The Ambivalence of Emancipation
Psychoanalysis between Functional Integration and Dialectical Negativity
in US Sociological Theories, post-WWII

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Introduction

Sigmund Freud proclaimed in a slightly abbreviated, but all the more capturing phrase, the objective of psychoanalytic therapy: “Where there was Id, Ego Shall be” (1944 [1933]:86, my translation). Psychoanalysis sets out to emancipate the neurotic subject, tortured by obscure forces, from the archaic rebellion against reasonable and rational conduct that, however, not only originates in its own mind, but is one of the most essential parts of it. Freud’s mission as a therapist follows an inherent emancipatory thrust which meets its limits in the constitutional opposition of individual desires and cultural restrictions. The emancipatory potential inherent to psychoanalysis, coupled with its simultaneous cultural pessimism, has stimulated an innumerable variety of theoretical and practical responses: praises, revisions, attacks, rejections, dogmatic perpetuations. The history of psychoanalysis is a global history of intra- and interdisciplinary quarrels, convergences and divergences. Following the thrust inherent to Freud’s enthusiastic proposal, the quarrels, consciously or not, always (already) address the question of individual (and therefore human) emancipation.

Conscious of the fact that my dissertation itself cannot escape the implication of inherently addressing that question, I investigate the role and function psychoanalytic concepts came to assume in a number of sociological theories in the US-American context in the (extended) post-World War II era¹. Generally triggered by what Eli Zaretsky has described as “the ambiguous legacy of psychoanalysis” (2004:3ff) in his seminal study Secrets of the Soul (2004) – its adaptability in the service of diverging conceptualizations of society, individuality, and autonomy – the question for specific ideas of emancipation underlying different adaptations of Freud emerges as my guiding research interest. My narrower focus lies on the gap that opens up between the physical encounter of the originally Frankfurt based Institute for Social Research (the Institute) and US sociology during the Institute’s American

¹ In the following: post-war era. For the purposes of my work, I employ a slightly extended definition of the post-war era, setting in with the end of WWII in 1945 and extending to the late 1960s. My definition orients itself towards the rise and decline of both disciplines of interest to my dissertation, US sociology and psychoanalysis in America. For both disciplines, the war had a boosting effect, as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter I. The relative decline of sociology as an academic discipline, and the rapid, and almost complete decline of psychoanalysis as a clinical psychological discipline in the late 1960s, hence, marks the end of the (disciplinary) post-war era.
exile from 1935 to 1949 and the delayed reception of *Critical Theory*, its social-philosophical legacy, which hesitantly begins in the late 1960s and early 70s. This early encounter is embedded in a disciplinary and cultural atmosphere that is characterized by an increasing interest in Freudian theory across disciplinary boundaries, which historians of both sociology and psychology in the US describe as the respective “golden ages” (Calhoun 2007; Zaretsky 2004). My project focuses on psychoanalysis, hence, as a common reference system that propels the *Institute*’s collaboration with US sociologists and psychologists. I ask for the critical potential of Freudian theory and trace theoretical and personal encounters in order to illuminate a period of conformity, challenges, and changes within the disciplinary field.

Analyzing the characteristics of psychoanalysis in both *Critical Theory* and the American sociological mainstream in the post-war period serves a double function: it carves out the psychoanalytic implications for ideas of emancipation in particular theoretical contexts, and it aims to gain critical insights from the historical discussion in order to illuminate more contemporary sociological engagements of/with psychoanalysis. My study’s discussion of historical theoretical texts therefore engages the works of critical theorists Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Theodor W. Adorno, and American sociologists Talcott Parsons, David Riesman, and, Phillip Rieff, all of whom – at least temporarily – prominently worked with Freudian ideas. It follows from my specific research interest that the account of the disciplinary field of US sociology is tilted towards both psychoanalysis and *Critical Theory*;

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2 I use the label *Critical Theory* with reference to Max Horkheimer’s and Herbert Marcuse’s programmatic essays in the *Institute*’s journal *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (ZfS) *Traditionelle und kritische Theorie* (Horkheimer 1937) and *Philosophie und kritische Theorie* (Marcuse and Horkheimer 1937). It aims to identify the social philosophy developed at the *Institute* under Max Horkheimer’s (and later Adorno’s) directorship. The term is self-descriptive and conveys the spirit of a certain orthodoxy, which becomes obvious with Erich Fromm’s exclusion from *Critical Theory* after his departure from the *Institute*. I nevertheless consider and label Fromm a critical theorist, however only in a broader sense of the term, which is indicated by the use of a capital C for the self-descriptive term and a lower-case c for the broader definition. The *Institute*’s name is used whenever referred to collaborative projects/efforts by its protagonists, specifically working in its name (and on its pay role). The term *Frankfurt School* is an external ascription that emerged only after the *Institute*’s relocation. I only use it when referencing literature which uses it.

3 Andrew Arato suggests a periodization of *Critical Theory*’s American reception. He states a simultaneous physical presence and non-reception in the American social sciences in the 1940s and 50s, an incomplete political reception in the 60s, a series of condemnations in the early 70s, and, finally starting in the late 70s, a theoretical reception that corresponds to the spirit of Critical Theory (Arato 1986:617-618). Robert Zwarg’s recent *Die Kritische Theorie in Amerika* (2017) provides a detailed and very exhaustive account of the concrete reception, which was most visible in the two radical academic journals *Telos* (first issue published in 1968) and *New German Critique* (first issue published in 1973), both of which emerged as a reaction to what was perceived as the New Left’s failure (Zwarg 2017:58f).

4 The collaborative efforts most prominently result in the *Studies in Prejudices* series (1950) conducted by the *Institute* and the *American Jewish Committee* (AJC) in the 1940s, which will be addressed in Chapters I and II.

5 The investigation encompasses the conflicting, and contradictory role of psychoanalysis in *Critical Theory* and US sociology. The increasing importance of another strand of (critical) psychoanalytic theorizing, as it emerges in France at the time, embodied by the work of Jacques Lacan, does not lie within the project’s focus.

6 The notion of a sociological mainstream is further explicated, in all its problematic facets, in Chapter II.
it therefore necessarily neglects other contemporaneous developments in the field and does not claim general representativity.

**Emancipation**

In order to develop a framework to address the specificities of different ideas of emancipation in the theories of interest for my study, it is helpful to carve out contradictions and complexities characterizing the conceptual history of emancipatory ideas. This will further illuminate, and complicate, their general normative tendency. Freud’s inherent emancipation model is the vantage point for my following discussion of emancipation. However, it should be noted at this point, that Freud himself never used the term ‘emancipation’ in order to address the objective of his scientific project and therapeutic practice; this only accentuates the often subliminal character of emancipation ideas in theories of society and individual. The emancipatory thrust inherent to psychoanalysis hinges on a central motif in enlightenment thinking: scientific analysis as the building block of an ever-increasing elucidation of a human-centered world. Freud conceived psychoanalysis as a scientific analysis of the human psyche which, despite the immense difficulties it met in contemporary scientific communities, was itself exposed to the logic of scientific progress. He continuously complemented and revised his theoretical findings while negotiating contemporary scientific insights extending far beyond the psychological and medical professions. The resistance psychoanalysis met in scientific circles and Freud’s simultaneous insistence on its scientific character hint at a defining characteristic of psychoanalysis, which also considerably impacts its inherent notion of emancipation. Enlightenment thought posits the thinking/self-reflecting subject at the center of an obstacle-ridden universe that has to be rationally mastered. The main specificity of psychoanalysis’ emancipatory thrust, however, lies with its initial rebellion against the

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7 The collection of Freud’s forewords to his continuously re-published *Die Traumdeutung* (first published 1900) provides a good insight into this process. In the foreword to the second edition (1908), he emphasizes the resistance the book met: “My psychiatric colleagues didn’t seem to make any effort to transcend the initial disconcertment which my novel understanding of dreams stirred up, and the professional philosophers who are used to treat the problems of the life of dreams as an addendum to conscious states of minds […] didn’t notice that there would actually be a lot to reveal on this end which would help to fundamentally change our psychological understanding” (1961 [1908]:IX, my translation). In the foreword to the third edition (1911), however, he emphasizes that “[t]he progress of scientific knowledge […] didn’t leave the *Interpretation of Dreams* unaffected. When I wrote it down in 1899, the theory of sexuality didn’t yet exist; the analysis of the complicated forms of psychoneuroses was still at its beginning” (1961 [1911]:XI, my translation).

8 According to Adorno and Horkheimer, “Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters” (1972 [1947]:1, my translation).
coherent self. In his *Neue Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (1933), Freud holds that

[from the very beginning, when life takes us under its strict discipline, a resistance stirs within us against the relentlessness and monotony of the laws of thought and against the demands of reality testing. Reason becomes the enemy which withholds from us so many possibilities to obtain pleasure. (1944b [1933]:49, my translation)

The emancipatory process begins with the realization that the thinking subject is not master of its domain but is driven by obscure forces. In its most fundamental categories, psychoanalysis challenges notions of emancipation at the same time as it establishes a newly conceived emancipatory mode that relegates the process to the individual sphere. Emancipation understood as increasing enlightenment/general improvement becomes a personal/therapeutic possibility. Freud’s conceptualization of emancipation processes culminates in the above mentioned dictum: “Where there was Id, Ego Shall be” (Ibid.:86, my translation); pathological libido fixations have to be resolved, libido has to move back under the ego’s authority. Therapy, as the manifestation of the emancipation process, relies on the presence of the therapist as an external entity. Not only because of her scientific expertise, but because transference, the “battlefield of all psychic forces wrestling with each other” (1944 [1917]:472, my translation) is the psychological, and therapeutic mechanism by which a “revision of the repression process” (Ibid.) becomes emancipatory reality, due to the fact that a mere memorial reconstruction of the original repression process is necessarily limited. The figure of the therapist becomes crucial. All libido, and all resistance to it, is gathered and directed towards the relation to the therapist, who becomes, as a fantastic (that is, fantasized) object, the stand-in for all the illusory libido objects characterizing the neurosis. However, instead of re-staging the repression process, the conflict is resolved with the therapist’s suggestive help. Because renewed repression is avoided, the alienation between ego and libido is revoked. Once freed from the therapist as object, the libido can’t retreat to its former objects but is at the ego’s disposal (Ibid.:473). It becomes subject to the ego’s authority and capable of flowing in direction of constructive cathexes.

At the cost of the unconscious, the ego is magnified through the interpretative work which transforms unconscious to conscious content. Through guidance it is made conciliatory towards the libido and tends to allow it some kind of satisfaction, its anxiety towards the libido’s demands is diminished by the possibility to handle a partial amount of libido via sublimation. (Ibid., my translation)
Emancipation is only possible as a lengthy and painful process that necessitates the presence of an external authority, the therapist. The societal9, or in Freud’s words, the cultural dimension enters the process through the conceptual distinction of ego and super-ego, the latter representing the concrete demands of the cultural reality principle within the individual psyche. Freud defines psychoanalytic work as cultural work (Kulturarbeit) in the above mentioned passage of New Introductory Lectures (1944 [1933]:86). Culture, however, does not appear as an object of emancipation. The fundamental tension between individual pleasure- and cultural reality principle remains irresolvable: discontent in culture10 can become conscious to a certain extent – it cannot be overcome. The radicality of psychoanalysis as therapeutic practice lies in its approximation of a traumatic past, in making it conscious (to a certain extent). Breaking the neurotic fixation means to connect to the past in order to achieve mastery again. Freud metaphorically describes the nature of that cultural work as comparable to the “draining of the Zuidersee” (Ibid. my translation): just as the Dutch reclaimed land from the sea, piece by piece, the analyst recovers hidden content in the individual therapeutic/emancipation process. The cultural dimension lies with the scientific revelation of the formerly opaque psychological mechanisms, which, eventually can be known, but are not subject to change.

In Freud, the emancipatory promise of progression towards greater enlightenment is individualized and eventually contained by the fact that individual emancipation from neurosis is always already ‘tainted’ by, however constructive, submission to the cultural reality principle. This leads me to describe the undeniable emancipatory thrust – not least

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9 The distinction between society and culture refers to the different uses of the terms in the theoretical universes discussed in my study. Especially in Critical Theory’s terminology, society assumes a quite different meaning than in, say, Parsons’s work. Adorno holds that the notion of society is not merely descriptive, it is not to be understood as just all people who live together at the same time in the same epoch. It is moreover, in the Marxian sense, a functional- or relational concept that addresses relations between working people (Adorno 2003:61,62). Adorno’s use of the term, and his reference of Marx implies another level of abstraction, that of objective mediation. Society doesn’t solely describe the specific relatedness of people but constitutes itself an objective entity which affects the way the relatedness is constituted. I use the term in this sense whenever it is juxtaposed to- or complemented by the notions of ‘culture’ and/or ‘social.’

10 In his seminal Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (1929) Freud explicates his understanding of culture that has changed considerably with the introduction of the death drive with the 1920 publication Jenseits des Lustprinzips. Culture demands the internalization of destructive impulses and necessarily evokes a sense of guilt as a reaction to the cultural demand of reducing aggressiveness. The super-ego becomes the psychological manifestation of this process; a part of the ego splits off and is juxtaposed against the ego itself: the super-ego “now, in the form of ‘conscience’, is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals. The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, is called by us the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment. Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city” (Freud 2005 [1929]:121). The fundamental tension between the ego and super-ego is irresolvable, it constitutes the essence of the discontent in culture.
inscribed in psychoanalysis’s universalism – as Freudian emancipation potentiality. This concept helps me to simultaneously address two issues central to my study: On the one hand, it describes the inherent complications of psychoanalytic therapy understood as an emancipatory project that eventually educates the subject about its own, inscribed rebellion against reason. On the other hand, Freudian Emancipation Potentiality also addresses the concrete theoretical precariousness of emancipation as it emerges in the diverging receptions of Freud’s work, that is, in Freud’s ambiguous legacy.

Psychoanalysis’s individualized emancipatory thrust becomes especially pronounced when contrasted with the radicalized idea of emancipation as it is made explicit in Karl Marx’s materialist reformulation of enlightenment thought. Marx’s critique not only helps to illuminate the specificities of the Freudian one, it also crucially informs the way emancipation is conceptualized in Critical Theory. The contradiction between Marx and Freud, hence, provides a productive gateway into my further delineation of the concept of emancipation. It is especially in his early writings that Marx explicitly addresses emancipation. In Zur Judenfrage (1843), he generally defines it as tracing the human world, the circumstances/conditions back to the human being itself (Marx 1981 [1843]:370). The general condition of emancipation, emanating from the critique of religion, is further developed with regard to the political context, since atheism/agnosticism was the foundation, but not the eventual objective of Marx’s project. The dialectics of emancipation emerge in Marx’s conceptualization of true, individual emancipation in contrast to political emancipation. While political emancipation reduces the human being to categories – the citizen understood as the member of bourgeois society and the moral person, true emancipation comes with the recession of those abstract entities in light of the individual’s ascendance to becoming a species-being in its empirical, individual (work) life and circumstances. The individual is capable of recognizing her own powers as societal being, and consequently of ending the splitting of societal power, in shape of political power, from herself (Ibid.). The concise definition of ‘emancipation’ provided in The Jewish Question tackles the fundamentals of an enlightenment notion that proposes individuality, autonomy and freedom in light of societal power relations and their historical genesis. Marx’s definition of emancipation is key to understanding the relations of individual and societal emancipation per se. One is not attainable without the other. Emancipation, according to Marx, is never just personal or individual. Individual emancipation understood in a Freudian sense, hence, fails per definition to fulfill the above outlined criteria because it leaves society, which is inherently anti-
emancipative because it propels the split of individual citizen and moral person, untouched. The ‘personality’ split that is proposed by Marx becomes the central problem around which the further conceptual apparatus approximating the conditions working against ‘true emancipation’ revolves. Central concepts here are alienation\textsuperscript{11} and, later on in George Lukács’ re-evaluation, reification\textsuperscript{12}. Both also play a significant role in Critical Theory's conceptualization of emancipation. The convergence between Marx and Freud is apparent in the normative dimension that is inscribed in the respective universalisms. Emancipation, individualized and/or societal/cultural, is a real possibility that, once it has become conscious, pushes towards its realization; the contradiction arises in the societal/cultural limits ascribed to the emancipatory process by Freud on the one, and Marx on the other hand.

The normative directedness inherent to notions of emancipation that are the explicit objective of Marx’s theorizing and (still) characterize Freud’s model despite his initial undermining of reason urges to further socio-historically localize the concept and clarify its position in the context of my research interest. The contradiction between Marx and Freud becomes productive because it emphasizes the ambiguous potential not only of psychoanalysis but of emancipatory ideas in general. Emancipation’s historical time core emerges in the transition of meanings it underwent from its Latin Roman origins to contemporary political discourses. The dual Roman meaning of ‘emancipation’ – coming of age and freeing of slaves – reflects

\textsuperscript{11} Marx’s notion of alienation, chiefly developed in Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (published posthumously) generally suggests that human beings (workers) under capitalism are alienated from their ‘Gattungswesen’ through the division of labor and the separation of their work from the product (Heinrich 2004:19f). Philosopher Rahel Jaeggi’s study Entfremdung (2005) offers an exhaustive investigation of the concept’s history and intellectual career, which eventually argues for its critical recovery.

\textsuperscript{12} The concept of reification is strongly entwined with alienation in Critical Theory; it was, according to Martin Jay, “not introduced until somewhat later to the Marxist tradition by theorists like George Lukács [but] expresses the spirit of Marx’s analysis of capitalism, in which humanly created processes appear as natural laws, and commodities produced by human labor for human use are converted into self-sufficient objects or things to be exchanged in the marketplace” (2016:77). Susan Buck-Morss provides an instructive synopsis of Lukács’ concept in The Origin of Negative Dialectics (1977): “In his famous chapter “Reification and Class Consciousness,” Lukács analyzed the tradition of bourgeois philosophy, demonstrating that the antinomies which continuously appeared within it had the same structure as the contradictions of bourgeois economic production. He argued that the fundamental problem of idealism, the dualistic separation of subject and object, had its prototype in the problem of commodities, in which products appeared as objects divorced from the workers who had produced them. The concept of reification provided the key to both. Just as commodities in the realm of production took on a reified form, became “fetishes” which appeared cut off from the social process of their production, so bourgeois theory's reified conception of the "object" as an immutable "given" obscured the sociohistorical process through which it had come to be. And just as the reified commodities took on an abstract exchange value, divorced from their social use value, so the reification of bourgeois logic was manifested in its abstract separation of form from content. Hence the limit to bourgeois thought was “objective; it is the class situation itself”” (26), Jürgen Habermas suggests a Weberian retranslation of Marx’s Capital into a theory of reification on part of „Hegelmarxists” Lukács, Horkheimer, and Adorno (1985:67). Reification is understood as rationalization in the context of a critical notion of rationality, which is derived from a materialist appropriation of Hegel (Ibid.:95).
the specific socio-historic situation in its concreteness. The meaning it has assumed in contemporary Western political discourse, that is, the general associative proximity to notions of liberation, freedom, and equality, emanates from the concept’s centrality to enlightenment philosophy, whose main (German) protagonists such as Kant, and later Hegel, and then Marx “have […] a universalistic conception of freedom linked to a strong notion of human dignity and/or human rights [in common]” (Wellmer 1998:3) upon which the respective emancipatory potentialities are theorized.

Ernesto Laclau’s *Emancipation(s)* (1996) provides a series of essays identifying key issues in theoretical approximations of emancipation. Laclau’s work moves into focus because he addresses the problematic nature of emancipation’s inherent thrust towards liberation and its practical and theoretical boundaries head on. His essays provide a meta-theoretical assessment of emancipation that makes its own emancipatory interest explicit. Emancipation appears as necessarily radical, the practical, political (societal) dimension is at the center of the discussion. For the purpose of my work, Laclau’s abstractions, hence, have a double function. They serve as stepping stones into-, and as structuring guidelines for further delineating emancipation in the specific theoretical and referential contexts inherent to the theoretical universes of interest, and they help to clarify my own position.

13 In his discussion, Laclau positions himself in a historically specific intellectual debate, the opposing poles of which are marked by universalism on the one and “pure particularism” on the other hand (2007 [1996]:viii). By identifying Jürgen Habermas as the most prominent representative of the first position and “some forms of postmodernism” as the second, his own positioning, however, implies what has come to be called the “linguistic turn” in social- and cultural sciences as a major theoretical presupposition. By navigating Habermas’s universalism and “some post-modern” particularisms on the common ground of insisting on semiotics, Laclau’s positioning feeds into a narrative of theoretical progression that inherently identifies materialist and dialectical approaches as outdated, as that which has been overcome. With regard to Critical Theory, Laclau’s reference of Habermas has some serious implications. Habermas is commonly treated as second generation Frankfurt School and therefore Critical Theory’s legitimate innovator. His *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1981) becomes the manifestation of Critical Theory’s communicative turn. The presupposition for that turn is, of course the reproduction of the common first, second, third generation narrative, which leaves out ‘second’ and ‘third’ generation engagements with Critical Theory that do not agree with Habermas, such as Moishe Postone’s, Hans-Jürgen Krahl’s, Detlev Claussen’s, to name but a few.

The notion of a linguistic/communicative turn appears as a necessary reduction of a complex and of course contradictory and diverse development in critical theorizing that is not further differentiated. Its general thrust is to make the argument that the victory of what Zwarg subsumes under the label French theory (Zwarg 2017:274f) over traditional and other (Western) Marxism is one that chiefly concerns professional intellectual (i.e. academic) spheres, and that paradigm shifts within the sphere, however, are all too easily confused with a directed progression within theory discourses. These, in an almost Hegelian sense, inherently pose as improvement. Since my research focus ends with the late 60s, and “French theory” becomes only pervasive in US (critical) academic circles in the 1970s, the linguistic or communicative reorientation (chiefly via Habermas) first of all coincides with the end of psychoanalysis’s and sociology’s golden ages and marks the (however diffuse) beginnings of different intellectual paradigms. Nevertheless, for my project’s specific interest in emancipation it seems adequate to illuminate the conceptual history beyond my research focus, since the analysis of the differing notions within the theoretical universes of interest is historical and retrospective.
Laclau identifies six dimensions of emancipation. Dichotomy, constituted in an “absolute chasm, a radical discontinuity” between “the emancipatory moment and the social order which has preceded it”; a holistic dimension, constituted in the fact that “emancipation affects all areas of social life”; transparency, constituted in emancipation’s eventual goal, the “absolute coincidence of human essence with itself” achieved through overcoming alienation\(^\text{14}\) (2007 [1991a]:1), “[E]mancipation” he infers, “presupposes the elimination of power, the abolition of the subject/object distinction, and the management – without any opaqueness or mediation – of communitarian affairs by social agents identified with the viewpoint of social totality” (Ibid.). The fourth dimension aims to grasp the dialectical dimension of emancipation processes by proposing the “pre-existence of what has to be emancipated vis-à-vis the act of emancipation.” Laclau holds that “[t]here is no emancipation without oppression, and there is no oppression without the presence of something which is impeded in its free development by oppressive forces.” He comes to the conclusion that “[e]mancipation is not, in this sense, an act of creation but instead of liberation of something which precedes the liberating act” (Ibid.). The fifth is what he identifies as the ground dimension. Emancipation, as a radical act, “has to take place at the level of the ‘ground’ of the social. If there is no ground, if the revolutionary act leaves a residue which is beyond the transforming abilities of the emancipatory praxis, the very idea of a radical emancipation would become contradictory” (Ibid.:2). The sixth, “rationalistic,” dimension juxtaposes religious eschatologies with what Laclau calls secularized eschatologies; the latter are inscribed with a rationalizing thrust towards totalized emancipation:

As the idea of an absolute representability of the real cannot appeal to anything external to the real itself, it can only coincide with the principle of an absolute rationality. Thus, full emancipation is simply the moment in which the real ceases to be an opaque positivity confronting us, and in which the latter’s distance from the rational is finally cancelled. (Ibid.:2)

The key problematic of emancipation emerges in the incompatibility of the emancipatory act’s necessary radicality (dichotomic dimension) with the emancipatory moment’s inevitable entanglement with an irrational past, that is, the specific socio-historic and discursive context from which the act of emancipation sets itself apart in order to bring forth something new (dimension of ground). Laclau holds that

\(^{14}\) Laclau proposes that “[i]f alienation in its various aspects – religious, political economic […] has been radically eradicated, there is only the absolute coincidence of human essence with itself” (2007 [1991a]:1).
either emancipation is radical and, in that case, it has to be its own ground and confine what it excludes to a radical otherness constituted by evil or irrationality, or there is a deeper ground which establishes the rational connection between the pre-emancipatory order, the new ‘emancipated’ one and the transition between both – in which case emancipation cannot be considered a truly radical foundation. (Ibid.:4)

The inescapable “dilemma of emancipation” (2007 [1991a]:5) is, according to Laclau, apparent in the fact that emancipation “means at one and the same time radical foundation and radical exclusion”¹⁵ (Ibid.:6). This dilemma is, however, conceived as productive. Laclau aims to show that the six dimensions do not “conform to a logically unified whole” and that “the assertion of the classical notion of emancipation in its many variants has involved the advancement of incompatible logical claims” (Ibid.:2). The logical inconsistencies are exactly what he suggests as the vantage point for opening “new liberating discourses which are no longer hindered by the antinomies and blind alleys to which the classical notion of emancipation has led” (Ibid.:2). Laclau’s redefinition of the “classical notion” hinges on a critique of the rationalist dimension manifest in the “secularized eschatology” of Marxisms which identify the proletariat as the historical force of emancipation. He holds that

In the case of a secular eschatology […] the source of the universal is not external but internal to the world, the universal can only manifest itself through the establishment of an essential inequality between the objective positions of the social agents. Some of them are going to be privileged agents of historical change, not as a result of a contingent relation of forces but because they are incarnations of the universal. (Ibid.)

Laclau’s critique of ontologically inscribed universality problematizes the notion of privileged historical agency as it informs especially concrete political manifestations of Marxian ideas. It connects the Marxist identification of the proletariat as the prime historical agent with what has been criticized as a key problematic of enlightenment philosophy, especially by postcolonial theorists: eurocentrism. Laclau holds that “the same type of logic operating in eurocentrism will establish the ontological privilege of the proletariat” (Ibid.).

Laclau’s dissection of notions of emancipation helps to delineate different ideas of emancipation in the works of interest for my study. However, I think that his critique of the

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¹⁵ The dilemma emerges as the “incompatibility between dichotomic dimension and dimension of ground [it] creates two fundamental matrices around which all the other dimensions are organized. As we have said, the pre-existence of the oppressed vis-à-vis the oppressing force is a corollary of the radicalism of the chasm required by the dichotomic dimension; if the oppressed did not pre-exist the oppressing order, it would be an effect of the latter and, in that case, the chasm would be constitutive. […] But all the other dimensions logically require the presence of a positive ground and are, consequently, incompatible with the constitutivity of the chasm required by the dichotomic dimension” (2007 [1991a]:5).
Marxian notion of emancipation as necessarily implementing, via its conceptualization of universality, class dichotomy as ontological privilege needs to be reconsidered. The central questions are: what is being universalized; and what is the universalizing force? American sociologist Vivek Chibber insists in his 2013 study *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital* on capitalism’s universalizing tendency against the argument — here made by Ranajit Guha — that (post)colonial situations eventually expose the Eurocentrism of Marxian categories because it is the smooth cooperation of capitalist production and rigid systems of political autocracy which characterizes modes of exploitation in (post)colonial settings (101ff). Chibber emphasizes that “[w]hat is universalized under the rule of capital [however] is not the drive for a consensual and encompassing political order, but rather the compulsions of market dependence” (Ibid.:125). The global expansion of that compulsion is inscribed in what appears as capital’s drive to “self-expansion” (Ibid.:110). In its attempt to achieve highest possible valorization capital has the tendency to transgress national borders (Heinrich 2004:209-210). According to Marx, the “world market constitutes the basis and vital atmosphere of the capitalist mode of production” (Marx 1964 [1894]:120; my translation, quoted after Heinrich 2004:210). Capital’s self-expanding tendency, it follows, increasingly globalizes a specific compulsory mode: “with the advent of capitalism, the logic of exploitation underwent a transformation. […] The locus of compulsion has shifted from the person of the overlord to the workers’ structural situation” (Chibber 2013:114-115). In Marx’s analysis, this universalizing tendency affects the worker in a double way: she is free to (choose whom to) sell her labor power and she’s compelled to do so in order to survive (Marx 1962 [1890]:181f, Harvey 2010:99). The specific mode of labor exploitation thus becomes the defining force in shaping constitutional lifeworldly experiences; exploitation experience, the substrate of the dialectic inscribed in Marx’s ‘double freedom,’ becomes a defining part of a universality that eventually emanates from the increasingly globalized materiality of the capitalist economy. Marx’s “dull economic compulsion” functions as the agent of a universalization which translates into individual suffering and trauma and eventually (albeit potentially) mobilizes the individual to defend its physical and mental well-being. Chibber, hence, identifies two universalisms at work in capitalism: “the first is the universalizing drive of capital […] The second is the universal interest of the subaltern classes to defend their well-being against capital’s domination” (Ibid.:202-203, highlighting in the original). If capital is the universalizing force which potentially creates a universal interest to withstand the concrete manifestation of capitalist domination, Laclau’s critique of the proletariat’s ontological privilege becomes questionable. The emancipatory thrust inherent to Chibber’s
second universalism first of all constitutes a possibility which derives from a universalizable experience brought forth by changed, and still changing, material conditions. The concrete (life-worldly) experiences contain traces of the universal because of the specific way capitalism integrates the individual in order to exploit its labor power. Resistance emerges as a potential, not as a teleological necessity. Moreover, if capital’s universalizing thrust considerably affects and shapes the experiences of those who most obviously suffer from the specific relations of domination characterizing its concrete socio-political forms - the proletariat or subaltern classes - it necessarily has, albeit under very different preconditions, to affect those on top of the hierarchy too. Thus, Laclau’s critique works well as a critique of Marxism’s historical-teleological narration. However, it falls short of addressing capital’s universalizing thrust adequately.

Laclau nevertheless brilliantly works out the contradictions of emancipation. In doing so, he aims to show that emancipation is actually not adequately thinkable in what he identifies as the logics of “incarnation” in religious and secularized eschatologies, and “pure particularism,” which identifies the emancipatory subject solely in the oppressed group. He suggests a “fourth alternative: the universal is the symbol of a missing fullness and the particular exists only in the contradictory movement of asserting at the same time a differential identity and cancelling it through its subsumption in the non-differential medium” (2007 [1991b]:28). Not only reifications of traditional, reductionist Marxism but dialectical logic altogether falls prey to his critique of secularized eschatologies. With reference to Hegel, Laclau insists that

The idea of the negative implicit in the dialectical notion of contradiction is unable to take us beyond this conservative logic of pure difference. A negative which is part of the determination of a positive content is an integral part of the latter. This is what shows the two faces of Hegel’s Logic: if, on the one hand, the inversion defining the speculative proposition means that the predicate becomes subject, and that a universality transcending all particular determinations ‘circulates’ through the latter, on the other hand, that circulation has a direction dictated by the movement of the particular determinations themselves, and is strictly reduced to it. Dialectical negativity does not question in the least the logic of identity (= the logic of pure difference). (Ibid.:29)

In order to clarify my own position, I want to emphasize the dialectical perspective on the grounds of Marx’s insistence on societal/species emancipation, as it is engrained in his critique of (mere) political emancipation. Picking up on Laclau’s suggestion to understand the
universal as “the symbol of a missing fullness” I suggest harking back to Adorno’s notion of the non-identical. Adorno identifies similar problems in Hegel as Laclau, however, he does so on different theoretical grounds. He holds that

[n]othing is capable of transcending the dialectical immanence relation other than itself. Dialectic critically reflects that relation and its movement. […] Such dialectic is negative. Its idea pronounces the difference to Hegel. In Hegel identity and positivity coincide: the inclusion of everything non-identical and objective into a subjectivity that has been expanded and raised to absolute spirit is supposed to achieve reconciliation. In contrast, however, the force of the whole totality (das Ganze), at work in every single determination (Bestimmung) is not only the negation of the totality but itself the negative, the untrue. The philosophy of the absolute, total subject is particular. (Adorno 2003 [1970]:145-146, my translation)

Adorno’s conclusions overlap with Laclau’s in their critique of identity thinking, both aim to transcend the Hegelian logic. By identifying the “force of the whole, at work in every single determination” as the “negative, the untrue” itself, Adorno, however, grounds his critique of Hegel in Marx’s. He rejects the Hegelian harmonization of the whole in the “absolute spirit” and instead empathizes the Marxian suggestion that “there is no synthesis[,] [t]here is only the internalization of and greater accommodation of the contradiction” (Harvey 2010:62). Steeped in Marx’s dialectical valuation of the contradiction, Adorno focuses das Begriffslose/Nichtbegriffliche – that which escapes conceptualization – and identifies the attempt to conceptually grasp it as a central motif of philosophy (2017 [2007]:103). It figures in Adorno’s philosophy as the non-identical and becomes its lynchpin. Rolf Tiedemann, editor of Adorno’s collected edition at Suhrkamp Verlag, suggests in an editorial note to the Vorlesung über Negative Dialektik (2007) that the opposition of the identical and the non-identical can generally be understood as what “traditional terminology” describes as the opposition of the material and the ideal, the one and the many; it grasps not the general but the particular in its idiosyncrasy (Ibid.:292). This idiosyncrasy is rooted in the epistemological problem of the ineffable individual: language, in its general concepts, can never entirely grasp the particularity of the individual.

Hegel, too, discusses this problem in his critical reflection of immediacy,16 which points out that “there is nothing between heaven and earth or in nature or in spirit, or wherever it may

16 German philosopher Andreas Arndt provides a concise evaluation of the epistemological problem of immediacy and its role in philosophical discourses in Unmittelbarkeit (2013). Quite generally, immediacy signifies spontaneous comprehension: “something is immediate if it is comprehensible by itself, because it references itself in a way that makes every additional argumentative explanation obsolete” (Arndt 2013:10, my translation). The epistemological problem of immediacy is reflected in its relation to the concept of mediation. Arndt holds that “for the project of Enlightenment which doesn’t simply accept ‘natural’ and spiritual authorities
be, which doesn’t contain immediacy as well as mediation” (Hegel after Arndt 2013:47, my translation). Hegel’s project is to identify the mediation in the immediacies; it establishes a notion of mediated immediacy, which aims to unveil the initial semblance of immediacy in order to restore true immediacy through mediation (Ibid.:48). For Hegel, the absolute spirit is capable of establishing mediated immediacy. Adorno’s non-identical is conceived precisely against this move in Hegel’s dialectic, it represents immediacy as that which is not mediated — and can’t be further approximated. For Adorno, the immediate does not signify a positive existence but what he describes as the preponderance of the object (Ibid.:106).17 The central accusation against Hegel’s dialectic is that it misjudges the negativity of the whole; it “lacks sympathy for the utopia of the particular which lies buried beneath the general” (Adorno 2017 [2007]:292). The difference to Hegel establishes the proximity to Marx. Marx’s materialism is rooted in the notion of the specific objective mediation of human perception/knowing and action, it regards humans as determined by objects and objectively active natural beings. While, according to Marx, idealism abstracts from the real preconditions of philosophical positing, materialism abstracts from positing and solely recognizes that human beings are being posited by objects (Arndt 2013:87). Adorno’s negativity is eventually materialistic because it conceives the non-identical as the signifier of a constitutional lack emerging in the necessary divergence of object and subject in the face of the existing societal conditions and their historicity. Adorno, hence, formulates an essential dialectical critique of the “logic of pure difference,” which both Laclau and Adorno detect in Hegel. Against Hegel, Adorno’s negative dialectic insists: the movement of dialectics “doesn’t tend towards the identity within the difference of each object from its concept, but rather is suspicious of the identical.” Dialectical logic is a “logic of disintegration/decay with regard to the customized and reified form of the concept which the perceiving and eventually knowing subject is immediately but asks for reason and validity, [...] the task arises to mediate immediacy with regard to the generality it claims” (Ibid.:18); the most prominent enlightenment philosopher engaged in this project is Hegel.

17 In *Negative Dialektik* (1967) Adorno holds that “[a]pplied critique of identity feels for the preponderance of the object. Identity thinking is, although denying it, subjectivist.” He further explicates: “Because of the inequality in the notion of mediation, the subject falls very differently into the object as the latter in the former. Object is only thinkable through subject, but maintains itself against the latter as something different; subject however, is, due to its own construction, at first also object. [...] It belongs to the meaning of subjectivity to also be object; not, however, to the meaning of objectivity, to be subject” (2003 [1970]:184, my translation). The preponderance of the object re-formulates Marx’s objective mediation as a fundamental critique of subjectivist philosophy as it is represented in Hegel’s totalization of spirit. In *Zu Subjekt und Objekt*, an essay originally published 1969, Adorno further points at the “by no means ontological but historically stacked up block between subject and object” which the subjects erects by “claiming the supremacy over the object and thus defrauds itself of it. The object, in truth non-identical, becomes farther removed from the subject the more the subject ‘constitutes’ the object” (Adorno 2016 [2003]:753, my translation). The indebtedness to Marx shows in the idea that the gap between subject and object appears as forged in the historical process, instead of being an ontological necessity – which eventually makes it, at least potentially, subject to change.
confronted with. Their identity with the subject is the untruth” (2003 [1970]:148, my translation).

From such perspective, the prevalence of domination, inscribed in the objective mediation of concrete societal conditions, determines the ‘tainted’ universality of the present. In Melange, a Minima Moralia aphorism concerned with the dialectics of proposing universal human equality in the face of actual societal relations of domination, Adorno proposes that “[a]n emancipated society […] wouldn’t be a unitary state but the realization of universality in the reconciliation of differences” (2003 [1951]:116). The possibility of a material reality allowing for the reconciliation of subject and object becomes the measuring pole for ‘true’ identity. The emerging (utopian) universality becomes concrete in its eventual objective: the end of (individual and species) suffering, which societally translates into the end of domination. Against the utopian potentiality of reconciliation, such universality is inscribed in the ubiquity of damage, extending from the lower to the upper end of the power hierarchies. Suffering, hence, always already constitutes more than a mere expression of particularity that emerges in the solidification of (group) identities via relations of domination – it becomes, as the universalizing characteristic of existence under contemporary conditions, the (negative) anticipation of liberation. Adorno’s dialectic insists on Marx’s “internalization of and greater accommodation of the contradiction” while retreating to the Hegelian method of negative determination as a mode of praxis which attempts to cling to the non-identical against the negativity of the whole. It pronounces Laclau’s dimension of pre-existence and transcends the way he frames the dilemma of emancipation because it identifies the potentiality of emancipation as dialectically engrained in the concrete societal conditions, albeit negatively. Capital’s universalizing thrust does not establish the ontological privilege of a specific class as an identitarian collective which has become conscious of itself but is constituted in the material realization of Capital’s inherent exploitative logic. Through the Adornian lens, the divergence of Laclau’s dichotomic- and ground dimension exemplifies the dialectic relation of a negative societal whole and the inherent potentiality of overcoming it. The divergence is dialectical because it encompasses the potential of overcoming itself.

The contextual boundaries in the evaluation of emancipation and its directedness (who is emancipated by whom, from what, and to what end), of course, emerge in its historicity. Nevertheless, especially in the central position emancipation has assumed in enlightenment discourses, its necessary entanglement with progression narratives becomes paramount. Emancipation becomes the conceptual condensation of the realizable promise of human
freedom and equality; a notion that inherently carries the urge to its realization, once taken up by a particular subject. This is explicitly pronounced by Laclau, but also inherent to Adorno’s negative dialectic. Laclau emphasizes the semiotic dimension in the contradictions of emancipation. Especially with regard to the substance of emancipation ideas emerging in the works of interest to my research, it is thus crucial to keep the presuppositions the linguistic paradigm injected into current intellectual debates, to which Laclau’s conceptualization belongs, in mind. Laclau pinpoints essential problems of emancipation which help to delineate emancipation ideas in the works of differing theorists; its specific discursive positioning further illuminates the contextual ties emerging as emancipation’s historic time core. The concrete juxtaposition of differing ideas of emancipation that informs my work, however, remains pre-established by its research object. Freud, as the advocate of an individualized emancipation process, becomes the discussion’s lynchpin. The societal dimension of emancipation emerges specifically, and most pronouncedly, in *Critical Theory’s* indebtedness to Marx (and Hegel), as the forefather(s) of social theory. This dimension is simultaneously inscribed in the preponderance of the social/cultural (sphere), as it pervades the works of Talcott Parsons and David Riesman and is derived from the Weberian and Durkheimian universes, however, without the explicit emancipatory thrust inherent to Marx. The delineation revolves around the opposing poles of individualized emancipation and societal emancipation, both of which (still) exhibit a universalist thrust which is challenged by the “postmodern particularisms” mentioned by Laclau. In the attempt to position my research and expose the normative thrust of its engagement with ideas of emancipation, however, I want to finally emphasize the dialectical dimension of divergence which Adorno pronounces. Following Adorno, I find it represented in the ‘productive’ contradiction between Freud’s individualized notion of emancipation and Marx’s insistence on the simultaneous preponderance and changeability of material conditions.

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18 In *Reason and Revolution* (1941) Marcuse provides an account of the transition from philosophy to social theory. It starts with Hegel: “The transition from philosophy to the domain of state and society had been an intrinsic part of Hegel's system” (1955 [1941]:251). According to Marcuse, “Hegel was the last to interpret the world as reason, subjecting nature and history alike to the standards of thought and freedom. At the same time, he recognized the social and political order men had achieved as the basis on which reason had to be realized.” He anticipates social theory, as it emerges with Marx: “the critical tendencies of the Hegelian philosophy […], were taken over by, and continued in, the Marxian social theory” (Ibid.:252). Marx, indebted to Hegel, becomes the forefather of social theory, and the tradition which defines critical theory.
Research Material

The scientific fields of sociology and psychology experienced critical boosts in the immediate post-World War II era. Propelled by the state’s demands for social analyses and psychological expertise, both disciplines were able to expand and rise to prominence in the US-American academic sphere. At the same time, a great number of émigrés, escaping persecution as either communists and/or Jews in their European home countries, contributed to the disciplines’ further expansion and specific developments. The mutual influences of war-effort, émigré scholars and established disciplinary boundaries are, of course, complex and often contradictory. Certain tendencies can, nevertheless be identified. From the broader perspective that necessarily comes with the retrospective, tendentially objectifying, professionalized glance necessitated by a scientific study, these tendencies become the central guidelines in the development of my historical narration. Both sociology and psychology are characterized by Weberian, self-reproducing processes of rationalization and professionalization which propel certain theoretical and practical tendencies and methods to dominant positions within the disciplines. The process is perpetuated by the US nation state’s demands, which, in turn, reflect necessities created by the war effort and its immediate aftermath. The relation of US sociology and psychoanalysis emerges in the coinciding ‘golden ages,’ for which the US war effort serves as a central accelerant. The war and its ramifications simultaneously enclose Critical Theory’s relation with both disciplines; it becomes a marker for both the Institute’s exile (and return) and its interest in psychoanalysis as a theory of human irrationality.

My work is oriented towards the closer analysis of theoretical works representing various tendencies within the complex network of relations between American- and émigré scholars

19 Herbert Marcuse’s *Feindanalysen über die Deutschen* (1998), a collection of analyses he conducted while working for the US intelligence agency Office of Strategic Services from 1942 to 1951, illustrates the concrete demand for the type of sociological analyses created by the war-effort.

20 For the purpose of my project, I (necessarily) take the risk of complexity reduction, bearing in mind that such narrative streamlining necessarily comes at the price of neglecting or even erasing processes and developments complicating, or even contradicting the narration. The historical account of disciplinary developments is, thus, necessarily incomplete and from the outset biased by my own research perspective. The particularities of that perspective are laid out in the following discussion of the concepts I develop and apply throughout the study. It most prominently emerges in the delineation of emancipation and the previous etymological / historical discussion of the concept itself.

21 It is of course WWI that originally fosters the interest in psychoanalysis in order to theoretically grasp the fact that the European proletariat enthusiastically went to war against each other instead of conjointly abolishing capitalism (Schwandt 2009).
in a disciplinary field and its internal, structuring logic. By focusing on the works of Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Talcott Parsons, David Riesman, and Philip Rieff, the study is limited to the analysis of six theorists who prominently engage Freud in at least a significant number of their works, if not in all of them.²² For the purpose of emphasizing the specific theorists’ positions in the disciplinary field of post-war sociology in the US, Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno are at first identified as Critical Theorists and Parsons, Riesman, and Rieff as American sociologists.²³

Erich Fromm is one of the most prominent figures in the history of sociological engagements with psychoanalysis. He was an early member of the Frankfurt Institute’s inner circle under Max Horkheimer’s directorship up to the late 1930s. As both a trained psychoanalyst and sociologist he directed the Institute’s empirical research division and was, together with Horkheimer, responsible for the Institute’s first theoretical engagements with psychoanalysis. Fromm’s falling-out in 1939 with Horkheimer and Adorno, and consequently the Institute, revolving around Fromm’s revision of Freud’s drive theory, marks a central rift. This rift led to a fundamental divergence in the relation of Critical Theory and US sociology. After breaking away from the Institute, Fromm was able to establish himself as one of the most prominent authorities in US academic and intellectual circles, and increasingly also in the public sphere. Fromm’s attempt to bring together a Marxian critique of societal conditions and the Freudian theory of the human psyche, and his work as a psychoanalyst, social theorist and bestselling author in the US, makes his work a crucial source for my interest in the psychoanalytic implications figuring in ideas of emancipation in the context of US post-war sociology. Fromm, as a person and a theorist, embodies the complexities of theoretical

²² In his 2004 study Social Theory Since Freud, sociologist Anthony Elliot stresses Fromm’s, Marcuse’s and Adorno’s outstanding importance for Critical Theory’s engagements with psychoanalysis: “Of the [Frankfurt] School’s attempt to fathom the psychopathologies of fascism, the writings of Adorno, Marcuse and Fromm particularly stand out; each of these author’s, in quite different ways, drew upon Freudian categories to figure out the core dynamics and pathologies of post-liberal rationality, culture, and politics, and also to trace the sociological deadlocks of modernity itself” (29). In my selection of theorists I generally follow Elliott’s suggestion, however, especially Horkheimer’s role in pushing psychoanalysis as one of Critical Theory’s meta-theoretical pillars cannot be underestimated.

²³ The distinction between Critical Theorists on the one, and American sociologists on the other hand, serves the purpose of a structuring guideline in the attempt to trace personal encounters and theoretical resonances in the context of a disciplinary field that is considerably impacted by émigré scholars. It does not aim to prescribe any essential characteristics other than the fact that Critical Theory constitutes a self-proclaimed programmatic vision for a specific way to engage social theory which was not visibly present in the field of American sociology before WWII. The “American” in American sociologists, hence, rather harks back to the established scientific tradition in the American field than making any claims on essential characteristics of cultural identity. The fact that two of the three Critical Theorists, Fromm and Marcuse, became US citizens and left considerable marks on the academic, intellectual, and political landscape points at the precariousness and limited reach of the distinction.
divergences, interpersonal relations, and cross-cultural impacts, especially in the encounter of the Institute and US sociology. While his insistence on Marx transcends the limits of the American sociological tradition, his revision of Freudian drive theory, together with that of a number of other scholars, such as Karen Horney, plays a crucial role in the establishment of a specific notion of psychoanalysis within the field.

My study specifically focuses a number of publications which establish and further perpetuate the decisive turn in Fromm’s Freud interpretation. The 1937 article *Die Determiniertheit der psychischen Struktur durch die Gesellschaft* first pronounced Fromm’s revision of drive theory and established the breach with his Institute colleagues.\(^{24}\) His 1941 publication *Escape from Freedom*, further elaborated his revision of drive theory and the subsequent introduction of the notion of social character. Following Axel Honneth’s suggestion that the book has by now been recognized as Fromm’s main work, it becomes an important source for my study (2006:152). The follow-up publications *Man for Himself* (1947), and *The Sane Society* (1955)\(^{25}\) further develop the notion of social character and emphasize the societal dimension of character formation; all three books together are at the heart of my analysis. The analysis is complemented by additional works of Fromm’s expansive body of publications, personal correspondences and secondary literature. Among the more recent Fromm scholarship especially Lawrence Friedman’s biography *The Lives of Erich Fromm - Love’s Prophet* (2013) stands out; it constitutes an important resource for my study.\(^ {26}\)

Herbert Marcuse becomes interesting for my study because he represents the American career of the ‘orthodox’ strand of Critical Theory, which specifically sets itself apart from Fromm, most prominently. He was a member of the Institute’s inner circle, an (antifascist) US intelligence analyst, and eventually professor at Brandeis University and the University of California San Diego. Additionally, Marcuse’s work prominently pronounces Critical Theory’s engagement with psychoanalysis. Together with Fromm, he co-authored the

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\(^{24}\) The article was rejected for publication in the Institute’s journal *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and only recovered posthumously. It was at the time read and discussed by Horkheimer and Adorno.

\(^{25}\) According to Anthony Elliot “[t]he emphasis on cultural contributions to identity-formation was underscored by Fromm in his major books *Escape from Freedom* (1941) and *The Sane Society* (1956), both of which argued the idea of an essential nature of man, a nature repressed and distorted by capitalist patterns of domination” (2004: 32).

\(^{26}\) Fromm’s work has only quite recently attracted renewed scholarly attention, after a long period of relative neglect. Among the most prominent engagements with Fromm are, besides Friedman’s biography, Kieran Durkin’s *The Radical Humanism of Erich Fromm* (2014), and Joan Braune’s *Erich Fromm’s Revolutionary Hope - Prophetic Messianism as a Critical Theory of the Future* (2014).
Marcuse’s approach to psychoanalysis is eminently pronounced in his two best-known publications *Eros and Civilization* (1955) and *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). Both books are at the center of my analysis, complemented by additional publications and correspondences. In the 1960s and 70s Marcuse published a number of essays and gave interviews addressing the (im)possibilities and fallacies of liberation politics, which prove especially important for the delineation of psychoanalytically inspired notions of emancipation. Marcuse’s work has been extensively discussed in Martin Jay’s *The Dialectical Imagination* (1973), Rolf Wiggershaus *Die Frankfurter Schule* (1988), Eva-Maria Ziege’s *Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie* (2009), Thomas Wheatland’s *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (2011), and especially with regard to his relation to the New Left, in Robert Zwarg’s *Die Kritische Theorie in Amerika* (2017). All these work constitute invaluable resources for my study.

Theodor W. Adorno is the third critical theorist of interest. Adorno joined the Institute’s inner circle in 1938, while it was already in New York and affiliated with Columbia University. Already in 1934 Adorno voiced strong interest in psychoanalysis and proposed the project of developing a *Dialectical Psychology* to Horkheimer (Bock 2017:37). After his arrival in New York, he took over Fromm’s position and worked closely together with Horkheimer on the seminal *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1947), and *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950); both works exemplarily represent Critical Theory’s engagement with Freud and the specificity of its dialectical insistence on drive theory. *The Authoritarian Personality* was widely and positively received in American sociology. The book’s academic success signifies a lasting importance of Adorno’s for the field, despite the fact that he returned to Germany in 1949. Adorno became the most prominent Critical Theorist in Germany in the post-war era, and is today still the most eminent name associated with the first generation of what has come to be known as the Frankfurt School. Adorno’s differences with Marcuse, especially accentuated in
their continuing debate about the students’ movement in the 1960s, pronounce the idiosyncrasy of his position, despite the common ground between Marcuse and himself.

My study focuses those works which most prominently engage Freud, Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947), The Authoritarian Personality (1950), Minima Moralia (1951), and Negative Dialektik (1967). It additionally looks at a number of other publications, of which, Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Psychologie (1955) and Die Revidierte Psychoanalyse (1962) are the most import ones. His correspondences complement my research material. Adorno is, just like Marcuse, prominently and exhaustively addressed in Jay’s, Wiggershaus’s, Ziege’s and Wheatland’s study’s; with regard to the role of psychoanalysis in Adorno’s work, Wolfgang Bock’s recent and extensive study Dialektische Psychologie (2017) has proven especially valuable for my work.27

Talcott Parsons is the most prominent sociological theorist in the field of US sociology in the post-war era. His expansive theoretical universe shifts into focus because he prominently picks up on contemporary developments in the American psychological field by integrating psychoanalytic concepts in search for a theory of motivation. Parsons’s engagement with psychoanalysis starts in the late 1930s and develops into a central pillar of his theoretical constructions. In his position as the most prominent sociological theorist, Parsons’s integration of psychoanalytic concepts constitutes a major contribution to the establishment of Freudian theory in the disciplinary mainstream. His work is central to my study because it represents the objectivist disciplinary mainstream; it therefore illustrates the gap between Critical Theory and US sociology most prominently. At the same time it illustrates the influence of neo-Freudianism on sociological Freud adaptations in the American field at the time; Parsons, too rejected Freudian drive theory, and regarded the works of Fromm and Horney, and others, as the most up-to-date version of psychoanalysis.

The works of central interest are Actor, Situation and Normative Patterns (1939), his first engagement with Freud, and additionally The Social System (1951), Towards a General Theory of Action (1951), Working Papers in the Theory of Action (1953), and Family, Socialization and Interaction Process (1955), which together constituted the peak of his

27 The interest in Critical Theory’s approach to psychoanalysis has recently increased, especially in Germany. In addition to Bock’s study, Frank Schumann’s Leiden und Gesellschaft - Psychoanalyse in der Gesellschaftskritik der Frankfurter Schule (2018), and the volume Freud und Adorno- Zur Urgeschichte der Moderne (2015), edited by Christine Kirchhoff and Falko Schmieder stand out. Helmut Dahmer’s Die Unnatürliche Wissenschaft - Soziologische Freud-Lektüren (2012) also engages Adorno’s work prominently.
integration of with Freudian concepts. These works represented the increasing importance of Freudian concepts for Parsons work, and are complemented by numerous articles and correspondences. With regard to secondary literature, I am especially indebted to Heinrich Kunze’s *Soziologische Theorie und Psychoanalyse* (1972), Helmut Nolte’s *Psychoanalyse und Soziologie* (1972), and Harald Wenzel’s *Die Ordnung des Handelns* (1990).²⁸

David Riesman is of central relevance for my work because his seminal and vastly successful²⁹ *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) centrally relies on psychoanalytic concepts in its typology. Erich Fromm’s social character model is the foundation upon which Riesman’s notion of contemporary American character types rests. As an (unintentionally) bestselling author, Riesman therefor functions as an amplifier of Freudian-, especially neo-Freudian ideas, and becomes a prominent factor in the disciplinary, and even more so, the cultural establishment of psychoanalysis. The neo-Freudian rejection of dive theory figures in Riesman’s work, and constitutes another point of interest with regard to the relation of Critical Theory and US sociology. As a close friend of Fromm’s he additionally represents the most obvious link between Critical Theory and US sociology.

My analysis predominantly engages *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) and a number of articles on Freud and psychoanalysis published by Riesman in *Psychiatry* in the same year. It is complemented by correspondences. Riesman’s work has, despite its immense success, not sparked much scholarly interest over the last decades; the quite recent volume *David Riesman’s Unpublished Writings and Continuing Legacy*, edited by Keith Kerr, B. Garrick Harden, and Marcus Aldredge, is a welcome exception to that rule. My analysis, hence, mostly relies on the primary sources.

Philip Rieff is interesting for my study because his, relatively marginal, position on the field is highly idiosyncratic. His two major publications *Freud: Mind of the Moralist* (1959) and *Triumph of the Therapeutic* (1966) critically engage the effects and repercussions of Freudian theory in US academia and society. In contrast to the majority of sociological engagements

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²⁸ More recent engagements with Parsons approach to psychoanaylsis are to be found in Philip Manning’s *Freud and American Sociology* (2005), and Johannes Schülein’s *Soziologie und Psychoanalyse - Perspektiven einer Sozialwissenschaftlichen Subjekttheorie* (2016).

with Freud, Rieff insisted on drive theory and formulated a sharp cultural criticism which targeted the rationalized version of psychoanalysis that permeated the field otherwise. This is especially interesting with regard to Critical Theory’s position in the field. Rieff’s criticism converged with Marcuse’s (and Adorno's) in crucial aspects, such as the common (dialectical) insistence on drive theory, however, in its meta-theoretical contextualization and general cultural conservative direction, it differed considerably. Rieff’s work therefor establishes an interesting link which helps to address the complexities of the relation of critical theorists and US sociologists, especially with regard to underlying ideas of emancipation, at the time.

My analysis focuses Freud: Mind of the Moralist and Triumph of the Therapeutic, his two major publications. In 1972 Rieff addressed fellow social theorists in an article called Fellow Teachers; the article is another valuable resource, because it explicitly addresses the divergences between Rieff and Marcuse. Similar to Riesman, Rieff’s work has not inspired much scholarly interest over the last decades. My work therefore relies foremost on the primary sources. Antonius Zondervan’s extensive study Sociology and the Sacred (2005) constitutes he exception to the rule, it specifically engages the later works of Rieff, which have been publish shortly after his death in 2006 in three extensive volumes.
Methodology

In its general methodological orientation, my project pursues a historical-systematic discussion of theoretical texts. The concrete conceptual approximations, which I will introduce in the following, are conceived in recognition of the dialectical dimension of divergence as sketched out in my earlier discussion of emancipation in Laclau and Adorno. In Negative Dialektik (1967) Adorno develops the constellation approach, which puts the non-identical at the center of theoretical reflection and proposes something akin to a methodology of theorizing:

Becoming aware of the constellation within which a thing stands means as much as to decipher the one which it bears in it as something that has become what it is. […] Only that knowledge is capable of mobilizing the history within the object that recognizes the object’s historic positional value in its relation to others – the actualization and concentration of something that has already been known, which simultaneously transforms it. Recognition of an object in its constellation is that of the process it preserves. As constellation, the theoretical thought circles the concept it wants to unlock, hoping that it might open just as the locks of well secured safes: not with just one key, or a single number, but a combination of them. (Adorno 2003 [1970]:164-165 my translation)

The constellation approach starts from the realization that the object escapes ‘total description’ and proceeds to the suggestion that its essence can only be approximated in recognition of the matrix of historical becoming and contextual relations in which it is embedded. It pronounces the dialectical dimension of divergence, because it treasures the object as carrier of the non-identical. In my own conceptual approach, it figures as a point of reflection, a constant reminder of both the precariousness and normative weight of the concepts applied and discussed.

In my actual discussion, Pierre Bourdieu’s field analysis is deployed in order to illuminate the structures and developments within the scientific fields of sociology and psychoanalysis. This especially applies to the first two chapters which investigate the specificities of cultural, symbolic, economic, and social capital accumulation in the respective fields of US psychology and sociology. It helps to illuminate power relations and -dynamics and to develop a concise notion of a sociological mainstream in the post-war United States. Bourdieu picks up on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), whose notion of scientific paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (xlii) appears helpful in constructing a notion of a disciplinary mainstream. Bourdieu further extrapolates Kuhn’s concept and shifts the focus to particular agents in scientific fields and especially the implications of social power and status in the emergence, shift, establishment, and challenge of scientific paradigms. According to Bourdieu scientific fields (too) function under the premise of capital acquirement: “investments are organized by reference to - conscious or unconscious - anticipation of the average chances of profit” (1975:22). The notion of capital acquirement extends the notion of paradigm shifts by incorporating the question for the reasons why scholars regard certain scientific problems as more important than others. The answer provided identifies the “high degree of legitimacy” (Ibid.) as the underlying objective of scientific strivings; legitimacy comes to function as accumulated symbolic capital, which eventually translates into scientific authority. Bourdieu suggests that

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\text{[t]he structure of the scientific field at any given moment is defined by the state of the power distribution between the protagonists in the struggle (agents or institutions), i.e. by the structure of the distribution of the specific capital, the result of previous struggles which is objectified in institutions and dispositions and commands the strategies and objective chances of the different agents or institutions in the present struggles. (Ibid.:27)}
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Bourdieu’s focus on the dimension of power distribution targets the instrumental dimension of paradigm shifts in the scientific fields. It theorizes a functional instrumentality governing (even) the sphere of academic/scientific reflection. In the attempt to construct a historic narration of developments in US sociology and psychology, Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus helps to carve out a structuring logic behind the developments. The instrumental dimension can be traced back to Critical Theory’s critique of instrumental reason as it was most prominently formulated in Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Die Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947) and Horkheimer’s The Eclipse of Reason (1947). In a Minima Moralia (1951) aphorism, Adorno proposes that “[d]ialectical reason is, when posited against the dominant mode of reason, unreason: only by convicting and sublating this mode does it become itself reasonable” (2003 [1951]:81, my translation). Even taken out of its concrete context, this short sentence pinpoints the essence of Critical Theory’s critique of instrumental reason. Seyla Benhabib captures the argumentative essence of Dialectic of Enlightenment in her exhaustive study Critique, Norm, and Utopia (1986) quite illustratively:
If the plight of the Enlightenment and of cultural rationalization only reveals the culmination of the identity logic, constitutive of reason, then the theory of the dialectic of the Enlightenment, which is carried out with the tools of this very same reason, perpetuates the very structure of domination it condemns. The critique of Enlightenment is cursed by the same burden as Enlightenment itself. This aporia, which is acknowledged by Adorno and Horkheimer themselves (DA, p. 3), is not resolved, but redeemed through the hope that the critique of Enlightenment can nonetheless evoke the Utopian principle of non-identity logic, which it must deny as soon as it would articulate it discursively. (169)

Adorno’s aphorism and Benhabib’s comment illuminate the double notion of reason in late Critical Theory: the potentiality of true reason is posited against the reality of instrumental reason. While Benhabib criticizes the aporetic structure of the argument, I want to insist on the notion of instrumental reason as it is developed by Adorno, Horkheimer, and also Marcuse30 with reference to the dialectical dimension of divergence – that is, the concrete potentiality of reconciliation as it is preserved in the non-identical. The epistemological divergences between Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and Critical Theory thus most prominently emerge in Critical Theory’s dialectical insistence on practical reconciliation as theory’s eventual objective and in Theory of Practice’s tendency to state the eventual persistence of power relations via its emphasis on trans-historic symbolic structures.31 This divergence, of course, cannot be neglected. Bourdieu’s categories are therefore applied as rather descriptive approximations in the context of a historic narration about two disciplinary fields that generally aligns itself with Critical Theory’s normative thrust as a critique of instrumental rationality.32

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30 Martin Jay in his 2016 Reason after its Eclipse discusses the general thrust of Critical Theory’s critique of instrumental reason and the divergences between the chief protagonists Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse in great detail (97ff).
31 In his comparative study of Adorno's and Bourdieu’s sociological theories, sociologist Martin Proißl identifies the proximity of both theorists in the emphasis their approaches put on the concrete limitations of practice despite existing action alternatives (Proißl 2014:13). It is exactly this proximity that lead me to employ Bordieuian categories in the context of a work that generally orients itself towards Critical Theory’s emancipatory thrust. The reach of these categories in this context is, however limited. A further differentiation of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and Adorno’s Critical Theory, which Proißl brilliantly exercises in his study, exceeds the framework of this dissertation. In his conclusions, Proißl emphasizes Adorno's eventually reconciliatory perspective against Bourdieu’s trans-historical and deterministic side (ibid.:463). Proißl, however, does not aim to delegitimize Bourdieu’s theoretical efforts; his critique rather calls for a further engagement with Bourdieu’s categories as critical tools in the description of existing power relations. This reflects the problematic nature of their deeper, meta-theoretical implications (ibid.ff).
32 Proißl suggests that “[m]any of Bourdieu’s concepts are very well equipped for the socio-analysis of power, domination and social inequalities, as long as Bourdieu’s conception of the human being is not reproduced and one keeps insisting to analyze humanity’s prehistory [in the Marxian sense] instead of trans-historic social and symbolic structures” (2014:465 my translation). Proißl pinpoints my hesitation to fully apply a Bourdieuian framework.
Bourdieu’s “cultural field,” broadly defined as a “space of competition, of struggles, and of genuine debate” (Bourdieu 1991:378), exhibits such descriptive value. It functions on the implication that struggle, competition, and debate within a field are eventually driven by the generation and accumulation of a variety of capitals which translate into scientific authority. Bourdieu holds that

[a]s a system of objective relations between positions already won (in previous struggles), the scientific field is the locus of a competitive struggle, in which the specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific authority, defined inseparably as technical capacity and social power, or, to put it another way, the monopoly of scientific competence, in the sense of a particular agent’s socially recognized capacity to speak and act legitimately (i.e. in an authorized and authoritative way) in scientific matters. (Bourdieu 1975:19)

The notion of the cultural field, with all its implications, resonates in a variety of more recent accounts of American sociology’s historical development which simultaneously criticize and complicate it (c. for example Calhoun 2007). Some of these complications inform my own historical narration, especially the one about American sociology. Bourdieu emphasizes the necessity for the sociologist’s self-reflexivity, in the sense of clarifying the system of positions from which (research) strategies are pursued, in the development of a sociology of sociologies (1993:78). This, of course, applies to the (re)narration of disciplinary history; the accounts – and Bourdieu’s work on the disciplinary history proves to be a prime example of the strategy – have to incorporate a reflexive moment instead of posing as chronological narratives of happenings and facts. Bourdieu’s narrative about paradigm struggles in post-war US sociology (1975;1991;2004) is a crucial reference for and subject to further critical reflection of contemporary sociologists of American sociology. These critical re-evaluations of Bourdieu’s original texts inform my own narration, however, without the intention of reproducing the Bourdieuan “science of sciences” paradigm (Bourdieu 2001) on a deeper (meta)theoretical level.

The above developed notion of Freudian emancipation potentiality serves as the foundation upon which my discussion of the emancipatory implications in the psychoanalysis adaptations characteristic of the works of Fromm, Marcuse, Adorno, Parsons, Riesman, and Rieff unfolds. Laclau’s six-dimensional delineation of emancipation serves as a structuring guideline. In the following analyses of psychoanalysis adaptations in Critical Theory (Chapter III), and American sociological theories (Chapter IV), I orient my discussion along categorical junctions reflecting the specificities of the theories under investigation. Simultaneously, I
consider the categorical universality necessitated by the concept of emancipation and its general (utopian) thrust towards individual/societal improvement. The first categorical junction of interest is character structure. It is the junction most informed by psychoanalytical discourse and it appears in all the theories of interest, albeit in diverging variations. The second categorical junction is integration. It encompasses the theorization of the subject’s relation to society in general and its specificities emerging in the theories of interest, such as the Marxian notion of alienation as it is vital to Fromm, Marcuse and Adorno, or the Durkheimian notion of anomie as it appears in Parsons and Riesman. The third and final categorical junction is social change. It is the closest approximation of the possibility of a more emancipated state of society and it appears in all the theoretical universes discussed. While I recognize that these general abstractions necessarily reduce complexity and therefore themselves exhibit a certain amount of ephemerality, they nonetheless function as structuring guidelines in my study. They are helpful for the task of bringing into conversation the diverging notions of individual and society presented in the different works I analyze. The general purpose of using these abstractions is to bring the categories to life within the specific theoretical contexts they were conceived in.

The role of psychoanalysis as a common reference system in the collaboration of Critical Theorists and US sociologists and the (early) reception of the works of Institute’s members suggests that it might have served as a catalyst for the mutual recognition of otherwise conflicting epistemologies. As the overwhelmingly positive reception of Studies in Prejudice in US sociology demonstrates, it was psychoanalysis – widely received in the field at that time – which propelled some of the Institute’s publications to the center of attention. Especially figures like Eric Fromm and David Riesman would appear as theory-cultural ambassadors in that context, similar to those protagonists of Critical Theory and US sociology whose works most obviously signify mutual influence and who resonated enormously in the American academic and public sphere. The closer analysis, however, complicates the picture. Especially in Parsons, there are only very few hints at an engagement with Fromm’s ideas, and these remain clearly confined to an adoption of some of his psychoanalytic innovations. They also and blur with the works of (other) neo-Freudians like Karen Horney. Fromm’s critical theory, in the sense of a critique of the existing societal organization, embodied in his Marx-adoption, is not visibly received at all. Quite generally, my research lead me to the

33 I discuss the reception of Studies briefly in Chapter I. For now, it suffices to say that they were well chiefly praised for their innovative psychoanalytically derived methodology in US sociology, which, however, did not lead to any traceable reception of Critical Theory, as the Institute’s social philosophical background.
conclusion that psychoanalysis did serve as a common language in the mainstream of US sociology. However, the reception of Critical Theory as a proper social philosophy remained confined to radical fringes – despite the upheavals in the discipline in the 1960s and even after the demise of Parsonian dominance in the 1970s. The ambiguous legacy of Freudian theory eventually emerges within the respective theoretical/analytical frameworks as a signifier of incomparability instead of becoming a vehicle of mutual recognition. The problematic of the remaining gap, despite the metaphorical bridge provided by the common language of psychoanalysis, leads me to further emphasize my insistence on divergence as the conceptual mode of approximating the differing theoretical adaptations of Freud. My project therefore sets out to illuminate divergences as points of conceptual clarification and solidification in the process of an encounter that brought forth co-joined projects and superficial recognition, even if it happened on the grounds of fundamentally different conceptualizations of individual, society, and social change. I thus want to insist on the validity of divergence vis-à-vis the different understandings of emancipation inherent to the way psychoanalysis is put to work by Fromm, Marcuse, Adorno, Parsons, Riesman, and Rieff.

In order develop a concise notion of thinking together the simultaneous insistence on divergence and the universal thrust that is inherent to emancipation ideas, I want to return to the dialectical dimension of divergence, as sketched out in my earlier discussion of Laclau and Adorno. Adorno’s dialectical insistence on contradiction is indebted to Marx’s objective mediation and identifies the societal whole/totality as the negative/untrue; it proposes, against Hegel, the theoretical rejection of reconciliation in spirit, and thereby eventually targets the material foundations of societal relations of domination. Divergence becomes a marker of the theoretical valuation of the ever-ongoing accumulation and perpetuation of contradiction, its dialectical dimension the marker of normative thrust inherent to this movement of thought. The critical/normative content of such a notion of divergence becomes especially highlighted in contrast to Talcott Parsons’s paradigm of theory convergence, which characterizes his attempt to formulate a general theory of action. Harald Wenzel analyses Parsons’s application of the convergence concept as follows: firstly, Parsons proves simple convergence by demonstrating that the element of social integration is inherent to all the investigated theories. Secondly he demonstrates the theories’ complex convergence with regard to the structuring elements of (his) general action system, and thirdly, the interpretation of important theory elements bears central modules for an unimpaired theory of the general action system, within which elementary unit and system are conceived consistently (1990:277). The convergence
paradigm, hence, hinges on the implication that social integration is the central element for the theorization of a general order of action that, as is the implicit objective of all social theories, sets out to approximate the truth about societal/human relations. The underlying narration is one of scientific (here: theoretical) progress towards ever increasing enlightenment. The convergence paradigm elevates the notion of social integration, under the guise of value neutrality, to the desirable outcome not only of successful theorizing about society, but, necessarily so, to the societal process altogether. It eventually alludes to a functionality bias in Parsons’s theorizing, that establishes functionality from the outset as the end of the social process.34

The dialectical dimension of divergence recognizes converging thrusts inherent to modernity, but emphasizes their implications in the production of (new) domination and their liberating potential at the same time. In terms of theory development it insists on irreconcilability. The aim is not to bring together diverging theories under the aegis of a common goal, but to emphasize the divergences in order to illuminate tensions. My discussion of original theoretical texts recognizes their socio-historic (and discursive) specificity, their necessary boundedness to the creation context. It is complemented by archival resources, such as correspondences of and between the main protagonists in order to broaden the perspective and reflect the specificities of the protagonists’ concrete life-worldly experiences. It is, thereby, a key intention of my project to delineate the general ambivalent and problematic character of scientific concepts against the background of the ambiguous career of psychoanalysis in the US. It follows that the concepts serving as structuring guidelines of my own work themselves cannot escape their inherent ephemerality. In order to account for such precariousness, my conceptual approach is oriented towards Adorno’s notion of constellation as he suggests it as the methodological essence of negative dialectics. The eventual objective is to assemble a differentiated snippet of a historical discussion that reflects its own normative directedness.

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34 The accusation of a functionality bias is at the center of a number of critiques leveled against Parsons. The most prominent one is probably Alvin Gouldner’s *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (1970), others are Heinrich Kunze’s *Soziologische Theorie und Psychoanalyse – Freuds Begriff der Verdrängung und seine Rezeption durch Parsons* (1972), and Helmut Nolte’s *Psychoanalyse und Soziologie - Die Systemtheorien Sigmund Freuds und Talcott Parsons’* (1972). It also figures in Adorno’s critique of Parsons affirmation of the existing, exemplarily pronounced in *Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Psychologie* (1955) and his lecture series *Einleitung in die Soziologie* (2003:18;186).
Chapter Overview

In the first chapter I trace the American career of psychoanalysis from the lectures Freud gave at Clark University in 1909 to the disciplinary golden age of the 1950s and its rapid decline in the 1960s. The main focus lies with the post-war era; and professionalization- and rationalization processes in the formation of the disciplinary field of US psychoanalysis are at the center. My analysis carves out the dialectical relation of professionalization processes and psychoanalysis’s inherent emancipatory promise against the background of the instrumental dynamics permeating the field in the struggle over scientific authority and symbolic capital. The rationalization process becomes evident as the increasing scientification of psychoanalysis, which is perpetuated by its close alignment with the medical professions. The US nation state’s demand for the impact of World War II as an accelerator of both psychoanalysis success in American psychology and culture, and its increasing rationalization. Against the backdrop of my research interest in the relation of Critical Theory and US sociology, I especially focus on the role of neo-Freudianism and its double role: the emancipatory re-formulation of Freudian theory and the simultaneous complicity in the perpetuation of rationalization and scientification. It further addresses American ego-psychology and its (partial) proximity to political conservatism, and the general conservatism of psychoanalysis in the 1950s in the context of professionalization processes. Finally, I address the rather rapid decline of the disciplinary field in face of its further scientification with regard to a number of factors: the emergence of new, more effective methods, the increasing popularity of self-help literature and the emancipatory attacks on reactionary analysis in the wake of the social movements of the 1960s.

In the second chapter I trace dynamics and processes which move the field of US sociology from a disciplinary ‘mainstream’ in the 1950s to a diversified landscape of approaches by the early 1970s. My account highlights the instrumental dimension of professionalization processes, which become explicitly evident in the exclusion of African American sociology and the impact of the US state’s war effort on the disciplinary field. The focus is tilted towards the relation of Critical Theory and US sociology; the work and impact of the Institute’s thus figures as an important reference. This is why the narration developed in the chapter does not claim general representativity but rather figures as a specific framework for my research interest in the relation of Critical Theory and US sociology. With Bourdieu, I
develop a concise notion of a sociological mainstream and relate it to Critical Theory. I additionally carve out the junctures between the sociological and the psychoanalytic fields and explore the temporary convergence of disciplinary trajectories and their limitations. Thereby I do not only address the dialectic relation of a scientistic mainstream and the grander structuring forces of instrumentalization, which become apparent in the war-state’s demands. Talcott Parsons’s objectivist grand theory, dominating in the post-war era itself eventually falls prey to the professionalization process which also rails against grand theories. The dialectics of emancipation and instrumental rationalization not only emerge in the (tendential) exclusion of emancipatory approaches, but also in the complicity of such approaches in the eventual prevalence of methodological positivism.

In the third chapter I discuss the adaptations of psychoanalysis in the works of critical theorists Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno. The chapter traces the convergences and divergences between the three theorists from the common beginnings at the Institute in the 1930s to the increasingly differing trajectories in the 1960s. The analysis is structured by the orientation towards the three categorical junctures of character structure, integration, and social change. The debate surrounding Erich Fromm’s revision of drive theory in the late 1930s is addressed as a crucial event that not only illuminates the divergences between Fromm on the one, and Marcuse and Adorno on the other hand, but prominently figures in the general relation of Critical Theory and US sociology. Fromm’s model of social character is carved out as the central conceptual innovation which establishes the link to David Riesman, and also Talcott Parsons, and to a certain extent Philip Rieff. The chapter emphasizes the divergences in the theorists’ ideas of emancipation by a closer investigation of Fromm’s notion of productivity, Marcuse’s dialectical extrapolation of Freudian categories, and Adorno’s outright rejection of psychoanalytic therapy. The differences between Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno are presented as moments of conceptual solidification; emancipatory potentialities are present in all trajectories, which emphasizes the dialectical character of the divergences.

In the fourth chapter I analyze the adaptation and integration of Freudian concepts in the works of US sociologists Parsons, Riesman, and Rieff. Similar to Chapter III, the discussion is structured along the categorical junctures of character structure, integration and social change. The first part traces Parsons’s theoretical evolvement form structural- to systemic functionalism, with specific regard to the role and function of psychoanalytic concepts. It carves out the central role of rationalized psychoanalysis, as proposed by the neo-Freudians
and ego-psychology, in Parsons’s construction of a complex functionalist universe. It specifically looks at Parsons notion of the personality system, and the symbolically generalized medium of affect. The second part addresses the centrality of Fromm’s social character model for David Riesman and specifically highlights the convergences and divergences between Riesman and Fromm. The Third part finally offers an analysis of Rieff’s work, which traces Rieff’s idiosyncratic position to his simultaneous position as anti-rationalist critic and rather conservative voice in the field, who insist on drive theory and calls for the recognition of the necessity of repression and authority. The three approaches are brought into conversation against the backdrop of their proximities and distances to the critical theorists discussed in Chapter III.

In the fifth and last chapter, I delineate explicit or implicit notions of emancipation, and the normative directedness of the works discussed in Chapters III and IV. I additionally pick up on Eva Illouz’s critical engagement of emotionality in capitalism and her notion of the ‘therapeutic narrative’ as the central narration of contemporary Western selfhood in order to link the historic discussion to recent sociological debates. The discussion is oriented towards Ernesto Laclau’s six dimensional approach to emancipation and generally illuminates the divergences between the six approaches against the backdrop of the theorists’ positioning towards the New Left which emerges in the 1960s. Illouz’s therapeutic narrative is eventually engaged in order to emphasize recent repercussions of the historical debates; the critical negotiation of Illouz’s work eventually helps to introduce the notion of Critical Theory’s negative emancipatory potential to the contemporary debate.
Chapter I: Psychoanalysis in America

In this chapter I aim to delineate the development of psychoanalysis in US psychology as a disciplinary trajectory in American academia. The reconstruction of the disciplinary developments in US psychology and sociology in the (extended) post-war era is the foundation from which my further investigation of psychoanalytic concepts in American sociological theories in Chapters III and IV unfolds. Picking up the question of how to account for the diverging and ambiguous ways psychoanalysis is put to work in sociological theories, the first two chapters are devoted to (re-)constructing a disciplinary history as a narrative framework for the closer investigations that follow. In the attempt to trace the specific relations of Critical Theory and US sociology, psychoanalysis becomes the vantage point for the further differentiation of theoretical divergences because it simultaneously inhabits a central position in Critical Theory, and is adapted by empiricist mainstream sociologists. The most prominent US mainstream theoretician at the time was Talcott Parsons, but psychoanalysis was also adapted by a number of other (critical) sociologists rising to prominence within the post-war period, such as David Riesman and Philip Rieff. Both psychology and sociology underwent processes of professionalization, institutionalization and scientification, which eventually result in the hegemony of scientistic paradigms in what disciplinary historians have described as the respective “golden ages” of the disciplines in question. These golden ages began in the immediate post-war era and lasted until the late 1960s (Hale 1995:276; Herzog 2017:5; Calhoun 2007:34). The (pre)conditions of coinciding “golden ages” eventually become stepping stones for tracing similarities between the disciplines in order to further contextualize the seeming convergence of theoretical interests that emerges in psychoanalytically inspired sociological theory, from Parsons to Adorno. Tracing processes which characterize the adoptions and adaptations of Freudian theory within US psychology, hence, finally aims to illuminate power relations in the disciplinary field, to carve out its structuring logic, and to highlight the specific mutual impacts of US psychology and Freudian theory.

The specifics of psychoanalysis’s clinical career in US psychology can easily be traced without taking sociological developments into account. However, discussing developments in US sociology necessitates the inclusion of psychoanalysis as a major innovation in both
empirical sociological research practices and sociological theory development. I therefore focus on psychoanalysis as a clinical and therapeutic practice in US psychology in this chapter and relegate the discussion of psychoanalytic developments in US sociology to Chapter II. With regard to methodology, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s field analysis and his focus on (social, symbolic) capital acquirement as a structuring orientation in the first two chapters. I use Bourdieu’s work, however, under the reservations sketched out in the introduction.

