

Objectifying Thoughts and Feelings

Intercultural Evidence from Conceptual Metaphors in Malay and English Poetic Texts

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Objectifying Thoughts and Feelings Intercultural Evidence from Conceptual Metaphors in Malay and English Poetic Texts

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OBJECTIFYING THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS
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Deutsche Kurzfassung der Dissertation

Die Untersuchung des Themas Metaphern blickt auf eine lange Forschungstradition zurück. In den letzten vier Jahrzehnten ist die Konzeptuelle Metapherntheorie (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) eine der einflussreichsten Theorien der Metaphern geworden, insbesondere im Bereich der kognitiven Linguistik. Gemäß dieser Theorie sind Metaphern sowohl in der alltäglichen Sprache als auch in unserem Denken und in unserem Handeln allgegenwärtig. Diese Theorie geht davon aus, dass abstrakte Sachverhalte (*Zieldomäne/target domain*) überwiegend durch konzeptuelle Metaphern als etwas Konkretes (*Quelldomäne/source domain*) beschrieben werden. Trotz der weit verbreiteten Akzeptanz dieser theoretischen Annahme werden Kriterien, die deutlich zwischen Konkretheit und Abstraktheit unterscheiden, von dieser Theorie bisher nicht festgelegt. Dies stellt eine große Forschungslücke dar und führt dazu, dass eine empirisch fundierte Metaphernanalyse grundsätzlich nicht durchführbar ist, denn eine Überprüfung von damit verbundenen Hypothesen ist unmöglich.

Im theoretischen Teil der vorliegenden Arbeit steht dieses Forschungsproblem im Fokus. Dabei wird untersucht, ob und wie Konkretheit „gemessen“ werden kann. Ausgehend von der Theorie der Objektivierung (Szwedek, 2000a, 2007b, 2014b) stellt diese Studie ein „Konkrete/Abstrakte-Skalarmodell“ vor. In diesem Modell werden Konkretheit und Abstraktheit als ein Kontinuum betrachtet. OBJEKT stellt dabei die konkreteste Ausprägung von Konkretheit dar; es gehört daher zum höchsten Konkretheitsgrad der Skala. Nach dem Objektivierungsansatz gilt taktile Wahrnehmbarkeit durch den Tastsinn als das klare und strenge Kriterium zur Bestimmung von OBJEKT. Es wird zudem dargestellt, dass das Skalarmodell in Übereinstimmung mit Forschungsbefunden der Wahrnehmungswissenschaften und mit dem ‚*Principle of Directionality*‘ der synästhetischen Metaphern steht. Basierend auf diesem Modell wurde dementsprechend ein systematisches und empirisch informiertes Protokoll zur Identifizierung von Metaphern mit „Drei Diskrepanz-Prinzipien“ erarbeitet.

Das zweite Hauptziel dieser Studie ist es, metaphorische Formen und Muster interlinguistisch und interkulturell zu erkunden, um zu ermitteln, wie diese die Konzeptualisierung von Gedanken (KOGNITION) und Gefühlen (EMOTION) im Malaiischen und im Englischen wiedergeben. Im methodischen Teil dieser Dissertation wird anhand von Beispielen praktisch gezeigt und erklärt, wie die Operationalisierung des Modells eine überlegene Analyseverfahren ermöglicht, um beständige und verlässliche Ergebnisse hervorzubringen. Zusätzlich zur traditionellen kognitionslinguistischen Analyseverfahren, die ausschließlich auf Intuition und Introspektion beruht, verwendet diese Studie die drei Diskrepanz-Prinzipien als ein methodisches Verifizierungsprotokoll des Analyseablaufs. Das

Korpus dieser Studie besteht aus insgesamt 72 poetischen Texten (d. h. Liedern und Gedichten) der beiden Sprachen. Darin wurden 1.471 metaphorische Verwendungen identifiziert, welche die Datenbasis dieser Arbeit bilden. Die Daten wurden quantitativ und qualitativ analysiert.

Die quantitative Analyse beschäftigte sich hauptsächlich mit den Merkmalen der Quelldomäne und der Zieldomäne der untersuchten konzeptuellen Metaphern. Die Ergebnisse sprechen stark zugunsten der Annahmen zu Konkretheit und Abstraktheit aus der Konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie und stützen gleichzeitig die Objektivierungshypothese, dass OBJEKT tatsächlich die ultimative Quelldomäne (*ultimate source domain*) ist. Die qualitativen Untersuchungsergebnisse zeigen erkennbare Muster der zugrunde liegenden konzeptuellen Metaphern, die auf eine unentwirrbare Verknüpfung zwischen Körper und Geist hinweisen. Trotz der kulturspezifischen Ausdrucksformen der beiden Sprachen beschreiben Malaiisch- sowie Englischsprecher*innen ihre Gefühle (EMOTION) als HAUT und ihre Gedanken (KOGNITION) als AUGEN, die beide als OBJEKTE gelten. In einem größeren Forschungskontext könnte geschlussfolgert werden, dass die Gesamtergebnisse dieser Arbeit weitere Belege für die kognitionswissenschaftlichen Annahmen zum ‚*embodied cognition*‘ darstellen.

Abstract

The notion regarding the concreteness of the source domain and the abstractness of the target domain is a long-held one in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993). Its accuracy, however, has been neither verified nor verifiable. As yet, no empirical distinction between concrete and abstract has been articulated within this framework, which in effect makes an empirically substantiated metaphor analysis impossible.

This dissertation attempts to rectify this situation, and investigates if and how concreteness can be ‘measured’. Motivated by Objectification Theory and its introduction of tactile perceptibility via the sense of touch as the strict criterion for concreteness (Szwedek, 2000*a*, 2008, 2014*a*), we propose an OBJECT-based concreteness/abstractness scalar model as a solution to this outstanding problem. In line with the general consensus in the field, this model treats concreteness and abstractness as a continuum, in which OBJECT represents the highest degree of concreteness on the four-category scale. We show that the model is in accordance with research findings from perception science and conforms to the Principle of Directionality of synesthetic metaphors. Based on this model, a systematic and an empirically informed protocol for metaphor identification with ‘three mismatch principles’ was developed. The second main objective of this study is to examine patterns of metaphors that reflect the conceptualization of thoughts (COGNITION) and feelings (EMOTION) in Malay and English. In the latter half of this work, we demonstrate the practical application of the protocol on real acquired data. The three mismatch principles function as a methodical verification of decisions made intuitively and introspectively during the analysis procedure. Data of this study comprise 72 poetic texts (i.e. songs and poems) in both languages, which permit cross-linguistic and intercultural observations and comparisons. Of these, 1,471 metaphor candidates were identified, which form the database of this work. The data were analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively.

The quantitative analysis focused on the characteristics of the source and target domains. Results strongly support the concreteness/abstractness assumptions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory as well as Objectification Theory’s prediction that OBJECT is the ultimate source domain. They also show that the source domain is more concrete than the target domain is abstract. The qualitative survey reveals patterns of metaphors that suggest an inextricable link between body and mind. Despite notable cultural differences in the (in)directness of expressions in Malay and English, the data show that speakers of both languages describe their feelings (EMOTION) as SKIN and their thoughts (COGNITION) as EYE, which both qualify as OBJECTS. In the broader context of research, we conclude that the combined results of this study constitute further evidence for embodied cognition.

Abstrak

Tanggapan bahawa domain sumber bersifat konkrit dan domain sasaran bersifat abstrak telah lama diterima dalam Teori Metafora Konsepsi (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993). Namun begitu, ketepatan pernyataan ini belum pernah lagi disahkan secara empiris. Ini adalah kerana sehingga kini, perbezaan antara konkrit dan abstrak masih belum diperjelas dalam kerangka teori ini.

Disertasi ini bermatlamat untuk memugari situasi ini dengan menyiasat samada dan bagaimana sifat konkrit boleh 'diukur'. Didorong oleh Teori Objektifikasi yang menamakan persepsi taktil melalui deria sentuhan sebagai kriteria dasar dan wajib dalam menentukan sifat konkrit (Szwedek 2000a, 2008, 2014a), kajian ini memperkenalkan model skalar konkrit/abstrak yang berdasarkan OBJEK. Selaras dengan kesepakatan umum dalam bidang ini, model tersebut menilai sifat konkrit dan abstrak sebagai suatu kontinum, di mana OBJEK mewakili tahap konkrit tertinggi pada skala yang mengandungi empat kategori. Asas model ini juga berselari dengan hasil kajian sains persepsi serta mematuhi 'Prinsip Arah' metafora sinestetik. Berpandukan model ini, sebuah protokol sistematik bagi mengenalpasti metafora telah dicipta. Matlamat kedua kajian ini adalah untuk menyelidik corak-corak metafora yang mencerminkan konseptualisasi pemikiran (KOGNISI) dan perasaan (EMOSI) dalam Bahasa Melayu dan Bahasa Inggeris. Adalah ditunjukkan secara praktikalnya bagaimana protokol ini diaplikasi pada data, di mana 'prinsip tidak sepadan' berfungsi sebagai langkah pengesahan bagi kaedah analisis teks yang sebelum ini berbentuk intuitif dan introspektif. Data kajian ini terdiri daripada 72 teks puitis (iaitu lagu dan puisi) dalam kedua-dua bahasa. Seterusnya, 1,471 calon metafora dikenalpasti dan membentuk pangkalan data kajian ini. Data dianalisis secara kuantitatif dan kualitatif.

Fokus analisis kuantitatif ialah ciri-ciri domain sumber dan sasaran. Hasil kajian ini menyokong kuat tanggapan Teori Metafora Konsepsi berkenaan sifat konkrit dan abstrak serta ramalan Teori Objektifikasi bahawa OBJEK ialah domain sumber muktamad. Hasil kajian ini juga menunjukkan bahawa domain sumber adalah lebih bersifat konkrit daripada domain sasaran bersifat abstrak. Analisis kualitatif pula mempamerkan corak-corak metafora yang mencadangkan pautan utuh di antara tubuh dan minda. Walaupun terdapat perbezaan budaya pada ungkapan Bahasa Melayu (yang lazimnya tersirat) dan Bahasa Inggeris (yang lazimnya tersurat), jelasnya kedua-dua bahasa tersebut menggambarkan perasaan (EMOSI) sebagai KULIT dan pemikiran (KOGNISI) sebagai MATA, yakni OBJEK. Dalam konteks penyelidikan yang lebih luas, dapat disimpulkan bahawa hasil keseluruhan kajian ini mengandungi bukti lanjut bagi 'embodied cognition'.

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Freie Universität Berlin
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*Für meine lieben Eltern
(in liebevollem Gedenken an meine Mama),
meine 4 Schwestern und 3 Brüder,
meine 12 sehr geliebten Engelchen, i.e. meine Nichten und Neffen,
und
für die Erinnerungen an Jeff*

*„Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten
die Grenzen meiner Welt.“*

*- Ludwig Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung)
1922, Satz 5.6*

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Abbreviations

(Listed in order of appearance in the dissertation)

Chapter of first appearance

CMT	-	Conceptual Metaphor Theory	Chapter I
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RM	-	repertoire member	Chapter II
S	-	signal	
IP	-	Invariance Principle	
MP	-	Member of Parliament	
IRA	-	Irish Republican Army	
LCCM	-	Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models	
SUMO	-	Suggested Upper Merged Ontology	
ESL	-	English as a Second Language	
L2	-	second language	
MPA	-	Metaphorical Pattern Analysis	
MIP	-	Metaphor Identification Procedure	
CDA	-	Critical Discourse Analysis	
STD	-	sexually transmitted disease	

fMRI	-	functional magnetic resonance imaging	Chapter III
ERP	-	event-related potential	
OED	-	Oxford English Dictionary	
p.	-	page	
GCOB	-	Great Chain of Being	
MML	-	Master Metaphor List	
OIS	-	OBJECT image schema	
ICT	-	Information and Communication Technology	
NBA	-	National Basketball Association	
SSD	-	sensory substitution device	
sC	-	strictly concrete	
lC	-	loosely concrete	
lA	-	low abstract	
hA	-	highly abstract	
C-to-C	-	concrete-to-concrete	
C-to-A	-	concrete-to-abstract	
A-to-A	-	abstract-to-abstract	
A-to-C	-	abstract-to-concrete	
ISL	-	Internal State Language	

HUM	-	HUMAN(S)	Chapter IV
ANI	-	ANIMAL(S)	
PLA	-	PLANT(S)	
INO	-	INORGANIC THING(S)	
TAC	-	TACTILE	
GUS	-	GUSTATORY	
OLF	-	OLFACTORY	
AUD	-	AUDITORY	
VIS	-	VISUAL	
MC	-	metaphor candidate	
USA	-	United States of America	
MS	-	Malay song(s)	
MP	-	Malay poem(s)	
ES	-	English song(s)	
EP	-	English poem(s)	
VMM	-	Value Mismatch	
EMM	-	Empirical Mismatch	
CMM	-	Contextual Mismatch	
<i>P</i>	-	prepositions	
R&B	-	rhythm and blues	
RA	-	Research Assistant	

N	-	number (of sample)	Chapter V
freq	-	frequency (of occurrence)	
DBP	-	<i>Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka</i>	
TTR	-	type-token ratio	
SD	-	source domain	
TD	-	target domain	
CM	-	conceptual metaphor	
LOC	-	LOCATION	
LFE	-	LIFE	
REL	-	RELATIONSHIP	
OTH	-	OTHERS	
TME	-	TIME	
COG	-	COGNITIVE STATES/PROCESSES	
AFF	-	AFFECTIVE STATES/PROCESSES	
SPR	-	SPIRITUALITY/SUPERNATURALISM	
VP	-	verb phrase	
V	-	verb	
NP	-	noun phrase	
N	-	noun	
SUB	-	subject	
OBJ	-	object	
suppl.	-	supplementary	

1. Introduction

1.1. Objectives and statement of research questions

The research subject of metaphor, as time has shown, has not ceased to intrigue curious minds throughout history, irrespective of the foci of their scholarly interests. Going back all the way to ancient philosophers and rhetoricians who saw metaphor as just another decorative literary device employed to achieve nothing much beyond poetic and rhetoric effects, and then fast-forwarding to present-day research particularly within the multidisciplinary field of cognitive science where scholars and scientists now consider metaphor to be an underlying mechanism of the human conceptual system, it seems rather telling that metaphor is an academic topic worth digging deeper into.

In the recent few decades, the latest developments in metaphor investigations have been predominantly propagated by researchers working within the framework of cognitive linguistics, an outstanding number of whom appear to be adopting the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth CMT¹), in one form or another, as the departure point of their research inquiry. Its ever-growing popularity aside, CMT has been and continues to be criticized by the cognitive linguistics community (and beyond) as still lacking the criteria of a scientific theory whose hypotheses and claims can be tested via empirical means. This, along with other important theoretical and methodological concerns that this study will address, has been one of the major roadblocks that prevent CMT from being universally well-received by the empirically-driven disciplines adjacent to ours, including the cognitive neurosciences and various branches of psychology.

At its conception stage, this study was envisaged to be a relatively straightforward exploration of emotion-related metaphors in Malay poetic texts (i.e. songs and poems) in contrast to their English counterparts. As studies on Malay metaphors are still few and far between, this study could be a meaningful addition to the existing metaphor literature, and one that would also offer valuable cross-cultural insights as an outcome of its comparative linguistic analyses. But having said that, conducting an empirically-

¹ Also known by other names since Lakoff and Johnson (1980), i.e. Cognitive Metaphor Theory, Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, and Neural Theory of Metaphor; however, for consistency, 'CMT' will be used throughout this work.

worthy study that would fit into the conceptual framework of CMT in its current version and at the same time is methodologically equipped to achieve the above-mentioned goals has been anything *but* straightforward. This is mainly owing to some of the most indubitably basic issues that, despite having received much attention and criticism in the metaphor research community, remain for the most part unresolved. It is not only the firm opinion of the author of this dissertation but also as is evidenced by her firsthand experience in undertaking this very project that unless and until we stop circumventing these issues and finally start committing to what we mean precisely by 'concrete' and 'abstract' when we speak about metaphors (especially in relation to other consequential terms such as conceptual mappings, source domains, target domains, etc.), we will not be able to advance much further in evaluating (be it rejecting or verifying) many of CMT's assumptions, big and small, in a way that is truly scientific.

The preceding paragraphs might have lent one a brief impression that a metaphor researcher opting to work within the CMT conceptual framework, myself included, may be getting him-/herself further tangled inside a web of theoretical complications perhaps not even worth disentangling. But quite the contrary; we acknowledge these challenges right upfront and choose instead to view them as an opportunity, i.e. an opportunity to revisit some old ideas while exploring some new ones, upon which we would develop an empirically substantiated model and protocol that feature methodological advantages over existing techniques of metaphor identification and analysis. Therefore, the pivotal question of whether or not we can objectively 'measure' and 'grade' concreteness and abstractness (and if yes, how?) is to be a topic central to this dissertation. In fact, it is only after having solved this crucial piece of the theoretical puzzle that we could move forward with carrying out a metaphor analysis that would have a genuine chance at producing meaningful results that all serious researchers should hope to achieve.

To put it in explicit operational terms, the goal of this doctoral study is twofold: firstly, to offer a clearly defined solution to CMT's problem of vague distinction between concrete and abstract, and we do that by devising an objective scale for unambiguously measuring the degree to which a concept is concrete or abstract (i.e. as a prerequisite for a clean metaphor identification and analysis); and secondly, to apply this scalar model in identifying and analyzing metaphors from our data, the results of which will help us answer at least three main research questions (explained below). Thus, it would be only logical and appropriate to approach this dissertation in this particular sequence. Also,

due to the exploratory and descriptive nature of this study, we did not seek to formulate specific hypotheses to be statistically tested with regard to emotion metaphors in Malay and English. Rather, we aim to provide a descriptive analysis on how emotion and emotion-related concepts are conceptualized in these two languages through the use of metaphor in songs and poems, guided by the following research questions: (i) to what extent can the Malay conceptualization of emotion be interpreted as ‘universal’?; (ii) what are the culture-specific features of Malay metaphors that set them aside from those in English?; and (iii) what are the most prevalent patterns of metaphorizing emotion within the context of songs and poems in both languages?

1.2. Overview and structure of dissertation

The ensuing paragraphs will provide the reader with a panoptic view of the contents of each chapter and show how the chapters are concatenated within the overall structure of this work. This dissertation contains, including the present one, seven chapters.

The next chapter, Chapter Two, is foundational to this dissertation. It is deliberately dense with diverse ideas, assumptions and argumentations about metaphor from various theoretical traditions, a sound understanding of which would be advantageous, if not imperative, for one to build a solid research upon. As metaphor is exceedingly vast in topic, we will make our best attempt to discuss as much important content as possible within our spatial and temporal constraints. In the first half of the chapter, we will be surveying some of the most influential theories of metaphor, whether they are directly opposed to or may be viewed as complementary to CMT, including sister theories and conceptual models born into or as a consequence of this theory. The second half of the chapter features a critical review of some of the more recent emotion and emotion-related metaphor studies (mostly, but not exclusively, within CMT framework), many of which contain cross-linguistic/-cultural research components. We include also, at the beginning of the review section, the existing handful of works on Malay metaphors to give the reader a glimpse of what Malay metaphor studies look like at present and to illustrate where exactly our study is needed to fill the gap in the metaphor literature.

The third chapter evaluates the merits and drawbacks of CMT. It addresses in detail some of its fundamental theoretical weaknesses, most notably its lack of falsifiability and predictive power, as well as its circularity of argumentations and overreliance on

post-hoc explanations, all of which have been to the detriment of CMT's stature as a conceptual theory of metaphor. We believe that addressing these issues at the theoretical level is not merely a matter of necessity, but one that is in fact non-negotiable, if we aim to improve CMT's viability as a scientific theory. On the methodological side of the coin, we will show how the lack of standardized methods in CMT-based research and CMT's apparent reluctance to forthrightly define the concrete-abstract distinction will continue to keep one in a rocky and precarious position when adopting this framework in its current version. We will subsequently demonstrate how proposals put forward by Szwedek via Objectification Theory² (2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2014a) would eliminate many of these theoretical complications and give rise to substantial methodological improvements on metaphor identification and analysis, with some of our own propositions as well. Here, our position is in perfect alignment with Szwedek's proposal for *density*, *boundedness* and *3-dimensionality* as the strict, empiric and non-subjective criteria for concreteness, with 'OBJECT-ness' as a direct consequence thereof (ibid.). We then go a step further by suggesting that in addition to touch (i.e. tactility), other sensory modalities (i.e. taste, smell, hearing and sight) should also be taken into consideration when further measuring or quantifying the concreteness of a concept. From this is born what we term as the 'concreteness/abstractness scale', which would prove to be a useful and impartial tool for aiding metaphor identification. Support for our proposed model stems directly from studies on perception science, on the one hand, and from linguistic analyses on synesthetic metaphors, on the other hand, along with valuable insights from the different subfields of psychology.

The fourth chapter describes the methodology of the study. It opens with terminological clarifications and a quick glance at other tropes in relation to metaphor, with the aim of extricating them from *actual* metaphor and preventing unnecessary (but unfortunately common) terminological confusion, especially in the forthcoming stages of metaphor identification and analysis. This is followed by some remarks on the Malay language, as well as a brief historical and sociocultural overview of its speakers. The most sizeable part of this chapter is devoted to detailing the research materials and preparation of data. This includes a short report on the preliminary analysis and descriptions of the rating study to elicit metaphoricity judgments by native speakers of Malay. At this juncture, it seems appropriate to clarify that our study is not full-scale empirical in nature; it neither

² Although its formulation as an alternative theory of metaphorization was formally recorded in 2007, the core idea of *objectification* and related hypotheses have already been proposed by Szwedek in his earlier papers since 2000.

utilizes advanced methods of statistical data analysis, nor has at its disposal cutting-edge computational modeling or neuroimaging techniques. However, principles and elements of empirical research have been adopted whenever appropriate and possible, and much effort and scrupulous measures have been taken to make it an empirically informed one.

Results obtained in this study are presented in the fifth chapter, which comprises three segments. The first one reports the results from the rating study and reveals different combinatory patterns of metaphors based on their judged degrees of metaphoricity. The latter two segments, on the other hand, contain results of analyses from the main study. Specifically, the second segment describes the results quantitatively, with a heavy focus on the *nature* of source and target domains, that is, in relation to the ‘concrete-abstract’ notion so often labeled onto them. Using descriptive statistics, we also evaluate whether or not the analysis results support Szwedek’s new typology of metaphor (2011, 2014a). And thirdly, as for the qualitative portion of the analysis, we present the results of the more in-depth qualitative survey on metaphors of the MIND, which highlights the roles of SKIN and EYE in the metaphorization of EMOTION and COGNITION, respectively.

The penultimate chapter begins with the summary of individual findings from the three different kinds of investigations that form this doctoral project as a whole. We then proceed to discuss the broader implications of these combined findings, especially when viewed within the larger context of CMT and cognitive metaphor research. Of particular importance here is that our findings offer the (hitherto missing) statistical evidence for the long-held assumptions about the concreteness and abstractness of source and target domains. By now, we are also in the position to give a substantiated assessment on the value *and* viability of the proposed integrated framework of CMT-Objectification for researching metaphor. We close the chapter by reminding the reader of the constraints and limitations of our study, as well as clarifying the scopes of our conclusions.

The final chapter summarizes how the findings of our study effectively integrate into and contribute to current theories and the metaphor literature in general. We conclude with proposals for further improvements based on what we have learnt and experienced from undertaking this project, and with suggestions for future research.

2. Theorizing Metaphor: A Literature Review

2.1. Metaphor as a research subject

A famous person once wrote: "... *all* of us, grave or light, get our *thoughts* entangled in metaphors, and *act* fatally on the *strength* of them," (Eliot, 1871³, emphases added). This quote, read today (but perhaps with somewhat reduced dramatics), may sound like a paraphrased description of metaphor in the way that the cognitive-based⁴ theories of metaphor regard it. But in fact, this citation comes from a writing of one of the leading English novelists of the Victorian era, i.e. *Middlemarch*, first published in 1871. In just one sentence, the brilliant George Eliot (who was certainly *not* a cognitive linguist) had wonderfully captured not one, not two, not even three, but *four* essences of metaphor, quite similar to what Conceptual Metaphor Theory began to propose well over a century later. In other words, what Eliot and CMT appear to be in agreement on is that metaphor strongly influences not just our thoughts, but our actions as well, and that none of us is exempted therefrom. In the words of several prominent modern-day metaphor scholars: (i) metaphor is the property of thoughts and not of words alone (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 3); (ii) it is used effortlessly by all of us in our everyday lives (ibid.: 272); (iii) it is "deeply engrained in cognitive processes, social acts and verbal usage" (Dirven & Paprotté, 1985: viii); and (iv) it can be a powerful tool especially in revealing how people think and feel (Cameron et al., 2009: 63). Before we proceed to examining more closely the assumptions and commitments made by contemporary theories of metaphor, we will first present a brief historical account of how metaphor came to be regarded since the Antiquity, and what had led to the major shift in the philosophical paradigm brought about by the big new wave of modern-day cognitive-based metaphor research that started taking place about forty years ago.

As a topic of scholarly inquiry, metaphor dates back about 2000 years ago, at least since the canonical works of Aristotle, i.e. *Rhetoric* (1952a) and *Poetics* (1952b), and has remained a fond subject of debates among philosophers, rhetoricians and literary critics,

³ Page number not available in the e-book format (<https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/e/eliot/george/e42m/chapter10.html>).

⁴ Because CMT is also known as *Cognitive* Metaphor Theory, for clarity and precision, we will use 'cognitive-based theories' (as we do 'cognitive-based views', 'cognitive-based approaches', etc.) throughout this work to broadly refer to non-traditional metaphor theories (i.e. including, but not exclusive to, CMT).

centuries on end. And throughout history, metaphor has been seen as “one of the most important ingredients of literature” (Ortony, 1980: 2). But while having been around for as long as it has, it is only in the last few decades that metaphor started evolving into a topic so widely and so robustly studied across fields and from fresh new angles, most recently having drawn curiosity from the scientific community including cognitive psychology and neurolinguistics (e.g. Arbib, 2006; Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Boulenger et al., 2009; Casasanto, 2008*a*, 2008*b*, 2009; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Moseley et al., 2011; Pulvermüller, 2005; Rohrer, 2001, 2005, etc.).

In fact, the sudden explosion of interest in metaphor over the past several decades has seen the production of more titles on this subject in 1977 than in the entire history of thought prior to 1940 (Booth, 1978: 49). This development has been termed by Johnson as “metaphormania” (1981: ix) to describe a landscape where so many scholars appear to have been “possessed” by metaphor (ibid.). Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to say that no other linguistic phenomena, figurative or otherwise (not even metonymy), could be said to rival the attention and ‘star-like’ status awarded to metaphor as a vivacious subject of both philosophical and empirical investigations. On the one hand, the fact that metaphor is a topic so wide-ranging and can be studied from virtually every dimension of human life across various academic disciplines (and not to mention in hundreds, if not thousands, of languages) would mean that every interested scholar and student of metaphor would have the chance to make a contribution to this broad field of research. But on the other hand, one should also be a little wary of the temptations of wanting to investigate *all* possible aspects of metaphor that the scope of one’s project could easily expand out of control. That is exactly what this chapter hopes to regulate, in addition to providing a theoretical backdrop to this study within the broader context of metaphor research. Thus, observations and evaluations made throughout this chapter will serve to reinforce our conceptual stance and steer the direction of this thesis. And wherever appropriate, we will state and highlight matters of our immediate research concern and identify those that lie outside the scope of this study. Inevitably, it would be impossible to answer all questions on metaphor within a single dissertation.

2.1.1. *Caveat: elusive nature and definitional incongruity*

As metaphor researchers, it may be easy at times to be taking for granted that what we mean by ‘metaphor’ is also what laymen understand by that term. The reality, however,

could not be more different. When discussing metaphor, definitional problems present themselves at multiple levels, namely: (i) academic versus non-academic; (ii) between the two major theoretical traditions, i.e. classical rhetoric and cognitive-based views (see subsection 2.2.1); and admittedly also, (iii) among researchers working within the same broad framework of cognitive linguistics, i.e. what would count as ‘metaphor’ *does* indeed vary across (sub)groups of researchers (see subsection 2.2.2). Of course, there are both theoretical and methodological explanations underlying these differences, and most of them could be sorted out and clarified in operational terms, one level at a time. The only one inescapable ‘problem’ of metaphor that neither philosophical nor empirical effort could provide solutions for is its inherently *elusive* nature, one which appears to be unique to this linguistic (and as many would argue also, ‘conceptual’) phenomenon, and one not even shared by its close figurative cousin, simile. This and other terminological issues will be duly addressed in Chapter Four within a subsection specifically reserved for it. And because many of our arguments thereof must assume a prior understanding of the nuances of metaphor definitions that exist even within the cognitive-based theoretical camp, which we have yet to present, it would be unfitting to elaborate more on our points at this juncture. Suffice it to say, for now, that the fact that metaphor lacks overt linguistic cues that can confirm that a word or an expression is indeed metaphorical (as opposed to simile, which requires clear linguistic indicators to qualify as one, e.g. ‘as’, ‘like’, ‘suchlike’, ‘akin to’), the former is much more difficult to detect during an analysis and is also much more susceptible to a wide range of misconceptions and definitional errors compared to the latter.

We shall first begin by unscrambling this confusion at the simplest level, i.e. the non-scholarly (mis)understandings of metaphor. We contend that most non-academic usages of the term ‘metaphor’ are incongruent with ours in the following ways: (a) when it is used to refer to its superordinate term ‘figurative’, i.e. more inclusively or generically as a form of lexical broadening, in which case this may just be a ‘loose’ and imprecise way of using language; (b) as a result of a lack of any lexical distinction between metaphor and other figures of speech, e.g. metonymy, simile, idiom, proverb, hyperbole, etc., in which interchangeable usages of these terms must necessarily be due to the user’s error of understanding; and (c) as the direct result of non-academics adopting the centuries-old classical definition of metaphor that views it restrictively and exclusively as a poetic, creative, unusual or extraordinary way of using language, which would be a form of lexical narrowing of the term ‘metaphor’ and which within the CMT context

would refer to only a small and limited portion of metaphors (i.e. the ‘novel’ metaphors) but would incorrectly exclude most others that are the more ‘conventionalized’ ones.

2.2. From classical to contemporary theories of metaphor

By having just now identified the three ways that a non-academic may misidentify an expression as metaphorical when it is not (or vice versa), we hope to have dissolved this disconcertment at the most general level, i.e. the academic versus non-academic. This section, which surveys some of the most established and influential metaphor theories (both traditional and contemporary), should simultaneously clarify these terminological incompatibilities at the two more complex levels, i.e. between classical rhetoric and cognitive-based traditions, and subsequently the (model-specific) definitional discords that exist even amongst linguists who identify themselves as belonging to the same framework of cognitive linguistics. We divide the theories according to whether they regard metaphor as having only or primarily *linguistic* functions, i.e. the traditional approaches, or whether they consider metaphor to be an important mechanism of the *conceptual* system, i.e. the cognitive-based views.

2.2.1. Traditional approaches to metaphor

Historically, metaphor has often been seen as a “rhetorical flourish” and “a device of the poetic imagination” (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 3) employed by poets, writers and rhetoricians in their conscious, deliberate efforts to achieve aesthetic or rhetoric effects in language. The classical perspective, as a whole, considers metaphor to be “a *detachable* element in language; a device added to language or used to achieve a specific, prejudged effect” (Bryan, 1986: 255, emphasis added). Within these classical approaches, the origin of which could essentially be traced back to Aristotle, metaphor is viewed merely as a feature of language, not of thought. Because of this, metaphor is considered as *inessential* for the processes of thought and reasoning. A detailed and comprehensive evaluation of each of these theories lies outside the scope of this thesis. However, we will summarize here some of the main views of metaphor within the classical theories, followed by significant developments in metaphor research in the later part of the 1970s that subsequently led to the birth of CMT and other related cognitive-based approaches to metaphor.

2.2.1.1. *Comparison view*

As is evident from the name itself, this view takes metaphor to be a distinct case of comparison or analogy (Keysar et al., 2000). It makes no serious differentiation between metaphor and simile, except in two functionally insignificant ways: (i) in that the former is a ‘condensed’ or ‘elliptic’ form of the latter (Black, 1979: 28), i.e. instead of saying “Richard is like a lion,” the word “like” is dropped and the sentence is truncated into “Richard is a lion”; and (ii) that whilst in similes, comparisons are stated explicitly (i.e. A is like B), comparisons in metaphors are implicit (i.e. A is B). Because this view also assumes that the comparisons are made based on an underlying similarity between a metaphorical expression and its literal paraphrase (Yu, 1998: 10), and also that a literal rewording is always possible, metaphor is in effect ‘superfluous’. In short, metaphor is just another way of expressing meaning. In terms of metaphor understanding, this view suggests that one will interpret any ‘anomalous’ expression, e.g. “Richard is a lion”, by first and foremost judging its truth-value. And if the expression is judged to be literally untrue, it will be interpreted simply as a simile, i.e. “Richard is *like* a lion”, whereby Richard is understood as possessing qualities similar to those of a lion. However, as scholars have correctly pointed out, any two concepts can be ‘similar’ in countless⁵ of ways (Glucksberg, 2003: 92) and can have varying degrees of perceived similarity (Glucksberg et al., 1997: 53). Very importantly also, to emphasize the simile-metaphor distinction from our *cognitive* stance, we would argue that when two things are compared in simile, they are being juxtaposed side-by-side (A is *like* B); whereas with metaphor, we are in fact describing one thing in terms of another (A *is* B), where one thing is placed *over* something else. In other words, metaphor would be most accurately described as a ‘projection’, i.e. as apposed to ‘juxtaposition’ in simile.

2.2.1.2. *Substitution view*

The substitution view, of which the comparison view is a special case, according to Black (1979: 28), holds that a metaphorical expression is used in place of an equivalent literal expression. This view also essentially regards metaphor as ‘superfluous’ and is thus expendable, i.e. except for the “incidental pleasures” that one gains from describing in figurative terms something that could have also been easily said in simple and plain

⁵ As highlighted by Tversky (1977), an object possesses an infinite number of features that can potentially be attributed to it; see also Tversky’s contrast model (ibid.).

literal language (ibid.). Apart from stylistic preferences, there may also be occasions where a substitution is motivated by lexical necessity (Ortony, 1980: 3). Also evident in its name, the substitution view regards metaphor as a mere substitution for its literal equivalent that has the same meaning, but without any of the decorative elements. To illustrate, the metaphorical expression “Richard is a lion” is said to be an embellished substitution for the literal statement “Richard is brave”.

2.2.1.3. *Interaction view*

The interaction view, which was proposed by Black (1962*a*, 1979) as an attempt at a functional analysis of metaphor, asserts that the metaphorical meaning that arises out of a metaphorical expression is a result of the interaction between ‘focus’ and ‘frame’, which stand in dynamic interaction with each other. According to Black, ‘focus’ refers to the metaphorical statement, i.e. the word or phrase used non-literally, while ‘frame’ is the rest of the literal statement that surrounds the former (1979: 28). For example, in the sentence “He doesn’t seem to be able to *grasp* the idea,” the word “grasp” is the ‘focus’ and everything else surrounding it is the ‘frame’. Also known as the ‘dead metaphor theory’ amongst some theorists, this view is described by Black (ibid.) as a modified and developed version of a model that is based on insights offered by I. A. Richards⁶ (1936) but which uses “primary or principle subject” to refer to ‘topic’ and “secondary or subsidiary subject” for ‘vehicle’. In addition, Black regards the comparison view and the substitution view as “its only available alternatives”, even though he expresses that unlike the interaction view, these two views have an “unempathic” and “depreciative” treatment toward metaphor (ibid.: 27-28).

2.2.1.4. *Incoherence view (3-stage error-recovery theory)*

Also strongly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition of metaphor, the incoherence view is in some ways similar to the substitution view. According to Cacciari and Glucksberg, this view has at least two versions, i.e. one that is associated with generative semantics and the other with pragmatics, both of which state that metaphor is “incongruous” and “defective” as statements, semantically or pragmatically (1994: 456). The basic idea of this view is that metaphor is a ‘violation’ of linguistic rules, which is rectified at the

⁶ It was in fact Richards who first introduced the terms ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936) that has become widely accepted by the metaphor community, similar to what are elsewhere known as ‘ground’ and ‘figure’ (cf. ‘target’ and ‘source’ in cognitive linguistics).

comprehension stage in the form of a substitution. Specifically, within the semantic context, the literal interpretation is substituted by a literal paraphrase of the semantic interpretation, whereas within the pragmatic context, the literal interpretation is rejected and replaced by a metaphoric interpretation (Yu, 1998: 252). This standard pragmatic model is also known as the 3-stage error-recovery theory, to reflect its proposed 3-stage language processing. It claims that we process language in three stages, namely: (i) we first look for the literal meaning of a sentence; (ii) we then access this meaning against a given context; and (iii) if the literal meaning does not make sense or fit into the context, we search for the figurative or non-literal meaning of the sentence that does make sense (Searle, 1979). Clearly, this view also gives precedence to the literal interpretation of an expression over the metaphorical one, i.e. by claiming that metaphorical interpretation is secondary to literal interpretation, and that metaphorical processing *does* necessarily require greater cognitive effort than literal processing. Results from psycholinguistic studies on metaphor processing, however, indicate that metaphor comprehension is *not* optional, and that it is neither more difficult than literal comprehension nor does it require more processing time than the literal one (Blasko & Connine, 1993; McElree & Nordlie, 1999; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002). That said, a clear merit of this theory is its testability and hence also its falsifiability (as shown by a wide range of psychological experiments⁷ in the 1980s), which other semantic theories of metaphor lack.

2.2.1.5. *Categorization view (category-inclusion model of metaphor)*

Also known as the class-/category-inclusion⁸ model of metaphor comprehension, the categorization view directly refutes the comparison view and states that metaphorical expressions are in fact *not* understood as an implicit form of simile. It proposes instead that metaphor is an untypical categorization process, where the ‘topic’ of a metaphor (cf. target domain) is assigned to a diagnostic ad-hoc category of which its ‘vehicle’ (cf. source domain) is a prototypical member (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg et al., 1997; Thomas et al., 2001). In short, the ‘topic’ is classified within the ‘vehicle’. Despite their contrasting views, efforts have been made to reconcile the comparison and categorization models based on experimental findings that show that there is actually a shift from ‘comparison processing’ to ‘categorization processing’ as novel metaphors

⁷ See Vasilescu (1997) for a critical review of some of these psychological experiments.

⁸ Other names for categorization-motivated approaches include “dual-reference” and “interactive property-attribution” accounts; also, models that regard metaphors as class inclusion statements have been suggested to be along the same line as Black’s (1979) interaction theory (Vasilescu, 1997: 3).

become conventionalized (Bowdle & Gentner, 1999). A participation in this debate would no doubt be a long detour from the goals of this thesis. Nevertheless, evidence brought forward by these studies that support the career of metaphor hypothesis (for details, see Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) is noteworthy, especially where metaphors of different ‘types’ are concerned (subsection 2.2.4 will address the notions of ‘novel’ and ‘conventional’ metaphors). Among the advantages of the class-inclusion model over the comparison view and the standard pragmatic model of metaphor are: (i) firstly, it does not assume that literal meaning must be rejected first to make way for metaphorical understanding, which empirical evidence has shown to be untrue (Glucksberg, 2003); and (ii) secondly, instead of focusing on the infinite number of ‘similar’ properties that any two category members can share, this view highlights the importance of feature *salience* (Jeles, 2013: 18-19). And despite experimental evidence in favor of the role of tacit conceptual metaphors in metaphor comprehension, which repudiates the category-inclusion claims⁹ (Gibbs, 1992: 572), this view has further encouraged investigations on the underlying conceptual structure of metaphor beyond its linguistic functions.

2.2.1.6. *Relevance theoretic account of metaphor*

Although relevance theory was born into a tradition that inherits classical assumptions about metaphor, it makes an explicit effort to distance itself from the traditional views in several important ways (Wilson & Carston, 2007; Sperber & Wilson, 2008). In fact, it sympathizes with the Romantic critics of classical rhetoric who saw metaphor as entirely normal and pervasive in language, and that literal paraphrases of metaphorical expressions are not always possible without loss to the originally intended meaning, even if it does so for reasons different than those of the Romantics (Wilson, 2011: 208). Positioning itself within cognitive sciences, relevance theory is part of an approach to lexical pragmatics whose main aim is to account for how lexical meanings, including metaphorical utterances, are adjusted during communication¹⁰. Although its emphasis is on the *communicative* aspect of metaphor (in that metaphor is said to arise naturally within linguistic communication), this view does not dismiss its cognitive aspect either. Specifically, it rejects the traditional belief that metaphor’s function is purely decorative with little or no cognitive significance. In fact, relevance theorists view themselves as

⁹ For those interested in the comparison-versus-categorization debate, including the hybrid accounts of both, we recommend, among others, Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Glucksberg, 2008; Utsumi, 2011; Barnden, 2012.

¹⁰ That is, as opposed to CMT that aims to provide a comprehensive account of metaphor as a fundamental *conceptual* mechanism; more on this later in subsection 2.2.4.

potential allies of cognitive linguists, with both parties having enormous potentials to contribute toward a comprehensive cognitive theory of metaphor. This cooperative posture is reflected in efforts made by metaphor scholars from the two (traditionally opposing) theoretical camps to reconcile their approaches (see, e.g., Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006; Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Wilson, 2011). Despite cohering to different goals and operating under different assumptions, it has been suggested that these two frameworks could, in some ways, be viewed as complementary instead of contradictory. For starters, both views parallel each other in arguing against the code model of communication and in espousing an inferential approach in metaphor interpretation (Wilson, 2011: 210). According to Wilson also, one of the ways in which relevance theoretic and conceptual metaphor accounts can be harmonized is by finding evidence that “some metaphors arise in language and others in thought” (ibid.: 197). Indeed, this does become clear when one considers that whilst relevance theorists commonly cite ‘standard examples’ such as “Richard is a lion”¹¹ (as do most classical approaches), cognitive linguists are more interested in postulating conceptual metaphors that are assumed to underlie (‘non-standard’) metaphorical expressions. Another major point of departure of relevance theory from classical rhetoric and Gricean pragmatics is that the former makes no sharp literal-versus-metaphorical distinction in language; rather, it suggests a continuum¹² of utterances from literal, loose, hyperbolic and metaphorical, where all forms are said to require the same mechanism for interpretation (Sperber & Wilson, 2008: 84). Further, relevance theory rejects the need for a literal interpretation prior to a metaphorical one and the traditional notion that metaphor is inferior to literal language or that it is an ‘exception’ to the norm. However, this view makes no effort to revere the special place of metaphor in language, either, as the Romantics and CMT proponents are wont to do. Finally, this view theorizes that hearers rely heavily on linguistic *and* contextual cues to understand metaphor, and they do so by creating ad-hoc or ‘occasion-specific’ concepts, which in this respect would be identifying itself with the class-inclusion view¹³.

2.2.1.7. *Interim summary and section interlude: Part I*

As our discussion now exits the traditional framework and enters into the domain of alternative approaches to metaphor, we will see that the change in metaphor research

¹¹ Barnden (2012) calls this a ‘be-form’ metaphor, although it is also known elsewhere as ‘nominal’ or ‘copular’.

¹² Less often and not always, ‘category extension’ is inserted in the midpoint of this continuum (Wilson & Carston, 2007).

¹³ Incidentally, our observation here appears to be in line with Sperber & Wilson, 2008; O’Donoghue, 2009; Utsumi, 2011; Barnden, 2012, i.e. in broadly classifying relevance theory under categorization view.

landscape (i.e. one that used to be confined to philosophy, rhetoric and literary studies, but has now reached across linguistics, psychology and brain sciences¹⁴) has profoundly impacted *how* metaphor is regarded, i.e. from being a mere decorative device to having important cognitive functions. Put simply, metaphor is no longer seen only as a matter of language, but also (and more importantly) a matter of thought. Many scholars and scientists have, over the last several decades, abandoned the former views in favor of the latter due to much empirical evidence, as the review of studies in Section 2.3 will show. Another major point that divides these two traditions (with a notable exception of relevance theory, which explicitly sets itself apart from the traditional accord) is that the traditional views claim that literal meaning is the ‘norm’ and reigns supreme, whereas metaphorical language is an ‘anomaly’ and a departure from normal language, whose interpretation is thus secondary and optional. Cognitive-based views, on the other hand, regard metaphor as entirely normal, natural and ubiquitous in language. In short, while theories with the Aristotelian root assume a stark literal-versus-metaphorical distinction (some starker than others), its contemporary oppositions do not.

More will be said about these two points later as this dissertation unfolds, but for now, we are bringing them into the foreground for a few important reasons, theoretical and methodological. First and foremost, they help explain the definitional inconsistency in regard to metaphor (recall subsection 2.1.1) and guide us in resolving this issue at the second level, i.e. between the two theoretical camps, classical and contemporary. While traditional theorists tend to place emphasis on *be-form* metaphors and cite examples of highly creative novel metaphors from sophisticated literary works, their contemporary counterparts mostly draw their examples from metaphors that are pervasive in everyday language, and beyond the *be-form* constructions. Secondly, and subsequently, this has crucial methodological consequences for researchers whose goals are to identify and analyze metaphors in various forms of discourse, whether they are written, spoken, hand-gestured, or perhaps even graphically depicted. That is, whichever theoretical stance one adopts will inevitably determine one’s methodological route, and naturally also the *number* and *form* of expressions that will ultimately be counted as ‘metaphor’. This is especially critical for studies that aim to provide empirically informed results, such as ours. Finally, the two previously mentioned theoretical disputes (firstly, whether metaphor is a product of language or of thought, and secondly, the legitimacy of the

¹⁴ Rohrer (2007b) presents a stimulating review on various theoretical issues regarding metaphor that range from philosophy to neuropsychology.

literal-versus-metaphorical distinction) will have important implications on the design of this study (one of the foci of Chapter Three), as well as how this dissertation is held together as a whole. A further point lies in the answer to the third issue regarding the dead-versus-alive metaphor distinction (see Section 2.4), which should simultaneously solve the definitional conflict at the third and most complex level, i.e. among researches working within the same broad framework of cognitive linguistics.

2.2.2. Early influences from the Romantic period

Even though the big new paradigm shift in looking at metaphor through more serious lenses started gathering force only in the 1980s with the inception of CMT as the first coherent cognitive-based metaphor theory, the Romantic critics of classical rhetoric had already long before championed the idea that metaphor has a much greater role to play beyond the aesthetics. Today known as the poetic¹⁵ or 'romantic' view of metaphor (i.e. after the movement that originated in the Romantic era), it asserts that metaphor is a means of experiencing the world, which is fundamental to language and thought. Driven by the 18th and 19th century Romanticism, this view venerates metaphor as evidence that imagination is key to conceptualization and human reasoning. It also argues that since language is largely metaphorical, no distinction between literal and figurative language is necessary (Saeed, 2003: 346). In short, these two points alone would explain why the cognitive-based theories are often thought of as an extension (or even regarded as the 'modern-day descendants') of the romantic view (ibid.: 347).

The romantic perspective may have been regarded as heterodox and often ignored by mainstream philosophers and rhetoricians, but literary critic Terence Hawkes (1972) regards it as one of the two fundamental views of metaphor in the history of language, alongside the classical rhetoric view. The romantic view considers metaphor to be a crucial component in all languages, that is, because language is "vitaly metaphorical" (Hawkes, 1972: 90) and because metaphor plays a part in making sense of our mental activity and in the creation of our reality within our culture (Hawkes, 1972, after Bryan, 1986: 255). And as reported by Wilson, there is now a growing consensus that the Romantic critics may have been right all along in their observations regarding metaphor (2011: 196), even though they may have had different motivations for arguing for its

¹⁵ Not in the same sense as Aristotle's use of the term in his discussion on metaphor in *Poetics* (1952b).

centrality in language. Of course, this view has little to say (at least not explicitly) about cognitive processes, but it has profoundly changed the way scholars look at metaphor as they do today. In a nutshell, although in today's academic landscape, it may appear that ample findings from empirical studies are lending support to claims about metaphor made relatively recently by cognitive linguists, many of these progressive ideas were in fact already widespread among the romantics well over 200 years ago.

2.2.3. Key contributions in the 1970s leading to CMT

Before we begin examining some of the major cognitive-based metaphor theories, we deem it useful to provide a brief introduction to the intellectual cavalcade that propelled the key developments in metaphor research in the late 1970s, which eventually led to the conception and finally the birth of CMT. Of course, CMT as a metaphor theory was but one piece of a much larger picture that was transformed by the non-conventional and somewhat revolutionary ideas challenging the centuries-old Western philosophical traditions regarding language, thought, meaning, truth, experience and understanding (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). But an even bigger academic product born out of this new wave of intellectual reform was a 'trend' that came to be known as cognitive linguistics (Hills, 2011). Now an influential field in its own right, this branch of linguistics and its fundamental tenets have broken free from traditional linguistic theories, including the formalist approach and Chomsky's universal grammar.

2.2.3.1. Schön's generative metaphor

As acknowledged by the metaphor community today, the now classic book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson did certainly transform the playing field and was instrumental in the burgeoning growth of cognitive-based theories of metaphor. At the same time, it is also important to recognize the contributions from other scholars that galvanized this radical paradigm shift, i.e. *pre-CMT*. Two figures in particular whose key works will be surveyed here are philosopher Donald Schön and linguist Michael Reddy. First published in the same volume of Ortony's original edition of *Metaphor and Thought* (1979), Schön's astute observations of generative metaphor and Reddy's thoughtful linguistic analyses on conduit metaphor in communication and information theory have had irrefragable influence on contemporary metaphor theories, especially CMT. Even though their insights may have been in some ways rudimentary

and perhaps not nearly as developed as CMT today, these seminal papers have but set up the stage for an enormous advancement toward this very way of looking at metaphor, that is, as being conceptually powerful and cognitively significant.

Schön's ideas concerning generative metaphor predated the then soon-to-be formal conception of the first cognitive theory of metaphor (i.e. CMT¹⁶) by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Schön's paper "Generative Metaphor" (1979), already preceded by his earlier works on similar topics (e.g. Schön, 1963; Schön & Bamberger, 1976), provides a seeding ground for the central notion that metaphor has a powerful cognitive function, in that it not only governs but also further *generates* ideas in our mind. The foci of Schön's investigations were issues affecting social policies, i.e. as reflected in his works on metaphor usage in technology and in the domain of housing policy. His examples include seeing a problematic neighborhood in the city as an urban "blight" and other concepts metaphorically generated therefrom, e.g. *health, diseases, palliatives, cures*, etc., as found in the excerpts of written reports by social policy practitioners (Schön, 1979). Undeterred by the mainstream classical views still deeply rooted in discussions on metaphor¹⁷ and taken for granted until the late 1970s, which still saw metaphor as a linguistic abnormality, Schön points out a bold new alternative. Specifically, he argues for a very different tradition that regards metaphor as "a way of looking at things" and treats it as "central to the task of *accounting for our perspectives* on the world: how we think about things, make sense of reality, and set the problems we later try to solve"¹⁸ (1979: 254, emphasis added). Again, in his own powerful words, Schön writes: "My point here is not that we *ought* to think metaphorically about social policy problems, but that we *do* already think about them in terms of certain pervasive, tacit generative metaphors" (ibid.: 256, emphases in original).

With an interest and expertise in urban planning, Schön was convinced that the key to overcoming difficulties in social policies lies in understanding the 'problem setting' prior to working at its 'problem solving', and that metaphor, by virtue of it remaining tacit, plays a tremendous role in conflict resolutions via cognitive works (ibid.: 255-256, 268). In other words, metaphorical descriptions of social situations (mostly implicit and

¹⁶ As Lakoff (1993) did explicitly pay homage to Reddy's Conduit Metaphor as having motivated many assumptions of CMT, we would take Reddy's overt support for and agreement with Schön's generative metaphor to qualify as such, too (at the very least, indirectly).

¹⁷ See key articles by Black, 1962b; Beardsley, 1967; Searle, 1979 (after Schön, 1979: 254).

¹⁸ Schön, in the same paper, refers to the work of Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth* (1946) as being central to this alternative tradition, whereby the latter also noted metaphor as having the functions of being both an utterance *and* a way of thinking (i.e. in other words, as both linguistic and conceptual).

semi-conscious) fundamentally shape how we tackle these problems. In fact, issues surrounding social welfare seemed to have influenced a good number of discussions¹⁹ that encouraged the shift in the way metaphor was regarded during this period. This is yet another compelling evidence for the wide-ranging functions and wide-reaching implications of metaphor, which genuinely *surpass* the linguistic and literary realms, as traditionally claimed and previously assumed. In regard to the theoretical assumptions of generative metaphor, Schön proposes that when we say ‘A is B’, we are not only perceiving, conceptualizing and understanding A as B²⁰, but we are in fact influencing and inviting others to do the same, as well. This is because generative metaphor causes the naming, framing and restructuring of our perception of an otherwise ordinary phenomenon (ibid.: 258-259). He also argues that metaphor “generates new perceptions, explanations, and even inventions” and involves speakers in new “information-rich” experiences, i.e. the concrete and the sensory (ibid.: 267, 277). Reiterating the tacit character of metaphor, Schön explains the differences between ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ metaphors as such: “the surface language of the story need *not* contain the words ‘health’ and ‘disease’, even though health/disease is the generative metaphor which underlies the story” (ibid.: 267, emphasis in original)²¹. He concludes by stressing that works involving instances of intuitive inquiry “can, and must, be empirically grounded” with vigilant descriptions and accurate analyses thereof (ibid.: 279).

2.2.3.2. *Reddy’s conduit metaphor*

In his now classic paper, “The Conduit Metaphor” (1979), Reddy expresses clear support for Schön’s (1979) idea of generative metaphor and describes it as a “long-awaited music” (ibid.: 284). Reddy affirms the importance of ‘problem setting’ before ‘problem solving’, and suggests ways to fill the gap for what he believes was missing in Schön’s works, i.e. its direct application to human communication. Concerned about language’s grave impacts on the preservation and destruction of a society, Reddy asserts that “[a]lleviating social and cultural difficulties require better communication” and explains that ‘better communication’ is exactly what Schön’s ‘frame restructuring’ (1979) and Kuhn’s ‘translation process’ (1970) essentially refer to (ibid.: 285). Though not the first scholar to have suggested this, Reddy claims with substantiation that we

¹⁹ See also Nisbet, 1969; Brown, 1976; Rein, 1976; Rein & Schön, 1977.

²⁰ Schön (ibid.) attributed the idea of “seeing-as” to an earlier discussion on descriptions by Wittgenstein (1953a: 193-216).

²¹ Cf. CMT’s claims on the implicit nature of conceptual metaphors, which will be discussed in subsection 2.2.4.1.

conceptualize ideas, thoughts and feelings as ‘things’²² and that our language about communication²³ is highly metaphoric, influencing how we think and solve problems (1979). Corroborating his claims was a thorough and systematic analysis of circa 140 metaphorical expressions on communication (i.e. 70% of which supports his conduit metaphor proposal), collected from English speakers and listed in the paper’s extensive 14-page appendix (ibid.). Lakoff praises Reddy’s (1979) hefty examples and scrupulous linguistic analysis as being the first of its kind (1993: 203-204), while Ortony describes them as “a major piece of work, providing linguistics with an unusual corpus, as well as substantiating Reddy’s claims about the pervasiveness of the root metaphor” (1993: 6). Reddy’s (ibid.) findings demonstrate that English speakers have a strong tendency to think about communication as a transfer of meaning between speakers via the conduit of language, in that words are containers within which meaning is held, packed by the speaker and then to be unpacked by the listener²⁴. According to Reddy, this ‘default’ and ‘preferred’ framework for communication in the English language, albeit flawed and faulty, has a “biasing effect” on our cognitive processes, which reinforces itself via the conduit metaphor (ibid.: 308). To further demonstrate that conduit metaphor is as ubiquitous as it is immensely difficult to avoid in the English syntax and semantics, Reddy draws up an alternative way of conceptualizing communication that he calls the ‘toolmakers paradigm’, which despite being logically more accurate than the conduit model, proves to be much less often used by English speakers (ibid.). These findings signify how cognitively powerful and entrenched a root metaphor can be (its accuracy or inaccuracy aside), which even on its own should disparage the entire traditional belief that metaphor does nothing much beyond ‘embellishing’ our speech.

Here is a quick look at Reddy’s methodology and analytical apparatus. In all the conduit metaphor examples, he observes that each occurrence contains a word with a ‘mental content’, e.g. *meaning, ideas, thoughts, feelings*, etc. that he terms as *repertoire member* or RM, which all speakers of English have. Now, if we are to think of this RM category as a ‘slot’ and its members as interchangeable ‘slot-fillers’, we will get a sort of general formula for what Reddy calls a ‘core expression’ (marked in italics in his paper)²⁵. To illustrate this with one of his examples, the sentence “Try to *get your thoughts across*

²² Cf. Szwedek’s notion on OBJECT as the ultimate source domain (2011, 2014a); details in subsection 3.3.1.3.

²³ This is what Uriel Weinreich (1972) describes as language being “its own metalanguage” (after Reddy, 1979: 286).

²⁴ These examples, if analyzed within CMT framework, would yield conceptual metaphors such as LANGUAGE IS A CONDUIT, IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, SIGNALS ARE CONTAINERS, etc.

²⁵ For the complete listing of major and minor frameworks of conduit metaphor, see the Appendix (Reddy, 1979: 311-324).

better” contains the core expression ‘*get RM across*’ (ibid.: 286, 290, underlines added). As we can see here, ‘*thoughts*’ may be replaced with any other repertoire members to formulate (virtually an infinite number of) other conduit metaphor expressions, e.g. ‘*get my meaning across,*’ ‘*get our ideas across,*’ ‘*get their feelings across,*’ etc. In addition to the RM category, Reddy also identifies another class of terms, i.e. *words, phrases, sentences, essays, poems*, etc. that he calls *signals*²⁶ or S, which would occur frequently (though not always) in conduit metaphor sentences. For example, the statement “John *fills* his *poems* with *emotions*” contains the core expression ‘*fill S with RM*’, which is a general formula that can very easily yield infinite variations of the original statement, e.g. “Kim *filled* her *email* with *anger*” or “The students *fill* their *essays* with *ideas*”. By now, it has become clear that within the framework logic of conduit metaphor, ‘mental contents’ are reified as *objects* that are inserted into containers of signals²⁷. Intriguingly, and as the upcoming chapters will show, these ideas match the very *core* of our thesis (i.e. the *objectification* of *thoughts* and *feelings*), primarily motivated by Szwedek’s Objectification Theory (2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2014a).

In summary, even independent of Lakoff’s (1993) explicit recognition of CMT as being traceable to Reddy’s (1979) ideas on conduit metaphor (or Reddy’s overt support for Schön’s [1979] generative metaphor), the fact that these two major works have paved the way for significant developments in the contemporary metaphor research, especially for CMT, is very clear. To Schön and to Reddy, ‘metaphors’ are not at all restricted to linguistic expressions containing novel elements only; rather, they very often come in the form of everyday conventionalized language, too, contrary to traditional claims. In fact, both scholars advocate that metaphor is a ‘seeing A as B’ cognitive phenomenon, which is *the* basic claim of CMT regarding metaphor. Further, it is also immediately noticeable how examples drawn by both Schön and Reddy in their respective works mirror those of cognitive-based researchers today, but diverge greatly from standard examples cited in the works of classical theorists that generally focus on the *be-form* metaphors. More specifically, Schön (1979) investigated tacit metaphors that appear in written reports on social housing, while Reddy (1979) collected data on metaphorical expressions by English speakers in their descriptions about communication. Both sets of examples (their domain-specificities notwithstanding) feature none other than *everyday* language used by *everyday* people, which further support their claim that metaphor is

²⁶ Reddy mentions borrowing the term “signal” from information theory to refer to bodily received “energies” (ibid.: 290).

²⁷ These ‘signals’ refer to “external physical patterns of marks or sounds” passing between speakers (ibid.: 298-300).

common, pervasive, unavoidable, implicit, and tacit, but yet conceptually powerful. All of these points do not only go against traditional assumptions, but are in tandem with (and in fact belong on the same theoretical page as) CMT and other cognitive-based approaches to metaphor. To conclude, the beyond-philosophical impacts of metaphor on our culture and our society as documented by Schön (ibid.) and by Reddy (ibid.) seem to be leaving very little room, if at all, for the traditional argument that metaphor has ‘no real function beyond stylistic or rhetoric’ to be holding its ground.

2.2.4. Cognitive-based theories of metaphor

This section will survey the contemporary theories of metaphor, which fall largely within the framework of cognitive linguistics. Many of these approaches do differ in their methods of research and operational specifics, but this is mainly explained by the fact that they have different foci of interests and seek to explore the different facets of metaphor. Broadly speaking, most of their assumptions can be seen as complementary to (and do not seriously contradict) each other’s, or those of CMT. We shall begin our review with CMT, but will at this point focus only on its main claims. A deeper critical evaluation thereof, however, will be provided in Chapter Three (Section 3.2), which is dedicated to assessing at length the theory’s merits and drawbacks, prior to presenting potential solutions to the highlighted problems. Further, because many of our proposed alternatives will be drawn (both directly and indirectly) from Szwedek’s Objectification Theory (2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2014a), a thorough and in-depth discussion on this theory will also be reserved for the next chapter (Section 3.3).

2.2.4.1. Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Although the idea that metaphor is the property of concepts and not of words alone may have already been simmering through ages (to our recorded knowledge as early as the Romantic period), it was not until the end of the 1970s that this finally reached its boiling point, i.e. at the formal introduction of Conceptual Metaphor Theory by Lakoff and Johnson in 1980. Since then, CMT has been extensively developed, modified and refined (e.g. Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Lakoff, 2008). Despite the criticisms received at both the theoretical and methodological ends (with still a good number of hurdles to overcome), CMT deserves the recognition it has gained for being perhaps the most comprehensive metaphor theory and most-frequently

adopted conceptual framework for metaphor studies today (of which this present work is not an exception). CMT has, in many ways, spearheaded the contemporary metaphor research and encouraged the emergence of other views and cognitive-based models²⁸. Some of these views offer solutions for unresolved issues in CMT, while others respond by challenging its weaker proposals. Perhaps one of the earliest and most basic claims of CMT is: “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is *fundamentally metaphorical* in nature,” (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 3, emphasis added). This assumption directly challenges just about all other previous traditional beliefs about metaphor. It asserts that metaphor is used effortlessly by ordinary people in everyday life, as it is an *inevitable* process of human thought and reasoning, and that it shapes the way we conduct our thoughts, speech and actions. In fact, according to Dirven and Paprotté, metaphor is “deeply engrained in the cognitive processes, social acts and verbal usage” (1985: vii), a genuine assessment of which, of course, requires us to look for evidence in *other* human systems as well, apart from just language.

Operating under the fundamental precept that metaphor essentially functions at the cognitive level, CMT proposes that metaphor links two conceptual domains, i.e. source and target. Source is the conceptual domain from which metaphorical expressions are drawn and tends to be ‘more concrete’ than the usually ‘more abstract’ target, which is the concept that is metaphorically described. The mapping²⁹ between these two domains allows us to understand target in terms of source. To illustrate, the postulated conceptual metaphor underlying the example ‘*Her love for him has wilted*’ is LOVE IS A FLOWER, where LOVE is described and understood in terms of A FLOWER. Unlike the traditional approaches that typically identify metaphors as they explicitly appear in sentences (mostly in *be-forms*, also known as ‘resemblance metaphors’ among cognitive linguists, following Grady [1999]), CMT *postulates* the conceptual metaphor underlying a surface metaphorical expression (cf. ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ metaphors in Schön, 1979: 267). Hence, unless a metaphor occurs in *be-form* (e.g. ‘*His love for her is a flower that never wilts*’ that would lead us directly to the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A FLOWER), most conceptual metaphors are implicit. This could explain the minor complication that may arise when it comes to postulating a conceptual metaphor from non-*be-form* linguistic metaphors, in that two or more metaphor analysts (indeed even those sharing the same

²⁸ Some of them will be surveyed shortly, but for in-depth discussions, see, among others: Grady, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999; Kövecses, 2005, 2010; Evans & Green, 2006; Müller, 2008; Cameron et al., 2009.

²⁹ The idea that metaphors are perceptually based has motivated the neural theory of language (NTL), which hypothesizes that the ways in which these two domains (source and target) are conceptually mapped correspond to *neural* mappings in the brain (Narayanan, 1997; Feldman & Narayanan, 2004).

theoretical understanding *and* using the same method of analysis) may not report the *exact* same conceptual metaphor, although they could all be correct in their postulations. For example, in the expression '*to grasp the idea*', we may agree that a few other fairly equally viable conceptual metaphor alternatives for this metaphorical expression (apart from UNDERSTANDING IS SEIZING), could be, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, or UNDERSTANDING IS AN ACTION, or AN IDEA IS AN OBJECT, or even THE MIND IS A HAND. Just as the interpretation and understanding of metaphor by a reader or listener is often context-dependent, the postulation of a conceptual metaphor from a linguistic metaphor may also depend on a researcher's focal point of the metaphorical expression. This is of great methodological importance, especially where the identification, analysis and classification of metaphors are concerned (addressed in Chapter Four).

In terms of the key aspects of conceptual metaphor as per CMT, there are three that will be summarized here, namely: (i) its metaphorical systematicity; (ii) the unidirectionality of its mappings; and (iii) the entailment-rich inferences it carries. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphorical systematicity explains how our understanding of one concept in terms of another highlights certain aspects of that concept and concurrently hides some others³⁰. This can be seen in ARGUMENT IS WAR³¹ conceptual metaphor (e.g. '*He won the argument*' or '*I couldn't defend that point*') where the adversarial nature of an argument is highlighted, while its organizational aspect is hidden, since the latter is inconsistent with this particular conceptual metaphor ([1980]/2003: 10-13). On the other hand, AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY (e.g. '*We'll proceed in step-by-step fashion*' or '*We've covered a lot of ground*') does the exact opposite. This is an illustration of how a concept or conceptual domain can be 'perspectivized' by metaphor (Evans & Green, 2006: 304). Another important aspect of conceptual metaphor is that its mapping is said to be unidirectional. This means that while UNDERSTANDING takes its structure from SEIZING, the reverse structural mapping is not possible because we do not conceptualize SEIZING as UNDERSTANDING, neither do we conventionally understand WAR in terms of ARGUMENT. In fact, as observed by Lakoff and Turner (1989), the unidirectional nature of metaphoric mapping applies even to metaphors that appear to have identical domains. For instance, PEOPLE ARE MACHINES (from '*He's a machine*') and MACHINES ARE PEOPLE (from '*My computer hates me*') have two sets of entirely different mappings

³⁰ Cf. Context-Limited Simulation Theory of Metaphor in Ritchie, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2013 (see subsection 2.2.4.5).

³¹ This conceptual metaphor postulation has been somewhat of a point of contention even within CMT, for which Primary Metaphor Theory offers a solution; as a result, Lakoff and Johnson later propose ARGUMENT IS STRUGGLE to be the primary metaphor instead ([1980]/2003: 265).

(Evans & Green, 2006: 297). The final aspect of metaphor that we will mention here is that conceptual metaphor carries with it rich inferences and entailments³². This means that many of the source domain features not explicitly mentioned can be *inferred* from the target, due to the vast amount of information being transferred during metaphoric mapping (ibid.: 298). Therefore, conceptualizing TIME in terms of MONEY entails that TIME is also conceptualized as A LIMITED RESOURCE, which in turn entails that TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 9).

All of these predictions by CMT about our conceptual system, intriguing as they are, have left the theory with more than just a few open questions to answer. Probably the biggest and most immediate one concerning the claims about metaphorical projection (taking the theorized functions of conceptual domains, source and target, at face value) would be: what is in fact the motivation behind this pattern or direction of mapping? In response to this question and some others, CMT has put forth proposals for Invariance Hypothesis³³ to explain how metaphoric mappings may be constrained (Lakoff, 1990; 1993). That is, in terms of the organization of conceptual structure, CMT theorizes that some mappings are based on “pre-conceptual embodied experiences” upon which other mappings build when forming more complex conceptual structures (Evans & Green, 2006: 301). Primary Metaphor Theory has something valuable to add to this, but up to this point, we are a little wary of CMT’s tendency to use rather strong assumptions about our conceptual structure (e.g. Invariance Hypothesis) in order to rationalize some of its *other* existing and equally complex assumptions about our conceptual structure (e.g. the nature of metaphoric mappings). We will address these points at greater length (and take issue with some of these ideas) in Chapter Three. For the time being, the following segment on Primary Metaphor Theory will discuss this theory’s alternative explanations to some of the unresolved problems within CMT.

2.2.4.2. *Primary Metaphor Theory*

A fair number of scholars, including Murphy (1996), have questioned CMT’s argument for ‘inherent structure’ in target domain as explained by Invariance Principle (for more

³² A similar observation has already been made earlier by Schön, “When we see A as B, we carry over to A the evaluation implicit in B” in discussing generative metaphor of *diseases* that need to be *cured* within the housing community (1979: 265); cf. Lakoff on how mapping enables our evaluation of concepts to be mapped from source to target (1993: 230).

³³ The first rudimentary version of Invariance Hypothesis was introduced by Lakoff and Turner (1989), but was reassessed and refined in their later works (e.g. Lakoff, 1990, 1993; Turner, 1990, 1993, 1996; Brugman, 1990), followed by various attempts by others to further refine it (Kövecses, 2010: 133); since Lakoff (1993), ‘Invariance Hypothesis’ came to be officially termed as ‘Invariance Principle’, although both terms are still sometimes used interchangeably in the literature.

details, see, e.g., Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Brugman, 1990; Turner, 1990, 1991; Lakoff, 1990, 1993). The basis of this criticism is that this notion would contradict CMT's claim that the target domain is 'more abstract' and 'much less clearly delineated' than the source domain. Accordingly, the question arises: why would the target domain need metaphoric structuring from the source domain if it already has its own 'inherent structure'? (Evans & Green, 2006: 304). The emergence of Primary Metaphor Theory may be seen as an effort, in part, to address this issue. In his doctoral dissertation, Grady (1997a) proposes two types of metaphors, primary metaphor and compound metaphor³⁴, whereby the former contains simple concepts upon which the latter builds its own more complex concepts. The next important claim of this theory is that source concepts are characterized by an experiential basis such as bodily perception and sensation (physical *and* physiological) that target concepts lack because their domains are generally non-physical (Grady n.d.: 5/14-15, after Evans & Green, 2006: 305). Congruent with CMT, Primary Metaphor Theory also maintains that metaphorical mappings are unidirectional (Grady et al., 1999; Grady 2005b). But rather than explaining this in 'concrete' and 'abstract' terms, Grady regards source and target domains as equally basic, i.e. both are directly experienced and perceived (1997a) but with a degree of subjectivity (Evans & Green, 2006: 304). Primary Metaphor Theory assumes that "primary source concepts relate to sensory-perceptual experience, while primary target concepts relate to *subjective responses* to sensory-perceptual experience" (ibid.: 304-305, emphasis in original). Taking DESIRE IS HUNGER to illustrate this point, this theory does not see the primary target concept DESIRE as being 'abstract', but rather as a *subjective response* to the experience of HUNGER and one's physical sensation when feeling hungry.

A further point of importance regarding primary metaphor is that to qualify as one, a conceptual metaphor has to link two simple concepts from distinct domains, instead of linking two distinct domains. These simple concepts are seen as corresponding to one another in a straightforward manner and thus contain no 'mapping gaps' between them (ibid.: 308). For example, 'That color is quite *close* to the one on our dining room wall' contains the primary metaphor SIMILARITY IS NEARNESS, where both SIMILARITY and NEARNESS are simple concepts that do not contain any simpler concepts within them (ibid.: 304). Conversely, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS does not only contain complex

³⁴ Primary metaphor was originally termed as 'primitive metaphor' in Grady's earlier works (e.g. Grady et al., 1996; Grady 1997a) and compound metaphor is sometimes referred to as 'complex metaphor' (Müller, 2008: 235), but for consistency, we will use 'primary metaphor' and 'compound metaphor' throughout.

concepts that can be further broken down into simpler concepts (e.g. PERSISTING IS REMAINING UPRIGHT and ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE), but it also lacks a ‘clear experiential basis’ that is another key criterion for primary metaphors. To clarify, primary source concepts NEARNESS, REMAINING UPRIGHT and PHYSICAL STRUCTURE may be said to have some sort of sensory-perceptual experiential bases (Grady, 1997b). THEORIES and BUILDINGS, however, do not have any clear experiential correlation linking them together (ibid.). Accordingly, this distinction between primary and compound metaphors may plausibly account for the universal-or-cultural disposition of metaphors. The claim that primary source and target concepts are linked together via “experiential correlations arising from human physiology and a shared environment” (Evans & Green, 2006: 308) may explain why primary metaphors, e.g. CHANGE IS MOTION, tend to be more universally conceptualized than compound metaphors, e.g. THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. It would thus be conceivable, as often noted in the literature, that the latter would not be as familiar a metaphor in non-industrial cultures, e.g. within a nomadic society or among cave-dwelling people, as it would (and in fact, *is*) to us.

Since its formulation by Grady (1997a), Primary Metaphor Theory has commanded respectable attention and attained enthusiastic responses from metaphor researchers, no less importantly from leading figures of CMT. Despite this theory’s central assumption that the source and target concepts of primary metaphors are equally basic (which is said to reflect its distinctness from CMT), the former’s approach remains essentially cognitive and no doubt builds upon the general framework of the latter. It is not a point of dispute to us that Grady’s (1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999) accounts of how metaphoric mappings occur, or are otherwise constrained, have been more conscientious, systematic and transparent than those of CMT, especially in addressing source and target domain motivations. However, it has also been pointed out that this theory, despite being useful in explaining metaphoric complexity, does not clarify if what it means by ‘experiential basis’ necessarily requires an actual and direct *first-hand* experience by the speaker and hearer, or if even the tiniest hypothetical possibility of one experiencing it would suffice (e.g. INTERRELATED IS INTERWOVEN), and therefore, still falls short of providing an “exhaustive way of constraining metaphorical mapping” (Jelec, 2013: 30-31).

Another observation that we would like to make here relates to this theory’s claim that primary metaphors link concepts that are ‘equally basic’ in that both of them are “directly experienced and perceived” as the basis for its rejection of CMT’s distinction

between source and target concepts being concrete and abstract, respectively (1997, after Evans & Green, 2006: 304), which will be expressed in two parts. Firstly, even in the original publication of *Metaphors We Live By* in 1980, Lakoff and Johnson (in discussing the grounding of our conceptual system) have already emphasized that “[w]e are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more basic than other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural, or whatever,” and explicitly stated that “[n]one of these has experiential priority over the others; they are all *equally basic* kinds of experience,” ([1980]/2003: 59-60, emphasis added). Thus, its principled theoretic accounts aside, we view Primary Metaphor Theory’s point on the equal basicness of primary source and target concepts as somewhat redundant, even though we are completely in accord with its non-acceptance of Invariance Principle as motivating metaphoric mappings between conceptual domains. Secondly, while we do not disagree with Grady’s (1997a) suggestions that primary source concepts have ‘image content’ derived from external sensory experience, whereas target concepts have ‘response content’ due to their subjective responses (i.e. evaluations, assessments, judgments, etc.) to the sensory experience, we maintain that the complete rejection of the abstract and concrete notions is not necessary. Granted, conceptual metaphor theorists have been, at best, nonchalant in clarifying what they mean by ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’, and have left the phrase ‘more or less clearly delineated’ for the most part subjective and open to the reader’s interpretation³⁵. And considering the *centrality* of these concepts to its theory, indeed we insist that this situation be rectified within CMT at once³⁶. However, sharing the opinion of Jelec, we too believe that any attempt at modifying a theory’s working hypothesis is best done within the theory’s limitations (2013: 31), and that is, in this respect, by providing a set of clear operational criteria for concrete and abstract concepts within CMT, instead of completely rejecting them altogether.

2.2.4.3. *Discourse Dynamics Approach to Metaphor*

While CMT is primarily concerned with the cognitive aspect of metaphor, the discourse dynamics framework takes a different angle on the subject and brings to light other important facets of it, most especially its *contextual* component, which CMT has been criticized as not having paid sufficient attention toward (Stern, 2000; Leezenberg, 2001;

³⁵ A clear exception to this theoretical negligence is Szwedek’s sharp distinction between physical (concrete) and nonphysical (abstract) based on the sense of *touch* (2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014a), which will be discussed at length in Section 3.3.

³⁶ This is one crucial theoretical gap that this study intends to fill; we shall present our extensive proposals in Chapter Three.

Zinken et al., 2008). In fact, advocates of the dynamic systems approach regard CMT as having downplayed the role of language use in relation to metaphor by overlooking the importance of the “specifics of the language-using situation” (Cameron et al., 2009: 63). CMT’s focus on metaphor at the conceptual level of a speech community (and hence its lack of emphasis on what is happening in the interactional world during the production and comprehension of metaphor at the individual level) has urged scholars to find new ways of investigating metaphor, i.e. one that focuses more on practical applications more suited to the field of social sciences. This has been made possible through the employment of metaphor as a powerful empirical tool³⁷ that helps reveal how people think and feel, which is invaluable for researchers who seek to better understand the human psychological and social realities (Cameron et al., 2009: 63-64).

The discourse dynamics approach does not challenge the cognitive aspect of metaphor or its centrality in metaphor research. Rather, it highlights the importance of change and connectedness in social and cognitive systems (Cameron et al., 2009: 64). Underlying this approach are the two main principles of language, i.e. thought and culture, which are *non*-static and closely interrelated. It posits that metaphor has multiple but unified dimensions: linguistic, cognitive, affective, physical and cultural, which are all dynamic and continuously changing, both throughout a discourse event and from one individual to another (see, e.g., Cameron, 2003; Cameron & Deignan, 2006; Cameron et al., 2009). Metaphors, whether linguistic or conceptual, are emergent, flexible and variable, but over time they stabilize through social and linguistic interactions, while at the same time remaining open to continuous change (Gibbs & Cameron, 2008; Cameron et al., 2009). Metaphor emergence³⁸ takes place, among others, during interactions of individual speakers, each possessing their individual ‘subsystems’, i.e. complex dynamic *language* systems, complex dynamic *cognitive* systems, complex dynamic *affective* system, etc. (Cameron et al., 2009: 66-67). These complex systems operate on multiple timescales and levels (i.e. from the millisecond to millennia, and from the individual to the international), which is reflective of how metaphor systems³⁹ are organized.

Within a discourse event, metaphor is considered part of a dialogic process, i.e. it is not owned by the person who produces it but belongs to *both* the speaker and hearer; it is

³⁷ The method for metaphor-led discourse analysis in applied linguistics involves detailed transcription, identification and coding of metaphors (prior to extracting metaphor patterns from coded data, in many cases using specialized software).

³⁸ See also Cameron and Deignan’s work on the *emergence* of non-literal and metaphorical expressions in discourse; linguistic metaphors are said to stabilize as idiomatic forms emerging from interactions (2006).

³⁹ For an in-depth discussion and a detailed visual representation of these systems, see Cameron, 2007b.

‘inter-individual’ (Morson & Emerson, 1990: 129; see also Bakhtin, 1981; Clark, 1996; Linell, 1998). Accordingly, metaphor is not a static phenomenon with fixed mappings, but “a temporary stability emerging from the activity of interconnecting systems of socially-situated language use and cognitive activity” (Cameron et al., 2009: 64). Since these systems are complex, nonlinear and unfolding continuously in real-time, metaphor is perceived as a human activity that must be considered from a full context of use (Cameron, 2003: 42). This context is an indispensable part of the systems, and not just a disconnected background against which various systems operate (Cameron, 2007b). Instead of viewing linguistic and cognitive phenomena like metaphors as objects, this approach sees them as processes, movements, and activities (Cameron, 2003, 2007b; Cameron & Deignan, 2006; Gibbs & Cameron, 2008; Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008). As a dynamic system develops, flows and adapts, speakers currently engaged in a discussion build upon each other’s or their previous ideas throughout the discourse event. The same would apply to the metaphor production process, whereby the use of a metaphor could elicit other metaphors that would in turn create a trajectory for others to follow suit. To illustrate, a metaphorical description of terrorism as ‘*sneaky*’ at one particular instance could be responsible for building the frame for what would be said next about it, e.g. that it is a form of ‘*bullying*’⁴⁰. As Cameron et al. put it, “One voice thought may activate another” (2009: 68). This shows that metaphor does not only *reflect* thinking, as suggested by CMT, but can further *affect* it, which is reminiscent of ideas by Schön (1979) and Reddy (1979), previously discussed in subsection 2.2.3.

As opposed to CMT’s forceful assumption that thought must necessarily have primacy over language, as reflected in its view that the connection between conceptual metaphor and linguistic metaphor is a *top-down* instantiation, i.e. from thought to language (see, e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003; Kövecses, 2005), the dynamic systems approach visualizes this connection as language ‘interacting’ with thought (Cameron et al., 2009: 68). In fact, in its classification of metaphors, it distinguishes ‘systematic metaphors’ as being a different phenomenon from ‘conceptual metaphors’, in that the former emerge upward whereas the latter downward. Of course, this could mainly be a reflection of the different research foci and inherently distinct applications of these two approaches. But perhaps the most striking appeal of the dynamic systems approach is its emphasis on context and the multi-dimensional character of metaphor, which cannot be neglected

⁴⁰ Cited from a participant’s response in a metaphor-led discourse analysis involving a focus group (Cameron et al.: 2009).

especially if one is to carry out a metaphor investigation that involves intercultural elements, such our present study. We conclude that this view effectively fills important gaps in metaphor research, making the contemporary framework more comprehensive. The value and indispensability of *context* as underscored by this approach are reflected in our metaphor identification and analysis methods in Chapter Four.

2.2.4.4. *Dynamic View of (Multimodal) Metaphors*

The dynamic view of multimodal metaphors as eloquently laid out by Müller in her book *Metaphors Dead and Alive, Sleeping and Waking: A Dynamic View* (2008) was inspired by Cameron's pioneering works on the dynamic aspects of metaphors in use since 1999⁴¹. Müller (ibid.) also states that her take on metaphor is in accord with Kyratzis' (2003) notion of a single dynamic category and has benefitted from McNeill's (1992, 2006; McNeill & Duncan, 2000) unified theory of language and gesture, as well as Chafe's (1994, 1996) dynamic aspects of cognitive organization. Other works that motivated this view include Lieb's (1964) reconstruction of a triadic structure for verbal metaphors and Stählin's (1914) empirical exposition on the degree of metaphoricity in the psychology of metaphor. In a nutshell, Müller's thoughtful draw on these distinct approaches, old and new, spanning different fields, languages *and* modalities resulted in the formulation of a comprehensive view that breathes new life into older discussions on metaphor (verbal and beyond). Müller's version of the dynamic view accounts for the different 'states' of metaphors based on various degrees of metaphorical activation. It contests the mainstream belief that 'conventionalized' metaphors are necessarily dead whilst only the 'non-conventionalized' ones are alive. Resultantly, this view offers an alternative explication for the 'liveliness' of metaphor, i.e. in that a metaphor can be 'sleeping' or 'waking'. This depends on the activation of metaphoricity during language use, which, owing to the dynamic nature of metaphor, would differ across individuals and contexts. The combination of cognitive- and context-based approaches employed by Müller has revealed that indeed metaphoricity is gradable, *not* absolute (2008: 2).

The rejection of the dead-versus-alive binary classification of metaphor is not new. Lakoff and Turner, for instance, have long challenged this assumption by suggesting that the so-called 'dead' metaphors used in the everyday life are very much alive and are in fact the most alive ones (1989: 128-130). Another focal point of the dynamic

⁴¹ Other works on the dynamic systems approach by Cameron and colleagues are listed in the Bibliography.

view is its rejection of the duality of meaning and its (re-)introduction of the triadic structure⁴² of metaphor. The former explains metaphor as a transfer or mapping between two entities, B and C, without a mediating force. Müller's triadic structure, on the other hand, determines that A relates to B and C, wherein B is seen in terms of C (2008: 26-32), and that establishing metaphoricity requires the *activation* of the triadic structure; a metaphor is thus 'dead' when the triadic structure is not activated. Suggesting that everyday 'conventional' metaphors may be both dead *and* alive, Müller shows that metaphoricity can be empirically documented. This outlook on metaphor is particularly appealing in that metaphors of at least two different modalities are studied together, i.e. verbal metaphors (spoken and written) alongside pictorial and gestural ones, too. Indeed this multimodal approach has shown that it is not uncommon for a metaphor to be sleeping in one modality but awake in another, which demonstrates that metaphor is modality-independent (ibid.: 32-36). Consequently, this model has achieved what others have been less successful at in providing a comprehensive picture of both linguistic *and* cognitive processes in metaphor production, which also supports Cameron's (2007b) thought-language 'interaction' claim, as opposed to 'governance'. Müller's work (2008) draws findings from empirical studies on multimodal metaphors not just in English but also in German, supplying her theory with cross-linguistic insights, as well.

Although the dynamic view is sympathetic to CMT, its classification of metaphor based on metaphoricity activation is visibly distinct from the Lakoffian approach. According to Lakoff and Turner, historical metaphors are those that have long died out, while conventional metaphors are still very much part of our 'live' conceptual system (1989: 128-129). Müller, on the other hand, proposes an alternative model comprising *two* levels of classification (ibid.). The first level is a tripartite classification relevant to the linguistic system (i.e. historic, entrenched, novel), while the second level is a bipolar classification that concerns language use (i.e. conventionalization, transparency). To synopsise a sophisticated model in one breath: (i) historic and entrenched metaphors are both conventionalized, but novel ones are not; and (ii) historic metaphors have lost their transparency, while entrenched and novel ones are still transparent. Here, 'transparent metaphors' entail that the corresponding literal expressions still exist and are presently accessible to language users in an interaction, which are dependent upon the cognitive activation of an interlocutor at a given moment of interaction (ibid.).

⁴² According to Müller (2009), the triadic structure is implied in other theories, e.g. in CMT (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003), Weinrich's Bildfeldtheorie (1958), Aldrich's visual metaphor theory (1996), and Black's interaction theory (1962a).

Because it takes into account metaphor (and metaphoricity) at both levels, i.e. system and usage, this view brings together primary concerns of CMT and dynamic approaches under one unified account, particularly in regard to the ‘liveliness’ of metaphor. And the fact that metaphoricity has been shown to be (i) a cognitive creation on the part of the interlocutors, and (ii) inherently gradable, i.e. the degree of which is context-dependent (ibid.: 2), carries methodological consequences. In short, a legitimate investigation on metaphor cannot afford to overlook its contextual aspects, and a cognitive account alone would be incomplete without the dynamic inputs (and vice versa). Moreover, findings from multimodal metaphor studies have also shown that whether or not the source domain of a ‘conventionalized’ verbal metaphor is active *may* vary across individuals and/or from one moment to another (ibid.). This supports the claim by Cameron et al. (2009) on the ‘temporary stability’ of metaphor (especially as reflected in what they term as ‘process’ or ‘active’ metaphor), and corresponds to the notion of metaphor as an inter-individual dialogic process (Morson & Emerson, 1990). This weighty evidence for context of use has significant methodological implications on any systematic study of metaphor. This will be illustrated, within the context of this study, in Chapter Four.

2.2.4.5. Context-Limited Simulation Theory of Metaphor

Context-Limited Simulation Theory of Metaphor⁴³ is another contemporary view that emphasizes contextual significance and it rests its assumptions on Barsalou’s (1999) model of perceptual simulation of language use and interpretation. As maintained by this view, language and other communicative acts are an essential part of perceptions, which are filtered and aggregated at multiple levels but only the most highly aggregated ones are within the conscious reach of our attention (Ritchie, 2007). The functions of the two neural systems (i.e. perceptual and conceptual) interact with each other at every level, with the latter having the capability to partially simulate the former. Specifically, perceptual neural system comprises internal states and experiences of the mind and the body, while conceptual neural system includes ‘simulators’ that can simulate the same full range of those states, experiences, muscular actions, etc. The tight interconnection between language (grammar and lexicon) and the conceptual system allows perceptions and simulations to activate language and other simulators, and then causing language to

⁴³ For a complete and extensive account of the Context-Limited Simulation Theory of Metaphor, see, e.g., Ritchie, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007. Note that the theory is also known as Context-Limited Simulators Theory in the literature.

activate yet other complex sets of simulators. Among them are simulators related to the conventional 'definition' of a word or phrase, along with simulators of subtle nuances of thoughts and feelings associated therewith. However, of these, simulators activated by an utterance but are irrelevant to the context of an interaction will be *suppressed*, and only the relevant ones will become highly *activated* and get connected to the working memory's current contents (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, after Ritchie, 2007). In metaphor creation, the suppressing of primary but context-irrelevant simulators connected to the vehicle (or source) and its conventional or 'literal' meaning, as well as the heightened activation of context-relevant secondary simulators⁴⁴, allow metaphor to transform the way we experience its topic (or target). It is this connection (i.e. perception, cognition and emotion) that creates 'meaning' for metaphor and gives it its expressive power.

An extremely valuable insight that this theory brings into the contemporary metaphor discussion is that it underlines the importance of the *nuances* of expression, perception, and the complexly rich responses to them, with each having the potential and capacity to be enhanced and amplified, but is otherwise indefinable. As generally agreed among scholars, besides our subconscious and ineluctable choice for the everyday metaphor use, metaphor is hugely helpful in speaking about difficult or emotionally intense topics (Gwyn, 1999; Cameron, 2007a). According to Ritchie, we tend to use, re-use and alter existing metaphors to express particularly subtle thoughts or powerful emotions (ibid.). In the example 'I was *crying* on the *desert*' (Cameron, 2007a)⁴⁵, the italicized words are said to trigger the activation of various and complex powerful simulators (perceptual, emotional, visceral, etc.), which are not easy to categorize conceptually or paraphrase linguistically without losing the full expressive force intended, specifically because they are the result of the perceptual simulators having combined and interacted together.

Another strength of this theory, in our view, is that its core assumptions are made within (what science has indicated to be) the limitations of the human cognitive processing capacities. Further, its emphasis on context-relevant secondary simulators encourages us to look out for those subtle nuances unique to an individual context of metaphor usage during metaphor analysis. As a theory of metaphor, its heavy stress on context appears to be (mutually) strengthening of a similar concern by the two previously discussed

⁴⁴ Cf. 'hiding' and 'highlighting' in CMT (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 10-13); cf. also 'selective projections' of input spaces that discard irrelevant and inconsistent inputs in Blending Theory (see, e.g. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, 2003; Turner, 2005, 2008).

⁴⁵ This example is borrowed from Cameron's study involving a reconciliation talk between an MP's daughter whose father was killed by an IRA-planted bomb and the person who planted the bomb himself (2007a).

dynamic approaches, i.e. the discourse dynamics approach to metaphor and the dynamic view of multimodal metaphors (and in fact also, relevance theory), their different theoretical vantage points aside. Thus, this theory may be seen as complementary to these other views, or as a self-sufficient theory of metaphor in its own right. Although its basis for the perceptual and conceptual neural systems interacting continuously with each other does not, in general, contradict conceptual claims by CMT (and in fact in many ways could be seen as supporting them), we evaluate its exposition of how only contextually relevant simulators are selected for metaphor processing as much more convincing than CMT's assumptions of 'inherent structure' in target domain, which is not only too complex, but also lacks substantiation and is even somewhat pataphoric. Context-Limited Simulation Theory, on the contrary, provides a perceptual-based model and argumentations that are simpler, clearer and most importantly, consistent with what we already know about our perceptual and cognitive processing abilities.

2.2.4.6. Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM)

Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM) is a theory of lexical representation and meaning construction that views metaphor as a function of meaning construction processes (Evans, 2007). Theorizing the nature of conventional meaning of words and how they combine to produce an utterance, LCCM suggests that words neither carry nor encode meaning but serve as an access route to encyclopedic knowledge, i.e. the vast semantic potential stored in our mind. With extra-linguistic contextual information, an utterance determines which part of a word's semantic potential should be activated, i.e. a situated interpretation from which meaning arises. As per its name, 'lexical concepts' and 'cognitive models' are the key conceptual products of this model. To summarize, a lexical concept is a semantic unit that appears in conventional form (e.g. orthographic), which carries a set of information associated with it and lends access to the enormous but highly structured encyclopedic knowledge. A unit of this knowledge system with the semantic potential of a lexical concept is called a cognitive model. A lexical concept provides access to a vast number of cognitive models with various types of information and varying degrees of access thereto. Primary cognitive models are accessed directly, while secondary ones are accessed indirectly by lexical concepts (ibid.).

According to LCCM, meaning is constructed when all lexical concepts of an utterance are interpreted in a manner consistent with each other, and interpretation occurs when at

least one cognitive model in the cognitive profile is activated (for details, see Evans & Zinken, 2006; Evans, 2006, 2007)⁴⁶. Let us now consider the following statements that contain lexical concept GERMANY: (1) *Germany has the population of about 80 million*; (2) *Germany won the 2014 FIFA World Cup against Argentina*; and (3) *After decades of reluctance, Germany is stepping up to take its place as a leader in European foreign policy*. From LCCM's viewpoint, only in (1) does GERMANY provide a direct access to its primary cognitive model, whilst in (2) and (3), the targeted (secondary) cognitive models are accessed indirectly. To explain this, LCCM theorizes that the access route to GERMANY in (1) concerns knowledge in a primary cognitive model GEOGRAPHICAL LANDMASS, whereas the cases in (2) and (3) are much less straightforward and require the activation of primary *and* secondary cognitive models. The semantic contribution linked to GERMANY in (2), for example, activates a primary cognitive model NATION STATE before its targeted (secondary) cognitive model NATIONAL SPORTS is arrived at. Subsequently, GERMANY in (3) involves an even longer route, i.e. firstly, it activates a primary cognitive model NATION STATE followed by a secondary cognitive model POLITICAL SYSTEM before the access route finally reaches its ultimate cognitive model ELECTORATE. Most importantly though, these examples show that activating extended access routes to secondary cognitive models *via* primary ones necessarily produces a 'resonance', i.e. the longer the route, the higher degree of information is attained, and hence also the greater the resonance. Consequently, many of us would agree that lexical concept GERMANY in (1) would be interpreted most 'literally' of the three, but more figuratively in (2) and (3), perhaps with (3) having the highest degree of figurativeness, i.e. due to its longest route and thus its highest degree of resonance⁴⁷.

Concerning metaphor, Evans states that it creates an 'aboutness' relation, i.e. the lexical concept of a vehicle (or source) reveals something about its target's lexical concept. It is precisely this 'clash' between the primary cognitive profiles of the lexical concepts of vehicle and target that gives rise to metaphor. To illustrate, in '*The time seemed to whiz by*', the complement WHIZ BY 'feels' figurative due to the fact that "entities that *whiz by* are normally physical artifacts" (2007)⁴⁸ but TIME is *not*, thus generating the 'clash' in the primary cognitive models of these two lexical concepts. LCCM also takes the stance

⁴⁶ The architectures of cognitive profiles are commonly illustrated using *visual* diagrams, which we would have to do without here. The cognitive models cited, however, are based on a '(partial) cognitive profile' exemplified in Evans, 2007.

⁴⁷ To clarify, these examples are only meant to illustrate LCCM's take on how 'literal' and 'figurative' interpretations of concepts are arrived at, which does not in any way reject, exclude or contradict any metonymic/metaphoric analyses thereof.

⁴⁸ Page number not available in a webpage format (details listed in Bibliography).

that metaphor is dynamic, and that its function is to construct meaning in a novel, creative or striking way by “exploiting clashes in cognitive model profiles in order to engineer secondary access” that creates resonance, which results in greater affective responses (ibid.). According to this model, then, ‘conventionalized’ lexical concepts are no longer metaphoric. We shall remark on this point in the subsection below.

2.2.4.7. *Interim summary and section interlude: Part II*

To briefly recap, in Part I of the ‘interim summary and section interlude’ (in subsection 2.2.1.7, following our overview of the classical theories), we wrapped up the hitherto discussion on the two critical issues that mark the great theoretical divide between the classical rhetoric and cognitive-based approaches to metaphor, namely: (i) the former sees metaphor as a product of language only, but the latter refutes this claim and argues that thought plays at least an equal role, if not a bigger one, in metaphor creation; and (ii) the former insists that literal meaning is the norm of which metaphor is an anomaly, while the latter rejects⁴⁹ any strict binary distinction between literal and metaphorical language. A lucid and unambiguous understanding of these two assumptions and their origins (along with a third that we will address shortly) is crucial for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Specifically, they clarify the definitional inconsistencies at the three different levels previously discussed, and they guide us toward a consistent and reliable method for metaphor identification and analysis. The third important point that needs to be foregrounded at this point (as will be illustrated, in practice, in Chapter Four when we present our research methodology) is (iii) how these different theories explain the dead-versus-alive metaphor distinction. This will untangle the definitional discrepancies at the third and most specific level, i.e. among researchers who belong to the same framework of cognitive linguistics and therefore share the common view that metaphor is cognitively significant and not inferiorly positioned in language.

Having already reviewed six⁵⁰ contemporary approaches to metaphor currently active in metaphor research and widely referenced in the field, we can now see that although they share some core assumptions about metaphor, they do in fact focus on varying aspects and functions of it. This may explain, at least partly, not just the different ways in which they approach the topic but also the slight contrast in their ‘definitions’ and descriptions

⁴⁹ We say this, again, with the exception of Relevance Theory.

⁵⁰ We will discuss a *seventh* one at great length in Chapter Three, i.e. Objectification Theory (Szwedek, 2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2014a), prior to presenting our OBJECT-based model for ‘measuring’ concreteness.

of metaphor, i.e. what would and would *not* count as one. By and large, we have seen that CMT as a conceptual theory of metaphor (and by extension also Primary Metaphor Theory) takes the broadest view on the subject and thus allows for the widest range of words and expressions to qualify as ‘metaphorical’, i.e. even the most unremarkable and ‘conventionalized’ ones. Key figures in CMT including Lakoff and Turner (1989), for instance, question the need for a dead-or-alive metaphor division, given their claim that the so-called ‘dead’ metaphors too common in our everyday language are not just *alive*, but can sometimes be the *most alive* ones. This position is strongly reflected in classic examples in the CMT literature, such as expressions that describe life as a journey or a relationship as one, which are said to employ the very same cognitive mechanism as do ‘novel’ and ‘poetic’ metaphors. This stance, however, is *not* unanimously shared by all cognitive linguists, as some of them regard these (highly ‘conventionalized’) examples as no longer metaphorical (recall LCCM in subsection 2.2.4.6). This issue might have perchance not been as controversial if CMT’s examples had not been largely ‘intuitively generated’ (most notably in its earlier days, the situation of which has improved steadily with time) and if CMT had provided clear, objective and unambiguous criteria of what would qualify as metaphor and what would not (that is, beyond what is ‘instinctively’ known to be metaphoric, a claim that cannot survive empirical scrutiny). Chapter Three will offer CMT a potential solution for this problem and fill this important theoretical gap. But for now, we summarize the different ways in which these theories explicate their classification of ‘metaphor’ from their respective conceptual vantage points.

Within the Discourse Dynamics Approach, a huge stress is placed on context and the multidimensionality of metaphor, and this framework articulately distinguishes between ‘process metaphor’⁵¹ that is currently active within a discourse context (but which not all metaphors are assumed to be) and other types of metaphor. The Dynamic View proposes a refined two-level model of classification based on both linguistic system and language use in ascertaining the ‘liveliness’ of metaphor, and suggests that a metaphor is ‘dead’ when the triadic structure fails to be activated. Context-Limited Simulation Theory does not singularly provide a classification of metaphor, but (akin to the latter two theories) also emphasizes its contextual importance, and it is therefore safe for us to conclude that it, too, would not be as liberal as CMT with its metaphor identification. Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM), though not a metaphor theory per se,

⁵¹ Cameron explains that process metaphor is an empirical event that may only be empirically measured by evidence from a neurological activity on an MRI scan; linguistic metaphor, however, has the *potential* to be metaphorically interpreted, but may only be evidenced textually via data assessment and logical argumentation (2007b).

identifies perhaps most precisely what qualifies as metaphor and what does not. It states unambiguously that, “metaphor involves dynamic processes of meaning-construction in order to *surprise*, or to make a particular point in a *novel* or *striking way*”⁵² (Evans, 2007⁵³, emphases added), reflected in the ‘clash’ of cognitive models, which produces ‘resonance’ and consequently greater affective responses. This directly and necessarily *excludes* all forms of conventionalized language from being accepted as ‘metaphor’.

To put this into a methodological context, one can expect that an analyst adopting CMT framework (i.e. the view being the most open or lax with its delineation of metaphor compared to all others) would be identifying many more expressions as ‘metaphorical’ than their counterpart who, for instance, shares the viewpoint of LCCM, which has the most stringent requisites for what can qualify as metaphor, and would therefore exclude all but the strongest vehicle-topic contrast as ‘metaphorical’ (i.e. due to the *resonance* created during a longer access route between a lexical concept and its targeted cognitive model, which ‘conventionalized’ expressions no longer create). A good illustration of this is the expression ‘*a long time*’ which LCCM does *not* accept as metaphorical (due to a lack of resonance in the access route), whereas CMT does and postulates for it the conceptual metaphor TIME IS SPACE⁵⁴. Hence, if we are to place these theories on a continuum in this respect, CMT will no doubt be on the most liberal end, with LCCM on the opposite end of the spectrum as the most conservative one. All other theories may be said to be falling somewhere in between the two views, i.e. Discourse Dynamics Approach, Dynamic View of Multimodal Metaphors, and Context-Limited Simulation Theory, all of which accentuate the function of *context* in researching metaphor.

2.3. Review of studies

We will now review various studies on metaphor carried out using different versions and/or combinations of analysis methods, as well as diverse sources of data (poetic and prosaic). The studies reviewed in this section are mainly text-based, much like our own. In Section 3.4 of the next chapter, we will also highlight a series of empirical works (both within and adjacent to our field), upon which we base our model for quantifying and grading concreteness. This arrangement is befitting the thematic focus of Chapter

⁵² Cf. Black’s interaction theory, in particular his discussion on live or vital metaphors, which to him are the only ‘active ones’ due to their *poetic* nature (1979: 25-26).

⁵³ Page number not available in a webpage format (details listed in Bibliography).

⁵⁴ As a sidebar, we would state TIME IS AN OBJECT as the conceptual metaphor for this expression (more in Chapter Three).

Three, which requires the inputs and insights from research beyond linguistics and the language modality. The text-based studies surveyed below are lined up based on their (general) metaphor themes to make comparisons and evaluations more effective. This would, as a result, make a sharp segregation between the specific methods of analysis difficult, as our review will soon make clear, but this is not consequential to our goals at hand. Of course, it is not surprising that each discipline (or even *sub*-discipline) would have its own preferred methods of research. And although the observation that beyond-textual metaphor studies tend to be 'more empirical' may be in many cases correct, this is not true across the board and is arguable for many studies. Regardless, to exercise scholarly prudence and not make the mistake of using the term 'empirical' too liberally (or too conservatively), we would acknowledge each discipline's own decision on what would make a study empirical or otherwise, i.e. within its respective research scope and methodological constraints. At the same time, finding ourselves within a very strongly and increasingly inter-/multidisciplinary research field, we also ought to venture some opinions and offer some assessments of our own here in regard to this matter.

Based on our literature survey, the 'empiricalness' of a (metaphor) study does appear to be a matter of degree. Because studies reviewed in this section are largely text-based, it may imply that they are viewed as 'less empirical' than those discussed later in Chapter Three. In any case, we would stress that even among these text-based studies, the level of 'empiricalness' varies to an incredible extent. Excellent examples include works that employ a corpus-based approach in studying metaphor by Stefanowitsch (2004, 2005)⁵⁵, which stand out from other works due to their superior research quality and whose empirical status is indisputable, despite it being text-based. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with the majority of other text-based studies, as we will see shortly. Another important remark that we must include here relates to a long-standing matter of serious concern amongst the cognitive sciences community, which has been directed specifically at cognitive linguists' heavy reliance on intuitive and introspective methods in conducting linguistic analyses. Specifically, from the viewpoint of the scientifically-inclined multidisciplinary fields of cognitive sciences, this analysis method continues to be seen and fiercely criticized as being too subjective and is thus incapable of producing desired empirical results. There exists a lengthy debate among cognitive linguists⁵⁶ on this, including strong voices that defend the legitimacy of some systematic methods of

⁵⁵ For more details on corpus-based approaches to metaphor, see also, e.g., Stefanowitsch, 2006a, 2006b, 2010.

⁵⁶ A good example of this is an online cognitive linguistics forum at UCSD (see Bibliography).

introspection as fulfilling the empirical requirements within cognitive linguistics. This debate, however, goes beyond the scope of our thesis. But perhaps it would be wise to conclude that systematic measures to control biasness in introspective methods *could* considerably increase objectivity when correctly implemented, and that introspection should not automatically or indiscriminately invalidate the empirical worth of a study that employs it in its analysis (at least not as far as cognitive linguistics is concerned)⁵⁷.

2.3.1. Text-based studies on emotion metaphors

The following series of studies, although broadly grouped together as ‘text-based’, may be further divided into two streams, i.e. based on their analysis practice. The first are those that adopt the general ‘Lakoffian tradition’. These are considerably more ‘free’ in respect to their data acquisition and analysis methods, and display a stronger reliance on introspection and whose results are therefore susceptible to greater subjectivity, too. The second are studies that utilize corpus-based⁵⁸ techniques and analysis methods that are far more systematic, as is the general practice in corpus linguistics, and they thus yield results that are also more consistent and reliable than do the former. Many studies, however, appear to have been a mix of the two streams. Additionally, even though the following three subsections will reflect a thematic (and language-based) classification of the surveyed works, the distinction between the two said streams of analysis methods therein will be, nevertheless, clear. In terms of the thematic choices of the selected studies under review, we are principally interested in investigations that involve Malay metaphors and/or metonymies, i.e. with a special focus on emotion and emotion-related themes. Due to a serious scarcity of academic works on emotion metaphor in the Malay language at present, we will also include a selection of papers on Indonesian emotion metaphor. Last but not least, we will also survey some studies that feature contrastive analyses on emotion-related metaphors across different languages and cultures.

2.3.1.1. Studies on Malay metaphors in general

Abdullah and Shuttleworth’s (2013) study on metaphor translation of an engineering textbook reported that only 37% of English metaphors were carried over into the Malay

⁵⁷ As stated by Lakoff in an email correspondence, “There is no empirical research in cognitive linguistics without introspection. The idea that there is an empirical research / introspection contrast makes no sense at all in our field” (date of email: 5th July 2004; see Bibliography).

⁵⁸ Note that although too many studies from the first stream have claimed to be ‘corpus-based’, we do not take this statement at face value; rather, we make our assessment strictly based on the *actual* methods employed, not on their claims.

translation, though in some cases with an increased degree of metaphoricity. This could be due to new and 'foreign' technological terms being introduced in the translation, thus triggering 'novel' metaphors in Malay. Back-translations into English showed that the remaining 63% of original metaphors could have been rephrased *non*-metaphorically, indicating English's stronger preference for metaphor use in academic texts over Malay. However, considering the single-authored textbook as the data source, this conclusion is limited hereto. Another metaphor translation study but in a reversed direction, i.e. from Malay *pantun* (quatrains) into English, reported that while all original Malay metaphors were ensured translation in English, all the (native English) translators added even *more* metaphors into their English translations (Shunmugam, 2007). To conclude, despite the reversed translation direction and an entirely different text genre from the previous study, this observation further suggests that English could be more inclined to metaphor usage than Malay. Whether this is a stylistic matter or a linguistic bias of the English language cannot be ascertained here, but this is interesting to observe, nonetheless.

A textual analysis on metaphors in a canonical Malay literary work *Hikayat Abdullah* (Abdullah & Hill, 1969) revealed that anthropomorphic metaphors ubiquitous in this work (originally published in 1849) are in fact still deeply rooted in present-day Malay (Subagiharti et al., 2015). Of these, metaphors in the form of verb phrase (out of five construction types) have shown to have the highest frequency. We are, however, more than a little concerned with this study's free and unbridled method of analysis, which even at its best is inconsistent. Another study on the historical roots of Malay metaphors (Suffian, 2004) showed that AGRICULTURE (along with a network of terms related to it) continues to be a strong and widespread source domain in Malay, even though many generations have passed since the Malays have had any active physical contact with traditional agricultural activities. On a different note, we have observed from this study that even *highly* concrete concepts commonly occupy the target domain, which suggests a re-evaluation of CMT's claims on conceptual domains. Finally, despite its transparent metaphor identification method, this study failed to mention its data sources. The form of cited examples suggested that they were *not* intuitively generated, rather they seemed more like quotes from sophisticated prose writings, but none was thereby referenced.

In an investigation on metaphors by Malaysian social-political bloggers of different ethnic backgrounds, i.e. Chinese and Malay, Ho-Abdullah and Hashim (2009) reported that the three biggest source domains for political issues are WAR, SEXUAL VIOLATION

and MEDICINE. While extremely conscientious in listing the biographies of the bloggers, including the statistics of the blogs, the authors provided hardly any information at all on statistical results of the metaphors claimed to be ‘dominant’ in the data. Methods of extracting metaphors from the texts were also not clarified, except by the mere mention of their adaptation of the ‘Lakoffian framework of analysis’. Chung (2005), in contrast, documented a systematic quantitative study on target concept MARKET with data from online editions of major newspapers in three languages and of three nations (Taiwanese Chinese, Malaysian Malay and American English). The findings demonstrated how the syntactic structures⁵⁹ of metaphor interact with their semantics. And while MARKET IS A PERSON yielded the highest occurrence (20-24% of 337 tokens) in all three languages, there are noticeable differences in the languages’ preferences for syntactic positions, i.e. English for the subject, Malay for the object and Chinese for the combination of subject, modifier and object. This study integrated Conceptual Mapping Model (Ahrens, 2002; Ahrens et al., 2003) with SUMO (Suggested Upper Merged Ontology)⁶⁰ and exhibited how conceptual metaphor analysis can be restricted and even automated, with research methods that are impressively clear and scrupulous as the reports of its findings.

In a descriptive study on metonymic and metaphorical expressions with body parts⁶¹ HAND and LEG in English and Malay, Charteris-Black (2001) paid special attention to the *evaluation* of the conceptual keys⁶² by native speakers of the respective languages. Drawing its data from large corpora of books, magazines and newspapers (totaling over 430 million words), conceptual keys were introspectively determined based on semantic and contextual considerations. This was followed by a questionnaire administered to 23 native speakers of Malay to classify the 25 Malay expressions as *positive*, *negative* or *neutral* in their connotative meanings in specific contexts. A clear method of frequency calculation was used to quantify and measure the resonance for each conceptual key for cross-linguistic comparisons, with results summarized in table form. Findings showed that although both languages do appear to share certain figurative conceptions of HAND, the Malay phrases are typically highly expressive whilst their English counterparts do not necessarily carry expressive meanings, and the differences in evaluation were said to be very evident. To illustrate, HAND FOR CONTROL in Malay has either ‘neutral’ or

⁵⁹ Following Halliday’s grammatical metaphors (1985)

⁶⁰ SUMO is an open-source software first released in 2000 (<http://www.adampease.org/OP/>).

⁶¹ Charteris-Black (2001) correctly noted that in Malay, *tangan* can either mean ‘hand’ or ‘arm’, and similarly, *kaki* can either mean ‘foot’ or ‘leg’, reflecting how the lexical field for the human body in Malay differs from that in English.

⁶² The author uses the term ‘conceptual key’ to refer to both of what in cognitive linguistics are best known as ‘conceptual metaphor’ and ‘conceptual metonymy’ (ibid.).

'negative' connotations, but it is only 'positive' or 'neutral' in English. Charteris-Black (ibid.) suggested that this could be because HAND in the Malay expressions signifies typical *behaviors* (expressed in 'adjectives') while in English it denotes specific *actions* (expressed in 'verbs'). He concluded with an eloquent account on the strong role that sociocultural-religious values play in shaping the Malay conceptions of body parts, as linguistically manifested. Another excellent contrastive study on English and Malay by the same author, but on figurative descriptions of oral body parts MOUTH, TONGUE and LIPS, sourced its data from a corpus of 25 million words in each language (Charteris-Black, 2003). In sum, while results on its cross-linguistic stylistic analysis showed that both languages do appear to carry comparable expressions of the said oral body parts as source domains, e.g. '*forked tongue*' and '*lidah bercabang*' (literally: 'tongue forked'), a deeper inspection revealed a considerable preference for metonymy over metaphor in English and the reverse for Malay, with a combination of both forms⁶³ existing in both languages. The author attributed this to the distinctive cultural stylistics of the peoples, i.e. with English speakers being partial to hyperbole and Malay speakers to euphemism. He also correctly observed that whereas overt evaluations via metonymy are culturally allowed in English, open criticisms or any form of direct negative assessments are more strongly disapproved within the context of the Malay culture (ibid.), the 'directness' of which metaphor can more cleverly mask. This conclusion is supported by findings from a cultural-anthropological investigation by Lim, which reported that the Malays are not directly expressive, and are often even suppressive, of their emotions (2003: 158-159).

Md Rashid et al. (2012) contrasted Malay/Arabic animal metaphors (i.e. with HORSE, GOAT, COW and DONKEY as source domains) from print and electronic sources that generated over 930 animal metaphors in total. The study reported the two languages as sharing similarities on the surface, but with striking differences in cultural evaluations on the animals. A further investigation on CAT metaphors by two of the same authors (Muhammad & Md Rashid, 2014) had a little more to report than the former. Using the same relatively unstructured analysis method based largely on CMT as in their previous study, it presented its results qualitatively. Specifically, their findings did not support Lakoff and Turner's (1989) report that CAT is conceptualized as fickle and independent but supported Deignan's (2005) corpus study that reported that CAT has mostly negative evaluation in English, as it also does in Malay. A comparative study on DOG metaphors

⁶³ This metaphor-metonymy combination is termed as 'metaphorical figurative blends' by the author (ibid.).

and metonymies (Ho-Abdullah, 2011) recorded a stark English/Malay cultural contrast in conceptualizing *canis familiaris*. While in English and Arabic, DOGS are commonly associated with positive qualities such as loyalty, likability, affection, etc., in the Malay data, DOGS are negatively described (i.e. 75% of the time) as weak, greedy, ungrateful, stupid and worthless. In the remaining 25% of time, they receive a ‘neutral’ evaluation, that is, when metaphorically compared to other animals (but *never* positive), regardless of whether they occupy the subject or object position. These findings are corroborated by Lim’s (2010) investigation on animal-based emotional proverbs in Malay.

Mohd Zamari et al. (2016) conducted an exploratory study on metaphoric competence in the usage of color terms in Malay and English, which involved 76 native speakers of Malay among college-level L2 learners of English. Using a questionnaire and ratings of comparable sets of 28 color terms in both languages, this study reported that 44% of the subjects prefer to use figurative expressions in English than the equivalents in their own native tongue. While the other 42% prefer Malay, the rest of the 14% did not report any language preference. In another pilot study, Mohd Amin et al. (2014) looked into the acquisition of Malay figurative speech by L2 learners among Chinese native speakers to examine the connection between learners’ self-consciousness and their employment of social strategies. Participants’ self-reports revealed that female learners tend to avert the cooperative strategy, i.e. contradictory to Morgan’s (1986) that reported otherwise.

With the goal of finding more effective methods of incorporating figurative expressions in L2 learning in order to improve the overall proficiency among L2 learners of target languages, results from such studies may not be particularly instructive for our project. Conversely, however, findings from studies on metaphors in poetic texts, such as ours, may potentially inform ESL educators in designing more creative L2 learning programs aimed at increasing the mastery of metaphor use by L2 learners, which is an important mark of a high proficiency in a target language (Ellis, 1997). After all, “identification of linguistic and conceptual similarities and differences in figurative expressions enable us to anticipate the types of problems that may be encountered by Malay-speaking learners of English in the acquisition of English figurative language,” (Charteris-Black, 2002: 104). Moreover, as also suggested by Deignan et al. (1997), implementing activities that raise cross-linguistic awareness can assist the learning of English metaphors within L2 contexts, and in fact, *poetry* has shown to be a particularly effective tool for increasing students’ metaphoric competence in their target language (Littlemore & Low, 2006).

2.3.1.2. *Studies on emotion metaphors in Malay and Indonesian*

Inspired by Norrick's work on American emotion proverbs (1994), Lim's study sought out to investigate how emotion is encoded and decoded by the Malays, and the role of *HATI* (LIVER) in emotion metaphor and metonymy (2010). It recorded a combined total of 11,225 proverbs sourced from dictionaries and compilations of Malay proverbs, and examined how body part symbolisms link to the integrated aspects of human emotion as suggested by Kövecses, i.e. language, body and culture (1995, 2000). It reported that the Malay data parallel Kövecses' findings (ibid.) on the universal conceptualization of ANGER, i.e. as BODY HEAT, INTERNAL PRESSURE and REDNESS⁶⁴. Lim also included a compelling philosophical account on the unified nature of emotionality-rationality i.e. as reflected by *HATI* (LIVER) in the Malay worldview, as a subpart of the broader Eastern traditions⁶⁵ with shared roots in Buddhism and Hinduism (ibid.). This stands in stark contrast with the modern Western norm of seeing 'emotion' and 'reason' as mutually opposing forces (ibid.: 77). In addition, Lim (ibid.) cited a survey by Hussain (1991) on the entries of Malay proverbs containing direct emotion words based on Norrick's list⁶⁶ (1994) that generated intriguing results. Specifically, out of 4,359 proverbs, there were only 22 entries with *emotion* concepts (i.e. 11 for FEAR, 10 for LOVE, and 1 for PITY), which is only a measly 0.5% of the total data. Lim concluded that this is clear linguistic evidence for the cultural character of the Malay people, who are very *indirect* especially in dealing with emotion and passion, which they view as too private for overt public display and should thus be 'indirectly expressed', and at times even 'suppressed' (2010: 68-69). This may very well explain the long-held Malay tradition and practice of using profoundly rich figurative expressions with multiple layers of camouflaged meanings in conveying their thoughts and feelings, i.e. in ways so subtly veiled that they would be understood only by their own cultural members, but not the language outsiders.

