



Western Approach to Chinese Philosophy as Global Philosophy

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The Need for Global Philosophy

1

Science is power (*scientia potentia est*), as Thomas Hobbes already asserted.¹ What applies to science in general applies to philosophy as a science in particular: As institutions that exercise power, they are normative orders.

"Normative orders" rest on basic justifications and accordingly serve to justify social rules, norms and institutions; they establish claims to rule and to a certain distribution of goods and opportunities in life. In this respect, a normative order is to be regarded as a justification *order*: It presupposes justifications and generates them at the same time, in a never completed and complex process. Orders of this kind are embedded in *justificatory narratives* that emerge in specific historical constellations and are transmitted, modified and institutionalised over long periods of time.²

Philosophy, especially the Western paradigm of philosophy,³ figures as a system of knowledge and interpretation, thus as an order of knowledge, and, what's more, with hegemonic claims to power. It stands in an order of justification that is historically predetermined.⁴ For reasons and justifications arise from historical

1 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Revised student edition*, Richard Tuck (ed.) Cambridge 1996, p. 63. Hobbes was probably not the first to note this, similar phrases can be found in Francis Bacon's *Meditationes Sacrae* [1597] and as early as Imam Ali (599–661) in the 10th century collection *Nahj Al Balagha*.

2 Rainer Forst, Klaus Günther (Eds.), *Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven*, Frankfurt/M., New York 2011, p. 2f. This is the still groundbreaking and extremely productive research approach of the Cluster of Excellence/ Research Network *Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen* [The Formation of Normative Orders] at the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, with which I was thankfully able to work for a longer period of time and still feel very connected to.

3 In the sense of Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago 1962.

4 Cf. Andreas Fahrmeir (Ed.), *Rechtfertigungsnarrative. Zur Begründung normativer Ordnungen durch Erzählungen*, Frankfurt/M., New York 2013.

Note: This is a translation of „Die Notwendigkeit globaler Philosophie“: in Rainer Forst u. Klaus Günther (eds.), *Normative Ordnungen*, Suhrkamp: Berlin 2021, pp. 234–249.

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constellations and experiences.⁵ It is necessary to be aware of this partly outdated historical context in order to critically examine the validity of reasons for this justification and order of domination in a new contemporary context. In the sense of the pioneering research programme mentioned in the above quote, the order of domination and the historically coagulated, supposed order of justification of Western, academic, institutionalised, contemporary philosophy will be critically examined. In what follows, I will show that the academic science system of Western philosophy needs to de-provincialize itself according to its own inherent justification, namely as problem-solving. As a traditional, sedimented justification, the Western paradigm itself offers inherent points of departure for its critique and overcoming. It is the performative tension between claims of justification and congealed institutional order that drives a dynamic of change in the normative orders of Western academic philosophy that we are only beginning to experience.

First, I will briefly sketch the situation of Western academic philosophy (2.). Then, my concern is with the internal, genuinely philosophical reasons for an expansion and diversification of the curriculum (3.). The considerations will culminate in an appeal to pursue philosophy globally (4.).

2

When 'we' in the Western academic world (whomever that includes) talk about philosophy, we usually mean, with a few exceptions, Western philosophy(s), i.e., those with ancient roots in the Greece of the pre-Socratic period⁶ to more recent times in Europe and eventually in the United States, today's dominant, even hegemonic culture of knowledge.⁷ This is at least the impression one must get when

5 Rainer Forst, „Zum Begriff eines Rechtfertigungsnarrativs“, in: Fahrmeir (Ed.), *Rechtfertigungsnarrative*, pp. 11–28.

6 It is contested that philosophy had its cradle in the West, see Peter K. Park, „Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy. Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780–1930“, Albany 2013. See also Franz M. Wimmer, „Unterwegs zum euräqualistischen Paradigma der Philosophiegeschichte im 18. Jahrhundert: Barbaren, Exoten und das chinesische Ärgernis“, in: *Deutsches Jahrbuch Philosophie* 9 (2017), pp. 167–194.

