

**A Matter of Human Rights of Refugees or a Diplomatic, Humanitarian
Issue of Defectors? The Influence of Conservative and Progressive
Ideologies and Identities on the Framing of the ‘North Korean Defector
Issue’ in the South Korean Media**

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Abstract

North Korean defectors, who mostly go through China to reach South Korea, are treated as illegal economic migrants by the Chinese government. Due to their illegal status, they commonly face exploitation and are often repatriated to North Korea where they face prosecution. This is frequently termed the ‘North Korean defector issue’ in the South Korean media. This thesis deals with the influence of ideology on the framing of the North Korean defector issue. It analyzes the South Korean media discourse on the North Korean defector issue in the context of the South-South conflict based on a type of critical discourse analysis, which combines a discourse-historical approach with a framing approach. The South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors is part of the larger discourse on how to deal with North Korea, including the North Korean human rights issue. This discourse is characterized by the division between South Korean conservatives and progressives, who have distinct conceptions of the South Korean identity.

This thesis argues that the historical development of the 20th century is vital in explaining the ongoing South-South division. The distinct framing of issues linked to North Korea is characterized by an emphasis of different norms. Moreover, the diverging framing is linked to different approaches pursued by South Korean progressive and conservative governmental and nongovernmental actors. While progressives view the North primarily as a kin nation for future unification, conservatives perceive North Korea as an enemy. Progressives tend to emphasize humanitarianism in dealing with issues related to North Korea, whereas conservatives highlight human rights. Additionally, progressives construct North Korean defectors as people who fled for economic and/or political reasons. In contrast, conservatives frame them as refugees and human rights victims. Progressives frame the North Korean defector issue as a matter of national sovereignty, diplomacy, human rights, and humanitarianism. Conservatives mainly frame it as a matter of human rights and international law. Progressive governments focus on maintaining good relations with North Korea and China to solve issues unofficially through bilateral negotiations based on a ‘quiet diplomacy’, while conservative administrations prioritize an ‘active diplomacy’ by cooperating with the US and UN to pressure North Korea and China to change their behavior by shaming them as human rights violators. Progressive NGOs are commonly humanitarian and provide humanitarian support to North Korean defectors, whereas conservative ones criticize China and North Korea as human rights violators. Although the dispute between both ideological camps continues, the human rights frame has become dominant within South Korea and the international community.

This thesis shows that the ideological affiliation of the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh has significantly influenced the framing of the North Korean defector issue, which indicates that they have been a key actor in reinforcing the South-South conflict. Moreover, the North Korean defector issue has been politicized by both camps. However, approaches advanced by both ideological camps have not solved the North Korean defector issue. Therefore, a new approach, which can be promoted by both ideological camps, should be explored. The hegemonic human rights frame should be critically approached and challenged.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Table of Contents.....	iii
List of Tables.....	v
List of Figures.....	vi
List of Abbreviations.....	vii
Romanization.....	viii
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Literature Review.....	18
2.1. The Construction of Human rights, Humanitarianism and Refugees.....	19
2.2. Approaches and Norms of Progressive and Conservative South Korean Governments and NGOs in dealing with the North Korean Defector Issue.....	24
2.3. The Academic Discourse on the North Korean Defector Issue.....	30
2.4. Previous Research on the Framing of Issues Related to North Korean Defectors in the South Korean Media.....	34
2.5. Conclusion.....	39
3. Theoretical Framework and Methodology.....	42
3.1. Theoretical Framework: A Synthesis of the Discourse-Historical Approach and Entman's Framing Approach.....	42
3.2. Methodology and Data.....	50
4. The Historical Context of the South Korean Discourse on North Korea and North Korean Defectors.....	54
4.1. The South Korean Political Culture: The Evolvement of Conservative and Progressive Ideologies and Identities.....	54
4.2. North Korean Defectors in the Context of Inter-Korean Relations: South Korea's Perception of and Settlement Policy for North Korean Defectors.....	65
4.2.1. The Cold War: The Age of the Heroes.....	66
4.2.2. The Post-Cold War Period after 1993: Welfare-dependent Migrants, Refugees, Defectors or Key Actors for a Future Korean Unification?.....	68
4.3. Conclusion.....	73
5. Framing Analysis.....	75
5.1. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to China in the Chosun Ilbo.....	75
5.2. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Chosun Ilbo.....	89
5.3. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to China in the Hankyoreh.....	104

5.4. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Hankyoreh.....	119
5.5. Core Arguments.....	132
5.6. Conclusion.....	138
6. Conclusion.....	144
Appendix.....	154
References.....	159

List of Tables

Table 1. The Framing of China’s Repatriation of North Korean Defectors by South Korean and International Actors in the Chosun Ilbo.....	77
Table 2. The Framing of the Exploitation of North Korean Defectors in China by South Korean and International Actors in the Chosun Ilbo.....	78
Table 3. The Framing of China’s Repatriation of North Korean Defectors by South Korean and International Actors in the Hankyoreh.....	105
Table 4. The Framing of the Exploitation Experienced by North Korean Defectors in China by South Korean and International Actors.....	106
Table 5. Distinct Framings of the North Korean Defector Issue and Diverging Core Arguments among South Korean Conservatives and Progressives.....	133

List of Figures

Figure 1. Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea.....	68
Figure 2. Problems Primarily Linked to China in the Chosun Ilbo	76
Figure 3. Causes of China’s Repatriation of Defectors According to the Chosun Ilbo	80
Figure 4. South Korean Actors Trying to Solve the Defector Issue According to the Chosun Ilbo.....	81
Figure 5. International Actors Trying to Solve the Defector Issue According to the Chosun Ilbo.....	86
Figure 6. Problems Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Chosun Ilbo.....	90
Figure 7. Causes of the Defection of North Koreans According to the Chosun Ilbo.....	91
Figure 8. South Korean Actors trying to Solve the North Korean Human Rights Problem According to the Chosun Ilbo	93
Figure 9. International Actors trying to Solve the North Korean Human Rights Problem According to the Chosun Ilbo	96
Figure 10. Negative Evaluation of Actors in the Chosun Ilbo.....	100
Figure 11. Negative Evaluation of South Korean Administrations in the Chosun Ilbo.....	103
Figure 12. Problems Primarily Linked to China in the Hankyoreh	104
Figure 13. Causes of China’s Repatriation of North Korean Defectors According to the Hankyoreh	107
Figure 14. South Korean Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Defector Issue According to the Hankyoreh	109
Figure 15. International Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Defector Issue According to the Hankyoreh	115
Figure 16. Problems Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Hankyoreh.....	120
Figure 17. Causes of the Defection of North Koreans According to the Hankyoreh.....	121
Figure 18. Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Human Rights Issue According to the Hankyoreh	122
Figure 19. Negative Evaluation of International Actors in the Hankyoreh.....	125
Figure 20. Negative Evaluation of Conservative and Progressive South Korean Actors in the Hankyoreh	127
Figure 21. Negative Evaluation of Other South Korean Actors in the Hankyoreh	130
Figure 22. Negative Evaluation of South Korean Administrations in the Hankyoreh.....	130

List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical discourse analysis
CPR	Civil and political rights
DHA	Discourse-historical approach
ESCR	Economic, social, and cultural rights
G8	Group of Eight
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IPCNKR	International Parliamentarians' Coalition for North Korean Refugees and Human Rights
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NHRCK	National Human Rights Commission of Korea
NKFC	North Korea Freedom Coalition
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN COI	United Nations Commission of Inquiry
UNHCR	United National High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
WFP	World Food Programme

Romanization

This thesis employed the popular English romanization of famous persons or words. Regarding the names of South Korean scholars, this thesis adopted the romanized names prevalent in the literature. For those scholars who do not use a specific romanization of their name, the romanization was based on McCune Reischauer system.

1. Introduction

For South Korea, the question of how to deal with North Korea is ultimately a matter of national identity rather than a mere policy matter (Shin Gi-wook/Burke 2007). So is the matter of North Korean defectors. Continuous food shortage, North Korea's weak economy and political oppression of the people by the regime have led tens of thousands of North Koreans to leave North Korea (Chang, Yoonok/Haggard/Noland 2008). According to statistics published by the South Korean Ministry of Unification in 2019, there are more than 33000 North Korean defectors in the South. More than 80% of them are female (Ministry of Unification 2019).

The majority of North Koreans who leave their country are women, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, North Korea introduced market liberalization reforms in 2002 which focused on a basic monetization of its economy as opposed to controlled prices and a coupon-based system for food rations, thus allowing supply and demand to determine market prices. As there has been a transformation of traditional gender roles, many women are actively engaged with the market in the North and have become the main breadwinners of the family as their husbands are employed at state owned factories. Therefore, women particularly have been involved in domestic as well as cross-border trade with China and have increasingly crossed the Sino-North Korean border as merchants. Secondly, there is a high demand for female North Koreans in China due to the number of men who cannot find a wife. In China, most North Korean defectors become victims of human trafficking, forced prostitution, forced labor or illegal marriages with Chinese men or men from the Joseon minority (ethnic Koreans with a Chinese citizenship). Although they are promised a better life as wives or workers in China, they are frequently abused by their husbands or are unable to find work (Ernst/Jurowetzki 2016).

Due to their illegal status in China, North Koreans are exploited and live in constant fear of being repatriated and punished by the North Korean regime (Noland et al. 2006) and often go through a third South Asian country before they can reach the South (Song, Jiyoung 2013; O, Tara 2011). They are often married before defecting and marry again to survive. They commonly reach South Korea with children. Moreover, they feel guilty for leaving behind family members in North Korea and have troubles dealing with the sociocultural differences between North and South Koreans after having reached the South. Due to their experiences after defection, a significant number of female defectors suffer from mental problems including depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Shin, Gisoo/Lee, Suk Jeong 2015).

One of the huge challenges for North Korean defectors is their unique feature of being perceived and entitled to distinct identities depending on where they are permanently or temporarily located: most commonly as citizens, migrants or refugees (Song, Young Hoon 2016). Their identity is context-dependent and socially constructed. In this manner, the governments of South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea), North Korea (officially the Democratic Republic of Korea) and China (officially the People's Republic of China) have different perceptions of North Koreans, which is also reflected in the different policies these governments have toward them. Many North Koreans leave their country for China and live there for years before they reach the South (O, Tara 2011; Song, Jiyoung 2013).

The Chinese government officially classifies North Korean defectors as illegal migrant workers or illegal economic migrants. Due to this understanding, China has been dealing with North Koreans in two ways. On the one hand, it has been quietly sending North Koreans to neighboring third countries, usually in South Asia, based on a quiet diplomacy in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), through which they are able to reach their final destination (Song, Jiyoung 2013). On the other hand, it has also repatriated many North Korean defectors claiming that this 'is necessary to maintaining national security, social order and border controls' (Cohen 2014: 69).

There are several reasons for China's forced repatriation of North Koreans. Firstly, they are based on treaties established in 1962 and 1986 with North Korea according to which both countries agreed to repatriate those who illegally cross the border. Beijing therefore feels pressured to uphold the agreement to not jeopardize their relations with Pyongyang (Hwang, Jaeho 2004, Cohen 2014, Shen/Xia 2015). Secondly, Beijing is also concerned that accepting and making it easier for defectors to stay will lead to a huge influx of defectors. The Chinese government wants to avoid the collapse of the North Korean regime, which could result from a massive outflow of North Koreans. Moreover, a sudden collapse could lead to a Korean unification, which would intensify the conflict of interests between the United States (US) and China. A unification of both Koreas could mean that the US would move its military close to the Chinese border, which China wants to avoid at all costs. In general, China is concerned that a Korean unification could increase the US influence on Northeast Asia. In addition, an increased inflow of North Koreans is perceived as a threat to China's socio-economic stability. As some North Koreans have an elite Special Forces background, there are concerns that these individuals could cause internal instability and violence within China. Furthermore, an increasing number of North Koreans in China

could also intensify the competition regarding low-skilled jobs prevalent in the country (Chung, Eunbee 2014: 291f.). For these reasons, China is unlikely to change its policy toward North Korean defectors anytime soon.

North Korean defectors are considered as traitors and criminals by the North Korean state. Therefore, all North Korean defectors are at risk of facing severe punishment and abuses when being sent back to their country¹. Upon repatriation, they are commonly faced with arbitrary detention, forced labor, and in some cases even with the death penalty. For North Koreans it is not only illegal to move within their country, but also to leave the country without state approval. Therefore, defection is considered a crime and political offence independent of the motives of defectors. These may be political, economic, or even one of survival (Amnesty International 2012).

The UNHCR and a number of South Korean and international human rights NGOs view North Koreans in China as refugees, no matter whether their motives for defection are political or not, because they face the fear of prosecution by the North Korean regime when they are repatriated (Song, Jiyoung 2013: 159). Those who argue that North Korean defectors are refugees commonly also emphasize that the protection of North Korean defectors is a matter of protecting their human rights (Han, Sang-u/Pae, Chi-suk 2008).

Officially, the South Korean government treats North Koreans as South Korean citizens. Both the North and South Korean governments have always proclaimed to be the only legitimate authority over the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, both governments officially acknowledge North Koreans as their own citizens (Noland et al. 2006). According to the South Korean Act on the Protection and Settlement Support for Residents Escaping from the North established in 1997, the principle of citizenship and protection applies to South Koreans as well as North Koreans who seek protection from the South. In this manner, this act provides a legal obligation for the South Korean government to diplomatically protect North Koreans, to provide settlement support once they have entered the South and to grant them South Korean citizenship (Choi, Gyubin 2019: 81).

¹ According to testimonies of North Korean defectors, repatriated North Koreans are interrogated in detention centers or police stations by North Korean authorities where they are often tortured. The severity of punishment depends on several factors including their background, the number of times defected, and whether the authorities perceive the defectors to be 'politically dangerous'. If not, they are generally sent to a labor camp in a village where they spend between three months and three years and are subject to forced labor. Those who are perceived to be politically sensitive, including military personnel or (retired) government officials, are at risk of being dispatched to a political prison camp. Those who have communicated with South Korean citizens or religious groups in China also face a high risk of ending up in a political prison camp (Amnesty International 2012). Moreover, repatriated pregnant North Korean women are commonly forced to get an abortion in detention centers (Hawk 2012: 9f.).

Although the official South Korean governmental stance of accepting North Korean defectors as South Korean citizens has not changed since Kim Dae-jung's presidency (1998-2003), there has been a debate within South Korean society on how to deal with defected North Koreans who have not been able to reach the South (or in rare cases a third country). This discourse is part of the larger South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea, which is characterized by a division between South Korean progressives and conservatives, commonly also called the 'South-South conflict'. The perception of North Korea is the most crucial determining criteria for the ideological tendency in the South (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007; Han, Gwan-su/Chang, Yun-su 2012). Within the South, the North serves as a dual identity: as a brother and kin nation to progressives and simultaneously as an enemy to conservatives (Son, Key-Young 2007: 498f.; Han, Gwan-su/Chang, Yun-su 2012; Son, Sarah A. 2015). In this sense, within South Korea the two ideological camps have two distinct conceptions of the South Korean identity (Shin Gi-wook/Burke 2007).

The prevalent literature on North Korean defectors in China and those who have been repatriated covers the diverse perspectives based on which the North Korean defector issue is constructed. I employ the term 'defector issue' as an umbrella term as it is commonly employed in the South Korean media, which includes a range of issues linked to North Korean defectors in China, and sometimes in a third country, and those who are repatriated back to the North. As described, these commonly include China's repatriation of North Koreans and their experience of exploitation in China due to their illegal status, including forced marriage, forced prostitution and horrible employment conditions as well as their punishment by the North Korean regime upon repatriation. Although the term 'defector problem' or 'defector issue' is sometimes also used in South Korea to designate problems and challenges defectors face in the South, it is frequently employed to label issues linked to defectors in an international rather than a domestic South Korean context.

Sometimes North Koreans abroad are framed as defectors (e.g. Lee, Shin-wha 2010), refugees (e.g. Lankov 2004; Chan, Elim/Schloenhardt 2007; Kang, Jin Woong 2013; Lee, Whiejin 2016), and less commonly but occasionally as migrants (e.g. Song, Jiyoung 2015). They are additionally sometimes framed as an ethnic diaspora (e.g. Yoon, In-Jin 2001; Kim, Bogook 2004) or a cultural minority (e.g. Choo, Hae Yeon 2006; Kim, Christina Hyun Im 2008). Psychology and anthropology scholars frequently focus on the traumatic experiences of defectors in North Korea and China understood to be migrants. Political science and international law scholars predominantly frame defectors as refugees or defectors while

mostly dealing with the human rights conditions of defectors in China and North Korea (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 3f.).

The two mainstream positions regarding the North Korean defector issue in South Korea, which are linked to the ideological cleavage, are addressed in the South Korean political science literature. The South Korean conservative perspective, based on a framing of defectors as refugees and victims of China's and North Korea's human rights violations, is predominant in the English literature. Much of the English literature on the topic has been written by South Koreans and there is a big emphasis on the practices of human rights NGOs or the legal status of North Koreans as refugees (e.g. Hwang, Jaeho 2004; Kim, Hyuk-Rae 2006; Moon, Kyungyon 2014; Lee, Whiejin 2016).

The progressive position, which is more cautious of framing defectors as refugees and naming and shaming China and North Korea as human rights abusers, is significantly more prevalent in the Korean literature compared to the English literature. Nonetheless, much of the Korean literature also interprets the North Korean defector issue as being part of the North Korean human rights problem. This shows that the human rights frame promoted by South Korean conservatives has become dominant within the South Korean discourse in the past decade. Moreover, South Korean literature commonly either primarily frames the North Korean defector issue as part of the South-South conflict with an emphasis on how actors of one or both ideological camps treat China, North Korea and sometimes both (e.g. Suh, Bo-hyuk 2006; Suh, Bo-hyuk 2014; I, Chun-t'ae 2015; Mun, Dong-hŭi 2018), or as a matter of human rights violations of refugees (e.g. Han, Sang-u/Pae, Chi-suk 2008; Son, Hyŏn-jin 2017). The literature dealing with the issue in the context of the South-South conflict often specifically addresses how both ideological camps treat the North Korean human rights issue.

The discourse on how to deal with defected North Koreans in China or a third country is commonly understood to be part of the discourse on the North Korean human rights issue in the context of the South-South conflict. In essence, the ongoing debate on how to deal with North Korea and North Korean defectors is based on a different notion and framing of the North Korean human rights issue (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013; Moon, Kyungyon 2014). Conservatives and progressives have a different conception of human rights, which impacts their distinct understandings of the North Korean human rights issue and their approaches in dealing with it. The different notion of human rights is linked to the different judgments on the severity of the North Korean human rights issue (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2006; An, Tŭk-ki 2011; Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013; Suh, Bo-hyuk 2014).

South Korean conservatives perceive human rights as being universally valid and emphasize civil and political rights. This is the human rights notion based on which the international community, particularly the Western world such as the US and Europe, evaluates and approaches the North Korean human rights issue (An, Tük-ki 2011: 35f., Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 242ff.). Ko Seong Joon et al (2013: 242ff.) view this as the Western perspective, as this conception of human rights has been established in the context of the development of democracies in the West.

In contrast, South Korean progressives assume that human rights are relative and that they must be approached based on considerations of internal and external conditions of states and cultural characteristics. In addition, they commonly highlight economic, social, and cultural rights as opposed to civil and political rights. The debate on whether human rights are universal or relative and which specific human rights are to be emphasized is also part of the broader international human rights discourse, which is characterized by a division between economically advanced democratic and less developed autocratic countries² (An, Tük-ki 2011: 36).

The different conception of human rights is linked to a distinct framing of the North Korean human rights issue by both ideological camps. Firstly, they disagree on the cause of human rights violations. Conservatives view the North Korean system as the main cause. They blame the North Korean regime for the defection of North Koreans and for oppressing civil and political rights of the North Korean people, framing the regime as a human rights violator. Contrarily, progressives additionally, and sometimes even exclusively, highlight external causal factors, e.g. the ongoing confrontation between US and North Korea and the prevalent Cold War mentality characterized by a hostile attitude towards the North (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 242ff.). Secondly, they evaluate the North Korean human rights situation differently. Conservatives perceive the North Korean human rights situation to be devastating. Progressives, while partly agreeing, view this evaluation to be exaggerated (Suh, Bo Hyuk 2014: 41).

² Economically advanced democratic countries tend to argue that cultural differences or the level of economic development are irrelevant when evaluating human rights, as they are understood to be unconditionally and universally valid. They criticize that a relativist position is claimed by authoritarian regimes oppressing democracy to legitimize their power. In contrast, those defending a relativist notion contend that cultural and economic differences influence the conception of human rights and assume that different definitions and standards can exist. Additionally, they assert that developed countries employ human rights to infringe the sovereignty of less developed states to advance their national interests (Kim, Wön-sik 2005: 105ff.; An, Tük-ki 2011: 36).

What actors identify or frame as a cause is closely linked to which solutions they promote (Snow/Benford 2000: 203). In this manner, South Korean progressives and conservatives advocate for different solutions to the North Korean human rights issue. Conservatives demand that South Korea and the international community need to reveal the ongoing human rights violations in the North to pressure it to change. Those belonging to extreme conservative groups even claim that regime change is necessary. On the contrary, progressives favor exchange and cooperation to improve inter-Korean relations, humanitarian assistance, and dialogue on the North Korean human rights issue with the support of the international community (Suh, Bo Hyuk 2014).

Suh, Bo Hyuk (2014: 42) argues that South Korean progressives have been rather passive in engaging in the debate on North Korean human rights because they refused to participate in the limited discourse led by conservatives. Regarding humanitarian assistance, conservatives view transparency and the principle of reciprocity as a precondition, whereas progressives defend humanitarian support without any preconditions as the most adequate solution to improve the lives of the North Korean people (Suh, Bo Hyuk 2014: 41f.).

The distinct framing of the North Korean defector issue of South Korean conservatives and progressives is also apparent in the different labels employed. Conservatives frame North Korean defectors as refugees. They view the structure of the North Korean system as the cause for the human rights situation perceived as horrible. Ultimately, they blame the North Korean regime for the defection of their people. They further argue that North Korean defectors must be acknowledged as refugees, independently from whether their motives for defection are political or not, because they face persecution by the North Korean regime once they are sent back. China's repatriation of defectors and North Korea's punishment of repatriated ones are both constructed as human rights violations by conservatives. Additionally, China's repatriation of defectors is regarded as a breach of the Refugee Convention (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2007: 32ff.).

Instead, progressives frequently employ the label defector or escapee. While acknowledging that some North Koreans defect for political reasons, they mainly view most of them as economic migrants, primarily blaming external, accidental factors for the defection of North Koreans, such as the US and Western sanctions on North Korea, the truce and divided system as well as natural disasters which led to the North Korean famine in the 1990s (Suh, Bo Hyuk 2014: 41). Therefore, allowing them to stay where they are located or giving them tacit approval to enter the South based on humanitarian concerns is regarded as the best solution (Suh, Bo Hyuk 2007: 31f.).

As progressives and conservatives have different understandings of the cause of North Korean defectors, they promote different approaches to solve related issues. Progressives highlight alleviating what they perceive as the main cause of the defection: the poor economic state of North Korea. Therefore, they assume that improving the North Korean economy will reduce the number of defectors, thus focusing on a gradual approach emphasizing basic rights, such as the right to eat, the right to medical care, the right to farm and others while maintaining peace. They commonly emphasize the need to provide humanitarian support to the North to contribute to North Korea's economic development (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2007: 35ff.). In contrast, conservatives view the North Korean authoritarian system as the main cause of defection and frequently advocate for North Korea's democratization. They highlight the potential external impact of the international community in improving the human rights situation, hence engaging in naming and shaming North Korea. Contrarily, being skeptical of external efforts aiming at regime change, progressives rather accentuate internal movements of the North Korean people (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2007: 40).

While some scholars have analyzed the link between the discourse on North Korea, including North Korean defectors, and the specific approaches of conservatives and progressives in dealing with the North Korean defector issue (e.g. Suh, Bo Hyuk 2007; An, Tūk-ki 2011: 36), others have focused on specific actors. The prevalent literature commonly addresses the approaches of conservative and progressive South Korean governments and conservative human rights NGOs in attempting to solve the defector issue. In general, these are widely perceived as South Korean key actors in the context of dealing with the defector issue.

The progressive Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Mu-hyun administrations (2003-2008) pursued a so called 'quiet diplomacy' vis-à-vis China and North Korea based on unofficial negotiations. Following his progressive predecessors, the current progressive President Moon Jae-In (since 2017) is also implementing a quiet diplomacy. This strategy is focused on maintaining good relations with involved countries and using diplomatic channels to find 'quiet' solutions without publicizing issues linked to North Korean defectors, which have been perceived as sensitive issues for North Korea and China. Due to favorable Sino-South Korean relations during the Roh Mu-Hyun and the Kim Dae-jung era, China let many North Korean defectors reach South Korea by sending them to a third country through which they were sent to the South (Lee, Shin-Hwa 2010; Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013).

Sino-South Korean relations deteriorated under the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013). This made it more difficult to successfully unofficially negotiate with Beijing to bring defectors to the South. The conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations (2013-2017) pursued a so called 'active diplomacy' focusing on internationally shaming China and North Korea as human rights violators: the former for repatriating defectors back to the North and the latter for punishing repatriated North Koreans (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013).

South Korean human rights NGOs, which commonly have a conservative affiliation, and particular Christian organizations have also been shaming China and North Korea as human rights violators with the US and other international human rights NGOs in front of the international community, e.g. through the United Nations (UN). Moreover, they have been key actors in constructing the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights of refugees (Suh, Bo Hyuk 2007: 32ff.; Moon, Kyungyon 2014). In contrast, progressive South Korean actors have largely abstained from using this framing. Instead, they have often emphasized the humanitarian aspect of issues related to North Korea, including North Korean defectors. Hence, progressive NGOs are commonly humanitarian NGOs and focus on directly supporting North Korean defectors without fiercely condemning China and North Korea (Suh, Bo Hyuk 2007: 42f.; Suh, Bo Hyuk 2014: 41; Moon, Kyungyon 2014).

While the role of South Korean governments and human rights NGOs has received significant scholarly attention, the role of the South Korean media has been largely ignored. It is commonly not covered and, if so, only in the context of how human rights NGOs employed the media to promote their construction of the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights of refugees and to pressure the Lee Myeong-bak government to pursue a more active diplomacy vis-à-vis China to stop the repatriation of North Koreans (e.g. Hwang, Jaeho 2004: 63f.; Kwak, Sun-Young/Lee, Yong Wook 2009b: 48f.; Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 256f.; Moon, Kyungyon 2014).

Although governments and NGOs have been key actors in constructing specific frames, the media has been a key actor in spreading these frames, and hence the interpretation of the defector issue, within South Korean society and internationally. In this sense, the media has significantly influenced the South Korean and international discourse on North Korean defectors. Ko Seong Joon et al. (2013: 256f.) and Moon Kyungyon (2014) highlight that the media had played a crucial role in pressuring the Lee Myeong-bak administration to take a more active stance against China, which initially did not advocate an active diplomacy toward China and North Korea. An incident which occurred in 2012

marks a turning point. Since then, South Korean human rights NGOs have actively begun to construct issues linked to North Korea as part of the 'North Korean human rights problem'. They have employed their international ties and the media to internationalize the defector issue, framed as a matter of human rights violation of refugees in China and North Korea (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013; Moon, Kyungyon 2014).

In February 2012, leading South Korean newspapers reported on China's plans to repatriate 30 North Koreans. Previously, the South Korean public did not have significant knowledge about the North Korean defector issue. The issue was spread and gained significant domestic and international attention through domestic and foreign media. Moreover, a conservative assemblywoman and a female North Korean defector fasted in front of the Chinese embassy as a sign of protest. In addition, famous South Korean celebrities joined these protests and held concerts, which amplified the attention of South Korean citizens. Over time, more conservative South Korean politicians joined the protests. Under remarkable public pressure, the Lee Myeong-bak administration started to publicly pressure Beijing and issued China's repatriation of North Koreans at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The conservative government tried to stop repatriation by cooperating with the US and the UN and by pressuring China together with the international community. The human rights frame promoted by conservative South Korean NGOs became dominant after 2012. However, China ended up repatriating the arrested North Koreans and has still not changed its official stance (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 255f.; Moon, Kyungyon 2014).

Although the South Korean media has played a vital role in spreading specific frames and narratives linked to the North Korean defector issue and mobilizing support of the South Korean public to pressure the Lee Myeong-bak administration, the media discourse on the North Korean defector issue has not been analyzed in-depth. This is striking, particularly considering that the discourse on the North Korean defector issue is frequently framed as being part of the South-South conflict. It is commonly argued that the ideological division of the South Korean media and their active promoting of ideological warfare have been reinforcing the existing South-South conflict (Rhee, June Woong et al. 2011).

The South Korean media has traditionally been a critical political actor due to several unique factors. Firstly, the media developed before South Korea even existed. The leading newspapers were established in the 1920s, while South Korea was established in 1948. Secondly, a significant proportion of the political elite rose through journalistic

activities during the Japanese colonial period. Even after Japan's colonial ruling, a journalistic career was highly evaluated in the following period of South Korea's dictatorship. During this time, the media did not merely perceive itself as an observer or watchdog, but as a participant of the political processes. Thus, it has not been uncommon for media figures to have been elected to the National Assembly (Levin/Han, Yong-Sup 2002: 71f.).

Furthermore, the overall weakness of political parties has also strengthened the power of the South Korean media. In the South, most political parties may be viewed as aggregations of diverse groups sticking together temporarily and being loyal to a specific leader. This has impaired their role as articulators of public policy. Within this structure, the media has filled this vacuum. In this sense, the conservative Chosun Ilbo and the progressive Hankyoreh newspapers have been functioning as central political players around which both ideological camps have been centered. South Korea's enormously high literacy rate and the fact that the vast majority of people read one of the major national daily newspapers underpin the considerable influence of these media outlets (Levin/Han, Yong-Sup 2002: 72).

This also explains why the conservative Chosun Ilbo and the progressive Hankyoreh are commonly viewed to represent the conservative and progressive South Korean ideological camps in various studies (e.g. Kwon, Ho Cheon 2017; Choi, Yoon-jung/Kweon, Sang-Hee 2014; Lee, Soo-beom/Kang, Yeong-gon 2012; Kim, Kyeong-hee/Noh, Ki-young 2011). Moreover, the South Korean media's influence on the public's perception and interpretation of issues linked to North Korea is particularly considerable due to the limited possibilities of ordinary citizens to directly gain and assess information about North Korea. This goes hand in hand with a severe information imbalance between the media and the public. Therefore, the South Korean public relies heavily on the media to receive information about North Korea (Kim, Dong Yoon 2015).

The media exerts influence over the public through frames. Frames are employed strategically by political and organizational actors and they are prevalent in cognitive structures of journalists, the audience, and in news media content. Political communicators, such as the political elite, NGOs, social movements, and other actors construct frames about specific issues, which they try to establish within the media and the public discourse (Gerhards/Rucht 1992, Benford/Snow 2000, Hänggli/Kriesi 2010). Frames may be understood as socially shared organizing principles which structure the social world in a meaningful way. As part of a culture, these frames direct and influence how information is

constructed by the elite, impact the information selection process of journalists, are apparent in media texts and affect attitudes and cognitions of audience members (Reese 2007). The main idea of framing is that events and issues are interpreted based on selective patterns. Through these interpretations, different narratives are constructed, negotiated, contested, and changed over time (Matthes 2011: 248f.).

Frames are a crucial process through which governments and journalists politically influence each other and the public (Riker 1986). The framing of issues, events and actors must promote interpretations and perceptions, which are advantageous to one side while being disadvantageous for others. This is a crucial precondition for successful political communication. In this sense, frames can increase support or opposition of parties involved in political conflicts by providing schemas for interpretation of events through salience and selection. In this sense, frames select and emphasize specific features of reality while leaving out others (Entman 2003: 417).

Framing plays a key role in the context of political communication. Politicians who are focused on gaining or maintaining the public's support compete with each other and also with journalists over media frames (Entman 1989, Riker 1986). In this sense, framing plays a key role in exercising political power 'and the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power- it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text' (Entman 1993: 55). Hence, frames may be understood as selective perspectives leading to distinct understandings of a perceived problem, its causes, solutions, and evaluations of involved actors (Entman 1993: 52).

News frames have two levels: on one level they function as mentally stored principles which help the audience to process information; on another level they are characteristics of the news text and are attributes of the news. This means they make it less likely for an inexperienced audience to identify the frames and to develop an independent interpretation. While this does not imply that every audience member shares the exact same interpretation, it is likely that politically impressive majorities share overlapping understandings when a single frame dominates a narrative (Entman 1991: 7f.).

Overall, the role of the media discourse in the context of the South-South conflict has received considerable scholarly attention within South Korea. Particularly the comparison of progressive and conservative media frames has become very popular in the past decade. On the one hand, scholars have studied the political influence of media frames on the South Korean public. For instance, the media's impact on the public's evaluation of political figures, their political preferences for specific politics, their interpretation of issues,

or on their political attitudes has been analyzed amongst other topics (e.g. I, Kōn-hyōk 2002; Pak, Yōng-hwan 2012; Lee, Mi-Na 2013; Ryu, Jaesung 2019). Generally, studies analyzing the framing effects focus on how frames provide schemes of interpretation and hence address the cognitive aspect of frames (e.g. Druckman 2001, Scheufele 2004, Matthes 2011). On the other hand, scholars have also focused on frames as features of news texts. In this manner, various scholars have analyzed the framing of the North Korean government, or issues and events related to North Korea (e.g. Choi, Jinbong 2005; Choi, Jinbong 2018). Particularly security-related issues have received much scholarly attention (e.g. Kang, Mihee et al. 2015; Kim, Dong Yoon 2015; Kim, Yonghwan/Jahng, Mi Rosie 2015; Lee, Seok Ho/Wang Qian 2016). In contrast, the number of studies focusing on the framing of issues linked to North Korean defectors in the South Korean media specifically in the context of the South-South conflict is very limited.

Prevalent studies comparing progressive and conservative frames in newspaper articles dealing with North Korean defectors show that progressive and conservative newspapers emphasize different value and contentual frames (Kwak, Jeong-rae/Lee, Joonwoong 2009; Ha, Sūng-hūi/I, Min-kyu 2012; Chong, Miyoung 2014; Ōm, Han-a 2014; Kwon, Ho-cheon 2017, Williams 2017). However, as quantitative studies, they neither identified how narratives were constructed based on how these frames were linked nor did they examine central arguments at the core of the dispute between both ideological camps. Additionally, they did not exclusively focus on the international North Korean defector issue. Hence, they rather provide a general overview of issues and topics linked to North Korean defectors covered in South Korean newspapers within a rather limited time span. Moreover, they do not cover the historical context of the South-South conflict or the role or perception of North Korean defectors in the context of inter-Korean relations. Therefore, the interpretations of their findings remain rather limited.

This thesis aims to fill the literature gap on the South Korean media discourse on the North Korean defector issue in the context of the South-South conflict. In addition, this thesis seeks to address the shortcomings of prevalent studies by comparing how the Hankyoreh and the Chosun Ilbo framed the defector issue between 1998 and 2017 based on a critical discourse analysis. More specifically, this thesis combines the discourse-historical approach to critical discourse analysis with Entman's framing approach. Particular attention is given to the larger historical context to interpret the empirical findings. In line with the theoretical framework, I assume that South Korean progressives and conservatives have constructed distinct narratives of the defector issue based on different understandings,

which have influenced their approaches in dealing with the issue. Furthermore, I assume that these narratives correspond to diverging perspectives, which are reflected in the different frames employed and in the different core arguments defended. In addition, I assume that ideologies and identities are discursively constructed.

On the one hand, I view the Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh articles as crucial platforms representing the general societal discourse between South Korean conservatives and progressives. Thus, the main arguments and narratives found in both media outlets are those shared by conservatives and progressives, and not just by these newspapers. On the other hand, I argue that it is vital to focus specifically on the media discourse due to the distinguishing feature of the mainstream media of having a huge audience and the potential to influence the large parts of the public through frames. This research addresses a number of key conceptual and empirical aspects deriving from the following main research question:

How has the ideological affiliation of the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh influenced the framing of the ‘North Korean defector issue’?

To analyze the historical and societal context in which this media discourse is embedded, the following sub research questions are answered:

- How has the South-South conflict evolved?
- How is the ideological affiliation of South Korean conservatives and progressives linked to specific conceptions of the South Korean identity?
- Which roles have North Korean defectors played in the context of inter-Korean relations?

The first two sub research questions address the historical context of the South-South conflict. In South Korea, the ideological affiliation is linked to two distinct perceptions of the South Korean identity. Understanding this connection is crucial to understanding the ongoing South-South conflict and the larger discourse on North Korea between conservatives and progressives, which is a characteristic feature of the political culture of South Korea. The third sub research question explores how changing inter-Korean relations have influenced the way South Korean administrations have treated North Korean defectors, which is reflected in the development of South Korea’s settlement policy

for North Korean defectors. To answer these sub research questions, the developments during and after the Cold War and South Korea's democratization have been covered. In addition, the following sub research questions focus on identifying the prevalent framing within the South Korean media:

- How were specific narratives representing the perspectives of the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh constructed surrounding the North Korean defector issue?
- What did they frame as main problems and their causes, and which actors were framed as being involved in solving these problems? Which approaches did they pursue and how were involved actors evaluated?
- How did actors promote normative frames (human rights, the protection of refugees based on international law, humanitarianism) to promote specific interpretations according to these media outlets?
- Which core arguments constituting the dispute on how to deal with the North Korean defector issue were presented?

I demonstrate that the ideological affiliation of the Hankyoreh and the Chosun Ilbo has significantly influenced their framing of the North Korean defector issue in several ways. First, both media outlets constructed different narratives based on distinct interpretations, which may also be viewed as distinct perspectives, centered around China and North Korea. Second, the core features of both ideologies were prevalent: a strongly negative stance toward North Korea and a positive stance toward the US by the Chosun Ilbo and a more sympathetic stance toward North Korea and a more critical view of US by the Hankyoreh. Third, both media outlets framed actors of their own ideological camp in a more positive light, whereas actors from the opposing camp were more negatively depicted. In addition, I show how other social practices are linked to discourse by revealing the link between the framing of the North Korean defector issue and perceived solutions by South Korean progressives and conservatives. Furthermore, I argue that the South Korean media has played a significant role in reinforcing the South-South conflict.