In a series of studies, Rashidin and Jalaluddin (2013, 2014, 2015) applied the Hybrid Theory method of analysis, which combines cognitive linguistic and relevance theoretic approaches to metaphor, pioneered by Tendahl (2008) and modified by Stöver (2010). With six traditional Malay chronicles from the Malay Concordance Project⁶⁷ making up

⁶⁴ Cf. results from Siahaan's study (2013) that revealed otherwise for the Indonesian conceptions of ANGER.

⁶⁵ As similarly manifested in many Asian languages, e.g. Sanskrit, Bengali, Hindi, Thai, Chinese, etc. (Lim, 2010: 77-78).

⁶⁶ FEAR, ANGER, MALICE, JEALOUSY, LOVE, HATE, PRIDE, SORROW, PITY, JOY, HAPPINESS (Norrick, 1994)

⁶⁷ Malay Concordance Project is an online academic source for classical Malay literature (<http://mcp.anu.edu.au/>).

their corpus, these studies examined linguistic manifestations of *MARAH* (ANGER). Using the Triple Processing model⁶⁸ on their data, the authors reported that this technique is equipped to explain and elaborate implicitly conveyed messages of metaphor that reflect emotional symbolization (2013: 88). In another study, the authors employed the same model but narrowed down their focus to the most extreme form of *MARAH* (ANGER), i.e. *AMUK* (AMOK)⁶⁹, that appear in these classical Malay texts (2014). Their results showed that appropriate to its most intense nature of ANGER, AMOK is represented by stronger explosive effects and in greater force, too. Their third paper (2015) contrasted the Malay conceptualization of ANGER to a list of conceptual metaphors of ANGER registered in previous studies in seven other languages (i.e. English, Indonesian, Mandarin Chinese, Arabic, Turkish, Spanish and Akan) to demonstrate the linguistic and cultural variances across these languages. Especially notable here is the authors' overt separation of Malay and Indonesian as two distinct languages, despite their very closely shared root.

Akmaliyah (2013) compared Malay ANGER metaphors to those in English, with the latter drawn primarily from Kövecses' previous works (2000, 2005), to a lesser extent from Low (1996), and a number of unnamed sources, including the author's own (*non-native*) self-generated examples. The study's general findings seemed to support Lim's (2003, 2010), though neither its precise goal nor its analysis method was specified. In fact, even the citation sources for examples in both languages were either missing or incomplete. With its rather slipshod analysis of 15 metaphorical expressions in English and 20 similar ones in Malay, i.e. based on the 7 most common conceptual metaphors of ANGER in English recorded by Kövecses (2000, 2005), this work, even under the most lenient evaluation, is no more than slightly informative. An interesting point that caught our attention (though not pointed out by the author of the study) is that the Malay use of FIRE metaphor in the examples is strikingly similar to those found in Chinese (cf. Yu, 2002; Lim, 2003), but which are not common in English.

Even after an extensive literature search, studies on emotion-related metaphors in Malay appear only by the handful, and this encouraged us to turn toward thematically similar works in its 'sister' language, Indonesian. An original attempt at exploring Indonesian metaphors for romantic love (Endarto, 2014) gave us precisely the valuable insights we were seeking. With a large set of data from three different corpora, this study employed

⁶⁸ The Triple Processing model involves simulation, metarepresentational and inferential processes (Stöver, 2010).

⁶⁹ Jamaluddin and Suhaili (2005) reported that the emotion ANGER among the Malays comes in three different levels or degrees, i.e. low, medium, high (the last and most extreme of which is known as *AMUK* or AMOK).

Stefanowitsch's (2004, 2006b) Metaphorical Pattern Analysis (MPA), i.e. a structured method for identifying and analyzing metaphors in data corpus. As a systematic corpus-based method that generates metaphorical patterns comprising lexical items from both the source and target domains, this method identifies (with consistency) patterns that collocate with target concept LOVE for English and its Indonesian equivalent *CINTA* in Endarto's (ibid.) data. Of 1,500 English and 1,000 Indonesian metaphorical expressions retrieved, 17 conceptual metaphors common to both languages were postulated, with an additional one found only in Indonesian but absent in English, i.e. LOVE IS A RELIGION. Besides the transparent contrastive analysis conducted at the surface level, the author also did a thorough job at further peeling the many layers of metaphors and unearthing something more. Specifically, although most conceptual metaphors of LOVE in English and Indonesian may appear similar at a glance, Endarto's meticulous analysis revealed that the expressions in fact differ in many ways, e.g. in their collocation patterns, their implied meanings and their usage (ibid.). A half-hearted examination would have easily missed these subtle but meaningful nuances, which was not the case with this study.

On a more critical note, having reviewed Endarto's study (ibid.) with such great interest (both due its merits and because this work is perhaps the closest one in language and theme to our own, thus far), three questions arose from our part, namely: (i) after all of the author's effort to conduct scrupulous analyses on a large number of metaphors from a deep pool of data, we are curious as to why no quantitative result was documented at all (not even in simple descriptive statistics), which would have been very valuable and enormously revealing of the specific patterns of love metaphors in Indonesian; (ii) we also cannot help but wonder if the author's exclusive selection of the lexical item *cinta* ('love') for this study had been deliberate (which was not specified in the study), i.e. without including *kasih* and *sayang*, both of which also mean 'love' in English⁷⁰ and what the consequences of this decision might have been (e.g. perhaps other important metaphorical patterns of love in Indonesian might have been overlooked?); and (iii) relating to our previous question, though the author explained that manual identification was performed to isolate metaphorical expressions from non-metaphorical ones (from those collocated with keywords 'love' and '*cinta*'), it was not made clear if the author did also isolate the concept of romantic love from non-romantic ones, especially since examples given in the study seem to be exclusively of the romantic kind.

⁷⁰ All three lexical items in Indonesian, i.e. *cinta*, *kasih*, and *sayang* carry the meaning of 'love', all of which may be used in (but are *not* restricted to) the context of 'romantic love'; cf. Ho-Abdullah & Md Rashid (2007).

Findings documented by Yuditha (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) on Indonesian conceptions of ANGER no doubt contribute to the richness of cross-cultural metaphor research. One particular work by the author that we will highlight here compared the conceptions of ANGER, LOVE and HATE (2013). Being among the more systematic and transparent with their research methods, Yuditha (*ibid.*) also employed Stefanowitsch's MPA (2006b) and a linguistic concordance tool on text corpus sourced from online blogs and literary databases⁷¹. Similar to Endarto's (2014) previously reviewed work, this study also did not report the frequency of metaphor occurrences that were identified and analyzed (which in our opinion, had been a research lost, especially after it having employed the MPA method). Its qualitative analyses, however, contained thoughtful observations and insights. Specifically, Yuditha reported that although ANGER, LOVE and HATE may all share the 'master' metaphor EMOTION IS LIQUID, only ANGER is in fact conceptualized as HOT LIQUID IN A CONTAINER, while LOVE and HATE as FLOWING LIQUID (*ibid.*). The author also described the master metaphorical conceptualizations for the three emotions, as well as metaphors specific to each emotion, many of which are, refreshingly, beyond those already discussed by Kövecses (2000). Yuditha (*ibid.*), however, did not explain how the 'master' metaphors came to be evaluated as such. An ongoing concern that we have for commendable studies (such as several reviewed here) is their tight adherence to previous claims made by CMT key proponents on the 'master-ness' of (what might in the end turn out to be only a handful of) conceptual metaphors, without solid statistical substantiation thereof. In conclusion, short of a large amount of systematically sourced data and consistent analysis results, it would perhaps be best to refrain from drawing globalized conclusions on what are 'master' patterns, and what are not.

Siahaan's study (2008)⁷² made an especially valuable contribution toward cross-cultural research on conceptualization of internal body organs by contrasting the source domain ORGAN in English and Indonesian. Included in the paper was an in-depth philosophical account on historical, cultural and religious aspects (including ancient paganistic liver divination rituals) that motivate the Indonesian conception of LIVER as the seat of life⁷³.

⁷¹ From The Figurative Language Project of Jakarta Field Station, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (<https://jakarta.shh.mpg.de>)

⁷² Published as a part of a compilation of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural research in *Culture, Body and Language* (Sharifian et al., 2008).

⁷³ Siahaan makes a compelling case associating how a similar conceptualization for LIVER as the seat of life, in fact, existed in Antiquity through the world, i.e. among the Babylonians, Assyrians, Etruscans, and later Hebrews, Greeks and Romans, as well (2008: 52-54); cf. Niemeier's works (2003, 2008, 2011) that deal with this topic at a more general level, discussing the three different major cultural models of 'emotionality' and 'rationality' throughout the world.

According to the author (*ibid.*), LIVER remains a major source domain for metonymy and metaphor for both FEELING *and* THINKING in Indonesian, as opposed to English (and many other Indo-European languages), in which the HEART-MIND dichotomy has long taken over and prevailed. Having drawn a total of 3,544 expressions containing the English word 'heart' and 1,954 with Indonesian '*hati*' (from 10 newspapers in each language), Siahaan observed that an astounding 90.6% of 'heart' instances occur in non-metaphorical use, whereas only a tiny fraction of the occurrence of '*hati*' (9.4%) is used non-metaphorically⁷⁴ (*ibid.*: 55). In another study, Siahaan (2013) challenged the fairly established claim in CMT on the universality of conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT and its 'embodied-ness' (Lakoff, 1987*b*; Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987). Siahaan cited, among others, linguistic and anthropological studies that reported that in the Indonesian culture, emotions relate to the society more than they do the individual (Goddard, 1996, 1997; Hollan, 1988, after Siahaan, 2013), and also quantitative-based diachronic studies on ANGER conceptions in Old and Middle English with evidence that ANGER IS HEAT in English is in fact not based on physiological symptoms of the emotion as predicted by embodiment theory (see Gevaert 2001, 2005; Geeraerts & Gevaert, 2008). Siahaan then proceeded with conducting a similar corpus-based examination on pre-modern texts dated between 1300 and 1950, and contrasted them to present-day Indonesian. Results reported that ANGER IS HEAT is *not* significantly found in Indonesian emotion metaphor, be it past or present (*ibid.*). Instead, the study's diachronic corpora of 5,8 million words showed ILL LIVER FOR ANGER to be the most dominant pattern for conceptualization in metonymic and metaphoric descriptions of this emotion in Indonesian.

2.3.1.3. *Studies on emotion metaphors in English and other languages*

Among the best-known works on emotion metaphors in a language other than English⁷⁵ are those by Yu, who has extensively documented the Chinese conceptualization of emotion. The author's (1998)⁷⁶ substantial work on this topic dedicates an entire chapter to contrasting Chinese and English metaphors for ANGER and HAPPINESS. Yu's (*ibid.*) examination revealed that while the same broad metonymic principle governs ANGER IS

⁷⁴ One good explanation for this, in our view, could be that 'heart' and '*hati*' (literally: liver) are only semantically equivalent in the *metaphorical* sense (i.e. referring to 'emotions' or 'feelings'), whereas in the physical and *non-metaphorical* sense, the Malay counterpart for the English 'heart' is '*jantung*' (literally: heart), and not '*hati*' (literally: liver). In short, Siahaan's (2008) non-metaphorical comparison here involves *two* different physical organs: 'heart' and 'liver', and thus, the vast cross-linguistic difference in the above-mentioned occurrences should not be too surprising.

⁷⁵ See also some of Kövecses' (1986, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000) most well-known works on this topic within CMT.

⁷⁶ *The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: A Perspective from Chinese* (1998) is a revised version of Yu's doctoral dissertation (see also Yu, 1995).

HEAT in describing physiological effects of this emotion in both languages, ANGER is more often conceptualized as HOT LIQUID IN A CONTAINER in English, but in Chinese it often takes the form of HEATED GAS⁷⁷. In a different study, Yu's (2002) data showed that Chinese emotion expressions involving *external* body parts are mainly metonymic, while those denoting *internal* organs are more often manifested as metaphor. Another insightful study by Yu (2009b) examined the Chinese HEART⁷⁸ (*XIN*) that reflects the absence of the HEART/HEAD dichotomy in this language (and culture), as the Chinese do not share the largely Western dualistic view of these concepts⁷⁹. Yu claims that the *XIN* conceptualization has its origin in ancient Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine⁸⁰ (ibid). And finally, with respect to the embodied nature of human cognition, Yu is an advocate of and argues for socioculturally-situated embodiment (2009b: 28).

Attempting to examine whether metaphor constitutes or reflects cultural models, Wu argues that the metaphor-culture relationship is one that mutually reinforces as well as constraints each other (2009). This opposes Quinn's (1991) claim that we are readily equipped with a primary literal understanding of a cultural model (after Wu, 2009: 115-116). In addition to not having been very methodical with the metaphor identification and analysis, Wu reported drawing most of the data from daily spoken English and Chinese but neglected to mention the acquisition method. The remaining examples were sourced from dictionaries and others' works (see Wu's [2009] paper for details), but citation sources were absent or incomplete. In fact, only a total of 7 examples in English and 9 similar Chinese metaphors for ANGER were given, which is not an adequate data size, to say the least. Further, the author provided no transliteration at all for the Chinese examples, except for translations that looked much like the English examples and were not very helpful. This is, regrettably, just one of the many examples we have repeatedly encountered that reflect the great quantity of metaphor studies available out there, too many of which, however, suffer from compromised (or even subpar) quality.

Afreh's work on a West African language explored the metonymic and metaphoric structures of *AKOMA* (HEART) as a target domain in Akan (2015). Employing Metaphor

⁷⁷ Malay ANGER metaphors appear to share both the Chinese HEATED GAS and English HOT LIQUID conceptualizations (Lim, 2003: 163).

⁷⁸ That HEART is the 'commander' of *all* mental activities was also touched upon in Yu's work (2002: 361); cf. Yu, 2009a.

⁷⁹ Cf. Lim's exposition on the Malay's view of HEART and MIND, which is similar to the Chinese holistic (emotion-reason) philosophy, but which is governed by a slightly different principle called '*budi*' as a fulcrum that *mediates* HEART and MIND, i.e. both existing together and are harmoniously synthesized (Lim, 2003: 191); cf. also a fascinating 'dualism within dualism' worldview in Afreh's study on the African conception of HEART in Akan (2015:53-54).

⁸⁰ This is similar to the metonymical use of *hati* (liver) in Malay language, originating from traditional Malay medicine [Ahmad, 1988 (after Lim, 2003: 161)]; cf. Japanese use of *hara* (bowel areas) as the container of emotions (Matsuki, 1995).

Identification Procedure (MIP), which is one of the more protocolled methods for identifying metaphors in discourse (Pragglejaz Group, 2007), this study contrasted its findings to those in English from previous works by Niemeier (2003, 2008, 2011). One of its highlights was the contrast between HIGH/UP and LOW/DOWN as POSITIVE and NEGATIVE, respectively, which tend to be taken as 'natural' in many Western cultures, but are regarded in Akan as the opposite, especially in reference to human qualities, for example, PATIENCE (2015: 147). This is similar to Indonesian and Malay cultures that also associate LOW/DOWN with admirable qualities, e.g. HUMILITY (Siahaan, 2008; Lim, 2003). Of our particular interest, initially, was Afreh's (ibid.) data that included song lyrics (which makes up >70% of our own). Unfortunately, due to the data conflation in the said study (which included media discourses, Akan dictionaries, the Bible, and self-generated examples with no specific labeling), no fair comparison would be possible.

Ansah's works (2010, 2011) investigated how the Akan emotion conception differs from English, as reflected by salient sociocultural distinctions between these languages. Critical of the embodied cognition theory, the author paid special attention to the two conceptual metaphors famous in CMT literature, LOVE⁸¹ (RELATIONSHIP) IS A JOURNEY and ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, in Akan. Linguistic data were elicited via focus group discussions among monolingual Akan native speakers (i.e. totaling 120 minutes of discussions that were audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis). The data underwent the Lakoffian introspective method of linguistic analysis, but were controlled for systematicity using Pragglejaz's MIP (2007). Next, Akan metaphors were compared to their English counterparts from secondary sources (e.g. Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987). Findings showed that the universality principle applies only to the general or schematic level of conceptualization, while language-/culture-specific elaborations determine the rest. These results would thus support the *cultural* embodied cognition thesis (see, e.g., Maalej, 2004; Kövecses, 2005, Maalej & Yu, 2011), and in some cases may even count as evidence for cultural factors override (Lutz, 1988, after Ansah, 2010). For instance, while Akan metaphors contain a pattern of HEAT FOR ANGER, the data did not show a strong presence of HOT LIQUID⁸², and while LOVE relationships are seen as JOURNEY in English (i.e. either by land or sea), linguistic manifestations in Akan do not denote any vehicle, but rather journeys that take place 'on foot' (2010: 17-20). Ansah's later study

⁸¹ Ansah clarifies that the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY in Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003) and Kövecses (2010) refers to love *relationship* (i.e. as opposed to love as an *emotion*) that is metaphorized as 'journey' (ibid.: 5). And as our present work will show, our metaphor identification and analysis *do* explicitly distinguish between these two concepts.

⁸² Cf. HOT GAS FOR ANGER in Chinese (Yu, 1998) and in Malay (Lim, 2003).

(2011) focused only on ANGER and extended the author's previous work (2010) with video clips depicting anger to evoke this emotion (alongside fear) as the stimulus for eliciting its linguistic data. This bottom-up approach with strict focus on metaphorical items within the data leans toward the discourse dynamics' methods (as opposed CMT's top-down approach). Ansah (2011) provides compelling arguments with corroborating examples on the two prototype models of ANGER in Akan that differ from English, as reflected in the most conventionalized conceptual metaphor for ANGER in Akan, e.g. ANGER IS GROWING WEED (not ANGER IS AN OPPONENT, as in English). As for ANGER IS REDNESS, the data reported no such expression in Akan, which the author suggested to be *selectively* relevant to light-skinned cultures only (as linguistically manifested in English, Hungarian, Chinese, etc.), which is not the case for darker-skinned Africans.

Mashak et al. (2012) attempted to find out if Persian emotion metaphors conform to those famously touted by Kövecses as 'universal' (2003), particularly the five basic emotions introduced in Kövecses (2000), i.e. HAPPINESS, ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR, LOVE. Mashak and colleagues (ibid.) collected 782 emotive metaphorical expressions from various sources, i.e. literary works, articles and dictionaries in both languages, as well as from works by CMT key figures (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003; Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987; Lakoff, 1987*b*; Kövecses, 1990, 2000, 2003, 2005). The American and British English data in the study by Mashak et al. (ibid.) were jointly analyzed as one. Moreover, while the paper's title claims that the study concerns metaphors in 'literary texts', its data were clearly conflated with those from other genres (both written and spoken), as well as self-generated ones. Its data were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed, and the procedure involved two stages: firstly, metaphorical items were categorized based on their source and target domains; and secondly, metaphors in each emotion category were linguistically compared and divided into 3 'patterns' based on degrees of similarities or differences. Finally, a chi-squared test was applied to the 3 patterns in each of the 5 emotion categories. To sum up, results showed that universal similarity was the dominating pattern for FEAR, partial similarity dominated SADNESS and ANGER, and no significant cross-linguistic differences were observed with regard to universal or partial similarities for HAPPINESS and LOVE. The authors concluded that despite some differences, Persian and English share most of the general conceptual metaphors for all five emotions (i.e. 51% universal similarity, 47% partial similarity, 2% differences), whereby most expressions in one language may be rendered into the other, and vice-versa, with the same meaning and effects (ibid.: 206).

A pilot study by Nguyen (2013) examined whether or not the Vietnamese language shares the same conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS LIQUID as found in English, with a focus on four basic emotions⁸³ (Kövecses, 2000). Like the previously reviewed work by Mashak et al. (2012), Nguyen's (ibid.) also did not distinguish the American English data from the British English ones, all of which were drawn from a variety of sources, online and otherwise. Applying a corpus-based method, emotion words were inputted as keywords to generate collocates that were most frequently used with *liquid* (e.g. *drink*), and metaphorical expressions were drawn therefrom and then categorized (ibid.: 336). Accordingly, *liquid* terms in Vietnamese were entered into the lemma box and emotion terms into the query box to check for concordances, the results of which were then cited as Vietnamese examples (ibid.). While this study reported the advantages of acquiring abundant data from the Google web-search (including having covered multiple sources and generating up-to-date instances), this method was not without flaws. Its drawbacks include unfiltered, duplicated and redundant search results, which resulted in inflation of data, especially due to the (default) built-in English-Vietnamese web translations. As admitted by the author (ibid.), this would in fact reduce the reliability of this type of data source compared to other types of corpora. Having contrasted English/Vietnamese source-to-target mappings, the study confirmed the existence of similar metaphors in both languages. Unfortunately, similar to a number of studies reviewed in this section that also claimed to yield quantitative and qualitative results, this study too could have fared much better if it had summarized the findings in clear tables and/or figures, that is, instead of having them unsystematically dispersed throughout the paper, leaving the reader perplexed and in constant search for important findings throughout the work.

Although we have repeatedly noted that too many studies have adopted the 'Lakoffian approach' as their research methodology and/or religiously taken Kövecses's results on conceptual mappings for emotion metaphors (e.g. in Kövecses, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, etc.) as their research bible, so to speak, the last two previously surveyed works in particular gave us the impression of an overly dogmatic reliance on existing research by CMT's prominent figures without the slightest reservations. There are two points, which (although we hope to have already made clear by now) warrant reiteration, notwithstanding. Firstly, we are genuinely concerned with analysis methods

⁸³ While Mashak et al. (2012) investigated metaphors for FEAR, ANGER, SADNESS, HAPPINESS, and LOVE, Nguyen (2013) examined only four out of these five emotions; that is, FEAR was *not* part of the data, the reason for which was not specified (but both studies claimed to have been modeled after Kövecses, 2000).

that rely solely (or even too heavily) on intuition and/or introspection without any form of structure or guideline to support them. Such a cavalier research conduct is made even worse when findings are taken at face value and conclusions are universally stretched. As expressed by Stefanowitsch, introspection could be useful in illustrating examples that exist in a language or in showing what kinds of metaphor patterns are possible in a language, but *not* ones to draw global conclusions from (2004: 138). Secondly, but no less importantly, we would argue that the practice of citing metaphor mappings from previous works in English as a form of ‘default template’ against which studies in other languages are measured (especially those that are culturally distant or not genealogically related at all) should be reduced to a minimum. This is because, with regard to such studies’ goals to provide legitimate cross-linguistic and cross-cultural insights, an over-dependence on certain established mappings for metaphors in English, for instance, may cause researchers (especially if they are not painstakingly careful in their analysis) to miss potentially valuable metaphors and nuances thereof, which could be unique to a particular language or culture. This would be, in our view, the exact opposite of what these studies have sought out to achieve in the first place. In short, cognitive linguistics research would be faring much better by resisting the temptation (and convenience) of looking at multi-linguistic/-cultural data via Anglo-Saxon-/Anglophone-tinted glasses.

An excellent example of a study that broke free from the practice of investigating a non-Western culture from Western lenses is one by Khajeh et al. (2013), which explored Persian metaphors on SADNESS with FOOD as the source domain. The study reported that the origins of these metaphors could be traced back to the humoral doctrine in combination with the Avicennian (Ibn Sina’s) medicinal tradition, which is also deeply rooted in Persian culinary practices, and manifested linguistically via metaphors. Their data stemmed from printed and online databases, and their research method involved a systematic analysis of SADNESS metaphors, i.e. firstly intuitively and introspectively by the main author (a native speaker of Persian), followed by cross-examinations by other Persian native speakers. Results revealed that despite bearing some resemblances to English metaphors, many metaphorical concepts are indeed unique to Persian. As for the more similar metaphors, the authors (*ibid.*) posited that the underlying motivations for Persian metaphors differ from those postulated by Lakoff (1987*b*) and Kövecses (2000) for English metaphors. Furthermore, although this study did start off with the basic Lakoffian assumptions of experiential realism and universal embodiment, it also

advocated ‘cultural em-mindedness’ or cultural cognition⁸⁴, which the authors argued would better explain the common beliefs entrenched in a particular culture (Khajeh et al, 2013). To illustrate, as opposed to the source domain HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER being widely accepted within CMT as specific to ANGER, their data revealed that in Persian, HEAT conception is also found in other emotions, even SADNESS⁸⁵ and is not specific to ANGER or any single emotion (ibid.: 57-59). They thus postulated EMOTION IS A HOT SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER, and that HEAT represents the INTENSITY of an emotion, be it ANGER or SADNESS. Common SADNESS metaphors found in their data also include SADNESS IS COOKING FOOD (for example, ROASTING, GRILLING, FRYING) and SADNESS IS BURNING FOOD, even if these might sound odd to non-Persian ears. Other illuminating insights from their findings included that SADNESS/DEPRESSION IS DOWN has its roots in the humoral doctrine and Persian culture, that is, that black bile (being of an *earth* element according to Persian traditional medicine) “causes the body to be weighted down” in a melancholic person, in addition to the etymology of the terms ‘melancholia’ and ‘black bile’, whereby *melas* is ‘black’ and *khole* is ‘bile’ (ibid.: 59-60). All in all, this study revealed that the conception of SADNESS as a human emotional temperament is much more complex than the hitherto assumptions by CMT, and urged researches conducting cross-linguistic metaphor studies to look deeper into ‘em-minded’ cultural models, which are claimed to shape much of a society’s cultural belief system that is inevitably also deeply engrained in their language.

Gulz’s study (1992) delved deep into some philosophical questions about metaphorical conceptions of emotions, where it was argued that such conceptions are in many ways “what one *perceives with* – not what one *perceives*” (ibid.: 1, emphasis in original). This critically reminds us what we as metaphor researchers tend to forget at times, especially in our enthusiastic quest to unearth ‘universal’ conceptual metaphors, that even within a culture, *individual* variants are always present, and then at a deeper level yet, *situational* variants also exist within the same individual (ibid.: 11). Despite having the earlier works of Lakoff (1987*b*) and Kövecses (1990) as its research backdrop, this study departed from the standard Lakoffian approach in a few notable ways and insisted that linguistic analyses be combined with psychological experiments. And though conceding human beings’ unavoidable use of metaphorical language when describing and speaking about emotions, emotional reactions and emotional situations, the author questioned the

⁸⁴ Cf. Maalej’s ‘cultural embodiment of the mind’ (2004, 2007), and Yu (2009*b*) on socioculturally-situated embodiment.

⁸⁵ Cf. Shweder’s (1985) prediction that SADNESS IS COLD and FEAR AND ANXIETY ARE COLD are universal.

extent to which metaphorical language *truly* reflects our beliefs and attitudes (ibid.), the conclusive answers to which purely textual analyses unfortunately cannot provide.

Like a much needed breath of fresh air, Stefanowitsch's study (2004) on HAPPINESS metaphors in English and German employed a corpus-based approach, which no doubt counts as one of the most empirical ways of researching conceptual metaphor. Unlike many corpus-driven studies that commonly identify and select specific source domain concepts⁸⁶ from their textual data or corpora (see, e.g., Barlow, 1997; Deignan, 1999), Stefanowitsch's work (ibid.) attempted the reverse, that is, with predetermined abstract concepts, instead. This study demonstrated that despite having inevitably missed a fair number of HAPPINESS metaphors that do not *explicitly* contain the word 'happiness' in them, this method has considerable merits and is able to produce meaningful results, nevertheless. Using a pair of similar but not identical concepts in each language, i.e. HAPPINESS and JOY in English, and their near German equivalents GLÜCK and FREUDE, the author applied an original method of metaphor analysis called Metaphorical Pattern Analysis (MPA), which has since been adopted by others in their studies (see, e.g., Endarto, 2014; Yuditha, 2013). Advantages of this structured method of analysis over the standard Lakoffian approach abound, but the most obvious one is its high empirical value⁸⁷. That is, by virtue of its targeted selection of specified target concepts from data corpus, this method has been shown to produce results that are consistent and reliable, which would more than make up for the metaphors necessarily missed out by a corpus search that excludes all but the preselected target concepts.

Soriano (2003), in contrasting Spanish/English prototypical semantic content of ANGER (including FURY/FURIA and RAGE/RABIA), specified four parameters against which these differences were measured, namely: (i) mapping existence in each language; (ii) degree of conceptual elaboration; (iii) degree of linguistic conventionalization; and (iv) degree of linguistic exploitation, all of which, except for the last one, were adopted from Barcelona (2002). Drawing its data from an inventory of 200 figurative expressions from American English and peninsular Spanish corpora, this study⁸⁸ explicitly focused on cross-linguistic differences, but *not* similarities. The general methodology employed

⁸⁶ This would be perfectly understandable, especially given the computerized nature of keyword search in a corpus study and the implicit nature of conceptual metaphor, whose target concepts do not necessarily appear in linguistic expressions.

⁸⁷ We have already expressed earlier in this section our agreement with Stefanowitsch's statement that the largely intuitive and introspective Lakoffian approach is useful for identifying existing or possible metaphor mappings in a language, but it is not adequate for comparing, contrasting and characterizing domain mappings across different languages (2004: 138).

⁸⁸ This study was part of Soriano's larger project for her doctoral dissertation (2003).

was the one proposed by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), combined with Barcelona's more elaborated procedure for identifying and describing conceptual metaphor (2002). The results indicated that "greater levels of specificity in the system bring along more cross-cultural differences" (Soriano, 2003: 110). In cases where metaphorical projections do not exist in one language, the study reported that speakers of the language are able to understand them, and even to identify their target domains, with little problem (ibid.) This was ascertained via informal questionnaires given to native speakers of respective languages who have no knowledge of the other language. To illustrate, the STEAM effect does not exist in Spanish but are understood by non-English-speaking native speakers of Spanish, presumably by virtue of the shared general mapping of ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. An example in a reversed direction is the Spanish mapping of FRYING FOR ANGER that English lacks. ANGER IS INSANITY, however, revealed varying degrees of conceptualization, that is, it is highly conventionalized in English, to the point of polysemy, but novel and judged as 'more colorful' in Spanish. Lastly, the manifestation of EXPLOSION in describing anger expression is very small in Spanish that it was found to be unintelligible to Spanish speakers (ibid.: 111-115). In short, this study offers us a wealth of insights in regard to ANGER conceptualization in Spanish that, despite sharing some general mappings with English, differs considerably in its degrees of elaboration, conventionalization and productivity. Having the data analyzed and contrasted based on a set of clearly specified parameters, such as the ones in Soriano's study (ibid.), would no doubt considerably increase the caliber of any contrastive work on metaphor.

In a diachronic study of LOVE metaphors comparing Early Modern and present-day English from corpora of about one million words, Tissari (2001) utilized a concordance program to search and assess the frequency of the lexeme 'love' to uncover metaphors most frequently attached to it. Previous works by the same author (1999, 2000) revealed that compared to the four other types of love, i.e. family love, friendship love, religious love, and love for things (i.e. *storgē*, *philia*, *agápē*, and *khreia*, respectively), romantic love⁸⁹ (*éros*) appears as "the most frequent category in comparisons across different text categories" (2001: 217), which was the focus of the investigation. To narrow down its search even further, the study zoomed in on the concepts that according to Langacker are the most basic cognitive entities, i.e. space, time and the sensory domains (1987:

⁸⁹ This is a topic extensively studied and pioneered by Kövecses in his more general exploration of the conceptualization of emotion, especially as linguistically manifested in metaphorical expressions in English (e.g. 1986, 1988, 1990, 2000, etc.).

147-150, after Tissari, 2001: 218)⁹⁰, which cannot be further reduced into smaller concepts. Borrowing Steen's (1999) notion of "metaphor focus" in 'detecting' metaphor as an object in text, Tissari's work (ibid.) demonstrated that LOVE metaphors appear more typically in the *noun* form as OBJECT, SUBSTANCE or ENTITY⁹¹, that is, compared to the verb form that denote dynamic processes. The study also revealed that while the 20th century English tends to use 'more concrete' source domains for LOVE, e.g. NEST, BOAT, CLOSET, etc., the 15th century English seemed to have lacked these and used 'less concrete' substances as source domains, e.g. LIQUID, WATER, FOUNTAINS, and so on. Further, even though the study did make appropriate references to existing findings by Kövecses (1986, 1988, 1990, 1998, 2000, etc.), Tissari (ibid.) did not religiously adhere to them like many studies on emotion metaphor are wont to do. It unearthed instead new patterns of metaphor manifestations, which make for a welcoming change for emotion metaphor research. Most interesting yet is that its results demonstrated that TIME also functions as source domain for the target concept LOVE (ibid.), even though TIME is often viewed as the abstract domain *par excellence* (Evans & Greens, 2006: 298).

Beyond theoretical works on EMOTION metaphors in general and on LOVE metaphors in particular, there exist also metaphor studies in the more applied fields of social sciences that investigate specific uses of metaphors regarding sexual love, sexual relations, and the implications thereof for the society. With a growing concern for the alarming rate of HIV/AIDS spread among youths in many parts of Africa, a group of researchers utilized available data from a huge multinational project called 'Protecting the Next Generation' conducted in 2003 and 2004 across Burkina Faso, Ghana, Uganda and Malawi for their metaphor studies. The acquired data included nationally representative surveys, 400 in-depth interviews, and 55 focus group discussions involving 114 youths of both genders between the ages of 12 and 19. Focusing their study exclusively on youths in Malawi, Undie et al. (2007) combined approaches from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and CMT to understand how SEXUAL LOVE and SEXUAL RELATION are conceptualized by adolescents, i.e. with the goals that future sexual health education and STD prevention efforts will profit from understanding the youths' ways of speaking *and* thinking about sex. Among others, linguistic manifestations from the data reflect a utilitarian attitude

⁹⁰ Langacker reiterates this stance in a different work more than a decade later: "... certain cognitive domains (such as space, time and the sensory domains) are basic by virtue of constituting irreducible realms of conceptual potential," (1999: 171, after Tissari, ibid.).

⁹¹ Lakoff's claim for ENTITY as being a basic-level source category (1987b: 406, after Tissari, 2001: 221) will be assessed in Chapter Three, which is of *utmost* importance to the fundamental design of our study and our OBJECT-based scalar model.

toward sex by the youths, and noticeably absent from their discourse were the elements of emotional connection and intimacy in a sexual relationship. The study concluded that this could be rectified via an improved sexual education, whereby language (especially metaphor) can be a powerful agent of mentality and attitude change (ibid.: 231-232).

Another study on a similar topic, but which was conducted in Nigeria, investigated everyday narratives on sex in intra- and intercultural communications beyond sexual agency, including how SEX metaphors in young people's slangs and sociolect play a role in their identity formation and social inclusion (Mensah & Nkamigbo, 2016). This exploratory qualitative study involved 25 unmarried male and female participants aged between 15 and 35 years old who were divided into 5 focus group discussions, and data were elicited through peer conversations and personal interviews. Results showed that most SEX metaphors reflect the following conceptual patterns: SEX IS SPORT (borrowed from English), SEX IS FOOD, SEX ORGANS ARE OBJECTS, and WOMEN'S BODIES ARE OBJECTS. The study reported that a big portion of the data reflects metonymic-based metaphorical mappings, and that there is clear linguistic evidence for strong sexual hegemony and male dominance (ibid.: 193-194). One of the authors had also previously conducted an investigation using a questionnaire adapted from Beneke (1982), which was administered to 20 Igbo-speaking men in Onitsha metropolis (Nkamigbo, 2015). The data comprising 104 sex metaphors were collated, analyzed and described in terms of conceptual metaphors with four main source domains, i.e. STATUS/OBJECTIFICATION, DOMINANCE, POSSESSION and AGGRESSION. Nkamigbo's findings (ibid.) exhibited a glaring gender-biased and gender-asymmetrical relationship in sex whereby women are always found to be at the disadvantaged end, which is a cause for serious concern for various cultural implications of these stereotypes and related stigmas toward sex. The paper also pointed out an interesting observation by Jurafsky (2014, after Nkamigbo, 2015: 91) that as source concepts, sexual terms (e.g. *sexy*, *seductive*, *orgasmic*, etc.) are typically used to describe lavish gourmet cuisines of the high-end gastronomy, whereas fast foods and cheap foods are often metaphorically described in terms of drugs and other addictive substances (e.g. *drug of choice*, *crack*, *addicting*, etc.). To add our own observation to this point, what we find even more fascinating is that although as the 'more abstract' *target* concept, SEX is commonly described in terms of casual activities like sports and games, inexpensive tools found in a repairman's toolbox, and very often also vulgar-ish expressions. On the contrary, SEX as the 'more concrete' *source* concept is used to describe its target concepts with notable suave and elegance (as reported by

Jurafsky, 2014). These evidently systematic choices for highlighting the ‘costly’ and ‘classy’ aspects of the concept SEX in its role as a *source* domain, but with the same concept receiving a reversed treatment in its position as a *target* domain, do certainly intrigue our curiosity yet further regarding the human conceptualization of SEX and SEXUAL LOVE in particular, and about the human conceptual system in general.

2.3.2. Review syntheses and general summary

Just as there is not one unified theory of metaphor within cognitive linguistics, there is also not just one single method for identifying, analyzing and classifying metaphors, as we have already seen from the studies surveyed in this section. Perhaps being in part the result of pressure (directly and otherwise) for ‘empiricalness’ from the experimentally-inclined neighboring fields within cognitive sciences, and in part due to the natural research evolution profiting from what present-day technology is increasingly and impressively able to do with data acquisition, data processing, etc., more and more advanced methods of metaphor investigation are continuing to take shape, in addition to (and in some cases, in place of) the more ‘primitive’ lexical or textual analysis methods. Such research and technological advancements notwithstanding, the old-fashioned text-based metaphor studies continue to prevail (or even to proliferate) within the cognitive linguistics community. In fact, from the total of 41 studies we have surveyed throughout subsection 2.3.1 (as well as dozens more that we have encountered but not reported here due to various constraints), almost all of them, i.e. 95% of those that we have reviewed, appeared to have adopted the ‘Lakoffian’ textual approach, in one form or another.

Although we are continuously expressing our concern that the relatively free (intuitive and introspective) method of identifying metaphor in textual data would be ill-advised when used on its own, i.e. with *sole* reliance on intuition, we are not against adopting this approach in principle, so long as it is guided, supported and reinforced by at least one protocolled procedure at the methodological execution level. This was the case with some, though not all, of the studies we have just reviewed in the previous section. Some of the more commonly employed structured methods include (but are not limited to) Steen’s (1999, 2011), Ahrens’ Conceptual Mapping Model (2002), Stefanowitsch’s Metaphorical Pattern Analysis (2006a), Pragglejaz’s Metaphor Identification Procedure (2007), and Tendahl’s Hybrid Theory analysis method (2008), which are at times also used in combination with the ‘Lakoffian’ introspective approach. Aside from the fact

that attempting to elaborate on and evaluate each of these methods would stray us too far away from our dissertation goals, we would also abstain from adjudicating which analysis method is the 'best' one, for we cannot be certain that this would be entirely possible. Suffice it to say that each method has its own unique advantages but inevitably also some shortcomings, and that every researcher is responsible for deciding on the method best suited to their own data type and size, research skills and tools at hand, and ultimately, the specific research goals that they wish to achieve. Quite naturally, the mileages of each study will vary, and having a range of different analysis methods would entail that comparing findings across studies will not be entirely unproblematic. Having said that, given the enormous and theoretically infinite potential for metaphor researchability, the advantages of having various methods for researching metaphor (as long as they are methodical) should far outweigh the drawbacks.

Our take on the 'Lakoffian analysis framework' is that we doubt that Lakoff, Johnson and colleagues ever did explicitly intend for their intuitive and introspective way of picking out metaphors in language and postulating conceptual metaphors from linguistic expressions to be adopted as a 'formal method' of metaphor analysis or to be applied as a research methodology, as such. Our impression is that these scholars and theorists were mainly demonstrating how surface metaphorical expressions contain much deeper underlying conceptual metaphors. This could explain why no exact procedure for this 'method' had ever been documented before (and this is also precisely why we are using the coinage 'Lakoffian analysis method' rather loosely throughout). It is indeed up to us as metaphor investigators to select and/or design a structured procedure to apply to our own data, especially if we aim to produce scientifically meaningful results and not just offering so-called armchair philosophical argumentations. In other words, we are of the view that it is not harmful to start off with one's intuition and introspection (as this seems unavoidable in 'manual' identification and analysis of metaphor, anyway), on the condition that this is supported by at least one structured and systematically protocolled method. On this note, we find ourselves asking the question of whether or not 'manual' identification of metaphor from textual data could ever be totally free from intuition and introspection? And this question certainly does bring us back to Lakoff's asseveration on the inseparability of introspection from empirical research in cognitive linguistics⁹². Even if and when technological advancement, e.g. in Artificial Intelligence, is to come

⁹² Again, Lakoff's email correspondence read: "There is no empirical research in cognitive linguistics without introspection. The idea that there is an empirical research / introspection contrast makes no sense at all in our field" (date: 5th July 2004).

close to inventing computers with metaphor ‘comprehension’ akin to ours, could human intuition ever be *replaced* by machines for these purposes?

In terms of research data, many of the reviewed studies contrasted their primary data in a target language with secondary data from existing studies on English metaphors (i.e. mainly from various works by Lakoff and by Kövecses, but also by a few others). The degree of the inter-language data comparability, as we have already seen earlier, varies from one study to another. As for the non-English primary data sources, their methods of data acquisition may be said to fall largely into three categories, some of which can be further sub-categorized. The first type of data is ones that were *self-generated* by the authors, their colleagues and their students, too. The second type is *collected* data, and we divide these into two groups based on the weight that the researchers seemed to have assigned to their data selection: (i) randomly collected data or data from various mixed sources, including those from unattributed sources (whereby the authors did not appear particularly concerned with the quality of data sources, nor were they selective with the uniformity of the acquired data); and (ii) carefully and intentionally sourced data from predetermined text genres, corpora or databanks (excellent examples here are corpus-based studies). The third type is *elicited* data, which can also be further classified based on the varying methods of data elicitation, and the more common ones in metaphor research are: (i) metaphors elicited either in written form, e.g. via essays, self-reports and questionnaires, or elicited in spoken form, e.g. via interviews, dialogues, and focus group discussions; and (ii) metaphors elicited from the participants’ responses to experimentally-designed stimuli (or sometimes the metaphors themselves are designed to be a part of an experiment’s stimuli). This last type of data (i.e. *elicited* data) would typically belong to *beyond-textual* metaphor studies, but warrants a brief mention here.

In principle, we do not object to the practice of utilizing English data from secondary sources, i.e. from existing works of others, especially in cases where this might be a matter of practical necessity. However, whenever one is making a deliberate attempt at an inter-linguistic comparison, for instance in contrasting metaphor patterns within a particular discourse genre (whether scientific, literary or political texts, to name a few) across languages, we strongly argue that acquiring primary data with predetermined uniform parameters for both languages is the more credible option, as this will ensure the most optimal degree of comparability. Studies by Charteris-Black (2003), Chung (2005) and Endarto (2014) are good examples of this, whereas studies by Wu (2009),

Mashak et al. (2012), Nguyen (2013) and Akmalayah (2013) had not observed this. Note that we are *not* talking about comparing one's findings to those of others; rather we are specifically referring to researchers' common mistake of comparing apples and oranges within a single study, while expecting to produce commensurable results. Moreover, in addition to the lack of a thoughtful decision regarding data *selection* (about which many authors had been surprisingly capricious), another point that we have observed from the surveyed studies is that whilst many claimed to offer both qualitative and quantitative results, the latter were often not duly reported. We hereby insist that merely claiming that certain metaphorical mappings are 'dominant' without providing any corroborating statistical information is unacceptable, and we urge for the simplest descriptive statistics to be the bare minimum goal. These proposed measures, as simple and basic as they are, when taken with care and seriousness will *significantly* increase the overall quality and credibility of text-based metaphor studies within CMT in particular, and in cognitive linguistics in general. In a broader context still, these actions can potentially strengthen these studies' power to inform research in other fields, as well.

Although most of the works surveyed here may be said to carry the general theme of emotion (or emotion-related) metaphors, indeed there are many ways for researchers to narrow down the focus of their investigation, or conversely, a topic can also be explored very broadly. In short, the choices of which metaphor is to be the focus of one's study are numerous. Some of the practical entry points for approaching the metaphor subject, as we have just seen, are: (i) via specific *source* domains, e.g. AGRICULTURE, ANIMALS, or BODY PARTS; (ii) via specific *target* domains, e.g. MARKET/ECONOMICS, POLITICS, or ANGER; and (iii) via specific conceptual metaphors, i.e. predetermined source-to-target mappings. For the third option, the selection of conceptual metaphors may be based on already established mapping patterns adopted from the works of others or oneself, but to be examined in a different language, e.g. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, or ANGER IS HOT LIQUID IN A CONTAINER (results of which could either support existing findings or otherwise), or fresh explorations on the pervasiveness of completely novel mappings in languages much less inspected than English, e.g. SADNESS IS FOOD in Persian, ANGER IS GROWING WEED in Akan, and so on. Further alternatives include exploratory investigations on a metaphor theme, which may be as general or as specific as reflected in this (broad-to-narrow) spectrum: general metaphors of the mind → all emotion metaphors → basic emotion metaphors → love metaphors → romantic love metaphors → sexual aspects of romantic love metaphors. In some other cases, metaphors may be examined within a

discourse genre (e.g. literary, academic, political, popular media, etc.), or across genres. It is also not uncommon to be researching metaphor alongside its close relatives, e.g. metonymy, simile, idiom, or proverb, just to name a few. Finally, diachronic metaphor studies, metaphor translation studies, metaphor usage among L2 learners, and metaphor applications in social sciences are further examples of what metaphor studies may look like, although these are merely describing the tip of the iceberg, so to speak.

For the purposes of research contained in this dissertation, some of the surveyed studies have been more informative than others. Overall, findings from a good number of these studies appear to support the idea of universal conceptualizations of emotion (e.g. Wu, 2009; Mashak et al., 2012; Nguyen, 2013, Akmaliah, 2013). At least just as many, however, do not; they point instead to the direction of cultural embodied cognition (e.g. Yu, 1998, 2009b; Siahaan, 2008, 2013; Ansah, 2010, 2011; Khajeh et al., 2013). In fact, two studies on emotion conceptualization in Persian recorded contradicting conclusions (cf. Mashak et al., 2012 and Khajeh et al., 2013). In short, the general body of work on this subject seems to be yielding equivocal results. This may be attributed to sufficiently different data sources, analysis methods, etc., which could make a fair comparison of findings difficult and a drawing of firm conclusions rather challenging. Nevertheless, despite what had appeared to be a mixed verdict (especially when the pieces of puzzles are examined separately), the combined picture does indicate a congruent whole. That is, whenever universal mappings are found (or confirmed) across at least two languages, they are reported to occur at the generic or surface level, whilst further investigations usually do reveal distinct patterns of cultural nuances at a much more profound and complex level (see, e.g., Ansah, 2010; Khajeh et al., 2013; Endarto, 2014). Utilizing specified parameters to measure these differences and variations, for instance the ones proposed by Barcelona's (2002) and adopted by Soriano (2003), is an excellent way to make comparisons transparent and objective. Conversely, not controlling for authors' intuition and introspection in any meaningful way and also using small data sizes (e.g. Wu, 2009; Akmaliah, 2013) would not do much for the individual studies and would simultaneously reflect poorly on our research field as a whole. With regard to metaphor studies in Malay, we have just seen that they are alarmingly scarce indeed, especially considering the total combined number of Malay and Indonesian speakers worldwide⁹³.

⁹³ Estimates tend to vary, but according to a recent report, Malay-Indonesian is ranked the 6th most spoken languages in the world with 281 million speakers worldwide. In the same estimate, Russian and French are 7th and 8th with 275 and 272 million speakers, respectively, worldwide (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_languages_by_total_number_of_speakers).

The situation is particularly dire for research on Malay emotion metaphors, which we hope our present work will in part remedy. In addition to the *quantitative* lack, the call for the bar to be raised for the *quality* of research in this specific area of study is more than justified. This also applies to text-based metaphor research in general, because as we have just now witnessed, these studies do differ greatly not just in terms of breadth and depth of investigation, but most importantly in their research quality. The literature on this subject is exceedingly extensive, of course, but we hope that the selected series of studies survey here has reflected in a fair manner the wide range of spectrum (i.e. quality-wise) of cognitive metaphor studies available out there.

Because emotion metaphor research in Malay is a largely uncharted territory still, we have but limited prior references to inform us of what to expect from this exploration, and certainly not enough to be constructing any hypothesis upon. However, we will briefly mention here a few points that have captured our curiosity from the literature survey. Studies on metaphor translation in opposite directions, i.e. Malay-to-English (Shunmugam, 2007) and English-to-Malay (Abdullah & Shuttleworth, 2013), have both indicated that English has a preference for metaphor over Malay, even though the nature of the studied texts varies greatly; the former is highly poetic, the latter highly scientific. Interestingly, though, when metonymy is added into the equation, i.e. when metaphor-metonymy preferences are contrasted inter-linguistically (Charteris-Black, 2003), Malay displays a predisposition for metaphor (euphemistic), whereas English for metonymy (hyperbolic). These converging results reinforce previous reports on the covert nature of emotion expression in Malay (Lim, 2003, 2010). A final remark concerns the intriguing metaphoric mapping mentioned in Tissari (2001) that did not feel immediately intuitive, i.e. a *highly* abstract concept TIME in the role of a *source* domain for another (arguably, *less*) abstract concept LOVE. This is of great interest to us for several reasons, but at this juncture, we shall leave the reader to ponder this point in relation to the concrete-versus-abstract assumptions in CMT, which will be precisely the focus of our next chapter.

3. Measuring Concreteness: An OBJECT-based Model

3.1. CMT's major contributions to cognitive sciences

CMT has put forth a number of excellent ideas, wherein some of its strengths lie. The irony, however, is that some of its weaknesses lie in fact in the *explanation* of these ideas. Other weaknesses are largely due to its rather overreaching claims and globalized conclusions regarding the conceptual system based primarily (and at times, exclusively) on language. This might have been in part influenced by the basic tenets of cognitive semantics that semantic structure reflects conceptual structure and can in fact be seen as equal to concepts⁹⁴. The three core game-changing ideas on conceptual metaphor that we will present below are fluid and interconnected, and are hence not necessarily clear-cut from one another. The common denominator that binds them together is the intimate and intricate *mind-body* relationship that manifests itself, among others, via conceptual metaphor. And although this chapter begins by discussing the merits and drawbacks of CMT's assumptions on metaphor, its primary objective is to bring into the foreground and discuss at length how Objectification Theory (henceforth Objectification) founded by Szwedek (2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2014a, 2018a) offers viable and convincing solutions for many of CMT's root problems, i.e. at the most basic theoretical level. We argue that Objectification provides precisely the conceptual constraints that CMT lacks (and needs) while at the same time remaining compatible with it, which would make a seamless integration between the two theories very possible. Drawing on Szwedek's theory (our focus in Section 3.3.), we have designed an OBJECT-based scalar model for measuring concreteness that will structure our metaphor identification, hence offering a solution at the methodological level, as well. We will then present converging evidence from empirical research in different fields to corroborate our proposals.

3.1.1. Multimodal and cross-domain considerations

A core assumption of the cognitive approach is that conceptual metaphor consists of two conceptual domains, i.e. the 'source' and the 'target', in which the latter receives its structural mapping from the former. This is a basic notion shared by all cognitive-based

⁹⁴ The former, though not identical to the latter, is said to form a subset of it (Evans & Greens, 2006: 158-159).

theories discussed in Section 2.2.4. In fact, it is also agreed amongst cognitive linguists that source domains tend to be more concrete and more graspable than target domains (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006: 121; Evans & Green, 2006: 298). And accordingly, abstract concepts are said to be ‘incomplete’ without metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 272) and as they are not clearly delineated, they require metaphorical conceptualization (Kövecses, 2010: 23). Let us put aside for a moment CMT’s lack of precise criteria for what it considers to be ‘concrete’ or ‘abstract’ (Section 3.3 will address this at length), and begin with the assumption that metaphor allows the abstract and intangible portion of our experience to be characterized by our concrete, physical one (Taylor, 2003: 134). Key to this premise is the multimodal characteristic of metaphor, which spans different sensory and *non*-sensory domains. Specifically, metaphor is a mechanism that connects (via domain mappings) the different dimensions of the human existence and human experience, i.e. from the (more concrete) physical ones such as bodily action, perception and sensation⁹⁵, to the (more abstract) *non*-physical ones such as cognition and emotion. Put simply, metaphORIZATION allows for the ‘crossing’ between sensual and non-sensual domains (Jelec, 2013: 17). As we have extensively shown in Chapter Two, traditional theories make no such claim for metaphor. Consequently, our cognitive approach entails (and in fact, *necessitates*) that evidence for metaphORIZATION must be sought in other modalities as well, i.e. *beyond* language, including the various branches of psychology, gestural systems, perception studies, and brain sciences. Among others⁹⁶, experiments in developmental psychology have shown that cross-domain sensory inferencing is a skill that develops in the initial developmental stages among infants as young as 29 days old, which indicates a capacity for metaphorical thinking very early in life (Meltzoff & Borton, 1979; Mandler, 1992). This chapter will illustrate how multimodal and cross-domain considerations for metaphor are hugely advantageous to CMT (theoretically and methodologically) in advancing its stature as a viable scientific theory.

3.1.2. Embodied experience and cognition

Inextricably linked to the previous point is another crucial mind-body claim by CMT, i.e. that metaphor originates from *bodily* experience, hence the term ‘embodiment’. This relates directly to another notion fundamental in cognitive semantics, that, “conceptual

⁹⁵ Here, we refer to ‘sensation’ strictly in the *physical* sense of the term.

⁹⁶ Some of the well-known experiments that have reported a correlation between our physical behaviors and abstract concept understanding include Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010; Miles et al. 2010.

structure is grounded in embodied experience” (Evans & Green, 2006: 286). The ideas that metaphor is fundamentally conceptual in nature but also grounded in everyday life and experience (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 272) are now supported by numerous empirical evidence, and are hence regarded to be psychologically⁹⁷ viable (ibid.: 246-249). Moreover, studies including those outside of the linguistic domain that show how our embodied experience influences (or at times even shapes) our understanding of abstract concepts abound (Kövecses, 2003; Forceville, 2005; Ferrari, 2006; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Cienki & Müller, 2008, after Gibbs, 2011; Casasanto, 2010). Within cognitive linguistics, CMT and embodiment go hand-in-hand. In fact, they might even be described as being two sides of the same coin. That is, while CMT argues that most abstract concepts have a metaphorical basis, embodiment theory posits that concrete concepts are grounded in bodily experience. From the standpoint of embodiment⁹⁸, sensory and motor faculties are an indispensable part of our conceptual system. Clearly, this presents a direct opposition to the long-held view in traditional Western philosophy that the mind can be studied independent of the body, as per Cartesian dualism. And since embodied cognition assumes that meaning derives from experience, subscribing to this thesis entails accepting our physical body as the prime instrument that navigates our perceptions and conceptions about the world, more or less. This means that the way in which we experience the world is largely dependent upon the nature of our physical body (i.e. our sensory apparatus as well as our biological morphology) and the nature of the physical environment that we come into contact with in our daily lives (Evans & Green, 2006: 45-46). Note that in the literature, ‘bodily experience’ is often described as being ‘basic’ (Goschler, 2005: 46; Ungerer & Schmid, 2006: 91; Ferreira, 2008: 14; Kövecses, 2010: xii; IJzerman & Koole, 2011: 9-10), and embodied experience is very commonly viewed as ‘literal’ in the sense that it is ‘physical’ (Ritchie, 2003: 125) and ‘directly understood’ (Jelec, 2013: 27; Kövecses, 1986, after Murphy, 1996). We will evaluate these statements in detail in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, alongside our proposals for the operational criteria for an objective concreteness-abstractness distinction.

In terms of research application, embodiment (by virtue of its connecting *perception* to *cognition* to *language*) provides a very fertile ground for scientific studies, especially in

⁹⁷ See Gibbs (2011) for a detailed review on cognitive psychological studies on metaphor in regard to embodied experience and the unconscious understanding of abstract concepts.

⁹⁸ We do recognize the finer inter-field specifications for ‘embodiment’, specifically between research in brain sciences (e.g. neurosciences and cognitive psychology) and cultural-anthropological research (e.g. cognitive anthropology and cognitive-cultural linguistics), but for the purpose of our present discussion, we will broadly treat them as one.

the broad and necessarily multi-/interdisciplinary field of cognitive science. Analyzing metaphors in language and other modalities, as we do in cognitive linguistics, is but *one* way to improve our knowledge and understanding of the conceptual system. Research approached from different directions are both possible and necessary, and they provide further support to the theory, most of them in the form of empirical evidence. Examples include various neurolinguistic experiments on brain mechanisms linking language and action, where subjects exposed to metaphorical expressions such as ‘grasping an idea’ show neuronal activations in the hand region of the motor cortex, as an illustration of mirror neurons at work (see, e.g., Pulvermüller, 2005; Arbib, 2006; Boulenger et al., 2009; Jirak et al., 2010; Moseley et al., 2011). Another important contribution that embodiment has brought into metaphor research, and beyond, is the proposal for image schema (see subsection 3.1.3), which are rudimentary concepts born out of embodied experience and manifested at the cognitive level. These proposals have become highly influential and are increasingly studied in neighboring fields especially in psychology, both cognitive and developmental (Evans & Green, 2006: 177-179, 202).

3.1.3. Image schema

Image schemas⁹⁹ emerge from embodiment. They are, in essence, relatively abstract concepts that arise from our embodied experience. Because image schema is central to the thesis of embodied cognition, one could hardly discuss the one without the other. It was in his influential book, *The Body in the Mind* (1987), that Mark Johnson first introduced this theoretical concept¹⁰⁰. Johnson strongly argued against the Objectivist¹⁰¹ philosophical accounts of meaning and its rejection of any role of the human body in the reasoning and understanding of abstract subject matters. In his fierce defense for embodiment, Johnson named image schemas and metaphorical projections as the two experientially-based imaginative structures that are “essential to most of our abstract understanding and reasoning” (ibid.: xvi). Elaborations thereof include identifying image schemas as perceptual and experiential gestalts originating from our sensorimotor

⁹⁹ Note the varying preferences in the use of the plural term ‘schemas’ and ‘schemata’ in the literature. For consistency, we will use ‘schemas’ throughout, even when citing authors, e.g. Johnson’s (1987) original ‘schemata’ (except, of course, in *direct* citations, whenever applicable).

¹⁰⁰ More precisely, the idea of image schema was jointly developed with Lakoff in his book with the same year of publication, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (Lakoff, 1987b), combining both the perspectives of a linguist and a philosopher (Hampe, 2005: 1).

¹⁰¹ Not to be confused with Objectification; ironically (i.e. despite their names), the Objectivist philosophy and Szwedek’s Objectification Theory (2000a, 20002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2014a) hold strictly opposing views regarding the role of the human body in our understanding of abstract concepts and phenomena.

activity during recurrent interactions with the world, which are largely pre-conceptual and unconscious in nature (Johnson, 1987; Johnson, 1991; Hampe, 2005). To illustrate, one of the earliest examples given was the image schema CONTAINER that is said to arise out of the nature of our contained physical body as well as our daily contact with all kinds of physical containers in our environment. Johnson argues that the ubiquity of this containment concept motivates the uses of *in* and *out* expressions for objects and experiences beyond actual containers (1987), e.g. ‘*in a rush*’ and ‘*out of sleep*’. Most, if not all, of the initial support for the image schema theory was in the form of (speech modality, as opposed to sign) language data. Talmy’s work (2000) on the conceptual system, for instance, particularly his analyses of linguistic expressions on motions and spatial relations¹⁰², further strengthened the cognitive semanticists’ claims about both embodiment and image schema (after Evans & Green, 2006: 176-177). However, it was not until image schema caught the attention of psychologists that it began to be taken seriously beyond cognitive linguistics, and hypotheses made about it finally started to gain empirical backing. In fact, from the viewpoint of developmental psychologists, discussions on image schema up until that point were considered to be “relatively informal” and confined to its functions within semantic theory (Mandler, 1992: 591). Mandler’s main research interests have been on the origins of image schemas and their broader roles in psychological functioning, including in preverbal and prelinguistic concept formation (ibid.). Indeed her subsequent works (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008) have continued to provide important insights from the developmental perspective, e.g. that image schemas¹⁰³ are emergent and not innate, and that they develop very early in childhood conjointly with both our physical and psychological developments (Mandler, 2004, after Evans & Greens, 2006: 46, 178).

As the body of research on image schema continues to expand, in number as well as in terms of its research parameter, it is very clear that theoretical implications of metaphor and metaphor-related notions in cognitive semantics reach well outside of linguistics research. In their review of studies, Gibbs and Colston (1995) bring together empirical evidence from experiments carried out in psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology and developmental psychology that lend further support to the stance that image schemas are psychologically real. Beyond linguistics, psychology and philosophy, Hampe (2005)

¹⁰² See also, e.g., Talmy, 2005; Dodge & Lakoff, 2005.

¹⁰³ Mandler & Pagán Cánovas (2014) propose to differentiate the three levels of cognitive structures known in cognitive linguistics as ‘image schemas’ into what the psychologists view as ‘spatial primitives’, ‘image schemas’ and ‘schematic integrations’. While we acknowledge this, we are bound by spatial constraints to be making such finer distinctions here.

reports that image schema has also been receiving treatments, empirical and otherwise, from the various perspectives of cognitive rhetoric (Turner, 1991, 2005; Oakley, 2005), cognitive anthropology (e.g., Holland & Quinn, 1987; Quinn, 1991; Shore 1996; Sinha & Jensen de López 2000; Kimmel, 2005), computer sciences (Feldman & Narayanan, 2004), gesture studies (Cienki, 2005), verbal synesthesia (Popova, 2005), as well as neurosciences (Deane, 1991, 1995, 2005). With the goals to fill the research gap in the neurophysiology of cognitive semantics, Rohrer (2001) designed and performed a series of experiments using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP) to test a number of predictions about embodiment. Rohrer reported that the results strongly indicate that activation in sensorimotor cortices is necessary in body-part semantic processing (ibid.). Rohrer's subsequent works include developing a neurobiologically plausible theory of how image schemas structure language, backed by empirical data from cognitive neurosciences (Rohrer, 2005; Johnson & Rohrer, 2007).

3.2. Shortcomings of CMT and CMT-based research

The previous section has identified three conceptual constructs that would count among the most influential ideas interlinked with conceptual metaphor, as propagated by key figures of CMT. These ideas have inarguably opened up expansive avenues for broader interdisciplinary investigations in mind and brain research. Unfortunately, despite all of its merits and a large body of evidentiary support gathered in its favor in the last three or so decades, CMT has yet to receive universal *empirical* acceptance, on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Specifically, in its existing version, CMT's compatibility with and applicability to empirical research are, at best, unconvincing. This section will highlight some drawbacks of CMT and CMT-based studies, with a very precise goal of showing that the theory in its current standing has yet to meet the four requirements to qualify as a *scientific* theory. These requirements are: (i) rigorous scientific testability of hypotheses; (ii) predictive power and explanatory value; (iii) clarity and consistency; and very importantly also, (iv) simplicity (i.e. obeying the principle of parsimony). No doubt, most of these points have already been previously pointed out by researchers elsewhere (see summary below). Nevertheless, our goal here is to systematically bring them together before putting forward our Objectification-based proposals for solving these problems, as we will do in ensuing subsections. We shall be working through the problems in an inside-out fashion, i.e. by addressing the theoretical concerns before the methodological ones. Of course, there are many more issues that need to be worked out

than our present avenue would allow us. However, we will restrict our argumentations to the few that are most pertinent to our goals at hand. We reiterate that the arguments we present here are relevant in advancing CMT as a *scientific* theory. That is, if we were to be content with it being a non-scientific theory, then many of these empirical-related concerns might probably not have their place here. But clearly, the voices in our field have been (in fact, for a while now) in unison about striving toward a universal acceptance of CMT as an *empirically* viable theory. In fact, even at the most implicit level, it does not seem right to be making assumptions about the workings of our *mind* (as we do in cognitive linguistics) divorced from empirical consensus from research that investigates the workings of our *brain* (as our colleagues in brain sciences do). And the only way to true claim scientific validity for our findings is by re-evaluating our own research principles and practices, and aligning them to those of our said counterparts.

3.2.1. Theoretical complications

Complaints and criticisms charged at CMT on issues along the empirical line stem from several different directions. From one angle, we have critics from opposing theoretical camps arguing that their competing models are superior to CMT in regard to scientific validity (e.g. McGlone, 1996, 2007; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999). In another corner, there are the on-the-fence skeptics from among non-linguists such as psychologists who are concerned with strong assertions by CMT about our cognition without satisfactory scientific corroboration (e.g. Mandler, 1992; Murphy, 1996, 1997; Mandler & Pagán Cánovas, 2014). And then of course there are those much closer to home from among cautious supporters of CMT including, but not limited to, empirical-minded linguists whose expertise include psycholinguistics, corpus linguistics, and so forth (e.g. Gibbs, 2000, 2007, 2011; Valenzuela & Soriano, 2005; Stefanowitsch, 2010; Cserép, 2014). Regardless of the origins of these criticisms, it would be in CMT's best interest to heed them. As repeatedly pointed out in the literature, a theory cannot be accepted until it receives empirical backing (Gibbs, 2000, 2007; Jelec, 2013; Cserép, 2014). But at the same time, "empirical evidence can only support a model that is *well specified* enough to make *clear predictions*" (Murphy, 1997: 103, emphases added). In other words, it is of insignificant value how much empirical support a theory may claim to receive, if the bases of its assumptions are shaky and its explanations for them muddy. In addition, it has also been argued that while experimental studies showing a link between language, cognition, and bodily experience continue to proliferate, very few of them have been

designed in a manner that would make rejecting CMT hypotheses with negative results a possible outcome (Jelec, 2013: 33-34). This could be attributed, among others, to the manner in which many of these hypotheses are *formulated*, that is, in ways that make testing and rejecting them impossible. An appropriate example of this is the Invariance Principle, which we will elaborate on in subsection 3.2.1.2 below.

3.2.1.1. *Mutual presuppositions about language and thought*

One of the major sources of unreceptiveness to some claims in CMT among metaphor scholars (opponents and proponents alike) lies in CMT's mutual presumptions about language and cognition. That is, that the way in which we talk necessarily tells us about the way we think, and that the way we think must be reflected in the way we talk. In fact, too many scholars have already delved deep into this issue (e.g. Murphy, 1996, 1997; Keysar, 2000; Soriano, 2005; Valenzuela & Soriano, 2005; McGlone, 2007; Casasanto, 2010; Jelec, 2013; Cserép, 2014; Mandler & Pagán Cánovas, 2014), thus we shall keep our contribution thereto brief, but while also underscoring its importance. In short, cognitive scientists have time and again pointed out that CMT research relies too heavily, and at times solely, on linguistic evidence to support monumental claims about the conceptual system. Not only are these claims not empirically testable, but they can also be, at times, misleading. As argued by Casasanto, whereas linguistic data do serve well as a source of hypotheses, they serve less well as a source of evidence (2010: 457-458). Also, they cannot simultaneously be the reason for hypothesizing *and* the post-hoc evidence for the hypothesized existence (Soriano, 2005: 14, after Valenzuela & Soriano, 2005: 5). Moreover, using metaphorical expressions as a *singular* evidence about our conceptual structure is, in fact, "assuming a particular answer to a question" (Murphy, 1997: 103) and "trying to prove a conviction we already have" instead of looking for an answer to explain why we use language as such (Jelec, 2013: 36). The danger that lies therein is precisely the circularity of argumentations. Scholars are in strong agreement that in order for its claims to be more convincing than they currently are, CMT claims must be independently supported by evidence from sources other than linguistic¹⁰⁴ ones, to avoid such circularity (Murphy, 1996: 183-184; Murphy, 1997: 102-103; Valenzuela & Soriano, 2005: 6; Casasanto, 2010: 466; Jelec, 2013: 36-38; Cserép, 2014: 266). And

¹⁰⁴ To be very precise, 'linguistic' in this particular context strictly and narrowly refers to *textual* data specifically from the *speech* modality (i.e. as opposed to other modalities). This also means that we are *not* broadly referring to 'behavioral experiments' as being about the human communication in general, which is a basic function of language.

whilst discovering evidences linking language to thought is very noteworthy, in keeping with the scientific research tradition, one should be careful not to confuse correlation with causality. To recap, we are *not* in any way against linguistic data or any evidence adduced therefrom; rather, we are emphasizing the importance of combining evidence from research in other modalities with our own so as to avoid from prematurely drawing forceful and globalized conclusions on our intriguingly complex conceptual system¹⁰⁵.

Fortunately, of course, CMT's research landscape has significantly improved in the last decade or so, especially in terms of the efforts in gathering (*beyond-textual*) empirical evidence from various sources, such as gesture studies, behavioral experiments, brain-imaging research, and so forth. Excellent examples are some of the earliest behavioral studies on the psychological reality of conceptual metaphor conducted by Boroditsky and colleagues (e.g. Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008). This would certainly be one way of increasing CMT's credibility within the scientific community¹⁰⁶. Put simply (albeit perhaps somewhat crudely), such a research trend would eventually liberate cognitive linguistics from "its tradition as an exercise in *speculative* psychology" (Stefanowitsch, 2010: 374, emphasis added). Once again, we are in no way suggesting that the 'old-fashioned' linguistic analysis no longer has a place in metaphor research. On the contrary, as eloquently stated by Murphy, "My point is *not* that materials should not be linguistic but that the evidence should include more of these different aspects of concepts," (1997: 103, emphasis added).

In fact, it is those patterns in language (e.g. metaphor, metonymy, etc.) discovered in textual data that continue to galvanize behavioral studies, whose results would in turn provide experimental (*beyond-textual*) evidence for supporting, and also rejecting, our postulations regarding conceptual metaphor. For example, Casasanto (2010)¹⁰⁷ offers an extensive report on a series of results from 11 behavioral experiments motivated by the well-known postulated conceptual metaphor TIME IS SPACE that appears to underlie spatiotemporal metaphorical expressions pervasive in our everyday language. Findings

¹⁰⁵ Likewise, other cognitive scientific studies (e.g. brain and mind research) also cannot do without linguistic (particularly textual) evidence, precisely because the field of cognitive science is, by definition, *interrelated*.

¹⁰⁶ Though it cannot be stressed enough that CMT urgently needs to re-articulate some of its hypotheses in a clear and *falsifiable* manner, as repeatedly urged by Murphy (1996, 1997), that is, before it could receive *universal* empirical acceptance from the more scientific neighboring disciplines.

¹⁰⁷ Casasanto finds the term 'conceptual metaphor' ambiguous and uses 'mental metaphor' in place of it, i.e. to distinguish it from 'linguistic metaphor' (2010: 457-458), which Murphy prefers to call 'verbal metaphor' (1996, 1997). We, however, are perfectly clear about these distinctions and stand by the CMT convention, i.e. 'conceptual metaphor' (used interchangeably with 'cognitive metaphor') that stands for the postulated underlying cognitive mechanism, and 'linguistic metaphor' for the metaphorical expression manifested linguistically.

from such experiments would provide corroborating *non*-textual evidence that people do not only talk about time in terms of space but indeed they think that way, as well. Textual data alone could not have awarded us this kind of behavioral discovery, and such experiments may not have taken place without textual data or linguistic analyses. In conclusion, we should neither look at text-based data and analyses as in any way ‘inferior’ to their non-linguistic counterparts, nor that they are the only data we should be looking at. Rather, shifting our outlook toward seeing them all as having equally crucial and mutually beneficial roles in our quest to better understand our conceptual system would help in balancing out our methods of researching metaphor within the cognitive scientific framework. Another way to put it is to view (text-based) metaphor analyses as a necessary ‘*means*’ to our quest, but not an ‘end’ in itself. This could be an effective way of resisting the temptations for making such mutual presuppositions and, in turn, save us from the sin of circularity of argumentations.

3.2.1.2. *Problematic assumptions of Invariance Principle*

Invariance Principle (IP) was originally formulated to answer several basic questions regarding conceptual mapping within CMT, one in particular is the motivation behind the mappings. Unfortunately, explanations offered by IP have shown to beget as many problems as (if not more than) they have been able to solve. Firstly, IP assumes an ‘inherent’ pre-metaphoric structure of target domain. The immediate question that arises here is that if we chose to operate under this assumption, it would become unclear why the target domain is thought to require metaphoric structuring from the source domain, as hypothesized also by CMT (Murphy, 1996: 186-188). Murphy makes a compelling case on how IP cannot preserve its metaphoric representation arguments *and* at the same time also attempts to explain the problem of multiple metaphors, as these accounts are inconsistent with each other (for details, see Murphy, 1996, 1997)¹⁰⁸. Clearly, this does not only weaken invariance-related hypotheses, but these contradictions also violate the clarity and consistency requirements for a viable scientific theory. Secondly, IP posits that metaphors should retain a ‘generic experiential structure’, i.e. the embodied source domain at the generic level¹⁰⁹. Jelec, among others, notes that this would be problematic in many cases and argues that in the example ‘My father is a dinosaur’, it is not clear

¹⁰⁸ In the same paper, Murphy (1996) proposes a strong and a weak version of metaphoric representation; cf. McGlone’s an “even weaker version” of it (2007: 116).

¹⁰⁹ Scholars made this interpretation based on Grady’s primary and compound metaphors (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández, 2011, after Jelec, 2013), although as pointed out by Jelec, what is ‘generic’ was not actually defined (ibid.: 34).

which aspects of DINOSAUR may actually be considered ‘more embodied’ than FATHER (2013: 34). CMT critics have made similar contentions with other parallel examples¹¹⁰. This very point relates to our upcoming argument following Szwedek (2010) on criteria specifications for concreteness-versus-abstractness (see subsection 3.3.1.1). Inevitably, one cannot test something that is vague, ambiguous or unclear. Thirdly, even with its elaborate accounts for metaphoric representation, IP is *still* not able to provide mapping constraints or to predict unacceptable mappings (and unfortunately, neither do the existing metaphor typologies¹¹¹ in CMT). On the contrary, CMT accounts for the occurrences and non-occurrences of conceptual metaphor by “postulating the activation of an implicit mapping making conceptual metaphor *unfalsifiable* in the empirical sense” (Jelec, 2013: 34, emphasis added). In the same breath, IP resorts to explaining such mappings by formulating post-hoc rationalizations of why certain mappings occur, instead of generating falsifiable¹¹² predictions thereof. All of these points do further reinforce CMT’s lack of predictive power and its weak explanatory value (McGlone, 2007: 122), at least in its current version. Finally, as we have briefly mentioned earlier in subsection 2.2.4.1, CMT’s claims concerning IP reflect a very strong assumption about our complex conceptual system (e.g. Invariance Hypothesis) in order to explain yet another strong assumption about our highly complex conceptual system (e.g. the nature of metaphoric mapping). We must be serious in admitting that, interesting as all of this may be, this is a whole lot of philosophical theorizing with unfortunately no practical or conceivable method of testing the assumptions, in *either* direction. This is simply *not* a desirable scientific practice. And since the scientific practice requires that a bad or an untestable hypothesis be eliminated, perchance a firm decision to jettison IP that has long been weighing down CMT would finally award the latter more stability. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we will present alternative proposals that could potentially solve these problems in ways that are clear, consistent and empirically testable.

3.2.1.3. *Lack of criteria for concrete-abstract distinction*

Murphy has expressed his concern that many of the notions of metaphoric concepts by CMT are too vague, not clearly articulated and not well specified enough to either be

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Murphy (1997) and an enlightening paper by Stockwell (1999) on the inflexibility of invariance hypothesis.

¹¹¹ By this we mean Lakoff and Johnson’s classification for ontological, structural and orientational metaphors (1980), and Grady’s notion of primary and compound metaphors (1997a, 1997b, 1998).

¹¹² As pointed out by Jelec (2013: 35), it is only when CMT is able to predict infelicitous mappings that we can conclude that the theory meets the Popperian (Popper, 1959) standard of falsification.

empirically confirmed or rejected (1996, 1997). We, like many others in cognitive linguistics, share the view of this cognitive psychologist. In this dissertation, we will narrow down our focus to addressing the problem of vagueness *specifically* in regard to the concrete-versus-abstract distinction within CMT. We realize that disentangling this issue would not answer *all* questions about metaphoric representations, but we believe that it is a very important step toward further solidifying the theory.

Even to date, there appears to be an almost religious-like acceptance in cognitive linguistics that metaphor helps us understand the ‘more abstract’ concepts of the target domain in terms of the ‘more concrete’ concepts from the source domain. Nevertheless, what is meant by ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ remains as vague, as subjective and as open-to-individual-interpretation today as it has been for the last four decades. With only a few exceptions, most notably by Szwedek (2000*a*, 2002*a*, 2004*a*, 2004*b*, 2007*b*, 2008, 2009*b* 2010, 2011, 2014*a*), we have yet to see substantial effort among other metaphor scholars in giving this issue the serious consideration it deserves. CMT appears to remain comfortable with such loose descriptions of these concepts, while the phrase ‘more or less clearly delineated’ (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 58; Kövecses, 2010: 17) is assumed to be unanimously understood without much explication¹¹³. Other versions of the descriptions include target domains being termed as ‘more vague’ and ‘more incomplete’ than source domains (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 272; Gibbs, 1996*a*: 311). Accordingly, source domains are labeled as ‘more tangible’ and ‘more graspable’ (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006: 127; Evans & Green, 2006: 298). While these further ‘clues’ might be slightly more helpful, they are still not specific enough. What is clear thereof, however, is the uniform usage of ‘more’ and ‘less’ in the literature, which indicates a consensus among metaphor scholars that the abstractness and concreteness of concepts are gradable¹¹⁴ and not either-or binary antonyms like, e.g., *dead* and *alive*.

Of course, one might contend that CMT’s reluctance to be specific about these concepts may be based on the reasoning that “concepts may not be entirely consistent entities that fit together like a jigsaw puzzle,” (Murphy, 1997: 104, in citing Gibbs’ response in their conversational interchange). Gibbs has a point here. However, given the foundational assumption regarding source and target domains within the theory, CMT would remain on shaky grounds unless and until a set of operational criteria for these concepts are

¹¹³ Subsections 2.2.4.1, 2.2.4.2, 3.1.1, and 3.1.2 have already lightly touched on this.

¹¹⁴ Turner (2005) suggests the possibility of a ‘continuum’, but does not elaborate further.

clearly articulated. We also considered Grady's proposal to reject entirely the abstract-concrete notions in light of primary and compound metaphors (1997a), but we maintain that this is not necessary (recall subsection 2.2.4.2). And while we agree with Szwedek that classifying phenomena as 'concrete' or 'abstract' is far from uncomplicated (2002a, 2011), we proffer that it is not impossible. In fact, we believe that ascertaining the criteria for concreteness would make empirical testability of CMT hypotheses possible. Section 3.3 will discuss how we propose to solve this problem, highlighting Szwedek's Objectification-based metaphor typology and the 'ultimate source domain' (2011).

3.2.2. Methodological concerns

Now that our concerns regarding the conceptual complications within CMT have been clarified, we will turn to issues related to its methodological practices. Due to spatial and temporal constraints, we will focus on only the three main ones here, namely: (i) sources and acquisition of linguistic data; (ii) unstructured methods of identifying and analyzing metaphor; and (iii) overgeneralized and globalized interpretations of findings. In Section 2.3 of the previous chapter, we have already provided a critical survey of text-based (emotion and emotion-related) metaphor studies, followed by a synthesized review (recall subsection 2.3.2) of the most common problems shared by many of these studies. Therefore, we will only present the following points in a summarized form, just to tie up all of the problems together for a coherent (larger) picture thereof.

3.2.2.1. Sources and acquisition of linguistic data

With regard to data sources and acquisition, we are concerned with self-generated examples by authors that are being freely touted as 'evidence' for the 'pervasiveness' of some metaphors. While this *may* be true in some cases (which still requires empirical verification, of course), Murphy reminds us of the difference between 'salience' and 'typicality' (1997: 105). Moreover, self-generated examples only show the *generative*¹¹⁵ nature of metaphors, i.e. it shows us what cognition *can* do, rather than proving that these metaphors are necessarily the 'dominant' ones in language. We are thus partial to *naturally*-occurring data (collected or elicited). However, as shown in Section 2.3, a number of the reviewed studies did not seem concerned with the sources and acquisition

¹¹⁵ Recall Schön's (1979) generative metaphor (subsection 2.2.3.1).

methods of their data (e.g. Wu, 2009; Mashak et al., 2012; Nguyen, 2013; Akmaliah, 2013). Specifically, the authors have included as their data randomly collected pieces of texts, many with mixed genres and/or with missing data sources. Also, another research practice that hurts the credibility of metaphor research is the use of *incomparable* secondary data (usually in English, as the basis for contrastive analyses) with primary data (usually in another language). We would recommend that for cross-linguistic and intercultural *contrastive* purposes, both sets of data should be similar, both in terms of quality (e.g. data genre) and quantity (e.g. data length).

3.2.2.2. *Unstructured methods of metaphor analysis*

To recap our exposition from Section 2.3, we view the ‘Lakoffian analysis framework’ as a starting point for generating hypotheses about conceptual metaphors, but not as a ‘formal method’ of metaphor analysis and identification. And while the intuitive and introspective methods play a mandatory role in the non-computerized identification of metaphorical expressions in texts, it should be accompanied by at least one (structured) metaphor identification protocol (e.g. Pragglejaz’s MIP). Without this additional step of analysis, most of these procedures would be far too subjective to make any replication (much less falsification) possible (Valenzuela & Soriano, 2005: 6). In short, the results would count as unreliable in statistical terms. Regrettably, despite the availability of systemized methods of metaphor identification out there, many studies continue to rely exclusively on the unbridled method of identification and analysis, which is at best, inconsistent. This would, ultimately, make the comparing and contrasting of findings across studies extremely difficult and the drawing of firm conclusions inconceivable.

3.2.2.3. *Overgeneralizations in the interpretations of findings*

Our final point concerns the tendency within CMT to overgeneralize the interpretations of findings beyond the actual scope of a study. Such overenthusiastic conclusions are drawn with little regard to one or more of the following limitations that *every* study is sure to have. They are: (i) insufficient body of data or statistically¹¹⁶ inadequate sample size; (ii) overgeneralizations on the nature and behavior of a particular type of metaphor

¹¹⁶ To clarify, while we regard quantification and statistics as imperative tools when making claims regarding ‘dominant’ or ‘major’ or ‘master’ conceptual metaphors, we are *not* in any way suggesting that a *single* metaphor occurrence is ‘less metaphorical’ or ‘less meaningful’ or ‘less potent’ than another metaphor with, say, ninety occurrences. Rather, we intend to promote caution, precision and objectivity in regard to formulating any claims and conclusions about conceptual metaphor.

to all other types, indiscriminately; (iii) limited type of data sources or homogeneity of discourse genre; (iv) limited number of languages studied or linguistic- and/or cultural-homogeneity of data; and (v) modality-specific, e.g. evidence found in spoken language only but not in signed-modality of the hearing-impaired persons¹¹⁷. The only remedy for this is for us to be realistic, vigilant and transparent about our research constraints, most especially when interpreting our findings and drawing our conclusions thereof.

3.3. Integrating Objectification into CMT: A viable solution

It is neither adequate nor appropriate to be merely pointing out CMT's weaknesses without proposing solutions that are constructive to the theory. After all, our goal is to contribute toward further *advancing* CMT as a scientific theory. Naturally, alternative proposals should be empirically testable and falsifiable (which is the only way to improve the predictive power and explanatory value of CMT¹¹⁸), while also remaining consistent and compatible with the existing body of CMT research. In fact, many of the possible answers and potential solutions that we are seeking are already out there, some of them hidden between the strata of the theory's unexcavated assumptions that we have presented throughout this dissertation, thus far. In other words, we need not reinvent the wheel entirely, for the most part. However, many of these complicated theoretical knots must be untangled first, and the jumbled pieces of the puzzles need to be *systematically* brought together and put in the right places where they cohere. This is precisely what this chapter aims to achieve. This section evaluates proposals by Szwedek and argues why Objectification¹¹⁹ (2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014a, 2018a) lends the best and most comprehensive accounts of metaphor and metaphORIZATION, which will equip CMT with exactly the kind of mapping constraints (and along with them, *testable* predictions) that it is still deficient of, and urgently needs.

3.3.1. Objectification Theory's motivations and assumptions

CMT's inability to convincingly account for the problem of mapping gap (i.e. the incomplete mapping of features between source and target domains) has caused a

¹¹⁷ An excellent counterexample to this is Jelee's work (2013), which presents a series of evidence that are *not* modality-specific in support of Objectification, i.e. in the form of speech *and* gestures.

¹¹⁸ Gibbs, although clearly admitting (on more than one occasion) the limited explanatory scope of CMT (2007: 109), did not offer any specific solutions or suggestions to overcoming this problem.

¹¹⁹ In fact, the core idea of objectification was already proposed by Szwedek in his earlier papers prior to its development as Objectification Theory in 2007 (see, e.g., Szwedek, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, and the complete list in the Bibliography).

significant breach in the theory's structural integrity. Although IP was intended to remedy this issue, it has in turn resulted in other theoretical difficulties. As these have already been explained in subsection 3.2.1.2, a reiteration thereof will be unnecessary. However, crucial to what makes Objectification¹²⁰ Theory especially valuable here is the fact that it provides simpler and more plausible explanations regarding the nature and relationship between source and target domains than those attempted by IP (or CMT in general). Two assumptions that are integral to IP's accounts of feature mapping are: (i) the preservation of cognitive topology in the form of image-schematic structure of the source domain (Lakoff, 1990: 54; Turner, 1990: 254); and (ii) the existence of inherent pre-metaphoric structure of abstract concepts (Jeles, 2013: 27).

Challenging IP, Grady (1997a) puts forward alternative ideas by introducing primary metaphors as the foundational sets of conventional metaphors that "link equally basic concepts at the cognitive level" (Evans & Green, 2006: 321). Asserting that primary source and target concepts have equal experiential¹²¹ significance and are both directly experienced, Primary Metaphor Theory rejects the concrete-abstract distinction. We have briefly expressed our objection to this idea in subsection 2.2.4.2 and will further elaborate it here, especially in relation to Szwedek's Objectification-based metaphor typology and the nature of OBJECT (2000c, 2002a, 2004a, 2007b, 2009c, 2010, 2011). We firmly position our arguments now onwards within the Objectification framework, and point out the small ways in which they may diverge slightly from Szwedek's (ibid.), whenever relevant. Also, it is important to note that many arguments about primary metaphor rest directly and indirectly on at least two assumptions that are incompatible (and for the most part, irreconcilable) with Objectification. They are: (i) the primacy of STRUCTURE (Grady et al., 1996) and SPACE (Grady, 1997b) as the most primitive or basic of all source domains, upon which more complex source domains are constructed; and (ii) the arguable status of structural, orientational and ontological metaphors, and the resulting directions (or 'hierarchy') of their relationships with each other.

In principle, we do endorse the idea that correlation-based¹²² metaphors are "*pre-conceptual* in origin" and are hence physically and experientially motivated (Evans &

¹²⁰ Throughout, we refer to Szwedek's theory as 'Objectification' (i.e. short for Objectification Theory), while leaving the general term 'objectification' un-capitalized.

¹²¹ Note that the issue of 'experiential significance' and which concepts or domains are 'directly experienced' is an elusive one and relies heavily on terminological understanding of these notions. We have mentioned ours in subsection 2.2.4.2, and will further expand on it below, i.e. in alignment with Szwedek's Objectification-based criteria for concreteness.

¹²² As opposed to resemblance-based metaphors with one-shot mapping, i.e. A is B, e.g. 'My job is a jail' (Lakoff, 1993: 238; Evans & Green, 2006: 293), which Barnden (2012) terms as *be-form* metaphors (recall subsections 2.2.1.7 and 2.2.4.1).

Green, 2006: 311-312, emphasis added), i.e. as per CMT, embodiment theory, image schema, etc. However, the finer details and the most determining aspects regarding the perceptual bases of metaphor as formulated by Szwedek, i.e. the role of tactile sensory experience (2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2004a, 2004b, 2007b, 2009c, 2014a, 2018a) offer much deeper considerations and more convincing explanations than any other presently available metaphoric accounts. In its eloquent explications for metaphorization, whether by design or as a natural and logical consequence of its assumptions (or possibly both), Objectification's proposals regarding '*inheritance* of entailments' (in contrast to CMT's notion of '*sharing* of entailments' proposed by Lakoff and Johnson [1980: 92], after Szwedek, 2000a: 144) simultaneously offers explanations for the series of previously unresolved problems and unanswered questions in contemporary metaphor research, as raised in prior sections. This section shows how Objectification efficiently addresses those issues via: (i) the hypothesis for inheritance of entailments (or properties); (ii) the origin of target domain according to the Objectification-based metaphor typology; (iii) the identification of OBJECT as the source domain of *all* source domains; and (iv) the often disregarded OBJECT image schema. Each of these points will ultimately convene at one common juncture where the relationship between the concreteness/abstractness of concepts and our physical experience will be effectively disambiguated.

3.3.1.1. *Ontological metaphorization and inheritance of properties*

We submit that a theory's ability to cogently explain and reliably predict metaphorical mappings will correlate with how clearly it is able to first and foremost account for the nature of (and relations between) the different types of metaphors that it postulates exist. This is expressed by or implied in the theory's metaphor typology, including the assumed origin of source and target domains, and whatever original structure that they may (or may not) be assumed to possess. In CMT's earlier days, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) posited that conceptual metaphors are structural, orientational or ontological¹²³. Objectification has much to say in response to this typology, particularly on how some modifications to this categorization will significantly boost CMT's explanatory value and predictive power. But first, let us demonstrate why Grady's (1997a, 1997b, 1998) primary and compound metaphors will have to be rejected as a viable alternative to Lakoff and Johnson's typology (ibid.), in favor of Szwedek's (ibid.).

¹²³ However, in the Afterword of the 2nd edition of their book (published in 2003), Lakoff and Johnson explain that this typology was, in fact, artificial ([1980]/2003: 264).

Recall that Primary Metaphor Theory characterizes primary source concepts by an experiential basis, i.e. bodily perception and sensation, and target concepts by their non-physical nature (recall subsection 2.2.4.2). Although at first glance, this characterization may appear to align with Objectification, a closer inspection reveals that this alignment is only superficial. At a deeper and more meaningful level, these two theories in fact do not share the same understanding of ‘equal basicness’ of source and target concepts, and they also differ in their terminological holds regarding the ‘experiential basis’ of the source domain. Firstly, Primary Metaphor Theory uses its arguments for the ‘equal basicness’ of primary source and target concepts to directly reject and replace CMT’s (admittedly vague) concrete-abstract distinction between the domains. Objectification, on the other hand, not only accepts this concrete-abstract distinction, but it is also (to the best of our knowledge) the very first theory of metaphor that actually takes on the challenging task of clearly defining this distinction. Secondly, the former views primary source and target concepts as ‘equally basic’ in that they are both “directly experienced and perceived” albeit with a degree of subjectivity (Evans & Green, 2006: 304). But while Objectification acknowledges that both the physical and non-physical worlds are of equal importance especially in the functioning of one’s life (Szwedek, 2009a: 178), i.e. in much the same way that CMT regards both kinds of worlds as equally real in our everyday lives (Lakoff & Johnson, [1980]/2003: 59-60, 181), Objectification Theory by definition cannot allow for the equally basic standing of physical and non-physical experiences in Grady’s primary metaphor sense (explained below). Our third point compares the arguments for *experiential* and *perceptual* grounds for source concepts, according to both theories. Specifically, Primary Metaphor Theory asserts that “primary source concepts relate to sensory-perceptual experience” (Evans & Green, 2006: 306), while target concepts “lack the kind of perceptual basis which characterises the source concepts” (Grady, n.d.: 5/14). Although we agree that Grady’s theory (1997a, 1997b, 1998) does in important ways provide “a more principled theory of the experiential basis of conceptual metaphor” (Evans & Greens, 2006: 306) than CMT, we argue that it is still not specific enough for methodological purposes. To cite a previous example, the theory does not clarify if ‘experiential basis’ in INTERRELATED IS INTERWOVEN¹²⁴

¹²⁴ For the sake of argument here, we propose that perhaps the only feasible way for Primary Metaphor Theory to make the argument that the experiential basis of the primary metaphor INTERWOVEN IS INTERRELATED applies to all human beings independent of any actual first-hand experience of weaving would be to add to Grady’s (1997b, 1998) original claims of directly experienced and perceived the mandatory addendum of ‘... or directly perceivable actions of said experiences’ (i.e. to include the big subset of the population *without* first-hand experiences thereof). That being said, Szwedek’s typology still proves to be much more solid and straightforward than Grady’s (1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999), in more ways than one.

would apply to only the subset of population with *first-hand* experience of weaving (Jelec, 2013: 30-31; recall section 2.2.4.2), or to all human beings alike. In contrast thereto, Szwedek's Objectification very specifically identifies the sense of 'touch' as the basis on which all of our physical perceptions, sensations and experiences are judged (2000a, 2002a, 2004a, 2004b, 2007b, 2009c, 2018a). This sharp characterization of the *ultimate* source domain, as we shall see next, makes the operationalization of concrete-abstract criteria not only possible, but also reliable (including as a direct application to linguistic data in metaphor analysis, which will be demonstrated in Chapter Four). And not unlike CMT, Primary Metaphor Theory also has not generated predictions¹²⁵ that can be empirically tested. To conclude this portion of our discussion, we would stress that Objectification's terminological clarity trumps that of Primary Metaphor Theory's. In short, insisting on keeping the latter's metaphor typology and its characterization of primary source and target domains would only be trading one theoretical obscurity (i.e. CMT's vague concrete-abstract distinction) for another (i.e. the unclarified notion of 'experiential basis' in Primary Metaphor Theory).

Returning to Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) classification of conceptual metaphors into structural, orientational and ontological, Szwedek (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002a, 2002b, 2008) points out that the relations among metaphors as expressed by this typology are flawed, on at least two grounds. First of all, this typology is arbitrary and its resultant 'sharing of entailments' indicates a *coincidental* relationship among the three metaphor types. Secondly, it implies that each type holds, at best, an equal and independent status, which disregards the important fact that 'structure' and 'orientation' necessarily depend on 'ontology' (ibid.). In other words, the main objection raised by Szwedek in regard to this typology is the assumed *sequence* of metaphorization implied by this typology and the weight of importance implicitly assigned to each type. Instead, Szwedek proposes a sequential revision to this configuration that results in a hierarchical (OBJECT-based) metaphor typology. He argues that, "ontological metaphors underlie both structural and orientational metaphors" (Szwedek, 2000a: 144) because "cognitively an object has to have some existence before its properties, structure and orientation can be perceived" (Szwedek, 2000b: 193). Two decades after the original publication of their book, Lakoff and Johnson confirmed that their earlier metaphor typology was artificial ([1980]/2003: 264). They clarified that, in fact, *all* metaphors are structural, *all* are ontological, and

¹²⁵ Even Gibbs' clarification, "a primary metaphor exhibits a metaphorical mapping for which there is an independent and direct experiential basis and independent linguistic evidence" (2011: 357), is not specific enough.

many are orientational, i.e. they map structures to structures (structural), create target domain entities (ontological), and map orientational image schemas (orientational), respectively (ibid., emphases mine). Indeed this important reconsideration tells us that Szwedek's (2000*a*, 2000*b*, 2000*c*, 2002*a*, 2002*b*, 2008, 2011) predictions about these metaphors cannot be far from accurate¹²⁶.

Observe that in Lakoff and Johnson's revised exposition on the three metaphor types (in the 2nd edition published in 2003), structural and orientational metaphors are described as having the function to "map" (structures and schemas, respectively), but only ontological metaphors are described as being able to "create" target domain entities (ibid.). This statement by Lakoff and Johnson (ibid.) is nothing less than monumental and is mutually supportive of Szwedek's (ibid.) postulation that ontological metaphor is the *basis* and source for the other two metaphor types. Naturally, logic would tell us that something must *first* be created, before it can start mapping something onto something else (see also Szwedek, 2000*c*: 9-12). Although this might seem much too obvious to require any pointing out, it is a surprise that this idea has not yet caught fire in CMT discussions. And whereas Lakoff and Johnson (ibid.) merely implied it, Szwedek made this observation explicit. As a matter of fact, this idea is the very bedrock of his theory, which makes the (previously indeterminate) nature of and relationships among these metaphors clear, simple and straightforward, at last. Such clarity, as we shall see shortly, will go a long way in ensuring that Objectification is well-equipped to explain and predict metaphorical mappings. Another advantage brought about by Szwedek's modifications to the typology (ibid.) is that according to this hierarchical approach, common entailments can now be viewed as a *natural* consequence of 'property inheritance'¹²⁷ and no longer as an *accidental* occurrence of 'shared entailments', which was a poorly justified argument for "metaphorical coherence"¹²⁸.

A central assumption within Objectification is that OBJECT, OBJECT SCHEMA and OBJECTIFICATION play a fundamental role in metaphorization (Szwedek, 2000*a*: 143). The theory's definition of 'objectification' tightly corresponds to the one given by the

¹²⁶ See Szwedek's in-depth *re-analysis* of conceptual metaphors previously discussed in CMT literature, where he compares structural metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY with ontological metaphor THE MIND IS A MACHINE and shows precisely what makes them structural and ontological, respectively (2004*a*: 173-176). In a different paper, Szwedek (2010: 101-103) re-evaluates LOVE IS A JOURNEY as analyzed by Kövecses (2002/[2010]: 7), and provides a much neater analysis and stronger arguments for it.

¹²⁷ Discussed as inheritance of properties by Beaugrande & Dressler (1981: 91, after Szwedek, 2002*a*: 159).

¹²⁸ For details, consult the chapter on 'Metaphorical Coherence' in Lakoff and Johnson's book ([1980]/2003: 87-96).

Oxford English Dictionary (OED), i.e. “the action of objectifying, or condition of being objectified; an instance of this, an external thing in which an idea, principle, etc. is expressed concretely (...) To make into, or present as, an object” (Simpson & Weiner eds. 1989, after Szwedek, 2002a: 1). It is not only an interesting coincidence that OED refers to ‘objectification’¹²⁹ as (something as *abstract* as) an ‘idea’ or a ‘principle’ being expressed in a *concrete* manner, which is in essence what Szwedek’s predictions for Objectification and ontological metaphorization are fundamentally about. In short, what is considered ‘concrete’ within the Objectification framework (as opposed to CMT) is clear and unambiguous, i.e. that the most concrete of all concepts are none other than OBJECTS. Hence, a reasonable sequitur from this (in answering the important questions on the nature and origin of source domain) is that OBJECT *is* the (ultimate) source of all source domains. Also indispensable to this discussion is the *physicality* of objects, i.e. the density of matter as experienced via the sense of touch (Szwedek, 2011: 357), which we will elaborate on shortly. But what we would like to emphasize at this juncture is that Szwedek distinctly draws the line between the physical and non-physical worlds based on OBJECTS, i.e. the former consists of concrete objects and the latter of abstract entities and relations (2009a: 173). Accordingly, all abstract entities and relations (e.g. events, activities, actions, etc.) must first be conceptualized as objects, i.e. they must first undergo *objectification* (or ontological metaphorization), before they can be given (or in other words, before they can ‘inherit’) properties of objects, including structure and orientation (Szwedek, 2000a: 146; 2008: 315; 2009a: 171; 2011: 354).

Evidently, Szwedek is not alone in positing the primary nature of ontological metaphor, and seeing structural and orientational metaphors as dependent and derivative of it¹³⁰ (2004b: 128; 2011: 360; 2014a: 346). He cites a similar line of thought in Langacker’s contrast between THINGS and RELATIONS (1987, after Szwedek 2000c; 2002b; 2002b; 2004b), which is foundational to cognitive grammar. That is, Langacker distinguishes predicates based on the nature of the entity designated, in which according to him, “a *nominal predication* designates a *thing*, while a *relational predication* designates either an *atemporal relation* [adjectives and adverbs] or a *process* [verbs]” (1987: 189, after Szwedek, 2002b: 62, emphasizes Szwedek’s). In tandem with Szwedek’s ontological

¹²⁹ Cf. Reddy’s (1979) use of ‘objectification’ in the same sense as Szwedek’s, while Langacker (1993) refers to the same idea as ‘reification’; Szwedek’s interpretation of the term ‘reification’, however, is specific to inanimate objects only, based on the Great Chain of Being (2002a: 1; 2011: 361).

¹³⁰ In his works on Objectification, Szwedek constantly reminds us that orientation is an aspect of structure, while structure and orientation are both aspects of object (2002b: 61-62; 2008: 308, 315; 2009b: 332; 2011: 347).

metaphorization and the resulting theory of Objectification, Langacker asserts that as an archetype for nouns, "an object is *conceptually autonomous*" while relations (verbs, processes, events, etc.) are "*conceptually dependent*" (Langacker, 2008: 104, emphases in original). We thus fully agree with Szwedek that Objectification could be seen as harmoniously bringing together Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive metaphor theory and Langacker's description of THINGS and RELATIONS in cognitive grammar (Szwedek, 2000a: 144). Another important observation that we share with Szwedek (2002a: 2) is that even in Lakoff and Johnson's ([1980]/2003: 25-32) earliest discussion on metaphor, they have come interestingly close to actually claiming the primary nature of ontology in metaphorization. That is, they describe ontological metaphor as the conceptualizing of EVENTS, ACTIVITIES, ACTIONS, IDEAS, EMOTIONS, etc. in terms of "physical objects and substances" and other entities ([1980]/2003: 25). In their own words, "[e]vents and actions are conceptualized metaphorically as objects, activities as substances, states as containers" (ibid.: 30). Unfortunately, as pointed out by Szwedek, this pivotal idea was not further developed or taken to its "natural and logical conclusions"¹³¹ (2000a: 145), which, had it been the case, could have perhaps led them to Objectification.

3.3.1.2. *Objectification-based metaphor typology*

The new typology of metaphor proposed by Szwedek is based on a strict ontological distinction between material and phenomenological worlds (2007b, 2008, 2009a, 2010, 2011, 2014a). The determining feature that demarcates these two worlds is OBJECT, characterized by Szwedek on the basis of the primary properties of *matter*, i.e. density, boundedness and 3-dimensionality (2000a: 148-149; 2011: 357-360). These properties and the experience of matter via the sense of touch will be explored in subsection 3.3.2, in relation to our evaluation of the concreteness/abstractness of concepts. Our focus in this subsection is a new metaphor typology that is different from Lakoff and Johnson's (1980), and born out of ontological metaphorization. According to Szwedek, accepting the idea of objectification would mean that one also accepts the automatic dissolution of the current version of Lakoff and Johnson's typology (ibid.) in order to make way for the new hierarchical configuration (2009b: 332). That is, "structural and orientational derive naturally from *objectification*" (ibid., emphasis in original) because structure and orientation are *aspects* of objects (i.e. ontology). Therefore, the inheritance of properties

¹³¹ That is, by Objectification's operational definition, SUBSTANCE and CONTAINER both fully qualify as OBJECT.

(of objects) from ontological metaphors to structural and orientational metaphors is only a natural consequence of this new typology, thereby making ‘shared entailments’ (as per CMT) irrelevant (Szwedek, 2007*b*: 314).

In Objectification, OBJECT is argued to be the very basis of both our conceptualization and metaphorization, in line with phylogenetic and ontogenetic developments of human beings (ibid.; 2011: 343)¹³². Due to the primacy and immediate¹³³ accessibility of the physical world and the lack thereof of all other worlds (intellectual, emotional, spiritual, social, etc.), the latter could well have been modeled after the former, as invariably manifested by the origins of our lexicons (ibid.). According to Szwedek, this “creation of concepts of non-physical elements *in the image and after the likeness* of the physical objects” (ibid.: 319, emphasis in original) reflects a much more plausible assumption about the evolution of the human mind and language, as compared to other existing accounts on metaphor and metaphorization. That is, by metaphorically conceptualizing and describing the non-physical worlds after the ‘likeness’ of the material world, a significant reduction in our vocabulary has been possible (Szwedek, 2000*a*: 151).

In contrast, an alternative option of each world having an independent set of vocabulary would make communication highly improbable, if not entirely impossible (ibid.). In other words, whereas the first model conceives of the mind as a powerful and efficient processing machine, the second sees it as a storage space requiring an infinite expansion (Szwedek, 2011: 343-344). Having postulated these probable evolutionary reasons and advantages for metaphorization, Objectification’s physical/non-physical¹³⁴ distinction allows for four¹³⁵ possible types of metaphorization based on the directions of source-to-target domain mappings or projections (Szwedek, 2010, 2011, 2014). These four are: (I) concrete-to-concrete; (II) concrete-to-abstract; (III) abstract-to-abstract; and (IV) abstract-to-concrete. Essentially all of Szwedek’s works related to Objectification in the past two decades have discussed and re-analyzed in depth Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980)

¹³² See Szwedek’s paper (2009*c*) for a detailed treatment of this interesting topic.

¹³³ Within the Objectification framework, ‘immediate’ and ‘direct’ strictly refer to “knowing through *senses*” (Szwedek, 2008: 316, emphasis added).

¹³⁴ We have by now established that in Objectification, ‘physical/non-physical’ distinction is used interchangeably with ‘material/phenomenological’ distinction and ‘concrete/abstract’ distinction.

¹³⁵ In his 2011 paper, Szwedek claims that although there are, in theory, four types of metaphorization based on domain mapping directions, only the first three types exist, in practice (p.344). In his 2014*a* paper, Szwedek leaves the fourth type undiscussed, at least temporarily, because how such expressions could be analyzed and interpreted is yet unclear (p.347). Quite naturally, we had been curious to find out if our data would contain any Type IV (abstract-to-concrete) metaphorization at all (see Chapters Five and Six). Also, a small note on the slight difference in the notation convention when indicating metaphor types as published in Szwedek’s papers, i.e. ‘Types I, II, III, IV’ as used in 2011, and ‘Types A, B, C, D’ in 2014*a*. Throughout this dissertation, we will follow the earlier/former convention.

ontological, structural and orientational metaphors, i.e. particularly *where* exactly they would stand within the Objectification framework and its new typology¹³⁶.

Type I concrete-to-concrete metaphorization is also referred to as ‘feature-to-feature’ or ‘metonymy-based’ metaphors, as the relation between the source and target domains are essentially metonymic. An example would be ‘Captain Thelwal is a perfect iceberg’, where *Captain Thelwal* is metonymically used for his personality, while *iceberg* is a metonymy for icy coldness (Szwedek, 2014a: 350). This metaphorization type typically zooms into a particular feature or aspect of the source domain to be mapped onto the target, the process of which is possibly grounded in the aspectual cognitive processes¹³⁷. Szwedek regards the phenomenon in the theory of amodal perception (Michotte et al., 1964) as the likely basis for whole-for-part metonymy and metonymy-based metaphor (2011: 345). Also crucial to Objectification is the supposition that concrete-to-concrete metaphorization was the earliest step in the phylogenetic development of mankind’s ability for abstract thinking, and is the simplest kind (Szwedek, 2010: 100; 2011: 346). In his analysis of examples for Type I metaphors, Szwedek adopts the five levels from the extended version of the Great Chain of Being (GCOB), i.e. supernatural beings¹³⁸, humans, animals, plants and inorganic things, from Lakoff and Turner (1989), which are said to correspond to five *specific* types of feature-to-feature metaphorization (in varying mapping directions), namely, supernaturalization, humanization, animalization, vegetalization and reification. Within this metonymy-based typology, Szwedek further identifies two forms of target domain conceptualization, i.e. integral wholes and whole-for-part types, as well as two typological divisions of source domains: (i) formulated as

¹³⁶ Szwedek’s 2010 paper introduces the new typology, which was then developed in his 2011 paper and further developed in his latest publication on this subject (2014a). As we can only afford an abridged version here, the reader is recommended to consult these papers for an enlightening discussion and in-depth analyses of each type of metaphorization.

¹³⁷ These cognitive processes are termed as ‘aspectual perception’ by Wittgenstein (1953b) and ‘aspectual shape’ by Searle (1990), after Szwedek (2011: 344-345), with various claims that metonymy is more fundamental than metaphor (Barcelona, 2003; Taylor, 2003; Kwiatkowska, 2007; after Szwedek, 2011: 347; Radden, 2003, after Evans & Green, 2006: 320).

¹³⁸ Szwedek presents a highly stimulating and thought-provoking discussion about the nature of divinity (2014a: 348-350), which, due to enormous variations in different religious and cultural conceptualizations of God (and other associated concepts) does not allow for a clear-cut or unified answer to the question of whether these supernatural beings (could) have a material/object status or not (putting aside, for this purpose, all debates on the ‘fictional/non-fictional’ existence of these entities according to science). The best and perhaps most controversial example would be that of Jesus Christ, who within Christianity is God in the abstract sense (also abstract when thought of as Holy Spirit) but who is also believed to have taken a human form, i.e. physical/material manifestation, on earth. In Islam, on the other hand, while Jesus Christ is most highly revered as one of the noblest prophets and the penultimate messenger of God and therefore had a physical/material form like all other humans do, he never did have any share in God’s Divinity, because the absolute singularity of God (both in existence *and* in manifestation) is essential to the Islamic faith. And unlike angels (e.g. Archangel Gabriel) who was also believed to have assumed a human form while sent down to earth to communicate God’s message to Prophet Muhammad, all Muslims (as would the Jews) would reject placing God among all other beings with *any* material form, as these strictly monotheistic (in the non-triune manifestation sense) religions would argue that any image-like conceptualization of God is absolutely impossible and is beyond the conceptualization capacity of humans. Therefore, in relation to our ontological inquiry at hand, ‘God’ according to the Jewish and Islamic faiths is considered unequivocally *abstract* in the *highest* sense and does not share the same status with all ‘other’ supernatural beings in the Great Chain of Beings.

X IS A NOUN¹³⁹, e.g. ‘*She is a bitch*’ and ‘*He is an old fox*’; and (ii) formulated as X VERB, e.g. ‘*She is blossoming*’ and ‘*He is withering*’ (2014a: 352-353).

Type II concrete-to-abstract metaphorization (i.e. from physical to non-physical) was the next step in the development of abstract thinking, and the biggest leap in the human conceptual evolution, phylogenetically speaking (Szwedek, 2009c, 2010, 2011, 2014a). This metaphorization type is reflected in metaphors like THOUGHT IS AN OBJECT, which requires the *creation* of abstract entities (recall Lakoff and Johnson’s statement about ontological metaphors “creating” domain entities [1980]/2003: 264). For example, note that THOUGHT, IDEA, LOVE, FEAR, etc. are just a few of the countless concepts from the non-physical areas of our lives whose identification, conceptualization and verbalization are modeled after physical objects (Szwedek, 2011: 345). In short, we objectify them, give them the object status, and speak about them as if they *were* truly objects with physical properties (hence the term ‘Objectification’). We would very naturally say *to give a thought, a heavy thought, to collect scattered thoughts*, etc. (ibid.)¹⁴⁰. Rather than creating an entirely new set of vocabulary for every non-physical domain, our ancestors seemed to have simply ‘recycled’ the existing vocabulary that is already available and readily accessible to us from our physical world (Szwedek, 2010: 100). Unsurprisingly, Reddy’s (1979) extensive examples on conduit metaphors (recall subsection 2.2.3.2) contain converging linguistic evidence for this crucial stage of metaphorization as per Szwedek’s typology. In fact, this phylogenetic development of abstract thinking seen in concrete-to-abstract metaphorization mirrors that of the writing systems, i.e. from (the more concrete) pictographs to (the more abstract) ideographs (Szwedek, 2011: 345).

Type III metaphorization is the abstract-to-abstract mapping, which is evidence of a highly advanced ability of abstract thinking (Szwedek, 2011, 2014a). This final step in phylogenetic evolution presupposes that Types I and II metaphorization have already successfully taken place within our cognitive faculty. As our mental (i.e. intellectual, emotional, spiritual, etc.) worlds become increasingly rich and as inseparable to us as do our physical worlds, we may mistakenly see (consciously or otherwise) some abstract entities as ‘concrete’. This confusion is reflected in the inconsistent views about the concrete/abstract status of source and target domains of this metaphor type (e.g. LIFE IS

¹³⁹ According to Szwedek, the X IS N consists of two subtypes (2014a: 352-353), but as we are bound by various constraints, we will not go further into this discussion here, but the reader is urged to refer to the paper for a compelling, structured and detailed exposition of metonymy and metonymy-based metaphor.

¹⁴⁰ See Szwedek, 2011: 350-355; 2014a: 354-358 for his extensive analysis of THOUGHT, FEAR, and RACE.

A JOURNEY and ARGUMENT IS WAR), which is in fact the most frequently discussed type in the cognitive metaphor literature. Szwedek's typology not only makes clear that *both* source and target domains of Type III metaphors are indeed abstract (2011: 345), but it also demystifies further questions concerning the 'concreteness' of these abstract concepts (see Szwedek, 2014a: 359-370). That is, LIFE, JOURNEY, ARGUMENT, WAR are *all* abstract concepts, each of which must first undergo 'objectification' before they can 'inherit' relevant OBJECT properties. Also, contrary to CMT's Invariance Hypothesis, Objectification's Inheritance Hypothesis clarifies that abstract concepts do *not* have pre-metaphoric structures of their own. Whatever structures and orientations they may have are those *inherited during objectification*. Szwedek positions the traditionally known as structural and orientational metaphors under this category, and states that what makes some abstract concepts 'more concrete' than others is precisely the number of physical components they possess (2011: 342, 345).

3.3.1.3. *OBJECT as the ultimate source domain*

As we have established, a very important difference between *Invariance Hypothesis* and *Inheritance Hypothesis* in explaining the nature of and relations between source and target domains is that the former begins with formulating strong assumptions about the *target* domain, although the connection between source domain and bodily experience remains vague and unclarified (recall subsection 3.2.1.2). Objectification, on the hand, takes an opposite approach. It starts by first studying and clarifying the *source* domain and then building all other assumptions (including those about the target domain) upon it. No doubt, CMT and Primary Metaphor Theory have attempted to account for the nature of experiential bases, also as reflected in their respective metaphor typologies. However, these attempts have shown to be less than successful. As admitted by Grady et al. themselves, "discussions of experiential bases have been sketchy: there is no clear or consistent understanding of what counts as experiential basis, nor of what the typology of experiential bases might be," (1996: 179, after Szwedek, 2014a: 354). A widely accepted view in cognitive linguistics is that the source domain is more concrete than the target domain. Thus, Objectification's primary treatment of the concrete *before* the abstract must be the more judicious one (as opposed to the reverse), as only the concrete can give us an objective, physical and *directly accessible* frame of reference to base our assumptions on (which the abstract cannot, save speculatively).

Another key strength of Objectification is its unambiguous concrete-abstract distinction based on the experience of matter via the tactile sense. The Objectification-based hierarchical metaphor typology and its identification of OBJECT as the source of *all* source domains provide a solid foundation for explaining (and subsequently predicting, testing, falsifying) metaphorical mappings between domains much more reliably than we previously could. By recognizing OBJECT as the ultimate source domain, we accept that OBJECT is “subject to no further metaphorization” and that “all other domains depend on the object” (Szwedek, 2011: 341). Szwedek’s analysis of three very common abstract concepts, i.e. THOUGHT, FEAR, RACE (as representing three distinct abstract domains, i.e. cognitive, emotional, eventive) shows that each metaphor has, ultimately, OBJECT as its source domain (2011: 350-355; 2014a: 354-358). And although some of these source domain concepts might not have been ‘immediately’ identified as OBJECT, a deeper examination reveals that each is, in fact, an OBJECT. Some examples¹⁴¹ of the source domain concepts shared by THOUGHT, FEAR, RACE (X signifies a target concept) are: X IS AN OBJECT, X IS A CONTAINER, X IS A MOVING OBJECT, X IS AN ANIMATE BEING, X IS A HUMAN BEING, and X IS A SUBSTANCE (ibid.). As is evident here, each of the source concepts is indisputably a form of OBJECT, i.e. having the property of matter (density, boundedness, 3-dimensionality), and each of which we can experience via the sense of touch. The realization that all of these source concepts are ultimately traced back to OBJECT, from which all properties (including structures and orientations) of target concepts are inherited, effectively answers the crucial questions in CMT about the natures, origins and structures of both of these domains.

Unfortunately, despite its ‘obviousness’, the idea that OBJECT is the best and the most viable candidate for the ultimate source domain has yet to receive the recognition it deserves within CMT, and has in fact been grossly overlooked in the research literature. Perhaps Szwedek is right in observing that OBJECT can often easily escape our attention because it is “*of so general a nature that we are not even aware of its existence*” (2000a: 147, emphasis added). He cites Wittgenstein’s statement that hits the same point: “The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity... We fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful,” (Wittgenstein, 1953b: 30, after Szwedek, 2000a: 147-148). Other scholars, for example, have previously identified two other concepts, i.e. STRUCTURE and SPACE,

¹⁴¹ For a detailed analysis of these metaphors and further examples, see Szwedek, 2011: 350-355 and 2014a: 354-358.

as the prime candidates for the ultimate source domain, at the very least implicitly, but oftentimes also explicitly (Rumelhart, 1993; Grady et al., 1996; Taub, 1996; Vervaeke & Kennedy, 2004; Radden, 2005; after Szwedek, 2011: 348-350). We would argue that these conclusions are incorrect, because they are based on inaccurate assumptions. A truly fair treatment of this subject would require an entire paper exclusively dedicated to it, which we unfortunately cannot afford at this point¹⁴².

