LoGoSO Research Papers No. 9

Public procurement of social services for migrants in Germany and China –
A comparative analysis of selected policy fields

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November 2020
LoGoSO Research Papers No. 9
ISSN: 2570-2351

The Publication Series

LoGoSO Research Papers is the publication series of the LoGoSO Germany China Research Project, edited by Prof. Dr. Katja Levy, Assistant Professor for Chinese Politics and Law at Freie Universität Berlin.

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The Research Project

Models of Co-operation between Local Governments and Social Organizations in Germany and China – Migration: Challenges and Solutions (LoGoSO Germany China) is a comparative research project of the Freie Universität Berlin, the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster and the Chinese Academy of Governance, funded by Stiftung Mercator.

This comparative research project looks at co-operation between state and social organizations (SOs) in China and Germany. It focusses on social service delivery in the area of integrating migrating populations with special attention to the fields of education, employment, vulnerable groups and social assistance (incl. legal aid) as a crosscutting issue. Within this subject area, the project seeks to identify different models of state-SO co-operation and analyse which models are successful and why and where this co-operation is problematic. It aims to capture the different models of co-operation in Germany and China, to analyse and compare the underlying structures and to show potentialities for development.
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1 Introduction

This report is part of the LoGoSO project. The comparative LoGoSO project investigates models of cooperation between local governments and social organisations (SOs) for migrants in Germany and in China. The aim of this report is to compare public service procurement (PSP), i.e. the government’s procurement of social services from SOs as part of public service provision in Germany and China with a special focus on the LoGoSO project’s four policy fields (education, employment, vulnerable groups and social assistance). The central questions of this report are: 1) How does PSP differ in the four policy fields? 2) How do these variations compare between Germany and China? So far, research has not systematically compared PSP in different policy fields. Comparisons between policy fields are relevant to the aim of tailoring policies to different fields. And comparisons between very different political systems such as Germany and China can shed light on the question of how generally applicable the results are. If similarities exist across the different systems, the results can be considered to offer general insights with broader applicability. If differences prevail it can be concluded that the political systems probably have a major impact on PSP in the different fields.

This comparative report is based on a review of relevant research literature, the LoGoSO internal research reports on social service provision the four policy fields in Germany and China, and the findings of the LoGoSO case studies.

Traditions of state-society cooperation differ between countries. This is not only the case when comparing “western” and “eastern” countries such as Germany and China. Even within the “west” and even within Europe there are major differences between countries (Brandsen and Johnston 2018, 319). In the US and the UK, a trend towards intensifying government-SO cooperation has been observed since the 1990s (Salamon 1995). In Central and Eastern European and Scandinavian countries, the state has remained a major provider of social services (Brandsen and Johnston 2018, 322). In Germany, six large umbrella organisations have played a prominent role in these cooperative efforts and social service delivery. However,

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1 LoGoSO stands for Local Government-Social Organisation. The full title of the project is: Models of Co-operation between Local Governments and Social Organizations in Germany and China – Migration: Challenges and Solutions. It is a comparative research project of the Freie Universität Berlin, the Westfälische Wilhelms Universität Münster and the Chinese Academy of Governance, generously funded by Stiftung Mercator. Three teams conducted the research from September 2016 to August 2019. See www.logoso-project.com for further details.

2 The term social organisation, found commonly in literature on Chinese non-profit or non-governmental organisations is used in this report to denote formally and legally established organisations set up as units separate from the state and non-profit in nature, i.e. not distributing profits to its members or staff. It is understood as synonymous with the term non-profit (organisation) that is more common in the literature on western organisations.

3 In Germany the term “migrants” as used here refers to the immigrants from war-torn countries who arrived in 2015 and 2016; in China the term refers to those Chinese citizens who move from the country's rural areas to the more affluent cities on its eastern coast (Levy 2020).

4 More reports from the LoGoSO project can be found online: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/17676.

5 A collection of these reports will be published in Chinese (Ma, Levy and Zimmer [in publication]). See also (Levy and Ketels 2019) and (Ketels und Levy [in publication]) for two in-depth analyses of the case studies of the LoGoSO project.

6 These umbrella organisations are: Caritas, Diakonie (Diaconia), jüdische Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle (Jewish Central Welfare Office), Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (German Red Cross), Arbeiterwohlfahrt (Workers’ Welfare) and the Deutsche Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband (German Parity Welfare
more recently, these umbrella organisations have not been able to maintain their exceptional position due to competition with commercial actors, particularly in the areas of healthcare, senior care and youth welfare. In addition, changes in government funding mechanisms are having a similarly detrimental effect on the corporatist tradition (Zimmer 1999).

Regarding the tradition of government-SO cooperation in the People's Republic of China (PRC), five phases can be distinguished. First, the initial three decades were characterised by complete responsibility and control over social services by the state and the Chinese Communist Party. Second, after the Reform and Opening policy was introduced at the end of the 1970s, SOs did enter the scene. However, most were still either initiated by the party-state or very closely connected to it. They worked primarily on the most pressing issues of poverty alleviation and disaster relief. Since economic growth was the focus of the new policies, other areas of governance were neglected, such as environmental protection and the welfare regime. Third, in the 1990s the Chinese government announced the 'socialisation of social welfare' in order to mobilise social actors and groups to help address social welfare issues that had been neglected in efforts to reform the economy (Chan, Ngok and Phillips 2008, 10 f.). Still, the government's economic focus and decentralisation policies led to unbalanced growth, regional and social inequalities, and serious environmental degradation. These developments intensified social tensions and protests became frequent and widespread in the 1990s. This led to the fourth phase during which the leadership team of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, which came to power in 2002/2003, put considerable emphasis on addressing social issues on the one hand and on maintaining social stability on the other. Reforms in this area were underscored by the formal announcement of a 'service-oriented government' in 2008 (Wen 2017, 68). Under the slogan of "social management" (社会管理), the party-state attempted to involve SOs in its service and control efforts as of 2002. The 'socialist harmonious society' was the overarching objective for these policies which were promoted from 2006 on (Wen 2017, 68). Finally, in the fifth phase, social management was further developed into "social governance" (社会治理) which became official policy in 2013 and is still valid today. For one thing, it is a way of integrating SOs into state governance in order to improve state output. By transferring social service delivery, the overall performance of government output is enhanced (Levy and Pissler 2020, 43). In addition, as Chan points out, the Chinese government’s outsourcing of social services to SOs is also a side effect of public institution reform. The SOs that were contractual partners in the initial phase of governmental social service procurement were mostly reformed public institutions (事业单位), either organisations that employed former civil servants and were responsible for basic social services (such as universities, hospitals, schools) or more independent organisations responsible for less important social services whose independent staff had no personnel connections to the government (C. K. Chan 2018, 6). In short, the PRC's tradition of state-society collaboration in service delivery first went through a phase of identity between state and service provider, second through a symbiosis between the two, and third and rather recently to something more reminiscent of a partnership between (more or less) independent organisations.7

Trends towards outsourcing are evident in Germany and China alike (Levy and Ketels 2019).

Association). On more general traditions of local public administration and social policy in Germany and China, see LoGoSO report no. 5 (Levy 2020).

7 On the limits to Chinese social organisations' independence, see e.g. Levy and Pissler (2020, 70-89) and Kand and Han (2005).
This report analyses these outsourcing practices with special attention to services offered to migrants in China and Germany. It is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of major theories of public service procurement (PSP) in general and proposes the categorisation from Dennis R. Young (2000) as a basic structure for systematic comparison of the policy fields and the two countries. Section 3 introduces the legal and political background of PSP for migrants in Germany and China as well as recent developments in this area in both countries. Section 4 provides an overview of PSP for migrants in the four policy fields of education, employment, vulnerable groups, and social assistance for each country, with greater attention to education and employment than vulnerable groups and social assistance in order to avoid repetition. Section 5 applies Young’s categorisation of government-SO cooperation to make a systematic comparison of the different models of PSP. Finally, section 6 summarises the findings.

2 Theoretical approaches to PSP

Public or government procurement of social services\(^8\) means contracting out or transferring “the production of services from the public sector to non-governmental organisations through a bidding or negotiation process after which a bid winner needs to produce the required amount and quality of services stated in a contract” (C. K. Chan 2018, 2). In this section, I introduce Young’s categories of state-SO cooperation to systematise my observations concerning PSP in the respective policy fields in Germany and China.

There are prominent attempts to explain why governments and social actors/organisations cooperate: *Network theory* is interested in why and how partners cooperate in networks. Governance Network Theory in particular is interested in networks in which government actors and social groups cooperate in service delivery (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). *Resource dependency theory* (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) explains collaboration with environmental constraints and the need to secure resources while reducing uncertainty and risk. *Institutional theorists* try to explain the (cooperative) behaviour of organisations in response to problems or pressures (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). From a *management* perspective, collaboration of state and societal actors in service provision is concerned with strategic aspects of co-production of services (Hill and Lynn 2010), or from the point of view of the *organisations’ survival*, to secure competitive advantages by means of collaboration (Sowa 2008).

