

## Entangled Discussions: Talking with Ian Hodder About His Book *Entangled*

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Through a series of fortuitous events, Ian Hodder agreed to visit the Institut für Vorderasiatische Archäologie (Institute of Western Asian Archaeology), Freie Universität Berlin in early December 2013 to discuss his recent book, *Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things*. A group of interested students and scholars assembled for this occasion. As organizers of this event, we are pleased to acknowledge the sponsorship of the Excellence Cluster Topoi and the Institut für Vorderasiatische Archäologie, both of the Freie Universität Berlin, and Forum Kritische Archäologie. Above all we wish to express our thanks to Ian Hodder for his willingness to engage over the course of a long afternoon with our comments and questions.

The discussion took place in two successive meetings. We first met without the author, trying to stake out some of the important themes of the book that we wished to explore in more detail. The second meeting a week later, this time with Ian Hodder, was devoted to commenting on and questioning specific elements of the theoretical arguments presented in the book. We felt that the discussions helped us to understand the positive sides of his theory of entanglement but that they also highlighted a number of problems. In this commentary we summarize our thoughts on the positions laid out in *Entangled* in light of our various readings and these two sets of discussions. As will become clear the turns taken in this discussion as well as some of the arguments reflect German archaeological discourse and its specific cultural and historical background.

### A very brief summary

*Entangled* was published in 2012. It sets out to turn our typically anthropocentric view of the world on its head and examine the relationship between people and material things from the point of view of things. Hodder identifies four key sets of relations – things depending on humans (T-H), humans depending on things (H-T), things depending on other things (T-T), and humans depending on other humans (H-H) – which he discusses in terms of the entanglements they produce. Crucially, he envisions entanglements as involving all of these relationships and as occurring both synchronically and diachronically. Although three of these four sets of relations involve humans as distinct from things, he also considers humans to be to some extent things.

In this commentary we explore seven main themes that derive from our readings and discussions of the book. These are 1) the concept of entanglement and its use in archaeology, 2) multitemporality and the diachronic dimension of entanglement, 3) disentanglement, 4) the notion of care in connection with things, 5) relations among people, 6) the politics of entanglement, and 7) issues of universality with respect to entanglement.

### Entanglement as a way to enlarge our perspectives on the past

One of the overriding positive elements of Hodder's presentation of the concept of entanglement is the way it encourages us to extend and expand our perspectives on the past, as seen through the lens of archaeological research. Instead of constructing arguments analytically and typologically, a focus on entanglements challenges us to think in an associative fashion similar to the approach of a symmetrical archaeology (e.g. Shanks 2007; Witmore 2007; Olsen 2012). The approach works against tendencies to focus on single categories of artifacts; instead, we find ourselves engaged in different ways of arranging things in relation to each other. Tracing entanglements means making our way through a strongly heterogeneous world and following links and chains in a fashion that is rhizomatic<sup>1</sup> rather than linear or dendritic.

These multidirectional and multifaceted explorations have important consequences for the strict disciplining of academic boundaries that is characteristic for continental Europe. Rather than upholding the traditional units, we might read *Entangled* as a manifesto to “tear down this wall!” A simple example: through the insistence on the material qualities of things, we find ourselves turning to archaeometry both for analytical help and as a source that can enrich archaeological discussions but without succumbing to archaeometry's epistemological restrictions. A question we did not explore in our discussions was what happens when we take seriously the call to step regularly and decidedly across academic boundaries. What might the results be of such new forms of knowledge production and dissemination? How would they differ across the global world of academics, given the varied ways of carving up archaeological knowledge production in, for example, the United States and Germany?

1 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's well-known introduction to *Thousand Plateaus* (1987).

### Diachronic entanglement and matters of multitemporality

When we examine the entanglement of things and people synchronically, we come quickly to a recognition of the complexity of the links that connect them. In addition, strands of entanglement are built on preconditions that must be identified, and entanglements often produce diverging sets of consequences. Entanglements are always in flux, whether today, in the past or in the future. Therefore, exploring the threads of an entanglement brings us immediately to the importance of diachrony. Relationships over long periods of time, together with those between multiple categories, can and should be thematized.

