

Extraordinary human energy consumption and resultant geological impacts beginning around 1950 CE initiated the proposed Anthropocene Epoch

Jaia Syvitski^{1✉}, Colin N. Waters², John Day³, John D. Milliman⁴,
Colin Summerhayes⁵, Will Steffen⁶, Jan Zalasiewicz², Alejandro Cearreta⁷,
Agnieszka Gałuszka⁸, Irka Hajdas⁹, Martin J. Head¹⁰,
Reinhold Leinfelder¹¹, J. R. McNeill¹², Clément Poirier¹³, Neil L. Rose¹⁴,
William Shotyk¹⁵, Michael Wagreich¹⁶ & Mark Williams²

Growth in fundamental drivers—energy use, economic productivity and population—can provide quantitative indications of the proposed boundary between the Holocene Epoch and the Anthropocene. Human energy expenditure in the Anthropocene, ~22 zetajoules (ZJ), exceeds that across the prior 11,700 years of the Holocene (~14.6 ZJ), largely through combustion of fossil fuels. The global warming effect during the Anthropocene is more than an order of magnitude greater still. Global human population, their productivity and energy consumption, and most changes impacting the global environment, are highly correlated. This extraordinary outburst of consumption and productivity demonstrates how the Earth System has departed from its Holocene state since ~1950 CE, forcing abrupt physical, chemical and biological changes to the Earth's stratigraphic record that can be used to justify the proposal for naming a new epoch—the Anthropocene.

A stratigraphic case has been made for a planetary-scale Anthropocene time interval at epoch rank, one that would end the Holocene Epoch at ~1950 CE¹. Conceptually, the transition reflects a change from human drivers of environmental change having gradually increasing significance and mostly regionally expressed, to becoming overwhelming and global in extent. But what quantifiable metrics enable direct comparison between the Anthropocene and the preceding Holocene? As a unit of the international Geological Time Scale, the Quaternary Period^{2,3} formally partitions into Pleistocene (2.58 My to 11.7 ky) and Holocene (11.7 ky to present) epochs⁴. The Holocene, which follows the end of the last cold episode with the rapid northward movement of the oceanic polar front, is formally subdivided by the International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS) into three ages:^{5,6} Greenlandian (11.7 to 8.2

¹ INSTAAR, U. Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA. ² U. Leicester, Leicester, UK. ³ Louisiana State U., Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA. ⁴ College of William and Mary, School of Marine Sciences, Gloucester Point, VA, USA. ⁵ Scott Polar Res. Inst., Cambridge U., Cambridge, UK. ⁶ Australian National U., Canberra, Australia. ⁷ U. País Vasco UPV/EHU, 48080 Bilbao, Spain. ⁸ Jan Kochanowski U., Kielce 25-369, Poland. ⁹ ETH Zürich, 8093 Zürich, Switzerland. ¹⁰ Brock U., St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1, Canada. ¹¹ Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin D-12249, Germany. ¹² Georgetown U., Washington, DC, USA. ¹³ Normandie U., UNICAEN, UNIROUEN, CNRS, M2C, 14000 Caen, France. ¹⁴ U. College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK. ¹⁵ U. Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G2R3, Canada. ¹⁶ U. Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria. ✉email: syvitski@colorado.edu

ky), Northgrippian (8.2 to 4.3 ky), and Meghalayan (4.3 to 0 ky). Here, we trace the human footprint through each Holocene age, with focus on two historical and informal intervals: Pre-Industrial (1670–1850 CE) and Industrial (1850–1950 CE), within the Meghalayan Age. The Anthropocene as a potential epoch^{7,8} is first compared to these earlier Holocene ages, using the human population and its energy consumption and economic productivity, and then assessed by evaluating how human action has disturbed the landscape, altered river discharge (water, particulate and dissolved constituents), and has shifted climate, biogeochemical cycles, biodiversity, and other parts of the Earth System. These changes have already resulted in a sharp distinction in the stratigraphic record between the Holocene and Anthropocene^{1,7,8}. This study formulates a consistent quantitative approach evaluating key Earth-surface parameters and their human drivers to validate the contention that the Anthropocene is an epoch-level planetary interval in Earth's history, comparable to or exceeding in planetary impact the Holocene Epoch, and greatly exceeding component Holocene ages.

The Anthropocene Epoch is used here as a geological time unit for potential inclusion in the Geological Time Scale. A proposal to formalize the Anthropocene for this purpose is currently being developed by the Anthropocene Working Group (AWG), which includes many authors of this paper, and will require a defining Global Boundary Stratotype Section and Point (GSSP) to be selected and approved, consistent with ICS standard practice.

A Holocene history of the human footprint

The Greenlandian Age (11.7 to 8.2 ky) constitutes the first 3464-y of the Holocene, driven by Milankovitch warming of $\sim +0.5^\circ\text{C}$ ⁹, during which the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone shifted northward¹⁰ and Northern Hemisphere ice sheets ablated. Atmospheric CO_2 and CH_4 concentrations continued a trend of rapid rise initiated in the latest Pleistocene and peaking at ~ 10 ky¹¹. Coastal human populations retreated inland from initial settlements¹², especially on deltas¹³, as global mean sea level rose ~ 48.5 m, at a rate of ~ 15 mm/y between 11.4 ky and 8.2 ky¹⁴. Human population was sparse and grew from ~ 4 M to 8 M (Fig. 1a), at a rate of 0.01%/y (Table 1, Supplementary-Table 1).




Fig. 1 Correlation of global human population, energy consumption and productivity during the Holocene and Anthropocene epochs. **a** Global human population (millions), **b** global energy consumption (EJ/y), and **c** global productivity ($\$/\text{y}/\text{capita}$), across the Holocene and proposed Anthropocene epochs (in this paper starting in 1950 CE). All three parameters are highly correlated (Spearman's rank coefficient = 1.00). Larger circle = 1850 CE; large square = 1950 CE. Data references are listed in Supplementary Online Material.

Regional extinctions of large terrestrial mammals (e.g., ground sloths in North and South America) correlate with the arrival of humans¹⁵. Humans lived as foragers, fishers, or hunters, but in a few locations began to cultivate domesticated food crops¹⁶. Energy sources were wood-burning and human muscle, and more rarely, animal muscle, with an estimated per capita energy consumption of 6.2 GJ/y, ranging from 5.8 to 6.5 GJ/y (Fig. 1b, Table 1). The human population during the Greenlandian consumed 0.12 zetajoules of energy (with $1 \text{ ZJ} = 10^{21} \text{ J}$). Global productivity is used here as a measure of output per unit of input, such as labor, capital or any other resource calculated for the global economy (GDP per capita per unit time), and if meaningful at all for the Greenlandian, was very low (Fig. 1c, Table 1).

During the Northgrippian Age (8.2 to 4.3 ky), global mean sea level rose another ~ 14.5 m, mostly in the first 1500-y, as the great Northern Hemisphere ice sheets largely had disappeared by 7000-y ago^{14,17}. The Age-averaged rate of global mean sea-level rise was ~ 3.6 mm/y (Table 1). Global climate was relatively stable at a temperature plateau until 5.48 ky, when the planet cooled $\sim -0.2^\circ\text{C}$, but with regional exceptions⁹. The trend in atmospheric CO_2 and CH_4 concentrations changed from slightly falling to slightly rising, at ~ 8 ky and ~ 5 ky respectively. Although some have argued that this increase reflected deforestation in response to expanding agriculture, in particular rice cultivation in the case of methane¹⁰, others suggest that the rise reflects the gradual adjustment of ocean chemistry towards an equilibrium state following deglaciation¹⁸. Some humans, still a minority at the end of the Northgrippian Age, organized into structured agrarian societies. Once sea level stabilized, the human population grew to 27 M (0.03%/y), as urban centers and ports developed (Fig. 1a, Table 1) and the earliest state-level societies originated (Mesopotamia at 3700 BCE, Egypt at 3300 BCE, Peru 3000 BCE, Indus Valley at 2500 BCE, Mesoamerica 1900 BCE, and Yellow River 1700 BCE^{19,20}). Energy sources included wood burning, human and animal muscle, with the per capita energy consumption at 7.1 GJ/y, ranging from 6.5 to 7.8 GJ/y (Fig. 1b, Table 1). Humans expended 0.34 ZJ across the Northgrippian Age, a 332% increase from the Greenlandian, reflecting an increased human population. Human productivity remained low (Fig. 1c, Table 1). The anthropogenic footprint included regional soil erosion from deforestation, a proliferation of pastureland, and some mining^{21,22}. Extinction of large terrestrial mammals correlates with climate change²³, though some extinctions have been linked to human actions¹⁵.

The Meghalayan Age, as represented here, is the recent ~ 4.2 -ky interval (to ~ 1950 CE), when global mean sea level rose 1.0 to 1.5 m, or ~ 0.3 mm/y¹⁴, as the global climate cooled $\sim -0.5^\circ\text{C}$ ⁹, in what is referred to as Neoglaciation²⁴. Insolation decreased, and there were slight rises in atmospheric CO_2 and CH_4 concentrations²⁵. Human populations increased by an average 0.2%/y, reaching a population of 2500 M by 1950 CE (Fig. 1a, Table 1). Apparently related to sea-level stabilization, biological productivity on the coastal margin increased dramatically and likely initiated the further movement to large empire level organization in human society facilitating greater demand for goods, increased trade and complex urbanization^{19,20,26}. Large-scale water diversion schemes were built, and extensive farming practices increased^{21,27}. Coal became a common energy supply in the 19th century²⁸. Per capita energy consumption averaged 8.3 GJ/y, ranging from 7.8 to 40 GJ/y, with humans expending 14.2 ZJ across the Meghalayan Age, a 24-fold increase over the Northgrippian Age (Fig. 1b, Table 1). Per capita GDP averaged $\$144/\text{y}$ (Fig. 1c, Table 1). Humans transferred plant and animal species beyond their native ranges, exemplified by the spread of chickens²⁹, maize³⁰ and Pacific rats³¹. Human impacts produced extensive regional losses³² and widespread

Table 1 Average values of key human and environmental drivers for each studied time interval.