7 The term “Western philosophy” is used here in a shortened form as a comprehensive term for the philosophies in the Anglo-European countries of the Global North; therefore, the term “Anglo-European” is often used as well. This is not unproblematic. There is a danger here, of which one should be aware, of essentializing both “Western philosophy” and “non-Western philosophy”. For, first, it is wrong to conceive of “Western philosophy” as monolithic, because there is an enormous diversity within its intellectual traditions, the internal plurality of which must not be overlooked and misappropriated. Second, this plurality and diversity applies equally to “non-Western philoso-

looking at introductions to philosophy from Western countries in Europe and North America, the curricula in Western philosophy institutes and the standard definitions in Western encyclopaedias. Mostly missing is non-Western philosophy from Asia, Africa, Latin America or any other part of the world. This neglects other cultures and traditions (such as classical Persia, Egypt, India, Japan, and China, etc.) that have a history of philosophical thought that is at least as old and important. Internationally, therefore, there is a growing awareness that philosophy in the Western academic world faces a serious diversity problem in terms of representation of philosophical traditions and discourses, and philosophies outside the Anglo-European mainstream.⁸ Asian or African philosophy is still largely excluded from the average curriculum of Western philosophy departments and is hardly taken seriously by European and Anglo-European philosophers. Moreover, “non-Western philosophy” is essentialized and one-sided. In most cases, a dominant part of the respective non-Western tradition, such as Confucianism, is equated with ‘the tradition’ (in this example, Chinese philosophy), at the expense of extremely influential but not so dominant parts (such as Daoism), which might even be philosophically more interesting and responsive.

Of course, there was and still is scientific occupation with, for example, Chinese, Japanese, Indian or Persian philosophy, but mostly either from a purely historical point of view in the history of philosophy or from the point of view of philologies or regional studies or *area studies*, as in Sinology, Indology, Japanese Studies, Islamic Studies, etc. Yet, in a few institutes research and teaching is done on intercultural or comparative philosophy.⁹ Comparative philosophy, in which Wes-

phy”. Third, “non-Western philosophies” must not be conceived merely as “others” in terms of difference from what has been constructed as “Western”. This Eurocentric discourse may contribute to the devaluation and oppression of others who are looked down upon; see the relevant prominent critique by Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1978. The theoretical reconstruction of any ideas or philosophies should be examined as an interpretation of the ideas and practices of the respective representatives at their time, regardless of whether they see themselves as the authoritative spokespersons of a civilization, culture, religion or intellectual tradition. In this respect, when it comes to more precise analyses than is possible here, one should neither refer to geographical designations nor to broad intellectual traditions in order to draw the necessary boundaries for the units of comparison, but start from the self-identifications of individuals as participants in a philosophy as they understand it themselves.

⁸ See Jay L. Garfield, Bryan W. Van Norden, »If Philosophy Won't Diversify, Let's Call It What It Really Is«, in: *The New York Times* (11.05.2016), Bryan W. Van Norden, *Taking Back Philosophy. A Multicultural Manifesto*, New York 2017; Peter K. Park, *Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy. Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780–1930*, Albany 2013.

⁹ Meanwhile, within the spectrum of so-called comparative, intercultural or even transcultural philosophy, various methods have emerged between universalist and relativist approaches. For an overview of the situation in contemporary German philosophy, see Rolf Elberfeld, “Interkulturali-

tern and (Far) Eastern philosophies are usually juxtaposed, remains, however, an external procedure in which the contents are not really philosophically related to one another. In contemporary systematic philosophy, which claims to deal with the great, often ahistorical and certainly not locally specific philosophical questions of the world, these non-Western philosophies do not appear. In other disciplines, the comparative perspective that goes beyond the European framework has long since become a matter of course, such as comparative linguistics, comparative religious studies, comparative literature, comparative sociology, comparative history, comparative law, etc.

