5 Discussions and Conclusions

In the conclusion, I shall first summarize the empirical part of my work. In the later part of section I will then attempt to answer the questions raised in the Introduction. The main interest of this investigation was to identify successful tools of humanitarian intervention. Since, from the several possible forms of strategic interaction, negotiation is the most prevalent in achieving the goals of these humanitarian interventions, I will concentrate on the evaluation of the recommendations of the two main schools of thought in the field: the power-based and the WW approaches to negotiations.

Power-based negotiation techniques see power and sanction capacities as the most influential factor. The importance of sanctioning capacities when enforcing norms is a core belief of classical sociology (Weber 1980) and was later formalized in rational choice and game theoretical models. The assumption suggests that in a negotiation not marked by mutual interest in a consensual outcome, sanctions can modify revenues of a non-cooperative party. Sanctions can either impose such high costs on the uncooperative party that an agreement (and thus avoidance of further sanctions) would appear profitable (usually referred to as punishment), or it can credibly threaten the enforcement of the object of negotiation (usually referred to as denial). Regarding peace negotiations the power-based approach suggests that an agreement can be brought about if the costs and risks imposed by sanctions outweigh the profit of continued fighting.

The WW approach on the other hand considers decision-makers to be underinformed. Its emphasis is therefore on communication: on exploring areas of mutual gains (WW solutions). In sectors, in which such options are not available the application of a "fair standard independent of the will of either side" (Fisher and Ury 1991:xviii) is recommended. WW negotiations also imply an element of persuasion, since positional negotiation demands should be discarded and solutions for "real needs" be sought. I shall show that in the context of the Bosnian War power-based negotiation techniques were more successful than purely WW style negotiations.

However, the most successful negotiations were those, in which both approaches could be combined.

An evaluation of the two negotiation approaches will then be put in the context of the Bosnian conflict. The power-based approach to succeed presupposes rationally acting counterparts. The WW approach, with its stronger emphasis on communication and consideration of psychological factors, seems to presume negotiating situations with not strictly rationally acting participants. Following the assumptions offered in the introduction, I shall discuss the rationality assumption concerning the behaviour of warring parties in the context of its two main objections: cognitive and emotional factors and organizational deficits. Both factors could, in principle, impede rational responses to outside challenges.

Turning to the international context of the humanitarian engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the main question refers to the motivation escalating international engagement. The crux is whether international actors on the ground, IOs and the media, are in fact agents influencing events or whether they are mere executives reacting to political processes on the international level.

5.1 Summary (The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mostar)

From its outset (April 1992), the distribution of capabilities of the various factions of the Bosnian war was markedly unequal. The Serbs, constituting some 30% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's pre-war population, originally had the JNA on their side and after the JNA's (*Jugoslovenska narodna armija* – Yugoslav People's Army) withdrawal in May 1992, inherited some 90% of its weapons and manpower. This advantage gave them an overwhelming superiority over their opponents, the various Croat armed units and the spontaneously forming government and Bosniac forces. The initial material advantage resulted in the Serb forces rapidly seizing around 70% of the country's territory. The better prepared Croat armed groups, who enjoyed strong support from Croatia, came to dominate much of the remainder though they frequently shared territory with other armed formations, such as the territorial defence, autonomous armed units, armed and militarized police units and local

militias. Only Sarajevo itself and areas in Central Bosnia around Tuzla and Zenica were chiefly under the control of the Bosnia-Hercegovinian government, being originally still multiethnic, but later clearly Bosniac-dominated.

By late 1992 the front lines stabilized along the already mentioned 70% to 30% division – in many respects a great success for the vastly inferior defenders. The initial equilibrium of superior Serb power and inferior Croat and Government forces, however, slowly changed. Government forces kept arming and training thus increasing their numbers, while the spontaneously organized independent units were gradually brought under a central command, increasing the efficiency of the force. A similar process took place among the much better armed, but numerically inferior Croat forces.

At the same time the Serb VRS forces kept suffering from an international economic and arms embargo imposed on them and their semi-detached ally, the rump Yugoslavia. The overall shift in capabilities in favour of the still immensely weaker ABiH forces temporarily halted the HVO assault on the Bosniac side. The superior number of Bosniac men bearing weapons and doubtless with a high measure of motivation – they had nowhere to flee to – resulted in a military defeat and significant loss of territory by the HVO in Central Bosnia and a critical standoff between the ABiH and the HVO in Herzegovina. In military terms, the Bosnia-Hercegovinian Croats were in a desperate situation and thus, also under international pressure, were forced to enter a US-brokered peace agreement with the Bosniac-dominated government forces in early 1994.

In the one-and-half years of the war the already mentioned shift in power, in favour of the Bosniac government forces and to the detriment of the VRS, continued. This development was further accentuated by increased assertiveness of international intervention. Faced with this middle-term shift in the balance of power, the Bosnian Serb leadership seems to have decided on what can only be called a high-risk – high yield strategy: the eradication of the Eastern Bosnia UN Safe Areas, thereby freeing up troops, and the provocation of the IC (International Community). The elimination of the safe areas became militarily rational because the enclaves were never actually disarmed. ABiH fighters undertook regular raids VRS territory from the safety of the

UN-protected areas. The gamble failed, as it finally triggered NATO-led air strikes, which, in combination with an HVO / ABiH ground offensive, delivered a serious defeat to the VRS. The shift in military potential and control of territory flanked by US-led power mediation finally resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement, November / December 1995.

5.1.1 International Engagement

As repeatedly mentioned, international engagement provided several important and finally crucial inputs into the Bosnian peace process. A gradual intensification of international involvement had already begun before the period under investigation, during the crises in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. As already noted, in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we can observe six phases of intensifying involvement, stronger pressure and better coordination among the main countries of the IC. However, real developments were perhaps less coherent than this simple escalation model suggests. For instance, following the Somalia debacle in December 1993, the US reduced its engagement for some two months before becoming more pro-active again – and then more vehemently then ever before. The general trend was nevertheless a gradual escalation of pressure and involvement, usually following key events that attracted international attention.

Phase I (spring 1992) of IC involvement exclusively employed political and economic tools. Its success in Bosnia was to a large extent cosmetic: the withdrawal of the JNA and the transformation of the remaining 90% of its manpower and hardware into the VRS.

Phase II (summer 1992 until spring 1993) of IC involvement saw the first steps towards military engagement and threat based interaction: the stationing of blue helmets outside of their usual peacekeeping role in a humanitarian mission with a weak enforcement element to secure and run Sarajevo Airport, to escort humanitarian relief convoys and later to ensure the protection of the UN safe areas. This period also saw the first open engagement of NATO in the Yugoslav conflict – to

oversee the embargo on Yugoslavia and from December 1992 onwards to enforce a ban on military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Phase III, the summer of 1993, experienced the first tangible but still only implicit threats of NATO military action through the creation of necessary preconditions for eventual strikes by allocating combat aircrafts for deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later by approving the principle of NATO military action in support of the UN mission in the country. The possibility of NATO action was sufficient to deter VRS attacks on the eastern Bosnian enclaves declared as UN safe havens.