Geological Unit	Greenlandian Age	Northgrippian Age	Meghalayan Age	Pre-industrial Interval (informal)	Industrial interval (informal)	Anthropocene (proposed Epoch)
Time Interval (y before 2020 CE)	11,720–8256	8256–4270	4270–70	350–170	170–70	70–present
Interval span (y)	3464	3986	4200	180	100	70
Global climate change (°C)	~ +0.5	~ 0.0	~ -0.5	~ 0.0	~ +0.2	~ +0.9
Sea Level Rise (mm/y)	15	3.6	0.3	0.15	0.75	2.4
Population growth rate (%/y)	0.01	0.03	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.6
Primary energy source	Wood & human muscle	Wood & increasingly animal muscle	Wood, muscle, coal in cities	Wood, muscle, whale oil, coal, streams	Coal, oil, hydroelectric	Coal, oil, gas, nuclear, renewables
Per capita energy consumption (GJ/y)	6.2	7.1	8.3	18.4	27.2	61
Total interval energy (ZJ)	0.12	0.34	14.2	2.9	4.9	22
Generalized human narrative	Primitive Agrarian Societies	Organized Agrarian Societies	Advanced Agrarian Societies	Empires, Nations, City States	Nations & Empires	UN
GDP (Int'l \$/Capita/y)	96	109	144	170	679	5400

Human and environmental drivers across the IUGS/ICS-approved Holocene ages, along with values for two informal intervals occurring in the last 280 years of the ~11,700-y Holocene history, and the proposed Anthropocene Epoch starting in this paper at 1950 CE. All values shown are interval averages.

extinctions of land vertebrates³³, including the ancestors of domesticated cattle in Eurasia³⁴ and flightless birds in the Pacific³⁵. Introductions and extinctions left a distinctive archeological and fossil signal^{36–38}.

Below we discuss two informal intervals, the Pre-industrial and the Industrial, that capture the end of the Meghalayan.

Pre-Industrial interval (1670–1850 CE). A 180 y-long interval when Holocene sea-level rise was at its slowest ~0.15 mm/y¹⁴, with no discernible trend during the 18th century, and a slight fall from 1800 to 1850 CE³⁹, when Alpine glaciers were at their maximum Meghalayan extent⁴⁰ in response to extensive volcanism⁴¹. Earth had no discernible climate trend ~0.0 °C⁹ during this interval, with cooling pulses varying regionally⁴². Human population expanded from ~600 M to 1247 M, a growth rate of 0.4%/y (Fig. 2a). The per-capita energy consumption was 18.4 GJ/y, ranging from 13.5 to 22 GJ/y (Fig. 2b, Table 1), with humans expending 2.9 ZJ or 20% of the human energy consumption during the 4,200-y Meghalayan Age (Table 1). Novel energy sources included whale oil⁴³ and stream energy; for example, there were >65,000 water-powered mills in the U.S.A. prior to 1840 CE^{44,45}. Human-enabled species introductions expanded, and transfers happened rapidly, exemplified by the spread of accidentally introduced aquatic mollusks in Europe⁴⁶. This informal interval represents the fundamental transformation from pre-industrial to full industrial energy use. Prior to 1670 CE, expenditures in England used to obtain basic energy resources (human food, fodder for animals, and wood fuel) amounted to 50–70% of GDP⁴⁷. By 1850 CE, with the growing use of coal, less than 30% of GDP was allocated to obtaining energy, and <10% after 1950 CE, as fossil fuels dominated energy use⁴⁷. Global per capita GDP increased by 1750 CE to \$178/y in 1990 international dollars (Table 1, Fig. 2c).

Industrial interval (1850–1950 CE). This 100-y interval captures the change in human–nature interactions⁴⁸. Atmospheric CO₂ increased from the spread of industrial activity and drove a planetary warming by ~+0.2 °C⁴⁹ (~ +0.6 W/m²)⁴⁹, on an otherwise essentially flat Milankovitch insolation signal^{50,51}. Solar variability had very little effect, with the number of sunspots rising in 1950 CE to levels slightly lower than that in the 1860s and the 1780s^{52,53}, in contrast to the pre-industrial Maunder Minimum from 1645 to 1715 CE⁵⁴. Thus, natural

variability contributed little to warming, (<0.2 W/m²)⁴⁹ during this interval, where the main natural changes were brief intervals of cooling related to large volcanic eruptions that ejected reflective material into the stratosphere (e.g. Krakatoa in 1883 CE)^{55,56}. Sea-level rise accelerated to ~0.5 mm/y in the late 1800s, and to ~2.2 mm/y by 1940 CE, before beginning a temporary deceleration⁵⁷. This pattern is consistent with the natural fluctuations in the warmth of the North Atlantic in responses to changes in the Atlantic Meridional Ocean Circulation that induces regional and slight global warming as it accelerates, reversing as it decelerates⁵⁸.

Human population grew at 0.8%/y, from 1250 M to 2500 M (Figs. 1a, 2b, Table 1). Energy consumption per capita averaged 27.2 GJ/y, ranging from 22 to 40 GJ/y (Fig. 2b), accounting for 4.9 ZJ or 35% of the energy consumption across just 2.4% of the 4200-y Meghalayan Age (Table 1). In addition to the growing use of coal, new energy sources included hydroelectric power, oil and natural gas, more than offsetting declines in whale oil and stream power (driven by gravity). Many large rivers were engineered, with levees, dams and water diversion schemes⁵⁹. Some lake⁶⁰ and marine⁶¹ ecosystems started to turn hypoxic. Biodiversity loss increased and introduced species, such as the giant African snail and naval shipworm^{62,63}, spread through terrestrial and aquatic environments^{21,32,64}. Dispersals were facilitated by increasing global trade⁶⁵. Per capita GDP had increased by 1900 CE to \$679/y in 1990 international dollars (Table 1, Fig. 2c), underwriting new global transportation systems and power sources.

Although the European industrial interval began in the 1700s, we use 1850 CE as the start of the interval, given the remarkable change in both global energy use and global productivity (Fig. 2c). For most of the Holocene Epoch, human productivity (GDP per capita: see SOM Historical GDP Consumption Data) increased linearly with a growing population (Fig. 2c). From 1850 CE onwards, human productivity accelerated (Fig. 2c), which explains why that time period was originally suggested as the start of the Anthropocene^{66,67}. For most of the Holocene, the ratio of human productivity to energy use decreased (Fig. 2d). After 1850 CE, human society became more productive per unit of energy use (Fig. 2d). During the 11.7 ky of the Holocene Epoch, including the Industrial interval, the global human population consumed 14.6 ZJ of energy of which 35% was consumed in the final 100 years.

An Anthropocene history of the human footprint

Proposed Anthropocene Epoch from 1950 CE:^{1,68} Driven by the accelerated burning of hydrocarbon fuels, atmospheric temperatures increased by 0.9 °C in the last 70 years (and by 1.1 °C from 1900 to 2018 CE⁶⁹), with much of the rise post-dating 1970 CE⁷⁰, during an interval of limited sunspot influence and a flat Milankovitch signal. Sunspot numbers rose slightly from their 1950 CE levels to peak levels in 1980 CE and 1990 CE that are more or less similar to those reached in the 1780s and the 1860s, and then began declining⁵² even as warming continues (Box 1).




Fig. 2 Relationships between human population (millions) and key economic indicators. Relationships between human population (millions) and key economic indicators: **a** rate of population growth (%/y), **b** energy consumption per capita (**E** in GJ/y/capita), **c** per capita productivity (**P** as GDP in 1990 international dollars, \$/y/capita), and **d** **P/E** ratio, each across Holocene and Anthropocene epochs. Purple circle = 1850 CE; blue square = 1950 CE. A marked change in GDP per capita after 1850 CE reflects the global spread of industrialization and technology. The rate of change in population sharply increases around 1950 CE. The **P/E** ratio fell for most of the Holocene, until 1850 CE, when human society became more productive per unit energy use. Data references are listed in Supplementary Online Material.

Atmospheric CO₂ levels reached 415 ppm in 2019⁷¹, higher than at any time in the past 3 million years⁷¹. Planetary response to this atmospheric warming includes:

- **Sea-ice volume** shrinkage: 300 ± 100 km³/y loss (~275 Gt/y) in the Arctic Ocean since 1980 CE⁷². Antarctic sea ice extent in October 2019 CE was less than for any previous October since satellite observations of sea-ice began in 1978 CE⁷³.
- **Glacial-ice mass** loss: from 113 ± 125 Gt/y during 1992–1996 CE to 665 ± 48 Gt/y during 2012–2016 CE⁷⁴, with ~5.6 Tt (=10¹² tonnes) of land ice loss on Greenland⁷⁵ and ~5.0 Tt from Antarctica since 1980 CE⁷⁶.
- **Sea-level rise** acceleration: from 1.53 mm/y (0.96 to 2.11 mm/y) during 1901–1990 CE, to 2.06 mm/y (1.76 to 2.36 mm/y) during 1971–2015 CE, and to 3.07 mm/y (2.70 to 3.7 mm/y) during 1993–2015 CE^{77–79}.
- **Acidification of the global ocean:** through the absorption of atmospheric CO₂ with open-ocean surface pH declining by a range of 0.017–0.027 pH units per decade since the late 1980s^{80–82}, threatening the survival of particularly soluble organisms, such as aragonitic pteropods. Increasing acidity may raise the calcium carbonate compensation depth (CCD) in the deep ocean, causing the demise of carbonate-shelled deep-water benthic organisms.

Since 1950 CE, the human population has rapidly increased, with societal and medical advances extending lifespans. Industrial-scale agriculture, with its global distribution system, presently feeds a global population of 7800 M that grows at an average rate of 1.63%/y, presently 71 M/y. In absolute numbers, human migration within and between continents has reached its historical zenith during the Anthropocene, as many coastal cities have transformed into megacities (>10 M) in just decades⁸³ (Table 2).

1950 CE also marks an important upturn in the global spread of technological knowledge occurring when societies became more economically interdependent (the Great Acceleration^{48,84}). Between 1650 and 1750 CE, the annual citations of scholarly references grew at ~0.15%/y⁸⁵, increasing by an order-of-magnitude to ~1.5%/y during 1750–1927 CE. After 1927 CE for all subjects, and after 1947 CE for the natural sciences, citation rates have jumped to ~8%/y⁸⁵ following compulsory education and widespread literacy.