The thesis is structured in the following way. This introduction chapter serves to provide an introduction and a brief overview of the research topic including an outlining and embedding in the current literature. Most importantly, it shows that the South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors is part of the wider discourse on how to deal with North Korea and the North Korean human rights issue. This discourse is characterized by

the South-South conflict with conservatives and progressives sharing distinct understandings and notions of the North Korean human rights issue. Although the media has been reinforcing the South-South division and has majorly spread the awareness on the North Korean defector issue by promoting specific frames, the South Korean media discourse on North Korean defectors has not been analyzed in depth. This thesis seeks to fill this gap.

In the second chapter, I provide an overview of the relevant literature. The chapter is divided into four subchapters. The first subchapter (2.1) focuses on the construction of human rights, humanitarianism and refugees based on international law based on a constructivist understanding. These norms are part of the core of the dispute between South Korean progressives and conservatives and are not fixed, but instead have been contested by various actors throughout history. The second subchapter (2.2.) addresses how South Korean NGOs emerged as an important actor engaged in inter-Korean relations in the context of North Korea's economic crisis. Moreover, the influence of humanitarian and human rights NGOs on the South Korean government's approach toward North Korea and China to protect North Korean defectors through the promoting of humanitarian and human rights norms is covered. The third subchapter (2.3) presents an overview of the academic discourse on the North Korean defector issue. It focuses on arguments made by scholars to defend or criticize the two mainstream positions regarding the North Korean defector issue. The final subchapter (2.4.) presents the previous research on the framing of issues related to North Korean defectors in the South Korean media. Limitations and shortcomings are listed, while the contributions of this thesis are highlighted.

Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical and analytical framework as well as the methodology employed for this research. In chapter 3.1, I discuss the paradigmatic foundation of this thesis, critical theory, as well as the theoretical framework, which is a synthesis of the discourse-historical approach to critical discourse analysis and Entman's framing approach. The analytical framework, including the methodology and data, is presented in chapter 3.2.

In the fourth chapter, which is divided into two subchapters, I situate the South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors in a larger historical context. The first subchapter (4.1.) deals with the development of South Korean conservative and progressive ideologies and shows how these ideological camps have two distinct conceptions of the South Korean identity. This ongoing South-South conflict is at the core of the South Korean discourse on North Korea and North Korean defectors. The second subchapter (4.2.)

focuses on the role of North Korean defectors in the context of inter-Korean relations, reflected in South Korea's settlement policy for North Koreans. It emphasizes how North Korean defectors have been politicized within the South since their emergence.

I subsequently present the findings of my own empirical analysis in the fifth chapter, which is divided into five subchapters. In chapter 5.1, I focus on the framing of issues primarily linked to China in the Chosun Ilbo, whereas the framing of issues mainly linked to North Korea are presented in chapter 5.2. In chapter 5.3, I cover the framing of issues primarily linked to China in the Hankyoreh, while the chapter 5.4 deals with the framing of issues mainly linked to North Korea. Chapter 5.5 outlines the core arguments of the dispute between progressives and conservatives on how to approach the North Korean defector issue prevalent in both media outlets. Particular attention is given to the distinct assumptions and interpretations made by both camps, which are linked to their different approaches vis-à-vis China and North Korea. In this sense, these arguments are central to explaining the different policies and strategies advanced by South Korean progressive and conservative governmental and nongovernmental actors attempting to solve the North Korean defector issue.

In the final chapter (6), I discuss the key findings of this thesis and provide a normative critique of the South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors. In this context, I provide recommendations for scholars and other involved actors regarding how to approach the North Korean human rights issue and the North Korean defector issue. Moreover, I provide suggestions for dealing with the South-South conflict.

This thesis contributes to existing bodies of literature in several ways. Firstly, this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the continuing South-South divide. This research sheds light on the reasons and causes of ongoing disagreements between South Korean conservatives and progressives. This is done by highlighting the historical context and evolution of the two ideological camps linked to different notions of the South Korean identity as a basis. In addition, how the construction of different frames contributes to the (re)constructing of partially overlapping and partially different narratives linked to different perspectives is shown. Moreover, this research explains how the different perspectives have led South Korean governmental and nongovernmental conservative and progressive actors to promote distinct approaches and strategies in dealing with China and North Korea in the context of the North Korean defector issue. This research confirms previous findings of Suh, Bo-Hyuk (2006, 2007, 2014), who also explored the link between the South Korean discourse on North Korea and the social practices in the context of the South-South conflict

comparing the different perceptions and approaches of South Korean progressives and conservatives.

Secondly, this thesis adds to the prevalent literature dealing with and comparing progressive and conservative South Korean media frames. Thirdly, this thesis also contributes to the constructivist body of literature which emphasizes the role of ideas including identity, ideology, norms, and values in explaining political action. Fourthly, this thesis establishes a theoretical and analytical framework based on a synthesis of the discourse historical approach and Entman's framing approach, which may be applied by other critical scholars. Lastly, as a critical inquiry, this thesis further includes practical suggestions and recommendations to mitigate the South-South conflict and to contribute to solving the North Korean defector issue in the final chapter.

2. Literature Review

This chapter situates this thesis within the wider literature and focuses on the academic discourse on the North Korean defector issue and relevant aspects. It is divided into four parts. The first subchapter (2.1) deals with the construction of human rights, humanitarianism and refugees based on international law, as these are the central norms which are part of the discourse on North Korean defectors. Therefore, their origins and commonalities based on a constructivist perspective are briefly discussed. In addition, the way the UN frames these norms as well as its involvement in the North Korean human rights issue including the North Korean defector issue are addressed.

The second subchapter (2.2.) begins with a presentation of the historical context of North Korea's famine and economic crisis at the end of the Cold War and the emergence of South Korean NGOs since South Korea's democratization. It focuses on the approaches pursued by governmental and nongovernmental actors to deal with North Korea's economic crisis including the defector issue. Moreover, particular attention is given to the norms advocated and adopted by these actors to justify their approaches.

The third subchapter (2.3) covers an overview of the academic discourse on the defector issue. It looks at how the defector issue has been framed by scholars and how involved actors have been evaluated in the literature. The fourth subchapter (2.4.) presents the previous research on the framing of issues related to North Korean defectors in the South Korean media, while the final subchapter (2.5) summarizes the main conclusions of the entire chapter.

2.1. The Construction of Human rights, Humanitarianism and Refugees

As human rights and humanitarianism are normative concepts, which are socially constructed, there are various definitions and understandings. Both norms, or more precisely their construction and meaning, evolved over time and have been constructed fragmentarily and conditionally without a clear continuous narrative (Cmiel 2004: 117ff.). As practitioners of humanitarianism and human rights have been increasingly working in both areas, there has been a growing debate on how their interventions relate to each other and whether they are rivals or allies with the common goal of defending humanity (Barnett 2018: 314). While human rights organizations initially did not engage in armed conflict, they have been increasingly doing so (Neier 2012). Due to the extensive impact of human rights organizations and their extended activities, humanitarian aid organizations have adopted a rights-based approach (Hilhorst/Jansen 2010: 1135f.). In this sense, scholars have argued that international human rights law and humanitarian law have merged into humanity's law (e.g. Leebaw 2007, Teitel 2011, Luban 2015).

Many scholars emphasize the commonalities of both norms and or relate these to each other, contributing to a blurriness between the two. For instance, Buergenthal, Shelton and Stewart (2009) define human rights 'as the law concerned with the protection of individuals and groups against violations of their internationally guaranteed rights' (p.1), 'be they civil and political rights or economic, social and cultural rights' (p.27). They further view humanitarian law as the branch of international law which 'can be defined as the human rights component of the law of armed conflict' (Buergenthal et al. 2009: 22). They contend that the international human rights law acknowledges that all people 'have internationally guaranteed rights as individuals and not as nationals of a particular state' (Buergenthal et al. 2009: 25). Thus, they emphasize that human rights laws and institutions aim at protecting individuals against human rights violations committed by other as well as their state of nationality (Buergenthal et al. 2009: 25f.).

Leebaw (2007) understands both human rights and humanitarian movements as impartial 'ethical responses to war dispossession, suffering, and the relationship between the rich and poor', (p. 223) or more generally, to injustice and suffering. He argues that the core difference between the two movements lies in the different ways in which impartiality has been conceptualized, based on a diverging understanding of the relationship between politics and ethics. According to him, humanitarian practices are based on a definition of impartiality in pragmatic terms, 'as a space apart from political conflict, designated to

provide aid to the suffering without provoking the hostility of combatants' (Leebaw 2007: 224). Contrarily, he argues that the human rights movement does not consider the political sphere as separate, rather employing impartiality as a foundation for moral evaluation targeted at changing internal political practices while claiming to be impartial. He highlights that humanitarian practices have been characterized by the urgency of relief, whereas human rights efforts focus on long deliberations aimed at establishing responsibility for wrongdoings to promote progressive change. In his eyes, humanitarian organizations faced with limits of impartial activism have relied on human rights as a foundation to politicize their efforts. Similarly, human rights organizations met with critique regarding their claim of being impartial have assimilated humanitarian law and logic to counter such judgments. In this manner, both human rights and humanitarian organizations adopted strategies from each other and have reframed their claims of impartiality by merging justice claims of the human rights movements with the pragmatic refraining of evaluation and urgency linked to humanitarianism (Leebaw 2007: 223ff.).

Barnett (2018: 316ff.) describes that up to the 1990s, human rights and humanitarian efforts focused on different types of suffering: human rights on the suffering due to a lack of rights and entitlements caused by a government, and humanitarianism on suffering caused by extraordinary circumstances, which affect a huge population and threaten basic life. He contends that humanitarianism is defined by many as life-saving relief, whereas human rights target stopping oppression and enabling individuals to live a fulfilling life according to their own choice. Humanitarian and human rights actors commonly emphasize the meaning in their practices and point out to be motivated by humanity (Barnett 2018: 316). However, he observes that in the past two decades, what counts as one or another has become a matter of contestation (e.g. Teitel 2011, Crowe 2014, Moyn 2016, Barnett 2018). According to him, the debate about their boundaries has significantly intensified since the 1990s due to a drastic increase of concern and amount of suffering induced by violent conflicts. This led actors to reevaluate which kinds of suffering they devoted themselves to as well as what constitutes their practice (Barnett 2018: 318).

Forsythe (2013) argues that both human rights and humanitarianism have the same humane or traditionally liberal aim of constructing 'a policy space for human dignity in the face of state and nonstate power' (p.60) based on philosophical liberalism, specifically in the context of military necessity and state security. Nonetheless, he points out that international human rights law and international humanitarian law are legally two different bodies of law. The human rights law has a rather broad, general scope, whereas humanitarian law

specifically focuses on situations of armed conflict. The human rights law was first established between 1945 and 1948, which marks the beginning of the UN era, and has significantly been extended over time. In contrast, humanitarian law was established in the form of a treaty which dates to 1864 and the first Geneva Convention for war victims (Forsythe 2013: 59f.).

The UN focuses on both promoting human rights and providing humanitarian aid. Its approach and framing of both norms reflect how both norms are not clearly separated, but rather perceived as being intertwined. According to the UN, 'human rights are inherent to all beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible' (OHCHR n.d. a). Human rights are constructed by the UN as both rights and obligations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, is the first established legal foundation of the international human rights law. The Declaration specifies a list of human rights which all human beings should be able to enjoy, including basic civil and political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. According to the UN, the international human rights law specifies obligations of states to protect and uphold human rights. The International Bill of Human Rights are comprised of the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Operational Protocols, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Kabasakal Arat 2006: 417).

The rights to adequate food and housing, water and sanitation, health, education, social security, to participate in cultural life and work are categorized as economic, social, and cultural rights (United Nations 1966a). Civil and political rights include the right to life; freedom of speech, religion, and assembly; and rights to political participation, which must be secured by governments (United Nations 1966b). The UNDR did not differentiate between economic, social, and cultural rights and civil and political rights. The distinction emerged in the context of the Cold War. The Eastern bloc emphasized the former, while the Western bloc instead highlighted the latter. Therefore, two separate Covenants were adopted (OHCHR 2008: 9).

Although the UN abstains from providing a clear definition of humanitarianism, humanitarian crises, or humanitarian aid, it repetitively emphasizes the link to human rights. For instance, the UN states: 'humanitarian crises- including man-made conflicts, natural disasters and pandemics- often result in or exacerbate human rights concerns. In

addition, deteriorating human rights situation may trigger crises and increase humanitarian needs of affected populations (...). OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) applies a human-rights based approach to humanitarian action (...) Human rights often perform a 'bridging' function across phases of a crisis, and support continuity among efforts by humanitarian, development and sustaining peace partners. Every humanitarian operation can benefit from human rights work, which addresses root causes of a crisis and therefore contributes to build a comprehensive response and enhance peace and security for all (...) Through the participation in humanitarian coordination structures, we try to integrate the protection of human rights in humanitarian action' (OHCHR n.d. b).

The UN has four entities focusing on humanitarian aid by primarily delivering relief support: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Hence, helping refugees is constructed as a humanitarian effort by the UN. The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 protocol are the legal foundations for the international protection of refugees. According to the UN, a refugee is 'a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being prosecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him- or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution' (UNHCR 2011).

The UNHCR also argues that those who did not leave their country for refugee-related reasons, such as economic migrants, have legitimate claims to be protected as 'refugees sur place' if actors in the residing country violate the human rights of the community the migrant belongs to. This may apply to victims of human trafficking. Moreover, those who face fear of persecution from their country of origin while staying abroad and may also be categorized as 'refugees sur place' (Kurlantzick/Mason 2006: 44f.). Generally, the UNHCR defines persons who were not refugees when they left their country but become refugees at a later point in time as 'refugees sur place' (UNHCR 1992).

The 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol are the main legal documents of refugee law. So far, the so-called refugee agreement has been ratified by 1954 states, including China. Apart from defining who is considered a refugee, their rights, and the legal obligations of governments to protect them are laid out. These include the non-refoulement principle according to which states must not repatriate refugees to a country where their life

or freedom are considerably threatened (United Nations 1951), which is widely acknowledged as a customary law norm (Gil-Bazo 2015: 41). This means that refugees have a right to seek asylum according to the international refugee law. The non-refoulement obligations are constructed by the UN, amongst others, as relevant for every state independently from whether the state has signed the refugee agreement. Moreover, Article 14 of the UDHR also recognizes the right to seek asylum (Terry 2002: 29).

In the 2000s, South Korean and international human rights NGOs heavily advocated for the protection North Korean human rights and the UN incorporated it in its agenda. The UN Human Rights Committee started dealing with the North Korean human rights issue in 2003 (the UNHCR in 2006), and the UN General Assembly adopted the North Korean Human Rights Resolutions since 2005. Apart from monitoring the human rights situation in North Korea (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2014: 37), the UN has also been dealing with the North Korean defector issue. In this manner, the UN has been pressing China to abide by the principle of non-refoulement and consider them as refugees *sur place*, whether they left their country for economic or political reasons, because they face persecution once they are sent back. Hence, the UN has been demanding that China should allow them to resettle in a third country when it is reported that North Koreans have been arrested by Chinese authorities (Kurlantzick/Mason 2006: 34ff.).

In the literature, the international refugee law and the protection of refugees have often been understood as humanitarian action (e.g. Terry 2002, Legomsky 2005: 915f.) or as being founded on a human rights paradigm (e.g. Hathaway 1991, Anker 2002, Chetail 2014, Gil-Bazo 2015), sometimes also as extended foreign policy relations on the basis of national interest (Legomsky 2005: 915f.) and, although less common, also as a post-colonial enterprise (e.g. Juss 2013). The widespread framing of the refugee law as a matter of humanitarianism or human rights again shows how both norms are commonly linked without clearly being distinguished. As Forsythe (2013: 60) points out, this may be because the international refugee law shares common philosophical roots with humanitarianism and human rights, namely liberalism. In this manner, they all promote the notion that every individual has rights, and that states must protect these, reflecting the idea that state sovereignty is not limitless.

In summary, human rights and humanitarianism are contested norms based on liberalism. They both promote a notion of human dignity which applies to every individual and aim at alleviating or at least decreasing specific types of human suffering, which also overlap according to some scholars. The increasing convergence of issues and areas tackled

by both human rights and humanitarian practitioners has further contributed to the blurriness between the two norms. The protection of refugees based on the international refugee law is a good example for this phenomenon, as it is framed as a humanitarian and/or human rights endeavor and tackled by activists on both sides.

2.2. Approaches and Norms of Progressive and Conservative South Korean Governments and NGOs in dealing with the North Korean Defector Issue

North Korea's economic crisis and famine in the mid to late 1990s was induced by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which had supported the country with food, cheap fuel and substantial aid as a socialist ally during the Cold War. This led North Korea to ask for humanitarian assistance, which paved the way for South Korean NGOs to become a key actor in inter-Korean relations (Reed 2010). South Korean humanitarian and human rights NGOs have been norm entrepreneurs since South Korea's democratization. They have played a major role in South Korea's changes with regard to its North Korean human rights policy based on different notions of human rights, including the government's approach vis-à-vis China and North Korea in the context of the North Korean defector issue (Moon, Kyungyon 2014).

NGOs may be defined as non-state actors with a public character and a private form, which are non-profit oriented in the goals and undertakings (Powell 1987, Anheier/Seibel 1990, Powell/Clemens 1998, Weiss/Gordenker 2007). NGOs have emerged internationally as an institutional hybrid assuming public functions based on private initiative. They are increasingly taking over tasks which were traditionally exclusively exercised by governments (Salamon/Anheier 1994). Their advantage over governments is that they can act more effectively in areas where governments lack flexibility or resources. Moreover, they are also crucial channels for public opinion and movements, particularly when governments are unwilling to deal with certain social needs. In this sense, NGOs have become key actors in exercising initiatives focusing on public goals on the local, national, or global level (Kim, Hyuk-Rae 2000: 596). In South Korea NGOs have flourished since the country's democratization movement in 1987 (Han, Sang-Jin 1997; Yu, P'al-mu/Kim, Ho-gi 2013). Previously, under authoritarian ruling, the state promoted economic development and modernization while and suppressing the evolvement of a civil society (Kim, Hyuk-rae 2000).

In the South Korean context, it is important to distinguish between human rights and humanitarian NGOs. Human rights NGOs refer to those dedicated to advocating for human rights in the North and/or for North Korean defectors. They are usually conservative. In contrast, humanitarian NGOs promote and focus on humanitarian development and aid of North Koreans and are generally progressive or centrist. South Korean NGOs adopted humanitarian as well as human rights norms thereby influencing normative perceptions of South Korean governments and the South Korean society regarding North Korea since South Korea's democratization. The norms adopted by the NGOs evolved over time (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013; Moon, Kyungyon 2014).

South Korean humanitarian NGOs became an important political actor supporting North Korea between 1995 and 1999. Following North Korea's request for food aid directed to the international community in 1995, new humanitarian NGOs emerged. These NGOs and prevalent religious groups aimed at alleviating what they perceived as the North Korean humanitarian crisis and began to advocate for humanitarian aid to support the DPRK faced with a famine when the South Korean Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1998) was rather reluctant to support the North (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013; Moon, Kyungyon 2014).

The humanitarian NGOs justified their efforts by promoting norms of fraternal love and humanitarianism, thus seeking to replace dominant frames linked to a perception of the North as an enemy, which had been advocated by the authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. As the Kim Young-Sam administration was rather restraining regarding its response to the food crisis in the North, South Korean NGOs and religious groups filled this vacuum and emerged as a new political actor. Using their extensive social networks, humanitarian NGOs actively campaigned for humanitarian aid to the North by lobbying politicians, employing the media and involving the public by promoting frames of humanitarianism and fraternal love. They assumed these norms would be easier to accept by the Korean society than human rights norms, which had not been fully internalized yet (Moon, Kyungyon 2014: 69f.).

Under the following progressive Presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun, who pursued an engagement policy vis-à-vis the North, the role of NGOs in the context of inter-Korean reconciliation was promoted. This policy of engagement was linked to a changed discourse on North Korea. The policy marked a drastic shift from the previous South Korean policy toward the North focused on Korean unification through South Korean absorption of North Korea. Instead, dialogue and engagement based on humanitarian principles and the provision of aid, economic exchange and cooperation were emphasized.

Both the progressive Kim and Roh administrations viewed improved inter-Korean relations and reconciliation as their primary task in dealing with Pyongyang (Ministry of Unification 2005: 112).

Particularly humanitarian NGOs were more influential during the Kim and Roh era (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013; Moon, Kyungyon 2014). Humanitarian NGOs successfully influenced the Kim Dae-jung administration, which adopted the norms of fraternal love and humanitarianism. Under Kim's presidency NGOs could engage directly with the North for the first time (Moon, Kyungyon 2014: 69f.). The North Korean human rights issue did not gain significant public attention until the late 1990s during the early years of Kim Dae-jung's presidency. Although it was recognized that North Korean human rights abuses occurred, the government emphasized that the principles of human rights should be upheld insofar as inter-Korean relations are not jeopardized (Ministry of Unification 2005: 112).

Influenced by humanitarian NGOs, the progressive South Korean governments viewed human rights as a by-product of economic improvement and development. Therefore, humanitarian assistance was understood to improve the human rights of North Koreans (Son, Sarah A. 2016). Between 2000 and 2003, humanitarian NGOs advocated for the human rights framework by highlighting economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR). Not only were ESCR concerns separated from political and civil rights matters, ESCR were selectively adopted by being reduced to the right to food (Moon, Kyungyon 2014: 86).

Moreover, the acceptance and support of North Korean defectors in South Korea was also framed as a matter of humanitarianism and filial responsibility by the progressive Kim Dae-jung administration, pointing out the shared ethnicity of all Koreans (Son, Sarah A. 2016). As improved inter-Korean relations were prioritized by the progressive Kim and Roh administrations, any discourse and actions that could majorly impede such efforts were avoided on a governmental level. Therefore, these governments largely abstained from issuing the North Korean human rights issue and from voting on the UN resolution condemning North Korea as a human rights violator (Son, Sarah A. 2018: 667f.). Thus, promoting humanitarianism as the guiding norm in dealing with North Korea was a useful way of justifying the engagement policy vis-à-vis an authoritarian regime and the support of North Korean defectors, who increasingly settled in the South.

As the number of North Korean defectors massively increased in the 1990s due to the North Korean economic crisis, South Korean NGOs focused on the North Korean human rights issue emerged in the mid- to late 1990s. While previously the South Korean public knew relatively little about the life of North Koreans, this changed with the influx of

North Korean defectors, who began to testify about their experiences. These testimonies were important data for NGOs engaged in advocacy campaigns and human rights documentations. The North Korean human rights discourse was promoted by conservative human rights NGOs during the time of progressive administrations, which did not support such efforts (Chubb 2014).

After the US established the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004, the debate on the North Korean human rights issue within South Korea was particularly lively until the end of the Roh administration. The conservative Bush administration pursued a different North Korea policy from the progressive Roh administration, and the discourse on North Korean human rights reinforced the ideological cleavage within the South Korean society. Conservative human rights NGOs defended the civil and political rights (CPR) framework, while centrist and humanitarian NGOs supported the ESCR framework. After 2008, the CPR framework became dominant within South Korea. The election of the conservative Lee administration mistrusting the North Korean regime as well as strengthened transnational network activities of human rights NGOs contributed to the consolidation of the CPR normative framework (Moon, Kyungyon 2014: 86).

Under the conservative Lee Myeong-bak government, the human rights discourse was intensified, specifically in the context of a discourse on Korean unification. Both Lee Myeong-bak and his conservative successor Park Geun-hye pursued a hardline approach vis-à-vis the North, prioritizing denuclearization over improved inter-Korean relations. A key feature of their North Korea policy was that they used the North Korean human rights issue to pressure Pyongyang to denuclearize. In this manner, they criticized the North Korean regime for its human rights abuses through a rhetoric of shaming and by voting for the UN North Korean human rights resolution (Son, Sarah A. 2015). Accepting North Korean defectors was framed by conservative administrations in terms of human rights. This reflects the identification of South Korea as a separate, responsible actor, different from the North (Son, Sarah A. 2016). In this sense, as opposed to progressive administrations, which had emphasized humanitarianism, conservative governments highlighted the human rights frame in dealing with North Korea.

South Korean progressives and conservatives have not only been disagreeing on how to deal with North Korea, but also on how to deal with China's repatriation of North Koreans. Progressive governments have pursued a so called 'quiet diplomacy' focused on unofficially and bilaterally negotiating with Beijing to let defectors reach the South via a third country based on humanitarian grounds whenever defectors are caught by Chinese

authorities. As China does not acknowledge North Korean defectors as refugees and China's cooperation is required to stop repatriation, progressives emphasize that maintaining good relations with China is crucial. The core target of Kim and Roh's quiet diplomatic approach were North Korea and China. In a context of promoting a mood of détente in Northeast Asia, progressive governments wanted to avoid international and inter-Korean tensions and were therefore more cautious in accepting North Koreans. Particularly Roh's strategy prioritized avoiding any provocations vis-à-vis Pyongyang to reduce inter-Korean tensions (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 254f.).

Opposing this approach, the conservative Lee and Park administrations practiced an 'active diplomacy' characterized by internationally naming and shaming China and North Korea as human rights violators: the former for repatriating defectors back to the North, and the latter for punishing repatriated North Koreans and for the scarce human rights situation in the North, which was framed as the cause of defection of North Koreans. Unlike progressive governments, conservative governments chose to appeal to the international community including the UN, emphasizing human rights as a universal matter (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013).

The Lee Myeong-bak government did not pursue an active diplomacy toward China and North Korea until it was significantly pressured by the South Korean society in 2012. South Korean human rights NGOs employed their international ties and the media and played a major role in internationalizing the North Korean defector issue. They framed the repatriation of defectors by China and their punishment by North Korea as a matter of human rights violation of refugees in China and North Korea (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013; Moon, Kyungyon 2014). In this sense, the North Korean defector issue was constructed as being part of the wider North Korean human rights issue based on a CPR framework of human rights by South Korean human rights NGOs.

In line with conservative South Korean governments, conservative human rights NGOs and many Christian organizations have been shaming China and North Korea as human rights abusers with the US and other international NGOs in front of the international community and the UN. Focusing on advocacy, they have been demanding that North Korean defectors should be acknowledged as refugees due to the human rights violations they face in China as well as in the North once they are repatriated (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 244ff.). Human rights NGOs have also been the main promoters of the US North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (Kim, Jungin 2010: 80f.) and of the South Korean North Korean Human Rights Act of 2012 (Moon, Kyungyon 2014). They also contacted the

UN, which had neglected the issue of North Korean defectors, asking the UNHCR to return to China to determine the conditions of North Koreans in the country. They referred to the 1995 bilateral agreement, which specifies that the organization has the permission to access refugees in China (Kwak, Sun-Young/Lee, Yong Wook 2009b: 56). In this sense, human rights NGOs have been the main actors to internationalize the defector issue through the media, through influencing national governments and the United Nations by constructing the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights of refugees.

In contrast, progressive and centrist humanitarian NGOs have supported North Korean defectors, commonly after they have settled in the South, while having abstained from framing matters as human rights issues and from any actions which could provoke China or North Korea. They have instead been focused on humanitarian development and aid of North Koreans (Ko, Seong Joon et. al 2013: 244ff.; Moon, Kyungyon 2014: 66ff.).

Overall, South Korean progressives mainly stress humanitarianism, whereas conservatives accentuate human rights in dealing with North Korea and China in the context of inter-Korean relations and the North Korean defector issue. South Korean NGOs have significantly influenced the discourse on North Korea and North Korean defectors by defending specific norms, which have been adopted by South Korean administrations. During the period of the progressive Kim and Roh administrations, progressive humanitarian NGOs, which constructed North Korea's economic crisis, famine, and North Korean defectors as humanitarian issues, were more influential. Progressive actors have been focused on improving inter-Korean relations and supporting North Korea's economic development. Moreover, progressive governments have tried to solve the North Korean defector issue based on a quiet diplomacy focused on bilaterally negotiating with China and North Korea to stop repatriation (Ko, Seong Joon et. al 2013: 244ff.).

However, there was a drastic shift during the period of the conservative Lee administration. Conservative human rights NGOs were successful at promoting their human rights framing, which became dominant within South Korean society. These constructed issues linked to North Korea, including North Korean defectors, as matters of human rights based on a CPR framework. This CPR framework was not shared by progressive humanitarian NGOs, which adopted an ESCR framework. In this manner, the concept of human rights has been a core dispute between South Korean progressives and conservatives. Conservative governments have pursued an active diplomacy pressuring and shaming North Korea and China as human rights violators in front of the international community. Similarly, conservative human rights NGOs have engaged in advocacy, naming

and shaming China and the North. They further constructed North Korean defectors as refugees, framing them as human rights victims who must be protected by the international community (Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 244ff.).

2.3. The Academic Discourse on the North Korean Defector Issue

Both mainstream positions regarding the North Korean defector issue are prevalent in the literature. The conservative framing of defectors as refugees and human rights victims of China and North Korea is predominant in the English literature. Within the English academic discourse, scholars frequently focus on human rights NGOs or the legal status of North Koreans as refugees (e.g. Hwang, Jaeho 2004; Kim, Hyuk-Rae 2006; Moon, Kyungyon 2014; Lee, Whiejin 2016).

The progressive position, which critically views the construction of the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights violations of refugees, is defended more frequently in the Korean literature compared to the English literature. However, much of the Korean literature also interprets the North Korean defector issue as being part of the North Korean human rights problem. This shows that the human rights frame has also become dominant within the South Korean academic discourse in the past decade. In the South Korean literature, the North Korean defector issue is mainly either primarily framed as part of the South-South conflict (e.g. Suh, Bo-hyuk 2006; Suh, Bo-hyuk 2014; I, Chun-t'ae 2015; Mun, Dong-hŭi 2018), or framed as a matter of human rights violations of refugees (e.g. Han, Sang-u/Pae, Chi-suk 2008; Son, Hyŏn-jin 2017). In addition, the Korean literature covers approaches of governmental and nongovernmental actors more extensively (e.g. I, U-yŏng et al. 2000; Jhe, Seong Ho 2002; Suh, Bo-hyuk 2006; Han, Sang-u/Pae, Chi-suk 2008; I, Suk Cha 2009; Jung, Giwoong 2012; Suh, Bo-hyuk 2014; I, Chun-t'ae 2015; Hur, Joon-young/Kim, Jihye 2017).

In general, scholars have been increasingly defending the conservative framing of the North Korean defector issue. In line with South Korean and international human rights organizations and the UNHCR, many scholars argue that North Koreans must be acknowledged as refugees or refugees sur place, independently from whether their motives for defection are political, because they fear prosecution by the North Korean regime once they are sent back (e.g. Kulantzick/Mason 2006: 34ff.; Charny 2004: 93ff.; Haggard/Noland 2006: 9; Chan/Schloenhardt 2007: 229; Han, Sang-u/Pae, Chi-suk 2007: 131ff.; Son, Hyŏn-jin 2017: 120f.; Park, Byung-do 2012; Kuk, Min-ho 2017). Defenders of this position assert that China should acknowledge North Koreans as refugees and stop repatriating them and

abide by its international obligations as a member state of the Refugee Convention. This goes hand in hand with the assertion that China should be pressured by the international community to do so (e.g. Haggard/Noland 2004: 9, Kurlantzick/Mason 2004: 34ff.; Hwang, Jaeho 2004: 67f.; Kim, Hyuk-Rae 2006: 85f., Cohen 2014).

This position primarily emphasizes the obligation to protect human rights and abide by the international refugee law, thereby defending the human rights and international law frame. Nonetheless, some scholars promoting this framing support a solution based on humanitarian grounds. The UN has repetitively demanded from the Chinese government to provide the UNHCR and humanitarian organizations unhindered access to North Koreans in China and to protect them from human trafficking, amongst other things. Among scholars viewing defectors as refugees, some support the proposal by the UNHCR and other NGOs, such as The Human Rights Watch, that China should grant all North Koreans an indefinite humanitarian status and allow them to access them (e.g. Charny 2004: 96; Cohen 2014: 73).

Commonly, those promoting the South Korean conservative interpretation of the North Korean defector issue criticize the quiet diplomacy by pointing out that the progressive governments have been too passive and that their strategy has not improved the human rights of defectors in China. Moreover, this strategy has been renounced for not being successful at stopping China's repatriation of defectors. Additionally, progressives are often attacked for overly highlighting North Korea's distinct characteristics and therefore having ignored the human rights violations happening in the North, or having adopted an attitude of rational ignorance, assuming that it is better not to issue the matter for strategic reasons. In this context, they are blamed for having prioritized inter-Korean relations over the human rights of North Koreans (e.g. Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013: 258; I, Söng-u 2009: 2; Lee, Shin-wha 2010: 163ff.; I, Suk Cha 2009; Jung, Giwoong 2012; Kuk, Min-ho 2017). Their emphasis of North Korea's distinct characteristics, according to some, can be viewed as legitimizing the human rights violations (I, Söng-u 2009: 2).

Defenders of human rights NGOs contend that they have been key actors who have influenced the US and South Korean governments to establish legal foundations for the protection of human rights of North Koreans (e.g. Kim, Jungin 2010; Kwak, Sun-Young/Lee, Yong Wook 2009b). Furthermore, it is highlighted that NGOs pressured the South Korean government to no longer exercise a quiet diplomatic strategy but to promote an active strategy of criticizing China with the international community (Kwak, Sun-Young/Lee, Yong Wook 2009b: 55). Moreover, the transnational networks between NGOs,

governments, and the private sector, as well as their advantage in providing others with information on related issues, are emphasized (Kim, Jungin 2010: 84).

In addition, it is sometimes argued that human rights NGOs have in some cases been successful at impacting China's decision not to repatriate North Koreans by strategically using the international media to promote the issue as a human rights concern of refugees targeting at influencing the publics' and governments' perception on the issue in the US and South Korea. Thus, defenders of human rights NGOs highlight that their efforts contributed to China's decision not to repatriate North Koreans at times due to concerns over its international image by mobilizing and creating international pressure (Kwak, Sun-Young/Lee, Yong Wook 2009b: 48f.).

In line with South Korean progressives, other scholars disapprove or are skeptical of the construction of the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights violations of refugees and of a strategy of naming and shaming China and North Korea. Those who see the North Korean famine and economic situation as the main cause of defection advocate for the South Korean government and NGOs to support North Korea to revive its economy to solve the food and economic crisis and to improve the human rights situation in the North based on an engagement approach (e.g. I, U-yōng et al. 2000: 84f.; Kim, Hyuk-Rae 2006: 85ff.). Moreover, it is frequently assumed that China's willingness to treat defectors as refugees and to cooperate with the UNHCR and foreign NGOs will not change. In this sense, it is argued that it is pointless to change the status of North Korean defectors to refugees as long as China and North Korea reject this (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2007: 32).

Those opposing an active diplomacy condemn the conservatives for excessively emphasizing human rights as a universal value, thereby unnecessarily intensifying conflict (e.g. I, Sōng-u 2009: 2). Approaching the North Korean human rights issue merely focusing on civil and political rights is evaluated to be problematic as this liberal conception of human rights does not consider social and economic conditions of the country. Acknowledging the link between the state of economic development and the human rights situation, the right to development may be viewed as particularly crucial for the North. Peace is another key issue as it is possible to argue that the North Korean government lacks its rights to security due to a direct or indirect threat from the US. In this sense, it is argued that North Korea will ignore demands from the international community to improve human rights as long as the US does not guarantee these basic rights for the North (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2007: 26).

Furthermore, it is frequently contended that an active diplomacy contributes to deteriorating relations between South Korea and China as well as North Korea, making it more difficult for the South Korean government to successfully negotiate with these countries to bring North Korean defectors to the South. In this sense, the quiet diplomacy has partly been evaluated as having made it easier to cooperate with China to successfully bring them to the South (e.g. Ko, Seong Joon et al. 2013).

Critics of human rights NGOs contend that the international spotlight they have been attracting has been counterproductive. The internationalization of the issue through the media due to NGO activities is evaluated by some to have led to an increased crackdown of North Korean defectors by Chinese and North Korean authorities sent to Northeast China (Hwang, Jaeho 2004: 63f.). Furthermore, it is frequently pointed out that the issue of North Korean defectors must not be politicized and that North Korean defectors should not be used as a tool with the intention to contribute to North Korea's collapse or regime change (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2006: 18f.) or to bash progressives (Sin, Nan-Hŭi 2015: 348f.).

Much of the literature condemning the quiet diplomacy was written before or not too long after the Lee Myeong-bak administration began to pursue an active diplomacy. These scholars assumed that an active diplomacy would be more effective in solving the North Korean defector issue. However, the experience of two periods of progressive and conservative governments have shown that neither the quiet diplomacy, nor the active diplomacy, have been able to stop China's repatriation of North Koreans and to prevent China from continuingly treating them as illegal migrants. In this sense, despite different endeavors of South Korean progressive and conservative governments and NGOs, the lives of North Korean defectors and their human rights situation has not significantly improved.

Generally, the North Korean defector issue is not constructed coherently in the literature. Commonalities between the two main depictions are that the repatriation of North Koreans by Chinese authorities and the punishment of repatriated defectors by the North Korean regime are commonly evaluated to be unjust. The repatriation of North Korean defectors by China, their exploitation in China due to their illegal status and their treatment by the North Korean state are commonly constructed and accepted as human rights violations. China and North Korea are often depicted as human rights violators, whereas North Korean defectors are commonly framed as victims.

The major points of contention are the conception of North Korea and the human rights issue, whether North Korean defectors are refugees according to international law,

and which approach is the most effective for governmental and nongovernmental actors in approaching the North Korean defector issue. Essentially, all these differences are linked to the different core conception of North Korea of South Korean conservatives and progressives. The distinct interpretation of both ideological camps is reflected in the emphasized norms. Conservatives primarily construct the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights of refugees, while progressives mainly view defectors as economic migrants who must be supported based on humanitarianism.

2.4. Previous Research on the Framing of Issues Related to North Korean Defectors in the South Korean Media

The framing of North Korea by the South Korean media has gained scholarly attention in recent years. Comparing conservative and progressive newspaper outlets, Choi Jinbong (2005, 2018) analyzed how the North Korean government is framed in the South Korean media. Others have compared how South Korean and foreign media have framed issues or political events related to North Korea. These frequently focus on the framing of security-related issues such as the missile crisis (e.g. Kim, Yonghwan/Jahng, Mi Rosie 2015; Lee, Seok Ho/Wang, Qian 2016) or North Korea's nuclear testing (e.g. Dai, Jia/Hyun, Kideuk 2010).