Stalling progress on the ground, the Serb shelling of the Sarajevo market place was sufficient to trigger the first direct and coercive NATO threat (Phase IV) in early 1994. The threat was successful as it led to the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. Signs of a lack of IC resolve in the subsequent follow-up to the threats, however, led to Serb provocations and occasional, but belated and not too serious, NATO retaliation. The US finally taking the lead in search of a settlement is another important development of the period. The first success of US involvement was a peace deal between the Croat and Bosniac forces.

Phase V, with the US now leading the search for peace saw an obvious shift to balance of power thinking in IC intervention logic. Long-term shifts in power on the ground in Bosnia, directly or indirectly supported by the IC and to the detriment of the VRS, made the Serb leadership less willing to give in to further IC demands that would benefit their enemies. In their increasingly threatened position, renewed NATO air strikes led to a high-risk Bosnian Serb response, probably with the aim of finally cowing IC intervenors: the hostage-taking of UN peacekeepers in reach of VRS forces. The dispersion of UNPROFOR on VRS-held territory was a well-known strategic weakness of the UN forces.

After the release of the hostages, achieved through the intervention of Milošević, the VRS quickly moved to create facts on the ground while the peacekeepers were still in their reach: they attacked and took the UN safe havens of Srebrenica and Žepa massacring all men of fighting age in the former. This was once again a high-risk strategy, clearly aimed at freeing up forces that were tied down in controlling the

never disarmed Bosniac enclaves and boosting the sagging morale of the VRS troops. The massacre, besides being probably a desire for revenge, seems to have served a military reason: denying the enemy (ABiH) an influx of some 8000 men of fighting age – a key rationale for detaining men throughout the war.

IC indignation with the Serbs had reached new levels leading to *Phase VI* (August 1995) of intensified international intervention. In this mood of general anger against Serb policies, Croatia felt the time was ripe for a decisive new move. Within a few days its now well-trained and well-equipped army drove rebel Serbs out of the Krajina region of Croatia, which they had held for four years. The renewed shelling by Serbs of the Sarajevo market place killing over thirty civilians, triggered devastating two week-long NATO air strikes on the Bosnian Serb positions. A simultaneously launched ABiH and HVO offensive managed to push back VRS forces significantly, creating a new balance of power coming close to the contact group's plans, i.e., a 49% to 51% land division in favour of the Federation. Forceful NATO military action was followed by forceful US-led diplomacy that eventually led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

5.1.2 The War in Mostar

Soon after the outbreak of the war in the spring of 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, JNA and Serb forces took over most of Mostar. They were, however, soon driven out by Croats and Bosniacs fighting in Croat-dominated militias. For almost a year, relations between the two groups remained tense but peaceful, until on 9 May 1993 the HVO launched a full-scale attack on its former ally. The attack was a part of Zagreb's policy of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina. The HVO attack, however, soon got bogged down and a nine month-long siege with continuous shelling of the Bosniac-held part of the town ensued. The original encirclement was soon broken by the ABiH. Small ABiH advances in the late summer and autumn of 1993 further threatened the HVO grip on the Bosniac-held part of the town. Heavy HVO losses in Central Bosnia, increasing international impatience with Croatia's Bosnia policy – even leading to threats of sanctions against the country – and finally a forceful US diplomatic initiative

led to the cessation of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs in February and March 1994.

5.1.3 The International Intervention at the Level of Mostar

Just a few months after the beginning of the war in Bosnia international organizations had established a firm presence in Mostar. These were, most importantly, UNHCR and UNPROFOR. ICRC and a number of other UN agencies like UNICEF and international NGOs were also present. In addition to the humanitarian relief effort, the first successful intervention by international organizations concentrated on the release of Serb detainees, captured and detained after pushing out VRS forces from the Mostar and West Herzegovina areas. The release was achieved by the visit of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the special rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in October 1992. At that time, the HVO was already in close contact with Bosnian Serb representatives. The conflict of the two sides was considered to be solved – there were thus no significant nationalist conceptual obstacles to the release of the detainees to the Serb-controlled territory.

However, the HVO attack on the ABiH in Mostar and the subsequent ethnic cleansing and detainment of civilians as well as the shelling and denial of relief for the entrapped and starving population of East Mostar posed a more serious challenge to international organizations active in the area. All these issues pertained to Croat national interests, as perceived by the secessionist Bosnian Croat leadership. Initially, in May 1993, while Bosnian Croat forces still felt strongly in control of the military situation in and around Mostar, minor concessions, like access to detention centres and delivering supplies to them and to the besieged East Mostarian population, were still granted. After the ABiH had broken the HVO siege and the consequent weakening of the HVO's position, such concessions to humanitarian demands became unattainable.

International humanitarian organizations pursued two radically different strategies in this situation. In accordance with its core philosophy, ICRC continued with its low-level, persuasive approach, while UNHCR also carried on with its policy that allowed

for the use of pressure tools through the international media and / or other political means. The reaction in Croatian and Bosnian Croat political circles clearly point to the damage to Croatia's international image and the consequent loss of international support even leading to the threat of militarily relevant international sanctions[56] that motivated the search for an agreement with humanitarian organizations. As these threats became more and more probable, so did the "willingness" of HVO to compromise, finally even leading to the granting of concessions that implied clear military disadvantages. Such an obstacle to HVO military action was created by the setting up of a mobile hospital by UNPROFOR at the southern entrance of East Mostar.

Mate Granić, the Croatian Foreign Minister, was the first to understand the implications of a deteriorating international image for Croatia. He then communicated his concerns to the Herceg-Bosnian leadership – and here it was only the more educated and, according to a several accounts, highly intelligent Prlić, then the political leader of the HVO, who grasped the situation and attempted to remedy it. Resistance in Herceg-Bosna, however, remained strong until the threat of sanctions became more and more palpable, i.e., easier to "understand" for the wider circles of the Croatian elite.

5.2 Negotiations

Following the summary of the state and field level events of the Bosnian war, let us now raise the question of the main theoretical interest: which of the two approaches to negotiating, the power-based or the WW approach, was more relevant and efficient in achieving the fulfilment of IO mandates?