In his opening remarks Hodder noted the connection between the domestication of cattle in the Neolithic in western Asia and global warming spurred by today's industrial-scale farming and the methane gases thereby produced. This is, of course, a process that will affect us well into the foreseeable future. Another unintended *longue durée* consequence of cattle domestication can also be mentioned: in his *Barbed Wire: A Political History* (2002) Olivier Razac observes that barbed wire was first used in 19th century North America to fence off private property in order to protect cattle from wild animals. This same barbed wire was then used in World War I trench warfare where it viciously entangled soldiers; its later electrified version compartmentalized people in Nazi concentration camps. Such diachronic entanglements have been highlighted in some historical writing and in science studies but rarely in archaeology.<sup>2</sup> Here Hodder's approach challenges us to explore previously uncharted territories in archaeology.

One of the corollaries of Hodder's notion of entanglement is that connections between things, people, and people and things are productive of change, bringing about different kinds of consequences. The notion that actions produce unintended consequences is not a new one; it plays a central role in the scholarship of Anthony Giddens who considers them to be the main source for the contingent nature of history (Giddens 1979). But in Hodder's approach

the emphasis is on a diachronic and especially on a long-term perspective that goes far beyond the temporal dimensions envisioned by Giddens. Although his view in *Entangled* opens new realms for examination, he simultaneously narrows the range of unintended consequences by contending that they always lead in the direction of greater entanglement: we are inevitably "digging ourselves into a hole" (p. 104) even as, and perhaps especially when, we make efforts to alleviate the problems brought about by entanglement. Despite his claims to the contrary, we consider this stance to be reductionist, as it insists that historical change has a particular direction, even if the specific forms of change may vary.

This specification of a rather strict directionality makes Hodder's diachronic understanding of entanglement tend toward determinism. While he claims that his approach is not teleological, it seems to depend on the level at which one examines entanglement. Specific kinds of entanglement may be unpredictable, but at a more general level the assertion is that there has been and will continue to be increasing entanglement. Thus, on a specific level his theory may not be teleological, but on a general or world history scale it is. This is a remarkable return to a way of thinking that minimizes historical contingency and is much closer to social evolutionary ideas than Hodder's other writings since the early 1980s. We are alleged to have become increasingly complex throughout history, although how that growing complexity has manifested itself may be more or less variable and is in the end judged negatively.

Many of us might agree that from the perspective of the broad sweep of human history people have become more and more entangled in a material world they have created. However, by making this into a central argument of his theory of entanglement, Hodder risks writing human history from the perspective of those who are considered in the public sphere as the "most successful", because they have been able to impose their specific materiality on their contemporaries as well as on things that endure, something that may be termed "political taphonomy" (Bernbeck 2005). Alternative directions that might have been chosen for some period of time but that did not last over the long term would potentially be written out of history if we follow Hodder's approach, because they do not fit the progression of growing entanglement that leads us to where we find ourselves today.

A final element of diachronic entanglement that seems to us of particular relevance is connected to Hodder's remark that entanglement forces us to

2 An excellent example for a culture history that exposes entanglements (without use of the term) is Wolfgang Schivelbusch's *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century*. A host of "things" such as new types of literature and "new" diseases including trauma resulted from the practice of travelling by train. For an archaeologically informed study in this vein see Michael Schiffer, Tamara C. Butts, and Kimberly K. Grimm (1994) *Taking Charge: The Electric Automobile in America*.

think of relationships that have neither beginning nor end. One can therefore enter and exit a piece of research at any point, as there is no validity in searching for origins or for some sort of final collapse. This point is not a new one (e.g. Conkey with Williams 1991), but it has remained underexplored in archaeological (and historical) research. A lingering question is whether there is a logic to where one begins or ends in examining a temporal slice of entanglement, or perhaps more importantly, what difference does the choice of temporal limits make to the results of a piece of research? Is it really the case that any point is as suitable as any other at which to begin, or is there something special about, for example, the Neolithic as a time when entanglements underwent a major change, with the consequence that the speed of further entanglement processes was faster than ever before?