The disciplinary rise of psychoanalysis in the US in the US, as both a theoretical endeavor and clinical practice, has informed a number of scholarly works. My own account relies heavily on Nathan G. Hale’s *Freud in America* series, especially the second volume *The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States* (1995), Eli Zaretsky’s *Secrets of the Soul - A Social and Cultural History of Psychoanalysis* (2004), his more recent *Political Freud - A History* (2015), and Dagmar Herzog’s very recent *Post-war Freud - Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catastrophes* (2017). All three historians engage retrospectively with the career of Freudian thought and practice, albeit under quite diverging paradigms. Hale’s account focuses on American adaptations of Freud in the therapeutic field, and re-narrates the history of psychoanalysis as a medical profession and clinical theory. Zaretsky’s books illuminate the history of Freudian thought in terms of intellectual adaptations in (academic) theory and (societal) practice and its cultural impact. They shed light on psychoanalysis’s openness to a variety of rather diverging adaptations. Herzog’s study magnifies the ambiguity inherent to Freud’s concepts in its detailed investigation of reactionary trends and of the forces eventually leading to the discipline’s downfall by the end of the 60s. These differing perspectives already hint at the amount of critical attention Freudian theory – albeit as a historical topic – has instigated and still instigates. At the same time, the multiplicity of interpretations figuring in the various narratives of psychoanalysis’s history capture what eventually becomes manifest in the disciplinary field itself, and what Arnold Goldberg has described, and defended, as a valuable *plurality* of approaches (Goldberg 2002).

At the same time, such plurality, pinpointed by Zaretsky as psychoanalysis’s “ambiguous legacy,” (2004:4f) appears as one of the difficulties in constructing a consistent historical narration. My reliance on Hale’s, Herzog’s and Zaretsky’s accounts explicitly intends to cover diverging perspectives on various, yet crucial, aspects in psychoanalysis’s American career. Eventually, it aims to explore tensions and divergences in the trans-cultural and trans-
disciplinary movement of psychoanalytic knowledge. Hale’s account is primarily concerned with the institutional dimension, Zaretsky’s additionally engages the cultural community, which extends far beyond the disciplinary boundaries, and Herzog explicitly focuses on emancipatory movements targeting misogyny and homophobia within and against already established psychoanalytic institutions and cultural adaptations. With reference to the Bourdieuiian scientific field as a specific form of the cultural field, the conditions framing the struggles over scientific authority in American psychoanalysis becomes my main interest. In terms of its construction as a disciplinary field, psychoanalysis in the US is, from the outset, strongly tied to the medical professions (medicine and psychiatry). This impacts the nature of the emerging institutional structure, and eventually the way scientific authority is claimed (Zaretsky 2004:287). Historically the main focus lies with psychoanalysis’s “golden age” as Hale and Herzog define it, which sets in in the immediate post-war period in the 1940s and lasts until the mid to late 1960s (Hale 1995:276; Herzog 2017:5).35

Early Pragmatization and Cultural Resonances

The history of adaptations of psychoanalysis in America, of course, predates the mid-1940s. Ever since Freud gave his Clark lectures in 1909, psychoanalytic theory and clinical/therapeutic practice has captured the imaginations of American psychologists, physicians and intellectuals. Upon the invitation of president C. Stanley Hall, Freud visited Clark University in 1909 to attend a conference in honor of its 20th anniversary. Freud’s (only) visit to the US marks a decisive point, not only in the history of American psychoanalysis, but also with regard to the discipline’s further career altogether. According to Zaretsky, the lectures even join ranks with “the first skyscrapers, Charlie Chaplin’s movies, and Thomas Edison’s light bulb” in being “signal moments announcing the advent of the second industrial revolution” (2004:80). Freud delivered 5 Lectures in Psychoanalysis, which soon would evolve into the foundational text for the American canon. The lectures “condensed, almost to the point of caricature the major theories he had worked out in his first great works, The Interpretation of Dreams, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and Studies in Hysteria” (Hale 1971:5). The Clark lectures

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35 Hale’s and Herzog’s definitions of the “golden age’s” time frame differ slightly. For Hale, it starts in 1945 and ends in the mid-60s, while for Herzog it “had run roughly from 1949 to 1969” (2017:5). The reasons for the slight differences will be addressed later.
popularized psychoanalysis not only because of their abbreviated, approachable nature; the composition of the crowd who listened to Freud is another crucial factor in the rather rapid multiplication of psychoanalytic interest among American scholars. The audience was quite diverse (in terms of occupational and disciplinary boundaries) and encompassed such figures as philosopher William James, anthropologist Franz Boas, psychiatrist Adolf Meyer, and many others (Hale 1971:4; Zaretsky 2004:81).

In the 1920s, psychoanalysis was not yet broadly recognized as an academic/scientific discipline, but it already drew heavy attention among psychologists, and was even officially acknowledged by the American Psychological Association (APA1)36 (Jahoda 1969:424). Hale further points out that the first generation of American followers of Freud developed a fairly pragmatic approach to psychoanalysis, often tied back to optimistic social activism and the conviction that psychoanalysis/psychiatry could eventually help to overcome prisons, “the hangman,” and essentialist assumptions perpetuating a criminal justice system steeped in the logic of punishment (1995:23f). According to Hale, the “simple psychoanalysis of the Clark lectures, shorn of its later complexities and refinements” considerably shaped the Freud adaptations of the 1920s (Ibid.:22). Without yet exercising any societal, cultural, or even disciplinary authority, the way in which psychoanalysis would impact American society, culture, and the discipline of psychology was already anticipated in these simplified, pragmatized approaches. Additionally, the institutional demands directed at psychoanalysis were, from early on, rather strict. Hale states that

[w]ithin a decentralized and open medical establishment, American psychiatry sought to cloak itself in the scientific authority of medicine by insisting that psychoanalysis conform to prevailing canons of the scientific, a demand that would become increasingly important in the 1930s and beyond. (Ibid.:8)

By the early 1930s it had already become a widely accepted “movement” in American academia (Ibid.:6). While the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsAA) was founded in 1911, and, at first, remained rather limited in its public visibility, the emerging institutionalization is more prominently marked by the establishment of an educational

36 The American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association share the same acronym (APA). They will be distinguished as APA1 (American Psychological Association) and APA2 (American Psychiatric Association). APA1 was founded in 1892 at Clark University and was already well-established when psychoanalysis managed to impact American academic and public life in the 1920s. APA2 was founded in 1844, changed its name several times and finally adopted the current name in 1921. APA2 is chiefly interesting because of the increased interest in psychoanalysis that is especially represented in William C. Menninger, its president from 1948-1949, who was president of the APsAA shortly before.
institute for psychoanalysis in New York in 1931, the *New York Psychoanalytic Society & Institute*, the launch of *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* in the same year, and the foundation of the APA's special section for psychoanalysis in 1933 (Oberndorf 1953:187;190). The emergence of an independent academic journal and the discipline’s integration into the biggest and most renowned psychological organization of the country mark the most important steps in its institutionalization and full-fledged acknowledgment. Psychoanalysis, it follows, was already in the early 1930s an established part of American academia – a Bourdieuan scientific field that had established its specific symbolic currency as a precondition for the achievement of scientific authority. The symbolic currency necessary to institutionally establish the emerging field was heavily informed by the pragmatized ‘Clark-lectures-reading,’ which eventually became manifest in the institutional structures and the increased demand for scientificity that would amount to outright scientism in the 40s and 50s. The early career of a theoretical and practical endeavor that sets out to illuminate (psychological) irrationalities and contradictions for the sake of emancipation that subsequently takes up a life of its own as the streamlined and pragmatized echo of the necessarily under-complex abbreviations of the Clark lectures, and that eventually congeals in institutions devoted to the hard science paradigm of the medical profession, already illustrates the dialectic of emancipatory thrust and instrumental rationality.

When taking a closer look at concrete relations of domination in US society at the time, the general streamlining thrust of professionalization is complicated by the fact that Freud was from early on vividly received in African American culture (Zaretsky 2015:38ff). Zaretsky especially emphasizes the intellectual milieu of the Harlem Renaissance as a hotbed for an early African American reception (2004:154f; 2015:42ff). This reception, however, differed in a crucial aspect from that of the white mainstream in a segregated society:

> [f]or middle class white America, psychoanalysis served as avatar, interpreter, and authority over private, intimate space. In African American society the line between public and private was more tenuous, breached by the racial intimidation, economic victimization, and sexual misuse. [...] Freud was not typically the interpreter of personal life per se but had to be political as well. (2015:40)

The emancipatory dimension inherent to psychoanalysis turned it into a concrete political one. The pragmatized form psychoanalysis had taken in the aftermath of the Clark lectures did not align itself with its liberating potential in the face of struggles against concrete domination. Zaretsky suggests that the “element of internal struggle was strengthened when Freudianism
entered African American culture” (Ibid.:44). W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of double consciousness, developed in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1902) as a “consciousness divided between self-consciousness and regard for the gaze of the other” (Ibid.:42) became, under the impact of a trickling-down Freud reception, increasingly Freudian, a development condensed in the “image of a “racial unconscious” (Ibid.:45). Zaretsky’s account focuses on Harlem Renaissance writers Zora Neal Hurston and Richard Wright. It traces Hurston’s suggestion of a racial unconscious to her early encounter with Freudian theory at Columbia University (2004:154) and Wright’s political affiliations with the Communist party, in the orbit of which Du Bois himself and other outstanding intellectuals and activists were active. Du Bois himself remarked in his autobiography, reflecting on the cruelty and ubiquity of lynching and its deep roots in “the twisted white psyche[,]” (Zaretsky 2015:48), “that he had not been ‘sufficiently Freudian to understand how little human action is based on reason’” (Du Bois 1940, after Zaretsky 2015:48). Even though to further explore this topic would exceed the frame of this chapter, it is important to state that the concrete political dimension came to inhabit within African American culture provides a crucial and illuminating insight into the dialectic of emancipatory thrusts and instrumentality, engrained in concrete struggles and simultaneous pragmatization and professionalization.

While Freud himself had reservations against the developments in the increasingly professionalized American discipline, the influx of European immigrants during the rise of fascism in Europe contributed in various ways to its further professionalization. According to Marie Jahoda, herself an émigré psychoanalyst, between 150 and 250 professional psychoanalysts and psychologists with psychoanalytic orientation arrived in the US in the 1930s and 40s (Jahoda 1969:428). Among them were many prominent European scholars, such as Else Frenkel-Brunswik, who was soon to become an important figure “in the effort to integrate American psychology and psychoanalysis” (Ibid.:438). Jahoda succinctly summarizes the specific conditions leading to the successful integration of European migrant scholars:

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37 Frenkel-Brunswik would become part of the Berkeley Opinion Study group conducting the studies on *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) together with the exiled Institute, under the supervision of Adorno and Horkheimer. Jahoda praises these studies as exemplary works of empirical social science that combine the psychoanalytic approach and the “methods and measurements of the academicians” (Jahoda 1969:440).
It is a combination of this historical event, the receptivity of the host culture, the intention of some leading psychoanalysts, and the resistance to oversimple solutions of psychological problems which altogether distinguished psychoanalysis from the other psychological schools, and which explain jointly the profundity of the impact of the émigré psychoanalysts on American psychology. (Ibid.:445)

The “receptivity of the host culture” grew out of the already established and institutionalized academic (and increasingly cultural) interest in psychoanalysis the émigré scholars encountered upon arrival in the US. The specificity of the progression in psychoanalytic thinking in the US lies in the rapid, and limiting, professionalization of psychoanalysis as an academic discipline, strongly tied to institutionalized medicine and psychiatry. It was propelled, according to Zaretsky, by “US psychoanalysts” as “agents of rationalization” (Zaretsky 2004:287).

Zaretsky, in accordance with Russell Jacoby, frames the rationalizing process as the “Americanization” of psychoanalysis, which sets in in “the early years of the Depression” (Zaretsky 2004:287; Jacoby 1985:166f). Zaretsky complicates the notion of Americanization by pointing at the “fateful conjuncture” of psychoanalysis and “American mind-cure culture,” which was actually fostered by emigration. He suggests that “the worst tendencies in European psychoanalysis – perfectionism, a worship of science, authoritarianism, contempt for and fear of politics – received a new and characteristically American inflection” (2004:287). The notion of Americanization translates into a specific way of pragmatization that magnifies already existing tendencies in European psychoanalysis; it illuminates the mutual impact, and eventual directedness of psychoanalysis’s integrative process in American academia and culture. This specific understanding of pragmatization, however, meets its explanatory limits if one considers that these magnified tendencies were always already present in European psychoanalysis. To culturally specify rationalization and professionalization becomes problematic when looking at the dialectics of emancipatory potential and domination that becomes manifest in psychoanalysis’s institutionalization. Such rationalization processes cannot sufficiently be explained by cultural specificity. In this context, the term conveys a reductive understanding that cuts off the universal dimension of rationalization which can, with Weber and Marx, be tied back to the instrumental rationality characteristic of modern, capitalist, Western societies.

Herzog’s use of the term further illuminates its problematic character. With reference to psychoanalysis’s “Americanization” she suggests that “one could tell the story of American
Herzog, by focusing on politically reactionary tendencies in the professionalization process of psychoanalysis, also addresses the problematic of psychoanalysis’s (original) emancipatory thrust and eventual (institutional) conservatism head on. Her reconstruction of what she calls the “libido wars” (Ibid.:55) between church leaders and representatives of institutionalized psychoanalysis demonstrates not only how a “simplified sex-centered version, erected as an anti-psychoanalysis straw-man by Catholics and Protestants served to identify Freudianism and its conclusions to “contradict common sense and the traditional intellectual heritage of the Western World” (Ibid.:44), it also points at the (willful) concessions made by (some) defenders of psychoanalysis, such as William C. Menninger. Menninger, in his function as president of the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA) from 1946-1947, openly questioned the libidinal foundations of Freudian theory and sought to turn the APsaA into the “spearhead of the movement” by liberalizing membership requirements, among other things (Herzog 2017:41; Plant 2005:182). Herzog shows that this debate had a vast impact on the specific version of Freudian theory and practice, which was able to make it into the academic and therapeutic mainstream. “[I]n the midst of the by no means marginal fight between religion and psychoanalysis in the post-war years in the USA […] a unique version of
psychoanalytic psychiatry was consolidated” (2017:45). The reactionary elements that would later instigate resistance by the emerging women- and gay rights movement were part and parcel of that unique version.

Repercussions of the encounter of European émigré analysts and institutionalized American psychoanalysis with the specific, pragmatized (and streamlined) version of Freudian theory that made it into the institutional mainstream also figure in divergent trends. Two particular developments illustrate the convergences and complications instructively: neo-Freudianism, or Freudian revisionism, as it was called by its critics (Marcuse 1955), and ego psychology. Both deserve attention because they explain the concomitance of multifaceted/diverging developments and the emergence of a general theoretical thrust in psychoanalysis’s American career. Questioning Freudian theory’s “libidinal foundation,” in some cases to the extent of completely disposing of drive theory, becomes a common denominator in otherwise diverging trends. Especially the neo-Freudians, diverging from, and challenging orthodox Freudian theory, and American mainstream institutions at the same time, move into focus. In Herzog’s work the orthodox Freudian accusation of psychoanalysis’s desexualization by neo-Freudians – leveled against neo-Freudians, or revisionists by American mainstream institutions (APsaA) and radical approaches, such as Adorno’s, Marcuse’s, and Brown’s alike – is identified as a misunderstanding in the historiography of neo-Freudianism. However, the relativization of drive theory becomes the defining characteristic of the (conservative) psychoanalytic mainstream, and neo-Freudianism is (unintentionally) complicit in its fabrication. Hence, in the relation of psychoanalysis, US sociology and Critical Theory, neo-Freudianism becomes the lynchpin of diverging ideas of emancipation.

The Neo-Freudians

Karen Horney and Erich Fromm are probably the most prominent figures of neo-Freudianism, followed by Clara Thompson and Harry Stack Sullivan. With Horney and Fromm coming from Europe and Thompson and Sullivan from the US, the group, by no means representing

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The term neo-Freudians has become a common signifier for psychoanalysts diverging from Freudian instinct theory that pervades the literature on psychoanalysis, its history, and developments. In the US context, it is most commonly used to label the dissident analysts connected to the New York American Institute of Psychoanalysis, of which the most prominent figures are Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Clara Thompson (Friedman:76f; Hale 1995:47f; Herzog 2017:22f; Zaretzky 2004:209f; Strean 1966:279). Some accounts, such as Strean’s, include Alfred Adler as a founding figure (Strean 1966:279).
anything close to a psychoanalytic mainstream, exemplifies the encounter of émigré analysts and American scholars as Jahoda describes it. While still connected with the oldest psychoanalytic organization in the US, the New York Psychoanalytic Society, Horney and Thompson, as well as Fromm, who at the time was still on the Institute’s payroll, joined Sullivan’s Zodiac group during the 30s (Friedman 2013:76f). The group functioned as a platform for discussing new ideas and exchange dissatisfactions among analysts. However, it was also open to, and frequented by, prominent anthropologists, such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead (Ibid.:76-77). It propelled an exchange between analysts and social scientists that resonates in the reinterpretations of Freudian theory perpetuated by its members. Fromm, who was both an analyst and a sociologist, impersonates the overlapping of disciplinary fields quite illustratively. The most prominent common denominator was their rejection of Freudian drive theory, and their insistence on shifting the focus from internal drives towards the social environment as an eventual motivational source, all of which led to the conceptualization of the social character model. Among the most influential publications coming from members of the Zodiac group, which define the general thrust of neo-Freudianism, are Karen Horney’s The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937), New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom (1941), and Harry Stack Sullivan’s Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (1945). They had considerable impact on the social sciences as well as on psychology.

39 Both had connections to Karl Abraham’s Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut in the 1920s, Horney as teaching analyst and Fromm as trainee. Horney had also been a student and follower of Wilhelm Reich in Vienna (Zaretsky 2015:55,96). Reich, in turn, was influential in the IfS’s early years; Zaretsky identifies his work on the “mass psychology of fascism” as pioneering the “version of political Freudianism” which sought to “combine Marx with Freud” (Ibid.). Reich’s work deeply impacted the neo-Freudians, according to Zaretsky, he presented a radical adaptation of Freudian theory with practical ambitions: “Terming matriarchy the familial system of ‘natural society,’ Reich praised ‘the natural self-regulation of sexuality that it entails.’ By contrast, the creation of patriarchy, private property and the state constituted the Ur-repression from which all neuroses flowed. Working in ‘Red Vienna’ with its working-class schools, libraries, community centers, and apartment blocks […], all aimed at creating neue Menschen, Reich urged the politicization of analysis, he called for the sexual liberation of youth and women” (Zaretsky 2015:96).

40 Herzog states that “Horney was positively received across the social sciences, as American sociologists too celebrated her as ‘an outstanding psychoanalyst’ embracing her work as ‘mark[ing] an important step in the highly significant process of freeing psychoanalytic theory and practice from it outmoded formulations [especially appreciated were her insights that ‘neuroses are disturbances in social relations’ and ‘the libido theory in all its contentions is unsubstantiated’) and announcing that, ‘for years to come, it will probably serve as a standard guide to the newer, more sociological, more realistic Freudianism’” (2017:31, quoted after: reviews of Horney’s books in AJS 44.6 (may 1939) and ASR 4,6 (December 1939).

41 A further conceptual explication of the way the neo-Freudians diverged from orthodox Freudian drive theory exceeds the framework of this chapter. The discussion of Erich Fromm’s breach with the Institute, part of Chapter III, addresses major shifts characteristic of the Neo-Freudian approach; social character is the key concept with regard to my research interest. It results from the neo-Freudian turn, its conceptual specificities in relation to Freud’s original concepts emerges in the discussion of its adoptions and criticisms in the following chapters on the specific use of psychoanalytic concepts in American sociological theories.
Hale’s account traces the tensions between the APsaA and “smaller independent training organizations” such as the neo-Freudians’ (1995:42f). In 1941 they were responsible for the first schism in institutionalized US psychoanalysis, which occurred after Horney was disqualified as an instructor at the New York Psychoanalytic Society (Horney Eckardt 1978:144). Subsequently, Horney, Thompson and a number of other analysts left the organization and founded the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis. A major accusation leveled against the New York Society in their letters of resignation was that the “society has become a hotbed of political intrigue; [that] religious fervor has replaced free inquiry and dogma has firmly established itself under the guise of science” (Horney et al. 1941, after Horney Eckardt 1978:145). Herzog’s account of the “libido wars” provides a further contextualization of the general debate and complicates Horney’s and Thompson’s railing against the APsaA’s “religious fervor” – since organized religion was about to push mainstream analysis towards questioning the radically erotic fundament of orthodox analysis.

The dissociation, they argued, became necessary in the interest of “the scientific advancement of psychoanalysis, in keeping with the courageous spirit of its founder” (Ibid.). The New York Society’s ‘false’ scientism was challenged on the grounds of scientific progress. The disputes revolved around the legitimacy of the major revisions of Freudian theory the neo-Freudians were implementing. The common denominator of both factions, however, is apparent in framing the respective position in terms of scientficity. Despite their divergence, the neo-Freudians were in as much entangled in the professionalization and further rationalization of the discipline as the established institutions. The disagreements, breaches, and schisms – what Bourdieu would claim to be characteristic of a scientific field – reaffirm its boundaries by way of determining the specific expression of scientific authority voiced by the institutional organs. By founding their own organization, the neo-Freudians did not achieve a position of authority in the field, in contrast to the mainstream institutions. However, according to Herzog, they did in the long run come out on top against orthodox Freudian adherents of drive theory. Herzog points out that more contemporary approaches, such as “relational psychoanalysis,” which orients itself towards Sullivan’s work, rather pick up on neo-Freudian paradigms than on orthodox ones (2017:52-53).

Horney, Thompson, Benedict, Mead and inspired by them Sullivan and Fromm, pronouncedly criticized Freud’s naturalization of the patriarchal family model and psychoanalysis’s inherent misogynic thrust. Friedman points out that
Under the guise of a modernist project that underscored the efficacy of libidinal release, Mead, Benedict, and others in the group criticized the traditional interpretation for justifying patriarchy and the subordination of women. As the Mead group became intertwined with the neo-Freudian psychoanalysts, Fromm, Sullivan, Kardiner, and Sapir became more feminist than they might otherwise have been. (2013:92)

The feminist revision of Freudian theory is formulated as a concrete emancipatory project and resonated widely via the later popularity of some of its protagonists (Horney and Fromm most importantly). The 1975 anthology *Women & Analysis* presents a collection of feminist analytical authors. It prominently features Horney, Mead, and Thompson as representatives of the neo-Freudian generation, and also next generation feminists, such as Juliet Mitchell, whose *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1974) has become a milestone in the attempt to reclaim Freud despite the inherent naturalization of patriarchal structures. In her contribution to the volume, Mead suggests that

Freud opened up a whole new way of understanding ourselves, our development through history, our behavior today. [...] The path he outlined, although in his discussion of the psychology of women he was completely culture-bound, still suggests that the rhythms of human development, patterned during a million years, are ignored at our peril, and understood give us wisdom. (1975:127)

Mead’s conclusion resonates with the volume’s general insistence on psychoanalysis’s specific validity for a feminist critique of patriarchy. Mead picks up on a central question posed in Horney’s text, which dates back to 1926: “[H]ow far has the evolution of women, as depicted to us today by analysis, been measured by masculine standards and how far therefore does this picture fail to represent quite accurately the real nature of women?” (1975 [1926]:202). Mitchell, in response to the older generations of psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic feminists, picks up the thread of Horney, Mead (and Thompson), but twists it in another direction. She asks: “if we live in a patriarchal society in which, from whatever your political standpoint, the sexes are treated at least differently, not to say “unequally”, then is it not highly unlikely that the psychological development of the sexes should be one of parity?” (1975:43) This question leads her to defend Freud’s account exactly because it reflects the socio-historically derived relations of domination, and because it therefore can help to illuminate, and eventually to truly transcend them. Altogether, the volume demonstrates how neo-Freudianism became a crucial reference for ongoing, explicitly emancipatory debates.42

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42 Mitchell’s approach is an example of a radical approach to psychoanalysis that helped to secure its institutional survival, however marginal, in sociological niches after the golden age. Another interesting
The brief excursion into feminist psychoanalytic trajectories further highlights that their secession in the early 40s diversified the field. However, it simultaneously strengthened the mainstream, not least because of the common claim on embodying (true) scientific progress. The actual power distribution within the institutions became quite visible in the events and debates leading to the exclusion of lay-analysts in the 40s and 50s.\textsuperscript{43} These discussions were prompted by the APsaA and aimed at delegitimizing lay analysis; they constituted concrete measures in the struggle for scientific authority and relegated neo-Freudianism clearly to the lower end of the power curve in terms of established scientific authority. Nevertheless, neo-Freudianism proved capable of exercising authority in its own right. Herzog ascribes a central role to social/civil rights movements in bringing psychoanalysis’s “golden age” to an end. The neo-Freudians provided some of the vocabulary for the formulation of their criticism towards mainstream analysis. Neo-Freudianism, it follows, came to serve a double function in the rise of psychoanalysis in America: On the one hand, it preserved emancipatory potential by denouncing the reactionary implications of orthodox dogmatism, which are most prominent in the misogynist and homophobic therapeutic practices of concrete analysts and institutions.\textsuperscript{44} On the other hand, it was complicit in propelling the grander trend in American psychoanalysis adaptations, which characterizes the (instrumental) rationalization and scientification process by a considerable revision of Freudian drive theory (and therefore getting rid of fundamental contradictions which remained irresolvable in orthodox Freudian theory). Both of these functions served to bring psychoanalysis’s golden age to an end in different ways: The rationalization process eventually questioned psychoanalysis’s effectiveness in the name of scientific measurability. Hale stresses this development as the connection which emphasizes the relative proximity of ‘radical’ circles at the time was made in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, when the editors published Margaret Mead’s article On the Institutionalized role of Women and Character Formation in 1936.

\textsuperscript{43} Fromm himself was banned from practicing psychoanalysis in 1942 by the APSAA, because he did not hold a medical degree.

\textsuperscript{44} Herzog provides a detailed and insightful discussion of the changes within the analytical “community” resulting from the impact of the gay rights movement, which is most pronounced in the APA’s move to cancel homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) list in 1974 (2017:72). Homophobic analysts attempted to re-theorize the causes of homosexuality instead of disposing of the disease-mongering conceptualization altogether. They kept trying to localize disruptions/distortions in the course of psychosexual development, eventually causing homosexuality (Ibid.:74ff). In addition to the pervasiveness of “scientific” homophobia at work, these attempts demonstrate how problematic it is to understand Freud’s model of psychosexual development as a universalizable ideal of normal sexual development. Marcuse’s fairly early critique of Freud’s reality principle – under the impact of which genital sexuality between male and female is produced – as representing a historically and socially specific societal order, the constitutional categories of which are reproduced in the process of individual socialization, helps to shed light on the complete ahistorical reification of the concepts these analysts were working with. It highlights the implicit affirmation of the existing social- and in this case, sexual order (this is, however, not pronounced by Marcuse).
main reason for psychoanalysis’s eventual disappearance (1995:302,383) – the social movements, drawing from the criticism leveled against mainstream analysts, became concrete actors in the process of attacking psychoanalysis as reactionary. The criticism of neo-Freudian “revisionism,” voiced by Adorno and Marcuse, further illuminates the dialectics of emancipatory thrust and concrete power struggle for societal and disciplinary positions endowed with the symbolic currency of scientific authority that characterizes neo-Freudianism’s double function. Herzog suggests that Adorno’s and Marcuse’s rejection of neo-Freudianism and their pronounced critique of the disposal of drive theory were complicit in perpetuating the misunderstanding pervasive in the historiography of psychoanalysis. This historiography identifies the neo-Freudians as the eventual source of the desexualization of psychoanalysis as it became (known as) characteristic of its American career. Herzog especially defends Horney against these accusations by pointing out that Horney, despite revising drive theory, still “extensively theorized both sexuality itself and the relationships between sexual and other realms of existence in ways that were far ahead of her time” (2017:36). The “main impetus for the neutralization in post-war America of whatever sex-radical potential had once existed in psychoanalysis was a battle over whether Freud could be reconciled with Christianity” (Ibid.) instead of resulting from neo-Freudian revisionism. Herzog’s defense of Horney makes a lot of sense in the context of the discipline’s history as it has been written since. With regard to the role of Adorno and Marcuse in the writing of that history, however, her account suffers from a misunderstanding itself. Their critique of neo-Freudianism is part of, and especially starts as, a debate within the circles of critical theoreticians. Neither Fromm, nor Horney are identified as concrete representatives of the psychoanalytic mainstream. The critique rather identifies tendencies in Horney and Fromm which anticipate the de-radicalization/politicization of psychoanalysis as it manifested itself in the later evolvement of mainstream analysis and American ego psychology. It is developed on the foundation of an insistence on drive theory that is itself conceived against the objectifications of Freudian orthodoxy (and therefore the orthodox mainstream): a dialectical extrapolation of psychoanalysis’s fundamental categories.45

The irony of neo-Freudianism’s double function lies with the fact that the disposal of drive theory became an essential component of the symbolic currency in the field of American psychology. Radical notions of emancipation insisting on drive theory’s importance challenge this particular aspect of neo-Freudianism, without necessarily denying the simultaneous

45 The argumentative foundation of Adorno’s and Marcuse’s criticism will be explicated in Chapter III.
concrete emancipatory potentialities. When looking at the role of neo-Freudianism from a perspective that is interested in the relation of Critical Theory and US sociology via psychoanalysis, the neo-Freudian Freud adoption magnifies psychoanalysis’s ambiguity in the service of the present, because it propels concrete emancipatory potential at the same time as it works towards resolving the fundamental tension between individual and society that is preserved in drive theory. I have so far chiefly addressed the (instrumental) rationalization process, the sediments of which coalesce in the ‘streamlined’ version of psychoanalysis, as a struggle for scientific authority within the disciplinary field; it depends, however, on broader structuring forces. The dynamics of the US war effort, voiced by the US state as concrete demands towards the sciences of psychology (and sociology), actively propelled psychoanalysis to the position it found itself in at the beginning of the ‘golden age.’

Psychoanalysis and (World) War (II)

A striking indicator of how psychoanalysis had already impacted institutional America by the early 40s is the increased employment of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts (both, since it was not likely to be the latter without being the former) in the examination of men applying for military service (Hale 1995:187f). The ambiguity of psychoanalysis becomes manifest in the state’s employment of analysts, that is, in the application of psychoanalytic knowledge in service of determining psychological fitness for war. As a result of the state’s new precautionary measures “[b]etween 1942 and 1945 psychiatrists rejected 1,875,00 men for military service, 12 percent of the fifteen million men examined” (Ibid.:188). The lessons from WWI had been learned. World War I had impacted psychoanalysis to a considerable extent: Freud’s treatment of traumatized soldiers eventually led him to the major revision of his instinct theory with the introduction of the death instinct (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1921). By the time of America’s entry into World War II, the fully established discipline had become a valuable resource on several levels.

Psychoanalysts became part of training programs for military psychiatrists. Dissidents and mainstream analysts alike were working for the state department. Neo-Freudian Harry Stack Sullivan was among them, expressing his certainty that psychoanalysis could help to “predict those likely to become neuropsychiatric casualties” (Hale 1995:188). In the course of the war,
psychoanalysis’s impact on the Army’s conceptualization of psychological disease increased steadily. According to Hale, “a high point in the influence of Freud and psychoanalysis” was represented by “the Army’s new psychiatric terminology, adopted August 19, 1945” (Ibid.:200). The new terminology was chiefly introduced by William Menninger and reflected a major shift in the understanding of mental illness. Old categories, such as the “psychopathic personality” were dropped in favor of more differentiated ones, understanding patients (at least broadly) in the context of their childhood experiences, and social surroundings (Ibid.:200-201). Rationalized Freudian concepts of group psychology were put to use in order to emphasize “the importance of morale, of identification with the military unit as vital to preserving the strength and intactness of the soldier’s ego” and informed many of the new treatments of traumatized soldiers (Ibid.:195). The mutual impact of the state’s war effort and psychoanalysis’s conceptualizations of the human psyche can hardly be underestimated. The instrumental rationalization of psychoanalytic concepts towards the end of increasing the war-state’s effectiveness worked, of course, against (even) the individual emancipatory thrust inscribed in (orthodox) Freudian theory and practice. The individual became a mere appendix of the state as a concrete embodiment of a reality principle that employed psychoanalysis in the service of rationally calculating individual destructive potentialities. Not only did psychoanalysis influence the treatment of already traumatized soldiers; it was also employed to improve the military’s effectiveness by preventing ‘unstable’ individuals from entering the war. In the production of a psychoanalytic golden age in the US, the influx of European émigré analysts is one aspect; another one is psychoanalysis’s infusion with religious cultural demands as Herzog describes it; the war effort is the third. All three are, of course interrelated. Karl and William Menninger, key figures in the APsaA (both were presidents of the organization at different times and conceptual innovators) exemplify the double streamlining function that institutionalized analysis, in its relation to organized religion and the war-state, came to serve. In the debate surrounding organized religion, Karl and William Menninger stressed “the congruence of analysis with faith” (Herzog 2017:45) as a response to its condemnation as anti-religious. At the same time William Menninger played a key role in “persuading the Army to focus its psychiatric efforts on rehabilitation rather than diagnosis and discharge” (Ibid.). Getting the Army involved with psychoanalysis (and vice versa) resulted in increased funding and attention, which was secured even beyond the end of the actual war-effort in 1945 under the paradigm of trauma rehabilitation. Simultaneously, psychoanalysis was directed towards ever more effective treatments of (war) trauma. It was thus bound to lose critical potential in the name of treatment rationalization. Finally, the
involvement of psychoanalysis with the Army propelled the cultural adaption of the discipline towards the American religious mainstream (which, of course is essentially ad odds with Freud’s analysis of the cultural function of religion as it is most spelled out in Die Zukunft einer Illusion (1927). Ego psychology is among the most prominent manifestations preserving the three aspects of rationalization and instrumental directedness described above.

**Rationalized Analysis: Ego Psychology and Conservatism**

The most prominent name associated with ego psychology is probably that of Freud’s daughter, Anna Freud. Zaretsky ascribes her 1937 essay Ego Psychology and the Mechanisms of Defense the status of a foundational text (2004:181). Ego psychology’s general thrust, and its major divergence from Sigmund Freud’s original theory, is embodied in the shift from the Id as the (sole) source of energy and motivation towards the ego. The “core idea” behind this was “that the ego was two-sided: simultaneously an agent of rational self-reflection and the locus of the resistance to self-reflection” (Ibid.:278). Ego psychology heavily influenced the American psychoanalytic landscape where, in the process of popularization, “the ego increasingly appeared as the agent of reason and control” while its simultaneous function as the “locus of resistance” was lost (Ibid.). Émigré analyst Heinz Hartman’s contributions to ego psychology were crucial in this shift: “Claiming that the earlier generation of analysts had overemphasized the power of the drives, he hoped to turn psychoanalysis into a general psychology that could explain such functions as thinking, memory, and perception” (Ibid.). Hartman’s “main theme was the “strength” of the ego, its ability to adapt and thereby master the external world” (Ibid.). Instead of arising out of the Id in response to the demands of the reality principle – as Freud had put it – the ego was conceptualized as a product of differentiation. The presupposition for this differentiation was not the Id: “Strictly speaking, there is no ego before the differentiation of ego and Id, but there is no Id either, since both are products of differentiation” (Hartman 1958 [1939]:12). The Id, as the original ontogenetic entity, containing drive energy, was dropped in favor of an “undifferentiated Matrix” which already contained “inborn ego apparatuses, such as perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking, language, […], productivity” (Blanck and Blanck 1974:28).

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46 Distinctive European developments of ego (centered) psychoanalysis at the time were Melanie Klein’s Object-Relations approach in Britain, Jacques Lacan’s Mirror Stage in France; and Sandor Ferenczi’s theory of passive object love in Hungary (Zaretsky 2004:181f).
Hartman’s innovations echoed the neo-Freudian revision of drive theory and Karl and William Menninger’s backpedaling in face of organized religion. Ego psychology constituted a sociologized and, in contrast to neo-Freudianism, truly desexualized version of psychoanalysis that fitted the demands and developments in the established American institutions quite well.

European émigré scholars like Hartman and American analysts conjointly established an “ego psychology rooted in the attempt to make psychoanalysis scientific” in post-war America. It “coincided with a more conservative social and political temper in America” (Hale 1995:213). Heavily drawing from Freud, but disposing of his most polarizing aspect – the prevalence of the drives – ego psychology evolved into a streamlined, rationalized psychology of the reasonable ego, proposing a “maturity ethic” that came to represent the “public face” of the post-war era (Zaretsky 2015:30). Ego psychology became the psychoanalytic articulation of the conformist and reactionary cultural climate of the 1950s in the US. Zaretsky states:

Ego psychology and the maturity ethic [...] were integral to what has been called the “administered society” of postwar America, infusing the work of school psychologists, guidance counselors, urban planners, medical doctors, therapists, juvenile court justices, and religious counselors. The maturity ethic stresses the strength and adaptability of the ego in the practical world, while also maintaining that the deeper experiences of life were to be found in the private realm. (Ibid.:149)

Psychoanalysis had made its way into American public life and represented values easily adopted by the conservative mainstream, such as “maturity,” “responsibility” and “adulthood” (Ibid.). This “new ethic” was “simultaneously shaped by, and in turn shaping, psychoanalysis” (2004:285). Zaretsky evokes émigré scholar Erik H. Erikson as another protagonist representing psychoanalysis’ development towards ego psychology. Erikson described the mature personality as “tolerant of differences, cautious and methodical in evaluation, just in judgment, circumspect in action, and [...] capable of faith and indignation” (quoted after Zaretsky 2004:185), without however representing the conservative mainstream. Not holding a medical degree, Erikson was, similar to neo-Freudians like Fromm, among the analysts “discredited by their lack of medical credentials” in the wake of the scientification campaign of the early 1940s. In the mid-1950s, Erikson developed the concepts of “identity” and “identity crises” which would become crucial for efforts to theorize recognition in relation to discrimination experiences (Ibid.:311). Erikson inhabits a special place in the development of ego psychology, because the concept of identity helped to theoretically frame
concrete issues in emancipatory struggles by conceptualizing misrecognition as the cause of grave psychological distress. While Erikson himself had “scant influence on mainstream analysis [...] the move in the direction of intersubjectivity also unfolded in more orthodox quarters” and led to the replacing of “the word “ego” by the word “self”” in Freud’s original writings on narcissism (Ibid.:311-312).

**Ascendance and Golden Age**

The rapid professionalization of the field, with its internal differences and rifts – exemplified by the neo-Freudians’ secession and Erikson’s double position as critical innovator and streamliner – and the increased entanglement with state affairs fostered by the war effort, established psychoanalysis as a new (conservative) force in American psychology and the American public. In 1946, Karl Menninger, at that time president of the APsaA, proposed expanded membership policies in order to further the inclusion of physicians who applied Freudian concepts, but did not provide orthodox therapy (Hale 1995:212). Menninger’s move reflects the increased interest in Freudian concepts, and, at the same time, it stresses the strong ties to the medical profession, as the APsaA had proposed it all along. The conservatism inscribed in the Scientification paradigm, propelled by Herzog’s “libido wars,” further came to the fore when, in the 1950s, a new challenge to psychoanalysis reared its head with Alfred Kinsey’s sexology. According to Herzog, “[p]sychoanalysts were wholly unprepared for being outflanked by new competition. In their testy antagonism to Kinsey, US psychoanalysts solidified the misogynist and homophobic views for which they have become so justly notorious” (2017:55). Homophobic and misogynist interpretations of psychoanalysis, steeped in the maturity ethic that expressed itself as an insistence on family values, characterized the work of mainstream analysts in the 1950s.47

At the same time, the 1950s saw the appearance of a variety of psychoanalytic publications challenging the conservative mainstream. Horney’s and Fromm’s works were already well established as marginal, but nonetheless influential positions. They were complemented by

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47 Herzog holds that “Nowhere was the homophobia as strong as in the post-war USA. In the early post-war years, the dramatically rapid spread of psychoanalytic ideas into the American mainstream via the mass media and popular advice books was marked by an ever more firmly consolidated consensus among analysts that homosexuality was by definition abnormal. It was almost as though it was the one thing that otherwise feuding analysts could agree on” (2017:62).
the Institute’s and the American Jewish Congress (AJC) conjoint Studies in Prejudices series (1950) and by the more explicitly radical Freud adoptions of Wilhelm Reich’s simplified ‘orgiastic’ radicalism. Herbert Marcuse’s and Norman Oliver Brown’s radical philosophical explications of Freudian theory and the works of Geza Roheim and Paul Goodman also appeared in the 1950s. All of these approaches and theories set out to put psychoanalytic concepts to work in the service of a critique of the societal status quo. In a 1972 study, Richard King suggests that “[a]fter World War II Freudian terminology became the common coin of the intellectual realm” (King 1972:44) and that Freud, to some extent, substituted Marx among radical intellectuals. King’s suggestion addresses a general tendency that only strengthens the validity of the “golden age” narrative. It holds true for a number of “New York Intellectuals” who re-oriented themselves during the post-war era and increasingly discovered Freud, such as Lionel Trilling (Ibid.:46). However, for a number of radical approaches Marxian theory did still play an important role because the concept of alienation provided a general framework directing the adoption of Freudian concepts towards a fundamental critique of society. In his 1969 publication The Freudian Left, sociologist Paul Robinson identifies Reich, Marcuse, and Roheim as the most prominent representatives of these efforts. His discussion sets out to clarify the question if “Freud’s theoretical achievement im[plies] a revolutionary or a reactionary attitude toward the human situation” and identifies their “sexual radicalism” as the common theoretical denominator (Ibid.:4).

Interestingly enough, it was not mainstream analysis, but Fromm who became the negative foil for radicalism, labeled a “rabid sexual conservative” in this account(Ibid.:5). The specifics characterizing some of the radical Freud adoptions will be addressed in the discussion of Critical Theory in Chapter III. For the purposes of this chapter it suffices to emphasize that, at least to the narrative perpetuated by Robinson and King, the radicalism was implicated with an insistence on the emancipatory potential of drive theory against neo-Freudianism, ego psychology, and (less explicitly but inherently definitely so) mainstream analysis and a variety of their sociological and cultural resonances. Generally, the coinciding

48 Robinson’s juxtaposition of Fromm and the ‘radicals’ draws from a public debate between Fromm and Marcuse in the radical journal Dissent in 1955/56, which will be addressed in more detail in the second chapter. The juxtaposition illuminates the debate as an important event in American intellectual history. It marks the moment when Fromm lost credibility among radical intellectuals (Friedman 2013:197). Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, editors of Dissent at the time of the debate, had been in contact with the Frankfurt scholars in the 40s. They lost interest in Fromm’s writings after the debate and radical intellectuals regarded Marcuse as the “winner” (Ibid.). Marcuse’s critique was henceforth applied to Fromm’s work. The debate contributed considerably to the fact that Fromm was ‘forgotten’ as a critical theorist. At the same time, the publication and vast success of The Art of Loving (1956) in the same year marks the moment of Fromm’s greatest influence on the American public. While ascending to prominence as an author of popularized psychoanalytic criticism, he was simultaneously ousted from critical intellectual circles.
of conservative mainstreaming and the emergence of radical approaches only demonstrates what the golden age narrative implies: psychoanalysis resonated in every societal sphere, however, with quite different undertones.

Both conservative mainstreaming and radical trajectories gained momentum in the 50s, while the APsaA was clearly dominant. However, despite the organization’s strong resistance, lay-analysis increased in the 50s, resulting in an ever more rigorous insistence on the strong ties between psychoanalysis, medicine, and psychiatry on part of the APsaA. In 1954, a joint “declaration against lay practitioners” was issued by the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychoanalytic Association (Hale 1995:215). APsaA president Ives Hendrick (1953-1955) even “suggested that American psychoanalysis was in fact superior because medical background conferred on American analysts, as it had on Freud, a better understanding of patients, particularly of the emotional components of medical problems” (Ibid.:214). The remnants of Freud’s drive theory that were still pervasive in mainstream analysis picked up Freud’s original biologism instead of rejecting it. This served as the foundation upon which scientism, homophobic and misogynistic tendencies merged into a streamlined version that was put forth by the organization, its adherents, and allies among the other American organizations, such as APA₁, APA₂.

The 50s saw psychoanalysis defending the uncritical reification of American democracy as the epitome of freedom and plurality, based in conservative values of family life, mass consumption, scientism and professionalization, against dissidents, deviant groups and individuals. Therapy was implicated with and actively propelling conformity. Russell Jacoby suggests in his retrospective analysis The Repression of Psychoanalysis (1983) that the extent of analysis’s implication in propelling conformity eventually inflicted irreversible damage on the substance of Freudian thought as it had progressed in America (1985 [1983]:191). Scientific authority in the field was claimed, won, and defended by a scientism that is to be contextualized in broader developments of professionalization, instrumental rationalization, impacted by the war-effort, the consumption revolution⁴⁹, WWII, and the Cold War (Ibid.:177). The general impact of the cold war on analysis crystallized in McCarthyism’s targeting of individual analysts and intellectuals. A number of scholars, émigré and American, shifted into the House Un-American Activities Committee’s (HUAC) focus. They were

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⁴⁹ Kenenth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (1958) pinpoints this development in its theoretical aspirations.
subjected to its inquiry techniques and the general “demand that individuals betray their conscience and their friends” which was, according to Zaretsky where “[f]or most” lay “the agony of McCarthyism” (2004:284). The atmosphere of suspicion and (at times) willful cooperation with government agencies characterizing McCarthyism pervaded American analysis to an extent that “even liberal analysts acquiesced” (Zaretsky 2004:291) in it and “[s]ome analysts urged their patients to cooperate in the HUAC ad McCarthy hearings” (Ibid.:292). Erik Erikson was affected by this atmosphere already in 1949 while employed at Berkley’s psychological department which was led by R. Nevitt Sanford and Edward Tolman Sanford and Tolman were, according to Erikson biographer Lawrence Friedman (1999), among the main protagonists protesting the University’s pre-emptive anti-communist policy which required teaching staff to provide a “loyalty oath” (Ibid.:246). Friedman holds that as an employee of this particular department “Erikson was […] at the eye of the storm” (Ibid.). This caused a troublesome process of weighing the felt necessity to exhibit his respect for his new home country by giving the oath against the conviction that it was at odds with the American constitution (Ibid.:247-48). Erikson eventually “refused to sign” and provided a testimony before the university’s Committee on Privilege and Tenure, later published in Psychiatry (1951) that explained his reasons (Ibid.). Erikson is but one example of a number of people, such as Sanford, Tolman, and Marcuse, subjected to similar processes. Friedman emphasizes Erikson’s reluctance to criticize the US in comparison to Marcuse, and implies that in the end Erikson might have signed a form of contract that included the loyalty oath he had publicly opposed before (Ibid.:248;250). Friedman’s account questions Erikson’s depiction as an astute opponent of the red-scare as contemporaries like Karl Menninger and David Riesman perpetuated it (Ibid.:251). It is exactly the insecurity and ambivalence characterizing Erikson’s negotiation of the demands of McCarthyism which illustrate the above described atmosphere quite instructively. The general thrust of conservative streamlined analysis resonated well with a conformist socio-political atmosphere that led a high number of intellectuals to at least publicly disavow any affiliations and sympathies with and for communism.
Decline

The rigid professionalization partly led to psychoanalysis’s demise in the 60s. While sociologist Peter L. Berger was able to state in 1965 that psychoanalysis had become a “cultural phenomenon” (28) in the US and that it had trickled down into different spheres of everyday life, its medical career began to crumble. Clinical psychoanalysis declined rapidly from 1965-85. Hale attributes the downward spiral chiefly to increasing demands for effectiveness and concrete results, because the effectiveness of psychoanalysis was difficult to prove, while the therapeutic process was extremely long (1995:302). The 60s saw an upsurge of somatic approaches aiming to treat psychological problems with new medication, targeting bodily procedures as eventual sources. In an ironic twist, the main argument leveled against psychoanalysis by both behaviorists and a new generation of clinical psychologists and therapists was that it was “unscientific” and useless therapy and theory” (Ibid.).

Professionalization in the name of scientification constituted a major motif in the history of psychoanalysis in the US. The process of professionalization appears, through a Weberian lens, as a rationalizing one, which is, in Critical Theory ascribed a normative direction by the introducing the notion of instrumental reason. Rationalization appears directed towards competitiveness and effectiveness. The instrumental dimension becomes the structural force, the historical movens propelling psychoanalysis as a medical discipline (to which the development of theory is crucial but secondary) into a direction that would eventually lead to its decline. The applied scientism eventually fell prey to its own logic: the difficulty to prove its effectiveness in face of emerging somatic approaches, rapidly producing concrete results, psychoanalysis eventually appeared unscientific and outdated. The struggle over scientific authority is eventually won by those agents (individual and institutional) proving to be most effective in their application of methods. Both in contrast and in addition to Hale, Herzog stresses the dimension of concrete domination engrained in societal power structures perpetuating misogynist, and homophobic tendencies. Through this lens, psychoanalysis’s decline is also the outcome of emancipatory struggles within and against the established institutions:
The “golden age” of American psychoanalysis [...] was about to be brought to an end by the combined impact of the feminist and gay rights movement with their numerous, highly valid complaints about the misogyny and homophobia endemic in post-war analysis; the rise of shorter-term and more behaviorally oriented therapies, but above all the explosion of pop self-help, much of which would expressly style itself in opposition to the expense and purported futility of years on the couch; and the antiauthoritarian climate in general. (2017:5)

With the “explosion of pop self-help” Herzog addresses a third dimension implicated with psychoanalysis’s decline. The dynamics propelling self-help to the fore, often voiced in an explicitly emancipatory tone and positing a do-it-yourself attitude against the lengthy and supposedly authoritarian therapeutic process, reflect the instrumental dimension in the rationalization process. This instrumentality becomes especially obvious in the shirtsleeved insistence on the resolvability of psychological issues, which easily translates into a claim on higher effectiveness. Railing – with reference to neo-Freudianism – against drive theory as the epitome of reactionary tendencies in mainstream analysis, the emancipatory movements, while engaged in a concrete struggle for social emancipation, at the same time perpetuated a logic that further diminished the radical insistences on drive theory. Herzog complicates the narrative of the history of psychoanalysis in the US by shedding light on the dialectical interrelatedness of disciplinary and societal struggles over scientific, and cultural, authority and struggles against concrete discrimination. The history of African American psychoanalysis adaptations and their concrete political element only emphasizes this dimension. The ambiguous legacy of psychoanalysis emerges in light of an almost ubiquitous instrumentality – emancipation is always already inscribed with the tendency to bring forth, or make way for, new forms of domination.
Chapter II: Post-War Sociology

In this chapter, my general objective is to address what sociologists George Cavalletto and Catherine Silver identify as The Opening/Closing of the Sociological Mind to Psychoanalysis (2014) in their same-titled study. In the first part of the chapter, I trace processes and illuminate dynamics in US sociology which move the disciplinary field from what is commonly identified as a ‘sociological mainstream’ in the 1950s to a diversified disciplinary landscape by the early 1970s. I look at US sociology as a disciplinary field and aim to develop a concise notion of a sociological mainstream. In the second part, I identify junctures and convergences between the sociological and the psychoanalytic fields in order to explore the temporary convergence of the two disciplinary trajectories and their limitations. The chapter is, just as Chapter I, oriented towards Bourdieu’s field analysis as a structuring methodology that helps to carve out the dialectics of emancipation and instrumental rationalization.

The history of US sociology as a disciplinary field differs from the history of American psychoanalysis in one crucial aspect: US sociology has developed a narrative about itself as a proper American academic tradition. The story of American psychoanalysis is necessarily one of a transfer of knowledge; psychoanalysis traveled across the Atlantic and made its way into American academic and medical life, and as Berger suggested, eventually also into American culture. The body of knowledge (theoretical and practical) went through a process of adaptation/transformation. The first chapter addresses the dynamics inherent to the process in terms of professionalization, scientification and instrumental rationalization. Psychoanalysis, having evolved into American ego psychology, lost its depth dimension and became a practical tool, working in the service of social control, until it was made redundant by renewed definitions of scientist standards. For US sociology the story is more complicated. There are, however, a number of parallels and similarities to the streamlining process in the psychological field, which temporarily became a psychoanalytic field. In Bourdieu’s terms, US sociology evolved from an unsettled field into a fully institutionalized, settled field in the post-war era (Steinmetz 2007). Some of the major paradigms that emerged in that process, and that characterized the scientific authority claimed by its major protagonists (individual and institutional), resemble those pervading the psychoanalytic field almost completely. The field of sociology was, just as psychoanalysis, subject to a process of professionalization
oriented towards scientification. This became manifest in scientistic research paradigms, which, in turn, where implicated with concrete exclusions.

**Professionalization and ‘Mainstream’**

My research interest concerns the already settled field as it appears in the post-war era. The question and problematic of identifying a mainstream is among the key issues addressed in this chapter. The majority of historical accounts concerned with American post-war sociology agree on the pervasiveness of dominating paradigms within the field in the 1940s and 50s, which allows for the notion of an identifiable “mainstream” (Cavalletto and Silver 2014; Gouldner 1971; McAdam 2007; Mills 1959; Steinmetz 2007; Wallerstein 2007). In his elaborations on disciplinary struggles in the American field post-WWII, Bourdieu identifies what he, in reference of the Roman deities Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, polemically calls the “Capitoline triad” of Talcott Parsons, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Robert K. Merton as the dominant scientific authorities at the time (1975:38; 1991:378). Parsons, Merton and Lazarsfeld are identified as individual representatives of the mainstream. The institutions shifting into focus, accordingly, are Harvard (Parsons) and Columbia (Lazarsfeld, Merton). Bourdieu’s account informs more recent historiographies of American post-war sociology – such as Abbott and Sparrow 2007, Calhoun 2007, Cavalletto and Silver 2014, Steinmetz 2007 – and constitutes the foundation upon which my own reconstruction of the field unfolds. Bourdieu’s narration is complicated by Calhoun’s and Vanantwerpen’s suggestion that, despite the prominence of Parsons at Harvard and Lazarsfeld and Merton at Columbia, the field was heavily contested, and the notion of a “mainstream” only emerged as “a retrospective reconstruction and invocation” by differently oriented sociologist, most prominently C. Wright Mills and Alvin W. Gouldner (2007:371). Calhoun and Vanantwerpen criticize what they identify as an unduly streamlining of a diverse field via the invocation of a (conservative) mainstream and emphasize that the label originally functioned as an “epithet tendentiously hurled by radicals” (Ibid.:368). While the meaning of mainstream as a “floating signifier” changed in the 70s, it had originally assumed a strongly negative connotation, implicated with the delineation of (political) identity positions within the field – “between Mill’s 1959 critique of the twin evils of ‘grand theory’ and ‘abstract empiricism’ and Gouldner’s 1970 declaration that the rebels were winning” (Ibid.:405).
Calhoun and Vanantwerpen hold that “positivism” supposedly “became an omnibus term of accusation” at the time, under the influence of “Adorno and other Frankfurt school critical theorists” (Ibid.:395). They criticize the accusatory dimension of the label “positivism” with regard to its function as a specific form of symbolic capital: the accusation determines the accuser’s (radical) position as political, while the accused’s (mainstream) position is ‘revealed’ as apolitical. Such criticism is capable of illuminating instrumental dynamics within the disciplinary field. However, in this instance it makes sense to take a closer look at the accusation leveled against Mills and Gouldner. Calhoun and Vanantwerpen conflate the notion of positivism as it is put forth by Adorno (and, for that matter, indeed by other Critical Theorists, such as Horkheimer, Habermas and Marcuse) with the general and associative understanding of the term as it usually is used with reference to a kind of empiricism that orients itself towards the natural sciences. 51 They end up identifying a reified conception of Critical Theory’s notion of positivism as an instrument within the struggles over scientific authority in the field. This does not serve the purpose it is intended to serve. Instead of formulating a critique of Critical Theory’s concept of positivism, they merely address an abbreviated resonance of it that supposedly informed the struggles against Parsonian and empiricist dominance in the 1960s. Similarly, the fact that the mainstream as such was (first)

51 There are two different notions of positivism in play here, which need to be delineated. Calhoun and Vanantwerpen contextualize the use of the term in the German “Positivismsstreit,” identified as “a curious debate, because no important figure argued the case for positivism - certainly not Karl Popper” (2007:395). The fact that Popper refused to accept the label for himself suffices for Calhoun and Vanantwerpen to delegitimize Adorno’s critique. Adorno’s position is not only dismissed too easily, it is not even considered. The definition of positivism underlying the authors’ argument is based on the conception that figures in the concept of methodological positivism. Such conceptualization makes sense as a working definition in order to construct an ordering narrative about the disciplinary field - by stressing core assumptions about the discipline’s specific characteristics in terms of objectives, working modes, and self-understanding. The Frankfurt School’s – more particular Adorno’s – understanding of positivism, however, is fundamentally different. It is steeped in the specific Hegelian-Marxist dialectic of Critical Theory, which holds a particular concept of history. From such a perspective, a positivistic approach to social reality is characteristic to what Max Horkheimer identifies as “traditional theory” in opposition to Critical Theory (1937). Theory (and practice) that does not integrate a reflection of its own entanglement in the specific historic conditions of late capitalist society – permeated by instrumental rationality – amounts to positivism because of its eventual affirmation of these conditions. In Critical Theory, social reality can only be approached negatively precisely because the theorist/theory concepts used are necessarily infused with the rationality perpetuated by the societal conditions. Seen from such a perspective, Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism appears to be positivistic, not because it identifies the findings of (social) sciences as “natural/objective facts” (which it clearly does not), but rather, because it fails to critically conceptualize the specific kind of consciousness emanating from the existing social conditions that is complicit in the achievement of “scientific” knowledge in the first place. Positivism here is not just a particular set of assumptions on how social sciences should work, but the failure to contextualize scientific research within a critical, historicist (dialectical) social philosophy. It amounts to the affirmation of the existing social conditions. Against the background of this crucial difference in the conceptualization of positivism, Calhoun’s and Vanantwerpen’s statement that “the project of joining empirical social science to theory” was “perhaps more fully achieved in the Lazarsfeld-Merton years at Columbia” (2007:395) than by the Institute of Social Research does not make sense at all. If Critical Theory’s defining characteristic was to juxtapose itself in opposition to “traditional theory,” any argument that a general joint-venture of sociological theory and empirical research would be able to resemble the Institute’s project necessarily falls flat.
identified from the radical fringes does not do much to delegitimize the term, nor does it misrepresent the disciplinary field at the time. Despite the later integration of radical sociological ‘subcultures’ into the institutions, the radical approaches still only got limited access to institutional sources of capital generation (McAdam 2007). My account, hence, generally sticks to the notion of mainstream put forth by Bourdieu and others.

With reference to Bourdieu, George Steinmetz suggests that US sociology evolved from an unsettled field pre-World War II to a (temporarily) settled one in the immediate post-war era (Steinmetz 2007). Steinmetz’s suggestion helps to carve out the field’s specific characteristics in that period. This is a necessary precondition in defining the sociological mainstream. It goes without saying that a mainstream can only appear in a settled field, since it relies on a widespread resonance solidifying its scientific authority. While Bourdieu’s “Capitoline triad” assumed authority in the post-war era, US sociology already had a longstanding history before WWII. In the first half of the 20th century, What came to be known as the Chicago School played the most significant role in the discipline’s first steps towards institutionalization. Both the nation’s first sociology department, the School of Social Sciences (1892), and its oldest journal, the American Journal of Sociology (AJS, 1895), were founded at the University of Chicago and influenced the further establishment of the discipline. Sociologists at Chicago at the time pursued approaches of ethnographic field studies, often embedded in an overall social activist approach to the investigation of society. The Chicago School established US sociology as a proper discipline within American academia. At the same time, however, the field was diverse. This is reflected in the foundation of the major American sociological organization, the American Sociological Association (ASA, founded as American Sociological Society) in 1905 at the Johns Hopkins University by a group of sociologist from all over the country, as will be explained in the following.

One of the first attempts to “adequately” tell the discipline’s “story,” Howard W. Odum’s US Sociology (1951), bases its narrative on the history of the ASA (1). In this account, the ASA, understood as the “backbone of US sociology” (34), comes to function as the representative institution of the entire discipline; its history is taken to represent the discipline’s history. By focusing on the institutional history up to 1950, Odum’s account becomes a story of increasing professionalization and scientific progress. Calhoun’s more recent account seconds Odum’s general focus on processes of institutionalization by pointing out that throughout the 1920s and 30s, “departments and journals proliferated […] the PhD degree became more
standard[,]” while “professionalization” increasingly gained “the upper hand over engagements in extra-academic reform moments” (Calhoun 2007:26). The moralist dimension, inscribed in the double role of sociologist and social activist, which characterized the original ethnographic Chicago School, lost significance as professionalization increased. This resulted in a decline of importance for Chicago, until, in 1936, the ASA set out to “severe what had once been a close relationship with the University of Chicago and the AJS to launch the ASR [the American Sociological Review, the organization’s own Journal]” (Ibid.:29).

**Constitutive Exclusions: US Sociology and the ‘Colorline’**

The instrumentality permeating the processes of professionalization and rationalization in the field is further emphasized, and complicated, when considering not only the mainstream, but also those scholars that were excluded from it, against the backdrop of concrete relations of societal domination. The historiography of US sociology has been called into question by a number of sociologists concerned with what they identify as the continuous legacy of racial segregation in US sociology and US society (Bhambra 2014; Hill Collins 2007; Morris 2007; Winant 2007). In his contribution to *Sociology in America – A History* (2007), Aldon Morris confronts the common historical narration about American sociology, and its beginnings, with the exclusion of African American scholarship. The eminent African American sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois serves as the prime example of the historical marginalization of black scholars. Morris poses the question why Du Bois’s extensive study *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899) does not appear in common historiographies, which emphasizes similar studies conducted by Chicago School sociologists almost two decades later (2007:484). For Morris, Hill Collins, and Winant, the critical reexamination of Du Bois’s exclusion from canon and historiography becomes the linchpin for developing a new sociology of race which is firmly located in the DuBoisian tradition. These attempts fundamentally problematize the general processes of professionalization in the field with regard to the concrete relation of racial domination. Morris carves out the immediate consequences of (academic) segregation in Du Bois’s own time. Du Bois never held a “major academic post, [nor did he have] access to ably prepared students, and the sponsorship of white colleagues and philanthropy”, and generally, his “scholarly work suffered perennially from lack of adequate funding” (Ibid.:532). The resonances of these historical exclusions became visible via a historiography of the sociology of race. In his own time,
Du Bois (1909) contested sociological arguments that sought to explain the unequal conditions within which African Americans found themselves in terms of a postulated biological differentiation of races. Instead, he argued for race to be understood as a social issue. That is, as a problem located in the configuration of relationships between people; in issues of poverty, degradation, systematic oppression and segregation, including also the institutional segregation of educational establishments. (2014:475-476)

Such a perspective did not only work against the contemporary pervasiveness of biological definitions of race, it radically challenged the existing societal conditions, and thus pronounced a radical notion of emancipation, one that was even made explicit by Du Bois himself, who was also an outspoken activist:

One of the distinguishing characteristics of African American conceptions of emancipation, then, was its expanded definition: from the narrow sense of being a counterfoil to slavery in terms of simple liberation from enslavement, to being regarded as the necessary condition for the fulfillment of one’s capacities as a human being. Where emancipation has usually been understood in terms of formal equality […] African American conceptions of emancipation emphasized the necessity of broader understandings of equality underpinning the possibilities of emancipation. (Bhambra 2014:483)

Du Bois’s sociology constitutes not only a marginalized voice, subjected to racialized discriminatory processes within the disciplinary boundaries but a radical emancipatory theory of society that stands in stark contrast to the discipline’s increasing professionalization. Du Bois insisted on an idea of emancipation that challenges the reformist conception of emancipation by law - a conception that fails to address Laclau’s dimension of ground adequately. The necessity for radicality, for changing fundamental societal relations (e.g. property ownership), is emphasized by Du Bois. It calls for the socio-historic reflection of the objective/societal roots of discrimination: emancipation was neither a formal project of recognition, nor was it the task of those to be emancipated to adopt and live up to the standards posited by the dominant group (white America); it was everybody’s problem and therefore a societal task (Bhambra 2014:483).

Hill Collins and Winant provide illuminating accounts of the successive dominant approaches to the sociology of race in the historiography of the segregated field. Since my research interest lies with the post-war era, it makes sense to take a brief look at their analysis of the approach developed under what they identify as the functionalist paradigm in the 40s and 50s. Winant suggests that “[w]ith their focus on social integration, structural functionalism’s chief
architects aspired to a disciplinary consensus never before achieved” (Winant 2007:557). Structural functionalism\textsuperscript{52}, it follows, pinpoints a general paradigm of mainstream sociology at the time, which also permeates the way in which issues of race are approached. Hill Collins specifies that “[w]ith functionalist logic, social class became the purview of white men, with occupational achievement elevated as one core dimension of social structure” (2007:580-581). She exemplarily references American sociologists Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore:

By specifying the implied connections among individual achievement, white men as the basic unit of social class analysis, and social stratification itself, sociologists Kingsley Davis and Wilber Moore (1944) took this assumption one step further. Not only was this version of social class the way society worked, but this particular organization was \textit{functional} to the smooth workings of society. In a section titled “The Functional Necessity of Stratification,” they argue that “as a functioning mechanism a society must somehow distribute its members in social positions and induce them to perform the duties of these positions. (Ibid.:581)

The conclusion is that the objectivist and descriptive logic of “[f]unctionalist analyses interpreted racial segregation not as a social problem but rather as part of the normal workings of societies” (Ibid.). Neither Davis, nor Moore, nor concrete approaches to the sociology of race figure prominently in my study. However, these challenges to the common historiographical accounts of American sociology help to sharpen both concrete interpretations of emancipation, which transgress the boundaries of academic considerations and concrete struggles, and the definition of a sociological mainstream, as it figures in the foundational opposition of Critical Theory and US sociology, which I suggest as a structuring orientation for my study. Moreover, the accounts fundamentally challenge the ‘objectivity’ of American sociology’s (historical) self-perception. They shed light on concrete manifestations of (societal) relations of domination and the inherent reproduction of those dynamics within the disciplinary field. Morris points out that “a DuBoisian model of analysis was not the currency that launched or sustained academic careers, no matter the race of the scholar” (2007:510). He evokes the categories of Bourdieuan field analysis and addresses the concrete relation of domination that unfolds along racial categories. Long before the establishment of an American sociological mainstream in the late 40s and 50s, the still unsettled, yet already sharply divided field defined the limits of what would be able to enter the mainstream (also)

\textsuperscript{52} Winant reflects the problematic of expanding the definition of structural functionalism in order to identify a research paradigm that extended far beyond Parsons’s theoretical universe. While acknowledging the divergences between Parsons, Merton, and Kingsley Davis, which he identifies as the “chief architects”, he suggest “that they shared a view – descended more centrally from Durkheim than from Weber – that emphasized the self-regulatory and integrative features of modern social structures and that consequently minimized the continuity and fundamentality of key social cleavages in U.S. society” (2007:557-558fn).
along the societal reality of segregation. The would-be mainstream solidified itself at the expense of African American sociology.

Altogether, the dynamics pervading the sociological field show striking similarities to the establishment of professionalized psychoanalysis as pursued by the APsaA, APA1 and APA2. Paralleling psychoanalysis’s process of professionalization and scientification in the 1930s, US sociology steadily progressed towards becoming a more integrated field and developing dominating centers which would help to establish a mainstream. Over time, the focus shifted from Chicago towards the East Coast, where Columbia was evolving into the hotbed of innovative survey analysis methods under Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Harvard emerged as the institutional home of US sociology’s grand theoretician Talcott Parsons and his developing functionalist theory universe. Steinmetz points out that the change from Chicago-style ethnography to the dominance of Parsonian functionalism and Lazarsfeldian methodological positivism was by no means a quick process. The 30s were, moreover, characterized by the hegemony of a “sort of pluralism” or “epistemological stalemate” (2007:319). Further professionalization and an accelerated settling of the field only came about with the US’s entry into World War II. The exclusion of the African American tradition, even from the early quasi “pluralism” best exemplified in Du Bois’s outstanding yet neglected scholarship, illuminates the concrete resonances of relations of domination in the field, implicated in the direction of the professionalization and scientification process.

World War II

Just as the war-effort considerably impacted US psychoanalysis, it accelerated the settling of US sociology as a disciplinary field. In the case of sociologists, employment in government services was one, but not the main driving factor. Accounts of famous sociologists’ employment by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), such as Herbert Marcuse, Leo Löwenthal, Barrington Moore, and Edward Shils, have gained notoriety, additionally, as Abbott and Sparrow state, a number of other “[s]ociologists saw a wide variety of service in the government” (Abbott and Sparrow 2007:289). However, altogether, the numbers were rather “modest,” extending to only 17 percent of around 1000 ASA members (Ibid.). While the numbers do not suggest a massive influx of sociologists into government service, the collaboration of US sociology and the US war-state did open the door to new resources.
Abbott and Sparrow point out that “wartime agencies” invested a lot of “public money in sociology,” which impacted the direction sociological research would take considerably, because “nearly all of it [went into] various forms of survey analysis [and] whetted sociologists’ appetite for survey analysis” (Ibid.:298). Similar to the way the war-effort directed psychoanalytic theory and practice towards developing pragmatic concepts and methods, it strengthened the innovative methodology prominently developed by Lazarsfeld at Columbia.

Not only did the investigation of micro-sociological dimensions of military service experience turn into a proper sociological research interest, which was not directly tied to interests of the war-state – for example, the AJS published a special issue on “Human Behavior in Military Society” in 1946–, but a great number of future sociologists had actually experience in military service themselves. Abbott and Sparrow emphasize that the so-called GI-Bill – the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 – impacted the discipline considerably. Among other benefits, it provided tuition fees, thus allowing veterans to study:

The war in effect stopped graduate education altogether for about four years […]. When graduate school reopened, the GI bill flooded pent-up demand into the system and graduate departments ballooned. As a result, over three quarters of the ASA-membership in 1955 came from the post-1945 graduate school cohort. (2007:292-293)

With the GI Bill in place, ASA membership exploded. It went from roughly a thousand in 1940 to around 5000 in 1955 (Ibid.:284). The increase in numbers was the most prominent direct effect of sociology’s involvement with the war-state. The instrumental push towards survey analysis was another one. The instrumentalization of the whatever liberating, moralist, or social activist potential sociology can be ascribed, seems obvious in case of sociology’s service of the war-state, Complications, however, emerge in single cases like Herbert Marcuse’s and Leo Löwenthal’s government employment, who continued their work even after the war had ended. While in the case of psychoanalysis, the war-effort clearly worked against the discipline’s inherent individualized emancipatory thrust (potentiality), the involvement of (critical) sociologists with the war-state does not necessarily contradict any possible emancipatory directedness of their work towards societal emancipation. Since the war was fought against fascism, murderous antisemitism, and racism, the necessity for a sociological and psychological assessment of the German population, such as Marcuse’s
Ascendance and Golden Age

After the war, US sociology emerged as a strengthened discipline both in terms of finances and membership numbers. It was, according to Abbott and Sparrow, “intellectually […] dominated by the odd marriage of survey analysis and Parsonian theory, symbolized by the pairings of Stouffer and Parsons at Harvard and Lazarsfeld and Merton at Columbia” (Abbott and Sparrow 2007:285). It was “becoming a well-structured field,” within which survey analysis, as the representative of methodological positivism, and Parsonian structural functionalism appeared as the manifestations of scientific authority (Steinmetz 2007:339). Bourdieu’s “Capitoline triad” was in place; a sociological mainstream was established and US sociology, as an integrated disciplinary field, ascended to its “golden age” (Calhoun 2007:34) approximately at the same time as US psychoanalysis. And just as psychoanalysis’s ascendance towards the peak of its professional and cultural significance was accompanied by first institutional schisms, US sociology experienced the institutionalization of the discipline’s critical voices with the founding of the Society for the Studies of Social Problems (SSSP) in 1951 (Abbott and Sparrow, 296). Various dissident sociologists gathered under the SSSP’s umbrella, devoted to ethnographic field studies in the name of social reform, such as Chicago

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53 Marcuse alludes to the complexity of working for an American intelligence agency while being an outspoken critic of capitalism in a letter to Löwenthal upon the latter’s appointment to full professorship at Berkeley. Marcuse writes: “Congratulations you are saved from the misinformation agencies and the rest home of behaviorists” (Letter Marcuse to Löwenthal 6/3/1956 Box Na4 Allg. Korrespondenzen 1935-1960 Ordner A LL-HM 1935-1960LLA:A992:175). The letter alludes to the fact that government employment was, of course, in the first place a necessity in order to make a living in exile. At the same time Marcuse’s ironic tone implies a critical distance towards the agency (and towards Columbia’s sociology department, where Löwenthal was simultaneously employed before becoming professor at Berkeley and which appears as equally corrupting as intelligence services in Marcuse’s laconic statement).

54 Sociologist Uta Gerhardt offers further insight into the entanglements of war-state, US sociology, and psychology in her 1996 article *A Hidden Agenda of Recovery: The Psychiatric Conceptualization of Reeducation for Germany in the United States during World War II*.

55 According to Steinmetz’s definition of methodological positivism, it has “three main dimensions[…]” It firstly encompasses “an epistemological commitment to […] to the probabilistic variants of covering laws that were accepted as legitimate by logical positivist philosophers in the mid-twentieth century[,]” secondly adheres to “an empiricist ontology, according to which scientific statements link empirically observable events[,]” and thirdly beliefs “that the social and natural sciences should approach their objects of study in identical fashion” (2007:316-317). This definition is set apart from Critical theory’s definition, as mentioned above. Whenever I talk about methodological positivism in this chapter, Steinmetz’s definition applies.

56 Steinmetz suggests that “[m]ethodological positivism was becoming orthodox or even doxic, that is, its practices and proclamations were increasingly recognized even by its opponents as a form of scientific capital, however much they disliked it” (2007:339).
veteran and former ASA president Ernest W. Burgess, and a new generation of radicals oriented towards Marxism, such as Alvin V. Gouldner, who later became one of Parsons’s harshest critics. Their common denominator was the rejection of positivist dominance and scientism emanating from Columbia, Harvard, and the ASA.

The example of the SSSP shows that the field was still contested. The mainstream was not all-encompassing, nor was it as unified as it appears in, for example, Gouldner’s account (1970). C. Wright Mills’s affiliation with the Columbia’s Bureau of Applied Social Research – he was Assistant Professor from 1945-49 under Lazarsfeld’s directorship – is another example for the diversity of approaches that were, at times, assembled even at the center of methodological positivism’s domination. Mills was an outspoken opponent of positivism and functionalism. However, Steinmetz rightfully questions whether “these dissident positions could match the positivist mainstream in terms of their symbolic capital” and highlights the fact that “the critics were not centrally located according to a sociological map of disciplinary ranking” (2007:355). Mills “was not a bulwark against this positivist tide,” according to the individual account of a Columbia alumni; he, in fact, “seemed to matter little” (342). Steinmetz’s suggestion helps to integrate the complication inscribed in the Institute’s affiliation with Columbia during its Exile years. The fact that Adorno, Horkheimer, and other Institute members, such as Löwenthal and Pollock worked and taught at Columbia does not undermine the notion of a mainstream, but rather solidifies it by stressing the specific form of scientific authority translatable into symbolic, social, and economic capital. Critical Theory was present at Columbia, but it did not resonate in sociological debates in the US on any significant scale despite the fact that, with the widely received Studies in Prejudice, the Institute had put its name on the map.58

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57 Gouldner’s The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970) is a voluminous critique of Parsonian structural functionalism. It aims to reconstruct the discipline’s “Infrastructure,” Parsons’s oeuvre, the decline of his prominence in the field, and to map out the changes the discipline was facing in the early 70s. One of the main points of critique is that US sociology, via Parsons’s introduction of a specific European canon, is fundamentally flawed because it avoided Marx. A deeper engagement with the book exceeds the framework of my dissertation, especially because the argument of Parsonian dominance can easily be made without Gouldner. With reference to Calhoun and Vanantwerpen, who point out the book’s success upon publication, I rather suggest that the publication of the book can chiefly function as another marker of Parsons’s, and therefore the sociological mainstream’s ‘golden age’s’ decline (2007:384-85).

58 The dominance of methodological positivism at Columbia, and the difficulties resulting from it, is addressed by Herbert Marcuse in his correspondence with Leo Löwenthal, who was briefly employed at Columbia before his appointment as professor of sociology at UC Berkley in 1956. Marcuse writes in a letter from 3/6/1955: “Congratulations on your appointment to the Center for the Advanced Study of Misbehavioral Sciences. I know that you will do your best not to be corrupted by the assembled Untermenschen there” (Box Na4 Allg. Korrespondenzen 1935-1960 Ordner A LL-HM 1935-1960). As mentioned in a previous footnote Marcuse remarks in another letter to Löwenthal “Congratulations: you are saved from the misinformation agencies and from the rest home of bee-haviorists” (Ibid.:LLA:A992:175). Both letters demonstrate Marcuse’s approach
Steinmetz further points out that “U.S. sociology’s own view of itself followed a narrative of steady progress from social meliorist beginnings toward scientific maturity” (2007:366). Odum’s previously mentioned historical account of US sociology is a prime example of such a narrative. The book generally presents sociology as a science, modeled after the natural sciences. According to Odum, “sociology, like all sciences, must approach its study through units and subjects that are small enough and specialized enough to enable the scientist to be reasonably successful in his study” (1951:21). The science of sociology is an empirical undertaking defined by the “twofold objective” of “all sciences[:] [...] discovering truth and attaining mastery” (Ibid.). It, accordingly, “emphasizes social research and the actual laboratory of social practice as mutually essential” (Ibid.). The essential motivation of US sociology appears to be located in a scientific observation of social reality that orients itself towards “all sciences.” The role and function of sociological research, and the development of theory, is solely defined in the context of specialized sciences, concerned with the investigation of singled-out social phenomena. The emphasis on scientificity, inherent to Odum’s suggestions, resonates very well with the dominant tone in Columbia and Harvard. Renowned Chicago sociologist Florian Znaniecki offers another insight in a 1950 address to the Midwest Sociological Society. Znaniecki addresses the role of theory and states that “the main achievement of Europe in the realm of social thought was the development of objective sociological theory, independent of any philosophy of values” (Znaniecki 1950:217). After establishing the doctrine of value-neutrality as the most important achievement in theory, he draws the following conclusions:

[I]t is now [in the context of Italian fascism, German National Socialism and ongoing Soviet communism, MD] obvious that sociology cannot be made subservient to practical ideals without losing its utility. There is only one way to promote the development of sociological theory and at the same time the usefulness of its applications and that is by considering every attempt to solve a social problem as if it were an experiment in which some sociological theses may be tested. (Ibid.:218)

The lesson to be learned from European authoritarianism is that sociological theory has to subordinate itself to empirical ‘testing’ in order not to work in the service of totalitarianism, which determine research results from the outset. It is safe to say that Znaniecki’s choice of theorists is preselected by Talcott Parsons, whose The Structure of Social Action (1937),
introduced the soon-to-become canon\(^{59}\) of European sociological theory to US sociology. Sociologist Michael Burawoy emphasizes Parsons’s “grand synthesis of Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, Marshall, and, subsequently, Freud,” which came to dominate US sociology in the post-war era (Burawoy 1982:1). In light of Znaniecki’s call for objectivity, Parsons’s structural functionalism seems to constitute the contemporary response. Parsons himself, stating in the 1960s that sociological theory had now replaced ideology, only supports this observation (Parsons 1966:335). The doctrine of sociology as an objective, value-neutral science figures prominently. By positioning the value-neutral canon against theory devoted to “practical ideas” Just like Parsons, Znaniecki circumvents the engagement with (critical) theory development oriented towards Marx. While stating the necessity of an objective sociological theory, Znaniecki at the same time speaks out against mere positivism, criticizing "the concerted efforts of certain American sociologists to make sociology an exact natural science, on the model of physics, by a combination of radical empiricism and mathematical dogmatism" (Znaniecki 1950:220). Against the scientism of mere empiricists he holds that “[s]ociologists should remember that cultural systems, unlike natural systems, must be studied as they are experienced, not by external observers but by those agents who conceive them, produce them, and keep them in existence by acting individually and collectively on their behalf (Ibid.). A sensibility for the fluidity of culture, the concreteness of individual experience, the impossibility to study the social world without taking the actual actors/agents into account, crucial to Chicago sociology, figure in Znaniecki’s remarks. And Znaniecki himself represents this tradition prominently.\(^{60}\) Despite the methodological differences, and the fact that Znaniecki represents a School of sociology that has been relegated to the margins of the field, his call for objectivity in sociological research still resonates well with the most fundamental principles of voiced by both functionalism and positivism. The common motif lies in the rejection of meta-theoretical attempts to grasp the (historic) nature of ‘social facts.’ Theory is only supposed to provide an organized set of hypotheses, subject to further

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\(^{59}\) Immanuel Wallerstein suggests that Parsons book “invented the “canon” of sociological theorizing” in the US. While “[f]or Parsons, the canon was “Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto [...] U.S. sociology adopted Durkheim and Weber, but not Pareto [and] [f]urthermore, they added Marx, whom Parsons clearly wanted to exclude” (2007, 429). With regard to the historical exclusion of African American sociologists, Parsons’ canonization of Weber, Durkheim, and Pareto not only has to be confronted with the exclusion of Marx, but also with that of his contemporary Du Bois.