Of course, most actors can be assumed not to have been trained in the WW methods of the Harvard Project, but neither were they educated game theoreticians or experts in the field of rational choice. Many of the recommendations of both schools are,

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[56] These were mainly threatened economic sanctions that would have denied Croatia the chance to adequately arm and train its troops.

however, in some respects commonsensical. Accordingly, in the conclusion of their book, Fisher and Ury (1987) turn to their readers:

> "There is probably nothing in this book, which you did not already know at some level of your experience. What we have tried to do is to organize common sense and common experience in a way that provides a usable framework for thinking and acting. The more consistent these ideas are with your knowledge and intuition the better" (p.147).

The same can be said about many of the recommendations of the rational choice approach, as for instance the need for credibility if a threat is to be taken seriously. Looking at the history of the Bosnian War and the developments in Mostar, one can find elements of both threat-based and coercive bargaining on the one hand and WW type negotiating attitudes on the other. Let us begin with the recommendations of the Harvard School. My main focus so far has been on the more tangible aspects of the main recommendations of this negotiating school – on innovative, creative compromises or solutions that offer mutual gains, or at least solutions to the "real underlying interests" of one side, while not unduly harming the other. Before proceeding with the analysis of the WW approach, a remark on the other main, but less material recommendations of the school, separating people from the topic and educating the negotiating partner, is necessary.

Relying on the two main participatory accounts of the high-level Bosnian peace negations, Owen's *A Balkan Odissey* (1995) and Hobrooke's *To End a War* (1998), one has the impression that the negotiations were conducted in a fairly cordial atmosphere. Given the fact that many of the Bosnian negotiators, like Karadžić, Mladić or Milošević, were later denounced as war criminals, or were in any case of similar calibre, e.g., lile Boban,[57] this is quite a remarkable feat. In other words, there is little evidence from the side of the international negotiators that personal, moral or other preferences and dislikes influenced the negotiations. On the contrary, all descriptions point to factual, pragmatic negotiations. Similarly, and just as much in line with the teachings of the Harvard School, one can find several instances of international negotiators educating their counterparts on the consequences of non-

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[57] Mate Boban died in 1997. Until then no indictments of war crimes were levelled at him. However, many of his associates have been indicted. As leader of Herceg-Bosna it does not seem farfetched to assume at least command responsibility in relation to the breaking of the Geneva Conventions.

agreement and on the meaning and impact of developments on the international level etc.

In the same manner as at the Mostar-level negotiations, international officials tried to keep meetings factual and correct. Long discussions were devoted to educating counterparts on the possibilities and the mandate of their organizations, on the role of international organizations and on the international system. Negotiators also stressed the sufferings of the war-effected population, as if those local warlords and officials perpetrating the shelling of civilian targets or ordering detainments were not aware this. When meetings turned hostile, this could usually be attributed to local-power holders attempting to intimidate international officials. With some they succeeded, with others they did not.

There is thus little evidence that, in terms of the less tangible aspects of the WW and alternative conflict-resolution negotiating schools, serious omissions would have been made. Turning to what might be called the essence of the alternative negotiating approaches, the creation of WW solutions, or in the terms of this work, creative compromises, these tools have also been widely used in negotiations between international officials and local power-holders. Examples are the corridors to Goražde, the lease agreement of the Ploče harbour, putting Mostar under international (EU) administration or settling for an arbitrage solution in Brčko, etc.

There are of course countless cases of coercive, power-based negotiation interactions as the rational choice approach would suggest too: the sanctions regime against Milošević's Yugoslavia, the NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone, NATO air strikes – first to alleviate the humanitarian crises and later basically to impose a settlement. Regarding the types of threats employed in these power-based interactions, one finds deterrent threats as well as coercive threats of both the punishment and denial types. Below, first state-level interventions and the subsequently the evaluation of field level negations will be analysed.[58]

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[58] Lacking or having only little direct coercive power, negotiating techniques on the field level are, without prior remark, not readily comparable to state-level interventions.

5.2.1 State-Level Interventions

With regard to state-level international-local interactions, Table 5 summarizes the findings of the more detailed Table 1 that compiles in detail all main state-level interactions during the Bosnian War.

Of the 18 recorded state-level international-local negotiation interventions 4 were coded as purely or mainly only WW or persuasive (WW), 10 as only or mainly power-based (PB) and 4 as combining aspects of both approaches. Obviously, the number of cases is very low and, as already mentioned, the coding of the cases was done by the author. As mentioned previously (see p.117) the evaluation "success", "limited success" and "failure" were based upon the stated aim of the negotiation. With this constraint in mind, some conclusions can be drawn. The success / failure rating of the cases indicates that approaches combining aspects of both PB and WW techniques are the most successful (3 successful cases, 1 failure). In addition, the case coded as "failure", interaction No. 13, the peace proposal of the Contact Group in the summer of 1994, can, from the perspective of power-based negotiation techniques, be considered to be deficient, as the massive sanctions threatened were not properly invoked. A truly decisive approach, coupled with a balanced peace proposal offering creative compromises, might have very well succeeded. This finding comes close to the statistical analysis of Regan (1996) examining international mediation interventions after World War II. The study shows that the simultaneous application of both positive and negative incentives is the most efficient in reaching positive results in peace negotiations.

PB-type interactions alone proved less successful, but still more successful than WW techniques alone. Out of the 10 PB interactions, 4 were considered a success, 2 as a limited success and 4 as failures. A closer scrutiny of the limited "success" and "failure" type interactions reveals that interactions 3, 5, 14 and 17 (the Sarajevo Airport, UNPROFOR escort for convoys, the 1994 protection of UN Safe Areas and the 1995 attack on Srebrenica and Žepa) were, in the terms of the rational choice approach, not properly executed. Retaliatory and coercive sanctions were only hesitantly performed coupled occasionally with accommodative gestures. Lacking clear, dependable and predictable behaviour, a reputation for resolve necessary for

the success of PB approaches cannot be established. Occasional retaliation, mixed with occasional accommodative signals is, in fact, probably the most hazardous attitude against a risk-acceptant counterpart ready to use violence. There was, however, also a significant failure of purely PB interactions, the bombing of Serb positions (interaction 16) around Sarajevo and the subsequent UN hostage drama. This will be analysed in detail later.

Turning to purely WW interactions, they show the lowest success rates – 3 failures and 1 success. Peace conferences applying only mediation and persuasive techniques failed throughout. The only success in this category was Jimmy Carter's Christmas 1994 mediation of a ceasefire (interaction 15) that lasted for some four months. However, the entire military-political background mitigates somewhat the success of this purely WW intervention. At this time, the VRS was engaged in low-level tit-for-tat military exchange with UNPROFOR and NATO forces. In addition, Serb forces were without doubt exhausted after the first military setbacks they suffered against joint ABiH and HVO forces. The same was, however, also true for the federal allies. Mutual desire for a settlement has been identified as a key precondition for mediation success. In this sense, the laudable Carter mediation came at an optimal moment. Nevertheless, the main interest of this investigation is to identify how wars and conflicts can effectively be stopped or at least some of their most gruesome effects reduced *even at times when the warring parties are not yet ready to negotiate in good faith*.