### Is disentanglement possible?

A striking element of Ian Hodder's presentation of his book and his motivations for writing it was what he himself described as his pessimism with respect to the potentials of disentanglement. Put simply, he argues that disentanglement is not possible: any attempt in that direction results in being caught in other, even more entangled kinds of nets. We take a different position, contending that the problem resides in Hodder's tendency to see entanglement as an all-or-nothing status rather than a process that proceeds in degrees that can be enhanced or reduced, sped up or slowed down. It may also help to specify the context(s) in which disentanglement may occur: we suggest that it is more likely to do so in the realms of dependencies of humans on things, rather than in "inter-thing relations" (T-T) or the dependence of things on humans.

We also see Hodder's credo regarding the irreversibility of entanglement (called "directionality" in his book [pp. 169-171]) and path dependence as falling prey to the capitalist dogma of growth. Whether in material production, the educational sector, scientific "output", or at the individual level of a CV, growth has become such an unquestioned and unquestionable background to our reality that entanglement is also enveloped by it. But on the historical plane of H-T relations, aren't the many asceticisms of Eastern religions, the millenarian movements at the time of Jesus, or the décroissance and altermondialist ideas of people like Jacques Ellul (1954) a sign of such reversibilities? Hodder intimates that, in the long term,

their effect does not count as much as the historical junctures through which entanglement processes are accelerated, of which the Neolithic revolution is the one with which he is most concerned. We imagine a comparative study of entanglement in, for example, an Old Babylonian city in Mesopotamia such as Ur, the Inka center of Cuzco, and the medieval town of Cairo. Can we find an increase in entanglements in the various human-thing matrices of dependences? We doubt it, but it would mean a rigorous quantified analysis, an endeavor that seems impossible because of the heterogeneity of entanglements as well as their diachronic dimension, as Hodder himself admits (p. 108). A methodological point not raised in our discussions but noted by some of the participants afterwards is the question of where one begins a "tanglegram", and, perhaps more importantly, how tanglegrams can be compared. This would be of particular relevance if we wished to examine the question of whether and how there are changes in the relative weight accorded to different kinds of dependencies between people and things or amongst people or things. Can, in fact, the degree of entangledness at different moments or over specific trajectories be measured?

If anything, we would think that a world history conceptualized under the notion of entanglement is characterized by a stage-like movement, perhaps similar to "punctuated equilibria" (Gould and Eldridge 1977) in biological evolution. The modern age, with its horrendous onslaught of material products and their continuous growth in numbers and kinds, certainly gives the impression of rapidly increasing entanglement, indeed that it speeds up at a yearly if not monthly rate. But this may be a historically specific and even aberrant case. What if we turn to archaeological methods: has there ever been a systematic comparison of densities of object categories ("things") through time and space? The productivity of terra sigillata in La Graufesenque in southern France was certainly way beyond that of later medieval production output, for example. Despite our own situations in which we are drowning in things, we claim that the world can still be steered in different directions. The increasing interest in the commons (Hardt and Negri 2009), involving sharing rather than possessing things, is only one potential way out of the impasse of entrapment in a world of things.

Positionality or the place from which one examines entanglements also plays an important role that is insufficiently addressed in the book. What happens when entanglements are observed from an internal

vs. an external perspective? Hodder's perspective on entangled worlds is a decidedly external, rational one. But must we not assume that there was also an awareness in the past of entanglement and a desire on the part of some to disentangle? Overall, what are the potential responses to the awareness of being entangled? Must disentanglement be envisioned as something that happens only by force of necessity – for example, in contexts of “collapse” (Yoffee and Cowgill 1988; McAnany and Yoffee 2009) – or can it occur as a matter of choice? We suggest by way of a few examples that partial disentanglement can indeed take place and may be the product of intentional choices on the parts of actors.

In a recent discussion of settlement and demography in the Ur III period (c. 2100-2000 BCE) in the city-state of Umma in southern Mesopotamia, Robert McC. Adams argues that there was a steady stream of people who freed themselves, at least partially, from the demands of the state by leaving cities (Adams 2008). In doing so, they chose to pursue a more mobile lifestyle or one that was located on the edges of the densely settled belt of irrigation. In other words, these were people who disentangled themselves from a particular kind of settled life and many of the demands it placed upon them. If we silence them, one reason is our own preference for writing history from the perspective of material heritage producers similar to ourselves. And in doing so we seem conveniently to forget that such groups leave fewer traces than those who actively pursue human - thing entanglements.