Yet, there is a shameful asymmetry: while there is a great lack of serious engagement with other philosophical traditions in the 'Western' philosophical traditions, there is a large body of impressive work that seriously engages with Western traditions from the perspective of the other philosophical traditions. This disparity is clearly evident in the number of publications and translations from the non-Western traditions, which is much lower than the reverse. This asymmetry and the narrowing of the field of philosophy in Anglo-European discourse is the legacy of a long-standing but gradually changing world order. To the extent that the old world order was and is an unjust one this is so because it is (and was) based on global relations of inequality, dependency, exploitation, domination and environmental damage. The hubris of Anglo-European philosophy was and is complicit in these hegemonic relations of dominance and must, therefore, necessarily shed its narrow-mindedness and arrogance.

If the conditions remain as they are today, the next generation of philosophers, like the present generation, will be trained in only one way of thinking: from an Anglo-Eurocentric perspective. In this way, the operative situation will be maintained and the dominance of Western philosophy will be reinforced.

This neglect of other philosophical traditions in Europe and North America is a nuisance, which is at best thoughtlessly ignorant, insofar as it is simply assumed, often without sufficient knowledge of the facts, that philosophies of other traditions have nothing significant to contribute to the philosophical questions under discussion. Moreover, this is often epistemically unfair.¹⁰ An epistemic testimonial injus-

tät", in: Ralf Konersmann (ed.), *Handbuch Kulturphilosophie*, Stuttgart 2012, pp. 39–45, and Heinz Kimmerle, *Interkulturelle Philosophie zur Einführung*, Hamburg 2002.

¹⁰ In the sense of Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, Oxford 2007, who distinguishes between two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutic injustice; Gail Pohlhaus, Jr.'s "Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance" extends Fricker's approach in an interesting way, which would also fit in well here. See also Elizabeth Anderson, "Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions", in: *Social Epistemology*, 26 (2012), pp. 163–173.

tice is done to philosophers of other traditions in their capacity as knowers (and this includes being co-producers of knowledge) if and because it is assumed that other worldviews and traditions of thought cannot measure up to classical European philosophy or that they are not real, true philosophy at all, but 'only' religion, wisdom(s) or the like. This harm is aggravated even more when Western philosophy appears with hegemonic pretensions, or any rate is perceived as hegemonic by others. It is a legacy of colonial thought that philosophy is claimed exclusively for Western intellectual history. Other cultures are considered incapable of the special intellectual effort of philosophy.

From the students' side, there is always interest in an expanded curriculum of global philosophy, which, however, cannot really be adequately responded to in Western philosophy institutes at present. This applies very strongly, for example, to interest in Islamic philosophy on the part of students from families with an Islamic background. To the extent that more and more students who are 'non-white' or have a migrant background shaping them study in Western academia in the global North (e.g. at prominent and prestigious universities), these students will tend to feel alienated and culturally disregarded in the face of a purely Western curriculum in philosophy departments. They will be treated epistemically-hermeneutically unfairly¹¹ if, as members of subordinate groups, they are unable or not put in a position to articulate relevant experiences (which will very likely include experiences of discrimination and bias) because they lack (or have no access to) hermeneutical resources. If Anglo-European faculty continue to lack a minimal understanding of non-Western thought, then students will tolerate this less and less. In the worst case, they will turn away from philosophy disappointed with the distance to and silence about their lived reality and drop out of such studies; in the best case, they will campaign for curricular reform.¹² Both will probably increase the pressure to diversify philosophical curricula in the medium term. Anglo-European academic philosophy must therefore face the new challenges that arise from our new multicultural diversity. Closer engagement between all traditions of philosophy can bring pedagogical benefits by better educating an increasingly diverse student body in a global view of philosophy.

But beyond instrumental reasons for expanding and diversifying the curriculum, there are also internal, genuinely philosophical reasons for doing so, which I will address in the next section.

¹¹ Again, in the sense of Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice*.

