

Performativity and the Altermodernities: Occupy, Bodies and Time-Spaces

**A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
to the Department of Philosophy and Humanities of Freie Universität
Berlin**

by Iman Ganji

Berlin, 2018

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Erika Fischer-Lichte
Second Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Matthias Warstat

Date of defense: 25.02.2019

Grade: Summa Cum Laude

Selbstständigkeitserklärung

Hiermit bestätige ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbstständig und unter
Zuhilfenahme der angegebenen Literatur erstellt habe.

Berlin, den 27.01.2021

Iman Ganji
(Unterschrift)

Acknowledgment

This project would not have been possible without the support of many people. Special thanks to Professor Erika Fischer-Lichte and Professor Matthias Warstat, my supervisors, who patiently helped me to make sense out of what was originally confusion, and also Dr. Sruti Bala, who never stopped supporting me, even in my most difficult times. Many thanks to InterArt fellows and staff, for creating a community in which all ideas of the following dissertation have been produced in many collective debates. Thanks to German Research Foundation (DFG) for awarding me the scholarship and providing me with the financial means necessary to complete this project. And finally, thanks to all my past and future comrades in struggles for a better world, especially to my colleague and partner in life, Mohadeseh Zareh; and to the comrades in our anonymous collective back in Tehran, who cannot even leave Iran because of senseless prosecution of their thinking; and finally to dear friends, Sarah Ibrahim, Omid Montazeri, Ozgur Bahceci, Anirban Kumar, Yasmin Salimi, and many others.

Abstract

In the final months of 2010, a new global cycle of protests and social movements emerged that, as the following text will argue, has forced us to critically interrogate and transform the accepted ways in which theorists and researchers perceive the relation between aesthetics and politics, performativity and critical practice, modernity and its presupposed mimetic dynamics between the Global North and the Global South. These protest movements will be examined as various instances of the general category that we can call “the Occupy form.” The following research begins with an overview of the cycle of struggles and protest that were born out of the global revolutions in 1968. After having provided the salient features of this moment of recent political history, this text moves on to considerations of *the performative turn* in both the arts as well as in politics, thereby allowing for a broader critique of Modernity and for a conceptualization of what one could call as *altermodernities*. — a category, which obliges the theorist-researcher to reconceive of the very notion of performativity in the process. The research also defines *performative event* and its aesthetics in contrast to other existing literature such as social performance theory, and it goes on to argue for an aesthetics whose function is to create the conditions for *alternative subjectifications*. As performative politics works on the social relations to envision and enact a future society in the present, the transformations in dominant spatio-temporality — a constituent part of relationality — as well as bodies — in-between which the social relationality emerges — will be examined. The processes and mechanisms of constructing and imagining collective bodies at the national level, and how performative politics disrupts such processes of homogenization will be also an important part of evaluating the impacts and effects of occupy movements as well as how these performative movements re-appropriated time and space; creating spatio-temporalities *different from* the established colonial and authoritarian linear progress-centered ones reproduced by the nation-state apparatuses, particularly in the West Asia and North Africa. It will be also argued that a paradigm of imitation and mimesis will come short of explaining the communication and dissemination of protests movement from Cairo to New York, from Istanbul to Madrid, thus proposing the idea of performative contagion as a model to rethink this communication. Although this research makes use of case studies, archived material, and author led interviews with artist-activists, all of which are related to the

main subject of this thesis the occupy form of protests and its predecessors, it largely remains a theoretical endeavor to use performance and theatre studies in the socio-political field, drawing its insights from the tradition of the philosophers of immanence and the thinkers of community in 20th century.

Table of Content:

1 Introduction	iii
1-1 The First Global Cycle in 21 st Century: Politics Performative	viii
1-2 Performative Altermodernities: Toward New Socialities	xiii
2 Chapter One: Altermodernity Performativized	3
2-1 Alternative Modern: Creating the Alter-	3
2-1-1 <i>A Modernity with Capital M</i>	4
2-1-2 <i>Modernism</i>	6
2-1-2-1 Anti-Modern critique of the Nation-State: the ambiguity of the Minoritarian	9
2-1-2-2 Anti-Modern Critique of Progress	15
2-1-2-3 Modernity as a Power Relation	17
2-1-3 <i>“Alter-”: The significance of the prefixes</i>	20
2-2 A Discussion on the Methodology	31
2-2-1 <i>Dramatization</i>	34
2-2-2 <i>Performativization</i>	44
2-3 A Geography of Intensities	55
2-3-1 <i>The Drama of Communicating Intensities</i>	56
3 Chapter Two: The Performative Event	62
3.1 A Liminal Agency toward the Performative Event	62
3.1.2 <i>A Shortcut to the Social Context</i>	64
3.2 Performativierung/Aufführung – Ereignis/Event	65
3.3 Territories of Performance: Delimiting the Performative	69
3.3.1 <i>The Performative at Work</i>	70
3.3.2 <i>Territorialized Arts: The Creative and Culture Industries</i>	72
3.3.3 <i>Art’s Territory for Aufführung</i>	74
3.3.4 <i>Politics’ Territory for Aufführung</i>	79
3.3.4.1 Against the Vanguardist Trap	79
3.3.4.2 The Spectacle and its Political Performance	87
3.3.4.3 Dispossession, the Poor and the Inner Borders of Publikum	91
3.4 Aesthetics and the Performative Event	97
3.4.1 <i>Event as Aesthetic Dislocation</i>	98
3.4.2 <i>The Aesthetic Production of the Creation</i>	103

3.4.3 <i>Arts-Politics: Machinic Assemblages</i>	105
3.4.4 <i>Limits and Transgression: the Performativization of Deterritorialization</i>	112
3.4.5 <i>Autopoiesis and Allopoiesis</i>	117
3.4.6 <i>In/corporeal Transformations</i>	120
4 Chapter Three: From the POV of Bodies	129
4.1 An Introduction	129
4.2 The Body as Battleground	133
4.2.1 <i>What is there to see in a body?</i>	134
4.2.2 <i>The Nietzschean Body</i>	137
4.2.2.1 Nietzsche and the Impulsive Organization of the Body	139
4.2.2.2 The Survival of Organism	145
4.2.2.3 Imagination and the Nietzschean Body	147
4.2.3 <i>Affect and the Body</i>	153
4.2.4 <i>Recording and Inscription: the Machinic Function of the Code</i>	158
4.3 The Biopolitical Body	168
4.3.1 <i>The Technos-Body</i>	174
4.3.2 <i>The Government of Things</i>	178
4.4 The Patchwork Body: the Machinic Function of “and”	180
4.5 The State and the Body	199
4.5.1 <i>Imitation, Nationalism and the Colonial Divide</i>	202
4.5.1.1 “Volk vor dem Tor”	202
4.5.1.2 The War and the Nation	208
4.5.1.3 The Resentful West, the Resentful East: A Tale of Twins	209
4.5.1.4 Whose Nationalism, whose subjectivity?	212
4.5.2 <i>Nations to the East</i>	219
4.5.2.1 “The Successors”: From Greek Nationalism to a National Collective Body	223
4.5.2.1.1 <i>From Enlightened Individual to True Volk</i>	224
4.5.2.2 A Volk’s Renaissance in Iraq and Syria	227
4.5.2.3 The Happy Turk	232
4.6 The Performative Disruption of the Encoded Organism	234
4.6.1 <i>The Stateless Monsters Rallying on the Street?</i>	240
4.6.2 <i>The Monstrous Threat against the Natural-Identical</i>	250
4.6.3 <i>Political Monster: A Case of Fascination</i>	259

4.6.4 <i>The Kurdish Stateless Monstrosity</i>	263
4.7 A Conclusion: Contagion	266
5 Chapter Four: Time-Spaces of the Performative Event	290
5.1 The POV of Time-Spaces	290
5.2 Time Wars	292
5.2.1 <i>Dominant Temporality</i>	293
5.2.2 <i>Time of the Performative Event: A Return to the Future</i>	300
5.2.2.1 Multiplicity without One	303
5.2.2.2 The Multiple One	303
5.2.2.3 Kairos	305
5.2.2.4 Kairos and The Open Future	307
5.2.2.5 Kairos and Hiatus	310
5.2.2.6 Kairos and Everyday	314
5.2.2.7 A Return to the Future?	320
5.2.3 <i>Kairoi and Occupy Movements</i>	322
5.2.3.1 A New Machinic Assemblage of Revolutionary Temporalities	325
5.2.3.1.1 <i>Insurrection</i>	325
5.2.3.1.2 <i>Resistance</i>	326
5.2.3.1.3 <i>Revolutionary Ascetism</i>	327
5.2.3.2 The Three-Fold Temporal Assemblage	331
5.2.3.3 Reinventing the (post-)colonial Temporality	338
5.3 From time to space: Kairotope	343
5.4 Site in the Performative Event	346
5.4.1 <i>Space as social positioning</i>	346
5.4.2 <i>Space as Enclosure</i>	348
5.4.3 <i>Space and Sociality</i>	349
5.4.4 <i>Philosophers of Spatial Relation</i>	352
5.4.5 <i>Smooth Space: Contemporary Capitalism's Spatiality</i>	355
5.4.6 <i>The Occupy Form: Immanent Striation of the Contemporary Smooth Space</i>	364
5.4.7 OWS and its Spatialities	365
5.4.8 <i>Reclaiming the Space from the Post-Colonial Authoritarianism</i>	372
6 Conclusion	379
6.1 Performative Knowledge Production	380

6.2 The Affective Solidarity	382
6.3 The Performative Realism	384
6.4 Aesthetics, an Altermodern Perspective	386
6.5 The Occupation Performative Dynamics, Summarized	392
6.6 Art: The Continuation of Politics by Other Means	395
Table of Tables	398
Bibliography	399

Introduction

1 Introduction

2011 was a year that came bearing gifts, but of a kind that would come to be recognized as less of a present and more of a Pandora's box. Looking back, it now seems that this was a year that opened onto a situation where all the world's evils have been distributed to ever farther corners of the globe. And if one were to enumerate the countries who would come to suffer the worst of what this fateful year held in store, *Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen*, as well as a host of many others would, without a doubt, top the list of those places where "civil wars" have come to dominate the whole of society for a large portion of the world. Terror and bombing, shooting and slaughtering, knives on necks and explosive belts around torsos, and bombs hidden inside bodies, are all indicating that indeed a *spectre* is haunting our contemporary world – the spectre of death. Dying peacefully in a white isolated room, "the loneliness of dying" as Elias (2001 (1985)) puts it as an existential catastrophe, is now a miracle in Mesopotamia. Any invitation to think, it seems, could not exceed Brecht's anger: "Bedenkt das Dunkel and die Große Kälte/ in diesem Tale, das von Jammer schallt" (Brecht 2009 (1928)).¹

Such is our contemporary world; hopeless, helpless, *piling rubble on top of rubble in a single catastrophe* (Benjamin 2003 (1940)). While once defined as a collective action of a free people, politics is now reduced to the exertion of power by various nation-states and their respective body-politic. If this is the dead-end of politics as such, when politics is defined as the collective self-determination of a people enriched with differences, "to unfold the consequences of a new possibility" (Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis*, 31), then how could one write about politics?

One should keep in mind, however, that the new phase of destructive identity politics has come after a caesura within the international arrangement of geopolitical power. Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Greece, Spain, the United States, and Syria, all erupted one by one in social protest movements, exhibiting collective heterogeneous bodies of different, yet communicating types. The *local-global* communication of these movements brought to the surface the real

¹ "Think of the darkness and of the great colds/in this valley, which reverberates with misery."

antagonisms that had long since been covered over through national unifications, religious sectarian wars, international consensus building, and ethnic or ideological suppressions. Introducing permanent austerity measures, neglecting the growing gap between the commoners and the rich, overseeing the crisis in representational democracy, and intensifying the unfinished (hi)story of colonialism in post-colonial regions such as the Middle East, neoliberal economic globalization has connected the Arab revolutionaries of al-Tahrir to the American dissatisfied urban youth (hence the latter started its movement by declaring “Are you ready for a Tahrir movement?” (Adbusters qtd. in Writers for the 99%). However, apparatuses of *the Same* started to function soon afterwards; regardless of its costs, homogeneity had to be set up again.

But in the Pandora’s box still one thing has remained – one that can always be the last gift for an imagination of another world: hope. A hopeless hope; not a hope for something, but a hope that confirms the hopelessness of the contemporary situation only in order to make itself ready for an alternative image of thought. That is why this research claims that the whole situation can contribute to an affirmation of performative politics and its exigency, conditioned by a re-“organization of pessimism” (Benjamin, *Surrealism* 217). *There is no outside*; politics begins with this recognition only in order to reach a double affirmation of life (Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth* vii-viii): first, to accept the world as it *is*; and second, to re-affirm the active forces capable of changing it from within, *immanently*, as it *becomes*.

When the Arab Spring and other occupy movements in Europe and the US emerged, performance studies became an important discipline in discourses produced around those movements, even being recognized by more traditional disciplines such as sociology as a method of enquiry about social phenomena (we will discuss the social performance theory in this regard in Chapter Two). In writing the final parts of this thesis, I encountered one such work that I surprisingly missed until then: Richard Schechner’s *Performed Imaginaries* (2015).

Schechner’s text opens with the same analysis and worries with which I began this text, yet formulating it differently regarding the field of “performance studies”:

I sit here this morning (does it really matter which morning?) trying to be optimistic. I want to write how performance studies and the performing arts can save the world, or at least help to

save the world. I am typing while rockets and bombs are exploding in Gaza and Israel; Egypt is in turmoil, Syria in the throes of civil war; M23 rebels are closing on Goma in the Congo, putting a million people under threat; suicide bombings and assassinations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan; the Somali civil war is ongoing. Sunnis and Shias have warred against each other since the martyrdom of Hussein in 680 CE; in India, Hindus murder Muslims and vice versa (1).

The first striking issue in the passage above is the centrality of *identity*. As a performance scholar, he knows better than most that even in its most simplified conception, performativity theory argues that an identity comes out of a repetitive repertoire as a *product*. The subjugated performativities of everyday life reproduce themselves, in a context of a spectacle, within pre-established limits of performance for different identity categories. They code the population, dividing it according to gender, class, race, etc., to maintain an imposed hierarchy that is subsequently naturalized as “national identity”. Contrary to all these teachings, Schechner’s text, “Can we be the (new) Third World?”, deals with the populations of the so-called Third World according to identitarian discourses in Western Media — “Sunnis and Shias”, “Hindus and Muslims”— with a deep misunderstanding about at least the Shia/Sunni divide by easily connecting it to a mythological origin, the martyrdom of Hussein in 1400 years ago². Does a performance studies perspective allow a scholar to neglect epistemological breaks in order to defend a mythological basis for identitarian conflicts?

The other issue comes from this axiom: “performance studies and the performing arts can save the world”. In many of those countries that the “Spring” occurred or the resistance and struggle against authoritarian regimes emerged, there is no academic field as “performance studies” and the performing arts have their best and foremost appearance in the form of performative protests and on streets or in tent cities, not in galleries, private salons, or theatres. This problem, combined with the previous one, results in the following rather startling comment:

Today, artists, activists, and scholars are a New Third World ... The vanguard of this New Third World are – and here I hope you won’t think me too arrogant – performance theorists and artists

² Shia is a historical construct, as Sunni is. The contemporary Shia in Iran and Iraq only formed during the Safavid dynasty, in 16th century – as a direct differentiation with the powerful enemy on the Western borders, the Sunni Ottoman Empire.

who practice collaborative performance research, persons who know that playing deeply is a way of finding and embodying new knowledge, renewing energy, and relating on a performative rather than ideological basis (Schechner 9).

Thus, a return to academic/institutional vanguardism in the wake of leaderless, contagious, heterogenous “performative” movements in the form of Occupy. And a claim on representing the name “Third World” by a few performance theorists and artists, a claim that ignores the concrete specificity of actual Third World peoples, and how they are being treated as refugees and immigrants outside the windows of the very room in which Schechner sits and drinks his coffee. I believe this comes not from a personal shortcoming, as Schechner shows all best intents and good will, but from a theoretical shortcoming in his analysis, and in the dominant discourse of performance studies in general. This shortcoming repeats itself in this text too, when Schechner writes that “performance studies arises from the premise that everything and anything can be studied ‘as’ performance” and goes on to write:

there is a problem at the heart of all this. If anything can be studied “as” performance, if any tool can be used (performance studies being the ultimate disciplinary bricoleur), then what “is” performance, what “is” performance studies? As I theorize it, something “is” performance when, according to the conventions, common usages, and/or traditions of a specific culture or social unit at a given historical time, an action or event is called a “performance.” I know this is a squooshy definition, shape-shifting, and unreliable in absolute terms (Schechner 6).

It is not only a “squooshy” definition, but also shows that performance in performance studies discourse still struggles to acquire critical or conceptual value after five decades of being used in theory. Although we have to praise Schechner for posing the problem in the first place, a concept should be able to differentiate between something *and* something else: it generates value by differentiation, it is a force that comes from a historical dramatization, as Nietzsche believed.

But Schechner does not see a need for such a value, not because he does not differentiate between a massacre and a revolution, but because he believes in universal values. In fact, in accordance with previous problem, he takes the so-called “western values” of the White intellectual as the already existing universal elements of differentiation for each context. In this way, he has no need for a concept that contains the critical force of differentiation in itself. In

fact, albeit his claims to do otherwise, his conception of performance is a very solid, fixed, static image, that – by way of already presupposing the universal values – does not capture the dynamics of performativity.

The same problem has been repeated in many other commentaries on the Arab Spring and Occupy movements, analyzing all of them with the same categories, extracting the same static images and drawing similar conclusions. Some would say that these are done as abstract argumentations for forming a theoretical framework. But is this really an abstraction? When Gilles Deleuze writes about abstraction in thought (Difference and Repetition 276)³ for example, he defines it as an attempt to draw a diagram of forces, intensities and movements, not to extract a static image, or design a theatrical scene with a prewritten script. Abstraction then should serve the understanding of becomings' dynamics, so that one can delve into a singular context, track the forces, and try to hear and see those forces that have been silenced and suppressed for years by the constituted power, and not rendered audible and visible by the dominant discourses – this may be what Spivak calls “measuring silences” (Can The Subaltern Speak? 82).

If my critique holds true, then I should try an alternative way of imagination according to one of Schechner's own beliefs:

Performance studies scholars and performance artists need always to remain actively critical of “self-appointed mortal gods.” We must imagine, invent, and perform alternative ways of becoming (14).

The invention of an alternative conception of performativity is then the main methodological inquiry of this research. It builds itself of course on the corpus of very significant contributions to the field, including ground-breaking works of Schechner himself, but through its particular subject matter— the Occupy movements— it attempts to argue for a concept of “performativity” that differentiates between *ontogenic* or *morphogenic* processes *and* actualized beings and forms. This point will be discussed thoroughly in the course of the present text. Thus, the following research will deal with the problematic of new political forms of dissent, especially in

³ Deleuze writes: “The theory of thought is like painting: it needs that revolution which took art from representation to abstraction. This is the aim of a theory of thought without image”.

recent years, and its different *events* in local contexts. Based on previous research on collective art after May 68, and the performative war machine during *the first global cycle of protests* (1998 to 2003) in my master dissertations in Tehran Art University and the University of Amsterdam, the current research will deal with *the second global cycle*, roughly started in 2009-10, including Iran's *Green movement*, the Arab Spring, and Occupy movements in the United States, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine.

1-1 The First Global Cycle in 21st Century: Politics Performative

On January 27, 2003, Picasso's "Guernica" was covered up at the United Nations Security Council entrance to make "an appropriate background for the cameras" (Stubblefield 182). That was the reason given by the United Nations Press Secretary, while some others were concerned whether the covering actually made for a more suitable *stage* for a warmongering performance. A week later, on February 5th, then US Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke to the world about the urgency and necessity of an attack to Iraq, during which Guernica was completely covered and even hidden behind the Security Council flags. "Mr. Powell can't very well seduce the world into bombing Iraq surrounded on camera by shrieking and mutilated women, men, children, bulls and horses", reported the New York Times (Dowd).

The covering-up at the entrance also marked the terminus of the first global cycle of struggles in 21st century. Protests against the 2003 Iraq War have been described as the largest world-wide protest event in the history of mankind (Callinicos)⁴. Since 1998, however, the world witnessed a globally interconnected network of resistance and struggle. And this was unprecedented for the simple reason that globally integrated capitalism and its neoliberal forms of economy and politics

⁴ "The French political scientist Dominique Reynié has estimated that, between 3 January and 12 April 2003, some 36 million people took part in nearly 3,000 protests around the world against the Iraq war".

had been recognized and praised as “the end of history”⁵ while people in the street were shouting for a different world.

The movements began from 16 May 1998. A global street party, called for by London’s *Reclaim the Street* group, happened in more than 30 cities around the world to “transnationally”⁶ resist transnational capital. In the next year, Seattle’s protest became the sign for the possibility of the people’s victory against capitalist domination. But in 2001, Genoa proved that the happy, joyous, activism of Carnival against Capital was not far from a battlefield full of prepared armed Police forces.

Although the early carnivalesque forms of the *alterglobalization movement* have disappeared gradually after Genoa, the globally coordinated days of protest culminated on February 15, 2003, against the coming war on Iraq. People rushed to the streets in more than 600 cities, only to find that their voice could not be more unheard by their supposed representatives in a globally admired system of *representational* democracy.

Even though this global cycle reached its terminus after the beginning of the Iraq War, a new “image of thought” had been created through differentiating new paradigms of time and space regarding collective bodies, and the body itself, which will be the main focus of current research. Politics and aesthetics, performative acts of struggle and activist art practices, have never been so entangled than before. New forms of organization and resistance have been created. And in contrast to the mainstream imagination in whose apocalyptic novels and movies capitalism is still functioning after *the end of the world*, performativity of struggle contributed to the creation of new “poles of imaginal recomposition” (Shukaitis 27, 82) for new and multiple virtual worlds.

This new performative politics made a decisive break with the preceding tactics of traditional leftist movements, which consisted of – in both traditions of parliamentary or extra-parliamentary socialism -- long marches from time t_1 , point s_1 to t_2 , s_2 and aimed to seize the

⁵ Even Francis Fukuyama, who defended the neo-conservative American political model as the ultimate possible Good and proposed the concept of the End of History (1992), revised his positions by a critique on the United State government after 2003 Iraq War (*After the Neocons*).

⁶ The slogan of the movement was “our resistance will be as transnational as capital”.

power of central government and to establish another Head/State; it revolutionized the revolution. Though this revolutionizing revolution “began in May 68”, as Felix Guattari and Antonio Negri suggest (Guattari and Negri, *New Lines of Alliance, New Spaces of Liberty* 37), its point of becoming-global was in the time of the alterglobalization movements.

Erika Fischer-Lichte introduced the term “the performative turn” (2008 (2004)) to designate a new aesthetic paradigm for the arts *in general*. In other words, the performative turn does not only refer to the emergence of contemporary performance arts in 1960s-70s, but also tracks its effects on other arts, and their way of presentation and reception. One could say that the performative is the *hegemonic* “form of content” in different artistic “forms of expression”, and these combinations form a new aesthetics – free from modernist limitations, divisions, and hierarchies – which nonetheless sets up its own territory of forces and intensities. In the same track, the performative turn in dissent politics refers to a paradigmatic break with previous forms of protest movements. If it is legible to put art and revolution under the same umbrella, as Terry Eagleton does so in *Lenin in the Postmodern Age* (2007 44), then one could speak about a new aesthetics for the new revolutionary politics.⁷

The term performative, however, has not been totally absent in political texts. Particularly under the influence of Judith Butler’s life-time work on performativity, many theorists have reacted and used this term, but they often identify it with *theatricality* (including Butler herself in some instances). Criticizing Laclau’s demand-based *populism*, Zizek, for example, calls it *performative politics* (2007, 83). However, Zizek qualifies his criticism by saying that “the term ‘demand’ involves a whole theatrical scene in which a subject is addressing her demand to an Other presupposed to be able to meet it” (ibid). The performative here is identified with the theatrical in which the divisions of theatrical apparatus are already presumed: the divisions between the performer and the audience, the actor and the director, the authority of text and the submission of the performance – in sum, completely opposite to any aesthetics of the performative turn.

⁷ The performative aesthetical analysis of revolutionary politics and protest movements will be justified further in this research: First, through the performativization method, and then, by discussing the theory of event.

Zizek's point, on the other hand, is more or less true about the theatricality in Althusserian ideological "interpellation" which has been used by Butler as an example for construction of a subject through repetitive *performance* (The Psychic Life of Power 106-131). Nonetheless, it is not again in any case what this research calls performative politics. In Althusser's dramatization of interpellation, the individual is made into a subject by virtue of the authority of the State, by subjection to the law, or as Zizek puts it, by recognizing the other. The dialectics of recognition between the self and the other, which originated in the notion of the individual conscious subject *a la* Hegel, has long found its way to leftist thought. However, as it will be explained throughout the research, the new aesthetics of performative politics speaks a different language.

Trying to point out the categorical elements of this new aesthetics, Fischer-Lichte writes about, among others, its communal character and its autopoietic feedback loop; two characteristics through which contemporary performance art goes beyond any dialectics of the self and the other. Community indicates a collectivity⁸ working through this autopoietic feedback loop, "consisting of the mutual interaction between actors and spectators, brings forth the performance. The notion of the artist as autonomous subject creating an autonomous work of art, which each recipient may interpret differently but cannot change in its materiality, evidently no longer applies here." (The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics 163)

It is according to this new aesthetics that Athena Athanasiou challenges Butler with the notion of "self-poietics". According to her,

Self-poietics does not concern just the "self" – in the way of heroic self-sufficient individualism or an alternative liberal "anything goes" – but emerges as a *performative* occasion in an ongoing process of socially regulatory self-formation, whereby under different circumstances the self struggles within and against the norms through which it is constituted; and such struggles are only

⁸ The notions of community and collectivity will be confronted again in the discussion about self-organization. For the notion of community should not be presupposed here, because this term historically refers to a homogenous, united whole, opposed to the bourgeois individualistic society. Challenging this conception of community, the critical contemporary treatment of the term (for example, in Agamben's *Coming Community*) links the *new* community to an open whole of singularities. The altermodernities challenge both the modern and conventional/traditional collective bodies, community and society, or nation and *volk*.

waged through and with others, in ways that open up to others (including other selves) (Butler and Athanasiou 63).

While Fischer-Lichte's *autopoiesis* surpasses the pre-established limits of individual artist-subject and its passive recipients, Athanasiou's performative self-poietics goes beyond the Hegelian dialectic of self and other. There is no more "self"; rather the question is about its *dispossession*: the moment when the other is no longer the antithesis of the self; its rival in recognition; but on the contrary, the self and the other both become the limits of the common, the singularities which exist in being-together, in a space in-between them. Or as Butler frames it:

For politics to take place, the body must appear. I appears to others, and they appear to me, which means that some space between us allows each to appear [...] No one body establishes the space of appearance, but this action, this performative exercise happens only "between" bodies [...] the action emerged from the "between" (Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street).

The performative turn in arts also signifies a break between the theatrical and the performative. More precisely, the performative relation has been freed from the theatrical relation, for the theatrical relation is only one possible realization of the performative relation. In contemporary performance art, bodily movement is not essentially engaged in a signifying relation, acting as the signified for a textual signifier (hence the distinction between dramatic and performative). Nor is it similar to classical dance, where a certain hierarchical grammar imposes itself on the dancer's body, and bodily movements are imitations from natural, organic movements, functioning in a paradigm of similarity. On the contrary, the performative sets the body free, makes it open to inorganic movements, and brings it *back* to the paradigm of difference, although it is always prone to assign itself a determinate form, a certain hierarchical organization.

On the other hand, as Klossowski asserts in his reading of Nietzsche, the performative signs cannot be absorbed in the discourse: the performative eludes the capture of the discursive.

Every movement should be conceived as a gesture, a kind of language in which (impulsive) forces make themselves heard. In the inorganic world there is no misunderstanding, communication seems to be perfect. *Error* begins in the *organic* world. ... The contradiction is not between the

'false' and the 'true' but between the 'abbreviations of signs' and the 'signs' themselves.
(Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* 44)

According to Klossowski's Nietzsche, there's a gap between the organic world and the inorganic world. For while signs remain bodily movements or gestures in the inorganic world; the organic world, with its natural organization of impulses, abbreviates these bodily performative signs to discursive ones thereby allowing for the formation of the organism. That said, the nature of this gap is not of a dichotomy or dual nature. The inorganic world, the world of *permanent becoming*, is ontologically primary and only subsequently becomes realized within the organic world as a determinate and codified organism.⁹.

That said, one should more conveniently note that the 2004 terminus of the alterglobalization movement does not refer to a failure. The alterglobalization movement was not a war between capitalism and its outside. If the "vanguard party," in the previously dominant paradigms of leftist politics, inhabited a place that was allegedly *outside* of capitalism, the new performative politics began with the affirmation that "there is no outside"; there is no pure space, there are no clean hands. The paradigm of struggle has transformed from a dialectical one, based on thesis-antithesis relation, to an immanent one, which affirms the autonomous constituent power of a heterogeneous multitude (not a homogenous people of the party) who are able to change the social relations of the current constituted Power, which has crystallized out of their own constituent *potentia*. When there is no war between outside and inside, when the aim is no longer that of "seizing Power", then there is no total victory or failure. The significance of these movements was their temporary realizations of alternatives, of the new.

1-2 Performative Altermodernities: Toward New Socialities

The alterglobalization movements (widely considered, from 1994 to 2003) have actualized some potential concatenations of art and politics through machinic performative assemblages in an

⁹ Nietzsche is widely known as a philosopher of organism. To attribute inorganic to his thinking needs more arguments. These arguments are presented in Chapter Three, in the discussion on Nietzschean body.

immanent plane of struggle. Through these movements, temporary *performativizations* of altermodernities happened in different contexts. However, the Occupy movements presented us with far more complex dynamics of altermodernities and forms of struggle and change; especially with respect to their experimentation with spaces and time, and thus with the embodiment of social relations.

As Larbi Sadiki (2015) observed in the Arab Spring, people's coming together was "to ephemerally substitute the authoritarian regimes' practice, thought and language of controlling power with their own conceptions of political practice, thought and terminology" (Unruliness through Space and Time 2); a substitution that was, in short, a new performativity. For Benjamin Arditi (2016), this performative dimension allows the demonstrators to keep their distance from "more conventional, Jacobin-scripted vision of change as a discontinuity between what is and what can be" (36), as the occupiers started to live in the tent cities they created in order to realize their alternate future in the present.

Saul Newman (2016) calls this politics the politics of anti-politics "which points towards the possibilities of autonomous social relations and political life beyond the bankrupt despotism of the financial system and the nihilistic charade of parliamentary politics" (93). According to Newman, this politics obliges us to "shift our gaze from the figure of the sovereign to the encampments springing up at the gates of the city that are quietly and joyfully laying siege to power" (93). The anti-representational aspect of these movements shouted explicitly by occupiers themselves, as in the case of *the indignados* movement (*indignados* meaning *the outraged*) in Madrid's Puerta del Sol Square, whose slogan was: "you don't represent us!"

In light of the theoretical discourse surrounding performativity and the recent emergence of the "movements of the squares," this text sets itself the task of analyzing what is often called "performative politics" with carnivalesque, performative forms of expression and new organization of bodies or the collective bodies through space and time. It will be argued how performative politics signifies a break with previous forms of political dissent,, just as "the performative turn" (E. Fischer-Lichte) in the arts signifies such a break and ushers in a new aesthetic paradigm.

This break has been proved difficult to theorize by central figures in modernist leftist critical thought, such as Alain Badiou who – albeit praising the movements as the beginning of a new era – calls them “blind, naive, scattered and lacking a powerful concept of durable organization” (The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings 5) or Žižek who mourns that their “authentic rage ... [is] unable to transform itself into even a minimal positive program for socio-political change” (The Year of Dreaming Dangerously 78). But the different names of these movements, the Arab Spring, the Spanish Indignados, the Greek Aganaktismenoi (meaning desperate and indignant), Occupy Wall Street and so forth are still being heard in the analysis of current affairs at the global level, where they are characterized as “events that will come to be understood as having been decisively political frequently unfold without notice or confusedly, to all appearances an unstable, disconnected series of aggregating aberrations whose collective merits will only be acknowledged in retrospect” (Woodward, Jones III and Ma 209).

If these movements have effected a recognizable break, then what is required is a new image of thought, and a new paradigm of spatio-temporal relations through which a concrete, practical, and situated form of thought made possible. These new *relationalities*, which are equally social and political, will be examined under the name of “alter-modernities”¹⁰. The discussion on this issue in Chapter One will be accompanied by commentaries on performativity within politics, its break with the (post-)modernist discourses and critiques, the emergent alter-modernities, and ultimately arrives at an *ontogenic* account of this kind of performative politics.

Therefore, the main research question deals with these new spatio-temporal relations and their corresponding collective bodies, but it will not ask, for example, “what are they?” Or, “What is their essence or nature?” Rather, the relevant question that guides this research is the following: “how have these new spatio-temporal relations emerged within these recent protest movements and how have they subsequently come to be understood or conceptualized?”. To approach such

¹⁰ Alter-modernity has been conceptualized in recent political texts, especially with reference to anti-orientalist and post-colonial critique, after its introduction into the field by Hardt and Negri (2009 101-118). Altermodernism was also been theorized by Nicolas Bourriaud. He curated the Tate Triennial 2009 with the title “Altermodern”. However, it will be argued that what he conceptualizes there as altermodern is not in any case what this research means by the same term.

a question, the research will define a methodology that it calls performativization method; a re-thinking of Deleuze's method of dramatization – a method he assigns to Friedrich Nietzsche (a significant methodological choice since Nietzsche and Deleuze both remain important theoretical figures for the entirety of this research).

In the second chapter, the theory of the event will be re-considered and ultimately re-defined as a *performative event*. A preliminary remark is required here since the Event has been conceptualized according to different, and even sometimes altogether antagonistic, perspectives of critical thinkers as an aesthetic-political happening. In other words, according to activist philosophy for example, each event is aesthetical when it works on time/space, folds onto them and folds them; and it is also political, because of the participation, or partaking of bodies in these time/space relations, transforming them and being transformed by them (Massumi, *Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts* 2-28). In Chapter three, these insights on performativity will guide our inquiry of the collective bodies in the performative event. Additionally, each context will be analyzed separately, the established processes of making national collective bodies will be revisited and the alternative collective bodies in each Occupy movement will be discussed in this chapter.

In chapter four, I discuss the disruption of the dominant temporality and the constituent time of performative event, as well as the singular site of such dynamic social phenomena. Performance studies will help this portion of the research to consider the different performative aesthetics of each singular time-space, or as it will be called here, *kairotope*. Arts and performances, theatrical and carnivalesque features provide those transversal processes of subjectification, borrowing Guattari's formulation, that create subject-groups capable of performativizing kairotopes.

To develop this research, I have made use of archival material (documentaries, reports, news analyses, images, inside stories) from different case studies, literature reviews, interviews with activists, my own lived experience, and my own analyses of cases based on the existent literature.

The theoretical framework of this research is structured in a way that re-affirms the primacy of constituent becoming over actualized being and therefore develops its argument around a whole network of concepts that have been produced in this context.

Multiple cases are going to be discussed and mentioned in this research, some in detail and some in passing. Their primary purpose is to show the heterogeneity of performative political events and dynamics, rather than trying to validate a universal theory for political performativity. Among those cases are: the 2010-2011 Egyptian protests, focused mainly in Alexandria and Cairo; the 2011 Tunisian Revolution; the 2011 Syrian Revolution; Iran's Green Movement of 2009-10; Carnival Against Capital or alterglobalization movement, which took place between the late 1990s-early 2000s; Occupy Wall Street, 2011; Gezi Park's Movement in Turkey in 2013; the recent history of the Kurdish struggle in both Turkey in Syria; the 2011 Spanish *Indignados* movement; the 2011 Aganaktismenoi in Greece,; the 2011 Bahrain Uprising; and so on. In conjunction with my analyses of these events, a variety of performative art groups, activist productions, theatre plays, literary pieces, and other artistic discussions will be discussed as well.

This project, with its ambitious aim to attempt a redefinition of the performative in regard to the political, became a lengthy endeavor in theoretical and methodological discussions. It has divided its field of study in three main levels: a more general point of view, and a more abstract discussion on the concept of altermodernities, performativizations and the performative event, in chapters one and two. Then, chapters three and four, the argument continues by way of particular points of views within performativity theory, one from the point of view of bodies and the other from the vantage point of each event's respective time-spaces.

It seemed necessary to ground the theoretical and philosophical arguments for proceeding in each of these points of view; a necessary task that has made this research lengthy and theoretical. However, the concepts in each of these points of view correspond with the concepts that emerged out of the struggles of its perspectival counterparts, forming a necessary conceptual network that encompasses the whole of this research and functions as its *plane of consistency*.

This is not at all a comprehensive work, or a flawless one. If sometimes bold, it retains its ultimate modesty. It is above all an exercise in hopeless hope, in this very moment in history. Just now, as I am typing these words, Iran is witnessing another popular uprising, this time an uprising made up of the subaltern, the poorest and the most marginalized in an authoritarian regime. Who

knows where the destiny of this uprising will bring it; yet again the streets are the scene of a performative struggle, headless, leaderless, *swarming* in space and time, reclaiming the night, becoming “*monstrous*”. This research hopes to open another path for listening to the inaudible forces of these bodies and for tracing the invisible rays of affirmative contagion in their collective, “savage time-spaces.”¹¹

¹¹ Lyotard’s concept of savage time-space will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Chapter One

Altermodernity Performativized

2 Chapter One: Altermodernity Performativized

2-1 Alternative Modern: Creating the Alter-

“Hatred of modernity and of outdatedness are identical”, writes Adorno (*Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life* 93), a modernist critic of modernity, who defends his own musical experiments under the name of “my modernity” against the conservative neo-classical – yet modern – perspective of his first composition teacher (*ibid* 218); an enthusiastic reader of Kafka and Beckett’s modernist literature against Lukácsian condemnation of their decadence, who was nonetheless “more thoroughly Lukácsian than Lukács himself” (Lazarus 137). Unlike Walter Benjamin, Adorno was not fond of Baudelaire's modernity. By contrast, he saw the victims of Hitler’s Fascism hidden in the “sensation” of Baudelaire's poetics. Simultaneously, however, modernity for him was “a qualitative, not a chronological, category” that “turns its back on conventional surface coherence, the appearance of harmony, the order corroborated merely by replication” (*Minima Moralia* 218). Still, Adorno cannot refuse to see that the “cult of the new, thus the idea of modernity” (*ibid* 235), is but “eternal recurrence of damnation” (*ibid* 236).

Adorno’s paradoxical entanglement with the modern is not limited to him alone, but typical of the *anti-modern modernist critique of Modernity*. In other words, there is a permanent tension inherent to the very notion of the “modern”, which in a way turns modernity against itself, leads it to a self-negation, and maintains a negative dialectical relationship while de(con)structing the more positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic. As Bruno Latour has pointed out, this tension inherent to the “modern”

designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time. When the word 'modern', 'modernization', or 'modernity' appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic and stable past. Furthermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a fight, in a quarrel where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns. 'Modern' is thus doubly asymmetrical: it designates a break in the regular passage of time, and it designates a combat in which there are victors and vanquished. If so many of our contemporaries are reluctant to use

this adjective today, if we qualify it with prepositions, it is because we feel less confident in our ability to maintain that double asymmetry: we can no longer point to time's irreversible arrow, nor can we award a prize to the winners (Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* 10).

Now, the question is how one can conceive of the modern, modernism, and Modernity in such a relationship; and the possible approaches that would allow thought to go beyond the tension that remains an ineluctable fact of the “modern.” To go beyond, yes, but not in order to solve the tension, to work out a synthesis, or in a more concrete political term, to finish the unfinished project of modernity. On the contrary, to go beyond this tension means to re-affirm the paradox and accept the ancient face of the modern for the sake of creating an alternative. The following chapter will discuss this inherent paradox of the “modern” and its consequent problem of moving *beyond* it in both thought and practice.

2-1-1 A Modernity with Capital M

If Adorno is right that the old has been always repeated under the guise of the new, an etymology of the very concept of modernity may prove to be useful. The word “modern” comes from the Late Latin word *modernus*, which is itself derived from the Latin root *modo* (just now, present in here and now). In its turn, *Modo* comes from the Indo-European root, *med-*, meaning *to measure*, *to give advice*, and *to heal*. These three meanings can vaguely reveal the normative implications inherent to the word modernity as a Westernized notion from the very outset. For example, St Augustine used the word “modern” as early as the 5th century to contrast “the new Christian era with pagan antiquity,” as “a means of describing and legitimizing new institutions, new legal rules, or new scholarly assumptions” (Martinelli 5). And yet, contemporary discourses regarding the status and meaning of Modernity itself— whether those still in favor of the Enlightenment project and theorizing the unfinished Modernity or those defending multiple modernities in different “cultural” and historical contexts – are not that distant from these earlier uses of the “modern” within theological-political discourses.

Modernization understood as the process of (re)producing concrete (trans)formations under the name of modernity in different parts of the world, is exemplary in this regard. This concept

“established itself in the political-ideological climate of the years after the second world war” (ibid 1), of the period of decolonization and post-colonial nationalism on one hand, and of the Cold War on the other hand. Although different countries had been attracted to either the Eastern (the Soviet Union) or Western (the United States) styles of modernization, the modernized politico-economic order would inevitably consolidate political and economic power and would take that hegemonic form of what Felix Guattari and Antonio Negri called *Integrated World Capitalism*, which is a “figure of command which coordinates yet exasperates the unity of the world market, submitting it to instruments of productive planning, monetary control, political influence, with quasi-statist characteristics” (New Lines of Alliance 48). Under the hegemony exercised by Integrated World Capitalism, the contradiction between American capitalism and Soviet socialism proved to be secondary, as a global market of socialist-capitalist economies deterritorialized “statist command and the national states” (48), absorbing the Global Periphery in “a network of international organizations, a planetary strategy of the mass media, rigorous taking control of the market, of technologies, etc” (49).

Just as Modernity is “the product of nascent capitalism and develops in close association with the worldwide expansion of the latter” (Amin 7), *modernization* is mainly economic in nature and subordinates the cultural and political aspects of everyday life, thereby transforming culture and politics into supplemental spheres whose function is aiding in the realization of economic ends. Hanna Arendt described this economic modernization as a “modern glorification of labour,” which leads to the “deworlding [of] the world through which human-being regress to a merely private, atomistic self. And leads to the regression of human form of life, bios, to life as such, zoē” (Rensmann and Gandesha 13). This analysis has been taken up and furthered on by Giorgio Agamben, who proposes the idea that under modern states of security and control, the *nomos* of the world was that of the concentration camp; replete with a form of juridico-political governance that arose from what it deemed to be a permanent situation of crisis and this reestablished sovereignty via the declaration of a state of exception, under which everybody is

treated as *homo sacer*: “human beings deprived of their rights as citizen – having the bios as their form of life – and become naked life -- a life reduced to *zoē*¹²” (see Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 1998).

Therefore, the political and cultural modernizations that are proper to the modern economic paradigm were re-appropriated according to each local context. The modern nation-state, though deterritorialized, is still an important factor for the flow of global capital, reinforced by atomism, utilitarianism, consumerism, and the division of the public and the private as its cultural side.

Clearly, modernization propagates a modernity which situates its “origin” in the West and conceives its progress as a linear process toward the “end of history” (i.e. American neoliberalism). And it is for this very reason that modernity has been analyzed as an evolutionary process, going from the backwardness to Western civilization. Thus, one comes to understand why some writers called the experience of the communist states of the USSR and Eastern European countries a “fake modernity” (Martinelli 14) or why “numerous North American sociologists and political scientists devoted themselves to studying the problems that ‘backward’ Third World countries had to face in order to acquire the characteristics of modernity as it appeared in the developed countries of the West” (ibid 1).

Hence Modernity with capital m. In order to refer to the homogenized and globalized western conception of modernity, and the arbitrary *universality* of what Adorno called “the universalized instrumental rationality” behind the global capitalist system, the following research will write modernity with a capital m, as the constituted Power-relation of our (post)modern world.

2-1-2 Modernism

The authoritarian character typical of discourses on Modernity, accompanied by colonial and post-colonial procedures of modernization and “globalization,” have given rise to a wide body of

¹² In chapter three, this paradigm will be revisited critically through contemporary theories of body and biopolitics.

critical theory, literature, and art, often branded as *modernist*. And it is from these critiques that the widely discussed distinction between modernism and Modernity has arisen.

Modernism typically refers to that period in history that roughly begins in the 1850s and ends after the Second World War, and is described in terms of counter-cultural, artistic and activist processes in which the actors within these fields *opposed* the very idea of Modernity itself. Nonetheless, modernist thought has been situated inside Modernity's power-relation from the outset. For example, Samir Amin gives the following definition for Modernity, as it was conceptualized during the Enlightenment, although he directly connects it later to Eurocentrism: "[Modernity is] the claim that human beings, individually and collectively, can and must make their own history" (Amin 13). After the Enlightenment, this definition of the human being as a bearer of the freedom and obligation to "make their own history" was further refined by Karl Marx: "but [human beings] do not make [history] as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* 10).

Making one's own history, the autonomy of mankind, was certainly a part of what Kant would call *the emergence from one's self-imposed nonage* (Kant). Moreover, Kant's 1784 essay 'What Is Enlightenment?' can be read as his public statement regarding his overall view of Modernity as a whole: self-governance, appreciation of men's value, going toward novelty, autonomy, democracy and so forth. Therefore, the project of Modernity had a universal aspect of an emancipating project with a motto that Kant formulated as having "the courage to use your own reason" (Kant). This understanding refers to human reason and reality as its exclusive source, and thus changes constantly according to the movement of history and the changes experienced by human social life as a whole. This is what Martinelli calls a *modernist* definition of Modernity:

Modernity is a process with no end that implies the idea of permanent innovation, of continual creation of the new. Living in the present, it is oriented towards the future, avid for novelty, promoting innovation. It invented ... the *tradition of the new* (Martinelli 7).

Therefore, Modernism is simultaneously distinct from, and part of, the whole process to which Modernity refers. That is why Lars Rensmann and Samir Gandesha define political Modernity as

“a constellation comprised of three major elements: the dynamics of modernization (modern social and political transformations and formations), the idea of Modernity (normative claims to autonomy, self-governance and non-domination) and modernism (the critical or self-reflexive, and aesthetic dimensions of political Modernity)” (Understanding Political Modernity 12).

This fact led to an understanding of Modernity as Janus-faced (see Alexander 148): a dark side responsible for a history of suppression, oppression, colonialism, wars, and inequality; and a bright, progressive, side – the modernist thought -- which could not realize itself in order to overcome its evil *doppelgänger*. In this fashion, modernism was regarded as “the self-consciousness of Modernity” (Bernstein 56), as if the problem with Modernity were of a dissociative identity disorder, as if Modernity were a Doctor Jekyll, who is supposed to be the *healer*, but sometimes mistakenly turns into an evil Mr. Hyde. In this way, the solution will be a psychiatric treatment with more doses of “rational” modernism without any need to a change in nature, i.e. the Habermasian idea of Modernity as “an incomplete project.”

However, this conception of modernist critique is rooted in a linear conception of time deemed to be naturally progressive. Modernity has been conceptualized as the *new* society, particularly because *time* was hypostatized by Enlightenment philosophy; particularly by the German Idealists. During the 18th century, views about time and consequently history underwent a major conceptual shift. Inspired by Newtonian physics, Kant liberated time from space and movement, and turned it into an autonomous axis of existence. Hence the significance of, for Deleuze, Hamlet’s lamentation that “time is out of joint;”, a formulation that Deleuze takes up in order to re-formulate Kant’s understanding of the nature of time. However, it would be Hegel who synthesized the linearity of time with the “movement of History;” a synthesis, says Hegel, that the notion that History indeed has a logic (linear progressive development) and thus can be said to be rational. Therefore, the German word for Modernity, “*Neuzeit*”, could refer simultaneously to two issues: first, this is the new time of human societies, a new era; and second, the time itself is renewed in human understanding. Ultimately, says Martinelli, it was due to these ontological and epistemological breaks made by German Idealism that post-Enlightenment thought would move “toward a conception of modernity with the idea of *progress* at its core” (Martinelli 7). On the one hand, in a more concrete basis, Enlightenment established the “fundamental

identification of the modern with the *here and now*”, and “from then on *modern society is our society*” (Martinelli 6) — such reformulations of time reveal the reasons for the internal tension inside Modernity. On the other hand, this attitude toward *the new* has been identified with an attitude toward the status quo of a very particular certain kind of society, *their society*.

Like Modernity, however, modernism does not refer to a homogenous branch of thought. As a modernist thinker, for example, Adorno criticized the conception of linear time of capitalist progress, and its proper “sensations” of excess, speed, violence, and war. For Adorno, on the one hand, the modernist style of Baudelaire, Poe, and Wagner or of Futurist art was not different in nature from the aesthetic trends valorized by German Fascism, which he calls “the absolute sensation” (Minima Moralia 237). On the other hand, the seemingly more progressive modernist art, such as the modernist theatre of Brecht, was also according to Adorno unable to become politically radical, since “the illustration of late capitalism by images from the agrarian or criminal registers does not permit the monstrosity of modern society to emerge in full clarity from the complex phenomena making it” (ibid 144). Avoiding any “identification of the non-identical” (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 29) as a compromise, the obsessive negative dialectics of Adorno was itself the anti-modern modernist critique par excellence.

In the following, therefore, some instances of anti-modern modernist critique and their possible passage to an altermodern perspective will be discussed.

2-1-2-1 Anti-Modern critique of the Nation-State: the ambiguity of the Minoritarian

As it was commented on before, the political form proper to Modernity is the “nation-State.” The modernization process, through which many colonial territories and “outdated” sovereignties entered the global scene of official politics, consists of forming a State representing its nation as a Whole.

Although it is no more the center of power in the age of control societies, the nation-State still remains valid as the “natural” form of organization and one of the most important institutions of the globalized network of (post)modern power relations.

Particularly after 9/11, the imposed global framework for progress, the economic, political principles called “Washington Consensus”¹³, presents itself in the form of a binary, both of them refers to an identity-based State-politics: Bush or Bin Laden. This political dead-end of globalized capitalism offers the nation-State as the only political form proper to our contemporary world, and merely its form of content – either being a theocratic authoritarian one or a neo-liberal parliamentarian and representative one – could be a matter of preference. The nation-State is necessary for the functioning of globally integrated capitalism, flowing of capital, and the control over produced wealth.

Because of its authoritarian, hierarchical, centralized, and exclusive nature, the State form has been subjected to countless critiques in the history of critical philosophy. Without bringing these already clear shortcomings onto table again, one should remember that in particular, the State functions as a means for imposing policies proper to economic modernization, protecting the private property, and “pacification of a territory via the ‘monopoly of legitimate violence’” (Martinelli 15) in order to absorb more foreign investments in the modernization process of post-colonial countries.

The newest kind of this post-colonial State-making process is the so-called “Islamic State” (originally known as the Jihadi group “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant”); it is indeed the most recent (self-)declared State in the world. The declaration of the Caliphate, the performative action of saying “I am the Caliph” by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and of expressing allegiance (*Bey’at*, بيعت) by the “subjects” in Mosul’s Grand Mosque, 5 July 2014, was the last stage of symbolically establishing a State. The rest will be a period of war, of absence of “Politics”. For the politics is always on the opposite side, always *a people’s* politics; a collective act of self-organizing difference and *dissensus* in an egalitarian, non-hierarchical way.

The Arabic word for State, *Dowla* (دولة), is etymologically tied to the word for glory; and glory, according to Giorgio Agamben’s discussion on the secularized Christian theological grounds of

¹³ This term is invented by John Williamson, an international economist, in the same year with the Fall of Berlin Wall in 1990, referring to “10 policy instruments about whose proper deployment Washington can muster a reasonable degree of consensus **Invalid source specified**.”

the modern Western sovereignty-governmentality, is the empty locus of mediation between the transcendent Sovereign Power and the immanent governmentality's technics, the divine and the material (see *The Kingdom and the Glory*). This is why Islam is merely an *adjective of the noun*, a refined political form of content for a classically universal form of expression which we have called it for a long time *the State*.

And what is more is that this State has been put into existence in a region marked by Sykes-Picot colonial agreement, with a Caliban sleeping on its soil. Thus it seems that the Shakespearean drama is playing itself out once more: the monster, which has been wanted tamed, trained, or organized properly, is already subjected to a "turned-into-Master" slave authority, only in order to finally find the "true" civilized (Western) former Master better than the other one. In other words, ISIL is not a radical political group, but has been feeding – like a parasite – on collective bodies of resistance and struggle in that region. Or, as Jonas Staal formulates the situation via an analysis of ISIL's performative strategies:

On [the] one hand, the Islamic State explicitly opposes the colonial borders of Iraq, and thus forces into public consciousness the history of foreign occupation, military intervention, and extralegal prisons that created the conditions for and in some ways legitimacy of the organization. On the other, the Islamic State also functions...as the unlimited patriarchal construct of the total state in the form of the ever-expanding caliphate. The performative gestures of Islamic State fighters publicly destroying their passports and thus allowing no administrative way back, as can be seen in their latest film *The Clashing of the Swords IV*, actually oppose statelessness and commit to one absolute and total state (*To Make a World, Part I*).

Just like the so-called Islamic State tries to make *Umma* (أمة) its nation¹⁴, each State couples with its nation. By definition, the nation is characterized by a homogenous identity. Thus, when Modernity comes into an actual territory, a process of homogenizing is undertaken for the sake of constructing a "people;" a process that has as one of its main consequences the exclusion of some groups from the *national identity* that is in the process of its realization. To continue with the example, one should note that in its pre-modern history, Umma was never a nation. Instead,

¹⁴ This discussion will be developed further in chapter three, in the section about nationalism and national collective bodies.

Umma, a traditional name referring to the world-wide community of Muslims, was a heterogeneous whole subordinated to the transcendent point of the Caliph's (sovereign's) authority. To become a nation, it could not remain the same. It must be secularized as the divine glory been in the Dowla. In this case, a particular Islamic identity has been coined for *national identity*, which means excluding numerous fractions of Muslims from the nation. Thus, ISIL must be understood as promoting a very particular kind of Sunni Islam, excluding all other branches, including various branches of Shiism, mystical Islam, and so forth.

As a term, State comes from Pre-Indo-European root "sta-", similar to Persian "-stan" (*country*), referring to what stands, what *is*. Additionally, the Ancient Greek term "stasis" means *to be at a stand still*. So, rather than existing as a permanent entity, this stasis of the State refers to an interruption of the movement, of the *kinesîs*. Unlike *stasis*, it is the Ancient Greek term *kinesîs* that signifies permanency, (but again as a term it has a derivation of its own that helps us in furthering the conceptualization: *tasis* which means tension, intensity, force, and antagonism, *extending the sound of an utterance for the pleasure of saying or hearing it*. In this etymological theatre of words, one could say that what has a permanent role, the one that permanently endures, is not the State (the standstill constituted Power), but paradoxically the movement and its tension (the *constituent* power), the pleasurable self-utterance of a people that sometimes halts with the loud State's "clariounes, that in bataille blowen bloody sounes" (Chaucer, The Knight's Tale): and the *bataille* is the State's civil war against the people. Hence the Foucauldian motto: "where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, The History of Sexuality 95)). Thus, insofar as a constituted Power continues to exert itself, there is always a resistance against the homogenization of *national* identity and is perpetually striving to move beyond the State's regime of constituted power. "There is no social system that does not leak from all directions, even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 204).

Even in the capital of the most brutal existing State, Raqqa, graffiti painters are risking their life to write slogans against ISIL on the walls. And not unlike the “Standing Man” of Taksim Square¹⁵, Suad Nofel made her “one-woman rally” protest every single day for three month in front of ISIL headquarters in Raqqa, holding a sign with these words: “No for oppression, no for unjust rulers, no for atonement, and yes for thinking!” (Taleb).

These leakages, or *lines of flights*, can nevertheless lead to two different politics: anti-modern identity politics, or alter-modern non-identity politics;+ both of which have been ascribed confusingly to the *minorities* of their territories. And minority politics – whether identity-oriented or not – is considered then as an emancipatory politics in political discourses, which are critical of modern States. Nonetheless, a certain perspective of minority would be able to differentiate between these two politics.

If minority is considered merely as a people, who is excluded or has a different mother tongue, religion, sexuality, or ideological tendency in relation to the *majority*, then such a definition would not bestow an inherent emancipatory signification to minority. According to such a definition, racist, purist, or other right-wing radicals are minorities, causing disastrous scandals from time to time. Thus, such a definition of minority is merely a *quantitative* one, purely *extensive*, and not related to the political; rather, it acts against the introduction of the new.

The quantitative approach leads to the confusion between minority and identity, and consequently to a categorization of minorities according to their supposed identities. For example in the case of Iran, a Kurdish identity exists which has separate, sometimes conflictual interests in comparison with the Balochi identity, homosexual identity, Sunnis identity, leftist identity, and so forth. A politics based on such categorization will then take the form of a demand-oriented one, which has been differentiated from the contemporary performative politics of dissent mentioned above.

Identity means to be identical after all, and thus, making politics out of Kurdish identity means covering numerous antagonisms and differences which exist between those who are called

¹⁵ A contemporary dance practitioner who, by just standing in the middle of a square, made one of the most famous scenes of Occupy Gezi protests. We shall return to this performative act later in the research.

“Kurdish”, in order to construct a homogenous whole. And yet, there is no such a thing as One Nation, for every so-called nation is a heterogeneous whole, consisting of different identities. To construct a homogenous whole, however, countless procedures of nation-building and Statecraft, which operate via exclusion in diverse and violent forms – from genocide to forced displacement, sterilization, mass detention, criminalization, devilization, and so on.

Just as we have seen regarding the Hegelian dialectic of the self and the other (as two separate identities), the political relationship between two identities, one majoritarian and the other minoritarian, considering minority as a *different* identity, should be analyzed inside the realm of dialectics. The “identity politics”, which always claims to be of minority, is a political practice that can only be done when it recognizes the authority and is conditioned by a master-slave dialectical relationship. Therefore, any *other* social relation that an identity politic seeks to establish, instead of the really existing one, lives on a *reaction* to the Master, the already established Power of the central State, and is not “autonomous”. Thus, it is unlike the politics of the performative turn since it is not a politics of self-poietics. Kafka’s *Number Twenty-Nine* aphorism in his “The Zürau Aphorisms” (1991) dramatizes the same problem in a master-slave relationship:

The ulterior motives with which you absorb and assimilate Evil are not your own but those of Evil. The animal wrests the whip from its master and whips itself in order to become master, not knowing that this is only a fantasy produced by a new knot in the master's whiplash (22).

In our case, the evil is but the nation-State form, replete with its centralization of power, homogenization of national identity, and its hierarchical body.

Moreover, as long as the minoritarian identity is only negative, based on the mere negation of the Master, it reproduces the very relations it wants to destroy by its *reactionary* as opposed to autonomous response. In other words, just as the Master and slave are two sides of the same coin, so too are the minority and majority identities; just like the relation between the Jihadist’s hierarchically organized terrorist group and globally integrated capitalism. The former is the unworthy son of the latter and even though they “contradict” each other, their contradiction is in the paradigm of the same, since it defines itself through a lack of similarity: a *negative* as opposed to a pure difference.

Therefore, the relationship between the minority as identity and the central State is of a double subjugation: the minority as identity can only recognize itself when it affirms what it negates, i.e. the homogenizing authority; it is not only unable to turn its back on totalitarian sovereignty, but maintains an obsessive relationship with it. It is Kafka who again grasps this double, *oedipal*, subjugation best, when he writes in *Letter to My Father*:

...from the many occasions on which I had, according to your clearly expressed opinion, deserved a beating but was let off at the last moment by your grace, I again accumulated only a huge sense of guilt. On every side I was to blame, I was in your debt (The Sons 133).

Thus, it is not accidental that many identity political movements, including different nationalist anti-colonial movements, ended up in similar repressive, sometimes genocidal nation-States as – if not worse than – their colonial adversaries.

The idea of (minority as) identity politics, which has been shared by many conventional socialists, situates itself in a dialectical relationship which longs for the identification of the non-identical, for a return to the lost unity, to a *synthesis*. That is the reason why Adorno insists on a *negative* dialectics, a dialectics in which the main attempt is the non-identification of the identical and the non-identical. In other words, the tension between the poles of the contradiction should never resolve in a “higher” unity: “the whole is false” (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* 50). However, another approach to the notion of minority is possible; an approach which is non-identity-oriented, non-dialectical, and – far from recognizing a totalizing authority – autonomous.

2-1-2-2 Anti-Modern Critique of Progress

In a Modernity constituted by the “false promise” of the new, where “everything modern, because of its never-changing core, has scarcely aged than it takes on a look of the archaic” (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* 237), one can trace back the remains of the so-called pre-modernity which still subsists in the very core of Modernity itself.

Trying to do so, Deleuze follows a Nietzschean critique, arguing that even if God is dead, his place still remains intact; a place which has been conquered by “man” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 88,

165, 166). As God designates a historical name for the transcendent, so too does “man.” Therefore, if “pre-modern thought had grounded the truth, being and identity of the world on God” (Colebrook 28), then modernity has grounded them on individual subject by placing man on the throne of transcendence. However, as natural, not divine, laws apply to man, then its transcendence necessitates a belief in progress, in his evolution according to the dictates of the values of Modernity. It is for this reason that, “the critique of humanism maps on to a critique of progress and ‘the developmental discourse on race’” (Gilbert 49).

Just like the State apparatus proper to Modernity, the notion of capitalist progress is also widely criticized by modernist thinkers and artists in the 20th century. Such a critique is found, for instance, in Walter Benjamin’s dramatization of history’s progress in his *Theses on the Concept of History* (Benjamin, *On the Concept of History* 392); a work whose most famous figure is none other than the “angel of history.” Crucially, Benjamin’s angel was a detournement of the one Paul Klee had depicted in his “Angelus Novus;” an angel looking backward and witnessing all the ruins of history as “one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage”, while the futural winds of Paradise propel him ever forward. “The storm,” writes Benjamin, “irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned” (ibid), since he wants to return to the past, wake the dead and lead them to salvation. But what is that storm which pushes him forward? The answer is: progress. Benjamin criticizes the idea of progress in many of his works. For him, progress is the ideological, and bourgeois, alternative for emancipation and history, and under its name, so many catastrophes has been piled up. The history of progress is the history of barbarism; a history, which leads “from the slingshot to the megaton bomb” (Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* 320). But why does the angel wants to go back? The history behind him, the history that repeats the catastrophe, is also a history with so many non-actualized potentialities. Only if all these potentialities would be actualized, the continuity of catastrophe and the course of the past as oppression would be brought to an end and usher in the salvation of humanity . These potentialities are called, in this research, as *trends of altermodernities*.

The Benjaminian bridge between the anti-modern modernist critique and the alter-modern creation has been made possible by his new conception of time. “A new time”, writes Massimo Cacciari, “is what the Angel incessantly looks for the *just* representation: present-instant,

interruption, arrest of the continuum, Jetzt-zeit. Every *Jetzt* can represent it.” (Cacciari 164) This new time is a time proper to altermodernities, whose realization through performative politics will be discussed in Chapter Four.

2-1-2-3 Modernity as a Power Relation

In an interview I conducted with the activist, urban theorist, and historian Mike Davis, we spoke about the way in which the large scale protests in Wisconsin as a show of resistance to the new *budget repair bill* drew inspiration from the spirit and form of the Occupy Al-Tahrir movement and through a connection to it; a collective affect that could go beyond an activist student direct action and become a popular protest, with a number as high as 100000 protestors. The people, says Davis, were shouting in the streets “Government Walker: Our Mubarak” while the others had occupied the State Capitol Building. And then on the TV screen, Americans watched placards in Al-Tahrir square, saying “Egypt Support Wisconsin Workers – One World, One Pain.” Davis concluded that largely broadcast Arab Spring showed the people in the West that democracy, which they long had thought it is their exclusive property, is much more present in Cairo streets than in their countries, that Arabs are not those cliché images in mainstream media, belonging to a region outside of progressive modernity. The seemingly “natural” link between modernity/modernism and the West was, therefore, challenged.

However, the non-Western and revolutionary avant-garde movements of Modernity, which inspired modernists in the West, have a long history such as and the October Revolution of 1917. Himself a modernist critical thinker of Modernity, Marx also presupposed the West and its industrialized capitalist countries as the origin of the modern against the East as a pre-modern despotic region. Engels even went so far that called Turkish people “barbarian” (Engels) and “been convicted of the most inveterate opposition to all progress”, arguing in defense of a British colonial aggression against possible Tsarist Russia’s rule on Turkish territory as an “interest of the revolutionary Democracy” (Engels), without voicing any reservation about the colonial dimension of this affair. Therefore, it is not surprising that their anti-modern modernist

revolution – they concluded firmly – would have happened in one of the *advanced* countries; particularly Germany, not in “backward” peasantry Russia.

Inventing the theory of “the weakest link of the chain” (Lenin, *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism* 27), even Lenin himself noted that the revolution should not have happened in Russia. It is interesting that Alain Badiou, while reflecting on the Al-Tahrir movement, revives again this old Leninist hypothesis, by identifying Middle Eastern Arab dictatorships, such as Mubarak, as the weakest link in the chain of globalized capitalism (Alain Badiou on Tunisia, Riots & Revolution), restoring the same self-colonizing division of modernist thought.

Not only the avant-garde manifestations of modern thought have appeared in the non-Western regions, but also the repressive, dark side of Modernity was embodied there in a time that challenges any geographical origin for Modernity. Foucault’s archeology and later genealogy of modern strategies of governmentality and of modern power-relations, for example, does not conceptualize their interconnected genesis in the West as well as the East; which Gayatri Spivak rightly identifies as Foucault’s “sanctioned ignorance” (*Can The Subaltern Speak?*). In particular, one can refer to the case of the Panopticon as Foucault’s main model for modern technics of governmentality in discipline societies. Foucault refers to the idea of a tall tower in the center of a prison that Jeremy Bentham had offered British government for penal reforms. But the Panopticon interestingly was not Jeremy Bentham’s own idea, coming from the historical context of already “advanced” Great Britain; instead, it was born in the East, in Tzarian Russia, by his brother Samuel (Werret). In a semi-colonial context and for the sake of English experts’ control over Russian peasants and unskilled shipbuilding workers, Samuel Bentham designed the Panopticon, and inspired Jeremy, who in his turn generalized the idea into a universal of Modernity.

The problematic view of Modernity as a system originated in the West has largely been taken for granted – as we saw in the case of Foucault – even in the critical discourses against the “authority” of westernized Modernity and the literature around modernism and different manifestations of the modernist critique. They have also fallen to the trap of presupposing a geographical origin for modernism, which is as always *the West*. That is why Terry Eagleton,

writing about the modernist style of James Joyce, notes that “one may claim that modernism ‘should have’ broken out in the world metropolis of Britain, but it did so instead in the stagnant backwaters of colonial Ireland”. (Eagleton 53)

Not surprisingly, the Western-oriented modernist critique was even present in the first 20th century’s revolutionary attempt to negate Modernity and its capitalism, i.e. *the October Revolution*. Outlining the strategies and tactics of social-democracy, Lenin argued that by correctly applying the principles of Marxism one is inevitably led to the conclusion that every society should undergo capitalist development, if it is based on commodity production and has economic contact with the “civilized capitalist nations”. He then continues to say that

in countries like Russia the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as from the insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is, therefore, most certainly interested in the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism (Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution 45).

According to these cases, modernity must not be regarded as a notion or order of things invented in a certain geographical region (the global North), and only then exported to the global South, which hosted its antithesis (traditionalism, or pre-modern thought). But what perspective, instead of a spatial geographic one, which has been proven to be at least problematic, should one consider to approach?

Criticizing the commonplace definitions of Modernity, Foucault suggested – though vaguely – a way to approach Modernity differently. “Rather than seeking to distinguish the ‘modern era’ from the ‘premodern’ or ‘postmodern’”, writes Foucault, “I think it would be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of ‘countermodernity.’” (What Is Enlightenment? 39) Attitude is here the key term, by which he means “a mode of relating to the contemporary reality” (ibid). But to understand and apply it, one should consider Foucault’s life-long engagement with the theory of power, the interaction of forces, and diagramming them in order to approach that “mode of relating” to reality. In other words, Modernity should be considered as a power-relation, a permanent interaction or “struggling” – as Foucault puts it – between modern attitudes and *countermodern*

attitudes: a virtual geography of forces and intensities, rather than a historical geography of borders and national territories.

Approaching Modernity from such a perspective, Hardt and Negri characterize it as a relation of power between a normative Eurocentric modern view and differing, and sometimes contradictory, anti-modern forces – a relation of power which is at work everywhere, with anti-modern forces emerging from inside as well as outside of the so-called West. If it is the case that “where there is power, there is resistance ...”, then the resistance against Modernity’s power has always been present. Thus anti-modernity is a force against Modernity, not of a pre-modern traditional attitude, and while it aims to negate Modernity, it still remains “inside” the modern power-relation. Strictly speaking, anti-modern force can only be defined through its negation of Modernity.

2-1-3 “Alter-”: The significance of the prefixes

The previous section discussed the Modernity’s power relation, i.e. the struggle between the modern and the anti-modern, through different instances of modernist critique against it. The use of prefixes before Modernity – anti and alter¹⁶ – comes from applying the Nietzschean

¹⁶ It can be argued that at least another prefix is important to be discussed regarding the critique of Modernity: “post-”. The post-modern critiques are considered here in the category of the anti-modern. The reason is post-modern critique, even in the form of post-colonial criticism, have been mostly engaged with the task of revealing the appearances of dominated ideologies and their repressive consequences: the Eurocentric discourses, the masculine normativity, critical Whiteness, and so forth. This act of criticism is highly necessary and immensely valuable, but it does not suffice (as we shall see later). In his notes on “Desire and Pleasure”, Deleuze writes that “I couldn’t agree with Michel [Foucault] more about an aspect I consider fundamental: neither ideology nor repression” (Desire and Pleasure 125). This statement does not mean that there is no longer ideology or repression. It claims that ideology is only an *assemblage* of power, among many other possible assemblages; and repression does not always explain the functioning of domination, so the analyst should consider the various assemblages of desire that can even, through fixation and reterritorialization on particularities, become fascist. Desire itself is another name for constituent power (???). This perspective makes way for an understanding of a possibility of creation in the face of obscurities of ideologies and highly repressive environment. It can explain the various forms of expression for resistance and struggle in the most disciplined and controlled spaces, which are usually considered deprived of the political (for example, the moments of creativity in Auschwitz itself, the desiring machines of North Korea, the everyday struggle of veiled women in the Middle East, and so on). In other words, going beyond the critique of ideology makes space for thinking the alternative positively, along with the endless denouncement of the

“dramatization” method on this concept, a typology of forces and a symptomology of their affects and affections¹⁷.

From this perspective, the prefix “anti-” does not only refer to traditionalist conservative thought, which longs for a return to a lost unity, but also to a range of critical thought that has sometimes been called “modernist”, and is mostly associated with a leftist critique. This research deals almost completely with the latter. The former type of anti-modern forces has been strictly rejected by the thinkers of the other type as both reactionary and destructive, which means it destroys to bring back the old order. As an anti-modern critic, for example, Adorno described them as the “anti-modern particularities and blind arbitrariness” (Rensmann and Gandesha 11), longing for the lost unity, purity, and conservative values such as race, blood and religion – as if they would remind him nothing but *Auschwitz*.

Therefore, anti- does not necessarily have negative value, although it refers to negations of modernity. Nevertheless, as the cases of modernist thought have shown in the previous sections, anti- itself divides to two subtypes.

The first one is an *Aufhebung* dialectics, seeks to negate Modernity as its anti-thesis, but only in order to bring about a synthesis. The first two meanings of the verb *aufheben*, to pick up and to cancel, are in need of “something” (accusative), which means something recognized should be canceled as it *is*, only in order to exist in another, higher level. When *Aufhebung* is understood in such terms – which is not always the case with all commentators –, its application in the field of modern politics leads to socialist politics (seizure of State power, and making another State with a *higher* content), social democratic politics (accepting the obligatory shortcomings and try to

re-appearances of white-male-heterosexual subjective discourses, of the main-stream media strategies, and of the Eurocentrist thought.

Therefore, although so many other scholars (including Foucault) have preferred to remind the autonomy of “the other” to the West under the title of the postmodern, the term postmodernism is not persuading enough for the start of this research. It is true that postmodernist discourses work with the heterogeneity and fragmentations, but the heterogeneity there is only captured by static images crystalized around established institutions of power (see Früchtl 2010). In other words, postmodernism is the extension of modernity to its margins, coming after expansion of national markets and older imperialist systems, by referring to the cultural aspects of such developments.

¹⁷ The methodology section of the Introduction will discuss this method.

reform with a *higher* content) or identity politics (in which the social relations are fed with the *higher* content of one's own identity). In none of those politics occurs a *difference in nature*, and as mentioned before, all are prone to new procedures of exclusion and homogenizing.

Benjamin's *Author as Producer* provides us with a critique of this modernist stance, by "indicating the decisive difference between merely transmitting the apparatus of production and transforming it" (4). To indicate this difference, he starts with changing the main question of materialist literary and art critique: instead of asking how an artwork stands "in relation to" (zu) the production relations of an epoch (Produktionsverhältnissen der Epoche), one must ask how an artwork stands "in/inside" (*in*) those relations. The question entails not an attention to the produced content (how "radical" and critical it may be) in the first place; rather, to the formal elements and the technics of their production, and whether they mark a break with pre-established established relations of production. Criticizing modernist-leftist movements of „Aktivismus“ (Activism) and „Die Neue Sachlichkeit“ (The New Objectivism) for relying on production of critical content in the same bourgeois production relations, he sees such modernists as "reproducer[s] of the apparatus of production" (8). They don't transform the existing apparatus, although they negate it in their stance *zu* dominant relations of production. They don't place themselves *in* these relations, rather "sublimate" themselves into a vanguard group outside of the *dirty world* and "sublate" it into a different world yet with same relations, same apparatuses of production – different but not *in nature*. In the case of Aktivismus, this world is of an addendum of spirituality on capitalism.

A more sophisticated case of this subtype can be traced in Derrida's later work on the (quasi)concept of "The democracy to come" (*la démocratie à venir*). For Derrida, democracy is essentially self-destructive. Democracy, *the rule of people*, consists of demo- (demos or people) and -cracy, meaning rule and coming from arche, a word that Derrida extracts its authoritarian implications in *Archive Fever*; therefore, for it to be a rule, demo-cracry needs to rely on a form of authority, or sovereignty. A democracy without sovereignty, according to Derrida, is non-existent. Moreover, democracy includes another self-contradiction by claiming both freedom and equality as its characteristics. For, according to Derrida, freedom of the individual, i.e. the possibility of being *singular*, is limited by a desire to equality, or to be *the same*. What follows

then is that democracy is never achieved and we can only progressively go toward closest possible forms to it (see Derrida).

Derrida's later political perspective on democracy, though it criticizes modern sovereignty, presupposes all pillars of Modernity without challenging them. By rejecting any potentiality of non-authoritarian self-sovereignty of a people, he recognizes the modern hierarchical, organic organization of people as "nation" as the sole, natural possible form of organization. By confusing the individual and the singular, he reasserts the Enlightenment's individualist freedom, that is *the freedom of homo economicus*. And by identifying equality with being the same, he recognizes the primacy of similarity, turning difference into a lack of sameness, and renouncing the potentiality of being equal *and* different. Benjamin's critique then applies also to the way in which the later Derrida theorizes democracy.

The second subtype of modernist thought, in contrast with the *Aufhebung* dialectics, is of a *negative dialectics*. As mentioned earlier, negative dialectics avoids any "identification of the non-identical" (Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* 29) as a compromise. It does not subl(im)ate the tension, the real antagonism of reality; rather, it keeps the antagonisms revealed and exposed, intensifying them, while it does not again let any ideology cover it, or any "false whole", unity or seemingly homogenous identity hide it. Confronting with dualities that have the identical on both sides, negative dialectics does not have recourse to a synthesis; it is the non-identification of the non-identical. For "velleity binds the new to the ever-same, and this established the inner communication of the modern and myth. The new wants nonidentity, yet intention reduces it to identity; modern art constantly works at the Munchhausen trick of carrying out the identification of the nonidentical (Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* 29).

For Adorno, in the case of modernist art, the new of the modern is "only a longing for the new" (Bernstein 57). This desire to create the new, while "each and every artwork works back on society as the model of a possible praxis in which something on the order of a collective subject is constituted" (Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* 350) turns art into a "placeholder for an absent collective praxis".

Then, is it really an incurable pessimism, already accepted the fate of “an eternal recurrence of damnation” (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* 236), of a permanent despair without remedy? “The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair”, writes Adorno, “is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption” (ibid 247) – an echo of Walter Benjamin’s “organization of pessimism”, his “pessimism all along the line”, but not only to negate the order of the day and destroy its “image-sphere”, but also simultaneously to contribute to the production of a new alternative profane “image space” (*Surrealism* 216-17).

There is, therefore, a creation at work. As Holloway says, “non-identity can only be a force that changes itself, that drives beyond itself, that creates and creates itself” (Holloway 14). Here creation refers to an impossible production, a miraculous one, since the production is not a synthesis, a re-production; nor is it the old under the guise of the new. It does not happen in the existing relations of work, rather it is a product of the “non-work”, of being’s *desoeuvrement* (worklessness or lack of work), a creativity without subject’s control (Blanchot, *The Space of Literature* 35, 46). It is a production under alternative inoperative relations, a production of a *miraculating-machine* (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 11).

The flash-like crossings through various thinkers with different – sometimes antagonistic – theories in the previous paragraph, point together to a potential “leap” from pure negativity of anti-modern modernist critique to a beyond of Modernity’s power-relation; in other words, it marks an alternative power-relation, an *alter-modern* one.

The aforementioned leap is perhaps best captured in Blanchot’s May 68 pamphlet, *disorderly words* (1995). Talking about the “most powerful characteristic” of the May 68 movement, he proclaims that the refusal of this *radically affirmed* break with existing powers, “without ceasing to be active refusal, does not remain a *purely negative moment*” and “goes way beyond simple negativity”, since “it is the negation even of what has not yet been advanced and affirmed” (200-01).

How could a “purely negative moment” negate what is yet to come as a constituted Power of another State, if it did not maintain itself through a leap toward a positive force, a constituent

power, i.e. a *becoming* simultaneously constituent of beings and also destroying them? Holloway is right in claiming that the restless Adornian non-identity *creates*, but only if it performs the leap toward *the affirmative*.

The affirmative here is not of a solid, permanent being, like something with the *stasis* of a State. On the contrary, it is in constant mutation, a plastic chaotic field of immanent forces that founds the Nietzschean ontology, or better, *ontogenesis*. For the aforementioned leap is also the leap from Nihilism to the love of life, that is dramatized in the figure of “the man who wants to die” (Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life* 81).

The man who wants to die is a figure of negativity in the last stage of Nihilism that even negates negativity itself. By declaring that “better a nothingness of the will than a will of nothingness”, this figure performs a rupture from the destructive will to nothingness, only in order to destroy the negativity and makes space for the *new* affirmative; for a will to the nothingness of the will of nothingness turns against itself, making possible the leap from the *last man* to the beyond of mere repetition of the old. “And at this moment of the completion of nihilism (midnight), everything is ready – ready for a transmutation” (ibid). Hence, the introduction of the alternative.

The significance of the prefix before Modernity, i.e. the difference between anti- and alter-, can be traced back in the first global cycle of performative politics mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. However, to grasp this importance, there should be a quick reconsideration of the image mass media had been feeding the world in first years of 21st century, by defining this movement as *anti-globalization*. A movement so globally diffused, consisting of activists from Indian farmers, landless Brazilian and Iranian exiles to American anti-racists and West European performers and artists, is not against at least a certain meaning of globalization. It is true that this movement has been against the unequal globalization led by the so-called Global North corporations and nation-States and instructed through seemingly international organizations such as WTO and IMF, both infamous because of their imposed structural re-adjustments on poor countries, supporting post-coup d'état dictatorships and their neoliberal imposed policies, and so on. But it's also true that the world-view of those performative political heterogeneous

movements could be summarized in this Zapatista slogan: “a world in which many worlds fit” (Conant).

In fact, their proposals focus on alternative but equally global relationships of trade, cultural exchange, and political process—and the movements themselves constructed global networks. The name they proposed for themselves, then, rather than “antiglobalization,” was “alterglobalization” (or *altermondialiste*, as is common in France). The terminological shift suggests a diagonal line that escapes the confining play of opposites—globalization and antiglobalization— and shifts the emphasis from resistance to alternative (Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth* 102).

The ontological basis of this politics, as explained, could be summarized as “negation is not enough; creation is necessary.” However, the alterglobalization movement was widely stigmatized, particularly after “N30” in *Seattle* (November 30, 1999), as an anti-modern destructive fantasy of non-mature youth; those cynical and over-excited dreamers who do not know what they are doing. The ageist accusation is not much different from what Adorno recalls in a dramatic scene of *Minima Moralia*, when his first composition teacher, confronted by *Adorno’s modernity*¹⁸, advised him that “the ultra-modern” is not modern and “the new youth had, as he liked to put it, more red blood-corpuscles” (218). Even the traditional left, baffled with the new forms of protests, could not notice the break entailed in the contemporary performative politics.

Considering the Autonomist shift of Marxist thought in Italy’s 60s and 70s, there is another way to understand the shift from antimodernity to altermodernity. Italy was the only country in which the May 68 movement could extend itself (Hardt, *Laboratory Italy* 6), not only in order to negate the then-established powers, but also to become “the negation even of what has not yet been advanced”. Militant-researchers in groups such as “Potere Operaio” (*worker’s power*) and “Autonomia Operaia Organizzata” (*Organised Workers’ Autonomy*), among whom Mario Tronti and Antonio Negri became the main figures, conceptualized a reversal of Marxist political perspective through the autonomy of the non-identical. According to them, the course of

¹⁸ Adorno indeed writes “my modernity”, when referring to this incident.

capitalist development has not been a capitalist progressive force, or the result of its positive initiative. On the contrary, the establishment of capitalist system and its progress could only be made possible through the *capture* of the constituent power of dissent.

Thus, for these Italian militant-researchers, the principle element of political determination is to be found in the collective force of resistance and struggle, which causes the reaction from the side of capital. From this perspective, Fordism as the abstract management of labour was a reaction to the revolutionary movements of the 1910s the capture of its revolutionary spirit in order to assimilate it within the already existing constructions: the process of recuperation.

Recuperation processes of Modernity and its capitalism does not prove the nonexistence of altermodernities, but it shows the temporary characteristic of emerging alter-modernities. “By reopening the question of recuperation”, writes Stephen Shukaitis, “the inevitable drive to integrate the power of social insurgency back into the workings of capital and the state, we create possibilities for exploring a politics continually reconstituted against and through the dynamics of recuperation, to keep open an antagonism without closure that is continually composed and recomposed” (10). In other words, as the Blanchotian affirmative refusal becomes itself an “institution of power” (Disorderly Words 200), once the passage from the instituent to the instituted is completed. And in this instance one is confronted with another form of the modern rather than *an alter-modern*.

That said, it may seem easy to negatively characterize the alter-modernities, barring what cannot function as altermodernities. For example, the so-called multiple modernities, such as Iranian Modernity or Chinese Modernity, each of them theorized by local intellectuals or western scholars, do not represent altermodernities. Contrastingly, they often offer unfortunate models for a combination of anti-modern peculiarities hostile to any modern humanist values (such as freedom of expression, legal equality, liberal women’s and minorities’ rights) *and* modern capitalist political and economic forms and a modern ambition for progress. As Slavoj Žižek points out, the contemporary capitalist ideology of free market is like an empty form that can absorb any content and that is why the dictatorships in East and SouthEast Asia, for example, are so

efficiently functioning in economic modernization and global market (Zizek, Capitalism with Asian values).

To continue the discussion on minoritarian politics, one could characterize it in the same track, as an aspect of alter-modernities. Various armed (and unarmed) organizations which fight under the name of minorities' cause, according to our analysis of constituted versus constituent power, do not have any difference *in nature* with the centralized government they are fighting with. The same State-form, with a highly hierarchical collective body, a vertical organization of power, and strict demand of obedience make them *the new knot the master's whiplash*. Functioning as a specialized vanguard group outside of their own people in general, they must even keep their distance from the rest of the population to be able to claim a kind of representation. Of course, differences *in degree* exist for the worse: in case of some groups such as Jeisho-al-Adl (the Army of Justice) which supposedly fights on behalf of the Balochi minority in Iran, the strategies of control and discipline are much more violent, and the gender inequality and exclusion of sexual minorities is far crueller than the central governments. These are, nevertheless, the differences already trapped in the paradigm of the same. They cannot create any alternative relation but can only reproduce the modern centralization of power with a touch of resentful anti-modern peculiarities. Therefore their relation to a central government becomes an oedipal one, like what Kafka described in the aforementioned piece of his letter to the father.

Thus, negatively defining a minority politics is always a non-identical one: minority never assumes an identity. Minority is not only uncountable by the constituted Power, it also disrupts the already established relations, and more importantly, it creates a language of its own in constant variation; a new form of expression and an alternative way of organizing the collective bodies, or in sum, a life proper to its permanent movement. For this very reason, "being-minority" is not the issue at stake, for there is no minority as a solid Being. The problem is "becoming-minoritarian": a process under which all identities are avoided, and performative experimentations for reaching an alternative "being-together" are conducted. When the protestors were shouting, "We are all German Jews", "We are all undesirables" in May 68 (Knabb), they were not claiming an identity for themselves, rather they were affirming minority as a movement beyond any notion of the identical.

In addition, what has been theorized by Nicolas Bourriaud as *altermodern* does not signify the aforementioned implications of its name's prefix. As a well-known curator who forged the term "relational aesthetics", Bourriaud curated the Tate Triennial 2009 with the title "Altermodern". But the exhibition, its manifesto, and the subsequent publications by Bourriaud reveal that his understanding of alter-modern is not different from some branches of (post)modernist critique, and still subjected to the power relations constitutive of Modernity. Bourriaud insists that *his* altermodern is *modernism reloaded*, but a modernism which is "post-colonial" (Momus). It is evident that such a definition presupposes a good value for the adjective "post-colonial", but is post-colonial really a good term in itself? The activities of multinationals as well as IMF and WTO in the countries of the global South exhibit another colonialism empowered by outsourcing cheap labour, imposing restructuring programs, and extracting resources with huge environmental costs. As Aniket Jaaware warns, there is a "risk in the concept of post-coloniality" which is "in its use" (509) as a name for a period in that colonialism is dead and wholly in the past. There is a post-colonial coloniality or a colonial post-coloniality. In one of the recent examples of such a situation, 40,000 Masai pastoralists have to leave their traditional lands, because a safari company based in Dubai is going to buy the land and turn it into a "reserve for the royal family of Dubai to hunt big game" (D. Smith). On the other hand, Hito Steyerl argues how contemporary art is an accomplice in this postcolonial colonialism:

What is the function of art within disaster capitalism? Contemporary art feeds on the crumbs of a massive and widespread redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich, conducted by means of an ongoing class struggle from above. It lends primordial accumulation a whiff of postconceptual razzmatazz. Additionally, its reach has grown much more decentralized -- important hubs of art are no longer only located in the Western metropolis (Steyerl, *Politics of Art: Contemporary Art and the Transition to Post-democracy*).

Isn't the last sentence, "its reach has grown much more decentralized -- important hubs of art are no longer only located in the Western metropolis", the core idea of altermodernism in Bourriaud's optimistic – if not compromising – account?

On the other hand, Bourriaud relates alter-modernity to "a globalized state of culture" which is emerging now. This single phrase incorporates a number of problems. First of all, what is culture?

There is no need to point to all critical theories criticizing the concept of culture as a tool for maintaining the established hierarchies, pre-defined places for different social positions, etc. At least, one can ask whose culture? In addition, alter-modernity is never *an* altermodernity, *a* globalized cultural hegemony (even if it has so many heterogonous elements inside as *a* state of culture). Heterogeneous, creative and non-representational, alter-modernity is a singularity. As Jean-Luc Nancy writes in *Being Singular Plural*, “the singular is primarily *each* one and, therefore, also *with* and *among* all the others, the singular is a plural” (32), and exactly like the singular which has always been referred to as *singuli* (the plural form), there’s no “One and the Same Alter-modernity”. Instead there are only alter-modernities, forming the network of being “with and among all the others”.

This means artworks should be studied in a network comprising at least two levels of analysis: in their local contexts as well as global context, while Bourriaud easily rejects the idea of locality (as post-modern bric-a-brac) in favor of a globalized state he claims multiple, heterogenous and not western (Bourriaud, *Altermodern: Tate Triennial 20*). As he writes:

If twentieth century modernism was a purely western cultural phenomenon ... today there remains the task of ... inventive modes of thought and artistic practices that would be directly informed by Africa, Latin America or Asia (Bourriaud, *The Radicant* 17).

In front of this generous statement, one could ask what is the difference when an established European curator calls for this? Wasn't the modernist movement of cubism, for example, “directly” informed by African art, an artistic tradition which was imported by colonialism to France and other Western countries? Isn't today's curatorship importing African art by its post-colonial colonialism and make western art directly informed by it? Why are most artists in an alter-modern exhibition western, or western oriented, and some works presented are similar to those travelogues or itineraries written by colonial literary figures, only this time in visual art mediums?¹⁹

¹⁹ Darren Almond, for example, presented a set of long-exposure photographs of moonlit landscapes. A critic who saw these photos wrote the following in his review: “it was only by reading about Almond that I discovered that he

But a negative elimination method or a proof by contradiction cannot present the functioning and affirmative characteristics of alter-modernities, or does not grasp the performative experimentations of minority politics. On the other hand, there is no single established alter-modernity so that one can study it objectively and positively, and extract its features. The alter-modernities emerge during their being performed, their process of performativizations, much more like a flash of lightning. The only way to grasp them is to enter into their dynamics, to analyze their performativity, and to approach the bodies that together make it possible.

2-2 A Discussion on the Methodology

“Occupying a motorway is no easy business”, wrote Charlie Fourier (a pseudo name for a member of Reclaim the Street [RTS]), “We’ve been planning this for about five months. Everything has been looked at in detail” (Fourier 51). He describes a RTS protest against the newly introduced neoliberal policies in July 1996 in London. After several months of planning, and undergoing a number of unanticipated accidents during the night of the action, RTS could set up a street party on a motorway in London, with a truck full of sand (for a children’s playground), a truck equipped with a sound system, and an unassembled 40 foot tower for dancing (ibid 53). In another event, two cars in a shopping street seemingly had an accident and their drivers got out and started to argue. After a short time, one of the drivers attacked the other’s car by a hammer, while the people/consumers on the sidewalk stood by and watched. All of a sudden, a few persons among the crowd joined the driver, spraying different colors on the cars and streets, while more than 500 people joined the party with music and dance to *reclaim the street* (ibid 62).

In the early 1990s, a new road construction program started in the UK and caused “a series of protest camps in remote landscapes, whose forms of action sometimes seemed strange to outsiders: someone showed up, furnished a treehouse and thus claimed ‘squatter’s rights’; people dug tunnels under the construction sites, chained themselves to cement blocks and

had traveled the world to take his pictures from places of ‘economic, historical and ecological significance’. There was no economic, historical or ecological significance evident in his pictures” **Invalid source specified.**

waited to be evicted” (Hamm). Of course, the protests could not stop *the apparatus of capture*²⁰ which was reappropriating the common space for the sake of State programs, but they did start a processual form of performative politics.

Not much later, this infrastructure project, which began outside of the capital came to London, as did the protests . What happened was “a months-long permanent performance in constantly occupied Claremont Road. Art objects were installed and rearranged as barricades as needed. Sofas, chairs and various other things found in living rooms were brought from private interior space to the public sphere of the street” (Jordan 137). Alongside this squatting act, a network of rave parties emerged in margins of the city and took to the streets to joyfully oppose the new neoliberal policies acting on public space. Reclaim the Street inherited this strategy of road protests and rave parties in which activists usually create an “ temporary autonomous zone” (TAZ) and keep it for as long as they can. In the level of strategy, this was the performativization of Hakim Bey’s idea of TAZ and Poetic Terrorism (PT). According to Bey, “PT is an act in a Theater of Cruelty which has no stage, no rows of seats, no tickets & no walls. In order to work at all, PT must categorically be divorced from all conventional structures for art consumption (galleries, publications, media)” (Bey 3). The idea was principally to create a TAZ in which bodies collide, act sovereignly, and would be able to establish their own alternative relations, rather than submit to everyday capitalist relations.

In 1994, the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) was introduced in the UK according to which rave parties became illegal. This was a moment in which RTS formed consistently and activists reunited against the implementation of this law. According to one of them, it was even helpful to give them more strength and autonomy (Hamm). Reclaim the Street began forcefully as a project of reclaiming the common after CJA. At a typical RTS event, a street would be reclaimed and occupied for a couple of hours wherein people would organize and host a party. In their agit-prop, they asked: “Won’t the streets be better without cars? Not if all that replaces them are aisles of pedestrianized consumption or shopping ‘villages’ safely protected from the elements...The struggle for car-free space must not be separated from the struggle against global

²⁰ The term “apparatus of capture” has been theorized in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (424-74).

capitalism” (qtd. in Jordan 140). Connecting their struggle to the bigger yet to come movement of alterglobalization, they continued to assert:

We are basically about taking back public space from the enclosed private arena. At its simplest, it is an attack on cars as a principal agent of enclosure. It’s about reclaiming the streets as public inclusive space from the private exclusive use of the car. But we believe in this as a broader principle, taking back those things, which have been enclosed within capitalist circulation and returning them to collective use as a common. (ibid).

The creativity of RTS was contagious and spread among activists across the globe. RTS’ strategy had a constant presence on every Global Action Day, since it introduced play, joy and pleasure as well as dancing and performing into the new forms of resistance from the very beginning. In Birmingham, UK, the first Global Action Day in 1998, where the G8²¹ held a meeting, “75,000 Jubilee 2000 anti-debt campaigners make a human chain around the summit, and a Reclaim the Streets party blocks the town center with 6,000 people, many dressed as clowns” (Notes from Nowhere 2003, 134).

RTS related itself to the dreams of the Diggers in 17th century England: the era of the embryonic bourgeois State. Diggers were fighting against the primitive accumulation through which the common lands were appropriated by the state and turned into so-called public property. The fenced lands, i.e. enclosures, became full of sheep as the sign of private property and closed off common land from the vast majority of people. As stated in the agit-prop of RTS, streets are today, they believe, the enclosed spaces.

What was ‘the commons of the city’ in a mythic past, commonly utilizable space for discussions and exchange within a social community, has been removed from this use today. Whereas in the past it was sheep that led to the privatization of land, today it is cars that take urban public space away from use by the inhabitants (Hamm).

²¹ The Group of Eight (G8) was a forum consisting of the first seven wealthiest, most industrialized nation-States of the world (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Canada, Japan) *and* Russia. After the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine and its subsequent civil war, Russia was excluded from the forum, and it is now again, like before 1998, the G7. G8-1 symbolizes the head of a global body, undergoing the globalization operation for a more “healthy” functioning of its economic metabolism.

While it represented a rupture from previous forms of struggle and protest, RTS performativized a conception of the common out of a real problematic field that was from the beginning in the foundation of modern nation-states: the duality of the private and the public. The common as a concept exists in various texts of political philosophy, from the early modern philosophers who conceptualized it as the Divine natural given for all human-beings to modernist advocates of a non-institutionalized communism and contemporary theorists of post-autonomist Marxism who formalized common property as the produced wealth that belongs to “all” human being, in contrast to private property as the property of the non-governmental entities and to public property as the property of the State, exclusive for its own recognized citizens. Yet, outside of its textual crystallization, the common is here performativized as a societal relation, as a singular mixture of concept, percept, and affect, of art, politics, and thought.

The following section deals with the notion of performativization as the methodological viewpoint of the present research, but it starts with a discussion over dramatization and the necessary reformulation of this method.