Another example are the Anishnabeg of Upper Michigan who were employed in the 1920s-1930s by the Bay de Noquet Lumber Company. They attempted to avoid becoming entrapped in capitalist relations that would have forced them to purchase food from a company-owned store. Instead they engaged heavily in canning and hunting in order to provide for themselves in ways that sidestepped the use of money (<http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/hiawatha/learning/history-culture/?cid=stelprdb5106493>).

Yet another example is the small Late Neolithic site of Tol-e Bashi in the Zagros mountains of southern Iran. Here, the minimal quantities of durable objects have been interpreted as a refusal to become caught in a life surrounded and channeled by things (Pollock and Bernbeck 2010: 283-287). Things often have a temporal surplus; they easily survive a human lifetime. People not only display an attitude of concern and care for things - they may often experience the world of things as a threat. Hodder considers the

persistence and durability of things (e.g. Figure 9.8, p. 194), but he evaluates them as a largely positive element: they provide stability for “transient and uncertain lives” (p. 5). He uses a logic that corresponds to Sigmund Freud's widely cited story of his grandson who symbolically replaced his mother with a spool while she was absent (Freud 1998). But might the scarcity of material objects not imply an intention toward disentanglement (or avoidance of entanglement), rather than a status of being less “civilized” or less complex? Would John Chapman's (2000) fragmentation theory not also fit such a general scenario of durability as a threatening temporal surplus?

A rather different view was also raised during our discussions: could historical changes in entanglement be a kind of zero-sum game in which variability lies in the extent to which different kinds of human-thing relations are entangled? In one specific example it was argued that the complexity of the entanglement embodied in human-human relationships is much greater in hunter-gather than in capitalist societies where relationships involving things are the primary locus of complex entanglements. While we do not necessarily propose that the sum of entanglements is the same in all cultural contexts, in all times and places, the point is that a hunter-gatherer world in the Upper Paleolithic of Eurasia may have been as entangled as that of Stanford, California today. Whereas the former may have been characterized by complex entanglements between people, non-material forces, animals and a few things that were based on an entirely different ontology than ours, in the latter entanglements are denser and more complex only in the realms that imply things.

This argument can be linked to a more complex issue. Hodder depicts his matrix of relations as being so fundamental that as relations they remain independent of each other. But what if this independence is not taken as given? Might it not be that different historical instances exhibit situation-specific “relations of relations”? So when human interrelations predominate over those that connect people to things, then human-thing relations will be conceptualized against a background of those between humans. On the other hand, when things take center stage, relations between people can metamorphose into relations patterned after those involving things. This is exactly György Lukács' (1971 [1923]) reification thesis: the contention that in modern societies things have had such an enormous impact that social relations have taken on the character of human-thing relations. Lukács insisted on a difference in the

material world that is at the core of Marx's writings, and which curiously disappears entirely in *Entangled*: that between the use value and the exchange value of things. Hodder's book as well as much of the materiality literature in general seems to assume the dominance of the use value of objects, from pre-history to postmodern times, as if we did not live in a world that is saturated with exchange values and associated ways of thinking (e.g. Sohn-Rethel 1985).

Nowadays we see the growing entanglements involving things as a part of the way in which people are increasingly disciplined and thereby entrapped in situations in which the variety of relations among humans is comparatively small, largely as a result of the fact that they are dominated by commodification. In the long term, one could even insert Norbert Elias's arguments about the process of civilization into such a history (Elias 1977).

André Gorz (1989) has offered a possible way out. He argues that an important step away from commodified relations (the dominant form that determines intersubjective relations in contemporary societies) is, to take a simple example, to avoid taking a taxi and instead hitchhiking or at least agreeing on mutual, non-monetary exchanges in which anyone driving a car from point A to point B takes whomever wishes to travel in the same direction, in a kind of delayed-return system. The idea can, of course, be extended to fit a wide range of other contexts such as community gardens in which people work together, harvesting what they can use as well as expanding and cementing social ties. This arrangement offers a largely non-commodified alternative to having one's own garden and hiring a service to take care of it.