\(^{60}\) One of the most well-known studies by Chicago sociologists is William Isaac Thompson’s and Florian Znaniecki’s *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1920) conducted over the course of two years. The study is credited by Lewis Coser as “the earliest major landmark of American sociological research” and inhabits a prominent space in the history of US sociology (Coser 1977:511). Against the backdrop of the more recent attempts to carve out the segregatist character of US sociology’s historiography, the fact that Coser praises this study as the “earliest major landmark” additionally illustrates the problem of exclusion via Du Bois’s *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899) as Morris (2007:505) and Bhambra (2014:484) point it out.
empirical testing and subsequent adjustment. Without ever mentioning Parsons, Znaniecki’s sketch of the nature and function of theory approximates structural functionalism. Despite his insistence on objectivist scientism, the address ends on a rather moralist note:

at the middle of this century sociology faces a tremendous task [...] [l]et sociologists cease to be involved in metaphysical doctrines concerning the essence of the universe, natural and cultural, or in ontological doctrines of the essence of man as a natural and cultural microcosm within the macrocosm. To be a science, sociology must deal specifically and exclusively with social systems. [...] For adequate scientific knowledge of social systems and their relationships is a fundamental condition without which no long-term planning for a harmoniously united and increasingly creative humanity can be realized. (Ibid.:221)

The scientist doctrine pervades Znaniecki’s vision of sociology. European fascism is the negative foil for (re-)establishing value-neutrality as an urgent measure against totalitarian tendencies; the value neutrality paradigm, in turn, is not only supposed to safe-guard sociology from becoming subservient to ideological purposes, but, moreover is itself constituted as an instrument of progress. This is especially interesting because Znaniecki positions himself clearly in opposition to positivism.

Edward Shils61 is yet another prominent sociologist who, according to Steinmetz “criticized US sociology’s technocratic and manipulative scientism, its empiricism and positivism, its ‘deficient sense of the past’, and even the disposition to universalize what is, in fact, particular to one society and one epoch” in the 50s (2007:361). Steinmetz further states that “none of this [however] prevented Shils from insisting that sociology was fundamentally about the search to discover the “variables” underlying “general laws” of action” (Ibid.). Despite his opposition against scientistic reductions, Shils’s general theoretical stance on universal laws of social action reveals the pervasiveness of objectivist core-assumptions in US sociology at the time. And it approximates, just as Znaniecki’s, the way Parsons’s structural functionalism presents itself to the discipline in the 50s. Shils was, however, much more closely related to Parsons’s theory development than Znaniecki. Together with Parsons he worked on and published the 1951 volume Toward a General theory of Action. In light of the criticism

61 Shils’s position in the mainstream of US sociology is complex. In the 40s, he worked for the OSS, was acquainted with and worked together with some of the Frankfurt theorists on the Institute’s Studies in Prejudice project. In a 1948 assessment of The Current State of US sociology, he was, at first, enthusiastic about the project and congratulated the group of researchers to have “conducted [the study] with originality and precision in technique and with results of considerable importance” (29), but he changed his position in the 50s, harshly criticizing Adorno’s (et al) The Authoritarian Personality for its biased (and eventually Leninist) leanings (Shils 1954).
leveled against Adorno et al’s *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), voiced in Shils’s contribution *Authoritarianism Left and Right* to the volume *Studies in the scope and method of “The Authoritarian Personality”* (1954), his collaboration with Parsons sheds light on the theoretical divergences between Parsons and Critical Theory, and on the power distribution within the field at the same time. Shils’s main point of criticism targets Adorno’s supposed inability “to perceive the distinctions between totalitarian Leninism […], humanitarianism and New Deal interventionism” so that the authoritarian personality’s antagonist, the ideal democrat, is actually as streamlined an idea of the prototypical leftist, as the one Senator McCarthy envisions in his anti-communist crusade (1954:30). The study is challenged for its supposed metaphysical assumptions and incapability of identifying communists. This assessment of the study resonated quite well with the red-scare atmosphere of McCarthyism.61

As implicit to Bourdieu’s dictum of the “Capitoline triad,” which was also mentioned in other sociologies of US sociology, the core of the discipline in the 1950s was a complementary combination of methodological positivism and objectivist sociological theory constituted in structural functionalism. Abbott and Sparrow stress a general, methodological shift from the study of “social groups, group conflict, or group relations” to the study “of atomized individuals characterized by variable properties and located in a larger and indefinite field – ‘the collectivity,’ ‘the social group’, ‘the society’” (2007:285). With the scientist doctrine increasingly dominating the sociological field, the “influence of social psychology as an interdisciplinary platform for wartime social scientific expertise” became an incarnation of the (fateful) conjuncture of two streamlined disciplines (Ibid.). One result was that an “[i]ndividual-collectivity model” (IC model) (Ibid.:301), steeped in personality analysis, became pervasive in sociology and was implicated in preventing deeper social analyses from gaining importance.62 In Abbott’s and Sparrow’s study, the “IC model” serves as a theoretical

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61 Erik Erikson’s loyalty oath affair pinpoints aspects of McCarthyism’s effects in the context of US psychoanalysis. For US sociology under McCarthyism, the situation was similar. Edward Shils’s polemical remarks on Adorno’s proximity to McCarthyite conceptualizations of the ideal leftist of course denounce McCarthyism as wrong. At the same time, the need to publicly denounce and distance oneself from any suspected communist affiliation permeates the remarks. The fact that Talcott Parsons, who never grew tired of diminishing the sociological importance of Marx, became subject to a “loyalty investigation” himself further illuminates the pervasiveness of McCarthyism at the time; the Talcott Parsons Papers contain material on the investigation (HUGFP 42.8.8/box 13/ Folder: Loyalty investigation papers & correspondence; HUGFP 42.8.4/Box 12/ Folder: IOLB 1954-1955, Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).

62 According to Abbott and Sparrow, the pervasiveness of the “IC” model at the time was exemplified in the excellent reception of *The Authoritarian Personality*, despite the fact that Adorno himself was “dissatisfied with the study’s failure to place the psychology of prejudice more firmly within a critically articulated social analysis” (2007:308). The focus on personality only reinforced the lack of social analysis: “it is striking in this connection that Neumann’s *Behemoth* (1944) did not become one of the great texts of modern social science, while *The Authoritarian Personality* did” (Ibid.). The conjuncture of psychoanalysis and sociology under the aegis of
construction that is capable of explaining “the otherwise enigmatic post-war marriage of the florid abstractions of Talcott Parsons with the dowdy concreteness of survey analysis” (Ibid.:308). The authors address the question of how the conjuncture of structural functionalism and methodological positivism actually came into existence. In a field heavily impacted by a scientist orientation towards methodological positivism, Parsons was understood as a ‘grand theorist’ and thus represented an exemption. In a 2014 study on psychoanalysis in US sociology sociologists, George Cavalletto and Catherine Silver examine articles published in AJS and ASR in the 40s and 50s. They distinguish between an “essayist” style, supposed to represent a non-positivist approach, and a scientistic style, supposed to represent methodological positivism (2014:26). In this study, Parsons represents the essayist group, which, according to Cavalletto’s and Silver’s findings, was clearly in decline, while the scientistic articles gain the upper hand (Ibid.). The study seemingly puts Parsons at odds with the overall climate of scientism. Abbott’s and Sparrow’s IC model, however, helps to bridge the gap that opens up between Parsons and methodological positivism.

In the eyes of his critics, most prominently Gouldner, Parsons, however, was clearly a positivist. I have delineated the two different notions of positivism, characterizing the conceptual confusion on positivism earlier. Gouldner’s position is definitely closer to that of Adorno’s and targets the eventual affirmation of the socio-historic conditions subjected to theoretical inquiry. When applying the more rigid definition proposed by Steinmetz, Parsons does not qualify immediately as a positivist. Gouldner’s critique – and even more so, Critical Theory’s more sophisticated criticism of positivism – hits a nerve, however, when looking at the broader function of an objectivist sociological theory in the societal context. Parsons’s systematic approach left little room for the conceptualization of social change, and did not hold any notion that problematizes overarching structural conditions. Despite differences in the interpretation of the role of theory between Parsons and methodological positivism, functionalism did not challenge the “consensus on what counted as scientific capital” at the

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scientism is an important factor in the specific reception of Studies in Prejudice. The studies were praised for the innovative psychoanalytic methodology, but Critical theory as the social philosophy framing the studies, at least in the eyes of the contributing IfS members, was overlooked (or denounced as leftist propaganda, for example by Shils 1954). I will discuss the specific, objectivist way psychoanalysis was integrated in structural functionalism in detail in Chapter III.

64 Gouldner describes positivism as an approach that is devoted to methodological research, modeled after the natural sciences. It might be critical of the deficiencies of the current culture, but it rather aims at completing, than of overcoming it (Gouldner 1971 [1970]:91).

65 The deeper engagement with functionalism follows in Chapter III. The first part is supposed to provide a general overview of the discipline’s development. A basic understanding of Parsons’s theory has to suffice for the moment in identifying it as an objectivist endeavor.
time (Steinmetz 2007:308). The IC model helps to illuminate the convergences. Parsons’s first book *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), published at a time when he was explicitly distancing himself from positivism (Steinmetz 2007:351), “clearly presupposed two levels of social life: the individual and the collectivity” (Abbot and Sparrow 2007:308). In the 50s, Parsons not only refrained from denouncing positivism publicly, but became rather enthusiastic about the various “streams of thought” which would be “in the process of flowing together” (Parsons 1951:viii; Steinmetz 2007:351). Schematic categories of collectivity and individuality, emerging in Parsons’s social and personality systems, at least superficially converged, *intra-disciplinarily*, with methodological positivism’s interest in acquiring scientific facts about individual experiences via survey analysis. A streamlined social psychology which had successfully eliminated psychoanalysis’s depth dimension from its conceptual toolbox furthered the *inter-disciplinary* merger of US sociology and American psychoanalysis.

The fact that “Columbia played a central role in the positivist disciplinary formation before the 1930s and after 1945” (Steinmetz 2007:323) is not only interesting because dissident like Mills and other non-positivists like Robert and Helen Lynd and Robert McIver were employed there. The *Institute* was, as mentioned before, also affiliated with Columbia. Adorno even participated briefly in the Radio Research Project, which was directed by Lazarsfeld. The *Institute’s* contributions to the field at the time were, however, only successful in relation to the possibility of reading them through the lens of the IC model. *Studies in Prejudice* clearly provided this opportunity; the deeper theoretical insights were not made explicit, but remained esoteric, only detectable to those who were able to decipher them (Ziege 2009:270). Despite the influx of the most pronounced (and arguably most sophisticated) anti-positivist scholarship and knowledge, impersonated by the Frankfurt Scholars, Columbia’s, or more specifically, Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research became the “center of methodological expertise and research in the positivist spirit” which became manifest in Lazarsfeld’s and Rosenberg’s *The Language of Social Research* (1955) as the “embod[iment of] the methodological hegemony of positivism (Steinmetz 2007:341).

To put it in Bourdieu’s words, “[t]he leaders of the sociological establishment thus succeeded in imposing a true intellectual orthodoxy by imposing a common corpus of issues, stakes of discussion,-and criteria of evaluation” (Bourdieu 1991:378). The field was definitely not unified. Dissident voices existed and were published in such journals as *Politics* (eg Mills),
and some of them institutionalized their disagreement in founding the SSSP. Those voices challenging the consensus of the scientist mainstream, however, remained confined to the fringes until the 60s.

Another, quite important dimension characterizing the ‘golden age’ and defining the ‘mainstream’ was the close collaboration of sociology (and psychoanalysis) with branches of the government. Abbott and Sparrow suggest that “the great paradigm of post-war social science and the most important bridge between academic work and national policy during the high cold war” was modernization theory (2007:312). They point at the ideological dimension of social sciences in the post-war era, pursuing an approach to sociological theory and practice that translated into the attempt to “remake the ‘third world’ in the idealized image of the United States” (Ibid.:313). This approach was conceptually mirrored by “Parsonian structural functionalism and the intellectual culture of the Harvard Department of Social Relations” (Ibid.). Modernization theory appears here as a set of knowledge working in the interest of the US as the (self-proclaimed) epitome of modernity in the 50s. This power was, however, contested and eventually broken in the “controversial winds of the 60s” (Ibid.).

The 60s

Just as the 1940s saw a rapid expansion of the field (triggered by the effects of the war-effort), numbers exploded once again in the 60s. ASA membership numbers went from 6,000 in 1959 to 13,485 in 1969 (McAdam 2007:414). While the discipline grew in personnel, its relative unity, embodied in the domination of methodological positivism and functionalism, crumbled, however. Gouldner diagnosed the disappearance of a “single, organizing, intellectual center for the sociological community,” which for him had been represented by Parsonian functionalism I 1970 (Ibid.:159). In his more recent account, sociologist Doug McAdam brings the second membership explosion and the simultaneous diversification of the field, in line with Gouldner’s diagnosis, in conversation. The new generation of the “baby boomers” brought an interest in social change to the fore, which the works of the 1940s/50s professionalizers, representing the aged sociological mainstream, failed to address.

66 Sociology was able to practically contribute to the hegemony of modernization theory in via “massive social surveys to enable the technocratic management of personal and social adjustment required by the bureaucratic rationality of modern society” (Abbot and Sparrow 2007:313).
The critical voices of the earlier decades, such as C. Wright Mills and Gouldner himself, became more widely heard and considerably “shape[d] the rise of the New Left” (Calhoun 2007:35) with which a great number of the new sociologists identified.

McAdam suggests the differentiation of ‘professionalizers’ (or the mainstream) and politically engaged sociologists as a working definition, but warns against any oversimplification. He urges to contextualize the baby boomers’ political agenda in their specific life-worldly experiences, crucially characterized by social upheavals and the emergences of emancipatory movements fighting for women’s rights and minority rights (2007:417). In the 60s, “[t]he “naïve positivism” of the “professionals” […] came in for attack, weakening the normal science consensus that had characterized the discipline in the post-World War II period” (Ibid.). While concrete life-worldly experiences can certainly impact political self-understandings, Calhoun and Vanantwerpen make a valid point by stating that the “odd lines of opposition [were actually] staked out in the late 60s and early 70s” (2007:368). Their hint at the invocation of the “mainstream” by the new generation (and its old masterminds) complicates the picture in an elucidating way. The argument that the mainstream actually only emerged in the process of denouncing it as conservative, or even as apolitical, sheds light on the necessarily reductive function implicit to any notion of the mainstream. From that perspective, the vital interest in emancipation from various forms of domination, steeped in the baby boomers concrete life-worldly experiences that lead them to denounce the old elite, simultaneously changes into a vital interest in acquiring new forms of scientific authority in the struggles of the disciplinary field.

The concrete effects of diversification were eventually visible in the changing theory canons in sociology departments. The canon introduced by Parsons was eventually reduced to Weber and Durkheim. In the course of the discipline’s further professionalization, it was extended, most prominently by including Marx. The interest in Marx’s critique of capitalism grew steadily in the 60s, fostered by early critics of the mainstream such as Mills, Gouldner, and Marcuse. In 1967 Parsons noted:

There is an important sense in which, although relatively few American sociologists are explicitly Marxists, in a more diffused way his influence has grown in recent years as a focus of several crucial themes, notably the importance of conflict, social change, and positive political action. (103)
The interest in Marx might actually have reflected the life-worldly experiences of the new generation, but it also grew out of a critique that had been voiced at the fringes of the mainstream all along. In the 60s, such criticism became increasingly able to generate symbolic capital, because it resonated with the younger generation. However, it never succeeded in gaining scientific authority. Herbert Marcuse’s position, most prominently expressed in his open solidarity with the students- and civil rights movements amidst the upheavals in American society and the disciplinary field, illustrates that resonance.\textsuperscript{67} Robert Zwarg reconstructs the complications and fallacies of Marcuse’s role and position in the 1960s (2017:42ff). In the common, contemporary and retrospective perception, Marcuse figured as “Guru,” “father” and “spiritus rector” of the new American (and German) left (Ibid.:42). He increasingly expressed solidarity with the emancipatory and counter culture movements. This, however, was at odds with his theoretical insistence on the integrative power of ‘one-dimensional’ society, as most prominently expressed in his 1964 \textit{One-Dimensional Man}. The tension between his theory and his positions on political practice re-emerges in Marcuse’s actual relation to the New Left. In contrast to the common perception, his impact was very limited, as Andre Arato and Zwarg suggest. This becomes evident when looking at concrete textual evidences for negotiations of Marcuse’s writings instead of looking at sales numbers of \textit{One-Dimensional Man}. While sales numbers upon the book’s publication in 1964 were exorbitant (Ibid.:44), actual, deeper, theoretical engagements with its hypotheses on part of a great number of New Left protagonists remains doubtful (Zwarg 2017:44; Wheatland 2009:268f). Marcuse’s position oscillates between the authoritarian fantasy of a towering intellectual leader of the New Left, which was fostered by his portrayal in the media, by political opponents, and by parts of the New Left movements themselves, and the image of a pessimist observant, sharply criticizing the societal status quo in face of the realization of its overwhelming integrative power. In the context of my own historic account, Marcuse’s rise to prominence as a critical theoretician helps to mark the deterioration of a disciplinary mainstream that oriented itself towards objectivist theory and methodological positivism. The fact that an actual academic resonance of Marcuse’s work is, however, not traceable, of course hints at the instrumental dimension which Marcuse’s symbolic and theoretical-practical legacy cannot escape either.

\textsuperscript{67} Marcuse’s private correspondence with Adorno during the late 1960s demonstrates his political positioning on the side of the students, which is criticized sharply by Adorno. Their difference in opinion regarding the students movement helps to clarify not so much theoretical but practical political divergences between Marcuse and Adorno, which are reconstructed and contextualized by Robert Zwarg in his 2017 \textit{Die Kritische Theorie in Amerika} (42ff). These political divergences, in turn, also illuminate the divergences in conceptualizations of emancipation between the two – this will be addressed in more detail in Chapters III and V.
The concrete emancipatory thrust of African American sociologists’ struggle, as Bhambra, Morris, Winant, and Collins point out, further complicates McAdam’s and Calhoun’s accounts and the Bourdieuan analysis. Here, the concrete emancipatory demands, informed by life-worldly experiences, have a longstanding history, which already coagulated in an academic tradition: African American sociology. The fact that this tradition was able to make itself heard in the 60s has to do with the wider societal resonances of the baby boomers’ rebellion against the old elites. The concrete emancipatory demands, however, precede the 60s by far. According to Hill Collins, “[t]he social movements of the 1950s and the 1960s not only challenged the logic of segregation within American social institutions but also revealed how this same logic comprised sociological knowledge” (2007:585). The struggles for concrete emancipation in the context of remaking the field coincide with struggles for scientific authority. Eventually, this points at the limits of a field analysis, which is chiefly interested in the structural function of knowledge as it generates symbolic capital, but not in its content. Bhambra emphasizes that for the African American sociological tradition, challenging the mainstream had been the conditio sine qua non from its earliest beginnings (2014:478). In the 60s, this historical challenge eventually succeeded in transgressing the segregated boundaries and in creating forms of scientific authority, which at least granted entry into newly emerging niches in the diversifying field. The implicit instrumental dimension does not (completely) undermine the emancipatory achievements. At the same time, the resonances of historical segregation in current historiographies already hint at the fact that the general logic pervading the field still operates against the emancipatory challenges.

The attacks on the ‘mainstream’ eventually resulted in a diversification of the field. These effects became eventually visible in the institutional make-up of the ASA. Subsections that had grown out of radical, leftist concerns were established from the early 70s to the early 80s, such as Sex and Gender, Environment, Marxist sociology, Racial and Ethnic Minorities, to name the most prominent ones. Other subsections established previously, in the 50s and early 60s, solely addressed “mainstream disciplinary and societal institutions[.]” such as Methodology, Medical Sociology, and Family (McAdam 2007:418). The establishment of the subsections symbolizes the institutionalization of formerly radical (and emancipatory) demands that would continue to be relevant to sociological research interests. The institutionalization of social psychology as the most prominent adaptation of psychoanalysis
in US sociology was made manifest in the ASA’s Social Psychology section in 1961. It coincided with what Cavaletto and Silver call the “closing of the sociological mind to psychoanalysis” (Cavaletto and Silver 2014). In this particular case, the moment of institutional integration turns into a marker of increasing irrelevance. This is of course not a general law and does not apply to all radical sections established in the 70s and 80s. However, despite the integration of some radicals into major institutions, the dominance of a particular form of social capital within the field remained (and still remains) intact. While the domination of Parsons’s ‘Grand Theory’ collapsed in the 60s, its complementary segment, methodological positivism, survived the attack: “[t]hough still roundly criticized in many quarters, ‘mainstream sociology’ continues to prize the same general elements – technical innovation, normal science, basic research – as were associated with the older ‘professional projects’” (McAdam 2007:418).

The decline of Parsonian ‘Grand Theory,’ hence, remains as the definite marker of the end of the golden age. The field diversified, Durkheim and Weber became some theorists among others, Marx and other critical theorists were increasingly integrated into the teaching canons. At the same time, survey analysis and methodological positivism remained dominant. Radical sociology was still pursued at the fringes, the radicals were “usually not absorbed into the elite departments” (Calhoun and Vanantwerpen 2007:369). Apparently, Parsons’s decline additionally marks the decline of ‘Grand Theory’ in US sociology altogether. It is an interesting question if this decline might even be complicit in the fact that other ‘grand theories,’ standing in a Marxian tradition, such as Critical Theory, were never able to establish themselves prominently in the discipline. A supporting argument for this hypothesis is that early critics of the mainstream who were steeped in a pragmatist approach to theory and scientific practice, for example C. Wright Mills, always also targeted ‘Grand Theory’ as such.

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68 The Sex and Gender section, for example, grew rapidly and has been the biggest section in the organization for several decades now (McAdam 2007).
The Common Language: Psychoanalysis in Post-War Sociology

The remaining part of the chapter is concerned with investigating encounters of US sociology and US psychoanalysis. The history of sociological interest in psychoanalysis goes almost as far back as the history of US psychoanalysis itself. Since my focus lies with the post-war era, the account of the pre-war history will, however, be rather brief. In a 1939 AJS article, sociologist Ernest W. Burgess (ASA president 1934) traces the history of the sociological reception of psychoanalysis to its beginnings: the Clark Lectures. Burgess’s account distinguishes a phase of outright rejection (1909-1919) from a phase of increasing interest (since 1920) (356); Philip Manning’s exhaustive study *Freud and US sociology* (2005) complicates Burgess’s “rather simplistic” (30) description and points at early sociological interests despite a general suspicion of “Freud’s emphasis on the ‘‘sex instinct’’” (Ibid.) shared by American sociologists at the time. While “outright rejection” does not adequately describe the earliest phase, Burgess’s suggestion that interest steadily, and visibly, increased after 1920 holds true. It found exemplary expression in an 1936 AJS article by sociologist Read Bain, who poses the introductory question:

> If psychoanalysis can make its peace with natural science (with human biology especially), accept the sociological theory of human nature and culture, depart from mysticism, dualism, mechanism and sequential evolution, what use can sociology make of psychoanalytic concepts, thus revised and restated? (207)

Bain’s intention to put psychoanalysis to work in a sociological framework hints at the general persuasiveness psychoanalytic theory exercised on American sociologists. At this early time, and (probably) unaware of sociological Freud adoptions oriented towards similar questions, such as Erich Fromm’s, Bain critically asks for psychoanalysis’s potential as a sociological theory of the psyche. The attempt to answer his own question leads him to formulate the “thesis that many psychoanalytic concepts, redefined in a cultural frame of reference, may be very useful for sociological analysis and interpretation” (Ibid). Psychoanalysis turns into a methodological model for the analysis and diagnosis of societal “diseases” and their subsequent treatment (Ibid.:209f). Bain’s article is, of course, in no way representative of a general approach towards psychoanalysis in US sociology at the time it was published. However, it provides a snippet of a discursive position that resonates well with
tendencies that would soon become increasingly prominent, such as neo-Freudianism and the anthropological Culture and Personality School and finally Parsons Functionalism. The fact that Burgess, only 3 years later, publicly recounts psychoanalysis’s American sociological history itself becomes a marker of interest increase.

1939

In his article, Burgess mentions several sociologists having worked with psychoanalytic ideas in “recent years;” (1939:365) Erich Fromm is among them. Harold Laswell, another prominent American sociologist writes in the same issue of AJS: “It has been a sociologist with psychoanalytic training who has coped most boldly with the problem of putting the psychoanalytic procedure itself in explicit relationship to the cultural-historical setting in which it originates and survives[:] Erich Fromm” (1939:385). In Laswell’s account, Fromm becomes the sociologist putting Bain’s earlier hypothesis to work. Especially from my specific research perspective, Burgess’s and Laswell’s Fromm references are illuminating. Fromm, who was still a member of the Institute at that time, even though he was already in the process of cutting ties with it, becomes an important link between psychoanalysis and sociology and simultaneously the Institute and US sociology. The articles were, in fact, published in a year that retrospectively proved crucial for the development of sociological interest in psychoanalysis in general, and, even more pronouncedly so, for the specific relation of US sociology, psychoanalysis, and Critical Theory. In 1939 Talcott Parsons, pointed to Freud by his colleague Elton Mayo, picks up psychoanalysis as a complement to his structural functionalist aspirations of developing a general theory of action, which he first expressed in his essay Actor, Situation, and Normative Pattern (1939) and in which he references Karen Horney as a major innovator of psychoanalytic theory (183). 1939 marks Fromm’s breaking away from the Institute because of theoretical divergences emerging from his disposal of Freudian drive theory. He first expressed it in his 1937 essay Die Determiniertheit der psychischen Struktur durch die Gesellschaft, which was never published by the Institute’s Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung.69 Karen Horney’s New Ways in Psychoanalysis, another milestone of neo-Freudian revisionism, was also published in 1939 and referenced by Parsons (Parsons 1939:84). David Riesman started analysis with Fromm

69 The details of Fromm’s breach with the Institute will be addressed in Chapter III.
and developed a lifelong friendship with him that would deeply impact his work. Fromm, Horney, Sullivan, Thompson, as members of the Zodiac group, developed new approaches to psychoanalysis across the disciplinary boundaries of sociology, anthropology and psychoanalytic practice. The year becomes altogether significant, because it marks the emerging importance of neo-Freudianism for the integration of psychoanalysis into American (mainstream) sociology. The significance of neo-Freudianism for psychoanalysis’s integration/adaptations emerges also on the micro-level: Parsons, would become the dominant mainstream theorist for almost three decades, and Riesman, who would become the author of the sociological bestseller of all times The Lonely Crowd, both engaged with Freudian theory through the lens of its neo-Freudian innovators/revisionists.

A Brief Opening

With Opening/Closing the Sociological Mind to Psychoanalysis (2014), sociologists George Cavalletto and Catherine Silver have contributed an illuminating study addressing the career of Freudian theory in US sociology on the macro-level. One of their conclusions is that psychoanalysis lost sway in US sociology even before it began to decline in American clinical psychology. According to Cavalletto/Silver, the “sociological backlash” against psychoanalytic ideas actually set in soon after the “opening of the sociological mind” and resulted in its closure already by the end of the 50s (2014:18). Russell Jacoby additionally suggests that the professionalization of psychoanalysis cannot be distinguished from the general professionalization which America has experienced over the past century (1985:177). At this point, the most striking convergence between the trajectories of US psychoanalysis and sociology appears in the processes of professionalization that helped to establish a streamlined conservative psychoanalytic mainstream, oriented towards ego psychology on the one hand, and a sociological mainstream, oriented towards scientification on the other hand. Both disciplines underwent processes of rationalization that eventually led to fundamental changes. For psychoanalysis, these changes appeared as more existentially threatening, since it lost its standing in American clinical psychology, while methodological positivism was able to survive in the sociological field. It follows that the instrumental dimension (effectiveness, production of quick results) seems, on both ends, to shape the form of symbolic capital that eventually translates into scientific authority. Hence, Cavalletto’s/Silver’s and Jacoby’s suggestions can be brought together under the premise of instrumental rationalization:
psychoanalysis lost sway in US sociology because its sociological adoptions did not translate into scientific authority any longer as soon as Parsonian functionalism was in decline and methodological positivism remained the only paradigm in place.

In order to illuminate the more or less rapid increase and decline of sociological interest in psychoanalysis, Cavaletto’s/Silver’s study is of great help. It provides “two rather simple tales” (46) of US sociology’s development at the time. One “is specific to the efforts to create a psychoanalytic sociology in the period 1948-1960” (Ibid.) and begins with an upsurge in excitement concerning what was perceived to be an opening of new ways to incorporate psychoanalytic ideas to mainstream sociology. This upsurge is followed closely by the emergence of a strong backlash which succeeded, first, in restraining acceptance to these efforts by narrowing available frames of reference to those consistent with the dictates of methodological positivism, and then, finally, in the almost total elimination of even such constrained efforts from mainstream sociology. (Ibid.)

The other one has a longer time frame and concerns the larger world of American mainstream sociology in general. It begins in the pre World War II period when sociology was open to a diversity of approaches. This situation is overturned in the post-WWII period by an institutional and ideological transformation that brought with it a positivistic ideology and that together transformed an unsettled fragmented field of diverse sociological practices into a settled institutional field of greatly constricted practices. (Ibid.:46)

Their account relies on a definition of the mainstream that measures and evaluates publications in the most representative journals of the established sociological institutions, which they identify as AJS and ASR (Ibid.:18). The study provides statistical data about the frequency with which psychoanalytic issues were discussed in the journals. In its conclusions, it qualitatively distinguishes between two different styles of “written structures that organized thought on the issue[:] […] before the end of 1953, almost all of the articles favoring psychoanalysis […] were written in an essayist style; after 1953, all favorable articles […] were written in a scientific style, with a focus on hypothesis formation and statistical testing” (Ibid.:45). Essayistic and scientific style turn into markers of a paradigm change towards methodological positivism – the authors’ “second tale” – which eventually leads them to locate the peak of psychoanalysis’s American career in the early 50s.
The first and the second tale come together in the beginning of the 1950s, when the second tale of the institutional transformation and emergent ideological hegemony provided the driving force leading the first tale’s proponents of psychoanalysis to give way to a double capitulation – first to scientism and second to the dismissal of psychoanalysis as unscientific. (Ibid.:46)

Cavaletto’s and Silver’s argument of increasing scientification underscores the instrumental dimension of the rationalization process that characterizes the sociological career of psychoanalytic thought. What appears as (scientific) progress, increasingly cancels out emancipatory potentialities, while it serves the establishment of a unified disciplinary field. As I established in the preceding section, however, an interesting twist of the mainstream narrative is that Parsons, in this account, does not fit the scientistic category and presents something akin to an exception from the rule. In light of Parsons’s continuous concessions to scientific doctrines, rationalized with reference to Weber’s value neutrality paradigm, his firm position in the mainstream at the time does not contradict the settling of the field under methodological positivism as Cavalletto/Silver describe it. Parsons’s increasing schematization, which characterizes his integration of psychoanalytic concepts actually mirrors the scientistic/objectivist orientation. My account treats the complication that Parsons, understood as a “grand theorist,” simultaneously contradicts the scientist paradigm of methodological positivism not as an exception from the rule, but as an expression of the complexities and multi-directedness instrumental rationalization can exhibit. Just as the adoption of reactionary positions into the psychoanalytic mainstream of the 1950s is not merely explainable by professionalization and scientification, but resonates with the multiplicity of relations of societal domination which play into the directedness of processes of rationalization, Parsons’s theorizing and essayistic style rather represent another trajectory of the mainstream instead of an exception to it. Again, the constitution of the mainstream solidifies in the face of concrete exclusions, as the example of contemporary African American sociologist Horace Cayton suggests. Freudian theory resonates in his work *A Psychological Approach to Race Relations* (1948), which chiefly draws on Herbert A. Millers’s notion of “oppression psychosis” (Cayton 1948:423). However, Cayton’s ideas only existed in a parallel disciplinary universe of radical approaches that did not even make it into the discussions at the fringes of the mainstream, despite the fact that psychoanalysis and issues of race and prejudice were of increased interest at the time.

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69 This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter III.
It has become more than clear at this point that Parsons is the most prominent figure in the process of integrating psychoanalysis into sociology – a disciplinary field that, propelled by scientistic rationalization, was in its entirety rather suspicious of grand narratives about the individual and society, such as Freudian one. As US sociology’s “grand” theorist, however objectivist, Parsons became psychoanalysis’s vessel into the sociological mainstream. As mentioned above, picking up on Horney, Fromm, and other neo-Freudians, and also on ego psychologists, the specific reading of Freud figuring in his oeuvre was from the outset sociologized. This means that societal and cultural impact in the ontogenetic developmental process was prioritized over drive theory. What distinguishes Parsons’s approach from the others is that he, under influence of the convergence paradigm that had directed his earlier integration of Durkheim, Marshall, Pareto, and Weber in his first publication *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), “believed that this integration [of sociological and psychoanalytic ideas] had to be recognized rather than constructed, because from his vantage point Freud’s ideas already “converged” with those of leading sociologists” (Manning 2005:8). The most important works addressing the integration of Freudian concepts into his theoretical universe are *Towards a General Theory of Action* (1951), *The Social System* (1951), *Papers in the Theory of Social Action* (1953 with Robert Bales), *Family, Interaction and Socialization Process* (1954 with Edward Shils), and the numerous articles and essays which appeared in the most prominent psychological, psychiatric, psychoanalytic, and sociological journals.71

Parsons’s increasing integration of psychoanalysis in the 1940s, as seen in the above mentioned publications, was paralleled by other projects that would result in widely received publications. Such as Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) and the *Institute’s Studies in Prejudices* (1950). Especially Studies, due to its scope and institutional background, brought together a great number of sociologists, psychologists, social psychologists and theoreticians from various backgrounds. As I suggested in the introduction, the role of psychoanalysis as a common language most obviously manifests itself in this project, not least because there were some members of the Institute involved: Max Horkheimer as one of the two directors, Adorno and Löwenthal as co-authors. A radical adaptation of psychoanalysis that insisted on drive theory was brought to the table. What further characterizes the studies is that, despite the

71 The specificities of Parsons’s approach to psychoanalysis will be addressed in detail in Chapter IV.
Institute’s internal rigor about theoretical divergences – such as Fromm’s – the studies were generally conducted in a spirit of openness that relied on dynamic Freud interpretations, rather than scientific dogmatism.

‘Studies in Prejudice’ and Freudian (not so) Radicals

The first draft for a Research Project on Anti-Semitism, which would later result in the 5 volumes of Studies in Prejudices, was published in the last issue of Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in 1941. By that time, this journal appeared under the English title Studies in Philosophy and Social Science. Because it was beyond the Institute’s financial capacities, the project was pursued with financial aid of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) from 1942 onwards. The project’s development was characterized by a multitude of simultaneous research projects and the insecurity if the AJC will continue to fund it. Antisemitism Among American Labor, an exhaustive study of around 1500 pages that was never published, marks a waypoint between the first proposal from 1941 and the final 5 volumes of Studies published in 1950. The project’s importance, the urgency with which the Institute’s pursued its concrete research interest in the motivational sources of anti-Semitism, is, of course, inseparable from the extermination of European Jewry in the Shoa that Germany commanded in Europe at the time.

In 1950, the results of the huge cooperative project were published in five volumes. The Authoritarian Personality by Institute member Theodor W. Adorno, Austrian-born psychoanalyst Else Frenkel-Brunswik, American psychologist Daniel J. Levinson, and American psychologist R. Nevitt Sanford, is the best-known volume. It demonstrates the fruitful collaboration of émigré scholars of sociological, psychological, and Critical Theory backgrounds. The common interest in psychoanalytic theory enables the refinement of research instruments, the most prominent of which is probably the by now infamous F-Scale: a “condensation of three original attitudinal scales into one set of questions capable of measuring authoritarian potential on the latent psychological level” (Jay 1996, 243). The study’s findings present the anti-Semitic mind desiring the extermination of Jewish life as a most extreme expression of an intra-psychic dynamic within which the “superego becomes the spokesman of the id [a] dynamic configuration,” as Adorno notes, that “is not altogether new to psychoanalysis” (1950:630). The second volume, Dynamics of Prejudice: A
Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans by Austrian-born psychoanalyst child-psychologist Bruno Bettelheim and American sociologist Morris Janowitz is a study of prejudices among WWII veterans, based in psychoanalysis as a “central theory of human behavior and social organization” (1950:2), supported by the authors’ "conviction [...] that this theory seemed an exceedingly fruitful one in accounting for certain aspects of human behavior in society” (Ibid.). The authors, however, abstain from any interpretative dogmatism: “[t]his is not to mean that, in basing our investigation on the psychoanalytic theory, the theory was regarded as a closed and finished system of propositions” (Ibid.). The statement illuminates the importance of psychoanalysis for the project at the same time as it highlights the openness of the authors’ approach. The third volume by American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Nathan W. Ackerman and Austrian-born émigré social psychologist Marie Jahoda, Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation, follows a similar paradigm. Based in psychoanalytic interpretation, the authors explicitly renounce “[a] traditional concept of science – which is often uncritically transferred from the physical to the social sciences – maintains that detachment from the issue is the most important qualification for one who aspires to study it[.]” and position their work “opposed to this concept,” because they deem it “logically and psychologically untenable” (1950:1). Jahoda and Ackerman clearly identify psychoanalysis as their disciplinary/theoretical background. The pronounced rejection of a traditional concept of science, and its supposed objectivity and neutrality, positions the project explicitly in opposition to general trends in the emerging sociological mainstream. German émigré sociologist Paul Massing's Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany is a historical study of the social and political undercurrents and pre-conditions of German pre-WWII anti-Semitism. In contrast to the other books of the series, it is not concerned with the psychology of anti-Semitism. It constitutes a complement to the other volume’s psychological investigations and was among the most well-received of the volume. Institute member Leo Löwenthal’s and Polish émigré scholar Norbert Guterman’s Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator is a psychoanalytic, qualitative text analysis and targets the anti-Semitic/prejudiced agitator. It examines agitator texts and speeches by psychoanalytic interpretations. The book starts with an assemblage of actual phrases agitators employed (1970 [1949]:1ff), and ends with a psychoanalytic translation of the narratives implicit to the phrases (Ibid.:141). The dynamic Freud interpretations and insistence on psychoanalysis as a proper instrument of critical inquiry illustrate that the scientistic paradigms pervasive in American psychoanalysis and US sociology at the time did not completely permeate the entire field. This, of course, in no way
means that the studies were not part of the disciplinary struggles at all; it just illustrates the complexity of the field at the time.

Thomas Wheatland’s exhaustive study *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (2009) illuminates the situation surrounding the conduction of *Studies*, especially with regard to individual and immediate responses by American sociologists working together with or close to Institute members. Renowned sociologists, such as Robert Lynd, Robert MacIver, and Paul Lazarsfeld, all of them professors at Columbia University at the time, got involved with the project and/or expressed their high regards of it (Wheatland 2009:248). Wheatland’s account sheds light on professional and individual relations of Critical Theoreticians during the Institute’s Exile years. To-become prominent critical sociologists, such as C. Wright Mills, Nathan Glazer, Alvin Gouldner, David Riesman, were among those orbiting Columbia University and the affiliated Institute; Wheatland suggests that “[l]ike other coteries of émigré social scientists, the Institute served as a conduit between curious young Americans and the legacy of the continental tradition” (Ibid.:249). *Studies in Prejudice* played an important role in the strengthening some of these ties as an ongoing project. However, the individual relations and acquaintances, as Robert Zwarg’s study demonstrates in great detail, was rather inspired by a common interest in Marxian theory than psychoanalysis (2017:85ff). For the reception in mainstream US sociology upon the publication of *Studies*, these encounters do, however, not play a decisive role. Rather, it is the other way around: psychoanalysis as a common reference system becomes decisive in the professional reception as it is traceable in the two major journals, AJS and ASR, via book reviews. The common denominator of all reviews is the appraisal of the individual volumes’ innovative psychoanalytic methodologies – except for Massing’s historical study, of course, which did not apply Freudian concepts (Bunzel 1950; Landheer 1950; Review of *Prophets of Deceit* 1950; Shibutani 1951-52; Turner 1951-52; Wrong 1950). The reception of *Studies* exemplifies the complex interplay of power dynamics

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72 Some of the personal relations between Institute members and critical US sociologists can be recovered from the correspondences and will be addressed later. The most important relation is surely Riesman’s friendship with Fromm; As an advisor and former mentor, Reisman was also related to Rieff, who for some time worked with Marcuse at Brandeis University. Another relation which is not directly addressed in my study, yet still illustrates Wheatland’s suggestion is the one between C. Wright Mills and Leo Löwenthal, which is well documented in the 2000 publication *C. Wright Mills – Letters an Autobiographical Writings*, edited by Kathryn and Pamela Mills.

73 For the first generation actively engaging with Critical Theory in the US, Marxian theory, especially Western Marxism (Lukács), was the gateway, not psychoanalysis (Zwarg 2017:85ff). Zwarg’s detailed account suggests a continuity of marginality in the reception of critical Marxist theory, at least with regard to academic circles. In the 1940s Marx and Critical Theory were picked up by the New York Intellectuals, some of whom can be located at the fringes of the sociological mainstream. In the late 60s and early 70s, a new generation of radical academics established its academic reception at the academic fringes. These fringes seemingly never followed Freudian ideas in order to end up with critical theory, they followed Marxian ideas from the outset.
in the disciplinary field. In the mainstream, studies were only capable of acquiring symbolic capital as innovative psychoanalytic studies. The social-philosophical underpinnings were at least esoterically – as Eva Maria Ziege describes it for Adorno’s contributions to *The Authoritarian Personality* (2009:270) – present in the studies and known to critical intellectuals at the fringes. However, they were generally not noticed, or misinterpreted as research biases in favor of leftists, as Shils’s earlier mentioned essay demonstrates.

Another incident, or anecdote, that illustrates the instrumental dynamics pervading the field concerns the publication of Leo Löwenthal’s *Terror's Atomization of Man* (1946), a psychoanalytically inspired study of the destruction of individuality under the conditions of total terror in concentration camps. Suggested for publication by American sociologist Robert Lynd, it was rejected by the AJS in 1944 with the argument that it would lack sufficient empirical data. It was finally published in *Commentary* (Löwenthal 1980:191-192). Löwenthal points at the absurdity of the editor’s – whose name he does not mention but who can be identified as Herbert Blumer – argument for rejecting the publication because it implied the necessity for collecting empirical evidence in concentration camps as a precondition for scientifically addressing the topic. Löwenthal was puzzled by the political naivety inherent to the editor’s remark (Ibid.:192). Blumer’s remark demonstrates political naivety and insensitivity, and it formulates the scientistic paradigm pervasive of the field and its inherent opposition to (meta)theoretical abstractions at the same time.

Parsons’s inspiration by neo-Freudianism led him to develop a proper psychoanalytic conceptual apparatus that reflected his structural/systemic functionalist universe rather than adopting neo-Freudian concepts. The impact of neo-Freudian revisionism on US sociology and culture follows another trajectory, which can be traced along the lines of the concept of the *social character*74, as Erich Fromm proposed it in *Escape from Freedom* and further developed and applied it in a number of additional, and quite influential books, such as *Man for Himself* (1947) and *The Sane Society* (1955). Especially Riesman’s *Lonely Crowd* adopts the notion. *Social character* became the backbone of Riesman’s study, which at the same time serves, due to its vast extra-academic success, as a popularizer of the idea. Riesman’s engagement with Freud found additional expression in the *Lonely Crowd’s* complementary volume *Faces in the Crowd* (1954) and a number of essays. Via Fromm, it did not take place

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74 The concept will be delineated in Chapter III, it questions Freud’s psychosexual development model by rejection drives as the major force behind character development and generally suggests a vast, almost complete and immediate societal/cultural impact in character formation.
at the radical fringes, nor did it fit the sociological mainstream. It rather suggests a separate trajectory, that of a sociologized, pragmatized, though still critical Freud adoption. The social character model informed and triggered a variety of sociological publications relying on the conceptualization of (immediate) relatedness of character development and social/cultural demands, as inscribed in Fromm’s model, such as C. Wright Mills’s follow-up’s *The New Men of Power* (1948), *White Collar* (1951), and *The Power Elite* (1956), Seymour Martin Lipset’s *Political Man* (1960), or William W. Whyte’s *Organization Man* (1956). Mills, one of the most prominent representatives of the radial American fringes, picked up the concept in more detail in the 1953 study *Character and Social Structure – The Psychology of Social Institutions*, co-authored by émigré sociologist Hans Gerth.

Sociologist Philip Rieff formulated “[a]t about the same time” as Parsons an analysis of “the moral implications of Freud’s thought” in his study *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* (1959) (Manning 2005:8). The study distanced itself from Parsons and “reinstated a question that was very important to the first generation of American sociologists; namely, is it possible to have a moral science of society?” (Ibid.:8-9). Rieff’s engagement with Freud and his further pursuit of the question led to the publication of his second major work, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic – Uses of Faith after Freud* (1966). Rieff was a former student of Riesman, who considered him at times “conservative” and “belligerent” and had doubts about him (Letters of David Riesman to Harvard Officials 12/14/1949 and 12/28/1949 HUGFP 99.12/Box 37/Folder: Rieff, Philip). He was also a friend of Herbert Marcuse, who especially liked him for his work, despite inter-personal shortcomings. Rieff’s work further diversifies the array of positions between mainstream and (so-called) radicals. Marcuse himself, especially with *Eros and Civilization* (1955), almost one decade later with *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), and with numerous essays, emerges as the most prominent representative of a radical position, who was still able to secure himself institutional positions without making amends towards the domination of scientism and objectivism. Though not a sociologist, social philosopher Norman Oliver Brown, friend and critic of Marcuse, and his two major works *Life against Death* (1959), and *Love’s Body* (1966) shifts into focus as another “Freudian Radical” (Robinson 1969) who insisted on drive theory.

75 In a letter to Leo Löwenthal, Marcuse states that he thinks highly of Rieff but that the latter belongs to those people who “throw people away” when no longer needed (Letter of Herbert Marcuse to Leo Löwenthal 1/14/1959 LLA:A992:185).
Theodor W. Adorno, despite his relocation to Germany in 1949 – together with the Institute – remained an important voice in the context of sociological Freud adoptions. Not only because of his co-authorship in the successful *Authoritarian Personality*, but because of the importance of psychoanalysis, especially drive theory, in the formulation of negative dialectics as it emerges in his entire oeuvre from *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1947 with Max Horkheimer) and *Minima Moralia* (1951), both written during exile but only published in German, over numerous essays to *Negative Dialectics* (1967). The concrete relation to the American sociological mainstream illustratively emerges in the quarrels before and after the *Heidelberger Soziologentag* in 1964, which was organized under Adorno’s directorship of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie*. It primarily concerned the concrete encounter of Talcott Parsons and Critical Theorists. From Adorno’s correspondences it becomes clear that he did not want to invite Parsons but could not avoid it; Marcuse was invited explicitly to counterpoise Parsons’s presence. Parsons post-conference correspondences with his friend and colleague Benjamin Nelson, who also attended the event, documented in detail in Uta Gerhardt’s *The Social Thought of Talcott Parsons* (2011), in which Nelson discusses his outright rejection of Marcuse, whom he heard lecturing in Heidelberg, provide a pretty clear picture of the irreconcilabilities between Nelson and Marcuse (Gerhardt 2011:145ff). Parsons’s approach towards Marcuse is deductible from the correspondence to a certain extent. These encounters, together with the analysis of individual protagonists’ positionings towards the student’s movement guide through Chapter’s III and IV. They play a significant role in the delineation of ideas of emancipation, underlying and illuminating conceptual divergences, which is provided in Chapter V.

By the time of the *Soziologentag*, both Parsonianism and US sociology’s engagement with psychoanalysis were in decline. *Critical Theory*, personified by Marcuse in the US and by Adorno in Germany, attracted increased attention by students and seemed to provide the vocabulary to address the widespread discontent in a societal status quo characterized by various forms of domination and the synchronism of affluence and (outsourced) exploitation. This vocabulary was, however, not picked up on any significant scale; its extrapolation remained confined to (radical) fringes of academia. While the relation of US sociology and US psychoanalysis was pulverized between the relentless grindstones of scientistic

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75 The verve with which Nelson, in the name of Weberian sociology, attacks Marcuse – most visibly in a New York Times article, to which Marcuse publicly responded and which was praised by Parsons in a letter to Nelson from 2/13/1967 (HUGFP 42.8.8/Box 10/ Folder: Nelson, Benjamin 1965-74, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives), illuminates the personal, and theoretical differences quite well.
rationalization and instrumental cooptation of legitimate emancipatory moves against psychoanalysis’s most reactionary expressions, Critical Theory never had a comparable relation to US sociology. Its relation to psychoanalysis would vanish in the wake of Habermas’s linguistic turn.76 However, its radical legacy persists at the fringes.

76 Habermas’s linguistic reorientation becomes evident in his 1968 Erkenntnis und Interesse. I will briefly summarize the central argument: The exhaustive study mobilizes Charles S. Peirce’s logic of understanding and Wilhelm Dilthey’s focus on the sphere of communication for a reevaluation of psychoanalysis; Habermas consequently carves out psychoanalysis’s potential as a science of depth hermeneutics. The depth dimension lies with Freud’s recognition of errors in the ‘texts’ of everyday speech and behavior, as something intentional and emerges in psychoanalysis’ overall objective to uncover the distortions’ original (traumatic) sources. Lack of memory, exclusions and other aberrations have proper contexts of meaning; there are hidden texts behind the obvious ones. The unconscious subsequently appears as the “class of all motivational urges which have taken on a life of their own […] coming from socially not licensed need-dispositions and they emerge in the causal relation between the original situation of renunciation and eventual aberrations in speech and behavior” (1973 [1968]:331, my translation). The unconscious is constituted by mutilated and regressed language material, which is renounced by the (external) forces of the reality principle. Such Material can eventually be restored by the depth-hermeneutical procedure that is psychoanalytic therapy.
Chapter III: Critical Theory and Psychoanalysis

In the preceding chapters, I sketched out the disciplinary fields of US psychology/psychoanalysis, US sociology, and the convergences of both represented in sociological Freud adaptations. My historical narration, oriented towards Bourdieuian field analysis, emphasizes the instrumental dimension structuring the field, and, at the same time, the simultaneity of diverging approaches and the complex (theoretical and personal) interplay of instrumental rationalization and (emancipatory) divergence. This is particularly eminent in the ambivalent role of the neo-Freudians as emancipatory critics of Freudian misogyny and homophobia. At the same time, the neo-Freudians are crucial references for an increasingly streamlined sociological mainstream, the constitutional exclusion of African American scholarship from the field’s major institutions and its dominant historiography, and the disparity of Studies reception and the social-philosophical thrust some of its authors ascribed to it. The historical narration is the foundation upon which I closely investigate the “fate” of psychoanalytic concepts in the works of the theorists introduced in Chapters I and II. The investigation starts with three exiled- and/or émigré Critical Theorists: Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor W. Adorno. I aim to delineate the contextual specificities Freudian concepts exhibit in the respective works with regard to (meta)theoretical underpinnings. The task, hence, is to accentuate Freud’s role in theoretical endeavors which position themselves (more or less) radically critical towards the societal status quo in Western, industrialized societies. The investigation further aims to shed light on the complexities of Critical Theory’s relation to US sociology (academia) that is inscribed in the Institute’s physical presence, the impact of its publications, and the delayed and persistently marginal academic reception of its social philosophy.

My investigation is mostly concerned with primary works. It is, however, complemented by an extensive body of literature on the history of Critical Theory, respectively the Institute of Social Research, or the Frankfurt School that has been published over the past 40 years. Among the most prominent volumes are Martin Jay’s The Dialectical Imagination (1973), Rolf Wiggershaus’s Die Frankfurter Schule (1988), Thomas Wheatland’s The Frankfurt School in Exile (2009), Eva-Maria Ziege’s Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie (2009), and Robert Zwarg’s quite recent Die Kritische Theorie in Amerika – Das Nachleben einer
Examining primary texts of Adorno, Fromm, and Marcuse in search of convergences, contradictions, and (dialectical) divergences in their specific approaches to psychoanalysis inevitably, and continuously, leads to the realization that it is impossible to transcend the richness, density and scholarly precision that characterizes these works. My intention, hence, is not to write yet another history of the Frankfurt School, but rather to locate and contextualize Critical Theory’s position within the dynamics of the increasingly diverse, yet inevitably mainstreaming, disciplinary field of American post-war sociology, with the specific interest in underlying, ideas of emancipation and their meta-theoretical contextualization. Psychoanalysis, as a common reference system across theoretical divergences, and because of its proper, inherent emancipatory thrust, is the vantage point into the discussion. Highlighting the ever specific readings of psychoanalysis in Adorno, Fromm, and Marcuse helps to arrive at a differentiated understanding of the underlying conceptions of society, individual, and emancipation, which, in turn, is crucial for my objective to illuminate the multifaceted character of psychoanalysis in American sociological theories in the face of its ambiguous legacy.

The way Freud is discussed, criticized and further developed differs considerably in Adorno, Fromm, and Marcuse. My discussion refrains from the methodologically questionable aim of (literal) comparison and rather aims at animating the concepts in the respective theoretical contexts and critical contestations; it however does not hide its own normative orientation. The discussion of psychoanalytic concepts is oriented towards the three categorical junctions of character structure, integration, and social change. The specificity of Adorno’s, Fromm’s and Marcuse’s approaches is inherent to the specific concepts they apply in order to address the issues the three categorical abstractions aim to summarize. My discussion sticks to the conceptual expressions applied by the theorists. Characteristic of all three theoretical universes discussed in this chapter, and of Critical Theory in general, is the centrality of the Marxian concept of alienation, which theorizes integration (at least into the ‘wrong society’) negatively. Inscribed in Critical Theory’s normative, emancipatory thrust is, further, the (more or less explicit) affirmation of Utopia as a concrete political possibility that (at least theoretically) directs social change. The chapter is altogether designated to sharpen the understanding of the ever specific ways Freudian concepts are applied and re-interpreted.
Freud and the ‘Institute’

The prehistory of Critical Theory and psychoanalysis can be traced to the 1920s, even before Max Horkheimer became director of the Institute in 1931 and turned it into the home base of Critical Theory. Horkheimer, Fromm, and Wilhelm Reich were affiliated with the Institute, which was at the time directed by Karl Grünberg and showed great interest in Freudian theory. All three underwent analysis: Horkheimer with Karl Landauer, Reich and Fromm with Otto Fenichel (Bock 2017:18-19); Fromm and Reich became trained analysts themselves. Adorno, also loosely affiliated with protagonists of the Institute, especially Horkheimer, worked on his first attempt of a habilitation treatise Begriff des Unbewussten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre at the time, in which he extensively grappled with psychoanalysis. After Horkheimer had assumed directorship, he started to actively extend the integration of psychoanalysis into the Institute’s theoretical and practical research interests; in the early phase, Fromm became his closest collaborator in this effort, while Wilhelm Reich pursued his own path. Horkheimer’s inaugural speech Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung, given in January 1931, suggests itself as a starting point in tracing the relation of Freudian- and

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78 The study “defended Freud from an idealist, Kantian position and then switched in the concluding pages to a Marxist, materialist analysis of the ideological reasons for the lack of acceptance of Freud” (Buck-Morss 1977:179). It was withdrawn by Adorno after Hans Cornelius, his supervisor, voiced concerns about its originality (Müller-Doohm 2003:156-161).

79 As one of the first and most outstanding ‘Freudo-Marxists’ of the early 1920s, Wilhelm Reich is an important figure in the orbit of the Institute and its protagonists, and Horkheimer’s, Adorno’s, and ‘romm’s, early interest in psychoanalysis. His most influential books Die Funktion des Orgasmus: Zur Psychopathologie und zur Soziologie des Geschlechtslebens, (1927), Massenpsychologie des Faschismus (1933), and Charakteranalyse: Technik und Grundlagen für studierende und praktizierende Analytiker, (1933) were ground-breaking ‘freudo-marxist’ analyses, which inspired and anticipated some of the Institute’s later works, such as Studien zu Autorität und Familie and Studies in Prejudice. Helmut Johach (2009) summarizes Reich’s role in psychoanalysis in the 1920s instructively: “The young Wilhelm Reich belongs, in 1920s Vienna to the outstanding personalities in psychoanalysis. However, in the Freudian circles he attracts attention because of the radicality with which he reformulates Freud’s scientific libido-theory as biological orgasm theory. At the same time, he rejects Freud’s modifications of psychoanalysis, especially the more pronounced necessity for cultural repression of drive energy. From his work at the Psychoanalytisches Ambulatorium develops his engagement in sexual-politics and his theoretical and practical interest in Marxism, which leads him to become active in Vienna, and later Berlin, in multiple ways” (189, my translation). Reich’s intellectual development, from his early encounters with Freud, and his participation in Freud’s discussion circles, the eventual breach with the ‘father’ (of psychoanalysis), sexual-politics activist, to orgon theory guru is certainly interesting, in its own right. For example, Paul Robinson points out that Reich considered Freud’s Unbehagen in der Kultur an indirect reaction to his own ideas (1969:311). In the context of my study, however, it only figures as a point of reference for Adorno and Fromm. This is due to the fact that by the 1940s, Reich, who immigrated to the US just like the Institute, had substituted his critical theoretical perspective with a practically oriented sex-polities approach that increasingly developed into a cult rather than a critical, scientific negotiation of Freudian theory. Especially because my focus lies with psychoanalysis in American sociological theories, Reich’s work does not play an important role. His function as a ‘Freudian Radical’ (Robinson 1969; King 1972) is rather that of a counter cultural guru, than that of a critical intellectual.
Critical Theory. He carves out the permanent dialectical interpenetration and ongoing development of philosophy and specialized scientific practice as the Institute’s new guiding spirit. The new approach is to overcome the established conception according to which the specialized scientist considers philosophy as a beautiful but scientifically fruitless exercise, while the philosopher is emancipated from the specialized scientist by the belief that there is no time to wait for the latter’s far-reaching conclusions (1931:10). Horkheimer emphasizes correlations between the economic life of society, the psychological development of the individual, and changes within the different fields of culture as structuring the contemporary discussions in philosophy, social-philosophy, and sociology (1931:13). Psychoanalysis was the available rational psychological theory of irrational behavior the Institute turned to (Elbe 2000:34). In Die Kritische Theorie - Eine Einführung (2009) Michael Schwandt suggests two crucial elements drawing the Institute’s attention to psychoanalysis: for one, that it is a psychology of the unconscious, which limits the conscious self’s reach and control; for another, the (inherently) materialist foundation of Freud’s drive theory, which conceptualizes the inner life of the individual as being necessarily entangled with its bodily existence (65-66). These foundations led the Frankfurt scholars to consider psychoanalysis a theory that inherently posed itself radically critical towards societal reality (Ibid.:70). It made it the most suitable psychological approach for the effort to develop a critical theory of society based in materialist, Marxist philosophy and oriented towards the human potentiality of reason.

The Frankfurt scholars diverged from Freud most fundamentally in their dialectical extrapolation of Freud’s essentialist understanding of human nature, as it is inscribed in the biologist foundations of drive theory. ⁸⁰ In a 1976 interview Horkheimer emphasizes that he was specifically drawn to Freud’s notion of the unconscious because it recognizes character traits that are not detectable by ‘apparatuses,’ nor are they considered to be mere facts (Ibid.:165). The notion of the unconscious provided Critical Theory with a theory capable of addressing irrational behavior, but it had to be freed from its biologist objectifications. In the early years of Horkheimer’s directorship, the person most prominently concerned with the task to integrate Freud and Marx is Erich Fromm (Jay 1973:88; Wiggershaus 1988:70ff; Schwandt 2009:62; Wheatland 2009:21).

⁸⁰ Freud notes that “the power of the Id expresses the actual living purpose of the individual being, which is the satisfaction of the needs it brought along.” The human being appears as an essentially drive driven, ego-centered creature here (Freud 1953:10; my translation).
The Early Years

Fromm was a trained sociologist. He first encountered psychoanalysis in the mid-1920s in Heidelberg at the private sanatorium of psychoanalyst Frieda Reichmann, whom he later married (Wiggershaus 1988:68-69). Since he did not hold a medical degree, he started practicing as a lay analyst in the late 1920s (ibid.). Psychoanalyst Rainer Funk notes that Fromm’s interest in psychoanalysis was always determined by his overall sociological outlook (1993:7). This interest was developed and put to work, before Horkheimer’s *Institute* and the institutional home of *Critical Theory* came into existence. In a 1929 essay, anticipating his future role at the *Institute*, Fromm states:

A psychoanalysis that conceptualizes human beings as socialized, in the sense that their mental apparatus is chiefly developed according to, and determined by the relation of individual and society, has to take up the task of providing its share in addressing sociological problems, as far as human beings and/or their psyche play a role in them. (1993b:13-14, my translation)

The human psyche only plays a limited role in the causality of sociological problems here; Fromm conceptualizes social structures as a proper force impacting the individual. This is where Fromm introduces Marx to his Freud interpretation. Fromm’s combination of psychoanalysis and sociology fitted Horkheimer’s programmatic vision. It was formulated before Horkheimer became director and Fromm was Horkheimer’s main source of inspiration and favored communication partner, at least until Adorno’s arrival at the *Institute* in New York in 1938, according to Erich Klein-Landskron. This even suggests that Horkheimer’s speech essentially verbalized aspects of Fromm’s vision (Klein-Landskron 1992:163). Elbe suggests that Fromm’s theory of society sets elements of Freudian and Marxian character conception in a dialectical relation: behavior patterns, initially independent of the psychic structure, are imposed on social actors by the inherent necessities of capitalist production and subsequently turn into an element of their drive structure (Elbe 2000:13). Elbe’s assessment sheds light on how Fromm negotiated Marx and Freud. Fromm himself points out in his early work that every form of society does not only have its proper economic and political structure, but also a specific libidinous one; psychoanalysis can, thus, especially illuminate certain aberrations from the direction of development that can be expected on grounds of economic presuppositions (1993c:19).
The specifics of and developments within Fromm’s Freud adaptation will be addressed later in more detail. In the history of the Institute’s interest in psychoanalysis, Fromm, as both an analyst and sociologist, constituted an important addition to its circle of scholars, which was by then mostly comprised of philosophers. In the early years, Fromm was the only member who had proper training as an analyst and experience in empirical research (Bierhoff 1991:60). Thomas Wheatland additionally suggests that Fromm’s innovations in social research, based in psychoanalytic methods, constituted a major breakthrough for German social sciences altogether (2009:26). With all these qualifications, Fromm assumed the position of the Institute’s research director 1930 to 1939, and was the main orchestrator of its first empirical project Studien zu Autorität und Familie. This study was based on what Bierhoff calls the art of psychoanalytic interpretation: a process of disclosure that is critical of ideology and differentiates between two levels of meaning; one that is consciously addressed and rationalized, and a hidden one that is determined by unconscious processes and factors (Bierhoff 1991:63). Studien über Autorität und Familie was published in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in 1936. Studien, with its unprecedented methodological set-up, constituted an outstanding project in the history of empirical social research, because it translated Horkheimer's programmatic vision into a concrete scientific effort. It was an important step for Institute members as a research group, and would, as Wheatland notes, additionally have a considerable impact on the further development of their empirical works, such as the Studies in Prejudices Project (Wheatland 2009:69). The question if there is a concrete methodological continuity from Studien to Studies in Prejudices has been controversially debated among actual participants, such as Fromm and Adorno, and among scholars writing their history.\(^\text{81}\)

However, regardless of the fact that it is difficult to compare the concrete research methodologies, the continuity emerges in the psychoanalytically refined interest in a correlation of authoritarian leanings and character structures, sociologically contextualized in a, however vaguely formulated (Studies), critical Marxian theory that characterizes both projects, and harks back to Horkheimer’s address.

\(^{81}\) Adam Schaff, who interviewed Fromm in the 1960s, holds that Fromm insisted that the studies presented in The Authoritarian Personality were actually based on his methodology, developed in Studien (Schaff 1987:45).
The Revisionism Controversy

Erich Fromm’s departure from the Institute is a decisive event for my investigation because the theoretical divergences characterizing it posit two irreconcilable positions, which echo in the disciplinary developments, debates, and confrontations surrounding the sociological adaptations of psychoanalysis in the American field in the postwar era. In the following, I subsume the argumentative substance of the theoretical divergences under the term revisionism controversy. This controversy is immediately linked to Fromm’s breach with the Institute in 1939. However, it lasted longer: Adorno and Marcuse in the 40s, 50s and early 60s repeatedly published essays and engaged in debates addressing what they perceived as the issue of neo-Freudian revisionism. Since there was no public (or published) debate at the time of the actual breach, the theoretical divergences surrounding it had to be recovered from at the time unpublished documents and correspondences. The major accounts addressing the Institute’s history, or that of single protagonists’, such as Martin Jay’s *The Dialectical Imagination* (1973), Rolf Wiggershaus’s *Die Frankfurter Schule* (1988), Burkhard Bierhoff’s *Erich Fromm und das Institut für Sozialforschung* (1991), Eva-Maria Ziege’s *Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftskritik* (2009), Thomas Wheatland’s *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (2011), Lawrence Friedman’s *The Lives of Erich Fromm* (2013), and Wolfgang Bock’s *Dialektische Psychologie* (2017), discuss the breach in differing detail and from differing angles. In the following, I will briefly recapture the main theoretical currents of the controversy in order to sharpen the perspective.

Despite the success of *Studien zu Autorität und Familie*, Fromm’s influence and standing in the Institute declined. In 1936, while the Institute was already affiliated with Columbia University in New York, Fromm had established himself as an increasingly successful lay

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82 Revisionism is the term Adorno and Marcuse continuously used to address and define the neo-Freudian reorientation that characterizes the works of Fromm, Horney, Sullivan and others (Adorno 1952/62; Marcuse 1955). I stick to the term in my account because it illustratively captures the polarization characterizing the controversy. In the 1980 volume *Der Stachel Freud – Beiträge und Dokumente der Kulturalismus Kritik*, editor Bernhard Görlich addresses the controversy as the *culturalism*- respectively the culturalism-revisionism debate (7;13). The term culturalism hints at concrete issues pertaining to the argumentative substance of the neo-Freudian reorientation, the fact that culture figures as the predominant force of socialization and character development. In the volume the debate between Fromm and Marcuse in *Dissent* (1955) is identified as the centerpiece of the controversy (Görlich et al 1980:7). In the exchange of arguments in *Dissent* the polarized positions emerge most illustratively due to the format of a confrontational debate. In my account of the controversy, however, I chiefly focus on the origins of the controversy. The *Dissent* debate exemplifies the long-term repercussions of the original fall-out, the continuous resurgence of the debate. These repercussions/resurgences are addressed in my discussions of the individual approaches to psychoanalysis in Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno.
analyst, was teaching at Columbia, and became more and more involved with New York intellectual circles which would later come to be described as the *Culture and Personality* movement (Bierhoff 1991:66; Friedman 2013:76-78). Particularly influenced by Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan and Margaret Mead (Friedman 2013:78), Fromm increasingly diverged from orthodox Freudian theory. The theoretical divergence eventually had severe consequences for his ties to the *Institute*. At the same time, Fromm’s orientation towards intellectual circles outside the *Institute* coincides with Adorno’s increasing theoretical and eventually also physical presence; the latter did not arrive in New York before 1938, but his employment at the Institute had been discussed with Horkheimer for several years (Jay 1996:98ff; Wiggershaus 1988:298ff). In his account, Burkhard Bierhoff suggests a concrete relation between Fromm’s drifting away and Adorno’s increasing presence in the *Institute*. He holds that the former’s influence declined to the extent that the latter’s increased (1991:67).

Bierhoff’s suggestion hints at the fact that the (intellectual) relation between Fromm and Adorno had been tense from the outset; it cumulated in the eventual theoretical fall-out over Fromm’s neo-Freudian re-orientation. It is traceable in a number of letters Adorno sent to Horkheimer over the course of three years. Fromm’s deviation from *Critical Theory’s* orthodoxy83 was firstly expressed in *Die Determiniertheit der Psychischen Struktur durch die Gesellschaft*, written for the *Institute’s* own *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1937, but never published in it.84 The essay helps to sharpen exact points of theoretical divergence, at least on Fromm’s side. On the side of those speaking on behalf of the *Institute* – this is, of course, most prominently its director Max Horkheimer at the time – the theoretical arguments against Fromm have to be retrieved mostly from correspondences.

In his earlier works Fromm still “accepted the psychoanalytic notion of character as the sublimation of reaction formation of fundamental libidinal drives” for the most part (Jay 1996:93). In the article, however, he formulated for the first time a proper approach to what he called *social psychology*, based in a full-fledged revision of Freudian drive theory.85 The

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83 Detlev Claussen talks about *Critical Theory’s* ‘hidden orthodoxy;’ the concept aims to capture the duality of *Critical Theory’s* general openness to include new historical experiences, and its self-understanding as firmly positioned in the tradition of dialectical materialism (1988:8). He additionally suggests that *Critical Theory* as a label itself operated as a code name in the anti-Marxist climate of the 1930s (1988:8).

84 For Horkheimer, Marcuse, Löwenthal, and Adorno the article sealed Fromm’s alienation from the *Institute*, and they prevented its publication; it was only recovered from Fromm’s estate in 1991 (Funk 1993:9-10).

85 Freud’s drive theory was developed, and revised in the course of his clinical work. It assumes basic drives, which are generally conceptualized as stimuli coming from the body’s inside, reaching into the psyche. The first version is outlined in *Triebe und Triebschicksale* (1915) and differentiates between sexual drives and ego drives. Both types are eventually governed by the *pleasure principle* and rooted in the same basic drive that is later
article marks a decisive point in both the development of *Critical Theory* and Fromm’s development as a social scientist and theoretician. In the article, he distinguishes two explanatory principles in Freud: the first one addresses psychological phenomena as the individual’s reaction to its environment and is most prominently expressed in Freud’s Oedipus complex; the second one explains psychological phenomena as directly resulting from sexual drives. Psychological phenomena are not a reaction to the environment here, but an expression of sexuality, modified by the environment (Fromm 1993d [1937]:159-161).

The differentiation is central to Fromm’s further theory development. While abandoning Freud’s second principle, he sticks to the first one and redefines it on his own terms. In Freud’s universe, the Oedipus complex appears as a universal phenomenon of human development. Fromm, however, points at its specific historic nature and contextualizes it in bourgeois society, more specifically the bourgeois family (Ibid.:174). It does not represent a universal pattern characterizing the emergence and further evolution of civilization and individual any longer, but becomes a socio-historically specific developmental pattern reflecting the conditions of European bourgeois capitalism. Fromm historicizes Freud’s concept and simultaneously emphasizes the impact of the societal sphere as its most valuable dimension. The super-ego, developing in the Oedipal phase as a response to and introjection of the father’s overpowering authority, is the psychological manifestation of the Oedipus complex. In Fromm’s sociological reinterpretation it is central as a mental representation of society. Fromm sets out to radically follow the principle of sociologization and proposes to

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defined as *Eros*. The theory was revised in 1920 in *Jenseits des Lustprinzip*. Freud introduces the *death drive* (later labeled as *Thanatos*) here as the fundamental opponent of *Eros*. The conceptualization of the death drive recognizes sadism, and especially masochism as phenomena not explainable by the pleasure principle and results from clinical work with WWI veterans who showed a *compulsion to repeat* traumatic, unpleasurable experiences in their dreams. While *Eros*, the life drive, aims at creating ever greater unities, *Thanatos*, the death drive, aims at dissolving bonds and destroying things, its final goal is to transfer the living into the inorganic state (Freud 1953:10). Drive theory underlies Freud’s conception of character development, which becomes the important point of departure for Fromm.

86 The notion of the Oedipus complex is firstly evoked in Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and assumed increasing importance in his theory of psychosexual development (1961 [1900]:270ff). It describes a phenomenon that occurs in the phallic stage (3-5 year olds). The child becomes aware of its gender and starts to explore its body. Freud holds that the boy starts to fantasize about the mother until he experiences the greatest trauma of his life through the threat of castration (by the father, whom he unconsciously wants to kill, but whose greater strength leads to the boy’s total submission) and through his realization of the mother’s ‘lack of penis’. The trauma marks the beginning of the latency period. The girl experiences fundamental frustration in her realization of her ‘lack of penis’ (Freud 1953:18). Freud’s conceptualization of the Oedipus complex defines female sexuality as fundamentally inferior and characterized by lack. Fromm questions the notion and takes a critical stance on the implied assumption that patriarchy had always existed (Friedman 2013:46). It constitutes a naturalization of the patriarchal organization of bourgeois society, inherently attributing power and agency to the male. The reason for Fromm to stick to the Oedipus Complex as a *prototypical model* for the further development of his social psychology lies with the fact that the model is built on the assumption of culture’s (or society’s) deep impact on the development of character. The drives play only a secondary role in it.
make it a general standard for explaining psychological impulses and attitudes (Ibid.:180). The eventual motivational source of character development, behavior, and interaction is not libidinal energy, but is inscribed in the individual's social relatedness to its environment.

The role of the family consequently changes as a result of this redefinition; it is chiefly considered a psychological agent of society (Ibid.:179). While it represented an archaic structure and model hierarchy in Freud, it comes to represents contemporary society in Fromm. With regard to Freud’s notion of the reality principle, this has severe consequences: while in Freud the family, more specifically the father, appears as a manifestation of the reality principle as it has evolved in the general course of cultural development, in Fromm it turns into a representation of the historic specificity of contemporary culture/society. Fromm’s reinterpretation of the Oedipus Complex mechanism identifies society, or more specifically the individual’s immediate social environment, as the major driving force of character development.

Fromm claimed that his practical experiences as an analyst led him to his theoretical revision (Ibid.180). In an earlier article, Die gesellschaftliche Bedingheit der psychoanalytischen Therapie (1935), which appeared in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Fromm already questioned Freud’s practical therapeutical approach. In Freud’s call for the analyst’s neutrality and emotional distance, which, according to Fromm would rather suit a surgeon than the “magnificent new situation which is inherent to the relation of analyst and patient” (1993a [1935]:42, my translation), he detects rigid bourgeois morality: “We want to show that underneath the value-freedom and liberalism lurks an approach which respects the taboos of bourgeois morality and abhors their infringement no less than the conservative members of the same social class” (Ibid.:63, my translation). With reference to Sandor Ferenczi, Fromm juxtaposes a humane, benevolent approach that unconditionally supports the patient’s strivings for happiness to Freud’s patri-centric, authoritarian, and in its deep structures misanthropic tolerance (Ibid.:63). While drive theory is not fundamentally challenged in the

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87 Freud juxtaposes the individual pleasure principle with the cultural reality principle. While the former strives for immediate and egoistic drive gratification, the latter represents the impossibility of immediate gratification that occurs in civilization. The need for the postponement of pleasure in order to maintain culture lies at the center of the concept. The family, in turn, represents the reality principle with regard to the ontogenetic development of the infant. The father is, in Freud, its most concrete representative because he forbids the (son’s) desire for the mother. The reality principle is represented in the individual’s psyche by the super-ego, as the internalized voice of the father, established during childhood, and the ego as the entity negotiating external demands and Id based desires, established in the phylogenetic process (Freud 1953:6ff).
earlier article, the later revision is already palpable.\textsuperscript{88} Both articles demonstrate how Fromm increasingly drifted away from orthodox Freudianism towards an explicitly humanistic social psychology. In the second article, Fromm even reflects the probability of orthodox Freudian resistance against his hypotheses and insists on the revision as a necessary and consequent continuation of Freud’s theory (1993d [1937]:179; 180). The revision of Freudian theory is presented as a necessary progression of theory.

While it was eventually the abandoning of Freud’s second explanatory model – drive theory – which lead to Fromm’s departure from the \textit{Institute}, the earlier article already caused some of the orthodox reactions. In a 1936 letter to Horkheimer Adorno attacked Fromm’s call for benevolence sharply; he identified it as sentimental and wrongly immediate (falsch unmittelbar), as a mixture of social democracy and anarchism, characterized by a considerable lack of dialectical apprehension (Adorno in Gödde and Lonitz 2003:129). The accusation of insufficient dialectical apprehension is at the center of Adorno’s, and subsequently Horkheimer’s, insistence on drive theory against Fromm’s revisions. Adorno insists in the letter that “especially when we criticize Freud from the left, things like the foolish argument of ‘lack of benevolence’ should not happen. This is exactly the spin bourgeois individualists have against Marx. I cannot withhold from you that I see a real threat to the line of the \textit{Zeitschrift in this work}” (Ibid.:129-130). The conceptual foundation underlying Adorno’s accusation of an insufficiently dialectical perspective is explicated in more detail in an earlier letter. Already in November 1934, Adorno, who was at the time affiliated with Oxford University in the UK, informed Horkheimer about his own psychoanalytic ambitions in a letter. The letter, which Wolfgang Bock has called Adorno’s “great letter” (26, my translation) in his recent study \textit{Dialektische Psychologie} (2017) is a response to Horkheimer’s offer of a closer collaboration with the \textit{Institute} in New York and presents Adorno’s vision of how such collaboration could become reality. Following Bock’s analysis, the letter is very strategic in nature\textsuperscript{89}. It launches Adorno’s attack on Fromm as the \textit{Institute}’s director of empirical research, its only trained analyst, and Horkheimer’s closest collaborator (Ibid.:26f). Adorno claims psychoanalysis – besides music – to be his field of expertise and introduces, via a pronounced critique of Fromm, his own conceptualization of a \textit{dialectical psychology}. It would eventually prove successful in securing him the desired position on Horkheimer’s side.

\textsuperscript{88} In the article Fromm criticizes Freud’s theory of sublimation suggesting that it reflects a “skeptical, if not negative approach to sexual satisfaction” (1993d [1935]:51).

\textsuperscript{89} I want to specifically emphasize the strategic character against the background of Adorno’s highly precarious situation in British exile and the fact the \textit{Institute} offered a more secure perspective. I refrain from furthering the impression that Adorno pursued a longstanding strategy directed against Fromm personally.
Psychoanalysis emerges as one of Adorno’s central theoretical interests: Adorno outlines a dialectical critique of Freud’s reality principle (Bock 2017:616). Fromm and Wilhelm Reich figure as opposing referential points, in-between and against which Adorno positions himself:

I would like to proceed from Reich, who […] is, e.g., in the right against Fromm when he rejects the seamless transference of individual psychology onto social theory […] but who himself makes instructive mistakes and seems to raise the danger of Feuerbachianism⁹⁰ (“healthy sensuality”), wrong immediacy, in short: Anarchism, namely, and that’s interesting, by failing in psychological theory itself (because he absolutizes genital libido in a sense and posits it as a measuring pole by adapting a highly suspicious biology).⁹¹ (Adorno after Bock 2017:37, my translation)

Preserved in the critique of wrong immediacy, which he levels against Reich in the first and against Fromm in the second letter, is the accusation of insufficient dialectical apprehension. While Fromm increasingly – without yet disposing of drive theory – emphasizes the individual’s social relatedness, Reich reifies the drives into a biological entity. They (only) have to be unleashed against the current reality principle as the representation of a bourgeois, capitalist status quo. Adorno criticizes Fromm for erecting a “false hierarchy” (Bock 2017:36, my translation) by proceeding from individual psychology in order to draw conclusions about society instead of tracing the relation from the opposite direction (Ibid.).

Adorno’s materialist perspective, which emphasizes the preponderance of the object, is quite explicitly pronounced here. His suggestion of a dialectical psychology is steeped in Marx’s objective mediation. Regarding Reich’s reification of genital libido, he goes on to explain:

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⁹⁰ The term Feuerbachianism references Marx’s critique of philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, pronounced in the former’s famous Thesen über Feuerbach (1845). The general gist of Marx’s Thesen was to prove that the existing, objective world can only be understood through mediation (Schmieder 2006:205). Objective mediation, as opposed to the Hegelian notion of mediated immediacy, is the central category. Feuerbach is accused of developing a materialism that is merely descriptive and not capable of transcending the bourgeois order because it does not reflect that totally of societal mediation in bourgeois consciousness.