2-2-1 Dramatization

Dramatization as a critical method is Nietzsche’s invention. In *The Birth of Tragedy* (1999), Nietzsche founded this method through his discussions on Greek tragedy, and later developed it in his other works. The persistent existence of dramatization as a method in Nietzsche’s thought could enable Deleuze to claim that it was indeed, contrary to the prevalent commentaries on it, a systematic and coherent form of Thought (Nietzsche and Philosophy 52). Deleuze adds that dramatization is the “only method adequate to Nietzsche's project and to the form of the questions that he puts” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 79).

It is often believed that Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* establishes a duality between Apollo (the world of reason and representation) and Dionysus (the chaosmos of sensation) in order to explain the supremacy of Greek tragedy and Greek culture, as a result of being in a perfect equilibrium between these two poles. Even if this claim could be true for this particular work,

Nietzsche's later works and his theory of forces would suggest a different way of reading his conception of drama, and then dramatization.

Trying to define the dramatist (*the one who dramatize*), Nietzsche relates the "aesthetic phenomenon" of becoming artist to the transformative power of a collective field of affects and affections, to a *life* among "crowds of spirits"; and thus, the dramatist is the one who "feels the impulse to transform oneself and to speak out of other bodies and souls" (The birth of tragedy and other writings 43). The Dramatist is therefore a singularity of a multiple (one inside a crowd of bodies and souls), which is itself a multiplicity (*speaks out of other bodies and souls*). That is why for Nietzsche there exists something as *the original* phenomenon of drama, which is the experience of seeing oneself transformed before one's eyes and acting as if one had really entered another body, another character (ibid).

But how does this singularity form itself, or how does a process of dramatization happen? It is here that Nietzsche implements his duality between Apollo and Dionysus, as if dramatization is a process of transformation, or rather formation, coming from the Dionysian pole to the Apollonian one, and as a result, a represented form of the Dionysian impulse becomes visible through images on the stage.

In his transformed state he [the Dionysiac enthusiast] sees a new vision outside himself which is the Apolline perfection of his state. With this new vision the drama is complete. This insight leads us to understand Greek tragedy as a Dionysian chorus which discharges itself over and over again in an Apolline world of images (ibid 44).

What is the Dionysian that transforms itself into the Apollonian? The latter, which Nietzsche describes as an "objectification of a Dionysiac state" (44), is already known to us: the world of images, of representation. But the Dionysian remains vague and mystified: on the one hand, it transforms into the Apollonian, which means it has already assumed a form; on the other hand, it belongs to the realm of instincts and is invisible, unknown, and in itself unknowable. It needs to be represented through the dramatization process; a process which in any case causes it to differ from itself and transforms into another form. Pointing to the same distinction, Deleuze writes:

The clear and distinct is the claim of the concept in the Apollonian world of representation; but beneath representation there is always the Idea and its distinct-obscure depth, a drama beneath every logos (Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts* 103).

Therefore, the duality can be reformulated as another duality between the depth and the surface, the distinctness and the obscurity. From this viewpoint, it is right to claim that Nietzsche establishes an arbitrary essentialist duality; however, by considering his later Spinozist force theory, there is another version of Nietzsche's dramatization.

In a postcard to Franz Overbeck (1881), Nietzsche passionately writes: "I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza" (*The Portable Nietzsche* 92). The most important point that is held in common between these two thinkers is their ontology. The Spinoza's *potesta* and *potentia* distinction, i.e. the difference between constituted Power and constituent power, is not a simple opposition between two essences or two distinct substances. There is one and only one substance, Spinoza believes. *Potentia* as the affirmative affects and affections is ontologically primary in relation to the *potesta*²². The constituted Power is only a product of, an actualization of the constituent power. This view, which has been articulated in another way in the previous chapter, realized its concrete meaning in the *Political Treatise* (1883), when the supreme form of governance is absolute democracy (the rule of Multitude over Multitude) and every other form of governance, even in Absolute Monarchy, is considered first of all a result of the constituent power of the multitude. The same ontological stance goes with the Nietzschean apparent dualities: in the course of his thought, Nietzsche's works ultimately dealt with an ontological difference between the active, affirmative forces and the reactive, passive ones, between superman and man, or creativity and nihilism. If dramatization is a process working on the difference between the Dionysian and the Apollonian, then one may consider this difference to be ontological, again between the active and reactive forces.

²² For more clarification about *potesta* and potential, see Michael Hardt introduction, *The Anatomy of Power*, in: Negri, Antonio. *The Savage Anomaly*. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis, Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, pp. xi-xvi.

This is exactly what has been earlier conceptualized as the Nietzschean gap between the organic and the inorganic, or the signifiatory and the performative, since *performativity* and *permanent becoming* is ontologically primary in relation to the fixed signs and existing organisms.

So, if dramatization is the process going from Dionysus as the figure of the inorganic world of becoming to Apollonian world of representation, then it involves different kinds of forces, working on this gap to produce an image out of the process of becoming. That is why Nietzsche's dramatization as a method of critique consists of typology of forces and symptomology of their effects (in Spinozist reformulation, typology of affects and symptomology of their affections). But still a dramatist creates *out of other bodies and souls* and what is created here is the concept. The philosopher-dramatist intervenes with inventing a concept through her dramatization of a problematic. It is the reason why Deleuze, in the above quote, refers to "the claim of the concept in the Apollonian world of representation" which is dramatized out of an *Idea* (with capital I).

Describing the method of dramatization, Deleuze has distinguished between three things to describe the method: Ideas, concepts and dramas (see *Desert Islands and Other Texts* 94-117, *Difference and Repetition*). Nonetheless, neither Idea is here Platonic, nor concept is Hegelian.

Deleuze writes Idea with a capital I for a reason: it is always transcendental in relation to its determinations. But what is an Idea and in what way does it remain irreducible to Platonism ?

"Ideas are essentially 'problematic'", writes Deleuze, "conversely, problems are Ideas" (*Difference and Repetition* 168). By characterizing Ideas as differential problems, Deleuze nominates the Idea as that common *horizon*, which embraces all lines of determination along which concepts of understandings form themselves and inscribe themselves in the representational order. Moreover, it is due to the fact that problematic-Ideas constitute the horizon, which encompasses a certain set of processes of actualization and concept formation, that Deleuze will further characterize Ideas as being, in themselves, undetermined; undetermined precisely because Ideas refer not to an object or the knowing-subject and function as that which renders actualization and concepts consistent within a single problematic field. Or what Deleuze calls *a plane of immanence*, which is defined as a transcendental field that does not "refer to an object or belong to a subject" and appears as "a pure a-subjective consciousness"

(Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life* 25). Although it is an undifferentiated field which has indeterminacy as its chief characteristic, Ideas are subjected to a “transcendental empiricism,” which is simultaneously Deleuze’s method of critique and, as we shall see, another name for *dramatization*.

With respect to the Idea as a plane of immanence, and according to Deleuze himself, if a transcendental critique remains necessary, it is due to the nature of the Idea, which is “at once both immanent and transcendent” (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 169). That is to say, a “problematic” (Idea) is not merely a formal problem: it is “the ensemble of the problem and its conditions”, the “problem-instance” (ibid 177). The problem connects itself with many other problems through differing itself from them and their concepts of the understanding, although it exists alongside them in a network. Therefore, the unidentified problems relate to each other through an independent differential relation – a function which makes a determination possible. Thus, the object of problematic-Ideas is “the differential relation,” which is itself “a pure element of potentiality” (ibid 175). There are different series’ of problems all related to this differential relation inside the problematic, forming its conditions, and consist of non-representable singularities and becomings — i.e. the (inter)actions of the forces involved in the determining process. In other words, the conditions of the problems in a problematic have in themselves a way for determining a solution. They “progressively specify the fields of solvability in such a way that ‘the statement contains the seeds of the solution’” (ibid 180). The solution is then a determination of the undetermined problem, yet at the same time it is immanent to the problematic, already present in its conditions. In the terminology of philosophy, the solution is a concept created immanently in relation to Idea and this process of determination is called *dramatization*. Deleuze defines this process as follows:

Given any concept, we can always discover its drama, and the concept would never be divided or specified in the world of representation without the dramatic dynamisms that thus determine it in a material system beneath all possible representation. (Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts* 98)

This definition again highlights that the problematic-Idea is “a material system beneath all possible representation.” Thus, Ideas are that which cannot be given via representation

(determinate concepts of the understanding) but whose reality can be grasped by Thought's apprehension of the differential relation that conditions and animates the totality of specific Problems, their determinate field of resolvability, and its attendant concepts. and their series of determination.

To summarize: The Idea as a problematic is undetermined as such, i.e. one cannot represent it as the empirical content of a determinate judgement or concept. The conditions of the problem, however, make the Idea determinable, through a dynamic of differential relations; in the end, an *individual* concept is determined as a solution. The determining process of actualization is therefore an individuation of an individual (concept) out of the pre-individual state of the Idea.

Thus, Ideas contain three moments simultaneously: the moments of the undetermined, of the determinable, and of the determined. The determined forms a transcendental point which is still immanent to the field of Idea, and that is why the critical method proper to this perspective is called transcendental empiricism. The transcendental is not the transcendent, for the latter as the thing in itself is external to the immanent field, a universal abstracted out of real problematics, a God standing over the material system. The transcendent does not exist; it is only a false solution for a problem whose statement has been formulated falsely, for if the problem was true, then the solution would be immanent to it. By contrast, the transcendental is only a possible actualization of the plane of immanence (Idea), a product of a certain dramatization and differential relations. It is exactly, according to Nietzsche and Deleuze, the biggest misunderstanding of the history of philosophy. Philosophers are often inclined to take a concept of the understanding as the transcendent, forgetting its historical and contextual dramatization, and therefore totalizing it as the Universal – such as the western modern values of Modernity as a system of regulations and norms, which had been historically dramatized in different contexts of the West and has since been taken as a Universal truth.

So, one should above all consider the determinability constituent of the Idea, which is the function of a differential relation and creates a concept. The differential relation is of pure potentiality, and the concept is an actualization of this potentiality, but not its sole actualization. The differential relation between different non-representable becomings and singularities in an

Idea could be articulated differently, resulting into another actualization, another conception. These different articulations are what Nietzsche calls *perspective*, the relational constituent of the actualization process which is the set of dramas behind a concept. Idea is in the realm of the virtual (becomings, affects, desire, or the constituent power) which becomes dramatized in the field of the actual (beings, affections, pleasures, or the constituted Power). But there is no unique actualization for the virtual, since the virtual is the field of pure potentiality that can actualize itself into multiple transcendental objects of representation, or eludes the representation, remaining non-actualized. It is important to not confuse the virtual with the unreal. On the contrary, the actual is real because the virtual is real. There is no opposition or contradiction between these two terms, for the latter is the non-represented material becomings of the constituent power, which has been already shown as the ontologically primary process, while the actual is a product. It is the reason for the dual nature of the Idea as both immanent and transcendent, since Idea differentiates itself through its dramatization from the virtual, undetermined problems to the actual, determined solutions – both immanent in relation to each other.²³

The concept of “concept” is not here identifiable with its Hegelian type as a transcendent form that stands above the experience of consciousness and the course of history. On the contrary, the Deleuzian concept is an open-ended treatment of an Idea and exists in a transversal relation with this very Idea in a way that never transcends it. As a transversal, the Deleuzian concept therefore also has a vertical dimension in relation to the plane of immanence, which makes it transcendental. It is still in the same plane of immanence, in the plane of virtualities, but also expressed through actualization.

Moreover, determinability signifies duration and localization. The dramas as differential relations are dramatizing and differentiating the Idea into concepts, as far as the *differentiation* of the Idea presupposes spatio-temporal dynamisms (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 216-17). For the dramas are played on the stage of the world, in a local spatio-temporality. On one hand, “by

²³ For more information about the distinctions between the virtual and the actual, see Chapter IV in Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 168-221.

virtue of the complexity of Ideas and their relations with other Ideas, the spatial dramatization is played out on several levels: in the constitution of an internal space, but also in the manner in which that space extends into the external extensity, occupying a region of it” (ibid). In other words, the internal milieu and the external environment of a conception or actualization should be determined through dramatization which itself begins from the material field of the problematic, in an existing condition of materiality. On the other hand, dramas “constitute a time of actualization or differentiation no less than they outline spaces of actualization” (ibid 217) and in this way, by working on the existing temporal relation, they form another temporality proper to this particular actualization.

This is the two-sided *ontogenesis* of Deleuze’s dramatization method that dates back to Salomon Maimon, the marginal philosopher of Enlightenment. Following the Copernican revolution of Kant’s philosophy, Maimon criticized him with respect to the problematic of experience. According to Maimon, Kant simply presupposed the conditions of possible experience in reason without being able to explain how these conditions are themselves produced immanently. Another formulation for what we have just discussed: the conditions of the problem are immanent to it; the solution is immanent to the problematic. It led Maimon to search for a genetic method that would contain the process of creating the conditions and conditioning, which must situate difference rather than identity as the principle of thought. It is only difference that can explain a genetic condition. “This requirement - that conditions not be broader than the conditioned - means that the conditions must be determined along with what they condition, and thus must change as the conditioned changes” explains Daniel Smith, while reminding that “it is one thing to layout a general project like this; it is another thing to find a 'method', so to speak, capable of providing a way of thinking these conditions of the real” (*Deleuze and the Production of the New* 154). Performativization is exactly an attempt to “find a method”, where the drama and its stage, the problem and its conditions, are both conditioning each other. The only thing that returns eternally, *the unconditioned*, is the differential.

The spatiotemporal dimension of performative actualization of altermodernities is the main subject of the following research and would enable it to propose a new perspective on dealing with the contemporary performative turn in anti-systemic politics of the 21st century. In this

way, dramatization becomes a method that can refuse from reducing human or social phenomenon into static images in order to analyze them according to the already established knowledge, i.e. already existing concept of the understanding. It allows the critic to reveal the particular dramas behind such concepts in order to deprive them from their assumed universality and transcendence, while at the same time, it enables the critic to discover or invent new, alternative conceptions dramatized in social phenomenon, such as our contemporary radical performative politics, and analyze such phenomena outside of main-stream discourses.²⁴

On the other hand, the dramatization method as it is based on ontological claims, shows the specific meaning of Pragmatics in Deleuzian non-essentialist thought, for it demonstrates how ontology does not function as a tool for understanding “what Being is”; rather, as Todd May explains, is “to be able to take up a certain viewpoint toward the world in order to engage in certain ways of living” (T. May 294). Moreover, critique itself means *knowing by changing*, or as the Zapatista’s put it, “Walking, we ask questions.”²⁵ One could even return to Marx’s famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach (“The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Theses On Feuerbach)), in which the philosopher does not suggest to leave theoretical and philosophical practice, rather to engage in a way of critical knowledge-production that can only be possible via changing the world (see Mackenzi and Porter 36). It refers thus to the same claim that was made in the previous sections about alter-modern critique (in comparison to anti-modern one); a critique consisting of introducing the new and of dramatizing an alternative would only possible by way of a qualitative change with respect to the relations between the plane of immanence, the transcendental, and the empirical. This change, which makes *room* (and *time*) for the new, is already, according to its method of analysis, inscribed in the way the problematic as *Idea* is conditioned:

²⁴ Mackenzie and Porter (2011) introduced the dramatization method to the field of political science with the same reason. This research owes its methodological path to their attempt in order to use dramatization in the context of politics.

²⁵ This is a Zapatista slogan. Among other sources, it is mentioned here: Notes from Nowhere (ed.). *We are Everywhere*. 2003, p. 506.

The theory of problems is completely transformed and at last grounded, since we are no longer in the classic master-pupil situation where the pupil understands and follows a problem only to the extent that the master already knows the solution and provides the necessary adjunctions.

In other words, not only does dramatization allow for an analysis of human phenomenon, in field of politics for example, beyond the main-stream established conceptualization, it also allows for tracking the dynamism of an intervention by subjectivities beyond the constituted Power of the current sovereignty – that is, to search for alternative moments of organization of the collective bodies different from nation, of forces different from State, of performative arts beyond institutional art, and so forth.

It is for this reason that dramatization is always said to be a practical activity. Moreover, for Deleuze, this kind of practical activity is in no way limited to the activity of writing, philosophizing, or concept creation precisely because the subject of dramatization is the subject that transforms the world. Therefore, Mackenzi and Porter are right when they claim “that the dramatization of concepts is as likely, and perhaps more likely, to occur on the streets...There is nothing in being a professional philosopher that privileges these individuals in the use and dramatization of concepts [...] The philosopher is the one who creates concepts and to create concepts means to create events. What is more, the philosopher need not be an individual; it could just as easily be a pair, a group or social movement. Any movement, for example, spurred to respond to an event by creating a new way of articulating their existence, a new concept ... is a philosopher” (MacKenzie and Porter 68). It is under the light of this viewpoint that one should understand the Nietzschean dramatist; the one who “feels the impulse to transform oneself and to speak out of other bodies and souls” (Nietzsche, *The birth of tragedy and other writings* 43). To transform while speaking from within the *common* field of the problematic, situating itself in between other bodies and souls: this is how a protest movement can be a dramatist.

From this perspective, one can now return to Nietzsche’s initial figures of Dionysus and Apollo in order to destabilize his conceived duality in the *Birth of Tragedy* and transform it into an ontological difference between the actual and the virtual, or better, into the ontogenetic process

of dramatization. And yet, despite all of the critical promise of dramatization as method, Deleuze would go on to denounce the method employed in *Difference and Repetition* and will claim that there indeed exists a qualitative break between this book and his later text, *Logic of Sense*. And after this alleged “break,” there is no official return to dramatization as method in Deleuze’s works. The next chapter speculates on the shortcomings of this method and introduces the *performativization method* as its modification proper to the post-performative turn in the existing literature.

2-2-2 Performativization

In 1979, Deleuze claimed that he changed his method after *Difference and Repetition* in which the main methodology was dramatization (cited from Mackenzie and Porter 44). However, in an interview in 1969, after writing the *Logic of Sense*, he describes his new book in light of new, modern problematics, since “for a long time we were stuck with the alternative: either you are persons or individuals, or you sink back into an undifferentiated sea of anonymity; Today, however, we are uncovering a world of pre-individual, impersonal singularities” (*Desert Islands and Other Texts* 143). However, Deleuze continues to characterize his own work as an engagement with the pre-individual, impersonal, singularities, since “there is a big difference between partitioning a fixed space among sedentary individuals according to boundaries or enclosures, and distributing singularities in an open space without enclosures or properties” (ibid). This is the same formulation as the foundational claim of dramatization: sedentary individuals, the products of actualizing the virtual or dramatizing the Idea, should not be considered as primary, transcendent, and whose existence remains independent from the plane of immanence as genetic and structural principle of reality (doing so would amount to nothing more than rehabilitating the classical definition of Ideas given to them by Plato who viewed them as Absolute Forms with invariable essences). In other words, sedentary individuals are products of pre-individual singularities that have been actualized by virtue of the process of individuation. However, if this compatibility truly exists, why did Deleuze have to change his method? The rest of this section deals with this question by implementing the critical method of dramatization on itself, revealing the dramas behind its conceptualization in Nietzsche and Deleuze.

As we have demonstrated in the preceding section, Nietzsche's conception of dramatization presupposes a division between depth and surface. Although approaching it through the ontogenesis of constituent power has let us to claim otherwise, the division between the organic and inorganic is also compromised insofar as it dogmatically presupposes a distinction between depth and surface. Even when Deleuze defines the world as an *egg*, which is itself a *theatre* for dramatization, it is because the egg is an *example* of the non-individual inorganic that gives rise to an individual being by passing through the differential relations of embryonic growth: "Embryology shows that the division of an egg into parts is secondary in relation to more significant morphogenetic movements: the augmentation of free surfaces, stretching of cellular layers, invagination by folding, regional displacement of groups" (*Difference and Repetition* 216).

Now, the image of the Egg has been used once before with the same implication in Georges Bataille's *Story of the Eye* (1928). Moreover, and with respect to the image of the egg within postwar French theory, it is relevant to note that Barthes, in analyzing the metaphor of the eye in Bataille's story, describes the text as a poem, rather than a novel, relating the former to virtuality and the later to reality. As Barthes writes

the novelist's imagination is probable; a novel is something that might happen, all things considered. It is a diffident sort of imagination (even in its most luxuriant creations), daring to declare itself only against the security of the real. The poet's imagination, on the other hand, is improbable; a poem is something that could never happen under any circumstances-except, that is, in the shadowy or burning realm of fantasy, which by that very token it alone can indicate. The novel proceeds by chance combinations of real elements, the poem by precise and complete exploration of virtual elements. (Barthes, *The Metaphor of the Eye*, 240)

In this passage, Barthes relates the distinction between the probable and the improbable to the one between the virtual and the real, which is, according to previous discussions on ontogenesis, a false establishment of a problem. The probable is an actualization of the virtual, which is entirely real as a process of becoming. Moreover, Bataille wants to write about the chaosmos of constituent power and rather than merely describing the sexual act and its moments of pleasure

(as it seems), he wants to grasp sexual desire itself. However, the solid surface of the egg functions as a contour that separates the inorganic and the organic, as if there were two substances, separate from each other in two different levels of depth; as if there were an outside for the world of representation; as if the relation of production between the virtual and the actual were of a casual nature. This is certainly not true according to the ontogenetic claims of dramatization. The spatio-temporal dimension of dramas gives a reciprocal relationality between Idea, concepts and dramas in a way that Ideas as the real field of problematics are conditioned by previous established concepts, the existing conception of time and space, and the differential relations (dramas) acting on it. It is also inversely true about concepts and dramas, for each of them is conditioned by the other inside the immanent plane of the Idea.

The contour of the egg symptomizes also a return to the equilibrium. The solid surface is formally where the chaotic universe of the inorganic enters a relation of equilibrium with the organic (i.e. the regulated world of representation). Through this surface, they can exist beside each other, no longer acting effectively upon each other. However, equilibrium is itself an actualization of the virtual, not an a priori condition of existence.

The problem of equilibrium is indeed very important in the notion of dramatization. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche underscores the fact that the Greek word drama means “action” (43). Dramatization, from this viewpoint, is still a method engaged with action despite the fact that the action here is fundamentally theatrical: it is subjugated to a chain of causality and therefore produces a division between depth (of agency) and surface (of effects). Nietzsche did not problematize the submission of the dramatic to the textual, albeit his attempts to point to the inorganic world of performative movements; drama as text is where action becomes casual or in Hegel’s dialectics, is identified with negativity. Nietzsche ultimately interprets the chaos of the world with the dramatic text, restores it into a signficatory state of equilibrium, and its world of abbreviated signs.

Additionally, the form of the egg is symptomatic of actions that find themselves circumscribed by the horizon of equilibrium. The solid surface, as the guardian of the inorganic world, is the

embodiment of what Bataille's calls "unemployed negativity."²⁶ For Bataille was indeed a critic of making equilibrium the central element of theoretical analysis as it is the case with the whole tradition of philosophy before 20th century with some rare exceptions such as Nietzsche and Spinoza. "[Life] is constant destabilization of the equilibrium without which it wouldn't be", writes Bataille, claiming that life is beyond temporary equilibriums, disruptive of them, while simultaneously being conditioned by them. The two-sided relation of the virtual (life) and the actual (equilibrium) is affirmed without recognizing the necessary productive relation between those two that signifies a single substance of constituent power, crystallizing momentarily into established constituted Power. Instead, Bataille rejects the notion of equilibrium as substance in favor of a multiplicity of life's forces disrupting the equilibrium. For Bataille, Life corresponds to the inorganic, which finds itself in an opposition with the organic equilibrium as two distinct substances. However, the limit between these two separate worlds should itself be a solid line, forming as the interface for equilibrium in the interactions between inner differential forces of *chaosmos* with outer regulated forces of representation's world. And this limit is precisely what Bataille meant by the term unemployed negativity: an action of an exhausted actor who cannot act, or as Kafka would say, the great swimmer who cannot swim (Kafka, *Fragments*). It is a non-productive activity or non-productive expenditure, which does not produce anything, but only marks the difference between the world of representative actions and the world of inorganic movements. That is why Simone, in the *Story of the Eye*, "developed a mania for breaking eggs with her behind" (Bataille). The flow of the inorganic to the organic is disruptive of organic relations, emancipating the desire from being fixated on an object of pleasure into a chaotic queer desire, flowing freely between various sexualities. In the end, however, Bataille's conclusion re-affirms Nietzsche's ontogenetic claim such that his understanding of the movement from the inorganic to the organic are shown to be founded upon the formulation of a false problem, which gives rise to internal oppositions and contradictions instead of pure differential relations.

²⁶ "If action is – as Hegel says – negativity, the question arises as to whether the negativity of one who has 'nothing more to do' disappears or remains in a state of 'unemployed negativity'" (Bataille, Letter to X 90)

To avoid such falsities, Deleuze modifies the conditions of the problem in his later work. He insists that there is a theatre of philosophy in which the textual is determined by the non-textual on a philosophic stage, yet he adds that he was not successful in his previous attempts (*Desert Islands and Other Texts* 144). A method of dramatization that does not return to equilibrium in the (textual) dramatic process may be conceived better by a detour into another field of knowledge: the study of thermodynamics.

Initially, classical thermodynamics followed a similar principle as Nietzsche's method of dramatization, for the chemical phenomenon as a result, according to thermodynamics, is motivated by differential relations (differences in intensity). The differential relations trigger an action (a movement of matter, a crystallization process) which leads to the individuation of a determined result. This relation to thermodynamics is of interest since one of Deleuze's key examples for describing the dramatization method is the process of crystallization. For example, a salt solution functions as the immanent field of Idea in which, because of differences in intensities, various differential relations (the dramas) start to work upon the solution and crystallize the determined, representable salt crystals (concepts) from within the problematic field of the Idea (that contained them virtually). Contrary to its initial impulse, however, classical thermodynamics retains a conception of equilibrium as reality in order to analyze actual quantities (extensive variables) with the cost of cancelling the differences and presupposing constants. In other words, by assuming a closed thermodynamic system isolated from the plane of immanence, removing the undetermined in order to examine the determinable through the determined, accomplishes precisely what Deleuze views as the function of the dogmatic image of thought: "partitioning a fixed space among sedentary individuals according to boundaries or enclosures." (*Desert Islands and Other Texts* 143) Thus, classical thermodynamics becomes self-contradictory, for it fails to acknowledge that, according to its own principles, a closed system in the state of equilibrium could only exist as an effect of a particular thermodynamic relation, and thus would be unable to grasp the pure differential relation it is based on.

Despite this internal contradiction, thermodynamics could modify itself in a way such that it would become capable of posing true as opposed to false problems. This contemporary thermodynamics is labelled "far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics." As Manuel De Landa

explains, “the systems studied in this new discipline are continuously traversed by an intense flow of energy and matter, a flow that maintains these differences and keeps them from canceling themselves that is, a flow that does not allow the intensive process to become hidden underneath the extensive results” (“Deleuze, Diagrams, and the Open-ended Becoming of the World” 32). In other words, “far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics” examines the virtual (i.e. the problem as a non-representable singularity and the intensive process working within it). Moreover, by situating epistemic inquiry within an open system with a continuous flow of energy and matter, thermodynamics does away with any form of pre-determined boundaries, establishing a properly diagrammatic relation between itself and the world, unlike Bataille’s conception, which simply retains the pure differential relations (the dramas of the constituent power) rather than any equilibrium or crystal of the representative order.

In order to escape from its own self-contradictory falsities, dramatization has to follow a similar path as Thermodynamics, refusing the totaliation of concepts into a duality, which reintroduces equilibrium as the ground of dramatization. The dramatic is enclosed in the textual, being delimited by its boundaries in the closed system of writing – a system that claims self-reflexivity and total independence from the outside world. The dramatic emancipates itself from the textual equilibrium by releasing the body from pre-defined movements, or tearing the performative out of the theatrical. Here, instead of dualities, we are again confronted by a conceptual coupling with different ontological status: the dramatic-theatrical are only actualizations of the performative-the bodily through a set of differential (or *differenciating*) relations.

And it is precisely along this line of argumentation that Deleuze and Guattari will criticize the dramatic/theatrical in their treatment of psychoanalysis. In particular, it is Freud’s description of unconscious through primal scenes of sexual intercourse between Father and mother that is the subject of critique, as it leads to the theatrical development of the *oedipal complex*: a stage set of symbols, always interpreting each and every mental disorder (neurosis and psychosis) by referring them to the familial triangle of father, mother and the son and its dramatic, pre-written inner movements. According to them, the unconscious does not constitute a theatre, but rather a factory, a production machine (Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 24). If the world

was an egg-theatre in *Difference and Repetition*, it now becomes a deterritorialized land of the theatre of production:

That is what the completion of the project is: not a promised land and a pre-existing land, but a world created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization. The movement of the theatre of cruelty: for it is the only theatre of production, there where the flows cross the threshold of deterritorialization and produce a new land. (Ibid 323)

As seen in this passage, the method of dramatization is still at work, but now in a qualitatively different manner. It is not a movement from the presupposed depth of the inorganic (*the promised land*) to the outer surface of the organic (the pre-existing land out of the promised land); rather, it is the topography of the surface – as the substance, the plain of immanence – and its permanent differential becomings and temporary transcendental actualizations, both pre-existing and promised. There is no outside, but in the inside, in the field of immanence, production and destruction happens incessantly through differential relations between flows of desire (or forces' interaction of constituent power). The only permanent element is the differential; intensive difference as the vehicle of change and movement, which is the properly foundational principle of Thermodynamics. And it is from this perspective that one must understand the peculiar type of pragmatics espoused by Deleuze and Guattari: pragmatics does not consist in the consideration of the usefulness or effectiveness of things without reference to their essence; rather, it consists, above all, of a refusal of essentialism, and an emphasis on the virtual and its productive functioning. Deleuze and Guattari's "pragmatism" does not ask what/which objects are functioning; on the contrary, it asks how undetermined, yet determinable, differentials will come into a relation with each other in a determinate manner by virtue of the differential as that which produces something, gives rise to the individuated being.

Thus, *this dramatic critique of dramatization as method* performs a reversal of the relation between the theatrical and the performative, releasing the latter from the subjugation of the former and bestowing it with an ontogenetic status. Considering the theatrical bonding with the textual (i.e. the relation of non-sense/paradox to sense/good sense), it is easy to find the same movement in relation to language. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari reassert that it is pragmatics, not mainstream linguistics, that serves as the privileged locus for any substantial

critique of language (*A Thousand Plateaus* 77). On the one hand, the primary function of language is not informative or communicative; rather, language primarily functions in order to issue commands in order to act upon reality. On the other hand, the non-linguistic (which is outside of signification chain) rather than the linguistic (which is an element of signification) is the vehicle of language, of its movements and its variations. Here all of language's statements are speech-acts and therefore, performative; but the performative is not in any case limited to the speech-acts. Remembering the Nietzschean inorganic world of the performative movements which in its turn gives rise to the world of abbreviated linguistic signs, one could argue that the performative is the pre-individual; it is both the non-linguistic and the linguistic, but also beyond that: the pre-linguistic.

In this way, theatre turns into a theatre of production, a purely performative pre-individual theatre whose dramas are mutating active forces not determined images and written scenes. Thus, by folding onto itself and performing a self-critique, dramatization goes beyond itself, becoming a critique for the real as the virtual, where virtual means pre-individual, differential, and performative. From this perspective, dramatization does not necessarily go from the depth to the world of representation; it can trace the very performative relations as movements on a surface, or better on a plane of immanence that includes at once the non-representable, the representable, and the represented. It not only releases itself from representation as a false condition of the problem, but also shows that the represented is only one possible actualization of the performative.

The performative turn in the arts shares the same critique of representation. Instead of a dramatic theatre of images and pre-written scenes, why not a performative theatre of differential relations, those movements that actually give rise to possible dramatic images? In his *Postdramatic Theatre* (2006), Hans-Thies Lehman argues that historically "the text as an offer of meaning reigned; all other theatrical means had to serve it and were rather suspiciously controlled by the authority of Reason" (Lehmann 47). Drama had been supposed as identical to the "text" in the history of post-primitive theatre, when the theatre was not anymore ritualistic but a means for representing literature. But as Lehman claims, the second half of the 20th century witnessed the growing importance of the live performance in a new theatrical form, i.e.

the postdramatic theatre. This is again the performative break we have discussed before in arts and politics, but this time we may ask, whether there is a post-dramatic dramatization?

The importance of the performative and its ontogenetic status in the aforementioned discussions could be re-affirmed by substituting dramatization with *performativization* (*performatisierung*). This is because the notion of *performative* includes in itself the notion of drama, and puts it in a non-reductionist framework. If the dramatic refers always to something outside of itself (which means if it is representational), then, as Judith Butler clarifies, “‘performative’ itself carries the double-meaning of ‘dramatic’ and ‘non-referential.’” (Butler, *Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory*)

The fact that performativization is not a representational method, or not a methodology working on representations, does not fulfil only an intellectual gesture; its most important characteristics are equally significant when dealing with the 21st century’s global cycles of protests. From the very beginning, the contemporary performative politics and arts have rejected representation in both senses of the term. Politically, the alterglobalization movements and altermodern occupy movements refuse to engage in representative politics or trust in their national and international so-called representatives. Their own forms of organization are non-representational as they often evade the hierarchical organizations and assignment of protest leaders or group representatives. Their heterogeneous collective body that cannot be identified with nation, party, vanguards, industrial proletariat, and any other single identity shows another aspect of this non-representationality. Aesthetically, as it was mentioned before, the critique of representation dates back to the modernist movements, but it is strongest in the performative turn. Therefore, to analyze and criticize such social phenomena, performativization proves to be theoretically proper with respect to our contemporary world. It poses the problem of the revolution correctly, not as a means for the seizure of constituted Power, establishing another State as a transcendent point of reference, rather as a problem of alternative social relations as those differential relations (*performativizations*) that generates, through their constituent power, the social forms. As Deleuze puts it, “The real problem of revolution, a revolution without bureaucracy, would be the problem of new social relations, where singularities come into play,

active minorities in nomad space without property or enclosure” (Desert Islands and Other Texts 145).

It should be kept in mind that the real problem of revolution did not suddenly become what it has always truly been, being disguised by various theoretical distortions. Dramatizations and performativizations are conditioned by their time and space; so does the dramatizing and performativizing thought. Nor is there any conception of progress from an ignorant to a self-conscious posing of the problem of revolution since it is the spatio-temporal dimension that is both conditioning and conditioned in relation to the Idea; and therefore, performativizations function in the existing spatiotemporal relations of the real problematic, only in order to make way for the alternative, to approach the new reality. This new reality in turn necessitates a new image of thought.

As it was discussed before, social movements also think critically the new reality in their performativizations out of it – what Malabou terms “cognitive plasticity”²⁷ (2008). The philosopher-movement thinks the Idea and working on the plane of immanence, it engages with a practice inside the chaosmos of the virtual, the chaotic interactions of becomings, affects, and forces. Chaos here does not have a negative value; on the contrary, it is “a degree of complexity” beyond the capacity of already determined concepts of the understanding (see Berardi, *The Soul at Work* 212). But as Deleuze and Guattari warn, “philosophical thought does not bring its concepts together in friendship without again being traversed by a fissure that leads them back to hatred or disperses them in the coexisting chaos where it is necessary to take them up again, to seek them out, to make a leap.” (Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* 203) There is always a momentary performativization which again washes away in the flows of the chaos. But when a philosopher-movement performativizes, it acts as a *chaoid*. A chaoid is an assemblage through differential relations that can cut through the chaos, place “a secant plane that crosses it” (ibid), and create an architectural composition, “a provisional organizer of chaos” (Berardi,

²⁷ *What Should We Do With Our Brain?*, Catherine Malabou. Translated by Sebastian Rand, Marc Jeannerod, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.

Felix Guattari: Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography 11). If this is the new image of thought, then what reality is it conditioning and been conditioned by?

In describing the new image of thought involved in the speculation of reality, Deleuze argues that “the opposition between a pure universal and particularities enclosed within persons, individuals, or Selves” is no longer of fundamental importance. “We can't let ourselves be satisfied with that” he continues, “especially if the two terms are to be reconciled, or completed by one another. What we're uncovering right now, in my opinion, is a world packed with *impersonal individuations*, or even *pre-individual singularities*” (On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought 137).

This new reality of a world “packed with *impersonal individuations*” invokes a new image of thought, which proceeds according to the method of performativization. However, the first step is to be able to track down these individuations or differential relations. The relations (as forces of constituent power) are abstract and free, for they do not depend on their terms. Moreover, these undetermined differentials are only determinable in relation to each other. In the terminology of calculus which is the *mathematical study of change*, “ dx ” is a differential which has no value in relation to x , when x has a determined value as C ($f(x)=C$), so that dx/x is 0. This is also true for dy in relation to y , when $f(y)=C'$. But dy/dx is a differential relation that although its differentials are independent from x and y , it has a value of itself as a relation free from its terms. In addition, dy/dx expresses the determinable moment of two undetermined differentials, as long as it is located in space and functions for a certain duration on that spatiality. In other words, $f(dy/dx)$ is determined as a particular actual, when it functions on (x, y) , supposing x in the domain of (A,B) and y in the domain of (C,D) . An example can be the velocity of a bullet at the time of hitting a bulletproof vest: the bullet's space and time no longer changes at the moment of impact, but the point of impact has a time-space value.²⁸

To show the spatio-temporality of a relational function, diagramming is necessary. To draw a diagram, with respect to the problem of performative politics and its altermodernities, is to chart altermodernities through their internal forces and movements. Each moment should be traced

²⁸ Deleuze writes: “We will say that dy/dx equals z , that is to say it does not involve y or x at all, since it's y and x under the form of vanishing quantities.” (Deleuze, Spinoza's Lectures)

with the different movements of desires and differential relations of those movements which lead to certain performativized alternatives. Deleuze explains the notion of diagram in his monograph on Foucault as an “abstract machine” which considers the “relation between forces:”, “Every diagram is intersocial and constantly evolving. It never functions in order to represent a persisting world but produces a new kind of reality, a new model of truth” (1988, p.34-5). Or, as Guattari conceptualizes it, diagrams articulate two aspects of performativizations: the relations between the incorporeal universes (*the virtual*) that are non-discursive, outside of signification chain, and their being is non-linguistic, with the enunciated assemblages (the actuals) that are signifying, communicating meanings, and discursive.

It is by means of the diagram that we can theoretically grasp the *new kind of reality* that is enveloped within altermodernities. Moreover, given that the diagram is set in the axes of time and space with virtual and actual dimensions; and considering the aforementioned two-sided ontogenesis; these axes are themselves subjected to variation during a performativization. Therefore, the diagram as an element of the method of performativization should consist of movements, which disrupt and transform the spatio-temporal determination of diagrammatic activity, and precisely because altermodernities have, by definition, qualitatively different spatio-temporal paradigms.

Thus this research takes performativization as its main methodology in a double meaning: first, it engages with the performativizations of altermodernities in the second global cycle of 21st century performative dissent politics, and to do so, it tries to performativize (yet on text, then more akin to dramatization as a possible form of performativization) the differential relations inside case studies, the new social relations they have succeeded to express between bodies and the spatiotemporality proper to them. These case studies will be the subject of the next section’s discussion.

2-3 A Geography of Intensities

The case studies of this research, as it was mentioned earlier, belong to the second global cycle of protests, roughly from 2009 to now, as it has happened in Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, the United States, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Ukraine, and so forth. Among the cases, which are performativizations of alter-modernities, there exist different artistic groups and practices that joined the movement or answered its call. The very notion of art will thus be revisited in the course of discussing different case studies.

One can object that how it is justified to draw examples from such a diverse “geographical” territories with different localities, histories, and cultures. However, it should be noted that a certain geography or spatiality of these various events is at stake here, which is of course not a *historicized* geography of borders, of nation-States. This certain geography is rather of intensities and forces, and as it will be immediately argued, has a *historical* dramatization of its own, which is different from the former conception of geography.

2-3-1 The Drama of Communicating Intensities

Ned Ludd was apparently a British weaver who in 1779 – according to narratives after being punished because of laziness at work – took up a hammer and broke two stocking frames in his sweatshop. When the protest movement of Luddites, consisting of peasants, craftsmen, industrial workers and the unemployed, emerged against the labour conditions and relations and the dominance of capitalists on production – embodied in the machineries of their workplaces – in the beginning of the so-called “Industrial Revolution”, all manifestos and declarations were signed under the name of Ned Ludd, from whom no one remembered anything but that moment of frustration. The protesters of the emergent working class, who called themselves Luddites and turned that angry unskilled worker of 30 years ago into their spiritual leader, would gather together under the cover of darkness and attack the factories to destroy the machineries. From a simple worker being wiped because of laziness, Ludd transformed in the slogans of this movement into the “King Ludd ” and “General Ludd”. Workers did not claim that Ludd was their king just like the way that George III, the official King of those times, was their king through his apparatuses of exploitation and unequal, hierarchical division of constituted Power. *Ludd the*

King was an assertion of the *people as King*, i.e. people's re-affirmation of their own sovereignty and constituent power. The proper name of Ludd functioned as a "collective phantom" (Holmes) through the Luddite Movement, haunting the back alleys of British industrial cities in which the factory bosses had been confronting with crowds, each of them shouting with others that "I am General Ludd".

Proper names become collective phantoms in the course of a popular protest movement. Losing their strict link with the pre-ascribed individual meanings, they lose their identities only in order to fall again in the new history made by the movement. "Names reach humans *in descending*, that is, through historical transmission" (Agamben, *Language and History* 49).

Benjaminian division between the language as such, the pre-Babel-Tower language of God, *and* the multiple human languages after the Babel Tower is indeed another formulation for Nietzsche's organic-inorganic distinction, and it should be treated with the same caution and correction. Starting with the claim that being is coextensive with divine language, Benjamin characterizes the latter as the unspoken word of God, which is mute creation (*On Language as Such and on the Languages of Man* 70). The unspoken word is a sign in the divine language, which is not reduced to the level of human linguistic knowledge, and is identified with pure action of creation, just like the inorganic word presents the signs of bodily movements before being abbreviated in human languages. But this undetermined language (the virtual) constituent of being should be in a relation with determined human languages (the actual), a differential relation like dramatization that leads to its various individuations after Babel Tower. Benjamin calls this relation a *translation*. "The language of things [the mute divine words]", writes Benjamin, "can pass into the language of knowledge and name only through translation" (71). Benjamin's divine language is thus the pre-linguistic or non-linguistic performativity which is ontogenetically primary and gives rise, through translations, to different individuated and representational languages. But if we break the link between translation and representation, which was indeed already done by Benjamin himself in his later *The Translator's Task* (2000), we can see how proper names function as phantoms in a protest movement, and refer to intensive field of constituent power.

Divine language communicates itself and the names are the moments of language's communicability: not a communication of something through language, but a communication of communicability. The language as such then is not representational, since it communicates itself, its own movements, rather than communicating an object. Moreover, names are particularly important in this conception of language, since it has creative and receptive parts, contains simultaneously the nameless and the namable. Therefore, naming is a dramatization that individuates a human name out of the potentiality of communication, i.e. of the divine word itself which has the "unique union" (69) of the nameless (undetermined) and the namable (the determinable). Since "[there is no specific] name...to correspond to any person" (69), to any individual, therefore the human name is, therefore, pre-individual, singular and not necessarily representative; it is again an open field of communicability. Forming a language, these singularities are only meaningful when they come into a relation to each other.

Similarly, in the course of a protest movement, names appear phantom-like, as a *sign* to translate (and to give name to) an intensive region of forces or the immanent field of constituent power and its intensities. If Ned Ludd took up that hammer and broke the machinery, his work was performativized and re-interpreted as the destruction of the embodiment of the capitalist relation to and subjugation of his labour power; and everyone who could recognize in herself this emancipatory constituent power – not Ludd as an individual, but as a singularity – and its intensive field of forces would become a Luddite by assuming his name. The singular intensities of individuals could communicate through the collective phantom of Ludd as the pure element of communicability and involve in a differential relation with each other. Thus, collective phantoms are singularities which are in themselves plural: a singular multiplicity of singularities. This is another formulation for the two-sidedness of ontogenesis.

Extending this perspective on all of the case studies, one could argue that different forms of struggles have resonance with and among each other, just like the singularities of a movement could communicate through their collective phantom as a field of intensities. The struggle has become global, yet is practicing in a local scale. The slogan of Reclaim the Streets, "the resistance will be as transnational as capital", points to this resonance. If the Benjaminian translation as a mode relegates the relations between languages toward a heterogeneous singular language –

the language in which children and sparrows communicate – then the names of movements serve as elements of pure communicability that refer to a geography of intensities akin to them all.

We have already seen how Occupy Al-Tahrir and Occupy Wall Street movements communicated with each other in the recent global cycle of protests. Protests in Madrid and Athens have inspired Wall Street, too, and then Gezi in Istanbul and Maidan in Ukraine followed the path. Here, as Benjamin emphasizes, the problem is not of the original and the copy, but a kind of kinship and “it is clear that kinship does not necessarily involve similarity” (The Translator’s Task 78). Rather, the communication comes from the differential relation between these movements in their geography of intensities. Just like Benjaminian translation liberating an independent relation between languages, translation of different movements into each other is a practice on a line of flight extending from various forms of struggles and creativity. Therefore, there is indeed a common language of truth as Benjamin asserts, whose names are different movements of the second global cycle. Accordingly, the different case studies are actually from the same geography of intensities, coextensive with this common language of truth in our contemporary spatio-temporality.

In addition, the communicability between these movements should be considered as a principle that open each locally situated movement to a global level. Each altermodern movement is a singularity in the immanent field of constituent power: on one hand, it is a singular multiplicity (or a multiple singularity, for it is situated in a two-sided ontogenesis) consisting of various singularities communicating inside it; on the other hand, it is a singularity in a network of other movements as singularities. As seen in the discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy’s writings, the singular had been always used in its plural form, *singuli*, in its ancient usage and “the singular is primarily *each* one and, therefore, also *with* and *among* all the others”. Strictly speaking, there is no *single* singularity, “because, in general, a singularity is indissociable from a plurality”. (Nancy 32).

Therefore, the following research will take up those seemingly geographically separated case studies and analyze the altermodernities, which emerged out of their performativization. However, the abstraction of diagramming in performativization, or better, the abstraction of the virtual Idea and its individuations and singularities does not at all amount to totalizing or

generalizing conclusions. This would simply be another false formulation of the problem, since the abstract of the transcendental empiricist critique is above all empirical. It is local yet it communicates on a global level, as we already mentioned in previous sections. Performativizations of a performative politics necessarily deals with (collective) bodies in each local context.

Chapter TWO

The Performative event

3 Chapter Two: The Performative Event

3.1 A Liminal Agency toward the Performative Event

P, the Protagonist in Beckett's *Catastrophe* (1984 (1982)), is in the middle of the stage, standing on a black block, with a black dressing-gown, ankles exposed and his head bowed. The play itself is about a rehearsal for a main-stream theater production and whose character's names signify the differing degrees of authority within the hierarchy of theatre, with D standing as director, A as assistant, and L as lighting technician. P, D, A and L seem, therefore, to represent the abbreviated names designated for different "subjective" positions, each on a different level of a power relation embodied in a game of gazes. Four codes in the (re-)codification of "theatrical territory."

In this way, *Catastrophe* portrays the absolute authority of the director, with his gaze directly fixing at P, while A and L representing the other gazes aimed at P through D. Thus, there is an economy of the gaze that does not go beyond the stage, beyond the scene of representation.

P is himself totally immobile, standing as a statue of flesh. His gestures are neither his own nor done by him, but made according to the orders and by the hands of A, with no agency of his or her own. And there exists another economy: the orders are produced in an economy of text in the form of A's notes that textualize D's subjective judgments.

The theme of the play seems evident: a critique of representation by pointing to the authority of the dramatic text; the authority of the director, the subjection of the actor to the gazes of these authorities, and the calculated gaze of the audience/critics (who the director hopes that P's performance "will have them on their feet"). But the ending sentences of the text, written inside brackets as stage description, bring this particular text beyond a mere critique of theater:

[Pause. Distant storm of applause. P raises his head, fixes the audience. The applause falters, dies. Long pause.]

The previously immobile P raises their head just after the theater finishes with that imaginary storm of applause, right after the representation apparatus finished its work. And P fixes the audience, while their gaze aims at a non-existing one.

Here, the agency is displaced to the limits of the theatrical spectacle, where P inhabits a liminal position with a gaze toward the off-stage, as if off-stage was the place where the performative event would happen, external to the representative theater. This is even implied in the text, since Beckett writes these sentences inside the final brackets as stage description, on the limits of the text itself. In linguistics, the bracketed parts of a text – that give guidelines, extra hints, and extra explanations for reading it or addressing the audience – are called *paratext*. Gerard Genette conceptualizes paratext as that very locus of the text that connects to its exterior: “paratext is ... a zone between text and off-text, a zone not only of transition but also of transaction (Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation 2).” Beckett displaces the event into the off-stage region of the play through this use of paratext. Here, those closed economies of text and gaze, order and subjection, through which theater is (re)produced are refused for an opening toward an indefinite event beyond representation; an event that is pointed to by a minimal and also liminal agency on the limits of representation.

The gaze does not come from a pre-defined subject position of actor, from P, because the theatrical presentation, in which the term *actor* acquires its meaning, is already finished before the gaze. At the same time, that gaze remains still an action for the P of any possible theatrical production of Beckett’s play. The liminal position is where the territorial codes are being decodified. With raising the head and fixing the gaze, P is no longer P, the code representing a low hierarchical position. P has come out of that power relation.

Moreover, the gaze is not aimed at any pre-existing audience. It is a rehearsal and the salon is simply empty, but Beckett still writes that “P fixes the audience”. This brings us to the much-discussed notion of political theater and “the missing people” or rather, “the people to come”. A notion that Carmelo Bene turned into his central perspective of creating theatre. “The people are missing”, says Bene, since popular theater does not “represent” the people; rather “it anticipates a people who may not yet exist and whom the theater must help bring into existence” (Rodowick

141). So if there is an indefinite, non-representational event of theater, *a performative event*, this event is also the event of constituting *an* audience, *a* people. One cannot presuppose collectivity: collectivity is itself constructed through the processes of an event, at the same time that it produces the event.

There is also a reverse direction for reading Becket's *Catastrophe*. It appears as a highly exaggerated play, mostly similar to a *farce* rather than a comedy. Farce, as a genre, deals with improbable situations and by the same token, the function of exaggeration in *Catastrophe* is to make an improbable theater: it empties theater of the performative, rendering it as a mere spectacle of representation, without any agency or subjectivity, and reduced to a set of textual guidelines and subjective orders. The result of which is a closed system that calls for the "storm of applause", even though there are no real bodies sitting on chairs being affected by it. No transformations, no event, just a spectacle of entertainment.

But there is no representation without performative processes. As we discussed in the previous chapter, each representation is one possible product. The performative is what produces, even if it turns into a static image. There exists no ideal, closed system that can seal off all lines of flight from its rigid order.

So, the reverse reading of *Catastrophe* will tell us that any attempt to predict and manage everything in a performance or to reduce it to a mere spectacle or mere theatricality is doomed to fail. There exists no contradiction or duality between theatricality and performativity, between spectacle and event, rather a productive relation between them. The spectacle is always prone to be inflicted by the transformative power of the performative. *Catastrophe* presents an idea of a performative event by contrasting it to a representational theatrical happening. In the same manner, the following examples aim to shortcut this discussion into the social context.

3.1.2 A Shortcut to the Social Context

In June 2009, Iranian people started a decentralized protest movement that was marked by the overwhelming emergence of three million demonstrators marching in silence on the 15th of that

month. June 15 became the event that marked a before and after, opening a space of dissensus that did not close on itself for several months. The protests were characterized by an intense creation of new forms of struggle and resistance that have been borrowed from artistic practices and carnivalesque organization: songs, graffiti, green color splashed everywhere on the streets and walls through various means, performances, poetry, and of course urban resistance against the State's violence. Even in the days of mourning for the lives lost during the protest movement, participants were celebrating the "people's victory."

In April 2, 2015, Tehran's government and foreign powers reached an interim deal on Iran's nuclear program that promised an end to economic sanctions. Immediately after the declaration of the deal, people rushed into the streets with balloons, pastries, and music. Young women and men danced together on streets with "illegal joyful music" in contrast to the strict rules of the Islamic Republic to celebrate the "government's victory." There was indeed a transgression of the law, but as Lacan reminds us, it was already inscribed in the law itself: Kant on the other side of de Sade.

Although some media analysts hailed the nuclear agreement as an historical "event," the differences between these two political happenings and their corresponding "performances" on the streets are self-evident. However, the self-evidence does not explain anything: how does an event work? What are the differences between the functions of a "cultural" event (belonging to the domain of the spectacle and representative Politics) and the pragmatics of a "performative" event? Considering Beckett's *Catastrophe*, could we refer to the ideas of non-representationality, a "missing people," liminal agency, and deterritorialization in order to differentiate the so-called social performances?

3.2 Performativierung/Aufführung – Ereignis/Event

Performativizations of a movement have their own chemistry. The differential relations of this process, as have been discussed in the previous chapter, would only be triggered by *a* difference in intensity, by a thermodynamic happening in the social. In the aforementioned example of the

individuation process in salt crystallization out of salt water solution (as Idea), there are also preconditions for the existence of this process: the thermodynamic instability of *the crystallization point*, even if there is a mechanical one. The difference in intensity, or energy, provides the necessary impulse for the differential movement to be triggered. This can be a supersaturation, a sudden density of dislocations, or the non-homogenous, striated inner surface of a container: disruptions, excesses, etc.

In the chemistry of social movements, the condition of performativization is called an event. However, unlike the classical terminology of chemistry as a natural science, events are a precondition for performativization as long as performativization is a precondition for event, since the foundational ontology is a two-sided ontogenesis, and in the far-from-equilibrium social-human phenomena, the constant flows of desire are being crystallized and melted in different performative events as their performative points in which a *change in nature* occurs.

The relation between performativity and event has been already established throughout the literature. Alain Badiou, for instance, calls “performance arts” as the contemporary “Event” in arts (The Event in Deleuze 37), which bears similar implications to Fischer-Lichte’s *performative turn*, for the latter is also a sign of simultaneous rupture and novelty in artistic practice and production. Referring to artistic exhibitions as events became especially popular after the performative turn in the arts, where bodily presence and movements of both the artist and the audience became relevant in the creation and exhibition of the works themselves; a popularity that has been transferred to the field of culture in general, though not with the same meaning. Moreover, in philosophy, the event has acquired a more general status, especially after Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou, and it refers to the emergence or creation of the new: events transform the pre-existing situation to make way for the new.

The German language offers a way to think about the differences between event as a cultural happening and event as the creation of the new. While the former is the English word Event, the latter has its history of conceptualization in the term „Ereignis“. This usefulness becomes more apparent in relation to the performative event, given that the German word for performativity (*Performativität*) stems from the same Latin root (and performativization as *Performativierung*),

while for performance it is the German word *Aufführung* that is used. Through using this term, the complex relationships between performance, performativity, event, and politics are clearer and more exact.

In their co-written piece "Politics as Performance" (*Politik als Aufführung*), Christian Horn and Matthias Warstat believe that political performances should be regarded as *performance* in general, in terms of a collective and processual action-perception that has a *performative* aspect. The bodily co-presence, the particular spatio-temporality, the blurring of established structural borders between action and reception, and its uniqueness in terms of non-reproducibility under these terms are all mentioned as analytical points for a political performance. But these analytical points, they believe, already establish a relationship between political performance and event (*Ereignis*). In other words, event could be considered as performative (E. Fischer-Lichte, *Performativität und Ereignis* 396).

Nonetheless, they warn that not all political "performances" are "performative" events, since an event -- understood in terms of the political -- entails "exceptional effectiveness or potency that stand out from everyday routine activities and open up potential for change" (ibid). The political performances of mass celebrations and huge carnivals in Nazi Germany did make a change, but by recouring to an already established mythical past narrative and for the worst, not toward an alternative future. The highly mediatized politico-rhetorical performances of Obamas, such as president's ironical play-acting with his *anger's translator* or first lady's funky dances, are all political performances but not performative events. The performative event has neither a defined past nor a predictable future: it occurs in a far-from-equilibrium social experimentation milieu.

This relationship between eventness and performativity is clearly conceptualized in Fischer-Lichte's analysis of Handke's "Offending the Audience" by Claus Peymann (*Performativität und Ereignis* 11-14). Staging an avant-garde text that aims to engage the audience actively, Peymann was finally irritated by audience members attempting to climb the stage and re-situate themselves in order to acquire the role of actors in the second night of performance – what Fischer-Lichte calls *a change in the roles* (Roleswechsel) that amounts to the aforementioned

change in nature. Peymann wanted to defend the borders that were becoming blurred through the performative aspect of the performance, although this aspect renders theater non-representational.

According to Fischer-Lichte, performativity makes us understand that theater is itself constituted through an event, an event in which "something between actors and audience occurs [ereignete]", and most probably, this something is what happens with the "relation" between actors and the audience: the auto-poetic process that was discussed before. Therefore, even if we deal with a representative theater, performativity remains ontogenetically prior. Far from affirming this paradigmatic transformation of the performative turn, far from affirming his own piece's unpredictable intensive flows of counter-identification which turned the classic theatrical urge to identification into a non-identitarian desire for being active, Peymann tried to defend the already established *territory* of theater against the *deterritorializing* performative event.

The event of the performative gives a few hints for an analysis of political performance, for it shows that something happens in the (social) relation between different groups of people who are pre-situated in different levels of a hierarchy of action and power. In other words, although the co-presence of bodies and the particular spatio-temporal determinations are constituent of the event, it is the event itself that produces its own people. Therefore, the people of the event can no longer be defined through the duality of actor/audience, of active/receptive, for it is precisely the people, which occurs (ereignet) in a given event (ereignis).

It is true that a *Publikum* should exist in order for a performance to take place. But if a group of bodies construct a stage of their own and make a performance for no audience, but as an invitation for all to join the stage, then it would be incorrect to analyze this phenomena according to the schema of actor/audience. In other words, a performative event deterritorializes the already established territory. To understand this aspect of the performativization, one can make a detour to see what a territory of theater (its stage) means, and through that, take an oblique look at the territory of political performance. This will make way for an understanding of the performative events in their singular contexts, as well as those singular collective bodies that become the bodies of those events.

3.3 Territories of Performance: Delimiting the Performative

A woman is shown sitting on a chair in an airport. A man comes, sits in front of her, holding a newspaper which has the picture of the woman on its cover, saying that she is wanted by the Police. The woman seems surprised, not as much as when she sees her picture in the news on airport screen that she is a dangerous and unpredictable criminal on the loose. The scene goes on by a description of her appearance from the airport megaphones. She is shocked, shaking, and shouting that she hasn't done anything. Two security police approach her with a silver suitcase; one of them asks her gently, "are you stressed?" "Well, yes, a little bit," she answers, without even having this image in her mind that one of the security police would open the suitcase and show her the anti-stress Nivea Deodorant.

The above Nivea advertisement is an illuminating example of how contemporary capitalism works and produces wealth. It shows two logics at work simultaneously: the shift from manual labour to affective immaterial labour which consists in exploiting the affective sensual capabilities and faculties of humans, *and* the affective logic of the true – the affective true which dominates not only the media and advertisements but also discourses of politicians²⁹. In the former, advertisement exploits the affections and sentiments of a real person for the sole purpose of selling them a product. At the same time, it shows that product is not only based on the material conditions (and needs) of her body (sweating), but more than that, it is designed for her affections, her stress. If decades ago, Marina Abramovic could speak about a difference between

²⁹ The logic of the affective true could be described, following Brian Massumi, as a superlative futurity, like "it will have been real" **Invalid source specified**.. The example Massumi argues around is Bush speech about the war in Iraq in 2004, in which he said that although the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was not true, "we removed a declared enemy of America, who had the capacity of producing weapons of mass destruction, and could have passed that capability to terrorists bent on". "Having the capacity" and using the perfect form in conditional sentence, "could have passed", which show the premise is not real and the conclusion is less than a real possibility, are characteristics of the affective true: there is no possibility for this "fact" to be realized, because the condition was non-existent; but there is a pure potentiality which comes from the affections, the feeling of the infinite threat of terrorism in the air, and this affective potentiality effectively constructs the affective true. This is the case in Nivea's advertisement, too. If she could have used the Anti-Stress Nivea Deo, she would not have feel any stress in a security and control society, in a society in which everyone is already subjected to (micro-) surveillance.

theatre and performance, designating the false or the fake (in intra-human relations) to theatre and the true to performance, the Nivea advertisement and so many other similar situations blur the binary between these two, since they – like performance arts from Abramovic perspective – produce the conditions for *real* human relations to emerge, and at the same time turn these “real” human relations to commodities, objectified and ready to put in the cycle of capital production and accumulation. This is what Italian autonomist thinkers call *the hegemonization of immaterial labour* in which the “performance” has a central role.

3.3.1 The Performative at Work

Contemporary reformists and activists have been long talking about the transformations that happened through the new economic order inside social institutions. Terms such as neoliberalism, globalization, immaterial production, and cognitive capitalism have been brought into play to explain these institutional changes particularly after the 1960s.

Inspired by Italian (post)autonomist thought, the focus has been on a transition that “is *fundamentally* from the hegemony of material labour to that of immaterial labour” (Negri, *Logic and Theory of Inquiry: Militant Praxis as Subject and as Episteme* 62). The hegemonization of immaterial, affective, and performative labour marks the distinction between what is called now Post-Fordism (related to Neoliberalism and corporate globalization) with Fordist mode of production in the first half of the 20th century, or in a broader sense, the difference between “formal” and “real” subsumption in Marx.

Immaterial production is highly dependent on living beings and their affections. Exploitation, thus, needs thoughts and sentiments more than muscles in this era. Indeed, “the current passage in capitalist production is moving toward an ‘anthropogenetic model,’ a biopolitical turn of the economy” in which “the production of forms of life is becoming the basis of added value” (Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth* 132). The production of forms-of-life, on the other hand, shifts the focus from disciplining and homogenizing the subjects and producing objects to the creation of “*the world within which the object exists and ... the world within which the subject exists*” (Lazzarato, *From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life* 188). Thus, performativity as the basis of

subjectification and the production of form-of-life becomes centralized. Mårten Spångberg, as a dance specialist, observes the same phenomenon when he writes, “One could say that the world has experienced a shift of focus from manufacturing, to production of goods, to performance and movement” (Spangberg 8). Thus, the most valuable contemporary knowledge is, borrowing from Lyotard, “performative knowledge.”

Additionally, the Marxian concept of “general intellect” (Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Political Economy* (Rough Draft) 706) is often summoned to explain this capitalist transition. Writing about the future implications of scientific-technologic innovations and the importance of fixed capital, Marx argues that “the development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it” (ibid). General intellect refers here to an open, always altering *Whole* of societal knowledge that not only is productive, but also invents forms-of-life. In other words, general intellect becomes the hegemonic force of production *in general*. It is therefore not necessarily subjugated to capitalist production, although capitalist “apparatus of capture” (see Deleuze and Guattari 424-473) absorbs general intellect and turns it into a vital function of its development, leading many contemporary theorists to view the contemporary relationship between capital and society as “parasitic.” “The general intellect has been increasingly seized by capitalist valorization in recent decades” (Raunig, *Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity* 17), and thus various mechanisms of *performative knowledge production* are at work in order for contemporary “cognitive” capitalism to function and ever greater portions of the general intellect to be captured.

The abstract terminologies of immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism find more concrete explanations in the critiques of neoliberalism after 1960s. The notion of precarity and its political interpretation in the term “precarariat”, which is supposedly an alternative for the proletariat, refer to this actual aspect, where “precarity refers ... to the labor conditions that arose after the transition from life-long, stable jobs common in industrial-capitalist and welfare-state economies, to temporary, insecure, low-paying jobs emerging with the globalization of the service and financial economy” (BRE 115). It is also incorporated in the outsourcings of cheap

labour in third world countries, the immigration of workers from the global south to the global north, the mass displacement of refugees, precarization of residence, and so forth.

Having entered forcefully into the lives of citizens, the precarity of neoliberalism thus extended itself to all aspects of life, into the very realm of human existence. While writing against the neoliberal transformations in educational institutions, Cote et. al., for instance, defines the neoliberal project as “a complex web of practices and institutions that have the effect of perpetuating and multiplying various forms of interlocking oppression” that is able to divide and manage the “populations” and brings about a form-of-life immersed “in capitalist exploitation and state-based, rational-bureaucratic control” (Cote, Day and Peuter 319).

3.3.2 Territorialized Arts: The Creative and Culture Industries

The main difference between Marx’s notions of formal and real capitalist subsumption is where the latter not only seized upon the production process and subsumed the constituent power of the multitude under its own “universal” logic of production, but also changed that very production process by its technological innovation and the seizure of General Intellect and performativity. Here lies the principle we brought about in the first chapter: “There is no outside to capitalism”. This fact implies that arts and artistic production have also transformed drastically during these historical changes.

“Creative and Culture Industries” (CCI), coined not so long ago by policy makers, is a key-term for understanding these changes. The term has been accepted warmly by art institutions; and for the sake of it, there have been lots of cultural policies – introduced by the USA, European Cultural Committee and other international institutions – which also try to develop this industry in the Global South.

One example of this exportation is “creative cities”, “a Central Europe Programme project in which five partner cities (Ljubljana, Genova, Gdansk, Leipzig and Pécs) collaborated to further develop and promote CCI potentials” (Mierovec and Kavas 24). Actually, CCI is very important in contemporary Europe and “represent more than 3% of total Europe Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) and 3% of its employment.” In other words, as Mierovec and Kavas put it, “CCI are drivers of innovation with positive spill-over effects on the rest of the economy” (ibid 28). Indeed, CCI strategy in Slovenia as a non-developed eastern European country was quite successful: 4.4% of employment, 9.6% of all companies in there, and a GVA (GDP – taxes + subsidies) per employee which is more than the overall rate in overall economy (ibid). CCI policies are always effective for an economy with open borders for neoliberal market. Hito Steyerl addresses the same problematic when she is talking about the politics of contemporary art (Steyerl, *Politics of Art: Contemporary Art and the Transition to Post-democracy*):

Contemporary art is no unworldly discipline nestled away in some remote ivory tower. On the contrary, it’s squarely placed in the neoliberal thick of things. We cannot dissociate the hype around contemporary art from the shock policies used to defibrillated slowing economies.

What Hito Steyerl is referring to by using the term “shock policies” is the neoliberal economic policies which were mainly theorized by Milton Freedman and have been used in various parts of the world – such as post-coup d’état Chile, post-war Iraq, post-apartheid South Africa. Naomi Klein calls this “disaster capitalism” in her work *The Shock Doctrine* (2007).

The main territory of CCI is the Global North (Western European Countries, North America, Australia and Japan). It is enough to walk in the stations of London’s Metro in order to see how advertisements about toothpaste, shampoo, chocolate and so on have been mostly replaced by posters advertising the latest performances, dances and movies. And not surprisingly this term was articulated by a British policy-maker from New Labour party. After New Labour took the government in 1997, the department of National Heritage was changed to the department of Culture, Media and Sport. Chris Smith, its new chairman, published a book very much associated with the party’s new policy on this issue in which he renamed cultural industries as creative industries and called for setting up a “creative industries task force” including many big names and important figures in British art scene (O’Connor 4). However, one cannot separate the rise of creative industries from Neoliberalism, since the history of creativity “cannot be considered independent from the institutions and forms of governmentality in which it takes place and which it engenders” (Nowotny 19) and this form of governmentality is exactly what is commonly called,

aftermath of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, *neoliberalism*. Since the implementation of neoliberal policies in the West has been historically attributed to Thatcher's conservative government, the UK can serve as a good example for tracing the transformations in arts, particularly theatre and performance arts.

3.3.3 Art's Territory for Aufführung

Before Thatcherism took hold in the United Kingdom, its Arts Council had a different perspective on funding arts, which can be defined, following Baz Kershaw, as a "humanist liberal" perspective according to which the "artist has something special to offer to society that transcends any particular political or economic regime" (Kershaw 42). The Art Council of Great Britain was formed in 1944, during World War II, under the name of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) to protect British Culture, but the name was changed to the Arts Council of Great Britain after a few years. Regardless of this change in name, what persisted and served as the motor of its governing policies was the modernist idea of the supremacy of culture and art; a remnant of the Enlightenment's humanist and liberal ideals. For instance, Roy Shaw, the chairman of the council from 1975 to 1982, "approvingly quotes Iris Murdoch's dictum that art is 'a training in the love of virtue'" (ibid). Consequently, by funding policies of the Arts Council, arts were supposed to be partly protected from the business sphere and were to remain not-for-profit activities open for all. It was out of this perspective that cultural institutions were built for the sake of the bourgeois class as the supporting ground of liberal humanist ideas and historical context for producing this discourse around culture and arts.

But after "the Iron Lady" took power in 1979, immense budget cuts and the deregulation of the market changed the nature of every sphere of society. Business models have been promoted in every "industry" since then and the Arts Council was no exception. William Rees-Mogg, the new chairman of the Arts Council, was himself a strong supporter of this transformation of the sphere of Arts and Culture into a business one with a strong corporate perspective. He had a good factual reason for this: "The arts have an excellent sales record, and excellent prospect. Customers are growing in numbers" (qtd.in Kershaw 43). And these customers, the so-called "audience" of the

arts, are the “vanguard consumers of a new art renaissance” (Kershaw 37). Here again, considering Steyerl’s reference to contemporary art and contemporary capitalism, numbers and percentages, 1% and 99%, problematize both arts and its audience: what kind of art for the 99% camping in Zuccotti Park, how much (self-) excluded is this art from that “new art renaissance”?

Although it seems that visual arts are more fitted within neoliberal policies and its spaces like cultural centers, museums and galleries, theatre and performance arts have never been immune and ultimately suffered the same fate. In the case of the UK, “the invasion of a new cultural economy into British theatre in the 1980s and 1990s can be clearly traced ... under Thatcherism theatre became subject to increasingly market pressure” (ibid). This policy, on the one hand, directly turns performance into a commodity, or better, an *immaterial commodity* and the other hand, leads to the “degeneration of theatre art as a result of economic pressure” (Dombroski 96).

The impact of new policies in theatre transformed it into a business with a strong focus on marketing. Like any other contemporary capitalist immaterial business model, the traditional boundaries between production and consumption are blurred in theatre and performance: theatre programmers first construct the network of consumers and then provide them with the commodities. There’s even the prestigious term “audience development” coined particularly for this process (Kershaw 46). Moreover, the dominant genres and productions are also referring to this change of perspective in theatre and performance: increase in musicals and fun performances, decrease in classical theatres, decrease in original works, and astonishing rise of adaptations.

This problematic is by no means a contemporary capitalist one. The same *attitude* enraged Artaud, among many others, to “protest against the idea of culture” where according to him, “true culture operates by exaltation and force, while the European ideal of art attempts to cast the mind into an attitude distinct from force but addicted to exaltation. It is a lazy, unserviceable notion which engenders an imminent death” (Artaud 10). One can say, however, this commodifying attitude of corporate capitalist culture toward arts has been intensified after Neoliberalism in an unprecedented pace, due to the paradigmatic change from material to

immaterial production. In such a way, a particular territory has been erected for the performance arts.

A territory is a pre-defined space and time with pre-established codes to regulate its affairs. It comes out of a process of “territorialization”. For instance, performance is fixed on some spaces, time, and functions through territorialization carried out by creative and culture industries.

The specialized space in which theatre and performance art are performed is theatre saloon or theatre building. This place is itself an embodiment of all territorial capitalist codes running in performance art field since the beginning of bourgeois theatre. In other words, “theatre building is not so much the empty space of the creative artist, nor a democratic institution of free speech, but rather a kind of social engine that helps to drive an unfair system of privilege” (Kershaw 31).

When the Russian revolutionary avant-garde artists started their new forms of “eccentric theatre” and “the theatre of attractions” after the October Revolution, their dream was to tear down the boundary between spectator and actor, theater and everyday life, workers and artists. But as Raunig points out, “in the practice of Soviet theater around 1920, however, it was evident that the hierarchy of the spatial and social architecture of the theater thwarted the realization of these far-ranging goals.”

Richard Schechner describes the hierarchical architecture of the proscenium theatre, a form developed from seventeenth to twentieth century, as a class-based architectural form which embodied all pre-established social values of its time in itself. Schechner’s analogy between theatre and factory serves as a consideration of conditions of production in theatre itself:

Theater workers enter through a backstage door unseen by the ticket-buying patrons. This is a version of the industrial practice of separating the factory where goods are produced from the store where they are sold (Performance Theory 179).

One could say that the description Schechner gives (the division between factory and store) is the division between buying and selling processes theorized by Marx in the first volume of *Capital*. This division leads to another one, which is between labour and leisure -- leisure as a time for reproduction of energy in the workers for the next day labour which is often spent in

consumption of goods. According to the latter division, “theatre is a place to go when work is finished; it’s not meant to be a rival of work” (ibid 183). This was true according to the production conditions of that time, with a strict separation between production and consumption, labour time and leisure time. But this border has been blurred in contemporary capitalism. Now, “the developing theatre estate is integrated to the disciplines of late capitalist consumerism, paralleling the spread of shopping malls, heritage sites and other tourist venues” (Kershaw 32). This space of touristic consumerism provides its consumers with a “pleasurable submission” (ibid) like a proper café, or a fancy restaurant, to make them digest the foods provided for their hungry souls. Schechner, for his part, is not unaware of this difference: “The proscenium theatre is a model for capitalism. Today, as capitalism evolves into corporate capitalism, new kinds of theatre arise. Cultural centers and regional theatres are examples of corporatism” (Schechner, Performance Theory 183).

But the theatre building is not equal with the territory of theatre. The territory of theatre has certain socio-political functions: (1) theatre as a process of audience training: it means how audience should perceive certain things.; (2) theatre as a system of cultural production that aims to shape the formation of society in terms of class, gender and race; and (3) theatre as a method of spatial indoctrination or a system functions to embed values in audience (Kershaw 31).

From this perspective, theatre has been subjected to many critical discourses so far. For example, Gramsci accused bourgeois theatre of promoting “white slavery” (Gramsci 306). Moreover, according to him, “the great social import of theatre consists in its capacity to provide occasion for collective intellectual recreation” and now it’s designed for profit (Quoted in Dombroski 1986, 95). He believes that the most popular plays of his time, “written and staged to satisfy the tastes of the middle class”, had a very definite political function: to preserve the status quo and produce consensus.

Louis Althusser shares almost the same concerns with Gramsci. Althusser considers classical theatre as a state apparatus which tries to maintain the existing order through the process of identification (Althusser 15). One can even refer to Lefebvre’s conception of theatre “as a space of domination shaped by the ruling ideologies of society, made for purposes of power and control

that too often work against the interest of [the] majority” (Kershaw 31). Bourdieu also criticizes theatre from another point of view which is closely related to other criticisms. According to him, “theatre produces ‘a miracle of predestination’ through which different groups – playwrights, actors, critics, audiences – are constructed according to hierarchical principles” (ibid). The theatre which serves as a guardian of hierarchical capitalist order is itself organized hierarchically.

To summarize, here, the elements of the theatre-as-territory, one could ask the following questions to find out a way to consider these criticisms: how to not exclude the audience from the theatrical means of productions (flesh, communication, signs, space)? How to not restrict the produced theatrical value among a certain range of privileged audience? How to not cooperate in capitalist value production? How to not reproduce the hierarchical organization anymore? These are the possibilities that open up through the performative event, either in a theatre piece such as Peymann’s or in the streets.

The solution that has usually been given for avoiding the effectiveness of embodied socio-political values in the space and time of theatre is that of having active participants or committed performers and artists. On the one hand, Ranciere’s critique of Brechtian theatre would reveal the problem of participatory theatre, since Brecht, in trying to propose certain higher values and ideas and heighten the awareness of masses, presupposed himself as being on a higher level of knowledge and power in relation to those masses he wanted to liberate (The Emancipated Spectator). On the other hand, “the active occupation” of theatre as a territory which is marked by all those capitalist values cannot be liberating on its own, since the subjective, performative action is already limited by the context in which they perform that action.

Gramsci, in spite of criticizing the theatre which helps to maintain the established order, uses the term “theatre of struggle” in a strategic conceptual context as a way to reach the victory for those “who are apparently inferior to enemy” (Gramsci 271); in other words, theatre of struggle is way to achieve hegemony for the people. The use of theatre as a term here points to the importance of theatrical actions and reactions in a society, or one could say it’s a reference to a struggle at the level of political “representations”, both of which can lead to the realization of hegemony for those who are apparently inferior to the State of situation. Hence, the assemblage of a

performance machine with other social, desiring machines, a problematic that will be further discussed.

3.3.4 Politics' Territory for Aufführung

The term “performance” acts as a bridge between different realms: from politics to arts to linguistics to management, from theatricality to performativity, from ritual to the social. The most important – and perhaps the most confused – oscillation of this term happens nonetheless between the virtual and the actual, whose connection corresponds, according to our previous discussions, to the relation between the performative and the theatrical. Particularly in Butler, performance becomes the repetitive “a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established”, a “ritual social drama” (Gender Trouble 178) that constructs the social identities and consequently, social segregations. In this fashion, Butler borrows Turner’s notion of ritual and turns it into a “normative performance” (J. MacKenzie 223) which belongs to the realm of an already constituted power. Butler warns that this performance-based identity “that regularly conceals its genesis” (Gender Trouble 179) characterizes it as a product of a performative process – i.e. the theatrical as the subjection of the performative to *the already socially established meanings*. On the other hand, a performance-oriented reading of identity makes way for considering that concealed genesis, that hidden performative dimension which is beyond the representational and identitarian theatricality of social performances; and in this way, it makes thinking toward altermodernities possible. Thus, there exists something as established territories of politico-social performances that, like the artistic territories, have been constantly contested and surpassed.

3.3.4.1 Against the Vanguardist Trap

From this perspective, the modernist avant-garde's view shares the same problematic with vanguardist revolutionaries: they are both still caught in the apparatus of representation. The territory of theatre is in the end a territory of representation delimited through textually determined bodily acts – a performativity subjected to the drama – and theatre avant-gardes, in

trying to transform this territory through different means, acted as its progressive, self-aware representatives that can define its path toward emancipation and teach it to the people. It was their self-contradiction, for they also became the source of inspiration for the activists of performative radical politics in 60s and 70s. One of the most famous figures of Yippie movements, Abbie Hoffman, characterized “The Museum of the Streets” as the space of radical politics. “For us, protest as theater came naturally”, he writes, depicting “guerrilla theater” as “the oldest form of political commentary” and referring to Artaud as a theatre avant-garde who called for a “new poetry of festivals and crowds, with people pouring into the streets” (Hoffman).

The same goes with the vanguardist revolutionaries who considered themselves not only as the progressive, self-aware representatives of the oppressed masses, but also the inventors and preachers of a new social performance toward salvation. They, too, are still sources of inspiration, as we often hear activists mention Lenin, Luxemburg, Bakunin, and so on. The inspiration, nonetheless, does not go beyond showing respect for old revolutionaries and the reason lies in the radical difference of contemporary movements with their predecessors.

Two of the main aspects of the contemporary performative politics, as discussed above, has been its communal character and its autopoietic feedback loop, both resulting in a non-hierarchical, “headless” bodily organization. The altermodern performativization thus keeps its distance from party politics as well as State politics, even if this party claims to be progressive or revolutionary (Leninists, Stalinists, Maoists, Trotskyists, and so forth).

Although this aspect of performative politics started in May 68, it has become hegemonic in post-2000 protest movements, due to the long artistic and political experimentations with performativity after the 60s. Even in May 68, vanguardist ideas were still prominent and powerful, and they were sometimes transformed into authoritarian forms of being-together in „transgressive“ patriarchal communes such as Otto Muehl’s *Friedrichshof* or else, their believers found their way into the highest ranks of political or economic elite against their initial impulses – Jerry Rubin for instance, whose path started from the countercultural *Yippies* and ended in main-stream elitist culture of Yuppies, from the “Museum in the Street” to the Museum in Wall Street.

As a playwright, novelist, poet, filmmaker (in sum, as a *dramatist*) and an official member of Communist Party who always made art for the dispossessed and the poor, Pier Paolo Pasolini's reactions, denouncements and appraisals to his contemporary performative movements of 60s and 70s in Italy and the United States, I believe, exemplifies the still-emergent characteristics of *performative eventness*.

In an infamous, highly dramatized poem, "*I Hate You Dear Students*", Pasolini showed an unexpected, and strange, reaction to the violent clashes between protesting autonomist students and police in the streets of Rome. As an *official* member of the *official* Italian Communist Party, as a romantic lover of the rural tradition in Southern Italy, as an eccentric artist, it was not surprising that Pasolini would not immediately support non-hierarchical, extra-parliamentary autonomist movements that were criticizing Party politics of all kinds. However, to support the attacking Policemen (as true commoners) against the defending students (as bourgeois middle-class "spoiled children") was considered by many as a banal, unethical, senseless provocation. The sociological class-related observations of Pasolini as an *official* party intellectual were outdated and wrong, and no longer carry any historical significance, as they have been proven wrong through decades of the precariat performative resistance and struggle. The comments came from Pasolini's vanguardist point of view; the one who rejected the students' offer to join them on the ground in order to know them better. As Simona Bondavalli writes, "[Pasolini] and fellow intellectuals, continued to talk *about* young people and *to* them, more than *with* them" (Fictions of Youth 151). That is why, according to Bifo, Pasolini "did not understand the meaning of the student movement of '68". Pasolini did not figure out the fast-changing character of class compositions and similar to his fellow Orthodox Leninists, considered students as privileged middle-class children who have been separated from the real economy in their ivory tower of Academia. Consequently, he did not find any "class element" in the student movement: "You are their children,/their hope, their future; if they reproach you/they are certainly not preparing a class conflict/against you! if anything,/the old civil war".

This story was in no way historically unique; rather, it is still repeating itself absurdly till our times. When the *People's Global Action* (PGA) called for its first global resistance carnival on 16 May 1998 and the first global street party, called for by London Reclaim the Streets happened in the

streets of more than 30 cities in that day, the reaction of all “professional politicians”, whether right or left, was the same. May 98 was a perfect timing for the first appearance: thirty years after 68, May was conceived in terms of its global significance as both the G8 and the WTO had meetings, respectively in Birmingham, United Kingdom and Geneva, Italy. The WTO’s Second Ministerial meeting was aimed to discuss the so-called Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); a set of rules which could deregulate foreign investment and oblige less developed countries to violate the rights of their people, mostly workers and farmers, in exchange for greater foreign investment. This was accentuated by the fact of the G8’s simultaneous meeting of eight of the world’s most powerful countries, all of whom would directly benefit from the MAI’s corporate-friendly rules. But the PGA organized the global action days in this month in a very novel way, precisely because the PGA itself was neither a party, nor a formal organization, but *a network*: “While the PGA does not define itself as an organization, it holds a distinctive organizational philosophy based on decentralization and autonomy. It has no head office, no central funds, no membership, and no representatives” (Notes from Nowhere 2003, 96). In Birmingham, RTS threw a street party in the center of the city with 6000 people dressed as clowns and blocked the whole functioning of the city, while 75000 more protestors formed a human chain around the summit building. In Geneva, 10000 marched through the city and big, sometimes violent clashes happened (Notes from Nowhere 2003, 104). In this first global action day, through the massive street protests and NGOs’ active interventions, MAI was defeated and never passed. That was the first public appearance of a new collective subject, replete with theatrical costumes and props, dressed as clowns or comic book characters, singing or playing music, dancing and partying in the middle of huge streets, performed the very joyful nature of protesting against what they saw as a cold-blooded, irresponsible, unequal, and sad “corporative globalization”.

Due to the PGA’s novel organizational nature and their spectacular use of performance art and theatrical tools, the events on May 98 baffled authorities, mainstream media and even traditional leftist parties. “Who ARE these guys?” wondered the *Financial Times* after the defeat of the MAI” (ibid, 66). Even some years later, after other events in Seattle (99), Washington (2000), Quebec (2001) and Genoa (2001), the confusion didn’t disappear. An activist describes this confusion by

referring to British political commentator Hugo Young who “attacked the ‘herbivores’ behind anti-capitalist protests for making ‘a virtue out of being disorganized’, while the head of the World Wildlife Fund referred to us in Genoa, as a ‘formless howling mob’”(ibid). The spokesman of Europe’s Transnational Police Agency (Europol) also commented that “we don’t consider them terrorists.... We’re not yet sure how to even label them” (ibid) and another media commentator described the idea of the movement as a must “to go back to stone ages [...] to destroy the industry and everything”.

Pasolini the Italian director was among the skeptics of the youth movements, but later he changed his mind. His trajectory in dealing with the emergence of new forms of struggles and new collective subjectivities is illuminating.

An agitator and avant-garde provocateur, Pasolini is still an artist of extreme contradictions and paradoxes. Although he didn’t accept the student’s invitation to join them in the protest, he praised American intellectuals who “threw their body into the fight”, pointing already to the performative significance of new forms of struggle (Bondavalli 151). For him, the United States could only function as the birth-place of this contemporary form of creative dissent, for which Pasolini suspiciously puts the adjective “new” inside quotation mark, since Italy has already the revolutionary language of official Communist party:

Look at /the Americans, your adorable contemporaries, /with their foolish flowers, they are inventing /a “new” revolutionary language! /they invent it day by day! /but you can’t do it because in Europe there already is one:/can you ignore it? /yes, you want to ignore it [...] abandoning the revolutionary language /of the poor, old, official Communist Party of Togliatti /you have adopted a heretical variant of it /but on the basis of the lowest jargon/of sociologists without ideology (or of the bureaucratic daddies) (qtd.in Bondavalli 152)

Ideology has been the main critique of official leftism against the contemporary performativizations of dissensus. Even after the 2011 Occupy Movements, traditional leftists lamented that “‘the streets are full but the churches are empty’ [...] in the sense that, although there is a lot of fight in these movements, there is little ideology or centralized political leadership” (Hardt and Negri, Declaration 90). Already in chapter two, the shortcomings of the

modernist ideological insistence and anti-modern critique of modern ideologies have been both discussed, where ideology should itself be considered as a particular actualization or arrangement of differential forces in the society, and not vice versa. But making the similarity between the ideologue and the priest exhibits the very centripetal forces of the Orthodox Leninist struggles; those repetitive normative performances that do not contain any difference in nature, since all of them logically tend toward the constituted Power of the State. “Every time desire is betrayed, cursed, uprooted from its field of immanence, a priest is behind it. The priest cast the triple curse on desire: the negative law, the extrinsic rule, and the transcendent ideal” (A Thousand Plateaus 154), wrote Deleuze and Guattari, thinking about the same forces. They identified “the Center or the Signifier” as the “faciality of the despot” which necessitates the church or the temple and the palace as the space proper for “the priests and bureaucrats” of the State apparatus, pointing to the inclusive modern structure of arborescent thought not only in Major politics, but also in Major literature and arts working inside, as Guattari would say, *the tyranny of the Signifier*. However, an apparatus – *dispositif* – is not only the instrument of the rule and oppression of the Signifier, but is also the immaterial compositions of those lines that categorize and produce the necessary bifurcations and segmentarity of the current order of things; a problem that we will soon return to it.

Coming out of the mentioned paradoxes, Pasolini later recognized the new nature of his contemporaries’ movement and described them as “something fluid and indescribable” although “extraordinarily democratic and fascinating” (Bondavalli 157). The very force of the Italian autonomist movement drew the artist of the poor to itself, and saw Pasolini eventually cooperate with *Lotta Continua* (Continuous Struggle), “a leftist organization that mixed Marxism, Maoism, and anarchism with a generous helping of Christian radicalism”; so much so that Pasolini gave up his previous insistence on ideology and accepted that “the priority of these young militants is passion and sentiment” (Bifo, *Pasolini in Tottenham*). The fluidity and indescribability he recognized in 1969 has been a constant characteristic of the performative event in the interconnected fields of art and politics. In contrast to the traditional theater, where spectatorship meant sitting fixed on the seat and fixated on the stage, performative art events gave the freedom of movement and the fluidity of acting to its *crowd*. Performative politics

offered the same fluidity to its crowd, against the rigid identities of people and/or masses, and the same freedom of movement to the protestors who are not anymore beholden to the authority of either the Party or the union. In the same manner, whereas the traditional theater could be described by dramaturg-playwrights, commentators, reviewers and critics in their textual endeavors, performance arts proved to be too non-representational (thus open to contingency and difference instead of being all planned) to be describable.

After the Seattle protests of alterglobalization movement in 1999 against the WTO summit that resulted to the shutdown of the summit and cancellation of talks, these same characteristics baffled the security officials who were unable to take over the situation by means of their outdated strategies of oppression against urban struggle. To understand the new “monster”, the Pentagon commissioned the RAND Corporation, a policy consultation think tank, for the purpose of producing a study on *Carnival Against Capital*. The study (Arquilla and Ronfeldt) described the movement as “the NGO swarm”, pointing to its fluidity, and warning about the governments’ difficulty to deal with such an organizational character, “because it has no leadership or command structure and ‘can sting a victim to death’” (Mittal), shedding light on its non-representationality.

For someone such as Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, himself an active participant in the Italian autonomist movement, , and in spite of all his false observations in *I Hate You Dear Students*, Pasolini was still seen as someone who could still forecast the maladies of centripetal forces of the vanguardist, of “followers of the Leninist Faith ... in power”; those who “were only fighting for power, were only aiming at taking power from the hands of their parents”, those who “accepted and justified the concentration camps of Joseph Stalin, the crimes and lies and oppression of the Soviet nomenklatura ... and hailed the proletarian dictatorship as a step towards the bright future of socialism” (Pasolini in Tottenham). This cannot apply, as Bifo insists, to “the entirety of the movement”, but it shows the tensions inside the movement. In other words, the autonomist movement had another inner movement that was fighting against the vanguardist ideas, rejecting them by its very constituent power of a heterogeneous, multiple collective body.

These antagonistic forces define the limits of a political performance, drawing the correspondent diagram where the performative events are responsible for destroying, outflanking, and blurring them. If the theatre avant-gardes reproduce the territoriality of theatre albeit failing in their attempts to surpass its limits, the vanguardist do the same regarding the representational territory of politics and its corresponding performances; a territory that can be called *major politics*.

Major politics forms itself around the molar identities: there should always be a homogenous nation, people, *Volk*, citizenry, for a major politics to function (Thoburn 8). These collective identitarian bodies, although necessarily crossed by multiple lines of flights and heterogeneities, function as (non)audience for the modern acting of sovereignty and governmentality, calling by them, becoming hegemonized as we discussed in chapter two.

The molar functions of hegemonization, nonetheless, do not work in a linear way, bestowing the same status to all spectators of the major political performance. “Whether we are individual or groups, we are made up of lines and these lines are very varied in nature”, wrote Deleuze and Parnet, designating these different natures by lines of rigid or molar segmentarity *and* lines of more supple, molecular segmentarity (Many Politics 124). The first type produces “clearly defined segments, in all kinds of directions” to inscribe the molar identities through families, armies, schools, professions, etc. The second type of lines is where the constituent forces, the desires, start their creations and becomings: molecular versus the molar movements of the former. Regarding our previous discussions on *Potesta* and *potentia*, there is no contradiction here; rather, the second type of lines are curvy, broken, in-between lines of performativizations that can crystalize in the first constant, delimited line-segments that are by definition bounded by two distinct end points.

The molecular lines *subsist* underneath of the molar segments that delimit the territory of major political performances, the performances of governmentality. Here, both meaning of the performance, in art as well as in management, mixes with each other, since the societies of control and the contemporary capitalism, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, has their own biopolitical lines of subjectification and their own profit-oriented performativity. However,

if the performative event is disruptive of the already established limits of the performance stage, then differential relations of performativizations are the molecular lines of events. In order to see how the major political performances and performative events can be differed from each other, a critique of “social performance theory” – a theory that is blind to this very differentiation – would be helpful.

3.3.4.2 The Spectacle and its Political Performance

Not all political performances [*Politische Aufführung*] are political (and aesthetic) events [*Ereignis*]. This differentiation was re-asserted in the previous chapter through the notions of major/minor politics, corresponding to molar segments and molecular lines.

The recent and emerging field of Cultural Pragmatics and Social (or cultural) Performance theory seems to neglect this difference, flattening all antagonistic forces in a generalized theory of performance in societies, that stretches itself from time immemorial and its mythical simple societies to our contemporary so-called highly complex society. This sociological analysis borrows ideas from classical theater studies, based on the modern categories of actors, audience, signs, and meanings, considering the social performances “analogized systemically to theatrical ones” (Alexander, *Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy*), and mixes this with Saussurean linguistic methodology, in the sense that the performances’ significations can be studied through the duality of *Langue/Parole*, i.e. diachronically and synchronically. The mixture assumes an evolutionary tone, with characteristics typical of Hegelian historical narratives, where the simple societies with their simple rituals become more sophisticated and develop cultural performances that are ritual-like.

Despite its constant reference to the “performative” (and contemporary performance studies), Jeffrey C. Alexander’s conceptualization as the main theorist of Social Performance do not get near the main conceptual differences that the performative turn in arts and politics created after the 1960s. The first presupposition behind this conceptualization is the existence of an already provided stage on which “an individual or collective actor must be able to communicate the meanings of their actions that they consciously or unconsciously want others to believe”

(Alexander, *Performance and Power*), providing a modernist and representational definition for performance where “the systems of collective representations ... background every performative act” (Alexander, *Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy* 33). Based on modernist binaries, the model for performance obtains a rigid structural character in which all elements, all possible dramatizations, are already defined in order to provide Alexander an “analytical model of social performance safely in hand” for analyzing “earlier societies” as well as contemporary “social developments” of “performative action” (ibid 32). There is no contingency involved in such a performativity; in fact, this performance can be accomplished “by becoming an actor in a script” (Alexander, *Performance and Power* 2), in a pre-written dramatization which makes no room for the fluidity of the performative subjectification processes. The notion of performativity is here conceptualized from a pre-performative turn perspective, identified with theatricality, subjugated to the textual-dramatic, and in such a way that “like any other text, these collective representations, whether background or foreground, can be evaluated for their dramatic effectiveness”³⁰.

Performance here is nothing but the Butlerian normative performance that constructs rigid identities, with a crucial difference: in Butler, performativity disrupts performance, bringing about a non-discursive alternative that resists mere identities. By contrast, in Alexander, there is no difference in nature between these two sides. Alexander finds its theatrical perspective on Marjorie Boulton’s definition of theater as “literature that walks and talks before our eyes”. It is not surprising that Boulton gives such an Aristotelian, classical definition of theater, enslaved to literature and writing in general, since she writes mostly in Esperanto, a language that is itself constructed according to a universalist idea of the One against the multiple. This theorization thus has nothing to do with what we have called in our previous discussion the performative radical politics, or the performative event (as *Ereignis*).

The simplification process of this sociological theory, which claims to be a theory on “the performative”, reaches its height by putting the major politics of the established order and the minor politics of the protest movements beside each other: social performance theory does not

³⁰ Beckett’s *Catastrophe*, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, can already function as a critique of this perspective.

even separate dissensus from consensus, State politics from grassroots politics, medialized spectacular happenings in the level of governments from bodily co-presentation against the main-stream apparatuses of representation. For instance, in another text in the seminal collection of essays by social performance theorists (Alexander, Giesen and Mast, *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*), the Clinton/Lewinsky affair become an example of “event-ness”, confusing four concepts of *Performativität*, *Aufführung*, *Event*, and *Ereignis* by using them interchangeably.

Therefore, social movements are considered as social performances that function as an umbrella term covering almost every kind of happenings in the field of politics. The scholars with this perspective would consider indifferently social campaigns against and for Clinton, Obama electoral campaign, Chinese cultural revolution, Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Gezi, the Egyptian revolution, as all belonging to the same category of social performance (Alexander and Mast, *Introduction: symbolic action in theory and practice*). But as Saul Newman rightfully points out, the occupy movement involves “the creation of autonomous spaces and relations rather than the representation of identities [or messages] to power” (*Occupy and Autonomous Political Life* 93).