Earlier research has suggested that contracting out government services has several advantages over a government offering these services itself, such as lower costs (by competition, the requirements of the tendering organisation, economies of scale, pooling of resources, and specialisation), better quality (by professionalism, division of labour, and proximity of service providers to beneficiaries), risk transfer from government to nongovernmental actors, and higher government accountability and responsiveness (because it retains control over service provision, monitors it, and increases collective ownership) (C. K. Chan 2018, 2 f., Brandsen and Johnston 2018, 312). Other researchers have emphasised that SOs are better equipped to handle the increasing complexity of socio-economic challenges (Brandsen and Johnston 2018, 311 f.) and offer multifunctionality because they can be active

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\(^8\) The distinction between public services and social services is sometimes blurred or confused in the research literature. In this article I follow the distinction used by Dong et al. (Dong, Cui and Christensen 2015) which understands *public services* as a broader term and social services as a subsection thereof. *Public services* therefore denote *public utilities*, such as gas, electricity, water and public transport, and *social services* refer to e.g. school instruction, senior care, and/or social housing.
in several distinct areas such as policy development, policy implementation, service delivery, interest representation, lobbying, and providing avenues for social cohesion (Zimmer 2010).

According to Stephen P. Osborne (2009, 2010), cooperation between governments and SOs has in theory shifted from hierarchical to more collaborative forms of cooperation. He identifies three types of governance in order of their appearance: Classic Public Administration, a form of governance whose important features include the rule of law, the division of politics and administration within public organisations, and professionals in public service delivery; New Public Management which emphasises output control, often in combination with market mechanisms; and New Public Governance, in which multiple interdependent actors are involved in social service delivery and also inform the policy-decision process (Brandsen and Johnston 2018, 313). Others find that the development is less straightforward and expect more hybrid forms of governance networks to prevail (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). Brandsen and Johnston point to certain risks in collaborative governance. In particular, the balance of power in these relationships is not equal and sometimes SO autonomy can suffer (Brandsen and Johnston 2018, 313).

While these theories attempt to explain why states and SOs collaborate, Dennis R. Young’s approach tries to describe and categorise such relationships:

Starting from an economist’s perspective with a background in rational choice theory, Young distinguishes three models of cooperation between governments and SOs. First, SOs can supplement governments in a relationship that can be explained by ‘government failure’ (Weisbrod 1975). Governments decide to contract out services to SOs where they themselves cannot satisfy the many different needs of their citizens or where demand is volatile. SOs operate where governments leave space open for service delivery. The more heterogeneous the potential beneficiaries of the services, the more likely these services are outsourced to more flexible SOs (Young 2000, 151 f.).

Second, SOs and government may also complement each other in delivering services. In this case, governments and SOs work together in a division of labour whereby the government often provides funding and the SOs deliver the services. Young explains this by another economic theory, namely the theory of organisations with special reference to the idea of transaction costs. Here, the delegation of service delivery is driven by efficiency considerations. SOs might work more efficiently because they can adjust their costs by utilising economies of scale and the market economy. One might argue that for-profit enterprises are able to be as efficient, flexible and innovative as non-profits. However, according to Young non-profit SOs have the advantage of not having to compromise service quality and variety for profit like their for-profit counterparts.

Third, SOs and governments may also face each other as adversaries. This is especially the case when SOs take on an advocacy role. This may again be explained by Weisbrod’s concept of government failure. Where the government fails to address the needs and interests of certain minority groups, the latter might organise to change government policy. Governments therefore have an interest in controlling SOs.

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9 Young uses the term "nonprofit" in the original.
Theoretical approaches to government-SO cooperation were first developed in European and US research and then spilled over to Chinese research, even though the latter have their own traditions in this area as was shown in the introduction.

3 Legal and political frameworks and recent PSP developments for migrants in Germany and China

In Germany, the legal and political framework for PSP for migrants must be seen against the backdrop of federalism in Germany and the policies of the European Union. Asylum and refugee policies are increasingly being decided on the EU level. Migrant integration issues are handled on the three levels of German administration, i.e. the federal (Bund), federal state (Bundesländer) and municipal (Kommunen) levels. The country's complex legal framework of migrant integration involves different policy fields such as social welfare, employment, education, youth, family and housing. Basic questions concerning migrants' residence status are regulated on the federal level, which cooperates with SOs, mainly the above-mentioned large umbrella organisations, by funding counselling work by these organisations for migrants in the initial phase following arrival in Germany (Meyer 2019, 328). In 2005 Germany adopted the Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) and established the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge), thereby acknowledging its role as a destination country for migrants and also centralising part of its migration and integration responsibilities. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, with 84 local branches, is responsible for recognising refugee status but also offers integration courses and conducts research on migration and integration in Germany. The Integration Act, another piece of federal legislation, followed in 2016.

The individual states have some leeway in interpreting federal law which leads to different migration and integration policies on that level. These differences appear in areas such as granting and denying work permits, citizenship and expulsion criteria, school, training and cultural policies as well as the establishing of foreigners' advisory councils and commissioners. In addition, the states are able to influence policies on both the federal and municipal levels. Some states have adopted local integration laws (Meyer 2019, 330).

The municipalities play a key role in efforts to integrate migrants in Germany by addressing the practical needs of new arrivals right from the start. They have limited financial means, however, so are dependent on higher administrative levels. Municipal integration policies expanded from selective immediate responses to migration challenges in earlier decades to more strategic and long-term policies as of the 1990s. The latter include strategic policy areas such as neighbourhood work, integrational aspects of educational systems, and integration and networks across different administrative departments dealing with different aspects of migration (Meyer 2019, 331 f.).

In Germany SOs play an important role in the three aspects of integration policy, namely its formulation, funding, and implementation. While the six umbrella organisations are active in all three fields, foundations are particularly engaged in funding. Other SOs, the trade unions and the churches are also active in integrating migrants into society. The SOs also include organisations set up by migrants themselves (Meyer 2019, 332 f.). With the greater refugee

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10 This section on Germany’s legal and political framework is closely based on Meyer’s comprehensive and up-to-date description of the situation (2019).
influx in 2015, efforts such as the joint programme by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales) called *ESF-Integrationsrichtlinie Bund* (ESF Integration Guideline, 2014-2020) gained significance in the context of state-SO cooperation. The aim of this programme is “to assist persons with difficulties in accessing training and employment and to foster their sustainable integration into the labor market. [...] The main idea behind [this] program [and its predecessors is] to strengthen relationships between various actors from the public, private and non-profit spheres, in order to reduce barriers for labor market access [...] Thus, building local or regional networks was and is a mandatory component of the federal programs. In the current funding phase, these collaborative networks must include the local employment agencies or job centers as well as non-profit organisations and employers as either operative or strategic partners.”

In summary, migration and integration policy in Germany is a joint effort by the different administrative levels of the federal system that incorporates EU policies and includes programmes that support or even require collaboration between local state levels and SOs.

In China, national and local laws and regulations regulate social service provision for migrants. National policy stipulates the broad guidelines. The general trends are to increase public services and to lower barriers to migrants’ access to these services. Central government policies affect social service provision for migrants in three ways: 1) the household registration (*hukou*) system which regulates who is entitled to which services in which location; 2)...

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12 The household registration (*hukou*) system was introduced in the early years of the People’s Republic. Before 1998 a Chinese citizen inherited the *hukou* status from her or his mother; after 1998 the *hukou* status could be inherited from either the mother or father. At the beginning, its purpose was to control rural-to-urban migration within the country and it was strictly implemented. Consequently, citizens with a rural *hukou* who nevertheless came to the cities were illegal and were not eligible for any public services. Health insurance for them and their families and schooling for their children at a different place from their registered home locations were out of reach. When economic development took off in the 1980s and workers were needed in industrial areas along China’s eastern coast, enforcement of the *hukou* regulations was relaxed to a certain degree. Workers were able to move to the cities with less risk of being sent home but still lacked access to social services for themselves and their families. After 1978, conversion of a *hukou* first needed state-level approval to change from agricultural to non-agricultural status (农转非) and then local-level change of registration to the new location. There were only a few ways to change one’s status. The most common successful reasons in the early years after introduction of the Reform and Opening policy were employment by a state-owned enterprise, enrolment in an institution of higher education, promotion to a senior administrative position, displacement due to state land expropriation, or demobilization to cities for soldiers (Colas and Ge 2019, 298 f.).

More recently, migrant workers in cities have some limited access to social services at their workplaces. Because social security systems in China’s rural and urban areas were strictly separated, the reform of these systems and ensuing reform of the hukou system are complex processes that are still underway (Levy 2020, 5). In the 1990s and 2000s, the *hukou* regulations were gradually relaxed and the central government delegated ever more power to local governments to issue regulations on *hukou* changes. These local administrations prefer to award urban *hukous* to newcomers with good educational backgrounds and high incomes in order to ensure tax revenue and not strain local budgets with the provision of social services. In general, it is easier for migrants from nearby rural areas or from rural neighbourhoods that became urban after cities extended and incorporated them. However, for the majority of those migrant workers from remote areas with limited education and low earnings, it is still very difficult or impossible to get an urban *hukou*. As a rule of thumb, the larger, richer and more important a city is, the more difficult it is to get a *hukou* for it. These urban *hukous* are in very high demand because they mean better social security and services. Consequently, authorities in these cities...
educational policy which applies to any Chinese citizen, regardless of where he or she is registered, works, and lives – at least on a general level such as the compulsory number of years of primary school education; and 3) healthcare policy, the implementation of which differs widely in different localities (A. Chan 2015, 15).

