. Satz allows for equality above a sufficiency threshold, but she continues to think about sufficiency as a distributive pattern which at times converges with equal distribution. Anderson is even more tied to a TDS understanding of sufficiency by maintaining that unequal distributions are of no importance above the sufficiency threshold. Thus, both theorists lay out an SFDT project of seeking sufficient education for their deeper goals. Yet, both are also limited to varying degrees in their theorization of sufficient means by an incorrect conception of sufficiency as a distributive pattern with its own internal characteristics (TDS).

b. *The Critics of Educational Adequacy: Arguing against TDS and not SFDT*

Beyond Anderson's and Satz's own incorrect understanding of adequacy as TDS, their critics universally view their arguments for educational adequacy as TDS. In this section, I explore the criticisms of Anderson's and Satz's educational adequacy arguments to show how their critics

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[12] Like Satz, when discussing sufficiency, Anderson cites Frankfurt in a footnote to one of her articles on educational justice. She states that "Frankfurt (1988) offers a vivid defense of sufficientarianism with respect to income and wealth" (Anderson, 2004b: 110).

(like Anderson and Satz themselves) have been assuming an incorrect telic distributive perspective of adequacy/sufficiency.

There has been much recent criticism of the adequacy position supported by Anderson and Satz in their arguments for educational justice.[13] All of the criticism assumes that Anderson and Satz approach adequacy/sufficiency from a telic distributive perspective. The criticism can be broken down into two categories: 1) Criticism of educational adequacy/sufficiency that argues it should be more concerned with equal distribution due to considerations of fairness, and 2) Criticism of educational adequacy/sufficiency that argues it should be more concerned with equal distribution due to considerations of relational egalitarianism. I will look at some of the leading arguments made by critics to show that what they criticize is not an understanding of sufficiency as SFDT, but an incorrect picture of adequacy/sufficiency as TDS.

With regard to the first category of criticism, those who prefer an equal distribution to adequacy/sufficiency due to considerations of fairness, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift are the leading proponents of this perspective in the educational justice debate. Instead of adequacy/sufficiency, they argue for distributive egalitarianism combined with other principles of justice (Brighouse & Swift, 2009, 121). They state that:

> The monomaniacal educational egalitarian is required to level down, but the pluralist educational egalitarian is not. […] One reason to keep educational equality, and the unfairness of educational inequality, clearly on the table is that it prompts us to think about [questions of unfair inequality] […] rather than over-generously accepting that, as long as the inequalities help the less advantaged in the long run – relative to some theoretically arbitrary, status-quo-dependent, baseline – they are beyond criticism (Brighouse & Swift, 2009: 121).

Brighouse and Swift think that educational inequality is unfair. They think we should always keep equality "on the table" while combining it with other principles of justice. They support a

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[13] For criticism of the adequacy position in educational justice, see Brighouse & Swift 2009, 2014; Macleod 2010; Reich, 2013; Harel Ben-Shahar 2016; Burroughs 2016; Macfarlane 2018; Oprea 2020; Kissel 2021.

position of pluralist educational egalitarianism, which has room for multiple principles, but which always includes a concern with distributive equality as a principle of justice.

When criticizing the adequacy position, Brighouse and Swift portray adequacy as TDS. They focus on Anderson's TDS claim that "[s]ufficientarian principles do not constrain inequalities in educational access above the sufficiency threshold" (Anderson, 2007: 615; Brighouse & Swift, 2009: 125). Against the negative thesis of TDS, they make the familiar 'indifference objection' that it is possible to have inequalities above the sufficiency threshold that are matters of moral importance. Like Casal's example of extra money being given to a hospital in which all patients have reached a sufficiency threshold, they provide an example in which "all children have an adequate education" and a "bounty of unexpected resources enters the system" (Brighouse & Swift, 2009: 125). Like Casal, they argue that TDS's indifference to how this extra money is distributed is unjust, and that:

> there is a reason, albeit a defeasible reason – namely fairness – for concentrating the new educational resources on those with lower than the median prospects. The claim that the principle of adequacy is the only principle of justice of the distribution of education does not even allow equalizing prospects to enter the discussion (Brighouse & Swift, 2009: 125).

Brighouse and Swift thus view Anderson's argument for educational adequacy as TDS, and they argue that it should be combined with other principles, such as a concern with fairness and equal distribution, in order to overcome the indifference objection. They do not address Satz's efforts to include a concern with equality within educational adequacy. Instead, they claim that Satz, like Anderson, supports a TDS version of adequacy that is indifferent to inequalities above the threshold and which does not countenance combining TDS with other principles (Brighouse & Swift, 2009: 118).

Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar not only criticizes educational adequacy, but she criticizes the common understanding of what 'equality' in education means. Harel Ben-Shahar argues for "all-the-way-equality" (Harel Ben-Shahar, 2016: 83), which she states goes beyond the "effort only"

approach of Brighouse and Swift, in which "inequality in educational outcome" is only allowed "when it is caused by differences in the effort that was invested" (Harel Ben-Shahar, 2016: 90). Harel Ben-Shahar views educational adequacy as TDS and thus as a fully separate principle from educational equality and priority. She states that adequacy is:

> based on the premise that what is important, as a matter of justice, is not that all people have the same, but that all people have enough (of whatever is being distributed – welfare, resources). In education, it means that the state is obligated to ensure that all children are supplied with an adequate education (Harel Ben-Shahar, 2016: 84-85).

Thus, since she argues for an extreme interpretation of equality, adequacy for Harel Ben-Shahar can be set aside because she sees it is a fully distinct distributive principle to what she is arguing for.

The second approach taken to criticizing the adequacy position is to criticize adequacy in the name of relational equality. Kirsty Macfarlane provides an "internal critique" of Anderson's position in which she argues that Anderson's choice of the adequacy standard does not distribute education sufficiently for her deeper purpose of relational equality (Macfarlane, 2018: 760). Like Brighouse and Swift, Macfarlane views Anderson's argument for adequacy as TDS and she argues for equal distribution rather than TDS. However, unlike Brighouse and Swift, Macfarlane does not argue for equal distribution because she is concerned with fairness, but because she thinks equal distribution is the best form of distribution to instantiate relational equality. She states that "[e]stablishing a society of equals will necessarily require integration, as Anderson emphasises" and "inequality can interfere with integration and thereby relations of equality by encouraging informal segregation in schools" (Macfarlane, 2018: 761). Thus, she advocates for equal distribution of education in order to enable integration that will support relational equality.

Macfarlane, like Satz, comes close to fully arguing for sufficient education for relational equality (SFDT). However, also like Satz, instead of seeing that she is arguing for a truer form of sufficiency than TDS, Macfarlane argues that sufficiency (as TDS) for the purpose of relational equality is indistinguishable from distributive egalitarianism. She states in a footnote that:

> [a] reviewer pointed out that the fact that the practical application of sufficiency may require equality under current conditions does not undermine sufficiency as a general matter. This is true, but sufficiency survives as a standard for relational egalitarians only by requiring equality, so it loses much of its appeal (Macfarlane, 2018: 774).

Macfarlane maintains a conception of sufficiency as a distributive principle. She states that in arguments for relational equality, sufficiency overlaps with equality as a distributive principle and thus loses relevancy as a principle of distribution in itself. So, although Macfarlane argues for a form of distribution which she thinks will sufficiently work towards the end of relational equality, she fails to identify the new form of sufficiency she is describing (SFDT). Rather than explicitly arguing for a conception of sufficiency that subordinates distribution to its deeper purpose, she argues that sufficiency (as TDS) fails to stay relevant because it overlaps with equal distribution.

Although the critics of educational adequacy provide different positive proposals for educational justice, what they have in common is a view of the educational adequacy position they are criticizing as TDS. Macfarlane comes closest to understanding that sufficiency means something more than telic distributive sufficiency. Yet, she, like the other theorists, does not ultimately break out of a telic distributive conception of sufficiency. This inability to view sufficiency as something other than TDS is understandable given that both Anderson and Satz describe adequacy in TDS terms as a distributive principle with its own internal characteristics.

In the next section of this chapter, I argue that by misconstruing sufficiency/adequacy as TDS in the educational justice debate, both the supporters and critics of the adequacy approach fail to fully engage with the SFDT arguments that Satz and Anderson are in fact making.

Section 2: How Understanding Sufficiency Correctly in the Educational Justice Debate is Important to Arguments For and Against Educational Adequacy

As I argued in Chapter Three, sufficiency does not have its own inherent characteristics and thus it cannot act as a principle of distributive justice. Sufficiency takes whatever form is required by a goal and the means of reaching that goal. Therefore, if Satz and Anderson were truly arguing only for a principle of the sufficient/adequate distribution in itself, this argument would simply be incorrect. However, despite their claims to be arguing for sufficiency as a distributive principle in itself, these theorists are in fact arguing for sufficient education *for* democratic equality/equal citizenship. Thus, underlying their claims to be proponents of TDS, are correct SFDT arguments for sufficient education for a deeper theory. Understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT will enable these theorists of educational adequacy, and those arguing against them, to engage fully with these deeper arguments.

a. How Understanding Sufficiency Correctly Will Help Proponents of Educational Adequacy

Understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT will help Satz and Anderson as proponents of educational adequacy in at least four important ways: 1) it frees these theorists from the constraints of sufficiency understood incorrectly as TDS in their theorizing of the adequate education for their deeper goals; 2) it focuses theorists on theorizing their goal clearly; 3) it encourages the full theorization of the sufficient means of reaching a goal; 4) sufficiency understood correctly as SFDT opens up the means of reaching its goal beyond distribution.

