

Conclusion

The presented history of the Polish-British relations within the period of 1990-2004 as well as the research material were to prove legitimacy of the hypotheses constructed at the beginning of the research process. The author focused on the events which marked the transformations of Poland's political, economic and social system in 1990, with the most historic moments leading to the country's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999, and the membership in the European Union in 2004. Such an essential period for Poland's development in terms of military, political and economic stability, however, was accompanied by the participation and support of other countries, whose memberships in the organizations of military security and economic growth were to determine Polish aspirations.

For this reason, the author focused on Poland's relations with Great Britain, the country with which the link had been strengthened through history, a huge number of Polish community in the UK as well as the closeness through the USA bonds. Moreover, the state's cooperation in context of the Partnership for Peace and NATO relations, altogether with its position in the hard core of the European Union could contribute to the British attitude towards Poland's aspirations for both memberships. Therefore, the thesis made attempts at proving the hypotheses of the British contribution to the acceleration of a system transformation in Poland and the country's ambitions to enter the integrative organizations. Furthermore, the author aimed at proving the hypothesis of the UK's political impact on Poland's membership in NATO and the EU, as the attitude of forcing the enlargement processes.

On the basis of the collected research material, however, both hypotheses were proven to be true, although with reference to the factors which influenced the favourable attitude of Great Britain in terms of Poland's aspirations and membership in the organizations as well as the process of enlarging the structures with new members.

The development of the British-Polish relations seemed to emerge more from the principles of Britain's foreign policy, as Poland was never a crucial political, economic or military partner in its European policy in the past. It did not mean, though, that Poland was not of any diplomatic interest for Great Britain, as it was, which was mostly determined by its location in a geopolitical arrangement in this part of Europe.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that Great Britain's attitude to Poland's presence in the European as well as Atlantic structures after 1989 became favourable, with

the approval of Polish aspirations. Such a political change, with reference to its approach after both World Wars, showed how much the state transformed its policy towards Central Europe, and discerned that leaving this part of the continent without any assistance might result in a European instability. For this reason, the UK altogether with Poland were governed by their own goals: Warsaw intentionally aspired for the guarantee of future economic and military security and London could make attempts to retrieve the position of a superstate after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the British also pressed for the membership of Poland in especially military structures for fear that either Germany or Russia could fill the role of hegemonic protector in this part of the world. The possibility of achieving its national purpose with the help of Poland, though, was one of the factors motivating Britain in the pursuit for the Polish membership.

However, Great Britain's efforts for widening the EU with easterners should not be assessed as only its policy of profits. Since its early presence in the Community, Britain was a member with its own aspirations, objectives and policies fairly different from those of the organization. Although the British approved of the membership, they tended to loosen the bonds with the integrative structure as much as possible in order to save its sovereignty, which not necessarily collided with Poland's goals. The history of Polish nation proved how the Poles were attached to their nationality and any sign of losing independence might result in their objection. Thus, Warsaw appreciated the possibility of entering the stable and economically secure organization on the one hand, but it was also concerned about the necessity of a kind of subordination to the principles of the Union, on the other. Therefore, both sides made efforts to avoid incurring either financial or social costs; London persuaded the Poles to conduct necessary political and social reforms to reduce the costs of admitting new members and restrict the internal EU transformations, thus accelerating inevitable changes for the country.

Moreover, the UK's contribution to Poland's aspirations was also reflected in positive and encouraging attitudes of both British parties: the Conservative and Labour Party, which, although with opposite philosophies and policies, approved Poland's ambitions for different reasons, though.

The Conservative Party's polemics proved their interests in the membership of Eastern European countries, including Poland, to concern mostly their vision of Europe and the place Britain could take as an EU power. The visits paid by the UK's Conservative officials to Poland were intended to enhance British image in Europe than express a real care for the applicant country. Moreover, the statements and speeches made by the Tories showed the genuine aspiration for enlarging the organization with the post-communist states, and

even if the concern referred to the states themselves, their development, prosperity and security, the real reason which predominated still was to block a deeper integration within the European Union.