Moreover, as controversial as it may be to be posing such a challenge to a theory as established as CMT, we must hereby record that a deeper inspection into the conceptual metaphors in the Master Metaphor List (MML) by Lakoff et al. (1989/1991) has shown a lack of coherence in how the conceptual metaphors are formulated. That is, without the precise identification of OBJECT as the (ultimate) source domain, the listing of the source domains has turned out, for the lack of a better term, 'messy'. To illustrate, we submit that the postulation of conceptual metaphors (i.e. X IS Y) as BELIEFS ARE STRUCTURES, STATES ARE SHAPES, CHANGE IS MOTION, CAUSES ARE (PHYSICAL) FORCES, etc. are, at best, incomplete¹⁴³. Firstly, Szwedek has repeatedly asserted that structure is *dependent* on object and hence, "[i]t is always 'the structure of an object', never *'the object of a structure.' We cannot have a structure without an object that has the structure" (2011: 350). The same must then apply to SHAPES, MOTION, FORCES (as *properties* of object) as listed in the MML (Lakoff et al. 1989/1991), that is, it would have to be 'the shape/motion/force of an object', *not* otherwise. Secondly, it appears that CMT often confuses a 'conceptual metaphor' with the '*interpretations* of a conceptual metaphor' (or sometimes also the *inferences* drawn from it). We cite a few counterexamples from Szwedek (2014a: 352-353) to elucidate how this problem is nonexistent within Objectification by virtue of having (the physicality of) OBJECT as the only viable ultimate source domain. From the metaphorical expressions '*Don't bark at me*', '*I have to fly*', and '*He is withering*' (whereby X stands for the target entity), the identified conceptual metaphors are as follows, respectively: X IS A DOG, X IS A BIRD, and X IS A FLOWER (ibid.). Everything else, however, would be identified as possible interpretations of or inferences from the conceptual metaphors, for example, YELLING IS BARKING, MOVING FAST IS FLYING, and WEAKENING GRADUALLY IS WITHERING,

¹⁴² Szwedek's works delve deep into this topic, e.g. 2009b (on the conceptualization of SPACE and TIME), 2011, and 2014a.

¹⁴³ Also listed in MML (Lakoff et al., [1989]/1991) in what we argue to be 'incomplete' conceptual metaphors are: STATES ARE SHAPES (p.10), BELIEFS ARE STRUCTURES (p.98,104,117,126), CHANGE IS MOTION (p.2,4,5,15), ACTION IS MOTION (p.26, 27,33,141), EMOTION IS MOTION (p.145), FORM IS MOTION (p.167,180), CAUSES ARE (PHYSICAL) FORCES (p.10, 23, 39,170-172), LOGIC IS A FORCE (p.125-126), INFLUENCE IS A FORCE (p.131), EMOTIONS ARE FORCES (p.141,156,160), OBLIGATIONS ARE FORCES (p.207).

respectively (*ibid.*), but *not* as conceptual metaphors themselves (as is often argued within CMT). Such clarity may only be achieved by a theory with a solid foundation on the nature of and relations between the conceptual domains, like Objectification. The absence of such a systematic regulation and typology, on the contrary, exposes a theory (and the researcher and analyst) to great inconsistency and irregularity in postulating conceptual metaphors from metaphorical expressions in any given linguistic data.

Another candidate identified as the most important source domain is SPACE (Radden, 2005: 117, after Szwedek 2009*b*, 2011, 2014*a*). This common mistake or confusion is quite understandable, considering that ‘space’ can be a widely ambiguous term. Without getting too deep into the semantics (or the mathematics) of it, let us simplify and agree that SPACE can be conceptualized as follows: (A) a boundless region beyond the earth’s atmosphere or solar system in the universe; (B) a series of 0-, 1-, or 2-dimensional boundless space (i.e. *point*, *line/distance*, or *square/area*, respectively); or (C) a 3-dimensional bounded space (*cube/volume*). Relevant to our discussion here are SPACE in (B) and (C), denoted here as SPACE_B and SPACE_C. We argue that SPACE_B is essentially A PLACE or A LOCATION¹⁴⁴ and these concepts are often used interchangeably in the cognitive metaphor literature. To illustrate, in a personal communication between Grady and Taub, Grady argues that ACTIONS ARE LOCATIONS [= SPACE] is a highly productive conceptual metaphor (Taub, 1996: 460, after Szwedek, 2011: 348). Tying back our argumentation to Objectification’s hierarchical typology where structure and orientation necessarily depend on ontology, and with support from Langacker’s (1987) distinction between THINGS and RELATIONS, we maintain that LOCATION is a *relation* between objects in space (Szwedek, 2011: 348; see also similar claims by Miller & Johnson-Laird [1976] and Levinson [2003], after Szwedek, 2011). Therefore, SPACE_B *cannot* be the ultimate source domain. As for SPACE_C, the fact that it is by definition 3-dimensional and bounded (and must therefore have density) automatically makes the case on its own for us. And it is not merely an interesting coincidence that these are *precisely* the basic attributes of OBJECT as defined by Objectification. Finally, being 3-dimensional and having volume, it becomes inarguable that SPACE_C can be (that is, depending on its size) A ROOM, A STORAGE, A CONTAINER, A BOX, A CUBE, etc. In other words, SPACE_C IS AN OBJECT. An excellent example of such a conceptual mapping is THE MIND IS SPACE, i.e.

¹⁴⁴ We cite as a reference point for relations between objects: “Consider a discrete set of points (such as a finite collection of points) to be 0-dimensional. By dragging a 0-dimensional object in some direction, one obtains a 1-dimensional object. By dragging a 1-dimensional object in a *new direction*, one obtains a 2-dimensional object. In general one obtains an $(n+1)$ -dimensional object by dragging an n -dimensional object in a *new direction*” (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimension>).

in the sense of THE MIND IS SPACE_C, which is ultimately THE MIND IS AN OBJECT¹⁴⁵. So, once again, OBJECT *is* indeed the ultimate source domain.

3.3.1.4. OBJECT image schema

Despite being inarguably the most discrete, most clearly delineated and most highly perceivable entity, OBJECT remains largely eclipsed by (and falsely thought of as being merely ‘a part of’) other image schemas, e.g. CONTAINER, PATH, and FORCE schemas. This gross neglect of OBJECT image schema (OIS) in image schema discussions within CMT (e.g. by Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987*b*; Grady, 1997*a*, 2005*a*; Hampe, 2005) has been criticized and called into question by Santibáñez (2002) and Szwedek (2000*a*, 2002*a*, 2011, 2014*b*, 2018*a*). It is worth noting, however, that Deane (1992) and Cienki (1997) have generally hinted toward OIS as being a general construct comprising other image schemas (Santibáñez, 2002: 185). Santibáñez goes a step further by suggesting that OIS may be “a basic image-schema” that activates other image-schematic patterns dependent upon it (*ibid.*: 183), much like a “blueprint” (*ibid.*: 186). Szwedek asserts even more forcefully that OIS is “not only a schema in its own right, with structure and orientation” but also an inherent component of other image schemas (2018*a*: 63). He points out that OBJECT schema¹⁴⁶ fulfills both Johnson’s (1987) structural conditions and Grady’s (2005*a*) perceptual experience criterion (Szwedek, 2018*a*: 57)¹⁴⁷.

In an introduction to a substantial compilation of work on image schema, Hampe extrapolated a set of definitional criteria of image schema from the earliest books by Lakoff (1987*b*) and Johnson (1987) on this subject (2005: 1-2). Topping the list is the description that image schemas are ‘directly meaningful’ (experiential or embodied)¹⁴⁸ and ‘pre-conceptual’ (*ibid.*), which Szwedek stresses as leading us back once again to the primacy of OBJECT and its tactility (2018*a*: 58-60). He also emphasizes that “touch is the most unique, primeval sense”¹⁴⁹ but is too often overlooked due to much research

¹⁴⁵ Another very good example is the misconstrual about TIME as being ‘always’ conceptualized as SPACE, which is actually not true (Szwedek [2009*b*] discusses this at great length, so we will not go into it any further here). We do predict, however, that this widespread *false* conceptual metaphorization about SPACE could have also contributed to the strong (and perhaps overzealous) arguments for SPACE as the most fundamental and productive source domain.

¹⁴⁶ Rashidin & Jalaluddin (2014) in their examination of *AMUK* (AMOK/RAGE) in traditional Malay text corpora mention the OBJECT image schema of FIRE in the metaphor AMOK/RAGE IS FIRE, based on Santibáñez’s (2002) characterization of it. Elsewhere, they discuss ANGER IS A RED OBJECT, also in light of OBJECT image schema (Rashidin & Jalaluddin, 2013).

¹⁴⁷ In his paper on OIS, Szwedek provides his modified versions of image schemas (with respective diagrams) comprising 7 *static* and 11 *dynamic* OBJECT schemas, with OBJECT as the most basic schema upon which others are built (2018*a*: 63-80).

¹⁴⁸ Rohrer’s paper (2007*a*) presents a fine-grained distinction between the terms ‘embodiment’ and ‘experientialism’ at various levels of investigation in cognitive science.

¹⁴⁹ We cite appropriate scientific support for this claim in subsection 3.4.2, but the reader is invited to consult Szwedek’s papers that have dealt with this topic more profoundly (2000*a*, 2002*a*, 2009*b*, 2011) and also Rohrer’s (2005).

on it being mainly restricted to the postnatal period (*ibid.*). Considering that image schemas are thought of as providing “one of the ‘embodied’ anchors of the entire conceptual system” (Hampe: 2005: 2), we must take seriously Szwedek’s point on the primacy of our tactile experience over other sense modalities. And because touch begins to develop prenatally alongside the nervous system, it is a strong indication that this sense could be experientially more fundamental than vision (2018a: 80). Another likely reason why we may be easily obscured by touch’s primacy when thinking about image schema is that the term ‘image’¹⁵⁰ itself denotes ‘vision’. In fact, the term ‘image’ in ‘image schema’ has an equivalent use in psychology to ‘imagistic experience’, which is also known as ‘sensory experience’ (Evans & Green, 2016: 179). Clearly, ‘sensory’ is a much more *neutral* term than ‘imagistic’ and does not imply any bias for vision (or any other senses) or lead us to wrongly assume the primacy of vision over other senses.

3.4. Measuring concreteness and identifying metaphors

We have clarified, at the beginning of this dissertation, that one of our two *arch* goals for this doctoral project is to search for and put together a clearly defined solution for the problem of vagueness of concreteness/abstractness within CMT. We are committed to the idea that solving this problem is *key* to strengthening CMT’s theoretical stance and increasing its methodological credibility. This chapter is a direct expression of our commitment, and has been aptly framed within the two primary commitments¹⁵¹ of cognitive linguistics, i.e. Generalization Commitment and Cognitive Commitment, as outlined by Lakoff (1990: 40). Specifically, the former is to “undertake linguistics as a scientific endeavor” and the latter is to align our accounts of language “with what is generally known about the mind and the brain” from various disciplines (*ibid.*). In the same line of thought, Gibbs stresses that cognitive linguists’ commitment toward the field lies in seeking correspondences between cognition, language and the body (1996b: 49, after Valenzuela & Soriano, 2005). This chapter in particular is to be viewed as the bedrock for the design of our project, as it results in a model that directly informs the methods applied onto our own data (see Chapters Four and Five). And as cumbersome as the task of teasing out the (often inconspicuous) criteria for concreteness of concepts

¹⁵⁰ Interestingly, similar observations have been made by non-linguists on a visuocentric tendency in sensory and perception research, where vision is often wrongly taken to be ‘representative’ of other sensory modalities, i.e. via terminological deployment of vision-based terms onto other senses, e.g. *image*, *appearance*, *scene*, *perspective*, *observe*, etc. (O’Callaghan, 2008b: 316).

¹⁵¹ Lakoff reminds us that in the event that these two commitments do not mesh, “cognitive commitment takes priority” (*ibid.*: 41).

can be, it is not a step to be skipped in a reliable metaphor study¹⁵². Moreover, as urged by Stefanowitsch, if we are truly serious in our efforts toward an *empirical* cognitive semantics, then we ought to turn away from assumptions that are “forever beyond operationalization and measurement” (2010: 373). To that end, this final segment of Chapter Three proposes to *operationalize* the concrete-abstract distinction by putting forward the big (and no doubt, controversial) questions: can ‘concreteness’ be reliably measured, and if yes, how?

3.4.1. Can ‘concreteness’ be reliably measured, and if yes, how?

Our answer to this is, yes, a reliable measurement for concreteness is possible, although not entirely without difficulties. Among other key CMT proponents, Gibbs explains that the reason for the unidirectionality of source-to-target mappings is that, “target domains tend to be more vague and incomplete than are source domains,” (1996a: 311). But as pointed out by Jelec, this statement is problematic in more ways than one, especially because “it is difficult to find objective criteria for measuring the level of ‘vagueness’ and ‘incompleteness’ of a domain,” (2013: 29, see also Szwedek, 2011). Therefore, we propose that the solution to this is to be doing the exact *reverse*, i.e. by measuring what is ‘clear’ and ‘complete’ in a domain instead. Fortunately, this has been made possible, for the most part, by Objectification and its resulting metaphor typology.

As for the question of ‘how’ concreteness can be reliably measured, we maintain our position that *concrete-or-abstract* is not a binary or contradictory pair of antonyms, such as *dead-or-alive* (recall subsection 3.2.1.3). Rather, the distinction is a matter of degree, which is congruent with the general consensus in the field, explicit or otherwise. This section will explore in depth the prospect of ‘where’ exactly a given concept would fall on the different points of the said continuum. And this is precisely how we propose that it could be measured, i.e. via our (*beta* version of the) ‘concreteness/abstractness scale’. Our predictions have been largely motivated by Szwedek’s Objectification ideas (2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2014a) and pursued in line with hypotheses within the theory. We then go a step further by exploring how the concrete-abstract distinction may be extended to accommodate concepts that fall into the more difficult ‘gray areas’ between the prototypically concrete and abstract on the spectrum.

¹⁵² Jelec mentions that Turner (2005) has considered that perhaps the concrete-abstract distinction is entirely unnecessary (2013: 29), but we contend that it is necessary indeed, especially for practical (i.e. methodological) purposes.

While many metaphor studies in linguistics have extensively documented EMOTION as a target domain described in terms of concepts from the more concrete source domain (recall Section 2.3), research in the field of aesthetics and art criticism has reported that MUSIC is often described in terms of EMOTION (see, e.g., Zangwill 2007). This suggests that even the abstractness of a highly abstract concept such as EMOTION may still be relative to other concepts to which it stands in relation. In a number of his papers, Szwedek explains precisely why WAR is ‘more concrete’ than ARGUMENT, even though both of them are *abstract* concepts and neither is actually ‘concrete’ (2002*b*: 63) based on Objectification’s criteria for concreteness. The same assessment applies to JOURNEY and LIFE (2004*a*: 173-175), or JOURNEY and LOVE (RELATIONSHIP) (2010: 101-103). And even though ARGUMENT IS WAR, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, and LOVE (RELATIONSHIP) IS A JOURNEY have been (inaccurately) described as concrete-to-abstract metaphors by CMT, Objectification contends that they are of the abstract-to-abstract type (Type III). This is because both domains here are technically ‘abstract’, albeit in varying degrees, i.e. the source is ‘less abstract’ (and accordingly, ‘more concrete’) than the target. That is, we can in fact reliably assess the degree of concreteness/abstractness of such abstract concepts by examining the number of ‘physical components’ contained in each concept (Szwedek, 2011: 342, 345). Szwedek unambiguously states that ‘physical components’ refer only to entities that we can *touch* (2010: 108) and that, “[n]either journey nor love are concrete entities, because one cannot touch journey or love. What one can touch are only physical components of journey (i.e. travellers, road) and love (i.e. lovers)” (ibid.)

As firmly established, we closely follow Szwedek’s characterization of concrete entities as having the physicality of objects, which is ascertained based on the density of matter (2000*a*: 149; 2011: 357). Density gives an object (matter) its fundamental properties, i.e. 3-dimensionality and boundedness, whereas its derivative properties would include its weight, size, form/shape, light reflection, etc. (Szwedek, 2000*a*: 148). He argues that object/matter and its fundamental properties may only be experienced in the strictest sense via ‘touch’ (ibid.). In fact, even vision falls short of a genuine 3-dimensional experience, that is, our visual experience is, at best, only 2,5-dimensional (Szwedek, 2000*a*: 149; 2000*b*: 197, 2002*a*: 5, citing Jackendoff, 1983)¹⁵³. In a good number of his papers including his most recent ones, Szwedek (2007*b*, 2009*b*, 2010, 2011, 2014*a*, 2014*b*, 2018*a*) contrasts his characterization of the prototypical OBJECT to those of other

¹⁵³ Marr’s (1982) Computational Theory of Vision also discusses 2,5-dimensionality (see also Kitcher, 1988; O’Callaghan, 2008*b*).

scholars, including Kotarbiński (1929/1990)¹⁵⁴, Krzeszowski (1991), Schneider (1997), and Santibáñez (2002). While some of the characteristics of OBJECT as outlined by these scholars do overlap (and some do not), Szwedek summarizes that the only inarguable feature of OBJECT is its “boundedness in space” (2018a: 61). Based on the object/matter criterion, we accept Szwedek’s classification of OBJECT (ibid.) that includes all forms of entities with *material substance*, i.e. animate beings, natural things as well as manmade things (as opposed to views that only consider manmade things as objects).

Szwedek’s characterization of OBJECT as the ultimate measurement for concreteness is very convincing and will no doubt significantly improve the ‘empirical researchability’ of conceptual metaphor. At last, we are now no longer bound to CMT’s weak, vague and unoperationalizable notions of concreteness/abstractness. But our challenges do not end here. Whilst Objectification’s clear criterion for touch as the experiential basis for concreteness is highly effective in identifying prototypically concrete concepts with a *solid* form (e.g. A BOY, A DOG, A FLOWER, ROCKS, PAPERS and SCISSORS), measuring the ‘in-between’ and less straightforward cases of concepts will prove to be a bit more challenging. Szwedek himself recognizes that this “characterization is not easy” due to “the variety of objects in the world, from dust particle to a mountain, and from an ant to an elephant” (2018a: 57). So, whilst identifying AN ELEPHANT and AN ANT as concrete entities would be very clear-cut, most non-researchers might probably hesitate, even if for a second, to confidently state that DUST PARTICLE¹⁵⁵ is *just* as concrete as the former two concepts. And because our textual data comprise a wide range of vocabulary and concepts (and many will inevitably fall within the gray areas between the prototypically concrete and abstract ones), a corresponding measuring scale needs to be developed.

To achieve this goal, we propose that Szwedek’s strict criterion for OBJECT based on the tactile sense is placed at the highest end of the concreteness/abstractness scale, under the ‘*strictly concrete*’ category of concepts. We explore the possibility of engineering a scale that includes (at least) three other grades of concepts along further points on the continuum with decreasing degrees of concreteness (or increased abstractness), namely: ‘*loosely concrete*’, ‘*low abstract*’ and ‘*highly abstract*’, respectively. Consistent with both Objectification and CMT, we return to embodiment and utilize the remaining four

¹⁵⁴ Even though Kotarbiński makes no mention of the prototypicality of OBJECT, his concise statement that, “[w]hatever is, is a thing” (1929/1990) is best interpreted as whatever exists physically is a thing (i.e. object), which entails that abstract concepts, which have no physicality, do not (physically) exist and thus are not things or objects (see also Szwedek, 2018a).

¹⁵⁵ In his 2004a paper, Szwedek discusses some experiential difficulties, including the contrast between the physicist’s view of the world and an ordinary man’s, in relation to this topic (p.167-173).

external sensory modalities aside from tactility (i.e. gustatory, olfactory, auditory and vision). Accordingly, these four sensory experiences will lead us to the ‘secondary’ criteria for measuring the concreteness/abstractness of concepts with *lower* degrees of concreteness (but which are *not* abstract), i.e. the ‘loosely concrete’ ones. Next on the scale are abstract concepts with externally perceivable physical components and/or imageability such as EVENT, JOURNEY, WAR, etc., which would belong to ‘low abstract’ category. Finally, concepts that are not (mandatorily) externally perceivable, i.e. internal states such as THOUGHTS and FEELINGS, would be categorized as ‘highly abstract’. We will present and discuss this model in depth in subsection 3.4.3.4.

3.4.2. Convergent evidence for ‘touch’ as our most ‘basic’ sense

Recall that the two core principles of cognitive semantics are: “conceptual structure derives from embodiment” and “semantic structure reflects conceptual structure” (Evans & Green, 2006: 176), which tightly link the body, cognition and language. Within this framework, CMT predicts that conceptual metaphor originates from bodily experience, where descriptions for abstract concepts are drawn from the more concrete physical domains. Objectification further sharpens the distinction between concrete and abstract based on OBJECT properties directly experienced by the sense of touch. Next, building upon Objectification’s strict ‘touch’ criterion for concreteness, we will explore other sensory¹⁵⁶ faculties in developing our scalar model for concreteness/abstractness. Our goal is to enable the placement of other concepts (from our data and beyond) that are not actually abstract, but whose ‘concreteness’ may not be as immediately obvious as those of prototypical OBJECTS. To ensure that our study design is consistent with the above-mentioned assumptions in CMT and Objectification, as well as compatible with the existing body of scientific research, we aptly turn toward disciplines that directly investigate the body, the mind and language to be our research compass and our guiding foundations. In addition to considering centuries-long philosophical ideas and cultural models, we also examine a series of converging evidence (on ‘touch’) across various disciplines. Findings from these investigations, mostly empirical, point toward a unified direction, i.e. one that indicates that our predictions about the concreteness/abstractness scale are well-founded, empirically informed and worth exploring.

¹⁵⁶ While ‘sensation’ and ‘perception’ go hand-in-hand and are thus often inaccurately used interchangeably, we clarify here (albeit in a simplified manner) that the former is a bottom-up process of receiving raw stimuli from the environment via our five external senses, while the latter is a top-down process where the brain internally integrates and interprets the information received.

Underpinning our model for the concreteness/abstractness scale is the assumption that the roles of the five Aristotelian senses (also known as the five ‘empirical’ senses) are vital in measuring concreteness. However, we propose that they each differ in strength when it comes to determining the specific degree of a concept’s concreteness, i.e. in this particular order: touch → taste → smell → hearing → sight. This might seem, at first glance, counterintuitive (or to be in a ‘reversed sequence’, as might have been generally assumed), especially because vision is almost always and immediately thought of as the ‘main’ sense that we rely on in navigating our existence in this world. Here, we intend to show otherwise in concert with Szwedek’s approach in considering the phylogenetic and ontogenetic significances of touch (2002a, 2008, 2009b, 2009c, 2010, 2011), and the importance of the other four sensory modalities for the survival of our species. We begin by highlighting a fair number of compelling evidence in favor of Objectification’s predictions about the primordial nature of our tactile sense, ranging from philosophy to science. Then, we examine these five sensory modalities together, i.e. their relations to one another and the bases of what constitute the ‘hierarchy’ of these senses in the said order. Finally, we bring forth linguistic correspondences that reflect the manifestations of this sensory hierarchy in language via synesthetic metaphor, tying up the converging evidence together in a coherent manner. Indeed we recognize the extreme complexity and intricacy of the perceptual systems. Our focus on the five exteroceptive senses here is not to be interpreted as us disregarding the interoceptive ones. But since we predict that concreteness relates directly to the *physical* entities of the world, the best place to start will be the senses that can be most objectively and empirically accessed.

Note that our reference to ‘touch’ throughout this thesis recognizes that the complex processing of its sensory neurons are integrated within the entire somatosensory system. According to experts, sensory and motor functions are tightly linked, particularly during active touch (Flanagan & Lederman, 2001: 389). These two systems “exert influence over each other” (Ackerman et al., 2010: 1712) and “form an indissociable whole” (Hatwell, 2003: 2). These facts bring about some touch-/tactile-related terminological implications for our study. Because these terms might be understood and used slightly differently across disciplines, they warrant some attention here. That is, the intricately close relationships between *touch/tactile*, *haptic* and *somesthetic* (that further includes *kinesthetic* and *proprioception*) have resulted in some or all of these terms to be used interchangeably for simplicity in many fields, e.g. in social communications, ICT and

virtual reality research (Robles-De-La-Torre, 2006: 27), to name a few. But importantly, the general consensus amongst cognitive psychologists, experimental psychologists and physiologists is that touch may refer to both ‘tactile’ (*passive touch*) and ‘haptic’ (*active touch*) perceptions (see, e.g., Berkley & Hubscher, 1995; Hatwell et al., 2003; Robles-De-La-Torre, 2006; Gallace & Spence, 2010). We shall thus follow this classification and use these three terms (i.e. touch, tactile, haptic)¹⁵⁷ interchangeably throughout our study, while acknowledging the complexly integrated sensorimotor functions involved. Although this might still be somewhat oversimplifying, we judge it sufficient for the purpose of our study and recognize that the (superordinate) somasthetic system also includes a range of other different receptors for haptic and tactile perceptions, such as temperature, pressure, pain, joint position and muscle movement.

3.4.2.1. *Philosophy and cultural models*

Szwedek is neither alone nor the first scholar to be arguing for touch as being the most basic of our senses, a fact that he often emphasizes in his papers. Whether this idea was very explicitly stated or only implicitly hinted at by many others, the fact is that touch has not been given the real attention it deserves in research. Modern-day scholars and scientists from various fields who now recognize this error are proposing that this trend be reversed (e.g., Klatzky & Lederman, 2003; Robles-De-La-Torre, 2006; Gallace & Spence, 2008, 2010; Gallace, 2012; Ackerman et al., 2010). One very likely explanation for this gross neglect could be that the touch sense is ‘too basic’, i.e. too intrinsically embedded in us, that we become too often oblivious to it. This is where Wittgenstein’s statement rings true again, that is, that we are often blind to the things most basic and important to us because they are too familiar to us (1953*b*: 30, after Szwedek, 2000*a*: 147-148). Some of the most prominent figures in the Western philosophical thinking dating back to Democritus, Aristotle and Aquinas have considered touch as “the basis of all other senses” (Williams, 1976: 472). In fact, this view also came to be shared by famous minds later, such as Diderot and Berkeley (Popova, 2005: 400), so much so that the prominence of touch is hard to dismiss or ignore. The same idea, albeit indirectly conveyed, is found in the centuries-old cultural model on our notions of *beings* and their properties, i.e. Great Chain of Being (GCOB). This model, extremely widespread in the Western as well as other world’s cultures (as a backdrop to literary and historical ideas),

¹⁵⁷ Etymologically speaking, ‘tactile’ comes from Latin ‘*tactilis*’ which means “tangible; may be touched”, and ‘haptic’ comes from Greek ‘*haptikos*’ which means “able to come into contact with” (source: www.etymonline.com).

is also described by Lakoff and Turner (1989) as “essential to an understanding of the worldviews of classical authors like Plato and Aristotle, medieval authors like Dante and Chaucer, Renaissance authors like Shakespeare, and even Augustan authors like Pope” and “still exists as a contemporary unconscious cultural model indispensable to our understanding of ourselves, our world, and our language” (1989: 167, after Szwedek, 2004a: 171). And as if agreeing with Wittgenstein (ibid.), Lakoff and Turner further state that the model “is largely unconscious and so fundamental to our thinking that we barely notice it” (ibid., after Szwedek 2004b: 124).

With regard to Objectification, Szwedek adopts Krzeszowski’s (1997) modified version of the Great Chain of Being that combines the final two categories, ‘complex objects’ and ‘natural physical things’ into one, i.e. ‘inorganic things’, which occupies the fourth level after ‘humans’, ‘animals’ and ‘plants’ (2004b: 124). As illustrated by Table 1 below, every category shares all attributes of the category below it and the position within the hierarchy is determined by its highest property (Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 168, 171; Krzeszowski, 1997: 67, after Szwedek 2004b: 124-125). Most consequential here are Szwedek’s astute observations of the model, here summarized as: (i) none of the categories accommodate non-physical entities; (ii) all levels share the same property of material substance; and (iii) this property is accessible by touch only (2007b: 317). In addition, Szwedek draws a parallel between the Great Chain of Being and Kotarbiński’s (1929/1990) *reism* philosophy and writes that, “[i]n both approaches the absence of the non-physical level is strikingly crucial,” which further strengthens the argument for the physicality of object, and ergo, the primeval nature of touch (2007b: 317-318).

	properties	material substance	life	instincts	reason
levels					
Humans		+	+	+	+
Animals		+	+	+	
Plants		+	+		
Inorganic Things		+			

Table 1: The Great Chain of Being (from Krzeszowski, 1997: 67, after Szwedek, 2011: 358)

3.4.2.2. *Ontogeny and our origin*

The claims for the basicness of the touch sense¹⁵⁸ are not only backed by philosophical argumentations, but also a multitude of scientific experimentations whose convergent

¹⁵⁸ At times, our reference to the sense of touch may include, to a certain extent, some aspects of taste (see subsection 3.4.3).

evidence will further solidify our convictions on the unique characteristics of touch not shared by other senses. This is true both in our ontogenetic (Gallace & Spence, 2008; Ackerman et al., 2010) as well as phylogenetic developments (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010; Gallace, 2012), making the sense of touch fundamental to the survival of our species on earth, from an evolutionary perspective (Field, 2001; Ackerman et al., 2010; Gallace & Spence, 2010; Gallace, 2012). According to Rohrer, sensory stimuli generally do not commence at birth (2005: 176). Specifically, research in neuroembryology reports that the first fetal bodies burst into motion as early as the 6th week of gestational age, and the first sensitivity of an embryo to tactile stimulation manifests by the 8th week (see, e.g., Chamberlain, n.d.: 1; Gottlieb, 1971; Barnett, 1972; Bernhardt, 1987; Humphrey, 1992; Piontelli et al., 1997; Marx & Nagy, 2017). Citing Montagu (1978), Chamberlain notes: “Touch, the first sense, is the *cornerstone* of human experience and communication, beginning in the womb,” (n.d.: 1, emphasis mine).

As the most highly developed sensory modality at birth (Burgoon et al., 1996, after Kraus et al., 2010: 745), the sense of touch is crucial to early brain, cognitive and socioemotional developments from infancy and childhood (Stack, 2001; Hertenstein, 2002; Field, 2010, after Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006: 528), as well as daily interactions from birth until death (Gallace & Spence, 2010: 246). And given that the tactile sense develops simultaneously with the nervous system at the early stage of pregnancy (Szwedek, 2018a: 80), and that both of them are “indispensable in the perception of density” (Kornas-Biela, 2011: 6, after Szwedek, *ibid.*), Objectification’s predictions must definitely be explored and investigated more deeply. As observed by Szwedek, “[e]mbodied cognition requires inclusion of the development of all senses and the nervous system from their very beginnings,” (*ibid.*: 83), as its origins “stretch back into prenatal experiences” (Rohrer, 2005: 176). Clearly, our emphasis on *tactility* over other modalities (including vision) as the primary tool for assessing the physicality of objects (and concreteness of concepts) *does* align well with scientific findings on our ontogeny.

3.4.2.3. *Structure and functions of touch organs*

The skin and its receptors are the oldest of our sense organs (Frank, 1957; Montagu, 1971; Field, 2001, after Gallace & Spence, 2010: 246), as well as the heaviest in weight and the largest in surface area (Young et al., 2006: 167). Skin makes up almost one fifth of the weight of an average male adult and approximates 180 square meters of skin

(Montagu, 1971, after Gallace & Spence, 2010: 246). Regions that are most mobile and dense with sensory receptors are “the most effective in the tactile domain” (Hatwell, 2003: 3), especially the hands, around and inside the mouth and sexual organs. Tactile organs are functionally the most vital organs with the biggest neuronal representations in brain structures (Szwedek, 2009c: 208). Functions of the skin extend beyond obvious external physical sensations such as touch, pressure, pain and temperature, and include many other functions indispensable to us. The skin provides a barrier between us and the outside world (both psychologically *and* physically), “maintaining the integrity of our organs and protecting them from external menaces” (Gallace, 2012: 2). Other critical functions of the skin are natural protections from damaging stimuli (e.g. ultraviolet light, thermal, chemical and mechanical insults), thermoregulation, metabolic functions, sexual functions (Young et al., 2006: 167), as well as being “a social organ” (Morrison et al., 2010, after van Erp & Toet, 2015: 2). As a multireceptor organ integrating input from different receptors (Chamberlain, n.d.: 3), touch differs significantly from other senses in that “its receptors are spread over the whole body,” (Hatwell, 2003: 2). At the same time, touch is the most “primitive” and the simplest and most straightforward of all sensory systems with minimal processing capacity (Gregory, 1967, after Gallace & Spence, 2008: 392; Geldard, 1960, after Hertenstein et al., 2009: 566). Yet, the somatosensory system possesses remarkable capacity to interpret an infinite amount of tactile stimuli (Abraira & Ginty, 2013). Our tactile modality enables us to recognize objects, discriminate textures, provide sensory-motor feedbacks, participate in social exchanges, etc. (*ibid.*), and is involved in almost all of our everyday activities especially the most basic ones (Gallace, 2012). The loss of this sense, consequently, will result in catastrophic consequences and cannot be adequately compensated by other senses, even sight (Robles-De-La-Torre, 2006: 24-28). Recorded cases of the tactile impairment have shown that it would take years, decades, or even a *lifetime* to adjust to the loss of touch sense (*ibid.*). This is because tactile impairment will carry devastating effects on other important modalities as well, including the disablement or loss of motor control and kinesthetic abilities, whose effects could surpass those of blindness or deafness (Cole, 1995; Cole & Paillard, 1995, after Robles-De-La-Torre, 2006: 24, 28).

3.4.2.4. *Touch from psychological standpoints*

Touch “directly monitors biologically vital features of the environment by means of *direct contact*” (Gallace & Spence, 2008: 392, emphasis mine; see also, e.g., Barnett,

1972; Hatwell, 2003; Robles-De-La-Torre, 2006; Young et al., 2006; Gallace & Spence, 2008; Hersteinstein et al., 2009; Szwedek, 2009c; Gallace, 2012). Touch conveys to us *direct* information about the state of our body, as well as *distal* information about our external world (Gallace & Spence, 2008: 393, emphases in original). Psychologically, touch provides us with the most direct experience of the physical world (Popova, 2005), and is the closest link between us and our reality (Moseley et al., 2012; Gallace, 2012). It is our “last system of defense” both biologically and socially, and the “primordial matrix” that forms the separation between us and the external environment (ibid.: 2). This gives us our “perceptual frame of reference” and ‘self-versus-others’ identification (Szwedek, 2002a). In a similar vein, Popova writes that touch “incorporates self-awareness uniquely and distinctly from the other senses” in which its “stimulation is *obtained* rather than imposed by the stimulus” (2005: 401, emphasis in original; see also Gallace, 2012), as opposed to the smelling, hearing and seeing of stimuli that we may not voluntarily choose to take in. Yet another unique characteristic of tactility that is not shared by other sensory modalities is that it is the only ‘whole-body’ sense (Hatwell, 2003; Szwedek, 2008; Moseley et al., 2012), wherein the triggering of stimuli would affect any part of the skin covering our entire body.

Cognitive psychologists regard touch as superior to other senses in terms of being the only sense that provides us with a true 3-dimensional experience of our physical world, that is, by virtue of its ability to experience an object’s density in ways other perceptual faculties cannot (Klatzky et al., 1993: 170-172; Flanagan & Lederman, 2001: 389; Klatzky & Lederman, 2003: 106). This so-called “quality of proximal reception” of touch (Hatwell, 2003: 2) also implies “direct physical interaction and co-location” (van Erp & Toet, 2015: 2). According to David Katz, an experimental psychologist, “[w]hat has been touched is the true reality that leads to perception; no reality pertains to the mirrored image, the mirage that applies itself to the eye,” (1989: 240, after Popova, 2005: 400). A similar point is made by Gregory: “one cannot be attacked and eaten by an image [...], and neither can one feed on images” (1967: 37, after Gallace & Spence, 2008: 392). And while one can feel oneself touching, one cannot see oneself seeing or hear oneself hearing (Popova, 2005: 401). In fact, even the pioneer of developmental psychology such as Piaget himself had long recognized that the hands and the mouth (i.e. the main active organs for touching) are critical for the human survival throughout an individual’s lifetime, from early childhood to well into adulthood. In Piaget’s study of the human cognitive development, his theories and experiments (Benson, 1998: 136-

144) reflect the primitiveness of touch even in the earliest developmental stages, where infants will first learn object manipulation prior to acquiring other forms of knowledge and understanding. In cognitive psychology, touch experience is regarded most relevant in supporting the development of conceptual knowledge, intrapersonal and interpersonal (Ackerman et al., 2010: 1712, 1714). Tactile sensations are also shown to influence higher social cognitive processing in very specific ways (ibid.: 1712), despite the fact that subjects in the psychological experiments seem less aware of tactile stimuli and stimuli changes compared to those of vision (Gallace & Spence, 2008: 391-392).

3.4.2.5. *Touch in social communications*

Another critical function of touch that is often overlooked but is crucial to the survival of our species is as a communication channel, i.e. within intimate spheres (Andersen & Guerrero, 2008; van Erp & Toet, 2015) as well as in public interactions (Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006; Gallace & Spence, 2010). As “the *primary* modality for conveying intimate emotions” (van Erp & Toet, 2015: 2, emphasis mine; see, e.g., Field, 2010; Morrison et al., 2010; App et al., 2011), touch is vital to our physical and emotional wellbeing (Field, 2001; Spence, 2002, after Gallace & Spence, 2010: 247). Further, as the very first medium of communication between newborns and parents, touch is key in early social development in mammals (Harlow & Zimmermann, 1959; Montagu, 1971; van Erp & Toet, 2015). Studies on tactile modality show that while touch “intensifies the emotional displays from other modalities” (Knapp & Hall, 1997, after Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006: 528), it is also surprisingly powerful all on its own in affecting people’s emotions and governing their behaviors (Gallace & Spence, 2010: 255; van Erp & Toet, 2015: 3). Furthermore, findings suggest that tactile stimulations may actually be more powerful than language in communicating emotions (Gallace & Spence, 2010: 247) and more versatile than facial expressions in conveying a wider range of positive emotions (Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006: 532). For instance, experimental subjects are able to more precisely identify and interpret emotions via touch (with a high accuracy of up to 78-83%) compared to both visual and auditory cues (face and voice), even without seeing the tactile stimulation (Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006; Hertenstein et al., 2009). Also, whereas results show that facial expressions can successfully communicate only one positive emotion (joy), participants are able to accurately decode four distinct positive emotions (joy, love, gratitude and sympathy) communicated via touch, including while merely watching others do it (Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006; Hertenstein et al., 2009). In

fact, researchers are looking into how our tactile modality may provide some insights into the neural basis of empathy (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003: 1506).

A host of other studies have also reported that tactile experience influences consumer decision-making in the marketplace, as well as teamwork and group performance in the workplace (Ackerman et al., 2010; Gallace & Spence, 2010; Gallace, 2012). To cite an example, a season-long ethological study on professional athletes in the NBA (National Basketball Association in North America) games reports that teams that practice what might seem like insignificant tactile communication (e.g. slap on the back, brush of a hand, etc.) shows higher group performance, which researchers predict may be linked to an increased level of trust and cooperation among team members (Kraus et al., 2010). The impacts of touch on our social life are not be underestimated, especially as they seem to fit evolutionary claims about social cooperation (Andersen & Guerrero, 2008), i.e. that tactile communication (gratitude, sympathy, etc.) signals prosocial intents and rewards prosocial behaviors, both of which are essential to cooperation among members of a community (ibid.). Within Information and Communications Technology (ICT), there are growing concerns that technologies are emerging at the expense of physical and tactile communications, causing our modern society to suffer from serious ‘touch hunger’ (Gallace & Spence, 2010). This situation has encouraged researchers to design and develop what is termed as mediated ‘virtual’ social touch into multisensory virtual and long-distance communications (Robles-De-La-Torre & Hayward, 2001; Gallace & Spence, 2010). The main areas in which ‘tangibility’ in a virtual interface may be experienced via ‘somatic sensors’ include remote communication between partners in long-distance intimate relationships, remote group collaboration in work settings (van Erp & Toet, 2015), and as training devices for surgeons due to tactility’s advantages over the eye (Flanagan & Lederman, 2001: 389).

3.4.2.6. Touch deprivation and touch therapy in medicine

Another domain whose scientific discoveries lend further support for our claim for the basicness of touch over other senses is medicine. Firstly, the devastating effects of the deprivation of tactile stimulations on an individual’s normal growth (bodily, cognitive, emotional, social, etc.) are incomparable to those of other modalities. The consequences are most dire if the deprivation of a mother’s touch occurs in infancy or early childhood, resulting in serious developmental delays, as are common amongst premature neonates

and institutionalized children (Field, 2001; Hertenstein et al., 2009). The effects of touch deprivation range “from the behavioral to the molecular level” (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010: 156), the damages of which are not easily reversible (*ibid.*), albeit possible via intensive ‘touch therapy’ (Field, 1995). Accordingly, results from clinical studies in medicine and therapy on the therapeutic effects of tactile and kinesthetic stimulation (see, e.g., Field et al., 1986; Scafidi et al., 1986) on premature and full-term newborns, children as well as adults have been remarkable, showing that chemical changes brought about by touch carry *lifelong* effects. Specifically, various forms of touch therapy result in a decrease in cortisol and an increase in serotonin and dopamine, thereby reducing depression, anxiety and stress in patients (Field, 1995; Field et al., 2005). Touch therapy also affect gene expressions in the brain areas that regulate endocrine and behavioral responses to stress (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010: 154). Positive effects of tactile therapy on our biochemistry are also linked to the enhancement of one’s immune system as well as improved conditions of various diseases (Ironson et al., 1996; Field et al., 2005). Developmental studies show that tactile stimulation on neonates as little as 15 minutes thrice daily for 10 days leads to “superior growth and developmental performance” (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010: 153), including neurocognitive development (Gallace, 2012: 7). The effects of a mother’s touch are described as “persistent” and extend to infants scoring better in Bayley mental and various motor assessment tests (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010: 153), as well as a reduced incidence in minor neurological abnormalities (e.g. Weiss et al., 2004; Bellieni et al., 2007). In fact, the *dominance* of touch is not limited to our species alone, but is crucial to the survival of a wide range of species, i.e. from mammals to reptiles to even insects (Weber, 2005; Anstey et al., 2009, after Gallace, 2012; Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006; Ardiel & Rankin, 2010). That is, the developmental roles of touch observed in human infants are also observed in non-human animals, from rat pups to worm larvae (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010: 153). And likewise, deficit in tactile stimulations is detrimental to other organisms too, just as positive effects of touch can reverse these damages and significantly facilitate their recovery (*ibid.*: 155).

3.4.2.7. *Phylogeny and our survival*

Up until this point, we have invested some time to bring together disjointed pieces of evidence from various disciplines that converge together in support of our claim for the basicness, primevalness and primordially of the tactile sensory experience. This is vital to the design and execution of our project. In this final subsection, we wrap up our

discussion by stressing that touch is key to the survival of organisms across phylogeny (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010: 156). This is reflected in its crucial functions at all levels of our existence: physiological, psychological, sociological, etc. (van Erp & Toet, 2015: 5, 9), which is as true for humans as for non-human primates (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; de Waal, 1989, after Hertenstein & Keltner, 2006). As “the single sense that is as old as life itself,” touch has been termed by scientists as “the core of sentience” (Andersen & Guerrero, 2008: 155) and is thought to have preceded the phylogenetic development of vision (Gregory, 1967, after Gallace & Spence, 2008: 392), and also that of language in the hominid evolution at birth (Burgoon et al., 1996, after Kraus et al., 2010: 745). From an evolutionary point of view, tactility requires the functioning of relatively older brain areas, i.e. the orbitofrontal cortex (Gallace, 2012), and the hand is “one of the most important adaptations in our evolutionary history” (Ackerman et al., 2010: 1712). Moreover, tactility is obligatory for our species’ survival, as evidenced by the fact that a total lack of tactile sensation in human is almost nonexistent. Scientists predict that this sense is ‘protected’ by evolution from serious damage or alterations (Gallace, 2012). In the very words of Field: “We often forget that touch is not only basic to our species, but the *key* to it” (2001: 57, after Gallace & Spence, 2010: 247, emphasis mine).

3.4.3. Applications for metaphor research

Primarily motivated by Objectification and its OBJECT-based criteria for concreteness, this section explores how these conceptual constructs may be operationalized, as well as their direct applications for metaphor research. Convergent scientific evidence for the primordial nature of the tactile modality, i.e. from ontogenetic to phylogenetic, informs us *how* and *why* the sense of touch is key to reliably ascertaining the concreteness of a concept. We propose here that bodily senses provide us with the most reliable physical indicators of the concreteness of concepts, including those that are otherwise difficult to assess objectively. Because CMT characterizes metaphor as the mapping between the more concrete source domain and the more abstract target domain, it necessitates that what is concrete and what is abstract must be clear, that is, prior to identifying potential metaphor in discourse. As explained in Sections 2.3 and 3.2, most cognitive metaphor studies are still relying solely or too heavily on subjective introspection, in one form or another. To reduce judgment subjectivity and minimize researcher bias, it has become common practice for researchers to employ groups of research participants to identify metaphors and/or judge the metaphoricity of identified metaphors. Similar methods are

applied in neuroimaging studies, whereby subjects are instructed to rate whether listed concepts are concrete or abstract via questionnaires (Kounios & Holdcomb, 1994; Feng et al., 2011, after Jelec, 2013: 64-67; see also, e.g., Paivio, 1968, 1971; Moseley et al., 2011; Schrauf, 2011). However, as aptly pointed out by Jelec, without objective criteria to demarcate concrete concepts from abstract ones, collective judgments by the studies' participants remain subjective (*ibid.*)¹⁵⁹ and hence do not carry much empirical weight. This is precisely where our proposal for using tactility along with the other four sense modalities in measuring concreteness could potentially solve this longstanding problem. More specifically, the result of having clarified and operationalized the hitherto vague concreteness/abstractness notions is a scalar model with *practical* applications for the identification of metaphor, which we will term as the concreteness-/abstractness scale. This model, provisional as it may be, features substantial methodological improvements to metaphor identification that text-based metaphor studies could benefit from. At the very least, this model is falsifiable and its resultant metaphor identification procedure replicable, and could therefore be empirically worthy. As Murphy repeatedly asserts in his appeal for "more specific models of metaphoric concepts" (1997: 106), a falsifiable model is required "even if it is a simplified, incomplete one, so that its successes and limitations can be accurately assessed" (*ibid.*). Chapter Four will demonstrate at length how this model is applied onto our own textual data.

3.4.3.1. *Measuring the 'concreteness' of concepts beyond OBJECTS*

It is crucial to understand that by having justified our claims for touch as the primary sensory modality for measuring a concept's concreteness in its strictest sense, we are in no way downplaying the importance of other senses. After all, privileging and extolling one modality over the others might be misconstrued as promoting avoidance of other sensory experience (Kambaskovic & Wolfe, 2014: 1). More specifically, we do not wish to promote 'tactocentrism' or to be giving a parochial account of touch, the way that many vision researchers have been criticized as spreading a visuo-centric view with regard to perception and perceptual processes (O'Callaghan, 2008a, 2008b, 2012). On the contrary, we fully acknowledge the multimodal nature of our perceptual systems, their highly complex interconnectivities (*ibid.*; Chamberlain, n.d.: 4), and also experts' caution against any extreme individuation of the senses (Macpherson, 2011b; Matthen,

¹⁵⁹ To illustrate this point, Jelec argues that just because many people would judge a dolphin as a fish, we should not simply accept this judgment as true at face value; the same is said to apply to concreteness judgments (2013: 66).

2015). Our reason for bringing touch into the foreground, however, is because we are arguing for the basicness of the tactile sense, i.e. in *specific* relation to concreteness. We predict that tactile sensory experience is key in objectively assessing the *highest* degree of concreteness in concepts, i.e. the ‘strictly concrete’ concepts, or in Objectification’s term, OBJECTS. The other four senses are nonetheless vital secondary indicators of concepts with a *lower* degree of concreteness, i.e. ‘loosely concrete’. That is, they guide us in further measuring the (reduced) concreteness of concepts *beyond* OBJECT as per Objectification, which do not fulfill the criterion of mass (i.e. they lack boundedness and 3-dimensionality), but are still perceivable via senses other than touch. In fact, we have good reasons to believe that within this ‘loosely concrete’ category, there could be a subscale that further breaks down the other four sensory experiences into decreasing strength of concreteness: gustatory → olfactory → auditory → visual, hierarchically. Incidentally (and very interestingly), it has come to our attention that in the domain of perception science, researchers have distinguished ‘material objects’ from other *non-material* ‘perceptual objects’, i.e.: ‘visual objects’, ‘auditory objects’, ‘olfactory objects’ and ‘gustatory objects’ (e.g. Hopfield, 1991; O’Callaghan, 2008a, 2011; Carvalho, 2014; Bayne & Spence, 2014; Daniel, 2015). So, on the one hand, we have ‘material objects’ that are proper objects that can be perceived by the tactile sense, and which correspond perfectly to our ‘strictly concrete’ category (i.e. OBJECT). And on the other hand, there are the rest of the non-material ‘perceptual objects’ perceivable by the other four senses, i.e. the ‘loosely concrete’ concepts.

3.4.3.2. *Hierarchy of the senses and concreteness*

We have already mentioned that the ‘strictly concrete’ category comprises concepts that meet Objectification’s strict criterion for OBJECT (density of matter), and is experienced only via touch. Ascertaining concepts that belong to the ‘loosely concrete’ category, however, requires us to look into the other four perceptual modalities. What we have discovered from our investigation has allowed us to posit that in regard to measuring concreteness, the senses are *not* on equal footing. We propose the following hierarchy¹⁶⁰ of the senses, with gradually decreasing strength in the experience of concreteness, that

¹⁶⁰ Throughout, our use of the term ‘hierarchy’ to describe the senses is to be understood in relation to the degree of physical accessibility to concreteness in concepts, and not in the same way it was employed by classical, medieval and early modern Western philosophical idealism or metaphysics debates (but which are in an *inverted* hierarchy to ours), which exalt the nobility of sight and maligning the inferior nature of touch (see, e.g., Wolfe, 2009; Kambaskovic & Wolfe, 2014, for a detailed discussion on this topic).

is: touch → taste → smell → hearing → sight. The hierarchy has been so ordered based on combined insights from epistemology, scientific findings from sensory biology and perception psychology, as well as linguistic data (i.e. synesthetic metaphor). Traditional studies on sense and perception have generally viewed the five Aristotelian senses as anatomically and functionally independent. However, reports of findings from recent empirical studies indicating otherwise have triggered a radical shift in how these senses are currently regarded and researched. In a nutshell, sensory atomism is considered false and perceiving is in fact a multimodal affair (O’Callaghan, 2008*b*, 2012). Cross-modal illusions, cross-modal plasticity and various forms of sensory substitution devices (i.e. SSDs) are further support for this (e.g. Auvray & Myin, 2009; Ward & Meijer, 2010). It has even been suggested that, “the differences between the senses amount more to a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind” (Macpherson, 2011*a*: 139)¹⁶¹.

Perhaps one way that this ‘degree’ may be understood is by studying the *associations* between a modality on the hierarchy or scale (e.g. starting with touch) and the one that immediately tails it (e.g. taste). The next pair of senses (adjacent on the scale) whose associations are to be noted are taste and smell, followed by smell and hearing, and finally, hearing and sight. Using a scalar model, one may visualize that while touch and taste are conceptually closer in distance¹⁶² (i.e. as taste is to smell, smell to hearing, and hearing to sight), the distance between touch and smell is greater, and that of touch and hearing greater yet, etc. A cursory glance at the relations among the senses suggests that there may be an exception to the rule with regard to touch and sight (i.e. each occupies the *opposite* ends of the spectrum), which might allow them to defy this distance rule, and possibly other rules as well. For example, touch has both communicative and SSD functions, although these are not its primary functions. This also fits perfectly with the fact that some properties of perceptual objects from the tactile and visual modalities *do* overlap, e.g. ‘shapes’ or ‘forms’ of objects¹⁶³ (for details, see, Ludwig, 1995).

As for the associations between one modality and the one that immediately follows it on the scale (which essentially motivates the postulated ‘distance’ on our scalar model), we

¹⁶¹ Macpherson (ibid.) makes this statement in discussing echolocation, ultraviolet vision, infrared vision and tactile vision; however, a parallel observation could be made about the five senses, as well.

¹⁶² Because our model is provisional and our study explanatory, we shall have to refrain from committing to an assumption that the distance between each sense is to the one next to it is equal (it may well be not, although one might be hard-pressed to figure out specific methods of ascertaining this). For simplification, we shall temporarily assume here that the distance from A to B, B to C, C to D, etc. is roughly equal.

¹⁶³ One may be tempted to count *texture*, *hardness*, and *depth* among the overlapping properties of objects perceivable both tactilely and visually. However, we would argue against this and maintain that these aspects may only be accurately experienced via touch.

ascribe them to the *overlapping features* between any two neighboring senses. More specifically, such features would belong to one or more of the following criteria for individuating the five external senses, namely: (i) sensory organs; (ii) external stimuli; (iii) properties of perceptual objects; and (iv) qualitative experience (e.g., Grice, 1962; Keeley, 2002; Nudds, 2004; Auvray & Myin, 2009; Macpherson, 2011a)¹⁶⁴. We present our arguments for the four criteria with the following examples¹⁶⁵.

First of all, although we would generally agree that touch and taste are two separate sensory modalities (and according to most of the four criteria, they are), tongue as the main organ for taste is also a tactile organ, albeit not a primary one. Indeed there can be no tasting of food or drinks without physical contact (in other words, ‘touch’) between the tongue and a tastant. Secondly, the “closely allied” taste and smell (Chamberlain, n.d.: 4), also known as the “chemical senses” (Spence et al., 2014: 2), share more than just chemical properties of their stimuli, but properties of perceptual objects, as well. That is, perceptions of taste and smell *do* mutually influence each other, and finding a ‘pure’ tastant (i.e. one whose gustatory perception is not at all influenced by olfactory stimulation) has been found to be extremely difficult (ibid.: 8). Conversely, odor also possesses a ‘dual’ status, wherein olfactory receptors can be stimulated orthonasally via the nose when sniffing, and also retronasally by the mouth when drinking and eating (ibid.: 9). The complexity of flavor perception further illustrates the intimate relation between gustation and olfaction (see, e.g., Spence, 2012; Spence et al., 2014, for details on intriguing experiments on taste, odor and flavor experiences).

Next, the two neighboring modalities further down on our scale are smell and hearing. While these two senses may not share obvious links with regard to their sense organs or qualitative experience, a closer look would reveal a covert commonality¹⁶⁶ between the ‘form’ of the substance of their stimuli. More specifically, olfaction is the detection of concentrations of chemical stimuli (Keeley, 2002: 12) mainly in the air but sometimes also in water, and audition is the detection of pressure waves in the air, and to a lesser extent also in water (Macpherson, 2011a: 132). Finally, the link between audition and vision are perhaps the most recognizable one, i.e. as they are the main communication

¹⁶⁴ Although this taxonomy may contain minor terminological variations and/or sub-classifications amongst some groups of scholars, the four criteria given here are the most widely accepted ones in the perception science literature. The other three additional criteria (but which are not included in our discussion here) are: *dedication* (Keeley, 2002), *behavioral equivalence* (Morgan, 1977; Keeley, 2002), and *sensorimotor equivalence* (O’Regan & Nöe, 2001).

¹⁶⁵ Note that our examples take into consideration only the *human* perceptual experience, and not those of other animals.

¹⁶⁶ Yu has also taken notice that smell and sound are similar in that they both exist ‘in the air’ (2003: 31).

senses¹⁶⁷ in our daily lives, either in-person or virtually (the term ‘audio-visual’ comes quickly to mind). Often studied together, perceptual experiences of hearing and seeing are reported to influence each other, and the obstruction of one modality would affect the reception of the other (O’Callaghan, 2008b). Moreover, stimuli of both senses are carried in the form of wave frequencies, i.e. *sound waves* stimulate audition and *light waves* stimulate vision. Subsequently, our next action step will be to inspect the varying aspects of the five senses together, on a spectrum, which we take to be converging support for our proposed sequence of ‘touch → taste → smell → hearing → sight’ in the hierarchy¹⁶⁸, i.e. in relation to our embodied experience of concreteness.

In the classical, medieval and early modern periods, touch was seen as a materialistic sense and sight as the noblest one. The Western metaphysic discourse implies a strong moral valuation of the senses, with touch (as a *contact* sense) often being seen as the most sensual, corporeal, animalistic, and dirtiest sense that belongs to the ‘lower self’. On the opposite end of the continuum, sight is valued as the most religious, spiritual, enlightened, and trustworthy sense that belongs to one’s ‘higher self’ (Kambaskovic & Wolfe, 2013). In between the two ends lie taste and smell, which were also “associated with our animal nature” (ibid.: 4), while hearing sits closer to sight as ‘divine’¹⁶⁹. In regard to our predictions regarding the sequence of these senses, we are indeed in good company. Historically, Berkeley (1713/1975) was known to discuss sounds *after* pains (i.e. part of tactile sense), tastes and smells, but *before* sights (O’Callaghan, 2011: 144). Interestingly, Perkins’ discussion (1983) also follows the same order, i.e. with audition coming *after* olfaction and the other senses, but *before* vision (after O’Callaghan, ibid.). Ontogenetically speaking, prenatal development of the five senses conforms precisely to the same hierarchy, as well (Chamberlain: n.d.). This developmental sequence reflects the importance of use, as senses are put to service immediately upon availability (ibid.: 1). This ontogenetic development appears to mirror the phylogenetic sequence, i.e. from touch to sight (Williams, 1976: 472)¹⁷⁰, which is indicative of their survival functions to our species, from an evolutionary standpoint (recall subsection 3.4.2.7). These survival functions are also reflected in the varying degrees of severity of sensory impairments in

¹⁶⁷ Pöppel and Edinghaus aptly refer to vision and audition as ‘telecommunicative senses’ (1994).

¹⁶⁸ By ‘hierarchy’, we mean that touch, as the “least abstract, and therefore *basest*” sense (Kambaskovic & Wolfe, 2014: 3, emphasis mine), occupies the ‘base’ of the sense hierarchy, followed by taste, smell, hearing and sight.

¹⁶⁹ Radical empiricism’s response to such idealist thinking was that touch is the ‘atheistic’ sense, and Diderot’s famous saying, “if you want me to believe in God I would have to touch him” (1975, after Wolfe, 2009: 8).

¹⁷⁰ Williams’ slight ambivalence about the placement of hearing and vision is reflected in his ‘order of transfers’, i.e. stated as: “tactile, gustatory, olfactory, acoustic/visual *or* visual/acoustic” (ibid., emphasis mine). But essentially, in his work on synesthetic adjectives and sensory transfer, Williams treats hearing and vision as being equal on the hierarchy (ibid.).

human, i.e. tactility seems to be the most protected one by evolution whereby a total touch sense impairment is reported to be very rare (Gallace, 2012). In contrast, total (especially congenital) visual and auditory impairments have been recorded as the most common worldwide and also the most easily corrected and/or substituted¹⁷¹.

A neurophysiological parallel can also be seen in the length and complexity of neuronal branching of the senses, i.e. with the least for tactile, the longest and most complex for visual and auditory experience, and with the other two in between (Pribram, 1971: 16, after Williams, 1976: 473). Another specific fact about the senses that fits our proposed sequential pattern is the location and ‘accessibility’¹⁷² of the main receptive points of the five sense organs. Specifically, the skin covers all surfaces of the body and is the most accessible organ, followed by the taste buds on the tongue inside the mouth that is partially (and optionally) accessible. However, the olfactory epithelium inside the upper nostrils is much less accessible, while the cochlea is hidden yet deeper inside the inner ear, and lastly, the retina is located all the way at the back-end of our eyeball inside our head. Next, by virtue of touch and taste being contact senses, they carry the highest risks of contracting infections or diseases, with olfaction carrying considerable risks as well (e.g. via direct contact with the skin, via food or drink consumption, and airborne transmission), whereas audibly- and visually-transmitted diseases are virtually unheard of. In terms of proximity¹⁷³, touch and taste require the closest proximity to a stimulus, and the stimuli of olfaction (though also requiring contact with olfactory receptors) can be perceived from a further distance, and finally, audition and vision could be perceived from much greater distances than the others.

According to the Gale Encyclopedia of Psychology, the degree of absolute threshold from touch to sight are as follows: a bee’s wing 1 cm off one’s cheek (touch), a drop of quinine in 250 gallons of water (taste), a drop of perfume in a 6-room house (smell), a watch ticking from 20 feet away (hearing), and a candle flame 30 miles away (vision), which also reflects our proposed sequence. Another related observation regarding the hierarchy of the senses is the degree of density of the substance detectable by respective

¹⁷¹ Accurate figures for worldwide population on this are not currently available, whilst by-country estimates vary. We make our claim based on observation and deduction, which could be considered well-reasoned, e.g. from the prevalence of Braille system for the visually-impaired, sign languages for the hearing-impaired, and various SSDs for blindness and deafness.

¹⁷² It must be more than a fortunate coincidence that while we are referring to the *perceptual* accessibility of touch as being the highest and vision the lowest, Shen describes touch as having the highest *conceptual* accessibility and vision the lowest one (1997: 51).

¹⁷³ Foster & Verry (2007) consider vision, audition, olfaction and gustation to be distal (or foreground) senses, while tactile is said to be part distal, but also part proximal (or hidden), i.e. the part that is connected to vestibular and proprioceptive systems.

senses as stimuli, i.e. with decreasing degree of solidness (in other words, concreteness), from touch to sight. That is, tactility can detect solid, liquid and gaseous substances; detection of gustation mainly involves solid and liquid substances; that of olfaction involves chemical molecules in the air (to a less degree in water); audition is triggered by mechanical vibration in the air (to a less degree in water); and vision is triggered by a range of light within specified wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum. Finally, the preservation of (or the 'capturing' of) visual and auditory experience is easy and can be made permanent, such as with technological media like cameras and other recording devices. Scent preservation is (with the help of a medium such as a piece of cloth or paper) somewhat possible for an extended time, albeit not a lasting one. And although taste could linger for several hours after contact with the receptors, the experience is not preservable without the stimuli, whereas tactile experience is entirely dependent on and limited to the presence of the stimuli, and cannot be otherwise captured or preserved.

3.4.3.3. *Concreteness within perceptual and conceptual synesthesia*

What we have learnt so far concerning the five senses that has driven us to postulate the 'touch → taste → smell → hearing → sight' sequence has been intriguing. But what has finally made it compelling enough for us to model our 'concreteness/abstractness scale' after this hierarchy is the fact that similar patterns have also been discovered in *language*. Specifically, we are referring to the directions of transfer found in synesthetic metaphor, i.e. also known as 'literary synesthesia' (Tsur, 1992) or 'intersense metaphor' (Yu, 2003). Analogous to synesthesia, which is a rare¹⁷⁴ perceptual phenomenon caused by a *cross*-wiring between different brain regions that results in the experience of one sensation in another (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001; see also Spector & Maurer, 2009; Marks, 2011; Deroy & Spence, 2013), synesthetic metaphor is a conceptual phenomenon that involves a *cross*-mapping from one sensory modality to another, manifested linguistically. An example of synesthesia is when a synesthete sees the color green when hearing the tone C-sharp (or the reverse), whereas '*dark music*' and '*loud colors*' are synesthetic metaphors, that is, when a sensory experience is described using the vocabulary from another sensory modality. According to Tsur, literary synesthesia is "the exploitation of verbal synesthesia for specific literary effects" (1992: 245). But much more than that, neuroscientists predict a strong connection between synesthesia

¹⁷⁴ Although perceptual synesthesia affects only about 4% of the population (Simner et al., 2006, after Marks, 2011), normal subjects show "implicit associations" that are thought to be 'milder' forms of synesthesia, e.g. linking bright colors to high-pitched sounds (Marks, *ibid.*), which very interestingly resemble conceptual synesthesia, i.e. synesthetic metaphors.

and metaphor (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001: 4-5). Moreover, because the former is an empirical neural-sensory phenomenon, it can potentially be “an experimental lever” for investigating “more elusive phenomena such as metaphor” (ibid.). Incidentally, as we are continuously arguing throughout this dissertation, such ‘experimental levers’ are precisely what our field needs in order to improve its empirical acceptability within a largely scientific interdisciplinary research. Ramachandran and Hubbard further argue, “[i]f concepts are represented in brain maps just as percepts are, then *cross-activation* of brain maps may be the *basis* for metaphor,” which they believe would explain higher synesthesia incidences in artists and poets (ibid.: 28, emphases mine).

And while neuroscientists consider *synesthesia* as a window into perception, thought and language, cognitive linguists regard *metaphor* as a window into the body, cognition and language. Looking at synesthesia as both perceptual and conceptual phenomena, and also the almost symbiotic relationship between the two, we suspect that somewhere therein lie more answers to our concreteness/abstractness questions. Despite a growing interest in synesthetic metaphor within cognitive metaphor research, it appears that the massive potentials that it has to offer to our field has been barely tapped into, especially considering the touted centrality of *embodiment* in cognitive linguistics. After all, what could give us a more direct access and deeper insights into our embodied cognition than our senses and the arising sensory experiences? In fact, it is rather surprising that aside from Szwedek, hardly anyone else (to the best of our knowledge) has made an explicit and a strong enough link between the natures of conceptual domains and any specific sensory modality, especially in solving the concreteness/abstractness puzzle. Building upon Objectification, we have explored in even greater depth the sense of touch and the other four senses, i.e. the neurobiological, psychological, and linguistic aspects of them, and we treat them as central to our study design. Hence, instead of viewing synesthetic metaphor as merely ‘a type’ of metaphor, we would suggest that it may actually be ‘the archetype’ of metaphor¹⁷⁵, i.e. in the sense that it reflects most clearly and transparently its cross-modality mapping. Other non-synesthetic mappings, however, may or may not be opaque, especially those that involve greater mapping distances that map vastly different domains (i.e. concrete and abstract domains). Supporting our prediction are: (i) Ramachandran and Hubbard’s proposal that beyond cross-activation between sensory

¹⁷⁵ We are intrigued indeed that our suspicion appears to be shared by neuroscientists as well, albeit from a different (non-linguistic) perspective, i.e. Ramachandran and Hubbard write: “It is even possible that the angular gyrus was originally involved only in cross-modal metaphor but the same machinery was then co-opted during evolution for other kinds of metaphor as well” (2001: 18).

modalities, "there may be extensive cross-wiring between brain regions that represent *abstract* concepts," (2001: 3, emphasis mine); and that (ii) neurological lesions in the angular gyrus (i.e. the brain area where synesthetic cross-wirings take place, and also where polymodal sensory information converge) would lead to the loss of one's ability to understand metaphors, as well (ibid.: 3, 5).

Our main interest in synesthetic metaphor lies, in fact, in its Principle of Directionality, which is reported to universally govern the directions of synesthetic transfers, i.e. across discourse genres, across genetically unrelated languages (see, e.g., Ullmann, 1957/1959; Williams, 1976; Yu, 1992, 2003; Day, 1996; Shen, 1997; Shen & Gil, 2008)¹⁷⁶, and also enduringly in English for the last 1200 years (Williams, 1976). Two specific discoveries on synesthetic metaphor with direct bearing on our project are: (i) the mapping direction of synesthetic transfers appears to largely conform to our postulated hierarchy (touch → taste → smell → hearing → sight) that will guide our measurement of the concreteness strength in concepts; and (ii) the findings that the semantic field of tactile experience is the *largest* source of synesthetic transfer to the other four sensory modalities (Ullmann, 1957, after Williams, 1976: 463) can be taken as further solidifying Objectification's claim for OBJECT (by virtue of touch) as the *ultimate* source domain (Szwedek, 2011). As one of the earliest scholars to delve deep into this subject, Ullmann (ibid.) claims that the 'panchronistic' nature of the sensory transfer involves three general tendencies, namely: (1) an upward mapping of 'hierarchical distribution' from lower modalities to higher ones, i.e. touch, taste, smell, sound, sight; (2) touch is the predominant transfer source; and (3) sound, instead of sight, is the predominant transfer destination, which violates the hierarchy, but which Ullmann attributes to visual vocabulary being much richer than that of the auditory (1959: 276-284, after Yu, 2003: 21).

Based on what we have learnt about sensory modalities and synesthetic metaphors (i.e. for the purpose of engineering an empirically informed research design for this study), we do have some insights to contribute with respect to Ullman's third observation on sound violating the transfer hierarchy. While we do not dispute Ullman's account of the visual terminology being richer than that of the auditory, we offer another explanation

¹⁷⁶ Ullmann (1957/1959) examined synesthetic metaphor in poetry in English, French and Hungarian from the 19th century, Williams' (1976) was a diachronic study on synesthetic adjectives in daily English spanning 1200 years, with evidence from Indo-European languages and Japanese, Yu's studies (1992, 2003) contain data from poetic and prosaic Chinese, Day's (1996) from German and American English prose, Shen's (1997) from Modern Hebrew Poetry, and Shen & Gil's (2008) from Indonesian. Aside from minor violations, these studies report a strong support for the Directionality Principle. Also, in cases where the transfer directions are violated, they would tend to disappear from language use over time (Williams, 1976: 467-468, 475).

thereof that can be found in the fact that tactile and visual modalities share at least one common perceptual property¹⁷⁷, e.g. the *shape* of objects (for details, see Ludwig, 1995; Hatwell, 2003; Gallace & Spence, 2008; recall also subsection 3.4.3.2). Also, Williams' (ibid.) breakdown of Ullmann's (1957) category of 'sight' into two perceptual aspects thereof, i.e. 'dimension' and 'color' (Yu, 2003: 21), as well as Yu's analysis following this breakdown on Chinese data (ibid.) have shed some light onto this matter. That is, we argue that the inclusion of dimension as an aspect of sight *per se* is incorrect (and at best, misleading), and will cause a conceptual convolution regarding tactile and visual properties. Instead, we posit that dimension (most accurately) belongs to tactility rather than vision, and we propose a repositioning of 'dimension' on the hierarchy, i.e. from a higher modality to a lower one, by virtue of it being *primarily* a tactile property.

We bring forth two arguments to support the above claim. Firstly, observe that most of the words listed under 'dimension' in both Williams' (1976) and Yu's (2003) respective works can also be listed under 'touch' denoting *object* properties such as shape or form, texture, hardness, depth, weight, volume, etc. (recall also subsection 3.4.3.2). Examples include *flat, deep, thin, full, big, even, fat, hallow, high, shallow, thick* (Williams, ibid.), and *elasticity, stretch, curving, zigzagging, low, heavy* (Yu, ibid.). Secondly, out of the six instances of dimension being recorded as a transfer source in Yu's data (ibid.), five of them are in fact composite synesthetic metaphors with double or triple transfers (four of which involve composites with 'touch' and 'taste'). In short, dimension almost never transfers independently. In fact, in the single isolated case where dimension appears to have done so, i.e. 'dimension → smell' in "*turning the fragrance into the shape of a belt*" (ibid.: 27, emphases in original), one could even argue that the presence of BELT (inarguably an OBJECT) implies the objectification process *first*. This would also mean that touch is once again involved, making a composite 'dimension + touch → smell' a real possibility. So, if we were right about this, then it would translate that dimension in fact *never* transfers independently. In other words, dimension's ability to transfer would depend fully on *touch*, either explicitly (via composite tactile transfers) or implicitly (by virtue of dimension words being richer and more concrete due to tactility).

Concerning Ullmann's (1959) three general tendencies, Yu reports that the first two generalizations are largely met in the Chinese data on synesthetic metaphors, but not the

¹⁷⁷ Note that in subsections 3.3.1.2 and 3.3.1.3, we have extensively argued our case for 3-dimensionality being a fundamental property of OBJECT, experienced most accurately only via touch (vision, however, is only 2,5-dimensional).

third¹⁷⁸. That is, sound is *not* the prime transfer destination in the data, but rather, “color and sound words *trade* metaphors” (2003: 21, emphasis mine), in that they ‘mutually’ transfer to one another. These findings, when taken together with our two previous observations about dimension (as well as what we have surveyed on the psychology and biology of the senses in subsection 3.4.3.2), do offer us some new insights into the hierarchical distribution. While the routes for synesthetic transfer proposed by Williams (1976; see Figure 1 below) have been illuminating indeed, a few minor revisions may be in order, especially with respect to where ‘dimension’ stands on the hierarchy.




Figure 1: Routes of modality transfers in synesthetic metaphor (Williams, 1976: 463; red marks added)

In light of newer findings post-Williams’ (1976), i.e. by Shen (1997), Yu (1992, 2003) and Shen & Gil (2008), we offer a revised version of the diagram depicting *all* possible synesthetic transfer routes¹⁷⁹ in Figure 2 below. Note that in Figure 1 above, we added a red mark and arrow to Williams’ original diagram (ibid.) to indicate the isolated case of violation of transfer direction by ‘dimension’ found in Yu’s data (2003). Resultantly, when seen from our view (dimension being a *tactile* property), no such violation occurs. It is also worth noting that, as per Figure 2 below, dimension transfers to *all* modalities *except* touch, and vice versa, reflecting a ‘shared modality’ indeed. This makes perfect sense, because within-sensory transfers, by definition, *cannot* constitute a metaphor.




Figure 2: Our proposed *revision* to Williams’ (1976) original synesthetic transfer routes

¹⁷⁸ Yu’s (ibid.) data show two cases of downward mappings: (1) ‘sound → touch’; and (2) ‘color → smell’. In (1), Yu explains that there is an ambiguity in the mapping due to onomatopoeia, epithet and metonymy (ibid.: 24). As for (2), we have observed that in “floating strands of *dark red smell* of blood” (ibid.: 27, emphasis in original), there may have *first* been an OBJECT conceptualization, i.e. both via “floating” as object property and “strands” as OBJECT. If this were in fact the case, then it might have perhaps allowed for an implicit transfer from tactile to smell, *before* color (ibid.: 27), e.g. possibly ‘(touch → color) → smell’ or ‘(touch → color) + (touch → smell)’, i.e. consider a possible paraphrase: “floating *dark red* strands of blood *smell*”. That being said, without any knowledge of the Chinese language and especially its syntactic structure, naturally, this will have to remain a mere educated speculation on our part, at least now.

¹⁷⁹ Our investigation shows that these studies report *all* transfer routes as illustrated in our proposed revision as per Figure 2, except for ‘taste → color’, which, although did not appear in their data, is nonetheless very much possible (e.g. *sweet color*).

Essentially, our modification to Williams’ original routes (ibid.) brings to the fore that dimension is primarily a tactile property. But because we recognize the multimodality of the senses, we find it impossible to divorce all aspects of dimension from vision. Our emphasis here, however, is that vision on its own (i.e. color) transfers only to audition (i.e. sound) and requires part of tactility (i.e. dimension) to transfer to others. Tactility, in contrast, transfers to *all* modalities freely and independently. Once again, predictions by Objectification prevail, especially its claims for touch as the sole experiential source for concreteness and OBJECT as the de facto ultimate source domain. Tables 2a and 2b below show, in figures, the sensory modalities and their ‘synesthetic transferability’ (i.e. as transfer source) as well as their ‘synesthetic targetability’ (i.e. as transfer destination), based on collated data from the above-mentioned studies. Although we have stated that

SENSORY MODALITY	TAC	GUS	OLF	AUD	VIS	
synesthetic vocabulary	touch	taste	smell	sound	color	dimension
SOURCE	4	3	2	1	1	4
DESTINATION	0	2	3	5	5	0

Table 2a: Synesthetic transfer tendencies based on Williams’ (1976) classification in Figure 1 above

SENSORY MODALITY	TAC		GUS	OLF	AUD	VIS
synesthetic vocabulary	dimension	touch	taste	smell	sound	color
SOURCE	4	4	3	2	1	1
DESTINATION	0	0	2	3	5	5

Table 2b: Synesthetic transfer tendencies based on our proposed revision in Figure 2 above

dimension is primarily a tactile property, here we partially maintain Williams’ (1976) treatment of it as an aspect independent thereof, i.e. for the purpose of illustrating the synesthetic transferability (and targetability) of the respective synesthetic adjectives, as in Table 2b. But evidently, even with this conservative count, touch remains the *biggest* source of synesthetic transfer. Very importantly also, notice that when tactile aspects are not conflated into vision, the data (collated from at least six different studies) converge to obey and confirm the hierarchy originally predicted by Ullmann (1957/1959), and the upward mapping from tactile to vision is duly preserved.

3.4.3.4. An OBJECT-based concreteness/abstractness scale

Everything that we have laid out in this chapter thus far has been a series of groundwork for the development, and ultimately the production, of our OBJECT-based scalar model.

Having firstly inspected some areas in CMT that are structurally most vulnerable and then evaluated some solutions by Objectification that can be integrated into CMT for the required reinforcement, we have been subsequently led to seek yet deeper answers in our sensory modalities. The result thereof is ‘the concreteness/abstractness scale’. As shown in Table 3¹⁸⁰ below, we have divided the scale into four main categories. These categories, arranged from the most concrete to the most abstract from left to right, are: ‘strictly concrete’, ‘loosely concrete’, ‘low abstract’ and ‘high abstract’ (henceforth to be referred to as ‘SC’, ‘LC’, ‘LA’ and ‘HA’, respectively; the term ‘category’ when not stated is implied). These categories may contain further subcategories, identified based on the experiential modalities involved. Interestingly, as we move from the concrete to the abstract, there appears to be a gradual shift from the physical (body) to the mental (mind), i.e. from *perceptual* (SC and LC), to *perceptual-conceptual* (LA), to *conceptual* (HA). Even a brief glance at our model would suggest that previous treatments of the concrete-abstract distinction in our field have been, at the very least, remiss. Notice in Table 3 below that when concepts are positioned on such a scale, one would be able to more effectively explain why some concepts are more ‘qualified’ than others to be occupying the source domain¹⁸¹. This is vital because most concepts are ‘more concrete’ in relation to *some*, but they may be ‘more abstract’ in relation to *others*.

	-----> concreteness decreases and abstractness increases ----->			
	CONCRETE		ABSTRACT	
Category	strictly concrete (SC)	loosely concrete (LC)	low abstract (LA)	highly abstract (HA)
Modality	TACTILE	gustatory>olfactory>auditory>visual	more imageable less imageable	the mind (cognitive and affective)
Description	can be experienced via touch	can be experienced via the other four senses	can be externally perceived	cannot be externally perceived
	tactile objects (material objects or proper objects)	non-tactile perceptual objects	external events or activities with physical components	internal processes or states and mental constructs
Identification	Szwedek's (2011) "ultimate source domain", i.e. OBJECT (density, boundedness/3D)	our proposal for an 'extension' of concrete category beyond OBJECT (<i>not</i> ultimate source domain)		
	Krzyszowski's (1997) version of The GCOB, i.e. Humans, Animals, Plants, Inorganic Things	synesthetic vocabulary from Ullmann (1956) & Williams (1976) (non-tactile semantic fields)		mental state vocabulary from ISL (Internal State Language)
Typology	source and target concepts in Objectification's C-to-C typology (metonymy-based metaphors)	source and destination concepts in synesthetic metaphor (non-tactile semantic fields)		
	source concepts in Objectification's C-to-A typology or CMT's 'ontological metaphors'		source and target concepts in Objectification's A-to-A typology or CMT's 'structural metaphors'	target concepts in Objectification's C-to-A typology or CMT's 'ontological metaphors'
Examples	firemen, aunts, students, newborns, ... whales, parrots, frogs, dragonflies, ... trees, flowers, leaves, seeds, ... boulders, sands, books, machines, ...	taste, flavor, sweetness, bitterness, ... odor, stench, scent, fragrance, ... music, loudness, pitch, voice, ... color, darkness, sunlight, shadow, ...	war, gambling, argument, debate, games, sports, career, enterprise, journey, wedding, marriage, society, party, excursion, ... experience, life, ...	cognition, thought, idea, memory, ... emotion, love, joy, disappointment, ... soul, virtue, morality, kindness, time, ...

Table 3: Our proposed scalar model for concreteness/abstractness of concepts

¹⁸⁰ We include here CMT's ontological and structural metaphors in parentheses to illustrate where they would belong on our scale, while standing by our claim that this typology is not unproblematic. In their restatement regarding this typology, Lakoff and Johnson have also expressed that this typology is in fact ‘artificial’ (2003: 264).

¹⁸¹ An extensive survey by Kövecses (2010: 28) shows that the most common source domains are HUMAN BODY, ANIMALS, PLANTS, FOOD and FORCES, and the most common target domains are EMOTION, THOUGHT, MORALITY, TIME and HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS (after Evans & Green, 2006: 297). The former confirms 80% (i.e. 4 of 5) of SC concepts in our model, and the latter 80% (i.e. 4 of 5) of HA concepts therein, suggesting that our scale may not be far from accurate.

Note that since this is our very first attempt at the model, we might probably not reject the possibility of a fifth ‘in-between’ category along the scale. But for the purpose of an exploratory investigation, we judge these four categories as adequate and appropriate. Moreover, due to the scalar and gradient nature of concreteness/abstractness, a flawless demarcation between any two adjacent categories may not be entirely possible¹⁸². For instance, recall the overlapping aspects between touch and taste, and between taste and smell. Our divisions, though imperfect, are necessary. In addition to Objectification’s strict criteria for OBJECT (boundedness and 3-dimensionality), various aspects of the perceptual modalities (neurobiological, psychological, linguistic, etc.) have been cited, and they support our decision to single out haptic/tactile from the other four modalities to constitute the sC category (i.e. the ‘strictly concrete’ concepts, or OBJECTS).

To recap, Szwedek’s sharp characterization of OBJECT (2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014a) is of utmost importance to our OBJECT-based scalar model for several reasons. First of all, it readily supplies us with a solid starting point, i.e. the *basest*¹⁸³ category of concepts that can be experienced 3-dimensionally, upon which categories for the less concrete concepts are then founded. In fact, observe that other categories are often derivatives of sC (whose members constitute *only* OBJECTS) in one form or another. That is, *non*-tactile perceptual objects of LC (e.g. flavors, odors, sounds and colors)¹⁸⁴ may be properties of tactile objects housed within sC, even if they may be so to varying extents. Similarly, external events and activities from LA as well as internal processes and states from HA also count as derived constructs (physical or mental) by humans, without whom these creations simply would not exist.

Secondly, the OBJECT criteria are key because they provide a firm and unambiguous cutoff point between sC and LC, which up until now has not been too easy to draw. For example, while one would very quickly and easily identify solid substances (e.g. ICE CUBES, ICE CREAM, FROZEN YOGHURT, etc.), and to a lesser extent liquid substances (e.g. WATER, OIL, etc.) as concrete objects, the ‘concreteness’ of gaseous substances

¹⁸² As stated by Johnson, “SCALARITY does seem to permeate the whole of human experience, even where no precise quantitative measurement is possible,” (1987: 123).

¹⁸³ As mentioned in subsection 3.4.1, attempts to measure concreteness/abstractness must begin with the domain that is the clearest, the most precise and the most complete, or in other words, the most concrete one. We concur with Jelec that doing the reverse, i.e. trying to map out the abstract domain first, due to its lack of structure, would not work (2013: 29).

¹⁸⁴ In perception science, non-tactile perceptual objects may be features of material/tactile objects, or they may not (see, e.g. O’Callaghan, 2008a). For instance, while ‘red’ or ‘brightness’ may each be a feature of a material/tactile object, ‘a rainbow’ is not, i.e. it is a visual object in and of itself, and it is only an ‘object’ as far as the *visual* perception goes, but it defies the principles of solid material objects. Thus, according to our model, A RAINBOW, though a visual object, is *not* an OBJECT.

(e.g. STEAM, AIR, etc.) may not be as immediately obvious, particularly to non-linguists. However, according to our scalar model, i.e. positioned within Objectification, STEAM and AIR unequivocally qualify as OBJECTS by virtue of our ability to experience them via our tactile sense, i.e. due to some degree of density they possess. And without having to get technical about the principles of thermodynamics, we would argue that although STEAM and AIR may lack boundedness and 3-dimensionality in their gaseous state, their conversion into liquid and solid states are possible, in which case the OBJECT criteria will then be fulfilled. Even if their concreteness will decrease in strength, accordingly, i.e. from solid to liquid to gas, they will still remain safely housed in the sC category¹⁸⁵. In contrast, *non-tactile* perceptual objects, e.g. TASTE, SCENT, MELODY, RAINBOW, do *not* qualify as OBJECT in our model and are therefore excluded from sC because they lack 'touchability'. But because they are still *perceptual* objects and can be experienced via any of the other four sensory modalities (and hence cannot be argued to be abstract), we consider them 'loosely concrete' and place them under LC.

The third important aspect of Objectification to our model is Szwedek's (2004*b*, 2007*b*, 2009*b*, 2010, 2011) identification of the four levels in Krzeszowski's (1997) version of the Great Chain of Being (henceforth GCOB) as fulfilling the OBJECT criteria. Indeed, this would immediately, and objectively, eliminate any possible doubts about whether or not 'breathing beings' (e.g. HUMANS, DOGS, BIRDS, FISH, etc.) should fall under sC alongside 'non-breathing things' (e.g. FLOWERS, LEAVES, ROCKS, RINGS, etc.). This is precisely because the OBJECT criteria make it clear to us that the feature of 'breath' (or lack thereof) is completely irrelevant for the OBJECT characterization. A methodological consequence of this for our metaphor identification would be, for example, the ability to objectively decide that (and justify why) the utterance 'Her *fear flew away*' contains a metaphor. This can be accurately accounted for by the fact that whereas FEAR is an HA concept, 'flying' is a feature of OBJECT (be it an animal such as A BIRD, or an inorganic thing such as A PLANE, both of which belong to sC)¹⁸⁶. In a nutshell, it is precisely the mapping between sC and HA, and the interaction between them, that would create this metaphor. And while most native and proficient speakers of English would intuitively

¹⁸⁵ Here is where we would need to draw the line from stepping into the very complex worldview of the physicist, which Szwedek has already highlighted in his work (2004*a*), i.e. the modern physics' claims for the total unity of the world, the ultimate interconnectedness of all natural phenomena of the universe, etc. (Capra, 1975, after Szwedek, *ibid.*: 168-173). For the purpose of our study, we maintain that the OBJECT criteria and experiential aspects of touch should suffice to contain OBJECT concepts within sC.

¹⁸⁶ The context would tell us if 'flying' here is to be conceptualized as a feature of a bird or a plane (i.e. in the case where the distinction would matter; though in some cases it may not, e.g. in cases where FEAR IS A FLYING OBJECT would suffice).

judge this expression as metaphorical, cognitive linguists have continued to struggle to *objectively* and *empirically* justify why it is so (and empirical cognitive scientists from adjacent fields continue to insist that we do so)¹⁸⁷. At last, we now have both the frame (i.e. Objectification) and the tools (i.e. our model) to do precisely this.

In addition to the OBJECT criteria, Objectification also equips us with a significantly improved metaphor typology that is far more coherent than those in previous cognitive metaphor accounts. It brings to light the role of physical elements of certain groups of abstract concepts that would make them ‘more concrete’ (or ‘less concrete’) than others. For example, in RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY, while *both* RELATIONSHIP and JOURNEY are abstract concepts, the latter is ‘less abstract’ (or again, ‘more concrete’) by virtue of it containing more *physical* components than the former (Szwedek, 2010, 2011, 2014a; also reflected in Table 3, p.124)¹⁸⁸. That said, there still exists a conceptual gap for a set of concepts that cannot be categorized as abstract (as they have direct perceptual bases), but do not meet the OBJECT criteria either (for they lack boundedness and density). In perception science, these concepts are known as non-tactile perceptual objects, whereas in cognitive linguistics they would constitute what we call synesthetic vocabulary.

Synesthetic metaphors, although researched in cognitive linguistics, seem to have been treated, thus far, as just another type of metaphor. In our view, however, the semantic fields of sensory perception have been grossly overlooked, especially since synesthetic vocabulary has shown to be occupying a wide conceptual space in language, and also, considering the centrality of embodiment in cognitive semantics. To fill this theoretical gap, we have assigned this particular set to LC to reflect its appropriate position on the continuum. Next, following LC on the scale is LA, which is made up of external events and activities with physical components. As per Table 3, members of LA category may be largely divided into two, i.e. those that are ‘more imageable’ are positioned closer to LC, and those ‘less imageable’ closer to AH. The LA category also corresponds to source and target concepts in Objectification’s Type III A-to-A typology. And although one may argue that ‘imageability’¹⁸⁹ is subjective and requires introspective judgments, our

¹⁸⁷ Pragglejazz Group (2007), for instance, proposes a detailed procedure to identify metaphor in discourse (MIP) with the goal to reduce subjectivity and increase accuracy in metaphor analysis. However, we have found that this method does not fare well in terms of practical research applicability, the reasons of which will be explained in Chapter Four.

¹⁸⁸ Szwedek (2010: 101-103) provides a much neater revision of Kövecses’ earlier analysis of LOVE IS A JOURNEY (2002: 7), which we have cited here as RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY, to reflect that in this particular case, it is the *RELATIONSHIP* aspect of LOVE that is metaphorized here, not LOVE as an EMOTION. Our model makes it unambiguous that LOVE in the latter sense belongs to HA, not LA.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Clausner & Croft (1999) on nonimagistic domains, and Lakoff & Turner (1989) on domains that lack images.

model forthrightly defines ‘higher imageability’ as ‘containing more physical elements’, in line with Objectification. Specifically, while the *physical elements* of any events or activities may be perceived as OBJECTS via touch, the events and activities *themselves* cannot be touched. For example, in WAR and SPORT, physical equipment is involved, i.e. in the form of WEAPON and SPORTS GEAR, respectively. In contrast, while ARGUMENT has PARTICIPANTS as its ‘physical elements’ (which would correspond to SOLDIERS in WAR, and PLAYERS in SPORT), its ‘defense tools’ are most likely mental and/or verbal, instead of physical. Understandably, therefore, the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is pervasive in language, whereas the reverse is still unheard of (if cognitively possible at all). And finally, on the most abstract end of the spectrum lies HA¹⁹⁰, which comprises internal processes and states, including mental¹⁹¹ constructs. These cannot be characterized by physical elements, and are not externally perceivable via the five senses (at least not mandatorily, for instance, one may verbally express that they are thinking about something, or may indicate that they are feeling a certain way via words, voice tones, facial expressions or even tears, but these expressions or ‘clues’ are entirely optional and concealable from the external world, as they often are)¹⁹².

Under the heading ‘Examples’ in Table 3, we have listed all lexical items uniformly in the *substantive* form. This decision was made based on several considerations. On the basic level, this is to adhere to CMT’s convention of expressing a conceptual mapping (i.e. X is conceptualized or described in terms of Y), whereby X and Y are often, if not always, nouns. On a deeper level, by having positioned our model within the framework of Objectification Theory (and having adopted its notion for OBJECT as the ultimate source domain and also as constituting our *basest* category, i.e. sC), consistently using the noun form in our model does seem most appropriate. Similarly, the four levels in Krzeszowski’s GCOB (1997) are also expressed as nouns. On a yet deeper level, recall Langacker’s (1987) distinction between THINGS and RELATIONS in cognitive grammar (subsection 3.3.1.1), in which he states that “an object is *conceptually autonomous*”, whereas relations (i.e. verbs, processes, events, etc.) are “*conceptually dependent*”

¹⁹⁰ The Internal State Language (ISL) vocabulary in HA in Table 3 (p.124) applies as long as ‘internal’ and ‘mental’ align with our criteria. In fact, even the psychologists’ usage of these terms shows at least 11 variations of the internal and/or mental state language classifications, ranging anywhere from 4 to 7 categories, and a total of 12 subclasses (see, e.g., Stein & Glenn, 1979; Gearhart & Hall, 1979; Hall & Nagy, 1979; Hall et al., 1981; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Beeghly et al., 1986; Kauschke & Klann-Delius, 1997; Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons et al., 2005; Slaughter et al., 2007; Lemche et al., 2007; Kay-Raining Bird et al., 2008; Kristen et al., 2012; Kristen et al., 2014).

¹⁹¹ We specify our use of the term ‘mental’ and/or ‘psychological’ to subsume both the (i) the cognitive/intellectual *and* the (ii) affective/emotional aspects of THE MIND, e.g. THOUGHTS and FEELINGS are both mental and both psychological.

¹⁹² We fully concur with Szwedek’s statement: “Those abstract words are not accessible to our senses; we can only perceive physical *symptoms* accompanying mental process and emotional states” (2009b: 330, emphasis mine).

(Langacker, 2008: 104, emphases in original). In Objectification's terms, OBJECTS (invariably nouns) are the *only* independent concepts, from which properties derive (e.g. in the form of verbs, adjectives, adverbs, etc.). The methodological advantage of this is reflected in the previous example, 'Her *fear flew away*'. That is, we are able to very easily, and reliably, identify the verb 'to fly (away)' as a feature of AN ANIMAL or AN INORGANIC THING, thus assigning it to sC (by virtue of it being a property of OBJECT). In short, the syntactic category in which a lexical item appears in a metaphorical expression is insignificant, and the identification of metaphor will still remain objective and the postulated conceptual metaphors will remain consistent¹⁹³.

In the course of developing our scalar model, we have made a number of meaningful observations in connection to metaphorical mappings¹⁹⁴ (summarized in visual form in Figure 3 below). The first concerns possible mappings, which warrants an important terminological clarification in regard to the hitherto use of the term 'domain' in CMT. That is, although 'cross-domain'¹⁹⁵ mapping has been used to indiscriminately describe *all* conceptual metaphors, our model requires us to deviate from this convention. This is because the Objectification typology and the mappings in our model (see Figure 3) have shown this to be inaccurate. Specifically, even if we were to hypothetically use the term 'cross-domain' mapping, this would only describe 3 out of 9 possible mappings (in fact, only Type II C-to-A typology maps 'across domains' in Objectification, while the rest map 'within domain'). Hence, to eliminate confusion and promote precision, we shall reserve the use of 'domain' only in reference to 'source and target domains', but refrain from using the same term to separate the concrete from the abstract. For the purpose of this study, we retain the term 'category' to reflect the four main categories in our model and 'modality' to show the finer within-category distinctions. As previously shown in Table 3, metonymic-based metaphor, synesthetic metaphor and A-to-A typology all reflect '*within-category*' mappings, which constitute much closer mapping distances

¹⁹³ A simple illustration of such lack of consistency and uniformity within CMT is Kövecses' (2000: 48-49) listing of conceptual metaphor ANGER IS TRESPASSING, which we propose would be best expressed as ANGER IS A TRESPASSING OBJECT, or simply ANGER IS A TRESPASSER.

¹⁹⁴ Our observation on the 9 possible mappings in Figure 3 (p.130) is *not* to be interpreted as us suggesting a typology different from Objectification's, because we are not. It is mainly meant to show, in support of Objectification, that the idea that a source concept must necessarily come from the 'concrete domain' (and a target concept from the 'abstract domain'), which is widely spread in CMT, is amiss.

¹⁹⁵ Unless, of course, 'domain' here denotes the specific 'modality' to which two mapped concepts belong (e.g. COLOR and MELODY), which may be acceptable. However, this could be confusing as the term 'domain' is *also* used to refer to the 'source and target domains' (as an *utmost* important theoretical construct in CMT). Within our conceptual framework, simultaneous uses of 'domain' to denote 'source/target domains' and 'concrete/abstract domains' could risk incoherence, and may be misleading (i.e. as we have already established that both C-to-C and A-to-A mappings are possible). Perhaps this has not been viewed as a problem within CMT because its concreteness/abstractness conceptual distinction remains vague (which, of course, as we continue to argue throughout this thesis, in itself is problematic).

than the ‘*cross-domain*’ mapping discussed in CMT. To illustrate, we have mapped out the following diagram to accompany our explanation of our scalar model.

Category	strictly concrete (sC)				loosely concrete (LC)				low abstract (LA)				highly abstract (HA)			
Scalar value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Modality	TACTILE (i.e. OBJECT)								more imageable (more) physical elements				less imageable (less)			
	HUM	ANI	PLA	INO	GUS	OLF	AUD	VIS					THE MIND (cognitive and affective)			
	perceptual								perceptual-conceptual				conceptual			
	< free mapping in all directions >				>>> with exceptions				>>> only				no within-category mapping (?)			
within-category mappings																
sC > sC	<i>Tom</i>				<i>iceberg</i>											
LC > LC					<i>sweet</i>				<i>colors</i>							
LA > LA									<i>journey</i>				<i>life</i>			
HA > HA													??			
adjacent cross-category mappings																
sC >> LC	<i>rough</i>								<i>colors</i>							
LC >> LA									<i>dark</i>				<i>excursion</i>			
LA >> HA													<i>war</i>			
non-adjacent cross-category mappings																
sC >>> LA	<i>rough</i>												<i>life</i>			
LC >>> HA					<i>bitter</i>								<i>anger</i>			
end-to-end cross-category mapping																
sC >>>> HA	<i>machine</i>												<i>the mind</i>			

Figure 3: Our proposed concreteness/abstractness scale (with examples of possible mappings)

To begin, consider these examples: (i) ‘*Tom* is an *iceberg*’; (ii) ‘Alex picked out such *sweet colors* for their room’; and (iii) ‘The *journey* of her *life* has just begun’. Each example maps a pair of concepts that belong not only to the same ‘concrete/abstract domain’ (per CMT), but also the same *category* (per our model). These within-category pairs, i.e. sC > sC, LC > LC, and LA > LA¹⁹⁶, reflect the mappings between: (i) HUMAN and INORGANIC THING; (ii) TASTE and COLOR; and (iii) JOURNEY and LIFE, respectively. Beyond them are ones that involve further distances, i.e. ‘*cross-category*’ mappings, such as ‘*rough colors*’, ‘*dark excursion*’, and ‘*intellectual war*’, which map category-adjacent concepts, i.e. sC >> LC, LC >> LA, and LA >> HA, respectively. Another type of ‘*cross-category*’ mapping involves an even greater mapping distance, i.e. between two non-adjacent categories. For example, ‘*rough life*’ maps sC >>> LA, and ‘*bitter anger*’ map LC >>> HA. Finally, the *longest* possible mapping distance (as transpired in our model) is sC >>>> HA, which maps both ends of the spectrum, and translates into Objectification’s Type II C-to-A metaphorization and CMT’s ‘ontological metaphors’, e.g. ‘My *mind* is not *functioning* properly today’, i.e. THE MIND IS A MACHINE.

After having seen the 9 possible mappings captured by our model, we began to reflect on *impossible* mappings, or constraints in mappings. Notice the hypothetical HA > HA

¹⁹⁶ For brevity, we use the symbol ‘>’ to signify the mapping between a source and a target. As in Figure 3, ‘>’ indicates the shortest mapping distance, and ‘>>>>’ the longest one. In short: ‘>’ = within-category mapping; ‘>>’ = adjacent cross-category mapping; ‘>>>’ = non-adjacent cross-category mapping; and ‘>>>>’ = end-to-end cross-category mapping.

within-category mapping marked as ‘??’ in Figure 3, which indicates that it is the only mapping pair for which we cannot think of an example, and are unsure is possible at all¹⁹⁷. Clearly, as shown by its three counterparts, within-category mappings are not only possible, but are pervasive indeed. Perhaps concepts in HA are abstract to the extreme that they completely lack even the slightest structure to provide as a source of transfer that could be mapped onto another same-category concept of a different aspect (e.g. the *cognitive* and *affective* aspects of THE MIND). And perhaps also, analogous to OBJECT from sC that is predicted by Szwedek to be the ultimate source domain (2011), mental concepts from HA may, in fact, be the ultimate *target* domain. Notice that in contrast, members from categories *other* than HA are able to map amongst themselves, albeit with varying degrees of constraints, depending on how concrete the particular category is. That is, the more concrete a category, the more freely the mappings appear to be (i.e. less constraints therein). Among LA concepts, as briefly mentioned earlier, mappings are shown to be in one direction only, i.e. from events with more physical elements (e.g. WAR, RACE, JOURNEY, ADVENTURE, etc.) to events with fewer physical elements (e.g. ARGUMENT, LIFE, MARRIAGE, CAREER, etc.), but very rarely, if ever, the reverse. The case for LC has been presented in depth in the previous subsection on synesthetic transfer routes (recall Figure 2, p.122), where mappings are generally from lower to higher modalities, with exceptions to audition and vision, which mutually map onto each other. And finally, concepts in sC seem to have the highest freedom when it comes to the directions of mapping amongst its category members, presumably due to their abundant properties and structures. In Objectification, this C-to-C metaphorization is composed of humanization, animalization, vegetalization and reification (Szwedek, 2014a: 350-358), which also reflects the four levels in Krzeszowski’s GCOB (1997).

Now, moving beyond the within-category mapping constraints reflected in our scale, the more general mapping directions (i.e. of the cross-category mappings) also appear to show a strong *left-to-right* mapping tendency. This would be in alignment with CMT’s

¹⁹⁷ While we briefly considered ‘*somber thoughts*’ and ‘*precocious emotions*’ as possible instances thereof, the interpretations came out as personification (or more accurately, *humanization*), where THOUGHTS and EMOTIONS are conceptualized as HUMAN, i.e. reflecting sC >>>> HA, instead. Recall the inheritance of properties hypothesis (subsection 3.3.1.1), whereby within Objectification, only OBJECT has properties and structures, which abstract concepts do not, but when they do, they are those inherited from OBJECTS. This is consistent with the HA > HA mapping constraint reflected in our model, which if shown to be true, would in effect support Szwedek’s inheritance hypothesis (2000a, 2002a, 2008, 2009b). And if this is the case, then one must insist that CMT’s notion of the ‘inherent structure’ in Invariance Hypothesis must be rejected entirely. This is because if HA > HA is in fact an *impossible* mapping (due to the absence of *any* structure in HA to provide as source), then CMT’s assumption that the target domain has any ‘*inherent* structure’ will have essentially been *nullified* by our model, which shows that HA concepts have no such structure. As for all other non-HA target concepts, their structures will not have been ‘inherent’, but rather ‘*inherited*’ from OBJECT.

prediction of the unidirectionality of metaphorical mapping (recall subsection 2.2.4.1). With our proposed scalar model, we can now see more clearly and more precisely that while unidirectionality does apply to cross-category mappings, they do not necessarily do so within-category mappings (that is, synesthetic metaphors defy this principle slightly, and metonymic-based metaphors defy it completely). Furthermore, although we do not yet have the tools to predict infelicitous mappings per se, the presence of a model such as ours could still be a substantial improvement over the hitherto generalized claims on mappings by CMT. Specifically, not only are concepts now categorized systematically based on clearly defined criteria and properties (both by Objectification and our model), metaphorical mappings can now be explained with much more precision than ever, and more transparently, too. The results thereof would include an empirically testable model and falsifiable predictions, i.e. either by having (a sufficiently large group of) subjects rate the acceptability of mappings in experiments, or via the discovery of conceptual metaphors that genuinely violate the mapping directions or constraints predicted here by our model and Objectification. Our own analysis of metaphors in poetic texts (Chapters Four and Five) will be the first move at testing some of these predictions.

A final mapping-related observation that we would like to mention here is a possible connection between mapping distance and metaphoricity. That is, our model predicts that the greater the mapping distance between two mapped concepts is, the higher the metaphoricity may be (recall Figure 3). This prediction is motivated by several sources. Firstly, Objectification's C-to-C typology, i.e. *metonymic-based metaphor*, maps only specific *features* of concepts (also termed as 'feature-to-feature' mapping; see Szwedek, 2011, 2014a). This implies more straightforwardness in metaphorical mapping (as well as interpretation), as compared to C-to-A metaphorization, and also places metonymic-based metaphors on the midpoint between pure metonymies and all other metaphors. This aligns well with CMT's claim that metonymy, which maps concepts from the same domain, is a more fundamental cognitive mechanism than metaphor (Evans & Green, 2006: 311-313; see also, e.g., Kövecses & Radden, 1998; Barcelona, 2003). Our second motivation is the notions of resonance and cognitive access routes of lexical concepts in Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM), i.e. the longer the routes, the greater the resonance and therefore also the higher the degree of figurativeness (Evans, 2007; recall subsection 2.2.4.6). Here, the parallel can be seen between LCCM's 'distance of access routes', which resonance and figurativeness are based upon, and the 'mapping distance' between two mapped concepts, upon which metaphoricity may depend, as per

our model. However, instead of modeling concepts in terms of hypothesized cognitive model profiles like in LCCM, our model takes (what we view to be) a much neater, simpler and more objective approach. That is, by spreading out the concepts on a clearly defined scale with predetermined values (illustrated in Figure 4 below with examples), our model makes possible an *objective* measurement of the mapping distance between source and target concepts. Put simply, one may liken this to measuring two specified points on a surface using a ruler or a measuring tape. Last but not least, this prediction is also inspired by intersense transfers reflected in synesthetic metaphors, and supported by what we have learnt about the nature of sensory modalities. In subsection 3.4.3.2, our short meta-analysis of results from six synesthetic metaphor studies that involve five languages reveals that ‘touch’ does not *not* synesthetically transfer to ‘dimension’¹⁹⁸ (or vice versa), but they both transfer to ‘taste’, ‘smell’, ‘sound’ and ‘color’. We suggest that this could be because transfers within the *exact* same sensory modality cannot, by definition, generate a metaphor. For example, ‘soft touch’ is not metaphorical because *soft* is a property of *touch*, hence no transfer or mapping may exist here. And based on what we have reported on hierarchy of the senses, i.e. ‘tactility → gustation → olfaction → audition → vision’, particularly in regard to the similarities and overlapping features between any two adjacent senses (recall subsection 3.2.3.1), it is reasonable to postulate that these would translate into conceptual synesthesia¹⁹⁹ or intersense metaphors, too.

Let us consider the following examples, whereby the difference in value between two concepts is to be taken as the posited ‘mapping distance’. Based on the predetermined (hypothetical) values on the scale, we predict that as the mapping distance progressively increases from ‘*soft taste*’ (5-4=1) to ‘*soft scent*’ (6-4=2) to ‘*soft melody*’ (7-4=3) to ‘*soft colors*’ (8-4=4), so would the degree of metaphoricity (see Figure 4 below). In contrast, the value for ‘soft touch’, if measured the same way, would turn out as ‘0’ (i.e. 4-4=0), because both concepts belong to the same sensory modality and thus share the same scalar value. In short, ‘0’ accurately tells us that there is *no* metaphoricity here, i.e. that the expression is *non-metaphorical* (as it is). Based on this method of measurement,

¹⁹⁸ We emphasize once again that ‘touch’ and ‘dimension’ are *not* on a par with each other, but rather, the latter is a perceptual aspect of the former (please refer back to subsection 3.4.3.3, particularly Figures 1 and 2, p.122, for details and explanation on why they are cited side by side here).

¹⁹⁹ During a paper presentation on the hierarchy of sensory modalities in synesthetic metaphors at an international graduate summer school on Cognitive Sciences and Semantics (Riga, 2013), with “Perception” as its theme, the author of this thesis was inquired by an adjudicating professor, Barry Smith, to predict a condition that may determine the degree of metaphoricity in synesthetic metaphors (also present in the audience were other prominent perception experts such as Fiona Macpherson, Mohan Matthen, Casey O’Callaghan, Charles Spence, and Dustin Stokes). The author’s response then was the same one discussed here, which had been well received, especially by Prof. Smith. Thus, we may take this as a positive indication that our predictions here are well-founded, or at the very least, would be worth further exploration.

we propose to apply the same principle and extend the same prediction on mapping distance and metaphoricity to other metaphors²⁰⁰ in general, as depicted below. Once

4	5	6	7	8	(hypothetical) mapping distance
TAC	GUS	OLF	AUD	VIS	
<i>soft touch</i>					4-4=0
<i>soft</i>	<i>taste</i>				5-4=1
<i>soft</i>		<i>scent</i>			6-4=2
<i>soft</i>			<i>music</i>		7-4=3
<i>soft</i>				<i>colors</i>	8-4=4

Figure 4: Mapping distance and hypothesized metaphoricity (with examples of synesthetic metaphors)

again, we reiterate that given the exploratory nature of our study, the values on the scale (i.e. 1-16) are, at present, our best approximates, and should be treated as provisional and experimental. But more importantly, for the moment, the scalar values are meant to illustrate how this model may be empirically operationalized. It is also important to note that ‘familiarity’ of mappings would no doubt influence any metaphoricity judgment. Specifically, frequently used metaphors that have become familiar to us would lose their metaphoricity strength over time. In terms of the testability of our model, participants’ metaphoricity judgments mandatorily combined with an extensive corpus concordance search (to pre-test the frequency of particular metaphorical combinations²⁰¹) may be one way to test (i.e. either verify or falsify) our predictions.

3.4.4. Design syntheses and general summary

Without a doubt, CMT research has made significant advances on various research fronts in the last few decades, and has been a very strong driving force behind cognitive metaphor research, as we know it today. However, a few core issues remain untreated, which have deterred its continuing advancement and unequivocal acceptance into the empirical research community. To quickly recap, some of its theoretical weaknesses lie in its mutual presuppositions about language and thought, problematic assumptions of Invariance Principle, and the absence of criteria for the concrete-abstract distinction. Objectification, on the other hand, provides us with a much sturdier framework to work

²⁰⁰ In fact, we may be in good company on this point. For example, Jelevic writes: “Sensory perception constitutes a plausible basis for more advanced processes of abstract reasoning” (2013: 17), and Casasanto states that, “the mind recruits old structures for new uses” (2010: 453).

²⁰¹ That is, ‘frequency’ or ‘familiarity’ would need to be factored into the existing mapping distance and metaphoricity equation ‘x=z-y’, if one were to consider developing a mathematical algorithm to determine metaphoricity strength based on the scale. But for now, this is nothing more than a conjecture and a visualization of hypothetical scenarios for possible future research (but does not directly concern the present study).

within, especially with its new metaphor typology and its precise characterization of OBJECT, as we have argued throughout this chapter. Further, its emphasis on the tactile modality, in effect, frees us from the undesired language-thought circular reasoning, as we now finally have a solid basis (i.e. the touch sense) to firmly anchor our predictions on. This will be scientifically advantageous for the clear reason that the body is much more directly *accessible*, and much more objectively *assessable*, than the mind.

This chapter has also been specifically devised to demonstrate how the incorporation of Objectification into CMT would substantially reinforce the latter's structural integrity, which in itself will be a further milestone in conceptual metaphor research. Moreover, an operationalization of the concrete-abstract distinction for methodological purposes is now finally possible, which was previously not, absent Objectification. Within a CMT-Objectification paradigm, we have been able to further expand on Szwedek's proposal for 'touch' as a legitimate point of reference for the OBJECT criteria. This was achieved by surveying current scientific research on tactility alongside the other four sensory modalities in order to understand their nature, functions and interconnectedness before beginning to postulate their roles in characterizing concepts with weaker degrees of concreteness than OBJECT, but which are *not* abstract. We have invested much time and effort into understanding the biology and psychology of perception in order to ensure that our postulations are well-founded, precisely because strong research results cannot be produced by a weak and wobbly research design. Our exploration on this subject has indicated that Szwedek has indeed started a series of fruitful conversations with his work on Objectification Theory. We hope that the model that we are proposing here, its work-in-progress status notwithstanding, will be effective in continuing Szwedek's conversations further (and hopefully as fruitfully, as well).

In some ways, then, the concreteness/abstractness scale could be seen a fortunate byproduct that emerged as a natural consequence of engineering a practical solution to a conceptual problem. And while the notion that concreteness/abstractness is a matter of degree has been long implicitly accepted in cognitive metaphor research, our project seeks to break this quiet consensus by bringing to the fore explicit proposals about it. The Objectification-motivated concreteness/abstractness scale presented in this chapter has been a result of that effort. Because we are working within a framework that defines metaphor as the mapping from the 'more concrete' to the 'more abstract', the failure to objectively state what is 'concrete' and what is 'abstract' would invariably translate into

questionable methods of metaphor identification, and subsequently, unreliable results of analysis. Our tasks are especially challenging because metaphors may (and do) appear in a variety of syntactic forms and units, i.e. they do not have linguistic indicators like similes do. Also, additional 'clues' (e.g. adding "metaphorically speaking" to sentences with metaphors) are optional and rare. As previously argued, while metaphoricity and/or concreteness judgments by a group of participants may be helpful at times, this method on its own and the results thereof remain, nonetheless, subjective. By having a scalar model (rudimentary as it may be) that identifies fairly precisely where specific concepts and their categories characteristically fall on the concreteness/abstractness spectrum, we should now be on a much firmer ground in regard to this subject. Conceptually, we now have a transparent, objective and 'sharable' frame of reference, without which we run the risk of 'cross-talking' among research colleagues (i.e. two parties may be discussing 'abstract concepts' but referring to completely different grades of abstractness). And methodologically, we shall be profiting from having a model that is testable, falsifiable, and replicable by fellow researchers, and thus, could be empirically worthy. Up until this point of the dissertation, we hope to have contributed to solving a core theoretical problem, the primary result of which has been an empirically informed model that is the backbone of our research design. The next chapter onwards will show how this model may be applied as a methodological tool in metaphor identification and analysis, and in testing some predictions by Objectification. Assuming a fair degree of success in our endeavors, not only would we have helped in further promoting CMT-Objectification as an integrated framework for cognitive metaphor research with significantly improved predictable power, but also in raising its empirical researchability by having introduced an operationalizable model that makes the testing and falsifying of hypotheses possible. And very importantly also, we would have achieved these goals by essentially returning to embodiment and the root assumption in cognitive semantics that conceptual structure is grounded in embodied experience, which in our view, has remained more of a notion than practice. That is, hopefully, until now.

4. Methodology of Research

4.1. Cognitive, linguistics, literary & cultural facets of the study

This chapter details the methods employed in our study and addresses methodology-related issues common to metaphor research, as observed in our survey of metaphor studies (recall section 2.3), as well as our own preliminary analysis. In this first section, we inform the reader of what investigating metaphor in poetic texts within a CMT-Objectification framework would involve and entail. We provide a brief introduction to the Malay language (its historical origin and its present-day status) and the Malaysian society for the benefit of the majority of the academic audience to whom these may not be too familiar. This is also in keeping with the cognitive approach that recognizes the cultural dimension of metaphor. The second section covers all aspects related to our research materials, preparations and methods, while the third section provides a short report on our preliminary analysis, which was carried out prior to the main study. The fourth section concerns the rating study on metaphoricity judgment, in which its results were used to test some of the metaphoricity predictions by our model. The final section concludes the discussions in this chapter.

4.1.1. *Linguistic analysis of cognitive metaphors in poetic texts*

As explained in Chapter Two, metaphor can be a notoriously difficult element to study due to its elusive nature, which could also be part of its charm. We have channeled a lot of energy and effort into designing an operationalizable model and controlling as many methodological aspects as could be controlled in every step of our study. However, as for the ones beyond a researcher's control, the best we could do is acknowledge those constraints and keep the interpretation of our results within the context of our study. This will be made clear in due course. At this point, we wish to quickly recap two very important points raised at the beginning of this dissertation, which are crucial to any metaphor identification and analysis attempt. In fact, these are the two most commonly misunderstood terminological pairs (particularly by those to whom the traditional and contemporary distinctions thereof are not absolutely clear), namely: (i) 'literal-versus-metaphorical' expressions; and (ii) 'dead-versus-alive' metaphors.

Firstly, it would be fair to say that those with a profound understanding of CMT do *not* take 'literal' as the necessary opposite of 'metaphorical', i.e. out of appreciation for the different senses that 'literal' contains, which are relevant mainly to traditional metaphor theories and to which we do not subscribe (consult Lakoff, 1986, for an illuminating exposition of this subject²⁰²). In short, it would be most efficient for us to avoid the theory-laden term 'literal', and to distinguish 'metaphorical' from '*non*-metaphorical' instead, as aptly urged by Lakoff (*ibid.*). Secondly, and not unrelated to the previous point, researching metaphor from a CMT vantage point means that we are clear about what makes a metaphor a 'dead' one and that conventional metaphors are *not* to be confused as 'dead' (Lakoff, 1987a)²⁰³. According to Müller (2008), the 'liveliness' of metaphor is determined by a two-level classification that comprises linguistic system and language use (recall subsection 2.2.4.4), which is not incompatible with CMT. The methodological implications of having an unambiguous grasp of these terms are crucial and far-reaching. And since we accept that novel and conventional metaphors employ the same cognitive mechanism (and thus did not favor either one in the identification process), it is expected that those who do not share our understanding of metaphor may likely reject a fair portion of expressions that we have identified as metaphorical. This is because those expressions might be inaccurately read as 'literal expressions' and/or 'dead metaphors', owing to the fact that they are *conventional* in language. Thus, while our metaphor decisions might appear too 'liberal' to our colleagues in the traditional camp, and to fellow cognitive linguists who are more conservative in this regard (e.g. those who view metaphor from LCCM lenses that reject conventional expressions as metaphors), we stand by our approach and have remained consistent in our analysis.

Another important methodological remark concerning our study is that it is neither our goal nor our interest to 'decide' which metaphors are novel and which are conventional from our data. In fact, it is doubtful that any researcher is qualified to be making this 'decision' on behalf of the population, as this is a subjective matter. To an extent, we may generally agree that some metaphors (particularly the highly poetic ones) could appear to be 'more novel' than others, but for the most part, one cannot claim scientific accuracy from such judgments. At the level of linguistic system, only an extensive

²⁰² Lakoff (1986) explains the four senses of 'literal': (1) conventional literality; (2) subject-matter literality; (3) non-metaphorical literality; (4) truth-conditional literality, and clarifies why *only* (3) is mutually exclusive with 'metaphorical' in CMT and the others are not.