Global per capita GDP has risen rapidly in the Anthropocene, to a current figure of \$12,500/y (Fig. 2, Table 2). This inflation-adjusted global productivity is an order-of-magnitude greater than during the Industrial interval just 70 years earlier (Tables 1, 2, Fig. 2c). Since 1950 CE, energy consumption by humanity has averaged 61 GJ/y per capita (range 40 to 75 GJ/y; Fig. 2b, Table 1), enabled by a diversified portfolio of energy sources (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, and renewables). Fossil fuels power more than 80% of the economy⁸⁶. In total, 60% of all human-produced energy has been consumed since 1950 CE, at 22 ZJ, more than in the entire previous Holocene (~14.6 ZJ; Table 1). Since 1871 CE, the Earth's oceans have stored ~436 ZJ of solar energy trapped through the

Box 1 | Slight oscillations within Earth's climate system do not disrupt underlying climate trends

Superimposed on the rises in both temperature and sea level are slight fluctuations caused by natural oscillations within the climate system. Warm El Niño events in the Pacific cause short-term spikes in global warming, with larger events responsible for brief global warmings of 0.2 °C above the underlying trend, while La Niña cold events, produce short-term global cooling. Longer term (circa 2 decade-long) events in the Pacific (Pacific Decadal Oscillation) and Atlantic (Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation) also cause even smaller rises and falls in global temperature and sea level⁵⁶. These oscillations help explain why global temperatures in the 1940s rose slightly above the overall trend of rising temperature and sea level fell slightly below the trend in the 1950s and 1960s, rose again in the 1980s, flattened slightly in the 2000s, and continued rising after 2013 CE⁵⁵. These events do not disrupt the underlying trend.

Table 2 Selection of key global environmental parameter values spanning the Holocene-Anthropocene transition.

Environmental Parameter	1900 CE	1950 CE	2000 CE	2015 CE
Human Population (millions)	1643	2499	6076	7349
No. of megacities (>10 M)	0	2	39	45
Human Energy Consumption (EJ/y)	41	100	377	514
Fossil Fuel Consumption (TWh)	5973	20,139	94,462	132,891
CO ₂ emissions (Gt/y)	2	5.8	25	35
Atmospheric CO ₂ (ppm)	296	311	369	404
Atmospheric N ₂ O (ppb)	280	289	316	328.5
Atmospheric CH ₄ (ppb)	890	1162	1774	1835
Sea level (mm)	-152	-87	0.0	49
Land-Ocean Temperature Index	-0.19	-0.08	0.39	0.83
GDP (billions 1990 Intl \$/y)	1116	4656	38,267	73,902
Number of motor vehicles (M)	0.01	8	450	1200
Number of 15 m+ Dams (thousands)	1.6	7	47	50
Global Freshwater use (km ³)	671	1230	3790	4000
Global Shrimp Farming (Mt/y)	0	0.01	1.0	3.5
Plastic Production (Mt/y)	0	2	213	381
Cement Production (Mt/y)	5	130	1600	4180
Ammonia (NH ₃) production (Mt/y)	0	2	126	175
Aluminum Production (Mt/y)	0	2	24	58
Copper Production (Mt/y)	0.5	2.4	13	19
Mineral Species (thousands)	5.3	8.3	85	170
Iron & Steel Production (Mt/y)	35	134	573	1160
Sulfur Production (Mt/y)	1	11	59	69
Salt Production (Mt/y)	12	48	195	271
Gypsum Production (Mt/y)	1	23	108	260
Helium Production (kt/y)	0.0	0.4	20	26

Global environmental parameter values for 1900 CE, 1950 CE, 2000 CE and 2015 CE. Almost all parameters see their largest increases after 1950 CE, with many parameters at or near zero near 1900 CE. Data references are listed within the Supplementary Online Material.

increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gases⁸⁷, and from warming-induced increases in water vapor⁸⁸, a reinforcing feedback. This is more energy by an order-of-magnitude than associated with direct human production and consumption (at 23.3 ZJ since 1871 CE). Approximately half of the Anthropocene sea-level rise stems directly from this steric effect on ocean volume, with the remainder largely derived from the melt of terrestrial snow and ice⁴⁹. Since about 1950 CE, the global ocean has progressively warmed both at the surface and increasingly to depths exceeding 2000 m. Heat is transferred vertically by storms and eddies, and by the sinking of surface water made dense by cooling, especially in the Labrador and Norwegian-Greenland seas in the Atlantic and in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica.

Many anthropogenic impacts post-1950 CE are planetary, with greater than regional significance, and scale up with the population of humans and their energy consumption and economic productivity⁴⁸. Below we offer 16 examples relevant to, and in support of, this Anthropocene Epoch thesis:

1. The magnitude of the anthropogenic N cycle is roughly equivalent to the global natural N cycle^{89,90}. However, such a simplified numerical comparison underestimates the ecological consequences of such a perturbation which includes impacts on climate change, water and air quality, ozone depletion, and biodiversity loss⁹¹⁻⁹³. Globally, reactive nitrogen (N_r) increased by ~50%, between 1600 and 1990 CE, with atmospheric emissions of N_r increasing by 250%, and N_r deposition into marine and terrestrial ecosystems increasing by more than 200%^{94,95} (Table 2). More than half of human population is alive today because of the production and use of N_r in fertilizers⁹⁶ and half the nitrogen in our bodies now comes from artificial production. Rates of use of N_r in the U.S.A. have increased from 0.22 g N m⁻² y⁻¹, in 1940 CE, to 9.04 g N m⁻² y⁻¹, in 2015

CE⁹⁷. One of many consequences of fertilizer overuse, along with contributions from increased livestock, human sewage and hydrocarbon combustion, is the spread of hypoxia in coastal waters as 'dead-zones' inimical to marine life⁹⁸: world coastal zones now receive ~100 Mt/y of anthropogenic-sourced N_r⁴⁸. Because industrially derived nitrogen is depleted in ¹⁵N, its atmospheric deposition offers a strong and coherent far-field signal in the N isotope ratios of both lake sediments and ice cores, with the main inflection at ~1950 CE^{99,100}.

2. River systems have been largely replumbed during the Anthropocene, with the construction of dams, reservoirs and diversions, with channel-bed mining and levee hardening, and with discharge focusing^{59,101,102}. Only 23% of rivers longer than 1000 km flow uninterrupted to the coastal ocean, and only 10.5% of large rivers in Europe and 18.7% in North America can be considered as free-flowing rivers¹⁰³. Large dams (>15 m in elevation) are the main cause of fluvial sediment being sequestered upstream, leading to a global decline of 18% in sediment delivery to the coastal ocean compared with pre-human times^{59,104}. Of the 58,519 large dams registered in 2017 CE¹⁰⁵, 1.4% were built before 1850 CE, having a combined reservoir capacity of 6.1 km³, 10% were built during 1850-1950 CE, with a total reservoir capacity of 685 km³. 95.7% of the world's total reservoir capacity was emplaced after 1950 CE, increasingly in Asia¹⁰⁶ (Fig. 3a, Table 2). Total reservoir capacity of these large dams today exceeds 15,000 km³; together they trap >3100 Gt of sediment, equivalent to a 5 m-thick deposit covering all of California or Spain. During the Industrial interval, four rivers (Colorado, Nile, Indus, and Yellow) transported 1.5 Gt/y of sediment to the coastal ocean; today they deliver <0.2 Gt/y¹⁰⁷. Similarly, smaller dams have greatly reduced discharges to the coastal ocean, a




Fig. 3 Global relationships between population, productivity, and energy, the forces behind changes in the environment, and key environmental indicators. Example relationships between the global population (millions), global productivity, and global energy, the forces behind changes in the global environment, and key environmental indicators: **a** global reservoir capacity of large dams (km³), **b** mixed atmospheric CO₂ (ppm), **c** global plastic production (Mt/y), **d** global cement production (Mt/y), **e** world copper production (Mt/y), and **f** world ammonia production (Mt/y) (see Supplementary-Table 2 for data, and Table 2 for other examples). 1850 CE (round) and 1950 CE (square) data points are highlighted. For data references see Supplementary Online Material. Correlation coefficients are provided for both dependent linear relationships (R²) and Spearman's Rank (ρ_s).

consequence of upstream demands by human consumption and reservoir evaporation¹⁰⁷.

- In 1904 CE, the U.S.A. had 225 km of paved highways outside of city streets¹⁰⁸. Today 4.3 M km of U.S.A. roads are covered in asphalt or concrete; another 2.2 M km of roadway remain unpaved¹⁰⁹. Since each road-km requires ~1250 metric tons of sand, and ~1875 metric tons of gravel, the U.S.A. highway system has consumed ~20.6 Gt of sand and gravel. By comparison the Great Wall of China contains only 0.4 Gt of stone⁵⁹. The 64 M km of global roads and highways¹¹⁰ have consumed ~200 Gt of sand and gravel to support the traffic of 1 billion motor vehicles (Table 2).
- Industrial-scale mining has changed the global landscape; for example, the >500,000 abandoned mines and quarries in the U.S.A. alone⁵⁹, or the removal of mountain tops in West Virginia to access the coal underneath along with the concomitant dumping of spoils in nearby river valleys. Natural processes (ice, wind, water) transport 26 Gt/y of global sediment⁵⁹, a much smaller value than from modern mining activity. Estimates of global annual coal production (including underground, surface, hard and brown coals) and associated wastes totaled 74 Gt/y (35 km³); other mining and mineral extraction, including overburden and waste removal accounted for another 27 Gt/y (13 km³), as recorded in 2015 CE¹¹¹. Coal mining in the U.S.A. increased from 0.9 Gt/y in 1905 CE¹¹² to 8.5 Gt/y during

2010–15 CE¹¹³. Bitumen (tar) sand-mining in Canada entered commercial production in 1967 CE; in 2012 CE, 1.5 Gt of bituminous sand were processed⁵⁹. In 1970 CE, 944 Mt of sand and gravel were mined within the U.S.A., compared with 0.5 Mt in 1902 CE¹⁰⁸. The Global Aggregate Information Network, representing 70% of global aggregate production (~50 Gt/y), operates 500,000 quarries and pits worldwide, employing 4 M people¹¹⁴. There is now concern that the increasing demand for sand for building megacities is outstripping supply. Offshore dredging for aggregates destroys marine habitats, as does bottom trawling for fish and shellfish, affecting marine biodiversity.