The attitude of the Labour Party towards Poland's admission to the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union was also favourable and even more open to the Polish side, especially during the rule of the Labourers. Since the beginning of Tony Blair in power, his politicians made attempts to sustain the status quo in British European policy, although a new Prime Minister strove for rebuilding Britain's foreign affairs, which were neglected by his predecessor, John Major. The European issues, however, were not pushed into the background, as the government did its best to reposition the UK in Europe, with the completion of the single market and the enlargement of the EU to the east as the priorities. Moreover, the Labour also intended to accelerate some processes, i.e. the expansion of the EU, during the British presidency in the first half of 1998.

The intensity of the British encouragement and presence in Poland increased with the period of its presidency during which both countries wished to put their actions forward to reach the goals although for different reasons. The clear objectives of the UK's European policy for the period of January-June 1998, presented during the Warsaw speech of Christopher Hum, British Ambassador in Poland was to clarify the government's vision of Europe, with the commitment of enlarging the community and accelerating the process of obtaining membership for Poland. He could express his satisfaction for the possibility of introducing the Poles, and the rest of eastern partners, to the European family, thus completing the challenge which appeared after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Mr. Hum did not hesitate to admit that the expansion could not only result from the British moral obligation, but it would also contribute to its own interest, i.e. a bigger and more prosperous single market, the respect for human rights and ethnic minorities, and the openness of Europe to the world.

The substantial part of the research process of the thesis, however, was based on the analysis of Poland in the coverage of the British press. Although the processes of Polish admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union did not take an extensive interest of British journalists, politicians and experts to debate over and discuss the intricacies of the events in the newspapers, magazines or periodicals, yet the articles which appeared in them tended to present Poland more in the context of the European or international political arena, with the events significant for Great Britain, its government and the citizens for some reasons. The presentation of the Polish attempts for both entries and the country which would become the UK's partner, affected not only the British society but also

the Polish side. The interest of Britain's newspapers and magazines proved their engagement on the road to the organizations, and the commentaries on Poland's backwardness in some areas helped the state realize it.

Although the press could mention both the strengths and weaknesses, Poland's on the road to the Alliance appeared as a trustworthy, self-confident and reliable partner, whose aspirations for the membership resulted from the necessity to provide its nations with political and military safety, and prevented itself from the potential threat of Russia. The British newspapers and magazines emphasized the fact of Polish inconvenient location, which might contribute to the state's possible problems, therefore fully supported its admission to NATO. Despite some sceptical voices which occurred on the way, Poland as the other countries, were not given a negative reception, and their determination to be always on the alert could dispel the doubts and show the candidate in a favourable light. Nevertheless, the issue of admitting Poland, among other eastern states, did not win much renown in the British press, the main concern of which occurred to be the debates on the relations with Russia in the context of the enlargement. Again, the fact of noticing Poland's efforts for the NATO entry, even if through the aspect of other events connected with it, proved the UK to involve its political potential in the country's ambitions. Furthermore, every comment, which accompanied the Polish advances in the issue, became an encouragement indicating a proper way to be taken.

The enlargement of the European Union with the Eastern European countries found a lot more place in British newspapers and magazines, as the process abounded with a greater number of substantial transformations of the functioning of the integrative organization. Poland, as the biggest state aspiring for the membership turned out to be more debatable in the context of its adjustment to the EU, the necessary changes being implemented in the EU institutions as well as the fears or concerns connected with Polish accession.

Poland's possible admission was compared to Spain's entry, in terms of economic criteria as well as the standards of living, unfortunately in favour of Spain, although the membership was not stated as impossible, according to the journalists. What did raise a kind of concern, though, was Warsaw's belief in early accession, with the full awareness of the majority of legislative work to be done in order to adjust to the EU standards.