¹² See for example Eugene Park, "Why I left Academia: Philosophy's Homogeneity Needs Rethinking", in: *Huffington Post* (09.03.2014). And for example, the BAME-students in Great Britain, who have campaigned hard for curriculum reform in recent years, including by using the slogan "Why Is My Curriculum White?".

3

A real systematic problem for Anglo-European philosophies themselves is one-sidedness when, with philosophical pretensions, i.e. with the assumption of good reasons, propositions with truth claims and prescriptions for the general regulation of behaviour are asserted as (generally) valid. When theoretical propositions and practical prescriptions and evaluations are asserted in philosophy, then it is assumed that they are supported by sufficiently good reasons that are in principle cognizable and recognizable as such by all rational beings in the world. Therefore, any philosophy, from whomever or wherever it comes, must endeavour to identify and justify the claims of validity it makes to all rational beings.¹³

This poses some challenges for philosophers: Since people do not think in isolation, but are socialized and educated in traditions of thought, they will initially act and react to questions and problems from the perspective of their tradition of thought and worldview. In order to be able to convince others in a philosophical discourse about the good reasons for the validity claims made, it is advantageous, if not indispensable, to become aware of the background assumptions, thought traditions, philosophies, and worldviews of the counterparts who are to be convinced in order to be able to understand their reactions. For a discourse with others to succeed, the metaphysical, religious, philosophical, etc. views and background beliefs must be spelled out, clarified and critiqued in a philosophical analysis. Since philosophical ideas are embedded in traditions, their practices, circumstances, and places, this implies a thorough engagement with the comprehensive (metaphysical, religious, philosophical...) views and their horizons of understanding having a formative influence on these individuals. These often implicit comprehensive background assumptions play a crucial role for interpersonal and intercultural understanding and successful justification.

Therefore, in the best hermeneutic tradition, philosophers have to open up for themselves the horizon of understanding of other persons with other philosophies. Ultimately, this can only be worked out, clarified and criticized in a philosophical analysis. This requires, first, a contextual analysis of the concepts and practices with which philosophers approach a particular problem within a given contextual framework. Second, a theoretical reconstruction of the philosophers' claims to validity as coherent systems of ideas is required. Third, the translation of an intellectual framing of a problem into terms that can be mutually understood by all participants in an intercultural exchange must be attempted. Performing these

¹³ See Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Vol. 1: *Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*, Frankfurt/M. 1981.

analyses and translations requires coordinated interdisciplinary and intercultural work,¹⁴ implying a learning process that faces considerable language barriers, attention deficits, and translation problems. The transaction costs are by no means low, but well worth the effort.

The best way to explain and understand people's opinions is to be able to identify reasons why the person has formed his or her opinion or intention by clarifying the initial mental state from which the person starts in his or her context. For this intentional explanation to be successful, it requires the assumption of rationality, or the disposition to form opinions or intentions to act according to the rules of rationality. The assumption of rationality functions here as a transcultural methodological principle. Assuming the person is rational, for what reasons did he or she do or believe this or that? If reasons can be named, we believe to have understood the action or opinion of others.

As far as philosophy is concerned, it has to be clarified in a hermeneutically sensitive way whether other systems of thought claim or can claim to be philosophy. In doing so, one should use as broad and comprehensive a concept of philosophy as possible. The concept of philosophy must not yet be fixed to certain, especially already established, Anglo-European methods, concepts, philosophies, etc. However, the concept of philosophy must have its conceptual limits and not be extended into arbitrariness. The Anglo-European conceptions of philosophy emphasize the difference to religion, (life) wisdom, mysticism, etc. Other traditions have a less sharp demarcation in this respect, which often leads to problems as to whether a text can rightly be considered philosophical or not. This seems to pose a dilemma: If the concept of philosophy is too narrow, other worldviews and traditions of thought risk being excluded by definition and then ignored. If the concept of philosophy is too broad, on the other hand, they risk being appropriated and subsumed under Western philosophical standards, according to which they may be judged to be inferior. If one wants to keep an open mind towards philosophies from other traditions and cultures, one should use a concept of philosophy that is as broad as possible, based on the minimalia of accepting and applying the standards or rules of rationality, and which at its core demands for at least clear, methodical thinking and logical argumentation. Under these presuppositions, the question of which thinking can be considered philosophy and which cannot – remains itself a meta-philosophical question to be discussed.