Local governments are responsible for implementing these policies, including social service provision. However, support from the central government is rather limited, particularly in financial terms. Local governments are responsible for formulating, funding, and implementing concrete policies and providing public services for migrants. This unfair division of labour is sometimes described as “the center treats; local governments pay” [...] Therefore, an analysis of public services provision for migrants requires a focus on local government policies and regulations.” (A. Chan 2015, 22). Scholars have described the Chinese state and its capacity to deliver public goods and services as “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992, Mertha 2009), but also as adaptive and able to pragmatically react to problems and incorporate local feedback and solutions (Heilmann and Perry 2011). Thus far, the combination of these qualities has not enabled the Chinese government to close the large gaps between the countryside and cities in terms of their social security systems (A. Chan 2015, 81). Instead, local governments are struggling to provide the necessary services. And migrants still face discrimination in many respects regarding access to social services. According to Alexia Chan, restricted access is not only due to resource scarcity or administrative inability but also should be seen as a form of social control: local governments use access and restrictions to social services as ways of regulating migration (A. Chan 2015, 24). The fact that the local governments bear the main responsibility for providing services to migrants in their jurisdiction also leads to large variations in migrant situations across different localities. For example, Beijing has a rather restrictive policy for migrants whereas Shanghai has a partly more open educational policy for migrant children and Chengdu is generally the most welcoming city for migrants, comparatively speaking (A. Chan 2015, 40). The differences might be explained by different local industrial needs for labour. Or as suggested by Chan, another explanation might be “whether local government officials shared a regional identity with the migrant workers”. In other words, migrants to Chengdu often come from nearby rural areas and smaller cities and share the regional language, customs and way of life, whereas cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou receive migrants from all over China with greater variations which makes integration more challenging (A. Chan 2015, 48).

13 An edited volume by Stepan and Duckett (2018) names key actors for advancing the agenda on social development in China and states that overlapping or unclear responsibilities between line ministries and different levels of government represent major fault lines in the system. So-called leading small groups or other multi-departmental groups are tools to improve coordination and communication on certain pressing policy issues. Already in 2006, the State Council established the “Joint meeting system on the work on migrant workers” (国务院农民工工作联席会议制度) (State Council. (2006). 国务院关于同意建立 农民工工作联 席会议制度的 批复. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-04/03/content_243694.htm, accessed 8 October 2020).
The practice of contracting out social services to SOs also varies widely across different regions, although government procurement is a matter of national legislation (C. K. Chan 2018, 8). Purchasing services was already included in government procurement according to the “Government Procurement Law of the PRC”\(^{14}\) (Wang und Han 2020) although social services are not mentioned explicitly (Wen 2017, 69). However, the most specific and important rules and policies concerning PSP are the “Guiding Opinions on Government Purchase-of-Services from Societal Actors” (State Council 2013), \(^{15}\) the "Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of Services" (Ministry of Finance 2020), \(^{16}\) and the "Guiding Opinions on Supporting the Promotion and Development of SOs through Government Purchase-of-Services" (Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Civil Affairs 2016)\(^{17}\) (Wen 2017, 66, Jing 2017, 180). Articles 6 through 8 of the 2020 Measures specify the kinds of organisations that may function as partners in public service provision. While SOs and enterprises were recognised partners from early on, individuals and some other groups were added later.\(^{18}\)

Support by SOs as service providers and as part of ‘social construction’ was adopted for the first time by President and General Party Secretary Hu Jintao in his Assembly Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007. Thereupon, “experiments of social deregulation unfolded, while local innovations like social service contracting diffused quickly” (Jing 2017, 181). Local governments have issued their own rules for public purchase of services within this national framework. These reforms took off in Guangdong province first (Wen 2017, 69). Economic development in this province benefitted not only from proximity to Hong Kong whose past as a British Crown colony meant it had extensive trade and diplomatic contact with western industrial countries. Guangdong had led the way in economic reforms since the late 1970s. And now, in the late 2000s, it was the first to introduce these social reforms. Again, Hong Kong with its traditionally rich and diverse third sector functioned as a model for this neighbouring PRC province (Lam and Perry 2000). Guangdong was also the first to partly relax the registration requirements for some SOs in order to promote their work. From there the new practice of social service procurement diffused to the other Chinese provinces. However, although relevant legislation has been updated several times,


\(^{16}\) 政府购买服务管理办法 [Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of Services], issued by the Ministry of Finance on 1 March 2020 and effective from the same day. It replaces the expired provisional regulations of 2014 (政府购买服务管理办法（暂行）) [Regulations on the Government Procurement of Services (Provisional)]. Notice No. 96, issued by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Civil Affairs and General Administration of Industry and Commerce, on 15 December 2014.

\(^{17}\) 中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅关于改革社会组织管理制度促进社会组织健康有序发展的意见 [The Opinions concerning Reform of Social Organization Administration System to Promote Development of Social Organization in a Healthy and Ordered Way], issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the General Office of the State Council on 21 August 2016.

\(^{18}\) Articles 6 to 8 stipulate who is eligible as service providers: “Enterprises and social organizations legitimately formed (with the exception of groups and organizations funded by fiscal appropriation), public institutions of public welfare category II and engaged in production and business activities, rural collective economic organizations, basic-level self-governing mass organizations, and eligible individuals may act as providers in the government procurement of services.” (Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of Services, 2020). Compared to earlier regulations, this most recent regulation considerably extends the scope of possible service providers. Individual persons and rural collectives stand out among the newly added groups (Wang und Han 2020).
collaborating with SOs is still a process of “learning by doing” (Wen 2017, 69) and many issues regarding social service provision to migrants are still not solved. To date, only a few studies have investigated the practice of service provision to migrants in China (Li 2018, 109).

To sum up, in both countries service provision is regulated within a complex system of national and local laws and guidelines. Germany and China have officially recognised SOs as providers of services and as partners in government outsourcing. In addition, both countries’ local-level administrative structures bear the burden of dealing directly with migrants’ requirements while under pressure to meet a broad spectrum of service responsibilities but with limited financial support from higher administrative levels.

The next section examines public service procurement and SOs’ service provision to migrants in the four focal policy areas of the LoGoSO research project, i.e. education, employment, vulnerable groups, and social assistance including legal aid.

4 PSP for migrants in the four policy fields

The LoGoSO research project investigates forms of cooperation between local governments and SOs for migrants in Germany and China. In the research design phase of the LoGoSO project, the three research teams chose the four policy fields of education, employment, vulnerable groups and social assistance (including legal aid) for their case studies. The four fields were chosen according to the following criteria applicable to both countries: the fields should be relevant for social service provision for migrants; SOs should be relevant service providers in the fields; and preliminary desktop research should reveal suitable and approachable cases of state-SO cooperation in the sample cities in the respective policy fields. In order to put field research results into perspective it was also decided to include one case in each city in any of the policy fields in which this type of cooperation did not work out. Altogether the project therefore comprises nineteen cases with five cases in Berlin, Guangzhou and Hangzhou and four in Cologne.

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19 The cities for the cases were selected at the same time. In order to ensure comparability, we selected two large and two medium-sized cities in each country, comparable in their respective migrant population sizes, regional economic roles, and levels in their country's overall administrative system. Berlin, located in the northeast of Germany, is the country's capital and largest city. Cologne, situated in the west at the Rhine River, is a medium-sized city that is nevertheless the largest city and economic centre of the state of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW). The Chinese cities were initially planned to include the capital Beijing for comparability with Berlin. But – as noted above - during this research project in 2017, the Beijing government decided to cap its population and order a significant proportion of its migrant population to return to their original places of residence. This would have posed serious obstacles to research on the integration of migrant population in Beijing, so Guangzhou was selected instead. It has a significant need for migrant integration due to its large production capacities and their great need for rural migrant workers. One of China's largest cities and the capital of Guangdong province, it is located in the southeast at the Pearl River Delta and is the centre of the most populous metropolitan area in mainland China. Finally, Hangzhou is considered a middle-sized city in China. Like Cologne, it is the largest city and economic centre of its province, as well as the capital of Zhejiang province (Ketels, Migrant Integration as a Challenge for Local Governments and Social Organizations in China and Germany – Policy Traditions and Integration Measures in Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Berlin and Cologne 2019, Levy, Zimmer and Ma, Introduction in publication).

20 The search for 'unsuccessful cases of cooperation' proved to be very difficult. In the end we included only three cases of this kind, one each from Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and Berlin, and none from Cologne. For an overview of the cases, see Levy and Ketels (2019, Appendix).
The following overviews of the situations in each policy field in Germany and China will concentrate on the two main fields of education and employment, and only briefly cover the two fields of vulnerable groups and social assistance (including legal aid) where they do not overlap with the sections on education and employment.

4.1 Education
Education is vital for the integration of migrants in Germany and in China. It encompasses different groups such as children, youth and adults, and includes different institutions and educational programmes such as schools, universities and vocational and language training. Offering equal educational opportunities to migrants and the resident population is a challenge in both countries.

4.1.1 The legal framework and political backdrop for PSP in education

4.1.1.1 Germany
The legal framework for education in Germany involves national and local laws and regulations. The German Basic Law (article 7) stipulates that the state has to provide the infrastructure for schooling, that legal guardians have the right to determine the child's participation in religious education, and that private schools may be established under the condition that permission is granted by the state. Cultural and educational matters are in the jurisdiction of the federal states (articles 30, 83 and 84). As a general rule, legal and administrative issues concerning childcare and schooling are the responsibility of the sixteen federal states and are therefore regulated in somewhat different ways. The sixteen states coordinate their educational policies in the Standing Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz). The states bear the lion's share of [public] school-related expenses (Grabbe 2018).