Such changes would, however, also impinge on time and an issue best termed "temporal justice". According to Hodder, things all have their own temporal rhythms to which people have to adapt (pp. 84-85). Therefore, the more things we arrange around ourselves, the less we master our own time. We become slaves of "altertemporality", a form of temporality that is objectified in material things. The loss of "time sovereignty" (Münkler 2007) plays a major role in present conditions of entanglement and imparts a historically highly specific character to it. Time sovereignty, and an emerging notion of temporal injustice, was likely of much less import before modernity, despite dependency on a yearly cycle organized around climate and weather.

In *Entangled* Hodder uses two notions, entanglement and entrapment, to describe the conditions that

keep people and things in a situation of mutual dependency. In the discussion he explained that he uses them interchangeably, although entrapment appears in several places in his book as the more negative alternative. We think that he misses an important potential of his concept by making little or no distinction between these terms. Whereas we are convinced, based on some of the examples given above, that it is possible to observe and to take part in disentangling, understood as processes that occur by different degrees and kinds, entrapment can be understood as a state in which entanglement can no longer be reversed without a more or less complete collapse. Thus, at Çatalhöyük things – from decorated houses to beautifully shaped stone knives and multifarious figurines – entrapped people, whereas in the aforementioned Tol-e Bashi such effects were prevented by a world of material scarcity, so that people dominated rather than succumbed to a specific level of material entanglement.

Ultimately, we argue on epistemological grounds that a theory of entanglement that sees no possibility for disentanglement, other than the collapse of an existing system, turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

### Caring for things

An important element of Hodder's ideas about entanglement is the notion that people are drawn into the care of and for things. This concept of care encourages us as archaeologists to think in new ways about the objects we excavate and study, to focus on efforts at maintenance and repair and not just on their original production or use. At the same time this perspective assumes that people always and everywhere attempt to maximally extend the temporality of things, trying to care for them so that they do not disintegrate, break or become otherwise useless. The universality of this postulate seems to us to be misplaced.

In drawing attention to the much more difficult issue of disinterest and disregard for the survival of things, one might think about the common practice of depositing hoards in Bronze Age central Europe. In these cases things were removed from the realm of care and concern by turning them into offerings (cf. Hansen et al. 2012; Hansen et al. in press). The argument that the large quantities of luxury goods deposited in the Royal Tombs at Ur involved the public "disposal" of major amounts of wealth on the part of public households (Pollock 2007) could also

be understood as a way to remove some of the oppressiveness of material wealth by burying it with the dead. In some cases, grave goods are not supposed to “live” on after the death of their owners. Another example is the abandonment and deliberate burning of houses or whole settlements, as has been argued for Neolithic structures in southeastern Europe (Tringham 2005) and the Burnt Village in Sabi Abyad (Verhoeven 2000). These are acts that may serve to deliberately separate people from things they took care of.

Care for single items is archaeologically attested, for example in the multiple mending holes in pottery from the Iranian Late Neolithic sites of Chagha Sefid and Ali Kosh. We can identify more or less care used in production processes, for example in the making of a stone relief, the writing of a cuneiform tablet, etc. Once produced, things also require care – but perhaps do not get it. A simple drive through parts of the United States reveals a large number of slowly decaying houses, garages, and other buildings, a neglect of structures that is astonishing to the eye of a visiting European. Abandonment cultures and production processes are clearly related. What characterizes the threshold at which an item is discarded? And what is the relation between specific production processes as more or less skilled labor (artistic, hand-craft, industrialized) and the willingness to dispose of things? Do we not live in a world of garbage heaps and landfills more than in one characterized by care for things?