The framing of issues linked to North Korean defectors in the South Korean media has not been examined until very recently and has received far less attention than the framing of other issues linked to the North Korean government. Thus, there is a lack of literature dealing with the framing of issues linked to North Korean defectors. There are a limited number of studies examining how North Korean defectors have been portrayed in the South Korean media. With the emergence of TV shows featuring North Korean defectors living in the South, studies were conducted examining how North Korean defectors are presented on these shows (Green/Epstein 2013; Choi, Jinbong 2016; Kim, Eunjene 2016; Kwon, Keum Sang 2018). These commonly show how North Korean defectors are portrayed as 'others', reflecting a notion of the South Korean identity excluding North Koreans. Furthermore, these scholars outline how specific narratives are promoted by presenting North Korean defectors in a specific way and reveal how they are used to criticize the North Korean regime. Hence, rather than giving North Korean defectors a chance to freely express themselves, the shows featuring North Korean defectors are evaluated to be focused on transferring specific political messages.

There are a few studies comparing South Korean progressive and conservative frames by analyzing newspaper articles dealing with North Korean defectors. Kwak Jeong-rae and Lee Joon-woong (2009a) analyzed contentual and value frames of five different newspapers during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun to find out based on which perspectives issues linked to North Korean defectors have been treated, interpreted and evaluated. Their study revealed that the conservative media mostly used the 'guarantee of human rights' frame, whereas the progressive media mostly employed frames related to specific events and issues. Additionally, both conservative and progressive media emphasized frames related to policy improvement regarding overseas North Korean defectors and national security as well as frames related to the establishment and improvement of institutions to secure their safe settlement in the South.

Regarding value frames, the conservative media stressed the 'peace and human rights' and the 'responsibility attribution' frames, whereas the progressive media mostly highlighted the 'responsibility attribution' and the 'international order' frames. Another discrepancy was that the conservative media emphasized that the government must implement a policy towards North Korean defectors based on universal values, such as human rights or their right to live. On the one hand, the progressive media took into account the overall situation of inter-Korean relations including the nuclear crisis and inter-Korean cooperation; on the other hand, it highlighted the related behavior of actors and the consequences, such as the attitude and response of surrounding countries with regard to the problem of North Korean defectors.

Ha Sŭng-hŭi and I Min-kyu (2012) compared media frames and information sources employed by the Chosun Ilbo, Hankyoreh and two other South Korean newspapers in articles dealing with the lives of North Korean people during the period of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Mu-hyun and Lee Myeong-bak's presidency. They found that the progressive and conservative media employed clearly different frames although they were all linked to the North Korea policy of the current administration. Furthermore, the study demonstrated that conservative newspapers used anonymous information sources significantly more often than progressive ones. Ha Sŭng-hŭi and I Min-kyu criticize that the negative framing using anonymous sources in the context of ongoing antagonistic relations between North Korea and the international community is very likely to contribute to a distorted perception of North Korea among South Koreans. They additionally argue that such an attitude of reporting can influence the credibility of the overall South Korean coverage on North Korea.

Chong Miyoung (2014) conducted a cross-cultural textual analysis of US, British and South Korean newspaper articles published between 1995 and 2013 covering female North Koreans as victims of human trafficking. Particular attention was paid to how politics and gender affected the coverage. She found that the essential causes of trafficking, such as gender issues, have been ignored by Western and South Korean newspapers, while hegemonic masculinity has been perpetuated. Moreover, she found that ideological frames influenced the coverage of North Korean female victims. She showed that North Koreans were depicted as providers of information on North Korea, witnesses of horrible incidents and testifiers of their own experience. In the South Korean media, the women were sometimes also framed as individuals who have successfully raised their social status within South Korean society. In both the Western and the South Korean media, the awful situation of North Korean defectors was framed to promote antagonism against North Korea. Other social causes of the human trafficking of North Korean women were ignored, while these were solely presented as a diplomatic issue between North Korea and China. The Western newspapers employed metaphors and political figures to describe Kim Jong-Il, which was not the case for the South Korean newspaper.

Ŏm Han-a (2014) analyzed which frames were employed by the Hankyoreh and the Chosun Ilbo in newspaper articles published between 2010 and 2014 depicting North Korean citizens in the South. Her aim was to identify causes of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination of North Koreans prevalent in South Korean society propagated by the media while considering the influence of political orientation. She identified six reporting frames: North Koreans as social underdogs, as representatives of the North Korean people or as a link to North Korea, as experiencing social maladaptation describing them as spies or criminals, as a political group within South Korean society, as good citizens portraying their volunteering or other activities contributing to society, and as individual standard South Korean citizens. She found that both media outlets most frequently employed the social underdog frame. The Chosun Ilbo criticized the North Korean government repetitively and portrayed difficulties North Koreans face in the South as personal issues, such as health problems. Contrarily, the Hankyoreh blamed the South Korean government for these difficulties, framing these as outcomes of structural problems of the weak South Korean social security system. Moreover, it largely abstained from criticizing the North Korean regime. Thus, Ŏm Han-a showed how issues linked to North Korean defectors are politicized by both ideological camps within the South Korean society.

Based on text network analysis, Kwon Ho-cheon (2017) examined the frequency of words appearing in titles and subtitles of articles related to North Korean defectors of the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh between 2013 and 2016 based on network analysis of key words. He found that the Chosun Ilbo covered various issues related to social and political problems. Furthermore, compared the Hankyoreh, words directly and indirectly related to the lives of North Korean defectors in South Korea appeared rather frequent. Contrarily, the coverage of words related to the domestic lives of the defectors emerged far less often in the Hankyoreh, while issues which have been presented as social and political problems, such as the spy incident of a public official of Seoul, appeared most frequently. Second most frequently covered were words linked to the issue of civil organizations sending leaflets to the North.

His study demonstrates that the Chosun Ilbo was rather reluctant to criticize the government and state institutions while employing a very moderate tone of argument regarding issues related to conservative civil organizations. In contrast, the Hankyoreh focused on various issues related to social, political, international affairs while reporting about the problems that defectors face living the South in a very limited manner. Moreover, the progressive media had a negative stance towards state institutions and conservative civil organizations and criticized them in the context of problems related to North Korean defectors. The three most common frames invoked by the Chosun Ilbo were the 'universal humanitarianism', 'pro-North Korea' and the 'improvement of human rights' frames. The most frequently applied frames in the Hankyoreh were 'mistakes of the government and the National Intelligence Service', 'triggering of social problems' and 'northerly wind', an expression used by South Korean progressives to criticize conservatives for causing inter-Korean tension by spreading fear of North Korea.

Williams (2017) analyzed articles published from 2016 to 2017 by three South Korean newspapers representing progressive (Hankyoreh), economic (Maeil Kyongjae) and conservative (Chosun Ilbo) views dealing with North Korean defectors based on a quantitative coding scheme. He identified six frames: the conflict frame emphasizing conflict between countries, institutions, groups or individuals; the human interest frame highlighting an individual's story or an emotional perspective of an issue or event; the attribution of responsibility frame presenting individuals, groups or governments as causal or solving actors of an issue; the morality frame interpreting issues or events based on moral or religious prescriptions; the economic consequence frame describing issues or events by pointing out their economic consequences; and the defector description frame focusing on

how North Korean defectors are portrayed – e.g. as unemployed, victims, or illegal workers. The conflict frame was being employed most frequently by all newspapers. In comparison, the Chosun Ilbo included most articles with a negative tone, whereas the Hankyoreh did not publish any articles with a negative tone. The Mail Kyeongjae had the highest percentage of articles with a neutral tone and the lowest proportion of articles with a positive tone.

All in all, prevalent studies have shown that conservative and progressive newspapers deal with different issues linked to North Korean defectors and largely employ different contentual and normative frames to depict sometimes overlapping issues related to North Korean defectors. This indicates that the ideological affiliation of media outlets significantly influenced the framing of these issues and highlights the role of the South Korean media in reinforcing the ongoing South-South conflict. However, the number of studies analyzing how issues linked to North Korean defectors are framed by conservative and progressive South Korean newspaper outlets remains rather limited.

Most scholars employing a framing approach focus on how the North Korean government is framed. Only very few studies analyze the framing of North Korean defectors or related issues and sometimes how the South and North Korean government were evaluated. Moreover, existing studies which do focus on the framing of North Korean defectors or related issues either analyzed all articles about North Korean defectors, or those depicting North Koreans in a very specific context, e.g. North Korean women as victims of female trafficking. So far, there has not been a study conducted on how the international North Korean defector issue has been framed by South Korean newspaper outlets with an emphasis on how normative frames have been promoted. This study aims to fill this gap.

Prevalent studies, which are predominantly quantitative, did not sufficiently consider the larger historical and societal context to interpret and explain the findings. Although the scholars often refer to the South-South conflict to emphasize the relevance of their research, they did not link why the identified frames were being employed by progressives and conservatives. In this sense, the findings were rather descriptive and lacked a deeper examination of who initially promoted specific frames for which reasons. For instance, the influence of governments and NGOs which have promoted specific normative frames, such as human rights and humanitarianism, which were adopted or contested by conservative and progressive actors, including the media, was ignored. In addition, the link between the South Korean ideologies and identities- or, in other words, between the national and political identities- was also commonly neglected. Hence, the wider discourse on the specific topics covered was not treated in depth.

2.5. Conclusion

In summary, this chapter has situated this thesis within the wider literature. On the one hand, it has highlighted the contribution of previous literature in explaining the framing of North Korean defectors in the media and more broadly within the South Korean society. The first subchapter demonstrated that norms are not fixed but instead constructed by different actors to justify specific endeavors. It was highlighted that, although both human rights and humanitarianism are linked to claims about impartiality, progressive agendas are generally advanced under the pretext of promoting human rights. Moreover, the international discourse on human rights which divided the Eastern and Western bloc during the Cold War was covered: while the former prioritized economic, social, and cultural rights, the latter stressed civil and political rights. Therefore, I argue that although the CPR framework has become dominant after the Cold War, particularly in the West, it is vital to critically approach any human rights issue and discourse without assuming that human rights are determined. Moreover, I argue that the hegemonic discourse as well as (other) agendas should be critically evaluated.

The second subchapter briefly presented the historical context of the North Korean economic crisis, which led to a massive exodus of North Koreans and contributed to the emergence of South Korean NGOs as a vital political actor. Moreover, it showed how South Korean NGOs have been norm entrepreneurs and influenced the South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea and North Korean defectors. These NGOs used norms to promote specific framings of the North Korean crisis and to justify particular approaches in dealing with it. The contested notion of human rights prevalent in the South Korean discourse on North Korea was highlighted: while progressives focus on the economic, cultural and social rights and are thus sympathize more with the North Korean view, conservatives underline civil and political rights. In addition, it was demonstrated that the inter-South Korean and inter-Korean dispute on human rights must be understood as being part of the larger international discourse on human rights, which divides economically advanced democratic countries and less advanced authoritarian ones.

The third subchapter revealed that the academic discourse on the North Korean defector issue reflects the general South Korean discourse with two main positions being prevalent: the framing of defectors as refugees and victims of human rights violations in line with South Korean conservatives, and the framing of defectors as predominantly illegal economic migrants in line with South Korean progressives. The former has become dominant within the South Korean academic discourse although diverse evaluations exist.

In contrast, the English academic discourse predominantly constructs defectors as refugees. Furthermore, while there are some South Korean scholars who critically examine the dominant framing, the English literature lacks critical contention of the construction of defectors as refugees and human rights victims. This, in my view, is problematic as the uncritical acceptance of this framing merely justifies a one-sided and human rights focused approach to issues linked to North Korea while excluding other humanitarian approaches.

The fourth subchapter, which covered the previous research on the framing of North Korean defectors in the South Korean media, showed that all studies consistently reveal that the ideological affiliation significantly influences the framing of issues linked to North Korean defectors. However, the limited existing studies did not include the larger historical context. Therefore, they failed to provide in-depth explanations of why specific frames were employed by media outlets, how these are linked to conceptions of the South Korean identity, which core arguments constitute the media discourse, and how the framing of issues is linked to the promoting of particular solutions.

On the other hand, this chapter also revealed how this thesis contributes to the prevalent literature by identifying a literature gap as well as limits of existing studies. This thesis adds to the critical and constructivist literature on norms. Based on an empirical study, I show how normative frames based on human rights, humanitarianism and the need to abide by international law have been used by South Korean progressives and conservatives to promote specific narratives which justify particular remedies to the North Korean defector issue. Moreover, I illustrate how the concept of human rights is contested and constructed within South Korea and that strategic considerations and other interests, or in other words different agendas, influence the discourse on the North Korean human rights issue.

Furthermore, this thesis complements the existing literature on the South-South conflict. While much of the literature dealing with the South-South division focuses on how actors perceive and deal with North Korea and take norms of assumptions for given, I focus on how the ideological division impacts the construction of the North Korean defector issue and how both camps deal with it based on a critical discourse analysis. Much of the literature focuses on a specific aspect of the South-South division without considering the larger historical, political, and societal context. In contrast to previous studies, which often focus on the ideological division, I interpret the findings considering the larger historical context. In this sense, I argue that specifically considering the following context is vital in

understanding the ideological division regarding issues linked to North Korea, including the North Korean defector issue.

Firstly, the monopolized discourse and framing of North Korea as an enemy by the authoritarian South Korean regime during the Cold War after Korea's division has largely been adopted by conservatives even after the Cold War. Secondly, South Korea's democratization movement and finally the country's democratization after the Cold War has allowed diversified understandings of North Korea. Progressives disagree with the conservative narratives and promote a framing of North Korea primarily as a partner to reconcile with, not an enemy. Thirdly, in line with other scholars, I emphasize the link between the South Korean identities and ideologies. I argue that to better understand the ideological division, the different national identities perceived by South Korean conservatives and progressives must be recognized. Conservatives exclude North Koreans, whereas progressives include North Koreans in their sense of national identity. Fourthly, the general characteristics of South Korean conservatives and progressives in the context of the South-South issue influence the way both perceive and treat the North Korean defector issue. For instance, conservatives emphasize the role of the US in solving issues linked to North Korea and defectors and promote a human rights frame. In contrast, progressives highlight bilateral efforts and advocate for humanitarian solutions. Thus, the discourse on North Korea and the discourse on North Korean defectors within South Korean society are inseparable.

Moreover, as a critical study, this thesis contributes to a critical evaluation of the dominant framings of the North Korean defector issue. Particularly the English literature lacks alternative framings or critical discussions of the North Korean defector issue which deviate from the conservative framing of North Korean defectors as refugees and human rights victims. In general, there is a lack of critical studies analyzing the discourse on North Korean defectors. In addition, this thesis adds to the literature comparing progressive and conservative framings of issues linked to North Korean defectors in the South Korean media. Not only are the number of existing studies very limited, none of them focus exclusively on the international North Korean defector issue. Hence, defectors framed in a domestic context have so far received more attention.

Lastly, this thesis particularly focuses on how normative frames are used by both ideological camps. Thus, the link between norms and social practices which are justified based on specific norms is emphasized. Prevalent studies comparing progressive and conservative frames mostly focus on other issues related to North Korea and do not

extensively pay attention to norms and the context in which they have evolved within South Korean society. The larger historical context is frequently not extensively covered. This study aims to fill this gap.

3. Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This chapter presents the underlying paradigm of this thesis, which is critical theory, as well as the theoretical framework and the methodology employed. The theoretical framework, a type of critical discourse analysis which is based on a synthesis of the discourse-historical approach and Entman's framing approach, is outlined in the first subchapter. The second subchapter deals with the methodology and data employed.

3.1. Theoretical Framework: A Synthesis of the Discourse-Historical Approach and Entman's Framing Approach

Critical theory is the underlying paradigm of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Paradigms may be defined as 'basic belief systems based on ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions' (Guba/Lincoln 1994: 107). Particularly qualitative research is generally based on one of the existing paradigms: Positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, constructivism (Guba/Lincoln 1994), although some scholars employ different categorizations and different terms to label the different paradigms. Positivism on the one end of the spectrum assumes that there is an objective reality which can be conceived. Knowledge is presented in generalizations which are independent from context and time based on a deterministic and reductionist stance (Hesse 1980). Constructivism on the other end of the spectrum is grounded on a relativist ontological position. The notion of an objective reality is dismissed. Instead, it is assumed that various locally constructed realities exist. Therefore, realities are understood to be detected as multiple, inconceivable mental constructions based on individual experience (Guba/Lincoln 1994: 110f.). Critical theory is situated in the middle of these positions and is closer to a constructivist position.

Critical theory is ontologically based on historical realism. It is assumed that there is a virtual reality, which is shaped by political, social, cultural, economic, gender and ethnic values, which reifies into various structures. These structures are treated as 'real', as a historical or virtual reality for practical purposes. Critical theory is based on a subjectivist and transactional epistemological stance. Regarding the methodology, dialectical and dialogic approaches are employed (Guba/Lincoln 1994: 110).

What distinguishes critical theory from other major paradigms is the normative nature of inquiry. Critical theory is focused on challenging established social orders, ideologies, institutions, discourses and dominating practices. Critical research generally analyzes a phenomenon in a political, historical, economic, and cultural context and identifies links to wider asymmetrical relations within society (Alvesson/Deetz 2000: 2). Critical theory challenges the status quo and seeks to ‘upset institutions and threatens to overturn sovereign regimes of truth’ (Kincheloe/McLaren 2002: 87).

Based on critical theory, CDA is a specific approach to discourse analysis, which was developed in the past three decades. The critical focus is heavily influenced by the Frankfurt school, particularly Habermas (Tenorio 2019: 187). Further origins of CDA can be traced back to critical linguistics (Kress/Hodge 1979; Fowler et al. 1979) influenced by Halliday’s (1978) systemic functional linguistics and theories of ideologies (Fairclough 1993, Rogers 2003). Critical linguistics deals with ideology and power by analyzing linguistic structures within a social context while considering underlying interests to recover meanings articulated through discourse (Fowler et al. 1979: 195f.). Althusser’s (1971) understanding of ideologies as being linked to material practices within social institutions and not just merely as ideas, essentially a Marxist theory of ideology, has further influenced CDA (Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 261).

CDA aims at raising awareness on employed strategies to establish, maintain and reproduce (a)symmetrical power relations through discourse. CDA scholars analyze features of a discourse through which dominant ideologies are reinforced or challenged and examine the coexistence of competing and contradictory ideologies (Tenorio 2019: 184ff.). CDA is problem oriented. It begins with identifying a social problem with a semiotic or linguistic aspect. It is application-oriented and tries to diminish the problem or contribute to a solution (Reisigl 2013: 84). Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-80) list the following main tenets of CDA:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

In CDA, discourse is defined as a specific form of social practice and particular attention is paid to the context of language (van Dijk 1993, Blommaert/Bulcaen 2000). Discourse is specifically analyzed in the social context of (re)production and challenging of social power leading to social inequalities (van Dijk 1993: 249f.). This is based on a view shared by most CDA approaches that 'text is included in context, and discourse includes both text and context' (Reisigl 2013: 13), despite their different emphasis regarding how context is defined. Hence, CDA aims at determining and bringing together the relationship between the following three levels of analysis: the actual text, discursive practices, and the bigger social context within which the discursive practices take place (McGregor 2010: 3).

Discourse is viewed to be socially constitutive of and simultaneously socially conditioned by constituted subjects, objects, events, processes, and phenomena. A discourse is constitutive in the sense that it contributes to maintaining and reproducing the social status quo or to changing it (Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 258). Races, gender, identities, ideologies, and other social and cultural categories are understood to be discursively constructed (Lin 2013: 1467). In this sense, discourse is understood to be ideological (Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 271ff.) and to influence people's identities (Locke 2004: 7).

Despite being based on critical theory and sharing similar agendas, CDA is not a unified approach. Instead, it developed into an interdisciplinary merge of diverse approaches focusing on the role of discourse within a historical, political, and social context (Billig 2003, Reisigl/Wodak 2018: 89). The different approaches of CDA differ with regards to their theoretical foundations or methodology (Tenorio 2019: 189). Nonetheless, they all emphasize that discourse is socially constructive and simultaneously constructed, that discourse is dependent on the context, and that discourse is practical- or, in other words, actional. Additionally, CDA typically involves some type of content analysis which is linked to the analysis of ideological presuppositions (Reisigl 2013: 7ff.). Some of the most prominent strands include the dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough 2001), the socio-cognitive approach (van Dijk 2009) and the discourse-historical approach (DHA) (Reisigl/Wodak 2018).

The theoretical framework for this thesis is largely based on a synthesis of the discourse-historical approach and Entman's framing approach. The discourse-historical approach provides the theoretical foundation regarding the comprehension of discourse, context as well as ideology and identity as discursively constructed. The strong emphasis on the context in explaining and interpreting a discourse not only contributes to comprehending a discourse in depth, but also contributes to an improved understanding of

ideologies and identities embedded in a specific historical context, which are linked to and (re)constructed through discourses. Moreover, the DHA enriches this thesis with a critical aspiration exceeding a descriptive and explanatory level.

Although the DHA assumes that social variables, such as ideology and identity, are discursively constructed, it does not explain how. The discursive construction of any social variable is linked to opinions, beliefs, perceptions, and memories, which are based on mental processes (Anderson 1988, Musolff 2004, Wodak 2006: 180). Wodak (2006: 179f.) argues that critical discourse analysts mostly agree that the interrelations between society and discourse must be analyzed based on a combination of linguistic and sociological approaches. However, she criticizes that cognitive theories are mostly evaluated to be irrelevant by CDA scholars and are excluded based on unjustified reasons. Thus, she points out that socio-cognitive concepts may be viewed as a crucial part of CDA research as social phenomena are essentially interdisciplinary in nature.

Entman's (2003: 423ff.) framing approach provides a theoretical basis for explaining how frames create mental associations linked to specific interpretations of issues and events. Entman explains how media articles, understood as ideological communicative texts, exert power through frames by influencing the interpretations of issues and events. The approach considers how frames influence cognitive patterns of people and how they provide actors with reasons for specific actions. In this sense, the link between frames and cognitive as well as other social practices is explained. Hence, both theoretical approaches can be integrated in a complementary manner.

In addition, there are several commonalities which make the two theoretical approaches compatible. First, both can be linked to other theoretical and methodological approaches. Framing can be understood as a research program which can be linked to cognitive, constructivist and critical theoretical perspectives (D'Angelo 2002, D'Angelo/Kuypers 2010, Matthes 2011). Being primarily problem-oriented, the DHA is multi-theoretical and multi-methodological and integrates other theories, approaches, and models to explain the problem of analysis (Wodak 2001: 63ff.). Second, although Entman focuses predominantly on media discourse, both approaches are concerned with discourse analysis. Third, both highlight that discourse is ideological (e.g. Entman 2007, Reisigl/Wodak 2018). Fourth, drawing on a constructivist understanding of the world, both assume that there are multiple perspectives of social reality and thus deny monoperspectivity (Gamson et al. 1992: 373, Reisigl 2013: 12). While the DHA defines the prevalence of plural perspectives as one of the core features of discourse (Reisigl/Wodak

2018: 89), Entman highlights that framing means to select specific elements of perceived reality based on which narratives are constructed. These promote specific interpretations (Entman 2007: 164). Both their concepts of 'perspectives' and 'narratives' are linked to specific interpretation of actors. I therefore use these terms interchangeably in this thesis. Fifth, although relying on different notions with a different emphasis, they both highlight the role of context of a discourse within which it is embedded. While Wodak employs the term 'context', Entman refers to the term 'culture' (e.g. Entman 2003, Wodak 2001). In addition, analytical frameworks stemming from the two theoretical approaches can be integrated as both are based on a type of content analysis.

The DHA, also called the 'Viennese' approach to CDA, has been heavily influenced by sociolinguists including Labov (1966, 1972), Hymes (1974) and Bernstein (1975, 1996). Wodak and Reisigl are amongst the most prominent proponents of this approach. This strand of CDA is characterized by its remarkable emphasis of the historical context of a discourse (Reisigl 2013: 6) and the integration of social theories from various disciplines to explain the context (Wodak 2001: 66).

This approach defines discourse 'as a specific complex of context-dependent, diachronically changing semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action' (Reisigl 2013: 12). Fields of action (Girnth 1996) are understood to be parts of a particular social reality and include situations, social structures, and institutional frames. The diverse fields of action have different functions or aims which are socially institutionalized (Reisigl/Wodak 2001: 35f., Wodak 2001: 66). Thus, these fields of action shape the frame of discourse. Discourses and discourse topics are not fixed. Instead, they diffuse to diverse discourses and fields (Wodak 2001: 40).

Specific discourses and fields of action have a dialectical relationship. Hence, situational, institutional, and social settings influence discourses. Simultaneously, discourses impact non-discursive and discursive social practices and processes. In short, discourses constitute and at the same time are constituted by non-discursive social practices (Wodak 2001: 38, Reisigl 2013: 12). Furthermore, discourse is understood to be linked to specific macro-topics with various sub-topics and arguments about validity claims, e.g. about what is 'true' or normative claims about what should be done. Diverse actors with different perspectives are viewed to participate in a discourse (Reisigl 2003: 91). Thus, pluri-perspectivity, argumentativity, and macro-topic-relatedness are viewed to be constitutive elements of discourse (Reisigl/Wodak 2018: 89).

Discourse and context are assumed to be interdependent and equally important (Reisigl 2013: 6). The DHA differentiates between four levels of context. While the first is descriptive, the others are linked to their theories on context. This notion of four-level context aims at providing triangulation and minimizing the risk of bias. It also reflects the strong interdisciplinary focus of the approach (Wodak 2011: 96). The four levels of context include the following:

1. the immediate, language or text internal co-text and co-discourse
2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses
3. the extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation'
4. the broader sociopolitical and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to' (Reisigl/Wodak 2017: 93).

I focused mainly on the fourth level, the larger historical and sociopolitical context. Additionally, I also identified co-discourses, which are part of the first level of context of the DHA.

Within DHA, ideology is understood to be discourse-dependent and discursively constructed (Reisigl 2013: 8). It is defined as a specific world view or perspective based on mental representations, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and judgments shared by members of social groups (Reisigl/Wodak 2018: 88). Ideologies are understood to be a crucial means to maintain or establish unequal power relations through discourse. This may, for example, be achieved by creating hegemonic identity narratives or limiting discourses or public spheres. Moreover, ideologies are also regarded as a mean to transforming power relations. Hence, DHA focuses on how ideology is mediated or perpetuated in a variety of social settings and institutions. DHA is also interested in 'demystifying' the hegemony of discourse by revealing those ideologies which establish, reproduce, or oppose dominance. Power, according to this view, is linked to an unequal relationship among actors who have different social positions or are part of distinct social groups. It is legitimized or de-legitimized through discourse and thus has a discursive dimension (Reisigl/Wodak 2018: 88).

Because the DHA does not offer a theoretical explanation of how discourses affect how actors think and act, my theoretical framework integrates crucial theoretical insights from Entman's framing approach, which includes cognitive aspects. Generally, framing is a research program rather than a unified paradigm, which has been strongly influenced by Entman's work. It is characterized by theoretical diversity with interdisciplinary roots

including psychology (Kahneman 2003, Kahneman/Tversky 1979, 1984), sociology (Gamson/Modigliani 1987, Goffman 1975) and linguistics (Lakoff/Johnson 1981). Overall, framing research focuses on political communication through media discourse and how particular frames are invoked which contribute to the construction of social reality (Tuchman 1978). Particularly media effects and cognitive perspectives have been strongly emphasized within the framing research tradition (Reese 2007: 149).

Despite the prevalent diversity, there are basic ideas which are commonly accepted among framing researchers. First, frames are regarded as themes within news stories which are delivered through multiple framing devices. Second, they are first causes sharing different levels of reality. Third, they are linked to cognitive and social behaviors which they have shaped. Fourth, they influence public discourse about political issues (D'Angelo 2002: 873). This means that all political issues can be interpreted and framed differently. Framing is therefore linked to the competing over a dominant interpretation of issues (Matthes 2011: 25).

Commonly, it is emphasized that media frames highly impact the way the audience understands issues or events. Thus, media discourse is understood as 'part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists (...) develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse' (Gamson/Modigliani 1987: 2). In the sense, the media actively sets frames of reference that the audience refers to when interpreting and discussing public events (Tuchman 1978). Simultaneously, preexisting meaning schemas or structures influence how people process information and interpret it.

Entman offers a theoretical explanation of how the media discourse influences how members of an audience understand and evaluate issues based on frames. Based on his concept of frames, he explains how frames impact the cognition of the audience. Entman (1991: 7f.) argues that news frames have two levels: on one level, they function as mentally stored principles which help the audience to process information; on another level, they are characteristics of the news text. This means they make it less likely for an inexperienced audience to identify the frames and develop an independent interpretation. While this does not imply that every audience member shares the exact same interpretation, it is likely that politically impressive majorities share overlapping understandings when a single frame dominates a narrative.

Concentrating on media frames, with an emphasis on political communication treated as an independent variable, Entman focuses on how the media provides the audience

with schemas for interpretation of events, pointing out salience and selection as crucial factors. He defines salience as ‘making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences’ (Entman 1993: 52). Thus, according to Entman, ‘(t)o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman 1993: 52). In this sense, frames focus on at least one of the following functions (Entman 1993: 52):

1. Determining the forces which create the problem
2. Defining related conditions or effects
3. Making moral judgments of causal agents
4. Proposing or justifying solutions to the problem and estimating their anticipated effects.

In this manner, framing may be defined ‘as the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation’ (Entman 2007: 164). Frames draw attention to certain aspects of reality while concealing specific elements. Entman underscores that framing plays an important role in exercising political power and that “the frame (..) is really the imprint of power- it registers the identity of actors or interests that compete to dominate the text” (Entman 1993: 55). Thus, frames are viewed as reflecting the power play as well as the scope of the discourse regarding an issue.

Frames emphasize information, which may be understood as salience. Salience ‘means making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences’ (Entman 1993: 53). Therefore, the higher the salience, the more likely it is that readers will notice and remember the information and meaning (Fiske/Taylor 1991 in Entman 1993). Frames are understood to impact a significant portion of an audience. They call attention to specific aspects of the presented reality, thereby simultaneously directing attention away from others. Thus, they influence which pieces of information are noticed and remembered by an audience and how. Frames exert power by repetitively invoking patterns of frame elements consistently thereby contributing to the audience detecting, comprehending and memorize these frames for potential future applications. They influence the audience through selectively presenting and leaving out aspects by impacting their interpretation of issues and events, which can lead to different responses of the audience (Entman 1993: 54f.).

Entman (1993) points out that at least four locations constitute the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. Communicators decide what to write about guided by frames which organize their belief systems, thus making unconscious or conscious framing judgments. Texts include frames which reinforce evaluations or arrangement of facts. This may be done through the usage or non-usage of specific key words, stereotyped images, standard expressions, or specific sources of information. Frames guide the perception and thinking of the receiver. Their thoughts and conclusions may or may not reflect a reproduction of the framing of the text and overlap with the intention of the communicator. Culture is defined by Entman as the repertoire of commonly invoked frames, as ‘the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping’ (Entman 1993: 53).

In summary, the theoretical framework for this thesis is based on a synthesis of the DHA and Entman’s framing approach. On top of ontological and epistemological assumptions, the DHA provides the theoretical explanation and link between discourse, ideology and context, whereas Entman’s framing approach offers an explanation of how a discourse exerts power and influences the audience based on frames which promote specific schemes of interpretation.

3.2. Methodology and Data

This study was conducted based on a critical content analysis of frames, which combines qualitative as well as quantitative methods. The analytical framework is influenced by Entman’s framing approach and the DHA. The research was conducted largely based on an inductive approach. After having decided to analyze the media discourse on North Korean defectors with a comparison of conservative and progressive frames, two media outlets were chosen: the progressive Hankyoreh and the conservative Chosun Ilbo. The two newspapers are commonly used as representatives of both ideological camps (e.g. Kwon, Ho Cheon 2017; Choi, Yoon-jung/Kweon, Sang-Hee 2014; Kim, Gyöng-hŭi/No, Gi-yöng 2011). This enabled me to identify the plural perspectives of progressives and conservatives, one of the three constitutive features of discourse according to the DHA.

The Chosun Ilbo was established in 1920 and has grown into one of South Korea’s biggest media groups, Chosun Media, which includes a variety of subsidiaries. According to their homepage, the Chosun Ilbo is acknowledged to be the most influential media outlet in

South Korea. Furthermore, it is the only newspaper with a daily circulation of more than one million (Chosun Ilbo 2017).

In contrast, the Hankyoreh was established in 1988 by journalists with the aim of creating an independent newspaper right after the peak of the uprising against the military dictatorship in 1987. During the time the authoritarian regime dismissed many journalists who promoted democracy and freedom of press. Against this backdrop, dozens of fired journalists successfully inaugurated the newspaper through special fundraising. Contrary to most traditional Korean newspapers, which are owned by a business conglomerate or a family, the Hankyoreh is owned by more than 60,000 shareholders. Moreover, the Hankyoreh was the first newspaper which promoted a progressive editorial stance (Hankyoreh n.d.).

The time frame covers the presidential terms of the following two progressive and two conservative South Korean governments:

- Kim Dae-jung (progressive): 25.02.1998 - 24.02.2003
- Roh Mu-hyun (progressive): 25.02.2008 - 24.02.2008
- Lee Myung-bak (conservative): 25.02.2008 - 24.02.2013
- Park Geun-hye (conservative): 25.02.2013 - 10.03.2017.

Choosing this time frame allowed me to analyze how both newspapers evaluated the governments which share their ideological stance and those that belong to the opposing ideological camp as well as their policies. The database was created by following three steps. First, I identified articles written in Korean which focused North Korean defectors. This was done by using the search engine of the Chosun Ilbo homepage as well as the bigkinds.co.kr website to find relevant articles published by the Hankyoreh. The following terms to label North Korean migrants, which I first identified by scanning a large number of articles, were searched for: 'North Korean escapee compatriot', 'escapee from the North', 'resident that has escaped from the North', the 'new Settlers', 'citizen who has escaped from the North' and 'North Korean refugee'. These were labels I found in at least one of the two newspapers.

After having scanned through the articles, I found that the discourse on North Korean defectors can be divided into two discourses: articles either dealt with North Korean defectors within South Korea, or with North Korean defectors outside of North Korea in an international context. These two sub-discourses were each linked to specific macro-topics. I chose to focus on North Korean defectors in an international context, as this topic and the related discourse have reached far less attention within the literature. Thus, as a second step, I therefore extracted all articles solely dealing with North Korean defectors in a domestic

context. These generally deal with North Korean defectors who have already settled in the South. I then read all articles focusing on defectors in an international context to get an overview of the macro-topics, the second element of discourse according to the DHA, and an idea of specific frames employed.

I found that these articles predominantly either problematized China or North Korea. Only an insignificant number of articles covered North Korean defectors in another country apart from China or North Korea. These mainly focused on defectors in a South Asian country as part of their route to the South. Hence, as a third step I removed these articles, which did not mainly address problems linked to China or North. Moreover, I identified the following macro-topics linked to both actors: China's repatriation of defectors, the exploitation faced by defectors in China and North Korea's human rights issue including its punishment of repatriated defectors. I noticed that the norms 'human rights', 'international law', and to a far lesser degree 'humanitarianism' were repetitively mentioned and linked to core arguments prevalent in the articles of both the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh. At least one of these norms were brought up in the vast majority of articles. Hence, as a fourth step, I then selected only the articles including one of the words labeling North Korean defectors and containing at least one of three norms. Finally, in total 189 articles from the Chosun Ilbo and 129 from the Hankyoreh were included in the database.

For both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis, I used Entman's four types of frames (problem, cause, solution, moral evaluation of actors) as analytical categories to categorize the content which was relevant to identify frames. I categorized the entire relevant content, which was classified according to Entman's four types of frames, without employing excluding categories. This means that not only the dominant or main causes, problems or moral evaluation of actors was considered, but all those appearing in each article. Most articles did not express a direct favoring of a solution to perceived problems. Therefore, instead of determining a proposed solution, I chose to identify which actors were covered in the context of trying to solve specific problems. This served to be vital in determining the narratives constructed in both media outlets. The content classified according to the four types of frames was again classified based on categories which were inductively determined.

Moreover, rather than describing specific issues as a human rights, humanitarian or international law problem, the newspapers frequently referred to other actors who framed issues as such matters. Therefore, I analyzed which actors, according to the articles, framed issues as matters of human rights, international law, or humanitarianism. Overall, the

qualitative part of the content analysis enabled me to detect one of the two crucial factors of frames according to Entman: selection.

The quantitative part enabled me to identify the second crucial factor of frames: salience, or in other words, which content was emphasized through repetition. I quantitatively assessed the content identified based on the qualitative analysis. Hence, I presented how frequently problems linked to North Korea and China were mentioned, how often specific causes to problems were presented, and how often actors were depicted as having tried to solve portrayed problems. Regarding the moral evaluation frame, both newspapers criticized actors but largely abstained from directly presenting actors in a positive manner, e.g. through using positive adjectives. Therefore, I displayed how often actors were depicted in a negative light. Actors were negatively depicted in two ways. Firstly, this was achieved by condemning their actions, e.g. China's repatriation of defectors or North Korea's punishment of repatriated defectors. Secondly, this was done by quoting or referring to opinions of researchers, experts, NGO activists, politicians or civilians who criticized these actors. For both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis I used MAXQDA, a program for computer-assisted qualitative as well as mixed methods analysis, to categorize and sort my data.

In addition to the content analysis of frames, I examined the third element of discourse according to the DHA: argumentation. Hence, I qualitatively analyzed and compared the core arguments linked to the North Korean defector issue, mainly in opinion articles or commentaries, but also in newspaper articles published since Kim Dae-jung's presidential term. These are linked to the different framings of both ideological camps centered around questions of how to deal with North Korea's human rights issue, whether defectors are refugees according to international law, and which approaches are the most adequate and efficient in solving the North Korean defector issue.

Moreover, particular attention was given to the larger historical and sociopolitical context the discourse is embedded in to interpret the empirical findings. The context was provided based on prevalent literature. On the one hand, the South Korean political culture characterized by the South-South conflict was addressed. The development of conservative and progressive ideologies in the 20th century and their link to distinct perceptions of the South Korean identity were outlined. The South Korean discourse on North Korea and North Korean defectors must be understood in the context of the ongoing South-South division. The South-South division is a key feature of the South Korean discourse on how to

deal with North Korea and is thus linked to the field of action of South Korea's North Korea policy and approaches of nongovernmental actors in dealing with North Korea.

On the other hand, North Korean defectors in the context of inter-Korean relations and South Korea's perception of and settlement policy for North Korean defectors were covered. This includes the evolvement of inter-Korean relations and the meaning and treatment of North Korean defectors during and after the Cold War. The politicization of North Korean defectors by South Korean conservatives and progressives must be comprehended in the context of inter-Korean relations and how both camps perceive North Korean defectors. This has been reflected in South Korea's settlement policy toward North Korean defectors who arrived in the South, which changed over time. As already stated, the discourse on North Korean defectors is linked to the field of action of South Korea's policy toward North Korean defectors as well as approaches of nongovernmental actors in dealing with them. As will be shown, both the discourse on North Korea and North Korean defectors, as well as the two related fields of action, are closely linked and interdependent.