²⁰³ The reader is invited to consult Lakoff (1987a) on why the traditional concept of 'dead metaphor' does not hold in CMT. He explains with examples that CMT considers a metaphor 'dead' only in the absence of *all* of the following elements: the source domain structure, the conceptual mapping, the linguistic mapping, and the source domain terminology.

concordance analysis of the targeted metaphor occurrences from a large corpus of data could empirically verify any claim for the novelty (or likewise, the conventionality) of identified metaphors in a language. Note also that a foreseeable drawback of comparing similar metaphors from two or more languages is that translated metaphors may appear more novel *post*-translation than they are in the original language, or easily vice versa. We will explain this in due course with appropriate examples, but this is worth keeping in mind throughout our discussion. At the level of language use, a conceivable way of determining metaphor's 'novelty' would be via participants' metaphoricity judgments, in which metaphors with higher metaphoricity ratings would often be interpreted as the 'more novel' ones. These rating results may then be used to confirm or falsify certain predictions made about metaphoricity. Our own study will address this in Section 4.4 below, and again later in Chapter Five. During our metaphor identification process, however, no discrimination was made among metaphors (which, in fact, ought to be the case due to CMT's widely accepted claim that the same cognitive mechanism underlies all metaphors, novel and otherwise). Furthermore, Cameron's (2007b) dynamics view states that some metaphors may be 'active' to some individuals but not to others, and in fact, the same metaphor may even be 'active' to an individual at one time but not at another time, depending on the context (recall the multidimensionality and temporary stability of metaphor). This 'process metaphor' (i.e. identified as an empirical event in the brain) could be detected as a neurological activity using brain-imaging techniques. Such techniques are neither available to us, nor are they relevant to what our study aims to achieve. To be clear, our focus at hand is to identify conceptual metaphors from our poetic data (i.e. songs and poems) and analyze their occurrences, which would be used to test the mapping predictions by our model and by Objectification. But whether or not they are 'active' to individuals listening to the songs or reading the poems is of no consequence to our study. To reflect this stance, each identified metaphorical item will be referred to as a 'metaphor candidate' (MC).

In addition to the elusive nature of metaphor irrespective of the discourse genre in which it appears, analyzing linguistic manifestations of this cognitive mechanism in our poetic data presents us with a set of additional challenges. As a form of literary creation and artistic expression, poetry typically contains an unusually high number of tropes alongside metaphor. They include, but are not limited to, hyperbole, simile, metonymy, idioms, proverbs, allegory, figuration, symbolism and imagery. The implications of this are threefold. Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that the interpretation of a poetic text as

a whole will differ (at the very least, slightly) from one individual audience to another, as is common to literary works. However, because songs and poems in our data relate to the theme of 'love', which is inarguably a universal human emotion and experience, this was not seen as an obstacle to our analysis. Furthermore, the majority of our data constitutes the *sung* version of lyric poetry, i.e. songs (as opposed to the *unsung* ones, i.e. poems). More precisely, the fact that songs are much more widespread among the general public compared to poems (whose target audience is a much narrower subset of the population, e.g. other poets, poetry enthusiasts, literature students, etc.) would mean that songs are generally less 'poetic' than poems. Secondly, it might be also expected that there would be more frequent and more active 'interactions' amongst metaphor and the above-mentioned tropes in poetic texts compared to their prosaic counterparts (for example, in everyday interactions, academic writings, news reports, etc.), because the latter, by definition, would not contain as many tropes as the former would. All of these aspects have been taken into our procedural considerations to ensure that non-metaphor tropes such as hyperbole and simile would not be mistakenly included in our analysis, even though they, too, may interact with metaphor in songs and poems. Thirdly, the language of poetry is known to defy grammar rules, especially in order to obey certain patterns of rhymes and rhythms of a song or poem, and the use of ellipses abounds. This would result in a potential 'clustering' of metaphors, as we will demonstrate later. Last but not least, analyzing metaphors in songs and poems also entails that 'contextual meaning' may go beyond the confines of a line or even a stanza, and often includes the context of an entire poetic text (or at times of a people's culture). Subsequent sections will detail precisely what we count as one unit of MC, and how this was achieved. In addition, knowledge about the cultural practices of the people, including their religious beliefs (or non-beliefs), is also important in a metaphor analysis.

4.1.2. A background introduction to Malay and Indonesian

The Malay language belongs to the Austronesian family, specifically to the Malayo-Polynesian subgroup, which is made up of over 1,000 languages widely dispersed throughout the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia. It is reported that despite its vast geographical spread, the structures of these languages are remarkably uniform²⁰⁴. The major languages from this language family are Malay and Indonesian,

²⁰⁴ http://www.krysstal.com/langfams_malayo.html

which stem from the Western branch of Austronesian. Their closer relatives include Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Acehnese and Tagalog, while the more distant ones include Fijian, Maori, Samoan, Tahitian and Hawaiian. The question whether Malay and Indonesian are dialects or varieties of the same language or two distinct languages in their own right is not an easy one to answer. Linguists themselves appear to remain divided on this issue, and historical and political aspects thereof complicate things even further. At present, *Bahasa Melayu* ('the Malay language') is the national and official language of Malaysia, the official language of Brunei, and one of the four official languages of Singapore. In Malaysia, the Malay language is also commonly termed as *Bahasa Malaysia* ('the Malaysian language') to reflect (and to continuously promote) national unity among its multicultural population, i.e. about 50% of whom are not ethnically Malay. In Indonesia, *Bahasa Indonesia* ('the Indonesian language') is both the national and official language of the country, whereas Malay is listed as one of the most spoken languages in Indonesia, i.e. after Indonesian and Javanese²⁰⁵. To reflect a more precise linguistic classification of these languages *independent* of geographical or political borders, Malay and Indonesian are also at times referred to as 'the Malayan language(s)', with varying extents of mutual (un)intelligibility amongst their speakers (Hammarström et al., 2017). Based on archaeological and linguistic evidence, historical linguists believe that the homeland of Proto-Austronesian speakers between 4000 and 3000 BCE was the modern-day Taiwan (Andaya, 2001: 317). Upon outward migrations by its people between 2500 and 1500 BCE to various parts of Southeast Asia, Proto-Malayo-Polynesian began to break up, and its descendent Proto-Malay is thought to be ancestor to Old Malay (ibid.: 318). The earliest written evidence of Old Malay in the Malay Archipelago was found in stone inscriptions dated 683 CE in southern Sumatra (Robson, 2004: 15).

Fast-forwarding to over a millennium later, its modern descendant language (which was, until the earlier part of the 20th century, spoken by groups of people with a shared cultural root in the region) was officially split upon the formations of two independent nations, post-Western colonization. Specifically, Indonesia gained its independence from the Dutch in 1945 and Malaysia from the British in 1954 (the name 'Malaysia', however, was only officially coined in 1963, before which time it was known as 'Federation of Malaya'). The national formations of both Indonesia and Malaysia were

²⁰⁵ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia>

consequential to the independent linguistic developments of what are now distinctly known as Indonesian and Malay, but which are, at the very least, recognized by their native speakers as 'sister languages'. Not surprisingly, separate growths in the social, cultural, economic and political spheres of the now two 'peoples' of two different nations have paved way for and resulted in not insignificant linguistic variations at every level, i.e. phonological, grammatical and lexical. Moreover, influences from each nation's former colonizers (the British in Malaysia, and the Dutch in Indonesia) only further widened the gap between Malay and Indonesian, as reflected in their modern vocabularies (ibid.: 31-34). For the purpose of our study, we consider the classification of Malay and Indonesian as variants of the Malayan language as satisfactory.

4.1.3. Present-day Malay in multiethnic Malaysia

In Malaysia, the Malay language continues to retain the Arabic script (*Jawi*), which reflects the Islamic influence on the language and culture of the people, even post-British colonization. To date, *Jawi* continues to be taught in public schools to Muslim pupils and students, remains active in daily use amongst conservative Muslim Malays especially the elderly, and is still in print in a weekly edition of a national newspaper, *Utusan Melayu* ('The Malay Messenger'). However, compared to the status of *Jawi* as an official script in Brunei, the role of *Jawi* in Malaysia is peripheral indeed, and has taken a backseat to the Latin script (*Rumi*) after the latter was declared the official script for Malay since the National Language Act 1963/1967 (Malaysian Attorney General Chambers, [1993/1999]/2006). To illustrate, the Malay word for 'thank you' can be written and read both in the Latin script as '*terima kasih*' and in the Arabic script as 'ترىما كاسه', albeit a common preference for the former. The same Act also allows the use of the nation's colonial language English in some official administrative matters (ibid.). While only in one out of 13 states in Malaysia (i.e. Sarawak) recognizes English as its official state language alongside Malay, English remains an active second language in the country and is taught in school as a compulsory subject to Malaysians between 7 and 17 years of age. According to EF English Proficiency Index (EF EPI)²⁰⁶, English proficiency among Malaysians is rated at about 60% nationwide, although this could be heavily skewed toward the privileged urban demographics in big cities such as Klang Valley ('Greater Kuala Lumpur'), Georgetown and Ipoh. Although officially,

²⁰⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EF_English_Proficiency_Index

the English language taught in Malaysian public schools adopts the British system (due to the colonial history), in practice, however, this appears to be limited mainly to the British *spelling* system. Due to the rapid inflow of American media, American English heavily influences the Malaysian Standard English. That is, American pronunciations, word choices, and urban slangs are increasingly preferred over those of the British. According to *The Encyclopedia of Malaysia: Languages and Literature*, only a very small percentage of Malaysians speak with acrolect (near-native) English proficiency, whereas most academics, professionals and English-educated Malaysians speak the mesolect variety²⁰⁷ (Omar, 2005: 61). Malaysian Standard English, which falls under the mesolect category, has phonological, grammatical and lexical components of (aside from American English) Malay, Chinese and Indian languages. In daily usage, most Malaysians speak the ‘Manglish’ variety, i.e. Malaysian Colloquial English, which is an English-based creole with structures and vocabulary from Malay, Chinese (e.g. Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien) and Indian (e.g. Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu) languages. This variety, almost completely unintelligible to native speakers of English, may be said to be the de facto primary and most actively spoken language of the multiethnic urban populations in Malaysia.

It is important to understand that due to the highly multilingual, multicultural and multi-religious nature of the Malaysian society, as well as the vastly distinct historical backgrounds of its three largest ethnic groups (i.e. the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians), Manglish has become the unofficial lingua franca accepted by (most groups within) each of these ethnic groups. This is perhaps due to its ‘ethnically neutral’ (or more precisely, ‘ethnically mixed’) status, which also seems to be a solidarity factor that unites the Malaysians, in ways that the Malay language has unfortunately failed to do (as opposed to Indonesian in Indonesia). This is likely because the ‘Malay’ language in Malaysia is still thought of as ‘belonging’ exclusively to the Malay ethnic group. In contrast, the ‘Indonesian’ language (whose name is not attached to any ethnic group and carries no connotation of a racial preference or subcultural dominance) seems to have had greater success in the integration of an also multiethnic nation, Indonesia. An unfortunate result of the situation in Malaysia for the Malay language is its decreasing preference and declining influence, even amongst its own native speakers. In fact, its strongest competition is not coming from the other native languages of the Malaysians

²⁰⁷ Mesolect is the intermediate point on the acrolect-mesolect-basilect continuum, based on Stewart’s (1965) proposed stratification.

(Mandarin, Cantonese or Tamil), but rather from Manglish (in daily use) and Malaysian English (in official affairs). This is especially true among the younger generations of the urban Malays, to whom Malay is merely a tedious and uninteresting subject to learn in class and pass in exams. Therefore, unless serious efforts are taken by policy makers in to permanently remedy this situation, i.e. by way of reawakening a genuine interest in the Malay language among Malaysians across the board (without any need to deny other languages, local or foreign), there is a good chance that Malay would sooner than expected suffer the same fate at the hands of Manglish, i.e. in the way that *Jawi* did at the hands of the *Rumi* script. And naturally, the loss of a language would entail the loss of its rich literature and along with it, the loss of a precious culture, as well.

While suffering a declining influence at home, the standing of the Malay language in the international academic arena is no better, having only a marginal presence therein, at best. This is unfortunate considering the surprisingly large number of speakers it is reported to have. While we recognize that estimates tend to vary, according to a recent report, the Malay/Indonesian language (inclusive of the varieties in Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Indonesia) has a combined total of 281 million speakers worldwide, positioning it as the 6th most spoken language in the world²⁰⁸. The same survey lists Russian and French as the 7th and the 8th with 275 million and 272 million speakers worldwide, respectively. Of course, we are aware that one modest contribution that is this doctoral project would not transform the scenario for the Malay language in either of the two arenas. However, we do believe that our study will contribute toward filling a clear research gap, among others by further introducing some aspects of the Malay language (and indirectly also, the culture of its people) to cognitive linguistics research, wherein it remains relatively understudied. Moreover, considering the serious scarcity of metaphor studies in Malay and Indonesian (as our survey in section 2.3 has shown), it is also hoped that this investigation will trigger serious interest in this subject among other Malay- and Indonesian-speaking students and researchers, too.

4.2. Research materials and preparations

This section presents all aspects related to our research materials and the steps leading up to the data analysis. In view of the exploratory nature of our project, a preliminary

²⁰⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_languages_by_total_number_of_speakers

analysis with a small sample of data was conducted prior to the main study. Results of the former had been used to inform our method-related decisions for the latter, as we will explain in this section. A short report on the preliminary study will be presented in Section 4.3, including technical issues and methodological problems encountered at the analysis stage. Consequently, everything that we had learnt from our shortcomings and mistakes during the preliminary phase had been put to use in improving and refining the methods of identification and analysis for our main study. Finally, we reiterate that although this work was not designed to be empirical in nature (due to the *poetic* nature of our data, among others), it does always take into consideration various aspects of empirical research, both in its design and execution. The results of our analyses will be presented in quantitative as well as qualitative formats in Chapter Five.

4.2.1. Aims

The goals of the main study have been to excavate and catalogue conceptual metaphors in Malay and English poetic texts (songs and poems), and to provide cross-linguistic and intercultural comparisons thereof. This has been achieved via systematic metaphor identification and analysis procedures, as reported below. Specifically, we intended to study to what extent the speakers of Malay and English share their conceptualizations of thoughts and feelings, and in what ways they may diverge. In addition, we have been curious to learn which types of abstract concepts appear most frequently in the target domain and which of their concrete counterparts function as the biggest source domain, i.e. in songs and poems of both languages, contrastively. As previously explained, we have taken advantage of having accumulated a large pool of metaphors from our data to test some of the hypotheses put forward by Szwedek via the theory of Objectification, particularly the ones related to the new metaphor typology and OBJECT as the ultimate source domain. In the same breath, the analysis results could also be used to test the predictions generated by our scalar model, e.g. the constraints in mapping directions, and the relations between metaphoricity and mapping distance.

4.2.2. Data

Because we have set out from the very beginning to make this study an empirically informed one, we have been very discerning about the various methodological aspects of the study, including the sources of our data. More specifically, we have targeted the

specific genre of lyric poetry in two varying modalities: the first one has its texts sung with accompanying melody (i.e. songs), while the second is the conventionally unsung written works (i.e. poems). In addition to being widely appreciated for their artistic and literary values, songs and poems are also outlets for deep personal thoughts and strong personal feelings. This would make them, in our view, a rich, potent and ideal source for investigating metaphors of the human mind, and extremely invaluable in regard to our quest to better understand both our cognitive and emotional faculties.

4.2.2.1. Criteria and sources of data

A big methodological advantage of having a set of data that comprises songs is that we could have a virtually inexhaustible corpus at our disposal. This makes establishing a large databank relatively unproblematic, thereby providing us with a quantitative edge, especially for the quantitative part of our project. Qualitatively, since we are comparing data from two languages, narrowing down our focus to the universal theme of love would make the cross-linguistic and intercultural comparability (i.e. for our qualitative analysis) all the more interesting. Because songs are usually aired and popularized in the media (traditionally via radio and television, and more recently via various internet platforms), the length of songs for both languages is typically uniform, usually between 3:30 and 4:30, but rarely much longer. This would make for another fair and effective cross-linguistic comparison. Poems, on the other hand, do not have any length limit or regularity, that is, one can be as short as a few lines, and another can be as long as any number of pages. So, for the selection of poems, we had targeted the same approximate length as the songs, i.e. an average of about 20-30 lines per poem, but not significantly longer. At the start of this project, we had initially intended to investigate Indonesian and Malay poetic texts alongside each other. However, after having conducted our pilot study (reported in Section 4.3 below), we have found that while Indonesian and Malay may not be identical enough to be studied as one language, they are also not different enough to allow for other aspects of comparison. Finally, we arrived at the decision to compare two genetically distant languages, Malay and English, instead.

Other variable controls for our data sources (to ensure optimal comparability between Malay and English) include the subgenre of the poetic texts, the degree of their general popularity, and the approximate time period in which they were popularized and/or published. For the song category, we specified that data from both languages should be

of the ballad or R&B subgenre, which are typical of the universal theme of love. This means that traditional folk or ethnic songs, urban hip-hop or youth rap songs, religious hymns, etc., were automatically discounted from our data selection. And because we also wanted data from both languages to have a comparable degree of popularity and influence amongst the general public, we included an additional selection criterion, i.e. an award-winning status. Specifically, songs that were to enter our databank needed to have occupied the top three positions on national top charts within the said category for the most popular music of the year in Malaysia and in the USA (i.e. for the Malay and the English data, respectively). This criterion reflects a fair level of familiarity with the songs among the general population of these countries. This also carries with it the implication that metaphors embedded in these popular and popularized songs may play a not insignificant role in potentially influencing, if not molding, the conceptualization of love and other love-related concepts among the Malaysians and the Americans of the respective time periods. Chart-topping Malay songs selected for our study are those that had won the annual award for the most popular songs in Malaysia, i.e. *Anugerah Juara Lagu* ('Song Championship Awards'). Their counterparts that make up our English data are those that had topped the USA's Billboard Charts within the same time period. But while the history of the latter dates back to 1940, the former was only conceived in 1986, which means that selected data from both languages must not be any earlier than 1986 so that the song eras of both languages and countries would match. Based on our preliminary study with a data sample of 10 songs, a song would contain an average of about 15 metaphors (we report the details below in Section 4.3). And finally, because our target had been to obtain well over 1,000 metaphorical items from both languages, combined (to achieve statistical credibility), a total of 72 pieces of poetic texts, i.e. 36 pieces per language, was considered a fair number for our databank. The finer category breakdowns of the data will be presented below.

4.2.2.2. Acquisition of data

While the previously mentioned parameters (i.e. length, subgenre, popularity and time period) have been relatively easy to meet for data in the song category, the same set of criteria for the poem category required slight adjustments. Firstly, the length of poems is not as uniform as that of songs, although we have, of course, done our best to keep the differences within a reasonable range (see Table 4 below). Secondly, although all of the poems do still fall under the subgenre of lyric poetry, their individual themes vary

slightly. For example, although the theme of love is still present, it is not always the focus of all poems as in the songs, nor is it necessary that of romantic love. Thirdly, in terms of popularity, while we did manage to procure a set of award-winning English poems from the annual Lyric Poetry Award (held by the Poetry Society of America), a comparable category was not found in Malaysia and/or for the Malay language. Finally, and as a consequence thereof, the years of publication for the Malay and English poems have not matched as perfectly as do the data in the song category.

	MALAY		ENGLISH	
	Malay songs (n=26)	Malay poems (n=10)	English songs (n=26)	English songs (n=10)
Stanza (mean)	5	4	6	5
Line (mean)	24	22	32	21
Word (mean)	89	88	210	177
Play duration (mean)	4:19	-N/A-	4:16	-N/A-
Time period (year)	1986-2010	1966, 2001-2011 (1 unavailable)	1986-2010	2001-2011

Table 4: Summarized descriptions of all acquired data

In any case, we have endeavored to observe the selection criteria as much and as best as we could, wherever and whenever possible. Concerning data in the poem category, the Lyric Poetry Award makes available to the public only the poems that win the first place every year since 2000, and its organizer (the American Poetry Society) whom we contacted could not release the runner-up and third-place winning poems due to data protection, making our options for this category rather limited. Due to this constraint and various others in regard to obtaining data in the poem category, we finally decided that 10 poems from each language should suffice for our study. This translated to our data comprising approximately 72% songs and 28% with an equal distribution between the two languages. Table 4 above features the profiles of songs and poems that make up our data, with the acquisition of Malay poems being the least straightforward one. That is, no comparable award for lyric poetry was found, despite our extensive search. As a compromise (but while still wanting to maintain a sound level of objectivity and non-biasedness in the selection and acquisition of all data), we sought the help and guidance of a highly revered Malaysian National Laureate, Datuk A. Samad Said. Specifically, we requested that the Malay literature expert, as a well-respected figure in this field, to nominate the names of poets whose lyric poems we would subsequently include as part our data. Names of all poets, songwriters and music composers whose works constitute our data are provided in Appendix 1, at the end of this thesis. For practical reasons, all

texts of the songs and poems were electronically obtained as published on the Internet, both via official and unofficial channels. All in all, we have made extensive effort to ensure that every aspect of our data sources and acquisition is as transparent, objective and comparable as possible for a contrastive study. Also, none of the metaphors from our data has been self-generated (i.e. we played absolutely no part in their creation), and the criteria for the texts were carefully thought out and predetermined prior to data acquisition, with all sources duly attributed to their creators.

4.2.2.3. Coding of data

We present here information concerning the coding of our data. For reasons already explained in subsection 4.1.1, we will refer to each instance of a metaphorical item, i.e. word or expression, identified in our data as a ‘metaphor candidate’ (henceforth MC). Because we have been dealing with an incredible amount of data (i.e. a total of nearly 1,500 MCs in both languages combined), it has been imperative that every single MC is appropriately coded. Each code is unique to the particular MC it belongs. This has not only shown to be very effective for us during the laborious procedures leading up to the final analysis, but it would also make for a quick and efficient reference by the reader. The four categories of our data are abbreviated as follows: Malay songs [MS], Malay poems [MP], English songs [ES], and English poems [EP]. Table 5 below summarizes how these data were coded, which is the convention that we will be using throughout this thesis whenever any of the examples are discussed or cited.

DATA CODE			SONG/POEM TEXT	MC #	ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT
Text	Stanza	Line			
MS-01	1	1	Tiada guna kau <i>berpatah arah</i>	1	There is no use for you to be <i>breaking directions</i>
MS-01	1	2	Jika niatmu <i>meyambung kasih</i>	2	If your intention is to <i>(re)connect love</i>
MS-01	1	3	Apalah ertinya <i>di sebalik tangisan</i>	3	What is the meaning <i>behind the crying</i>

Table 5: Example of data coding format in the original datasheets

As illustrated in Table 5 above, all MCs are indicated in italics, whereas in the original datasheets²⁰⁹, they are underlined. For data in the song category of both languages, any stanza or line that is repeatedly sung within a song (e.g. a song’s chorus) appears in the datasheet only *once*, and each of them is counted as one stanza or one line, accordingly. Similarly, whenever an MC identified in a song is repeatedly sung, it is only counted as

²⁰⁹ Due to copyright reasons, our datasheets with the 72 poetic texts will not be published with this manuscript. They are, however, enclosed in electronic form and submitted as part of this doctoral thesis to the board of examiners for grading.

one occurrence, as well. To illustrate one of the functions of the data coding, every reference to '*berpatah arah*' (*breaking directions*) throughout the thesis will be tagged with its unique code, i.e. 'MS-01/1:1' (when appropriate, its MC number will also be mentioned, which in this case is MC#1). In many cases where two (or more) individual MCs are contained within a single line, they are indicated with 'a', 'b', 'c' respectively. For example, line 7 in stanza 2 of Malay song number 2 in our data comprises two MCs. They are '*cintaku mewangi*' (*my love makes fragrant*) and '*cintaku harum*' (*my love is fragrant*), which are identified in the data as MC#26 and MC#27, and are coded as 'MS-02/2:7a' and 'MS-02/2:7b', respectively.

4.2.3. Procedures

This section details the methodology of research for the main study, i.e. all the steps involved that ultimately led to the metaphor analysis. Note that the procedures applied in the main study are those that have already been improved based on what we had learnt from the methodology-related problems that we faced during our pilot attempt. Although a report on the preliminary analysis will be presented in an upcoming section (Section 4.3), it naturally preceded the main study in terms of the actual chronology. Figure 5 below illustrates the operational stages of our project.




Figure 5: Flowchart that depicts the stages involved in this study

The pilot investigation that was carried out at the beginning of this project involved methods of metaphor identification and analysis that were primarily intuitive, and thus lacked consistency and reliability. As will be explained in subsequent sections, this was problematic in more ways than one. In fact, we also looked into Pragglejaz Group's (2007) Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) and seriously considered applying it to

our data. However, after several rounds of trials (its report for a high level of reliability notwithstanding), we decided that the MIP procedure is exceedingly lengthy and time-consuming, and we thus rated it very low on suitability and practicality, especially for studies with constraints and limitations such as ours. For example, the MIP procedure for identifying 6 metaphorically used words in a sentence that contains 30 words (or 28 lexical items) occupies at least 9 pages of explication and justification in the paper (i.e. MIP's pages 4 through 13). The sentence that was used to exemplify the procedure is: "For years, Sonia Gandhi has *struggled* to convince Indians that she is *fit* to *wear* the *mantle* of the political *dynasty into* which she married, let alone to become premier," (ibid.: 3-4, emphases added but only based on the lexical items identified in the original paper as metaphorical). Moreover, the paper explains that this procedure was carried out by a group of 10 metaphor analysts, who are all prominent experts in our field. Put simply, employing MIP would have cost our project far more resources (both in terms of manpower as well as man-hours), which we unfortunately could not afford. And this was clear evidence that an improved method for metaphor identification that is more suited to our study was direly needed to produce analysis results that are consistent and reliable (and also whose implementations are possible within our existing constraints). This is especially pertinent when a large set of data is involved, as is the case for our main study. Thus, before proceeding with the metaphor analysis for the main study, we decided to rethink our metaphor identification strategies and tools. As a result, a new protocol for metaphor identification was developed, i.e. based on our proposed scalar model introduced in Chapter Three and motivated by Objectification Theory. Note also that for our protocol, we have adopted some of the proposals made in MIP, but with a number of modifications and refinements. We present this protocol and its application in subsections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.1 below.

4.2.3.1. A new protocol for metaphor identification

We quickly reiterate here that the design and subsequently the execution of this study have been framed within a CMT-Objectification research paradigm. Our OBJECT-based scalar model in the form of the concreteness/abstractness scale has been a valuable practical consequence of an effort to solve some conceptual puzzles in CMT, absent Objectification. Evidently, and not surprisingly, the purely intuitive method commonly and traditionally employed in cognitive linguistics research for metaphor identification and analysis did not provide us with the consistency and reliability we desired, as we

had experienced firsthand during our preliminary study. In contrast, the four-category classification of concrete/abstract concepts in our scalar model has shown to be much more effective in helping us achieve these goals. Indeed, we understand and agree that a certain level of intuition and introspection is necessary in cognitive metaphor analysis (as expressed by the father of CMT, Lakoff, himself²¹⁰). At the same time, however, we cannot stress enough here that a purely intuitive method of identification and analysis *cannot* stand on its own and will very easily collapse, especially in the face of a large pool of data, such as ours. We thus returned to the CMT-Objectification framework as well as our scalar model in an effort to devise a tool for identifying metaphor that is both reliable and applicable by researchers working with textual data. We summarize below some valuable and practical aspects of MIP that we have partly adopted for our procedure, whilst showing how our own propositions would feature some substantial methodological improvements for what in our view could lead to a more viable method of research. This is followed by an introduction of the ‘mismatch principles’ that we have applied on our own poetic data comprising nearly 1,500 MCs.

Pragglejaz Group’s MIP: A practicality evaluation

In the interest of time, we will only highlight here some key points of the MIP, i.e. for a quick comparison with our own protocol for identifying metaphors in textual data. The interested reader is invited to consult the original paper for details on MIP (Pragglejaz Group, 2007). To summarize, MIP’s four-step procedure requires the analyst to do the following: (1) establish a general understanding of meaning by reading the entire text-discourse; (2) ascertain the lexical units within the text-discourse; (3)(a) establish the contextual meaning for each lexical unit, (b) determine if each lexical unit has “a more basic contemporary meaning” that is different from the present contextual meaning, (c) if yes, decide if “the contextual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it”; and (4) if yes, the lexical unit is to be marked as metaphorical (ibid.: 3). For step (3)(b), MIP states that for this purpose, “basic meaning tends to be” as follows: (i) more concrete, i.e. easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell, and taste; (ii) related to bodily action; (iii) more precise as opposed to vague; and (iv) historically older (ibid.). MIP also explains that basic meanings do not need to be the lexical unit’s most frequent meanings (ibid.).

²¹⁰ Expressed in an email correspondence to (and amongst) cognitive linguists; recall subsection 2.3.2.

Here is the summary of our assessment on MIP, accordingly: (1) we unequivocally agree with the utmost importance of establishing a general understanding of meaning for the whole text-discourse as the first step in any metaphor identification; (2) we find that in practice, having to *explicitly* ascertain each lexical unit in a text is unnecessarily laborious and unfeasible (especially when large data are concerned), i.e. because native and proficient speakers of a language would *implicitly* recognize lexical units whenever they see or hear them (we offer our alternative proposal shortly); (3)(a) we also agree with the importance of establishing a contextual meaning, but not necessarily for every single lexical item (again, our explanation for this follows shortly); (b) although we do appreciate the idea behind MIP's establishment of a lexical unit's 'basic meaning' in this step, the terminology 'basic meaning' and its criteria are rather problematic and unclear (see our protocol below, which replaces MIP's 'basic meaning' with 'embodied meaning', i.e. based on our scalar model); (c) we find this step, i.e. in the event that a lexical unit has a basic meaning (or preferably, in our terms, an *embodied* meaning), deciding whether it contrasts with the contextual meaning, to be an excellent idea; and (4) if it does, then we propose that the lexical item be marked as an MC. As for MIP's step (3)(b) on the criteria for their 'basic meaning', Table 6 below compares them with our cleaner and clearer criteria for 'embodied meaning' based on our scalar model presented in Chapter Three. Lastly, we share the view of MIP that embodied meanings (i.e. our preferable term for their 'basic meaning') are not necessarily the most frequent or conventional meanings of the lexical units (although they could be).

MIP's 'basic meaning' (Pragglejaz, 2007: 3)	Our 'embodied meaning' (as per our model)
Basic meanings tend to be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – more concrete; what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell and taste – related to bodily action – more precise (as opposed to vague) – historically older 	Embodied meanings are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – concrete and physical in that their experience directly involves one or more of the following senses: tactile, gustatory, olfactory, auditory and vision – related to bodily action – precise and objective, i.e. not vague and/or subjective – (although we are not including this criteria here at the present time, we recognize the importance of etymology in studying metaphor)

Table 6: Contrasting MIP's 'basic meaning' with our 'embodied meaning'

Our evaluation of MIP's step-by-step procedure reflects our serious consideration of applying it to our data, prior to deciding against it. Although there are certainly aspects of MIP that we appreciate, our own procedure for identifying metaphors in textual data differs to MIP to a fair extent. Specifically, our procedure requires the incorporation of Objectification into CMT, as well as the operationalization of our scalar model. Table 6

illustrates our disassociation from CMT's tendency (as apparently inherited by MIP) to use ambiguous descriptions that we are not very comfortable with, i.e. 'more concrete', 'more precise', and the like, as they are susceptible to subjective interpretations. Our classification, in contrast, describes the criteria precisely. Moreover, MIP's emphasis on individual lexical items in identifying metaphors is incompatible with our protocol. To illustrate, while examples given by MIP in the above excerpt about Sonia Ghandi's political status in India contain metaphors in the form of as single lexical items (e.g. *struggled, fit, wear, mantle*, etc.), more often than not, this is not the case. As we will demonstrate shortly with examples, a considerable portion of metaphorical expressions involves a *combination* of at least two lexical items. A final remark about MIP is that aside from its procedure and explication for identifying metaphors in discourse, it also proposes a series of very useful guidelines for reporting the details on studied texts, their target readership or audience, data coding, statistical reliability of the analysis, etc. (Pragglejaz Group, 2007: 13-22). We have made it a point to observe and apply some of these suggestions in our own study, as much as possible. Among others, we include (both in this chapter and in the appendices) information on the sources of our materials, for transparency. Next, we will explain the roles of the three mismatch principles as our three 'checkpoints' for identifying MCs in textual data.

The three 'mismatch principles'

Because a metaphor could take the form of a single word or an expression, but lacks explicit indicators (linguistic or otherwise) that we can *objectively* pick out, conducting a reliable metaphor identification and analysis is a tremendous challenge indeed. Thus, a set of guiding principles needs to be incorporated into a protocol of a study that aims to achieve this challenging goal. Based on the analysis carried out in our pilot study, we have identified three most common 'indicators' that seem to surface with items that we marked as metaphorical. In fact, even more interesting is that there is a distinctive sense of '*mismatch-ness*' that appears to be the common denominator for these three types of indicators. Having extensively surveyed a wide range of metaphor theories, traditional and contemporary, as well as various models born out of them (recall Chapter Two), we have no doubt been synthesizing (consciously and otherwise) previously dispersed ideas in our own ongoing process of formulating new ones. In other words, we consider our proposal for the 'mismatch principles' as an amalgamation of previous and existing notions that accrue along the lines of the 'clash', 'contrast', 'violation', 'interaction',

‘combination’ and/or ‘co-occurrence’ between two or more concepts of different nature (or in CMT’s terms, concepts from different ‘domains’) that appear to trigger or create a metaphor. Our preliminary data indicate that metaphor is the consequence of an event that we now call a ‘mismatch’. There are three kinds and levels of mismatches, as per our discovery: (1) Value Mismatch (VMM); (2) Empirical Mismatch (EMM); and (3) Contextual Mismatch (CMM). Similar to our scalar model, our protocol for metaphor identification is also a work-in-progress, and hence may still need to be considered in its ‘beta version’. Nevertheless, these mismatch principles do supply our protocol with at least one form of ‘checking tool’ that gives the intuitive and introspective parts of textual analyses a structure (thus also more objectivity and reliability than otherwise). It is also worth noting that the sequencing of VMM → EMM → CMM as such is *not* arbitrary, but rather purposeful, i.e. our protocol requires that this order be so observed. Finally, because our protocol in fact arose out of our scalar model that is based on Objectification, those who do not subscribe to this theory and our model might not be able to completely appreciate its methodological applications. Ensuing subsections and the reporting of the results of our main study in Chapter Five will demonstrate these principles in action. For now, we will present the mismatch principles with appropriate examples to illustrate our points. Figure 6 below is a visual illustration of how the three mismatch principles function as serial ‘checkpoints’ in the course of ascertaining that an item identified as metaphorical does *indeed* qualify as an MC for analysis.




Figure 6: The three mismatch principles as ‘verification checkpoints’ during metaphor identification

The first type of mismatch is Value Mismatch (VMM), which is the mismatch between the values of two paired concepts, i.e. according to the points on which they appear on the scale in Figure 3 (p.130). As further illustrated in Figure 4 (p.134) with instances narrowed down to synesthetic metaphors, 'soft touch' does not constitute a metaphor because both 'soft' and 'touch' have the same value on the scale, in their case, '4'. In contrast, 'soft taste', 'soft scent', 'soft music' and 'soft colors' all involve mismatches in their values, i.e. '4 and 5', '4 and 6', '4 and 7', and '4 and 8', respectively. Note that although in the previous chapter, these examples were used to illustrate our prediction about the relationship between metaphoricity and mapping distance, at the present stage of metaphor identification, the *difference* in value between two concepts is absolutely irrelevant. Rather, it is the *presence* of any mismatch in the value between two concepts (as indicated on the scale) that counts for the first mismatch principle, i.e. VMM, to be met. In subsection 4.2.3.2, we will demonstrate this procedure in a step-by-step fashion with appropriate examples to show precisely how this protocol was applied onto our data. But for now, we return to a more recently cited example from this chapter to show the VMM in application (recall an MC from our data recorded in Table 5, p.149). That is, according to our scalar model (Figure 3, p.130), the expression '*menyambung kasih*' ((re)connect love) [MS-01/1:2] contains a VMM, i.e. '4 and 15'. As previously argued, native and proficient speakers of Malay could intuitively judge this expression as metaphorical, and thus, they do not need our scale to inform them of the VMM to make this decision. In CMT's terms, one may say that a VMM simply shows that the two concepts belong to different 'domains'. However, because our study aims to provide results that are as reliable as possible, an objective measurement tool is an indispensable part of our research procedure, and hence the need for the scale.

The second mismatch principle is Empirical Mismatch (EMM), which follows VMM, and often (but not always) presupposes it. The reason why EMM is said to presuppose VMM is because when two concepts belong to different points on the scale, it entails that there is a possible mismatch in our empirical experience thereof, too. Recall the example '*menyambung kasih*' ((re)connect love) [MS-01/1:2]. Because '*kasih*' (love) is purely abstract, it cannot be cut with scissors and then afterwards get (its already cut ends) reconnected again in the same manner that can be done to a rope, i.e. the OBJECT of which the verb '*menyambung*' ((re)connect) in Malay is non-metaphorically used with. In other cases where EMM does not presuppose VMM (i.e. when there is EMM but no VMM), the identified MCs are often found to involve a metonymic element. It is

important to remember that in textual data (perhaps even more so in *poetic* texts than in others), metaphor may be actively interacting with other tropes, especially metonymy. And not surprisingly, in our love-themed data, the most frequent metaphor-metonymy interaction is the metonymy of the physical organs HEART and LIVER as standing for FEELINGS in English and in Malay, respectively. Very common examples for these in both languages are ‘*my heart broke*’ and ‘*hatiku patah*’ (literally: ‘*my liver broke*’), in which we would first interpret the metonymy HEART/LIVER FOR FEELINGS, and then the metaphor FEELINGS ARE FRAGILE OBJECTS. In cognitive semantics, this conceptual phenomenon is termed as ‘metonymy within metaphor’ (Evans & Green, 2006: 320)²¹¹. According to our mismatch principles, these expressions at the ‘surface’ level (i.e. prior to metonymy-within-metaphor interpretation) do not contain any VMMs. That is, based on Objectification and our scale, both HEART and LIVER are unambiguously OBJECTS, while ‘*broke*’ and ‘*patah*’ are both properties thereof. The same may be observed in metonymic-based metaphors (i.e. C-to-C metaphorization, in Objectification’s terms), which do not ordinarily meet the VMM principle. At the second checkpoint, however, we will find that these expressions *do* meet the EMM principle, i.e. because it can be empirically verified that neither LIVER nor HEART can physically break. To illustrate, if one were to hold either the organ HEART or LIVER in their hand and accidentally drop it on the floor, the organ would be *damaged*, yes, but it would not *break* in the way that GLASS or BONES would. And certainly, in the case of the two organs in a functioning state inside our body (which the metonymy-containing metaphors refer to), the second principle, EMM, is definitely met. Thus, such an expression qualifies as an MC.

The third and final mismatch principle that guides our metaphor identification protocol is Contextual Mismatch (CMM). While we have already seen how VMM and EMM deal with metaphorical expressions that involve a combination of two lexical items, we have also established that metaphors do often appear as single words, too. In the case of metaphorically used single words, therefore, the VMM and EMM principles would not apply. Specifically, this is where CMM plays a very important role in checking whether or not an identified word qualifies as an MC. That being said, in some cases, the CMM principle may also apply to a *combination* of words. We will illustrate both cases with appropriate examples, along with additional examples to compare the three principles, VMM, EMM and CMM, in action. Firstly, most (if not all) of us will agree, intuitively,

²¹¹ See also, e.g., Evans and Greens on metaphor-metonymy interactions (2006: 318-321), Goossens (1990) and Geeraerts (2002) for a more detailed discussion.

that the expression ‘Jack’s *emotion is scarred*’ is metaphorical. Our protocol, of course, necessitates that appropriate verifications be done at the three specific checkpoints to objectively confirm this intuitive decision. Here, the identified expression easily passes the first checkpoint, i.e. VMM, because when measured on our scale, EMOTION has the value of ‘15’ and SCAR falls on the value point ‘1’ on the scale. Hence, VMM is met and the identified item qualifies as an MC. Note that this item would have also passed the second checkpoint, i.e. EMM, but the fact that it has passed the first one suffices, according to our protocol, and no further verification is necessary. The next example is a variation of the previous one, but is much less straightforward, i.e. ‘Jack’s *heart is scarred*’, because it contains a metonymy within a metaphor. This, however, needs to be contextually ascertained, unlike the previous example ‘Jack’s *emotion is scarred*’, which does not require any contextual verification. In the case of the present example, there is no VMM, i.e. because at the surface level, HEART and SCAR both fall on the value point ‘1’ on the scale. This brings us to the second checkpoint, i.e. EMM, whose principle may or may not be met because the organ heart *can* be (empirically shown to be) *scarred*, i.e. unlike ‘*broken*’ in an earlier example. Thus, we cannot unequivocally decide if EMM is met here, which then leads us to our third and final checkpoint, i.e. CMM, which could confirm whether or not there is a mismatch between the embodied meaning and the contextual meaning. Suppose that the discourse under analysis were to concern a physician explaining to a devastated woman the condition of her husband’s organ heart after a heart surgery, we may safely conclude that the CMM principle is *not* met and confirm that the expression is *not* metaphorical. However, the same expression in a different context (where it is made unambiguous to us that HEART is a metonymy that stands for one’s EMOTION, e.g. in a story about a romantically traumatized man named Jack), in which case the CMM principle is met and the protocol will objectively accept the item as an MC. Finally, as mentioned earlier, MCs also do appear as single words in textual data, e.g. ‘*wounded*’, ‘*lost*’, ‘*alone*’, ‘*drowning*’, ‘*flying*’²¹² and so on. In this case, both the VMM and EMM checkpoints in our protocol may be skipped, as only the CMM principle can objectively qualify (or likewise, disqualify) an identified item’s status as an MC. Considering the theme of love in our data, it is reasonable to expect that these words would almost always refer to our mental faculty rather than the physical. Nevertheless, having a *systematic* protocol with such principles will increase

²¹² By framing our study within the CMT-Objectification paradigm, our first and default interpretation of lexemes would be the OBJECT-based *embodied* meaning (recall subsection 3.3.1.2). This automatically dissolves unnecessary complications of having to decide which meanings are the most ‘basic’ at the later stages of metaphor identification and analysis.

the transparency and reliability of each (initially intuitive) decision a researcher makes. In cases where an identified item may or may not be interpreted metaphorically, i.e. depending on the audience and the context, our policy has been to accept it as an MC, regardless (as aptly reflected in the coinage ‘metaphor *candidate*’). Finally, although our explication for the three mismatch principles may have made our protocol appear a little extensive to the unfamiliar reader, the following section will demonstrate how this procedure can, in practice, be applied onto real textual data with relative ease.

4.2.3.2. *Identifying metaphors in textual data*

Now that we have presented the three guiding principles for our metaphor identification protocol, we will demonstrate in a step-by-step fashion how the principles were put to practice, i.e. when the methods finally met the data. Table 7a below features a sample of an Excel spreadsheet, which is a screenshot of our original datasheet that we were working with during the process of identifying metaphors in our data. The formats in both languages are identical except that for the English data, no translation of text was necessary and hence the ‘Column J’ does not appear as in the Malay datasheets. Note that the screenshot below constitutes only *half* of a complete datasheet, whilst the other half contains three additional columns (that is, for the postulated conceptual metaphor, target domain and source domain). This is provided in Table 7b in the next subsection, not only due to the spatial constraint that would make contents of the image unreadable here, but very importantly also, because it belongs to the metaphor *analysis* stage. In this section, we focus only on the procedures for metaphor *identification*, first.

As exemplified in Figure 5 (p.150) and also explained earlier in subsection 4.2.2.3, our data were first uniquely coded and formatted in Excel spreadsheets, i.e. before any data processing commenced. The data codes are reflected accordingly in Columns A, B and C in Table 7a below. As for identifying metaphors in these texts, four main steps were involved during the metaphor identification phase, and each is illustrated in Columns D through I in the said table. In Step 1, very similar to Pragglejaz Group’s MIP (2007), our protocol requires that a general understanding of meaning for the entire text be established during the initial read. Step 2 involves a second and closer reading of the text. Here, words and expressions that are identified as metaphorical by the researcher are marked, accordingly (in our original datasheets, the items are *underlined*, as shown in Column D above). Note that at this stage, the identification is primarily based on the

researcher’s intuitive and introspective judgments (native or near-native proficiency in the language under investigation is of course highly desired, if not altogether required). Next, Columns E, F and G serve as ‘checklists’ for the mismatch principles introduced in the previous section, i.e. VMM, EMM and CMM, respectively, for Step 3. As per our in-depth explication earlier, this step is crucial in regulating the previously intuitive and introspective decisions (that are argued to be subjective) based on a series of *preset* requirements to be met. These mismatch principles are, therefore, an indispensable part of our identification procedure. This is because they function as mandatory checkpoints that provide a set of methodical verifications as to whether or not an item identified as metaphorical will be accepted as an MC for the analysis stage later. This particular step is the closest to an objective method that we could design for application on such an elusive subject matter like metaphor (especially with data that are highly poetic and artistic in nature, such as the ones at hand). More specifically, Step 3 requires that each

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	
STEP 0			STEPS 1 and 2		STEP 3			STEP 4		ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT (Original Title: Sekadar Di Pinggiran) "At the mere outskirts"
Data Code			Song/Poem Text		VMM	EMM	CMM	MC #	METAPHOR CANDIDATES	
Piece	Stan	Line								
MS-01	1	1	Tiada guna kau berpatah arah		✓			1	berpatah arah	<i>There is no use for you to be breaking directions</i>
MS-01	1	2	Jika niatmu <u>meyambung</u> kasih	✓				2	menyambung kasih	<i>If your intention is to (re)connect love</i>
MS-01	1	3	Apalah artinya di sebalik tangisan	✓				3	di sebalik tangisan atau rintihan	<i>What is the meaning behind the crying</i>
MS-01	1	4	Atau rintihan							<i>Or the lamenting</i>
MS-01	2	5	Untuk apa kau kembali lagi			✓		4	kembali	<i>What is the use of you returning</i>
MS-01	2	6	Sekadar hanya untuk menyakiti			✓		5	menyakiti	<i>(If) merely to hurt</i>
MS-01	2	7	Cukuplah sudah di sini saja			✓		6	di sini	<i>Enough already here only</i>
MS-01	2	8	Biar aku pendam duka	✓				7	pendam duka	<i>Let me bury the grief</i>
MS-01	3	9	Hati sedih		<✓>			8	hati sedih	<i>The liver is sad</i>
MS-01	3	10	Hati pedih			<✓>		9	hati pedih	<i>The liver smarts</i>
MS-01	3	11	Mengenangkan keindahan bersamamu							<i>Reminiscing the beauty of being with you</i>
MS-01	3	12	Tidak ku sampai ke puncak sana			✓		10	sampai	<i>I did not (manage to) arrive at that apex</i>
						✓		11	puncak	
MS-01	3	13	Apalah daya bertahan cuma			✓		12	daya	<i>What is (one to do) the strength enduring only</i>
						✓		13	bertahan	
MS-01	3	14	Di pinggiran yang memilukan			✓		14	pinggiran	<i>At the sorrowful outskirts</i>
MS-01	4	15	Jauh sekali di sudut hati			✓		15	jauh	<i>Farthest away at the corner of the liver</i>
						<✓>		16	di (... hati)	
						<✓>		17	sudut hati	
MS-01	4	16	Menyimpan dendam	✓				18	menyimpan dendam	<i>Storing a vengeful longing</i>
MS-01	4	17	Yang amat mendalam	✓				19	(dendam) ... mendalam	<i>That is very deep</i>
MS-01	4	18	Akan ku sahut namamu oh sayang							<i>I will answer (the call to) your name oh love</i>
MS-01	4	19	Sewaktu ku kesunyian							<i>Whenever I am lonely</i>
MS-01	4	20	Lenyapkanlah kisah pilu	✓				20	lenyapkanlah kisah	<i>Do (make) vanish a sorrowful tale</i>

Table 7a: Sample datasheet for identifying MCs in poetic texts

underlined expression in Column D receive *one* passing that confirms that *one* of the mismatch principles is met. The protocol also requisitions that the VMM → EMM → CMM sequence be observed. No doubt, many of the marked items could pass two or at times even all three of these checkpoints, but for our present purpose, this would be superfluous. Figure 6 (p.155) provides a visual illustration of this process. Note that if the researcher is not able to *unequivocally* decide at one checkpoint if the mismatch

principle is met or not (as may be the case, sometimes), the item is carried over to the next checkpoint, and so on. In the event that an item failed to pass any of the three checkpoints, the prior marking in Column D would be removed accordingly and the item discounted from passing as an MC. And finally, items that make the cut to be undergoing a metaphor analysis are numbered and listed as MCs in Columns H and I, respectively, in the last step of metaphor identification, i.e. Step 4.

It is not uncommon for a poetic line to contain more than one MC, in which case each will be individually identified, for example, MC#10 and MC#11 in Column H in Table 7a (p.160), which bear the data codes ‘MS-01/3:12a’ and ‘MS-01/3:12b’, respectively. At the same time, it is also possible for an MC to be ‘splitting’ into two (or more) MCs, whereby an element in a line is combined with another in the ensuing line, e.g. MC#18 and MC#19. That is, while ‘*menyimpan dendam*’ (‘*storing a vengeful longing*’) [MS-01/4:16] constitutes one MC, this expression flows over into the next line with the reference of ‘*dendam*’ (‘*vengeful longing*’) as being ‘*mendalam*’ (‘*deepening*’). In the datasheet, we note this in parenthesis with a series of period marks ‘...’, i.e. as shown in ‘(*dendam*)... *mendalam*’ (‘(*longing*)... *deepening*’) [MS-01/4:17] in Table 7a, which indicates that the parenthesized item belongs to a previous line (or in some cases, a succeeding line), but together they form a metaphor. Indeed we have found ellipses to be very common in our poetic data, as are violations of grammar rules, presumably to make way for rhythms, rhymes and other artistic and/or emotive effects, especially in songs. An example of a lexical ellipsis can be cited directly from the above text, i.e. the lexical item ‘*dendam*’ [MS-01/4:16] whose contemporary meaning is ‘revenge’ (in this case, the feelings thereof, not the action). However, in a poetic or literary setting, the expression ‘*rindu dendam*’ is used as a fixed collocation to denote an extreme and desperate passionate longing for one’s beloved, often deeply suppressed. On its own, ‘*rindu*’ would be the direct equivalent for ‘longing’, but is nowhere near as powerful as ‘*rindu dendam*’ and does not capture the emotional magnitude that the latter could. In the song text, instead of ‘*rindu dendam*’, an abbreviated form ‘*dendam*’ is used.

If we had to make an educated guess for possible reasons behind the above-mentioned ellipsis, we would say that the rhythmic constraints of the musical composition and/or the rhyming or rhyme-like effects of ‘*dendam*’ with ‘*mendalam*’ (and in fact also with ‘*pendam*’ from an earlier stanza) may have had something to do with it. In any case, the implications thereof for our methodology of research include the importance of the

researcher's cultural-contextual knowledge of the textual data, as well as goal-specific translation decisions. As noted in MS-01/4:16, the English translation provided for '*menyimpan dendam*' is '*storing a vengeful longing*', which would best fit the present context, although is admittedly imperfect. Naturally, because ours is neither a literary discourse analysis nor a poetry translation study, we are bound by numerous constraints that prevent us from explaining every one of our Malay-English translation²¹³ choices over several possible others. And because the main goal of this study is to catalogue, compare and contrast conceptual metaphors in Malay and English poetic texts, all of our translation-related decisions have been guided by this goal. Therefore, even though for every translated line there had almost always been an alternative translation that would have sounded 'better' and/or 'more poetic' in English to fit the literary nature of the discourse, we decided to give priority to the translation that best and most precisely reflects the *original* metaphorical expression. In many cases, of course, this inevitably results in the translated poetic verses appearing rather skewed or sounding 'unnatural' in English, but it was one of the judgment calls that we have had to make to preserve the post-translation Malay metaphors, as best as we could. No doubt, we did our best to strike a balance between the two whenever possible, but this was not always the case. Moreover, we did make it a point to indicate in parentheses, in the English translation, meanings that may have otherwise been missed (or misunderstood) by the non-Malay-speaking reader, e.g. those that are implicit in the original Malay words or expressions. These are illustrated in the datasheet in Column J of Table 7a (p.160). Also, because the Malay language does not require the presence of articles for nouns (determinate or otherwise), and is as equally lax in its grammatical indications for plurality, we provide the English translation that best denotes each individual meaning-in-context.

As briefly mentioned in subsection 4.1.1, active interactions between metaphor and other tropes in the poetic data have been expected, as well. Naturally, it would not have been realistic for us to attend to each of these items in the final analysis, but we include a few important remarks thereof here. Firstly, our data contain both 'pure' similes as well as similes that have metaphors embedded in them. As for metonymy, however, the nature of its interaction with metaphor appears to be the reverse, i.e. it is metonymy that is usually, if not always, contained within metaphor, as mentioned in the previous

²¹³ Our Malay-English dictionary references are: (1) <http://prpm.dbp.gov.my>; (2) <https://ms.oxforddictionaries.com>; and (3) <http://dictionary.bhanot.net>. The first source is the official and foremost authority of the Malay language in Malaysia, i.e. *Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka* or the (National) Institute for Language and Literature; the second is an Oxford online edition of Malay-English dictionary; and the third is the very first Malay-English online dictionary, in operation since 1996.

section. This would make perfect sense, of course, due to the nature of metonymy that is said to be more ‘fundamental’ than metaphor, which we have also touched upon in previous chapters. As the reporting of our analysis results in Chapter Five will show, a big portion of metonymy-within-metaphor occurrences in the data involve the organs LIVER and HEART that stand for EMOTION in Malay and English, respectively. In Columns E, F and G of our datasheet, the checkmark ‘✓’ at the mismatch checkpoints for items that contain metonymy are noted as ‘<✓>’ to indicate a metonymic presence (see examples MC#8, MC#9, MC#16 and MC#17 in Table 7a, p.160). Observe how MC#8 involves an additional element yet, i.e. it is a metonymic-containing metaphor of the *humanization*²¹⁴ type. To illustrate, ‘*hati sedih*’ (‘*the liver is sad*’) [MS-01/3:9] features LIVER as first standing for EMOTION, and then given a life of its own while conceptualized as HUMAN. At times, elements from imagery and/or symbolism may also surface alongside, within, or as metonymy, in which case the same rule would apply, i.e. the *metonymic* presence is noted with ‘<>’. However, spatial and temporal constraints had not allowed us to look deeper into these other tropes, intriguing as they may be. Similarly, whenever a song or poem contains figuration or allegory that result in a certain metaphoric theme to spread throughout a poetic text, our present capacity only allows us to catalogue the *individual* metaphors. As interesting as it would have been to be able to do otherwise, this was neither realistic nor within the scope of our present study. Nevertheless, we deem it important and useful to be mentioning these concerns here to give the reader a picture of what identifying metaphors in poetic texts involves and entails. Moreover, establishing clear methodological decisions at the early stages of a study will no doubt go a long way in producing meaningful results later.

A final remark before we move on to our metaphor analysis procedure concerns the role of *prepositions* in metaphor identification. We have mentioned that unlike MIP, we view having to explicitly note and mark every lexical item in the data as unnecessary. In many ways, the process of identifying lexical items is already implied in our Step 2, that is, each time that the researcher identifies words or expressions as ‘metaphorical’ and underlines the corresponding items in Column D, accordingly. Moreover, results from our preliminary analysis indicate that lexical items that are usually involved in generating metaphors are the open word classes (nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs).

²¹⁴ The more commonly used term for this is ‘personification’. Here, we follow Objectification’s terminological convention that identifies such an occurrence as ‘humanization’, which is adopted from Krzeszowski (1997); see also Szwedek (2014a).

In contrast, i.e. with the remarkable exception for prepositions, the closed word classes (pronouns, determiners, conjunctions, etc.) do not, for the most part, trigger or create a metaphor. This is also evidenced by the fact that the varying preferences in the use of determiners in Malay and English neither limits nor boosts either language's ability to generate metaphor. This supports our view that MIP's proposal to explicitly identify and mark every single lexical item is uneconomical and excessively taxing.

Concerning prepositions, Szwedek discusses in depth how Objectification regards this grammatical category in relation to metaphor and ontological metaphorization (2009a). But here, we briefly explain the importance of this unique word class to our metaphor identification procedure. Recall that at the VMM checkpoint of Step 3, our protocol necessitates the verification of whether or not there is a mismatch in the scalar value between a pair of lexical items identified as metaphorical. Unlike other members of the closed class, prepositions have a crucial function in this step. Here, prepositions behave much like the open class items (adverbs, adjectives, and verbs) in determining whether or not their pairing with a noun would constitute a VMM. Hence, although our model does not explicitly provide any 'value' for prepositions on the scale, applying the same principle onto prepositions as we do the other open class items should easily solve this problem. As pointed out by Szwedek, "[t]he primeval spatial nature of prepositions is testified by their etymology" (2009a: 172), but that they are also open to other non-spatial uses (ibid.). This fact, combined with Langacker's (1987) distinction between THINGS and RELATIONS (recall subsection 3.3.1.1), may be taken to support our stance to treat prepositions like the other relational concepts.

In reference to our model, we assign the value *P* to signify 'prepositions' and also state that *P* belongs to the sC category by virtue of prepositions being properties of OBJECTS, i.e. concepts with values 1 through 4 on the scale. This would mean that, in terms of methodological application, all noun concepts that lack tactile features (in other words, *all* concepts that are *non*-OBJECTS, as defined by Objectification) would trigger a VMM whenever they are paired with a preposition. An example of this from Table 7a (p.160) is MC#3, '*di sebalik tangisan*' ('*behind the crying*') [MS-01/1:3]. Here, our protocol confirms that the VMM principle is met because there is a value mismatch between the preposition '*di sebalik*' ('*behind*'), which denotes a location or RELATION between two OBJECTS, and '*tangisan*' ('*the crying*'), which is non-OBJECT. A counterexample may also be cited from Table 7a (p.160), whereby our protocol assesses that the VMM

principle is *not* met in MC#16. That is, the expression ‘*di (...hati)*’ (‘*at (...the liver)*’) [MS-01/4:15b] fails to constitute a VMM because ‘*di*’ (‘*at*’) and ‘*hati*’ (‘*the liver*’) both belong to sC of our scalar model, i.e. at the ‘surface’ level. In fact, the EMM principle is also unmet because one can empirically point to a physical location where an organ LIVER is ‘*at*’. However, when one goes beyond the linguistic surface (that is, when one looks into the deeper conceptual meaning and the broader contextual meaning), it will become very clear that this expression involves the metonymy *HATI/LIVER* standing for *EMOSI/EMOTION*. Thus, our protocol confirms that the CMM principle is met, which we correspondingly indicate as ‘<✓>’ in Column G, with ‘< >’ signifying the conceptual presence of metonymy-within-metaphor, that is, via *contextual* evidence.

4.2.3.3. *Analyzing metaphors in poetic discourse*

As depicted in our project flowchart in Figure 5 (p.150), the identification of metaphor was followed by two separate procedures (the rating study and the metaphor analysis), as indicated by their diverging arrows, respectively. The former, although part of the bigger picture of this project, plays a more peripheral role in relation to the latter. In a way, the rating study may be considered as an annex to our main study. Accordingly, its execution was independent of our procedure for analyzing metaphors, and its results did not affect the results of our metaphor analysis (or vice versa). We shall reserve the entire Section 4.4 to explicate in detail the aims, participants, procedures, etc. of our rating study, while this subsection focuses on detailing the step following the metaphor identification, i.e. the metaphor analysis stage. As briefly mentioned before, we regard the identification and the analysis of metaphor as two distinct steps, methodologically speaking. We have also demonstrated at length that the step of identifying metaphors in textual data requires a systematic protocol to govern the initially intuitive decision by the researcher. For this doctoral project, we have devised a new protocol that involves a series of mismatch principles based on our scalar model introduced in Chapter Three, which we have found to be practical and reliable, especially as it provides objective verifications to subjective identifications. Table 7a (p.160) in the previous subsection features a partial screenshot of the datasheet we used for the metaphor *identification*, procedure (i.e. Columns A-J), and Table 7b below reveals the other half of the Excel page for the metaphor *analysis* procedure. We record the posited conceptual metaphor, source domain and target domain in Columns K, L and M, respectively.

K	L	M
CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
DIRECTION IS A FRAGILE (BREAKEABLE) OBJECT	DIRECTION	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKEABLE)
LOVE IS A ROPE-LIKE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, ROPE-LIKE
CRYING/LAMENTING IS A 3-DIMENSIONAL OBJECT	CRYING/LAMENTING	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL
RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME)
PHYSICAL PAIN IS EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN
RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY
GRIEF IS A BURIAL OBJECT	GRIEF	OBJECT, BURIAL
EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN
EMOTION <LIVER> IS SKIN	EMOTION <LIVER>	SKIN
RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY
MARRIAGE IS THE APEX (OF A RELATIONSHIP)	MARRIAGE	APEX (OF A RELATIONSHIP)
RELATIONSHIP'S STURDINESS IS PHYSICAL STURDINESS	RELATIONSHIP'S STURDINESS	PHYSICAL STURDINESS
RELATIONSHIP IS A BUILDING	RELATIONSHIP	BUILDING
INSIGNIFICANCE IS THE OUTSKIRTS	INSIGNIFICANCE	OUTSKIRTS
EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
EMOTION <LIVER> IS A ROOM	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM
LONGING IS A STORABLE OBJECT	LONGING	OBJECT, STORABLE
LONGING IS AN OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	LONGING	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
A STORY/TALE IS AN OBJECT	STORY/TALE	OBJECT

Table 7b: Sample datasheet for postulating conceptual metaphors, target domains and source domains

Upon the completion of the metaphor identification procedure, the metaphor analysis ensued. From our experience, this stage would be relatively straightforward, provided that the identification was carried out systematically (and hence our strong emphasis on the identification protocol). At the analysis stage, we follow the traditional convention of analyzing metaphors used in CMT (or the so-called ‘Lakoffian approach’), i.e. via an introspective postulation of conceptual metaphor. Note, however, that by incorporating the mismatch checkpoints into our protocol, we have added a vital layer of procedural control that many other metaphor studies lack, as demonstrated in our extensive review of studies in Section 2.3. This should therefore give our study a methodological edge and an empirical credibility. Moreover, because we aim to provide analysis results that are as clean and consistent as possible, the entire analysis stage was conducted in Excel datasheets, as shown above. In addition to listing the postulated conceptual metaphors for every MC, we also note the concepts that occupy the target and source domains, accordingly. This is very important to the quantitative segment of our study, as Chapter Five will show. We make it a point to record the postulated target and source concepts as accurately as we could (i.e. whenever possible, in single lexical items, but whenever necessary, with further specifications thereof). This makes the tracking of any prevalent metaphor patterns throughout the data more efficient and effective. Inevitably, another researcher’s postulations would vary with ours (at the very least, slightly), but due to

the *tacit* nature of metaphor, this cannot be helped. However, we hope that our much invested time and effort to produce a structured protocol will bear fruit and minimize such inferential disputes. We also continue to use the '< >' symbol shown in Table 7b above (which is consistent with its use at the mismatch checkpoints in Table 7a, p.160) throughout to signify a metonymic presence in conceptual metaphor and target concept. Last but not least, it is important to note that our postulations of the Malay metaphors are based on the *original* Malay metaphorical items, and not the English translation of the text. An example of this is MC#19, i.e. '*dendam*... *mendalam*' (*(longing)*... *deep*) [MS-01/4:16], from which the conceptual metaphor LONGING IS AN OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH) is posited. Although non-Malay speakers might be left to wonder (based on the English translation given) why the source domain is not listed simply as CONTAINER, the answer lies in the word '*mendalam*'. Specifically, the Malay equivalent for *deep* is simply '*dalam*'. But in this song, the lexeme '*mendalam*' was chosen by the songwriter instead, which gives the sense of 'great depth' (and 'deepening yet') that is not quite captured in its English translation. Hence, despite our best effort, many concepts just cannot be linguistically rearticulated by its translation with 100% accuracy.

4.3. Preliminary analysis: A short report

Our work flowchart in Figure 5 (p.150) shows precisely at which point the preliminary analysis took place during the course of this project. The former has been instrumental in designing the methodology for the latter. The objectives of the pilot study differed significantly from those of the main study, as it was meant to inform us of the various methodological concerns involved in researching metaphor. The pilot study, in effect, functioned as our information tool by revealing to us method-related problems, and accordingly, helping us design appropriate solutions for them. In other words, it was our vehicle in testing the waters so we may get a feel of what investigating conceptual metaphors in poetic texts would involve before embarking on the main study that was planned to be at a much larger scale. Neither the data nor the results of the preliminary analysis had overlapped with those of the main study.

4.3.1. Aims

Having taken place at the earliest stage of our project, our pilot study was aimed at answering a series of method-related questions. Firstly, during the inception phase of

this thesis, we had initially considered comparing metaphors in Malay songs against those in Indonesian songs. However, due to the largely unclear language-versus-variety status of Indonesian and Malay, a preliminary study thereof was in order, i.e. to see if they would make a fruitful comparative study. Secondly, we wanted to survey possible metaphor interactions with other tropes in poetic texts, specifically the nature of these interactions, and how metaphors are generally manifested in poetic discourse. Thirdly, results from the pilot analysis would inform us on the number of metaphors within a song, on average. This would in turn help us estimate the overall size of data needed for the main study in order for it to achieve a fair level of statistical credibility. Findings from the preliminary data were not included in the main study.

4.3.2. Data

The data involved in our preliminary analysis comprised 10 present-day popular songs, i.e. 5 Malay and 5 Indonesian. At this particular point, we had not yet ascertained the precise profiling of the data as in the main study (e.g. the year of publication, award-winning status, etc.), as these were not crucial to the aims of the pilot study. Thus, the data selection was relatively random, although we were clear that the subgenres of the songs were to be ballad and R&B.

4.3.3. Procedures

At this point of our project, investigating conceptual metaphor in textual data was still an uncharted territory for us. Other than having surveyed previous cognitive metaphor studies on similar themes, our own experience with any actual data was very limited indeed. Our procedures at this preliminary phase were thus equally crude and lacked all the methodological specifications and sophistications contained in our main study. That is, for the pilot study, we only employed the convention generally used in CMT, which, without the identification protocol (that was only devised *after* the pilot phase), was purely intuitive. While the pilot results did provide some answers to our questions (e.g. on the viability of comparing Malay to Indonesian data, on metaphor interactions with other tropes, etc.), we were more than a little uncomfortable with this unbridled method of metaphor analysis, and foresaw that it would have been highly problematic for our main study for a number of serious reasons. But most of all, such a method would *not* have been able to handle a tremendous amount of data that our main study was going to

comprise, and consequently, it would have failed to produce reliable results. In fact, we had attempted *three* rounds of preliminary analyses (but with the same set of data) in order to assess the level of consistency achieved by this purely intuitive method.

For the *first* round of our pilot study, the analysis procedures may be summarized as follows: (1) data were coded into Excel spreadsheets; (2) the examined text was read twice, i.e. the first read was to establish the general understanding of the text, while the second one involved identifying metaphorical items within the text; (3) occurrences of simile and metonymy were noted, i.e. both their frequency and their interactions with metaphor; (4) possible metaphor ‘indicators’ were searched among the items identified as metaphorical (this step was particularly useful in helping us formulate the mismatch principles that would later constitute the protocol employed in the main study); and (5) conceptual metaphors were postulated and metaphor groupings or clusters were noted. Observe that we did not separate the metaphor identification and analysis procedures yet at this stage. Next, we attempted a *second* round of analysis using the same data to test the applicability of Pragglejaz Group’s (2007) MIP. Unfortunately, although this procedure would have boosted the reliability of results, it had consumed an unrealistic amount of analysis time. Thus, we decided against adopting it for our main study on the grounds of research inapplicability. The *third* round of analysis took place much later, that is, upon the refinements of our research methodology, and with the same goal of testing its applicability on much larger textual data. The results have been encouraging and gave us the confidence to apply in our main study.

4.3.4. Results, problems and implications

The results generated by our preliminary analysis did effectively answer our method-related questions and inform much of our methodological decisions for the main study. Firstly, the differences found in the Malay and Indonesian data had been too negligible to make for a very intriguing contrastive study, and hence, we decided that our main study would compare Malay and English poetic texts, instead. Secondly, we obtained a clearer picture on the interactions between metaphor and other tropes in poetic texts. As explained in subsection 4.1.1, various constraints would require us to disregard other forms of tropes that may surface in the data. More precisely, we would only provide statistical counts of *individual* metaphors for the main study (i.e. as opposed to noting any clustered metaphor themes within a text). Thirdly, the final round of our pilot study

yielded a total of 155 metaphors, which translated to an average of about 15 metaphors per song. This helped us in estimating that in order to have a final number that would well exceed 1,000 metaphors for our analysis to generate statistically weighty results, about 70 poetic texts would be needed as data for the main study (recall subsection 4.2.2.1). Note that the first and second rounds of the pilot study took place prior to the refinements of our research design and methods. Major problems faced during the first round (in the absence of a clear model and a structured protocol) were the inability to produce consistent results of analysis, nor to substantiate metaphor identifications. In addition, criteria for concreteness/abstractness were still somewhat vague to us, too, at this point. Fortunately, our direct contact with a set of real data and the discovery of these problems had propelled our search for practical solutions, the primary results of which include an OBJECT-based scalar model and a protocol with the three mismatch principles. The second round (i.e. the unsuccessful attempt to apply MIP to the data) contributed further to the refinements of our methods, including the separation between the metaphor identification and analysis stages. The third round, finally, was carried out to test our now improved methods for metaphor identification and analysis.

4.4. Rating study on metaphoricity judgment

This section details the methodological components of our rating study. As reported in subsection 4.1.1, at no point during the metaphor identification and analysis stages did we discriminate between ‘novel’ and ‘conventional’ metaphors from among the MCs. We also stated that at one level, concordance analyses on a large corpus of data could determine if identified metaphors are ‘novel’ or ‘conventional’ in a particular language, based on their frequency of occurrences. At another level, possible methods of research include measuring neurological activities via brain-imaging techniques and conducting a rating study on metaphoricity judgment by a group of subjects. Naturally, we went for the method that was most feasible and suited for our project, which was the latter.

4.4.1. Aims

Not unlike those of the preliminary study, the execution as well as the results of our rating study had been independent of the main study. The rating study was aimed at finding out which metaphors from among the identified MCs would attain the highest rating agreement from the participating groups of raters, i.e. measured at 70% and more

agreement across subjects. Specifically, the aim was to extrapolate from this subset of MCs any possible form or pattern in which the most highly rated conceptual metaphors transpire linguistically. MCs that obtain the highest ratings would be interpreted as the more ‘novel’ ones (at least to this group of subjects). Conversely, lower metaphoricity ratings would indicate that the items are perceived to be more ‘conventional’ by the participants. Additionally, results of the rating study may also be utilized to (partially) test some of the metaphoricity predictions by our scalar model. To quickly recap, our model predicts that the greater the mapping distance between two concepts, the higher the metaphoricity for the generated metaphor would be, and vice versa (recall Figure 4, p.134). That being said, as mentioned in subsection 3.4.3.4, there is also a ‘familiarity’ factor at play that may potentially override our mapping distance prediction, which is worth keeping in mind. Finally, tying together the rating study to our scalar model and the mismatch principles, it would be quite natural to predict that *single-word metaphors* (that is, those verified at the *final* checkpoint of the identification protocol, i.e. CMM) would receive the *lowest* metaphoricity rating by the participants. Due to constraints in our own resources (e.g. time, finances, manpower, etc.), we were only able to conduct a rating study on our Malay data by recruiting native speakers of Malay as participants, but not for English. Therefore, the rating study is to be considered independent of the cultural comparative dimension of the main study. Results from the rating study did not affect or influence the analysis results in the main study.

4.4.2. Participants and groupings

The rating study involved two separate and independent rounds, but with an identical procedure. In the first round, 30 participants (10 male) took part, while in the second round a further 40 participants (all female) were recruited. Participants were instructed to provide metaphoricity ratings for MCs in Malay songs and poems (we will explain the detailed procedure in subsection 4.4.4). However, from among the 30 participants in the first round of rating, 6 participants provided rating for songs only and 3 of them did so for poems only. In addition, 1 participant’s digital files were corrupted and could neither be opened nor repaired. On these accounts, we had decided to discard those 10 incomplete ratings (from the 30 participants in the first round), and carry out a second round of rating with 40 new participants. This would give us the final number of 60 participants who provided us with complete and file-readable responses. Due to the large amount of data that needed to be rated (i.e. 36 poetic texts in Malay; 26 songs and

10 poems), it was decided prior to the rating study that it would be methodologically prudent to divide the subjects into two groups. The distribution across the two groups in relation to the two data categories is summarized in Table 8 below.

	Group 1 (n=30)	Group 2 (n=30)	All subjects (n=60)
Number of songs	13	13	26
Number of poems	5	5	10
Total	18	18	36

Table 8: Size of data across two groups of participants for the rating study (Malay data only)

In terms of demographic profiles, all participants were undergraduate students aged 19 at a public university in Kuala Lumpur, majoring in linguistics and/or literature. They were all native speakers of Malay with active working knowledge of at least one other language (and in some cases, two), as is not uncommon among Malaysians. A Malay native speaker was defined as one who grew up in a Malay-speaking household with at least one parent or caretaker who spoke Malay as their first language. Subjects were not requested to report their second language proficiency for our rating study. However, it had been inferred from the university-entrance requirement for the English language (which is the primary medium of instruction at their university), that all students were fairly proficient in English. No remuneration was provided to the subjects. However, their participation in the rating study was counted as part of their attendance in their undergraduate linguistics course, which constituted 3 contact hours per week in a 14-week semester. The rating study took up 3 contact hours per student, but was conducted in a group setting on 4 separate sessions and monitored by their linguistics lecturer. The lecturer, who assumed the role of a research instructor to the participants during the rating sessions, had been employed and trained as our official Research Assistant (RA) for this study. Due to numerous limitations (for instance, the scarcity of native Malay speakers in Berlin who were willing and available to volunteer as our rating subjects, the vast geographical distance between Berlin and Kuala Lumpur, and the high cost for air travel, etc.), the author of this thesis was not able to be present in-person during the rating study, but rather by proxy. However, because the RA had been well trained and participated in the preparation for the rating study, he was familiar with various aspects of the project and was judged as qualified to oversee its execution.

By having conducted the rating study in a group setting (i.e. as opposed to individual ratings), we had been able to significantly reduce the study's implementation time, and

while also having profited from inputs from 60 participants. Our decision to split the subjects into two groups was made early on at the planning stage of the study based on methodical and strategic considerations. Specifically, our earlier projection of the rating time required per individual subject to go through all 36 poetic pieces had generated an unfeasible number of man-hours required (that is, without compromising the quality of rating by subjects within the time allocated). We had estimated that each subject would require a total of about 4 hours and 40 minutes to complete a metaphoricity rating for MCs in 36 poetic data. By splitting the subjects into two groups, however, the number of required man-hours would be halved to only 2 hours and 20 minutes per rater, which was clearly more practical. We summarize the details in Table 9 below.

	Option 1: 1 group of 30 subjects (Total: 30 subjects)	Option 2: 2 groups of 30 subjects (Total: 60 subjects)
	each subject would rate 26 songs and 10 poems	each subject would rate 13 songs and 5 poems
SONGS (n=26)	7 minutes x 26 pieces = 182 minutes / subject	7 minutes x 13 pieces = 91 minutes / subject
POEMS (n=10)	10 minutes x 10 pieces = 100 minutes / subject	10 minutes x 5 pieces = 50 minutes / subject
rating time per subject	182 minutes + 100 minutes = 282 minutes	91 minutes + 50 minutes = 141 minutes

Table 9: The projected man-hours required for the rating study

As previously stated, results from our preliminary analysis had informed us that a total of 70 poetic texts would be needed for our main study to contain approximately 1,000 analyzable metaphors (about 500 in each language) in order to carry statistical weight. This was going to be 35 poetic texts per language (25 songs and 10 poems). However, because we had also been planning for a rating study that would involve the Malay data being divided into two groups for this purpose, we needed to have an *even* number of songs. This resulted in our having added one additional song for each language, making the final number of our data 72 in total, i.e. 36 in each language (recall Table 4, p.148). For the rating study, the 36 Malay data were evenly divided between the two groups of raters, Group 1 and Group 2. As shown in Table 8 (p.172), each group consisted of 30 subjects and each subject had rated a total of 18 pieces (13 songs and 5 poems). To maintain a good cross-group data distribution, we planned that Group 1 would rate odd-numbered data, e.g. MS-01, MS-03, MS-05, etc., and accordingly, MP-01, MP-03, etc., whilst Group 2 would rate the even-numbered ones. This division ensured that the time period in which the songs were popularized and occupied the top charts would be well distributed among the subjects, as the songs were arranged and coded chronologically (i.e. based on year of publication) in our database.

4.4.3. Materials and preparation

The rating study was conducted via digital means, i.e. by using ratings sheets displayed on a computer screen into which the subject would directly enter their responses. Prior to the rating sessions, preparations for the following took place: (i) the rating sheets, i.e. two different sets for the two groups; (ii) the instruction sheet for the subject; (iii) a set of pre-test priming materials; and (iv) venue and technical arrangements for the study. The rating sheet was very simply and minimally designed, i.e. it was a basic version of our datasheets, except that the data were not coded or numbered. This was to minimize possible distractions for the subject. In addition, all underlined markings for the items previously identified as MCs were completely removed. Table 10 below shows a rating sheet as viewed by the subject (it is also an excerpt from the same poetic piece, MS-01, whose sample datasheet was featured in Table 7a, p.160).

Song/Poem Text	METAPHOR CANDIDATES	RATING
		YES
Tiada guna kau berpatah arah	tiada guna berpatah arah	
Jika niatmu meyambung kasih	niatmu menyambung kasih	
Apalah ertinya di sebalik tangisan	apalah di sebalik tangisan	
Atau rintihan	atau	
Untuk apa kau kembali lagi	kembali lagi	
Sekadar hanya untuk menyakiti	menyakiti	
Cukuplah sudah di sini saja	di sini	
Biar aku pendam duka	pendam duka	

Table 10: Sample of rating sheet on the subject's computer screen

In an effort to maximize the reliability of rating responses by the subject, we inserted a series of rater-blind distractors in the column labeled as 'metaphor candidates' on the rating sheet that appeared on the subject's computer screen. These distractors consist of unambiguously *non*-metaphorical elements (from the original poetic texts) that were blended into the MCs in a way that the subject would be blind to the fact that they were distractors. These distractors would serve as a form of verification that the subject had indeed maintained an acceptable level of concentration throughout the rating process. There were a total of 218 distractors added as fake MCs to the 733 real MCs, i.e. a (near) ratio of 1:4. We included (non-preposition) function words, e.g. *ini* (this), *atau* (or), *kerana* (because), etc. as distractor items to screen out subjects who were clearly dismissive of the rating task. Upon the completion of the rating, responses containing an unusually high number of distractors rated as metaphorical would be excluded from

our rated data (details in Chapter Five). For the rating study, a printed instruction sheet in Malay was prepared for the subjects to read before the start of the rating session. A pre-rating *priming* effort would also be included prior to the session, whereby printed reading materials in Malay (two poems and a prose excerpt) would be provided to the participants. This was intended to linguistically prepare the actively bilingual subjects for their upcoming rating task in the Malay language. We also ascertained that there was no overlap between the priming materials and our data. Finally, we needed to set up proper technical equipment at a university facility where the rating sessions would take place. With the help from the university IT staff, our RA was able to procure and organize a faculty multimedia lab for our study. We were granted permission to employ a lab that was equipped with 20 computers for 4 separate 3-hour sessions.

4.4.4. Procedures

All ratings were conducted electronically (on-screen). The study was spread out over 4 sessions that followed identical procedures, and 15-20 participants were present at one given session. Upon arrival at the venue, subjects were greeted by a background audio stimulus that was playing a medley of quiet but audible songs in Malay, i.e. before the rating session began. Each participant was seated at a desk with a standardly equipped computer set, which remained switched off until they were instructed to switch it on. Internet access was disabled during the entire rating session and no other application was open on the computer screen, except for the rating sheet. A set of printed materials awaited the subject on their desk, i.e. an instruction sheet and some reading materials. The instruction sheet contained two sections. The first requested the subject to read the two poems and a prose excerpt, which functioned as our pre-rating priming materials. The second comprised instructions for the rating task, which was also verbally read and explained to our subjects by the instructor, i.e. prior to the commencement of the rating session. The objectives of the study were not revealed to the participants, neither was the characterization of ‘conceptual metaphor’ as per CMT-Objectification.

Participants were reminded that this was not a test, but they were not to discuss their responses with the others. They were, however, allowed to seek clarification from the instructor in regard to the rating instruction and/or task. Effort was made on our part to maintain a good atmospheric balance between appropriately formal for research, but at the same time cordial so as to put the subject in a calm state of mind. To summarize,

the subject was instructed to read each poetic text on the screen twice, i.e. firstly to establish a general understanding of the text, and then secondly to determine if items in the column marked 'metaphorical candidates' were in fact metaphorical. Participants were forthrightly requested to provide a 'yes' for each affirmative response. We had opted for this particular form of rating response for several different reasons (that is, as opposed to a 5-point or 7-point agreement scale), but in sum, we were aiming for the most straightforward procedure. Given the large amount of items to be rated, having to provide scale-based decisions would have been cognitively very taxing to our subjects and could have compromised their concentration, and consequently, the reliability of their responses. Our choice, in contrast, was not only time-efficient for the subject and our rating study as a whole, but was expected to yield the most consistent results from the rating. Moreover, because each affirmative answer required the subject to simply key in the value '1' on the computer keyboard, a basic Excel computation would give us the final figure instantaneously and with minimal risk for human miscalculation.

4.5. Methods conclusion

The main goal of this chapter has been to present all aspects of our research methods. In addition, we have provided a brief overview of the Malay language and its roots, as well as the present-day linguistic scene of a multiethnic Malaysian society. As we hope to have shown, the formulation of our research methodology takes into consideration various method-related challenges commonly faced in metaphor research. After having tested out existing techniques via multiple rounds of pilot analyses, we anticipate that the methods we have devised will provide substantial methodological improvements to existing ones. The expected outcomes thereof will be results that are meaningful and convincing, which are what this study aims to produce. Although the specifics of our procedures might have been tailored to the poetic nature of our textual data, the general protocol may be well applied in cognitive metaphor research at large, with relative ease and minimal modifications. We have documented in detail why analyzing metaphors (particularly in poetic texts) in an empirically informed fashion is neither a painless nor a straightforward task, which requires conscientious calculations of numerous factors. That being said, we believe that with a well-thought-out *modus operandi*, these goals can be attained. One such mode is our own protocol for metaphor identification with three verification checkpoints termed as the 'mismatch principles', whose applications onto data have already been demonstrated at length. Our protocol, although having also

incorporated elements from MIP, is predominantly based on Objectification and our OBJECT-based scalar model. The four-category classification of concepts along the concreteness/abstractness scale is indispensable to the steps involved in our protocol, especially in two critical ways and at two distinct levels. Firstly, in regard to *identifying* metaphors in texts, the model enables us to contrast ‘embodied meaning’ (or MIP’s ‘basic meaning’) from ‘contextual meaning’, objectively and systematically. Secondly, in *verifying* those identifications, our model offers methodical governance to the three checkpoints, VMM, EMM and CMM. Thus, whether explicitly or implicitly, the scalar model cannot be detached from the identification protocol, as exemplified by the step-by-step application onto actual data. Our scalar model, in turn, was motivated by the theory of Objectification, particularly the highly consequential OBJECT criteria and its postulated role as the ultimate source domain. As extensively argued in Chapter Three, CMT in its current form (i.e. absent Objectification) lacks the conceptual clarity and configuration to be producing testable models and analysis methods that are structured, sturdy and solid enough to handle a tremendous amount of heterogeneous real-life data beyond self-generated theoretical examples. In this chapter, we have demonstrated in practice (that is, *beyond* theoretical argumentations) that without Objectification, the operationalization of our scalar model in the form of a metaphor identification protocol for analyzing acquired data could not have come to fruition.

At this point, we are reminded of a specific criticism toward CMT by Murphy (among many others who share this view), and his reluctance to accept empirical evidence by CMT research on account of “empirical evidence can only support a model that is *well specified* enough to make *clear predictions*” (1997: 103, emphases added). But now, with our advocated CMT-Objectification framework, we would have a theory soundly equipped with clearly articulated and empirically falsifiable predictions on metaphor. Further, the scalar model is also well specified enough to have resulted in a systematic identification protocol as part of a structured analysis method. As for Stefanowitsch’s urgent recommendation that cognitive semantic research should cast off theoretical assumptions that are “forever beyond operationalization and measurement” (2010: 373), we would proffer that this doctoral project is one reflection of such effort. As our survey on metaphor studies in Chapter Two has shown, cognitive metaphor research is not lacking in quantity at all, and in fact the number of published works in our field abounds, with many claiming to be ‘empirical’. Unfortunately, though, when it comes to the *scientific* quality of the methods employed, many of them are subpar and leave

much to be desired. There are still a number of methodological lacks and deficiencies that would continue to prevent the unanimous acceptance of CMT into the empirical cognitive sciences research sphere, until it fully (or at least, largely) adopts scientific research principles and practices, whenever and wherever possible. To quickly recap, the three basic methodological shortfalls in CMT as highlighted in the previous chapter concern: (i) the sources and acquisition of linguistic data; (ii) the inconsistent methods of metaphor analysis; and (iii) overgeneralizations in the interpretations of findings.

In carrying out our own study, we have made it a point to avoid those pitfalls, as far as could have been helped. As we hope this chapter has been evidence of, we have been very discerning and methodical about the selection, collection and coding of our data. We have also been equally solicitous and vigilant in regard to designing and applying a set of principled procedures as our identification and analysis methods. At the same time, we do recognize the limitations of our study and keep them in mind throughout, so as not to globalize the interpretations of our findings (focus of Chapter Five) beyond the applicable research scope. While each component of our project (i.e. the pilot study, rating study and main study) serves distinct purposes from one another, their broader goals align in striving to offer meaningful contributions to cognitive metaphor research. We hope that even by now, we have already been successful at setting our project apart from most of the other numerous text-based metaphor works in the most positive ways, both conceptually and procedurally. Last but not least, the presentation of this thesis has been envisioned to reflect an elegant cascade flow of important consequences, from theoretical to methodological. That is, by having identified some of the main and most pressing theoretical issues in CMT and shown how integrating Objectification into the framework could efficaciously solve many of those problems, the OBJECT-based scalar model was born (which then enables the operationalization of CMT-Objectification's theoretical constructs). In turn, the resulting product of the scalar model for a practical application onto actual data was the metaphor identification protocol that features the three mismatch principles (which further enhances the integrity of our methodology of research). And finally, such systematic procedures are prerequisites for studies that aim to yield meaningful results, which we hope Chapter Five will be evidence of.

5. Results of Analyses

5.1. General overview

This chapter is made up of three main segments. The first one reports the results of the rating study on metaphoricity judgment carried out on our Malay data with 60 native speakers of Malay, while the subsequent two sections contain analysis results from the main study consisting of 1,471 conceptual metaphors from 72 pieces of poetic texts in Malay and English. For the main study, results of the quantitative analysis are provided in the form of descriptive statistics in Section 5.3, which focuses on source and target domains, as well as their source-to-target conceptual transferability. In Section 5.4, we provide an in-depth qualitative analysis of metaphors of the MIND (i.e. COGNITION and EMOTION metaphors). Results of the preliminary analysis have already been discussed in Section 4.3 and will not be repeated here. It suffices to state in short that they have proven to be very useful in refining our research design and methodology, as Chapter Four has been a reflection of. Before we proceed to presenting the rating results, we clarify once again that the rating study was carried out *independent* of the main study, and the execution of the former did not overlap with that of the latter, or vice versa.

5.2. Results of the rating study

To quickly recap, the main aim of the rating study was to find out which from amongst the linguistic expressions that we have previously identified as ‘metaphor candidates’ (MCs) in Malay songs and poems would be judged as having ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ degree of metaphoricity by our subjects. This was in order for us to observe possible distinct patterns (if there was to be any) in selected subsets of conceptual metaphors based on their metaphoricity ratings, i.e. the ones on the lower range in contrast to those on the higher range. We have also established in Chapter Four that at no point in our study did we make any discrimination ourselves between (what might appear to some of us to be) ‘novel’ and ‘conventional’ metaphors, consistent with both CMT and Objectification’s theoretical stance. We have thus been able to retain our unbiasedness and objectivity by consulting the results yielded by the rating study for the purpose of testing some of our metaphoricity-related predictions. That is, items that attained higher agreement ratings are interpreted as the ones perceived to be ‘more novel’ by the participants, while those

with lower agreement ratings as the ‘more conventional’ ones. Throughout, we also keep in mind that there is an important ‘familiarity’ factor at play that would inevitably influence one’s metaphoricity judgment, which we did not have any method to control within the context of the present study. Once again, we remind the reader that the rating study was conducted on only 50% of our entire data, i.e. by Malay participants on the Malay songs and poems only, and the English data were not rated. Therefore, there was no cross-linguistic or intercultural comparison to be made or observed here.

As previously explained in Chapter Four, we made it a point to insert a series of (rater-blind) distractor items to the genuine MCs throughout the rating sheet, as an effort to record the subject’s attentiveness to the rating task at hand. Upon receiving the rating results, we used the standard five-number summary to generate a boxplot of the rating distribution in order to identify and discard outliers from among the participants. These were subjects with unusually high ratings of distractor items, most of which are clearly and unambiguously *non*-metaphorical (but some of which also include similes). Based on this computation, ratings by 5 subjects from Group 1, and 3 subjects from Group 2 were then removed completely from our data, in order to ensure results that are as clean




Figure 7: Exclusion of the outliers from among the rating participants

and as meaningful as possible. This means that *all* of the results reported in relation to the rating study from now onwards will refer to those collected and calculated from the remaining 25 subjects from Group 1, and a further 27 from Group 2. Figure 7 above shows where the outliers sat from amongst the initial total number of 60 subjects from both groups, prior to these outliers being excluded from our rating data.

5.2.1. Degrees of metaphoricity based on rating agreements

Overall, the rating results show that our participants have produced rating agreements that are generally higher for metaphors in the poem category than those in the song category. This is summarized in another boxplot in Figure 8 below, which illustrates the distribution, center and variability of rating results from the two groups, combined.




Figure 8: Distribution of rating results across two data categories

Indeed it did not come as a big surprise to us that metaphorical items from the poem category attained higher metaphoricity ratings than those in the song category, as we have predicted in Chapter Four. This was not unexpected, especially considering the greater popularity of songs as well as their wider accessibility to the general public, as compared to poems (which conversely, has a narrower and more homogenous target audience and enthusiasts than does the former). However, the *specifics* of the varying degrees of perceived metaphoricity across the two data categories could not have been known without carrying out a rating study. More specifically, we have found that the number of MCs in poems that received the highest ratings, i.e. 70% and above, was 50 out of 185 (i.e. 27% of the data in this category), whereas MCs with the same ratings from the songs were only 62 out of 547 (i.e. 11% of the data in this category). On the other end of the spectrum, that is, when we examined items with the lowest ratings, i.e. 30% and below, we have found that 49 out of 185 items from the poem category (i.e. 26% of its data) attained low ratings, while the number of items with the same ratings

from the song category was totaling 255 out of 547 (i.e. 47% of its data). Further, only 2% of items in the poem category (4 out of 185), as opposed to 6% of those in the song

metaphoricity level	rating agreement	MALAY SONGS (n=547)		MALAY POEMS (n=185)	
		freq	%	freq	%
high	≥ 70%	62	11	50	27
moderate	31-69%	230	42	86	47
low	≤ 30%	255	47	49	26
		547	100	185	100

Table 11: Rating agreements across two data categories (Malay data only)

category (34 out of 547), received ‘zero percent’ ratings by subjects. These findings indicate to us quite clearly the differences in the perceived metaphoricity across the two data categories in Malay. The figures are summarized in Table 11 above.

5.2.1.1. Zero-rated MCs

One must keep in mind that because the subject matter of our research is *conceptual* metaphor, even items that attained very low ratings (including the ones with absolute ‘zero’ ratings such as the ones reported here) are *not* to be misinterpreted as being non-metaphorical. Previous chapters have already established our stance on this at length, thus it requires no reiteration here. But very importantly, because in the context of our study, MCs with low ratings are interpreted as the ‘more conventional’ metaphors, it follows that those with the *lowest* ratings are taken to be the ‘*most* conventional’ ones. In fact, the metaphorical usage of expressions with ‘zero’ ratings may be postulated as being exceedingly common to language users to the extent that speakers (aside from perhaps cognitive metaphor researchers) are often not even a little aware of the fact that these items are indeed metaphors. We will illustrate this shortly by citing MCs from the data, along with their counterexamples, as well.

Based on the overall rating agreements by the participants, one specific observation has been made with respect to MCs that received zero ratings, which appears to apply to both categories of songs and poems. That is, a fairly high percentage of these zero-rated MCs had been identified as ‘metaphorical’ exclusively based on *context* during our metaphor identification stage, i.e. 75% for zero-rated MCs in poems and 82% for those in songs. Recall the three mismatch principles (VMM, EMM and CMM) introduced in subsection 4.2.3.1 as the main component of our protocol for metaphor identification. According to the identification protocol, contextual mismatch (CMM) is the third and

final verification checkpoint in unbiasedly deciding whether or not an expression is accepted as metaphorical. In short, unlike the first two mismatches, VMM and EMM, the decision made at the CMM checkpoint is one that is purely based on information supplied by the *context*. Table 12a below presents some examples from our Malay data, i.e. Malay songs and poems. Each of them had been identified as metaphorical, passed through the three verification checkpoints, and finally accepted as MCs on the grounds that there exists a mismatch between the embodied meaning and the contextual one. Note that even though some citations below may contain more than one metaphor, we underline *only* the particular MC that is presently under scrutiny. In addition, for each

Contextual meaning in use (i.e. metaphorical)	Contextual meaning and conceptual metaphor
Data code: MP-03/1:5 (MC#26) (1) <i>Membayangkan wajahmu adalah <u>siksa</u>.</i>	" <i>siksa</i> " (torment): great emotional pain
Shadowing (i.e. imagining) your face is a <u>torment</u> .	Postulated CM: EMOTIONAL TORMENT IS PHYSICAL TORMENT
Date code: MP-06/6:31-34 (MC#97) (2) <i>Seribu jari masa silam menunding kepadaku. Tidak. Aku tak bisa <u>kembali</u>.</i>	" <i>return</i> " (kembali): to go back to a relationship
A thousand fingers of the time of past pointing to me. No. I am not able to <u>return</u> .	Postulated CM: RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
Data code: MS-05/5:17-18 (MC#91) (3) <i><u>Terpisah</u> kerana Adat yang berbeza</i>	" <i>terpisah</i> " (separated): no longer one entity
<u>Separated</u> because of Different cultural traditions	Postulated CM: LOVERS ARE A DIVIDED ENTITY (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)
Data code: MS16/3:19-21 (MC#328) (4) <i>Hanya aku sendirian tak berteman <u>keseorangan</u></i>	" <i>alone</i> " (keseorangan): without a romantic partner in life
(There is) only me alone Without companion <u>alone</u>	Postulated CM: EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE

Table 12a: Examples of zero-rated MCs (verified at CMM checkpoint) from the Malay data

Embodied meaning in use (i.e. non-metaphorical)	Embodied meaning
From DBP Corpus: ISMAIL SALLEH. <i>BADAN BERTUAH</i> . Sastera, 1971 (5) <i>Hari-hari saja ada orang kena tangkap, orang kena <u>siksa</u>, orang kena bunuh.</i>	" <i>siksa</i> " (torment): great physical pain
Every day there are always people who get caught, <u>tormented</u> and murdered.	
From DBP Corpus: HIKAYAT HANG TUAH (EDISI PELAJAR). Sastera, 1995 (6) <i>Maka Laksamana dan Maharaja Setia pun bermohon <u>kembali</u> ke rumahnya.</i>	" <i>return</i> " (kembali): to go back to a previous location
Hence Laksamana and Maharaja Setia requested to <u>return</u> to their home.	
From DBP Corpus: <i>LIBUR JANUARI 2002</i> . Gaya Hidup, 2002 (7) <i>... kelab ini sememangnya menawarkan ruang <u>terpisah</u> antara lelaki dan perempuan.</i>	" <i>terpisah</i> " (separated): divided into two parts
... this club indeed offers <u>separated</u> spaces between the men and the women.	
From DBP Corpus: <i>KELUARGA JULAI 1995</i> . Keluarga, 1995 (8) <i>Aku yang <u>keseorangan</u> di rumah tengah berbaring di atas katil.</i>	" <i>alone</i> " (keseorangan): without other people
I am the one who is <u>alone</u> at home now lying down on the bed.	

Table 12b: (Counter)examples of *embodied* meaning in use (as contrasts to MCs in Table 12a)

example extracted from our data into Table 12a, we provide an alternative sentence in a non-metaphorical context in Table 12b (items underlined), to elucidate our point and substantiate our claim. To maintain objectivity and authenticity, all (counter)examples of alternative non-metaphorical usages of expressions outside of our data have been sourced from *Korpus Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka* (DBP Corpus), which is the largest Malay corpus available online at <http://sbmb.dbp.gov.my/korpusdbp/>.

5.2.1.2. Single-word MCs and contextual dependency

In regard to the zero-rated MCs under discussion, we have been very reluctant to form any conclusion based on the initial percentage cited above due to a very low number of samples of zero-rated MCs (i.e. 22 out of 34 in songs, and only 3 out of 4 in poems). Hence, we decided to expand the observation parameter to include more samples that comprise MCs whose rating agreements still fall within the lower range (i.e. $\leq 30\%$), in order to see if the same results would hold. We also attempted this on samples with higher rating agreements (i.e. $\geq 70\%$) to observe if the *reverse* might be true for the latter, as is implicitly predicted by our metaphor identification protocol. Specifically, due to the non-accidental but rather *adventent* sequence of the mismatch principles (i.e. VMM \rightarrow EMM \rightarrow CMM), the implicit prediction of our protocol is that MCs accepted at the VMM checkpoint would generally attain higher ratings, and the reverse would be true for items that have to reach the final checkpoint, CMM, before they are verified as MCs. In fact, because single-word metaphors can only be verified and accepted at the CMM checkpoint where *only* contextual information could justify the decision in favor of them being accepted as metaphors, there is an unvoiced expectation for such MCs to naturally receive lower metaphoricity ratings. Table 13 below summarizes the results of our observation in regard to the potential association between contextual dependency of MCs (marked by, or verified at, CMM checkpoint) and their rating agreements across two subsets of rated MCs, i.e. from the lowest and highest ends, respectively. Based on

metaphoricity level	rating agreement	MALAY SONGS		MALAY POEMS	
		marked by CMM	%	marked by CMM	%
low	$\leq 30\%$	173/255	68	25/49	51
high	$\geq 70\%$	7/62	11	3/50	6

Table 13: Potential link between contextual dependency and rating agreements

these figures, there appears to be a greater reliance upon contextual information among MCs with perceived lower metaphoricity (lower rating agreements) compared to those

with perceived higher metaphoricity (higher rating agreements) for both categories. In other words, our above-mentioned prediction has been met.

When we examined the subset with lower ratings on its own but compared the two data categories against each other, we found that 107 out of 255 (42%) of MCs in songs and 11 out of 49 (23%) of those in poems are *single-word* metaphors (i.e. the same kinds as the examples provided in Table 12a, p.183), as opposed to metaphorical expressions made up of two or more words. This appears consistent with the rating distribution across categories as depicted in Figure 8 (p.181) and Table 11 (p.182), where 47% of all rated MCs fall into the lower rating range in songs but only 26% fall into the same range in poems. Moreover, in regard to single-word metaphors, it was found that 93% (107 out of 115) and 92% (11 out of 12) of this type of MCs from the song and poem categories, respectively, sit within the *lower* rating range. These portions and figures are represented by the two pairs of charts in Figures 9 and 10 below.




Figure 9: Occupancy of *single-word* MCs in the lower range subset of both data categories




Figure 10: Rating agreement percentages for *all* single-word MCs across both data categories

As per Figure 10 above, the fact that the percentage of single-word metaphors is very high in the lowest rating range for both categories may indicate that the three mismatch principles do function well as a metaphor identification protocol. The remaining few of the single-word MCs, i.e. 8 out of 114 (7%) for songs, and 1 out of 13 (8%) for poems are from the mid-range (i.e. of 31-69% rating agreement), and none of them falls within the highest rating range at all. In fact, the rating results have recorded that single-word MCs received no more than 48% rating agreement in the poem category and no more than 32% in the song category. Once again, this is consistent with the general patterns shown in the broader picture of the rating results, wherein poems do display a tendency of having a higher percentage of 'novel' metaphors compared to songs. It would be logical indeed to suggest that by definition, single-word MCs would necessarily lack 'novelty' that is gained via creative *pairings* of words in the creation of 'more novel' metaphors (which, as a result, would be perceived as having 'higher metaphoricity' by language users, quite naturally). Also, not surprisingly, *all* single-word MCs from both categories have been found to be necessarily *context*-dependent, i.e. without one single exception. In terms of word classes for these single-word MCs (out of 127), 40 (31%) of them are nouns, 53 (42%) are verbs, 32 (25%) are adjectives and 2 (2%) are adverbs. Finally, its type-token ratio (TTR) is 101/127, which is 79.5% and indicates that single-word metaphors found in the rated data are highly varied.

5.2.1.3. *Verification checkpoints and degrees of metaphoricity*

A final observation that we would like to report here is one that relates to the potential association between the subset of MCs with the highest rating agreements (i.e. $\geq 70\%$) for both data categories and their verification checkpoints for these MCs. That is, there seems to be a descending order in terms of the percentage of the three mismatch types for the checkpoints involved in verifying these MCs, i.e. from VMM to EMM to CMM. This order seems to hold for both categories, albeit evidently more pronounced for the poems than the songs, as depicted by the graphs in Figure 11 below. Single-word MCs are not present at all in this subset. As illustrated below, the figures for songs are stated as follows: 76% were marked by VMM, 13% by EMM, and 11% by CMM (out of 62 MCs). As for poems, 72% were identified at VMM checkpoint, 22% at EMM, and 6% at CMM (out of 50 MCs). These figures tell us that in both data categories, most of the highest rated MCs were verified and accepted at VMM checkpoint (i.e. with much less at EMM and the least at CMM). This implies the centrality of VMM amongst MCs that




Figure 11: Verification checkpoints for MCs in the *highest* range subset for both data categories

are perceived to have the highest degree of metaphoricity (or, those interpreted as the most ‘novel’ metaphors). This could also be a further indication of the viability of our protocol and its mismatch principles. To summarize, when considered as a whole, these findings bring together at least four interrelated pieces of information, namely, that: (i) overall, MCs in songs have the tendency to receive lower rating agreements than those in poems; (ii) single-word MCs gravitate to the lower end of the rating distribution in both songs and poems; (iii) contextual dependency as the sole deciding factor in favor of an expression being accepted as an MC may indicate a weak degree of metaphoricity of the said MC as perceived by language users; (iv) MCs in poems are generally rated higher than those in songs by virtue of them not containing as many single-word and/or contextually-dependent MCs as do songs, and thus contain ‘more novel’ expressions that are made of up a combination of two or more words.

5.2.2. Mapping-related observations

This subsection reports our observations on the mapping distance and mapping patterns of MCs in relation to their perceived metaphoricity. Similar to the previous subsection, we extracted and examined two subsets from the opposite ends of the rated data, for this purpose. This is for the simple reason of our wanting to capture a stark contrast in patterns between the highest and lowest rated data. Because metaphoricity is essentially gradable (as established in Chapters Two and Three), comparing rated data from these two extreme ends while leaving out the mid-range (i.e. the moderately rated MCs) has enabled us to observe the differences in metaphoricity-related patterns between what

are perceived as the ‘more conventional’ metaphors and the ‘more novel’ ones. In the previous subsections and up until this point, we have been examining and contrasting the two subsets of MCs based on the overall *percentage* of rating agreements, i.e. the top thirty ($\geq 70\%$) and the bottom thirty ($\leq 30\%$). And although this method of subset selection was not only useful but also necessary in enabling us to more closely observe the distributional trends among the rated data, we have had to accept the inherent skews in their rating distribution. This resulted in one group having a much larger set of data than the other three, which Table 13 (p.184) has been a clear reflection of. But in this subsection (i.e. after having already observed and reported the distributional patterns of the rating results), we have decided to adopt the *percentile* system onto the same rated data (547 MCs in Malay songs) and (185 MCs in Malay poems) for unbiasedly splitting them into high and low metaphoricity subsets. This was to make the intra-category subsets more symmetrical (and thus more comparable) in terms of the number of subset members, as described in Table 14 below. Specifically, this was achieved by applying

metaphoricity	percentile	MALAY SONGS		MALAY POEMS	
		rating agreements	subset membership	rating agreements	subset membership
low	15th	0-7%	n=98	0-16%	n=30
high	85th	64-93%	n=95	78-96%	n=29

Table 14: Subset divisions of rated data in Malay poems and songs according to percentiles

simple statistical computations onto our rated data to extract those that fall within the 15th percentile (the lowest range) and the 85th (the highest range). As a result, we were left with 98 MCs (that received rating agreements between 0% and 7%) to represent the lower metaphoricity subset, and 95 MCs (that received rating agreements between 64% and 93%) to represent our new higher metaphoricity subset for the song category. As for the poems, the percentile system determined that 30 MCs (with rating agreements between 0% and 16%) and 29 MCs (with rating agreements between 78% and 96%) would now make up our new lowest range and highest range, respectively. The highest rating agreement that the rated MCs received was 93% for songs and 96% for poems, while a 100% rating agreement was not attained in either data category.

5.2.2.1. Type-token ratios of source-to-target mapping patterns

In analyzing the rated data, our focus has been on the general *patterns* of MCs from two contrasting subsets (that is, on metaphoricity and rating agreements in the previous subsection, and on mapping-related patterns in this present subsection), but *not* on the

particular metaphors themselves. More specifically, Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will deal with metaphorical expressions and the corresponding conceptual metaphors unearthed from the songs and poems in the main study. In regard to the mapping patterns found in the two subsets of our rated data, our first observation relates to the type-token ratio (TTR) of the *mapping patterns* of the percentile-determined subsets for songs and poems. By this we mean the mappings from source domain (SD) to target domain (TD) based on our scalar model (recall Chapter Three) that comprises four classifications of concepts. To quickly recap, the four categories are: strictly concrete (SC), loosely concrete (LC), low abstract (LA), and highly abstract (HA), as illustrated in Table 3 (p.124) and Figure 3 (p.130). In Table 15 below, we report the TTRs of specific mapping patterns based on percentile divisions. It is quite interesting to observe from these figures that the overall

	15th percentile			85th percentile		
	type	token	ratio	type	token	ratio
MALAY SONGS	16	98	16.3	26	95	27.4
MALAY POEMS	13	30	43.3	16	29	55.2

Table 15: Type-token ratios (TTRs) of *specific* mapping patterns based on percentile divisions

patterns of metaphoricity reported in the previous subsection are once again maintained here, i.e. as expressed in terms of how varied the mapping patterns of metaphors in the four subsets are. More precisely, mappings in the subset of poems with MCs of high metaphoricity have shown to be the most highly varied of all (TTR=55.2%). This is followed by poems with low metaphoricity MCs (TTR=43.3%), and then songs with high metaphoricity MCs (TTR=27.4%), and finally songs with low metaphoricity MCs (TTR=16.3%). Put simply, metaphorical mapping patterns in poems appear to be more highly varied than those in songs. In fact, mapping patterns of metaphors in poems in the *lower range* (15th percentile) of the rated data are also more varied than those of metaphors in songs in the *higher range* (85th percentile). Indeed highly varied mapping patterns in the said subsets could be yet another indication of the feature of ‘novelty’ of metaphors found in the poem category. That being said, given the considerably smaller sample size of the poem subsets (due to the overall asymmetry of the number of data in the two categories, that is, 72% songs and 28% poems), we shall refrain from drawing any conclusions for now, and simply report the figures as they surface in our findings. In any case, if we are to look at the two data categories separately, that is, by examining only the *intra*-category results (where sample sizes *are* comparable), the figures show that mapping patterns for subsets with higher metaphoricity are in fact more varied than for those with lower metaphoricity. And this holds for both categories.

While the previously reported TTRs referred to the *specific* patterns of mapping, we will now report on the more *general* patterns of mapping of the same subsets. That is, we have previously referred to the individual breakdown of the four classifications of concepts to see at which point *exactly* the source and target concepts would fall on the scalar model in creating those metaphorical mappings. For example, we differentiated between the specific mappings (stated as ‘SOURCE→TARGET’) of *HUMAN*→EMOTION, *ANIMAL*→EMOTION, *PLANT*→EMOTION, *INORGANIC.OBJECT*→EMOTION, etc., and the same with other (sub-)classifications as well. Here, however, we have decided to zoom out our lenses a little bit and consider the previous four specific mappings as *one*, i.e. by looking instead at their *broader* types when describing the source-to-target mapping patterns, e.g. *sC*→HA. Results of the TTRs based on the general mappings (shown in Table 16 below) largely mirror those that were based on the specific patterns (refer to Table 15 above). Specifically, the TTRs in a descending order are: 20.7% (higher range MP), 16.7% (lower range MP), 8.4% (higher range MS), and 7.1% (lower range MS).

	15th percentile			85th percentile		
	type	token	ratio	type	token	ratio
MALAY SONGS	7	98	7.1	8	95	8.4
MALAY POEMS	5	30	16.7	6	29	20.7

Table 16: Type-token ratios (TTRs) of *general* mapping patterns based on percentile divisions

Once again, the mapping patterns for MCs in poems appear more varied than those in songs (keeping in mind the smaller size sample of the former), and those in the higher range subsets are evidently more varied than their counterparts in the lower subsets. The difference, nevertheless, is more visible within the poem category, but not quite as pronounced in the song category. And finally, based on these reported mapping-related observations and analyses conducted on our rated data, we have been able to ascertain the following: (1) the number of types of metaphorical mappings there are (according to the four classifications in the scalar model); (2) the directions in which concepts are metaphorically mapped; and (3) their mapping constraints. Up until now, answers to these questions have been mere theoretical conjectures (at least for the most part). But now, we finally have at our disposal analyses results from authentic data to provide empirically informed (as opposed to largely postulated) answers to these questions. We will resume this discussion in Section 5.4.

5.2.2.2. *Mapping distance and metaphoricity*

This subsection presents our observations on mapping distance and metaphoricity. In Chapters Three and Four, we posited that our scalar model might be able to generate a few testable predictions relating to mapping and metaphoricity. One of the predictions is that the ‘distance’ between a pair of metaphorically mapped concepts may play a role in determining its metaphoricity. The scalar model represented by Figure 3 (p.130) is to be used to measure this conceptual ‘distance’. More precisely, the greater the distance of the target concept from its source, the higher the metaphoricity of the linguistically expressed metaphor is predicted to be. There are, however, two important facts to keep in mind, particularly at this point. Firstly, given the exploratory nature and the infancy stage of our investigation on this subject, we have explained that the numerical values given in our concreteness/abstractness scale are to be treated, for now, as provisional and experimental. Secondly, we have also mentioned that there is a critical ‘familiarity’ factor at play when it comes to metaphoricity judgment. That is, a very frequently used metaphor would appear ‘more familiar’ to speakers and therefore lose its metaphoricity strength. Unfortunately, this factor cannot be controlled within the context of our study and we therefore advise that the following findings be regarded as preliminary, as they would require a further investigation beyond the scope of this present study.

To examine the potential association between mapping distance and metaphoricity, we calculated the average distance of the total MCs for each of the four subsets of the rated data. For this particular purpose, we only considered the four *broad* classifications of concepts from the scalar model, i.e. sC, LC, LA, and HA (and disregarded their sub-classifications). We assigned the values 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the respective categories (note that these values differ from the ones given in Figure 3, p.130, for simplification). For each mapped pair, we performed a simple arithmetic operation as follows: ‘TD value – SD value = mapping distance’. We totaled up the figures in each subset to get its mean distance for a cross-subset comparison. The results are summarized in Table 17 below, where the subset with a higher mean distance within each data category is highlighted, accordingly. Here, we find it rather interesting to capture two contradicting patterns when results from the two data categories are compared. Observe that within the song category, results appear to obey our expectations, i.e. that the average (mean) mapping distance shows to be higher in the 85th percentile (higher range) subset than that in the 15th percentile (lower range). This is because the former contains MCs that achieved

high rating agreements, and is thus interpreted as having higher metaphoricity (overall), as compared to the latter subset. In sum, the figures show that the mapping distance in the higher range subset is greater by 0.5 (i.e. $2.3 - 1.8 = 0.5$) than the lower range. Note that the '0.5' value here is *not* to be interpreted with a statistical eye, but rather it is *relative* to the distances depicted on the scalar model. Within the present context (i.e. in reference to the SD-to-TD mapping distance), because the value of '1.0' is read as the distance between two adjacent categories (e.g. between sC and LC, as in SHADOWS ARE A HUMAN), a 0.5 value thus denotes a distance of *half* of 1.0.

	MALAY SONGS			MALAY POEMS		
	total distance	mapped pairs	mean distance	total distance	mapped pairs	mean distance
15th percentile	176.0	n=98	1.8	64.0	n=30	2.1
85th percentile	214.0	n=95	2.3	32.0	n=29	1.1

Table 17: Average (mean) 'mapping distance' of the four subsets of rated data

Results for the poem category, however, paint a completely different picture. Here, the figures have shown to defy our expectations on metaphoricity in relation to mapping distance. In contrast to the song category, it is in fact the *lower* range (15th percentile) subset of the poems that appears to have a greater overall mapping distance than the higher range (85th percentile) one. That is, the sum difference is 1.0 (i.e. $2.1 - 1.1 = 1.0$), which is twice that of the song category, but inversely. That being said, to completely reject our assumption about metaphoricity and mapping distance at this point (at least not without further investigations) might perhaps be premature, in our view. Recall the 'familiarity' factor mentioned earlier, which cannot be easily teased out here. Also, the fact that there are only 59 MCs from the observed subsets in the poem category (i.e. as opposed to its 193 counterparts from the song category) tells us that perhaps a separate study on this, with comparable data size, may be in order. At this point, we will simply report that our prediction is met in the song category, but unmet in the poem category.

5.2.2.3. Conceptual mapping and metaphorization

To supply the reader with a visual illustration of the patterns of mapping that we have been discussing thus far, we include in Figure 12 below a somewhat compressed view of these source-to-target mappings, as charted on our scalar model. The dotted lines therein indicate the respective conceptual classifications, i.e. from left to right: sC, LC, LA, HA. Perhaps the most striking difference in pattern between the two subsets in the song category is that the 85th percentile range seems heavy and dense with sC >>>> HA

mapping type (Objectification's Type II C-to-A metaphORIZATION, or CMT's ontological metaphor), but lacks the LA > LA (Objectification's Type III A-to-A metaphORIZATION, or CMT's structural metaphor) and LA >> HA mapping types, which the 15th percentile range seems to contain a lot of, in addition to the sC >>>> HA types. We will provide a more extensive report on this topic along with concrete examples from our data when we deliver the analysis results from our main study in Section 5.3. But for now, this is merely a preview of what an operationalization of a working model could potentially unearth with regard to conceptual mapping.




Figure 12: Mapping patterns for the highest and lowest range subsets for both data categories

In the meantime, we translate the clusters of the mapping bars from Figure 12 above into corresponding numbers and figures of the mapped concepts, that is, based on their domains of functions (source and target) in Table 18 below. Here, we are specifically comparing the presence of concepts (based on their classification types) between the 15th percentile range and the 85th percentile one. As is evident here, the *intra*-category differences between the lower and higher range subsets for both the source and target domains are generally unpronounced. This seems consistent across the board, with one clear exception. That is, notice that in the highlighted rows, low abstract (LA) concepts seem to be more heavily present in the lower range subsets (15th percentile) than in the higher range subsets (85th percentile), *irrespective* of whether their functional domain is

source or target. This tendency holds for both categories, although similar to previous analyses, the differences are almost always more pronounced in the song category (that

MALAY SONGS								MALAY POEMS									
	SOURCE DOMAIN				TARGET DOMAIN					SOURCE DOMAIN				TARGET DOMAIN			
	15th percentile		85th percentile		15th percentile		85th percentile			15th percentile		85th percentile		15th percentile		85th percentile	
	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%		(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%
SC	60	61	84	88	4	4	13	14	SC	26	87	26	90	5	17	13	45
LC	2	2	6	6	1	1	4	4	LC	1	3	1	3	0	0	3	10
LA	36	37	3	3	30	31	8	8	LA	3	10	1	3	7	23	2	7
HA	0	0	2	2	63	64	70	74	HA	0	0	1	3	18	60	11	38
	98	100	95	100	98	100	95	100		30	100	29	100	30	100	29	100

Table 18: Occupancy of concepts in SD and TD based on degrees of concreteness/abstractness

could be due to its much larger sample size). In any case, the strong preference for LA concepts to be occupying *both* the SD and TD much more frequently in the lower range but not in the higher range subset as shown here indicates that metaphoricity of Type III A-to-A metaphorization (or structural metaphor) has a recognizable tendency to be perceived as *weak*. The same cannot be said about Type II C-to-A metaphorization (or ontological metaphor), evidently. These findings, preliminary as they are, may prove to be consequential in relation to Szwedek’s hypotheses regarding the nature of domains and the resulting new metaphor typology (2000a, 2002a, 2004b, 2007b, 2008, 2009c, 2010, 2011, 2014a). We shall be exploring this further in the next section, in concert with analysis results from the main study. In summary, findings from the rating study in connection with metaphorical mappings indicate that: (1) mapping patterns (specific and general) are more varied amongst MCs with higher rating agreements, and overall, mappings of MCs in poems have shown to be more varied than those in songs; (2) our prediction on the potential association between metaphoricity and mapping distance is met by mappings in songs but not in poems, and requires further investigation; and (3) when the metaphorical mappings are systematically charted and closely scrutinized, a number of patterns emerge that may have implications on a theory’s clearly-articulated hypotheses about metaphorization, such as Objectification’s.