The encouragement which Poland obtained from both favourable and less favourable coverage boosted its confidence anyway. One of the clear evidence was an article published in *The Economist* about Poland as the future EU partner, but with a kind of educational message for the Poles in the context of Polish governmental elections and the expectations after the entry. The article was probably to present the British with the country which was

aspiring with such determination to share the privileges of the EU with them, but which missed so much to become an equal partner. Poland was described as the state with numerous drawbacks of the whole economic, social and political aspects of life, yet there were some statements of the authors which could imply that the nation eventually chose a proper way on their struggle for a well-developed country with high standards of living. Nonetheless, unscrambling the message the magazine tried to convey both for the Poles and Britons, turned out to be a hard task. Even if the intentions were to discourage the Polish side with the presentation of all “missing points” with the EU, the determination of Poland did not surrender, and if the plan was to threaten Britain with the state full of troubles when in the EU, thus depriving them of the profits, the target was not, fortunately, achieved.

Even if Poland’s more threatening profile happened to occur in the press, with reference to the country’s ability to take advantage of the situation it was in or the description as a demanding state, quite “aggressive”, which used for example the anniversary of Germany’s invasion 60 years before to obtain its goal, i.e. a fast and early admission to the European structures, it did not alarm the Poles.

Moreover, the nature of the Polish-British relations emerging from the coverage in the British press became even more distinctive along with the advancement of the EU negotiation accessions. Such issues as agriculture and the subsidies for farmers had always aroused concern among the EU states for the reason of a different size of rural areas, thus unequal division of subventions allocated to the members. No wonder, then, that when Poland, a country with the biggest population among the candidates and a great number of farmers, aspired for the membership, the doubts about the reform over CAP increased, with the peak of the farm debates falling on the period after the accession negotiations began.

However, the picture of Polish farmers in the light of the CAP reform obtained a vague reception from the British side, which tended to present it almost as relics of the past on the one hand, which could have contributed to the false image of Polish farming if it had not been for balancing it with the picture of a modern, prosperous and well-off farmer, on the other.

Although Poland attracted the British press attention during the hottest period of the negotiations, the general reception of the stubborn, determined and sometimes uncompromising attitudes of Polish politicians in the fight for farm benefits, eventually successful, met general favour of the coverage. The Polish aspirations and ambitions to satisfy the needs of its citizens, mainly farmers could be perceived as a positive feature of the states, though some tended to call Poland an uncomfortable partner. Yet, the journalists

were able to find similarities between the Poles and the British in terms of being mistrustful of the intentions of other member states, for the different reasons, though.

Moreover, a positive aspect resulting from Poland's fiery attitude to oppose the unfair farm policy and a federalist foreign policy run by Brussels, was appreciated by the British as Poland did approve of joining "anti-Common Agricultural Policy" club led by Britain, Germany, Holland and Sweden. Surprisingly, the UK joined the issue of the Polish and Spanish demands' cuts as soon as the British leader spotted the interest in the French-German axis. The British change of the attitude to Poland proved the mastery of the "culture of diplomacy", or rather a sense of craftiness, although Tony Blair claimed the decisions of cutting the budget expenditures of the four biggest contributors to the EU budget, i.e. France, Germany, Britain, with the support of Austria, Sweden and Holland, was made before the collapse of the Brussels summit. Nonetheless, the two events coincided at the same time, which could not allow limiting the EU spending to fund aid to poorer regions to be regarded differently than Warsaw and Madrid's punishment for blocking the agreement on the draft constitution. Despite the fact that the decision had been prepared before, though, the situation perfectly suited Germany, which did not even attempt to avoid this kind of impression, as one British senior diplomat stated.

All in all, the involvement of the British press in Poland's endeavours to become the EU partner, reflected the UK's impact and interest in the Polish membership. A general positive image of Poland was to convince the nation that the engagement of one of the leading states was not groundless and must have proved the Polish clout, thus encouraging the country to fight for its goals.