⁹¹ German original (after Bock 2017:37): „Ich würde ganz gern von den Dingen von Reich ausgehen, der manches Gute hat (z. B. m. E. gegen Fromm insofern im Recht ist als er die bruchlose Übertragung der individuellen Psychologie auf die Sozialtheorie ablehnt), aber insgesamt höchst instruktive Fehler macht und von einer ganz neuen Seite die Gefahr des Feuerbachianismus („gesunde Sinnlichkeit“), der falschen Unmittelbarkeit, kurz des romantischen Anarchismusheraufzuführen scheint, und zwar, das ist das Interessanteste, durch Versagen in der psychologischen Theorie selbst (weil er nämlich die genitale libido gewissermaßen verabsolutiert und als Maß setzt, unter Übernahme einer höchst fragwürdigen Biologie).“
My own considerations revolve around the mediation of society and psychology, which is central really. And I think it doesn’t work to simply assume the disallowance of genital satisfaction (just as it doesn’t work to statically assume poverty as a Marxist), instead of such invariable libido, one would have to understand it in its own societal phases, which first of all means to trace the problem of mental reification, if one wants to avoid falling back onto an un-dialectical anthropology. (The Nazi, torturing prisoners, doesn’t do it because of repressed genital libido, which often enough doesn’t have to be repressed at all, but because of repressed sadism; even partial drives can be repressed and are themselves not immediately to be characterized as repressions, but as historical stages of the altogether pretty dark libido in class society.) You may see, roughly, what my objective is, and where I differ from Reich, and also Fromm (who, in a different way, namely because he chooses the individual as a model, insufficiently enforces the commodity character). I would like to formulate these things once as “ideas of a dialectical psychology”; here I can, of course, only provide first beginnings.92 (Adorno after Bock 2017:51, my translation)

Adorno’s insistence on the Marxian categories of commodity character and reification, and their psychological implications, underscores his materialist critique of both Reich and Fromm. The Nazi torturer in Adorno’s example is not driven by genital libido misdirected by a repressive reality principle, as Reich would have it, but by repressed sadism as a representation of a historically forged partial drive. Bock illuminatingly points out that Adorno emphasizes the possibility of repressed partial drives as forms of mental reification because he takes the death drive, introduced by Freud with Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), seriously (2017:52). Fromm and Reich, however, both reject the notion of Thanatos and proceed from Freud’s earlier model, which assumes libido – Eros – as the only drive-representation (and, in the case of Fromm, eventually abandon it altogether) (Ibid.). Adorno’s expression of class society’s ‘dark libido’ contains, hence, a twofold critique of Reich, Fromm, and also of Freud himself. Agreeing with Reich and Fromm, he insists on the historically specific nature of the reality principle. With Freud’s dual model of drive theory,

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92 German original (after Bock 2017:51): „Meine eigenen Überlegungen kreisen um das Problem der Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Psychologie, das ja wohl das zentrale ist. Und ich denke, es geht nicht an, einfach von der Versagung der genitalen Befriedigung auszugehen (so wenig man als Marxist etwa statisch von der Armut ausgehen kann), sondern anstelle dieser invarianten libido wird man sie selber in ihren gesellschaftlichen Phasen zu verstehen haben, d. h. aber vor allem dem Problem der psychischen Verdinglichung nachzugehen haben, wenn man nicht in eine undialektische Anthropologie zurückfallen will. (Der Nazi, der die Gefangenen foltert, tut es nicht aus verdrängter genitaler libido, die oft genug gar nicht verdrängt zu sein braucht, sondern aus verdrängtem Sadismus; auch die Partialtriebe können verdrängt werden und sind nicht selber unmittelbar als Verdrängungen zu charakterisieren, sondern eben als historische Stufen der, an sich ganz dunklen, libido in der Klassengesellschaft.) Sie sehen vielleicht etwa, wohin ich ziele und worin ich mich von Reich, aber auch von Fromm (der eben auf andere Weise, nämlich durch die Wahl des Individuums als Modell, den Warencharakter nicht hinreichend durchsetzt) unterscheide. Ich würde gern versuchen, einmal diese Dinge als „Ideen zu einer dialiktischen Psychologie“ zu formulieren; hier kann ich Ihnen natürlich nur Ansätze bezeichnen.“
however, he posits the dual existence of libidinal and destructive drives as representations of historically forged forces which pre-date the individual’s immediate social experiences. Bock emphasizes that for Adorno libido and Thanatos never appear in concrete forms, but, as Freud had it, as concrete mental drive representations (Ibid.). It follows that concrete appearances, such as sadism, are always already mediated. For Adorno the representative nature of the Freudian drive model is the vantage point to dialectically unfold Freud’s notion of the drives against the backdrop of a historical materialist analysis of bourgeois society.

In a letter to Fromm himself, concerning the rejected ZfS article Die Determiniertheit der psychischen Struktur durch die Gesellschaft, Adorno, repeats the divergences already sketched out in the earlier letters. He insists that Marxism’s and psychoanalysis’ methodological contradictions become dialectically maneuverable only when economic fetishism can be demonstrated as the law governing psychological fetishizations (Adorno to Fromm 11/16/1937, after Gödde and Lonitz 2003:539ff). Hence, the inherent task of a dialectical psychology is to investigate/reflect the (pre-)historical, psychological implications of commodity fetishism. Marxian theory becomes the conceptually prevalent, dialectical guideline for the extrapolation of psychoanalytic concepts, without aiming to resolve the methodological tension completely, however.

Adorno’s increasing presence at the Institute and his role in Critical Theory’s engagement with psychoanalysis – both in its empirical and theoretical projects – most prominently condense in the simultaneously pursued projects of The Authoritarian Personality (1950, with Brunswik et al), Dialectics of Enlightenment (1947, with Horkheimer), and Minima Moralia (1951). They are explicitly pronounced in Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie ujnd Gesellschaftstheorie (1952) and Die Revidierte Psychoanalyse (1962). In these publications, Adorno’s specific approach to psychoanalysis figures heavily. The conceptual details of this approach will be addressed later. With regard to Adorno’s functions within the Institute’s organizational structure, the hypothesis that Adorno was Fromm’s successor is tempting. However, the relation of psychoanalysis and Critical Theory, – the Institute’s proclaimed social philosophy – necessitates to include Marcuse, whose 1955 Eros and Civilization not only addresses the relation in great detail, but also picks up the debate with Fromm in its epilogue “Critique of neo-Freudian Revisionism” (238ff).\(^93\) Both Adorno’s and Marcuse’s

\(^93\) Shortly before the book’s publication, the radical American journal Dissent published the epilogue under the title “The Social Implications of Freudian Revisionism,” followed by Fromm’s reply “The Human Implication of
continuous interventions against ‘revisionism’ repeat the general spirit of the arguments made by Adorno in the three letters. I will address the letters and Fromm’s immediate replies in more detail in the respective sub-chapters.

Fromm’s breach with Institute became final in 1939 when his payments were officially stopped by Horkheimer.94 It is noteworthy that by that time, he had already established himself quite properly in the circles of New York psychoanalysts. The earlier mentioned debate around the comparability and methodological continuities concerning Studien zu Autorität und Familie and Studies in Prejudice arose in face of Fromm’s abandonment of Freudian drive theory. The breach constituted an internal struggle over theoretical differences. However, it did neither contradict the general spirit, at the Institute, which was guided by the interest in psychoanalysis nor the increasingly different trajectories Fromm on the one, and the remaining Critical Theorists, on the other, pursued after the breach. For the development of my general argument about the dialectical dimension of divergence, the breach becomes a decisive moment as a point of conceptual solidification that proves capable of illuminating major cleavages between Critical Theory, American mainstream sociology and the neo-Freudian trajectories. The controversy most illustratively condenses in Fromm’s departure; at the same time, it stretched over more than three decades. The actual physical rift pinpoints the irreconcilability of theoretical positions, while the dialectical dimension of the divergences emerges in the continuous resurgence of the debate: neo-Freudian revisionism became a negative foil for Critical Theory against which its own approach to Freudian theory was repeatedly reinstated.

Critical Theorists

For my purposes, Fromm’s further development as a theorist proves relevant, due to his great, direct and indirect, impact on the American academic and cultural sphere. I (still) address his works as those of a critical theorist, although he was excluded from the orthodoxy of Critical Instinctivist Radicalism”, Marcuse’s “A Reply to Erich Fromm” and eventually Fromm’s “A counter-rebuttal to Herbert Marcuse”. The conceptual details resonate in my further delineation of Freudian concepts and revolve around the core accusation of insufficiently dialectical apprehension leveled against Freud by Marcuse.

94 Horkheimer first, yet still subtly, responded to Adorno's attacks on Fromm in 1937 letter stating that “despite all the finesse of Fromm’s psychological descriptions, there is the danger of sliding into revisionism” would currently be discussed in New York (Horkheimer to Adorno 4/6/1937 TWAA Br-0670 670/44-46).
Fromm continued to insist on Marxian categories when analyzing the relation of individual and society. At the same time, he influenced prominent American sociologists, such as David Riesman, and prominently proposed the sociological revision of psychoanalysis characterizing the work of Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan and others (McLaughlin 2001; Fromm 1973). Hence, in shifting the focus from ‘orthodox’ *Critical Theory* to critical theorists *Fromm*, Adorno and Marcuse, Fromm moves into the position of a theory-cultural ambassador or transitional figure because in his work, the boundaries of theoretical trajectories are transcended. Fromm’s importance in the early phase of the *Institute* raises the question if his influence on the American academic sphere and his sociologization of psychoanalysis could not actually be interpreted as the consequent realization of the goals Horkheimer had proposed in his inaugural address in 1931: constant theory development and the dialectical interpenetration of social philosophy and empirical research. Against the backdrop of the conceptual debate around Fromm’s abandonment of drive theory, the question becomes especially interesting. Fromm’s reorientation coincides with the moment *Critical Theory* really takes shape as a social philosophy. This is expressed in Horkheimer’s essay *Traditionelle und kritische Theorie* (1937) and Marcuse’s *Philosophie und kritische Theorie* (1937). The fall-out between Fromm and other *Institute* members, continued by Adorno and Marcuse, emerges as a critical juncture that highlights the solidification of the respective conceptual foundations. My analysis is thus also guided by the question why Fromm left.

Revisiting *Critical Theory* in light of its adaptation of psychoanalysis finally leads to the recognition of another vital theoretical trajectory: the Marxian critique of the political

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95 In a 1986 article, sociologist John Rickart suggests that especially Fromm’s quarrel with Marcuse in *Dissent* (1955-56) led to a major misrepresentation of Fromm’s work among radical intellectuals which eventually was complicit in Fromm’s eradication from the historiography of critical theory after his departure from the *Institute*. Rockert concludes: “In distorting and subsequently neglecting his work, Fromm's critics have not only repressed the thought of one of the left's most passionate and penetrating spokesmen, they have also failed to benefit fully from the insights Fromm has to offer” (1986:387).

96 The Marxian concept of alienation is central to Fromm’s conceptualization of society, the specifics of which will be addressed later and figure illustratively in his *Beyond the Chains of Illusion – My Encounter with Marx and Freud* ([1962] 2009).

97 Horkheimer instructively summarized what he perceived as the *Institute for Social Research*’s new task. He emphasizes the idea of a permanent dialectical interpenetration and ongoing development of philosophical theory and specialized scientific practice. The new approach is to overcome established conceptions according to which the specialized researcher/scientist considers philosophy a beautiful but scientifically fruitless exercise while philosophers emancipate themselves from specialized scientists because they cannot wait for the latter in their universal, and overarching conclusions (Horkheimer 1931:10). Horkheimer's speech outlines the aspirations of the renewed *Institute* quite instructively. The dialectical interpenetration of social philosophy and empirical research constitutes a hitherto unprecedented orientation in social thought and sociological practice.
economy. The importance (and subtle predominance) of Marx for Critical Theory cannot be ignored; Marxian concepts are fundamentally integrated into Adorno’s, Fromm’s, and Marcuse’s theorizing. At the same time, Marx was not prominently discussed in the American sociological sphere before the 1970s (Gouldner 1970). The Institute’s encounter with the American academic sphere and the delayed reception of Critical Theory thus demarcate an era characterized by an increasing interest in Marx’s critique of capitalism. My study is dedicated to investigating the role of psychoanalysis in this era. This task cannot, however, be properly taken up without recognizing the importance of this other trajectory. For my study in general, and this chapter in particular, it follows that the discussion of Marx will be included whenever necessary, but altogether remains secondary to the discussion of Freud.
Erich Fromm’s importance for the development of (early) *Critical Theory* emerges in the centrality *Studien* assumes in the *Institute’s* early publication history. Horkheimer’s and Fromm’s personal relation is, however, depicted quite differently by various scholars. Fromm-scholar Erich Klein-Landskron suggests that Fromm had been the main source of inspiration for Horkheimer and his most important communication partner, at least until Adorno’s arrival at the exiled *Institute* in 1938 (1992:163). This is called into question by Wiggershaus’ emphasis on the ambivalence Horkheimer expressed about Fromm in a letter to Pollock as early as 1934 (1988:298). However, the personal relationship recedes into the background in light of Fromm’s eminent role as the *Institute’s* director of empirical research and its only trained psychoanalyst. He contributed considerably to the *Institute’s* output in the early phase and was an integral part in the effort to develop a critical theory of society while engaging in empirical studies. Wheatland notes that “[w]ith Fromm’s departure, the Institute could be seen for what it really was -- a collection of social theorists and philosophers” (2009:84). Fromm’s empirical orientation was of great importance to the *Institute’s* aspirations to empirical research, which, in turn was a crucial aspect in Columbia University’s interest in the *Institute*. Wheatland’s suggestion highlights the centrality of Fromm’s training as a psychoanalyst and a sociologist for the *Institute* as a scientific institution in exile. This ‘professional’ aspect of Fromm’s biography is crucial for my work: Fromm’s social psychological approach reflects, in its conceptual apparatus, the orientation of a pragmatic, practically engaged social scientist.

In the analysis of Fromm’s conceptual apparatus, my main focus lies with notions of character, sexuality, alienation, and social change – i.e. the conceptions of liberated and/or improved societal conditions implicit to Fromm’s thinking. The categorical junctions help to relate Fromm’s ideas to those developed by the other theorists discussed in my work. Social

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98 Horkheimer informs Pollock that Fromm does have productive ideas but that he wouldn’t like him too much because he (Fromm) would want to have good relations with too many people at the same time (Wiggershaus 1988:298).
99 Martin Jay suggests that “it was […] primarily through Fromm’s work that the Institute first attempted to reconcile Freud and Marx” (1996:88).
100 He was, however, not a trained physician, which cause him some trouble later in the US and resulted in losing his license as a psychoanalyst (Zaretsky 2004:289).
change is the one that most prominently resonates with my main research interests: respective notions of emancipation and their psychoanalytic implications.

**Multiple Careers**

Fromm pursued multiple careers and inhabited a variety of social positions in his lifetime, as psychoanalyst, social scientist, critical/public intellectual, bestselling (self-help) author, and political activist. For my project, the interest lies chiefly with the work he pursued at the Institute and specifically during and after his departure. The ZfS articles discussed above provide a solid foundation for the further engagement with a series of three books in which he specifically develops the social character model that lies at the center of his reinterpretation of Freud: *Escape from Freedom* (1941), *Man for Himself* (1947), and *The Sane Society* (1955). A brief snippet of some important stages in his careers and societal positions illuminates the closer analysis of the theoretical works. His encounter with Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan and other members of the Zodiac group, such as the cultural anthropologists Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Clara Thompson, is crucial to the theory revisions expressed in the two ZfS articles. Especially Freud’s naturalization of what was identified by Mead, Benedict, and Thompson as a socio-historically specific patriarchic social order caused him to reject the Freudian notion of psychosexual development. Lawrence Friedman traces the feminist inflection Fromm’s Freud revision acquired in the orbit of the Zodiac group to the cultural anthropologists:

Fromm was heavily influenced by the challenge that the Mead group had launched against the orthodox Freudian perspective on gender roles. Under the guise of a modernist project that underscored the efficacy of libidinal release, Mead, Benedict, and others in the group criticized the traditional interpretation for justifying patriarchy and the subordination of women. As the Mead group became intertwined with the neo-Freudian psychoanalysts, Fromm, Sullivan, Kardiner, and Sapir became more feminist than they might otherwise have been. (2013:92)

The feminist critique of Freudian patriarchy lends Fromm’s revisions a concrete emancipatory thrust, which, in the context of my research interest, emphasizes his dual, contradictory position as streamliner and emancipator. The concrete emancipatory dimension condenses in his career as a political activist; he was an outspoken opponent of the nuclear arms race of the post-war era, actively and publicly supported Democratic Senator Eugene McCarthy’s
primary elections campaign in 1968 and was generally well established in the circles of the American political and cultural elite (Friedman 2013:273).

Fromm’s multiple engagements did not leave his work as a social theorist unaffected. To the extent that his public visibility increased, the quality of his theoretical output decreased. Friedman points out that the

[M]ore recent books (M[ay] M[an] P[revail]? [1961], Marx’s Concept of Man [1961], Beyond the Chains of Illusion [1962]) borrowed heavily from conceptual structures and historical perspectives that Fromm had developed in the 1930s and early 1940s, culminating with the publication of *Escape from Freedom*. He became an increasingly self-referential writer, often drawing on the premises of his early publications. In brief, Fromm had not taken adequate advantage of the tough but significant criticisms of discerning colleagues in quite some time. (2013:251)

Friedman implies here that the controversy over his increasing distance to Freudian orthodoxy in his *Institute* years lead Fromm to sharpen his theoretical positions. *Escape from Freedom* is the most immediate outcome of this process. It has, by now, been widely recognized as his major work (Honneth 2006:152). Overlapping with Friedman, Axel Honneth suggests that the study owes its density not least to Fromm’s persistent aspiration for theoretical autonomy, which eventually led him to distance himself from some of the *Institute’s* premises on social psychological work (2009:152). While Friedman’s implication highlights controlling dimension of external criticism as a means of sharpening theoretical perspectives, Honneth’s emphasizes personal qualities. With reference to both, I want to insist on the dialectical dimension inscribed in the conceptual divergence over the emancipatory potential of Freudian theory. The fall-out with Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse further solidified a position developed in conversation with other critical intellectual circles. With *Escape from Freedom* and its immediate successors, Fromm had firmly established himself as a very influential figure in American academic life.101 In the following discussion circling the categorical junctures of social character, integration and social change, I focus chiefly on these early, influential works.

101 Friedman points at a number of theorists whose works were influenced- and anticipated by Fromm’s: “In elaborating on mindless “automaton conformity”, Fromm anticipated the substantial and exciting postwar literature on consumer culture” (2013: 110) illustrated in C. Wright Mills’s studies on labor *White Collar – The American Middle Classes* (1951), *The Power Elite* (1956, William Whyte’s *Organization Man* (1956) And of course David Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd* (1950), to name the most prominent examples.
Social Character and Scientific Progress

Already in the two ZfS articles, Fromm presents the revision of Freudian theory as a necessary progression of social theory and redefines psychoanalysis in sociological terms. Fromm’s renunciation of drive theory is conceived under influence of, and further deepens the similarities with, the neo-Freudians, such as Horney and Sullivan. The similarities become an important point of conceptual solidification in the revisionism controversy because the attacks leveled against Fromm by his former colleagues Adorno and Marcuse are similarly directed at Horney, Sullivan and other neo-Freudians, resp. revisionists. Adorno and Marcuse generally target the abandonment of drive theory, as a new development in American psychoanalytic theory and in its claim to represent psychoanalysis’s state of the art, under the umbrella term of revisionism. In *Man for Himself* (1947), Fromm states that “[t]he progress of psychoanalytic theory led, in line with the progress of the natural and social sciences, to a new concept which was based, not on the idea of a primarily isolated individual, but on the relationship of man to others, to nature, and to himself” (1990 [1947]:57). Fromm considers Freud’s original concepts as legitimate beginnings and, moreover, explicitly evokes a paradigm of scientific progress that (even) orients itself towards the natural sciences and presents itself as a process of ever increasing enlightenment.

In *Die gesellschaftliche Determiniertheit*, Fromm reduces Freud’s drive model, of which he had never accepted the dualistic version, culminating in the proposition of *Eros* and *Thanatos*, radically. He solely differentiates between natural physiological drives, such as hunger, and historical, psychological impulses (Fromm 1993a [1937]:186). The crucial sociological innovation lies with the fact that these impulses are considered to be subject to change in the course of the societal process. In *Escape from Freedom*, he explicitly accuses Freud of naturalizing the capitalist social order of bourgeois society by eventually reducing human motivation to biological drives which would, however, only resemble the competitive principle of society’s economic structure (1994 [1941]:10). Freud’s notion of psychosexual development, eventually a process of continuous drive renunciation, is targeted as apologetically theorizing the inescapability, and naturalness of the capitalistic, patriarchal, bourgeois status quo. Upon the foundation of this revision, Fromm erects, in the further

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102 Fromm exemplifies his alternative understanding of character development with reference to Freud’s ‘anal character.’ While in Freud the anal character exhibits character traits that result from a fixation in the anal stage
course of his scholarly career, his characterology that is best exemplified in the notion of social character.

The assumed progress of psychoanalytic theory condenses in the notion of social character; it is the most prominent conceptual consequence of abandoning drive theory. Fromm repeatedly posits the individual’s specific relatedness to the world as social psychology’s key problem against Freud’s theory of libidinal frustrations and satisfactions (1994 [1941]:10). The crucial realization is that if most drives are products of the social process and individually specific, society can no longer be understood as only having a repressive function with regard to individual development; it has to have a creative one too (Ibid.:11). This creative impact, ascribed to the social sphere, is the decisive renewal that sets Fromm (also: Horney and Sullivan) fundamentally apart from Freud. It figures prominently in the revisionism controversy and altogether adds another, concrete, emancipatory dimension to the conceptualization of the social individual. In The Sane Society, Fromm defines social character as follows: “[t]he concept [refers] to the nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture in contradistinction to the individual character in which people belonging to the same culture differ from each other” (2002 [1955]:76). Social character is to be distinguished from individual character; the latter is formed “by the impact of [individual] life experiences, the individual ones and those which follow from the culture, on temperament and physical constitution” (1990 [1947]:61). In contrast to social character, individual character is a rather fixed entity; together both define the social individual’s character structure in a historically and culturally specific society.

The importance of productivity and creativity in Fromm’s thinking is inscribed in the way he conceives of the concept’s social function. Social character functions in two different ways. For one, it is “in the dynamic sense of analytic psychology […] the specific form in which human energy is shaped by the dynamic adaptation of human needs to the particular mode of existence of a given society”, for another, “[c]haracter […]in turn determines the thinking, feeling, and acting of individuals” (2002 [1955]:76). Fromm sociologically integrates this double function with Marxist vocabulary: social character becomes the mediating entity between society’s economic base and its cultural superstructure.103 Beyond the Chains of

during childhood development, it becomes a representation of the socio-historically specific European petite bourgeois in Fromm (1993d [1937]:200).

103 In Die achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Napoleon Marx states: Auf den verschiedenen Formen des Eigentums, auf den sozialen Existenzbedingungen erhebt sich ein ganzer Überbau verschiedener und eigentümlich
Illusion (1962) contains a graph illustrating social character’s double function within the framework of the Marxian base-superstructure model:

![Graph of Economic Base, Social Character, and Ideas and Ideals](image)

(2009 [1962]:68)

Social character is supposed to supplement the Marxian model. Society produces the type of social character it needs in order to keep functioning. The specific requirements of a given society towards its individuals are internalized and reproduced without the detour of conscious decision making. The individual reproduces the basic demands of the economic order within the realm of her desires: “The method of production […] determines the social relations […] It determines the mode and practice of life” (2002:78-79). The superstructure of ideas and ideals is, however, not conceptualized as a main reflection of the economic needs, they are, moreover “rooted in the social character [but] they in turn also determine, systematize and stabilize” it (Ibid.:79). Society appears as a dynamic process with social character as its mediating center, considerably influencing both economic base and cultural superstructure.

While drive theory vanishes in Fromm, his characterology is, at the same time, still essentially informed by Freud. In accordance with Freud it is assumed that

[C]haracter traits underlie behavior and must be inferred from it; that they constitute forces which […] the person may be entirely unconscious of[;] that the fundamental entity in character is not the single character trait but the total character organization from which a number of single character traits follow. (1990:57)
Fromm differentiates between temperament and character as the two constitutive forces of personality. Temperament functions as “the mode of reaction.” It is “constitutional and not changeable,” while “character is essentially formed by a person’s experiences, […] and changeable, to some extent, by insights and new kinds of experiences” (1990 [1947]:52). This distinction has considerable consequences with regard to social and ethical questions in relation to individual personalities. Temperament, as the fixed trait of personality, is reduced to a “matter of subjective taste” (Ibid.). A political and/or moral assessment is not possible. Character, however, can be subjected to such questions. This becomes especially interesting with regard to the conceptualization of emancipatory potentialities in Fromm’s thinking and remains a crucial insight for the further investigation of Fromm’s psychoanalytic concepts.

As stated above, the major divergence from Freud is constituted in the fact that “the fundamental basis of character is not seen in various types of libido organization but in specific kinds of a person’s relatedness to the world” (1990 [1947]:58). In its ontogenetic development, the individual establishes relations “to the world (1) by acquiring and assimilating things, and (2) by relating himself to people (and himself)” (Ibid.:58). Ontogenetic development is conceptualized as a process of assimilation and socialization. The specific way the individual establishes her relations to the world “constitute the core of h[er] character [which] can [thus] be defined as the (relatively permanent) form in which human energy is canalized in the process of assimilation and socialization” (Ibid.:59). This conceptual framework strongly resonates with sociological perspectives. At the societal level, it emphasizes the independency of society’s impact on the individual; character development is conceived as a process of socialization. The dynamic model of social character mediating between, and simultaneously impacted by, super-structure and base, brings Marxian and Weberian concepts of societal progression together. At the individual level, Fromm’s subject is essentially a social being, center of a complex network of social relations, influenced by, and itself influencing, its social environment; endowed with agency, and an empirically observable capability for positively conceptualized social action: productivity, creativity, love.

Fromm’s subjects are able to “adapt [themselves] to almost any conditions[,]” they are, however, not merely “blank sheets” solely imprinted with culturally acquired needs and functions – certain “striving[s, such as those] for happiness, harmony, love and freedom are inherent in [their] nature” (Ibid.:79). The underlying concept of human nature seems oddly
colloquial in comparison to Freudian drive theory. While Freud sets out to uncover the hidden roots of "happiness, harmony, love, and freedom," Fromm objectifies the categories as inherent human qualities. Happiness is Happiness; it does not need any further theoretical investigation. Fromm falls back on a conception of human nature that reifies commonly ascribed human strivings as basic potentials without further investigating the concepts themselves.104

In Fromm’s developing theory, from 1937 onwards, social character is conceptualized to fill an apparent (or supposed) gap in Marx’s analysis of economic base and cultural superstructure – it becomes the mediator between the two. Although Fromm retains Freudian causality models in conceptualizing character traits as the unconscious roots of behavior, his departure from orthodox Freudianism, eminent in his conceptualization of character as an eventual effect of the social environment, cannot be underestimated. In Fromm, the historically and culturally specific human motivation for action is not retraceable to libidinal drives. It is moreover, molded in the process of socialization. He puts forth a sociologically informed reinterpretation of Freudian characterology the most important theoretical consequence of which is the abandonment of a model that allows for archaic, phylogenetically acquired qualities figuring in the ‘modern’ individual’s psychological apparatus.

Psychosexual Development and Productiveness

Social character and its respective characterology do not rely on libidinal and/or destructive energy as major motivational sources behind character development any longer. Freudian concepts do, however, still play an important role in the way psychosexual development is conceived by Fromm.105 Fromm recounts that in Freud “libido development continues from the oral through the anal and to the genital stage, and […] in the healthy person the genital...

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104 The notion of human nature proposed here exemplifies Marcuse’s and Adorno’s accusation of an insufficiently dialectical understanding of society as it would manifests itself in the use of fundamentally problematic, because not further extrapolated, categories (Marcuse 1955; Adorno in Claussen 1988:12f).

105 In Freud, the process of psychosexual development proceeds in three early stages, the oral, the anal, and the phallic, and eventually the latency- and genital stage. Each stage is characterized by a specific organization of libidinal energy, resulting in the cathexis of mouth, anus, genitals. The latency phase is characterized by a receding of libido and the genital stage finally by the establishment of genital sexuality as the final, sublimated, and culturally accepted form. Important aspects of Freud’s are: the general proposal of infantile sexuality, setting in in earliest childhood; the differentiation between the terms sexual and genital, the former encompassing many actions not having anything to do with genitals; sexual life encompasses deriving pleasure from parts of the body which only subsequently come to serve reproduction (Freud 1955 [1938]:74ff).
orientation becomes predominant” (1990 [1947]:36). This developmental process is retained and further extrapolated in Fromm’s conceptualization of a healthy, mature personality. The ethically charged ideal of such a personality is implicit to Freud’s theory of psychosexual development. It is, however, negatively conceived: in Freud, says Fromm, “the pregenital orientations, characteristic of the dependent, greedy, and stingy attitudes, are ethically inferior to the genital, that is, productive, mature character“ (Ibid.:36). In Freud, as in Fromm, the (non-neurotic’s) psychosexual development results in a productive mature character upon completion, the definitions of productivity are, however, diametrically juxtaposed in opposition to each other.

Freud’s theory does not apply in its original intention, since the eventual rootedness in libidinal drives is missing. It is no coincidence that Freud’s genital character is only inversely conceivable as the healthy, productive member of society. The concepts of lack-of-penis-realization, and castration-threat demonstrate that, in Freud, culture (society) is fundamentally juxtaposed to the individual’s basic strivings; this tension cannot be fully resolved. Genital sexuality is already highly sublimated and shaped by the impact of the reality principle. Productivity can only be conceived in the frame of a repressive culture and is therefore already negatively juxtaposed to the individual’s basic Id strivings. It follows, that Freud’s concept of the genital character only symbolically resonates with Fromm’s productive character, “[f]or the stage of sexual maturity is that in which man has the capacity of natural production; by the union of the sperm and the egg new life is produced” (Fromm 1990 [1947]:84).

For Fromm productiveness, inversely derived from Freud, assumes a central position. Psychoanalysis, in its sole focus on the sick, neurotic personality is complemented with regard to “the character of the normal, mature, healthy personality” (Ibid.:83). An array of concepts is developed revolving around the non-neurotic, positively conceived personality, capable of reasonable social action. Productiveness is an expression of “a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all realms of human experience” (Ibid.:84). Simultaneously, productiveness is understood as the manifestation of human potentialities (Ibid.:87). In Fromm, love becomes one of the “powers” inscribed in human potentiality; it is conceptualized as productive:
Genuine love is rooted in productiveness and may properly be called, therefore, “productive love.” Its essence is the same whether it is the mother’s love for the child, our love for man, or the erotic love between two individuals [...] certain basic elements may be said to be characteristic of all forms of productive love. These are care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. (Ibid.:98)

In symbolic terms, productive love still reflects the Freudian origins of Fromm’s theoretical endeavor. At the same time, Fromm shows himself as a sociologist in the classical sense, oriented towards a theory of human action that conceptualizes a potentially enlightened individual, capable of critical reflection and concrete, positive action. Fromm’s use of Freudian characterology inherently disposes of the traumatic encounter of pleasure principle and reality principle. Freud’s individual is necessarily egotistic; socialization (not coincidentally conceptualized as psychosexual development) is a process of traumatic adaption to a culturally imposed reality principle that basically works against the subject’s libidinal desires. Fromm’s focus on productiveness suggests something different. While the notion of necessary cultural/societal adaption is maintained, it is turned into a positive process. Socialization ideally results in the development of a productive personality related to its environment on multiple levels. The underlying idea of human nature is an inherently benign one in the sense of social productiveness. It follows that trauma and sickness, as they manifest themselves in the neurotic and psychotic personality, result from the historically specific organization of society and culture. The conceptual framework to grasp the nature of this culture is mainly borrowed from Marx. The integration of Marxian and Freudian concepts is a proclaimed objective of Fromm’s theory development. While Freud accounts for the sick individual, Marx accounts for the sick society.

Alienation

Alienation is the Marxian key concept in Fromm’s understanding of the specific societal conditions characterizing the contemporary, Western, industrialized world. The Sane

106 The basic make-up of society is largely responsible for the types of social character within a socio-historically specific group. The positive/productive potential is amplified by the social order the individual encounters: “Any given social order does not create these fundamental strivings but it determines which of the limited number of potential passions are to become manifest or dominant. Man as he appears in any given culture is always a manifestation of human nature, a manifestation, however, which in its specific outcome is determined by the social arrangements under which he lives” (2002 [1955]:14).

107 Fromm introduces, discusses and uses alienation without referencing the Lukácsian notion of reification (Claussen 1988). In Adorno’s and Marcuse’s thinking both concepts figure prominently. The preclusion of
Society contains an exhaustive introduction to the concept. The focus lies with the estrangement of human beings from themselves that is eventually rooted in the mode of production. The alienated member of capitalist society does not “experience himself as the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts—but his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship”(2002 [1955]:117). Self and other “are experienced as things are experienced; with the senses and with common sense, but at the same time without being related to oneself and to the world outside productively” (Ibid.).

This notion of human self-estrangement in capitalist society frames the conceptualization of Fromm’s characterology. Fromm relates alienation to psychoanalytic concepts and identifies convergences in Marx’s and Freud’s thinking. His discussion of Freud’s original conception of transference in Beyond the Chains of Illusion, which relates it to alienation, exemplifies these convergences illustratively. While the general insightfulness of the concept is valued, Freud is criticized for reducing the neurotic person to his inner child and for solely seeing the unconscious at work in transference (2009 [1962]:40). This reduction to earlier developmental stages and unconscious forces, however, neglects the social as a source of mental problems, or at least does not sufficiently account for it. Fromm holds that “[t]he neurotic grown-up patient is an alienated human being; he does not feel strong, he is frightened and inhibited because he does not experience himself as the subject and originator of his own acts and experiences” (Ibid.). Neurosis and alienation are connected; anxiety and feelings of guilt are identified as two closely related symptoms of mental illness which result from and further propel alienation. The alienated individual in a sick society is incapable of developing a sense of self, which psychologically manifests itself in a deeply engrained anxiety (2002 [1955]:197). This anxiety is, in turn, accompanied by a feeling of guilt that is deeply rooted in contemporary society, despite its increasingly secular nature (Ibid.:198).

A fundamental question arises here: If neurosis results from alienation and capitalist society is characterized by a state of permanent, and necessary, alienation, how can certain personalities reification from Fromm’s work is implicated in the eventual divergence of perspectives between Adorno and Marcuse on the one, and Fromm on the other hand.

108 In Freud, transference is the psychological (and therapeutic) mechanism capable of breaking up the neurotic fixation: all libido and all resistance to it is gathered and directed towards the relation to the therapist, who becomes the stand-in for all the unreal (irreal) libido objects characterizing the neurosis. However, instead of re-staging the repression process, the conflict is resolved with the therapist’s suggestive help. Once freed from the therapist as object, the libido becomes subject to the ego’s authority and eventually flows in direction of constructive cathexes (See: Introduction).
in this society be neurotic, while others are not? Fromm accounts for the contradiction by allowing for stronger and lesser alienated persons, which is eventually expressed in the intensity of transference, experienceable by the analyst in the therapeutic session. While the neurotic person cannot escape the mechanism at all, “[t]he less alienated person may also transfer some of his infantile experience to the analyst, but there would be little intensity in it” (2009 [1962]:41). From his practical experience in psychoanalytic therapy, Fromm infers, with reference to Marx, that “the content of transference is usually related to infantile patterns while its intensity is the result of the patient’s alienation” (Ibid.).

The way Fromm understands mental illness and mental health needs further explanation. In accordance with his notion of alienation, he infers that personalities identified as healthy by the standards of a sick, alienated society cannot be truly healthy, because the standard definition of healthiness necessarily reproduces the underlying principles of the very society proposing it (2002 [1955]). In order to be able to realize that the proposed model of mental healthiness of capitalist society is actually sick, a notion of healthiness is juxtaposed to it that derives its definition from what Fromm calls normative humanism. It establishes „[u]niversal criteria for mental health which are valid for the human race as such, and according to which the state of health of each society can be judged“ (2002 [1955]:12). Defined by such standards, the emancipated individual emerges as the prototype for mental healthiness. She is able “to love and to create,” freed from “the incestuous ties to family and nature,” and equipped with “a sense of identity based on [it]’s experience of self as the subject and agent of [it]’s powers” (Ibid.:197). The question how such a prototype of mental healthiness can exist within the framework of an alienated society remains open.

Social Change, Productiveness, Utopia

The productive character emerges as the psychological manifestation of the emancipated subject on the grounds of Fromm’s normative humanism. Equipped with the qualities of (true) creativity, love, knowledge, responsibility, and reason, the productive character anticipates the better society within the alienated one. Fromm holds that “[t]he mentally healthy person is the person who lives by love, reason and faith, who respects life, his own and that of his fellow man (2002 [1955]:197). The complication lies with the fact that these categories of productiveness are not alien (because they cannot be) to the alienated social order they are
supposed to contradict, at least to a certain extent. It is characteristic of bourgeois society, as it is conceptualized in Marx, that the image it has of itself is contradicted by its societal conditions and practice. Humanism is exactly that image – it is the ideological narration bourgeois society keeps uttering to itself, while its societal conditions and practices reproduce domination. Alienation emerges as a result of this contradiction. Since the categories are not alien, they do not contradict the existing order altogether; rather, they formulate another attempt to concretely conceptualize the ideological narrative’s actual realization. In Fromm’s terms, this means that a “utopian consciousness” becomes achievable within the conditions of the existing social order.

In Fromm’s thinking, this utopian consciousness becomes conceptually possible via a dynamic conceptualization of alienation that allows for varying degrees, that is, for a less alienated and a more alienated character development within the conditions of alienated society. The possibility of less alienated character development becomes the gateway for introducing a notion of positive social action into a Marxian conceptualization of alienated society; positive social action, hence, contradicts the altogether alienated status quo at the same time as it is rooted in it. Fromm’s normative humanism is fundamentally steeped in his practical experiences as both a psychoanalyst and a sociologist. The concepts he develops reflect the rather pragmatic approach that he repeatedly claims for himself, one that relies on practical (analytical) experience as the empirical base for theory development. His “productive orientation” as the practical contradiction of capitalist alienation, necessarily reiterates the productively oriented language of bourgeois humanism: the soundtrack of bourgeois society, if you will – a twist that Fromm is well aware of. In his first reply to Marcuse in the infamous *Dissent* debate, he insists that “the alienated society already develops in itself the elements which contradict it[,]” the productive orientation becomes a concrete, individualized expression of these elements. Fromm further explains that “the productive character […] is rare in an alienated society, and in contrast to the marketing orientation which is the rule”¹⁰⁹ (2002 [1955]:348). The productive orientation eventually leads to a quite pronounced understanding of psychoanalysis’s concrete task in a sick, alienated society. In *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (1969), Fromm evaluates the clinical discipline’s professional situation in the face of new developments in psychoanalytic theory and practice. He navigates various developments and simultaneously delineates and sharpens

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¹⁰⁹ The marketing orientation is defined by Fromm in *Man for Himself* as “[t]he character orientation which is rooted in the experience of oneself as a commodity and of one’s value as exchange value” (1990 [1947]:68).
his own humanistic approach. Ego-psychology, as it has developed in the US specifically, is polemically identified as the “real answer” to the crisis of psychoanalysis. It strips the approach of its fundamental potential for social criticism and makes it fit for psychological practice within the conditions of alienated society; it thereby, however, only stabilizes these conditions (1973 [1969]:44). The other development Fromm criticizes is personified in the “philosophers of psychoanalysis”, the most prominent of which is Marcuse (Ibid.:26-27). Fromm attacks Marcuse’s philosophical engagement with psychoanalysis on the grounds of his “insufficient knowledge of [psychoanalysis’s] clinical basis” and a general misunderstanding of basic Freudian concepts (Ibid.:27). Fromm’s double attack in direction of ego-psychology and Marcuse solidifies his own theoretical position while it implies practical experience as a pre-condition of theory development.

The outlook on psychoanalysis’s further developmental possibilities and its social functions is contextualized within the normative framework of Fromm’s theoretical orientation: “the creative renewal of psychoanalysis is possible only if it overcomes its positivistic conformism [manifest in ego-psychology] and becomes again a critical and challenging theory in the spirit of radical humanism” (1973 [1969]:45). Renewed like that, psychoanalytic theory and practice has to further investigate those phenomena identified as symptoms of the alienated society: loneliness, anxiety, feelings of guilt. It sets out to help establish a societal situation in which the individual’s adaptation to society is substituted by society’s adaptation to the individual’s needs (Ibid.:45). Psychoanalysis, for Fromm, has practical, positive tasks: to investigate the negative symptoms of the alienated society in the individual, and practically further the individual’s emancipation by decreasing the degree of alienation it suffers from, thus helping to establish a productive orientation. The conceptualization of “productive character” as the manifestation of the positive human potentialities against the marketing character pinpoints Fromm’s concrete understanding of change. Utopia, as the place that does not (yet) exist, fades in face of a reformist insistence on the possibility of true maturity, that is, concrete productiveness within the conditions of alienation.

Public (Self-Help) Intellectual

With reference to Fromm’s *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (1950), in which he firstly negotiates non-theistic religions and mysticism, which would increasingly influence his writings,
Friedman comes to the conclusion that the formerly cautious and prudent theorist had become “a prophet of sorts for a productive human spirit” whose “humanist ideals would soon become widely known” while “his American audience […] started to grow”; making “[t]he 1950s […] his decade of greatest influence” (155). The hypothesis that Fromm’s influence grew as his scholarly precision decreased in favor of a more pronounced articulation of humanistic ethics, supports, as I pointed out earlier, the argument of an instrumental dimension pervading the disciplinary fields of US sociology and psychoanalysis. This dimension seems to condense illustratively in Fromm’s work of the 1950s, especially with regard to his simultaneous reception in academic and radical intellectual circles, and in the wider American public. Fromm’s radical humanism provided a possibility to formulate watered-down alternative values within the conditions of the rigorous red-scare atmosphere of the 1950s. Fromm was able to secure himself a prominent position as a critical public voice. The extent to which this voice diverged from his former colleagues at the Institute is best captured in his role as an American public intellectual, which is brilliantly accentuated in Friedman’s book as one of the ‘many lives’ Fromm led. His most successful book *The Art of Loving*, published in 1956 – shortly after *The Sane Society* was published and he had exchanged arguments on radical Freud interpretations with Marcuse in *Dissent* – exemplifies how Fromm developed from critical Frankfurt scholar to a self-help author. With the book, “Fromm joined social commentators such as David Riesman and John Kenneth Galbraith as a thinker on the Left who conveyed his thoughts to a mass readership at a time when McCarthyism held currency”¹¹⁰ (Friedman 2014:156). In the book, Fromm maintained an at least formally critical perspective, which railed against the conformity and repressiveness of the era and simultaneously offered comparably simple solutions. In the introduction he states:

> The reading of this book would be a disappointing experience for anyone who expects easy instruction in the art of loving. This book, on the contrary, wants to show that love is not a sentiment which can be easily indulged in by anyone, regardless of the level of maturity reached by him. It wants to convince the reader that all his attempts for love are bound to fail, unless he tries most actively to develop his total personality, so as to achieve a productive orientation; that satisfaction in individual love cannot be attained without the capacity to love one's neighbor, without true humility, courage, faith and discipline. In a culture in which these qualities are rare, the attainment of the capacity to love must remain a rare achievement. (Fromm 1956:xix)

¹¹⁰ According to Friedman *The Art of Loving* “was an international phenomenon […] by 1999 it had been translated into thirty-two languages and had sold more than twenty-five million copies [and] was readily available for purchase in drug stores, train depots, and airports. (2014:156)
The first sentences set back the expectations evoked by the promising title, however, the eventual relief follows immediately: while it is not easy to truly love, it is possible, and, moreover it can be learned from this book. The book reformulates the theoretical delineation of maturity and productiveness in a more accessible fashion. The analysis of the existing social conditions is (still) inherently Marxist: Western society is conceptualized as highly alienated, which diminishes the chances to actually develop productiveness:

People capable of love, under the present system, are necessarily the exceptions; love is by necessity a marginal phenomenon in present-day Western society. Not so much because many occupations would not permit of a loving attitude, but because the spirit of a production-centered, commodity-greedy society is such that only the non-conformist can defend himself successfully against it. (Ibid.:132)

Fromm’s vocabulary is, however, increasingly morally loaded; categories like greed are posited against those of love, humility, courage, or faith. Steeped in such moral dichotomies, Fromm proposes an objective concept of human nature. The task is to restructure the social order in order to guarantee its flourishing. He holds that “[s]ociety must be organized in such a way that man's social, loving nature is not separated from his social existence, but becomes one with it” (Fromm 1956: 133). The non-conformist occurs as the concrete representation of human nature and is, by virtue of Fromm’s appraisal, turned into a desirable social identity.

The book conveys the spirit of self-help literature which increasingly filled American bookstores and family home shelves in the 50s. Clara Thompson noted shortly after its publication that it “resonated with American culture far more than any of his previous writings” (Thompson in Friedman 2014:182). This, of course, stands in stark contrast to his earlier critical interventions. Especially when contextualized in the simultaneously ongoing debate in Dissent, the book helps to shed light on the specific position Fromm came to inhabit in the course of his American career. The fact that he ‘lost’ the discursive battle with Marcuse in the eyes of radical intellectuals resonates with The Art of Loving’s mass appeal. Critical Theory, originally set out to uncompromisingly criticize the existing social order and its theoretical apologetics, is diluted to an extent that contradicts its original – negative – thrust and simultaneously makes some of its concepts and ideas compatible with a wider readership. The divergence between Fromm’s critical theorizing and Critical Theory as the Institute’s,
and later/retrospectively the *Frankfurt School’s* defining social-philosophy, becomes (again) obvious here. The dialectical twist of this divergence lies with the solidification of conceptual differences, which further propelled radical objections to Fromm in the name of actual/true emancipation. At the same time, Fromm’s position as a critical public voice in the 1950s helped to broadly establish a theoretical perspective that would crucially inform the emancipatory upheavals in the following decade: “Fromm, his money, his political activism, and his ideals helped form planks in the bridge of change from the conformity of McCarthyism and the early years of the Cold War to the more protean and rebellious 1960s” (Friedman 2014:185). By the mid-50s Fromm was a renowned critical scholar and public intellectual. His influence on American academic circles was made manifest in the pervasiveness of the social character model, which informed many sociological works considered as seminal in challenging the sociological mainstream and diversifying the field in the 60s, such as Whyte’s, Mills’s and Riesman’s. Via psychoanalysis as a common reference system, Fromm was able to introduce a sharply de-radicalized and streamlined version of *Critical Theory* to the American sociological landscape that had a considerable impact on the further development of the discipline in the 1960s.
Eros, Reason, One-Dimensionality: Herbert Marcuse's Freud

In the preceding part I took a closer look at Fromm’s Freud adaptations. Herbert Marcuse, Fromm’s former colleague at the Institute, and co-author of Studien zu Autorität und Familie, came into view as an intellectual antagonist of Fromm’s in the American intellectual and academic landscape. This part is devoted to analyzing the psychoanalytic implications of Marcuse’s Critical Theory, which he most prominently developed after he himself had left the Institute in the early 40s. His output as a philosopher and critical intellectual is, however, still firmly located in the tradition of Critical Theory in the sense of its ‘hidden orthodoxy.’ Theoretical divergences between Marcuse and Adorno and Horkheimer never had consequences as severe as those characterizing the revisionism controversy with Fromm. A discussion between the three provides an instructive example. They argued over diverging approaches to the notion of reason. Marcuse’s argument insisted on the validity of Hegelian notion of negation and inherently reproduced the latter’s identity theory, proposing the reconciliation of subject and object in spirit, while Adorno and Horkheimer stressed the concept of non-identity, based in the fundamental idea that subject and object are not – and cannot be – identical within the existing societal conditions (Jay 1996 [1973]:60ff). Despite Marcuse’s decision to stay in the US and the Institute’s relocation, Adorno insisted on several occasions on the congruence of his own and Marcuse’s thinking. Marcuse’s and Adorno’s arguments most obviously converge in the revisionism controversy with Fromm. What makes Marcuse especially important for my project is the fact that he was clearly the most prominent representative of Critical Theory in the American academic sphere throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Just like Fromm, his work, as that of an original Institute member, represents a trajectory of critical Freud adaptations which are explicitly positioned critically towards the status quo of modern, Western industrialized societies. Unlike Fromm, Marcuse remained radically critical of professionalized and streamlined psychoanalysis in this process.

112 Wiggershaus provides a detailed account of Horkheimer’s strategy to put financial pressure on Marcuse in order to get him to find employment outside of the Institute, the financial situation of which was not stable at the time. Horkheimer’s strategy was a success and Marcuse started working for the OSS in 1942 (1988:331ff).
113 In his discussion of the debate, Martin Jay stresses Marcuse’s more explicit indebtedness to Hegel and sets it apart from Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason (Jay 1996 [1973]:60ff; 2016:97ff). Jay’s perspective offers a great insight into conceptual divergences between Marcuse and Adorno. However, a detailed discussion of the debates around philosophical figures of thought between the Institute members would exceed the frame of my study. The discussion illustrates that there was no general agreement among them, but rather a general atmosphere of at times sharp debate, which would, however, not necessarily lead to a fundamental breach, as it did in Fromm’s case.
employs in the services of the Office of War Information (OWI), in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during WWII, and in the state department until 1951 further exemplify his unique position in the American academic landscape. Resembling Fromm’s ascendance to a public intellectual in the 1950s to a certain extent, Marcuse became a public figure in the wake of the 1960s students’ and social movements. His pronounced support of radical emancipatory movements propelled him to the center of media attention, which, led to the creation of an iconographic imagery of him as a guru of the New Left (Zwarg 2017:42). In contrast to Fromm, however, his influence was never as embedded in the American cultural and political sphere. Even the actual reach of his philosophy within New Left circles is difficult to trace and it remains questionable, as Zwarg demonstrates (Ibid.:44ff), if the iconography exceeded the narrow frame of his essays written in support of the movements, and if it corresponds at all with actual engagements with his philosophy.\(^{114}\)

Marcuse’s approach to psychoanalysis is eminently pronounced in his two best-known publications Eros and Civilization (1955) and One-Dimensional Man (1964). However, it informs his entire philosophy. My focus lies mainly with the two books. I will structure my analysis along the notions of character, trauma, sexuality, alienation and fantasy as utopia, all of which relate to the categorical junctions of character structure, integration and social change. A closer look at the general tone and outlook of the two books reveals a more optimistic perspective in Eros and Civilization than the one of One-Dimensional Man. It becomes obvious that Marcuse’s philosophical thought underwent changes. These changes help to elucidate the persisting importance psychoanalysis had for his work.

In the resurgence of the revisionism controversy of the 1950s, Marcuse engages Fromm head on. The epilogue of Eros and Civilization is devoted to a critique of Fromm’s (and other revisionists’) abandonment of Freudian drive theory. Shortly before the publication, the radical leftist journal Dissent published the chapter as an essay and had Fromm respond to it, followed by another response by Marcuse and finally a counter-rebuttal by Fromm. As already mentioned before, the debate sheds light on different ways of conceptualizing psychoanalytic insights in the framework of a critical theory of society that is mainly inspired by Marx and Freud. The discussion of the debate helps me to delineate the specificity of Marcuse’s philosophy of psychoanalysis, which explicitly does not aim at contributing to the

\(^{114}\) I will discuss Marcuse’s support of the social movements, which led to a severe controversy between him and Adorno, in greater detail in Chapter V.
development of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic practice (Marcuse 1974 [1955]:7). In Fromm’s work, the concept of social character is the most obvious and radical revision of psychoanalytic categories. Fromm developed his own characterology and set his social psychology apart from Freud. Marcuse’s work does not contain such efforts. The understanding of modern individuals’ common characteristics, their social character, can only be negatively derived from Marcuse’s general philosophical figures of thought.

Trauma and Repression

In Eros and Civilization Marcuse discusses his proper (philosophical) interpretation of Freudian concepts in much detail; psychoanalytic notions are introduced and dialectically extrapolated. Marcuse’s inquiries thereby primarily rely on Freud’s notion of a traumatic encounter of individual and civilization that manifests itself in “the realization that full and painless gratification of needs is impossible” in culture (1974 [1955]:13). In accordance with Freud, Marcuse accentuates the fundamentally traumatizing nature of the collision of individual pleasure principle and cultural reality principle, it “is the great traumatic event in the development of man [sic!] – the development of the genus (phylogenesis) as well as of the individual (ontogenesis)” (Ibid.:15). The notion of fundamental trauma, not present in Fromm, is of great importance to Marcuse; it figures, as I will discuss later, equally, or even more prominently, in Adorno's Critical Theory. The divergence between Marcuse (and Adorno) and Fromm harks back to the revisionism controversy I discussed earlier. Unlike Fromm, Marcuse sticks, at least at first glance, to Freud’s notion of the elementary opposition of individual strivings and cultural demands. A closer look at Marcuse’s notion of trauma

115 In order to clarify the meaning of trauma in Marcuse (and Adorno), it is necessary to revisit the different meanings trauma assumes in Freud’s oeuvre. Freud’s early trauma theory, derived from his therapeutic work with female patients, suffering from what he describes as ‘hysteria,’ is eventually abandoned and substituted by drive theory. In trauma theory hysteria was traced back to real, traumatic events of sexual abuse, this was revised later. Freud assumed that the traumatic events were not real experiences, but rather happened in the realm of fantasy. In Freud’s later work, trauma appears as “any excitation from outside powerful enough to break through the [psyche’s] protective shield” (1961 [1920]:23). The latter is conceptualized as a defense mechanism of the consciousness against external stimuli. It is governed by the pleasure principle and protects the system from disturbing external influences. A breach of the protective shield by “an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism’s energy and to set in motion every possible defensive measure” (1961 [1920]:23). If unresolved, a compulsion to repeat the traumatic event can develop. The consciousness repeats the traumatic experiences over and over again. These considerations eventually resulted in the conceptualization of the death drive. Trauma appears here as a possible event that can lead to traumatic neuroses if not resolved psychologically. For Marcuse’s (and Adorno’s) work, these clinical considerations are less important. Trauma is interpreted from a philosophical standpoint. The traumatic encounter of individual pleasure principle and reality principle is conceptualized as an initial damage, that (this is
however, reveals significant divergences from Freud’s original conception. Fromm’s basic critique of Freud, namely that he conceptualizes the reality principle of a specific historical period and social context as a general representation of human reality, is reiterated by Marcuse. However, Marcuse emphasizes that Freud’s mistake does not invalidate his theory altogether: the “criticism is valid, but its validity does not vitiate the truth in Freud’s generalizations, namely, that a repressive organization of the drives underlies all historical forms of the reality principle in civilization” (Ibid.:34). Or actually: all historical forms so far. The reality principle’s socio-historic specificity is as important to Marcuse as it is to Fromm.

In contrast to Fromm, the Freudian concept’s constitutional assumption of a traumatic encounter of individual and civilization is, however, preserved. Marcuse re-interprets the concept under the auspices of a proper conceptualization of domination: “[i]f Freud justifies the repressive organization of the drives by the irreconcilability between primary pleasure principle and reality principle, Freud actually points at the fact that civilization has progressed as organized domination“ (Ibid.:34).

The general thrust of Marcuse’s theorizing – a fundamental critique of domination – relies on a re-interpretation of Freud’s work as unintentionally providing concepts which inherently pinpoint the dialectical juxtaposition of individual and society. The critical theorist’s task, it follows, is to “unfold the own content” (Ibid.:35) of Freud’s conceptual apparatus rather than sociologically contextualizing it. The dialectical extrapolation of Freud’s categories (such as the reality principle and repression) becomes necessary because they appear as reifications of socio-historic specificities. Freud is revisited through a philosophical lens that is chiefly informed by the concepts of alienation and reification. The extrapolation of the reified categories is at heart of the project of Eros and Civilization and further applied in One-Dimensional Man.

more pronounced in Adorno) leaves its marks on the individual psyche (Marcuse pronounces the centrality of trauma especially in Eros and Civilization, Adorno as ‘damage’ and ‘mutilation’ in Minima Moralia). In contrast to Freud’s concept of traumatic neurosis, which implies the possibility of, healthy, non-traumatic development, Marcuse and Adorno emphasize the fundamental traumatic impact of society on the individual. This is of course always tied back to the specific nature of the society the pleasure principle encounters.

Both concepts are, as pointed out in the introduction, essential for Marcuse’s and Adorno’s Critical Theories. The categories brought forth in the conditions of alienated society are implicitly problematic because they appear as objectifications of a socio-historically specific societal organization, which perpetuates commodity fetishization as a general principle, and therefore implicitly propels the cancellation of the categories’ own historicity and general precariousness. In Marcuse’s account, Freud’s categories exemplify that problem. They are not dialectically conceived and do not encompass the reflection on their problematic nature.
In his attempt to criticize Freud’s unhistorical conceptual apparatus, Marcuse develops his own conceptual and terminological framework. The critical engagement with psychoanalysis “calls for a duplication of concepts,” because Freudian terminology fails to properly differentiate between biological and socio-historical qualities. The terminology introduced in *Eros and Civilization* aims to address the socio-historic dimension while retaining the original critical thrust (Ibid.). What appears as repression\(^{117}\) (and sublimation) of libidinal energy in Freud reappears as *surplus repression* in Marcuse and aims to describe the “restrictions necessitated by social domination” and set them apart “from (basic) repression: the modifications of the drives necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization” (Ibid.). The repressed personality is contextualized in the frame of a critique of domination pointing to the fraction of its repressive condition that is caused by the societal reality of domination (Ibid.:87-88). The concept of the *performance principle* is developed under the same premises; it is introduced to conceptually grasp the specific socio-historical shape the reality principle takes in bourgeois society as encountered by Freud (and Marcuse). The *reality principle* is redefined as *performance principle* in order to highlight the fact that “under its rule society is stratified according to competitive economic performances of its members” (Ibid.:44). The *reality principle* re-appears as modified by the prevailing modes of production within a profit, and consumption oriented economy (Ibid.:37). It is not abandoned altogether, but socially and historically specified. Marcuse’s “extrapolation” overlaps with Fromm’s critique of the unhistorical character of Freud’s categories – the implicit naturalization of the specific conditions of European bourgeois society – however, the general thrust of both approaches differs considerably.

Eli Zaretsky suggests that Marcuse’s interpretation of Freud identifies *ananke*, scarcity, as repression’s eventual source (2004:318). Behind the *reality principle* lurks the need to survive under conditions of scarcity. Freud generalizes the concept, and applies it to all stages in the progress of civilization. In Marcuse, *ananke* is, just like repression and the reality principle, specific and tied back to the socio-historic situation of the society that it represents in its

\(^{117}\) In Freud repression results from the reality principle’s impact on individual libidinal strivings. The above mentioned necessity for the postponement of pleasure results in the repression of original libidinal desires, and eventually in the sublimation of that energy, its redirection for culturally useful tasks. Laplanche and Pontalis provide a concise definition: “Strictly speaking, an operation whereby the subject attempts to repel, or to confine to the unconscious, representations (thoughts, images, memories) which are bound to an instinct. Repression occurs when to satisfy an instinct—though likely to be pleasurable in itself—would incur the risk of provoking unpleasure because of other requirements. Repression is particularly manifest in hysteria, but it also plays a major part in other mental illnesses as well as in normal psychology. It may be looked upon as a universal mental process in so far as it lies at the root of the constitution of the unconscious as a domain separate from the rest of the psyche” (1973:390).
current form of expression (1974 [1955]:35). Technological progress provides the means for overcoming *ananke*. It already has established a situation in which *ananke* does no longer apply in its original sense. In late capitalism, scarcity has become a matter of distribution, not of insufficient resources/production. The following mechanism resembles *ananke* within the conditions of contemporary society: the satisfaction of basic needs necessitates work, which, in turn, is paid for by the postponement or absence of pleasure. In Freud, this amounts to a general conflict that characterizes culture. The argument is that the *pleasure principle* is incompatible with reality, and that the drives have to be subjected to repressive regimentation. Marcuse criticizes this argument for being “fallacious in so far as it applies to the brute fact of scarcity what actually is the consequence of a specific organization of scarcity, and of a specific existential attitude enforced by this organization” (Ibid.:36). *Ananke* is not a ubiquitous natural condition, but an ideologically charged concept that is further propelled and reproduced by the specific conditions of domination reflecting the contemporary organization of economy and production.

The critique leveled against Freud in all the concepts developed by Marcuse revolves around socio-historic specificity inscribed with human history as a continuation of domination. Marcuse’s aim, however, is not to resolve the inherent tension between *pleasure principle* and *reality (or performance) principle*. Freud’s conceptual contraction is rather a starting point for an extrapolation of the implication of specific societal organizations in the production of scarcity and repression, and the formation of the particular reality principle ‘enforcing’ their demands. An essential realization is that “[t]he pleasure principle was dethroned not only because it militated against progress in civilization, but also because it militated against a civilization whose progress perpetuates domination and toil” (Ibid.:40). The dialectical twist lies with the emancipatory quality inherent to the pleasure principle’s irreconcilability with the conditions of domination. This potential is further elucidated in Marcuse’s elaborations on *Eros* and sexuality.

**Eros and Sexuality**

Drive theory remains central to Marcuse. While Fromm especially criticizes Freud’s introduction of *Thanatos*, the death drive, it marks a decisive step in Freud’s theory development for Marcuse. The dual model of antagonists *Eros* and *Thanatos*, which results
from Freud’s revision of drive theory in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), assumes metaphysical status in Marcuse’s account, pertaining to its deep and revolutionary core (1968:11). The dynamic juxtaposition of *Eros* and *Thanatos* is at the core of Freud’s constitutional conceptualization of human motivation; it resonates heavily in Marcuse’s work. Marcuse’s extrapolation of *Eros’* complex nature recognizes the essential contradiction of two *Eros* qualities as proposed by Freud: exclusive sexuality and the drive’s biological-organic nature driving to combine organic substances into ever larger unities (Freud 1953:11). Again, Marcuse explicitly does not aim to reconcile these “two contradictory aspects of sexuality,” but suggests “that they reflect the inner unreconciled tension in Freud’s theory” (1974 [1955]:43). This, inherently and unintentionally, makes it a dialectical theory of society. The notion of the “unifying and gratifying power of Eros” that is “worn out in sick civilization” actually rebels, according to Marcuse, against Freud’s conception of an “inevitable ‘biological’ conflict between pleasure principle and reality principle, between sexuality and civilization” (Ibid.) Marcuse infers that “free Eros does not preclude lasting civilized societal relationships – […] it repels only the supraselective organization of society” (Ibid.). The current *reality principle* is criticized according to the standards set before; it figures as the specific historic manifestation of domination working against the pleasure principle, characterized by *surplus repression*. The fashion in which Marcuse explicates the dialectical tension in Freud’s *Eros* exemplifies the proposed extrapolation of hidden trends in Freudian concepts; it additionally alludes to a central motif in Marcuse’s general reinterpretation of *Eros* and sexuality: the emancipatory potentiality of *Eros’* liberation from the chains of *surplus repression*.

Marcuse generally holds on to Freud’s proposition that culture/civilization is necessarily steeped in the permanence of sublimation. As the constructive force behind culture, *Eros’* power is, however, lessened by the requirement for sublimation. Desexualization additionally weakens the life drive which eventually unleashes *Thanatos*: “[c]ivilization is thus threatened by an instinctual de-fusion, in which the death drive strives to gain ascendancy over the life instincts” (1974 [1955]:83). As a consequence, Marcuse infers, civilization, commencing in and further propelling the renunciation of *Eros* qualities in the course of its advancement, is inherently self-destructive (Ibid.). The extrapolation of the original Freudian content materializes as Marcuse’s insistence on the possibility of *libidinal work*. Work does not necessarily have to result from desexualization, be unpleasurable and an expression of renunciation (Ibid.). The crucial realization is that the “inhibitions enforced by culture also
affect […] the derivatives of the death instinct, aggressiveness and the destruction impulses” (Ibid.:84). Marcuse complicates Freud’s proposition by inferring that “work in civilization is itself to a great extent social utilization of aggressive impulses and is thus work in the service of Eros” (Ibid.). This leads him to conclude that “an adequate discussion of these problems presupposes that the theory of drives is freed from its exclusive orientation on the performance principle” (Ibid.). The possibility of *libidinal work* emerges against the backdrop of Eros’ involvement in the working process even under the conditions of the performance principle. It follows that under the rule of a non-repressive reality principle, one that no longer relies on *surplus repression*, work could actually be infused with *Eros* qualities, without unleashing destructive impulses which only serve the reproduction of domination. Under such conditions

\[\text{In the societal relations, reification would be reduced as the division of labor became oriented on the gratification of freely developing individual needs; whereas, in the libidinal relations, the taboo on the reification of the body would be lessened. No longer used as a fulltime instrument of labor, the body would be resexualized. The regression involved in this spread of the libido would first manifest itself in a reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality and in a decline of genital supremacy. (Ibid.:201)}\]

Marcuse’s conception of a non-repressive society, which raises its head quite explicitly in this passage, conveys a central motif underlying his theorizing: a longing for lost qualities and potentialities.118 Freud’s notion of mature, genital sexuality as the manifestation of completed psychosexual development is inherently negated. Pregenital, polymorphous sexuality is juxtaposed to it as the anticipation of non-repression. Marcuse emphasizes the ‘raw material’ of human psychological/sexual/intellectual development, as it is represented in the pregenital stages – before the reality principle traumatically reorganizes the psychic structure. Thus conceptualized, genital sexuality does not become a necessary result of ‘natural’ development, but rather reflects the specific impact of the *performance principle*, infused with instrumental rationality. Genital sexuality, it follows, is itself a mutilated form of sexuality. The ‘raw material’ is of course not in itself a representation of freedom from domination; it is not, and

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118 In *The Party of Eros* (1972) Richard King discusses Marcuse as one of three radical Freudsians and attributes to him a “neo-Romantic mode of cultural criticism” (139-140). While King’s suggestion resonates with the longing I identified in Marcuse, King proposes that it is rooted in a “traditionally antiscientific bias” (Ibid.). A certain nostalgic moment in Marcuse’s writings becomes especially pronounced in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) in the juxtaposition of bourgeois two-dimensionality against one-dimensionality as it characterizes the totally administered society. However, it is not an “antiscientific bias” that marks the nostalgic moment, but rather an inherent (and dialectically twisted) romanticization of bourgeois autonomy, that is, however, aware of the violent implications within the conditions of a social order that propels the autonomy of a few by the (structural) domination of the majority.
cannot be, raw material in the strictest sense, because it is already shaped (phylogenetically,
and ontogenetically) by domination as the historical substrate of civilization. The nostalgic
element is inscribed in the wistful longing for a stage before the full impact of the existing
social order. The longing already reflects, however, the impossibility of achieving liberation
by simply going back, or by uncovering lost content. In other words: pregenital polymorphous
sexuality allows a sole glimpse at ‘what could be’ within the conditions of the existing order.
This glimpse is necessarily dialectical; it does not romanticize the past as the better place, but
searches for hidden or subtle potentialities capable of transcending the status quo. The
nostalgia revolves around a potential that is located in a developmental stage predating the
totalizing impact of the performance principle, mediated by the culture industry, on the
individual in Western industrialized nations.

In Freud’s *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) the concept of polymorphous
perversity is first introduced to describe a disposition in adult, genital sexuality. Polymorphous perversity transgresses the boundaries of the genital sexual organization, which
in Freud appears as healthy/normal. It encompasses all kinds of sexual excitaments and
practices not resembling orgasm-centered. After describing the adult disposition, Freud infers
that the “sexual impulse of the child shows itself to be polymorphous perverse” (1905:56).
For Marcuse’s discussion of the concept, this is a crucial point. Freud defines perversion as
aberration from the genital sexual act without passing a moral judgment; polymorphous
further describes the (theoretically) indiscriminate excitability of bodily zones, manifest in the
child’s libidinal play with its own body. In the context of infantile sexuality polymorphous
perversity can thus be understood as a condition of generalized pleasure seeking through
bodily (self-)manipulation that is not (yet) put in the service of the reality principle.
Polymorphous-perversion pleasure seeking ends with the ‘completion’ of the pregenital stages
(oral, sadistic-anal, phallic) around the age of five. The Oedipus complex best exemplifies the
forces ‘taking over’ at that point and limiting sexuality to its normal or healthy expression.
Hence, in Freud polymorphous perversity is chiefly interesting as an aberration in adult
sexuality (as a way of connecting neurotic symptoms in adults with disturbances in particular
pregenital stages). The restrictions imposed on libidinal energy in the latency period is
eventually traced to organic, instinctual impulses; it appears as a natural process.

In Marcuse’s account polymorphous perversity assumes a quite different role; it pinpoints his
“Instinctual radicalism” (Fromm 1955) and further takes shape in a discussion and general
conceptual divergence with his longstanding friend, American philosopher Norman Oliver Brown, who also insists on drive theory and polymorphous perversity’s liberating potential. For Brown, just as for Marcuse, psychoanalysis value lies with its critical potential in the face of prevalent domination: “psychoanalytic consciousness can only be the vision of the possibility of human living not based on repression” (1963 [1959]:156). However, Brown conceptualizes the critique of the inseparable pair of repression and sublimation as total: “sublimation is the search for lost life; it presupposes and perpetuates the loss of life and cannot be the mode in which life itself is lived” (Ibid.:171). Polymorphous perversity is as central to Brown’s theoretical anticipation of utopia as it is to Marcuse’s. Freud’s genital sexuality is conceived as the actual ‘perversion of human sexuality’. However, it is not (external) social domination but anxiety which is responsible for the traumatic reorganization of sexuality. Brown’s analysis revolves around Freud’s partial reconsideration of the sources of repression in the pregenital stages. In the seminal text Hemmung, Symptom und Angst (1926) Freud formulates a proper theory of anxiety which reevaluates the role and function of anxiety in relation to repression. Whereas neurotic anxiety was formerly conceptualized as a result of repression, it now becomes a crucial agent of repression. Totalizing Freud’s reconsideration, Brown elaborates: “the cause of repression is put inside the child himself, making repression essentially self-repression” (1963 [1959]:112). Seeking the eventual origin of repression not in society but in the individual is what enables the fundamental critique of repression and sublimation. Anxiety is further put in relation with the death instinct; it is “a response to experiences of separateness, individuality, and death” (Ibid.:115). This relation is not pronounced by Freud, so Brown, too, claims to reveal hidden content of Freudian categories. Polymorphous perversity is positioned against any kind of sexual organization, pregenital and genital: “the sexual organizations […] appear to be constructed by anxiety, by the flight from death and the wish to die; the distribution of libido in a life not at war with death is polymorphous perversity” (Ibid.:116). This theoretical construction aims at abolishing sexual organizations altogether, an objective that might be achieved by “an ego strong enough to die,” since for Brown, it is the ego constructing sexual organizations as a reaction to anxiety. Just as in Marcuse, there is a nostalgic dimension in Brown’s longing.

119 Freud maintains the explanation of anxiety genesis as a hitherto unresolved problem in the former explanation of anxiety as a result of repression processes. In this new theory of anxiety, which generally constitutes an explanatory turn towards ego processes, and away from drive energy, the causation of anxiety “shall not be explained economically, anxiety is not produced in the process of repression but reproduced after an already existing memory as an affective state. With the further question for the origin of anxiety – as with affects in general – we leave the uncontested territory of psychology and venture into the realm of physiology. Affective states are integrated into psychic life as condensations of ancient traumatic experiences and are mobilized in similar situations as symbols of these memories” (1955 [1926]:120).
Polymorphous perversity appears as a utopian practice because it harks back to an original uninhibited state of being. The utopian dimension lies, however, with the acknowledgement of death, rather than with the abolition of societal domination. Brown’s nostalgia longs for a ‘natural’ state of unrepressed bodily existence, undisturbed by anxiety. The essential divergence between Marcuse and Brown, it follows, is inscribed in Marcuse’s dialectical perspective. While Brown’s position eventually longs for a pre-civilizational state of unrepressed polymorphous eroticism, Marcuse’s longing reflects the impossibility of merely going back in its conceptualization of the drives as the historical substrate of both liberation potential and domination. In the debate with his fellow “instinctual radical,” Marcuse’s dialectical perspective, characteristic of Critical Theory, is further sharpened.

The emphasis on pregenital sexuality is picked up in Marcuse’s elaborations on the role of fantasy in the conceptualization of utopian potentialities in the human psychic structure. It inhabits a central space in his Critical Theory and figures prominently in the debate around revisionism. It represents the consequent debunking of the reality principle as the agent of a societal totality that could be different (and less total). The nostalgic moment is complicated by the dialectical perspective, Marcuse’s considerations don’t simply romanticize the past or, in this particular case, archaic qualities in the psychic structure. The localization of potential in a stage as pre-societal as it is even possible is, within the universe of a materialist philosophy, however, undeniably endowed with a nostalgic quality. In the further advancement of Marcuse’s philosophy this nostalgic quality is repeated in the concept of one-dimensionality, which inherently conceptualizes the status quo of advanced capitalism as even destroying the last remnants of individuality the bourgeois era allowed for, at least for a privileged group.

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120 Marcuse and Brown engaged in a debate surrounding their differences in Commentary in 1967. The debate will be picked up in Chapter IV.

121 Marcuse critically reflects the notion of utopia. He points out that the term is not only used to describe the place that does not exist (yet, could exist) but the one that cannot exist. It is conceived negatively. He delineates the effort to achieve a non-repressive society from such utopianism. The former is a political possibility, based in the reality of technological progression, while the latter is implicated in the denunciation of such efforts as absurd and abstract. Utopia is part of the existing ideology as a negative impossibility: “We live and die rationally and productively. We know that destruction is the price of progress as death is the price of life, that renunciation and toil are the prerequisites for gratification and joy, that business must go on, and that the alternatives are Utopian” (1966:255). In my work, the term is used in order to describe the place that does not exist, without inferring that it cannot exist. I stick to the term in order not to reiterate Marcuse completely.
Alienation and One-Dimensionality

Alienation is, similar to Fromm’s conception of it, central to Marcuse’s conceptualization of society. In *Eros and Civilization*, he defines alienation in Marxian terms: the increasing division of labor characterizing the capitalist industrialization process cumulates in the “fact that man does not realize himself in his labor, that his life has become an instrument of labor, that his work and its products have assumed a form and power independent of him as an individual” (1974 [1955]:105). In the contemporary societal situation of the 1950s, the alienation of labor has increased and is “almost complete,” factories, office routines, buying and selling “rituals” are not connected with “human potentialities” any more (Ibid.:103). The notion of labor as almost completely alienated is crucial to his dialectical perspective. For one, it attempts to grasp the psychological state of individuality, characterized by the loss of a sense of self, and the increasing reproduction of reified concepts informing notions of social reality and the self. For another, it (still) allows for a potential capable of transcending these conditions: the abolition of alienated labor. The extent to which the subject has become a mere appendix of the assembly line simultaneously, and inherently, contains the potential of liberation. Instead of reviving the “repressed and productive personality”\(^{122}\) it ought to be abolished: “[t]he elimination of human potentialities from the world of (alienated) labor creates the preconditions for the elimination of labor from the world of human potentialities” (Ibid.:105). The notion of alienation is dialectically twisted; it characterizes the undesirable state of unfreedom and is simultaneously an expression of a potentiality for freedom that is engrained in the material conditions alienation itself reflects.

Alienation, understood as increasing human (self-)estrangement, is also a pivotal category in Marcuse’s second major work, the ‘more pessimistic’ *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). The concept is, however, newly adjusted: an identification with the existing societal conditions is no longer deception (Schein), but in reality the mediating sphere of art has vanished; society’s impact on the individual is immediate. Alienation has progressed to another level; it is ‘complete’, but only in the negative sense alluded to in *Eros and Civilization*. It has become objective: the alienated subject is totally incorporated into its alienated existence.

\(^{122}\) Fromm’s productive character is negatively resembled here. It appears as the functional agent of repressive capitalism. The negativity it is endowed with in Marcuse eventually results from the critique of psychosexual development and genital character: productiveness is entangled with repression, just as the process of psychosexual development is chiefly conceived as a process of internalizing domination.
Estrangement appears as a natural state; the satisfaction of false needs results in the individual’s contentment within the conditions of domination (1966 [1964]:11).123

Marcuse elaborates on the necessity to also re-adjust the psychological concepts dealing with the impact of one-dimensional society on the individual. The concept of introjection no longer adequately addresses the internalization of external needs (Ibid.:10). Alienation, as conceptualized in *Eros and Civilization*, evoked a concrete feeling of estrangement in the alienated person (worker).126 The possibility of such a feeling presupposes a psychological structure that has not been completely invaded by the existing order. In Marx, the experience of poverty and scarcity the workers confront in their daily lives provides the basis for such feelings. *One-dimensional* society, however, increasingly caters to the essential needs for shelter and food; scarcity can no longer be experienced in a way comparable to the situation of European workers in the 19th century. By providing the satisfaction of basic needs and continuously creating and gratifying new ‘false’ needs, technological rationality, as one-dimensional society’s rationale, is able to penetrate the individual’s consciousness to an extent that leaves no room for a sense of estrangement anymore. Translated into psychoanalytic terminology, Marcuse states that mimesis has substituted introjection (1966 [1964]:10).

123 Wheatland notes that “[u]nlike Marx, Marcuse insisted that technological progress was not inherently liberating” and detects “an utter repudiation of Marx’s expectations” in Marcuse’s work, “through its incorporation, the proletariat was no longer the revolutionary negation of capitalism” (2009:294).
124 The notion of one-dimensionality is twofold: it encompasses the societal and the psychological level, and conceptualizes one-dimensional society and one-dimensional thought. In contrast to two-dimensional society, as it existed in the bourgeois era, the sphere of art, catering to psychological qualities/potentials like fantasy and imagination, has vanished. The aesthetic dimension has been co-opted by technological rationality (or: instrumental reason) represented by the culture industry. The aesthetic dimension of society represented a sphere capable of escaping the instrumental rationality of society and allowing “lucid moments transcending the existing at least momentarily. The disappearance of that sphere in society is eventually reflected in the psychological structure: “a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior [emerges] in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe” (1966 [1964]:12).
125 Laplanche and Pontalis trace the concept to Sandor Ferenczi. Freud picked it up and “distinguishes it clearly from projection. His most explicit text on this point is ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915c), which envisages the genesis of the opposition between subject (ego) and object (outside world) in so far as it can be correlated with that between pleasure and unpleasure: the ‘purified pleasure-ego’ is constituted by an introjection of everything that is a source of pleasure and by the projection outwards of whatever brings about unpleasure” (1973:230). Introjection relates to the ego’s role in pleasure seeking and pleasure allowance – in Marcuse’s analysis the ego, however collapses, taking in what’s pleasurable is no longer a process of negotiation, directed by the ego, but an automatic response.
126 The way Marcuse conceptualizes experience in the course of his intellectual career sets his work apart from other *Institute* members in one crucial way: As a former student of Martin Heidegger’s, the latter’s philosophy of being, steeped in the paradigmatic phenomenological preeminence of experience are, following Andrew Feenberg traceable in his later works. Feenberg suggests that “Chapter six of *One-Dimensional Man* presents a remarkable synthesis of phenomenological and Marxist concepts” (2013:604). The concept of experience is key to Marcuse’s evaluation of the conditions and (im)possibilities of liberation in one-dimensional society. Marcuse’s understanding of experience references “four main sources: Lukács’s concept of reification, Heidegger’s concept of technology, Husserl’s late discussion of science and the lifeworld, and Horkheimer and Adorno’s theory of the impoverishment of experience under capitalism” (Ibid.).
individual psyche tries to adapt itself completely to the environment; the adaptation happens automatically, transcendent thought is co-opted. This results, however, not in an *End of Ideology* as Marcuse’s contemporary Daniel Bell\textsuperscript{127} had famously put it in 1960. Ideology has, moreover, increased in “advanced industrial culture,” it is already inscribed “in the process of production itself” (Marcuse 1966 [1964]:11). *One-dimensional* thought, it follows, is inherently and necessarily ideological without, however, encompassing transcendent potential. In psychoanalytic terms, society’s immediate impact on the individual psyche translates into a collapse of super ego and Id at the expense of the ego.

*One-dimensional Man* is more pessimistic than *Eros and Civilization*. Alienation has progressed to an extent that makes transcendence impossible. The societal sphere, which allowed for moments of transcendence, has disappeared; technological rationality pervades all spheres of society and is deeply engrained in the psychological apparatus. The emancipatory potential of increasing alienation is co-opted and channeled in the satisfaction of ‘false needs.’\textsuperscript{128} The tone of Marcuse’s second major work is thus notably darker. There are, however, certain characteristics that are reflected in both books. They are philosophical works, yet they are written in an explanatory style: the original concepts (Freudian, Marxian) are introduced and further ‘extrapolated’, the process of concept development is explained to the reader. Both books also contain similar elements: a critique of the existing social order on the societal and on the individual or psychological level, and eventually a negotiation of transcending potential and ways to conceptualize the non-repressive society. The latter part is not missing from *One-Dimensional Man*, despite its more pessimistic tone. The book’s third (and last) part is titled *The Chances for the Alternatives* (203ff) and consists of an evaluation of emancipatory potential within the conditions of *one-dimensionality*. The need for conceptualizations of emancipatory potentialities is, eventually, emphasized. Liberation is more distant, but still achievable.

\textsuperscript{127} In 1960 *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* by American intellectual Daniel Bell was published. Marcuse’s choice of subtitle: *Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* can be understood as an implicit replica to Bell.