¹⁴ See i.e. James Tully, "Deparochializing Political Theory and Beyond. A Dialogue Approach to Comparative Political Thought", in: Melissa S. Williams (Ed.), *Deparochializing Political Theory*, Cambridge 2020, pp. 20–59, und Melissa S. Williams, "Deparochializing Democratic Theory", in: *ibid.*, pp. 201–229.

Often, other, non-Western philosophies are ignored with the excuse that their content and purpose is quite different from that of Western philosophies. It would remain to show more precisely that this is the case. However, this can be justifiably doubted. One only has to realize that philosophy in general and in principle according to its concept claims to deal with great existential questions that move people everywhere and at all times. Whatever else philosophy encompasses, all philosophy aims at a lucid explanation of our human self-understanding as rational persons and of our social practices of reason-giving and reason-taking. To this end, it is necessary for us humans to make intelligible a (critical) reconstruction of our central ideas and ideals of this conception of ourselves as rational persons in its premises, to grasp its meaning, to make explicit the complex network of reasons and motives on which our theoretical and practical (self-)consciousness and our everyday rational practices are based. In this explication of our human self-understanding, or certain parts of it, there will be conflicting approaches within and outside Anglo-European philosophies. These contradictory approaches must now be discussed in philosophy in a methodically sound way and brought to a rational solution.

Philosophers need to discuss and evaluate claims for validity in a critical exchange of arguments, with reasons and counter-reasons. In the end, the main purpose of exploring the philosophical constructs of others is to critically evaluate the disputed validity claims of the respective philosophies. The search for truth and correctness is what drives philosophy. Therefore, it cannot stop at a mere comparison. Philosophical constructs are to be opened up in such a way that with their knowledge a critical exchange of the reasons for or against raised validity claims can be undertaken and also (even if mostly only provisionally) discursively decided. It is imperative to use the possibilities of philosophical reflection in order to determine whether claims for validity can be made.

When critically reflecting on propositions, theorems, norms, values, practices, etc., one should not only think *about* them and those who represent them, but also together *with* those who represent them, i.e. who consider them to be true, correct and appropriate. For the representatives are often in the best position to identify, name and argue for the reasons which, from their point of view, speak for the represented validity claims. Therefore, it is indispensable that they participate in the discourse, not only together with their validity claims as objects of inquiry, but as subjects of the dialogue. In this respect, philosophy in particular is dependent on rational discourse with all philosophers and, beyond that, with all interested parties.¹⁵

15 See Anthony Simon Laden, *Reasoning. A Social Picture*, Oxford 2012.

For a rational discourse to succeed, there must be a common denominator. But there is no such thing as a completely neutral point of view. In attempting to engage philosophical ideas embedded in different cultures, we must begin where we are; we must start from frames, reference points, problems, or questions that arise within our own philosophical worldviews. If we start from where we are, we are always in danger of distorting our inquiry by falsely assuming that the issues that are important to us are also important to others, and failing to see the issues that are important to others. A transcultural dialogue may well start from the assumption that human thought is rooted or embedded in received ideological frameworks and social relations, assuming also that it need not remain stuck there. Philosophical thought always takes its origin from where we are now in our socio-historical location. It would therefore be wrong to understand global philosophy as an ahistorical project and thereby to conceal one's own historical and local situatedness and the resulting position of power; this would be problematic both epistemologically and morally.