In my interviews about Gezi Park protests with Turkish activist-artists, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the mainstream analytical perspective of performance studies on the recent social movements that does not, in its analysis, differentiate between various occupy movements in different local contexts. In a lecture in Berlin, Turkish art critic Süreyya Evren also insisted that the creativity in Occupy Gezi cannot be compared similarly with the creativity in the Global North contexts such as Occupy Wall Street. Although Evren did not elaborate any further, the point seems fairly clear: there are different problematics as ideas, different performativizations, different molecular lines of flight, and thus different subjectification processes at work when one looks at the respective occupations in Istanbul and New York.

In his lecture in the same conference in Berlin, Alexander analyzed Obama’s 2008 election campaign not only in relation to the Occupy Movements after 2011 regardless of their singular contexts in the Global North and South countries, but also in juxtaposition with Chinese Maoist

peasant revolution and cultural revolution decades before all these movements as well. For him, these performative actions are all measured through certain structural criteria of success such as theatrical identification, emotional catharsis, receiving and accepting “your symbolic projection” as inevitably passive observers. a performativity which is paradoxically not processual, but result-oriented, which means a non-performativity, or any other concept rather than performativity.

What is more, these theoretical confusions, says Alexander, have been made and ultimately justified as the necessary means for erecting “a systematic, macro-sociological model of social action as cultural performance” (Alexander, *Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy* 31). And herein lies the problem: one cannot study the micro-social processes in daily life and particularly in social movements with a macro-sociological model that adapts the perspective of the constituted Power, of the molar segments and major politics; and precisely when one must necessarily assume an other methodology which affirms, with Spinoza, that even the rigid *Potesta* of an absolute monarchy is the product of the fluid *potentia* of the multitude.

In social performance theory, just as it is with Modernity’s social projects, reduction and homogenization go hand in hand. First, all the performance stages are homogenized. It is not important how the stage was constituted, whether it was preexisted or autonomously created by the collective body. Nor is it considered where and when the stage erected, i.e. under what conditions and limitations for a social performativity.

Even in Austin’s philosophy of the performative, one should consider the conditions of a performative utterance, or better, to see how it works. When Austin refers to the criteria of success as part of his pragmatics, it is not a utilitarian pragmatics. The performative utterance should change the reality in order to be a successful performative utterance and this transformative power comes from its ability to establish new (social) relations – as in the case of his famous example, the relation of marriage between two individuals. In Alexander, on the other hand, this criterion becomes the success of manipulation: make others believe what you believe or you want them to believe. It is a shift from the terrain of constituent power of performativity, its transformative power, or better, of performativizations, to the terrain of ideology, that is a certain actualization of power relations.

Moreover, the bodies are also homogenized under social performance theory. Even if we think in terms of audience and actors, there are different layers of spectatorship from which various groups try to make a stage for their performance.

Let us consider Occupy Wall Street as a social performance against the State's spectacle. There are those who are already considered as legitimate actors of the dominant socio-political scene, the so-called 1% and the professional politicians. The citizenry as a whole, the so-called 99%, function as the spectators. However, there are various inner barriers inside the citizenry, categorizing the citizens with their proximity to higher ranks of power relations' hierarchy. From the color of the skin to sexuality, age, profession, ethnicity, and so on, all of which affect one's role as spectator who shares in the performance to the extent that they are distinct from *those who personify its representative function*. Like a usual performance involving food sharing in an established theater salon, only the spectators of the front seats will enjoy the full experience by tasting some of the provided material.

3.3.4.3 Dispossession, the Poor and the Inner Borders of Publikum

The more distanced spectators of the molar political scene are more dispossessed, poor, marginal, or subaltern; all designations that come out of contemporary political theory to give a name to the unnamed in societies. However, these are not pure victims of a monstrous system, but possess the power of constituting the being, the potentiality of flight and creativity. In their book on the performative in the political, Butler and Athanasiou (2013) establish a link between the transformative power of the performative and dispossession. While they do not forget to pay attention to the sufferings and oppression in the case of imposed processes of dispossession on different minorities and populations, dispossession brings about another implication in their analysis: the dispossession of molar identities due to and during performativizations in events, the dispossession that establishes a distance between itself and the State's apparatuses of spectacular performances. They are dispossessed of any agency in the theatrical spectacle of major politics, although being mentioned as part of political programs, not unlike P. in the Catastrophe. So-called "illegal aliens" in the official discourse, or the homeless poor, the

indebted, who rose in number after the 2008 Crisis, or the Black Lives – their gaze upon the limits of State’s representation may as well show the direction of the people to come.

Nonetheless, Butler and Athanasiou’s concept of dispossession is linked with the concept of “loss” and “lack” in psychoanalytic discourse, where – as previously discussed – the ultimate link between subject and subjection remains intact. Adopting our own perspective in the research presented here, the ontogenetic primacy of the affirmative and constituent forces over the negative, Hardt and Negri’s notion of the multitude of the poor proves helpful. Here, “the poor is defined by not lack but possibility”, which is productive with its own creative forces, but virtually not reproductive of capitalist production, since “the poor, migrants, and ‘precarious’ workers ... are often conceived as excluded, but really, though subordinated, they are completely within the global rhythms of biopolitical production” (Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth* xi). Although they define poverty as a characteristic of the multitude in opposition to property as a definitive element of Modernity’s sociality, they as well insist that this opposition “should be understood in terms of ... the forms of subjectivity produced”, where the poverty of the multitude names a production of social subjectivity that results in a radically plural and open body politic, opposed to both the individualism and the exclusive, unified social body of property”. The poor–those who are not really allowed in the game of spectatorship– migrate through the molecular lines of performativizations against the major spectacle and its conditions, and against its territorialization.

In the case of the occupy movements, this multitude of the poor breaks into four “figures of the subjectivity”, the Indebted, the Mediatized, the Securitized, and the Represented, whose creativity brings about the characteristics of altermodernities (cf. Declaration 2012).

(This breakdown and its corresponding analyses in the book, however, could be read as too eurocentrist, where there is fear of a fatal theoretical mistake: neglecting the differences between local contexts and their idiosyncratic singularities, between their singular bodies and major political spectacles, thus between their territories of the molar theater of the spectacle and the molecular theatre of production.)

The salon is anyway too small for the 99%: there are even people, like the “illegal” immigrants or the homeless, who are not counted by the State of the situation among the respectable citizens. Thus, to say one cannot generalize the actor and the audience of a social performance is not enough: the mere existence of the unrepresented paperless asylum-seekers, immigrants, and homeless people beside the middle-class intellectuals and artists, the precariat, and the indebted in Zuccotti Park delegitimizes the use of generalized actor-spectator terminology that flattens all the differences between bodies, of any structural territorialized conception of theatrical performance, and consequently, of social performance theory of Alexander and his colleagues.

The active appearance of such groups in Occupy Wall Street is a dynamic that cannot be accounted for by virtue of Social Performance’s methodology, or any other methodology that fails to observe the performative processes of this event. And contrary to the Social Performance perspective, the global heterogeneity of Occupied parks and plazas cannot be treated as similar and therefore comparatively theorized with the Clinton affair or Obama’s re-election campaign: they are different *in nature*.

Differing in kind and not in degree, one is forced to confront the fact that even the most humble of analogies between the OCW movement and other Occupy movements is quite simply untenable. For example, despite the fact that Israel had its own occupy movement in 2012, its domestic Arab population stayed out of its tent cities despite their being the most unrepresented minority in Israelisociety. Therefore, the questions that must be posed are as follows: how do the bodies of an occupation perform the idea of being together? How does the relationship between different bodies transform there in comparison to the dominant sociality? How do they recreate their temporality and spatiality through their performativizations?

The inner borders of a performance *Publikum*, and in a more general sense, of the public itself, have been one of the problematics that contemporary performance artist-activists have engaged with in different projects. Noteworthy here are the Hawaiian Diggers, a guerrilla theatre group in Hawaii, who dealt with the paradoxes of the public in a long-term processual project in their own manner. This project consisted of planting papaya seedlings near a fence bordering a privatized space accessible to the public and non-privatized public space, and then opening a free-shop

afterwards. Without getting into the specifics of their processual piece, it is worth underscoring the paradoxes these artist-activists found in the notion of the public:

The public comes to be understood as the group that *already* has access to private property where they can conduct all the other activities that life demands: sleeping, working, having sex, growing food. All those things that are banned from *public space*. For those without private homes or reliable access to food, or for those performing activities prohibited in public, “public space” becomes a zone of criminality (Chan and Sharma 181).

Nonetheless, taking a macro-perspective and thinking through the rigid segments in social performance theory has already enabled us to see better how the territory of performance from the perspective of major politics is territorialized, which in turn makes the cartography of its deterritorializing and transgressing forces easier.

Social performance theory illegitimately incorporates another element from contemporary performance studies; namely the disappearance of the duality between authenticity and artifice, or the real and the artificial, in order to justify its macro-perspective by rejecting any difference *in nature* between minor politics of performativity and major politics of the spectacle. Alexander and Mast claim that “the signified, no matter what its position in the manipulated field of cultural production, can never be separated from some set of signifiers”. Such a statement amounts to saying that there are no strata or unequal positions inside the field of cultural production such as those mentioned in the case of theater buildings, or in that of Occupy Wall Street, or indeed anywhere else in society. By way of this axiom, Alexander and Mast reject the ideas that point to the society of spectacle. “Commentators as Baudrillard announce, and denounce, the contemporary interplaying of reality with fiction as demarcating a new age,” they write, “one in which pragmatics has displaced semantics, social referents have disappeared, and only signifiers powered by the interests and powers of the day remain” (Introduction: symbolic action in theory and practice 6).

The disappearance of social referents does not signify incurable pessimism in politics as much as it signifies a paradigmatic, historical rupture between the disciplinary societies of industrial capitalism and the societies of control and micropower in the age of cognitive, performative

capitalism. Additionally, it implies that representative politics and the politics of representation are themselves dissolving under the weight of theoretical and practical crises, making the way for the best or the worst, as we have seen in the performativizations of occupy movement and joyful immanent politics, or in the incessant destruction machine of identity politics in contemporary civil wars. All these considerations, therefore, refute Alexander and Mast's claim that "we are 'condemned' to live out our lives in an age of artifice, a world of mirrored, manipulated, and mediated representation" (ibid 7).

Now, with the detailed critique of Cultural Pragmatics and Social Performance theory, we know what does not work as a performative event and falls within the realm of major spectacular performances. These are theories that conceive of an autonomous, open, collective body, with all its heterogeneities, differences, and minoritarian practices, in terms of a "static contradiction" between those who act and those who receive, between the communication of a meaning and the acceptance of that meaning, between the subject of enunciation (or here, main figures/actors) and the subject of statement (or here, script). There is, however, no relation of production between these two contradictory poles: in this semi-Hegelian theory, the two already-existing opposing poles exist and whose synthesis is simply the result of a more primary relation between opposing generalities. Therefore, there is always a macro-sociological stage for a molar politics based on competition (and there is a huge difference between competition and dissensus). The past of a social performance here is always the same territory of spectacular theater, with its rigid territorialization; its future, depending if it is *successful* in persuading others to identify with its own identity, remains as nothing other than the same spectacular theater, only now with different actors or limits.

A performative event cannot be a social performance of this kind: being performative, there exists a productive relation, an *ontogenesis*, between the bodies and their stage, that establishes transversal relations among the different layers of spectators, actors, the excluded, the marginalized. As an event, there should be something "ereignen" in the social relations, bringing about an alternative present by going *back* to the *future* (the temporalities of performative event will be discussed in the next chapter).

Speaking about the 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, Badiou argues that the European mainstream media have tried to represent the movement as a “static contradiction” (A Present Defaults). In this static image reproduced by mass media, the Ukrainian movement does not live its singular past, nor does it have a future; because its future – joining the European Union – is already a predefined *past*; an actualized historical drama. Therefore, static contradiction finds itself overdetermined by conditioning binaries such as West/East, liberal democracy/monocracy, market freedom/socialist Iron Feast; and its actors play their role to communicate a meaning as referents.

But the production of images, as a function of what Lazzarato calls “capitalist expression machine” (Struggle, Event, Media), is itself an aesthetic procedure that initiates its own molar subjectifications. And yet, a (re)productive relation remains enveloped therein: , even if some narrative considers it a static contradiction, there are biopolitical subjects reproduced by these processes to maintain the established order. This is the function of major political performances or its theatre of the spectacle. It is not detached from daily life, but is reproductive of daily life inside already-existing limits.

The cases of the “Artistic Hundred Group” and “Student Assembly” in Maidan Revolution are particularly helpful in this regard. Regarding the former, the “Artistic Hundred Group” was an initiative that was shaped by the movement itself, as a sign of loyalty or fidelity to it and whose name was a direct reference to the one hundred separate ways of organizing bodies in the square (there were around 100 initiatives in the Civil Council of Maidan that were practicing being-together and direct democracy). Perhaps most importantly, the “Artistic Hundred Group” believed that the organization of Maidan’s collective body should not be crystallized in any organic or hierarchical structure.

Maidan was indeed full of assemblies. “Student Assembly,” one of Maidan’s biggest formation, had organized movie screening, lectures in Maidan’s Open University, various theatrical and musical performances, and protests against existing higher education. But above all, they were a group living in an occupied administrative building, “where according to the police’s estimation a thousand individuals lived together”. Some of them still maintained and applied theatre of the

oppressed, a “Theater for dialogue”, alongside an autonomist and non-hierarchical organization, for the purpose of intervening in the civil war. Their organizers describe the collective body in Maidan as a body consisting of “anarchists, Cossacks, reenactors of historical events, Nationalists, Nazis, leftist intellectuals, Labour union leaders and active members, professional politicians, NGO workers and leaders, human rights activists, contemporary artists and just artists...”³¹. As one can see, these events do not let themselves be reduced to any homogenous spectacle. There is a complexity to the internal dynamics proper to the Maidan Revolution due to the particularities of the historical and material context of Ukraine in 2014; a complex dynamism that cannot be grasped by either main-stream media narratives or by Social Performance Theory.

Deterritorializing and transgressive, the performative event marks a rupture from the established territory by tending to its threshold, while simultaneously moving toward an alternative organization of forces – the direction of P’s gaze in Catastrophe.

Here we come back to our initial differentiation between the molecular and the molar, the virtual and the actual, the performativizations and the crystals. They are not in contradiction with each other, rather presenting us with a productive, and ontogenetic, relation.

Although we can distinguish aesthetically and performatively which acts are *not* participants within the performative event, we still need to see its function and how singular performativizations of each singular event, particularly for our main cases of different Occupy Movements. These moments, as Pasolini recognized, are *fluent* and *indescribable*, yet *immensely democratic*. These characteristics, therefore, suggest an aesthetics proper to the performative event.

3.4 Aesthetics and the Performative Event

³¹ The quotations are derived from my interview with an Ukrainian activist who participated actively in the movement. Further problematization of this heterogeneity that includes Nazis is presented in chapter three, in the discussion of the machinic function of “and”.

Considering the concrete usage of the term “event” for the production of the new in art and politics, it is not surprising that the performative event has been conceptualized via different, even sometimes antagonistic, perspectives of critical thinkers under the rubric of an *aesthetic-political* happening. In other words, according to Whitehead for example, each event is aesthetical when it works on time/space, folds onto them and folds them; and it is also political, because of the participation, or partaking of bodies in these time/space relations, transforming them and being transformed by them.

Aesthetics nonetheless brings about different implications in each theoretical endeavor on performative events which should be considered with their convergent and divergent lines of thought. However, in almost all of them, there is a reference to art, or better artistic practices, as a constituent element in eventness. Deleuze once wrote about Proust that “thanks to art, instead of seeing a single world, our own, we see it multiplied, and we have as many worlds at our disposal as there are artists, worlds more different from each other than those that spin through infinity” (Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* 187). When the Zapatistas declare their will toward *a world in which many worlds fit*, it is hardly far from such aesthetics.

3.4.1 Event as Aesthetic Dislocation

In October 1968, just a few months after the ‘events of May’, Gerard Fromanger and Jean-Luc Godard set up some red plexiglass bubbles on a street in Paris. The ordinary life in the street, all minor confrontations among people and between them and the space with their speeds and slowness, whatever that was happening in the streets, were reflexing in a distorted way on those bubbles. Passersby gathered around the plexiglass bubbles and Godard started filming their reaction toward the installation. After a short while, police suddenly intervened, smashed the bubbles and arrested the artists. We may wonder: what triggered such a violence reaction from police? And how did the installation of bubbles, streets, and bodies exactly work as a ‘work’?




Figure 1 - Godard and Fromanger red plexiglass bubble in the street. Image Extracted from the film ArtVille by Claude Yvans, 2016³².

Related to, and yet different from, Godard and Fromanger's installation is Khaled Hourani's project, *Picasso in Palestine*. On the basis of a loan request made to the Van Abbemuseum by the International Art Academy Palestine in July 2009, and following extensive research, the painting *Buste de Fern me* (1943), one of the most iconic works of the Van Abbemuseum's collection travelled to Ramallah, where it was exhibited in a specially constructed room inside the IAAP, June 24 to July 20, 2011. *Picasso in Palestine* laid down a challenge to art institutions, insurance companies, transport agencies, and diplomats, but most of all illustrated the Palestinian population's struggle for recognition and a normal life in the occupied territories. Picasso represented a normality in the state of exception, another dislocation, which was faced by strong opposition from Israel's government. Even more telling here is the works place within the history of the traffic of art objects to and from zones of occupation and exception and the passage of a painting from one occupation in 1943 to another in 2011; from the Nazi occupied Paris to Israeli occupied West Bank, Ramallah.

³² Video Available at: <http://www.creativtv.net/artistes/video/fromangerv.html>



Figure 2 – Picasso in Palestine: Picasso's "Buste de Femme" in International Academy of Art Palestine in Ramallah, 2011. Photo by Charles Esche³³

Yet another example belongs to a period of popular protests against Vladimir Putin, the president of Russian Confederation. The protest happened in 2012, when the occupy movements were spreading throughout the nation and even reaching extending itself to its continental borders. During these popular demonstrations against Putin, a puppet demonstration took place in the Siberian city of Barnaul, after a regular demonstration for fair elections was forbidden by the police. The demonstration of around 250 toys from Kinder eggs, Lego figures, toy soldiers, stuffed animals, and toy cars was met by police intervention and permission for more public demonstrations was refused on the grounds that these toys were produced mainly in China and were, therefore, not "Russian".

In light of these examples, it is perhaps Jacques Rancière's theory of aesthetics and distribution of the sensible that proves to be the most helpful. For Rancière, aesthetics does not primarily mean the study of the beautiful. It originally comes from the first critique of Kant, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which aesthetics is related to a priori conditions of sensual perception, which are space and time. Ranciere borrows this concept, and extends it to art theory via third Kantian Critique, the *Critique of Judgment*. He defines aesthetics "not as the theory of the beautiful or of art; nor is it the theory of sensibility. Aesthetics is a historically determined concept which

³³ Courtesy of the artist: Available at: <https://www.afterall.org/article/picasso-in-palestine.1>

designates a specific regime of visibility and intelligibility of art, which is inscribed in a reconfiguration of the categories of sensible experience and its interpretation” (Rancière, *Thinking between Disciplines: an Aesthetics of Knowledge* 1).



Figure 3 - Puppet demo in Barnaul, 2012. Photo by RFE/RL's Russian Service³⁴

On the other hand, molar society is formed by rigid segment-lines, those hierarchies that place each subject in a pre-defined space and time. This hierarchical sensory system is the relation between aesthetics and politics, or as Rancière puts it, “a well-ordered society would like the bodies which compose it to have the perceptions, sensations and thoughts which correspond to them” (ibid 9). In other words, aesthetics here should be “understood in the Kantian sense – re-examined by Foucault – as a system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience” (The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible 13). Consequently, Rancière introduces another term: the *distribution of the sensible*. This term refers exactly to those positionings in space and time which constitutes a society and its regime of visibility and intelligibility and specifies which objects and subjects should be seen, heard and thought of; or in political terms, who should be counted:

I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define

³⁴ Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/toy_protests_in_siberian_city_now_need_permission/24479678.html

the respective parts and positions within it (The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible 2).

In the realm of art, however, Rancière speaks of an aesthetic revolution, in which aesthetics appears as “a ‘finality without end’ [finalité sans fin], a pleasure disconnected from every science of ends” (Thinking between Disciplines: an Aesthetics of Knowledge 5). This aesthetic revolution interrupts the existing distribution of the sensible, intervenes in it, and redistributes the sensible in a way that invisible and inaudible subjects and objects could be seen and heard; where the objects and themes which have been excluded from the realm of art are included via a *redistribution* of the sensible, which abolishes the historical and material hierarchy between genres and the senses (or in political terms, uncouth people will be counted by an aesthetic revolution). For Rancière, this process of redistribution is characterized by a dislocation, understood as the introduction of specific phenomena within a regime of space and time whose internal logic actively prevents its appearance in the world. To make the invisible visible, is, if nothing else, the political dimension of aesthetics *par excellence*.

And this is how Godard and Fromanger’s simple performance in Paris became so threatening and elicited an excessive, if not absurd, response on the part of the police. They dislocated their installation or performance from galleries or theatres – where a performance is supposed to be performed -- into tense streets of Paris after May 68. This is how the performative *event* becomes performative *dislocation*. A dislocated performance always transgresses the limits of the theatre as territory; that is to say, performative dislocations are acts of deterritorialization. And it is precisely by grasping the that dislocated performances could provide an answer to those questions which were presented in the previous section.

Given the demonstrable limitations to theatre’s territorialization, an exodus from theatre buildings – which are the embodiments of established values – seems necessary. Kershaw correctly warns us that “it doesn’t matter much that we might have a critical attitude to these ideologies [represented by theatre]; the fact of their use is in part an animation of the values inscribed in the architecture” (Kershaw 51). Hence, acts of the performative unfold within the street and in public spaces, which have served as the field for political dissent theatre and

performance artists alike, and precisely because “art is political because it shapes a specific sensorium, suspending the ordinary coordinates of space and time that structure the forms of social domination” (Rancière, *Artists and Cultural Producers as Political Subjects*).

To locate the eventness of a happening or an artistic practice on the social aesthetics, that is spatio-temporal relations, presents another important characteristic of performative events: their processual being. Neither static contradictions, nor still images; rather, processes, differentials, performativizations are constituent of events. But this entails another aspect in the event that Rancière does not consider. This overlooked aspect marks another problem in the For what is overlooked within the Rancièrian theory of dislocation is its indifference to singular contexts, which is the condition of possibility for analyzing three examples from France, Palestine and Russia with the same abstract, conceptual framework.

3.4.2 The Aesthetic Production of the Creation

If we consider the Marxian formulation that “capital is a social relation”, then we can say that the Occupy movements were collective experiments, not only in exiting the globalized capitalist social relations particular to their local context, but also in temporarily creating new social relations through performative forms of politics. That said, we immediately encounter the limits of Rancière’s redistribution of the sensible via dislocation presupposes the already-existing spatial relations, and therefore aims only to disrupt, redistribute, and ultimately work inside them. What if the established relations can be altered, and give way to an alternative? Rancière does not include any ontogenetic, productive relation between the bodies and their spatio-temporal relationality in society; therefore, performativizations of political events are not considered in it. While it may be the case that “Being is made in the event” (Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth* 63), the ontogenesis proper to performativized political events is two-sided; i.e. events function “in a way that bumps ‘being’ straight into becoming” (Massumi, *Parables For The Virtual* 5). It is here where artistic practice situates itself: coming from the present through experimenting with it, putting the being into becoming, creating the new, performing another experimentation, and so on. “Art has this strange prophetic function: it is made in the present, from the materials at hand, but calls out to something else”, writes Sullivan on the contemporary characteristics of the event, pointing “to the importance of aesthetic processes in general - those

constructive ruptures - that are not necessarily held within art but that nevertheless effect a deterritorialization of subjectivity” (Sullivan 98). Therefore, aesthetics find another implication here, “in the sense of the production of the creation of something” (Lazzarato, *Grasping the Political in the Event* 15).

“The production of the creation” means triggering alternative subjectification processes that make creation possible; and creation is always the production of *the new*, or in our particular historical context, of *altermodernities*. But as we have seen, the major hegemonic mode of production has already put immaterial and performative faculties into work. “Subjectivity itself has become the most important objective in capitalist societies” writes Guattari, insisting that non-discursive, performative basis of subjectivity is attacked by capitalist forms of living (Lazzarato, *The Aesthetic Paradigm* 174). This is the reason that the aesthetic character of the event, according to Guattari, contains the inevitable rupture, the flight, from the dominant regime that makes space (and time) for the new; “something happens - a molecular event, a point of indeterminacy” (O’Sullivan 96).

We began this chapter with the delimitations of the performative not only in the creative and culture industry, but also in the new industry as a whole. Art as a separate field is already integrated into the world market and movements of globalization. Nonetheless, the efficacy of a performative event lies exactly here, too. “If artistic techniques appear to play a more and more important role in the processes of subjugation, they must also be mobilized for the processes of subjectivation” (Lazzarato, *The Aesthetic Paradigm* 175). It is in the assemblages between the artistic to the social and the political, which connects to each other through aesthetics, we can find the real implications of performative event.

The ethico-aesthetic paradigm purports to locate art's 'creative potential' transversal to every domain, characterizing and traversing 'political' experience. 'Art is not just the activity of established artists but of a whole subjective creativity' which traverses the most diverse domains and milieus, 'the generations and oppressed peoples, ghettos, minorities' (ibid).

It is this transversality that goes through all bodies, bringing the bodies of the poor onto the autonomous stage of their performative event. Moreover, "a certain kind of disinterested subject

is required for this operation to work". Therefore, this aesthetic creation amounts to the labour of the poor, all those who are *disinterested*, either in furthest seats of major political performance or excluded from it, all those who mark the paradoxes of "the public", where part of the performativizations of the event is creating alternative (social) relations of production. Hence, the aesthetic production of creation.

3.4.3 Arts-Politics: Machinic Assemblages

This research redefines artistic and political processes of subjectivation and creation in terms of its own method, by referring to a *potentia* that is able to transform the time and space, and creates its own common body. Therefore, what is here called performative in art and politics resonates with Benjamin's conceptualization of critically political art and literature in regards to the author as producer: such an art/politics should transform the dominant relations of production imposed on it by capitalist system. Updating Benjamin's modernist perspective, one should consider the colonial and post-colonial relations of production in each singular context, that invalidates the very ideas of modernity and modernism in relation to our research. Under this light, we are dealing with non-representational artistic practices that challenge not only the representation regime of art, but the regime of representation that persists by virtue of the functioning of political institutions.

Chantal Mouffe, for example, argues in favor of a supposedly radical reformism, which engages with institutions in order to transform into actually existing democratic institutions. Hence the reason for Mouffe's critique of the Occupy movements for their lack of engagement with existing institutions and intervene in the style of SYRIZA in Greece, or Podemos in Spain. On the other hand, various art groups and collectives engaged in the movements by making an exodus from institutions. Many of them warn against the dangers of Mouffe's views. Especially when, according to Hito Steyerl, contemporary art is inherently related to contemporary post-colonial capitalism (Steyerl 2010). This danger has been called *democratism*: the peaceful coexistence between different cultures and ideologies in a manner that best ensures the continued existence of the structure of globalized contemporary capitalism. Since the postwar global expansion of

the democratist doctrine, art has become one of its primary tools of legitimization: art exactly embodies the "freedom" that democratist rule claims to bring to the world.

Possibly the ultimate example of art as democratist propaganda is a notorious CIA funded project during the Cold War, the "Congress for Cultural Freedom," which among other things was tasked with globally promoting the works of American abstract expressionist artists in response to the pictorial regime of socialist realism as the officially sanctioned art of the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the CIA's "Congress," abstract art is free art.

First of all, democratism, through its permanent display of culture in the form of art, industrial progress, and even conquered people, aims at proving its capacity to engineer "peaceful coexistence" between different cultures and ideologies... Second, democratism's display of global peaceful coexistence is based on the fact that its engineering structure, formed by colonial capitalism, is not questioned or subverted itself, which would result in the immediate introduction of martial law or other "states of exception" in order to guarantee the continuation of democratism's rule. And thirdly, this engineering structure is defined by a continuous overlap between governmental forces and private ownership. (Staal, *Progressive Art* 60)

A more recent example is the "critical" theater group Orkater and the author Arnon Grunberg, who joined the Dutch troops in Afghanistan in 2006 (ibid 62). Both are known as critical cultural producers who have translated their experiences in Afghanistan to expose the ambiguities and paradoxes of war, the discrepancies between the home command and the war on the ground. Interestingly enough, it is not in spite of, but precisely because of this criticality that they were tolerated by the military. By their mere presence, the artists prove the success of democratism as an exported product: its transparency and self-critique extend to the point where war is being criticized even while it is being waged. However, this critique never brought the war to an end.

On the other hand, there is the enduring legacy of the PublixTheatre Caravan and its Volxtheatre Favoriten—a project that began in Ernst Kirchweger Haus (EKH), an autonomous squat in Vienna whose squatters were a group of autonomists, anarchists and Kurds. The performances of this agit-amateur-theater group consisted of free adaptations of classic dramatic works, operas in collaboration with music bands, cooperation with immigrants to address the problems of asylum

seeking, and so on. Their performative works were done without director, by collective processes of decision-making, while the group was open to other interested outsiders. Volxtheatre left its EKH immobile stage once the far-right party FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) was deemed to be a legitimate political organization, thereby allowing the FPÖ to enter into a coalition government with other conservatives. In response, a mass movement broke out in order to oppose its racist, xenophobic discourses, wherein Volxtheatre initiated a mobile strategy by setting off theater caravans for nine days of street celebration in nine different cities. And in order to further the groups experiment with performative practices, Volxtheatre shifted their focus away from protesting against the national policies to intervening at the transnational level, thereby becoming what is now known as the Publixtheatre Caravan, whose first tour started in May 2000 in support of asylum seekers and against Europe's migration policies.

As part of the preparations for the battle against the 27th summit of G8 in Genoa, the PublixTheatre Caravan, with participants from 10 different countries, traveled through Austria, Slovenia, Germany, and Italy, to places where borders could be problematized and migrant policies be challenged, and oriented itself toward the events which alterglobalization movement was planning to perform in Salzburg (against World Economic Forum [WEF]) and Genoa (against G8) (See Müller 2002). In a move against its abstract machines that dominate over the field of expression and the production of images, the Caravan broadcasted daily reports on the tour via mobile phone, the Viennese independent Radio Orange, and through online reports published by independent media web pages and activist mailing lists. With respect to the events that transpired in Genoa of that year, police arrested the whole caravan. In the wake of a court case that was highly covered by mainstream media, the Caravan found themselves frustrated by the fact that their image was appropriated by mainstream media, which shaped court proceedings, which ultimately led to the Caravan's announcement of their dissolution.

As we have seen in previous sections, the real subsumption of the creative faculties within the logic of capitalist accumulation appears as the fate of those involved in processes of artistic productions. After all, real subsumption could not mean otherwise. Rather, it testifies to the fact

that the modernist notion of artistic autonomy and its privileged critical position toward industrial production – because of its different regime of production – have been long gone. But it does not mean that autonomy of the processes of artistic creation, its singular subjectifications, and its virtual forces in envisioning a world of many worlds are gone. Instead, art should be seen as artistic *machines* that have the capacity to construct *machinic* assemblages with other social machines: either the technical machines of semio-capitalism, or the desiring or performative machines of social movements.

Machine here, however, does not refer to either technological innovations or new-age cyborgs. The word machine derives from the Latin word *machina* which means “machine, engine, military machine; device, trick; instrument”. This very Latin word is itself a derivation of the ancient Greek *mekhane* which refers to “device and means”. *Mekhane* is in the same family with *mekhos* (“means, expedient, contrivance”) coming from the root *magh* which means “to be able, have power” (that in the old English has its relation to the verb “can”). The etymology of the word shows that machine originally did not refer only to the mechanical or technological things and tools, but to device, expedient and contrivance as well. From the vantage point of its etymology, it is clear that ‘machine’ had an immaterial as well as material connotation. And as Gerald Raunig has helpfully reminded us, the main two fields of application for the word in antiquity were theatre (as theatre machines) and war (as war machines).

However, the various meanings of machine, from its use as a concept in texts and discourse in general, became limited in the 16th century. In the 1540s, according to the Etymology Dictionary, machine was defined by the dominant discourse as referring to a “structure of any kind”. This meaning became even narrower in the mid-17th century, when the term referred to a “device made of moving parts for applying mechanical power” and was applied as “apparatus, appliance and military siege-tower”. As Raunig, in the 17th century “there was a proliferation of metaphors of man as machine, of the state as machine, of the world as machine” (Raunig, *A Thousand Machines* 19-20); machine as universal metaphor for a purely utilitarian and functional order, on both of the micro and macro levels. The main impulse of this conceptualization of machine as purely functional and utilitarian could be related to the increasing speed of development and industrialization in the first stage of capitalism. And the dreams, horrors, and fantasies about

machines – which can be easily seen in the emergent genre of science fiction that time – complete this drama.

In the second half of the 19th century, there was a revival of the immaterial connotation of machine and is perhaps best seen in a famous section of Marx's *Grundrisse*, "Fragment on Machines". In this text, Marx explains the development of machines in the history of the development of fixed capital and its relation to the "general intellect". For Marx, the machine became qualitatively different from a simple tool, for while a tool can be used by an individual worker as a means of production, a machine is the objectification of skills and knowledge, and dominates workers via a regime of social subjection. In this fragment, the machine is described as an independent entity which consumes energy just like workers who consumes food: machine has a "soul of its own" (Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Political Economy (Rough Draft)* 693) and dominates workers to the extent that they become cogs in huge machinery. Therefore, Marx's analysis means that "the modes of subjectivation and socialization are certainly not to be regarded as the outside of machine (and thus to be constructed as machine metaphors) but rather as enclosed in the technical machinery" (Raunig, *A Thousand Machines* 22). Moreover, Marx's definition of the machine as an "automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs" (*Grundrisse: Foundations of the Political Economy (Rough Draft)* 692), shows that machine embodies both the material and immaterial labour, where the latter is the knowledge and skill embodied in it. In *Capital* (1986), Marx again returns to the development of machinery as fixed capital. He conceptualizes the machine as a means for producing surplus value and optimizing the workers' exploitation (see Raunig, *A Thousand Machines* 2010, 22). Crucially, throughout these texts, two aspects of machinery are revealed. First, "social subjection" as a relation wherein individual workers are relegated as parts of a larger whole, the centrality of the labour of individual workers is supplanted by the objectification of the collective skills and knowledge upon which the machine depends for both its existence and its productive function. The other one is *machinic enslavement*, which is the subjugated intellectual labour of those who invent, modify and run machines.

Deleuze and Guattari, in particular, returned to this concept of the machine and developed it further according to the contemporary material problematics that began to emerge with the era

of Post-Fordism. Deleuze and Guattari were critical of Marx's theorization of the machine because of on one hand, his linear evolutionary methodology which goes from the human to the tool to the machine, and on the other hand, his anthropomorphic and anthropological viewpoint on machines, which led him to analyze and understand machines in terms of human characteristics. The main perspective that Deleuze and Guattari develop in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* could be summarized via two primary points: there is no contradiction or dichotomy between nature and human, or nature and culture/industry; and the whole society is organized by and through machinic assemblages. They give a new conceptualization of machine to not only use the previous development in the concept but also make a conceptual rupture which, as it shall be explained further, was a result of the performativization of May 68: "A machine may be defined as a *system of interruptions* or breaks. These breaks should in no way be considered as a separation from reality; rather, they operate along lines that vary according to whatever aspect of them we are considering." (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* 36).

To be sure, this definition remains ambiguous. They clarify their definition further by adding that a machine "is related to a continual material flow (*lzye*) that it cuts into". This continual flow can be material: for example, a flow of milk that connects mother's breast machine to child's mouth machine. Or else, it can be immaterial: a flow of transgressive desire that connects performance machine of Living Theater to revolutionary machines of alterglobalization activists.

Thus, the important aspect of the machines is that they function only in relation to other machines. For example, the mouth machine of a child plugs into the breast machine of its mother: it breaks the flow of milk. But on the other hand, the mouth machine will plug into the digesting machine of the child and it gives a continual flow to this machine. Therefore, "every machine is a machine of a machine. The machine produces an interruption of the flow only insofar as it is connected to another machine that supposedly produces this flow" (ibid).

Machine, thus, is primarily a communication factor. The question about the machine "is not a question of essence, but of the event, not about *is*, but about *and*, about concatenations and connections, compositions and movements that constitute a machine" (Raunig, *A Thousand*

Machines 19). When we define *machine* as an intersection of flows, then the problem is no longer the essence of the machine as such but its connections and disjunctions: *how different machines plug into each other and form different assemblages, bring about new machines, and so on*. Unlike *Stelark's* performativizations of the Idea of the machinic, Deleuze and Guattari show how the machine is neither a mere prosthesis attached to the human nor its replacement, and it is not a celebration of human-machine such as cyborgs. The machine is a matter of *assemblage*.

Looking from the perspective of artistic machinic assemblages, the question is no longer “what is a political art” or “what is a political performance”; rather, it is a question of how performance machines, political machines, revolutionary machines, artistic machines, and so forth relate with all its others, plug in and out from each other, and form different assemblages. Consequently, the critical autonomy of aesthetics and arts assumes an altogether different meaning from that of its modernist conceptualization; a transformation that Pil and Galia Kollektiv, for example, point out in an interview:

There has been much writing in recent years suggesting that with the cooptation of creativity into post-fordist labour, art loses its autonomous critical position. We would argue against this position because it is precisely the collapse of such boundaries that allows artists to operate in solidarity with workers in other fields, opening up new prospects for political engagement. It is because it is not autonomous that art can be critical (Kollektiv).

Machinic assemblages, whether they be artistic, political, or social, harbor within themselves the potentiality of a creation, whose processes of deterritorialization confront the majoritarian and spectacular-political performance with an aesthetics of the capacity for creation particular to machinic assemblages themselves. With the help of artistic practices, machinic assemblages pose “the problems of the construction of 'being-together' and the modes of political subjectivation” (Sullivan 176). Polyphony and heterogeneity, processual creativity, autopoiesis, and communal being-together: these are the constituent elements of the aesthetics of the performative turn. And it is in light of this aesthetics of the performative event that we can grasp the liminal practices that occurred within the machinic relation between arts and politics, by those who become well-known as *artivists*.

3.4.4 Limits and Transgression: the Performativization of Deterritorialization

For a discussion on artistic practices in performative politics, we go back to the PublixTheatre Caravan. Performed without any director overseeing their works, the Caravan's works were realized via collective processes of decision-making while maintaining an open relation to interested outsiders (Müller). Rejecting the vanguardist perspective, while Volxtheatre Favoriten did not make theatre *for* the immigrants, thereby *representing* their interests, needs, or subjectivities; rather, it made theatre *with* and *among* them. Moreover, to a certain extent one could say that there was a pre-existing atmosphere at EKH, which encouraged a heterogeneous population in terms of nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, language, and even political views. Within this context any collective experimentation there necessitated inventing practices that were devised to specifically deal with a non-identitarian and non-hegemonic body. That said, Volxtheatre, or any of its individual performances, is not in itself *the performative event*. Through its machinic assemblages, it functioned as a performative collective body that perpetually situated itself with respect to the *evental* processes, always in alteration and becoming, changing tactics and deterritorializing the stages it contributed to their creation, and thus forming assemblages with other fields (social and political) by means of performative aesthetic practices. Further on its course of performative practices, while the shock of Carnival against Capital in Seattle was still reverberating, Volxtheatre changed the focus from protesting against the national policies to intervening on a transnational level. *Volx*-theatre became *Publix*-theatre: "one world, no nation; Anarchy instead of Austria" (Müller) and under such a slogan, the first tour started in May 2000 in support of asylum seekers and against Europe's migration policies. The performative practices designed to blur the boundaries, shared the communal affects, and triggered their own singular autopoiesis:

Provisionally occupying public space to temporarily put on a different play, with Publix-Kitchen, propaganda radio, street duets, hocus-pocus and pie fights, among other means, demanded from the travelers not only being able to deal with the organization of an everyday life rich in conflicts in a constantly changing large-scale collective, but also permanently flexible situation-related forms of action and overcoming the cliché boundaries in their own self-image (Müller).

As it was mentioned before, as part of the preparations for the battle against 27th summit of G8 in Genoa, PublixTheatre Caravan, with participants from 10 countries, traveled through Austria, Slovenia, Germany and Italy, and in a move against the dominant expression machine and its image production, Caravan broadcasted daily reports on the tour by mobile phone and the Viennese independent Radio Orange as well as online reports to independent media webpages and activist email lists. "The broadcasts were ... an important aspect of the strategy of self-determined representation and offensive visibility. The wish to sovereignly create the images of the caravan, in contrast to images from spectacular media machines *and* in contrast to clandestine political strategies ..." (ibid 225). Contrary to what the social performance theorists believe, the appropriation of image and its construction in what Baudrillard called "hyperreality" wiped out the classical distinction between original and copy, presence and simulacra. The performative event, then, is a way to disrupt this projective apparatus through aesthetic creation.

Having been arrested in Genoa and forced to work under the post-9/11 conditions, the PublixTheatre Caravan changed its strategy again and focused more on media art to engage differently in the struggles around migration policies and border violence. The new project, "NoBorderZone", was to expand the possibilities of virtual networking (Müller) by organizing the 2002 Noborder Camp at Strasbourg. The Noborder Camp lasted from July 19 to July 28 and saw the participation of 3000 artist-activists from different countries. With the novel and singular form assumed by the Camp alongside the experience of this form of collectivity on the part of the artist-activists in attendance, can serve as an abstract, we discover a prototype or model for the Occupy Movements of 2009. Essential to the idea of the Camp was its performative protest against racism and security measures implemented by European countries; especially after September 11, when EU member states hindered and blocked the movement of both activists and immigrants within the European Union's borders (September 11, 2001 marked a drastic intensification in security aspects of globalization): "Where the 'enemy' was previously perceived as an external one, now there is a blending of this external 'enemy' and a new 'dangerous class' within the nation-state" (Raunig, *Art and Revolution* 243).

In order for the EU to identify this new type of enemy, international security measures not only reinforced the external borders between countries, preventing even European activists in the

blacklist to move freely in the Schengen area; they also developed internal borders, checking the people regularly in trains, buses, metros, and according to Etienne Balibar, separating groups of people from one another (Raunig, *Art and Revolution* 245). Therefore, an intensive segregation and separation among different actors happened through an omnipresence bordering procedure. If a performative political event transgresses limits, it sure needs to deal with all these external and internal borders.

At the same time that the EU was reinforcing its internal and external borders, a very bold internal critique was circulating among the activists. After Seattle and Genoa, the narrativization of these events by mainstream media outlets gave a picture of alterglobalization as *One Movement*. A process of hegemonization of different heterogeneous groups, demands, ideas and practices was put to work, the performance projected as spectacular theatre of violence and destruction, and simultaneously neglected all other protests in non-western countries. This image of One Movement could endanger the whole idea of intercontinental networks, altermodernities and the affirmation of differences in parallel actions (see Hardt, Porto Alegre: Today's bandung? 2005).

It is against the backdrop of the spectacular narrative of the existence of one, singular and homogenous, movement, that we can grasp how the artistic practices of the Noborder Camp inaugurated a shift in organizational tactics, which were themselves devised in response to these issues. The Camp was erected not only to protest against, and resist, the establishment of borders, but also to reaffirm the heterogeneous multiplicity of all the movements of alterglobalization and the existence of altermodernities beyond any hegemonization. The *artists* of the camp did not allow this performative act to be represented by mainstream media, and the Publixtheatre Caravan, Indymedia, and Radio Orange/Helsinki covered the event using the terms and practices immanent to the movements themselves. On the other hand, there was no submission to any utopian perspective of a world without borders. According to Raunig, "the concrete practices of the noborder network do not aim so much at an elimination of borders, but at strategies of thematizing, making visible, performatively opening borders" (Raunig, *Art and Revolution* 247).

Artivists chose Strasbourg for *performatively opening borders* for two reasons: first, the location was a “highly contested Schengen border” between France and Germany that has changed its nationality five times in the last 500 years (Kuemmer), and second, the Schengen Information System (SIS), the database including all those who applied for asylum and who are in the black-list, is located in this city. Furthermore, considering the proliferation and intensification of internal borders that delimits small territories of performance for different groups, the Camp’s three thousand international artists and activists were supposed to live together in a “ten-day laboratory for creative resistance and civil disobedience” that made their performativization of daily life a vital aspect of the whole experience.

Daily life in the camp was organized into different “barrios”, which were arranged around a kitchen, a toilet block, a garbage collection point, and a discussion area. The distribution of the participants among the barrios was free and changeable and was by no means intended to reproduce a distribution according to countries (Raunig, *Art and Revolution* 257). With workshops, exhaustive discussions, and hot debates, the landscape of camp seemed to be chaotic: “If anything, this microcosmic model of a ‘functioning anarchy’ was an instance of how the actions and energies of the ‘multitudes’ might translate into concrete realities on a day to day basis in a possible future away from capitalism” (Sengupta), writes Shuddhabrata Sengupta, an Indian participant in the camp.

Happening on a literal contested border, this performative event worked on different types of limits, and transgressed them inside its own autonomous stage as well as outside it. There is a dialectical approach to the relation between law and transgression that puts the transgression of law already within the remit, or logic, of the law itself, whereby every law can only be established around its exception. From this perspective, Bataille’s concept of transgression is a decidedly pre-Kantian one (for example, see Zizek, *The Parallax View* 2006, p 95-6). The presupposition behind such a claim is a conception of transgression as surpassing the established limit, going from one identity to the other, from inside to the outside, which leads to nothing but the expansion of law and the establishment of new limits in order to transgress them again. This dialectical perspective sees limit as a contour, as an absolute definite line, *a rigid segment*, which separates the inside from the outside, one identity from the other.

There is a non-dialectical conception of limit, however, which doesn't see it as a definite line or contour, but understands limit in the paradigm of power as a *zone of force*³⁵. The limit of a thing is the termination, or ending, of a mode of existence that is predicated upon its powers of its indefinite expansion. The borderline of a forest, its limit, is never a linear set of trees marking the place when inside is finished and outside begins; rather the intensity and density of forest gradually diminishes until there is no forest anymore. Limit, in this sense, is not a line but a region or a zone. Thus, not pointing to a line segment to show the exact location of a limit; rather *tending toward* the limit.

From this perspective, transgression of a limit does not mean surpassing a linear limit, a movement to an *outside* that reiterates and demarcates another *inside*. In the same manner, transgressing the law does not simply mean disobeying the law, which amounts to submitting again to the rule of extended law after transgression. Rather, the limit is always a threshold toward which the molecular, differential lines of performativization tend in order to *performatively render the threshold as open*. "There's always a border, a line of flight or flow, only we don't see it, because it's the least perceptible of things. And yet it's along this line of flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape" (Deleuze, *Negotiations* 45).

Thus, the performative event is located on the very borderline, and its transgression "does not overcome the border to make it disappear, it is the gesture that changes the border *inside it*: a change that does not consist in the absolute division of identities, but in enabling a flowing space, in which differences oscillate, collide, process" (Raunig, *Art and Revolution* 252). Seen under this light, we can say that the Noborder Camp was an experimentation with the limit, on the limit, toward the limit, and for the purposes of transgression: transgressing the limit as that which separates not only different geographical places, but also individuals and groups in the same geography, even boundaries separating colored from white, and Eastern from Western among those very artists. There is no utopian illusion for flattening all the particularities, but to performatively open them toward each other, making machinic assemblages and constructing

³⁵ For further details, see Deleuze, *Seminars on Leibniz*, 1987.

common performances in these border-zones. In other words, it was the immaterial flow of a transgressive desire that connected the performance machine of PublixTheater Caravan to the informatic machine of Indy Media through the abstract machine of NoBorderCamp. *Altermodernities* emerge inside and outside of these unique assemblages of performative events. Deterritorializing and transgressive, the performative event marks a rupture from the established territory by tending toward its threshold, while simultaneously tending toward an alternative organization of forces. In Sullivan's words, "there are always two faces to any given assemblage in this sense, one looking inwards, one looking outwards; a principle of cohesiveness and one of escape; an autopoiesis and an allopoiesis" (Sullivan 96). And in light of the Janus-faced nature of assemblages, the question we are forced to confront is the following: '*How do you escape?*'

3.4.5 Autopoiesis and Allopoiesis

On 25 June 2010, many people in Alexandria wore black, went to the coastal line that extends 32 km along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and stood there in silence, with their back toward the city and their face looking into the horizon of the sea. Each individual kept five meters distance with the other to get around the emergency law of Mubarak's government that banned gatherings of more than three people. It was *as if*, with their back to the city, thousands of people in a long chain along the seafront were leaving the old order and setting off on a journey through the plane of immanence (something akin to Foucault's description of the mad journey on the ships). It was *as if* the people were reenacting the Ancient Egyptian Exodus drama, where the sea was parted, and the enslaved people escaped the rule of the tyrant.

The event was the first mass appearance of dissensus that triggered by the brutal murder of Khalid Mohamed Said under police custody on 6 June 2010 and led to a series of protests that finally, on 25 January 2011 (the so-called National Police Day in Egypt) toppled down Mubarak's long-time autocracy. The movement in June 2010 named itself as "We Are All Khalid Said" (كلنا خالد سعيد). Like what we have said about the case of Ned Ludd, Khalid Said became a proper name that distinguished between the zone of constituent forces, enriched by people's performativizations of alternative social relations and performances in Alexandria and later Al-Tahrir Square, *and* the constituted Power of the State, its police forces, and its "good" relations with the global capitalism and Western emblems of Modernity.

What happened on June 25th, 2010, has often been described as a “flashmob” or “smartmob”. The stage of this contemporary form of performance is the metropolis. If immaterial labour functions through new communication and information technologies, flashmob is the direct product of implanting these innovations in performance art; and through combining them with “performative bodies, and social machines, they form new assemblages offering new methods of living, performing, and communicating within society” (Walker). There is no individual artist who creates something for the gaze of viewers; in this collective cooperation of present bodies, performers are usually commoners taking part in a simple performance, who appear suddenly, perform the flashmob, and disappear again. A flashmob swarms, disrupts, disappears. And as a political form, it was indeed not the invention of Bill Wasik or the result of his “boredom” in 2003, as he boldly claims (Wasik 19). The form had a tradition in rave parties and Hakim Bey’s TAZ -- that we discussed in chapter two – and then, various performative political expressions during the Global Action Days from 1998 to 2003. However, to make an assemblage between bodies and new communication technologies made it a potentially powerful form of political expression; powerful enough that even before the first arranged flash mob could happen in *Claire’s Accessories* in New York City, police intervened and closed the shop’s doors. It thus gained popularity soon. In Detroit, for example, a group of queer activists organized the 'Detroit Guerrilla Queer Bar', “which targets a local straight restaurant or bar for 'swarming' on a designated night” (Hewitt).

But one should be careful in describing the flashmob as a performative political form of expression. Considering the capitalist (re)territorialization of the performative – discussed in the beginning of this chapter –, not surprisingly flashmobs are now mostly used in marketing and advertisements. Wasik himself pointed out that the flashmob is now a phenomenon of consumerism and hipster culture. “In fact, the flash mob, which dates back only to June 2003, had almost entirely died out by that same winter” he harshly comments, “despite its having spread during those few months to all the world's continents ... it was, in its very form ...intended as a metaphor for the hollow hipster culture that spawned it”. (Wasik 2006, 56)

The one-hour flashmob or smartmob in Alexandria, however, cannot be included in such a definition. It was a singular assemblage between bodies of the poor whose welfare had been

attacked by WTO and IMF policies and their neoliberal Western-friendly dictator/decision-maker, bodies of the youth who were suppressed by police brutality, of the mothers whose children went missing, *and* various technologies of communication: not only online social networks, but also via older means such as word of mouth; although later, after the revolution, the media could represent it as a carefully curated performance by a single curator who worked for Google.

An Egyptian director from Alexandria described the event for me, of which she made a short video clip and uploaded it under pseudonym, as a performative No to the government. “Imagine! Thousands of people wearing black and standing in front of the sea. And if you consider the geography of Alexandria, that it is basically a narrow city extended all along the coast, it becomes stronger”, she said, and continued to explain the government “cultural performance” to counter this event. The municipality organized a festivity that day in the honor of the city of Alexandria. The carnival happened in front of the coastal line, with huge trucks and banners practically hiding the people in black who, a few meters further close to the sea, were standing silent with their back toward the established sociality. The exodus is contagious; it needs to remain unheard, untouched, and unseen.

Exodus is not only a refusal of current sociality; for it also has a creative side that, through its performative aesthetic practices, leads to the production of alternative subjectification processes. The historical drama behind this concept dates back to the biblical drama of the Jews, who escaped from the Egyptian pharaoh’s army, crossed the Nile and went to the desert. That was the beginning of their nomadic mode of existence, which for centuries did not turn into an immigration – such as *Hijrat* in the beginning of Islam – to another permanent settlement. Reflecting on the meaning of “being Jewish” according to this historical drama, Blanchot considers “the exigency” of being Jewish as “the exigency of uprooting; the affirmation of nomadic truth” (Blanchot, *Being Jewish* 230). Nomads do not root in any firm ground, but are always in displacement, changing ground, and refusing to establish their constituent power as a permanent constituted power: they refuse the State-form. According to Blanchot, nomads refuse to be fixed, “to plant oneself in the earth, to establish oneself through a pact with the permanence that authorize sojourn and is certified by certainty in the land” (Blanchot, *Being Jewish* 230). But this avoidance of permanence is not the only truth of nomadism; rather, the

more important aspect of nomadism is its affirmation of constituent power, or what Blanchot calls "making people". Exodus can make the collective subject, just like the biblical exodus which made "of the slaves of Egypt a people" (ibid).

The difference between a negative exodus and an affirmative one can be described by the difference between the immigrant line of flight (or line of deterritorialization) and the nomad line. The immigrant line is an escape, a deterritorialization which is nonetheless relative and it goes from point A to point B, passing through sub-territories in the Territory -- i.e. the apparatus -- but not the Territory itself. The nomad line, rather, is passing through and in between points "leads the movements of deterritorialization into a current" (Raunig, *A War-Machine Against Empire*). The nomad line is offensive; it opposes power everywhere immanently by giving way to desiring machinic assemblages, and develops its constituent power. In other words, exodus is a machinic assemblage between two constituent processes: autopoiesis and allopoiesis. The first one signifies a self-making that aims to give birth to an alternative sociality, one that is unknown to the existing system.

That said, let us not romanticize any concept: nomadism has also been re-appropriated, very similar to flashmob, in the hipster culture and all creative and cultural industries that set the urban youth as their target consumer demographic. But the nomadic journey that started on 25 June 2010 brought about its own people that could overcome the highly centralized, hierarchical, violent, and corrupt *Potesta* of their situation and its corresponding social relations (or aesthetics). One may ask then, how did it restore itself through the military coup in 2013? The possible answers lie in the problem of temporality, which will be taken up in the next chapters. For now, what must be attended to within the performative process are those that explicated itself against the backdrop of the established social order by moving through a sea of virtual socialities that can be performativized in a processual performative event.

3.4.6 In/corporeal Transformations

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze defines event as a "pure effect" (p.1), which happens as a *conjunctive* operation on the temporal *disjunction* between past and future and therefore, eludes the present. A disjunctive conjunction, for it happens in the present only in order to elude it; but

a disjunctive conjunction of disjunction, since future and past are in a disjunctive relation in the present. Such is the paradoxical nature of an event. But it still works on another disjunction too: the disjunction between fixed beings and infinite becomings, between the limited and the excessive. From this perspective, the event appears as the moment when what is excessive surpasses that which is limited (Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* 3), thus actualizing a process of deterritorialization.

The event is paradoxical in another sense, too: it is simultaneously a conjunctive operation on seemingly disjunctive elements, as well as a disjunctive operation on the imposed unity of the current state of affairs. The latter is an interruption in the (re)production of order, while the former is a production of the new. Thus, one may say that event is a paradoxical force of production: a productive anti-productive happening, a work of the poor. Yet, if there is a disruption and a creation, an autopoiesis and an allopoiesis, what does really change throughout a performative event and how?

In a letter penned on his 40th birthday, Benjamin recounts a Hasidic-Jewish “saying about the world to come”:

Everything will be arranged there as it is with us. How our parlor is now, it will be in the world to come; where our children sleep now, they will sleep there in the world to come. What we wear in this world, we will wear that in the world to come. Everything will be like here – only a little bit different. So it is with imagination. It is only a haze that imagination extends over the distance. Everything may stay there as it stood, but the haze seethes and everything beneath it transforms itself imperceptibly (In Der Sonne 419-20).

An imperceptible transformation is what the world to come means that nothing remains the same imperceptibly, molecularly, although we will wear the same things and arrange our rooms in the same way. And following Benjamin, Arditì argues for a similar quality of performativity in Occupy movements, writing that their performativity “designate an activity that is already changing things here and now, ... by pursuing ‘enacted utopia’ [or the imagined world-to-come]”. But what is the function of imagination that Benjamin assigns the transformative utopian power to it?

During and after the Al-Tahrir Occupation, a graffiti of two small astronauts appeared on the walls of Cairo, depicting humans floating in outer space, among many other graffiti portraying pop figures such as Batman, Joker, or Ghandi. Due to their emergency function as revolutionary propaganda, such urban art forms cannot be exactly explained as metaphors or symbols; rather they reveal a trajectory of experimentations with “performative” politics, trying to create what Shukaitis (2009) calls “poles of imaginal recomposition” (Shukaitis, *Imaginal Machines: Autonomy & Self-Organization in the Revolutions* 82). This recomposition of affects and affections acts as a medium of exodus from the current imaginary affective system of sensibility. And it plays an important role in the performativization of altermodernities, which should be able to differentiate themselves from the already existing social sensibility.



Figure 4 – Astronauts in Cairo: graffiti appeared in 2011 Revolution in Cairo, Photo © Soraya Morayef via <https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/>

The Association of Autonomous Astronauts (AAA) is another example of such experimentation toward imaginal exodus (and recomposition). AAA formed in 1995 “as a response to the

continued militarization of space through programs such as Star Wars” (Notes from Nowhere 2003, 92). The Association acted not as an affinity group or an organization, but as an umbrella name under which many groups in a network-based horizontal association joined forces. On the one hand, the activism of AAA was defined by a struggle against both the exclusive access to the outer space on the part of corporations and the military; and on the other hand, by orienting itself toward *outer space*, they tried to form an immaterial imaginal exodus:

We really don't think it's worth going through all the effort of getting into space just to live by the same rules as on Earth. What attracts us to space exploration is the possibility of doing things differently. We are not interested in finding out what it's like to work in space, to find new ways of killing. We want to find out what dancing or sex feels like in zero gravity (Association of Autonomous Astronauts flyer for J18 Carnival Against Capital, 1999).

To imagine another daily life, the activist groups of AAA have been engaged in mail art, psychographic activities and radical performance arts. Like the Publixtheater Caravan, they soon joined the alterglobalization movement and extended their activities to political organizations (Shukaitis 92-4). On June 18th, 1999, AAA joined the Carnival Against Capital with members wearing space suits while confronting London's police forces. And immediately after this confrontation, they started the “Space 99: Ten Days That Shook the Universe” festival in order to continue their anti-neoliberal activities through performative resistance. In the end, when they could no longer find any function for the notion of outer space rather than its increasing commercialization, they, then, completed their logic of exodus by enacting their premeditated dissolution. One could claim that such immaterial, imaginal recomposition have been so far, the biggest accomplishment of two recent contemporary global cycles of protests, where – as recent cases of Greece and Rojava showed us – imagining another sociality is no longer merely a slogan on banners of “another world is possible”, but a lively discussion in all sectors of society.

When Deleuze defines events as “pure effects”, he considers them as being completely “ideal”, where the ideal is understood in terms of Deleuze's theory of the Idea as Problematic. That is to say, for Deleuze, the ideal belongs to the realm of the virtual, whose main characteristic is an indeterminacy and is temporarily actualized via processes of performativization. As Deleuze puts

it, the event “is ultimately that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but never that which is happening” (*The Logic of Sense* 8).

To demonstrate the “incorporeal” nature of events, Deleuze draws upon the Stoics’ thesis that asserts that where bodies can be considered as causes, events are to be understood as incorporeal entities or pure effects (ibid 4). Incorporeal pure effects have no cause, while they are essential to bodies and the result of the mixtures of bodies. They do not exist; they rather *subsist*, and as incorporeal effects, they are located at the surface, “on the skin”, and are not to be found in the depths of the body (ibid 5). It is for these reasons that Deleuze defines events as completely immaterial and “out of matter”, such that even “their spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs is real and imperfect...an accident”. Events are not “substantives or adjectives, but verbs”.

These definitions, however, remain insufficient ones insofar as they are inflicted by dualities such as “real and ideal” (whereas he himself insists that virtual is *more* real), “inherent and accident”, and the presupposition behind them amounts to a static opposition between the virtual and the actual. The same critique of dramatization applies here to the conception of processual event in the *Logic of Sense*: the secret duality of depth/surface and the corresponding equilibrium is still present albeit being contested, and the performative event is still subjected to textuality and theatricality. Deleuze indeed establishes a relation between event and language, where language not only fixates and delimits, but also “transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming” (3). Here event dismantles the functions of fixation and identity (the loss of proper name (3)), both pillars of the established state of affairs, *but the non-linguistic*, which in relation to the actuality of meaning, of the linguistic, belongs to the realm of virtuality *should function as the constitutively ontogenetic element of events themselves*. Instead, Deleuze’s perspective seems to neglect the productive relation between the virtual and the actual, bringing them into relation through mystical stoicism, while, in the same book, making the claim that “the virtual refers to that which is creative, productive and transformative (a transcendental field of difference)” (146). The virtual, the realm of performative relations, of constituent power, has for itself the ontogenetic capacity of transformation.

Moreover, Deleuze's insistence on the ideal aspect of events, its *pure* incorporeality, leads him to say that, since there is always a question persisting in the answers (where there will be no proper answer for a given Question and no singular solution to a Problem) any realization or actualization is doomed to be imperfect in relation to the ideal to which it corresponds. Close to Derrida's modernist concept of a *democracy to come* (whose critique we have already seen in prior sections), this is a duality not unlike Plato's distinction between the Ideal and the Real, since Deleuze – as he claims himself – only *overturns* Plato in *The Logic of Sense*, and thereby remains within the territorial coordinates of Platonism itself.

The aesthetic aspect of the event in Guattari; the non-semiotic, non-signifying creative processes of subjectification; reconceives this relation of production between the virtual and the actual, of the corporeal and the incorporeal (although this aspect – as we have discussed in chapter two as well as here – is *virtually* present in Deleuze's methodology). It was "by Guattari's critique of the imperialism of semiotics based on signification" that "the popular conception of being political conceived as the being of language (Ranciere, Virno, Butler etc.) is radically called into question" (Lazzarato, *The Aesthetic Paradigm* 176). But if this perspective follows the line of the virtual, the non-linguistic, and its productive capacities, then it must, by definition, be understood in terms of that which is incorporeal. And as expected, we find, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, a conception of the non-linguistic, which becomes the agent of incorporeal transformation that produces corporeal transformations via its having become a Body without Organs with its own regime of production (the creativity of the dispossessed or the poor). Deleuze and Guattari express what is now understood to be the two-sided ontogenesis proper to the relation of the corporeal to the incorporeal as follows:

The paradox gets us nowhere unless, like the Stoics, we add that incorporeal transformations, incorporeal attributes, apply to bodies, and only to bodies. They are the expressed of statements but are *attributed* to bodies. The purpose is not to describe or represent bodies; bodies already have proper qualities, actions and passions, souls, in short forms, which are themselves bodies. Representations are bodies too! If noncorporeal attributes apply to bodies, if there are good grounds for making a distinction between the incorporeal expressed "to become red" and the corporeal quality "red," etc., it has nothing to with representation. We cannot even say that the

body or state of things is the "referent" of the sign (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 95).

The bodies are not necessarily representational or representative. On the contrary, representations are themselves bodies. Considering the ontogenetic relation between the virtual and the actual, bodies have a virtual dimension that can and/or cannot crystallize itself in the realm of representation. And it is this ontogenetic link that is made visible in the proper names that belong to an event.

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze insists that signification, denomination, and manifestation -- where proper names belong the category of denomination -- are not characteristics of the event. On the contrary, the event is the interruption of signifying, denominating, and manifesting processes. And despite Deleuze's claim that "proper names alone form properly material singularities" (*The Logic of Sense* 13), the event should, in the end, eliminate the proper name that is inevitably tied to that which persists as its personal or identical elements.

A productive contrast to Deleuze's theory of the event in *The Logic of Sense*, is found in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where the proper name becomes more complex insofar as "abstract machines"—those connecting points of different desiring machines—"have proper names (as well as dates), which of course designate not persons or subjects but matters and functions" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 142). Here, events are the liberated (and liberatory) semiotic and are composed of indefinite articles, proper names and infinitive verbs, such that it is only via this semiotic that events are "expressed or expressible" (*The Logic of Sense* 12). And while it is true that events eliminate a proper name (tied to an identity), but only in order to bring about another, this time non-identical, proper name. A proper name that expresses "a 'primary intensity' [in order] to distribute difference" (*The Logic of Sense* 39). Al-Tahrir, the square of government, diminished and revived as a name for a certain region of forces. Or rather, in a more complex fusion of identitarian and non-identitarian directions, Khalid Said, who was killed under police custody in Alexandria, revived as a proper name in a popular movement where people were shouting: "We are all Khalid Said". His disrespected, disfigured face became the respected, definite face of a revolution.

Introducing the term “performative”, Austin ironically, but obsessively, comments in a footnote that similar to “performatory,” a term that he used before, “performative” is still an ugly word, but one of which he is forced to make use of. The very term of the “performative” becomes necessary since it was the only word, says Austin, that could convey the particular meaning he had in his mind. Moreover, as he goes on to claim later in his text, it is a term whose “etymology is not irrelevant”, too (Austin 6-7). If one takes this marginal obsessive comment to its logical conclusion, what becomes clear in the close anatomical observation of the word is the following: “to perform” means then to accomplish or to move forward in a double movement of shape-making, precisely because while ‘per-’ etymologically refers to “through” and “forward”, ‘form’, with its connection to Morpheus (the god of metamorphoses that appears in dreams), refers to both a physical shape and a dreamlike figure. Thus, from within the perspective of the performative, “to perform” is to further, via the accomplishment of its act, the dual process of figurative and bodily constitution and dreamlike incorporeal construction. In this double movement, we know that the performative presents its *transformative power* (Fischerlichte), given that “transform” is itself composed of ‘trans-’ + ‘form’, where trans signifies a *beyond*. The performative event comes out of bodies, of their mixture, but it goes beyond the already existing body of its social milieu and brings about another body. In the following chapter, we will deal with the problem of singular bodies of performative events.

Chapter THREE

From the POV of Bodies

4 Chapter Three: From the POV of Bodies

4.1 An Introduction

It was a familiar scene in Occupy Wall Street (OWS) to see dollar notes attached on protestors' forehead, mouth and other parts of body, or to see theatrical expressions depicting or mocking the American systemic desire for *money*. It was not only a protest against actual institutions of financial capitalism, rather a critique of its very idea: the reduction of everything, including human bodies, to *money*.

Money becomes the only measure of social production [and] so now we have an ontological definition of money as form, lifeblood, internal circulation, in which is consolidated the value constructed socially in the whole economic system (Negri, Marx and Foucault: Essays).

In October 2017, Reuters news agency published a report about a new profitable trade: the body trade. It was about an American company, *Science Care*, that made a fortune selling dead bodies. And to maximize the profit, it selected McDonald's Corp as its business model. "Science Care founder Jim Rogers aimed to provide customers with the same cuts from cadavers no matter which Science Care branch handled the order" (Shiffman and Grow), reads the report, explaining how each of those cut bodily parts are being sold at a fixed price.

It is too literal an interpretation for Klossowski's *Living Currency*, where he argues that "humans themselves that are used as currency, a living currency, and they can function as currency because they are sources of sensation, emotion and pleasure." (D. W. Smith, Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia 1) It also presents a dark dramatization of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of *socius*, a huge bodily plane of social (re)production into which organs are plugged for creating value.

The suppression and exploitation of body for generating capital has been a long-time critical discourse, at least since Karl Marx's theory of value and labour. The body of the worker became the center of industrial production, but in different conditions from the labourers of previous production regimes. The worker was a *Vogelfrei*: his body was released from the fixed anchor point of the land (unlike the peasants); and it was also freed from the total control of the slavery relations. Unlike the enslaved body, worker's body was not a property as a whole, and it was not subjected to the sovereign power over death. Decoupled from natural and authoritarian chains, worker's body was going to be disciplined and managed.

Critical theory argues that body is not natural, nor given. Body is always a historical body, constructed in a particular context, always changing and never a constant. As Foucault writes, "it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances." (Nietzsche, *Genealogy, History* 87).

Bakhtin explains how capitalist bourgeoisie used court's purist ethics of body for imposing a certain performativity on bodies; a performativity that ensures *individualism*, and its corresponding sealed and contained body. It is against this "illusional" body that Bakhtin conceptualizes the grotesque body³⁶. A management of bodily flows and a suppression of excessive behaviors, one may say, to keep the efficiency of body in terms of production and reproduction.

Another formulation of such a view on the relation between capitalism and body came from Wilhelm Reich. For him, capitalist system needed to repress sexuality and sublimate it into a work ethics and therefore, it managed to performatively and discursively prevent the overflows of impulsive forces through a "body armour" (see Reich, *Character Analysis* 1990 (1933)).

Norbert Elias even goes further back, to the origins of modern Western discourses, and figures such as Erasmus, to show how pedagogues were making a certain code for raising the children

³⁶ "The grotesque body [...] is a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, never completed; it is continually built, created, and builds and creates another body. Moreover, the body swallows the world and is itself swallowed by the world..." (Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his World* 317).

of nobilities as civilized, working on their bodily techniques and behaviors; the same ethics that provided the basic backbone of modern social moralities. In his book *The Civilizing Process*, Elias explains that in the process of civilization, the civilized human habitat becomes the one that is cleansed of every trace of the human body's physical existence, particularly its excesses (2000 (1939)). But modern disciplinary and tight control over bodies has had its side effect. In fact, such a control came "at the cost of fragmentation, of losing the experience of a whole body open to its world, replaced with feelings of a mental or personal essence divided from the automaton it must inhabit."³⁷ (Burkitt 131)

However, the regime of production that started with turning worker's muscular energy into capital has undergone radical changes, as we have discussed in earlier chapters. Marx himself predicts a kind of socialization of the labour:

production loses its private character and becomes a social process – not formally, since production is social in every exchange because of the absolute dependence of the producers on each other and because of the necessity of representing their work as abstract social labour (money), but in real terms. Since the means of production are used as social means and thus not through ownership by individuals but through their relationship of production, so too labour is carried out on the social scale. (Marx, Capital Volume III qtd. in Negri, Marx and Foucault)

Labour's socialization results into a deterritorialization of factory into society, and subsequently, a multiplication of control mechanism for bodies. The new technologies transform bodies and at the same time, alternative bodies start to emerge. As Negri argues,

Social cooperation in production (which in other times was produced directly by capital) has achieved a degree of autonomy. Capital has become a financial power, engaged in the capture of surplus value that is 'socially' produced. Around this highly centralised process there develop antagonist moments of self-valorisation that are radically independent and that economic and political power attempt to hold together and to subject to capitalist despotism (ibid).

In those moments of performative self-valorization, new collective bodies are creating and being created by performative events. To understand the social transformations, there is no other way

37

but to confront with the question of body – the social body that acts as the subject of such transformation. As Negri puts it, “the body is at the centre of the research, of the diagnosis, and of the dispositif of action ... subjectivation as an action that operates on being and (collectively) transforms it” (ibid).

In contrast to New Yorkers who protested against the reduction of bodies into living currency, the protestors in Egypt came with pictures of a disfigured body. Khalid Saeed whose body was brutally destroyed in the hand of Egyptian police became the name of the collective body appeared for the first time in Alexandria, shouting “we are all Khalid Saeed”. Months before that, Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence started its “torture diary” project.

Complaints arrive daily: An 18-year-old man was beaten in a police station and thrown off a third floor balcony. Another man was punched and flogged. Earlier, a family was dragged to the police station, where the father was beaten and the women were threatened with rape (Naggar).

Egypt’s torture diary is a symbol of another relation between the government and the bodies, according to which the body is forced to total obedience through unbearable police brutality.

Police, as Foucault says, is modern state’s fundamental agent for creating the consciousness of the reason of state (*raison d'etat*) and inscribing *the code of the everyday signs* (which we explain later) on the surface of the body; or as Reich would say, putting the *body armor* on the social collective bodies. Police provides the State-sponsored technologies of the self, through creating a conscious “self” according to the *raison d’etat*.

But the biopolitics that Foucault conceptualized has developed a micro-power network of control over the disembodied organs of social bodies. The contemporary societies have developed a subtler regime of control and increasingly harsher apparatus of surveillance through new digital technologies. Body has also undergone radical changes.

Thus, the collective bodies of contemporary occupy movements resist different layers of control and discipline depending on their local context, while they also resist a globalized trend of constructing and suppressing bodies.

In this chapter, we will delve into the problems of body and discuss the altermodern bodies that were performatively created during occupy movements. We show how the modern body is conceived with the principles of identity, homogeneity, unity and verticality, and its interaction with other bodies is based on imitation, linguistic communication. We then argue that this imagined body's total closure is presupposed as the *natural* state, where healthy condition is thought to be a natural, pure state, free from alien, external elements – in philosophical, medical, cultural as well as political discourses. That is why a whole apparatus of medical, psychological and religious practices and discourses helped the modern centralized state to reproduce this imagined body, while the modern philosophy empowered it and the colonialism was in need of it. The natural modern body for a state is thought often in the same manner, and is called *nation*. The limits or figural contours of this body are identity-based and consequently exclusionary.

In both **molar** and **molecular** levels, both for *nations* and *singular bodies*, we will explain how body is actually porous and heterogenous *prior to inscription*. The summary of our discussion is best formulated in Elizabeth Grosz's definition of body as "indeterminate, amorphous, a series of uncoordinated potentialities that require social triggering, ordering, and long-term 'administration'" (Space, Time and Perversion 104).

The administration of body is always necessarily incomplete and incapable of imposing a total control. Therefore, we will discuss how the performative disrupts body's organic pre-defined organization toward a non-hierarchical, alter-modern body. The discussion will move through various inter-related thinkers, with a particular focus on Klossowski's Nietzsche. Through him, we argue for a constituent bodily power that presents itself as the capability to connect, to affect/be affected, in a way that all connected bodies are intensified and no domination is emerged out of it. If health can be redefined as such an increase in power (with no resentment is at work and no reactionary force involved that could upset one end of the relation, weaken it and make dominion), then what can an altermodern body do?

4.2 The Body as Battleground

4.2.1 What is there to see in a body?

P., the protagonist of Beckett's *Catastrophe*, was trapped in an economy of gaze, and we discussed his subjection to the gaze of text/director as well as the calculated gaze of audience/critics whom director hopes P "will have them on their feet". It was also mentioned that how P.'s gaze toward the off-stage in the end escapes the theatrical economy of gaze.

Throughout the research, we explained theatricality and performativity through the difference between actuality and virtuality. It was argued that theatrical is produced by performative, and as a product, it is a reproductive of the dominant regime of production and organization.

But when it comes to body, theatricality is far more nuanced than that. Through Klossowski, we will discuss how bodily performative forces are producing simulacra on the surface of bodies. Theatricality is above all about the surface of bodies. Therefore, considering already discussed theory of body, theatricality is a two-sided interwoven regime of the seeing and the seen, which not only affects the perception of body, but also is being affected by it.

The body of the actor produces a way of seeing, and the audience see through that body: not only the world, but also themselves, both as seeing and seen bodies. The actor's body is also a body exposed to the gaze of audience, under their affective swarming, and is being shaped on the stage. When theater inner limits are surpassed in a performative piece, this two-sided process of seeing/being seen is intensified and turned into an autopoietic feedback loop.

Theatron is a *seeing* place: but seeing and touching, eye and flesh, are entangled as Merleau-Ponty shows in *the Visible and the Invisible*. Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty explains this entanglement with looking at a work of art and writes:

I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it (Eye and Mind 132).

The seeing/the seen dynamics is complicated by a number of analytical factors. It is not an anthropocentric endeavor as Merleau-Ponty's focus on an inanimate "thing" to explain the two-sidedness of the seeing and the seen foretells Foucault's idea of "the government of things". For

Merleau-Ponty body and the world are not “separate things”; rather, they have a chiasmic relation.

It is also not in a paradigm of signification and meaning; rather, it remains a bodily relation. Even the language is, for Merleau-Ponty, a product of the body:

if we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see the possibilities of language already given in it (The Visible and The Invisible 155).

Moreover, it should not be viewed as a universal process for every pair of eye. The situatedness of the body in the world makes it a body with a history: the *facticity* of the body, as one may say, that comes in a form of “inheritance”. This inheritance, as Foucault shows, “is granted through specific social practices” and “social practices are where the power is”. Therefore, many aesthetic, social and political elements, specific to singular contexts, construct the process of seeing that couples at least two bodies together.

Seeing and being seen is on the other hand a condition of politics, as Hanna Arendt formulated through her discussion of the public space, the space of *coming into appearance*. The space of politics is where everybody can see/be seen and listen/be heard. The state, as we have discussed, does not have a regime of equal seeing and listening. The governmental discourse is a framing with a regime of light and sound; just like a movie, only those elements in the frame, with light and sound equipment over them, are visible and audible, effecting a hierarchy among bodies. What disrupts this hierarchical regime is the performative: the bodily yet invisible and muted forces that disrupt the established organization of a naturalized collective body.

Theatricality, as we discussed in earlier chapters, is mostly about this hierarchical interpretation of seeing and hearing. As Susan Broadhurst and Josephine Machon explains, theatre as a theatron functioned as “a prosthesis of eye and ear that privileged the ‘objective’ senses of sight and hearing through which it structured the vision of the audience” (Sensualities/Textualities and Technologies xx). But as theatre transformed into its contemporary life, it has opened toward performative possibilities: a collapse of sense’s hierarchy, a move toward the non-representational.

The common place of seeing and hearing is always political in character. And it made theatre political as well. Even the classical theatre “is also one through which consensual and idealized notions of polis, citizenship and community were produced” (ibid). With the contemporary theatre, politics subsists in the form, and “the idea(l) of a common place that might be produced through the interaction of bodies, texts and technologies remains.” (ibid. xi)

Yet in contrast to the classical conception of theatre and its claim to a rational and quasi-objective experience, the performative arts try to become sites of “immersive sensual/sensory experience, an experience which is always produced between bodies, texts and technologies”, while these three are “no longer isolated as elements but are distributed, diffused and disseminated through performance.” (ibid. xii) We discussed how the contemporary movements made use of theatrical means, and why a performative turn in radical politics has also happened since 1960s.

In the performative event, the collective body is a mixture of human and non-human bodies, texts and technologies. It is a time-space of non-representational appearance. However, the dynamics of the seeing/the seen and its feedback loop functions as the most important organizing principle of this event. It is less about the bodies being seen than the present future which can be seen through them: through how the collective body has been shaped, how it disrupts the hierarchical regime of lights and sounds, and how its bodily forces are reshaping the social relation. In other words, we can only see *what these movements envision* through their collective body and what these bodies envision.

In this section, we will try to see these bodies, see through them, and how they differ from the naturalized ideas of body. All these problems will be discussed through a Nietzschean theory of body, which comes through a certain tradition of thought with figures such as Pierre Klossowski, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.

Nietzsche’s philosophy proved to be insightful for this chapter, as he himself have developed a theory of seeing through bodies: perspectivism. Perspective is the frame of perception, of seeing and hearing. It amounts to making a position toward the world. As Eric Brondel argues in his

Nietzsche, The Body and Culture, interpreting for Nietzsche is “to have a body and to be a perspective”.

On the other hand, perspective is itself a bodily notion; it emerges as a phantasmic obsession related to an impulsive force in bodies and as body consists of a multiplicity of impulsive forces, there are multiple perspectives and multiple ways of seeing:

There are various eyes, even the Sphinx has eyes, and consequently there are many kinds of “truths” (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* 291).

The impulsive forces construct the singularity – or as Nietzsche puts it, “idiosyncrasy” – of any body. More than being relativist, arguing for a difference-less multiplicity, Nietzsche’s statement about “various eyes” can be seen as an invalidation of those discourses that claim universality and timelessness and consider all different bodies under a homogenous imagined body of “nation”; and as a critique on State’s imposed discourses and limits of performativity that hierarchizes bodies. After all, Nietzsche views the State “as the coldest of all cold monsters” that “even lies coldly” (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* 32).

When Gilles Deleuze calls for “new eyes” and “new ears” to track the invisible and inaudible forces, he refers to the same point. There is no necessity for an exclusionary, hierarchical and freedom-hostile established discourse to be taken as granted.

For Nietzsche, body is the surface on which multiple perspectives exist and confront each other. “The body is a battleground”, as Barbara Kruger puts it on one of her works. And the collective bodies in contemporary occupy movements could show, through their radical performativity, that what this battle is about.

4.2.2 The Nietzschean Body

In earlier chapters of this research, Nietzsche’s philosophy and its 20th century French revival functioned as a reference point for developing a more nuanced conception of performativity and a methodology for approaching performative phenomena. Nietzschean theory of performativity rests naturally on a theory of body.

Nietzschean idea of body is particularly important for this research, when it comes to the analysis of collective bodies that have been engaged in contemporary performative events, and particularly the occupy movements. These movements show, as we shall see in this chapter, that the conventional collective bodies of socio-political analyses (nation, people, mass) do not represent the multilayered heterogeneity of those collective bodies inside performative events. Moreover, the Nietzschean paradigm gives the possibility to criticize the idea of a *natural* body. Embodiment from this perspective is not only a concept that implies that there is a biological dimension to comportment, but embodiment is also a phenomenon that depends on other related concepts and thus on cultural context.

Body may seem like an essence, or like what philosophers now call a natural-kind term (like water, heat, or gold). But I see the concept of the body in Nietzsche as more like money, or love, or power, or justice phenomena that depend on their concepts and on culture.” (Klossowski, *Living Currency* 58)

Even in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, who had an undeniable inspiration for the coming thinkers of body, the naturalization of body has its foothold. Merleau-Ponty presented a critique of mind/body duality and argued that body is the locus of Knowledge, but on the other hand, he considered this body “as having a telos towards rationality and explicitness”. That is why for Foucault, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze are indeed opposite in respect to their theory of body. For Merleau-Ponty, Foucault believes, “the body-organism is linked to the world through a network of primal significations” (*Theatrum Philosophicum* 219). It comes from an originary perception of world that marks its effect as *organism* on the human body. For Deleuze, the network of life consists of human and inhuman elements and actors, and organism is just a hierarchy of forces in a certain body that comes not from any originary source, but as result of a contingent articulation that is now solidified.

Therefore, the following paragraphs will present the Nietzschean idea of body and try to develop and extend it through existing literature from an individual level into a more social, collective one, proper to this research.

4.2.2.1 Nietzsche and the Impulsive Organization of the Body

In the second chapter, we referred to an “inorganic” dimension of bodily acts in Nietzsche, especially to show his distance to the dominant organicism that swept over the Europe in 19th century (*see the section on Nationalism*). But one cannot ignore traces of biologism in Nietzsche. Indeed, an inorganic Nietzschean body seems a problematic claim, particularly when he asserts that

powerful organic principle seems essential to me because of the ease by which it incorporates inorganic substances. I do not see how this finality could be explained simply by intensification. I believe rather that there are eternally organic beings (qtd in Klossowski, *Vicious Circle* 28).

Here, it seems for Nietzsche the organic is an encompassing structure that has the ability of incorporating the inorganic without being destroyed, an *eternal* structure that is too powerful to be defeated by the invasion of the inorganic. Note that relative to each organism, the inorganic is those excluded elements. They do not have a place in the organization of the organs which is called organism. This is the main conceptual backbone of all organicist theories of nation-states that turn a blind-eye to threats of social and ethnic cleansings and genocides for protecting the nation as organism. Hence the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche.

As we explained in earlier chapters, the way to surpass the duality of organic/inorganic in Nietzsche is to consider a productive, ontogenetical relation between them, as organic being one possible organized product of inorganic, performative, and differential forces. According to Scott Lash, Nietzsche himself was in a way critical of such duality:

In art, Nietzsche contrasts bodily and nonbodily values. He criticises his early work (in *The Birth of Tragedy*) as inscribed in a 'two-world' conception, as an 'aesthetic justification' - or 'aesthetodicy' - in which a 'will to beauty' is counterposed to the ugliness of this world (*Genealogy and the Body*).

Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche is a way to avoid the trap of organicism. According to his reading, there is an “intensive impulsional body” giving rise to the “extensive organic body”. The former is what remains mostly incommunicable within the organic body, nonetheless forms its very structure. As Smith puts it, “the extensive organic body finds its sufficient reason in the intensive impulsional body, which is what Deleuze would later call, following Artaud, a body

without organs,” (Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia) to which we return later.

By discussing consciousness and language through Nietzsche’s texts, Klossowski shows how he goes beyond from a preference for the absolute organic and its simple opposition to the inorganic. To shatter the organic/inorganic duality, Klossowski’s Nietzsche argumentation undermines other dualities between mind/body and consciousness/unconsciousness. The ontological target of this theoretical attack is the principle of identity (as it is inherent to the idea of “self” or “ego”) and the notion of a universal, homogenous and natural body:

The body is a product of chance; it is nothing but the locus where a group of individuated impulses confront each other so as to produce this interval that constitutes a human life (Klossowski, Vicious Circle 21).

According to Smith, Klossowski refers to many notions in Nietzsche by the term “impulse”; notions such as ‘drive’ (*Triebe*), ‘desire’ (*Begierden*), ‘instinct’ (*Instinke*), ‘power’ (*Mächte*), ‘force’ (*Kräfte*), and ‘impulse’ (*Reize*, Impulse) itself. He uses the term “impulsive forces” in a Leibnizian way to show that there is no duality between impulsive and physical forces, since Leibniz defines force as the *sufficient reason* of movement. On the other hand, Leibniz sees such forces as differential, because they not only create difference, but also their function is conditioned by the presence of difference. There is movement when there is difference.

We discussed how these differential forces represent the performative in Klossowski’s Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, as we said, the performative signs cannot be totally absorbed in the discursive:

Every movement should be conceived as a gesture, a kind of language in which (impulsive) forces make themselves heard. In the inorganic world there is no misunderstanding, communication seems to be perfect. Error begins in the organic world (ibid. 35).

Error is not simply a negative term in Nietzsche, as he always maintained that error is the vehicle of thought. Here, however, it refers to the actualized notion; notions that taken as granted, eternal and originary: “‘Things’, ‘substances’, ‘qualities’, ‘activities’ - we must guard against their projection into the inorganic world. These are the errors of species, through which organisms live.” Such concepts and the language of signs in general do not communicate the impulsive

forces (that need *a language of gestures* to be heard), rather silence them (and should *be guarded against*). “Our beliefs in 'the subject', 'truth' and the categories of logic have no objective validity”, Scott Lash writes, “we hold these beliefs insofar as they function towards the expanded reproduction of bodies.” (Genealogy and the Body 13). The organic is thus sustained by the actual, and the stability of the organism is sustained by concepts that cannot absorb the inorganic. How does an organism survive, why should impulsive forces be silenced?

To reach that point, Klossowski focuses on the concept of “everyday codes” or the “code of everyday signs” in Nietzsche. The everyday code functions as the element that generates the dominant meanings and significations. *Externally*, it is the translation of the dominant societal forces into the realm of representation, particularly language; and *internally*, it is the specific “coding filter” that comes out of the impulsive hierarchy of consciousness. As Klossowski puts it, “in as much as the exteriority is installed in the agent by the code of everyday signs, it is only on the basis of this code that the agent can make declarations or state opinions, think or not think, remain silent or break its silence.” (Vicious Circle 37)

There is a vicious circle in the process of expression through such a code, because “body wants to make itself understood through the intermediary of a language of signs that is fallaciously deciphered by consciousness”, while “consciousness itself constitutes this code of signs that inverts, falsifies and filters what is expressed through the body”. For this very reason, one should differentiate between two kinds of expression: the expression that comes from an already established subjective position, which uses “the everyday signs”, and a performative expression, which is not only expressive, but is above all creative. It is a production that not only its process is its expression, but also it produces signs for its singular form of expression.

The everyday code gives the structure to a set of forces according to the dominant norm. It has a close relation with the concept of discourse on one hand, and the axiomatics of Deleuze and Guattari on the other hand. They also used coding in the same manner, where to code something is to make it enter certain definite relations. A rigid coding of a flow or a force make it less able to pursue alternate relations. Not only code defines what is good and evil, but also causes the

hierarchical and vertical organization of impulses; the organism. *Understanding, culture, morality* - all are based on the code of everyday signs (ibid. 40).

In terms of individual body, the homogeneity of the codes of everyday signs forms the self, a homogenous agent proper to the conscious and unconscious divide. Nietzsche approaches the question of body through impulsive forces (and the language of gestures) and their interaction with the dominant external forces (and the language of everyday signs) in order to destabilize such divide. For him, the former is not simply the opposite pole of the latter. He gives priority to the performative (sign as gesture), which is not coded by the everyday signs and contains the differential forces of the inorganic, but has produced such signs as its own abbreviation for the organic:

The contradiction is not between the 'false' and the 'true' but between the 'abbreviations of signs' and the 'signs' themselves. The essential point: the creation of forms, which represent numerous movements, the invention of signs for all types of signs. (ibid. 43-44)

Therefore, Klossowski defines the only "authentic" form of communication as the exchange of bodies "through the secret language of corporeal signs" (ibid. 69). What we outlined as the performativization method is a way to approach that aim of capturing the movements of performative signs. As Klossowski puts it, "it is not a matter of destroying what Nietzsche calls the abbreviation (of signs) by signs themselves - the encoding of movements - but of retranslating the 'conscious' semiotic into the semiotic of the impulses." (ibid. 50)

Deleuze and Guattari also consider the sign as "a position of desire". Through their idea of socius (which will be explained later), they argue that the first signs are "the territorial signs that plant their flags in bodies":

And if one wants to call this inscription in naked flesh "writing," then it must be said that speech in fact presupposes writing, and that it is this cruel system of inscribed signs that renders man capable of language, and gives him a memory, the spoken word (Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 145).

The conscious self is not only a product of the everyday code, but also a symptom of its effect on impulsive organization. According to Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche, there's a chaotic field of

impulses in a body. This chaos would be hegemonized and reduced by a movement in which an impulsive force gets the upper hand, dominates the other impulses and makes a hierarchical order in the body. This hierarchical order is organism; a vertical organization in which the head rules the other organs, defines their proper actions, suppresses their individual impulses and makes a hegemonic closed whole.

Following this process, what is called self or agent takes form in the psychological construction of human body. Agent is itself the product of this contingent vertical organization of impulses and also the guardian of this organization, continuing to reproduce it permanently. “[The human being] always believe itself to be in its own body”, writes Klossowski, “but its own body is only the fortuitous encounter of contradictory impulses, temporarily reconciled” (Vicious Circle 28). Moreover, the word “impulse” signifies “desire” for him too (ibid. x). In this so-called natural organic body, the free flow of desire is then blocked and interrupted by a ruling authority of a dominant impulsive force and the agent it formed. From this point of view, the problem of organization is the problem of the head.

This is not an isolated chemical process in an individual body, as we have seen. The code of the everyday signs effects the self, shapes the conscious and defines the head as the locus of decision-making, knowing and commanding. The moral values, the cultural norms, the bodily technics. Through the code of the everyday signs, Klossowski brings this institutional level into the analysis:

consciousness and unconsciousness, which are derived from what is responsible or irresponsible, always presuppose the unity of the person of the ego, of the subject - a purely institutional distinction, which is why it plays such an important role in psychiatric considerations (ibid. 30).

The code of the everyday signs makes what Deleuze and Guattari defines as the encoding or territorialization of the body possible. If brain is considered the master in the perceived vertical hierarchy of human body, and only then comes the heart, hands, feet and finally the genitals, similar organization can be found in an imagined collective political body. In the “natural” or “organic” political body, brain -- which is the sovereign or the state -- is at the top, and then

privileged classes, the middle classes, the poor and the non-represented come next and they should follow the commands of the head for the organism to survive.

Moreover, the contemporary capitalism has multiplied the codes of the everyday signs, as it allows and promotes “expressions” of differences that focuses on individuals and their personalities. Indeed, these differences are difference between identities, not differentiating lines of subjectifications: they all subjected to the same logic of consumption and consumer-subject positions. The examples of such codes are multiple sub-cultures that even if started as rebellions against the establishments, are now identities integrated and consumed in it: punk culture, nerd culture, goth culture, nomad culture, skin-head culture and so forth. Each “type” of collective bodies signifies a homogenized group of people and a certain code of the everyday signs, even if they have different “characters”.

We can summarize our discussion on the Nietzschean body till now in the following points:

- The body cannot be presupposed as a natural given. As Nietzsche writes in *The Genealogy of Morals*, the body is a thousand folds process.
- The body cannot be presupposed as a unity. It is a plurality or multiplicity of impulsive, inorganic forces. “The alleged unity is not a given, but is only ever to be achieved (and inevitably only incompletely, as a fictional or imaginary unity)” (Hoy 21).
- The unity of a body results from a relation of dominancy. It is where the relation between dominant and dominated forces plays out its drama. “As a plurality of these forces, the body is a multiplicity that is unified only insofar as some of these forces dominate others.”
- There is no given conscious subject or a presupposed self. “The subject is never at one with itself, but always involves a plurality of bodily forces.” (Hoy 21)
- The subject is always constructed in a situation. In other words, “the Nietzschean position recognizes the situatedness of the agent and the challenge of creating integrity in the face of conflicting demands and perspectives.” (Hoy 20)
- As such, the body is always a political issue. Its construction comes from a certain political performativity. “Nietzsche’s novelty is to construe the body as like a political organization of unstable forces and of frictions that can be regulated only temporarily.” (ibid. 52)

- And in the final analysis, there is no permanent domination, only a permanent struggle for domination. “If the various relations that compose a body were characterless in themselves, this unity could be guaranteed for an eternity. This is not the case. All relations are subject to qualifications” (Buchanan 82).

4.2.2.2 The Survival of Organism

A process of suppression should exist in order for a self/agent to form. The unconscious should be limited to a theatre of images and abbreviated signs that the conscious could page through and reach their real meaning, while it rather resembles, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, to a factory that produces and changes the terms of interaction with the real – hence the psychiatric power.

The conscious and its concepts are necessary, according to Nietzsche, for the survival of organism, for its reproduction. But any organism is on one hand only a possible organization of the inorganic body and on the other, is riddled with the impulsive forces that cannot be captured by its conscious level. Therefore, the conscious that is defined by the everyday code and defining the self has become the guarantor of organic homogeneity. In other words, “the body that is grasped by the consciousness ‘adopts only those reflexes that allow it to maintain itself for this cerebral activity just as the latter henceforth adopts the body as its own product’”. (Vicious Circle 27) Therefore, consciousness functions as a filter that only passes the impulsive forces yielded to the dominant one. “The body through the consciousness that grasped it”, writes Smith, “dissociates itself from the impulses that flow through it.”

Klossowski explains the generation of the conscious agent by way of intensities. Here again, the affinity between Nietzsche and Spinoza makes such reading possible. Intensity for Spinoza is the affect that a body causes itself. In other words, it is an active force of the body, where the body causes its own affect and its action is not separated from its own force nor from its own value that is the product of the evaluation process (see Buchanan 87). Klossowski uses the concept of intensity to explain the production process inside the body, which gives rise to the subjectivity and consciousness.

