

Chapter II

Poland's road to the European Union.

1. The origins of integration processes.

Since the ancient times it was the state, which guarded the security, domestic order of a society, and all citizens altogether with the rest of inhabitants. Nevertheless, despite possessing the authority and power, the weakness of a state was perceived as long ago as in antiquity. Thus, the observation of the failures of own sovereignty led to the conceptions of great philosophers that the states-towns ought to integrate in relationships as they were not a self-sufficient existence any more⁹⁵. Moreover, it was believed that creating such a unity would provide benefits of two kinds: states-towns involved in an organization would prevent them from mutual destructions; besides, they would become a power with the guarantee of internal and external security for their citizens.

However, the reasons that philosophers, thinkers or rulers were guided by in order to unite the continent were of a various nature⁹⁶. First of them was associated with the loss of a political unity at the age of the Roman Empire, with a goal of rebuilding such a state of affairs. Furthermore, no matter which history period is taken into consideration, the second cause was connected with a fear of an external aggressor, the Arabs, Turks, leading to Russia. Finally, the proponents of political views perceived the idea of integrated Europe to be a chance of disposing of fierce battles forever.

1.1. The notion and essence of the European integration.

The notion of “integration” is ambiguous and interpreted in all sorts of ways. It comes from a Latin word “integratio”, which means creating a unity out of different parts. As a consequence, however, in place of a bigger number of smaller entities before integration, appears a smaller number of bigger entities, or even one overpowering entity⁹⁷. The European integration, though, is a multilateral process of a voluntary rapprochement and

⁹⁵ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja europejska*, Warszawa 2004, p. 25.

⁹⁶ Popowicz K., *Historia integracji europejskiej*, Warszawa 2006, p. 13.

⁹⁷ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 29.

an internal connection of a group of states, which forms new legislative rules as well as new organizational structures⁹⁸.

The European integration is based on long-lasting achievements of Europe's civilization, shaped mostly by Greek culture, Roman law and universal Christian ideas. Moreover, it is enhanced by commonly formed heritage of human rights and liberties, equalities and solidarity, the rule of law, pluralism of ideas and tolerance, as well as democratic rules of the states. Throughout the centuries, different borders of European countries have not prevented from a development of philosophic ideas, intellectual movements, a development of art, or scientific discoveries on the whole continent⁹⁹.

However, the essence of the European integration does not only result from a development of European culture, as external conditions, such as experiences and results of the Second World War, as well as internal ones, i.e. European-German relations did contribute to the process¹⁰⁰. In the beginning the integration process in Europe included only some aspects of cooperation between integrating countries, but with time and experience, it extended to other fields leading to creating new structures and improving the rules of functioning.

The first concepts of integrating Europe in the form of theoretical conceptions of philosophy and political-ideological ideas, along with particular political as well as economic undertakings, appeared at the times of antiquity¹⁰¹. The initial proposals referred to the creation of "states-towns" relationships as the forms of integration structures in the ancient Greece. At the times of the Middle Ages, however, the ideas were more of a universal nature¹⁰². Saint Augustine called for forming a great worldwide empire based on peace principles. Moreover, similar views were propagated by Saint Thomas of Akwin, who promoted the supremacy of popes' power over secular authority. But there were some proponents, such as the Italian poet D. Alighieri, who expressed different opinions on the issue of providing a universal peace. Just the opposite, he was in favour of uniting all states under an absolute rule of the emperor, independent from the pope.

The XVI century also abounded in a big number of integration projects, among which a special attention should be paid to the proposal of the Czech king George from Podiebrad¹⁰³. He put forward the idea of establishing anti-Turkish union of European states (the League of Peace) with supranational bodies. The vision of king George's country led to

⁹⁸ Łastawski K., *Historia integracji europejskiej*, Toruń 2006, p. 9.

⁹⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁰ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁰¹ Nowak A.Z., Milczarek D., (ed.), *Europeistyka z zarysów*, Warszawa 2006, p. 16.

¹⁰² Ibidem, p. 17.

¹⁰³ Ibidem.

equal rights for nations, peace conditions of Europe's development, a common army, sanctions against aggressors, and a common law with the judiciary¹⁰⁴.