The first way that understanding sufficiency correctly helps the proponents of educational adequacy for democratic citizenship to make their arguments, is to free these theorists from incorrectly viewing sufficiency as a certain distributive pattern with its own inherent characteristics. These theorists will no longer be limited by an incorrect view of sufficiency as requiring distribution towards a threshold, after which point distributions have less or even no moral significance. Satz has already broken away from the 'negative thesis' requirement of little or no care being given to distributions above the threshold. As discussed above, she has argued that maintaining enough equal distribution to sustain relational equality is a part of her understanding of adequacy for democratic citizenship. However, Satz continues to think of adequacy/sufficiency in terms of a distributive pattern, in which distribution aims at a certain threshold. She also compares and contrasts the pattern of sufficiency to a principle of equal

distribution. Anderson has been even more constrained than Satz by her incorrect understanding of sufficiency as TDS. Following the strict understanding of TDS, Anderson has maintained a view of sufficiency in which distributions above a certain threshold are of little or no significance.

Both Satz and Anderson could theoretically make SFDT arguments for sufficient/adequate education for democratic citizenship that involve distributions towards a threshold or that lack care for distributions above such a threshold. However, as an SFDT argument of sufficient means for their deeper goal, distribution towards a threshold and a lack of care above the threshold must be chosen because they are the best means for reaching sufficient education for democratic citizenship and not because of the nature of sufficiency as a principle of distribution (TDS). However, it is clear from both Satz's and Anderson's discussions of educational adequacy that they think there is a principle of sufficient distribution, with its own characteristics, and that they are theorizing from within this framework when they argue for educational adequacy. Satz argues for more concern with distributive equality than what TDS usually allows, but she does so in terms of breaking away from what she understands to be the typical conception of sufficiency/adequacy. Despite this alteration, Satz still thinks of sufficiency as necessarily involving distribution towards a threshold. Anderson maintains a view of sufficiency as involving distribution towards a threshold and a lack of concern with distribution above the threshold. Thus, in order to make a fully SFDT argument for sufficient education for democratic citizenship, Satz and Anderson must be freed from the constraints of their understanding of sufficiency as TDS. Only then can they freely determine what an adequate education for democratic citizenship looks like.

Once Anderson and Satz have put aside a concept of sufficiency as TDS and the restraints that come with it, they can fully explore what sufficient education *for* democratic equality/equal citizenship will entail. This brings us to the second and third ways that understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT helps the proponents of educational adequacy. In their endeavour to determine the adequate education for their goals, it is important that Satz and Anderson clearly theorize the goal of education. Without a clear goal, sufficiency cannot be determined because a clear goal guides the development of the sufficient means for the goal's instantiation. As I argued in

Chapter Three, within a theory of the sufficient means for the just society, there are multiple levels of goals. There is a goal of the just society and then goals at the level of the spheres of justice, and then sub-goals within the goals of the spheres. Sufficiency within a theory of the just society works from abstraction to greater specificity.

In spite of their understanding of sufficiency as TDS, as stated above, both Anderson and Satz have laid out SFDT projects in which they seek sufficient education for their respective goals. Both theorists have developed clearly defined goals towards which they wish to theorize sufficient educational means. Anderson has built her SFDT argument regarding sufficient education out of her concern with democratic equality. As discussed in Chapter Two, Anderson, in her influential article "What is the Point of Equality?", provides an account of what she thinks relational egalitarianism entails. Anderson thinks that a just society is fundamentally one in which people relate to each other as equals and she calls this 'democratic equality' (Anderson, 1999). She develops her argument for sufficient education within this deeper goal of democratic equality. In a paper on educational justice, she addresses her broader SFDT argument of sufficient capability for democratic equality, stating that:

> [in] another paper (Anderson, 1999), I argued for a conception of justice I called 'democratic equality'. According to this view, the members of a state are entitled to opportunities sufficient to enable them to function as equal citizens in a democratic society. […] How much of a chance for development of one's talents is enough, from the standpoint of democratic equality? The answer is: enough to sustain a genuinely democratic culture and society (Anderson, 2004: p. 105, 108).

She goes on to elaborate what "enough to sustain a genuinely democratic culture and society" is in the realm of education, stating that for education to be sufficient for democratic equality, it must:

> […] ensure that the elites of society – those holding public offices and private positions with decision-making authority – are fully integrated, containing significant representation of individuals from all social classes and groups that mark significant social divisions. Universities today function as the main gatekeepers to elite status in

modern societies. So democratic equality requires that the state provides educational opportunities sufficient to ensure that any child from any social background who has the potential to succeed at the university level will be able to qualify herself for university, if she expends a normal (not extraordinary) effort to do so (Anderson, 2004: p. 105, 108)

Thus, Anderson's conception of an adequate or sufficient education is ultimately rooted in her goal of democratic equality. However, as a means to achieving this ultimate goal she develops a lower-level goal (at the level of the spheres of justice) of developing the capability of elites to uphold a democratically equal society. Her theorization of the sufficient education works towards the goal of the sphere of developing the capability of elites, which then works towards her ultimate goal of democratic equality. In order to uphold a democratically equal society, Anderson thinks that elites need to have the capability to be responsive to the needs of all members of society and she thinks an education which creates an integrated elite will develop this capability.

Satz, like Anderson, seeks a relationally equal society of equal democratic citizens. As I argued in Chapter Two, these theorists support a relational egalitarian interpretation of Rawls's theory of justice (RRE), which ultimately advocates for a society of mutual respect because of the equal moral worth of its citizens. Unlike Anderson, however, Satz has not provided an independent account of her ultimate goal of relational equality. Her argument for adequate education assumes this ultimate relational egalitarian goal and argues for the lower-level goal (at the level of the spheres of justice) of the capability of equal democratic citizenship. Her theory of equal citizenship is taken from T.H. Marshall. She states:

> I define citizenship, following T.H. Marshall, in terms of the political, civic, and economic conditions that are needed to make one a full member of one's society. Citizens are equal in terms of their status as full members, although they may be unequal along other dimensions such as income and wealth. As full members of society, citizens (1) have equal basic political rights and freedoms, including rights to speech and participation in the political process; (2) have equal rights and freedoms within civil society, including rights to own property and to justice; and (3) have equal rights to a threshold of economic welfare and to 'share to the full in the social heritage and to live

the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society.' Marshall associated citizenship not only with political and civil rights – but also with social and economic rights – such as access to employment, health care, education, housing, and a level of income essential to being, and being regarded as, a full member of one's society (Satz, 2007: 636).

Based on this understanding of equal citizenship, Satz develops a goal of the capabilities needed for democratic citizenship and she derives a conception of educational adequacy based on this goal. She states:

> Educational adequacy for citizenship directs us to distribute primary and secondary schooling in terms of five criteria:
>
> 1. Secure an educational minimum, whose empirical content is defined dynamically by the changing requirements for full membership in society. These requirements must not be understood narrowly as political capabilities but must also include capabilities for sustained productive employment and solid prospects of living a decent life.
> 2. Secure fair opportunities for educational and employment positions above the minimum. No social group should be relegated to a second-class position, with access only to inferior and unrewarding schools and jobs. While fair opportunities need not be equal, the extent of acceptable inequality of opportunity for access to positions in society has bounds.
> 3. Secure the distribution of leadership skills among diverse social groups.
> 4. Develop the capabilities needed for cooperative interactions in a diverse society. These include trust, tolerance, mutual understanding and mutual respect. To achieve capabilities, we need to move beyond an exclusive focus on resources and focus on integrating schools and neighborhoods across race and class divisions.
> 5. Avoid leveling down the development of talent and ability through education, except insofar as this is necessary to get all children with the requisite potential above citizenship's high threshold (Satz, 2007: 647-648).

Satz notes that Anderson is also a supporter of her third and fourth criteria of an adequate education. However, unlike Anderson, Satz adds a criterion which includes a clear concern with distributive equality. Satz's second criterion restricts inequality in "fair opportunities for educational and employment positions above the minimum" which would lead to the creation of "second-class" citizens, who can only achieve "inferior and unrewarding school and jobs" (Satz, 2007: 647). Although Satz states that these "fair opportunities need not be equal," she nevertheless maintains that "the extent of acceptable inequality of opportunity for access to positions in society has bounds" (Satz, 2007: 647). This concern with inequality above the 'sufficiency' threshold goes beyond what Anderson requires. With this concern Satz moves further beyond TDS, towards SFDT, because she is most directed by the needs of her goal of equal citizenship and not by the constraints of a conception of sufficiency as a distributive pattern with its own characteristics. Although TDS would require indifference to or at least less care about inequalities above a distributive threshold, Satz sees that these inequalities could undermine her ultimate goal of equal democratic citizenship. Thus, she includes in her definition of educational adequacy a concern with maintaining enough equality above a basic threshold of distribution.

Satz has further developed her theory of what an adequate education for equal citizenship requires (Satz, 2012). In an article on the topic of education for equal citizenship, she has focused less on a TDS understanding of educational adequacy as having to do with distribution and reaching "educational minimum[s]," and more on the development of an education sufficient to provide equal opportunity for equal citizenship. Referring again to the definition of equal citizenship provided by T.H. Marshall, she states that:

> If we measure equality of opportunity in terms of the 'opportunity to participate fully in the political, civic and economic life of the community' – to stand as a citizen in a society of equals – then we will need to attend to other measures besides access to careers: not everyone will want or be able to opt for a college education or a high-flying career. […] In broad outlines, the state owes to its citizens an education that:

(a) Gives them a threshold of knowledge and competence for public responsibilities such as voting, serving on a jury and the meaningful exercise of civil liberties such as freedom of speech;

(b) Gives them sufficient knowledge for productive work and independence;

(c) Develops their capacities for empathy, self-respect, imagination and reciprocity (Satz, 2012: 166).

Here Satz continues to work out her understanding of an adequate education for the goal of equal citizenship. She argues that an adequate education will provide equal opportunity to all members of society to fully participate in all of the most relevant aspects of society. An education which provides these opportunities, she argues, will develop in children the ability to carry out "public responsibilities", the ability to work productively and be independent, and to develop the personal attributes of "empathy, self-respect, imagination and reciprocity." Satz makes clear that in order for an education to be adequate for equal opportunity for equal citizenship, the above list must be actually achieved. She says "[i]t is important to note that the list is about achievements, not opportunities" (Satz, 2012: 166). Moreover, she states that "[i]n education, we should ensure that all children have the achievements necessary for equal citizenship. These achievements provide opportunities that encompass but go beyond opportunities for employment. They also encompass opportunities for political, civic and social participation. Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity is best understood in these terms" (Satz, 2012: 168).