The responsibility for youth welfare services lies with the municipalities. Childcare facilities are run and financed by a combination of public funding (federal states and municipalities), parents’ contributions and private service providers. The ratio differs from one state to another. Many municipalities’ budgets are strained by having to provide childcare, and the level of childcare differs across states due to divergent regulations (Grabbe 2018).

The dual vocational educational system in Germany combines vocational school classroom studies with on-the-job training. Vocational schools are regulated by the ministries of education and cultural affairs of the federal states. Their matters, such as framework guidelines and curricula for the different professions, are also coordinated by the Standing Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs. The different professional chambers are responsible for the accreditation of training companies, the supervision of traineeships and the organisation of examinations. Local communities or districts are the usual providers for vocational schools. Because work permits are required for vocational training, it has been difficult for refugees to access this type of education. However, these barriers have recently been somewhat lowered (Grabbe 2018).

The above-mentioned article 7 of Germany’ Basic Law is usually not understood as a broad right to education. However, a right to education can be derived from certain fundamental rights to human dignity (article 1, paragraph 1) and to freedom of personal development (article 2,

21 This overview is closely based on the report by Grabbe (2018).
paragraph 1) and the principle of equality (article 3, paragraph 1) guaranteeing open access to education. However, some of the federal states explicitly postulate the right to education in their constitutions. Constitutionally guaranteed entitlements apply to German citizens and incoming migrants alike. Children and youth are additionally protected by the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child which Germany ratified. It obliges states to grant children and youth the right to education regardless of their residence status. Similarly, the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (article 14) and the revision of the EU Reception Directive (article 14) require equal access to the educational system for German citizens and under-age refugees. School attendance is compulsory for all children and youth in Germany, including refugee children and youth, although details such as when refugees have to start school after arriving in Germany or whether special welcome classes are offered for them are stipulated in the laws of the individual states (Grabbe 2018).

As for the finances, most of the funding for education in Germany comes from public sources, with only a minor share private. In 2017, 9 per cent of Germany's overall spending went to education (OECD 2020). In 2018, the federal government covered roughly 7 per cent of Germany’s educational expenditures, while the states and municipalities covered 69 and 22 per cent respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019). The states assume most of the costs for schools and universities, private households and SOs are involved in the financing of childcare, and companies fund part of the vocational training. On-the-job training in the vocational education system is financed by the companies and indirectly by the trainees as they receive low wages (Grabbe 2018, 4).

Migrants’ access to educational services, including financial support for education, depends on their residence status (recognised refugees, refugees who have applied for asylum, and refugees whose asylum applications have been rejected but whose residence is still tolerated in Germany) (Gluns 2017). Refugees who have left the reception centres and been assigned to a locality (after their status has been recognised) have the right to use childcare facilities and to apply for full or partial exemption from the fees for these facilities. In reality, some municipalities are not able to offer enough childcare facilities (Grabbe 2018).

In short, the salient feature of the legal-political framework for migrants’ access to education in Germany is the federal system with variations in different localities. Recently, in light of growing numbers of refugees to Germany and the failed integration experience of earlier migrant generations, access to education for this heterogenous group has been eased.

4.1.1.2 China

The Chinese leadership has always emphasised the importance of education. It is believed to be vital for the country’s development and pursuit of a leadership role in the world. The Chinese government has recently intensified educational investments. Yet many migrant children continue to be prevented from enrolling in public school in their host cities, and private migrant schools have sprung up in many cities (A. Chan 2015, 18). In China the legislative and administrative responsibilities of education are also spread over different administrative levels. The legal framework for education on the national level is drafted primarily by the Ministry of Education and the laws are then adopted by the National People’s Congress. More regulations and policies for implementation are added at the local level (OECD, Education in China. A snapshot. 2016, 12). Roughly speaking, the responsibilities for primary and secondary education lie with county-level administrations, and higher education is the responsibility of
administration at the provincial level (OECD 2016, 9). The central law on education is the Law on Compulsory Education, which was first enacted in 1986, then revised in 2006, amended in 2015, and again in 2018\textsuperscript{22}. Among other things, it stipulates nine years of compulsory education, exemption from fees and tuition for compulsory education as well as limits to the profit margins of textbook prices (OECD 2016, 12).

Besides the Ministry of Education, other ministries and commissions also issue policies and programmes for education. The National Reform and Development Commission, for example, has issued a long-term plan on education for the years 2010 to 2020. Education is also part of the five-year programmes of the State Council and other national and regional development plans (OECD 2016, 12).

As for financing, the Educational Law\textsuperscript{23} stipulates that the government’s allocation of funds for education as a percentage of GDP should continue to grow in accordance with the country’s economic development and revenue. The above-mentioned long-term plan sets the goal for educational expenses at 4% of the GDP. This goal was first reached in 2012 (OECD 2016, 14). The national and local governments are the largest source (80.54% in 2014) of educational funding in the PRC. Additional sources include private school founders (0.4%), donations and fundraising (0.24%), institutional income (i.e. tuition fees) (16.54%), and other funds (2.28%) (OECD 2016, 16). At the end of 2005, a new State Council regulation\textsuperscript{24} set up a new financing system for compulsory education in rural areas. According to this new system, local governments and the central government were to share educational expenses for compulsory rural education based on projects or percentages. Investment should also increase incrementally. After a long period of attempts to implement this starting in 2006, and again in 2010, almost the total educational investment (96%) in rural compulsory education came from government budget allocations for education (OECD 2016, 17).

Preschool for children aged two to six is not compulsory. There have recently been efforts to extend the public supply of preschools. While the central government formulates laws, regulations, policies and development plans for preschools, county governments are responsible for administering them. Before these efforts were introduced, most preschools were private. Now, local governments are setting up public preschools and often cooperating with private organisations in the process (OECD 2016, 11).

Nine years of primary and secondary education are compulsory for every Chinese child starting from the age of six. After compulsory education, children may choose to attend senior secondary schools or vocational secondary schools. To enter a senior secondary school, they need to pass what is called the middle entrance exam (zhong k ao\textsuperscript{22}). Vocational schools are a relatively young phenomenon in the Chinese school system, introduced on a broader basis in the early 2010s (OECD 2016, 10). According to Klorer and Stepan, “In many areas China’s [vocational education and training] system is in a dire state. In society it is regarded as a fallback for those who failed their exams and a second-class education. For many years, vocational training was politically and financially neglected in favour of university expansion.

\textsuperscript{22} In Chinese: 中华人民共和国义务教育法.
\textsuperscript{24} Notice on Deepening the Rural Compulsory Education Assured Funding Mechanism Reform (深化农村义务教育经费保障机制改革的通知), online available at: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-02/07/content_181267.htm (accessed 21 August 2020).
When it was the ‘world’s extended workbench’ China had little need for skilled workers. Unskilled workers had been perfectly satisfactory for jobs in factories. Now there is need for a radical turnaround” (Klorer und Stepan 2015). As for the financing of compulsory schooling, in cities the district governments commonly administer and fund primary education and the city governments administer and fund secondary schools. Schools also commonly collect supplementary fees from parents to meet additional expenses (A. Chan 2015, 55).

Tertiary or higher education was reformed in the early 2000s, leading to diversification in this area and higher numbers of students. The national university entrance examination (gao kao 高考), which is held only once a year, is a prerequisite for acceptance to a university in China. The results of this highly competitive exam determine the quality of the university students can attend. Undergraduate students usually need three years to complete their degree, and another two or three years for a master's degree. Students can also enrol in professional higher education programmes which usually take three years (OECD 2016, 11). Some universities are administered at the national level and others at the provincial level under the auspices of the ministry of education and education departments and commissions on the provincial level.

Regarding migrant workers, the Chinese educational system is characterised by large gaps between rural and urban opportunities. In the cities it is still very difficult for migrant children and youth to gain access to the educational system. The hukou still determines individual educational careers, although there have recently been increasing efforts first privately by the migrants themselves and later by local governments to improve the situation of migrant children in the cities.

To sum up, in both countries, the legal and political framework is a complex combination of national and local laws and regulations. Local administrations in both countries have restricted budgets that need to cover a large share of the administration and funding for schools. Migrant children in Germany must have access to compulsory primary and secondary education according to the laws of the different federal states. Further education for migrants in Germany depends on their residence status and can be restricted. However, in light of high immigration numbers in 2015 these rules have been relaxed and educational facilities have been opened or supported by special migrant-related programmes. In China, despite nine years of compulsory schooling for every child, migrants' access to schooling in the localities where their parents live is still affected largely by the hukou system. The gap in education between rural and urban areas is still significant.

4.1.2 The particular challenges of education-related PSP for migrants and solutions offered by SOs

4.1.2.1 Germany

From the point of view of the government, the main challenge is to integrate the migrants at their new localities and thereby to maintain public order and social stability. The municipalities face the difficulties of putting orders from above to offer social services into practice with their limited budgets and administrative capacities.

The main challenges from the point of view of migrants in the German system are twofold. On the one hand, the link between their residence status and access to social services may lead to variations across groups. And on the other, differences in legislation among the federal states may lead to variations in educational opportunities across localities. Specific everyday
educational challenges for migrants include accessing childcare while they study, seek work, or work, and attending language instruction.