TABLE 5   Evaluation of state-level interactions grouped according to the negotiation approach. For a detailed identification of the interaction see footnote[59]. Please note that interaction No. 19 (the Contact Group Plan II) was dropped since the initiative was abandoned after the peace plan had been rejected by the US Senate in July 1995 (see also p.121).

	Success	Limited Success	Failure
□ Only Win-Win	1	0	3
■ Only Power-Based	6	4	2
▨ Mixed	3	0	1

5.2.2 Mostar Level Interventions

TABLE 4, summarizing Mostar-level interventions identically to state-level interventions, is relatively inconclusive. The reason for this is the rather different conditions under which these negotiations were held. One major difference between state- and field level interventions refers to the lack of direct sanctions in the case of the latter, although UNPROFOR did actually possess a certain direct coercive power.

[59]

Type of Intervention	Success	Limited Success	Failure	Total of interactions
Only WW	interaction 15		interaction 1, 8, 10	4
Only Power-Based	interaction 4*, 6*, 7, 11, 18, 20	interaction 2, 3, 5, 14	interaction 16, 17	12
Mixed (WW and Power-Based)	interaction 9, 12, 21		Interaction 13	4

* Includes two interactions, 4 and 6 (access and disbandment of concentration and rape camps), that were only negotiated through publicly stated demands and in which only vague formal threats were pronounced. I nevertheless classified these interactions as power-based because their fundamental tool of success was coercive *punishment* in the form of damage to Serb image and escalating the situation making military strikes more probable.

Field-level organizations, however, had at their command an important indirect coercive instrument, i.e. the media and Western public opinion.

Another, probably more substantial difference refers to the type of issue negotiated on state- and field-levels. Negotiations at the field level are mostly single topic issues. In contrast, state-level issues, especially peace talks, are more often multi-topic issues. The crucial difference between single- and multi-topic negotiations is that in multi-topic, complex negotiations trade-offs and creative solutions are much more likely to occur than in single-topic issues. It is true that in some cases single topic-issues can be extended to grant greater benefits for both parties. An example would be a simple price negotiation (zero-sum, single-topic issue), where suddenly the possibility of paying in rates is introduced. The issue has been converted into what Raiffa (1982) calls integrative bargaining.

Nevertheless, single-issue negotiations resemble zero-sum bargaining situations more closely. Accordingly, from the 8 Mostar-level international-local interventions, only two showed elements of integrated negotiations: (1) access negotiations to the Rodoč camp in May 1993 and, (2) access to East Mostar in August 1993. In the first case, UNHCR was asked for and offered food and certain relief items for the detainees. In the second the simultaneously conducted body exchange (i.e. the echange of the dead) functioned as an additional, integrated incentive for the HVO to agree to the UNHCR demand. Otherwise six of the eight interventions were based on the coercive leverage of bad media coverage, including the two negotiation interactions with integrated aspects.

The remaining 2 interventions, Maczowiecki's intervention regarding the freeing of Serb detainees (autumn 1992) and demanding access to ABiH detention camps (autumn 1993), did not need significant coercive leverage to be granted. Concerning the first, the release of Serb detainees mostly to Serb-held territories was unproblematic, since the dominant force in the region, the HVO, had already made its secret deal with the Serb side. Additionally, Macziowecki, as the Special Envoy of the UN, had a certain moral authority that could be translated into punishing evaluations. Regarding access to AbiH-led detention camps, the Bosniac side made a conscious, political decision to cooperate with the IC. Furthermore, there were no basic

ideological obstacles, like the basically racist hate propaganda of Herceg-Bosna that would have "demanded" the mistreatment of detainees as a matter of principle. These were issues demanding only minor concessions in the specific context of the international-local interactions.

A meaningful overview over these interactions thus groups the interactions in a somewhat different way than for state-level interventions, adding the concept of major and minor concessions, demanded by the IC intervention and modifying the achievement strategy categories as "Not strongly Power-Based", "PB" and "PB and integrated".

TABLE 6   **Summary of Mostar level international-local interactions**

Type of Concession	Achievement Strategy	Success	Limited Success	Failure
Minor Concession	Not Power-Based	1*	1**	--
Major Concession	Power-Based	1***	**1**[†]	**2**[††]
	Power-Based and Integrated	**2**[†††]	--	--

*	Access to ABiH detention camps	[††]	1. Stopping ethnic cleansing, 2. stopping the shelling of civilian targets
**	Release of detained Serbs		
***	Setting up field hospital	[†††]	1. Access to HVO prison camps, 2. Access to East Mostar
[†]	Release of Bosniac detainees		

To a certain degree, TABLE 6 is inconclusive, since, all interventions that demanded major concessions were power-based. From the above summary we cannot judge the eventual outcome of the interventions on similar issues using mainly integrated techniques. The only point of comparison is ICRC's principally non-power-based approach. Unfortunately, however, ICRC as an organization is routinely discrete

about its interventions. The empirical account of IC actions in Mostar during the war nevertheless provides a strong indication of the greater efficiency of the power-based approach.

Four points have to be mentioned specifically to support this claim: (1) The testimony of a UNHCR official (p.152) clearly shows that it was the UNHCR that negotiated access for ICRC to go to prison camps to register detainees. (2) The initiative of Mate Granić, the Croatian Foreign Minister, to solve the issue of detention camps and human rights abuses was explicitly motivated by the damage that Croatia's international image had suffered through negative publicity. ICRC could not have created any such harm since its public profile was minimal – only two news items were found to contain "balanced" information originating from the ICRC. In contrast, UNHCR had an officially stated policy of using the media offensively. (3) It was a UN convoy, initiated by UNHCR, that first entered East Mostar. (4) ICRC on principle cannot turn to superior levels of state officials, politicians, etc. UNHCR and other UN organizations (should they have the drive and courage) can turn to such individuals and institutions for support.

At least on two instances, reference to superior IO or state instances proved essential. During the Međugorje negotiations in May 1993 access to the Rodoč camp was explicitly mentioned giving the issue a higher profile – basically amounting to a certain coercive leverage. The other important case occurred during the visit of US Congressman Frank Wolf, who, after being briefed on the situation, threatened the Herceg-Bosna leadership. Permission for the field hospital to be installed in East Mostar and probably the changed US attitude towards the Croat-Bosniac conflict can be attributed to his intervention.