Thus, Satz thinks that fair equality of opportunity for equal citizenship is ultimately how we should understand the goal of educational adequacy. An education will be adequate when it provides all children with the achievements necessary to have the opportunities that enable them to participate as equal citizens. In this elaboration of her theory of educational adequacy, Satz expands on her understanding of what an adequate education for equal citizenship requires. However, she has obviously not provided an extensive or complete theory of democratic education as the means towards her goal, but only laid out in broad terms what she thinks an adequate education for equal citizenship entails. Both Anderson and Satz, if they are serious about the goal of education that is sufficient/adequate for democratic equality/equal citizenship, need to elaborate upon the details of this type of education.

This brings us to the fourth way in which taking the correct SFDT approach to sufficiency helps proponents of educational adequacy. Beyond freeing these theorists from the constraints of a TDS understanding of sufficiency, and focusing them on clearly defined goals, the SFDT approach opens up the theorization of sufficient means beyond the bounds of distribution and aims at a fully developed theory of such means. From my discussion of their theories of adequacy in this section, it is clear that both Anderson and Satz have developed theories of adequacy that go beyond accounts of distribution. However, they have not provided a fully developed theory of the adequate education for democratic equality/equal citizenship. Understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT makes it clear that a theory of sufficiency will be one which provides a full account of the means necessary to meet its goal. Distributions will be a part of this account, but in non-telic distributive accounts of justice, they will not exhaust a theory of the means to instantiate the just society.

Other theorists of democratic education have done more to elaborate what is required of an adequate education for democratic citizenship. Therefore, the next and final chapter will examine theories of democratic education. I will explain how these theorists are working out the details of the SFDT argument of an adequate education *for* democratic equality/equal citizenship by highlighting the basic features of these theories which enable them to work towards the goal of a sufficient education for democratic citizenship.

b. *How Understanding Sufficiency Correctly Will Help Critics of Educational Adequacy*

With regard to arguments against educational adequacy, understanding sufficiency correctly both: 1) Frees critics from a focus on sufficiency incorrectly understood as a distinct distributive principle with its own inherent characteristics (TDS), which is not ultimately what Anderson and Satz as SFDT theorists are arguing for; and 2) It focuses critics instead on the SFDT arguments that Satz and Anderson are in fact making for sufficient education for democratic citizenship. Once critics are focused on the arguments that Satz and Anderson are ultimately making, they could take one of two approaches. They could either argue against the ultimate goal of RRE as guiding the theorization and distribution of education, or they could accept this goal but argue

that adequacy theorists have not provided convincing accounts of the sufficient education for this goal. Within the second approach critics should attempt to provide a better account of an SFDT argument for the adequate/sufficient education for RRE.

As discussed above, criticism of educational adequacy has fallen into two broad categories: 1) Criticism of educational adequacy/sufficiency that argues it should be more concerned with equal distribution due to considerations of fairness, and 2) Criticism of educational adequacy/sufficiency that argues it should be more concerned with equal distribution due to considerations of relational egalitarianism. In both cases, the criticism is aimed at a TDS conception of sufficiency, which views sufficiency as a distributive pattern, which requires distribution towards a sufficiency threshold, above which inequality is of little or no importance.

Regarding the first category of criticism, Brighouse and Swift, like Casal, make the indifference objection to TDS. Arguing against a conception of sufficiency as TDS, which allows for inequality above a distributive threshold, they argue that fairness requires a concern with the equal distribution of educational opportunity and that sufficiency/adequacy cannot account for this. If Brighouse and Swift were to argue against the deeper SFDT argument that Anderson and Satz are making, they could take the first approach and argue that distributive fairness is a more important goal than relational equality. [14] Or they could take the second approach and accept the ultimate goal of relational equality, but argue that relational equality requires distributive equality.

Harel Ben-Shahar simply dismisses adequacy altogether, understood as TDS, because she thinks it does not account for distributive egalitarian concerns. Like Brighouse and Swift, if she were instead to argue against Anderson's and Satz's arguments of an adequate education for relational equality, she would likely argue that their goal of relational equality is incorrect and should be replaced by the goal of fairness in distribution. However, Harel Ben-Shahar would give a

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[14] In his book *On Education*, Harry Brighouse argues that "the central purpose of education is to promote human flourishing" (Brighouse, 2006: 42). Whereas Anderson and Satz argue for democratic education towards their goal of RRE, Brighouse argues that for the purpose of "human flourishing", "schooling should aim to produce responsible, deliberative citizens who are capable of accepting the demands of justice and abiding by the norm of reciprocity" (Brighouse, 2006: 131). Thus, Brighouse may argue against Anderson and Satz that "human flourishing" is in fact the ultimate end towards which an adequate democratic education should be theorized.

different, stricter, interpretation of what distributive equality for fairness requires than Brighouse and Swift.

Macfarlane seems to have taken the second approach as she accepts the goal of relational egalitarianism and argues persuasively that Anderson's adherence to TDS's indifference to inequalities above a sufficiency threshold undermines her broader concern with relational equality. Macfarlane shows how "[i]nequality can produce social divisions and status differentials that encourage informal segregation in schools, because people typically prefer friends who are like themselves" (Macfarlane, 2018: 760). Thus, the integration that Anderson claims to be encouraging through an education sufficient to develop a responsive elite, is undermined when she allows for inequality above her chosen sufficiency threshold. Macfarlane states that "[a]llowing educational inequality, even above a threshold, would encourage social stratification and inegalitarian relations. Allowing significant inequality in education seems antithetical to the social mobility that Anderson envisions" (Macfarlane, 2018: 768). Thus, Anderson's adherence to a TDS conception of sufficiency, with its allowance of inequality above the sufficiency threshold, undermines her ultimate goal of an education that is sufficient for the purpose of instantiating a society of relational equals.

However, Macfarlane only partially takes the second approach. Her argument is constrained by thinking in terms of principles of distribution. She does not take a fully SFDT approach by explicitly subordinating principles of distributive justice to the goal of relational equality. Instead, she highlights how the goals of distributive egalitarianism and relational equality overlap. She states that:

> The distinction between relational egalitarianism and distributive theories which focus on achieving equality therefore seems to collapse. What is needed to achieve genuine integration in schools and encourage students to relate as equals seems very similar to what distributive egalitarians require. […] a sufficiency standard compatible with integration and a society of equals will likely be functionally equivalent to equality (Macfarlane, 2018: 769).

Macfarlane thus seems caught between equal distribution *for* relational equality and equal distribution as a principle of justice in itself because she has placed them on an equal level. The problem with her argument ultimately brings us back to focusing on what our ends are – why should we choose equality in Macfarlane's case? She should be clearer that equal distribution is for the deeper purpose of relational egalitarianism. She is therefore not arguing for telic distributive egalitarianism, but for an SFDT perspective rooted in relational equality, which will take whatever distributive principle is necessary to bring about relational equality.

Macfarlane is thus not necessarily arguing for equal distribution, but for whatever distribution brings about relational equality. The "functional" equivalency of equal distribution and distribution sufficient for relational equality is not relevant because her goal is not equal distribution – highlighting it is in fact misleading. The "distinction between relational egalitarianism and distributive theories which focus on achieving equality" may "seem" to have "collapse[d]," but it is a very important distinction for the proper rational/philosophical justification of the distribution. Equal distribution in the SFDT case of arguing for relational equality is not a principle of justice in itself, but a contingent means towards the deeper end of relational equality. If Macfarlane took a fully SFDT approach she would highlight this distinction between equal distribution *for* relational equality and distributive equality as a principle of justice. She would also show how within her argument of sufficient education for relational egalitarianism distribution is clearly subordinate to her goal and will take whatever form that goal requires.

By viewing sufficiency correctly as SFDT, Macfarlane could also focus on the broader argument she is in fact making for the sufficient education for relational equality. An SFDT argument requires the theorization of the sufficient educational means to instantiate democratic equality. Macfarlane focuses only on distribution and not on this broader argument. Her criticism of Anderson would be stronger if she provided a robust argument for the nature of sufficient education in contrast to the account Anderson provides (the second approach I suggest above). This argument would show how an account of sufficient education for relational egalitarianism governs the required patterns of distribution, and that it also provides the full theorization of the nature of such an education. Understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT and not as TDS, and

moving beyond the realm of telic distributive patterns, would thus open Macfarlane's critique of Anderson up beyond an account of distribution to show more fully how her argument for sufficient education for relational equality could be improved.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT will change the terms of the educational justice debate for the better. By understanding sufficiency/adequacy correctly as SFDT, it becomes clear that the educational justice debate should not be focused on equal distribution vs. a conception of sufficiency as a distributive pattern (TDS). Rather the educational justice debate should be focused on the ends of an adequate education and how to sufficiently theorize means to meet those ends. Distribution may come into theories of the adequate education, but unless a theorist is a telic distributivist, distributions will be instrumental towards the ultimate goal of an adequate education for a chosen end. Moreover, as I argued in Chapter Three, sufficiency/adequacy takes whatever shape is required for means to meet their ends. In the case of theorizing the adequate education for democratic equality/equal citizenship, this will not take the form of distributing a discrete good towards an absolute threshold, but will take the form of developing a detailed theory of democratic education sufficient to instantiate equal democratic citizens.

In the final chapter, I will show how Anderson's and Satz's arguments for the sufficient education for democratic equality/equal citizenship can be improved by further theorization of the sufficient education. I will explore theories of democratic education and show how these theories are working out the details of the SFDT argument of an adequate education *for* democratic equality/equal citizenship. I will then highlight the basic features of these theories which allow them to work towards the goal of a sufficient theory of education for equal democratic citizenship. By taking the correct SFDT approach to arguments for educational adequacy, it becomes clear that theories of democratic education contribute to theories for the sufficient/adequate education for equal democratic citizenship.