At the beginning of the XVII century, Maximilian Sully, the minister and adviser of the king of France Henry IV, presented on behalf of his king the Great Plan¹⁰⁵. The Plan included the idea of shaping the relationship of European countries, which would be treated equally, as well as of three European religions: Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism. At the same time, however, the project assumed the creation of European structure with the freedom of trade and the security against external danger. At the end of the century, William Penn, a co-originator of a religious group, the Quakers, proposed to set up a union of all European nations, including Russia and Turkey, with an aim of providing peace in Europe and peaceful solutions of conflicts among member states¹⁰⁶.

The following century began with a monumental work: "The project of a constant permanent peace" by Castel de Saint-Pierre, a French priest, diplomat and philosopher¹⁰⁷. The author presented the conception of creating the European Union in the form of Christian republic, with similar purposes of his predecessors from the previous century. The project aroused a great interest among European elites of the time, influencing the reflections of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant or Stanislaw Leszczyński, the king of Poland¹⁰⁸.

Rousseau, altogether with his colleague, Voltaire, in their numerous publications and treatises propagated the creation of European nations' alliances, directing at the establishment of one all-European republic, which would replace states and provide peaceful solution of conflicts¹⁰⁹. Especially Rousseau followed the idea of "perpetual peace", developed by de Saint-Pierre, which found a great number of followers and was used, among the others, in the treaties of the acknowledged German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Kant's demands for establishing European republican federation, called the League of Nations, was not, however, presented in a detailed conception.

The modern times of XIX century and later were dominated by a complete abandonment of the universal state's conceptions in favour of the ideas of the integration of states and nations in Europe, with a reference to Kant and the previous authors¹¹⁰. The discussion about integration in the XX century was dominated by German doctrines, and the conceptions of R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi. In his doctrine, the integration of Europe would,

¹⁰⁴ Łastawski K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁶ Doliwa-Klepacki Z.M., *Integracja europejska*, Białystok 2005, p. 57.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem, p. 58.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁹ Nowak A.Z., Milczarek D., (ed.), *Europeistyka...*, op. cit., p. 18.

¹¹⁰ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 28.

first and foremost, bring the elimination of the worst evil and the cause of disaster, which was nationalism¹¹¹. Therefore, the author not only rejected the concept of states' sovereignty, but even assumed their gradual disappearance in favour of supranational and self-governmental organs. Soon after the war, the thoughts of Coudenhove-Kalergi found its place in some federalist doctrines, which will be presented in the following sub-chapter.

This superficial review of first European concepts since the earliest times served to present the origins of such processes and the initial purposes, which undoubtedly oscillated around the ideas of crossing the borders in order to eliminate the conflicts, and create possibilities of commonly counteracting internal threats. The integration projects mostly aimed at increasing the feeling of security and prosperity of European nations. The authors of such ideas were the representatives of various environments: European rulers, clergymen, royal advisors, writers, philosophers or political activists.

After the World War II, however, there was a great change, in comparison to the previous periods, in the mentality of politicians and intellectuals about the issue of international integration in Europe. Whereas the interwar time was connected with national thinking, the Western European states accepted nationalism to be the cause of most nations' disasters, still approved of the idea of the state's good, which should be derived from a general good of Europe, from an absolute need for maintaining peace, developing cooperation and increasing prosperity in all countries¹¹².

1.2. European integration projects and conceptions after World War II.

The history of first conceptions and visions of united Europe dates back to the times of antiquity, although the interwar and after the Second World War periods became dominated by different forms of states' organizations as well as various views on types of cooperation among them. One thing was obvious, though, that no matter how powerful and independent a country was, the history proved that any kind of cooperation seemed to be more beneficial and secure than counting on one's self-sufficiency.

¹¹¹ Ibidem.

¹¹² Ibidem, p. 33.

1.2.1. Federal Europe.

A federal idea of integrating Europe appeared in the interwar period among the circles of intellectuals. This kind of conception is based on the act of will, and these are the states, which decide about restricting their sovereign rights in favour of common organs¹¹³. Federalism as a structure of managing a state is an effect of a federalist process, during which independent so far communities form voluntarily a new political community and a new common managing system. The communities, keeping the autonomy of actions in external relations, participate in the process of decision-making on the federal level.

First federal ideas appeared after the First World War, but they never became a uniform political theory. However, the representatives of federal views in Europe could not come to an agreement. One of many efforts to integrate the movement in various parts of the continent, which ended successfully, was the establishment of pan-European movement in Vienna by Coudenhove-Kalergi¹¹⁴. This German earl propagated the idea of a political union of Europe's united states, which was supposed to be based on federalist principles. The organization that he set up in 1922 proposed the integration of Europe, excluding England and Russia, which were to form their own unions of states¹¹⁵.