However, problems and problem-solving can be regarded as an inevitable and constitutive starting point of reasoning. People use their reason to solve problems they are confronted with in everyday life under different conditions and in different areas of life. The basic methodological principle of all intercultural comparative philosophy, from which all other methodological approaches derive, should therefore be functionality – that is, the problem-solving ability. The initial question of any comparison of different philosophies, therefore, difficult as this is, must be, in purely functional terms, the problem under investigation, free from the terms and philosophical theories in which it is formulated in the respective philosophy.¹⁶ In this, problems are relative to background assumptions and expectations. Problems are culturally specific and historically as well as socially formed. They arise only in the context of a practice that is always already shaped and each time particular, historically situated and socially instituted, because they arise out of a pre-shaped and -interpreted situation. Problems arise only against this background. However, problems do not arise all by themselves. Rather, they must be identified as such. Only by identifying the situation in a certain way does it become interpreted as a problem. The background assumptions, the worldview, the worldviews of others can only be opened up by understanding them as solutions to problems. At the same time, the problems that the respective philosophies explicitly or implicitly claim to

¹⁶ On problems as a logic of scientific inquiry see cf. John Dewey, *Logic: The theory of inquiry*. New York 1938. Especially the progress of science, politics and morality and so on is often grasped by numerous authors today by means of problem-solving ability.

solve are also only understandable against the background of the respective, often unquestioned, construct.

Even if the questions about the limits of philosophy, of dialogue, of argumentation are always transculturally open, there must be certain transcendental foundations of understanding. This is where the functional understanding of philosophy helps. For the basal practical problems of life will usually be theory-independent.¹⁷ Problems indicate to us that our understanding of the world is deficient in some way to be determined in more detail. If you have a problem, you want to solve it. It is the role of a structured system of opinions, more precisely of theories, to solve problems by improving our understanding of the world. If it is essential to the purpose of theories to solve problems, the test of the adequacy of a theory can be whether or not it solves our problems. Only a theory that can eliminate a posed problem is worth accepting. Thus arises the thesis of considering success in problem solving as a standard of rationality that is not theory-relative.¹⁸ What counts as success is determined by the nature and description of the problem. The criteria for success are relative to the problem formulation. Given certain anthropological assumptions about the universality of certain goals, success or the criteria of success in solving these problems are not entirely culturally relative. Success is an intrinsic criterion of every theory or worldview because any theory has the goal of solving problems. It is by this goal that they can be measured. The problem or the problem formulation ensures the comparability of different theories or methods. Contrary to the suspicion of relativism, this does provide a context-independent evaluation criterion for the comparison of different philosophies, which are constitutive of theories or worldviews. This criterion states that those philosophies are better founded, which solve problems more successfully than competing philosophies. This criterion should be obvious to everyone, because it is in everyone's interest to have the most successful problem-solving methods possible.

Success is a gradual criterion; some solutions to problems are more successful than others, i.e. they solve the problem faster, easier, more elegantly, etc. Therefore, one can rationally believe – as long as no better theories are known – that one's own methods of theory building are successful. However, if one learns about more successful procedures, there is a rational and motivating reason to adopt these procedures.

¹⁷ For the following see Stefan Gosepath, *Aufgeklärtes Eigeninteresse. Eine Theorie theoretischer und praktischer Rationalität*, Frankfurt/M. 1992, p. 198f.

¹⁸ See John Kekes, "Rationality and Problem-Solving", in: *Philosophy and the Social Sciences* 7 (1977), pp. 351–366, here p. 268; Charles Taylor, "Rationality", in: Martin Hollis, Steven Lukes (Eds.), *Rationality and Relativism*, Oxford 1982, pp. 87–105, here p. 101, p. 103.