Finally, the empirical findings of the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh were compared, interpreted, and discussed considering the larger historical context including the political culture. This served as a basis for the normative critique and suggestions to deal with the North Korean defector issue and the South-South conflict.

4. The Historical Context of the South Korean Discourse on North Korea and North Korean Defectors

This chapter provides the historical context in which the South Korean discourse on North Korea, including North Korean defectors, is embedded in. The first subchapter focuses on the evolvments which led to the ongoing South-South conflict. The second subchapter deals with the role of North Korean defectors for South Korea, and respectively for South Korean progressives and conservatives, which is linked to the South Korean settlement policy for North Korean defectors. It shows how the issue of North Korean defectors has always been politicized within the South.

4.1. The South Korean Political Culture: The Evolvement of Conservative and Progressive Ideologies and Identities

This subchapter deals with the evolvement of the prevalent South Korean ideologies and how these are linked to distinct conceptions of the South Korean identity. Considering

the historical context of the development of South Korean ideologies and identities after Korea's liberation from Japan and the division of Korea is crucial to understand the ongoing South-South conflict including the perception of and approaches of South Korean actors in dealing with the North Korean defector issue. Particularly North Korea and inter-Korean relations have been crucial with regards to the development of the South Korean national identities (Shin, Gi-wook /Burke 2008). The question on how to deal with the North Korean defectors is in essence a matter of whether they are viewed by South Koreans as 'others' or not (Kim, Ji-yun 2014; Son, Sarah A. 2016).

This subchapter begins with the Korean division, the Korean War, and the inter-state competition between the two authoritarian states of North and South Korea to represent the 'true' Korean people. I then address the rise of the progressives under the conservative authoritarian dictatorship in the context of the minjung movement, South Korea's democratization movement, which emerged in the 1970s. The dispute over the national identity between the two Koreas on a state level was extended to a state-society conflict between the conservative authoritarian state and the progressive minjung forces within the minjung movement. Subsequently, I outline the further evolvement of the minjung movement in the 1980s, the Kwangju massacre and the diversification of progressive ideologies. Lastly, I depict developments after South Korea's democratization. This includes the different policies toward North Korea between progressive and conservative governments on the state level and the further evolvement of the conservative and progressive ideologies within South Korean society, characterized by the South-South division.

Identity has long played a crucial role within Korean politics. For example, Koreans strived to reposition their nation in the context of a newly shaping regional and world order a century ago. This included China's decline, Japan's rise, and the enhancing Western presence in the region of Northeast Asia. Against this backdrop, the nation evolved as a main source of a new collective identity of Koreans. After 1910, under Japanese colonialism, the politics of national identity was strengthened. Koreans strongly opposed colonial assimilation under the oppressive Japanese rule during which the Japanese tried to force their identity and culture on the Koreans by emphasizing the uniqueness and purity of the Korean race and nation. In this sense, the Japanese oppression consolidated the Korean sense of a single ethnic national identity based on a shared bloodline (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007; Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2008).

Korea's liberation and national division in 1945 ended Japan's rule over Korea (1910-1945). The Soviet army took control over the Northern part while the US occupied the Southern part of the peninsula (Pak, Mi 2005). In the context of the beginning of the Cold War, no consensus on unification could be reached between the US and the Soviet Union, leading to the establishment of two separate governments: the capitalist Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and the socialist Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. Both claimed to be the only legitimate sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula (Cumings 2011).

The Korean War broke out on June 25th, 1950 when North Korea's People's Army, which was supplied by the Soviet Union, crossed the 28th parallel trying to invade the South. This led to the intervention of the United Nations forces led by the US as the principal participant supporting the South. This in turn caused the Chinese People's Liberation Army to back the North. At last, the brutal war ended in 1953 as a stalemate with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement. On both sides, more than one million combat casualties had been suffered and the Korean Peninsula remained to be split into two antagonistic states (Rockoff 2012: 245f.).

Influenced by the national division in 1945 and the brutal war between both Korean states, the nature of the Korean politics of national identity changed in the postcolonial era. As Korea was split into two separate parts, the political principle that the state and nation should be congruent as formulated by Gellner (1983) was violated. This territorial division and the prevalent vigorous sense of ethnic homogeneity contributed to a competition for national representation among both Koreas. In this manner, both claimed to be the only legitimate government representing the entire ethnic Korean nation, adopting specific ideologies, anti-Communism in the South and anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the North, which were linked to the national identity of both countries. Accordingly, this rivalry over the national representation was framed as a conflict between true patriots and traitors and the other side was depicted as the turncoat infringing the purity of the Korean national community by gearing to the interests of American or Russian foreign imperialists (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007; Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2008).

As North Korea was responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War, the perception of the South being the victim and of the North as the antagonistic enemy seemed to be natural in the aftermath of the Korean War. South Korea focused on securing its own national security vis-à-vis the North with the core task of maintaining the identity of a South Korean nation. In this sense, the conservatives in power emphasized being anti-

communist and anti-North Korea while being pro-America as the US secured the South's security through a strong US-South Korean military alliance. This became the basis of the conservative ideology and was considered as legitimate with North Korea posing a threat to postwar South Korea. Thus, within the context of the Cold War, anti-communism, the ideology of the capitalist bloc, was employed to legitimize the authoritarian regime in the South. During the military dictatorship, the authoritarian government monopolized the discourse on North Korea leaving little room for competition among diverse political perspectives. Therefore, anti-communism, which included severe anti-North Korean rhetoric and reasoning, became a crucial part of the national identity of South Korea (Chae, Haesook/Kim, Steven 2008; Hwang, Ji-hwan 2011; Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007; Shin, Gi-wook/ Burke 2008).

The political leaders with a lack of democratic legitimacy misused the national security to domestically guard their regime security. Having experienced colonial exploitation by the Japanese, the destruction of the Korean War and poverty, they were determined to advance economic development at all costs. In the name of national security, productivity and efficiency, democratic principles and human rights were discounted in the pursuit of a state-led development (Ham, Jae-bong 2005).

The dispute over the national identity between the two Koreas on a state level was later extended to a state-society conflict within South Korea, particularly during the minjung movement in the 1970s, which developed into a national struggle for democracy and unification in the 1980s. In the 1970s, minjung, which means common people as opposed to elites, leaders, or even the educated and cultured, were understood by intellectuals to be an 'object' to be enlightened by them. The movement was advocated particularly by domestic intellectuals, politicians, students and workers that formed a coalition against the regime of Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), who controlled and led the industrialization process under his iron rule (I, Nam-hŭi 2016). During this process of democratization, the issue of national identity was of particular importance leading to an emotional and intense conflict between the democratizing civil society and the authoritarian leadership with both parties contending to represent the 'real' Korean nation. Thus, the dynamics of identity politics played a crucial role in the democratic movement within the South (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007).

The populist minjung ideology may be understood as a political reaction to two occurrences. Firstly, it made serious allegations against the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime under the Yusin (revitalization) constitution which was established by Park Chung-

hee in 1972. This new constitution made it possible for the president to be reelected for an unlimited number of times for a six-year term and effectively accumulated all governing power in his hands. Under the Yusin system, industrialization was performed based on repressive labor policies. The government was commonly engaged in kidnapping, torture, intimidation, rape, lynching, and executions of trade union activists. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the army, the police, special police units in civilian outfits known as 'paekkoldan', which literally means white skeleton brigade, as well as mobsters hired by companies called 'kusadae' were all employed against workers (Pak, Mi 2005). The government even enforced an emergency decree on national security mainly against industrial disputes, which were recognized as equivalent to communist politics. Moreover, restrictions on civil liberties were mainly justified by emphasizing the requirement to discipline the labor force in the context of North Korea posing a threat to the South. Such restrictions were also employed to implement a low wage policy (Pak, Mi 2005).

Secondly, it was a response to the increasing economic inequality and the perception of an absence of morality in the process of wealth accumulation by large parts of the South Korean population (Ku, Hae-gŭn 1991). Contrarily to the oppression of labor, the authoritarian regime actively promoted the growth of large conglomerates, known as 'chaebŏl' in Korean, which had close ties with the state. The economic policy focused on the chaebŏl led to an asymmetrical accumulation of wealth of the chaebŏls. This was accompanied by the alienation of the middle class (Pak, Mi 2005: 264ff.). By 1980, the top one percent possessed one third of the national wealth (Nam, Kun-u 1989: 122). Hence, the movement was a response of progressive intellectuals who formed an expansive alliance among the politically or economically excluded people from the state-led development to the economic as well as social injustices in the context of the economic development of the country (Ku, Hae-gŭn 1991).

Particularly intellectuals played a way more crucial role within the democratization movement in South Korea compared to the West. Intellectuals, students, and other white-collar workers were in the forefront of the political revolt against the authoritarian state severely affecting the consciousness and organization of the working class. As opposed to the early European working class, which benefited from a strong craft tradition from which it attained many ideological and organizational resources, the South Korean working class did not have a cultural tradition or a coherent community advancing solidarity among the class. In contrast, the minjung movement provided the working class with an opposing

ideology to the authoritarian state, new politicized languages, organizational networks, and shelters (Ku, Hae-gŭn 1991: 486ff.).

During the minjung movement, the amount of compromises, unjustifiable sacrifices and human rights violations during the period of the military dictatorship were fiercely denounced and the correction of past mistakes, wrongdoings and justice was demanded (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007). The movement may be understood as ‘discursive contestations in a field of political, cultural, and symbolic forces by emphasizing its potency, richness, and historical significance’ (I, Nam-hŭi 2016: 295). The minjung movement, which constructed itself as a counterpublic sphere, included constituting new hierarchies and norms. All other forces were perceived to be hostile to the movement as anti-minjung, antinational and antidemocratic. This dichotomic strategy of glorifying the minjung and ‘othering’ and sometimes demonizing the state, foreign powers, and corporate conglomerates essentially reinforced their oppositional identity (I, Nam-hŭi 2016: 295).

The South Korean minjung movement was the driving force for the successful overturning of the authoritarian regime and the transition to a parliamentary democracy and is thus comparable to other democratization movements in South Africa and Eastern Europe. Modern history, particularly the South Korean path of decolonization, led to a sense of failure and distant as well as the recent history was questioned. This paved the way for negotiating and reconstructing meanings and identities and gave rise to the discourse of the minjung. During this process of disputing and rewriting Korean history, major historical events were reevaluated and reinterpreted, and the antagonistic depiction of the North based on the Cold War structure was discredited. In this context, the national identity based on anti-communism advanced by the authoritarian rulers was contested by the democratizing civil society (Ham, Jae-bong 2005).

At last, increasing mass protests and industrial actions against the authoritarian state led to the collapse of the Yusin system in 1979. After Park Chung-hee’s assassination in 1979, South Korea experienced a short period of democratization. Industrial conflicts escalated and workers demanded improved working conditions. Students, intellectuals, and journalists aligned with them. The students continued to protest in 1980, pressing for academic freedom and comprehensive social reforms. However, General Chun Doo-hwan staged a military coup and assumed power by defeating domestic opposition, thereby reestablishing a military government (1980-1988) (Pak, Mi 2005). In May 1980, the military massacred more than a thousand civilians during a protest in the Southern city of Kwangju.

Despite state efforts to crush its dissidents, protests continued (An, Jong-ch'öl 2002; Pak, Mi 2005).

The Kwangju massacre was a turning point for the student movement as revolving was subsequently perceived as the only viable alternative to overcome the military dictatorship. As opposed to earlier student movements, the clearly stated goal of the movement in the 1980s was a revolution. While in the 1970s the minjung were regarded as the 'object' needed to be enlightened by intellectuals, in the 80s, they symbolized the suppressed people in the sociopolitical system capable of resisting and rising up against it. In this manner, the proponents of the minjung movement concluded that the minjung were protagonists of a political, cultural enterprise opposing and rejecting the narrative of state-led development and the true subject of the historical development in Korea capable of social change. In this sense, the notion of minjung in this context depicts real historical subjectivity (Pak, Mi 2005).

In addition, there was another crucial difference between the previous democratization movements and the student movement of the 1980s: while the former ones were populist, in the 80s the political positions of activists were influenced by diverse strands of Marxism. In the 1960s and 1970s, the number of student activists involved in secret socialist organizations was very limited. The Kwangju massacre was the critical juncture after which Marxist ideas gained influence among the protestors. In the 1980s, many intellectuals objected to neoclassical liberal, developmentalist and pro US approaches within academia with various strands of Marxism gaining popularity (Cumings 1997: 381). This led to the flourishing of the Marxist intellectual movement. South Korean students, intellectuals and human rights activists incorporated ideas from preexisting ideological strands, including Leninism, neo-Marxist dependency theory, Maoism and Kim Il-sung's Juche (self-reliance) ideology to come up with diverse Marxist strategies. Particularly Leninism and the Juche ideology were widely spread among members the movement by the mid-1980s (Pak, Mi 2005).

The continuous backing of the South Korean authoritarian regimes by the US led to increasing anti-US sentiments, especially after the Kwangju massacre, which was conducive to the formation of a pro-North Korea faction called 'chusap'a' within the movement. Many perceived their country to be a US colony due to the stationing of about 40,000 military personnel in the South. Furthermore, these also regarded the US to be in control over the South Korean army through the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Notably, the US commanders had permitted the Chun Doo-hwan regime to employ South Korean troops

against civilians during the Kwangju uprising. This was understood as the US approval of and compliance with the military regime. In this sense, the US was perceived to be involved in injustices and human rights violations through collusive behavior with the authoritarian regime. Therefore, the US was regarded as the main impediment to Korean unification and democratization and fierce anti-Americanism became a vital part of the movement (Pak, Mi 2005; Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007).

Most of those who have spent their youth fighting for South Korea's democratization belong to the so called 386 generation, which refers to those who were born in the 60s and attended university in the 80s. The experience of suppression under the Yusin system in the 1970s and the turbulent 80s, including the Kwangju massacre, contributed to a common generational consciousness which became the foundation of the student movement in the 1980s (Pak, Mi 2005; Pak, Sŏn-Young 2007).

Overall, the democratization movement lasted over twenty years under the reckless oppression of the authoritarian state generating many martyrs. Many gave up their lives and proclaimed to be honored to die for Korea's democratization when being convicted to death. And many more spent years in prison. After the Kwangju Uprising thousands of intellectuals voluntarily chose to live as factory workers instead of being while-collar professionals. State security agents and the police often forcefully separated them from their families, which sometimes lasted for years. As an act of active resistance, many also committed suicide. Male students were enforced to join the military during imprisonment and various among them were found dead while being in military service. Many of those who were released were precluded from being employed in the public or other sectors and were not permitted to leave the country (I, Nam-hŭi 2016).

The few existing historical analyses of the minjung movement written by progressives solely highlight the context of state oppression and heroic resistance, which is not surprising considering the sacrifice of the people and the trajectory of the movement (e.g. Hwang, Ŭi-bong 1986; I, Jae-o 1984). Most of them were written during the peak of the movement by former activists or people who sympathized with the movement. The minjung movement in the literature is commonly depicted in an excessively coherent manner, as a natural consequence of the oppressive military ruling accompanied by extremely fast industrialization its negative effects (e.g. Pak, Mi 2005; I, Nam-hŭi 2016; Ku, Hae-gŭn 1991).

The Kwangju massacre is a prominent example for the different interpretation and evaluation of South Korea's political history between conservatives and progressives. In this

sense, its causes and consequences continue to be contested by conservative forces. The Kwangju Democratization Movement was officially recognized in 1988 and in 1995 the main perpetrators were convicted. However, some conservative groups continue to claim that the movement was in fact a violent uprising secretly organized by North Korean infiltrators and Kim Dae-jung to take over the government and enable South Korea's invasion by North Korea. Hence, the Kwangju massacre is one of the contested issues linked to South Korea's history and national identity (Mosler 2020: 49).

In 1987, over a million people demonstrated against the regime and pressured the government to allow constitutional change which included direct presidential elections (Pak, Mi 2005). In the same year, the first direct and free presidential election in 20 years was held, which marked the transition to democracy. Because both opposition leaders Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who had fought severely for South Korea's democratization, failed to agree on important issues and a unified candidacy, their votes were split up. This led to Roh Tae-woo's election, who had a military background. However, Kim Young-sam's election in 1993, which led to the establishment of the first civilian government since 1962, and progressive Kim Dae-jung's election in 1997 consolidated the South Korean democracy (Ham, Jae-bong 2005; Hwang, Ji-hwan 2011). After Kim Young-sam's election, an increasing proportion of student activists were convinced that 'fascist' means were no longer a viable solution in the 1990s despite of the ruling party occasionally using brutal oppression to manage economic and political crises. Additionally, in the late 1980s, the number of occupational organizations, NGOs, and diverse social movement organizations, including environmental, women's and youth movements, drastically increased (Pak, Mi 2005).

The progressives not only experienced South Korea's democratization, but were also faced with a changing international setting. The Soviet bloc started to break up with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Consequently, the international geopolitical conditions drastically began to change. The dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to an ideological disorientation and disillusion with the socialist countries among many progressive activists. With the new domestic and international developments, the ideologies of the progressives changed as the new social movements seemed to contradict their ideas. The majority of activists in the 1990s renounced from the idea that North Korea and the Soviet Union constituted alternative societies (Pak, Mi 2005).

Moreover, a growing number of activists concluded that, instead of engaging in a revolution, the aim should rather be to develop a civil society. Criticizing the state-centered

approach of the old progressives, other facets of transformative movement were highlighted including identity, self-realization, and autonomy of activists, opting for defensive as opposed to offensive strategies, cross-class mobilization and the politicization of everyday life. Overall, in the 1990s the movement ideologies highly diversified with ideas of different political trends such as post-Marxism, Trotskyism, the New Left, social democracy, and post-modernism acquiring followers among activists (Pak, Mi 2005).

In this democratic era, the military establishment, corruption, as well as the close ties between the government and big businesses built by the previous authoritarian regimes, were main objectives of reform. Furthermore, progressives criticized the depiction of North Korea as an enemy and emphasized the shared ethnicity (Ham, Jae-bong 2005; Hwang, Ji-hwan 2011). Despite certain events like the 1997 financial crisis reviving anti-American sentiments, with the evolvement of democratization, anti-American nationalism incrementally decreased in the 1990s. Simultaneously, although the US also played a crucial role for the progressive governments, the progressives developed a more critical view of the US (Ham, Jae-bong 2005; Hwang, Ji-hwan 2011; Sin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007).

Democratization and the financial crisis in 1997, which severely harmed the country's economy, turned out to be an opportunity for the progressive ideology to become part of South Korea's political mainstream (Ham, Jae-bong 2005). Since then, three progressive presidents have been elected: Kim Dae-jung, Roh Mu-hyun, and the current president Moon Jae-in. The identity of progressives after democratization was highly influenced by the progressive governments and their North Korea policy as the anti-authoritarian oppositional identity of the Cold-War-period needed to be replaced (Ham, Jae-bong 2005).

The fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea's patron, and China's reluctance to support Pyongyang's adventurism, and the economic crisis in the 1990s made North Korea less of a threat to the South and the outside world. In this context, the progressive President Kim Dae-jung promoted the Sunshine Policy, a new type of engagement policy towards the North. Kim promoted a policy of *détente*, which was continued by his successor Roh Mu-hyun and lasted for a decade until Lee Myeong-bak from the opposition party was elected. The policy reflected the progressive idea of one nation being divided into two states cooperating to decide the future of Korea without foreign powers interfering (Ham, Jae-bong 2005).

The Sunshine Policy had two remarkable features: the significant material aid provided by the South, personal exchanges as well as the massive fostering of

communication between both governments for the first time since 1953. This was based on a separation of economic and political issues. In 2000, the first meeting between the two heads of Koreas, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Il-sung, was held in Pyongyang. This had a significant meaning for inter-Korean relations and was a powerful demonstration of the idea of national self-determination (Ham Jae-bong 2005).

Moreover, it was vital regarding the changing perception of many South Koreans of North Korea from an enemy to a cooperating partner (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007). Ultimately, the engagement policy towards the North with a more positive attitude towards it and a more critical stance towards the US became the most fundamental part of the identity of the progressives after democratization, contrarily to the conservatives who tend to continue to perceive the North as a threat and have a more positive evaluation of the US.-R.O.K. alliance (e.g. Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007; Chae, Haesook/Kim, Steven 2008).

The engagement policy was criticized by conservative forces which were not fundamentally against engagement with the North but were more skeptical that North Korea would change and also insisted on more reciprocity (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007). North Korea's first nuclear test on the 9th of October 2006 was seen by many as an indictment against the engagement policy advocated by the two progressive presidents. Despite of years of investing in North Korea and providing it with aid, the South seemed to have gotten little in return. While the former President Kim Young-sam stated that the policy should 'be thrown into a trash can' (Ryu, Jin 2006), conservative legislators contended that the nuclear test meant the 'death penalty' for the Sunshine Policy (Ch'oe, Sang-hun 2006).

Many conservatives consider the period of the progressive Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun administrations between 1998 and 2007 a 'lost decade'. The following conservative presidents Lee Myeong-bak and Park Geun-hye adopted policies which marked a dramatic shift from the previous policy. Prioritizing denuclearization over progress in inter-Korean relations, a hardline policy was implemented, and inter-Korean dialogue was suspended, leading to the lowest level of inter-Korean relations in decades (Lee, Seung-Ook 2015: 698ff.).

The progressive camp, including the Roh Mu-hyun administration, did not interpret the nuclear test as a verdict on the engagement policy towards North Korea. Rather than perceiving the nuclear issue as an inter-Korean problem, the progressives viewed the nuclear issue as being rooted in the difficult relations between the US and the North. In their eyes, the Bush administration's hardline approach towards the North, the

issuing of regime change and the preemptive-strike doctrine led to an environment which drove the North to pursue its nuclear plans to ensure its security (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007).

Additionally, the engagement policy was not considered to be responsible for the deteriorating US-North Korean relations, while this condition was acknowledged to be potentially obstructive to inter-Korean relations. Such differing perspectives on North Korea and the US of the conservative and progressive camps remain to be crucial to the division within the South. To South Koreans, North Korea is not just a policy issue, but is ultimately linked to the national identity of the country (Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007). Overall, the conflict between progressives and conservatives about how to deal with North Korea, the South-South conflict, has replaced the confrontation between pro- and anti-democratic forces (Han, Gwan-su/Chang, Yun-su 2012; Shin, Gi-wook/Burke 2007).

In essence, progressives have a notion of the South Korean identity which includes North Korea, whereas conservatives view the North as 'the other' based on a perception of the South Korean identity which excludes North Korea. Thus, the South Korean conservative and progressive ideologies cannot be separated from distinct understandings of the South Korean identity. The controversy on what North Korea means to the South and how South Korea should deal with it is the core of the ongoing South-South conflict. Understanding the link between the South Korean identities and ideologies is crucial to understanding the discourse on North Korea including North Korean defectors. The South-South conflict may be viewed as the political culture prevalent in the South characterized by two mainstream framings of issues related to North Korea.

4.2. North Korean Defectors in the Context of inter-Korean Relations: South Korea's Perception of and Settlement Policy for North Korean Defectors

This subchapter outlines the role of North Korean defectors for the South Korean government in the context of inter-Korean relations. During the Cold War, the South Korean government associated North Korean defectors with heroes in the context of the ongoing rivalry between both Koreas over which system is superior. Hence, defection was encouraged by granting them huge benefits. However, after the Cold War the number of North Korean defectors who entered the South massively increased due to the North Korean economic crisis and famine. On the one hand, defectors were increasingly perceived

as economic migrants or refugees. On the other hand, they were also viewed as important actors in the context of a future Korean unification. The changing perception of North Korean defectors over time is reflected in the development of the South Korean settlement support policy for North Korean defectors and the terms employed to label them.

4.2.1. The Cold War: The Age of the Heroes

The origin of North Korean defectors is linked to the division of Korea, including the establishment of two distinct governments, and the Korean war. The division of Korea and the establishment of a physical border at the end of the Second World War after Korea's liberation from Japan separated the Korean people. The US occupied the Southern part, whereas the Soviet Union occupied the Northern part of the Korean Peninsula. In the context of the emerging Cold War, negotiation between Korea, the US, and the Soviet Union to establish an independent unified Korea failed. This led to the establishment of two separate governments with opposing systems: a capitalist South Korea and a socialist North Korea. In the mid-1940s and early 1950s, the migration between the inter-Korean border in both directions was significant. Capitalists, landlords, Christians, pro-Japanese collaborators fled to the South. Farmers, laborers, revolutionaries, progressive intellectuals, and activists fled to the North. These were labeled 'war refugees' (pinanmin), 'people who lost their hometown' (silhyangmin) or 'separated families' (isangajok) in the South. These labels reflect their perception as victims of the division and war (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 6f.).

During the Cold War, the South Korean military regime introduced a system to reward North Korean defectors. They were welcomed and received huge benefits. Most defectors had a privileged elite class background being former military officials, government officials or party members and were treated with honor and respect. As the South Korean government, just like the North Korean regime, proclaimed to be the only legitimate government authority of the entire Korean Peninsula, accepting North Korean defectors was viewed as a natural procedure and a way to proclaim that the South Korean system was superior to the North. In this context, North Korean defectors were viewed as citizens of South Korea who proved their service to the state. Therefore, they were given the status and citizenship of South Koreans including all rights upon arrival in the South (Noland et al. 2006). Defectors were crucial for the government since they provided it with information about the North and devices in exchange for money as a reward. Given the elite background and the high value of information, they were rewarded very generously (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 7f.; Choi, Gyubin 2018: 82f.).

Until 1962 there was no official legislation or policy on North Korean defectors prevalent in the South (Chǒng, Chu-sin 2007). The first South Korean law on North Korean defectors was established in 1962. The primary aim of the so called ‘Law on the Special Protection of Patriots and North Korean Defectors’ was to honor and reward those who chose the South over the North. This law granted the defectors the same recognition that was given to those that fought against the Japanese colonists during the Second World War (Fuqua 2011). Moreover, in 1962 the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs was established as an important administrative institute under the authority of the prime minister with the aim of managing military protection including patriots, their families and North Korean defectors (Yang, Eun-sung 2009).

The defectors also received settlement money according to a ranking system which classified them into three ranks. Those in the highest rank received a million Won, whereas those in the second rank received 0,7 million Won, while those in the lowest rank were given half a million. Considering that the South Korean economy used to be among the worst in the world, the amount of money was considerable. Furthermore, North Korean defectors received residential, educational and employment support and medical service. As the law treated North Korean defectors as heroes, they maintained their privileged status after having settled in the South (Dong, Seung-chul 2005).

In 1974 the ‘Special Law on Protection for Patriots and Others’ was enacted, which was basically the same law established in 1962 with minor changes (Chǒng, Chu-sin 2007). The main difference was that North Korean defectors were no longer directly mentioned with the new phrasing. However, neither did this mean that the law no longer addressed North Korean defectors, nor did it represent a turn to negative perceptions of them. Thus, the following law reemploys the term ‘brave North Korean defectors’ to label them. It is possible that this relabeling aimed at being more inclusive by using the term ‘other’ (Yang, Eun-sung 2009).


In 1978 the ‘Law on Special Compensation for Brave North Korean Defectors’ was established. The primary difference to the previous laws was that the resettlement money was handed out more systematically. In this manner, the amount of the payment depended on two factors: the person’s rank in North Korea and the value of the provided information (Dong, Seung-chul 2005). Moreover, the existing medical service and educational support policies were continuously applied while economic benefits were enhanced. With the existing benefits for defectors being increased, the South Korean policy on North Korean defectors reached a peak with the 1978 law in terms of generous rewards. Defectors were

viewed as respectable and could still easily maintain a privileged status in the South (Fuqua 2011).

4.2.2. The Post-Cold War Period after 1993: Welfare-dependent Migrants, Refugees, Defectors or Key Actors for a Future Korean Unification?

In the early 1970s, Cold War tensions slowly eased up and diplomatic relations between both Koreas were established in the late 1980s. The early 1990s were marked by an economic downfall of North Korea. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc led to an economic crisis and famine in the North. During the great famine, about one million North Koreans, equaling about five percent of the North Korean population, died. Moreover, the composition and number of North Korean defectors significantly changed (Haggard/Noland 2006). The following graph shows how drastically the numbers of North Koreans who entered the South increased.

Figure 1. Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea



Source: Ministry of Unification (2020).

While prior to 1993 there were less than ten defectors entering the South each year, the number of defectors significantly increased in the 1990s³. Thus, the financial burden for compensation massively increased with the high influx of defectors in the post-Cold War era (Jung, Jinheon 2011). Moreover, the motivation for defecting and the demographics of North Korean defectors drastically changed. Most defectors in this period primarily searched for food and work. They commonly had a poor and underprivileged background including farmers, factory workers, women, and young adults. This placed the South Korean government in a new dilemma (Yang, Eun-sung 2009). While previously North Korean defectors were predominantly single adult males, since 2002 women have outnumbered men. Many arrived with another family member (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 10).

On the one hand, North Korean defectors were rather perceived as a burden than beneficial for the South by the Kim Young-sam administration. After the Cold War, the propaganda values of the defectors for the promotion of the superiority of the capitalist system over socialism were no longer prevalent. The South Korean government made various efforts aiming at peaceful cooperation with the North. This, in turn, had negative consequences for its policy on North Korean defectors for two reasons.

Firstly, officially encouraging defection would be counterproductive in the context of peace efforts and could jeopardize stability within the North (Haggard/Noland 2006). Secondly, the defectors were simply not as valuable as in the previous era. The information provided by the defectors was no longer a military asset that could be used against the North. In this context, the official and public attitude towards the defectors changed negatively with the defectors being perceived as needy outsiders facing huge difficulties adjusting to the South.

On the other hand, the South Korean government has always proclaimed to be the only legitimate authority over the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it has acknowledged North Korean defectors as South Korean citizens hoping of a unified Korea in the future. To renounce from this position would mean that its unification principles would be undermined (Haggard/Noland 2006).

The Post-Cold war laws reflect the severe changes in the geopolitical circumstances and the North-South relations in the new era (Fuqua 2011; Yang, Eun-sung 2009). In this

³ The number of North Koreans arriving in South Korea decreased since Kim Jong Un became the Supreme Leader of North Korea in 2011 due to tightened border controls between China and North Korea and higher rates charged by brokers (Jung, Da-min 2018).

manner, various amendments were enacted to the 1978 law majorly reducing the benefits of the defectors through the introduction of a more rational management of defectors. In 1993, the 'Law on the Protection of North Korean Brethren who returned to the state' was established under the conservative Kim Young Sam administration. The law no longer provided huge benefits to the defectors, but marked a shift towards social welfare, thereby signaling a departure from the previous policy. In the context of the sharply increasing influx of North Koreans in the South in the 1990s, the law served as a limiting strategy by posing an obstacle to adequate settlement (Dong, Seung-chul 2005).

North Korean defectors were viewed as impoverished citizens in need of governmental support instead of being treated as heroes. Consequently, the benefits majorly decreased, particularly the amount of settlement money, and the focus shifted to basic aid and economic support, which was provided according to family size. Moreover, defectors were no longer classified into different classes (Lee, Woo-yeong et al. 2000). North Korean defectors faced with a low social status and poverty began to identify themselves as strangers or second-class citizens (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 9).

Although the law aimed at replacing the propaganda-dominated approach of the Cold War era with a humanitarian one, the social welfare-focused approach failed to incorporate the ideals important for a co-ethnic immigration policy. Particularly the fraternal aspect of South Korea's unification policy was viewed to be missing. This contributed to an introduction of a new law (Kim, Jung Soo 2012: 125). At the end of his presidential term, Kim Young Sam implemented the 'Law on Protection and Settlement Aid for Residents who escaped from the North' in 1997. The official term used here for North Korean defectors, which may be translated as 'residents who escaped from the North' (pukhan it'al chumin), is still the official term for North Korean defectors (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 9). Based on the new law, a council for North Koreans in the South was established as well as facility protection for a year, the acknowledgement of certificates and educational background acquired in the North and vocational training (Yi, Küm-sun 1999).

As part of the engagement policy introduced by the progressive South Korean President Kim Daejung, the issue of South Korea's treatment of North Korean defectors was understood to be a crucial preparation step for unification and their support was significantly increased (Dong, Seung-chul 2005). In addition to the provision of material benefits and protection, post-settlement issues, economic self-reliance and socio-cultural adjustment were the key aspects of the new settlement policy. This was based on the idea shared by progressive presidents that dealing with North Korean defectors is an important

preparation for future unification, which would not happen through South Korea's absorption of the North as promoted by previous conservative governments (Choi, Gyu-bin 2018: 87).

Although the increasing numbers of defection were perceived as an obstacle to rapprochement efforts with the North, the Kim Dae-jung government illustrated a sense of obligation to accept North Korean defectors and providing them with a wide range of settlement support services. The resettlement money was massively increased. Moreover, a new key concern was to support the adjustment of defectors in the South by addressing psychological and cultural difficulties and improving job training efforts. The Hanawon resettlement education center, which provides North Korean defectors with socio-cultural practical training for eight to twelve weeks to prepare them for life in South Korea's capitalist society, was first established in 1998 (Son, Sarah A. 2014: 19f.).

During Kim's presidency, the media started to label North Korean defectors as 'escapees from the North'/'North Korean defectors' (t'albukja), which continues to be the most commonly used term in the South in non-formal settings and documents (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 9). The current settlement support system based on three stages consisting of entry and protection, initial education and support at Hanawon center, and post-settlement management on a municipal and provincial level was established under Kim Dae-jung (Choi, Gyu-bin 2018: 88).

The Roh administration introduced the term 'new settlers' (set'ömin) to replace the Cold War terminology such as 'defectors' to highlight the migrant characteristics of North Korean defectors based on the idea that North Koreans are 'persons with new homes who live in hope' (Kim, Hwa-sun/Ch'oe, Tae-sök 2011: 41; Choi, Gyu-bin 2018: 88). Due to their lack of experience with the capitalist economic system, many defectors lost much of the resettlement money within a short period after their arrival. Thus, the Roh administration began to divide payments in rates. These have since been paid out over a longer period (Chung, Byung-Ho 2008: 12).

Under the conservative Lee Myeong-bak administration, which pursued a hardline policy vis-à-vis the North, inter-Korean relations deteriorated. Moreover, the defector settlement policy promoted by the conservative government placed more emphasis on North Korean defectors successfully being employed as contributing members of society. Thus, the main goal of the policy was to integrate North Koreans by supporting their economic stability and independence of government support. The settlement money was decreased while different types of funding, e.g. for vocational training or skill development,

were extended (Son, Sarah A. 2014: 22). The Lee administration reintroduced the official term 'residents escaping from the North' in 2008 as defectors and conservative groups protested against the label 'new settlers' introduced by the previous Roh administration, arguing that the term mitigates the political reasons for defections (Kim, Hwa-sun/Ch'oe, Tae-sök 2011: 41; Choi, Gyu-bin 2018: 88).

Since 1997 no new laws for North Korean defectors have been enacted. Nonetheless, various policies have since been introduced continuously to facilitate the adjustments of the defectors within South Korean society based on amendments of the law (Yang, Eun-sung 2009). The South Korean government has since focused on deepening their services to support their integration in a more comprehensive manner and on increasing their agency. Moreover, both governmental and private actors have been increasingly involved in providing these services and support their adjustment (Son, Sarah A. 2015: 173).

The settlement policy has become part of the South's unification policy by focusing on social integration with an emphasis on supporting defectors to adjust to life in South Korean society and overcoming social exclusion (Kwon, Sook Do 2014). As unification is a long process, the social integration of North Koreans is viewed as a first step prior to the system integration between different institutions or the social system (Sul, Jin Bae et al. 2014). In this manner, Lee's successor, President Park-Geun-hye highlighted that the integration of North Koreans is a 'test-bed for unification' (Choi, Gyu-bin 2018: 89).

In essence, there is a link between the prevalent perceptions of the South Korean identity evident in the discourse on North Korean defectors and the policy toward North Korean defectors (Kim, Hwa-sun/Ch'oe, Tae-sök 2011; Son, Sarah A. 2014; Son, Sarah A. 2015; Choi, Gyu-bin 2018). In the context of inter-Korean enmity during the Cold War, defectors were treated as heroes who were massively rewarded as they were a mean for the South to display its superiority over North Korea's system. In the post-Cold War period, the numbers drastically increased due to the North Korean famine.

The Kim Young Sam administration understood it to be a humanitarian responsibility to protect the vulnerable defectors viewed as economic migrants. His successor Kim Dae-Jung emphasized the need to support their integration into South Korean society as a crucial step for a future unification and significantly extended the settlement support. Since then, the issue of North Korean defectors has become part of South Korea's unification policy. The conservative Lee Myeong-bak and Park Geun-Hye administrations placed greater emphasis on supporting North Korean defectors to become self-sufficient and economically independent from the government.

As Sarah Son (2015: 173) points out, the South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors is characterized by two collective identity frames in the national narrative of South Korea: a positive identity including North Koreans based on a discourse of shared ethnicity, history and responsibility for North Koreans; and a negative one viewing North Koreans as others rooted in the political enmity and the distinct hybridization of both societies. This has influenced South Korea's settlement policy toward North Korean defectors in the post-Cold War period. The distinct identity frames are linked to the ideological divide within South Korean society.

Moreover, the ideological division is linked to different unification policies: progressives aim at reviving a popular ethno-nationalism including the North Korean state, whereas conservatives adopted anti-communism as a guiding principle regarding national South Korean policies. Thus, for conservatives, who are influenced by the Cold War mentality of previous authoritarian regimes, the defection of North Koreans is continued to be viewed as a sign of South Korea's superiority over the North. This is perceived as a crucial feature of South Korea (Choo, Yong Shik 2003).

In this manner, conservatives interpret the defection of North Koreans as a sign of the collapse of the North Korean regime and thus to be encouraged (Son, Sarah A. 2014: 58). Hence, although both conservative and progressive governments in the post-Cold War era have underlined the importance of the integration of North Korean defectors as a way to prepare for unification, they have a different view of the role of North Koreans in the context of inter-Korean relations, which is linked to their view of the North Korean state.