Since industrialization, human mining activities have impacted the global mobilization of naturally occurring elements, particularly the cycles of the chalcophile elements (e.g., As, Cd, Cu- Fig. 3e, Hg, Ni, Pb, Sb, Zn) associated with the smelting and refining of base metal ores, coal combustion and cement production^{115,116}. In recent decades, platinum group elements that are required for advanced materials and technologies have been profoundly affected^{117–119}. Increased extraction rates of ores (Table 2) have caused a transfer of metals from the lithosphere to these metal-in-use products and thence to wastes¹²⁰. While negligible amounts of the industrial metals were extracted and put into use before 1900 CE¹²¹, use of metals substantially increased after the 1950s¹²² causing disturbances in natural biogeochemical cycles. Perturbations of

- Pb, Hg, Se and Sn geochemical cycles now reach a global scale¹²³, with increasing perturbations for other metals¹²⁴.
- Industrial-scale agriculture accounts for 50% of terrestrial soil loss^{125,126}, leaving nearby rivers with increased sediment and nutrient loads^{126–128}. Forest clearing for the creation of agricultural lands has long increased soil erosion rates^{27,129}, but contemporary rates of soil loss from cropland exceed the natural rates of erosion 30-fold¹³⁰. Cropland represents ~11% of the global land area, but accounts for ~50% of soil erosion¹³¹; soil erosion rates from forests are 77 times lower. From 2001 to 2012 CE, when 2.3 Mkm² of forest was lost, only 4% of this loss was converted to cropland, but was responsible for more than half of the increase in soil erosion¹³². Remaining soils are then progressively compacted by large agricultural machines and have their organic content gradually reduced, requiring replacement with artificial fertilizers (Fig. 3f). Soils have also become increasingly dry in response to atmospheric warming¹³³. The industrial agricultural system consumes ~10 units of energy for each unit of food energy produced^{134,135}.
 - Many thousands of anthropogenic contaminants including persistent organic pollutants (e.g. organochlorine pesticides, brominated flame retardants) and pharmaceutical compounds have been deliberately or accidentally released into the environment. Following the discovery of its insecticidal properties in 1939 CE, the total usage of DDT during 1950–1993 CE was ~2.6 Mt¹³⁶; 5-y emissions of DDT to the atmosphere from 1970 to 1975 CE were ~750 kt¹³⁷. General use of pesticides in agriculture now reaches ~4 Mt/y¹³⁸. Compounds such as DDT are highly persistent in the environment despite a 1970s ban in many countries and have left a clear signal in the sedimentary record⁸. Pesticides are widely released as legacy pollutants from melting glaciers¹³⁹. Compounds such as PCBs find their way via the atmosphere to Arctic lands where they contaminate the wildlife (e.g. seals) used as food by indigenous peoples. Atmospheric emissions of the refrigerant chlorofluorocarbon CFC-12 (dichlorodifluoromethane, CF₂Cl₂) was zero in 1930 CE, rising to >460 kt in 1987 CE¹⁴⁰. CFC releases have caused the Antarctic Ozone Hole, and their use is now banned under the Montreal Protocol. The combustion of coal, and historical gold and silver mining, has increased atmospheric mercury concentrations by ~450% over pre-industrial levels¹⁴¹. Global anthropogenic emissions of black carbon during 2000–2010 CE were ~6.6 to 7.2 Mt/y¹⁴², compared with 0.6 Mt/y in 1875 CE¹⁴³; the result has been a major increase in carbonaceous fly-ash in natural archives across the world since the 1950s¹⁴⁴.
 - Coastal engineering has globally added thousands of km of groins, jetties, seawalls, breakwaters and harbors to control the movement of coastal sediment, leading either to coastal erosion or to siltation^{58,145}. Lacking the delivery of silt from the interior, along with the rise of coastal aquaculture and coastal megacities (Table 2), river deltas are subsiding at rates of tens to hundreds of mm/y^{146–148}. Many coastlines now retreat at highly variable rates of tens to hundreds of m/y¹⁴⁵, except where substantial seawalls are emplaced, as in the Netherlands. The global extent of wetlands today is ~10 Mkm²¹⁴⁹. Best estimates suggest that 54–57% of the total area of natural wetlands has already been lost, with the rate of loss accelerating during the 20th and 21st centuries¹⁵⁰. In many tropical areas, natural and protective mangrove swamps have been replaced with shrimp and fish farms, further exposing coastlines to erosion¹⁴⁵. Consequences of this wetland loss include the oxidation of extensive reserves of organic matter into CO₂, reduced water retention and storage, more groundwater infiltration by saltwater, and loss of wildlife habitat and biodiversity.
 - Plastic production has increased from ~2 Mt/y in the 1950s, to 359 Mt/y in 2018 CE^{151–153}, including 526 B/y of plastic beverage bottles and 3000 B/y of plastic cigarette filters¹⁵⁴ (Fig. 3c, Table 2). Plastic debris now enters into the ocean at rates between 4.8 and 12.7 Mt/y¹⁵⁵, and microplastics are increasingly being transported by aeolian vectors, permitting true global distribution, even to Arctic snowfields¹⁵⁶, forming a near-ubiquitous and unambiguous marker of Anthropocene strata⁸.
 - Human-mediated mineral species and synthetic mineral-like compounds now exceed 180,000 in number, with most species created since 1950 CE^{8,157} (Table 2). Earth's geological processes over the last 4.5 By have only supported the formation of 5,300 naturally occurring mineral species, including those mediated by biological processes^{157,158}.
 - Concrete production in modern times began in 1824 CE, with the patenting of the Portland Cement recipe. Production remained minor until 1950 CE when 0.13 Gt/y of cement produced ~1 Gt/y of concrete. Today, global cement and concrete production are 4 Gt/y and 27 Gt/y, respectively (Fig. 3d, Table 2), incorporating novel geochemical and mineralogical compositions, such as organic polymer fibers, silica fume, fly ash, nanotubes and nanospherules of silica, iron, graphene and titanium oxide¹⁵⁹. Cement production requires the heating of CaCO₃ to release CO₂, leaving lime in the form of calcium oxide (CaO) or hydroxide.
 - As the planet heats up, water vapor evaporated from the oceans, lakes, reservoirs and soils has become the dominant greenhouse gas accounting for ~50% of the greenhouse effect, followed by clouds (~25%), CO₂ (~20%), then CH₄ and N₂O⁸⁸. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is, however, the main driver of planetary warming. In 1750 CE, humans produced 0.009 Gt/y of atmospheric CO₂, increasing to 0.2 Gt/y by 1850 CE, 5.3 Gt/y by 1950 CE, then accelerating to 36.1 Gt/y by 2017 CE¹⁶⁰ (Fig. 3b, Table 2). Emission sources include combustion of coal, oil, and gas, and cement production. Similarly, atmospheric methane globally increased from 719 ppb in 1750 CE, to 1162 ppb in 1950 CE, and 1850 ppb in 2017 CE¹⁶⁰; atmospheric nitrous oxide concentration shows a similarly increasing trend¹⁶⁰ (Table 2).
 - In 1950 CE, 1% of the high seas (non-territorial open ocean) were fished, with 0% of fishery species considered exploited, overexploited or collapsed, as defined by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization. By 2006 CE, 63% of the high seas were fished and 87% of fish species were considered exploited, overexploited, or had collapsed¹⁶¹, with overall marine fish declines of 38%. Certain baleen whale populations have declined by 80–90%¹⁶².
 - Humans, together with their livestock including domesticated poultry, have a cumulative biomass of ~0.165 Gt C¹⁶³, 4-fold greater than the wild mammal and bird biomass (~0.04 Gt C) ~100 ky ago¹⁶⁴. Fully 96% of today's mammalian biomass is represented by humans and their domesticated animals; the biomass of poultry birds amounts to 70% of all living birds¹⁶³. Wild bird and mammal totals today have a much-reduced biomass ~0.009 Gt C¹⁶³. For comparison, the total biomass of modern human-cultivated crops is ~10 Gt C¹⁶³. It is estimated that Earth's current total vegetation biomass is half of potential biomass stocks prior to human perturbation, mainly through forest loss^{163,165}.

14. Anthropogenic emissions of sulfur-containing gases exceed natural fluxes by 2 to 3 times¹⁶⁶. Presently there is a peak in atmosphere emissions of SO₂ (~100 Mt/y), although emissions are expected to decline¹⁶⁷. Emissions of SO₂ from nickel smelting in Sudbury, Ontario, reached their zenith in the 1960s (2.5 Mt/y), but technological innovations have since lowered these by ~95%¹⁶⁸. Phosphorus mobilization by human activities currently exceeds the natural global cycle by a factor of 3¹⁶⁹. Like N, P is commonly growth-limiting for biota with profound ecological consequences^{170,171}, with both nutrients contributing to surface water eutrophication.
15. The annual rate of species invasions has greatly increased since the late-20th century¹⁷². Species inventories of ecosystems record rapid or substantial changes in many seas¹⁷³, rivers¹⁷⁴, estuaries¹⁷⁵ and terrestrial settings^{176,177}, often leaving a biostratigraphical signature of change^{46,178}. Many invasive species signal highly human-disturbed ecosystems¹⁷⁹.
16. The most widespread and globally synchronous human signal is the fallout from nuclear weapons testing commencing in 1945¹⁸⁰. Liberation of radioactivity to the atmosphere via thermonuclear explosions from more than 500 tests between 1952 and 1980 CE, have left a clear signature of anthropogenic radionuclides on or near the surface of the entire planet¹⁸⁰. Approximately 300 kg of ¹³⁷Cs and 120 kg of ⁹⁰Sr were released in those atmospheric explosions¹⁸¹, along with 2900 kg of ²³⁹Pu, corresponding to about 6.5 PBq of radioactivity¹⁸². ²³⁹Pu occurs naturally in the Earth's crust but its pre-1950 CE concentration is extremely low, ~0.05 mBq/kg in typical soils¹⁸³. Due to its long persistence (half-life 24,110 y), this naturally rare radionuclide will be detectable for ~100 ky into the future¹⁸⁴.

Human population has exceeded historical natural limits, with 1) the development of new energy sources, 2) technological developments in aid of productivity, education and health, and 3) an unchallenged position on top of food webs. Humans remain Earth's only species to employ technology so as to change the sources, uses, and distribution of energy forms, including the release of geologically trapped energy (i.e. coal, petroleum, uranium). In total, humans have altered nature at the planetary scale, given modern levels of human-contributed aerosols and gases^{88,160}, the global distribution of radionuclides, organic pollutants and mercury^{123,139,141,144}, and ecosystem disturbances of terrestrial^{185,186} and marine environments¹⁸⁷. Approximately 17,000 monitored populations of 4005 vertebrate species have suffered a 60% decline between 1970 and 2014 CE¹⁸⁸, and ~1 million species face extinction, many within decades¹⁸⁹. Humans' extensive 'technosphere', now reaches ~30 Tt, including waste products from non-renewable resources¹⁹⁰.