“The philosophical line of demarcation does not lie between body and soul”, Klossowski writes, “but rather between our impulsional forces, which are incommunicable, and the expression of these impulses in consciousness, language, and rational and economic norms, which fundamentally falsify the nature of the impulses.” (Vicious Circle 20). For Klossowski, the soul is the space for the free interplay between the impulsive forces, where a certain relation between these forces forms *a tonality*. The tonality of the soul, as he calls it, is “a fluctuation of intensity”. Intensity is the product of a force or set of forces (power) that are acting and provoking. An intense experience, for example, consists of external forces affecting the internal impulsive forces, putting them inside a certain relationship, causing what Klossowski calls the “rises and falls”. This organization of impulsive forces, these rises and falls create intensities, but for the inorganic impulsive intensity to be communicable, it should turn back on itself, repeats itself and imitates itself in order to “become a sign”.

A sign is first of all the trace of a fluctuation of intensity. If a sign retains its meaning, it is because the degree of intensity coincides with it; it signifies only through a new afflux of intensity, which in a certain manner joins up with its first trace... But a sign is not only the trace of a fluctuation. It can also mark an absence of intensity - and here too, a new afflux is necessary if only to signify this absence! (Vicious Circle 48)

Such a process makes a drama out of affects. Its signs or intensity’s significations are nonetheless “like the figures that rise to the crest of a wave, leaving behind them only foamy froth” (62). But as we said earlier, if they are dissociated from the sea of impulsive forces through the coding filter of the conscious self, *the identity*, they form an agent that continues to reproduce itself. The drama becomes a static image.

Here again the Spinozist distinction between the power and the Power emerges in the discussion of impulsive forces and the conscious agent through the distinction Klossowski makes between the power and the will to power.

Power resists everything, except that it cannot resist itself. It must act - as long as it is not reacting, it must provoke in order not to be provoked. This is why there is 'will' to power: power was itself as power, and cannot not will itself. Now there is a degree beyond which the will disappears in power. The will merely concerns the agent. Power, which belongs to life, to the cosmos - which

represents a degree of accumulated and accumulating force - produces the agent, in accordance with its rises and falls. (ibid. 68)

Power means here the certain relation between the forces and the ability of them to affect and be affected. Negri formulates such affective definition of power as “an action on the action of the other” (Marx and Foucault: Essays by Negri). Not a reaction, but an action that creates value, a *difference*.

It also explains that a reactive force, a force of the solidified identity does not act or provoke, but only be used in the already existing hierarchy of organism in order to contribute to its survival. On the other hand, the will to power concerns the conscious agent, while the power itself produces both consciousness and its agent.

Interestingly, the State or parliament are often described as the consciousness of the nations, where nation is the main imagined collective body under the State as head. A case particularly repeated in the post-colonial governments in the South, where the State takes the role of promoting the “national consciousness”. The national consciousness is considered by many commentators as the first step toward the construction of a nation (see Khalidi).

The (post-)colonial national consciousness gives rise to a hierarchy of impulsive forces in the nation as collective body. It renders some forces unrepresented or under-represented inside the head of the nation, which is the State.

4.2.2.3 Imagination and the Nietzschean Body

In the earlier chapters, we discussed about the possibility of bodily transformations in performative events. We distinguished material and immaterial transformations that affects collective bodies, inspiring other forms of organization in them. Immaterial transformations, we discussed, are in relation with the imagination that is provoked in such movements.

Nietzsche’s theory of the body presents a way for conceptualizing imagination and its relation to the organization of the body. It explains why on one hand the imagination of national collective bodies can shape, take root, persist and reproduce the imagined unity, and how on the other

hand, alternative poles of imaginal recomposition contribute to the transformation of such collective bodies. To formulate this, Klossowski uses concepts of “phantasm”, “simulacrum” and “stereotype”.

Phantasm comes from the Greek *phantasia* (appearance, imagination), and in Klossowski, it refers to “an obsessional image produced within us by the forces of our impulsive life”. Or as Lash formulates it, “thought produces phantasms which have primal appendages, in a theatrical vein”, where “body thinks through phantasm” (*Genealogy and the Body*) and philosophy becomes – as Foucault famously said – a theater.

The aforementioned process of coding has an important role in the production of these images, because “every living being interprets according to a code of signs, responding to variations in excited or excitable states. Whence come images: representations of what has taken place or what could have taken place - thus a phantasm.” (Klossowski, *Vicious Circle* 36)

A phantasm is a product of a tonality of soul, of an organization of the impulsive forces. Therefore, it can be caused by the intervention of alternative affective forces, or by the reproduction mechanism of the reactive forces. In any case, it is still not a conscious element, until it is willed by the conscious agent.

For the impulse to become a will at the level of consciousness, the latter must give the impulse an exciting state as an aim, and thus must elaborate the signification of what, for the impulse, is a phantasm: an anticipated excitation, and thus a possible excitation according to the schema determined by previously experienced excitations.

Here comes Klossowski’s second concept, *simulacrum*, that is the willed reproduction of phantasm, while phantasm itself is a product of a tonality of the soul that at the same time, produces the willing agent. This reproduction can take several forms, artistic or else. In any case, Klossowski explains simulacrum through an imitative process, as “the actualization of something in itself incommunicable and nonrepresentable”. Phantasm is thus an idea that could be performativized in many ways, conditioned by and conditioning the impulsive, differential forces of the body.

The simulacrum, in its imitative sense, is: the phantasm in its obsessional compulsion (Klossowski, Living Currency 8).

The obsession is the error of species to sustain the organism. If the obsession fades away, a phantasm could give way to other phantasms, forming another set of relation that results into a different simulacrum.

As we have repeatedly asserted, the code of the everyday signs, the dominant language of the structure has already conditioned the production of such simulacra. The process of performativization is already happening inside a predefined territory of performance. And a set of axioms – former simulacra that gotten worn-out – and a corresponding coding process try to limit its differential forces for the survival of organism.

Stereotype is the name that Klossowski assigns to the code of everyday signs. All inventions of simulacra “always presupposes a set of prior stereotypes.” On a common-sense level, stereotypes reproduce the existing hierarchies in a collective body by assigning specific characteristics to people with different genders, sexualities, ethnicities and backgrounds. “The beliefs attach themselves so to speak to our sense organs, to the 'surfaces of bodies'”, Lash writes, “thus the T doesn't think, but bodies think through the T.” (Genealogy and the Body)

Such explanation of phantasms and simulacra resembles the concept of fantasy in psychoanalysis and connects the theory of body with a theory of imagination. Criticizing the individualist analysis of fantasy, Deleuze and Guattari argues that “fantasies are group fantasies”. According to them, group fantasies are a product of a desiring collective body that “assembles [together] social production and desiring-production.” (Anti-Oedipus 142) Desire in them, as we discussed and will return later, amounts to the constituent power of what Klossowski calls the impulsive forces.

So in another level, the simulacrum refers to an image of thought, being produced by a collective body.

Earlier, we discussed how collective bodies in social movements, through their performativizations, are thinking and acting at the same time. A stereotypical image of thought

can be thus overthrown in a performative event, and substituted by an alternative one that make possible a thinking proper to its thinking body.

The concept of simulacrum helps us to trace back the representations of social movements into its performative, non-representational level of active/reactive forces. When we are confronted with the new forms of protest movements, the different forms of their simulacra (as Smith says, literal, plastic, conceptual, pictorial, ...) enables us to track the impulsional, i.e. performative and differential forces that give rise to them. They are the signs that the collective body of a performative event create, its own language. And they explain to some extent what kind of a body has created them.

They also form an imaginal pole for the construction of an alternative imagination. Through alternative fantasies for a new life – “another world is possible” is an important slogan in the contemporary movements –, the perceived limits of performance will be surpassed toward a new political performativity.

The distinction between new, alternative simulacrum and the worn-out one, i.e. stereotype, gives another formulation for the distinction was made in the previous chapter between the performative event and the political spectacle. We argued there that a performative event is singular, and as a repetition it always repeats the difference, while the spectacle is a repetition of the same, belonging to the realm of the identical. The latter belongs to the order of general/particular dichotomy, while the former is an active relationship between the singular and the universal, where the universal is an affective phenomenon (to be explained in the following sections of this chapter).

Klossowski categorizes certain concepts in Nietzsche to clarify the concept of singular. For him, the singular contrasts the gregarious and the two form the most basic typologies of bodies. The latter comes from “what Nietzsche calls the ‘herd’, which reduces its singularity to a common denominator, and expresses only what can be communicated” (D. W. Smith, Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia 6). While the singular is unexchangeable, unintelligible, mute and non-linguistic, the gregarious is exchangeable, comprehensible, communicable and linguistic. “Gregariousness [is]”, Klossowski writes, “being equivalent to something else, namely,

to anything that contributes to the conservation of the species, to the endurance of the herd, but also to the endurance of the signs of the species in the individual” (The Vicious Circle 60).

In terms of consciousness and the unconscious, the singular belongs to the latter, as it remains unexchangeable and non-linguistic. This idea is further developed in Deleuze and Guattari schizoanalysis, where the unconscious is unrelated to negation, indifferent to personal identity and independent of linguistic expression.

The political connotations of Nietzschean terms such as slave morality is problematic, as we already discussed. To empty it of its sinister references to colonialism, slavery and white-supremacy, it is necessary to define it based on active and reactive forces. The singular as the unconscious is not a product of simple negation – which is the case for Nietzsche in his erroneous reading of Hegel’s master/slave dialectics – but an affirmation of constituent power and as such, it extends the limits of its own being. It is a performative element that does not stay inside the pre-existing limits of performativity. On the contrary, as Lash argues, “slave moralities which are non-bodily in content, attach themselves to weak bodies or groupings or weak bodies, because they function in their expanded reproduction. ... Such moralities are life-destroying, however, for the species.”

Returning to Klossowski, the singular is a simulacrum of a specific tonality of the soul that breaks down the gregarious stereotype of an organic body. As Smith puts it, the stereotype “express the gregarious aspect of lived experience in a form already schematized by the habitual usages of perception and thought.” But in the same manner that stereotype is a product of phantasm’s performativization and a worn-out simulacrum, the herd is also the crystallization of a singular state that tries to reproduce itself eternally against the invasion of the new.

Singular	Gregarious
degenerate type	successful type
unexchangeable	exchangeable
unintelligible	comprehensible

muteness	communication
non-language	language

Table 1: Typology of Bodies in Klossowski – the Singular/the Gregarious

The individual is not in itself singular. Singularity is a mode of an organization of impulsive forces and “an individuality's capacity could never exhaust the differentiated richness of single existence.” Klossowski calls this singular state an “idiosyncrasy” which is an assemblage of impulses (Vicious Circle 71). It is precisely because of this point in Nietzsche/Klossowski theory of body that we can extend it to the realm of collective bodies, where the assemblage is machinic assemblage and the code is a machinic function that can put different bodies inside a certain relation. The political importance of Nietzsche's theory of body comes from this fact, since the multiplicity of forces exists in the body renders it being uncontrollable, even in the presence of modern and contemporary multilayered apparatuses designed for its suppression.

To summarize again our discussion, I will explain here shortly how Nietzsche/Klossowski's theory of body connects with the next section on volk and nationalism and gives a way to analyze the contemporary movements challenging it.

The nationalist governmentality, as we will see, tries to impose a certain relation between different groups and collective bodies in its territory. It operates through a code, a machinic function that cause a hierarchy of power, a certain formation of forces based on a relation of dominance. It is a relation coming out of some complex dynamics between class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality. It includes certain collective bodies, put them on different power positions, and excludes some, judging their bodies as spendable. The nation is imagined and performativized through phantasms created in the body and it becomes a stereotype. Not only the nation as the organic national body, but also the national identity results from this formation of forces, and the State, the protector of this identity and the consciousness of the nation becomes its conscious agent. It also starts a hygienic apparatus to maintain that organization, excluding those forces that can threaten the imagined unity.

Yet on the other hand, the machinic function of a new code, a new image of thought emerging through the differential forces of performative event could change the machinic assemblage of political bodies, envisioning what we have called altermodernity.

How the body changes, what a body can do: we will come back to these question in this chapter.

4.2.3 Affect and the Body

“All of these movements ... shared one thing in common: online and offline solidarity shaped around the public display of emotion” writes Papacharissi³⁸ (Affective Publics: sentiments, technology, and politics 6), referring to the affective publics that formed by the protest movements. A public display of emotion: this brings us to the realms of affects. Emotion is different from affect: affect is indeterminate, not far from idea that needs dramatization to become concept, and is virtual; but emotion is a definition of an affect in terms of anger, indignation, joy, ...

Writing about the queerness in Gezi, a Turkish scholar writes that “in the intermixing of bodies, signs, objects, voices, stories, and emotions, movement solidarity renews existing ties and spawned new intimacies and affection” (Zengin). Massumi calls this affective solidarity a “belonging in becoming” (Parables For The Virtual 79).

From this perspective, Papacharissi idea should be read reverse, so that the emotion become the product or dramatized concept of the solidarity. Therefore, correcting Papacharissi sentence, one should write: a public display of emotion was the performativization of an affective solidarity. It reminds one of the famous Guevarian phrase that “solidarity represents the affection of peoples”.

Flowing in-between the bodies in the squares, the affects and affections transformed, even if momentarily, the organization of a collective political body in contrast to what was given as *natural* under their nation-states.

38

The body, according to the above discussion, can be considered as a multiplicity of impulsive forces. The will to power follows the formation of a conscious agent in an exchange with the code of the everyday signs, and a chaotic field of power precedes that definite state. That power, as we mentioned, is the power to affect and be affected, itself a product of affectivity between the internal and external forces.

Referring to Nietzsche's theory of body, David Couzens Hoy argues that the subject is affective in Nietzsche. He also points to the emergence of consciousness and the process of signification:

In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche asks "Who interprets?" and then answers: our "affects." That is, affective modules that come into play before consciousness are already at work in configuring how we will experience the world. Significance is contributed by affective processes prior to conceptual or cognitive processes. The data flow that is being processed is not a given that carries its meaning on its face, but how significant it is and how it is to be construed is always already interpretive. (Critical Resistance)

Nietzsche continues to argue that subject is itself a result of interpretation, thus of the bodily organization of impulsive forces. Interpretation is itself a form of the will to power and "exists (but not as a being, but as a process and a becoming) as an affect" (ibid).

Then the affection makes the subject, as much as the subject experiences the affection. As we discussed before, the interaction of impulsive forces results into differential relations that cause signs, phantasms, and simulacra. Deleuze also argues that "drives" are differential relations between active (affirmative) and reactive (negative) forces, internal and external to the individual body. For him, these differential relations affect the body, and the subject, itself an effect of those relations, experiences them as affections and passions. Affections and passions are then experienced as emotions, feelings and inclinations by the conscious agent (Ian Buchanan 75). This two-sided relation, which we explained as an ontogenetic relation, is explained by Spinoza's couple-concept of affect/affection and its relation to passion.

The power of a body is its capacity to affect and be affected. If a body is affected by another body, it experiences an affection that in its turn, produces an affect, enables it to form another relation with another body. Affect should be thought of as the capacity that a body has to form relations

with other bodies. As Deleuze puts it, “relations are inseparable from the capacity to be affected” (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 218).

Affect is on the other hand the rise or fall of intensity, as Klossowski would call it, and since the impulsive forces are constituent forces of body, any rise or fall in the power means a rise or fall in body’s capacity to exist.

Deleuze and Guattari also define affect/affection relation in terms of “a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (Massumi in *A Thousand Plateaus* xvi). Here, affect/affection relation translates also to the realm of force, where there are two basic affect-affection relations: happiness or sadness.

The three basic affects in Spinoza are desire (appetite), joy or happiness, pain or sadness. Desire would be later interpreted differently, as the constituent power (*potentia*) by his late commentators, but happiness means an increase in the capacity to exist and sadness amounts to a decrease in it. Emotions are the results of such experiences.

Spinoza defines a *mode* in terms of a relation between affect and affections: every body that produces an ‘affection’ in my own body at the same time produces a rise or fall in my capacity to exist, an ‘affect’ that is experienced as a joy or a sadness (D. W. Smith, Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia).

Unlike affect/affection, a passion is less connected with an active relationality, although it can arise its own affect/affection in connection with other bodies. Passion comes from the Latin *pati*, meaning *to suffer* or *to endure*. It is indeed something that “happens” to an already existing subject, it is experienced by it “passively”.

Affects are differential relations, and as such, they are autonomous. As we discussed in earlier chapters, a differential relation is not conditioned by its terms; rather, it is floating in-between points. Affects are then virtual; they need bodies to be performativized into certain modes and cause transformations (or reproductions) in the organization of impulsive forces and thus the body:

we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body (Deleuze and Guattari 257)

At the same time, they are performative, as the relation between performative forces of bodies. Affect is material, though virtual and indeterminate; it is, according to Deleuze, based on the non-cognitive perception of a situation that leads to a modification of the body which triggers the emotion. Therefore, emotion comes in the end of the process of affective production: the affect is situational and contextual, singular to its context, and it traverses bodies while bodies interact also on the flow of affect. Then an affection is produced in the flesh which can rise to the emotion as the dramatized affect.

Focusing on the affects, Deleuze and Guattari's reading of the impulsive forces goes beyond Nietzsche/Klossowski's seemingly individualist approach³⁹. For Deleuze and Guattari, bodies are foldings in the social flesh; there is no interiority sealed away from the exteriority, instead there are foldings of the immanent plane.

In order to undermine dualities such as personal/social and individual/collective, Deleuze and Guattari introduce affect as an impersonal, cooperative and performative force. This is part of Deleuze and Guattari's attempt to replace aetiology (cause/effect relation) with ethology (action/affect relation). As Ian Buchanan explains,

(a) ethology involves a change in direction - unlike aetiology it looks forwards and not backwards; (b) ethology entails a new conceptualization of the body - unlike aetiology it looks outwards and not inwards (79)

³⁹ Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche is not centered around the individual as long as it formulates "the self" as a contingent, temporary organization of impulsive forces. As one of the so-called philosopher of the community, Klossowski's main political strategy is to empty the imagined a priori interiority of the human, the destruction of the self. As such, he comes in a trajectory of thought that extends from Nietzsche, Bataille, Artaud, Blanchot to Nancy, Agamben and so on. However, his focus on the inner experience and the concept of idiosyncrasy of individuals makes it hard to directly connect his thought to a project of common.

From an ethological perspective, affect is defined as the capacity of a body to form relations. The affective relations are differential, performative relations as we discussed before; they are “the virtual links between bodies that a body can form” and they become actualized “when they are connected to a body, but they do not initiate anything themselves” (Buchanan 81).

As it was discussed in earlier chapters, the differential, performative relations are not subjugated to fixed terms. Not only they flow in-between points, they generate such points in their interactions; in the same manner that a conscious agent emerges in a human body as a fixed point of reference. However, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualization of the body does not presupposes it – as Klossowski does not – and the body becomes “an *a posteriori* product of newly connected capacities” (Buchanan 75). Virtual alternative bodies are awaiting their moments of performativization.

But if the affective relationality has the trans(per)formative power to alter the body, then it could be seen as a disease from the perspective of the dominant Power. The dominant Power always seeks to maintain its corresponding organism by eliminating the elements of change. That is why Deleuze believes that disorder, marginality, and anarchy present the habitat for affect.

From this perspective, the potentiality of a new collective body is already present in the contexts of nation-states, where there is already an imagined, presupposed national collective body. Giorgio Agamben formulates this potentiality with a distinction between “the people” and the people. “The people” is the imagined collective body of a state, or of a sovereign rule, whereas the people is what stays non-represented by that authority, retaining the potentiality of challenging such homogenizing rule.

Moreover, the ethological perspective offers us a typology of bodies based on their affects, their capacity to relate with other bodies, and the actions come out of such affective relationality. In other words, it does not categorized bodies according to the principle of identity, but of difference. That is why “a racehorse is more different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox” (Deleuze and Guattari *A Thousand Plateaus* 257).

Thus, one cannot even simply national collective bodies in the same category because they are all called nation. Each singularly contextual national body has forces that cannot be

communicated by the word nation. The only way to observe those is to track their performative simulacra, their pathological symptoms and the ailments of their organisms, to equip our methodologies with – as Deleuze would say – new sensual organs in order to listen to the unheard and to read the unwritten and to see the unrepresented. Before that, nonetheless, we have to understand the way they sustain the organism, organize and reproduce it. This brings us back to *the code of the everyday sign*.

4.2.4 Recording and Inscription: the Machinic Function of the Code

The code of the everyday sign functions as a means to impose a certain organization of forces on the body, and turn it into a homogenous, normative entity. As we said, it is the morality, culture, dominant discourses and norms of a society and it contributes to the production of phantasm and thus, simulacra and stereotypes.

For Deleuze, phantasms are “constituted at the interface where society [the code of the everyday signs] meets human bodies” (Lash 7 – *additional explanations are not in the original*). As we remember from earlier discussions, there is no duality of depth and surface for Deleuze, who quotes Vallery that “the skin is the deepest part of the body”. Therefore, phantasms are indeed inscribed on the surface of the body. They are the “incorporeal materiality” (see chapter two) of the bodies, and as phantasms, they are performative images: product of an organization of forces, but productive of further simulacra. Phantasms are points or knots that trap the flow of desire. The easiest example of a phantasm as an obsessive image would be the “face” of a lover in an intimate relationship; regardless of lover’s bodily presence, the other lover sees that face, as poets have written for centuries, in everything. And most probably, her/his body would remain close to other human affections for a while. As Lyotard explains, phantasm “grips the wild turbulence of the libido” (J. F. Lyotard)⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ Lyotard: “The phantasm here is not an unreality or a dereality, it is 'something' which grips the crazy turbulence of the libido, something it invents as an incandescent object, and which it instantaneously adds to the band traced by its trajectory”.

On the other hand, as we discussed in the previous chapter, “colliding, mingling and separating” bodies create events. Events are the performative forces that are created on the surface of bodies, interact with phantasms, transform them and invent a new image of thought and an alternative imagination. The forces of the exterior are not only of the dominant, gregarious type. A performative event produces its own bodies, while it is created by those very bodies. For Deleuze, the constituent power of such performative events is desire. The body is the battlefield for the struggle of active (productive) forces of the constituent power and the reactive (reproductive) forces of the dominant Power.

The body for Deleuze is a product of connected capabilities and the surficial inscription of phantasms and events. So it has for its own a plane of immanency where such processes are happening. *Skin* could be that, but it seems that *flesh* is what constitutes such bodily immanence for Deleuze. He borrows it from Merleau-Ponty:

it is the flesh that, at the same time, is freed from the living body, the perceived world, and the intentionality of one toward the other that is still too tied to experience; whereas the flesh gives us the being of sensation...flesh of the world and flesh of the body ... are exchanged as correlates (qtd. in Carmen and Hansen 19).

The being of sensation is “the block of percept and affect”, the forces constitutive of the body, which Deleuze sees inherent in the concept of flesh. Flesh is the body prior to organism.

The aforementioned social flesh in Deleuze and Guattari has the same status vis-à-vis the collective body of the society, or rather what has been imagined of it. It is a space where the phantasms, simulacra, stereotypes and events have been inscribed on it, through the code of the everyday sign and/or the performative forces. Two terms, *socius* and *body without organs* are used by the two co-authors of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* to conceptualize such social flesh.

Socius is the locus of social production and reproduction; it functions as the surface on which the coding of the body happens. It embodies the transcendental principles of the social order, those errors that Nietzsche considers necessary for the survival of organism.

Socius is formed through the machinic function of the code that plugs different organs into its flesh. As explained, there is nonetheless a struggle between desire and the dominant hierarchy of the organism, and thus socius's prime function "has always been to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly damned up, channeled, regulated". The code becomes the most important means of *machinic enslavement*⁴¹.

For Deleuze and Guattari, earth is the foundational ground of all productions and reproductions; just as it was the main thing to be affirmed in Nietzsche in his fight against Western metaphysics. Redefined as a generic, undifferentiated and abstract notion, earth becomes the plane of immanency on which all the processes proceed. The first territorialization happens on the earth, dissects it into the different units by the workings of a territorial machine. Socius thus emerges after such territorialization, as the particular earth of each society for its production and reproduction. As the authors explain,

[socius] is a founding act-that the organs be hewn into the socius, and that the flows run over its surface-through which man ceases to be a biological organism and becomes a full body, an earth, to which his organs become attached, where they are attracted, repelled, miraculated, following the requirements of a socius (Anti-Oedipus 159).

The different machinic syntheses on the socius are not always directed toward production or reproduction. The desiring machines could destroy the already existing machinic assemblage, removing the organs grew and/or plugged into the socius and pushing it toward its limits designated for controlling the desire. *The body without organs* (BwO) emerges at such a stage (to be explained in next sections).

The socius is however not an ahistorical entity. It changes according to the context it is built in, the particular codes of the everyday and the *zeitgeist*. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari offer a historical typology of different machinic assemblages. Problematic as it has certain traces of eurocentrism, orientalism, linearity and romanticizing primitivism, the important point for us is how they relate certain socius types to those social machinic assemblages: *body of the earth* for

⁴¹ For more information on machinic enslavement, c.f. the previous chapter, ???.

the primitive societies; *body of the despot* for barbarian despotic states; and *body of capital* for capitalist states.

This level of analysis is still too abstract, as it cannot grasp completely even the singular contexts in the Western Europe and the North America. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, they use the concept of minority to explain the difference between for example, a Spanish majoritarian collective body and a Basque or Catalan minoritarian collective body. Both are seemingly recourse to the same phantasm of national identity, while the former occupies a higher, inner-colonial Power position. As the requirements of our performativization methodology necessitates, we will go into each singular context of “national” collective bodies in the coming sections.

Nonetheless, Deleuze and Guattari relates the submission to the socius with Nietzsche’s theory of consciousness and the self:

Nietzsche says: it is a matter of creating a memory for man; and man, who was constituted by means of an active faculty of forgetting, by means of a repression of biological memory, must create another memory, one that is collective, a memory of words (*paroles*) and no longer a memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of effects (*Anti-Oedipus*, 144)

The difference between these two memories are the difference between the abbreviated signs and the performative signs. In another word, the memory of words comes when the stereotypical phantasms attach themselves to the surface of body, coming from the code of the everyday. While the performative intervention in the organism populates its body surface with new phantasms, resulting into a memory of effects. Thus, there is no individual body in so far as the social necessities and the hierarchical values impose its organization of forces. It is always a matter of collective body and a collective memory. As Bakhtin says, all enunciations are collective enunciations.

As we referred in the Introduction, Bakhtin also focused in a way to explain the bourgeoisie’s socius. For him, the modern individual body was historically constructed in a way to close on itself against any contamination from other bodies. According to him, the court ethics extended into the society at large with the bourgeois rule; an ethics that was obsessive with bodily excesses, regarding those natural outflows as obscenity. In contrast to this pious body, Bakhtin brings the

idea of a grotesque body, whose characteristics are excess, leaks, contamination and openings. The grotesque challenges the normative by undermining the foundational survival technique of its organism: body closure.

Commentators of Bakhtin's analysis in his book on Rabelais often presupposes a contradiction between the classical immured body and the pre-modern unregulated body. Such a duality is however already based on a modern perspective and a modern understanding of regulating the body. More important is Bakhtin's focus on the repertoire of practices that started to be imposed by a central state; practices that according to him, were deliberately segregated from everyday life⁴² and have been founded on morality. Morality, as it was discussed, is itself a hierarchy of impulses, a set of forces and respective values, and the machinic code for organization that made the immured organism possible. Its primary function is to establish "and order and hierarchy among the impulses" (Klossowski). The society was through this new bodily organization becoming a flesh that power could productively invest in, molding its new bodies/subjects.

The molar recoding of a body, as in the case of the organic social body, is in effect "the organizational model applied to the body (Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia* 192).

Even if modernization could globalize what Bakhtin was describing as the immurement of the body, the analysis stays Eurocentric. The repertoire of immurement is contextual, as any other repertoire of social bodily practices, depending on the particular code of the everyday sign in different societies and cultures. Marcel Mauss's notion of *techniques of the body* focuses on this repertoire only in order to explain "the ways in which from society to society men know how to use their bodies." (*Techniques of the body* 70)

Mauss uses the latin *habitus* instead of French *habitude* in order to explain the social nature of the habits, since the former translates into "the acquired ability" and "does not designate those metaphysical habitudes, that mysterious 'memory'" (Although for Mauss memory is a purely psychological term, we saw before how Deleuze and Guattari, through Nietzsche and Klossowski,

⁴² For an argument about this point, c.f. Michael C. Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

introduced another conception of memory, one that is closely tied with the idea of the code and the organization of body's impulsive forces).

Through the discussion on the technique of body, Mauss implicitly presents a non-subjective theory of imitation, too. For him, the techniques of the body are communicated through the imitation, but this is an imitation "that could be superimposed on that of education", and the education becomes effective by the presence of authority over the subject:

The action is imposed from without, from above, even if it is an exclusively biological action, involving his body (Mauss 73).

Mauss's analysis does not challenge the notion of the individual, even if he asserts that the difference between the techniques, as he sees them, are not that much between individuals than between societies. His bodily notion of habits nonetheless shows some similar aspects with the Nietzschean perspective. The non-subjective imitation is also an interaction of forces, where authority, the condition of its occurrence, translates into a relation of domination. "Habits are socially or culturally constructed", writes Brian Massumi, "but they reside in the matter of the body, in the muscles, nerves, and skin where they operate autonomously" (Parables for the Virtual 236), they are frozen affectivities. A change in the *habitus* thus brings a change in the *socius*.

So, there is a memory that Mauss refers to only implicitly and is different *in nature* from the mysterious memory he attributes to the metaphysical thinking. Not only a memory that resides in the body, an *embodiment*, but also a memory that is created through the body. The code of the everyday sign is a machinic function, and as such, it transforms as the time passes and the bodies change shape. The body is not only a passive receiver. It possesses an active transformative power, the capacity to form relations, the performative forces of affectivity. It is effected by and it effects the code of the everyday sign. It resists the Power from without, while its physiognomy changes under the effect of the same Power.

Therefore, to maintain control, the dominant Power should transform respectively, and consequently the code undergoes the same. Klossowski gives another formulation for this point: "the body is constantly being modified so as to form one and the same physiognomy" (29). From

the perspective of the dominant Power, this only means one thing: the necessity for perpetuation of control.

It is in this perpetuation that the memory, as Nietzsche believed, is constructed. A memory that is emerged out of the systemic workings on the body. Foucault adopts this point as the central thesis for *Discipline and Punishment*.

According to Foucault, disciplining and punishing the body as “outlaw” creates a memory for not only the offenders, but also for society at large. Tracing the memory on the surface of the bodies in the Western nation-states, he shows how each historical period corresponds to a different strategy of constructing such a memory that “exists at the level of the unconscious” and “is at the same time an agent of social control and functions in the interests of social reproduction” (Lash). Foucault argued that the classical governmentality directly and brutally engraved the memory of law on the bodies, whereas the modern governmentality – based on the model of panopticon – replaced the negative function of discipline and punishment with a more positive one – one that formed and transformed the bodies proper to the modern economic regime. In the modern era, the gaze of the supervision and the medical, psychological discourses penetrated the soul, where soul should be understood in its Klossowskian meaning, *the playground of the impulsive forces*.

In any case, this coding cannot be done with the negative and suppressive function of police violence.

We discussed shortly in the introduction to this chapter that police, as Foucault says, is modern state’s fundamental agent for creating the consciousness of the reason of state (*raison d’etat*) and inscribing *the code of the everyday signs* (which we explain later) on the surface of the body; or as Reich would say, putting the *body armor* on the social collective bodies. Police provides the State-sponsored technologies of the self, through creating a conscious “self” according to the *raison d’etat*.

From the state’s point of view, the individual exists insofar as what he does is able to introduce even a minimal change in the strength of the state, either in a positive, or a negative direction. (Foucault, *Technologies of the Self* 152)

Foucault shows that police had a specific meaning between the 16th to 18th centuries, a utopic one that underlies the later academic and institutional interpretations: “the specific techniques by which a government in the framework of the state was able to govern people as individuals significantly useful for the world” (ibid 154)

Turquet de Mayenne, to whom Foucault refers, considers police as a force to “foster civil respect and public morality”. For him, Police has to manage *life* both positively and negatively, and therefore, it must “branches out into all of the people’s conditions, everything they do or undertake”. For this early thinker of the modern state, “the police’s true object is man” (ibid 155-56)

Referring to Delamare, another early thinker of police for the modern state, Foucault reaches the ultimate formulation of police function: “life is the object of the police” (ibid 157). This positive aspect of a force that is usually associated with negative forces of punishment and suppression consists exactly at inscribing the code on the surface of bodies; a must for the reproduction of the modern (i.e. vertical, individual and sealed) body:

the main characteristic of our political rationality is the fact that this integration of the individuals in a community or in a totality results from a constant correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality. (ibid 161-62)

The total control on bodies was an illusion, and once the police institutions were established, the actual police force had to become a purely negative one, only suppressing bodies in order to conform them with the right-wing utopic ideas.

In the Western democracies, the police direct violence against the citizen bodies has been scaled down, especially since 70s. It has persisted and still persists in very high levels against the non-citizen bodies, from the poor and the homeless to the refugees⁴³.

⁴³ For a report on police brutality against the poor and the homeless, c.f. BRE’s (pen-name for a homeless activist) autoethnographic account, “Hard Livin’: Bare Life, Autoethnography, and the Homeless Body” in *Constituent Imagination*; edited by David Graeber et al. AK Press: Oakland, Edinburgh and West Virginia; 2007, pp. 223-241. Regarding violence against refugees, multiple reports have documented and strongly warned against the use of police violence in France against refugees in Calais. For example, c.f. The report by the Refugee Rights Data Project (RRDP) at: http://refugeerights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RRDP_TwelveMonthsOn.pdf

But in many post-colonial nation-states, especially those with the experience of the Arab Spring, direct police violence against bodies has not even been pushed into the dark corners.

"If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear and never to see them again, you should send them to Egypt," the Former CIA officer Robert Baer said in 2004, six years before the Arab uprisings started (Ashour).

This is why the destructed bodies of Khaled Mohamed Saeed, Neda Agha-Soltan, Hamza Ali Al-Khateeb, Ali Jawad al-Sheikh, and Mohamed Bouazizi turned into the symbol of revolutions in Egypt, Iran, Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.

This does not mean that countries such as Egypt and Syria are ruled by a classical regime of sovereignty. As Foucault makes clear – and we will discuss it later – old regimes are always still present in the new regimes and obtain new strategic functions through machinic assemblage with the new regime. Contemporary middle eastern nation-states are also control societies, highly advanced in high-tech surveillance technologies, with more visible residues of sovereign rule and disciplining law.

According to our earlier discussion, the transition from disciplinary societies to the societies of control distributed the Power in a micro level, micro-managing the organs plugged into the socius.

The man who enjoys the full exercise of his rights and duties has his whole body marked under a regime that consigns his organs and their exercise to the collectivity (the privatization of the organs will only begin with 'the shame felt by man at the sight of man' (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 144)).

The late capitalism of control societies necessitates the privatization of the social. Fordism could save capitalism because it started to make the flows abstract and the organs disembodied. The abstraction of the management of the labor-power was simultaneous with the abstract style of radically political painters such as Kandinsky, for whom the abstractness could also allow for a universal communication between peoples of different nationalities and cultural backgrounds,

contributing to the so-called international revolutionary movement. The universal abstract was a false promise, as it could not see its rootedness in the Western culture and account for the southerners of the universe. But in any case, “intersubstitutibility, homogeneity, relentless quantification, and exchange mechanisms” were the necessities that pushed capitalism toward more abstractness, and “an over-valuation of the individual is required to compensate for the massive collective disinvestment that takes place in the social as a result of the inexorable growth of the processes of abstraction” (Surin 260).

Floria Sigismondi’s collage video clip “4 Tone Mantis” reflects this process of abstraction/atomization and its consequent disembodiment and dissection of organs for the sake of socius. Her experimental video shows how the organs of atomized, interiorized individuals – who look homogenous under the effects of the exterior – are dissecting and flying toward a giant machine, in the form of a 4-tone praying mantis, and assembled for the continuation of reproduction.

In order to summarize, let’s proceed with a few points:

- The social body is constructed by the code of the everyday sign, while it transforms the code constantly. The code is a machinic function, as long as it plugs the body into the socius.
- The socius is the social flesh, and the coding happens first of all on its surface.
- The code sets up definite limits of performativity for bodies for the sake of a national collective body.
- The body is a historical and social product, it has always a collective dimension, and as such, it is transforming constantly. Therefore, the constituted Power feels the necessity to set up a permanent mechanism of creating *a memory* on the surface of the body in order to maintaining its desired physiognomy.
- The strategy and tactics of constructing the memory and embodiment of the code are different.

4.3 The Biopolitical Body

The coding, as we have seen, brings about a hierarchical, homogenous organism as long as it effects/imposes a certain organization of impulsive, performative, and differential forces of the body.

In one of the most nightmarish dramatization of its kind, Franz Kafka describes a process of coding and disciplining body in his *In the Penal Colony*. The story captures brilliantly the transition between, in Foucauldian terms, *the old regime* and *the modern regime*, from the classical direct engraving of law on the body to its disciplining and spiritual capture via the gaze. In a yet deeper level, it could function for the idea of coding and inscription in general, bringing to light a body that is not totally captured by the code.

The story has four main characters and a central apparatus: the condemned man, an insubordinate soldier who is going to be punished; the traveler, witnessing the punishment as a foreigner; the officer, the judge and the executioner of the military verdict; and a bored soldier standing beside the punishment apparatus.

The apparatus is indeed very interesting. It has a moving bed, an inscriber and a harrow which is traditionally a tool for smoothing out the surface of the soil. The bed moves and the harrow penetrates the surface of the body for the inscriber to inscribe the code. The entire process of the punishment is this inscription. The inscribed code is the law that the man is violated, although it remains a code hard to be decoded for the foreign witness. The code of the everyday sign that shapes the body (and is shaped by it), as Mauss would say, is culture-specific.

The convict does not know his own sentence, nor does he sense he is convicted. The officer justifies it by saying that “it would be useless to give him that information. He experiences it on his own body.” (F. Kafka, *In the Penal Colony*)

The penal colony serves as another spatial metaphor of the governmental law by Kafka. It is an old space of dominion that relies on its permanent self-reproduction, as it is guarded by the archivers – who according to Derrida are not only the key-holders of the discourse and its

interpretation, but are also the key-holders of the authority, of the *arche* – against the intervention of decoding and deterritorializing forces. As the officer says:

The organization of the entire penal colony is his [the already dead Commandant] work. We, his friends, already knew at the time of his death that the administration of the colony was so self-contained that even if his successor had a thousand new plans in mind, he would not be able to alter anything of the old plan, at least not for several years. And our prediction has held.

The attempt to keep everything as it is, *conserving* the status quo, does not refer to a lack of transformation. If we have defined the bodily power as constituent power in this chapter, its theoretical conclusion is that body cannot be controlled or closed down totally; rather it evades and transforms by its interaction with the forces from without. Therefore, the apparatus of capture should always reform and transform itself to adopt with the outlaw body. Referring to Klossowski again, “the body is constantly being modified so as to form one and the same physiognomy.”

Another paradox of the law’s function on the body emerges in Kafka’s story: the claim on legal action’s transparency, while the law itself remains a mystified code. The process of inscription is done with transparency, the officer explains: “to enable someone to check on how the sentence is being carried out, the Harrow is made of glass... And now, as the inscription is made on the body, everyone can see through the glass.”

The act of the punishment, the inscription of the law due to its violation is transparent; however, the law itself which comes from a certain impulsive dominion cannot be transparent. The code cannot be decoded; otherwise, the flows will evade it.

“Read it,” said the Officer. “I can’t,” said the Traveller. “But it’s clear,” said the Officer. “It’s very elaborate,” said the Traveller evasively, “but I can’t decipher it.”

We will later come back to this story to show how it dramatizes the resistance of the body against inscription. As we said, Kafka’s *Penal Colony* dramatizes the passage from the classical governmentality to the modern one. The former has the power to put its subjects to death; a negative function that comes as an extension of the sovereign’s body (“the old commander made the diagrams”). It does inscribe the law on the body, but its inscription means ultimately death.

And it needs it to be a public spectacle; a characteristic that faded away in the time of Kafka's story: "The whole society—and every high official had to attend—arranged itself around the machine. This pile of cane chairs is a sorry left over from that time." The penal colony as it is in the present time of the story is itself a *sorry* left over. The diagram, designed by the old commander, does not grasp the complexity of the new forces emerging through the time. The one is rapidly multiplying itself. The power is transforming into a network with several central nodes. As the officer says, "for they are made up of many heads". The sovereignty paradigm changes into the modern governmentality and the networked power start to asserts its effect on constructing bodies, on shaping and managing life, instead of only negating it and commanding death.

The Penal Colony does not end with emancipation. Its follow-up may rather resemble a world like *The Trial* or *The Castle*: no visible head of authority, an individualized law, and a more "spiritual" system of discipline. *P.* in Beckett's *Catastrophe* is the body under a regime of discipline that shapes its gesture, keeps it constantly under different layers of gazes, and allocate it to a predefined position.

Foucault called the new bodily-focused governmentality *biopolitics*. The contemporary discussions of biopolitics always starts with Foucault's introduction of the term in his "Society Must Be Defended" (1975-1976).

Foucault considers biopolitics as the political rationality proper to modern nation-state which supplements another rationality, that of the sovereignty: latter as "the let live and make die" verdict and former as "the let die and make live" verdict. And racism comes as a mediation that guarantees the dominancy of sovereign verdict on biopolitical verdict in totalitarian regimes.

However, biopolitics first use as a term dates back to the beginning of 20th century, when Eugenics became a biomedical and political discourse and biopolitics appeared "in the context of organicistic and vitalistic theories of the state" (Wilmer and Žukauskaitė). It seems to maintain some of its initial implications in the contemporary times, even when Foucault starts to discuss its different layers in new terms that according to Wilmer and Žukauskaitė include: a new

rearticulation of sovereign power; governmentality as a new form of power; and racism as a strategy to exclude the surplus of economic overproduction.

Eugenics became institutionalized after Francis Galton's Darwinist reading of social evolution. He argued that a management of population by promoting the reproduction of *valuable* groups and decreasing the reproduction of the *expendable* crowds gradually forms the ideal nation, without poverty and weak trends. All must be beautiful, and eugenics shrinks "all" to the point that only the well-born is included in it.

The eugenic policies remained as part of official institutionality well into the 20th century, and it was influential in the Western Europe, Northern America, Brazil, Russia, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, etc. However, many thinkers believe that eugenics is inherent in the structural form of the State, mostly through keeping a medical discourse on the body. Even Foucault calls "biological notions such as degeneracy, inferiority, and purity" as elements of a *statist* racist discourse "rather than *ethnic* because of the obvious ways in which the state uses it to justify practices such as segregation, apartheid, and even genocide" (Hoy 79).

As a term, State comes from Pre-Indo-European root "sta-", similar to Persian "-stan" (ستان, "country"), referring to what stands, what is. Greek "státis", in particular, means a standing still. On the other hand, stásis also refers to a long history of civil wars. The Greek were fighting to show who the real aristocrats are, those eugenic people proper to rule. Coming from Arete (excellence) and aristos (the best), aristocrats means the best people, which according to Platonic thought are allowed to impose their authority.

Beside the Greek eugenia, there are two other Greek terms that sit at the center of biopolitical theories. Through Giorgio Agamben and Hanna Arendt, biopolitics has been linked to a bodily dichotomy of bios/zoê, the first one a *form of life* (a life formed in terms of a singularity) and the latter a *bare life* (a life dispossessed of its singularity, of its form). The former belongs to an individual body that its contours are well-protected by a nation-state, and the latter, bared of its citizenship, is a fragile body, a body open to the horrors of the outside, misshaped, malnourished and yielded as it is dramatized in the figure of *Muslimann*. Politics has an intrinsic link with bios,

a name both for a body and a subject position; biopolitics in its turn reserved for the *zoê*, another subject position defined only negatively in face of Power, striped of any affirmative agency.

The notion and function of biopolitics has gone far beyond its Foucauldian definition in 1970s. And as time passed by, a discursive confrontation developed on both parts of the word "biopolitics". The biological life can be conceptualized from contrasting perspectives, one that presupposes it as the natural, homogenous, and based on the duality between the self and the other, and one that considers it an assemblage of different beings, multiple and heterogeneous. It can be formulated politically as bare life, charged with the history of its suppression, dispossessed of any autonomous constituent power, or it may be viewed as an affirmative field of struggle, where its poorness translates into its virtual creative forces. Politics brings the same discursive conflict into play, posing this question that how it should be defined in an era where the political is reduced to the economic, and bodies are increasingly captured as exchangeable commodities, over which the decision about worthfulness and worthlessness, desirability and disposability is valid. Can we still save politics for a collective liberatory practice among bodies, so that biopolitics as a term would represent a virtual field of emancipatory biopolitical practices? And all these problems seem to find their different approaches in a much older discussion on the negative and the affirmative, the destituent and the constituent.

The critics of Arendt and Agamben's focus on bios/zoe duality has long accused them of turning a blind eye to the issue of race and colonialism. According to Fabián Henao Castro, for example, Arendt and Foucault were negligent toward the very racial aspects of the Ancient Greece as the imagined origin of the Western Modernity, – "the 'color lines' of antiquity, which distributed bios to the Greeks and *zoê* to the non-Greeks" (239). He criticizes Arendt in particular for conceiving the singularity of life only in terms of bios.

On the other hand, Castro believes that they also overlooked colonialism in general, as he argues for a direct inherent connection between modernity, colonialism and racism that invalidates modernity's project in the final analysis. According to Castro, this critical perspective, present in Mbembe's decision to coin "necropolitics" in order to refer to the reign of a very harsh form of

biopower, produces "a new depoliticized subject", a disposable population that would be left to die, by simple destruction of their livelihood conditions.

Much like Castro, Ronit Lentin also argues about the racist as well as colonialist roots of modernity's political project. While referring to Agamben's State of exception, she formulates a similar critique against him by adding Fanon beside Agamben. For Lentin, Agamben's negligence of colonialism and the state of exception can be best observed in colonized parts of the world, which are – unlike western countries – in permanent suspension of law, living for decades in the normality of exception. "While neither Foucault nor Agamben directly theorized colonialism in the context of biopower" writes Lentin, "settler-colonialism is intrinsic to biopower, the product and process of a colonial world" (278).

Although both Castro and Lentin criticize the eurocentrism of Arendt, Foucault and Agamben, they maintain a difference in conceptualization of the body politics. While Ronit maintains an affirmative decolonial ethics, Andrés Castro remains more on the side of the negative, where the transformation in biopolitics is merely "from the bio to the necro".

For Castro all the movements of the exploited social flesh are under the control of biopower. Nonetheless, prior to and simultaneous with this brutal actuality of suppression, there exists a geography of creative forces in resistance and struggle, to which Castro refers only in passing in the very end by pointing to "the speech that only the subject who is deprived of speaking rights can perform, the speech that troubles the ancient division between *bíos/logos* and *zoê/phone*" (250).

A speech of those who cannot speak; a speech of the subaltern, as Spivak would put it. The subject-body that Castro calls for is prior to the state's inscription of law and the functioning of the code on its surface. An impossible speech, one may say, following Klossowski:

Is everything that is singular, incommunicable and unexchangeable (that is, everything that is excluded from what we call the norm) not only condemned to muteness, but also condemned to disappear...? Or on the contrary, is everything that conforms to this norm the result of a process that has weakened the singular, the result of a slow equalization of surplus forces - to the point

where their diminution leads to a compromise that forms a representative type which, because it is average, is also mediocre (Vicious Circle 77)⁴⁴

For Lentin, this is a reason to argue that the colonized or those who are suffering apartheid cannot be merely contained in the negative. Lentin does not find the "bare life" as an adequate notion for designating those people; this term, she believes, neglects their transformative subjective power through the decolonial acts of resistance.

4.3.1 The Technos-Body

Since 1990s, the contemporary movements have been characterized by an increase use of technology. Twitter for instance came out of alter-globalization activists' initiative to increase the speed of communication and to establish alternative mass media outlet independent from governments and big corporations.

Twitter became a big corporation itself, but since 2009, it has still been functional, beside Facebook, as an important means for organization of protests. In Occupy Movements in the West, the image of protestor equipped with smartphone and tablet captured the popular representation in the media. And the wide-spread use of these social networks for organizing, communicating, and promoting protest events made some commentators to dub those movements as "twitter revolution" or "facebook revolution".

There is a fundamental misunderstanding and reductionism in such naming. It confuses a process with a simple means of organizing. The performative events happened in a certain actual time-space by the collective bodies, and not in virtual reality through avatars. But the important role of such virtual communication technologies in effecting those collective bodies may call for a new definition of body, or rather life itself. Rosi Braidotti's post-humanist project is an attempt in this direction (see Posthuman Affirmative Politics).

⁴⁴ Such a speech is another aspect that Laclau and Mouffe's theory of hegemony cannot capture. For them, the expressions (of demands) are already given. But there are those whose first demand is the ability to demand, the ability to express. They are condemned to muteness and their speech is not an expression, but also a creation that disrupts the bios/logos and zoe/phone division. More discussion on Laclau and Mouffe's suggestions starts later on page 164.

Braidotti's conception of *zoē* as affirmative has similarities to Lentin's idea of a decolonial subjectivity. Braidotti conceptualizes a Deleuzian "bíos-zoē-technos-body" in order to undermine bíos/*zoē* duality by adding technos to the pair and constructing a biopolitical paradigm of pure immanence regarding life and body: a technos-flesh, if one wants to update Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh.

Technos however does not only refer to new high-techs, but also to the way that the inhuman couples with the human in an aesthetical body. As they lived in small self-styled tent cities, the collective bodies in occupy movements exhibit such machinic articulation with plants, animals and things in their immediate surrounding⁴⁵ in addition to the aforementioned new-age communication technologies.

A scientific-artistic collective in Australia, *the SymbioticA*, deals with the new technos-flesh and its corresponding conception of life, its fragility and impersonality. Their work deals with *Semi-Livings*, those "fragments of organisms taken out of their original context, reduced life into parts" (Catts and Zurr 135). They set up special laboratory environments to sustain these fragile pieces of -living flesh through intensive care. They invite their audience to observe this process and *touch* the ultimate impersonality of the technos-flesh.

Through their art experimentations with semi-livings, they are "purposely recontextualizing fragments of life within their milieu and giving them agency or a 'voice' to unsettle and bring back their visceral 'aliveness'" (ibid 143) Although they reproduce the lab environment for experimenting with fragile, fragmented life forms, their work become critical by being "non-utilitarian, non-instrumental, and frivolous" (ibid 135)

The apparent paradox of SymbioticA Lab artistic practice, i.e. working with semi-life while criticizing the technological approach to life behind them, is indeed the paradox inherent to biopolitical and immanent struggle against the control mechanisms of biopower. As Catts and Zurr formulate it, "resistance for us expressed through getting wet and messy with life" (152).

⁴⁵ The relevant cases will be presented in later sections of this chapter.

The Symbiotic artistic work witnesses to the material contextually of life. As they assert, the notion of a human body has been already challenged by new advanced technologies and genetic research. Criticizing the notion of body as a whole, they consider each living body as an ecology which is made of human-non-human assemblages. Regarding this biopolitical oppression of life, their work tries to show how life defies human and technological control. They call for an alternative biopolitics "that goes beyond the human-animal distinction, and deals literally with bare life". (ibid 137)

Nonetheless, *technos* machinic articulation with *flesh* has not always been a positive turn and many scholars point to its dark side in the current regime of biopower. James Harding for example recounts a third century legend of Cosmas and Damian – two Christian physician brothers who, according to myth, transplant a foot of a black man (a slave or an Ethiopian) to a Roman nobleman – in order to dramatize a certain relation of power in the contemporary biopolitics and its digital surveillance technologies: the relation between the White Northerner and its cultural other, a relation that allows for a global economy of organ transplants to find its donors in the South as well as an apparatus of capture that appropriates parts of our data without our consent (Harding).

To approach the performative dimension of the new technical, biopolitical body, Harding discusses the "rules of right", or simply put, the "terms and conditions" by which we are allowed to engage in certain social functions such as profession. Distinguishing them from the "codes of conduct", Harding argues that rules of right refer to "a willing submission to systems of surveillance and oversight" (175). This submission is then shaping our performative acts which in turn shape our identity in a way that enable us to conform with societal power relationships. We must conform with excessive surveillance and providing multinationals with pieces of our data in order to be functioning members of society.

The code of the everyday signs and its machinic functions have transformed accordingly in the digital age, becoming what F. J. Colman calls *bio-code* (Colman). This transformation in turn contributes to the new *technos-body* of contemporary biopolitics.

For Colman, body is still a "political site" in the era of "digital biopolitics". But he defines it as a "living capital body" (lcb), particular to the contemporary capitalism. Although similar rigid lines of segregation such as gender, age, color and etc are still active in defining this new "imaged body", lcb is a particular designation proper to the current biopolitics of capitalism, where the body is digitalized and its coded image functions in a data field "where all movements are monitored". (Colman 189)

Trying to situate lcb in biopolitical discourse, Colman starts with bio-identity cards and the double digital data of body that is stored and used for identity check and restrictions on movements. "Your body is an information image", writes Colman, indicating how this information image sanctions or prohibits the movements of certain lcb's based on the randomness of the facticity of their birth place. According to Colman, each lcb is carded and bio-coded. This coding, on the other hand, determines which exits and entrances are provided for certain lcb's.

Through these arguments, Colman shows how the production of lcb's is actually "the process of biopolitics at work". In other words, lcb is a biopolitical being in the age of digital informatics that is embodied in different bio-identity materials and will be enabled through data portals in different fields of biopower such as State power, global economy, reproduction and consumption. (Colman 192)

Since lcb as the imaged body depends on the historical image of life, Colman argues by referring to Donna Haraway's that how the digitalization has transformed the analog proletariat worker into a working body linked with several digital mediations. She points to the processes that make the image of life visible by the "technological mediation of the real" (Colman 197). In other words, if we connect Bergson with Foucault as she claims, then "we can articulate the matter of the biopolitical body whose fate is linked to its contemporaneous technology" (Colman 197). This body as "technology-image" is produced by those technologies that are mostly dealing with security, controlling and monitoring human movements by its digital bio-encoding.

Even if her depiction of lcb production, its treatment and corresponding technologies seems pessimistically dark, she concludes with the potentialities of biopolitical resistance and struggle that come out of the decoded parts of lcb micro-material, when again the machinic function of

the code becomes defunct. For Colman, it is still possible to seek "the potential for ... some relief through non-participation in the consumptive practices of capital", where the non-assimilated and non-integrated value of the lcb could be activated against capital. (Colman 199)

The global north appears to head toward what Colman conceptualizes here – much more than the global south, even if Colman does not agree – and thus, the occupy movements should be seen as challenges to the capitalist transformation of bodies into lcb. Indeed, with their unique style of living together and sharing labour, work and food, they have tried to cancel the functioning of the machinic code.

4.3.2 The Government of Things

The assertion of a new flesh coupled with *technos* necessitates an alternative that Thomas Lemke finds in some “promising areas of research that have so far regained little attention” (Rethinking Biopolitics 58), but would be able to transform the notion of biopolitics according to the contemporary condition.

These areas include the studies on matter as active, forceful, and plural rather than passive, inactive, and unitary as well as new literature on the “bioeconomy” which deals with the systematic relationship between neoliberal capitalism and changing concepts of life and the emergence of a biotech industry. As Lemke argues, the focus should be on a different definition of government, where “to govern means to govern things” (59).

Although the new materialists accused Foucauldian thought as being anthropocentric, Lemke argues that the idea of the government of things – which Foucault introduced through Guillaume de la Perrière – can be counted as a defense on his side. Because the government of things relies on “a sort of complex of men and things” in a milieu that hosts the interactions of human beings with other beings in an interrelated network.

We have discussed earlier the Merleau-Ponty’s idea of flesh, which he considers as an Element, as the matter of the world⁴⁶:

⁴⁶ We will return to this discussion later in the discussion about “the monstrous” in the same chapter.

To designate it [the flesh], we should need the old term “element”, in the sense it was used to speak of water, earth, air and fire, that is, in the sense of a *general thing*, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an “element” of Being (The Visible and the Invisible 139).

The new materialism develops such a concept further to present a conception of body and life that shares the same vision with Lyotard’s aesthetical body that includes things, humans and animals (to be explain later). The government of things also considers the apparatuses of capture working on such a heterogenous body – a whole system that depends on categorizing and hierarchizing different forms of life.

Through the biopower’s codification of bodies into “appropriate bodies” and “inappropriate bodies”, Audronė Žukauskaitė refers to the foundational gap in the concept of human itself and the discourses on humanity, where the non-human is put on the lower level in the hierarchy of being. Here, the biopower establishes mechanisms such as “humanization of animal” and “animalization of human” (Žukauskaitė 74) and sets up an apparatus to capture the non-human forces in general. Analyzing such mechanisms necessitates a fundamental shift of perspective through the philosophy of the impersonal. For Žukauskaitė, such a philosophy functions as a strategy to break down the categorizations of different forms of life in order to revive the notion of the government of the things. On the side of struggle, this shift translates into all technics and strategies of becoming imperceptible in order to re-affirm the heterogeneous multiplicity of the living (ibid 85). On the side of theory, Žukauskaitė suggests a biophilosophy in order to re-thinks life in terms of pure immanence, multiplicity and progressive differentiation, instead of referring to transcendental principles for theorizing it (89).

Eugene Tacker directly engages with the problem of a contemporary biophilosophy that could rethink life and its politics. Thacker presents a trinity of foundational elements for all conventional perceptions of life: “soul, meat, and pattern.” (Biophilosophy for 21st Century 123) In this trinity, soul is the organizing principle of life, meat is its brute matter or clockwork organism, and pattern is the way that life self-actualizes in time. The three elements form a faciality, a field of black holes and white walls that define a certain image of thought; an image

of thought about life which its dualistic method “posits a central universal, external principle of organization that culminates in the living” (Thacker 124) and at the same time, managing the boundaries of articulation between human and non-human, living and non-living. It is coming from an organicism that was criticized earlier through Klossowski’s Nietzsche.

Instead of such conventional, centralizing western thinking of life, Tacker argues for a philosophy that considers “life at the peripheries...extrinsic life, a life always going outside of itself, peripheral life...” (125) Thus, rather than seeking for the essence of life as philosophy of biology does, biophilosophy tracks the transformations of life and its multiple becomings. It is a cartography that draws out “the network of relations that always take the living outside itself” (Thacker 126). Thus, biophilosophy works on the level of ontology whereas philosophy of biology is an epistemological endeavor. And it deals with life in its vulnerability, precariousness, and crisis points, i.e. with a life that needs “care”. That is why Braidotti describes her project as an approach toward “an ethics that respects vulnerability while actively constructing social horizons of hope” (39).

4.4 The Patchwork Body: the Machinic Function of “and”

When we consider extending our theory of the body to the level of performative event – a field of politics one may say – then it is not only its encodement, but also the imposed organization and its manner of linking that concern us. The link is what constructs the actual collectivity.

As we explained parts of this problem before, we avoid repeating the unnecessary. The main problem is that of homogeneity and heterogeneity: the body is heterogenous, not only is a so-called “individual” level, but also more evidently in the case of social collective bodies. The dominant political regimes however have been based themselves on an idea of the homogenous body, one that is been called “nation”, and in smaller scales, conventional “communities” with harsher and more rigid nation-like hierarchies and centralization of authority. As Deleuze and Guattari famously claim, the central process of coding bodies in such a formulation is oedipalization and the nuclear family.

Critical political theory has always sought a way to find another collective body, one that is able to effect transformation. However, one part still retains the playground of the identity principle, seeking for alternative homogenous, or homogenized collective bodies and the other part insists on the element of difference, of heterogeneity.

After the already-existing socialist regimes became the subject of widespread criticism, such an inquiry seemed even more urgent. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (2001 (1985)) was a response to such an urgency. They also witnessed the new forms of contemporary movements and criticized them for the lack of what they have called *hegemony* and warned against the naiveté of non-representational politics and especially the Occupy form, the main subject of this research and the reason makes studying their theory an interest of this work.

In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe tried to conceptualize a new definition of hegemony as “a political type of relation”. The hegemonic relation is constructed around a master signifier:

the category of point de capiton (nodal point, in our terminology) or master-signifier involves the notion of a particular element assuming a `universal' structuring function within a certain discursive field — actually, whatever organization that field has is only the result of that function — without the particularity of the element per se predetermining such a function (xi).

The whole discourse of hegemony is based on the presupposed Hegelian duality of particular/universal, while the Hegelian negativity, here in form of antagonism, does not resolve itself in any higher synthesis. “There is no cunning of reason”, they write, “nor is there any kind of supergame that would submit antagonisms to its system of rules” (xiii).

Laclau and Mouffe accept the existing heterogeneity in the society. For them, the heterogenous elements are *differential positions* within the dominant order. While they remain particularities vis-à-vis the proclaimed universality of the state, particularities could enter an equivalential chain with each other only in order form a hegemonic body of politics like the State's body through an independent relation of hegemony among each other. In our terminology, the opposing differential, impulsive forces become dominated by a force among them that will organize them

into an organism, itself playing the role of the head/ the conscious agent and guarantees the verticality of the organization.

only one particularity whose body is split, for without ceasing to be its own particularity, it transforms its body in the representation of a universality transcending it (that of the equivalential chain) (ibid).

For the hegemonic relation to be established, there should be first a relation between different elements of a particularity, and then a relation of equivalency between different sets of particularities in an equivalential chain of signification. It is only then that a hegemony among different equivalent elements can form around a transcendent point of reference, an empty master-signifier that can be filled with a particular body. Laclau later asserts that the hegemonic relation is the condition of politics, making hegemony from “a political type of relation” to “the political type of relation” – or in other words, politics is the business of vertical bodies.

Laclau and Mouffe do not consider a pre-organic social collective body, a social flesh, and thus do not engage with theories of organization per se. They presuppose the organism, and analyze the social body through what has been inscribed on it; the events, phantasms and the code of the everyday sign which, in their analysis, is called *the discourses*. As there is no non-discursive dimension of analysis, there is no performativity in the sense of a differential force that disrupts the organism through affectivity.

On one hand, they found their theory on the “structural undecidability” as the very condition of hegemony, and contingent articulation as the only form of articulation that can only retrospectively seem *historical necessity*. On the other hand, they presuppose the overarching Structure of the organism, where Master-Signifier is the head and the homogenized particularities in a chain of equivalency form the rest of the body, and introduce it as the sole form of politics. They believe that the hegemonic dimension is constitutive of the subjectivity of historical subject.

I believe that such a contradiction comes, among other reasons, from a misunderstanding of the body as a construct: the hegemony theory does not presuppose the idea of body as the ground of politics, rather the constructed body, the inscriptions and recordings on the body become their

main plain of analysis. That is why the politics of hegemony necessitates the representative mechanisms in order to explain the counter-state collective body of its *people*.

Laclau explains this representational apparatus with a theatrical argument through the idea of the will. Similar to how we defined *will* as the product of an organization of forces, Laclau recognizes the “constitutive role of representation in the formation of the will” but considers the conscious will as the agent of change. For him, representation brings the will to different stages, and therefore, “the function of the representative is not simply to transmit the will of those he represents, but to give credibility to that will in a milieu different from the one in which it was originally constituted”. He also argues that the active participation of the representative as an actor of a stage for formulating the popular wills, let’s say through her/his own phantasms, adds something to the *identity* of the represented. The arguments are true, as long as one does not challenge the foundational concepts, will and identity, which have been presupposed by Laclau. As we argued, the fundamental break comes when the organization of the forces, the relation of dominance, which is the guarantor of the verticality, is collapsed. After all, we know the differences between the projects of capitalism and soviet-style communism, but we witnessed how both systems based themselves on centralized, vertical organization of their societies in the most abstract level of analysis.

The story is again a story of the head (in Laclau and Mouffe, the empty master-signifier position) and the body. We have argued and will argue that the vertical body is not a natural given, but a particular, contingent product. Although the authors of *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* first insist on the contingent nature of the linkage in a collective body, they forget to explore the other virtual, political linkages and fell in the trap of a head-top naturalized body. The way the added surplus homogenizes the counter-state hegemony in their theory is much like the way the modern state set up its own hegemony:

Hobbes establishes the spatial metaphor of sovereignty for all modern political thought in his unitary Leviathan that rises above and overarches society and the multitude. The sovereign is the surplus of power that serves to resolve or defer the crisis of modernity (Hardt and Negri, *Empire* 325).

On one hand, the central topic of the following research is perhaps what has been most neglected in the theory of socialist hegemony, i.e. the non-hegemonic, seemingly chaotic process that may lead to a hegemonic relation, when the master-signifier of the State is collapsed and the discourse (the code of the everyday signs) and its chains of signification is “out of joint”, swirling around as if the *head* of the imagined national body has already disappeared. This is the most creative phase of a movement, when its performative forces are at work without a totalizing state apparatus capturing and covering them.

Being an active participant and an activist in the field of knowledge production, I witnessed such a reality myself during the 2009 Iran’s popular Green Movement. It started with one single fact: “around three million people in the street.” It became the headline of many news agencies on the night of Monday, 15 June 2009; but this was not merely a piece of news, but rather an event that marked the before and the after in our lives. A fraudulent election resulted in a street politics of millions, and we witnessed again how the traditional discourses of the Left were at least challenged and how their discursive boundaries between binaries such as reformist/revolutionary praxis have been blurred. We entered into a chaos, in which the semiotic flows of society suddenly faced the absurdity of the abyss on which they had previously fixated – an abyss appeared after the disappearance of the signifier of an eligible State. Being de-rooted from the territory of representative order, the semiotic chains started to flow in all directions, and a hot pot of social experimentation took shape. In the middle of these processes of experimentation, “we” happened to meet each other. Through different connections among thrown-off individuals, a machinic assemblage of a chaoid functioning in the domain of our collective life emerged. However, if a chaoid is a machinic assemblage that can cut through the chaos and create an architectural composition, “a provisional organizer of chaos” (Berardi (Bifo), Felix Guattari: Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography 11), what was really the chaos then?

Chaos is “a degree of complexity which is beyond the ability of human understanding” (Berardi (Bifo), *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy* 212). Chaos is the name designated to the state of non-dominion among the impulsive forces in Nietzschean body and as Klossowski

says, “every signification remains a function of Chaos, out of which meaning is generated” (Vicious Circle 62).

Besides the disappearance of the transcendent signifier of a legitimate representative order, the chaos we are talking about emerged through the forceful introduction of the new in the context of Iranian politics after the 1979 revolution: a massive refusal of the governmental rule in the margins and undergrounds, and an attempt to make the unheard voice of the non-represented audible. This chaos, which followed the new, was a creative deterritorialization performed by a temporary collective subjectivity; it was a degree of complexity that was beyond the pre-established existing collective intelligence of Iran’s society, and it could only indicate that a new mass intellectuality is to come.

On the other hand, the hierarchy of organic political body forms inequalities in terms of power and makes the exploitation possible. A revolutionary or egalitarian political project should oppose this kind of body and propose another organization which can create an alternative body. The neglected virtualities in the problem of linkage, as Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony formulates it, are again the vital point.

The problem of linkage is a problem of relationality: how can different people, actors, things be connected in a collective body, so that a relation of dominance does not emerge to form an imagined unified organic body, one that necessitates exclusions and cleansings, closures and law-constituting violence?

During and after the Green Movement, I was in one of many new collectives emerging in Iran, mostly Tehran, who searched for new possibilities of organization and collectivity in light of the ongoing popular movement. As a group, we had certain forms of organization in front of us. The majority of groups engaged in the revived activities of the left in the 2000s, even among student activists, were practicing party politics or identity politics with hierarchical forms of organizations proper to these forms of politics. Many of the activists still believed in a kind of vanguardist schema, according to which intellectuals should lead and educate the proletariat in the struggles for a revolution. Naturally, revolution was imagined as a spectacular event, conditioned by the last instance, as a molar revolution intended to seize power and realize the interests of the mass.

But the collapse of the verticality during the movement opened the collective body to new experiments. New activists could see the presence of sexism, ageism, and hierarchical bureaucracy in previous political groups and a distaste, a Stalinist distrust against the bourgeois nature of “art”. Their inability to create new forms, the impotency of their aesthetics which was a reproduction of the mainstream, was the main reason for the failure of their egalitarian projects. The cure for this malady, the movement revealed, was on the one hand to do away with any kind of illusions about vanguardism, and on the other hand to engage in the time-consuming hard forms of transversal organization and try to create and invent new forms of struggle and collectivity, and alternative forms of knowledge production: to affirm the aesthetic and performative side of the politics, as the movement in large had done. Collectives like us emphasized the openness of a network-based organization, and instead of considering only “the economy of distribution of the product” (in this case, our texts, translations and artworks), we concentrated on “the internal economy of our group”: how to not be hierarchical, to not reproduce the present social relations inside our group, and to not let any form of unequal power relations take shape through differences in experience, age, knowledge, gender and so on.

The collective body on the streets presented us with a heterogenous body, incontrollable as much as ungraspable: Islamists besides queers, liberals beside leftists, women in chador beside militant feminists, clergies beside atheists, and nationalists beside human right activists. The hegemony was not there, although it appeared by the intensification of suppression and mass arrests only because some forces had more access to mainstream media when the grassroots media could not function anymore.

In contrast to the hegemonic body, where all its heterogenous, differential parts are said to be in a chain of equivalences, and the non-integrable parts simply excluded, I call the body of the contemporary movement a *patchwork* body. It is a proper body to the *patchwork space* of such movements that we will analyze in the next chapter.

In the moments of headlessness, where the *collective phantoms*⁴⁷ are haunting the nations, there is no master-signifier to form the conscious agent and homogenize the collective body. The code of the everyday signs is defunct, and the flows of desire escape the apparatus of capture and control. The previous machinic assemblage of technical machines on socius, where all social organs are plugged into, disassemble and the reproduction halts. The productive and reproductive connections are lost, and the new desiring machines are plugging themselves into the social flesh, and therefore, the immense power of the affectivity of new impulsive forces is intensifying the movements across social bodies.

It is a moment of paradox. The performative event is a paradoxical force of production: a productive anti-productive happening, a work of the poor. For Bataille, anti-production, for Blanchot, worklessness, for Deleuze and Guattari, miraculous production on the body without organs (BwO). Here the problem of time, space and bodies come together in the performative event.

BwO is a complementary concept for socius. When socius reaches its limits in a time of revolutionary movement – a movement that transforms the conditions of productions – it surpasses itself into the non-organic condition of BwO. BwO is not body without any organ; it rather signifies a body freed from the so-called natural organization of organs in an organism, the vertical body, and it exhibits a set of transitory organs, traversing the whole body, emerging and disappearing. BwO is *swarmed*. When the dominant coding of the body does not function, and the productive organs are plugged out of the socius, then it becomes an empty body without organ from the perspective of the system – since it does not anymore reproduce. But the miraculous production, the production under an alternative relationality, is also at work – to which the system is blind as it does not recognize the emerging alternative relations and the creativity of the poor⁴⁸ (we will return to this discussion later).

Thus, the differential, impulsive forces (of various social groups) produce their own performative simulacra, breaking down the stereotypes, engaging in numerous social machinic assemblages.

⁴⁷ For the discussion on the idea of “collective phantoms”, c.f. the discussion on the names of these movements, in “The Drama of Communicating Intensities”, Chapter 2.

⁴⁸ For the discussion on the concept of “the poor”, c.f. “The Spectacle and its Political Performance”, Chapter 3.

Different transitory organs start to grow, with their own non-hegemonic, non-homogenized regimes of production. Each part of the social body has now a color of itself. It looks like a patchwork that each segment affirms a different design, while all collectively protest against the impositions of styles, aesthetics, relations, and positions of the *head*.

As part of their argument for the political urgency of a theory of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe criticized Jean-Francois Lyotard for his particularism. They believed that Lyotard's conception of the collective body consists in "a plurality of incommensurable language games, whose interactions can be conceived only as tort, makes any political rearticulation impossible". A former Trotskyist, Lyotard changed his political philosophy with *May 68* to affirm an emerging new image of thought he recognized in the libidinal and performative powers of that event.

Regardless of his actual political theory, Lyotard pointed to the very problematics that the politics of hegemony can approach only by eliminating it and prioritizing an equivalential chain. For Lyotard, the social body of politics should be analyzed in terms of a bodily mode of aesthesis, which for him represents an autonomy from the law (see Curtis). Bodily mode of aesthesis is when the body is swarmed with new simulacra, coming out of an openness and energized affectivity: what Lyotard calls the libidinal body – a body he witnessed its short-lived burgeoning in May 68.

The libidinal body tries to resist the inscriptions of the law, and its own creativity (the power of impulsive forces) produce simulacra that push away the stereotypes from the surface of the body. What remains is a patchwork body. It is not an organic body and cannot be reduced to a verticalized "volume in Euclidean space" (Curtis 260), with perpendicular axes. The libidinal body creates excessively in all dimension, and it has no rigid contours-limits between an inside and an outside; its only limit is its power of receptivity, and "various things such as books, food, images, as well as words, machines and even sounds can be charged with libidinal investment and therefore become areas of the body." (ibid)

With such a bodily perspective in mind, the politics of Lyotard includes an aesthetic, performative aspect. It is a practice that "deals with the contingency of links between incommensurables", because the patches of the patchwork libidinal body, instead of being in a relation of equivalency,

keeps a relation of incommensurability. Looking back to the horrors of World War II, Lyotard considers “the linkage between phrases of heterogenous regimes” (The Differend 29) as the unavoidable problem of politics (xiii)⁴⁹. Unlike the hegemonic relation, an articulation should exist that gives equal positions of power to differential positions of signification, without homogenizing all those differences under a master-signifier head. Equality and freedom versus equality and exchangeability.

Lyotard believes that to link is necessary, but how to link is contingent (ibid). Therefore, the hegemonic relation is not the only real political link, and potential forms of linkage can happen in politics; or rather, as Beasley-Murray asserts, “there is no hegemony and never has been” (Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America ix).

This is a teaching of performative turn in arts as well. Performance is based on the contingent link that can emerge between those present in it; it blurs the roles of actor/spectator in order to set the conditions for a possible affective relation that can relate different bodies regardless of their conventional theatrical role. An affirmation of chance, an a-subjective experiment with freedom through contingency; it almost always remained on a level of spontaneity, although there have been experimentations with molecular forms of organization. Among the cases mentioned in this research, one can refer to Publixtheatercaravan. This is the type of organization we witnessed in Occupy Movements, one that is not imposing a certain structure, but forms a flexible, self-organized and heterogenous patchwork body. That is why Publixtheatercaravan, as we explained before, was an attempt at plugging a performance art machine into the BwO of a revolutionary machine.

The contingency of linkage is a symptom of singularity. As we explained before, it was this affirmation of contingency that marks the difference between the performance arts in 1960s-70s with modern avantgardes of theatre. As Ranciere argues in *The Emancipated Spectator*, the modern mentality consisted of engineering the affect, pre-organizing the desired linkage of audience, in other words, trying to play the head for the headless collective body of audience:

⁴⁹ Lyotard writes: “By showing that the linkage of one phrase onto another is problematic and that this problem is the problem of politics, to set up a philosophical politics apart from the politics of intellectuals and of politicians. To bear witness to the differend.” (The Different xiii)

the authority of text/author/director set the direction of the affect, which was usually conceived in terms of conscious elements (raising awareness or inducing self-consciousness). That was a repeatable act, and its singularity was not in its performance and its collective character, but in the higher, individual authority: *the Brechtian* was the name of the singularity. The performative disrupted this vertical theatrical body: a performance is singular, as its body, and both are contingent. The body of a performance is not also limited to humans, but can consist “various things such as books, food, images, as well as words, machines and even sounds can be charged with libidinal investment and therefore become areas of the body.” (Curtis 260) The same bodily mode of aesthesis that Lyotard finds in his libidinal politics.

Nonetheless, affirming the contingency has become the necessity of the new image of thought. The attempts at homogenization and modern rational, vertical bodies has resulted in most irrational disasters and excessively nihilist destructions. The contingency of linkage does not mean there is no organization of the body possible. As we already argued, the new image of thought that emerges simultaneously with the patchwork body constructs new performative rules for an organization, but an immanent one – not a head, not even a thousand heads, but immanent.

Performance arts can also inform us about the nature of an immanent organization. Erika Fischer-Lichte defines it as *autopoiesis*, “consisting of the mutual interaction between actors and spectators” through a feedback loop, that “brings forth the performance”.

The notion of the artist as autonomous subject creating an autonomous work of art, which each recipient may interpret differently but cannot change in its materiality, evidently no longer applies here. (Fischer-Lichte 163)

Head has no specific, higher function anymore. And the body of the performance, freed from its hierarchical divisions and stereotypical theatrical code, remains open and heterogenous with an immanent organization between differential expressions in equal power positions. The linkage remains necessarily contingent.

Pointing to the performative character of contemporary movement, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue for a new collective body proper to new forms of struggle. One of the main

characteristics of what they call “the multitude” is according to Beasley-Murray its *autopoiesis*. He defines autopoietic multitude as “a set of mobile singularities contingently aligned through immanent interaction” (Beasley-Murray 250). Although Hardt and Negri consider capitalism as an “autopoietic machine” (Empire 34) that “lives off the vitality of the multitude” (Empire 62), but their discussion of creativity and autonomy of multitude makes it *another* type of autopoietic machine, one that couples with *allopoiesis*.

Autopoiesis comes from the constituent power of performative, impulsive forces, or in other words, in the capability of the body in affecting and being affected. When the forces are not subjected under the vertical organization, they subsist in the bodily mode of aesthesis, an openness of affectivity.

Autopoiesis should not be confused with an isolated process of self-making. Autonomy itself does not translate into a self-retreat or an illusion of an access to an external, pure space of struggle; on the contrary, it is created by a collective action that produces non-subjugated alternative subjectivities in relation to each other – an autonomy that only functions with a heteronomy. Regarding this fact, it was argued in Chapter 3 that autopoiesis also comes with allopoiesis in the performative event: in other words, the collective relationality emerging in occupation movements does not only autonomously constitute itself (autopoiesis) but also constitute an alternative system regarding the established order and structures (allopoiesis).

Writing with reference to recent “time-spaces” of collective struggles, Donna Haraway defines this dynamic as “sym-poiesis” to emphasize on togetherness (*sym-*) instead of making (*poiesis*) while adopting a perspective of the government of things. For her, the machinic assemblages between the human and nonhuman have made them inextricably linked in myriad forms of practices. But these practices are experimentations of living together in order to create sustainable, non-hierarchical ways of collective existence (what is referred to as *experimental futures*), particularly on a damaged earth that a horizon of a livable future is increasingly fading away (see *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* 2016).

That is why for Hardt and Negri only multitude is the proper body/subject of the constituent power that has the transformative power against the established institutions. Their Multitude is

a performative endeavor, as it doesn't just produce goods and services, but also “cooperation, communication, forms of life, and social relationships” (Hardt and Negri, *Multitude* 339).

The renewed interest in Bakhtin's theory of the carnivalesque comes from this idea. In the bodily mode of aesthesis, the open body is a grotesque body from the point of view of the dominant power: ugly, excessive, open, porous, non-homogenous, threatening and ungraspable. The carnival is the organizational art of the grotesque body: without permanent hierarchization, open to different flows, threatening to the established order, and joyful.

Activists and participants in other contemporary movements share the same experience in terms of a heterogeneous collective body and a chaotic creativity in absence of hegemony.

I had few conversations with a performance artist, who works as a mime, contemporary dancer and a theatre of oppressed practitioner. Nina Khodorivska was in the square during the occupation. She also lived in an occupied building from 27 January till 18 February 2014, and in an occupied Ministry from 21 February to 1 March 2014. She was the coordinator of Student Assembly which prepared cultural programs for an occupied administrative building, “where according to the police's estimation a thousand individuals lived together”. This assembly had organized movie screening, lectures in Maidan's Open University, various theatrical and musical performances, and protest against existing Ministry of Science and Education.

When I asked about her experiences as an individual and as an artist who lived in Maidan tent city, she replied: “I liked to perform what I imagined about collective living. However, it's very true that people tend to like this collective equal co-habiting so much that they forget that the world is still not like that everywhere. And we have to fight for making it like this.” This was a fight of a heterogeneous body of multiple non-vertical organizations:

Civil Council of Maidan (platform for collaboration of around 100 initiatives, consensus decision making, many really serious guys, professional politicians not allowed, inclusive treatment of newcomers), Student Assembly (I was a coordinator of it), secret tent council (existed from time to time, mainly to provide tents with autonomous heating and feeding, so that the dwellers don't have to depend on the “headquarters”, appropriated by party politicians), The Library of Maidan (collected books, including very cool ones, systematized, invited writers and poets, and proposed

books for the protesters to read), The Open University of Maidan (invited cool lecturers on all kinds of topics to lecture at the square, and later – in the huge hall of our occupied building).

One should not also forget the “Artistic Hundred Group”. *Hundred* in their name was a reference to one hundred separate ways of organizing bodies in the square. They also believed that the organization of Maidan collective body should not be crystallized in any organic, hierarchical, and persisting structure.

There were various performances during the movement, and even now after it, happening in form of guerilla theatre and theatre of the oppressed by autonomist and non-hierarchical collective art groups. And also, individuals like “The Piano Extremist” were playing piano in front of riot police lines, and living among others in the occupied buildings. Or a famous unknown guitar player who played in different occupation spaces during the movement to cheer up people.

Mohammad, a current PhD researcher in Germany and a former organizer of Anti-Capitalist Muslims share the same story. I met him in the beginning of 2014, before he had to come out of the country in 2015. For him and his group, there was no dividing line based on identity between the bodies of the movement that is now called the Occupy Gezi. When the Anti-Capitalist Muslims were organizing *Iftar* in Ramadan for protestors in the street, giving free food to everybody and praying with fellow Muslims at the same time, the other groups – leftists, anarchists, greens, football fans, ... -- protected their ritual or food ceremony by forming human shields around them.

There is but always a problem in these heterogeneous bodies.

The problem of linkage comes back in all the contemporary post-performative turn political movements. The highly flexible, democratic characteristic of their collective body, unleashed from the military disciplines of vanguard parties or the hierarchies of traditional party politics, could be inviting for those political ideologies that do not share the basic values of equality and freedom with other protestors and militant groups.

When Nina describes the people in Maidan, she names all of them: “anarchists, cossacks, leftist intellectuals, labour union leaders and active members, professional politicians, NGO workers

and leaders, human rights activists, contemporary artists and just artists, reenactors of historical events, nationalists, and Nazis”.

When Mohammad explains that identity was not a basis and everybody was there, this “everybody” includes ultra-nationalists, who have a bloody history with minorities such as Kurds or Armenians⁵⁰.

Nor was Iran’s Green Movement, as I experienced it, always a pleasant mixture of bodies. In Iran’s 2009-10 massive demonstrations, the nationalists with their xenophobic discourse against Arabs and other minorities were there, just like Nazis came out in Maidan.

Hito Steyerl (The Articulation of Protest) refers exactly to this point by criticizing the widely acclaimed Seattle alterglobalization event in 1999, where anti-modern, anti-European and ultra-right nationalist fractions and parties appeared among the protestors. Reflecting on the nature of this “and”, she asks that whether this and is neutrally accumulative of “all” voices and images and then, paradoxically, makes a homogenous undifferentiated mass, or rather is a selective machinic assemblage which forms a radical heterogenous minoritarian multiplicity based on difference.

There are certain types of “and” that could put the heterogenous pieces of a movement together: an idiorhythmic, selective *and*, which we discussed before through Barthes, and an accumulative *and*, which juxtaposed anything indifferently.

These two functions are always mixed in contemporary movements.

If the accumulative “and” is adding indifferently, it acts as the reproducer of the established order, trying to subject all the heterogeneous elements to a resurgent dominant homogenizing Power, since Power is already internalized and reproduced by some other added elements in the chain, those who are in closer seats to the main spectacle of molar Politics.

But if an accumulative “and” is a function of reproduction apparatus, and a hegemonic relation also goes toward the same direction, how else do people connect in a contemporary protest

⁵⁰ Persian transcriptions of these interviews have been published in www.radiozamaneh.com (2014).

movement? How could a selective organization be free from forced, violent exclusionary processes?

The idiorhythmic “and”, I argue, functions through the new image of thought. The movement, its collective heterogenous body thinks, and it thinks *headlessly*, as it develops new phantasms and simulacra, populating the surface of socius with them, transforming the social flesh and pushing it toward its limits, disorganizing and reorganizing it.

We have already argued that body is a product of connected capabilities and the surficial inscription of phantasms and events. Therefore, with the performative event at work, and the code of the everyday signs defunct, the performative simulacra of a movement populate the surface of its body, functioning as the connecting points between different bodies within the socius.

In such a process, some performative rules become a means of selective organization, since not all ideological groups could find themselves obeying such open, polyvocal and non-hierarchical rules or following what they see as either useless and absurd or excessive and deviant.

Such performative rules that result from the new image of thought function as a type of game rules. In a game, rules are the conditions of a certain performance, a certain movement; they are not actively dividing or categorizing different bodies and limiting access based on hierarchical positions of power. They create a situated necessity out of a contingency. In a Fantasy Role Playing game, for example, a character enters in a situation, and the only limit to its movement is the limit of its power; its physical and spiritual power that has been digitized based on contingent criteria that could be increased during the events in the game: either happy affect/affections increase your bodily power and your protecting shield, or a sad affect/affection decreases your physical and spiritual health. Limits are defined by differential forces, not through rigid lines of various identities.

We need to recognize those performative rules and other performative simulacra in order to see the alternative forms of bodily organization in Occupy movements. Otherwise, the only theories remain to explain them must recourse again to a vertical or hegemonic relation for an alternative emancipatory politics.

Greece organization in the squares and the further attempts at maintaining an open collectivity is a good case to think about performative rules. In “people’s assemblies” in Syntagma square, every night up to 4000 participants attended the meetings for 40 days. On one hand, the process of decision-making with such a high number of actors looked very hard, if not impossible, at first glance, and on the other hand, Golden Dawn neo-Nazis were among the protestors in the beginning and their history of cooperating with police and security service agenda by attacking immigrants, refugees and left-wing political activists presented a real danger to the cause of the occupation.

As the movement tried to define itself as non-hierarchical, non-exclusionary and heterogeneously inclusive, a simple act of “throwing them out” was not an option. Therefore, occupiers had to invent new forms and tactics in the people’s assemblies to avoid integrating xenophobic and ultra-right-wing elements from the decision making. So an amazing form of organization emerged with establishing certain rules of performance.

First, everybody could speak about anything they wanted. Second, the speakers could not claim representing any bigger group or organization. Third, political (representative) parties were not allowed to promote their agenda, as people wanted “all of them out” and rejected the very mechanism of representation and outsourcing power to higher hierarchical positions. Fourth, the speakers were chosen by lottery, and nobody could claim a right to speak over others. Fifth, the speakers were limited to 2-minutes speeches, so that the time could distribute equally. Sixth, the moderators were also chosen by lottery for each round of discussion, so that nobody could obtain a higher symbolic power. Seventh, there were corridors for speakers to walk toward the microphone. Seventh, hand sign system and people’s mic – that we come back in the following – were adopted to facilitate the meeting proceedings.

It was a system that worked and by these very simple rules, the neo-Nazis self-excluded themselves from the occupation, as they could not tolerate this radical egalitarian and democratic procedure.

The bodily techniques that have been developed in the contemporary movement show another aspect of their persistence into forming an alternative, non-hegemonic collective body. As we

discussed through Mauss and Klossowski, the code of the everyday signs is an important part of our cultural bodily technics and a machinic function of its organization, while the code is itself constitutive of and constituted by the dominant image of thought (phantasms). A new image of thought, and new sets of simulacra created by it, could develop certain bodily technics: this time for a different communication and organization.

My first encounter with the depth of this sign system was during an interview with an autonomous, anarchist collective in Berlin, mostly cultural workers turned to be activists, and one of the first working groups of a short-lived Occupy Berlin.

The group that I met was a small one, consisting of seven to eight members. Among them, there was a young Russian-German activist who experienced the Occupy Wall Street and returned with inspiration and knowledge from New York to Berlin and joined others at the beginning of protests against the financial capitalism in Germany's capital. After that, the group started to make more connections with other autonomist and activist groups, mostly outside Germany, to educate itself on others' experiences. They also participated in Occupy Oranienplatz refugee movement and helped with organizing aid groups for legal consultation, teaching language and other related issues.

As an important part of their work, they used to present their ideas for moderating general assemblies and organizing decision-making process. For them, it was an urgent cause: moderating a general assembly of very different groups and individuals in a way that no single force could dominate and form a head, overarching the collective body. A difficult task I would say after I witnessed the organizing meetings of O-Platz. The collective body is heterogenous: a mixture of different non-white immigrants from various backgrounds and cultures, some speaking English, some French, and only a few German; and then German activists, some from the traditional left, used to disciplined work schedules and a definite set of goals and a hierarchical mechanism of decision making, and some from the new generations, anarchists or anti-fascists, with their own methods of organization, non-verticality, playfulness and inefficiency, with a visible tension breaking out any moment between the older and the younger

generations. Any dividing line based on language, age, gender and skin color had to be avoided so that the crystals of hierarchy could not reproduce themselves among activists.

The body language becomes an important way of communication. This sign system developed through years of experimenting with non-hierarchical, non-party politics and it was based on simple movements of hands. There are signs for showing support, agreement, dissatisfaction, critique and even blocking some ideas. They can form, in agreement, a semi-dance of swirling hands and in disagreement, a performance of rotating hands, calling for a change in speaker or in subject. There are certain rules for processing such commentaries. For example, a block can make a delay in decision until it is resolved; moreover, there is no representation allowed and nobody could speak in place of a larger number of people, unless there is a meeting designed for such a thing. More importantly, simple hand signs could give more ease and confidence to refugees with limited knowledge of English or German for giving their initial ideas over the proposals. And the silence of words accompanying such gestures is more inviting for an active participation of non-native activists with bodily signs.

Other sets of techniques such as “people’s mic” seem to be in line with the heterogenous body involved in protests. When somebody speaks at a corner of the encampment or in the general assembly, the listeners repeat his words toward the others behind them and the process continues. However, it is not a disciplined performance. While some are repeating the words, and moving their hands in agreement, others can protest with the different hand signals, showing live commentary on the speech. And of course, a people’s mic could filter the divisive rhetoric of the nationalists and xenophobes.

These performative rules and bodily technics could be more visible in Occupy movements in European and North American countries. Those protests met with police violence, but not as brutal as the police violence in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, Iran, and other similar countries.

Moreover, although one could argue that financial capitalism was the main target of occupy movements that emerged on a global scale since 2011, they targeted different entities in each country. In the US as well as Europe, the protests raged against the financial centers, banks and international monetary institutions. The governmental system per se was not a target, although

the protestors believed the government is occupied by the capitalist elite. In Egypt and Tunisia for example, mass impoverishment and the mechanisms of dispossession were closely tied with inequality, police brutality and crackdown of freedom; consequently, the main target was post-colonial states that have had long tried to construct their imagined nation-states by implementing neoliberal economic policies on one hand and establishing a fearsome apparatus of suppression on the other hand.

Therefore, any analysis of such movements should be capable of explaining the transformations in the imagined nations as dominant collective bodies, the disruptions on its conceived homogeneity, and the alterations in the dominant time-space – the habitat of the imagined collective body.

4.5 The State and the Body

When the different social uprisings started to appear in a global scale in the end of 2000s, theories tried to understand their particular logic of dissipation and repetitions. There were those in cultural and performance studies who brought up the notion of imitation or mimesis, and others from the same disciplines who recourse to a more biopolitical, affective concept: contagion.

There are no two cases of similar reactions to even most common viruses such as cold. When the virus comes, the transformations and changes through the interaction of immune system with it are all interdependent on the singular network of relations inside a particular historicized and disciplined biosphere, a human body.

The affective intermingling of forms and aesthetics among the contemporary different movements follows an immaterial-viral logic of contagion. While imitation and mimesis both presuppose a universal-ideal image, inherently Eurocentric, and become trapped in the apparatus of representation, the logic of contagion is more about the internal dynamics of those movements in their assemblages and different lines of flight.

What is being repeated? How repetition, as a spatiotemporal concept, can be conceptualized through viral contagion? If there is a new political collective body, a new social flesh, appearing out of such uprisings and struggles, how do these bodies, each in their own singular histories of, and with their own singular geographies of, intensities and forces react to the viral contagion? How do they deform or transform? How will the new social relationality intervene in and re-create the space and time in such a repetition? A symptomology of these bodies under the affects of contagion could show another aspect of repetition versus its representational conceptualization.

The emergence of multiple civil wars in the post-Arab Spring Middle East and their corresponding organization of social bodies do also symbolize the two types of repetition: a repetition for the new and of the difference, and a repetition of the old, in this case the never ending post-colonial processes of nation-State makings and its appropriate “national” identities. So, if this typology of collective bodies through repetition can be held, then our discussion should go into each of them.

I discussed before how modernity is tied with colonialism and how modernization process made the Nation-State a hegemonic form, making it the ultimate globalized model for organizing societal collective bodies. Nation is by definition a hegemonic whole, flattening the differences in the heterogeneous common body of a territory. But in each context, the processes of nation-making and their corresponding body is different. Even the designated names from different political fractions show different traditions of imagining this collective bodies: nation, volk, people, masses, multitude, etc.

The notions of community and collectivity must be confronted critically in the discussion about self-organization. For the notion of community should not be presupposed here, because this term historically refers to a homogenous, united whole, opposed to the bourgeois individualistic society. Challenging this conception of community, the critical contemporary treatment of the term (for example, in Agamben’s *Coming Community*) links the new community to an open whole of singularities. The altermodernities challenge both the modern and conventional/traditional collective bodies, community and society, or nation and volk.

Performativizations of a performative politics necessarily deals with (collective) bodies in each local context. For example, one cannot simply use the same talking points for collective bodies of Middle-Eastern Arab Spring and North American Occupy Wall Street. Although the flow of immigrants and refugees through globalization blurred the boundaries between these collective bodies, one cannot neglect their different conditions. For instance, the trajectories of al-ghomia and al-Sha'b (nation in Arabic) and Mellat (nation in Farsi and Turkish) are closer to the romantic conception of volk in German or people in the state discourses of existing socialisms (as in the People's Republic of China) than the individualist contractual conception of nation. In a similar manner, Umma in Islamic movements is not completely identifiable with community, people, or mass in other political discourses. Therefore, a discussion over the bodies of different so-called cultures will be necessary to face with this difficulty.

So, questions remain: which body does performativize? How is this body historically conditioned? How does temporality transform itself during performativization?

With the analysis of nationalisms, the Butlerian idea of repetitive performance as the core of identity enters a new level. Rather than focusing on individual performances, it argues how a nation-state starts its own lines of subjectification through the nationalist project. In other words, the nationalist project "suggests" a certain, limited, exclusive and exclusionary set of performances through homogenizing a populist, racist and sexist discourse. The authority of the state expects all individuals to "imitate" these performances.

In the following, I will focus on the theories based on imitation for explaining the collective body construction throughout different countries relevant to this research. I will discuss the idea of Volk, since when it was imagined by the romantic movement in Germany under the influence of French revolution, it had deep influences on intellectuals in the Middle-East, Turkey, Iran and Arabic speaking countries. And afterwards, the performative contagion and the disruption of such bodies will be discussed in contemporary occupy movements.

4.5.1 Imitation, Nationalism and the Colonial Divide

About imitation and mimesis, we as theatre studies scholars know enough. The concept is originally based on the principle of identity, functions in the realm of cognitive consciousness, brings forth similarities, and the difference are always secondary in relation to the identical. It works in the logic of generality and particularity. In the following, we will show how the general idea of a nation is suggested by Western commentators, from which many non-Westerns imitated their own nationalisms.

The word nation came to English from the Old French word *nacion*, which in turn originates from the Latin word *natio* (*nātīō*), literally meaning "birth", itself going back to the well-known root word **gene-*, the *origin*. "Soil and blood", one may say, are already implicitly present in the nation's meanings.