\textsuperscript{128} Marcuse’s concept of *repressive desublimation* exemplifies the theory of ‘false needs.’ In bourgeois society, the work of art expressed the artist’s alienation from society. The artwork, potentially containing and portraying the negation of the existing, was a product of sublimation, the gratification it provided was mediated to a high degree. In *one-dimensional* society, however, the integration of higher culture into mass culture replaces such “mediated gratification by unmediated gratification […] [t]he pleasure principle absorbs the reality principle; sexuality is liberated in socially constructive forms” (1966:72). Libido is ever more localized and the erotic experience, as it was connected with the experience of art is reduced to sexual satisfaction. *One-dimensional* society is capable of allowing for such desublimation “because its interests have become the innermost drives of its citizens, and because the joys which it grants promote social cohesion and contentment” (1966 [1964]:72). Desublimation serves the interests of domination by totally integrating the individual.
Fantasy and Utopia

In Marcuse’s theoretical universe, emancipatory and transcendent potential figures both in society and in the individual psychological structure. Both spheres are conceived as dialectically (re)producing each other to a certain extent. While the societal expression of utopian potential is made manifest in technological progress (the possibility to abolish scarcity), and is expressed in the realm of art, the individual’s capacities of transcendence are located in phantasy and imagination. The conceptualizations of this potentiality differ significantly in *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man*. Just as the notion of increased and negatively twisted alienation has evolved, the utopian categories have, too. *Eros and Civilization* highlights the emancipatory potential of fantasy and imagination: “[a]s a fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth value of its own, which corresponds to an experience of its own – namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality” (1974 [1955]:143). Fantasy displays an (almost) Hegelian potential: it is (almost) capable of sublating (*aufheben*) antagonistic reality. My discussion of Marcuse’s re-interpretation of Freud’s psychosexual development delineated the centrality of pregenital sexuality, and the inherent, yet dialectically twisted nostalgic moment in it. Both reappear in the conceptualization of fantasy’s transcendent potential: “phantasy (imagination) retains the structure and the tendencies of the psyche prior to its organization by reality, prior to its becoming an “individual” set off against other individuals” (Ibid.:142) – in other words, before the psychological structure is organized by the *performance principle*. Fantasy’s truth content is rationalized as follows:

[T]he truths of imagination are first realized when phantasy itself takes form, when it creates a universe of perception and comprehension – a subjective and at the same time objective universe. This occurs in *art*. The analysis of the cognitive function of phantasy is thus led to aesthetics as the “science of beauty”: behind the aesthetic form lies the repressed harmony of sensuousness and reason – the eternal protest against the organization of life by the logic of domination, the critique of the performance principle” (Ibid.:144, highlights in the original).

The psychological potential for transcendence and liberation is localized; fantasy becomes the psychological quality capable of harking back to primary experiences, preserved in the unconscious. Hence, fantasy and imagination are capable of exhibiting a distant sense for a state of being that predates the subject’s traumatic encounter with the *performance principle*. This is a possible source of transcendent moments. At the same time, however, the potential is
to be considered dialectically, since fantasy and imagination are also always reflections of the existing order and condemned to reproduce its specific way of conceptualizing reality (on various levels). Fantasy and imagination are thus not solutions to the problem of how to conceptualize a societal reality free of domination; they rather hint at what is wrong with society. Marcuse’s philosophy is still a materialist philosophy and necessarily negative in its conceptualization of emancipatory potential. Fantasy and imagination are fused with the existing order, but also contain – through their access to the unconscious – traces of the negation of an all too rigid organization of the reality principle.

The intuitiveness of a state of being that allows for more gratification, as the negation of the existing, bears transcendent potential if it develops into a consciousness that simultaneously reflects the necessary negativity of transcendent thought, and the impossibility of fully imagining the “better world.” In other words: it has transcendent potential if it learns to conceptualize primary experiences of discontent in the language of negativity. Marcuse’s emphasis lies, of course, on the specificity of the historic shape the reality principle takes in (late) capitalism, the performance principle. In contrast to Freud, Marcuse’s negativity is not presented as the final conclusion following from the realization of an inescapable state of repression in culture. Rather, it is conceptualized as the adequate theoretical response to a specific manifestation of social reality that could as well be different. Fantasy and imagination function as agents of transcendence.

In *Eros and Civilization*, the societal dimension of fantasy and imagination is (still) art. In *One-Dimensional Man*, however, the sphere of art appears as co-opted by one-dimensional society. Fantasy and imagination are corrupted, utopian potential has almost disappeared. Individual consciousness is subjected by a collective ego-ideal,129 which directs the mimetic process and causes the actual vanishing of individuality altogether. It is in the face of such developments that Marcuse (still) considers Freudian drive theory as inherently, and at times unknowingly, pinpointing crucial tendencies of contemporary politics (Marcuse 1968a:5). Marcuse conceives a societal totality in *One-Dimensional Man* that propels itself into de-individualization without having ever been ‘better,’ in the sense of ‘truly freer.’

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129 In *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus* (1914) Freud describes the erection of an ego-ideal as a pre-requisite for the repression process, the ego-ideal becomes the target of ego-love, instead of the real ego (2014:69). In Marcuse, who implicitly references Freud’s *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse* (1921), the ego-ideal is externalized, it is no longer product of an individual (pathological) process of problematic object-choice, but a generalized societal condition, perpetuated by mass-media.
The dialectical nostalgic moment in *Critical Theory* is undeniably present. Prior to the culture-industry, bourgeois society appears as an era of potential individuality. What is romanticized is, however, not the seemingly better empirical reality of a (social) world gone by, but the potentiality of autonomous individuality. This individuality was hypothetically granted to a specific, privileged, group, made possible by specific arrangement of temporarily, spatially, and culturally enclosed social conditions. Marcuse’s nostalgia thus revolves around a Hegelian potentiality of reason.\(^{130}\) It is questionable, however, if one can really describe such ‘longing’ as nostalgia, since Marcuse’s dialectical approach always already reflects on the price that was paid for the possibility of that potential, i.e. privilege that is built on exploitation and brings forth a form of enlightened consciousness that necessarily is fused with, contains and reproduces the existing social power relations and hierarchies. *Critical Theory*’s negativity does not only count as the only way of conceptualizing the present social order in a non-ideological way, but also the past ones, which (necessarily) only appear as a continuation of domination.

The role and emancipatory value of psychoanalysis is re-evaluated by Marcuse in an essay similar to Fromm’s *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis; Das Veralten der Psychoanalyse* (1968). He concludes that psychoanalysis cannot provide political alternatives. It can, however, contribute to reestablishing private autonomy and rationality. While the politics of mass society start at home by diminishing the ego and cumulate in its submission to the collective ideal, resistance can also start at home. Psychoanalytic therapy can help the patient to live with her individual consciousness and proper ego-ideal. In one-dimensional society, this can also mean to live in negation and opposition to the societal status quo. Psychoanalysis’s obsolescence as a functional tool in that society is exactly where Marcuse locates its strength: it insists on individual needs and opportunities, which are out-paced by societal and political developments (1968b:105).

\(^{130}\) In *Reason and Revolution* (1941) Marcuse elaborates on Hegel’s notion of potentiality: “The difference between the reality and the potentiality is the starting point of the dialectical process that applies to every concept in Hegel’s logic.” (65) The (diminished) potentiality of reason, in Marcuse, emerges against the backdrop of societal conditions perpetuating (economic) domination in one-dimensional society. For Hegel “the truth [… ] is not an object for passive contemplation, but an objective potentiality calling for realization. The idea of reason implies the freedom to act according to reason.” (Ibid.:255) Marcuse’s materialist turn of Hegel locates the impairment of the ‘freedom to act according to reason’ in the concrete societal conditions. In two-dimensional society, the potentiality was at least visibly located in the sphere of art.
Although Marcuse does not further elaborate on it, the concept of *social character* can be read into his writings. Marcuse identifies character traits universal to a culturally specific group – the Western, industrialized world’s ‘modern individual.’ The divergence is, however, apparent in Marcuse’s insistence and Fromm’s abandonment of drive theory. To rephrase it in terms of the concept’s ‘utopian potential:’ while Fromm proposes a general model of *social character*, one that is built on the foundational assumption that a certain society eventually brings forth the specific character type that it needs, Marcuse proposes an ideal of individuality that is supposedly implicit to Freud’s conception of the psychological apparatus and can only fully develop under societal conditions free of domination. In other words: Marcuse’s *social character* can only be conceived as negative, it is an expression of individuality’s defeat by a collectivized ego-ideal. Universal traits in social character always reflect domination. In a truly free society, however, the particularity of character would flower. Psychoanalysis as a therapeutic practice, it follows, only carries utopian potential if it is not functionally oriented. As a theory of society, its value is located in its inherent (negative) dialectics. The nostalgic vision of bourgeois individuality (still) pervades the negativity of this outlook; it realizes itself in the almost melodramatic call for the critical intellectual’s “Great Refusal,” on which *One-Dimensional Man* closes (1966 [1964]:257).
The Exaggerated Truth: Theodor W. Adorno and Psychoanalysis

After delineating essentials of Fromm’s and Marcuse’s Freud, I will now turn to Theodor W. Adorno’s approximations of Freudian (emancipatory) potentialities. Despite his relocation to Frankfurt in 1949, I consider Adorno’s work important for my project for two major reasons. Firstly, Adorno is today definitely the most prominent theorist identified with Critical Theory. Secondly, Adorno’s collaborations with American scholars in the 1940s and 50s, and the fairly widespread reception of these studies among American academics underline his importance for the American sphere despite his absence after 1949. Adorno initially formulates his psychoanalytic ambitions in the ‘great letter’ to Horkheimer in 1934. The rough outline for a dialectical psychology he provides in the letter is the closest approximation of a methodology of Freud interpretations Adorno provides, and an excellent vantage point into the further delineation of Freudian theory in his works after the fall-out with Fromm in the late 1930s. After Adorno’s successful establishment at the exiled Institute in New York, 1938, the close collaboration with Horkheimer became reality. The most prominent project, demonstrating the intellectual proximity between Adorno and Horkheimer is Dialectics of Enlightenment (1947) within which especially the chapter Elements of Antisemitism (177ff) is permeated by psychoanalytic thinking. In the foreword to Eclipse of Reason (1947), originally a lecture series held at Columbia University in 1944, while he was already working on the “Dialektikbuch” with Adorno, Horkheimer remarks that “[i]t would be difficult to say which of the ideas originated in his mind and which in my own; our philosophy is one” (1947:vi). For the discussion of Adorno’s dialectical psychology, Dialectics of Enlightenment is a key text; despite and because of Horkheimer’s pronouncement of an almost complete convergence of philosophical positions, Horkheimer’s contributions are (necessarily) implicit to the discussion, so that the Institute’s longstanding director is not completely missing from the picture. 131

In comparison to Fromm and Marcuse, Adorno's career after joining the Institute in New

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131 Horkheimer’s importance as the Institute’s director and “Stichwortgeber” of the Institute’s approach to Social Research cannot be underestimated. The impact of executive decisions, such as to resolve the contract with Fromm in 1939, on the development of Critical Theory only demonstrate Horkheimer’s centrality in the formulation of the Institute’s orthodoxy.
York, is much easier to trace and account for. As an exiled philosopher and social scientist, he started working for the *Institute* in 1938, together with Horkheimer, prepared and executed its return to Germany and remained an active member until his untimely death in 1969. Similar to Marcuse and Fromm, he assumed the position of a public intellectual in post-war Germany during the 50s and 60s. However, this public role always tied back to his position as a professor at the *Institute*. Especially his skeptical stance towards the students’ movement in the 1960s, most pronounced in a rather harsh exchange of arguments in his correspondences with Marcuse, and his last publication *Marginalien zu Theorie und Praxis* (1969), have attracted critical attention with regard to his public role (Zwarg 2017:42f). For the American scene, Adorno’s public persona was not of immediate relevance in any comparable way to Fromm and Marcuse in the 1960s.

Tracing the specific way Freudian ideas figure in Adorno’s work, however, is a much more difficult task in comparison to Fromm and Marcuse. Fromm and Marcuse explicitly and quite systemically develop their conceptual divergences with and against Freud; both provide (more or less) detailed explications of Freud’s original conceptual apparatus. While psychoanalysis constitutes a crucial, dynamic element in Adorno’s theorizing, there is no systematic delineation of concepts. The reader is presented with dense, philosophically intonated dialectical “poetry” that (explicitly) demands close examination in the attempt to trace its epistemological references and influences. The works in which psychoanalysis is most pronounced are *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1947), *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), *Minima Moralia* (1947?), and *Negative Dialectics* (1967) and a number of essays, of which *Die Revidierte Psychoanalyse* (1962)¹³², and *Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Psychologie* (1955) are the most important ones. My discussion orients itself towards the notions of trauma and damage, alienation and utopia, which relate to the categorical junctions of character structure, integration and social change. It attempts to pursue Adorno’s engagement with

¹³² Bock suggests Adorno’s ‘great letter’ to Horkheimer, and *Die revidierte Psychoanalyse* as the two seminal texts for tracing Adorno’s reception of psychoanalysis (Bock 2017:615;616). Bock recounts the history of the essay’s genesis by tracing it back to a talk Adorno gave in San Francisco in 1946. He emphasizes the differences of the raw, 1946 version and the later ones, firstly published in German as *Zum Verhältnis von Psychologie und Gesellschaftstheorie* in Psyche 1952, and under its better-known title *Die Revidierte Psychoanalyse* in 1962 (2017:616). Three topical divergences between those versions shed new light on Adorno’s Freud reception: a) in terms of style and language, the way Adorno addresses his issues with neo-Freudian revisionists, such as Fromm and Horney, is more open and at times even appreciative of their works in the original text; b) in the original text the influence of Walter Benjamin, especially his notion of shock, is much more pronounced, and c) The (increasing) harshness in tone against neo-Freudian revisionism is, on Adorno’s part implicated with especially Karen Horney’s history with the *Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut*, and its successor under national-socialism, the *Deutsches Institut für Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie* under directorship of Herman Göring’s cousin Matthias Göring (Bock 2017:14ff). For my own investigation, which chiefly aims to carve out the general gist of Adorno’s Freud reception, Bock’s three innovations are of marginal importance.
Freud from the 1940’s *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, *The Authoritarian Personality*, and *Minima Moralia* aphorisms through the 1950’s essays and finally the 1960’s *Negative Dialectics*.

Both (seminal) works *Dialectics of Enlightenment* and *The Authoritarian Personality* prominently make use of Freudian concepts, while being of considerably different nature. *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is a philosophical text while *The Authoritarian Personality* is a collaborative empirical study conducted by Adorno and other émigré and American social scientists and psychologists. Both texts together, however, can be understood to represent the Institute’s programmatic vision: a dialectical interpenetration of social philosophy and empirical research practice.\(^{133}\) The importance of the philosophical *Dialectic* and the empirical *The Authoritarian Personality* for the attempt to carve out the Institute’s (theoretical) legacy, which *Critical Theory* represents, becomes further pronounced by the fact that together, both books have evolved into the most famous works published by the Institute under Horkheimer’s directorship (Ziege 2009:10).\(^{134}\)

*Minima Moralia*, the collection of aphorisms Adorno authored in the 1940s is an invaluable complement to the two books. Composed while Adorno was involved with the empirical project in Berkeley, and simultaneously working on *Dialectics of Enlightenment* with Horkheimer, (some of) the aphorisms provide a more individually pronounced engagement with Freud. Together, all three texts allow insights into Adorno’s understanding of psychoanalysis from (slightly) different perspectives. There are several junctures where Adorno’s perspective, at least superficially, converges with Fromm’s, and/or Marcuse’s; the focus, however, lies with the divergences, which help to sharpen Adorno’s approach to a dialectical psychology.

\(^{133}\) Adorno emphasized retrospectively that *Elements of Antisemitism* can actually be understood as an approximation of the philosophical framework that is apparently missing from *The Authoritarian Personality*. I will discuss the relation of both works later in the chapter. It is important, however, to note that the contemporary recipients of *The Authoritarian Personality* were not able to make that connection, because *Dialectics of Enlightenment* had not been published in English by the time of *The AP’s* publication (Adorno 1998:230).

\(^{134}\) The fact that both books together have become the best-known publications (and sold the most copies) does, of course, not necessarily correlate with their suggested status of proving a realization of Horkheimer’s programmatic vision.
Trauma, Damage, and Mutilation

One of Adorno's *Minima Moralia* aphorisms proposes that “Nothing is true in psychoanalysis except its exaggerations,” (2003 [1951]:54) a puzzling statement that, however dialectically, pinpoints crucial aspects of Adorno’s Freud adaptation. The main categories of interest are the ones concretely related to the drastic juxtaposition of libidinal strivings and societal renunciations, such as the notion of trauma, which becomes central in Adorno’s psychoanalytically informed dialectics. Just as Marcuse, Adorno emphasizes that Freud’s theory is generally infused with the notion of trauma. In *Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Psychologie*, originally published in 1955, at the same time as Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization*, resp. his contribution to the *Dissent* debate, Adorno emphasizes the Freudian realization that adult patterns of behavior mainly repeat childhood experiences and introduces the notion of damage (*Beschädigung*) as implicit to Freud: psychoanalytic drive theory evidently encompasses the concepts of trauma and damage (1979 [1955]:23). Again, in accordance with Marcuse, Adorno distinguishes his perspective from Fromm’s notion of social character; he points out that the totality of such a conceptualization of character would only be conceivable in a non-traumatic society (Ibid.:24). In the exiting order, however, the individual experiences society as a continuous series of shocks, which are, in turn, determined by its alienation and altogether reflect the constitutional juxtaposition of individual pleasure principle and societal reality principle. He concludes that character, in the societal totality of the ‘wrong status quo,’ results to a much higher degree from shocks than from continued experience and almost appears as a “system of scars” (Ibid.: my translation).

Adorno’s and Marcuse’s perspectives converge in their emphasis on the initial traumatic encounter of pleasure principle and reality principle, which is steeped in their insistence on Freudian drive theory and their common critique of the (im)possibility of character development under the totalizing conditions of late capitalism. Adorno’s introduction of damage as a further quality to conceptualize socio-historical resonances in the individual psyche is illuminating in different ways. For one, it points at the irreconcilability of the existing social order and actual individual potentialities; for another, it rhetorically reflects Adorno’s pronounced theoretical negativity, which helps to illuminate the differences to
Marcuse, whose terminology is slightly less pointed (zugespitzt). Damage is irreparable, and in the concrete, contemporary societal context, it is inevitable. *Minima Moralia*’s subtitle is *Reflections from Damaged Life*. This is no coincidence; the subtitle dialectically emphasizes what is generally implicit to Adorno’s philosophy. The aphorisms have been interpreted as reflections of an émigré philosopher, mainly informed by the experience of exile – haunted by persecution and displacement; a reading within which ‘damaged life’ comes to represent life in exile, the loss of home, family, security (Wheatland 2009:275). Susan Buck-Morss hold that the book, while “it included much which was autobiographical [...], like Benjamins *Berliner Kindheit* and *Einhahnstrasse*, it illuminated less about the author than the objective conditions of society” (1977:181). While personal experiences undoubtedly inform the *Minima Moralia* aphorisms and *Critical Theory* altogether, I want to insist, following Buck-Morss, on the constitutional significance of trauma and damage for the conceptualization of consciousness in Adorno’s negative dialectics. The objective conditions are steeped in the continuous production of suffering and damaged individuality. Adorno holds that “the desire to let suffering speak is the condition of all truth. Suffering is objectivity weighing on the subject; what it experiences as most subjective, its own expression, is objectively mediated” (Adorno 2003 [970]:29). Freudian drive theory inherently conceptualizes trauma as necessarily inscribed in the individuation process. In light of

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135 Damage and trauma are important to the psychological representation of society in Adorno’s conceptualization of subjectivity. Society itself only appears as a negative totality, violently forcing its rationale on the individual. The individual, in turn, only appears negatively as the distortion of a potential that has lost the last bit of autonomy. Horkheimer and Adorno frame the negativity of their language as an expression of refusing to participate: „Die rastlose Selbstzerstörung der Aufklärung zwingt das Denken dazu, sich auch die letzte Arglosigkeit gegenüber den Gewohnheiten und Richtungen des Zeitgeistes zu verbieten. Wenn die Öffentlichkeit einen Zustand erreicht hat, in dem unentwirrbar der Gedanke zur Ware und die Sprache zu deren Anpreisung wird, so muß der Versuch, solcher Depravation auf die Spur zu kommen, den geltenden sprachlichen und gedanklichen Anforderungen Gefolgschaft versagen, ehe deren welthistorische Konsequenzen ihn vollends vereiteln“ (Adorn and Horkheimer 1994 [1947]:12-13). Philosophical language becomes a vehicle for the last possibility of rebellion.

136 The differences to Marcuse are pronounced in an exchange of letters regarding the German publication of Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization* in 1957. After coincidently being informed about the publication, Adorno complains to Marcuse about not having been informed, and that the book should actually have appeared in the Institute’s own series (Adorno to Marcuse 6/28/1957 TWAA Br_0969 969/25). In the course of the exchange Marcuse reveals to Adorno: „From the very beginning, I had the feeling that you are not very eager (understatement!) to publish my book in the Institute’s series“ (Marcuse to Adorno 7/11/1957 TWAA_Br0969 969/26, my translation “understatement!” English in the original). Adorno replies „The truth is that a certain concreteness and „unmediatedness“ (in the burdened sense we give to the concept of mediation) in your English Freud-text doesn’t please me, without, however touching the fundamental positions“ (Adorno to Marcuse 7/16/1957 TWAA_Br0969 969/27, my translation). Marcuse finally responds „It just seemed better to me to sometimes say the things without the appropriate mediation, even in immediacy, instead of not saying them at all“ (Marcuse to Adorno TWA_Br0969 969/29, my translation). The exchange simultaneously demonstrates a divergence in ‘style’ and convergence in general theoretical fundamentals. The concrete political dimension inscribed in Marcuse’s insistence on concreteness, even at the price of ‘unmediatedness’ becomes a central component of their controversy over the students’ movement and captures the divergences of their approaches to *Critical Theory* in the face of their convergences.
Adorno’s insistence on drive-theory, and his simultaneous dialectical reflection of it, his reflections from a ‘damaged life’ are not only informed by personal experiences of persecution, loss and emigration, the damage is (also) an inevitable consequence of the initial trauma. This trauma, in turn, is universal. Life in Western, industrialized society (and all others, actually) is necessarily and inevitably damaged life. Adorno holds that one of Freud’s greatest achievements was to destroy the myth of the psyche’s organic structure. In doing so, Freud gained more insight into the essence of societal mutilation as any direct parallelism of character and social influences would ever be able to (1979 [1955]:25). Mutilation is yet another quality pertaining to the societal status quo, just like shock, trauma, and damage. Adorno identifies these negative qualities as the main motifs of Freud’s philosophy and juxtaposes them to the neo-Freudian/revisionist attempts to sociologize character development. The terminology reflects the negativity of Adorno’s philosophy not only rhetorically, but perpetuates an essential refusal to make any concessions to the existing social order.

Character versus Personality

With regard to Adorno’s critique of Fromm’s social character model, The Authoritarian Personality shifts especially into focus. It too, relies on a notion of character suited to contemporary society, which bears, at first glance, striking similarities to Fromm’s concept. The Authoritarian Personality is conceptualized as the attempt to grasp a phenomenon that emerges in the specific socio-historic conditions of contemporaneous Western, industrialized societies. In the introduction, Horkheimer states that its “central theme […] is […] the rise of an ‘anthropological’ species we call the authoritarian type of man” (1950:ix). Adam Schaff picks up on the obvious, superficial confluence of Fromm’s model and Horkheimer’s “anthropological species” and points out that Fromm himself identified his own methodology, developed during his work on Studien in The Authoritarian Personality (Schaff 1987:45). In light of the claims of methodological continuity and the obvious divergences between Fromm’s and Adorno’s conceptualization of character, the specifics of the authoritarian personality, as a socio-historically specific type, deserve closer attention.

The volume focuses mainly on the actual measurement of prejudices within the minds of the participants under the hypothesis “that the political, economic, and social convictions of an
individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a ‘mentality’ or ‘spirit,’ and that this pattern is an expression of deep lying trends in his personality.” (Adorno et al 1950:1) The potentially fascist individual, “one whose structure is such as to render him particularly susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda” (Ibid.) is at the center of its research. The study does not hide its normative directedness; to investigate the psychological conditions of fascism is understood to help fighting it (Ibid.) The guiding research questions are: “If a potentially fascistic individual exists, what, precisely, is he like? What goes to make up antidemocratic thought? What are the organizing forces within the person? If such a person exists, how commonly does he exist in our society? And if such a person exists, what have been the determinants and what the course of his development?” (Ibid.:2) It is based in the hypothesis of an authoritarian type, a potentially antidemocratic individual in totality (Ibid.).

The study was conducted in two phases. The first one measured open and hidden prejudices with a set of specifically designed questionnaires using “factual scales” to inquire personal background information about “church preference and attendance, political party, vocation, income, and so on,” and “[o]pinion-attitude scales [which] were used from the start in order to obtain quantitative estimates of certain surface ideological trends: antisemitism, ethnocentrism, politico-economic conservatism. Later, a scale was developed for the measurement of antidemocratic tendencies in the personality itself.” (Ibid.:13) This final scale is the now (in)famous F-Scale, contributed by Adorno, which “represents a new departure [in sociological methodology]. The procedure was to bring together in a scale items which, by hypothesis and by clinical experience, could be regarded as ‘giveaways’ of trends which lay relatively deep within the personality, and which constituted a disposition to express spontaneously (on a suitable occasion), or to be influenced by, fascist ideas” (Ibid.:15).

The participants were divided into high-scores, those who showed high anti-democratic potential and low-scorers, those who showed low anti-democratic potential. The high-scorers were then, in the second phase, selected for clinical interviews which further pursued the characterological relations of anti-democratic potential, personal background, and personality structure. The empirical findings support the research hypotheses that the “authoritarian personality” emerges as the concrete expression of the contemporaneous, potentially fascist individual. The findings are, however, only loosely contextualized in the frame of Adorno’s

137 Joshua Rayman emphasizes another groundbreaking achievement of Adorno’s F-scale in the context of a positivistic oriented sociological landscape: it “was groundbreaking in its use of […] indirect methods, because they exposed the naïveté of positivistic methods in academic sociology. Few would admit directly to prejudiced attitudes; hence, it was impossible to discover the extent of prejudice through the direct questions favored by positivistic sociology” (2009:23).
and Horkheimer’s philosophical considerations. Since my main interest lies with the way character is understood within the context of their specific social theory, I will in the following focus on those passages which, more or less explicitly, address the philosophical context.138

In his introduction Adorno addresses the problem of defining conceptualizations regarding individual and collectively apparent modes of behavior and/or character traits as follows: personality139 is essentially a “product of the social environment of the past” (1950:6). The statement already includes an important distinction that is further explicated: “it [personality] is not, once it has developed, a mere object of the contemporary environment” (1950:6). Freudian drive theory is implicit to Adorno’s insinuations; personality is in the last instance shaped by the environment. The main focus, however, lies with the past, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. While the drive structure is subject to historical modification, the ontogenetic process of character formation mainly takes place during childhood. Personality is a “structure within the individual […] which though always modifiable is frequently very resistant to fundamental change” (1950:6). The specificity of character as a product of social environment in The Authoritarian Personality lies with the long-term effects of repression (social and psychological) on the drive structure. Fromm’s social character does not encompass a psychological entity (anymore) preserving archaic influences; character development is mainly attributed to the individual’s specific relatedness to its social environment. The distinction from Fromm, and other revisionist approaches, is implicit to the pronounced insistence on “the past” as the major force impacting the personality. At the same time, the notion of personality is dissociated from “a static biological” typology; it is, in the last instance, “dynamic and social;” Adorno holds that “the fact that human society has been up to now divided into classes affects more than the external relations of men” (1950:747).

The position on character development and its social meaning and function is located between Fromm’s revisionism and Freud’s (biological) fixation. It is, moreover, implicitly framed in

138 The (implicit) philosophical framework, hidden in Adorno’s contributions, is paramount to the delineation of the concrete analytical tools developed by the Berkley group, because the psychoanalytic argumentation is chiefly philosophical in Adorno’s (and Horkheimer’s) work.

139 Adorno states: “[a]ccording to the theory that has guided the present research, personality is a more or less enduring organization of forces within the individual. These persisting forces of personality help to determine response in various situations, and it is thus largely to them that consistency of behavior—whether verbal or physical—is attributable. But behavior, however consistent, is not the same thing as personality; personality lies behind behavior and within the individual” (1950:5). The way in which personality lies in the individual is conceptualized with reference to Freud’s drive structure. Personality is not just a reaction formation to external impulses, but deeply shaped by the specific reorganization of libidinal energy in the formative years of childhood.
the philosophical critique of a reified social world, that ‘invents’ categories, and applies them as if they were natural.

The notion of psychological types inevitably caters to such reified categories. There is, nevertheless, “reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and ‘produces’ different ‘types’ of persons” (Adorno et al 1950:747). The critique of a social world that is conceived as natural by its ‘inhabitants’ cannot escape the necessity of reproducing its underlying mechanism: reduction of complexity through categorization. The dialectical moment in Adorno’s perspective on The Authoritarian Personality is immanent to the juxtaposition of problematic reification and necessary typology. The philosophical reflection on the reified nature of those categories does not translate into the denial of their actual existence: “[o]nly by identifying stereotypical traits in modern humans […] can the pernicious tendency towards all-pervasive classification and subsumption be challenged” (Ibid.:747). Adorno immanently articulates another motif crucial to Critical Theory: the theoretical reflection of societal conditions has to realize the inevitably of its own entanglement with the social conditions it sets out to criticize and integrate it. The philosophical dimension is not very pronounced in The Authoritarian Personality. Adorno maintains that “[h]istorical factors or economic forces operating in our society to promote or diminish ethnic prejudice are clearly beyond the scope of our investigation;” the findings are confined to general psychological aspects of prejudice (Ibid.:972). This societal, historical, and economical dimension is inherent to Adorno’s insistence on Freud’s drive theory (and to Marcuse’s for that matter). The general notion of personality is derived from it and underlies the methodology of the study, however, esoterically (Ziege 2009:270). These dimensions are more visible in the chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment that Adorno retrospectively identified as a philosophical supplement to the empirical studies: Elements of Antisemitism (Adorno 1998:230).

In Dialectics of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer fundamentally criticize the course of (Western) Enlightenment. The philosophical work relies on psychoanalysis in some of its constitutional categories. In Elements of Antisemitism – The Limits of Enlightenment (177ff) these categories are most accentuated. Horkheimer stresses the chapter’s relation to the empirical research project in the preface to the first edition (Horkheimer in
Adorno/Horkheimer 1994 [1947]:17). The simultaneous work on the antisemitism project, which would evolve into Studies, was the peak of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s relationship. Both were located at the West coast at the time. It is difficult to decide whether the antisemitism project was a disparate excursion to Dialectics or whether Dialectics triggered the antisemitism project. Both projects were inseparably (and dialectically) intertwined. This relation is, however, not pointed out in The Authoritarian Personality. The chapter’s subtitle The Limits of Enlightenment points to an essential realization about the social and psychological nature and function of antisemitism. The boundaries of the historical/philosophical project of enlightenment emerge in the stereotyped mindset produced by the existing social order. The enlightened world of brutality and violence culminates in modern antisemitism. For an assessment of the psychological mechanisms in the antisemitic mind psychoanalysis is the major theoretical tool. The central psychoanalytic motif in Elements is, in turn, false (or pathic) projection. In the fourth of the seven Elements, the authors hold that antisemitism is based on false projection (Ibid.:196). Projection is an inescapable psychological mechanism, helping to balance the ego in its struggle with the Id and external demands (represented by the super-ego). It is the self-reflective antithesis of perception, the realization that the external world exists in the own consciousness, yet is recognized as ‘other’ (Ibid.:156). False projection, in contrast, is characterized by a lack of reflection; it is conceptualized as “reverse mimesis” (Ibid.:154). Konstantinos Rantis delineates this mechanism in his Psychoanalyse und Dialektik der Aufklärung (2001) by pointing out that if mimesis aims at adapting to the environment, false projection aims at adapting the environment to oneself (2001:117). The correlation of mimesis and false projection in Adorno and Horkheimer is analogous to Freud’s correlation of introjection and projection; both tie in with the process of identification through which the human subject establishes itself, both mechanisms are part of the defense mechanisms of the ego (Ibid.).

Horkheimer additionally highlights the role Leo Löwenthal played in the development of the first three theses. Löwenthal is another member of the IfS whose work is not discussed here. His major contribution to the Institute’s output is Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator (1950), which he co-wrote with Norbert Guterman. The study is based on a psychoanalytically informed analysis of speeches delivered by contemporaneous American antisemitic/fascist agitators. Löwenthal also stayed in the US after the Institute’s relocation, his contributions to the development of Critical Theory never received as much attention as Adorno’s, Marcuse’s and Horkheimer’s did.

Dialectics was published in German in the 1947 and not widely circulated. The Authoritarian Personality was widely received by an American, academic audience upon its publication in 1950. To allude to AP in Dialectics, but not to mention Dialectics in AP is an interesting move, especially because AP does contain passages implicitly hinting at the need for philosophical inquiries into the nature of the societal, economic, historical forces. Rantis points out that through projection, unpleasure/dullness is transferred to the external world, this enables the ego to shift attention away from its own unconscious to that of the other, the stranger (2001:118).
With regard to the function of mimesis in the particular context of *Elements*, Rantis emphasizes the central motif of Freudian mimesis: the death drive’s final objective is to return to a former stage, eventually to the absolute quiescence of the inorganic (Ibid.:115). In the spirit of Freud’s elaborations, the fifth thesis of *Elements* explains mimesis as aiming to resolve the self in the ups and downs of the surrounding environment (Adorno/ Horkheimer 1994 [1955]:190). False projection aims, accordingly, at resolving the imaginary other in the self, which, in turn, is molded by repression. Adorno and Horkheimer maintain that those blinded by civilization experience their own tabooed mimetic strivings only in certain gestures and practices they encounter in others - as isolated remnants, as embarrassing rudiments, sticking out in a rationalized environment. The disgusting other is actually all too familiar. (Ibid., my translation)

Adapting the other to the (repressed) self eventually culminates in ritual murder, it functions as a societal repetition of the psychological elimination of mimetic strivings from the individual’s consciousness. Rantis points out that in Adorno and Horkheimer, the antisemites are those tricked by the wrong status quo, their only rational motif is robbery. The urge of annihilation drives them to ritual murder; because they are economically and sexually frustrated, they hate the imaginary other endlessly (2001:110). The combination of economic and sexual frustration pinpoints the way Horkheimer and Adorno fused their critique of political economy and psychoanalysis, according to Rantis (Ibid.) It exemplifies the functional change of psychoanalytic concepts in *Dialectics*: they are woven into a philosophical critique of the existing, which references individual sciences but does not identify with them (Ibid.:131).

The concept of false projection, embedded in the philosophical critique of the existing social order, elucidates the importance of *Critical Theory* as a social philosophy for the empirical work conducted in *The Authoritarian Personality* and other projects. In accordance with Horkheimer’s introductory statement to *Dialectics*, Adorno notes that *Elements of Antisemitism* was “determinative for my participation in the investigation carried out later with the Berkeley Public Opinion Study Group. They found their literary expression in *The Authoritarian Personality*” (Adorno 1998, 230). The considerations in *Elements of Antisemitism* provide the materialist contextualization of the psychological dynamics of antisemitic stereotyping as it is demonstrated in *Studies in Prejudices*:
The “Elements of Antisemitism” theoretically shifted racial prejudice into the context of an objectively oriented critical theory of society. To be sure, in contrast to a certain economic orthodoxy, we were not dismissive of psychology but acknowledged its proper place in our outline as an explanatory aspect. However, we never entertained any doubts about the primacy of objective factors over psychological ones. (Adorno 1998:230)

Adorno’s retrospective contextualization of The Authoritarian Personality’s findings in Dialectics of Enlightenment exemplifies the however “esoteric” primacy of “objective factors” in the Institute’s empirical work. It reveals the fundamentally materialist orientation of Critical Theory, and highlights the place of psychoanalytic concepts. Psychoanalysis as an individual science provides important insights into individual psychological mechanisms. However, only in the context of a materialist philosophy, these realizations can help to reveal a ‘deeper truth’ about society. Adorno emphasizes his rejection of attempts to literally integrate psychology and sociology (Talcott Parsons’ Social Structure and Personality serves as a negative example); the tension between psychoanalysis and socio-philosophical inquiries cannot be resolved completely. The attempt to harmonize both sciences leads, moreover, to more distortion than their conflicting co-existence as individual sciences (1967:70ff).

Adorno’s critique of attempts to sociologize psychoanalysis is most pronounced in the 1950s essays; his criticism of revisionism additionally exemplifies the dialectically reinterpreted use of psychoanalytic concepts. When considered as complementary works, The Authoritarian Personality and Elements of Antisemitism point in a similar direction. The empirical findings identify authoritarian (high scorers) and non-authoritarian personalities (low scorers); the low scorers could potentially be conceptualized as productive characters in Fromm’s sense. In the context of Dialectics’ negative philosophy it becomes obvious, however, that the non-authoritarian personality can only exist as the lesser evil in a world totally pervaded by instrumentality.

The concept of ticket thinking, developed in The Authoritarian Personality with regard to the authoritarian personality’s attempts to politically position herself, exemplifies the relation of psychoanalytic concepts and (hidden) social-philosophy. While the psychodynamic processes, of stereotyping and personification are at the bottom, increasing alienation becomes the key concept in its societal dimensions. The individual has increasing difficulty to connect personal experiences and objective societal dynamic, its societal alienation is covered by surface-phenomena which emphasize the opposite, such as the personalization of political attitudes – the person becomes paramount to the political position. Personalization, in turn, provides a
substitute for the societal sphere’s dehumanization, which is at the center of most complaints and sufferings. Because societal and political organization of the individual is less and less important, people increasingly cling to the idea that the human being is the center of all and seek, in the all-encompassing power of prominent persons, substitution for their own social powerlessness (Adorno et al 1950:663ff). Freudian psychodynamic mechanisms are put to work in the context of a Marxian conceptualization of societal alienation, which is, however, not explicated in the study. Adorno elaborates on the functions of personalization and stereotyping for the individual’s attempt to understand the “ununderstandable” (Ibid.:664). Generally speaking, he emphasizes that “stereotypy helps to organize what appears to the ignorant as chaotic: the less he is able to enter into a really cognitive process, the more stubbornly he clings to certain patterns” (Ibid.:665). Personalization is added to the bill because “[t]he stereotype […] keeps the world as aloof, abstract, ‘non-experienced’ as it was before” (Ibid.). Personalization, defined as “the tendency to describe objective social and economic processes, political programs, internal and external tensions in terms of some person identified with the case in question” (Ibid.), enters a co-dependent relation with stereotyping. The fact that both stereotypy and personalization do not provide adequate understandings of the complexity of social reality is what makes the mechanisms interesting for the study of prejudices and fascist tendencies.

[S]tereotypy misses reality in so far as it dodges the concrete and contents itself with preconceived, rigid, and overgeneralized ideas to which the individual attributes a kind of magical omnipotence. Conversely, personalization dodges the real abstractness, that is to say, the "reification" of a social reality which is determined by property relations and in which the human beings themselves are, as it were, mere appendages. (665-666)

Ticket thinking, as the conceptualization of a psychological mechanism upon which fascist tendencies and authoritarian potential unfolds, exemplifies the interdisciplinary nature of the Studies quite instructively. Adorno directly refers to what I have called the socio-philosophical framework of the Institute’s work in the explanation of stereotypy and personalization. He argues that real abstractness is constituted in the reification of social reality, which is, in turn, determined by property relations
Alienation and Utopia

Adorno leaves no doubt about the “primacy of objective factors,” his philosophy is eventually materialist. The wrong status quo is understood as deeply rooted in the economic organization of society. In the spirit of Marx’s critique of the political economy, society appears as alienated, interpersonal and cultural relations as reified. In a lecture series from 1968 Adorno addresses and defines alienation as a concept that is widely used and talked about, but falsely emphasizes “a spiritual feeling of strangeness and isolation” and thus “conceals something which is really founded on material conditions” (2000 [1968]:3). Adorno delineates the materialist definition and the however blurry one of culturally induced estrangement. Repeatedly emphasizing that he actually wants to abstain from using it (Ibid.:3;43) in order to voice his opposition to the reified meme it has become, he (nevertheless) elaborates on alienating effects and their roots:

We live within a totality which binds people together only by virtue of their alienation from each other; […] the present society is mediated only through individuation, that also ha[s] a critical sense […]. For it is precisely through the insistence on the principium individuationis - in other words, through the fact that within the dominant forms of society individual people seek their individual advantage, profit - that the whole is able to survive and reproduce itself at all - even if while moaning and groaning and at the cost of unspeakable sacrifices. (2000:43)

Alienation does not only characterize society in general, it also serves as the means of keeping society functioning. The specific notion of individuality pervading society, which results from the economic principle underlying it, increases the mutual estrangement of its citizens while it binds them at the same time together ideologically. The individual’s alienation is expressed in the principle of instrumental individuation, which, in turn, is society’s conceptualization of autonomy, and freedom.

Adorno traces the concept of alienation and highlights its current validity: “[W]hat we call reification and what we call alienation – two concepts, incidentally, which are far from identical – undoubtedly arose from capitalist society in the specific form in which we have known them since Hegel and Marx” (2000:82). The underlying presupposition for the validity of the concepts as Hegel, Marx, and apparently Lukács coined them is the primacy of objective (read: economic) factors. The Marxian notion of alienation, and the chances to overcome it, is however, complicated by the further reference to Hegel. Wheatland notes that
Critical Theory abstained from “reducing all social and cultural life to their roots in the economic means of production” and “recovered Hegel in an attempt to rethink alienation, consciousness, and their relationships to the history of late-industrial society,” although, altogether, Critical Theory “remained firmly fixed within the tradition of historical materialism” (2009:106). Just as in Marcuse’s work, the fusion of alienation and the Lukácsian reification sets Adorno apart from Fromm and orthodox Marxists. Reification is, like with Marcuse, the predominant category in the final analysis of consciousness under (late) capitalist conditions. While proposing a materialist perspective, Adorno develops a dialectic philosophy fusing conceptualizations of alienation, reification, and consciousness, which is simultaneously informed by Hegel, Lukács, and Freud.

Adorno’s explication of alienation and the issues it is confronted with in the social sciences elucidates the concrete mode of dialectical reflection. The primacy of the object needs to be maintained, “but it should be added that recognition of the reification of society should not itself be [too] reified” (2000:152). The theorist’s (and social scientist’s) reflections have to permanently and continuously integrate the problem that the categories she employs always already appear as reified. Reflexivity is the only way to outbalance reification and not to submit to its totalizing tendency. Such reflexivity is missing from the reified social reality of everyday life in late-capitalism. With regard to the alienated individual’s consciousness, the world is characterized by the fact that “[t]he social power structure hardly needs the mediating agencies of ego and individuality any longer” (Adorno 1968:95). Adorno’s psychoanalytic translation of all-encompassing alienation in a reified social world results in a diagnosis similar to Marcuse’s one-dimensional thought: “The truly contemporary types are those whose actions are motivated neither by an ego nor, strictly speaking, unconsciously, but mirror objective trends like an automaton” (Adorno 1968:95). Individuality has deteriorated to an extent that the Freudian psychic structure does no longer apply. At the same time, this

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143 Lukács is integrated to a very limited extent, however. Susan Buck-Morss instructively captures the general gist of Lukács’s theoretical and practical ventures and Adorno's relation to it: “Lukacs opposed the mechanistic, deterministic, ‘vulgar’ Marxism which had dominated the Second International, and by claiming that Marxism was essentially a dialectical "method" he returned to Marx's Hegelian roots. Lukacs's understanding of dialectical materialism had two components. The first was negative. He saw it as a method for critically analyzing the dialectical relationship between bourgeois consciousness and material social conditions. As Ideologiekritik, it was a metacriticism of bourgeois intellectual efforts, a demonstration of the necessary limits of all bourgeois theories in their attempts to know reality. The second level was positive. Lukacs moved from a social critique of bourgeois consciousness to an affirmation of the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. Hence for Lukacs Marxism was a method of cognition which led to a program of action. But Adorno never took this second step. From the start, he remained unimpressed by Lukacs's equation of truth with proletariat class consciousness and by the Hegelian concept of history which it implied. His debt to Lukacs was clearly limited to the negative level of Ideologiekritik, the critical analysis of bourgeois class consciousness” (Buck-Morss 1977:25-26).
society keeps uttering and propelling the “princípium individuations” as its ideological glue that echoes a state of autonomy that has never existed. The potential of that autonomy did, however, shine through the conception of the bourgeois individual, as can be seen in Freud’s concept of the ego.\textsuperscript{144}

Adorno’s “contemporary types” resemble Marcuse’s one-dimensional person. And just like Marcuse’s they could be read as expressions of a specific Frommian social character of late-capitalist society. However, just as in Marcuse, they are not. Moreover, the tendencies identified by Fromm as evidence for the existence of social character types are interpreted as signs of further deterioration of autonomous individuality by Adorno. In contemporary mass society, which is mainly directed by the culture industry, such deterioration results in a conflation of super-ego and Id that (almost) cancels the ego:

A brutal, total, standardizing society arrests all differentiation, and to this end it exploits the primitive core of the unconscious. Both conspire to annihilate the mediating ego, the triumphant archaic impulses, the victory of id over ego, harmonize with the triumph of society over the individual” (1968:95).

The totality of society does not allow for productiveness in Fromm’s sense. Productiveness is always already ideologically charged and serves to propel the narrative of individuation as a tragic distortion of the ego’s actual deterioration. Just as in Marcuse, the dialectically twisted nostalgia for the bourgeois era shines through here. In contrast to Marcuse, Adorno’s language consequently reflects the negativity upon which his dialectical approach insists, and his considerations do not encompass a spelled-out search for chances of the alternatives.

\textsuperscript{144} In Adorno’s reading “the concept of the ego is dialectical, both psychic and extrapsychic” because it constitutes “a quantum of libido and the representative of outside reality[,]” at the same time. Freud’s failure to perceive the dialectical nature of the ego results in irresolvable contradictions in his “psychological statements” about it; no criteria are developed to distinguish “‘positive’ from ‘negative’ ego functions, above all, sublimation from repression” (1968:86). Adorno’s dialectical reading of Freudian (ego) theory sets out to ‘extrapolate’ its subtle content. He is in accordance with Marcuse here; his approach is, however, specific in its negativity and complex linguistic expression. The validity of Freudian theory, as a (unwillingly) dialectical critique of the existing is further underlined in Negative Dialectics. Adorno maintains here that “[t]he theory of the ego as a totality of defense mechanisms and rationalizations is directed against the individual as ideology” (2004 [1967]:351-352). Adorno contextualizes the dialectically twisted ‘subtle content’ in the frame of a critique of the repressive existing: Freud intrinsically unveils the ‘modern individual’s’ ideological character. Adorno further criticizes Freudian analysis for being, at times “all too ego oriented” and emphasizes the importance of Freud’s “magnificent discovery of infantile sexuality” (1968:90). Adorno’s ego critique converges with aspects of Marcuse’s ideas about pregenital sexuality and the problem with psychosexual development in a repressive society.
Utopia nevertheless figures prominently in his oeuvre, always in the terminology of negative dialectics. The last aphorism in *Minima Moralia* pinpoints the essence of the problem of envisioning the better world that emerges in the dialectical perspective:

To the dialectically educated person it is counterintuitive to engage in positive visions of the right society, of its citizens, or those bringing it about. The traces are horrifying, to those who look back, all societal utopias, since Plato, blur in bleak resemblance of that which they were constructed against. The leap into the future, over the boundaries of the present, lands in the past. (2003:X, my translation)

The right society only appears in the negative image of the wrong status quo. The critical thinker is confined to negative critique as the only means of implicitly keeping the thought in the world that a society free of domination is potentially possible. In *Negative Dialectics* Adorno locates this ban on images, which has a longstanding religious tradition and prominently figures in his thinking, in the tradition of materialism: “[I]t is only in the absence of images that the full object could be conceived. Materialism brought that ban into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured; this is the substance of its negativity. At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree with theology” (2004 [1967]:207). The materialist foundation of *Critical Theory* is unmistakably highlighted here. Although Marcuse’s work is dedicated to a similar negativity, the ban on images is undermined by his attempts to conceive the reorganization of the drive structure under non-repressive conditions, as they appear in his concept of libidinal work. Such attempts are not present in Adorno.

In Adorno’s framework of a negative dialectics, the role of psychoanalysis remains deeply twisted. He states that the psychoanalysts have long submitted to the predominance of the economic. Economic supremacy, in turn, makes the attempt to explain social conditions by psychological means impossible. If possible, however, a psychoanalysis of today’s culture would result in the realization that contemporary manifestation of sickness manifests itself precisely in the normal (2003:37). Adorno alludes to the contradictory role of psychoanalytic theory and practice here. While the theory states an irresolvable conflict between pleasure principle and reality principle (and unwillingly formulates a dialectic theory of the wrong status quo), the practice is (necessarily) oriented at strengthening the ego, which under the rule of the reality principle, simultaneously represents domination and unfreedom. Psychoanalytic therapy “no longer knows, and cannot know, where it wants to get the patient, to the happiness of freedom or to the happiness in unfreedom” (1968: 95). This contradiction is not resolved. In contrast to Marcuse, Adorno does not seem to feel the urge to at least
provide the glimpse of a practical outlook. In Fromm, the productive character represents the anticipation of the better society. In Adorno and Marcuse, personality types shaped by the existing social order only appear as manifestations of individuality’s further deterioration. Yet, in Marcuse, despite all negativity, therapy can help to reestablish the ego as a negation of one-dimensional society. Adorno abstains from such considerations. His critical employment of psychoanalytic concepts remains strictly negative.
Conclusion

My discussion of Fromm’s, Marcuse’s, and Adorno’s adoption and approximation of psychoanalytic concepts singled out elements I consider important and representative of the way Freud’s theory is interpreted and included. It has demonstrated that all three theoreticians share similar motivations and criticisms leveled against Freud’s original concepts. The most obvious one is their common critique of Freud’s naturalization of the socio-historic specificity of European bourgeois capitalism in his theoretical deductions. The nature of that critique, contextualized in the respective theoretical universes of Fromm, Marcuse and Adorno, points to the divergences of the three approaches at the same time, however. Fromm identifies the capitalist principle of competition in Freud’s drive theory and distinguishes his attempts to develop a critical theory of society from the general negativity of psychoanalytic theory. He develops the notion of productiveness and highlights the importance of focusing on possibilities of positive social action in alienated society. Adorno and Marcuse, on the other hand, emphasize the negativity as Freud’s greatest achievement, retain his drive theory and at the same time criticize the reification of categories implicit to Freud. Marcuse’s effort to ‘extrapolate’ the ‘hidden content’ of Freud’s deductions prominently involves speculations on positive reorganizations of drive energy, anticipating the non-repressive society. Adorno’s critique demarcates negative dialectics as the only possibility to approach to ‘the truth’ in the conditions of total domination.

The convergences and divergences among the three are informative with regard to the further developments of their respective theoretical trajectories. In Fromm, productiveness figures as the possibility of positive human potential, manifested in such categories as love, respect, and responsibility. The theory formulates the pragmatic outlook that Fromm, as a public intellectual, political activist, and practicing analyst translates into concrete, positive social action. Stabilizing the patient’s ego with reference to the ideal of the (already existing) healthy productive character is not only a strategic objective in alienated society, but a contribution to improve the conditions fundamentally. Alienation does not affect all members of society similarly; some are capable of resisting it to an extent that allows for productiveness. The pragmatic, reformative character of Fromm’s conceptual apparatus culminates in the concept of productive love, which anticipates utopia in the existing conditions of alienation. Marcuse’s and Adorno’s critique targets Fromm’s conceptual
positivity as reified categories which necessarily reproduce the conditions of domination. The conceptual apparatuses chiefly target the negative repercussions of a highly and increasingly alienated status quo. In Marcuse, *one-dimensionality* comes to represent the current state of society and thinking. While *one-dimensionality* constitutes a deterioration of a former two-dimensional society, the inherent vision of non-repressive society flashes as multidimensional. *One-dimensionality*, hence is the worst of all possible states. Yet, in all its negativity, Marcuse’s work conveys an at times even melodramatic revolutionary spirit, as it is expressed in his call for the ‘Great Refusal.’ Refusing to participate (in thought and practice) is not mere negation; it is, in its performative gesture endowed with rightfulness. The one who refuses actually does the right thing. Adorno’s negative dialectics refrains from such ‘compromises;’ its negativity is ubiquitous. His conceptual apparatus, stretching from trauma, damage, mutilation, destruction, brutality, to total submission only allows for glimpses of the better world in the shady reflections of the wrong one. The dialectical perspective enables the critical theorist to reflect about the negative state of things, and her inevitable entanglement in it. The effort of negative dialectics is, however, not endowed with greatness. In a total context of domination, the state of the critic’s mind is eventually also strongly inscribed with the resonances of damaged life.

Adorno’s participation in the empirical authoritarian personality project (and the numerous other projects he directed after the Institute’s relocation) seems to contradict the negativity. Reading it against the philosophical elaborations in *Dialectics*, however, lends it the proper negative framework it seemed to be (and in the American reception of the studies inevitably was) missing. The authoritarian personality is, in contrast to Fromm’s *social character* and at least in Adorno’s perspective, not an attempt to develop a model of positive character development (inherent to the conceptualization of the negative, authoritarian one). Adorno’s retrospective contextualization makes clear that the negative philosophical frame is an important aspect in the scientific examination of the existing social order. Empirical research is, and can only be, subordinated to it. Freud’s negativity is what eventually pervades Adorno’s interpretation and use of psychoanalytic concepts. Freud is employed as a negative, and (unwillingly) dialectical philosopher. Marcuse’s interpretation and use of Freud is also philosophical. Freud’s negativity lingers in his thinking but is eventually pragmatically and positively twisted with regard to actual possibilities of transcending the total context of domination. Freud is employed as a negative, and (unwillingly) dialectical theorist whose theory preserves (unintentionally) positive utopian potential. Fromm, however, criticizes, uses
and interprets Freud first of all as a clinical psychologist who established a methodologically
and theoretically refined approach to psychological practice and theory, which in its further
progression as a scientific enterprise is subject to continuous improvement.

The juxtaposition of Fromm’s, Marcuse’s, and Adorno’s approaches and their mutual
criticism resonates at times as a debate about what Freud really meant, or what the right
interpretation of his concepts and philosophical deductions was. However, the interpretations
colliding here diverge essentially. The point is rather to relate either of the interpretations to
the theoretical universe it is embedded in. Adorno and Marcuse regard Freud as a theorist who
is inherently dialectical in his perspective on the relation of individual and society, their
specific interpretation already channels the discussion in a particular direction: Freud's
insights are deep, although they are not framed philosophically the 'right way.' Fromm
understands Freud as a great psychologist who achieved elucidating insights into the function
of the human psyche, but failed to frame them sociologically the right way. The respective
theoretical universes express themselves differently and, metaphorically speaking, eventually
do not understand each other. What appears interesting here is that both parties point to
inconsistencies in Freud’s theoretical endeavors when criticizing the other. – a fact that only
highlights the multiplicity of uses Freudian theory can be subjected to.

Let me finally come to the (rhetorical) guiding question I posed in the introduction to the
chapter. Why is Fromm the one who had to leave the Institute? Thomas Wheatland notes that
after Fromm’s departure the Institute eventually showed its real nature as a collaborative
institution of social philosophers and social theorists. Wheatland’s suggestion already
anticipates the answer to my question. Fromm was clearly the one who fitted best into the
American sociological sphere, combining experience in empirical work with a solid standing
in psychoanalytic theory and practice. This is exemplified in his close collaboration with
Horney and Sullivan, in the way his social character model influenced sociologists like
Riesman, and in his increasingly influential role as a public intellectual and political activist.
At first glance, he seems to be the perfect personification of Horkheimer’s programmatic
vision of a permanent dialectical interpenetration of social philosophy and empirical research,
devoted to the critical analysis of the capitalist status quo. Taking a closer look, however, the
term dialectical in Horkheimer’s speech might actually allude to the crux of the issue.
Wheatland identifies the Institute’s inner circle as philosophers and social theorists. This is
exactly where Fromm and Horkheimer diverge from the outset. As a devoted social scientist,
Fromm sticks out from the rest of the members. The main accusation leveled against him in the revisionism debate by Adorno and Marcuse pertains to his insufficiently dialectical perspective. It is an accusation of (negative) philosophers against a (at least form their perspective) positivist social scientist. Fromm was ousted, because his revision of Freudian drive theory constituted a breach with the orthodoxy of Critical Theory. First generation Critical Theory revolves around a specific fusion of Marxian, Freudian, and Hegelian thought that is not only lost in Fromm’s later thinking; it is not really present in his early works either. No matter the (assumed) strategic character of Adorno’s attack on Fromm’s psychological positions, first voiced in the “great letter” to Horkheimer in 1934, the attempt to answer the question, in the last instance, always falls back on the currency that is deployed in the (inner) institutional struggle: conceptual approximations of ‘true’ emancipation. Through the Bourdieuan lens, the quarrels over drive theory between the competing parties appears as a competition for scientific authority, while this perspective is capable of pointing at dynamics in the field/institution, it tends to distance itself from the issue at play: emancipation. Through the lens of both parties, the ‘game’s’ currency is a serious insistence on approximating the truth about societal conditions of domination in order to eventually overcome them. The breach between Fromm and the Institute marks a point of conceptual solidification for both parties. The dialectic character of the irreconcilable conceptual divergences emerges in the mutual insistence on the true emancipatory mission. The normative perspective on these developments is itself interested in perpetuating emancipation, as I propose it for my work. Benefitting from the distance of the retrospective glance, it contemplates emancipatory aspects in both trajectories, and refrains from the temptation to resolve the tension.
Chapter IV: Functionalism, Lonely Crowd, Therapeutic Society – Freud in American Sociological Theories

In this chapter I investigate the way psychoanalytic concepts are integrated in a number of sociological theories in the post-war era. The investigation is guided by my research interest in the specific relation of Critical Theory and US sociology at the time. Psychoanalysis figures as a prominent common reference system, which potentially bridges theoretical and conceptual divergences between otherwise conflicting approaches. I aim to provide a concise account of the standing divergences, emerging in differing, yet on all sides psychoanalytically inspired, ideas of emancipation. The question for concrete appropriations of the ‘common language’ of psychoanalysis guides my aim to set Critical Theory in relation to the American sociological field. While it is fairly easy to identify the protagonists on the one end of my theory-cultural dichotomy – Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm – it is much harder to identify the ones on the side of sociology, since my aim is to look at an entire disciplinary field. My mapping of the field in Chapter II indicates an increased interest in psychoanalysis pervading the discipline at the time. Bourdieu’s notion of the Capitoline triad, consisting of Lazarsfeld, Merton, and Parsons, further pinned down the paradigmatic essence of the sociological mainstream to concrete sociologists and academic institutions (Harvard, Columbia). Among the three, Parsons stands out, because he engages Freud deeply in his theory. Since my interest revolves around the specificities of theoretical Freud adaptations, Parsons naturally moves to the center of attention. Another sociologist pioneering the adaptation of Freudian concepts at the time is David Riesman. Although he is not a representative of the mainstream as defined by Bourdieu, Riesman is a central figure, due also to the vast popularity of his major publication The Lonely Crowd (1950) and his close relation with Erich Fromm. Next to analyzing the specific ways psychoanalytic concepts are put to work in Parsons and Riesman, this chapter additionally looks at sociologist Philip Rieff’s two major works Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (1959) and Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966), both of which are outstanding works of sociological cultural criticism that are steeped in a Freudian perspective (Manning 2005:118; Zarettsky 2004:276).

145 Freudian concepts do not play any decisive role in Lazarsfeld’s work, although he was familiar with psychoanalytic ideas and his work is informed by the vaguely Freudian idea that motivational sources may often lie beyond the reach of the actor’s consciousness (Boudoun 1993:6).
I engage Parsons as the main protagonist of the theoretical mainstream, Riesman as the most concrete link between *Critical Theory* and US sociology, and as sociology’s most bestselling author, and Rieff as a prominent, idiosyncratic voice in the disciplinary field who provides an early meta-critique of the way psychoanalysis pervaded American academia (and culture) already by the 1950s. My analysis, hence, singles out theorists whose works brought to fruition specific, idiosyncratic elements of the general sociological interest in psychoanalysis: Parsons approaches psychoanalysis essentially as a science of motivation, complementing his attempt to conceive a general theory of action. In Riesman, psychoanalysis provides conceptual tools which are put to work in a sociological diagnosis of present times. Rieff formulates a cultural critique of psychoanalysis’s impact on and transformation of Western culture, which is posited against the mainstream, yet also diverges considerably from the radical approaches discussed in Chapter III in its normative orientation. Parsons’s and Riesman’s work are at the center of my analysis because they provide the most elaborate theoretical discussions of psychoanalytic concepts. Rieff’s works complement the picture because of his specific position as a rather conservative cultural critic of both the sociological mainstream and Western culture altogether. The structure of this chapter is similar to that of Chapter III: it traces the specific psychoanalysis adaptations along the categorical junctures of character structure, integration and social change.

The general interest of my project lies with delineating ideas of emancipation, conceived with the help of psychoanalytic concepts in differing/diverging theoretical universes. The major part of my discussion and evaluation of such diverging ideas of emancipation will be provided in Chapter V. However, the Freudian notion of emancipation as a self-enlightening process potentially leading to increased ego authority – Freud’s emancipation potentiality – already emerges as a substantial reference point in this chapter. It guides my discussion of Parsons’s, Riesman’s, and Rieff’s works. In contrast to the representatives of *Critical Theory*, it as neither Parsons’s, nor Riesman’s, nor Rieff’s intention to develop a pronounced theory of (individual and/or societal) emancipation. Rather, they provided a theoretical analysis of contemporary social phenomena. The dimension of emancipation lies hidden in the conceptual details of their works. It is safe to say, however, that for all theorists of interest, emancipation is a given, in the general sense of increased (self-) knowledge that is potentially

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146 Eva Illouz’s recent notion of a *therapeutic narrative* prominently references Rieff and establishes the contemporary validity of his cultural criticism. The relation of Illouz’s and Rieff’s works will be explicated in Chapter V.
available for the (at least partially consciously) acting subject. A generalized understanding of the Freudian *emancipation potentiality* is thus always already engrained in the theoretical presuppositions.
Affect and Functionality: Talcott Parsons’s Freud

In order to adequately grasp the role and function psychoanalysis assumes in Talcott Parsons theoretical universe, a partial (and, in the context of this study, necessarily reductive) reconstruction of said universe is necessary. Discussions of Parsons’s oeuvre in secondary literature generally identify the attempt to grapple the “utilitarian dilemma” as the motivational source behind his theoretical efforts. This utilitarian dilemma is constituted of (unsuccessful) attempts to solve the Hobbesian problem of order, represented for example in the works of John Locke or John Stuart Mill (Schülein 2016:148; Kunze 1972:8; Nolte 1970:10; Wenzel 1990:142). German sociologist Heinrich Kunze (1972) focuses on Parsons initial (and negative) orientation towards the original “Hobbesian” dilemma, constituted of the contradictory relation of individual action/rationality and societal requirements for a functioning social organization. According to Kunze, Parsons shows that what he identifies as utilitarian theory was not able to solve the problem of order ever since Hobbes. Parsons identifies two basic approaches: First, he proposes metaphysical assumptions about how action objectives are integrated in order to maintain autonomy. John Locke functions as Parsons’s prime example here. Second, he refrains from metaphysical assumptions altogether, dropping the action frame of reference and subsequently assimilating the action objectives to the situational conditions. Radical positivist theory of behavior, either social Darwinism or behaviorism, becomes subsumed to the natural sciences (1972:8). Parsons seeks to integrate elements of both strands in order to construct a theoretical universe capable of identifying autonomous action objectives and in order to theorize their specific relations to situational contexts the actor finds herself in. Parsons’s early attempt to overcome the proposed utilitarian dilemma is guided by a paradigm of theory convergence, under which the theoretical universes of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto and Alfred Marshall are brought together. 

147 The Hobbesian dilemma, or prisoner’s dilemma, metaphorically captures Hobbes’ state of nature. It poses the question of cooperation with regard to two prisoners who are locked in the same cell; if they cooperate, the situation improves for both; if they do not cooperate, the situation gets worse. Because neither can be sure the other will cooperate - it does not lie in her natural interest, according to Hobbes - cooperation is not self-evident. Hobbes conceptualizes the social contract as a coercive external power - embodied in the state - to guarantee cooperation.

148 Parsons sought to identify commonalities in major European sociological theories. At the same time, he introduced those theories and theorists to the sociological field in the US. This is why Parsons’s became the central figure in the canon formation of sociological theory in the US (Wallerstein 2007:429).
In this chapter I trace the integration of psychoanalytic concepts into and their specific role and function within Parsons’s continuing attempt to solve the Hobbesian problem. The scope of my discussion is thereby limited to works explicitly engaging psychoanalysis and integrating Freudian concepts. It orients itself towards Harald Wenzel’s differentiation of structural and systemic functionalist phases in Parsons’s work (1990:23f).\textsuperscript{149} It focuses the above mentioned categorical junctions: character structure as it is inherent to Parsons’s personality system, functional integration as it is inherent to Parsons’s notions of equilibrium and deviance, and the conceptualizations of social change (both as social fact and possibility).

**Theory Development and Convergence Paradigm**

Parsons’s first theoretical work, *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), aims to develop a theory of action that is capable of grasping the complexity of human (inter)action in social and societal settings against the backdrop of the above mentioned utilitarian dilemma. The convergence paradigm is applied to the works of Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, and Marshall (Kunze 1972, Nolte 1972, Wenzel 1990, Manning 2005, Schülein 2016). The objective is to theorize a system of action which is capable of determining the general order of action.\textsuperscript{150} Harald Wenzel (1990) suggests that this will eventually become possible under the systemic-functionalist paradigm as it is established with the publication of the *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953) (Wenzel 1990:422). Convergence\textsuperscript{151} remains the central concept in Parsons’s theory exegesis; it becomes a predicative universal, a common value pattern that is applied to sociological theories as a number of logical subjects (Wenzel:275-276). Social

\textsuperscript{149} Wenzel suggests that with *The Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953) and the introduction of the four-functions paradigm, a scheme of analytical differentiation that is applicable to all processes of action, structural functionalism is replaced by systemic functionalism (1990:24).

\textsuperscript{150} Such ambition pre-defines the concrete integration of psychoanalysis into the theory of action. Psychoanalysis comes to serve as an auxiliary science and becomes subject to a functionalist re-interpretation; its conceptual apparatus is mobilized to explain the order problem as structural, and later on, systemic functionalism poses it. In the process, its proper concepts become (even more) reified and serve as mere tools. While Freud starts at the psyche and arrives at the individual’s necessary discontent in culture, Parsons starts by theoretically establishing, and formulating, the order problem and arrives at the normativization of successful socialization via the internalization of values and patterns of symbolic expressions - that is at the fundamental possibility of well-being within the system(s).

\textsuperscript{151} Wenzel analyses Parsons’s application of the convergence concept as follows: firstly, Parsons proves simple convergence by demonstrating that the element of social integration is inherent to all the investigated theories. Secondly, he demonstrates the theories’ complex convergence with regard to the structuring elements of his general action system, and thirdly, the interpretation of important theory elements bears central modules for an unimpaired theory of the general action system, within which elementary unit and system are conceived consistently (1990:277).
integration is what the convergence thesis revolves around. The categories developed in the course of Parsons’s theory exegesis are pre-empirical, Parsons’s effort explicitly emphasizes the need for theory in order to complement and direct empirically oriented sociology. The categories aim to grasp human action not as an array of atomistic and independent acts, but as a phenomenon that in certain ways, relates these acts to each other. The notion of the system becomes central: singular acts form systems. Those revolving around individual actors are called personality systems; interrelated acts involving two or more actors are called social system. In contrast to these two systems, constituted by motivational acts, the third one, the cultural system, is constituted by a pattern of values, norms and symbols (Kunze 1972:51-52).

Parsons’s interest in psychoanalysis sets in after the publication of The Structure of Social Action. It develops out of the need for a proper theoretization of human action motivation. His serious engagement with Freudian theory starts in the late 1930s. Seminar notes, taken in a class he took at the London School of Economics with Bronislav Malinowsky in 1925, indicate that he was at least vaguely familiar with psychoanalysis from quite early on (1959:3-4; HUGFP 42.42/Box 1/Folder: Freudian Theory, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). However, the real interest only developed after his project of formulating a general theory of action had already been started. The “most important single suggestor” pointing Parsons to psychology and specifically Freud was economist Elton Mayo, Professor at the Harvard Business School at the time (1959b:9). Parsons’s interest in Freud finds a first expression in the 1939 essay Action, Situation and Normative Patterns, and plays an ever increasing role in the further development of his structural-functional and systemic-functional theory universe.

The convergence paradigm constitutes the basis upon which the further integration of psychoanalysis into Parsons’s general theory of action unfolds. Parsons most prominently emphasizes the convergence between Freud and Durkheim (Parsons 1953:14ff; 1962:73). It is chiefly constituted in the concept of internalization that is explicated in Freud’s work and implicit to Durkheim’s conceptualization of norms and values as a primary orientation for individual and society. In the Parsonian universe, “Freud’s discovery of the internalization of moral values”¹ and its conceptual manifestation, the super-ego, becomes the key concept

¹ Parsons’s notion of “moral values” already implies a Durkheimian (Weberian) reinterpretation of Freud. Where Parsons speaks of “Values”, Freud, however, rather uses the term “moral prescriptions” (Moralvorschriften) (eg in Totem und Tabu, Freud 1961 [1912]:191). Freud’s vocabulary inherently addresses the impossibility of unlimited individual desire within culture/civilization that is - negatively - internalized. The terminological divergence between Parsons and Freud already hints at fundamental theoretical differences: from
that links sociology and psychology: “The formulation most dramatically convergent with Freud’s theory of the super-ego was that of the social role of moral norms made by […] Durkheim” (1953:14). This discovery is ascribed general scientific importance:

This convergence, from two quite distinct and independent starting points, deserves to be ranked as one of the truly fundamental landmarks of the development of modern social science. It may be likened to the convergence between the results of the experimental study of plant breeding by Mendel and of the microscopic study of cell division – a convergence which resulted in the discovery of the chromosomes as bearers of the genes. Only when the two quite distinct bodies of scientific knowledge could be put together did the modern science of genetics emerge. (1953:15)

The comparison to biology raises the question to what extent Parsons’s work reproduces/is steeped in a scientistic understanding of the social sciences – an understanding that also played a decisive role in the rationalization/streamlining processes psychoanalysis underwent in the course of its American career. Parsons’s venture into biology also parallels Freud’s biological excursions (c. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*). In both cases, the natural sciences seem to function as a measuring index for scientificity. The convergence of Durkheim and Freud, hence, becomes more than a self-reflexive creative scholarly attempt to bring two different theoretical universes into conversation. It is presented as (necessary) scientific progress towards the conception of a general theory of action and reveals the theorist’s melioristic self-understanding. Convergence, the central quality in Parsons’s theory development, becomes the marker of scientific progress. According to Parsons, this is supposed to work both ways. Repeatedly, he argues that psychoanalytic concepts are not only useful to sociological theory in order to fill a gap (that is, the theorizing of the personality system and its motivational sources) that has not yet been adequately addressed, but also that psychology could similarly profit from sociology and integrate its concepts, such as the social system(s) (1950:346; 1954:vff). The differentiation between sociology and psychology becomes merely functional, based on the complexity of the respective research foci and the resulting practical impossibility of bringing them together under one umbrella. Parsons’s...
attempt to develop a general theory of action becomes a universal approach within which both disciplines supposedly converge.

The specifics of Parsons’s Freud adaptation, which first appear in *Actor Situation and Normative Patterns*, suggest a considerable Neo-Freudian impact from early on. This will be addressed later in more detail. For now it suffices to say that the rejection and revision of drive-theory, as the most crucial aspect in neo-Freudianism, is of fundamental importance for the explication of Parsons’s convergence argument with regard to Freud and Durkheim. The neo-Freudian reading is what ‘cleanses’ psychoanalysis of the major conceptual complex that would hardly converge with Durkheim’s notion of social integration. In Freudian terms, cultural (social) integration is only conceivable at painful costs, discontent (in culture) is what necessarily remains, and internalization is fundamentally a process of negative adaptation.

**Psychoanalysis**

For the purpose of this study, it is paramount to grasp the general role and function of psychoanalytic concepts in Parsons’s functionalism. Visibly starting in 1939 with the publication of *Actor, Situation and Normative Patterns*, Parsons’s integration of Freud peaks in the early 1950s and finds its most prominent expression in a number of successive publications, namely *The Social System* (1951), *Towards a General Theory of Action* (1951), *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953), and *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (1955). *Working Papers* assumes a special position in the process, because the theoretical paradigms established in this work can be taken to mark a decisive turn in Parsons’s theory development, which also affects the integration of psychoanalysis to some extent. The decisive conceptual shift hinges on the conceptualization of double contingency154

154 In *The Social System*, Parsons defines double contingency using the example of animal behavior: “In the classical animal learning situations the animal has alternatives between which he makes a selection and develops expectations which can be ‘triggered’ by certain signs or ‘cues.’ But the sign is part of a situation which is stable indenpendency of what the animal does; the only “problem” presented to him is whether he can “interpret” it correctly, e.g., that the black panel means food, the white one no food. But in social interaction alters possible ‘reactions’ may cover a considerable range, selection within which is contingent on ego's actions. Thus for the interaction process to become structured, the meaning of a sign must be further abstracted from the particularity of the situation. Its meaning, that is, must be stable through a much wider range of ‘ifs,’ which covers the contingent alternatives not only of ego's action, but of alter's and the possible permutations and combinations of the relation between them” (1964 [1951]:10-11). Sociologist Raf Vanderstreaten instructively summarizes the consequences double contingency has for Parsons theory development: “[The] concept differentiates two aspects. On the one hand, double contingency draws attention to the potential hazard of conflict between
in *The Social System* (1951) and *Towards a General Theory of Action* (1951, with Edward A. Shils), which preceded *Working Papers*. According to Wenzel, the concept is implicated with a breach in the continuity of Parsons’s theorizing: “Parsons himself participates in the revolution which substitutes the normal science paradigm with a pluralism of theories, which, in turn, is characterized by non-normative conceptualizations of social order” (Wenzel 2002:427-428, my translation). The argument is posited against a common (mis)representation of Parsons’s theoretical universe as a continuing attempt to propose a normativist theory of social order. According to Wenzel, this holds no longer true after the revision marked by *Working Papers*. “[F]unctional systems become the theory’s lynchpin” (Ibid.:429) in systemic functionalism, the “burden of integration no longer lies with the individual member of society’s moral commitment to a common […] value consensus; […] the character of morals changes, it is no longer understood as a commitment to follow norms; morals become post-conventional, a problem of the autonomous personality’s decision, without, however, guaranteeing social order at the same time” (Ibid.). Systemic functionalism introduces the notion of symbolically generalized media of communication, which function simultaneously as the currency of interaction in the respective systems and the systems’ integrative elements. Among these media of communication, it is the symbolically generalized medium of communication in the social system, affect, that is steeped in psychoanalytic concepts. My further analysis therefore chiefly focuses on affect which emerges as the central symbolically generalized medium of communication substituting value orientation as the crucial element of integration in the social system.

individuals confronting each other face-to-face; on the other hand, it points toward accomplishments that could lead to cooperation and sharing. The doubly contingent situation is an unavoidable basic condition that generates a *problem* at the social level that requires a *solution* if social interaction and social order are to be possible” (2002:78-79). Parsons’s solution is the introduction of the notion of symbolically generated media of communication.

155 Wenzel states that “[t]he phase of “normal science,” dominated by the functionalist paradigm, was replaced by what still counts today as the normal state of affairs in social theory: a (permanent) scientific revolution; a state of completion characterized by a pluralism of theories, within which no new paradigm was able to establish itself so far” (Ibid.:425, my translation). The terminology is borrowed from Thomas S. Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), where Kuhn defines “normal science” as “research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements […] that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (10).

156 Wenzel’s “oppositional reading” (2002:427, my translation) calls Parsons’s role as the eminent representative of functionalism as a normative grand theory radically into question. The fact that he abandoned the normative orientation of his theory of action in favor of a non-normative conceptualization of social order, however, leaves his position as the eminent *objectivist* theorist of the 50s and 60s untouched. My main argument, and I am aware of the fact that this has been pointed out before (c. Gouldner 1970?; Manning 2005?:; Calhoun 2007?:), is that Parsons’s Freud adaptation is first and foremost an objectivist ‘cleansing’ of psychoanalysis that aligns itself with the instrumental rationalization pervading the field of both psychology and sociology at the time.

157 While my analysis focuses on affect, other symbolically generalized media of communication are: intelligence (behavior system), resilience (personality system), definition of the situation (cultural system); and on the broader societal scale: money (economic system), power (political system), value orientation (fiduciary system), influence (societal community) (after Wenzel 1990:29).
Some crucial foundational definitions that are still important for systemic functionalism are already established in the 1939 essay. However, Parsons’s most visible systematic integration of the theory of action and psychoanalytic concepts can probably be found in the 1955 volume *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*. A number of articles in academic journals, spanning from sociology over medicine to psychology / psychoanalysis, completes the picture. My analysis orients itself along these publications. It aims to work out the specificities of Parsons’s Freud adaptations, and approaches Parsons’s earlier attempts through the lens of their more fully developed character in his later writings. In the essay, Parsons criticizes orthodox psychoanalysis’s preoccupation with the pathological (1939:83). In Freud, the neurotic personality is (supposedly) at the center of all generalizations about culture/society/civilization. The deviant personality becomes the model personality per se. Simultaneously, psychoanalysis lacks a proper conceptualization of the social realm, such as Parsons’s functional, and balanced, entity of the social system would provide (Ibid.). Parsons infers that these problems result in major distortions in Freud’s conceptualizations of culture/civilization and human development. Totem and Taboo serve as prime examples. However, Parsons emphasizes that especially newer developments in psychoanalytic theory provide crucial insights for the theory of action, if properly integrated (Ibid.). Karen Horney is mentioned as one of the major protagonists of such developments contributing to closing the supposed gap between psychoanalysis’ limited research interest and competence, and the general theory of action. (Ibid.) This is important for two reasons. For one, Parsons’s critique of Freud’s ‘pathology bias’ is steeped in his own equilibrium bias, a preoccupation with functionality that characterizes the structural/systemic-functionalist universe throughout all its phases (Kunze 1972:96). For another, the orientation towards Horney’s reinterpretation of Freud – within which the social/socialization comes to substitute the drive-theoretical foundation of psychoanalytic theory – becomes a cornerstone of his Freud adaptation.158 The Parsonian Freud is thus, from the outset, inscribed with the streamlined/rationalized characteristics which emerge in the retrospective glance on psychoanalysis’ American career; a career that Parsons theory itself heavily influenced and helped to progress. Both aspects are deeply intertwined and constitute vital preconditions for the convergence project; they define vital outlines of Parsons’s Freud.

158 Parsons later states that “the bodies of psychological theory which I studied most thoroughly were those of Freud and certain derivatives from him (e.g., Murray, Kardiner, Horney, Fromm, etc.) and the special sociologically oriented social psychology of Thomas and Mead” (1959a:622).
Character Formation and Personality System

The attempt to delineate Parsons’s conceptualization of character structure relies on recognizing the predominant importance of systemic relatedness within Parsons’s universe vis-à-vis his use of original psychoanalytic references. For example, despite the neo-Freudian influence, the Frommian social character model does not explicitly find its way into Parsons’s universe. The personality system becomes the conceptual entity that addresses the specifics of individual and psychological development. The theorization of motivational factors constitutes the entry point for psychoanalysis. By introducing the affective dimension in his 1939 essay, Freudian concepts first become an important complement for Parsons’s investigation of motivation in his theoretical universe (Wenzel 1990:366-67). The full-fledged systematization of these early ideas is realized with the publication of *The Social System* and *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951). Within the general question of action orientation, Parsons delineates motivational dimensions important to the affective dimension, namely motivation orientation and value orientation, which he again distinguishes into three possible variations: cognitive, emotional-cathetic, and evaluative-decisive (Nolte 1970:24). The dimension of motivation orientation is of specific interest here, especially the emotional-cathetic one, because this is where Parsons’s references to Freudian concepts are most pronounced. However, the distinction between the cognitive and the emotional-cathetic dimension is crucial for an understanding of Parsons’s divergence from Freud. It is itself developed with the aid of Freudian concepts. Already in 1939, Parsons states that Freud has contributed immensely to the complex, symbolic interrelations between objects and affective positions/relations. He further emphasizes the validity of Freud’s claim that those relations often lie beneath the brink of the conscious (1939:86). However, and this fundamentally informs the way psychoanalysis eventually plays out in structural- and systemic functionalism, he criticizes the Freudian “one-way-street”-approach to object relations by pointing out that those relations are often, and in various ways, reciprocal (Ibid.). The cognitive dimension is first pronounced in the 1939 essay. Parsons holds that in the (inter)action process

[t]he actor is oriented simultaneously towards normative patterns and an existing situation. His cognitive orientation towards the situation contains empirical as well as non-empirical elements, which have to be consistent to a certain extent. To the extent that there is integration at the cognitive level, he can’t advocate a non-empirical theory
that is in obvious contradiction to his empirical knowledge. (Ibid.:175-176, my translation)

The cognitive dimension is key in the establishment of the action frame of reference, which, in turn, directs the explanatory thrust in the attempt to develop a notion of action orientation towards social interaction. The introduction of cognition disentangles the affective, specifically the motivational dimension, from the pre-social forces of Eros and Thanatos. The affective dimension follows a systemic logic, which integrates motivational sources and value orientation; unconscious relations (re)appear as reciprocal object relations instead of drive-energy outlets (sublimated or neurotic) directed by the Id.159

The conceptualization of the affective dimension again exhibits the Parsonian preoccupation with functionality. Following the Durkheimian equilibrium assumption, Parsons identifies two characteristic aspects of what he calls the actor’s affective equilibrium in his 1939 essay. On the one hand, the actor is integrated in a system of introjected social norms, which organize her moral sensitivity in the sense that following the norms assumes a positive affective meaning. On the other hand, the affective dimension encompasses a more or less well integrated, self-serving equilibrium of satisfactions. What is important for the efficiency of rational acting, hence, is not the equilibrium of pleasure sentiments but the impact a concrete act has on the individual’s entire affective state (1939:115). Parsons’s analysis of the actor’s affective constitution emphasizes the integration of normative patterns into the subject’s moral sentiment, thereby pointing at the entanglement of affective dimension and the social/cultural structure. Normative patterns become part and parcel of the affective apparatus, with the ultimate goal to achieve well-being; the impact even of particular acts on the entire emotional balance is considered part of the process. It follows that the state of well-being is from the outset determined by normative patterns and possibilities of reciprocal (micro)gratifications. Freud’s reality principle, juxtaposing “the social” as an outside force to

159 Parsons (and Bales) recount the Freudian definition of the Id by identifying it as “that motivational sub-system which has the most direct genetic relation to pre-socialized organic needs and to the earlier stages of personality development, in a sense the one from which newly organized subsystems have branched off” (1964 [1955]:85). They further state that “[i]n this view the Id is particularly closely related to the genetic history of the personality” and that “[i]t contains more “archaic” elements than any other motivational subsystem” (Ibid.). The functionalist perspective, however, diverges: “It is of the first importance to our view that we do not define the id as a “constitutional factor,” a bundle of “instincts” in that sense. It is a part of the differentiated and organized personality system which as such has become organized by processes of learning” (Ibid.). In Parsons’s definition of the Id, the archaic aspect, so crucial for the Freudian concept, is put in parenthesis. This does not happen by coincidence, the Freudian term is solely used to maintain a certain sense of psychoanalytic originality as it seems – in terms of meaning it is completely Freud-less, since the phylogenetic dimension vanishes and archaic comes to stand only for the earliest stages of ontogenetic development.
the individual pleasure principle, disappears. Parsons’s analysis does not leave room for a fundamental state of (unconscious) discontent, as it is implied in Freud, where well-being within culture is also always a state of painful adaptation that inhibits Eros (and Thanatos for that matter) in its concrete thrust.