Apart from the concerns around the Common Agricultural Policy, though, Poland became present in the issues of institutional changes and overall transformations connected with the enlargement ranging from the Nice summit to the official completion of the accession negotiations and the invitation given at the Copenhagen meeting. The significance of the Nice summit was crucial for the reason of being the moment to end with the Treaty compared with Maastricht, and the one included necessary shifts to function as the Union of 27 members.

Again, the comments on Poland's haggling in Copenhagen were divided, with the harsh ones which tore the Polish behaviour to pieces, giving a picture of the Poles as the nation using their sense of national tragedy to achieve their goals and abusing a well-off club of Europeans, leaving the impression of money-grubbing Eastern European countries.

With the idea of creating the EU constitution and appointing the EU Convention under the leadership of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, there was no end of the discussions and

debates on the contents of the document as well as the transformation of the EU it would cause. The current states altogether with the still aspiring countries disputed about the consequences of the constitution for Europe, presenting their stances and demanding the changes to make the draft acceptable for all, two of them being of a special interest: Great Britain, whose sceptical attitude to a legislative restriction resulted from the lack of such a document and Poland, whose belligerence and drive for power had attracted publicity of the British press.

It would be impossible to deny, however, that the presence of Poland in the British press during the EU constitutional project was scanty. Just the opposite, as the Poles stood out with their attitude of a proud and rebellious nation, whose objection to being subordinated or manipulated made the EU members' life a misery. On the one hand, determination to act against all odds was perceived to be the state's virtue, but sometimes the frustration of the observers contributed to Poland's picture of an inexperienced, politically unprepared to face compromises, nationalistic and with a lack of political culture country, which so willingly referred to history, each time its European fate was endangered.

The image of Poland and the Polish nation for the British population had been a mystery, as while the British political scene could learn a lot from the direct relations with the Poles as well as their presence and participation in numerous European events, the Britons, as a society, were deprived of such knowledge. Moreover, the British Prime Minister, altogether with the representatives of his cabinet, and the distinguished politicians of Labour and Conservative Party paid visits to Poland, or received Polish diplomats in their country, hence having opportunities to meet and recognize the picture of the future EU partner from a political perspective.

On the one hand, a lack of a clear and distinctive portrayal with reference to the coverage in the British press should not be astonishing, as the information about Poland seemed to be incoherent as well as incomplete. It was impossible, though, to acquire at least some pieces of knowledge about the aspiring country, and with eagerness to widen or confirm such an image in other sources, the overall perception could be quite satisfying. Nevertheless, without making an attempt to excuse the commentaries in the press, an average Briton was able to learn about Polish politicians that they were determined and intransigent to achieve their national goals, as well as with prospects to be a strong, stable and influential partner in the European and world arena. As for the profile of an average farmer or an entrepreneur, however, the British were able to find out that they could either be technologically backward and poor landowners, or modern, prosperous and aspiring for the EU funds businessmen.

Finally, the way Poland was portrayed did not also clarify the British nation a real picture of the country, as once it was perceived as an economically and politically unstable state, while the other day the view changed to being a predictable ally and a responsible partner. No wonder, then, that the citizens of the UK did have problems with comprehending the information in order to get familiar with a new EU member.

The inconsistency of Poland's portrayal in the British press was proven by presenting Poles as highly skilled people who, although more than once worked as labourers, trades people or service sector workers, could apply their skills more rationally in the EU market due to the membership, and contrasting such an image with a traditional, a bit backward society. Following this way of perception, though, the Poles were a nation still dominated by the Catholic church and Poland was a country afraid of discussing such issues as prostitution or paedophilia.

Although one may state that the image of the country preserved in the public opinion has no reference to the political attitude of a state to a particular nation. In fact, though, it is just on the contrary: the society is as important part of the country as economy and politics, therefore the public opinion does shape the mutual relations as well. Its contribution may be manifested in the range of knowledge and the attitude constructed on the basis on that. However, the role of a state is to equip the society with the necessary information in order to enable people to realize the process, and present the potential benefits and threats resulting from it.