But the concept was determined (especially in the connecting point between liberal French and Anglo-Saxon thinkers and the influence of German enlightenment movement) through the idea of a social contract. By entering a contract with the State as the central power, individuals willingly *transfer* their right to rule in order to form the nation. When the romantics, themselves inspired by French revolution, started to use the term *Volk* through/instead of the borrowed term *nation*, the implications were different.

4.5.1.1 "Volk vor dem Tor"

In the early Scene of "Vor dem Tor" in Goethe's *Faust (Part One)*, Dr. Faust talks about *Volk* at the gate of a village in a Sunday holiday. He describes the village as "des Volkes wahrer Himmel", *Volk's true heaven*, where he feels himself as human, or as he puts it, "Hier bin ich Mensch, hier darf ich's sein" ("Here I may be so, am allowed to be so").

Volk refers in this dramatization to the lower-class people, commoners, who rank socially lower than Dr. Faust whose arrival to the village resonates with the romantic idea of returning to the nature, to the origin, to the raw.

In the scene called “Mitternacht” (Midnight), he repeats again the experience of being a human, this time by standing “before Nature”.

The Volk, the village, the nature: this link shows us how volk (as well as nation) is considered the natural organization of bodies. In such a natural environment of volk only a cultural (as opposed to natural) urban Faust could feel his true identity.

Another mechanism of Volk-construction is also discussed in Faust, which relates to its hegemonic and unified characteristic. In the village, one *burgher* says that wars are the main discussion in Sundays as in Turkey, under the sovereignty of Ottoman empire in the time of the play, “die Völker” (different volks or nations) fight each other to the death (“Nichts Bessers weiß ich mir an Sonn- und Feiertagen/ Als ein Gespräch von Krieg und Kriegsgeschrei,/ Wenn hinten, weit, in der Türkei,/ Die Völker auf einander schlagen”).

The implied contrast of a peaceful cafe’s conversation about war inside a territory for only one volk *and* “volks” fighting each other to the death in another territory, Turkey, speaks for itself. The peace seems to result from the lack of difference and heterogeneity in the village, where only one Volk lives. And it also entails the simultaneous construction and rejection of the other, here Turks. “We” of the villager is defined as contrast to the Turkish “other”, an important imperial rival to the “east”. One should not forget that the city of the new Volk is closed off with walls in Faust’s imagination.

And yet another mechanism emerges in *Faust* that is related to the previous one. Faust ultimate wish is the construction of a volk between the land and the sea, “nicht sicher zwar, doch tätigfrei” (“*not safe, admittedly, but actively free*”). Contrary to other romantic dramatizations of Volk, like that of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Goethe’s Faust does not recourse to biology or common ancestry for this new imagined Volk. The Volk is constructed by the common experience of *danger* from the sea. On one hand, this vision directly links the construction of Volk to colonial dreams of that time, with ships bringing “richly and colorfully laden with the products of foreign parts of the world” (“reich und bunt geladen/ mit Erzeugnissen fremder Weltgegenden”). On the other hand, it relates the construction of a people to the very idea of “resisting the danger” to which we come back later through Carl von Clausewitz.

As Goethe is considered, particularly through Faust, a bridge between so-called “classicism” and “romanticism”, Herder has been categorized the philosophical figure connecting the 18th century Enlightenment and the romantic thought of 19th century in Germany. If Kant’s Enlightenment advocates an individually focused cosmopolitanism, Herder’s political ideal seems to be more a localized Volk, reterritorialized inside a national, *original* territory. Many believe Herder to be “one of the earliest theoretical advocates of nationalism generally and of German nationalism in particular (see Alfred Apsler; Brian King; Fox).

The transition from the 18th century cosmopolitanism to the 19th century nationalism is another double movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The colonial endeavor was a deterritorializing force which helped in envisioning a new order, although the negligence toward colonialism and its corresponding divides, especially along the color-lines, show the limits of those cosmopolitanist claims. However, the intensification of imperial competitions on one hand and the impacts of the French Revolution on the other brought about a movement of reterritorialization based on coined national identities.

Herder has commentators who defend him against the accusations of racism and antisemitism; and of course, he has fierce critiques who made him infamous as the father of racial thought, if not racist thought. The third category of references to him are done by pseudo-researchers of the White supremacism in form of glorification and inspiration for a white ethno-State.

Even if we limit ourselves to the defenders of Herder against its Nazi reinterpretation and implementation, he emerges as a thinker of a linear evolution.

Herder, the romantic Goethe and others came after them broke away with the universalist promises of enlightenment. The particularism was on the rise, as the nationalism was fermenting on the European soil. The imperialist competitions and the total war of revolutionary France – as we will discuss further – revealed the failure of an illusionary promise of a cosmopolitan egalitarianism, unaware of its colonialist inheritance. As Nietzsche would write later, “since Copernicus man has been rolling from the center toward X.” (The Will to Power)

That is how the metaphysics of the origin coupled with an organicism based on a raw, sentimental biology in Herder, for whom the seed and the root were two main metaphors of the Volkgeist.

The Newtonian physics was replaced by an evolutionary biology, either based on botany or body anatomy and immunology. Organism replaced mechanism as the explanatory metaphor of the world.

Then it is not surprising that political philosophers of 19th century got interested into medical discourses about human body. In the beginning of 20th century, when the term biopolitics first entered the Western discourses, it was in the context of organicist and vitalistic theories of the state: they define state in terms of a living being with its proper collective body (Volk, nation, people). It is illuminating to take a look at a few titles of such works: Karl Binding's *zum werden und leben der Staaten*; Eberhard Dennert's *der Staat als lebendiger Organismus*; Edward Hahn's *Der Staat, ein Lebenswesen*; Rudolph Kjellen's *Grundriss zum einem System der Politik*; Jacob von Uexkuell's *Staatsbiologie: Anatomie, Physiologie, Pathologie des Staates* and Morley Robert's *Bio-politics: an essay in the physiology, pathology and politics of the social and somatic organism* (Wilmer and Žukauskaitė).

For Herder too, ethnology and botany are the same in their methods, as “the botanist cannot obtain a complete knowledge of a plant, unless he follows it from the seed, through its germination, blossoming, and decay” (Herder 38).

That is why both Herder and Goethe saw the perfection of the human in presence of a volk: “Ein Mensch, der sein vaterländische Gemüt verlor, hat sich selbst und die Welt um sich verloren” (“He that has lost his patriotic spirit has lost himself and the whole world about himself”)

In “Three Critics of the Enlightenment”, Isaiah Berlin sums up this idea referring to Herder: “to be fully human, . . . one must belong somewhere, to some group or some historical stream which cannot be defined save in the genetic terms of a tradition, a milieu and a culture” (198).

Herder's ideas thus can be summarized in this equation: *the national is the true*. Although there are attempts from Herder and other early thinkers of the volk to present pseudo-scientific justifications for a theory of race by using organicism and biology, the emphasis on the true and the soul proves the importance of sentiments and affections for them in constructing a collective body. With their insistence on spirituality and religion, Herder and other romantics implicitly

show how nationalist ideas and their corresponding practices are most likely to be transmitted through affects, rather than a willful, free, subjective imitation of what has been seen.

On the other hand, both Goethe and Herder, at the dawn of industrialization and the emergence of urban proletariat, found their idea of the Volk on the peasants, creating a divide between volk (peasants) and the rabble (workers). “There is only one class in the state, the Volk (not the rabble),” writes Herder, “and the king belongs to this class as well as the peasant” (qtd. in Brass 279).

As Goethe himself warns, “too much inquiring after the sources of things is dangerous. We should rather concentrate on phenomena as given realities” (qtd. in Treitler 90). That is what we set to do with the imagined volk and its realities, more than its utopist ideas and source-searching in the form of beautiful prose.

The king ruling the peasants in the imagined society of “only one class” translates to One-Party governments (*one nation, one state, one party*) in reality. This form of governmentality took control of power after nationalist movements and revolutions ended into formation of new nation-states. A few examples from our area of research would be the modernizing periods in Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Tunisia. The exclusion of the workers from the volk also shows the difference between “socialisms” in rightwing national-socialism and leftist socialism and the reason that the latter became the immediate ideological enemy, falling victim to the early suppressive attempts by the former. These are important facts that help us later to see the mechanisms of constructing a collective body in non-western contexts.

For Herder, a *volk* emerges out of an organic development, starting from an originary time and space. His platonic idea of a Volksgeist measures the truth of the volk through its distance to the originary territory. The Asiatic volks, for example, were shaped by the sun and the desert, and the Western ones by the rain and the river. The more distance a volk has from its national milieu, the furthest it is from its own truth. This idea functions as the grounding of his negative observation and comments on the Jewish volk. “The poor nation was dispersed into the world,” he writes of the Jewish people, “thus most of them formed their expression according to the genius of the languages among which they lived, and it became a sad mixture of which we had

better not think" (Sikka 175). And when he was writing on the misfortunes and mistakes in the semi-biological evolution of Jews, a *volk* of the Orient, they were segregated in Germany, living in Ghettos and not enjoying a full citizenship status until 1896 (see Apsler).

It is true that Herder was not an advocate of German Supremacy over all other races, but his so-called "cultural nationalism" that defined *volk* through a vast idea of culture became militarized not so long after him.

Nietzsche also relates nationalism to the German romanticism. "The nihilistic consequences of the ways of thinking in politics and economics," he writes, "where all 'principles' are practically histrionic: the air of mediocrity, wretchedness, dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchism, etc. Punishment." and a few lines below, he strikes with this conclusion: "Art and the preparation of nihilism: romanticism (the conclusion of Wagner's *Nibelungen*)." (*Will to Power*)

Nietzsche's choice of words constructs a dramatic reference: "histrionic" principles, German romantic art and the total art of Wagner, all bringing the same things into mind: drama, theatre, and stage. If nation is originally imagined, as Benedict Anderson argues, then the simultaneous rise of nationalism and of dramatic theatre, both with their own ideas of homogenous collectivity, the New Man, catharsis and spiritual purification, and the top/down dynamics of directors/actors/spectators, gives another meaning to the relation between 19th century romanticist art and the politics (which is said to be nonexistent, as the romantics were the advocates of art for the sake of art). Moreover, it is argued to the point of exhaustion that theatre functions as a way of collective bonding, and the so-called "national theatre", in colonies as well as mainland, was charged with the responsibility of imagining a national identity, and of a mythical past for it. And as for the political spectacles, we already discussed it in earlier chapters.

The performative as it is defined in this research deterritorializes the limits of the national identity as it could be set by the theatrical imagination; it calls for alternative imaginal points of reconstruction. And it disrupts the imagined homogenous collective body by bringing the differences and gaps inside it to the foreground. In addition, it breaks away with the classical concept of imitation, inherent in all such analyses where it comes to the relation between the West and the East, the global North and the global South. Before going back into this discussion,

we need to see the particular mechanisms of this national imagination in each singular context in order to escape the reductionism we have criticized so far in other commentaries on the occupy movements and the Arab Spring.

4.5.1.2 The War and the Nation

Another 19th century Kantian, Carl von Clausewitz connected German Enlightenment and Romanticism from a very different aspect, around the concept of *a volk's war* against imperial aggression. "Clausewitz claims that the defensive war of resistance mounted by a people shows that a new power (Potenz) has arisen which is the 'people armed' or *Volksbewaffnung* that now confronts the 'armed people' of the French Republic/Empire" (Caygill 19).

The emergence of German nationalism as a reaction to the French Revolution and Napoleon military adventures has been widely acknowledged; and even Clausewitz theory of war and resistance has been commented under this light. On one hand, Clausewitz traced back how a revolution could turn against *the political*, becoming a total war against the other. He "contemplated the possibility of a political logic (revolution) capable of actualizing a military energy of sufficient intensity to consume and destroy the political itself, a movement exemplified for him in the transformation of revolutionary into imperial France." (Caygill 20) A new kind of warfare, too, where a "total mobilization of people" into war for the defense of their revolution – what has been called "mass nationalism" (see Cederman et al) – constructs a new type of army. On the other hand, he saw in the resistance of the Spanish *volk* a new kind of warfare that is based on the "capacity to resist... as the sum of material means along with the moral will to resist the enemy." (Caygill 16)

As David A. Bell argues in his "The First Total War" (2007), it was during the people's wars against French army that war became a totalized experience, being able to transform societies into new ones. Those wars led to the rise in nationalism, the liberation movements in Latin America and the creation of a unified German nation-state.

The difference between those two forms of warfare outlines in a way the difference between two forms of nationalism: an offensive, colonial or imperial one *and* a resisting, defensive or indigenous one. This is a reduction of many different experiences, only for the sake of simplicity, but these two generic forms mix with each other in national territories – where a dominant class suppresses other minorities, becoming offensive – and each has been performativized into multiple different collective bodies based on its particular context.

The defensive nationalism repeated itself in many parts of the world; the repetition, however, seems to be based for many commentators on a repetition of the identical, or better, an *imitation* of the west.

4.5.1.3 The Resentful West, the Resentful East: A Tale of Twins

Howard Caygill links Clausewitz's idea of resistance against the imperial army through Volk's war to the idea of the *ressentiment* in Nietzsche:

Clausewitz seems to have settled on a distinction between positive war – aimed at destroying the enemy's capacity to resist – and negative war aimed at eroding or exhausting this capacity. With this Clausewitz arrives at an insight which will reappear in Nietzsche's aligning of resistance and resentment in the *Genealogy of Morals* (28).

Bringing the Nietzschean concept of resentment into the discussion of Volk's wars have certain consequences: there are new Masters and the Slaves are seeking justice resenting them; the resenting resistance aims to take over the place of the Masters, therefore imitating their creativity; and there is a certain glorified past that has been destroyed or subjected to a change. Although Caygill tries to develop a notion of pure resistance through resentment, it is hardly a neutral concept in Nietzsche.

An interesting dramatization of resentment comes in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

'It was': thus, is called the will's gnashing of teeth and loneliest misery. Impotent against that which has been – it is an angry spectator of everything past... That time does not run backward, that is its wrath. 'That which was' – thus the stone is called, which it cannot roll aside. And so it rolls stones around out of wrath and annoyance, and wreaks revenge on that which does not feel wrath and annoyance as it does. Thus, the will, the liberator, became a doer of harm; and on

everything that is capable of suffering it avenges itself for not being able to go back. This, yes this alone is revenge itself: the will's unwillingness toward time and time's 'it was.' (111)

This is a drama in which, according to many – mostly European – commentators, the colonized and the colonizers played its roles. These roles break down themselves formally into the dual power positions in Nietzsche's political thought: "In order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is basically a reaction" (On the Genealogy of Morality 20).

Daniel Chirot formulates such a position on nationalism very clearly: "All the types of nationalism which developed in the late 19th and 20th centuries, most should resemble Russian and German nationalism based on resentment more than the Anglo-American, more liberal type" (Modern Tyrants).

Considering the Nietzschean conceptualization of resentment, then the claim that many forms of non-Anglo-American nationalism are all based on resentment means that they come out of *reaction*. As it was discussed before, a reactionary force for Nietzsche is a force separated from its effect and value; it does not take the initiative, but imitates and instead of an increase in the power (as power to affect and be affected), it decreases that capacity. As Nietzsche writes,

When resentment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: The resentment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, And compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every Noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave Morality from the outset says no to what is "outside", what is "different," What is not itself, and this no is its creative deed. (ibid)

This implies a Eurocentrist presupposition in the idea of resentful nationalism: the lack of creativity, thus of subjectivity in Nietzschean terms, on the side of the colonized. The only creativity is of the Master and the Slave is a bad copy maker. Or as Chirot would put it, "almost all, certainly most of the new nationalisms that have been developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been based partly on jealous admiration for and resentment of the successful West" (Modern Tyrants).

It also results to a total closure against the other. If the power is basically the power of affecting and being affected, then resentful nationalism minimalizes this power, and its way of pursuing its aim comes with the hatred of the other, saying “no to what is ‘outside’”, all the while assessing itself against it. A double bind, if you wish, as we have discussed thoroughly in the discussion about anti- and alter-modernity.

The dynamics between the East and the West, particularly between the Ottoman and its Western neighboring empires gives another aspect to the discussion of resentment. Various scholars pointed to the resentful discourses of Renaissance against the Turks, often based on a division between Christianity and Islam (see Anievas and Nişancıoğlu; Sayyid). A divide that later was retrospectively called “the Eastern Question” and is still functioning in the (post)colonial discourses.

In “Creating East and West”, Nancy Bisaha argues that the initial phases of constructing a modern European identity can be found in Renaissance humanism long before colonialism. According to her, the battle of Constantinople and the cruel stories of the rampage and pillage met with all sorts of reactions from the West, but on the discursive level, “humanists as a group” created a “highly developed sense of Europe as the cultural superior to the East” (Bisaha 6) in their rhetoric on the Turks and Islam.

Renaissance Europeans battled fears that a hostile, Islamic enemy to the East could at any moment destroy their world. (Bisaha 2)

The first instances of a modern metaphysics of origin implemented for the sake of constructing an identity during war. The Pope Pius II for instance called the fall of Constantinople a “second death for Homer and a second destruction of Plato.” Humanists repeatedly labeled the Turks as “barbarians” who rolled back the achievements of Western civilization after defeating the Greek just at the end of what they themselves were calling the “dark ages” (ibid).

If resentment should become the pillar of identity-construction, then its early European manifestations must not get lost in the eurocentrist narratives of the emergence of nationalism; since “Europeans were on the defensive against a powerful enemy from the East. Not until the

seventeenth century did Europeans begin to believe that the ominous Turkish threat was slowing down” (Bisaha 3).

The fear as well as the feeling of superiority is not dead. Neither today, nor back in the era of Romanticism. It is not unrelated to the fact that Ottoman Empire had been historically constructed as the other, that Herder conceived Slavs as a volk that one day would be the real power in Europe, since they will have adhered to Christianity and to their idealism. A belief that made Herder an intellectual father figure for Pan-Slavism.

4.5.1.4 Whose Nationalism, whose subjectivity?

The formulation of nationalism based on resentment and imitation finds its way also to other analyses, even when they defend the liberation struggles against colonial rule.

Tom Nairn talks about the second generic form when he puts nationalism solely in the context of uneven global capitalist development and local economic inequality. For him, the “irrational” elements of nationalism came out of a reaction to Modernity’s colonial domination and invasion by western powers (see Cocks, *Passion and Paradox* 111-132).

As a Scottish under English sovereignty, Nairn does not see authentic culture or technological advance in the heart of nationalism (unlike two other seminal figures that we will discuss shortly), but the destruction of the colonized way of life. Nonetheless, it seems that he could see the dynamics of imitation in such a nationalism when he writes about the “nationalism’s inherent schizophrenia: its material determination and mythological self-interpretation; its glorification of a rural past and pursuit of an industrial future; its alternating impulses of emancipation and coercion.” (Cocks 114)

The (post-)colonial nationalist collective body is a modern naturalized nation, a symptom of similar phantasms and imitated stereotypes. Numerous (post-)colonial States used and are still using colonial-era laws to shape their nations with a brutality similar to former colonial masters. In many cases, these laws are confronted with artistic transgressions or confronting artistic and

cultural event deemed “threatening” to the moralities, i.e. the colonial-inspired code of the everyday signs.

As an example, one can turn to Uganda that has intensified its crackdown of LGBT community just in 2017 – a community “abnormal” for the nation, an anomaly in its so-called natural collective body. In the beginning of December 2017, for instance, police raided queer Kampala film festival and shut it down after one night. This was one of the last suppressive acts that came after a series of other events targeting queer audience had been shut down, such as the entire 2017 annual Pride Week festive events, such as parades, fashion shows, education workshops and so forth. All these suppressions have been based on a colonial-era law prohibiting “carnal knowledge against the order of nature” with possible sentences of up to life in prison (Human Rights Watch 2017).

Benedict Anderson (1991 (1983)) for example famously explained how nations were imagined through the nationalist movements, rather than emerging as a necessary product of sociopolitical conditions. But if the Western societies imagined their own, the South copied their imagination in their nationalist endeavors.

The imagination of the nation is of course not a purely immaterial endeavor. As Anderson argues, there are certain materialist transformations that made the emergence of such a homogenous collective body possible, which for him is based on “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Imagined Communities 7): cultural commons such as language and arts, technological advances such as “print capitalism”, and elite’s propaganda of their own nationalism through mass media. On the other hand, he was convinced that patriots are fighting not due to their hatred of the other, but out of their love for the nation. However, is one allowed to consider “nation” as separate from the State, or even based on Anderson’s analysis, would it be possible without a centralized state to propagate the national bond? How could a national bonding remain *horizontal*? Has not the love for the country already presupposed a hatred of the other? And Anderson’s love of the country – is it not similar to Herder’s patriotism?⁵¹ What about those who were citizens of other

⁵¹ For another differentiation, based on the distinction between patriotism and nationalism, see For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, By Maurizio Viroli (particularly pages 112-125). Viroli’s main idea is summed

nation-states, but fought alongside Isis on one front, or with Syrian Kurds on the other one? We already discussed the shortcomings of this view in early chapters of this research.

The notion of imitation plays a big role in the eurocentrist *imagined imagination* of the South. Chirot's analysis of Arab nationalisms is a typical case of such use: "Arab intellectuals travelled the familiar road of those exposed to the Europeans: first resistance, then acceptance and a wish to imitate, followed by a growing awareness of the contradictions between their own culture and the Western Enlightenment" (Modern Tyrants).

Partha Chatterjee's well-known critique of Anderson's imagined community, "Whose imagined community?", questions the Eurocentrist imitation approach to Western and Eastern nationalisms. His question is simple, but right to the point: "If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?" (Chatterjee 216)

Although Chatterjee's critique embarks rightfully to invalidate such perspective, it recurses to a dubious idea of an authentic cultural identity. In other words, it starts from the presuppositions and principles of Western theorization of the nation, of its *Volksgeist* in order to posit a true alternative. The identity becomes the principle of thought, where the difference should have been the perspective.

The paradoxes of nationalist imagination could be captured in the suggested dynamics by Meltem Ahiska (2010), a Turkish academic who worked extensively on national archives and radio broadcasts in Turkey. According to her, there is a dynamic between an occidental Orientalism and an oriental Occidentalism: a longing for Western style of progress and industrialization *and* an insistence on national and cultural superiority; criticizing the colonialism *and* exercising colonialist power against minorities inside national territories; criticizing Western culture and politics *and* imitating its political forms and institutions. The trap of occidental-oriental dynamics emerges when the separation between the form and the content of Modernity is legitimized. As

up in the aforementioned quote of Herder that "he that has lost his patriotic spirit has lost himself and the whole world about himself".

if a nation could adopt the form of modern governmentality and inject its “own” culture-specific content into it.

To escape the traps of already existing analyses of nationalism was the reason we initially referred to Clausewitz. The national collective bodies that are going to be discussed in this research are formed in different nationalist movements, through singular historical and geopolitical contexts. The anti-colonial or other forms of liberation movements in them, however, have been seen mostly nationalist, analyzed through the lens of classical imitation, resentment and reaction. This is not true, as we discussed in many parts of this research, and it makes the task of a researcher who is basically inquiring the disruptions of these national collective bodies harder and more complex. On one hand, it is true that there is a certain imitation, a copying of Westerners’ way, in the makings of non-Western nation-states. On the other hand, there have been multiple, heterogenous forces involved in those movements, each resisting the dominant Imperialist Power in its own way, contributing to (or subtracting from) the common emancipatory power, even if they had been finally dominated by a single impulse toward the nation-state. The nationalism comes after the people’s resistance, as its conclusion, or its dramatic product on the stage. Before it, there is a chaos of forces, interacting with each other against the colonial dominion.

That is why Clausewitz’s idea of a Volk’s War seems a flexible, yet historically viable approach to the question of nationalism. The Volk’s War leads to a national unification and is based on the capacity to resist “as the sum of material means along with the moral will to resist the enemy” (Caygill 16).

A Nationalist movement then, at least in its initial form before consolidating the ruling power, has been the sum of different material and immaterial means to resist, which includes culture and technology, poetry and politics, theatrical and performative actions, nation-state making process or confederalist struggles, peaceful and violent resistance alike. One of these means, one should note, is the openness toward the contagious ideas of resistance and struggle, and the communication happens between different context. Such a communication can be in the form

of eurocentrist imitation, but also of a more affective imitation, a sort of contagion, to which we will come back later.

It is the final relation between all these heterogeneous forces that form the face of that movement. Such a formulation of nationalist collective bodies is also in line with our foundational theory of the Nietzschean body. As we explained before, the body is the product of an organization of impulsive forces, and its affective capacity to form relations with other bodies. Looking at the body through the idea of affect, we found a way to categorize bodies not based on the principle of identity, but of difference: “a workhorse is closer to an ox rather to a racehorse”. In the same manner, we cannot simply put all national collective bodies beside together in their histories of emergence, governance and suppression, only because they are all being called by the same name, *the nation*. On the contrary, one needs to analyze their affects, their capacity to form relations between different societal bodies, and the organization of different forces inside them.

This explains how various Arab uprisings, due to their performative and theatrical use of national symbols and rituals, seemed to become both anti-nationalist and nationalist, using the flag of the country and protesting against its very reference, the nation-state. Tunisian revolution was an obvious example of such cases, where the national flag became the most visible symbol of the movement – but a national flag that stays as a heritage of Ottoman rule and the crescent and the five-pointed star on it represent respectively the unity of Arab-speaking people and Muslims. As one scholar notes, “during the protests, the flag was not a nationalist symbol but rather a patriotic one” (Coelho, *The Arab Spring in Tunisia - A semiotic perspective*); a symbol of a popular will against the nation-state that claims its representation. Another scholar considers the flag in Tunisian revolution as a marker of “banal nationalism” that can create a political assemblage between different groups for “effervescent experiences” (Hawkins 47).⁵²

⁵² One should not neglect the different strategies regarding flags in the Arab Spring, nor should one approach this problem without a proper critical point of view. Because flags in the post-colonial Arab Republics and their later protest movements can talk about different nationalist or patriotic sentiments as well as sedimented historical structures. In Egypt, flag had the same function as Tunisia, although not with the currency or ubiquitousness. However, in Syria and Libya, the revolutionaries replaced the official national flags from the beginning with their own.

There is another aspect in a Clausewitzian definition of nationalism that makes it proper to the research. Although nationalist theories presuppose the “nation” as the perspective of a collective body in such movements, Clausewitz *volk’s* war starts with a heterogenous, swarming collective body: “According to our representation of People’s War, it must be like a foggy or cloudlike being that will never allow itself to be concentrated into a resistant body, otherwise the enemy will apply an appropriate force to this kernel, and destroy it ... it is however necessary that this fog condenses at certain points and forms threatening clouds from which powerful bolts of lightning can emerge” (qtd. in Caygill 26).

Swarming is a keyword of the literature on the contemporary movements and the organization of their collective bodies. This heterogeneous organization of a collective body, of *a people*, has long been imagined conceptually in critical theories. For example, writing particularly about the alterglobalization movement in the beginning of 21st century, Nikos Papastergiadis refers to this collective body as a set of clusters:

Clusters composed of a diverse range of individuals and groups. Clusters do not assume the forms of institutional political bodies. They are fluid and relatively open-ended. Critics often confuse the amorphous structure of a cluster with the presumption that its members lack conviction and that it cannot generate a sustainable momentum. This failure to recognize the shape of a new political movement is further compounded by the judgement that fragmentary alliances and tactical gestures are the signs of the absence of politics (Papastergiadis 18).

Although the notion of “cluster” can capture here some vital characteristics, it is unable to explain how all these *clusters* form together a big open-ended whole, when it comes – as in the case of Tunisia, Syria and Egypt – to a total reimagination of nationhood. The relation between these different clusters, the way they connect to each other, should be also considered.

We referred before to Roland Barthes lectures, “How to Live Together?”, and his fantasy of a collective body. This fantasized collective body is a being-together of singularities, which at the same time have their very own autonomous character. Barthes calls this particular relationality between singular bodies as *idiorrhythmy*:

The pattern of a fluid element ... an improvised, changeable form. In atomism, one manner in which atoms can flow; a configuration without fixity or natural necessity: a “flowing” ...in short, the exact opposite of an inflexible, implacably regular cadence (Barthes, *How to Live Together?* 7-8).

Barthes thus speaks of a being together of idiorhythmic singularities, without any domination of one on the other. This is the relation not only inside, but also between the “clusters” of contemporary movements.

Therefore, the collective body of the contemporary movements is a body of different bodies, with idiorhythmic relations among these different bodies. Not so much different from aforementioned concept of multitude in Negri and Hardt:

Multitude is a form of political organization that, on the one hand, emphasizes the multiplicity of the social singularities in struggle and, on the other, seeks to coordinate their common actions and maintain their equality in horizontal organizational structures ... Multitude is thus a concept of applied parallelism, able to grasp the specificity of altermodern struggles, which are characterized by relations of autonomy, equality, and interdependence among vast multiplicities of singularities (Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth* 110-11).

These imagined collective bodies are all forming a difference from the imagined nation. They disrupt it, yield it and transform it into another organization that, albeit its temporariness, shows the performative dynamics of the event.

A Clausewitzian perspective on Volk’s war also fits with our discussions on the machinic assemblages between different elements in a collective body; and as it relies on the capacities of resistance – that can increase with connections between human and various inhuman elements – it provides a compatible model with the perspective of the *government of things*. In the case of Occupy movements, we called this collective body a patchwork body, proper to a patchwork time-space emerged during those performative events.

4.5.2 Nations to the East

The vanquished always want to imitate the victor in his distinctive characteristics, his dress, his occupation, and all his other conditions and customs. The reason for this is that the soul always sees perfection in the person who is superior to it and to whom it is subservient. It considers him perfect, either because it is impressed by the respect it has for him, or because it erroneously assumes that its own subservience to him is not due to the nature of defeat but to the perfection of the victor. If that erroneous assumption fixes itself in the soul, it becomes a firm belief. (Ibn Khaldūn 116)

These words of Ibn Khaldun, the Muslim forerunner of sociology and demography have been haunting the reality of many Muslim majority countries in the modern times. As Chirot argues, “by 1900, almost all of the non-western world was either directly colonized or indirectly controlled through interference and coups” (Modern Tyrants).

Although I will try to show the official discourses of the nation-making in some countries of interest for this research, I cannot go in detail about how the nationalist ideas went all the way to the Middle-East. The rise of a pan-Turkic political movement is a phenomenon of the 19th and 20th centuries and was in part a response to the development of Pan-Slavism and German nationalism and Greek nationalism in Europe. Pan-Turkism in its turn inspired Pan-Iranism in Asia. One should not forget economic relationship between Ottomans and Germany in Ottoman’s weakest period just before dissolution, between the Republic of Turkey and Germany, Iran and Germany, Germany’s Baghdad railway project, its connection to world war I and II, the Sykes-Picot colonial agreement, and the Pan-Turkist Turkestan legion organized by Nazis against the soviet. All these historical dramas have a life of their own, but the focus here is more on a historiography of Statist discourses that contributed to the emergence of a homogenous national collective body (see Karpāt 17-18; Kohn 160; Landau).

Milla, Mellat or Millet (مِلَّة) is an Arabic term used as “nation” in both Farsi and Turkish, while nation in Arabic translates to *Ghom or Qom* in the term *Dowlato-al-Qomiya* [nation-state].

In Turkey, Millet has been used for a long time to designate governmentality strategies in relation to collective bodies. However, the contemporary *Millet* has a different meaning than the idea of Millet in Ottoman's *Nizam Melli*.

To understand the imagined unitary collective body behind this term, let us then refer to the historical drama of its significations. In its ancient Quranic meaning, Millat means a particular way or path that people take it, or better imitate it from their leader. It has a similar meaning to Din or Sharia, both also meaning way or path, with a decisive difference.

While there are compounds referring to a Din of God (دين الله), or a Sharia of God (شريعته الله), Millat is not used in any compound as a Mellat of God: Mellat is always of a leader, a path that a leader *dictates*. Mellat shares also the same root with Emla, meaning "to dictate".

That leader could be a prophet of monotheistic religions, such as Mellat of Ibrahim or Mellat of Muhammad. On the other hand, Quran distinguishes between a Millet of believers and a millet of *infidels*. In other words, if Din is *The way of God*, Millet is only a way of some leader that can seek legitimacy from different sources, including God.

The ambiguity in the original meaning can thus be formulated like this: Millat is a way of leader that a people has embraced, but that way for believers always comes from God and that leader serves as his prophet. Millat is the bridge between the profane of the governmentality and its sacred, the worldly norms of a tradition dictated to and imitated by a people and the divine laws legitimating them.

Millat then is originally very different from Volk. While the latter presupposes a unity in language and culture, Millat of Muhammad for instance surpass the geographical, cultural and linguistic borders in favor of a unity based on the faith.

In Ottoman, where "volks are fighting with each other", Millet witnessed a history of different significations that builds a bridge between its religious, premodern meaning and its modern one. *Tanzimat* marks the turning point in this history.

After the conquest of Constantinople (today's Istanbul) by Sultan Mehmed II, Ottoman Nizam Melli took its final shape. Under this system that can be roughly translated as "a system of

nations”, each Millet kept a considerable level of autonomy, not only in culture, language, religion and rituals, but also in its judiciary and governing procedures. In fact, Ottoman’s system of nations was not systematic, but a loose structure of bigger and smaller centers, adhering to a militaristic and economic central power. Even different Millets did not have an overarching structure to homogenize each of them into a whole.

Nizam Melli was of course not a democratic confederalism or anything close to such a modern concept, but an imperial construct, result of an incessant expansionism on the part of Ottomans. Interpreters however points to Nizam Melli as a pluralistic and multicultural governance. It is a disputable claim nonetheless to use (post)modern concepts of pluralism and multiculturalism for an Empire that its attempt in modernization led to its disintegration.

Indeed, Nizam Melli used retrospectively on the eve of Ottoman’s modernization period in order to refer to a mythicized Mehmed II rule. It was supposed to pave way for the beginning of large-scale, ambitious and centralizing structural reforms called *Tanzimat*.

Tanzimat was a reaction to an increasing rise of nationalist resistance movements against the empire, particularly the Greek War of Independence. Nationalist ideas for Greek independence was formulated by those intellectuals who were under the influence of French Revolution, German Enlightenment and the subsequent romantic nationalism (see Ozturk; Aviv; Salem; Ágoston and Masters; Karpát).

With Tanzimat, the modernization started on this motto: reason, science, progress (Salem 32). The project was to form a nation-state, with a sense of national identity and a centralized power structure as a State. The national identity formed itself around what later was called Ottomanism.

Millet appeared in this period as a modern translation of nation, or rather Volk. Nizam Melli became official and the mythical narrative of the existence of such a system, dating back to Sultan Muhammad II, legitimized this modernizing turn. Subsequently, new governing and judiciary laws were written for each of the previously relatively autonomous territories of different Millets – Christians, Jews, Arabs, Kurds, etc – and their governors were sent from the center.

Tanzimat had different turns in itself, failed and was taken upon again, but the result was an intensification of rebellions in different parts of Ottoman Empire, a transition from Ottomanism to the construction of Turkish national identity and in the end, the fall of empire and the emergence of the Turkish republic.

During those decades, the biopolitical and medical connotations of nationality came into the highest level of international official discourses, when the Ottoman Empire was labeled as the “sick man of Europe”⁵³. The colonial powers were discussing about the “Eastern Question” again, this time in order to heal a “man” who “has fallen into a state of decrepitude” (de Bellaigue).

The subject position of the Westerner was deemed to be much higher than the Easterner. It was not sometimes even believable from such a subjective perspective that Ottomans had the ability to imitate the Western technics of governmentality which they did so since the beginning of 19th century. Fatma Müge Cöcek and M. Sükrü Hanioglu have shown for instance that the use of statistics, in particular census, have started since 1831 despite the wide ignorance of such practices in Ottoman Empire. In 1885, Samuel Sullivan Cox, the United States representative suggested the sultan to make use of those methods. However, the Ottoman State had been conducting census decades ago, and as Cöcek and Hanioglu argue, it “adopted Western statistical knowledge to develop a modern state administration and at the same time, to control the emerging civil society” (106).

Ottomanism, first attempt at a national identity for a centralized state in the Middle East, implemented Islam as one of its most important pillars. After that, Islam became one of the pillars of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism and some late trends of Turkish nationalism and Iranian nationalism for construction of modern national identities. However, the fundamental differences between the conception of collective body in premodern Islamic rule and its modern versions in (post)colonial era cannot be denied, even if the same word, Millet, is used in both times to signify that.

⁵³ The sick man of Europe started with designations of the Ottoman Empire, but didn't end there. After Ottoman, many other European countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany was once being called the sick man. The tradition is still ongoing with Greece, Spain and other contemporary European indebted nation-states.

According to the aforementioned discussions, one cannot ignore the agency on the side of these “Eastern” nationalism and reduce it to a pure imitation out of resentment. On the other hand, the dynamics of reaction and imitation must as well not be ignored, particularly in the discourses and practices of its often-dictatorial States that took on themselves to “modernize” their countries and form their nations. Nationalism had an important role in these dynamics. It was a material means of resistance, from a Clausewitzian perspective, but also became a material means of inner-colonialism, when the established governments turned against the minorities in their regions, trying to impose a type of bonding that was non-existent prior to the modernization era. As Salem argues,

Before the nineteenth century, politics in Arab-Islamic society was largely a matter of religion and dynasties. The political system ‘made political rather than cultural claims on the subjects. Loyalty to the sultan, payment of the tribute, and respect for peace and order were the main demands of the state, any infringement of which would incur its anger’. Increasingly intimidated by and impressed with the West, however, several Western influenced Arab and Turkish writers became convinced that national patriotism was the secret of Europe’s success. (31)

Therefore, while nationalism(s) of the Western Europe and their political form of the nation-state emerged out of the collective struggles, its transmission and enactment in other territories had a more complex dynamics, resulting into different ideas and organizations of a national collective body.

It is interesting how different nationalist sentiments and movements emerged in reaction to each other in the regions more to the *East* and which particular perspective of a nation became dominant in the following republics after that. Countries such as Greece and Turkey that have been mentioned in the research are among these cases.

4.5.2.1 “The Successors” : From Greek Nationalism to a National Collective Body

Herod Atticus Theater, an ancient theater build in 161 A.D., serves as the main venue of Athens Festival. It was renovated in 1950s, as part of a cultural heritage central to the idea of modern Greek national identity.

The paradox was that the guardians of Greek identity did not allow modern Greek pieces to be performed in Herod Atticus. In 1964, however, the Greek Tourist Organization organized a nation-wide contest for the best modern Greek play to be performed there and *The Successor*, out of 68 plays, won the competition.

The *Successors* by *Vangelis Katsanis* was an adaptation of Oresteia trilogy, written in a highly lyrical prose, and therefore “served to assuage the conservative mentality of some Greek government officials, who, for years, served as the self-appointed watch-dogs of the sacredness of the Herod Atticus Theater... The gods of the old Greeks could rest at peace; their ears would not have been defiled by unfamiliar and unholy sounds.” (Valamvanos 31) But even this play could not make it to the stage of Herod Atticus Theater. Behind the failure of this drama lies a historical drama of failure.

4.5.2.1.1 *From Enlightened Individual to True Volk*

The observations of Vangelis Katsanis about *The Successors* points to the official and Statist idea of a Greek nation that put into play after the independence from Ottoman Empire. The Greek nationalism testifies to Anderson’s argument that the final product of nationalism was the Elite’s version of it. As Kitromilides explains, “the national awakening of modern Greeks was the work of a group of cosmopolitan Greek intellectuals. These men, infused with the culture of the Enlightenment, belonged sociologically to the cosmopolitan European intelligentsia of the eighteenth century” (The Dialectic of Intolerance 7).

Like most other cases, the intellectual elite were usually based at those cities functioning as centers of commerce, as the roads of transferring ideas and goods were the same. The material basis of “the national awakening of modern Greeks” was provided by the wealth of an elite merchant class.

The case of Greek nationalism brings forward a crucial question: was there a link between the colonial-ignorant cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the particularism of romantic nationalism?

As commentators argue, the transmission of the ideas of the Enlightenment into modern elite Greek thought was an important factor in establishing the theoretical basis of a Greek nationalist

identity. According to Kitromilides, “neohellenic nationalism was the eventual product of the gradual opening up of the culture of Ottoman Greece to European intellectual and political influences in the course of the eighteenth century.” (6)

Thus, it is not surprising that neohellenic nationalism was often based on the aforementioned old Eurocentrist Imperial feeling of cultural superiority over the Turks, or in general Muslims. The only difference between the initial liberal nationalism with the final official State version of it was in terms of inner governance. The old Ottoman Greek elite, centered around the Patriarchate of Constantinople, took the power and Ioannes Kapodistrias, the first elected president went on to exert dictatorial, non-democratic power. And his assassination led to a period of absolute Monarchy in the hand of foreigner Kings. Hence, the repetitive story of colonial nation-state construction.

The imitation dynamics and its corresponding biopolitics plagues Greek nationalism, too. A transition happened: the proud neohellenic nationalism based on Enlightenment turned into a folk-constructing medical nationalism inspired by Romanticism.

A new philosophical outlook made its appearance, beginning from a fundamental criticism and refutation of the eighteenth-century philosophy of liberal individualism. This was done in an Essay on the Philosophy of History published by Markos Renieris in 1841... Renieris stressed that the liberal individualism of eighteenth century philosophy was only a very partial truth inferior to the wisdom of social collectivities such as the people, the Volk, whom he considered as the repository of true values and true knowledge (Kitromilides 12).

An imitation and a repetition of Herder’s equation, *the national is the true*. At the same time, those who were inspired by same ideas were wandering Europe and lamenting the loss of the Hellenic people and culture. Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, a 19th century romantic historian and journalist, famously wrote: “the race of the Hellenes has been wiped out in Europe. Physical beauty, intellectual brilliance, innate harmony and simplicity, ... even the name has disappeared from the surface of the Greek continent...not the slightest drop of undiluted Hellenic blood flows in the veins of Christian population and present-day Greece” (qtd. in Nikolopoulou 268). His comments summarize the core elements of biopolitical racism. His ideas of “physical beauty,

intellectual brilliance, innate harmony and simplicity” for the lost superior Hellenic race are the literal translation of Eugeneics, coming from the “eugenia” – an ancient Greek term which means one is well-born. Antonio Negri considers eugenics as the metaphysical foundation of modern sovereignty, *arche* in its double meaning: “only those who are good and beautiful, eugenically pure, are entitled to command” (The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life 194).

The state of the nation was thus dissatisfactory for those who wanted a pure Hellenic nation. The healing method came as shocks, as a series of coups started as early as 1909.

The Successors, the play we started this chapter with, was deemed offensive in such a process of nation-making. The exclusionary purist idea of a collective national body was not ready to put its senses to test with a slightly modernized version of a mythical inheritance such as Oresteia trilogy, central to its identity. In the upward, hierarchical “impulsive organization” of this collective body, no interference with the prime impulse (the imagined superiority of a Hellenic nation) is to be tolerated.

Only three years later, the right-wing colonels who made the coup in 1967 called their military takeover of the country “a revolution to save the nation”. To save the nation it was, with “the nation” taken as the pure ideal. The main figure of the junta, George Papadopoulos used to ornament his speeches with medical, grossly obvious biopolitical discourse. But even there, the romantic idea of a Hellenic nation, the main impulse, persists.

We are in front of a patient who we have on a surgical bed, and who, should the surgeon not strap on the surgical bed during the operation and the anesthesia, there is a probability, rather than the surgery granting him the restoration of the health, to lead him to his death. [...] The restrictions are the strapping of the patient to the surgical bed so that he will undergo the surgery without danger.

We have a patient. We have put him in a plaster cast. We are checking him to find out if he can walk without the plaster cast. We break the initial cast, potentially to replace it with a new one, where necessary. The referendum shall become a general overview of the patient's capabilities. Let us pray for him never to need a cast again; and should he need

one, we will put it to him. And the one thing I can promise you, is to invite you to witness the foot without a cast!

Our obligations are described by both our religion and our history. Christ teaches concord and love. Our history demands faith in the Fatherland. [...] Hellas is being reborn, Hellas will accomplish great things, Hellas will live forever. (Mikedakis 79-83-84)

The colonels crushed the resistance they faced, but they were the one who had to disappear in the coming decades of Greece. And the successors ultimately went on the stage. The national collective body of the Greece, *the Greek nation*, formed nonetheless in the process we described; and it was challenged and disrupted in the occupy movements that will be described later in the chapter.

4.5.2.2 A Volk's Renaissance in Iraq and Syria

At the same time with the Greek war of independence from Ottoman Empire, Egyptians started a revolt under the leadership of Mustafa Pasha. Napoleon military campaign in Egypt injected modernization and corresponding institutions into Egypt. With an ultimate goal of forming an independent State, Pasha's modernization project continued on those foundation, although with an arguably local approach in establishing juridical and governing institutions. The Egyptian who in this period were sent to France for education came back and theorized the nationalist movement.

Rafi al-Tahtawi, a forerunner of pan-Arabic Egyptian nationalism studied in 1820s in France, and upon returning to his own "backward" nation, he put his forward plan based on progress and industrialization. "Let the fatherland be the site of our common happiness," he wrote, "which we shall build with freedom, thought and factory" (qtd. in Salem 32). Factories were emerging in Pasha's Egypt. Industrialization and cultural reforms focus on an official, unified language and a translation movement. Contemporary to these transformations, al-Tahtawi is considered the first one who gave currency to the terms "watan" (fatherland) and "ummah" (nation). Ummah, an

Islamic term referring to all believers regardless of their ethnicity, was modernized by him, reducing the alleged Arab identity into an Egyptian one.

The basic claim inherent in the idea of ummah as nation is that such Arab nationalism aims to establish a State for all Arab-speaking territories of the Ottoman, particularly the greater Syria. During the upheavals against Ottoman, Egypt concurred Syria from 1831 to 1844. The Egyptian rule and its legal and educational institutions inspired in turn a Pan-Arab Syrian nationalism that travelled to Iraq and finally, through Ba'ath movement, took the power in both countries (Salem).

All these journeys of imitative nationalist modernizations forth and back between different post-colonial Arab republics had a disastrous consequence for minorities in these countries. As Sadiki points out, "the cardinal sin of most newly independent states – namely, the new Arab republics – was to seek a demolition job on peripheral existence." (Unruliness through Space and Time 6)

During another Pan-Arab nationalist awakening a century later, Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt entered into a United Arab Republic with Syria, based again on the idea of one volk, one state, one country. A cooperation with pan-Arab nationalist Ba'ath movement in Syria, it failed shortly afterwards, and Assad's Syrian Arab Republic emerged in the consequent events with a coup.

These nationalist movements had a complex history in the coming decades until the present time. In the discussion on the nation-state and Modernity, we discussed the latest brutal project of nation-state making, the project of "the Islamic State". It was noted that such a project was pursued by a ultra-right wing fundamentalist Jihadi group calling itself "the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria", claiming authority over the mythical land of the Fertile Crescent, the Greater Levant. Extending from Iraq to Egypt, this area has been divided into different nation-states following the fall of Ottomans and the intervention of colonial powers in the first world war. The accidental and colonial nature of the Sykes-Picot imposed nation-state borders in the Middle East was then discussed.

In such a historical context, a Lebanese Greek Orthodox became to influence another political system of Volk making in the middle east. Antun Sa'adah founded the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) in 1932. A Nazi party, literally, that still exists in Syria and backing the blood-thirsty government of Bashar al-Asad as the second biggest party of the country. SSNP expanded its

influence in the whole Levant, as it also claimed that a mythical Volk has been thriving in that geography.

Antun Sa'adeh was inspired by German romanticism. His ideas were based on biological evolution. He claimed that a certain "Syrian race" has been formed in the particular geographical territory of the Fertile Crescent. Rather than religions or ethnicities, this particular geography, he believed, has given the Syrians a singular Volksgeist that is making a nation out of them.

SSNP ideas did not remain on the margins. The Ba'ath movement practically shared such mythical visions of a national identity and finally took over both Syria and Iraq.

Ba'ath literally means renaissance, a reawakening of a nation that lost its unity, homogeneity, authority and thus, identity. A prominent theorist of Ba'ath, Michel Aflaq writes of nation as an ideal, belonging to *totality*: "the nation is not a numerical sum, but an 'idea' embodied either in the total or in part of it. the leader ... is not to appeal to a majority or to a consensus, but to opposition and enmity; he is the master of the singular idea from which he separates and casts aside all those who contradict it" (qtd. in Chirot).

Aflaq's nationalism exhibits similar ideas to the romantic version of the volk. Like any other modernist imitator, he also suffers from the tensions of two opposing forces: Occidentalism and longing for progress and industrialization, as well as Orientalism and the mystified desire for a unified Arab nation. We have seen that such dynamics results into a desire of "curing" the nation, purifying it into a more homogenous body (see Salem).

Moreover, Aflaq's insistence on spirituality, religion and affections marks another central element in romantic nationalism. Aflaq was critical of those Arab anti-colonial intellectuals who engaged themselves in "verbal investigations" for forming a liberated nation and losing "the force of nerve and the heat of emotion". According to him, "'nationalism is not science', it is ... a living remembrance." (qtd. in Chirot) Not surprisingly, this perspective made both Ba'ath and SSNP the enemies of left-wing politics.

The main difference between the Ba'ath and the left comes to the foreground when Aflaq compares leftist movements to the "*Shu'ubiyah* movements" in 9th and 10th centuries, during

Abbasid caliphate. *Shu'ubiyah* shares the same root as *Sha'ab* - a Quranic term for an entity bigger than tribe, close to nation. In *Shu'ubiyah* movements, non-Arab Muslims protested against inequality caused by the privileges of being Arab in the caliphate. *Shu'ubiyah* were Muslims too, since all are but equal according to the holy text of Islam, independent of their *Sha'ab*. Such a struggle from a pan-Arab nationalist perspective meant only a move to divide the perfect hegemony of a collective body.

Shu'ubiyah became one of the main derogatory terms in reference to minorities in Iraq and Syria. *Sha'ab* and *Umma* were appropriated as the keyword of Ba'athist pan-Arabic governments in Syria and Iraq. In these countries, *Sha'ab* as nation was the revolutionary part of the Arabic *Umma*, Saddam Hussein's last televised speech exhibits this supremacism coated in a theological rhetoric:

History is rather the reservoir in which exist, and from whose depth we derive, the laws that elevate the nation to assume its great mission for humanity, having attained the sublime status of communication with Allah, as a nation of loving, chosen believers, who are confident and obedient to the commands of the Almighty; a nation conscious of its great mission of faith both nationally and on the level of humanity, which is extended from the essence of the tenets established throughout its eternal history and the wealth of values adorning the landmarks of distinction along its mission (printed in *The Guardian*).

Although *Umma* was being used by Islamist nationalists (those who seek a national identity based on Islam) of some Muslim countries, it rarely became an official designation for a nation-state. In Iran, the word found its way into the constitution after the 1979 revolution against Pahlavi dynasty, but *Millat* became the official designation of national collective body and *Umma* remained to signify a vague global Muslim nation. In Turkey, the same divide exists.

In Arab-speaking countries, *Umma* had the same significations as Iran and Turkey and *ghomiya* used as to signify the national. In nationalist discourse, *sha'b* became equal with the nation, but functioned as the closest translation-imagination of *volk* in Arabic political discourses as the natural, bodily extension of the State. There are no parties but the ruling party, the party of the

State, as there should be no dissensus or antagonism, no gap or difference in the imagined collective body.

Such a will to a perfect body accompanied as usual by medical, biopolitical discourses and genocidal military campaigns of purification. *Ridda*, an Islamic term signifying treason, reaction or conspiracy, started to use in reference to communists, opponents of pan-Arabism, political opposition and minorities, and became the main word around which a medical discourse took shape during Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq. Saddam designated *ridda* as “the sickness of revolution” and promised to cure this “internal” problem by means of military action (Bengio).

Kurds turned to be an early victim of Iraq and Syria nationalist governments. According to Human Rights Watch, “in 1962, an exceptional census stripped some 120,000 Syrian Kurds -- 20 percent of the Syrian Kurdish population -- of their Syrian citizenship ... The number of stateless Kurds grew with time as descendants of those who lost citizenship in 1962 multiplied; as a result, their number is now estimated at 300,000” (Sherry). The census happened in Jazira, now a self-governing autonomous Kurdish canton in northern Syria. After the census, its former Kurdish citizen registered under “foreigner” or “unregistered”. In 1965, Syrian government started to form a “Arab cordon” in the Jazira region by resettling Bedouin Arabs in that area. (Vanly 126) Kurds were given back their right to citizenship only in 2011, after the sovereign, faced with a widespread revolutionary movement, had no choice but to make concessions.

Saddam also called the Kurdish movement a *ridda* and started a long, violent campaign of resettlement, ethnic cleansing and genocide in different periods in order to “protect” the Sha'b identity.

There are the examples that clearly set the case for considering the internal colonial relation inside anti-colonial State nationalism(s), or as Ronit Lentin argues, the inherent settler-colonialist relation in the foundation of any nation-state.

A familiar impulse dominated the organization of national collective bodies in the levant. One land, one identity, one nation. The purification processes to achieve this goal marked a horrendous history in the Middle East. As was mentioned before, another country that was

following the suit was the Republic of Turkey. Another nation-state-making project that suppressed the Kurdish population in the pursuit of a perfect, healthy national collective body.

4.5.2.3 The Happy Turk

“Kurdish question” is the most controversial discussion in contemporary Turkish politics, as it was in the beginning of the Republic.

Turkish national identity has been historically made through the exclusion of other ethnicities inside Republic’s territory. A genocide against Armenian happened when the seeds of the new Republic was being planted by the pan-Turkist movement. Indeed, the case of Turkish Republic witnesses to aforementioned Lentin’s theory of nation-state as an inherently settler-colonialist form.

After the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, the nation building process of this single-party State – as an inevitable part of its “modernization” – started with a focus on “an ethno-nationalist ideology despite the multiethnic and multilingual composition of the country” (Dayan 1). The eugenic mystifications of the constituted power assumed the figure of a “happy Turk” as Ataturk famously put it, according to that a fully Turkified collective body had to be formed. Ismet Inonu, the second president of the Republic, explains this belief with a violence proper to it:

We are frankly nationalist and nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority, other elements have no kind of influence. Our duty is to turkify non-Turks in the Turkish homeland no matter what happens. We will destroy those elements that oppose Turks or Turkism. (Inonu qtd.in Dayan 1)

The oriental/occidental dynamics of imitation was directly visible in pan-Turkism discourse. The main thesis of early Turkish nationalism was the White, European origin of Turkish nation. Ataturk adopted this racial mythology as a core belief on the new Republic.

In the early 1930s, historians, encouraged by Mustafa Kemal, linked pre-Islamic Turkish history with the origins of Western civilization in Central Asia. In contrast to the European categorization

of Turks as members of the 'yellow race', the Turkish history thesis claimed that the Turkish race is a member of the superior Caucasian race family.

The medical and anatomical discourses functioned to justify this mythical superior race family. But they did not end there. A happy Turk was going to be constructed not only through the exclusion of unwanted non-Turks, but also by imposing cultural technics of body. As Kemal said, "[Turkish] bodies remained in the East while their thoughts inclined toward the West". A body worthy of such thoughts had to be reshaped accordingly, getting rid of its "uncivilized" traits (qtd. in Dorsy 87).

The first eugenic thoughts in Turkey was formulated by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) members. CUP was founded by a group of medical students in Istanbul, 1889 and it transformed from a secret committee into a major ally of Young Turks in the coming decisive years. The nationalist physicians believed that progress could not be made without the biological improvement of society and "degenerate traits were hereditary and detrimental to social progress" (Alemdaroğlu). That improvement became a self-appointed task of a State that assessed the physical state of Turks was poor and it "arose from a century's worth of ill care rather than lack of talent" which was supposedly inherent in their European lineage.

After the declaration of the Republic, a full-fledged apparatus of eugenics set to function in the strategies of governmentality. encouragement for the physical training became part of the government policies in order to "lengthen and flatten the backs of the ill-shaped Turkish bodies".

The basic argument that the Turkish eugenicists employed was that human bodies were the principal and most profitable capital of a nation-state. Hence, human bodies should be sustained and managed to increase national wealth. In 'The Essence of Eugenics in National Population Politics', Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, a psychiatry professor and a prominent advocate of eugenics, claimed that insane and mentally retarded people were economic and hereditary burdens, and harmed a society's order and peace (Alemdaroğlu).

As it is mentioned earlier, states coming out of nationalist tendencies actively encouraged the performance of individual bodies for constructing the national identity as well as the perfect

collective body. An interesting story of a state-imposed performance on individual bodies could be seen in the laws regulating headwears in Turkey (Alemdaroğlu).

Tanzimat era was not only about the reform of the political structure. The socio-political regulations on body movements and physical behavior started to appear, too, as the citizens of Ottoman had to mirror the ideal national identity. The headwears story started from there. In 1829, Ottoman turban, a headwear based on cloth winding, was banned and fez, a close-fitting skull cap replaced it. Turban was mostly a symbol of the East, being used as a religious headwear by men and women alike. Fez had a more modernized look, although it owed its popularity to the Ottoman Empire. That is why after the announcement of the new Republic, fez was also banned in 1925. Mustafa Kemal articulated the reasons for such a ban when he once confronted a man in his audience wearing fez:

I see a man in the crowd in front of me; he has a fez on his head, a green turban on the fez, a smock on his back and on the top of that, a jacket like the one I am wearing... Now, what kind of outfit is that? Would a civilized man put on this preposterous garb and go out to hold himself up for universal ridicule? (qtd in Yumul 349)

“Universal ridicule” for a particularity that was deemed, by Kemal, not modern enough. The same reason that convinced him to ban Women’s hijab, another headwear symbolizing the always degraded Islamic East, with violent enforcement. The bodies, as Ataturk wished, had to be displaced to the West.

This section presented the different collective bodies formed through context-specific performativizations and State’s imposed regulations. In the following, this question will be asked: how could these bodies be transgressed and transgressive, transformed and transformative?

4.6 The Performative Disruption of the Encoded Organism

To approach the process of transformation in collective bodies, it is helpful to continue with Kafka’s *Penal Colony* from where we left in earlier.

The entire process of the punishment in Kafka's Colony, as we have witnessed, is the inscription of law on the convicted body. The inscribed code is the law that the man is violated, although it remains a code hard to be decoded for the foreign witness.

But the action, as much as it is elaborately detailed and micro-managed, does not go as it is planned. The body's contingency, its excess of blood, *contaminate* the clean functioning of the apparatus. The officer puts himself into the machine to prove its functionality only in order to face his ultimate demise, and the coming demise of his *old regime* penal colony.

On one hand, it shows the resistance of the body against the capture and its evasiveness, even when it has been under fierce suppression. "The condemned man is laid out on his stomach on the cotton wool—naked, of course. There are straps for the hands here, for the feet here, and for the throat here, to tie him in securely. At the head of the Bed here, where the man, as I have mentioned, first lies face down, is this small protruding lump of felt, which can easily be adjusted so that it presses right into the man's mouth." And all this suffocating design fails by a simple bodily excess. "My machine's as filthy as a pigsty."

For Peter Brooks, *The Penal Colony* tells a story of body's defiance and the incompleteness of inscription and of coding. The totalitarian ideology of shaping and taming the body is doomed to fail:

It is as if the promise of a body recovered for the law and for meaning by writing were untenable, false. To the extent that the writing project is imposed by a totalitarian ideology, one may see in the officer's untranscendent death an affirmation of the body's resistance to claims of correction, ennoblement, and conversion asserted upon it. (Brooks 285)

Lyotard conceptualized heterogeneous body as an incommensurable singularity, suggested the idea of a bodily mode of aesthesis, and considered "its quality as a surface receptive to sensation and affect, a receptivity heterogeneous and prior to the ordered rules and codings of inscription" – all in order to think of body prior to the law but not as *natural*:

the body, rather than being deficient, is in fact in excess with regard to the law. It exceeds the law in the sense that it is not reducible to the organization the law prescribes and which inscription

executes... the body is intractable, that is, unmanageable and uncontrollable; it is 'that which resists all law' because it remains non-totalizable, incommensurate to the law's realm (Curtis 254).

There is a certain bodily movement that escapes the *stasis* of the prescribed organization (that is infinitely permanent by the authority of the law), and evades the discourse, or in general, the code of the everyday sign. Another *performative* disruption of the code, close to Lyotard's *figural* that introduces heterogeneity and openness into the discursive.

The most immediate imagination of an embodied bodily mode of *aethesis*, of what Lyotard considers as the *body prior to the law*, is the day-dreaming. The work of art has long been associated with day-dreaming and artists as dreamers.

Daydreaming is interesting because it is not the presupposed passive state of sleeping, but an in-between: rather than a state exclusive to the unconscious, it comes out of a surprise appearance of the unconscious.

What escapes the dominant discourse also attacks its forged consistency. What has been made invisible haunts the realm of the visible. Daydreaming is the embodiment of an instance of such attacks and hauntings, when the code becomes defunct.

When someone tells us that we are 'dreaming out loud', it means that something impulsive has shaken or upset the code of everyday signs: we have been surprised by our 'unconscious' (Klossowski, *Vicious Circle* 40)

In the final section of previous chapter, we argued that how the performative relates to both *incorporeal* and *corporeal transformations*, to a dream-like state of change in the bodies. The introduction of the performative, as we discussed here, disrupts the stereotypical coding, based on the everyday signs. This is the disruption that we discussed in the chapter on the performative event, "an experience of rupture, an expressive excedence that is able to go beyond the *Erlebnis*" (Negri, Marx and Foucault: *Essays*).

Klossowski calls this an attack on "the institutional level of gregariousness" that can bring about "a de-actualization of that institution itself" (*Vicious Circle* 80). For him, such invasion "always go

beyond the agent, that is, the individual” and “they are harmful to the purely defensive and gregarious impulses” (ibid 92).

The choice of terminology, *attack*, *invasion*, and *harm* signifies that for Klossowski, transformation of a collective body and getting rid of the institutional coding is a violent process. He even founded his arguments on one of Nietzsche’s central pains, his migraine. Braidotti’s idea of a bios-zoe-technos body also calls for an opening toward the pain. Even the bodily mode of aesthesis, as Lyotard formulates it, seems to always appear in excessive situations of pain and torture like a penal colony, reminding Bataille’s analysis of a photograph depicting a Chinese prisoner’s torture.

Pain is a problematic concept. How could one call for an opening toward the pain, when millions of people are actually in pain in war torn regions in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, or in refugee camps in the global south and the global north. But if we want to go beyond the pain, what is the violence in decoding the stereotypical, in becoming another body? Why does Klossowski, through Nietzsche, claim that “in the experimental domain to create is to do violence?” (VC, 129).

Deleuze and Guattari see such a violence in the concept of “cruelty” in Artaud’s theatre of cruelty.

Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that might be commissioned to explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in bodies and inscribed on them belaboring them ... This culture is not the movement of ideology: on the contrary, it forcibly injects production of desire, and conversely, it forcibly inserts desire into social production and reproduction. For even death, punishment, and torture desired, and are instances of production (compare the history of *fatalism*) (Anti-Oedipus 159).

The violence or rather cruelty is then in the forceful injection of desire and its production in the socius. The deterritorializing force of desire, of the constituent power halts the dominant production on the socius, and as we discussed before, it starts with the alternative, creative production. And a patchwork body is born.

The fatalism, or Nietzsche’s *amor fati*, is not simply a will to self-demise or self-destruction. It is to create another destiny for the body and to call for an alternative reality, an *altermodern*

condition. That is why it brings about a state of exception from the perspective of the state which attempts to conserve the status quo and justifies suppression with the discourse of security. But the insecurity is only an insecurity for what has been naturalized in order to be proved the sole possible reality. Another world is possible, the slogan we talked about before, is actually a production of the real, the working of the constituent power. As Klossowski write:

Every creation of a new type must provoke a state of insecurity: creation ceases to be a game at the margins of reality; henceforth, the creator will not re-produce, but will itself produce the real (Vicious Circle 129).

The halt, hiatus or rupture, whatever we name the effect of an event with, has a specific concept in Foucault's terminology: desubjectification (*dassujettissement*).

As it was discussed in detail before, the dominant subjectification (subject-formation or *assujettissement*) is what produces the government's subjects for Foucault. It runs through the code of the everyday signs and the reproduction of stereotypes on the surface of bodies, and through preventing the performative processes of creating alternative simulacra. For Foucault, it was more aligned with "Rousseau's idealized image of virtuous citizens who rush to assemblies when called" (Arditi 41), the ideal of the nation. In contrast to that, Woodward et al tracks such a desubjectification in contemporary occupy protest movements, arguing that the subject is suspended in these performative events where "suspending in this context means the production of a 'conditional withholding', an interruption of what 'subjects' a situation to overcoding." (The Politics of the Autonomous Space 213)

According to our discussions till now, subjectification then means:

- reproducing conscious agent through molar, dominant lines of subjectivity: citizen-consumer-user;
- reproducing the dominant image of body: closed, homogenous, digitized, and hierarchized body, or what we discussed as lcb;
- reproducing the conventional image of life, and the biopower's discourses around it: the trinity of soul-meat-pattern;
- reproducing the hierarchical collective body as the nation.

So if *assujettissement* is the reproduction of dominant subjective molds, then *dassujettissement* signifies a break on that reproduction and paves way for the miraculous production, the creativity of the poor. This was a concept brought up by our discussion through Bataille, Blanchot and Klossowski, to whom the dissolution of the self, i.e. the hierarchy of the body, and therefore *desubjectification* plays the initial role (for more related discussions on this topic, c.f. the discussion on BwO).

The disruption comes with a new experience, as I explained in the section about patchwork body; the experience of headlessness. In case of social movements, the master signifier that holds everything together with control, hierarchy and homogenization is eliminated and a whole virtual field of experiences start to occur. These experiences come about in the moments of high intensity (as Klossowski would call); moments of performative events that mark a turning point in a particular history.

Talking about the contemporary protest movements, Benjamin Arditì argues that a radical democracy emerges in these movements, which he calls “liminal junctures”. Radical democracy for him is a politics of a different collective body, far from the theory of hegemony and as an alternative to the modern nation-state and its governmentality; a politics of non-representation.

In liminal junctures, Arditì argues, are those singular points of history that “limits are confronted” (Post-hegemony). The confrontation with limits is where *dassujettissement* happens: a transgression of the limits, a socius slipping into a BwO. Foucault calls this a *franchissement* of borders.

In Section “Limits and Transgression: the Performativization of Deterritorialization”, it was explained that transgression of limits is not simply a *going to the other side* of a limit. If the limit is defined as a region of diminishing forces, instead of a rigid contour, then transgression is working on the limits and taking a liminal position.

In this chapter, this definition of limit was reformulated, through Nietzschean thinkers, for body: the limits of body are its capability of affecting and affect, and its closure, *the body armor*, should be viewed rather as a social mechanism. Therefore, body transforms after transgressing the limits imposed on it during an eventful, intense experience. Indeed, experience itself changes meaning

in Nietzsche by becoming the experience of performative event, rendering all other experiences as gregarious, stereotypical reproduction of the already existing repressive phantasms on bodies:

For Nietzsche, Bataille and Blanchot, experience has the function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution (Foucault, Interview with Michel Foucault 141).

This experience takes the body out of the imposed norms, and therefore creates an *abnormal* body according to the political, cultural and medical discourses that define the limits of normality. It is viewed as vice, temptation, evil and monstrous.

The experience that Nietzsche and those French commentators of him conceptualized, disrupts the organization of the naturalized body, Therefore, the experience is a result of an experimentation, an openness toward the new.

The term “Versucher”, which Nietzsche sometimes uses to refer to the experimenter, has another biblical connotation, *tempter*. As Klossowski writes,

every creator is at once someone who tempts others and who experiments on (tempts) himself and others in order to create something that does not yet exist: a set of forces capable of acting upon and modifying that which exists.(Vicious Circle 127)

This reaffirms our two-sidedness argument about the body and its umwelt, the time-space that it is in: in order to change what exists, the body acts upon itself too. This is the violence and cruelty of the performative event: a violence “to what exists, and thus to the integrity of beings” (ibid 129).

4.6.1 The Stateless Monsters Rallying on the Street?

Bodily limits are, as we have explained before, much broader in the contemporary capitalism, especially in the global North where the forces of counter-culture have been actively recuperated since May 68 for the sake of capitalist progress. The rise of the far-right conservatism however calls for a re-institution of those limits, wishing for the comeback of disappeared collective bodies during the contemporary transformations and accelerations in capitalist production. Although

there is a small, yet highly advertised presence of LGBT stars in white supremacist scene, the majority of neo-fascists still violently promote the heteronormativity. Of course, color-lines are the strongest dominant phantasm that make them imagine an *ethno-state*, a state of pure national collective body. The underlying affectivity to these sentiments, however, could reach far more people through the country, with increasing public appearance of antisemitism, Islamophobia and other forms of racism and their systematic integration.

The United States is the clearer case of such issue right now. As Jonas Staahl argues, this is an effect of neoliberalism that calls for an abolition of the state, all the while that promotes an outsourcing of the agency to a so-called “deep state”, consisting of private security firms and multinational corporations, rendering populations into homogenous difference-less mass of lcb. Staahl argues that a whole apparatus of biopower, with high-tech surveillance and dataveillance methods, help create such a control (see *To Make a World*). The new apparatus superimposes itself on the nationalist discourse and all the biopolitical and medical nation-making processes that we have explained before become interwoven with the new governmentality.

Such limits set for collective bodies by bio-coding them. But deterritorializing, decoding forces of radical performativity could sometime successfully transgress them in the Occupy Wall Street and would fail in other instances regarding some other issues.

OWS had a diverse range of participants and presented a heterogenous collective body. It was not coded through the hyper-capitalist subjectification lines that is dominant in the context of the US, nor was it divided according to the systemic racial lines between the White and the non-White that has arguably contributed a lot to the image of American identity and its corresponding American dream and thus phantasmatic subjectification. One other element of national identity, the glorification of labour, was almost absent as well too – one of the pillars of individualism that corresponds anybody’s wealth or poverty to the amount of labour s/he does: “if you are poor, you should work more”.

That the collective body deterritorialized such national boundaries could be seen in its performativizations. The homeless, who are always labeled and even criminalized by the authority and presented as monstrous or untouchables in neoliberal perspective, joined the OWS

protestors actively. Their contribution and engagement witnessed to the non-hierarchical organization of the body, and the transformations in the social relation, meaning the destruction of the function of the code. The protestors started to learn the ways of living in open and sustaining in the cold weather from the homeless. Homeless performativity of everyday life now came to rescue the bodies that were trained under the protection of the system (see Writers for the 99%).

An openness toward the socially designated monstrous as the lowest predefined social status transforms the collective body and increases its power of living. One other case was the Body language in the moderation of general assemblies, that proved to be the only way for a sustainable discussion in big groups. These hand signals for communication en masse (twinkling) originated in American Sign Language (ibid 28); another contribution from another marginalized social group with so-called disabilities in hearing and talking.

The bodies involved in creating a common in their protests, caring for each other, sharing food and space, giving free food to everybody present. In the beginning, people were joining to the first smaller group who attempted the occupation because, as one activist explains, it kept a distance from "traditional way" of doing politics: "many people felt a sense of community, it came from the movement's atypical format" (ibid 9). This had a long-lasting consequence as one other activist thinks, transforming the traditional representative bodies such as unions that "even in the sixties it didn't happen". (ibid 58)

But at the same time, after the tent city established, the reproduction of the everyday signs began partly. One cannot ignore the racial divide between the White and the Non-white that is recounted by many participants. "Almost everyone I talked to concurred that racial disparities were important for Occupy to address", writes one activist. The other describes OWS as a "white organizing culture," where "the consensus model pushed people of color away." Even the initial planning was done mostly by white men and women (ibid 15) and those who were taking the floor in GAs remained stubbornly white and male (ibid 30).

After a certain time, the labour culture prevailed again and it hit first the one its always targets first: the homeless. Some were arguing that the homeless do not do anything for the movements

and do not participate actively in protests, so they should not get free food. And in final days, homeless were excluded from the food rations. As one other activist remembers, “socio-economic divides in the park became evident around hygiene issues. middle class more educated occupiers tended to have friends with apartments not far away. ... more polite and respectful occupiers were sent to homes of volunteers. ... mentally organized people with cultural capital thus had a good chance at getting clean” (ibid 65)

Nonetheless, an important point was that these issues were not going on unnoticed. The heterogeneity of the movement made it possible to critique and transform it from within, as it was not a static or established organization of bodies, but an ongoing experimentation with the problem of linkage and machinic connections. That is why the people of color started to organize the POC working group in the tent city

the POC purpose is to keep the movement accountable, to keep these white progressive activists accountable, to have them understand if they know feel the pinch and the burn....it doesn't mean that people's worlds haven't been in turmoil for decades, for centuries”. (ibid 112)

They even started to give advice to Occupy Philadelphia and Occupy Boston as they had both the same problems in terms of race. The POC working group then organized an occupy Brooklyn, a black-dominated neighborhood that was being invaded with the gentrification processes (ibid 117).

These divides appeared in many Occupy movements: a low participation of Kurdish population in Gezi or immigrants in European Occupy movements have been noted by their activists, too. Again, not left unaddressed as we have described in our examples.

In many countries to the East, the disciplining bodily limits stay clear and harsh. Abnormality is suppressed viciously and the dividing lines of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality and class are rigid and any violation of the modern discourses on health is seen as perversion or sickness.

Religions are often instrumentalized for safe-guarding such limits. As it was discussed before, the limits on bodily excesses and overflows have been established through historical processes tied with Modernity and capitalist production and a class-based society that revolutionized the

ancient order, while extending the court ethics, *the ethics of those born well to rule*, throughout the society with medical, moral, and eugenical discourses and practices.

In Egypt, Yasmin Moll calls such moral codes as Akhlaaq, the Arabic for *ethics*, which she argues that “emerges ... as a key site for constructing normative notions of citizenship and civic participation in a way that privileges the idea of ‘productivity’ as essential to the constitution of the New Egypt. Within such discourse, the formation of a proper religious interiority becomes central to the project of national systemic reform.” (Building the New Egypt) Like the American articulation of religious puritanism and glorification of labour, Egypt has as well connected the Islamic sunny orthodoxy with nationalist aspirations for development and practice, and Islamic codes beside traditional codes function as a way to organize the collective body and channel the impulsive forces of bodily desire into production.

Within this discursive universe, individual citizens are morally responsible for economically improving both their own lives and the lives of others through their own efforts, rather than through holding the nation-state accountable to its own developmentalist rhetoric (ibid).

These imposed borders of daily performance were being challenged by the monstrous alliance on Tahrir. The main-stream narratives tried to capture the collective body there through binary oppositions such as pro/anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy/pro-regime, pro-stability/pro-revolution. But it was not fitting the people there, as many Egyptians from all classes and backgrounds “whose political stances don’t fit neatly into one or the other of these categories” were present in the movement. The Muslims, Christians, Jewish people, communists and liberals joined hand in Tahrir and tried to imagine another sociality possible between themselves.

However, the details show that it was not an entire open collectivity again, but a site of conflicting forces, a place that challenging the normativity and sovereign authoritarian coding of bodies could happen.

One of the main problematic issues of Tahrir was the participation of women. Young women were in Tahrir as in many other Occupy movements, but eventually, they confronted what Paul Masson calls “an obvious and predictable backlash: and sexual assaults in Tahrir Square and in various Occupy camps.” (Mason)

However, to see the real transformation, one should go back to that Akhlaaq and its functioning in contemporary Egyptian society. Mole, herself a young woman director recalls how she was told that “from an “Islamic” perspective – I, a Muslim woman, shouldn’t be going to such public, and potentially dangerous, demonstrations as this was rather the duty of Muslim men” (Conversation on the Egyptian Revolution). And she resisted such coding, deviated from the natural, which seems monstrous from the patriarchal point of view of the system.

I could use the footage I was capturing to intervene in what has been for far too long a dominant narrative about women living in Muslim societies. I wanted to say something –something quite simple really – about women and their participation in the revolution and I felt the best way to do this would be through the very medium that galvanized many of these women to take to the streets in the first place – moving images (ibid).

This is change in the narrative about Muslim women, a narrative that has a global currency to the point that the current President of the United States used it against a Muslim mother of a fallen American soldier. The activist says that her video even changed these assumptions, as the viewers of her online documentation of women repertoire in Tahrir would told her that “the video made them rethink their assumptions about the types of actions *possible* for veiled Muslim women, and so on.” (ibid)

In theocratic states, religion becomes a tool for governmentality. It is an instrument in making national collective bodies, through the perspectives that we have explained before. During the performative events, however, religion also becomes a field of affectivity that can be tapped by happy affects, putting religious people from different religions as well as non-religious activists in the same patchwork body.

In Turkey for example, the Gezi protests saw the Anti-capitalist Muslims initiatives as we explained. As Muslims, they protested against a government that has been criticized as being Islamist. The many activists that I have interviewed, however, point to a different historical fact.

On one hand, the two mostly allied opposition against the suppressive and discriminatory policies of the modern Turkish republic were the suppressed Muslims and the leftists who included many Kurdish activists, too. Both opposition movements had one thing in common: a skeptical view

toward the former colonial power, and capitalism in general. With the rise of tensions and protests, a series of coup attempted to suffocate the attempts for reforms and revolutions. As Giorgio Agamben argues, the modern (economic) paradigm of governmentality retains the original meaning of *kybernes*, that a good captain is the one who sails through the tempest, and therefore, governmentality becomes managing the crises instead of preventing them, governing the effects instead of causes (From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power). This profit-based liberal-economic perspective has been intensified to the point that today “to govern means to make a continuous series of small coups d’état” (ibid 22). This was clearly a case for Turkey since 1970s and has extended until now. The last failed coup attempt was in July 2016, three years after the Gezi protests.

The military government after the important 1980s coup started the management of Islam as a tool for governmentality. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan rose to power, he intensified the neoliberalization of the economy, adopted an unprecedented open border policy for imported goods and services. And he of course used Islam as a tool for constructing a national collective body proper to his own agenda, in order to seize a limitless power. “Justice and Development”, the ruling party’s discourse seems to present a synthesis of seemingly contradictory identities, Atatürkism and Ottomanism: a synthesis of Republican national identity, based on the exclusion of Kurdish, Armenian and Alawite population, and Ottoman national identity, based on Islamic identity. It also includes one share element between those two poles: the discursive anti-western attitude, while “imitating” Western models of governmentality. And it has developed its own particular biocode in a country that immaterial, performative and feminized labor in the service industry is increasingly exploited.

In Gezi, however, such a synthesis of Atatürkism and Ottomanism seemed defunct. The code stopped functioning and the people blurred the hierarchical lines of division that the imagined national identity imposed on collective bodies. The Muslims had an important presence which makes a clear point about those discourses that tried to solely see the Gezi movement as a backlash against religion or a pro-western liberal democratic protest. According to Hammond and Angell,

the participation of working-class people, practicing Muslims, and ethnic and religious minorities belies any simplistic attempt to characterize this movement as a simple reiteration of existing divisions between secular and religious, urban and rural, Turkish and non-Turkish, and so forth (Is Everywhere Taksim?).

It was a moment of desubjectification: the citizens of a certain nation-state showed that they do not will and they are not the imagined nation of any dominant discourse in the country, secular or not. The return of the difference and the process of deterritorialization made such an intense affectivity that the collective body was heterogenous in all aspects and levels.

In the most molar perspective, from city to city and neighborhood to neighborhood, the aesthetics and the content of the protests were different. Slogans, language and the symbols varied as the dominant phantasm of a certain context could be anarchist, leftist, nationalist, secularist, Kurdish, Alawite or Armenian (ibid).

In a molecular level, each collective body present in any site of the protest was also heterogenous. This is how the Revolutionary Muslims explain this fact to Erdogan as he tries to paint the protest as anti-Islam:

Some news for the Prime Minister and his collaborators who try to reduce the resistance to a particular [secularist] political group and in so doing sow the seeds of polarization among us:

1. It was the atheists who formed a human blockade around those praying in the [Taksim] Square.
2. It was the soccer fans of Galatasaray who resisted the police attempts to detain the fans of Fenerbahçe.
3. Socialist victory arks and nationalist “grey wolf” hand gestures⁵⁴ were in the same square yesterday
4. The leftists and veiled women were in the same square yesterday

⁵⁴ We discussed before the problem of right-wing extremism presence in occupy movements. It is very troubling in the case of Turkey, where grey wolves are now involved in a campaign of anti-Kurdish war in the Kurdish areas. For more discussion about this issue, please refer back to our discussion on the machinic “and”.

This is called resistance. This is called solidarity. Against fascism the people are one heart⁵⁵.

The gender lines and the ethnic limit in the collective body were also surpassed. As two other Turkish scholar explains, “the protests were the embodiment of an unexpected ‘we’ emerging from bodily presence, but not controlled, mastered, fully grasped by any of society’s conventional identities or ideologies”. For them, the gender resistance provided a clear example of such an unexpected ‘we’.

2013 LGBTT Pride March in Istanbul presented an unprecedented show of solidarity between all fractions of the Gezi movement with their queer comrades. “We exist” became an important slogan for queer protestors, as the pure bodily presence of the excluded elements from the naturalized collective body inside the protesting collective body established that unexpected “we” through what Butler would call a “collective thereness”. Their refusal of being rendered mute and invisible is their performative rebellion against the constructed consciousness and the regime of words and light – as a banner in that march shouted “gays exist! Kurds exist!”. (ibid) “We exist” becomes a bodily sign, rather than a sentence saying the evident. Otherwise, there is no way to escape calling a slogan of “we exist” absurd.

Erdogan and all other political leaders use “we” in their speeches two. But similar to the aforementioned difference between people and “People”, there is a clear line – the line of the *statis*⁵⁶ – between the we consisting of such a heterogenous body and a *we* that refers to an imagined homogenous body. Although not homogeneous, the former is an attempt to make equality in terms of power between different positions of expression, instead of instituting – through representation – hierarchical positions of expression. The latter is an attempt to make homogeneity through dividing the body with imposing lines of identity and establishing a hierarchy of power. The move from the latter to the former necessitates that rupture, that experimentation and as it is not aiming to make unity out of homogeneity, a Turkish activist calls it convergence:

⁵⁵ Revolutionary Muslims' communique

⁵⁶ c.f. chapter two, the discussion on the State/statis/civil war

Nobody, none of us has become purified in Gezi. But something happened, beyond telling and understanding. Something that have never happened before and that would have never happened, we thought. What happened in Gezi was convergence (Halavut qtd. in Canlı and Umul 19).

With the appearance of such a transgressive collective body, Erdogan's government started to degrade the protestors, labelling them terrorists, vandals, troublemakers, lawbreakers⁵⁷. From the perspective of the state, however, the experimenter is evil, and to continue with Nietzsche, "whenever he sketches the experimenter philosopher, he always casts a glance on the monstrous aspect of these characters" (Klossowski, Vicious Circle 128).

Foucault uses the abnormal to refer to those bodies that could not be totally reconciled through the coding process. He also explains that such subjects, as we will see, have been called monstrous. The arche of the modern governmentality was argued to be the *well-born* and it is not surprising that political philosophers of 19th century got interested into medical discourses about human body. In the beginning of 20th century, when the term biopolitics first entered the Western discourses, it was in the context of organistic and vitalistic theories of the state, as we discussed before, and they define state in terms of a living being with its proper collective body (Volk, nation, people).

Against this arche, many contemporary political philosophers as well as artists summons the monster. The monster is the generic name that specifies the alternative collective body which can present the alternative.

The monster wanders in the dream and in the imaginary of folly: he is a nightmare for those who are "beautiful and good": it can exist only as catastrophic destiny that must be atoned, or as divine event (Negri, The Political Monster 194).

The monster is the patchwork body, the body of a performative event, or else, a catastrophic destiny of the alt-right and white supremacism or other right-wing extremism, Islamic or non-

⁵⁷ see for example, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-protesters-looters-vandals>

Islamic. Staahl formulates this situation in terms of two forms of statelessness as the two aspects of contemporary “reality of globalism”. The first one the so-called alt-right:

the rise of ultranationalism, which ultimately manifests itself in political structures outside of public control ... the disappearance of the state altogether, and its replacement by power structures that do not recognize any form of democratic control by the very people these structures affect. Nor do these structures restrict themselves to what used to be known as national borders (Staal, *To Make a World*).

But at the same time, there are alternative monstrosity, a heterogenous body affirmative of difference, has been rising in different forms around the globe:

the resurfacing of stateless internationalism, a political struggle that attempts to redefine a common culture beyond territorial and ethnic demarcations (*ibid*).

It is such a monster that becomes a subject of fascination for many radical artists and thinkers. The history of the name shows the reason.

4.6.2 The Monstrous Threat against the Natural-Identical

The monster could be a Leviathan, the one that announced “everything under heaven belongs to me” (Job 41: 11), that declared the natural common (earth, air, water, everything under heaven) as its property, and that was summoned to fill the mythical foundations of the modern Nation-State and its era of *public/private* dichotomy. Or else, could it be the monstrous witches who were often revealed, not surprisingly, during the peasant revolts against the nascent bourgeois State – opposing its appropriation of common lands – and had been hunted down, burned and crashed in the aftermath (Linebaugh and Rediker 52)? Or is it another Caliban, subjugated to its ultimate civilized colonial Master, rejecting him only in order to learn *in the hard way* that colonialism is for its own good? The skeptic may also ask about the monstrous body and “what it can do”: is it an organism with one or several heads, homogenous but divided, an oedipal “Frankenstein” which is only capable of *resentiment* against the Father, or an “Acéphale”, headless and labyrinthal, which declares of community against fascism, “against mass [...] against

the imposture of the individual”, a community “distinct from the community of blood, earth, and interests” (qtd.in Kendall 138)? The word monstrous signifies the serious acts of crime, or perceived “huge threats” against society⁵⁸.

In his second book of Physics, Aristotle defines the monster (τέρας, *teras*) as a mistake in or a deviance from Nature, such as the malformed new-born babies or hybrid animals with human bodies and animal heads.

Since the so-called “natural” was also the measure of the political and the social in ancient Greek, *teras* was nonetheless not, even in Aristotle, limited to the mythical and biological phenomena. For example, when Aristotle writes that “anyone who does not take after his parents is really in a way a monstrosity [teras], since in these cases Nature has in a way strayed from the generic type” (Aristotle, qtd.in Biles 163), he relates the idea of the natural to a social phenomenon, i.e. the familial relation, and thus who does not obey the natural rule of familial hierarchy would be considered a monster. In any case, monstrosity is a transgression of the natural limits.

The word “τέρας refers firstly to a wondrous and therefore terrifying omen of a future event, sent by gods and needing interpretation” (Mollendorf 94). *Teras* means sign, but mostly, a sign of threat that contains a *divine power* in itself. Etymologically, *teras* comes from the proto-Indo-European **k^wer-* (to do, to build, and to make) which keeps its form in the Indo-Iranian word *kār* (ڪ, meaning “work”) and its Proto-Balto-Slavic derivation, *čârь*, refers to “charm, and magic”. The Latin counterpart to *teras*, *monstrum*, shares the important meanings of the Greek term, as it comes from the same root with the verb “to demonstrate” and the noun “demonstration”. However, the signifying meaning of the monster has a particular nature: it signifies itself, the warning of a threat to the so-called humanity, by its pure presence. It does not need to even do something: its mere apparition, like *the divine*, is its action, turning a situation into an inhuman

⁵⁸ During the cold war, communists were often depicted as imaginal monsters, usually coming from the outer space, to destroy the “human civilization” (meaning the United States). As if Joe Hill knew the mentality of future, when he wrote in his last letter one day before his execution, that “the following day he expected to take a trip to Mars during which, upon his arrival, he would begin to organize Martian canal workers into the Industrial Workers of World” (Shukaitis 81).

one; simply because monstrosity is first of all refers itself to the *potentia*, the pure potentiality of building and making (*k^wer-).

Ifrit (عفريت), the name for supernatural monsters in Arabic, reveals the same abstraction-technic in the face of monsters. The word comes from *Iferr* (عِفِر), “strong and huge” or “malicious evil”, and simultaneously from *afar* (عَفَّر), “soil, dust, or to disperse like dust”. On the other hand, it comes etymologically from the Middle Persian *āfrīt* (آفریدن) which means “creation”. Thus, ifrit is not only very strong, but also as volatile and fleeting as dust, while these characteristics belong to its *creative power* (or one might say *potentia* again). According to Islamic mythologies, it is also said that ifrit is made out of fire (or smoke), and in its rare appearance in Qur’an testifies to its evasion of being fully known. In *Surat An-Naml* (27:39-40), an ifrit promises “King Solomon” to bring him “the Queen of Sheba’s throne” in an instance: “I will bring it to you before you rise from your place, and indeed, I am for this [task] strong and trustworthy.” The last clause, which begins with indeed, a rough translation for “انّ” (*ennī*) that functions as an emphasis, reveals that nobody, even a messenger of God himself such as Solomon – who, according to Qur’an, knows everything in the world, even the language of non-human creatures – could know an *ifrit* completely, or could predict its actions. That is why the ifrit itself has to emphasize that it can be trusted. Even the divine knowledge does not know what a monstrous body can do. Monster challenges the transcendent.

Monster is a category of the living, separated from human-being. It always situates itself in-between of the human and the animal; that is why numerous monsters are animal-human hybrids or some animals have been called monsters, when threatening the humans. For instance, international community started a world-wide program against Malaria mosquito in 1960s, in which the little insect was characterized as “the most tormenting, the most persevering, savage, vicious little monster on the face of the earth” and the program itself as “a clash between humanity and mosquitoes” (Shaw, Jones III and Butterworth 261). This in-between-ness of the monstrous made it difficult for human being to be able to *identify* it, to place it in the epistemological functions of similarity and comparison in natural sciences, and to categorize it for proper logical understanding. Perhaps, it is the reason why *teras* and *monstrum* comes

originally from such abstract meanings, and only after that they could refer to “natural” manifestations of the denaturing monstrosity.

The monster is a general name for the body that is not naturalized; or rather, it resists the naturalization and its bio-code. Such a monstrosity has been seen on many sites of protests; not only because protesters are seen as monstrous from the perspective of system, but also because they affirm their monstrosity. The affirmative monster will be explained in the next chapter, but an example from the occupy movements will make this more understandable.

How do these bodies challenge the natural collective body, i.e. nation, in themselves? If the conventional image of thought, that we discussed through Thacker, centers around the trinity of meat-soul-pattern, the monster is a body of what he calls the contemporary biophilosophy. Instead of a trinity, it is the immanence of flesh, its impulsive forces and the power of affective relationality, as it resists and dismantles the vertical organization of body.

All the above discussed etymological reverberations of the monster, from transgressing the natural limits to its potency and non-identifiability, but also its unintelligible body, are interestingly intermingled in a modern Arabic-Persian noun: hayulā (هيولا, “monster”).

Translating the Aristotelian concepts, the early Muslim philosophers arabified the word “hyle” (ύλη, “prime matter”) into hayulā or to be more exact, al-hayulā al-o’la (الهيولى الاولى, هيولاى اولى) “the first or the prime hayulā”. According to Aristotle, hyle is the primordial matter, serving as the raw and unformed material of, and consequently the underlying cause of, all objects. From this perspective, hyle is pure potentiality, which can act itself or be acted upon in order to acquire a form, to be actualized. Hyle as pure potentiality is strictly distinct from form as pure actuality, but their composite constructs the identifiable and knowable substance.

The function of hyle in Aristotle’s thought is however not clear. It could be a non-substantial element, as it has no characteristics or qualities; for form is the essence determining the actuality, which is always a unique essence for a certain moment, while potentiality (of matter) is multiple in itself, and makes the change and alteration – the movement foreign to heavenly bodies – of earthly objects possible. Thus, matter and its potentialities signify imperfection for Aristotle. That is why Aristotelian God, particularly with Aquinas, becomes the absolute Actuality or the pure

Form, in which no potentiality could harm the perfection (see Nash 20; Castoriadis 333). The God is “something which moves without being moved; something eternal which is both substance and actuality” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII 1072a), a “thought thinking itself” (qtd.in Castoriadis 333).

Hyle could also be a passive raw matter, when one considers that its Latin counterpart, “*materia*”, which “is originally another metaphor, having its literal meaning not in handicraft but in the supposedly passive role of the mother (*mater*) in conception” (Liedman 129). It is also argued that “Aristotle has the tendency to call hyle ‘*sperma*’ and to ascribe a certain activity to the female” (Long 179).

In the Arabic and Farsi translations of Aristotle’s thought, particularly in the contributions by Ibn-Sīnā (ابن سینا, “*Avicenna*” in Latin), hyle in the form of *hayulā* became more determined as a concept. In Islamic philosophy, *hayulā* as matter is categorized into first, the Prime (or first) *hayulā* as Aristotelian hyle, the formless matter which is the pure potentiality to acquire a form, then secondary *hayulā*, which refers to an already formed matter with the possibility to change its form, and it goes on even to the tertiary and quaternary types of *hayulā*. In particular, Ibn-Sīnā considers prime *hayulā* as a substance alongside with the Body, the Form, the Soul, and the Intellect (see Rezai and Hedayat-Afza 115, Richardson 44, 68, 87). The natural body is thus a composite of prime *hayulā* with the form, from which the latter is the extensive element of a body, constitutive of its continuity. Ibn-Sīnā writes:

You found out that body enjoys a massive continuous magnitude, and sometimes division and discreteness occurs to it. You know that a thing which is in itself continuous will be different from a thing which accepts both continuity and discreteness, and has both as its attributes. Therefore, the potentiality receptive of these two attributes is apart from the actual continuity and its form; and that potentiality receptive of both continuity and discreteness is not the same with ‘the continuous’ which will be destroyed by discreteness and gives way to the emergence of a new thing, nor is it such a thing that will be restored, if that continuity returns (Ibn-Sīnā 57 qtd.in Rezai and Hedayat-Afza 119).

This argument serves to demonstrate the existence of *hayulā*, in which the continuous is the “form”, whereas the receptive potentiality is identified with *hayulā* as the potentiality to be

formed (or deformed). The alleged continuity and extension of body, and its contradictory relation with discreteness, remains unproved in Ibn-Sīnā's philosophy. But we know that for the ancient Greeks, as Peter von Mollendorf claims, humans who are separated from their original halves are monsters, are "made deficient 'dividuals' out of real 'individuals'" (Mollendorf 94).

Trying to reject the existence of prime hayulā, however, "Shahab al-Din Suhrawardī", another Muslim philosopher, points to the fallacy in Ibn-Sīnā's argument by saying that

continuity is not receptive of discreteness' is true only if the intended continuity is a continuity between two bodies. But if the intended continuity is indeed the magnitude, such a claim is not acceptable; because using the term 'continuity' instead of 'magnitude' brings about the fallacy of using related term instead of each other, and thus, it is mis-thought that the intended continuity in a single body amounts to the continuity which perishes through discreteness (Suhrawardī 75 qtd.in Rezai and Hedayat-Afza).

According to Suhrawardī, thus, the connection between prime hayulā and its form as an external continuity, as its essence, does not prove itself to be necessary. Although he rejects prime hayulā for the same reason, one might take the inverse direction, trying to see hayulā under this new light. When the link between the potentiality (hayulā) and actuality (form) is broken, hayulā becomes the pure potentiality, the "potentiality to not-be" as Giorgio Agamben puts it.

If a potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all potentiality, then there is truly potentiality only where the potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully into it as such. This does not mean that it disappears in actuality; on the contrary, it preserves itself as such in actuality. What is truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such (Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy 183).

Therefore, the prime hayulā embodies the potentiality to not-be, since it is a primordial matter that challenges the position of God as pure Actuality, and does not have or necessitate any natural form or essence. Hayulā is thus against any essentialism, refuses from the pre-existing natural forms, and for this very reason, it does not let itself be rigidified or identified. Moreover, when prime hayulā "preserves itself as such in actuality," it exhibits a self-demonstration, just

like the monster that demonstrates itself by its mere apparition. So it should not be surprising that hayulā have become throughout its history in Farsi language a synonym for monster.