Chapter Five: Further Developing the Argument for the Sufficient Education for Democratic
Citizenship

Introduction

In Chapter Four I argued that understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT improves the
arguments for sufficient/adequate education provided by Anderson and Satz in four ways. The
first way is negative: understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT frees Anderson and Satz from
the constraints of sufficiency/adequacy understood as TDS. The other three ways are positive. A
correct understanding of sufficiency places a focus on theorizing a clear goal, on determining the
sufficient means of reaching that goal, and finally it opens up the theorization of the means
beyond distribution.

Chapter Five focuses on the positive ways that a correct SFDT understanding of sufficiency
improves arguments for a sufficient/adequate education. This chapter explores how Anderson
and Satz can improve their arguments for the adequate education for democratic citizenship by
more fully theorizing their goal and the means of reaching it.[15] The chapter begins by situating
the argument for the capabilities required for democratic citizenship within the larger SFDT
argument for the relationally equal society. I remind the reader that in Chapter Three I
established that the argument for the sufficient capability for democratic citizenship is occurring
at the 'level of the sphere' within the larger argument for sufficiency for the RRE society. It is
important to understand the overall sufficiency argument that is being made because this will
direct the theorization of the capability of democratic citizenship which is the lower-level goal
for the argument for adequate education that Anderson and Satz are making.

After situating Anderson's and Satz's arguments for adequate education within their broader
SFDT argument, the next section looks at the work of democratic education theorists. I examine
central parts of their theories for democratic education. These theories provide examples of how

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[15] As was explained in Chapter Four, Anderson argues for an adequate education for "democratic equality" and Satz
argues for an adequate education for "equal citizenship." In Chapter Five I will refer to the goal of an adequate
education as "democratic citizenship." I use this term to encompass both Anderson's and Satz's goals. It refers to the
goal of developing the capability for equal democratic citizenship.

Anderson and Satz could improve upon and expand their arguments for the adequate education for democratic citizenship.

Finally, in Section 3, using the democratic education theories discussed in Section 2, I provide an account of how to argue for sufficiency at the level of the sphere. Following this account, I further critique the arguments that Anderson and Satz have so far made for the sufficient education for democratic citizenship. I then provide a specific example, using the theories of the democratic education theorists, of how it is possible to expand and improve upon one aspect of Satz's theory of the sufficient/adequate education for democratic citizenship.

Section 1: Situating the Argument for Sufficient Education for Democratic Citizenship within the broader SFDT argument for the Relationally Equal Society

In Chapter Three, I argued that the true nature of sufficiency is not TDS, but 'Sufficiency *for* a Deeper Theory' (SFDT). SFDT takes the form: "Sufficient X *for* Y". At the heart of sufficiency is a working out of the nature of sufficient means (X) in the light of the purpose offered by the goal (Y). In the context of arguments for the just society, there is an 'Upper Level' of sufficiency in which X (the means) can be understood as spheres of justice working towards Y (the goal) of a just society. The spheres of justice consist of human capabilities and institutional functions. Sufficiency for the just society demands that we have sufficient human capabilities and institutional functions for the goal of the just society. The nature of the goal of the just society will decide what type of human capabilities and institutional functions we will need to sufficiently reach this goal. For example, in the case of the goal of RRE, we will need the capability of democratic citizenship.

Within each of the spheres of justice, there are further means which must be theorized sufficiently in order to bring about the goal of each sphere. Anderson's and Satz's arguments for sufficient education for democratic citizenship are working within the sphere of the capability for democratic citizenship, which itself is a means towards the ultimate goal of a relationally equal society. Thus, within the sphere of the capability for democratic citizenship, we need sufficient education (lower-level X) for the capability of democratic citizenship (lower-level Y). How do

we determine what sufficient education for democratic citizenship looks like? This is the level at which we need to work out in more detail what sufficiency really requires. At the higher level of sufficiency – the ultimate goal of a just society – we can be vaguer about the goals and simply label them as human capabilities or institutional functions, which together are sufficient for a just society. However, once we look at what sufficiency requires in order to bring about these capabilities and functions, we must work out in more detail what the capability or function (the lower-level goal) consists of and the sufficient nature of the means that will bring about such a capability or function.

Sufficiency grows in detail at the level of the spheres. The working out of the sufficient nature of lower-level X for the purpose of lower-level Y at the level of the sphere is an integral part of SFDT in the realm of political justice. It is at this level that one develops the details of the nature of the primary means with which we sufficiently achieve the purpose of each major sphere of a just democratic society. Without developing a clear understanding of the goal of the sphere and clear arguments about the nature of the means to achieving this goal, there will never be a complete understanding of sufficiency for a just society. It is thus at the level of the spheres of justice that political philosophy theorizes the details of spheres of justice (or basic structure) of the just society, which will provide a guide to more detailed planning and organization of the sufficient means to instantiate such a society.

In order for Anderson and Satz to theorize the sufficient/adequate education for democratic citizenship, it is important that they contextualize these arguments within their broader argument of sufficiency for RRE. Through this contextualization, a deeper understanding of the purpose of the goal of democratic citizenship is provided, which can guide the theorization of this goal and the sufficient means to reach it. Moreover, in order to have a complete understanding of sufficiency as SFDT, it is necessary to be aware of the multiple levels at which such a conception is working. Viewing the argument for sufficient education for democratic citizenship in isolation from the larger goal of RRE would provide only a partial understanding of SFDT.

In the next section, I explore major contributions to the theorization of democratic education. I aim to show how democratic education theorists have been working out the nature of sufficiency

at the level of the sphere of the capability for democratic citizenship. Section 2 will reveal how these theorists have depicted the goal or purpose of the capability of democratic citizenship and how they have shaped education towards this purpose. Democratic education philosophers have theorized in even more detail than Anderson and Satz what the sufficient education for the capability of democratic citizenship looks like. By examining their arguments, we can see how Anderson's and Satz's arguments for adequate education can be further developed.

Section 2: Theorizing Sufficient Education for the Capability of Democratic Citizenship for Relational Equality

In this section I will explore the work of democratic education theorists in order to show how the argument for a sufficient/adequate education that Anderson and Satz have begun to develop can be expanded and improved. I will look at the democratic education theories of John Dewey, Martha Nussbaum, Amy Gutmann, Eamonn Callan, and Philip Kitcher. Each of these thinkers attempts to theorize democratic education sufficient for the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship, and ultimately for relational equality. Similar to Anderson and Satz who aim at a Rawlsian Relational Egalitarianism (RRE), which views the goal of justice as a society of reciprocity and mutual respect, these democratic education theorists ultimately seek to educate towards a society of relational equals. Dewey views the democratic society towards which he theorizes the sufficient education as one of relational equals. He states that

> While what we call intelligence be distributed in unequal amounts, it is the democratic faith that it is sufficiently general so that each individual has something to contribute whose value can be assessed only as it enters into the final pooled intelligence constituted by the contributions of all. Every authoritarian scheme, on the contrary assumes that its value may be assessed by some *prior* principle, if not of family and birth or race and color or possession of material wealth, then by the position and rank the person occupies in the existing social scheme. The democratic faith in equality is the faith that each individual shall have the chance and opportunity to contribute whatever he is capable of contributing, and that the value of his contribution be decided by its place and function in

the organized total of similar contributions: – not on the basis of prior status of any kind whatever. (Dewey, 1937: 220)

Nussbaum and Kitcher each follow Dewey in their theories of democratic education by seeking an education that cultivates equal status between members of a democratic society (Nussbaum, 2023: 252) (Kitcher, 2022: 121). Kitcher argues for the goal of "Deweyan democracy" which is made up of "institutions for fostering deliberation among people with differing perspectives, and thus for arriving at policies all can tolerate" (Kitcher, 2022: 121). This sounds very similar to Anderson's ultimate, RRE, goal of democratic equality, which as stated in Chapter Two, she says "regards two people as equal when each accepts the obligation to justify their actions by principles acceptable to the other, and in which they take mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted" (Anderson, 1999: 313). Both Gutmann and Callan also argue that central to educating for democratic citizenship is instilling a belief in the equal status of citizens (Gutmann, 1995: 561) (Callan, 2000: 149).[16]

Because these theorists share with Anderson and Satz the SFDT project of developing a theory of education sufficient for the capability of democratic citizenship for relational equality, we can use their theories to expand and improve the theories of Satz and Anderson. For each theorist, two aspects of their arguments for democratic education will be highlighted: 1) how they depict a clear goal of the capability for democratic citizenship for relational equality; 2) how they shape democratic education towards sufficiently reaching this goal. The aim of the section is not to comprehensively summarize the theories on democratic education of each thinker. There are many other components to their theories of the capability for democratic citizenship and of democratic education than what I address here. Instead, my goal is to show how each theorist attempts to shape democratic education towards sufficiency for a clearly defined goal that makes up at least a part of the capability of democratic citizenship for relational equality.

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[16] Although all of the democratic education theorists I address in this chapter work towards the goal of relational equality, some theorists, particularly Dewey, Nussbaum, and Kitcher, also place human flourishing as a goal of education. I will focus here on the parts of their arguments that develop theories of democratic education for relational equality, in order to show how Anderson's and Satz's theories can be improved. There could be separate SFDT arguments for the goal of human flourishing or the goal of human flourishing could be combined with relational equality. I will address the general issue of multiple ultimate goals for SFDT arguments in the conclusion to my dissertation.

Starting with John Dewey's foundational work on democratic education, *Democracy and Education*, Dewey identifies "good citizenship" as an aim of democratic education which is part of the more general aim of "social efficiency" (Dewey, 1916: 127). Dewey states that:

> In the broadest sense, social efficiency is nothing less than that socialization of *mind* which is actively concerned in making experiences more communicable; in breaking down the barriers of social stratification which make individuals impervious to the interests of others. When social efficiency is confined to the service rendered by overt acts, its chief constituent (because its only guarantee) is omitted, - intelligent sympathy or good will. For sympathy as a desirable quality is something more than mere feeling; it is cultivated imagination for what men have in common and a rebellion at whatever unnecessarily divides them (Dewey, 1916: 127-128).