Hodder only briefly points out the possibilities of elaborating distinctions between the production of longevity by caring for things and another kind of temporal production, that of brevity. Things may require care, without getting it: the German word “entsorgen” – to “dis-care” – meaning to throw away, appropriately expresses an intrasubjective positioning towards a thing and an external practice, denoting neither simple carelessness nor socially sanctioned mechanisms for removing things but rather a fundamental and conscious shift in attitude away from care. Recognizing these tensions encourages the investigation of distinct chrono-spatially anchored practices of care and dis-caring, rather than seeing care as quasi-universal. At the same time we must be attentive to the diachronic dimensions of these examples: a glance at a hyper-consumerist society, such as the contemporary United States reveals that the rapid discard of objects may be directly related to the desire to acquire new things, itself an essential element of advanced capitalism which only thrives by promoting constant growth accompanied by waste

and (more or less planned) obsolescence (Reuß and Dannoritzer 2013).

A further concern is whether one can use a single concept to encompass care for things and care for people. In the realm of intersubjective relations, Axel Honneth distinguishes between *Anerkennung*, recognition or acknowledgment as a process that occurs between people, and *Kennen*, to know, involving objectification and complete reification of the other (Honneth 2005). People may attempt to dissolve these boundaries by ritually animating things, as is the case in the mouth-opening rituals practiced in both Mesopotamia and Egypt to bring statues to life (Walker and Dick 2001). Here, one sees a kind of *Auskennensvergessenheit*, or deliberate forgetting of skilled production knowledge, in that through ritual one was encouraged to forget the human practices that are at the origin of animated things (Bernbeck 2009).

### The neglect of human relationships

Many of us who took part in the discussion remain decidedly anthropocentric, in contrast to Hodder’s avowed aim to take a thing-centered perspective on the world (“This book aims to look at the relationships between humans and things from the point of view of things” [p. 10]). There are numerous reasons why we insist on the importance of people and of “human-human” dependency relationships, not to the neglect but also not to the privileging of relationships with and between things.

The first of these is that in a thing-centered perspective on the world, people can be easily marginalized. When people are objectified by placing things at center stage, or at least on the same level, it is all too easy to end up treating (other) people as lesser than members of one’s own group.

We argue that only by dissolving the human-thing boundary is it possible to dehumanize and objectify people. Critique of the subject - object divide, the mantra of current anthropology and archaeology, meets its political counterpart in early 20th century writings on critical theory: instead of elevating things to a level equal to people, the concern was then - and we claim that it should be today as well - to fight against the objectification of people. The obfuscation of the boundaries between people and things, initially advanced in Appadurai’s (1986) introduction to *The Social Life of Things* where he declares

that people and things both can turn into commodities and exit such a status, opens the philosophical door not only to the recognition of animal rights, but also to the legitimization of slavery, the annihilation of whole groups of people, and the glorification of war. Ideas about a world history are always themselves situated in historically specific discourses. In a German intellectual environment, any preoccupation with the past has to take into consideration the fundamental historical and cultural rupture of the “Third Reich”. This rupture includes the impossibility of any adequate historical representation of the Holocaust (Lang 2000) and stands in the way or at least leads to hesitations in considering non-anthropocentric conceptualizations of world history. And so it should. Theoretical considerations must be historically situated, and the German context may well be fundamentally different in this regard from a U.S. (or other anglophone) academic and intellectual environment.

Second, we are of the opinion that Hodder’s discussion of entanglement works on the basis of a normative or generic image of being human, although he explicitly denied this in our discussion. By generic or normative human we refer to the elision of gender, age, (dis)abilities, etc. that results in Tringham’s critique of a past peopled by “faceless blobs” (Tringham 1991). If we wish to write histories of entanglement, we must insist on the specificity of the people whose social and material worlds became, in different ways, entangled and how those entanglements differed at one time and place for different kinds of people. Many of the concrete examples used in *Entangled* are chosen so as to minimize the roles played by relationships among people; rather, they often tend to consider single individuals and their material environment, most poignantly in the examples of the author and his boat or piano. Interactions between one person and one thing are situations and practices in which means and ends coincide: the act of playing music does not gesture to anything beyond itself. However, over the long term such practices are not central to Hodder’s ideas, as for example in his diachronic account of the growth of entanglement or the sequence of changes documented at Çatalhöyük. Interestingly, this statement of position in *Entangled* seems to be quite different from his own positioning a decade or so ago, when he wrote, “There is too little emphasis on subjectivity and self as constructed by individual agents” (Hodder 2000: 25).