Considering this ontic link between pure potentiality and monstrosity, a critique of Agamben seems legitimate. Agamben still situates being as actuality in contrast to the potentiality to not-be as the act of creation, or better as separated with “a Nothing alone” (Potentialities 247) from this act. From this point of view, the relation between potentiality and actuality is either mediated by the possible or by its lack. But the monster-hayulā, as Foucault has asserted, belongs to the realm of the impossible (Abnormal 56), or rather to a zone of non-identifiability which is indifferent toward the possible: a monster could be, by definition, a logically impossible wolfman, or a logically possible queer activist collective. Accordingly, if one wants to approach the impossible monstrosity, one should replace Agamben’s ontology with an *ontogenesis*. Hayulā then appears as the unique Spinozian substance according to which the divine (God or the transcendent) becomes immanent in relation to Nature. Substantial hayulā presents itself as an open, heterogeneous Whole that qualitatively differs in and from itself, and generates a qualitative multiplicity. On the other hand, these virtual processes of differentiation and individuation may result, but not necessarily, into quantitative differences: a contingent passage from the realm of non-representation and *difference in nature* to that of representation and *difference in degree*.

One might now ask about the materiality of the affirmative monstrous as the constituent power, extending our being. Commenting on the notion of hyle, Howard Robinson (2014) writes that “‘Matter’ [hayulā] is rather the name for whatever [...]. Relative to the human body, matter is flesh and blood.” To translate this hint into our conceptualization of monster, blood must be removed from the formula, for it has served historically as an essentialist ground – with the exception of its function in the case of vampirish monsters, where it is taken regardless of gender or race. Hence, remembering our discussion on biophilosophy, the *flesh* is the prime matter, the materiality of hayulā-monster, or the *Element* of being.

For monster always resides at the limit, at the threshold, at “the cutting edge of deterritorializations” of Being; for the incarnation of the virtual monstrous, the body of the

monster, could only be flesh, the prime Matter, *al-hayulā al-o'la*. Hence, the tautology of the monstrous, as Foucault (Abnormal 57) puts it: *monster is monster; monster demonstrates*.

In the poetics of flesh, where flesh is seen Elemental and common, there will be no anthropomorphic hierarchy: in *David Cronenberg's* movie, "The Fly", fly and human flesh's potencies can only be assessed after they are machinically connected to each other, intensifying their forces of deterritorialization, and crossbreeding monsters. Flesh is the self-differentiating continuum of being, heterogeneous, flowing, and plastic. As an Element of being, it is constituent. Flesh incarnates the potentia. Therefore, the only monster proper for this formulation is the creative monster, the joyful schizo in the process of becoming-schizophrenic; one of those Mosley's *hopeful monsters*, "born perhaps slightly before their time; when it's not known if the environment is quite ready for them" (Hopeful Monsters 71).

Fly, mosquito and many other insects have been projected as monsters by humans in different forms. Cockroaches join them in being targeted in an interspecies war as monsters. But one collective body, a group of humans in Greece, was *becoming cockroach* through the transformative power of the occupation movement.

Cockroaches are resilient, as much as being the sole survivors of a possible nuclear war, dying out of hunger if their head is to be cut, or resisting cyanide more than any other animal. They are said to have an elaborate social structure, social behaviors and collective decision-making. They are fast, they can appear and disappear in a second, they *swarm* without having leaders.

These are the characteristics that made cockroach "the face of the monster" (Tsianos 228) in Athens 2011. The parliament had to vote for adopting a life changing austerity policy, which they did, and the people came out to protest the law, just prior to the parliament session. They occupied two neighboring squares in the city center close to the parliament for several months, and chanting "we won't go away before they do!". The session was hold because the riot police used excessively tear gas on the protestors. But the protests continued. As two Greek activist-scholar describe:

Since yesterday, June 28, we live like cockroaches in Syntagma square. We are sprayed continuously with chemicals by the Greek police regardless of what we do or what we say, but we

persist. We leave Syntagma square for a while to catch our breath and keep on coming back. We rest a bit and return to the square (Kambouri and Hatzopoulos).

Becoming cockroach becomes a tactic of occupation that challenges established taxonomies, they argue:

As we are becoming cockroaches we begin, without really realizing it, to adopt tactics of stasis, of perseverance and endurance, that were previously unknown to us. Chemicals keep on flying, sound bombs keep on exploding all around us making terrible noise and the crowds respond by not leaving, by remaining at Syntagma square. Becoming cockroaches and growing more and more resistant to the chemicals, our bodies begin to mutate (ibid).

Speaking about stasis, they point to the constituent power of their monstrous becoming, the affectivity of the mutation they are undergoing that comes in the midst of a performative event. What is the mutation then? What challenges the established organization? As we argued, the event's hiatus and its subsequent introduction of the new in the established collective body mark this mutation, this *becoming-hayula*, which is not only a break with the statist discourse of the national body but also a break from the conventional leftist politics:

The classic urban tactics of demonstration (marching in a linear fashion, protesting in front of the Parliament, dispersing after the end of the demonstration) or confrontation (like throwing marbles, stones, and Molotov cocktails against the police and destroying symbolic targets like banks, multinational commercial chains etc.) seem and are secondary in face of our tactics. Cockroaches do not attack, they do not make much noise, nor do they destroy something (ibid).

The performative character of their protest is obvious here. They do not march from point A to point B in the limited time of a day. They occupy time-space to produce a new subjectivity. That is why the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the representative of traditional left, failed to understand the new movement and argued that "movement did not represent any danger to the establishment, had no alternative political suggestions beyond the immediate rejection of the government and the austerity measures" (qtd. in Prentoulis and Thomassen 213).

A coalition of new leftist parties (Syriza) came to existence during the protests and it consisted of those groups who affirmed the new forms of protests, instead of rejecting the protestors as

hooligans or bunch of excited youth. When Syriza took the power, it acted as another government, and the new prime minister rejected a part of protestors of the austerity policies – that his government yielded to – as delusional, non-realist, and too much left. Yet the cockroaches still exist to this date, marching in Greek cities against austerity, as they knew that they do not aim to take the state power.

4.6.3 Political Monster: A Case of Fascination

Lurking smoothly into the Modern era, monsters are far from being extinct: they “have always defined the limits of community in Western imaginations” (D. J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women : The Reinvention of Nature* 181). That is why the non-natural and non-identifiable transgressive monster has been long a source of fascination for modern and contemporary thinkers.

Feminist Donna Haraway shifts the dissent character of monstrosity into the gender and sexuality, claiming that the monstrous “Centaur and Amazons of ancient Greece” upset the norms of these fields “by their disruption of marriage and boundary pollutions of the warrior with animality and woman” (Haraway, *Simians* 181), with their *in-between-ness*. For her, in whose works the main protagonist (*cyborg*) itself belongs to the category of monster, “the possibilities for our reconstitution include the utopian dream of the hope for a monstrous world without gender” (182).

As we hinted before, in his 1974-75 lectures at the College de France, collected under the title “abnormal”, Michel Foucault follows the modern procedures of “overlying”, “appropriating” and “colonizing” the monstrous since 18th century. He defines monster as a “juridico-biological” notion, for “what defines the monster is the fact that its existence and form is not only a violation of the laws of society but also a violation of the laws of nature” (Foucault, *Abnormal* 56). What Foucault notes as the (discursive) characteristics of monstrosity in 18th and 19th century echoes again the abovementioned etymological meanings. Non-identifiable is the monster as “a principle of intelligibility in spite of its limit position as both the impossible and the forbidden”; a principle of intelligibility which is “strictly tautological, since the characteristic feature of the

monster is to express itself as, precisely, monstrous, to be the explanation of every little deviation that may derive from it, but to be unintelligible itself" (57). Remembering the prevalent figure of the mad as the monstrous in Foucault's thought, this claim is more or less asserted by Pierre Klossowski:

Outside the time of the intellect, outside its dimensions: something monstrous that takes shape only through a delimitation of the non-comprehensible (Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle 134).

Arguing in a similar manner with Negri's critique of the eugenic, Foucault extends the field of monstrosity from a human dominance over non-human humans into a human dominance over the absolute non-human, or rather, the living entirely, in which the monster reveals itself always as "the limit" and "the exception" (Abnormal 56). Thus, perhaps most importantly, Foucault considers the monstrous as immanent to the Nature, although it occupies a liminal position – not unlike Derrida who situates the monster "within the nature". Foucault writes:

The monster is, so to speak, the spontaneous, brutal, but consequently natural form of the unnatural (Abnormal 56)

The exterior – *the unnatural* – is never in an Outside on the other side of a limit; on the contrary, the inside is "an operation of the outside" (Deleuze, Foucault 97), a folding of the outside that interiorizes it, "as if the ship were a folding of the sea" (ibid). It is according to this relation between the exterior and the interior that Foucault describes the monstrous Renaissance madman as "the Passenger *par excellence*" (Foucault, qtd.in ibid), because he would be imprisoned on a ship, "in the interior of the exterior", and become a prisoner of *the field of immanence* ("sea") which is "the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroad" (ibid). The monster lives "on the edge", lurking on the singular points of the folds. Its liminal position is immanent to the field of immanence, and its transgression is "from inside the border" – monster is non-identifiable, it does not pass from one identity to another one; it is "the prisoner of the passage" (ibid).

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari seem to be in terms with the last Foucauldian characterization of monsters, but they would have criticized his other points, and consequently his entire perspective. To define the monstrous primarily through the individual subjected to the Power

(*potestas*, “constituted power”) of medical, juridical, and penal institutions is to bestow upon the transcendental (meaning, the form of *potestas*) the first analytic⁵⁹ position of one’s perspective. It is also not compatible with Foucault’s own analysis of the monster in the ship, his conception of transgression, or his view on the *nomadic* powers of the monstrous. Moreover, the title of all Foucault’s lectures and his main focus is *the abnormal*, in which he also includes monsters. But by referring first to the becoming-animal of Captain Ahab through “a monstrous alliance with the Unique, the Leviathan, Moby-Dick”, Deleuze and Guattari notes the following about the abnormal and the anomalous:

It has been noted that the origin of the word *anomal* (“anomalous”), an adjective that has fallen into disuse in French, is very different from that of *anormal* (“abnormal”): *a-normal*, a Latin adjective lacking a noun in French, refers to that which is outside rules or goes against the rules, whereas *an-omalie*, a Greek noun that has lost its adjective, designates the unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization. The abnormal can be defined only in terms of characteristics, specific or generic; but the anomalous is a position or set of positions in relation to a multiplicity. (A Thousand Plateaus 243-44)

The monster, therefore, entails a multiplicity. Moreover, as “the cutting edge of deterritorialization”, it stands as the creative-resistant or revolutionary force of a situation, (re)territorialized by the transcendental point of *potestas*; a constituted power that manifest itself in form of hierarchical and centralized institutions. That is why Deleuze and Guattari define the “originary undertaking” of the becoming-monstrous with “a rupture with the central institutions that have established themselves or seek to become established” (ibid 247). The Nietzschean experimentation, the performative disruption of the code.

From this perspective, then, monster becomes the affirmative monster. Just like the distinction the two authors make between the revolutionary schizoid process and “the way schizophrenics are produced as clinical cases” (Deleuze and Guattari, *On Anti-Oedipus* 23), there should be a distinction between the becoming-monstrous, or the affirmative non-identifiable monsters that are always in the process of becoming and alteration, *with* the “identified” monsters either

⁵⁹ It is also useful to remember that “analytical” means “toward the lower”.

trapped in medical, judicial, and penal institutional influence of the constituted power, or turned into the servants of the transcendence, of the sovereign, and completely detached and crystallized from the field of immanence.

The fascination with monsters comes from its affinity to the constituent power: those interrelated forces of becoming that constitute the being, extend its limits, and destroy the barriers of constituted power, all those false transcendent crystals of its own becoming, which actualized an identifiable form out of countless possibilities. And monster resides on the limit: on the zone of becomings, alterations, and deterritorializations, on the exclusive zone of constituent power. “The monster is not only event, but *positive event*”, writes Negri, defining the monstrous as “a mechanism of ... (material and/or utopian) construction” (Political Monster 200).

The occupiers of Athens squares have been the cutting edge of the deterritorialization. They have not been the “abnormal” monster, the *outsiders*, as the victory of the left-wing government in Greece proved later.

The cockroach monstrosity formed a multiplicity open to other different, so-called “alien” elements in the collective body. When the refugees of the war-torn post-Arab Spring Middle East fled the bloodshed toward Europe, the former occupiers of Athen’s squares opened their squats to them. The squats increased dramatically during the protest movements, as part of the war on the space. The immigrants who were rejected help by many European elites found shelter in these self-governed autonomous squats. In my interviews, the Greek activists told me how they struggled with language barriers, different cultural norms, and many other issues in hosting the refugees, which is part of the long-term processual construction of a multiple, heterogenous collective body.

It must be noted here that although the etymological meanings of *teras*, *monstrum*, or *ifrit* can be still heard in the contemporary discourses around the monster, its figure, its body, and its relation to the humans have of course been changed throughout the history. Monster challenges the arche, the origin, and that is exactly why its ancient meanings still seem relevant today. Nonetheless, with the introduction of the natural/civil rights dichotomy in particular, the monster found itself in the margins of the Nation-States. Negri shows how this initial spectral monstrosity

has *demonstrated* itself more concretely during the history of its struggle and resistance against capitalism, transforming itself from an imaginal, spectral, and natural-juridical monster into a bio-political immanent one, with a concrete *multitudinous* body, in the age of immaterial labour (see *ibid*).

This affirmative perspective toward the monstrous, which gives it a class character, has certain consequences for the organization of a monstrous body.

4.6.4 The Kurdish Stateless Monstrosity

A deviance from the natural “Turkish” collective body, based on blood and soil, the Kurdish became the monstrous and its unintelligibility led to its discursive exile on the exterior of Turkish identity: Kurds were even designated the name “mountain Turks”.

This “Caliban” seems to be raised again, free, and in the flesh. When nobody could stop the fascist ISIL’s apparatus of capture, Kurdish monster manifested its joyful strength in Kobani, stopping the Jihadists’ military with its war machines. In a passage in the *Theses on the Concept of History*, Benjamin writes that today’s critical “mode of thought” needs to make the world “repugnant”, or one might say, *monstrous*. For the politicians “in whom the opponents of Fascism had placed their hopes” compromised with fascism, and for this very reason, the monstrous mode of thought must intend to free “the political child of the world from the nets in which they have ensnared it” (Benjamin, *On the Concept of History* 393). It is certainly the case with Kobani’s monster, to which “Kurdish” serves only as a common name, not a signifier of any identity.

But what has created the monstrous flesh of the struggle in Kobani was occurred before this “canton”, thanks to its daring defense, transformed into a spectacular image in the mainstream media. The singular and monstrous form-of-life which is tied to the name of Kobani, its becoming “canton” instead of a “city-State”, the organizational form of the collective body, and the minor narratives about the life of its militants construct together the truth of Kobani, where comrades dance and sing for the living as well as for the dead, where the seemingly “traditional” marginalization and domestication of women have no place, and where Identity is refused.

Kobani is one of the three Rojava Cantons in Syria. Insisting on the right for self-determination, these cantons have formed an autonomous territory. Canton originally means “region or corner”, and had been referred to autonomous members of the Old Swiss Confederacy during 14th and 15th century with their own form of direct democracy⁶⁰.

Inspired by the Idea of cantons’ confederacy, residents of Rojava have written their own, still limited, Constitution for an alternative organization of the collective bodies that starts with the following:

We, the people of the Democratic Autonomous Regions of Afrin, Jazira and Kobane, a confederation of Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, freely and solemnly declare and establish this Charter. In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity and democracy and led by principles of equality and environmental sustainability, the Charter proclaims a new social contract [...] we, the people of the Autonomous Regions, unite in the spirit of reconciliation, pluralism and democratic participation [...] in building a society free from authoritarianism, militarism, centralism and the intervention of religious authority (The Constitution of the Rojava Cantons).

However, the manner in which militants from other regions have been joining the struggle in Kobani, and even the historical formation of the collective body in this city, points more toward a monstrous alliance with the collective body, rather than a “social contract”, as a way of making “being-together”.

Kobani is a city made by World War I and its consequent nationalist States. Its name means “company” and refers to the German Railway Company which was building the controversial Berlin-Baghdad railroad. During the Armenian genocide in the Turkish Empire, refugees built Kobani near the railway, and were joined later by the Kurds who fled the Turkification of the Turkish Republic. The liminal city was again divided by a new national border in the aftermath of Sykes-Picot, and situated literally on the borderline between Turkey and Syria (Taştekin). Now, this hybrid one-hundred-year-old monster demonstrates itself with a new collective body,

⁶⁰ This form of direct democracy must be analyzed within its own historical context, since numerous gendered and racial divisions had been present inside of the Old Swiss Confederacy that could be critically challenged.

heterogeneous, multiethnic, and multilingual, which actively refuses the “natural” modern form of the Nation-State.

Looking to the horrors of identity politics in the West Asia and North Africa, it is exactly today that “we need new giants and new monsters to put together nature and history, labor and politics, art and invention,” Hardt and Negri write, “in order to demonstrate the new power that is being born in the multitude” (Multitude 194). With its political and creative art of making “war machines”, even in the literal sense of the word, the Caliban of Kobani demonstrates the power of the flesh, resisting the advance of the gregarious slave-master resentment for the sake of “the particular case”.

The proclaimed new social contract proved to be more a “monstrous” alliance, such as the one Deleuze and Guattari conceptualizes through Captain Ahab’s way of connecting with the *monster*. Joining the monstrous collective body is not a matter of contract; rather, it is a pact with the monster: dangerous, threatening, necessitating a permanent transformation and an insistence on the threshold. During the battle of Kobani, many people from all around the world joined the Kurdish affirmative monster to resist a statist monster that promoted homogeneity, obedience, nation-state making and establishing national borders. Fighters from all over the world came to help the indigenous monster of Kurdish soil to resist the newly emerged State and as such, they proved the stateless affirmative aspect of the Kurdish project: as monsters, they do not seek the power, nor they behave according to conventional leftist politics in the Middle East.

That is another important aspect in the monstrous collective body: the connecting point is not a presupposed universal social contract with the State, outsourcing the agency to a tamed monster of the state. The autonomy of the political monster is exactly this: the refusal of imposed passiveness.

The fact that the foreign nationals from all over the world (the US, Canada, Australia, Iran, Turkey, the Netherlands, Germany, ...) joined Kobani’s Kurdish struggle point to the fact that the affectivity of their struggle was contagious beyond the naturalized national borders.

But the rise of extreme-right reactionary movement and its ultra-nationalist agenda has been beyond the border, and contagious. How are bodies affected through contagion? What is the

effect of contagion on collective bodies? and what does contagion tell us in general about performative political movements and their bodies?

4.7 A Conclusion: Contagion

On January 4, 2011, Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian Street Vendor, passed away as a result of his grave injuries after he set himself on fire. On 14th, Ben Ali, the dictator of Tunisia resigned. Then we had other movements and revolutions happening in Egypt (January 25), Jordan (January 28), Syria (February 4), Kuwait (February 6), Yemen (February 11), Algeria (February 12), Iran (February 14), Bahrain (February 14), Libya (February 16), Iraq (February 16), Morocco (February 20), Oman (February 27), Lebanon (February 28). Let's even stay in these geographical limits and don't mention others that witnessed other protest movements.

Theories tried to understand the particular logic of dissipation and repetitions of such movements. There were those in cultural and performance studies who brought up the notion of imitation or mimesis, which we have criticized before and will continue to rest our case in the following in favor of the coming concept, and others from the same disciplines who recourse to a more biopolitical, affective concept: contagion. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued, the age of globalization is the age of contagion.

Contagion comes from a different logic. In our simple biological understanding, we know that there are no two cases of similar reactions to even most common viruses such as cold. When the virus comes, the transformations and changes through the interaction of immune system with it are all interdependent on the singular network of relations inside a particular historicized and disciplined biosphere, a human body. The paradox of such a perspective is how a local struggle reaches a universal repetition, without it being originated in certain Western values. Contagion argues for a certain universality, too, but not a universality on actualized, possible options, but a universality of a certain virtual zones of affectivity. Contagion is ultimately based on this claim

that universal transformative forces can intensify local forces through happy affects (progressive, deterritorializing) or sad affects (reactionary, reterritorializing); but both are intensities, either in negative degrees or positive one. As intense affectivity, they mark their effects on social psyche, reactivating stereotypical phantasms on the surface of collective bodies, or allowing for creating new image of thought and its corresponding simulacra. It breeds monsters: they can be either affirmative, being open to the different, heterogenous elements in the collective body, or negative, trying to violently eliminated everything that threatens the homogeneity of the Statist body.

This is how the indigenous struggle of Zapatista inspired the Carnival against Capital, the Kurdish struggle and other minoritarian struggles in the world. Its monstrosity was to struggle as the dispossessed against colonial mechanisms of dispossession, and to form a non-Statist collective body against the nation and the urge to nationalist obedience. The Zapatista had a far-reaching network of alliance with many activists around the world. They even called for Global Days of Justice, as their local struggle was a struggle against both the nation-state and the global capitalist relations of biopower. Yet they were insisting on their indigenous identity.

Their contagious power was in their affirmation of indigenous identity and of its radical openness as opposed to the Statist discourses. It resonated with many others, as a monstrous anomaly that comes from the forces of deterritorialization, and these virtual forces are performativized differently, and singularly, in each local context.

Subcomandante Marcos, former masked speaker of the Zapatistain Chiapas believed that the struggle of local and indigenous peoples is the avant-garde of a war against the neoliberal capitalism today, a radically decentralized war.

The Catalan, Basque and Galician pro-independence movements claim that “We are the Zapatistas of the South of Europe,” and want it for “all peoples of this world who struggle for the right to self-determination” (Staal, To Make a World). The Kurds with their idea of democratic confederalism feel close to Zapatista’s struggle, which is mutual feeling according to many announcements of solidarity by the latter. And the list could go on further and further.

Thus, contagion does not negate the idea of indigenous struggle. Each context is different, each monstrosity is singular, and each performativization is accordingly unique. However, contagion effects bodies through affectivities that do not recognize national borders. As we said earlier, affect categorize alternatively the bodies: not according to their identity, but through their affections, forces and powers.

What kind of affects? In Spinoza, the three basic affects are appetite (desire), joy or happiness, pain or sorrow. In the Spinozist readings of affect, considering Spinoza's monist ontology of forces, desire becomes equivalent to the *potentia*, the constituent power, which Spinoza designates to the Multitude. For him, all forms of *potesta*, i.e. constituted power, such as State-formations from Absolute Monarchy to Oligarchy are still a product of that *potentia* in one form or another (Political Treatise). It was also discussed that in Deleuze and Guattari, affect/affection relation translates also to the realm of force, where there are two basic affect-affection relations: one that increase the constituent power and one that decrease it, former is called happiness or joy and the latter sadness.

But one should not neglect the bodily element of the affect. What Deleuze and Guattari call "the ability of affecting and being affected" is the logic of affective contagion. Affect is material, though virtual and indeterminate; it is, according to Deleuze, based on the non-cognitive perception of a situation that leads to a modification of the body which triggers the emotion. Therefore, emotion comes in the end of the process of affective production: the affect is situational and contextual, singular to its context, and then it traverses bodies while bodies also interact on the flow of affect. Then an affection is produced in the flesh which can rise to the emotion as the dramatized affect. Emotions (anger, rage, hatred, delight, gaiety, etc) as products are representable, belonging to the spectacle of public display, but only considering them leads to the mystification of the processes that leads or contributes to it or springs from it. It also leads to homogenize all singular contexts in a logic of generality and particularity, not unlike Social Performance theories.

Consider Gezi protests. Around the midnight of 27 May 2013, bulldozers and demolition machines enter the Gezi Park, located near Taksim Square, to uproot the park trees and free the

space for constructing a copy of an Ottoman barracks with a shopping mall and mosque inside it. The protestors gathered to prevent this and started an encampment. On 31st of May five in the morning, police evacuated the park forcefully and the wide-spread protests happened afterwards.

If we only consider the trees being uprooted as the triggering point, if we consider the origins or the first emotions rising from the desire to protect trees, we miss the very dynamics of Gezi. I am not talking about the development policies of Erdogan's AKP party government, to which some Turkish scholars put the name of "performance of infrastructure" and its function has been to both ground their political authority (the economic success story) and to naturalize a particular project of generating value (which is visible in the coupling of a mosque and a shopping mall in an Ottoman barracks). I am not talking about multiple gentrification projects around Gezi park and Taksim square that targeted various ethnic and gender minorities as well as the poor in general. I am not referring to the initiative of Taksim Solidarity with more than 100 different groups that formed in 2012. My point is exactly about trees, that they can even show the logic of generality and abstracting static images or generalizing emotions does not work and neglects some parts of that public display too. The tree as a political symbol became indeed uprooted in Gezi protest, functioning in a flexible form that was the result of them becoming rhizomatic. The tree floatingly became the embodiment of different lines of resistance and struggle, which intersected in a performative event. A line from a communist poet, Nazim Hikmet, saying "to live like a tree, solitary and free, and like a forest, in brotherhood/this is our longing" hanging from one tree with red flags. Next to it, revolutionary Muslims attached a quote from the Qur'an to a tree—"the trees bow down before God." A line from Orhan Pamuk's novel, *My name is Red*, reads that "I don't want to be a tree, I want to be its meaning". Some trees had signs such as "listen to your conscience, don't kill me"—and personified with the names (and in some cases, photos) of people killed in the conflicts relating to the oppression of Kurdish minority. Graffiti around like "parks, not concrete" had environmentalist claims, or were against neoliberal capitalism, gentrification, but among them was even the giant marching tree-spirit Ents from the cinematic version of *The Lord of the Rings* (see Hammond and Angell; Lloyd).

This is the abstract logic of affective relations, those performative relations between bodies: a logic related to the non-conscious and imperceptible forces of life, that traverse between and distribute human and non-human actors within a field of virtual forces. The body is thus a “conversion channel” or transducer that can modulate this intensive force through a kind of sensing feel, rather than a conscious calculation. But this modulation comes in two types of, as we said before, decreasing and/or increasing the potentia.

Affective radical relationality points to a flow of affects and affections as the basis of sociality and blurs the I/other dichotomy versus the affective self-containment, where being healthy meant being able to contain in oneself, accepting a clear boundary between inner and outer self as well as between oneself and the other. The former (affective radical relationality) has been marginalized in different forms through the modern political organization of the Nation-State.

When this organization is shattered to a radical, affective intermingling of differences, one can search for the virtual forces of a performative event.

On the evening of June 28, 2013, a group of several-thousand people marched through the streets of Kadıköy in solidarity with the Kurdish town of Lice, in the district of Diyarbakir, where Medeni Yıldırım, a young protestor was shot dead in a protest against the extension of a military station (Schafers and Ilengiz). The groups active in Gezi park movement took to street in order to show their solidarity, but the case of Kadıköy is particularly illuminating.

Kadıköy is a neighborhood on the Asian side of Istanbul that is known to be mostly inhabited by middle-class, “white Turkish” residents. A deviance from the natural “Turkish” collective body, based on blood and soil, the Kurdish became unintelligible and its unintelligibility led to its discursive exile on the exterior of Turkish identity: Kurds were designated the name “mountain Turks”. Even the Kurdish language had been long prohibited in the public space, let alone its education.

But on that evening, Thousands of residents of the White Turkish neighborhood were for the first time shouting Kurdish slogans “Long live the brotherhood of peoples!” (Bijî biratiya gelan in Kurdish) while the language was completely foreign for them, they didn’t know the words, their pronunciations, or their meanings (Schafers and Ilengiz). They were trying, with faults (some were

mistakenly shouting Dicle instead of Lice), errors and mixings of pronunciation to enunciate from a different subject position, the position of a Kurd. Even the geography of Turkey's Kurdistan, which they had not been calling it as Kurdistan, was only a vague image in their minds. This is how the affective relationality, a performative non-linguistic contagion goes through bodies, modify them and create affections.

It is this kind of mimesis or imitation that challenges the Eurocentric paradigm of mimicry based on free will, signification, meaning, the hierarchical power relation of progress and underdevelopment, and the duality of original/copy. It is not enough to understand this challenge, similar to what Social Performance theorists such as Turkish scholar Nilüfer Göle formulates as a reversal (Public Space Democracy). Göle refers to a mimetic reversal that "occurs between the West and the East. To the extent that the West is not the only standard bearer of democracy, interconnected imaginaries and transversal solidarities between different societies emerge". This explanation keeps the mimetic principles intact, presupposing it and with it, presupposing the modern (even if former) superiority of White Western advanced countries. Or Jeffrey Alexander, the main figure of Social Performance Theory does the same when he writes "there is an unprecedented connection of Eastern and Western impulses, demonstrating that the tide of democratic thought and action is hardly confined to Judeo-Christian civilizations." (qtd. in Göle) As Zeynep Gülşah Çapan argues, the scripting of Gezi comes with its "thingification" and "sacralization". posited in "a linear progressive narrative of the story of the 'Turkish Nation'" or focuses on the "foreign influences" on the movement, the presupposed dynamics of imitation and getting closer to the European context, therefore scripting Gezi "through Eurocentric spatial and temporal designations" (Çapan).

But if we are not in the paradigm of meaning/interpretation/consciousness, then we are in the paradigm of affect/interpretation/phantasm; the idea that we discussed through Nietzsche. If mimesis is related to conscious agent, affectivity transmits through the process of contagion.

In their introduction to an essay collection on the concept of contagion ("Ansteckung"), Mirjam Schaub and Nicola Suthor explains that contagion is the corporeal dimension of an aesthetic principle (see Schaub, Suthor and Fischer-Lichte), through which, they argue, reception in arts

can be conceptualized without recouring to metaphysical sovereign control of a knowing/imitating subject. As they put it, contagion is a contingent transfer via contact; an aesthetic mode of appropriation that reach “under the skin” (Schaub, Suthor and Fischer-Lichte).

There are other attempts in approaching the problem of mimesis through the affect theory, centering around the idea of a “mimetic desire”. In the paradigm of mimetic desire, a form of complex imitation is posited that is not based on the mimetic principles of free will, consciousness, original/copy, and signification. The theorists of this field point to the main initial discursive figures of affect theory in philosophy, James and Bergson, who had interest in hypnotic suggestibility and psychic phenomena. They implement various studies of hypnotic suggestibility and psychic phenomena to explain how forms of affect and emotion would spread throughout population.

Going back in this tradition, Gabriel Tarde stands as a founding thinker. Tarde gives the most important social role to the imitation. For him, “the social being, in the degree that he is social, is essentially imitative, and that imitation plays a role in societies analogous to that of heredity in organic life or to that of vibration among inorganic bodies.” (Tarde 11)

In the beginning of this chapter, we referred to the historical inheritance of bodies through Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, which referred to body’s situatedness and facticity in Merleau-Ponty and its administration through biopolitical mechanisms in Foucault. Through Klossowski, we later discussed how the code of the everyday signs reproduces the naturalized organic body and how performative forces disrupt such process by creating their own phantasms and simulacra on the surface of bodies.

Imitation for Tarde has the same implications. Tarde’s conception of imitation was not based on the meaning and conscious repetition, but on a strange notion of imitative rays, waves of affective suggestibility that passes through different bodies and affect them in a way that triggers an action based on the same affection. Theatrical, for sure.

Tarde’s *microimitations* happen inside a monadic society. The monads are neither individuals nor collectives. They are singular bodies that cannot be categorized through pre-defined identities; they are rather actualized in a network of social relationalities. “Every thing is a society”, writes

Tarde, “every phenomenon is a social fact.” (qtd. in Sampson 7) According to Tarde, a collective body is thus not an assemblage of human bodies: it is a machinic assemblage of human and non-human elements in a site.

But as monads of social relationalities, they are always dividual. Or as Latour puts it, “everything [in Tarde] is individual and yet there is no individual in the etymological sense of that which cannot be further divided.” (Tarde’s Idea of Quantification 155)

The contagion spreads between such monads. It is a flow of affectivity that passes through these heterogenous bodies that make them perform similar actions. Tarde says that imitative rays “radiate out imitatively”. Microimitations that comes out of those rays cannot be conceived through the classical paradigm of imitation/mimesis:

What radiates out imitatively (what spreads) should not be confused with a purely cognitive, ideological, or interpsychological transfer between individuals and organic social formations (groups, masses, etc.). The imitative ray comprises of affecting (and affected) noncognitive associations, interferences and collisions that spread outward, contaminating feelings and moods before influencing thoughts, beliefs, and actions (Sampson 19).

Therefore, there are fields of phantasmic affectivity that could create similar actions and simulacra in different bodies. What Tarde calls microimitation is the transfer of those fields of affectivity, or a region of forces through different dividual bodies. In the second chapter, we argued that in the course of a protest movement, names appear phantom-like, as a sign to translate (and to give name to) an intensive region of forces or the immanent field of constituent power and its intensities. Those names also signify a source of imitative rays that transmit that affectivity. Tarde makes clear that such a source of imitative rays should be perceived through the affirmative forces of creativity. It is not, in the beginning, a reproduction of the old, but an introduction of the new. And its repetition as imitation comes from such creativity:

All repetition, social, vital, or physical, i. e., imitative, hereditary, or vibratory repetition ... springs from some innovation, just as every light radiates from some central point, and thus throughout science the normal appears to originate from the accidental (Tarde 7).

Although Tarde here refers to a central point, the central point does not seem to be a fixed, individual body as his social monadology teaches us. According to more recent commentators of Tarde, the imitative rays are those differential relations between bodies that join them together; they are affective capabilities of making relations. “Imitative ray does not travel between (inter) individual persons;”, argues Tony D. Sampson, “rather, it moves below (infra) the cognitive awareness of social association”. (20). For Tarde, imitation is more of suggestibility.

According to our discussions throughout the thesis, we can conclude that the imitative rays as differential relations are not subjected to their terms. and do not originate in one point, going to the other one – unlike the basic presumption of imitation theory, which – as we have shown – consider for example the West as the original point of “Modernity” or “nationalism”, and the East as an often-bad imitator. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “[Tarde’s] microimitation does seem to occur between two individuals, but at the same time, and at a deeper level, it has to do not with an individual but with a flow or a wave.” (A Thousand Plateaus 218)

Therefore, Tarde’s theory of contagion is based on first, a source of creative forces, those “much-imitated social inventions”; second, a network of interconnected monadic bodies; and third, the interaction of those forces with the monads, i.e. affectivity. Therefore, it fits with the notion of patchwork body in contrast to those theories that search for a unified, hegemonic body as a subject of change. The connectivity in contagion “follows the pathways of networks -- and especially distributed networks -- rather than the pattern of hegemony and its chains of equivalence” (Sampson 38).

But as the happy affects could be contagious, the sad affects transmit the same way. That is why suggestibility signifies a threat of dictatorship, fascism and totalitarianism. If Wilhelm Reich, for instance, conceptualizes the capitalist body armor as a shield against bodily affectivity and flows of desire, he also argues that people may desire fascism. The rise of far right in the Western countries is a symptom of such contagion.

The case of Donald Trump teaches us that the reality principle, factual validity, or true/false duality or any other cognitive category does not play an important role in the dissemination of his ideas to millions of people. Those ideas resonate with certain people in a very literal meaning.

They signify those fields of affectivity and regions of forces that are sad, reactive, and reproductive of the dominant order; or as was quoted earlier from Nietzsche, they are those mistakes that help with the survival of a particular organism. The support for those ideas, rather than being a conscious cognitive decision, has an affective aspect.

The simplest argument for this fact was actually given by a high-ranking republican politician, Newt Gingrich, after Trump became the official nominee of the republican party. Trump made one of his famous speeches in that ceremony: 75 minutes speaking of crisis, of “unprecedented” rise in crime and terrorism in Barack Obama’s United States, and all incompatible with real statistics and facts. Presenting the real statistics, a CNN host asks Gingrich to explain Trump’s claims. The following conversation between them speaks on itself (Gingrich):

CNN host: Violent crime across the country is down.

Gingrich: The average american does not think crime is down, does not think they are safer.

-: But it is. We are safer.

-: No, that’s you view.

-: It’s a fact. this is statistics.

-: what I say is also a fact. Liberals have some statistics which theoretically may be right, but that’s not what human beings are.

-: this is FBI statistics. They are not a liberal organization.

-: But what I am saying is equally true: *people feel more threat.*

-: Yes, they feel it. but the facts don’t support it.

-: As a political candidate, I’ll go with how people feel and I let you go with the theoreticians.

Going to *how people feel*: that is what brings us to those theories which traditionally concerned arts. In fact, modern and contemporary arts as well as critical theory always challenged liberal economy’s attempts to model human behaviors according to numbers and quantities. If the statistics showed economic improvement relative to Obama’s first year in office, they also

pointed to an increase inequality, an increase in the number of billionaires, and an increase in the share of wealth for the 1% of the society.

What these statistics cannot register is the affects and affections in relation with the changes and differences in the numbers. If the Occupy Wall Street was a contagious movement, the white supremacist movement is also a contagious one, and it even affects the decisions of those who consciously think they are not racists.

Sampson explains this contagious transmission by an interaction between two streams: upstream flows of affect and downstream flows of biographical responses, which for him disintegrates “the Enlightenment artifice between contaminating emotion and pure reason” because “what is socially suggested, and biologically responded to, intersects”. The imitative rays that go below or over social persons can change their moods, thus thinking:

It is the manifestation of affects in this encounter which move upstream, activating mostly unconscious feelings of horror, before they intersect with the downstream flows of a neural circuitry loaded with manipulable and biographical emotional content. It is this seemingly ready-made, yet highly absorbent and adaptable circuitry that is tapped into by political strategists (Sampson 9).

In other words, there are not only accidental overflows of creativity and desire that function as the sun for imitative rays of contagion. Rather, there is a ready-made circuitry of affectivity that can be tapped into by political strategists, advertisement experts and other public relations engineers.

The social networks and cyber space have intensified and multiplied the possibilities of communication and consequently, transmission. Even when in Internet a photo or video or short text is shared immensely, it is tagged as “viral”.

The internet “memes” are the most common viral things and they have different types, like “challenges”, “gifs”, “trolls”, etc. But meme is actually a term of mainstream cultural analysts who pursue a kind of evolutionary biological pattern with a strong Eurocentric perspective. These neo-Darwinian thinkers consider meme as transferable cultural behaviors and believe that there is an analogy between meme and gene: the way the genes determine our biological destiny and

its growth and sustainability, cultural memes determine our cultural destiny and its “natural” environment of growth and progress. Although they perceive memes as viruses that transmit through contagion, their paradigm remains one of determinist imitation, plagued by body/mind and subject/object duality. The meme virus thus becomes “a unit of imitation which determines the evolutionary invariance and survival of the ideas that spread through a population of minds” (Sampson 16). Their linear evolutionary thought, *memetics*, divides human beings more according to the lines of Volk theory that we discussed earlier.

Memetics is based on a false reading of Tarde. The memetics theorists consider him as their conceptual fore-runner, which according to our aforementioned discussions, can only be proved otherwise. As Sampson argues, “a Tardean ‘epidemiological’ diagram can be clearly differentiated from the deterministic logic of the neo-Darwinian meme/gene analogy, and its claim to be the definitive biological force shaping social and cultural fields.” (ibid)

Although founded on wrong, Eurocentric and even racist premises, memetics has become the foundational science behind the PR strategies. Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was an unfortunate successful attempt of such strategies in engineering the affectivity, and in a more shocking manner than previous advertisement and political PR campaigns.

And it is not only about that. The other aspect of contagion in dominant political theory is as we discussed, a negative aspect that justifies, through the biopolitical processes and modern medical discourses, a hygiene that supposedly protects nations and individuals against the contamination. Eugenics, in other words, is based on a campaign against the contagious elements that can disrupt an imagined pure nation. As Eugene Thacker says, “contagion and infection are more than mechanisms of antigen recognition and antibody response; they are, as our textbooks tell us, entire ‘wars’ and ‘invasions’ continuously fought on the battle lines of the human body.” (Thacker, *On the Horror of Living Networks*)

Both aspects are contributing to contemporary capitalism’s mechanisms of machinic enslavement. They contribute to the immaterial turn in capitalist production.

But the modern medical (and their corresponding political) discourses that underlies such biopolitical devices, as we have discussed before, are not compatible with the new image of

thought. The contemporary biophilosophy necessitates an alternative way of thinking life that goes beyond the individual toward the idea of the impersonal life. As Margrit Shildrick, a contemporary biologist asserts, “the purity of the distinction [between self/non-self] is illusory and what constitutes the proper ‘me’ is already shot through with otherness” and “all human bodies swarm with a multitude of putatively alien others”. (Chimerism and Immunitas 95).

On the other hand, as a long history of avant-garde performance has shown, management and engineering the performative affects and predicting the affections that audience receive, even with the most advanced audio-visual and lighting technologies, is simply not possible.

(An interesting case is the Moscow First Workers Theatre. In that theatre, Sergei Eisenstein, Boris Arvatov and Sergei Tretyakov followed an interesting avant-garde revolutionary experimentation with theatre between 1921 and 1924, in the form of what they called “eccentric theater” and the “montage of attractions”. Although it may have begun first as a counterstrategy against “the effects of the organic representation of situations in the theatre”, calling for leaving the stage toward the streets, it soon developed to adopt a positive strategy, an avant-garde one that aimed for “a consistent and precisely calculated agitation of the audience in the theater” (Raunig, *Art and Revoltion* 154). This time, the stage was set in a space best fit to the target audience and the content of agitation. Eisenstein and Tretyakov cooperation in performing Tretyakov’s play *Protivogazy* [“Gas-Masks”] is an interesting example of this attempt, and also its last one. *Gas-Masks* was their final cooperation in 1924, before Tretyakov left the theatre of production for the life of production in Kulkhuz. They wanted to perform a play specifically written for some particular workers to those workers in their work-place, so that workers experience the play written about their everyday life of production in their everyday life of production. And they believed this one to one correspondence between elements of play and the site of performance will have given them the ability to induce the affection in workers’ bodies they wanted them to have. The result is captured in one of the actor’s notes about the performance: “It already became clear after the first performance that we were disrupting their work....They put up with us for four performances and then politely showed us the door.”)

No matter how advanced technologies become, there is always – as Deleuze and Guattari put it – leakages and lines of flights that evade the total control. In other words, no total affective manipulation or control is possible.

Therefore, we can agree with Sampson to distinguish between two forms of contagion and virality, a molar one and a molecular one.

Molar virality is ... endemic to new biopolitical strategies of social power that is, a discursive (and prediscursive) means of organizing and exerting control... biopower is further exercised through the exploitation of the entire valence of human emotion—not just through fear, panic, terror, and fright but via the positive affects that spread through a population when it encounters, for instance, the intoxication of hope, belief, joy, and even love. (Sampson 5)

Molecular virality located in the accidents and spontaneity of desire. This precedes the endeavor to organize the social via representational categorizations of epidemic disease or joyful encounters of hope and belief. (Sampson 6)

Therefore, there is again a relation of production between molecular and molar virality, rather than a simple opposition. The molecular virality corresponds with the affectivity of performative and impulsive forces and creation of new simulacra; it also corresponds with the patchwork body that disrupts the imagined homogeneity of national collective body. The latter is related to the molar virality, which is a way of coding through the everyday signs, and reinforcing stereotypes through engineered affectivity.

These attempts signify an attempt to bring mimesis close to affective contagion. Therefore, we can ask about the repetition in these performative acts, and the corresponding affections of a radical affective relationality.

In the 60s, where for the first time the performative aspect of events challenged the modernist claims to universality, modern hierarchies, and colonial rule, Mary Douglas, somehow anticipating Butler's theory of performativity, conceptualizes the logic of contagion through disruption, ritual and margins: "Disruptions, caused by disorderly expressions that do not align with established rituals, attain power through contagion. Power takes form in the shape of

contagion by polluting the established order through disruptions, which are ephemeral until they become ritualized and thus normalized into ritualized order”

Such a contagious disruptive repetition can be seen in the case of Rainbow Stairs in the aftermath of Gezi. This case shows how the original motivation of an individual act, its meaning, and its signification for a certain people is not what contagiously repeated afterwards. In October 2013, a retiree painted the cement-color steps connecting two neighborhoods of Istanbul, Findikli to Cihangir, in a colorful pattern similar to rainbow colors. The municipality re-painted the stairs in gray to bring back the original color and this governmental violation produced another affective solidarity, where many other stairs in public spaces in Turkey were painted in rainbow colors. The retiree said in the meantime that his idea was not to protest, but to make people smile, of course not thinking about the queer implications of rainbow colors. To paint is an artistic strategy and artistic practices are those which produce affects and affections.

If contagion of performative event is about happiness and disruption, it is not surprising that many went back to festive forms and Bakhtin’s concepts of the carnivalesque. The repetition is inherent in festivals, carnivals and ceremonies; as a repetition of a singularity (mythical, religious, ..). Deleuze calls this the apparent paradox of festivals: "they repeat an ‘unrepeatable’. they do not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the ‘nth’ power.”

Repeating the unrepeatable is where the disruption does not become, as Mary Douglas pointed out, “ritualized” and “normalized”, but keeps its power of contagion. To understand this repetition, we can start again from the established modern order of generality. The order of generality and particularity is based on resemblances and functions through the exchangeability and substitutability. Deleuze says: "repetition is a necessary and justified conduct only in relation to that which cannot be replaced. Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities". In other words, to repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent. (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 2)

Deleuze differentiates even between “the repetition at the level of external conduct” or what we called earlier a public display of emotion, from “internal repetition within the singular” saying

that the former “echoes [the] more secret vibration which animates it”, the intensive contagious repetition of singular affects themselves, and points to the same productive relation between affective relation and emotion as product that we started this presentation with.

According to Deleuze, the repetition in artistic practices, or in works of arts, is “a singularity without concept”. Concept is the determined form of an idea, being dramatized under the effects of virtual performative forces. This is also the main idea of performativization method, as it argues that each performative event is a repetition of singular forces of a problematic in a singular context (being indefinite, non-representational, affective, and contagious). A singularity without concept resides in the field of the performative and the affective, and its concept can only emerge in its process of performativization. No performative event has an actualized past or a predictable, already-existing future. Therefore, the analyses that see Gezi in terms of contradictions between secular versus religious, Eastern authoritarianism versus Western democracy, Ottoman-style rule versus liberalism of European union are not analyzing a social protest movement, or a radical performativity in between bodies, but reproducing the same static, modernist, and Eurocentric images of thought. Recoursing to statistics for justifying such sociological rigidities has not been helpful, too. Statistics, as it cannot capture contagion beyond the conscious significations is utterly confusing vis-à-vis a performative event. In the case of Gezi, according to Konda statistics (2014 19), around 30 % of the protestors came to the park for liberties, 20% to claim rights and to protest against violations, 10% to protest against dictatorship and oppression, 9,5% for the resignation of the government, 8% for peace and democracy, 6,2% to protest the police violence, 6,1% for support and solidarity, 4,6% to protect the trees and the Gezi Park Square to avoid the construction, 3,2% to challenge the system and for revolution, 2,5% to be heard. The important thing that these numbers capture is the revelation of their insufficiency and the existence of an element they cannot capture in the categories of generalized demands.

The order of repetition that we discussed through Deleuze does away with equivalency, exchange and therefore numbers. For him, "if exchange is the criterion of generality, theft and gift are those of repetition" (Difference and Repetition 1).

However, there is a ritualized, empty repetition. In Douglas, we found that ritual is a product of that disruptive, affective, and contagious repetition. This ritual is translated into habit in affect theory, where habit is a solidified and actualized form of affection with a repetition without difference. "Habits are socially or culturally constructed. But they reside in the matter of the body, in the muscles, nerves, and skin where they operate autonomously". Disruption, the affective contagion, is a disruption of habit, of theatrical spectacle.

That is also why disorder, marginality, and anarchy present the habitat for affect (p19) and affective contagion works on margins and borders.

But if habit is in the flesh, its performative change presents a transformative power in the flesh, and in our domain of discussion, on the collective bodies and their spatiotemporality. As Lisa Blackman argues, "the body within this formulation is both a transducer of potential but also an interrupter to the system of flow that becomes lodged through the action of habit".

So, if we talk about a logic of contagious repetition that does not function through exchange and substitution, but affect, affections, theft and gift, of a singular repetition of singular forces, then analyzing performative event through sign analysis, semiotics and semantics is not helpful.

The case of the standing man in Turkey presents another case for studying contagion. When the first performer acted as a silent "standing man" (Duran adam), so many others followed and re-enacted it afterwards. Erdem Gündüz was a Kemalist, he later published a statement and cleared "the meaning" of his performance, and during his act, he was looking straight to Kemal Ataturk's big picture hanging on one corner of the Taksim square, neighboring Gezi, but anyways, the standing man repertoire repeated in different places antagonistic to Kemalist views of a Turkish national identity, in Kurdistan, on the spots where Alevi young men were killed, by anarchists, leftists, old and young and veiled and secular people. If Gündüz won publicity and prizes out of his act, there was an activist woman, going with the performative repertoire of Duran adam to minorities even in Kurdish regions, standing with and beside them, and her name is never published in reports with her photos.

Can we say it spread because Gündüz published his statement later, and there was a gap between his act and the understanding of that act, actually a delay in perception of a meaning? The answer is no, this cannot be a coherent argument.

Here we can again bring the differences between a logic of imitation, based on similarity/contradiction and identity, signs and meanings, and a logic of affective contagion, based on difference and intensive repetition. Both logics are always at work. Even in the case of the standing man, the AKP supporters made the same performance as a reaction/contradiction to Gündüz, which means they just imitate, and their act cannot be seen through the lens of contagion.

In my interviews, a certain point was always being repeated: the limits of Kurdish participation in the Gezi protests. Although there was a Kurdish stand in the occupation and other examples that we have mentioned happened during the Gezi movement, many believe that the movement could not show enough openness to absorb Kurdish people in it.

These are the limitations that we have spoken about other cases before in this chapter. They show that even we can witness temporary powerful performativization of an open, multiple, affirmative monstrous anomaly in these societies, they can be rolled back easily when they are not sustained through constant organization and engagement. Even now, when Turkish State has been in a brutal war against Kurds in the south, there is little popular protest against it. And the country seems far more divided based on identity lines than before.

The affective, contagious struggles and solidarities have yet continued, although in a smaller scale. One particular struggle is against the patriarchal coding of the collective body. The feminist movement, the queer movement and the Kurdish movement have had a strong alliance in recent years in Turkey – which is interestingly evident in the physical existence of non-governmental organizations defending LGBTQ and Women’s rights in Diyarbakir, a very important city in the Kurdish movement (which itself has an Alawite minority among other Kurdish populations). And their solidarity composes a patchwork body that its parts have been deemed as a threat to the naturalized patriarchal Turkish identity. And as we have seen the feminist and queer struggles in

Gezi movement, we witness how contagion is transmitting this deterritorializing power back and forth between these groups.

The women's movement became a movement inside the movement, as they challenged the patriarchal social codes, being dominant even inside leftist and Kurdish opposition groups. "We started our struggle against the Turkish state," says Fadile Yıldırım, a representative of the Kurdish Women's Movement, "but later we realized it was not just the matter of the repression of the Turkish state...[and thus] women's freedom movement started inside the national liberation movement." The systemic inequality they had suffered was also experienced by LGBTQ, as they tried to resist transphobia and homophobia inside leftist groups and the people of Gezi Occupy Movement, as we discussed.

Yıldırım explains how their struggle is in the intersection between race, gender, capitalism, colonialism and consequently, the state. Therefore, this trans-sectional movement was not a struggle against some certain bossy men, but with a general discourse being promoted by the very form of the nation-state:

We Kurdish women saw that if we want to be free, we have to be independent. We realized that women represent the first class of slaves, and also the first colonized class. So we said if the first class and the first oppressed sex in history and society are women, then history and society can only be liberated by women. We believe that female liberation is only possible in a society where there is no state, no hierarchy and no power, where these structures are overcome. If we look at other national liberation movements or if we look at the Soviet Union we see that all revolutionary organizations that could not manage to do their own revolution inside looked like the enemy.

As we see, such a struggle affirms an openness toward others suffering from the limitations imposed by the constituted power, recognizing in the poor and in the dispossessed the constituent power of creativity inside a performative movement that breaks with former political forms of struggle, such as Soviet's style of socialism.

Solidarity with women struggle has been a sign of struggle against the Turkish state, especially after 2013, when the peace process with Kurds failed, the State started another war, and prosecute all opposition. In interviews, Turkish activists described the new national identity as

being performatively manlier and manlier, and they see a direct relation between increasing Turkish nationalism with women's violence. The women being killed or harassed by their male partners have been in record numbers in recent years, simultaneously with the degrading social relation in Turkey and further divides based on naturalized Turkish identity promoted by the State (Ashdown, 2015 & UN Women 2016).

Other minorities have also suffered during recent years and struggled prior and during the Gezi protests. Those struggles proved how a patchwork body could form between different groups beyond any Turkish identity, groups that are under-represented or unrepresented in the nation-state discourses. A sad fact witnesses to this participation, as Mustafa Dikec documents in his book, is the victims of Gezi Movement protests:

Who were these victims and where were they killed? All the victims killed by the police were Alevis, and they were all killed in areas peripheral to the centre of protest and media attention...two in Armutlu neighborhood in Hatay, and one in Okmeydani in Istanbul (Urban Rage: The Revolt of the Excluded 204).

He continues to name other neighborhoods in Ankara and Istanbul that have "Alevi-leftist identity". The Armutlu neighborhood in Hatay, Antakya was on the other hand a clear case of how contagion happened during Gezi between the so-called periphery and the centre of protests, connecting different suppressed groups in an affirmative protest together.

Armutlu protests was predated the Gezi Park movement in Istanbul, inspired it and later, being inspired and accelerated by it. Armutlu movement was an occupation movement, too; but it started as the revolt of the Alevi population barricading their own neighborhood against the security forces that for decades exercised the violence of State's nation-making project on their bodies.

We discussed the 1980 military coup and their new projection of Turkish national identity through using religion as a tool in the re-establishment of power hierarchy in the collective body. That process had a brutal actualization in Armutlu, where a Military Complex had been built right after the 1980 military coup with the objective to "separate the Alevi and Sunni residential parts

of the town and to control them better hence". Armutlu "was isolated and specifically targeted by the state during the 1980 military coup."

Right before Gezi, the protests started against the security state. This protest affected the bodies of Gezi protestors, as they showed their solidarity ("the affection of the people") and Gezi protests intensified the indigenous, local struggle in this particular neighborhood. Armutlu was claimed by their Alevi residents, as the graffiti on the walls show. One special graffiti was even showed an inspiration from another struggle for self-determination and against Fascism:

Armutlu were blocked off with barricades created by the residents, barriers made of cast-off pieces of metal, wooden planks, and even old refrigerators and washing machines. One graffiti reads, "No pasaran!" (ibid)

Saufeguarding the neighborhood, "¡No pasarán!" was famously used during the Spanish Civil War, at the Siege of Madrid by Dolores Ibárruri Gómez, a member of the Communist Party of Spain. And it was being shouted just recently from Catalan people against the police violence on their day of independence referendum.

The contagion connects those oppressed, dispossessed groups who have been divided by a Statist, nationalist discourse that tries to impose a certain identity on the whole population and simply suppress or neglect the rest of the population. As Benjamin Arditi argues, what makes these initiatives viral is the rejection of a totalitarian identity in these movements: "they linked with one another as dispersed nodes that shared values with other groups/nodes and mobilized for a cause but were unconcerned about a unitary political score or creating the +1 of a common identity" (39)

The case of trees in Gezi that became rhizomatic, as it was argued earlier, points to another important of contagious performativity: its transversality. Transversality of the rhizome stands in contrast with the verticality of the tree on one hand, and the subjugated horizontality of the radicle. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualizes these three kinds of organization: (1) Tree-like or vertical organization with strict classification depending on a main root as its center (centric organization). (2) Radicle-like or semi-horizontal organization depending on many small radicles as its multiple centers and its lines go from one center to

another (multi-centric organization) (3) Rhizomatic or transversal organization which doesn't depend in any kind of root or point of reference, and its lines aren't drawn between fixed points but go in between (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 2005, 1-26). Before that, in an essay called *Transversality* (1984 (1964)), Guattari distinguishes between three institutional cultures in psychotherapy: first, verticality and being hierarchical which has the voice of authority over patients; second, subjugated horizontality which Guattari describes as "a state of affairs in which things and people fit in as best they can with the situation in which they find themselves" (17), much like the organization culture of contemporary corporation of hypercapitalism; and third, transversality, an in-between state in which the movement between levels occurs and the heterogenous bodies come together in a machinic assemblage through subjectification processes. For Guattari, transversality as a relation can lead to the formation of subject-groups, a collective heterogeneous subject that not only lacks leadership or hegemony, but also is based on difference and liberated desire. He writes:

Transversality in the group is a dimension opposite and complementary to the structures that generate pyramidal hierarchization and sterile ways of transmitting messages. Transversality is the unconscious source of action in the group, going beyond the objective laws on which it is based, carrying the group's desire. (ibid 22)

Arditi sees this transversal rhizomatic organization in the networks of contagion in the Occupy movements where "nodes communicate with another without necessarily passing through a single core or even a series of hubs." Something that, returning to Clausewitz, maximize the capacity of resistance against erasure by the enemy forces, because if the core or multiple hubs are destroyed, the virus continue to follow the path of contagion and affect more and more bodies, forming the dividual patchwork body of the whole movement. Contagion forms "a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits" (D&G-21)

The patchwork body of heterogenous elements, positioned equally in terms of both power and expression, seems to be temporary though, if it does not follow by a constant care and affirmation of the transformative power exists in the performativity of such body. As in the case

of No pasarán in Spanish civil war, we know that in near future, the leader of the nationalist forces would shout that "Hemos pasado" ("We have passed").

To care for the monstrous body of a performative event is an endeavor in time and space, or more exactly, in time-space proper to such a patchwork body. This is the topic of the final chapter.

Chapter Four

Time-Spaces of The Performative Event

5 Chapter Four: Time-Spaces of the Performative Event

5.1 The POV of Time-Spaces

An occupy movement is above all an occupation of time and space by a certain collective body. The difference of occupy movements with previous forms of social protests was exactly a difference in dealing with time and space. As we have seen, two Greek activist-scholars point to this difference about Athens 2011 movement by explaining that “the classic urban tactics of demonstration (marching in a linear fashion, protesting in front of the Parliament, dispersing after the end of the demonstration) or confrontation (like throwing marbles, stones, and molotov cocktails against the police and destroying symbolic targets like banks, multinational commercial chains etc.)” (Kambouri and Hatzopoulos) have been secondary in the performative struggles of anti-austerity protests.

Occupy movements have invented a new form of protest that was processual and durational on one hand, and site-specific on the other hand, as we have explained in the discussion on *Aesthetics* in Chapter 3. They insist on a space, trying to transform and reshape it while being shaped by its dynamics. They subsist in a duration of time, trying to reclaim it in their molding of new subjectivities. And in this time-space, a patchwork monstrous body emerged, breathed and developed until its ultimate disappearance.

In previous chapter, we discussed the patchwork character of collective bodies in a performative event. Therefore, we need to understand the time-space proper to such collective body; a time-space that could host the new body that is not only human, but integrated the elements in its surrounding, a time-space that could explain the contagious relationality exists in the formation of those collective bodies, a time-space in which the affirmative monstrosity lives in.

Time and space cannot and should not be considered as totally separated categories. Earlier in the course of this thesis, it was explained that these are aesthetical categories and as such, social relationalities that form the positions of subjects. An established order (re)territorializes and (re)codes time and space and according to the previous chapter, it inscribes this everyday

reproductive code on the surface of collective bodies, in order to achieve the imagined national collective body. However, when such coding is halted in a performative event, the time-space is becoming deterritorialized, too.

The deterritorialization of time-space in contemporary Occupy Movements that have been revisited in this research have happened in various forms and in response to different local conditions. From a general point of view, they have exhibited a resistance toward modern nation-state conservatism, which is itself a reaction to the untamable constituent power of the heterogenous collective body; a deterritorializing force that evades total control. Thus, “the modernist desire for stability and permanence is one which arises in the midst of a society constantly changing and recreating itself and is a reaction against these conditions” (Burkitt 131). The altermodern desire is not desiring its own blockage, as the modernist desire does by reproducing the State and its conscious agent, the imagined nation. The altermodern desire comes from a patchwork monstrous body that claims its freedom and agency.

On the other hand, there is a globalist tendency, the so-called post-modern globalization that made another effect paradoxical to that desire for stability.

On one hand, as Ian Burkitt argues, social relations are in contemporary times “mediated to such an extent that they becoming fleeting and unspecific to either time or place” and the modernist idea of a self has been transformed to a post-modern “the product of images that are created in the nexus of relations” (132), or as it was discussed through Klossowski in previous chapter, are created as stereotypical images on the surface of collective bodies.

This *unspecificity* to either time and place, being effected in an economy of image production, is already established through a globalized neoliberal economy that not only causes an erasure of public spaces but also performs a constant capture of people’s time with value-creating activities: from freelance, flexible, or in fact timeless jobs that are blurring any former modernist division between labour time and leisure time for the sake of extracting more profit, to entertainment industry that needs people as constant consumers of immense (re)production of entertaining programs on TVs, Internet, Cinemas, theatres, operas, exhibitions, street festivals, paper-back books, eBooks, and many other print and digital media. Entertainment has developed to the point

of turning any politics into an entertainment, as the US 2016 election and its subsequent White House politics have shown an American style of reality TV show as politics.

Apart from these, the post-colonial governments in the Middle Eastern countries have continued, through their modernization aka imitation policies, to homogenize the time-space toward a linear, elitist and suppressive understanding of progress. This is a more important aspect in the occupy movements struggles in those countries, as they have tried to uphold their imagined naturalized homogenous national collective body that was thoroughly explained in the previous chapter. While transforming the imagined exclusionary collective body, those occupy movements had to also transform the social relationality constitutive of such bodily organization, i.e. the *time-space*.

In this chapter, for the sake of a clear analysis, we will focus separately on the time *and* the space of performative events regarding the separate levels of contextual analyses that was mentioned in previous paragraphs, but we will argue for a concept inspired by Bakhtin and Latour, "*kairotope*", that relates these two social relationalities in one mixture.

5.2 Time Wars

Many of people whom I interviewed had one thing in common: the occupy movement marked a turning point in their life and divided it into a *before* and an *after* "the" event. For many of them who stayed a few days or more in the occupation site, their time as an active participant of the movement has been the most "wonderful" experience of their life, and as such, it offered them another sense of perceiving time, *different in nature* from any other time they spent in labour or leisure. The same feeling has always been mentioned regarding other important personal life events, like wedding nights or the days one becomes mother or father.

This *difference in nature* has been a focus of critical thought for a long time; or rather, there has been a war on "time" at least in the modern era. However, as our earlier discussions on time and modernity have shown, this war has been waged in multiple levels.

5.2.1 Dominant Temporality

The war on time challenges its dominant perception and use in different layers. On one hand, there has been an ontological war in a history of conceptualizing time. Critical thinkers go back as far as Ancient Greece to question the Western foundations of perceiving and theorizing time. On the other hand, the critique of capitalism and its system of social relations have made time a focal point of its struggle. Marx relates the production of value directly to a productive time that has been quantified and divided as a measure for value, for he believes that “economy of time, to this all economy ultimately reduces itself” (Grundrisse 173).

Ancient Greek philosophy defined time as a measure, subjected to the space. For Aristotle for example, time was a measure of the quantity of motions, and since there is a multiplicity of motions, there is a multiplicity of time. Time did not have an ontological status to explain in itself the world of motions. Being devoid of the creative power, time became a negative force in Aristotle, as an origin of decay.

Time in and of itself is the origin of decay; time is the number of motion, changing movement however brings that which is towards its collapse. (Physics 221b1–2 qtd. in Murchadha 13)

The time as measure for movement was defined based on space, both extensive quantities dividable into measurable units.⁶¹ Xenon’s paradox was a product of such an image of thought: a maximum subordination of time to space.

In their search for an ultimate criterion or standard for measuring all motions against it, the ancients also conceptualized an ideal, absolute motion. In “Timaeus” (360 BC), Plato dramatizes this perception of time. There, the character of Timaeus of Locri describes the World Soul as two crossing circles: the outer circle, to which the primacy is given, is the circle of the Sameness, undivided, motionless and unchangeable; the inner circle, the circle of Difference is divided into seven circles that are in motion with either equal speeds or constant relative speeds. The circle of Difference consists of heavenly bodies and it functions as the measure of all other motions, as

⁶¹ See the discussion on Time in Chapter One, the section on Modernity.

it is eternal and infinite, immutable and permanent. In this Platonic schema, time is in time-less subjection to *eternity* as “originary time”.

Interestingly enough, Timaeus dialogue discusses cosmology and time in order to finally define the “good polis”, the place of ideal Platonic politics. Here, it starts with the principle “the relation of being to becoming is of truth to belief”, follows with the definition of time as “the moving image of eternity” and of eternity as the being *immune to becoming*. The eternal truth then is immutable, too, and it functions as the foundation of Platonic “good polis”. This is an eventless time, as Negri argues:

[In classical thought] time is the mobile image of the immobility of being. In this tradition, time is thus an extrinsic modality: it presents itself as illusion or as a measure, never as event, never as a this here. (Time for Revolution 148)

This conception of time serves the conservative war against *contingency*. The claim on universal and eternal truths has continued well into the contemporary world, especially with its corresponding perception of time as measure in the modern era, and a continuity and reversal in the direction of spatialization of time. However, one should be careful not to presuppose a linear historical continuity between the ancients and the moderns, which will be a trap of the same perception of time we are criticizing. As Antonio Negri writes,

It is true, in antiquity we have absolute (Plato), relative (Atomists) and hybrid (Aristotle) theories of time, but they should not be confused with the absolute (Newton), relative (Einstein) or hybrid theories of modernity, because the epistemological framework has been completely modified. (ibid 101).

One phantasm, a dominance of one impulsive force, has nonetheless continued between these two separate epistemological frameworks: the war against contingency.

The dominant temporality, as critical thought has formulated, resulted from an attempt to do away with contingency. In modern times, this amounts to the nationalist projects of nation-state making and of eugenical policies toward the biopolitical ideal of the homogenous body, as we discussed in previous chapter.

As Manuel De Landa's etymology of contingency shows, it is composed of two elements, "con-" meaning together (con-, another form of com, as in common) and "tangere-", that is "to touch": "contingency brings togetherness and body or sensation into the time: a paradigm of time which includes contingency in itself implies collectivity."

We have argued in previous chapter that the linking in a collective body is contingent, as it comes through affect and affection relationality, a togetherness of touches. The contingency in time breaks down the nationalist modernization agenda based on a mythological origin for a homogenous body in a path of so-called *progress*.

To avoid contingency, time had to be fully determined. And a full determination of time meant adopting a linear perception, where what has been actualized is all that is real, and the future is built on this totally determined time as past. In Manuel De Landa's words,

with the final mathematization of classical physics in the nineteenth century, a certain dominant picture of the world emerged, in which clockwork determinism reigned supreme and time played no creative role, so that the future was effectively closed, completely given in the past. (Deleuze, *Diagrams and the Open-Ended* 29)

This *chronological* view of time presents a line of succession between past, present and future, where time is still thought as "spatial segmentations of a continuum that are themselves immobile" (Rodowick 81). The Newtonian conception of time, very much a Kantian one, bestowed an independence to time (being considered by the variable of t in mathematical equations for mechanics), but it still kept it as a dividable quantity that functions as a measure of movement. As De Landa states, "time-variable refers to a simple instant or a chronologic period of time (not duration), always divides time into measurable segments of three distinct respective qualities: past, present, and future." (Deleuze, *Diagrams ...* 29)

This was the dominant empirical as well as transcendental form of time; the one that "is always already determined" and "is given either as calculated intervals of movement or as a whole expanding through differentiation and integration toward an image of sublime totality." (ibid)

Regarding this conception that became dominant in the modern empirical sciences, critiques point to a synthesis between the ancients and the moderns, or Greek and Christian traditions. Casarino for instance defines dominant temporality as “the unhappy offspring of the arranged marriage between, on the one hand, the circular and cyclical time of Greco-Roman antiquity, and, on the other hand, the continuous and linear time of Christianity” and cites Aristotle and Hegel as the two main figures of such conception. (Time Matters 220)

For Hegel, “time ... is the thing existing which is not when it is, and is when it is not”; a definition that witnesses to the conception of time as homogeneous and quantifiable succession of instants where the present instant is past as it happens and leads to the future as it perishes, finding “its realization and fulfillment only in the next instant ... as it negates itself.” (Casarino 237) This is the temporality of progress, as we have already explained in second chapter. Here time is given in the form “of measure and accountability, of command and function”. (Negri, 48)

The ideology of progress wants to turn time into a measurable quantity in order to quantify and evaluate labor. As Casarino points to, Hegelian definition of time bears similarity to Marx’s definition of money, as which is not when it is, and is when it is not. Hence the famous motto of capitalist societies: time is money. As such, time becomes the temporality of money-circulation and does not have any creative power to introduce the new – the time of *reproduction*. Instead, it becomes a temporality of debt, since “such a process of circulation leads to a society ruled by debt and to a definition of the human as always already indebted” (244). The occupiers in Athen’s square were reclaiming their time to fight the imposed definition of being indebted.

The previous chapter started with a reference to another occupy movement: OWS protestors who sealed their mouth with dollar notes, arguing how body has become a living currency. The dominant temporality of money-circulation affects body toward such a function. If capital is a social relation, time of circulation is an element of its social relationality, and as an atomized chain of fleeting instants proper to the system of wage labour, it contributes to the dominant individuality. In Negri’s words:

Extraction of relative surplus value is not just about the division of the worker's working day between the necessary labour part and the surplus labour part: it also revolutionizes from top to bottom both the technical processes of labour and the social groupings. (Marx and Foucault 18)

The time of wage labour is also the time of discipline, or as Michael Hardt calls it, "prison time", since modernist definition of freedom is the control over one's time, and many avant-garde art strategies has also shown a focus on the leisure as creativity against the reproductive function of labour time:

Prison takes our time in precisely determined quantities. Like the equations between labor-time and value, our society sets up an elaborate calculus familiar to all of us between crime and prison-time. Theft of a car equals six months; sale of illegal drugs equals five years; murder equals ten years (Prison Time).

Such a temporality is thus of inscribing the code of the everyday signs on the body⁶². Therefore, the everyday itself had to become an empty repetition of quantifiable time-units. As Susan Stewart describes it,

temporality of everyday life is marked by an irony which is its own creation, for this temporality is held to be ongoing and non-reversible and, at the same time characterized by repetition and predictability. (On Longing 14)

The inscription of the machinic code on body, including the dominant temporal codification, brings out a memory of a conscious agent (as we remember from the previous chapter, a memory of bodily technics, discursive abilities, and so on) through which bodies are inserted into the socius. Deleuze and Guattari consider this memory as the necessary condition of "synergy of man and his technical machines", and clock as a social machine to effect such a code, "as a technical machine for measuring uniform time, and as a social machine for reproducing canonic hours and for assuring order in the city." (Anti-Oedipus 155)

As an element of social relationality, temporality is then always political. Therefore, the modern state attempted to regulate the temporality of the social in line with regulation of bodies and

⁶² See chapter three.

space to ensure a certain vertical, hierarchical economy of power, value and desire. According to Antonio Negri, the central Hobbesian condition of establishing the state is the condition of “organization and of command over the time of life”. (Time for Revolution 83)

“Power in our society is above all power over our time” (Hardt, Prison Time 65), each in its own singular context, and “is invested directly into time as a series of disciplines, regimentations, orderings” (ibid 64). The command over the time of life turns everyday time as one that when is spent, it seems to “have no duration, no substance because of ... the homogeneity, the lack of novelty” (ibid 65).

But the contemporary transformations in the regime of production and the immaterialization of labour have had certain consequences on the understanding of time as well. Putting the cognitive and immaterial faculties of human beings at the center of production, the globalized capitalism gives a certain autonomy to labour force, deterritorializes disciplinary borders limiting the creative potentialities, and unleashes a source of cooperation and collective construction. Calling the workers of late capitalism as “social workers”, Negri recognizes the temporality of their labour as both a means of subjection and a potentiality for liberation – one is the temporality of the machinic enslavement and the other is the temporality of the machinic assemblages in a revolutionary machine:

The time of the social worker presents itself here as a relation between expansive times, as a relation between different but concurrent velocities. The relation of diverse times has two fundamental aspects: the first is that which is taken up by the assemblages of struggle and recomposition under the sign of the conditions of exploitation and of its asymmetrical effects; the second is that of individual liberation, of collective constitution and of the corporeality of the associative and co-operative relations. (Time for Revolution 104)

Thus, contemporary capitalism’s apparent paradox is its subsequent attempt to reterritorialize all the created value inside the territory of capital. Negri summarizes this paradox in what he considers as the capitalist thermodynamics of society:

The process has three fundamental characteristics: it must be endogenous to the system; it must be continuously productive of functions and systemic innovations; and it must reach equilibrium (ibid 49).

We already discussed the fallacies of a thermodynamics of equilibrium, arguing in favor of a thermodynamics far from equilibrium that can register the performative, virtual forces of transformation, preceding the actualized products of performativizations (see Chapter One 41). The total control and management of time is not possible. The creative time flashes itself out in performative events, even if as transitory as a lightning. According Casarino, the Aristotelian-Hegelian enslavement of time to space formed the dominant temporality of modern nation-states in order “to neutralize time’s most fructiferous and disquieting aspects.” (225)

That is why reclaiming time becomes a critical point for revolutionary projects. For Lazzarato, “the big problem, clearly, is the political struggle with respect to time: the plasticity of the political” (Grasping the Political 12); a plasticity that breaks down the naturalized hierarchy in national collective body and creates the altermodern patchwork body; a plasticity that destroys the prison time, the temporality that “lies at the heart of our social order” (Hardt, Prison Time 64), as the necessary condition for altermodernities to come.

If the empty time imprisons us, then a revolutionary project should consist of the constitution of a new time, “a new rhythm of living”, and this is a transformation that is “both material and immaterial” (ibid 64), that is *performative*. Or as Agamben would say, “the original task of a genuine revolution, therefore, is never merely to 'change the world' but also – and above all – to ‘change time’.” (Infancy and History 91)

To put it more exactly, it is a war on time as we started this chapter with. It is an attempt to construct a new paradigm of temporality, one that accounts for the becomings, the creative power of time and its ontogenetical status. A temporality that affirms the singularity of each moment, and the novelty for everyday life:

We can only experience time become homogeneous and without qualities while staring at the clock in endless expectation. As our time is apportioned, it becomes all too easy to forget that this

moment is unlike any other and will never return – experience is thereby atomized and put out of reach as even time is commodified by the measure of the hourly wage (Tepper).

Following previous discussions in previous chapter, *to experience is to experiment*, it is the moment that the code of the everyday signs becomes defunct and the monstrous body is breeding in the chaos of liberated social relations. Therefore, we are seeking the time of the performative event.

5.2.2 Time of the Performative Event: A Return to the Future

The present instant is not a spatialized immobile unit in a sequence of such interchangeable, homogenous units. Indeed, as Rodowick reminds us through Deleuze, “closer attention to the present shows that there is real movement, a movement of becoming which is the pure form of time as change.” For Deleuze, the present splits into two heterogenous direction, past and future.

In his video installation series titled “Time Machine!” (2002-2004), Japanese Artist, Masayuki Akamatsu, tried to capture the split in each moment of time: the split of the past and the future in the present. Using a sophisticated video processing program, Akamatsu placed a DV camera in front to record the live image of a visitor, and then the digitally mutated and transformed image was projected on a screen facing the visitor. Using a jog wheel controller that allows them to jog through video media, visitors could interact with the installation and modify the projected image. Each movement of visitor’s body was projected with a delay and the delayed image also contained virtual multiplication of that movement in various spaces of the surface. The digitalized projected video included even other directions of the same movements. Visitors could see an image either from an immediately past moment, coming into even farther past and including “other people who might have been there together with them” (Ars Electronica 2004), or returning to the present moment, as if returning into its future (see Murray). Even in the present image, the multiplication of the body movements into different directions and spaces of the surface made one think as if some potentialities of the present had been activated in an obscure future which was yet to come.

In other words, the act of “returning to the future” had been happening in each present moment of the projected image by splitting the present image into two immanent directions so that the temporality of the image was an immanence of the past, the present, and the future in relation to each other. “[Time] has to split the present in two heterogenous directions”, writes Deleuze, “one of them is launched toward the future while the other falls into the past.” (Cinema 2: The Time-Image 81)

Timelessness, the quality of being immeasurable, then, is the state of time in such a split moment. This unique temporality of a return to the future in the present is the temporality of an event.

“Who would have believed it! / we are told that new Joshuas at the foot of every tower, / as though irritated with / time itself, fired at the dials / in order to stop the day.” (On the Concept of History, Thesis XV)

This poem, as Walter Benjamin recounts the event, was written by an eye-witness of French Revolution of July 1830, where the clocks in the towers of Paris were being fired on in several places simultaneously, but as a result of separate initiatives; as if time was irritating, as if day had to be stopped.

Just like the drama Benjamin presents about the temporality of a revolution, an event causes an interruption in the existing dominant time of the situation. “At that moment, there is a stop, a suspension”, writes Blanchot, “history is interrupted” (Disorderly Words 205). We will return to this discussion.

The interruption, as it was discussed in previous chapters, comes with a performative event. According to our discussion in Chapter Three, the performative event is as an aesthetic-political happening. In other words, according to Whitehead for example, each event is aesthetical when it works on time/space, folds onto them and folds them; and it is also political, because of the participation, or partaking of bodies in these time/space relations, transforming them and being transformed by them.

Event is relational, too. It acts on the relations between different elements inside it, for example between participating bodies or on the current spatio-temporal relations. It is, as James puts it,

an economy of process full of both oneness and manyness. In a political reformulation, for example, indigenous Zapatista movement in Mexico has expressed its desire of transforming the existing reality in this slogan: "A world in which many worlds fit" (Conant). This relation between oneness and manyness, or the One and the multiple makes a distinction, as we will see, between two kinds of "return to the future".

The interruption of the time is nevertheless ambivalent, for it can present at least two relations between the past, the present, and the future, correspondingly to two distinct conceptions of the One and the Many.

Alain Badiou, for instance, interprets this interruption as a will to future. "What will come to be" is the time of event, because for him the event is the process of unveiling truth (identified with Lacan's the real) from beneath the covers of already-established symbolic order and is therefore, "decoupled" from existing temporal relations. Therefore, the past as the determined or the old is completely subtracted from the present and only a "will have been", a future perfect for signifying the break as completed, will remain to embrace the new.

But the old will eventually prevail again, if a fidelity to the truth does not exist. It is not a fidelity to an ahistorical truth such as an essence or a bureaucratic State after a revolution that would turn it into a fidelity to the old. Rather, it is a fidelity to a historically determined truth of a situation, to the possibility of the impossible. In this way, it does not have any actual object; on the contrary, it is a fidelity to the fidelity itself.

Therefore, there is indeed a "return to the future" in Badiou's event; a future of truth which is still to come. But one should be careful that, as Homi Bhabha warns, sometimes in a situation, "in order to maintain consistency, events are constantly re-enunciated, new pasts constantly drawn to justify the changing image of the present: cultural reinscription thus 'moves back to the future' by means of projective pasts which activate new histories." (Monaldi 27) If the past is completely subtracted from the temporality of the event, if event is actually a "radically new beginning" as Badiou puts it, then how could one recognize, and thus evade from, a repetition of the old?

5.2.2.1 Multiplicity without One

Badiou's conception of timelessness of event corresponds to his ontological claim that being is multiple. Then, any presence of the One amounts to a totalitarian reduction of the multiple into a false Whole. Therefore, Badiou has to found the Being on the void, rather than on a full, positive Being. The set theory gives him a proper tool, in which on one hand, all sets derive from the empty set, the subset of every set, and on the other hand, the size of each set is defined by counting of elements in it. The cardinality or the number is the proper expression of multiplicity, Badiou believes, for "multiplicity must be pure quantity (no quality) if it is to generate the paradoxes that condition the possibility of an event; and it must be homogenous and empty if it is to be the basis for a truly universalist politics" (Mullarkey 171). Set theory is then the language of ontology.

Being speculated on such ontology, reality is thus a human situation as a set, which has a State, and the membership operation in it signifies the existence of something and the subset operation expresses the representation of the member by the State. If an element belongs to a set, but is not its subset, then it is not represented by the State; it is a singularity, a carrier of truth – which is not representational and functions as a void in the symbolic order – that event gives it visibility and countability, and it becomes a subject of the event, faithful to its truth. On the other hand, truth should itself be declared and named by the subject, and therefore, the individuated and individual subject and Truth come out together in an event. So, the event is a transformation of numerical, quantitative relations between elements in a way that everybody is counted, and there exists a pure indifference to any qualitative difference: an affirmation of the pure multiple, outside of any logic of the One. From this viewpoint, event is an interruption of time, but as the qualitative differences are cancelled, the temporality as such does not exist: it is the time of the infinite.

5.2.2.2 The Multiple One

But event can be timeless from a different point of view. As we said, an event for Benjamin is an interruption of time, an "explosion of the continuum of history" (Thesis XV). This interruption

comes in a form of a singular *jetztzeit*, a *Kairos* (or *Cairós* or *Aion*), a star in a constellation of the history, whereas history is often written to emphasize the linear *Chronos*, the teleological time of sciences that is based on the idea of progress. But ontologically, what is constituent of being in time is not the chronological time, for “history is the object of a construction whose place is formed not in homogenous and empty time, but in that which is fulfilled by the here-and-now” (On the Concept of History, Thesis XIV). *Jetztzeit* is measureless and uncountable; and since it is constituent of historical situations, then ontologically a situation cannot be defined by quantitative multiplicities of a set. Rather than forming a void in the situation as Badiou would say, interruption of an event is therefore the actualization of a potentiality in the past, of a singularity-star. It intervenes as constituted power, destroying the already actual constituted Power of the situation, the whole system of counting and numbers.

Badiou’s quantitative perspective on multiplicity renders his conception of time closer to the capitalist time, however with a more Platonic tone through his notion of absolute truth. For Badiou, event becomes an intrusion of Platonic transcendental time, *the immobile eternity, the immutable Truth that stands above the immanence*, into the current order of the things, which – according to him – is the field of bodies and languages.

Badiou’s claim that there is a truth versus bodies and languages based on a presupposition: “there are only bodies and languages. This statement is the axiom of contemporary conviction.” (Bodies, Languages Truths) He ascribes this axiom to the contemporary thought, mostly to the tradition that this research draws from, which itself is too heterogenous to be totalized in such an axiom. However, there is another presupposition inherent in that presupposition: a duality between bodies and languages. As we have already discussed thoroughly in previous chapter, there is a productive relation between the performative-affective-bodily sign *and* the linguistic sign, latter as the product of the former. We also discussed how *truth* emerges out of a certain organization of impulsive forces. Ignoring this dynamic, the immobile eternity becomes the time of Badiou’s truth, and political liberation happens in an incessant segmentation of existing time with the negative edge of eternity’s blade, cutting through the imagined homogenous surface of bodies and languages. For Badiou, truth functions as “a faithful reflection of a static world of beings” (De Landa 31).

But does Benjamin's *Jetztzeit* capture this dynamic, or is it a single instant in a chain of eternal repetition of empty spatialized temporal units? If *Jetztzeit* is a fulfillment of a past potentiality, what is a return to the future? For more on this, we take a closer look at the concept of *Kairos*.

5.2.2.3 Kairos

If there is always a war between the constituent power and its constituted possibilities, then *kairos* is the moment that the constituent power reveals the potentiality beyond the existing order, waging a new war toward it. It is an opening toward an alternative temporality that is often met with police brutality, military oppression, and all other means of State's exclusive law-protecting violence that aims to close it up again.

Reinhart Koselleck reads *Kairos* besides crisis. It is the moment of a "crisis refers both to the observable condition and to the judgment (judicium) about the course of the illness. At such a time, it will be determined whether the patient will live or die" (qtd. in Alloa 201). This critical moment of determination, of war, is charged with another future: a future not already determined by the existing order.

For Saint Paul, *Kairos* is the moment of deciding the faith. According to his perspective, Murchadha explains, "*Kairos* is not 'contained' in the future; rather it is the moment (*Augenblick*) between past and future; it is the temporal dimension of decision" in which "the decision of faith is already living." (14) Paul used the term *Kairos* as the messianic time extending from the event of Resurrection, calling for a new future in terms of a new dividing line. Paul, a Jewish and a Roman citizen, declares that the line is not any more between Jewish and Roman people, or any other ethnicity or religion, but between those who believe in Jesus and those who not (see Badiou, Saint Paul). He brings the past as a whole to the presence for a future already virtually there. A new plane of immanency for a new war, a new history, and a new temporality.

Origen also uses *Kairos* as that moment when the prophecy is fulfilled, and a new period begins: not so far from the moment of *revolution* in its old use in astronomy.

Time, on the scale of days, is thoroughly homogenized by and on the model of the clock and natural time, while on the scale of years and ages ... there remain traces of a qualitative experience of time – in holidays – the repetition of which was, in fact, an archaic signification of the word “revolution.” (Tepper 5)

The same moment happened in Laylat al-Qadr (ليلة القدر) when Quran was first revealed to Muhammad, and the prophecy was fulfilled. But al-Qadr (القدر) also means literally measure, and comes from the same root with the words power, value, decree, and destiny. In that night, a new line was drawn that was rooted in the Kairos of revealing the power that decrees, evaluates, and makes things anew by ascribing a new destiny through a new war. The Quran says: “O’ Humanity! Without doubt We have created you from a male and a female and have made you into various nations and tribes, so that you may come to know and understand one another. Definitely the most honoured among you in the sight of Allah is the one who is the most Allah-Consciousness”. Drawing the new line between those who are conscious of Allah and who are not, Quran mostly addresses those who have faith [يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا] as its audience. It is the difference that makes the people of a new future.

The problem is that such a transcendent kairos bring eschatology into time. It truly interrupts the chronological understanding of time, that time subjected to the natural movement of heavenly bodies, and brings the past and future into the present, but it homogenized time as a whole by subjugating it to the transcendent. No more heterogeneity is allowed in the course of time, even though the new time is itself founded on heterogeneity. That is why when religion became an institution, its civil war was appropriated by the State-form entities – the disaster that plagues the post Arab Spring societies.

A critical re-evaluation of the time of event in Badiou and Benjamin opens a way toward another conception of Kairos, one that liberates it from the theological-teleological transcendent implications.

5.2.2.4 Kairos and The Open Future

Badiou maintains that an event witnesses to an unfulfilled past and an undetermined future. From this perspective, he criticizes those views on occupy movements that analyze them as an expression of a will to European liberal values, arguing that it is self-paradoxical if future of a revolutionary movement were already determined and thus foreseeable. There is simply nothing new in what has been already established.

Nonetheless, his theory does not live up to this claim. According to the aforementioned discussion, Badiou's theory of the new rests on the operation of subtraction: the determined past is subtracted from the present and only a "will have been", a future perfect for signifying the break as completed, will remain to embrace the new. The future is not an open whole, but a subtraction of past from present with the blade of eternal truth. Investing on the negative through subtraction, such a theory does not explain the creative power of time and the *to-come*. It does not recognize a definition of time as affirmative becoming. And it does not explain how an alternative temporality could emerge.

As it was discussed before, Badiou considers kairos in a heterogenous plane regarding bodies and languages, which for him form the homogenous plane of logos – the realm of the law, order and authority. But as Rowan Tepper explains, the relation between kairos to logos is not a matter of contrast, but a temporalization of a formerly presupposed eternal logos in the unique moment of Kairos, or as De Landa would say, a *plasticization* of the political, revealing that no single actualization of an idea in logos (as the plane of representation) exhausts totally its performative and virtual forces.

This becoming-temporal and becoming-contingent of the eternal, unconditional logos within Kairos is not merely the truth of time or a historical category, but it is the moment in which time becomes history (Tepper 7)

The linguistic signs are frozen performative signs of bodies. Logos in the moment of Kairos goes back to the its level of affective and bodily ontogenesis, open to transformation, decoding and deterritorialization.

On the other hand, a problem of Benjaminian *Jetztzeit*, Negri argues, is that it describes only the current temporality of capitalism.

Capital not only presents itself as measure and as system, it presents itself as progress ... political economy is entirely directed towards drawing the innovative element that history - in any case - produces into the time of administration (accumulation like administration, reversible time, eternal return, and cyclical-ness). Now-time, innovative precision, utopia: capital considers them as its own. Progress is the eternal return lit-up by a flash of a now-time (Time for Revolution 110).

According to Negri, Benjaminian *Jetztzeit* remains a form of time-as-measure and does not capture the gradual temporality of the constituent power; the processual *franchissement* of limits of being that for Negri happens at the *arrow of time*, another meaning of *Kairos*, always toward an open future. In other words, “after its sudden, glorious, and only too episodic flare— [Jetztzeit] is retranslated into quantified and measured time, and hence flattened back into the relentless march of progress precisely because it was only a flash” (Casarino 234)

In Benjamin, *Kairos* thus becomes a momentary flash, a shining star of eternal truth, that forms an alternative history in a constellation of stars. There are after all similarities between the immobility of such constellation as the *measure* of history’s suppressed truth and Plato’s eternity of heavenly bodies. Moreover, *Jetztzeit* does not have any duration: it is an insurrectional time that either functions as a hiatus to the dominant temporality or its exaltation with an *innovative* moment.

On the other hand, *Kairos* is an actualization of a potential unrealized in the past. Although that potential was a promise for an alternative future, Benjaminian’s *Kairos* – without including the dimension of duration – is an immanence of present in the past, keeping future closed, as its designated name, *Jetztzeit*, speaks for it.

Referring to Benjamin’s dramatization of time with the figure of *Angelus Novus*, Negri sides with the open future:

Matter discovers its hardness there where temporality decides of being, to create new being at the edge of time, in defiance of the immeasurable that exists between the before and after... Here

is where the Angelas Novas is also presented to us: the angel does not look back, but ahead, proceeding in the storm (Time For Revolution 180).

In this research, one position has been reaffirmed constantly: static elements, above all State, are a product of a process of becoming, of virtual forces and performative transformative power. The time of the performative event, its Kairos, should attest to such a conception of time. As Negri asserts, "any correct phenomenology of the events gathered ... shows us that at this level mobility, asymmetry, irreversibility - a multiversal horizon - are already given due to the liberation of ontological time itself."

Both Badiou and Benjamin have been criticized for their anthropocentric thought, which cannot explain such a "multiversal horizon", traversing the human and the inhuman, the animate and the inanimate in a network that circulates and sustains life force. In other words, they could not challenge the hierarchy of Being, established in the Western thought. We have discussed through the patchwork collective bodies of occupy movements that non-human elements are as much in the network of life forces as human bodies. An anthropocentric thought, even if it criticizes those discourses that presupposes a human essence and thus, universal human values, as both Benjamin and Badiou have done partially, falls nonetheless in the trap of human essentialism. And when essence exists, future is already defined by essential potentialities.

The notion of government of things was suggested to do away with the essentialist anthropocentric view and the object-subject divide. This non-essentialist paradigm contributes to an understanding of an open future that exists in the tradition of thought this research inspires most from: the Spinozist thinking of immanence.

To open the world is to reject essentialism: if essence existed, the past would be eternity and the future already defined by the always the same essences. Therefore, if essences are non-existent, objects cannot be objects as defined by the long tradition of philosophy. That is why Deleuze says "I don't believe in objects" (De Landa 31).

Disbelief in object is an affirmation of those virtual processes that actualize in a certain time and space, but not exhausted by that actualization. In other words, it argues for a processual genesis of form, an ontogenesis by constituent power that creates the being, where this power is the

performative interplay of difference of intensities. De Landa argues that a theory of the genesis of form could be built “on the basis of processes of becoming driven by intensity differences” (21) and prioritizes what has been called performativization in this research:

most of the important philosophical insights can be grasped only during the process of morphogenesis, that is, before the final form is actualized, before the difference disappears (32).

Difference is the becoming through which experience (of a *Versucher*) takes shape: performativization is above all differentiation. And the “world” it aims to create is a different world: not different in degrees but different *in nature*. Such a project entails a total reconceptualization of time in a way that an open future could be re-affirmed.

5.2.2.5 Kairos and Hiatus

The performative event, as we argued before, comes with the interruption of the code that paves the way for the construction of the patchwork body and a reimagination of time-space. Event’s hiatus stops the time and implodes the linear temporality of progress. In Murchadha’s words, “chronology forms a continuity, a continuity which is suspended in the kairological moment.” (15)

Therefore, Kairos and Chronos are *different in nature*⁶³ or as Hippocrates states, “chronos is that in which there is kairos and kairos is that in which there is little Chronos.” (qtd. in Agamben, *The Time That Remains* 65)

This is the same break of the performative event we have discussed in previous chapters, a Foucauldian *dassujettissement* (desubjectification) that signifies a break on that reproduction and paves way for the miraculous production, the creativity of the poor.

⁶³ Rowan Tepper traces the difference between Chronos and kairos in two German words *Moment* and *Augenblick*: “we generally see spatial metaphors, numerical and quantitative measure, and homogeneity/interchangeability associated with one word/concept (Chronos), while we encounter nonspatial (re-)presentations, intensive, qualitatively distinctions between times, as well as a heterogeneity that makes each moment or time unique and irreplaceable, associated with the other (kairos)”. (p1)

What is being stopped when dominant temporality stops? As for the body, its surface is flooded by stereotypes (frozen simulacra, resulting from phantasms) that the dominant hierarchy of forces, *the constituted power*, has produced and is reproducing through the conscious agent as its mediator. We referred to Wilhelm Reich's notion of *body armor* that seals the individualized body and shields it from the flows of impulsive forces and the contagious affectivity of experimentation (which for him, like the idea of philosopher-Versucher that Nietzsche uses to refer to experimentation, has an erotic meaning). It is interesting that Kairos for Homer means "a part of the body, which is particularly vulnerable, due to a gap in the armour plating of a warrior. In battle, it is a particular success to hit that point with a spear". (Murchadha 14) Being the moment of hiatus and rupture, Kairos creates that gap on the armor plating, make it possible to attack the gregariousness. Thus, desubjectification that comes with hiatus puts a stop on power's grip on body.

Dominant temporality, the prison time of capitalism is the measure of power, as discussed. Time is structured as if, Michael Hardt writes, "all is planned in advance by a higher power" which is why he also warns that "once a sovereign power has our time it is loath to let it go". (Hardt, Prison Time 65) Kairos of the performative event liberates time from the inflexible grip of constituted power. It is "the moment of decision, in which the standards of the past are no longer in force" (Murchadha 15).

Since the established norms and the code of the everyday are *no longer in force* in the performative event, its kairological time frees itself from subjection. It becomes an unconditioned time, an openness toward the new. According to Paul Tillich, "a moment of time, an event, deserves the name of Kairos, fullness of time in the precise sense, if it can be regarded in its relation to the Unconditioned, if it speaks of the Unconditioned, and if to speak of it is at the same time to speak of the Unconditioned." (The Interpretation of History 82) Thus, Kairos as the moment of fullness of time is the momentary point of contact between the temporal-conditional and the eternal-unconditional. Time becomes a performative social relation, freed from fixed points, flowing in-between bodies. But as this very argument shows, since the established norms are context-specific, therefore the emergence of Kairos – not itself – is

conditioned by the history in which it emerges. That is to say Kairos is a situated rupture and it is as historical as it forms the very possibility of another history.

The power of forgetting, which Nietzsche considers contrary to gregariousness, emerges in such a moment of hiatus. In other words, Kairos is the moment that the memory fashioned by society for the sake of a continuous reproduction, forming through a machinic assemblage with the clock as a technical machine, is lost. In Kairos, “there occurs a forgetting of Chronos”.

Therefore, Kairos is a moment of intensity, where intensity, as Klossowski explains, attacks the gregarious and creates a singular state⁶⁴:

depending on the strength of its intensity, however, this singular state, though anachronistic in relation to the institutional level of gregariousness, can bring about a de-actualization of that institution itself and denounce it in turn as anachronistic. (Vicious Circle 80)

For Klossowski, following Nietzsche, this is an anachronistic moment as it brings with itself the future into the presence. It is as well a contemporary moment, because it bestows the present moment its fullness, its fulfillment: it is no more an empty moment in the succession of the same⁶⁵. And with bringing the future into the presence, it effects a deactualization of institution “following a circuit of chance that Nietzsche will make the dimension of his thought” (ibid 64). Chance is the affirmation of contingency, of the untamable character of constituent time.