As mentioned in the introduction, private actors and SOs are traditionally involved in the childcare and pre-school parts of the German education system. As for schooling, local governments in the country have a long tradition of cooperating with private actors and SOs, sometimes associated with churches or other umbrella associations. There is also a small number of commercial providers which has thus far played only a marginal role (Szeili und Zimmer 2017, 10). SOs, volunteers and commercial actors offer other education-related services relevant for migrants, such as homework assistance, private tutoring and German language courses along with the classes specified by the federal integration programme. The SOs that offer educational services include the welfare associations and churches with their long tradition of working together with the local (state and municipal) governments to provide services as well as ad-hoc groups formed and managed by individual citizens. The German government supports civic engagement for migrants on different administrative levels and in various programmes (Grabbe 2018).

4.1.2.2 China

In general, the educational facilities and school qualities differ greatly between rural and urban localities in China. In the 1980s, decentralisation of funding and fragmentation of the provision of educational services changed the face of public education and the priorities of service providers. This led to greater inequality in services, and also opened some windows of opportunity for private and non-profit providers in deciding how to deliver their services (A. Chan 2015, 53). Basically, there are two options for pre-school and school education for the children of migrant workers: 1) they live with their parents in the cities where they work, and suffer from insufficient access to education; or 2) they stay with their grandparents in rural villages (the "left-behind children") and may have the disadvantage of low-quality schooling there. Drop-out rates are still high in rural areas, because families still need their children to work. Moreover, the "left-behind children" may suffer psychologically due to the long-term separation from their parents.

From the point of view of the state, the biggest challenge is to integrate the rural migrants into the urban education system. Some efforts to reform the hukou system are underway and several pilot experiments have been conducted to unify rural and urban household registrations in selected provinces which would give migrant children equal access to urban education. However, the policies attempted are very diverse and usually target better educated migrants with strong employment records and established housing situations (OECD 2016, 30). Local governments bear the main responsibility for providing education to the children of migrants in their jurisdiction. Another challenge for local administrations was to enable migrant children to take university entry exams in the location where their parents work instead of their place of origin. This was achieved in 2014 (OECD 2016, 11).

Chinese families usually regard education as highly important. According to a National Bureau of Statistics survey, 60% of Chinese families spent one third of their income on their children's education. According to the Ministry of Education, most children study at public schools funded by the government, and only a small proportion at private schools where they have to pay fees. However, even if this is the case and only a small number of migrant children do attend private schools, the fees can be very high and a large burden, or not affordable at all for migrant
parents (OECD 2016, 30). Most children of migrants (some 60 million in 2016) remain in their home towns. A large number (an estimated 36 million in 2010) accompany their parents to the cities when they reach school age and face limited access to education (OECD 2016, 29). Schooling in urban areas is mainly an administrative problem for migrant families. However, schooling in rural places of origin may bring psychological problems due to separation from parents, and also fewer opportunities to excel in the university entrance examination. The limited chances to attend a good university again have an impact on future job opportunities.

For a long time, privately run schools in urban areas were an important option for migrants who did not want to leave their children back in their villages. These bottom-up initiatives were quite common in the 1990s. Depending on the local government, they were declared illegal and suppressed, partially accepted, or fully accepted and included in the local urban school systems (A. Chan 2015, 39). In some places the private schools charged high tuitions. Only in the early 2000s did newly introduced regulations stop the practice of high tuitions for compulsory education for migrant children and allow the children to attend public schools (A. Chan 2015, 17). However, the educational system in China remains highly competitive. The highly competitive university entrance exam still provides sufficient motivation for local governments to keep migrant children out of schools that promise good scores on these exams. In practice, therefore, migrant children are still often forced to attend private schools for their compulsory education (A. Chan 2015, 17). In the focal area of education, the main service provided by Chinese SOs consists of setting up such private schools.

In short, SOs play important roles in the integration of migrant children, youth and adults into the urban educational systems of both countries. In Germany, SOs are engaged especially in offering childcare, tutoring and language courses to adult migrants, but are less involved in compulsory education. In China, it is especially the nine compulsory years of education where SOs offer their services and are needed most urgently by migrant children. Whereas in Germany the SOs complement the government services, in China they provide services the government is not able to offer, partly because of insufficient capacities, but also due to political considerations.

The next sections examine the political-legal frameworks and challenges related to employment services for migrants.

4.2 Employment

Migrants in Germany and in China need an income. Employment is therefore one of the most urgent needs and at the same time a vital factor for integration into the receiving societies. The field of employment policy may encompass employment as such, working conditions, insurance matters and security issues.

4.2.1 The legal framework and political backdrop for PSP in employment

4.2.1.1 Germany\textsuperscript{25}

Not all migrants come to Germany primarily for work. Refugees, for instance, come primarily for shelter. However, after receiving permission to stay, they require employment services. Recognised refugees must first attend integration courses before they register officially as looking for work at the Federal Employment Agency (\textit{Bundesagentur für Arbeit}) (Bonin 2017, 1-22).

\textsuperscript{25} This section draws heavily on Bonin (2017, 1-22).
1). Refugees accounted for 9.3 percent of all registered job seekers in 2017. Their share of the registered unemployed was 6.4 percent, which is noticeably lower. Many refugees make use of the Federal Employment Agency’s services such as its labour support measures. They are not counted as unemployed during this time26 (Bonin 2017, 2). Thirty-seven per cent of the refugees on Germany’s employment market have an average of 12 years of school plus higher education, which is higher than the proportion in the German population. However, roughly 20 per cent of refugees over 18 have attended either no school or only primary school. Knowledge of German is of course also rather rare among the majority of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They generally have no knowledge of German on arriving in the country. In addition, 5 per cent of the refugees arriving in Germany during the period under study were illiterate in their mother tongue (Bonin 2017, 6).27 In 2016, the unemployment rate in Germany was at a record low due to earlier structural reforms in employment policy. However, analysis by the Federal Employment Agency shows that the country does not have enough skilled workers. This shortage applies not only to positions that require academic training but also to professionals and specialists with vocational training (Bonin 2017, 8).

Due to restrictions on government spending during the legislative period of the "grand coalition" (CDU and SPD), structural reforms in the employment sector, and generally positive developments in Germany’s economy particularly in the export sector, government budgets on the national and local levels had higher income than expenditures in the years before the period of high migration in 2015-2016. As a result, the increased expenses for integrating migrants were manageable overall within the existing budgets.

However, demographic developments in Germany mean that its population will age increasingly over the coming years. The country’s budget is based on an intergenerational contract: the working-age population uses its taxes and contributions to finance social support for the retirement-age population. An ageing population threatens this balance. Incoming migrants can help mitigate the problem if the society succeeds in integrating them into the employment market and thereby as payers into the social security fund. From a macroeconomic perspective, it is therefore in the interest of both the incoming and receiving populations for integration into the employment market to proceed swiftly and successfully, particularly in segments requiring higher education and/or vocationally trained professionals and specialists (Bonin 2017, 10).

Not only the lack of German language skills and the ultimately generally low educational and skill levels of the migrants pose challenges in this endeavour. The administrative and legal

26 The migrants who form the focus of this study encompass the three groups of “recognised refugees” (entitled to stay and work in Germany), “asylum seekers” (whose applications have yet not been decided), and “persons with exceptional leave to remain” whose asylum applications have been denied (or who did not apply in the first place) but who cannot be repatriated. Their stay is “tolerated” (geduldet) only for short but renewable periods of time (Gluns 2017, Levy 2020, 3). In 2015 and 2016 a total of 1.2 million refugees registered in Germany. In 2016, 37 per cent of asylum applications at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees resulted in recognition of refugee status (according to the Geneva Convention or the German constitution). Twenty-two per cent resulted in subsidiary protection, i.e. neither refugee protection nor asylum but recognition of the threat of serious harm in the country of origin. About 100,000 (2016) asylum seekers achieved this “tolerated” status (Bonin 2017, 1 ff.).

27 Meanwhile, after the period of investigation, the proportion of illiterate individuals among the refugees has risen to 22 per cent (see https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fluechtlinge-deutschkurse-integration-bamf-1.4604569 and https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2020/20200908-am-tag-alphabetisierung.html, both accessed 8 October 2020).
systems that regulate immigration in Germany have also needed to adapt to the challenges of increased migrant numbers and the simultaneous need for skilled labour. Recent reforms have simplified refugee access to the employment market. The period during which asylum seekers with good chances for success\(^{28}\) and tolerated refugees have to wait before being allowed to take up employment, internships, or vocational training has been shortened from nine to three months. In addition, a regulation from the Federal Ministry of Labour in August 2016 suspended the requisite "priority review"\(^{29}\) by the Federal Employment Agency for three years in the vast majority of agency districts. Access to integration courses has also been simplified so asylum seekers with a high probability of recognition as well as tolerated refugees can begin their training already in the application phase when their residence status is still uncertain. In the past, refugees would wait years for recognition without being allowed to start a job, internship or training programme. This had a negative effect on their overall integration into German society. In order to accommodate the many migrants arriving in Germany in 2015, funding from the Federal Employment Agency for active labour measures and from the federal government for basic provisions for job seekers has increased significantly. In addition, a range of tools for assessing vocational skills and expertise in the absence of formal proof of qualifications or work experience has been developed (Bonin 2017, 15 f.).

Germany’s Integration Law came into effect in August 2016. It is guided by two principles. First, support measures for refugees are linked to active participation on the part of the beneficiaries, and non-cooperation is sanctioned. And second, support measures for refugees should be applied as early as possible to facilitate integration. The law introduces refugee integration measures, expands vocational training assistance for refugees, and eliminates the age limit of 21 years for vocational training. It continues to offer incentives for refugees who successfully learn German or actively pursue other ways of integration. It intensifies regulations on the freedom of movement for refugees by limiting it for those who have not yet found employment. This regulation aims to achieve a better, i.e. more even, distribution of the refugees and the associated responsibilities for the receiving localities (Bonin 2017, 15 f.).