Let’s formulate Hodder’s argument the other way around and contend that behind every dependency of humans on things as well as things on humans there

lies an intersubjective relation. One engages in environmental activism to try to slow climate change because of concern about the world to be left to one’s grandchildren and their children. Things are always a means for intersubjective relations, except when it is a question of a single person and her/his wellbeing (as in the example of playing music) or when one becomes so mired in a concern for things (in the above example, the environment) that one loses sight of why one is engaged. The latter could be understood as a sort of forgetting of intersubjective relationships, along the lines of Honneth’s *Anerkennungsvergessenheit* that results in an overemphasis on people’s relations to their material world. Nonetheless this does not amount to the disappearance of dependencies between people or of their centrality; rather, one might draw here on Hodder’s own notion of “hidden entanglement”.

A third issue is how we should understand the important concepts of dependence and dependency in the case of relationships between people. We contend that these are qualitatively different when inter-human relations are involved than in either “H-T” or “T-H” connections. As already discussed, the notion of *Anerkennung*, or recognition, is the condition of possibility for dependence in human-to-human relationships. However, this is not the case when it comes to things: if they stand in a relation of recognition with us, we have turned into the fetishists that symmetrical archaeology wants us to be. Dependency, described as “reliance on things [that] can become compulsive, even addictive” (p. 18), is thought by some of us not to be qualitatively different whether it is a matter of a dependency on things or on humans. Others claim that dependency of humans on other humans is a quintessential necessity for the mutuality that turns us into (human) subjects in the first place.

Finally, as already noted, Hodder’s examples often revolve around individual people and things. If, however, one begins with a collective, one more easily arrives at the idea that people can indeed make changes in the world, including in the direction of disentanglement. Here we think of the hippie movement of the late 1960s, which included a strong anti-consumerist element, a “back-to-the-roots” effort to disentangle; or the founding of the Green Party in Germany at the beginning of the 1980s, which laid the essential groundwork for changing to more renewable sources of energy and today to efforts to substitute small, local energy providers for large, centralized monopolies; or the above-mentioned urban gardening, which allows people to disentangle



themselves to a modest degree from industrial agriculture. Such efforts may seem ridiculously minor. However, changes in entanglement by necessity start somewhere on the margins.

### The politics of entanglement

A significant point of concern for at least some of those participating in the discussion was Hodder's lack of an explicitly political position on the subject matter at hand. One of the principal problems is that he thereby takes a position, albeit perhaps an unwanted one.

To a significant extent, Hodder's book is inspired by a concern with global warming and late capitalist technology. As such, it has inevitably a political stance. However, the retreat to the position of an external observer of a world history with apocalyptic tendencies implies an attempt at de-politicization. What is more, his pessimistic attitude toward the (im)possibilities of disentanglement disavows any attempt to construct a utopian future, however unrealizable that may seem under present conditions.

According to Hodder, such a utopia would include the recognition that we indeed become more and more entangled even as we attempt to disentangle. Yet this should provoke us to rethink the ways in which we try to extricate ourselves from webs of dependency. Although developing new technologies may seem like a possible way out and one that is regularly touted as a solution, they do not resolve the problem either. Instead, they may entangle us still further.

An alternative approach might start from the fact that entanglements exist at different scales and are due to specific perspectives. Over the past few years we have been accustomed to hearing about banks that are "too big to fail", energy giants that are too big to decentralize, and the size of the automobile industry that is too large to allow it to change to the production of ecologically more responsible cars. In each case we are confronted with the large-scale of phenomena that ostensibly prevent change. We contend as a counterpoint that reduction of the scale of entanglement is one main issue, rather than disentanglement per se. New movements such as Gezi Park in Istanbul or "Stuttgart 21", the protest against a huge project involving the construction of a train station in southern Germany, work against the scales of entanglements and a whole network of humans and

things - but not against a museum or train travel per se.