As we remember from the previous chapter, the bodily mode of aesthesis opens up to the world in this moment – which we call Kairos now. In other words, Kairos opens a horizon of affectivity and an environment suitable for contagion. That is why Murchadha argues that in such a moment, “mood swings between hope and despair, Angst and joy” (8), which according to our terminology, refers to two general affects in Spinoza, the happy affect of active forces or the sad affect of reactive forces.

⁶⁴ See chapter four

⁶⁵ Giorgio Agamben defines “becoming contemporary” in Nietzsche as the ability to see the invisible light of the future; in other words, training and creating a *new eye* that can see the *unseeable*, the virtual forces that are present yet not actualized and bear a promise of *to-come*. (“What is the Contemporary?” in *What is Apparatus and Other Essays*; Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009, 39 – 56.

Thus, this has problematic aspects: when time stops and the established order's coding is discontinued, the *crisis* begins, and chaos of a signification liberated from the Master Signifier can both lead to better or to worse:

Danger arises from the discontinuity which characterizes the Kairos... The moment ... can bring about a new beginning, but can equally lead to catastrophe. This is the kairological situation of revolutionary action: to enter a new order, to take part in a revolution, can lead to happiness and peace, but also to disappointment and war (Murchadha 15).

In post-Arab Spring Middle East, both of these aspects came into existence: on one hand, it directed history toward altermodernities, as in the case of Kurdish movement, brought the future into the present, and made a world fit to the contemporary thought; on the other hand, it brought war and destruction, labour slavery in Libya and sexual slavery in Syria, as it went to the darkest ruins of the past. A stateless monster unleashed to claim the right of the aboriginal and a State monster appeared to homogenize an entire Levant for a new nation-state in an old form.

This does not represent a contradiction. On the contrary, it reaffirms the productive, ontological relation between a kairological temporality, where time retains its transformative power in form of becoming, and a "Kairos subsequently integrated into chronos" (Murchadha 16), recaptured by the continuity of time of progress.

Although chronos is the quantified unit of time, it is just a moment like any other moments. As Hardt dramatizes it, hours and days of the chronological time resemble different points on an accordion. As much as they can *extend*, they can also fall back onto each other, as no differentiation exists between them, no intensity-difference as De Landa says. Therefore, it is only Kairos that "counts". It is the fulfilled moment, the full moment, the moment that marks a differentiation. And that is why it explodes the continuity of dominant temporality as the reproduction of empty, unfulfilled moments.

But each moment is singular, if lived fully. And through this conception of time, the everyday can be imagined differently, not as an empty repetition of a certain routine, but as a true experience of life – an experience of the everyday that the occupiers in various movements across the world has been talking about. This was an important part of Avant-garde art struggle against the

established order too, because as Rowan Tepper writes, “as our time is apportioned, it becomes all too easy to forget that this moment is unlike any other and will never return”

5.2.2.6 Kairos and Everyday

Negri’s critique of Benjamin shows that an instantaneous break in time(-space), without a constituent aspect of restructuring temporality(-spatiality), can be well integrated into the dominant temporality, or suggests a mystical and mystifying reading of reality that aligns with the already produced imagination – the phantasms and stereotypes attached themselves to the hierarchical body⁶⁶.

Entertainment business and modern arts both used such a technic of alienating by making dominant temporality (the segmented, quantified labour time) stop. As leisure time starts, the imaginary rules the bodily perception of time. The modern theatre, for instance, presents an invitation to a new temporality that is set in motion by designating a special space to the theatre. Has it been a break from the dominant temporality or its imaginary reinforcement? A time disconnected from the daily life, sure, but as a time that was part of an economy of reproduction. And in the colonized countries, imaginary extension of colonial cultural dominancy.

The occupation movements did not aim to set a stage in contrast to the daily life; on the contrary, they stayed there in order to create an alternative daily life, a daily life in which one controls its own time. The time of the daily life is managed differently. All the little things, cooking, cleaning, discussing, voting, following news, taking photos and videos with smart phones, all were done in a way that seemed to be miraculous and graceful even if they looked trivial before, a waste of time. A “wonderful” time, with each moment pregnant with a new experience of the daily life, because it was done in a self-organized, collective way, without the presupposed necessary patronizing role of the state and the outsourcing of power to it that has been said to be necessary.

As Murchadha shows by tracing the notion of kairos in religious rituals and rites, “kairos is not to be confined only to world-changing events, but rather is constitutive of belonging to a

⁶⁶ For more information on this discussion, see chapter three.

community, indeed to a historical people.” (16) Indeed, this is the temporality of Carmelo Bene’s imagined popular theatre. Bene, who believed “the people are missing”, considered popular theater a theater that “does not represent the people; rather it anticipates a people who may not yet exist and whom the theater must help bring into existence” (Rodowick 141). Such a kairological time cannot be only a flash of discontinuity in chronological time. It also consists of a duration, a longevity proper to a process of constitution. Because change comes in the process, in the duration of an event. As Tillich argues, Kairos makes philosophy to deal with history, “not in terms of its logical and categorical structures only, but also in terms of its dynamics” and it points to “a new understanding of the meaning of history and life.” (Tillich, Systematic Theology 369)

If Kairos is the moment of a people’s formation, then its hiatus is related to what we have called in chapter three *a machinic exodus*. Exodus, as we argued, was not only a negation of established relations of production, but also an attempt to create a new sociality, a new conception of time-space as social relationality. Kairos represents the moment of exodus, when the prophecy has been fulfilled for Moses in the action of taking the suppressed slaves out of Egypt and starting a process that a people was born out of it. As Massumi writes, “bodies in flight do not leave the world behind. If the circumstances are right, they take the world with them -- into the future.” (A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia 105)

On the other hand, Kairos is singular and as a singularity, it never exists individually. As Jean-Luc Nancy writes, “the singular is primarily each one and, therefore, also with and among all the others, the singular is a plural” (Being Singular Plural 32) and exactly like singular which has always been referred to as *singuli* (the plural form), one needs to talk about *kairoi*, a qualitative multiplicity where each *kairos* comes out of its own particular context and its own singular dynamics of creating altermodernity. On the other hand, to talk about *kairoi* is to talk about a time of everyday where every moment is at once experienced as singular and heterogeneous, or rather, a kind of everyday that affirms each moment as virtually singular, carrying the virtual force of an alternative, not-already-determined future. This multiplicity of *kairoi* presents time as a series of singular moments, an everyday full of wonders just like what the occupiers felt in the tent cities they erected. Each moment of those days for many occupiers, who have found their

lives changed after the movements, was a *historical* now, a *Jetztzeit*, “a historical now is not an indifferent instant but a *kairos*, which opens the horizon for past as well as for future.” (Lowith 185) Living in such an everyday is living in an intensity of historical present moments that makes possible the “apprehension of a virtual or future event as a force in the present emerging from the past” (Rodowick 142).

Therefore, as Negri suggests, one may differentiate between two conceptions of *Kairos*. The classical conception of *Kairos* as a transcendent instant of rupture or *Kairos* as an instant of rupture but one that is a “singular and open present” (Negri, *Time For Revolution* 152), occurs at the edge of time, deterritorializes it only in order to open a possible process of constituent practice of transforming temporality.

Let us here go back for a moment to our initial example of *Time Machine!* and its instantaneous division of present to past and future. If modernist theatre made use of hiatus to set in motion a time of the imaginary, the performative turn in arts was an affirmation of process and duration, of a gradual constitution of a collective relationality. It reaffirmed our aforementioned dimension of *Kairos* as constitutive of belonging to a community. Akamatsu also tries to create a new temporality through his video work by another articulation of narration, one that is not based on chronological order, *a chronicle*, but creates an unconditional time that brings past, present and future into a plane of immanency. *Time Machine!* is an embodiment of Deleuze’s time machine where “there is no present distinguishable from a present-becoming-past, on the one hand, and the present-becoming-future on the other” and “rather than a chronological and successive addition of spatial moments, time continually divides into a present that is passing, a past that is preserved, and an indeterminate future”. (Rodowick 81)

We exist in time, and time as such is the ontogenetical time pregnant with constituent power rather than time-as-measure, the subjugated, anthropocentric and modern form of its understanding. Therefore, the subject-object divide does not exist as no other perpetual and eternal essences exist and thus, subjectivity is not related to the presupposed immutable conscious agent, but is rather always an effect of deterritorializing the established order, creating and aiming at *the gap in the armor*. This is how art for Deleuze can contribute to the

understanding of time as ontogenesis, formerly discussed in the section on the aesthetics of the performative event, because art gives “material form to change as ‘sensible aggregates’ or ‘blocks of sensation’.” (Rodowick 140)

Deleuze considers past and future on heterogeneous planes, because otherwise the future would become a mere continuity of the past, rather than being a direction of the new that produces being on the tip of time’s arrow, of Kairos. Negri lays the grounds for the necessity of such a Deleuzian conception clearly:

[...] to consider past and future not in accordance with the arrow of time but on a homogeneous plane... by doing so, time loses its character of irreversibility and Kairos its creative force. From this erroneous perspective, time is reduced to a single extension without gaps that is traversable in every direction - which contradicts the common experience of the irreversibility of the arrow of time. Further, from the perspective we are criticizing, Kairos no longer exists as such, because in this time made of extension no creative event can be discovered. (Time for Revolution 161-2)

Negri believes that a proper conception of time comes with adopting Spinozist perspective of absolute immanence. In this way, the time as was discussed becomes a series of kairoi, and innovation of *Jetztzeit* will not be only an exaltation or a “deviation in the course of life”, but will occur “within the horizon of eternity”. This is the absolute immanence, “the dynamism of life” that “gives life its power” and presents time as becoming, change, and constituent force.

The difference between constituted Power and constituent power is not a simple opposition between two essences or two distinct substances. There is one and only one substance, Spinoza believes. *potentia* –affirmative affectivity – is ontogenetically primary in relation to *Potesta*. This applies also to the distinction between the virtual and the actual. The virtual as the realm of becomings, affect, desire, and in sum the constituent power becomes individuated in the field of the actual as beings, affections, pleasures, or the constituted Power. But there is no unique actualization for the virtual, since the virtual is the field of pure potentiality that can actualize itself into multiple transcendental objects of representation, or eludes the representation, remaining non-actualized. It is important to not confuse the virtual with the unreal. On the contrary, if the actual is real, that is because the virtual is real. There is no opposition or

contradiction between these two terms, for the latter is the non-represented material becoming of the constituent power, while the actual is a product. Moreover, the metaphoric duality of depth and surface does not apply to the distinction between the virtual and the actual, as if the former had depth and the former was only appearances on the surface. On the contrary, the actual and the virtual are immanent in relation to each other: there is only a surface, a plane of immanence, and studying the virtual is the topography of a chaotic surface.

This is affirmed by Tarde, when he speaks of contagious repetition. Kairos creates the conditions of contagion by opening up the body to the world and putting an stop to the machinations of already established codes and standards. In Tarde's world, Kairos is the emergence of an innovation-sun, similar to Benjamin's Jetztzeit-star:

All repetition, social, vital, or physical, i. e., imitative, hereditary, or vibratory repetition (to consider only the most salient and typical forms of universal repetition), springs from some innovation, just as every light radiates from some central point, and thus throughout science the normal appears to originate from the accidental (The Laws of Imitation 7).

Tarde asserts that the accidental, or to be more exact, the contingent is the origin of the normal, which has been deemed natural and necessary in terms of social order. Normal is an established historical actuality of a virtual process, that now stays immobile in its transcendental position. From this perspective, Being is not a solid actuality as a "it is", but a plastic, ductile plane of immanence as a "it becomes". Nor is it a void of the situation, but an affirmative constituent force. This is the problematic of time that Lazzarato talks about, "a struggle on the plasticity of the political" (Grasping the Political). Instead of numerical and quantitative differences, here we deal with intensive, qualitative differences; and instead of numbers and counting that define an infinite situation in Set theory, here uncountable differential relations define an infinite situation.

Thus, rather than an ontology rooted in purely formal, empty multiplicities, the speculation here finds itself upon an ontogenesis, a becoming of the being, or how an actuality comes out of the virtual.

The relation between the One and the Multiple finds itself different from what Badiou interprets. The virtual plane of the constituent power, as the sole substance, is not homogenous, but

heterogonous and in constant variation. It is a chaosmos of differential relations that make a temporary individuation out of the chaos. The One as a constant flux of becomings and variations is then itself multiple, and the multiple is immanent to the one. The one does not impose a return of the same, of the old, on every situation by totalizing it, as Badiou fears most; rather, the same which returns constantly is the difference, the new. "The eternal return of the difference": that is how Deleuze reformulated the famous Nietzschean axiom.

In this formulation, time ontogenetically is Kairos, or the pre-individual Aion. And event as the ontogenetical assumes this temporality. In other words, the virtuality of time in the event means that it problematizes the established truth of a situation, making room for the emergence of an alternative truth. "Time has always put the notion of truth into crisis", writes Deleuze, "... it is the form or rather the pure force of time that puts truth into crisis" (Cinema 2 130). By problematizing the reality and its truth, an event then deterritorializes the limits and borders of a situation, introducing an infinite in the finitude of the reality. The infinite is not however a numerical one, as in set theory, but a differential limit, tending toward the threshold of the situation.

Event then would not be something miraculous or exceptional in nature, as Badiou believes. It would not be an unveiling of a historical determined Truth, or the Universal for all local situations of a time. Indeed, it is what happening in every moment, as the vehicle of constituting the being, the introduction of the new. Nonetheless, event intervenes in any set of predefined regulations and axioms; it destroys the established, actualized relations and the actuality produced by them. It does not cancel the differences for the sake of a formal multiple; on the contrary, it always brings the difference into the situation. And since individual subject is itself a false transcendent point over the plane of immanence, an actualization of differential relations, it is not a constituent element of an event; instead, there are lines of collective subjectivities that form subject-groups, in a non-hierarchical relation with each other. Consequently, an event is relational as long as it transforms the relations in and through itself. As Deleuze puts it, "the real problem of revolution, a revolution without bureaucracy, would be the problem of new social relations, where singularities come into play, active minorities in nomad space without property or enclosure" (Desert Islands and Other Texts 145). Thus, the problem is indeed how the relations can be changed in an event into new relations. According to the new link we just formulated

between the One and the multiple, the nature of the transformative relations in an event could be characterized.

5.2.2.7 A Return to the Future?

As we already discussed throughout the research, Erika Fischer-Lichte's concept of the performative turn does not only refer to the emergence of contemporary performance arts in 1960s-70s, but also tracks its effects on other arts, and their way of presentation and reception. One could say that the performative is the hegemonic form of content in different artistic forms of expression, and these combinations form a new aesthetics, free from modernist limitations, divisions, and hierarchies, which nonetheless sets up its own territory of forces and intensities. In the same track, the performative turn in radical politics refers to a paradigmatic break with previous forms of protest movements.

The virtual differential relations of an event, as far as they are not linguistic, not pre-determined, and on the other hand, have the transformative constituent power of determination, are performative. If the virtual is itself performative, then all events, as long as they transform the existing relations between their bodies, should be considered as performative events.

Thus, the virtual contains three moments, which are all immanent to each other: the undetermined, the determinable, and the determined. If we go back to our example in the beginning, then the meaning of a "return to the future" would be clear. The temporality of the image is an interruption of time, when the past (the determined), the present (the determinable), and the future (the undetermined) are immanent to each other in each moment. The image then consists of numerous possible individuations and actualizations of the virtual time, which makes the current temporality suspended. So, a return to the future is only meaningful when it is a return to the future in the present, according to the real problematic of the present moment, or better, by the virtue of constant problematization of the present truth by the pure force of the time.

Therefore, a temporality of an event expresses itself in the form of a singular moment of an immanence in which the past, the present and the future become immanent in relation to each other. During May 68 Movement, in a pamphlet written for the chaotic streets of Paris, Blanchot wrote: “Tomorrow was May 68”. This single sentence is the expression proper for the temporality of a performative event.

If it is true that the temporality of the projected image of the visitor in Time Machine! is an experimentation with time as virtual, then to which extent the whole work in general is an event? Does it start from the real problematic of its situation, does it attempt to affect the established relations via transformative performative relationality?

The installation was exhibited in several galleries and museums all over the first world of arts. The visitors bought the tickets, stepped inside the territory of art institution (or better, of institutional art), went to Akamatsu’s designed room, and left the place exactly as they entered. If event is problematizing in the first place, Akamatsu’s work of art only could challenge the time perception of its audience, and one tends to say, rather playfully. Akamatsu works for Apple Company himself and also develops apps for iPhone and iPad that are available for sale on Google Play and Apple Store. His work doesn’t challenge the territories of contemporary institutional art, with its global market and international mega-exhibitions. The answer to the question seems evident, even if the artwork in question is radical in content: if event entails both aesthetic and political wings, then Time Machine! is pure entertainment, like an interesting app for iPhone. Walter Benjamin critique on arts which are radical only in content by “indicating the decisive difference between merely transmitting the apparatus of production and transforming it” (Author as Producer 4) is valid here, too.

But other performances, those we have considered as performative events in form of occupation movements, have shown us – each in its own singular way – a reclaiming of time, and a return to the future, a moment of becoming contemporary to the new image of thought, coming out of a history of different performative events.

5.2.3 Kairoi and Occupy Movements

In our discussions about time and Kairos, different temporalities came to the foreground. Kairos has been thought as a temporality “in which there is no or little chronos” (Agamben, *The Time That Remains* 68), in which chronology is forgotten, because the technical social machine of clock is no longer in force and the result of a machinic assemblage through that machine, i.e. the conscious agent and its “memory”, will be broken down.

Time in such a moment becomes the constituent power of ontogenesis. New forms are being created in kairological deterritorialization at the limits of being, and performativizations create new images of thought on the surface of bodies. The two-sided ontogenesis maintains that time is constituent and being constituted during the performative action of a collective body: in fact, the paradigm of absolute immanence considers collective body and time-space mutually constituent of each other in a duration of becomings and alternative organization.

In one way, as Hardt shows through readings of Jean Genet’s literary and dramatic works, the struggle for reclaiming and recreating time occurs in an *exposure* of body to the world. Kairos, full time as opposed to the prison time, is experienced when body is exposed, is open to the world. The exposed body loses its socially imposed armor; and the flow of time, its series of Kairoi, traverses it.

Exposure to the world is not the search for an essence elsewhere, but the full dwelling in this world, the belief in this world. The unexposed might construct an interior world, a separate realm of depths and abysses; exposure, in contrast, lays all of being equally on the surface, in the flesh. Exposed being is univocal; being is said always and everywhere in the same voice. It is not defined by being different in itself. When we expose ourselves to the force of things we realize this ontological condition, the immanence of being in existence (*Prison Time* 68).

Then Kairos is the moment that the social flesh liberates itself from the hierarchical organization in a moment of experimentation and high intensity. Flesh is freed from the grasp of “organism”; already attached stereotypes on its surfaces give way to a chaosmos of phantasmatic production of simulacra under new relations of production, *inside altermodernity*; and monstrous, patchwork collective body comes into existence through exposure. Moreover, through

Klossowski's theory of the self, we know that the attack of intensities (or in De Landa's words, intensity-difference) liberates the *fluctuations in the tonality of the soul* and as such it makes the past "rings out anew in its present". He describes such a process as an "incessant combat", a combat between the established order and the deterritorializing forces of to-come that metamorphose the body and time-space:

The incessant metamorphosis: in a brief interval of time you must pass through several individual states. Incessant combat is the means... What is this brief interval? not just any moment of our existence but the eternity that separates one existence from another. (Vicious Circle 69)

Two temporalities, then, are interwoven in the moment of Kairos: a quality of timelessness as the eternity that separates a former existence from the new existence following the hiatus on one hand, and a quality of duration and process, as in an *incessant metamorphosis*.

In addition, we argued how in Kairos as the virtual force of time translates as the immanence of three different moments of time: the determined (past), the determinable (present), and the undetermined (future). It bestows undeterminability to the past by plasticizing the political; it brings the undetermined future into the present and past to situate it in the historical rupture of Kairos between the old and the to-come.

The same way of perceiving time emerged in the performativity of occupy movements. They had at least moments of being contemporary with such an image of thought that marked their radical difference between the forms of exercising politics prior to them. But a struggle for an alternative future is a struggle of the present. Indeed, future in the common sense – in sentences like "are you not concerned about the future of your career?" or "invest for the future of your children" – is actually a past-present repeated without differentiation, and carries a promise of stability and permanence. Therefore, we should differentiate with that future and a future of the new, which opens up as the horizon of to-come in kairos.

It is indeed in the struggle for the free appropriation of the present that life opens itself to the to-come, and desire perceives - against the empty and homogenous time in which all is equal (including, and in particular, the future) - the creative power of praxis. (Negri, Time for Revolution 163)

Such a struggle does not only concern future or present but also past. The time is liberated when past is also experienced differently – not only as actualized history, but also as a geography of virtual forces that are constructing and deconstructing actualities. As Negri argues, “there is no possibility of immersing oneself in that being which comes before, if not by illuminating it with the present, reconstructing it and feeling it live in the present. [...] a genealogy of the present, that is, an imagination that brings to being that which came before in the same manner as it constitutes the *to-come*. One does not interpret the past; one tests it out.” (Time for Revolution 165)

Imagination as the genealogy of the present: going back to the future, bringing future into the past-present immanence needs the immaterial endeavor of reconstructing the imaginal poles. This point was discussed in earlier chapters with regard to their particular themes, and it was argued that in the moment of performative openness of body to the world, in the exposure, flesh creates new phantasms, new images on its surface in order to imagine outside the already established borders of imagination – as the body in exodus performs outside the established limits of performance.

This imagination comes in the process of performativization, attempting to create altermodernities in the aesthetic-political experimentations of a performative event. In Kairological time, the duality between labour time and leisure time, the time of work and non-work does not exist anymore. If time is not experienced as a homogenous, linear succession of empty units, then the whole paradigm of wage labour breaks down and time emerges as the force of creativity. Then work becomes the work of the poor, the performativity of the dispossessed, which as was discussed, is the miraculous production done under an alternative social relationality – not subjected anymore to capital as social relation (which has various forms of reenactment in different countries in the world). “[This] creativity that constituted the hard-qualitative core of liberated work”, Negri writes, “is manifested here in the form of imagination and hope”. (Time for Revolution 121)

That is why all occupy movements exhibited an incessant production of images, songs, poems, graffiti, jokes, and accompanied by several street performances, making sculptures, painting

streets and side-walks. Most of these aesthetic productions (not all of them) have shown an openness toward the other, affective solidarities with other struggles, and a rejection of institutionalized art practices and main-stream media representations- all those connections that are included in the machinic function of the code of the everyday signs.

These practices aimed to recreate the imagination, make it go further than what has been experienced, presented as end of history or the only viable options for living in a society, and make the case for feeling the joy of creating the new, instead of the paranoid fear of losing the old. Because as Spinoza teaches us, imagination “has the ontological function of recomposing the strata of being” and “it anticipates from within” (Negri, *Time for Revolution* 156) the development of altermodernities, that “to-come” which rests on the power of *love* and speaks about another world, a world in which many worlds fit.

5.2.3.1 A New Machinic Assemblage of Revolutionary Temporalities

The difference we assign to occupy movements in relation to former forms of struggle manifests itself in the unique assemblage of temporalities in their revolutionary machines. For the sake of simplicity, we can divide such forms regarding their temporality into three types with their own different domain of forces.

5.2.3.1.1 Insurrection

Benjamin’s *Jetztzeit* comes mostly as the insurrectional time, or the time of Divine violence he recognizes in the worker’s strikes as a violence that stops the mechanisms of capitalist production and its social relationality. Insurrection has a temporality with high acceleration and immense velocity in order to break the linear, homogenous order of successive time of progress. A temporality like those bullets that destroyed the clocks in Paris in 1848. There is a famous sentence attributed to Andreas Bader, a member of insurrectionist Rote Armee Fraktion, that “only gun cures the rigidity”.

Insurrection is sometimes necessary to put a hold on a disastrous affair that a State has embarked on: an austerity policy that dispossesses poor people from their right to education, health care

and so forth as in the case of African countries in 1990s or European countries in 2000s; a corrupt government that its management and (post)colonial economic relations has ruined a population's present and future as in the case of 2001 Argentina's insurrection; a war that will claim lives on both sides as in the case of Vietnam War or Iraq War; or a colonial rule with a police state and sheer brutality that reaches its climax of intolerability and its examples are as widespread as European colonialism was; a production regime that exploits its workers as in the case of the Luddites cited in the second chapter, who literally destroyed machinery to put a stop on factory lines.

This list can go on for pages, but the point is the sudden, flash-like temporality of the insurrection, resembling a lightning that is able to break the rigidity of the continuum. Insurrections emerge usually in a spontaneous way, but its examples in the past show that they either become hierarchical or supported by organizations with State-form and its corresponding verticality. Otherwise, they disappear as soon as the flash-like energy is suppressed by police violence. For instance, arm struggle in Europe after 1960s, when the factory had been deterritorialized and extended to the society as a whole, could start with a spontaneous organization of a few militants (usually intellectuals or university students), but it would take the form of a pseudo-militaristic organization and due to its secretive as well as professional nature (necessary training for using weapons, strategies and tactics of warfare in different environments, etc.), it would be an *elite* struggle, unable to engage ordinary population or connect with other fields of struggle in society.

5.2.3.1.2 Resistance

The temporality of resistance, as we have discussed before through Clausewitz, is different. Resistance aims to reduce the speed of enemy's advance, its mechanisms of dispossession. It is a negative acceleration, a movement in place, that wants to gradually erode the capacities of the enemy. It is the temporality of friction that stops something from going forward or a temporality of viscosity that slows down flows and fluxes.

Resistance was the order of the day under colonialism. It also slows down the processes of (post-)colonial dispossession (resistance against the multinational corporations in Africa), the encroachment of the State into the daily life (resistance of women in Iran or anti-fascists during

the Nazis), and the takeover of one's land by a foreign army (the nationalist movements, as we discussed in previous chapter).

Resistance movements can go on as non-movements, like those Assef Bayat describes in the Middle Eastern dictatorships, because they remain under the skin of cities and does not come out on streets as organized collective bodies. In other cases, they could acquire State-forms, becoming hierarchical and vertical, such as nationalist movements, many liberation struggles in the second half of 20th century, or many other movements that was labeled as "anti-modern" in the second chapter.

As it is obvious from our examples, insurrection can lead to resistance or resistance can culminate into an insurrection. But they are two types of struggles with different forces and heterogenous temporalities. Both nonetheless appear as a reaction to other forces and against initiatives set in motion by those forces, even if they are themselves symptoms of affirmative and performative forces of constituent power, their emergence is conditioned by what they act against. Therefore, they may point to a liberated time, they do not consist of it; as their temporality is still in relation to the dominant temporality, not the unconditioned new time that is the result of a collective constituent *process*, a *duration* of creativity.

5.2.3.1.3 Revolutionary Ascetism

The revolutionaries always attempted to reimagine a daily life under the light of revolutionary movements. Avant-garde artists and performance arts activists tried to change the everyday by blurring the boundaries between art and life, or labour time and leisure time. Some displaced the work from its designated space (gallery or theatrical stage) into public space. Some joined protest movements with their works and artistic tactics even for standing against police force. And some made process and performativity a foundational part of their art works.

Jerzy Grotowski tried to reinvent theatre as a practice of making community, a performative "event" that can create different subjectivities, put in force an alternative subjectification. For this, he made pieces in his so-called "paratheatrical phase" and "theatre of sources" that could go on for an extended period and presented an experimentation with communal rites. Leszek Kolodziejczyk explains that a para-theatrical experiment was

a common isolation by a group of people in a place far removed from the outside world and an attempt to build a kind of genuine meeting among human beings ... this is not a performance, because it does not contain in it the elements of theatre such as plot or action. There is nothing to see for the audience either, because there is no audience... Transcending theatre was the next step on the road. It meant a break ... with the one-sidedness of contact, caused by the duality of the actor and spectator. (qtd. in Schechner, *The Grotowski Sourcebook* 210)

Grotowski was forming an assembly through an *ascetic* way of being: a different organization of bodies to allow a performativization of an idea of a different life, a different sociality and a different contact through “transcending” the established limits and forgetting the chronos and its standards. It is interesting that after a while, he stops being the leader of paratheatrical journeys and it multiplied in different directions. But such a work needs a gradual process, a temporality of *caring* and *composition*, gradual and slow, without alienation. Thus, all work, all production, even if before banal, is bestowed by creativity of the autonomous performativity. Grotowski started with an idea of a theatre of production, but he soon understood that any new production comes out of new relations and conditions of production: a new time-space, a new image of thought, and a new body. If he designed a performance in the form of “a common isolation” and a place “far removed from the outside world”, it was an attempt to create conditions open to a new temporality (and spatiality) and therefore, he made a bubble immune to the already established relations, so in the absence of any urban temporality, the group creates gradually its own autonomous temporality – both *by* and *for* a new way of connection between bodies.

Criticizing Grotowski’s project is neither a novel attempt nor a hard one. It is individualistic, based on the power of truly realized individual selves; it is in line with the metaphysics of transcendence, authenticity, and unity, as it attempts to recapture the originary and go “to the sources of performativity”. In spite of this, his experimentation creates a simulacrum for ontogenetical time: a product of creative forces giving affective material to performative event’s *time-as-change*. As Deleuze says, art gives “material form to change as ‘sensible aggregates’ or ‘blocks of sensation’.” (Rodowick 140)

One thing that Grotowski and modernist Avant-gardes had in common was an investment on the leisure time as the non-labour time. If labour time was the temporality of empty repetitions and homogenous succession, leisure time associated with play and free flow of time, bestowed with forces of creativity as opposed to productivity, because no additional value could be created out of play. Such an opposition does not exist anymore, as we have argued throughout this research repetitively. Therefore, if leisure time and labour time are not different *in nature*, then there is no outside to the temporality of prison time and no heterogenous temporality to directly invest in. It cannot be presupposed, it must be constructed.

As the method of such construction, Grotowski adopts the ascetic way of being. Isolation, far from the world, in mountains or forests or deserts. Barthes explains the temporality of ascetic life as idiorrhythmy, a *being-together of singular rhythms*, an assemblage of different rhythms that are co-existing with each other without any rhythm takes over other ones and no impulsive force dominates the collective body. He uses the notion of idiorrhythmy to refer to “something like solitude with regular interruptions”, an attempt to deal with “the aporia of bringing distances together” (How to Live Together? 6). To exemplify such a “fantasy”, he recurses to the coenobitic monasticism and the way its monks living in convents by stressing on the communal life. For Barthes, the performativity of coenobitic ascetic life, although territorialized and encoded by religious disciplines and rules, can inform him on his fantasy of idiorrhythmic living-together.

But Grotowski re-enactment of ascetic being articulates it with play, and therefore, joy and spiritual exaltation. Grotowski makes a performance of ascetism, because he wants to experiment with the existing temporality through effecting a break by an ascetic performativity; or rather, unleashing the performative forces of ascetic life.

This is an assemblage of production theatre and poor theatre: poor as those who create and produce under alternative relations of production. Or an asceticism of happy and joyful affects, one that Negri describes in Spinoza:

Spinoza's asceticism brings to mind a forceful edict that imposes immanence as the proper plane of materialist discourse, and through which the force of life is established within it. In this way the

common is affirmed ... [toward] the development of ethical life which leads to the absolute act of knowledge that is love (Time for Revolution 189).

One then could say Grotowski invented a Spinozian performative method for giving material sensation to time as absolute immanence and a flesh, a collective body in the form of assembly. Assembly is a product of assemblage. If “and” as a machinic function brings together bodies, the machinic function of and-as-idiorrhythmy makes a machinic assemblage possible between different flows without trying to channel them into one. In other words, and-as-idiorrhythmy gives a name to the problem of linkage in altermodernities. It does not only use spatial concept of “and” that signifies bodies are beside each other in space: it also indicates that they are living a heterogenous time consisting of each one’s singular temporality.

Therefore, an assembly can refer to the organization of those mythical bodies in the Conference of Birds for example, all flying beside each other yet with their own singular rhythms, in different temporalities in each phase but ultimately upward toward the transcendence. Just like the ascetics of Mount Athos coenobitic monastery, whose way of life sums up as following in Barthes description:

Principle: each monk is free to live at their own particular rhythm. Labour: unequal. Some are idle...[with] a flexible conception of constraint. No rules; merely a few suggestions (How to Live Together? 33-34).

Revolutionary ascetism is therefore a slow, gradual temporality for a process of making alternative social relations: the temporality of what we have called the machinic function of “and-as-idiorrhythmy”. Those aforementioned idiorrhythmic assemblies might have accomplished a restructuring of time, but they have taken the existence of an outside for granted. We have argued that why such a presupposition proves to be false in the contemporary globalized capitalism. Thus, we need to search for Spinozian performativizations of idiorrhythmic assemblies that affirm the absolute immanence and try to create autonomous temporalities inside the dominant temporality of capitalism.

5.2.3.2 The Three-Fold Temporal Assemblage

If we return to one of our previous examples, 2002 Noborder Camp at Strasbourg may serve as a prototype for later occupy movements in 2010s which articulated the form of assembly with micropolitical performative action as well as insurrectional actions and acts of resistance. The camp was an experimentation with collective living and establishing new social relationality. Not only activist groups and collectives such as Publixtheatre caravan contributed a lot in its idea and implementation, but also it was an artistic strategy for giving aesthetic and affective material to the idea of change⁶⁷.

But Noborder Camp presented an interesting machinic assemblage of temporalities, while constructing its own patchwork body of an idiorhythmic assembly. It started as an insurrection, a short-term period of organization for staging a performative action

It functioned as an insurrection against blacklisting activists of alterglobalization movements and tightening the security apparatus with the help of anti-immigration discourse and policies. Strasbourg hosted the Schengen Information System (SIS), a database of all those who applied for asylum and who are blacklisted as activists and have difficulty in movement across European borders. And acts of sabotage and civil disobedience as attempts to put a halt on these security mechanisms also occurred during the camp, such as hacking:

hacking the database was as much about freeing information as it was about helping people move by letting them know how much they were being watched, how and where (Shuddhabrata Sengupta).

The camp was itself part of a larger context of resistance, the whole alterglobalization movements that started in late 1990s as a global cycle of protests and extended themselves till 2003, protests against Iraq War. Therefore, a foundational element of this performative action was being inside a temporality of resistance.

⁶⁷ It should be noted that Nobordercamp was not “invented” as an event that year, but the particular Nobordercamp in Strasbourg received full attention by activists because of the issues under question, especially the immigration policies and blacklisting activists. The history of Nobordercamp dates back to 90s biggest activist network in Germany, “Keine Mensch Ist Illegal” which started from the Hybrid Workspace at the “documenta X” (1997) and “was designed as a hybrid project of artistic and political practice from the beginning” **Invalid source specified**..

However, this camp – as was discussed – differed from previous events in the alterglobalization movement in terms of a refusal of spectacularity and representation, taking initiative in terms of time-space instead of organizing a direct action in reaction to a time and space set for an international meeting, and living together for a duration of time. Indeed, the camp description by Gerald Raunig has all these three temporalities in itself: “a ten-day laboratory for creative resistance and civil disobedience”, a gradual construction of an assembly in a context of resistance and insurrectional time.

The constituent temporality of time proper to caring and constructing a new social relation, a micropolitical transformation via the machinic function of *and-idiorrhythmy*, has been captured in Shuddhabrata Sengupta description of camp:

If anything, this microcosmic model of a ‘functioning anarchy’ was an instance of how the actions and energies of the ‘multitudes’ might translate into concrete realities on a day to day basis in a possible future away from capitalism.

Occupy movements witnessed the same performative experimentation, indeed a revolutionary “laboratory for creative resistance and civil disobedience”. Through them, the common isolation in a urban time-space becomes rather an open call to all residents to join in a performative experimentation with daily life, and thus, time-space.

As much as they have similarities to ascetic assemblies, they also lay in a context of resistance and emerge with an insurrectional temporality to put a stop and demand a State to be overthrown, or a policy rejected.

In those camps, each in their own specific struggles against a particular temporalization of nation-state/capitalism progress, a new time has been experienced: a time that puts a stop to dominant temporality of prison time, slows down the advance of dispossessing mechanisms, and acquires creative forces and fullness of life.

The general assemblies in different occupy movements embodied the machinic function of *and-as-idiorrhythmy*. As centers of decision-making, they had a gradual slow temporality of caring,

affection and production, with meetings being moderated with more suggestive, performative rules rather than bureaucratic, hierarchical disciplines.

The inside stories from Occupy Wall Street Movement tent city talk to us about such a performativity of revolutionary ascetism and constituent collective time. One can consider the general assembly meetings, particularly in the beginning of the movement. Activists describe these meetings as long and tiring, where reaching a decision is a hard, slow collective process. In the second day of occupation, general assembly takes from 3 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. (Writers for the 99% 19-20), which was going to repeat in other days, and with the formation of different working groups, in other meetings. As one activist describes:

Period of meeting, perhaps unsurprisingly, can stretch for long hours into the night, often with a dwindling audience, but the same rules of affirmative speaking and respect for the rights of others to be heard apply (Writers for the 99% 31)

In addition, there is another aspect of collective creative temporality that exhibits itself in the improvisations with daily objects in the camps. For instance, one activist describes the OWS camp like this:

The camp feels magical, but it's also totally jerry-rigged, improvisation built upon improvisation; tape, string, tarp, cloth, metal tent poles holding up a sagging canvas roof, plastic sheets propped up on three long bamboo rods taped together. (Writers for the 99% 7)

The magic lies in the everyday moments, in the improvisations with materials that are in an ordinary situation are just waste. The time of performative event releases the creative forces of the collective body there, and thus, dealing with ordinary in-hand material, whatever that can be “found”, is in a way not so much different with the way modern avant-garde art dealt with them.

Consider surrealism. One of main impulses of surrealist movement was to give a “magical” character to the everyday and it starts with re-affirming contingency and chance. The artist’s time, the time of creativity, was then different in nature from the worker’s time; as immaterial labour was supposed to be inherently autonomous from modern capitalist relations of

production. It was the liberated time of the flaneur who could, like André Breton, go to the flea markets and bestow artistic, so-called magical character to objets trouvés [found object] which mostly is a waste, is a “useless” thing. Artists could give another use-value to trivial objects because of this inherent difference between creative time and labour time. The unified labour time and its regime of wage labour create objects with exchange values that hide the real processual time of collaborative production by dividing it into hours, whereas the creative time of immaterial labour, when invested on an object, creates an alternative use-value for it. The work of art is then, as Merleau-Ponty argues, *something* that sees while being seen, while disturbing the subject/object divide.

Breton recounts his search for such objects in Nadja:

I go there often, searching for objects that can be found nowhere else: old-fashioned, broken, useless, almost incomprehensible, even perverse (qtd. in Weiss 7).

If Breton was mostly amused by the unknown in such object, as Allen S. Weiss explains, Jean Dubuffet had another perspective in dealing with everyday objects. In fact, “it is precisely the banal textures and forms, objects and images of the everyday world that Dubuffet would ultimately recuperate into his own works of art, into his own aesthetic” (Weiss 8).

Dubuffet invested in the aforementioned opposition between material labour and immaterial labour, which for him translated into an opposition between channeling the libidinal energy into productivity *and* “nonproductive expenditures”. The former is the social, oedipal sublimation of desire, effected by the code of the everyday signs, and correlates with the quantified, unified, and empty linear time of the everyday – a time captured by the established order. On the contrary, the nonproductive expenditure happens in the moments of experimentation, loss of the conscious agent and ecstasy, thus in the free flow of onto/morpho-genetical time. And as the loss of self, it is desublimatory, breaking the hierarchical organization of impulsive forces in the body.

Referring back to our discussion on the definition of aesthetics (see Chapter Two), Dubuffet’s aesthetics serves more as an oppositional aesthetics against what he calls “the cultural arts”, which are reproductive of the same established order. As Weiss explains, his aesthetics is “an

aesthetic desire working against itself, moving toward an antiaesthetic or perhaps more accurately a counteraesthetic procedure” (10), and trying to give material to another idea of the everyday, creating alternative use-values for things trapped in the dominant temporality.

However, our time particularly in the context of American hyper-capitalism is different from that of surrealism. Not only the immaterial labour is the hegemonic form of labour, but also nonproductive expenditures have become a part of pleasure-economy. The individual avant-garde artist has no such place or status anymore, nor could any art claim avant-gardism in the contemporary world of creative and cultural industries.

Only a collective act of constructing alternative temporality can transform the everyday and its found objects into something magical, as the occupier in OWS described about a camp of experimentation with daily life and improvisation with banal found objects – objects that for the first time revive their use-value in a revolutionary time machine.

Moreover, the plasticity of the political finds itself in occupy movements again in contrast to the capitalist precarization of time. The flexible time of immaterial labour under capitalist relations of production is already reterritorialized around the extraction of value as rent and accumulation of capital. It is flexible only in terms of an extension of labour time and its corresponding delimited and pre-determined performativity into the so-called leisure time. And contemporary communication technologies and devices such as smart phones, tablets and smart watches are contributing a lot to this total capture of living time. Nonetheless, the basic principle of quantifying time and using it as a measure for payments is not disappeared. Instead, it is not micro-managed flexibly.

One sign of change in controlling time is the re-appropriation of communication technologies. The OWS protestors have been ridiculed because of having their smart phones always in hand, sitting in tents behind their laptops and being always connected to the internet. However, they transformed the function of such devices from means of labour and value production to means of alternative organization of bodies and time-space.

One other inhuman element that acquired another characteristic was a London plane tree in the Zuccotti Park. A flash mob reclaimed the tree as “tree of life” and created a sacred place around

it that became one of the common spaces of imagination in the tent city. It was a *medmob*, a meditation flash mob, that developed into a network of performative actions, even after the movement. One of the networks engaged in medmob organizations is Dancing without Borders, an initiative that aims to “harnesses the power of dance, rituals, storytelling and community to raise awareness of the most pressing issues of our time and celebrate our humanity.” (Writers for the 99%) The meditation practices in OWS, far from being the escapist mysticism consumed by a large part of cultural consumers in the global North, was an opportunity – as they claim themselves – “to cultivate an understanding of the connection between personal transformation practices and social transformation”. And due to this aim, they happened beside other ongoing workshops related to art, activism, and western psychology (Writers for the 99% 88), all organized by the meditation working group. They also tried to deal with the problems of race/class divide (as we described in previous chapter and will revisit in the on-coming pages on space) through the notions of “changing oneself”, a method of self-care that attempts in creation alternative subjectivities. (Writers for the 99% 90)

Occupiers also knew the importance of reconstruction of imagination and how artistic practices can create simulacra that challenge the established limits of imagination. Therefore, they had an arts and culture committee with one task: "to engage the imaginations of people". (Writers for the 99% 12)

The power of creative imagination is unleashed in the kairological time, time of the uncanny, and as we have seen, an articulation of celebration, crisis, decision-making and exuberance – a fullness of time and a fullness of existence versus the repetitive routine of a homogenous and divided time and the depressive feeling of void that is usually coming with it.

As the time of everyday is freed from its modern quantification, then the previous trivial activities are becoming revolutionary: "I said, ' I'm a librarian. I can organize books. At this time, organizing books is a revolutionary act" (Writers for the 99% 61) And the library would have later 4000 books.

Returning to our reference to Goethe's Faust, it is interesting that Dr. Faust feels his fullness of existence in a holiday among the leisure of a common Volk. He too was escaping the routine of

modern life, rooted in a modern mythology of science and progress. Goethe's Faust overall project to confront that was a re-insertion of myth through Volk into the social thought. However, that mythology was offering a past fully determined, cemented in an idea of an originary human environment: nature plus pure race; soil and blood. A dangerous nightmare.

As Laclau observes, "a society from which myth was radically excluded would be either an entirely 'spatial' and 'objective' society -- where any dislocation had been banished... - or one in which dislocations lacked any space for representation." (New Reflections 67) The modern mythologies of progress – and its linear, chronological and teleological time –, be it nationalist or globalist, volk-oriented or millet-based, have found themselves a firm space for representation: The State. And a body to reproduce it: the nation. The naturalization of nation-state comes with a cemented imagination that only through transgression goes beyond *what was* and *what is* toward *becoming* and *to-come*. The contemporary radical politics are transgressive in the sense that they unleash the power of imagination through performative actions that effect an alternative social relation between different bodies. And this comes with a re-insertion of a myth into public space. As Laclau writes, "intrusion of myth into space that constitutes the politicization of that 'pure space'" (New Reflections 68).

Politicization means problematizing the established order, upsetting its hierarchies and opening its closed borders. Nonetheless, unlike Laclau's recourse to a similar mythology as Goethe's Faust and investing on a will to a homogenous People, the re-insertion of myth in occupy movements came with a performative laboratory of living together in the form of improvised tent cities and forming a patchwork body – a myth that acknowledges the unfinished potentialities of the past and the possibility of a return to the future.

This is why the performative aspect of radical politics has a foundational effect. The flash-mobs, street theatres, graffiti, songs, music, drums playing ceaselessly in the OWS, becoming cockroach, making improvised collective statues, performative rules, people's mic ... they are all providing a plastic format of political ritual, much different from the dominant political ritual – as Weber calls it – imposed by the State, i.e. the ritual of voting each four-five year in general elections. In fact, Kairos itself was originally "the temporal occasion" of the performance of a ritual.

This section focused on OWS with its particular context, confronting the financial capitalism in a place most symbolizing it. From this aspect, it had more contextual similarities with occupation movements in the European countries, such as the Spanish movement. Indeed, the Spanish Democracia Real Ya! describes themselves in their manifesto as a heterogenous collective body with differing political views, but united in one thing: being tired of the present established order. That is why in Toma la Plaza, occupiers manifesto called “for dignity and the priority of life over economic and political interests” (qtd. in Prentoulis and Thomassen 224).

In the following section, we turn to Egypt to analyze the performativization of a qualitative experience of time in another context.

5.2.3.3 Reinventing the (post-)colonial Temporality

In Egypt particular context, the war on time was different. Al-Tahrir Occupy Movement was a result of a long tradition of resistance, dating back to 1990s worker’s struggle and particularly 2003 protests against Iraq War.

On the other hand, police brutality, a suppressive type of coding bodies and channeling desires, reached to such levels in 2010 that people, first in Alexandria⁶⁸ and then in Cairo, had to rise up. The popular insurrection on the annual Egyptian “police day” was a clear expression of such a will to stop.

And the tent city came, a laboratory of imagining a new sociality, a new relationship between followers of different religions, leftists and Islamists, urban middle class and the marginalized.

The same articulation of insurrectional, resistive, and constituent time that is the abstract form of occupy movements, coming from different material and historical trajectories based on context.

One thing that all the Arab Republics which witnessed the formation of such a revolutionary machine had in common was a post-colonial modernized nation-state and accordingly, the

⁶⁸ For a more detailed description of this movement, see chapter two.

formation of a linear time of progress against the indigenous and local notions of time. As Larbi Sadiki explains it,

in Arab setting there are endless examples of how linearity is engineered in the postcolonial moment to drive forward being, thinking and doing to erase the traces of colonialism [...] Such an undertaking meant, among other things, some form of commitment to mimicking the former colonizer's bureaucratic decision-making, construction of newly independent national identities, and adoption of 'rational calculation' in all matters concerning modernization and development, including organization of public time. The postcolonial state envisaged this through socio-political engineering of individual and collective identity (Unruliness Through Space and Time 5).

As a socio-political engineering, this process of imitation had to be top-down, and thus under brutal authoritarian regimes who could form a unified people – through imposition, exclusion, and biopolitical and eugenical practices –. for “the [linear] march towards progress, new citizenry, modernity and the like” (ibid).

Time then had to be shaped in a linear, progressive and evolutionary frame, from the times of the past toward the times of the nation-state. Times of the past included not only colonial era, which imported modernity to the Arab Republics, but also the indigenous time.

As we have explained in the section on nationalism, it was a project of constructing a homogenous collective body, here out of a heterogenous, tribal formations with very different ways of life. As the factories were being established, the unified time of the wage labour had to be imposed on populations through a socio-political engineering. Sadiki calls this a demolition of “peripheral existence” and by that, of peripheral conceptions of time, because

the invention and formation of national identity could not be conceived within 'traditional' notions of time: a notion that made identity fluid rather than stable, and decentered rather than cemented to a center or a single locus of power..., the irrationality of all of this laid in the fact that the real intention was to control citizenries, rather than deliver them from either the heavy excesses of colonization or those oppressive aspects of traditional time – e.g. khumus or fifth of the produce in return for timeless labour by peasants in North African societies (Unruliness Through Space and Time 6)

Obvious examples of modernizing the conception of time as an element of sociality are the introduction of a European calendar and adopting Saturday and Sunday as weekend holidays.

The encroachment of the State power over the time had other mechanisms, too. The nationalist project in the Arab Republics, like any other nation-state, selectively wrote down the history in order to reinforce the imaginary homogenous national identity. State's organization and manipulation of time had to define codes as "modern" or "traditional", "of the past" or "for the future".

And as the constituted power established its prison time, it also hierarchized the access to leisure time. This inequality has been another common point of post-colonial nation-states in North Africa and the Middle East:

While the majority of society lived hand to mouth, in some cases literally, those in power lived in opulence and extravagance (Gaddafi's palaces, Bin Ali and Leila Bin Ali's fortune and the Mubarak family's wealth), where they exercised a quasi-monopoly on distributing 'leisure time' to themselves and their clients (Sadiki 7)

And all this was in accordance with the ethical codes cited in previous chapter for the Egyptian case. The bodies were subjugated under a subjugated regime of temporality (and spatiality).

Thus, Egyptians, Tunisians, and Syrians started a collective reappropriation of their own time, "engaging in subversion of existing paradigms of time and attendant notions of belonging, loyalty, autonomy and self-understanding" (Sadiki 6). And it was done performatively, with a contagious repetition of an act of disobedience in Fridays.

Friday has been traditionally the weekend holiday in countries with Muslim majority, because it is the holy day for worship and rest. Holidays have a reserve of a qualitative experience of time, the kairological time, as Benjamin notes, in contrast to the empty chronological and quantified time of labour: holidays repeat a virtual force of free time. This is what the Arab-speaking revolutionaries in these countries invested on.

Sadiki calls this collective endeavor of Egyptians as "mapping out new conceptions of time" so that they "define a revolutionary sense of direction and purpose" and "endow their unruliness

with ... a collective sense of history-making". (Sadiki 8) Kairological time, when constructed collectively, is not only a historical rupture, but also a moment of founding history.

Egyptian protestors started to call for mass demonstrations in Fridays, in an attempt to construct another temporality autonomous from the State's imposed time of progress. Their "re-demarcation of time disrupted, interrupted and disorientated the authoritarian regime's universalized time scale when they declared Friday 28 January the 'Friday of Wrath' (jumu'at al-ghadhab)."

The Fridays continued, not only in Egypt, but also in Syria, Bahrain, and other countries. They have been weekly given "common names", such as Friday of Wrath (جمعة الغضب), of dignity (كرامة), departure (رحيل), agency (ارادة), resistance (صمود), freedom (حرية), justice (قصاص), victory (النصر), purification (تطهير), and steadfastness (استمرار).

Continuing the discussion on common names in the first chapter, a common name is created in a historical collective act of performative expression. Performative expression, since linguistic expression relies on pre-existing signs and already created names. Like a performative utterance, the act of common naming corresponds to the act of transforming reality because a new name is created to signify a new being. In the case of Friday's naming in the Arab Spring, it is a name that signifies the emergence of a new field of affectivity, putting common values in contrast to the State's values of governance.

Therefore, common name and Kairos belongs to the same order. As Negri says, "through Kairos, the ontological affirmation of the name cannot be understood other than as a decision of a new being. In this sense, in kairos, presence is expression." (Time for Revolution 154) In other words, expression comes as a process of producing that expression, not by use of the established codes and signs. This is possible in the performative event, "in the struggle that separates the opening being-to-come from the senseless repetition in the void of the 'future' [of the linear temporality of progress]" (ibid 150).

Fridays could challenge the established temporality with a cyclical, kairological and intensive kairology that was opening up to alternative realities, to alter-modernities. However, as Sadiki points to, "the temporal constructs of dignity (*karamah*) or departure (*rahil*) are meaningless

without their physical experience and mapping out in relation to the spatial reordering of peoplehood in different sites of struggle in Egypt, including the famous Tahrir.” (8)

The act of naming always happens in space. “The name marks something in space” Negri writes, “that is the first and most simple experience of naming.” But he conditions this experience with the axis of time – as it happens in a space that as Laclau argues is re-inserted with a myth that “politicize” it – and continues:

if marking the thing in space (or expressing a common name) did not occur at the same time as the event of the thing (or of the common quid), we would not be able to provide the name or the common name with truth (Time for Revolution 152).

As it was repetitively argued, social relations are not only temporal, but also spatial. Time and space are relations in between bodies. Bodies exist in spatiotemporal relations, but they can transform these relations by their deterritorializing constituent force. Moreover, construction of nationhood is not only by imposing the temporality of progress, but also through management of public space.

In discussions on previous cases, such as occupation movements in the US, Greece, Spain, Turkey and elsewhere, we have also seen that the qualitative experience of time comes with experimentations in/through/with space.

Therefore, not only the apparatus of capture subjugates both time and space, the struggle for altermodernities deal with the liberation of both. A popular theater as Bene would want to anticipate the people to-come needs both spatial and temporal dimension. As Sadiki explains,

The spatial and the temporal are inextricably linked as dynamics of the reconstitution of peoplehood and newly freed ‘borders’ of unruliness. The authoritarian space that has for so long served the purpose of concealing public sentiments ... is in the Arab Spring moment restored as a theatre for openly staging discontent, resistance or solidarity through creative conceptions of time (Unruliness Through Space and Time 8).

So, it is not possible to consider temporality and spatiality separated from each other, just as it was argued in the beginning of this chapter. The dualities between these two cannot fit into a

paradigm of immanence; an image of thought that the perception of kairological time necessitates it. Thus, it is surprising that Negri, in spite of his endless argumentation for establishing a durational and processual concept of kairos, maintains such a duality between time and space, when he writes that “the dualistic matrix is given. One could quip, space to capital, time to the working class” (Time for Revolution 98). This amounts to understanding spatiality only in terms of actuality and ignoring its productive role in shaping social relation between bodies.

Indeed, in disciplinary societies, the empty succession of prison time is assigned to the spaces of confinement and discipline. In societies of control, as temporalities has multiplied for the sake of empowering the immaterial workforce productivity, the spaces of confinement have been shattered down, too. The factory is deterritorialized and its walls are broken down as society has become a factory itself. But it does not mean that power has no control over space. It micro-manages it in its network of control and multiplies the spaces of discipline and coding the bodies. As Ian Burkitt argues, “the shift in capitalism towards greater forms of flexible accumulation and the development of technologies which allow relations to be disembedded from their traditional everyday anchoring means that our embodied experience of space and time is fundamentally restructured.” (129)

5.3 From time to space: Kairotope

The contemporary image of thought, proper to the patchwork monstrous body, necessitates the paradigm of self-differentiating immanence. When the axiom of identity is rejected, homogeneity gives way to heterogeneity and therefore, there is nothing that can unify occupy movements but a field of performative, impulsive forces: a constituent power that deterritorializes already established limits of performativity and create alternative subjectification processes. Two Greek scholar activists formulates this point as following:

The common produced by the global occupy movement is not a mutually shared opposition to the capitalist crisis, nor a collective identity (of the “indignados” or of the 99%), nor a consensual

political project (for real, authentic democracy). The common does not even embody an identical strategy of occupying public space, but rather to a series of becomings that question established categorizations and taxonomies that normalize the production of subjectivities and the organisation of life (Kambouri and Hatzopoulos).

The monstrous body breeds with such becomings in a kairological time, where kairos is the arrow that aims at the gap on the body armor in order to release the desire from its social subjugation. Lyotard's bodily mode of aesthesis, which was cited as the body of performative event, emerges with such a qualitative experience of time, but it also resides in an intensive space, "a Deleuzian spatium, a primal or groundless space prior to the passive synthesis performed [by the conscious agent]" and Lyotard calls this spatio-temporality as "savage or alien space and time" (see Curtis 255-256; Lyotard, Prescription 177). We call this "savage time-space".

Therefore, reclaiming time and space in occupy movements both should be viewed in the immanent paradigm of becomings and thus, interwoven together.

Kairos is the proper form of time regarding a performative event, but as Latour explains, the event cannot be split into separate time and space: "if a place counts as a no-place, it counts as a non-event. ... When a place counts as a topos, it also counts as a Kairos" (qtd. in May and Thrift 28)⁶⁹. Analyzing global occupy movements, Zizi Papacharissi even suggest that kairos itself refers to singular context of space-time blocks.

Long before, Bakhtin was considering how time is being dramatized in arts and "takes on flesh" as a set of relationships in connection with spatial ones. He used the term "chronotope" (meaning time-space) to designate such an idea: "We will give the name chronotope to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature...In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot, and history." (The Dialogical Imagination 84) However, the chronological continuity of the passing time, chronos, is interrupted by the moment-of-Kairos, i.e. the moment of event in its

⁶⁹ This point will be explained further in the next section.

ontogenetical and political sense. The materialist theology of Paul Tillich describes Kairos in contrast to Chronos as a term that “should express the feeling of many people... that a moment of history had appeared which was pregnant with a new understanding of the meaning of history and life” (369).

Therefore, under the light of Latour’s conception of kairos ↔ topos, one can change Bakhtin’s chronotope to *kairotope*. The form of occupy itself, and the resistance of people based on a simultaneous defense and re-creation of their habitats, brings one to the consideration of topos in relation to Kairos, to that “intrinsic connectedness” Bakhtin refers to. Kairotope is another name for Lyotard’s notion of savage time-space.

Recognizing the importance of Occupy movements and the singular machinic assemblages that came into existence during those movement, Donna Haraway has tried to capture the same image of thought this research invested on. For her, the contemporary situation has unleashed “sym-ctonic forces and power” that are result of machinic assemblages between the human and the inhuman. She calls these “real and possible timespaces” as “Chthulucene” (D. J. Haraway, *Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin*). However, not the concept itself, but what it signifies is important for this research, as it reaffirms the previous discussions.

we need a name for the dynamic ongoing sym-cthonic forces and powers of which people are a part, within which ongoingness is at stake. Maybe, but only maybe, and only with intense commitment and collaborative work and play with other terrans, flourishing for rich multispecies assemblages that include people will be possible. I am calling all this the Chthulucene—past, present, and to come (ibid. 160).

Not only Chthulucene is an immanence of past, present and to come, but it also comes through a processual and gradual constituent time, “with intense commitment and collaborative work and play”. Haraway continues to describe Chthulucene from a perspective of government of things, an immanence of human and nonhuman, spatial and temporal elements in the network that sustains the life force of that constituent power: “entangles myriad temporalities and

spatialities and myriad intra-active entities-in assemblages—including the more-than-human, other-than-human, inhuman, and human-ashumus”.(ibid)

Till now, the axis of time and its transformations during the collective act was analyzed. In the next session, the focus will be on the space.

5.4 Site in the Performative Event

In our discussions on time, we established the inherent relationship between temporality and spatiality. It was argued that Kairos should be always considered in a kario-tope assemblage and the monstrous body of performative event emerges in a savage time-space, in Chthulucene.

But what space are we talking about? The problematic of space has been critically presented by various thinkers and theorists, especially in its relationship with performativity, yet not all of them have been talking about the same space.

To address this problem, one should consider two different types of space that are interwoven, yet can be differentiated from each other (which was shortly discussed in the discussion on Ranciere’s notion of aesthetics): one, space as social position or one’s already determined place in society; and two, space as enclosure, or according to ontogenetical perspective of this research, space as a concrete social product and an element productive of social relation.

5.4.1 Space as social positioning

The first type is space as social positioning. This type of space is directly defined by the representation apparatus of governmentality, which is not at all delimited in a so-called national territory – at least, not since the 9/11 and the declaration of war on terror.

An episode of “Homeland” television series – a propaganda TV show devoted to promoting the public image of United States War in Terror broadcasted simultaneously with OWS movement – tells the story of a fictional operation for hunting down an American woman assisting “Arab”

terrorists. Checking her background, CIA finds out that the accused was once arrested before in United Kingdom, when she was 17 years old and protesting in front of a G8 meeting. A high-rank CIA agent then asks: “so, how does a schoolgirl become a terrorist?”

An activist of alterglobalization movement, a movement that gave currency to performative and carnivalesque forms of protest, is considered a “terrorist” in mainstream media mentality. And she gets, as a White American, on the same level with “Arabs” who are already considered outsider and certainly in lower levels of social status as immigrants. The space of the society is partitioned in a way to place certain groups, identities or even individuals in pre-defined “places”. Each place is named by the authority of the constituted power of government, just like each creature was named by the authority of God and then man as the greatest of all creatures – as one can read in the Old Testament, on which Walther Benjamin writes: “God made things knowable in their names. And man names them according to knowing” (On Language as Such and on the Languages of Man 15).

The naming creates different identities and places, from normal people to pervert ones, sane to insane, healthy to sick, law-obeying to criminal, respectable citizens to terrorists, illegal immigrants, and so on. Each place is bestowed by a social status, and limits of action, and all of them are redefined in political economic discourses.⁷⁰

Here one should be aware of the distinction between space and place: while space is a general concept referring to spatial relations and not fully determined and defined, place is a determined, pre-defined space. And the process of determination is what matters, as we saw and shall see further in the following.

⁷⁰ See the discussion on the hierarchizing the audience of political spectacle in chapter three

5.4.2 Space as Enclosure

While the first type of space is more related to the social status, the second type deals with a more common-sense definition of space as concrete places for individuals and groups to “be in there”: space as “habitat”.

17th century of England was the era of the embryonic bourgeois State. During this period, well-known as “primitive accumulation” in Marxist terminology, the common lands were appropriated by state and turned into the so-called public property. In this process, fences emerged around common lands, turning them to “enclosures”, and herds of sheep were released inside these enclosures as a sign of another type of property, which was no longer common. The popular movement of Diggers emerged to take down these fences and defend common rights, and consequently was brutally suppressed.

The modern society has been partitioned to different concrete spaces with different property rights: public or private. Each space has its own regulations and functions with its own inhabitants. Even in contemporary capitalism, we have witnessed the emergence of different activities who challenges these partitioning, as diggers did. For example, as we read in the agit-prop of Reclaim the Street (RTS), streets for them are today the enclosed spaces. “What was ‘the commons of the city’ in a mythic past, commonly utilizable space for discussions and exchange within a social community, has been removed from this use today. Whereas in the past it was sheep that led to the privatization of land, today it is cars that take urban public space away from use by the inhabitants” (Hamm).

Representation is again the main factor of defining space here: the State as the representative owns the public space and recognizes and protects the right for private property of space for citizens while denies it for certain groups of non-citizens. The private owners in their turn will be those who represent their owned spaces in front of others. This is also not confined in a national territory, as we have multinational companies owning different lands and other spaces in different countries of global North and South.

What seems to be common at the first glance in these two types is their necessarily social character. Both types are social products or at least connected to certain sociality at work in a

certain society. Therefore, as we mentioned before, these two spaces are mutually related and interconnected, in a way that to talk about one necessarily leads to the other. The following sections will first discuss the critical approaches to space which addresses these two types simultaneously and then, through the example of recent social movements, will see how new spatial relations could form which challenge these two social products of space and make room for the new to come.

5.4.3 Space and Sociality

Space has been a very important factor in maintaining authority and a certain regime of governmentality. Drawing national borders and dividing country into different partitions (provinces, states, etc) are only the most general obvious examples of this fact. As Linda McDowel writes, “there is a reciprocal relationship between the constitution of places and people” (Capital Culture 1); not just as social positioning, but also in relation to resistance and struggle against the imposed hierarchy on society and the inaccessibility of (public) space for the public.

Therefore, challenging the established spatiality and using spatial knowledge has been long conducted by revolutionaries, leftist theorists, and social protest movements. As Frank N. Pieke explain in the case of Chinese students and workers’ struggle against the authoritarian Communist regime, it was not accidental that Tiananmen Square became the center of protests in 1989; simply because “occupying, and conquering space ... became the primary means to negotiate and eventually struggle for the exercise of legitimate power in China” (Images of Protest 167).

Henri Lefebvre was among the first Marxist thinkers who gave a special attention to the concept of space. Arguing that Marxism has neglected space in favor of time, he formulated his main argument as follows: capitalism produces and arranges space in a way that maintains its reproduction and accumulation of surplus value. Having experienced the May 68 movement, Lefebvre asserted that city and urban spaces have a definite role in the struggle against capital and their radical transformation is not only a tool for struggle but the struggle itself. “Right to the

City”, one of the most famous essays of Lefebvre, became a slogan in recent urban struggles against capitalism.

The reproductive function of space, in particular urban space, linked those aforementioned two types of space in Lefebvre’s work: on one hand, the concrete spaces are organized in a way that facilitates the flows of value and labour power and contains them in the capitalist distribution system, which on the other hand, relates directly to the class-based social positions of producers, workers, consumers, and so on. It is from this perspective that one should understand his famous sentence that “space is a product”. Those two types of space presuppose, reinforce and reproduce each other.

However, Lefebvre has been criticized due to mainly two reasons: he ignores the temporality and its role on spatial determinations; and he assigns all the power of determining the space to the capitalist State or governmentality, subtracting the constituent power of people.

In Lefebvre, there is certain duality between time and space as two completely autonomous entities. Before starting this section, we argued for the entanglement of temporal and spatial axes. David Harvey, another thinker of political geography, argues for the same fact:

The circulation of capital makes time the fundamental dimension of human affairs. Under capitalism, after all, it is *socially necessary labor time* that forms the substance of value, *surplus labor time* that lies at the origin of profit, and the ratio of surplus labor time to *socially necessary turnover time* that defines the rate of profit and, ultimately, the average rate of interest...Under capitalism, therefore, the meaning of space and the impulse to create new spatial configurations of human affairs can be understood only in relation to such temporal requirements. (The Ways of the World)

Harvey believes that space is “used, organized, created and dominated” to help with the circulation of capital. The capitalist spatial organization has produced the international division of labour as well as various crises all over the world. Moreover, this organization leads to certain division between center and periphery in which the center and periphery also have their own centers and peripheries. What these divided spaces contain are certain people with certain different class statuses and social positions and also those who have no space, those who struggle

against this organization, and those who make rebellions in cities, the urban spaces of capitalism, to challenge its spatiality. The latter is what Harvey thoroughly discussed in his “Rebel Cities”.

Just like Lefebvre who proposes a wide urban movement against capital as the only solution which can make use of space as a tool and afterward opens the way for a new urbanism or new configuration of space, it seems Harvey harnesses the same idea. Discussing the common as the metropolitan space in contemporary capitalism, Harvey argues that reclaiming the common is not the solution. In his words,

... the problem is not the common per se, but the *relations* between those who produce or capture it at a variety of scales and those who appropriate it for private gain (Rebel Cities 79 - emphasis added).

Therefore, it seems that a critique of space leads Harvey to put the general solution in an old familiar Marxist formulation: a revolutionary movement is to change the relations of production. To which one could ask this question: what if the space (and time) is itself a relation? What if the space is at the same time produced and productive? What if the transforming of space, reclaiming it, is a transformative power which changes those relations between producers?

Capital as a relation is not subjected to its terms. In other words, “the individual body” cannot set itself free of this relation willingly. Moreover, one or many cannot just leave the society in an act of self-marginalization to be outside of this relation. Living in farms, going to remote places or any other similar act would just serve to ease the bad conscience, while one should abandon all illusions of not making one’s hands dirty, all illusions of an actually existing Outside to capitalism – as it was the main idea of Marxism-Leninism.

Here, as we argued before, one can find the paradigm of immanent struggle, in the complex system of conjunctions and disjunctions between capitalist relation, spatio-temporality, and the performativity of bodies. The bodies perform in a way that produces a relation between them; however, the conditions of their performance, the space and time they are performing in, limit their performativity or mostly impose a pre-written drama on them, which means they provide the bodies with a pre-existing relation and therefore, frame their performance. However, space and time are themselves already distributed and defined by the existing relation. On the other

hand, the performative force of the bodies, the constituent power of the moving flesh, or the desire cannot be totally delimited and channeled. As Deleuze and Guattari say, a society leaks out on all sides. This is where the excessive performativizations begin ephemerally set up another relation, to then trigger the radical imagination toward offering an alternative – not a defined solidified alternative, but the being of alternative itself, the ghost which is haunting the global imagination.

Limiting ourselves to the spatial relation, we can summarize the whole point as follows: 1) existing spatiality is a capitalist social relation; 2) space as a relation works as a condition for performativization; 3) but we have a two-sided connectivity between performativization and spatiality, which means performative event is able to transform the spatial relation; 4) that is because performative event brings about two transformation: corporeal and incorporeal.

5.4.4 Philosophers of Spatial Relation

Defining space as relation has the benefit of containing all types of space mentioned in the beginning. A contemporary French philosopher whose project is fundamentally focused on space is Jacques Ranciere, according to who “art is not political because it deals with political matters or represents social and political conflicts. It is first political because it reframes the distribution of space, its visibility and—let us say—its habitability”. Space as well as time are conceived as “social relations” in Ranciere’s re-conceptualization of aesthetics – as it was discussed thoroughly in Chapter Two.

Although he recognizes spatiality as a social relation, Ranciere focuses on the distribution of the sensible. He must presuppose the existing spatial relations in order to be able to conceptualize their re-distribution and disruption through dislocation. The paradox is if space is a relation, it is productive of sensible, and therefore, could be possibly transform into another relation. To explore this possibility, it seems necessary to go back to one of Ranciere’s main theoretical resources: Foucault.

Michel Foucault's seminal text, "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias" (1997 (1967)), not only predicts, but also emphasizes on the importance of "relation" in understanding contemporary space. In his short genealogy of the conception of space in different epistemological periods, he distinguishes three kinds of spatial understanding.

The first one, medieval space, is the space of emplacement, "a hierarchic ensemble of places" divided into sacred/profane, urban/rural, celestial/supercelstial dualities (330). The second one, the modern space or the extensive space, comes after Galileo's effect whose importance, according to Foucault, is to show "space is nothing but a point in its movement", is not closed but infinite, and earth is not co-extensive with the space of the world. "In other words, starting with Galileo and the seventeenth century, extension was substituted for localization." (331)

But the third kind, which concerns us, is the contemporary space called by Foucault "site". Site has a familiar ring in our ears: websites, multisite networks, restriction site in a DNA, subsites, etc. Foucault also relates the term to technics and defines it by way of referring to data collection, memory of a machine, and coded elements. Moreover, he considers site as a heterogeneous space delineated by our very social relations:

The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another. (333)

One can see the shift from the extensive space of modernity to the intensive, relational space of contemporary capitalism parallel to the passage from disciplinary societies to the societies of control; which concerns the crisis of modern spaces of confinement in disciplinary societies and their transformation from "molds" to "modulations"; or in other words, from extensive spaces to spaces delineated by social relations.

In the case of art, one can see how this shift contributed to the so-called curatorial turn. To grasp the concept of curatorial turn, one should return to 1960s; the decade of big transformations in

all social fields. In that period, as Paul O'Neill correctly indicates, "the primary discourse around art-in-exhibition began to turn away from forms of critique of the artwork as autonomous object of study/critique towards a form of curatorial criticism, in which the space of exhibition was given critical precedence over that of the objects of art" (O'Neill 13). The notion of *curator*, as the guardian or keeper of a museum, is closely tied to the *space* of art. However, by the social uprisings of 1960s, the concept of space itself went into crisis, since the rigid and strict boundaries between various spaces – or as Foucault would say, spaces of confinement – became to shatter and blur and the whole social field entered into an immanent order of non-vertical organizations as well as subjected to an omnipresent control strategy. In the Italian movement of autonomists, for instance, workers, students, lawyers, physicians, nurses, women, homosexuals, judges and so on joined the movement and contributed to the molecular revolution as well as molar revolution in various social fields and spaces. If Boris Buden is right that "an act of criticism almost necessarily implies the awareness of a crisis and vice versa," (Buden), then it makes sense why programmers started to develop a critical discourse on the "space" of art.

Foucault's genealogy captures the various deterritorializing forces and movements which transgress the established limits of space in each epistemological period, construct another spatiality with its own limits. These deterritorializations are embodied in contemporary capitalism, too, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest. The contemporary space emerges through the deterritorializing forces of informatics, machines, and etc. As capitalism moves always in reaction to the autonomous constituent power of the collective subjectivities, it has to reterritorialize around the extraction of value and accumulation of capital.

What Foucault sees as the signs of incomplete deterritorialization or liberation of space are the still subsisting modern dualities: "for example between private space and public space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space of leisure and that of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred". For Foucault, the sacred subsists from medieval space⁷¹.

⁷¹ In the same context, Luce Irigaray dates back the relation between sacred and space much further by interpreting the Western-Christian historical conception of time and space in philosophy of subject through mythology: "In the beginning there was space and the creation of space ... The gods, God, first create space. And time is there, more or

But the subsistence of such typologies of space does not explain the contemporary one. Indeed, Foucault had to adopt a particular perspective that fits to the contemporary image of thought and explains the immanent workings of site as Foucault explains.

Space is (re)productive as far as it is a social relation, conditioning the performativization of subjectivities, the production of so-called identities, and is a product as far as it is shaped and configured in-between of these performativizations, the actions of collective subjectivities. Now, from this perspective, we are going to inspect this two-sided ontology of space in recent protest “Occupy” movements, dealing with the contemporary capitalist space.

5.4.5 Smooth Space: Contemporary Capitalism’s Spatiality

The distinction between striated and smooth space is helpful to define the contemporary space. Developed by Deleuze and Guattari, striated space is a space with determinate divisions: surface and depth, roof and bottom, a surface coded as A and a surface coded as B and so on. The modern extensive space was such a space: different spaces of confinement, such as family houses, schools, factories, universities, mental hospitals, prisons, etc. with their rules, disciplines, and strict limits, with their central State, public spaces, private ones, bourgeois institutions and so on. Inside each space, there was a hierarchy: father/mother/child, capitalist/manager/foremen/skilled workers/ unskilled workers, boss/overseer/white or pink-collar workers... However, with the new knowledge-based cognitive capitalism, the different surfaces and levels of modern striated extensive spaces, its strata, destratified into the capitalist smooth space.

less in the service of space... God would be time itself, lavishing or exteriorizing itself in its action in space, in places”. (An Ethics of Sexual Difference 7) She then goes on to claim that time is the interiority of the masculine subject with the masculine experienced as time, and space is the exteriority implying abyss with the feminine experienced as space. Therefore, the feminine, the abyss, or the space has always been subjugated to the subject, the interiority, the time. The feminine provides spaces for the masculine, but it is itself an abyss, not locatable, occupies no space. So, if Foucault concerns himself with the problem of the sacred in space, one can ask, through Irigaray, the following question: if space is feminine, which means it is productive, or rather, reproductive, then how to release it, how to release it from God, how to release it from the reproduction necessities of masculine time?

With the hegemonization of immaterial labour, the focus of production has displaced on the innovation, creativity, flexibility, knowledge, and performance. Using the cognitive abilities to produce necessitates easier flowing of information, better communication, minimum levels of obstructing discipline and instead, micro-scale employment of control strategies. In other words, cognitive or immaterial workers should use artificial commons (sentiments, language, thoughts, and knowledge) to produce value. These necessary conditions of productions lead to the surpassing of established limits, deterritorializing the traditional territories and hierarchies, and going toward the network organization. On the other hand, the neoliberal deregulation and intensified privatization of public properties – including public spaces – in favor of multinational corporations marks again our era as the era of erasing the traditional set of dualities and limits. If Marx and Engels regarded Bourgeoisie as the revolutionaries who have created a new sociality in an era in which “all that is solid melts into the air” (Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party), our era has also witnessed the erasure of many bourgeois institutions and ideologies, the dissolution of social traditional bodies such as people, family, clubs, etc, the power of multinationals over central states, and so on. This is again an era in which all concepts and ideas which were central to bourgeoisie have been melting into the air. The contemporary spatiality has transformed in the same manner, too.

One should keep in mind, as Negri and Hardt points out, that the immaterial biopolitical labour is autonomous in relation to capital (see Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth 142). Production needs collectivity, organization and communication. In Fordism, this collectivity could be possible through gathering workers together around factory machinery, because manual material labour was central in producing surplus value and accumulating capital, and for producing collective subjectivities to do this, capitalism needed workers to communicate around something. Of course, this was an opportunity for resistance too, since resistance as collective action could emerge from these collective subjectivities in different processes of subjectification (see Hardt, Into the Factory: Negri’s Lenin and the Subjective Caesura). On the other hand, immaterial labour put language, affections, and bodily performances into use. Doing this means exploiting the immaterial faculties of humans through which communication is possible. That is why immaterial workers are always communicating and the organization of labour needs horizontal networks to

access the flows of information -- and not Fordist vertical hierarchies anymore. Consequently, the place of production is directly common and the management of immaterial labour is no longer immanent to the production process, but external to it, since it doesn't need to create common places for communication or intervene and control the "process of production" directly. In other words, if accumulation of capital in Fordism was through the profit production, the accumulation of capital in post-Fordism is via rent (see Negri, Postface). Moreover, this process led to a blurring of boundaries between "work time" and "leisure life", or "performance" and "daily life" of the workers (Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth 146), those dualities mentioned by Foucault. For example, the working day has been seemingly shorter, but it's extended into the whole day via smart phones, netbooks, laptops and other tools. This phenomenon has led to a more dispersed and scattered network of Power and supervision and that's why the so-called control societies have emerged instead of discipline societies.

Although capitalism is external to immaterial production, it cannot let it be free of regulations and control. As Foucault shows in his *Birth of Biopolitics*, the neoliberal art of governmentality does not interfere directly in the economic field, rather it sets regulations from outside to channel the production process (See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics). That's why the relation of capital to biopolitical production is of a parasite. This parasite is the mentioned major reterritorialization of the smooth space: an externally imposed territory for production of value, which keeps the smoothness, but re-appropriates the produced wealth. Therefore, production on this smooth space is the production of capitalist reproduction and the reproduction of capitalist production; no matter if it is now not striated as conventional Fordist space.

Smooth space and striated space are not opposite to each other: they develop out of each other, are present in each other, and form different mixtures. However, one should note that the established sociality imposes striation on social space: the representative government represents the public and its public space, develops proper regulations, and manages it. By the increasing weakening of central state after neoliberalism and the crisis of representation both in politics (representative democracy) and arts, the imposed striation has been disappearing, and the aforementioned transformation in conditions of production turned the spatiality of capitalism into a smooth one, suitable for the functioning of rent. Although the smooth space is

heterogeneous, the capitalist smoothing process imposes the hegemony of its labour and production conditions (i.e. its social relations of (re)production) on the space, privatizing it, and reconfiguring it around the possibility of wealth accumulation.

Therefore, we need to differentiate between two smooth spaces and two striated spaces.

- ***The smooth and striated space of constituted power:*** the former is a result of contemporary global capitalist processes, mostly visible in the erasure of public space and an intensification of privatization in form of corporate property, and the latter is the space proper to the disciplinary power, and an intervening State that creates rigid lines of subjectification for its predefined subjective positions.
- ***The smooth and striated space of constituent power:*** the former emerges when the code of the everyday sign is defunct and performative event effects a rupture, thus deterritorializing already established limits, while the latter is produced through an immanent molecular striation of a smooth space in the gradual temporality of constituent action. This will be explained further in the next section.

Flat Ontology and the Site of Performative Event

The space and its dynamic processes under the rule of capitalism has been described in previous sections. What remains to be yet discussed is the spaces of unruliness under such conditions, the Deleuzian spatiums that hosts intensive becomings and monstrous bodies.

In the light of Occupy Movements, Keith Woodward, John Paul Jones III, and Sallie A. Marston suggests a perspective of immanence to understand such spaces; the perspective of “flat ontology”.

Woodward et al argue for a "flat ontology" that contests the privileged, transcendent abstraction of structural, hierarchical, and formal treatments of "being". (204) For them, flat ontology has become a necessary image of thought in order to "stress the situated, immanent nature of being (or 'becoming') - often characterized by generative , material processes of self-organization and self-differentiation - against the supposed timelessness and ubiquity of idealistic essentialism”

(205) An ontology capable of explaining the emergence of swarming patchwork bodies that – as we have argued before – are produced within a machinic assemblage of the human and the inhuman, under a government of things. Thus, “an immanent ontology that requires ... no transcendental organizing principle or category beyond the swarms of material articulation’ (Woodward et al, 2010, qtd. in page 211).

Their flat ontology signifies our conception of ontogenesis in this research. It does not prioritize solid being over becoming as in classical ontology; on the contrary, it tries to capture the micropolitical processes occur in occupation tent cities throughout the world. It also tries to fit with the kairological paradigm of time, defining those spaces as kairotopes, where durational processes of becoming are performativizing ideas of the political through the space. Indeed, when Antonio Negri tries to speculate on the time of revolution in a framework of absolute immanence, he points to the same flattening of the being:

This radical flattening of being, this refound surface of ontology destroys any neo-Kantian claim for the difference of intellect from experience; it uproots every subjective genealogy of being; and it opens onto the problem of the reconstruction of a new ontological terrain (Marx and Foucault 5).

The new ontological terrain that we call ontogenesis affirms a productive relation between the performative, virtual bodily forces and the discursive, actualized signs and structures. Although the latter conditions the former, it is produced by it.

One of the reasons for flat-ontological perspective, Woodward et al explain, is also the non-discursive characteristic of the collective body that forms in the spaces of Occupy movements. For them, what appears to come out of those spaces resembles more “noise” than articulated demands. This refusal of actualized modern discourses has made many critiques on the Left, even between contemporary thinkers who still side with modernist concepts such as Badiou⁷², as they

⁷² Badiou calls occupy movements as “blind, naive, scattered and lacking a powerful concept of durable organization” (The rebirth of History).

also hear nothing but noise from those movements and do not try to train new ears to hear the inaudible forces of those movements.

On the contrary, Woodward et al argue that adopting a *flat-ontological* perspective witnesses to “a willingness to attend to the uncertain noise that erupts with difference and singularity” which they describe as “an obscure, uncompromising remainder that imposes itself when all the orders and similarities have been enumerated, logged and filed away.” (208)

The production of nonlinguistic, performative signs that break away with the code of the everyday signs is explained through Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche in previous chapter. We argued that performative event’s rupture brings about an emptying out of the master signifier, following by a chaotic field of impulsive forces and creating of new phantasms and simulacra. In this kairological time, a self-loss happens, a Foucauldian desubjectification (*dassujettissement*) that disrupts the modern duality of subject/object and therefore, it refuses to be grasped by subject-oriented thinking. Woodward et al chose the aforementioned Foucault’s notion of site exclusively to explain a space proper to such a moment in the performative event. They argue that other conceptions of spatialities “are the disciplinary and fetishized sister concepts to subject-thinking: they manifest a number of lingering Cartesian extensive spaces that grid materiality or reflect Kantian spatial structures arranged by the control center of transcendental thought” (Woodward, 2010). In the same manner, Boyarin refers to “close genealogical links between the ‘Cartesian coordinates’ of space and time and the discrete, sovereign state” (*Space, Time and the Politics of Memory* 4) that include relations of mapping, boundary setting, inclusion and exclusion.

For them, site should thus be understood through its capability of making relations and its micropolitical processes. In short, site is an affective environment ripe for contagion. Therefore, the methodology for analyzing sites cannot steam from a thinking based on the principle of identity or as Woodward et al formulate it, “refuse the checklist of identity categories” (212); rather, as this research suggests, a performativization method can “discern the nonsubjective and unnamable, yet completely material processes of the site” (*ibid*), those “instances of self-organization and auto-affection that carry on regardless of the place or ‘role’ of the subject”

(211), setting in motion with the virtual and performative forces of an event – the forces effect that desubjectification:

certain material (counter)movements ... not only constitute the event space of the site, but simultaenously 'suspend' the subject. (206)

In such a site, identities blur and open up to the other, as we discussed in the case of Istanbul's Kadikoy march in support of Kurds, when the so-called "white-Turks" started to shout non-sensical slogans in an attempt to talk a banned language for the first time. Woodward et al call this an "anexact enactment of an identity", coming out of the suspension of subject (or more exactly, a suspension of subjectification coding) and creating noise, "the extra- or a-subjective clusters of orientations – the 'noise' – that make up the site" (209).

With the suspension of the subject, the space opens up to new processes of subjectification, and "allows us glimpses of the effects of a site's drawing-together, the immanent enlistment of whatever bodies produce singularities" (Woodward et al 213). In other words, the gradual and caring process of molecular striation of the space begins.

If we are confronted with a smooth space, we should keep in mind that smooth space is completely indeterminate and chaotic. Subjectification, on the other hand, needs performativization, individuation, and determination. Striating space is not in itself a negative concept, if it comes immanently from inside, from the very constituent power that deterritorializes the private/public space, making it smooth, and then striates it into the common space through its performativity. Neither the common can be pre-supposed, nor the collective subjectivity with its different names (people, multitude, and so on); both of them are produced. This process of commonizing the space set out the collective subjectification, since it is the event which corporeally and incorporeally changes the social relations including spatiality; while the smooth capitalist space, due to its hegemonic function of rent which prevents alternative collective subjectivities to be formed, reproduces the already established typologies of subjective positions⁷³ as its main function.

⁷³ See the discussion on the code of the everyday signs in chapter three.

When the constituent power forms temporarily the social relations, then the production on this smooth space is not anymore under capitalist conditions: the non-reproductive production produces excess that cannot be absorbed again in the process of reproduction; the excesses that according to Woodward et al these excesses “erupting from botched performativity” that is now liberated and “begin to produce material effects in the world” (209). Hence the production of the poor; the artistic strategies of aesthetic production that prevail in Occupy movements. And an alternative sociality will emerge.

These excesses are produced under an alternative relationality to capitalist relation in forms of different simulacra that appear in multiple artistic and performative practices and experimentations. They are aesthetic, in the sense that they produce alternative subjectification processes. Collective striations mark different parts of the site, and new subjectivities grow on them. As such, they create zones with different tonalities, affectivities and textures. Something like a patchwork that sews pieces of fabrics with different color, texture and size.

In Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology (A Thousand Plateaus 476), patchwork functions as an example for their conception of smooth space: the *common* space of nomads, the space of nomadic war machines against the hierarchical, established relations of the striated space of the State or capitalism. For us, as we explained here, patchwork is a reclaimed smooth space by a collective patchwork body that create different affectivities and subjectivities in a non-hierarchical way. In one sense, it is still smooth, as it is the common site of immobile nomads, and on the other hand, it is heterogenous, different in nature from the subjugated space it was before.

A concept that supplements the notion of patchwork in Deleuze and Guattari is “consistency”: the autonomous formation of machinic assemblages between diverse elements in a non-hierarchical way. On one hand, consistency explains the molecular striation of alternative subjectification lines on a patchwork site, without it losing its character of smoothness. On the other hand, it connects the spatiality of patchwork with the kairological time of morphogenetic process that generates new beings without homogenizing and hierarchizing them:

Consistency necessarily occurs between heterogeneities, not because it is the birth of a differentiation, but because heterogeneities that were formerly content to coexist or succeed one

another become bound up with one another through the "consolidation" of their coexistence or succession. ... What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities as such (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus* 364).

As much as the molecular striation⁷⁴ needs the gradual and processual kairological temporality, it needs a site for experimentation. That is why the space in occupation movements looks like a stage cut out from the urban scene. The Versuchers don't need to move away from where they are, marching toward other places or attack different governmental buildings, because "their aim is to resist over-coding as well as to invent ways of being different without having to seize/smash the state as their default option" (Newman 36).

The fixation on space, however, does not signify any statics. On the contrary, as we have seen, a site is swarmed not only by human and inhuman bodies and elements, but also with multiple virtual and performative forces. Its dynamics is rather intensive than extensive. "The nomad is on the contrary he who does not move", Deleuze and Guattari write (D&G, 1988, 381). Moreover, to insist on a space is to resist against the mechanisms of dispossession; a case best observed in indigenous struggles for lands and natural resources.

Still, we need to delve deeper into the cases in order to track the different performativizations and as we exemplified the previous section on time mostly through OWS and Occupy Tahrir, we continue with that in the following sections section.

⁷⁴ Before, we have referred to a processual piece by the Hawaiian Diggers, a guerrilla theatre group in Hawaii (see Chan and Sharma). Their strategy of changing a particular relationality in their community was not through forming a common isolation in a space of their urban life, or even staying in one place. Instead, they marked the space with a plant in order to problematize the accepted coding of space into public and private, making social established answers turn to new questions through a micropolitical performative durational action. Their simple moves (to plant papaya seedlings beside the fence between formerly public space turned private and a current public space, to inform people about them and introducing future trees as common property for all, opening a free shop) made a discussion between people about the nature of space and its owners, keyholders and regulators (state in the case of public property, private entities and corporations in the case of private property). It created a different socialites when former insensitive citizens became involved in a free circulations of goods and trying to create a common property that everybody has access to.

5.4.6 The Occupy Form: Immanent Striation of the Contemporary Smooth Space

One of the biggest city squares in the world, Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, has been a place of protest for at least a century. Parallel to this, it has been the main symbol of capital, the place of military parades, anniversaries of People's Republic, statues of People's leaders, enormous pictures of supreme leaders, prestigious site of welcoming foreign leaders, and in short, a public space re-appropriated by the State centralized power and used for its own purposes.

In 1976, The Tiananmen Incident happened, because people wanted to keep, against the will of The Gang of Four top officials of the communist party, the displays of mourning after the death of Premier Zhou Enlai. Although the public space of Tiananmen was supposed to belong to the public, the party ordered to clean the square. Thirteen years later, the square was still in hands of the so-called representatives of people, the communist party of china which embraced capitalism and its conception of growth. Amid a very high inflation and cutbacks in social spending (including education which caused higher tuition fees, worse conditions in dormitories, etc.), student protestors went to the square and gradually occupied it. During the occupation, the governmental territory imposed on the square deterritorialized and protesters reappropriated their own space, commonizing it. The protest was not at all limited to students: it was a general call to everyone, surpassing the limits of different identities while recognizing the differences. The square became a tent city, with collective self-organization of daily life and resources. However, the routine was no longer repetitive and dull: it was full of joy and happiness. The politics was also no longer hierarchical and boring: it entangled with collective delight and exuberance. People were there with their trucks and tractors. Children were there singing and playing (see Pieke).

Succeeding in removing the imposed striation from the square, occupiers were gradually and immanently striating their own space: alternative collective subjectivities were formed. The spatiality was becoming totally different as the event was transforming corporeal and incorporeal relations. The immanent striation could be seen as embodied in the statue of "Goddess of Liberty"; a statue the created in four days by student-occupiers of Central Academy of Fine Arts inside the square. The art machine had plugged into the revolutionary machine, in an era in which

the gurus of management keep telling us that “MFA (master of fine arts) is the new MBA (master of business administration)” (Pink 54).

Out of these real transformations, ordinary people of Beijing, in every street of the city, were feeling a different sociality: they were those who stood in front of the army after the declaration of martial law and didn't let the armed vehicles reach the square; they were the main people who got killed on 3rd of June. It was not only Tiananmen Square massacre, but Beijing massacre, in order to reclaim the space, to destroy the embryos of alternative social relations.

China is the most famous example for the fact that economic (neo)liberalism does not necessarily bring political liberalism, i.e. parliamentary democracy. With the crisis of representative democracy as well as economic liberalism in the late 2000s, the occupy form emerged again all around the world: from Bahrain and Egypt to Turkey and Greece and Spain to United States.

5.4.7 OWS and its Spatialities

The sites of Occupy performative events all show similar abstract processes of virtual forces that performativize differently according to each context: “the affective bodily arrangements of human and non-human participants; the charismatic chaos of unexpected eruptions and routine redundancies; the complex of arrivals and departures that both connect sites to one another and continually reshape their boundaries; and in the recruiting of human bodies into political moments unanticipatable from the perspective of their subjectivities alone” (Woodward et al 206)

One of the main performative impulses of the occupy movements was the re-appropriation of the space, turning the public property into the common property. An earlier, but self-evident example of struggle over common space happened in Greece, although three years before 2011 occupy movement. In fact, the “Scream” revolt in December 2008 was the background of resistance that Syntagma Square occupation placed itself in it. Just months after the revolt, an abandoned place in Athens was transformed into a park. Theodoros Karyotis describes this park, Navarinou, as “self-managed by neighbors and collectives and available for cultural and social

events” that “despite attempts at eviction, the park retains its character to this day” (The Right to the City in an Age of Austerity).

According to Karyotis, Navarinou “represented an early instance of the substitution of ‘public’ space with ‘common’ space; of rigid, aseptic space that serves as a neutral ground between isolated individuals with organic space where individuals can connect and intertwine their desires in the context of the community, where they can negotiate the terms of their co-existence.” (ibid)

This communizing of the public space, and turning it into a site of experimentation with an alternative sociality, repeated itself in later occupy movements such as Occupy Wall Street. OWS started in a park in the heart of US financial capitalism. Zuccotti Park symbolizes a location which obviously witnesses to the smoothening process of neoliberalism, since it was a former public space, called “Liberty Plaza Park”, fully privatized only in 2006, and became John Zuccotti’s private property. A space formerly supposedly belonged to the public, Liberty Plaza Park was located where in 18th century, the first public demonstration against Tea Act happened, which gradually led to United States independence. One of the few remaining open public spaces in the heart of Wall Street financial district, it was covered with dust and destroyed with debris after 9/11 and then sold to Brookfield Properties for renovation.

Zuccotti park is located between Wall Street and former site of World Trade Center. In 2010, an anti-mosque rally was held there. Unlike other types of protests that meet with sudden police aggression, some 300 ultraright-wing protesters held their gathering there, although permit request was rejected. After they finished, the park’s western side was a reminder of nationalist imagination and a desire to homogenous body, as American and Gadsden flags were flying all over the place.

After occupying Zuccotti Park in September 2011, leftist activists erected a tent city, like al-Tahrir square; even their initial call was: “are you ready for a Tahrir movement”? The adbusters who made the call, asked their readers to “catch the zeitgeist” and describe their movement “a fusion of Tahrir with the Acampadas of Spain” (see Writers for the 99%).

There were many committees in the camp to make possible and facilitate the direct democratic collective decision making without any attempt to annul the differences between different actors

of this struggle, or in other words, to practice the non-representational democracy. But as an activist emphasizes, “the space took time to develop into this”, in a durational process of a collective constituent time that slowly striated the already smooth space and created alternative lines of subjectification. (ibid 44) Indeed, many committees and groups formed in preparation time in a network-based organization before the event: food committee, students committee, the outreach committee, the internet working group, the arts and culture working group, and the tactical committee.

Having been started as reclaiming a privatized former public Park, OWS extended its struggle over space into other parts of the city, especially regarding the gentrification of lower-income family neighborhoods that raise the rent and services price and make the former occupants leave their houses to new middle class mostly white residents.⁷⁵ In one case, the occupiers joined another occupy movement, “occupy 447” in Harlem neighborhood. Occupy 447 tries to save a historical landmark and low-income residential building at 447 west 142nd street, which is a hot district in terms of gentrification. Since October 2010, the corporate owners who wanted to demolish the building and evacuate its low-income residents, faced with their resistance, and in response left the building without heat and hot water. (ibid 119)

It was mentioned that OWS camp, although equipped with various organizational innovations and assemblies, was indeed chaotic. The camp was “totally jerry-rigged, improvisation built upon improvisation”, writes one activist. But as Woodward et al remind us, this is part of the flat-ontological aspect of the site, as it suspends dominant subjectification:

a politics not tethered to the agency of subjects ... accounts for the fact that even direct participants have scratching their heads and fumbling to make sense of this messy reality" (209)

Remembering Ranciere main thesis that is “[art] is first political because it reframes the distribution of space, its visibility and—let us say—its habitability” (Artists and Cultural Producers 1), it is worth to look at OWS map. It resembles a patchwork as it consists of different corners

⁷⁵ Indeed, this was one of the points of protest in Occupy Gezi, especially for transgender community whose main neighborhood close to Taksim was subjected to gentrification.

with different functionalities, but even in its dynamics, it differentiates into various forms of subjectification.