Such vast alterations to Earth's natural atmospheric, hydrologic, pedologic, biologic, biogeochemical and sedimentary systems not only have changed the Earth System considerably^{191–193} but have also created innumerable globally detectable and preservable signals. These changes are now being used to justify a new geochronologic epoch, the Anthropocene^{1,194}.

A thought experiment in measuring human impact

Humans, like all living organisms, inject a biological force into their environment. Individualized, this human force should collectively scale up with a growing population. With that logic and other things held constant, one billion humans would offer 1000 times the environment force of one million people. Early humans with their limited numbers (Fig. 1a), had a recognizable but minimal impact on the planet's terrestrial and marine

environments through most of the Holocene (Table 1). Population grew slowly (Table 1, Supplementary-Table 1), and energy use remained low (Figs. 1b, 2b) even with the advances of tool-based hunting, use of fire, employment of animals in agriculture or travel, and the development of settlements. Earth's surface environment also has some ability to repair itself, such that 1000 humans across 1000 y would likely have a smaller lasting environmental impact than one million humans in just one year. The time-averaged human population in the Holocene is 97 M, compared with the Anthropocene's population of 4940 M (Supplementary-Table 1). Using a constant per capita energy consumption of say 1 GJ/y, human-derived energy use during the Holocene (to 1950 CE) would be 1.13 ZJ (97.2 M × 11,630 y × 1 GJ/y), and just 0.35 ZJ in the Anthropocene, a longer Holocene duration being more important than a larger Anthropocene population. However, per capita energy consumption increased by an order-of-magnitude across 11,700 years (Table 1, Fig. 1b). As a consequence, humans have already consumed more energy in the short space of the Anthropocene than in the entire Holocene (21.7 ZJ versus 14.6 ZJ).

Humans became a geological force over the last 300 y, particularly after the start of the global industrial revolution in 1850 CE when excess energy (fossil fuel) became widely available. There are strong relationships amongst three parameters: global population, global energy use, and global productivity (Table 2, Figs. 2 and 4). Increases in human productivity support larger populations that consume higher levels of energy and materials that in turn support increases in productivity. The harnessing of fossil fuels has allowed humans to apply this excess in available energy beyond simple food production and survival. As a result, the growth rate in human population increased rapidly, peaking during the mid-20th century (Fig. 2a), as did the associated rates of energy consumption and productivity (Figs. 1 and 2d, Tables 1 and 2). The result has been the mid-20th century 'Great Acceleration' when humanity began to dominate many of the planetary cycles as outlined above. Like the intertwining of global human population, energy consumption and productivity, major environmental tracers also appear tightly coupled to each other and to these three human forces (Table 2, Figs. 3 and 4). It should be of no surprise then that the global reservoir capacity of large dams, or atmospheric CO₂, each track closely with global energy use (Fig. 3a, b, Table 2), or that global plastic or cement production closely follows economic productivity (Fig. 3c, d, Table 2), or that the global production of ammonia (NH₃) and copper correlate highly with global human population (Fig. 3e, f, Table 2), as with many other human environmental signals outlined in Table 2: shrimp farming, production of gypsum, salt, iron, steel, sulfur, helium, aluminum, mineral species, atmospheric gases (CO₂, N₂O, CH₄), terrestrial freshwater budgets, surface temperatures, and sea levels. These major environmental parameters have been strongly altered by the mid-20th century (and beyond, Table 2).

The environmental parameters discussed above should be understood as the societal forcings that lead to stratigraphic markers that will characterize the Anthropocene, such as horizons identified by extinctions or invasive species, radioisotopes, elevated natural and novel chemical compounds, etc. In and of themselves, the societal metrics that we have identified here may not define the Anthropocene, but they can lead to the markers that do and, if present trends continue, will.

Proposed Anthropocene versus Holocene epochs

The Holocene Epoch, the most recent of the Quaternary interglacials, was a time of warm, relatively stable (±0.5 °C)




Fig. 4 Statistical relationships between human population, productivity, and energy, and key environmental indicators. Correlation-matrix displayed as cross plots for examples of Late Holocene and Anthropocene environmental factors, including ensemble estimates of global human population (millions), global human energy consumption (EJ/y), global GDP (billions, 1990 Int'l \$/y), global reservoir capacity (km³; year-end), global number of large dams (year-end), global plastic production (year-end), global cement production (year-end), mixed atmospheric CO₂ (mid-year). The value in the lower right corner of each plot identifies the Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficients. Data references are listed within Supplementary Online Material.

climate that fluctuated in response to variations in Earth's natural systems (e.g., Milankovitch): ice sheet volume decreased, and sea levels rose at an Epoch-averaged rate of 5.54 mm/y, larger than for the proposed Anthropocene Epoch (although if warming continues modern rates will quickly rise). The proposed Anthropocene Epoch sees many other key Earth-surface parameters change in response to human action (Table 2). Parameters with 200% to 300% variances or larger, compared to the Holocene Epoch, include atmospheric and ocean temperatures, atmospheric CO₂, CH₄, and N₂O levels, global reactive nitrogen, environmental mercury and many other metals, phosphorus release^{194,195}, sediment transport, terrestrial soil loss, and terrestrial and marine biomass losses. Parameters with order-of-magnitude increases, compared to the Holocene Epoch, include anthropogenic CO₂ emission rates, human-produced energy, upstream sequestration of sediment, number of “mineral” species, concrete production, rates of species extinction³², declines in river runoff, and increased coastal hypoxia. There are also phenomenological changes without precedent in the Holocene, including a warmer and more acidic global ocean, global dispersal of new materials (plastics, ceramics, aluminum metal, radioisotopes, persistent

organic pollutants, pharmaceutical compounds, fly-ash particles), and modern alterations to the biodiversity of marine and terrestrial ecosystems, with a globally distributed invasive species component¹⁷² and a greatly raised rate of species extinction³³. Even Earth's crustal process, such as earthquakes, can now have an anthropogenic imprint¹⁹⁶.

The Anthropocene Working Group (AWG) has voted to affirm a) the Anthropocene be treated as a formal chronostratigraphic unit defined by a GSSP, and b) the primary guide for the base of the Anthropocene be one of the stratigraphic signals around the mid-twentieth century of the Common Era^{1,7,68}. Geological records characterizing the base of the Anthropocene are being assembled, and in due course the Group's recommendations will require approval by the International Commission on Stratigraphy. The narrative and quantitative data presented here strongly underpin the trajectory of the Earth System away from a Holocene state of the system, substantially and globally, around the mid-20th century, circa 1950 CE¹⁹². Establishing the proposed new epoch would formalize the use of the term Anthropocene, which already has been used widely in research describing changes induced by human actions and recorded in geological archives.

Data availability

The datasets analyzed during the current study are provided as tables within the main paper or within the accompanying online material file, along with the original data references to peer-reviewed sources including persistent government web links.

Received: 28 April 2020; Accepted: 15 September 2020;