The conceptualization of the affective dimension changes when Parsons readjusts his theory, a development first pronounced in *Working Papers*. Affect takes up an increasingly central position, not only as an explanation of action motivation, but as a central medium of integration. The affective dimension is constituted of a system of expressive symbolisms, which is acquired in the socialization process, just as the cognitive frame of reference. In their discussion of the socialization process, Parsons’s et al elaborate: “One primary aspect of learning to love and to be loved is the internalization of a common culture of expressive symbolism which makes it possible for the child to express *and communicate* his feelings and to understand the mother's feelings toward him” (Parsons et al. 1953:23). The pattern of cultural norms and values is no longer, as implied in the 1939 essay, the primary target of the individual’s object cathexis, which made affect the primary medium in the individual’s relation to the cultural system. The process is turned around: object cathexis, in the anticipation of reciprocity, primarily targets concrete protagonists of the social system(s); affect becomes primarily a currency in inter-personal relations. However, the concrete way affect emerges, attached to the particular expressive symbolism, (still) bears, a heavy societal/cultural imprint from the outset.

Affective and cognitive dimension are heavily inter-related in both the process of socialization and of general interaction. Parsons further explicates the specificities of the cognitive dimension in later publications. In a 1958 article, originally published in *Psychiatry*, he holds that

the personality structure, as a precipitate of previous identifications and of lost objects, develops by a process of differentiation from the earliest and simplest identification with the mother. Both this early relationship of identification and the succeeding object-choice relationship contain in their motivation an essential erotic component. But this does not in any way contradict the importance of the capacity to develop and operate motivational structures which are not primarily oriented to erotic gratifications, but rather to impersonal or “affectively neutral” patterns of behavior. (1970 [1958]:103)
What in Freud appears as (constructively) redirected libidinal energy, resulting from original drive renunciations, turns into “generalized motivational structures.” The centrality of the libido as the original motivational source is relativized in a move of retrospective cancellation: because the outcome of the sublimation process empirically appears as “affectively neutral behavior” at times, that quality is assumed to characterize the original (in Freud: renunciatory) situation. Libidinal energy becomes only “one component” (Ibid.). It follows that interpersonal relations, according to Parsons neglected by Freud, function primarily on a level of cognitive orientation.

The personality system is the epitome of Parsons’s integration of structural/systemic functionalism and psychoanalysis. Internalization becomes the primary psychological mechanism behind personality development, a process that is primarily conceptualized as increasing system differentiation propelled by social interaction. Parsons holds that “[m]uch of the content of the human personality system is derived from social interaction, however; […] it consists of ‘internalized’ social objects” (Parsons 1959a:619). The centrality of social interaction – and of the internalization of social objects – relies on the theorization of action orientations, understood as preconditions for the interrelatedness of human action. In turn, (action) orientation patterns revolve around social roles. Kunze suggests that Durkheim’s solution to the problem of order guides Parsons’s integration of Freudian concepts. The cultural system appears as institutionalized in the specific arrangement of social roles in the social systems, and as internalized into the personality system by way of shaping need dispositions via learning processes. Motivational energy flowing towards the personality system is transformed into need dispositions – the personality system’s basic elements – by the ascription of orientation patterns. Social interaction becomes only possible because different actors have internalized the same cultural system and are subsequently able to act within the same role patterns (Kunze 1972:52).

In Parsons’s theory, the central meaning of social interaction is developed against Freud’s supposed neglect of “a frame of reference relating a personality to its situation or environment with […] specific reference to the analysis of the social interaction of persons as a system” (1964 [1952]:19). The systemic interrelatedness of (social) actors becomes paramount to the Freudian collision of internal pleasure principle and external reality principle as the major ‘movens’ of personality development. Parsons’s focus on the social environment (re)formulates a critique of Freud’s naturalization of the cultural/societal status quo that
was/is shared by many diverging critiques concerned with a sociological perspective on psychoanalysis. This perspective first made its appearance in the writings of Fromm, Horney, other neo-Freudians, and also Critical Theory (Marcuse). In Parsons’s work, the specificity of the cultural dimension enters the individual sociologization process via the “the frame of reference in terms of which objects are cognized, and therefore adapted to” (Ibid.). The emphasis put on its cultural nature, the fact that it “cannot be taken for granted as given but [that it] must be internalized as a condition of the development of mature ego-functioning” (Ibid.), alludes to Parsons’s critique of the original Freudian conception of ego and super-ego; the separation of the cognitive and the emotional-cathective dimension is mobilized to question Freud’s differentiation: “In the light of the foregoing considerations the distinction which Freud makes between the superego and the ego--that the former is internalized, by identification and that the latter seems to consist of responses to external reality rather than of internalized culture--is not tenable. These responses are […] learned responses; but internalization is a special kind of learning which Freud seemed to confine to the superego.“ (1964 [1952]:19) Parsons critique, it follows, not only points to Freud’s generalizations inscribed in the universalized concepts, which were derived under socio-historic specific societal/cultural conditions. The critique targets the divergent psychological mechanisms which are, according to Freud, at work in the genesis of ego and super-ego and eventually results in a super-egoification of the psychological apparatus.

In the wake of this critique, Parsons identifies “three elements of the common culture” that help to illuminate the specificity of his adaptation of psychoanalysis and his approach to a general theory of action. The three elements are (1) the “internalization of moral standards,” a dimension which Freud made apparent in his conceptualization of the Oedipus-complex and in the development of the super-ego, (2) the “internalization of the cognitive frame of reference for interpersonal relations,” and (3) the “common system of expressive symbolism,” both of which are, according to Parsons’s neglected by Freud due to the “structure of his theoretical scheme” (1953:21).The Oedipus-complex becomes the conceptual blue print

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160 Parsons’s critique of Freud’s naturalization of the current (cultural) status quo is in line with Critical Theory, and with the neo-Freudians in its general thrust. Parsons’s conclusion that the ego eventually results from learning processes, demonstrate a prominent divergence between critical Theory and Parsons. Parsons’s conceptualization of the ego presupposes a sever relativization of drive theory. Adorno and Marcuse stick to the Freudian notion that the ego emerges in response to renunciation processes which are driven by libidinal energy and therefore also represents the ‘archaic’ dimension that is inscribed to the drives.

161 Differentiation of internalization and introjection: Laplanche/Pontalis emphasize the terms’ interchangability, but internalization is at the same time specifically used to describe a “process whereby intersubjective relations are transformed into intrasubjective ones” (1973:226). This dimension blurs in Parsons, although in the paragraph cited above, he describes the original distinction quite well.
Freudian psychoanalysis has to offer. Freud’s model analysis of the internalization of societal (moral) prescriptions during the oedipal phase – a model that chiefly focuses the (almost immediate) relation of subject and society – is turned into the model sociological explanation altogether. The Parsonian reading of the Oedipus complex\textsuperscript{162} propels it to the center of psychoanalytic theory. The super-ego is no longer an isolated psychological entity, but an all-encompassing mode of cultural internalization (Schülein 2016:152).

Parsons’s critique focuses on the dimension of organization most explicitly in \textit{Working Papers} (1953). Unlike in Freud, the dimension of organization does not result from the encounter with the reality principle alone, but “from two fundamental forces: the external world as an environment; and the common culture which is acquired from objects of identification” (1953:26). The Oedipus-mechanism is extended to earlier stages via identification processes, which simultaneously function as processes of cultural internalization. The cultural learning process located in the realm of interpersonal relations (that is, in interaction) becomes paramount; the significance of (renunciation of) experience is relegated to the background. Parsons “modification of Freud’s conception of the ego” (Ibid.) emphasizes the immediacy of societal/cultural imprints. He conceptualizes an interaction frame of reference in relation to both the cognitive and the cathective level of learning processes. Here, Parsons, as he repeatedly points out himself (Ibid.), is in line with contemporary developments in US psychoanalysis, which dispose of or at least weaken the position of drive theory:

In the light of the development of the more general theory of action […] the cultural element must […] certainly occupy a very central place. For if the ego and the id in Freud's formulations are taken alone, there is no adequate bridge from the theory of personality to the theoretical analysis of culture and of the social system. The superego provides exactly such a bridge because it is not explicable on any other basis than that of acquisition from other human beings, and through the process of social interaction. (1953:27)

Erich Fromm critically pointed at the importance of the Oedipus complex vis-à-vis drive theory in order to establish a truly sociological adaption of Freud – one that recognizes society’s immediate impact on character/personality development (see: CH III). Parsons’s critique of Freud hits a similar spot. The elaborate analysis of society as an array of social

\textsuperscript{162} Parsons’s notion of the Oedipus-complex is completely rid of a notion of sublimation, as it is fundamentally important to Freud’s original version, and as it reflects the drive-theoretical implications of the subject-society relation as expressed in the father-child relation.
systems, which the individual has to navigate, is the general theoretical orientation that guides the integration of psychoanalysis into Parsons’s general theory of action. The personality system is the conceptual manifestation of this theoretical effort; it differs considerably from the original Freudian conceptualization of personality as the result of a process of renunciation and sublimation\textsuperscript{163} of drive energy. The fact that it is conceptualized as a system, modeled after the social system, reflects the theory’s general functional-integrative thrust in the particular. Thereby, Parsons’s personality system to some extent approximates Fromm’s conceptualizing of social character. In Fromm, social character represents, in Marxian terms, the immediate link between economic base and cultural superstructure. Parsons, bearing no interest in Marx,\textsuperscript{164} frames the relation differently. His systemic functionalist analysis, introduced in Working Papers, is, of course not based on the assumption of an economic base that somehow informs a cultural superstructure. Rather, in the conception of differentiated interaction systems which are pervaded and integrated by symbolically generalized media of communication which, in turn, pertain to the two dimensions of instrumental- and expressive symbolism. Wenzel points out that “within the general system of action, it is the social system which constitutes the functional focus of integration. Its contribution is affect, in the sense of a generalized factor in the production of solidarity” (1990:28, my translation). However, the personality system not only resembles the social system(s) in their functional conception. Societal norms and values inscribed to the increasingly differentiated role patterns of the social and of the cultural system, turn into individual need dispositions directing individual action towards societally mediated goals in the socialization process. The proximity between social character and personality system emerges in the immediacy of societal and individual

\textsuperscript{163} Sublimation is a key concept in Freud’s theoretical universe. In Talcott Parsons’s Freud adaptation it hardly appears at all, not even as critical point of reference. In Social Structure and the Development of Personality (1958) Parsons describes Freud’s analysis of the process he “usually refers to as sublimation” as “considerably less satisfactory than his analysis of the earlier” processes (1964 [1958]:103). Another of the very few mentionings of sublimation appears in a footnote of Parsons’s and Shils’s contribution to Towards a General Theory of Action (1951). In their discussion of Freudian defense mechanism, they laconically state that “Sublimation is not a special mechanism of defense in this sense but a special case of the normal learning mechanism of substitution (1951:137). In Parsons’s analysis sublimation is substituted with a learning process, set in motion by both object cathexis (of which identification with the “mother” is the precursor) and cognitive orientation, characterized by increasing complexity due to increasing differentiation processes in the social systems.

\textsuperscript{164} Parsons makes his position on the value of Marx as a social theorist explicit in Sociological Theory and Modern Society (1967) by stating that “judged by the standards of the best contemporary social-science, Marxian theory is obsolete” (132). Invoking a teleological narrative of ongoing scientific progress in sociological theory, Marx’s work is depicted as outdated: “Karl Marx was probably the greatest social theorist whose work fell entirely within the nineteenth century. His place in intellectual history is secure. As a theorist in the specifically scientific sense, however, he belongs to a phase of development which has been superseded. In sociology today to be a Marxian, in the strict sense that denies any substantial theoretical progress since Marx, is not a tenable position” (Ibid.:135). Marx is dismissed by confining the validity of his theoretical reflections to the historical situation of the 19th century, within which he is mainly credited for bridging the gap between idealism and utilitarianism (Ibid.:130).
dimension. In Parsons, as well as in Fromm (et al), character/personality formation is completely directed by society; the socio-historic specificity of societal and cultural relations is, in both cases, translated into the ‘fact’ that society eventually produces the very character type / personality system it demands.\textsuperscript{165}

The Parsonian specificity is apparent in the schematic systematization of his conceptual tools. The personality system is structured along the AGIL/LIGA scheme, a theoretical tool designed to capture the functional characteristics of (social) systems. Psychoanalytic concepts are eventually subjected to and put to work within the system’s inherent logic. The theoretical insights of the \textit{Working Papers} are schematically realized in \textit{Family, Socialization and Interaction Process} (1955). With \textit{Working Papers}, the AGIL/LIGA pattern assumes the centrality it subsequently is ascribed in Parsons’s oeuvre. In general, the AGIL pattern is organized as a sequential scheme that reflects the multiple dimensions of system organization, best illustrated in the following figure:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Problem Solving} & \textbf{System Maintenance} \\
\hline
\textbf{Instrumental} & \textbf{Expressive} \\
\hline
\textbf{Adaptation} & \textbf{Goal Attainment} \\
\hline
\textbf{Latency} & \textbf{Integration} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{165} The simultaneous proximity and distance to Fromm et al emerges in Parsons’s notion of national character: “We suggest that there is, in a society, only in a very abstract sense a trend to a “modal personality” type which independent of sex, class, and some other variables. However, if these two categories are treated as variable in the way indicated, it is considerably more realistic to speak for instance of a modal upper-class masculine and feminine personality type, and a model lower-class type for each sex. Again very broadly we suggest, that with the “slant” given them by the societal value system, the upper class personalities will tend to a greater super-ego-nurturance focus, the lower to a greater adequacy-security focus” (1964 [1955]:159). While the theoretical underpinnings strongly imply a character model that approximates Fromm’s social character, it is not spelled out here. However, the fact that socialization is the prime factor in shaping personality suggests a conceptualization of character that reflects the socio-cultural specificities (in TP terms: various roles) of the surrounding social systems. Parsons’s model diverges from Riesman’s because it isn’t embedded in a temporal narration of character succession like Riesman’s population growth hypothesis (I further explicate Riesman’s hypothesis in the following sub-chapter).
\end{flushright}
The four dimensions are adaptive-instrumental (A), goal gratification (G), integrative (I), and latent (L). While, with regard to the personality system, the A-G-I-L pattern in its subsequent order is applicable to task performance and social control processes, socialization and therapy are conceived as following the reversed order (L-I-G-A). Because socialization is key to the integration of psychoanalytic concepts in structural/systemic functionalism the focus will lie with the reverse pattern and its actual employment in the explanation of socialization mechanisms as it appears in *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (1955).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>adaptive-instrumental / manipulation of rewards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>goal gratification / denial of reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>integrative / support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>latent / permissiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1964 [1955]:40)

Parsons attempts to point out how the Freudian psychosexual development phases and the system-functional phases in the learning-social-control process coincide (Ibid.:40ff). This process is structured by increasing systemic differentiation, which is implicit in the LIGA pattern. Parsons suggest two fundamental theorems in the analysis of personality development; the first holds that

the primary structure of the human personality as a system of action is organized about the internalization of systems of social objects which originated as the role-units of the successive series of social systems in which the individual has come to be integrated in the course of his life history. (Ibid.:54)

In the second theorem, Parsons states that "this structure of personality develops, not primarily by a process of the modification of ‘primary drives’ or ‘instincts’, but by a process of differentiation of a very simple internalized object system [...] into progressively more complex systems” (Ibid.). The schematization of the process aims to capture the developmental process of increased systemic differentiation, which is internalized as an

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166 This is key to understanding the Parsonian valorization of psychoanalytic concepts: they become fully integrated into pre-conceived patterns, and serve to legitimize those patterns at the same time under the guiding principle of convergence (here: of the learning process and Freud’s notion of psychosexual development). However, since the notion of psychosexual development that is applied here is already ‘cleansed’ from its drive-theoretical roots (because it is filtered through the neo-Freudian lens), the notion of coincidence (or even convergence) is highly questionable. Parsons sociologizes psychoanalytic theory: the social (system) becomes the governing totality that subsumes or integrates the developing personality (system) completely. Renunciation is rid of its traumatic dimension and eventually turned into a constructive process, serving the greater good of system functionality (which itself becomes a desired ‘value’ of the individual subjected to the process). This resembles Fromm’s notion of productiveness. In addition, it implicitly exposes the Parsonian redefinition of the unconscious, since it is not governed by drive energy working against social/culture altogether, but rather appears as a harbor of wish manifestations that are not socially accepted.
increasing variety of social roles. According to Parsons (and his co-author Robert Bales), the functional perspective “makes the process of personality development much more closely analogous to the embryological development of the individual organism, and also to the development of social systems than does the orthodox view” (Ibid.:55). The rejection of drive theory emerges (interestingly enough) in the biological metaphor of embryological development: cell-differentiation becomes the model-process for personality development, the Freudian psychosexual development process is subjected to it. Parsons’s latency phase (L) is put on equal terms with the psychoanalytic phase of oral dependency: mother-child identity becomes the starting point of the differentiation process in terms of object systems. Parsons’s integrative phase (I) is compared to Freud’s (object) love attachment phase: parent-self/object-differentiation becomes the next (twofold) step in the differentiation process.

Parsons’s goal gratification phase (G) signifies the Freudian latency period and the four object family system in Parsonian terms, followed by the Parsonian adaptive-instrumental phase (A), which represents Freud’s genital phase and which is organized in Parsonian terms as a 8-16 object system (Ibid.:48-49). The social role remains the key concept in the theorization of social/functional integration.

The ‘sociologization’ of psychoanalysis is inscribed in the generalization of the Oedipus-complex/latency-phase-mechanisms. Parsons’s ego is no separate psychic entity, but an early manifestation of the orthodox Freudian super-ego, the general cultural content of which is, however, limited because it is derived from social interaction processes within the (increasingly differentiated) family systems. The problem of individuality in the face of the social’s/culture’s overwhelming reach into the deepest structures of the psyche is solved by theorizing autonomy and individuality as resulting from the specificity of the actors’ relatedness to her environment, her own body and her individual experience: “the personality becomes an independent system through its relations to its own organism and through the uniqueness of its own life experience; it is not a mere epiphenomenon of the structure of the society” (Parsons 1970 [1958]:82). Subjective experience appears here as relatedness to an ever increasing array of objects, which are organized as systems and simultaneously differ in their concrete individual manifestations. Universal and particular dimension are intertwined,

167 The excursion into biology again implies, as mentioned before, a scientistic paradigm that orients itself towards the ‘hard sciences’ in seeking scientific validity. Although in this case it eventually works against some of Freud’s concepts (drive theory), the orientation towards biology strongly resembles some of Freud’s theorizing (a prime example is Beyond The Pleasure Principle).

168 Parsons actually references ego-psychologist Erik Erikson’s mother-child identity concept here, rather than Freud’s primary identification/narcissism.
the former eventually dominates the latter, and individuality is always already inscribed with
the social/cultural dimension, via the internalization of cultural demands as social roles.

In Parsons, socialization is learning: “the integration of the personality in a social system […]
is characterized by a particular process of learning in a particular context of object-relations”
(1970 [1958]:84). The process starts with child-birth. Parsons theorizes the early relation of
mother and child as a social interaction process within which the infant is already an active
agent, attempting to do things and getting increasingly “rewarded or punished according to his
success in doing them” (Ibid.:85). The mother-child relation, which appears in Freud as a
unity, already signifies the infant’s integration into a functional system, with the mother as the
first and only chosen object. Personality emerges in the interaction process as an increasingly
systematized pattern of actions and responses – a behavior system, which is primarily
triggered by the “immense inequality of the power relationship” in the original, the mother-
child, system (Ibid.:87). Identification, via internalization, is key to the learning process, it
becomes “the process by which a person comes to be inducted into membership in a
collectivity through learning to play a role complementary to those of other members in
accord with the pattern of values governing the collectivity” 169 (Ibid.:91). Identification, in its
concrete manifestation in the ontogenetic developmental process, appears as the primary
mechanism of orientation that directs the personality system to not only act, but also desire in
conformity with preexisting cultural norms and values. It is not only “the cognitive side but
also the motivational side of the personality [that] is arranged around internalized social
objects. Not instrumental skills alone, but the goals of the mature personality are organized
through identifications and the consequent internalization” (Parsons 1959:656).

The abandonment of drive theory, inherent to the neo-Freudianism that lies at the bottom of
Parsons’s universe, emerges in the re-conceptualization of motivation/desire. Motivation/desire is understood as something that also chiefly results from processes of
interaction, and therefore of identification and internalization. For Parsons it is unmistakably
clear that “the goal structure of the human adult cannot be derived from the structure of the
instinctive, i.e. genetically inborn, needs of the organism” (Ibid.). The successful integration
of the personality system as a functional entity, characterized by the internalization of an

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169 In Freud’s work, the ontogenetic process also reflects the phylogenetic one, identification is a reflection of
mimesis, a subject identifying with its surroundings (mother) to an extent that makes it impossible to conceive of
own subjectivity. Parsons’s systematic, schematic language leaves no room for the historical dimension.
Historical development vanishes through the eye of schematic analysis.
increasing variety of social roles, is quasi pre-determined by the already established social and cultural systems and the specific norms and values inscribed to the concrete systemic role patterns. All of this is perpetuated by the symbolically generalized media of communication. Organized as a system of behavior, personality mirrors its social/cultural environment in its functional mechanisms and motivational strivings.

**Integration and its Discontentso (Deviance)**

Parsons’s theoretical endeavors are explicitly conceived as attempts to theorize (functional) integration. In the preceding discussion of the relation of individual and society in *Critical Theory*, integration appeared only as negative because of the tension emerging in the theorization of the *alienated* subject’s factual integration. In contrast to this, Parsons’s work, conceptualizes integration as both starting point and objective of the theoretical approximation of the relation and constitution of society and individual. My preceding discussion of the personality system and of the socialization processes addressed Parsons’s conceptualization of functional integration and demonstrated that the functionalist paradigm is deeply inscribed in his conceptual apparatus, even after the theoretical readjustment in *Working Papers*. In addition to affect, the symbolically generalized media of communication, one of Parsons’s other key concepts is the social role. Wenzel points out that in Parsons’s universe, society does not consist of individuals, but rather, that their fundamental component is the role. The respective evaluative pattern becomes role expectation, and the order problem of social systems consequently lies with the double contingency – the possibility that alter and ego can sanction each other’s actions – characterizing the interaction situation (1990:388). Wenzel’s suggestion points to the centrality of the social role in Parsons’s conceptualization of subjectivity; it helps to illuminate the specificities of the subject’s functional integration into the variety of social systems. Identification is the key mechanism here. In *The Social System* (1951) Parsons holds that “[i]t is fundamentally the patterns institutionalized in role structure which constitute the moral standards which are introjected in the process of socialization and become an important part of the personality structure of the individual, whether he conforms to them or not” (1964 [1951]:338). The fundamental mechanism of

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170 Such a conceptualization of the order problems differs, of course, considerably from Freud’s, which rather resembles Hobbes’s and within which culture - rooted in- and constantly reproducing drive sublimation - constitutes, in its negative relation to the subject’s drive structure, the problem of order itself, and repression appears as the only solution.
integration lies with the coincidence of role patterns introjected into the average super ego and the functional needs of the social system(s). The individual as a separate and problematic entity vanishes.

The super ego becomes the prime agent of functionality. Functionality, in turn, is the system’s eventual objective. It becomes the conceptual expression of an instrumental rationality that defines the functional equilibrium of the social system as the desirable end goal of theorizing. Parsons’s discussion of the super ego as the locus of identification processes within the personality system necessarily obliterates the super ego’s unconscious qualities, as they appear in Freud’s original conception. This is, of course, engrained in the pre-established rejection of drive-theory. The super-ego (as well as the ego) is disentangled from drive energy and this enables the Parsonian re-conceptualization of the super-ego as a mere agent in the process of internalizing societal, and cultural, patterns, and moral demands in the first place. Integration is a self-propelling process that does not appear to be problematic because the question for domination in social and especially societal relations is not posed. Without any notion of alienation, negative integration appears, consequently, solely as deviance; systemic distortions are furthermore not theorized with regard to the societal level (the social and cultural systems), but mostly appear at the level of the personality system and are characterized by irrationality.

In the 1939 essay, irrationality in the action process is foremost theorized as a lack of effort, which is explained with the actor’s empirical knowledge about the technological conditions of the situation. Such lack of effort is, in turn, entangled with the affective dimension and, more concretely, with unconscious inhibitions (or ambivalences) up to psychopathologies (neuroses, psychoses) (117fn). Deviant behavior, however, exhibits another kind of irrationality:

The tension between normative patterns and organic teleology appears as the conflict between various means, resp. between wishes and obligations. Such conflict probably leads to irrational behavior in the sense of concrete deviance because the actor is simultaneously oriented teleological towards incompatible goals. (Parsons 1939:118-119fn, my re-translation)

While the notion of organic teleology disappears from Parsons’s conceptual apparatus in the course of time, it helps to illuminate a tendency in his definition of deviance. As shown above, Parsons problematizes notions of mere biological motivations (as they are proposed by
Freud for example). However, the early model implies an eventual non-social (organic) motivation as the source of deviant behavior. In accordance with his critique of the Freudian ‘pathology bias’ Parsons identifies a specific source of deviant behavior that is not universalizable.\footnote{The discontent in culture, universal to Freud, is relegated to the realm of deviance here.}

The emphasis of organic teleology in the production of deviant behavior survives in the further theory development as the tendency to personalize deviance in the attempt to differentiate its empirical appearances. The concrete analysis is, as Heinrich Kunze suggests, merely phenomenological and avoids to grasp the roots of the problems (1972:87). In Working Papers Parsons et al state that ”whatever the source of the disturbance, the upsetting of the equilibrium would have to take place in one of a small number of definable directions” (1953:73, Kunze 1972:87) and goes on to provide a detailed classification of those directions.

The concrete phenomenology closely describes possible actor relations (between alter and ego) and theorizes systemic responses as “social control” mechanisms” (Parsons et al 1953:69). Deviance, hence, systemically emerges in a dichotomous relation with social control:

Deviant behavior […] is behavior in contravention of one or more institutionalized normative prescriptions or expectations, “social control” is the system of “mechanisms” by which tendencies to deviance are “counteracted”. The two together constitute the system of social forces viewed from the perspective of its maintenance as a system. (The Social System, first draft:1-2 HUGFP 42.45.2, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives)

From the systemic perspective, deviance and social control process are subordinated to the system’s inherent thrust to maintain itself, they become possibilities in the eternal equilibrium struggle. This subordination reflects the system’s general primacy in functionalism, against which the individual disappears in favor of the social role. Eventually, the upsetting of the systemic equilibrium is traced to the motivational dimension: the actor, in his inability to appropriate social roles adequately, appears as the problematic entity.\footnote{Parsons defines “mental health – and illness – [as] states of the personality defined in terms of their relevance to the capacity of the personality to perform institutionalized roles” (Parsons 1970 [1958b]:259)}

Kunze further suggests that because the sources of deviance are accidental for Parsons, they can only be grasped in specific, concrete empirical investigations within which repression
only becomes relevant as the consequence, not the source, of conflict (1972:85). The redefinition of repression, inherent in the sociologized adaptation of psychoanalysis, relegates sources of deviance – which are, in Freudian terms, implicit to the specificities of individual psychosexual development process, but simultaneously generalizable as a tendency in the individual’s cultural embeddedness – to the realm of exceptionality. Kunze’s suggests that the social system becomes, in a normative sense, the measuring pole of deviance and illness. Due to system-hierarchy it cannot be called into question by the individual. Kunze’s argument convincingly points to the de-individualization inherent to systemic/structural functionalism (Ibid.).

Picking up on Kunze’s suggestion of the system’s predominance, I want to insist on a continuity in Parsons’s psychoanalysis adaptation, despite his readjustment of concepts in Working Papers and the serious consequences this adjustment had for his theoretical orientation, as pointed out by Wenzel. The continuity is chiefly embodied in Parsons’s initial abandonment and sociological reconceptualization of drive theory. The fact that autonomy, cathexis, and affect – the conceptual innovations characterizing Parsons’s in-house ‘revolution’ – are conceived on the basis of a fundamentally neo-Freudian perspective serves as the main argument for such continuity. Despite the functional differentiation of social systems, and despite Parsons’s abandoning of Weberian/Durkheimian value orientation as the binding element which formerly assured structural functionality, the general thrust of his integration of psychoanalytic concepts remains functionalist. Parsons’s systemic functionalism (still) sets out to analyze and describe the functionality of systems. The question if structural/systemic functionality is theorized by way of a preemptively established normative orientation – as it guided structural functionalism – or by way of affect as a symbolically generalized medium of communication remains secondary. Systemic functionalism specifically highlights the fact that Parsons adapts psychoanalysis chiefly as a theory of object relations: it propels affect to the center of its understanding of social integration and therefore grants psychoanalysis a key role in the theorization of systemic functionality. The question,

173 Freud’s original understanding of repression becomes modified in structural/systemic functionalism. According to Kunze, Parsons eliminates crucial aspects of the repression problematic, as Freud describes them for the normal personality: that traces of the conflict between individual and society, and its coerced integration, are detectable in manifold and partially common psychic phenomena, such as dreams, slips, jokes, fantasy, but also religion and war: that among the most severe consequences of psychic deformation is the inability to act reasonably (1972:84).

174 Kunze holds that the predominance of the social system over the personality system and the hierarchic order of the social systems, precludes the possibility for any conceptualization of social change that would have a utopian thrust (1972:85).
however, is, at what costs. Without drive theory, Parsons’s socialization process still constitutes a learning process. In so doing, it does not matter if it is theorized as an immediate introjection of cultural norms and values through the negative internalization of (paternal) authority, or as the procedural internalization of social and cultural contents through affective identification with role patterns in an increasingly differentiated social environment. In both cases Freud’s super-ego mechanisms, originally confined to the Oedipal phase, are generalized and extended to earlier stages in the theorization of socialization.

Social Change, Deviance and Autonomy

In the context of this project, the conceptualization of social change in Parsons emerges as quite specific because it does not involve a dimension of fundamental transformation towards liberation. Parsons generally understand social change in terms of structural differentiation. In a 1960 article, he states that “perhaps the most important keynote of the process of social change is structural differentiation” (1970 [1960]:318). Structural differentiation is at the same time a conceptual lynchpin in Parsons’s theorizing. He identifies it as a key characteristic of modernity: “the salient fact about modern society is the high development of structural differentiation, and the rapidity with which processes of structural change at the requisite levels have gone on” (Ibid.:310). Social change is generally conceived as a systemic process the eventual outcome of which, again, is the respective system’s functionality (equilibrium). The Social System and Towards a General Theory of Action, the two works immediately preceding the transformation of structural functionalism to systemic functionalism, contain exhaustive discussions of social change mechanisms. These discussions generally address the level of change within systems. An important presupposition for the possibility of change is the system’s general precariousness. Parsons and Shils elaborate:

Social systems and especially large-scale societies are inescapably caught in a very fundamental dilemma. On the one hand they can only live by a system of institutionalized values, to which the members must be seriously committed and to which they must adhere in their actions. On the other hand, they must be able to accept compromises and accommodations, tolerating many actions which from the point of view of their own dominant values are wrong. Their failure to do so precipitates rebellion and withdrawal and endangers the continuation of the system even at the

175 See also Kunze’s suggestion.
level of integration which it has hitherto achieved. In this paradox lies a principal source of strain and instability in social systems, and many of the most important seeds of social change. (1951:179)

The paragraph highlights the (almost dialectical) relation of deviance and social control mechanisms that is further explicated in Parsons’s later works. The tension-ridden relation of deviance and social control simultaneously threatens and stabilizes the system. The vital dynamic between the two keeps the system going. The system is necessarily directed towards functionality. Therefore, deviance becomes crucial in the process of systemic change and stability, despite of its exceptional status. The systemic responses to deviance, manifested in the social control mechanisms, “may, of course be more or less successful” (The Social System, first draft:1-2). Deviance, thus, can turn into “one of the major sources of structural change in the social system [and] must therefore be treated as preliminary to any generalized analysis of the processes of change” (Ibid.). Parsons provides a further differentiation of possible loci of conflict perpetuating change mechanisms to an extent that leads to actual social change in The Social System. He states that “[t]here will be uneven distributions among the different parts of the society. There will be value conflicts and role conflicts” (1964 [1951]:231). Value-conflicts and role-conflicts emerge as the central arenas of deviance and potential change. Against the backdrop of the centrality that is ascribed to the individual motivational structure, deviance emerges as an essential distortional factor in the order of systems, capable of precipitating change not only on the level of the personality system – which is constituted in the learning process – but on the level of the social system, too. Social change as a result of deviance comes, however, with a certain level of arbitrariness, because the success or failure of social control mechanisms as responses to deviant performances are more or less coincidental.

Deviance, however, is not the sole factor potentially precipitating change. Parsons further elaborates that “change might result not only from open deviation from unequivocally institutionalized patterns but also from a shift in the balance between two or more positively institutionalized patterns, with an invasion of part of the sphere of one by another” (Ibid.). The inner dynamics of the social system, as they emerge in the interrelatedness of the system’s four structuring elements as proposed in the four-functions-paradigm, can themselves be implicated in the production and perpetuation of processes of social change. Structural differentiation can possibly be understood as the chief ‘external’ factor, impacting the systemic interrelations to an extent that furthers social change: “[I]n the combination of
the inherent tendencies to deviation and the imperfections of the integration of value-orientations, there are in every social system inherent possibilities of change” (Ibid.).

The actual possibilities for social change are, however, precarious. Parsons notes elsewhere:

on the one hand role conflict can be seen to be very important as a source of motivations leading to social change, through some sort of undermining of the motivational bases of an established order which includes the provision of motivationally acceptable alternatives. On the other hand this possibility is potentially so dangerous to the stability of a given institutional system that it may be presumed that one of the major functions of the mechanisms of social control is to forestall the establishment of a claim to legitimacy for the expression of need-dispositions which are alienative relative to the major institutionalized patterns of the social system. (Ibid.:282-283)

Despite the constitutional precariousness of the system and the continuous challenges of deviance and conflict, it seems rather unlikely that social change processes are actually successfully instigated by role-conflicts. Parsons assumes the primacy of social control mechanisms as the agents of the system’s functionality. Such a perspective is only logically consistent from a functionalist standpoint; it underscores Kunze’s conclusion of the system’s (almost) absolute primacy.

Parsons’s readjustment of conceptual tools does little to change the primacy of the system and its inherent thrust towards functionality. It substitutes the integrating primacy of the cultural system as the guard of institutionalized value-patterns, with the symbolically generalized media of communication. Deviance becomes a concrete manifestation of expressive symbolism and the related (re-)direction of affect. Object choice diverging from systemically institutionalized (role-)patterns becomes the locus of conflict. These patterns are, however, already predetermined, and the extent of transgression characterizing deviant affect distribution is complicated by the fact that affect itself appears as a highly mediated medium. Affect always already perpetuates the logic of systemic functionality. Autonomy emerges as the conceptual consequence of the notion of double contingency – the fact that from a theoretical standpoint, the reciprocity of interaction processes has to be accounted for. It rather constitutes a logical necessity posited by the complexity of the interaction situation, instead of being a (necessarily) normative ideal of individuality that pushes towards liberation. It is always already caught up between the limited choices provided by the system’s structural patterns (such as social roles) and the overriding thrust towards systemic equilibrium. In Parsons’s theoretical universe, learning is the procedural manifestation of
functionality, of a (re-)achievement, or of a (re)instatement of the equilibrium. The fact that psychoanalytic therapy, in this context, originally emerges as a social control mechanism sheds further light on the emancipatory dilemma Parsons’s functionalism is confronted with (1964 [1955]:36). Maturity, the symbolic goal of socialization and therapy, becomes a measuring index for the individual’s (read: personality system’s) integration into the systemic order. The individualized Freudian emancipation potentiality ascribed to therapy is redefined as functional systemic integration. Social change does not even appear as a distant possibility that is (necessarily) implicated with personal emancipation anymore. Functionality comes to dictate the objective of personal emancipation processes and deviance functions as the arbitrary distortion that potentially upsets the systemic equilibrium to an extent that precipitates change.
David Riesman: Freud, Fromm and *a Lonely Crowd*

David Riesman not only moves into my project’s focus as the author of the sociological bestseller *The Lonely Crowd* (1950). As a longtime friend and collaborator of Erich Fromm, he is also the American post-war sociologist that most immediately links the theory tradition perpetuated by Horkheimer’s *Institute* to the American sociological mainstream. Riesman was introduced to Fromm in 1939. In the same year, Fromm also analyzed Riesman. They quickly developed a lifelong personal and intellectual friendship. Riesman’s association with *Critical Theory* was therefore a consequence of his close relationship with Fromm. Fromm was a critical thinker, who, despite major divergences with the *Institute*, still represented a theoretical tradition very different from the objectivist paradigm pervading the American field in the post-war era. I already established how and why Fromm is treated as a critical theorist in my study: Marx and Freud continued to be main inspirations of the social philosophy framing his works. Riesman, however, did not just follow Fromm’s lead. Rather, he developed his own approach to sociological analysis, which was deeply inspired by Fromm’s revision of Freudian theory. One of the most obvious divergences is Riesman’s treatment of Marx. For Fromm, Marx is indispensable as a critical theorist of capitalism, especially because his notion of alienation provided one of the constitutional arguments for Fromm’s theory of society. Riesman also acknowledged the historical importance of Marx’s work, which already sets him apart from his contemporaries in the sociological mainstream of the 40s and 50s. However, Marxian theory does not figure prominently neither in Riesman’s historical narration (the population growth hypothesis, which will be explicated below) nor in his attempts to conceptualize human estrangement.176

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176 In a 1972 response letter to Professor Brian R. Betz (The Riesman Papers did not contain Betz’s original letter), Riesman sketches out the impact Fromm’s work had on his thinking, and their divergences, as follows: “Your inquiry of June 29 about the influence Erich Fromm has had on me personally or through his writings is not easy to respond to. I met him in 1939, through Karen Horney who was close to my mother, and began psychoanalytic work with him which was intermittent since I was living then in Buffalo. Politically, I was anti-Marxist, and I saw him as a Marxist although interpreting Marx in terms of Marx’s early more humanistic writings as you surely know. Like many Europeans of the “Frankfort School” [sic] he saw America as more monolithic than I did, and he was never especially persuasive to me in his judgments about American institutions. But where he was extraordinarily and deeply influential was his interpretation of character structure, in general and in America. His theory of social character was extremely and decisively influential in *The Lonely Crowd* and, probably even more important, his mode of psychoanalytic thinking interpretation was decisive for the kind of analysis I made of interview material in *Faces of the Crowd*; the method of this latter book owes a great deal to the kind of analysis Fromm illustrates in his book *The Forgotten Language*. As a clinician, I have found Fromm unequalled in his grasp of nuance and his understanding of individual and group character. The series of essays on Freud which I published in the journal *Psychiatry* in 1950 […] are equally indebted to
The following analysis predominantly revolves around Riesman’s best known publication *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) and a number of articles on Freud and psychoanalysis he published in *Psychiatry* in the same year. The *Lonely Crowd* was the result of a collaborative effort with sociologist (and New York Intellectual) Nathan Glazer and popular culture ‘specialist’ (and poet) Reuel Denney. The study is interesting for my study because it represents a milestone in the establishment and success of psychoanalytic concepts within sociological theorizing, and it simultaneously pinpoints the author’s conceptualizations of individual and society. Its vast and unexpected success makes it additionally interesting, because it exemplifies a tendency emerging in the coalescent “golden ages” of US psychoanalysis and US sociology in the post-War era: the popularization of scientific and intellectual efforts beyond the boundaries of academic and intellectual circles.\(^{176}\) As a merger of sociological research interest and psychoanalytically inspired categories, the study’s findings were received as a characterological *Zeitdiagnose*: The three historically successive social character models developed in it captured a wide ranging audience’s desire to imagine themselves and their relation to their societies, as well as their common goals and values.

The simultaneous publication of *Studies in Prejudices* (1950) further strengthens the argument. While *Studies* was a fair success in the academic world, rarely any copies were sold outside of it. With his first major publication, however, Riesman reached a far bigger crowd.\(^{177}\) As the reception of *Studies* clearly indicates, psychoanalysis was already of great interests within academic circles at the time. The *Lonely Crowd’s* success demonstrates that psychoanalysis, at that point in time, had also already pervaded American academia and

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\(^{176}\) Wilfred McClay summarizes Riesman’s career and the significance of *The Lonely Crowd* as follows: “David Riesman had a career of many parts: as an attorney, law professor, freewheeling intellectual, respected student of American higher education, fearlessly independent commentator on diverse political controversies, elder statesman of the American academy. But the one accomplishment with which his name will forever be linked, above and beyond everything else he has done, was *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*—an amazingly durable book of social and cultural analysis, now nearly 60 years old and still going strong” (McClay 2009:22). McClay continues to emphasize the book’s impact: “Consider, by way of comparison, how hard it would be to imagine a work of American social analysis published in 1900 that would have had as much immediate interest for readers living in 1950 as *The Lonely Crowd* has for readers today. (Only Veblen’s work could come close.) Indeed, it is not at all extravagant to claim, as the sociologist Dennis Wrong has suggested, that *The Lonely Crowd* ‘rings even more true today than when it was written’” (Ibid:23).

\(^{177}\) Historian Daniel Geary holds, in a 2013 article on The LC’s impact that “Historians generally interpret *The Lonely Crowd* as a classic work of the 1950s. Yet the book sold nearly as many copies during the 1960s as it did during the 1950s. (611) “The Doubleday paperback edition of 1953–60 sold 543,111 copies. In 1961, however, Yale University Press took back the paperback rights to the book. That edition had sold 411,000 copies by 1970” (Ibid.:fn).
culture to a considerable extent. In light of *The Lonely Crowd*'s success, the question arises why *Studies* did not capture the attention of extra-academic readers in a comparable manner. I want to formulate the following hypothesis: Riesman’s book constituted a first major popularization of critical time diagnostics. Published at the beginning of the 1950s, it can be understood to have paved the way for Fromm’s bestseller *The Art of Loving* (1956) and the further popularization of psychoanalytic concepts in the increasingly successful genre of self-help literature.\(^{179}\) The abandonment of Freudian drive theory, exposing the individual via the social character concept to the immediate influence of its concrete societal environment, helped in the popularization process.

Not only did *The Lonely Crowd* unintentionally pave the way for Fromm’s increasing popularity, the book was also conceived under heavy influence of Fromm’s thinking. It is through Fromm that the social character model found its way into Riesman’s theorizing. In the attempt to trace a knowledge-transfer – oriented towards the question if, and how, *Critical Theory* was received during the Institute’s exile years – this becomes an important realization. *Critical Theory*, despite its explicit concern to pursue both sociological research and theory development, was deeply rooted in the European philosophical tradition. A similar tradition was not only lacking in the American sociological mainstream, but a visible academic reception of the critical European tradition (especially of Marx) was only pursued at the radical fringes in the 40s and did not begin to influence the mainstream before the 1960s. Talcott Parsons canonized the European theory tradition for US sociology – Durkheim, Weber, Pareto – and (intentionally) left out Marx (and Hegel). If Parsons set the course of the mainstream here, Riesman, with his first major publication, already diverged from it. The inspiration he took from Fromm’s work and his subtle engagement with the Marxian tradition (even though he also subtly dismissed it) marks a proper position in the field of post-war sociology that is located between the radical fringes and the theoretical mainstream. Sociologist Neil McLaughlin stresses Riesman’s divergence from Fromm’s grand Marxist narrative as a valuable attempt to preserve sociology as a (critical) science that refrains from one-sidedness and all too speculative conclusions. He suggests that “[t]he collaboration

\(^{179}\) The popularization hypothesis does not claim that the book itself, in its academic qualities, such as methodology and careful theoretical reflection, constituted ‘popular science.’ Indisputably, the volume has a definite academic nature. It is a sociological reflection steeped in concepts derived from philosophy, sociology and psychology. However, as Riesman himself repeatedly observed, the book was commonly misinterpreted by its recipients as favoring the inner-directed- over the other-directed character, which was never intended by Riesman et al (McClay 2009:28).
between Fromm and Riesman was so powerful precisely because Fromm provided subversive insights which Riesman’s civility moderated” (2001:20).

**Freud, Fromm, ‘Institute’ Circles**

Riesman’s well-to-do family background, and especially his mother’s involvement with contemporary intellectual and artistic circles, paved the ground for his further development as an intellectual – from law professor to critical sociologist. Freud’s writings were a familiar presence from early on. Eleanor Riesman (born Fleisher) showed great interest in psychoanalysis; she was analyzed by Karen Horney in the 1930s, “indisputably an intellectual” and generally someone “with whom [you] could talk about Freud” (Riesman 1990b:45,24f;). Riesman’s relation to Freudian theory and practice deepened when he started what he called “an unorthodox psychoanalysis with Erich Fromm” at the age of 30, while he was teaching at the University of Buffalo Law School (Ibid:45, Horowitz 2010:1005). Freud impacted his work considerably in the early 40s. His interest in psychoanalysis continued after his transition to the social sciences at Chicago University, where he, after a short legal career, gave a series of three lectures on Freud in 1946. These lectures would later be published in *Psychiatry* (1950,1951) (Weiland 1989:73). Despite his admiration for Freud, however, he never became a “proper” Freudian: He did not admit to Freud’s idea of psychoanalysis as the grand theory of ontogenetic and phylogenetic development. Riesman, who appreciated Freud as a great intellectual figure, especially focused on the contradictory nature of Freud’s intellectual legacy:

[B]y virtue of his greatness – by virtue, too, of the fact that he was on the whole a liberator [emancipator] of men –[he] has succeeded in imposing on a later generation a mortgage of reactionary and constricting ideas that were by no means universally held even in his own epoch. Like so many other thinkers he was ambivalent; he provides the texts for the partialities of incorporation, and for contradictory life-paths and social policies. (1954a:311)

In light of this ambiguity, Riesman located his own work on Freud in the field of sociology of knowledge rather than considering it an adaptation of a psychoanalytic methodology by a sociological mind. His aim was “to contribute […] to the ongoing effort, both in psychiatry and in the other social sciences, to separate what is essential in Freud’s thought from the garb” (1954b:334). Riesman kept a ‘professional distance’ to Freud’s theoretical universe, which
was further enabled by his appreciation of the “culture and personality school,” represented by neo-Freudians like Fromm, Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan and the cultural anthropologists Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, Clara Thompson and Abraham Kardiner. Riesman adopted from the culture and personality school a focus on the entanglement of contemporary culture and character development. His critical lens identified the “garb” in Freud’s thought as “determined very largely by the time and the culture, in which that thought made its debut” (Ibid.).

In Riesman’s essays Freud appears as an exceptionally great intellectual. His work is considered against the backdrop of personal attitudes towards the conventions, necessities, and restraints of his contemporary culture. Riesman repeatedly stresses the general emancipatory thrust of Freud’s work and confronts it with what he perceives as Freud’s reactionary notions, induced by his surrounding culture, such as the drives. The criticism leveled against Freud is heavily influenced by Mead, Thompson, Benedict and exhibits an idiosyncratic emancipatory/political thrust, which also characterized Riesman’s general professional outlook.¹⁸⁰ For Riesman, Fromm’s humanism became the legitimate moral framework of a renewed approach to psychoanalytic therapy – one that did not refrain from education and proposed that “the analyst may have to help patients confront repressed moral issues about which they ought to be, but are not consciously, troubled.” (1954c:407). The neo-Freudian Fromm, close to the culture and personality school, became a major orientation not only for Riesman’s reading of Freud, but also for the general political thrust of his outlook.

Riesman himself repeatedly emphasized the closeness of his relation to Fromm and its importance for his development as a (critical) sociological thinker. He met Fromm for the first time on suggestion of Karen Horney, who analyzed his mother at the time and reportedly had remarked that he was a very “resigned young man” (Wilkinson 2015:159). In an interview with sociologist Stepjan Mestrovic (2015) he remembered the occasion as follows:

¹⁸⁰ Daniel Geary describes Riesman’s political approach as qualitative liberalism: “Though proponents of qualitative liberalism were not so blind as to believe that all Americans were affluent, their focus on middle-class quality of life slighted the persistence of poverty in the post-war US. Since economic inequality was deeply racialized and gendered, qualitative liberals overemphasized the problems of American society’s most privileged group: well-off white men.” (2013:605) The fact that Riesman’s ideal-types represent the respective middle-classes further solidify Geary’s suggestion and critique: “If we wanted to cast our social character types into social class molds, we could say that inner-direction is the typical character of the “old” middle class – the banker, the tradesman etc while other direction is becoming the typical character of the “new” middle class – the bureaucrat, the salaried employee etc” (2001 [1961]:20).
What saved me was meeting Erich Fromm and being psychoanalyzed by him. I was living in Buffalo and Karen Horney thought I was awfully resigned for a young man, which I think is true. I was fatalistic about myself and so I started commuting weekends to New York and seeing Erich Fromm for two hour stretches. Well, it changed my life. We became close friends. Enormous friends. (178)

Riesman’s relation to Fromm was from the outset characterized by a deep intellectual connection, in the interview he recalls that they “would have long discussions about Marxism and ideas as well as psychoanalytic sessions” (Ibid.). The encounter with Fromm impacted Riesman’s engagement with psychoanalysis profoundly. Riesman’s Freud was, via Fromm, neo-Freudian from early on, that is, it was cleansed from drive theory. 1939, the year Riesman met Fromm, was also the year which finalized Fromm’s breach with the Institute. Fromm’s revision of drive theory was established and he already had begun a close intellectual and personal relation with Horney and the neo-Freudian circles. The intense and expansive correspondence between Riesman and Fromm, spanning over many decades (up to Fromm’s death in 1980), is a concrete manifestation of their friendship. The exchanges and collaborations were not limited to academic/intellectual issues. They found political commonalities in their opposition to Zionism and the anti-nuclear weapons movement, manifesting itself in their common support for democratic senator Eugene McCarthy’s campaign in 1968.180 For the purpose of my work, I want to limit my following analysis to two major topoi: the neo-Freudian inspiration in Riesman’s engagement with Freud and the commonalties and the divergences with regard to the importance of Marxian thinking to their respective works.

Riesman, as a social theorist and critic, evolved with regard to research interests, political positioning, and theoretical visions. In a 2015 report on an interview he conducted with Riesman in the 1980s, sociologist Rupert Wilkinson suggests “an ideological shift in

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180 Fromm’s involvement with the campaign is documented in great detail by Lawrence Friedman (2014:273). In the above mentioned letter to Brian R. Betz, Riesman sketches the political commonalities: “Whatever the differences in interpretation of American society, we were in complete agreement about the dangers of American and foreign nuclear policy during the cold war years. And here Fromm’s knowledge of central European people and politics was invaluable for my own understanding; […] In this area, Fromm’s Marxism of which I had been originally so very critical was a help, because he belonged to that strand of European Social Democrats who were passionately and intransigently anti-Communist, so that the positions he took whenever compromised, as was the case with so many Americans who opposed the cold war, by any touch of Stalinist outlook. The positions we took in those years, now of course widespread and even taken for granted, were often extremely lonely ones. […] One other field in which he had an influence on me was to support a position I long held on the basis of the most limited understanding, and that was concerning Zionism. Fromm is steeped in Jewish lore, law and tradition; I am almost completely ignorant on that subject. He knew some of the leading theologians who played a part in training to create a bi-national state in Palestine. In 1948 we worked together along with Norman Thomas, Hannah Arendt and just a few others in this direction” (Letter to B. R. Betz, 8/15/1972, HUGFP 99.12/Box 10/Folder: Fromm, Erich 2, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).
[Riesman’s] writing from a left-wing, even quasi Marxist picture of big business owner in his writing on America and modern society in 1942 to the pluralist model in L[onely] C[rowd]” (162). Upon reviewing the interview script, Riesman agreed with Wilkinson, stating that his “sensibility had changed’ before writing the Lonely Crowd, [that] he had read C. Wright Mills New Men of Power (1948) on labor leaders, and had disliked Mills exaggeration, as he saw it, of leader’s power” (Ibid.). The shift from quasi-Marxist to pluralist sociologist in the respectively short time period of one decade serves as an illustration for the fluidity / openness of Riesman’s intellectual and professional outlook. Wilkinson’s observation does, however, pinpoint an essential characteristic of the theoretical development of a number of New York radicals, a development that Riesman’s friend and Lonely Crowd collaborator Nathan Glazer describes as a move from “Socialism to Sociology” (Glazer 1990:190) in his self-titled autobiographical reflection on his career. In light of these developments, it is important to state that the following analysis, which focuses on Riesman’s work from the 40s and early 50s and delineates conceptualizations of emancipation, is not meant to draw any final conclusions about the evolving (political) thinker David Riesman as such. The purpose of my analysis is rather to discuss the ideas inherent to the concepts in the concrete historical setting, and in relation to other ideas emerging at the same time. As a critical theorist and a major influence on Riesman’s thinking, Fromm inhabits a central space. While Riesman’s relation to Fromm was close, the ties to the latter’s former institutional embedding, the Institute, were rather loose to non-existent. Fromm served as the main transmitter of ideas.

There is not much documentation about concrete relations Riesman might have had to the Institute’s inner circle. My research suggests that they must have been limited to occasional correspondences about administrative issues and to their functions as mutual professional academics. Riesman’s friendship and close professional relation with Nathan Glazer, who had listened to Horkheimer’s and Löwenthal’s lectures at Columbia, read the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung and its English language successor Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, and his acquaintance and professional relation with C. Wright Mills, who, in turn, was friends with Leo Löwenthal, underline the relative proximity to the ideas emanating from the Institute at the time (Glazer 1990; Mills and Mills 2000:129). The geographic proximity and the intellectual and personal relations he had with Fromm and others, strongly suggests that

181 In light of Riesman’s correspondences, as exemplified by his letter to Brian R. Betz, Wilkinson’s suggestion of quasi-Marxism seems, however a little exaggerated.

182 An exchange between Riesman and Marcuse about Riesman’s doctoral student Philip Rieff, who would later become a renowned sociologist, is the only encounter documented in the Riesman papers (Riesman to Marcuse, 12/29/1956, HUGFP 99.12/Box 37/ Folder: Rieff, Philip, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).
Riesman was aware of at least some of their works. However, his general attitude towards Critical Theory was skeptical to say the least. In a 1968 letter to Glazer, expressing his astonishment of being compared to Herbert Marcuse in terms of how influential The Lonely Crowd had been for the students-movement, Riesman proclaimed that this was “very troubling since I have always thought of Marcuse as despicable” (Letter to Nathan Glazer, quoted after Geary 2013:604). An exchange between Daniel Bell and Riesman from the early 70s underlines the scruples Riesman had of the Institute circle and their works. In the exchange, Bell complained about a doctoral candidate who wanted to pursue a project on alienation in the US. Bell claimed that his “conception of the country had been formed by the German abstractions which Horkheimer et al constructed as their defenses against looking at the diffuse American reality” and he concluded that “now their defenses had passed over and become the standard language of young American students.” (Bell to Riesman 1/20/1972, HUGFP 99.8 /Gen. Crspd. With Ind./ Box 5 /Folder BAU – BELL, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). In his response, Riesman seconds Bell’s observation with reference to his own experiences:

Many students didn’t want to hear the figures, they wanted to assume some abstraction and also that there would be villains somewhere who could be made to surrender their goods – plentitude and scarcity. I find it hard to get students to look now, not because they are awed by Freud as I used to feel they were at Chicago, but they know what they will see is rotten and to pay detailed attention and even to be curious is escapism. Those generalizers of the Frankfurt School have, as you say, had an extraordinary impact. (Ibid.:Riesman to Bell, 3/3/72, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives)

183 One example is provided by Rupert Wilkinson, who interviewed Riesman about his life’s work in 1988. He holds that Riesman “acknowledged that he had read and interacted with Adorno’s writing on popular radio music” while disliking the Frankfurt School’s general conclusions about mass society (2015:160).

184 Riesman and the other intellectuals mentioned here never referred to the output of the Horkheimer circle as “Critical Theory” at the time. The general attitude is deducted from his positions on singular works and on general comments made mostly in personal letters from the late 60s and early 70s.

185 This is a very interesting passage. For one because Riesman is attributing the disinterest in empiricism he detects in his students to the influence of the Frankfurt School. In his perception, Critical Theory seems to have had a huge impact on at least a generation of students, an impact that he evaluates as negative, because it draws them away from sociological curiosity about the empirical details of social reality. This is particularly interesting against the backdrop of general notions/analyses of the Frankfurt School’s impact on American academia, which would portray it in a quite different light, arguing that it only begins in the 1970s in very distinct and marginal academic and radical circles (Zwarg 2017; Arato 1986). Generally, it is questionable whether Marcuse was really read by many students involved in the students’ movement, as it appeared in the media image constructed of Marcuse. The question that follows would be: was it really the impact of the Frankfurt School that is at work here? Or was it rather Riesman’s imagination of the Frankfurt School’s positions on empiricism that he projected onto his students, thereby reproducing a reduced understanding of the polarities of the Positivism debate, while taking the side of empiricism/scientism? Calling the Frankfurt scholars generalizers speaks much in favor of that interpretation. Looking more closely at the FS positions on the relevance of empirical research, it becomes obvious that empiricism was regarded a vital and necessary component of the project of Critical Theory. It follows that the students’ rejection of empiricism could only be based in a misreading of Critical Theory (either by themselves, or as suggested above, by Riesman, projecting it back onto them). The other interesting aspect is
While the first comment is personal and does not contain much information about Riesman’s concrete positions towards Marcuse’s work, the second comments points at Riesman’s main criticism. Critical Theory’s ‘grand narrative-ness’ appears as a mere generalization. Wilkinson’s interview report further highlights the ambivalent relation with reference to The Lonely Crowd’s theoretical foundations: “Along with Lonely Crowd’s own typology of political types and its attack on ‘notions of a power elite,’ [the study] rejected the [Frankfurt] School’s ‘class analysis’ as well as its ‘critique of the masses’” (2015:160 fn, original citations by Riesman). Wilkinson quotes Riesman: "Fromm and Löwenthal were ‘enormously talented observers’ of contemporary America, ‘but did not have much sense for American history’” (Ibid.). By rejecting Critical Theory’s class analysis and critique of the masses, Riesman positions himself (as a social scientist) against one of Critical Theory’s defining characteristics: the insistence on a philosophically explicated theoretical grounding of sociology that is critically positioned towards “traditional theory” and the positivist doctrine of value neutrality.

Character Structure

Despite his opposition to Critical Theory’s “generalizations,” Riesman’s major work, The Lonely Crowd, is itself steeped in a grander historical narration that aims at identifying the sources of change in society and subject. Riesman et al put forth a hypothesis of demographic change that distinguishes between three successive phases of population growth trends. These trends, in turn, characterize the development of modern societies. The authors organized the developmental scheme along an S-shaped curve. The first phase, constitutive of a tradition-directed society, exhibits high population growth potential, but is characterized by no significant increase in population: the birth rate equals the death rate. The second phase, constitutive of an inner-directed society, exhibits transitional growth: the death rate decreases via the invention and establishment of new production facilities. The third phase is

that Riesman juxtaposes the (unfavorable) rejection of empiricism on the grounds of Critical Theory and the (apparently more favorable) skepticism displayed by his Chicago students on the grounds of their “Freudianism”. In her contribution to the 1961 volume Culture and Social Character. The Work of David Riesman Reviewed, Margaret Mead states: “His use in The Lonely Crowd of a daring and as yet uninvestigated hypothesis of the dependence of character type upon demographic trends may be regarded as a choice among possible ways of ascerting the significance of large-scale historical trends, such as the progress of technology, which become, at least in part, independent of the characterological peculiarities of the peoples caught in their sweep” (19, my emphasis). Mead’s suggestion rather emphasizes the nature of Riesman’s hypothesis as a grander narration than its concrete content.
constitutive of an other-directed society and exhibits incipient population decline, which is marked by the decrease of both birth and death rates. The population growth hypothesis identifies “two revolutions” as the historical movers in the transitions from one phase to another: the industrial revolution and the consumption revolution\(^{188}\) (1955 [1950]:8f).

At the core of the project, however, is the theorization of what appeared in Fromm as the missing link between base and superstructure: social character. Riesman et al specifically set out to trace the change and evolvement of social character manifestations in the contexts of their differentiation of society along three different phases: high-growth-potential, transitional-population-growth, and incipient-population-decline. The study’s central hypothesis is that “each of these three different phases on the population curve appears to be occupied by a society that enforces conformity and molds social character in a definably specific way”\(^{190}\) (2001 [1961]:8). The industrial and the consumption revolution fundamentally change social organization and consequently the specific make up of social character. The industrial revolution results in a cut-off from family- and clan-oriented, traditional ways of life. This process, while is still ongoing, is, however, already entangled with the effects of the second revolution: the “shift from an age of production to an age of consumption.” This second revolution results in a further decline of family ties in favor of ties between the peer group (2001:6). The study introduces three social character types, tied back to the specific phases on the population curve: the tradition-directed social character for the high-growth-potential phase, the inner-directed social character for the transitional-population-growth-phase, and the outer-directed social character for the phase of incipient population decline.

\(^{188}\) Riesman mentions Leo Löwenthal’s article “Biographies in popular magazines[.] Dr. Lowenthal, to whom I am indebted for helpful suggestions, links the shift from ‘heroes of production’ to ‘heroes of consumption’ to major changes in American life” (1955:239 fn).

\(^{189}\) The population growth hypothesis constitutes a major divergence from Fromm. In Fromm alienation is the major factor in the emergence of the specific social character of the marketing orientation. Riesman grounds his psychoanalytically informed abstractions on character formation in the analysis of population growth processes. Riesman does not provide a substantial argument to support his claim. The S-shaped curve implies a historically progressive growth of population, following societal laws. This very broad overgeneralization is, as he frankly admits, chiefly used to avoid talking about capitalism. Drawing from Marx, however, would have provided him with a far more dynamic theoretical framework for his social character model. The population growth theory leads Riesman straight into a problematic “grand analysis,” which theorizes cannibalism etc. as a means of keeping the population in check (2001:9). A theoretical issue emerges in the transition from high growth potential to transient growth in the question of what caused tradition-directed societies to break up. It seems Riesman circumvents the materialist perspective on the rise of capitalism by emphasizing population explosion as the historical force.

\(^{190}\) Fromm’s influence is most obvious here. The conceptualization of social character as an array of character features that is necessitated by a particular social organization is the main idea around which Fromm’s revision of the psychoanalytic character conceptualization revolves, as I have shown in Chapter III.
Delineating the specifics of Riesman’s character model necessitates a closer look at Fromm’s concrete conceptual impact on the study. In terms of comprehensibility, the authors hold that:

To the reader who is familiar with Erich Fromm’s treatment of the role of social character types in the historical process, this approach will not present difficulties; our principal reliance has been on the concepts he has done so much to develop. On the other hand, it should present no great difficulties to the everyday reader, especially perhaps the reader of novels and drama, who is aware of salient differences between his generation and that of his father and grandfather. (1955 [1950]:vi)

The study presupposes a knowledge of Fromm’s basic concepts. Interestingly enough, Riesman et al refer to the everyday reception of generational differences as a comprehensive resource in the reception of the book. The authors unknowingly anticipate a reason for the study’s success outside of academia here. The influence of Fromm’s model is further illustrated in a response made to Wilkinson’s question about what exactly *The Lonely Crowd* added to Fromm’s insights: “‘the details’; though the fundamental ‘building blocks’ of [the] book were Fromm’s” (2015:160). In a later revision (2/6/1989) to the interview, Riesman modified his statement:

[O]n reflection I do not think it is correct to say that ‘the fundamental building blocks were Fromm’s.’ The concept of autonomy owes most to Fromm. However, Fromm’s concept of the ‘marketing orientation’ is more denigrating than we intended ‘other-direction’ to be: the latter has qualities of empathy, not self-salesmanship, certainly not for any ‘capitalistic purpose.’ (Ibid.)

Riesman further specified the divergences. His typological distinctions “between anomie, adjustment and autonomy” did not match Fromm’s approach, which generally distinguished between differing states of *alienation* (allowing for the development of productive character types on the lower end). In addition to this, “the idea of the peer group” was not included in the Fromm’s “concept of the marketing personality” (Ibid.).

The details in which Riesman’s model diverges from Fromm’s are crucial for a delineation of their emancipatory content. However, against the background of the general thrust in neo-

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191 Riesman’s distinction between adjustment, anomie, and autonomy will be analyzed more closely in the following two subsections. For now it suffices to say that they describe the three different integrative modes/possibilities, applying to the prevalent social character formations of the respective phases. In Riesman’s typology there are, according to McClay, “individuals who either conform happily to the characterological standard (adjustment), fail to conform to that standard (anomie), or transcend the standard (autonomy)” (2009:26).
psychoanalytic trends, such as neo-Freudianism and ego psychology, Riesman’s earlier statement that Fromm provided the “building blocks” for the models still offers a valuable insight. The most important building block is not specific to Fromm, but pervades the works of a great number of psychoanalytic innovators at the time. Referencing ego psychologist Erik H. Erikson and Fromm at once, Riesman et al further elaborate on the hypothesis that societies engender social character formation according to their needs. According to Erikson “systems of child training […] represent unconscious attempts at creating out of human raw material that configuration of attitudes which is (or once was) the optimum under the tribe’s particular natural conditions and economic-historic necessities” (Erikson after Riesman et al 1955 [1950]:5). While Fromm states “In order that any society may function well, it members must acquire the kind of character which makes them want to act in the way they have to act as members of the society” (Fromm after Riesman et al Ibid.) Riesman et al conclude that “[b]y implication these two writers are saying that if human beings lived at random – in an inconceivable pure contingency – their drives could not be harnessed to perform the culturally required task” (1955 [1950]:5). The proximity of Erikson and Fromm which Riesman emphasizes is preconditioned by their common rejection of drive theory. Despite considerable differences in the conceptualization (and critique) of the contemporary social order, the immediacy of society’s/culture’s impact on the subject, and its deep entanglement in character formation is the common ground upon which the theoretical abstractions unfold. In Riesman’s writing, as analyzed above, the almost complete socialness of character is taken for granted. He abstains from further theorizing, or even delineating it, just as in Parsons, neo-Freudian theorizing (and ego psychology) appear as a legitimate and necessary progression in psychoanalysis.

The divergences from Fromm (and others) appear in the specific typologies / in the specific characterology. The fundamental assumption that “the link between character and society […] is to be found in the way in which society ensures a degree of conformity from the individuals who make it up” is accepted; the specific mode of conformity necessitated by a specific society makes for the specificities of social character (2001:5,6). These specificities emerge in the conceptualization of societies along the population curve. High growth potential societies are defined as relatively unchanging. The individual members’ mode of conformity reflects her membership in particular age-grades, clans, or castes. It ensures that she understands and appreciates patterns which have endured for centuries and emerge in institutionalized
(religious) rituals, which safeguard stability. Therefore, the social character brought forth in high growth potential societies is *tradition-directed*.

Transitional population growth societies are characterized by rapid capital accumulation and by constant expansion, resulting in increased personal mobility. The source of direction for the individual “is implanted early in life by the elders and directed toward generalized but nonetheless inescapably destined goals” the character mode is described as inner-directed (2001 [1961]:14;15). The *inner-directed* individual is thus, despite her mobility, aware of tradition, namely of family tradition. Riesman et al use the metaphor of the gyroscope in order to describe the inner stability of orientation. The instrument is set in the socialization process in (early) childhood by the family, by parents, and by other authorities. It keeps the inner-directed individual on course for her life time. The inner-directed subject has clearly-defined goals in life which are tied back to the family tradition. In turn, serves as the foundation upon which environmental demands are negotiated.

Societies of incipient population decline exhibit an increasing importance of the “peer group”, due to the rise and establishment of mass media. The character mode shifts from inner- to *other-direction*.

Other-directed individuals seek direction from “their contemporaries,” rather than internalizing family tradition. The metaphorical instrument describing this process is that of a ‘radar’ (2001 [1961]:21). The orientation towards peers and contemporaries constitutes a constant process of re-orientation. Goals shift with every new orientation towards new sources of direction, “it is only the process of striving itself and the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain unaltered throughout life” (1955 [1950]:22).

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192 Riesman worked for the *Sperry Gyroscope Company* during WWII, which eventually finds expression in the metaphorical category he develops to describe the inner-directed individual’s internalization of values.

193 Despite the insistence on diversifications from Fromm’s character model, Riesman et al emphasize general convergences with contemporary characterologies: “It all adds up to a pattern which, without stretching matters too far, resembles the kind of character that a number of social scientists have seen as developing in contemporary, highly industrialized, and bureaucratic America: Fromm’s ‘marketer,’ Mill’s ‘fixer,’ Arnold Green’s ‘middle class male child’” (1955 [1950]:19-20). The divergence from Fromm’s marketer is chiefly emphasized in the context of possible misperceptions (a fear that will turn out to become reality) of *The Lonely Crowd’s* typology. Riesman explains his choice of ‘other-direction’ over Fromm’s marketer by pointing out that Fromm’s terminology (over)emphasizes the marketing aspect, especially in the sense of self-marketing. This leads to a reception that eventually develops preferences in character types (the inner-directed comes to represent the more ‘authentic’ one associated with autonomy, while the other-directed becomes an epitome of performative adaptation to the market). The authors insist that the typology is conceived in a purely descriptive way and doesn’t imply preferences – the choice of terminology, however, anticipates the eventual reception trends: “despite the germinal role [Fromm’s concept played in] the development of [their] own typology […] ‘the Marketer’ might seem only to refer to a person actively engaged in marketing […] and businessmen tend already to be viewed with an excessive contempt” (1955 [1950]:172-173).
The social character types exhibit distinctive emotional sanction and control mechanisms. The tradition-directed character is controlled and sanctioned by shame, installed by a fear of being ousted from the totality of the community. The inner-directed character is controlled and sanctioned by guilt, resulting from the conflict between external demands and internalized values and goals. The outer-directed character is controlled and sanctioned by anxiety, the subject is never sure if s/he is “doing right, following the right persons and trends (2001 [1961]:24-25). The theoretical con- and divergences between Riesman and Fromm are, as pointed out before, marked by their common rejection of drive theory, and by the nuances in their concrete conceptualizations of the social character models. Riesman’s divergence from Freud is, of course, most apparent in the rejection of his model of psychosexual development. Riesman’s Freud is a sociologized Freud – just as Fromm’s, Horney’s, Mead’s, and Parsons’s.

In one of his articles, Riesman references Fromm in the discussion of the relation of superego, ego, and Id: “the function of parents and teachers in any historical culture is to see to it that the individual will want to do what, under the given social and economical conditions, he has to do” (Fromm 1944, quoted after Riesman 1954b:345). For Riesman the ego becomes “the walking delegate from economics” and the super-ego “the walking delegate from ideology” (1954b:344). This separation at first sticks to the original Freudian conceptualization. The ego is “an ‘official’ agency which “not only develops out of man’s helplessness in the presence of the great forces of life”, but […] exercises over the id the authority of those forces and administers their demands” (Ibid). The super-ego, on the other hand, is “holding the individual up to his internalized ideals – ideals he can never attain – [it] sees to it that he does not violate the cultural taboos appropriate to his social situation” (1954b:345). However, in the final analysis, Riesman relegates Freud’s psyche model to the socio-historically specific past of the Victorian age. He holds that:

The very pressure applied to the process of socialization by strict child rearing prolongs, as compared with the earlier era, the period in which socialization takes place. Freud has described this situation wonderfully in his concept of the watchful superego as a socializing agency incorporated into the child and accompanying him throughout life with ever renewed injunctions. This concept, while less fruitful in application to other societies, does seem to fit the middle class during the heyday of inner-direction in the west. One might even say that the character structure of the inner-directed person consists of the tension between superego, ego, and id. (1955 [1950]:44)
In the inner-directed individual, the ideal-typical protagonist of Freud’s age, the super-ego becomes conceptually manifest in the gyroscope. In the society of incipient population decline the model no longer applies. The edited and abridged version of *The Lonely Crowd*, first published in 1961, at a time when a number of important criticisms had already been published and reacted upon by Riesman et al, contains “Some necessary Qualifications” that further develop some of the categories in the original volume. Among them is an illuminating comparison of the conceptions of socialization in Freud and Harry Stack Sullivan. Riesman posits Sullivan’s “emphasis on the role of the peer group” (2001 [1961]:30) against Freud’s super-ego as the internalized manifestation of parental authority, which is projected onto authoritative figures in the course of life. He concludes that the “insistence on the importance of interpersonal relations” (Ibid.) not only resulted in a much more optimistic conceptualization of human sociability, of “the possibilities of social peace and harmony” in Sullivan’s work (in comparison to Freud’s) – it could “itself be viewed as a symptom of the shift towards other-direction” (Ibid.). The Sullivan reference further pronounces the centrality of neo-Freudianism in Riesman’s Freud adaptation. At the same time, it sheds light on the specificity of that adaptation within the framework of the population growth hypothesis and the consequential changes in social character. The neo-Freudian project is not only understood as a critique of Freud’s original categories, it becomes the socio-historically adequate progression of psychoanalytic theory. The abstractions are understood to address and capture the actual changes in social character on both the descriptive level and the level of conceptualization itself. The new categories turn into expressions of a mind that is already impacted by the shifting societal trends and shows the characteristics of the newly emerged social character model. Sullivan’s focus on the peer group embodies the neo-Freudian implication that Freud’s categories would not adequately address the actual (immediate) impact of the social on the subject in a changed cultural/societal setting. It is implicated with a categorical critique that denounces some of Freud’s original core concepts as outdated. As a contemporary, or ‘up-to-date’ time diagnostic, Sullivan (and the other neo-Freudians) becomes the vessel of the outer-directed social character, superseding the inner-directed Freud, the great time diagnostic of the Victorian age.

Of course, Riesman’s perspective stands in sharp opposition to Adorno’s, and Marcuse’s. Against Riesman’s ‘up-to-date’ social character model, *Critical Theory*’s insistence on drive theory appears as a stubborn rejection of the necessity for contemporariness in the social sciences. The irreconcilable theoretical divergence that became apparent in the revisionism
debate turns into a matter of timely topicality within which Fromm represents the latest approach. If one applies the assumptions implicit to Riesman’s perspective, namely the population growth hypothesis, to Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, they appear as inner-directed individuals (probably autonomous ones). They are determined by a specific character formation – and therefore also by conceptual preferences -, that is, by the conditions of transitional population growth society. Freud himself serves, in line with the logic applied above, as a prime example of the inner-directed character. In the essay/lecture on work and play in Freud’s oeuvre, Riesman analyzes Freud’s commitment to his science and research as actually a “type […] of play hidden inside what looked very much like work” (1955 [1950]:337). Universalizing the Freudian commitment in the socio-historic context, Riesman further holds that “[a] number of intellectual theories and chains of reasoning developed by sternly inner-directed men have been “play” of the same sort” (Ibid.). Psychoanalysis, in that narration, becomes a manifestation of sublimated play posing as work in an age of cultural conventions which favor hard work and commitment over play.

Cultural conventions change alongside with the social character mode. This is illustrated in the “thick descriptions” (Fromm, after Maccoby 2015:186) that characterize The Lonely Crowd’s typology. They investigate the differences of social character types within specific societal/cultural settings. For the realm of politics, the authors develop the notion of political styles expressing the respective social character modes. The inner-directed individual in politics is identified as the “political moralizer” and said to have “a firm grip – often much too firm – on the gamut of judgments that he is willing to apply anywhere and everywhere” (1955 [1950]:270). His other-directed counterpart, the “inside-dopester is unable to fortify any particular judgment with conviction springing from a summarized and organized emotional tone” (Ibid.). The differences between the two styles / social characters appear at first glance

194 Adorno’s elaborations on character in relation to Marx’s notion of character masks inherently criticize the social character model by attacking the concept of social role: “People have roles in a structural relation of society which trains them to mere self-preservation while denying the preservation of their selves. The all-governing principle of identity - the abstract comparability of their societal work - drives them towards the annihilation of their identity. The notion of the role, posing as value-neutral, is, not without reason, borrowed from theater, where actors are not in reality those they are playing. Such divergence, in societal terms, expresses the antagonism. Theory of society would have to proceed from its [the antagonism’s] immediate evidences towards the realization of its social grounding: why people are still sworn to roles. The Marxian notion of character mask, not only anticipating that category [the role] but deducting it socially (societally), has tendentially done that” (Theodor W. Adorno, [1965], Gesellschaft, in: ders., GS 8, Frankfurt am Main, 1979, S. 13, quoted after Proißl 2014:43, my translation). Marx’s notion of character masks is a pointed critique of a societal status quo that itself produces the specific human types it needs to perpetuate. This critique also applies to the social character model, because it rests on the assumption that each society produces the character types it needs.

195 It is questionable if Riesman would have used the term sublimated himself (it does not appear in the text).
as differences of what Riesman et al describe as social habit. However, the roots go deeper. They are grounded in a psychoanalytic characterology. The political moralizer/inner-directed character’s emotional tone is the voice of the super-ego, which emerges in the Oedipal phase after Freud’s conceptualization of psychosexual development. The inside-dopester/other-directed character, however, does not have this voice anymore. Characterological development in the age of other-direction has fundamentally changed; the super-ego as Freud describes it has vanished. The universalizing thrust of Freud’s development process – steeped, of course, in drive theory – is challenged here. Riesman et al further elaborate that with regard to the inside-dopester “[i]t could be argued that the suppressed affect or emotional tone is still there, remaining hidden” and that “the Freudian doctrine would predict the return of the repressed” (1955 [1950]:270). However, the Freudian model no longer applies: “[I]t seems more likely, social habit being as powerful as it is, that the repeated suppression of such enthusiasm or moral indignation as the inner-directed man would consider natural permanently decreases the capacity of the other-directed man for those forms of response” (Ibid). The authors’ insistence on the power of social habit emphasizes the sociologization of psychoanalysis in the wake of neo-Freudianism and the culture and personality school. Freud’s original abstractions eventually only appear useful within the contemporary societal/cultural context. Characterology becomes a tool of time-diagnostics. Drive-theory’s disposal leads to a complete re-formulation of character development, within which the conceptualization of Freud’s most fundamental entities, the Id and the unconscious, radically change. If the ‘repressed’ does not return – the implication for the other-directed character is that the degree of repression necessitated by society has decreased – not much repression has happened in the first place, due to changed societal conditions. Such a conclusion is not compatible with Freud’s original notion of repression. If Riesman implies that the repression in the age of other-direction cannot result in the neurotic symptoms characteristic of the period of inner-direction, this does not mean that the repressed merely disappears or that there even is less or no repression. Freud conceptualizes the reoccurrence of the repressed as an ‘in-whichever-way’ return, which could easily be exhibited in exactly what Riesman summarizes as the common social habit in other-directed individuals.\(^{196} \) The question where the line should be drawn between constructive repression, (ie sublimation) and neurosis cannot be answered by looking at mere epiphenomena, such as specific expressions of social habit. Riesman et al are, however, not interested in this question, or rather, the question is not posed

\(^{196}\) As Adorno points out in the 36th aphorism in *Minima Moralia* (2003 [1951]:65f), the knowledge about neurotic symptoms of old is incorporated into the “popular girl’s”, the “regular boy’s” performance; normalcy is pathological, and life without such symptoms becomes, in turn, the *symptom* of pathology.
in their approach. If there is no drive-governed \( I_d \) that is always already in conflict with the societal/cultural realm, repression becomes a mechanism quite different from Freud’s. In its most fundamental conclusions, *The Lonely Crowd* is in line with Parsons, with the neo-Freudians, with the culture and personality school, and with ego psychology. Character emerges as an epiphenomenon of current cultural necessities; it does not juxtapose individual and society.