5.3. Main study, part I: A quantitative report

To quickly recap, the principal objectives of the main study have been to excavate and catalogue conceptual metaphors in Malay and English poetic texts for cross-linguistic and intercultural contrastive analyses. Our focus in this section is to present our results on the 1,471 conceptual metaphors quarried from 72 analyzed poetic pieces. Although we will attempt to deliver our reports in a quantitative format whenever possible, the

inherently qualitative nature of our data does not make them most perfectly suited for a quantitative analysis in its purest form. And whilst results from the rating study have been (to a certain degree) measurable in some basic statistical terms, it would perhaps be wise for us to dissolve the expectation and illusion that the same may be applied to poetic data. It should go without saying that interpretations of literary works are, by definition, subjective, and should be appropriately treated as such. This section reports results of textual analyses on the source domains (SDs) and target domains (TDs) from the postulated conceptual metaphors (CMs). Of our particular interest are the source and target domains with the highest frequencies, as well as the most prevalent patterns of conceptual mapping for metaphors in songs and poems in both languages. Unlike in the rating study, no distinction or discrimination of any sort was made between ‘novel’ and ‘conventional’ metaphors in the main study. This means that *all* of the 1,471 MCs (i.e. 732 Malay and 739 English) are counted, and accounted for, in our analyses.

5.3.1. Manifestations of metaphorical mappings

For all linguistic expressions that we have identified as MCs, we state each postulation of conceptual metaphor as ‘A is B’, i.e. to denote ‘A is conceptualized in terms of B’. In keeping with CMT’s (or more broadly, the cognitive-based approaches’) convention, ‘A’ refers to a target concept and ‘B’ refers to a source concept. Although we recognize the intimate relationship between conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy that is not always easy to break apart (recall subsection 4.1.1), practical constraints require us to leave out metonymy from our analysis and discussion, at least for the most part. Exceptions have been made in a few cases, i.e. for those without which the examination of some metaphors would be incomplete. In such cases, the symbol ‘< >’ is used to signal a metonymic presence within a metaphorized concept, e.g. EMOTION <LIVER> IS A CAPTIVE (from ‘*meronta hatiku*’ (‘*my liver struggles*’) [MC#63; MS-04/3:11]), or to cite a similar example with a metonymy that is more familiar to English speakers, i.e. EMOTION <HEART> IS A TOY (from ‘*play with my heart*’ [MC#150; ES-08/2:5]). In such cases, the symbol ‘< >’ demonstrates the inextricable metaphor-metonymy interaction *within* the postulated conceptual metaphor. Another important symbol that we use in articulating some conceptual metaphors is ‘[]’, which signifies a kind of symbolism or representation of a (non-metonymical)²¹⁵ concept *within* a conceptual metaphor. An

²¹⁵ In a few cases, one may find some symbolisms to have a metonymic feature, due to their shared *representational* nature.

example of this would be, THE AFTERLIFE [ETERNAL LANE] IS THE FINAL DESTINATION (from ‘*ke lorong abadi*’ (‘*toward the eternal lane*’) [MC#123; MP-07/2:20b]). In this example, ETERNAL LANE symbolizes THE AFTERLIFE for the Malays. Note that the degrees of conventionality for symbolisms do vary (much like metaphoricity, in some ways), whereby some may be highly conventional while others may be more novel or creative. In some cases also, there may exist more than one *layer* of metaphor, that the conceptual statement could in fact be read as ‘A [(is) Z] is B’, wherein the symbol ‘[]’ has proven to be immensely helpful in capturing this feature. For instance, EMOTIONAL SCARS [PHYSICAL SCARS] ARE CLOTHES (from ‘*wearing these scars*’ [MC#525; ES-24/7:39]) is postulated to have already contained the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONAL SCARS ARE PHYSICAL SCARS, that is, in ‘*scars*’. This metaphorical concept is then once again conceptualized as CLOTHES in ‘*wearing these scars*’. This, evidently, is not an isolated occurrence, and similar cases are found in both languages²¹⁶. Another remark concerns the CM postulation in any cognitive-based metaphor analysis, i.e. that it is *introspective*. This fact, combined with the tacit nature of metaphor, makes an entirely undisputed postulation impossible. The best that one could do is to formulate principled decisions throughout the analysis, into which we have channeled our best effort.

Table 19 below describes the four data categories. Indeed it is a fortunate coincidence for us that the numbers of metaphors (totaling 1,471) from both languages turned out to be near symmetrical and almost mirroring each other, i.e. 732 MCs in Malay and 739 MCs in English. From the complete list of CM, TD and SD (see in Appendices B, C and D, respectively), we calculated the frequency of occurrence for the source concepts

	MALAY			ENGLISH		
	texts (n)	MCs (n)	MCs (mean)	texts (n)	MCs (n)	MCs (mean)
SONGS	26	547	21.0	26	551	21.2
POEMS	10	185	18.5	10	188	18.8
	36	732	39.5	36	739	40.0

Table 19: Descriptions of identified MCs (in number and mean) across four data categories

and target concepts of these conceptual metaphors. In connection with the ‘depth’ of conceptual categorization listed out as SD and TD, each decision was made based on the information supplied by the particular linguistic expression, which differs from one

²¹⁶ See the complete list of the 1,471 conceptual metaphors catalogued in Appendix B. Due to copyright restrictions, we are not able to publish the 72 poetic texts. They are, however, provided in read-only data files in CD-ROM as a supplementary material to the five reviewers and examiners of this doctoral thesis (English translations of the Malay texts are supplied).

case to another. To illustrate, in ‘*life treats you kind*’ [MC#180; ES-09/3:14], we state the conceptual metaphor as LIFE IS A HUMAN/PERSON, whilst in ‘*tergoda cakerawala*’ (‘*the sky is seduced*’) [MC#83; MP-06/2:9], the conceptual metaphor is expressed as THE SKY IS A SEDUCEE. This is because the latter contains more information about the source than does the former. Naturally, THE SKY IS A HUMAN/PERSON for the latter case would have also been a correct and an acceptable (albeit a more general) postulation. The same principle applies to non-human concepts, especially to OBJECT. For instance, in ‘*pendam duka*’ (‘*bury the grief*’) [MC#7; MS-01:2/8], the conceptual metaphor is stated as GRIEF IS A BURIABLE OBJECT. Here, we are not provided with any specific information about what kind of OBJECT exactly that GRIEF is conceptualized as, other than that it was metaphorically ‘buried’²¹⁷. However, in ‘*spangled night*’ [MC#61; EP-05:2/10], the conceptual metaphor reads as THE SKY <NIGHT> IS A CLOTH, whereby A CLOTH is inarguably OBJECT and thus could have also been stated as THE SKY <NIGHT> IS AN OBJECT. Once again, the latter, while not incorrect, would have been less precise, that is, given the semantic information made available here.

Last but not least, an important notion that also merits mentioning here is SOUL, whose conceptual presence throughout the analyzed texts did not go unnoticed. Although the word ‘soul’ is traditionally used in an interchangeable fashion with ‘spirit’ to refer to a perception-transcendent (dead or undead) abstract entity in religious beliefs or cultural mythos, our analysis has shown that this was not the case for most instances found in our data. Instead, SOUL largely carries the meaning of INNER-SELF (which appears as the 6th biggest target domain in our data, as we will show shortly). In addition, SOUL also refers to THE HEART OF HEARTS, and although it is often used alongside HEART or EMOTION, a deeper analysis reveals that whenever HEART AND SOUL appear together linguistically, the combination is actually meant to emphasize an internal state that goes even *deeper* than EMOTION <HEART/LIVER> itself. Our challenge in this case, however, stretches beyond the mere semantics of the word ‘soul’, but rather, we have also had to consider the cultural and/or religious notions of SOUL from the perspectives of Malay and English speakers, which are often, but not always, in tandem with each other. We shall resume this discussion in Section 5.4 with examples from the data to demonstrate cross-linguistic and cross-cultural contrasts between the two languages. But our remark

²¹⁷ This is an excellent example of how inter-language translations may fail us, if we were not careful. Although the translated English version ‘*bury the grief*’ may be argued to be read as GRIEF IS A CORPSE, ‘*pendam*’ in Malay specifies the burying of *non*-human objects, thus excluding GRIEF from being conceptualized as CORPSE, in this particular case.

at this juncture is meant to alert the reader that conceptual classifications of the source and target domains in this study have been determined *beyond* superficial vocabulary. In the case at hand, the target domain SOUL/INNER-SELF is classified under AFFECTIVE STATES/PROCESSES (AFF) and not SPIRITUALITY/SUPERNATURALISM (SPR), i.e. due to its conceptual contents being more reflective of the former than the latter (with some possible overlaps, notwithstanding). On the other hand, when SOUL is used in reference to SPIRIT that is conceptualized as an entity transcending the physical body or existing beyond the physical plane, it is classified under the former with other related concepts, e.g. GOD, ANGEL, SINS, PRAYERS, FAITH (IN GOD), and so on. For clarity and precision, we express these cases as ‘SPIRIT/SOUL’, i.e. to clearly distinguish it from ‘SOUL’. The consequences of having been conscientious with the categorical divisions of the source and target domains will be reflected in the analysis results reported below.

5.3.2. Source domain (SD) and target domain (TD)

Because the source domain and target domain are fundamentally two sides of the same coin, we will present their analysis results together under one subject heading. Having just now clarified the varying degrees of conceptual specificity as reflected in the SD and TD columns of our CM catalogue in Appendix B, we present below the source and target concepts that appeared most frequently in the 72 analyzed texts. All figures given here reflect calculations that are based on the previously explained levels of conceptual specificity. For starters, as shown in Table 20 below, the type-token ratios (TTRs) for both the source and the target domains are about equally varied, i.e. 22.6% for concepts in SD and 22.2% for those in TD. This tells us that there is almost no notable difference at all in the overall lexical variability between the ‘more concrete’ SD concepts and the

	type	token	ratio
SOURCE	332	1471	22.6
TARGET	327	1471	22.2

Table 20: TTRs for source and target concepts from 1,471 conceptual metaphors

‘more abstract’ TD concepts. Of course, these figures do not offer a complete picture of the distribution of concepts in both domains, for which a deeper inspection is required. Specifically, when we itemized all of the 332 source and 327 target domains (i.e. type), we discovered that concepts with a frequency of ≥ 20 (i.e. token) occupy a little more than half of the entire data, and this has been the case for both domains. In the source

domain, the top 7 concepts make up 50.6% (i.e. 745) of the total 1,471 items, whereas the top 10 concepts in the target domain constitute 51.4% (i.e. 756) thereof. In other words, the 7 and 10 most common source and target concepts dominate *half* of their respective domains throughout the whole data, as shown in Table 21 below. To further illustrate this skewed distribution, we briefly mention here that there are 192 source and 181 target concepts (which respectively translate to 13.1% and 12.3%) that appear only *once* throughout the entire data. This suggests that for both domains, the data are highly varied at the lowest end of the frequency spectrum, but are largely hegemonized by the 7 and 10 most popular concepts on the top half of the distribution.

	Frequency in the data	
	(n)	%
Top 7 source domains	745/1471	50.6
Top 11 target domains	756/1471	51.4

Table 21: The most common source and target domains (i.e. with ≥ 20 tokens) in our data

Due to spatial constraints, we will not be able to discuss or mention the rest of the 325 source and 316 target domains here, but they are listed in Appendices C and D. The 6 most common source domains that surfaced in our data are: OBJECT, HUMAN/PERSON, ROOM/CONTAINER, LOCATION, JOURNEY, and OCEAN. On the other side of the coin, the 9 most frequently metaphorized concepts that appeared as target domains in the data are: LOVE, EMOTIONS/FEELINGS, THE LOVER AND THE BELOVED, RELATIONSHIP, TIME, SOUL/INNER-SELF, LIFE, LONGING, and MIND. The breakdown of these most prevalent SDs and TDs (i.e. those with the frequency of 20 and more) will be provided in the following subsection. At this point, the figures given for the more generic (or lexically broader) source domains such as OBJECT and HUMAN/PERSON do not yet include their sub-categorizations (for example, ANCHOR, BED, SPONGE, TUNNEL, etc., each of which is OBJECT, and ARTIST, DOCTOR/SURGEON, PRISON GUARD, SLAVE, etc., each of whom is HUMAN/PERSON). The same applies to target domains, e.g. EMOTIONS/FEELINGS²¹⁸, whereby its frequency of occurrence has not yet been combined with the specific kinds of EMOTIONS/FEELINGS, e.g. ANGER, DESPAIR, HAPPINESS, LONGING, and others. The combined total of their frequency of occurrence based on the broader classifications of SDs and TDs will be presented shortly, in subsection 5.3.2.2.

²¹⁸ In cases where it is inconsequential to the goals of our study to make the finer distinctions between some semantically similar, related and/overlapping concepts, e.g. EMOTIONS and FEELINGS, we have decided to combine and count them as *one* mapping domain, as indicated above, i.e. EMOTIONS/FEELINGS.

5.3.2.1. SD and TD: Dominance

In this subsection, we present *only* the source domains and target domains with ≥ 20 tokens for each type. Specifically, these refer to the 6 SDs and the 9 SDs that appear to be the most common ones in our Malay and English data, combined. In addition, there is a special category labeled as 'PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL' (to refer to the source-to-target mappings) that is present in both domains, i.e. 129 in SD and 150 in TD, and each is marked with '*' in the two frequency tables presented below. Subsection 5.4.2 is dedicated to discussing this particular kind of mapping that appears to be recurrent in our data. But to explain it briefly here, abstract concepts of this kind almost always lack the lexical unit that can describe their meanings on their own, that is, without having to 'borrow' any vocabulary from the source domains, in terms of which it would then be conceptualized (recall also Tables 12a and 12b, p.183). A previously cited example of conceptual metaphor (p.196), i.e. EMOTIONAL SCARS ARE PHYSICAL SCARS, is a good illustration of this. Most, if not all, of them may also be expressed in a general formula of 'NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X'. However, because the 'original' *non*-metaphorical vocabulary for such abstract concepts is practically nonexistent, we have decided to label them as 'PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL', for now. And because they do not, strictly speaking, constitute a domain on their own (be it source or target), we have clustered them together and regard them as tokens of the same *one* broad type of conceptual transfer. And given their noticeable presence and regularity throughout the data in both languages, we have decided to study this conceptual phenomenon a little deeper and report our findings accordingly in subsection 5.4.2.

Tables 22a and 22b below register the most common SDs and TDs in our data, as well as their frequency of occurrence. Their conceptual categories are indicated accordingly, based on the scalar model, i.e. perceptual (SC and LC), perceptual-conceptual (LA), and conceptual (HA). Due to the romantic disposition of lyric poetry (poems and songs), the metaphorized concepts of LOVE and RELATIONSHIP (TDs 1 and 4, respectively, as in Table 22b below) that surfaced in our data refer exclusively to ROMANTIC LOVE and ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP, and should be so read throughout, even when not explicitly stated henceforth. It is indeed clear from both tables that the concepts that function as source domains in metaphorical mappings are the 'more concrete' ones, whereas those in target domains are the 'more abstract' ones. That is, 4 out of 6 of the most common source domains found in our data have clear perceptual bases (SC and LC, although in

this case they are all sC), whilst the remaining 2 are perceptual-conceptual (LA), and none is conceptual (HA). As for the target domains, the figures display a clear obverse trend, i.e. 6 out of 9 are conceptual (HA), 2 are perceptual-conceptual (LA), and only 1 is perceptual (sC and LC, although the one referred to here is sC).

	Source domain	Frequency
1	OBJECT	296
*	PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL	129
2	HUMAN/PERSON	129
3	ROOM/CONTAINER	89
4	LOCATION	57
5	JOURNEY	25
6	OCEAN	20
	Total	745

■ perceptual (sC, LC) ■ perceptual-conceptual (LA)

Table 22a: The 6 most common *source* domains in our data

	Target domain	Frequency
*	PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL	150
1	LOVE	132
2	EMOTIONS/FEELINGS	111
3	THE LOVER AND THE BELOVED	90
4	RELATIONSHIP	74
5	TIME	64
6	SOUL/INNER-SELF	47
7	LIFE	40
8	LONGING	26
9	MIND	22
	Total	756

■ perceptual (sC, LC) ■ perceptual-conceptual (LA) ■ conceptual (HA)

Table 22b: The 9 most common *target* domains in our data

A surface-level interpretation of these findings is that they lend unambiguous support to the cognitive-based metaphor theories with respect to the (more) concrete nature of source domain and the (more) abstract nature of target domain. And at a more profound level, these findings may have also brought to light some conceptual constraints that are inherent in metaphorical mappings. Specifically, observe from Table 22b above that even concepts from the *most* concrete source domain, sC (or in Objectification's term, the '*ultimate* source domain'), i.e. OBJECT, including HUMAN/PERSON (under which, of course, THE LOVER AND THE BELOVED is subsumed), *can* function as a target domain

and be conceptualized in terms of another concept. The reverse, however, is clearly *not* the case with HA, i.e. highly abstract concepts that are purely conceptual (which our model predicts to be the ‘ultimate *abstract* domain’), e.g. THOUGHTS and FEELINGS, because they do not functionally exist as a source domain. In other words, one could interpret these findings as evidence for the difference in the conceptual transferability (or ‘mapping-ability’)²¹⁹ between SDs and TDs. Specifically, while the target domain seems to be relatively lax in regard to which concepts may be accepted into its domain (irrespective of their degree of concreteness/abstractness), the source domain is much more strict in accepting its domain members and demands that they fulfill a certain structural requirement (which the HA concepts, by definition, lack). Upcoming sections will show how these observations, especially when taken together with a series of other findings in this study, may carry meaningful implications for CMT-Objectification, and cognitive-based metaphor research, at large.

5.3.2.2. SD and TD: Prevalence

As previously reported, the 7 biggest source domains and the 10 biggest target domains that emerged from our analyses dominate a little over half of our data. From this point onward, we return to the entire data and present a broader picture of all concepts that appeared in the source and target domains (i.e. 1,471 pairs of them). This subsection and the next will take a closer look into these domains with respect to their conceptual transferability. It is important to keep in mind that concepts are essentially *fluid* and are thus not often easily classified (even with precise, pre-determined criteria). Moreover, conceptual and semantic overlaps are not uncommon, and language can be notoriously imprecise at times (not least *poetic* language), in that what is expressed often denotes something else. So, again, applying principled decisions through and through is key in carrying out all the tediously painstaking tasks involved in a study such as ours. Table 23 below describes the presence of the 16 source and/or target domains of conceptual

	perceptual								perceptual-conceptual				conceptual			
	strictly concrete (sC)				loosely concrete (LC)				low abstract (LA)				highly abstract (HA)			
	HUM	ANI	PLA	INO	GUS	OLF	AUD	VIS	LOC	LFE	REL	OTH	TME	COG	AFF	SPR
SD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓*	✗	✗	✓*
TD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 23: Source and/or target domains that surfaced in the data (based on classifications)

²¹⁹ There are, in fact, unique exceptions that appear to be violating this rule, but which we have analyzed and hypothesized to be a ‘reverse mapping’. We will discuss this phenomenon in subsection 5.4.1, with examples from the data.

metaphors that we have identified and analyzed in the data, i.e. grouped according to the criteria determined and described in the scalar model.

It is important to understand that unlike in the sC (i.e. HUM→ANI→PLA→INO) and LC (i.e. GUS→OLF→AUD→VIS) categories, ‘sequences’ of concepts reflected in the within-category breakdowns in LA and HA in Table 23 above are *not* meant to represent any degree of concreteness/abstractness. Pending further investigation, we need to suspend any assumptions thereof, and would for now treat the members of LA (i.e. LOC, LFE, REL, OTH) and HA (i.e. TME, COG, AFF, SPR) as ‘equal’ amongst their within-category members, in this regard²²⁰. In the two boxes for TME and SPR in the SD row in Table 23 above, the checkmark with an asterisk symbol next to it (‘✓*’) highlights a ‘violation’ to our predictions about domain-to-domain transferability. That is, that HA concepts are too highly abstract and thus lack any structure that can be conceptually transferred as an SD to a TD in a metaphorical mapping. We will present our analysis of such cases in subsection 5.4.1 and offer some insights on this notable phenomenon. In the meantime, Table 24a below features a finer breakdown of the two perceptually based (sC and LC) domains, with brief descriptions and prototypical examples from the data. These are the 8 source domains that represent 73% of the entire data (1,073 out of 1,471), which at the same time have also shown to be actively functional as target domains, even if only 19% of the time (282 out of 1,471). Finally, due to the clear perceptual characteristics of both sC and LC, we report their findings here jointly.

code	brief descriptions	SOURCE DOMAIN		TARGET DOMAIN	
		freq	examples from data	freq	examples from data
HUM	humans	229	ADVERSARY, BOSS/SUPERIOR, GUEST	105	DREAMER, LOVERS, SURFERS, WIFE
ANI	animals	14	PREDATORY BIRD, LION, WOLVES	6	FLEAS, CANARY, A FLOCK OF SEAGULLS
PLA	plants	38	LOTUS, ROSE, PLANTS, TREE	10	FLOWER, GRASS, LEAVES
INO	inorganic/tactile objects	736	BOOK, BRAZIER, CANVAS, DAGGER	94	BELLS, BOULDERS, CURTAIN, GUITAR
GUS	gustatory stimuli/quality	9	SWEET TASTANTS	1	SWEETNESS
OLF	olfactory stimuli/quality	3	FRAGRANCE, FRESH SCENT	2	FRAGRANCE (OF A ROSE), SCENT
AUD	auditory stimuli/quality	8	MUSIC, SONG, SOUND	32	CRY, MUSIC, SONGS, PITCH, VOICE
VIS	visual stimuli/quality	36	BRIGHTNESS, COLOR, LIGHT, SHADOW	32	COLORS/SHADES, DARKNESS, RAINBOWS
		1073		282	

Table 24a: sC and LC concepts as source and/or target (with examples from data)

We have argued in Chapter Three that concepts that belong to sC and LC are relatively straightforward to describe and classify, in contrast to their counterparts in LA and HA. In fact, we even stated in subsection 3.4.3.4 that we would not reject the possibility of a

²²⁰ We should add that this statement is more true for HA than LA concepts, because as we have already substantiated in subsection 3.4.3.4, within-category mapping here is possible, i.e. from ‘more imageable’ to ‘less imageable’ concepts, e.g. LIFE IS A JOURNEY, but not in the reverse direction *A JOURNEY IS LIFE.

fifth in-between category on the concreteness/abstractness scale, in the event that there is sufficient evidence therefor following further investigation. Meanwhile, we adhere to the existing classifications in the scalar model. As illustrated in Table 24b below, we have identified source and/or target domains LOCATION, LIFE and RELATIONSHIP, and grouped them under LA. In addition, there is one sub-category provisionally labeled as OTH (for ‘others’) that combines source and target domains such as STATES, EVENTS, ACTIVITIES, ACTIONS, MOVEMENTS, and the like. Although we find it less than ideal to be assigning these domains in the ‘others’ sub-category, this was one of the limitations that we have had to make do with, for now. Observe also that in spite of having pointed

code	brief descriptions	SOURCE DOMAIN		TARGET DOMAIN	
		freq	examples from data	freq	examples from data
LOC	location	94	LOCATION, PLACE, POSITION, SPACE	0	(not found in data)
LFE	life	0	(not found in data)	43	LIFE, TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)
REL	relationship	0	(not found in data)	95	MARRIAGE, RELATIONSHIP, ROMANCE
OTH	states, events, activities, etc.	281	KINGDOM, JOURNEY, ADVENTURE, GAME	236	DIFFICULTIES, DIRECTIONS, DISTANCE
		375		374	

Table 24b: LA concepts as source and/or target (with examples from data)

out in Chapter Three the dimensional ambiguity of SPACE (recall subsection 3.3.1.3), which could denote both LOCATION (2-dimensional, i.e. SPACE_B) as well as CONTAINER (3-dimensional, i.e. SPACE_C), we have decided to err on the side of caution here and classify SPACE as LOCATION in the *former* sense (SPACE_B) whenever there is ambiguity. This is particularly because as advocates of Objectification Theory, we do not wish to give any impression of biasedness toward OBJECT by pushing the occurrences of SPACE into sC category that would no doubt pull up the total frequency for OBJECT in the final analysis (even though there are at times some indications that point to their OBJECT-ness, or in Objectification’s terms, ‘boundedness’). Hence, in order to stay as objective as (is humanly) possible, we only accept SPACE to mean CONTAINER (i.e. SPACE_C or OBJECT) when there is *unequivocal* evidence for its OBJECT-ness. In any case, we find it highly remarkable that the total frequency counts for members of the LA category are 25% for *both* domains, i.e. 375 out of 1,471 as source domains and 374 out of 1,471 as target domains. This does suggest that in our data, loosely abstract concepts (LA) are as equally prevalent and functional in SD as they are in TD (i.e. unlike the perceptual and conceptual ones that tend to lean toward one domain or the other).

And finally, as for the HA category, we have identified four main sub-categories of the target domains most prevalent in our data, i.e. TIME, COGNITIVE STATES/PROCESSES, AFFECTIVE STATES/PROCESSES and SPIRITUALITY/SUPERNATURALISM, summarized in

Table 24c below. With the probable exception of TIME, the other three members of this category essentially allude to the MIND and the different facets of mental activities and constructs (hence they are characterized in data as purely conceptual). Similar to LA, we would recommend a detailed investigation into this category before committing to a more than provisional proposal regarding whether or not some members of this category might be more or less abstract than their co-members. Until then, we would treat them as equally highly abstract. Perhaps partly due to their shared origin in the MIND, the semantic overlaps between these three members (i.e. COG, AFF, and SPR, for brevity)²²¹ of HA are not uncommon. Indeed the overlapping of some cognitive and affective functions of the

code	brief descriptions	SOURCE DOMAIN		TARGET DOMAIN	
		freq	examples from data	freq	examples from data
TME	time	*2	*TIME	64	FUTURE, NIGHT, PAST, TIME
COG	cognitive states/processes	0	(not found in data)	117	CONFUSION, DOUBT, DECISIONS, SANITY
AFF	affective states/processes	0	(not found in data)	586	ANGER, ANXIETY, BLISS, EXCITEMENT
SPR	spirituality/supernaturalism	*21	*ANGELS, *EVIL SPIRIT, *HEAVEN, *HELL	48	FAITH/PRAYER, GOD, SINS, SPIRIT/SOUL
		23		815	

Table 24c: HA concepts as source and/or target (with examples from data)

brain are now well acknowledged, as reflected in a multitude of scientific discourse, most notably in cognitive-affective neuroscience, wherein the two intertwined faculties of the mind are studied hand-in-hand. And while we recognize this fact, conceptual classifications for the purpose of our present study have been relatively unproblematic, and in most cases, their semantic distinctions are clear. To illustrate, concepts such as THOUGHTS, LOGIC, INTELLECT, REASONING, etc. are straightforwardly classified as COG, whereas FEELINGS/EMOTIONS, PASSION, SORROW, SADNESS, etc. fall inarguably under the AFF sub-category. It is, however, concepts like HOPES, DREAMS, FANTASIES, MEMORIES, etc. that tend to hover rather ambivalently, at times, over the gray area that lies between most of the other clear-cut concepts in COG and AFF. More precisely, these concepts may be argued to possess some aspects of *both* faculties, even if to varying degrees. In such cases, then, decisions would be made in favor of the sub-category in which aspects of a concept (cognitive or affective) were judged to be more dominant in that particular instance. In addition to the COG-AFF conceptual overlaps, the SPR sub-category is also not entirely without conundrums, especially in relation to AFF. We will provide specific examples of this when we present our analysis results in subsequent subsections. One final observation that we would like to highlight here is the utmost

²²¹ In fact, in subsection 3.4.3.4, we made a mention of the lack of consensus in the psychology literature with regard to the Internal State Language (ISL) vocabulary, resulting in at least 11 variations of internal and/or mental state language classifications, which might very well have been attributed to the fluidity of these internal concepts.

prevalence of HA concepts as target domains, i.e. 55% of the time (815 out of 1,471) compared to 25% for LA concepts and 19% for LC and SC concepts in a target domain capacity. Further, in contrast to the LA, LC and SC categories that are all able to occupy *both* mapping domains relatively freely (albeit with varying degrees), the ability of HA to do the same is very extremely limited. As displayed in Table 24c above, aside from the 23 occurrences out of 1,471 (i.e. only 2% from the entire data) that display TME and SPR as source domains, HA exists almost exclusively as a target domain. As a matter of fact, a closer inspection has revealed a distinctive pattern for these ‘violations’ to the postulated mapping rule (marked with ‘*’), which we will discuss in Section 5.4.

5.3.3. Source-to-target conceptual transferability

By now we have established the dominance of the 7 SD concepts and 10 TD concepts that make up more than 50% of 1,471 items in our conceptual metaphor databank. We have also exhibited the prevalence of 16 identified subcategories and the varying levels of capacities in which they have shown to function as the source domain, the target domain, or both. In this subsection, we will go a step further and present our findings on conceptual transferability of these 16 subcategories. We will be highlighting here the domain-to-domain transfer tendencies in metaphorization, as well as some patterns that may suggest a predisposition or preference for metaphorization that is unique to either Malay or English. Table 25 below records in detail the frequency of occurrence for the 16 mapping domains found in the data, both in their capacity as source and/or target domains. The breakdown according to language is provided here to reflect inter-language similarities and differences in this regard between the two languages. If we

		SOURCE DOMAIN			TARGET DOMAIN						
		Malay (n=732)	English (n=739)	Total (n=1471)	Category Total	Malay (n=732)	English (n=739)	Total (n=1471)	Category Total		
SC	HUM	147	82	229	1073	SC	HUM	57	48	105	282
	ANI	10	4	14		ANI	1	5	6		
	PLA	37	1	38		PLA	2	8	10		
	INO	343	393	736		INO	40	54	94		
LC	GUS	2	7	9	375	LC	GUS	1	0	1	374
	OLF	3	0	3		OLF	1	1	2		
	AUD	4	4	8		AUD	4	28	32		
	VIS	18	18	36		VIS	12	20	32		
LA	LOC	40	54	94	23	LA	LOC	0	0	0	815
	LFE	0	0	0		LFE	18	25	43		
	REL	0	0	0		REL	46	49	95		
	OTH	115	166	281		OTH	84	152	236		
HA	TME	*2	0	*2	1471	HA	TME	26	38	64	1471
	COG	0	0	0		COG	46	71	117		
	AFF	0	0	0		AFF	356	230	586		
	SPR	*11	*10	*21		SPR	38	10	48		
		732	739	1471			732	739	1471		

Table 25: SD and TD according to category breakdowns in both languages

are to add up figures from sC and LC, the final counts will turn out quite comparable between the two languages, both for SD and TD. Specifically, about 38% (564 out of 1,471) and 34% (509 out of 1,471) of these perceptually based concepts function as source, while 8% (118 out of 1,471) and 11% (164 out of 1,471) of them function as target in Malay and English, respectively. However, when broken down into their sub categories, a number of inter-language differences will become visible in regard to their transfer trends. That is, whereas both languages display an overwhelming occurrence of INO as source domains (343 in Malay and 393 in English), Malay appears to have ANI and PLA as source domains visibly more often than English does, even though the two subcategories are notably absent in the data of both languages as source domains as a whole (and even more scarce as target domains). But when we zoom in to only on HUM and INO as target domains, the figures in both languages mirror each other well, albeit Malay's slight tendency for metaphorizing HUM and English's for INO. In short, Malay appears to display a preference for human-related concepts in metaphorization (both as source and target), whereas English seems to do so with (inorganic) thing-related ones at a similar frequency, albeit with more visible differences in SD than in TD.

Although both the sC and LC categories are characterized as 'perceptual' by our scalar model (i.e. they are both *concrete*), results clearly show that the presence of the former in our data (whether as source or target domains) is incomparably greater than that of the latter. In fact, the metaphoric presence of LC in the analyzed poetic texts (especially in English) is surprisingly scarce, i.e. only about 4% (56 out of 1,471) as source and barely 5% (67 out of 1,471) as target. A deeper inspection, however, indicates that this may be due to the fact that concepts in this category are not only perceptual objects that were directly referred to in songs and poems, e.g. as TASTANTS, FRAGRANCES, SOUNDS and COLORS, but references about them are also often made indirectly, i.e. as properties of (tactile) OBJECTS. This is found to be especially true for gustatory and olfactory objects. Examples from the data include FOOD (that typically invokes the gustatory sense) and FLOWER (that typically invokes the olfactory sense), which owing to their irrefutable OBJECT-ness are categorized as sC. Contrasting the LC occurrences across languages, these concepts function as source domains with a fairly equal frequency in both languages (27 in Malay and 29 in English). As target domains, however, it seems that the frequency is much lower in Malay (i.e. 18) than in English (i.e. 49)²²². As for

²²² We should mention here that 19 out of these 49 target domains surfaced in the same text [EP-07], where metaphorization of auditory and visual stimuli was the poem's focus, thus driving up the total frequency of LC category in the English data.



LA's functions as metaphorical mapping domains in our data, Table 25 (p.206) reflects some notable discoveries. Notice that concepts from LOC function exclusively as source domains (but never as target), whereas those from LFE and REL function exclusively as target domains (but never as source). The fact that these results are *identical* for data in both languages also makes for an interesting finding, in our view. In fact, this could well be indicative of the (possibly universal) nature of these concepts as well as their conceptual transferability in metaphorization, instead of a mere linguistic (or cultural) preference of either language. In addition, at a micro-level, one would also notice that the loosely abstract concepts (LA) have a stronger presence in English than in Malay, and this is consistent in all subcategories and in both domains.

We will discuss the highly abstract (HA) category more closely in subsection 5.4.1, but before that, we summarize in Table 26 below the mapping domain tendencies, which will give us a more focused view of the concreteness/abstractness of source and target domains as discovered in our Malay and English data. Subsequent Figures 13 and 14 (p.209) translate the results generated here into a visual graphic format. When viewed

	SOURCE DOMAIN				TARGET DOMAIN			
	MALAY (n=732)		ENGLISH (n=739)		MALAY (n=732)		ENGLISH (n=739)	
	frequency	%	frequency	%	frequency	%	frequency	%
perceptual	564	77	509	69	118	16	164	22
perceptual-conceptual	155	21	220	30	148	20	226	31
conceptual	13	2	10	1	466	64	349	47
	732	100	739	100	732	100	739	100

Table 26: Concreteness/abstractness of SD and TD in Malay and English data

together, the following two pairs of pie charts distinctly show that source domains are made up of mostly concrete concepts, whilst target domains display an opposite trend. Results from both languages are consistent on this, although the contrast is a little more pronounced in Malay for both domains. The first pair of pie charts reveals that source domains are dense with concepts characterized by strong perceptual features (in other words, *concrete* concepts), i.e. with 77% in Malay and 69% in English. Low abstract (LA) concepts that lie between perceptual and conceptual lines also function as source domains to a visibly smaller extent, i.e. 21% of the time in Malay and 30% in English. A rather tiny portion of highly abstract (HA) concepts that appear to have 'violated' our mapping predictions make up 2% and 1% of source domains in Malay and English, respectively. The second pair of pie charts shows that highly abstract (HA) concepts are most prominent in target domains, and more so in Malay than English, i.e. with 64%

Figure 13: Inter-language comparison of concreteness/abstractness of *source* domainsFigure 14: Inter-language comparison of concreteness/abstractness of *target* domains

and 47% respectively. Very interestingly, within each language, figures for low abstract (LA) concepts that function as target domains seem to perfectly mirror those in source domains (i.e. 20% and 21% in Malay and 31% and 30% in English). Additionally, the stronger presence of LA (i.e. ‘perceptual-conceptual’) in both domains in the English data indicate that they carry more Type III A-to-A (or structural) metaphors than do the Malay data, which in contrast may contain more Type II C-to-A (or ontological) ones. Finally, the fact that 16% of target domains in the Malay data are occupied by *concrete* concepts (sC and LC) as opposed to 22% in the English data could suggest that target domains in Malay are generally more abstract than target domains in English. In other words, metaphorized concepts in English may be said to be generally *less* abstract than those in Malay, at least as far as our poetic data are concerned.

To conclude this section, we have combined the analysis results from our Malay and English data and generated a bar graph presented in Figure 15 below, which illustrates

the degrees of concreteness/abstractness of concepts that function as source and target domains in the poetic texts. Indeed, these findings provide compelling evidence for the famous claim by CMT on the concreteness of source domain and abstractness of target domain. And they do so as accurately as any inherently qualitative data would allow it, with a large quantity of conceptual metaphors (n=1,471), and in a manner considerably more methodic and objective than previous or hitherto vague guestimates. All in all, perceptual based concepts have the highest transferability in metaphORIZATION, followed by perceptual-conceptual ones (which function as source and target equally well), while highly abstract concepts are not able to transfer and thus appear exclusively as target. The rare ‘violations’ to the said rule will be discussed in subsection 5.4.1.




Figure 15: The concreteness and abstractness of SDs and TDs as per our data

5.4. Main study, part II: A qualitative survey

This section presents analysis results from the main study, i.e. in a qualitative fashion. Therefore, unlike in the previous section where the quantifiable portions of our data were observed and evaluated largely in terms of their *frequency*, we will approach this section by highlighting and reporting any *systematicity* in conceptual metaphORIZATION that we discovered during our analysis. This means that whether a metaphorical item occurred once or 50 times in the data is inconsequential to our goals at hand. But more importantly, whenever there is observable systematicity between one item and another, or a set of others, in the data (even if their linguistic manifestations may differ, on the

surface), one occurrence will still be regarded as a meaningful part of our findings as a whole. Needless to say, it would be impossible to discuss each of the 1,471 conceptual metaphors quarried from 72 Malay and English poetic texts. Instead, we shall focus on the conceptual metaphors of the MIND, especially ones that pertain to the cognitive and affective aspects of our mental faculties. Of our special interest are the similarities and differences in conceptual metaphorization across the two languages, which we will be bringing into the foreground, as and when they arise.

5.4.1. Mapping directions and constraints

This subsection will present answers to the following inquiries: (1) number and types of metaphorical mappings; (2) directions of metaphorical mapping; and (3) constraints in metaphorical mapping. To begin with, based on the four classifications of concepts in our scalar model, there are in theory 20 possible types of source-to-target mappings (i.e. including within-category mappings in *both* directions). We have charted out these theoretical mappings in Table 27 below to supply the reader with a visual illustration thereof. Now, if we were to take CMT's rather vague 'from concrete to abstract' claims about metaphorical mapping but with no clear criteria for concreteness or abstractness (recall subsection 2.2.4.1), there should only be, strictly speaking, 6 possible mappings (i.e. A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, and C1). But, if we were to take into consideration Szwedek's (2011) Objectification-based typology of metaphor (i.e. C-to-C, C-to-A, and A-to-A; recall subsection 3.3.1.2) with his precise criteria for concreteness by virtue of OBJECT-ness, there could be up to 9 possible mappings (i.e. A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, C1, and C2). With the formulation of our scalar model and its four-category classifications of concepts, and also taking into consideration previous findings on transferability of synesthetic metaphors, our model predicts 11 possible mappings (i.e. A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B1, B2, B3, B4, C1, and C2). That being said, our analyses have revealed three further mappings that exist in our data, all of which occur in a *reversed* direction (i.e. 'right-to-left') *beyond* their own categories. In short, these three mappings do appear to violate the 'concrete-to-abstract' prediction by CMT, on account that they assume the reversed 'abstract-to-concrete' mapping direction (at least on the *surface*, they do).

Table 27 below illustrates the 20 theoretically possible conceptual mappings based on our scalar model. Here, all ordinary concrete-to-abstract mappings are printed in black. Since accounts and examples thereof have already been provided in subsection 3.4.3.4,

informs us that this mapping is not entirely inconceivable. Observe that despite the two violations, i.e. (1) ‘*from more abstract to more concrete*’ irregular mapping direction; and (2) *beyond* its own category, the source MELODY remains a *perceptually* defined category, i.e. LC (more precisely, AUD). Perhaps it is due to the perceptual availability of sC and LC (to varying degrees) that a mapping in a reversed ‘*abstract-to-concrete*’ direction would still be possible, albeit considerably limited compared to the governing ‘*concrete-to-abstract*’ direction. Of course, another plausible analysis within the CMT-Objectification framework may be that MELODY has already, at a prior level, undergone the fundamental and universal process of *objectification*. This process, which is argued to be the biggest leap in the phylogenetic evolution of the human mind and language (Szwedek, 2009c, 2011; recall also subsection 3.3.1), underlies all subsequent steps in metaphorization, e.g. as exemplified by Type III A-to-A metaphorization (or structural metaphor). The same mechanism may be at play here with THE BELOVED IS A MELODY. In either case, neither explanation would contradict our predictions thus far.

5.4.1.1. *Post-objectification metaphorization*

The final two cases of mapping violations (D2 and D5 in Table 27 above) are marked with ‘✓*’ in *red* to denote that neither of their presence in the data was predicted by our model, and was in fact considered impossible and/or infelicitous. This is precisely because they both involve a category that is highly abstract (HA) and purely conceptual (which, by definition, must be entirely without perceptual features) as their *source*. In short, HA concepts should *not* be able to function as source domains. Interestingly also, both of these D2 and D5 impermissible mappings involve SPR as their source domains, and similar occurrences have been observed in *both* languages. We are of the view that these are not mere coincidences, but rather, they could be reflective of a prior process of objectification, similar to the previous example. Note that until there is convincing evidence that indicates otherwise, we shall continue to treat members of HA as equally highly abstract. For this reason, we employ the symbol ‘<=’ or ‘=>’ in Table 27 above for within-category mappings for the HA category, based on their manifested mapping directions. The ‘=’ symbol reminds us that we are presently assuming that both mapped concepts are equally highly abstract in nature, while the ‘<’ and ‘>’ would each signify their respective mapping directions along the scale. However, as registered in Table 27 above, only D2 is present in our data, but not D1.

To illustrate, for the linguistic expression ‘*menjadi memori kekalnya abadi*’ (‘*becoming a memory everlasting (and) immortalized*’) [MC#357; MS-17/4:31-32], we posited the conceptual metaphor A MEMORY IS AN IMMORTAL BEING. Recall that Table 24c (p.205) describes SPIRITUALITY/SUPERNATURALISM (SPR) as an HA sub-category with highly abstract concepts such as GOD, ANGELS, SINS, HELL, HEAVEN, etc., to which IMMORTAL BEINGS also belong. Inarguably, none of these concepts may exist linguistically other than metaphorically²²³. In the case at hand, IMMORTAL BEING has already undergone a metaphorization process, i.e. *objectification* (or more precisely, ‘(super)humanization’), in which it was given shape, image, life, etc. based largely on human characteristics. It is only then that it may transfer any of its (*metaphorically* acquired) features to another concept as a source domain in a metaphorical mapping, i.e. in this case the aspect of ‘life’, to another highly abstract concept, MEMORY. The same rule applies to another variant of the same D2-type violation, but with LOVE (AFF) in place of MEMORY (COG) as its target domain. More specifically, LOVE IS AN IMMORTAL BEING is the conceptual metaphor that we postulate underlies the expression ‘*biar ku abadi cinta yang setia ini*’ (‘*let me immortalize this faithful love*’) [MC#29; MS-02/3:11-12] as well as its English counterpart, i.e. ‘*[you] said we’d be forever, said it’d never die*’ [MC#152; ES-08/2:7]. Another example that appears to display the same pattern is ‘*marah merasuk minda*’ (‘*anger possesses (i.e. as an evil spirit) the mind*’) [MC#544; MS-26/5:15], postulated as ANGER IS AN EVIL SPIRIT (THAT POSSESSES ONE’S MIND). These instances appear to carry a striking *systematicity*, i.e. the universal process of objectification (i.e. in these cases, (*super*)humanization). In other words, whether they are IMMORTAL BEINGS, EVIL

²²³ While we are in favor of Szwedek’s proposals (2018b) to reinstate the level of ‘God’ into the current 4-level version of the Great Chain of Being (Table 1, p.104) and to include all other supernatural beings and associated concepts into this level to make the model more compatible with our linguistic reality (i.e. as opposed to Krzeszowski’s (1997) proposal on adding an ‘intermediary’ level between humans and God), we have not adopted Szwedek’s (ibid.) use of the term ‘deities’ but prefer instead his alternative/former use of ‘supernatural beings’ to refer to *all* entities in this level. That is, his notion of ‘deification’ is not fully compatible with an HA sub-category (SPR) in our model, i.e. SPIRITUALITY/SUPERNATURALISM, but which his former use of ‘supernaturalization’ (2014a) would be more accordant with. Moreover, our employment of the term ‘God’ will always be deliberately distinct from ‘gods/goddesses/deities’, despite the fact that both cases are subsumed together under ‘supernatural beings’ in our model, along with angels, devils, evil spirits, shape-shifters, and all other kinds of supernatural/magical/immortal creatures and places, e.g. heaven, hell, the afterlife, and all other nonphysical planes. But most importantly, without having to involve ourselves in any theological or ontological debate (and while also refraining from evaluating/validating/invalidating these beliefs and non-beliefs alike), we would formulate our arguments as cognitive linguists objectively on the *semantics* of these concepts, i.e. that as far as our model is concerned, these entities and places have their existence in the MIND (see also Krzeszowski [1997: 67] who has expressed a similar view on this particular point). As a result, these concepts occupy the highly abstract (HA) category on our concreteness/abstractness scale, precisely owing to the absence of any physical evidence for their physical existence (recall our description of them as being ‘perception-transcending’). The claims that these entities are ‘real’ by a group of people but ‘unreal’ by another group of others is not at all our concern here. Our interest lies solely in the fact that these concepts lack *all* kinds of concreteness and thus *cannot* be referred to non-metaphorically (also as already pointed out by Barcelona, 2003). A final point to highlight here is that while Szwedek places the ‘supernatural beings’ (or, in his preferred term ‘deities’) level on the topmost seat on the Great Chain of Being, i.e. above ‘humans’, our SPR sub-category of highly abstract (HA) concepts sits at the (rightmost) end on our scale, i.e. with ‘humans’ on the *opposite* (leftmost) end of the continuum as strictly concrete (SC). We do not, however, see this as presenting any theoretical conflict at all, but are in fact somewhat intrigued by the impression that one scale’s ending might be another chain’s beginning, which gives us a sense that a conceptual circle is, then, complete.

SPIRITS, GHOSTS, ANGELS, DEITIES, GOD, HEAVEN, HELL, etc., they are able to function as source domains for target domains such as LOVE, ANGER, GRIEF, MEMORY, DREAMS, and so on, only by virtue of having been *first* objectified.

As a matter of fact, similar examples from outside of our data abound. One that comes to mind at once is ‘*haunting dreams*’ (with its perfect Malay equivalent ‘*mimpi yang menghantui*’), both of which are linguistic manifestations of the conceptual metaphor DREAMS ARE GHOSTS. To further corroborate this claim, a quick online dictionary²²⁴ search for the word ‘haunt’ has generated instances of its metaphorical pairings with PROBLEMS, TUNE, FRAGRANCE, FAILURE, EXPERIENCE, IMAGES, MEMORIES, EVENTS, SIGHT, SHADOW, and DISEASE. Put simply, the TD ‘slot’ in ‘DREAMS ARE GHOSTS’ may be relatively freely substituted by any of the other ‘slot-fillers’²²⁵ from the above list to be entered into the formula ‘X ARE GHOSTS’²²⁶. This new discovery has then urged us to reconsider D3 and D4 in Table 27 (p.212), i.e. that the same kinds of metaphORIZATION should be expected for these two mapping types (in all languages in general). Although they were not found in our data, results produced by our dictionary search clearly show that this post-objectification metaphORIZATION may also be extended to other categories on the scale, i.e. LA, LC and SC. That is, in those dictionary-cited examples, PROBLEMS, FAILURE, EXPERIENCE, EVENTS and DISEASE are low abstract (LA) concepts, whereas FRAGRANCE, TUNE, SHADOW and SIGHT are loosely concrete (LC) ones. Thus, we have marked D3 and D4 in Table 27 with ‘✕*’ to indicate that although these mappings (i.e. ‘*from more abstract to more concrete*’) are not present in our data, they do in fact exist in language, as evidenced by these dictionary search results. And they operate precisely under the same principle of objectification as D2 (and D5, reported below).

As for the final type of ‘*abstract-to-concrete*’ mapping found in our data (D5 in Table 27, p.212), observe that this is yet another extension of the same post-objectification metaphORIZATION discussed above, but one that stretches all the way to the *leftmost* point on the scale, i.e. to the strictly concrete (SC). In fact, examples provided here contain a further complexity with a *metonymic* presence intertwined with their already elaborate layers of metaphORIZATION. To illustrate, in both languages, the target domains are THE

²²⁴ From <https://www.merriam-webster.com>, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org>, and <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com>.

²²⁵ At this point, one is reminded of Reddy’s (1979) analytical apparatus, with which he identified a category of concepts as RM (‘*repertoire member*’) and all words with MENTAL contents as interchangeable substitutes or ‘slot-fillers’ in his conduit metaphors analysis (recall subsection 2.2.3.2); incidentally, our analysis here also operates on a similar principle.

²²⁶ For simplicity, we take the singular and plural forms of CMs as being conceptually identical to each other, i.e. ‘X IS A GHOST’ is the same as ‘X ARE GHOSTS’; the difference is only a reflection of the form in which they transpire linguistically in the metaphorical expressions.

BELOVED (female), with one of them explicitly referred to as A WIFE. An example from the English data is ‘*and now it’s too late to hold you, [be]cause you’ve flown away, so far away*’ [MC#202; ES-12/1:2-4], from which we have postulated THE BELOVED <THE BELOVED’S SOUL> IS AN ANGEL. In this case, the objectification of ANGEL involves a supernaturalization (i.e. a combination of (super)humanization and animalization²²⁷). A similar occurrence from the Malay data is ‘*syurga di wajahmu*’ (‘*heaven on your face*’) [MC#181; MS-08/7:27], whose conceptual metaphor is articulated as A WIFE <WIFE’S FACE> IS HEAVEN. However, the latter instance involves a slight twist, i.e. because the objectification of the SPR concept, HEAVEN (in the form supernaturalization), yields the conceptual metaphor HEAVEN IS A PLACE²²⁸ (that is, its source domain is LOCATION instead of HUMAN like in the previous examples with SUPERNATURAL BEINGS).

5.4.1.2. Can TIME be objectified into a source domain?

The final variant of the D5-type violation in mapping direction involves another highly abstract (HA) sub-category as its source domain, i.e. TIME. This unexpected appearance of TIME as a mapping source is marked with an asterisk (‘*’) in Tables 23, 24c, and 25 (p.202, p.205 and p.206, respectively). There were only *two* such occurrences amongst the 1,471 items in our entire data, but we deem it necessary to report them here. This is particularly considering that TIME has been cited as the abstract domain *par excellence* (Evans & Greens, 2006: 298), and thus its occupancy in the source domain stands out rather oddly from the rest of the data. In any case, both items were found in the Malay data and none in the English ones (howbeit it could well exist in English outside the context of our data). But not unlike the previous examples of the SPR variant of this D5-type violation, the target domain once again appears to be THE BELOVED (female). Of course, supernaturalization has no bearing on the TIME variant of the D5-type ‘*abstract-to-concrete*’ mapping. However, the same principle of metaphorization applies, i.e. a prior *objectification* of TIME is mandatory before this HA concept could be sufficiently equipped with features to transfer into a target in its new function as a source.

An example of the case in point is, ‘*Tapi mengapakah kau sekadar waktu*’ (‘*But why are you merely time*’) [MC#134; MS-07/5:16], whose conceptual metaphor reads THE

²²⁷ Cf. Szwedek (2018b: 6) on supernatural beings adopting “mixed forms”, e.g. “human bodies with wings” for angels.

²²⁸ In the same paper, Szwedek’s analysis on supernatural-related concepts interprets supernatural locations *metonymically* instead of metaphorically, i.e. GEHENNA/HELL/HEAVEN FOR A PLACE OR STATE OF MIND (ibid: 10-12). As established in Chapters Two and Three, the metonymy-metaphor cline is not often easy to discern; we therefore view the discrepancy between his analysis and ours as a result of varying methodological approaches rather than theoretical ones.

BELOVED IS TIME. The only other similar instance in the data is ‘*apakah engkau juga menjadi masa silamku?*’ (‘*have you then also become my bygone time?*’) [MC#92; MP-06/5:23]. In both cases, TIME is first objectified, i.e. presumably as TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, before it could function as a source domain for THE BELOVED. Foreseeably, some may be tempted to counter-argue that any ‘*abstract-to-concrete*’ mapping should not be considered as a metaphor at all. And although in the beginning, we too were admittedly hard-pressed to question this very possibility, the chains of evidence found for such systematicity have not been very easy to pass over throughout the course of our analyses. In fact, our arrival at these conclusions has been the result of working stringently within the CMT-Objectification conceptual framework and abiding by a set of methodical principles. Indeed, if one is to observe these metaphORIZATION processes very carefully and reflect upon Szwedek’s (2011) Objectification-based new metaphor typology (Type I C-to-C, Type II C-to-A, and Type III A-to-A; recall Chapter Three), which is argued to mirror the evolution of the human mind and language, it will surely be hard to discard the prospect that we might have stumbled across the ‘Type IV’ A-to-C metaphORIZATION. Specifically, we suspect that these ‘*abstract-to-concrete*’ mappings found in our data may in fact reflect the *final* stage in the phylogenetic development of our abstract thinking (at least as far as metaphORIZATION is concerned).

When examined closely, the principles underlying ‘Type IV’²²⁹ metaphORIZATION are somewhat similar to those of Type III, in that abstract entities do not have their own structure except those *inherited* via objectification. And precisely for this reason, these abstract concepts, i.e. low abstract (LA) for Type III, and highly abstract (HA) for ‘Type IV’, need to have been objectified *first* before the next step in metaphORIZATION could take place at all. Furthermore, because ‘Type IV’ source domain comprises the *most abstract* of entities whose origin and existence are essentially *mental*, they need to have already undergone the fundamental and universal stage of objectification (that is, in the form of (super)humanization/supernaturalization for the *SPR* sub-category), as shown at length in our analyses above. Recall also Szwedek’s (2009c, 2011) identification of the *metonymic* characteristics of Type I C-to-C metaphORIZATION, which he also often refers to as ‘feature-to-feature’ or ‘metonymy-based’ metaphors, and argues to be grounded in Wittgenstein’s terms of ‘aspectual perception’ (1953b, after Szwedek, 2011). Szwedek

²²⁹ Because what we are presenting here would be a considerable proposal to Szwedek’s (2009c, 2011) existing metaphor typology, we will only refer to ‘Type IV’ in inverted commas (‘’) to signify its *provisional* status mainly for the purpose of the present discussion and not to wrongly imply or assume its acceptance into the theory.

also hints that if ‘Type IV’ were to exist, it would involve an objectified entity and its *metonymic* interpretation thereof (ibid: 346). Interestingly, the examples cited from our data and discussed above also point to specific *features* of the objectified entities, for example, HUM_{FORM}/ANI_{FLY} in ‘ANGEL’, LOC_{PLACE} in ‘HEAVEN’, INO_{FLEETINGNESS} in ‘TIME’, and so on. These findings may be taken as further support for our proposal that these instances could actually be the ‘Type IV’ metaphorization previously thought to be nonexistent and/or impossible. Moreover, if our analyses have attained a good measure of success, these results may also suggest ‘permissibility’ for highly abstract concepts (including TIME) to be objectified into functioning as source domains, but *not* prior to objectification. Finally, we conclude this discussion by answering the questions raised at the beginning of this subsection: (1) the number and types of metaphorical mappings discovered in our data are recorded in Table 27 (p.212); (2) the governing direction for metaphorical mapping is indeed concrete-to-abstract (i.e. left→right on our model), and exceptions are observed only when: (a) the source domain is *perceptually* defined, that is, sC and LC; and (b) the source domain is an abstract concept, either LA or HA, which has already undergone *objectification*; and (3) one form of constraint in metaphorical mapping is determined by the ability and capacity of SD to transfer to TD the relevant properties required for metaphorization, whether they are *inherent* properties by virtue of their natural perceptual characteristics (for sC and LC), or their *inherited* properties by virtue of the universal process of objectification (for LA and HA).

5.4.2. NONPHYSICAL ‘X’ IS PHYSICAL ‘X’

In subsection 5.3.2.1, we reported the top 6 source domains and 9 target domains that represented 1,471 conceptual metaphors in our data. These were registered in Tables 22a and 22b (p.201), respectively, each containing a special kind of mapping labeled as ‘PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL’ to reflect its reach across the domains. But as previously explained, the asterisk mark (“*”) in both tables indicates that, strictly speaking, this group is neither a source nor a target domain. Rather, what we express as ‘PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL’ may be seen as a general ‘structure’ or ‘frame’ for metaphorically mapping concepts from the physical world to the non-physical worlds. And given their pervasiveness and regularity in the data (i.e. ranking very highly both in their SD and TD functions), we decided to report these findings here. In terms of cross-linguistic or intercultural contrasts, there did not appear to be any considerable difference between such occurrences in either language from our poetic data, except for a slightly stronger

presence in English (53%) compared to Malay (47%). Due to their uniformity, we refer to the general ‘frame’ of this kind of mapping pattern as ‘PHYSICAL X IS NONPHYSICAL X’, under which variations of such conceptual metaphors are subsumed.

Because our data stem from lyric poetry, the most recurrent poetic themes and the most frequently metaphorized concepts are, unsurprisingly, LOVE and EMOTIONS/FEELINGS. This is evidenced by these two concepts being the biggest target domains in the entire data, as reported in subsection 5.3.2.1. Similarly, the ‘PHYSICAL X IS NONPHYSICAL X’ frame contains a large portion of AFFECTIVE STATES/PROCESSES (AFF) as their target domains (i.e. approximately 87%), which could have been identified more precisely as ‘EMOTIONAL X IS PHYSICAL X’. Nonetheless, since such occurrences reflect only a high majority, but *not* exclusivity, we decided to formulate the structure more broadly, i.e. as ‘NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X’. This is not only in order to accommodate other NON-EMOTIONAL/NON-AFFECTIVE ‘X-concepts’ that surface in our data, but also to indicate that this principle can apply just as equally to *other* NONPHYSICAL concepts or worlds beyond our data. These other NONPHYSICAL WORLDS include the other members of the highly abstract (HA) category (aside from EMOTIONAL WORLD) such as INTELLECTUAL WORLD, SPIRITUAL WORLD, and also the highly abstract (HA) superordinate category itself, regardless of whether it is referred to as MENTAL WORLD, CONCEPTUAL WORLD, or PSYCHOLOGICAL WORLD. In fact, the applicability of this mapping structure is not only limited to the highly abstract (HA) concepts as the TD for THE PHYSICAL WORLD, but rather they may also stretch over to the low abstract (LA) concepts, and to a smaller extent to the loosely concrete (LC) concepts, too. In essence, NONPHYSICAL WORLDS could include any of these other spheres of the human life, e.g. SOCIAL, FINANCIAL, MATHEMATICAL, VERBAL/AUDITORY, VISUAL, and so on, the possibilities of which are, in theory, endless. In fact, as aspects of the human existence continue to expand and evolve with all kinds of technological advancements, these expansions (e.g. DIGITAL WORLD, VIRTUAL WORLD, etc.) will also be replicated in our conceptual system, and subsequently manifested in our language via the general frame of conceptual transfer as ‘NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X’ metaphors.

Although we employ the term ‘PHYSICAL’ to mean ‘BODILY’, the source domain may also at times be represented by ‘SPATIAL’. Let us consider the expression ‘*around me*’ in ‘*yet everyone around me thinks that I’m going crazy*’ [MC#519; ES-24/6:34-35]. In this case, the singer is not necessarily referring to the people who are physically present

near her or who are within her *geographical* or *spatial* range, but rather to her family, friends or colleagues, who are within her *social* circle. Hence, we state the conceptual metaphor as SOCIAL PROXIMITY IS SPATIAL PROXIMITY. We realize that such instances are primarily reflective of the transference of physical structures to *nonphysical* entities *without* those structures. In Objectification’s typology, then, most of these cases would fall under the Type III A-to-A metaphorization, and which in CMT’s terms would be structural metaphors. Indeed, as shown in Table 28 below, most of the target domains comprise concepts relating to STATES, EVENTS, LOCATIONS, RELATIONS, PROPERTIES, QUALITIES, and ACTIONS. Even though some of these subcategories do tend to overlap, our point here is that all (save one) of them belong to the low abstract (LA) category. The exception to this is the set labeled as ‘TACTILITY/HAPTICS’, which bears directly on the EMOTIONAL WORLD and will be discussed in the following subsection.

TACTILITY/HAPTICS	STATES/EVENTS	LOCATIONS/RELATIONS	PROPERTIES/QUALITIES	ACTIONS
SENSATION	PRESENCE	PLACE	STRENGTH	SACRIFICE
PAIN	LACK/LOSS	SHELTER	WEAKNESS	ACCEPTANCE
WOUND	DEPARTURE	WEIGHT	STURDINESS	EXCLUSION
INJURY	DISCOVERY	DISTANCE	ENERGY	PREVENTION
SCARS	CHANGE	PROXIMITY	VIGOR	INTERFERENCE
HEALING	MOBILITY	BOUNDARY	CAPACITY	RETRACTION
BRUTALITY	PARALYSIS	PROBLEMS	CONDITION	
TORMENT	COLLAPSE	AFFAIRS		
SUFFERING	ENCOUNTER			
PUNISHMENT	UNION			
TREATMENT	REUNIFICATION			
CONSOLATION	MESS			
COMFORT				
SUPPORT				
IMPACT				
BAGGAGE				

Table 28: Examples of slot-fillers (from the data) for the slot ‘X’ in ‘NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X’

As previously mentioned, most of these ‘X-concepts’ do not have their own ‘original’ or nonphysical (that is, *non-metaphorical*) vocabulary, and hence they need to almost always ‘borrow’ those from THE PHYSICAL WORLD to be referred to linguistically. For this reason precisely, they qualify as metaphors, i.e. consistent with our descriptions of ‘embodied meaning’. No doubt, one may find that in many of these cases, dictionary entries would list the nonphysical (i.e. metaphorical) meanings before the physical ones to reflect the former’s dominant use in the present-day linguistic system. But still, even if contemporary language users are to identify the nonphysical or metaphorical senses as the ‘primary’ meaning of these terms, and even if the physical sense is no longer regarded as the ‘dominant’ one, as long as the physical meaning is still ‘transparent’ (recall Müller’s triadic structure in subsection 2.2.4.4), its metaphorical status stands. In other words, NONPHYSICAL WORLDS ARE THE PHYSICAL WORLD could be the principal conceptual metaphor within which a series of components for conceptual metaphors are

contained. Each is represented by the formula ‘NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X’, whose ‘X-slot’ may be made up of any of (but not limited to) the ‘slot-fillers’ quarried from our data, as shown in Table 28 above. Based on these observations, it does appear that the human mind is predisposed to building NONPHYSICAL WORLDS and features thereof around (and *in terms of*) THE PHYSICAL WORLD and its contents. This is reminiscent of Szwedek’s argumentations for the stages in the phylogenetic development of abstract thinking, that human beings’ conceptual and linguistic constructions of the nonphysical worlds are modeled after the physical world (2011: 361). Once again, the phrase “in the image and after the likeness” as cited by Szwedek (*ibid.*) rings true indeed.

5.4.3. The SKIN and the EYE in the MIND

This subsection presents our analyses on the central role of TACTILITY/HAPTICS in the conceptualization of FEELINGS/EMOTION, as well as the equally fundamental role of the VISUAL MODALITY in metaphorizing THOUGHTS/COGNITION. For starters, we have just now provided a list of concepts from our data that function as slot-fillers for the ‘X-slots’ in the conceptual formula ‘NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X’ (see Table 28 above). Contained therein is a subset labeled ‘TACTILITY/HAPTICS’ in the first column, whose concepts are found to be *indispensible* to the descriptions of our EMOTIONAL WORLD, as far as our data have shown. Within this context, it appears that Malay and English both possess a vocabulary that allows a considerable extent of ‘sharing’ between the PHYSICAL WORLD and EMOTIONAL WORLD. We can, evidently, utilize any of the listed slot-fillers for the ‘X-slots’, e.g. PAIN, WOUND, INJURY, SCARS, HEALING, BRUTALITY, TORTURE, SUFFERING, PUNISHMENT, etc. very freely to refer to either ‘PHYSICAL X’ or ‘EMOTIONAL X’, and the relevant or intended sense will be made clear by the context. One may, of course, anticipate a counter-argument that these are simply instances of polysemy²³⁰ and that the identical appearances of ‘pain’ in the physical sense and in the emotional sense are no more than a linguistic happenstance. From our theoretical and methodological viewpoints, however, these cases are unambiguously metaphorical, not least by our having established solid grounds for our scalar model and its descriptions for embodied meaning. We will now bring forth evidence from our data that supports CMT’s hypotheses for the systematicity and non-arbitrariness of conceptual metaphor, which should also simultaneously refute any ‘linguistic accident’ argumentations.

²³⁰ In any case, many polysemous words are *metaphorically* motivated; see also Szwedek (2007a).

5.4.3.1. EMOTION IS THE SKIN

Based on linguistic evidence discovered in our Malay and English data, it appears that our understanding of EMOTION is rooted primarily in our tactile experience, i.e. based on SKIN. In our brief overview on the anatomy and physiology of the tactile modality in subsection 3.4.2, we stated that the main functions of the skin include the perception of external sensations, i.e. touch, pressure, pain and temperature, whose aspects do often overlap. Accordingly, we have taken these four types of tactile sensations as guidelines for extracting SKIN-based metaphors of EMOTION from the data. Although we are aware of the complexity of the somatosensory system and that the touch sense is inextricably linked to other perceptual modalities, our present constraints require us to focus only on SKIN as the source domain for EMOTION, for now. We reiterate that during the analysis, identical occurrences of an item within a text that we considered 'repetitive' for poetic or rhythmic effects are counted only *once*. In other words, their ubiquity in the data is usually higher than reported here. Nonetheless, due to our *qualitative* emphasis in this section, the frequency counts given below are only meant to give the reader a rough idea on the cross-linguistic contrasts for each subgroup, whilst our real interest lies in the inter-language *systematicity* found in the metaphorization of EMOTION.

EMOTION and tactile sensation 1: 'Touch'

The first kind of tactile sensation, i.e. 'touch', which is used to describe AFFECTIVE STATES/PROCESSES appears to be equally common in both languages, i.e. 22 in English and 21 in Malay. However, it has been observed that metaphorical uses of 'touch' in the English data are linguistically homogeneous, that is, all of them employ the lexeme 'feel', in one form or another. A common occurrence takes the form of a verb phrase (VP), when 'feel' (V) is paired with EMOTION, including (EMOTIONAL) PAIN. Examples include: '*I feel pain*' [MC#172; ES-08/8:40], '*feel my pain*' [MC#386; ES-20/5:51], '*to feel true love*' [MC#261; ES-15/4:16], '*we feel the sorrow*' [MC#59; EP-05/2:7], and variants thereof, e.g. '*I never thought I'd feel this way*' [MC#1; ES-01/1:1], '*I never felt this way*' [MC#278; ES-17/3:12], and '*what I'm feeling inside*' [MC#437; ES-21/7:45], and so on. In addition, instances with noun phrases (NP) are also found, whether as a grammatical subject (SUB), e.g. '*[be]cause the feeling ain't the same*' [MC#384; ES-20/5:38] or object (OBJ), e.g. '*that feeling I get about you deep inside*' [MC#228; ES-13/2:12]. In Malay, similar expressions are also very common, e.g. '*terasa cintamu*'

(*'your love is felt'*) [MC#53; MS-04/1:2], *'naluriku rasa bahagia'* (*'my intuition feels blissful'*) [MC#263; MS-13/4:17], and also as NP variants, for example, *'perasaanku yang memujamu'* (*'my feelings that worship you'*) [MC#444; MS-21/4:18] and *'dengan kasih memeluk rasa'* (*'with love embracing feelings'*) [MC#546; MS-26/6:20]. Based on this analysis, it does appear that FEELINGS/EMOTIONS are expressed more directly in English than in Malay, even though most of these expressions may share a conceptual metaphor root, and even when the exact lexeme equivalents are used in both languages (i.e. 'feel' in English and '*rasa*'²³¹ in Malay). Specifically, observe how the expressions appear in active forms in English, but in Malay they are either passively expressed, i.e. 'your love is felt' (instead of the more direct "I feel your love"), or indirectly expressed via humanization of those feelings (which is yet another layer of metaphorization).

Also in regard to metaphorizing FEELINGS/EMOTIONS via the 'touch' sensation, while all 22 out of 22 instances in English employ variants of the lexeme 'feel', their Malay equivalents of '*rasa*' only appear in 8 out of 21 such examples. This is why we stated that the English data are less varied in their 'touch' metaphorical expressions compared to the Malay ones. Aside from '*rasa*' ('feel'), Malay also often uses the lexeme '*belai*' ('caress') in different forms to metaphorically describe FEELINGS/EMOTIONS. Examples include: '*belaian kasih sayang suci darimu*' (*'caresses of untainted love (and) affection from you'*) [MC#113; MS-06/3:15], '*dipenjara belaian cintaku ini*' (*'imprisoned by the caresses of this love of mine'*) [MC#410; MS-20/1:3-4], '*kau membelai jiwaku ini*' (*'you caressed this soul of mine'*), and '*rindu ... membelai jiwa*' (*'longing ... caressing the soul'*) [MC#347; MS-17/3:15-16]. These instances illustrate the same utilization of the 'touch' sensation in EMOTION metaphors that are comparable to when one says in English, "You *touched* my heart" or similarly in German, "Du hast mein Herz *berührt*." In our English data, however, TOUCH is evidently only present in its physical sense, but not metaphorically. Moreover, in regard to the 'touch' sensation, Malay seems to make familiar references to THE WIND, which is described as coming into contact with one's EMOTION in the same way that THE WIND blows and touches our SKIN. To illustrate, '*dihembus angin nan pilu*' (*'being breathed out by the sorrowful wind'*) [MC#394; MS-19/4:21] and '*berhembus angin rindu*' (*'the wind of longing breathes out'*) may have also been (more directly) expressed by using 'feel', e.g. "I *feel* the sorrow" and "I *feel* the longing", respectively. This could perhaps be yet another display of indirectness of

²³¹ The embodied meaning of '*rasa*' is 'feel' (tactile), but it also means 'taste' (gustatory), whose intended sense is clarified by the context. This makes perfect sense since the tongue is also a tactile organ, and taste cannot happen without touch.

the Malay people in expressing their FEELINGS. Further examples of how Malay draws from the 'touch' sensation of the SKIN in creating EMOTION metaphors are: '*rindu telah melekat dalam hatiku*' ('longing has adhered inside my liver') [MC#289; MS-15/2:5], '*di hatiku terukir namamu*' ('at my liver your name is engraved') [MC#355; MS-17/4:29-30], and '*duka bersulamkan pasrah*' ('grief embroidered with surrendering thoughts') [MC#353; MS-17/4:25-26]. Even in some of these more creative instances, the effects of 'touch' can still be clearly observed in the metaphorization of EMOTION, which reflects the indispensable function of SKIN in it.

EMOTION and tactile sensation 2: 'Pressure'

The second type of tactile sensation is 'pressure', which is very intimately linked to 'pain', especially as the latter is often the result of the former. Hence, drawing a strict line between them might not be too easy. Perhaps partly for this reason, the explicit use of 'pressure' by itself (i.e. without 'pain', 'temperature', or 'touch') on EMOTION that is analogous to its effects on SKIN is rather scarce. The few instances in Malay that could qualify as references to 'pressure' in metaphorizing EMOTION are: '*sepinya melanda hatiku*' ('loneliness strikes my liver') [MC#123; MS-07/1:2] and '*gelora rinduku kepadamu*' ('the turbulence of my longing for you') [MC#441; MS-21/3:13]. Much in the same fashion as in the previous examples with 'touch' (howbeit in a much greater intensity here), these expressions with 'pressure' that come from TURBULENCE and STORM (also from a natural force like WIND) could have also been simplified (and de-intensified) as "I *feel* the loneliness" and "I *feel* the longing", respectively. Other Malay examples that involve 'pressure', but not as natural disasters but rather as a force from physical objects, are: '*dihimpit dicengkam rindu ini*' ('pressed (and) gripped by this longing') [MC#445-446; MS-22/1:1] and '*rindu yang mencengkam di hatiku*' ('the longing that is gripping at my liver') [MC#295; MS-15/3:10]. Note that in many of these 'touch' and 'pressure' examples from Malay, the objectification of EMOTION (including its subordinate form, i.e. humanization) has already taken place, in which case it is then THE PERSON experiencing those feelings that is conceptualized as SKIN. As shown before, this may well be due to the indirectness of the Malay people in their expression of emotion. Thus, instead of straightforwardly saying, "I feel an emotion", among the more culturally preferred alternatives would be to say, "an emotion is felt (by me)" (note that "by me" may also be omitted, hence creating a distance between the emotion and the experiencer), or "my liver/soul feels an emotion" (i.e. in a third person,

once again maintaining that distance), or even more indirectly, “an emotion strikes me” or “I am struck by an emotion” or “my liver/soul is struck by an emotion” (i.e. in ways that would imply a kind of ‘involuntariness’ in these emotional experiences).

As for English, even though ‘pressure’-related EMOTION metaphors may be lacking in our English data, they are of considerable importance in the English language, as well. In fact, Kövecses’ extensive survey on EMOTION metaphors provides at least a chapter worth of analyses on the *force* of emotion (2000: 61-86), including his proposal for a single underlying “master metaphor” that is EMOTION IS FORCE (ibid.: 61). And since ‘pressure’ is essentially *force* applied to a surface (in the present context, the surface of our SKIN), this could indicate that we may be in good company. If this were the case, then, it would be plausible that the all too familiar English expression ‘*falling in love*’ [MC#272; ES-17/1:1] and its variants such as ‘*I keep on falling*’ [MC#275; ES-17/2:8], ‘*to keep me from falling*’ [MC#513; ES-24/5:29], ‘*I’m falling apart*’ [MC#429; ES-21/6:40], and ‘*you’ve fallen to pieces*’ [MC#451; ES-22/2:9] are a display of ‘pressure’ acting upon EMOTION and its experiencer. Other instances include: ‘*you ... hit a new low*’ [MC#445; ES-22/2:6] and ‘*you’re coming back down*’ [MC#457; ES-22/4:20], i.e. akin to the Malay examples cited above with emotions “striking” the experiencer. Once again, English speakers seem to be claiming a more active involvement in experiencing their emotions, whereas Malay speakers tend to conceptualize these emotions as events happening to them who are primarily passive recipients, instead.

EMOTION and tactile sensation 3: ‘Pain’

The third kind of sensation experienced via our SKIN is ‘pain’, which is perhaps the biggest source for conceptualizing and describing EMOTION in terms of this tactile organ, most especially the metaphorical uses of HURT and PAIN. In fact, these instances may be exceedingly familiar to us (and are perhaps even much more frequently used than their physical senses in our daily lives) that their metaphorical status can be easily overlooked or simply ignored. Some of the common examples are: ‘*the everyday pains*’ [MC#83; EP-05/6:33], ‘*I didn’t need the pain*’ [MC#486; ES-24/1:2], ‘*I’m just in so much pain*’ [MC#168; ES-08/8:35], and ‘*(you) cause me so much pain*’ [MC#282; ES-17/3:14], and accordingly, ‘*when I’m hurting*’ [MC#374; ES-20/2:19], ‘*but I’m hurting while I’m with you*’ [MC#287; ES-18/1:2], and ‘*all those times at night when you just hurt me*’ [MC#166; ES-08/7:26]. Although both ‘hurt’ and ‘pain’ may appear as a noun

and a verb in English, there is a greater tendency for the former to appear as a verb and the latter as a noun. The analogous use of ‘hurt’ (V) in Malay is *‘sekadar hanya untuk menyakiti’* (*‘if only merely to hurt’*) [MC#5; MS-01/2:6], while the one for ‘pain’ (N) is *‘ku menghamparkan sakitku’* (*‘I’m laying out my pains’*) [MC#502; MS-24/4:23], both of which are variants of the same lexeme *‘sakit’* (*‘pain’*). Additionally, while ‘hurt’ and ‘pain’ expressions appear 13 times in the English data, the corresponding form *‘sakit’* as ‘hurt’ and ‘pain’ appear only twice in the Malay data. This may be because the more preferred form of expressing emotional ‘hurt’ and ‘pain’ in Malay appears to be *‘luka’* (*‘wound’*), irrespective of the grammatical form in which it transpires, i.e. in 9 separate occasions. Another common Malay way of metaphorically saying “my heart hurts” or “it hurts inside my heart” would be to say “my liver stings/smarts” or “it stings/smarts inside my liver.” To illustrate this, we cite some expressions that utilize the sensation of ‘pain’ that is primarily used for SKIN, which is *‘pedih’* (*‘stinging/smarming’*), to describe EMOTIONAL PAIN. Examples include: *‘hati pedih’* (*‘the liver is smarting’*) [MC#9; MS-01/3:10], *‘pedih di dalam dada’* (*‘smarting inside my chest’*) [MC#139; MS-07/5:19], and also *‘pedih kemelut cinta’* (*‘the stinging of the conflicts of love’*) [MC#451; MS-22/1:16]. And some examples wherein the Malay *‘luka’* (*‘wound’*) corresponds to the English ‘hurt’ are: *‘walaupun terluka namun ku merindu’* (*‘even though wounded still I long (for her)’*) [MC#22; MS-02/1:2], *‘bila ku terluka terseksanya hati’* (*‘when I am wounded how tormented is the liver’*) [MC#56; MS-04/2:5], and *‘selamilah jiwa ini yang terluka’* (*‘dive into this soul that is wounded’*). Accordingly, examples in which the Malay *‘luka’* (*‘wound’*) is more comparable to the English ‘pain’ are: *‘kau tak akan mengerti segala lukaku’* (*‘you will never comprehend all of my wounds’*) and *‘biar luka sembuh sendiri’* (*‘let the wound heal on its own’*) [MC#537; MS-26/3:10].

Descriptions of EMOTIONAL PAIN in terms of ‘wounds’ are not unique to Malay. Even though the English texts that we analyzed contain neither the physical nor metaphorical instances of ‘wounds’ per se, they do carry similar expressions wherein different forms of wounds on the SKIN (including the results of such wounds) are employed to describe EMOTIONAL PAIN. Some of the examples are: *‘I’ll be wearing these scars’* [MC#525; ES-24/7:39], *‘even though this might bruise you’* [MC#378; ES-20/3:26], and also *‘I gave you my heart but all you did was tear it up’*²³² [MC#313; ES-18/6:35-36]. Some other variants that seem to involve more serious injuries to SKIN (and possibly beyond)

²³² In this last example, we find EMOTION <HEART> IS A PAPER/CLOTH to be an equally acceptable interpretation. But since ‘torn up skins’ (resulting from an injury) are also very common, we decided to include this example here, as well.

in describing AFFECTIVE STATES/PROCESSES include: ‘*you cut me open*’ [MC#501; ES-24/3:19], ‘*I keep bleeding*’ [MC#502; ES-24/3:20], and ‘*bleeding love*’ [MC#503; ES-24/3:21]. Other forceful illustrations of physical injuries to SKIN that are metaphorically transferred to emotional injuries and FEELINGS in Malay are: ‘*kau menghiris hati*’ (‘*you slice (my) liver*’) [MC#341; MS-17/2:8], ‘*ucapan cinta menghiris kalbu*’ (‘*speeches of love slicing the emotion*’) [MC#117; MS-06/4:17], ‘*menikam kalbuku*’ (‘*stabbing my emotion*’) [MC#145; MS-07/6:22], ‘*menikam jiwa*’ (‘*stabbing the soul*’) [MC#401; MS-19/5:28]. In all of these cases, EMOTION (whether metonymically represented or not) is treated as layers of SKIN susceptible to injuries that would cause pains, wounds, heavy bleeding, and in extreme cases, even possible death. Other ‘pain’-based injuries to SKIN used to describe EMOTION are: ‘*tercalar ... di dalam dada*’ (‘*scraped ... inside (my) chest*’) [MC#138; MS-07/5:19], ‘*wajahku ... dicakar masa silamku*’ (‘*my face ... clawed at by my bygone time*’) [MC#106; MP-06/8:48], and ‘*onak dan duri asmara*’ (‘*thorns and thorns of passion*’) [MC#161; MS-08/2:8]. Finally, another form of injury to SKIN is via skin burn, as reflected in these examples of metaphors for EMOTIONAL PAIN, i.e. ‘*it’s burning me to hold onto this*’ [MC#355; ES-20/1:2] and ‘*I’m going to be burning till you return*’ [MC#391; ES-20/6:25]. In short, whether the object causing the ‘wound’ is a dagger, a knife, fingernails, claws, thorns, or fire, both Malay and English speakers evidently conceptualize and describe their feelings in terms of suffering from those pains in the same way that their SKIN would in any physical injury.

EMOTION and tactile sensation 4: ‘Temperature’

The fourth sensation perceived by our tactile organ is ‘temperature’, which is another potent source for metaphorizing EMOTION in both Malay and English. Note that our interest here is *not* to evaluate the differences in temperature (hot, cold, or anything in between) in relation to specific metaphors, or language. In fact, such studies abound in the metaphor literature, a few of which were mentioned in subsection 2.3.1.3. Our goal here is to show that in concert with the other external sensations perceived by our SKIN (touch, pressure and pain), temperature is also regularly referred to when we think and talk about EMOTION. However, not quite like the other three sensations, references to temperature in the poetic texts are not straightforward, as our examples will show. As per our data analysis, we have identified four ways in which FEELINGS/EMOTIONS may draw from ‘temperature’ for the creation of metaphor, namely, where: (i) EMOTION is conceptualized as a condition of being at or having a particular temperature, commonly

as COLDNESS, COOLNESS, WARMTH, and HEAT; (ii) EMOTION is the temperature that causes a change of state within a matter or a substance, e.g. solid→liquid, liquid→solid, etc.; (iii) EMOTION is the process (or a step in the process) of combustion, or an object to create combustion; and (iv) EMOTION is the result of combustion that causes injury to SKIN (which overlaps with the sensation of ‘pain’, as illustrated above).

To elucidate, we begin by citing expressions for the conceptual metaphor LONELINESS IS COLDNESS from both languages, e.g., ‘*my days are cold without you*’ [MC#285; ES-18/1:1], ‘*to wake up cold and lonely*’ [MC#346; ES-19/7:39], and ‘*sunyinya malamku kelam ... dingin kelu bicara*’ (‘*oh how lonely (I am) my night is dim ... chilly and tongue-tied (speech)*’) [MC#453; MS-22/1:7]. As regards these instances, indeed we acknowledge the physiological symptoms (e.g. waking up in bed alone as opposed to with a partner) and atmospheric conditions (e.g. at nighttime or in winter times) that may have, in theory, motivated these metaphors, in which case they may also be argued to be metonymies. Speculations aside, it is hard to ignore the linguistic evidence, i.e. concurrent appearances of ‘cold’ and ‘lonely’ in both languages (not least when one of them is Malay, i.e. a language spoken in countries on the equator where it is very warm all year long). Another variant with COLDNESS as the source domain is ‘*between us ... an icy little pond*’ [MC#179; EP-09/1:11-12], which we interpreted as (EMOTIONAL) DISTANCE IS COLDNESS. As for the opposite temperature, LUST IS HEAT is postulated from ‘*are you more than hot for me*’ [MC#112; ES-05/7:29]. Indeed, Malay contains EMOTION IS HEAT metaphors, too, but they are expressed much more indirectly, i.e. in third-person forms (instead of first-/second-person like in English), and with the source domain as combustion (or objects that causes it), as we will demonstrate shortly.

Next, we analyze cases where EMOTION is conceptualized and described as causing the change of state within a substance. The two kinds that we have extracted from our data are the *freezing* (liquid→solid) and the *melting* (solid→liquid) of the English ‘HEART’ and the Malay ‘LIVER’, which are both metonymical representations of our EMOTION. Examples for ‘freezing’ include: ‘*hati membeku*’ (‘*the liver freezes*’) [MC#109; MS-06/3:11], ‘*aku pun beku di tepinya*’ (‘*I thus freeze at its side*’) [MC#101; MP-6/8:44], and ‘*before you know it you’re frozen*’ [MC#489; ES-24/1:6]. In both languages, metaphors that describe a change of state as ‘water turning into ice’ appear to occur exclusively in situations that involve a lack or loss of love. Interestingly, this would correspond perfectly to the LONELINESS IS COLDNESS metaphor cited above, and may

in a way even extend it, that is, as extreme consequences of the absence of love that a person (or their heart/liver) becomes hardened as ice, just as water does in a prolonged state of extreme coldness. On the hand, this ‘ice’ may be turned once again into ‘water’ with the return of the lost love, or the emergence of a new one, as illustrated in ‘*my heart melted to the ground*’ [MC#492; ES-24/2:9] that describes a woman falling in love again after having her heart frozen for a while. This ‘reversion in state’ is also in perfect accord with LUST IS HEAT discussed above and LOVE/PASSION IS FIRE examples below. Another observation to highlight here is that the *freezing* and *melting* metaphors are consistent with the COLDNESS (without love) and HEAT (with love) patterns *only* when they involve ICE and WATER undergoing the changes of states. However, when the liquefying involves mineral substances, this rule does not seem to apply anymore. For instance, ‘*leburlah harapan cinta*’ (‘*the hopes of love are then smelted*’) [MC#468; MS-22/3:18] clearly does not follow the ICE/WATER and *freezing/melting* precept.

As briefly mentioned above, the Malay counterpart for the English LUST IS HEAT is not directly expressed but is hedged somehow, e.g. by redirecting HEAT to the source of the HEAT and/or the objects that create it. That is, PASSION/LOVE IS FIRE is the conceptual metaphor postulated for these expressions: ‘*salju terbakar kehangatan*’ (‘*snow burnt (over)heated*’) [MC#80; MS-05/3:9], ‘*bernyalalah api cinta*’ (‘*the fire of love then flares up*’) [MC#87-88; MS-05/4:14], and ‘*semangat cintaku ... membara kerana dia*’ (‘*the vigor of my love ... burning for her*’) [MC#487; MS-23/2:16]. Notice that in *none* of these examples is the person experiencing their feelings directly mentioned in regard to HEAT (e.g. in a straightforward manner more common in English, “I am hot for you” or “you are hot for me”). But instead, it is the PASSION/LOVE that is implied as being responsible for the HEAT that it emits by virtue of combustion, i.e. FIRE. Yet another creative instance of an even less direct reference to PASSION/LOVE and HEAT in Malay, in which the poet describes the loss of his beloved as the lack of fire to an object for burning, is illustrated by the expression ‘*aku tungku tanpa api*’ (‘*I am a brazier without fire*’) [MC#33-34; MP-03/1:10]. In addition, LONGING is also an emotion described as combustion-related processes, for example, LONGING IS A FLAMING FIRE from ‘*rindu nan membara*’ (‘*the longing that is burning*’) [MC#344; MS-17/3:15] and LONGING IS A FIRE’S EMBERS from ‘*rindu ... menyala*’ (‘*the longing ... is flaming*’) [MC#345; MS-17/3:16]. Once again, these observations and findings, especially taken as a whole, provide support for the systematicity of SKIN (and the four sensations carried by their respective receptors) in the metaphorization of EMOTION in both languages.

5.4.3.2. COGNITION IS THE EYE

This subsection is meant to reflect the metaphorization of ‘the other side’ of the MIND, i.e. COGNITION and COGNITIVE STATES/PROCESSES. Similar to the previous subsection that presents evidence for the conceptualization of our EMOTION via SKIN, we wish to demonstrate here a parallel employment of another sensory modality, i.e. EYE for the conceptualization and description of our COGNITION. Needless to say, we acknowledge the cognitive-affective interactions in the brain as well as the multisensory nature of our perceptual modalities, along with the overlaps between these systems. However, for our present purposes, some lines need to be drawn and some simplifications need to be made, and in most cases the said demarcations are clear indeed. Due to the inherently romantic nature of our poetic data, THOUGHTS/COGNITION metaphors are considerably less in number compared to the FEELINGS/EMOTION ones, as expected. Nevertheless, we will present a brief report of their occurrences as much as we have discovered, with the intention of further investigating them in future research. Also, as our data on this is currently limited, we confine our discussion to only *two* broad aspects of COGNITION that surfaced in our data (even if some of the metaphors may not perfectly fit into either grouping), i.e.: (i) knowledge and understanding; and (ii) fantasies and memories.

Indeed the discussion on the role of VISION in the metaphorical mapping of COGNITION is neither new nor lacking. But while the multitude of literature on this topic has had longstanding debates on whether SEEING is the source domain for UNDERSTANDING, or THINKING, or KNOWING, etc. (and each with valid arguments and linguistic evidence thereof, as well)²³³, we have taken a somewhat different route in approaching this topic. That is, we propose a little step-back from looking too closely at or being too focused on the specific mapping source for SEEING so as to expand our view to consider instead the *physical organ* of the source domain SEEING, i.e. the EYE. Our proposition is made on several grounds, but we will mention only two here that are most directly relevant to our study. Firstly, this is in keeping with our CMT-Objectification theoretical approach, in which OBJECT is taken as the *ultimate* source domain, i.e. ‘EYE’ clearly fulfills the OBJECT criteria, whilst ‘SEEING’ does not. Secondly, as we have already demonstrated in our previous analyses on SKIN and the four types of tactile sensations in relation to

²³³ See, e.g., Allan (2008), Danesi (1990, 2001), Deignan & Cameron (2009), Kövecses (2002), Lakoff & Johnson (1980), and Sweetser (1990).

EMOTION metaphors, different languages and cultures do, in fact, have the tendency to formulate their metaphors in different fashions and from different angles (even though the roots of the conceptual metaphors are essentially the same). As corroborated by our findings, while most English expressions focus on the ‘action’ of a person experiencing an emotion, their Malay counterparts do it more indirectly by describing the ‘event’ of an emotion happening to a person. So, in other words, if we are to focus on only one particular *aspect* of the visual organ, e.g. the act or process of seeing, we are bound to miss many other aspects thereof, at best. An even greater implication of that is that we would be imposing on ourselves a set of Anglocentric and/or Anglophonocentric lenses for analyzing metaphors. Danesi’s (1990) work on visual metaphors provides a set of useful classifications for THINKING IS SEEING and distinguishes metaphors that involve: (i) the physical processes of seeing; (ii) the intensity of light of the visual object; and (iii) the different modalities of the visual perspective. And while this is certainly a big improvement over previous approaches, its effective application may still be restricted to English and related languages (and cultures) only. We present below some findings from our cross-linguistic analyses to support our claims.

The EYE in KNOWLEDGE and UNDERSTANDING

We shall begin with examples from our data that would more or less correspond to a conceptual metaphor well-known in CMT, i.e. UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING and one of its variants KNOWING IS SEEING. They are: ‘*now there’s so much more I see*’ [MC#12; ES-01/4:16], ‘*I can’t see how you could bring me to so many tears*’ [MC#298; ES-18/3:17] and ‘*you will see what you mean to me*’ [MC#128; ES-07/1:1], which refer to UNDERSTANDING. As for KNOWING, this cognitive state is expressed as ‘*(you) see my days are cold without you*’ [MC#284; ES-18/1:1]. We interpret these expressions as THE MIND IS THE EYE (or more precisely, COGNITIVE FACULTY OF THE MIND IS THE EYE, i.e. in the same way as we have shown that AFFECTIVE FACULTY OF THE MIND IS THE SKIN). Notably, comparable instances for mapping SEEING onto UNDERSTANDING are not found in our Malay data²³⁴. There are, however, two instances that could be interpreted as referring to KNOWLEDGE, that is, one of them is expressed in a poetic fashion, while the other is implied. The example for the latter is ‘*sinaran mata cerita*

²³⁴ A cursory search in DBP Malay Corpus at <http://sbmb.dbp.gov.my/korpusdbp/> shows that neither ‘*nampak*’ (‘to see’) nor ‘*lihat*’ (‘to look’) are used as clear metaphorical sources for UNDERSTANDING or KNOWING in Malay (i.e. out of 50 results from ‘*nampak*’ and 50 from ‘*lihat*’). We suspect that they are not nonexistent in Malay, but are rather extremely scarce. However, we can comment no further on this without a proper investigation and sufficient evidence thereof.

segala ('the illumination of the eyes narrates everything') [MC#472; MS-23/1:1], which works in the reading of the EYE as the SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION. This also matches the first part of an English example on UNDERSTANDING cited just now, i.e. 'look into my eyes, you will see what you mean to me' [MC#128-129; ES-07/1:1-2]. Specifically, in both the Malay and English examples, the EYE seems to be conveying KNOWLEDGE, and it is also the EYE that these expressions have in common, i.e. instead of SEEING or LOOKING. Once again, we can describe the same pattern (as we did with EMOTION metaphors) of intercultural contrasts in the linguistic manifestations of conceptual metaphors. Observe that it is the *action* of 'looking into the eyes' that is foregrounded in English, whereas it is the *event* of 'the eyes narrating everything' that transpires in Malay, which mirrors our findings on EMOTION very perfectly. Another example of the connection between EYE and KNOWLEDGE, which is interpreted as THE MIND IS THE EYE, is '*menatapmu adalah makrifat tentang zat*' ('gazing at you is the knowledge of substance') [MC#18; MP-02/2:8]. Here, we find the poet equating the act of gazing at his beloved with acquiring knowledge and the essence of knowledge.

In addition to KNOWLEDGE and UNDERSTANDING, another manifestation of '*tatap*' ('gaze') in a COGNITION metaphor is '*ku menghamparkan sakitku untuk tatapan kamu*' ('I am laying out my pains for your gazing') [MC#503; MS-24/4:23-24]. Here, the poet is a man trying to woo a woman and is describing all that he would sacrifice for her if only she would consider accepting his love. From this context, we have interpreted the conceptual metaphor MIND AND DECISION-MAKING ARE THE EYE. Note that whereas this metaphorical expression would not quite fit into the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor, COGNITION IS THE EYE can better accommodate all of these cognitive processes alike, i.e. in this case, decision-making. Further riveting examples include: '*dalam samar mata*' ('in the dimness of the eyes') [MC#47] and '*kerna kabur pandanganku dalam ... tarian cintamu*' ('because my vision is blurry in ... the dance of your love') [MC#320; MS-16/2:14-16], from which we postulated POOR JUDGMENT IS OBSCURED VISION, i.e. motivated by COGNITION IS THE EYE. Because judgment is also a form of cognitive event, an obstruction to EYE by any means implies an obstruction to the cognitive process as well, hence causing a person to make an impaired judgment or decision. Once again, we hope to have shown that if we had constrained our analysis parameters to considering only the physical act of seeing, or the visual experience, or a visual stimulus (i.e. if we had analyzed them *separately*), we might not have been able to piece the puzzle together into a well-formed, coherent picture.

The EYE in FANTASIES and MEMORIES

Having already presented our analysis results on the mapping of the eye onto cognitive processes, we will now turn to the mapping of the same perceptual organ onto what we broadly identify as cognitive constructs. Despite our unaffluent data on COGNITION metaphors, we have identified two distinct kinds of cognitive constructs from the texts, i.e. FANTASIES and MEMORIES. Unfortunately, EYE-based metaphors for FANTASIES only appear in the English data, whilst the ones for MEMORIES are found only in the Malay data. Due to this exclusivity, cross-linguistic and intercultural observations are not possible. Nonetheless, we shall not let this deter our intellectual curiosity, but will treat these modest findings as a precursor to future larger-scale explorations. For now, consider these COGNITION (i.e. FANTASIES) metaphors: ‘*images of rupture*’ [MC#194; ES-11/3:14] and ‘*picture a little scene from heaven*’ [MC#216-217; ES-12/4:19]. As native and proficient speakers of English will agree, to avoid or escape from using vision-related terms in describing ‘imagination’ and related concepts is very difficult indeed. In fact, Oxford online dictionary²³⁵ registers “mind’s eye” as synonymous with ‘imagination’ and it is thus not surprising that metaphors on FANTASIES would contain vision-related (and more broadly, EYE-related) terms. In the above examples, ‘images’ and ‘picture’ unambiguously refer to the mental world, not the physical one.

Thanks to various technological advancements in this day and age, many of the eye and vision-related terms have been expanded to encompass relatively recent manmade eye- and vision-related equipment and machinery. These could be mundane everyday items like mirrors, spectacles, and contact lenses, or more sophisticated ones like cameras, visual-recording devices, and the most advanced forms of visual aids for the visually impaired. In short, they have become the modern-day *extensions* of our visual organ and visual sensory. Accordingly, we simultaneously ‘copy’ these perceptual extensions into our conceptual and linguistic systems, even if we are rarely aware of it. As a result, both the old and new terms for our visual organ and its extensions proliferate amongst terms used for our COGNITION, e.g. *reflect*, *focus*, *zoom in*, *zoom out*, *review*, and so on. Returning to our data, instead of saying ‘to imagine’ for FANTASIES, Malay expresses this as ‘*bayangkan*’ which means ‘to shadow’. The most accurate contextual equivalent for ‘*bayangkan*’ is ‘to imagine.’ However, since the Malay ‘*imej*’ is not native to Malay

²³⁵ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/imagination> (DOA: 11th September 2018)

but rather borrowed from the English 'image' and in Malay denotes 'social image' (not 'mental image'), the most apt translation for 'bayangkan' for our purposes here is 'to shadow' (the substantive 'bayang' literally means 'shadow'). But, as stated above, such metaphors for FANTASIES are only found in the English data. Interestingly, however, in referring to another kind of mental construct, i.e. MEMORIES, Malay employs 'shadows' ('bayang-bayang') as its mapping source, as well. Examples from the data include: 'terbayang lambaiannya' ('her waving is shadowed') [MC#79; MS-05/3:8], 'terbayang wajahmu' ('your face is shadowed') [MC#52; MS-04/1:1] and also 'membayangkan wajahmu adalah siksa' ('shadowing your face is a torment') [MC#25; MP-03/1:5]. In each case, the poet is describing MEMORIES of his or her lost love, all of which share the conceptual metaphor A MEMORY IS A SHADOW. And although 'shadow' might not be thought of as being directly linked to the EYE, it is indeed a form of reflection, i.e. a reflected image, whose *source* of perception is our visual organ, which is the EYE.

Still on MEMORIES, we will now examine the opposite of *remembering*, i.e. *forgetting*, which also appears inseparable from the EYE and the visual perception. Consider these expressions: 'hilangkan dirimu' ('make yourself disappear') [MC#482; MS-23/2:11], 'lenyapkanlah kisah pilu' ('do make vanish a sorrowful tale') [MC#20; MS-01/4:20], and '... melenyapkan sebuah kisah' ('... makes vanish a story') [MC#78; MS-05/2:7]. Here, each poet is describing their desperate attempts to forget their lost love and the MEMORIES of them via 'hilangkan' ('make disappear') and accordingly, 'lenyapkan' ('make vanish'), which denote 'to cause to pass from view or sight', despite the fact that MEMORIES have their existence only in the MIND. We have also observed that the metaphorization of FORGETFULNESS is sourced from 'lena' ('sleeping' or 'dozing off'), which we find very intriguing because it is a state when our eyes are closed. This is exemplified by: 'kita yang terlena' ('we are the ones who dozed off') [MC#84; MS-05/4:11] and 'kerna simpati atau lena' ('because of sympathy or for having dozed off') [MC#213; MS-10/3:16-17]. Indeed, it would make perfect sense that if we do in fact conceptualize COGNITION and COGNITIVE STATES/PROCESSES as the EYE, then the state in which our EYES are *closed* would no doubt disrupt those cognitive processes and result in FORGETFULNESS (in a consistent manner that an obscured vision would impair a judgment). To conclude, whether referring to our KNOWLEDGE and UNDERSTANDING of a subject matter or to our FANTASIES and MEMORIES of an event, the EYE has shown itself to be ever-present in our COGNITION metaphors, be it directly or otherwise.

6. General Discussion

6.1. Summary of findings

Throughout Chapter Five, we presented a series of results from three different kinds of investigations conducted for this doctoral project. To recap, they are: (1) a rating study on metaphoricity judgment on the Malay data with 60 subjects; (2) a quantitative-based analysis on the source and target domains of conceptual metaphors as manifested in the entire data; and (3) a qualitative-based analysis that centers on conceptual metaphors of the MIND (i.e. COGNITION and EMOTION) that surfaced in the Malay and English poetic texts. And even though each of these parts may have had a different focal point, their implementations were intended to ultimately converge to form a coherent whole for our study. The goal of this chapter is to show precisely that. The localized conclusions and narrower implications of the findings have already been presented at the end of their respective sections and/or subsections, following the discussion of those results. In this chapter, we shall address the broader implications of the combined findings from our investigations within the larger context of CMT and cognitive metaphor research. We begin by summarizing the findings from each investigation, first.

6.1.1. *Study on metaphoricity rating*

The rating study was conducted to find out how the linguistic items that we previously identified as metaphor candidates (MCs) in the Malay texts would be rated in terms of their metaphoricity level. Results yielded by this particular investigation have allowed us to observe behavioral differences between MCs that received high rating agreements against those with low ones, in an unbiased and impartial fashion. More precisely, we interpreted the former subset as the ‘more novel’ metaphors, and the latter subset as the ‘more conventional’ ones, without having to input any of our own evaluations on them. Moreover, by having conducted a strict (statistically-guided) post-rating screening on the rating results before they were accepted into our final analysis, we had in effect inserted yet another measure to increase the level of accuracy of these results.

Overall, MCs in poems received higher rating agreements than those in songs, which suggests that poems contain ‘more novel’ metaphors than songs, whereas metaphors in

songs may tend to be perceived as ‘more conventional’ by the participants. When these results were checked against our original (*pre*-rating) metaphor identification records, it was found that they are indeed consistent with the fact that these poems do not carry as many single-word or contextually-dependent MCs as do songs. Also, cross-references on the degrees of judged metaphoricity for the *highest* rated subsets of MCs showed that their occurrence frequencies do, in fact, correspond to the meaningful sequence of the three verification checkpoints, i.e. with the biggest membership for VMM, followed by EMM, and then CMM. This could be seen as a positive indication that our protocol for metaphor identification that was founded on the three mismatch principles proposed in Chapter Four has functioned with notable consistency and efficiency.

In terms of mapping patterns (i.e. based on the four categories of our scalar model), the rating results demonstrated that the patterns are more varied amongst MCs with higher metaphoricity. And accordingly, between the two data categories, mappings of MCs in poems are more varied than those in songs. These, too, are consistent with previous results that indicate a higher level of novelty and creativity in MCs in poems than those in songs. With regard to our prediction on the potential association between mapping distance and metaphoricity, this was met by MCs in the song category but not by those in the poem category. This may be a clue to the suspected influence of the ‘familiarity’ factor in determining the degree of metaphoricity for MCs. And finally, when source-to-target mappings are charted out based on the classifications of concepts on our scalar model, results showed that Type III A-to-A metaphORIZATION (or structural metaphors) received overall low ratings. This could suggest that metaphors of this type tend to be perceived as having weak metaphoricity, in general. Although we will no doubt require a further investigation on this before more conclusive claims can be made, these initial findings may be of some meaning to Objectification as a metaphor theory.

6.1.2. Quantitative segment of the main study

The quantitative portion of our main study focused on analyzing the nature and profiles of the 1,471 *pairs* of source and target domains for the 1,471 conceptual metaphors extracted from a total of 72 poetic texts in Malay and English. Taking advantage of the sizeable databank obtained from our large-scale metaphor analysis on two genetically-*unrelated* languages, we had been able to closely scrutinize and better understand the nature of source and target domains, i.e. both on their own as well as in relation to each

other. Results produced by this quantitative-based approach showed both domains to be almost equally varied throughout the data, i.e. in terms of their type-token ratio counts. A deeper examination revealed that the top 6 source and top 9 target domains (plus a group of 'PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL' mapping in both domains) make up a little over 50% of the entire data, i.e. Malay and English combined. The 6 biggest source domains are: OBJECT, HUMAN/PERSON, ROOM/CONTAINER, LOCATION, JOURNEY and OCEAN. Of these, 4 of them have clear perceptual bases (concrete), and the other 2 are perceptual-conceptual (low abstract). On the other side of the coin, the 9 biggest target domains are: LOVE, EMOTIONS/FEELINGS, THE LOVER AND THE BELOVED, RELATIONSHIP, TIME, SOUL/INNER-SELF, LIFE, LONGING and MIND, in which only 1 of them is perceptually defined (concrete), 2 are perceptual-conceptual (low abstract), and 6 are conceptual (highly abstract). Indeed, these results are clear evidence that source domains are more concrete than target domains, and that target domains are more abstract than source domains, which explicitly support CMT's longtime predictions. These findings also tell us that whereas concepts from *all* categories may be metaphorized in the form of target domains, the means to function as source domains is not equal among concepts.

When the frequencies of occurrence for both domains were compared between the two languages, results showed that there is a visibly stronger presence for low abstract (LA) concepts in the English data than in the Malay ones, and this applies for both the source and target domains. Additionally, intra-language comparisons for concepts from the LA category revealed that their figures in the source and target domains *mirror* each other almost perfectly in each language with higher occurrences in English for both domains. These results suggest that English may have a stronger preference for Type III A-to-A metaphorization (or structural metaphors) as compared to Malay, as far as our data are concerned. This is further supported by consistent findings that Malay metaphors carry a higher percentage of concrete concepts (sC and LC) that function as source domains and a higher percentage of highly abstract concepts (HA) that occupy target domains, as compared to English. In short, within the context of our data, metaphorized concepts (i.e. target domains) in Malay could be said to be more abstract than those in English. These combined findings also suggest that the Malay data potentially carry more Type II C-to-A metaphorization (or ontological metaphors) than the English ones.

Last but not least, of course, is that the results on cross-domain transfer tendencies in metaphorization provide clear support for Objectification's proposal that OBJECT is the

ultimate source domain, i.e. with OBJECT occupying the source domain at least 70% of the time. Even within the constraints of our qualitative data (but ones that nonetheless comprise a substantial collection of 1,471 conceptual metaphors in Malay and English), results obtained from this quantitatively guided analysis have a direct and meaningful bearing on CMT's longstanding claims for the concreteness of the source domain and the abstractness of target domain. In fact, we would argue that our study has achieved even more than that, as evidenced by our findings. That is, we are now finally able to *precisely* articulate the frequencies of occurrence for concrete (perceptual), low abstract (perceptual-conceptual), and highly abstract (conceptual) concepts across the mapping domains. To the best of our knowledge, this has not yet been achieved, nor attempted, by text-based metaphor studies in our field, at least not via the operationalization of CMT-Objectification's (or even another framework's) theoretical constructs.

6.1.3. Qualitative segment of the main study

In the third and final segment of Chapter Five, we reported the results of our qualitative reflections on a few selected groups of conceptual metaphors that emerged in the 72 poetic texts that we had analyzed. Naturally, it would have been impossible to discuss all of the 1,471 identified metaphors within such a constrained space. And since one of our exploratory goals had been to track down and draw forward *systematic* occurrences discovered in the data and focus specifically on a deeper analysis of those metaphoric patterns, the need for numbers and frequency counts became no longer necessary for this part of our study. Nevertheless, some of the results obtained from the rating study and the quantitative-based analysis had been vital in informing and shaping part of the inquiries and observations in our qualitative survey, as reported in and reflected by the previous chapter. For instance, it was in fact the combination of what we discovered in the rating study (i.e. the mapping patterns of the 'more novel' MCs with higher rating agreements including the irregular *abstract-to-concrete* mappings) and the quantitative analysis results (i.e. the source-to-target conceptual transferability that revealed that highly abstract concepts from the TME and SPR subcategories could actually function as source domains) that had prompted us to dive deeper into inspecting these unexpected 'violations' in mappings. And as a result of a close-up examination of these cases, the systematicity contained therein was then uncovered and better understood, i.e. in this case, this was interpreted in terms of post-objectification metaphorization that showed that these occurrences are *not* random. Another example of the interconnectedness of

the three investigations is the discovery of the (highly contextually-dependent) single-word MCs that stood out during the rating study as the ‘most conventional’ metaphors, combined with the quantitative discovery of the special ‘PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL’ mapping (that is strongly present in both domains) that led us to study this phenomenon further in our qualitative analysis. As a result, the highly systematic metaphoric pattern with the formula ‘NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X’ that reflects the principal conceptual metaphor NONPHYSICAL WORLDS ARE THE PHYSICAL WORLD was unearthed.

Firstly, with respect to mapping directions and constraints, we had identified all of the ‘permissible’ types of source-to-target mappings that surfaced in our data based on the four classifications of concepts (i.e. SC, LC, LA and HA) on our scalar model. More specifically, by ‘permissible’ we mean the generally adduced in the cognitive metaphor literature as the ‘concrete-to-abstract’ mapping (i.e. with a left→right direction on the concreteness/abstractness scale), as well as two *within*-category ‘abstract-to-concrete’ mappings for the perception-based categories (SC and LC). From this analysis, we were able to identify two specific conditions under which a ‘violation’ to the rule is allowed, or in other words, when the governing ‘concrete-to-abstract’ mapping direction may be defied. These conditions are: (i) only if the source domain is concrete, i.e. *perceptually* defined (SC or LC); and (ii) only if the source domain is abstract (LA or HA) but which has already undergone *objectification*. Accordingly, these findings allowed us to posit that one of the main constraints in metaphorical mapping is determined by the source domain’s ability to transfer perceptual features for metaphorization to its target domain. These features may either be *inherent* in their natural perceptual characteristics (i.e. for concrete concepts: SC and LC), or *inherited* via objectification process (i.e. for abstract concepts: LA and HA). And ultimately, we were led to the (rather bold) postulation that the post-objectification metaphorization may actually be a reflection of the ‘Type IV’ A-to-C metaphorization in Szwedek’s typology (2011), which was previously thought to be impossible and/or nonexistent.

Next, amongst the results generated by our analyses on the most common source and target domains from the 1,471 conceptual metaphors extracted from the analyzed texts, a rather unique kind of mapping caught our eye, i.e. PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL. This particular mapping was found to be pervasive in the data from both languages, but with approximately 6% more in frequency in English than in Malay. Further, it ranked the second highest in the source domain (i.e. following the OBJECT source domain) and the

highest in the target domain (i.e. preceding the LOVE target domain). And even though strictly speaking, this mapping is neither a source domain nor a target domain per se, their regularity is summarized by the formula 'NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X', which appears to be the general 'frame' for specific components of (what we postulate to be) the principal conceptual metaphor NONPHYSICAL WORLDS ARE THE PHYSICAL WORLD. That is, 'NONPHYSICAL' was the selected superordinate term to represent other spheres of the human life, such as INTELLECTUAL, EMOTIONAL, SPIRITUAL, VIRTUAL, DIGITAL, FINANCIAL, SOCIAL, just to name a few. The primary reason why this mapping is (and has to be) designated by such a formula is due to the complete lack of vocabulary in the target domain of this kind of metaphors, that is, apart from an identical one 'borrowed' from the source domain. Some examples include PRESENCE, DEPARTURE, DISCOVERY, CHANGE, PLACE, SHELTER, WEIGHT, STRENGTH, ENERGY, etc., all of which are slot-filler concepts for the slot 'X' in the formula 'NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X'. In such cases, each metaphorical mapping involves a conceptual transfer of a specific *structure* or element, which is reflective of Objectification's Type III A-to-A metaphorization (or in CMT's terms, *structural* metaphors). This is further supported by the fact that most of these slot-filler concepts belong to the low abstract (LA) category on our scalar model, which does appear to be too systematic to be 'random' coincidences. We concluded by arguing that these findings are evidence for human beings' propensity to construct their NONPHYSICAL WORLDS and all the components that come with them based on THE PHYSICAL WORLD and its physical contents, supporting Szwedek's claims (2011).

Last but not least, we reserved our most in-depth analyses on conceptual metaphors of the MIND in the final part of our qualitative survey. Our focus was on the central and unique roles of SKIN and EYE in the metaphorization of our EMOTION and COGNITION, respectively. Based on a series of linguistic evidence excavated from our Malay and English data, we discovered a set of patterns in the SKIN-based EMOTION metaphors whose mappings are drawn from the four types of external sensations perceived by the tactile organ, i.e. touch, pressure, pain, and temperature. It was interesting indeed to observe that both Malay and English speakers conceptualize and describe emotional afflictions in the various ways in which their skin would experience those sensations during or after a physical injury. Moreover, an equally intriguing BODY-MIND parallel was found with COGNITION metaphors that exhibit a clear dependency on the EYE for their metaphorical mappings, that is, not only on the visual organ or visual stimuli per se, nor only on the process or act of SEEING, but also on modern-day technologically

manufactured *extensions* of the visual organ, too. In both cases of SKIN-EMOTION and EYE-COGNITION metaphors, a very visible cross-linguistic contrast was observed in the linguistic manifestations of the same conceptual metaphors between the two languages. That is, English speakers seem to express their feelings more directly than their Malay counterparts. In addition, the former also display a more (pro-)active involvement in experiencing their thoughts and feelings compared to the latter. Malay speakers, on the other hand, appear to be assuming a more indirect approach in the expressions of their thoughts and feelings, as reflected in the way that these mental states and processes are often described as ‘events’, of which they are merely passive recipient or experiencer. Very importantly, however, all of these surface-level differences aside, both languages evidently share a deep common root in relation to their tactile-based and visual-based metaphors of the MIND. To conclude, it seems that at the end of the day, when it comes to conceptualizing some of the most highly abstract concepts such as our EMOTION and COGNITION (both of which are of extreme importance to our existence), we would all return to our sensory organs, to our BODY. We shall therefore take this accumulation of findings as ‘living’ evidence for our *embodied* experience and cognition, indeed.

6.2. Implications for metaphor research

This project has been an exploratory study on the phenomenon of conceptual metaphor within the proposed integrated framework of CMT-Objectification. We have argued for the merits of this merger throughout this dissertation by demonstrating the workability of two research products (one conceptual and one procedural) born out of it, i.e.: (1) an OBJECT-based concreteness/abstractness scalar model; and (2) a protocol for metaphor identification based on the three mismatch principles (VMM, EMM, CMM). Although a substantial part of our investigative process did in fact involve the identification and analysis of metaphors in textual data, our research interests run much deeper than the linguistic manifestations of this conceptual phenomenon. Our bona fide intent has been to unearth what lie underneath the surface of those analyzed metaphors. In other words, we were looking to better understand the components of conceptual metaphorization by closely studying the nature of source and target domains, i.e. both independently and in relation to each other. This section discusses the implications of our findings within the broader context of cognitive metaphor research and shows how the present study can be positioned (to effectively fill some of the existing research gaps) within our field.

6.2.1. Concreteness-abstractness distinction

As explained at the very beginning of this dissertation, the question of if and how concreteness can be objectively 'measured' against abstractness has been central to our study. Furthermore, we consider a clear distinction between them as a prerequisite for carrying out an effective (empirically-guided) large-scale metaphor identification and analysis. Across the cognitive metaphor literature dating back to Lakoff and Johnson's initial introduction of CMT in 1980, the source domain has always been described as 'more concrete' than the target domain, and the target domain as 'more abstract' than the source domain. But aside from other similarly vague and noncommittal descriptions of source domains as being 'more tangible' and 'more graspable' while target domains are regarded as 'more vague' and 'more incomplete' (recall Chapter Three), no precise criteria were ever declared by CMT even until now, nearly four decades later. With the clear exception of Szwedek (2007*b*, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014*a*) and a handful of others, CMT community as a whole seems relatively untroubled by this lack of distinction.

Although this might not have been a serious issue if cognitive linguistics were to exist as a 'self-sufficient' discipline, the fact of the matter is that it does not, and cannot. By definition, cognitive linguistics is an interdisciplinary field of research. And given that many of its neighboring and/or overlapping fields are scientific in nature and practice (i.e. including but not limited to psychology, psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, and so forth), empirical considerations do weigh heavily indeed. This is especially true when it comes to their unanimous acceptance of any theory that bears on the human cognition, and in our case, CMT. Certainly, we share Gibbs' concern that concepts do not always fit perfectly into a category (Murphy, 1997, cited as Gibbs' response to their discussion on this matter), and also Szwedek's similar view that the task of classifying concepts as concrete or abstract is far from uncomplicated (2002). But considering the centrality of these notions in our field, we are left with no other alternatives but to be *unambiguous* about what we mean by 'concrete' and 'abstract', not least because 'source domains' and 'target domains' are essentially the building blocks of this phenomenon we call 'conceptual metaphor'. In fact, as crude as this may sound, we cannot possibly hope to formulate convincing claims about conceptual metaphor (at least not to the scientific community) if we do insist on remaining vague about even its most basic components, upon which our fundamental assumptions are founded. And as ambitious as this may sound, our study has taken upon itself the task of rectifying this situation and also with

the goal of filling this sizeable research gap in our research field. Resultantly, this effort offers some methodological improvements to existing techniques for the identification and analysis of metaphor. We discuss below four main advantages to CMT as a result of having solved this concreteness/abstractness conundrum (even if only partially).