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The idea of *global philosophy* now stands for the notion that different philosophical approaches should – out of their enlightened self-interest – engage more with each other in solving philosophical problems. Most philosophical theoretical approaches attempt to use only the resources available within a philosophical tradition.¹⁹ A more promising approach is to make better use of the full global range of available intellectual resources to strengthen our ability to offer better and more compelling solutions. The idea of global philosophy encourages us to look beyond our traditions to better solve our philosophical problems as we apprehend them.²⁰ Understanding philosophy (also) functionally as an intellectual problem-solving activity requires that in comparing different philosophies one must radically free oneself from one's own dogmatic prejudices in order to be able to recognize how other philosophies formulate quite different, and possibly better, answers to (one's own) philosophical questions one is interested in. Orientation towards common problems also helps to avoid a kind of *double bind* that complicates intercultural philosophical exchange: namely, non-Western philosophies seem to have to tie in with existing themes, interests or paradigms of the dominant discourse in order to be recognized or considered. At the same time, however, non-Western philosophies must offer something that is not already known from Western philosophies one way or another, because otherwise the other tradition does not seem to be needed. But if they do offer something obviously completely different or new, it is usually perceived as too foreign to be taken seriously.²¹ However, especially in the case of common problems, it often helps to look at the problem from a completely different angle or to understand or describe the problem in a way completely diverging from the usual. The divergent perspective can help to come closer to solving the problem.

Philosophy, according to this view, is global insofar as philosophical problems and their solutions are universal. They are geographically found in many places on different continents. Nor are such problems the exclusive subject of any particular tradition. Accordingly, the answers apply as solutions to intellectual problems not only in one tradition of thought, but in all of them.

¹⁹ This would be a problem for any scientific endeavor; see, for example, Heidi Grasswick, “Epistemic Injustice in Science”, in: Ian James Kidd, José Medina, Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*, London, New York 2017, pp. 313–323, but it seems particularly pressing in the case of philosophy, whose objects and resources are so tied to self-interpretations.

²⁰ On this term in relation to this idea see Thom Brooks, “Philosophy Unbound: The Idea of Global Philosophy”, in: *Metaphilosophy* 44 (2013), pp. 254–266.

²¹ See Amy Olberding, “It's Not Them, It's You: A Case Study Concerning the Exclusion of Non-Western Philosophy”, in: *Comparative Philosophy* 6 (2015), pp. 14–34, here p. 14n.

Intellectual neglect of other traditions has always been a problem, but it becomes all the more delicate as we increasingly engage in transcultural social exchange in the wake of globalization. Globalization, which affects all of us, now challenges us even more to rethink the nature of philosophy. Philosophy has always been – but today more than ever – about relating philosophical traditions of all kinds and provenances and seeking common, correct answers to philosophical questions. Globalization now provides both the opportunity and the context, motivation, and resources for the de-provincialization and decentering of Anglo-European philosophies.²²

Faced with increasingly global common challenges, there is a particular search for solutions to common intellectual and practical problems encountered by all which demand common solutions that are acceptable to all concerned – based on common grounds or overlapping consensus. Different philosophical approaches should, therefore, engage more closely with each other in their own interest in order to solve problems together. Problems that are addressed by philosophy around the world, and are of general human relevance in that they have either 'always' concerned people in their respective historically given horizons (truth, rightness, the good life, etc.), or are 'generally human' in the sense that they now concern all people (such as global justice, climate change, etc.), require a global dialogue between different political philosophies. This is especially true when they form the basis for the actions of powerful state and non-state actors.

The thesis of this appeal is, of course, by no means original or new. The question is rather why this thesis, which is common today especially with regard to other sciences, has not yet been taken seriously in Anglo-European philosophy and why hardly any significant measures have been initiated to improve the situation. Why is it that our philosophy is still in such a bad position in this respect, worse than that of the neighbouring sciences?²³

²² See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference*, Princeton 2009.

²³ For an account of a number of pseudo-explanations see Justin Weinberg, "When Someone Suggests Expanding the Canon...", in: *Dailynous* (12.05.2016), <<http://dailynous.com/2016/05/13/when-someone-suggests-expanding-the-canon/>>, last accessed on 16.09.2020.

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