As Choi Gyu-bin's (2018: 79) formulates, '(t)he emergence, movement, and treatment of North Korean refugees are intrinsically political'. As the question of North Korean defectors is linked to the division of Korea and inter-Korean relations, the issue has always been politicized within South Korea. Since South Korea's democratization, it has been politicized by both progressives and conservatives in the context of the South-South conflict.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the larger historical context in which the current South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors is embedded in. The South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors has always been part of the larger South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea. In this manner, the discourse has been linked to social practices within the field of action of South Korea's North Korea approach, which includes

governmental and nongovernmental approaches in dealing with North Korea, North Korean defectors, and Korean unification.

The first subchapter shed light on the political culture of South Korea since the country's democratization characterized by the South-South conflict between conservatives and progressives. I showed that understanding the historical developments in the 20th century is critical to comprehending the South-South division. Most importantly, the South Korean ideologies are linked to distinct conceptions of the South Korean identity. During the Cold War, the South Korean discourse on North Korea was monopolized by the authoritarian state. Faced with the Korean division and lacking democratic legitimacy, being anti-communist, anti-North Korea and pro-US were constructed by the authoritarian regime as core features of the South Korean identity which excluded North Korea. These continue to be the basis of the South Korean conservative ideology.

In the context of South Korea's democratization movements led by progressives, the conservative ideology was condemned and the conservative hegemonic discourse on Korean history, including the notion of the South Korean identity, was contested. Thus, progressives defended a sense of the South Korean identity including North Korea. North Korea was primarily framed as a partner for unification rather than an enemy, while the US was criticized for having cooperated and supported the authoritarian regimes. In short, the discursive construction and contestation of the South Korean identities and ideologies continue to influence current South Korean politics through the ongoing South-South conflict.

The second subchapter illustrated how the issue of how to deal with North Korean defectors, whether in South Korea or abroad, is linked to perceptions of North Koreans influenced by inter-Korean relations. Moreover, it highlighted the link between the discourse on North Korea and other social practices, including South Korea's North Korea policy and South Korea's settlement policy for North Korean defectors. In the context of inter-Korean enmity and competition over the superiority of one's own political system, North Korean defectors who had an elite background were treated as heroes and massively rewarded during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the North Korean famine led to a drastic increase of defectors and North Korean defectors were perceived as economic migrants in need of humanitarian assistance by the Kim Young Sam administration. Therefore, the settlement support was massively reduced.

Under the Kim Dae-jung administration, North Korean defectors were framed as vital actors for future Korean unification and the settlement support was increased and

extended. Conservative presidents have adopted this framing. However, they have focused on supporting them to become self-reliant and economically independent from the state. In this sense, the settlement support policy for North Korean defectors has been influenced by the ideological affiliation of the South Korean governments and the state of inter-Korean relations.

In general, progressives and conservatives have different understandings of the role of North Koreans for South Korea. Progressives have highlighted the importance of North Koreans for future unification. Although conservatives adopted this framing, they continue to view the defection of North Koreans as a validation of South Korea's superiority over the North and a sign of the collapse of the North Korean regime. In this manner, the issue of North Korean defectors has always been and continues to be politicized by both ideological camps.

5. Framing Analysis

This chapter presents the outcome of the content analysis of the Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh articles. The chapter is divided into three subchapters. The first two subchapters correspond to the two analyzed newspapers. The following two subchapters (5.1. and 5.2.) lay out the findings of the Chosun Ilbo, while the subsequent two subchapters (5.3. and 5.4.) focus on the findings of the Hankyoreh. Both media outlets primarily focused on problems mainly linked to North Korea and China. Chapters 5.1. and 5.3. address the framing of issues primarily linked to China, whereas chapters 5.2. and 5.4. deal with the framing of issues primarily linked to North Korea. These subchapters are each divided into three parts. These focus on the framing of specific problems, related causes and actors involved in trying to solve problems. Moreover, the subchapters 5.2.4. and 5.4.4. present the moral evaluation of actors in both media outlets. Chapter 5.5. deals with argumentivity and reveals the core arguments constructed by both ideological camps. The conclusion of the entire empirical chapter, including a summary, is formulated in chapter 5.6.


5.1. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to China in the Chosun Ilbo

The Chosun Ilbo fiercely criticized both China and North Korea in the majority of articles. Overall, about 73,54% of the Chosun Ilbo articles focused on problems primarily

linked to China, whereas 70,37% dealt with issues mainly linked to North Korea. Thus, both China and North Korea were main targets of criticism in the Chosun Ilbo.

Problems related to China were addressed in the majority of articles which appeared in the Chosun Ilbo. These have been grouped into four categories. Two of them relate to China's treatment of North Korean defectors: China's repatriation of defectors and China's crackdown on defectors including those who support them. Another category covers the exploitation commonly experienced by defectors in China and related problems. These include forced female prostitution and forced marriage to Chinese men and other forms of sexual abuse, illegal work without sufficient payment as well as the lack of citizenship or any official registration of children born between North Korean defectors and Chinese men. Defectors entering foreign schools or offices to be sent to South Korea, and in rare cases, to another country, make up the last category. The following graph provides an overview of how often these problems mainly linked to China have been covered, specified in percentage.

Figure 2. Problems Primarily Linked to China in the Chosun Ilbo



The main problems thematized by the Chosun Ilbo were China's repatriation of North Korean defectors (37,03%), the exploitation of defectors (14,29%), the crackdown of defectors and or defector helpers (12,17%), and defectors entering foreign offices or schools (3,17%). Hence, the main criticism of the Chosun Ilbo against China was its treatment of defectors. China was primarily condemned for repatriating North Koreans. Moreover, the

Chosun Ilbo also highlighted the consequences of China’s policy toward defectors by shedding light on the difficulties commonly experienced by them while residing in China.

China’s repatriation of North Koreans and the exploitation experienced by North Koreans in China were framed as a human rights issue by specific actors. These usually also argued that North Korean defectors are refugees according to international law. The following table demonstrates which actors constructed China’s repatriation of North Koreans as a human rights and refugee issue according to the accounts of the Chosun Ilbo.

Table 1. The Framing of China’s Repatriation of North Korean Defectors by South Korean and International Actors in the Chosun Ilbo

	Human rights	Refugee
Obama administration	-	X
Lee Myung-bak administration	X	X
Park Geun-hye administration	X	-
NHRCK	X	X
Conservative politicians	X	X
South Korean human rights NGOs	X	X
South Korean religious organizations	X	X
North Korean defectors	X	-
UN	X	X
Bush administration	X	X
International NGOs	X	X

According to the findings, most actors who view China’s repatriation of North Koreans to be a human rights violation also view North Korean defectors as refugees. The following South Korean actors constructed China’s repatriation as a human rights violation and a breach of the International Refugee Agreement: the Lee Myung-bak administration, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK), politicians affiliated with conservative parties, South Korean human rights NGOs and South Korean religious organizations. Thus, conservative domestic actors and NGOs were described as having promoted this framing. In contrast, the Park Geun-hye administration and North Korean defectors solely constructed the issue as a matter of human rights. President Park was

generally reluctant to frame North Korean defectors as refugees⁴. Regarding international actors, in line with South Korean conservative actors, the UN, the Bush administration and international organizations also framed China's repatriation as a human rights and refugee issue. Solely the Obama administration promoted the understanding of defectors being refugees without constructing repatriation as a human rights matter.

Furthermore, the living conditions of North Korean defectors in China were also sometimes framed as a human rights problem by specific actors. Generally, the life of North Koreans in China was described in a very negative manner characterized by exploitation. Forced prostitution and marriage of female defectors, horrible working conditions, and underpayment due to their illegal status were repetitively pointed out by different actors in the Chosun Ilbo. The following table presents which actors framed these problems as a human rights issue according to the Chosun Ilbo.

Table 2. The Framing of the Exploitation of North Korean Defectors in China by South Korean and International Actors in the Chosun Ilbo

	Human rights	Refugee
Park Geun-hye administration	X	-
NHRCK	X	X
Chosun Ilbo	X	X
South Korean human rights NGOs	X	X
North Korean Defectors	X	-
Bush administration	X	X
Obama administration	X	X
IPCNKR	X	X

The findings indicate that predominantly conservative actors constructed the living conditions of North Korean defectors in China as a human rights matter. Moreover, those who emphasized the human rights aspect also framed North Korean defectors as refugees. The following actors constructed the exploitation experienced by defectors in China as a human rights and refugee issue: the NHRCK, the Chosun Ilbo, South Korean human rights NGOs, North Korean defectors, the Bush and Obama administrations as well as the International Parliamentarians' Coalition for North Korean Refugees and Human Rights (IPCNKR). Hence, the Obama administration was presented as the only progressive actor


⁴ This might be because she promoted the framing, which was originally used by Kim Dae-jung, that North Korean defectors are key actors for a future unification between both Koreas to support minor changes in South Korea's domestic policy towards North Korean defectors. Alleviating the negative prejudice against North Korean defectors in South Korea was a main target of her domestic policy. Her administration promoted the slogan 'unification is awesome' and used the label 'citizens coming from North Korea'. In the context of failed improvements regarding inter-Korean relations, this could have been a strategic choice to highlight her efforts within the unresolved inter-Korean conflict.

who shared the framing of conservatives regarding this issue. However, there was no account of the Obama administration bashing China as a human rights violator. In this manner, the Chosun Ilbo portrayed progressive South Korean and US governments as having renounced from directly condemning the Chinese government as a human rights violator. Additionally, both the Park Geun-hye administration and North Korean defectors employed the human rights frame to problematize the living conditions of defectors in China without framing defectors as refugees.

Overall, the findings suggest that South Korean and U.S. conservatives share a common interpretation of the North Korean defector issue as reflected in the common frames employed to construct China's repatriation of North Koreans and their exploitation in China as a matter of human rights of refugees. In this sense, they promoted China's repatriation as a violation of human rights and a breach of the International Refugee Agreement. The Park Geun-hye administration and North Korean defectors constitute an exception as they only promoted these issues as a matter of human rights. Contrarily, according to the Chosun Ilbo, South Korean progressives abstained from employing such frames, whereas the Obama administration only advocated for defectors to be protected as refugees and not repatriated based on the International Refugee Agreement. While the Obama administration did not construct the repatriation of North Koreans as a human rights issue, it did promote the exploitation they experience in China due to their illegal status as a human rights matter. Hence, the Chosun Ilbo clearly showed that there was a difference in the frames employed by progressive and conservative actors in South Korea, but also in the US.

Although the Chosun Ilbo described four different, yet related, problems linked to China, the media outlet only outlined causes for the most frequently addressed problem: China's repatriation of North Korean defectors. In the context of providing reasons for China's repatriation policy, the Chosun Ilbo predominantly quoted spokespersons from the Chinese government. The following graph presents the causes for China's repatriation of North Korean defectors as described in the Chosun Ilbo, specified in percentage.

Figure 3. Causes of China's Repatriation of North Korean Defectors According to the Chosun Ilbo



The cause for China's forced repatriation of North Koreans was barely issued, particularly considering that repatriation was the most frequently addressed problem primarily linked to China. Most frequently, China's view of North Korean defectors was depicted as the main reason for repatriation. In this manner, 6,35% of the articles pointed out that China considers North Korean defectors to be illegal economic migrants who are temporarily in the country for economic reasons. This explanation often goes hand in hand with the account that China does not view defectors as refugees as stated in 4,76% of the China Ilbo sources. These results indicate that the Chosun Ilbo views China's perception of defectors as a main cause for its repatriation policy.


In addition, two further reasons were prevalent in the Chosun Ilbo. The progressive Roh administration was depicted as being responsible for the repatriation of defectors in 1,06% of the articles. In these articles, the Roh administration was accused of its passive diplomacy toward China. Thus, the Roh administration was framed as the causal actor based on the assumption that a tougher diplomacy toward China could have prevented the repatriation of North Korean defectors. Lastly, 0,53% of the articles framed the Sino-North Korean border treaty signed in 1986 as the cause for repatriation. As previously explained, this treaty determines that China is to repatriate all unauthorized North Korean migrants in its country. Hence, China's policy of arresting and repatriation North Korean defectors is legally based on this document.

All in all, China's treatment of North Korean defectors as illegal migrants and its unwillingness to accept them as refugees was viewed to be the main reason for China's repatriation policy. The Chosun Ilbo blamed the Chinese government for choosing not to acknowledge the refugee status of North Korean defectors as demanded by conservative

South Korean governments, domestic as well as international human rights NGOs, the US, and the UN.

As the North Korean defector issue has increasingly been constructed as an international problem, there have been numerous domestic as well as international actors involved in trying to solve this issue. Most efforts reported in the context of trying to solve the North Korean defector issue focused on stopping China’s repatriation. Nonetheless, some actors also aimed at improving the overall human rights situation of North Korean defectors in China. Due to the wide variety of actors covered, I will first present an overview of how often domestic actors were mentioned in this context and then elaborate on their strategies and frames. Subsequently, I will continue with international actors. It should be noted that the solutions listed refer to the efforts of actors trying to get China to change its policy toward North Korean defectors. Hence, these do not include opinions on how the North Korean defector issue should be solved. The following graph provides an overview of South Korean actors who tried to solve problems related to North Korean defectors and China in the Chosun Ilbo, specified in percentage.

Figure 4. South Korean Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Defector Issue According to the Chosun Ilbo



According to the Chosun Ilbo, the most proactive actors who tried to stop China’s repatriation of North Korean defectors were South Korean human rights NGOs which were mentioned in 23,81% of the articles. Among the different types of NGOs which help defectors, the ones portrayed in the Chosun Ilbo were mostly human rights NGOs and

sometimes Christian NGOs, which are predominantly conservative. On a domestic level, these NGOs aimed at pressuring the South Korean government to pursue an active diplomacy characterized by pressuring China in cooperation with the US and through the UNHRC by constructing China's repatriation of defectors as an international human rights issue. The Chosun Ilbo described that human rights NGOs repetitively demanded from the progressive Roh Mu-hyun and conservative Lee Myung-bak administrations to take a more active approach toward China. These NGOs were portrayed as having condemned them for being too passive in the context of trying to solve the North Korean defector issue. Moreover, they tried to raise awareness of China's policy by leading demonstrations against repatriation front of the Chinese embassy. Almost half of the articles mentioning domestic human rights NGOs in the context of trying to solve the North Korean defector issue covered such demonstrations.

On an international level, human rights NGOs were depicted as actively having promoted the repatriation of North Koreans as an international human rights issue through various activities. These included the holding of international conferences on the North Korean human rights problem and China's repatriation of North Korean defectors with US human rights NGOs, advocating international campaigns and publicly condemning China's behavior and demanding it to change its policy. Moreover, South Korean human rights NGOs also tried to influence the US government and the UN directly to counter China's behavior. The Chosun Ilbo pictured South Korean human rights NGOs as having actively cooperated with US NGOs to pressure the US government to pursue a hardline policy against North Korea.

In addition, the North Korean defector association also sent a letter to Bush supporting the introduction of the US North Korean Human Rights Act. Simultaneously, the Chosun Ilbo illustrated how South Korean human rights NGOs called on the public to sign petitions demanding the acknowledgement of the refugee status of North Korean defectors or petitions against their repatriation, which they handed over to the UN. They also supplied the UN with information on the North Korean defector issue. In general, according to the accounts of the Chosun Ilbo, the North Korean defector issue was strongly promoted as a human rights issue by South Korean NGOs.

All in all, South Korean human rights NGOs were depicted as having been very engaged in solving the North Korean defector issue. Notably, they were presented as having been the most active during the period of the Lee Myung-bak government. In this manner, their actions were not only aimed at criticizing the progressive governments for their quiet

diplomacy, but also targeted at pushing the conservative government to take a tougher stance against China.

Diplomatic efforts of South Korean administrations to settle the dispute over China's repatriation were issued in 11,64% of the articles. Comparing this with human rights NGOs, the invoked narrative is that human rights NGOs were far more active than the governments in dealing with the North Korean defector issue. Efforts of conservative governments were covered in 9,52% of the articles, whereas merely 2,12% mentioned endeavors of progressive administrations. Hence, the progressive governments were portrayed as having put significantly less effort into bilaterally settling the dispute.

Progressive and conservative South Korean governments clearly employed different frames according to the Chosun Ilbo. The progressive Roh Mu-hyun administration emphasized humanitarianism when asking China not to repatriate defectors during bilateral negotiations. Although the Lee Myung-bak administration sometimes also highlighted humanitarianism, it mostly demanded China to abide by the UN Refugee Protocol and the UN Convention against torture according to the articles. In this sense, the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration mainly employed the international responsibility frame constructing defectors as refugees when discussing the issue with China.

In contrast, as reported by the Chosun Ilbo, the Park Geun-hye administration demanded from China to stop repatriation without using any specific frame during bilateral talks. However, both conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations depicted repatriation as a human rights problem in front of the UNHRC. However, they only criticized China as a human rights violator indirectly as they abstained from mentioning China directly in front of the UN. Instead, the Chosun Ilbo covered how they addressed the problem of repatriation or thematized the North Korean defector issue, demanding from third countries to stop repatriation.

Pastors, church members and religious organizations have been categorized under 'religious individuals or organizations'. These were included in 9,22% of the articles and were portrayed as having been very involved in the North Korean defector issue. Their activities included helping or guiding North Korean defectors through China to reach another South Asian country, helping defectors reach a US embassy in China as well as campaigning and demonstrating against China's repatriation policy in South Korea and the US. Moreover, these were illustrated as having framed the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue.

National assembly members from conservative parties and the Chosun Ilbo were grouped together under the category 'other conservative actors', which were addressed in 8,99% of the articles. About half of these articles highlighted how conservative politicians fasted as a sign of protest against China's repatriation, met the Chinese ambassador to discuss the issue, or led a demonstration against the country's proceedings in front of its embassy. In this sense, conservative politicians were framed as having been eager to spread the awareness on China's repatriation.

The remaining articles covered how the Chosun Ilbo was involved in activities to increase awareness on China's repatriation of North Koreans based on two strategies. Firstly, the media outlet produced and aired a documentary in 2008 called 'Crossing Heaven's Border' on the human rights violations of North Korean defectors faced during their journey through China and South Asian countries to reach South Korea. The second volume of the documentary series was produced in 2011. Secondly, the media outlet financed events focusing on the human rights violations of North Koreans in the North and China. By highlighting the human rights abuses of North Korean defectors in both countries, these events advocated for China's acceptance of defectors as refugees while constructing repatriation as a human rights issue. Thus, the Chosun Ilbo outlined its own efforts to improve the human rights situation of North Korean defectors in China.

Another 7,94% of the articles reported on North Korean defectors having been involved in internationalizing the issue. Single defectors and an NGO established by and consisting of North Korean defectors have been grouped into the category 'North Korean defectors'. Their main activities described were focused on raising awareness of China's repatriation of North Koreans by testifying on the human rights abuses they experienced in China. According to the Chosun Ilbo, this was done on an international level through the support of human rights NGOs. Hence, North Korean defectors also promoted the human rights frame to criticize China's treatment of North Koreans in the country. Moreover, some articles covered how North Korean defectors fasted in a Chinese facility or in front of the Chinese embassy in the South as a sign of protest.

South Korean individuals not affiliated with the government or any NGO were grouped under the category 'others'. These were mentioned in 6,88% of the articles. More than half of these articles were about celebrities who participated in the demonstrations against China's repatriation of North Koreans or performed concerts for the human rights of North Korean defectors. These concerts aimed at raising the public's awareness of the North Korean human rights problem by strongly opposing China's repatriation. Other


articles outlined how individuals signed a petition against repatriation or how people fasted or demonstrated in front of the Chinese embassy as a form of protest against the repatriation of North Koreans. While repatriation was problematized in the articles, it was only sometimes constructed as a human rights problem by South Korean citizens as reported by the Chosun Ilbo.

It has been common for brokers or the Joseon minority to help North Korean defectors in China. About 4,65% of the articles covered how these helped North Koreans in China. Brokers were depicted as having guided North Korean defectors on their journey through China to another South Asian country and as having advised defectors to go to South Korea. People belonging to the Joseon minority were also described as having helped defectors in China and having participated in protests against China's repatriation of North Koreans in front of the Chinese embassy in the South.

Lastly, the NHRCK was referred to in two articles which corresponds to about 1,06% of the articles. One article covered how the Committee recommended the government to be more active diplomatically to improve the human rights situation of North Korean defectors in China, the other reported about how the NHRCK declared that it will conduct research on the conditions of North Korean defectors in China. Their emphasis on the exploitation experienced by North Koreans in China framed as human rights violations complies with the strategy of South Korean conservatives to shame and pressure China. Furthermore, in contrast to most actors, who were predominantly portrayed as having focused on resolving the repatriation issue, it is the only actor together with the Chosun Ilbo having exclusively focused on improving the human rights situation of North Koreans in China, at least according to the illustrations in this newspaper outlet. As a human rights commission, it exclusively presented issues North Korean defectors face in China as a human rights problem.

In addition to the domestic actors, there were various international actors depicted as having been actively involved in trying to solve the North Korean defector issue. These include the US government, the UN, international human rights NGOs, and other international actors. The subsequent graph depicts how often international actors were mentioned in the context of trying to solve problems related to China, specified in percentage.

Figure 5. International Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Defector Issue According to the Chosun Ilbo



Efforts of the UN in dealing with problems related to China were mentioned in 14,81% of the articles, followed by the US (13,67%), international human rights NGOs (8,99%) and other actors (8,47%). The US media, American citizens not affiliated with any governmental or nongovernmental organizations and the Group of Eight (G8) were grouped under the category ‘others’. The US and UN were even brought up more often than the South Korean government within the context of trying to solve problems primarily linked to China. This indicates how important the role of these actors is in the eyes of the Chosun Ilbo. This also reflects the conservative stance and the favoring of an active approach of the media outlet. Rather than focusing on bilateral efforts, the emphasis lies on a strategy of pressuring China in front of and with the international community, mainly with the US and through the UN.

The UN was clearly depicted as a key actor in solving the North Korean defector issue. The Chosun Ilbo covered how the conservative Bush and Lee Myung-bak administrations as well as human rights NGOs issued China’s repatriation at the UN based on a framing of North Korean defectors as refugees. The UN has since been actively responding to demands to deal with the issue. Reports also covered how Ban Gi-Mun, the former South Korean Secretary-General of the UN (2007-2017), thematized the problem on several occasions. Most importantly, the UN was presented as having published resolutions officially demanding an end to China’s repatriation policy, thereby officially condemning China’s proceeding.

The Chosun Ilbo did not only focus more on domestic conservative actors than progressive ones, but also highlighted the efforts of the Bush administration significantly more frequently than those of the Obama administration. Thus, the conservative Bush administration, which was mentioned in 10,07% of the articles, was outlined as having been far more engaged in solving the North Korean defector issue than the progressive Obama administration, which was merely mentioned in 3,60% of the articles. The Bush administration was pictured as having tried to pressure China on a legal basis through the North Korean Human Rights Act and by constructing China's repatriation as a human rights issue. The act was originally framed as a solution to the North Korean human rights problem and mainly targeted at the North Korean regime.

Moreover, Bush was depicted as having been personally very invested in solving the North Korean defector issue. Several articles referred to his statements about the issue or described how he met defectors to listen to their testimonies. In addition, various measures undertaken by his administration were covered including US demands to stop repatriation, the US issuing it in front of the UNHCR, a Congressman joining a demonstration against it, the US ambassador visiting a North Korean defector, issuing the North Korean defector issue in front of the Congress and a hearing on the repatriation issue. One article also pointed out that the Bush administration pressured the progressive Roh administration to take a more active stance against China's repatriation.

As opposed to the Bush administration, the Obama administration was barely presented as having addressed China's repatriation of North Koreans. During Obama's presidency, the articles covered a US Congress hearing on repatriation and a Congress debate during which it was discussed whether to establish a law to prevent Chinese who were affiliated with the repatriation of North Koreans from entering the US. Moreover, talks between US and China were mentioned during which the topic was addressed as well as a republican politician having participated in a demonstration against China's repatriation. Thus, Obama himself was not framed as having been much involved in trying to solve the North Korean defector issue.

Overall, according to the Chosun Ilbo, the US governments, including progressive and conservative administrations, employed the term 'refugee' to label North Korean defectors and also demanded from China to treat them as refugees, pointing to the UN Refugee Agreement signed by China. In addition, in contrast to the Obama administration, the Bush administration actively promoted China's repatriation of North Korean defectors as a human rights issue.

Most international human rights NGOs covered by the Chosun Ilbo, which took an active stance against China, were from the US. During Bush's presidency, these tried to pressure his administration to increase the legal basis for punishing China's repatriation. One such proposal referred to a law based on which the US should respond to repatriation by implementing sanctions, another consisted of a law which prevents Chinese who were involved with the repatriation of North Koreans from entering the US. In addition, the Chosun Ilbo reported on how US human rights NGOs demanded from China to stop repatriation and engaged in activities promoting the frame of North Korean defectors being refugees, e.g. through organizing and participating in conferences on the North Korean defector issue with South Korean human rights NGOs. Other international human rights NGOs were also mentioned in the context of demanding from China to stop repatriation and participating in demonstrations against this practice.

Most other actors brought up in the Chosun Ilbo were also from the US. These included the US media and citizens. The US media was illustrated as having actively reported on the North Korean defector issue and even having produced a film about North Korean defectors, whereas US citizens participated in demonstrations against China's repatriation policy in South Korea according to the accounts. Furthermore, the G8 was mentioned once for having criticized the repatriation of North Koreans.

To sum up, the Chosun Ilbo largely focused on conservative domestic and international actors portrayed as having been invested in solving the North Korean defector issue. South Korean conservative governments, the US, UN, and particularly South Korean human rights were portrayed as key actors who raised the awareness of China's repatriation of North Koreans internationally. This points to the Chosun Ilbo's perception of conservative South Korean and international actors as crucial in solving the North Korean defector issue. This goes hand in hand with the lack of coverage of progressive actors. The progressive South Korean governments were framed as not having actively tried to stop China's repatriation. A relatively small number of articles dealt with progressive governments using their diplomatic channels to ask China to stop repatriation based on humanitarianism. This clearly reflects the negative perception of progressive administrations and a quiet diplomatic approach of the Chosun Ilbo.

In contrast, conservative South Korean governments were described as having been very eager to stop China's repatriation of North Koreans by pressuring and shaming China through the UNHRC, thereby promoting the issue as a matter of human rights of refugees based on an active diplomacy. The Lee Myung-bak administration was described as

additionally having referred the UN Refugee Protocol and the UN Convention against Torture to demand from China to stop repatriation, thus having justified its demand on international legal documents. This understanding of the North Korean defector issue as a universal human rights issue and one of international law explains the high attention given to international actors in the media outlet.


Human rights NGOs, particularly South Korean ones, were depicted as main actors having promoted the North Korean defector issue internationally as a human rights issue of refugees. According to their portrayal in the Chosun Ilbo, they coordinated their efforts with US human rights NGOs and tried to influence the UN, US, and South Korean governments to take a tougher stance against China. Notably, the Chosun Ilbo mainly described efforts of human rights NGOs and ignored endeavors of NGOs with a different ideological affiliation. Hence, activities of progressive or centrist NGOs were neglected.

Moreover, the relatively high coverage of human rights NGOs and other conservative non-state actors such as religious groups, singers or individuals invoked the narrative of a largely conservative South Korean society having advocated for the rights of North Korean defectors, which were being ignored by the progressive South Korean camp. In addition, North Korean defectors were frequently portrayed not only as victims, but also as human rights activists fighting eagerly against China's policy toward North Korean defectors. Thus, there was a clear dichotomic depiction of actors who were divided into two groups: South Korean progressives who have prioritized inter-Korean relations versus all other actors who share the conservative view on the North Korean defector issue as matter of refugee's human rights.

5.2. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Chosun Ilbo

While the previous subchapter dealt with the framing of issues mainly linked to China in the Chosun Ilbo, this subchapter covers the framing of issues primarily linked to North Korea. The Chosun Ilbo not only framed China in a negative manner, but also negatively depicted North Korea to a significant degree, mainly by constructing it as a human rights violator. The antagonistic view of the conservative camp of North Korea was clearly apparent in the Chosun Ilbo articles. The North Korean regime was the most frequently condemned actor and was criticized in most articles. The human rights frame was applied in vast majority of articles. The following pie chart demonstrates the proportion of articles that issued different problems related to North Korea, specified in percentage.

Figure 6. Problems Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Chosun Ilbo




The North Korean regime was condemned in all articles which mention it. About 78,42% of the articles which criticize the government do this based on a human rights frame. Almost half of the articles (48,92%) did this by referring to the North Korean human rights problem by using expressions including the term ‘North Korean human rights’ such as ‘North Korea’s human rights violations’, ‘North Korean human rights problem’, ‘North Korean Human Rights Act’, ‘North Korean human rights situation’ amongst others. Merely a little less than one third of the articles (29,50%) contained a specification of what is understood under the North Korean human rights problem. According to the Chosun Ilbo, this includes the North Korean state sending North Korean defectors and their family members to prison camps, the government starving its citizens, public executions, forced as well as an excess of work and forced abortion of North Korean women who have been repatriated by China. Moreover, sometimes the term was used to also include the exploitations faced by North Koreans in China and China’s repatriation of defectors.

Many articles solely referred to the problematic North Korean human rights situation without explaining what is exactly meant. This indicates that the Chosun Ilbo assumed there is a common understanding of the North Korean human rights problem, which makes it unnecessary to explain the notion to the audience. Moreover, about 15,11% of the articles addressed the problem of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, whereas 4,31% problematized the starving of the North Korean people due to lack of food in the country. Only 2,16% dealt with other problems, including North Korea strengthening its border to China to prevent defection, the threatening of a North Korean defector in Laos to go back to the North and the kidnapping of someone who helped defectors in China.

The articles generally highlighted the negative behavior of the North Korean government by framing the regime as a human rights violator of its citizens. This predominantly negative portrayal of the North is in line with the South Korean conservative ideological tendency to perceive North Korea as a threat and enemy. In addition, the conservative South Korean governments pursued a hardline policy toward North Korea by prioritizing denuclearization over improved inter-Korean relations. This explains why about one sixth of the articles dealing with North Korean defectors abroad criticize the North's nuclear policy. In this manner, the depiction of North Korea in the Chosun Ilbo clearly shows that its conservative South Korean identity influenced its discourse on North Korean defectors. The conservatives promote a strategy of shaming North Korea internationally and pressuring it with the international community. Therefore, making use of an internationally employed and well known human rights frame is likely to have served as a useful tool to internationalize this issue and to frame North Korea's problematic behavior as not just a mere Korean problem, but as an international problem.

As opposed to the Chosun Ilbo's high emphasis on criticizing the North Korean regime, the causes of the North Korean human rights situation were not covered at all. However, the causes for the defection of North Koreans was mentioned in 3,57% of the articles. The following graph presents these causes, specified in percentage.

Figure 7. Causes of the Defection of North Koreans According to the Chosun Ilbo



Two reasons for the defection of North Koreans were identified. The North Korean government was presented as the root cause for North Koreans defecting from the country without any further specification or explanation. Considering the conservative ideological stance of the media outlet and that the Chosun Ilbo predominantly reported on the North


Korean human rights situation, the human rights conditions in North Korea are likely to have been perceived as the reason for defection. The second reason contended for defection was the lack of food in the North, which was particularly the case in the 1990s during the famine.

In addition, 0,71% of the articles focused on the cause of the North Korean regime punishing repatriated North Koreans. It was explained that the government views them as traitors of the system. The blaming of the North Korean government, especially also considering the overall negative framing as a human rights violator, reflects that the North Korean government was perceived to be responsible for the defection of its people. Thus, this implies that it was assumed that defectors choose or have chosen to leave the country for political, but also economic reasons. Overall, the North Korean regime was blamed for having created conditions which led North Koreans to defect and for punishing those who have been repatriated.

Corresponding to the framing of issues linked to North Korea as human rights issues, the solution frame solely dealt with solutions to the human rights issue. This underlines the salience of the human rights issue apparent in the Chosun Ilbo articles. However, it must be considered that this database only includes articles containing at least one of the key words human rights, humanitarianism, refugee, or international law and one of the diverse labels used for North Korean defectors. Therefore, it can be assumed that other issues, such as North Korea's nuclear proliferation, played a bigger role in articles that do not primarily deal with North Korean defectors, but rather focus on the North Korean regime and the security of the Korean Peninsula. Considering that conservatives advocate a strategy of officially shaming and thereby pressuring North Korea to change, it is especially likely that the nuclear policy was criticized quite frequently in the Chosun Ilbo. Additionally, as the conservative governments prioritized to solve the nuclear issue over improved inter-Korean relations, it can be expected that solutions to this perceived problem were also highlighted in other articles of this media outlet.

Regarding those actors mentioned as having tried to solve North Korea's human rights problem, I will elaborate on the domestic actors involved and then address international actors and their pursued measures described in the Chosun Ilbo. The subsequent graph illustrates the percentage of articles which mention South Korean actors in the context of trying to solve North Korea's human rights problem.

Figure 8. South Korean Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Human Rights Problem According to the Chosun Ilbo



North Korean defectors, mentioned in 17,46% of the articles, were not only portrayed as victims of human rights violations, but also as the most active domestic actors who fought to improve the North Korean human rights situation. According to the Chosun Ilbo, their main activities were focused on spreading awareness on the North Korean human rights issue by testifying on the situation and sharing their own experiences mostly in front of an international audience, but also within South Korea. The articles covered how they spoke about the North Korean human rights situation during US hearings and how they testified in front of the UN and other international audiences. Moreover, they were often mentioned together with human rights NGOs which supported their endeavors.

South Korean human rights NGOs were depicted in 11,11% of the articles, mainly as having been involved in promoting the North Korean human rights issue internationally. The articles covered how they reported on the North Korean human rights abuses to the UN and participated in international conferences on this issue. Moreover, they described how they tried to influence the US government to pressure North Korea by reporting to the US government about the North Korean human rights problem, having meetings with US government officials, writing letters to President Bush, Senators and Speakers of the House of Representatives conveying their support for the North Korean human rights law, or contacting the US embassy in South Korea.

Through these channels, they also promoted the US North Korean Human rights Act as a strategic tool to proceed against the North. In addition, the Chosun Ilbo reported

about how human rights NGOs informed and educated foreign human rights NGOs on the North Korean human rights issue and that they mobilized their support. While North Korean defectors were being invited to speak about their experiences on international stages, South Korean NGOs were the ones described as having been predominant actors in internationalizing the North Korean human rights issue as they reached out to governmental, transnational and nongovernmental international actors.

Conservative South Korean governments were depicted as having been far less active than North Korean defectors and human rights NGOs. Their efforts were solely covered in 4,76% of the articles. These included the issuing of the North Korean human rights problem at the UN and the preparing and establishing of the South Korean North Korean Human Rights Act of 2016. As opposed to trying to solve the issue bilaterally and directly with the North, the conservative governments were portrayed as having pursued an active diplomacy based on a strategy of shaming and pressuring North Korea by framing it as a human rights violator in front of the international community. Contrarily, the progressive South Korean governments were depicted as not having done anything to solve North Korea's human rights problem. This negative framing of progressive governments clearly reflects the conservative bias of the Chosun Ilbo.

Activities of conservative politicians to tackle the North Korean human rights problem were included in 4,76% of the articles. More specifically, these included the conservative party supporting the establishment of the North Korean Human Rights Act since 2005, conservative politicians participating in events such as the North Korean human rights festival and the establishing of an NGO for North Korean human rights. Hence, the Chosun Ilbo covered how specific conservative politicians pursued the strategy of shaming North Korea for its human rights violations, which is consistent with the conservative government's policy.


In total, 2,65% of the articles covered how South Korean citizens not affiliated with the government or any NGO, without any information on their ideological affinity, actively dealt with the North Korean human rights issue. Thus, although they were not presented as predominant actors in this context, they were framed as having been being more active than the progressive governments and the progressive camp in general. This may clearly be understood as a criticism of the progressive camp as even citizens were framed as having tried to contribute to solving the North Korean human rights issue more than the entire progressive camp.

Pastors and church members as well as religious organizations were categorized as 'religiously affiliated groups or individuals'. These were mentioned in 1,43% of the articles and were presented as having been involved in campaigning activities for the North Korean human rights issue in the US. Their strategy of criticizing and pressuring North Korea, their close ties to the US as well as their employing of the human rights frame point to their conservative affiliation. Furthermore, the NHRCK was brought up in 2,12% of the articles in the context of establishing a report center for North Korean human rights. In addition, the Chosun Ilbo reported on the chairperson writing of a letter to North Korean defectors to apologize for the lack of documentation of human rights violations previously faced by them in the North by the progressive governments.

Lastly, progressive politicians were outlined as practically not having tried to solve the North Korean human rights situation. Only one article, which equals 0,53% of the articles, mentioned a progressive politician. The only progressive politician covered from the progressive Minju party who thematized the North Korean human rights problem and argued it was a problem independent of ideological affiliation which must be respected by everyone, including the North Korean government, was Moon Jae-in, the current South Korean president. According to the article, he argued that the progressive party also needs to actively become engaged to improve the human rights situation of North Korean citizens. Considering that the progressive governments and progressive camp were generally described as having been too passive in dealing with the human rights situation of North Koreans, they were not presented in a positive light.

All in all, South Korean conservative governments and human rights NGOs which recruited North Korean defectors were displayed as key actors in promoting the North Korean human rights issue internationally. They pursued a strategy of pressuring North Korea by shaming it as a human rights violator in front of the international community. The depiction of the international actors in the Chosun Ilbo sheds light on which actors were perceived to be the most important in this context. The following graph presents the percentage of articles which mention international actors in the context of attempting to solve the North Korean human rights problem.

Figure 9. International Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Human Rights Problem According to the Chosun Ilbo



The Bush administration’s efforts to solve the North Korean human rights problem were described in more than one quarter of the articles, which makes the US the most frequently mentioned actor among domestic and international actors in the context of committed to solving the North Korean human rights issue. Predominantly, attention was given to the preparation and establishment of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 introduced under the Bush administration. North Korean defectors were labeled as refugees in this act and by his administration and international human rights NGOs according to the reports.

The framing of defectors as refugees and victims of the North Korean government’s human rights violations competes with the Chinese framing of defectors as illegal economic migrants. By framing North Korean defectors as refugees, the Bush administration promoted the narrative that North Korean defectors must leave the country due to the political circumstances thereby dismissing economic reasons for defection. This served as a strategic tool to pressure North Korea by depicting the North Korean government as treating its citizens horribly and violating their human rights. In this manner, the Chosun Ilbo described how the Bush administration financially supported North Korean human rights NGOs and framed defectors as refugees and victims of human rights violations by the North Korean regime.

Although the North Korean Human Rights Act was established in 2004, the US was reluctant to accept North Korean defectors seeking asylum in the US for a long time and

accepted six defectors 2006 who were declared by as refugees by the UNHCR for the first time in May. The lack of Washington's willingness to accept North Korean defectors despite the introduction of a legal basis for this was criticized by NGOs and the World Bank according to the Chosun Ilbo.