**Alienation and Anomie**

The theorization of different modes of integration in Riesman’s work borrows from different theoretical universes. The ‘triple a’s’ of adjustment, anomie, and autonomy bring together the Durkheinian dichotomy of equilibrium and anomie, and the Frommian notion of productivity that re-appears in Riesman’s work as autonomy. The Marxian notion of alienation is mentioned in *The Lonely Crowd*, it is, however, not further extrapolated. The concept is briefly addressed in the context of the shift from the transient-growth phase to the phase of incipient decline, instigated by the consumption revolution. Riesman et al apply the notion of alienation in their discussion of the rise of mass media and the consequential impossibilities of direct consumer participation:

> Unlike the square dancer of an earlier era who could participate in the caller’s innovations, the consumer of modern popular culture has virtually no opportunities for participation. He is, in Marxian terms, alienated both, from the means of production and the (participative) means of consumption. (1955 [1950]:158)

The concept of alienation is discussed in a concrete example; it remains unclear, however, if it is also understood in the Marxian sense as a general condition in capitalist society. It is applied in a rather colloquial fashion: as a result of the consumption revolution, alienation extends from the realm of production to the formerly sheltered private sphere of reproduction. It is questionable, however, if Riesman’s attempt to use Marx in order to conceptually grasp the change in the relation of subject and society in the context of the consumption revolution is really successful. In Marx’s terms, alienation is always already total. The relation of subject and society, in its entirety, is determined by the relations of production; the subject’s consciousness is permeated by alienation. The relation of consumer and entertainment, here exemplified with the square dancer, used to be more participative. Now it is characterized by
alienation because the mode of consciousness through which the entire relation is ‘rationalized’ by both the recipient and the dancer is tainted by alienation. Lacking a conceptual extrapolation and concrete application to the situation discussed, alienation is not properly addressed at all.196 This, of course, constitutes a significant divergence from Fromm197, who strongly relies on Marx’s concept and vocabulary in his theorization of the subject’s integrative mode.

Riesman et al demonstrate their familiarity with Marx’s writings. However, they refrain from further developing Marxian concepts. The concepts are rather used as vantage points into a rather descriptive discussion of societal phenomena, and put in conversation with approaches addressing the same phenomena in a different way. Class is yet another Marxian notion that briefly raises its head in The Lonely Crowd and is soon brought together with a wider array of conceptual approximations of social stratification:

Class, as Marx used the concept, referred to a polarization of society caused by the consequences for human consciousness of differing relationships to the mode of production. The historical types of character and the range of adjustment, autonomy, and anomie at any given time are, like classes, the products of differing life experiences – this would seem to hold for groups even though, in the case of individuals, idiosyncratic factors of constitution may be relevant. (Riesman et al 1955 [1950]:293)

Class, as a marker of difference in life-experiences, becomes the blueprint for the conceptualization of the way The Lonely Crowd’s characterology relates to the societal roots of character development, and also to the set of integrative modes applicable to the specific social character types. Riesman et al pick up the notion of class in a one-dimensional way. It solely appears as class of itself: a descriptive sociological category linking specificities in life experiences, specific forms of consciousness, and the eventual position within the societal

196 The attempt to grasp the changing relations of subject and society in “late capitalism” undertaken by the Frankfurt theorists relies heavily on the Lukascian concept of “reification.” A notion of increased reification seems more applicable to the concrete situation discussed by Riesman. Alienation pertains to a more general condition under capitalism. On the other hand, Riesman et al use the term in a colloquial manner, which was typical for the time. Alienation increasingly became a self-explanatory buzz word, providing a blurry, associative impression of the idea that ‘something is wrong’ about the relation of subject and modern/capitalist/consumer society.

197 In a letter to Riesman, from 5/23/1960 Erik Erikson identifies “some of Fromm’s most recent publications [as having] the quality of marketing in quick-production style some ideas.” Among these ideas Erikson identifies an “early Marxian romanticism of alienation” (HUGFP 99.12/Box 8/Folder: Erikson, Erik, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). Erikson’s remarks point to two developments that play an important role for my study and have been mentioned before: for one Fromm is inherently criticized as a popularizer of ideas, for another, Marx is dismissed.
The second dimension, class-for-itself, which lends the Marxian project its radical emancipatory thrust, is missing. The neglect of this dimension enables the authors to move smoothly from Marx’s class notion to the further differentiation of character types and integrative modes.

The integrative modes of adjustment, anomie, and autonomy, are further developed in the concrete discussion of the relatedness of specific character types to their social surroundings; they appear as “the adjusted, the anomic, the autonomous” (1955 [1950]:287) – embodied ideal types. The adjusted are described as the typical manifestations of the respective character types: “people who respond in their character structure to the demands of their society or social class at its particular stage on the curve of population” (Ibid.). Those not conforming to “the characterological pattern of the adjusted” are conceptualized as “either anomic or autonomous” (Ibid.). The Durkheimian notion of anomie is picked up, however, it is defined broader and understood as “virtually synonymous with “maladjusted”” (Ibid.). Autonomous individuals, in contrast, are described as being “on the whole […] capable of conforming to the behavioral norms of their society – a capacity the anomics usually lack – but […] are free to choose whether to conform or not” (Ibid. emphasis in original). An important qualification is that the descriptive differentiation is not concerned with “deviations in overt behavior but with conformity or nonconformity in character structure itself” (Ibid.). The integrative mode is, thus, already inscribed in the character structure, a possibility that relies on the theorization of social character as only a specific part of character structure altogether.

Riesman et al define the anomic individual as “a characterological nonconformist who is frequently neurotic.” Conformity might well be displayed “outwardly,” but at the costs of developing “psychosomatic symptoms.” The level of outwardly conformity may vary with the autonomous individual as well, however, at a considerably lower costs because for her to conform or not remains a matter of choice (1955 [1950]:288). Autonomy as an integrative mode will play an important role in the delineation of social change / emancipation conceptualizations in Riesman et al in the following subsection. In order to arrive at an

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198 In a critical review of the *Lonely Crowd*, published in 1961, Seymour Martin Lipset’s speaks of Riesman’s “materialism” (1961:141). This materialism is, of course, not to be confused with the Marxian one, which always has a concrete emancipatory thrust that targets the eventual causes of alienation in its criticism of societies material base (relations of production). Riesman’s materialism is rather descriptive. It assumes the preponderance of objective relations via the population-growth hypothesis. It does, however, refrain from fundamental criticism.
understanding of Riesman’s conceptualization of negative integration, the generalized notion of anomie moves into focus. For Riesman et al, the ultimate sources of anomie are identifiable and at least to some degree related to population growth stages: anomies are created when “new types emerge” and become successful (i.e. the nodal point of the social structure’s changed demands) in the wake of fundamental shifts on the population curve (1955 [1950]:288ff).

The psychoanalytic implications in the conceptualization of integrative modes are inscribed in the neurotic nature of the anomic’s (non-)conformity. Psychological pathology marks the difference between autonomy as the desirable transcendence of adjustment (mere functional integration) and anomie as non-desirable negative integration. The concept of anomie, especially in the even more generalized way it is intended by Riesman et al, already sets the framework for the way psychoanalytic concepts are able to play into the conceptualization of negative integration. Anomie, in contrast to alienation, is not a totalizing force, it does not affect all subjects; it allows, moreover, to single out and pathologize the aberrations from the rule. Psychoanalysis, apart from providing the (already heavily modified) conceptual tools for *The Lonely Crowd’s* characterology, additionally becomes important as a clinical enterprise that provides the conceptual and terminological toolbox for the description of aberration.

Taking a closer look at Riesman’s deeper engagement with Freud’s “utilitarian and philistine attitudes toward work and play” and the consequences for psychoanalysis as a theory of subject and society reveals another level of Freudian implications in Riesman’s conceptualization of negative integration (1954a:311). He points at the (unintended) value of Freud’s rigid separation of work and play in favor of the former:

> [T]here are certain advantages to making fun and play surreptitious – even sinful. For then, play is less apt to be socially guided, less apt to be compulsively gregarious. Freud’s view of play as a kind of underground in adult life protects it – gives it some of the same chaotic freedom that the carnival provides in Catholic countries. (1954a:332)

This applies, of course, only to the culturally specific socio-historic context within which Freud’s work was conceived, since Freud’s separation of work and play is understood as a reflection of the culturally imposed conventions of the time. In Riesman’s terms the separation serves as a marker of the society that demands an inner-directed social character. In
the other-directed’s society, play moves into a different, however still precarious, position, because it is not relegated to the societal subconscious:

[T]he contemporary social focus on recreation sometimes tends to leave no room either for whorehouses or for underground passages of any sort; everything must be out in the open. And while in a utopian society this would not be so bad, today it often means that play is exploited in fact – as it was from Freud in Principle – for physical and psychic hygiene. (Ibid.)

What makes this passage particularly interesting, especially with regard to Riesman’s understanding of negative integration, is that a certain amount of systemic distortion seems to be inherent here: Riesman problematizes the exploitation play experiences under the conditions of the society of incipient population decline. 200 Riesman seems to be close to Marcuse’s dialectical extrapolation of Freud’s categories (Chapter III), at least in terms of how play is co-opted within the existing social conditions; especially Marcuse’s notion of repressive desublimation addresses the same phenomenon. The focus lies with notions of physical and psychic hygiene towards which play opportunities are instrumentalized. Such focus implies a certain instrumental rationality directing the integration of play and fun into a direction that is eventually marked by the distortion of true potential. However, a concise notion and/or critical conceptualization of what actually is at work, namely, that play and leisure are co-opted and exploited, is missing.

It is possible to get to the true potential of play in the Riesmanian universe by taking a closer look at his explications on the problematic of work in the society of other-direction. At the bottom of the problem lies that work has lost meaning. Riesman suggests that: “It may be a long time before middle-class people, in America will feel themselves free to play when they are not free to really work – if their work has degenerated into sociability or featherbedding” (1954a:333). Again, a certain proximity to Marcuse (especially Eros and Civilization) emerges in the notion of enjoyable (Marcuse: libidinal) work that Riesman implies. However, Riesman hesitates to apply categories such as alienation, which are implicated with a fundamental critique of forces determining the concrete societal conditions and the structure of work in a way that encompasses a distorted relation between subject and society.

200 The fact that “whorehouses” serve as the prime example for play here (especially in the context of a utopian society, in which an open existence of whorehouses wouldn’t be “so bad”) of course reveals the narrowness of the emancipatory dimension implicit to Riesman’s conceptualization of play. Instead of criticizing the existence of whorehouses as sexualized marketing spaces catering to the demands of a patriarchal status quo, they are supposed to stand for the imagined, emancipated place that does not yet exist.
Therefore, his approach also differs from Marcuse’s. Riesman instead locates the problem at the level of consciousness:

[P]eople have to learn to play – or stop unlearning; in this enterprise they are faced with the whole long tradition of the driving and driven men who created Western industrial society, Western political organization, and Western scientific thought, including psychoanalysis. (1954a:333)

Learning how to play is the key to be able to learn how to work. The emancipatory process appears here as a process of learning, the underlying historical narration focuses on subjects. Of course, these subjects are, in the last instance, determined by the specific (social) character arrangements, and therefore on their society’s position on the population curve. In contrast to Marcuse, work does not appear as a societal manifestation of a, however distorted, form of rationality, deeply inscribed into the societal structures that always already works against the possibility of play. Riesman’s materialism is merely descriptive; the causality it develops leaves no room for conceptualizations of fundamental societal change. Psychoanalysis plays a subordinate role in the conceptualization of the possible, but not necessary, distortion of the subject’s relation to society – in contrast to Marcuse, where it provides the libidinal structure as a most fundamental category. Its function is, too, chiefly descriptive: it provides the characterological categories and helps to distinguish pathological from non-pathological phenomena (anomic vs autonomous). The conceptualization of autonomy as an integrative mode and a true possibility within the existing societal conditions is implicated with the rejection of fundamental categories such as alienation and drive-theory. This is where Riesman approximates Fromm (at least in terms of Marcuse’s, and Adorno’s critique of the his productivity approach) very closely.

Autonomy

The emancipatory thrust in Riesman’s work, and specifically in *The Lonely Crowd*, emerges from the concept of autonomy. Regardless of the social character type, the autonomous subject is the concrete embodiment of social change. It is, as Riesman repeatedly states, saturated in the “‘productive orientation’ […] used by [Fromm] in *Man for Himself* for the type of character that can relate itself to people through love and to objects and the world generally through creative work” (1955:310fn). The concept is steeped in the present
possibility of archiving autonomy; emancipation is disentangled from radical change. The possibilities for autonomy, however, still depend on the societal phase. Riesman et al provide a brief historical retrospective that identifies “loopholes for autonomy even in the earlier despotic periods, since the despots were inefficient, corrupt, and limited in their aims” (1955 [1950]:296). With regard to the eras of transient population decline and incipient population growth, Riesman et al hold that “autonomy in an era depending on inner-direction looks easier to achieve than autonomy today” (Ibid.). Such estimation is rooted in an analysis that identifies “modern totalitarianism” as the sole force that “wages open and effective war on autonomy” driven by, “as Erich Fromm has said […] ‘escape from freedom’” (Ibid.). According to Riesman et al the societal conditions demanding other-direction demonstrate that “the diffuse and anonymous authority of the modern democracies is less favorable to autonomy than one might assume” (Ibid.). The reasons are multifold, one being that “the other-directed person is trained to respond not so much to overt authority as to subtle but nonetheless constricting interpersonal expectations” (Ibid.). Autonomy in its concrete manifestations, hence, emerges only against the socio-historically specific background, which, in turn, is implicated in the determination of possibilities of autonomy in the first place. Riesman et al state that:

[t]he character of the autonomous individual is derived from, hence in part determined by, the prevailing modes of conformity in the society in which he lives. Autonomy is never an “all or nothing” affair; it does not come about suddenly, but sometimes imperceptibly, and always as the result of a continual struggle with the forces of the culture which oppose it. (1955:300)

As briefly addressed in the discussion of negative integration above, play, in its opposition to work, is the main space within which possibilities of autonomy are theorized. With regard to autonomy in the era of other-direction, Riesman introduces the notion of leisure competence. Raising the Marxian concept of alienation only to subsequently dispose of it, the authors pose the question: “Are we right then, in supposing that play offers any easier channels to autonomy than work; are not both equally ‘alienated’ in Marx’s sense, so much so that even the coming of socialism would mean little?” (1955 [1950]:347). The answer to the rhetorical question is, of course, no – or at least, not altogether, because alienation is not total, there is still room for ‘true’ play: “it is largely through competence in leisure that most other-directed people can develop autonomy and political imagination” (Ibid.). Unlike in Marcuse’s work, play, however, does not chiefly appear as a universal realm of libidinal autonomy here, but as the favored cultural/societal realm in the age of other-direction. What qualifies it as the arena
in which autonomy can be achieved is that the competence of play becomes a cultural/societal necessity. The comparison to the inner-direction era solidifies the argument: “the inner-directed man even if he could not play could feel, qualitatively, that he was a participating member of society by virtue of his work alone, the other-directed man if he cannot play is apt to feel disqualified from participation in a society which is increasingly governed by leisure ideology” (1955 [1950]:347).

Again, the proximity and simultaneous distance to Marcuse via Fromm emerges here. In both theoretical universes, play is deemed central to the emancipatory process. Riesman’s understanding of play, however, investigates actualities of play under the given societal conditions. In the age of consumption play has become the central knot of social activities, “leisure competence” consequentially becomes a marker of autonomy for the other-directed subject. As the discussion of Marcuse’s repressive desublimation in Chapter III has shown, for him such competence first of all signifies the totality of the subject’s integration into societal conditions, which actually work against autonomy. Marcuse’s approach is steeped in Freud’s conceptualizations of infantile sexuality. Within the frame of drive theory, the discussion of the (im)possibilities of play as a realm of liberation is linked to the pre-social qualities of play and fantasy. Riesman’s conceptualization of play diverges from that notion. The concrete manifestations and possibilities of play are chiefly expressions of the cultural conventions/pressures, play does not exhibit a pre-social quality (and is therefore not universalizable, beyond the immediate cultural realm). Riesman ends his considerations on play by supposing that “[p]erhaps there is more competence at play than meets the eye – less passivity, less manipulation, less shoddiness than is usually charged” (Ibid.). The convergence with Fromm’s productivity concept is evident here, despite Fromm’s insistence on and Riesman’s rejection of alienation. Similarly to the divergence between Fromm and Adorno/Marcuse, Riesman’s diagnosis obviously diverges from Adorno/Marcuse, who conceptualize competence as always already inscribed with the instrumentality of the conditions of domination. According to them, it cannot function as a transcending quality.

With regard to concrete possibilities for social change, Riesman et al suggest, much in line with their culture-saturated conceptual apparatus, “that a cultural bill of rights is necessary to

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201 This is not to say that there is no universal dimension. Riesman does state that “even apart from such cultural pressures and definitions, I believe play is of basic human importance for achieving autonomy” (1955 [1950]:347). A further extrapolation and differentiation of the way play is co-opted in other-direction society and what it is supposed to stand for as a basic human quality in the achievement of autonomy is missing.
liberate sociability for all in the United States, before any can be wholly liberated“ (1955 [1950]:336). Cultural politics move into the position of imposing change on the societal level, which eventually enables individual emancipation. The limits of the potentialities of emancipation emerge in the cultural specifics emanating from Riesman’s watered-down “materialism”: the respective society’s position on the population curve. The concrete possibilities for autonomy are always already predefined by the specific socio-historical material conditions. Riesman states:

My emphasis on ecology and economy does rule out the purely rationalistic interpretations of much contemporary intellectual history, for I believe that only certain ideas will be generated and catch on under any given socioeconomic conditions. […] my focus on character structure leads me to view the role of ideas in history still more narrowly; character, with all its intractabilities and self-reproducing tendencies, will largely dictate the way ideas are received. In contrast to those few people who still put their faith in some world-wide intellectual or religious revival, I do not believe any idea, no matter how noble and necessary, is likely to capture a globe that, though composed of people with the same basic humanity, still contains people at very widely differing stages on the not easily accelerated curve of character and population. (1955 [1950]:368-369)

Social character, understood as the reflection of the material conditions, turns into a concrete entity that marks the emancipatory limits of such ideas; it becomes the first measure of human possibilities of emancipation. Riesman’s argument reverses that proposed by Critical Theory (including Fromm): The analysis does not start with the historically generated structures of domination (especially the economic structure) and conceptualizes (social) character as sort of a missing link between base and superstructure. Rather, social character becomes its starting, and eventually its end point. The socioeconomic conditions are not further analyzed; concrete expressions – such as Marx’s class antagonism in capitalism – recede to the background in the face of the chief factor in character development: population growth. The universalizing thrust of emancipation is contained by cultural specificities. Liberation is only conceivable in concrete cultural spheres, constituted, in fact, by the nation state as the concrete manifestation of culture’s socio-historic specificity.
A Theology of Morality and Repression: Philip Rieff's Freud

In this part of the chapter I analyze the main currents of American sociologist Philip Rieff’s Freud adaptation. Rieff contributed two major works to the vast array of sociological texts engaging psychoanalysis in the extended post-war era: *Freud: the Mind of the Moralist* (1959)\textsuperscript{202} and *Triumph of the Therapeutic* (1966).\textsuperscript{203} The two works stand out because they put Freudian concepts to work and simultaneously trace the contemporary pervasiveness of psychoanalysis within American sociology and culture. Rieff started his academic career in the late 1940s at Chicago University under the influence of eminent American sociologist Edward A. Shils. He soon developed a keen interest in Riesman’s work on Freud, who held a position as professor of sociology in Chicago at the time. Rieff’s academic, intellectual and personal relation to Riesman further emphasizes the crucial position of Rieff’s work within my research perspective. It was from the beginning characterized by difficulties. Riesman repeatedly described the relation as ambiguous, both in terms of intellectual dis/agreements and personal issues. In what was supposed to be a letter of recommendation to sociologist

\textsuperscript{202} The book is the revised version of his doctoral dissertation, *Freud’s Contributions to Political Philosophy*, which he handed in at University of Chicago’s Department of Political Science in 1954 (Zondervan 2005:14). Charles Turner (2011) points out that the published version hides the fact that Susan Sontag, who was married to Rieff from 1950 to 1958, had participated in the revision of the book; after the divorce, Rieff dedicated it solely to his parents and his son (81).

\textsuperscript{203} *Freud: Mind of the Moralist* and *Triumph of the Therapeutic* remained his two major publications until his death in 2006. In 1972 Rieff addressed his fellow social theorists in an article called *Fellow Teachers* which was later revised and published as a book in. In the article Rieff explicitly pronounces his disagreement with critical theorists like Marcuse and further develops his own psychoanalytically infused criticism of modernity. The article is helpful for my analysis, especially with regard to my aim to delineate Rieff’s notion of emancipation, which will pursued in more detail in Chapter V. The majority of Rieff’s later works, however, was not published before 2006. Charles Turner (2011) provides an overview: “during the decades of virtual silence Rieff was working on something like a *magnum opus*; there were thousands of pages of essays, chapters, drafts and notes. Although much of this material seems to have been set down in the 1980s, it has only been available since 2007 as the first two volumes of a three-volume work, *Sacred Order/Social Order*. Rieff oversaw the publication of the first, *My Life among the Deathworks: Illustrations of the Aesthetics of Authority* (Rieff, 2006), shortly before his death […]. The second, *The Crisis of the Officer Class: The Decline of the Tragic Sensibility* (2007), appeared a year later. With the exception of one piece from 1994, the third, published in 2008 as *The Jew of Culture: Freud, Moses and Modernity* (2008a) is an anthology of previously published pieces on Jewish themes, half of them from the Freud book. As if that were not enough, a fourth volume entitled *Charisma: The Gift of Grace and How It Has Been Taken Away From Us* appeared in 2008 (2008b)” (81-82). Turner provides an insight into Rieff’s later works, which helps to identify a general direction of his development as a theorist and cultural critic. He suggests that “Rieff was fond of conducting cultural diagnosis through the identification of the dominant ‘characters’ of an era, as had Nietzsche and Weber been before him” (Turner 2011:85). In later works he introduced concepts such as “sacred order” and “officer class” in the attempt to address the meaning and function of culture and those who (should) assume authoritative positions within it. The foundation for this lifelong project was laid in the two books, expressed in the concepts of ‘psychological man’, and the ‘therapeutic.”
Daniel Lerner, at the time professor at Stanford University, Riesman expressed “somewhat mixed feelings” about his “former student and colleague” Philip Rieff:

He is undoubtedly one of the ablest and most gifted young men who have come up through the ropes here, since I have been here. I worked very closely with him on his Master’s thesis, (of which Herman Finer and I were the readers), and am now engaged in a similar role on his doctoral dissertation concerning Freud’s political thought. […] It was at my instance, largely, and because of his interest in my work that he joined our College staff in Culture and Personality, and he did his first teaching more or less under my auspices. […] As a teacher he was a considerable success; he was brilliant, incisive, erudite, dominating – in fact had some of the qualities, and also some of the defects, of Ed Shils, who became something of a model for him. The result was that he was rather rough on his girl students, and the more unsophisticated of the boys, and that he antagonized many of his colleagues by what seemed like arrogance. Moreover, moving with a good deal of speed from a more or less Marxist position over into a more theological one, he followed a fashion which many here view with misgivings. I myself view such transformation with mingled feelings, as I think you know.

(Riesman to Lerner 4/3/1952, HUGFP 99.12/Box 37/ Folder: Rieff, Philip, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives)

From the letter it becomes evident that Rieff’s departure from Chicago University was at least not completely voluntary. Riesman helped him to secure a position as assistant professor at Brandeis University where he would later also work in the proximity of Herbert Marcuse, who taught at Brandeis from 1954 to 1965.203 Riesman’s deep involvement in Rieff’s early academic career leaves no doubt about the fact that Riesman had a considerable impact on Rieff’s development as an academic and critical intellectual, specifically his interest in psychoanalysis. In his introduction to the 2015 volume David Riesman’s Unpublished Writings and Continuing Legacy, co-editor Stjepan Mestrovic indicates that a hitherto unpublished book draft entitled Freud: A Study in Ambivalence, dating back to the early 1950s, was most likely co-authored by Rieff (3).204 The draft offers a perspective on Freud as a pessimistic cultural theorist who at least flirts with authoritarianism, and establishes a proximity “to the grimly pessimistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer” (Ibid.). Discussing the meaning of the Greek concept of Kairo, a notion of time as “experienced in terms of cyclical political fate” (Rieff and Riesman 2015:79) for Freud’s work, Rieff and Riesman state:

203 Rieff’s employment at Brandeis was similarly marked by difficulties. In a 1953 letter to Riesman Rieff describes his current work situation as follows: “Brandeis is ok […]. Some tension with [Lewis] Coser, evidently because I am a ‘Riesman man’ and he is positively phobic about you” (to Riesman 6/29/1953, HUGFP 99.12/Box 37/ Folder: Rieff, Philip, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).

204 The editors indicate that “In at least two notes, typed into the original text, the second author identifies himself or herself as ‘PR’” (2015:79). The fact that Rieff worked together with Riesman in Chicago at the time and that some of the draft’s arguments resemble Rieff’s first book strongly suggest him as the second author.
Freud finds war therapeutically necessary. War readjusts the disparity between reality and our superego structure. War makes life more interesting because when death can no longer be denied life must be regarded as having a fuller significance. But is this not strangely close, not only to Schopenhauer in *Will and Idea*, but also to the fascist theory of permanent barbarization – the return to the bare primal man? If it is true that ‘we spring from an endless ancestry of murderers, with who the lust for killing was in the blood, as possibly it is to this day with ourselves,’ than we may console ourselves that modern institutionalizations of barbarism – e.g. the compulsory labor camp – have “the merit of taking somewhat more into account the true state of affairs.” (2015:84)

They go on to conclude that for Freud, “[w]e are all barbarous, underneath our suits of clothes. And it is this pessimism which puts Freud in the line of great authoritarian philosophers. All authoritarian philosophy is pessimistic and all pessimistic philosophy authoritarian” (Ibid.:96). In the draft, Rieff and Riesman articulate a pronounced critique of the cultural pessimism and inherent fascination with authoritarianism in Freud’s work. While this argumentation is in line with Riesman’s general approach to Freud, it also inversely anticipates the direction Rieff’s further engagement with Freud would take with his increasing affirmation of exactly those qualities in his writing that the draft criticizes. This, of course, simultaneously marks Rieff’s increasing divergence from Riesman.

In *Freud and US Sociology* (2005) Philip Manning ascribes to Rieff a central position in the sociological ventures into psychoanalysis, right next to Parsons. Manning notes that Parsons eventually failed because “his complicated scheme of interlinked two-by-two classificatory boxes could not capture the complexity of social life” (2005:xiii). This left him “unable to grasp, as Philip Rieff did brilliantly, that Freud was a moral teacher (perhaps the moral teacher), albeit one in need of radicalization” (Ibid.). For Manning, who implicitly criticizes Parsons’s clinging to the “neutral scientific assumption that his work was morally neutral” (Ibid.), Rieff’s two Freud books, especially the second one, become the formulations of these radicalizations. In Manning’s account Rieff becomes the cultural critique who challenged the objectivist paradigm of the 1950s on psychoanalytic grounds and thereby reinstated “a question that was very important to the first generation of American sociologists; namely, is it possible to have a moral science of society?” (Ibid.:9). In light of my work’s general research interest in inherent emancipatory potentials ascribed to sociological Freud adaptations, Rieff’s project as one that introduces morality (against Parsons) to the disciplinary discourse provesto be of interest.
In a 1953 article, Rieff addresses current developments in American sociological theory with specific regard to their meta-theoretical undercurrents:

Influential theoreticians of contemporary social science like Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils have acknowledged Weber as well as Freud as their master. Plainly, however, they do not serve both masters. They owe more to Freud and less to Weber than they acknowledge. Marx is, of course, ignored. And the fact that Weber saw psychology as a "natural science" and proposed to develop his verstehen sociology free from psychology is equally ignored by these eminent Weberians. Weber understood the problem of verstehen as a methodological construction of its not of I's. For Weber, as for Hegel and Marx, the historical subsumed the psychological. The subsumption was irreversible. For Freud, as for the dominant movements of contemporary social science, the psychological subsumed the social. (117)

Parsons and Shils misunderstand themselves as Weberians, while actually substituting the Weberian (and eventually Hegelian) emphasis on the preponderance of the historical with the Freudian focus on the psychological. Rieff generally welcomed the Freudian correction of the Hegel-Marxian history paradigm, which, according to his analysis, has formerly guided the social sciences. At the same time, the tone of his assessment is fairly polemical and indicates a severe distance to the sociological mainstream:

The assimilation of the social sciences to psychology as the master-science, instead of to history, is made complete when one moves from the problem of material to the problem of analysis. Not only is social data first and foremost psychological, but all knowledge of it must be purely nominal and subjective. [...] History is mass psychology, and the knowledge of it pure psychologism. It is fortunate for contemporary social science that the structure of society has been discovered to be congruent with the psychological principle of “interaction”[.] (Ibid.118)

Instead of approaching Freud as a theorist whose concepts dialectically challenge the Hegel-Marxian dogma, contemporary social science absolutizes his scientistic tendencies and adopt the inherent self-understanding as natural science. Following the Parsonian paradigm of interaction, social science thereby becomes a parody of psychology. Rieff, no less a critic of Hegel and Marx than of contemporary trends in the social sciences, especially turns to drive theory as the conceptual locus of a dialectical fusion of the historical and the psychological. In Mind of the Moralist he states that “[i]t was evidence of intellectual courage that [Freud] was willing to extend his theory of the unconscious and his therapeutic method even into areas of speculation where misunderstanding is especially likely” (1979 [1959]:10). Scientificity is not the measuring pole for the validity of Freudian concepts. Rather, it is Freud’s intellectual daring as a cultural critic who transcends the discipline’s scientistic orientation, despite his
explicit orientation towards the natural sciences. Rieff firmly locates psychoanalysis in a
dialectical tradition, one that asks for the deeper content, the meaning of disorders and
diseases, rather than offering purely physiological explanations (Ibid:14-16).206

Rieff’s idiosyncratic perspective on Freud is emphasized in the simultaneous proximity and
distance to other eminent theorists of the era engaging Freud, most prominently Parsons,
Riesman, and Marcuse. In the following, I aim to carve out the main currents of this
perspective, structured along the categorical junctures of character structure. Rieff addresses
the idea of character structure in his notions of ‘psychological man’ and ‘the therapeutic.’
Social integration, apparent in Rieff’s understanding of the relation of culture and individual,
is expressed in his concept of ‘anti-culture.’ Social change, finally, figures in his notion of the
sacred.

Drive Theory, Psychological Man and the Therapeutic

Rieff provides a very dense, detailed, and rich discussion of Freudian theory, which aims to
carve out the dialectical nature of his reasoning. Rieff mobilizes it against the rationalized and
objectivist Freud adaptations pervading the social sciences at the time, such as Parsons’s.
Rieff repeatedly stresses those elements in Freud’s work that argue against rationalization.
They are most visibly engrained in his notion of the unconscious as the harbor of unreason.
While Parsons’s work dismisses these elements, Rieff values them:

    The anti-efficiency of Freudian therapy appears clearly in the extraordinary leisure
    with which it is conducted. […] The extreme leisureliness of therapy finds its correlate
    in a theory of mind – in particular, Freud’s theory of what he deemed the crucial part
    of the mind, the unconscious. The timelessness and indifference to logic with which
    the unconscious operates are echoed in the leniency of the psychoanalytic interview.
    (1979 [1959]:333)

Anti-efficiency becomes a quality instead of a flaw of therapy; it draws its cultural primacy
over rationalization from the most basic institution of the human mind, the unconscious. For
Rieff, the unconscious essentially functions as a conceptual representation of the eternal
contradiction inscribed to human nature. Rieff’s divergence from Parsons (and also Riesman)

206 Rieff proceeds from comparing psychoanalysis to William James’s physiological psychology, which
understands the psyche as a mere echo of bodily functions, by stating that “Freud gave a new impetus to the
dialectical tradition” (1979 [1959]:16).
becomes apparent in his insistence on Freudian drive theory, which simultaneously establishes the proximity to Marcuse and Adorno. Freud becomes a grand theorist of human civilization not despite but exactly because of the objectifications inscribed in drive theory:

A science that recognizes the instincts is a basic science, examining not this social system or that but the system of civilization as a formed thing in itself. Freud has made the greatest single contribution to the understanding of civilization – not merely to the understanding of our own. (Ibid.:339)

Rieff’s critique also targets neo-Freudianism and ego-psychology. However, it traces the roots of the divergences over drive theory, and the beginning of psychoanalysis’s American career to John Dewey’s *Human Nature and Conduct* (1921), which Rieff deems the “most penetrating critique of Freudian instinct theory […] which not only is the seminal work of American social psychology […] but also had a strong influence on large numbers of those professionally affiliated with the Freudian movement” (1979 [1959]:30). It has to be noted that Dewey’s book does not engage Freud or any of his concepts explicitly, a fact Rieff at least recognizes by stating that it “is not aimed at Freud alone” (Ibid.). According to Rieff, Dewey’s book rather constitutes a critique of psychological theories which emphasize instinctual over socially mediated forms of motivation. In the book Dewey juxtaposes the concept of habit to an overly extended understanding of instinct. Rieff uses this juxtaposition in order to identify Dewey as one of the main inspirations for American social psychology and as someone who lends the disciplinary trajectory a considerable anti-Freudian inflection. Rieff suggests a considerable epistemological influence of pragmatism in American academia, which materializes in the conceptual apparatuses of American social sciences: “Terms such as ‘organization,’ ‘integration,’ and ‘interaction’ are expressive of the liberal belief, to which Dewey contributed more substantially than any other American philosopher, that we can turn conflicts to advantage and progressively fulfill our boundless

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207 In the book, which was originally a lecture given at Leland Stanford Junior University in 1918, Dewey criticizes instinctual psychology by stating that “it is unscientific to try to restrict original activities to a definite number of sharply demarcated classes of instincts. And the practical result of this attempt is injurious. To classify is, indeed, as useful as it is natural. The indefinite multitude of particular and changing events is met by the mind with acts of defining, inventorying and listing, reducing to common heads and tying up in bunches. But these acts like other intelligent acts are performed for a purpose, and the accomplishment of purpose is their only justification. Speaking generally, the purpose is to facilitate our dealings with unique individuals and changing events. When we assume that our clefts and bunches represent fixed separations and collections in rerum natura, we obstruct rather than aid our transactions with things” (Dewey 1921:131).


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wants and desires” (Ibid.:34). Against this “liberal belief,” he insists that Freud’s “instinctualism is chiefly what gives an admirable sharpness to his estimate of human nature, and makes it more valuable as a defense of the individual than the critique of his position theoretically prefigured by Dewey and carried out by such neo-Freudians as Karen Horney and Erich Fromm” (Ibid.:33). The suggested proximity between Dewey and the neo-Freudians specifically helps to illuminate Fromm’s compatibility with the contemporary American disciplinary field, whose notion of productiveness conveys a strikingly pragmatist tone. Unsurprisingly, Rieff’s valuation of Freudian drive theory shows remarkable similarities with Marcuse’s and Adorno’s in the Revisionism controversy:

[T]he liberal revisers of Freud, in their efforts to avoid the pessimistic implications of his genetic reasoning, tend to let the idea of the individual be absorbed into the social, or at best to permit it a vague and harried existence. Freud himself – through his mythology of the instincts – kept some part of character safe from society, restoring to the idea of human nature a hard core, not easily warped or reshaped by social experience. (Ibid.)

The crucial difference between his approach and that of Marcuse and Adorno is inscribed to Rieff’s reproduction of Freud’s terminology of “human nature”, which does not comply with the dialectical extrapolation of drive theory proposed by Marcuse and Adorno. Rieff comes to the conclusion that “Freud’s theory of instinct is the basis for his insight into the painful snare of contradiction in which nature and culture, individual and society, are forever fixed” (Ibid.:34). His account thereby appropriates Freud’s irresolvable tension of individual pleasure and the cultural reality principle.

For Rieff, neo-Freudians Horney and Fromm, together with his former mentor Riesman, exemplarily represent contemporary attempts to diminish Freud’s relevance for any liberation that would transcend or break the sexual restrictiveness and rigidity of the Victorian era – a liberation, which had at that point already been accomplished anyway (Ibid.:339). In these accounts, the biologism of Freudian drive theory serves as a conceptual locus of his inherently

209 In his seminal The American Evasion of Philosophy – A Genealogy of American Pragmatism (1989) philosopher Cornel West provides an exhaustive discussion of the pervasiveness of pragmatism in American intellectual life. He discusses Dewey at length and identifies him as “the greatest of American pragmatists because he infuses an inherited Emersonian preoccupation with power, provocation, and personality – permeated by voluntaristic, amelioristic, and activist themes – with the great discovery of nineteenth-century Europe: a mode of historical consciousness that highlights the conditioned and circumstantial character of human existence in terms of changing societies, cultures, and communities” (69-70). In West’s account, sociologists W.E.B. Du Bois and C. Wright Mills become central innovators of pragmatism who, even though they were arguing against Dewey, nevertheless continue to perpetuate pragmatism’s main currents. West’s study solidifies Rieff’s implication regarding the pervasiveness of pragmatism as a subliminal social philosophical orientation in the American social sciences, though it does not share Rieff’s anti-pragmatist thrust.
reactionary, patriarchal, and authoritarian content. Again overlapping with Marcuse and Adorno, Rieff identifies these attempts as flawed because they merely substitute Freud’s biologism with a rigid sociologism:

If Freud may be accused of biologizing the ambivalences by which all societies are constituted, the post-Freudians may sociologize them too much. The question of reconciling these biologizing and sociologizing tendencies in depth psychology has scarcely been settled, nor even fully explored. Till it is, we had better trust Freud’s cheerless intuitions into the duality of all human feeling, thought, and action. (Ibid.:339)

Rieff refrains from merely reproducing Freud’s biologism; his *in dubio pro reo* plea on behalf of Freud is that of a proper sociologist, who neither identifies as a natural scientist nor gives absolute primacy to historical forces, but instead recognizes both in their necessary incompleteness. For Rieff, the truth content of psychoanalysis transcends the scientific concepts developed by Freud; at the same time it is represented in Freud’s charismatic vision as a grand theorist.

In contrast to Parsons, Rieff positively accentuates the fact that psychoanalysis draws its universalizing conclusions about the human mind from the treatment of neurotic patients. Freud’s insight “that the difference between so-called normality and neurosis is only a matter of degree, is one of the key statements in his writings.” (1979 [1959]:354) The implication is threefold:

First it declassifies human society, creating an essential democracy within the human condition [...] Second, to say that all men [sic!] are neurotic means to imply an injunction to tolerance” [...] “Third, and most important, this conception of neurosis reveals the essential ethical nature of Freud’s idea of normality. Normality is not a statistical conception, for the majority is no longer normal. Normality is an ethical ideal pitted against the actual abnormal (Ibid.:355).

While Parsons explicitly criticizes Freud’s “preoccupation with the pathological” (1994 [1939]:183fn), Rieff values it as an illumination of the general human condition. Rieff’s reading of Freud again overlaps with Marcuse’s and especially Adorno's in this respect. Normality “being essentially negative” becomes a specter that “no one catches,” while simultaneously “everyone must act as if it can be caught” (1979 [1959]:354). It becomes an essential characteristic of Rieff’s ‘psychological man’, the contemporary expression of the culturally induced psychological ideal type he introduces in *Mind of the Moralist*, that he cannot “forget himself in pursuit of the normal, for his normality consists of a certain kind of
self-awareness” (Ibid.). The condition of the psychological man is to integrate the therapeutic conception of the self, proposed and perpetuated by psychoanalysis, into the normal state of mind.²¹⁰

The concept of the psychological man resembles the array of (social) character types characterizing sociological works from the 50s onward, most prominently Fromm’s marketing character, Riesman’s other-directed character, Winston Whyte’s Organization Man, and even Marcuse’s one-dimensional man. A major specificity in Rieff’s conceptualization is, however, that psychoanalysis does not just provide the theoretical instruments to dissect and theorize the mutual impacts and entanglements of the current (affluent) societal conditions and their subjects. Psychoanalysis becomes the driving force behind cultural change. In this respect, Rieff essentially diverges not only from Riesman, but also from Marcuse.²¹¹ Rieff’s specific valuation of drive theory further complicates the picture. The neo-Freudian notion of social character is based on the rejection of drive theory; social character becomes the missing link between economic base and cultural superstructure and essentially substitutes the Freudian drive complex as an explanation of human motivation. ‘Psychological man’ rather functions as a description of the specific way conceptions of the self are (re)produced by the individual in a cultural sphere that is increasingly saturated with psychoanalytical knowledge and terminology. At the same time, Rieff’s insistence on the validity of drive theory as an expression of a trans-historic truth about human nature implies that psychological man is, despite his increasing self-knowledge, eventually driven by obscure and archaic forces.

In Rieff’s account, psychoanalysis turns into the cause and the terminological expression of a cultural revolution which eventually condenses in the newly emerging psychological ideal type and the increasing cultural dominance of its respective institutions: “In the emergent democracy of the sick, everyone can to some extent play doctor to others, and none is allowed the temerity to claim the he can definitely cure or be cured. The hospital is succeeding the church and the parliament as the archetypical institution of Western culture” (Ibid.). Similar to

²¹⁰ Adorno’s 36th Minima Moralia aphorism hints at a similar phenomenon, however, without introducing the notion of a new characterological ideal type.
²¹¹ He converges with Marcuse’s diagnosis of the devastating and almost complete defeat of individuality by the forces of instrumental rationalization: “I am aware that these speculations may be thought to contain some parodies of an apocalypse” (1973 [1966]:24) and immediately turns it around by posing the rather polemical question “[b]ut what apocalypse has ever been so kindly? What culture has ever attempted to see to it that no ego is hurt?” and insinuating that maybe “[c]ivilization could be, for the first time in history, the expression of human contents rather than the consolatory control of discontents. Then and only then would the religious question receive a markedly different answer from those dominant until recently in our cultural history” (Ibid.).
Fromm and Riesman, Rieff develops a narration of a historical succession of psychological ideal types which function as character ideals, guiding and directing the individual’s self-conceptualization:

Three character ideals have successively dominated Western civilization: first, the ideal of political man, formed and handed down to us from classical antiquity; second, the ideal of the religious man, formed and handed down to us from Judaism through Christianity, and dominant in the civilization of authority that preceded the Enlightenment; third, the ideal of economic man, the very model of pure liberal civilization, formed and handed down to us in the Enlightenment. (Ibid.:356, my emphasis)

The three successive character ideals are characterological expressions of what Rieff identifies as “languages of faith” (1973 [1966]:201) – systems of cultural symbolism oriented towards a transcending authority. Psychological man becomes the expression of psychoanalysis, the language of faith of an “age, in which technics is invading and conquering the last enemy – man’s inner life, the psyche itself” (1979[1959]:356). For Rieff, however, psychoanalysis differs in one crucial aspect from the former languages of faith (ancient philosophy, Judaism and Christianity, and Enlightenment philosophy): it originated as a language of science. In Triumph of the Therapeutic he elaborates on the distinction between languages of faith and science:

In all cultures before our own, the competing symbols took the form of languages of faith. A language of faith is always revelatory, communicating through the mouthpiece of the god-term a system of interdicts – a pattern of ‘thou shalt nots’, or taboos. The language of science is not revelatory but analytic; for this reason, the scientist can never claim that his own terms have a prophetic function. (1973 [1966]:201)

Rieff establishes a distinction of scientific analysis and prophetic theology. The latter proposes a system of rules, which it established when the cultural institutionalization was successful, while the former is devoted to description. In psychoanalysis, understood as an analytical science of the psyche and as a therapeutic praxis aiming to liberate the neurotic individual at the same time, both elements are dialectically intertwined:

So far as the therapist casts himself in the role of a social scientist (e.g. Freud), he seeks to analyses interdictory symbolisms, not to assert them. Yet, as we have seen, modern therapists must use a language of faith. So far as their languages are ‘scientific’ and yet moralizing, they depend upon counter-interdictory symbolism, ‘heretical’ or negative conceptions of the interdictory symbolism itself, releasing rather than controlling. (Ibid.)
Psychoanalysis becomes the prototype of a scientific language that always already changes into a language of faith because of its inherent therapeutic objective. In the process of psychoanalysis’s rise to becoming the dominant system of cultural symbolism, Freud’s successors play a decisive role. In *Triumph of the Therapeutic* Rieff discusses at length the works of Freud disciples-turned-antagonists C. G. Jung (1973 [1966]:93ff) and Wilhelm Reich (Ibid.:121ff), and that of the British author and intellectual D. H. Lawrence212 (Ibid.:162ff), who emerged as a fierce critic of Freud in the 1920s. While especially Jung, Freud’s most conservative follower, and Reich, his the most left-leaning former disciple, diverge in their critique of Freud, all three converge in the fact that they “made representative efforts to go beyond the analytic attitude” and that “[t]hey exhibit, in their writings, various uses of faith in a culture populated increasingly by psychological men. Each attacked the connection between morality and a culture about which they expressed strong disapprovals” (Ibid.199). Freud himself assumes the role of a secular moralist, whose rigid scientific attitude is increasingly lost on the following generations. Rieff’s account identifies Freud’s idea that human motivation is essentially irrational, chaotic drive energy, as the central, disenchanting realization that establishes psychoanalysis’s authority as a language of science, because it pinpoints the constitutional dualism of human nature. At the same time, Rieff identifies psychoanalysis as a new language of faith, especially in the versions succeeding Freud,. This is implicated in the production of psychological man. Psychological man’s chief characteristic, however, is the loss of faith: “Having lost faith in the world, knowing himself too well to treat himself as an object of faith, modern man cannot be self-confident; this, in a negative way, justifies his science of self-concern” (1979 [1959]:355-356). The therapeutic self-obsession of psychological man additionally perpetuates a distinct indifference towards “the ancient question of legitimate authority, of sharing in government, so long as the powers that be preserve social order and an economy of abundance” (1973 [1966]:24). The “tyranny of psychology” (Ibid.:355), hence, produces a fundamental cultural apathy, which eventually

212 Rieff holds that “David Herbert Lawrence spent much of his creative energies contriving a second faith, something to succeed what he considered false Christian philosophy and its successor, the sterile rationalism of science. In *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* and again in *Fantasia of the Unconscious*? Lawrence made his main efforts to explain that second faith, otherwise expressed in his art” (1973 [1966]:162). Rieff engages Lawrence’s two treatments’ of psychoanalysis, which appeared in 1921 and 1930, in order to trace his ‘second faith.’ It was developed against Freud and hinged on the idea that “[t]he world of “ideas,” Freud's included, was the symptom of the disease at the root of our culture—false efforts at self-cure” (Ibid.163). Rieff states that “Freud possessed a coherent conservative imagination, the one conservative genius of modern culture, defending in it only what can possibly defended. Lawrence’s was an incoherent and revolutionary imagination — incoherent because heavily on the side of the remissions” (Ibid.:198), he goes on to conclude: “[i]n our own immediate time, the incoherence of the remissive imagination, as we find it expressed in art and poetry, is a consequence of the decline of the necessary and permitting condition out of which remissive imagination can develop: the vitality of the received controls. Once the dialectic of controls and remissions had been shattered, the remissive imagination was distorted. Because we have no real churches, we can have no reformations” (Ibid.).
threatens the stability of contemporary culture. In other words: psychoanalysis as a scientific language and a therapeutic practice that inherently proposes emancipation, and therefore implies the self as its ‘god-term,’ turns into a therapeutic ethics of self-concern. Driven by a Weberian logic of rationalization, it threatens Western culture with its demise.

Anti-Culture and Negative Communities

Rieff’s analysis and critique hinges on a Weberian understanding of culture as “another name for a design of motives directing the self outwards, towards those communal purposes in which alone the self can be realized and satisfied” (1973 [1966]:3) He further elaborates that “[i]n general, all cultures have a therapeutic function, insofar as they are systems of symbolic integration —whether these systems be called religious, philosophical, ideological, or by any other name” (1973 [1966]:57). He generally diagnoses the “West, particularly the United States and England” with a deep cultural rift, which leads him to reverse Dostoyevsky’s Question “Can civilized man believe?” to: “Can unbelieving men be civilized?” (1973 [1966]:4). Guided by this question, Rieff reads Freud as a proponent of moral authority and elitism; he points out that Freud’s understanding of culture, which puts emphasis on coercion and the renunciation of instincts as indispensible elements in all culture […] depended upon crossing between his idea of moral authority and an elitist inclination. Freud would legitimize the proposed necessity of controlling the mass (enacted by a minority) in order to preserve culture, by theorizing the mass as “those who ‘have no love for instinctual renunciation’ and who cannot be ‘convinced by argument of its inevitability’. (Ibid.:8)

Critically appropriating Freud’s ambitions to preserve culture, Rieff identifies the contemporaneous trend among “the cultivated and the intelligent” towards “identification with the masses” as “the most elaborate act of suicide that Western intellectuals have ever staged” (Ibid.). Psychoanalysis, while originally providing conceptual tools for the perseverance of culture, is implicated in producing a pervasive rationalized mindset, which

213 Rieff defines culture as follows: „Superior to and encompassing the different modes in which it appears, a culture must communicate ideals, setting as internalities those distinctions between right actions and wrong that unite men and permit them the fundamental pleasure of agreement. Culture is another name for a design of motives directing the self outwards, towards those communal purposes in which alone the self can be realized and satisfied” (1966:3). Despite its explicit Freudian aspirations, Rieff’s understanding of culture has a definite Weberian inflection; it stands in contrast to the understanding of culture underlying the works of Fromm, Marcuse and Adorno, which chiefly relies on the Marxist notions of alienation and reification.
infuses the Western intellectual sphere with a kind of nihilism that poses as a proponent of freedom from cultural coercion:

By psychologizing about themselves interminably, Western men are learning to use their internality against the primacy of any particular organization of personality. If this re-structuring of the Western imagination succeeds in establishing itself, complete with institutional regimes, then human autonomy from the compulsions of culture may follow the freedoms already won from the compulsions of nature. (Ibid.:19)

Rieff polemically proposes the categorical operability of what he identifies as therapeutic “anti-culture” (Ibid.:20). At first glance, it seems that he romanticizes the contemporaneous anti-authoritarian trends emerging in the social- and counter cultural movements as vast revolutionary upheavals in the cultural sphere. The very movements which, as Herzog has demonstrated, were complicit in the downfall of psychoanalysis. However, the price for the “autonomy from the compulsions of culture” is heavy:

[W]ith the art of psychiatric management enhanced and perfected, men will come to know one another in ways that could facilitate total socialization without a symbolic of communal purpose. Then the brief historical fling of the individual, celebrating himself as a being in himself divine and therefore essentially unknowable, would be truly ended. (Ibid.:20)

It is nothing short of bourgeois individuality that is at stake. Through the lens of Critical Theory, Rieff’s anti-culture signifies the tragic loss of the potentialities inscribed in the bourgeois notion of individuality. Such diagnosis is close to Marcuse’s one-dimensionality. Reiterating Norman O. Brown’s vision of brushing the ego aside – a psychological manifestation of cultural coercion – Rieff states that “the new anti-culture aims merely at an eternal ethic of release from the inherited controls” (Ibid). Again alluding to Brown’s Love’s Body, he, in an almost prophetic gesture, pronounces that “[t]he wisdom of the next social order, as I imagine it, would not reside in right doctrine, administered by the right men […] but rather in doctrines amounting to permission for each man to live an experimental life. Thus, once again, culture will give back what it has taken away” (Ibid.:23). Rieff further introduces the notion of negative community, the characteristic form of social organization emerging in the wake of the cultural change. He argues that it is caused by psychoanalysis as the new system of cultural symbolism:

[i]n the time of public philosophies and social religions, the great communities were positive. A positive community is characterized by the fact that it guarantees some kind of salvation to the individual by virtue of his membership and participation in that
community. That sort of community seemed corrupt to the economic man, with his particular vision of an ascetic ideal tested mainly by self-reliance and personal achievement. The positive community was replaced, in social theory, by the neutral market. Now, in the middle of the twentieth century, the market mechanism appears not so much corrupt as a fiction to psychological man, with his awareness of how decisions are made in the social system. In order to participate self-protectively in the manipulative and acquisitive game, psychological man builds his tight family island, living for the remainder of his time in negative communities. But these collections of little islands surrounded by therapeutic activities, without any pretence at a doctrine of salvation, are themselves infected by the negativity of the larger community and become arenas themselves, rather than oases of escape from the larger arena. (Ibid.:45)

Negative communities and the surrounding anti-culture are characterized by the disintegration of a binding system of cultural symbolism, which proposes a common orientation towards a transcendent ideal. Integration is constituted negatively, since negative community and therapeutic anti-culture are infused with the symbolism of the therapeutic.

Rieff’s account of a historical succession of character types and their respective communities again resembles the neo-Freudian social character model. Economic man seems almost replaceable by either Riesman’s inner-directed character, or by Fromm’s marketer. Psychological man is, of course, an innovation that is neither present nor alluded to in Fromm or Riesman. Rieff’s notion of positivity and negativity, while it appears as explicitly normative in both Fromm and Riesman (and actually, also in Marcuse and Adorno, even though they turned it on its head), is rather descriptive. Negativity simply comes to signify ‘without hope for salvation (utopia).’ It is a qualitative measurement of spiritual aspects in community values (resp. the lack thereof). Rieff’s negative communities lack a notion of salvatio however spiritually twisted. The previous separation of the private and the public realm, which characterizes economic man’s era, dissolves within the existing ubiquity of the therapeutic.

The indefinite prolongation of psychoanalytic therapy is itself a form of membership in the negative community. Positive communities were, according to Freud, held together by guilt; they appear attractive only now, in distant retrospect, but the modern individual, faced with the necessity of merging his own life into communal effort, would have found them suffocating. (Ibid.:45)

Psychological man becomes, in an almost dialectical fashion, the reflection of a social rationalization process. At the same time as it evokes nostalgic longing for the spiritual togetherness of the past, this rationalization process integrates the self-reflective therapeutic
conceptual apparatus as a concrete internalized expression of the impossibility to go back. Rieff’s proximity to a Weberian understanding of culture is apparent in the subliminal implication that the therapeutic ethos of self-concern figures as the successor of his Protestant ethic, even though Rieff does not reflect his proximity to Weber explicitly in the two books. However, for Rieff psychoanalysis functions as cause and expression of an emergent anti-culture. This signifies a substantial difference to Weber. Weber’s focus lies with the dialectical relation of systems of cultural symbolism and historical forces of rationalization. Psychology is subordinated; it does not function as a historical force. In line with Freud however, Rieff identifies culture as the phylogenetically progressing manifestation of drive renunciation and establishes its concrete link to psychology. By proposing the deterioration of culture in an age of ‘releases,’ he alludes to a Freudian understanding: in Freud’s perspective, total release would necessarily equate with the dissolution not only of culture, but of civilization. For Rieff, the therapeutic threatens Western culture with disintegration, because it establishes a mindset of individual psychology that works against the cultural necessity of repression. The dialectical twist lies with the fact that in Rieff’s anti-culture, culture vanishes, but the social order of the affluent society prevails. The loss of culture signifies the loss of individuality, not of sociability altogether. Defining the next social order as characterized by drive-release and therefore as anti-culture, Rieff polemically positions Freud’s understanding of culture against psychoanalysis’s therapeutic objective. In Freud the enlightened (read: analyzed) (bourgeois) subject, which knows about herself and her hidden motivations, while she also reflects the limits of her general capacity to know, is the center of society/civilization. Rieff juxtaposes to Freud’s subject a de-individualized subject, entangled in, and therefore actively reproducing, a sociability network that proofs itself capable of ‘surviving’. This, however, does not fit the Freudian (bourgeois) definitions of culture. Affluence enables drive-release as a social norm; subjects are bound together exactly by their de-individuality and still function as society. The price, of course, is culture itself. Psychological man’s integration into the negative community of a psychoanalytically infused anti-culture is itself negative in the sense Rieff established: self-concern has substituted communal hope for salvation.

214 In Fellow Teachers, Rieff initially insists that he is neither “Freudian nor anti-Freudian, Marxist or anti-Marxist, Weberian nor anti-Weberian” but rather a “scholar-teacher of sociological theory [who tries] to help [him]self and [his] students to see not only what the theorist has seen, but through him to see what is at stake in his vision” (1972:6). The distances he tries to establish here cannot hide the fact that the concepts he employs bear a certain inflections.

215 Eli Zaretsky fully develops this argument in Secrets of the Soul (2004). He holds that “psychoanalysis served as the “Calvinism” of the second industrial revolution. It played a role analogous to that played by Calvinism in relation to capitalism and by Methodism in relation to industrialization” (8).
Rieff’s Freudian understanding of cultural integration diverges considerably from Parsons’s reading of Freud as a theorist of positive integration. It also diverges from Riesman’s, Fromm’s, Marcuse’s, and Adorno’s, because it does not operate with the terms of alienation or anomie. Rieff’s psychoanalytically enriched cultural criticism constitutes a trajectory of its own that further completes the picture of a multifaceted theoretical landscape in US sociology.

Social Change and Scientific Culture

In his analysis of contemporary “anti-culture,” Rieff suggests that the “cultural elites” – those who formulate and perpetuate the current language of faith – have employed two different symbolic systems. He calls them “interdictory symbolism” and “counter interdictory symbolism” (Rieff 1973 [1966]:201). As I have discussed earlier, Rieff defends Freud’s original scientific attitude, and his analytical mode against the faith narrations of his followers. A certain transcending quality that lends social processes a normative direction is inherent in his fundamental critique of contemporary anti-culture. Triumph of the Therapeutic contains a few passages alluding to the conception of a true culture that is negatively inscribed into his critique. Addressing the problem of science, he concludes in his analysis of contemporary clinical psychology:

A language of hypothesis is culturally neutral. [...] The scientific psychologist, as clinician, aspires to be neither interdictory nor counter-interdictory. Because the clinical attitude aspires to moral neutrality, its therapeutic effect is culturally dubious. Clinicians continue to vacillate between interdictory and counter-interdictory symbolisms depending upon a diagnosis of the individual patient’s own conditional relation to these symbolisms. No culture has yet produced a third type of symbolic – one that would embrace that historic contradiction in terms: a ‘scientific culture.’ If, and only if, a neutralist symbolic becomes operative, may we speak of a scientific culture. (Ibid.:201-202)

Rieff’s glimpse at the possibility of normatively directed social change addresses the societal dimension as well. He holds that “[e]very system of moral demands must operate within some social order. No less than its predecessors, the neutralist symbolic would have to create institutions appropriate to its expression, and even enter into shifting class alliances” (Ibid.). Rieff formulates his proposition in the vocabulary of revolutionary approaches: in order to
establish the next order, new institutions have to emerge. The radicality of Rieff’s suggestion is, however, ambiguous in its normative direction. Rieff does not further qualify the nature of the new institutions, neither in terms of political orientation, nor in terms of their concrete societal function. In his further analysis, he carefully differentiates between cultural and political revolutions and identifies the ongoing shift towards the therapeutic as a cultural revolution:

Cultural revolution is usually distinguishable from political revolution, which may assault the social order and leave the moral demand system fundamentally unaltered. Our cultural revolution has been made from the top, rather than from the bottom. It is anti-political, a revolution of the rich by which they have lowered the pressure of inherited communal purpose upon themselves. (Ibid.:206)

Rieff’s cultural revolution is perpetuated by a cultural elite and chiefly describes a shift towards individual pleasure in ideological rationalizations of the existing societal conditions; it leaves the existing social order intact. Freudian theory becomes complicit in the production of a new cultural ego-ideal, which is, according to Rieff, potentially capable of transcending the social order. However, Rieff’s account does not problematize that a cultural elite perpetuates a cultural revolution in favor of its own interests; quite the opposite: it inherently calls for the establishment of suitable institutions which would help to turn the prototypical cultural elite of contemporary scientific culture to flourish into the vanguard of a renewed, resacralized authoritative societal organization.

In his seminal Secrets of the Soul (2004) Eli Zaretsky suggests that “U.S. analysis was at the center of both the growing rationalization of personal life unfolding in the 1950s and the looming critique of rationalization, the charismatic rejection of the mundane, that came to the fore in the 1960s” (277). Rieff, Marcuse, and Norman O. Brown figure in Zaretsky’s account as some of the “most profound thinkers of the fifties” who, when they “sought to criticize social control and conformity […] turned to psychoanalysis” (276-277). For Zaretsky, they represent the anti-rationalization faction in the 1950s, despite their profound differences. The common ground between Rieff, Marcuse and Brown can be seen in their converging rejection of rationalized psychoanalysis, as represented in ego psychology and neo-Freudianism, both of which insist on drive theory. The divergence becomes apparent in the analysis of the role and function of social institutions.216 While for Marcuse and Brown the institutions of

[^216]: Rieff’s Fellow Teachers contains a pronounced critique of Marcuse which emphasizes the divergence; Rieff attacks Marcuse as yet another prophet of salvation: “Marcuse offers no lawful symbolic. His is yet another spiritualization of flesh, based this time around his own version of the technological mystique of a new Eden, a
Western, capitalist societies appear as safeguards of domination, Rieff insists on the necessity of their existence, and on an authoritative elite to operate them, in order to preserve culture (and civilization). In the 1978 epilogue to *Freud: Mind of the Moralist*, he maintains the original Freudian definition of repression and its constitutional relation to culture. His Weberian understanding of culture has, as I pointed out before, a deeply Freudian inflection: he identifies the Weberian term “values,” which he frequently uses himself, as “modern code for the educated belief that the central repressions, inscribed on the body as civilized nervousness, cannot hold us close enough to what they really are – the unavoidable refinements of a commanded life” (1979:361). Rieff’s insistence on Freud’s morality is steeped in a cultural critique that is deeply ambiguous in its normative orientation. *Triumph of the Therapeutic* ends on the following note:

That a sense of well-being has become the end, rather than a by-product of striving after some superior communal end, announces a fundamental change of focus in the entire cast of our culture – towards a human condition about which there will be nothing further to say in terms of the old style of despair and hope. (Ibid.:224)

Freud emerges as the proponent of a new ethic of individualized well-being. Freudian psychoanalysis provided the vocabulary for a new language of faith that radically diminishes community and emphasizes the anti-social aspects of an individualized emancipation potentiality. This potentiality is (necessarily) conceived upon the assumption that the content of cultural reality principles might vary, but the rigidity with which pleasure principle and reality principle collide is not subject to change. Culture is necessarily repression, psychoanalysis’s individualized focus turns into an expression of a privileged class consciousness. Rieff proposes that ‘psychological man’ and the ‘therapeutic,’ despite their (self-)destructive qualities, are the potential anticipation of a ‘true’ cultural elite – one which is capable of establishing a truly neutral scientific culture, which transcends the boundaries of interdictory and counter-interdictory symbolism. Rieff’s moral Freudianism therefore proposes a culture liberated from the devastating, de-individualizing effects of the therapeutic. It objectifies social hierarchies, and therefore relations of domination, into trans-historical necessities. Rieff’s radicalized Freud is, in contrast to Riesman’s, Fromm’s, and especially Marcuse’s and Adorno’s, not a potential critic of domination in modern societies.

world free first of all from scarcity. Like others among our most progressive theorists, Marcuse is an ally of the technological mystagogues. In order to possess any truth, a theory must be of order - of authority and its descent. An 'aestheticizing' theory is only of reality as a game; such lightness and play cancels out the shadowed nature of authority, at least in the theory itself” (1972:65fn).
He rather emerges as a secular moralist who reveals the truth about the trans-historic aspects of current societal conditions by theorizing repression as a cultural necessity.
Conclusion

My discussion of the adaptation of psychoanalytic concepts in the works of Talcott Parsons, David Riesman, and Philip Rieff focused on those aspects I consider central to their specific approaches to Freudian theory. Similar to Chapter III, the discussion is oriented towards the three categorical junctions of social character, integration, and social change in order to establish a certain, however momentary, proximity between diverging theoretical and social scientific trajectories. A major difference to my discussion of Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno, however, lies with the fact that there is no explicitly pronounced common theoretical trajectory, such as Critical Theory, against which the discussion of the divergences and convergences unfolds. Furthermore, the theories discussed in this chapter do not explicitly pronounce emancipatory interests. The notions of emancipation are rather subliminal and engrained in the conceptualizations of individual, society, and interaction.

Their disciplinary commonality becomes eminent in the fact that their works, in one way or another, came to represent prominent, though idiosyncratic tendencies and positions in the field of post-war sociology. Parsons clearly represents the theoretical mainstream as the major grand theorist of American sociology in the (extended) post-war era. Devoted to the Weberian neutrality paradigm, his theoretical universe complements the otherwise empirically dominated mainstream in its general objectivist thrust. The integration of Freudian concepts follows the objectivist orientation. At the same time, it is one of the most exhaustive, complex, and differentiated sociological attempts to mobilize psychoanalysis for an encompassing theory of society. Riesman’s work differs in its general nature and direction. The Lonely Crowd is not embedded in an ongoing scholarly attempt to develop an overarching theory of society; it rather constitutes a detailed diagnosis of its time, which is steeped in psychoanalytically inspired concepts. Riesman’s prominent position on the disciplinary field arises from the immense success of The Lonely Crowd. As a devoted sociological scholar, he was unintentionally also a popularizer of Freudian concepts. Just like Fromm, he perpetuated the trickling down of psychoanalytic thought figures in American culture. Rieff’s work establishes yet another perspective in the disciplinary field, which, however, is not marked by its prominence in terms of scientific authority (Parsons), or accumulated symbolic capital (Riesman). It rather derives its relevance, at least from the perspective of my research interest, from its idiosyncratic position as a negative cultural
criticism, formulated in a heavily Freud-inflected language of sociological inquiry that does not hide its critical, and therefore, normative thrust.

As was the case with Fromm, Adorno, and Marcuse, the most striking divergence among the Parsons, Riesman, and Rieff becomes apparent if one takes a closer look at their different positions on Freudian drive theory. All three – and actually also Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno – have in common a critical reflection of Freud’s biologist objectification of the drives. The theoretical consequences they draw from this, however, are quite different. Parsons’s personality system and Riesman’s social character types are, despite their significant conceptual differences, developed in recognition of neo-Freudianism and ego-psychology as the most recent embodiments of scientific progress in the field of psychoanalysis. The abandonment of drive theory is at the center of these revisions. Rieff’s character type, however, explicitly targets this development. While Freud’s biologism might not be satisfying from a sociological/theoretical perspective, his intuition still points in the right direction. Rieff’s psychological man and his notion of the therapeutic emerge as the manifestations of an unfettered rationalization of psychoanalysis. Rieff posits the therapeutic mindset, and simultaneously aims to confront it with the fact that it is precisely the relentless forces of the drives, and the need for repression, which need to be recognized in order to save culture, and therefore bourgeois individuality, from its demise.

Riesman and Rieff both ground their sociological evaluation of contemporary social and cultural trends in notions of character ideal types, while Parsons’s personality system is rather conceived as a relative stable entity which generally reflects the structural organization patterns of (high) modernity. The dynamics of a successive/differentiated typology is contained in the conceptualization and central significance of the social role. Against Parsons’s systemic perspective, Riesman’s and Rieff’s typologies convergence in the essential point that both theorists employ grander historical narrations pertaining to the forces which precipitate changes in the predominant character types within the respective historical periods. Riesman’s quasi materialist population growth hypothesis and Rieff’s Weberian notion of successive cultural languages of faith establish a certain primacy of historical forces; they reformulate Fromm’s suggestion that specific historic epochs bring forth the required character types. With regard to the way the causal relations of historic forces and character formation are theorized, however, psychological man and the other-directed differ considerably. Psychological man is the incarnation of psychoanalysis as a cultural vocabulary
that has risen to dominance in Western culture; the other-directed character is chiefly the reflection of a demographic development. In their typologies, neither Riesman nor Rieff provide theoretical accounts of the concrete processes of character formation. Parsons, however, who refrains from employing the notion of character types, does exactly that. Freudian – and neo-Freudian – categories, instead of providing the vocabulary to address broader societal and historical trends at concrete examples of social character types, rather become central tools in the specific and differentiated way the formation of the personality system is conceptualized. In Parsons’s personality system, psychoanalysis figures as an auxiliary science in the attempt to formulate an all-encompassing theory of social interaction. Instead of different character types, Parsons’s systemic universe is populated by a structurally differentiated array of social roles, more or less successfully appropriated by personality systems in the specific systemic contexts.

With regard to their respective conceptualizations of integration, Rieff most strikingly diverges from Parsons. Parsons’s focus on interaction as the locus of systemic integration, against the backdrop of the system’s inherent thrust towards functionality, perpetuates a positive understanding of integration. Successful integration generally appears as the desirable outcome of the socialization process, deviation constitutes a constant possibility but altogether remains an aberration from the norm. Rieff, in contrast, conceptualizes psychological man as the epitome of a process of negative integration. The therapeutics’ auto-obsessive tendencies flourish in an environment of negative communities and anti-culture. Parsons inherently affirms the existing societal organization, because he does not introduce a notion of domination into his systemic universe. Rieff affirms domination by painting a dark picture of looming cultural demise, that is, however, dialectically enlightened by the (distant) possibility that the therapeutic becomes aware of her authoritative responsibility as the possible incarnation of a new cultural elite. Riesman’s ‘thick description’ is positioned between the two. It posits autonomy, steeped in the Frommian notion of productivity, as the desirable goal of successful integration that transcends mere functionality, while it recognizes the possibility of anomie at the same time. However, the generalized notion of anomie is, similar to Parsons’s notion of deviance, rather conceptualized as a psychologized, individual aberration than a systemic, societal, or cultural distortion. Riesman’s notion of autonomy is clearly posited against (systemic) functionality, which in Parsons’s universe is always already the result of social interaction, and therefore contains autonomy in the system’s primacy. Both theorists, however, come together in their insistence on the possibility of autonomy, in the
sense of rational, enlightened subjectivity, within the given societal conditions. Rieff, at the same time, particularly insist on the constitutional irrationality of motivational sources and proposes, much in the sense of the Freudian emancipation potentiality, enlightened subjectivity as the individual, enlightened realization of the fact that autonomy is necessarily limited not only by cultural demands, but by the constitutional obscurity of motivational sources. My project to delineate the conceptual approximations of psychoanalysis in Parsons’s, Riesman’s, and Rieff’s universes clearly meets its limits in the considerable methodological and meta-theoretical divergences. However, picking up on Daniel Geary’s analysis of Riesman’s “qualitative liberalism” (2013:605), I want to emphasize that all three approaches, despite their different theoretical and normative directions, tendentially take the (white) middle class male as the chief representative of contemporary society in their analyses, and therefore inherently run the danger to reaffirm relations of domination. The normativity of all three approaches, explicit (Rieff, Riesman) or not (Parsons, after transition to systemic functionalism), emerges in the fact that critically reflecting societal relations of domination is not among their primary objectives. This is, however, not to negate their attempts to theorize the possibilities of autonomous subjectivity, but rather to highlight, and treasure, the tension that emerges when their work is considered against the backdrop of Critical Theory’s explicit aim to criticize in order to potentially liberate.
Chapter V: Emancipatory Potentials

The interest in psychoanalysis’s critical and emancipatory potential guides my discussion of Erich Fromm’s, Herbert Marcuse’s, Theodor W. Adorno’s, Talcott Parsons’s, David Riesman’s, and Philip Rieff’s theorizations of the relation of the individual and society. In the first two chapters, I introduced the historical and disciplinary developments of American psychoanalysis and American sociology with specific consideration of the *Institute for Social Research*’s position in the field, which was marginal from the outset. In Chapters III and IV, I delineated the concrete Freud adaptations in the works of the six theorists. Freud’s original concepts provided the foundation for the further conceptual extrapolations. My discussions identified crucial points of convergence with and divergence from Freud; what I call the Freudian emancipation potentiality figures in the discussions as Freud’s own subliminal normative orientation.

Psychoanalysis’s inherent emancipatory thrust, its rather fragile and individualized emancipation potentiality, necessarily inscribes the theories adapting it at least with traces of a normative drive towards not only greater (scientific) enlightenment, but towards individual and/or even societal improvement. The purpose of this chapter is to make these emancipatory potentialities and normative orientations explicit. The chapter addresses the question how the potentialities are negotiated, and if the respective theoretical constructions make them explicit or not. Ernesto Laclau’s six-dimensional approach to emancipation provides a meta-theoretical guideline for this project, however, in recognition of the limitations I worked out in the introduction. Let me repeat at this point in Laclau’s understanding of emancipation, emancipatory change is conceived as necessarily radical. Thus, my choice of using Laclau’s work as a meta-theoretical guide introduces the normative direction of my own perspective. The question which of the concrete Laclauian dimensions of emancipation is actually addressed by the respective theorists and how it is negotiated is necessarily biased, because it inherently asks for radicality. In light of my insistence on the dialectical dimension of divergence, however, radicality becomes exactly the quality which helps to illuminate the conceptual differences and their normative direction.
The dimension of instrumental rationalization as a structuring force in the disciplinary field, which I especially highlighted Chapters I and II, serves as a further conceptual contextualization in the negotiation of emancipation potentialities. Neither objectivist, value-neutral sociological theorizing, nor radical emancipatory critique can escape the logic of capital acquirement, which pervades the academic fields. The totalizing tendency inscribed in instrumental rationality is a crucial point of reflection, because it emphasizes the dialectical nature of the theoretical standpoint: it is abstract in its objective to account for the societal organization, and at the same time concrete in its entanglement in struggles over scientific authority.

In this chapter I address the theories discussed in the preceding chapters in the same chronological order. I begin with critical theorists Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno, and proceed to Parsons, Riesman, and Rieff. In addition to the theoretical texts at the center of the analyses in Chapters III and IV, the relation of the individual theorists to the emancipatory struggles of the 60s moves into focus. The (emancipatory) upheavals of the 60s provide the negative foil for the delineation of concrete individual positionings towards societal struggles. It is my intention to illuminate in more detail how theoretical content and practical positions correlate and what the concrete arguments are.

In general, my discussion unfolds upon the constitutional realization that the ambiguous legacy of psychoanalysis still resonates today. Despite the discipline’s decline in the late 60s and early 70s, psychoanalysis continues to inspire a diverging array of theoretical and scientific engagements with society and individual, such as Lacanian Feminist criticisms and neurobiologist reifications of drive-theory and unconscious motivations.217 In order to link the retrospective glance to present discussions within the field of sociology, I will in the final part of this chapter provide a discussion of Israeli sociologist Eva Illouz’s recent work, which has received considerable attention inside and outside of academic circles the world over. Illouz critically investigates emotionality in capitalism. Paraphrasing Philip Rieff, she develops the critical notion of a “therapeutic narrative” (2013 [2007]:48), which today figures as the central narration of modern (Western) selfhood. Illouz’s notion provides the vantage point into delineating current implications of psychoanalysis’s emancipatory potential.

217 The fact that psychoanalysis has in recent years become of increasing interest to neurobiologists is a striking example of a continuing scientistic adaptation of Freudian ideas (Dahmer 2012:248).
Erich Fromm: Love and Integrity

Erich Fromm identifies his approach as a radical critique of Western capitalism in *The Sane Society* (1955) and concretely defines it as *normative humanism* (2002 [1955]:12ff). The self-proclaimed radicality resonates in his indebtedness to Marx. He conceptualizes contemporary capitalist societies as highly alienated; the characterological reflection of alienation, the dominant social character type in capitalism, is the non-productive marketing character. Despite the preponderance of alienation in capitalism, Fromm develops the notion of the productive orientation as the concrete anticipation of a free, truly humanist society, within which true human qualities, such as love, responsibility, and maturity can flourish. As we have seen in Chapter III, Fromm’s productive orientation explicitly juxtaposes the real possibility of love against the capitalist reality of instrumentality and automatization, and argues in favor of societal transformation. In the final chapter of *The Sane Society* Fromm discusses in great detail the conditions of the kind of change that would correspond to the true human qualities exemplified by the productive orientation (2002 [1955]:263ff). While he sharply criticizes the existing socialist societies and “Marxist Socialism” (Ibid.:270ff, my emphasis) he nevertheless insists on socialism as a general concept:

The only constructive solution is that of Socialism, which aims at a fundamental reorganization of our economic and social system in the direction of freeing man from being used as a means for purposes outside of himself, of creating a social order in which human solidarity, reason and productiveness are furthered rather than hobbled. (Ibid.:270)

Fromm’s normative humanism acknowledges the devastating effects contemporary capitalism has on the individual; for Fromm, emancipation has, with Marx, a definite societal dimension. The necessary societal transformation is translatable into concrete political terms and demands: “Man today is confronted with the most fundamental choice; not that between Capitalism or Communism, but that between robotism (of both the capitalist and the communist variety), or Humanistic Communitarian Socialism” (2002 [1955]:354). *Humanistic Communitarian Socialism* emerges as the concrete antidote to both capitalist exploitation and communist authoritarianism. The road to a sane society is one of reformist transformation, steeped in the radical insistence on moral standards and a positive conception of human nature. Fromm proposes a radicalized social democratic vision, which explicitly sets itself apart not only from existing communistic societies, but also from Western Marxists.
who, like his former colleagues at the *Institute*, insisted on the revolutionary thrust towards fundamental change in Marx’s theory.

The (reformist) radicality of his approach generally aligns itself with Laclau’s understanding of emancipation as necessarily radical. It addresses Laclau’s holistic dimension, because it conceives of emancipation as a societal transformation, which has to and will affect all areas of life. It furthermore is conceived as a process which will eventually instigate the abandonment of alienation and establish the “absolute coincidence of human essence with itself” (Laclau 2007 [1991]:1). Fromm especially accentuates Laclau’s transparency dimension: not only will the transformation of society generate the end of alienation, the human essence – that which is to be liberated – is already present in the existing societal conditions. It follows that Fromm’s project revolves around the liberation of *actual* human qualities from a societal reality which distorts them; it posits the nature of true human essence against a status quo that perpetuates and sanctions instrumentality.

This, of course, fundamentally clashes with Freud’s individualized emancipation potentiality. In Freud’s theory, emancipation meets its limits in cultural repression; human essence is not defined as fundamentally positive and good, but rather as ambivalent, narcissistic and tendentiously destructive. Culture therefore imposes regulations necessary to keep drive energies in check, and is itself only a product of drive sublimation. Fromm resolves Freud’s ambivalence by positing human nature as essentially productive and loving. Capitalist society produces alienation. However, it allows for varying degrees (Chapter III). This is the gateway for the productive character, the conceptual manifestation of true maturity and mental healthiness (Chapter III), into *sick society*. Within the alienated conditions of Western capitalism, the productive types function as an emancipatory elite in a double sense: they push reforms in order to transform society in a direction of less alienating conditions, and at the same time, they serve as the characterological ideal type of a society that is not alienated. Or, to put it differently: the vision of the emancipated individual is modeled after the critical humanist intellectual, which, in the end, Fromm himself represented.

On the level of social ground, Fromm’s reformist approach does not imply a radical or revolutionary breach. The societal foundation is gradually transformed, which makes a radical disruption, as it emerges in Laclau’s dichotomic dimension, impossible. Instead of calling for a materialist revolution in the Marxian sense, Fromm’s *normative humanism*
operates as a language of faith (in the Rieffian definition). It posits love, faith, and hope as the central categories of rebellion, even in the face of a societal reality that increasingly diminishes such potential. In *The Sane Society*, Fromm concludes:

Most facts seem to indicate that [mankind] is choosing robotism, and that means, in the long run, insanity and destruction. But all these facts are not strong enough to destroy faith in man's reason, good will and sanity. As long as we can think of other alternatives, we are not lost; as long as we can consult together and plan together, we can hope. (2002 [1955]:354)

Laclau’s dilemma of emancipation is resolved, or rather circumvented by ruling out the necessity for an absolute breach with the past from the outset. The antagonism inscribed in the “pathology of normalcy” (Ibid.:12) and the productive character’s definition as the epitome of mental healthiness is resolved by ascribing the latter the agency and the capacity to transform the former. It follows that from Fromm’s radical humanist perspective, emancipation is fundamentally seen as a project of moral integrity and political (and therapeutic) advocacy for those who are denied the privilege to enjoy a non-alienated life.