6.2.1.1. *Concreteness of SD and abstractness of TD*

Firstly, at the conceptual level, we began by operationalizing CMT-Objectification's theoretical constructs, the product of which was the OBJECT-based scalar model that positions concepts along a four-category concreteness/abstractness continuum (sC, LC, LA, HA) according to their perceptual and conceptual characteristics. Next, this enabled us, at the procedural level, to engineer a metaphor identification protocol motivated by embodied cognition and partially modeled after Pragglejaz's MIP (2007), but with an additional verification tool in the form of the three mismatch principles (VMM, EMM, CMM) to minimize biasness and maximize reliability. Finally, the practical application of this method onto a large pool of textual data generated results that strongly support CMT's longtime prediction regarding the concreteness of the source domain and the abstractness of the target domain. Although this assumption was not in dispute amongst cognitive metaphor researchers, the research community was still lacking an empirical (or at least, empirically-guided) evidence to back up this statement when so challenged by our colleagues in the scientific fields. However, by having put our research tools into action, we were finally able to verify those basal assumptions in CMT, which had been long accepted (and even taken for granted) but never really tested or verified, due to the absence of a clearly articulated and workable model and protocol.

Now, with our findings, we can finally state with a good measure of confidence that *indeed* the source domain is more concrete than the target domain, and the reverse is true for the latter. In fact, we now even have cogent evidence of the precise extent of which each domain is concrete and/or abstract, i.e. for the 1,471 conceptual metaphors analyzed in our poetic data. The replicability of our methods will allow investigations on data from other genres, or even other modalities, as well. In any case, with analysis results from 1,471 *pairs* of source and target domains, we can now make the following claims with some empirical weight (that is, as empirical as it could get with qualitative data), that in our Malay and English poetic texts: (i) source domains are concrete 72% of the time, low abstract 26% of the time, and highly abstract 2% of the time (but only

after having been objectified for HA); and (ii) target domains are highly abstract 56% of the time, low abstract 25% of the time, and concrete 19% of the time. Put simply, no longer is CMT deficient of transparent criteria for concrete and abstract concepts, nor is it anymore bound to untestable claims about concrete-abstract distinction in relation to mapping domains (for the first time in almost four decades). In conclusion, our model, our protocol and our analysis results converge together to contribute toward reinforcing CMT's structural integrity apropos the concrete-abstract notions, both at the conceptual and procedural levels. We hope that by our having filled this not insignificant research gap, CMT will now be better equipped to handle empirical scrutiny on this issue.

6.2.1.2. *Nature and constraints of mapping domains*

Our attempt at devising a workable model as a working solution to CMT's long-drawn concreteness/abstractness dilemma was not only carried out for its own sake. Rather, the benefits of having gained such clarity on this subject matter also include having a better understanding of the nature and constraints of the two domains. As previously established, our work has been strongly motivated by Szwedek's investigation on this topic (2000c, 2002b, 2004a, 2010, 2011, 2014a) and we see this study as a continuation of his effort at unveiling and appreciating the nature of source and target domains in greater depth, that is, beyond the superficial level that they are commonly alluded to in the literature. Based on findings from 1,471 conceptual metaphors, we now know that source and target domains are more or less equally varied. Results also indicate that for at least 50% of those, the same 7-10 most common source and target domains (out of circa 330 types from each domain) appear recurrently across the 72 poetic texts. This suggests that a hefty portion of the mapping domains of conceptual metaphors in our data revolve around the same 7 source domains and 10 target domains. In addition, just as we now have the tools to measure the precise extent to which these two domains are concrete or abstract, we can also see very clearly from our data that overall, *the source domain is more concrete than the target domain is abstract*. Such observations have not yet been made or so explicitly articulated prior to this study, presumably due to the absence of an instrument that would make such a measurement possible.

At an even deeper level, then, these findings reveal visible differences in the nature and behavior of source and target domains. Specifically, whereas the target domain seems much more lax in accepting virtually all concepts with any degree of concreteness or

abstractness, the source domain is much more stringent with allowing membership into its functional circle. Thus, while most concepts may be metaphorized as target domains (irrespective of their degrees of concreteness or abstractness), a lot less of them could function as a source in metaphorization. That is, as a rule, highly abstract (HA) concepts cannot, and not all low abstract (LA) concepts can, unless they have been objectified. These combined results inform us that the nature of source domain makes it mandatory for its concepts to be well-equipped with perceptual features to transfer to its target, i.e. either *inherent* ones (for concrete concepts), or *inherited* ones (for abstract concepts). In other words, our findings deliver unambiguous support for Objectification Theory's Inheritance Hypothesis, which states that abstract concepts do *not* have pre-metaphoric structures of their own other than those inherited via objectification process (Szwedek, 2000a, 2002a, 2002b, 2008, 2011, 2014a; recall also subsection 3.3.1.1), without which they cannot function as the source domain.

In relation to CMT's Invariance Hypothesis that assumes an 'inherent' pre-metaphoric structure in the target domain (which we have argued against in subsections 2.2.4 and 3.2.1), we now have a series of results to support our (as well as others') refutation of this idea. In fact, we do offer a counter-proposal that based on our findings, the notion of 'inherent' structure only applies to source domains with concepts that are *perceptual* in nature (SC or LC). But for source domains with abstract concepts that only 'inherit' those features post-objectification (LA or HA), 'inherent' structure is in effect an invalid notion. As a result, within Objectification's framework and according to our findings, the assumption that the target domain would possess or require any 'pre-metaphoric' structure to explain mapping constraints is automatically dissolved. Although still a work-in-progress, our OBJECT-based scalar model suggests that hypotheses regarding mapping constraints (and metaphorization, in general) would be best formulated with the source domain as the foundation of said assumptions, and *not* the target domain. An appropriate example for this is our (testable) prediction that one of the main constraints in metaphorical mapping lies in the source domain's capacity to transfer perceptual properties (inherent or inherited) to the target domain. This is because the former, being evidently (not just 'presumably', anymore) more concrete than the latter, is abundant in perceptual properties that are directly *accessible* to and objectively *assessable* by us, which abstract entities inarguably lack, and claims about them are therefore extremely difficult (if not entirely impossible) to verify, either way.

6.2.1.3. *The ultimate source domain*

Further implications of our combined findings for the broader theoretical literature bear directly on Szwedek's proposal for OBJECT as the ultimate source domain (2011) that was confirmed by a series of results from our quantitative analysis. Firstly, as reported in subsection 5.3.2.1, the single *biggest* source domain is 'OBJECT', from a total of 332 source domain types out of 1,471 tokens (note that this ranking does not yet include sub-classifications of OBJECT like HUMAN/PERSON, ROOM/CONTAINER, etc.). Secondly, concepts that meet Szwedek's (*ibid.*) OBJECT criteria (i.e. tactile-perceivability and 3-dimensionality) are the second, third and sixth biggest source domains. Put simply, 4 out of 6 most common source domains that constitute more than 50% of the data are OBJECTS. Thirdly, *all* subcategories of sC and LC (i.e. in other words, OBJECTS) have shown to function as source domains in our data, which is *not* the case with LA and HA (i.e. non-OBJECT) concepts. Finally, even our most conservative estimate shows that at least 70% of source domains from 1,471 conceptual metaphors that surfaced in our data are OBJECT source domains. Again, we emphasize that the value of our findings does not only lie in the meticulously structured procedures applied throughout this study, but also in its quantitative strength. That is, 1,471 *pairs* of source and target domains is, by any standard, a good and solid data size, statistically speaking.

Aside from OBJECT, the other two source domains treated as prime candidates for the ultimate source domain in the cognitive metaphor literature (even if they may not have been explicitly termed as such), are STRUCTURE²³⁶ and SPACE (Rumelhart, 1993; Grady et al., 1996; Taub, 1996; Vervaeke & Kennedy, 2004; Radden, 2005; after Szwedek, 2011). In Chapter Three, we have already argued why we hold these assumptions to be incorrect. Here, we corroborate those claims with our results that show that OBJECT is in fact the ultimate source domain, and that STRUCTURE and SPACE are not. That being said, we have also observed several unique characteristics of STRUCTURE and SPACE from our data that could explain why they have been receiving more attention in the literature than other source domains. In regard to STRUCTURE as a conceptual domain, our analysis on the most dominant source and target domains showed a distinct kind of mapping to be highly common across both domains, which we labeled as 'PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL'. Upon a deeper analysis, it was revealed that *all* instances of this source-to-target mapping could be summarized by a single formula of 'NONPHYSICAL

²³⁶ By 'STRUCTURE' here we mean ANATOMY/CONFIGURATION (non-OBJECT), and *not* BUILDING (OBJECT).

X IS PHYSICAL X', which represents various *structures* and components of a broader conceptual metaphor NONPHYSICAL WORLDS ARE THE PHYSICAL WORLD. As detailed in subsection 5.4.2, a substantial portion of the slot-filler concepts for the 'X'-slot in the formula belongs to the low abstract (LA) category, e.g. STATES, EVENTS, LOCATIONS, RELATIONS, PROPERTIES, QUALITIES, etc. Firstly, these concepts are characteristic of Objectification's Type III A-to-A metaphorization (or CMT's *structural* metaphors), a pattern that appears to be too systematic to be dismissed as a series of coincidences. Secondly, analysis results on the transferability of source domains also seem to confirm Szwedek's reasoning that STRUCTURE is *dependent* upon OBJECT, and not the reverse (2011), further reinforcing Langacker's distinction between THINGS and RELATIONS (1987). Put simply, in a hypothetical scenario where OBJECT/THING did *not* exist as a source domain, neither would STRUCTURE/RELATION. In fact, in our view, the ubiquity of OBJECT in metaphorization also results in STRUCTURE and other RELATION concepts to be widespread, too. It is thus not surprising that STRUCTURE is taken to be a key concept in Primary Metaphor Theory (Grady, 1997a, 1997b). However, as previously argued, given how vastly disparate the bases of assumptions of this theory are (to the point of contradiction) to find a common ground with Objectification, its reconciliation with our framework and approach is a conceptual and methodological impossibility.

As for SPACE, concerns regarding its terminological ambiguity that could potentially lead to theoretic obscurity were already addressed in subsection 3.3.1.3. But to briefly recap, SPACE_B (perhaps the most 'popular' sense of the term) is essentially PLACE or LOCATION, which is non-OBJECT, i.e. noted by its 0-, 1- or 2-dimensionality. On the other hand, SPACE_C (howbeit much less in use) may be read as ROOM or CONTAINER, which would then be OBJECT, i.e. if 3-dimensionality is implied. In short, SPACE_B falls into the low abstract (LA) category on our scalar model, whilst SPACE_C belongs to the strictly concrete (sC) category. Again, as explained in the previous chapter, to maintain unbiasedness in reporting our results, we decided to calculate *all* occurrences of SPACE from our data as SPACE_B, i.e. *non*-OBJECT. This was because in most cases, it was not entirely unambiguous whether SPACE_B or SPACE_C was referred to. Thus, we deliberately chose to be conservative with our calculations of OBJECT to avoid over-interpreting or misrepresenting the results in favor of our own predictions, which we did not. To show why SPACE is *not* the ultimate source domain, we point out that not unlike STRUCTURE, it too belongs to the low abstract (LA) category on the scale. And although neither STRUCTURE nor SPACE falls on the abstract-most end of the concreteness/abstractness

spectrum, neither of them meets our criteria for concreteness. Furthermore, it is also interesting to observe that both SPACE (i.e. PLACE/LOCATION) and STRUCTURE (i.e. ANATOMY/CONFIGURATION) are *forms* of RELATION, much like how ORIENTATION in CMT's orientational metaphor is RELATION (Szwedek, 2007b, 2008). The 'ultimate' source domain, however, must by definition be the '*most concrete*' of concepts, which STRUCTURE and SPACE are not. And based on our findings, LOCATION ranks the fourth on the biggest source domains' list (while OBJECT ranks the first place, and OBJECT-type source domains rank the second, third and sixth). In addition, while all sC and LC sub-categories function as source domains in our data, only half of LA sub-categories do, which further convinces us that the ultimate source domain cannot be an LA or HA concept. Last but not least, the fact that LA category functions almost equally as source and target domains (i.e. 26% of the time as SD, and 25% as TD) would clearly refute any possibility that SPACE or STRUCTURE could be the ultimate source domain.

All these points aside, we can very well imagine why SPACE is thought to be a 'special' conceptual domain. That is, as discovered in our data, LOCATION appears *exclusively* as a source, but never as a target, and findings are consistent in both Malay and English. In other words, LOCATION has not shown itself to be metaphorized or conceptualized as another concept (at least as far as our data are concerned). That being said, we did not take this as an indication that LOCATION could be the ultimate source domain. This is because by the same logic, then, RELATIONSHIP and LIFE would be viable candidates for the ultimate *target* domain (i.e. due to the fact that they appear exclusively as target domains but not source domains in our data). This cannot be an acceptable postulation, because even if all other arguments fail, RELATIONSHIP and LIFE *do* (inarguably) have at least some physical components, the fact of which will automatically nullify their candidacy as the ultimate target domain. And finally, because the results unequivocally show that highly abstract (HA) concepts function most dominantly as target domains, we would argue that this category is the best candidate for the ultimate *target* domain.

6.2.1.4. *Typology of metaphor*

Yet another positive cascading effect of having a perspicuous concreteness/abstractness description and a firmer grasp on the nature of source and target domains is the ability to make predictions about source-to-target mapping types. In this study, we have been able to chart out all 20 hypothetical mapping types (i.e. based on the four categories of

concepts of the scalar model), and record the existence and nonexistence of each type, as found in our data. Thus, not only were we able to observe the finer characteristics of these mapping patterns, but we can now also formulate *verifiable* predictions about the governing direction of mapping, and articulate the precise conditions under which a violation to this rule is permitted. In the cognitive metaphor literature, only the *regular* mapping direction i.e. ‘from more concrete to more abstract’ source-to-target mapping is addressed, but the opposite i.e. ‘from more abstract to more concrete’ is almost never mentioned or considered in CMT’s discussion on this topic. In fact, the ‘concrete-to-abstract’ hypothesis about conceptual mapping seems to have always been accepted as ‘true’ without in-depth scrutiny to verify or falsify it or to explore the reverse ‘abstract-to-concrete’ direction, or other possibilities like ‘concrete-to-concrete’ and ‘abstract-to-abstract’. An exception to this, once again, is Szwedek (2008, 2010, 2011, 2014a), who addresses at length the nature and relations between the domains (which are manifested as different mapping types) in his proposal for a new metaphor typology.

As extensively argued in Chapter Three, the new Objectification-based typology by Szwedek (*ibid.*) offers a more viable alternative to CMT’s metaphor classification into structural, orientational and ontological metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003). We reiterate here that our placement of concepts onto the four points on the scalar model (sC, LC, LA, HA) does not contradict Szwedek’s OBJECT criteria for concreteness and abstractness (*ibid.*). But rather, the scalar model simply further divides ‘concreteness’ into ‘strictly concrete’ and ‘loosely concrete’ (i.e. the line is drawn between tactile and non-tactile perceptibility), and ‘abstractness’ into ‘low abstract’ and ‘highly abstract’ (i.e. the line is drawn between concepts with physical components and those without them). Thus, the mapping types charted out based on our model are fully compatible with Szwedek’s metaphor typology, i.e. Type I C-to-C, Type II C-to-A, Type III A-to-A, and the hypothetical ‘Type IV’ A-to-C (2011, 2014a). Since Szwedek’s extensive analyses on Types I, II, and III metaphorization have already confirmed the existence of these types (*ibid.*), our results may be seen as corroborating his earlier findings with data from our Malay and English poetic texts.

In relation to ‘Type IV’ A-to-C metaphorization previously thought to be impossible or nonexistent, our findings suggest that they do, in fact, exist, but only under ‘special’ circumstances, which are now much better understood than before. This has enabled us to form some predictions on mapping directions and constraints, which was previously

difficult to achieve, i.e. without having first disentangled the concreteness/abstractness issue. That is, we can now precisely state that: the regular and governing direction of metaphorical mapping is 'concrete-to-abstract' (i.e. left-to-right on our scalar model), whilst the 'abstract-to-concrete' (i.e. right-to-left on the scale) is also possible, albeit irregular, and with the condition that objectification has already taken place for all non-concrete concepts. Therefore, the implications of this study's findings on the typology of metaphor is not insignificant, as we have now shed some new lights on decades-long assumptions in the field, in addition to equipping CMT with the power of predictability (at least in regard to mapping types and metaphorization) that was previously lacking in the theory. By working within this CMT-Objectification framework, we are also able to substantiate the counterintuitive 'abstract-to-concrete' mapping and explicate how such highly abstract (HA) concepts like TIME and SPIRITUALITY/SUPERNATURALISM may, in fact, serve as source domains to strictly concrete (SC) concepts like HUMAN, that is, *via* objectification. In fact, evidence also suggests that objectification is the same universal principle that underlies Type III A-to-A metaphorization (CMT's structural metaphors). More broadly, these findings also lend support for CMT's claim for the systematicity of conceptual metaphor, reflected in those 'violations', which are clearly *not* random.

6.2.2. Classical versus cognitive assumptions

This subsection discusses how some of our findings relate to issues that stem from an even broader theoretical debate, i.e. between the traditional and contemporary camps. We limit them to the three major points of dissensus discussed at the beginning of this dissertation, i.e.: (i) whether metaphor is a product of language only, or of thought but with language as one mode of manifestation; (ii) whether or not metaphorical meaning is optional (or tangential to) literal meaning; and (iii) if conventional metaphors are 'dead' metaphors. Even though our study was not designed to respond directly to these classical-versus-cognitive disputes, results generated from our analyses do indeed lend support for the cognitive metaphor assumptions. Firstly, as regards the traditional claim that metaphor is a product of language only, our analysis results display remarkable systematicity in the Malay and English conceptualization of the MIND. Despite the two languages being genetically unrelated to each other, and their speakers hailing from vastly diverse cultural traditions and geographical locations, their metaphors evidently share a deep common root that goes beyond the surface-level inter-language variability. Our focus on sensory perceptions as the metaphorization sources for COGNITION and

EMOTION also gives our study objective, transparent and directly observable subjects of investigation, i.e. our perceptual modalities. And the fact that vocabulary from the five senses are not just randomly scattered across metaphors of the MIND in either language is a sound indication that there has to be a system that governs this systematicity that transcends language, presumably our conceptual system. To assume the rejection of our thought as having any role in metaphorization would be to say that all SKIN-EMOTION and EYE-COGNITION metaphors found in the two notably distant languages are no more than a series of fantastic linguistic coincidences.

Secondly, relating to the traditional assumption that literal meaning is primary whilst metaphorical meaning is peripheral and/or superfluous, our data inform us that this is incorrect and fully support Lakoff's (1986) distinction between 'non-metaphorical' (i.e. in lieu of 'literal') and metaphorical meanings. In fact, based on our combined findings, we propose an explicit and deliberate change in the terminological distinction, that is, from 'literal-metaphorical' to '*physical*-metaphorical' contrast instead, thus completely dissolving the classical theory-centric notion of 'literal' from our cognitive metaphor framework altogether²³⁷. However, unlike the traditional approach, we do maintain that the physical and metaphorical meanings or interpretations are of equal importance, and that neither is superior or inferior to the other. Aside from the fact that both our model and our protocol are driven by the natural 'clash' or 'mismatch' between physical and nonphysical elements, our textual data contain an outstanding number of PHYSICAL-TO-NONPHYSICAL conceptual transfers, as well. This particular kind of mapping (noted in the formula 'NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X' to reflect a broader conceptual metaphor 'NONPHYSICAL WORLDS ARE THE PHYSICAL WORLD') constitutes an extensive list of *metaphorically*-rooted vocabulary, such as SCARS, HEALING, PRESENCE, DEPARTURE, DISCOVERY, CHANGE, PLACE, SHELTER, WEIGHT, STRENGTH, ENERGY, and the like. As a result, in cases where it might be ambiguous which sense of the word is referred to, 'nonphysical' (i.e. *metaphorical*) qualifiers would be necessary for disambiguation, e.g. *spiritual strength*, *emotional shelter*, *intellectual discovery*, *virtual presence*, and so on. But whenever the unmodified form of these words is used without qualification (i.e. *strength*, *shelter*, *discovery*, *presence*, etc.), we often, though not always, refer to its 'physical' sense²³⁸. In none of these instances is the old and dated 'literal-metaphorical'

²³⁷ Our use of the term 'physical' as a contrast to 'metaphorical' corresponds specifically to Lakoff's (1986) third sense of literality, i.e. '*non-metaphorical* literality'; cf. also Szwedek's physical-phenomenological demarcation (2010, 2011).

²³⁸ Ritchie has previously hinted that embodied experience is 'literal' in the 'physical' sense (2003: 125).

distinction meaningful to us. Further evidence can be found in the EYE-COGNITION and SKIN-EMOTION metaphors from our data (recall subsection 5.4.3), in which the qualifier 'physical' is inarguably more accurate and more revelatory than 'literal', as a contrast to the metaphorical sense, e.g. *physical picture*, *physical scene*, *physical pain*, *physical pressure*, *physical touch*, and so on. And finally, our discovery of 'Type IV' A-to-C metaphorization that involves highly abstract (HA) concepts from SPR subcategory (i.e. SPIRITUALITY/SUPERNATURALISM) also supports the 'physical-metaphorical' contrast and the cognitive metaphor claim that metaphorical meaning is neither peripheral nor optional. More precisely, as these concepts have purely mental existence (Krzyszowski, 1997) and lack all kinds of concreteness or physicality, they cannot possibly be referred to in any other way (Barcelona, 2003), save metaphorically.

And thirdly, concerning the traditional belief that 'conventional' metaphors are 'dead', our data indicate that whether metaphors are identified as 'novel' or 'conventional' has no bearing whatsoever on its 'aliveness'. That is, the 'conventionality' and 'aliveness' of metaphor are *not* mutually exclusive, and 'conventionality' does *not* equate to the 'death' of metaphor, as asserted by most classical theories. In fact, the notion of 'dead metaphors'²³⁹ is impertinent to the cognitive views, and we will state shortly how some of our findings may fit into this part of the theoretical picture. More appropriate to the contemporary standpoint that metaphoricity is gradable is Müller's gradient description of metaphors as 'sleeping' and 'waking' (2008), i.e. in place of the traditional 'dead-alive' binary contrast. As regards our present work, the rating study was not designed to investigate metaphoricity per se, but we were curious as to the characteristic features that could trigger what language users would perceive to be 'novel' or 'conventional' in respect of metaphor. Thus, operating on the premise that metaphoricity is gradable, we compared subsets from the highest and lowest ends of the rating results to capture a visible contrast between the two subsets. In short, results from the rating study confirm that even 'the *most* conventional' of metaphors (i.e. *zero*-rated MCs) are nowhere close to being 'dead', thus effectively rejecting the classical 'dead metaphor' idea. Moreover, our findings may also be consequential to cognitive metaphor research apropos of the three mismatch principles as key to our metaphor identification protocol. Specifically, the analysis results contain some insights on how the different verification points (i.e. VMM, EMM and CMM) could detect and reveal to us at least three different forms in

²³⁹ Cf. Lakoff's four conditions for metaphors to be truly 'dead' in CMT (1987a); recall also subsection 4.1.1.

which metaphors transpire in language, according to metaphoricity rating tendency (i.e. generally, the highest at VMM and the lowest at CMM). Finally, our findings indicate that metaphors with similar ratings are typologically similar, as well, for instance, the highly conventional and contextually-dependent metaphors reflect a broader conceptual metaphor ‘NONPHYSICAL WORLDS ARE THE PHYSICAL WORLD’, which contains a set of *structural* metaphors ‘NONPHYSICAL X IS PHYSICAL X’. This is consistent with another discovery that Objectification’s Type III A-to-A metaphors (or *structural* metaphors) tend to receive low ratings too, overall. In short, our interpretation of these findings is that ‘conventional’ metaphors are not ‘dead’, but they are at most ‘asleep’ or ‘inactive’, in which case their ‘aliveness’ can be verified by the *context* of use, via CMM.

6.3. Constraints and limitations

Despite one’s best efforts, no study is without limitations. We have already pointed out some of ours throughout this thesis, as and when appropriate, but we summarize them here collectively as a way to conclude this chapter. Firstly, our study on metaphoricity rating involved a concentrated population of 60 undergraduate students. Hence, while this may be a statistically acceptable number, we do not claim that it is representative of Malay speakers’ judgments. However, for our present goals, the participants have served their functions adequately. Secondly, regarding our linguistic data, despite our endeavor to analyze metaphors from two vastly distinct languages, Malay and English, we would limit our claims and conclusions to these two languages, for now. Although it may be tempting to levy a ‘universal’ label on all intriguing intercultural discoveries, it will be prudent to reserve a more forceful conclusion after having gathered more data from other languages, as well. Thirdly, and along the same line of reasoning, we would also confine the conclusions of our study to metaphors in poetic texts, in spite of our suspicion that the same principles could well apply to metaphors in other genres and modalities, i.e. due to the *cognitive* mechanism presumed to underlie metaphorization. Next, whilst we are confident in the size of our data (i.e. 1,471 conceptual metaphors from 72 poetic texts), the data themselves are essentially qualitative, as most data in our field are. And finally, because the analysis of conceptual metaphors cannot do without a certain level of human introspection, we must accept the inherent subjectivity in our observations and interpretations, while at the same time also purposefully and tirelessly applying structured methods and principled decisions throughout the study.

7. Conclusions and Outlook

7.1. Main contributions

In this final concluding chapter, we will suggest several main contributions from our study to cognitive metaphor research. This is followed by recommendations for future research that we believe could further expand some of the ideas proposed in this work, especially in ways that a project with our mileage and constraints cannot. But first, we will summarize the major contents of all the previous chapters of this thesis.

Chapter One presents an introduction to this study by stating its goals, objectives and research questions, as well as providing an overview of how this dissertation was to be structured, as a whole. We also mentioned in this introductory chapter that central to our research is the hitherto unclarified notions of concreteness and abstractness, which are highly consequential to many cognitive claims about source and target domains of conceptual metaphors. Therefore, devising a clearly defined solution to this conceptual problem was to be our primary focus, prior to excavating and cataloguing conceptual metaphors from the Malay and English poetic texts. Chapter Two aims at establishing a solid theoretical foundation for our research. It examines some of the most influential theories of metaphor, both classical and contemporary, and highlights the three biggest points of contention that mark the great conceptual divide between the two theoretical camps. We wanted to make sure that all conceptual bases have been covered, including providing a critical survey on existing works on emotion metaphors in Malay, English and other languages, prior to commencing with our own academic inquiry. Chapter Three evaluates the merits and drawbacks of CMT, and addresses a selected number of its basal theoretical deficiencies that could be effectively dissolved by the incorporation of Objectification Theory into the former, for a much sturdier conceptual framework. Here, we also proposed our own OBJECT-based scalar model that was born out of this conceptualized CMT-Objectification integration as a working solution to a long-drawn concreteness/abstractness dilemma in the field. This model is also informed by findings from perception science and synesthetic metaphor research. Chapter Four records the methodology of our study as well as its subcomponents, and introduces our protocol for metaphor identification with the three mismatch principles (VMM, EMM, CMM) as its defining features. Here, we demonstrated in practice the workability of this procedure

in identifying conceptual metaphors in poetic texts, which may also be applied to other forms of data, textual and otherwise. Chapter Five presents the results of our analyses that were divided into three parts, i.e. the rating study on metaphoricity, the quantitative analysis that focused on source and target domains, and the qualitative analysis that explored conceptual metaphors of the MIND in our Malay and English data. Chapter Six summarizes the findings from the three different segments of our study, discusses the main implications of the combined findings for the broader theoretical literature, and ends with a brief recap on the constraints and limitations of our study. Lastly, this final chapter concludes this thesis by suggesting a few distinctive contributions of this work and some potential avenues to be further explored in future research.

7.1.1. An OBJECT-based scalar model for ‘measuring’ concreteness

The most substantial and notable contribution of this project for conceptual metaphor research as a whole, in our view, would be the OBJECT-based concreteness/abstractness scalar model proposed in Chapter Three. This model arises, first of all, out of an urgent need for a clear characterization for the largely vague and noncommittal employment of the terms ‘more concrete’ and ‘more abstract’ within the cognitive approaches. At the conceptual level, such a lack presents a serious theoretical breach to a number of CMT’s central claims regarding conceptual metaphor and prevents it from generating testable predictions about them. And at the procedural level, this deficiency translates into a big methodological mess during the stage of metaphor identification, for which empirically acceptable substantiation cannot be convincingly offered. This is especially true for studies with sizeable data like the present one. With a clearly articulated model such as ours, however, theoretical assumptions could now be made in a transparent manner and with greater specificity, which would thereby allow them to be empirically confirmed or rejected. This could (even if only in part) respond to Murphy’s appeal for “more specific models of metaphoric concepts” (1997: 106), and to his statement that a falsifiable model is imperative for a theory of cognition, i.e. “even if it is a simplified, incomplete one, so that its successes and limitations can be accurately assessed” (ibid.). Put simply, a falsifiable model would considerably enhance CMT’s structural integrity and increase its empirical worth. And as mentioned on previous occasions, we consider our model as a work-in-progress that would be further developed in concert with future inquiries and discoveries. In addition, by having proposed our scalar model, we are not rejecting the functionality of existing or future alternative models. Rather, our intention

here has been to illustrate the tremendous value of having such a model for a cognitive theory of metaphor, and that the model, when properly engineered, could help advance the theory's empiric and scientific researchability. The distinctive appeal of our model, as we have argued throughout, is that it is explicitly based on our sensory modalities and the perceptual system. It is, in essence, a return to *embodiment*.

7.1.2. Protocol for metaphor identification with mismatch principles

Another important contribution of this study is our protocol for metaphor identification, which is a direct reflection of an operationalization of our scalar model. That is, the OBJECT-based concreteness/abstractness scale of our model forms the very basis of this protocol, i.e. by strictly governing the mismatch criteria for VMM and EMM as well as the descriptions for 'embodied meaning' as an effective contrast against 'contextual meaning' for CMM. As a methodological tool, the protocol is as valuable as it is vital, precisely due to the tacit and implicit nature of conceptual metaphor as a subject matter for research. As shown in our review of existing works on emotion metaphors, most of these studies do rely exclusively on intuitive identification of metaphors, and as further evidenced by our own preliminary analysis, this method by itself lacks the construction to generate consistent and reliable results that could be considered empirically worthy. Moreover, absent a systematic procedure, substantiating one's decision for identifying an expression as metaphorical in an empirical²⁴⁰ fashion (i.e. beyond one's 'inkling' or personal suspicion) is exceedingly difficult, if not entirely impossible. In fact, the larger the data, the more unmanageable this problem will get. And because human intuition and introspection cannot be divorced from the identification and analysis of conceptual metaphors (which are, by nature, elusive), inserting a series of mandatory 'regulators' such as the three verification checkpoints (VMM, EMM and CMM) into the procedure would substantially increase its objectivity, thus also its reliability. Partially modeled after Pragglejaz's MIP (2007), but which we have found to be rather low on practicality *and* practicability of implementation for the present study, our own protocol sets itself apart from other methods with the three mismatch principles as its defining feature. At the core, these three mismatch principles are a synthesis of variegated ideas heretofore dispersed across many metaphor theories and models that have all alluded to one form of 'clash' or another, as regards metaphor creation.

²⁴⁰ By this we mean a method that is acceptable as 'empirical' *beyond* our own field of cognitive linguistics.

7.1.3. ‘Type IV’ abstract-to-concrete *metaphorization*

One completely unexpected discovery that we would like to briefly mention here is the ‘Type IV’ A-to-C metaphorization, i.e. based on Szwedek’s metaphor typology (2008, 2010, 2011, 2014*a*), which was previously thought to be impossible and/or nonexistent. What is perhaps most surprising about this metaphorization is that defies the infamous concrete-to-abstract metaphorical mapping assumption, one that continues to receive exclusive attention in the cognitive metaphor literature. In fact, an *abstract-to-concrete* metaphorization can be said to be ‘counterintuitive’, for it directly violates the hitherto unchallenged description of CMT’s conceptual metaphor as the mapping ‘from the more concrete to the more abstract’. We view this particular discovery as consequential to Objectification Theory in that it lends support to Szwedek’s hypothesis concerning the universal process of objectification that underlies metaphorization (ibid.), and also that it could be reflective of the ultimate stage in the phylogenetic development of our abstract thoughts. At the same time, this discovery does suggest that a slight refinement to CMT’s existing prediction regarding metaphorical mapping might be in order. More specifically, that, even though concrete-to-abstract is indeed the governing direction for metaphorical mapping, the opposite may be possible but under *specified* conditions. In light of this, we would argue that Objectification has in fact captured metaphorization in its entirety via its all-embracing metaphor typology (C-to-C, C-to-A, A-to-A, and A-to-C), which would make its integration into CMT all the more profitable especially in upping the latter’s predictive power. In short, this finding has alerted us to the existence of a previously overlooked type of metaphorization, which is an attestation to the non-negotiability of a well-defined model of metaphoric concepts for a cognitive metaphor theory. In fact, this ‘Type IV’ A-to-C metaphorization would not have been picked out from our data, if we did not have our scalar model in place, to begin with.

7.1.4. *Cross-linguistic and intercultural insights*

Our review of studies has shown that research on Malay metaphors is, to date, scarce. The largely exploratory nature of this work imposes, among others, limitations on the depth of what we might have otherwise been able to disinter from the wealth of Malay metaphors discovered in the data. Although at its inception stage, the primary aim of this study had initially been to investigate in great depth Malay metaphors in songs and

poems alongside their English counterparts, the lack of a clearly articulated model of metaphoric concepts and a regulated protocol for metaphor identification required that our main focus be shifted toward these latter two more pressing concerns. After all, the attainment of the former goal would substantially depend on the efficacy of the latter. This reprioritization of our research goals also meant that certain compromises were inevitable, i.e. an in-depth coverage on metaphors as originally intended was no longer possible, due to spatial and temporal constraints. Nevertheless, our analysis, explorative as it may have been, did yield a number of insights to contribute to cognitive metaphor research. As regards the source and target domains of conceptual metaphors from our data, we briefly recap some cross-linguistics contrasts here: (1) whereas Malay displays a preference for HUMANS/PERSONS for metaphorization, English appears to be partial to INORGANIC THINGS (this applies to both domains, but with more visible differences in SD than TD); (2) English metaphors contain notably more low abstract (LA) concepts than Malay (this holds for both domains); and (3) Type III A-to-A metaphorization, i.e. CMT's structural (and orientational) metaphors, would be more pervasive in English than Malay. The question whether these contrasts can be attributed to varying linguistic features between the two languages or if they are culturally-motivated would require an investigation with a distinct focal point, which escapes the purview of our study.

As for our intercultural discoveries on the Malay-versus-English conceptualization of the MIND, we would conclude that there might potentially be a universal blueprint for this conceptual process, but one that would allow for a culturally-tailored manifestation in language, i.e. unique to each society's own principles and practices. Even though at one level, there seems to be a strikingly similar pattern for metaphorizing EMOTION and COGNITION between these two languages, equally remarkable are the cognitive-cultural interplays of the conceptual metaphors that manifest themselves linguistically, and they do so within an evidently 'agreed upon' conceptual parameter. Potentially universal, as it appears, is the way that the *AFFECTIVE FACET OF OUR MIND* 'experiences' external tactile sensations (i.e. touch, pressure, pain, temperature) and 'suffers' the same kinds of injuries that the SKIN does. Similarly, parallel functions of various aspects of the EYE are found in the metaphorization of the *COGNITIVE FACET OF OUR MIND*. Once again, we interpret these findings as evidence for embodiment and the primacy of our physical and bodily experience in metaphorization. And because we metaphorize our THOUGHTS and FEELINGS as SENSORY ORGANS, we in effect *objectify* them, directly or otherwise. Our conclusion for now is that our (inarguably universal) perceptual apparatuses are

globally employed as ‘shared’ conceptual mechanisms for metaphorization at its roots (even between distant languages), but with a degree of *flexibility* regarding how their metaphors may transpire linguistically, i.e. within the constraints of a society and what its cultural and religious norms would permit. In our case, cultural-specificities are seen in how metaphorical expressions on THOUGHTS and FEELINGS accommodate opposing values and beliefs, e.g. the stark contrasts on what are considered socially acceptable in expressing one’s opinions, as well as those concerning romantic behaviors.

7.2. Future directions

In answering a number of questions, this study has also raised several new ones along the way, as research works often do. In fact, many of these questions would inevitably require research expertise that lies outside the reach of our present capacities, technical and otherwise. Ultimately, our intrinsic goal is to make a meaningful contribution that would work collectively with other studies in advancing the scientific researchability of CMT-Objectification beyond the scope of cognitive linguistics. Therefore, by having offered specific solutions to some of CMT’s basic issues, we hope that this study will encourage further and more in-depth research into related topics, and beyond. We will briefly suggest a few potential future directions from this point forward.

7.2.1. Expanded text-based analyses on metaphors of the MIND

To begin with, we firstly state our own planned next step following this research, i.e. to further develop the third segment of this project into a full-blown study on metaphors of the MIND, with a narrowed focus on our perceptual modalities as the source domains for conceptual metaphorization. As intrigued as we have been with findings from this study, we view them as preliminary and exploratory, and are hence in need of deeper investigations. And now that we have our model and protocol in place, all resources could then be directed at expanding on this topic via a more in-depth analysis. Intended languages to be studied by the author of this dissertation are German, English, Malay, and Indonesian. We would also like to adopt a corpus-based method, which will be an invaluable feature for most effectively extracting keywords for both source and target domains from a text corpus, now that we know precisely what we would be searching for in the corpora. In terms of genre, perhaps a combination of different text genres would yield a more balanced number of EMOTION-COGNITION metaphors (e.g. literary,

scientific, political, etc.), as compared to exclusively studying one genre only. Finally, we would also invite prospective collaborations with, as well as replications of, studies in other languages (beyond the four mentioned above) amongst other researchers.

7.2.2. *Metaphors by visually- and hearing-impaired individuals*

Another direction to go with this theme would be to investigate EYE-COGNITION and SKIN-EMOTION metaphorical mappings in conceptual metaphors by *two* specific groups of individuals, namely, the (congenitally) visually-impaired and hearing-impaired. We believe that it would be extremely interesting to find out the extent to which the former group, being deprived of *sight*, would conceptualize COGNITION in terms of the EYE, as compared to seeing persons. And even though it would not be easy to tell if and to what extent one's visual impairment may shape their EMOTION metaphorization, we would recommend that this be studied concurrently, as well. As for the latter group (that is, the hearing-impaired individuals), although their visual perception would be intact, the metaphors that they produce would belong to the visual-manual modality, which could then be compared to COGNITION metaphors by vocal-auditory communicators. In fact, it does make one wonder if and how their EMOTION metaphors would differ in terms of SKIN-based source domains, precisely because their 'speech' modality is heavily tactile. Another variation would be an investigation on conceptual metaphors of the MIND in *non*-linguistic modalities such as gestures and body language, as well as visual and pictorial metaphors. Data sources could include all forms of visual arts and media. No doubt, none of these studies would be easy to execute, but they would be worth the effort in further testing the claim that metaphor is, in fact, conceptual in origin.

7.2.3. *Behavioral experiments, brain imaging studies, and beyond*

Beyond the traditional text-based metaphor analysis like ours, and parallel studies on conceptual metaphors in other (linguistic and non-linguistic) modalities such as those previously mentioned, there are several other paths available to studying metaphors of the MIND, based on one's research interest and expertise. In the case at hand, one may choose to rigorously scrutinize the SKIN-EMOTION and EYE-COGNITION metaphorical mappings using various (beyond linguistic) approaches and techniques, for example, psychological and behavioral experiments, brain imaging studies, and computational modeling and simulation, just to name a few. Aside from the obvious advantages of

belonging to an interdisciplinary field such as cognitive science (and also to an era of rapid technological advancements that make possible various forms of research), our subject matter of interest also does appear opportunely ideal for examining the BODY-MIND relationship in greater depth, as regards metaphor. Specifically, these particular source-to-target conceptual projections in question (i.e. from the *tactile* modality to the *affective* faculty of the mind, and from the *visual* modality to the *cognitive* faculty of the mind) could be said to be quintessential specimens of *embodied* metaphors. In fact, one could hardly think of a more befitting illustration of physical-mental or perceptual-conceptual components at play than the SKIN-EMOTION and EYE-COGNITION pairings. Thus, psychological and behavioral experiments that involve, for instance, participants' reactions to tactile and visual stimuli during a series of affective- and cognitive-related tasks may be just one of the numerous possibilities of such studies to better understand metaphorical mappings beyond textual analyses. Accordingly, brain-imaging studies that potentially investigate specific areas of the motor and visual cortices during and/or in relation to a series of designated tasks could also reveal a wealth of new information concerning metaphorical mappings that cannot be achieved via other means.

Naturally, as these areas do lie outside of our research expertise, we could only offer general ideas based on what existing research in these fields have shown to be capable of. In fact, at present, there are already vigorous works explored in the similar direction as suggested here, albeit different in the specifics. However, considering the incredibly vast scope of conceptual metaphor as a research subject, we could perhaps never have enough of research to continuously improve our knowledge and understanding of it. Last but not least, we maintain that these advanced and sophisticated research methods and approaches are invaluable complements to (but are in no way replacements of) text-based studies, which, primitive and old-fashioned as they may be, are an important part as well as an *indispensable* starting point for researching metaphor.

7.3. Closing remarks

To conclude this work, we emphasize once again that the task of researching a subject matter as charmingly elusive as conceptual metaphor (i.e. in a way that could satisfy the empirical demands of the scientific research community while also at the same time staying true to our cognitive metaphor research tradition), is a tremendous undertaking indeed. It requires one to engineer a set of empirically supported research instruments

for measuring and quantifying the kinds of data that are generally thought to be beyond mathematical measurements. Furthermore, this needs to be achieved without jettisoning the inevitably subjective human intuition and introspection, which are an indelible part of identifying and analyzing metaphors within the framework of cognitive linguistics. That being said, despite these incredible challenges, attaining such a goal is not entirely impossible, provided of course that the work is built upon solid theoretical grounds and guided by a series of structured methodological procedures.

With regard to the present study, we have admittedly attempted an extremely grueling task that calls for painstaking efforts and exceedingly meticulous (and at times, tedious) work, to say the least. But we do believe that this is the only viable way of empirically researching a conceptual mechanism that could easily escape objective quantifications, lacking such conscientiousness. In short, it is not for the faint of heart. No doubt, such an audacious endeavor, especially with the introduction of a model that might in a way challenge the status quo of the existing CMT research may be expected to meet with criticisms, resistance and/or rejection, at least initially. But as daring as we realize our enterprise has been, we have decided to take the risk anyway, for the sake of hopefully contributing to metaphor research in a most meaningful way and of further advancing CMT-Objectification's massive, and still untapped, potentials. The intellectual rewards, to us, have already been well worth all efforts and risks.

Needless to say, the present work does not even begin to touch the tip of the iceberg of the immensely fascinating world of our conceptual system. To assume otherwise, in our view, would be a gross display of arrogance and ignorance. In fact, even with the most advanced and sophisticated research technologies known to mankind today, there is so indescribably much to be learnt and discovered about the human mind that it would be safe to conclude that it will remain for the most part a wonderful mystery to us. But it is perhaps this very enigma that continues to galvanize our enthusiasms and efforts in this never-ending quest for knowledge acquisition and sharing as researchers. Certainly, we hope that our modest contribution would trigger many other works within our field as well as beyond, as part of the enormous collective effort of advancing cognitive science (and of knowledge advancement), as a whole.

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Cambridge Online Dictionary

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org>

Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Institute for Malay Language and Literature) Dictionary

<http://prpm.dbp.gov.my>

Dr. Bhanot's Malay-English Cyber Dictionary

<http://dictionary.bhanot.net>

Korpus Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Institute for Malay Language and Literature Corpus)

<http://sbmb.dbp.gov.my/korpusdbp>

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary and Thesaurus

<https://www.merriam-webster.com>

Online Etymology Dictionary

<https://www.etymonline.com>

Oxford Malay-English and English-Malay Online Dictionary

<https://ms.oxforddictionaries.com>

Oxford Online English Dictionary and Thesaurus

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com>

ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES, OPEN-SOURCE PROJECTS & OTHERS

Former Jakarta Field Station, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology

<https://jakarta.shh.mpg.de>

Malay Concordance Project

<http://mcp.anu.edu.au>

Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO)

<http://www.adampease.org/OP>

The Encyclopedia of Malaysia

<http://encyclopedia.com.my>

The KrissTal Website: A UK-based Educational Website

http://www.krysstal.com/langfams_malayo.html

Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimension>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EF_English_Proficiency_Index

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_languages_by_total_number_of_speakers

Note: All websites and webpages listed here were last accessed on 9th March 2019.

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** Due to copyright reasons, the datasheets containing 72 poetic texts (including the English translations of the Malay texts) that made up this study's data will not be published as part of the manuscript, but is enclosed in CD-ROM and submitted along with this doctoral dissertation to the five members of the PhD examination board and to the examination office of FU Berlin (for thesis grading purposes only).*

Appendix A - Profiles of Analyzed Data (Malay)

Data Code	Year	Title of Song	Performing Artist	Composer - Lyricist
MS-01	1986	Sekadar Di Pinggiran	Francisca Peter	Manan Ngah - Likhman S.
MS-02	1986	Sampaikan Salam Cintaku	Alleycats	A. Ali - Juwie
MS-03	1987	Menaruh Harapan	Zaiton Sameon	A. Ali - Habsah Hassan
MS-04	1988	Kau Kunci Cintaku Di Dalam Hatimu	Ramlah Ram	Ahmad Nawab - Juwie
MS-05	1989	Isabella	Search	Search - Bob Lokman
MS-06	1990	Janji Manismu	Aishah	Adam Ahmad - Aishah
MS-07	1991	Takdir Dan Waktu	Mega	Rahim Othman - Juwie
MS-08	1992	Pada Syurga Di Wajahmu	Nash	Fauzi Marzuki - Bob Lokman
MS-09	1993	Teratai Layu Di Tasik Madu	Fauziah Latiff	Adam Ahmad - S. Amin Shahab
MS-10	1994	Curiga	Ning Baizura	Jari Idris - Mahzan B.
MS-11	1995	Cinta Beralih Arah	Aishah	Jari Idris - Habsah Hassan
MS-12	1996	Jerat Percintaan	Siti Nurhaliza	Adnan Abu Hassan - Hani M.J. & Othman Zainuddin
MS-13	1997	Naluri	Nora	Johan Nawawi - Johan Nawawi
MS-14	1998	Puncak Kasih	Ziana Zain	Adnan Abu Hassan - Maya Sari
MS-15	1999	Purnama Merindu	Siti Nurhaliza	Azmeer - Likhman S.
MS-16	2000	Kau Kekasihku	Siti Nurhaliza	Ajai - Alam Maya
MS-17	2001	Seandainya Masih Ada Cinta	Dayang Nurfaizah	Ajai - Syad E.N.V.
MS-18	2002	Menadah Gerimis	Ziana Zain	Azmeer - Azmeer
MS-19	2003	Bunga-bunga Cinta	Misha Omar	Adnan Abu Hassan - Adnan Abu Hassan
MS-20	2004	Rela Ku Pujuk	Spider	Tam - Keon
MS-21	2005	Awan Yang Terpilu	Ning Baizura	Lin Li Zhen - Loloq
MS-22	2006	Mungkir Bahagia	Hazami	Hazami - Hazami & Ita
MS-23	2007	Izin Ku Pergi	Kaer Azami	Azlan Abu Hassan - Sulu Sarawak
MS-24	2008	Sampai Syurga	Faizal Tahir	Audi Mok - Faizal Tahir
MS-25	2009	Pergi	Aizat	Pete Teo - Pete Teo & Amran Omar
MS-26	2010	Tolong Ingatkan Aku	Ana Raffali	Ana Raffali - Ana Raffali

Data Code	Year	Title of Poem	Poet	Source / Compilation
MP-01	2009	Kekasih	Usman Awang	http://www.cicinta.com/2009/08/puisi-kekasih-usman-awang.html
MP-02	2011	Tentang Kamu, Su	Kemala	Meditasi Dampak 70 Kemala
MP-03	2003	Kangen	W.S. Rendra	Empat Kumpulan Sajak
MP-04	1966	Mahkota Cinta	Usman Awang	Antologi Puisi Bintang Mengerdip
MP-05	2006	Dapatkah Kudekapmu	Kemala	Ziarah Tanah Kudup
MP-06	n.d.	Ku Panggil Namamu	W.S. Rendra	Dari Blues Untuk Bonie
MP-07	2011	Bisikan Zaitun	Siti Zainon Ismail	Surat Dari Awan 18
MP-08	2011	Keindahan	Huda M Elmatsani	http://www.puisiuntukkekasih.coMPage/4/
MP-09	2011	Dinihari Tiba	Siti Zainon Ismail	Surat Dari Awan 21
MP-10	2011	Tidur Berselimut Rindu	Huda M Elmatsani	http://www.puisiuntukkekasih.coMPage/5/

Appendix A - Profiles of Analyzed Data (English)

Data Code	Year	Title of Song	Performing Artist	Songwriter
ES-01	1986	That's What Friends Are For	Dionne Warwick (and friends)	Burt Bacharach, Carole Bayer Sager
ES-02	1986	On My Own	Patti LaBelle & Michael McDonald	Burt Bacharach, Carole Bayer Sager
ES-03	1987	Livin' on a Prayer	Bon Jovi	Jon Bon Jovi, Richie Sambora, Desmond Child
ES-04	1988	Roll With It	Steve Winwood	Steve Winwood, Will Jennings, Holland-Dozier-Holland
ES-05	1989	Straight Up	Paula Abdul	Elliot Wolff
ES-06	1990	Nothing Compares 2 U	Sinéad O'Connor	Prince
ES-07	1991	(Everything I Do) I Do It for You	Bryan Adams	Bryan Adams, Michael Kamen, Robert Lange
ES-08	1992	End of the Road	Boyz II Men	Charlotte Anning, Babyface, Antonio Reid, Daryl Simmons
ES-09	1993	I Will Always Love You	Whitney Houston	Dolly Parton
ES-10	1994	I'll Make Love to You	Boyz II Men	Babyface
ES-11	1995	Fantasy	Mariah Carey	Mariah Carey, Dave Hall, Adrian Belew, Chris Frantz, Steven Stanley, Tina Weymouth
ES-12	1996	One Sweet Day	Mariah Carey & Boyz II Men	Mariah Carey, Walter Afanasieff, Nathan Morris, Michael McCary, Shawn Stockman, Wanya Morris
ES-13	1997	Something About the Way You Look Tonight	Elton John	Elton John, Bernie Taupin
ES-14	1998	I Don't Want to Miss a Thing	Aerosmith	Diane Warren
ES-15	1999	If You Had My Love	Jennifer Lopez	Rodney Jerkins, LaShawn Daniels, Cory Rooney, Jennifer Lopez
ES-16	2000	Come on Over Baby (All I Want Is You)	Christina Aguilera	Johan Aberg, P. Rein, C. Aguilera, R. Fair, C. Blackmon, R. Cham, E. Dawkins, S. Peiken, G. Roche
ES-17	2001	Fallin'	Alicia Keys	Alicia Keys
ES-18	2002	Foolish	Ashanti	Ashanti, Mark DeBarge, Etterlene Jordan, Irving Lorenzo, Marcus Vest
ES-19	2003	All I Have	Jennifer Lopez (feat. LL Cool J)	Jennifer Lopez, J. Smith, M. Riddick, C. Richardson, Ron G., D. McPherson, L. Peters, W. Jeffrey
ES-20	2004	Burn	Usher	Usher, Jermaine Dupri, Bryan-Michael Cox
ES-21	2005	We Belong Together	Mariah Carey	Mariah Carey, J. Dupri, M. Seal, J. Austin, K. Edmonds, D. Bristol, B. Womack, P. Moten, S. Sully
ES-22	2006	Bad Day	Daniel Powter	Daniel Powter
ES-23	2007	Irreplaceable	Beyoncé	Shaffer Smith, Mikkel Eriksen, Tor Hermansen, Espend Lind, Amund Bjørklund, Beyoncé
ES-24	2008	Bleeding Love	Leona Lewis	Jesse McCartney, Ryan Tedder
ES-25	2009	My Life Would Suck Without You	Kelly Clarkson	Max Martin, Lukasz Gottwald, Claude Kelly, Kelly Clarkson
ES-26	2010	Just the Way You Are	Bruno Mars	Bruno Mars, Philip Lawrence, Ari Levine, Khalil Walton, Khari Cain

Data Code	Year	Title of Poem	Poet	Source / Compilation
EP-01	2001	(untitled)	Gary Young	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2001/award_2/
EP-02	2002	Blue Skies	Shira Dentz	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2002/award/
EP-03	2004	ascension in the initial v	Carol Ciavonne	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2004/award_2/
EP-04	2005	And though she be but little, she is fierce	Lee Upton	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2005/award_2/
EP-05	2006	Valle d'Aosta	Alicia Jones	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2006/award_2/
EP-06	2007	Pier life	Ed Skoog	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2007/award_1/
EP-07	2008	The child's cry is a light that comes on in the house	Wayne Miller	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2008/award_6/
EP-08	2009	Parliament passes The inclosing lands act, 109	Susan Kinsolving	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2009/award_2/
EP-09	2010	Lament	Ira Sadoff	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2010/award_5/
EP-10	2011	The guitar	Patrick Phillips	https://www.poetrysociety.org/psa/awards/annual/winners/2011/award_9/

Appendix B - Catalogue I: Conceptual Metaphors

MS	Malay Song
MP	Malay Poem
ES	English Song
EP	English Poem
MC #	Metaphor Candidate Number (as coded in the datasheets)

NO.	CODE	MC #	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1.	ES-04	63	ABILITIES/SKILLS [TOUCH] <HANDS> ARE LOSABLE OBJECTS	ABILITIES/SKILLS [TOUCH] <HANDS>	OBJECT, LOSABLE - <i>pl.</i>
2.	ES-21	415	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
3.	ES-24	523	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
4.	EP-06	116	AN ACTIVITY IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	ACTIVITY	ROOM/CONTAINER
5.	ES-02	34	AN AFFINITY IS A PLACE/PERSON (TO WHICH/WHOM ONE BELONGS)	AFFINITY	PLACE/PERSON (TO WHICH/WHOM ONE BELONGS)
6.	MS-19	400	AFFLICTIONS [TURBULENCES] ARE DAGGERS	AFFLICTIONS [TURBULENCES]	DAGGERS
7.	MS-19	403	AFFLICTIONS ARE FORCES OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)	AFFLICTIONS	FORCES OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)
8.	MS-19	402	AFFLICTIONS ARE STORMS	AFFLICTIONS	STORMS
9.	MP-07	123	THE AFTERLIFE [ETERNAL LANE] IS THE FINAL DESTINATION	AFTERLIFE [ETERNAL LANE]	DESTINATION, FINAL
10.	MP-05	48	AGE IS A GERMINATED SEED (WITH GRIZZLE AS ITS SPROUTS)	AGE	SEED, GERMINATED (WITH GRIZZLE AS ITS SPROUTS)
11.	MP-05	54	AGE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECOGNIZES)	AGE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECOGNIZES)
12.	MP-09	158	AN AGEING HUMAN BODY IS A FALLING LEAF	HUMAN BODY, AGEING	LEAF, FALLING
13.	MP-05	65	AN ANGEL IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREETES)	ANGEL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREETES)
14.	MP-06	100	ANGER IS A BUNCH OF GRANULES	ANGER	GRANULES, A BUNCH OF
15.	MP-06	99	ANGER IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	ANGER	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
16.	MP-06	98	ANGER IS A REBEL	ANGER	REBEL
17.	MS-26	544	ANGER IS AN EVIL SPIRIT (THAT POSSESSES ONE'S MIND)	ANGER	EVIL SPIRIT (THAT POSSESS ONE'S MIND)
18.	EP-05	58	ANIMALS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO FEEL SORROW)	ANIMALS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO FEELS SORROW) - <i>pl.</i>
19.	MS-11	218	ANSWERS ARE LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECTS	ANSWERS	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) - <i>pl.</i>
20.	MS-05	96	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS [A ROAD] ARE A MAT/RUG/CARPET	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS [ROAD]	MAT/RUG/CARPET
21.	MS-05	97	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS IS A ROAD	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS	ROAD
22.	MS-17	350	ANXIETY AND DISTRESS ARE DEAR/LONG-TIME FRIENDS	ANXIETY AND DISTRESS	FRIENDS, DEAR/LONG-TIME
23.	MS-10	214	ANXIETY AND SUSPICION ARE A SWING	ANXIETY AND SUSPICION	SWING
24.	MS-20	425	ANXIETY IS A FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)	ANXIETY	FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)
25.	MS-22	449	ANXIETY IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)	ANXIETY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)
26.	MS-07	153	ANXIETY IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	ANXIETY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
27.	MP-05	72	ARTS ARE A VICTIM OF WITCHCRAFT	ARTS	VICTIM OF WITCHCRAFT
28.	EP-01	6	ASHES AND BITS OF BONES ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO MOVE)	ASHES AND BITS OF BONES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO MOVES) - <i>pl.</i>
29.	MS-18	361	THE ATMOSPHERE IS WATER	ATMOSPHERE	WATER
30.	ES-03	52	AN ATTEMPT IS A SHOT	ATTEMPT	SHOT
31.	ES-06	127	AN ATTEMPT IS AN OBJECT	ATTEMPT	OBJECT
32.	ES-24	504	AN ATTEMPT IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	ATTEMPT	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
33.	ES-18	308	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE IS PHYSICAL CHANGE	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE	PHYSICAL CHANGE
34.	ES-20	371	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE IS PHYSICAL CHANGE	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE	PHYSICAL CHANGE
35.	ES-12	205	AUDITORY PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	AUDITORY PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
36.	ES-21	408	AUDITORY PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	AUDITORY PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
37.	MS-25	520	AUDITORY PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	AUDITORY PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
38.	EP-06	97	AWARENESS [TRACKS/LINES] IS A STORABLE OBJECT	AWARENESS [TRACKS/LINES]	OBJECT, STORABLE
39.	MS-10	212	AWARENESS IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	AWARENESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
40.	MP-07	114	AZAN (MUSLIM CALL FOR PRAYER) IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAVES)	AZAN (MUSLIM CALL FOR PRAYER)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAVES)

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41.	MS-26	535		BAD MEMORIES (IN RELATIONSHIP) ARE ERASABLE WRITINGS	MEMORIES, BAD (IN RELATIONSHIP)	WRITINGS, ERASABLE
42.	ES-22	454		BAD SITUATION IS A MOVABLE (ROTATABLE) OBJECT	BAD SITUATION	OBJECT, MOVABLE (ROTATABLE)
43.	EP-06	114		BARNACLES ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO REMIND)	BARNACLES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REMINDS) - <i>pl.</i>
44.	ES-14	241		BEING IN LOVE IS A GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION	BEING IN LOVE	GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION
45.	ES-23	475	A	BELIEF/CONVICTION IS A WAGER	BELIEF/CONVICTION	WAGER
46.	EP-05	50		BELLS ARE ANGELS	BELLS	ANGELS
47.	EP-05	51		BELLS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO RISE)	BELLS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES) - <i>pl.</i>
48.	MS-11	223		BETRAYAL IS A GIFT-IN-RETURN	BETRAYAL	GIFT-IN-RETURN
49.	MS-11	222		BETRAYAL IS A POISON	BETRAYAL	POISON
50.	MS-26	533		BLAMES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP) ARE A BREAKABLE SCOREBOARD	BLAMES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP)	SCOREBOARD, BREAKABLE
51.	MS-03	51		BLESSINGS ARE A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)	BLESSINGS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)
52.	MP-07	109		BLESSINGS ARE HARVESTS/CROPS	BLESSINGS	HARVEST/CROPS
53.	MP-07	112		BLESSINGS ARE RAIN	BLESSINGS	RAIN/WATER
54.	MP-07	126		BLESSINGS ARE ZAM-ZAM RAIN/WATER	BLESSINGS	RAIN/WATER, ZAM-ZAM
55.	MS-06	104		BLISS IS A LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	BLISS	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
56.	MS-13	257		BLISS IS A TRANSPORTABLE OBJECT	BLISS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
57.	EP-05	72		BOULDERS ARE A COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS	BOULDERS	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS
58.	EP-07	147		BREATH IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)	BREATH	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)
59.	ES-13	227		BREATH IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	BREATH	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
60.	ES-19	347		CALMNESS IS CHILLNESS	CALMNESS	CHILLNESS
61.	ES-22	456	A	CAMERA IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO DOES NOT LIE)	CAMERA	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO DOES NOT LIE)
62.	EP-04	37		CANARIES ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (OF ANIMIST BELIEF)	CANARIES	HUMAN/PERSON (OF ANIMIST BELIEF) - <i>pl.</i>
63.	EP-04	33	A	CAR IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO AGES)	CAR	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO AGES)
64.	MS-20	410		CARESSES ARE PRISONS	CARESSES	PRISONS
65.	MS-06	103		CHALLENGES (IN LIFE) ARE TURBULENCES	CHALLENGES (IN LIFE)	TURBULENCES
66.	ES-11	187		CHARM IS A SWEET TASTANT	CHARM	TASTANT, SWEET
67.	EP-01	2	A	CHARRING CORPSE <BODY> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SITS)	CORPSE, CHARRING <BODY>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SITS)
68.	EP-01	1	A	CHARRING CORPSE <HEAD> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	CORPSE, CHARRING <HEAD>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
69.	ES-19	324	A	CHOICE IS A PATH	CHOICE	PATH
70.	ES-21	410	A	CHOICE IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	CHOICE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
71.	EP-03	26		CHURCH/RELIGIOUS TUNES ARE COLORING SUBSTANCES	TUNES, CHURCH/RELIGIOUS	SUBSTANCES, COLORING
72.	EP-05	89		CITIES ARE A GROUP OF ISLANDS	CITIES	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
73.	ES-24	499		CLOSED EMOTION <CLOSED VEIN> IS THE CAUSE OF EMOTIONAL CRIPPLING	CLOSED EMOTION <CLOSED VEIN>	CAUSE OF EMOTIONAL CRIPPLING
74.	EP-05	68	THE	CLOUD IS A BINDING OBJECT	CLOUD	OBJECT, BINDING
75.	MP-01	4		CLOUDS ARE AN EMBROIDERY	CLOUDS	EMBROIDERY
76.	EP-06	111		COLDNESS IS DEPTH	COLDNESS	DEPTH
77.	EP-05	86	THE	COLOR BLACK IS CONTAMINATION	COLOR BLACK	CONTAMINATION
78.	MS-14	276		COLORS (OF EMOTIONAL WOUNDS) ARE OVERFLOWING LIQUID	COLORS (OF EMOTIONAL WOUNDS)	LIQUID, OVERFLOWING
79.	MS-05	82		COLORS ARE HEAT	COLORS	HEAT
80.	MS-14	274		COLORS ARE HEAT	COLORS	HEAT
81.	EP-02	13		COLORS/SHADES ARE OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)	COLORS/SHADES	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)
82.	EP-03	29		COMFORT [LIGHT AND HEAT] IS A MOMENTARY FEAST	COMFORT [LIGHT AND HEAT]	FEAST, MOMENTARY
83.	ES-07	138		COMMITMENT IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	COMMITMENT	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
84.	ES-03	55		COMPANIONSHIP <HAND> IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	COMPANIONSHIP <HAND>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
85.	MS-13	259		COMPANIONSHIP <HAND> IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	COMPANIONSHIP <HAND>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
86.	MS-03	44		COMPANIONSHIP IS A LOCATION	COMPANIONSHIP	LOCATION
87.	ES-05	115		CONCEPTUAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	CONCEPTUAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
88.	EP-04	47		CONCEPTUAL SUPPORT IS PHYSICAL SUPPORT	CONCEPTUAL SUPPORT	PHYSICAL SUPPORT
89.	MS-26	534		CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP) ARE SCORES ON A SCOREBOARD	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP)	SCORES ON A SCOREBOARD
90.	MS-22	451		CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP) ARE STINGS	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP)	STINGS

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91.	MS-14	266		CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE) ARE OCEAN CURRENTS	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE)	OCEAN CURRENTS
92.	MS-08	178		CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE) ARE STORMS	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE)	STORMS
93.	ES-08	156		CONFUSED MINDS ARE SPINNING WHEELS	MINDS, CONFUSED	WHEELS, SPINNING
94.	ES-05	92		CONFUSION IS A GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION	CONFUSION	GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION
95.	EP-07	133	A	CRY (OF A CHILD) IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH GREAT STRENGTH)	CRY (OF A CHILD)	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH GREAT STRENGTH)
96.	EP-07	126	A	CRY (OF A CHILD) IS A LIGHT	CRY (OF A CHILD)	LIGHT
97.	EP-07	141	A	CRY IS A (SWINGING) PENDULUM	CRY	PENDULUM (SWINGING)
98.	EP-07	129	A	CRY IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECEIVES)	CRY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECEIVES)
99.	EP-07	148	A	CRY IS A PUSHABLE OBJECT	CRY	OBJECT, PUSHABLE
100.	EP-07	145	A	CRY IS AN EMERGING OBJECT	CRY	OBJECT, EMERGING
101.	EP-07	142	A	CRY IS AN ESCAPEE (OUT OF A CHILD'S BODY)	CRY	ESCAPEE (OUT OF A CHILD'S BODY)
102.	EP-07	151	A	CRY IS EARTH/SOIL	CRY	EARTH/SOIL
103.	EP-07	139	A	CRY IS FURNITURE (THAT FILLS THE WHOLE HOUSE)	CRY	FURNITURE (THAT FILLS THE WHOLE HOUSE)
104.	EP-07	143	A	CRY IS WATER/FLOOD	CRY	WATER/FLOOD
105.	MS-01	3		CRYING/LAMENTING IS A 3-DIMENSIONAL OBJECT	CRYING/LAMENTING	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL
106.	MP-06	82		CULTURAL TRADITIONS ARE A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH A NERVE DISEASE)	CULTURAL TRADITIONS	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH A NERVE DISEASE)
107.	MP-06	81		CULTURAL TRADITIONS ARE AN AUTHORITY (THAT IS REBELLED AGAINST)	CULTURAL TRADITIONS	AUTHORITY (THAT IS REBELLED AGAINST)
108.	MS-05	69	A	CULTURE IS A WORLD	CULTURE	WORLD
109.	EP-04	36		CURSING IS A SONGLINE	CURSING	SONGLINE
110.	MP-09	163		CURTAINS ARE DOORS	CURTAINS	DOORS
111.	EP-07	134		DARKNESS IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	DARKNESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
112.	ES-11	193		DAYDREAMS ARE AN OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	DAYDREAMS	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
113.	EP-06	121	A	DEAD FISH IS A BOXER (WITH A BADLY PUNCHED FACE)	FISH, DEAD	BOXER (WITH A BADLY PUNCHED FACE)
114.	MP-09	167		DEATH [TIME] <TICKING OF A CLOCK> IS A MOVING OBJECT	DEATH [TIME] <TICKING OF A CLOCK>	OBJECT, MOVING
115.	EP-02	17		DEATH <CORPSE> IS A FLAG	DEATH <CORPSE>	FLAG
116.	ES-01	3		DEATH IS A DEPARTURE	DEATH	DEPARTURE
117.	MP-07	135		DEATH IS A DEPARTURE	DEATH	DEPARTURE
118.	EP-03	30		DEATH IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS GRACEFUL)	DEATH	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS GRACEFUL)
119.	EP-03	31		DEATH IS BLOOD (<LEECH>ING OUT OF THE LEAVES)	DEATH	BLOOD (<LEECH>ING OUT OF THE LEAVES)
120.	MP-09	168		DEATH IS INACTIVITY OF VISUAL AND SPEECH ORGANS	DEATH	INACTIVITY OF VISUAL AND SPEECH ORGANS
121.	ES-12	209		DECEASED FRIENDS ARE LOST OBJECTS	FRIENDS, DECEASED	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>
122.	ES-19	352		DECEPTION IS A GAME	DECEPTION	GAME
123.	EP-04	45	A	DECIMAL POINT IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)	DECIMAL POINT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)
124.	ES-19	323		DECISIONS ARE MADE/CREATED OBJECTS	DECISIONS	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
125.	MS-20	417	A	DECLARATION (OF LOVE) IS ROYALTY	DECLARATION (OF LOVE)	ROYALTY
126.	ES-05	114		DEMANDS ARE MADE/CREATED OBJECTS	DEMANDS	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
127.	EP-06	110		DEPTH IS (EXTREME) COLDNESS	DEPTH	COLDNESS (EXTREME)
128.	MP-05	52		DESPAIR IS A DIM LIGHT	DESPAIR	LIGHT, DIM
129.	MS-22	462		DESPAIR IS AN OCEAN WAVE	DESPAIR	OCEAN WAVE
130.	EP-09	173	THE	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS IS A (RAPID) DOWNWARD MOVEMENT	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
131.	ES-17	272	THE	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS IS A (RAPID) DOWNWARD MOVEMENT	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
132.	ES-17	275	THE	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS IS A (RAPID) DOWNWARD MOVEMENT	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
133.	ES-24	513	THE	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS IS A (RAPID) DOWNWARD MOVEMENT	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
134.	ES-24	515	THE	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS IS A RAPID MOVEMENT <RUSH>	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, RAPID <RUSH>
135.	MS-14	268	A	DEW IS A FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) OBJECT	DEW	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE)
136.	MS-15	298	A	DEW IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	DEW	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
137.	ES-22	463		DIFFICULTIES (IN LIFE) ARE SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS	DIFFICULTIES (IN LIFE)	SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
138.	ES-04	70		DIFFICULTIES ARE A TUNNEL	DIFFICULTIES	TUNNEL
139.	ES-03	46	A	DIFFICULTY IS THE QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
140.	ES-04	64	A	DIFFICULTY IS THE QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH

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141.	ES-05	109	A	DIFFICULTY IS THE QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
142.	ES-06	126	A	DIFFICULTY IS THE QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
143.	ES-21	416	A	DIFFICULTY IS THE QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
144.	ES-24	505	A	DIFFICULTY IS THE QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
145.	ES-24	524	A	DIFFICULTY IS THE QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
146.	MS-01	1		DIRECTIONS ARE FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) OBJECTS	DIRECTIONS	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) - <i>pl.</i>
147.	MS-11	234		DIRECTIONS ARE MOVABLE OBJECTS	DIRECTIONS	OBJECT, MOVABLE - <i>pl.</i>
148.	MS-26	545		DISAPPOINTMENTS ARE SHROUDS	DISAPPOINTMENTS	SHROUDS
149.	EP-08	160		DISCOMFORT IS HELL	DISCOMFORT	HELL
150.	EP-04	38		DISTANCE <HEIGHT> IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)	DISTANCE <HEIGHT>	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)
151.	EP-06	104		DISTANCE IS A LOCATION	DISTANCE	LOCATION
152.	EP-09	179		DISTANCE IS COLDNESS	DISTANCE	COLDNESS
153.	ES-20	395	A	DIVIDED PART <SIDE> OF THE SELF IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)	DIVIDED PART <SIDE> OF THE SELF	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)
154.	EP-04	44		DOMINION IS A GRASPABLE OBJECT	DOMINION	OBJECT, GRASPABLE
155.	ES-24	511		DOUBT IS A (FILL-IN) SUBSTANCE	DOUBT	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
156.	ES-05	93	A	DREAM [AN UNKNOWN/UNFAMILIAR LOCATION] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAM [AN UNKNOWN/UNFAMILIAR LOCATION]	ROOM/CONTAINER
157.	ES-14	236	A	DREAM IS A REMOTE PLACE	DREAM	PLACE, REMOTE
158.	EP-07	146	A	DREAM IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAM	ROOM/CONTAINER
159.	MS-21	438	A	DREAMER IS A BIRD	DREAMER	BIRD
160.	MP-10	175		DREAMS ARE A ROOM (THAT IS ADJACENT TO REALITY)	DREAMS	ROOM (THAT IS ADJACENT TO REALITY)
161.	MS-09	192		DREAMS ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAMS	ROOM/CONTAINER
162.	MS-13	261		DREAMS ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAMS	ROOM/CONTAINER
163.	MP-01	11		DREAMS ARE ENUMERABLE OBJECTS	DREAMS	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
164.	MS-23	478		DREAMS ARE FLOWERS	DREAMS	FLOWERS
165.	ES-14	246		DREAMS ARE SWEET TASTANTS	DREAMS	TASTANTS, SWEET
166.	MS-23	477		DREAMS ARE TRANSPORTABLE OBJECTS	DREAMS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
167.	EP-06	93		DRIED FISH ARE ACTORS	FISH, DRIED	ACTORS
168.	MS-08	168		DROUGHT IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	DROUGHT	ROOM/CONTAINER
169.	MP-01	6		EAST/MORNING STAR [FLOWER] IS A BROOCH	STAR, EAST/MORNING [FLOWER]	BROOCH
170.	MP-01	7	THE	ECLIPSED MOON [FRUIT] IS A LAMP	MOON, ECLIPSED [FRUIT]	LAMP
171.	EP-08	157	THE	ECONOMY IS A COMPETITION	ECONOMY	COMPETITION
172.	EP-03	25		EFFECTS OF MORPHINE <MORPHINE> ARE A (FILL-IN) SUBSTANCE	EFFECTS OF MORPHINE <MORPHINE>	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
173.	EP-06	120		EMBARRASSMENT IS A HAT	EMBARRASSMENT	HAT
174.	EP-06	119		EMBARRASSMENT IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)	EMBARRASSMENT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)
175.	EP-10	187	AN	EMBRACE <ARMS> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMBRACE <ARMS>	ROOM/CONTAINER
176.	MP-08	149	AN	EMBRACE IS A NECKLACE	EMBRACE	NECKLACE
177.	MS-03	46		EMOTION (CENTER OF) IS THE SMALLEST PART OF THE <LIVER>	EMOTION (CENTER OF)	SMALLEST PART OF THE <LIVER>
178.	MS-15	293		EMOTION [FULL MOON] IS A FLOATING OBJECT	EMOTION [FULL MOON]	OBJECT, FLOATING
179.	MS-18	372		EMOTION [GAZE] IS A DEITY	EMOTION [GAZE]	DEITY
180.	MS-18	371		EMOTION [GAZE] IS A SHARP AND LONG OBJECT	EMOTION [GAZE]	OBJECT, SHARP AND LONG
181.	MP-10	181		EMOTION [WORDS] IS A CHILD (BEING TUCKED INTO BED)	EMOTION [WORDS]	CHILD (BEING TUCKED INTO BED)
182.	MP-10	182		EMOTION [WORDS] IS A FLOWER	EMOTION [WORDS]	FLOWER
183.	MP-10	184		EMOTION [WORDS] IS A FRAGILE (CRUMBLING) OBJECT	EMOTION [WORDS]	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)
184.	MP-10	180		EMOTION [WORDS] IS THE CREATOR OF HEAVEN	EMOTION [WORDS]	CREATOR OF HEAVEN
185.	MS-07	140		EMOTION <CHEST> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <CHEST>	ROOM/CONTAINER
186.	MS-07	138		EMOTION <CHEST> IS A SCRATCHED SURFACE	EMOTION <CHEST>	SURFACE, SCRATCHED
187.	MS-07	139		EMOTION <CHEST> IS SKIN	EMOTION <CHEST>	SKIN
188.	MP-10	173		EMOTION <CHEST> IS THE FLOOR/GROUND	EMOTION <CHEST>	FLOOR/GROUND
189.	ES-24	498		EMOTION <HEART> IS A (CRIPPLED) LIMB	EMOTION <HEART>	LIMB (CRIPPLED)
190.	MS-26	541		EMOTION <HEART> IS A CLOCK (WITH LOUD TICKINGS)	EMOTION <HEART>	CLOCK (WITH LOUD TICKINGS)

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191.	ES-13	234	EMOTION <HEART> IS A DEEP OCEAN	EMOTION <HEART>	OCEAN, DEEP
192.	MP-10	177	EMOTION <HEART> IS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE	EMOTION <HEART>	LANGUAGE, FOREIGN
193.	ES-21	427	EMOTION <HEART> IS A FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) OBJECT	EMOTION <HEART>	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE)
194.	ES-18	289	EMOTION <HEART> IS A HUMAN/PERSON	EMOTION <HEART>	HUMAN/PERSON
195.	ES-08	171	EMOTION <HEART> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	EMOTION <HEART>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)
196.	ES-02	38	EMOTION <HEART> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)	EMOTION <HEART>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)
197.	ES-01	14	EMOTION <HEART> IS A LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	EMOTION <HEART>	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
198.	ES-20	365	EMOTION <HEART> IS A LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	EMOTION <HEART>	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
199.	ES-18	313	EMOTION <HEART> IS A PAPER/CLOTH	EMOTION <HEART>	PAPER/CLOTH
200.	ES-02	16	EMOTION <HEART> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <HEART>	ROOM/CONTAINER
201.	ES-07	134	EMOTION <HEART> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <HEART>	ROOM/CONTAINER
202.	ES-07	130	EMOTION <HEART> IS A SEARCHABLE PLACE	EMOTION <HEART>	PLACE, SEARCHABLE
203.	ES-08	150	EMOTION <HEART> IS A TOY	EMOTION <HEART>	TOY
204.	ES-18	312	EMOTION <HEART> IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	EMOTION <HEART>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
205.	ES-08	148	EMOTION <HEART> IS AN INSTRUMENT	EMOTION <HEART>	INSTRUMENT
206.	ES-24	492	EMOTION <HEART> IS ICE MELTED INTO WATER	EMOTION <HEART>	ICE MELTED INTO WATER
207.	MP-05	68	EMOTION <LIVER> [SILK] IS A VIBRATING OBJECT	EMOTION <LIVER> [SILK]	OBJECT, VIBRATING
208.	MS-20	427	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A BUILDING (ON FIRE)	EMOTION <LIVER>	BUILDING (ON FIRE)
209.	MS-04	63	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A CAPTIVE	EMOTION <LIVER>	CAPTIVE
210.	MS-20	407	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A CHANGEABLE OBJECT	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE
211.	MS-07	125	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A CITY	EMOTION <LIVER>	CITY
212.	MS-07	128	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A CITY	EMOTION <LIVER>	CITY
213.	MS-07	147	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A CITY	EMOTION <LIVER>	CITY
214.	MS-13	262	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A DEEP OCEAN	EMOTION <LIVER>	OCEAN, DEEP
215.	MS-18	370	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A DEEP OCEAN	EMOTION <LIVER>	OCEAN, DEEP
216.	MP-06	91	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A FLESH (OF A PREY)	EMOTION <LIVER>	FLESH (OF A PREY)
217.	MP-07	129	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A FLOWER	EMOTION <LIVER>	FLOWER
218.	MS-07	129	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HOST	EMOTION <LIVER>	HOST
219.	MS-08	170	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON
220.	MS-04	64	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CRIES)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CRIES)
221.	MS-24	501	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)
222.	MS-14	271	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)
223.	MS-01	8	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)
224.	MS-19	382	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)
225.	MP-05	58	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS YOUNG AND HANDSOME)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS YOUNG AND HANDSOME)
226.	MS-06	110	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REMEMBERS)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REMEMBERS)
227.	MS-21	436	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)
228.	MS-01	16	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
229.	MS-03	45	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
230.	MS-06	121	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
231.	MS-07	150	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
232.	MS-08	172	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
233.	MS-08	187	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
234.	MS-15	296	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
235.	MS-17	354	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
236.	MS-24	496	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
237.	MS-20	409	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A PRISONER	EMOTION <LIVER>	PRISONER
238.	MS-01	17	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER
239.	MS-05	94	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER
240.	MS-14	270	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER

NO.	CODE	MC #	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
241.	MS-15	290	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER
242.	MS-04	62	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR AND A LOCK)	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR AND A LOCK)
243.	MS-05	95	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
244.	MS-20	408	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A SLAVE	EMOTION <LIVER>	SLAVE
245.	MP-04	42	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A SUBMERGED OBJECT	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT, SUBMERGED
246.	MS-17	341	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A THINLY SLICED OBJECT	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT, THINLY SLICED
247.	MS-16	318	EMOTION <LIVER> IS A VISUAL ORGAN	EMOTION <LIVER>	ORGAN, VISUAL
248.	MS-17	355	EMOTION <LIVER> IS AN ENGRAVED PLATE	EMOTION <LIVER>	ENGRAVED PLATE
249.	MS-18	367	EMOTION <LIVER> IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)
250.	MP-05	67	EMOTION <LIVER> IS SILK	EMOTION <LIVER>	SILK
251.	MS-01	9	EMOTION <LIVER> IS SKIN	EMOTION <LIVER>	SKIN
252.	MS-16	317	EMOTION <LIVER> IS SKIN	EMOTION <LIVER>	SKIN
253.	MS-06	109	EMOTION <LIVER> IS WATER TURNED INTO ICE	EMOTION <LIVER>	WATER TURNED INTO ICE
254.	ES-03	57	EMOTION IS A GRASPABLE OBJECT	EMOTION	OBJECT, GRASPABLE
255.	ES-18	315	EMOTION IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)	EMOTION	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)
256.	MP-10	178	EMOTION IS A LANGUAGE	EMOTION	LANGUAGE
257.	MS-23	485	EMOTION IS A LOCATION	EMOTION	LOCATION
258.	MS-15	305	EMOTION IS A MOUNTAIN	EMOTION	MOUNTAIN
259.	MS-07	154	EMOTION IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION	ROOM/CONTAINER
260.	MS-06	118	EMOTION IS A THINLY SLICED OBJECT	EMOTION	OBJECT, THINLY SLICED
261.	MS-07	145	EMOTION IS A VICTIM OF STABBING	EMOTION	VICTIM OF STABBING
262.	ES-13	229	EMOTION IS AN OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	EMOTION	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
263.	ES-20	379	EMOTION IS AN OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	EMOTION	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
264.	ES-21	425	EMOTION IS AN OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	EMOTION	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
265.	ES-21	436	EMOTION IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)	EMOTION	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)
266.	ES-20	355	EMOTION IS SKIN	EMOTION	SKIN
267.	ES-20	391	EMOTION IS SKIN	EMOTION	SKIN
268.	ES-24	526	EMOTION IS SKIN	EMOTION	SKIN
269.	MS-04	54	EMOTION IS SKIN/HAIR	EMOTION	SKIN/HAIR
270.	MS-06	113	EMOTION IS SKIN/HAIR	EMOTION	SKIN/HAIR
271.	ES-21	406	EMOTION/FEELING IS A TACTILE STIMULUS	EMOTION/FEELING	TACTILE STIMULUS
272.	ES-18	301	EMOTIONAL ACCEPTANCE IS PHYSICAL ACCEPTANCE	EMOTIONAL ACCEPTANCE	PHYSICAL ACCEPTANCE
273.	ES-22	444	EMOTIONAL BAGGAGE IS PHYSICAL BAGGAGE	EMOTIONAL BAGGAGE	PHYSICAL BAGGAGE
274.	MS-06	115	EMOTIONAL BRUTALITY IS PHYSICAL BRUTALITY	EMOTIONAL BRUTALITY	PHYSICAL BRUTALITY
275.	MS-14	284	EMOTIONAL CAPACITY IS PHYSICAL/FINANCIAL CAPACITY	EMOTIONAL CAPACITY	PHYSICAL/FINANCIAL CAPACITY
276.	ES-22	457	EMOTIONAL COLLAPSE IS PHYSICAL COLLAPSE	EMOTIONAL COLLAPSE	PHYSICAL COLLAPSE
277.	ES-15	253	EMOTIONAL COMFORT IS PHYSICAL COMFORT	EMOTIONAL COMFORT	PHYSICAL COMFORT
278.	ES-18	307	EMOTIONAL CONDITION IS PHYSICAL CONDITION	EMOTIONAL CONDITION	PHYSICAL CONDITION
279.	ES-19	348	EMOTIONAL CONSOLATION IS PHYSICAL CONSOLATION	EMOTIONAL CONSOLATION	PHYSICAL CONSOLATION
280.	ES-06	117	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
281.	ES-06	124	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
282.	ES-08	153	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
283.	ES-09	176	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
284.	ES-18	305	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
285.	ES-18	310	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
286.	ES-18	314	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
287.	ES-19	320	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
288.	ES-21	412	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
289.	MS-23	476	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE IS PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
290.	ES-05	95	EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IS PHYSICAL MOVEMENT	EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT	PHYSICAL MOVEMENT

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291.	ES-25	540	EMOTIONAL DISCOVERY IS PHYSICAL DISCOVERY	EMOTIONAL DISCOVERY	PHYSICAL DISCOVERY
292.	MS-01	15	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
293.	MS-06	120	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
294.	MS-10	208	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
295.	MS-22	458	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
296.	MS-05	70	EMOTIONAL ENCOUNTER IS PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER	EMOTIONAL ENCOUNTER	PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER
297.	MS-07	148	EMOTIONAL ENERGY IS PHYSICAL ENERGY	EMOTIONAL ENERGY	PHYSICAL ENERGY
298.	MS-10	203	EMOTIONAL EXCLUSION IS PHYSICAL EXCLUSION	EMOTIONAL EXCLUSION	PHYSICAL EXCLUSION
299.	MS-26	538	EMOTIONAL HEALING IS PHYSICAL HEALING	EMOTIONAL HEALING	PHYSICAL HEALING
300.	ES-22	446	EMOTIONAL IMPACT IS PHYSICAL IMPACT	EMOTIONAL IMPACT	PHYSICAL IMPACT
301.	ES-08	167	EMOTIONAL INJURY IS PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
302.	ES-18	309	EMOTIONAL INJURY IS PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
303.	ES-20	362	EMOTIONAL INJURY IS PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
304.	MP-06	104	EMOTIONAL INJURY IS PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
305.	EP-09	181	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS IS PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
306.	ES-12	214	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS IS PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
307.	ES-14	245	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS IS PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
308.	ES-25	545	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS IS PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
309.	ES-05	104	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY IS PHYSICAL MOBILITY	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY	PHYSICAL MOBILITY
310.	MS-12	252	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY IS PHYSICAL MOBILITY	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY	PHYSICAL MOBILITY
311.	ES-21	434	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN] IS A REFLECTING IMAGE	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	IMAGE, REFLECTING
312.	ES-08	168	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	ROOM/CONTAINER
313.	ES-08	172	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN] IS A TACTILE STIMULUS	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	TACTILE STIMULUS
314.	ES-20	386	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN] IS A TACTILE STIMULUS	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	TACTILE STIMULUS
315.	ES-08	169	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN] IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
316.	ES-17	282	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN] IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
317.	ES-08	155	EMOTIONAL PAIN IS PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
318.	ES-18	287	EMOTIONAL PAIN IS PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
319.	ES-20	374	EMOTIONAL PAIN IS PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
320.	ES-24	486	EMOTIONAL PAIN IS PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
321.	MS-01	5	EMOTIONAL PAIN IS PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
322.	MS-24	502	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS] ARE A MAT/RUG/CARPET	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS]	MAT/RUG/CARPET
323.	EP-05	83	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS] ARE AN OCEAN	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS]	OCEAN
324.	MS-07	143	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS IS PHYSICAL PARALYSIS	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS	PHYSICAL PARALYSIS
325.	MS-07	142	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS IS VERBAL PARALYSIS	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS	VERBAL PARALYSIS
326.	ES-21	421	EMOTIONAL PLACE [PHYSICAL PLACE] IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	EMOTIONAL PLACE [PHYSICAL PLACE]	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
327.	ES-02	33	EMOTIONAL PLACE IS PHYSICAL PLACE	EMOTIONAL PLACE	PHYSICAL PLACE
328.	ES-06	120	EMOTIONAL PLACE IS PHYSICAL PLACE	EMOTIONAL PLACE	PHYSICAL PLACE
329.	MS-22	456	EMOTIONAL PLACE IS PHYSICAL PLACE	EMOTIONAL PLACE	PHYSICAL PLACE
330.	ES-02	22	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
331.	ES-02	31	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
332.	ES-06	119	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
333.	ES-08	163	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
334.	ES-08	165	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
335.	ES-14	248	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
336.	ES-18	288	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
337.	ES-19	325	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
338.	ES-19	329	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
339.	ES-20	380	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
340.	ES-24	491	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE

NO.	CODE	MC #	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
341.	ES-25	542	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
342.	ES-25	543	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
343.	MS-03	42	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
344.	MS-04	66	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
345.	MS-04	68	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
346.	MS-06	108	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
347.	MS-11	216	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
348.	MS-13	258	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
349.	MS-13	260	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
350.	MS-15	299	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
351.	MS-16	326	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
352.	MS-16	327	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
353.	MS-16	328	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
354.	MS-17	348	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
355.	MS-18	374	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
356.	MS-19	396	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
357.	MS-20	423	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
358.	MS-20	424	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
359.	MS-24	493	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
360.	MS-24	499	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
361.	MS-26	540	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
362.	ES-24	497	EMOTIONAL PREVENTION IS PHYSICAL PREVENTION	EMOTIONAL PREVENTION	PHYSICAL PREVENTION
363.	ES-20	370	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS ARE MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS	MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS
364.	ES-21	432	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS ARE MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS	MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS
365.	MS-08	186	EMOTIONAL PUNISHMENTS ARE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENTS	EMOTIONAL PUNISHMENTS	PHYSICAL PUNISHMENTS
366.	ES-19	344	EMOTIONAL REUNIFICATION IS PHYSICAL REUNIFICATION	EMOTIONAL REUNIFICATION	PHYSICAL REUNIFICATION
367.	ES-07	139	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE IS PHYSICAL SACRIFICE	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE	PHYSICAL SACRIFICE
368.	MS-12	248	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE IS PHYSICAL SACRIFICE	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE	PHYSICAL SACRIFICE
369.	ES-24	525	EMOTIONAL SCARS [PHYSICAL SCARS] ARE CLOTHES	EMOTIONAL SCARS [PHYSICAL SCARS]	CLOTHES
370.	MS-03	41	EMOTIONAL SHELTER IS PHYSICAL SHELTER	EMOTIONAL SHELTER	PHYSICAL SHELTER
371.	ES-02	35	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
372.	ES-18	304	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
373.	ES-22	466	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
374.	MS-04	58	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
375.	MS-07	127	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
376.	MS-24	498	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
377.	MS-01	12	EMOTIONAL STURDINESS IS PHYSICAL STURDINESS	EMOTIONAL STURDINESS	PHYSICAL STURDINESS
378.	MS-23	484	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING] IS A HEAVY LOAD	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING]	LOAD, HEAVY
379.	MS-17	351	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING] IS A HUMAN/PERSON	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING]	HUMAN/PERSON
380.	MS-02	25	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING IS PHYSICAL SUFFERING	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING	PHYSICAL SUFFERING
381.	ES-01	9	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT [EMOTIONAL PRESENCE] IS PHYSICAL SUPPORT	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT [EMOTIONAL PRESENCE]	PHYSICAL SUPPORT
382.	ES-21	418	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT IS PHYSICAL SUPPORT	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT	PHYSICAL SUPPORT
383.	MP-03	26	EMOTIONAL TORMENT IS PHYSICAL TORMENT	EMOTIONAL TORMENT	PHYSICAL TORMENT
384.	MS-04	57	EMOTIONAL TORMENT IS PHYSICAL TORMENT	EMOTIONAL TORMENT	PHYSICAL TORMENT
385.	MS-07	141	EMOTIONAL TORMENT IS PHYSICAL TORMENT	EMOTIONAL TORMENT	PHYSICAL TORMENT
386.	MS-08	171	EMOTIONAL TORMENTS ARE PHYSICAL TORMENTS	EMOTIONAL TORMENTS	PHYSICAL TORMENTS
387.	ES-18	292	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT IS PHYSICAL TREATMENT	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT	PHYSICAL TREATMENT
388.	ES-19	318	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT IS PHYSICAL TREATMENT	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT	PHYSICAL TREATMENT
389.	ES-18	306	EMOTIONAL WEAKNESS IS PHYSICAL WEAKNESS	EMOTIONAL WEAKNESS	PHYSICAL WEAKNESS
390.	MS-23	483	EMOTIONAL WEIGHT IS PHYSICAL WEIGHT	EMOTIONAL WEIGHT	PHYSICAL WEIGHT

NO.	CODE	MC #		CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
391.	MS-02	22		EMOTIONAL WOUND IS PHYSICAL WOUND	EMOTIONAL WOUND	PHYSICAL WOUND
392.	MS-04	56		EMOTIONAL WOUND IS PHYSICAL WOUND	EMOTIONAL WOUND	PHYSICAL WOUND
393.	MS-26	537		EMOTIONAL WOUND IS PHYSICAL WOUND	EMOTIONAL WOUND	PHYSICAL WOUND
394.	MS-14	277		EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS] ARE COLORFUL OBJECTS	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS]	OBJECT, COLORFUL - <i>pl.</i>
395.	MP-03	23		EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS] ARE HUMANS/PERSONS	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS]	HUMAN/PERSON - <i>pl.</i>
396.	MP-03	22		EMOTIONAL WOUNDS ARE PHYSICAL WOUNDS	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS	PHYSICAL WOUNDS
397.	MP-06	105		EMOTIONAL WOUNDS ARE PHYSICAL WOUNDS	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS	PHYSICAL WOUNDS
398.	ES-05	98		END OF A (SHORT-LIVED) ROMANCE IS A SLAMMING DOOR	END OF ROMANCE (SHORT-LIVED)	DOOR, SLAMMING
399.	ES-20	372		END OF A RELATIONSHIP IS THE END OF A (SHARED) JOURNEY	END OF RELATIONSHIP	END OF A (SHARED) JOURNEY
400.	ES-24	520		ENERGY IS WATER	ENERGY	WATER
401.	ES-22	442		ENTHUSIASM [BRIGHTNESS] <BLUE SKY> IS A COLOR (THAT FADES AWAY)	ENTHUSIASM [BLUE SKY] <BRIGHTNESS>	COLOR (THAT FADES AWAY)
402.	EP-09	178		ESTRANGED LOVERS ARE LANDS (SEPARATED BY BODIES OF WATER)	LOVERS, ESTRANGED	LANDS (SEPARATED BY BODIES OF WATER)
403.	EP-06	123	AN	EVENT [A BOUNDED SPACE] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	EVENT [BOUNDED SPACE]	ROOM/CONTAINER
404.	ES-05	106	AN	EXCITEMENT IS A SENSATION OF EXTREME COLDNESS	EXCITEMENT	SENSATION OF EXTREME COLDNESS
405.	ES-08	161	AN	EXPERIENCE IS A LOCATION	EXPERIENCE	LOCATION
406.	MS-23	472	THE	EYES [LIGHTS] ARE A NARRATOR	EYES [LIGHTS]	NARRATOR
407.	MP-04	38	THE	EYES ARE THE STARS	EYES	STARS
408.	MP-05	70		FAITH (IN GOD) IS A LIFEBOAT	FAITH (IN GOD)	LIFEBOAT
409.	ES-02	39		FAITH IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	FAITH	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
410.	MS-11	237		FAITH/PRAYER IS A REMEDY	FAITH/PRAYER	REMEDY
411.	MS-22	469		FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY IS A GRASPED OBJECT	FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY	OBJECT, GRASPED
412.	MS-14	272		FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY IS A VALUABLE OBJECT	FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY	OBJECT, VALUABLE
413.	MP-10	176	A	FALL IS A BEDROOM	FALL	BEDROOM
414.	MP-04	35	A	FAMILY IS A FARM	FAMILY	FARM
415.	MS-06	112		FANTASIES ARE BALL-THROWERS/-PLAYERS	FANTASIES	BALL-THROWERS/-PLAYERS
416.	ES-11	192	A	FANTASY IS A SWEET TASTANT	FANTASY	TASTANT, SWEET
417.	MP-09	162		FATE [WIND] IS A LETTER/DECREE	FATE [WIND]	LETTER/DECREE
418.	MS-16	337		FATE <DIVINE CALLING> IS AN AUTHORITY	FATE <DIVINE CALLING>	AUTHORITY
419.	MS-08	165		FATE IS A GIVEN INSCRIPTION	FATE	INSCRIPTION, GIVEN
420.	MP-09	164		FATE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (OF FAITH AND PIETY)	FATE	HUMAN/PERSON (OF FAITH AND PIETY)
421.	MS-08	166		FATE IS A TEST	FATE	TEST
422.	MS-06	107		FATE IS AN INSCRIPTION	FATE	INSCRIPTION
423.	MS-07	133		FATE IS AN INSCRIPTION	FATE	INSCRIPTION
424.	MP-03	27		FEAR IS A (FILL-IN) SUBSTANCE	FEAR	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
425.	ES-13	228	A	FEELING [A TACTILE SENSATION] IS A RECEIVABLE OBJECT	FEELING [TACTILE SENSATION]	OBJECT, RECEIVABLE
426.	ES-20	376	A	FEELING IS A TACTILE SENSATION	FEELING	TACTILE SENSATION
427.	ES-20	384	A	FEELING IS A TACTILE SENSATION	FEELING	TACTILE SENSATION
428.	ES-21	437	A	FEELING IS A TACTILE SENSATION	FEELING	TACTILE SENSATION
429.	MS-12	253		FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS] ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS]	ROOM/CONTAINER
430.	MS-09	190		FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS] ARE CHANGEABLE OBJECTS	FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS]	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE - <i>pl.</i>
431.	ES-01	1		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
432.	ES-01	4		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
433.	ES-11	201		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
434.	ES-17	274		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
435.	ES-17	278		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
436.	ES-18	302		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
437.	ES-20	357		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
438.	ES-20	387		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
439.	ES-21	407		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
440.	ES-21	430		FEELINGS ARE TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS

NO.	CODE	MC #		CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
441.	EP-08	152	A	FIELD IS A ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	FIELD	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
442.	EP-08	163	A	FIELD, FARM, AND FOREST ARE (EACH) A CLOSED ROOM/CONTAINER	FIELD, FARM, AND FOREST	ROOM/CONTAINER, CLOSED
443.	ES-25	536	A	FIGHT IS AN OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)	FIGHT	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)
444.	EP-07	132		FILAMENTS ARE A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO QUIVERS)	FILAMENTS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO QUIVERS)
445.	MP-08	151		FIRE IS A FLOWER	FIRE	FLOWER
446.	EP-01	3		FIRE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	FIRE	ROOM/CONTAINER
447.	EP-01	5	A	FLAME IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)	FLAME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)
448.	EP-04	41		FLEAS ARE (STRONG AND BRAVE) WARRIORS	FLEAS	WARRIORS (STRONG AND BRAVE)
449.	EP-01	4		FLESH IS (LAYERS OF) SKIN	FLESH	SKIN (LAYERS OF)
450.	MP-07	110	A	FLOCK OF SEAGULLS IS A COMMUNITY OF PEOPLE	SEAGULLS (A FLOCK OF)	PEOPLE (A COMMUNITY OF)
451.	MP-10	183		FLOWERS ARE STARS	FLOWERS	STARS
452.	MP-01	1		FOAMS ARE ROPES	FOAMS	ROPES
453.	EP-05	71	A	FOG IS A BUILDING	FOG	BUILDING
454.	EP-05	66	A	FOG IS A HEAVY OBJECT	FOG	OBJECT, HEAVY
455.	EP-05	67	A	FOG IS A TROOP OF SOLDIERS	FOG	SOLDIERS, A TROOP OF
456.	MS-10	199		FONDNESS IS A PICTURE	FONDNESS	PICTURE
457.	MS-05	84		FORGETFULNESS IS FALLING ASLEEP	FORGETFULNESS	FALLING ASLEEP
458.	MS-10	213		FORGETFULNESS IS FALLING ASLEEP	FORGETFULNESS	FALLING ASLEEP
459.	MS-25	523		FORGETTING ONE'S BELOVED IS A HEAVY LOAD	FORGETTING ONE'S BELOVED	LOAD, HEAVY
460.	EP-05	77	A	FORM <OBJECT> IS AN ATTIRE	FORM <OBJECT>	ATTIRE
461.	MP-08	139		FRAGRANCE (OF A ROSE) IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	FRAGRANCE (OF A ROSE)	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
462.	ES-19	333		FULFILLING ONE'S PROMISES IS A HAVING MOVED THROUGH A TUNNEL	FULFILLING ONE'S PROMISES	HAVING MOVED THROUGH A TUNNEL
463.	MS-15	307	THE	FULL MOON IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)	MOON, FULL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)
464.	ES-06	123		FUN/PLEASURE IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	FUN/PLEASURE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
465.	MS-03	50	THE	FUTURE IS A LOCATION (AHEAD OF US)	FUTURE	LOCATION (AHEAD OF US)
466.	MP-07	130		GOD <SEJADAH> (MUSLIM PRAYER MAT) IS A CARING MOTHER/CARETAKER	GOD <SEJADAH> (MUSLIM PRAYER MAT)	MOTHER/CARETAKER, CARING
467.	MP-07	113		GOD IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CALLS AND WAVES)	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CALLS AND WAVES)
468.	MS-11	236		GOD IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ACCEPTING)	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ACCEPTING)
469.	ES-12	220		GOD IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LISTENS)	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LISTENS)
470.	MP-07	127		GOD IS A LOVING HUMAN/PERSON	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON, LOVING
471.	MP-06	94		GOD IS AN ARTIST	GOD	ARTIST
472.	MP-09	161		GOD IS AN AUTHORITY	GOD	AUTHORITY
473.	MS-08	156		GOD IS AN EXAMINER	GOD	EXAMINER
474.	MP-07	138		GOD'S LOVE [THE ETERNAL WHISPER] IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)	GOD'S LOVE [THE ETERNAL WHISPER]	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)
475.	MP-07	137		GOD'S LOVE IS THE ETERNAL WHISPER	GOD'S LOVE	WHISPER, ETERNAL
476.	MP-07	121		GOD'S MESSAGE/GUIDANCE IS THE WHISPER OF LOVE	GOD'S MESSAGE/GUIDANCE	WHISPER OF LOVE
477.	MS-06	101		GOD'S MIGHT IS AN ENORMOUS-SIZED OBJECT	GOD'S MIGHT	OBJECT, ENORMOUS-SIZED
478.	MS-11	224		GOOD DEEDS ARE LOST OBJECTS	GOOD DEEDS	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>
479.	EP-09	171		GRASS IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ACTS OUT)	GRASS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ACTS OUT)
480.	EP-09	170		GRASS IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IMPATIENT)	GRASS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IMPATIENT)
481.	MP-04	36		GRASS IS FABRIC	GRASS	FABRIC
482.	MS-02	31		GREETINGS ARE CATCHABLE OBJECTS	GREETINGS	OBJECT, CATCHABLE - <i>pl.</i>
483.	MP-04	41		GREETINGS ARE TRANSPORTABLE OBJECTS	GREETINGS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
484.	MS-02	21		GREETINGS ARE TRANSPORTABLE OBJECTS	GREETINGS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
485.	MS-23	473		GRIEF AND MISERY ARE BURIAL OBJECTS	GRIEF AND MISERY	OBJECT, BURIAL - <i>pl.</i>
486.	MS-17	353		GRIEF AND SURRENDERING THOUGHTS ARE AN EMBROIDERY	GRIEF AND SURRENDERING THOUGHTS	EMBROIDERY
487.	MS-01	7		GRIEF IS A BURIAL OBJECT	GRIEF	OBJECT, BURIAL
488.	MS-06	100		GRIEF IS A PUNISHMENT (FROM GOD)	GRIEF	PUNISHMENT (FROM GOD)
489.	MS-22	447		GRIEF IS RAIN	GRIEF	RAIN
490.	EP-10	182	A	GUITAR IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)	GUITAR	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)

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491.	EP-10	183	A	GUITAR-CASE <GREEN VELVET> IS A BEDROOM	GUITAR-CASE <GREEN VELVET>	BEDROOM
492.	MS-05	73		HAPPINESS [LIGHT] IS A LOST OBJECT	HAPPINESS [LIGHT]	OBJECT, LOST
493.	MS-05	74		HAPPINESS [LIGHT] IS A PREY	HAPPINESS [LIGHT]	PREY
494.	ES-22	455		HAPPINESS <SMILE> IS A HUMAN BODY	HAPPINESS <SMILE>	HUMAN BODY
495.	MP-08	141		HAPPINESS <SMILE> IS A LOCATION	HAPPINESS <SMILE>	LOCATION
496.	ES-04	84		HAPPINESS IS A DANCE	HAPPINESS	DANCE
497.	MS-14	280		HAPPINESS IS A LUSH-GROWING TREE	HAPPINESS	TREE, LUSH-GROWING
498.	MS-22	455		HAPPINESS IS A PUSHABLE OBJECT	HAPPINESS	OBJECT, PUSHABLE
499.	ES-12	219		HAPPINESS IS BRIGHT LIGHT	HAPPINESS	LIGHT, BRIGHT
500.	ES-22	459		HAPPINESS IS BRIGHTNESS	HAPPINESS	BRIGHTNESS
501.	MS-12	249		HAPPINESS IS HOMELAND	HAPPINESS	HOMELAND
502.	ES-01	6		HAPPINESS IS LIGHT	HAPPINESS	LIGHT
503.	ES-02	40		HAPPINESS IS LIGHT	HAPPINESS	LIGHT
504.	MS-05	72		HAPPINESS IS LIGHT	HAPPINESS	LIGHT
505.	MS-03	33		HARDSHIPS ARE VALES AND DALES	HARDSHIPS	VALES AND DALES
506.	ES-12	217		HEAVEN IS A FILMING STUDIO	HEAVEN	FILMING STUDIO
507.	ES-12	208		HEAVEN IS A VERY HIGH PLACE	HEAVEN	PLACE, VERY HIGH
508.	ES-12	203		HEAVEN IS A VERY REMOTE PLACE	HEAVEN	PLACE, VERY REMOTE
509.	MS-24	500		HEAVEN IS THE FINAL DESTINATION	HEAVEN	DESTINATION, FINAL
510.	EP-06	115	A	HIDING IS A DARK CELLAR	HIDING	CELLAR, DARK
511.	ES-13	235		HONESTY IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	HONESTY	ROOM/CONTAINER
512.	ES-05	99		HONESTY IS STRAIGHTNESS	HONESTY	STRAIGHTNESS
513.	MS-08	174		HOPE IS A BRIGHT LIGHT	HOPE	LIGHT, BRIGHT
514.	MS-14	283		HOPE IS LIGHT	HOPE	LIGHT
515.	MS-22	468		HOPES (OF LOVE) ARE MINERAL SUBSTANCES	HOPES (OF LOVE)	SUBSTANCES, MINERAL
516.	MS-24	495		HOPES (UNFULFILLED) ARE FAKE OBJECTS	HOPES (UNFULFILLED)	OBJECT, FAKE - <i>pl.</i>
517.	ES-04	76		HOPES ARE GRASPABLE OBJECTS	HOPES	OBJECT, GRASPABLE - <i>pl.</i>
518.	MS-24	504		HOPES ARE LOST OBJECTS	HOPES	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>
519.	MS-03	47		HOPES ARE STORABLE OBJECTS	HOPES	OBJECT, STORABLE - <i>pl.</i>
520.	MS-18	362		HOPES ARE VALUABLE OBJECTS (BUT SNATCHED FROM OWNER)	HOPES	OBJECT, VALUABLE (BUT SNATCHED FROM OWNER) - <i>pl.</i>
521.	EP-10	186		HUMAN BEINGS <CORPSES> ARE FRAGILE (CRUMBLING) OBJECTS	HUMAN BEINGS <CORPSES>	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING) - <i>pl.</i>
522.	EP-05	73		HUMAN BEINGS ARE LIQUID	HUMAN BEINGS	LIQUID
523.	EP-05	87	A	HUMAN BODY (A CHILD'S) IS A SHELL	HUMAN BODY (A CHILD'S)	SHELL
524.	EP-05	63	THE	HUMAN BODY IS A BUILDING	HUMAN BODY	BUILDING
525.	EP-05	65	THE	HUMAN BODY IS A VESSEL/CANISTER	HUMAN BODY	VESSEL/CANISTER
526.	MP-01	13		ILLUSORY HEAVENS ARE A MURDER WEAPON	ILLUSORY HEAVENS	WEAPON, MURDER
527.	ES-11	194		IMAGES ARE REPTILES OR INSECTS	IMAGES	REPTILES OR INSECTS
528.	ES-12	216	AN	IMAGINATION IS A PICTURE	IMAGINATION	PICTURE
529.	ES-18	293		IMPORTANCE/SIGNIFICANCE IS A HIGH POSITION	IMPORTANCE/SIGNIFICANCE	POSITION, HIGH
530.	ES-04	90	AN	IMPROVEMENT IS AN (UPWARD-STEPPING) MOVEMENT	IMPROVEMENT	MOVEMENT (UPWARD-STEPPING)
531.	EP-05	88		IMPURITY IS MUD	IMPURITY	MUD
532.	MP-03	21		INDEPENDENCE IS AN ADVERSARY	INDEPENDENCE	ADVERSARY
533.	ES-05	105	AN	INDICATION IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)	INDICATION	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)
534.	EP-04	42	AN	INFANT IS A KING/RULER	INFANT	KING/RULER
535.	MS-16	310		INFATUATION IS A (FILL-IN) SUBSTANCE	INFATUATION	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
536.	MS-10	206		INFATUATION IS A 3-DIMENSIONAL OBJECT	INFATUATION	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL
537.	MS-01	14		INSIGNIFICANCE IS THE OUTSKIRTS	INSIGNIFICANCE	OUTSKIRTS
538.	ES-16	270	AN	INSTINCT/URGE IS A MOVING OBJECT	INSTINCT/URGE	OBJECT, MOVING
539.	MP-05	59		INTELLECT IS A KITE	INTELLECT	KITE
540.	EP-09	180		INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS	INTELLIGENCE	BRIGHTNESS

NO.	CODE	MC #	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
541.	ES-24	493	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION) IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY DISTANCE FROM THE <HEART>)	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION)	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DISTANCE FROM THE <HEART>)
542.	ES-24	514	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION) IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZED)	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION)	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZED)
543.	ES-02	17	INTUITION IS A HUMAN/PERSON	INTUITION	HUMAN/PERSON
544.	MS-13	263	INTUITION/EMOTION IS A HUMAN/PERSON	INTUITION/EMOTION	HUMAN/PERSON
545.	ES-12	204	INTUITION/EMOTION IS A TACTILE SENSATION	INTUITION/EMOTION	TACTILE SENSATION
546.	ES-19	353	INTUITION/EMOTION IS A TACTILE SENSATION	INTUITION/EMOTION	TACTILE SENSATION
547.	EP-05	81	ISLANDS ARE FLOATING OBJECTS	ISLANDS	OBJECT, FLOATING - <i>pl.</i>
548.	MS-12	250	A JUNCTION IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	JUNCTION	ROOM/CONTAINER
549.	EP-06	96	KELP IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH HANDS)	KELP	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH HANDS)
550.	MS-11	221	KINDNESS IS A REMEDY/ANTIDOTE	KINDNESS	REMEDY/ANTIDOTE
551.	MP-10	185	KISSES <LIPS> ARE WORKS OF POETRY	KISSES <LIPS>	WORKS OF POETRY
552.	MP-08	143	KISSES ARE SWEET TASTANTS	KISSES	TASTANTS, SWEET
553.	EP-05	82	KNOWLEDGE IS AN OCEAN	KNOWLEDGE	OCEAN
554.	MP-07	120	KNOWLEDGE IS WATER	KNOWLEDGE	WATER
555.	ES-05	110	LACK OF INFORMATION IS A GAME OF HIDE AND SEEK	LACK OF INFORMATION	GAME OF HIDE AND SEEK
556.	ES-24	487	LACK OF SUCCESS IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LACK OF SUCCESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
557.	ES-03	44	A LACK/SCARCITY IS A LOW POSITION	LACK/SCARCITY	POSITION, LOW
558.	ES-04	78	A LACK/SCARCITY IS A LOW POSITION (AND AN AWAY MOVEMENT)	LACK/SCARCITY	POSITION, LOW (AND AWAY MOVEMENT)
559.	EP-05	70	LANDS ARE WATER	LANDS	WATER
560.	EP-03	21	LEAVES ARE A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)	LEAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)
561.	EP-03	32	LEAVES ARE SKIN AND FLESH	LEAVES	SKIN AND FLESH
562.	MS-06	99	LIES AND DECEPTION ARE FAKE OBJECTS	LIES AND DECEPTION	OBJECT, FAKE - <i>pl.</i>
563.	MP-09	152	LIFE [FERTILITY] IS A SOUND	LIFE [FERTILITY]	SOUND
564.	MS-05	81	LIFE [THE WORLD] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE [WORLD]	ROOM/CONTAINER
565.	MS-06	98	LIFE [THE WORLD] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE [WORLD]	ROOM/CONTAINER
566.	ES-02	23	A LIFE CIRCUMSTANCE IS A LOCATION	LIFE CIRCUMSTANCE	LOCATION
567.	MS-16	338	LIFE IS A BOUNDED SPACE	LIFE	SPACE, BOUNDED
568.	MS-19	381	LIFE IS A DARK ROOM (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)	LIFE	ROOM, DARK (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)
569.	EP-06	92	LIFE IS A FILM/MOVIE	LIFE	FILM/MOVIE
570.	ES-04	67	LIFE IS A HOUSE	LIFE	HOUSE
571.	ES-09	180	LIFE IS A HUMAN/PERSON	LIFE	HUMAN/PERSON
572.	ES-03	53	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
573.	ES-04	82	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
574.	ES-07	144	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
575.	ES-09	177	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
576.	ES-12	210	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
577.	ES-19	351	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
578.	MS-03	32	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
579.	MS-05	93	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
580.	MS-12	251	LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE	JOURNEY
581.	MP-07	122	LIFE IS A JOURNEY (WITH A DEFINITE DESTINATION)	LIFE	JOURNEY (WITH A DEFINITE DESTINATION)
582.	ES-07	143	LIFE IS A LOCATION	LIFE	LOCATION
583.	ES-22	465	LIFE IS A LONG PATH/ROAD (WITH VARIOUS CHECKPOINTS)	LIFE	PATH/ROAD, LONG (WITH VARIOUS CHECKPOINTS)
584.	ES-04	61	LIFE IS A MOVING (ROLLING) OBJECT	LIFE	OBJECT, MOVING (ROLLING)
585.	ES-02	28	LIFE IS A MOVING OBJECT	LIFE	OBJECT, MOVING
586.	ES-09	174	LIFE IS A PATH	LIFE	PATH
587.	ES-22	450	LIFE IS A PATH/ROAD	LIFE	PATH/ROAD
588.	MS-24	492	LIFE IS A PRESENT (TO THE ROYALTY THAT IS THE BELOVED)	LIFE	PRESENT (TO THE ROYALTY THAT IS THE BELOVED)
589.	ES-01	10	LIFE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE	ROOM/CONTAINER
590.	ES-21	439	LIFE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE	ROOM/CONTAINER