The site of the OWS movement made a machinic assemblage possible between the human and the nonhuman elements inside it. The props, signs, graffiti and posters covered the space to mark it as a laboratory of experimentation. Moreover, smartphones, tablets and other technical gadgets were integrated in the flows of the tent city, becoming part of the overall image of the movement and its network of *life*. Not to mention the tree of life which stood a few blocks away from the 9/11 memorial but became a living memorial to the imagination of occupiers.

As we have argued before, the collective body of performative events is best described as a “patchwork body” because different phantasms and simulacra attach themselves to such a body. The people gathered in the Wall Street had multiple political views or personal histories, mostly white but also from minority communities. And they developed different forms of political performativity while being part of one movement.

The space had lost its neutrality and smoothness gradually and the striation began, extending itself to the limits of the site. As one activist describes, “far from a homogenous buffer, the four sidewalks that make up Zuccotti’s perimeter quickly took the form of distinct zones, each with different sorts of interactions, shaped by particularities in the internal organization of the occupation itself.” (Writers for the 99% 126)

This shows itself in the inner dynamics in the camp, where the differences were materialized in the space, “mapped themselves out on the surface of the square and in the lived experience of those sleeping in the park” (ibid 61-62). This fact may however point to one of its failures, or to its incomplete process of desubjectification and deterritorialization.

Many activists described how the space gradually differentiated in a molar way along the lines of class and race, simultaneously with the molecular processes that were partially in force in the patchwork space of the performative event’s site. The latter manifested itself in a struggle over the space as common, where race and class does not represent any dividing line. Not only in various graffiti and street performances, but also in slogans one could trace the forces of such struggle – in slogans such as “whose street?/ Our street” or “Whose street?/ Troy’s street” that

refers to Troy Davis, an African-American convict who got executed in Georgia for a crime that many believed he did not do it. His name became a symbol of structural racism in the United States.

There was another issue with the police regarding the space. As a librarian participant in OWS says, “one of the things that you always know is that if the cops don't want you to go somewhere, you don't. they block it.” (Writers for the 99% 37) As the police barricaded around the Zuccotti Park, the free movement was stopped. (ibid 127) Police force is the harshest form of territorializing space, and the occupiers had to deal with that while performatively opening the borders of space.

But the molar differentiation started when the camp was divided geographically into eastern and western ends (Writers for the 99% 61-2). According to activists' inside stories, the Eastern end of the park accommodated the more reform oriented and middle-class supporters and the west was more occupied by the working class and “politically uncompromising activists” such as native Americans, black community and anarchist artists, particularly the drummers who were playing atop the stairs for extended periods every day. (ibid 63) Others also point out that the occupation sleeping areas were also marked by differences in class and race. In the Northeast, the well-educated and mainly white occupiers had their more comfortable tents and Zuccotti's southwest side was all black and Latino. As one black activist observes, the divisions were just like New York City. (ibid 65). The reproduction of divisions in the camp shows the limitations of performative movements, and their temporariness⁷⁶.

What seems interesting in the map of OWS camp is the name assigned to the space of arts: Art Area/Flexible Space. This space exists in every tent city of public square occupiers: in Al-Tahrir, for example, there were “a volunteer security service, trash collectors, medical services, a

⁷⁶ In syntagma square, there was also a division between ' the upper square' and the 'lower' square, although it formed its own patchwork space too, creating "collective self-mobilization across numerous fields, from media and farming co-operatives to autonomous health and art centres that labour under non-capitalist and non-statist principles of egalitarian participation and social solidarity" (and all these autonomous parts became part of the site in the squares). Upper part hosted more nationalist voices, where protesters demanded the rejection of economic agreements with the troika (IMF, EU and ECB) without a clear perspective for the future, while in the lower square, more politicized protestors started to create a framework of policies via assemblies (Prentoulis and Thomassen 224).

‘Painter’s Corner’ for literate protesters to make signs, outdoor exhibitions of revolutionary banners, a makeshift stage for poets to recite their poems, even an open air space for weddings” (Writers for the 99% 6). Or in Gezi, there was cinema, library, and various dance performances. These two examples refer to the smoothening processes, too: in case of Gezi, the intense gentrification process wanted to replace the park with a trade center, and in case of al-Tahrir, the big square was the central point for the flow of labour power, occupied by cars and vehicles, too crowded for people to even gather there normally for an hour or two.

Flexible/art space is a sign referring to the necessarily heterogeneous character of a site as smooth space which striated immanently. Unlike the capitalist smooth space which seems homogenous due to the privatization of its produced wealth, the immanently striated smooth space of collective subjectivities is heterogeneous, hosting various differences without homogenizing them. This type of relation is not only present in the organization of space, but also in the general organization of whole movement, which is self-managed, self-organized, network-based, and leaderless.

The OWS Arts and Culture Working Group was an important part of the movement. Indeed, they were the first group who attempted (and failed) to occupy wall street on September 1st and confronted with the first wave of mass arrests (146). One of the artists and performers who did this attempt insists on its importance although it failed, saying “we changed the nature of that space by stepping out there and calling attention to everybody that was there, speaking to people and calling them to see themselves... as a group, as connected” (Writers for the 99% 147).

When the occupation succeeded, the art group became the living force of imaginal recomposition. Alex Carvalho, a founding member of OWS Arts and Culture working group, explains their perspective like this:

Before social practices change, and institutions change, you need to change the conversation. you need to change the aesthetics, you need to change the symbols, the images people use as a backdrop to frame the conversation in the first place (Writers for the 99% 145).

Their flexible art space became a site of an intensive creativity. They believed that “we are at the brink of a new art movement, a new school of thought” (Writers for the 99% 145) and they asked others to join them in pushing the boundaries of we consider to be art. The flexible art space attempted to create what Benjamin called once an alternative “image space” (Surrealism 216-17), a space of an aesthetic production of new subjectivities⁷⁷. As organizers were insisting, their art wanted to differentiate itself from the territory established by creative industries, claiming that “in the OWS movement, arts are not simply decoration or distraction, but rather tools to engage the base, send a clear message, and engage people who would not necessarily find a way in” (Writers for the 99% 147). Multiple time, they together with students and trade unionists affiliated with Occupy Wall Street infiltrated auctions, interrupting the sale of multimillion dollar paintings and furniture (ibid 56).

A revolutionary pragmatics, in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari use the term⁷⁸. And it was due to such pragmatics that the different branches of art group called themselves “guilds”, a word that used to refer to artisans of a town. The puppetry guild made giant puppets such as lady liberty and other imaginary figures, the performance arts guild performing different short, improvised or scripted pieces and flashmobs, the music guild lightening the mood or increasing the intensity based on the moment with their music, and the poetry guild was inventing slogans and writing poetry to be read in the tent city, reviving a tradition of people’s poets in pre-modern history. Poets in their form of performing poetries exhibited the same organizational ideas that the movement was all about: collectivity, participation, non-horizontality and a free economy of words, where the words circulates freely through a common field of collaboration. As one of the art group members explains, “if the occupation was a horizontal and leaderless movement, poetry would be no different. Poets were chosen at random by lot and given no more than three minutes to read. Lines of poetry were repeated back to the poet with people's mic” (Writers for the 99% 148-49) And interestingly enough, all these guilds joined the movement in contingent

⁷⁷ For previous discussions on this concept, c.f. chapter two, section “Alter-: the significance of the prefixes”

⁷⁸ For a detailed discussion on the concept of pragmatics in Deleuze and Guattari, c.f. chapter two, section “Dramatization”.

assemblages, not in form of preorganized groups (ibid 148). Even many groups unaffiliated with the working group spontaneously appeared and created works on a daily basis (ibid 149)

These activists considered the gatherings themselves as works of art. One of them describes the general assembly as “the first performance of OWS”. It is worth to keep in mind that in the US, the legal limit of twenty participants is only allowed at public gatherings, while the GAs in OWS had hundreds of participants in its initial phase. (Writers for the 99% 151)

The flexible art space was also a site that tried to disrupt the aforementioned molar spatial divisions of the tent city in its other part. It presented an open site for all creative and performative expressions, engaged actively POC community and other minorities and even organized performances to performatively challenge the image of a racially and class-based divided space. On Columbus Day (reclaimed and thus renamed as Indigenous People's Day by POC working group), Mexica, an indigenous, cultural Mexican performance group staged a dance performance in white and read with the beats of OWS drummers. (Writers for the 99% 116)

The flexible art space characterized a space that embodied an alternative, common mythology of a return to the future. Its existence cannot wash away the other molar divisions that striated the space according to the code of the everyday signs, as we have discussed, but it kept the performative forces of the movement alive with its ceaseless creation of simulacra, constructing an alternative image space.

5.4.8 Reclaiming the Space from the Post-Colonial Authoritarianism

Egypt's case of spatial management is certainly very different from the American public space in terms of national policies. On one hand, the globalization of contemporary capitalism has unleashed certain similar processes of creating smooth spaces and homogenizing space by flattening everything into the realm of “corporate property” – not only in the US, but also in African and Arab-speaking countries such as UAE or Egypt. On the other hand, the state in the Middle East and North Africa have shaped authoritarian regimes with a different social

engineering strategy regarding space. Arditi explains the politics of space in authoritarian regime as

a grammar for building sociability and practices of reterritorialization in authoritarian contexts marked by demobilization, the disorganization or ban of political parties and the threats of the seemingly ever-present eye of power of the state. (36)

Sadiki also emphasizes that in the context of the Arab authoritarian states, space must be understood as “political constructs within and through which narratives of nation and state-building are produced and reproduced”.

It seems however that authoritarian alone cannot capture the difference there. According to our discussions, the dimension of (post) coloniality plays a very significant role in these countries, especially in what Sadiki calls the narratives of nation and state-building, which we have explained before.

Not only in Cairo, but also in Tunis and Tripoli, the public spaces were marked by an attempt to narrate a national history, rooted in mythologies, embodied in strong male leaders. As Sadiki says, the urban planning, especially regarding the central squares that were named after political figures or historical events, were part of a post-colonial “socio-political engineering aimed at defining the territory of power and state-holders” (3). In the most typical case, Gaddafi largely ruled Libya from his residence in the Bab Al-Aziz military barracks.

When the people stormed these squares, and built their tent cities in front of them, they challenged this order. They wanted to symbolically behead the signification hierarchy in order to open space for the emergence of a site, and a flow of creative signs and symbols created during the movement. In these repossessed site – Tahrir Square in Cairo, and the Habib Bourguiba Boulevard and the Kasbah in Tunis – the dispossessed materialized their struggle against the State that set up the apparatus of capture and mechanisms of dispossession.

And the resistance was not only regarding the material conditions of the space, rather, “as they reconstructed space and time as spheres of public enactment – suited and dedicated to collective resistance and moral protest – are noted for their immaterial quality” (Sadiki 10).

That's why Egypt has witnessed an opening in radical arts on its wounded soil. A wave of radical artists' graffiti-works has appeared on the walls of revolutionary Egyptian cities. Some of them have been playing with pop figures such as Batman, Joker, Ghandi, Panda, and so on. But they did not really function as metaphors or symbols; rather they revealed a trajectory of experimentations with "performative" politics, trying to create "imaginal poles of recomposition". In one of those graffiti, two small astronauts appeared on the walls of Cairo after revolution, depicting humans floating in "outer space" (Figure 4).

Imagining outer space through one's revolutionary desire is not a new phenomenon. In his last letter from the day before his execution, Joe Hill wrote that "the following day he expected to take a trip to Mars during which, upon his arrival, he would begin to organize Martian canal workers into the Industrial Workers of World" (Shukaitis 81). The space of revolution – the space not only on which the revolution happens, but which participates in making the revolution itself – *is* the outer space. If the non-space of mirror is the image of heterotopia for Foucault (1984), this outer-space-dystopia presents itself more as the reflecting surface of a sea wave: it gives a ground for *re*-presentation, but still let itself to be transformed by its multitude of molecular movements. The problematic of a revolution, when problematic stands for a problem and its set of conditions, includes spatiality: revolution dreams of a different spatial relation, an alternative geography, or a new map.

As Sadiki observes in the Occupy movements in the post-colonial Arab Republics,

once control over time is the sole focus on the present (and its 'glory'), control of space itself is made possible. Public space is then coded and decoded by the public in the newly constructed terms that cement it to present symbols (liberation, independence, revolution) and icons (7).

Graffiti and signs cover all over the space, not only to signify a war on the space, but also to construct a safe space, a space that should be guarded against the invasions of the State. The movements symbols and signs cover the establishment propaganda that is all over the walls of the city, either by legal notices, political posters and announcements or advertisements. But as they are erasing those signs, a sign of *desubjectivation*, they are realizing a new subjectivity through new images of the new imagination.

Writing about May 68 in Paris, Maurice Blanchot describes the symbols, graffiti and signs of what we call performative event as mobile hosts of a contagious affectivity – a threatening one as it disrupts the established order:

Tracts, posters, bulletins; street words, infinite words; it is not some concern for effectiveness that makes them necessary. Whether effective or not, they belong to the decision of the moment. They appear, they disappear. They do not say everything, on the contrary they ruin everything, they are outside everything. They act and reflect fragmentarily. They leave no trace: they are a trait without trace. Like the words on the walls, they are written in insecurity, received under threat, are themselves the bearers of danger, then pass by the passerby who passes them on, loses them or forgets them (Blanchot, *Disorderly Words* 204).

(In Tunisia too, there was a burst of street arts and movement's signs such as graffiti and other interventions on the walls of the main squares proliferated exponentially – mostly done by common citizens. The cars that during the occupy movement were covered in such symbols are still preserved today as they were, "as if monuments" (Coelho, *The Arab Spring in Tunisia - A semiotic perspective* 5).

Now, if one go back to Al-Tahrir, one could see that the space was differentiated during the protest movement through the patchwork organization of collective body and the multiple signs the movement has created. In fact, it was differentiated regarding to various assemblies or councils. In addition, or better corresponding to the various councils, the Al-Tahrir tent city had different spaces for wedding ceremonies, children playground, painters and graffiti or street artists' corner, library, and so forth.

From a smooth capitalist space, Al-Tahrir becomes thus a *patchwork*: an immanently striated space. By occupying central public squares, Egyptians, Tunisians and Libyans "re-enacted peoplehood by reclaiming the spaces of tyrannical rule, breaking all barriers of fear, and redesigning space", turning it into a patchwork site "where the public breathes life into ossified politics." However, as Deleuze and Guattari say (*A Thousand Plateaus* 475), there are always mixes of these two kinds of space, and they actually emerge out of each other. By the institutionalization of the movement and major political conflicts in the government, the

autonomous space closed in on itself. It is not anymore possible to articulate expressions freely, and even street artists face criminalization. The walls of freedom, with graffiti and other images from the revolution were still in Al-Tahrir, but graffiti artists were not allowed to work anymore. Therefore, during the Muslim Brotherhood as well as Military coup governments, they had to work in the same spot covertly in nights. In one example, in 2013, the iconic graffiti on the "walls of freedom" was replaced by a pink camouflage pattern. 15 Egyptian revolutionary street artists cooperated in this act, where the pink stands for blood and the camouflage refers to the army. "Like the military trying to hide the truth, all the graffiti is now hidden under pink camouflage," Amr, a graffiti artist and activist, told *Al-Monitor* (Stoter).

The report also explains that the Egyptian revolution in 2011 opened the gates for a wave of street art, which had been impossible under Mubarak's regime, where the Ministry of Culture controlled all public expression. Since then, it has been often used by revolutionaries to express their feelings about the current situation.

Indeed, the occupied squares even later became symbols of resistance, bearing those performative forces that inserted a new spirit into the politics of its day. This effect was so threatening for central states that for example in Bahrain, the rulers destroyed the Pearl Roundabout (دوار اللؤلؤ) and teared down its monument (Bronner) where the occupiers built their initial site of resistance. The monument, once a State's symbol, had turned to a monument for resistance and struggle during the occupation movement.

To summarize the discussions on space, if we consider two types of existing conceptions of space, space as social positioning and space as enclosure (from electronic space to public space to private space), then defining spatiality as a social relation can refer to both. Holding this perspective, we analyzed the smoothening process of contemporary capitalism and its desubjectification effect which reterritorialize the whole seemingly homogenous social space around the accumulation of wealth through rent. From this perspective, the occupy form of recent protests makes the deterritorialization on the smooth space of capitalism, creates a site as we characterized it, and by living a different daily life on the occupied space and rejecting the

representative order, their participants striate immanently the space, transform corporeally and incorporeally the existing spatiality, and plant the seeds of collective subjectivity. These events, although temporarily, reveal the possibilities of a life to come, of an alternative sociality which has yet to be recognized by far more people to change the current order of the world and prevent the imminent catastrophes hanging on our head: from the mass-spreading of far-right xenophobic ideas to global warming and other environmental catastrophes to the danger of authoritarian capitalism in post-colonial world.

Conclusion

6 Conclusion

Contrary to the theoretical confusion of “everything is performance”, this research started with a call for a reconceptualization of performativity in a way that it distinguishes between what is performative and what has been differentiated from it. It argues that the performative forces of an event are differential, virtual and non-representational, although they can result into solidified, actual and representational products in a process of production. The performative, in other words, is the force of creation in its related situations. Built upon this premise, the performative event was introduced to conceptualize the socio-political events such as occupy movements; and affective contagion became the form of communication between these events.

Looking back, it seems that this research has mostly dealt with political performative struggles that are now either totally disappeared or existing in the form of a pure discourse. In some cases, the disappearance joined with war and dangers. In Egypt for example, the Copts and the Muslims held their hands together in Al-Tahrir square, made the impossible, and toppled down a brutal dictatorship with a mighty army. And after, the tensions and divisions came back again to open a way for another brutal dictatorship: the Islamists made wrong decisions when they held the first democratically elected government; the army and the intelligence service misused revolutionary anger and staged a coup; Christians backed the coup, and fanatical right-wing Muslims started targeting them. Now, from those images of solidarity in Tahrir we have arrived at the images of burnt bodies in 2013 Rabba massacre and the exploded churches in Cairo and Sinai Peninsula. “Egypt, in short, is the clearest example of the revenge of the hierarchy”, Paul Mason writes. Or maybe a revenge of *identity*, one would rather say, that is everywhere playing its role after the failure of a universalized socio-political model based on equilibrium. In Turkey, other catastrophic events happened: another war against Kurdish population and a rise in nationalism, intervention in the Syrian War, a coup, and a wide-spread exclusionary suppressive initiative against the opposition; in Greece, after the square movement, a Neo-Nazi anti-immigrant party is growing into the third strongest parliamentary force; in the US, an ultra-right showman became the president; and the list goes on.

So after all the previous discussions on the virtual, performative forces of change and transformation, it seems to be fair to ask: did the Occupy movements change the reality at all? How did political performativity and its aesthetics interact with the contemporary world?

The most feasible answer is referring to the actual phenomena regarding these movements.

6.1 Performative Knowledge Production

One is the proliferation of *Critical Performative Pedagogy* (CPP) methods related to these movements that is a result of affirming the new image of thought. In the dynamics of performative liminality, there is a movement toward inside the educational institution, where teachers and professors – recognizing that ‘pedagogy is not simply about the social construction of knowledge, values, and experiences [but] a performative practice embodied in the lived interactions’ (H. A. Giroux 61) – engage in *Critical Performative Pedagogy* (CPP). CPP is not only about changing the institutional relations between the teacher and students, but aims to ‘go beyond’ the university, and reconnects itself with the broader social movements. Here pedagogy is a performative event (H. A. Giroux), and as an event, it has the *potentiality* of breaking with the constituted old and moving for the constituent new.

Many recent CPP practices have come out of their local occupy movements or participated in them. In Greece, during the occupy movement, some professors brought performative methods inside the teacher training programs to search for alternative ways of education not only in university, but also for future primary school students. I attended for example a conference lecture about how a mathematical teacher training program joined with a group of dancers and choreographers in order to study the ‘affective flows of teacher and learner becoming’ and to ‘recraft mathematical subjectivity’ through improvised choreography (Chronaki). The emphasis on the classroom activity and bodily movements in pedagogy, particularly for mathematics as the most abstract science, reveals the core idea to which such a project refers: the performative production of knowledge and its potentiality to produce its own lines of subjectification in contrast to the established regime of subjectivity.

In another instance, the project of 'Student as Producer' was an experiment in order to 'occupy a curriculum' as a response to neoliberalization of higher education. As the name discloses, the project was inspired by Walter Benjamin's 'Author as Producer' (1934), and as such, it was to re-affirm Benjamin's insistence that producing 'radical content' is not enough as long as the relations of production and its 'technical' apparatus remain unchanged.

Student as Producer 'is the organizing principle for teaching and learning at the University of Lincoln, in the UK ... since 2007' (Neary and Amsler 121) and the academicians who started this project believe that 'the Occupy movement is explicitly pedagogical.' (111) In 2000s, many universities across the UK among other Global Northern countries had witnessed numerous sit-ins and protests against the neoliberalization of higher education. Student as Producer, which has its roots in the revolutionary politics of the 1960s was launched in such a context in order to create "'counter-spaces" of education, in which the production of emancipatory knowledge is accomplished through the re-appropriation and ... production of social spaces, times and relations of learning.' (Neary and Amsler 125) To what extent is such an idea functional only inside the territory of the university? What is the intensive extension of this project in the 'Outside'? And more importantly, to what extent will this new performative line of pedagogical subjectification counterbalance and/or push back the established pedagogical subjectivity?

Struggling with such problems, the academic-activists of Student as Producer project recognized its limitations and developed it into 'Social Science Center' (SSC), an autonomous open university in the city of Lincoln that works outside the territorial relations of mainstream academy. The fact 'that the student does not *exceed* its own institutional and idealised form,' as well the emergence of multilayered social occupy movements led the pedagogues to draw a far more radical conclusion: 'In order for the student to become more than themselves, the neoliberal university must be dissolved.' (Neary and Amsler 124)

Although the SSC had no direct relationship with the University of Lincoln, nor with any other university, it still located itself on a liminal position. As Neary and Amsler explains, the SSC did not aim to dissolve higher education into a homogenized, undifferentiated mass intellectuality, but to radically de-institutionalize it (126).

The need to go beyond the academic framework for de-institutionalizing higher education is expressed in different open universities engaged in performative pedagogy and research that emerged out of the protest movement contexts. The examples of such a performance-based critical pedagogy are numerous and diverse: *Free University of Liverpool*, *the Really Open University* in Leeds, and *London Free University* – all of them later joined together to form *the Free University Network* – in the UK; *the Radical Teachers* group in the US, who defined themselves as part of the larger Occupy Wall Street Movement, and other open universities of occupy movements from Kiev to Istanbul; or *The Silent University* which is an autonomous transversal knowledge machine by and for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants (Tan).

6.2 The Affective Solidarity

After the police forcefully evicted the activists from Zuccotti Park, one of the OWS activists noted that “with the eviction comes a practice of non-attachment and a shift from attachment to 'place' and a greater focus on creativity” (Writers for the 99% 92). It may be a too hopeful of a statement, but points to another fact, that the affective relations that were forged in these movements have sustained themselves in spite of harsh and brutal crackdown. In Egypt for example, the young women kept their vanguard position with regard to the social movement. The LGBT community as well started to announce itself with more performative force, and as it has met unfortunately with suppression again, this time its voice has been resonated in cities such as Berlin and Paris through the established network of affectivity after the Al-Tahrir revolution. The graffiti artists have also not given up and repainting the wall of freedom constantly in Tahrir albeit harsh punishment against the so-called “vandalism”. The daily resistance and struggle is still going on in a degree that Sisi’s government is considering an option to relocate the governmental buildings to New Cairo, a rich neighborhood in the Southern Suburbs far away from the Al-Tahrir square, the living symbol of an unfinished revolution, a site that was immanently striated for growing alternative subjectivities. Another version of the solution given by Bahraini royal dictatorship that destroyed Lou’lou Roundabout in order to extinguish the contagious revolutionary sensuality. In

fact, Al-Sisi inaugurated the new headquarters of the Ministry of Interior in New Cairo on 27 April 2016, but it did not remove the dissent from society.

Other examples happened after other Occupy movements, like Greece. One occupier explains the long-lasting effect of the movement as a kind of imaginal reconstruction, development of a capability to imagine alternatives:

This experience made visible a new form of organization in the eyes of ordinary people that things can be done in a different way. When the occupation of Syntagma Square finished, when people went back to their daily lives, they carried with them the spirit of solidarity that had started at the square. For instance, some people began to support the social solidarity economy (Ishkanian and Glasius 10).

During my interviews with a few Greek activists and artists who participated in the Occupy movement in 2011, I encountered those who lived long afterwards in squats emerging before, and proliferating during the movement; even after the prevailing return of parliamentary politics through Syriza election. Their squats provided important shelters to the refugees who fled the wars of post-Arab Spring in the Middle East.

Other acts of resistance and solidarity happened afterwards, such as the occupation of Vio.me metal factory by its own workers, who opened the factory with self-management backed by the support of other Greek people. In their manifesto, they basically repeated the principles of the Syntagma Occupy movement:

The basic and central principle of the operation of the factory, of the struggle we conduct and the key term of our future plans is parity in participation and decision making, horizontality and direct democracy.

Other examples are the Potato Movement in February 2012, where activists helped farmers to sell their products directly to the people without the middleman, or the refusal of paying the extra household tax as part of the imposed austerity policies.

6.3 The Performative Realism

Similar things could be pointed out in other contexts which witnessed Occupy movements, but one OWS slogan seems to present another answer to our question: “be realistic; dream the impossible”.

The virtual, as we have discussed, is not less real than the actual; indeed, it contains the forces of the real as the constituent force of becoming which produces the reality, the actual being. With a contemporary world being torn apart by harsh inequalities, persisting neo-colonial relations, wars and civil wars, with a globalized sovereign power that decides on worthfulness and worthlessness, disposability and non-disposability of certain populations, the actual present is not simply sustainable. That OWS slogan witnesses to this reality and affirms the virtual forces of the present in order to learn how to live together in such a damaged earth.

In first chapter, we sought for a methodology that can capture those virtual forces – the virtual forces that sustained the aforementioned affective solidarity. Performativization is a methodology that deals with performative processes of creation; a methodology in the sense of Nietzschean “perspective” toward what is being researched on, toward the world. According to this perspective, concepts and established forms of perception in the world of representation are the crystals of non-representational performative processes that bodies carry out, or in other words, they are the actualized products of certain virtual performativizations. However, these products are only possible actualizations of those processes and the interruptions of the flows of constituent power that only flows from in-between of collective bodies. Then one must change the perspective from observing only the representation and considering also the non-representational performative processes of creation in order to critique the already-existing actuality and understand the other potentialities of historical events. This change of perspective necessitates a change of relation between researcher’s body and the researched. There can be no more “safe dialectical distance” between a researching individual subject and a researched object: the researcher’s body, her own performativizations, is also a part of the research.

The performativization perspective brings then the productive relation into play and thinks about the process of production instead of product. Latour talks about the same relation when he writes that “we should not speak of time, space, and action but rather of temperisation, spatialisation, actualization..., put, more elegantly, as timing, spacing, acting” (qtd. in May and Thrift 28). This consideration dates back to Marx discussion of fetishism, where he tries to show why starting from commodity to think about capitalism leads to mystification and how we solve this problem by starting from production process.

As a perspective, performativization is also a set of already known methods such as autoethnography, dramatization, research militancy/militant research, performance as research, critical performative cartography, and so on. Among these, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis recognizes the interconnectedness of space and time, and recurses to the notion of rhythm which according to him “implies the relation of a time with a space, a localized time, or if one wishes, a temporalized place.” Therefore, rhythmanalysis is actually analyzing the processes through which time and space are both liberated from quantitative segmentarity, and thus defuse into and fold onto each other, the processes of creating what we have called in the fourth chapter as kairotopes. Processes that could be set in motion either through the molecular kairoi of everyday life or the more announced manifestations of constituent power in protest movements.

The rhythmanalysis should mostly leads with idiorrhythmy of dissenting bodies being together toward another future. Roland Barthes, in his lectures on “How to Live Together?”, explains his fantasy of living together that consists of singularities (neither individual nor collective) being in common but at the same time have their very own autonomous character which he calls idiorrhythmy: “The pattern of a fluid element ... an improvised, changeable form. In atomism, one manner in which atoms can flow; a configuration without fixity or natural necessity: a ‘flowing’...in short, the exact opposite of an inflexible, implacably regular cadence”.

We have used performativization method in these different forms in this research. And in the second chapter, we approached the problem of the performative event in which such a idiorrhythmy emerges.

6.4 Aesthetics, an Altermodern Perspective

With the help of general artistic strategies, performative events pose the problems of the construction of 'being-together' and the modes of political subjectivation for altermodernities to-come.

While the ontogenetical processes of performative event have been analyzed, *polyphony* and *heterogeneity*, *processual creativity*, *autopoiesis* and communal (or common) *being-together* that is created simultaneously during the performance, *rupture* of the code of the everyday signs, and transformation in spatiotemporality emerged as the constituent elements of the aesthetics of the political performative turn: the aesthetics from an altermodern perspective.

In Chapter Two, Becket's *Catastrophe* was mentioned in order to conceptualize a performative event. Now, considering the discussions in this research, one other theatre playwright and theatre director even clarify this perspective of performative event more: Carmelo Bene.

If Bene's performative aesthetics seems to be marginal in the world of theatre, it is much more traceable in the world of political performativity – especially through commentaries made by Gilles Deleuze in *One Manifesto Less* (Deleuze, *One Manifesto Less*).

Nonrepresentationality is one of the most important characteristics of Bene's theatre, who aimed for producing a kind of *unrepresentable theatre* (*il teatro dell'irrepresentabile*) often translated as unperformable.

Nonlinguistic interventions and prioritizing the performative over the textual (Bene wanted to write the play on the stage, during its performance) is one of the strategies of this nonrepresentationality. The non-linguistic signs and non-sensical sounds in Bene show an escape from the code of the everyday signs and the logocentrism, therefore, rejecting presupposed human subjectivity. Because "representation in theatre always sides with codified power (even when it dramatizes conflicts and oppositions) and is necessarily the manifestation of political power on stage." (Deleuze, *One Manifesto Less*)

For him, the theatre as performative event consists of a *rupture* that as we discussed in chapters three and four, will initiate an experience of self-loss, in the meaning of *desubjectification* or suspension of the conscious agent. For Bene, creative action comes from the suspension of thought and the emptying of the mind, an *exodus* from the machinations of the established code, “which allow the performer to transcend the limitation of language and the obstruction of subjectivity”. This discussion was developed in chapter three.

As Deleuze writes in his commentary on Bene’s nonrepresentational theatre, theatrical signs “under the imperial rule of representation” are “already normalized, codified, institutionalized; they are 'products'”. In contrast to that, Bene seeks a *theatre of production*, but of a *production of the poor*, outside the dominant relations of discursive production, since he believed “what cannot be said above all must not be silenced”. (Chillemi) Therefore, new ears should be created during the performance for these forces to be audible.

Process thus becomes the other important element of Bene’s productivist aesthetics, a productivism that comes from adopting the perspective of aforementioned performative realism. Because he, too, attempts to perform the unperformable. This process is embodied in Bene’s affirmation of becomings, of becoming *minoritarian* (another name for the poor, the non-represented and non-representable):

Deleuze reminds me that we are a body: it is not true that we have a body, because we are not [a being but a becoming; *Deleuze’s note*] (qtd. in Chillemi).

Body is itself a becoming. The primacy of process and becoming does not allow one to presuppose a collectivity or an audience before it occurs: it should construct its own collective being-together. This is in fact the formulation of *autopoiesis* in Bene’s performative aesthetics.

Being asked “for whom is your theatre addressed, to which people are they addressed?”, Bene answers that “I make popular theatre. Ethnic. But it is the people who are missing” (qtd. in Deleuze, *Cinema 2* 330). This is not an announcement of an elitist avant-garde who thinks he has not yet found his audience. Bene completes this answer by saying that “it is I who am first of all

a people, the people of my atoms”⁷⁹ (qtd. in *ibid* 227). Not only a homogenous, presupposed self as subject does not exist, but as we have discussed in chapter three, “the purity of the distinction [between self/non-self] is illusory and what constitutes the proper ‘me’ is already shot through with otherness” (Shildrick 95). Human body consists of a multiplicity of impulsive forces and is situated in a network of life in-between human and non-human elements. As Shildrick says, “all human bodies swarm with a multitude of putatively alien others” (*ibid*).

More than that, Bene’s announcement says something about the whole performative dynamics: the people of performative event do not pre-exist their performative expression (either through a performative work of art or in a performative political movement).

Performative production and performative expression are the same. In other words, the modern distance between production and expression is non-existent in the performative aesthetics, since the performative expression has a productive aspect, too. The ontogenetical perspective of this research argued that the bodies and their performativizations are mutually constituent of each other.

But if these bodies are transforming and produced by transformation, then autopoiesis also comes with ***allopoiesis*** in the performative event: the emerging collective relationality does not only autonomously constitute itself but also constitute an alternative system regarding the established order and structures. Hence ***the immanence of autopoiesis and allopoiesis.***

Through Bene’s theatre, Deleuze then points to this aesthetical subjectification potentiality in artistic practices:

not that of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of contributing to an invention of a people (Cinema 2 217).

To set such a becoming in motion, the experience of the rupture should happen; and the rupture, the struggle against the machinic codification should continue in the process. The production of the ***excess*** – a product of the non-productive labour – is the corresponding artistic strategy

⁷⁹ The other translation in *One Manifesto Less* registers this part as follows: “I am a mass, “see how politics becomes mass, the mass of *my* atoms.” (217)

because as Deleuze points out, excesses make it hard to “normalize, domesticate, and neutralize their productions” (Kowsar 33). Excess is different from the added value in that it refuses to be integrated in the reproduction process.

This situates Bene in the tradition of another theatre artist, Artaud, whose notion of cruelty and excess contributes to Bene’s performative aesthetics. In both, the body – which as we have discussed, sees and be seen, touches and be touched, makes perspective and is in perspective – becomes monstrous. It transforms to its ***bodily mode of aesthesis***, an open body, or as Genet’s would say, an exposed body. This aesthetics of ***exposure*** is described by Bene as an obscenity:

Theatre embodies this dis-being, this discomfort of being obscene on the scene. Theatre is what is obscene – ... which means “outside the scene” – even though it happens on the scene (qtd. in Chillemi).

In fact, this is the difference between Becket and Bene. Beckettian theatrical aesthetics in for example the *Catastrophe* waits for an event that is going to happen in the off-stage, it is a waiting for the missing people but relocates the whole subjectivity outside of theatricality, and performs what is left on the stage to perform: the absurdity of control and reproduction, the non-agency. But Bene’s assertion that ***“theatre is what is outside the scene”*** calls for an active, transversal engagement with theatre and theatricality in order to affirmatively contribute to the appearance of the missing people by setting in motion alternative processes (and molds) of subjectification.

For such a process, time should be experienced qualitatively, not as the everyday paradigm of time of progress, as the empty repetition of successive units. If the nonrepresentational theatre seeks to attack the power, it should attack its time too, the prison time. And it should liberate the collective constituent time of its auto/allopoiesis, what we have called ***“the kairological time”***.

One of the main points of difference between Bene and avant-garde theatre – just like the difference between the performative politics and (anti)modernist politics – is in the conception of Kairos. The modernist discourse understands it more as Benjaminian *Jetztzeit*, a time of innovation, that shows the truth of the to-come as a lightning and then disappears into the constellation of materialist historian. A shock that disrupts the history and shows the figuration

of redemption even for a second. The time of insurrection. The techniques of alienation or theatre of attractions. As Deleuze explains, the avant-garde theatre introduces a temporal conflict between what is now *and* what must and will be. It always defines the future and the past and presupposes its subjects and audience.

On the contrary, Bene's theatre of the missing people tries to work on the present to return to the future, experimenting with the current social relation between bodies in order to transform it. That is why for Bene-Deleuze the minor authors are those who are untimely:

But the truly great authors are the minor ones, the untimely ones. It is the minor artist that offers the true masterpieces: the minor artist does not interpret his times; mankind does not have a specific time, time depends on mankind. (One Manifesto Less 208).

The untimely author is the one who can track *the virtual forces* beneath or beyond the actualized being. The performative processes of the real underlying the symbolic and the imaginary could produce simulacra that envision that *to-come*, not through the existing language and codes – that can only fall into silence vis-à-vis a non-defined, alternative *to-come* – but by creating its own expressive devices. In Deleuze's words, "minority designates the potential of a becoming, whereas majority designates the power or the impotence of a state, of a situation" (ibid).

Working on the present and tracking the performative differentiations in it, and striating molecularly for an alternative subjectivity, occurs (as we have discussed in chapter four) in processual, gradual kairological time – a qualitative experience of time that has no beginning or end. That is why the theatre of Bene is a theatre of, as Deleuze says, different speeds, fastness and slowness:

The events "in-between" are also the most vital and dynamic. "What is interesting is never the manner in which one begins or ends. The interest lies in the middle, that which occurs in the middle . . . where becoming, movement, speed . . . excess" take place... The middle, rather than the past or future, is the site of becoming outside of time, beyond time (Kowsar 22).

In the end, his methodological tendency is what this research has defined as performativization, and Deleuze formulates it as "to extricate becomings from history, lives from culture, thoughts from doctrine" (One Manifesto Less 208), virtual from actual.

However, even if we can summarize what we have discovered as aesthetics of performative political movements through Bene's theatre, he himself asserts that theatre cannot act on politics. Deleuze argues that Bene's work presents us with a critical theatre, because it performs an exodus from the territory of theatre, centered around an organism of hierarchical elements such as the Text, the Actor, the Director, and the Structure. (see *One Manifesto Less*).

Being toward the missing people, critical function of Bene's theatre, according to Deleuze, is in its *open-endedness*, adapting "the conscience of a minority, in becoming universal, carrying out alliances here and there according to each case, following the lines of transformation that leap out of theatre and take another form, or even convert themselves again in the form of theatre for a new leap" (*One Manifesto Less* 221-222).

This open-endedness is in fact a political capability of forming *machinic assemblages* with other affective fields of society where machinic assemblage is "a dynamic composition of heterogeneous elements that eschew identity but nonetheless function together, subjectively, socially, in cooperation" and "incorporating all kinds of human and nonhuman elements or singularities" (Hardt and Negri, *Assembly*).

Such a minoritarian performative event follows the lines of *contagious affectivity* that carries the transformative power of performative forces, tra(ns)versing different bodies and regions of social production and forging *affective solidarities*.

"Theater did not succeed in going into the street and dissolving its aesthetic, emotionalizing essence in action" (qtd. in Raunig, *Art and Revolution* 149), writes Sergei Tretyakov, one of the central figures of early productivist theatre after Russian revolution, leaving the literary and theatre scene for the kolkhoz, and announcing that "the confrontation between 'life' and 'art' was over." Bene refused to believe in this confrontation, this avant-garde duality and therefore, his statement that theatre cannot act on politics should be read from this perspective. In fact, Bene's perspective on theatre, one may say, opened the potentialities of the performative aesthetics in the terrain of theatre.

6.5 The Occupation Performative Dynamics, Summarized

While Bene remained marginal in the theories of performance, we have argued that such a performative aesthetics⁸⁰, with similar virtual forces, have been at work in the Occupy movements. However, the elements we mentioned and underlined are only mapping such forces beside together, and do not provide us with a universal form of their performativizations, individuations or actualizations: no possible actual can exhaust the performative forces of the virtual. That is the reason one must always talk about *altermodernities*, always plural-singular.

The Occupy movements on the other hand extended the powers of those performative elements in their singular form of their own cartography. Above all, they were movements that through their performativizations, as discussed in chapter two, collectively thought and developed a common intelligence. They did not have any “heads”, and as such, they marked a different, ***headless form of performativity*** in regard to actual artistic experiments that are initiated by identifiable persons – even if they affirm the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the self.

By disrupting the discourse of imitations, which has claimed the West as the universal model of democratic practices, the Arab Spring exhibited the case for ***the contagious affectivity***.

Regarding the aesthetical problematization of performative politics, one can again point to Ranciere’s main thesis that is “[art] is first political because it reframes the distribution of space, its visibility and—let us say—its habitability” (Artists and Cultural Producers as Political Subjects). It is not accidental that many contemporary movements are named after the particular space of their happening: Al-Tahrir Square, Wall Street, Maidan, Gezi, and so on.

These movements may look less mobile in their insistence on occupying a certain space. They reclaimed multilayered public spaces that are subjected to the process of smoothing. Al-Tahrir squares for example, a public square that in the end of 2000s, one could not walk there, or would never stay for resting, because the cars – symbols of private property – has occupied the

⁸⁰ In the case of research, other performative experiments and performance practitioners have been mentioned for extraction of the performative aesthetics. Except Beckett and Artaud, Jerzi Grotowski and Publixtheatercaravan group are among them.

streets with dense traffic jams and high levels of air pollution that is the result of progress-oriented urban planning of the post-colonial national State. A square that is the symbol of centralized power that has imposed a certain imitative modernization on its heterogenous and diverse population, in order to forge a unified imagined collective body as Egyptian nation. People occupied this square, defying what Shokr calls “the exclusionary logic that had governed their urban space for years. What they created was an anti-city of sorts” (The Eighteen Days of Tahrir 43).

Similar eroding public spaces started to be occupied in other countries, and in all cases, the occupiers stayed on them, made them common and turned them into the sites of a laboratory for experimentations with collective life. According to our discussions in chapter four, these experimentations resulted to an emergence of a generic type of space, a *patchwork site* that comes after the immanent reterritorialization and striations for constructing alternative subjectivities.

Although being attached to the ground under their feet, such performative movement was as mobile as nomadic lines of flights put in force through these molecular experimentations. As *intensive* movements, from its performative safe space, they extended themselves quickly inside a logic of affective contagion.

Al-Tahrir happened: “the Greek Tahrir awaits us” occurred in Syntagma square in Athens; in Spain, *indignados* called for their version of Cairo and Athens, and started *Acampadasol* in Madrid’s *Puerta del Sol* (Romanos); in New York, Al-Tahrir was re-enacted in the Wall Street (Gould-Wartofsky).

If the paradigm of thinking this communication changes from imitation to contagion, then it is easy to understand the heterogeneity of these movements, as each of them happened in their own singular way. And heterogeneity did not fall victim to a desire for the homogenous inside any of them.

Apart from the international level, the contagious connectivity happened in national and also molecular, social levels. In the case of Occupy Wall Street (September 2011) for example, occupations extended from Boston to Portland, Oregon, from Memphis to Los Angeles, from

Washington to Honolulu by early October (Writers for the 99% 156). Even in the US, Occupy movements were not homogenous and as they spread, “its success or failure in a particular locale was often rooted in the ability of local organizers to accommodate local conditions and articulate relevant issues” (Writers for the 99% 160).

In a more molecular level, contagion was working to proliferate the affectivity of the movement outside of its safe space. Arditì describes this aspect of occupy movements as an ability in “developing and expanding networks of autonomous zones generated through a homeopathic intervention of society on itself” that can “range from alternative research centres to workers' coop, from ad-hoc squatter collectives and self-funded employment advisory centres to the communal tenure and exploitation of land, from non-electoral political action committees to independent media initiatives” (Post-hegemony 36).

In these sites where time was experienced qualitatively, a particular articulation of temporalities in the kairological time emerged. On one hand, it was an assemblage between three temporal axes which intersect, intensify and mix with each other. First is the temporality of resistance: it slows down the capitalist functional speed and is located in a history of negating the progress and encroachment of authoritarian power; second, of rebellion and insurrection: it appears as the sudden interruption, as Benjaminian *Jetztzeit*, in order to open a space in pre-established relations of reality, a time of innovation and rupture; and third, of constituent power, which is the temporality of a gradual performativization of alternative relations. On the other hand, it is the immanence of three forms of ontogenetical and morphogenetical linkage in collective bodies. Through Barthes, we called this temporal order an *idiorrhymy*: an immanence of autopoiesis, allopoiesis, and *sym-poiesis*, where the autonomous construction of a collective body keeps it open toward the other (the bodily mode of aesthesis, the monstrous), and insists on togetherness (*sym-*) in order to experiment with non-hierarchical ways of collective existence, particularly on a damaged earth that a horizon of a livable future is increasingly fading away from it (D. J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*).

Time and space are relations in between bodies. Bodies exist in spatiotemporal relations, but they can transform these relations by their deterritorializing constituent force. Therefore, any

research that deals with the *kairotopes* of resistance and revolution is also dealing with the dissenting bodies that create such kairotopes. Thus, the aforementioned openness, as we argued in chapters three and four, is seen in the monstrous patchwork body which emerges in a kairotope – an immanence of a patchwork site and a kairological time – defying the limits of normative performance and neutralizing the machinic coding of bodies. Contrasting the naturalized, the monstrous is either *abnormal* and against the rules, or *anomalous*, i.e. antagonistic to but autonomous from rules as it is liberated from that power relation. – depending on the intensity of the experience and body’s history of dispossession and resistance, and its positionality in regard to the power hierarchy.

6.6 Art: The Continuation of Politics by Other Means

The monstrous could be a dangerous, destructive force, if captured by the apparatus of identity. Contagion can also lead to the fast distribution of sad affections and extreme reactionary sentiments. But this text started with a promise of giving a critical value to the concept of performativity, using it in order to differentiate between phenomena and processes. A value comes from the actions of a force, and thus, evaluating the concept of the performative had to deal with the performative forces.

As it was established during this thesis, performative forces – particularly in the field of politics – are virtual forces of ontogenesis. They have the power of deterritorialization as well as constitution. In other words, performative forces do not reproduce already existing forms and structures, but initiate morphogenetical processes: they deform and decode, making BwOs and planes of immanence, in order to create alternative plastic forms with consistency, where consistency means the autonomous formation of machinic assemblages between diverse elements in a non-hierarchical way.

Strictly speaking, performative forces correspond to the process, becoming and alterations. One should trace them in the dynamics of productive and creative processes, not in the representational final products. If one correlates the performative to the productive and the virtual, the spectacular has the same relation to the produced, the reproductive and the actual. Itself a product of performative forces, the spectacle is a crystallized virtuality that tries to hide, control and channel the performative forces. From another perspective, then, performativity affirms the primacy of difference, whereas the spectacle is founded upon the principle of identity. Theatricality is oscillating between these two poles: it can be affirmative of performative happenings or just reproductive of the already existing hierarchy of visibility and power; it may center around a repetition of difference and an experimentation for the new with creating performative simulacra, or it can be a static image of the unequal distribution of the sensible in social order and reiterate already existing stereotypes.

Occupy movements showed the complex dynamics of performativity in aesthetic-political events. These contemporary protest movements made use of artistic strategies for: (1) performatively opening the borders of social relationality to the other; (2) putting in motion alternative subjectifications; (3) effecting imaginal reconstruction; and (4) experimenting in the creation of altermodernities. These performative political initiatives have now become the hegemonic form of protest and struggle, and their cognitive plasticity and open-endedness have helped them to be able to maintain its affective solidarity in the social field.

With the immaterialization and feminization of labour, as it was discussed in chapters one and two, the affective labour and performative knowledge have been put into the center of production. Thus, any meaningful contemporary act of artistic struggle should be a collective act: and thus, a political one. It seems that with the emergence of this form of politics, the long dream of the avant-garde art has become true, but only with surpassing the avant-gardism itself.

Clausewitz axiom has been for long a well-known saying: war is the continuation of politics by other means. Although a sort of affirmative reading of Clausewitz's thesis was discussed in chapters one and three, especially through the notion of the civil war, the common sense regarding politics in that sentence is different. It understands politics around the duality of

friend/enemy: a politics modeled on the Hegelian dialectics between the self/the other. In such a representational politics, particularly in our contemporary condition, the antagonisms should be resolved by the intervention of representative authority: either in the negotiations between political elite in the parliament, or by the decisions of an authoritarian head of State. When this politics reaches an impasse, the war happens to continue politics by other means. The already predicted telos of that politics is obvious: one of the self-conscious subjects in this struggle must overcome the other, resulting in either her/his enslavement or destruction. Such is, it seems, the logic of our contemporary world.

The performative politics has contributed to another imagination of politics: a politics of affirmative affectivity that does not recognize the dialectics of the self/ the other. When the other is no longer the anti-thesis of the self, its rival in recognition, then the self and the other become liminal elements of each other in the common, as those singularities which exist in a being-together of a performative event. This re-imagination of politics could not happen without the contribution of artistic strategies for alternative subjectifications.

All the Occupy movements have happened when the representational politics stopped functioning and reached its impasse. The civil war followed this unsustainability of the dominant politics, but by implementing aesthetic strategies and starting its performative war machines. Now, we may then change Clausewitz thesis into this: art is the continuation of politics by other means.

To judge if these strategies can cause any long-lasting transformations toward altermodernities, especially in their struggle against all-powerful security states, is a case for future. For now, they have triggered a new image of thought, capable for imagining an emancipatory politics, and in their occupation laboratories, they returned – although temporarily – to a future of the new.

Table of Figures

Figure 1 - Godard and Fromanger red plexiglass bubble in the street	99
Figure 2 - Picasso in Plasetine	100
Figure 3 - Puppet demo in Barnaul	101
Figure 4 - Astronauts in Cairo	122

Table of Tables

Table 1: Typology of Bodies in Klossowski – the Singular/the Gregarious	132
---	-----

Bibliography

- 4 *Tone Mantis*. Dir. Floria Sigismondi. Perf. Amon Tobin. 2000. Video Clip.
- Adorno, Theodor W. *Aesthetic Theory*. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. London and New York: Continuum, 2004.
- . *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*. Trans. E. F. N. Jephcott. London and New York: Verso, 2005 (1951).
- . *Negative Dialectics*. Trans. E.B.Ashton. London and New York: Routledge, 1973.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*. Trans. Patricia Daley. Stanford: Stanford University, 2005.
- . *Communitas*. Trans. Micheal Hardt. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993 (1990).
- Agamben, Giorgio. "From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 21-29.
- . *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- . *Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of the Experience*. Trans. Liz Heron. London: Verso, 1993.
- Agamben, Giorgio. "Language and History: Linguistic and Historical Categories in Benjamin's Thought." Agamben, Giorgio. *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 48-61.
- . *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- . *The Kingdom And The Glory*. Trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Ágoston , Gábor and Bruce Masters. *Encyclopedia of The Ottoman Empire*. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009.
- Ahiska, Meltem. *Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting*. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010.
- Alemdaroğlu, Ayca. "Politics of the Body and Eugenic Discourse in Early Republican Turkey." *Body & Society* 11.3 (2005): 61–76.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Jason L. Mast. "Introduction: symbolic action in theory and practice." *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*. Ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen and Jason L. Mast. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 29-91.

- Alexander, Jeffrey C. "Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy." *Social Performance: Symbollic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*. Ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen and Jason L. Mast. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 29-91.
- . *Performance and Power*. Yale University, Center for Cultural Sociology, n.d. Online Public Document. <http://ccs.research.yale.edu/documents/public/alex_perfrmPower.pdf>.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C., Bernhard Giesen and Jason L. Mast, *Social Performance: Symbollic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Alfred Apsler, Number 1, Volume. "Herder and the Jews." *Monatshefte für Deutschen Unterricht* XXXV.1 (1943). <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/30169949>>.
- Alloa, Emmanuel. "Getting in Touch: Aristotelian Diagnostics." *Carnal Hermeneutics*. Ed. Richard Kearney and Brian Treanor. New York: Fordham University Press, 2015. 195-213.
- Althusser, Louis. "The 'Piccolo Teatro': Bertolazzi and Brecht." Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Penguin Press, 1969. 129-153.
- Amin, Samir. *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion and Democracy*. Trans. James Membrez Russell Moore. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Second. London: Verso, 1991 (1983).
- Anievas, Alexander and Kerem Nişancioğlu. *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism*. London: Poluto Press, 2015.
- Arditi, Benjamin. "Post-hegemony: Politics Outside the Usual Post-Marxist Paradigm." *Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude Versus the Hegemony of the People*. Ed. Alexandros Kioupiolis and Katsambekis Giorgos. London and New York: Routledge, 2016. 17-44.
- Aristotle. *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. Vols. 17, 18. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933 (1989). <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D12%3Asection%3D1072a>>.
- Arquilla , John and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. RAND Corporation, 2002. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html>.
- Artaud, Antonin. *The Theater and Its Double*. Trans. Mary Caroline Richards. New York: Grove Press, 1994.
- Ashdown, Nick. "Turkish women fight back against domestic abuse." *Aljazeera* 21 May 2015. <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/150506071905719.html>>.
- Ashour, Omar. "Egypt's Notorious Police Brutality Record." *Aljazeera* 20 March 2016. <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/egypt-notorious-police-brutality-record-160322143521378.html>>.

- Austin, J. L. *How To Do Things With Words*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962.
- Aviv, Efrat. "Millet System in the Ottoman Empire." 28 November 2016. *Oxford Bibliographies*.
<<http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0231.xml>>.
- Badiou, Alain. *A Present Defaults*. Trans. Clement Petitjean. 23 April 2014.
<<http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1569-a-present-defaults-unless-the-crowd-declares-itself-alain-badiou-on-ukraine-egypt-and-finitude>>.
- "Alain Badiou on Tunisia, Riots & Revolution." 19 January 2011. *WRNGRTHMTC*. 2012.
<<http://wrongarithmic.wordpress.com/2011/02/02/alain-badiou-on-tunisia-riots-revolution/>>.
- "Bodies, Languages Truths." 2006. *Lacan.com*. 22 2013. <<http://www.lacan.com/badbodies.htm>>.
- *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*. Trans. Ray Brassier. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- "The Communist Hypothesis." *New Left Review* 49 (2008): 29-42.
- "The Event in Deleuze." *Parrhesia* 2 (2007): 37-44.
- *The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings*. London and New York: Verso, 2012.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. *Rabelais and his World*. Trans. Hélène Iswolsky. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1984 (1965).
- *The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays*. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas, 1981.
- Barthes, Roland. *How to Live Together?* Trans. Kate Briggs. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
- Barthes, Roland. "The Metaphor of the Eye." Barthes, Roland. *Critical Essays*. Trans. Richard Howard. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000. 239-248.
- Bataille, Georges. *Story of the Eye*. Trans. Joachim Neugroschal. New York: Superverb, 2003.
<http://supervert.com/elibrary/georges_bataille/story_of_the_eye>.
- Beasley-Murray, Jon. *Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010 .
- Beckett, Samuel. "Catastrophe." *The Collected Shorter Plays*. New York: Grove Press, 1984 (1982). 191-195.
- Bell, David A. . *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare As We Know It*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.
- Bengio, Ofra. *Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
<https://books.google.de/books?id=c9cJCAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

- Benjamin, Walter. "In Der Sonne." Benjamin, Walter. *Gesammelte Schriften, IV*. Ed. Tillman Rexroth. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991. 417-419.
- Benjamin, Walter. "On Language as Such and on the Languages of Man." Benjamin, Walter. *Selected Writing 1913-1926*. Ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings. Vol. 1. Cambridge, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997. 62-74.
- Benjamin, Walter. "On the Concept of History." Benjamin, Walter. *Selected Writing: 1938-40*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003. 389-401.
- Benjamin, Walter. "Surrealism." *Selected Writings, Volume 2, Part 1, 1927-1930*. Ed. Howard Eiland, Gary Smith Michael William Jennings. Trans. Rodney Livingstone et al. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005. 207-221.
- Benjamin, Walter. "The Translator's Task." *The Translation Studies Reader*. Ed. Lawrence Venturi. Trans. Steven Rendall. London: Routledge, 2000. 75-83.
- Berardi, Franco. *Felix Guattari: Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography*. Ed. Giuseppina Mecchia and Charles J. Stivale. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- . *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy*. Trans. Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009.
- Berlin, Isaiah. *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder*. Second. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013 (1960).
- Bernstein, J. M. "Political Modernism: The New, Revolution, and Civil Disobedience in Arendt and Adorno." *Arendt and Adorno: Political and Philosophical Investigations*. Ed. Lars Rensmann and Samir. Gandesha. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012. 56-77.
- Bey, Hakim. *The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism*. New York: Autonomedia, 1991.
- Bifo, Franco Berardi. "Pasolini in Tottenham." *E-Flux* 43 (2013). <http://worker01.e-flux.com/pdf/article_8964615.pdf>.
- Biles, Jeremy. *Ecce Monstrum: Georges Bataille and the Sacrifice of Form*. the Bronx, New York: Fordham University Press, 2007.
- Bisaha, Nancy. *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
- Blanchot, Maurice. "Being Jewish." *The Blanchot Reader*. Ed. Michael Holland. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995. 228-235.
- Blanchot, Maurice. "Disorderly Words." *The Blanchot Reader*. Ed. Michael Holland. Oxford: Blackwell Publication, 1995. 200-205.
- . *The Space of Literature*. Trans. Ann Smock. London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.

- Bondavalli, Simona. *Fictions of Youth: Pier Paolo Pasolini, Adolescence, Fascisms*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015.
- Bourriaud, Nicolas. *Altermodern: Tate Triennial*. London: Tate Publishing, 2009.
- . *The Radicant*. New York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2009.
- Boyarin, Jonathan. "Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory." *Remapping Memory: The Politics of TimeSpace*. Ed. Jonathan Boyarin. 1994.
- Braidotti, Rosi. "Posthuman Affirmative Ethics." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 30-56.
- Brass, Tom. *Class, Culture and the Argarian Myth*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014.
- BRE. "Hard Livin': Bare Life, Autoethnography, and the Homeless Body." *Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations // Collective Theorization*. Ed. Stephen Shukaitis, David Graeber and Erika Biddle. Oakland and Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007. 223-241.
- Brecht, Bertolt. *Die Dreigroschenoper*. European American Music Corporation. 2009. Digital. 2016. <<https://dreigroschenopersongtext.blogspot.de/2009/04/dreigroschenfinale-threepenny-finale.html>>.
- Broadhurst, Susan and Josephine Machon. *Sensualities/Textualities and Technologies: writings of the body in 21st century performance*. London and New York: palgrave macmillan, 2009.
- Bronner, Ethan. "Bahrain Tears Down Monument as Protesters Seethe." *New York Times* 18 March 2011. 2015. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/middleeast/19bahrain.html>>.
- Brooks, Peter. *Body Work: Objects of Desire in Modern Narrative*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Buchanan, Ian. "The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Can Do?" *Body Society* 3 (1997): 73-91.
- Buden, Boris. "Criticism without Crisis: Crisis without Criticism." 1 1 2006. *European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies*. 9 12 2012. <<http://eipcp.net/transversal/0106/buden/en>>.
- Burkitt, Ian. *Embodiment, Identity and Modernity*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999.
- Butler, Judith and Athena Athanasiou. *Dispossession: The Performative in the Political*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.
- Butler, Judith. *Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street*. 9 2011. 7 2012. <<http://eipcp.net/transversal/1011/butler/en>>.
- . *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1999.
- . "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." *Theatre Journal* (1988): 519-531.

- . *The Psychic Life of Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Cacciari, Massimo. "The Problem of Representation." *Recoding metaphysics: The new Italian philosophy*. Ed. Giovanna Borradori. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988. 155-177.
- Callinicos, Alex. "Anti-war protests do make a difference." *Socialist Worker* 19 March 2005. <<http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=6067>>.
- Canlı , Ece and Fatma Umul. "Bodies on the Streets: Gender Resistance and Collectivity in the Gezi Revolts." *Interface* 7.1 (2015): 19-39.
- Çapan, Zeynep Gülşah. "Enacting the International/Reproducing Eurocentrism." *Contexto Internacional* 39.3 (2017): 655-672. <<http://www.scielo.br/pdf/cint/v39n3/0102-8529-cint-2017390300655.pdf>>.
- Carman, Taylor and Mark B. N. Hansen. *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Casarino, Cesare. "Time Matters." Casarino, Cesare and Antonio Negri. *In Prase of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics*. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 219-246.
- Castoriadis, Cornelius. *World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination*. Trans. David Ames Curtis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Castro, Fabián Henao. "From the "Bio" to the "Necro"." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 237-253.
- Catts , Oron and Ronat Zurr. "The Biopolitics of Life Removed From Context." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 135-158.
- Caygill, Howard. *On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance*. London: Bloomsbury, 2013 .
- Cederman, Lars-Erik , T. Camber Warren and Didier Sornette. "Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War." *International Organization* 65 (2011).
- Chan, Gaye and Nandita Sharma. "Eating in Public." *Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations // Collective Theorization*. Ed. Stephen Shukaitis, David Graeber and Erika Biddle. Oakland and Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007. 180-89.
- Chatterjee, Partha. "Whose Imagined Community?" *Mapping the Nation*. Ed. Gopal Balakrishnan. London and New York: Verso, 1999 (1996). 214-225.
- Chillemi, Francesco. "Filming Nothingness. Invisibility, Ineffability, and the Inviolable Absence of God in Carmelo Bene's Hamlet." *Scrittura della performance* 4.2 (2015): 33-48. <<https://journals.openedition.org/mimesis/1085?lang=en>>.

- Chiot, Daniel. *Modern Tyrants*. New York: The Free Press, 1994.
 <<https://books.google.de/books?id=q0SxYRu9aKcC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>>.
- Chronaki, Anna. "Recrafting mathematical subjectivity through classroom activity and improvised choreography." Stockholm: Deleuzian Studies Conference , 2015.
- Cöcek , Fatma Müge and M. Sükrü Hanioglu. "Western Knowledge, Imperial Control and the Use of Statistics in the Ottoman Empire." *Cultural Horizons: a Festschrift in Honor of Talat S. Halman*. Ed. Jayne L. Warner. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2001. 105-117.
- Cocks, Joan. *Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Coelho, Nuno. *The Arab Spring in Tunisia - A semiotic perspective*. March 2013. 2016.
 <http://www.motelcoimbra.pt/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/AlternativeAcademia_NunoCoelho.pdf>.
- Colebrook, Claire. *Understanding Deleuze*. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002.
- Colman, F. J. "Digital Biopolitics: the Image of Life." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 189-201.
- Conant, Jeff. "What the Zapatistas Can Teach us About the Climate Crisis." 3 August 2010. *Foreign Policy in Focus*. 2013 1 12.
 <http://fpif.org/what_the_zapatistas_can_teach_us_about_the_climate_crisis/>.
- Cote, Mark, Richard Day and Greig de Peuter. "Utopian Pedagogy: Creating Radical Alternatives in the Neoliberal Age." *The Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies* 29 (2007): 317-336.
- Curtis, Neal. "The Body as Outlaw." *Body and Society* 5.2-3 (1999): 249-266.
- Dayan, Vedat. "Kurdish or Turkish Question?" Frei Universität Berlin, 2014. Draft-Unpublished.
- de Bellaigue, Christopher. "The Sick Man of Europe." *The New York Review of Books* 48.11 (2001).
- De Landa, Manuel. "Deleuze, Diagrams, and the Open-ended Becoming of the World." *Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Future*. Ed. Elizabeth E. Grosz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 29-41.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. "Many Politics." Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. *Dialogues*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 124-148.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus*. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
- . *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.

- Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. "On Anti-Oedipus." *Negotiations*. New York: Colombia University Press, 1995. 13-24.
- . *What Is Philosophy?* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Colombia University Press, 1994.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London: The Athlone Press, 2000.
- . *Desert Islands and Other Texts*. Los Angeles, New York: Semiotext(e), 2004.
- Deleuze, Gilles. "Desire and Pleasure." *Two Regimes of Madness*. Ed. David Lapoujade. Columbia University, 2006. 122 - 134.
- . *Difference and Repetition*. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- . *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*. Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Zone Books, 2013 (1990).
- . *Foucault*. Trans. Seán Hand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988.
- . *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Continuum, 2008 (1983).
- . *Negotiations*. New York: Colombia University Press, 1995.
- . *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. London and New York: Continuum, 2002.
- Deleuze, Gilles. "On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought." Deleuze, Gilles. *Desert Islands and Other Texts*. Ed. David Lapoujade. Trans. Michael Taormina. Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext(e), 2004. 135-142.
- Deleuze, Gilles. "One Manifesto Less." *The Deleuze Reader*. Ed. Constan V. Boundas. New York: Colombia University, 1993 (1979). 204-222.
- . *Proust and Signs*. Trans. Richard Howard. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- . *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*. Trans. Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Books, 2001.
- . *Spinoza's Lectures*. Trans. Timothy S. Murphy. Paris, 17 02 1981. 2009.
<<https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/38>>.
- . *The Logic of Sense*. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. London: The Athlone Press, 1990.
- Dikec, Mustafa. *Urban Rage: The Revolt of the Excluded*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
- Dombroski, Robert S. "On Gramsci's Theater Criticism." *Boundary* 14.3 (1986): 91-119.
- Dorsy, James Michael. *Shifting Sands: Essays On Sports And Politics In The Middle East And North Africa*. New Jersey and London: World Scientific, 2017.
- Dowd, Maureen. "Powell Without Picasso." *New York Times* 5 February 2003.
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/05/opinion/powell-without-picasso.html>>.

- Eagleton, Terry. "Lenin in the Postmodern Age." *Lenin Reloaded*. Ed. Stathis Kouvelakis, and Slavoj Žižek Sebastian Budgen. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007. 42-58.
- Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process*. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 2000 (1939).
- . *The Loneliness of Dying*. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. New York and London: Continuum, 2001.
- Engels, Friedrich. "The Real Issue in Turkey." 2007. *Marxists Internet Archive - Marx & Engels Collected Works: Volume 12*. 12 June 2014.
- Fischer-Lichte, Erika. "Performativität und Ereignis." *Performativität und Ereignis*. Ed. Erika Fischer-Lichte, et al. Tübingen und Basel: A. Francke, 2003. 11-47.
- . *The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics*. Trans. Saskya Iris Jain. London and New York: Routledge, 2008 (2004).
- Foucault, Michel. *Abnormal: lectures at the College de France 1974-1975*. Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. Trans. Graham Burchell. London, New York: Verso, 2003.
- Foucault, Michel. "Interview with Michel Foucault." *Power: Essentials Works of Foucault (1954-1984)*. Ed. James D. Faubion. New York: The New Press, 2000. 239-297.
- Foucault, Michel. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Foucault, Michel. *The Foucault Reader*. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. 76-100.
- Foucault, Michel. "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias." *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory*. Ed. Neil Leach. New York: Routledge, 1997 (1967). 330-336.
- . *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*. Trans. Colin Gordon. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980.
- . *Society Must Be Defended - Lectures at the College De France, 1975-76*. Ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana . Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003.
- . *Technologies of the Self*. Ed. Luther H Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H Button. The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.
- . *The History of Sexuality*. Trans. Robert Hurley. Vol. I. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. Print.
- Foucault, Michel. "Theatrum Phliosopicum." *Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime*. Ed. Timothy Murray. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1997. 216-238.
- Foucault, Michel. "What Is Enlightenment?" *Foucault Reader*. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon, 1984. 32-50.
- Fourier, Charlie. "Reclaim the Streets: an Arrow of Hope." *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistable Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism*. Ed. Notes from Nowhere. London and New York: Verso, 2003. 50-60.
- Fox, Russell Arben. "J. G. Herder on Language and the Metaphysics of National Community." *The Review of Politics* 65.2 (2003): 237-262.

- Früchtli, Josef. *The Impertinent Self*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong*. London: Profile Books, 2006.
- . *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press, 1992.
- Genette, Gerard. *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*. Trans. Jane E. Lewin. New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997 (1987).
- Gilbert, B. J., Gareth Stanton, and Willy Maley. *Postcolonial Criticism*. Ed. B. J., Gareth Stanton, and Willy Maley Gilbert. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014.
- Gingrich, Newt. *Feelings vs Fact* CNN. 27 July 2016. Video. 28 July 2016. <<https://youtu.be/xnhJWusy4I>>.
- Giroux, Henry A. *Dangerous pedagogy*. 2012.
- Giroux, Henry A. "Cultural Studies, Public Pedagogy, and the Responsibility of Intellectuals." *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 1.1 (2004): 59–79.
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. *Faust The first and second part of the Tragedy*. Internet Archive, 1832 (2016). Ebook. <<https://web.archive.org/web/20160309072028/http://en.goethe-faust.org/dedication>>.
- . *Faust: Der Tragödie erster Teil*. The Project Gutenberg, 2000 (1808). Ebook. <<https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2229>>.
- Göle, Nilüfer. "Public Space Democracy." 29 July 2013. *Eurozine*. <<https://www.eurozine.com/public-space-democracy/>>.
- Gould-Wartofsky, Michael A. *The Occupiers: The Making of the 99 Percent Movement*, . New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. eBook.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1992.
- Grosz, Elizabeth. *Space, Time and Perversion - Essays on the politics of bodies*. New York and London: Routledge, 1995.
- Guattari, Félix and Antonio Negri. *New Lines of Alliance, New Spaces of Liberty*. Ed. Stevphen Shukaitis. Trans. Michael Ryan, Jared Becker and Arianna Bove. London and New York: Autonomedia, 2010 (1985).
- Guattari, Félix. "Transversality." *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*. Trans. David Cooper. Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1984 (1964). 11-23.
- Hamm, Marion. "Reclaim the Streets! Global Protests and Local Space." June 2002. *Republic Art*. 19 August 2013. <http://republicart.net/disc/hybridresistance/hamm01_en.htm>.
- Hammond, Timur and Elizabeth Angell. "Is Everywhere Taksim?: Public Space and Possible Publics." *Jadaliyya* 9 June 2013. <<http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/28755/Is-Everywhere-Taksim-Public-Space-and-Possible-Publics>>.

- Haraway, Donna J. "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin." *Environmental Humanities* 6 (2015): 159-165. <<http://environmentalhumanities.org/arch/vol6/6.7.pdf>>.
- . *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016.
- Haraway, Donna Jeanne. *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science*. New York, London: Routledge, 1989.
- . *Simians, Cyborgs and Women : The Reinvention of Nature*. New York, London: Routledge, 1991.
- Harding, James. "Data Doubles and the Specters of Performance in the Bit Parts of Surveillance." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 173-189.
- Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. *Assembly*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Ebook.
- Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. *Commonwealth*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.
- . *Commonwealth*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.
- . *Declaration*. New York: Argo Navis Author Services, 2012. <www.argonavisdigital.com>.
- . *Empire*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- . *Multitude*. New York: Penguin, 2005.
- Hardt, Michael. "Laboratory Italy." *Radical thought in Italy*. Ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010. 1 - 12.
- Hardt, Michael. "Porto Alegre: Today's Bandung?" *The Global Resistance Reader*. Ed. Louise Amoore. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. 190-94.
- . "Prison Time." *Yale French Studies* 91 (1997): 64-79.
- Harvey, David. *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. London and New York: Verso, 2012.
- . *The Ways of the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Epub.
- Hawkins, Simon. "Teargas, Flag and the Harlem Shake: Images of and for Revolution in Tunisia." *The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest: The Arab Spring and Beyond*. Ed. Pnina Werbner, Martin Webb and Kathryn Spellman-Poots. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. 31-52.
- Herder, Johann Gottfried von. "Ideas Towards a Philosophy of the History of Man." *Theories of History*. Ed. Patrick Gardiner. New York: Free Press, 1959. 35-49.
- Hewitt, Giles. "Flash mobs: a new social phenomenon?" 30 July 2003. *ABC News*. 14 June 2015. <<http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/stories/s913314.htm>>.

- Hoffman, Abbie. "Museum of the Streets." 1980. *The Anarchist Library*. 12 May 2012. <<http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/abbie-hoffman-museum-of-the-streets>>.
- Holloway, John. "Why Adorno?" *Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism*. Ed. John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler. London: Pluto Press, 2009. 12-18.
- Holmes, Brian. "Unleashing the Collective Phantoms: Flexible Personality, Networked Resistance." 01 2002. *Republic Art*. August 2013. <www.republicart.net/disc/artsabotage/holmes01_en.pdf>.
- Hoy, David Couzens. *Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Postcritique*. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2004.
- Irigaray, Luce. *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*. London: Continuum, 2004.
- Ishkanian, Armine and Marlies Glasius. *Reclaiming Democracy in the Square?* London: The London School of Economics, 2013. Digital. 2016. <<http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/publicEvents/pdf/Final-Reclaiming-Democracy-Report.pdf>>.
- Jaaware, Aniket. *Simplifications*. New Delhi: Orient Langman Limited, 2001.
- "Job 41:1–34, New International Version." 2011. *Biblegateway.com*. Biblica, Inc.®. <<https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Job%2041&version=NIVUK>>.
- Jordan, John. "The art of necessity: the subversive imagination of anti-road protest and Reclaim the Streets." *Britain, DiY Culture: Party & Protest in Nineties*. Ed. George McKay. London and New York: Verso, 1998. 129-152.
- Kafka, Franz. "Fragments." *Grand Street* 56 (1996): 117-122.
- . "In the Penal Colony." 2011 (1919). *The Kafka's Project*. <<http://www.kafka.org/index.php?id=162,167,0,0,1,0>>.
- . *The Sons*. New York: Schocken Books, 1989.
- Kafka, Franz. *The Blue Octavo Notebooks*. Ed. Max Brod. Trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins. Cambridge, MA: Exact Change, 1991.
- Kambouri, Nelli and Pavlos Hatzopoulos. *The Tactics of Occupation: Becoming Cockroach*. 26 November 2011. <<https://nomadicuniversality.com/2011/11/26/the-tactics-of-occupation-becoming-cockroach/>>.
- Kant, Immanuel. "What Is Enlightenment?" 2010. *Columbia University*. 2013 1 12. <<http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html>>.
- Karpat, Kemal. "Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern, Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk." *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*. Ed. Kemal Karpat. Leiden: Brill, 2000.
- Karyotis, Theodoros. "The Right to the City in an Age of Austerity." *Roar Magazine* 6 (2017). <<https://roarmag.org/magazine/right-city-age-austerity/>>.
- Kendall, Stuart. *Georges Bataille*. London: Reaktion Books, 2007.

- Kershaw, Baz. *The Radical in the Performance: Between Brecht and Baudrillard*. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Khaldūn, Ibn. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History ; in Three Volumes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969 (1406).
- Khalidi, Rashid. *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- King, Brian. "Herder & Human Identity." *Philosophy Now* 12 (2016).
<https://philosophynow.org/issues/112/Herder_and_Human_Identity>.
- Kitromilides, Paschalis M. "The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict." *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* VI.4 (1979): 5-30.
- Klein, Naomi. *The Shock Doctrine*. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2007.
- Klossowski, Pierre. *Living Currency*. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017.
- . *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997 (1969). Document.
- Knabb, Ken, trans. *Situationist International Anthology*. Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006.
<<http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/May68docs.htm>>.
- Kohn, Hans. *Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology*. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press, 1953.
- Kollektiv, Pil and Galia. *On Claims of Radicality in Contemporary Art*. 27 January 2015.
- Kowsar, Mohammad. "Deleuze on Theatre: A case study of Carmelo Bene's Richard III." *Theatre Journal* 38.1 (1986): 19-33.
- Kuemmer, Harald. "Border Camp // Strasbourg // July 19 to 28, 2002." May 2002. *European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies*. August 2013. <<http://eipcp.net/transversal/0902/kuemmer/en>>.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. Second. London and New York: Verso, 2001 (1985).
- Laclau, Ernesto. *New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time*. London: Verso, 1990.
- Landa, Manuel De. "Deleuze, Diagrams and the Open-Ended." *Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures*. Ed. Elizabeth A. Grosz. New York: Cornell University Press, 1999. 29-41.
- Landau, Jacob M. *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*. London: Hurst & Company, 1995 (1981).
- Lash, Scott. "Genealogy and the Body: Foucault/Deleuze/Nietzsche." *Theory, Culture and Societies* 2 (1984): 1-17.
- Latour, Bruno. "Tarde's Idea of Quantification." *The Social after Gabriel Tarde: Debates and Assessments*. New York: Routledge, 2010. 145-162.

- . *We Have Never Been Modern*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Lazzarato, Maurizio. "From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life." *Ephemera* (2008): 187-208.
- . "Grasping the Political in the Event." *INFLexions* 3 (2008).
<http://www.inflexions.org/n3_lazzaratohtml.html>.
- . "Struggle, Event, Media." 5 2003. *Republic Art*. 12 February 2010.
<http://www.republicart.net/disc/representations/lazzarato01_en.htm>.
- Lazzarato, Maurizio. "The Aesthetic Paradigm." *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New*. Ed. Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. London and New York: Continuum, n.d. 173-183.
- Lehmann, Hans-Thies. *Postdramatic Theatre*. Trans. Karen Jürs-Munby. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Lemke, Thomas. "Rethinking Biopolitics." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016.
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers, 1992.
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution." Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. *Collected Works*. Vol. 9. Moscow, 1962. 15-140.
- Lentin, Ronit. "State of Exception and Acts of Resistance." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016.
- Liedman, Sven-Eric. "Is content embodied form?" *Embodiment in Cognition and Culture*. Ed. John Michaels Krois, et al. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B. V., 2007. 127-131.
- Linebaugh, Peter and Marcus Rediker. *The many-headed hydra : sailors, slaves, commoners, and the hidden history of the revolutionary Atlantic*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.
- Lloyd, James. "Occupy Gezi: the cultural impact." 17 June 2013. *Pressenza*. 02 February 2015.
<<https://www.pressenza.com/2013/06/occupy-gezi-the-cultural-impact/>>.
- Long, Christopher P. *The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.
- Lowith, Karl. *Meaning In History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.
- Lyotard, Jean Francois. *Libidinal Economy*. Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993 (1974).
- . *The Differend*. Trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988 (1983).
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "Prescription." Lyotard, Jean-Francois. *Toward the Postmodern*. Ed. Robert Harvey and Mark S. Roberts. New York: Humanities Press, 1999. 176-191.

- MacKenzie, Iain and Robert Porter. *Dramatizing the Political: Deleuze and Guattari*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- MacKenzie, Jon. "Gender Trouble: (the) Butler Did It." *The Ends of Performance*. Ed. Peggy Phelan and Jill Lane. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 217–235.
- Martinelli, Alberto. *Global Modernization: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005.
- Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. "Manifesto of the Communist Party." 2000. *Marxists Internet Archive*. 1 May 2013. <www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto>.
- Marx, Karl. *Capital Volume III*. Marxist.org, 2010 (1894).
- . *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Political Economy (Rough Draft)*. Trans. Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin Books, 1993.
- . *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972.
- Mason, Paul. "From Arab Spring to Global Revolution." *The Guardian* 05 February 2013. Digital. 2016. <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/05/arab-spring-global-revolution>>.
- Massumi, Brian. *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Cambridge : MIT Press, 1992.
- . *Parables For The Virtual*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
- . *Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts*. Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 2011.
- Mauss, Marcel. "Techniques of the body." *Economy and Society* 2.1 (1973): 70-88.
- May, Jon and Nigel Thrift. "Introduction." *Timespace: Geographies of Temporality*. London and New York: Routledge , 2001. 1-46.
- May, Todd. "Gilles Deleuze and the Politics of Time." *Man and World* 29 (1996): 293-304.
- McDowell, Linda. *Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "Eye and Mind." *Images: A Reader*. Ed. Sunil Manghani, Arthur Piper and Jon Simons. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006. 131-137.
- . *The Visible and The Invisible*. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.
- Mierovec, Nika and Damjan Kavas. "Economic Analyses of the Cultural and Creative Industries in Slovenia." *Our Economy* 5-6 (2012): 22-33. Document.
- Mikedakis, Emmi. "Manipulating Language: Metaphors in the Political Discourse of Georgios Papadopoulos (1967-1973)." *"Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the [3rd] Annual Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University, 23-24 June 2000"*. Ed. E. Close, M. Tsianikas and G. Frazis. Adelaide: Flinders University Department of Languages – Modern Greek, 2001. 76-86.
- Mittal, Anuradha. "Foreword." *The Battle of the Story of the Battle of Seattle*. Ed. David Solnit and Rebecca Solnit. Edinburgh; Oakland: AK Press, 2009.

- Moll, Yasmin. "Building the New Egypt: Islamic Televangelists, Revolutionary Ethics and 'Productive' Citizenship." *Hotspots* (2013). <<https://culanth.org/fieldsights/231-building-the-new-egypt-islamic-televangelists-revolutionary-ethics-and-productive-citizenship>>.
- . "Conversation on the Egyptian Revolution: Fieldwork in Revolutionary Times." *Hotspots* (2013). <<https://culanth.org/fieldsights/240-conversation-on-the-egyptian-revolution-fieldwork-in-revolutionary-times>>.
- Mollendorf, Peter von. "Man as Monster: Eros and Hubris in Plato's Symposium." *Bodies and Boundaries in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*. Ed. Thorsten Fögen and Mireille M. Lee. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2009. 87-111.
- Momus. *AlterModern Week*. 2 March 2009. 17 May 2013. <imomus.livejournal.com>.
- Monaldi, Paola. "Folding Cubanidad: A Deleuzian Approach to Contemporary Cuban Cinema." PhD Thesis. 2012. <hdl.handle.net/10023/3322>.
- Mosley, Nicholas. *Hopeful Monsters*. Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990.
- Mullarkey, John. "Deleuze." *Alain Badiou: Key Concepts*. Ed. A. J. Bartlett and Justin Clemens. Durham: Acumen, 2014. 168-176.
- Müller, Gini. "Transversal or Terror? Moving Images of the PublixTheatreCaravan ." 10 2002. *European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies*. September 2013. <eipcp.net/transversal/0902/mueller/en/prin>.
- Murchadha, Felix Ó. *The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger*. London: Bloomsbury , 2012.
- Naggar, Miret El. "In Egypt, diary of 'torture' captures police brutality." *The Christian Science Monitor* 22 July 2010. Digital. 2014. <<https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0722/In-Egypt-diary-of-torture-captures-police-brutality>>.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. *Being Singular Plural*. Trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
- Nash, Ronald H. *The Concept of God*. Michigan: The Zondervan Corporation, 1983.
- Neary, Mike and Sarah Amsler. "Occupy: a new pedagogy of space and time?" *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 10.2 (2012). <<http://www.jceps.com/PDFs/10-2-03.pdf>>.
- Negri, Antonio. "Logic and Theory of Inquiry: Militant Praxis as Subject and as Episteme." *Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations // Collective Theorization*. Ed. Stephen Shukaitis, David Graeber and Erika Biddle. Trans. Nate Holdren and Arianna Bove. Oakland and Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007. 62-73.
- . *Marx and Foucault: Essays*. Trans. Ed Emery. Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2017. Kindle Ebook.
- Negri, Antonio. "The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life." Casarino, Cesare and Antonio Negri. *In Prase of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics*. Trans. Maurizia Boscagli. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 193-218.

- Newman, Saul. "Occupy and Autonomous Political Life." *Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude Versus the Hegemony of the People*. Ed. Alexandros Kioukiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis. London and New York: Routledge, 2016. 93-110.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007 (1887).
- . *The birth of tragedy and other writings*. Trans. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- . *The Portable Nietzsche*. Trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann. New York: Penguin, 1988.
- . *The Will to Power*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1967 (1901).
- . *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Trans. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Nikolopoulou, Kalliopi. *Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life*. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2013.
- Notes From Nowhere, ed. *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistable Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism*. London and New York: Verso, 2003.
- Nowotny, Stephan. "Immanent Effects: Notes on Cre-activity." *Critique of Creativity: Prec"arity, Subjectivity, and Resistance in the "Creative Industrie*. Ed. Gene Ray, Ulf Wuggenig Gerald Raunig. London: Mayfly, 2011. 9-22. Document. <Mayfly.org>.
- O'Connor, Justin. *The Cultural and Creative Industries: a Literature Review*. London: Arts Council England, 2007. Document.
- O'Neill, Paul. "The Curatorial Turn: From Practice to Discourse." *Issues in Curating Contemporary Art and Performance*. Ed. Judith Rugg and Michele Sedgwick. Bristol, Chicago: Intellect Books, 2007. 13-29.
- O'Sullivan, Simon. "The Production of the New and the Care of the Self." *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New*. Ed. Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. London and New York: Continuum, n.d. 91-103.
- Ozturk, Fatih. "The Ottoman Millet System." *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 16 (2009): 71-86. Online. <<https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1pvoQtTLDgIJ:dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/12937+&cd=16&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=de>>.
- Papacharissi, Zizi. *Affective Publics: sentiments, technology, and politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Papastergiadis, Nikos. *Spatial Aesthetics, Art, Place, and the Everyday*. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2010.
- Pieke, Frank N. "Images of Protests and the Use of Urban Space in the 1989 Chinese People's Movement." *Urban Symbolism*. Ed. Peter Nas. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993. 153-171.

- Pink, Daniel H. *A Whole New Mind*. New York: Penguin, 2006.
- Plato. *Timaeus*. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. London: Macmillan, 1959.
<<http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1572>>.
- Prentoulis, Marina and Lasse Thomassen. "Autonomy and Hegemony in the Squares: The 2011 Protests in Greece and Spain." *Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today*. Ed. Alexandros Kioupiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis,. Surrey: Ashgate Publication, n.d.
- Rancièrè, Jacques. "Artists and Cultural Producers as Political Subjects." *Opposition, Intervention, Participation, Emancipation in Times of Neo-liberal Globalization*. Berlin, 16 1 2006.
- Ranciere, Jacques. "The Emancipated Spectator." *ArtForum* (2007): 271-280.
- Rancièrè, Jacques. *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*. Trans. Gabriel Rockhill. New York: Continuum, 2004.
- . "Thinking between Disciplines: an Aesthetics of Knowledge." *Parrhesia* 1 (2006): 1-12.
- Raunig, Gerald. *A Thousand Machines*. Trans. Aileen Derieg. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2010.
- . "A War-Machine Against Empire: On the Precarious Nomadism of the PublixTheatreCaravan." May 2002. *Subsol*. 17 September 2013.
<http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors2/raunigtext.html>.
- . *Art and Revoltion*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007.
- . *Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity*. Trans. Aileen Derieg. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2013.
- Reich, Wilhelm. *Character Analysis*. Trans. Vincent R. Carfagno. New York: Farrar, Straus and Grioux, 1990 (1933).
- Rensmann, Lars and Samir Gandesha. "Understanding Political Modernity." *Arendt and Adorno: Political and Philosophical Investigations*. Ed. Lars Rensmann and Samir Gandesha. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012. 1-30.
- Rodowick, D. N. *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997.
- Romanos, Eduardo. *From Tahrir to Puerta del Sol to Wall Street: Analyzing Social Movement Diffusion in the New Transnational Wave of Protest*. Bordeaux: ECPR General Conference, 2013.
<<https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/3b373c0d-5a88-4802-97a0-1a1c68d7ebfc.pdf>>.
- "Saddam Hussein's speech." 6 January 2003. *The Guardian*.
<<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/06/iraq1>>.
- Sadiki, Larbi. "Unruliness through space and time: reconstructing "peoplehood" in The Arab Spring." *Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*. Ed. Larbi Sadiki. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. 1-14.
- Salem, Paul. *Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994.

- Sampson, Tony D. *Virality: Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks*. London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
- Sayyid, Salman. *Recalling the Caliphate*. London: Hurst, 2014.
- Schafers, Marlene and Çiçek Ilengiz. "Improbable Encounters: Marching for Lice in Kadıköy." *Hot Spots* (31). <<https://culanth.org/fieldsights/404-improbable-encounters-marching-for-lice-in-kadikoy>>.
- Schaub, Mirjam , Nicola Suthor and Erika Fischer-Lichte, *Ansteckung: zur Körperlichkeit eines ästhetischen Prinzips*. München: Wilhelm Fink, 2005.
- Schechner, Richard. "Introduction to Part II." *The Grotowski Sourcebook*. Ed. Richard Schechner and Lisa Wolford Wylam. London and New York: Routledge, 1997. 207 - 215.
- . *Performance Theory*. Routledge: London and New York, 1988.
- . *Performed Imaginaries*. London and New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Sengupta, Shuddhabrata. "No Border Camp Strasbourg : A Report." 29 July 2002. *nettime.org*. 12 August 2013. <<http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0207/msg00185.html>>.
- Shaw, Ian G.R., John Paul Jones III and Melinda K. Butterworth. "The mosquito's umwelt, or one monster's standpoint ontology." *Geoforum* 48 (2013): 260-267.
- Sherry, Virginia N. "Syria: The Silenced Kurds." 1996. <<https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria.htm>>.
- Shiffman, John and Brian Grow. "The Body Trade." 2017. 26 October 2017. <<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-bodies-science/>>.
- Schildrick, Margrit. "Chimerism and Immunitas." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. . New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 95-108.
- Shokr, Ahmad. "The Eighteen Days of Tahrir." *The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt*. Ed. J. Sowers and C. Toensing. London: Verso, 2011. 41 - 46.
- Shukaitis, Stevphen. *Imaginal Machines: Autonomy & Self-Organization in the Revolutions*. London, NYC and Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2009.
- Sikka, Sonia. *Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Smith, Daniel W. "Deleuze and the Production of the New." *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New*. Ed. Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. London and New York: Continuum, 2008. 151-161.
- Smith, Daniel W. "Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia." Klossowski, Pierre. *Living Currency*. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017. 1 - 41.
- Smith, David. "Tanzania accused of backtracking over sale of Masai's ancestral land." *The Guardian* 16 November 2014. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/16/tanzania-government-accused-serengeti-sale-masai-lands>>.

- Spangberg, Marten. "Motivation at the End of Times: To gain respect is just the beginning." *Frakcija* (2011).
- Spinoza, Benedict de. *Political Treatise*. Ed. R. H. M. Elwes. Trans. A. H. Gosset. London: G. Bell & Son, 1883. <<http://www.constitution.org/bs/poltr-00.htm>>.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can The Subaltern Speak?" *Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory: a reader*. Ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. 66-111.
- Staal, Jonas. *Progressive Art*. n.d. 2015. <http://www.jonasstaal.nl/site/assets/files/1204/progressive_art_-_sternberg_press.pdf>.
- . "To Make a World, Part I: Ultrationalism and the Art of the Stateless State." *e-flux* No. 57 (2014). 3 2015. <<http://www.e-flux.com/journal/57/60395/to-make-a-world-part-i-ultrationalism-and-the-art-of-the-stateless-state/>>.
- Stewart, Susan. *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993 (1984).
- Steyerl, Hito. "Politics of Art: Contemporary Art and the Transition to Post-democracy." *E-Flux* 21 (2010). <<http://www.e-flux.com/journal/politics-of-art-contemporary-art-and-the-transition-to-post-democracy/>>.
- . "The Articulation of Protest." September 2002. *Republicart*. 09 2009. <http://republicart.net/disc/mundial/steyerl02_en.htm>.
- Stoter, Brenda. *Young Egyptians reclaim Tahrir Square*. 19 November 2013. 3 3 2014.
- Stubblefield, Thomas. *9/11 and the Visual Culture of Disaster*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- "Surat An-Naml." n.d. *quran.com*. 10 January 2015. <<http://quran.com/27/39-40>>.
- Surin, Kenneth. "Socius." *The Deleuze Dictionary (Revised Edition)*. Ed. Adrian Parr. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010. 258-260.
- Taleb, Julia. "From Assad to ISIS, a Tale of Syrian Resistance." *Waging Nonviolence* 22 August 2014. <<http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/assad-isis-tale-resistance/>>.
- Tan, Pelin. *The Silent University: Alternative Pedagogy as our Commons*. 2 2014. <<http://www.migrazine.at/artikel/silent-university-alternative-pedagogy-our-commons-english>>.
- Tarde, Gabriel. *The Laws of Imitation*. Trans. Elsie Clews Parsons. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1903 (1895).
- Taştekin, Fehim. "Erdogan plays 'Arab card' in Kobani." *Al-Monitor* 28 October 2014. <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/turkey-kobani-erdogan-deals-arab-card.html>>.

- Tepper, Rowan G. *Kairos: A Political Post-History of the Concept of Time*. 2012. 2014.
 <https://www.academia.edu/1468890/Kairos_-_A_Political_Post-History_of_the_Concept_of_Time>.
- Thacker, Eugene. "Biophilosophy for 21st Century." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 123-134.
- . *On the Horror of Living Networks*. Cambridge, March 2010.
 <<http://www.networkpolitics.org/request-for-comments/dr-thackers-position-paper>>.
- The Constitution of the Rojava Cantons*. February 2014. <<http://civiroglu.net/the-constitution-of-the-rojava-cantons/>>.
- Thoburn, Nicholas. *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Tillich, Paul. *Systematic Theology*. Vol. Three. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
- . *The Interpretation of History*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2015 (1936). Digitalized.
 <<http://media.sabda.org/alkitab-2/Religion-Online.org%20Books/Tillich%2C%20Paul%20-%20The%20Interpretation%20of%20History.pdf>>.
- Treitler, Leo. *Music and the Historical Imagination*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Tsianos, Vassilis S. "Democracy, Metropolitan Statis@Real Democracy." *Subjectivation in Political Theory and Contemporary Practices*. Ed. Andreas Oberprantacher and Andrei Siclodi. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 219-236.
- "Uganda: Police Raid Queer Kampala Film Festival." 2017.
 <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/15/uganda-police-raid-queer-kampala-film-festival>>.
- Valamvanos, George. "The Successors by Vangelis Katsanis." *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* VI.4 (1979): 31-84.
- Vanly, Ismet Chériff. "The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon." *The Kurds: A Contemporary Review*. Ed. Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl. London and New York: Routledge, 2000 (1992). 112-134.
- Walker, Rebecca A. "Badgering Big Brother: Spectacle, Surveillance, and Politics in the Flash Mob." *Liminalities* 7.2 (2011). <<http://liminalities.net/7-2/flashmob.pdf>>.
- Wasik, Bill. *And Then There Is This*. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.
- Weiss, Allen S. "The Primacy of Matter: Art Brut and Modernism." Weiss, Allen S. *Shattered Forms: Art Brut, Phantasms, Modernism*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1992. 7-24.
- Werret, Simon. "The Panopticon in the Garden: Samuel Bentham's Inspection House and Noble Theatricality in Eighteenth-Century Russia." *Ab Imperio* (2008): 47-70.
- Wilmer, S. E. and Audronė Žukauskaitė. "Introduction." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016.

- Women, UN. *Global Database on Violence against Women*. 2016. 2017. <<http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en/countries/asia/turkey>>.
- Woodward, Keith, John Paul Jones III and Sallie A. Ma. "The Politics of Autonomous Space." *Progress in Human Geography* 36.2 (2012): 204 - 224.
- Writers for the 99%. *Occupying Wall Street: the Inside Story of an Action that Changed America*. Chicago: Haymarket, 2011.
- Yumul, Arus. "Fashioning the Turkish Body Politic." *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity*. Ed. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 349-369.
- Zengin, Aslı. "What is Queer about Gezi?" *Hot Spots* (2013). <<https://culanth.org/fieldsights/407-what-is-queer-about-gezi>>.
- Zizek, Slavoj. *Capitalism with Asian values* Al Jazeera. 13 November 2011.
- . *The Parallax View*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.
- Zizek, Slavoj. *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*. London and New York: Verso, 2012.
- Žukauskaitė, Audronė. "From Biopolitics to Biophilosophy." *Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies*. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 74-93.
- In Farsi:***
- Rezai, Mohammad Javad and Mahmoud Hedayat-Afza (رضایی، محمد جواد و محمود هدایت‌افزا). "Suhrawardi's Viewpoint on Peripatetic Hayulā" ("دیدگاه سهروردی درباره‌ی هیولای مشائی"). *Sino Wisdom* 49 (2013), 117-137.
- Ibn-Sīnā (ابن‌سینا). *Remarks and Admonitions* (الاشارات و التنبيهات). Qom: Al-Balagha (البلاغه), 1997.
- Suhrawardi, Shahab al-Din (شهاب‌الدین، سهروردی). *Kitab al-Mashari' wa'l-Motarahat*, Arabic texts edited with introduction in French by H. Corbin (مجموعه مصنفات شیخ اشراق، تصحیح هانری کرین). Tehran: Iranian Academy of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 2000.