Although the conception of a new European countries' union did gain its followers among some European politicians, especially French ones, the idea included weaknesses. First of them was revealed during the speech of French minister of foreign affairs, Aristide Briand, who called the representatives of the League of Nations for creating a federal bond amongst the states of Europe, without decreasing their sovereignty. Apparently Briand did not perceive the contradiction of such an appeal. Moreover, a next disadvantage of Coudenhove-Kalergi's proposal was the fact that the organization would exist only within the League of Nations as its internal structure, which undoubtedly would lead to diminishing the integrating possibilities of a new organization. Furthermore, the subordination of any economic integration to a political integration structure would result in a failure, which was proven during the course of history.

Among the proponents of federalist Europe there were different fractions, i.e. pragmatic and constitution federalists¹¹⁶. Pragmatists believed in the necessity of an absolute reconstruction of a state system and the creation of supranational structures during a long evolutionary process. Constitutionlists, on the other hand, were in favour of fast action,

¹¹³ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 19.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 21.

¹¹⁵ Bakajto J. (ed.), *Federalizm. Teorie i koncepcje.*, Wrocław 1998, p. 54, [in:] Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 21.

¹¹⁶ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 24.

leading to constituenta. They aspired for forming European federation by taking legal and political actions, as a result of which the interested countries would undertake exact executive steps.

The originators of European Communities, R. Schuman and J. Monnet, in their plans of integrated Europe from 1950 thought about building a united continent in a federal way¹¹⁷. Although the project met numerous doubts, Schuman and Monnet counted on economic integration, which would, with the passing of time, lead to more profound integration in other areas of a social life. Such an idea seemed realistic, as the plans of involving politics or the defence issues usually met resistance among possible members of a community, and the economic matters appeared to be, if not beneficial, at least neutral for partners.

Nevertheless, leaving different ways of shaping united Europe, all the followers agreed that the integration should be based on the centralization of some functions on a supranational level, i.e. a federal government and parliament, whereas should depend on the decentralization on lower levels, i.e. regional and local ones. In other words, it was necessary to form supranational federal institutions by taking over some of the responsibilities of national authorities, courts and parliaments in favour of their supranational equivalents¹¹⁸.

1.2.2. Confederate Europe.

The conception of Europe as a confederation originated also in France, and its author was the creator of the V Republic of France Charles de Gaulle¹¹⁹. The general rejected the conception of equality between France and Germany as well as the vision of supranational Europe, and was in favour of a close union of sovereign European nations. The strong bond, on the one hand, was to guarantee France a control over Europe, but the relationship was also supposed to be weak enough to guarantee an absolute sovereignty, on the other.

In de Gaulle's vision, confederation would take responsibility for the issues of defence, trade interchange, the interchange of science and culture, with France playing a leading role¹²⁰. The general was of the opinion that only independent states, which cooperated with each other, could become a political power. The superpower based on an agreement, whose purpose would be to oppose the United States and the Soviet Union.

¹¹⁷ Łastawski K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 99.

¹¹⁸ Jesień W., *Wybór czy inercja. Traktat Amsterdamski w świetle teorii integracji europejskiej*, Nowy Sącz 2000, p. 20 [in:] Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 27.

¹¹⁹ Szeptycki A., *Francuskie koncepcje Unii Europejskiej*, p. 143, [in:] Haliżak E., Parzymies S. (ed.), *Unia Europejska. Nowy typ wspólnoty międzynarodowej*, Warszawa 2002.

¹²⁰ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 29.

The Gaulle's idea of future Europe, unlike Schuman and Monnet's, promoted political interests as a driving force of integration processes. The importance of a political dialogue, in his opinion, would bring the effect of constant cooperation, and the feeling of European identity. However, it did not mean that he ignored the significance of economy in those processes, as he did not. De Gaulle noticed the necessity of economic cooperation, yet it was a minor issue¹²¹.

1.2.3. Models of diversified integration.

Along with the process of enlargement, the European Union faces the problem of a bigger number of states, which are prepared to participate in the integration structures to a different degree. As new members underwent the transformation processes not equally, their economic and cultural conditions are diversified, and definitely differ a lot in comparison to old members. Therefore, the European Union allows the countries to adjust to the Community requirements by indicating transitory periods, which is regarded as an expression of inter-treaty flexibility¹²². The European Union also agrees for more flexibility in the fields of a closer independent integration of some member states, without specifying its direction. Thus, the issue of giving permission for a flexible integration becomes more significant each time the EU invites new members. At this point in time, the Community suggests the following models of diversified integration: Europe of different speed, Europe of variable geometry, Europe a la carte¹²³.