5.2.3 Power-Based vs. WW Negotiations: Policy Recommendations

In summary there are strong arguments indicating that (1) power-based approaches combined with creative WW constructs or integrated solutions (combined approach) are the most successful. There are, however, conditions to this: the power-based

aspect of the interaction has to be properly executed, i.e., the threatened sanctions have to be perceived as credible and sufficiently severe to make agreement profitable for the threatened side, e.g. (2) In war-like situations, except for the rare occasions where the parties to a conflict are united and simultaneously positive in their wish to achieve agreement on a certain issue, purely WW or integrated type negotiations are inefficient.

A further comment is necessary concerning power-based approaches. As it turns out, it was single item issues that were negotiated in a power-based manner. Their success-efficiency lay between the non-power-based (low efficiency) and combined approaches (high efficiency). The question arises whether it would be possible to raise the efficiency of power-based single-issue negotiations by adding integrated aspects to them. Examining the power-based, non-integrated negotiation topics, in most cases it would be very difficult to design integrated approaches that are still politically, legally or morally (in the sense of international humanitarian standards) feasible. Another reason why integrated negotiation proposals are difficult to find in conflict situations refers the problem of time management. The persuasive negotiations of the WW approach require time. Delaying sanctions, however, create the appearance of hesitation. Only if this inherent ambivalance can be overcome will integrated negotiation solutions become feasible.

Typical single-issue negotiations in the Bosnian War concerned the respect of civilians and of POWs, the protection of safe areas, the removal of heavy weapons from designated areas, a halt to ethnic cleansing, the release of detainees, the ending of the systematic rape of Bosniac and Croat women, etc. For some of these issues, integrated approaches such as the demilitarisation of the safe areas were considered. It is the grave failure of the IC that this was not carried out consistently.

Regarding most other issues, there seemed to have been a lack of responsible integrated approaches, let alone WW solutions. It thus appears that raising the efficiency of single-issue negotiations in war situations requires, first and foremost, a more stringent implementation of the power-based aspects of the intervention. If you to threaten to use power, do it properly! Wherever possible, integrated approaches should, of course, still be explored, as they can improve intervention efficiency.

Another crucially important reason for the prevalence of power-based negotiation tactics in humanitarian intervention lies in the fact that the warring party committing a human rights abuse is perfectly happy with the status quo. They do not want to stop ethnic cleansing, the rape of women, laying a medieval type siege on a city etc. A key observation of the empirical negotiation literature suggests, however, that negotiations in which all parties are interested in finding a solution also tend to be more successful. If the status quo is more favourable for one side – the typical negotiation context of humanitarian interventions – then it is only through power-based means that one can achieve compliance – stated in economic terms – by reducing its revenues from the maintenance of the status quo.

5.2.3.1 Resolve

A last word is necessary concerning the the reputation for resolve of negotiators. The importance of reputation, of strategies demonstrating and committing one to resolve have all been mentioned. All information points to the fact that these recommendations also hold true for international interventions in local wars in the context of humanitarian missions. Already Schelling (1960) observed how the reputation for resolve of a negotiator in international negotiations can affect outcomes by influencing the way the negotiator's counterparts evaluate the chances of the threatened sanctions actually being instigated – and this irrespective of the material costs and benefits at stake.

The assumption has far-reaching consequences for international interventions and international-local interactions in war situations: even in interactions in which the overall balance of power and capabilities would allow for an agreement, negotiators with weak resolve or reputations of weak resolve will achieve only sub-optimal results. And this, let me emphasize again, in a situation in which the basic context would allow for a better outcome for the side with the weak negotiator.

Turning to the concrete case of the Bosnian War, most IC negotiators and officials positioned on both the state- or field-levels seriously lacked such a reputation. As an example, Lord Owen (1995:471) reports that Ratko Mladić, the military leader of

Bosnian Serbs, showed strong contempt for the "pusillanimous behaviour of the Western democracies" (for a full citation see p.237). Regarding for instance the Spanish UNPROFOR troops, I heard from both former HVO and ABiH fighters, the derogatory term *turisti* (tourists) being used to describe them. In contrast, British troops were described as real professional soldiers; the only "real" outside army that came to Bosnia during the war. I do not intend to deride the "national character" of the Spanish, but the rules of engagement and the conceptualisation of the UNPROFOR mission by the Spanish Army were not optimal regarding the challenges faced. It was a mission conceptualisation that lacked resolve and firmness.

This finding would thus be a strong argument for using solid, resolute negotiators in dealings with local warring factions in the context of humanitarian missions and supported by a decisive conceptualisation of their mission by the respective military and civilian international organizations. The appeal of this proposal, let it repeatedly be stressed, is that it should not "cost" more, since from the same given structural power context resolute negotiators could obtain better results.

5.2.3.2 *Neutrality*

The resolve of a negotiator, partly at least, might be attributed to personal qualities. There is, however, most definitely also a structural aspect to such a reputation concerning issues of mandate but also of values and perceptions of roles. The concept of neutrality as a third party is one such dominant value of peacekeeping interventions. For traditional, Cold War peacekeeping missions the neutrality of a mission has been identified as one of the main factors determining success, but also helping to keep casualty rates low (Diehl 1994). These missions, like the ongoing assignment in Cyprus or the UN Emergency Force I and II in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s, were based on the real consent and wish of the warring parties for the UN to oversee the ceasefire lines. The missions were by design neutral.

Already during the Cold War, however, missions were occasionally designed with a more partial, because humanitarian, mandate. With the Ex-Yugoslav wars this became the norm of international missions. Preisler (1995) remarks on the ethnonational context of wars with humanitarian interventions:

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"Unfortunately, perhaps the classic indicator of ethnic and sectarian conflict is that civilian populations are not simply the unfortunate and unintended victims of the conflict but its targets*. […] That is, since the civilians themselves are the target, the 'enemy', any international agency seeking to help them cannot help but be perceived as partisan by those targeting the civilians (pp. 287-288).*

The principle of neutrality applied to such missions results in some truly bizarre outcomes. It is something like squaring a circle, seeking the "non-value laden", neutral middle ground between the demands of two warring factions, one usually an aggressor, the other, at least temporarily, the victim of aggression, and combining this with a mandate that is by definition partial in a humanitarian sense in favour of the victims. There is no coherent, communicable position to be derived from such a position. Without a clear view of incidents and unforeseen contingencies, resolve and commitment cannot be communicated. Judgement and the evaluation of situations become erratic, shifting between the two contradictory demands of neutrality and a "partial" mandate. One of the basic preconditions of success in power-based bargaining, in fact of any negotiation situation, is thus not given. This behaviour signals a lack of resolve and probably irritates both sides, though it favours the side of the aggressor more.

With regard to such a negative evaluation of neutrality in the context of humanitarian missions, I agree with some of the findings of peace research. Bercovitch (1991), e.g., observes that simple neutrality is not a crucial precondition for the success of third-party mediation. More important is the intensity of its engagement, its legitimacy and the resources at its disposal.