Thus, according to Dewey a central aim of democratic education is the cultivation of a state of mind which aims to communicate and find common ground with others, what Dewey calls "intelligent sympathy or good will." This capability occurs when the "imagination" is "cultivated" in a way that enables democratic citizens to see what they share. He states further that "social efficiency as an educational purpose should mean cultivation of power to join freely and fully in shared or common activities" (Dewey, 1916: 130). Thus, a central aim of democratic education for Dewey is the development of the capability to collaborate with others through the development of a sense of comradery and common humanity.

In order to sufficiently reach this goal, Dewey argues that a democratic education must go beyond regular classroom memorization and must teach students through activity with others. He states that education should occur:

> in an educational scheme where learning is the accompaniment of continuous activities or occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of typical social situations. For under such conditions, the school becomes itself a form of social life, a miniature

community and one in close interaction with other modes of associated experience beyond school walls (Dewey, 1916: 370).

Thus, a central aspect of a sufficient education for developing the capability of citizenship for Dewey is an education which teaches students how to work together towards common ends. This is done through the development of a "miniature community." It is through common activity that students develop the state of mind required for democratic citizenship because of the democratic citizen's need to communicate and collaborate towards common ends.

Martha Nussbaum argues that democratic education requires the development of "three abilities" (Nussbaum, 2023: 252).[17] These three abilities together make up the goal of democratic education, as they enable capability for democratic citizenship. The first of these abilities according to Nussbaum is "the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one's traditions, for living what, following Socrates, we may call 'the examined life'" (Nussbaum, 2023: 252). Through the cultivation of this ability, students learn not to simply accept authority, but to question "all beliefs, statements, and arguments" and only to accept "those that survive reason's demand for consistency and justification" (Nussbaum, 2023: 253). The second ability necessary for democratic citizenship is the ability to see all humans as part of a common humanity. This requires learning to see ourselves "as not simply citizens of some local region or group, but also, and above all, as human beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern" (Nussbaum, 2023: 254). Both this ability and the first are connected to Nussbaum's third ability of democratic citizenship, which she calls the "narrative imagination" (Nussbaum, 2023: 255). She states that, "[t]his means the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person's story, and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have" (Nussbaum, 2023: 255).

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[17] Nussbaum states that her theory of "education for democratic citizenship […] has affiliations with the ideas of the progressive educationists John Dewey in the United States and Rabindranath Tagore in India" (Nussbaum, 2023: 252).

According to Nussbaum, these three abilities together make up the aim of democratic education, the capability for democratic citizenship. A primary means of achieving these capabilities, according to Nussbaum, is through cultivation of the narrative imagination "through literature and the arts" (Nussbaum, 2023: 255). She cites both Rabindranath Tagore and Dewey as fellow promoters of the use of the arts for democratic education and argues that "[t]hrough the imagination we may attain a kind of insight into the experience of another that is very difficult to attain in daily life – particularly when our world has constructed sharp separations, and suspicions that make any encounter difficult" (Nussbaum, 2023: 255). Thus, a sufficient education for the development of the capability of democratic citizenship, according to Nussbaum, will involve the use of the arts to cultivate an imagination capable of sympathizing with those who are different from ourselves.

Amy Gutmann in her book *Democratic Education* characterizes the goal of democratic education as "conscious social reproduction" which requires that a democratic society "educate all educable children to be capable of participating in collectively shaping their society" (Gutmann, 1999: 39). Thus, the capability of democratic citizenship according to Gutmann is the capability to actively take part in democratic governance. She further states that:

> 'political education' – the cultivation of the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation – has moral primacy over other purposes of public education in a democratic society. Political education prepares citizens to participate in consciously reproducing their society, and conscious social reproduction is the ideal not only of democratic education but also of democratic politics […] (Gutmann, 1999: 287).

Thus, according to Gutmann, democratic or political education is the most important goal of education within the just democratic society. She goes on to say that:

> The primacy of political education reorients our expectations of primary schooling away from the distributive goals set by standard interpretations of equal opportunity (such as educating every child for choice among the widest range of good lives) and toward the

goal of giving every child an education adequate to participate in the political processes by which choices among good lives are socially structured (Gutmann, 1999: 287).

Therefore, a sufficient (or adequate) education according to Gutmann is one which provides the capability to fully partake in the structuring of a democratic society. For Gutmann, this educational goal should take primacy over other purposes of education.

Central to Gutmann's theory of a sufficient democratic education for the capability of democratic citizenship is the goal of "cultivating the kind of character conducive to democratic sovereignty" (Gutmann, 1999: 41). According to Gutmann, a democratic education must teach children to "accept those ways of life that are consistent with sharing the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic society" (Gutmann, 1999: 42). She states that:

> [a]lthough inculcating character and teaching moral reasoning by no means exhaust the purposes of primary education in a democracy, together they constitute its core political purpose: the development of 'deliberative,' or what I shall interchangeably call 'democratic,' character (Gutmann, 1999: 51-52).

In order to develop this 'democratic' or 'deliberative' character, Gutmann argues that teachers must develop in students the "virtues of citizenship, which can be cultivated by a common education characterized by respect for racial, religious, intellectual and sexual differences among students" (Gutmann 1999: 287). In a separate article on the topic of democratic education, Gutmann states that "[m]utual respect among citizens regardless of their race, religion, ethnicity, or gender is a fundamental prerequisite for a just liberal order" (Gutmann, 1995: 561). Thus, central to a sufficient democratic education is the inculcation of these basic values.

With regard to methods for teaching the democratic character, Gutmann states that "[t]he moral primacy of political education also supports a presumption in favor of more participatory over more disciplinary methods of teaching. […] even when student participation threatens to produce some degree of disorder within schools, it may be defended on democratic ground for cultivating political skills and social commitments" (Gutmann, 1999: 287). Therefore, similar to Dewey,

Gutmann argues that this democratic character should be taught through participatory teaching which enables students to develop their skills of actively participating in a democratic society. According to Gutmann, "[p]articipatory approaches aim to increase students' commitment to learning by building upon and extending their existing interests in intellectually productive ways" (Gutmann, 1999: 89). She argues that participatory education is important to teaching the capacity for democratic citizenship because "[i]f primary schooling leaves students with a capacity for political criticism but no capacity for political participation or sense of social commitment, either because it fails to cultivate their sense of political efficacy or because it succeeds in teaching them deference to authority, then it will have neglected to cultivate a virtue essential to democracy" (Gutmann, 1999: 92).

In further works, Gutmann develops her concern with the goal of educating towards democracy as "conscious social reproduction" into a theory of deliberative democracy. In the book *Why Deliberative Democracy?*, Gutmann, with Dennis Thompson, states that:

> [a]n important part of democratic education is learning how to deliberate well enough to be able to hold representatives accountable. […] Because the school system in a democracy appropriately aims to prepare children to become free and equal citizens, it constitutes one of the most important sites of rehearsals for deliberation (Gutmann & Thompson, 2009: 35).

Thus, according to Gutmann, an important part of the capability for democratic citizenship is the capacity for deliberation, and the development of this capacity is a central part of a sufficient democratic education. This education for deliberation will "develop the capacities of students to understand different perspectives, communicate their understandings to other people, and engage in the give-and-take of moral argument with a view toward making mutually justifiable decisions" (Gutmann & Thompson, 2009: 61). Gutmann's work on deliberative democracy carries on her concern with developing an account of the sufficient democratic education for the capability of democratic citizenship for relational equality. Teaching the values of mutual respect and the skills of deliberation through a participatory education thus constitutes an integral part of a sufficient education for the capability of democratic citizenship according to Gutmann.

With regard to the distribution of educational resources, Gutmann argues for sufficient educational resources for democratic participation. She states that "inequalities in the distribution of educational goods can be justified if, but only if, they do not deprive any child of the ability to participate effectively in the democratic process" and that the there is "a moral requirement that democratic institutions allocate sufficient resources to education to provide all children with an ability adequate to participate in the democratic process" (Gutmann, 1999: 136). Distributions are thus grounded in Gutmann's theory of democratic education and do not act as principles of justice in themselves. Distributions are subordinated to the goal of an adequate democratic education.

Another important theorist of democratic education is Eamonn Callan. Callan has argued for the importance of achieving a sufficient education for democratic citizenship, stating that "sufficient opportunity, where sufficiency is fixed by the educational presuppositions of citizenship, is a better criterion of what we owe to our children in civic education than strict equality" (Callan, 2016: 78). Prior to arguing for sufficiency explicitly, Callan theorized about the nature of democratic education in his book *Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy*. In this book, he argues that the goal of a democratic education is to educate citizens who are able to uphold what he calls "justice as reasonableness." (Callan, 1997: 8) He states that:

> Justice as reasonableness devolves into a cluster of mutually supportive habits, desires, emotional propensities, and intellectual capacities whose coordinated activity requires contextually sensitive judgement. Future citizens need to develop some imaginative sympathy for compatriots whose experience and identity incline them to see political questions in ways that differ systematically from their own. A respect for reasonable differences and a concomitant spirit of moderation and compromise has to be nurtured. A vivid awareness of the responsibilities that the rights of others impose on the self, as well as a sense of the dignity that one's own rights secure for the self, must be engendered. All these accomplishments may be subsumed under the idea of justice only so long as we bear in mind that the idea captures no simple master-rule for moral choice. (Callan, 1997: 8)

Callan's concept of "justice as reasonableness" grows out of his focus on Rawls's "political conception of the person," which is at the centre of Rawls's conception of the just democratic society (Callan, 1997: 24). Callan focuses on the idea of the capacity to be "reasonable" in Rawls's political conception of the person. He explains that, according to Rawls, reasonableness involves:

> […] a commitment to moral reciprocity […] [r]easonable persons are predisposed sincerely to propose principles intended to fix the rules of fair cooperation with others; they are ready to discuss proposals made with the same intention by others; and they are prepared to comply with such proposals should others be willing to do likewise. (Callan, 1997: 24-25).