The conception of Europe of different speed was presented by the chancellor of Germany Willy Brandt in 1972, who discerned inequality of economic development of the member states, thus influencing the inhibition of the communities' growth. The concept of Brandt found its place in the report of Belgian prime minister, Leo Tindemans, who prepared the conception of future European union in 1975. The prime minister agreed with his predecessor that progress of all countries and equal participation in realizing common goals was impossible, therefore, the weaker states should be given the right of derogation.

The idea of diversified speed allows the members to participate unevenly in all tasks of the Community. The basis of this model, however, is the acceptance of *acquis communautaire* by all countries. The states, agreeing to the realization of common goals at different speed, do not delay other partners, which do not have to wait.

¹²¹ Szczepański W.J., *Europa w myśli politycznej de Gaulle'a*, Warszawa 1979, [in:] Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 30.

¹²² Ibidem, p. 33.

¹²³ Ibidem, p. 35 – 36.

The model of variable geometry, or concentric circles, was firstly presented by the president of France F. Mitterrand at the end of 1990. The conception divides the member states into three groups: the states of hard core, the peripheral states, and the associate states. The hard core comprises euro countries, the most advanced ones, whereas the second group includes the rest of the EU states. The French concept was developed in the document by two German CDU/CSU politicians, who perceived the countries of hard core to be indicating a federal direction of the European Union. The countries outside it, however, would base on intergovernmental cooperation.

The European Community expressed acceptance for this model of integration in Amsterdam Treaty, which introduced the institution of flexibility. The regulation of the Treaty, however, warns of not leading to such a division of states that could make the maintenance of economic cohesion difficult.

The model of Europe a la carte seems to be the most controversial, as it introduces a free choice of policy the states would like to participate in, with a right of rejecting others. According to its originator, Lord Ralf Dahrendorf, the groups of cooperation in different fields, which would be formed as a result, would create integration. It is a controversial model, though, as it contravenes the rule of the acceptance of the common law, being a threat for the European Union's unity at the same time.

In the history of the European Community the model has been used only once. During the negotiations of Maastricht Treaty, Great Britain and Denmark were given the right of not participating in European Monetary Union, Denmark – in defence policy, and Great Britain – in the Charter of Basic Social Rights of Workers.

1.2.4. Neo-functional conceptions.

Functionalism as a theoretical conception appeared during the period of establishing and enlarging the structures of European Communities. Its creator was David Mitrany, who in 1966 presented his ideas in a work, titled "A working peace system"¹²⁴. The author observed post-war reality, especially the aspirations of Great Coalition to create sector international institutions, which would serve for finances and trade, health protection or power industry. The observations of the states' efforts could lead Mitrany to the statement that the necessity of international cooperation resulted from the consolidation of peace on the globe.

¹²⁴ Bógdał-Brzezińska A., *Neofunkcjonalne i neorealistyczne koncepcje Unii Europejskiej oraz ich krytyka*, p. 96 – 97., [in:] Halizak E., Parzymies S. (ed.), *Unia Europejska. Nowy...*, op. cit.

His views were close to liberals, as he also criticised particularistic interests of states as a source of international conflicts, and perceived an interest of a community as the real one, being of a peaceful nature. For Mitrany a community was identified with security and peace.

Moreover, he claimed that in the area of economic cooperation appeared an effect of spill-over, i.e. the integration in some fields happened spontaneously under the influence of integration phenomenon in other disciplines¹²⁵. However, economic integration conditioned political integration, and according to Mitrany, there should be a separation between political and non-political elements of international cooperation.

Functionalism as a research trend in a science of international relations expresses similar visions of the European Union to the idea of federal Europe put forward by Schuman and Monnet.

Neo-functionalism is an approach, which criticises previously appeared functionalism by Mitrany with a federalist nature¹²⁶. It promotes the views about a political community as a final stage of integration process. The proponents of neo-functionalism analyzed the links between economic and political aspects of the integration, and called for establishing a structure of the organization or a supranational institution after the completion of economic integration. In the aspect of forming a final stage of the integration, this approach is similar to federalism, but from a functionalistic point of view, a social consensus resulted from common goals and aspirations, neo-functionalism assumed the ability of solving social conflicts, being a basis for the stability of a political system.