In conclusion, a humanitarian mission by definition cannot be neutral because of its humanitarian objectives. At best it acts as a third party with its own set of priorities. Therefore, it is inefficient and potentially dangerous to try to apply a neutral, balancing position between the two sides to a conflict. It is dangerous and inefficient because this neutral approach lacks clearly perceivable goals and thus the capability to establish a reputation of deterrent or coercive resolve. Lacking a reputation for resolve and a clear goal, it also cannot efficiently negotiate on issues demanded by the mandate.

5.3 Interacting with the Warring Parties

Regarding interaction with local warring parties the question posed in the introduction referred to whether warring parties could be conceived of as rational unitary actors who are trying to maximize their utility defined in terms of their national interest. Alternatively, it was suggested that cognitive and emotional factors, or the organizational characteristics of the warring groups might distort their rational responses to a degree that the unitary rational actor assumption could not be sensibly applied. In the latter case realizing anything resembling a national or joint group interest would not be feasible. A confirmation of the rational actor assumption would serve as an explanation as to why power-based negotiation tools were successful.

5.3.1 Reactions to Threats – Rational or Emotional Response?

One crucial point where WW and power-based negotiation approaches strongly disagree refers to the use of threats. The WW approach assumes that threats lead to counter-threats setting off an escalatory cycle that would lead to suboptimal negotiation results or outright conflict. Since proponents of the WW school do not use rational choice arguments, one might assume that the escalation in this context is, at least partially, also understood in a psychological and not in a rational choice sense, i.e. an escalation not being based on a keen calculation of the chances of success, but on emotional prerogatives. This psychological interpretation of the escalation is usually not stated explicitly. In contrast, rational choice treats threats as essential in communicating negative incentives in case of non-agreement.

Can the escalation-under-threat assumption be substantiated for the documented international-local interactions of the Bosnian War? From the 25 (of a total of 31) interactions, including both state- and Mostar-level actions, analysed in the present work, only 2 led to any retaliatory measure and of these only 1 to serious escalation. In summer and autumn of 1994, NATO engaged in a tit-for-tat threat and retaliation-

based interaction with the VRS. Casualties on both sides were low to minimal. Most importantly, however, in terms of the power-based approach, the interaction was poorly executed by NATO. All the signals sent by NATO / UN military personnel indicated hesitance and reluctant retaliation.

The only case of serious escalation occurred during another attempt to protect Sarajevo from shelling by VRS forces in the spring 1995. The first really significant NATO air raid resulted in the hostage-taking of UN peacekeepers. Could this have been avoided? In the given situation of blue helmets being stationed in, or in transit in VRS-held area the only way to have avoided retaliation would have meant acquiescing in the Serb shelling of Sarajevo. No reaction or just a symbolic retaliation could probably have averted the hostage drama. These measures, however, proved time and again to be insufficient to effect Serb compliance with UN resolutions.

The next question concerns whether this escalation was in any way irrational or more precisely an emotional reaction. All indicators point at a highly rational though risk-acceptant calculation. Lord Owen's comment on Mladić, the engineer of the hostage-taking drama, is very enlightening:

> *"I knew from my talks with Mladić that he had very little wishful thinking in his strategic analysis. He was contemptuous about the pusillanimous behaviour of the Western democracies but he also knew that Russia was hesitant to lock horns with the US. He hoped that Milošević would in the last analysis not dare leave him and the Bosnian Serb army to be defeated on the battlefield […] Mladić's intransigence was always qualified. There was just enough flexibility to let the minimal amount of UN food aid through. He would return UN hostages after having exposed UN vulnerability, accept some NATO close air support if his field commanders went too far, but react very strongly to punitive NATO air strikes because he knew they could do real damage. […] For all his bluster about the UN leaving, I believe Mladić knew that UN troops were his ultimate safeguard against NATO air power tilting the balance against him"* (pp.471-472).

This characterization of Mladić, one of the main decision-makers of the war, depicts a shrewd person with his strategic moves representing a carefully calculated balance between signalling unbending resolve and compromising when perceiving a credible threat. The surprising and, in fact, characteristic feature of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is how rationally the warring parties adjusted to the changing balances

of power. The Bosnian Croats, much more vulnerable to Western pressure, did not even attempt any high-yield high-risk strategies against the international presence. Tuđman needed US and European support too much to retake the occupied parts of Croatia to risk to seriously alienating these allies.

5.3.2 Social-Psychological Factors

Information and cognition is, however, the main area where the rational behaviour assumption is most seriously challenged. There is a real risk in war situations with humanitarian interventions that the threatened parties do not properly comprehend a very real threat or impending sanctions. To illustrate the issue, once again an Owen quote referring to a period in 1993, when bombings were again debated within the IC:

> *"All the talk of air strikes I hoped might have an effect in Pale [the Bosnian Serb capital], but it seemed pretty minimal from our ringside seat. Most of the time the Bosnian Serb leaders were blissfully unaware of NATO decisions, EC policy or Security Council declarations and I knew that they hardly read the letters of protest that poured in, even those from heads of government" (Owen 1995:165).*

The situation is similar with regard to the Mostar events. The majority of the Herceg-Bosna leadership did not adequately grasp to what extent bad publicity, on account of their record on human rights, could affect their cause. At the very beginning of the war, Serb *četnik* units even proudly showed the scene of their latest massacre on Bosniacs to visiting journalists. Thus, no matter how rationally a warring faction might try to behave, if their environmentally shaped perception structures and personal experience do not sufficiently prepare them to grasp impending sanctions as such, international intervenors might still be forced to use force that they had hoped to avoid by using threats. In this sense, cognitive insufficiencies are the most serious impediments to the success of threat-based negotiations.

Another exception to rational adaptation refers to the perceived fairness of a proposed deal. The behavior of the Bosnian government represents an area where rational adjustment to a given balance of power is less apparent. The entire attack on the multiethnic structure of the society and the Bosniacs in particular, as well as the

peace deals proposed to Sarajevo were perceived as so unfair that Bosniac fighters preferred to fight on against all odds. In fact, in the course of the war a conversion of perceptions of fairness with regard to proposed peace agreements and rationally achievable outcomes can be observed. The Dayton Agreement represents just such a compromise – a unitary Bosnian-Hercegovinian state with far-reaching autonomy to Bosnian Serbs and to a lesser extent to Bosnian Croats. This example thus confirms one of the demands of the WW and alternative conflict resolution schools, namely that showing concern for the fairness of a deal can be crucial in certain contexts.