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591.	MP-05	74	LIFE IS A STAGE	LIFE	STAGE
592.	ES-22	461	LIFE IS A SYSTEM/MACHINERY	LIFE	SYSTEM/MACHINERY
593.	MS-08	189	LIFE IS A THORNY ROAD	LIFE	ROAD, THORNY
594.	MS-06	102	LIFE IS A VOYAGE	LIFE	VOYAGE
595.	MS-03	48	LIFE IS AN ACTIVITY	LIFE	ACTIVITY
596.	MS-21	431	LIFE IS AN ADVENTURE	LIFE	ADVENTURE
597.	MS-03	43	LIFE IS AN ADVERSARY	LIFE	ADVERSARY
598.	MS-14	285	LIFE IS AN ADVERSARY	LIFE	ADVERSARY
599.	ES-22	464	LIFE IS AN EVENT (THAT CAN GO WRONG)	LIFE	EVENT (THAT CAN GO WRONG)
600.	ES-03	45	LIFE IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	LIFE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
601.	ES-14	237	LIFE IS MONEY/RESOURCE	LIFE	MONEY/RESOURCE
602.	ES-15	265	LIFE IS MONEY/RESOURCE	LIFE	MONEY/RESOURCE
603.	ES-02	36	LIFE'S PURPOSES ARE A DISCOVERY	LIFE'S PURPOSES	DISCOVERY
604.	ES-02	37	LIFE'S PURPOSES ARE ONE'S OWN POSSESSIONS	LIFE'S PURPOSES	POSSESSIONS, ONE'S OWN
605.	EP-07	128	A LIGHT [A SOUND] IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	LIGHT [SOUND]	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
606.	EP-07	150	LIGHT AND SOUND ARE PLANTS	LIGHT AND SOUND	PLANTS
607.	EP-09	168	A LIGHT IS A LOST OBJECT	LIGHT	OBJECT, LOST
608.	EP-01	7	A LIGHT IS A RELEASED OBJECT	LIGHT	OBJECT, RELEASED
609.	EP-07	136	A LIGHT IS A SOUND	LIGHT	SOUND
610.	MP-07	118	A LIGHT IS AN ARROW'S BOW	LIGHT	ARROW'S BOW
611.	MP-04	37	LIVELIHOOD IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	LIVELIHOOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
612.	ES-22	447	A LIVING CONDITION IS A MAN-MADE/PRODUCED OBJECT	LIVING CONDITION	OBJECT, MAN-MADE/PRODUCED
613.	ES-04	62	LIVING IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	LIVING	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
614.	ES-22	445	LIVING IS STANDING IN A QUEUE	LIVING	STANDING IN A QUEUE
615.	MS-03	34	LIVING IS WALKING	LIVING	WALKING
616.	MS-22	470	LIVING ON [STEPPING FORWARD] IS A HEAVY CHAIN	LIVING ON [STEPPING FORWARD]	CHAIN, HEAVY
617.	ES-04	86	LIVING ON A IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	LIVING ON	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
618.	ES-04	69	LIVING ON IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	LIVING ON	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
619.	ES-20	396	LIVING ON IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	LIVING ON	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
620.	MS-03	49	LIVING ON IS STEPPING FORWARD	LIVING ON	STEPPING FORWARD
621.	EP-05	69	LOGIC IS A GROUP OF ISLANDS	LOGIC	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
622.	MS-22	463	LONELINESS IS A (SOLITARY) WANDERER	LONELINESS	WANDERER (SOLITARY)
623.	ES-18	311	LONELINESS IS A DESERT <DESERT>	LONELINESS	DESERT <DESERT>
624.	MS-07	123	LONELINESS IS A FORCE OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)	LONELINESS	FORCE OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)
625.	MS-07	124	LONELINESS IS A MOVING OBJECT	LONELINESS	OBJECT, MOVING
626.	MP-06	75	LONELINESS IS A RIVER	LONELINESS	RIVER
627.	MP-03	32	LONELINESS IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LONELINESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
628.	MS-11	217	LONELINESS IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LONELINESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
629.	MS-22	464	LONELINESS IS A SAILOR	LONELINESS	SAILOR
630.	MS-26	529	LONELINESS IS A SPONGE	LONELINESS	SPONGE
631.	MS-17	349	LONELINESS IS A STRETCHABLE OBJECT	LONELINESS	OBJECT, STRETCHABLE
632.	MS-14	282	LONELINESS IS AN ADVERSARY (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)	LONELINESS	ADVERSARY (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)
633.	ES-19	346	LONELINESS IS COLDNESS	LONELINESS	COLDNESS
634.	MS-15	297	LONGING [FULL MOON] IS A COLORFUL OBJECT	LONGING [FULL MOON]	OBJECT, COLORFUL
635.	MS-15	295	LONGING IS A (STRONGLY GRIPPING) HAND	LONGING	HAND (STRONGLY GRIPPING)
636.	MS-22	446	LONGING IS A (STRONGLY GRIPPING) HAND	LONGING	HAND (STRONGLY GRIPPING)
637.	MP-10	169	LONGING IS A BEDROOM	LONGING	BEDROOM
638.	MP-01	8	LONGING IS A DARK ROOM	LONGING	ROOM, DARK
639.	MS-15	288	LONGING IS A DISPLAYED OBJECT	LONGING	OBJECT, DISPLAYED
640.	MS-17	344	LONGING IS A FIRE'S EMBERS (STILL BURNING)	LONGING	FIRE'S EMBERS (STILL BURNING)

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641.	MS-17	345	LONGING IS A FLAMING FIRE	LONGING	FIRE, FLAMING
642.	MS-07	155	LONGING IS A GROUP OF ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED OBJECTS	LONGING	OBJECTS, ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED (A GROUP OF)
643.	MS-07	131	LONGING IS A GUEST	LONGING	GUEST
644.	MS-04	59	LONGING IS A HEAVY LOAD	LONGING	LOAD, HEAVY
645.	MS-07	132	LONGING IS A HOST (WHO INVITES LOVE TO BE ITS GUEST)	LONGING	HOST (WHO INVITES LOVE TO BE ITS GUEST)
646.	MS-17	346	LONGING IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)	LONGING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)
647.	MS-23	481	LONGING IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DEPART/LEAVE)	LONGING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DEPART/LEAVE)
648.	MS-23	482	LONGING IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DISAPPEAR)	LONGING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DISAPPEAR)
649.	MS-07	130	LONGING IS A MOVING OBJECT	LONGING	OBJECT, MOVING
650.	MS-15	292	LONGING IS A MOVING OBJECT	LONGING	OBJECT, MOVING
651.	MP-03	31	LONGING IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LONGING	ROOM/CONTAINER
652.	MS-01	18	LONGING IS A STORABLE OBJECT	LONGING	OBJECT, STORABLE
653.	MS-22	445	LONGING IS A TIGHT CROWD	LONGING	CROWD, TIGHT
654.	MS-21	441	LONGING IS A TURBULENCE	LONGING	TURBULENCE
655.	MP-02	14	LONGING IS A VICTIM OF STRANGLING	LONGING	VICTIM OF STRANGLING
656.	MS-15	289	LONGING IS AN ADHESIVE SUBSTANCE	LONGING	SUBSTANCE, ADHESIVE
657.	MS-19	379	LONGING IS AN ILLNESS/DISEASE	LONGING	ILLNESS/DISEASE
658.	MS-01	19	LONGING IS AN OBJECT (OF GREAT AND EVER-INCREASING DEPTH)	LONGING	OBJECT (OF GREAT AND EVER-INCREASING DEPTH)
659.	MS-25	512	LONGING IS THE WIND	LONGING	WIND
660.	MS-19	386	LOVE (BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE) IS AN INTERTWINED ROPE	LOVE (BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE)	ROPE, INTERTWINED
661.	MS-05	92	LOVE (THAT HAS TO END) IS A FALLING LEAF	LOVE (THAT HAS TO END)	LEAF, FALLING
662.	MS-19	393	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) [A WILTING FLOWER] IS A BURIED CORPSE	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) [A WILTING FLOWER]	CORPSE, BURIED
663.	MS-19	391	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) IS A BRITTLING BRANCH	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	BRANCH, BRITTLING
664.	MS-06	122	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) IS A BURIED CORPSE	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	CORPSE, BURIED
665.	MS-19	390	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) IS A FALLING LEAF	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	LEAF, FALLING
666.	MS-11	226	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) IS GLASS (THAT IS WORTHLESS AND IN PIECES)	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	GLASS (THAT IS WORTHLESS AND IN PIECES)
667.	MS-11	233	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) IS LEFTOVER FOOD	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	FOOD, LEFTOVER
668.	MS-16	330	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) IS LEFTOVER FOOD	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	FOOD, LEFTOVER
669.	MS-18	368	LOVE (THAT IS SUPERFICIAL) IS AN OBJECT (AT THE <EYES> ONLY)	LOVE (THAT IS SUPERFICIAL)	OBJECT (AT THE <EYES> ONLY)
670.	MS-18	369	LOVE (THAT IS TRUE) IS A SUBMERGED OBJECT	LOVE (THAT IS TRUE)	OBJECT, SUBMERGED
671.	MP-07	128	LOVE [EMBRACE] IS A CATCHABLE OBJECT	LOVE [EMBRACE]	OBJECT, CATCHABLE
672.	MP-06	84	LOVE [LIGHT] IS A LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	LOVE [LIGHT]	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
673.	MS-15	301	LOVE [MARRIAGE PROPOSAL] IS AN ENGAGEMENT RING	LOVE [MARRIAGE PROPOSAL]	ENGAGEMENT RING
674.	MS-15	302	LOVE [MARRIAGE] <RING FINGER> IS A SWEET-TASTING OBJECT	LOVE [MARRIAGE] <RING FINGER>	OBJECT, SWEET-TASTING
675.	MS-07	144	LOVE [VENOM] IS A DAGGER	LOVE [VENOM]	DAGGER
676.	ES-23	469	LOVE <A MAN> IS A FOUND OBJECT	LOVE <A MAN>	OBJECT, FOUND
677.	MS-08	180	LOVE AND AFFECTION (OF A WIFE) ARE A HARBOR	LOVE AND AFFECTION (OF A WIFE)	HARBOR
678.	MS-04	55	LOVE AND AFFECTION ARE A (FILL-IN) SUBSTANCE	LOVE AND AFFECTION	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
679.	MS-11	225	LOVE AND AFFECTION ARE GEMS AND PRECIOUS STONES	LOVE AND AFFECTION	GEMS AND PRECIOUS STONES
680.	MS-06	114	LOVE AND AFFECTION ARE UNTAINTED OBJECTS	LOVE AND AFFECTION	OBJECT, UNTAINTED - <i>pl.</i>
681.	MS-26	546	LOVE AND EMOTIONS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (IN EMBRACE)	LOVE AND EMOTIONS	HUMAN/PERSON (IN EMBRACE) - <i>pl.</i>
682.	MP-02	19	LOVE AND LONGING ARE MOVING OBJECTS	LOVE AND LONGING	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
683.	MS-16	324	LOVE AND ROMANCE [THE STARS] ARE FLOWERS	LOVE AND ROMANCE [THE STARS]	FLOWERS
684.	MS-16	323	LOVE AND ROMANCE ARE THE STARS	LOVE AND ROMANCE	STARS
685.	MS-18	365	LOVE IS (TANGLED) HAIR/THREAD	LOVE	HAIR/THREAD (TANGLED)
686.	MS-07	151	LOVE IS (WOUNDED) SKIN	LOVE	SKIN (WOUNDED)
687.	MS-20	415	LOVE IS A (CONSTANT) TEST	LOVE	TEST (CONSTANT)
688.	EP-03	24	LOVE IS A (FILL-IN) SUBSTANCE	LOVE	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
689.	MS-22	452	LOVE IS A (GOVERNED) COUNTRY/STATE	LOVE	COUNTRY/STATE (GOVERNED)
690.	ES-24	485	LOVE IS A (POTENTIAL) THREAT OR DISTURBANCE	LOVE	THREAT OR DISTURBANCE (POTENTIAL)

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691.	ES-21	401	LOVE IS A (TIGHTLY-)GRASPED OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, GRASPED (TIGHTLY-)
692.	ES-18	300	LOVE IS A BOSS/SUPERIOR	LOVE	BOSS/SUPERIOR
693.	MS-02	23	LOVE IS A BOUNDED SPACE	LOVE	SPACE, BOUNDED
694.	MS-22	471	LOVE IS A BOUNDED SPACE	LOVE	SPACE, BOUNDED
695.	MS-17	343	LOVE IS A BUILDING	LOVE	BUILDING
696.	MS-20	421	LOVE IS A CAPTIVE	LOVE	CAPTIVE
697.	MS-10	211	LOVE IS A CREATED OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, CREATED
698.	MS-16	322	LOVE IS A DANCE	LOVE	DANCE
699.	MS-02	28	LOVE IS A DISCARDABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, DISCARDABLE
700.	ES-12	213	LOVE IS A DISPLAYED OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, DISPLAYED
701.	MS-10	205	LOVE IS A DIVIDED ENTITY (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)	LOVE	ENTITY, DIVIDABLE (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)
702.	MS-05	83	LOVE IS A FLOWER	LOVE	FLOWER
703.	MP-04	45	LOVE IS A FLOWERING PLANT	LOVE	PLANT, FLOWERING
704.	ES-13	222	LOVE IS A FOUND OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, FOUND
705.	ES-24	494	LOVE IS A FOUND OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, FOUND
706.	MS-14	275	LOVE IS A FRAGILE (CRACKED) OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRACKED)
707.	MS-19	404	LOVE IS A FRAGILE (CRUMBLING) OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)
708.	MS-02	24	LOVE IS A FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE) OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE)
709.	MS-17	342	LOVE IS A FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE) OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE)
710.	MS-02	26	LOVE IS A FRAGRANCE	LOVE	FRAGRANCE
711.	MS-25	515	LOVE IS A FRAGRANCE	LOVE	FRAGRANCE
712.	MS-25	513	LOVE IS A FRESH SCENT	LOVE	SCENT, FRESH
713.	MP-04	44	LOVE IS A FRUITING PLANT	LOVE	PLANT, FRUITING
714.	MS-16	325	LOVE IS A GARDEN	LOVE	GARDEN
715.	ES-03	47	LOVE IS A GRASPED OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, GRASPED
716.	ES-20	356	LOVE IS A GRASPED OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, GRASPED
717.	MS-05	90	LOVE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (IN DESPAIR)	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (IN DESPAIR)
718.	MS-20	411	LOVE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)
719.	MS-02	30	LOVE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)
720.	MS-21	437	LOVE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS REVERED)	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS REVERED)
721.	MS-06	106	LOVE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO NEEDS A SHELTER)	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO NEEDS A SHELTER)
722.	MS-08	159	LOVE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)
723.	MS-23	486	LOVE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)
724.	MP-04	46	LOVE IS A KINGDOM	LOVE	KINGDOM
725.	MS-22	459	LOVE IS A LOCATION (TO ESCAPE FROM)	LOVE	LOCATION (TO ESCAPE FROM)
726.	MS-04	61	LOVE IS A LOCKABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, LOCKABLE
727.	MS-08	185	LOVE IS A LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
728.	ES-10	183	LOVE IS A MADE/CREATED OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
729.	MS-07	135	LOVE IS A MOVING OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, MOVING
730.	MP-02	20	LOVE IS A NATURAL SUBSTANCE	LOVE	SUBSTANCE, NATURAL
731.	MS-07	136	LOVE IS A PASSERBY	LOVE	PASSERBY
732.	MP-02	15	LOVE IS A PILLORIED CAPTIVE	LOVE	CAPTIVE, PILLORIED
733.	MP-04	43	LOVE IS A PLANT	LOVE	PLANT
734.	MS-19	392	LOVE IS A PLANT	LOVE	PLANT
735.	MS-02	27	LOVE IS A PLEASANT-SMELLING OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, PLEASANT-SMELLING
736.	MS-08	160	LOVE IS A PRECIOUS JEWELRY (BUT PAWNED IN DESPERATION)	LOVE	JEWELRY, PRECIOUS (BUT PAWNED IN DESPERATION)
737.	MS-20	420	LOVE IS A PREY	LOVE	PREY
738.	MS-23	490	LOVE IS A PURE SUBSTANCE	LOVE	SUBSTANCE, PURE
739.	EP-09	174	LOVE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER
740.	ES-17	273	LOVE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER

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741.	ES-24	496	LOVE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER
742.	ES-17	276	LOVE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
743.	MS-01	2	LOVE IS A ROPE/STRING	LOVE	ROPE/STRING
744.	ES-12	215	LOVE IS A SHARABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, SHARABLE
745.	MS-21	433	LOVE IS A SHELTER	LOVE	SHELTER
746.	MS-23	479	LOVE IS A SPROUTING PLANT	LOVE	PLANT, SPROUTING
747.	MS-26	547	LOVE IS A STORY/TALE	LOVE	STORY/TALE
748.	ES-21	400	LOVE IS A SWEET TASTANT	LOVE	TASTANT, SWEET
749.	ES-15	261	LOVE IS A TACTILE STIMULUS	LOVE	TACTILE STIMULUS
750.	MS-04	53	LOVE IS A TACTILE STIMULUS	LOVE	TACTILE STIMULUS
751.	MS-15	304	LOVE IS A TAGGING/MARKING OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, TAGGING/MARKING
752.	MS-20	430	LOVE IS A TALISMAN (BURIED IN THE BELOVED'S HEART)	LOVE	TALISMAN (BURIED IN THE BELOVED'S HEART)
753.	ES-07	141	LOVE IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
754.	ES-10	186	LOVE IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
755.	ES-06	116	LOVE IS A TRANSPORTABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
756.	MS-07	137	LOVE IS A TRAVEL COMPANION	LOVE	COMPANION, TRAVEL
757.	MS-21	432	LOVE IS A TREE	LOVE	TREE
758.	MS-19	399	LOVE IS A VALUABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, VALUABLE
759.	ES-03	48	LOVE IS A VALUABLE POSSESSION	LOVE	POSSESSION, VALUABLE
760.	MP-05	73	LOVE IS A VICTIM OF DROWNING	LOVE	VICTIM OF DROWNING
761.	MS-05	89	LOVE IS AN EMBLEM	LOVE	EMBLEM
762.	ES-08	152	LOVE IS AN IMMORTAL BEING	LOVE	BEING, IMMORTAL
763.	MS-02	29	LOVE IS AN IMMORTAL BEING	LOVE	BEING, IMMORTAL
764.	MS-23	475	LOVE IS AN IMMORTAL BEING	LOVE	BEING, IMMORTAL
765.	ES-05	97	LOVE IS AN OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT
766.	MS-11	232	LOVE IS AN OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)	LOVE	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)
767.	EP-09	175	LOVE IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	LOVE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
768.	ES-03	51	LOVE IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	LOVE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
769.	ES-07	142	LOVE IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	LOVE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
770.	MS-11	227	LOVE IS AN OBJECT (OF ASSESSMENT)	LOVE	OBJECT (OF ASSESSMENT)
771.	ES-15	251	LOVE IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	LOVE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
772.	ES-15	259	LOVE IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	LOVE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
773.	MS-04	65	LOVE IS AN OCEAN	LOVE	OCEAN
774.	MS-25	514	LOVE IS AN OLFACTORY OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, OLFACTORY
775.	ES-15	260	LOVE IS AN TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
776.	ES-24	503	LOVE IS BLOOD	LOVE	BLOOD
777.	MS-05	88	LOVE IS FIRE	LOVE	FIRE
778.	MS-23	487	LOVE IS FIRE	LOVE	FIRE
779.	MS-18	373	LOVE IS HEAVEN	LOVE	HEAVEN
780.	ES-18	295	LOVE IS LIFE	LOVE	LIFE
781.	MS-15	303	LOVE IS LIGHT	LOVE	LIGHT
782.	MP-05	66	LOVE IS THE MOON	LOVE	MOON
783.	MS-20	422	LOVE IS WAR/CONQUEST	LOVE	WAR/CONQUEST
784.	MS-08	169	LOVE IS WATER	LOVE	WATER
785.	MS-16	333	LOVERS (LIFELONG) ARE (MONOGAMOUS, MATE-FOR-LIFE) SEAGULLS	LOVERS (LIFELONG)	SEAGULLS (MONOGAMOUS, MATE-FOR-LIFE)
786.	MS-05	91	LOVERS ARE A DIVIDED ENTITY (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)	LOVERS	ENTITY, DIVIDED (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)
787.	ES-25	532	LOVERS ARE A MERGED ENTITY	LOVERS	MERGED ENTITY
788.	MS-12	244	LOVERS ARE DRIFTERS (AT SEA)	LOVERS	DRIFTERS (AT SEA)
789.	MS-05	87	LOVERS ARE FIRELIGHTERS	LOVERS	FIRELIGHTERS
790.	MS-12	241	LOVERS ARE VICTIMS OF A SNARE-TRAP	LOVERS	VICTIMS OF A SNARE-TRAP

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791.	ES-02	20	LOVING ONE'S BELOVED IS A FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE	LOVING ONE'S BELOVED	FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE
792.	ES-04	75	LUCK IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STAYS)	LUCK	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STAYS)
793.	ES-04	71	LUCK IS A MOVING OBJECT	LUCK	OBJECT, MOVING
794.	ES-04	72	LUCK IS A SLIPPERY OBJECT	LUCK	OBJECT, SLIPPERY
795.	ES-04	74	LUCK IS A TRANSPORTABLE OBJECT	LUCK	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
796.	ES-05	112	LUST IS HEAT	LUST	HEAT
797.	ES-22	441	MAGIC IS A LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	MAGIC	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
798.	ES-01	2	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
799.	ES-01	5	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
800.	ES-02	25	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
801.	ES-04	77	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
802.	ES-13	226	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
803.	ES-17	277	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
804.	ES-17	279	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
805.	ES-18	296	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
806.	ES-19	317	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
807.	ES-26	547	A MANNER IS A PATH/ROAD	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
808.	MS-01	11	MARRIAGE IS THE APEX (OF LOVE)	MARRIAGE	APEX (OF LOVE)
809.	MS-14	279	MARRIAGE IS THE APEX (OF LOVE)	MARRIAGE	APEX (OF LOVE)
810.	MS-09	195	A MARRIED WOMAN IS A BLOSSOMING FLOWER	WOMAN, MARRIED	FLOWER, BLOSSOMING
811.	MS-25	507	MELANCHOLINESS IS A DIVIDABLE OBJECT	MELANCHOLINESS	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE
812.	MS-22	467	MELANCHOLINESS IS A HEAVY LOAD	MELANCHOLINESS	LOAD, HEAVY
813.	MS-10	200	MEMORIES ARE 3-DIMENSIONAL OBJECTS (IN LARGE QUANTITIES)	MEMORIES	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL (IN LARGE QUANTITIES) - <i>pl.</i>
814.	MS-22	448	MEMORIES ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO BECKON)	MEMORIES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BECKONS) - <i>pl.</i>
815.	MS-25	524	MEMORIES ARE LIVING (AND FLOWERING) PLANTS	MEMORIES	PLANTS, LIVING (AND FLOWERING)
816.	ES-09	178	MEMORIES ARE TASTANTS (THAT ARE BOTH BITTER AND SWEET)	MEMORIES	TASTANTS (THAT ARE BOTH BITTER AND SWEET)
817.	ES-09	179	MEMORIES ARE TRANSPORTABLE OBJECTS	MEMORIES	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
818.	MP-06	86	MEMORIES ARE UNREACHABLE (FARAWAY/REMOTE) OBJECTS	MEMORIES	OBJECT, UNREACHABLE (FARAWAY/REMOTE) - <i>pl.</i>
819.	ES-21	423	MEMORIES OF <THE BELOVED> ARE OBJECTS	MEMORIES OF <THE BELOVED>	OBJECT - <i>pl.</i>
820.	EP-05	79	MEMORY IS (DRIED AND CRACKED) EARTH/SOIL	MEMORY	EARTH/SOIL (DRIED AND CRACKED)
821.	MS-10	209	A MEMORY IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	MEMORY	ROOM/CONTAINER
822.	MP-03	25	A MEMORY IS A SHADOW	MEMORY	SHADOW
823.	MS-04	52	A MEMORY IS A SHADOW	MEMORY	SHADOW
824.	MS-05	79	A MEMORY IS A SHADOW	MEMORY	SHADOW
825.	MS-10	210	A MEMORY IS AN IMMORTAL BEING	MEMORY	BEING, IMMORTAL
826.	MS-17	357	A MEMORY IS AN IMMORTAL BEING	MEMORY	BEING, IMMORTAL
827.	ES-04	68	MENTAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	MENTAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
828.	EP-08	161	MENTAL RESOLUTION IS BODILY STRENGTH	MENTAL RESOLUTION	BODILY STRENGTH
829.	EP-06	124	MESSAGES ARE A CROWD OF PEOPLE	MESSAGES	PEOPLE, A CROWD OF
830.	ES-11	196	MIND <HEAD> IS A LOCATION	MIND <HEAD>	LOCATION
831.	EP-04	34	MIND <THE PERSON> IS A SLIPPERY SURFACE	MIND <THE PERSON>	SURFACE, SLIPPERY
832.	MS-24	503	MIND AND DECISION-MAKING ARE THE EYES	MIND AND DECISION-MAKING	EYES
833.	MS-08	162	MIND AND REASONING ARE (TEMPORARILY MISPLACED) OBJECTS	MIND AND REASONING	OBJECT (TEMPORARILY MISPLACED) - <i>pl.</i>
834.	ES-19	349	MIND IS A CHANGABLE OBJECT	MIND	OBJECT, CHANGABLE
835.	ES-16	271	MIND IS A MADE/CREATED OBJECT	MIND	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
836.	ES-04	89	MIND IS A SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)	MIND	SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)
837.	ES-21	424	MIND IS A SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)	MIND	SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)
838.	EP-05	78	MIND IS A SURFACE OF EARTH (WITH CRACKS)	MIND	SURFACE OF EARTH (WITH CRACKS)
839.	ES-08	151	MIND IS A TOY	MIND	TOY
840.	ES-11	191	MIND IS A TUNNEL	MIND	TUNNEL

NO.	CODE	MC #		CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
841.	ES-20	393		MIND IS A TWISTABLE OBJECT	MIND	OBJECT, TWISTABLE
842.	ES-23	470		MIND IS A TWISTABLE OBJECT	MIND	OBJECT, TWISTABLE
843.	ES-24	506		MIND IS THE EAR	MIND	EAR
844.	ES-01	12		MIND IS THE EYE	MIND	EYE
845.	ES-07	129		MIND IS THE EYE	MIND	EYE
846.	ES-14	247		MIND IS THE EYE	MIND	EYE
847.	ES-18	284		MIND IS THE EYE	MIND	EYE
848.	ES-18	298		MIND IS THE EYE	MIND	EYE
849.	ES-20	354		MIND IS THE EYE	MIND	EYE
850.	MP-02	18		MIND IS THE EYE	MIND	EYE
851.	EP-03	23	A	MIST IS A SHAPE-SHIFTER	MIST	SHAPE-SHIFTER
852.	ES-20	388	A	MISTAKE IS A MADE/CREATED OBJECT	MISTAKE	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
853.	ES-19	343		MISTAKES ARE MADE/CREATED OBJECTS	MISTAKES	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
854.	MS-26	536		MISTAKES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP) ARE NOTES IN A NOTEPAD	MISTAKES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP)	NOTES IN A NOTEPAD
855.	MP-06	89		MISTAKES OF THE PAST ARE WOLVES	MISTAKES OF THE PAST	WOLVES
856.	EP-02	10	THE	MOON IS A (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED) OBJECT	MOON	OBJECT (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED)
857.	ES-13	224		MOONLIGHT IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	MOONLIGHT	ROOM/CONTAINER
858.	MP-05	56		MOONLIGHT IS A TORCH	MOONLIGHT	TORCH
859.	MP-01	5		MOUNTAIN BREEZE IS A FABRIC (TO BE SEWN INTO A DRESS)	BREEZE, MOUNTAIN	FABRIC (TO BE SEWN INTO A DRESS)
860.	EP-06	99	A	MOVEMENT IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)	MOVEMENT	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)
861.	EP-05	53		MUSIC IS AN (UPWARD-)MOVING OBJECT	MUSIC	OBJECT, MOVING (UPWARD-)
862.	MP-05	49		NEGLIGENCE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	NEGLIGENCE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
863.	MP-05	51		NEGLIGENCE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO HITS ONESELF <CHEST>)	NEGLIGENCE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO HITS ONESELF <CHEST>)
864.	MP-05	50		NEGLIGENCE IS A TOW-TRUCK	NEGLIGENCE	TOW-TRUCK
865.	MS-18	375	A	NEW BEGINNING IS A MORNING DEW	NEW BEGINNING	MORNING DEW
866.	MP-04	40		NEWS ARE TRANSPORTABLE OBJECTS	NEWS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
867.	MP-10	171	THE	NIGHT IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE BELOVED)	NIGHT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE BELOVED)
868.	MP-06	77	THE	NIGHT IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE SOUL)	NIGHT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE SOUL)
869.	MP-06	76	THE	NIGHT IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SIGHS)	NIGHT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SIGHS)
870.	ES-08	166	THE	NIGHT IS A LOCATION	NIGHT	LOCATION
871.	ES-21	422	THE	NIGHT IS A LOCATION	NIGHT	LOCATION
872.	MS-15	300	THE	NIGHT IS A LONELY COMPANION	NIGHT	COMPANION, LONELY
873.	MP-10	172	THE	NIGHT IS A MAT/RUG/CARPET	NIGHT	MAT/RUG/CARPET
874.	ES-03	59	THE	NIGHT IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	NIGHT	ROOM/CONTAINER
875.	MP-05	55	THE	NIGHT IS A TERMINAL/STATION	NIGHT	TERMINAL/STATION
876.	MS-19	380	THE	NIGHT IS AN OCEAN WAVE	NIGHT	OCEAN WAVE
877.	ES-23	468		NONSENSE/RIDICULOUSNESS IS ANIMAL'S SOLID WASTE	NONSENSE/RIDICULOUSNESS	ANIMAL'S SOLID WASTE
878.	EP-04	46		NUMERALS ARE DEPENDANTS (OF THE DECIMAL POINT)	NUMERALS	DEPEDANTS (OF THE DECIMAL POINT)
879.	EP-04	43	A	NURSERY IS A KINGDOM	NURSERY	KINGDOM
880.	MS-14	267		OCEAN CURRENTS ARE SAILBOATS	OCEAN CURRENTS	SAILBOATS
881.	MP-09	159		OLD-AGE IS A BRITTLE TWIG	OLD-AGE	TWIG, BRITTLE
882.	MS-25	525		OLD-AGE IS A TWIG (ON A TREE)	OLD-AGE	TWIG (ON A TREE)
883.	ES-21	413		ONE <PART> OF THE SELF IS A LOST OBJECT	ONE <PART> OF THE SELF	OBJECT, LOST
884.	ES-02	32		ONE'S PLACE IN LIFE IS A LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	ONE'S PLACE IN LIFE	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
885.	ES-24	507		OPINIONS/JUDGMENTS ARE AUDITORY OBJECTS	OPINIONS/JUDGMENTS	OBJECT, AUDITORY - <i>pl.</i>
886.	ES-05	94	AN	OPTION IS A PATH/ROAD	OPTION	PATH/ROAD
887.	MP-10	179		PAGES OF A BOOK IS A CONTAINER (WITH OVERFLOWING EMOTION)	PAGES OF A BOOK	CONTAINER (WITH OVERFLOWING EMOTIONS)
888.	MP-03	28		PARALYSIS IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	PARALYSIS	ROOM/CONTAINER
889.	MS-08	161		PASSION IS A BUNCH OF THORNS	PASSION	THORNS, A BUNCH OF
890.	ES-22	443		PASSION IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GOES AWAY)	PASSION	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GOES AWAY)

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891.	ES-22	467	PASSION IS A LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	PASSION	OBJECT, LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	
892.	MS-05	80	PASSION IS FIRE	PASSION	FIRE	
893.	MS-23	480	PASSION IS HEAVEN	PASSION	HEAVEN	
894.	MS-16	331	PASSION OF LOVE IS AN OCEAN WAVE	PASSION OF LOVE	OCEAN WAVE	
895.	MS-19	397	PASSION OF LOVE IS AN OCEAN WAVE	PASSION OF LOVE	OCEAN WAVE	
896.	ES-09	175	A	PATH IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	PATH	ROOM/CONTAINER
897.	MS-08	157		PATIENCE IS AN OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)	PATIENCE	OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)
898.	MP-07	136		PEACE/CONTENTMENT IS A SMILE	PEACE/CONTENTMENT	SMILE
899.	MP-07	116	A	PEOPLE'S LEADER IS AN ANCHOR	PEOPLE'S LEADER	ANCHOR
900.	ES-26	550		PERFECTION IS AN UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	PERFECTION	OBJECT, UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
901.	ES-19	336		PERMANENCE IS A STATE OF STEADINESS (AND ALSO A LACK OF MOBILITY)	PERMANENCE	STATE OF STEADINESS (AND ALSO LACK OF MOBILITY)
902.	ES-11	189		PERSON/OBJECT OF INTEREST IS A CONTAINER	PERSON/OBJECT OF INTEREST	CONTAINER
903.	EP-06	117	A	PIER IS A PUBLIC SINK	PIER	PUBLIC SINK
904.	EP-09	176	A	PITCH IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	PITCH	ROOM/CONTAINER
905.	ES-10	185		PLANS ARE MADE/CREATED OBJECTS	PLANS	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
906.	ES-17	280		PLEASURE IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	PLEASURE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
907.	ES-17	281		PLEASURE IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	PLEASURE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
908.	MS-26	531	A	POCKET IS A PICKPOCKET	POCKET	PICKPOCKET
909.	EP-06	125	A	POEM IS AN EVENT	POEM	EVENT
910.	MS-09	196	A	POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE IS A HONEY-FILLED LAKE	MARRIAGE, POLYGAMOUS	LAKE, HONEY-FILLED
911.	MP-05	47		POOR JUDGMENT IS OBSCURED VISION	JUDGMENT, POOR	VISION, OBSCURED
912.	MS-16	320		POOR JUDGMENT IS OBSCURED VISION	JUDGMENT, POOR	VISION, OBSCURED
913.	ES-03	54	A	PRAYER IS A SUSTENANCE	PRAYER	SUSTENANCE
914.	MS-03	37		PRAYERS ARE A GROUP OF ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED OBJECTS	PRAYERS	OBJECTS, ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED (A GROUP OF)
915.	MP-08	144		PRAYERS ARE A HUMAN BODY	PRAYERS	HUMAN BODY
916.	MP-09	157		PRAYERS ARE MOVING OBJECTS	PRAYERS	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
917.	ES-22	449	A	PRETENSE IS A FAKE OBJECT	PRETENSE	OBJECT, FAKE
918.	MS-18	363		PRETENSES ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	PRETENSES	ROOM/CONTAINER
919.	ES-19	321		PRIDE IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	PRIDE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
920.	EP-06	118		PROBLEMS ARE DISCARDABLE OBJECTS	PROBLEMS	OBJECT, DISCARDABLE - <i>pl.</i>
921.	ES-25	537		PROBLEMS ARE OBJECTS (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	PROBLEMS	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
922.	EP-06	106	A	PROCESS IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
923.	ES-16	267	A	PROCESS IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
924.	ES-22	462	A	PROCESS IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
925.	ES-23	472	A	PROCESS IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
926.	ES-23	474	A	PROCESS IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
927.	ES-24	495	A	PROCESS IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
928.	ES-20	359	A	PROCESS IS A MOVEMENT	PROCESS	MOVEMENT
929.	ES-04	73	A	PROGRESS IS A (FORWARD) MOVEMENT	PROGRESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
930.	ES-05	96	A	PROGRESS IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY SPEED)	PROGRESS	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SPEED)
931.	MS-15	287		PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE) ARE OBJECTS (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY)	PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE)	OBJECT (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY) - <i>pl.</i>
932.	MS-18	364		PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE) ARE OBJECTS (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY)	PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE)	OBJECT (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY) - <i>pl.</i>
933.	MS-06	116		PROMISES (THAT ARE UNKEPT) ARE A FLEXIBLE ORGAN	PROMISES (THAT ARE UNKEPT)	ORGAN, FLEXIBLE
934.	ES-02	19		PROMISES ARE ENUMERABLE OBJECTS	PROMISES	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
935.	ES-19	332		PROMISES ARE MADE/CREATED OBJECTS	PROMISES	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
936.	MS-06	111		PROMISES ARE SWEET TASTANTS	PROMISES	TASTANTS, SWEET
937.	MP-07	117		PROPHET MUHAMMAD [CHOSEN MESSENGER] IS A TARGET (OF A SHOT ARROW)	PROPHET MUHAMMAD [CHOSEN MESSENGER]	TARGET (OF A SHOT ARROW)
938.	MP-07	124		PROPHET MUHAMMAD IS A SEED <EYE> OF AN OLIVE	PROPHET MUHAMMAD	SEED <EYE> OF AN OLIVE
939.	MP-07	107		PROPHET MUHAMMAD IS A SEED OF AN OLIVE	PROPHET MUHAMMAD	SEED OF AN OLIVE
940.	MP-07	115		PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S LIFE IS A VOYAGE	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S LIFE	VOYAGE

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941.	EP-04	40	PROWESS IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	PROWESS	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
942.	ES-20	375	PSYCHOLOGICAL AFFAIRS ARE BUSINESS AFFAIRS	PSYCHOLOGICAL AFFAIRS	BUSINESS AFFAIRS
943.	ES-25	538	PSYCHOLOGICAL MESS IS PHYSICAL MESS	PSYCHOLOGICAL MESS	PHYSICAL MESS
944.	MS-08	183	PURIFICATION IS WATER	PURIFICATION	WATER
945.	MP-07	125	PURITY IS (THE PRE-PRAYER ABLUTIONS) WATER	PURITY	WATER (THE PRE-PRAYER ABLUTIONS)
946.	ES-24	512	A PURPOSE IS A GOAL	PURPOSE	GOAL
947.	EP-06	103	A QUANTITY IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	QUANTITY	ROOM/CONTAINER
948.	EP-05	64	A QUANTITY IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY HEIGHT)	QUANTITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY HEIGHT)
949.	MS-11	220	QUESTIONS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS	QUESTIONS	HUMAN/PERSON - <i>pl.</i>
950.	MS-11	219	QUESTIONS ARE ROTATING WHEELS	QUESTIONS	WHEELS, ROTATING
951.	MS-26	530	QUIETNESS IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NOT LONELY)	QUIETNESS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NOT LONELY)
952.	MP-06	103	QUIETNESS IS A LOCATION	QUIETNESS	LOCATION
953.	MS-25	516	RAIN IS HAIR	RAIN	HAIR
954.	MP-08	147	RAINBOWS ARE A DRAWING/PAINTING	RAINBOWS	DRAWING/PAINTING
955.	MP-07	111	RAINBOWS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (OF FAITH AND PIETY)	RAINBOWS	HUMAN/PERSON (OF FAITH AND PIETY) - <i>pl.</i>
956.	EP-09	172	RAPID GROWTH IS A SPRAY OF GAS	RAPID GROWTH	SPRAY OF GAS
957.	MS-05	76	REALITY [NATURE] IS A DIVIDABLE OBJECT	REALITY [NATURE]	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE
958.	MS-05	77	REALITY [NATURE] IS A MAGICIAN	REALITY [NATURE]	MAGICIAN
959.	MS-14	281	REALITY IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	REALITY	ROOM/CONTAINER
960.	MP-01	12	REALITY IS A VICTIM OF MURDER	REALITY	VICTIM OF MURDER
961.	ES-20	385	REALIZATION IS A DISCOVERY	REALIZATION	DISCOVERY
962.	ES-24	522	REALIZATION IS A DISCOVERY	REALIZATION	DISCOVERY
963.	MS-03	38	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS EVERLASTING) IS A LUSH-GROWING TREE	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS EVERLASTING)	TREE, LUSH-GROWING
964.	MS-06	105	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL) IS A BRANCH	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL)	BRANCH
965.	MS-03	39	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL) IS A BRITTLE BRANCH	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL)	BRANCH, BRITTLE
966.	ES-19	341	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT) IS A GAME	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT)	GAME
967.	ES-19	342	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT) IS A GAME/GAMBLE	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT)	GAME/GAMBLE
968.	ES-20	358	RELATIONSHIP [EVENT] IS A BOUNDED SPACE	RELATIONSHIP [EVENT]	SPACE, BOUNDED
969.	MS-04	67	RELATIONSHIP IS A (JOINT) TRAVEL/TRIP	RELATIONSHIP	TRAVEL/TRIP (JOINT)
970.	ES-05	102	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
971.	MS-01	6	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
972.	MS-01	10	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
973.	MS-04	60	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
974.	MS-05	71	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
975.	MS-07	149	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
976.	MS-08	188	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
977.	MS-09	198	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
978.	MS-10	204	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
979.	MS-10	215	RELATIONSHIP IS A (SHARED) JOURNEY	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
980.	ES-02	24	RELATIONSHIP IS A BOUNDED SPACE	RELATIONSHIP	SPACE, BOUNDED
981.	ES-02	29	RELATIONSHIP IS A BOUNDED SPACE	RELATIONSHIP	SPACE, BOUNDED
982.	ES-15	262	RELATIONSHIP IS A BOUNDED SPACE	RELATIONSHIP	SPACE, BOUNDED
983.	MS-01	13	RELATIONSHIP IS A BUILDING	RELATIONSHIP	BUILDING
984.	ES-07	140	RELATIONSHIP IS A CAUSE TO BE FOUGHT FOR	RELATIONSHIP	CAUSE TO BE FOUGHT FOR
985.	ES-20	363	RELATIONSHIP IS A FLAMMABLE OBJECT	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, FLAMMABLE
986.	ES-20	369	RELATIONSHIP IS A FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES) OBJECT	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)
987.	ES-19	345	RELATIONSHIP IS A FRAGILE (BROKEN INTO PARTS) OBJECT	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BROKEN INTO PARTS)
988.	ES-20	361	RELATIONSHIP IS A GRASPED OBJECT	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, GRASPED
989.	ES-07	133	RELATIONSHIP IS A HIGHLY VALUABLE OBJECT	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, HIGHLY VALUABLE
990.	ES-19	330	RELATIONSHIP IS A HOME	RELATIONSHIP	HOME

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991.	ES-09	173	RELATIONSHIP IS A HOME/RESIDENCE	RELATIONSHIP	HOME/RESIDENCE
992.	ES-18	297	RELATIONSHIP IS A HOME/RESIDENCE	RELATIONSHIP	HOME/RESIDENCE
993.	ES-20	373	RELATIONSHIP IS A HOME/RESIDENCE	RELATIONSHIP	HOME/RESIDENCE
994.	ES-02	27	RELATIONSHIP IS A HOUSE/ROOM	RELATIONSHIP	HOUSE/ROOM
995.	ES-19	319	RELATIONSHIP IS A HOUSE/ROOM	RELATIONSHIP	HOUSE/ROOM
996.	ES-06	122	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
997.	ES-19	328	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
998.	ES-20	383	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
999.	ES-21	433	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
1000.	ES-25	530	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
1001.	ES-25	533	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
1002.	ES-08	170	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1003.	ES-20	389	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1004.	ES-20	392	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1005.	ES-21	417	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1006.	ES-25	529	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1007.	MP-06	97	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1008.	MS-01	4	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1009.	MS-06	119	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1010.	MS-09	197	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1011.	MS-10	207	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1012.	MS-16	332	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1013.	MS-17	340	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1014.	MS-18	376	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1015.	MS-19	383	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1016.	MS-23	474	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1017.	MS-25	521	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1018.	ES-18	291	RELATIONSHIP IS A LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
1019.	ES-25	544	RELATIONSHIP IS A MACHINE	RELATIONSHIP	MACHINE
1020.	ES-19	339	RELATIONSHIP IS A PRISON	RELATIONSHIP	PRISON
1021.	ES-20	360	RELATIONSHIP IS A RELEASED OBJECT	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, RELEASED
1022.	ES-08	157	RELATIONSHIP IS A ROAD	RELATIONSHIP	ROAD
1023.	MS-03	40	RELATIONSHIP IS A SHELTER/SHED	RELATIONSHIP	SHELTER/SHED
1024.	ES-20	368	RELATIONSHIP IS AN ACTIVITY	RELATIONSHIP	ACTIVITY
1025.	ES-23	481	A RELATIONSHIP IS AN ACTIVITY	RELATIONSHIP	ACTIVITY
1026.	ES-20	381	RELATIONSHIP IS AN EVENT	RELATIONSHIP	EVENT
1027.	ES-20	382	RELATIONSHIP IS AN EVENT	RELATIONSHIP	EVENT
1028.	MS-26	527	RELATIONSHIP IS AN EVENT	RELATIONSHIP	EVENT
1029.	ES-06	125	RELATIONSHIP IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
1030.	MS-08	173	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE IS A LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1031.	MS-14	273	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE IS A PALACE	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	PALACE
1032.	MS-08	177	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE IS AN OCEAN	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	OCEAN
1033.	MS-14	264	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE IS AN OCEAN <WATERS>	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	OCEAN <WATERS>
1034.	ES-21	426	A RELIEF (FROM A BAD SITUATION) [BREAK] IS A CATCHABLE OBJECT	RELIEF (FROM A BAD SITUATION) [BREAK]	OBJECT, CATCHABLE
1035.	EP-08	164	RESTRICTION IS A CLOSED BUILDING	RESTRICTION	BUILDING, CLOSED
1036.	EP-04	48	A ROLE <PART> IS A DIVIDABLE OBJECT	ROLE <PART>	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE
1037.	MS-20	418	ROMANCE [A SERIES OF GAMES] IS A HEAVY LOAD	ROMANCE [SERIES OF GAMES]	LOAD, HEAVY
1038.	MS-17	352	ROMANCE [DRAMA] IS A BOUNDED SPACE	ROMANCE [DRAMA]	SPACE, BOUNDED
1039.	MS-25	508	ROMANCE [LEGEND] IS A BEAUTIFUL OBJECT	ROMANCE [LEGEND]	OBJECT, BEAUTIFUL
1040.	MS-25	510	ROMANCE [LEGEND] IS A HISTORY	ROMANCE [LEGEND]	HISTORY

NO.	CODE	MC #		CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1041.	MS-16	336		ROMANCE IS A (SPECIALIZED) DISCIPLINE OF STUDY	ROMANCE	DISCIPLINE OF STUDY (SPECIALIZED)
1042.	MS-12	246		ROMANCE IS A (VIOLENT) SEA TRAVEL	ROMANCE	TRAVEL, SEA (VIOLENT)
1043.	MS-12	254		ROMANCE IS A BOUNDED SPACE	ROMANCE	SPACE, BOUNDED
1044.	MS-12	242		ROMANCE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	ROMANCE	ROOM/CONTAINER
1045.	MS-12	247		ROMANCE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	ROMANCE	ROOM/CONTAINER
1046.	MS-20	419		ROMANCE IS A SERIES OF GAMES	ROMANCE	GAMES, A SERIES OF
1047.	MS-12	243		ROMANCE IS A SNARE-TRAP	ROMANCE	SNARE-TRAP
1048.	MS-12	245		ROMANCE IS AN OCEAN CURRENT	ROMANCE	OCEAN CURRENT
1049.	MP-08	140	A	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER IS A DECORATED ROOM	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER	ROOM, DECORATED
1050.	MS-12	240	A	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER	ROOM/CONTAINER
1051.	MS-24	494		ROMANTIC EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS	EVENTS, ROMANTIC	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
1052.	MS-25	509		ROMANTIC EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS	EVENTS, ROMANTIC	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
1053.	ES-11	199	A	ROMANTIC FANTASY IS A BOUNDED SPACE	ROMANTIC FANTASY	SPACE, BOUNDED
1054.	ES-11	200	A	ROMANTIC FANTASY IS A BOUNDED SPACE	ROMANTIC FANTASY	SPACE, BOUNDED
1055.	MS-14	278		ROMANTIC HISTORIES ARE STORABLE OBJECTS	ROMANTIC HISTORIES	OBJECT, STORABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1056.	ES-03	50	A	ROMANTIC PARTNER IS A VALUABLE POSSESSION	ROMANTIC PARTNER	POSSESSION, VALUABLE
1057.	ES-08	146		ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP IS PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)
1058.	ES-21	411		ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP IS PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)
1059.	ES-25	531		ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP IS PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)
1060.	MS-20	414		ROMANTIC REJECTION IS PHYSICAL ATTACK	ROMANTIC REJECTION	PHYSICAL ATTACK
1061.	MS-20	428		ROMANTIC REJECTION IS PHYSICAL ATTACK	ROMANTIC REJECTION	PHYSICAL ATTACK
1062.	EP-02	12	A	ROW/LINE IS A VESSEL/CANISTER	ROW/LINE	VESSEL/CANISTER
1063.	ES-06	118		SADNESS [BLUES] IS A TRANSPORTABLE OBJECT	SADNESS [BLUES]	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
1064.	MS-15	291		SADNESS [CLOUDS] IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)	SADNESS [CLOUDS]	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)
1065.	MS-05	75		SADNESS [DARKNESS] IS A PREDATOR	SADNESS [DARKNESS]	PREDATOR
1066.	MS-16	319		SADNESS [TEARS] IS AN OBSTRUCTING OBJECT	SADNESS [TEARS]	OBJECT, OBSTRUCTING
1067.	MP-06	102		SADNESS [TEARS] IS GLASS (IN PIECES)	SADNESS [TEARS]	GLASS (IN PIECES)
1068.	ES-18	299		SADNESS <TEARS> IS A LOCATION OF ARRIVAL	SADNESS <TEARS>	LOCATION OF ARRIVAL
1069.	MS-25	517		SADNESS IS RAIN WATER (POURED OUT OF A CONTAINER [THE SKY])	SADNESS	RAIN WATER (POURED OUT OF A CONTAINER [THE SKY])
1070.	ES-22	448		SADNESS/DEPRESSION IS A LOW POSITION	SADNESS/DEPRESSION	POSITION, LOW
1071.	ES-22	458		SADNESS/DEPRESSION IS A LOW POSITION	SADNESS/DEPRESSION	POSITION, LOW
1072.	EP-08	159		SANITY IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS QUESTIONED)	SANITY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS QUESTIONED)
1073.	EP-02	19	A	SCENT IS A STATIONARY/NON-MOVING OBJECT	SCENT	OBJECT, STATIONARY/NON-MOVING
1074.	MS-16	314	A	SECRET IS A ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	SECRET	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
1075.	ES-13	232		SECRETS ARE (DEEPLY-)CONCEALED OBJECTS	SECRETS	OBJECT, CONCEALED (DEEPLY-) - <i>pl.</i>
1076.	ES-07	135		SECRETS ARE HIDDEN OBJECTS	SECRETS	OBJECT, HIDDEN - <i>pl.</i>
1077.	ES-13	233		SECRETS ARE OBJECTS (WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF DEPTHS)	SECRETS	OBJECT (WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF DEPTHS) - <i>pl.</i>
1078.	MS-11	239		SELF-CONFIDENCE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RETURNS HOME)	SELF-CONFIDENCE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RETURNS HOME)
1079.	ES-23	482	A	SELF-CREATED BAD SITUATION IS A BED	BAD SITUATION, SELF-CREATED	BED
1080.	ES-02	18		SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS IS A SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)	SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS	SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)
1081.	ES-19	327		SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS IS A SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)	SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS	SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)
1082.	EP-08	156	THE	SENSE OF BELONGING, COMFORT AND FAMILIARITY IS HOME	SENSE OF BELONGING, COMFORT AND FAMILIARITY	HOME
1083.	MS-03	35		SERENITY IS A LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	SERENITY	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
1084.	MS-03	36		SERENITY IS A LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	SERENITY	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
1085.	ES-05	113	A	SERIES OF MEANINGLESS ROMANCES ARE ENTRIES IN A HISTORY BOOK	SERIES OF MEANINGLESS ROMANCES	ENTRIES IN A HISTORY BOOK
1086.	ES-24	516		SEXUAL DESIRE [RUSH] IS A MOVING OBJECT	SEXUAL DESIRE [RUSH]	OBJECT, MOVING
1087.	ES-05	111		SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT IS A GAME	SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT	GAME
1088.	ES-05	101		SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT IS A HIT-AND-RUN ACCIDENT	SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT	ACCIDENT, HIT-AND-RUN
1089.	ES-16	266		SEXUAL TEASE/FLIRTATION IS A GAME	SEXUAL TEASE/FLIRTATION	GAME
1090.	EP-06	113	A	SHADOW IS HAIR	SHADOW	HAIR

NO.	CODE	MC #	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1091.	MS-20	406	SHADOWS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO ARE ANXIOUS)	SHADOWS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS) - <i>pl.</i>
1092.	MS-20	405	SHADOWS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO CHASE)	SHADOWS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CHASES) - <i>pl.</i>
1093.	MS-22	453	SILENCE IS COLDNESS	SILENCE	COLDNESS
1094.	EP-09	177	SILENCES ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	SILENCES	ROOM/CONTAINER
1095.	MS-08	175	A SINNER/CHEATER IS A DRIFTER (AT SEA)	SINNER/CHEATER	DRIFTER (AT SEA)
1096.	MS-08	163	A SINNER/CHEATER IS A LOST PERSON	SINNER/CHEATER	LOST PERSON
1097.	MS-08	184	SINS ARE MUD/DIRT	SINS	MUD/DIRT
1098.	MS-08	176	SINS ARE OCEAN CURRENTS	SINS	OCEAN CURRENTS
1099.	MS-08	182	SINS ARE TAGGING/MARKING OBJECTS	SINS	OBJECT, TAGGING/MARKING - <i>pl.</i>
1100.	ES-25	539	A SITUATION IS A PATH/ROAD	SITUATION	PATH/ROAD
1101.	EP-02	14	THE SKY <BLUE> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SOLITARY)	SKY <BLUE>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SOLITARY)
1102.	EP-02	9	THE SKY <BLUE> IS A TOOL/INSTRUMENT	SKY <BLUE>	TOOL/INSTRUMENT
1103.	EP-02	20	THE SKY <BLUE> IS AN AUDITORY OBJECT	SKY <BLUE>	OBJECT, AUDITORY
1104.	EP-02	11	THE SKY <BLUE> IS AN OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)	SKY <BLUE>	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)
1105.	EP-05	61	THE SKY <NIGHT> IS A CLOTH	SKY <NIGHT>	CLOTH
1106.	EP-03	28	THE SKY AND THE BLIZZARD ARE (EACH) A BOUNDED SPACE	SKY AND BLIZZARD	SPACE, BOUNDED
1107.	EP-02	8	THE SKY IS A (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED) OBJECT	SKY	OBJECT (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED)
1108.	MP-08	148	THE SKY IS A CANVAS (FOR DRAWING/PAINTING)	SKY	CANVAS (FOR DRAWING/PAINTING)
1109.	MP-06	83	THE SKY IS A SEDUCEE	SKY	SEDUCEE
1110.	ES-23	478	SLEEP IS A LOST OBJECT (AND A VALUABLE RESOURCE)	SLEEP	OBJECT, LOST (AND A VALUABLE RESOURCE)
1111.	ES-23	479	SLEEP IS AN OBJECT (QUANTIFIED BY <EYE> WINKS)	SLEEP	OBJECT (QUANTIFIED BY <EYE> WINKS)
1112.	EP-04	39	SMALLNESS IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GIVES ONESELF PROWESS)	SMALLNESS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GIVES ONESELF PROWESS)
1113.	MP-08	146	A SMILE IS AN ARTIST	SMILE	ARTIST
1114.	MP-08	145	A SMILE IS A FLOWER	SMILE	FLOWER
1115.	ES-13	231	A SMILE IS AN INSTRUMENT	SMILE	INSTRUMENT
1116.	EP-02	16	A SMOKE [FUNNEL] IS A HOVERING OBJECT	SMOKE [FUNNEL]	OBJECT, HOVERING
1117.	EP-02	15	A SMOKE IS A MOVING OBJECT	SMOKE	OBJECT, MOVING
1118.	ES-16	268	SOCIAL BOUNDARY IS PHYSICAL BOUNDARY	SOCIAL BOUNDARY	PHYSICAL BOUNDARY
1119.	ES-24	519	SOCIAL PROXIMITY IS GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY	SOCIAL PROXIMITY	GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY
1120.	ES-21	435	A SONG [MIRROR] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	SONG [MIRROR]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1121.	MS-21	434	SONGS [ONE'S INNER DESIRES] ARE TRAVEL GUIDES	SONGS [ONE'S INNER VOICES]	GUIDES, TRAVEL
1122.	EP-10	185	SONGS ARE A BOUNDED SPACE	SONGS	SPACE, BOUNDED
1123.	EP-10	184	SONGS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO AGE)	SONGS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO AGES) - <i>pl.</i>
1124.	EP-05	91	SORROW IS A BLUNT TOOL/WEAPON	SORROW	TOOL/WEAPON, BLUNT
1125.	MS-22	450	SORROW IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)	SORROW	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)
1126.	EP-05	90	SORROW IS A ROOM	SORROW	ROOM
1127.	EP-05	57	SORROW IS A SPOKEN LANGUAGE	SORROW	LANGUAGE, SPOKEN
1128.	EP-05	59	SORROW IS A TACTILE STIMULUS	SORROW	TACTILE STIMULUS
1129.	MS-07	126	SORROW IS AN EXILE	SORROW	EXILE
1130.	EP-05	84	SORROWS ARE AN OCEAN	SORROWS	OCEAN
1131.	EP-07	130	A SOUND IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)	SOUND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)
1132.	EP-07	131	A SOUND IS A LIGHT	SOUND	LIGHT
1133.	EP-07	149	A SOUND IS A LIGHT	SOUND	LIGHT
1134.	ES-24	509	SOUNDS ARE A (FILL-IN) SUBSTANCE	SOUNDS	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
1135.	ES-24	508	SOUNDS ARE A SHARP OBJECT	SOUNDS	OBJECT, SHARP
1136.	MP-07	131	SOUNDS ARE CATCHABLE OBJECTS	SOUNDS	OBJECT, CATCHABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1137.	EP-05	56	SOUNDS ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO SPEAK)	SOUNDS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS) - <i>pl.</i>
1138.	EP-05	55	SOUNDS ARE OBJECTS (MEASURED BY HEIGHT)	SOUNDS	OBJECT (MEASURED BY HEIGHT) - <i>pl.</i>
1139.	MS-22	454	SPEECH IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GETS TONGUE-TIED)	SPEECH	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GETS TONGUE-TIED)
1140.	MP-05	61	SPEECH IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	SPEECH	ROOM/CONTAINER

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1141.	MS-06	117		SPEECHES ARE A (SHARP) KNIFE	SPEECHES	KNIFE (SHARP)
1142.	EP-03	22	THE	SPIRIT/SOUL (OF SAINT HILDA) IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	SPIRIT/SOUL (OF SAINT HILDA)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
1143.	MP-09	165	THE	SPIRIT/SOUL IS A GASEOUS ELEMENT	SPIRIT/SOUL	ELEMENT, GASEOUS
1144.	MP-09	166	THE	SPIRIT/SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON WHO RISES	SPIRIT/SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
1145.	MS-08	167		SPIRITUAL STRENGTH IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH	SPIRITUAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
1146.	ES-12	211		SPIRITUAL UNION IS PHYSICAL UNION	SPIRITUAL UNION	PHYSICAL UNION
1147.	ES-12	206		SPIRITUAL VIGOR IS PHYSICAL VIGOR	SPIRITUAL VIGOR	PHYSICAL VIGOR
1148.	MS-15	294	THE	STARS ARE COMPANIONS	STARS	COMPANIONS
1149.	MP-10	174	THE	STARS ARE FLOWERS	STARS	FLOWERS
1150.	MP-02	17	THE	STARS ARE SHARP OBJECTS	STARS	OBJECT, SHARP - <i>pl.</i>
1151.	EP-05	85		STARVATION IS A COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS	STARVATION	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS
1152.	ES-03	56	A	STATE (OF BEING PAWNED) IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	STATE (OF BEING PAWNED)	ROOM/CONTAINER
1153.	ES-14	240	THE	STATE OF BEING IN LOVE IS A HOME/RESIDENCE	STATE OF BEING IN LOVE	HOME/RESIDENCE
1154.	ES-26	551	A	STATE OF BEING IS A HOME/RESIDENCE	STATE OF BEING	HOME/RESIDENCE
1155.	ES-21	431	A	STATE OF BEING IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	STATE OF BEING	ROOM/CONTAINER
1156.	ES-11	198	THE	STATE OF FEELING BLISS IS HEAVEN	STATE OF FEELING BLISS	HEAVEN
1157.	ES-16	269	THE	STATE OF FEELING PLEASURE IS PARADISE	STATE OF FEELING PLEASURE	PARADISE
1158.	ES-04	91	THE	STATE OF LUXURY AND COMFORT IS PARADISE	STATE OF LUXURY AND COMFORT	PARADISE
1159.	MS-16	321		STEPS ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	STEPS	ROOM/CONTAINER
1160.	MS-01	20	A	STORY/TALE IS A VANISHING OBJECT	STORY/TALE	OBJECT, VANISHING
1161.	MS-05	78	A	STORY/TALE IS A VANISHING OBJECT	STORY/TALE	OBJECT, VANISHING
1162.	ES-18	303		STRENGTH IS A RECEIVABLE OBJECT	STRENGTH	OBJECT, RECEIVABLE
1163.	ES-22	460		STRESS (OF THE EVERYDAY LIFE) IS A WORK/JOB	STRESS (OF THE EVERYDAY LIFE)	WOKR/JOB
1164.	ES-03	43	A	STRIKE IS A SURFACE	STRIKE	SURFACE
1165.	EP-04	49	A	STRONG AND BRAVE PERSON IS A LION	PERSON, STRONG AND BRAVE	LION
1166.	ES-03	49		SUCCESS (IN LIFE) IS ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)
1167.	ES-04	80		SUCCESS (IN LIFE) IS ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)
1168.	ES-19	326		SUCCESS (IN LIFE) IS ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)
1169.	ES-04	79		SUCCESS IS A DISPLAYED OBJECT	SUCCESS	OBJECT, DISPLAYED
1170.	ES-04	83		SUCCESS IS MUSIC	SUCCESS	MUSIC
1171.	ES-23	483		SUFFERING (SELF-CREATED) CONSEQUENCES IS A LYING-DOWN POSITION	SUFFERING (SELF-CREATED) CONSEQUENCES	POSITION, LYING-DOWN
1172.	MP-01	9	THE	SUN [HUMAN/PERSON] IS AN OCEAN	SUN [HUMAN/PERSON]	OCEAN
1173.	ES-21	420	THE	SUN IS A HUMAN/PERSON	SUN	HUMAN/PERSON
1174.	MS-05	86	THE	SUN IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SILENT)	SUN	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SILENT)
1175.	MP-08	142	THE	SUN IS AN ARTIST (WITH LIGHTS AS HIS/HER DRAWINGS)	SUN	ARTIST (WITH LIGHTS AS HIS/HER DRAWINGS)
1176.	EP-06	95		SURFBOARDS <BLUE AND GREEN> ARE SMEARY SUBSTANCES	SURFBOARDS <BLUE AND GREEN>	SUBSTANCES, SMEARY
1177.	EP-06	102		SURFBOARDS ARE BEDS	SURFBOARDS	BEDS
1178.	EP-06	100		SURFERS ARE CONTROLLERS OF VEHICLES	SURFERS	CONTROLLERS OF VEHICLES
1179.	EP-06	109		SURFERS ARE VICTIMS OF PICKPOCKETS	SURFERS	VICTIMS OF PICKPOCKETS
1180.	ES-14	238		SURRENDER IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	SURRENDER	ROOM/CONTAINER
1181.	ES-14	239		SURRENDER IS A SWEET TASTANT	SURRENDER	TASTANT, SWEET
1182.	MS-13	256		SURRENDERING THOUGHTS ARE A HUMAN/PERSON	THOUGHTS, SURRENDERING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS GREETED BY THE WIND)
1183.	MS-20	426		SUSPICION IS A FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)	SUSPICION	FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)
1184.	MS-10	202		SUSPICION IS A FLOATING OBJECT	SUSPICION	OBJECT, FLOATING
1185.	MP-07	133		SWEETNESS IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NEGLIGENT)	SWEETNESS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NEGLIGENT)
1186.	MP-05	64		SWIFTNESS IS HEAT	SWIFTNESS	HEAT
1187.	MP-07	132		SYAHADAH (MUSLIM PROCLAMATION OF FAITH) IS WIND/WATER	SYAHADAH (MUSLIM PROCLAMATION OF FAITH)	WIND/WATER
1188.	EP-08	154	A	SYSTEM IS A BOUNDED SPACE	SYSTEM	SPACE, BOUNDED
1189.	ES-23	477	A	TEAR IS A FALLING LEAF	TEAR	LEAF, FALLING
1190.	ES-06	121		TEARS ARE A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	TEARS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)

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1191.	EP-06	122	TERROR IS AN OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)	TERROR	OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)
1192.	MP-07	134	TESTS (IN LIFE) ARE RIOTS	TESTS (IN LIFE)	RIOTS
1193.	ES-12	202	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) <THE BELOVED'S SOUL> IS A (FLYING) ANGEL	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) <THE BELOVED'S SOUL>	ANGEL (FLYING)
1194.	MS-25	519	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A BEAUTIFUL MELODY	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	MELODY, BEAUTIFUL
1195.	MP-01	2	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A CAPTIVE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	CAPTIVE
1196.	MS-07	152	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A CAPTIVE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	CAPTIVE
1197.	MP-06	93	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A HOME	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	HOME
1198.	MP-03	24	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A KNIFE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	KNIFE
1199.	ES-02	26	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A LOST OBJECT	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	OBJECT, LOST
1200.	MP-03	29	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A POISON	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POISON
1201.	ES-08	149	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A POSSESSION	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POSSESSION
1202.	MS-20	416	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A POSSESSION	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POSSESSION
1203.	MS-24	497	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A PREY	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	PREY
1204.	ES-08	158	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A RELEASED OBJECT	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1205.	MP-05	60	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A ROSE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ROSE
1206.	MS-25	518	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A SONG	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	SONG
1207.	ES-12	207	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS A STAR	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	STAR
1208.	MS-20	429	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS AN ESCAPEE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ESCAPEE
1209.	ES-19	340	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1210.	MP-03	34	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS FIRE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	FIRE
1211.	MP-01	10	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS HONEY/NECTAR	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	HONEY/NECTAR
1212.	ES-13	225	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS LIGHT	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	LIGHT
1213.	ES-26	548	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE EARTH'S ROTATION	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE EARTH'S ROTATION
1214.	ES-12	218	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE SUN	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE SUN
1215.	ES-08	159	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS THE POSSESSION OF HER LOVER	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POSSESSION OF HER LOVER
1216.	MP-06	92	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS TIME	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	TIME
1217.	MS-07	134	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) IS TIME	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	TIME
1218.	MS-11	229	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S HANDS> IS A GARDENER	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S HANDS>	GARDENER
1219.	MS-17	356	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S NAME> IS AN ENGRAVEMENT	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S NAME>	ENGRAVEMENT
1220.	ES-05	107	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A BOOK	THE BELOVED (MALE)	BOOK
1221.	ES-24	501	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A DOCTOR/SURGEON	THE BELOVED (MALE)	DOCTOR/SURGEON
1222.	ES-19	350	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A RELEASED OBJECT	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1223.	ES-21	402	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A RELEASED OBJECT	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1224.	ES-25	546	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A RELEASED OBJECT	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1225.	ES-19	335	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A REPLACABLE OBJECT	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, REPLACABLE
1226.	ES-23	473	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A REPLACABLE OBJECT	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, REPLACABLE
1227.	ES-23	480	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS A REPLACABLE OBJECT	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, REPLACABLE
1228.	ES-25	534	THE BELOVED (MALE) IS THE POSSESSOR/OWNER OF A <PIECE> OF HIS LOVER	THE BELOVED (MALE)	POSSESSOR/OWNER OF A <PIECE> OF HIS LOVER
1229.	ES-23	476	THE BELOVED (MALE) WHO CHEATS IS AN OBJECT (TO BE ELIMINATED)	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT (TO BE ELIMINATED)
1230.	ES-20	378	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE BELOVED> IS SKIN AND FLESH	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE BELOVED>	SKIN AND FLESH
1231.	MP-06	85	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EYES ARE LIGHTS	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EYES	LIGHTS
1232.	MP-02	16	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) GAZE IS A SHARP OBJECT	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) GAZE	OBJECT, SHARP
1233.	MP-05	69	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) KISSES <THE BELOVED'S LIPS> ARE HONEY	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) KISSES <THE BELOVED'S LIPS>	HONEY
1234.	ES-15	256	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE BELOVED> IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE BELOVED>	ROOM/CONTAINER
1235.	ES-24	518	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED'S FACE> IS A VISUAL OBJECT	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED'S FACE>	OBJECT, VISUAL
1236.	ES-18	286	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED> IS HEAT/WARMTH	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED>	HEAT/WARMTH
1237.	MS-18	359	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE IS A SCRAPING TOOL	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE	TOOL, SCRAPING
1238.	MS-18	358	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE IS AN EROSIVE SUBSTANCE	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE	SUBSTANCE, EROSIVE
1239.	ES-05	100	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A (POTENTIAL) VICTIM OF A HIT-AND-RUN ACCIDENT	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	VICTIM OF A HIT-AND-RUN ACCIDENT (POTENTIAL)
1240.	ES-11	197	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A CONTROLLED MACHINE/DEVICE	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	MACHINE/DEVICE (CONTROLLED)

NO.	CODE	MC #	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1241.	ES-24	500	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A DOCTOR/SURGEON	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	DOCTOR/SURGEON
1242.	MS-11	228	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A FLOWER	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	FLOWER
1243.	MS-11	230	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A FRAGIBLE (CRUMBLING) OBJECT	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)
1244.	MS-09	193	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A LOTUS	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	LOTUS
1245.	ES-24	502	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A VICTIM OF SERIOUS INJURY	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	VICTIM OF SERIOUS INJURY
1246.	MS-11	231	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A WILTING FLOWER	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	FLOWER, WILTING
1247.	MS-16	329	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)
1248.	ES-25	541	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS A WORTHLESS OBJECT (WITHOUT HER BELOVED)	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	OBJECT, WORTHLESS (WITHOUT HER BELOVED)
1249.	ES-15	257	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS AN INSTRUMENT	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	INSTRUMENT
1250.	MS-15	306	THE LOVER (FEMALE) IS THE FULL MOON	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	MOON, FULL
1251.	MP-03	30	THE LOVER (MALE) <THE LOVER'S BLOOD> IS A VICTIM OF POISONING	THE LOVER (MALE) <THE LOVER'S BLOOD>	VICTIM OF POISONING
1252.	ES-08	154	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A (BROKEN) MACHINE	THE LOVER (MALE)	MACHINE (BROKEN)
1253.	ES-20	397	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A (BROKEN) MACHINE	THE LOVER (MALE)	MACHINE (BROKEN)
1254.	MP-03	33	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A BRAZIER	THE LOVER (MALE)	BRAZIER
1255.	MS-22	460	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A DRIFTER (AT SEA)	THE LOVER (MALE)	DRIFTER (AT SEA)
1256.	MS-20	413	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A PREDATORY BIRD	THE LOVER (MALE)	BIRD, PREDATORY
1257.	ES-08	164	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A RELEASED OBJECT	THE LOVER (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1258.	ES-19	337	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A REPTILE OR AN INSECT	THE LOVER (MALE)	REPTILE OR INSECT
1259.	ES-07	145	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A RISK-TAKER (FOR HIS BELOVED)	THE LOVER (MALE)	RISK-TAKER (FOR HIS BELOVED)
1260.	MS-22	461	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A SMALL BOAT (AT SEA)	THE LOVER (MALE)	BOAT, SMALL (AT SEA)
1261.	MS-20	412	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A WARRIOR	THE LOVER (MALE)	WARRIOR
1262.	ES-13	221	THE LOVER (MALE) IS A WORTHLESS OBJECT (WITHOUT HIS BELOVED)	THE LOVER (MALE)	OBJECT, WORTHLESS (WITHOUT HIS BELOVED)
1263.	MS-22	457	THE LOVER (MALE) IS AN ESCAPEE	THE LOVER (MALE)	ESCAPEE
1264.	ES-08	160	THE LOVER (MALE) IS THE POSSESSION OF HIS BELOVED	THE LOVER (MALE)	POSSESSION OF HIS BELOVED
1265.	ES-24	484	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE LOVER> IS A SECURED/PROTECTED AREA	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE LOVER>	AREA, SECURED/PROTECTED
1266.	ES-24	489	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER> ARE WATER TURNED INTO ICE	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER>	WATER TURNED INTO ICE
1267.	MS-21	444	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS ARE A WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS	WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)
1268.	MS-18	360	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS ARE ERODED AND SCRAPED OBJECTS	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS	OBJECT, ERODED AND SCRAPED - <i>pl.</i>
1269.	ES-15	254	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER> IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1270.	ES-15	264	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER> IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1271.	ES-18	294	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER> IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1272.	ES-11	195	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) MIND <THE LOVER> IS AN ENTRANCE	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) MIND <THE LOVER>	ENTRANCE
1273.	ES-07	137	THE LOVER'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE LOVER'S LIFE> IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	THE LOVER'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE LOVER'S LIFE>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1274.	MP-06	101	THE LOVER'S (MALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER> ARE WATER TURNED INTO ICE	THE LOVER'S (MALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER>	WATER TURNED INTO ICE
1275.	ES-07	132	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER> IS A FOUND OBJECT	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, FOUND
1276.	ES-07	136	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER> IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1277.	ES-19	322	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER> IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1278.	MP-10	170	THE LOVER'S (MALE) RESTLESSNESS IS A POSSESSION (OF HIS BELOVED)	THE LOVER'S (MALE) RESTLESSNESS	POSSESSION (OF HIS BELOVED)
1279.	ES-20	377	THE LOVER'S (MALE) SEXUAL DESIRE <THE LOVER'S BODY> IS A HUMAN/PERSON	THE LOVER'S (MALE) SEXUAL DESIRE <THE LOVER'S BODY>	HUMAN/PERSON
1280.	ES-21	428	THE SELF <EMOTION> IS A FRAGILE OBJECT	THE SELF <EMOTION>	OBJECT, FRAGILE
1281.	MS-11	235	THE SELF IS A COMMODITY	THE SELF	COMMODITY
1282.	ES-21	429	THE SELF IS A FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES) OBJECT	THE SELF	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)
1283.	ES-22	451	THE SELF IS A FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES) OBJECT	THE SELF	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)
1284.	ES-02	41	THE SELF IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1285.	ES-03	58	THE SELF IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1286.	ES-13	230	THE SELF IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1287.	ES-21	438	THE SELF IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1288.	ES-24	510	THE SELF IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1289.	ES-24	521	THE SELF IS A VESSEL/CONTAINER (OF WATER)	THE SELF	VESSEL/CONTAINER (OF WATER)
1290.	ES-21	403	THE SELF IS AN INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)	THE SELF	INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)

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1291.	ES-21	405	THE SELF IS AN INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)	THE SELF	INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)
1292.	ES-25	535	THE SELF IS AN OBJECT (WITH DIVIDABLE <PIECES>)	THE SELF	OBJECT (WITH DIVIDABLE <PIECES>)
1293.	ES-21	414	THE SELF IS AN OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE <PART>)	THE SELF	OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE <PART>)
1294.	ES-20	394	THE SELF IS AN OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE PART <SIDE>)	THE SELF	OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE PART <SIDE>)
1295.	MP-09	160	THE SOUL (OF THE <POET>) IS A TREE'S ROOTS	SOUL (OF THE <POET>)	TREE'S ROOTS
1296.	MP-05	63	THE SOUL [A VISUAL ORGAN] IS PREDATORY BIRD	SOUL [VISUAL ORGAN]	BIRD, PREDATORY
1297.	MS-23	488	THE SOUL IS A BROOCH	SOUL	BROOCH
1298.	MS-24	491	THE SOUL IS A CHILD/SUBORDINATE (TO THE SELF)	SOUL	CHILD/SUBORDINATE (TO THE SELF)
1299.	MS-19	384	THE SOUL IS A DEEP OCEAN	SOUL	OCEAN, DEEP
1300.	MS-19	389	THE SOUL IS A FLOWER	SOUL	FLOWER
1301.	MS-18	366	THE SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON
1302.	MP-06	79	THE SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS)	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS)
1303.	MS-23	489	THE SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)
1304.	MS-19	388	THE SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)
1305.	MP-06	78	THE SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TROUBLESOME)	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TROUBLESOME)
1306.	MS-22	466	THE SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS WOEFUL)	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS WOEFUL)
1307.	MS-21	443	THE SOUL IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SENDS OUT SIGNALS)	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SENDS OUT SIGNALS)
1308.	MS-16	309	THE SOUL IS A LOCATION	SOUL	LOCATION
1309.	MS-16	335	THE SOUL IS A LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	SOUL	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
1310.	MP-06	80	THE SOUL IS A REBEL	SOUL	REBEL
1311.	MS-10	201	THE SOUL IS A ROOM/CONTAINER (FOR IMMORTALIZED MEMORIES)	SOUL	ROOM/CONTAINER (FOR IMMORTALIZED MEMORIES)
1312.	ES-07	131	THE SOUL IS A SEARCHABLE PLACE	SOUL	PLACE, SEARCHABLE
1313.	MS-26	543	THE SOUL IS A SINGER/MUSICIAN	SOUL	SINGER/MUSICIAN
1314.	MS-19	401	THE SOUL IS A VICTIM OF STABBING	SOUL	VICTIM OF STABBING
1315.	MP-05	62	THE SOUL IS A VISUAL ORGAN	SOUL	ORGAN, VISUAL
1316.	MS-07	146	THE SOUL IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)	SOUL	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)
1317.	MS-22	465	THE SOUL IS AN OCEAN	SOUL	OCEAN
1318.	MS-19	385	THE SOUL IS SKIN	SOUL	SKIN
1319.	MS-17	347	THE SOUL IS SKIN/HAIR	SOUL	SKIN/HAIR
1320.	MS-19	387	THE SOUL IS SKIN/HAIR	SOUL	SKIN/HAIR
1321.	MS-19	398	THE SOUL IS SKIN/HAIR	SOUL	SKIN/HAIR
1322.	ES-11	188	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS ARE A HECTIC PLACE	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS	PLACE, HECTIC
1323.	MS-19	377	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS ARE OCEAN WAVES	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS	OCEAN WAVES
1324.	ES-11	190	THOUGHTS ARE (RIVER) WATER	THOUGHTS	WATER (RIVER)
1325.	ES-22	453	TIME [DAY] IS A REMOVABLE OBJECT	TIME [DAY]	OBJECT, REMOVABLE
1326.	ES-12	212	TIME [DAY] IS A SWEET TASTANT	TIME [DAY]	TASTANT, SWEET
1327.	ES-22	452	TIME [DAY] IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	TIME [DAY]	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1328.	MS-26	539	TIME [DAYS] IS A SCYTHE	TIME [DAYS]	SCYTHE
1329.	ES-20	398	TIME [DAYS] IS A SERIES OF ENUMERABLE OBJECTS (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)	TIME [DAYS]	OBJECTS, ENUMERABLE (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)
1330.	ES-18	285	TIME [DAYS] IS TEMPERATURE	TIME [DAYS]	TEMPERATURE
1331.	MP-08	150	TIME [EMBRACE] IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME [EMBRACE]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1332.	ES-15	258	TIME [ETERNITY] IS MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME [ETERNITY]	MONEY/RESOURCE
1333.	ES-20	399	TIME [HOURS] IS A SERIES OF ENUMERABLE OBJECTS (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)	TIME [HOURS]	OBJECTS, ENUMERABLE (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)
1334.	ES-23	471	TIME [MINUTE] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	TIME [MINUTE]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1335.	ES-14	249	TIME [MOMENT] IS A HOME/HOUSE	TIME [MOMENT]	HOME/HOUSE
1336.	ES-22	440	TIME [MOMENT] IS A LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR) OBJECT	TIME [MOMENT]	OBJECT, LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
1337.	ES-14	242	TIME [MOMENT] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	TIME [MOMENT]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1338.	ES-14	243	TIME [MOMENT] IS MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME [MOMENT]	MONEY/RESOURCE
1339.	ES-14	244	TIME [MOMENT] IS TREASURE <TREASURE>	TIME [MOMENT]	TREASURE <TREASURE>
1340.	ES-10	182	TIME [NIGHT] IS A TUNNEL	TIME [NIGHT]	TUNNEL

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1341.	ES-10	184	TIME [NIGHT] IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME [NIGHT]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1342.	ES-02	30	TIME [NIGHT] IS MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME [NIGHT]	MONEY/RESOURCE
1343.	MS-05	85	TIME [SEASON] IS A CHANGEABLE OBJECT	TIME [SEASON]	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE
1344.	MP-05	53	TIME [SEASON] IS A COLOR	TIME [SEASON]	COLOR
1345.	MP-07	108	TIME [SEASON] IS A LOCATION	TIME [SEASON]	LOCATION
1346.	EP-08	166	TIME <THE WORLD> IS A MOVING OBJECT	TIME <WORLD>	OBJECT, MOVING
1347.	MP-06	96	TIME IS A BLAMER (OF ONE'S MISTAKES)	TIME	BLAMER (OF ONE'S MISTAKES)
1348.	MS-11	238	TIME IS A BOUNDED SPACE	TIME	SPACE, BOUNDED
1349.	ES-13	223	TIME IS A DARK ROOM (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)	TIME	ROOM, DARK (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)
1350.	MP-09	154	TIME IS A FLOWER	TIME	FLOWER
1351.	EP-05	62	TIME IS A GROUP OF ISLANDS	TIME	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
1352.	EP-04	35	TIME IS A HOLE (INTO WHICH ONE SLIPS AND FALLS)	TIME	HOLE (INTO WHICH ONE SLIPS AND FALLS)
1353.	EP-05	75	TIME IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO OWNS VALLEYS)	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO OWNS VALLEYS)
1354.	ES-05	103	TIME IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STANDS STILL)	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STANDS STILL)
1355.	EP-05	76	TIME IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WEARS CLOTHES)	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WEARS CLOTHES)
1356.	MP-06	95	TIME IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)
1357.	ES-20	366	TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT	TIME	OBJECT, MOVING
1358.	ES-24	488	TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT	TIME	OBJECT, MOVING
1359.	MS-26	542	TIME IS A MUSICAL NOTE	TIME	MUSICAL NOTE
1360.	MS-26	532	TIME IS A POCKET (OF VALUABLES) AND VALUABLES	TIME	POCKET (OF VALUABLES) AND VALUABLES
1361.	MP-06	90	TIME IS A ROOM	TIME	ROOM
1362.	EP-03	27	TIME IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	TIME	ROOM/CONTAINER
1363.	ES-14	250	TIME IS A SERIES OF OBJECTS (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)	TIME	OBJECTS, A SERIES OF (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)
1364.	MP-06	106	TIME IS A SET OF CLAWS	TIME	CLAWS, A SET OF
1365.	MP-05	71	TIME IS A WIZARD/WITCH	TIME	WIZARD/WITCH
1366.	ES-08	147	TIME IS AN OBJECT	TIME	OBJECT
1367.	EP-05	52	TIME IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1368.	ES-03	42	TIME IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1369.	ES-20	367	TIME IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1370.	ES-20	390	TIME IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1371.	ES-19	331	TIME IS MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME	MONEY/RESOURCE
1372.	ES-19	334	TIME IS MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME	MONEY/RESOURCE
1373.	ES-04	87	TIME OF PAST IS A LOCATION (BEHIND US)	TIME OF PAST	LOCATION (BEHIND US)
1374.	ES-04	66	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS) ARE A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO KNOCKS)	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO KNOCKS)
1375.	ES-21	419	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS) ARE A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO TREATS ONE ROUGHLY)	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO TREATS ONE ROUGHLY)
1376.	ES-04	65	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS) ARE OBJECTS (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY) - <i>pl.</i>
1377.	ES-01	7	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	ROOM/CONTAINER
1378.	ES-01	8	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	ROOM/CONTAINER
1379.	ES-04	85	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE ABANDONABLE OBJECTS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ABANDONABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1380.	ES-02	15	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE ENUMERABLE OBJECTS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1381.	ES-02	21	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE ENUMERABLE OBJECTS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1382.	ES-08	162	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE ENUMERABLE OBJECTS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1383.	ES-24	490	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE ENUMERABLE OBJECTS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1384.	EP-07	135	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE LOCATIONS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	LOCATIONS
1385.	ES-04	88	TIMES (OCCASIONS) ARE OBJECTS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT - <i>pl.</i>
1386.	ES-04	60	TOLERABILITY IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	TOLERABILITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
1387.	ES-15	255	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS IS AN ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)
1388.	ES-17	283	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS IS AN ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)
1389.	ES-18	290	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS IS AN ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)
1390.	ES-19	316	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS IS AN ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)

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1391.	ES-19	338		TOUCH IS A PRISON GUARD	TOUCH	PRISON GUARD
1392.	ES-21	409		TOUCH IS AN OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	TOUCH	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1393.	EP-09	167	A	TOWN IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LOOSES THINGS)	TOWN	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LOOSES THINGS)
1394.	ES-15	252		TRUST IS A TRANSFERABLE OBJECT	TRUST	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1395.	MS-24	505		TRUTH [BRIGHTNESS] IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	TRUTH [BRIGHTNESS]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1396.	MS-24	506		TRUTH IS A BLINDING LIGHT	TRUTH	LIGHT, BLINDING
1397.	MS-08	164		TRUTH IS LIGHT	TRUTH	LIGHT
1398.	ES-05	108		UNDERSTANDING [READING] IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	UNDERSTANDING [READING]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
1399.	ES-21	404	AN	UNDERSTANDING IS A MEASUREMENT/SCALE (FOR DEPTH OF WATER)	UNDERSTANDING	MEASUREMENT/SCALE (FOR DEPTH OF WATER)
1400.	ES-01	11		UNDERSTANDING IS AN OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	UNDERSTANDING	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
1401.	ES-15	263		UNHAPPINESS IS A LOCATION OF ARRIVAL	UNHAPPINESS	LOCATION OF ARRIVAL
1402.	MP-07	119	AN	UNLEARNED PERSON IS AN EMPTY GLASS	PERSON, UNLEARNED	GLASS, EMPTY
1403.	MS-09	194	AN	UNMARRIED WOMAN IS A WILTING FLOWER	WOMAN, UNMARRIED	FLOWER, WILTING
1404.	EP-08	153	AN	UNRESTRICTIVE SYSTEM IS AN OPEN ROOM/CONTAINER	SYSTEM, UNRESTRICTIVE	ROOM/CONTAINER, OPEN
1405.	EP-05	60	A	VALLEY IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PULLS)	VALLEY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PULLS)
1406.	EP-05	74		VALLEYS ARE SUCTION DEVICES	VALLEYS	SUCTION DEVICES
1407.	ES-25	527		VERBAL RETRACTION IS PHYSICAL RETRACTION	VERBAL RETRACTION	PHYSICAL RETRACTION
1408.	EP-02	18		VISUAL INTERFERENCE IS PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE	VISUAL INTERFERENCE	PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE
1409.	EP-05	80		VISUAL PRESENCE IS PHYSICAL PRESENCE	VISUAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
1410.	MS-21	442		VISUAL SIGNALS ARE VERBAL STATEMENTS	VISUAL SIGNALS	VERBAL STATEMENTS
1411.	EP-07	137	A	VOICE IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	VOICE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
1412.	EP-07	138	A	VOICE IS A LIGHT	VOICE	LIGHT
1413.	MP-04	39	A	VOICE IS A SONG	VOICE	SONG
1414.	EP-05	54		WARMTH IS A GROUP OF ISLANDS	WARMTH	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
1415.	EP-08	155		WATER IS A (<PENNEDED> FARM) ANIMAL	WATER	ANIMAL (<PENNEDED> FARM)
1416.	EP-06	112		WATER IS A BRUSH	WATER	BRUSH
1417.	MS-14	265		WATER IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS CALM)	WATER	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS CALM)
1418.	EP-06	94		WATER IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	WATER	ROOM/CONTAINER
1419.	MP-09	153		WATER IS SOIL	WATER	EARTH/SOIL
1420.	EP-06	101	A	WAVE IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	WAVE	ROOM/CONTAINER
1421.	MS-21	440		WAVES ARE A DRAWING (TO BE PAINTED WITH COLORS)	WAVES	DRAWING (TO BE PAINTED WITH COLORS)
1422.	EP-06	98		WAVES ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	WAVES	ROOM/CONTAINER
1423.	EP-06	107		WAVES ARE ENUMERABLE OBJECTS	WAVES	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1424.	MS-16	315		WAVES ARE FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) OBJECTS	WAVES	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) - <i>pl.</i>
1425.	MS-19	378		WAVES ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WHO ARE ANXIOUS)	WAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS) - <i>pl.</i>
1426.	MS-16	316		WAVES ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WITH FINGERS)	WAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS) - <i>pl.</i>
1427.	EP-06	105		WAVES ARE HUMANS/PERSONS (WITH VISUAL ORGANS)	WAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VISUAL ORGANS) - <i>pl.</i>
1428.	EP-06	108		WAVES ARE PICKPOCKETS	WAVES	PICKPOCKETS
1429.	MP-01	3		WAVES ARE WEADED MATS	WAVES	MATS, WEADED
1430.	EP-08	158		WEALTH IS WELLNESS	WEALTH	WELLNESS
1431.	MS-14	269		WETNESS IS A LACK OF COLOR	WETNESS	LACK OF COLOR
1432.	MS-21	435		WHISPERS [ONE'S INNER DESIRES] ARE TRAVEL GUIDES	WHISPERS [ONE'S INNER VOICES]	GUIDES, TRAVEL
1433.	MS-08	181	A	WIFE <WIFE'S FACE> IS HEAVEN	WIFE <WIFE'S FACE>	HEAVEN
1434.	MS-08	179	A	WIFE IS A HARBOR	WIFE	HARBOR
1435.	MS-08	158	A	WIFE IS AN EMBLEM (OF LOVE)	WIFE	EMBLEM (OF LOVE)
1436.	EP-08	162		WILD PLANTS ARE DEAR/LONG-TIME FRIENDS	PLANTS, WILD	FRIENDS, DEAR/LONG-TIME
1437.	MP-09	155	THE	WIND IS A HOUSE (WITH WINDOWS)	WIND	HOUSE (WITH WINDOWS)
1438.	MP-05	57	THE	WIND IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)
1439.	MS-19	394	THE	WIND IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)
1440.	MS-25	511	THE	WIND IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)

NO.	CODE	MC #	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR		TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1441.	MS-13	255	THE	WIND IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREET'S ONE'S THOUGHTS)	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREET'S ONE'S THOUGHTS)
1442.	MS-19	395	THE	WIND IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)
1443.	MS-16	313	THE	WIND IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)
1444.	MP-06	87	THE	WIND IS A REBEL	WIND	REBEL
1445.	MP-09	156	THE	WIND IS A WINDOW FRAME	WIND	WINDOW FRAME
1446.	MP-06	88	THE	WIND IS AN ATTACKER	WIND	ATTACKER
1447.	MS-16	311	THE	WIND IS HAIR	WIND	HAIR
1448.	MS-16	312	THE	WIND IS HAIR	WIND	HAIR
1449.	EP-07	127	A	WINDOW IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOW	ROOM/CONTAINER
1450.	EP-07	144	A	WINDOW IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOW	ROOM/CONTAINER
1451.	EP-09	169	A	WINDOW IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOW	ROOM/CONTAINER
1452.	MS-16	308		WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES> ARE A LOCATION	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>	LOCATION
1453.	MS-16	334		WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES> ARE A LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
1454.	ES-07	128		WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES> ARE A ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>	ROOM/CONTAINER
1455.	ES-10	181	A	WISH IS A MADE/CREATED OBJECT	WISH	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
1456.	ES-20	364	A	WISH IS A MOVING OBJECT	WISH	OBJECT, MOVING
1457.	MS-21	439		WISHES ARE UNREACHABLE (HIGHLY-POSITIONED) OBJECTS	WISHES	OBJECT, UNREACHABLE (HIGHLY-POSITIONED) - <i>pl.</i>
1458.	MS-17	339		WORDS ARE 3-DIMENSIONAL OBJECTS	WORDS	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL - <i>pl.</i>
1459.	MS-25	522		WORDS ARE COMPANIONS	WORDS	COMPANIONS
1460.	MS-26	526		WORDS ARE MOVABLE OBJECTS	WORDS	OBJECT, MOVABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1461.	ES-01	13		WORDS ARE MOVING OBJECTS	WORDS	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
1462.	MS-09	191		WORDS ARE TOYS	WORDS	TOYS
1463.	ES-25	528		WORDS ARE TRANSFERABLE OBJECTS	WORDS	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1464.	MS-15	286		WORDS/SPEECHES ARE OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)	WORDS/SPEECHES	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)
1465.	MS-26	528		WORDS/SPEECHES ARE OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)	WORDS/SPEECHES	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)
1466.	EP-10	188	THE	WORLD <EARTH SURFACE> IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)	WORLD <EARTH SURFACE>	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)
1467.	ES-04	81	THE	WORLD IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REFUSES TO HELP)	WORLD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REFUSES TO HELP)
1468.	EP-07	140	THE	WORLD IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)	WORLD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)
1469.	ES-26	549	THE	WORLD IS A HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STARES)	WORLD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STARES)
1470.	ES-24	517	THE	WORLD IS A ROOM/CONTAINER	WORLD	ROOM/CONTAINER
1471.	EP-08	165	THE	WORLD IS A ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	WORLD	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)

Appendix C - Catalogue II: Target Domains

< > metonymy embedded within metaphor

[] metaphor embedded within metaphor

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1.	ABILITIES/SKILLS [TOUCH] <HANDS>	OBJECT, LOSABLE - <i>pl.</i>
2.	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
3.	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
4.	ACTIVITY	ROOM/CONTAINER
5.	AFFINITY	PLACE/PERSON (TO WHICH/WHOM ONE BELONGS)
6.	AFFLICTIONS	FORCES OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)
7.	AFFLICTIONS	STORMS
8.	AFFLICTIONS [TURBULENCES]	DAGGERS
9.	AFTERLIFE [ETERNAL LANE]	DESTINATION, FINAL
10.	AGE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECOGNIZES)
11.	AGE	SEED, GERMINATED (WITH GRIZZLE AS ITS SPROUTS)
12.	ANGEL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREETES)
13.	ANGER	EVIL SPIRIT (THAT POSSESS ONE'S MIND)
14.	ANGER	GRANULES, A BUNCH OF
15.	ANGER	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
16.	ANGER	REBEL
17.	ANIMALS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO FEELS SORROW) - <i>pl.</i>
18.	ANSWERS	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) - <i>pl.</i>
19.	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS	ROAD
20.	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS [ROAD]	MAT/RUG/CARPET
21.	ANXIETY	FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)
22.	ANXIETY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)
23.	ANXIETY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
24.	ANXIETY AND DISTRESS	FRIENDS, DEAR/LONG-TIME
25.	ANXIETY AND SUSPICION	SWING
26.	ARTS	VICTIM OF WITCHCRAFT
27.	ASHES AND BITS OF BONES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO MOVES) - <i>pl.</i>
28.	ATMOSPHERE	WATER
29.	ATTEMPT	OBJECT
30.	ATTEMPT	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
31.	ATTEMPT	SHOT
32.	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE	PHYSICAL CHANGE
33.	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE	PHYSICAL CHANGE
34.	AUDITORY PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
35.	AUDITORY PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
36.	AUDITORY PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
37.	AWARENES	ROOM/CONTAINER
38.	AWARENES [TRACKS/LINES]	OBJECT, STORABLE
39.	AZAN (MUSLIM CALL FOR PRAYER)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAVES)
40.	BAD SITUATION	OBJECT, MOVABLE (ROTATABLE)
41.	BAD SITUATION, SELF-CREATED	BED
42.	BARNACLES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REMINDS) - <i>pl.</i>
43.	BEING IN LOVE	GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION
44.	BELIEF/CONVICTION	WAGER
45.	BELLS	ANGELS

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
46.	BELLS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES) - <i>pl.</i>
47.	BETRAYAL	GIFT-IN-RETURN
48.	BETRAYAL	POISON
49.	BLAMES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP)	SCOREBOARD, BREAKABLE
50.	BLESSINGS	HARVEST/CROPS
51.	BLESSINGS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)
52.	BLESSINGS	RAIN/WATER
53.	BLESSINGS	RAIN/WATER, ZAM-ZAM
54.	BLISS	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
55.	BLISS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
56.	BOULDERS	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS
57.	BREATH	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)
58.	BREATH	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
59.	BREEZE, MOUNTAIN	FABRIC (TO BE SEWN INTO A DRESS)
60.	CALMNESS	CHILLNESS
61.	CAMERA	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO DOES NOT LIE)
62.	CANARIES	HUMAN/PERSON (OF ANIMIST BELIEF) - <i>pl.</i>
63.	CAR	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO AGES)
64.	CARESSES	PRISONS
65.	CHALLENGES (IN LIFE)	TURBULENCES
66.	CHARM	TASTANT, SWEET
67.	CHOICE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
68.	CHOICE	PATH
69.	CITIES	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
70.	CLOSED EMOTION <CLOSED VEIN>	CAUSE OF EMOTIONAL CRIPPLING
71.	CLOUD	OBJECT, BINDING
72.	CLOUDS	EMBROIDERY
73.	COLDNESS	DEPTH
74.	COLOR BLACK	CONTAMINATION
75.	COLORS	HEAT
76.	COLORS	HEAT
77.	COLORS (OF EMOTIONAL WOUNDS)	LIQUID, OVERFLOWING
78.	COLORS/SHADES	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)
79.	COMFORT [LIGHT AND HEAT]	FEAST, MOMENTARY
80.	COMMITMENT	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
81.	COMPANIONSHIP	LOCATION
82.	COMPANIONSHIP <HAND>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
83.	COMPANIONSHIP <HAND>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
84.	CONCEPTUAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
85.	CONCEPTUAL SUPPORT	PHYSICAL SUPPORT
86.	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP)	SCORES ON A SCOREBOARD
87.	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP)	STINGS
88.	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE)	OCEAN CURRENTS
89.	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE)	STORMS
90.	CONFUSION	GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
91.	CORPSE, CHARRING <BODY>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SITS)
92.	CORPSE, CHARRING <HEAD>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
93.	CRY	EARTH/SOIL
94.	CRY	ESCAPEE (OUT OF A CHILD'S BODY)
95.	CRY	FURNITURE (THAT FILLS THE WHOLE HOUSE)
96.	CRY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECEIVES)
97.	CRY	OBJECT, EMERGING
98.	CRY	OBJECT, PUSHABLE
99.	CRY	PENDULUM (SWINGING)
100.	CRY	WATER/FLOOD
101.	CRY (OF A CHILD)	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH GREAT STRENGTH)
102.	CRY (OF A CHILD)	LIGHT
103.	CRYING/LAMENTING	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL
104.	CULTURAL TRADITIONS	AUTHORITY (THAT IS REBELLED AGAINST)
105.	CULTURAL TRADITIONS	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH A NERVE DISEASE)
106.	CULTURE	WORLD
107.	CURSING	SONGLINE
108.	CURTAINS	DOORS
109.	DARKNESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
110.	DAYDREAMS	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
111.	DEATH	BLOOD (<LEECH>ING OUT OF THE LEAVES)
112.	DEATH	DEPARTURE
113.	DEATH	DEPARTURE
114.	DEATH	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS GRACEFUL)
115.	DEATH	INACTIVITY OF VISUAL AND SPEECH ORGANS
116.	DEATH [TIME] <TICKING OF A CLOCK>	OBJECT, MOVING
117.	DEATH <CORPSE>	FLAG
118.	DECEPTION	GAME
119.	DECIMAL POINT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)
120.	DECISIONS	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
121.	DECLARATION (OF LOVE)	ROYALTY
122.	DEMANDS	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
123.	DEPTH	COLDNESS (EXTREME)
124.	DESPAIR	LIGHT, DIM
125.	DESPAIR	OCEAN WAVE
126.	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
127.	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
128.	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
129.	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)
130.	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS	MOVEMENT, RAPID <RUSH>
131.	DEW	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
132.	DEW	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE)
133.	DIFFICULTIES	TUNNEL
134.	DIFFICULTIES (IN LIFE)	SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
135.	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
136.	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
137.	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
138.	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
139.	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
140.	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
141.	DIFFICULTY	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH
142.	DIRECTIONS	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) - <i>pl.</i>
143.	DIRECTIONS	OBJECT, MOVABLE - <i>pl.</i>
144.	DISAPPOINTMENTS	SHROUDS
145.	DISCOMFORT	HELL
146.	DISTANCE	COLDNESS
147.	DISTANCE	LOCATION
148.	DISTANCE <HEIGHT>	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)
149.	DIVIDED PART <SIDE> OF THE SELF	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)
150.	DOMINION	OBJECT, GRASPABLE
151.	DOUBT	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
152.	DREAM	PLACE, REMOTE
153.	DREAM	ROOM/CONTAINER
154.	DREAM [AN UNKNOWN/UNFAMILIAR LOCATION]	ROOM/CONTAINER
155.	DREAMER	BIRD
156.	DREAMS	FLOWERS
157.	DREAMS	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
158.	DREAMS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
159.	DREAMS	ROOM (THAT IS ADJACENT TO REALITY)
160.	DREAMS	ROOM/CONTAINER
161.	DREAMS	ROOM/CONTAINER
162.	DREAMS	TASTANTS, SWEET
163.	DROUGHT	ROOM/CONTAINER
164.	ECONOMY	COMPETITION
165.	EFFECTS OF MORPHINE <MORPHINE>	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
166.	EMBARRASSMENT	HAT
167.	EMBARRASSMENT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)
168.	EMBRACE	NECKLACE
169.	EMBRACE <ARMS>	ROOM/CONTAINER
170.	EMOTION	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)
171.	EMOTION	LANGUAGE
172.	EMOTION	LOCATION
173.	EMOTION	MOUNTAIN
174.	EMOTION	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
175.	EMOTION	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
176.	EMOTION	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)
177.	EMOTION	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)
178.	EMOTION	OBJECT, GRASPABLE
179.	EMOTION	OBJECT, THINLY SLICED
180.	EMOTION	ROOM/CONTAINER
181.	EMOTION	SKIN
182.	EMOTION	SKIN
183.	EMOTION	SKIN
184.	EMOTION	SKIN/HAIR
185.	EMOTION	SKIN/HAIR
186.	EMOTION	VICTIM OF STABBING
187.	EMOTION (CENTER OF)	SMALLEST PART OF THE <LIVER>
188.	EMOTION [FULL MOON]	OBJECT, FLOATING
189.	EMOTION [GAZE]	DEITY
190.	EMOTION [GAZE]	OBJECT, SHARP AND LONG

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
191.	EMOTION [WORDS]	CHILD (BEING TUCKED INTO BED)
192.	EMOTION [WORDS]	CREATOR OF HEAVEN
193.	EMOTION [WORDS]	FLOWER
194.	EMOTION [WORDS]	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)
195.	EMOTION <CHEST>	FLOOR/GROUND
196.	EMOTION <CHEST>	ROOM/CONTAINER
197.	EMOTION <CHEST>	SKIN
198.	EMOTION <CHEST>	SURFACE, SCRATCHED
199.	EMOTION <HEART>	CLOCK (WITH LOUD TICKINGS)
200.	EMOTION <HEART>	HUMAN/PERSON
201.	EMOTION <HEART>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)
202.	EMOTION <HEART>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)
203.	EMOTION <HEART>	ICE MELTED INTO WATER
204.	EMOTION <HEART>	INSTRUMENT
205.	EMOTION <HEART>	LANGUAGE, FOREIGN
206.	EMOTION <HEART>	LIMB (CRIPPLED)
207.	EMOTION <HEART>	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
208.	EMOTION <HEART>	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
209.	EMOTION <HEART>	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE)
210.	EMOTION <HEART>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
211.	EMOTION <HEART>	OCEAN, DEEP
212.	EMOTION <HEART>	PAPER/CLOTH
213.	EMOTION <HEART>	PLACE, SEARCHABLE
214.	EMOTION <HEART>	ROOM/CONTAINER
215.	EMOTION <HEART>	ROOM/CONTAINER
216.	EMOTION <HEART>	TOY
217.	EMOTION <LIVER>	BUILDING (ON FIRE)
218.	EMOTION <LIVER>	CAPTIVE
219.	EMOTION <LIVER>	CITY
220.	EMOTION <LIVER>	CITY
221.	EMOTION <LIVER>	CITY
222.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ENGRAVED PLATE
223.	EMOTION <LIVER>	FLESH (OF A PREY)
224.	EMOTION <LIVER>	FLOWER
225.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HOST
226.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON
227.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CRIES)
228.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)
229.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)
230.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)
231.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)
232.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS YOUNG AND HANDSOME)
233.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REMEMBERS)
234.	EMOTION <LIVER>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)
235.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
236.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
237.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
238.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
239.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
240.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
241.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
242.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
243.	EMOTION <LIVER>	LOCATION
244.	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)
245.	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE
246.	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT, SUBMERGED
247.	EMOTION <LIVER>	OBJECT, THINLY SLICED
248.	EMOTION <LIVER>	OCEAN, DEEP
249.	EMOTION <LIVER>	OCEAN, DEEP
250.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ORGAN, VISUAL
251.	EMOTION <LIVER>	PRISONER
252.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER
253.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER
254.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER
255.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER
256.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR AND A LOCK)
257.	EMOTION <LIVER>	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
258.	EMOTION <LIVER>	SILK
259.	EMOTION <LIVER>	SKIN
260.	EMOTION <LIVER>	SKIN
261.	EMOTION <LIVER>	SLAVE
262.	EMOTION <LIVER>	WATER TURNED INTO ICE
263.	EMOTION <LIVER> [SILK]	OBJECT, VIBRATING
264.	EMOTION/FEELING	TACTILE STIMULUS
265.	EMOTIONAL ACCEPTANCE	PHYSICAL ACCEPTANCE
266.	EMOTIONAL BAGGAGE	PHYSICAL BAGGAGE
267.	EMOTIONAL BRUTALITY	PHYSICAL BRUTALITY
268.	EMOTIONAL CAPACITY	PHYSICAL/FINANCIAL CAPACITY
269.	EMOTIONAL COLLAPSE	PHYSICAL COLLAPSE
270.	EMOTIONAL COMFORT	PHYSICAL COMFORT
271.	EMOTIONAL CONDITION	PHYSICAL CONDITION
272.	EMOTIONAL CONSOLATION	PHYSICAL CONSOLATION
273.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
274.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
275.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
276.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
277.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
278.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
279.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
280.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
281.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
282.	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE
283.	EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT	PHYSICAL MOVEMENT
284.	EMOTIONAL DISCOVERY	PHYSICAL DISCOVERY
285.	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
286.	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
287.	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
288.	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE	PHYSICAL DISTANCE
289.	EMOTIONAL ENCOUNTER	PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER
290.	EMOTIONAL ENERGY	PHYSICAL ENERGY

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
291.	EMOTIONAL EXCLUSION	PHYSICAL EXCLUSION
292.	EMOTIONAL HEALING	PHYSICAL HEALING
293.	EMOTIONAL IMPACT	PHYSICAL IMPACT
294.	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
295.	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
296.	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
297.	EMOTIONAL INJURY	PHYSICAL INJURY
298.	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
299.	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
300.	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
301.	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS
302.	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY	PHYSICAL MOBILITY
303.	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY	PHYSICAL MOBILITY
304.	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
305.	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
306.	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
307.	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
308.	EMOTIONAL PAIN	PHYSICAL PAIN
309.	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	IMAGE, REFLECTING
310.	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
311.	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
312.	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	ROOM/CONTAINER
313.	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	TACTILE STIMULUS
314.	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]	TACTILE STIMULUS
315.	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS]	MAT/RUG/CARPET
316.	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS]	OCEAN
317.	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS	PHYSICAL PARALYSIS
318.	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS	VERBAL PARALYSIS
319.	EMOTIONAL PLACE	PHYSICAL PLACE
320.	EMOTIONAL PLACE	PHYSICAL PLACE
321.	EMOTIONAL PLACE	PHYSICAL PLACE
322.	EMOTIONAL PLACE [PHYSICAL PLACE]	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
323.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
324.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
325.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
326.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
327.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
328.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
329.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
330.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
331.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
332.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
333.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
334.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
335.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
336.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
337.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
338.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
339.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
340.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
341.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
342.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
343.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
344.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
345.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
346.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
347.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
348.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
349.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
350.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
351.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
352.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
353.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
354.	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
355.	EMOTIONAL PREVENTION	PHYSICAL PREVENTION
356.	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS	MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS
357.	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS	MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS
358.	EMOTIONAL PUNISHMENTS	PHYSICAL PUNISHMENTS
359.	EMOTIONAL REUNIFICATION	PHYSICAL REUNIFICATION
360.	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE	PHYSICAL SACRIFICE
361.	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE	PHYSICAL SACRIFICE
362.	EMOTIONAL SCARS [PHYSICAL SCARS]	CLOTHES
363.	EMOTIONAL SHELTER	PHYSICAL SHELTER
364.	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
365.	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
366.	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
367.	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
368.	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
369.	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
370.	EMOTIONAL STURDINESS	PHYSICAL STURDINESS
371.	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING	PHYSICAL SUFFERING
372.	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING]	HUMAN/PERSON
373.	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING]	LOAD, HEAVY
374.	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT	PHYSICAL SUPPORT
375.	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT [EMOTIONAL PRESENCE]	PHYSICAL SUPPORT
376.	EMOTIONAL TORMENT	PHYSICAL TORMENT
377.	EMOTIONAL TORMENT	PHYSICAL TORMENT
378.	EMOTIONAL TORMENT	PHYSICAL TORMENT
379.	EMOTIONAL TORMENTS	PHYSICAL TORMENTS
380.	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT	PHYSICAL TREATMENT
381.	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT	PHYSICAL TREATMENT
382.	EMOTIONAL WEAKNESS	PHYSICAL WEAKNESS
383.	EMOTIONAL WEIGHT	PHYSICAL WEIGHT
384.	EMOTIONAL WOUND	PHYSICAL WOUND
385.	EMOTIONAL WOUND	PHYSICAL WOUND
386.	EMOTIONAL WOUND	PHYSICAL WOUND
387.	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS	PHYSICAL WOUNDS
388.	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS	PHYSICAL WOUNDS
389.	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS]	HUMAN/PERSON - <i>pl.</i>
390.	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS]	OBJECT, COLORFUL - <i>pl.</i>

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
391.	END OF RELATIONSHIP	END OF A (SHARED) JOURNEY
392.	END OF ROMANCE (SHORT-LIVED)	DOOR, SLAMMING
393.	ENERGY	WATER
394.	ENTHUSIASM [BLUE SKY] <BRIGHTNESS>	COLOR (THAT FADES AWAY)
395.	EVENT [BOUNDED SPACE]	ROOM/CONTAINER
396.	EVENTS, ROMANTIC	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
397.	EVENTS, ROMANTIC	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
398.	EXCITEMENT	SENSATION OF EXTREME COLDNESS
399.	EXPERIENCE	LOCATION
400.	EYES	STARS
401.	EYES [LIGHTS]	NARRATOR
402.	FAITH	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
403.	FAITH (IN GOD)	LIFEBOAT
404.	FAITH/PRAYER	REMEDY
405.	FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY	OBJECT, GRASPED
406.	FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY	OBJECT, VALUABLE
407.	FALL	BEDROOM
408.	FAMILY	FARM
409.	FANTASIES	BALL-THROWERS/-PLAYERS
410.	FANTASY	TASTANT, SWEET
411.	FATE	HUMAN/PERSON (OF FAITH AND PIETY)
412.	FATE	INSCRIPTION
413.	FATE	INSCRIPTION
414.	FATE	INSCRIPTION, GIVEN
415.	FATE	TEST
416.	FATE [WIND]	LETTER/DECREE
417.	FATE <DIVINE CALLING>	AUTHORITY
418.	FEAR	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
419.	FEELING	TACTILE SENSATION
420.	FEELING	TACTILE SENSATION
421.	FEELING	TACTILE SENSATION
422.	FEELING [TACTILE SENSATION]	OBJECT, RECEIVABLE
423.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
424.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
425.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
426.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
427.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
428.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
429.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
430.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
431.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
432.	FEELINGS	TACTILE SENSATIONS
433.	FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS]	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE - <i>pl.</i>
434.	FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS]	ROOM/CONTAINER
435.	FIELD	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
436.	FIELD, FARM, AND FOREST	ROOM/CONTAINER, CLOSED
437.	FIGHT	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)
438.	FILAMENTS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO QUIVERS)
439.	FIRE	FLOWER
440.	FIRE	ROOM/CONTAINER

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
441.	FISH, DEAD	BOXER (WITH A BADLY PUNCHED FACE)
442.	FISH, DRIED	ACTORS
443.	FLAME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)
444.	FLEAS	WARRIORS (STRONG AND BRAVE)
445.	FLESH	SKIN (LAYERS OF)
446.	FLOWERS	STARS
447.	FOAMS	ROPES
448.	FOG	BUILDING
449.	FOG	OBJECT, HEAVY
450.	FOG	SOLDIERS, A TROOP OF
451.	FONDNESS	PICTURE
452.	FORGETFULNESS	FALLING ASLEEP
453.	FORGETFULNESS	FALLING ASLEEP
454.	FORGETTING ONE'S BELOVED	LOAD, HEAVY
455.	FORM <OBJECT>	ATTIRE
456.	FRAGRANCE (OF A ROSE)	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
457.	FRIENDS, DECEASED	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>
458.	FULFILLING ONE'S PROMISES	HAVING MOVED THROUGH A TUNNEL
459.	FUN/PLEASURE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
460.	FUTURE	LOCATION (AHEAD OF US)
461.	GOD	ARTIST
462.	GOD	AUTHORITY
463.	GOD	EXAMINER
464.	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CALLS AND WAVES)
465.	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ACCEPTING)
466.	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LISTENS)
467.	GOD	HUMAN/PERSON, LOVING
468.	GOD <SEJADAH> (MUSLIM PRAYER MAT)	MOTHER/CARETAKER, CARING
469.	GOD'S LOVE	WHISPER, ETERNAL
470.	GOD'S LOVE [THE ETERNAL WHISPER]	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)
471.	GOD'S MESSAGE/GUIDANCE	WHISPER OF LOVE
472.	GOD'S MIGHT	OBJECT, ENORMOUS-SIZED
473.	GOOD DEEDS	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>
474.	GRASS	FABRIC
475.	GRASS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ACTS OUT)
476.	GRASS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IMPATIENT)
477.	GREETINGS	OBJECT, CATCHABLE - <i>pl.</i>
478.	GREETINGS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
479.	GREETINGS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
480.	GRIEF	OBJECT, BURIABLE
481.	GRIEF	PUNISHMENT (FROM GOD)
482.	GRIEF	RAIN
483.	GRIEF AND MISERY	OBJECT, BURIABLE - <i>pl.</i>
484.	GRIEF AND SURRENDERING THOUGHTS	EMBROIDERY
485.	GUITAR	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)
486.	GUITAR-CASE <GREEN VELVET>	BEDROOM
487.	HAPPINESS	BRIGHTNESS
488.	HAPPINESS	DANCE
489.	HAPPINESS	HOMELAND
490.	HAPPINESS	LIGHT

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
491.	HAPPINESS	LIGHT
492.	HAPPINESS	LIGHT
493.	HAPPINESS	LIGHT, BRIGHT
494.	HAPPINESS	OBJECT, PUSHABLE
495.	HAPPINESS	TREE, LUSH-GROWING
496.	HAPPINESS [LIGHT]	OBJECT, LOST
497.	HAPPINESS [LIGHT]	PREY
498.	HAPPINESS <SMILE>	HUMAN BODY
499.	HAPPINESS <SMILE>	LOCATION
500.	HARDSHIPS	VALES AND DALES
501.	HEAVEN	DESTINATION, FINAL
502.	HEAVEN	FILMING STUDIO
503.	HEAVEN	PLACE, VERY HIGH
504.	HEAVEN	PLACE, VERY REMOTE
505.	HIDING	CELLAR, DARK
506.	HONESTY	ROOM/CONTAINER
507.	HONESTY	STRAIGHTNESS
508.	HOPE	LIGHT
509.	HOPE	LIGHT, BRIGHT
510.	HOPES	OBJECT, GRASPABLE - <i>pl.</i>
511.	HOPES	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>
512.	HOPES	OBJECT, STORABLE - <i>pl.</i>
513.	HOPES	OBJECT, VALUABLE (BUT SNATCHED FROM OWNER) - <i>pl.</i>
514.	HOPES (OF LOVE)	SUBSTANCES, MINERAL
515.	HOPES (UNFULFILLED)	OBJECT, FAKE - <i>pl.</i>
516.	HUMAN BEINGS	LIQUID
517.	HUMAN BEINGS <CORPSES>	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING) - <i>pl.</i>
518.	HUMAN BODY	BUILDING
519.	HUMAN BODY	VESSEL/CANISTER
520.	HUMAN BODY (A CHILD'S)	SHELL
521.	HUMAN BODY, AGEING	LEAF, FALLING
522.	ILLUSORY HEAVENS	WEAPON, MURDER
523.	IMAGES	REPTILES OR INSECTS
524.	IMAGINATION	PICTURE
525.	IMPORTANCE/SIGNIFICANCE	POSITION, HIGH
526.	IMPROVEMENT	MOVEMENT (UPWARD-STEPPING)
527.	IMPURITY	MUD
528.	INDEPENDENCE	ADVERSARY
529.	INDICATION	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)
530.	INFANT	KING/RULER
531.	INFATUATION	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL
532.	INFATUATION	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
533.	INSIGNIFICANCE	OUTSKIRTS
534.	INSTINCT/URGE	OBJECT, MOVING
535.	INTELLECT	KITE
536.	INTELLIGENCE	BRIGHTNESS
537.	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION)	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZED)
538.	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION)	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DISTANCE FROM THE <HEART>)
539.	INTUITION	HUMAN/PERSON
540.	INTUITION/EMOTION	HUMAN/PERSON