The British society was deprived of a consistent and genuine picture of the Polish nation as the study of the information published in the press revealed. Therefore, the analysis of the outcomes of the surveys proved the Britons to be indifferent to the enlargement, and even if they expressed their support to welcome Poland to the organizations, their approach was rather a result of an instinctive reaction, than a careful comprehension of the issue. A potential reader could ask why the British should take more interest in familiarizing with the Polish nation more than with other newcomers, then? The answer seems to be simple: for the very reason of Poland being the biggest population to enter the EU, and moreover, for the reason of their state taking a particular interest in having Poland on their side. Of course, the second cause may be not convincing enough for an average citizen, but the first one must be too appealing as it is connected with the labour market, and yet does not lack the link with the state's policy. As the politics shapes the public opinion, the public opinion creates the attitude of the politics, in reverse.

Therefore, if the political attitude of Great Britain was to be evaluated in terms of its public opinion, however, the first hypothesis should have been rejected.

The second hypothesis, concerning Britain's approach to the very process of enlarging both NATO and the EU, also proved to be true. The research process of the study of accessible materials reflected the impact of the UK's aspirations for widening the organizations on approving Poland as a member.

The history of British relations shaped before and during the World War II shows how distant the country was from the European continent, although located in this part of the world. Its links and even dependence on the USA as well as an imperialist nature, but also a geopolitical situation and a natural separation from the continent gave the state a feeling of isolation, independence and a special respect for its sovereignty. Therefore, Great Britain did not express much interest in taking a leadership of a strong and long-lasting European association, although it possessed all virtues to do that in 1945.

Great Britain treasured the British Commonwealth the most. In a post-war period, a dismantlement of the colonial system and a creation of a new line-up with colonies became a task of a high priority. For this reason all the European matters were put aside. The state shaped a conception of three concentric circles of British policy, which emphasized the significance of the British Commonwealth in the world, and placing the issues of Europe in the end. Winston Churchill at the conference of the Conservative Party in September 1948 confirmed his strong approval for the circles' idea and came the British Commonwealth and the Empire to the fore. He stated that the second concentric circle concerned the English-speaking world of the USA, where Canada and other colonies played a really important role. The third circle, however, was a united Europe. Such a distant position of the European continent in British policy did not mean a lack of respect for a future order in Europe, though, but Churchill realized that shaping a new line-up in a post-war Europe would result from the division of the old continent, with a special regard on the East-West line.

The indifference of Great Britain to Europe, expressed by the society as well as political leaders, caused a lack of knowledge about the European economic or political activity. However, it did not mean that Great Britain stayed in a total isolation from any form of cooperation, as it did not. The state signed some agreements or other documents, although without much faith in their significance or a great change in British policy. The attitude of Great Britain towards the integration of Europe began to change about 15 years after the war. Although the mentality of European countries underwent that process soon after the ravages of war, Britain kept its indecisiveness until about 1960.

Great Britain's activity on the field of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union has not restricted to the very process of enlargement. On the one hand, its involvement and acceptance of the expansions proved to result from British interests for

widening rather than deepening the structures, especially as far as the EU was concerned, but on the other hand, the UK tended to enhance the bilateral relations with the aspiring countries, one of which was undoubtedly Poland.

The process of reshaping an international framework by Great Britain has been a complex one, and not successful on each stage, but the aim of having an effective foreign policy, in its Atlantic and European dimension, however, was accompanied by both, intelligent and exploitable assets. The United Kingdom possesses a military and economic power, on the one hand, and reputation, cultural diplomacy, on the other. All those tangible and intangible assets contribute to a credible and effective foreign policy.