Published online: 16 October 2020

References

- Waters, C. N. et al. The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene. *Science* **351**, aad2622 (2016).
- Gibbard, P. L. & Head, M. J. The newly ratified definition of the Quaternary System/Period and redefinition of the Pleistocene Series/Epoch, and comparison of proposals advanced prior to formal ratification. *Episodes* **33**, 152–158 (2010).
- Gibbard, P. L., Head, M. J. & Walker, M. J. C., The Subcommittee on Quaternary Stratigraphy. Formal ratification of the Quaternary System/Period and the Pleistocene Series/Epoch with a base at 2.58 Ma. *J. Quaternary Sci.* **25**, 96–102 (2010).
- Head, M. J. Formal subdivision of the Quaternary System/Period: present status and future directions. *Quaternary Int.* **500**, 32–51 (2019).
- Walker, M. et al. Formal ratification of the subdivision of the Holocene Series/Epoch (Quaternary System/Period): two new Global Boundary Stratotype Sections and Points (GSSPs) and three new stages/subseries. *Episodes* **41**, 213–223 (2018).
- Walker, M. et al. Subdividing the Holocene Series/Epoch: formalisation of stages/ages and subseries/subepochs, and designation of GSSPs and auxiliary stratotypes. *J. Quaternary Sci.* **34**, 173–186 (2019).
- Zalasiewicz, J. et al. The Working Group on the ‘Anthropocene’: summary of evidence and recommendations. *Anthropocene* **19**, 55–60 (2017).
- Zalasiewicz, J., Waters, C. N., Williams, M. & Summerhayes, C. (Eds) *The Anthropocene as a Geological Time Unit: A Guide to the Scientific Evidence and Current Debate*. 1st Ed. (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2019).
- Marcott, S. A., Shakun, J. D., Clark, P. U. & Mix, A. C. A reconstruction of regional and global temperature for the past 11,300 years. *Science* **339**, 1198 (2013).
- Ruddiman, W. F. The Anthropocene. *Annu. Rev. Earth Planet. Sci.* **41**, 45–68 (2013).
- Monnin, E. et al. Atmospheric CO₂ concentrations over the last glacial termination. *Science* **297**, 112–114 (2001).
- Turney, C. S. M. & Brown, H. Catastrophic early Holocene sea level rise, human migration and the Neolithic transition in Europe. *Quaternary Sci. Rev.* **26**, 2036–2041 (2007).
- Stanley, D. J. & Warne, A. G. Worldwide initiation of Holocene marine deltas by deceleration of sea-level rise. *Science* **265**, 228–231 (1994).
- Lambeck, K., Rouby, H., Purcell, A., Sun, Y. & Sambridge, M. Sea level and global ice volumes from the Last Glacial maximum to the Holocene. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **111**, 15296–15303 (2014).
- Steadman, D. W. et al. Asynchronous extinction of late Quaternary sloths on continents and islands. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **102**, 11763–11768 (2005).
- Barker, G. *The Agricultural Revolution in Prehistory: Why Did Foragers Become Farmers*. 1st Ed. (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2006).
- Clark, P. U. et al. Consequences of twenty-first-century policy for multi-millennial climate and sea-level change. *Nat. Clim. Change* **6**, 360–369 (2016).
- Broecker, W. S. et al. Evidence for a reduction in the carbonate ion content of the deep sea during the course of the Holocene. *Paleoceanography* **14**, 744–752 (1999).
- Day, J., Gunn, J., Folan, W., Yanez, A. & Horton, B. The influence of enhanced post-glacial coastal margin productivity on the emergence of complex societies. *J. Island Coastal Arch.* **7**, 23–52 (2012).
- Gunn, J., Day, J., Folan, W. & Moerschbacher, M. Geo-cultural time: advancing human societal complexity within worldwide constraint bottlenecks – A chronological-helical approach to understanding human-planetary interactions. *Biophys. Econ. Resource Quality* <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41247-019-0058-7> (2019).
- Ellis, E. C. et al. Used planet: a global history. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **110**, 7978–7985 (2013).
- ArchaeoGLOBE Project. Archaeological assessment reveals Earth’s early transformation through land use. *Science* **365**, 897–902 (2019).
- Graham, R. W. et al. Timing and causes of mid-Holocene mammoth extinction on St Paul Island, Alaska. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **113**, 9310–9314 (2016).
- Denton, G. H. & Porter, S. C. Neoglaciation. *Sci. Am.* **222**, 101–110 (1970).
- Ruddiman, W. F. et al. Late Holocene climate: natural or anthropogenic? *Rev. Geophys.* **54**, <https://doi.org/10.1002/2015RG000503> (2016).
- Kennett, D. J. & Kennett, J. P. Early state formation in southern Mesopotamia: Sea levels, shorelines, and climate change. *J. Island Coast. Archaeol.* **1**, 67–99 (2006).
- Jenny, J. P. et al. Human and climate global-scale imprint on sediment transfer during the Holocene. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **116**, 22972–22976 (2019).
- Malanima, P. Energy in world history. In: *The Basic Environmental History*, Eds. M. Agnoletti & S. N. Serner. (Springer, New York, 2014).
- Bennett, C. E. et al. The broiler chicken as a signal of a human reconfigured biosphere. *R. Soc. Open Sci.* <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsps.180325> (2018).
- Williams, M. et al. The palaeontological record of the Anthropocene. *Geol. Today* **34**, 188–193 (2018).
- Matisoo, S. et al. Patterns of prehistoric human mobility in Polynesia indicated by mtDNA from the Pacific rat. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **95**, 15145–15150 (1998).
- Bomgardner, D. L. The trade in wild beasts for Roman spectacles: a green perspective. *Anthropozoologica* **16**, 161–166 (1992).
- Ceballos, G. et al. Accelerated modern human-induced species losses: entering the sixth mass extinction. *Sci. Adv.* **1**, e1400253 <https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1400253> (2015).
- Mona, S. et al. Population dynamic of the extinct European aurochs: genetic evidence of a north-south differentiation pattern and no evidence of post-glacial expansion. *BMC Evol. Biol.* **10**, 83 (2010).
- Allentoft, M. E. et al. Extinct New Zealand megafauna were not in decline before human colonization. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **111**, 4922–4927 (2014).
- Burney, D. A. et al. Fossil evidence for a diverse biota from Kaua’i and its transformation since human arrival. *Ecol. Monogr.* **7**, 615–641 (2001).
- Rijsdijk, K. F. et al. Mid-Holocene vertebrate bone concentration-Lagerstätte on oceanic island Mauritius provides a window into the ecosystem of the dodo (*Taphus cucullatus*). *Quaternary Sci. Rev.* **28**, 14–24 (2009).
- Crowther, A. et al. Ancient crops provide archaeological signature of the westward Austronesian expansion. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **113**, 6635–6640 (2016).
- Jevrejeva, S., Moore, J. C., Grinsted, A. & Woodworth, P. L. Recent global sea level acceleration started over 200 years ago? *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **35**, L08715 <https://doi.org/10.1029/2008GL033611> (2008).
- Sigl, M. et al. 19th century glacier retreat in the Alps preceded the emergence of industrial black carbon deposition on high-alpine glaciers. *Cryosphere* **12**, 3311–3331 (2018).
- Wood, G. Tambora: the eruption that changed the world (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 2014).
- Pages2K-Consortium, Ahmed, M. et al. Continental-scale temperature variability during the past two millennia. *Nat. Geosci.* **6**, 339–346 (2013).
- Tower, W. S. A history of the American whale fishery. (University of Philadelphia, 1907).
- Walter, R. C. & Merritts, D. J. Natural streams and the legacy of water-powered mills. *Science* **319**, 299–304 (2008).
- Merritts, D. et al. Anthropocene streams and base-level controls from historic dams in the unglaciated mid-Atlantic region, USA. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc.* **369**, 976–1009 (2011).
- Himson, S., Kinsey, N. P., Aldridge, D. A., Williams, M. & Zalasiewicz, J. Invasive mollusc faunas of the River Thames exemplify biostratigraphical characterization of the Anthropocene. *Lethaia* **53**, 267–279 (2020).
- Fizaine, F. & Court, V. Energy expenditure, economic growth, and the minimum EROI of society. *Energy Policy* **95**, 172–186 (2016).
- Steffen, W., Grinevald, J., Crutzen, P. & McNeill, J. The Anthropocene: conceptual and historical perspectives. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A* **369**, 842–867 (2011).
- IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. *Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (eds. R. K. Pachauri, L. A. Meyer.) (IPCC, Geneva, 2014).
- Berger, A. & Loutre, M. F. Insolation values for the climate of the last 10 million years. *Quaternary Sci. Rev.* **10**, 297–317 (1991).
- Berger, A., Loutre, M. F. & Crucifix, M. The Earth’s climate in the next hundred thousand years (100 kyr). *Surveys Geophys.* **24**, 117–138 (2003).
- Clette, F., Svalgaard, L., Vaquero, J. M. & Cliver, E. W. Revisiting the sunspot number. *Space Sci. Rev.* **186**, 35–103 (2014).
- Clette, F., Cliver, E. W., Lefevre, L., Svalgaard, L. & Vaquero, J. M. Revision of the sunspot number(s). *Space Weather* **13**, <https://doi.org/10.1002/2015SW001264> (2015).
- Vaquero, J. M. Historical sunspot observations: a review. *Adv. Space Res.* **40**, 929–941 (2007).
- Neukom, R. et al. Consistent multidecadal variability in global temperature reconstructions and simulations over the Common Era. *Nat. Geosci.* **12**, 643–649 (2019).
- Neukom, R. et al. No evidence for globally coherent warm and cold periods over the preindustrial Common Era. *Nature* **571**, 550–554 (2019).