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
541.	INTUITION/EMOTION	TACTILE SENSATION
542.	INTUITION/EMOTION	TACTILE SENSATION
543.	ISLANDS	OBJECT, FLOATING - <i>pl.</i>
544.	JUDGMENT, POOR	VISION, OBSCURED
545.	JUDGMENT, POOR	VISION, OBSCURED
546.	JUNCTION	ROOM/CONTAINER
547.	KELP	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH HANDS)
548.	KINDNESS	REMEDY/ANTIDOTE
549.	KISSES	TASTANTS, SWEET
550.	KISSES <LIPS>	WORKS OF POETRY
551.	KNOWLEDGE	OCEAN
552.	KNOWLEDGE	WATER
553.	LACK OF INFORMATION	GAME OF HIDE AND SEEK
554.	LACK OF SUCCESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
555.	LACK/SCARCITY	POSITION, LOW
556.	LACK/SCARCITY	POSITION, LOW (AND AWAY MOVEMENT)
557.	LANDS	WATER
558.	LEAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)
559.	LEAVES	SKIN AND FLESH
560.	LIES AND DECEPTION	OBJECT, FAKE - <i>pl.</i>
561.	LIFE	ACTIVITY
562.	LIFE	ADVENTURE
563.	LIFE	ADVERSARY
564.	LIFE	ADVERSARY
565.	LIFE	EVENT (THAT CAN GO WRONG)
566.	LIFE	FILM/MOVIE
567.	LIFE	HOUSE
568.	LIFE	HUMAN/PERSON
569.	LIFE	JOURNEY
570.	LIFE	JOURNEY
571.	LIFE	JOURNEY
572.	LIFE	JOURNEY
573.	LIFE	JOURNEY
574.	LIFE	JOURNEY
575.	LIFE	JOURNEY
576.	LIFE	JOURNEY
577.	LIFE	JOURNEY
578.	LIFE	JOURNEY (WITH A DEFINITE DESTINATION)
579.	LIFE	LOCATION
580.	LIFE	MONEY/RESOURCE
581.	LIFE	MONEY/RESOURCE
582.	LIFE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
583.	LIFE	OBJECT, MOVING
584.	LIFE	OBJECT, MOVING (ROLLING)
585.	LIFE	PATH
586.	LIFE	PATH/ROAD
587.	LIFE	PATH/ROAD, LONG (WITH VARIOUS CHECKPOINTS)
588.	LIFE	PRESENT (TO THE ROYALTY THAT IS THE BELOVED)
589.	LIFE	ROAD, THORNY
590.	LIFE	ROOM, DARK (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
591.	LIFE	ROOM/CONTAINER
592.	LIFE	ROOM/CONTAINER
593.	LIFE	SPACE, BOUNDED
594.	LIFE	STAGE
595.	LIFE	SYSTEM/MACHINERY
596.	LIFE	VOYAGE
597.	LIFE [FERTILITY]	SOUND
598.	LIFE [WORLD]	ROOM/CONTAINER
599.	LIFE [WORLD]	ROOM/CONTAINER
600.	LIFE CIRCUMSTANCE	LOCATION
601.	LIFE'S PURPOSES	DISCOVERY
602.	LIFE'S PURPOSES	POSSESSIONS, ONE'S OWN
603.	LIGHT	ARROW'S BOW
604.	LIGHT	OBJECT, LOST
605.	LIGHT	OBJECT, RELEASED
606.	LIGHT	SOUND
607.	LIGHT [SOUND]	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
608.	LIGHT AND SOUND	PLANTS
609.	LIVELIHOOD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
610.	LIVING	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
611.	LIVING	STANDING IN A QUEUE
612.	LIVING	WALKING
613.	LIVING CONDITION	OBJECT, MAN-MADE/PRODUCED
614.	LIVING ON	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
615.	LIVING ON	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
616.	LIVING ON	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
617.	LIVING ON	STEPPING FORWARD
618.	LIVING ON [STEPPING FORWARD]	CHAIN, HEAVY
619.	LOGIC	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
620.	LONELINESS	ADVERSARY (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)
621.	LONELINESS	COLDNESS
622.	LONELINESS	DESERT <DESERT>
623.	LONELINESS	FORCE OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)
624.	LONELINESS	OBJECT, MOVING
625.	LONELINESS	OBJECT, STRETCHABLE
626.	LONELINESS	RIVER
627.	LONELINESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
628.	LONELINESS	ROOM/CONTAINER
629.	LONELINESS	SAILOR
630.	LONELINESS	SPONGE
631.	LONELINESS	WANDERER (SOLITARY)
632.	LONGING	BEDROOM
633.	LONGING	CROWD, TIGHT
634.	LONGING	FIRE, FLAMING
635.	LONGING	FIRE'S EMBERS (STILL BURNING)
636.	LONGING	GUEST
637.	LONGING	HAND (STRONGLY GRIPPING)
638.	LONGING	HAND (STRONGLY GRIPPING)
639.	LONGING	HOST (WHO INVITES LOVE TO BE ITS GUEST)
640.	LONGING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
641.	LONGING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DEPART/LEAVE)
642.	LONGING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DISAPPEAR)
643.	LONGING	ILLNESS/DISEASE
644.	LONGING	LOAD, HEAVY
645.	LONGING	OBJECT (OF GREAT AND EVER-INCREASING DEPTH)
646.	LONGING	OBJECT, DISPLAYED
647.	LONGING	OBJECT, MOVING
648.	LONGING	OBJECT, MOVING
649.	LONGING	OBJECT, STORABLE
650.	LONGING	OBJECTS, ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED (A GROUP OF)
651.	LONGING	ROOM, DARK
652.	LONGING	ROOM/CONTAINER
653.	LONGING	SUBSTANCE, ADHESIVE
654.	LONGING	TURBULENCE
655.	LONGING	VICTIM OF STRANGLING
656.	LONGING	WIND
657.	LONGING [FULL MOON]	OBJECT, COLORFUL
658.	LOVE	BEING, IMMORTAL
659.	LOVE	BEING, IMMORTAL
660.	LOVE	BEING, IMMORTAL
661.	LOVE	BLOOD
662.	LOVE	BOSS/SUPERIOR
663.	LOVE	BUILDING
664.	LOVE	CAPTIVE
665.	LOVE	CAPTIVE, PILLORIED
666.	LOVE	COMPANION, TRAVEL
667.	LOVE	COUNTRY/STATE (GOVERNED)
668.	LOVE	DANCE
669.	LOVE	EMBLEM
670.	LOVE	ENTITY, DIVIDABLE (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)
671.	LOVE	FIRE
672.	LOVE	FIRE
673.	LOVE	FLOWER
674.	LOVE	FRAGRANCE
675.	LOVE	FRAGRANCE
676.	LOVE	GARDEN
677.	LOVE	HAIR/THREAD (TANGLED)
678.	LOVE	HEAVEN
679.	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (IN DESPAIR)
680.	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)
681.	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)
682.	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS REVERED)
683.	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO NEEDS A SHELTER)
684.	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)
685.	LOVE	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)
686.	LOVE	JEWELRY, PRECIOUS (BUT PAWNED IN DESPERATION)
687.	LOVE	KINGDOM
688.	LOVE	LIFE
689.	LOVE	LIGHT
690.	LOVE	LOCATION (TO ESCAPE FROM)

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
691.	LOVE	MOON
692.	LOVE	OBJECT
693.	LOVE	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)
694.	LOVE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
695.	LOVE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
696.	LOVE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
697.	LOVE	OBJECT (OF ASSESSMENT)
698.	LOVE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
699.	LOVE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
700.	LOVE	OBJECT, CREATED
701.	LOVE	OBJECT, DISCARDABLE
702.	LOVE	OBJECT, DISPLAYED
703.	LOVE	OBJECT, FOUND
704.	LOVE	OBJECT, FOUND
705.	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRACKED)
706.	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)
707.	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE)
708.	LOVE	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE)
709.	LOVE	OBJECT, GRASPED
710.	LOVE	OBJECT, GRASPED
711.	LOVE	OBJECT, GRASPED (TIGHTLY-)
712.	LOVE	OBJECT, LOCKABLE
713.	LOVE	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
714.	LOVE	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
715.	LOVE	OBJECT, MOVING
716.	LOVE	OBJECT, OLFACTORY
717.	LOVE	OBJECT, PLEASANT-SMELLING
718.	LOVE	OBJECT, SHARABLE
719.	LOVE	OBJECT, TAGGING/MARKING
720.	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
721.	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
722.	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
723.	LOVE	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
724.	LOVE	OBJECT, VALUABLE
725.	LOVE	OCEAN
726.	LOVE	PASSERBY
727.	LOVE	PLANT
728.	LOVE	PLANT
729.	LOVE	PLANT, FLOWERING
730.	LOVE	PLANT, FRUITING
731.	LOVE	PLANT, SPROUTING
732.	LOVE	POSSESSION, VALUABLE
733.	LOVE	PREY
734.	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER
735.	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER
736.	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER
737.	LOVE	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
738.	LOVE	ROPE/STRING
739.	LOVE	SCENT, FRESH
740.	LOVE	SHELTER

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
741.	LOVE	SKIN (WOUNDED)
742.	LOVE	SPACE, BOUNDED
743.	LOVE	SPACE, BOUNDED
744.	LOVE	STORY/TALE
745.	LOVE	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
746.	LOVE	SUBSTANCE, NATURAL
747.	LOVE	SUBSTANCE, PURE
748.	LOVE	TACTILE STIMULUS
749.	LOVE	TACTILE STIMULUS
750.	LOVE	TALISMAN (BURIED IN THE BELOVED'S HEART)
751.	LOVE	TASTANT, SWEET
752.	LOVE	TEST (CONSTANT)
753.	LOVE	THREAT OR DISTURBANCE (POTENTIAL)
754.	LOVE	TREE
755.	LOVE	VICTIM OF DROWNING
756.	LOVE	WAR/CONQUEST
757.	LOVE	WATER
758.	LOVE (BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE)	ROPE, INTERTWINED
759.	LOVE (THAT HAS TO END)	LEAF, FALLING
760.	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	BRANCH, BRITTLING
761.	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	CORPSE, BURIED
762.	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	FOOD, LEFTOVER
763.	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	FOOD, LEFTOVER
764.	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	GLASS (THAT IS WORTHLESS AND IN PIECES)
765.	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)	LEAF, FALLING
766.	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) [A WILTING FLOWER]	CORPSE, BURIED
767.	LOVE (THAT IS SUPERFICIAL)	OBJECT (AT THE <EYES> ONLY)
768.	LOVE (THAT IS TRUE)	OBJECT, SUBMERGED
769.	LOVE [EMBRACE]	OBJECT, CATCHABLE
770.	LOVE [LIGHT]	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
771.	LOVE [MARRIAGE PROPOSAL]	ENGAGEMENT RING
772.	LOVE [MARRIAGE] <RING FINGER>	OBJECT, SWEET-TASTING
773.	LOVE [VENOM]	DAGGER
774.	LOVE <A MAN>	OBJECT, FOUND
775.	LOVE AND AFFECTION	GEMS AND PRECIOUS STONES
776.	LOVE AND AFFECTION	OBJECT, UNTAINTED - <i>pl.</i>
777.	LOVE AND AFFECTION	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
778.	LOVE AND AFFECTION (OF A WIFE)	HARBOR
779.	LOVE AND EMOTIONS	HUMAN/PERSON (IN EMBRACE) - <i>pl.</i>
780.	LOVE AND LONGING	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
781.	LOVE AND ROMANCE	STARS
782.	LOVE AND ROMANCE [THE STARS]	FLOWERS
783.	LOVERS	DRIFTERS (AT SEA)
784.	LOVERS	ENTITY, DIVIDED (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)
785.	LOVERS	FIRELIGHTERS
786.	LOVERS	MERGED ENTITY
787.	LOVERS	VICTIMS OF A SNARE-TRAP
788.	LOVERS (LIFELONG)	SEAGULLS (MONOGAMOUS, MATE-FOR-LIFE)
789.	LOVERS, ESTRANGED	LANDS (SEPARATED BY BODIES OF WATER)
790.	LOVING ONE'S BELOVED	FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
791.	LUCK	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STAYS)
792.	LUCK	OBJECT, MOVING
793.	LUCK	OBJECT, SLIPPERY
794.	LUCK	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
795.	LUST	HEAT
796.	MAGIC	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
797.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
798.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
799.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
800.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
801.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
802.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
803.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
804.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
805.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
806.	MANNER	PATH/ROAD
807.	MARRIAGE	APEX (OF LOVE)
808.	MARRIAGE	APEX (OF LOVE)
809.	MARRIAGE, POLYGAMOUS	LAKE, HONEY-FILLED
810.	MELANCHOLINESS	LOAD, HEAVY
811.	MELANCHOLINESS	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE
812.	MEMORIES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BECKONS) - <i>pl.</i>
813.	MEMORIES	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL (IN LARGE QUANTITIES) - <i>pl.</i>
814.	MEMORIES	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
815.	MEMORIES	OBJECT, UNREACHABLE (FARAWAY/REMOTE) - <i>pl.</i>
816.	MEMORIES	PLANTS, LIVING (AND FLOWERING)
817.	MEMORIES	TASTANTS (THAT ARE BOTH BITTER AND SWEET)
818.	MEMORIES OF <THE BELOVED>	OBJECT - <i>pl.</i>
819.	MEMORIES, BAD (IN RELATIONSHIP)	WRITINGS, ERASABLE
820.	MEMORY	BEING, IMMORTAL
821.	MEMORY	BEING, IMMORTAL
822.	MEMORY	EARTH/SOIL (DRIED AND CRACKED)
823.	MEMORY	ROOM/CONTAINER
824.	MEMORY	SHADOW
825.	MEMORY	SHADOW
826.	MEMORY	SHADOW
827.	MENTAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
828.	MENTAL RESOLUTION	BODILY STRENGTH
829.	MESSAGES	PEOPLE, A CROWD OF
830.	MIND	EAR
831.	MIND	EYE
832.	MIND	EYE
833.	MIND	EYE
834.	MIND	EYE
835.	MIND	EYE
836.	MIND	EYE
837.	MIND	EYE
838.	MIND	OBJECT, CHANGABLE
839.	MIND	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
840.	MIND	OBJECT, TWISTABLE

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
841.	MIND	OBJECT, TWISTABLE
842.	MIND	SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)
843.	MIND	SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)
844.	MIND	SURFACE OF EARTH (WITH CRACKS)
845.	MIND	TOY
846.	MIND	TUNNEL
847.	MIND <HEAD>	LOCATION
848.	MIND <THE PERSON>	SURFACE, SLIPPERY
849.	MIND AND DECISION-MAKING	EYES
850.	MIND AND REASONING	OBJECT (TEMPORARILY MISPLACED) - <i>pl.</i>
851.	MINDS, CONFUSED	WHEELS, SPINNING
852.	MIST	SHAPE-SHIFTER
853.	MISTAKE	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
854.	MISTAKES	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
855.	MISTAKES OF THE PAST	WOLVES
856.	MISTAKES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP)	NOTES IN A NOTEPAD
857.	MOON	OBJECT (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED)
858.	MOON, ECLIPSED [FRUIT]	LAMP
859.	MOON, FULL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)
860.	MOONLIGHT	ROOM/CONTAINER
861.	MOONLIGHT	TORCH
862.	MOVEMENT	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)
863.	MUSIC	OBJECT, MOVING (UPWARD-)
864.	NEGLIGENCE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
865.	NEGLIGENCE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO HITS ONESELF <CHEST>)
866.	NEGLIGENCE	TOW-TRUCK
867.	NEW BEGINNING	MORNING DEW
868.	NEWS	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>
869.	NIGHT	COMPANION, LONELY
870.	NIGHT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE BELOVED)
871.	NIGHT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE SOUL)
872.	NIGHT	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SIGHS)
873.	NIGHT	LOCATION
874.	NIGHT	LOCATION
875.	NIGHT	MAT/RUG/CARPET
876.	NIGHT	OCEAN WAVE
877.	NIGHT	ROOM/CONTAINER
878.	NIGHT	TERMINAL/STATION
879.	NONSENSE/RIDICULOUSNESS	ANIMAL'S SOLID WASTE
880.	NUMERALS	DEPEDANTS (OF THE DECIMAL POINT)
881.	NURSERY	KINGDOM
882.	OCEAN CURRENTS	SAILBOATS
883.	OLD-AGE	TWIG (ON A TREE)
884.	OLD-AGE	TWIG, BRITTLE
885.	ONE <PART> OF THE SELF	OBJECT, LOST
886.	ONE'S PLACE IN LIFE	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
887.	OPINIONS/JUDGMENTS	OBJECT, AUDITORY - <i>pl.</i>
888.	OPTION	PATH/ROAD
889.	PAGES OF A BOOK	CONTAINER (WITH OVERFLOWING EMOTIONS)
890.	PARALYSIS	ROOM/CONTAINER

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
891.	PASSION	FIRE
892.	PASSION	HEAVEN
893.	PASSION	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GOES AWAY)
894.	PASSION	OBJECT, LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
895.	PASSION	THORNS, A BUNCH OF
896.	PASSION OF LOVE	OCEAN WAVE
897.	PASSION OF LOVE	OCEAN WAVE
898.	PATH	ROOM/CONTAINER
899.	PATIENCE	OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)
900.	PEACE/CONTENTMENT	SMILE
901.	PEOPLE'S LEADER	ANCHOR
902.	PERFECTION	OBJECT, UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
903.	PERMANENCE	STATE OF STEADINESS (AND ALSO LACK OF MOBILITY)
904.	PERSON, STRONG AND BRAVE	LION
905.	PERSON, UNLEARNED	GLASS, EMPTY
906.	PERSON/OBJECT OF INTEREST	CONTAINER
907.	PIER	PUBLIC SINK
908.	PITCH	ROOM/CONTAINER
909.	PLANS	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
910.	PLANTS, WILD	FRIENDS, DEAR/LONG-TIME
911.	PLEASURE	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
912.	PLEASURE	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
913.	POCKET	PICKPOCKET
914.	POEM	EVENT
915.	PRAYER	SUSTENANCE
916.	PRAYERS	HUMAN BODY
917.	PRAYERS	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
918.	PRAYERS	OBJECTS, ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED (A GROUP OF)
919.	PRETENSE	OBJECT, FAKE
920.	PRETENSES	ROOM/CONTAINER
921.	PRIDE	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
922.	PROBLEMS	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
923.	PROBLEMS	OBJECT, DISCARDABLE - <i>pl.</i>
924.	PROCESS	MOVEMENT
925.	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
926.	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
927.	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
928.	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
929.	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
930.	PROCESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
931.	PROGRESS	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)
932.	PROGRESS	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SPEED)
933.	PROMISES	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
934.	PROMISES	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>
935.	PROMISES	TASTANTS, SWEET
936.	PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE)	OBJECT (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY) - <i>pl.</i>
937.	PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE)	OBJECT (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY) - <i>pl.</i>
938.	PROMISES (THAT ARE UNKEPT)	ORGAN, FLEXIBLE
939.	PROPHET MUHAMMAD	SEED <EYE> OF AN OLIVE
940.	PROPHET MUHAMMAD	SEED OF AN OLIVE

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
941.	PROPHET MUHAMMAD [CHOSEN MESSENGER]	TARGET (OF A SHOT ARROW)
942.	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S LIFE	VOYAGE
943.	PROWESS	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
944.	PSYCHOLOGICAL MESS	PHYSICAL MESS
945.	PURIFICATION	WATER
946.	PURITY	WATER (THE PRE-PRAYER ABLUTIONS)
947.	PURPOSE	GOAL
948.	PYSCHOLOGICAL AFFAIRS	BUSINESS AFFAIRS
949.	QUANTITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY HEIGHT)
950.	QUANTITY	ROOM/CONTAINER
951.	QUESTIONS	HUMAN/PERSON - <i>pl.</i>
952.	QUESTIONS	WHEELS, ROTATING
953.	QUIETNESS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NOT LONELY)
954.	QUIETNESS	LOCATION
955.	RAIN	HAIR
956.	RAINBOWS	DRAWING/PAINTING
957.	RAINBOWS	HUMAN/PERSON (OF FAITH AND PIETY) - <i>pl.</i>
958.	RAPID GROWTH	SPRAY OF GAS
959.	REALITY	ROOM/CONTAINER
960.	REALITY	VICTIM OF MURDER
961.	REALITY [NATURE]	MAGICIAN
962.	REALITY [NATURE]	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE
963.	REALIZATION	DISCOVERY
964.	REALIZATION	DISCOVERY
965.	RELATIONSHIP	ACTIVITY
966.	RELATIONSHIP	ACTIVITY
967.	RELATIONSHIP	BUILDING
968.	RELATIONSHIP	CAUSE TO BE FOUGHT FOR
969.	RELATIONSHIP	EVENT
970.	RELATIONSHIP	EVENT
971.	RELATIONSHIP	EVENT
972.	RELATIONSHIP	HOME
973.	RELATIONSHIP	HOME/RESIDENCE
974.	RELATIONSHIP	HOME/RESIDENCE
975.	RELATIONSHIP	HOME/RESIDENCE
976.	RELATIONSHIP	HOUSE/ROOM
977.	RELATIONSHIP	HOUSE/ROOM
978.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
979.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
980.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
981.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
982.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
983.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
984.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
985.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
986.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
987.	RELATIONSHIP	JOURNEY (SHARED)
988.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
989.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
990.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
991.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
992.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
993.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION
994.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
995.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
996.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
997.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
998.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
999.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1000.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1001.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1002.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1003.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1004.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1005.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1006.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1007.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1008.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1009.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1010.	RELATIONSHIP	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
1011.	RELATIONSHIP	MACHINE
1012.	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
1013.	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, FLAMMABLE
1014.	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)
1015.	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BROKEN INTO PARTS)
1016.	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, GRASPED
1017.	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, HIGHLY VALUABLE
1018.	RELATIONSHIP	OBJECT, RELEASED
1019.	RELATIONSHIP	PRISON
1020.	RELATIONSHIP	ROAD
1021.	RELATIONSHIP	SHELTER/SHED
1022.	RELATIONSHIP	SPACE, BOUNDED
1023.	RELATIONSHIP	SPACE, BOUNDED
1024.	RELATIONSHIP	SPACE, BOUNDED
1025.	RELATIONSHIP	TRAVEL/TRIP (JOINT)
1026.	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS EVERLASTING)	TREE, LUSH-GROWING
1027.	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL)	BRANCH
1028.	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL)	BRANCH, BRITTLE
1029.	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT)	GAME
1030.	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT)	GAME/GAMBLE
1031.	RELATIONSHIP [EVENT]	SPACE, BOUNDED
1032.	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)
1033.	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	OCEAN
1034.	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	OCEAN <WATERS>
1035.	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE	PALACE
1036.	RELIEF (FROM A BAD SITUATION) [BREAK]	OBJECT, CATCHABLE
1037.	RESTRICTION	BUILDING, CLOSED
1038.	ROLE <PART>	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE
1039.	ROMANCE	DISCIPLINE OF STUDY (SPECIALIZED)
1040.	ROMANCE	GAMES, A SERIES OF

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1041.	ROMANCE	OCEAN CURRENT
1042.	ROMANCE	ROOM/CONTAINER
1043.	ROMANCE	ROOM/CONTAINER
1044.	ROMANCE	SNARE-TRAP
1045.	ROMANCE	SPACE, BOUNDED
1046.	ROMANCE	TRAVEL, SEA (VIOLENT)
1047.	ROMANCE [DRAMA]	SPACE, BOUNDED
1048.	ROMANCE [LEGEND]	HISTORY
1049.	ROMANCE [LEGEND]	OBJECT, BEAUTIFUL
1050.	ROMANCE [SERIES OF GAMES]	LOAD, HEAVY
1051.	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER	ROOM, DECORATED
1052.	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER	ROOM/CONTAINER
1053.	ROMANTIC FANTASY	SPACE, BOUNDED
1054.	ROMANTIC FANTASY	SPACE, BOUNDED
1055.	ROMANTIC HISTORIES	OBJECT, STORABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1056.	ROMANTIC PARTNER	POSSESSION, VALUABLE
1057.	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)
1058.	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)
1059.	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)
1060.	ROMANTIC REJECTION	PHYSICAL ATTACK
1061.	ROMANTIC REJECTION	PHYSICAL ATTACK
1062.	ROW/LINE	VESSEL/CANISTER
1063.	SADNESS	RAIN WATER (POURED OUT A CONTAINER [THE SKY])
1064.	SADNESS [BLUES]	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE
1065.	SADNESS [CLOUDS]	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)
1066.	SADNESS [DARKNESS]	PREDATOR
1067.	SADNESS [TEARS]	GLASS (IN PIECES)
1068.	SADNESS [TEARS]	OBJECT, OBSTRUCTING
1069.	SADNESS <TEARS>	LOCATION OF ARRIVAL
1070.	SADNESS/DEPRESSION	POSITION, LOW
1071.	SADNESS/DEPRESSION	POSITION, LOW
1072.	SANITY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS QUESTIONED)
1073.	SCENT	OBJECT, STATIONARY/NON-MOVING
1074.	SEAGULLS (A FLOCK OF)	PEOPLE (A COMMUNITY OF)
1075.	SECRET	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
1076.	SECRETS	OBJECT (WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF DEPTHS) - <i>pl.</i>
1077.	SECRETS	OBJECT, CONCEALED (DEEPLY-) - <i>pl.</i>
1078.	SECRETS	OBJECT, HIDDEN - <i>pl.</i>
1079.	SELF-CONFIDENCE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RETURNS HOME)
1080.	SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS	SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)
1081.	SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS	SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)
1082.	SENSE OF BELONGING, COMFORT AND FAMILIARITY	HOME
1083.	SERENITY	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
1084.	SERENITY	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
1085.	SERIES OF MEANINGLESS ROMANCES	ENTRIES IN A HISTORY BOOK
1086.	SEXUAL DESIRE [RUSH]	OBJECT, MOVING
1087.	SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT	ACCIDENT, HIT-AND-RUN
1088.	SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT	GAME
1089.	SEXUAL TEASE/FLIRTATION	GAME
1090.	SHADOW	HAIR

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1091.	SHADOWS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CHASES) - <i>pl.</i>
1092.	SHADOWS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS) - <i>pl.</i>
1093.	SILENCE	COLDNESS
1094.	SILENCES	ROOM/CONTAINER
1095.	SINNER/CHEATER	DRIFTER (AT SEA)
1096.	SINNER/CHEATER	LOST PERSON
1097.	SINS	MUD/DIRT
1098.	SINS	OBJECT, TAGGING/MARKING - <i>pl.</i>
1099.	SINS	OCEAN CURRENTS
1100.	SITUATION	PATH/ROAD
1101.	SKY	CANVAS (FOR DRAWING/PAINTING)
1102.	SKY	OBJECT (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED)
1103.	SKY	SEDUCEE
1104.	SKY <BLUE>	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SOLITARY)
1105.	SKY <BLUE>	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)
1106.	SKY <BLUE>	OBJECT, AUDITORY
1107.	SKY <BLUE>	TOOL/INSTRUMENT
1108.	SKY <NIGHT>	CLOTH
1109.	SKY AND BLIZZARD	SPACE, BOUNDED
1110.	SLEEP	OBJECT (QUANTIFIED BY <EYE> WINKS)
1111.	SLEEP	OBJECT, LOST (AND A VALUABLE RESOURCE)
1112.	SMALLNESS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GIVES ONESELF PROWESS)
1113.	SMILE	ARTIST
1114.	SMILE	FLOWER
1115.	SMILE	INSTRUMENT
1116.	SMOKE	OBJECT, MOVING
1117.	SMOKE [FUNNEL]	OBJECT, HOVERING
1118.	SOCIAL BOUNDARY	PHYSICAL BOUNDARY
1119.	SOCIAL PROXIMITY	GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY
1120.	SONG [MIRROR]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1121.	SONGS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO AGES) - <i>pl.</i>
1122.	SONGS	SPACE, BOUNDED
1123.	SONGS [ONE'S INNER VOICES]	GUIDES, TRAVEL
1124.	SORROW	EXILE
1125.	SORROW	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)
1126.	SORROW	LANGUAGE, SPOKEN
1127.	SORROW	ROOM
1128.	SORROW	TACTILE STIMULUS
1129.	SORROW	TOOL/WEAPON, BLUNT
1130.	SORROWS	OCEAN
1131.	SOUL	BROOCH
1132.	SOUL	CHILD/SUBORDINATE (TO THE SELF)
1133.	SOUL	FLOWER
1134.	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON
1135.	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS)
1136.	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)
1137.	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)
1138.	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TROUBLESOME)
1139.	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS WOEFUL)
1140.	SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SENDS OUT SIGNALS)

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1141.	SOUL	LOCATION
1142.	SOUL	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
1143.	SOUL	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)
1144.	SOUL	OCEAN
1145.	SOUL	OCEAN, DEEP
1146.	SOUL	ORGAN, VISUAL
1147.	SOUL	PLACE, SEARCHABLE
1148.	SOUL	REBEL
1149.	SOUL	ROOM/CONTAINER (FOR IMMORTALIZED MEMORIES)
1150.	SOUL	SINGER/MUSICIAN
1151.	SOUL	SKIN
1152.	SOUL	SKIN/HAIR
1153.	SOUL	SKIN/HAIR
1154.	SOUL	SKIN/HAIR
1155.	SOUL	VICTIM OF STABBING
1156.	SOUL (OF THE <POET>)	TREE'S ROOTS
1157.	SOUL [VISUAL ORGAN]	BIRD, PREDATORY
1158.	SOUND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)
1159.	SOUND	LIGHT
1160.	SOUND	LIGHT
1161.	SOUNDS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS) - <i>pl.</i>
1162.	SOUNDS	OBJECT (MEASURED BY HEIGHT) - <i>pl.</i>
1163.	SOUNDS	OBJECT, CATCHABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1164.	SOUNDS	OBJECT, SHARP
1165.	SOUNDS	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)
1166.	SPEECH	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GETS TONGUE-TIED)
1167.	SPEECH	ROOM/CONTAINER
1168.	SPEECHES	KNIFE (SHARP)
1169.	SPIRIT/SOUL	ELEMENT, GASESOUS
1170.	SPIRIT/SOUL	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
1171.	SPIRIT/SOUL (OF SAINT HILDA)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)
1172.	SPIRITUAL STRENGTH	PHYSICAL STRENGTH
1173.	SPIRITUAL UNION	PHYSICAL UNION
1174.	SPIRITUAL VIGOR	PHYSICAL VIGOR
1175.	STAR, EAST/MORNING [FLOWER]	BROOCH
1176.	STARS	COMPANIONS
1177.	STARS	FLOWERS
1178.	STARS	OBJECT, SHARP - <i>pl.</i>
1179.	STARVATION	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS
1180.	STATE (OF BEING PAWNED)	ROOM/CONTAINER
1181.	STATE OF BEING	HOME/RESIDENCE
1182.	STATE OF BEING	ROOM/CONTAINER
1183.	STATE OF BEING IN LOVE	HOME/RESIDENCE
1184.	STATE OF FEELING BLISS	HEAVEN
1185.	STATE OF FEELING PLEASURE	PARADISE
1186.	STATE OF LUXURY AND COMFORT	PARADISE
1187.	STEPS	ROOM/CONTAINER
1188.	STORY/TALE	OBJECT, VANISHING
1189.	STORY/TALE	OBJECT, VANISHING
1190.	STRENGTH	OBJECT, RECEIVABLE

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1191.	STRESS (OF THE EVERYDAY LIFE)	WOKR/JOB
1192.	STRIKE	SURFACE
1193.	SUCCESS	MUSIC
1194.	SUCCESS	OBJECT, DISPLAYED
1195.	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)
1196.	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)
1197.	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)
1198.	SUFFERING (SELF-CREATED) CONSEQUENCES	POSITION, LYING-DOWN
1199.	SUN	ARTIST (WITH LIGHTS AS HIS/HER DRAWINGS)
1200.	SUN	HUMAN/PERSON
1201.	SUN	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SILENT)
1202.	SUN [HUMAN/PERSON]	OCEAN
1203.	SURFBOARDS	BEDS
1204.	SURFBOARDS <BLUE AND GREEN>	SUBSTANCES, SMEARY
1205.	SURFERS	CONTROLLERS OF VEHICLES
1206.	SURFERS	VICTIMS OF PICKPOCKETS
1207.	SURRENDER	ROOM/CONTAINER
1208.	SURRENDER	TASTANT, SWEET
1209.	SUSPICION	FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)
1210.	SUSPICION	OBJECT, FLOATING
1211.	SWEETNESS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NEGLIGENT)
1212.	SWIFTFNESS	HEAT
1213.	SYAHADAH (MUSLIM PROCLAMATION OF FAITH)	WIND/WATER
1214.	SYSTEM	SPACE, BOUNDED
1215.	SYSTEM, UNRESTRICTIVE	ROOM/CONTAINER, OPEN
1216.	TEAR	LEAF, FALLING
1217.	TEARS	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)
1218.	TERROR	OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)
1219.	TESTS (IN LIFE)	RIOTS
1220.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	CAPTIVE
1221.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	CAPTIVE
1222.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ESCAPEE
1223.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	FIRE
1224.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	HOME
1225.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	HONEY/NECTAR
1226.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	KNIFE
1227.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	LIGHT
1228.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	MELODY, BEAUTIFUL
1229.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1230.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	OBJECT, LOST
1231.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1232.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE EARTH'S ROTATION
1233.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE SUN
1234.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POISON
1235.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POSSESSION
1236.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POSSESSION
1237.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	POSSESSION OF HER LOVER
1238.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	PREY
1239.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	ROSE
1240.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	SONG

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1241.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	STAR
1242.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	TIME
1243.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)	TIME
1244.	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) <THE BELOVED'S SOUL>	ANGEL (FLYING)
1245.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	BOOK
1246.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	DOCTOR/SURGEON
1247.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT (TO BE ELIMINATED)
1248.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1249.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1250.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1251.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, REPLACABLE
1252.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, REPLACABLE
1253.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	OBJECT, REPLACABLE
1254.	THE BELOVED (MALE)	POSSESSOR/OWNER OF A <PIECE> OF HIS LOVER
1255.	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S HANDS>	GARDENER
1256.	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S NAME>	ENGRAVEMENT
1257.	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE BELOVED>	SKIN AND FLESH
1258.	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EYES	LIGHTS
1259.	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) GAZE	OBJECT, SHARP
1260.	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) KISSES <THE BELOVED'S LIPS>	HONEY
1261.	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE BELOVED>	ROOM/CONTAINER
1262.	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED'S FACE>	OBJECT, VISUAL
1263.	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED>	HEAT/WARMTH
1264.	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE	SUBSTANCE, EROISVE
1265.	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE	TOOL, SCRAPING
1266.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	DOCTOR/SURGEON
1267.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	FLOWER
1268.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	FLOWER, WILTING
1269.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	INSTRUMENT
1270.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	LOTUS
1271.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	MACHINE/DEVICE (CONTROLLED)
1272.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	MOON, FULL
1273.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)
1274.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	OBJECT, WORTHLESS (WITHOUT HER BELOVED)
1275.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	VICTIM OF A HIT-AND-RUN ACCIDENT (POTENTIAL)
1276.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	VICTIM OF SERIOUS INJURY
1277.	THE LOVER (FEMALE)	WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)
1278.	THE LOVER (MALE)	BIRD, PREDATORY
1279.	THE LOVER (MALE)	BOAT, SMALL (AT SEA)
1280.	THE LOVER (MALE)	BRAZIER
1281.	THE LOVER (MALE)	DRIFTER (AT SEA)
1282.	THE LOVER (MALE)	ESCAPEE
1283.	THE LOVER (MALE)	MACHINE (BROKEN)
1284.	THE LOVER (MALE)	MACHINE (BROKEN)
1285.	THE LOVER (MALE)	OBJECT, RELEASED
1286.	THE LOVER (MALE)	OBJECT, WORTHLESS (WITHOUT HIS BELOVED)
1287.	THE LOVER (MALE)	POSSESSION OF HIS BELOVED
1288.	THE LOVER (MALE)	REPTILE OR INSECT
1289.	THE LOVER (MALE)	RISK-TAKER (FOR HIS BELOVED)
1290.	THE LOVER (MALE)	WARRIOR

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1291.	THE LOVER (MALE) <THE LOVER'S BLOOD>	VICTIM OF POISONING
1292.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE LOVER>	AREA, SECURED/PROTECTED
1293.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS	OBJECT, ERODED AND SCRAPED - <i>pl.</i>
1294.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS	WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)
1295.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER>	WATER TURNED INTO ICE
1296.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1297.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1298.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1299.	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) MIND <THE LOVER>	ENTRANCE
1300.	THE LOVER'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE LOVER'S LIFE>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1301.	THE LOVER'S (MALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER>	WATER TURNED INTO ICE
1302.	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1303.	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, FOUND
1304.	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1305.	THE LOVER'S (MALE) RESTLESSNESS	POSSESSION (OF HIS BELOVED)
1306.	THE LOVER'S (MALE) SEXUAL DESIRE <THE LOVER'S BODY>	HUMAN/PERSON
1307.	THE SELF	COMMODITY
1308.	THE SELF	INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)
1309.	THE SELF	INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)
1310.	THE SELF	OBJECT (WITH DIVIDABLE <PIECES>)
1311.	THE SELF	OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE <PART>)
1312.	THE SELF	OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE PART <SIDE>)
1313.	THE SELF	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)
1314.	THE SELF	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)
1315.	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1316.	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1317.	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1318.	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1319.	THE SELF	ROOM/CONTAINER
1320.	THE SELF	VESSEL/CONTAINER (OF WATER)
1321.	THE SELF <EMOTION>	OBJECT, FRAGILE
1322.	THOUGHTS	WATER (RIVER)
1323.	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS	OCEAN WAVES
1324.	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS	PLACE, HECTIC
1325.	THOUGHTS, SURRENDERING	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS GREETED BY THE WIND)
1326.	TIME	BLAMER (OF ONE'S MISTAKES)
1327.	TIME	CLAWS, A SET OF
1328.	TIME	FLOWER
1329.	TIME	HOLE (INTO WHICH ONE SLIPS AND FALLS)
1330.	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO OWNS VALLEYS)
1331.	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STANDS STILL)
1332.	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WEARS CLOTHES)
1333.	TIME	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)
1334.	TIME	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
1335.	TIME	MONEY/RESOURCE
1336.	TIME	MONEY/RESOURCE
1337.	TIME	MUSICAL NOTE
1338.	TIME	OBJECT
1339.	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1340.	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1341.	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1342.	TIME	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1343.	TIME	OBJECT, MOVING
1344.	TIME	OBJECT, MOVING
1345.	TIME	OBJECTS, A SERIES OF (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)
1346.	TIME	POCKET (OF VALUABLES) AND VALUABLES
1347.	TIME	ROOM
1348.	TIME	ROOM, DARK (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)
1349.	TIME	ROOM/CONTAINER
1350.	TIME	SPACE, BOUNDED
1351.	TIME	WIZARD/WITCH
1352.	TIME [DAY]	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1353.	TIME [DAY]	OBJECT, REMOVABLE
1354.	TIME [DAY]	TASTANT, SWEET
1355.	TIME [DAYS]	OBJECTS, ENUMERABLE (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)
1356.	TIME [DAYS]	SCYTHE
1357.	TIME [DAYS]	TEMPERATURE
1358.	TIME [EMBRACE]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1359.	TIME [ETERNITY]	MONEY/RESOURCE
1360.	TIME [HOURS]	OBJECTS, ENUMERABLE (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)
1361.	TIME [MINUTE]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1362.	TIME [MOMENT]	HOME/HOUSE
1363.	TIME [MOMENT]	MONEY/RESOURCE
1364.	TIME [MOMENT]	OBJECT, LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR)
1365.	TIME [MOMENT]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1366.	TIME [MOMENT]	TREASURE <TREASURE>
1367.	TIME [NIGHT]	MONEY/RESOURCE
1368.	TIME [NIGHT]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)
1369.	TIME [NIGHT]	TUNNEL
1370.	TIME [SEASON]	COLOR
1371.	TIME [SEASON]	LOCATION
1372.	TIME [SEASON]	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE
1373.	TIME <WORLD>	OBJECT, MOVING
1374.	TIME OF PAST	LOCATION (BEHIND US)
1375.	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO TREATS ONE ROUGHLY)
1376.	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO KNOCKS)
1377.	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY) - <i>pl.</i>
1378.	TIMES (OCASSIONS)	ROOM/CONTAINER
1379.	TIMES (OCASSIONS)	ROOM/CONTAINER
1380.	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	LOCATIONS
1381.	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT - <i>pl.</i>
1382.	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ABANDONABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1383.	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1384.	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1385.	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1386.	TIMES (OCCASIONS)	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1387.	TOLERABILITY	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
1388.	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)
1389.	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)
1390.	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1391.	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)
1392.	TOUCH	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)
1393.	TOUCH	PRISON GUARD
1394.	TOWN	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LOOSES THINGS)
1395.	TRUST	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE
1396.	TRUTH	LIGHT
1397.	TRUTH	LIGHT, BLINDING
1398.	TRUTH [BRIGHTNESS]	ROOM/CONTAINER
1399.	TUNES, CHURCH/RELIGIOUS	SUBSTANCES, COLORING
1400.	UNDERSTANDING	MEASUREMENT/SCALE (FOR DEPTH OF WATER)
1401.	UNDERSTANDING	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)
1402.	UNDERSTANDING [READING]	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)
1403.	UNHAPPINESS	LOCATION OF ARRIVAL
1404.	VALLEY	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PULLS)
1405.	VALLEYS	SUCTION DEVICES
1406.	VERBAL RETRACTION	PHYSICAL RETRACTION
1407.	VISUAL INTERFERENCE	PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE
1408.	VISUAL PRESENCE	PHYSICAL PRESENCE
1409.	VISUAL SIGNALS	VERBAL STATEMENTS
1410.	VOICE	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)
1411.	VOICE	LIGHT
1412.	VOICE	SONG
1413.	WARMTH	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF
1414.	WATER	ANIMAL (<PENND> FARM)
1415.	WATER	BRUSH
1416.	WATER	EARTH/SOIL
1417.	WATER	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS CALM)
1418.	WATER	ROOM/CONTAINER
1419.	WAVE	ROOM/CONTAINER
1420.	WAVES	DRAWING (TO BE PAINTED WITH COLORS)
1421.	WAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS) - <i>pl.</i>
1422.	WAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS) - <i>pl.</i>
1423.	WAVES	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VISUAL ORGANS) - <i>pl.</i>
1424.	WAVES	MATS, WEAVED
1425.	WAVES	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1426.	WAVES	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) - <i>pl.</i>
1427.	WAVES	PICKPOCKETS
1428.	WAVES	ROOM/CONTAINER
1429.	WEALTH	WELLNESS
1430.	WETNESS	LACK OF COLOR
1431.	WHISPERS [ONE'S INNER VOICES]	GUIDES, TRAVEL
1432.	WIFE	EMBLEM (OF LOVE)
1433.	WIFE	HARBOR
1434.	WIFE <WIFE'S FACE>	HEAVEN
1435.	WIND	ATTACKER
1436.	WIND	HAIR
1437.	WIND	HAIR
1438.	WIND	HOUSE (WITH WINDOWS)
1439.	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)
1440.	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)

NO.	TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAIN
1441.	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)
1442.	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREET'S ONE'S THOUGHTS)
1443.	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)
1444.	WIND	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)
1445.	WIND	REBEL
1446.	WIND	WINDOW FRAME
1447.	WINDOW	ROOM/CONTAINER
1448.	WINDOW	ROOM/CONTAINER
1449.	WINDOW	ROOM/CONTAINER
1450.	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>	LOCATION
1451.	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)
1452.	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>	ROOM/CONTAINER
1453.	WISH	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED
1454.	WISH	OBJECT, MOVING
1455.	WISHES	OBJECT, UNREACHABLE (HIGHLY-POSITIONED) - <i>pl.</i>
1456.	WOMAN, MARRIED	FLOWER, BLOSSOMING
1457.	WOMAN, UNMARRIED	FLOWER, WILTING
1458.	WORDS	COMPANIONS
1459.	WORDS	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL - <i>pl.</i>
1460.	WORDS	OBJECT, MOVABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1461.	WORDS	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>
1462.	WORDS	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE - <i>pl.</i>
1463.	WORDS	TOYS
1464.	WORDS/SPEECHES	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)
1465.	WORDS/SPEECHES	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)
1466.	WORLD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REFUSES TO HELP)
1467.	WORLD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)
1468.	WORLD	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STARES)
1469.	WORLD	ROOM/CONTAINER
1470.	WORLD	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)
1471.	WORLD <EARTH SURFACE>	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)

Appendix D - Catalogue III: Source Domains

< > metonymy embedded within metaphor

[] metaphor embedded within metaphor

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1.	ACCIDENT, HIT-AND-RUN	SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT
2.	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS
3.	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS
4.	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS
5.	ACTION (OF TAKING/GRASPING)	TOLERANCE FOR PAIN/UNHAPPINESS
6.	ACTIVITY	LIFE
7.	ACTIVITY	RELATIONSHIP
8.	ACTIVITY	RELATIONSHIP
9.	ACTORS	FISH, DRIED
10.	ADVENTURE	LIFE
11.	ADVERSARY	INDEPENDENCE
12.	ADVERSARY	LIFE
13.	ADVERSARY	LIFE
14.	ADVERSARY (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)	LONELINESS
15.	ANCHOR	PEOPLE'S LEADER
16.	ANGEL (FLYING)	THE BELOVED (FEMALE) <THE BELOVED'S SOUL>
17.	ANGELS	BELLS
18.	ANIMAL (<PENNEDED> FARM)	WATER
19.	ANIMAL'S SOLID WASTE	NONSENSE/RIDICULOUSNESS
20.	APEX (OF LOVE)	MARRIAGE
21.	APEX (OF LOVE)	MARRIAGE
22.	AREA, SECURED/PROTECTED	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE LOVER>
23.	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)
24.	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)
25.	ARRIVAL (AT A SET DESTINATION)	SUCCESS (IN LIFE)
26.	ARROW'S BOW	LIGHT
27.	ARTIST	GOD
28.	ARTIST	SMILE
29.	ARTIST (WITH LIGHTS AS HIS/HER DRAWINGS)	SUN
30.	ATTACKER	WIND
31.	ATTIRE	FORM <OBJECT>
32.	AUTHORITY	FATE <DIVINE CALLING>
33.	AUTHORITY	GOD
34.	AUTHORITY (THAT IS REBELLED AGAINST)	CULTURAL TRADITIONS
35.	BALL-THROWERS/-PLAYERS	FANTASIES
36.	BED	BAD SITUATION, SELF-CREATED
37.	BEDROOM	FALL
38.	BEDROOM	GUITAR-CASE <GREEN VELVET>
39.	BEDROOM	LONGING
40.	BEDS	SURFBOARDS
41.	BEING, IMMORTAL	LOVE
42.	BEING, IMMORTAL	LOVE
43.	BEING, IMMORTAL	LOVE
44.	BEING, IMMORTAL	MEMORY
45.	BEING, IMMORTAL	MEMORY

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
46.	BIRD	DREAMER
47.	BIRD, PREDATORY	SOUL [VISUAL ORGAN]
48.	BIRD, PREDATORY	THE LOVER (MALE)
49.	BLAMER (OF ONE'S MISTAKES)	TIME
50.	BLOOD	LOVE
51.	BLOOD (<LEECH>ING OUT OF THE LEAVES)	DEATH
52.	BOAT, SMALL (AT SEA)	THE LOVER (MALE)
53.	BODILY STRENGTH	MENTAL RESOLUTION
54.	BOOK	THE BELOVED (MALE)
55.	BOSS/SUPERIOR	LOVE
56.	BOXER (WITH A BADLY PUNCHED FACE)	FISH, DEAD
57.	BRANCH	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL)
58.	BRANCH, BRITTLE	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS PROVISIONAL)
59.	BRANCH, BRITTLING	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)
60.	BRAZIER	THE LOVER (MALE)
61.	BRIGHTNESS	HAPPINESS
62.	BRIGHTNESS	INTELLIGENCE
63.	BROOCH	SOUL
64.	BROOCH	STAR, EAST/MORNING [FLOWER]
65.	BRUSH	WATER
66.	BUILDING	FOG
67.	BUILDING	HUMAN BODY
68.	BUILDING	LOVE
69.	BUILDING	RELATIONSHIP
70.	BUILDING (ON FIRE)	EMOTION <LIVER>
71.	BUILDING, CLOSED	RESTRICTION
72.	BUSINESS AFFAIRS	PSYCHOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
73.	CANVAS (FOR DRAWING/PAINTING)	SKY
74.	CAPTIVE	EMOTION <LIVER>
75.	CAPTIVE	LOVE
76.	CAPTIVE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
77.	CAPTIVE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
78.	CAPTIVE, PILLORIED	LOVE
79.	CAUSE OF EMOTIONAL CRIPPLING	CLOSED EMOTION <CLOSED VEIN>
80.	CAUSE TO BE FOUGHT FOR	RELATIONSHIP
81.	CELLAR, DARK	HIDING
82.	CHAIN, HEAVY	LIVING ON [STEPPING FORWARD]
83.	CHILD (BEING TUCKED INTO BED)	EMOTION [WORDS]
84.	CHILD/SUBORDINATE (TO THE SELF)	SOUL
85.	CHILLNESS	CALMNESS
86.	CITY	EMOTION <LIVER>
87.	CITY	EMOTION <LIVER>
88.	CITY	EMOTION <LIVER>
89.	CLAWS, A SET OF	TIME
90.	CLOCK (WITH LOUD TICKINGS)	EMOTION <HEART>

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
91.	CLOTH	SKY <NIGHT>
92.	CLOTHES	EMOTIONAL SCARS [PHYSICAL SCARS]
93.	COLDNESS	DISTANCE
94.	COLDNESS	LONELINESS
95.	COLDNESS	SILENCE
96.	COLDNESS (EXTREME)	DEPTH
97.	COLOR	TIME [SEASON]
98.	COLOR (THAT FADES AWAY)	ENTHUSIASM [BLUE SKY] <BRIGHTNESS>
99.	COMMODITY	THE SELF
100.	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS	BOULDERS
101.	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENTS	STARVATION
102.	COMPANION, LONELY	NIGHT
103.	COMPANION, TRAVEL	LOVE
104.	COMPANIONS	STARS
105.	COMPANIONS	WORDS
106.	COMPETITION	ECONOMY
107.	CONTAINER	PERSON/OBJECT OF INTEREST
108.	CONTAINER (WITH OVERFLOWING EMOTIONS)	PAGES OF A BOOK
109.	CONTAMINATION	COLOR BLACK
110.	CONTROLLERS OF VEHICLES	SURFERS
111.	CORPSE, BURIED	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)
112.	CORPSE, BURIED	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED) [A WILTING FLOWER]
113.	COUNTRY/STATE (GOVERNED)	LOVE
114.	CREATOR OF HEAVEN	EMOTION [WORDS]
115.	CROWD, TIGHT	LONGING
116.	DAGGER	LOVE [VENOM]
117.	DAGGERS	AFFLICTIONS [TURBULENCES]
118.	DANCE	HAPPINESS
119.	DANCE	LOVE
120.	DEITY	EMOTION [GAZE]
121.	DEPARTURE	DEATH
122.	DEPARTURE	DEATH
123.	DEPEDANTS (OF THE DECIMAL POINT)	NUMERALS
124.	DEPTH	COLDNESS
125.	DESERT <DESERT>	LONELINESS
126.	DESTINATION, FINAL	AFTERLIFE [ETERNAL LANE]
127.	DESTINATION, FINAL	HEAVEN
128.	DISCIPLINE OF STUDY (SPECIALIZED)	ROMANCE
129.	DISCOVERY	LIFE'S PURPOSES
130.	DISCOVERY	REALIZATION
131.	DISCOVERY	REALIZATION
132.	DOCTOR/SURGEON	THE BELOVED (MALE)
133.	DOCTOR/SURGEON	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
134.	DOOR, SLAMMING	END OF ROMANCE (SHORT-LIVED)
135.	DOORS	CURTAINS
136.	DRAWING (TO BE PAINTED WITH COLORS)	WAVES
137.	DRAWING/PAINTING	RAINBOWS
138.	DRIFTER (AT SEA)	SINNER/CHEATER
139.	DRIFTER (AT SEA)	THE LOVER (MALE)
140.	DRIFTERS (AT SEA)	LOVERS

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
141.	EAR	MIND
142.	EARTH/SOIL	CRY
143.	EARTH/SOIL	WATER
144.	EARTH/SOIL (DRIED AND CRACKED)	MEMORY
145.	ELEMENT, GASEOUS	SPIRIT/SOUL
146.	EMBLEM	LOVE
147.	EMBLEM (OF LOVE)	WIFE
148.	EMBROIDERY	CLOUDS
149.	EMBROIDERY	GRIEF AND SURRENDERING THOUGHTS
150.	END OF A (SHARED) JOURNEY	END OF RELATIONSHIP
151.	ENGAGEMENT RING	LOVE [MARRIAGE PROPOSAL]
152.	ENGRAVED PLATE	EMOTION <LIVER>
153.	ENGRAVEMENT	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S NAME>
154.	ENTITY, DIVIDABLE (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)	LOVE
155.	ENTITY, DIVIDED (THAT WAS ONCE MERGED/WHOLE)	LOVERS
156.	ENTRANCE	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) MIND <THE LOVER>
157.	ENTRIES IN A HISTORY BOOK	SERIES OF MEANINGLESS ROMANCES
158.	ESCAPEE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
159.	ESCAPEE	THE LOVER (MALE)
160.	ESCAPEE (OUT OF A CHILD'S BODY)	CRY
161.	EVENT	POEM
162.	EVENT	RELATIONSHIP
163.	EVENT	RELATIONSHIP
164.	EVENT	RELATIONSHIP
165.	EVENT (THAT CAN GO WRONG)	LIFE
166.	EVIL SPIRIT (THAT POSSESS ONE'S MIND)	ANGER
167.	EXAMINER	GOD
168.	EXILE	SORROW
169.	EYE	MIND
170.	EYE	MIND
171.	EYE	MIND
172.	EYE	MIND
173.	EYE	MIND
174.	EYE	MIND
175.	EYE	MIND
176.	EYES	MIND AND DECISION-MAKING
177.	FABRIC	GRASS
178.	FABRIC (TO BE SEWN INTO A DRESS)	BREEZE, MOUNTAIN
179.	FALLING ASLEEP	FORGETFULNESS
180.	FALLING ASLEEP	FORGETFULNESS
181.	FARM	FAMILY
182.	FEAST, MOMENTARY	COMFORT [LIGHT AND HEAT]
183.	FILM/MOVIE	LIFE
184.	FILMING STUDIO	HEAVEN
185.	FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE	LOVING ONE'S BELOVED
186.	FIRE	LOVE
187.	FIRE	LOVE
188.	FIRE	PASSION
189.	FIRE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
190.	FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)	ANXIETY

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
191.	FIRE (TO BE EXTINGUISHED)	SUSPICION
192.	FIRE, FLAMING	LONGING
193.	FIRE'S EMBERS (STILL BURNING)	LONGING
194.	FIRELIGHTERS	LOVERS
195.	FLAG	DEATH <CORPSE>
196.	FLESH (OF A PREY)	EMOTION <LIVER>
197.	FLOOR/GROUND	EMOTION <CHEST>
198.	FLOWER	EMOTION [WORDS]
199.	FLOWER	EMOTION <LIVER>
200.	FLOWER	FIRE
201.	FLOWER	LOVE
202.	FLOWER	SMILE
203.	FLOWER	SOUL
204.	FLOWER	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
205.	FLOWER	TIME
206.	FLOWER, BLOSSOMING	WOMAN, MARRIED
207.	FLOWER, WILTING	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
208.	FLOWER, WILTING	WOMAN, UNMARRIED
209.	FLOWERS	DREAMS
210.	FLOWERS	LOVE AND ROMANCE [THE STARS]
211.	FLOWERS	STARS
212.	FOOD, LEFTOVER	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)
213.	FOOD, LEFTOVER	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)
214.	FORCE OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)	LONELINESS
215.	FORCES OF NATURE (TO EMOTION <LIVER>)	AFFLICTIONS
216.	FRAGRANCE	LOVE
217.	FRAGRANCE	LOVE
218.	FRIENDS, DEAR/LONG-TIME	ANXIETY AND DISTRESS
219.	FRIENDS, DEAR/LONG-TIME	PLANTS, WILD
220.	FURNITURE (THAT FILLS THE WHOLE HOUSE)	CRY
221.	GAME	DECEPTION
222.	GAME	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT)
223.	GAME	SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT COMMITMENT
224.	GAME	SEXUAL TEASE/FLIRTATION
225.	GAME OF HIDE AND SEEK	LACK OF INFORMATION
226.	GAME/GAMBLE	RELATIONSHIP (THAT LACKS COMMITMENT)
227.	GAMES, A SERIES OF	ROMANCE
228.	GARDEN	LOVE
229.	GARDENER	THE BELOVED (MALE) <THE BELOVED'S HANDS>
230.	GEMS AND PRECIOUS STONES	LOVE AND AFFECTION
231.	GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION	BEING IN LOVE
232.	GEOGRAPHICAL DISLOCATION	CONFUSION
233.	GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY	SOCIAL PROXIMITY
234.	GIFT-IN-RETURN	BETRAYAL
235.	GLASS (IN PIECES)	SADNESS [TEARS]
236.	GLASS (THAT IS WORTHLESS AND IN PIECES)	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)
237.	GLASS, EMPTY	PERSON, UNLEARNED
238.	GOAL	PURPOSE
239.	GRANULES, A BUNCH OF	ANGER
240.	GUEST	LONGING

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
241.	GUIDES, TRAVEL	SONGS [ONE'S INNER VOICES]
242.	GUIDES, TRAVEL	WHISPERS [ONE'S INNER VOICES]
243.	HAIR	RAIN
244.	HAIR	SHADOW
245.	HAIR	WIND
246.	HAIR	WIND
247.	HAIR/THREAD (TANGLED)	LOVE
248.	HAND (STRONGLY GRIPPING)	LONGING
249.	HAND (STRONGLY GRIPPING)	LONGING
250.	HARBOR	LOVE AND AFFECTION (OF A WIFE)
251.	HARBOR	WIFE
252.	HARVEST/CROPS	BLESSINGS
253.	HAT	EMBARRASSMENT
254.	HAVING MOVED THROUGH A TUNNEL	FULFILLING ONE'S PROMISES
255.	HEAT	COLORS
256.	HEAT	COLORS
257.	HEAT	LUST
258.	HEAT	SWIFTNES
259.	HEAT/WARMTH	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED>
260.	HEAVEN	LOVE
261.	HEAVEN	PASSION
262.	HEAVEN	STATE OF FEELING BLISS
263.	HEAVEN	WIFE <WIFE'S FACE>
264.	HELL	DISCOMFORT
265.	HISTORY	ROMANCE [LEGEND]
266.	HOLE (INTO WHICH ONE SLIPS AND FALLS)	TIME
267.	HOME	RELATIONSHIP
268.	HOME	SENSE OF BELONGING, COMFORT AND FAMILIARITY
269.	HOME	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
270.	HOME/HOUSE	TIME [MOMENT]
271.	HOME/RESIDENCE	RELATIONSHIP
272.	HOME/RESIDENCE	RELATIONSHIP
273.	HOME/RESIDENCE	RELATIONSHIP
274.	HOME/RESIDENCE	STATE OF BEING
275.	HOME/RESIDENCE	STATE OF BEING IN LOVE
276.	HOMELAND	HAPPINESS
277.	HONEY	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) KISSES <THE BELOVED'S LIPS>
278.	HONEY/NECTAR	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
279.	HOST	EMOTION <LIVER>
280.	HOST (WHO INVITES LOVE TO BE ITS GUEST)	LONGING
281.	HOUSE	LIFE
282.	HOUSE (WITH WINDOWS)	WIND
283.	HOUSE/ROOM	RELATIONSHIP
284.	HOUSE/ROOM	RELATIONSHIP
285.	HUMAN BODY	HAPPINESS <SMILE>
286.	HUMAN BODY	PRAYERS
287.	HUMAN/PERSON	EMOTION <HEART>
288.	HUMAN/PERSON	EMOTION <LIVER>
289.	HUMAN/PERSON	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING]
290.	HUMAN/PERSON	INTUITION

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
291.	HUMAN/PERSON	INTUITION/EMOTION
292.	HUMAN/PERSON	LIFE
293.	HUMAN/PERSON	SOUL
294.	HUMAN/PERSON	SUN
295.	HUMAN/PERSON	THE LOVER'S (MALE) SEXUAL DESIRE <THE LOVER'S BODY>
296.	HUMAN/PERSON - <i>pl.</i>	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS]
297.	HUMAN/PERSON - <i>pl.</i>	QUESTIONS
298.	HUMAN/PERSON (IN DESPAIR)	LOVE
299.	HUMAN/PERSON (IN EMBRACE) - <i>pl.</i>	LOVE AND EMOTIONS
300.	HUMAN/PERSON (OF ANIMIST BELIEF) - <i>pl.</i>	CANARIES
301.	HUMAN/PERSON (OF FAITH AND PIETY)	FATE
302.	HUMAN/PERSON (OF FAITH AND PIETY) - <i>pl.</i>	RAINBOWS
303.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ACTS OUT)	GRASS
304.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO AGES)	CAR
305.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO AGES) - <i>pl.</i>	SONGS
306.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)	ANXIETY
307.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO APPROACHES)	SORROW
308.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	DEW
309.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	LIVELIHOOD
310.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	NEGLIGENCE
311.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO ARRIVES)	VOICE
312.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BECKONS) - <i>pl.</i>	MEMORIES
313.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)	WIND
314.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)	WIND
315.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO BREATHES)	WIND
316.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CALLS AND WAVES)	GOD
317.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)	LONGING
318.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CARESSES)	LOVE
319.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CHASES) - <i>pl.</i>	SHADOWS
320.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO CRIES)	EMOTION <LIVER>
321.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO DOES NOT LIE)	CAMERA
322.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE BELOVED)	NIGHT
323.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO EMBRACES THE SOUL)	NIGHT
324.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO FEELS SORROW) - <i>pl.</i>	ANIMALS
325.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GETS TONGUE-TIED)	SPEECH
326.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GIVES ONESELF PROWESS)	SMALLNESS
327.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GOES AWAY)	PASSION
328.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREET'S ONE'S THOUGHTS)	WIND
329.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO GREET'S)	ANGEL
330.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO HITS ONESELF <CHEST>)	NEGLIGENCE
331.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ACCEPTING)	GOD
332.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS)	SOUL
333.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS) - <i>pl.</i>	SHADOWS
334.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS ANXIOUS) - <i>pl.</i>	WAVES
335.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS CALM)	WATER
336.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)	LOVE
337.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FAITHFUL)	SOUL
338.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)	EMBARRASSMENT
339.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS FIERCE)	FLAME
340.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS GRACEFUL)	DEATH

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
341.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS GREETED BY THE WIND)	THOUGHTS, SURRENDERING
342.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IMPATIENT)	GRASS
343.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)	EMOTION <LIVER>
344.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS IN LONGING)	MOON, FULL
345.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	EMOTION <HEART>
346.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	EMOTION <LIVER>
347.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	SOUL
348.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS LONELY)	TEARS
349.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NEGLIGENT)	SWEETNESS
350.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS NOT LONELY)	QUIETNESS
351.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS QUESTIONED)	SANITY
352.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS REVERED)	LOVE
353.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)	EMOTION <LIVER>
354.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SAD)	SADNESS [CLOUDS]
355.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SILENT)	SUN
356.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SOLITARY)	SKY <BLUE>
357.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)	EMOTION <LIVER>
358.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS SORROWFUL)	WIND
359.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DEPART/LEAVE)	LONGING
360.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TOLD TO DISAPPEAR)	LONGING
361.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS TROUBLESOME)	SOUL
362.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS WOEFUL)	SOUL
363.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO IS YOUNG AND HANDSOME)	EMOTION <LIVER>
364.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO KNOCKS)	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)
365.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LISTENS)	GOD
366.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO LOOSES THINGS)	TOWN
367.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO MOVES) - <i>pl.</i>	ASHES AND BITS OF BONES
368.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO NEEDS A SHELTER)	LOVE
369.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO OWNS VALLEYS)	TIME
370.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PULLS)	VALLEY
371.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)	BREATH
372.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO PUSHES)	SOUND
373.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO QUIVERS)	FILAMENTS
374.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECEIVES)	CRY
375.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RECOGNIZES)	AGE
376.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REFUSES TO HELP)	WORLD
377.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REMEMBERS)	EMOTION <LIVER>
378.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO REMINDS) - <i>pl.</i>	BARNACLES
379.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RETURNS HOME)	SELF-CONFIDENCE
380.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	ANGER
381.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	ANXIETY
382.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	CORPSE, CHARRING <HEAD>
383.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	SPIRIT/SOUL
384.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES)	SPIRIT/SOUL (OF SAINT HILDA)
385.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO RISES) - <i>pl.</i>	BELLS
386.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SENDS OUT SIGNALS)	SOUL
387.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SIGHS)	NIGHT
388.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SITS)	CORPSE, CHARRING <BODY>
389.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)	GUITAR
390.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SLEEPS)	WORLD

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
391.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)	DECIMAL POINT
392.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)	DIVIDED PART <SIDE> OF THE SELF
393.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS)	EMOTION <HEART>
394.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO SPEAKS) - <i>pl.</i>	SOUNDS
395.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STANDS STILL)	TIME
396.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STARES)	WORLD
397.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO STAYS)	LUCK
398.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO TREATS ONE ROUGHLY)	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)
399.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)	BLESSINGS
400.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAITS)	GOD'S LOVE [THE ETERNAL WHISPER]
401.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WAVES)	AZAN (MUSLIM CALL FOR PRAYER)
402.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WEARS CLOTHES)	TIME
403.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)	EMOTION <LIVER>
404.	HUMAN/PERSON (WHO WHISPERS)	WIND
405.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH A NERVE DISEASE)	CULTURAL TRADITIONS
406.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)	EMOTION
407.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH ARMS)	WORLD <EARTH SURFACE>
408.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)	LEAVES
409.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS)	TIME
410.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH FINGERS) - <i>pl.</i>	WAVES
411.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH GREAT STRENGTH)	CRY (OF A CHILD)
412.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH HANDS)	KELP
413.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)	LOVE
414.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VIGOR)	LOVE
415.	HUMAN/PERSON (WITH VISUAL ORGANS) - <i>pl.</i>	WAVES
416.	HUMAN/PERSON, LOVING	GOD
417.	ICE MELTED INTO WATER	EMOTION <HEART>
418.	ILLNESS/DISEASE	LONGING
419.	IMAGE, REFLECTING	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]
420.	INACTIVITY OF VISUAL AND SPEECH ORGANS	DEATH
421.	INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)	THE SELF
422.	INDIVIDUAL (SEPARATE FROM THE SELF)	THE SELF
423.	INSCRIPTION	FATE
424.	INSCRIPTION	FATE
425.	INSCRIPTION, GIVEN	FATE
426.	INSTRUMENT	EMOTION <HEART>
427.	INSTRUMENT	SMILE
428.	INSTRUMENT	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
429.	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF	CITIES
430.	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF	LOGIC
431.	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF	TIME
432.	ISLANDS, A GROUP OF	WARMTH
433.	JEWELRY, PRECIOUS (BUT PAWNED IN DESPERATION)	LOVE
434.	JOURNEY	LIFE
435.	JOURNEY	LIFE
436.	JOURNEY	LIFE
437.	JOURNEY	LIFE
438.	JOURNEY	LIFE
439.	JOURNEY	LIFE
440.	JOURNEY	LIFE

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
441.	JOURNEY	LIFE
442.	JOURNEY	LIFE
443.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
444.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
445.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
446.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
447.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
448.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
449.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
450.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
451.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
452.	JOURNEY (SHARED)	RELATIONSHIP
453.	JOURNEY (WITH A DEFINITE DESTINATION)	LIFE
454.	KING/RULER	INFANT
455.	KINGDOM	LOVE
456.	KINGDOM	NURSERY
457.	KITE	INTELLECT
458.	KNIFE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
459.	KNIFE (SHARP)	SPEECHES
460.	LACK OF COLOR	WETNESS
461.	LAKE, HONEY-FILLED	MARRIAGE, POLYGAMOUS
462.	LAMP	MOON, ECLIPSED [FRUIT]
463.	LANDS (SEPARATED BY BODIES OF WATER)	LOVERS, ESTRANGED
464.	LANGUAGE	EMOTION
465.	LANGUAGE, FOREIGN	EMOTION <HEART>
466.	LANGUAGE, SPOKEN	SORROW
467.	LEAF, FALLING	HUMAN BODY, AGEING
468.	LEAF, FALLING	LOVE (THAT HAS TO END)
469.	LEAF, FALLING	LOVE (THAT IS REJECTED)
470.	LEAF, FALLING	TEAR
471.	LETTER/DECREE	FATE [WIND]
472.	LIFE	LOVE
473.	LIFEBOAT	FAITH (IN GOD)
474.	LIGHT	CRY (OF A CHILD)
475.	LIGHT	HAPPINESS
476.	LIGHT	HAPPINESS
477.	LIGHT	HAPPINESS
478.	LIGHT	HOPE
479.	LIGHT	LOVE
480.	LIGHT	SOUND
481.	LIGHT	SOUND
482.	LIGHT	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
483.	LIGHT	TRUTH
484.	LIGHT	VOICE
485.	LIGHT, BLINDING	TRUTH
486.	LIGHT, BRIGHT	HAPPINESS
487.	LIGHT, BRIGHT	HOPE
488.	LIGHT, DIM	DESPAIR
489.	LIGHTS	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EYES
490.	LIMB (CRIPPLED)	EMOTION <HEART>

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
491.	LION	PERSON, STRONG AND BRAVE
492.	LIQUID	HUMAN BEINGS
493.	LIQUID, OVERFLOWING	COLORS (OF EMOTIONAL WOUNDS)
494.	LOAD, HEAVY	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING [PHYSICAL SUFFERING]
495.	LOAD, HEAVY	FORGETTING ONE'S BELOVED
496.	LOAD, HEAVY	LONGING
497.	LOAD, HEAVY	MELANCHOLINESS
498.	LOAD, HEAVY	ROMANCE [SERIES OF GAMES]
499.	LOCATION	COMPANIONSHIP
500.	LOCATION	DISTANCE
501.	LOCATION	EMOTION
502.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
503.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
504.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
505.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
506.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
507.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
508.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
509.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
510.	LOCATION	EMOTION <LIVER>
511.	LOCATION	EXPERIENCE
512.	LOCATION	HAPPINESS <SMILE>
513.	LOCATION	LIFE
514.	LOCATION	LIFE CIRCUMSTANCE
515.	LOCATION	MIND <HEAD>
516.	LOCATION	NIGHT
517.	LOCATION	NIGHT
518.	LOCATION	QUIETNESS
519.	LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP
520.	LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP
521.	LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP
522.	LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP
523.	LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP
524.	LOCATION	RELATIONSHIP
525.	LOCATION	SOUL
526.	LOCATION	TIME [SEASON]
527.	LOCATION	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>
528.	LOCATION (AHEAD OF US)	FUTURE
529.	LOCATION (BEHIND US)	TIME OF PAST
530.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
531.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
532.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
533.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
534.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
535.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
536.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
537.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
538.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
539.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
540.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
541.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
542.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
543.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
544.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
545.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
546.	LOCATION (HOME, POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE
547.	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	EMOTION <HEART>
548.	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	EMOTION <HEART>
549.	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	RELATIONSHIP
550.	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	SOUL
551.	LOCATION (POINT OF ORIGIN)	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>
552.	LOCATION (TO ESCAPE FROM)	LOVE
553.	LOCATION OF ARRIVAL	SADNESS <TEARS>
554.	LOCATION OF ARRIVAL	UNHAPPINESS
555.	LOCATIONS	TIMES (OCCASIONS)
556.	LOST PERSON	SINNER/CHEATER
557.	LOTUS	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
558.	MACHINE	RELATIONSHIP
559.	MACHINE (BROKEN)	THE LOVER (MALE)
560.	MACHINE (BROKEN)	THE LOVER (MALE)
561.	MACHINE/DEVICE (CONTROLLED)	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
562.	MAGICIAN	REALITY [NATURE]
563.	MAT/RUG/CARPET	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS [ROAD]
564.	MAT/RUG/CARPET	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS]
565.	MAT/RUG/CARPET	NIGHT
566.	MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS
567.	MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS	EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS
568.	MATS, WEAVED	WAVES
569.	MEASUREMENT/SCALE (FOR DEPTH OF WATER)	UNDERSTANDING
570.	MELODY, BEAUTIFUL	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
571.	MERGED ENTITY	LOVERS
572.	MONEY/RESOURCE	LIFE
573.	MONEY/RESOURCE	LIFE
574.	MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME
575.	MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME
576.	MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME [ETERNITY]
577.	MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME [MOMENT]
578.	MONEY/RESOURCE	TIME [NIGHT]
579.	MOON	LOVE
580.	MOON, FULL	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
581.	MORNING DEW	NEW BEGINNING
582.	MOTHER/CARETAKER, CARING	GOD <SEJADAH> (MUSLIM PRAYER MAT)
583.	MOUNTAIN	EMOTION
584.	MOVEMENT	PROCESS
585.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	LIVING
586.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	LIVING ON
587.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	LIVING ON
588.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	LIVING ON
589.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	PROCESS
590.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	PROCESS

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
591.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	PROCESS
592.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	PROCESS
593.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	PROCESS
594.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	PROCESS
595.	MOVEMENT (FORWARD)	PROGRESS
596.	MOVEMENT (UPWARD-STEPPING)	IMPROVEMENT
597.	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS
598.	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS
599.	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS
600.	MOVEMENT, DOWNWARD (RAPID)	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS
601.	MOVEMENT, RAPID <RUSH>	DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC FEELINGS
602.	MUD	IMPURITY
603.	MUD/DIRT	SINS
604.	MUSIC	SUCCESS
605.	MUSICAL NOTE	TIME
606.	NARRATOR	EYES [LIGHTS]
607.	NECKLACE	EMBRACE
608.	NOTES IN A NOTEPAD	MISTAKES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP)
609.	OBJECT	ATTEMPT
610.	OBJECT	LOVE
611.	OBJECT	TIME
612.	OBJECT - <i>pl.</i>	MEMORIES OF <THE BELOVED>
613.	OBJECT - <i>pl.</i>	TIMES (OCCASIONS)
614.	OBJECT (AT THE <EYES> ONLY)	LOVE (THAT IS SUPERFICIAL)
615.	OBJECT (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY) - <i>pl.</i>	PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE)
616.	OBJECT (AT THE <LIPS> ONLY) - <i>pl.</i>	PROMISES (THAT ARE INSINCERE)
617.	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)	FIGHT
618.	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)	LOVE
619.	OBJECT (HELD IN ONE'S HAND)	SKY <BLUE>
620.	OBJECT (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED)	MOON
621.	OBJECT (MAN-MADE/PRODUCED)	SKY
622.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY
623.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY
624.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	ATTEMPT
625.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	LIFE
626.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	RELATIONSHIP
627.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY)	UNDERSTANDING [READING]
628.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DENSITY) - <i>pl.</i>	TIMES (LIVING CONDITIONS)
629.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY DISTANCE FROM THE <HEART>)	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION)
630.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY HEIGHT)	QUANTITY
631.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY HEIGHT) - <i>pl.</i>	SOUNDS
632.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME
633.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME
634.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME
635.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME
636.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME [EMBRACE]
637.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY LENGTH)	TIME [NIGHT]
638.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)	DISTANCE <HEIGHT>
639.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)	INDICATION
640.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZE)	MOVEMENT

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
641.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SIZED)	INTENSITY (OF EMOTION)
642.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY SPEED)	PROGRESS
643.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]
644.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]
645.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	LOVE
646.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	LOVE
647.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	LOVE
648.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	PLEASURE
649.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	TOLERABILITY
650.	OBJECT (MEASURED BY VOLUME/QUANTITY)	UNDERSTANDING
651.	OBJECT (OF ASSESMENT)	LOVE
652.	OBJECT (OF GREAT AND EVER-INCREASING DEPTH)	LONGING
653.	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	DAYDREAMS
654.	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	EMOTION
655.	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	EMOTION
656.	OBJECT (OF GREAT DEPTH)	EMOTION
657.	OBJECT (QUANTIFIED BY <EYE> WINKS)	SLEEP
658.	OBJECT (TEMPORARILY MISPLACED) - <i>pl.</i>	MIND AND REASONING
659.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)	EMOTION
660.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)	EMOTION <LIVER>
661.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE HALVED)	SOUL
662.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	CHOICE
663.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	FAITH
664.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	FUN/PLEASURE
665.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	LOVE
666.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	LOVE
667.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	PRIDE
668.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	PROBLEMS
669.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
670.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>
671.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>
672.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	TIME [DAY]
673.	OBJECT (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED/OWNED)	TOUCH
674.	OBJECT (TO BE ELIMINATED)	THE BELOVED (MALE)
675.	OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)	PATIENCE
676.	OBJECT (WITH A SPECIFIABLE LOCATION)	TERROR
677.	OBJECT (WITH DIVIDABLE <PIECES>)	THE SELF
678.	OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE <PART>)	THE SELF
679.	OBJECT (WITH MORE THAN ONE PART <SIDE>)	THE SELF
680.	OBJECT (WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF DEPTHS) - <i>pl.</i>	SECRETS
681.	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL	CRYING/LAMENTING
682.	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL	INFATUATION
683.	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL - <i>pl.</i>	WORDS
684.	OBJECT, 3-DIMENSIONAL (IN LARGE QUANTITIES) - <i>pl.</i>	MEMORIES
685.	OBJECT, ABANDONABLE - <i>pl.</i>	TIMES (OCCASIONS)
686.	OBJECT, AUDITORY	SKY <BLUE>
687.	OBJECT, AUDITORY - <i>pl.</i>	OPINIONS/JUDGMENTS
688.	OBJECT, BEAUTIFUL	ROMANCE [LEGEND]
689.	OBJECT, BINDING	CLOUD
690.	OBJECT, BURIABLE	GRIEF

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
691.	OBJECT, BURIAABLE - <i>pl.</i>	GRIEF AND MISERY
692.	OBJECT, CATCHABLE	LOVE [EMBRACE]
693.	OBJECT, CATCHABLE	RELIEF (FROM A BAD SITUATION) [BREAK]
694.	OBJECT, CATCHABLE - <i>pl.</i>	GREETINGS
695.	OBJECT, CATCHABLE - <i>pl.</i>	SOUNDS
696.	OBJECT, CHANGABLE	MIND
697.	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE	EMOTION <LIVER>
698.	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE	TIME [SEASON]
699.	OBJECT, CHANGEABLE - <i>pl.</i>	FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS]
700.	OBJECT, COLORFUL	LONGING [FULL MOON]
701.	OBJECT, COLORFUL - <i>pl.</i>	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS [PHYSICAL WOUNDS]
702.	OBJECT, CONCEALED (DEEPLY-) - <i>pl.</i>	SECRETS
703.	OBJECT, CREATED	LOVE
704.	OBJECT, DISCARDABLE	LOVE
705.	OBJECT, DISCARDABLE - <i>pl.</i>	PROBLEMS
706.	OBJECT, DISPLAYED	LONGING
707.	OBJECT, DISPLAYED	LOVE
708.	OBJECT, DISPLAYED	SUCCESS
709.	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE	MELANCHOLINESS
710.	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE	REALITY [NATURE]
711.	OBJECT, DIVIDABLE	ROLE <PART>
712.	OBJECT, EMERGING	CRY
713.	OBJECT, ENORMOUS-SIZED	GOD'S MIGHT
714.	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	DREAMS
715.	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	PROMISES
716.	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	TIMES (OCCASIONS)
717.	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	TIMES (OCCASIONS)
718.	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	TIMES (OCCASIONS)
719.	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	TIMES (OCCASIONS)
720.	OBJECT, ENUMERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	WAVES
721.	OBJECT, ERODED AND SCRAPED - <i>pl.</i>	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS
722.	OBJECT, FAKE	PRETENSE
723.	OBJECT, FAKE - <i>pl.</i>	HOPES (UNFULFILLED)
724.	OBJECT, FAKE - <i>pl.</i>	LIES AND DECEPTION
725.	OBJECT, FLAMMABLE	RELATIONSHIP
726.	OBJECT, FLOATING	EMOTION [FULL MOON]
727.	OBJECT, FLOATING	SUSPICION
728.	OBJECT, FLOATING - <i>pl.</i>	ISLANDS
729.	OBJECT, FOUND	LOVE
730.	OBJECT, FOUND	LOVE
731.	OBJECT, FOUND	LOVE <A MAN>
732.	OBJECT, FOUND	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>
733.	OBJECT, FRAGILE	THE SELF <EMOTION>
734.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE)	DEW
735.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE)	EMOTION <HEART>
736.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) - <i>pl.</i>	DIRECTIONS
737.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKABLE) - <i>pl.</i>	WAVES
738.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)	RELATIONSHIP
739.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)	THE SELF
740.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BREAKING INTO PIECES)	THE SELF

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
741.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (BROKEN INTO PARTS)	RELATIONSHIP
742.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRACKED)	LOVE
743.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)	EMOTION [WORDS]
744.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)	LOVE
745.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING)	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
746.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUMBLING) - <i>pl.</i>	HUMAN BEINGS <CORPSES>
747.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE)	LOVE
748.	OBJECT, FRAGILE (CRUSHABLE)	LOVE
749.	OBJECT, GRASPABLE	DOMINION
750.	OBJECT, GRASPABLE	EMOTION
751.	OBJECT, GRASPABLE - <i>pl.</i>	HOPES
752.	OBJECT, GRASPED	FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY
753.	OBJECT, GRASPED	LOVE
754.	OBJECT, GRASPED	LOVE
755.	OBJECT, GRASPED	RELATIONSHIP
756.	OBJECT, GRASPED (TIGHTLY-)	LOVE
757.	OBJECT, HEAVY	FOG
758.	OBJECT, HIDDEN - <i>pl.</i>	SECRETS
759.	OBJECT, HIGHLY VALUBLE	RELATIONSHIP
760.	OBJECT, HOVERING	SMOKE [FUNNEL]
761.	OBJECT, LOCKABLE	LOVE
762.	OBJECT, LOSABLE - <i>pl.</i>	ABILITIES/SKILLS [TOUCH] <HANDS>
763.	OBJECT, LOST	HAPPINESS [LIGHT]
764.	OBJECT, LOST	LIGHT
765.	OBJECT, LOST	ONE <PART> OF THE SELF
766.	OBJECT, LOST	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
767.	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>	FRIENDS, DECEASED
768.	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>	GOOD DEEDS
769.	OBJECT, LOST - <i>pl.</i>	HOPES
770.	OBJECT, LOST (AND A VALUABLE RESOURCE)	SLEEP
771.	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	LOVE
772.	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	LOVE [LIGHT]
773.	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	MAGIC
774.	OBJECT, LOST (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	ONE'S PLACE IN LIFE
775.	OBJECT, LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	PASSION
776.	OBJECT, LOST/MISPLACED (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	TIME [MOMENT]
777.	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	BLISS
778.	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	SERENITY
779.	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	SERENITY
780.	OBJECT, LOST/UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR) - <i>pl.</i>	ANSWERS
781.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED	LOVE
782.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED	MIND
783.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED	MISTAKE
784.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED	WISH
785.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>	DECISIONS
786.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>	DEMANDS
787.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>	MISTAKES
788.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>	PLANS
789.	OBJECT, MADE/CREATED - <i>pl.</i>	PROMISES
790.	OBJECT, MAN-MADE/PRODDUCED	LIVING CONDITION

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
791.	OBJECT, MOVABLE - <i>pl.</i>	DIRECTIONS
792.	OBJECT, MOVABLE - <i>pl.</i>	WORDS
793.	OBJECT, MOVABLE (ROTATABLE)	BAD SITUATION
794.	OBJECT, MOVING	DEATH [TIME] <TICKING OF A CLOCK>
795.	OBJECT, MOVING	INSTINCT/URGE
796.	OBJECT, MOVING	LIFE
797.	OBJECT, MOVING	LONELINESS
798.	OBJECT, MOVING	LONGING
799.	OBJECT, MOVING	LONGING
800.	OBJECT, MOVING	LOVE
801.	OBJECT, MOVING	LUCK
802.	OBJECT, MOVING	SEXUAL DESIRE [RUSH]
803.	OBJECT, MOVING	SMOKE
804.	OBJECT, MOVING	TIME
805.	OBJECT, MOVING	TIME
806.	OBJECT, MOVING	TIME <WORLD>
807.	OBJECT, MOVING	WISH
808.	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>	EVENTS, ROMANTIC
809.	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>	EVENTS, ROMANTIC
810.	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>	LOVE AND LONGING
811.	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>	PRAYERS
812.	OBJECT, MOVING - <i>pl.</i>	WORDS
813.	OBJECT, MOVING (ROLLING)	LIFE
814.	OBJECT, MOVING (UPWARD-)	MUSIC
815.	OBJECT, OBSTRUCTING	SADNESS [TEARS]
816.	OBJECT, OLFACTORY	LOVE
817.	OBJECT, PLEASANT-SMELLING	LOVE
818.	OBJECT, PUSHABLE	CRY
819.	OBJECT, PUSHABLE	HAPPINESS
820.	OBJECT, RECEIVABLE	FEELING [TACTILE SENSATION]
821.	OBJECT, RECEIVABLE	STRENGTH
822.	OBJECT, RELEASED	LIGHT
823.	OBJECT, RELEASED	RELATIONSHIP
824.	OBJECT, RELEASED	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
825.	OBJECT, RELEASED	THE BELOVED (MALE)
826.	OBJECT, RELEASED	THE BELOVED (MALE)
827.	OBJECT, RELEASED	THE BELOVED (MALE)
828.	OBJECT, RELEASED	THE LOVER (MALE)
829.	OBJECT, REMOVABLE	TIME [DAY]
830.	OBJECT, REPLACABLE	THE BELOVED (MALE)
831.	OBJECT, REPLACABLE	THE BELOVED (MALE)
832.	OBJECT, REPLACABLE	THE BELOVED (MALE)
833.	OBJECT, SHARABLE	LOVE
834.	OBJECT, SHARP	SOUNDS
835.	OBJECT, SHARP	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) GAZE
836.	OBJECT, SHARP - <i>pl.</i>	STARS
837.	OBJECT, SHARP AND LONG	EMOTION [GAZE]
838.	OBJECT, SLIPPERY	LUCK
839.	OBJECT, STATIONARY/NON-MOVING	SCENT
840.	OBJECT, STORABLE	AWARENESS [TRACKS/LINES]

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
841.	OBJECT, STORABLE	LONGING
842.	OBJECT, STORABLE - <i>pl.</i>	HOPES
843.	OBJECT, STORABLE - <i>pl.</i>	ROMANTIC HISTORIES
844.	OBJECT, STRETCHABLE	LONELINESS
845.	OBJECT, SUBMERGED	EMOTION <LIVER>
846.	OBJECT, SUBMERGED	LOVE (THAT IS TRUE)
847.	OBJECT, SWEET-TASTING	LOVE [MARRIAGE] <RING FINGER>
848.	OBJECT, TAGGING/MARKING	LOVE
849.	OBJECT, TAGGING/MARKING - <i>pl.</i>	SINS
850.	OBJECT, THINLY SLICED	EMOTION
851.	OBJECT, THINLY SLICED	EMOTION <LIVER>
852.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	BREATH
853.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	COMMITMENT
854.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	COMPANIONSHIP <HAND>
855.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	COMPANIONSHIP <HAND>
856.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	EMOTION <HEART>
857.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	EMOTIONAL PLACE [PHYSICAL PLACE]
858.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	FRAGRANCE (OF A ROSE)
859.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	LIGHT [SOUND]
860.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	LOVE
861.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	LOVE
862.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	LOVE
863.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	PLEASURE
864.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	PROWESS
865.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>
866.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>
867.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	THE LOVER'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE LOVER'S LIFE>
868.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	THE LOVER'S (MALE) LOVE <THE LOVER>
869.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE	TRUST
870.	OBJECT, TRANSFERABLE - <i>pl.</i>	WORDS
871.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE	BLISS
872.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE	LOVE
873.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE	LUCK
874.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE	SADNESS [BLUES]
875.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>	DREAMS
876.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>	GREETINGS
877.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>	GREETINGS
878.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>	MEMORIES
879.	OBJECT, TRANSPORTABLE - <i>pl.</i>	NEWS
880.	OBJECT, TWISTABLE	MIND
881.	OBJECT, TWISTABLE	MIND
882.	OBJECT, UNFOUND (AND SEARCHED-FOR)	PERFECTION
883.	OBJECT, UNREACHABLE (FARAWAY/REMOTE) - <i>pl.</i>	MEMORIES
884.	OBJECT, UNREACHABLE (HIGHLY-POSITIONED) - <i>pl.</i>	WISHES
885.	OBJECT, UNTAINTED - <i>pl.</i>	LOVE AND AFFECTION
886.	OBJECT, VALUABLE	FAITHFULNESS/LOYALTY
887.	OBJECT, VALUABLE	LOVE
888.	OBJECT, VALUABLE (BUT SNATCHED FROM OWNER) - <i>pl.</i>	HOPES
889.	OBJECT, VANISHING	STORY/TALE
890.	OBJECT, VANISHING	STORY/TALE

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
891.	OBJECT, VIBRATING	EMOTION <LIVER> [SILK]
892.	OBJECT, VISUAL	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) LOVE <THE BELOVED'S FACE>
893.	OBJECT, WORTHLESS (WITHOUT HER BELOVED)	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
894.	OBJECT, WORTHLESS (WITHOUT HIS BELOVED)	THE LOVER (MALE)
895.	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)	COLORS/SHADES
896.	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)	WORDS/SPEECHES
897.	OBJECTS (LINED UP IN A ROW)	WORDS/SPEECHES
898.	OBJECTS, A SERIES OF (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)	TIME
899.	OBJECTS, ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED (A GROUP OF)	LONGING
900.	OBJECTS, ASSEMBLED/COLLECTED (A GROUP OF)	PRAYERS
901.	OBJECTS, ENUMERABLE (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)	TIME [DAYS]
902.	OBJECTS, ENUMERABLE (WITH DISCRETE PARTS)	TIME [HOURS]
903.	OCEAN	EMOTIONAL PAINS [PHYSICAL PAINS]
904.	OCEAN	KNOWLEDGE
905.	OCEAN	LOVE
906.	OCEAN	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE
907.	OCEAN	SORROWS
908.	OCEAN	SOUL
909.	OCEAN	SUN [HUMAN/PERSON]
910.	OCEAN <WATERS>	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE
911.	OCEAN CURRENT	ROMANCE
912.	OCEAN CURRENTS	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE)
913.	OCEAN CURRENTS	SINS
914.	OCEAN WAVE	DESPAIR
915.	OCEAN WAVE	NIGHT
916.	OCEAN WAVE	PASSION OF LOVE
917.	OCEAN WAVE	PASSION OF LOVE
918.	OCEAN WAVES	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS
919.	OCEAN, DEEP	EMOTION <HEART>
920.	OCEAN, DEEP	EMOTION <LIVER>
921.	OCEAN, DEEP	EMOTION <LIVER>
922.	OCEAN, DEEP	SOUL
923.	ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE EARTH'S ROTATION	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
924.	ONE WITH THE POWER TO AFFECT THE SUN	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
925.	ORGAN, FLEXIBLE	PROMISES (THAT ARE UNKEPT)
926.	ORGAN, VISUAL	EMOTION <LIVER>
927.	ORGAN, VISUAL	SOUL
928.	OUTSKIRTS	INSIGNIFICANCE
929.	PALACE	RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE
930.	PAPER/CLOTH	EMOTION <HEART>
931.	PARADISE	STATE OF FEELING PLEASURE
932.	PARADISE	STATE OF LUXURY AND COMFORT
933.	PASSERBY	LOVE
934.	PATH	CHOICE
935.	PATH	LIFE
936.	PATH/ROAD	LIFE
937.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
938.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
939.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
940.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
941.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
942.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
943.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
944.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
945.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
946.	PATH/ROAD	MANNER
947.	PATH/ROAD	OPTION
948.	PATH/ROAD	SITUATION
949.	PATH/ROAD, LONG (WITH VARIOUS CHECKPOINTS)	LIFE
950.	PENDULUM (SWINGING)	CRY
951.	PEOPLE (A COMMUNITY OF)	SEAGULLS (A FLOCK OF)
952.	PEOPLE, A CROWD OF	MESSAGES
953.	PHYSICAL ACCEPTANCE	EMOTIONAL ACCEPTANCE
954.	PHYSICAL ATTACK	ROMANTIC REJECTION
955.	PHYSICAL ATTACK	ROMANTIC REJECTION
956.	PHYSICAL BAGGAGE	EMOTIONAL BAGGAGE
957.	PHYSICAL BOUNDARY	SOCIAL BOUNDARY
958.	PHYSICAL BRUTALITY	EMOTIONAL BRUTALITY
959.	PHYSICAL CHANGE	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE
960.	PHYSICAL CHANGE	ATTITUDINAL CHANGE
961.	PHYSICAL COLLAPSE	EMOTIONAL COLLAPSE
962.	PHYSICAL COMFORT	EMOTIONAL COMFORT
963.	PHYSICAL CONDITION	EMOTIONAL CONDITION
964.	PHYSICAL CONSOLATION	EMOTIONAL CONSOLATION
965.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
966.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
967.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
968.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
969.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
970.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
971.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
972.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
973.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
974.	PHYSICAL DEPARTURE	EMOTIONAL DEPARTURE
975.	PHYSICAL DISCOVERY	EMOTIONAL DISCOVERY
976.	PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE
977.	PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE
978.	PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE
979.	PHYSICAL DISTANCE	EMOTIONAL DISTANCE
980.	PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER	EMOTIONAL ENCOUNTER
981.	PHYSICAL ENERGY	EMOTIONAL ENERGY
982.	PHYSICAL EXCLUSION	EMOTIONAL EXCLUSION
983.	PHYSICAL HEALING	EMOTIONAL HEALING
984.	PHYSICAL IMPACT	EMOTIONAL IMPACT
985.	PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY
986.	PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY
987.	PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY
988.	PHYSICAL INJURY	EMOTIONAL INJURY
989.	PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE	VISUAL INTERFERENCE
990.	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
991.	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS
992.	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS
993.	PHYSICAL LACK/LOSS	EMOTIONAL LACK/LOSS
994.	PHYSICAL MESS	PSYCHOLOGICAL MESS
995.	PHYSICAL MOBILITY	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY
996.	PHYSICAL MOBILITY	EMOTIONAL MOBILITY
997.	PHYSICAL MOVEMENT	EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
998.	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP
999.	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP
1000.	PHYSICAL OWNERSHIP (MUTUAL, OF EACH OTHER)	ROMANTIC PARTNERSHIP
1001.	PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN
1002.	PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN
1003.	PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN
1004.	PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN
1005.	PHYSICAL PAIN	EMOTIONAL PAIN
1006.	PHYSICAL PARALYSIS	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS
1007.	PHYSICAL PLACE	EMOTIONAL PLACE
1008.	PHYSICAL PLACE	EMOTIONAL PLACE
1009.	PHYSICAL PLACE	EMOTIONAL PLACE
1010.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	AUDITORY PRESENCE
1011.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	AUDITORY PRESENCE
1012.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	AUDITORY PRESENCE
1013.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	CONCEPTUAL PRESENCE
1014.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1015.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1016.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1017.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1018.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1019.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1020.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1021.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1022.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1023.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1024.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1025.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1026.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1027.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1028.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1029.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1030.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1031.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1032.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1033.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1034.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1035.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1036.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1037.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1038.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1039.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1040.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1041.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1042.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1043.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1044.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1045.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	EMOTIONAL PRESENCE
1046.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	MENTAL PRESENCE
1047.	PHYSICAL PRESENCE	VISUAL PRESENCE
1048.	PHYSICAL PREVENTION	EMOTIONAL PREVENTION
1049.	PHYSICAL PUNISHMENTS	EMOTIONAL PUNISHMENTS
1050.	PHYSICAL RETRACTION	VERBAL RETRACTION
1051.	PHYSICAL REUNIFICATION	EMOTIONAL REUNIFICATION
1052.	PHYSICAL SACRIFICE	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE
1053.	PHYSICAL SACRIFICE	EMOTIONAL SACRIFICE
1054.	PHYSICAL SHELTER	EMOTIONAL SHELTER
1055.	PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH
1056.	PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH
1057.	PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH
1058.	PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH
1059.	PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH
1060.	PHYSICAL STRENGTH	EMOTIONAL STRENGTH
1061.	PHYSICAL STRENGTH	SPIRITUAL STRENGTH
1062.	PHYSICAL STURDINESS	EMOTIONAL STURDINESS
1063.	PHYSICAL SUFFERING	EMOTIONAL SUFFERING
1064.	PHYSICAL SUPPORT	CONCEPTUAL SUPPORT
1065.	PHYSICAL SUPPORT	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT
1066.	PHYSICAL SUPPORT	EMOTIONAL SUPPORT [EMOTIONAL PRESENCE]
1067.	PHYSICAL TORMENT	EMOTIONAL TORMENT
1068.	PHYSICAL TORMENT	EMOTIONAL TORMENT
1069.	PHYSICAL TORMENT	EMOTIONAL TORMENT
1070.	PHYSICAL TORMENTS	EMOTIONAL TORMENTS
1071.	PHYSICAL TREATMENT	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT
1072.	PHYSICAL TREATMENT	EMOTIONAL TREATMENT
1073.	PHYSICAL UNION	SPIRITUAL UNION
1074.	PHYSICAL VIGOR	SPIRITUAL VIGOR
1075.	PHYSICAL WEAKNESS	EMOTIONAL WEAKNESS
1076.	PHYSICAL WEIGHT	EMOTIONAL WEIGHT
1077.	PHYSICAL WOUND	EMOTIONAL WOUND
1078.	PHYSICAL WOUND	EMOTIONAL WOUND
1079.	PHYSICAL WOUND	EMOTIONAL WOUND
1080.	PHYSICAL WOUNDS	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS
1081.	PHYSICAL WOUNDS	EMOTIONAL WOUNDS
1082.	PHYSICAL/FINANCIAL CAPACITY	EMOTIONAL CAPACITY
1083.	PICKPOCKET	POCKET
1084.	PICKPOCKETS	WAVES
1085.	PICTURE	FONDNESS
1086.	PICTURE	IMAGINATION
1087.	PLACE, HECTIC	THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS
1088.	PLACE, REMOTE	DREAM
1089.	PLACE, SEARCHABLE	EMOTION <HEART>
1090.	PLACE, SEARCHABLE	SOUL

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1091.	PLACE, VERY HIGH	HEAVEN
1092.	PLACE, VERY REMOTE	HEAVEN
1093.	PLACE/PERSON (TO WHICH/WHOM ONE BELONGS)	AFFINITY
1094.	PLANT	LOVE
1095.	PLANT	LOVE
1096.	PLANT, FLOWERING	LOVE
1097.	PLANT, FRUITING	LOVE
1098.	PLANT, SPROUTING	LOVE
1099.	PLANTS	LIGHT AND SOUND
1100.	PLANTS, LIVING (AND FLOWERING)	MEMORIES
1101.	POCKET (OF VALUABLES) AND VALUABLES	TIME
1102.	POISON	BETRAYAL
1103.	POISON	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1104.	POSITION, HIGH	IMPORTANCE/SIGNIFICANCE
1105.	POSITION, LOW	LACK/SCARCITY
1106.	POSITION, LOW	SADNESS/DEPRESSION
1107.	POSITION, LOW	SADNESS/DEPRESSION
1108.	POSITION, LOW (AND AWAY MOVEMENT)	LACK/SCARCITY
1109.	POSITION, LYING-DOWN	SUFFERING (SELF-CREATED) CONSEQUENCES
1110.	POSSESSION	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1111.	POSSESSION	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1112.	POSSESSION (OF HIS BELOVED)	THE LOVER'S (MALE) RESTLESSNESS
1113.	POSSESSION OF HER LOVER	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1114.	POSSESSION OF HIS BELOVED	THE LOVER (MALE)
1115.	POSSESSION, VALUABLE	LOVE
1116.	POSSESSION, VALUABLE	ROMANTIC PARTNER
1117.	POSSESSIONS, ONE'S OWN	LIFE'S PURPOSES
1118.	POSSESSOR/OWNER OF A <PIECE> OF HIS LOVER	THE BELOVED (MALE)
1119.	PREDATOR	SADNESS [DARKNESS]
1120.	PRESENT (TO THE ROYALTY THAT IS THE BELOVED)	LIFE
1121.	PREY	HAPPINESS [LIGHT]
1122.	PREY	LOVE
1123.	PREY	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1124.	PRISON	RELATIONSHIP
1125.	PRISON GUARD	TOUCH
1126.	PRISONER	EMOTION <LIVER>
1127.	PRISONS	CARESSES
1128.	PUBLIC SINK	PIER
1129.	PUNISHMENT (FROM GOD)	GRIEF
1130.	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY
1131.	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY
1132.	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY
1133.	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY
1134.	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY
1135.	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY
1136.	QUALITY OF BEING HARD/TOUGH	DIFFICULTY
1137.	RAIN	GRIEF
1138.	RAIN WATER (POURED OF OUT A CONTAINER [THE SKY])	SADNESS
1139.	RAIN/WATER	BLESSINGS
1140.	RAIN/WATER, ZAM-ZAM	BLESSINGS

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1141.	REBEL	ANGER
1142.	REBEL	SOUL
1143.	REBEL	WIND
1144.	REMEDY	FAITH/PRAYER
1145.	REMEDY/ANTIDOTE	KINDNESS
1146.	REPTILE OR INSECT	THE LOVER (MALE)
1147.	REPTILES OR INSECTS	IMAGES
1148.	RIOTS	TESTS (IN LIFE)
1149.	RISK-TAKER (FOR HIS BELOVED)	THE LOVER (MALE)
1150.	RIVER	LONELINESS
1151.	ROAD	ANSWERS/SOLUTIONS
1152.	ROAD	RELATIONSHIP
1153.	ROAD, THORNY	LIFE
1154.	ROOM	SORROW
1155.	ROOM	TIME
1156.	ROOM (THAT IS ADJACENT TO REALITY)	DREAMS
1157.	ROOM, DARK	LONGING
1158.	ROOM, DARK (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)	LIFE
1159.	ROOM, DARK (BUT LIT UP BY ONE'S BELOVED)	TIME
1160.	ROOM, DECORATED	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER
1161.	ROOM/CONTAINER	ACTIVITY
1162.	ROOM/CONTAINER	AWARENESS
1163.	ROOM/CONTAINER	DARKNESS
1164.	ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAM
1165.	ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAM [AN UNKNOWN/UNFAMILIAR LOCATION]
1166.	ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAMS
1167.	ROOM/CONTAINER	DREAMS
1168.	ROOM/CONTAINER	DROUGHT
1169.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMBRACE <ARMS>
1170.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION
1171.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <CHEST>
1172.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <HEART>
1173.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <HEART>
1174.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>
1175.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>
1176.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>
1177.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTION <LIVER>
1178.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]
1179.	ROOM/CONTAINER	EVENT [BOUNDED SPACE]
1180.	ROOM/CONTAINER	FEELINGS [TACTILE SENSATIONS]
1181.	ROOM/CONTAINER	FIRE
1182.	ROOM/CONTAINER	HONESTY
1183.	ROOM/CONTAINER	JUNCTION
1184.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LACK OF SUCCESS
1185.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE
1186.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE
1187.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE [WORLD]
1188.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LIFE [WORLD]
1189.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LONELINESS
1190.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LONELINESS

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1191.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LONGING
1192.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LOVE
1193.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LOVE
1194.	ROOM/CONTAINER	LOVE
1195.	ROOM/CONTAINER	MEMORY
1196.	ROOM/CONTAINER	MOONLIGHT
1197.	ROOM/CONTAINER	NIGHT
1198.	ROOM/CONTAINER	PARALYSIS
1199.	ROOM/CONTAINER	PATH
1200.	ROOM/CONTAINER	PITCH
1201.	ROOM/CONTAINER	PRETENSES
1202.	ROOM/CONTAINER	QUANTITY
1203.	ROOM/CONTAINER	REALITY
1204.	ROOM/CONTAINER	ROMANCE
1205.	ROOM/CONTAINER	ROMANCE
1206.	ROOM/CONTAINER	ROMANTIC ENCOUNTER
1207.	ROOM/CONTAINER	SILENCES
1208.	ROOM/CONTAINER	SONG [MIRROR]
1209.	ROOM/CONTAINER	SPEECH
1210.	ROOM/CONTAINER	STATE (OF BEING PAWNED)
1211.	ROOM/CONTAINER	STATE OF BEING
1212.	ROOM/CONTAINER	STEPS
1213.	ROOM/CONTAINER	SURRENDER
1214.	ROOM/CONTAINER	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) DEVOTION <THE BELOVED>
1215.	ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF
1216.	ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF
1217.	ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF
1218.	ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF
1219.	ROOM/CONTAINER	THE SELF
1220.	ROOM/CONTAINER	TIME
1221.	ROOM/CONTAINER	TIME [MINUTE]
1222.	ROOM/CONTAINER	TIME [MOMENT]
1223.	ROOM/CONTAINER	TIMES (OCASSIONS)
1224.	ROOM/CONTAINER	TIMES (OCASSIONS)
1225.	ROOM/CONTAINER	TRUTH [BRIGHTNESS]
1226.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WATER
1227.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WAVE
1228.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WAVES
1229.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOW
1230.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOW
1231.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOW
1232.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WINDOWS OF THE SOUL <EYES>
1233.	ROOM/CONTAINER	WORLD
1234.	ROOM/CONTAINER (FOR IMMORTALIZED MEMORIES)	SOUL
1235.	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR AND A LOCK)	EMOTION <LIVER>
1236.	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	EMOTION <LIVER>
1237.	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	FIELD
1238.	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	LOVE
1239.	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	SECRET
1240.	ROOM/CONTAINER (WITH A DOOR)	WORLD

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1241.	ROOM/CONTAINER, CLOSED	FIELD, FARM, AND FOREST
1242.	ROOM/CONTAINER, OPEN	SYSTEM, UNRESTRICTIVE
1243.	ROPE, INTERTWINED	LOVE (BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE)
1244.	ROPE/STRING	LOVE
1245.	ROPES	FOAMS
1246.	ROSE	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1247.	ROYALTY	DECLARATION (OF LOVE)
1248.	SAILBOATS	OCEAN CURRENTS
1249.	SAILOR	LONELINESS
1250.	SCENT, FRESH	LOVE
1251.	SCOREBOARD, BREAKABLE	BLAMES OF THE PAST (IN RELATIONSHIP)
1252.	SCORES ON A SCOREBOARD	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP)
1253.	SCYTHE	TIME [DAYS]
1254.	SEAGULLS (MONOGAMOUS, MATE-FOR-LIFE)	LOVERS (LIFELONG)
1255.	SEDUCEE	SKY
1256.	SEED <EYE> OF AN OLIVE	PROPHET MUHAMMAD
1257.	SEED OF AN OLIVE	PROPHET MUHAMMAD
1258.	SEED, GERMINATED (WITH GRIZZLE AS ITS SPROUTS)	AGE
1259.	SENSATION OF EXTREME COLDNESS	EXCITEMENT
1260.	SHADOW	MEMORY
1261.	SHADOW	MEMORY
1262.	SHADOW	MEMORY
1263.	SHAPE-SHIFTER	MIST
1264.	SHELL	HUMAN BODY (A CHILD'S)
1265.	SHELTER	LOVE
1266.	SHELTER/SHED	RELATIONSHIP
1267.	SHOT	ATTEMPT
1268.	SHROUDS	DISAPPOINTMENTS
1269.	SILK	EMOTION <LIVER>
1270.	SINGER/MUSICIAN	SOUL
1271.	SKIN	EMOTION
1272.	SKIN	EMOTION
1273.	SKIN	EMOTION
1274.	SKIN	EMOTION <CHEST>
1275.	SKIN	EMOTION <LIVER>
1276.	SKIN	EMOTION <LIVER>
1277.	SKIN	SOUL
1278.	SKIN (LAYERS OF)	FLESH
1279.	SKIN (WOUNDED)	LOVE
1280.	SKIN AND FLESH	LEAVES
1281.	SKIN AND FLESH	THE BELOVED'S (FEMALE) EMOTION <THE BELOVED>
1282.	SKIN/HAIR	EMOTION
1283.	SKIN/HAIR	EMOTION
1284.	SKIN/HAIR	SOUL
1285.	SKIN/HAIR	SOUL
1286.	SKIN/HAIR	SOUL
1287.	SLAVE	EMOTION <LIVER>
1288.	SMALLEST PART OF THE <LIVER>	EMOTION (CENTER OF)
1289.	SMILE	PEACE/CONTENTMENT
1290.	SNARE-TRAP	ROMANCE

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1291.	SOLDIERS, A TROOP OF	FOG
1292.	SONG	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1293.	SONG	VOICE
1294.	SONGLINE	CURSING
1295.	SOUND	LIFE [FERTILITY]
1296.	SOUND	LIGHT
1297.	SPACE, BOUNDED	LIFE
1298.	SPACE, BOUNDED	LOVE
1299.	SPACE, BOUNDED	LOVE
1300.	SPACE, BOUNDED	RELATIONSHIP
1301.	SPACE, BOUNDED	RELATIONSHIP
1302.	SPACE, BOUNDED	RELATIONSHIP
1303.	SPACE, BOUNDED	RELATIONSHIP [EVENT]
1304.	SPACE, BOUNDED	ROMANCE
1305.	SPACE, BOUNDED	ROMANCE [DRAMA]
1306.	SPACE, BOUNDED	ROMANTIC FANTASY
1307.	SPACE, BOUNDED	ROMANTIC FANTASY
1308.	SPACE, BOUNDED	SKY AND BLIZZARD
1309.	SPACE, BOUNDED	SONGS
1310.	SPACE, BOUNDED	SYSTEM
1311.	SPACE, BOUNDED	TIME
1312.	SPONGE	LONELINESS
1313.	SPRAY OF GAS	RAPID GROWTH
1314.	STAGE	LIFE
1315.	STANDING IN A QUEUE	LIVING
1316.	STAR	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1317.	STARS	EYES
1318.	STARS	FLOWERS
1319.	STARS	LOVE AND ROMANCE
1320.	STATE OF STEADINESS (AND ALSO LACK OF MOBILITY)	PERMANENCE
1321.	STEPPING FORWARD	LIVING ON
1322.	STINGS	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP)
1323.	STORMS	AFFLICTIONS
1324.	STORMS	CONFLICTS (IN RELATIONSHIP/MARRIAGE)
1325.	STORY/TALE	LOVE
1326.	STRAIGHTNESS	HONESTY
1327.	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)	DOUBT
1328.	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)	EFFECTS OF MORPHINE <MORPHINE>
1329.	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)	FEAR
1330.	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)	INFATUATION
1331.	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)	LOVE
1332.	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)	LOVE AND AFFECTION
1333.	SUBSTANCE (FILL-IN)	SOUNDS
1334.	SUBSTANCE, ADHESIVE	LONGING
1335.	SUBSTANCE, NATURAL	LOVE
1336.	SUBSTANCE, PURE	LOVE
1337.	SUBSTANCES, COLORING	TUNES, CHURCH/RELIGIOUS
1338.	SUBSTANCES, MINERAL	HOPES (OF LOVE)
1339.	SUBSTANCES, SMEARY	SURFBOARDS <BLUE AND GREEN>
1340.	SUBSTANCE, EROSIVE	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1341.	SUCTION DEVICES	VALLEYS
1342.	SURFACE	STRIKE
1343.	SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)	MIND
1344.	SURFACE (ON WHICH OBJECTS REST)	MIND
1345.	SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)	SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS
1346.	SURFACE (ON WHICH ONE STANDS)	SELF-RELIANCE AND/OR ALONENESS
1347.	SURFACE OF EARTH (WITH CRACKS)	MIND
1348.	SURFACE, SCRATCHED	EMOTION <CHEST>
1349.	SURFACE, SLIPPERY	MIND <THE PERSON>
1350.	SUSTENANCE	PRAYER
1351.	SWING	ANXIETY AND SUSPICION
1352.	SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS	DIFFICULTIES (IN LIFE)
1353.	SYSTEM/MACHINERY	LIFE
1354.	TACTILE SENSATION	FEELING
1355.	TACTILE SENSATION	FEELING
1356.	TACTILE SENSATION	FEELING
1357.	TACTILE SENSATION	INTUITION/EMOTION
1358.	TACTILE SENSATION	INTUITION/EMOTION
1359.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1360.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1361.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1362.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1363.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1364.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1365.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1366.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1367.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1368.	TACTILE SENSATIONS	FEELINGS
1369.	TACTILE STIMULUS	EMOTION/FEELING
1370.	TACTILE STIMULUS	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]
1371.	TACTILE STIMULUS	EMOTIONAL PAIN [PHYSICAL PAIN]
1372.	TACTILE STIMULUS	LOVE
1373.	TACTILE STIMULUS	LOVE
1374.	TACTILE STIMULUS	SORROW
1375.	TALISMAN (BURIED IN THE BELOVED'S HEART)	LOVE
1376.	TARGET (OF A SHOT ARROW)	PROPHET MUHAMMAD [CHOSEN MESSENGER]
1377.	TASTANT, SWEET	CHARM
1378.	TASTANT, SWEET	FANTASY
1379.	TASTANT, SWEET	LOVE
1380.	TASTANT, SWEET	SURRENDER
1381.	TASTANT, SWEET	TIME [DAY]
1382.	TASTANTS (THAT ARE BOTH BITTER AND SWEET)	MEMORIES
1383.	TASTANTS, SWEET	DREAMS
1384.	TASTANTS, SWEET	KISSES
1385.	TASTANTS, SWEET	PROMISES
1386.	TEMPERATURE	TIME [DAYS]
1387.	TERMINAL/STATION	NIGHT
1388.	TEST	FATE
1389.	TEST (CONSTANT)	LOVE
1390.	THORNS, A BUNCH OF	PASSION

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1391.	THREAT OR DISTURBANCE (POTENTIAL)	LOVE
1392.	TIME	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1393.	TIME	THE BELOVED (FEMALE)
1394.	TOOL, SCRAPING	THE BELOVED'S (MALE) VOICE
1395.	TOOL/INSTRUMENT	SKY <BLUE>
1396.	TOOL/WEAPON, BLUNT	SORROW
1397.	TORCH	MOONLIGHT
1398.	TOW-TRUCK	NEGLIGENCE
1399.	TOY	EMOTION <HEART>
1400.	TOY	MIND
1401.	TOYS	WORDS
1402.	TRAVEL, SEA (VIOLENT)	ROMANCE
1403.	TRAVEL/TRIP (JOINT)	RELATIONSHIP
1404.	TREASURE <TREASURE>	TIME [MOMENT]
1405.	TREE	LOVE
1406.	TREE, LUSH-GROWING	HAPPINESS
1407.	TREE, LUSH-GROWING	RELATIONSHIP (THAT IS EVERLASTING)
1408.	TREE'S ROOTS	SOUL (OF THE <POET>)
1409.	TUNNEL	DIFFICULTIES
1410.	TUNNEL	MIND
1411.	TUNNEL	TIME [NIGHT]
1412.	TURBULENCE	LONGING
1413.	TURBULENCES	CHALLENGES (IN LIFE)
1414.	TWIG (ON A TREE)	OLD-AGE
1415.	TWIG, BRITTLE	OLD-AGE
1416.	VALES AND DALES	HARDSHIPS
1417.	VERBAL PARALYSIS	EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS
1418.	VERBAL STATEMENTS	VISUAL SIGNALS
1419.	VESSEL/CANISTER	HUMAN BODY
1420.	VESSEL/CANISTER	ROW/LINE
1421.	VESSEL/CONTAINER (OF WATER)	THE SELF
1422.	VICTIM OF A HIT-AND-RUN ACCIDENT (POTENTIAL)	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
1423.	VICTIM OF DROWNING	LOVE
1424.	VICTIM OF MURDER	REALITY
1425.	VICTIM OF POISONING	THE LOVER (MALE) <THE LOVER'S BLOOD>
1426.	VICTIM OF SERIOUS INJURY	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
1427.	VICTIM OF STABBING	EMOTION
1428.	VICTIM OF STABBING	SOUL
1429.	VICTIM OF STRANGLING	LONGING
1430.	VICTIM OF WITCHCRAFT	ARTS
1431.	VICTIMS OF A SNARE-TRAP	LOVERS
1432.	VICTIMS OF PICKPOCKETS	SURFERS
1433.	VISION, OBSCURED	JUDGMENT, POOR
1434.	VISION, OBSCURED	JUDGMENT, POOR
1435.	VOYAGE	LIFE
1436.	VOYAGE	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S LIFE
1437.	WAGER	BELIEF/CONVICTION
1438.	WALKING	LIVING
1439.	WANDERER (SOLITARY)	LONELINESS
1440.	WAR/CONQUEST	LOVE

NO.	SOURCE DOMAIN	TARGET DOMAIN
1441.	WARRIOR	THE LOVER (MALE)
1442.	WARRIORS (STRONG AND BRAVE)	FLEAS
1443.	WATER	ATMOSPHERE
1444.	WATER	ENERGY
1445.	WATER	KNOWLEDGE
1446.	WATER	LANDS
1447.	WATER	LOVE
1448.	WATER	PURIFICATION
1449.	WATER (RIVER)	THOUGHTS
1450.	WATER (THE PRE-PRAYER ABLUTIONS)	PURITY
1451.	WATER TURNED INTO ICE	EMOTION <LIVER>
1452.	WATER TURNED INTO ICE	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER>
1453.	WATER TURNED INTO ICE	THE LOVER'S (MALE) FEELINGS <THE LOVER>
1454.	WATER/FLOOD	CRY
1455.	WEAPON, MURDER	ILLUSORY HEAVENS
1456.	WELLNESS	WEALTH
1457.	WHEELS, ROTATING	QUESTIONS
1458.	WHEELS, SPINNING	MINDS, CONFUSED
1459.	WHISPER OF LOVE	GOD'S MESSAGE/GUIDANCE
1460.	WHISPER, ETERNAL	GOD'S LOVE
1461.	WIND	LONGING
1462.	WIND/WATER	SYAHADAH (MUSLIM PROCLAMATION OF FAITH)
1463.	WINDOW FRAME	WIND
1464.	WIZARD/WITCH	TIME
1465.	WOKR/JOB	STRESS (OF THE EVERYDAY LIFE)
1466.	WOLVES	MISTAKES OF THE PAST
1467.	WORKS OF POETRY	KISSES <LIPS>
1468.	WORLD	CULTURE
1469.	WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)	THE LOVER (FEMALE)
1470.	WORSHIPPER (OF HER BELOVED)	THE LOVER'S (FEMALE) FEELINGS
1471.	WRITINGS, ERASABLE	MEMORIES, BAD (IN RELATIONSHIP)

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