5.3.3 Organizational Factors

The last factor mentioned as possibly distorting the rational responses of warring parties to international sanctions refers to organizational factors. Consistently, decision-makers in the war were claiming not to have had full authority over fighting units – following such a claim, the realization of the national interest as a shared group interest would of course be impossible. While such a claim might hold true for the first few months of the Bosnian war, already towards the second half of 1992, the fighting factions began to streamline and discipline unruly units thus establishing more or less effective command structures. As also the Report of the Commission of Experts (United Nations Security Council 1994) emphasizes, the appearance of broken command structures might have been deliberately created and maintained by the warring parties in order to avoid responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law and the rules and customs of war.

In fact, in most cases of strong coercive pressure the warring parties did successfully enforce ceasefires, or would allow convoys or inspection teams to proceed. The two peace agreements of the Bosnian War, the Washington and the Dayton Agreement, are a case in point. The ceasefires and necessary troop withdrawals were performed without any significant incidents, apart from the odd small-arms fire. Similarly, at the Mostar level access for UN convoys to the Eastern part of the town, when approved after significant IC political interventions, went relatively smoothly. The same is true of the establishment of the mobile hospital on the southern fringes of the ABiH held area in Mostar. However, when humanitarian interventions were negotiated without

the significant pressure of higher levels of IC political structures, fractured command lines seemed to take over. Low-level officers, or even simple soldiers refused to let convoys pass, entry to prison camps etc. Thus, when connected to the significant "national interest" of the warring parties to avoid IC pressure and sanctions command lines appeared to be sufficiently well functioning.

Another possibility of organizational issues impacting and distorting action in accordance with the national interest was proposed through warlordism – war becoming a mode of economic production. In a less extreme form this suggestion would include criminal economic networks, with no interest in the publicly stated national interest of the warring sides, determining the politics of the entity. War profiteering and criminal economic action was abundant during the Bosnian war. Bosnian Croats, with the support of the Croatian secret service, were trading stolen cars and petrol to Bosnian Serbs. Corrupt Bosnian Serb commanders and criminals were reportedly selling weapons to both Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs. Even artillery fire on enemy positions could occasionally be purchased from a temporarily neutral third side.

There is nevertheless little evidence that the economic interests of such networks in prolonging the war did seriously and negatively influence the outcome of any negotiations. The reason might be that ending the war did not immediately cut out these networks from further profitable action. Criminal groupings around warlords like Tuta or individuals located closer to the political military establishment continued their trade for several more years to come. Thus, contrary to expectations, organizational issues did not seem meaningfully to disturb the rational actor-like behaviour of the para-state entities of the Bosnian war.

5.4 The International Context and the Humanitarian Intervention

An analysis of the negotiation situations of the Bosnian war, at both the state as well as field levels, has showed that power and the possibility of imposing sanctions were crucial ingredients of successful negotiation outcomes during the humanitarian

intervention in the Bosnian war. In this section the question will be raised what processes brought about the use of the powerful sanction tools (economic and military) available to the main IC states to support the humanitarian objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In its most straightforward formulation the question was posed in terms of whether the intervention was motivated by forces emanating from from the state level – a top-to-bottom intervention – or from the field level of events – a bottom-to-top drive of international engagement.

On the international level three sources of forceful intervention motivation, propagated by three distinct schools of thought, was offered as an explanation. These were the (1) national interest, as defined by neorealists, (2) norm-based action, in terms of constructivist thinking, and (3) parochial electoral and bureaucratic mechanisms, as described by institutional theory. The possibly effective bottom-to-top forces mentioned included (4) international organizations and their officials as independent actors – also a constructivist proposal, and (5) the international media, described by the theorem of the "CNN effect".

The proposed motivations of international intervention are not mutually exclusive. Only state action motivated by security-derived national interests would appear to be an exclusively top-to-bottom process. In contrast, normative motivations or parochial, institutional interests could either be portrayed as top-to-bottom, or as being stimulated by bottom-to-top actions. Contrary to the proposed international-level motivations of humanitarian intervention, field-level forces (media and IOs) can be conceptualized as becoming effective only by linking in with state-level processes capable of motivating the use of power tools identified as necessary for intervention success. The bottom-to-top hypothesis of forceful humanitarian intervention is thus an interactive model field and international level actors.

5.4.1 National Interest, Normative Action and Institutional Theory

Events on the macropolitical level and within the most powerful states of the IC (the US, EU countries and Russia) are not the main focus of the present work. A few observations regarding IC involvement into the Bosnian crisis are nevertheless

possible. There is little evidence that national interest, in the sense of maximizing the security of states, played any meaningful role in the escalation of Western intervention. On the contrary, as Warren Zimmermann, former US ambassador to Yugoslavia, states, the end of the Cold War

> *"removed the important place which Yugoslavia had occupied in the East-West balance. No longer could it be argued that Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity were essential to America's vital security interests. The basis for the four-decade consensus between U.S. administrations and the Congress was no longer in place. It now became possible for members of Congress to isolate and advance specific aspects of policy toward Yugoslavia, such as human rights and ethnic preferences or dislikes. With no Soviet Union to pick up the pieces of a fractured Yugoslavia, there was also less rationale for holding Yugoslavia together"* (Zimmermann 1996, http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF129/CF-129.chapter11.html).

For the administration of President George Bush Sr., Silber and Little (1996) quote Brent Scowcroft, a leading foreign policy advisor, saying that

> *"Eagleburger [another foreign policy advisor of President Bush] and I were the most concerned here about Yugoslavia. The President and Baker[60] were furthest on the other side. Baker would say 'We don't have a dog in this fight.' The President would say to me once a week 'Tell me again what this is all about'"* (Silber and Little 1996:201).

The lack of clear and strong national interests with regard to Yugoslavia also characterized the perceptions of the enfolding catastrophe in European countries, though the geographical proximity of the country added a somewhat greater urgency to European efforts to find a solution. Thus, what was stated as a characteristic feature of the post-Cold War world, the absence of a clearly defined set of interests, was particularly true with regard to Yugoslavia – a country that has lost its geopolitical significance.

In addition to IC states not perceiving compelling national interests at stake in Yugoslavia, the risks of a military intervention were felt to be very high (Calic 1995). Among the intervention options debated among Western states the deployment of ground troops was rejected with reference to the experiences of the Wehrmacht in

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[60] James Baker was Secretary of State from 1989-1992.

World War II (Cancian 1993) and of the US in Vietnam. Another option, aerial bombardment without the use of ground troops, was rejected as being inefficient given the difficult terrain. Military analysts additionally claimed that without the support of troops on the ground the impact of air strikes would only be very limited. The final proposition, to lift the arms embargo on the Bosniacs and Croats and to support their ground offensive against Serb troops from the air, was understood by European states as merely escalating and prolonging the war. Perceiving grave risks on the one hand and not having significant national security interests at stake in Bosnia on the other, the main IC states involved in finding a solution for the Bosnian crisis reverted to passivity. Consequently, one can observe no impulses originating from the international macro-political level escalating the intervention and thus moving the situation closer to a solution.