Besides these legal improvements, Bonin points out several problems in the context of migration and employment-related services in Germany. The number of German language courses is still not sufficient. So many migrants have to wait for this training. Yet it is tricky to adjust the number of classes and teachers because demand fluctuates. In many cases the courses also lack quality and their content does not match professional needs. Another problem is the refugees’ insecurity regarding their duration of stay. Potential employers who offer jobs and training criticise the risk that refugees whose recognition procedure is incomplete or those with subsidiary protection might be sent back at any time, resulting in losses for the company. Finally, a lack of transparency in how authorities decide on refugees’ residence status is criticised. The federal structure of Germany makes decision-making in individual cases even more opaque. A further demand regarding governmental integration measures is

\(^{28}\) Generally, this is the case for refugees who do not come from what are called “safe third countries” considered by the German government not to pose a threat to the lives of migrants and therefore not to constitute a reason for granting political asylum.

\(^{29}\) The priority review gives preference to national workers and needs to show that none are available for the post in question in order for a work permit to be granted to an asylum seeker. Apparently for political reasons, this suspension was not followed in some federal states (Bonin 2017, 13).
that they should be better adapted to different groups of refugees and their needs as well as to particular integration goals (Bonin 2017, 19 f.).

4.2.1.2 China

In China, work is the major reason for rural migrants to move to the cities, although there are other reasons such as reuniting with family members or marriage.

Before the Reform and Opening policy was introduced at the end of the 1970s, employment policy in China consisted mainly of central allocation of jobs by the state. Individuals generally had no freedom in choosing their profession and were assigned to positions for life by the government. Workers (and peasants) had no contractual relations with their employers but were in administrative relationships with the state, organised by the work unit (danwei 单位) in the cities and by the collective in rural areas (Schucher 2014, 704). Because each citizen of working age was assigned a position, there was – at least officially – almost no unemployment and work efficiency was rather low. However, even at that time hidden unemployment existed because not every unemployed person was counted in the official and highly politicised statistics.

After the Reform and Opening policy was introduced, job allocation by the government slowly came to an end. Companies had to sign contracts with new employees. Wages now depended on job performance (Schucher 2014, 709). Work contracts were introduced in 1986. In the beginning, their main purpose was to make work relations more flexible rather than to protect the workers (Schucher 2014, 715). People and enterprises could now search individually for jobs and employees, respectively. At the same time, the social security system that was bound to the workplace, namely the danwei system with its so-called “iron rice bowl” meaning cradle-to-grave social security system and guaranteed services such as housing, healthcare and pensions etc. for every worker, collapsed. It was replaced by labour contracts, employment market mechanisms, and an insurance-based social security system that is still a work in progress today (W. Hu 2018, 1). While economic expansion was facilitated by this new worker mobility and the flexibility of labour relations, conditions for individual workers slowly deteriorated (Schucher 2014, 705).

Rural-to-urban migration is a common phenomenon in developing countries. However, in China it was suppressed for a long time by the hukou system. In the first three decades of the PRC, peasants stayed in rural areas and workers in urban areas. Due to the rapidly increasing demand for workers by the export and manufacturing industries, this policy was relaxed in the 1980s. However, officially the restrictions on individual spatial mobility have not been lifted to this day. This leads to a situation in which migrants and the family members accompanying them do move relatively freely but have limited access at their destination localities to the social security system and social services such as healthcare and schooling as mentioned above.

Over the years, the legal framework for labour in China was improved and should have ameliorated the situation for workers. In 1995 the Labour Law came into effect, introducing basic regulation of the relationship between employer and employee. However, it was not

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30 According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, it and its local branches offer special literacy courses that are also adapted to individual needs (see https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2020/20200908-am-tag-alphabetisierung.html, accessed on October 2020).
completely implemented for a very long time, especially with respect to how work contracts are entered into and how wages are paid. In 2008 the Labour Contract Law was introduced in order to enforce contractual work relationships. Here, too, implementation remained problematic (Schucher 2014, 715). Between the Reform and Opening and the global financial crisis of 2008, China was considered the “work bench of the world” because labour was cheap in the country. However, the Chinese leadership has since emphasised higher production quality, efficiency and innovation. As a consequence, wages have risen significantly (Schucher 2014, 729) and many cheap production enterprises have moved on to countries with lower-cost labour (Zhang und Jia 2018, 1) such as Vietnam and Myanmar.

As a consequence of these developments, the PRC has gone through several phases of fluctuating unemployment and policies to overcome this problem. Unemployment statistics in China give only a very rough picture of the real situation because they only consider women aged 16 to 45 and men aged 16 to 50 unemployed if they possess an urban hukou and are registered as unemployed. These statistics therefore do not include peasants without income in rural areas, migrant workers, certain groups of dismissed urban employees or early retirees (Schucher 2014, 720). The first phase was in the 1980s when the large state-owned enterprises were reformed and restructured to comply with efficiency standards, and some of them closed or merged (Duckett and Hussain 2008, 213 f.). Employees were laid off. For people with an employed-for-life status at state-owned enterprises, the political leadership introduced what it called a "step-down-from-the-post" scheme (xia gang 下岗). Workers were dismissed but continued to receive a minimum payment for three years. This policy was intended to prevent political upheaval and ensure social stability. However, many people still had to learn new skills and find new work over the long term (Schucher 2014, 710). Another group that contributed to rising unemployment numbers in the 1980s were the young people who had been sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution and now returned to the cities looking to make a living. Roughly at the same time, Sino-foreign joint ventures were introduced first in the special economic zones and later everywhere in the country. Small private enterprises ("individual households" 个体户) and in some sectors larger private enterprises as well as companies with mixed ownership models also appeared. They provided ample job opportunities and led to fairly quick absorption of job seekers in the first unemployment phase. A second wave of unemployment came after the global financial crisis in 2008, although due to a massive government investment programme was not as severe as in many western countries. Still, it is estimated that 30 million migrant workers lost their jobs (Schucher 2014, 709).31

Employment ratios in the different economic sectors have shown significant changes over the past decades. In the late 1970s, state-owned and collective enterprises employed nearly all workers in China. However, these enterprises’ share of employees had shrunk to 18% in urban areas and 10% in rural areas in 2014, with the large majority of jobs being generated in the private and public-private mixed sectors (Schucher 2014, 711 f.). Until the late 1970s, most of China’s employment, namely more than 76%, was in the agrarian sector. In 2011, that ratio had shifted to roughly 35%, with 30% in industry and 35% in the service sector (Schucher 2014, 712).

31 The Covid-19 pandemic at the time of writing is certainly leading to a new phase of unemployment. However, it is too early to be included in this overview.
In short, the policy field of migrant integration into the labour market differs greatly between Germany and China. This is due first of all to the differences in the migrant groups of this study. Obviously the integration of migrants from different countries and with different residence entitlements in Germany entails a complex framework of regulations and responsibilities. Moreover, language problems and very different educational, vocational training, and certification systems as well as work and employment traditions further complicate the integration process in Germany. In China, by contrast, the migrants observed in this study have far fewer problems integrating into the target locality due to only negligible differences in language, culture and educational systems between their places of origin and destination cities. Secondly, Germany and China differ greatly in how the national and local states see their role in the integration process. The Chinese state seems to be primarily concerned with providing basic conditions that allow enterprises to create job opportunities, and in protecting the urban social security systems from an overwhelming number of new participants from the countryside. The German state is more concerned with differentiating between groups of migrants that are eligible to access the labour market and those that are not. In addition, the German government is actively involved in the integration programmes on the ground both on its own different levels and in cooperation with the European Union.

4.2.2 The particular challenges of employment-related PSP for migrants and solutions offered by SOs

4.2.2.1 Germany

Residence status is what determines how different groups of migrants gain access to the labour market in Germany. While recognised refugees are equal to Germans and need no further permission to take any employment, asylum seekers who have not yet been recognised and those who have been rejected but are tolerated have limited access to the labour market. Migrants from safe third countries are not allowed to work during any part of their stay (Gluns 2018b). Migrants eligible for the job market are offered integration courses that cover language training and cultural orientation. These courses are financed by the federal government. Local job centres can require migrants to take such courses in order to benefit from their services. A federal network (“Integration through qualification”) specialises in helping migrants attain recognition of their professional qualifications. This includes support in getting existing professional training certificates recognised by the German authorities, arranging for supplementary training if the certification is not recognised, and help in finding alternative ways to prove qualifications if no documentation can be provided due to the circumstances of leaving their original countries. Integration is difficult for some migrants because they might lack knowledge or documentation such as language skills, training certification, or education that meets the German requirements. In addition, strict and complex rules of access to the job market from the government make finding employment difficult and untransparent. Here it should be noted that trade unions in Germany strive to ensure that there are equal employment opportunities and that no salary dumping occurs (Gluns 2018b).

SOs in Germany support migrants in communicating with potential employers and setting up mediation platforms for job, internship and vocational training placement. They offer job-related counselling, language tuition and individual professional training. Different formats receive

[32] This section on the challenges of integrating migrants into the German job market is based closely on the internal report by Gluns (2018b).
financial support from different levels of the German government or the European Social Fund (Gluns 2018b).

4.2.2.2 China

As mentioned above, the hukou system is the main obstacle to migrant workers in terms of integrating into the job market and gaining access to the associated social services in their destination cities.