The acceptance of North Korean refugees, as pointed out, occurred in the context of the Washington maximizing the pressure on Pyongyang to solve the nuclear issue under the Bush administration, which also criticized the North for counterfeiting and money laundering and its involvement in drug businesses. US experts also assumed that this step could lead to an increased number of North Korean defectors and could even lead to the elite being agitated once the information spreads within the North. In this manner, this step of accepting North Koreans as refugees was interpreted by experts as having a symbolic meaning. The Chosun Ilbo further quoted Michael Horowitz, senior researcher of the Hudson Institute at that time, who explained that the strong emphasis on the North Korean human rights problem and the issue making by framing defectors as refugees was based on the North's unchanged attitude toward the Six-Party-Talks and the weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, Jay Lefkowitz, Bush's Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, also stated that the North Korean refugee issue was a credibility issue for the US and that the US would actively take action to settle the North Korean defector problem.

In addition to introducing the North Korean Human Rights Act and accepting North Korean as refugees, the US government pursued a variety of further measures to promote the North Korean human rights frame, by far most extensively under the Bush administration. According to the Chosun Ilbo, these included Bush meeting defectors, the US Congress hearings on North Korean human rights, the governmental support of research on NGO activities linked to North Korean human rights, the financing of North Korean human rights NGOs and the promoting of the North Korean human rights issue with NGOs. The Chosun Ilbo illustrated that North Korean defectors were invited to the US by the Bush administration on several occasions to testify against the North Korean regime.

Moreover, based on the accounts the Bush administration repeatedly and extensively made use of the North Korean human rights problem frame. The human rights issue was utilized as a diplomatic instrument to pressure Pyongyang to stop its nuclear policy amidst the lack of success in resolving this issue. This shows how highly politicized the North Korean defector issue has been. Furthermore, the vast attention given to the Bush administration displays that the Chosun Ilbo perceived the conservative Bush administration to be a key actor in solving the North Korean human rights problem. This is

also consistent with the tendency of South Korean conservatives to view the US to be a crucial actor and partner for South Korea in dealing with issues linked to North Korea.

Activities of other actors, meaning members of the international community apart from the UN, the US, the ROK or the DPRK, were reported in 10,05% of the Chosun Ilbo articles. All these actors actively promoted the North Korean human rights issue. US Harvard students were reported to have held meetings during which they debated about the North Korean human rights issue. A German politician was mentioned as having been very engaged in raising awareness on North Korean defector the issue. Additionally, European intellectuals announced a statement to improve the North Korean human rights situation and the British and US media were portrayed as having covered reports and documentaries on the issue.

The UN, which was mentioned in 8,47% of the articles, was also presented as an actor who has been actively engaged in defending the human rights of North Koreans. The Chosun Ilbo mainly covered how the UN published reports on the North Korean human rights situation demanding from the North Korean government to stop the violation of human rights. In March 2013, it also established a Commission of Inquiry (COI), which investigated the human rights abuses in the DPRK and demanded from the North Korean regime to release political prisoners from the prison camps. Furthermore, by acknowledging specific defectors as refugees, it recognized their political suppression by the government thereby declaring it to be responsible for their defection.

International human rights NGOs were issued in 6,35% of the articles. The majority of articles which mentioned international human rights NGOs were about activities of US NGOs. Thus, US human rights NGOs were depicted as having been particularly engaged in solving the North Korean human rights problem and having promoted the issue internationally. As previously explained, according to the Chosun Ilbo conservative South Korean human rights NGOs pursued a strategy of internationalizing the North Korean human rights frame and reached out to US NGOs to influence the US government to support this endeavor. Apart from US human rights NGOs having pressured the US government to pursue a tougher policy on the North, other measures pursued by US and other international NGOs covered included the reporting on North Korean human rights violations to the UN and organizing and participating in international conferences on the issue.

Lastly, the Obama administration was merely mentioned in 4,29% of the Chosun Ibo articles. The articles covered how the Obama administration held high level talks with

South Korea on the UN resolution condemning the North Korean government for violating the human rights of its citizens and how the US ambassador to South Korea visited North Korean defectors and tweeted about it. In addition, the Chosun Ilbo described how a North Korean woman received the US Secretary of State's International Woman of Courage Award. In the aftermath of the fourth nuclear test conducted by the North in January 2016, Washington increased its financing of human rights NGOs led by North Korean defectors which advocated for North Korea's democratization, according to the accounts. This again points to the North Korean defector issue having been politicized and employed as a tool to pressure North Korea to stop its nuclear development.

Despite the coverage of efforts of the Obama administration, it has been mentioned significantly less than the Bush administration. In comparison, the Bush administration was brought up almost six times more frequently than the Obama administration. Hence, the Bush administration was framed as a more vital and engaged actor in dealing with North Korea. The low coverage of activities of the US government under Obama reflects the Chosun Ilbo's dissatisfaction with Obama's North Korea policy. Simultaneously, this also points to the media outlet's preference and approval of a conservative US government. In this sense, the Chosun Ilbo did not only favor conservative South Korean administrations, but also a conservative US administration.


Overall, the Chosun Ilbo portrayed conservative South Korean actors, particularly North Korean defectors and human rights NGOs, as having been the key actors actively engaged in trying to solve the North Korean human rights issue. Human rights NGOs were depicted as having promoted the North Korean human rights issue domestically and internationally by having mobilized the support of US NGOs, by having informed the UN and by having demanded their treatment of the issue. Moreover, human rights NGOs were also described as having recruited North Korean defectors to promote the North Korean human rights issue internationally. South Korean human rights NGOs and North Korean defectors were highly involved in raising the awareness on the issue particularly during the Bush administration based on the accounts.

Conservative South Korean governments were described as having issued the North Korean human rights problem in front of the UN. The establishment of the South Korean North Korean Human Rights Act in 2016 under conservative President Park was also covered. Apart from that, the conservative governments were barely mentioned. The conservative Bush administration and the UN received far greater attention. Particularly the Bush administration was portrayed having pressured North Korea consistently by

condemning its human rights situation, whereas the Obama administration was mentioned to a significantly smaller degree. The UN was outlined as an important actor which criticized the North Korean regime for violating the human rights of its citizens. Moreover, the UN was presented as acknowledging certain defectors as refugees. Thus, the key actors in solving the North Korean human rights issue according to the Chosun Ilbo were South Korean human rights NGOs, North Korean defectors, the UN, and the Bush administration.

The moral depiction of actors in the Chosun Ilbo was based on a clear dichotomic perception of good versus bad actors. North Korea and China, primarily framed as troublemakers within the international community and human rights violators, were almost unexceptionally framed in a negative manner. In this sense, both actors were condemned by the Chosun Ilbo in the majority of articles. In contrast, all the other South Korean and international actors mentioned, except for South Korean progressive actors, were predominantly depicted positively and as having tried to stop China's repatriation of defectors and the oppression of North Koreans by the evil North Korean regime. The following graph provides an overview of how often specific actors were evaluated negatively by the Chosun Ilbo, specified in percentage.

Figure 10. Negative Evaluation of Actors in the Chosun Ilbo



Overall, North Korea was criticized in 69,84% and China in 59,26% of the Chosun Ilbo articles, followed by progressive South Korean actors (9,52%), the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration (1,5%) and the conservative Bush administration (1,06%). The

significantly higher negative account of progressive actors compared to conservative ones clearly shows the conservative bias of the Chosun Ilbo. North Korea was the most frequently criticized actor in the Chosun Ilbo and was almost exclusively depicted as a horrible actor. Overall, 99,25% of the articles which deal with North Korea denounced the regime. Hence, North Korea was almost exclusively condemned by the Chosun Ilbo. The tendency of South Korean conservatives to deeply mistrust North Korea and to view it as an enemy was therefore clearly reflected in the predominantly negative depiction of the North Korean government in the Chosun Ilbo.

Similarly, China was mainly portrayed as a problematic actor responsible for repatriating North Koreans and for the human rights violations they face in the country, clearly invoking a negative image of the government. China was criticized 84,21% of the articles which mention China. The Chinese government was never characterized as a positive actor. This overly negative evaluation of China is explicable considering two factors. Firstly, China was exclusively mentioned in the context of repatriating North Koreans and the awful living conditions and exploitation defectors experience in the country. Both were frequently presented as a matter of human rights violations, whereas repatriation was frequently framed as a breach of the International Refugee Agreement.

Secondly, the conservative bias of the Chosun Ilbo most likely contributed to a negative perception of China. As previously discussed, the conservative South Korean identity is highly influenced by the Cold War structure and the framings promoted by the authoritarian South Korean regimes. During the Cold War, China and North Korea were part of the Communist bloc, and China supported the North during the Korean War in 1950. The perception of China as an enemy and a country not to be trusted still shapes the way many South Korean conservatives evaluate China. Although China is no longer perceived as an enemy, it is viewed as a country with close ties to South Korea's enemy, North Korea, which cannot be fully trusted.

Progressive South Korean actors were condemned in about one fifth of the Chosun Ilbo articles. More specifically, the South Korean administrations were criticized in 6,35% of the articles. The progressive Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun governments were condemned for having been too passive with regard to the North Korean human rights issue, for having abstained from the UN North Korean human rights resolution, for having helped North Korea and for generally having been too passive with regard to protecting and helping North Korean defectors. In the context of the North Korean defector issue, these governments were attacked for their quiet diplomacy. Some articles even blamed the

progressive governments for China's repatriation of defectors based on the assumption that a hardline policy toward China would have been effective to prevent this practice.


The progressive Minju party, which was an opposition party during the Lee Myung-bak era, was accused in 2,11% of the Chosun Ilbo articles of having ignored the North Korean human rights issue, of having blocked the South Korean North Korean Human Rights Act and of not having undertaken anything against China's repatriation of defectors. In addition, 2,11% of the articles blamed the entire South Korean progressive camp for having ignored the North Korean human rights issue and for having adapted North Korea's perspective. Thus, progressive South Korean actors were framed in a rather negative manner. All other actors in the Chosun Ilbo were depicted in a positive manner. Nonetheless, the Lee Myung-bak administration and the Bush administration were also criticized in the media outlet, but to a far lesser extent.

The Lee Myung-bak administration was solely negatively described in 1,59% of the articles which merely equals 3,90% of the articles published during Lee Myung-bak's presidency. Hence, the Lee Myung-bak government was barely depicted in a negative way compared to the progressive governments. The Park Geun-hye administration did not face any criticism by the Chosun Ilbo. Lee Myung-bak was criticized at the beginning of his presidential term for his approach toward China. According to the newspaper, particularly human rights NGOs demanded from his administration to pursue an active diplomacy. As the Lee Myung-bak administration implemented such a strategy, it was no longer framed in a negative light.

The US was predominantly portrayed as a key actor in solving the North Korean human rights issue. Nonetheless, 1,06% of the articles pointed out that the US did not accept any North Korean defectors despite having established the North Korean Human Rights Act. Apart from this commentary, the US was described as a crucial partner of the South Korean conservatives in the context of internationally pressuring and passing censure on North Korea on China and in the context of promoting the framing of these governments as human rights violators.

Although progressive South Korean governments were criticized far less than China and North Korea, they, including their efforts, were often neglected in the Chosun Ilbo. The previous graph depicted how frequently the different administrations were negatively depicted in the articles analyzed. In contrast, the following graph shows how often South Korean administrations were criticized in articles which appeared during their period and in which they were mentioned, specified in percentage.

Figure 11. Negative Evaluation of South Korean Administrations in the Chosun Ilbo



In total, progressive governments were far more frequently criticized, although the Lee Myung-bak administration was also negatively evaluated to a significant degree. The Roh administration was negatively framed in most articles written during his era, in about 81,35%; followed by the Kim administration (50%) and the Lee administration (36,36%). The relatively frequent critique of the Lee administration before it pursued an active diplomacy vis-à-vis China underlines the role of the Chosun Ilbo in pressuring the Lee administration to change its approach. As the Park administration continued the active diplomacy, it was not negatively framed at all.

Overall, all actors apart from China, North Korea and the progressive governments were evaluated positively in the Chosun Ilbo. These include South Korean human rights NGOs and religious organizations, the conservative South Korean media, conservative politicians, the NHRCK, North Korean defectors, brokers, the Joseon minority, the UN, and international NGOs. All these have been presented as viewing China and North Korea as human rights violators, whereas particularly the South Korean conservatives, human rights NGOs and the international community were framed as having tried to protect the human rights of North Korean defectors. This was based on the framing of the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights of refugees, which has been shared by most of these actors. The positive evaluation was based on a depiction of these actors as having been eager to solve the defector issue and North Korea's human rights problem, and sometimes


also North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, the Chosun Ilbo abstained from criticizing these actors in the newspaper articles.

5.3. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to China in the Hankyoreh

Overall, 81,40% of the Hankyoreh articles addressed problems primarily related to China, while merely about one third (32,56%) covered problems mainly linked to North Korea. Hence, as opposed to the Chosun Ilbo, which criticized both China and North Korea in the majority of articles, the Hankyoreh was rather reluctant to report on negative issues linked to the North.

China was the most frequently criticized actor in the Hankyoreh. The problems primarily linked to China laid out in the Hankyoreh included China’s repatriation of defectors to the North, North Korean defectors entering foreign offices or schools in China, China’s crackdown on defectors or their helpers in the country and the exploitation experienced by defectors while residing in China. Forced prostitution and marriage of female defectors, the lack of citizenship and legal status of children born between Chinese men and female defectors and defectors being underpaid for their illegal work were pointed out as common forms of exploitation. The following table presents an overview of the main problems primarily linked to China which appeared in the Hankyoreh, specified in percentage.

Figure 12. Problems Primarily Linked to China in the Hankyoreh



China’s repatriation of North Koreans was the most frequently highlighted problem (38,10%), followed by North Korean defectors entering South Korean or foreign embassies, diplomatic offices or schools (34,02%), the crackdown on defectors and those who assist

their planned defection (15,24%) and the exploitation of North Korean defectors in China (12,03%). Hence, the Hankyoreh mainly criticized China's treatment of North Korean defectors. Additionally, it also largely focused on describing the journey of defectors on their way to the South, and in some rare cases to another third country, by paying great attention to the details of North Korean defectors entering foreign offices or schools in China and the responses of the South Korean and Chinese government and other actors.

The Hankyoreh regularly covered statements made by or actions pursued by diverse actors who problematized China's repatriation of North Korean defectors and the hardships and exploitation faced by defectors in China due to their status as illegal migrants. Frequently, these actors framed these issues as a matter of human rights violations and or a matter of refugees. The following table presents which types of frames have been employed by diverse actors who have addressed China's repatriation according to the Hankyoreh.

Table 3. The Framing of China's Repatriation of North Korean Defectors by South Korean and International Actors in the Hankyoreh

Actors	Frames	
	Human rights	Refugee
Obama administration	-	X
Lee Myung-bak administration	X	X
Park Geun-hye administration	X	-
NHRCK	X	X
Other South Korean conservative actors	X	-
Human rights NGOs	X	X
South Korean religious organizations	X	X
Brokers	X	-
North Korean defectors	X	-
Bush administration	X	X
UN	X	X

As the table illustrates, the Hankyoreh displayed that progressive and conservative South Korean actors employed clearly different frames. The findings clearly point to the tendency of South Korean conservatives to construct China's repatriation as a human rights issue of refugees. In this sense, most actors who employed the human rights frame frequently also made use of the refugee frame. Based on the Hankyoreh, the following actors condemned China's repatriation of North Korean defectors as a violation of human rights and a violation of the non-refoulement principle based on the international refugee agreement: the Lee Myung-bak administration, the NHRCK, South Korean human rights

NGOs, religious organizations, the Bush administration and the UN. The Park Geun-hye administration, other conservative South Korean actors, brokers, and defectors were depicted as having promoted the issue as a matter of human rights. Conservative politicians and the Chosun Ilbo were grouped together under the category ‘other conservative actors’.

According to the Hankyoreh, progressive South Korean and US actors abstained from constructing the repatriation of North Korean defectors as a human rights issue. In this manner, the Obama administration was depicted as only having advocated the repatriation of North Koreans as a violation of the international refugee agreement. In accordance with South Korean progressives, there are no accounts of the administration constructing the issue as a violation of human rights. This suggests that the division between progressives and conservatives has not only impacted the perception and framing of the North Korean defector issue within South Korea, but also in the US, despite the difference between US and South Korean progressives and conservatives.

Although repatriation was the most frequently addressed issue in the Hankyoreh, the exploitation experienced by North Koreans in the country was also problematized in the media outlet. According to the accounts, only three actors thematized the poor living conditions and exploitation of North Koreans in China: conservative politicians and international as well as South Korean human rights NGOs. As opposed to China’s repatriation, which was framed by conservative actors as a matter of human rights and or international law, this issue was only sometimes framed as a human rights matter. The following table presents which actors framed the exploitation experienced by North Koreans in China as a human rights issue according to the Hankyoreh.

Table 4. The Framing of the Exploitation Experienced by North Korean Defectors in China by South Korean and International Actors


	Human rights	Refugee
South Korean conservative politicians	X	X
South Korean and international human rights NGOs	X	X

The exploitation of North Korean defectors in China was constructed by conservative politicians and South Korean as well as international human rights NGOs as a human rights issue, while progressives abstained from employing this frame. In accordance with the framing of China’s repatriation of defectors, conservatives employed the human rights frame to criticize China, whereas progressives did not employ any specific frame.

Additionally, conservative politicians and human rights NGOs not only framed the exploitation of defectors in China as a human rights issue, but also advocated for defectors to be treated as refugees.

In accordance with the Chosun Ilbo, the Hankyoreh only covered causes for China’s repatriation, the most frequently addressed problem in the media outlet. In this context, the Hankyoreh referred to China’s view and perception of North Korean defectors as an explanation for China’s policy. The following table provides an overview of the different causes for China’s repatriation of North Korean defectors according to the Hankyoreh, specified in percentage.

Figure 13. Causes of China’s Repatriation of North Korean Defectors According to the Hankyoreh



The Hankyoreh presented causes for China’s repatriation way more frequently than the Chosun Ilbo, in about one fifth of the analyzed articles. More specifically, the Hankyoreh predominantly quoted spokespersons of the Chinese government declaring China’s position on the North Korean defector issue. In this manner, 16,19% of the articles covered statements of the Chinese government explaining that China views defectors as illegal migrants. In 15,24% of the articles, the government announced that China does not view defectors as refugees. These two claims generally go hand in hand and were commonly declared together. According to the Hankyoreh sources, the Chinese regime emphasized repetitively that defectors are North Koreans who leave their country and illegally enter

China for economic reasons to secure food and to make money. Thus, China's disagreement with the argument that North Korean defectors are refugees as advanced by South Korean conservative groups was stressed repetitively.

Furthermore, the Sino-North Korean border treaty signed in 1986 was also depicted as a cause of China's repatriation, but merely in 2,85% of the articles. This treaty determines that China is to repatriate all unauthorized North Korean migrants in its country. In addition, 1,90% of the articles blamed the Chosun Ilbo for the repatriation of defectors who were located at the Sino-Russian border. According to the Hankyoreh, the Russian government clearly stated through the media that it will be difficult for Russia to deal with North Korean defectors if the media reports on the issue and asked the South Korean government not to report on ongoing incidents.


Moreover, 0,95% of the articles pointed out that the establishment of the US North Korean Human Rights Act caused China to intensify its crackdown on North Korean defectors. According to the specifications, China has been silent about defectors entering foreign offices, but North Korea complained to China after the establishment of the act during bilateral talks. The North contended that supporting North Korean defectors equals attempting to overthrow the North Korean system. The Hankyoreh concluded that China had to react to such demands and pressure from the North. In this manner, rather than blaming China, the US was portrayed as having contributed to China's decision to repatriate defectors in this context.

The frequent stressing of the Chinese perception of the North Korean defector issue indicates that the Hankyoreh perceived the understanding of the Chinese view to be crucial to solve the North Korean defector problem, which is typical for progressive South Korean actors. Moreover, the portrayal of the US North Korean Human Rights Act as having contributed to the repatriation of defectors reflects the rather critical view of the US shared by South Korean progressives.

The Hankyoreh covered efforts of various actors trying to stop China from repatriating North Korean defectors and to improve their living conditions in China. Based on the strategies employed by these actors, they may be categorized into two groups: those favoring a quiet diplomacy and those advocating an active diplomacy. As laid out earlier, a quiet diplomacy is focused on quietly solving issues bilaterally with China and North Korea and is commonly advocated by progressives. In contrast, an active diplomacy, which is generally promoted by conservatives, emphasizes pressuring China and North Korea with the international community.

As there have been numerous actors involved in trying to influence China, domestic actors and their strategies will be presented before continuing with the description of international actors. Within the domestic context, conservative actors were described as having been a lot more active in the context of trying to solve the North Korean defector issue. The following graph provides an overview of South Korean actors who have been engaged in solving the North Korean defector issue, specified in percentage.

Figure 14. South Korean Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Defector Issue According to the Hankyoreh



Activities of South Korean human rights NGOs were covered in about one fourth of the articles (24,76%), which makes these NGOs the most frequently mentioned actor in this context. In the Hankyoreh, humanitarian NGOs, which were only mentioned in 0,23% of the articles, were described as having helped North Korean defectors in China for humanitarian reasons. Contrarily, human rights NGOs were depicted as having been involved in systematically planning the entering of foreign offices of North Koreans in China to seek protection and permission to leave the country to reach the South or US. Furthermore, human rights NGOs were eager to raise awareness on the difficulties and exploitation experienced by defectors in China such as forced prostitution or marriage. These were framed as a human rights problem by domestic human rights NGOs according to the accounts.

Moreover, South Korean human rights NGOs were particularly engaged in trying to stop China's repatriation policy by participating and organizing demonstrations against repatriation in front of the Chinese embassy in Korea and in other foreign countries. They were portrayed as having participated in and having organized events focusing on the North Korean human rights problem or specifically the North Korean defector issue. Human rights NGOs were depicted as having promoted China's repatriation as a human rights issue. In addition, they tried to establish temporary protection facilities for defectors in Mongolia with the UNHCR and delivered a petition to the UN asking for defectors to be accepted as refugees based on international law. The strategies employed by these NGOs, according to the articles, focused on shaming and pressuring China to stop repatriation and acknowledge North Korean defectors as refugees. In this context, they constructed the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights of refugees.

Progressive South Korean governments were mentioned in 23,81% of the articles and were presented as having been very engaged in helping North Korean defectors. Most articles focused on how the governments tried to negotiate with China to prevent the repatriation of North Korean defectors and to bring them to the South. Official as well as unofficial bilateral negotiations, which are characteristic for the quiet diplomacy pursued by progressive governments, were covered.

Both the Kim Dae-jung and the Roh Mu-hyun administrations were outlined as having emphasized humanitarianism when asking China not to repatriate North Koreans, not to punish those who helped them and when requesting China to deport defectors as illegal migrants to another third country. Other actions apart from diplomatic meetings with China described in the Hankyoreh included the issuing of temporary travel documents for North Korean defectors, the holding of emergency meetings on measures on how to deal with defectors entering foreign offices in China, and cooperating with the UNHRC in China to bring North Korean defectors to South Korea. Moreover, the articles reported on progressive governments organizing unofficial seminars and other events with NGOs to explain China's view on the North Korean defector issue, the difficulties of the South Korean government in dealing with the issue and side effects of NGO activism.

Thus, the progressive governments were portrayed as mainly having approached the North Korean defector issue as an issue to be solved diplomatically between the countries. In this context, the progressive governments paid great attention to China's stance on the issue and tried to consider it when trying to solve the issue based on the accounts. For instance, some articles described how the Roh administration asked South Korean human

rights NGOs to stop engaging in the systematic planning of defection as China strongly opposed this and reacted to increasing numbers of North Korean defectors entering foreign offices in the country by intensifying the crackdown on North Koreans and NGOs. A government spokesperson from the Roh administration explained that NGOs have increasingly been engaged in planned defection for political reasons rather than to protect the human rights of defectors. In this sense, the increased planning of defection of human rights NGOs ignoring China's stance was perceived by the administration to harm North Korean defectors residing in the country rather than helping them to reach the South.

Additionally, the progressive governments were eager to maintain good relations with China. In this sense, the Hankyoreh illustrated that the progressive governments also refrained from framing the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue and continued to highlight humanitarianism, a frame which the Chinese government has referred to whenever it decided to deport North Koreans to another country, which ultimately meant that they could be sent to the South.

Endeavors of conservative South Korean governments were mentioned in 14,28% of the articles. They were described as having pursued an active diplomacy toward China. In this manner, the conservative governments were presented as having pressured China by asking or demanding China to stop repatriation through bilateral channels including Sino-South Korean summits or high-level talks. In addition, numerous reports focused on how conservative South Korean governments addressed China's repatriation policy at the UNHRC without directly mentioning the country by demanding from 'third countries' to stop repatriation. Hence, these governments indirectly framed China's repatriation of North Koreans as a human rights matter by issuing it in front of the UNHRC. Only one report mentioned that President Park decided to include the issue of protection of the human rights of North Korean defectors in China in the agenda for an upcoming Sino-South Korean summit.

Thus, based on the Hankyoreh, both the conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations largely abstained from directly articulating that the North Korean defector issue is a human rights issue due to considerations that this could impede negotiations with China. However, they have also indirectly supported the framing of repatriation as a human rights issue by financing conservative human rights NGOs which were the in the forefront of promoting the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue in South Korea and abroad.

As opposed to progressive governments, the Hankyoreh reported on how conservative governments were focused on shaming and pressuring China in front of the international community by constructing repatriation as a violation of human rights. According to the Hankyoreh, the Lee Myung-bak administration additionally repetitively highlighted that the repatriation of defectors is a violation of the non-refoulement principle based on the UN Refugee Convention, thereby framing North Korean defectors as refugees. Thus, while the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations both constructed the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue, the former also emphasized international legal documents that China should abide by.

Another difference between the two governments, as presented by the Hankyoreh, is that the Lee Myung-bak administration highlighted humanitarianism when asking China not to repatriate North Koreans. However, as the North Korean defector issue was mainly framed as a refugee and human rights issue by the Lee Myung-bak administration, the stressing of humanitarianism may be interpreted as a strategic choice. As China repetitively emphasized that it deported North Korean defectors to third countries based on humanitarianism de facto thereby enabling them to reach the South, the Lee Myung-bak government is likely to have highlighted humanitarianism during diplomatic negotiations to adjust its communication according to China's framing of the issue.

Other conservative actors were mentioned in 11,43% of the articles, almost as frequent as conservative governments. Politicians belonging to a conservative party and the Chosun Ilbo were grouped into this category. Most of these articles covered conservative politicians participating in demonstrations against China's repatriation policy and harshly criticizing China. In addition, the Hankyoreh described how conservative politicians demanded from the Lee Myung-bak administration to pursue an active diplomacy toward China, how they sent a petition to the UN aiming at improving the human rights situation of North Korean defectors in China and how they demanded a human rights solution to the North Korean defector issue at an interpellation of the National Assembly. In addition, a few conservative politicians also held a press conference on the human rights situation of North Korean defectors in Chinese facilities in China. This was interrupted and stopped by the Chinese government.

Moreover, the Chosun Ilbo was criticized for reporting on North Korean defectors in Russia. The Hankyoreh blamed the media outlet for their repatriation because they did not abstain from reporting on incidents despite Kim Dae-jung having asked the Chosun Ilbo not to publicize them as demanded by the Russian government. However, the Chosun

Ilbo published a headline article on their first page on the situation and North Korean defectors were repatriated to China and from there to the North. According to the accounts, as President Kim explained that North Koreans defectors could only be repatriated to the North due to the reporting, the Chosun Ilbo reacted by blaming the Sunshine Policy for the repatriation.

Overall, conservative politicians were depicted as having been heavily engaged in criticizing China and condemning repatriation while having framed the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights. In this manner, both the exploitation experienced by North Korean defectors in China and their repatriation were framed as human rights issues by conservative politicians in the Hankyoreh. The Chosun Ilbo was framed as an irresponsible media outlet which criticized the repatriation of defectors, yet also contributed to the repatriation of North Koreans due to its publication of certain incidents.

Christian organization and individuals, mostly churches and pastors, were included in 8,57% of the articles. These were presented as having helped North Korean defectors in China to reach South Korea. It was reported that until 2001, before China started intensifying its crackdown on North Korean defectors, about 300 churches and church related organizations and almost 1000 missionaries have been active close to the North Korean border. Together with some South Korean human rights NGOs, the Christian groups were one of the first actors to get involved in supporting North Korean defectors in China according to the articles. While some helped the defectors for humanitarian reasons or based on fraternal love, it was pointed out that some did so to train North Korean defectors and use them to spread the gospels inside North Korea.

Furthermore, numerous Christian organizations were described as having been particularly active in promoting the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue through activities such as participating in demonstrations against China's repatriation of North Koreans with human rights NGOs. Moreover, they also advocated for North Korean defectors to be recognized as refugees by signing a petition to the UN demanding their refugee status, emphasizing that repatriation violates the non-refoulement principle. In this manner, their actions, strategies, and framing of the North Korean defector issue of many Christian organizations covered in the Hankyoreh overlapped with those of human rights NGOs.

Together with Christian organizations and human rights NGOs, brokers and those belonging to the Joseon minority, who were mentioned in 3,81% of the articles, have also

helped North Korean defectors in China to reach the South. Brokers were not just depicted as having helped defectors, but also as having pressured them to pay huge amounts in return for their guiding services through China to a third country. They were framed as primarily being interested at making money while calling themselves human rights activists, claiming to be helping defectors to improve their human rights situation. As opposed to NGOs, Christian churches or organizations, brokers generally assist North Korean defectors in China in exchange for money.

According to the *Hankyoreh*, many defectors used the majority of the resettlement money received by the South Korean government to cover their broker fees, either for their own defection or for the defection of their family members remaining the North. The *Hankyoreh* problematized that the systematic helping of defectors in China provoked China, the same criticism it expressed against human rights NGOs. The Joseon minority was mostly outlined as having helped North Korean defectors in China, however, one article addressed the exploitation of North Koreans by members of the Joseon minority who lied to defectors and did not pay them their wage as promised. Brokers were depicted as sometimes framing the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue by defining themselves as human rights activists, whereas the Joseon minority was depicted in the *Hankyoreh* as not having focused on promoting any specific frame.

Barely any articles focused on progressive politicians being engaged in solving the North Korean defector issue or articulating their view on the matter. In this sense, these merely appeared in 1,9% of the articles. According to the *Hankyoreh*, a progressive politician stated that the number of North Korean defectors should be reduced by helping North Korea overcome its economic difficulties without deteriorating inter-Korean relations. The focus on solving the issue without harshly criticizing China or the North as well as the emphasis on improving inter-Korean relations is typical for the South Korean progressive camp. Moreover, a progressive politician suggested that a committee composed of the ruling and opposition party should be established to come up with a common policy toward China and to conduct research on the living conditions of defectors in China. Thus, progressive politicians in the *Hankyoreh* abstained from promoting any specific frames and highlighted the role of improved inter-Korean relations and supporting North Korea economically to alleviate the cause of defection. Furthermore, they emphasized the necessity of a common policy toward China shared by progressives and conservatives.


In the *Hankyoreh*, only 0,95% of the articles reported on a North Korean defector, who is also a reporter of the *Chosun Ilbo*, who testified on China's repatriation of North

Koreans in front of the US Congress. Apart from that, North Korean defectors were not framed as activists trying to stop China's repatriation. Another 0,95% of the articles covered that the NHRCK recommended the Lee Myung-bak administration to pursue a more active policy toward China to stop the repatriation of North Koreans and to protect their human rights based on the UN Refugee Agreement, international law and humanitarianism.

The advocating of an active diplomacy and the promoting of the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights of refugees by referring to international law suggests that the NHRCK had a conservative affiliation during the presidential period of the Lee Myung-bak. In accordance with the Lee Myung-bak government, the NHRCK also constructed China's repatriation of North Koreans as a matter of human rights of refugees while referring to humanitarianism when demanding from China to change its policy.

Compared to South Korean actors, a smaller number of international actors were depicted in the Hankyoreh as having tried to solve the defector issue. These included China, the UN, and the US. The following graph provides an overview of how often foreign actors were depicted in the Hankyoreh in this context, specified in percentage.

Figure 15. International Actors trying to Solve the North Korean Defector Issue According to the Hankyoreh



The Chinese government was not only presented in the Hankyoreh as having repatriated North Korean defectors, but also as an actor who chose not to repatriate North Koreans repetitively. In this manner, one fifth of the articles reported on successful negotiations between South Korea, China and other actors such as the UN or other governments leading to China deporting defectors as illegal migrants to essentially enable them to enter South Korea. On the one hand, the Chinese government was framed as being responsible for the repatriation of North Koreans. On the other hand, it was also illustrated

as having been willing to avoid the repatriation of North Koreans under certain conditions. This differentiated framing points to a nuanced perception and evaluation of the Chinese government, which was not prevalent in the Chosun Ilbo. Furthermore, China's stance on the North Korean defector issue that it deals with North Koreans based on humanitarianism, domestic and international law was repetitively covered in the Hankyoreh.

Another key actor according to the Hankyoreh was the UN, which was mentioned in 17,4% of the articles. Based on the accounts, the progressive South Korean governments coordinated their efforts with the UN when trying to negotiate with China to let North Korean defectors reach South Korea. The UN was also depicted as being actively engaged in trying to stop the repatriation of North Koreans through various means. For instance, when North Korean defectors entered the Spanish embassy in China, the UN consulted Spain on how to deal with the circumstances and tried to establish temporary protection facilities for defectors in China. Moreover, it also declared that specific defectors should be recognized as refugees. When China sent these back to the North, the UN complained about China's actions through a press statement.

Furthermore, numerous articles covered how the UN voiced concerns over the repatriation of North Korean defectors and issued recommendations and reports on the North Korean human rights issue according to which 'third countries', an expression used to indirectly target China, are to stop repatriation and abide by the non-refoulement principle. Hence, the Hankyoreh described that the UN framed North Korean defectors as refugees who should be protected and must therefore not be repatriated to the North based on international law. Additionally, the Hankyoreh mentioned how the UN asked surrounding countries to protect defectors based on humanitarianism. Nonetheless, this is an exception in the Hankyoreh as other articles predominantly reported on the UN having emphasized international law and human rights when demanding not to repatriate North Koreans.

The US government, which was mentioned in 12,35% of the articles, was outlined as another key actor involved in the North Korean defector issue. Among these, 6,66% focused on the progressive Clinton and Obama administration, whereas 5,71% dealt with the conservative Bush administration. Thus, the Hankyoreh almost evenly covered efforts of both conservative and progressive US administrations. The Clinton administration was mentioned as having negotiated on the repatriation of defectors with China. The Bush administration was portrayed as having addressed the repatriation of defectors at a US-Chinese summit. Moreover, the Hankyoreh reported on the US Senate's hearing on the

human rights situation of North Korean defectors in North Korea and China during the Bush's presidential term.

Contrarily, the US government's activities were far more frequently covered in this context during the Obama administration. During Obama's presidency, the US prepared a law to accept North Korean defectors in the US. Moreover, the Obama administration issued China's repatriation of North Korean defectors indirectly by asking third countries not to repatriate defectors according to the reports. In addition, the US and South Korea held a press conference after holding high level talks, jointly expressing that China must not repatriate North Koreans, and other articles reported on the US officially demanding China to stop repatriation. In addition, the US congress also held hearings on the North Korean defector issue.

Thus, the US government was depicted as having tried to stop China's repatriation of North Koreans most notably during the period of the progressive Obama administration. According to the Hankyoreh, the Bush administration promoted the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue, whereas the Obama administration emphasized that defectors should not be repatriated based on the UN Refugee Convention based on an interpretation of China's repatriation as a legal matter.

Actors who were referred to in less than 5% of the articles were grouped together under the category 'others'. Altogether, these were mentioned in 7,62% of the articles and include the International Parliamentarians' Coalition for North Korean Refugees and Human Rights (IPCNKR), the German and Spanish government as well as international NGOs. The Hankyoreh reported on a meeting of the IPCNKR during which the North Korean defector issue was discussed. Furthermore, it reported on how the IPCNKR issued a petition for the international recognition of North Korean defectors as refugees demanding from countries to stop their repatriation.

The German and Spanish government were outlined in the context of North Korean defectors having entered the German school and the Spanish embassy in China. Both these governments were portrayed as having employed their diplomatic channels to persuade China to deport these North Koreans to a third country to enable them to subsequently be sent to South Korea without promoting any specific frame. International human rights NGOs were presented in the Hankyoreh as having helped North Korean defectors in China reach the South. It was pointed out that China was dissatisfied with the NGOs for systematically supporting their journey to South Korea. This again points to the Hankyoreh having critically viewed the activities of human rights NGOs in the country which provoke

China or North Korea, in line with progressive South Korean governments. Moreover, the media outlet also covered how South Korean human rights NGO joined a demonstration against China's repatriation of North Koreans.

Overall, the Hankyoreh focused a lot more on domestic actors than on international actors who tried to change China's policy toward North Korean defectors. Within the domestic context, the Hankyoreh reported on a larger number of conservative actors who were involved in solving the North Korean defector issue compared to progressive ones. This may be due to the tendency of South Korean progressives to perceive the North Korean defector issue to be a matter to be primarily solved through diplomatic channels between the concerned governments based on a 'quiet solution'. In this sense, the Hankyoreh clearly portrayed the Chinese and South Korean governments as key actors as they mainly covered their efforts.

The Hankyoreh reports portrayed how conservative South Korean actors, including the South Korean government, human rights NGOs and National Assemblymen, pursued a strategy of trying to publicly and internationally shame and pressure China to stop the repatriation of defectors, sometimes also highlighting the horrible conditions under which these live in the country including their experience of exploitation. In contrast, progressive governments were portrayed as also having been eager to stop China's repatriation of North Korean defectors, however, based on a quiet diplomacy primarily through unofficial bilateral negotiations. Apart from progressive governments, there were merely any accounts of progressive South Korean actors who have been in the forefront of trying to solve the North Korean defector issue, although humanitarian NGOs and a progressive politician were mentioned. Again, this may be due to the understanding of South Korean progressives of the North Korean defector issue. They primarily view the defector issue to be solved by involved governments.