Based on this aspect of the reasonable person, Callan sees a central capability of a democratic citizen as the ability "to participate competently in reciprocity-governed political dialogue and to abide by the deliverances of such dialogue in their conduct as citizens" (Callan, 1997: 28). A just society is thus a society made up of reasonable persons who have the capability of engaging reciprocally in democratic governance and a sufficient education for Callan will therefore educate towards this capability.

To sufficiently develop the capability to take part in "reciprocity-governed political dialogue", a sufficient democratic education for Callan will engage students with beliefs that are unlike their own. Callan states that:

> The essential demand is that schooling properly involves at some stage sympathetic and critical engagement with beliefs and ways of life at odds with the culture of the family or religious or ethnic group into which the child is born. Moreover, the relevant engagement must be such that the beliefs and values by which others live are entertained not merely as sources of meaning in their lives; they are instead addressed as potential elements within the conceptions of the good and the right one will create for oneself as an adult. I characterize the understanding this process is intended to yield as 'sympathetic' not

because it entails an indiscriminate embrace of pluralism. My claim is that to understand ethical diversity in the educationally relevant sense presupposes some experience of entering imaginatively into ways of life that are strange, even repugnant, and some developed ability to respond to them with interpretive charity, even though the sympathy this involves must complement the toughmindedness of responsible criticism (Callan, 1997: 133).

Thus, similar to the other democratic education theorists discussed above, part of a sufficient democratic education for Callan is the cultivation of imagination so that citizens are able to take seriously and understand the different perspectives and beliefs of others. This imagination will be cultivated through "engagement with beliefs and ways of life at odds with the culture of the family," and the engagement must not be done simply for the purpose of passively learning about other beliefs and values, but in order to actively engage with these beliefs as possible answers to questions of the good life for oneself. Callan thinks that an education which involves this type of engagement will help to develop the capacity for reasonableness that is central to the capability for democratic citizenship.

Another important aspect of the sufficient democratic education for Callan is that it teaches a sense of egalitarian justice (Callan, 2000: 148). Arguing against Harry Brighouse's claim that democratic education should not teach democratic values uncritically because this undermines the principle of liberal legitimacy (the freedom to give consent to the form of government one is governed by), Callan argues that "[a]n education for liberal legitimacy must seek to instill autonomy as well as a sense of justice, and these are not anything like character-neutral achievements" (Callan, 2000: 142). According to Callan:

> the point of liberal legitimacy is to forestall the oppression that free and equal citizens are properly motivated to eschew in the design of basic political institutions. But being properly motivated here cannot be anything less than the desire to ensure that political institutions are in keeping with the equal worth of all who live under them. That being so, an egalitarian sense of justice is intrinsic to the hypothetical perspective from which legitimacy or illegitimacy is discerned and given the educational relevance of the values

which constitute that perspective, they must also be cultivated among those who would create or sustain a society in which legitimacy is achieved (Callan, 2000: 149).

Thus, according to Callan, not only does teaching egalitarian values not undermine liberal legitimacy, it is in fact an integral part of upholding liberal legitimacy. This is because it provides the justification and motivation for a concern with liberal legitimacy in the first place.

Callan's concern with providing an education that teaches egalitarian virtue can be seen as foundational to his idea of justice as reasonableness. He states that "suppose we stipulate then that reasonableness simply is the virtue of egalitarian justice. Autonomous character secures the self-regarding aspect of justice. Through the cultivation of reasonableness […] the self-regarding aspect can be combined with the other-regarding aspect of egalitarian justice" (Callan, 2000: 148). Central to Callan's conception of the capability for reasonableness as the goal of democratic education is a concern with inculcating the value of egalitarian justice. A sufficient democratic education, according to Callan, will not be value-neutral, but will clearly teach the equality of all citizens.

Finally, Philip Kitcher has recently contributed to the scholarship on democratic education with his book on the philosophy of education, *The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education*. Kitcher distinguishes between three levels of democracy: 1) "shallow" democracy, which emphasizes "elections and votes", 2) Slightly "deeper" democracy, which "recognizes the importance of free and open debate, so that citizens have the chance to understand how their votes might best promote their interests", and 3) "Deweyan" democracy, a "concept of democracy as a 'shared way of life' in which regular interactions among citizens promote mutual learning and accommodation" (Kitcher, 2022: 7). Kitcher argues that democratic education should aim to build the capability for Deweyan democracy because a healthy democracy must function at this level and cannot be maintained at the shallower levels. This is because at the level of Deweyan democracy deliberation is encouraged which allows "people with differing perspectives" to come to mutual understanding and to develop "policies all can tolerate" (Kitcher 2022, 121). Kitcher argues that "[t]he health of democracy at any level […] rests on the extent to which Deweyan democracy is realized" and that this "sets the basic educational task […] How

are citizens to be prepared for Deweyan democracy?" (Kitcher, 2022: 121) Therefore, Kitcher clearly lays out the goal of sufficient democratic education: the capability for Deweyan democracy.

With regard to Deweyan democracy, Kitcher states that "the core of [Deweyan] democracy […] consists in conversations aiming to exemplify three virtues: inclusiveness, informedness, and mutual engagement" (Kitcher, 2022: 8). Thus, an education for the capability of democratic citizenship within a democracy so conceived will require the development of the capability for such conversations. Kitcher calls these "deliberations" and argues that "to the extent that deliberations of this sort can be (re)introduced into democracies, we can expect to avoid recurrent reversals of policy that harm all through the instability they generate, and to diminish polarization and fragmentation" (Kitcher 2022, 8). The goal of democratic education for Kitcher is thus to develop the capacity for deliberation that is inclusive, informed, and mutually engaging.

Similar to the democratic education theorists already discussed, Kitcher thinks that the cultivation of the ability for deliberation requires the development of an ability of citizens to be "open to ideas and perspectives they initially view as uncongenial and even threatening" (Kitcher, 2022: 122). Kitcher argues that the ability to be open to strange beliefs requires a sense of "interpersonal trust" which consists in the "confidence that their fellow citizens are committed to protecting them against serious losses" (Kitcher, 2022: 122). Thus, a fundamental goal of democratic education is the cultivation of a sense of trust between citizens which enables true engagement with each other's perspectives during deliberation.

Central to a sufficient democratic education for the capability for democratic citizenship according to Kitcher is the development of a deeper care or concern for other citizens. He states that:

> [i]n the course of our early lives, almost all of us come to give priority to particular other people in the formation of settled preferences – this begins with close family members – and, as we mature, we develop our own idiosyncratic spectrum of altruistic linkages. If we are able to become citizens, capable of participating in a functional democracy, the

individual networks must be readjusted to allow for wider forms of cooperative action. Achieving that is the work of education (Kitcher, 2022: 138).

Kitcher thinks that expanding our network of "cooperative action" requires the cultivation of "Deweyan engagement with others" which occurs through an education that is "committed to expanding the limited domain of individuals' altruism, through instilling a disposition for seeking out and engaging with fellow citizens" (Kitcher, 2022: 138). This form of education "encourages you to expand the circle of those you care about, so it encompasses the entire society" (Kitcher, 2022: 138). As Kitcher states, "[a]n essential task of education today is to help restore the possibilities of community democracy requires" (Kitcher, 2022: 149).

Kitcher lays out some clear educational strategies that he thinks will be part of a democratic education sufficient for creating and maintaining a Deweyan democracy. These proposals Kitcher provides aim to "produce people who are eager to engage with and learn from others, even from those whose perspectives they initially find alien" (Kitcher, 2022: 150). The proposals follow a theme of encouraging planning and collaboration between students, starting at a young age with simple group activities, and continuing into secondary education, all the while increasing the complexity of the tasks and the "size and diversity of the groups" (Kitcher, 2022: 149). Kitcher adds that "[a]fter several years of experience in joint decision-making" teachers should "supplement the practical activities with studies of differences in human cultures" and "[i]ntegrate these with analyses of the costs of cultural clashes and of the effects of attempts to cooperate" (Kitcher, 2022: 149). Kitcher's conception of education sufficient for Deweyan democracy does not end in adolescence, but continues into adulthood, at which point democratic education will "[e]ncourage adults to take periodic (funded) 'sabbaticals,' in which they live, plan, and work with people unlike those they have previously encountered" (Kitcher, 2022: 150).

Altogether, many of the core recommendations Kitcher makes for a democratic education sufficient for the capability of Deweyan democracy encourage trust and collaboration between citizens, even those who come from very different places and ways of life. Kitcher has developed this conception of a sufficient education in light of his concern with the goal of creating citizens who are capable of deliberation that is inclusive, informed, and mutually engaged. He argues that

the capability for this type of deliberation requires a sense of trust and comradery between citizens, which must be cultivated through a democratic education developed for this purpose.

After surveying many of the central arguments for a sufficient democratic education made by democratic education theorists, it is clear that these theorists seek to theorize a sufficient education for the capability of democratic citizenship for relational equality. All of these theorists articulate central aspects of the capability for democratic citizenship. Each theorist then aims to develop a theory of education which is sufficient for the purpose of instantiating these aspects of the capability of democratic citizenship for relational equality. Their theories of democratic education thus aim at the same SFDT goal as Anderson and Satz, but they develop their theories of sufficient education in more detail than Anderson and Satz. In the next and final section of Chapter Five, I will explore how Anderson and Satz can improve their approach to educational adequacy by more fully theorizing the sufficient education for their goal of democratic citizenship for relational equality.

Section 3: Further Developing the Argument for Sufficient Education for Democratic Citizenship for Relational Equality

In Section 1 of this chapter, we saw that the sufficiently just society is worked out in more detail at the level of the spheres of justice. The democratic education theorists provide an example of what working out sufficiency at the level of the sphere looks like. The democratic education theorists surveyed in Section 2 work towards identifying the sufficient means to achieve the capability of democratic citizenship. The capability of democratic citizenship is one of the spheres of justice that contributes towards the higher-level goal of sufficiency for a relationally equal society. Looking in detail at the approaches taken by the democratic education theorists gives us an example of what working out sufficiency at the level of the sphere looks like.