The Chinese labour market has some unique features such as migrant flows and what is still the employment of excess labour in state-owned enterprises. Demographic developments, migrant flows and labour hoarding at state-owned enterprises have the potential to mitigate unemployment shocks. However, hukou restrictions and the lack of social services for migrants may weaken long-term labour-market flexibility. In addition, prolonged reliance on the special features of the Chinese labour market could reduce labour flexibility, leading to inefficient allocation and limiting productivity gains (Lam, Liu and Schipke 2015, 3). Inefficiency in labour allocation and discrimination remain problems on the Chinese labour market even today (Zhang und Jia 2018, 1).

Overall, the employment situation for migrant workers in the cities has improved significantly over the past decades with respect to contracts, wages, occupational safety and other matters – despite the above-mentioned problems in implementing legal regulations. However, apart from the generally limited access to social services, employment services are not offered by the government in sufficient ways. Government employment policy efforts have lately concentrated on encouraging the establishment of labour-intensive companies that might provide job opportunities for many people, and also on encouraging the unemployed to become entrepreneurs themselves. In the cities, district communities (shequ 社区) are taking on some service provision for unemployed people such as arranging training for them. Vocational training has also been offered by local governments but has not been well adapted to actual industry needs (W. Hu 2018). In theory, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) would be the first to address workers’ interests, grievances and demands. However, since this very large organisation and its branches are not elected by the workers but set up by the Communist Party, it cannot serve this purpose in practice (Estlund 2017, 44). This is where SOs step in.

SOs that devote their efforts to improving the situation of workers, mostly migrant workers who have restricted access to social security systems and social services as described above, are often referred to as labour NGOs in the literature. The Chinese government regards them with suspicion and sees them as “seedbeds of independent organised labour activism”.33 However, they are the organisations that provide vital social services that local governments are unable to offer migrant workers (Estlund 2017, 45). In the early 2000s, labour NGOs increased in number and appeared in all parts of China. They provided health services, worker education and legal advice to migrant workers. They were sometimes tolerated by the authorities and sometimes repressed. In 2012 local authorities began turning to labour NGOs officially to work with them in providing services to migrant workers (Howell 2015, 702). This was an outcome of policy by the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao from 2002 to 2012. The period

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33 For excellent research on labour activism, which is not in the focus of this report, see e.g. the work by Diana Fu (2016, 2017) and Lee and Shen (2011).
before their administration had been marked by unprecedented economic growth rates and reform endeavours that brought significant side effects such as environmental deterioration and violations of labour rights. People went onto the streets to vent their grievances, and mass demonstrations and wildcat strikes were common when Hu and Wen took over from Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. Their administration consequently produced policy slogans such as harmonious society, scientific development, and people-centred development. These policies included fostering local government cooperation with SOs to complement the state’s welfare system by providing social services (Howell 2015, 706). The Chinese leadership tried to push this process by “experimental adjustment” of the strict registration rules for SOs and by introducing the procurement of services by local governments from these SOs (Howell 2015, 707). According to Jude Howell’s research findings, early activities by labour NGOs to involve SOs in providing services to migrant workers were launched by the Guangdong province government in 2012 under the leadership of the provincial Party Secretary Wang Yang who has since become known for his progressive policies concerning the third sector, environmental protection, and even the peaceful solution of some upheavals.34

While some labour NGOs are successful in bidding for government procurement of labour services, others have problems registering properly or elicit ideological reservations about “cosying up” with local governments. Other organisations are even listed as inappropriate for government cooperation for political reasons or because they rely solely on foreign funding35 (Howell 2015, 717 f.). Some of these organisations have specialised in vocational training that is better adapted to the needs of the migrant workers than what local governments are offering. SOs also cooperate with local governments in providing employment services that may include sharing information on job opportunities as well as on employment policies, labour contract signing and social insurance issues. Another important focus of organisations that support migrant workers is legal advice and protecting labour rights (W. Hu 2018).

SOs that provide social services to migrant workers have their own problems. First of all, it is not easy for them to register properly (and thereby exist and work within legal bounds) due to generally high hurdles posed by the legal requirements for setting up an organisation in China. Second, they compete for talent with private and state-owned firms as well as government departments that usually can afford to pay better salaries. Third, they still struggle with management problems and service quality which can differ quite widely. Finally, their organisational sustainability and work are highly dependent on local policies concerning migrant workers. Any policy change may affect them substantively (W. Hu 2018).

To sum up, Germany has recently reformed and relaxed its previously very restrictive employment policies for refugees and thereby facilitated integration. However, refugee integration in the country is difficult because the migrants need to overcome the language barrier and are sometimes even illiterate in their mother tongue. Also, their vocational education standards differ from German requirements. SOs in Germany build exchange

34 Since the 19th CCPs Party Congress in 2017 he is now one of the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and also the head of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, i.e. a member of the highest leadership of the CCP.

35 Since 2010 funding channels from abroad to Chinese social organisations have been almost completely cut (Howell 2015, 706). The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations within the Territory of China (adopted in 2016 and effective since 2017) has reopened some possibilities for joint foreign-domestic efforts (Jia 2017) but these are beyond the scope of this report.
Platforms for employers and refugees to mediate jobs, internships, and vocational training placements. They offer job or employment-related counselling and language tutoring and are financed privately, by the German government or the European Social Fund. In China, government employment policy primarily means encouraging and supporting business enterprises to create jobs. Support for migrant job seekers is offered by SOs. The Chinese labour market is characterised by long phases of high demand for labour in the manufacturing sector due to high economic growth rates. Some policies and events have led to periods of unemployment which was quickly absorbed. Migrant workers’ needs for counselling, training, and legal advice are answered by labour NGOs and employment service organisations. Due to the political sensitivity of labour issues, organisations dealing with migrant workers are often viewed with suspicion by the government but tolerated in areas where they are able to mitigate migrants’ grievances.

4.3 Vulnerable groups

In the LoGoSO research project and in this report, vulnerable groups are defined as people who “can be considered particularly vulnerable due to their personal circumstances which may hamper full participation in society, e.g. because of disabilities or particular needs” (Gluns 2018a). These persons have particular needs that should be taken into account when discussing social services provided to them in their destination countries. This group is very diverse and its members may have very different needs. Among migrants to Germany, the term “vulnerable groups” refers mainly to (pregnant) women, (unaccompanied) minors, disabled and elderly persons, single parents, persons with psychological disorders, and traumatised persons. Some refugees had been harassed in their country of origin because of their sexual orientation and were also in danger of harassment by compatriots and other refugees in Germany. They too are considered a vulnerable group. Vulnerable groups in this sense may need special access to medical or psychological treatment, or protection against (sexual or other) violence (Gluns 2018a). In the Chinese context, the term vulnerable groups (弱势群体) refers to elderly, poverty-stricken, unemployed, and/or disabled people within the group of migrant workers (Y. Hu 2018).

4.3.1 Germany

Like in other policy fields, access by vulnerable migrant groups to social services such as healthcare depends on their residence status and can be regulated differently in each federal state. This means that parts of this group, e.g. tolerated asylum seekers, have only limited access to the health system. In addition, language difficulties and complicated bureaucratic procedures can make access to social services for members of vulnerable groups even more difficult. SOs have specialised in helping vulnerable groups in areas that are particularly difficult for them. They run foster homes, offer residential support services, organise youth work and assisted living facilities, offer legal advice on the asylum procedure, psychological treatment etc. (Gluns 2018a). Of note for this group of migrants is that its members come with a great diversity of special needs. SOs can identify particular needs and respond directly to them, whereas the government is only able to provide non-specific kinds of social services.

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36 This overview follows the internal report on Germany’s policies on vulnerable groups among migrants by Danielle Gluns (2018b).
4.3.2 China

The idea of vulnerable groups is a rather new and less well researched concept in China (Chu 2011, 2). While larger underprivileged groups – often also referred to as marginalised – such as the poor or seniors or migrants have long been a focus of the Chinese government, less is known about finer-grained categories of vulnerable groups such as drug addicts or released prisoners and their special needs for social services. On the national level, laws stipulate the protection of rights for large vulnerable groups such as seniors, women, disabled persons and minors. Further regulations to protect certain groups have been adopted on local levels. The legal framework and related policies that protect the rights of vulnerable groups have made noticeable progress since the Reform and Opening policy was introduced. However, these laws and regulations are very general. Like in Germany, the government’s different levels are unable to understand and respond to the great variety of needs of vulnerable migrant groups. Similar to the policy field of employment, the government first turns to the districts (shequ 社区) to take care of vulnerable groups. In many ways the successor to the danwei system, local city districts are regarded as administrative units involved in the provision of social services, such as care work. In the final analysis, the SOs know best how to serve the myriad different needs of this group (Y. Hu 2018).

4.4 Social assistance

Social assistance can be offered in different policy areas. For migrants it may include services such as healthcare, housing, financial support, counselling and language instruction. The general idea of social assistance is that the state should facilitate a minimal level of participation in social, cultural and political life (Gluns 2018c). While most assistance in this area consists of government funding provided to the needy, other services are offered by SOs and volunteers.