In general, South Korean and US conservatives have in common that they have a tough stance against China and view the pressuring of China through the international community as the most desirable way to deal with the North Korean defector issue. Moreover, they tend to promote China's repatriation as a human rights issue and share the perception that defectors should be recognized as refugees. These actors further tend to emphasize that North Korean defectors are refugees based on the UN Refugee Convention and demand from China to stop repatriation. They argue that the non-refoulement principle based on the UN Refugee Convention must not be violated. On the one hand, they refer to the concept of human rights, which they perceive to be universal rights of humans

which states need to accept. On the other hand, they point to international legal agreements to emphasize that North Korean defectors are refugees and must not be repatriated.

In contrast, progressives tend to emphasize bilateral negotiations as an effective mean to stop China's repatriation of North Koreans and are more reluctant to frame the North Korean defector issue as a human rights issue or to emphasize international agreements. Thus, as opposed to focusing on internationally criticizing and pressuring China, they favor a diplomatic solution based on cooperation. This explains the lack of reports on other South Korean actors condemning China's behavior. Moreover, the Obama administration was described as having focused more on bilateral means based on the perception that China's repatriation is a legal matter as opposed to the Bush administration, which condemned China's policy toward defectors more frequently based on a human rights framing.


5.4. The Framing of Issues Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Hankyoreh

The characteristics of South Korean progressives to have a more sympathetic view of North Korea and the reluctance to criticize it were prevalent in the Hankyoreh. While the Hankyoreh focused on problems mainly linked to China in most articles, only about a third issued problems primarily linked to North Korea. In this manner, the Hankyoreh addressed problems mainly linked to the North far less frequently than the Chosun Ilbo.

Two problems related to North Korea were identified in the Hankyoreh: The North Korean human rights issue and the nuclear issue. China's repatriation of North Koreans and the exploitation experienced by North Korean defectors in the country were largely constructed as human rights issues by conservative actors, whereas South Korean progressives abstained from employing such a framing of the issue. This validates that there is a contestation between South Korean progressives and conservatives on the issue based on diverging understandings. This is reflected in the different framings promoted by both camps.

In contrast, both camps agree that there is a 'North Korean human rights problem'. In this manner, the Hankyoreh repetitively mentioned the North Korean human rights issue. Sometimes only this expression was employed without further specification, although a few articles described specific problems which were understood to be part of the North Korean human rights issue. The following graph presents how frequently these problems primarily related to North Korea were covered in the Hankyoreh, specified in percentage.

Figure 16. Problems Primarily Linked to North Korea in the Hankyoreh




The majority of articles problematizing North Korea, about 83,33%, addressed the North Korean human rights issue. Contrarily, about one fifth of the articles (19,05%) mentioned North Korea's nuclear development and policy, whereas only 7,14% mentioned another problem. Thus, the North Korean government was predominantly condemned based on a human rights frame. Within the context of addressing the human rights issue, the North Korean government was criticized for several reasons. It was mainly denounced for its punishment of repatriated North Korean defectors by sending them to prison camps where they are tortured. Moreover, the Hankyoreh pointed out that the defectors are branded and classified as traitors of the North Korean system and this status is even inheritable. In addition, the government's treatment of its citizens was also denounced including public executions or their oppression, e.g. by sending them to labor or prison camps. Considering that many articles simply referred to the North Korean human rights problem without further specifying what exactly was meant indicates that there is a common understanding of this notion making further explanations unnecessary.

The North Korean human rights issue was sometimes a major theme of the Hankyoreh articles, but many articles mainly primarily focused on China while solely mentioning the North Korean human rights issue. In addition, rather than focusing on the North Korean human rights issue itself, related issues or actors were covered, e.g. how actors tried to establish the North Korean Human Rights Act or activities of North Korean human rights NGOs. Particularly the North Korean nuclear issue was never the main topic of any article, but the US was predominantly framed as having employed the North Korean

human rights issue as a mean to pressure North Korea to halt its nuclear development against the backdrop of failed negotiations.

Other problems related to the North Korean government, according to the Hankyoreh, were the lack of food in the country, the North Korean regime sending spies as North Korean defectors to South Korea to report on the route defectors take to reach the South, and the kidnapping of two US journalists who were conducting research on North Korean defectors. Thus, all in all the North Korean government was portrayed as an unjust regime which oppresses its citizens and causes trouble by holding on to its nuclear development. The Hankyoreh further specified the reasons for the defection of North Korean citizens. The following graph presents how often causes for the defection of North Koreans were covered in the Hankyoreh, specified in percentage.

Figure 17. Causes of the Defection of North Koreans According to the Hankyoreh




The Hankyoreh presented numerous reasons for the defection of North Koreans. The North Korean famine or the lack of food in the country were most frequently framed as the main reason for defection. Almost a quarter of the articles (23,81%) criticizing North Korea issued food shortage as a cause of defection. This was followed by the economic reasons for defection as well as the high demand for young female defectors in China. Both causes were highlighted in 7,14% of the articles. Several articles pointed out that North Korean woman were being married to Chinese men or those belonging to the Joseon minority or were forced to prostitution in China. About 4,76% of the articles contended that North Koreans defect to generally reach the South or to reunite with their families in South Korea. Another 4,76% highlighted political motivation as a decisive factor for defection. The

Hankyoreh also explained that the influx of information from outside the country into the North contributed to a different judgment of the North Korean system among North Koreans. Lastly, the human rights situation in the country was solely presented as a reason for defection in 2,38% of the articles.

Hence, the Hankyoreh emphasized the economic reasons and the lack of food as main causes of defection as opposed to the oppression North Koreans face in the country. Thus, although the North Korean regime was described as oppressive, political suppression was not presented as a main motivation and reason for the phenomenon of defection. In this sense, the North Korean government was not framed to be primarily responsible for defection, but the economic situation and the related shortage of food within the country.

Compared to the efforts described to change China’s policy toward defectors, far less attention was given to the endeavors of actors to solve problems related to North Korea. This may be explained based on two factors. Firstly, China’s treatment of defectors was condemned far more frequently in the Hankyoreh compared to North Korea’s treatment of North Korean defectors, which were both the main points of criticism in the media outlet. Secondly, the articles analyzed for the purpose of this thesis do not focus on North Korea primarily, but on North Korean defectors in China and North Korea. The following graph demonstrates how frequently actors were mentioned as having tried to solve problems related to North Korea, specified in percentage.

Figure 18. Actors Trying to Solve the North Korean Human Rights Issue According to the Hankyoreh



Overall, the articles paid attention to actors trying to solve the North Korean human rights issue. While opinions on South Korea’s North Korea policy were covered,

governmental resolutions undertaken to solve problems related to the North including the human rights issue were not covered. Although problems related to North Korea were covered in a significant number of articles, these were not the problems that the Hankyoreh mainly addressed. Instead, problems related to the North were brought up in the context of covering the North Korean defector issue. More specifically, the articles focused on how the North Korean defector issue was addressed and approached by other actors such as the US, human rights NGOs, and conservative actors. Moreover, this contributed to a bigger focus on China than North Korea.

The US government was brought up in 16,28% of the articles, most commonly in association with the US North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, which was established under President Bush. This served as legal basis for accepting North Korean defectors in the US, although the US was portrayed as having been reluctant to really accept North Korean defectors as refugees. Overall, 10,85% of the articles present the conservative Bush administration as having tried to solve the North Korean defector issue as part of the larger North Korean human rights issue.

While previously the US aimed at solving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue, failed negotiations led the Bush administration to change its policy by using the North Korean human rights issue as a diplomatic card to negotiate with the North according to the Hankyoreh accounts. For instance, the Hankyoreh covered an interview with Michael Horowitz from the Hudson Institute according to whom there is a group within the Bush administration, which advocated a diplomatic solution based on dialogue to the North Korean nuclear issue, and another so called Helsinki group, which promoted the pressuring of the North Korean regime based on its human rights situation. The Hankyoreh reported that, in the context of Bush's policy shift toward pressuring and condemning North Korea for its human rights issue, the government began to financially support anti-North Korean, human rights NGOs in a large scale.

In contrast, efforts undertaken during the Obama administration were described in 5,43% of the articles. These also mainly focused on the preparations of the US North Korean Human Rights Act. Only one article pointed out that Obama personally expressed his concerns about the North Korean human rights situation during a US-South Korean summit discussing the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue. Apart from that, other governmental actors, such as the US Senate, were portrayed as having prepared the North Korean Human Rights Act.

South Korean humanitarian NGOs were mentioned in almost 9,42% of the articles. They were depicted as having been mostly engaged in dealing with the improvement of the human rights situation in North Korea by organizing debates on issue. Thus, their presented efforts mainly targeted at influencing the discourse on the North Korean human rights issue. All other actors were merely referred to in 2,38% of the articles as having tried to solve the problem. Based on the accounts of the Hankyoreh, the media outlet itself financed expert debates on the improvement of North Korean human rights organized by humanitarian NGOs. This points to connections between the progressive media outlet and progressive NGOs. Moreover, according to the accounts, a politician affiliated with a progressive party presented a policy recommendation formulating that North Korea should alleviate its restrictions of its citizen's movement and legalize the returning of defectors. Furthermore, the Hankyoreh reported on how the NHRCK hosted a symposium on the North Korean human rights issue with domestic and international experts.


As opposed to progressives, who were framed as having tried to contribute to improving the human rights situation in the North, conservative actors were depicted as having focused on condemning the regime. In this sense, they were presented as primarily having focused on shaming North Korea rather than solving the human rights issue. According to the Hankyoreh, conservative human rights NGOs and religious organizations criticized the North Korean system and focused on raising awareness of the North Korean human rights violations in prison camps. Thus, whereas the conservative actors were depicted as having emphasized the negative aspects of the human rights issue, progressive actors were framed as having highlighted the positive aspects of the advanced human rights conditions and how to promote further enhancements. Furthermore, only one international human rights NGO was mentioned as having demanded from Pyongyang to guarantee not to punish North Korean defectors and reveal where they are.

In summary, the Hankyoreh mostly problematized North Korea's human rights issue as opposed to other problems linked to the North. Accordingly, actors who mainly concentrated on solving the North Korean human rights issue were covered, while the media outlet predominantly focused on domestic actors. Conservative actors were presented as primarily having denounced the North Korean regime and having slammed its human rights situation, whereas progressives were described as having highlighted the improvements made in this area and having been engaged in searching for ways to further enhance the situation. Moreover, North Korean defectors were outlined as mainly having

left their country for economic reasons and for food. Political motivations for defection were acknowledged but were stressed to a far lesser degree.

All in all, the Hankyoreh portrayed actors in a more nuanced way than the Chosun Ilbo by abstaining from clear and one-sided depictions of actors as either only being good or bad. In this manner, there was less of a clear-cut dichotomic portrayal of actors promoting the narrative of good versus bad actors as promoted by the Chosun Ilbo. As opposed to solely framing China and North Korea as evil human rights violators, the Hankyoreh focused on trying to understand and explain their perspectives and critically dealt with the motives and rationales behind their proceedings. The following graph presents the percentage of articles which portray China, North Korea, and the Bush administration in a negative light.

Figure 19. Negative Evaluation of International Actors in the Hankyoreh



China, the most frequently criticized actor in the Hankyoreh, was negatively depicted in almost half of the articles (49,61%), North Korea in about one third (34,88%) and the Bush administration in 3,1% of the articles. Corresponding to the problems identified in the media outlet, which were centered on China and North Korea, these two actors were the mainly condemned actors. On the one hand, China was mostly condemned for the repatriation of North Korean defectors and for being responsible for the exploitation and hardships North Koreans face in the country, clearly contributing to a negative evaluation.

On the other hand, 12,40% of the articles, which were all published during the era of progressive governments, described that the Chinese government was planning to or has enabled North Korean defectors to reach South Korea or the US by deporting them as illegal migrants to a South Asian country from which they were able to further continue their

journey to their final destination. Therefore, although China was often depicted negatively, it was also outlined, even if not exclusively, in a positive manner. Thus, China was overall more frequently evaluated negatively, but the somewhat positive depiction, based on a highlighting of China's cooperative behavior during the periods of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun administrations, contributed to a more nuanced illustration of the Chinese regime. Additionally, the Hankyoreh emphasized China's perspective and interests repetitively. As opposed to solely condemning China, the rationale for China's repatriation of defectors was identified and viewed to be crucial in finding a solution to the defector issue.

The North Korean government, which was predominantly condemned for its human rights violations, was the second most frequently criticized actor. However, it was mostly not the main target of criticism in the articles, but the human rights and the nuclear issue were commonly brought up in the context of dealing with the North Korean defector issue and reporting on China's repatriation policy.


The Bush administration was critically evaluated for two reasons. Firstly, it was pointed out that, according to a foreign media outlet, finances from the US congress were indirectly supporting North Korean defectors seeking asylum in foreign embassies in China. Based on the accounts, a representative of the nonprofit organization National Endowment for Democracy (NED) stated during an interview with that press that the NED financially supported conservative South Korean human rights NGOs which were helping defectors seek asylum. Hence, connections between US and South Korean human rights NGOs were highlighted. Secondly, it was mentioned that the Bush government shifted from a previous US policy focusing on trying to stop North Korea's nuclear proliferation through dialogue to a policy of pressuring North Korea by attacking its human rights abuses.

In this manner, the US North Korean Human Rights Law was viewed as part of the US strategy to condemn the North Korean regime for its human rights violations and to recognize defectors as refugees. Hence, in the context of failed progress with regard to solving North Korea's nuclear problem, it was contended that the Bush administration decided to use the North Korean human rights issue as an additional diplomatic card by adding it to the negotiation table. The Hankyoreh scrutinized the motives behind Bush's policy shift towards pressuring North Korea based on its human rights situation.

The conservative Bush administration and its employment of the human rights frame in attempts to stop North Korea's nuclear proliferation were not supported by the Hankyoreh. Rather than heavily attacking the US, the Hankyoreh merely expressed its

dissatisfaction with the US hardline policy toward North Korea as pursued by the Bush administration by highlighting alternative motives. In contrast, the progressive Obama administration and its policy were not criticized. This indicates that the Hankyoreh had a more positive attitude toward the progressive Obama administration compared to the conservative Bush administration due to a more similar position on how to deal with China and North Korea. The moral evaluation of domestic progressive and conservative actors also reflected the progressive affiliation of the Hankyoreh. The following graph presents how often actors who could clearly be categorized as belonging to either the conservative or progressive camp were negatively evaluated in the Hankyoreh, specified in percentage.

Figure 20. Negative Evaluation of Conservative and Progressive South Korean Actors in the Hankyoreh



Conservative actors or the entire conservative camp were criticized in 6,20% of the articles, followed by conservative governments (4,65%), progressive governments (3,10%), the entire progressive camp (2,33%), conservative human rights NGOs (2,33%) and humanitarian NGOs (0,78%). The conservative camp, conservative politicians and the Chosun Ilbo were grouped under the first category. The entire conservative camp was criticized for using the conservative bias of South Korean conservatives and North Korean defectors politically, thereby making the North Korean defector issue another source of the South-South conflict and contributing to deteriorating inter-Korean relations. The conservative camp was accused of having expected from North Korean defectors to express their gratitude toward South Korea and their hate toward the North Korean regime publicly. In this manner, they were blamed for using defectors to spread anti-North Korean

propaganda. Conservative politicians were negatively depicted for having tried to hold a press conference on North Korean defector's human rights in China, thereby provoking the Chinese government. Moreover, they were negative depicted for having surrounded the North Korean ambassador at the UN shouting 'repatriation is not okay'. The Chosun Ilbo was condemned for having publicized information on North Korean defectors, which led to their repatriation.

The conservative Lee Myung-bak government was accused of not having been interested in the North Korean defector issue until the media pressured the government to pursue a hardline stance against China. The active diplomacy was framed as having deteriorated Sino-South Korean relations, which was interpreted as having made it harder for the South Korean government to negotiate with China to let defectors leave to the South. Based on the accounts, North Korean defectors could be visited in Chinese facilities and supplied with money and clothes. However, after South Korea started to internationally shame and pressure China to stop repatriation, the Chinese government no longer allowed defectors to be visited, not even through bribes. Moreover, the new diplomatic approach was evaluated as having intensified China's crackdown on defectors and as having led to increased broker fees.

This clearly shows that the Hankyoreh opposed the active diplomacy pursued by conservative South Korean governments. The conservative Park administration was negatively evaluated for having asked the international community for cooperation on Korean unification at the UN General Assembly while also having addressed the North Korean human rights and nuclear issue. This was regarded to be contradictory as unification requires exchange and cooperation, whereas stressing the human rights matter and North Korea's nuclear proliferation provoked North Korea in the eyes of the media outlet. This reflects the Hankyoreh's dissatisfaction over the hardline policy pursued against North Korea by conservative South Korean governments.

The Hankyoreh further outlined criticism advanced by conservative actors who attacked the progressive South Korean governments for their Sunshine Policy toward the North. The Hankyoreh described how South Korean conservatives attacked the engagement policy as a failure, framing it as having indulged North Korea's wrongdoings which deteriorated the human rights situation of North Korean citizens. In general, conservative actors, and sometimes progressive ones, repetitively condemned the South Korean governments for having ignored the North Korean human rights issue and the human rights of North Korean defectors due to prioritizing inter-Korean relations. In line with this

criticism, the Hankyoreh covered that the entire progressive camp was attacked by conservatives for having neglected in the North Korean defector issue and their human rights and for only having prioritized improved inter-Korean relations.


Although the Hankyoreh exposed such critique expressed by conservatives, the Hankyoreh also referred to progressive actors who defended the progressive governments and positively evaluated their policies toward North Korea and China. Hence, rather than having agreed with the negative evaluation of progressive governments, it was clear that this criticism exposed was a way to point to disagreements between progressives and conservatives on how to approach North Korea and the North Korean defector issue. Simultaneously, the Hankyoreh acknowledged that progressives could have been more engaged in dealing with the North Korean human rights issue.

In addition, South Korean human rights NGOs were condemned for using North Korean defectors to increase anti-North Korean propaganda and sometimes also to gain financial support for promoting such a discourse. Furthermore, they were criticized for provoking China and North by systematically supporting and even inducing defection and helping North Koreans to seek asylum in foreign offices in China. This was viewed to have contributed to tensions between South Korea and China.

Based on the Hankyoreh accounts, the engagement of human rights NGOs has made it more difficult for the South Korean government to negotiate with China while it also led to China's increased crackdown on defectors and less cooperative behavior. Hence, conservative human rights NGOs were framed as having endangered the lives of North Korean defectors in China and as having contributed to their deteriorated human rights situation. Contrarily to conservative human rights NGOs, which were criticized for having been too involved in trying to solve the North Korean defector issue, progressive NGOs were negatively judged for not having paid enough attention to support North Korean defectors and protect their human rights.

Although the entire conservative camp was criticized at different times, specific conservative administrations were evaluated when they were in power. Thus, the following graph shows how frequently South Korean administrations were negatively depicted in articles which appeared during their period and in which they were covered, specified in percentage.


Figure 21. Negative Evaluation of South Korean Administrations in the Hankyoreh



The ideological bias of the Hankyoreh was clearly reflected in the negative depiction of conservative administrations as opposed to progressive ones. Both the Lee and Park administrations were negatively framed in all articles which mentioned them. In contrast, the Roh administration was critically depicted in a quarter of the articles, and the Kim administration in 10% of the articles which covered them. This shows the how dissatisfied the Hankyoreh was with the conservative governments and reflects its progressive ideological bias. However, it also reveals that the Hankyoreh negatively evaluated governments belonging to their ideological camp in a significant manner, thus abstaining from a black and white depiction of good versus bad governments.

Apart from these actors, a few other actors have been depicted negatively in the Hankyoreh. However, none of them were criticized in more than 5% of the articles. Therefore, none of them were negatively framed to a significant degree. The following graph presents an overview of how often these actors were criticized, specified in percentage.

Figure 22. Negative Evaluation of Other South Korean Actors in the Hankyoreh



As the graph shows, the following actors were evaluated in a negative manner: North Korean defectors (3,1%), brokers (1,55%), the NHRCK (0,78%), and religious organizations (0,78%). North Korean defectors who were commonly depicted neutrally or as victims of human rights violations by the Hankyoreh were sometimes also critically evaluated based on two reasons. Firstly, it was mentioned that some defectors were involved in criminal acts such as stealing due to hunger, being violent toward and, in one case even killing, a Chinese policeman while being in danger of getting arrested. However, the exploitation and difficulties faced by defectors in China were also highlighted so that defectors were not merely illustrated as criminals and condemned per se. Instead, external circumstances which contributed to their criminal behavior were highlighted. Secondly, rather than directly criticizing North Korean defectors, the Hankyoreh questioned the validity of defector's testimonies.

The Hankyoreh directed attention to the difficulty of verifying the content of their testimonies and argued that some testimonies contain contents which are not true or exaggerated. This was explained by pointing out that the anti-North Korean NED mainly financed South Korean conservative organizations supporting North Korean defectors. According to the Hankyoreh, conservative human rights NGOs had to produce information on North Korea and its human rights abuses to increase their financial support. Moreover, the fierce competition for financial resources led some human rights NGOs to publish unverified, partially exaggerated, and even distorted information on North Korea. Thus, North Korean defectors were generally not evaluated negatively based on one-sided accounts. Instead, their situation, which led single defectors to become involved in criminal acts in China due to their illegal status, was critically viewed.

Brokers were denounced for charging huge amounts of money for helping North Korean defectors reach the South, thereby exploiting them. According to the accounts, brokers commonly blackmailed and threatened North Korean defectors in South Korea to pay the broker fees for themselves and for helping their families remaining in the North to reach the South. It was pointed out that, due to the high fees, defectors used the majority or even their entire resettlement money to pay the brokers. The NHRCK was condemned for having published personal information on defectors including their names and those of their family relatives still in North Korea. In the eyes of the Hankyoreh, this incautious proceeding risked the lives of defectors and their families as they feared prosecution from the North Korean regime. Some religious organizations were negatively evaluated for using

defectors to spread the gospels in North Korea by training them in China and sending them back to their country as missionaries.

5.5. Core Arguments

So far I have shown how issues related to North Korean defectors in an international context, which were primarily focused on problematizing China and North Korea's treatment of defectors, were framed in the *Hankyoreh* and the *Chosun Ilbo* based on a framing analysis. As pointed out earlier, in order to fully understand the different framings employed by the *Hankyoreh* and the *Chosun Ilbo*, it is crucial to understand the underlying basic assumptions and interpretations of different aspects of the North Korean defector issue which contribute to a different argumentation. The diverging arguments cannot be separated from the distinct framing of issues and contrasting solutions preferred in dealing with the North Korean defector issue by South Korean conservatives and progressives. While the previous part of this chapter focused on identifying macro-topics and the plural perspectives based on a framing analysis, this part of the chapter deals with the third constitutive element of discourse according to the DHA: argumentativity.

This subchapter presents the arguments made by South Korean progressives and conservatives found in both media outlets. Various *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Ilbo* opinion articles, commentaries and articles covered claims and opinions of diverse progressive and conservative domestic actors including government representatives, NGOs, defectors, and experts such as professors and researchers.

Overall, the different assumptions and interpretations made by both camps clearly led to different understandings of the North Korean defector issue, different evaluations on whether defectors are to be treated as refugees, and on distinct solutions on how to solve the North Korean defector issue. The following table sums up the different ways conservatives and progressives interpret and frame different aspects of the North Korean defector issue linked to core arguments.

Table 5. Distinct Framings of the North Korean Defector Issue and Diverging Core Arguments among South Korean Conservatives and Progressives

	Conservatives	Progressives
Main cause of defection	Oppression of citizens and human rights violations by the North Korean regime	Draught, famine, economic reasons along with the oppression of citizens by the North Korean regime
Perception of North Korea	Not to be trusted, human rights violator	Partner for cooperation and future unification
Acknowledgement of refugee status	Defectors are refugees according to international law	Not all defectors are refugees according to international law
Main understanding of issue	Matter of human rights and international law	Matter of national sovereignty, human rights, humanitarianism, and diplomacy
Contended most effective governmental approach and reasoning	Active diplomacy: condemning and pressuring China and North Korea internationally are the most effective means to change China and North Korea's behavior; quiet diplomacy and the Sunshine Policy have failed to solve the defector issue	Quiet diplomacy: maintaining good relations with China and North Korea is a precondition to solve the issue bilaterally (and internationally); provoking China and North Korea by pressuring them only deteriorates relations with both countries and increases the crackdown on defectors; supporting North Korea's economic development leads to alleviating the root cause of defection
Most effective non-governmental approach	Condemning and pressuring North Korea and China with the US and the UN	Addressing the defector issue domestically and internationally from a social movement level

South Korean conservatives, having promoted an active diplomacy based on shaming and pressuring China and North Korea, tend to argue that North Korean defectors should be recognized as refugees based on the international refugee agreement. They emphasize that there are many North Koreans who leave their country to gain freedom due to the oppression and other human rights violations of the North Korean regime. They generally highlight that the North Korean regime oppresses political enemies and limits the food distribution within the country, highlighting political reasons for defection as opposed to economic ones. In this sense, they regard the North Korean regime as an unjust system

which is responsible for the root cause of defection and assume that the North Korean system could collapse.

Moreover, they emphasize that repatriated North Koreans are treated as traitors by the North Korean regime and are punished and sent to prison camps. They argue that this qualifies North Korean defectors to be recognized as refugees. In this manner, conservatives view North Korea as an unjust system or one that will or could collapse soon. Therefore, they highlight the oppression North Koreans face in the country and conclude that North Korean defectors are refugees (e.g. Kang, Bang-sik 2012; Kim, T'ae-hun 2012; Yun, P'yŏng-chung 2012; Ch'oe, Bo-sik 2018; Rim, Il 2019).

Based on the perspective that defectors are refugees, conservatives demand from the Chinese government that it must accept them as refugees, particularly as a member state which has signed the international refugee treaty. Therefore, they commonly argue that China not acknowledging the refugee status of North Korean defectors constitutes a breach of international law. Moreover, the repatriation of North Koreans is frequently framed as a human rights violation as defectors are punished by the North Korean regime when repatriated (I, Chang-hun 2019).

As the North Korean defector issue is commonly framed by conservatives as a matter of human rights of refugees, cooperating with the UN and the international community is regarded as crucial. Moreover, establishing legal measures such as the North Korean Human Rights Act as a legal basis backed by important members of the international society is also evaluated to be necessary to solve the problem (Han, Ki-hong 2011; Anonymous 2012; I, Chang-hun 2018). Based on this rationale, conservatives conclude that the most effective strategy to solve the North Korean defector issue is to promote the framing of the North Korean defector issue as a matter of international law and human rights. Therefore, they advocate for an active diplomacy focused on condemning China and North Korea's behavior: the former for breaking international law by repatriating North Korean defectors and not recognizing them as refugees, and both for violating the human rights of defectors. This also goes hand in hand with rejecting a quiet diplomacy which primarily focuses on bilaterally solving issues (Anonymous in Chosun Ilbo 2002).

Conservative actors also assume that condemning North Korea for its human rights violations will contribute to changing the North Korean system (Pak, Chŏng-hun 2016). In addition, pressuring North Korea by condemning the human rights violations with the US and through the UN is understood to be an adequate strategy for solving the North Korean

nuclear issue (Anonymous in Chosun Ilbo 2005). On a governmental level, this has led conservative governments to pursue an active diplomacy based on a tougher stance toward China and North Korea and to criticize both governments internationally. Rather than bilaterally negotiating with China, pressuring China to stop repatriation based on the refugee agreement through the UNHRC and with the international community, particularly the US, is perceived to be the most effective approach by South Korean conservatives (Anonymous in Chosun Ilbo 2002; Kim, T'ae-hun 2012).

On a nongovernmental level, conservative human rights NGOs have focused on systematically planning and supporting the defection of North Koreans, raising awareness on the injustices committed by China and North Korea domestically and internationally by promoting the North Korean defector issue as matter of human rights violations of refugees. Activities to raise awareness on these issues commonly include organizing and participating in demonstrations against China's repatriation, sending petitions asking for increasing support in pressuring North Korea and China to the US and the UN, organizing events, and framing the North Korean defector issue as part of the North Korean human rights issue (e.g. Sŏ, Ch'ang-rok 2008; Cho, Baek-kŏn 2012; Cho, Ho-jin 2012).

Additionally, their strategy also includes the cooperation with or hiring of North Korean defectors who testify on the oppression they faced in North Korea, on their experience of exploitation in China and repatriation, not only but particularly in the US and in front of the UN. From the viewpoint of these human rights NGOs, these testimonies serve to provide evidence in front of the international community that North Korea and China have been violating the human rights of North Korean defectors (e.g. I, Hyŏn-t'aek 2017; Kim, Sŏng-hun 2017; Ha, Ju-hŭi 2019; Yun, Hŭi-hun 2019).

Contrary to conservatives, progressives reject the understanding that all North Korean defectors are refugees. Two arguments are often contended to support this. Firstly, it is argued that only political refugees are refugees according to the international refugee agreement. They emphasize that many North Koreans leave their country for food or economic reasons while admitting that some choose to defect for political reasons. Hence, they conclude that it is difficult to acknowledge all defectors as refugees (e.g. Cho, Chun-sang 2000; Kang, Bang-sik 2012). In addition, according to the South Korean constitution South Korea's territory covers the entire Korean Peninsula. Consequently, North Koreans, including North Korean defectors, are legally considered to be South Korean citizens. Therefore, North Korean defectors, unlike any other migrants or refugees, are eligible to receive the South Korean citizenship in the South. Accordingly, it is evaluated to be

problematic and contradictory to simultaneously categorize defectors as South Koreans and refugees (Hwang, P'il-kyu 2019).

Progressives understand the North Korean defector issue as a matter of national sovereignty, human rights, humanitarianism, and diplomacy (Anonymous in Hankyoreh 2005; Ko, Yu-hwan 2012a). Contrary to attacks of certain conservatives that progressives ignore, deny or do not care about human rights, they approve and agree with them that human rights are a universal human value independent from ideology and system and also acknowledge that the human rights of North Korean defectors must not be violated. Within the progressive camp, it has been repetitively stressed that progressives must become more engaged in the North Korean human rights issue (Kim, P'o-kŭn 2010; Ko, Yu-hwan 2012a; O, T'ae-kyu 2012). Nonetheless, they pay greater attention to China's and North Korea's stance on the issue as opposed to conservatives (Kang, Bang-sik 2012; Yu, Ho-yŏl 2012).

Progressives generally highlight that China and North Korea interpret the North Korean defector issue as a matter of national sovereignty over their own citizens (Ko, Yu-hwan 2012a). They highlight that China views defectors as temporary economic migrants and does not acknowledge them as refugees (Kang, Bang-sik 2012). Regarding North Korea, progressives acknowledge that North Korea treats defectors as criminals who cross the border illegally, or as traitors who deny their system (Yu, Ho-yŏl 2012). Nonetheless, they are inclined to see North Korea as a partner who South Korea needs to cooperate with and unify in the future.

Hence, rather than primarily viewing North Korea as an enemy, they regard it as a kin nation and partner for cooperation. They usually do not regard the North Korean regime as being solely responsible for the defection of North Koreans. In this manner, they emphasize that North Korea was hit by a famine and economic crisis in the early 1990s causing many defectors to leave their country for economic reasons. Based on these grounds, they conclude that improved inter-Korean relations and economic exchange with North Korea should be intensified that North Korea can improve its economic situation so that their citizens do not need to defect (Im, Ŭl-Ch'ul 2002; Kang, Bang-sik 2012).

Moreover, some contend that if North Korea intensifies its societal control for the purpose of advertising its system, the route of defectors will be blocked and the prevalent unofficial channels between North and South through defectors will be broken. These networks between defectors in the South and North Koreans in their country are viewed to be an important channel for change within the North (Ko, Yu-hwan 2012a).

Paying stronger attention to the international circumstances, progressives tend to primarily approach the North Korean defector issue as a diplomatic matter and advocate for a quiet diplomacy (Kang, Bang-sik 2012). They assume that considering the special Sino-North Korean relationship, it is not likely that the Chinese government will simply listen to demands of the South Korean governments and stop repatriation or acknowledge them as refugees. Furthermore, it is presumed that promoting the refugee status of North Korean defectors as a pending issue and assisting planned defection provokes China and North Korea, which contributes to an intensified crackdown of defectors and deteriorates South Korea's relationship with both countries. This again is assumed to make it more difficult to find a solution to the North Korean defector issue (Ko, Yu-hwan 2012b; Im, Ŭl-Ch'ul 2002).

In addition, progressives argue that the Chinese government has enabled defectors to reach the South through forced deportation of defectors as illegal migrants to a third South Asian country from which they could go to South Korea based on humanitarianism (Yu, Kang-mun 2004). However, they argue that due to the active diplomacy and the increased shaming of China and North Korea on an international level by conservative South Korean governments and human rights NGOs, the Chinese government felt pressured and intensified its crackdown on North Korean defectors and those who help them. The systematic supporting of defectors to enter foreign diplomatic offices and schools by human rights NGOs is also viewed to increase China's crackdown on defectors (Anonymous in Hankyoreh 2004).

For these reasons, not provoking China and North Korea is understood to be crucial in order to solve the North Korean defector issue and to ensure that defectors do not face injustices by China and North Korea as a response to the growing attacking and shaming of conservative forces. Furthermore, progressives are more critical of the increased media attention of the North Korean defector issue. According to their perspective, the publicizing of personal details of defectors and their family members as well as their route through China can cause a severe threat to the human rights of defectors and their families. They emphasize that North Korea and China can use these pieces of information to crackdown on defectors more effectively and that the North Korean government can punish the family members of defectors left behind in the country (Im, Ŭl-Ch'ul 2002; Kim, Kyu-wŏn 2012).

Progressives further voice concerns over the North Korean defector issue, including the planned defection supported by human rights NGOs, being used for political reasons by conservatives rather than to improve the human rights of defectors (Cho, Baek-ki 2012; I, Sŭng-chun/Ko, Han-sol 2016). In line with such concerns, it is criticized that the Lee

Myung-bak government was not interested at the North Korean defector issue, but that it suddenly adopted a tougher stance toward China due to the increased media coverage when the North Korean defector issue became a pending issue before elections (Ko, Yu-hwan 2012b).

Contrary to conservatives, progressives tend to focus on alleviating what they perceive as the root cause of defection. In this sense, they assert that the South should continuously supply North Korean defectors with material needs, support North Korea with food and fertilizers and enhance inter-Korean exchange to contribute to improving the economic situation of the North (Im, Ŭl-Ch'ul 2002; Kang, Bang-sik 2012). This is regarded as an effective way to improve the lives and human rights of North Koreans. The progressives advocate for the South Korean government and nongovernmental actors to take on different roles and strategies.

On a governmental level, a quiet diplomacy is viewed to be the most effective strategy to solve the defector issue. This means diplomatically approaching each defection related issue case by case and prioritizing unofficial bilateral negotiations with China to bring defectors to the South while improving relations with the North (Kang, Bang-sik 2012; Ko, Yu-hwan 2012b). On a nongovernmental level, it is acknowledged that the North Korean defector issue should be addressed domestically and internationally through the media by civil actors without releasing any information which may be employed to go against or punish defectors or their families. It is understood to be desirable for the North Korean defector issue to be addressed by the media from a social movement level (Ko, Yu-hwan 2012a; Ko, Yu-hwan 2012b).

5.6. Conclusion

In summary, I have shown that the ideological affiliation of the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh has significantly influenced their framing of the North Korean defector issue and the narratives constructed. Both media outlets presented the issue to be centered around North Korea and China. There was an overlap in the macro-topics covered: China's repatriation of North Korean defectors, the exploitation North Korean defectors face in China and China's crackdown on them were problems primarily linked to China, while the North Korean human rights issue was the main topic primarily linked to North Korea. North Korea's nuclear issue was also covered, however, it did not receive as much attention as the North Korean human rights issue. Overall, China's repatriation of North Koreans was the most frequently depicted problem in both newspapers.

The framing analysis revealed that both media outlets have a different perspective on the North Korean defector issue. The core features of the conservative ideology of being pro-US and anti-North Korea, as well as the those of the progressive ideology of being more sympathetic towards North Korea and more critical of the US, were prevalent in the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh. In this manner, the negative perception of North Korea was reflected in the Chosun Ilbo as North Korea was the most frequently criticized actor. Moreover, the Chosun Ilbo portrayed the US as a key actor engaged in solving the North Korean human rights issue. Particularly the conservative Bush administration was framed as having been far more active than the progressive Obama administration. In addition, conservative human rights NGOs and other South Korean conservative actors were framed as having been eager to solve the North Korean defector issue, whereas progressives were depicted as having been rather passive.

In contrast, the Hankyoreh criticized North Korea, but by far not as extensively and frequently as the Chosun Ilbo. China was more frequently the mainly condemned actor in the Hankyoreh, whereas the criticism advanced against the North Korean regime was contended in the context of the North Korean defector issue, but often not framed as the main issue. North Korea was generally not depicted as South Korea's enemy, but as a country that the South needs to diplomatically negotiate with to solve problems linked to North Korea including the North Korean defector issue, the North Korean human rights problem and North Korea's nuclear proliferation.

The Hankyoreh also portrayed the US less often as having been eager to solve the North Korean defector issue. The efforts of the Obama administration were more frequently emphasized compared to those of the Bush administration. Moreover, it was significantly more critical of the Bush administration and questioned the motives for Bush's human rights policy. Progressive domestic actors were also framed in a more positive light than conservative ones. Thus, both media outlets framed actors affiliated with their own ideological camp in a more positive manner and more negatively evaluated those belonging to the opposing camp.

The newspaper articles of the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh clearly invoked different narratives. The Chosun Ilbo focused on a dichotomic depiction of involved actors distinguishing between those fighting for the improvement of the North Korean human rights issue and those ignoring it. Based on the Chosun Ilbo's perspective, North Korea and China are troublemakers within the international community portrayed as inherently bad actors. In contrast, all domestic and international actors apart from South Korean

progressives were outlined as having sided with South Korean conservatives against China and North Korea. Progressive South Korean governments were criticized for their policy toward North Korea and China and were even partly depicted as having been responsible for the wrongdoings of these countries due to the engagement policy toward Pyongyang and the quiet diplomacy toward Beijing.

Furthermore, the entire South Korean progressive camp was condemned for having ignored the North Korean human rights issue and for having promoted a softer, more cooperative approach toward North Korea. This invoked the perception of South Korean progressives having been outsiders within the international community. In this sense, this contributed to a framing of South Korean progressives and their approach toward China and North Korea as having been against the trend of the international community, which therefore also lacked international support.

In contrast, South Korean conservative governments, politicians, and human rights NGOs were depicted as key South Korean actors who were actively involved in dealing with the North Korean defector issue based on a hardline approach toward China and North Korea, focusing on internationally condemning and pressuring these governments. Particularly South Korean human rights NGOs were presented as having played a crucial role in promoting the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights violations of refugees by framing North Korea and China as human rights violators and defectors as refugees. Moreover, the perception that North Korea-related South Korean NGOs are generally focused on the human rights issue was promoted as humanitarian or centrist NGOs, or generally NGOs which did not focus on the North Korean human rights issue, were not covered at all.