Although Great Britain might consider a “cautious” policy, sheltering behind the security policy of others, or becoming the periphery of international politics, but why shall it? While it is strategically located, with global interests and commitments developed and the glory of historical super power, the state still possesses the assets to play a major role on the European and world stage. Moreover, Britain perceives strengthening its economy as a driving force of an effective foreign policy, which is closely connected with free trade. In terms of security, however, the power believes in the armed forces as a guarantee of peace. The defence factor expresses itself mainly through NATO membership, whereas the political and economic aspects are chiefly associated with membership of the European Union. Great Britain has relied on the Anglo-American relationship in the context of security since the end of the Second World War, being aware of the fact that the USA is the only power able to take decisive action in case a state or a group of states is in danger.

The question of “what kind of Europe”? in British foreign policy, however, occurred to be not less troublesome to answer. Since the end of Second World War and the speech of Winston Churchill about the circles and, at the same time, the position of Europe in British policy, the conception for the UK’s vision of Europe has not transformed. Great Britain has tended to be in favour of a “Europe of states”, based on cooperation, in contrast to a “Federal Europe” with a focus on integration, which has been gaining more and more followers on the continent. Such a British attitude has confirmed member states in the conviction of its reluctance and obsession with independence as well as sovereignty.

The biggest problem for Britain in the EU, however, is its commitment to economic and monetary union (EMU). The issue in question has two dimensions of losing sovereignty: the symbolic one – e.g. the Queen’s head on banknotes, and the practical one – connected with limiting the independence of national economic management. Moreover, the British anxiety about EMU results from the fact whether the system will be able to handle the necessary management tasks and how much support it will receive from national

governments in case of making unpopular decisions. Furthermore, the political dimension of the monetary union is also a great enigma for Great Britain: if the countries hand over to “federal” authority their national economic management, will it mean no return and the final surrender of autonomy? Again, then, the prospect of becoming EMU member will bring the UK closer towards federalism, the model which is disapproved of by many British elites.

Therefore, the Britain’s favourable approach to the process of enlargement resulted from its own interests to a great extent, especially as far as the EU expansion was concerned. With enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, the UK was not governed by its benefits only, although that aspect could become an important part either.

It is essential to underline that all political parties in the UK had approved of the Atlantic Alliance since its establishment in 1949, which undoubtedly contrasted with their attitudes to the country’s membership in the European Communities. Nonetheless, it does not mean that there were not any disputes among the British politicians over the involvement in the forces. There were, the same as the temperature of the relationships between two allies, which had changed according to the operations held by NATO. There was the other side of fluctuation in British attitude to NATO actions: the party in power. The Conservative cabinet of John Major had less favourable relations with Bill Clinton, which was reflected in the differences in coping with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, whereas the Labour government became more Atlanticist, which revived the atmosphere on the Blair-Clinton line and the engagement of British forces.

However, Blair’s government distinguished more benefits from the cooperation. It did also realise that the UK’s value for the USA was closely associated with its leading role in the EU, which was emphasized by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Cook. After all, the United Kingdom perceived its goal in joining the military structures and opening its door to the new members. Firstly, the alliance with the United States meant keeping under control either Germany or Russia and preventing them from potential eagerness to dominate Europe. Secondly, the enlargement of NATO was supposed to keep Germany tied to the western democracies and the institutions of the western security community, thus sharing the role of a co-ordinator for the new countries and allowing other EU states to play the role, especially Britain.

Britain’s aspirations for the expansion of the European Union, however, resulted from different reasons, although a common interest between those two processes existed: the UK’s ambition for a political clout in the international scene. The issue of the EU enlargement, brought more committed a British attitude, as the stake was higher.

However, with the origin of the European Union, the prospects for Britain's equal role with France and Germany began to materialize provided that Great Britain would play its hand well. Therefore, when John Major took up the Cabinet and declared in March 1991 Britain's place at the heart of Europe, the EU smaller states hoped for weakening the Franco-German hegemony and gaining the vote for their interests. The Tories' stance since 1988 accepted the membership of the Community as an unchangeable part of British politics and their leader became famous for his pro-European views as early as in 1994 when, as a Labour leader, created a "Europe Group" associated with all aspects of the EU policy. His objective at that time was to perceive the Labour as an anti-federalist party, but willing to cooperate with the EU partners in order to change the image of an isolated country.