As I have shown in Chapter III, Fromm’s specific position becomes especially apparent if one compares it to those of his former colleagues at the Institute. The revisionism controversy served as a catalyst in the solidification of theoretical positions. It eventually culminated in changing Fromm’s status to that of an increasingly self-referential public intellectual. After the debate with Marcuse in *Dissent*, Fromm had lost credibility in the radical intellectual circles (Chapter III). However, he maintained his self-image as a radical humanist. In a 1968 letter to his longtime friend David Riesman, he stated “I think that Marcuse and I represent a polarization of two entirely different ideas of radicalism” (Fromm to Riesman 3/22/1968 HUGFP 99.12/ Box 11/Folder: Erich Fromm 1 of 4, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).217 He perceived the divergence from Marcuse, and partly also from the positions he himself had formulated while he was still the Institute’s director of empirical research, as one of irreconcilable radical approaches. By the time he wrote this letter, Fromm had firmly established himself as a leftist liberal intellectual with strong ties to the political establishment, however. He represented the establishment that was targeted by radical critics (such as Marcuse) more than he called it into question.

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217 He responds to Riesman’s observation that those of the latter’s fellow faculty members who oppose Fromm’s views are “addicted to Herbert Marcuse” (Riesman to Fromm 3/15/1968 HUGFP 99.12/ Box 11/Folder: Erich Fromm 1 of 4, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).
His life-long commitment to Marx, of course, still sets him apart from many of his liberal contemporaries and political allies, such as Riesman. Marxist humanist Raya Dunayevskaya, with whom Fromm had exchanged letters concerning issues of Marxism and Socialism for almost two decades, stressed his critical legacy as a Marxist intellectual in an obituary: “The many articles that poured forth in 1980 when Erich Fromm died on March 18 all praised him only as a ‘famous psychoanalyst.’ The press did, by no accident at all, fail to mention that he was a Socialist Humanist” (after Anderson and Rockwell 2012:236). Especially in the American context, Fromm’s diluted Marxism constituted an aberration from the liberal norm that resonated as radical. Fromm’s correspondence with Dunayevskaya not only documents his interest in Marx, but additionally helps to sharpen the perspective on his intellectual relationship with Marcuse. The conceptual differences shown in Chapter III were often a subject of their conversation (Ibid.:139ff). Fromm criticizes Marcuse for merely expressing “alienation and despair ‘masquerading’ as radicalism” (Ibid.:158). He identified his own approach as more radical. At the same time, he decided to drop a planned critique of Marcuse, which was supposed to be published as an appendix to The Revolution of Hope (1968), in face of the rightwing attacks and death threats Marcuse was confronted with in 1968 (Ibid.). The essential categorical divergences did not diminish a principal sense of solidarity for a fellow, yet distant, radical critic of capitalist society.

The dialectical character of the conceptual divergences between Fromm and Marcuse figures in the relative solidarity expressed in face of common political antagonists. Fromm and Marcuse both formulate normative social critiques which insist on the need of species emancipation. In the Dissent debate, Fromm states, against Marcuse, that “to study the conditions of love and integrity means to discover the reasons for their failure in capitalistic society; that the analysis of love is social Criticism; that to attempt to practice these virtues amounts to the most vital act of rebellion” (Marcuse and Fromm 1956:348-349). His emphasis on productivity as embodied emancipation perpetuates a notion of liberation that escapes the dilemma of emancipation as Laclau posits it. Fromm insists on the radicality of his approach. However, his call for love and integrity forcefully bridges the gap between the necessary radicality of emancipation (dichotomic dimension) and the simultaneous need for its positive social grounding (dimension of ground) by pulling the image of the liberated subject as a concrete essence from the realm of utopia into the fundamentally distorted reality.

219 The chapter was published posthumously as “The Alleged Radicalism of Herbert Marcuse” in the 1992 volume The Revision of Psychoanalysis, edited by Rainer Funk.
of alienated society. The contradiction of radicality and ground dimension is resolved, because the liberated subject already exists under the oppressive conditions; these conditions are therefore identified as the positive social ground the liberated subject needs. The radical chasm vanishes; emancipation loses its radicality.

**Herbert Marcuse: Negativity and Liberation**

As demonstrated in Chapter III, the debate between Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse served also as a point of conceptual solidification on Marcuse’s end. In response to Fromm, Marcuse states in *Dissent*:

> Fromm reminds me that ‘the alienated society develops in itself the elements which contradict it.’ It does, but I disagree with Fromm on where and what these elements are: much of what he calls alienation is to me the force which overcomes alienation, and what he calls the positive is to me still the negative. ‘Nihilism,’ as the indictment of inhuman conditions, may be a truly humanist attitude part of the Great Refusal to play the game, to compromise with the bad ‘positive.’ In this sense, I accept Fromm's designation of my position as ‘human nihilism.’ (1956:81)

Marcuse’s position radically differs from Fromm’s in the his refusal to theorize possibilities of positive subjectivity within the conditions of oppression. Facing Fromm’s revision of Freudian drive theory, Marcuse emerges as a strictly negative philosopher. However, despite the negative thrust of his criticism, he repeatedly addresses the problem of emancipation head on. His two major works *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man* are commonly understood to reflect a progression towards (theoretical) pessimism. This is, however, challenged by Marcuse’s continuing solidarity with the student and civil rights movements of the 60s. Emancipation possibilities appear in the mediation of both positions. In an interview, which appeared in *Psychology Today* in 1971, Marcuse elaborates:

> The real emancipation of man can take place only in a different society after a fundamental change in values and in political and economic structures. Now here is a

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220 *Eros and Civilization* contains a fairly optimistic re-evaluation of conceptualizations of labor against the backdrop of Freud's infantile sexuality (polymorphous perversity). The (ascribed) optimism is reflected in the concepts developed, such as *surplus repression*, *performance principle*, *libidinal work*. *One-Dimensional Man*’s conceptual innovations, such as *repressive desublimation*, are rather focused on the totalizing forces of the existing conditions (welfare state, late capitalism etc), identifying supposed liberations (such as the sexual revolution) as yet another mechanism that prolongs the existing conditions. However, despite the “pessimist” analysis of the general conditions, the possibility of non-repressive desublimation, or better, libidinal sublimation is still inscribed in the concepts.
paradox, for I have always insisted that this new rationality and sensibility must emerge prior to the change. They are necessary to bring about the change. We cannot possibly expect human beings who have been distorted and mutilated by being born into and living in this society to set up new institutions and relationships that are really liberating and emancipating. (2011 [1971]:194)

Marcuse concretely addresses the dilemma of emancipation, he points at the impossibility of ‘true emancipation’ within the conditions of totalizing alienation – a societal reality within which human relations are reified to an unprecedented degree. The radicality necessitated in order to break with the past collides with the question for the concrete actors in the emancipatory process: “at least some human beings with new values and new aspirations must exist and do their work prior to the massive change that will make general liberation possible” (Ibid.). For Marcuse, the social movements represented such potential as concrete political forces. However, he refrains from answering the question of how such “new sensibilities” are able to emerge under totalizing conditions. Instead, he emphasizes the force of negativity: “you can be determined by your community and the determination can be a negative one” (Ibid.:198). While the individual psyche is still fundamentally determined by the performance principle and its general competitive thrust, individual transcendence of this principle is possible, albeit only negatively.

Marcuse consequentially approximates the new, transcending rationality negatively; he states that it “would be a psyche, a mind, an instinctual structure that could no longer tolerate aggression, domination, exploitation, ugliness, hypocrisy or dehumanizing, routine performance” (Ibid.196). From the negative, he eventually deduces positive characteristics: “you can see it as the growth of the aesthetic and the erotic components in the instinctual and mental structure” (Ibid.). Such features are “manifested today in the protest against the commercial violation of nature, against plastic beauty and real ugliness, against pseudovirility and brutal heroism” (Ibid.). The dilemma of emancipation is approached and resolved, however incompletely, in the anticipation of a new rationality as it would emanate from new institutions. A dialectical twist is constituted in the necessity that at least traces of this new rationality/sensibility have to precede the establishment of new institutions and structures.

Emancipation emerges as a contradictory process that eventually escapes complete conceptual containment. Reason, dialectically conceived as a potentiality that emerges against its real (and reified) counterpart – instrumental reason – lies at the bottom. The Freudian emancipation potentiality is posited with and against Marx’s species emancipation; the
conceptual contradiction produces a tension between individual and species-being that ultimately remains unresolved. However, to endure the contradiction, that is, not to give in to the urge to (positively) dissolve either one position into the other, emerges as the emancipatory moment.

The concrete understanding of emancipation is steeped in Freudian drive theory and its constitutional implication of a traumatic encounter of individual and culture under the aegis of domination. Marcuse alludes to it in the interview by envisioning a drive structure intolerant of aggression. The juxtaposition of Eros and Thanatos appears as a radical conceptualization of human motivation that “carries a deep revolutionary core” (2011 [1963]:111). Marcuse’s engagement with Freud is always in search for conceptual ‘loopholes’ allowing for transcendence of the existing. While he questions the reach of psychoanalysis’s practical emancipatory impact, he retains its inherent emancipatory thrust: “Psychoanalysis draws its strength from its obsOLEScence: from its insistence on individual needs and individual potentialities which have become outdated in the social and political development” (Ibid:122).

As stated before, an almost nostalgic longing for (bourgeois) indiviDuality pervades the negativity of this outlook, manifesting itself in the “Great Refusal” (1966 [1964]:257). This refusal, however, does not simply result from a critical reflection of the current conditions of domination; it is inscribed in the drives at least as liberation potential. Primary narcissism constitutes the drive-theoretical anticipation of the Great Refusal: “The Orphic-Narcissistic images are those of the Great Refusal: refusal to accept separation from the libidinous object (or subject). The refusal aims at liberation – at the reunion of what has been separated” (1974 [1955]:170). The concept is dialectically unfolded in order to mobilize the drive as the historical substrate of liberation. Addressing the instrumental rationalization pervading the field of psychology and pushing psychoanalytic theory out, Marcuse suggests that “[t]he hypotheses and exaggerations which are being eliminated are precisely those which oppose the smooth incorporation of psychoanalysis into the established system of culture and its smooth functioning as a socially rewarded activity” (2011 [1957]:106).

Marcuse’s position converges, at first glance, not only with Adorno’s, but also with Rieff’s, whose psychological man exemplarily embodies the cultural consequence of psychoanalysis’s professional and cultural rationalization. Following Eli Zaretsky, Marcuse’s and Rieff’s positions can be counted among the anti-rationalization strand in 1950s American psychoanalysis adaptations, together with Norman O. Brown and Lionel Trilling, (2004:277). As I demonstrated in Chapter IV, Marcuse’s divergence from Rieff becomes most apparent in
the latter’s insistence on an authoritative societal organization. It is further emphasized by Rieff’s attack on Marcuse in *Fellow Teachers*, where Rieff identifies Marcuse, just like Norman O. Brown, as a false prophet of libidinal chaos (1972:80-82). Both Zaretsky and Rieff point to Marcuse’s theoretical proximity to Brown, which I briefly addressed in Chapter III. In order to sharpen the emancipatory thrust in Marcuse’s dialectical Freud adaptation, however, it is important to address the *divergences* between Brown and Marcuse. In 1967 Brown and Marcuse exchanged arguments in the journal *Commentary*. Brown’s introductory statement “My friend Marcuse and I: Romulus and Remus quarreling; which of them is the real revolutionary” (Brown 2009 [1967]:184) pinpoints the character of their intellectual relation. The radicality of both approaches lies in their uncompromised rejection of the cultural status quo in Western industrialized societies. In both approaches, society appears as a historically specific entity that continuously reproduces a state of (unnecessary) repression of the individual. Both reject the neo-Freudian disposal of Freudian instinct theory and reinterpret the psychoanalytic concept of “polymorphous perversity” – the way infantile, pregenital sexuality expresses itself – as a concrete manifestation of utopian potentialities. Their actual ideas of emancipation diverge considerably, however. The (fragile) construction of polymorphous perversity as an expression of a dialectically twisted utopian potentiality exemplifies Marcuse’s cautious conceptualization of emancipation. It acknowledges the necessity of sublimation, and therefore of repression, in the societal process. At the same time, it carves out an (unnecessary) dimension of repression, which is tied back to the material conditions of a social reality entangled in a history of domination. Self-reflexivity and the political awareness of concrete societal manifestations of domination stand at the beginning. However, changing the political and economic foundations of society is inevitable.

For Brown, emancipation is embodied in what he calls “symbolic consciousness” (1966:87). Symbolic consciousness evokes the total rejection of (scientific) rationality; it is characterized by the re-sexualization of thought and speech: “Symbolism is polymorphous perversity” (1966:249). Thought itself becomes the transcending practice. His reinterpretation of Freud eventually seeks the non-repressive society in a readjustment of psychological processes. *Thanatos*, the death instinct, turns into reified anxiety – the fear of death. It is this fundamental anxiety that lurks behind contemporary (Western) civilization and its discontents. Reconciliation with death, hence, becomes the prime objective of emancipation. Brown proposes the spiritual acknowledgement of death as a precondition for a “resurrection
Emancipation is a spiritual and body-centered project that calls for a (re)mystification of thought.

Freud’s implicit cultural criticism eventually states an irresolvable tension between the individual pleasure principle and the repressive demands of the reality principle. The process of psychosexual development, despite its fundamentally repressive nature, is regarded as inevitable. It is exactly this inevitability which is called into question by Marcuse and Brown. Freud’s reality principle comes to represent the historically specific, repressive organization of Western culture/societies. Infantile sexuality turns into an experimental field in the attempt to envision modes of social conduct beyond Freud’s model of the healthy, genital sexual organization. Freud insists on ‘organic’ sources of repression. The fundamental alteration of sexuality – from polymorphous to genital-centered – is eventually attributed to renunciated and sublimated drive energy. It explains dynamic processes of development (and aberrations) by way of juxtaposing two given sets of energies. This duality is dialectically extrapolated by Brown and Marcuse and takes the concrete socio-historical dimensions of both phylogenetic and ontogenetic development into account. Both understand the reality principle as a reified representation of the existing that traumatically impacts individual psychosexual development. The fundamental difference is: for Marcuse, the reality principle represents the history of domination, that is, human history, while Brown conceives the reality principle as a (reified) representation of a collective neurosis, that is, culture as we know it.

Against the individualized Freudian emancipation potentiality, Marcuse and Brown emphasize the societal dimension of emancipation. Both have in common a radical rejection of the existing societal organization. The most striking divergence, however, lies in the oppositional Understandings of the material of emancipation. For Marcuse, emancipation is only possible under changed societal conditions, yet such change starts with a consciousness capable of negating the existing while being aware of its own entanglement in it. Marcuse’s dialectic is political; it hinges on a concept of reason that is juxtaposed to instrumental rationality. Emancipatory consciousness is, eventually, reasonable consciousness. The notion of reason vanishes in Brown. Emancipation means to overcome the fear of death, the reconciliation with unconscious desires: “The foundation on which the man of the future will be built is already there, in the repressed unconscious; the foundation does not have to be created out of nothing, but recovered” (Brown 1963 [1959]:??). Brown’s nostalgia, it seems, is not dialectically twisted. Marcuse, in contrast, understands the unconscious as the harbor of
desires and wishes which are impacted and mutilated by phylogenetic and ontogenetic histories of domination. A non-repressive societal organization cannot be ‘recovered’ from such content. Polymorphous perversity is foremost a symbolic anticipation. However, it is in its concrete appearance highly problematic, because it is also inscribed with domination. Brown’s call for a re-mystification of thought eventually ends in a reification of the body and a romanticization of a lost state of being. Psychoanalysis’s radical emancipatory potential emerges in both. Marcuse writes to Brown: “You have revealed the latent, the true content of politics – you know that the political fight is the fight for the whole: not the mystical whole, but the very unmystical, antagonistic whole of our life and that of our children – the only life that is” (2009 [1967]:183). Brown’s nostalgic symbolism is conceived as an artistic intervention and represents a strong critical gesture. However, Marcuse’s nostalgia for something that has never existed emphasizes the necessity for liberation, while it preserves the need for societal organization. The enlightening potential of both theorists lies in their insistence on the unconscious; psychoanalysis adds the depth dimension to the quarrel about the ‘real revolutionary’ approach. In the face of Brown’s mysticism, Marcuse’s position eventually emerges as rational.

The contrasts between Fromm and Marcuse on the one, and Brown and Marcuse on the other hand, emphasizes Marcuse’s specific position as an anti-rationalizer who simultaneously insists on reason, albeit as a potentiality. It underscores the political dimension of Marcuse’s understanding of emancipation. His insistence on negativity recognizes the Laclauian dilemma of emancipation as irresolvable, the dichotomic dimension and the dimension of ground are both accounted for. At the same time, emancipation emerges as a process of critical reflection and political positioning within a societal reality characterized by domination. The process is necessarily tainted by the fact that the subject of emancipation – true human essence – can only exist as a potentiality within the conditions of domination. Marcuse’s insistence on negativity reveals the Hegelian roots of his dialectical understanding of emancipation. However, just like Adorno’s Hegelianism as discussed in my introduction, Marcuse’s Hegelianism is kept in check by his insistence on objective mediation. The concrete subjects of potential liberation cannot simultaneously be the embodiment of liberated human essence (as they are in Fromm).
Theory and Praxis

Marcuse’s support for the student and social movements highlights the ways in which he drew practical consequences from his theoretical positions. Marcuse exchanged letters with his former Institute colleague Theodor W. Adorno over the span of three years, discussing the social movements. This exchange helps to sharpen central divergences between Marcuse and Adorno. In the following, I will discuss a short selection of excerpts. In a 1966 letter to Adorno, Marcuse defends his decision to accept an invitation to an Anti-Vietnam War conference. He states: “I think that the oppositional movement among the students today is the only precarious hope. I do what I can in that direction (it consumes a great deal of my time and energy – but I don’t know anything better)” (TWAA[Theodor W. Adorno Archiv, Frankfurt am Main] Br_ 0969 969/147 Marcuse to Adorno 5/5/1966, my translation). Adorno, however, was appalled by the students’ methods and by their activist fervor:

I am convinced that today when it comes to the unity of theory and praxis, the emphasis is on the most advanced and reflected theory. Many of the young students tend to synthesize their form of praxis with a non-existent theory, and thereby demonstrate a kind of decisionism which is reminiscent of the horrors [of National-Socialism] (Ibid.:969/153 Adorno to Marcuse 6/1/67, my translation).

In a 1969 letter to Marcuse, Adorno identifies the central point of the controversy as follows:

You think that praxis, in an emphatic sense, today is not obstructed; I think differently. I would have to deny everything I thought and knew about objective tendencies if I wanted to believe that the students’ protest movement in Germany would have the slightest chance to effectively intervene in the societal process. […] I take more seriously than you the danger that the students’ movement changes into fascism. (Ibid.:969/187 Adorno to Marcuse 6/16/1969, my translation).

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223 German original: „Du meinst, Praxis heute, im emphatischen Sinn, sei nicht versperrt; ich denke darüber anders. Ich müßte alles, was ich über objektive Tendenzen gedacht habe und weiß verleugnen, wenn ich glauben wollte, daß die Protestbewegung der Studenten in Deutschland auch nur die geringste Aussicht hat, gesellschaftlich eingreifend zu wirken. […] Die Gefahr des Umschlags der Studentenbewegung in Faschismus nehme ich viel schwerer als Du.“
In the anti-authoritarian and anti-theoretical thrust of the student movement’s activist practice, Adorno identifies convergences with fascist tendencies. Marcuse responded shortly before Adorno’s death in August 1969:

I do think that the students’ movement has the chance to effectively intervene in the societal process. [...] Through all the differences [pertaining to the different protest movements world wide] the same goal seems to me as the driving force. And this goal is the protest against capitalism, and it really goes to the roots of its existence; against its stooges in the third world, its culture, its morality. I naturally have never claimed the insanity that the students’ movement is a revolutionary movement. But it is today the strongest, maybe the only, catalyst of the inner demise of the system of domination. (Marcuse to Adorno 7/21/1969, after Kraushaar 1998:653, my translation).\footnote{German original: „Ich glaube allerdings, dass die Studentenbewegung Aussicht hat, „gesellschaftlich eingreifend zu wirken“. Ich denke dabei vor allem an die Verinigten Staaten, aber auch an Frankreich […]Und dieses Ziel ist nun mal der bis an die Wurzel der Existenz gehende Protest gegen den Kapitalismus, seine Handlanger in der dritten Welt, seine Kultur, seine Moral. Ich habe natürlich nie den Unsinn behaouet, das die Studentenbewegung selbst eine revolutionäre ist. Aber sie ist heute die stärkst, vielleicht der einzige Catalysator für den inneren Verfall des Herrschaftssystems.“}

Adorno’s last response picks up on Marcuse’s argument: “I am the last one to underestimate the merits of the students’ movement: it has disrupted the smooth transition to the administered world. But it contains a measure of delusion which teleologically contains the totalitarian dimension” (Adorno to Marcuse 7/26/1969 - copy from 8/6/1969, after Kraushaar 1998:671, my translation).\footnote{German original: „Die Meriten der Studentenbewegung bin ich der letzt zu unterschätzen: sie hat den glatten Übergang zur total verwalteten Welt unterbochen. Aber ist ihr ein Quentchen Wahn beigemischt, dem das Totalitäre teleologisch innewohnt, gar nicht[.]“}

The divergences between Adorno and Marcuse do not emerge as meta-theoretical differences, they rather concern the way the student movement is interpreted. Marcuse insists on the potentiality of an alternative rationality that is at least to some extent implied in the students’ legitimate rejection of the existing societal order. Despite the overpowering effects of repressive desublimation under the conditions of affluence, there is room for anticipations of an alternative world; it emerges in the concrete struggles for liberation, as they are embodied in the new social movements.

**Theodor W. Adorno: In Defense of the Non-Identical**

Adorno’s position was sharply attacked by the students, as reactionary and conservative. However, from the correspondence with Marcuse it becomes clear that despite the
increasingly harsh tone, Marcuse never personally accused Adorno of having become a conservative or reactionary. The debate revolved around sharply diverging theoretical evaluations of the movement, its practical political consequences, and, most importantly, a diverging understanding of political practice. Adorno’s last text *Marginalien zu Theorie und Praxis* (1969), finished shortly before his death, continues the debate with Marcuse (Zwarg 2017:42). The main characteristic Adorno ascribes to the movement is its hostility towards theory: “Pseudo-activity, praxis which takes itself more seriously and more diligently safeguards itself against theory and knowledge to the extent that it loses contact to the object – and loses its sense for proportions – is product of the objective societal conditions” (2016 [1969]:771, my translation). The desire for concrete action is inscribed with the very instrumentality that characterizes the societal conditions, against which the necessity for concrete action is evoked in the first place. Such activist desire inherently dodges theoretical reflection, which would recognize the powerlessness of the own position as one of its most central insights (Ibid.:776-777). Against Marcuse’s insistence on “new sensibilities” as the anticipation of emancipatory potentialities, Adorno invokes theory as the only mode of praxis that is capable of escaping the totalized cooptation of instrumental rationalization. Against the overpowering forces of the existing societal order, emancipation is first and foremost a process of (negative) reflection.

The psychoanalytic implications of Adorno’s understanding of emancipation potentialities condenses in one of his *Minima Moralia* aphorisms: “Nothing is true in psychoanalysis except its exaggerations” (2003 [1951]:54). Adorno insists, in line with Marcuse (and Rieff), on those aspects of Freud’s theory which have been cast aside in the professionalization and rationalization process: drive theory and the unconscious. At the same the aphorism formulates a dialectical critique leveled against Freud himself – the original biologist notion of the drive appears as an exaggeration. In *Sociology and Psychology* Adorno further elaborates that

Freud should not be reproached for having neglected the concrete social dimension, but for being all too untroubled by the social origin of this abstractness, the rigidity of the unconscious, which he registers with the undeviating objectivity of the natural scientist. The impoverishment that has resulted from an unending tradition of the negative is hypostatized into an ontological property. (2002 [1955]:46).

The dialectical extrapolation of drive theory holds on to the pre-social qualities precisely to identify drive energy as a considerable historic force and as being forged in processes of
phylogenetic developmental at the same time. Moreover, if the drives are understood as a conceptual approximation of something that is not further translatable into the language of the existing, the Id and the unconscious not only appear as harbors of desires and wishes renounced by contemporary society. They become (in line with Marcuse’s argument) preservers of phylogenetic experiences of domination, without turning into reified concepts. Such conception adds a socio-historic dimension to the individual psyche that transcends the externally encountered societal conditions.

The aphorism additionally addresses Adorno’s rejection of psychoanalysis as therapy. For Adorno, therapy only propels integration into a societal totality that works against emancipation:

> Psychoanalytic practice, which claims on paper to heal even neurosis, collaborates with the universal and long-standing practice of depriving men of love and happiness in favor of hard work and a healthy sex life. Happiness turns into something infantile and the cathartic method into an evil, hostile, inhuman thing. (1967 [1955]:80)

Already by the 1940s, the cultural expression of normalcy has evolved, psychoanalytic realizations have been integrated into subjectivity: “The ‘regular guy’, the ‘popular girl’ must repress not only their desires and cognitions, but also all of the symptoms generated by repression in bourgeois times” (2003 [1951]:65f). Adorno targets normal patterns of social behavior as expressions of actual pathology. The trickled down knowledge about neurotic symptoms triggers a process which leads to their negative incorporation into daily performances. Psychoanalysis becomes complicit in the subject’s total functional integration: “The horror of the ego’s abyss is cancelled by the realization that it is actually not much different from arthritis or sinus troubles. Thus, conflicts lose their threatening character. They are accepted; not at all healed, but merely fitted, as inevitable components, into the surface of normative life” (Ibid.). Adorno invokes Fromm’s ‘pathology of normalcy’ here, and at the same time, he anticipates Philip Rieff’s notion of the therapeutic as the new generalized cultural condition: „[S]ince, aided by movies, daily soaps and Horney, depth psychology penetrates even the last corners, humans are cut off, by organized culture, the last possibility to experience themselves” (Ibid.). The divergence from Fromm, however, emerges in the totality of the condition; there is no notion of mental health posited against sick society. The divergence from Rieff is inherent to Adorno’s general theoretical thrust: preserving in theoretical reflection the distant possibility of species-emancipation. By cutting off the
possibility of experience, ‘organized culture,’ hence, becomes the prime opponent of emancipation.

Freud, approached as a negative and (unintentionally) dialectical philosopher, helps to illuminate the depth dimension of mutilation and damage that characterizes social conditions. The emancipatory power of self-reflection is entangled with the (necessary) reproduction of a universal condition of damage in the subject’s psychological make-up. The crucial realization informing the possibilities of practical emancipation is expressed in *Minima Moralia* as follows: “Within repressive society the individual’s emancipation not only benefits but damages him” (2002 [1951]:92). In *Negative Dialectics* it is expressed even more dramatically: “The chances are that every citizen of the wrong world would find the right one unbearable; he would be too impaired for it” (2004 [1973]:352). In light of Adorno’s insistence on theory as the sole possibility of critical praxis, the Freudian emancipation potentiality, chiefly represented in psychoanalytic therapy, emerges as the epitome of a (negative) integration into the conditions of domination.

Adorno’s and Marcuse’s theoretical positions generally converge in their insistence on negativity as the sole mode of approximating the notion of liberated individuals and society. However, Adorno’s strictly negative understanding of emancipation potentialities pronounces the preponderance of the object even more as Marcuse’s. The Hegelian roots of Adorno’s negativity meet their limit in his vicious defense of the non-identical – the immediate and impenetrable part of the object – against any attempt of forced identification. From Adorno’s perspective, the students’ movement (unconsciously) functions as an agent of identity thinking, because it casts aside exactly those qualities necessary in the approximation of the non-identical: reflection, hesitation, and doubt. Laclau’s dilemma of emancipation – the incompatibility of dichotomic and ground dimension – is not only acknowledged, it becomes the primary locus of emancipatory consciousness. Such consciousness is, however, explicitly conceived by both Marcuse and Adorno as dialectical thinking. Via the notions of damage, trauma, and suffering, it holds on to the (Hegel-Marxian) notion of universality. It therefore collides with Laclau’s discursive logic and develops, against Laclau’s critique of secularized eschatologies and in all its negativity, a concrete emancipatory thrust towards species liberation.
Critical Theory's 'Negative Emancipatory Potential'

Adorno’s and Marcuse’s dialectical adaptations of Freudian theory suggest a negative emancipatory potential as Critical Theory's constitutive normative core. The notion of negative emancipatory potential is useful for conceptually approximates Adorno’s and Marcuse’s insistence on Freudian drive theory in their dialectical conceptualization of a pre-social psychic-somatic entity that identifies in the pre-dominantly negative historic ‘inscription’ of the drives both a regressive and a transcending force. Marcuse is most outspoken about these liberating potentialities, expressed for example in his notion of libidinal work – the approximation of a utopian relation of necessary societal labor and the liberation of the individual pleasure principle. Infantile sexuality becomes the expression of concrete play-potential here. However, this potential is not something that can easily be ‘recovered,’ but rather emerges as fragile. It is always already inscribed with the history of cruelty and exploitation that is human history. In Adorno’s work, the negativity of the emancipatory moment becomes paramount: the potential primarily emerges in the negation of the existing (das Bestehende) as the only achievable emancipatory praxis. The negative emancipatory potential sets itself apart from Fromm’s critical theorizing and its notion of productivity. It additionally figures as a point of essential divergence in the relation of Critical Theory and US sociology.

Talcott Parsons: Integrative Desire

Talcott Parsons’s lifelong project to develop a general theory of action differs in a crucial aspect from the critical theories of Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno, and the cultural and social criticism of Rieff and Riesman: it is not formulated as a normative critique of societal relations. Oriented towards Weber’s neutrality paradigm, it rather constitutes the scientific attempt to theoretically grasp the organization of societal integration. At the same time, Parsons’s project converges with critical theorists Fromm, Adorno, Marcuse, and also with Rieff and Riesman, in its insistence on the need for pre-empirical, theoretical categories to guide sociological inquiry. The convergence paradigm, under which these categories are subsumed in Parsons’s theory, is the conceptual manifestation of its subliminal normativity. It evokes a narration of scientific progress and implies theoretical progression towards ever
more enlightenment (see Introduction, Chapter IV). In light of my research interest, hence, the task is to carve out the subliminal normativity and its directedness. The cleavage between Parsons and Critical Theory becomes visible in the debates surrounding the 15. Heidelberger Soziologentag in 1964, which was dedicated to Max Weber’s legacy. The diverging approaches to Weber, valued by Parsons as a grand objectivist theorist, and criticized by Marcuse for inherently affirming the capitalist status quo in his conceptualization of reason (Gerhardt 2011:180-181). It becomes evident in the debate that Parson’s approach differs from that of critical theorists in his objectivist orientation, his neglect of Marx, and, with regard to my research perspective, his understanding of psychoanalysis as an auxiliary science of human motivation.

In Parsons’s theory, the Freudian emancipation potentiality emerges as the generalized likeliness of the individual’s (read: personality system’s) successful functional integration into differentiated social and cultural systems. Such a convergence of Parsons and Freud is, of course, forced. In Freud’s universe, the precariousness of individualized emancipation is inscribed in the definite cultural limits of the process: since culture is based on drive repression and sublimation, it is fundamentally the unreason of the drives which governs the unconscious sources of motivation. Parsons’s functionalism posits the social (and cultural) systems as the limits of the emancipatory process; the precariousness arises in the absolute preponderance of the societal dimension. Motivation is, in the last instance, always already mediated by society. Whereas Freud’s model theorizes a necessary amount of discontent as a general condition of the individual’s cultural existence, Parsons generally presents systemic integration as (almost) generally desirable for the individual.

Indebted to the neo-Freudian revision of drive theory, Parsons’s critique of Freud targets his differentiation of super-ego and ego (Chapter IV). Parsons focuses on the organization of the mental apparatus. In contrast to Freud, the formation of super-ego and ego both result from

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227 Uta Gerhardt (2011:175ff) provides a very detailed account of the occasion. Rather than reproducing Gerhardt’s account I want to emphasize the general tone and level of skepticism on both parts of the Critical Theorists. Adorno, involved in the organization of the event in his function as member of the executive committee and president elect of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, approached Marcuse already in 1962 with the question if he would consider giving a keynote at the conference stating: “I think that, as far as one is allowed at all to say something like that, it is important that you do it, for the sole reason to counteract Mister Parsons and Mister Aron, whom I could not prevent” (Adorno to Marcuse 11/6/62 TWA Br_0969 Marcuse, Herbert 969/54). Parsons voiced some concerns before the event in a letter to Reinhard Bendix after he had read Marcuse’s (and Aron’s) script: “In general, I am afraid I will be something of a Daniel in the Lion’s den in my much more positive note about both Weber’s own contribution and the nature of industrial society. At any rate we will hope that there will be some good discussions” (Afer Gerhardt 2011:177).
similar processes. The two central forces are the specific and increasingly differentiated social environment and the common culture, internalized through processes of identification. Identification, the motor of super-ego formation, is extended to earlier developmental stages. Ego formation is reformulated as a process of cultural internalization. Interpersonal relations, understood as role-model constellations, become paramount and the significance of experience (of renunciation) is relegated to the background. The Freudian notion of a doubling of ontogenetic and phylogenetic process gets lost. The ego, originally located at the critical juncture of drive energy and cultural restriction, turns into the central instrument of the learning process during socialization. It is simultaneously oriented to and constituted of the social environment and its specific systemic organization. As the prime agent of identification, it distributes the symbolically generalized medium of affect towards increasingly differentiated patterns of social-role-positions, and thereby internalizes cultural demands.

Parsons’s four-functions-paradigm introduces the separation of the instrumental and the expressive dimension in the organization of the system (see Chapter IV, fig. 1). The expressive dimension, with affect as its medium of communication, constitutes a decisive conceptual innovation in the transition to systemic functionalism. At least theoretically, it introduces a theory of motivation that is disentangled from the immediate reach of society, such as the direct orientation towards norms and values in the structural functionalist phase had proposed it. In the expressive dimension, object choice is first and foremost theorized as the crucial element of social interaction; cultural demands, norms, and values are only secondarily internalized. Identification with an ever increasing array of social roles and their representatives moves to the center. Affect is the highly mediated symbolic currency in the arena of interaction.

In a 1970 letter to Parsons, sociologist Robert Bellah refers to the centrality of (expressive) symbolism in Parsons’s systemic functionalism and makes an interesting suggestion. At the time, Bellah was co-organizing a conference in honor of Norman O. Brown’s work, which inspired the following statement:

With respect to Norman O. Brown, I would like to point out that there has been a radical shift in his view between Life Against Death and Love’s Body. The former book is brilliant but in my opinion profoundly misguided, and ends up really with a kind of biological reductionism. The latter book, however, accepts the centrally creating role of symbolism in human action and goes on from there to make a number
of extraordinarily interesting connections between physical organism, social system, personality, and symbol systems. While it would hardly be possible to find a writer more different from Talcott Parsons than Norman O. Brown, I would be prepared to make the drastic statement that Norman O. Brown is an ecstatic Talcott Parsons. (Bellah to Parsons 2/25/1970)

The convergence between Parsons and Brown that Bellah implies here revolves around their common reliance on a theory of motivation which identifies communicative symbolism as a creating force. Their approaches also differ from one another, however. This can be seen in Brown’s notion of symbolism as polymorphous perversity: for Brown, symbolism is a possible expressive medium of the irrational content of the unconscious. The difference to Parsons’s theory is twofold: for one, Brown’s notion of symbolism is steeped in drive theory, for another, it is embedded in a concrete, normative critique of the societal status quo. Symbolism becomes the gateway into the realm of unconscious unreason, which Brown welcomes as the concrete expression of liberation in face of an instrumental rationality. For Parsons, however, expressive symbolism complements rather than contradicts the instrumental dimension and it does not represent unreason as such, but is itself steeped in rationality due to its mediated nature.

Parsons does not address Bellah’s emphatic comparison directly in his response letter. However, it contains a passage on the students’ movement, in which he elaborates on rationality. This excerpt can be understood as an indirect response to Bellah’s statement:

I think that you and I would agree that probably the most important single focus of the current movement of dissent and revolt is against ‘the rationality complex.’ One of the main reasons why the university has become so important a target is that it is the citadel of rationality and I think again, we would agree inevitably so. But neither the more empirically oriented version of rationality as distinguished from value rationality in Weber’s sense, nor rationality as over against non-rational components can prevail in the sense of establishing a more or less stable balance. I am, however sufficiently inveterate “equilibrium” theorist so that I simply do not believe that swinging the balance too radically the other way so as really to downgrade cognitive rationality would help in stabilization. What I am trying to grope for is some way of defining the kind of balance which relative to our cultural and social situation, would have at least a fair chance at stabilization.” 3/16/1970

Parsons’s insistence on the equilibrium emphasizes his opposition to Brown. The revolt against the ‘citadels of rationality’ takes place in the grander, systemic balancing of forces, which itself is organized rationally and strives for systemic stabilization. The theoretical
The subliminal normativity in Parsons’s theory is implicated with his neglect of the societal relations of domination; it affirms the concrete organization of the social systems by focusing on functionality. Systemic functionalism necessarily fails to acknowledge Laclau’s dilemma of emancipation, because it does not aim to overcome the specific organization of society and its sub-systems, which it describes so exhaustively. The possibilities of social change are dependent on the ground dimension; change proceeds on the systemic level. The need for a dichotomic dimension is not theorized in Parsons. Social change emerges as a general, logical possibility, not as an emancipatory necessity.

The psychoanalytic implications follow the grander scheme of Parsons’s theoretical endeavor. Instead of problematizing the reified nature of Freud’s concepts – as Marcuse and Adorno, and to some extent Fromm have done it – Parsons further reduces the concepts to even more reified instruments in the attempt to solve the problem of social order. Freud, coming from the (empirically underpinned) problematization of the psyche, arrives at the discontent in culture. Parsons, coming from the theoretically established problem of order, arrives at the normativization of successful social integration via the internalization of value patterns: the basic possibility and likeliness of well-being within system(s). Parsons’s approach thereby erases a crucial moment in Freud’s theory that is capable of transcending the societal status quo: the realization of the cultural limits of individual pleasure (ie the discontent in culture). Precisely because desire eventually emerges from the immediate societal and cultural situation and does not have a pre-social (phylogenetic) thrust, individual emancipation is reduced to successful social integration, rid of its critical, negative moment.

David Riesman: Typological Autonomy

While all theorists discussed in my study so far have continuously expanded, revised and developed their theoretical universes in more or less confined meta-theoretical trajectories. David Riesman’s writings, however, rather represent the work of a (critical) sociologist rather than that of a grand social theorist. The population-growth hypothesis – Riesman’s historical narration established in *The Lonely Crowd* – was never further developed. However, it lent
The Lonely Crowd a certain materialist touch, which implicitly provided normative directions. Former Institute member Leo Löwenthal even suggested that by choosing a rather poetic title for their study, “the authors of the Lonely Crowd have identified themselves with that small minority that cannot understand how social science, as a science of man, can be anything else but a profoundly humanistic endeavor” (1961:27). For Löwenthal, the study explicitly, and rightfully so, establishes the proximity of the social sciences and the humanities (rather than the natural sciences). It thereby inherently articulates its indebtedness to a normative, humanist perspective. In comparison to Parsons, Löwenthal’s observation holds true. However, the normative directedness is relativized because Riesman’s study is not embedded in a grander theoretical project of social criticism.

In the expansive reception of The Lonely Crowd the typology was, in line with Löwenthal’s suggestion, perceived as an expression of criticism. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the characterology itself was not intended to be critical; it was especially not intended to value one character type over the other. The critical edge was rather engrained in the study’s conceptualization of autonomy. The notion of the other-directed individual nevertheless resonated with more explicit cultural criticisms, such as that represented in Rieff’s notion of the psychological man. In the enormous extra-academic reception of the book, the other directed character was received by many as a deterioration of the more favorable inner-directed character. The reception of the book, hence, established its nature as a work of social criticism against the intentions of its authors. The typology presented in The Lonely Crowd was aligned by its wide readership with a certain discontent in contemporary culture. The subtle normative thrust intended by the authors was amplified in the reception.

Riesman’s approach is located between Parsons’s objectivity and Critical Theory’s concrete emancipatory thrust. While admitting to a certain amount of criticism, it does not evoke Laclau’s dichotomic dimension; radical change is not theorized as a necessary condition in the

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228 Seymour Martin Lipset states in his contribution to the 1961 volume Culture and Social Character: “To th[e] continuing tradition of [social criticism David Riesman has been an outstanding recent contributor. In the Lonely crowd, especially, he has tried to describe systematically the impact of industrialization and urbanization on the everyday relations of men. In doing so, his approach is strikingly similar to those of Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen, to take two key figures who linked technology and social change” (Lipset 1961:136).

229 The passage is taken from Löwenthal’s contribution to the 1961 volume Culture and Social Character – The Work of David Riesman Reviewed, which he also edited together with Seymour Martin Lipset.
achievement of true autonomy. In their own contribution to the 1961 volume, Riesman and Nathan Glazer reconsider the position proposed in *The Lonely Crowd*:

In the past, Americans have in general felt that they could escape the intractabilities of institutions; and that it made an enormous difference whether these institutions were created and controlled by a central elite of definite objectives, as in totalitarian countries, or were developed with less central guidance, growing up in more vegetable fashion, as in democratic countries. [...] Correspondingly, we ourselves in *The Lonely Crowd* reflected this kind of American optimistic ‘exceptionalism’ in our view that, once the other-directed person could become aware of its subordination to what Fromm had called ‘anonymous authority’, he could take his fate far more in his own hands. (Riesman and Glazer 1961:437)

The authors admit that they “underestimated the power of power” (Ibid.) in the earlier analysis. However, their general understanding of autonomy as the capacity of self-reflection emphasizes what Daniel Geary suggests as Riesman’s “qualitative liberalism” (2013:615): Riesman et al overemphasized the specific living conditions of white middle class men in their characterological generalizations (Ibid.). This (liberal) notion of autonomy resembles the Freudian emancipation potentiality in the general sense that it relies on an educational process. In its characterological specificities, however, it diverges considerably from Freud’s theory. In their retrospective analysis, Riesman and Glazer emphasize this divergence themselves:

Unlike orthodox Freudians, and unlike Kardiner, we did not regard the institutions operating on the infant and child as ‘primary’ and all else as ‘secondary’; rather, following Fromm, we saw modern industrial society as primary, and as having an impact on child-rearing through the parents as transmissionbelts for the social imperatives. [...] The link between character and society was forged in the home; thus forged, character went out again to meet society – very much the same kind of society. We ‘Americanized’ this model (we were not wholly conscious of this at the time) by emphasizing the other influences in addition to the parents that played on the children: the peer group, the school […], the mass media of communication […]. And, of course, in stressing adolescence, we rejected the Freudian emphasis on infancy and early childhood. (Ibid.:435)

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229 In a 1963 letter to Edgar Morin, Riesman roughly sketches his political position in response to being identified as a ‘radical’: “Your view of me as a ‘radical’ in the same tradition as C. Wright Mills would surprise many readers both in America and elsewhere. Yet it is more correct in the more common view that I am a conservative liberal in the tradition of de Toqueville (as in part I am) whereas Mills is an slash [sic] and crusader in the tradition of Marx and Veblen. Both Mills and I share a common concerns with politics and culture even though our tone is very different and our judgments are very different, both about sociology and society.” (HUGFP99.16/ Box 41/Folder: the LC Corp. 2 of 2 Riesman to Morin, 12/27/1963, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). Morin’s comparison of Riesman and Mills resembles Lipset’s analysis. Riesman’s response, however, rather indicates that Lipset was, like many of his contemporaries, quick in detecting Marxist underpinnings in social criticism that was actually quite liberal.
The characterology bears general similarities to that presented by Fromm. It emphasizes the subject’s societal relatedness over Freudian drive theory. However, the general thrust of The Lonely Crowd’s social analysis diverges from Fromm, because it is not firmly grounded in the Marxian trajectory of his work. At the same time, Riesman and Glazer go beyond Fromm’s typology by stressing extra-familial agencies, such as the media and the peer group. What Riesman and Glazer describe as their ‘Americanization’ of Fromm’s model is criticized by sociologists Dennis Wrong and Robert Gutman in their contribution to the 1961 volume: “[T]he very psychological inadequacy of [Riesman’s] types partly results from their cultural richness and suggestiveness, which greatly exceed that of earlier efforts to define American character in more conventional psychoanalytic terms. His types are essentially ‘ethnological’ rather than characterological constructions” (1961:310). In Riesman’s typology, the individual blurs with her cultural environment, which becomes explicitly visible in the other-directed character.

The sociological reformulation of Freudian drive theory is also a major point of convergence between Parsons and Riesman. A crucial divergence, however, emerges in the fact that in Parsons’s theoretical universe the instrumental dimension is (still) the dominant one (Chapter IV). Translated into Riesman’s typological vocabulary, the contemporary expression of Parsons’s personality system would thus rather be Fromm’s marketing-, and not Riesman’s other-directed character. Parsons’s emphasis on the instrumental dimension thereby inherently questions the totalized cultural permeation of Riesman’s social character model. At the same time, it converges with Critical Theory’s insistence on the preponderance of instrumental rationality, without however sharing the latter’s critical thrust.

230 In a response to a reader of The Lonely Crowd, who points Riesman to Norman O. Brown’s work, Riesman stresses his divergence from the former and his closeness to Fromm: “from what I have read and from my talks with him, I think that professor Brown’s image of autonomy is too ‘biological’ and too little ‘cultural’ for my own thinking; I am more in agreement with Erich Fromm’s work than with Brown’s” (HUGFP99.16/Box 40/ Folder: Lonely Crowd correspondences 1. Folder: LC correspondence 1 of 2, Letter of Riesman to Richard O. Whipple 4/20/1960, courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).

231 Michael Maccoby, former student and close collaborator of Fromm’s elaborates on the divergences between Riesman and Fromm: “Unlike Fromm’s anchoring of social character types in psychodynamics, Riesman described the inner-directed person as controlled from within, with a gyroscope to regulate behavior, while the other-directed person conformed to a peer group. Riesman characteristically exchanged theory for thick description” (2015:186). He goes on to state that “Fromm criticized Riesman as lacking theory and essentially describing phenomena. Furthermore, Fromm saw Riesman’s passion to weigh all sides as a way of avoiding going to the roots. Riesman was an empathic liberal democrat and Fromm was a radical socialist humanist. While Riesman valued civility and was skeptical of radicals, Fromm admired revolutionary fervor. During the students’ movements of 1968, Fromm supported the radicals at Columbia University, while Riesman was critical of their extremism” (Maccoby 2015:188).
In the 1961 volume, Riesman and Glazer further accentuate the cultural dimension themselves:

The current preoccupation with identity in this country (as in the great impact of Erik H. Erikson’s work) reflects the liberation of men from the realm of characterological necessity. The power of individuals to shape their own character by their selection among models and experiences was adumbrated in our concept of autonomy; when this occurs, men may limit the provinciality of being born to a particular family in a particular place. To some, this offers a prospect only of rootless men and galloping anomie. To more hopeful prophets, ties based on conscious relatedness may someday replace those of blood and soil. (1961:458)

The divergence from Freud is even more pronounced here than in the original text. Character is no longer a necessary result of the clash between individual and culture; it becomes a matter of conscious choice. The individualized focus of this notion of autonomy only underscores that The Lonely Crowd does not address the dimension of social ground in its speculations on emancipation possibilities. Emancipation therefore turns into a highly individualized project of self-modification, based in the self-reflexive potential of the subject. Riesman and Glazer admit that they underestimated power, or domination in their conceptualization of autonomy in The Lonely Crowd. However, the elaboration on the emancipatory potential that emerges in the wake of Erikson’s shift from character to identity repeats the former line of argumentation. By arguing that the (discursive) shift towards identity signifies the liberation from “the realm of characterological necessity” and imagining “ties based on conscious relatedness,” Riesman and Glazer once again accentuate their rejection of drive theory and the related categories of the unconscious and sublimation. The image of “conscious relatedness” evokes Laclau’s transparency dimension and even goes beyond it. The autonomous individual does not only represent the ‘essence of human nature’ in a typological sense; she has also developed the capacity of consciously reflecting her desires to an extent that obscure motivations no longer blur and distort her social relatedness: she has become all-knowing. The unconscious as the harbor of the drive-energetic revolt against reason, of course, vanishes in such imaginations. At the same time, the theoretical potential to approximate the concrete characterological manifestations of domination, precisely as unconscious content and obscure forces, gets lost.
Philip Rieff: Repression and Mastery

Philip Rieff’s position in the field is idiosyncratic. This becomes evident in his increasingly pronounced cultural criticism and his simultaneous insistence on drive theory. Riesman’s difficult relation to Rieff – he regarded him as a rather conservative mind from early on (see Chapter IV) – underscores the image of Rieff as a theorist who posed his work against contemporary trends. Yet, he was able to secure himself a firm position in the field and to publish two works that were well received. Rieff’s theoretical endeavor bears a definite normative orientation. According to Charles Turner, for Rieff

[t]he primary responsibility of theory is normative, though not in the rationalist or Habermasian sense of the term; in *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, theory’s task is to ‘enable what ought to be to establish hegemony over what is’[…]; the object of theory is the ideal, ultimately God, the highest form of knowledge is faith, and the best life one of obedience to the articles of that faith. (2011:85)

Turner’s suggestion points to the direction of Rieff’s normative orientation. Theory is a medium of revelation (in the most theological sense): it aims to establish order by acknowledging the hierarchies needed for culture to prevail. Culture is implicitly identified as a sacred order, ideally safeguarded by a knowing cultural elite against the permanent threat of its demise, which, in turn is constituted of the drives as the eternal antagonists of order.

However, Rieff did not simply call for order and authority as mere political ends in themselves. As a dialectical thinker, he acknowledged and valued the liberating potential in Freud’s theory. And yet, he mobilized order and authority to serve the overarching battle against the eternal possibility of chaos. Rieff’s characterology is steeped in a Weberian understanding of cultural preponderance. His character types emerge as concrete embodiments of the dominant language of faith, and at the same time as the potential elite. His analysis of psychological man and of the culture of the therapeutic identifies the release of cultural constraint, which characterizes the societal situation psychological man is surrounded with, as not only destructive but also as productive potential. The productiveness is apparent in the distant possibility that psychological man becomes conscious of his privileged position and responsibly assumes the role of a cultural elitist.

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233 I use the male gender pronoun here because Rieff’s typology chiefly concerns the (white) middle class male. Its universal applicability is therefore, of course, questionable. Daniel Geary problematizes in his discussion of Riesman’s “qualitative liberalism” (2013:605), the research bias identified by Geary applies to Rieff as well.
The contemporary language of psychoanalysis is entangled with a dialectic of release and moral demise:

The leisured, or non-working, classes are the main resource from which the therapeutic, as a character type, is drawn. Emancipated from an ethic of hard work, Americans have also grown morally less self-demanding. They have been released from the old system of self-demands by a convergence of doctrines that do not resort to new restrictions but rather propose jointly the superiority of all that money can buy, technology can make, and science can conceive. (1973 [1966]:217)

The instrumental forces of rationalization have propelled a privileged class, equipped with a streamlined therapeutic vocabulary to the center of a “cultural revolution [which] has been made from the top, rather than from the bottom [and which] is anti-political, a revolution of the rich by which they have lowered the pressure of inherited communal purpose upon themselves” (Ibid.:206). In his rigid distinction of cultural and political revolutions, Rieff clearly ascribes predominance to the cultural ones. Concrete struggles for political change from the bottom, represented in the civil rights movements, are subordinated to the grander cultural change. With reference to the black civil rights movement, he goes on to state:

[T]he Negro protest movement in the United States will have to become more profoundly cultural if it is to succeed politically. Yet the American Negro is himself limited in his demands by the successful revolution of the rich. Being an American, the poor Negro believes that he too can live by bread alone. What the Negro asks, essentially, is a place at the American trough. But to gain that place, he is constrained to ask for something more than his share of places. (Ibid.)

234 Rieff’s somewhat ambivalent approach to the civil rights movements is additionally highlighted by his positions on homosexuality and the gay rights movement. Turner offers an instructive summary. “In his 1982 essay on Oscar Wilde entitled The Impossible Culture, Rieff distinguishes between the private transgressional homosexuality of an artistic genius he admired and the public anti-culture of a century later where, in the absence of binding moral demands, such transgression is a matter for public celebration. The object of Rieff’s critique here is not individuals, or better, it is not the private behavior of private individuals, but the conduct and statements of representatives of liberationist social movements, and the proponents of identity politics; and these include a group he calls, in a phrase one might otherwise want to call quaint, ‘the homosexualists,’ those who make a public philosophy out of a private preference and who help sustain a gay community whose rules of conduct can appear to outsiders to be less restrictive of ‘sexual opportunity,’ than those that prevail among heterosexuals. At least, that is one way of putting it. Here, though, is another: ‘Homosexuality as a social movement is not a movement of love but a movement of hatred and indifference. Third world heterosexualists follow the same pattern of hatred and indifference. But the homosexualists are in the vanguard.’ Gay culture is ‘the latest recycling of Baal worship in third culture’” (Turner 2011:93). Rieff’s blatant cultural conservatism and its homophobic roots become more than obvious here. What poses as cultural criticism is eventually an attack on concrete difference.
The legitimate struggle for material equality is ridiculed by its (supposed) lack of cultural relevance. In Rieff’s terms, the black civil rights movement falls for the promises of the new anti-culture of pleasure release, yet would have to impose a cultural revolution similar to the one started by the rich, in order to eventually succeed in securing equal (or equally privileged) positions. Rieff’s focus on culture turns Marcuse’s approach on its head. For Marcuse it is essentially the material structure of society which needs to change, despite the ideological hegemony of the cultural sphere.

Earlier in the chapter I pointed at the convergences between Rieff and Marcuse in the context of their position of anti-rationalization, which they shared with Brown and Lionel Trilling. While Rieff’s general divergence from Marcuse has already been established, the specificities of their disagreements become especially evident if one looks at them against the background of the emancipatory upheavals of the 1960s. Eli Zaretsky suggests that “Marcuse and Brown were gratified by the developments of the 1960s, while Trilling and Rieff were appalled” (2004:305). Rieff voiced his discontent with the changed situation following the struggles of the 60s at length in his 1972 article Fellow Teachers, where he especially attacks Marcuse. The conservative cultural criticism is no longer implicit to his concepts and his specific Freud exegesis. It is now expressed openly. Railing against a cultural (read: anti-cultural) state of affairs which does not produce real teachers (read: leaders) any more, he states:

Weber has been misunderstood, and abused, not only by the heavily capitalized entrepreneurs of the knowledge industry, but on the other side, also by our humanist gurus. With the impossibility of joining the roles of leader and teacher in a cultureless society, one without received truths and their repressions of possibility, compare Marcuse's effort as a social theorist to elaborate the dubious Freudian dichotomy between the concepts of repression and sublimation. In his attack on repression, Marcuse must also attack sublimation - and certainly all idealizations. But authority cannot exist unless it is possessed by an idealization to which it is willing to submit, although never uncritically. (1972:48fn)

Rieff’s attack is twofold. The established disciplinary field is polemically identified as ‘the knowledge industry’ and condemned, as are its most outspoken critics, such as Marcuse. For Rieff, Marcuse becomes the concrete embodiment of a therapeutic type who missed the chance to assume his position as a vanguard of culture. Instead of acknowledging the necessity of authority, and willfully representing it, he propagates the very tendency which

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235 Eli Zaretsky pinpoints the convergences as follows: “Both radicals and conservatives appealed to the same charismatic sources of sexuality, individuality, and the personal unconscious” (2004:305).
characterizes the state of therapeutic ‘lack of culture’ (Kulturlosigkeit) anyway. As a ‘humanistic guru,’ Marcuse has rather turned into the soulless mouthpiece of a psychoanalytically saturated anti-culture, produced and perpetuated by instrumental rationalization: “Marcuse gives us a choice between ‘one-dimensional’ carnality and a richer variety. His revolutionary answer is based on the doubtful assumption that the time of scarcity has ended and that we can now proceed to the translation of quantity into quality” (Ibid. 65fn). The divergence could not be clearer. Against Marcuse’s call for the ‘Great Refusal’ – a resistance against instrumental rationalization and its societal ground: capitalism – Rieff juxtaposes a theology of morality and repression that aims to re-sacralize hierarchies and institutions in the name of preserving culture. Rieff’s account evokes, and most closely resembles, the Freudian emancipation potentiality; psychological man’s only way is to become aware of the mechanisms and forces of repression, to gain mastery by acknowledging the need for authority in the face of the eternal threat of unconscious desires. Generally speaking, Rieff’s theory does not aim at emancipation in Laclau’s sense. Only when facing an established state of anti-culture, Rieff’s criticism calls for radical change. However, Rieff’s normativity is inscribed in his attempt to re-establish the hegemony of cultural languages of faith as a trans-historic continuity. Its objective is the opposite of the radical breach represented in Laclau’s dichotomic dimension. After the events of the 60s, Rieff considered his position as a vanishing attempt to rescue culture from the forces of modernity. Turner suggests that “in 1984 [Rieff’s] sense of having been defeated in the culture wars of the 1960s was so complete that he looked back on Fellow Teachers as ‘that postmortem letter to the dead, myself self-addressed among them’” (2011:82).

The Present Topicality of Therapeutic Culture: Eva Illouz’s Emotional Capitalism and its Freudian Implications

Eva Illouz’s extensive work on the implications of psychology, emotionality, and capitalism provides an excellent vantage point into current debates surrounding the issues of individual, psychology, and societal organization. Her work identifies the psychoanalytically informed ‘therapeutic narrative’ as the core of contemporary self-hood in capitalism. It offers an excellent analysis of what has become of psychoanalysis in the cultural field. In my analysis, I pick up this thread and simultaneously trace what was lost along the way, inspired by the
diverging perspectives on psychoanalysis’s emancipatory potentialities carved out in my discussion above. In this final part of the chapter, I bring Illouz’s critique of the psychoanalytic subject conceptualization in conversation with Marcuse’s, Adorno’s, and Rieff’s insistence on Freudian drive theory, and with Fromm’s, Parsons’s and Riesman’s insistence on the need for a scientific renewal of psychoanalysis.

Illouz’s main arguments can be extracted from her two books Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (2007) and Saving the Modern Soul: Therapy, Emotions and the Culture of Self-Help (2008). As a sociologist of emotions, Illouz’s interest revolves around the function of emotions in capitalism. A fundamental insight guiding her work is that the boundaries between the private and the public have long vanished: emotions used to be relegated to inner life, but have now moved to the public sphere (2013 [2007]:4). Both spheres are mutually saturated by emotionality on the one, and by an ethos of (economic) productivity on the other hand. As a sociologist of culture, she identifies language as the center of shaping experience. Both strands are brought together in her analysis of the trickle down process psychoanalysis underwent since it entered the professional and intellectual stage in the early 20th century. Especially her second standpoint is indebted to and continues Philip Rieff’s proposition of psychological man and therapeutic culture. She states that “[c]ommentators such as Lionel Trilling, Philip Rieff, Christopher Lasch, and Philip Cushman have interpreted the rise of the therapeutic worldview as marking the decline of an autonomous realm of culture and values” (2008:2). Her theoretical elaborations pick up on their diagnosis: “[T]herapeutic discourse has crossed and blurred the compartmentalized spheres of modernity and has come to constitute one of the major codes with which to express, shape, and guide selfhood” (Ibid.:6). In Cold Intimacies she further pinpoints the sources and effects of the de-compartmentalization: “the cultural persuasions of therapy [and] economic productivity […] intertwined and enmeshed with one another and provided the rationale, the methods, and the moral Impetus to extract emotions from the realm of inner life and put them at the center of selfhood and sociability” (2013 [2007]:37). Language becomes the prime constituent of subjectivity here, and emotions turn into its most valuable capital.

The therapeutic narrative is the fundamental category representing and producing what Illouz identifies as Self-Help Culture and Emotional Capitalism on the subjective level. Therapeutic narrative and self-help-culture – its cultural expression – are steeped in the psychoanalytic conceptualization of subjectivity: the notion of psychosexual development, derived from
Freud’s work with neurotic patients. Psychoanalysis identifies childhood experiences as the fundamental component of adult personality, and, in turn, conceptualizes original experience primarily as experience of renunciation, i.e. trauma. With reference to this narrative, Illouz points at an “extraordinary paradox [in] therapeutic culture[,] [while its] primary vocation […] is to heal[, it] must generate a narrative structure in which suffering and victimhood actually define the self” (2008:173). Suffering becomes the therapeutic narrative’s “central knot […] what initiates and motivates it, helps it unfold, and makes it ‘work’” (Ibid.). In contrast to Rieff, it is not constraint relief and desire for quick gratification which characterizes therapeutic culture, but a narcissistic obsession with individual histories of trauma and mastery.

The question for the genealogy of Illouz’s therapeutic narrative moves into focus. She suggests that “Freudian premises about the self could move to the core of American culture when the Freudian outlook was modified enough by subsequent theorists to admit the idea of the perfectibility of the self” and goes on to state that “psychoanalysis could diffuse widely […] because much of the Freudian bleak determinism was erased from it” (2008:155). Drive theory was the primary conceptual manifestation of that determinism. Illouz traces its abandonment from Heinz Hartmann and Erik Erikson, the main protagonists of ego psychology, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan, the main protagonists of Neo-Freudianism, to Carl Roger’s humanist psychology. Roger’s approach “viewed people as basically good or healthy and mental health as the normal progression of life, with mental illness, criminality, and other human problems as distortions of that natural, innate tendency toward health” (2008:155) and terminated in a conception of therapy that revolved around “realizing one’s own authentic self” (Ibid.). By disposing of Freud’s determinism, psychoanalysis ended up becoming a constructive/productive theory of authentic subjectivity. Illouz further connects the rationalization process psychoanalysis underwent with another trend, which is strongly entwined with the counter culture movements of the 1960s: she identifies an “ethos of Self-Help” (Ibid.) as the crucial complement to the psychoanalytic conceptualization of the subject in the therapeutic narrative. Illouz traces this trend back to Samuel Smiles’s late 19th century publication Self-Help. According to Illouz, Smiles’s ethos is as pervasive as Freud’s in American culture:

[I]n the self-help culture that has swept American society, Smile’s ethos of self-improvement and notions of Freudian inspiration have now become so intertwined as to be virtually indistinguishable. Moreover, precisely because of such alliance between
the self-help ethos and psychology, psychic misery has now become a feature of identity shared by both laborers and well-to-do people. (2013 [2007]:42).

Without explicitly mentioning it, Illouz evokes the fusion of self-help culture and psychoanalysis that is represented in such popular science bestsellers as Erich Fromm’s *The Art of Loving* and *To Have or to Be*. She goes on to explain that within therapeutic self-help culture, authenticity becomes achievable through “techniques of memory to recover the buried and thus authentic past” (2018:201). To generate authenticity becomes the therapeutic narrative’s eventual objective. Fused with the ethos of self-help and claiming authenticity, the psychoanalytic conceptualization of subjectivity endlessly propels emotions across the former boundaries of public and inner life. The cultural persuasion of “economic productivity” (2013 [2007]:36) readily commodifies emotions, while it becomes saturated with emotionality at the same time. The de-compartmentalization of modern life guarantees the total permeation of every aspect of personal and public life by a logic of self-improvement, dressed in the vocabulary of psychology and self-help.

Illouz’s analysis is steeped in an elaborate and exhaustive genealogy of the continuing rationalization process psychoanalysis’s underwent since first formulated by Freud. With regard to the notion of the Freudian emancipation potentiality, the question arises to what extent Illouz’s therapeutic narrative and self-help culture resonates with original Freudian ideas. As stated repeatedly in my study, Freud’s archaic’ rebellion against reason finds its conceptual expression in the drives and the Id. The unconscious is conceptualized not only as a harbor of renounced wishes in the form of mutilated speech – as a linguistic focus would have it – it is predetermined by the Id as the mental representative of the drives. The individual’s positioning towards the world / culture is always already compromised by the fact that culture denies complete desire fulfillment. Personality emerges out of the conflict between individual pleasure and cultural reality principle. Orthodox psychoanalysis diagnoses the self-help-culture-driven subject, which is obsessively engaged in a repetitive narration of suffering and seeks authenticity where none can be found, with a narcissistic cathexis of the ego – it approximates melancholia. In *Trauer und Melancholie* (1917) Freud holds that in contrast to mourning, which makes the world appear bleak and empty because a loved object has been lost, melancholia makes the ego appear bleak and empty (1946 [1917]:427-426). Melancholia is characterized by the irresolvable regression of libido to the ego. It is a regression from narcissistic object choice to primary narcissism. The result is ambivalent: the loved and lost object is resolved in the self via identification processes; it is simultaneously
loved and hated. The therapeutic narrative posits the authentic, healthy self as the object to be desired. This object however is initially lost, because it has never existed. It is incorporated in the self and triggers an ever-ongoing process of mourning. Self-help-culture, posing as emancipatory, is the symptom of the exact opposite: a collectivized regression. Freud introduces an individualized conception of possibilities of emancipation. Emancipation on the societal/cultural, or in Marx’s terms on the level of the individual as species being, vanishes. Culture is inescapable repression. Fromm, Marcuse, and Adorno insist on the necessity to always reflect emancipation on the societal level and problematize individualized emancipation as eventually regressing to functional integration. This is also what Parsons, with reference to streamlined psychoanalysis, proposes as the inevitable outcome of the societal process. Rieff, in turn, problematized this with regard to the cultural demise the ever-increasing smoothness of de-sublimated functionality brings about.

Illouz is reluctant to address emancipation explicitly. In the Introduction to Saving the Modern Soul, she offers a mission statement: “My purpose is neither to document the pernicious effects of the therapeutic discourse nor to discuss its emancipatory potential […]. My intent here is rather to move the field of cultural studies away from the “epistemology of suspicion” on which it has too heavily relied” (2008:3-4). However, if the mission is to help steer away an entire disciplinary field from the epistemology of suspicion, the second part of the statement actually implies that the two questions raised in the first part have already been answered. The ubiquitous reproduction of an epistemology of suspicion, pervading all spheres of life, is precisely what Illouz identifies as Freud’s haunting legacy. In Emotions as Commodities (2018), her position towards the actual usefulness of psychoanalytically informed thinking becomes more openly expressed: “psychology has itself been a conveyor belt for the commodification and intensification of emotions. It cannot be used as a vocabulary that would transcend the domain it wants to criticize” (2018:205).

The Rieffian, Marcusian and Adornian lenses amplify what Illouz’s analysis suggests: the therapeutic narrative’s effects are pernicious; emancipatory potential exists only as a perpetuated recreation of functioning subjects in a self-propelling universe of instrumentality. Illouz’s therapeutic narrative perpetuates a self that poses as capable of detecting and resolving trauma. However, neither trauma, nor emancipatory potential are real. Without drive theory the unconscious loses its impenetrable dimension and becomes what colloquial language already knows: a mere subconscious. Drive theory is, however, what lends
psychoanalysis the rebellious thrust against functionality and instrumentality. Let me, thus, in a final effort to pronounce my own normative perspective, mobilize Critical Theory’s negative emancipatory potential against Illouz’s complete disposal of psychoanalysis: if the emancipation question is asked, “Freudian bleak determinism” offers an (unintentional) stronghold against smooth incorporation. Drive theory, as psychoanalysis’s repressed content, has been relegated to the theoretical/philosophical unconscious by the fierce reality principle of a functionality-driven scientific and cultural discourse. The recovery of that content, in the face of its fundamental damage, allows a glimpse at the emancipatory moment within the conditions of progressing regression: the subject’s realization of its incapability to fully comprehend itself.
Conclusion

In my study, I investigated the theoretical universes of Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Talcott Parsons, David Riesman, and Philip Rieff with regard to two different levels of abstraction. The first one asks, with Laclau, for (radical) emancipatory potentialities, explicitly pronounced by or implicitly inscribed to their respective adaptations of psychoanalysis. The second one contextualizes the works, with Bourdieu, in the competitive dynamics of the disciplinary field, and posits, with Critical Theory, the notion of instrumental rationality as a structuring force. The concept of the Freudian emancipation potentiality guides my discussion; it specifically helps to shed light on the first level of abstraction. As the inscribed emancipatory core of Freudian theory, which becomes a common reference system in the context of my research interest, it establishes the foundation upon which the question for psychoanalysis’s critical potential is posed. I approach the different adaptations of psychoanalysis through the categorical junctures of character structure, integration and social change; the discussions in Chapters II and III, and the evaluation in Chapter V demonstrate that Freud’s emancipatory potential figures in the theories under investigation in quite diverging ways. The ambiguous character of psychoanalysis becomes apparent in the complex matrix of conceptual convergences and divergences between the different theories and simultaneously illustrates their normative differences.

At the same time, the constitutional ambiguity of Freud’s theory addresses the second level of abstraction. It resurfaces in the specific, and diverging, forms of symbolic capital and scientific authority generated in the context of the instrumental dynamics pervading the disciplinary field. The diverging conceptualizations of emancipation, characterizing the works of critical theorists Fromm, Marcuse, Adorno, and American sociologists Parsons, Riesman, and Rieff, emerge in a disciplinary field that, propelled by the war-effort, rapidly professionalized and underwent fundamental changes. Methodological positivism, as my analysis of the field in Chapter II has shown, was able to survive both the golden age of grand sociological theories, dominated by Parsons, and the upheavals of the 1960s. The dimension of instrumental rationalization, it seems, prevails in the long run. My analysis, however, also demonstrated that formerly excluded voices – within the discipline and outside of it – were not only able to make themselves heard, but also consequently managed to establish
themselves in the disciplinary institutions. The struggle for scientific authority, though dominated by methodological positivism and generally following the scientistic paradigm, is multifaceted. Pockets in the field allowed for a (increasing) number of (critical) voices, whose currency in the competition for symbolic capital is constituted in concrete notions of emancipation. These, in turn, translate into diverging Freud adaptations in my research perspective.

In the quarrel between Fromm on the one, and Adorno and Marcuse on the other hand, Critical Theory’s negative emancipatory potential emerges as a quite distinct form of symbolic capital, which, although it was not translatable into economic capital at first, proved capable of turning into a specific, however marginal form of scientific authority. It granted Critical Theory’s persistence, emerging in Marcuse’s popularity in the 1960s, despite the unfavorable conditions in the field. Although Fromm did not establish himself in the disciplinary institutions of the sociological field – he rather established his own institutions in the psychological field – his career as a (self-referential) public intellectual and self-help-style author demonstrate the successful integration of a formerly marginal perspective into the broader sphere of American academic and intellectual life. Adorno’s establishment in the German sociological field cumulated in his presidency over the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie. Marcuse assumed a fixed position as a professor of philosophy at the University of California San Diego. Their successful establishment in the institutions was accompanied by a relative institutionalization of their theoretical perspectives, which, however, remained and still are marginal. It is, however, important to note that the positions the theorists assumed with regard to the civil rights and students’ movements do not necessarily indicate something akin to an ‘emancipatory degree’ of the theoretical perspectives. Especially Adorno’s theoretical reflection of his eventual rejection of the students’ movement and his insistence on theory as the only possible practice constitutes an approach to emancipation that persist in its radicality against the coercion of immediate improvement. It is especially the difference from Marcuse’s approach which mobilizes the dialectical dimension of divergence, because both theorists eventually have in common their insistence on the necessity of a radical breach.

Under the guidance of the convergence paradigm, Parsons conceived an objectivist grand theory, which fitted the general scientistic paradigm and propelled his approach to one of the three prime positions in the field. His insistence on value-neutrality affirmed the symbolic currency of scientificity, at least for the span of more than two decades. Just as rationalized
psychoanalysis in the psychological field, Parsons’s grand theory, however, eventually fell prey to the very logic it perpetuated. While methodological positivism prevailed, grand theory vanished. The insistence on the necessity for pre-empirical categories characterizes all the works I investigate in my study. Against the predominance of methodological positivism, it represents critical potential, because it questions the steady assumption that social reality can only be scientifically grasped by neutral description. It moves the social sciences closer to the humanities. Parsonianism, thus, is caught up in the instrumental dynamics dominating the field as a functionalist theory, which does not radically criticize the societal status quo and simultaneously establishes the necessity for theoretical reflection. Its integration of Freudian concepts perpetuated the rationalization of psychoanalysis. However, it also preserved its potential as a legitimate theory of individual and society.

Riesman was well established in the field, but never inhabited a position as prominent as Parsons’s. In the wake of The Lonely Crowd’s incredible success, the symbolic capital generated by Riesman served the purpose of establishing him in the field, but more importantly, it catered to extra-academic spheres. The book became crucial in establishing a Zeitdiagnose-style of sociological analysis, which posed itself in opposition to empiricism, yet abstained from formulating radical critiques. Riesman’s appropriation of the neo-Freudian social character model helped to transform the critical instruments of Fromm’s criticism into a sociological bestseller, which, in turn, paved the way for Fromm’s further popularization, most eminent in the publication of The Art of Loving in 1955. The book captured a sense of discontent in its audience, which expressed itself in the fact that the typology was received as a critique of the current societal conditions (of other-direction). It thereby unintentionally mobilized critical potential and directed it towards increasingly streamlined and reified approaches of self-help.

Rieff’s idiosyncratic position as the proponent of a rather conservative cultural criticism further helps to delineate the dialectics of emancipation and instrumentalization. The impact of the instrumental rationality pervading the field becomes apparent in the fact that Rieff considered his position as a vanishing, almost extinct attempt to rescue culture from the forces of modernity. His last wake up call to fellow teachers, those who potentially could step up as leaders and preserve culture, rails against the rationalizing tendency. Rieff’s theoretical position was firmly established against the objectivist mainstream – most prominently embodied by Parsons. His sense of defeat, however, does not simply capture the truth about
instrumental rationalization in an increasingly cultureless society; it rather points to the complex entanglements of emancipatory and instrumental dynamics in the field and society and/or culture at large. On the one hand, it is informed by the vast force of instrumental rationality structuring the field as the logic of capital acquirement, which casts Rieff’s antipositivist approach aside. On the other hand, his conservative defense of repression and the cultural institutions enforcing it – as the materialized vanguards of culture – is juxtaposed in opposition to the concrete emancipatory struggles of the civil rights and students’ movements. His defeat, hence, at the same time as it underscores the rationalization dynamics in the field at large, signifies the practical, and of course always already instrumentalized, success of emancipatory processes.

All the trajectories I followed in my study are characterized by the fact that their protagonists were able to secure positions for themselves, and, more importantly, become authorities in one way or the other. Their theories cannot fully escape the complicity in reproducing the instrumental dimension within the competitive arena of scientific fields in their function as symbolic currencies. The inescapable instrumentality is further highlighted by the implication that especially the typological approaches discussed in my study, that is Fromm’s, Riesman’s, and Rieff’s, and to a certain extent Marcuse’s, cannot avoid perpetuating relations of domination because they universalize the experiences of (white) middle class men in their analyses.

The Bourdieuan perspective sheds light on the inner-disciplinary dynamics, and an inevitable instrumentality which directs the ‘content’ negotiated in the field towards competition. Herzog’s concrete analysis of emancipatory struggles in the field of psychoanalysis enriches the perspective, because it illuminates the directedness of instrumental rationalization and its entanglement with existing societal relations of domination. The fact that homophobia and misogyny became prominent features of mainstream analysis is not sufficiently explicable by an account of mere professionalization. The potential ambiguity of Freud’s legacy emerges in the ambivalent relation of emancipatory thrust and cultural pessimism inscribed in his conceptual apparatus. However, the concrete outcome of the disciplinary struggles, the fact that anti-emancipatory dogmatism was able to prevail, implies a directedness of instrumental rationalization processes towards relations of domination, deeply inscribed into the material societal structure. On the grounds of this realization, the question for the actual content of the symbolic currency arises. Notions of emancipation are, at the same time as they function as
means in the disciplinary competition for authority, inscribed with a thrust towards liberation. This implicit directedness calls for the theoretical assessment of emancipatory potentials as a means to its own ends.

The Bourdieuan lens runs the danger of erasing the actual content of the struggle. The dialectical dimension of divergence, which figures as a means of making my own normative orientation explicit in the discussion of emancipation potentialities, works against mere descriptive assessment. It brings actual potentialities to life by grasping juxtapositions without wanting to resolve the emerging tension in the immediate societal situation; it rather preserves the thought of reconciliation as an eventual possibility. The historical discussion of competing conceptualizations of psychoanalytic emancipation, hence, necessarily extents to the present, since hierarchies of domination have not vanished. Eva Illouz’s work helps to ground the lingering normative orientation in current debates. Her notion of the therapeutic narrative skillfully reflects the instrumental totality of ‘emotional capitalism’ and psychology’s entanglements in it. However, in face of Adorno’s defense of the non-identical, not least inscribed in the notion of constellation, Illouz’s eventual rejection of psychoanalysis merely reproduces the instrumentality which propelled the therapeutic to the core of modern Western self-hood in the first place. The potential reconciliation of subject and object – Laclau’s ‘absolute coincidence of human essence with itself’ – rather starts with the recognition of the fundamental and real trauma that is constituted by the subject’s powerlessness in the face of the (historical) forces of domination. Illouz’s therapeutic narrative rightfully targets the individualized Freudian emancipation potentiality when it criticizes the self-propelling logic of trauma resolution. However, the universal dimension of trauma, inscribed in Marx’s objective mediation, and concretely emerging in capitalism’s tendency to universalize suffering, challenges the individualized notion without disposing of the fundamental juxtaposition of subject and object, individual and society, as it is engrained in Freud’s drive theory, at least as a dialectical potential.
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TWAA Br_0969 Marcuse, Herbert
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969/26 Letter of Marcuse to Adorno 7/11/57
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HUGFP 15.2/Box 11/ Folder: Germany, Conference on 1944
HUGFP 42.42/Box 1/Folder: Freudian Theory
   handwritten notes 1959:3-4

HUGFP 42.45.2
   The Social System First Draft

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HUGFP 42.8.8/Box 3/ Folder: Bellah, Robert
   Letter of Bellah to Parsons 2/25/1970
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HUGFP 42.8.8/Box 13/ Folder: Loyalty investigation papers & correspondence

**David Riesman Papers**

HUGFP 99.8 Gen. Crspd. With Ind.
Box 5 /Folder BAU - BELL
   Letter of Bell to Riesman 1/20/1972
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Box 1/Folder: Bell, Daniel
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Box 8/Folder: Erikson, Erik
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   Letter of David Riesman to Richard O. Whipple 4/20/1960

Box 41/Folder: the LC Corsp. 2 of 2
   Letter of Riesman to Edgar Morin 12/27/1963
Summary

My dissertation explores the ambiguous legacy of psychoanalysis by analyzing a number of sociological theories which prominently integrate Freudian concepts in the field of US sociology, post WWII. It is specifically interested in the gap that opens up between the physical encounter of the originally Frankfurt based Institute for Social Research and US sociology during the Institute’s American and the delayed reception of Critical Theory, its social-philosophical legacy, which begins in the late 1960s. In the context of my research interest, psychoanalysis functions as a common reference system of otherwise conflicting approaches. I ask for the critical potential of Freudian theory and trace theoretical and personal encounters in order to illuminate a period of conformity, challenges, and changes within the disciplinary field.

The analysis is twofold. Following the conceptual framework of Bourdieuan field analysis, the first to chapters trace the instrumental dynamics of competitive struggles for symbolic capital and scientific authority in the fields of American psychology and US sociology, with regard to the integration of psychoanalysis. In both fields, processes of professionalization and scientification lead to disciplinary ‘golden ages’ in the 1950s and their eventual demise in the 1960s. My analysis eventually carves out the dialectical relation of professionalization processes and psychoanalysis’s inherent emancipatory promise and points to the complex entanglement of rationalization processes and societal relations of domination. Following, with reference to Ernesto Laclau, a definition of emancipation as necessarily radical, the third and fourth chapter investigate concrete adaptations of Freudian concepts in the works of critical theorists Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, and US sociologists Talcott Parsons, David Riesman, and Philip Rieff. The fifth and last chapter eventually offers an analysis of the explicit or implicit emancipatory potentials and essential convergences and divergences. The investigation finally picks up on Eva Illouz’s contemporary analysis of emotional capitalism, which critically identifies a ‘therapeutic narrative’ as the core of modern self-hood.

My investigation makes its own normative directedness towards radical notions of emancipation explicit. It comes to the conclusion that the abandonment of Freudian drive theory becomes a crucial marker of psychoanalysis’s rationalization which is complicit in the formation of Illouz’s therapeutic narrative; however, instead of abandoning Freudian theory altogether it mobilizes Critical Theory’s negative emancipatory potential and argues, with Adorno and Marcuse, for a critical, and dialectical, re-appropriation of Freudian drive theory.
Zusammenfassung


Dabei macht meine Untersuchung ihre eigene normative Ausrichtung an radikalen Emanzipationsbegriffen explizit. Sie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Entsorgung der Freudschen Triebtheorie zum kennzeichnenden Merkmal der Rationalisierung der Psychoanalyse wird, was sich schließlich in Illouz ’Therapeutischem Narrativ‘ niederschlägt. Anstatt jedoch auf die Erkenntnisse der Freudschen Theorie zu verzichten, möchte sie das negative emanzipatorische Potenzial der Kritischen Theorie mobilisieren und spricht sich mit Adorno und Marcuse für eine kritische, dialektische Wideraneignung der Triebtheorie aus.

Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Hiermit versichere ich an Eides statt, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation ohne fremde Hilfe angefertigt und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe. Alle Teile, die wortwörtlich oder sinngemäß einer Veröffentlichung entstammen, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit wurde noch nicht veröffentlicht oder einer anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt.

Marius Dahmen, Berlin, den 4. April 2019