In the work of the democratic education theorists discussed in Section 2, the three positive ways that understanding sufficiency correctly as SFDT improves arguments for democratic education are realized. Each democratic education theorist focuses on the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship for relational equality and attempts to give a clear description of this goal;

each theorist then delves deeply into theorizing the means (democratic education) of achieving this goal; and, if they mention distribution at all, it is part of, and subordinate to, the purpose of their larger theory of a sufficient education for democratic citizenship. These three features are essential to how the democratic education theorists work out the sufficient education for their purpose of realizing the capability for democratic citizenship for relational equality. Thus, they can be seen as three requirements of determining sufficient education for democratic citizenship for relational equality.

More generally, the three requirements central to working out the nature of sufficient education for democratic citizenship for relational equality reveal what working out sufficiency at the level of the spheres of justice requires. In any sphere of justice, working out sufficiency for the goal of that sphere will involve these three requirements: 1) The goal of the sphere must be clearly identified in the light of the ultimate goal of the just society; 2) The means of achieving that goal must be comprehensively theorized; and, 3) Distribution will be part of this theory, but will be subordinate and instrumental to the broader goal of theorizing sufficient means for the goal of the sphere.

Applying the second requirement (that the means of achieving the goal must be comprehensively theorized) to the example of sufficient education for democratic citizenship means the theory will have to explain in detail the concrete aspects of a sufficient democratic education and how they will achieve elaborated concrete goals. This will involve a theory that is not limited or abstract, but which shows clearly how the main goal set out, the capability for democratic citizenship, can be met. This will involve determining the scope of the educational sphere. As Stefan Gosepath has explained, a theory of the just education must determine whether to address only "the school system" or to include "society and its distribution of life prospects as a whole" (Gosepath, 2023: 274). Since sufficiency is shaped by its goal and the means available of reaching its goal, the scope of the sufficient education will be determined by the requirements of the goal and the means available. The scope will also need to be balanced against the goals of other spheres of the just society. In the examples of arguments for democratic education I gave in Section 2, the educational sphere addressed is the school system and not the family or the society as a whole. The theory of democratic education recommended by the theorists I address is meant to foster

democratic community outside of the school, but this education remains within the sphere of the school.

Together these three requirements are central to working out the nature of sufficiency at the level of the sphere in an SFDT account of the just society. Because Anderson and Satz set out an SFDT project of determining the sufficient/adequate education for the purpose of democratic citizenship for relational equality, both theorists must meet these three requirements. In Chapter Four, I discussed both Anderson's and Satz's theories of the adequate democratic education to determine what they had contributed to an SFDT argument and where they could improve. Using these three requirements and the theories of democratic education discussed in Section 2 of this chapter, it is possible to give a more thorough critique of Anderson's and Satz's arguments for educational sufficiency and to suggest in more detail how they could improve.

I begin with Anderson and with the first requirement of clearly defining the goal of the sphere, which in this case is the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship. Anderson identifies a capability towards which education for the higher purpose of democratic equality should focus. Rather than the goal of developing the capability of democratic citizenship for all citizens, Anderson identifies the goal of education as the creation of a "democratic elite" (Anderson, 2007: 596). [18] According to Anderson, education for a democratic elite must develop the capabilities of the elite members of society so that they are responsive to the needs of the rest of society. Anderson defines the goal of education at a very narrow level, neglecting to define the capability it should cultivate in the general population of a democratic society. Thus, her depiction must be expanded to include the capabilities of all citizens if it is to articulate the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship working towards her ultimate goal of democratic equality.

Moving on to the second requirement of SFDT at the level of the sphere, the development of a full theory of the nature of education sufficient for this goal. Because Anderson's goal is defined too narrowly, her theory for a sufficient education is too narrow. It only focuses on the development of a responsive and integrated elite and neglects to include what a sufficient

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[18] I leave aside the issue of whether it is problematic to include an "elite" class within a democratically equal society.

education for the remainder of society should look like. Anderson's theory of a sufficient education is also held back by the problem identified in Chapter Four, that she is indifferent to inequalities above a certain sufficiency threshold. This relates to the third requirement of SFDT at the level of the sphere: distribution must be subordinate to the purpose of building a sufficient theory for the goal of the sphere. Anderson clearly places too much importance on a supposed distributive pattern (TDS). She thereby limits her ability to fully theorize towards her goal of an adequate education for a responsive elite by arguing for potentially large inequalities above a TDS 'sufficiency' line of education.

Satz defines the goal of a sufficient education as equal citizenship. As I show in Chapter Four, following T.H. Marshall, Satz defines equal citizenship in terms of the 'opportunity to participate fully in the political, civic and economic life of the community' (Satz, 2012: 166). Based on this definition, Satz develops the outline of a theory for democratic education that would be sufficient for the purpose of equal citizenship. As previously quoted in Chapter Four, she states that:

> [i]n broad outlines, the state owes to its citizens an education that:
> (d) Gives them a threshold of knowledge and competence for public responsibilities such as voting, serving on a jury and the meaningful exercise of civil liberties such as freedom of speech;
> (e) Gives them sufficient knowledge for productive work and independence;
> (f) Develops their capacities for empathy, self-respect, imagination and reciprocity (Satz, 2012: 166).

With this account of an adequate education, Satz provides only a sketch of her conception of the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship and she neglects the second requirement of theorizing sufficiency at the level of the sphere. As Satz states, she provides an account of the goal of a democratic education in "broad outlines." In order to develop the capability of democratic citizenship, she argues that citizens must have "competence for public responsibilities," "sufficient knowledge for productive work and independence," and the "capacities for empathy, self-respect, imagination and reciprocity." Together, these competencies and capacities make up the goal of a sufficient education for her: the capability for democratic

citizenship. Satz has thus depicted the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship as including three parts. In order to argue for sufficiency as SFDT, each part must be clearly articulated and sufficient means must be theorized for each aspect of the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship.

With regard to the third part, of developing the capacity for "empathy, self-respect, imagination and reciprocity," these capacities amount to a capacity for mutual respect and reciprocity. The theories of education discussed in Section 2 provide examples of what a developed theory of sufficient education for such a capacity would look like. We can therefore look in detail at how these theorists work out sufficiency for the capacity for mutual respect and reciprocity that Satz identifies as part of the capability for democratic citizenship.

First of all, these theories expand upon and more fully theorize the goal that Satz simply defines as the capacity for "empathy, self-respect, imagination and reciprocity". As discussed in Section 2 of this chapter, Dewey refers to the capability of "intelligent sympathy or good will" which is developed when the "imagination" is cultivated" such that democratic citizens are able to see what they share and thus to collaborate (Dewey, 1916: 127-128). Nussbaum, following Dewey and Tagore, focuses on three capabilities which consist of the "capacity for critical examination of oneself and one's traditions," (Nussbaum, 2023: 252) the ability to see all humans as part of a common humanity, and the "narrative imagination" which enables citizens to imagine being "in the shoes of a person different from oneself" (Nussbaum, 2023: 255). Gutmann theorizes the capability of "democratic" or "deliberative" character which enables children to actively take part in their democracy by "inculcating character and teaching moral reasoning" (Gutmann, 1999: 51-52). Callan states the goal of democratic education as teaching "reasonableness" which is fundamentally the ability to treat others as equals. Finally, Kitcher aims at "Deweyan democracy" which Kitcher states is the ability to deliberate in a way that upholds "three virtues: inclusiveness, informedness, and mutual engagement" (Kitcher, 2022: 8). All of these theorists more thoroughly theorize the goal of democratic education as the capability for mutual respect and reciprocity.

Regarding the second requirement of thoroughly theorizing the means of sufficiently reaching a goal, the democratic education theorists attempt to do this with their theories of education. This second requirement of arguing for sufficiency at the level of the sphere is central to a theory of sufficiency because without theorizing the means of sufficiently reaching a goal, there is no account of the nature of sufficiency. Simply stating a goal and that it should be reached sufficiently (or adequately) is not a theory of sufficiency. Sufficiency arises in the attempt to meet a stated goal. I will thus give a brief summary here of the means that the democratic education theorists propose in order to sufficiently meet their stated goals.

As was discussed in Section 2, Dewey argues that to achieve the goal of good will, a democratic education must go beyond passive memorization and be participatory and engage students in activity with their peers. In order to sufficiently develop her three abilities, Nussbaum argues that an education must cultivate the imagination "through literature and the arts" (Nussbaum, 2023: 255). Gutmann argues for teaching mutual respect and deliberative skills through a participatory education. Callan argues that a sufficient education will expose students to beliefs that differ from their own and will cultivate their imagination to enable them to comprehend and respect the different perspectives of their fellow citizens. Kitcher argues similarly that a sufficient education will be one which enables citizens to be "open to ideas and perspectives they initially view as uncongenial and even threatening" (Kitcher, 2022: 122). He gives very clear, concrete suggestions as to how to educate towards his goal of Deweyan democracy. Through a series of steps, Kitcher aims to build democratic skills through exercises that involve planning and collaboration (Kitcher, 2022: 149-150).

Combining the work of these theorists we can begin to develop a robust theory of sufficiency for the goal of the capacity for mutual respect and reciprocity, which is central to the capability for democratic citizenship. This capacity is a disposition to treat others as equal to oneself based on a moral belief in the fundamental equality of all people and the imaginative capacity to understand and empathize with the viewpoints of others. The sufficient means of reaching this goal will include participatory education, education that develops the imagination through literature and the arts, education that exposes students to disparate belief systems in a way that encourages them to entertain and take seriously those beliefs, and an education that teaches the moral

equality of all people. Such a robust theory of the nature of this part of the goal of the capability of democratic citizenship and of the educative means of instantiating this capacity is the direction that Satz should go if she wishes to argue for an adequate education for the capacity of mutual respect and reciprocity. In order to fully theorize the sphere of the capability of democratic citizenship, she would then need to theorize sufficient means to reach her other two capacities of knowledge for public responsibilities and competence for work.