In the sense of investing more resources into the intervention ending the Bosnian war, the hypothesis of norm-based action by states appears similarly inefficient. Though personal disgust and compassion with the sufferings imposed on the population by the war must have affected several politicians,[61] there is no evidence of this compassion or the sense of moral obligation motivating any of the escalation phases of international intervention during the war.

Thus in spite of compelling moral and emotional reasons, in a situation with such ambiguous incentives, procrastination and mere posturing become a likely strategy for politicians. A revealing anecdote in this respect is recounted by Bell (1995), regarding the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd's first visit to Sarajevo in July 1992, whom the journalist, by the way, describes as a "humane and decent man, a man with a sense of history" (p.37):

> *"Mr. Hurd, accompanied by the Bosnian president, was making a mandatory diplomatic pilgrimage to the shrine of the massacre site [the first Sarajevo market place massacre by Serbs]. With large and enthusiastic crowds around him, for these were still the early days of their ordeal, it was the perfect opportunity for him to reach out to them in the instinctive glad-handing way of politicians, and find out what* they *thought, how* they *lived, and what* they *needed from him [authors emphasis]. But he did none of this. It was as if he*

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[61] E.g. see the biographies of Holbrooke (1996) or Lord David Owen (1995).

saw and heard nothing […]. He strode silently to his motorcade. From there President Izetbegović had planned a visit to the hospital, for which he believed that he had the foreign secretary's consent, so that Mr. Hurd might see for himself some of the human costs of the war. The president led the way and turned right towards the hospital. Mr Hurd sped straight on to UN headquarters […] and from there to the airport and home" (p.41).

However, consistent with institutional theory, ethnic and human rights lobby groups might have played a certain independent role motivating intervention escalation. Axt (1994) attributes the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany to public pressure induced by media reporting. More specifically, general public sympathy with the Croatian and Slovenian causes made an agreement between the ruling Christian Democrats and the main German opposition party, the Social Democrats, appear likely – a highly threatening scenario for the liberal democratic party of German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the small coalition partner of the Christian Democrats. His response was a quick move, which was uncoordinated with the other EC partners – the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. For the US Zimmermann (1996) describes the influence of ethnic groupings on decision-making in the US congress and senate:

"The Kosovo issue also provided a glimpse of the effect of ethnic lobbies on the Congress and the government. The Albanian lobby, despite its small size, managed to reach the ear--and the campaign coffers--of such influential legislators as Senator Dole. Except for Representative Bentley's rear-guard actions, Serbian-Americans were not particularly influential, despite the existence of about one million of them in the United States. The reason was probably that they were divided over whether to support Milosevic, who was both a Communist and a nationalist. Those Serbian-Americans who were politically active tended to back Milosevic, on the merits a much harder job than Albanian-Americans faced in protesting against Milosevic's human rights abuses. The Croatian lobby, representing about two million Croatian-Americans, got close to Senator Dole, but devoted most of its efforts to financing the election campaign of Franjo Tudjman, the nationalist who won Croatia's first free election in 1990" (ibid. http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF129/CF-129.chapter11.html) .

Zimmermann (1996), however, also adds that

Despite the strong Congressional support for the Kosovo Albanians, at no time before Yugoslavia's breakup was there any inclination, either in the Congress

A similar perceivable, but in the end not decisive role of ethnic lobby groups can also be assumed for European countries, as for instance recounted by Axt (1994) for the Croatian lobby in Germany. In summary, however, there is no evidence of the escalation of the international intervention into the Bosnian war being driven by the macropolitical level.

5.4.2 Media and International Organizations in the Field

Turning to the bottom-to-top proposal, i.e. the intervention escalation being motivated by field-level actions and developments, a compilation of the events surrounding the inception of the six escalation phases of international intervention into the Bosnian war will serve as the starting point for a discussion of the stimulators of forceful international action.

5.4.2.1 Key Events

Based on the empirical descriptions of Section 3.3 *"The International Community and the Bosnian* Conflict*"* in TABLE 7   , I have summarized the escalation phases of IC intervention into the Bosnian war. The summary in TABLE 7 reveals that certain events – spectacular though not necessarily strategically important – triggered a chain of subsequent actions that escalated international intervention to a more forceful level (a new phase). When a single, dramatic key event was identified as a leading to the new escalation phase the case was evaluated as a direct relation and marked "++" in the table. When no single issue, but only a recurring but dramatic event was discovered as leading to the new escalation phase, this weaker relation was marked as "+"; Finally, no key event is symbolized by a "-". The first such direct key event relates to the actions of General Philipp Morillon, Commander of the UN Peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 and led to escalation Phase III. Upon receiving information about the looming humanitarian catastrophe of the encircled Bosniac population at the hands of Mladić's troops, Morillon

> *"began a series of actions that first disturbed, and then infuriated, his bosses in New York: he resolved to go to Srebrenica himself"* (Silber and Little 1996:266).

The bureaucracies of the UN and IC states could not ignore Morillon's insistence and spectacular actions surrounding the siege of Srebrenica.

> *"UN officials in New York and Belgrade began to worry, too. Morillon had saddled them with a responsibility they did not want and did not know how to respond to. It was clear Srebrenica was going to be defeated [militarily by the VRS]. UNPROFOR, through Morillon's well-intentioned gesture, was revealed as a paper tiger. The UN now found itself in open disagreement – even conflict – with important sectors of international public opinion, most notably the American State Department"* (Silber and Little 1996:269).

In effect, Morillon's insubordination compelled the UN and its member states to pass a number of Security Council resolutions that declared safe areas throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and temporarily halted the VRS offensive in eastern Bosnia. An escalation took place inasmuch as UNPROFOR was tasked with the duty to secure these areas militarily. Quoting Silber and Little (1996) once again,

> *"The creation of the safe areas represented an important point of departure for UN involvement […] For the first time the international community had committed itself – morally, if not in any effective practical sense – to the protection of one side in the war against the other. […] It was also the biggest single step to date down a path which Western statesman had vowed at the beginning of the conflict, that they would not take – the path by which they would be drawn into the conflict in a series of unplanned, unthought-out, incremental steps"* (p.274).

The other escalation phases induced by key events relate to the shelling of Sarajevo market in February 1994, which led to Phase IV of international intervention – the first direct threat of NATO air strikes should VRS troops not withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. Such an escalation was a significant step since it moved international intervention further in the direction of taking sides in the conflict – however, taking sides in the sense of an objective set of human rights norms.