57. Dangendorf, S. et al. Reassessment of 20th century global mean sea level rise. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1616007114 (2017).
58. Chen, X. & Tung, K. K. Global surface warming enhanced by weak Atlantic overturning circulation. *Nature* **559**, 387–391 (2018).
59. Syvitski, J. P. M. & Kettner, A. J. Sediment flux and the Anthropocene. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A* **369**, 957–975 (2011).
60. Jenny, J. P. et al. Global spread of hypoxia in freshwater ecosystems during the last three centuries is caused by rising local human pressure. *Glob Chang Biol.* **22**, 1481–1489 (2016).
61. Gooday, A. J. et al. Historical records of coastal eutrophication-induced hypoxia. *Biogeosciences* **6**, 1707–1745 (2009).
62. Wilkinson, I. P. et al. Microbiotic signatures of the Anthropocene in marginal marine and freshwater palaeoenvironments. In *A Stratigraphical Basis for the Anthropocene* (eds. Waters, C. N., Zalasiewicz, J. A., Williams, M., Ellis, M. A. & Snelling, A. M.) 185–219 (Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 2014).
63. Hausdorf, B. The giant African snail *Lissachatina fulica* as potential index fossil for the Anthropocene. *Anthropocene* **23**, 1–4 (2018).
64. Williams, M. et al. The biostratigraphic signal of the neobiota. In *The Anthropocene as a Geological Time Unit* (eds. Zalasiewicz, J., Waters, C. N., Williams, M. & Summerhayes, C.) (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2019).
65. Seebens, H. et al. No saturation in the accumulation of alien species worldwide. *Nat. Commun.* **8**, 14435 (2017).
66. Crutzen, P. J. & Stoermer, E. F. The “Anthropocene”. *Global Change Newslett.* **41**, 17–18 (2000).
67. Crutzen, P. J. Geology of mankind. *Nature* **415**, 23 <https://doi.org/10.1038/415023a> (2002).
68. Zalasiewicz, J. et al. When did the Anthropocene begin? A mid-twentieth century boundary level is stratigraphically optimal. *Quaternary Int.* **383**, 196–203 (2015).
69. Hansen, J. E., Sato, M., Ruedy, R., Schmidt, G. A. & Lo, K. Global Temperature in 2018 and Beyond (2019). figshare <https://doi.org/10.1029/2018JD029522>. <http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/>; <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh5119/Temperature>
70. NASA, 2019, figshare <https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/global-temperature/>
71. NOAA, 2019, figshare <https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-atmospheric-carbon-dioxide>
72. Schweiger, A., Zhang, J., Lindsay, R., Steele, M. & Stern, H. Polar Science Center (2019). figshare <http://psc.apl.uw.edu/research/projects/arctic-sea-ice-volume-anomaly/>
73. NSIDC (2019). figshare <http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/>
74. Bamber, J. L., Westaway, R. M., Marzeion, B. & Wouters, B. The land ice contribution to sea level during the satellite era. *Environ. Res. Lett.* **13**, 063008 (2018).
75. Mouginot, J. et al. Forty-six years of Greenland Ice Sheet mass balance from 1972 to 2018. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **116**, 9239–9244 (2019).
76. Rignot, E. et al. Four decades of Antarctic Ice Sheet mass balance from 1979–2017. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **116**, 1095–1103 (2019).
77. Church, et al. Sea level change. In *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, (eds. Stocker, T. F., et al.) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, 2013).
78. NASA, figshare <https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/> Satellite data 1993–2018, Data source: Satellite sea level observations (2018).
79. Oppenheimer, M. et al. Sea level rise and implications for low-lying islands, coasts and communities. In *IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate* (eds. H.-O. Pörtner, et al.), (IPCC, Geneva, 2019).
80. Orr, J. C. et al. Anthropogenic ocean acidification over the twenty-first century and its impact on calcifying organisms. *Nature* **437**, 681–686 (2005).
81. Chen, C.-T. A. et al. Deep oceans may acidify faster than anticipated due to global warming. *Nat. Clim. Change* <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-017-0003-y> (2017).
82. IPCC, *IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate* (eds. H.-O. Pörtner, et al.) (IPCC, Geneva, 2019).
83. Syvitski, J. P., Zalasiewicz, J. & Summerhayes, C. Changes to Holocene/ Anthropocene patterns of sedimentation from terrestrial to marine. In *The Anthropocene as a Geological Time Unit: A Guide to the Scientific Evidence and Current Debate* (eds. Zalasiewicz, J., Waters, C., Williams, M. & Summerhayes, C.) (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2019).
84. Steffen, W., Broadgate, W., Deutsch, L., Gaffney, O. & Ludwig, C. The trajectory of the Anthropocene: the Great Acceleration. *Anthropocene Rev.* <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019614564785> (2015).
85. Bornmann, L. & Mutz, R. Growth rates of modern science: a bibliometric analysis based on the number of publications and cited references. *J. Assoc. Info. Sci. Tech.* **66**, 2215–2222 (2015).
86. Day, J. et al. The energy pillars of society: Perverse interactions of human resource use, the economy, and environmental degradation. *Biophys. Econ. Resource Qual.* **3**, 2 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41247-018-0035-65> (2018).
87. Zanna, L., Khatlwa, S., Gregory, J. M., Ison, J. & Helmbach, P. Global reconstruction of historical ocean heat storage and transport. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **116**, 1126–1131 (2019).
88. Schmidt, G. A., Ruedy, R. A., Miller, R. L. & Laci, A. A. Attribution of the present-day total greenhouse effect. *J. Geophys. Res.* **115**, D20106 (2010).
89. Gruber, N. & Galloway, J. N. An Earth-system perspective of the global nitrogen cycle. *Nature* **451**, 293–296 (2008).
90. Fowler, D. et al. The global nitrogen cycle in the twenty-first century. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci.* **368**, <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0164> (2013).
91. Erisman, J. W. et al. Consequences of human modification of the global nitrogen cycle. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci.* **368**, <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0116> (2013).
92. Vitousek, P. M. et al. Human alteration of the global nitrogen cycle: sources and consequences. *Ecol. Appl.* **7**, 737–750 (1997).
93. Galloway, J. N. The global nitrogen cycle. *Treatise Geochem.* **10**, 475–498 (2013).
94. Galloway, J. N. & Cowling, E. B. Reactive nitrogen and the world: 200 years of change. *AMBIO: J. Hum. Environ.* **31**, 64–71 (2002).
95. Schlesinger, W. H. On the fate of anthropogenic nitrogen. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **106**, 203–208 (2009).
96. Erisman, J.-W. Director, Louis Bolk Institute, Netherlands, personal communication (2016).
97. Cao, P., Lu, C. & Yu, Z. Historical nitrogen fertilizer use in agricultural ecosystems of the contiguous United States during 1850–2015: application rate, timing, and fertilizer types. *Earth Syst. Sci. Data* **10**, 969–984 (2018).
98. Zhang, J. et al. Natural and human-induced hypoxia and consequences for coastal areas: synthesis and future development. *Biogeosciences* **7**, 1443–1467 (2010).
99. Holtgrieve, G. W. et al. A coherent signature of anthropogenic nitrogen deposition to remote watersheds of the northern hemisphere. *Science* **334**, 1545 (2011).
100. Wolfé, A. P. et al. Stratigraphic expressions of the Holocene–Anthropocene transition revealed in sediments from remote lakes. *Earth Sci. Rev.* **116**, 17–34 (2013).
101. Vörösmarty, C. et al. Anthropogenic sediment retention: major global-scale impact from the population of registered impoundments. *Glob. Planet. Change* **39**, 169–190 (2003).
102. Best, J. Anthropogenic stresses on the world’s big rivers. *Nat. Geosci.* **12**, 7–21 (2019).
103. Grill, G. et al. Mapping the world’s free-flowing rivers. *Nature* **569**, 215–221 (2019).
104. Syvitski, J. P. M., Vörösmarty, C., Kettner, A. J. & Green, P. Impact of humans on the flux of terrestrial sediment to the global coastal ocean. *Science* **308**, 376–380 (2005).
105. ICOLD http://www.icold-cigb.org/GB/world_register/general_synthesis.asp (2017).
106. Milliman, J. D. & Farnsworth, K. L. River discharge to the coastal ocean: a global synthesis. (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2011).
107. Syvitski, J. P. M. & Milliman, J. D. Geology, geography and humans battle for dominance over the delivery of sediment to the coastal ocean. *J. Geol.* **115**, 1–19 (2007).
108. Beiser, V. *The World in a Grain*. (Riverhead Books, NY, 2018).
109. BTS Public road and street mileage in the United States by type of surface. *Publ. Bureau of Transportation Statistics* (2019). https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2000/1-4
110. IRF WRS (2019). <https://www.worldroadstatistics.org/contents.html>
111. Cooper, A. H., Brown, T. J., Price, S. J., Ford, J. R. & Waters, C. N. Humans are the most significant global geomorphological driving force of the 21st century. *Anthropocene Rev.* **5**, 222–229 (2018).
112. Bauerman, H. Coal. In *Encyclopædia Britannica* (ed. Chisholm, H.) 6 (11th ed.) (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 1911).
113. USGS (2019). <https://mrdata.usgs.gov/#mineral-resources> & <https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/construction-sand-and-gravel-statistics-and-information>
114. GAIN (2019). <http://www.uepg.eu/media-room/links/gain-global-aggregates-information-network>
115. Nriagu, J. O. Global inventory of natural and anthropogenic emissions of trace metals to the atmosphere. *Nature* **279**, 409–411 (1979).
116. Nriagu, J. O. & Pacyna, J. M. Quantitative assessment of worldwide contamination of air, water and soils by trace elements. *Nature* **333**, 134–139 (1988).
117. Klee, R. J. & Graedel, T. E. Elemental cycles: a status report on human or natural dominance. *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resources* **29**, 69–107 (2004).
118. Chen, W. Q. & Graedel, T. E. Anthropogenic cycles of the elements: a critical review. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **46**, 8574–8586 (2012).