Based on the accounts of the Chosun Ilbo, South Korean human rights NGOs have been domestically employing a strategy of promoting the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights abuses of the Chinese and North Korean regime. This has been done by raising awareness on these issues by influencing the domestic discourse on North Korean defectors by framing China and North Korea as human rights violators and harshly criticizing and shaming these governments. Specifically, the Chosun Ilbo covered how these human rights NGOs organized and participated in demonstrations against China's repatriation of defectors and illustrated that these pressured the Lee Myung-bak government to pursue an active diplomacy toward China.

On top of that, the Chosun Ilbo described the human rights NGOs as having been highly eager to promote the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights

violations of refugees on an international level. In this manner, China's repatriation of defectors was framed as a violation of the International Refugee Agreement signed by China within the larger international discourse on North Korean human rights. Furthermore, the Chosun Ilbo portrayed these human rights NGOs as having mobilized support of the international community by cooperating with international, particularly US, human rights NGOs. Together, they advocated international campaigns denouncing China's repatriation policy and demanded from the Chinese government to stop repatriation.

In addition, they were presented as having cooperated with US NGOs to pressure the US government to pursue a hardline policy toward North Korea and China. Further activities included sending letters to President Bush, writing petitions demanding defectors to be recognized as refugees as well as the abandoning of China's repatriation policy addressed to the UN, organizing and participating in international conferences on related issues, and mobilizing defectors to testify in front of the international community.

Hence, South Korean human rights NGOs were described as the key actor in internationalizing the North Korean human rights issue and the North Korean defector issue having reached out to governmental, transnational, and nongovernmental international actors. Their framing of the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights violations of refugees was demonstrated as having successfully been adapted by key actors in the international community including the US government, the UN, and international NGOs.

Moreover, according to the Chosun Ilbo North Korean defectors were engaged by human rights NGOs to provide evidence of the human rights abuses they experienced in China and North Korea. On the one hand, the North Korean defectors were framed as victims of human rights violations. On the other hand, defectors who had successfully settled outside of China were framed as human rights advocates who speak up against the wrongdoings of China and North Korea. In this manner, they were also portrayed as having played a crucial role in internationalizing the North Korean human rights issue.

All in all, the Chosun Ilbo's narrative is based on a clear division between bad actors (North Korea and China), those that acted indifferently and thereby contributed to China and North Korea's human rights violations (South Korean progressives) and good actors (South Korean conservatives, citizens, human rights NGOs, North Korean defectors and the international community, particularly the US and UN). This was supported by shared framings and strategies employed by the 'good' actors in approaching the North Korean defector issue. All actors were portrayed as having accepted the North Korean human rights

issue apart from North Korea and China. However, although South Korean progressives were described as having accepted that there is a North Korean human rights problem, they were outlined as having ignored the issue. China's involvement in human rights violations was not acknowledged by South Korean progressive actors. Nonetheless, there was a shared consensus and understanding of the involvement of the North Korean regime in human rights abuses according to the accounts.

Contrarily to the Chosun Ilbo, the narrative invoked in the Hankyoreh was not based on a clear division between good and bad actors. Instead, the North Korean defector issue was primarily constructed as a diplomatic issue and a matter of national sovereignty while the occurrence of human rights violations was acknowledged. According to the invoked narrative, involved actors all pursued specific interests based on their own perspectives. Although China and North Korea were negatively depicted to a significant degree, the Hankyoreh abstained from condemning North Korea in most articles. Moreover, it paid significant attention to China's view on North Korean defectors, which was framed as the main reason for China's repatriation policy. On the one hand, China was outlined as repatriating North Koreans. On the other hand, it was framed as also being cooperative at times and letting North Koreans reach the South. Thus, China was not merely framed in a negative manner.

According to the invoked narrative in the Hankyoreh, primarily the lack of food led North Koreans to leave their country and to enter China as opposed to the oppression of North Koreans by the regime. South Korean progressive governments, which asked China to cooperate with the South based on humanitarianism, were somewhat successful in negotiating with China to help North Koreans reach the South. Moreover, the conservative South Korean and US administrations financially supported human rights NGOs to name and shame China and North Korea as human rights violators. Particularly the Bush administration used the North Korean human rights issue to pressure North Korea to stop its nuclear proliferation in the context of failed negotiations. In line with US and other conservative South Korean actors, human rights NGOs were illustrated as a disruptive actor because they fiercely criticized China internationally as a human rights violator, despite the Roh administration's plea to stop, thereby provoking China and contributing to an increased crackdown and repatriation of North Koreans.

Furthermore, according to the Hankyoreh the Lee administration did not care about the North Korean human rights issue or about China's repatriation of defectors but pursued an active diplomacy of shaming North Korea and China due to increasing pressure by

human rights NGOs and conservative politicians. These human rights NGOs organized and participated in demonstrations supported by the conservative media. In addition, some religious groups also supported North Koreans to pursue their agenda of spreading the gospels in North Korea. Thus, conservative actors, while making use of a human rights rhetoric, contributed to deteriorating the human rights situation of North Korean defectors based on the Hankyoreh. In contrast, humanitarian and centrist NGOs supported defectors without having caused any diplomatic trouble.

Overall, the Hankyoreh abstained from constructing a clear dichotomic narrative of the good versus the bad. Instead, it was more critical of the interests and motives of conservative actors who claim to fight for the human rights of North Koreans. Furthermore, it also covered criticism of the progressive camp, mainly for having ignored the North Korean human rights issue. In this sense, the narrative invoked was more nuanced and more focused on the perspectives of the involved actors. Nonetheless, the ideological bias was significantly prevalent.

Based on the identified core arguments of South Korean progressives and conservatives on how to approach the North Korean defector issue, the findings support and confirm previous findings (Suh, Bo-hyuk 2006, Suh, Bo-hyuk 2007, Suh, Bo-hyuk 2014) that the different framing of the issue by the two ideological camps is linked to their different approaches. Overall, South Korean conservatives and progressives disagree on the following aspects: the cause of the issue, how they view North Korea, the acknowledgment of defectors as refugees as well as the most effective governmental and non-governmental strategy to solve the North Korean defector issue.

In essence, the dispute on how to deal with the North Korean defector issue is constructed around the following core arguments. Conservatives primarily frame the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights and international law. Thus, they argue that North Korean defectors are human rights victims and must be internationally acknowledged as refugees. Therefore, shaming China and North Korea as human rights violators with and through the international community is perceived as the best strategy for South Korean governments and NGOs.

In contrast, progressives understand the issue to be a matter of national sovereignty, diplomacy, humanitarianism, and human rights. Thus, while acknowledging ongoing human rights violations and that some defectors are refugees according to international law, they do not agree that all of them are refugees. As negotiating with China and North Korea is understood to be crucial to negotiate with these governments, strategies which focus on

attacking these regimes are evaluated to be counterproductive. Instead, diplomatically negotiating with these countries case by case based on a quiet diplomacy by emphasizing humanitarianism is perceived to be the most effective governmental approach. On a nongovernmental level, supporting North Koreans without using them as evidence for North Korea's wrongdoings and approaching the issue on a social movement level is viewed to be more desirable.

6. Conclusion

Based on a critical discourse analysis of Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh articles, I have shown that the ideological affiliation of the media outlets has significantly influenced their framing of the North Korean defector issue. I have demonstrated that they have played an active role in reinforcing the South-South conflict as key actors participating in the South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korean defectors. Both media outlets have constructed differing narratives linked to distinct perspectives and evaluated actors belonging to the opposite ideological camp in a more negative light compared to actors sharing the same ideological stance.

I have particularly highlighted the historical dimension of discursive action and revealed how the past continues to impact the present through discourse linked to other types of social practices. Such path dependency has been demonstrated on various levels. The ideological division between South Korean conservatives and progressives is linked to diverging conceptions of the South Korean identity which have been discursively constructed based on distinct interpretations of recent Korean history. This began with the division of the Korean Peninsula.

The South Korean authoritarian regimes during the Cold War discursively 'legitimized' their power based on a conservative ideology with the core features being anti-communist, anti-North Korea, and pro-US. These continue to be the central features of the present South Korean conservative ideology. During the democratization movement, progressive forces instead questioned this ideology and defended a counter-ideology based on a view of North Korea primarily as a kin nation to reconcile with and a more critical stance of the US government, which, in their eyes, supported the corrupt authoritarian South Korean governments. A more sympathetic stance toward North Korea and a more critical view of the US continue to be the core of the current progressive ideology in the South. While conservatives have viewed North Koreans as 'others', progressives have shared a notion of the South Korean identity including them.

Moreover, the issues of how to treat North Korean defectors and approach the North Korean defector issue have been politicized ever since the emergence of North Korean defectors. During the Cold War, the South Korean government used North Korean defectors to promote their superiority in the context of an inter-Korean system competition and to gain important military information from the North. In the post-Cold War era, defectors continue to be viewed as evidence of South Korea's superiority over the North by South Korean conservative groups. In this manner, conservative human rights NGOs have constructed the North Korean human rights issue using defectors as evidence for human rights violations committed by the North Korean regime.

In addition, conservative governments have supported the UN North Korean human rights resolution. In contrast, progressive NGOs have focused on humanitarian support. The progressive Kim Dae-jung administration framed North Korean defectors as vital actors for future unification and thereby legitimized the drastic increase of settlement support for North Korean defectors. Hence, the way both ideological camps have been approaching North Korean defectors and related issues is connected to their perception of North Korea and their perceived role of North Korean defectors in the context of inter-Korean relations.

Furthermore, I have shown that the South Korean media discourse on the North Korean defector issue is part of the wider South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea, the core of the South-South conflict. The discourse is linked to social practices within the field of action of South Korea's approach toward North Korea. The discourse and social practices are characterized by an ideological split between South Korean conservatives and progressives. Governmental as well as nongovernmental actors, particularly NGOs, and the South Korean media have been key actors within this field of action. This field of action includes approaches toward North Korea, approaches to the settlement support of North Korean defectors, approaches in dealing with other countries -mainly China- to support or protect overseas North Koreans as well as approaches to Korean unification.

The human rights frame advocated by South Korean conservatives has become dominant domestically and internationally, particularly since 2012. In this sense, issues linked to North Korea, including North Korean defectors, are commonly framed as being part of the North Korean human rights problem. Conservatives blame the North Korean regime for the famine in the 1990s and the defection of North Koreans, framing it as a human rights violator. However, progressives, while acknowledging that the North Korean regime violates human rights, have advocated for a humanitarian framing of issues related

to North Korea. They view external circumstances as the main cause for the famine and defection and prioritize improved inter-Korean relations, as this is viewed to be a precondition to solve issues linked to North Korea.

Simultaneously, the discourse is also part of the larger discourse on what constitutes human rights. During the Cold War, the capitalist bloc prioritized civil and political rights, whereas the socialist bloc emphasized economic, social, and cultural rights. In the post-Cold War era, economically advanced democratic governments, and South Korean conservatives, continue to highlight the former, while authoritarian countries, including North Korea as well as South Korean progressives, tend to underline the latter.

My analysis has also revealed the core arguments of the dispute on how to deal with North Korean defectors. In doing so, I illustrated how discourse and other social practices are linked: the perceived remedies to the North Korean defector issue are connected to what both camps perceive as causes of the phenomenon of North Korean defectors. Conservatives view the human rights violations, particularly the oppression of citizens, by the North Korean regime as the cause of defection based on a perception of the North Korean regime as an enemy and human rights violator. As repatriated North Koreans also fear prosecution when being repatriated, they argue that defectors are refugees according to international law. Therefore, they primarily construct the North Korean defector issue as a matter of human rights and international law. Conservative South Korean governments and NGOs have been shaming and pressuring North Korea and China as human rights violators to stop the repatriation and punishment of 'refugees'.

Contrarily, progressives primarily understand draught, famine, and economic reasons as main causes for the defection of North Koreans, or at least employ this framing for strategic reasons to not jeopardize relations with the North. Simultaneously, they do acknowledge that an increased number of North Koreans defect for political reasons. Nonetheless, they mainly view North Korea as a kin nation and emphasize that it is South Korea's partner for cooperation and future unification. Although they acknowledge that some defectors could be recognized as refugees based on international law, they do not agree that all defectors are refugees. As they primarily understand the North Korean defector issue to be a diplomatic issue, they prioritize maintaining good relations with China and North Korea to facilitate negotiations and thus largely abstain from shaming them as human rights violators. According to them, the most effective solution to the issue is to support North Korea to further develop economically to alleviate their perceived root

cause of defection and to provide humanitarian aid to the North Korean regime and to North Korean defectors.

Overall, the South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea and North Korean defectors is based on different interpretations and evaluations of history, including the present, by South Korean progressives and conservatives. This includes distinct evaluations of actors and social practices. The ongoing debates are characterized by both camps condemning each other. Additionally, within both ideological camps there is a lack of critical evaluation of the assumptions and narratives promoted within these camps. Particularly the Chosun Ilbo promoted the understanding that their perspective is the truth. The Hankyoreh considered the perspectives and interests of China and North Korea without justifying or necessarily agreeing with them. However, it did not share such an empathetic stance towards South Korean conservatives. Moreover, although restrictively, the Hankyoreh also covered the common critique advanced by conservatives as well as progressives that progressives have largely ignored the North Korean human rights issue.

Within the South, progressives and conservatives have been competing over 'the right framing'. The words 'frame' and 'framing' have become popular within the South Korean political discourse. In this sense, they have been increasingly used in the past years by the South Korean media and politicians. They have often been used to brush off criticism from the opposing camp and to argue that the way the other camp frames things is because it is pursuing specific political agendas against members of one's own camp. A Korean saying which literally means 'if I do it, it is a romance - if another does it, it is an affair' is frequently contended by actors of both camps to problematize the double standard prevalent among both South Korean progressives and conservatives. The lack of critical evaluation of one's own ideological camp as well as the negative conception of the oppositional one, which was also clearly identifiable in my critical discourse analysis, is an obstacle to solving the North Korean question including the North Korean defector issue.

The evolution of the South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea and the North Korean defector issue must be understood in the context of the development of power relations within South Korean society characterized by the South-South conflict after South Korea's democratization. In this sense, there are two mainstream perspectives and prevalent framings linked to the two ideological camps which have been competing over the framing of issues particularly linked to North Korea and over political power. As the political power is centered around these two ideological camps, so is the discourse centered around them. While the progressive framing of issues linked to North Korea with an

emphasis on humanitarianism became dominant during the era of the progressive Kim and Roh administrations, the conservative framing of issues focused on a human rights approach and a depiction of North Korean defectors as refugees became dominant after the election of the conservative President Lee Myeong-bak. In this sense, the dominant framing has been influenced by the power dynamics within the South. This points to the discursive production, reproduction, and manifestation of power relations and the link between discourse and other social practices.

Furthermore, the perspectives of North Korean defectors, who are often marginalized and commonly do not hold powerful positions in South Korea unless they subordinate to conservative parties and become conservative party members to promote anti-North Korean propaganda, are commonly unknown and neglected. Hence, mostly only those who collaborate with South Korean conservatives and promote their framing are successful at sharing 'their' view on issues linked to North Korea.

My thesis has crucial implications on how to approach the South-South conflict and the North Korean defector issue, both on a research and a social practice level. Beginning with the North Korean human rights issue, scholars as well as involved governmental and nongovernmental actors must be more cautious in dealing with the North Korean human rights issue. Rather than taking the notion of human rights for given and assuming that the North Korean government is 'evil' based on a black and white moral reasoning, the construction of the North Korean human rights issue should be critically approached. In this manner, the definition of human rights, the historical context of the problem and actors involved, their ideologies and identities, other agendas, strategic considerations of actors as well as other aspects which depend on the research question or focus of social practice, must be considered to provide a less biased and more complete presentation of the North Korean human rights issue. Particularly foreign scholars without thorough knowledge about the historical context and the South-South division should consider the historical dimension and critically approach the North Korean human rights discourse instead of uncritically accepting the currently dominant framing.

In addition, despite the dominance of the human rights frame in the South Korean discourse on North Korea including North Korean defectors, I argue that any norm, including human rights, is neither given nor determined. Instead, the definitions and meanings are discursively constructed and reconstructed over time and should be critically evaluated. For instance, other agendas may be pursued by those contending to aim at improving North Korea's human rights situation. Particularly conservative US and South

Korean governments and NGOs have been criticized for attempting to employ the human rights matter as a diplomatic card to pressure Pyongyang to end its nuclear development. Thus, the power dynamics and other interests or agendas of involved actors, the historical context of the discourse and related discourses and social practices should be considered when critically analyzing and approaching any human rights discourse.

Moreover, the hegemony of the North Korean human rights frame is contestable. Therefore, South Korean progressives should engage in the human rights discourse more actively rather than being passive. Their lack of participation in the human rights discourse facilitated the dominance of the conservative framing of the North Korean human rights issue. The emphasizing of the North Korean human rights issue by South Korean conservatives exhibits a severe inconsistency in their approach to human rights. On the one hand, they have been framing themselves as advocates for human rights by criticizing the North Korean regime. On the other hand, they have been rather ignorant about human rights abuses of North Korean defectors in South Korea committed by governmental authorities, an issue South Korean progressives have repetitively problematized for many years. Additionally, they have neglected issues of other minorities, such as sexual or gender minorities. For instance, many conservative religious groups have been engaging in fierce anti-gay and LGBTQ+ rhetoric and actions. Progressives should be more confident in exposing such inconsistencies. Simultaneously, progressives must acknowledge that their highlighting of humanitarianism within the discourse on how to approach North Korea can be perceived as an ignoring of North Korea's human rights violations.

South Korean progressives have historically fought for the human rights of South Korean workers and socially vulnerable groups. As opposed to conservatives, they have also fiercely criticized the human rights violations of North Korean defectors committed by South Korean authorities. These were committed mostly during the inspection process after their arrival. Thus, the discursive neglecting of the human rights violations of North Korean defectors outside of South Korea is, in this context, inconsistent on a practical and argumentative level. Progressives must find a way to embrace the North Korean human rights issue and to engage more actively in protecting the human rights of North Korean defectors, both through discourse and social practices. Their main challenge is to overcome their avoidance of any anti-North Korean discourse due to prioritized inter-Korean relations.

I suggest that a 'middle path' should be explored: an approach based on an engagement policy focused on improved inter-Korean relations while more confidently and

fiercely protecting the human rights of North Korean defectors. The issue of North Korean defectors should not be politicized by progressives and conservatives. First, the South Korean government should try to maintain good relations with China as negotiating with China to send North Korean defectors to South Korea, as well as dealing with North Korea and Korean unification, require China's cooperation. Second, as China argues that it sends North Koreans to a third country through which they are sent to the South based on humanitarianism, it is more likely that negotiations will be successful if the South Korean government emphasizes humanitarianism as opposed to human rights in dealing with China. Third, neither the goals of criticizing North Korea or China, nor the maintenance of good relations should be prioritized over the lives of North Korean defectors. Once North Korean defectors are caught by Chinese authorities, the South Korean media and NGOs should abstain from publicizing the issue, which could stop China from cooperating with the South Korean government.

If possible, a quiet solution should be found. However, whenever the issue of arrested North Korean defectors has already been publicized, the South Korean government should use the media attention to pressure China to support North Korean defectors to reach their country of choice based on humanitarian concerns. Once the South Korean government has control over North Korean defectors, they should protect them and under no circumstances repatriate them back to the North against their will⁵. Personal information of North Korean defectors in China, a third country or South Korea should not be publicized by the government, the media or NGOs to prevent them and their family members in North Korea from being punished.

Regarding the South-South conflict, I argue that it is important for actors from both ideological camps to stop glorifying one's own ideological camp and to be more honest by admitting their own mistakes or other agendas. This could contribute to decreasing the mistrust between both ideological camps and to create more sympathy for the opposing camp. For instance, conservatives could admit they have been using the North Korean human rights issue to solve the nuclear issue and that their media attention has at times put the lives of North Korean defectors in China at risk, and South Korean progressives could admit that they have prioritized improved inter-Korean relations over saving the lives of a few North Korean defectors.

⁵ In 2019, the South Korean government repatriated two North Korean fishermen who sailed into South Korean waters. The South Korean government argued that they were suspected of murdering 16 fellow crew members. However, the bodies were not found. The South Korean government treated them as criminals without any fair investigation or trial (Ch'oe, Sang-Hun 2019).

Both progressives and conservatives should also acknowledge that neither an active human rights approach, nor a quiet diplomatic approach have successfully stopped China's repatriation of defectors. Rather than blindly defending the strategies employed by one's own ideological camp based on loyalty, a new approach drawing on both existing approaches should be explored. To do so and overcome the ideological division, it will be crucial to construct a discourse which can be largely accepted by both camps. As both camps acknowledge that the North Korean defector issue is a matter of humanitarianism and human rights, a more inclusive discourse which could lead to more diverse social practices should be examined. Additionally, the unification frame, based on which defectors are framed as key actors for future unification, is used by both ideological camps in South Korea to legitimize the governmental and nongovernmental support of North Koreans who have settled in the South. Hence, this shared frame could be expanded to promote an approach which is not only advocated by one ideological camp.

Regarding the media specifically, I have exposed the prevalent perception invoking the narrative of 'we are the right and good ones' and 'the other ideological camp is wrong and bad', which was significantly stronger in the Chosun Ilbo. For instance, both media outlets negatively portrayed and evaluated the approaches of actors of the oppositional camp as ineffective and inadequate while evaluating strategies advocated by their own camp as more helpful to stop China's repatriation of defectors. However, no evidence was advanced to support such opinions or evaluations. This underlines the severe prevalence of ideological reasoning in the media. Rather than promoting ideological reasoning, other less subjective standards should be used as standards of evaluation.

I further problematize the politicization of North Korean defectors by the South Korean media to promote ideological reasoning and the intensification of the South-South division. Both newspapers only reported about North Korean defectors in so far as they fit in their constructed narratives. Thus, North Korean defectors were mainly framed as victims by both media outlets. The Chosun Ilbo additionally portrayed them as determined human rights activists condemning the North Korean regime, or as victims being used by conservatives to condemn North Korea by the Hankyoreh. The South Korean media should instead give North Korean defectors a voice to speak for themselves and communicate their own messages. Rather than primarily treating and framing them as victims, they could use their power to treat them and portray them as agents. This could also alleviate the perception of North Koreans as needy victims and second-class citizens in the South.

In general, the framing of North Korean defectors in the South Korean media has barely received any academic attention despite the media's significant influence on the South Korean public's perception of North Koreans. North Korean defectors commonly have major difficulties in adjusting to their life in the South, partly due to the discrimination they face and the poor sociocultural adaptation, which are associated with depressive symptoms (e.g. Um, Mee Young et. al 2015). Although the government provides medical care including psychological counseling for defectors, it has paid less attention to alleviating prevalent prejudice and discrimination against them. As discrimination and prejudice constitute main obstacles for North Koreans to adjust to the South and to live a more satisfied life, scholars, NGOs, the government and particularly the media should critically deal with this issue and explore ways to contribute to a more nuanced public perception of North Koreans.

This thesis has contributed to the existing literature on the framing of North Korean defectors in the South Korean media and on the role of the media in reinforcing the South-South divide. It has also contributed to the constructivist study of norms, including humanitarianism and human rights, by shedding light on how such norms were reconstructed by the South Korean media based on a critical constructivist approach and how these are linked to specific social practices of governmental and nongovernmental actors. This study has revealed how the South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea, including North Korean defectors, is characterized by the South-South divide, which is often ignored or undetected in foreign literature. Thus, this study may be used as a reference study for future research which analyzes related issues from a critical perspective.

Moreover, my theoretical and analytical framework, based on a synthesis of the DHA and Entman's framing approach, may be applied to the study of any discourse by scholars with a critical endeavor. On the one hand, my theoretical framework draws on the DHA to provide a theoretical explanation and link between discourse, context, and ideology. On the other hand, it relies on Entman's framing approach to explain how a discourse exerts power and influences public opinion based on frames which promote specific schemes of interpretation. In this sense, I extended the DHA to address and alleviate its shortcomings.

As the majority of North Korean defectors are women, who often become victims of exploitation, sexual assault, rape, human trafficking and forced marriage in China, the role of gender should not be ignored when discussing, analyzing and approaching the North Korean defector issue. Political scientists have so far commonly neglected the issue of

gender-based violence in this context. Future research should shed further light on the gender-violence dynamics and uncover the gendered logics prevalent in the discourse and practices based on a feminist and/or intersectional approach. In addition, scholars have largely ignored the perspectives of North Korean defectors. Future research should pay more attention to their view by giving them a voice and focusing on their discourse.

Appendix

Summary of the Findings

In chapter four, I have embedded the South Korean discourse on North Korea, including North Korean defectors, in the larger political and historical context. In chapter 4.1, I have focused on the evolvement of the South-South conflict. After South Korea's division and the establishment of South Korea in the context of the Cold War, conservative authoritarian regimes justified their power by framing themselves as the protector of the South Korean people from the North Korean government, South Korea's enemy. Being anti-North Korea, anti-communist and pro US was the core feature of the conservative ideology. This conception of North Korea and narratives of Korean history were contested by progressive forces in the 1970s and 80s during the democratization movement. These constructed North Korea as a kin nation to reconcile and critically viewed the US for having backed the authoritarian South Korean governments. Being anti-North Korea, pro-US and perceiving the North as a threat and enemy continues to be a core feature of conservatives, whereas a more sympathetic view of the North and a rather critical perception of the US remain key characteristics of South Korean progressives. Conservative view North Koreans as 'others', whereas progressive include them in their notion of the South Korean identity. The South Korean discourse on North Korean defectors has always been part of the larger South Korean discourse on how to deal with North Korea. In this sense, the discourse has been linked to social practices within the field of action of South Korea's North Korea approach, which includes governmental and nongovernmental approaches in dealing with North Korea, North Korean defectors, and Korean unification.

In chapter 4.2., I have highlighted the role of North Korean defectors in the context of inter-Korean relations, which is reflected in the South Korean settlement policy for North Korean defectors. During the Cold War, North Korean defectors were treated as heroes in the context of inter-Korean competition over which system is superior. The number of North Korean defectors was very limited. They provided the South Korean government with secret military information and were treated as heroes and were rewarded. In the post Cold War-era, North Korea was hit by an economic crisis and famine in the 1990s and the number of defectors rose significantly. Perceived and treated as needy welfare-dependent migrants and a burden to the South, the Kim Young-sam administration decreased the resettlement money drastically. Under Kim Dae-jung, who pursued the engagement policy, the settlement money and support system were increased again as North Korean defectors were framed as key actors for future reunification. Conservatives continue to use North Korean defectors to spread anti-North Korean propaganda, whereas progressives view them as people South Koreans need to reconcile with, however, thereby prioritizing improved inter-Korean relations over North Korean defectors. Thus, North Korean defectors have been politicized in the South since their emergence.

In chapter 5, I have presented the findings of my empirical framing analysis of Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh articles. My analysis has shown that the ideological affiliation has significantly influenced the framing of the North Korean defector issue and the construction of narratives in both media outlets. Both media outlets constructed the issue to be centered around North Korea and China and covered overlapping macro-topics: China's repatriation of North Korean defectors, the exploitation of North Koreans in China, China's crackdown on defectors and defectors entering foreign offices and schools in the country and North Korea's human right issue including the punishment of repatriated North Koreans. However, both media outlets clearly had different perspectives. The core features of both ideological camps, being anti-North Korea and pro Us (conservatives) and being

more critical of the US and more sympathetic towards North Korea (progressives) were prevalent. In this sense, these media outlets are key actors in reinforcing the ongoing South-South division.

The Chosun Ilbo fiercely criticized China, North Korea and South Korean progressives. It invoked a narrative of North Korea and China being human rights violators of North Korean refugees and South Korean progressives being outsiders in the international fight against these unjust regimes, who ignore the North Korean human rights issue. Particularly the role of South Korean human rights NGOs in internationalizing the issue and pressuring the Lee Myeong-bak administration to pursue an active diplomacy vis-à-vis China, and the role of the Bush administration in shaming North Korea were highlighted. North Korean defectors were framed as refugees and human rights victims, and simultaneously as human rights activists exposing the human rights violations of the North Korean regime. As the North Korean defector issue was primarily viewed to be a matter of human rights and international law caused by the human rights abuses of the North Korean regime, an active approach based on shaming China and North Korea, as promoted by conservatives, was supported.

In contrast, the Hankyoreh was far more reluctant to criticize North Korea. It constructed a narrative based on a more nuanced depiction of involved actors. These were not merely good or bad, but rather acted based on their specific interests. It described how the shaming strategy of conservatives provoked China and North Korea, making it more difficult to negotiate and to gain China's support in sending them to South Korea. Moreover, the framing of North Korea as a human rights violator was described as a strategy to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear plans in the context of failed negotiations between US and North Korea. North Korean defectors were constructed as escapees. It was acknowledged that some, but not all, could be acknowledged as refugees. As external factors, such as sanctions on North Korea and its economic situation, as well as political reasons were understood to be causes of defection, alleviating the root cause of defection by supporting North Korea's economic development based on humanitarianism and a quiet approach was defended.

Zusatz

Im vierten Kapitel wurde der südkoreanische Diskurs über North Korea, inklusive nordkoreanische Überläufer, in den größeren politischen und historischen Kontext eingeordnet. Im ersten Teil des Kapitels wurde die Entstehung und die Entwicklung des sog. Süd-Süd Konflikts zwischen dem südkoreanischen konservativen und progressiven Lager dargelegt. Nach der Teilung Koreas und der Gründung Südkoreas rechtfertigte das autoritäre südkoreanische Regime seine Herrschaft basierend auf einer konservativen Ideologie, indem es sich als Schützer des südkoreanischen Volkes vor dem Feind Nordkoreas darstellte. Eine negative Einstellung gegenüber Nordkorea, Kommunismus und eine positive Einstellung gegenüber den USA machten den Kern der konservativen Ideologie aus.

Die Auffassung Nordkoreas als Feind sowie Narrativen der koreanischen Geschichtsdeutung wurden von progressiven Gruppen im Rahmen der Demokratiebewegung in den 1970ern und 80ern bestritten. Die Progressiven konstruierten Nordkorea als brüderlichen Staat, mit dem sich Südkorea mit dem Ziel der koreanischen Wiedervereinigung versöhnen muss. Die USA wurden als Unterstützer des autoritären südkoreanischen Regimes bewertet und somit kritisch betrachtet. Die Grundlage der konservativen südkoreanischen Ideologie bildet die negative Einstellung gegenüber Nordkorea und die Wahrnehmung, Nordkorea als Feind zu betrachten, sowie eine positive Einstellung gegenüber den USA als Helfer Südkoreas. Dagegen ist die Basis der progressiven Ideologie eine positivere Haltung gegenüber Nordkorea und eine kritische Auffassung der Rolle der USA.

In Südkorea hängt die ideologische Zugehörigkeit mit einer unterschiedlichen Identitätsauffassung zusammen. Während Progressive die Nordkoreaner in ihre Identität als (Süd)koreaner mit einbeziehen, nehmen Konservative die Nordkoreaner als Fremde wahr. Der südkoreanische Diskurs über nordkoreanische Flüchtlinge war schon immer Teil des größeren Diskurses über den ‚richtigen‘ Ansatz im Umgang mit Nordkorea. In diesem Sinne war dieser Diskurs von Anfang an untrennbar von den sozialen Praktiken (social practice) im Handlungsfeld (field of action) des südkoreanischen Umgangs mit Nordkorea, den staatlichen und nichtstaatlichen Ansätzen in der Herangehensweise an Nordkorea, nordkoreanischen Überläufern und der dem Diskurs über die koreanische Wiedervereinigung abhängig.

Im zweiten Teil wurde die Rolle nordkoreanischer Überläufer im Kontext der Nord-Süd-Beziehungen untersucht. Diese lässt sich in der Entwicklung der südkoreanischen Siedlungspolitik für nordkoreanische Überläufer erkennen. Während des Kalten Krieges wurden nordkoreanische Überläufer als Helden im Rahmen des vorherrschenden Nord-Süd Wettbewerbs im Sinne der Überlegenheit des eigenen Systems behandelt. Die Anzahl der Überläufer war sehr gering. Im Tausch gegen geheime nordkoreanische Militärintformationen wurden sie sehr großzügig belohnt. Mit der Auflösung des sowjetischen Blocks nach dem Kalten Krieg kämpfte Nordkorea in den 1990ern mit einer Wirtschaftskrise und Hungersnot, wodurch die Anzahl nordkoreanischer Überläufer drastisch anstieg.

Wahrgenommen und behandelt als hilfsbedürftige Migranten, die abhängig von der südkoreanischen Sozialhilfe waren, wurde das Umsiedlungsgeld, das alle Überläufer erhalten, von der Regierung unter Kim Young-sam massiv eingeschränkt. Unter seinem Nachfolger Kim Dae-jung, der die sog. Sonnenscheinpolitik einführte, wurde das Umsiedlungsgeld wieder erhöht und nordkoreanische Überläufer wurden als Schlüsselakteure der zukünftigen koreanischen Wiedervereinigung gefördert. Konservative nutzen nordkoreanische Überläufer weiterhin, um anti-nordkoreanische Propaganda zu verbreiten. Progressive hingegen sahen sie primär als Teil ihres Volkes, mit dem sie sich

wiedervereinen müssen, jedoch priorisieren sie dabei verbesserte Beziehungen zur nordkoreanischen Regierung. In diesem Sinne wurde das Thema nordkoreanische Überläufer seit ihrer Existenz in Südkorea politisiert.

Im fünften Kapitel wurden die empirischen Erkenntnisse der Framing-Analysis der Zeitungsartikel von Chosun Ilbo und Hankyoreh dargelegt. Die Analyse zeigte, dass die ideologische Zugehörigkeit beider Zeitungen die Darstellung (framing) der Thematik nordkoreanischer Überläufer, sowie die Konstruktion von Narrativen, signifikant beeinflusst haben. Beide Zeitungen konstruierten die Thematik anhand der Darstellung von Problemen, die primär mit Nordkorea und China zu tun haben. Folgende Makro-Themen wurden in beiden Zeitungen dargelegt: Chinas Zwangsrückführung nordkoreanischer Überläufer, Chinas Festnahme der Überläufer, deren Ausbeutung in China, ihr Betreten von ausländischen Schulen und ausländischen diplomatischen Vertretungen, nordkoreanische Menschenrechte, worunter unter anderem Nordkoreas Bestrafung von zurückgeführten Nordkoreanern gezählt wurde.

Jedoch basierten die Darstellungen auf eindeutig unterschiedlichen Perspektiven. Die Hauptmerkmale der Konservativen, die negative Einstellung gegenüber Nordkorea sowie eine positive Einstellung gegenüber den USA war in der konservativen Chosun Ilbo deutlich bemerkbar. Hingegen war die positivere Einstellung gegenüber Nordkorea sowie eine kritischere Auffassung von den USA in der progressiven Hankyoreh vorherrschend. Dies bestätigte, dass die Zeitungen zentrale Akteure des Süd-Süd Konflikts sind, die die ideologische Auseinandersetzung zwischen den zwei ideologischen Lagern verstärkt.

Die Chosun Ilbo kritisierte China, Nordkorea und das progressive südkoreanische Lager stark. Dessen Narrative zufolge verletzte China und Nordkorea die Menschenrechte nordkoreanischer Flüchtlinge. Im internationalen Kampf gegen diese Regime wurden südkoreanische Progressive als Außenseiter dargestellt, die das Thema der nordkoreanischen Menschenrechte ignorieren. Vor allem die Rolle südkoreanischer Menschenrechtsorganisationen wurde betont: zum einen als Hauptakteur, der die Thematik nordkoreanischer Überläufer als Flüchtlinge und Opfer von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, internationalisiert hat; zum anderen als Schlüsselakteur, der die Lee Myung-bak Regierung unter Druck setzte, einen härteren Kurs gegenüber China einzuschlagen. Zudem wurde die führende Rolle der amerikanischen Regierung unter Bush Rolle im internationalen Diskurs über Nordkoreas Menschenrechte hervorgehoben. Nordkoreanische Überläufer wurden vorwiegend als Flüchtlinge und Opfer von Menschenrechtsverletzungen dargestellt, aber gleichzeitig auch als Menschenrechtsaktivisten und Zeugen der Menschenrechtsverletzungen Nordkoreas. Da nordkoreanische Überläufer primär als ein Problem von Menschenrechten und internationalem Recht verstanden wurde, befürwortete die Chosun Ilbo einen aktiven Ansatz, der vor allem darauf basiert, Nordkorea und China vor der internationalen Gemeinschaft zu kritisieren und unter Druck zu setzen.

Im Gegensatz dazu war die Hankyoreh eher zurückhaltend in ihrer Kritik Nordkoreas. Sie konstruierte eine Narrative, das auf einer eher nuancierten Darstellung der Akteure gründete. Diese wurden nicht einseitig als gut oder schlecht charakterisiert, aber vielmehr als Akteure mit bestimmten Interessen. Die Strategie der Konservativen, Nordkorea und China international bloß zu stellen, wurde negativ gedeutet, da es Verhandlungen mit China, nordkoreanischen Überläufern die Einreise nach Südkorea zu ermöglichen, erschwerte. Des Weiteren wurde die Illustration Nordkoreas als Menschenrechtsverletzer im Kontext der gescheiterten Verhandlungen zwischen den USA und Nordkorea als Strategie dargelegt, Nordkorea zur Aufgabe des Atomwaffenprogramms zu zwingen. Nordkoreanische Überläufer wurden als Überläufer, nicht als Flüchtlinge, konstruiert. Es wurde argumentiert, dass ein Teil der Überläufer, jedoch nicht alle, als Flüchtlinge anerkannt werden könnte. Da vor allem externe Faktoren, wie Sanktionen gegen Nordkorea und die wirtschaftliche Lage des Landes, aber auch politische Gründe als

Ursachen für das Überlaufen von Nordkoreanern verstanden wurde, wurde eine Strategie, die primär verbesserte Beziehungen zu China und Nordkorea und auf bilaterale Verhandlungen setzt, verteidigt. Außerdem wurde eine Politik unterstützt, die die Entwicklung der nordkoreanischen Wirtschaft zum Ziel hat, und ein humanitärer Ansatz befürwortet.

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that I have composed the presented thesis independently on my own without any other resources than the ones indicated. All thoughts taken directly or indirectly from external sources are properly denoted as such. The dissertation has not been accepted or rejected in any previous doctoral procedure.

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