4.4.1 Germany

Like other social services, financial assistance to migrants depends first of all on their residence status. Asylum seekers and tolerated persons receive financial assistance for basic needs (food, accommodation, clothes, healthcare and certain consumer goods) and personal necessities (e.g. mobility, communications). As long as the refugees live at reception centres, these necessities are provided in kind. After they have been assigned to different municipalities, part of or all of these expenses should be provided in cash depending on the municipality’s own decisions. Local administrations have the discretion in some cases to increase this financial assistance, e.g. for urgent medical reasons, or to reduce it e.g. if the individual is not expected to be recognised as a refugee or is suspected of having entered Germany primarily in order to obtain social assistance (Gluns 2018c).

Faced with the increased refugee influx in 2015-16, SOs responded to the basic needs of incoming refugees and helped in areas where the government was too slow, lacked sufficient local knowledge or resources, or was simply unable to offer what was needed. Older and newly established organisations as well as individuals offered their services here. For example, in the early weeks of the refugee influx they collected donations of money, goods or services and

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37 This overview follows the internal report on China’s policies on vulnerable groups among migrants by Hu Yinglian (2018).

38 This overview follows the internal report on Germany’s policies on social assistance to migrants by Danielle Gluns (2018c).
distributed clothes, toys and hygiene articles to migrants waiting in line to register at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. They arranged for language exchanges, helpers to deal with administrative procedures, students to assist the new arrivals’ children with their homework and many other services. This type of individual assistance proved helpful not only for integrating refugees but also for establishing initial contacts between locals and newcomers and for reducing prejudices and potential anti-foreigner sentiments. SOs were active in numerous fields. Together with for-profit providers, non-profits organised accommodation that had to be found, built or otherwise provided within a very short period of time. Housing is a major field of action for SOs because the refugees have to look for private accommodation after the registration process is over and they are assigned to different localities. Legal aid in areas such as the registration process, rental agreements, work contracts etc. is another area in which SOs are active. Some SOs receive funding from local governments to employ social workers to do integration tasks (Gluns 2018c).

In short, in the field of social assistance SOs work together in part with local governments and volunteers to support incoming migrants. They serve as translators, teachers, mentors, speakers and advisors for the refugees.

4.4.2 China

In China, funding as part of social assistance is once again highly dependent on the hukou. Among the eight kinds of social assistance in China (minimum subsistence allowances, special support for impoverished people, disaster relief, medical assistance, education assistance, housing assistance, employment assistance and interim relief) only disaster relief and interim relief are attainable for migrants, whereas all other services are limited to citizens with an urban hukou. Other forms of financial support that are applicable for migrants are relief for beggars and homeless people and support arranged by (state-initiated) charities, such as donation stations or charity supermarkets. These all include financial aid. Disaster relief only applies to those migrants who have been affected by disasters. Interim relief is a type of emergency and transitional assistance provided by the government to any household or individual whose basic livelihood is threatened by an unexpected event, injury, serious illness or other problem that cannot be covered by the regular social assistance system, or whose basic livelihood is still severely threatened even after assistance has been received. Relief for beggars and homeless people consists of food, shelter and medical treatment in acute cases as well as support for contacting relatives in the person’s home town and in some cases reimbursement of transportation expenses to that town (F. Ma 2018).

SOs in China provide social assistance to meet the manifold needs of migrants that the government cannot address. They offer e.g. psychological and employment counselling, social integration and other services that help migrants improve their living conditions. It is also generally believed in China that SOs understand the situation on the ground better and that they are capable of proposing innovative solutions to the social problems they encounter. SOs that are not government-initiated also participate in providing social assistance to migrants, including legal advice, basic living assistance, medical aid, and employment services as explained above.

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39 This overview follows the internal report on China’s policies on social assistance to migrants by Ma Fuyun (2018).
5 PSP comparison in the four policy fields in Germany and China

Based on these overviews of the four policy fields of education, employment, vulnerable groups, and social assistance we can draw several conclusions regarding the similarities and differences in PSP for migrants from SOs in the different policy fields and in the two countries. In order to provide a systematic comparison of the models of cooperation, I apply Dennis R. Young’s (2000) simple way of categorising possible forms of cooperation between governments and SOs providing services.

First a brief review of Young’s categorisation. He distinguishes three kinds of relations between governments and SOs: supplementary, complementary and adversarial. Supplementary relationships are those in which governments contract out services to SOs where they themselves cannot satisfy the many different needs of their citizens or where demand is volatile. SOs operate where the government leaves space for service delivery. The more heterogeneous the potential beneficiaries of the services are, the more likely these services are outsourced to the more flexible SOs. Young describes the relationship as complementary where governments and SOs work together in a kind of division of labour in which the government often provides funding and the SOs deliver the services. I consider this to be a closer cooperative relationship than the supplementary type. It is also characterised by the government and the SOs both delivering services in a particular area whereas in a supplementary relationship the government does not do so. In the third constellation, SOs and governments face each other as adversaries. This is especially the case when SOs take on an advocacy role.

Table 1 takes the social services provided by SOs that were identified in the policy fields in Section 4 and assigns them to the three categories of Young’s approach.
### Table 1: Categorisation of social services for migrants (in accordance with Young 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Services</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary</td>
<td>Clothing, food, care and health services upon arrival</td>
<td>Assistance in administrative procedures, administrative support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Vocational training, internship, language courses</td>
<td>Vocational training, internship, language courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Integration courses, language courses</td>
<td>Integration courses, language courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable Groups</td>
<td>Legal advice, psychological counseling</td>
<td>Services for persons with disabilities in cooperation with communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** author’s compilation

The analysis of the field of education shows that in Germany SOs deliver supplementary services mainly in the area of childcare, while in China they provide services in the core area.
of compulsory education. In the field of employment services, German SOs deliver supplementary and complementary services, whereas labour NGOs in China are often found to have adversarial relationships with the government, according to the literature. As one internal case report from the LoGoSO project on a migrant service SO in Hangzhou (Chen, Wang and Bao 2019) shows, Chinese SOs do deliver non-adversarial employment services, mostly in supplementary form. The Hangzhou case describes how the government leaves the SOs space to deliver tailor-made services for various special needs of the incoming migrants – from short-term accommodation to interview training and job placement. In Germany, services for vulnerable groups are mainly in the supplementary category, due to the high variety of demands that the state cannot satisfy. In China, the needs of vulnerable groups are less well studied and therefore limited primarily to better-known groups such as people with disabilities. These services are delivered in concert with the government. Social assistance is an area with lots of room for supplementary service provision by SOs in Germany. This is also the case for China, where the state has left room for the SOs’ services.

Young’s categorisation of supplementary service provision works well for Germany and China, but the explanations for why this type of service provision is preferred differ. During and after the unusually high influx of refugees in Germany in 2015, SOs engaged mainly in supplementary services, in areas where the state would not or could not meet refugees’ needs. This accords with Young’s explanation that supplementary services are needed most when addressees’ needs are highly variable and volatile (an extension of the “government’s failure” explanation). A sudden need for a wide variety of different services could best be answered by SOs and voluntary groups. In China, on the contrary, these explanations do not hold. Instead, the services are provided because state policies like the hukou system (still) aim at keeping certain groups (i.e. migrant workers) out of urban social services. SOs, therefore, fill the gaps that the state leaves intentionally, not as a result of its failure, at least for the time being before the hukou system is further reformed.

The category of complementary services also fits well with what happens in Germany when the government finances certain services for migrants that it has promised but lacks the capacity to offer itself. For China, the literature and cases reviewed here do not offer evidence of complementary service provision in Young’s sense targeted specifically for migrants. Although the government purchases the services for migrants, these services are usually not merely in addition to what the state offers but rather filling gaps where the state is not able or to offer social services at all. We know of other policy fields where complementary services are offered by SOs, i.e. funded by the state and delivered by SOs in addition to what the Chinese state offers, such as senior care and social work. Also, services for persons with disabilities that may include migrants fit into this category. However, the social services for migrants described in the literature above do not belong in this category.

As for the adversarial kind of service provision, we find no prominent example in the literature on migration to Germany. However, in China, social services in the field of employment for migrants can potentially touch on sensitive political issues, such as trade union work, labour movements, strikes and protests. They can be placed in the adversarial category.

6 Conclusion

In this report, I compare PSP for migrants in Germany and China in the four policy fields of education, employment, vulnerable groups, and social assistance. The investigation shows
that these policy fields differ in their scope and agents of social service provision for migrants and between the two countries. Some policy fields are dominated by state service delivery, whereas others leave more room to SOs in supplementary, complementary or adversarial relations with the state. The research literature and the cases of the LoGoSO research project show that the task of integration is understood quite differently in the two countries. Integration in Germany is understood in a broader sense, encompassing lifestyle, language and entitlements in the social welfare system. By contrast, integration in China is understood (and tackled) in a narrower sense confined to the entitlements in the social welfare system. Consequently, Germany with its strong federal states, social market economy and subsidiarity-based system that prioritises service provision by SOs in some areas, when challenged by the surge of incoming refugees in 2015 and 2016 turned to SOs because they could respond to the manifold urgent demands faster and address specific needs better. In China, the challenge of migration is of a larger and longer-lasting quality. It turns out to be less an administrative challenge that needs external help but rather a question of political will. The hukou system is the main obstacle to integration for rural migrants in their destination cities in all four policy fields. As a consequence, China’s social service delivery by SOs in the four fields is basically of the supplementary type. In other words, since the state refuses to care for the migrant populations, the SOs take over. In addition, the policy field of employment is particularly sensitive, and therefore also the engagement by SOs in this area.

This report shows that a deeper look at different policy areas provides nuanced insight into PSP. Further studies in this direction can support policy decisions on where social services are needed and who can best provide them – regardless of the country or political system.

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