119. Sen, I. S. & Peucker-Ehrenbrink, B. Anthropogenic disturbance of element cycles at the Earth's surface. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **46**, 8601–8609 (2012).
120. Gordon, R. B., Bertram, M. & Graedel, T. E. Metal stocks and sustainability. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **103**, 1209–1214 (2006).
121. Lifset, R. J., Gordon, R. B., Graedel, T. E., Spataro, S. & Bertram, M. Where has all the copper gone: the stocks and flows project, part 1. *J. Mineral Metals Mater. Soc.* **54**, 21–26 (2002).
122. Graedel, T. E. & Cao, J. Metal spectra as indicators of development. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **107**, 20905–20910 (2010).
123. Thorne, R. J., Pacyna, J. M., Sundseth, K. & Pacyna, E. G. Fluxes of trace metals on a global scale. In *The Encyclopedia of the Anthropocene*. (eds. DellaSala, D. A. & Goldstein, M. I.) Vol. 1, 93–102 (Oxford: Elsevier 2018).
124. Gordon, R. B. et al. The characterization of technological zinc cycles. *Resources Conserv. Recycl.* **39**, 107–135 (2003).
125. WWF (2019). <https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/soil-erosion-and-degradation>
126. Montgomery, D. R. Soil erosion and agricultural sustainability. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **104**, 133268–133272 (2007).
127. Walling, D. E. & Fang, D. Recent trends in the suspended sediment loads of the world's rivers. *Glob. Planet. Change* **39**, 111–126 (2003).
128. Restrepo, J. D. & Syvitski, J. P. M. Assessing the effect of natural controls and land use change on sediment yield in a major Andean river: the Magdalena drainage basin, Colombia. *Ambio* **35**, 65–74 (2006).
129. Wang, H. et al. Recent changes of sediment flux to the western Pacific Ocean from major rivers in East and Southeast Asia. *Earth Sci. Rev.* **108**, 80–100 (2011).
130. Hooke, R. L. On the history of human as geomorphic agents. *Geology* **28**, 843–846 (2000).
131. Wilkinson, B. H. & McElroy, B. J. The impact of humans on continental erosion and sedimentation. *Bull. Geol. Soc. Am.* **119**, 140–156 (2007).
132. Borrelli, P. et al. An assessment of the global impact of 21st century land use change on soil erosion. *Nat. Commun.* **8**, 2013 (2017).
133. Gu X. et al. Intensification and expansion of soil moisture drying in warm season over Eurasia under global warming. *JGR Atmos.* <https://doi.org/10.1029/2018JD029776> (2019).
134. Heller, M. & Keoleian, G. *Life cycle-based sustainability indicators for assessment of the U.S. food system*. (Univ. Michigan Center for Sustainable Systems, Ann Arbor, pub. CSS00-04, 2000).
135. Hamilton, A., Balogh, S., Maxwell, A. & Hall, C. Efficiency of edible agriculture in Canada and the U.S. over the past three to four decades. *Energies* **6**, 1764–1993 (2013).
136. Voldner, E. C. & Li, Y. F. Global usage of toxaphene. *Chemosphere* **27**, 2073–2078 (1993).
137. Schenker, U., Scheringer, M. & Hungerbühler, K. Investigating the global fate of DDT: model evaluation and estimation of future trends. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **42**, 1178–1184 (2008).
138. Davis, F. R. Insecticides, agriculture, and the Anthropocene. *Glob. Environ.* **10**, 114–136 (2017).
139. Bogdal, C. et al. Blast from the past, melting glaciers as a relevant source for persistent organic pollutants. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **43**, 8173–8177 (2009).
140. McCulloch, A., Midgley, P. M. & Ashford, P. Releases of refrigerant gases (CFC-12, HCFC-22 and HFC-134a) to the atmosphere. *Atmos. Environ.* **37**, 889–902 (2003).
141. UN Global Mercury Assessment 2018, *UN Environment Programme Chemicals and Health Branch*. (Geneva, Switzerland, 2019).
142. Klimont, Z. et al. Global anthropogenic emissions of particulate matter including black carbon. *Atmos. Chem. Phys.* **17**, 8681–8723 (2017).
143. Novakov, T. et al. Large historical changes of fossil-fuel black carbon aerosols. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **30**, 1324 <https://doi.org/10.1029/2002GL016345> (2003).
144. Rose, N. L. Spheroidal carbonaceous fly-ash particles provide a globally synchronous stratigraphic marker for the Anthropocene. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **49**, 4155–4162 (2015).
145. Syvitski, J. P. M. et al. Dynamics of the coastal zone. In *Global fluxes in the Anthropocene*. (eds. Crossland C. J. et al.) (Springer Publ., Berlin, 2005).
146. Syvitski, J. P. M. et al. Sinking deltas due to human activities. *Nat. Geosci.* **2**, 681–689 (2009).
147. Higgins, S., Overeem, I., Tanaka, A. & Syvitski, J. P. M. Land subsidence at aquaculture facilities in the Yellow River delta, China. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **40**, 3898–3902 (2013).
148. Tessler, Z. et al. Profiling risk and sustainability in coastal deltas of the world. *Science* **349**, 638–643 (2015).
149. Davidson, N. C. How much wetland has the world lost? Long-term and recent trends in global wetland area. *Marine Freshw. Res.* **65**, 934–941 (2014).
150. Davidson, N. C., Fluet-Chouinard, E. & Finlayson, C. M. Global extent and distribution of wetlands: trends and issues. *Marine Freshw. Res.* **69**, 620–627 (2018).
151. Zalasiewicz, J. et al. The geological cycle of plastics and their use as a stratigraphic indicator of the Anthropocene. *Anthropocene* **13**, 4–17 (2016).
152. Geyer, R., Jambeck, J. R. & Law, K. L. Production, use, and fate of all plastics ever made. *Sci. Adv.* **3**, e1700782 (2017).
153. Zalasiewicz, J., Gabbott, S. E. & Waters, C. N. Chapter 23: Plastic waste: how plastic has become part of the Earth's geological cycle. In *Waste: A Handbook for Management* (eds. Letcher, T. M. & Vallero, D. A.) 2nd Ed. (Elsevier, New York, 2019).
154. Cuthbert, L. Our addiction to plastic. *Natl. Geogr.* **2019**, 68–81 (2019).
155. Jambeck, J. R. et al. Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean. *Science* **347**, 768–771 (2015).
156. Bergmann, M. et al. White and wonderful? Microplastics prevail in snow from the Alps to the Arctic. *Sci. Adv.* **5**, eaax1157 (2019).
157. Hazen, R. M., Grew, E. S., Origlieri, M. J. & Downs, R. T. On the mineralogy of the “Anthropocene Epoch”. *Am. Mineral.* **102**, 595–611 (2017).
158. Heaney, P. J. Defining minerals in the age of humans. *Am. Mineral.* **102**, 925–926 (2017).
159. Waters, C. N. & Zalasiewicz, J. Concrete: the most abundant novel rock type of the Anthropocene. *Reference Module in Earth Systems and Environmental Sciences* <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-409548-9.09775-X> (2017).
160. Ritchie, H. & Roser, M. CO₂ and greenhouse gas emissions. *Our World in Data* <https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions> (2019).
161. *UN Resumed Review Conference on the Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks*. Publ. United Nations Department of Public Information DPI/2556 D (2010).
162. McCauley, D. J. et al. Marine defaunation: animal loss in the global ocean. *Science* **347**, 1255641 (2015).
163. Bar-On, Y. M., Phillips, R. & Milo, R. The biomass distribution on Earth. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **115**, 6506–6511 (2018).
164. Barnosky, A. D. Colloquium paper: megafauna biomass tradeoff as a driver of Quaternary and future extinctions. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **105**, 11543–11548 (2008).
165. Erb, K.-H. et al. Unexpectedly large impact of forest management and grazing on global vegetation biomass. *Nature* **553**, 73–76 (2017).
166. Rodhe, H. Human impact on the atmospheric sulfur balance. *Tellus* **51**, 110–122 (1999).
167. Brimblecombe, P. The global sulfur cycle. *Treatise Geochem.* **10**, 559–591 (2013).
168. Gunn, J. Forced Innovation: The Sudbury, Canada example. In *Environmental Reality: Rethinking the Options* (eds. Kessler, E. & Karlqvist, A), 47–51. (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences Press, Stockholm, 2017).
169. Yuan, Z. et al. Human perturbation of the global phosphorus cycle: changes and consequences. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **52**, 2438–2450 (2018).
170. Filippelli, G. M. The global phosphorus cycle: past, present, and future. *Elements* **4**, 89–95 (2008).
171. Chen, M. & Graedel, T. E. A half-century of global phosphorus flows, stocks, production, consumption, recycling, and environmental impacts. *Glob. Environ. Change* **36**, 139–152 (2016).
172. Seebens, H. et al. Global rise in emerging alien species results from increased accessibility of new source pools. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **115**, E2264–E2273 (2018).
173. Schmidt, C. et al. Recent invasion of the symbiont-bearing foraminifera *Pararotalia* into the Eastern Mediterranean facilitated by the ongoing warming trend. *PLoS ONE* **10**, e0132917 (2015).
174. Aldridge, D. C., Elliott, P. & Moggridge, G. D. The recent and rapid spread of the zebra mussel (*Dreissena polymorpha*) in Great Britain. *Biol. Conserv.* **119**, 253–261 (2004).
175. Cohen, A. N. & Carlton, J. T. Accelerating invasion rate in a highly invaded estuary. *Science* **279**, 555–557 (1998).
176. Witt, A. B. R., Kiambi, S., Beale, T. & Van Wilgen, B. W. A preliminary assessment of the extent and potential impacts of alien plant invasions in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem, East Africa. *Koedoe* **59**, 1–16 (2017).
177. Yang, Q.-Q., Liu, S.-W., He, C. & Yu, X.-P. Distribution and the origin of invasive apple snails, *Pomacea canaliculata* and *P. maculata* (Gastropoda: Ampullariidae) in China. *Sci. Rep.* 1185 <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-19000-7> (2018).
178. McGann, M., Sloan, D. & Cohen, A. N. Invasion by a Japanese marine microorganism in western North America. *Hydrobiologia* **421**, 25–30 (2000).
179. Eichler, P. P. B. et al. The occurrence of the invasive foraminifera *Trochammina hadai* Uchio in Flamengo inlet, Ubatuba, Sao Paulo State, Brazil. *Micropalaeontology* **64**, 391–402 (2018).
180. Waters, C. N. et al. Can nuclear weapons fallout mark the beginning of the Anthropocene Epoch? *Bull. Atomic Sci.* **71**, 46–57 (2015).
181. UNSCEAR Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Volume 1, UNSCEAR Report to the General Assembly, New York http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/2000_1.html (2000).
182. Choppin, G., Liljenzin, J.-O., Rydberg, J. & Ekberg, C. Behavior of radionuclides in the environment. In *Radiochemistry and Nuclear Chemistry* (Academic Press, Cambridge, 2013).
183. Taylor, D. M. Environmental plutonium-creation of the universe to twenty-first century mankind. *Radioactiv. Environ.* **1**, 1–14 (2001).

184. Hancock, G. H., Tims, S. G., Fifield, L. K. & Webster, I. T. The release and persistence of radioactive anthropogenic nuclides. In *A Stratigraphical Basis for the Anthropocene* (eds. Waters, C. N., Zalasiewicz, J. A., Williams, M., Ellis, M. A. & Snelling, A. M.) 265–281 (Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 2014).
185. Ellis, E. C. & Ramankutty, N. Putting people in the map: anthropogenic biomes of the world. *Front. Ecol. Environ.* **6**, 439–447 (2008).
186. Ellis, E. C. Anthropogenic transformation of the terrestrial biosphere. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A* **369**, 1010–1035 (2011).
187. Halpern, B. S. et al. Spatial and temporal changes in cumulative human impacts on the world's ocean. *Nat. Commun.* **6**, 7615 (2015).
188. WWF, Staggering extent of human impact on planet (2018). <https://www.worldwildlife.org/press-releases/wwf-report-reveals-staggering-extent-of-human-impact-on-planet>
189. IPBES, Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2019). <https://ipbes.net/global-assessment-report-biodiversity-ecosystem-services>
190. Zalasiewicz, J. et al. Scale and diversity of the physical technosphere: a geological perspective. *Anthropocene Rev.* **4**, 9–22 (2017).
191. Steffen, W. et al. Stratigraphic and Earth System approaches to defining the Anthropocene. *Earth's Future* **4**, 324–345 (2016).
192. Steffen, W. et al. Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **115**, 8252–8259 (2018).
193. Steffen, W. et al. The emergence and evolution of Earth System Science. *Nat. Rev.* **1**, 54–63 (2020).
194. Waters, C. N. et al. Global Boundary Stratotype Section and Point (GSSP) for the Anthropocene Series: where and how to look for potential candidates. *Earth Sci. Rev.* **178**, 379–429 (2018).
195. Carpenter, S. R. & Bennett, E. M. Reconsideration of the planetary boundary for phosphorus. *Environ. Res. Lett.* **6**, 014009 (2011).
196. Ellsworth, W. Injection-induced earthquakes. *Science* **341**, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1225942> (2013).

Acknowledgements

Contributing authors are mainly members of the Anthropocene Working Group (AWG), of the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy (SQS), a component body of the International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS). We thank Paul Crutzen for his initiatives, beginning with the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme and later the AWG, in pioneering the Anthropocene narrative upon which this paper builds. We thank colleagues M. Storzum, L. Edwards, and H. Haberl for their guidance in our paper's data presentation.

Author contributions

All authors developed and contributed to drafts of the text, figures and tables, as part of their voluntary AWG efforts. The concept for the study was designed by J.S. in association with J.D., J.M., C.S., W.S., C.W. and J.Z. All authors (J.S., C.N.W., J.D., J.D.M., C.S., W.S., J.Z., A.C., A.G., I.H., M.J.H., R.L., J.R.M., C.P., N.L.R., W.S., M. Wagreich, M. Williams) contributed to the development and expression of prior peer-reviewed data and their consequences as summarized here.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interest.

Additional information

Supplementary information is available for this paper at <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-020-00029-y>.

Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to J.S.

Peer review information Primary handling editor: Joe Aslin

Reprints and permission information is available at <http://www.nature.com/reprints>

Publisher's note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.



Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>.

© The Author(s) 2020, corrected publication 2020