The UK's approval of the EU enlargement has always been the part of British policy. The Britain's willingness to open to new countries arouse, to a great extent, from its reluctance to seek for a deeper integration, especially to enter EMU. John Major emphasized repeatedly that he continued the vision of the founders of the European Community. He agreed with all member states' duty towards the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the necessity of their incorporating into the European structures in order to prevent divisions in Europe.

With coming the Labour Party to power, the issue of the expansion became even more distinguished, with its hottest period during the British presidency whose programme concerned the enlargement of the European Union, presenting the leader's positive attitude. Nevertheless, the UK could discern its interest in advancing the process of entering new members: the extension of the European structures would mean less integration, and thus not pushing Britain into strengthening monetary relationships. However, the British stance on the enlargement favoured equal criteria for each of the entrants, regardless of progress each state was making.

However clearly the UK advocated its support for the EU enlargement, Germany and France also made their contribution to the process, or it is better to say: in the name of the expansion. Yet, it is beyond question that the core states were in favour of the enlargement, nevertheless they pressed for closer links between each other in order to create a "hard core" with a vision of a two-speed Europe, the model Britain was strongly opposed to.

However, the objective of NATO as well as the European Union of enlarging their structures and ensuring new countries with security and democratic, altogether with economic stability, was especially favoured by Great Britain. In the case of the Atlantic Alliance, though, the UK could not follow any national business, as the matter of military guarantee of peace in Europe and in the world was beyond any question. Nevertheless,

Britain's inclination to welcoming new members of the EU could bring some doubts whether its attitude was nothing else than a sheer care for a balanced development of the continent, or there might be hidden reasons for maintaining such a stance.

Yet, taking into consideration Great Britain's efforts to cut through to the leading core, it seemed to be obvious that the state was driven to act in favour of the enlargement in order to weaken the position of Germany in the EU in general and French commitments to some moves of common policies, which were unacceptable for the UK. Moreover, in the British interest was to speed up the process of extending in order to delay the actions for a closer integration, just as the economic and monetary union. On the other hand, however, one could not exclude the fact that Britain wished to invite new members for the reason of a historical and traditional attitude of contributing to a well-balanced arrangement of the economic power in the world.

The quoted facts proved that Great Britain's attitude was favourable and even pressing for the process of enlargement, which undoubtedly contributed to Poland's membership in the organizations. The other issue, however, is the question of the factors influenced such an approach. Although the research could get the author familiarized with various contexts of the events leading to and around the expansions, it was impossible to state clearly that Great Britain acted only in favour of its national interests and a favourable position in the structures. The history of British European Policy showed that this area had always been a significant issue for Britain, no matter who took the rule. Moreover, the aspirations for uniting the continent, providing its stability in terms of security and economy were not of the very national nature either, as they were beneficial for all countries located in Europe.

On the other hand, however, the skill of political competence, based on experience, diplomacy and culture, allowed the state to take advantage of some favourable conditions and obtain profits for itself as well. Yet, it was not an attitude which led the UK to their goals at the expense of Poland, as escaping from a closer integration of the EU or keeping Germany or Russia under control in case of NATO, did not bring Poland any threats or did not push it away from the structures. On the contrary, the favourable attitude of Great Britain to the enlargement of both organizations, regardless of the reasons, helped Poland enter the areas of military and economic stability.

Having undertaken the research in the aspect of Polish-British relations with the contribution of the UK to Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, the author hoped to prove that the cooperation between Poland and Great Britain existed and brought positive results. There are a lot of publications about the

Polish-German relations in terms of European policy or Polish-American relations in the aspect of military cooperation. However, the history of Polish-British links consolidated the stereotype of an indifferent nation, without a defined attitude towards particular issues. The author's aim was to prove the significance of the relationships between those two nations, their cooperation in the areas of mutual interests and the development of dependence as NATO partners and the EU members, which would contribute to the increase of knowledge in the field of the European and international political relations.