Both Anderson and Satz could improve their theories of the sufficient/adequate education for democratic citizenship by following the three requirements for sufficiency at the level of the sphere. These requirements stipulate the need for detailed theorizing of a means towards a clearly defined goal which is determined by the demands of a just society. Distribution will come into such a theory, but it will be subordinate to the goal being worked towards. Sufficiency at the level of the sphere is achieved when a means is theorized such that it is able to instantiate the goal of the sphere.

Conclusion

In Chapter Five, I explained how SFDT works at the level of the spheres of justice. Anderson's and Satz's arguments for the sufficient/adequate education for democratic citizenship occur at the level of the spheres of justice within their broader argument for RRE. Therefore, their arguments would be improved by following the requirements for arguing for sufficiency at this level. These theorists must clearly articulate the goal of the capability for democratic citizenship, they must then fully theorize the sufficient educational means of reaching this goal, and they must treat distributions as instrumental within their theory of the sufficient means. The democratic education theorists provide an example of what such an argument would look like. In particular, their theories of the sufficient educational means for the capacity for mutual respect and reciprocity show how Satz could expand and improve her argument for the sufficient education for this part of her understanding of the capability of democratic citizenship.

<u>Conclusion</u>

Thinking of sufficiency as the distribution of a discrete good towards a threshold on a cardinal scale of well-being only makes sense from within a welfare-consequentialist perspective. Sufficiency takes this form within a welfare-consequentialist perspective not because there is a universal distributive pattern of sufficiency that takes such a form and will apply in all accounts of justice, but because of the nature of the goal and the means of reaching the goal that welfare-consequentialist philosophers assume. The goal of sufficiency and the means of achieving that goal determine the shape that sufficiency will take. The welfare-consequentialist view of the world is similar to the example of filling a glass with water – it is a view in which goods are distributed until they reach the end of happiness or contentment, measured along a cardinal scale. Thus, sufficiency in such a theory of the just society takes the form of distribution of discrete goods towards a threshold. This structure of sufficiency is therefore specific to the welfare-consequentialist perspective and not a general structure of sufficiency that can be used outside of this worldview.

In a different theory of justice sufficiency takes a different form. One such different theory is Rawlsian Relational Egalitarianism (RRE). This theory seeks a society made up of democratic citizens who view each other as equal in status and their society as one of reciprocity. In such a theory of justice, which works from an ultimate abstract ideal to instantiate this ideal in the world, arguments for sufficiency occur in cascading levels from the upper level of the ultimate ideal, down to the detailed practical requirements of instantiating such a society. Within each level sufficiency takes the form required of it by its goal and the means available of reaching it. Philosophical theories of the just society and debates about justice take place at the upper level, regarding the ultimate goal of justice, and at the level of what I have called the 'spheres of justice.' The spheres of justice consist of the basic human capabilities and institutional functions that together make up the sufficiently just society. Sufficiency within each of these spheres will be shaped by the goal of the sphere and the means available of reaching it. It will consist of theories of both the nature of the goal and of the means to sufficiently reach that goal.

Anderson and Satz do not take the welfare-consequentialist view of the just society, in which justice consists of the distribution of some good towards well-being measured along a cardinal

scale. They take the RRE view, in which they aim towards a society of relational equals which view each other with respect and their society as one of cooperation towards mutual benefit. Because the goal of justice shapes sufficiency, Anderson's and Satz's understandings of sufficiency should not be shaped by the goal of welfare-consequentialism, it should be shaped by their goal of RRE. As I stated above, the goal of RRE shapes sufficiency in a very different way than the goal of welfare-consequentialism. Rather than a view of sufficiency as distribution of discrete goods towards an abstract threshold, Anderson's and Satz's view of sufficiency involves the theorization of spheres of justice towards their ultimate goal of relational equality. Within these spheres they must further theorize the sufficient means of realizing the goal of the spheres, which consist of human capabilities and institutional functions.

Anderson and Satz have in fact started to theorize sufficiency for at least one of the spheres of justice in an account of sufficiency for the relationally equal society. They have begun to theorize the sufficient education for the capability of equal democratic citizenship. However, neither theorist has provided a full theory of education sufficient for this goal. Anderson's account of the sufficient education is limited to the education of "elites". Satz provides a basic account of the capacities that are required for democratic citizenship without developing a theory of the education that would achieve these capacities.

As I argued in Chapter Five, the work of democratic education theorists reveals the way that sufficient education should be further argued for within the sphere of the capability for democratic citizenship. These theorists provide detailed accounts of democratic education. I highlight the aspect of their arguments that develop skills of mutual respect and reciprocity because these aspects of the capability for democratic citizenship clearly work towards the ultimate goal of a relationally equal society. Satz has identified "capacities for empathy, self-respect, imagination and reciprocity" (Satz, 2012: 166) as goals of the adequate education for democratic citizenship. However, she has not theorized these capacities thoroughly as the democratic education theorists have. Thus, Satz should follow the example of the democratic education theorists and further theorize these capacities if she wishes to provide an account of the adequate education for equal democratic citizenship. I suggest that such further theorization build upon the work of the democratic education theorists I discussed in Chapter Five.

Beyond the capacities of mutual respect and reciprocity, Satz also lists a "a threshold of knowledge and competence for public responsibilities such as voting […]" and "sufficient knowledge for productive work and independence" (Satz, 2012: 166). I think Satz is right that these three capacities – civic skills, work skills, and what could be called the 'democratic spirit' of mutual respect and reciprocity – are the main capacities that make up a sufficient education for the capability of democratic citizenship for a relationally equal society. I have explored the contribution of democratic education theorists to the theory of democratic education for the 'democratic spirit' of mutual respect and reciprocity, but these theorists have also theorized about the other capacities regarding civic skills and work skills. Those aspects would also be part of the complete theory of a sufficient democratic education.

Understanding sufficiency correctly is fundamentally important to arguments for justice because it gives the basic structure for how arguments for justice work. Once an ideal has been decided upon, arguments for justice are ultimately always arguments for sufficiency. This is because these arguments are fundamentally about finding the sufficient practical means of instantiating an ideal of the just society. Even in the case of the welfare-consequentialist view, these theorists are in fact following SFDT. They seek sufficient means for their goal of happiness or contentment. However, they take a very specific and narrow view of how to achieve happiness and contentment – through the distribution of specific goods. This is why Frankfurt equates sufficiency with getting "enough" of something. His welfarist goal of contentment and his consequentialist approach of achieving this goal through the distribution of a good (money) lead him to think of sufficiency as a matter of distributing enough of something. Whereas Frankfurt views sufficiency as enough money *for* contentment, Anderson seeks sufficient capabilities *for* democratic equality. Anderson thus requires the theorization of capabilities sufficient for her goal and theories of how to instantiate these capabilities, not the distribution of discrete goods towards a threshold line.

What about plural ideals? For example, in the educational justice debate it is often argued that education has plural purposes and these plural purposes, such as preparation for a capitalist workforce and democratic citizenship, require different distributive means of achieving them

(Gosepath, 2014; Satz & Reich, 2019). Sufficiency understood as SFDT reveals the need for identifying an ultimate goal clearly before sufficient means can be theorized to achieve that goal. Goals of education occur at a lower level (within the spheres of the human capabilities) and assume ultimate goals of the just society towards which they are working. Some education theorists assume an ultimate goal of a free-market capitalist society, while others assume RRE, meanwhile others focus on education for human flourishing. In order for an account of the sufficient education to be given, it is necessary to make clear what the goal or purpose of the education is. As Kirsten Meyer states in her book *Bildung*:

> [w]enn sich eine Theorie der Erziehung also nicht mit den Zwecken, sondern nur mit den Mitteln der Erziehung befasst, verliert sie damit die philosophischen Fragen aus dem Auge, deren Beantwortung eigentlich im Kern pädagogischer Theorie liegen müsste. Über bestimmte Mittel kann man immer nur relative zu bestimmten Zwecken sinnvoll nachdenken, und daher sollte eine philosophische Vergewisserung über die Ziele der Erziehung der Ausgangspunkt für pädagogische Überlegungen sein (Meyer, 2011: 4).

It is possible to theorize sufficiency separately for different goals. You could work out sufficiency separately for the human capabilities required for the free-market society, for RRE, and for a society based on the good of human flourishing. Alternatively, goals that are compatible could be integrated. Integration will require decisions about how to balance different priorities. These are not debates about sufficiency. They are debates about the ultimate ends of society. Until they are decided, however, theories of sufficiency will be muddled or arguing past each other. It is necessary to make clear what the goal is that you are aiming to sufficiently achieve.

If these goals conflict, then they will potentially undermine each other's sufficient means. For example, the goal of educating towards a capitalist workforce requires the creation of competitive, individualistic workers. This will conflict with the goal of creating a society of relationally equal democratic citizens who view society as a collective and reciprocal endeavour. When goals conflict like this, in order for sufficiency to be achieved, there are two options. Either one goal wins out and the other goal is entirely abandoned, or one goal is altered such that

it becomes instrumental to achieving the other. It is no longer the ultimate goal, but is conceived in such a way that it contributes towards the other goal. In either case, it must be decided what goal is most important in order to not have conflicting accounts of sufficiency that undercut each other.

In conclusion, sufficiency is at the heart of arguments for justice and it takes whatever form the goal and the means of achieving that goal require. Therefore, it would be disastrous to limit arguments for justice that are not welfare-consequentialist to the form sufficiency takes in arguments for welfare-consequentialism (distribution of discrete goods towards a threshold). It is vitally important that we rectify our understanding of sufficiency as the full statement 'Sufficient X for Y' (SFDT). This opens up space for the full theorization of sufficient means for all theories of justice.

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