Once again, we see here a problem that derives from the focus on human-thing/thing-human relationships. It brings with it a privileging of technological change rather than an equal focus on the human-human dimensions. The forces of entanglement may not have the degree of time depth that Hodder wishes to see in them; rather, entanglement without any way of return apart from complete collapse – what we would refer to as entrapment – may be a product of capitalism. It is capitalism that has been able to turn intersubjective relationships into forms characteristic of relationships with things. This line of thinking implies that the irreversibility and universality of (high degrees of) entanglement is in fact a quite recent product. It is exactly the reification (*Verdinglichung*) resulting from capitalism that leads Hodder to give relations among humans such short shrift.

His pessimism with regard to the (im)possibility of disentanglement has a fatalistic side to it, one that carries with it a conservative, things-cannot-be-changed-so-why-try message. This is even more striking in the long term, as it results in a picture of Spenglerian decline and reminds us of the figure of Walter Benjamin's *Angelus Novus* in the reverse, as recently described by Giorgio Agamben (2009): Hodder's archaeologists walk into the past backwards, not knowing and seeing that past, but rather perceiving the wreckage of the future.

Günther Anders, one of the most outspoken philosophers of technology of the 20th century, is in some respects a precursor of Hodder's pessimism. Anders describes in great detail the discrepancy between human abilities to produce all kinds of machines of destruction and our inability to imagine these potentials. Instead, humans feel a need to become as perfect as their creations but remain "antiquated" – for Anders, a terrible danger for the entirety of humanity (Anders 1956). Anders took practical consequences from his philosophical reflections. He resisted the university apparatus, was one of the first post-WW II activists in anti-nuclear campaigns, and later wrote a controversial "call to arms" against an increasingly violent technologized world (Anders 1987).

Here it is relevant to mention the notion of the Anthropocene, a new geological age in which humans have so severely impacted the world that the background for global processes are human creations, rather than the other way around (Crutzen and

Stoermer 2000). How can one bring a thing-centered perspective on the world together with one in which human agency has come to occupy such a central place that people have replaced geological processes at center stage? In answer to this question, Hodder argued that the Anthropocene can be seen as a quintessential entanglement, in which even the globe needs to be managed and cared for. However, this confronts us with the aporia of decentered subjects in an anthropocentric world. Somehow people remain at the core, yet at the same time the theoretical rug is pulled out from under humanity: people are responsible for the state of the world, yet this responsibility can no longer be shouldered. This seems to us both epistemologically and politically problematic.

### **A theory with claims to universalism leaves little space for future research**

In response to the question of whether he sees his theory of entanglement as one with global applicability, Hodder's answer was a definitive and, to us, astonishing "yes". But here we must ask ourselves, what then is left to research, and why? After all, the results are seemingly already known, and all we can do is fill in some illustrative details. Following this reasoning, we would be back in a situation similar to the heyday of neoevolutionary archaeology, where the direction of change was clear to all and the primary work of archaeologists was to identify when the next stage was reached as well as the precise steps involved in reaching it. To take a more concrete example, what happens if we accept the idea that all late Neolithic societies in Western Asia were on a path toward entanglement? Do we learn anything from our study of them? Shouldn't we rather consider the possibility of different kinds of entanglements in different places or even different directions, not all of which involved a growth in the degree of entanglement?

In addition, the global ambitions of Hodder's theoretical outlook is too eclectic in its derivation. Can elements of human behavioral ecology really be used alongside those of metaphor, mimesis and Latourian actor-network theory? At least some of us see a need to begin with a coherent ontology from which to build a convincing argument and theoretical position.

Overall, an engagement with positionality is missing. Hodder takes a neutral, outsider perspective, apparently without reflections on the consequences.

Is this a return to a kind of positivism, in which the scientist can survey the world objectively? In adopting this viewpoint the effects of one's own entanglements are not taken into consideration. What happens when someone with a quite different position and her/his own entanglements describes the world? In the introduction to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Georg Hegel claims that a valid theory needs to be applicable to itself: in this regard, how is entanglement decisive for its own recognition?

As the above comments show, the participants found much to engage with in *Entangled*. Although many of us are in disagreement with parts of the argument, we found the discussion with Ian Hodder enormously fruitful and continue to learn from the efforts to position ourselves with respect to the new challenges he has set out for us.

### **Participants in the discussion**

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