The originator of a neo-functional approach to European integration was Ernst B. Haas, who presented the critics of functionalism and the points for a discussion about EEC transformations in a work titled "The Uniting of Europe". Haas's views on the integration underwent some changes in the 1960s. In 1961 he still agreed with a definition of a political integration, although his notion of a political community seemed a bit vague, as he was not convinced whether he accepted the existence of a supranational state being a final stage of the integration.

In 1966, however, Haas propagated the notion of "a political union", rejecting a classical federalist approach, and in the late 1960s he concentrated on the idea of supranationality as an attribute of a political union and a special way of common decision-

¹²⁵ Mrozek J., *Teorie integracji regionalnej a Wspólnota Europejska*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 1991, no. 9, p. 45 after Bógdał-Brzezińska A., *Neofunkcjonalne...*, op. cit., p. 97., [in:] Halizak E., Parzymies S. (ed.), *Unia Europejska. Nowy...*, op. cit.

¹²⁶ Bógdał-Brzezińska A., *Neofunkcjonalne...*, op. cit., p. 97 – 100., [in:] Halizak E., Parzymies S. (ed.), *Unia Europejska. Nowy...*, op. cit.

making. The supranationality, though, was a classical symbol of a national state, which, according to its creator, became a basis of a neo-functional approach of a regional integration.

The next years brought further studies on the integration process and included the issue of sovereignty, its loss, new solutions, which helped countries prevent conflicts. Moreover, neo-functionalists began analyzing the problems of social unity, questioning the issues of a community of social goals. The main thesis assumed a contradiction between groups of interests in one country and similarity of interests of lobbies from different states. Haas became interested in lobbies as an element of a social structure and accepted them as a basic decision-making unit on the international forum.

The successor of Haas, Leon N. Lindberg, continued the research on the course and consequences of a decision-making process in the integration communities¹²⁷. He found a system theory useful to explain the integration processes, and perceived European Communities to be a system of multidisciplinary of international references, whose elements were national states, supranational institutions and lobbies. Nevertheless, an integration, according to Lindberg, was a process, which could lead to a political community.

A theory between a classical and functional approach is a communicative theory of integration created by Karl Deutsch¹²⁸. The author maintained a realistic assumption about superior roles of sovereign states in main international processes. He perceived integration to be a creation of “a community of states”, which cooperated on a lot of complementary grounds of international issues. According to Deutsch, the purpose of integration was to eliminate a war as an instrument shaping social relations and to form a community of security. In his conception, “a community of security” was a group of states, which had been integrated and formed “a feeling of community”, i.e. institutions favourable for solving international conflicts¹²⁹.

Deutsch posed a thesis about a complementary of a development of a national country and an integration process, which deepened a state of security and peace. Pluralism, autonomy and sovereignty of states creating a community stabilized an international situation. Simultaneously, the integration should be regarded as a condition of maintaining the sovereignty of a state, which was not exposed to using force. Achieving a security of community, however, was identified with a high level of maturity of integration bonds.

¹²⁷ Ibidem, p. 101.

¹²⁸ Ibidem, p. 102 – 103.

¹²⁹ Deutsch K., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, New York 1957, p. 5, after Bógdał-Brzezińska A., *Neofunkcjonalne...*, op. cit., p. 102., [in:] Halizak E., Parzymies S. (ed.), *Unia Europejska. Nowy...*, op. cit.

1.2.5. Neo-realistic conceptions.

A realistic theory, which accepted a real, material power of a state, became a basis of an intergovernmental conception as criticism of neo-functionalism at the turn of 1960s and 1970s, when a big number of thinkers made attempts to explain new mechanics of European integration¹³⁰.

The proponents of neo-realism were of the opinion that international institutions, such as EEC, influenced the redistribution of material power in the international system. Kenneth Waltz in his “Theory of International Politics”, John Mearsheimer in “Conventional Deterrence”, Joseph Grieco in “Realism and regionalism: American Power and German and Japanese Institutional Strategies During and After the Cold War” or Michael Mosser in “Engineering Influence: the Subtle Power of Smaller States in International Relations”, tried to analyze and provide explanations for the reason of European integration. Waltz claimed that the integration was realistic due to overtaking by the USA a role of a guarantee of Western European security after the Second World War. Having such a guarantee, the European states did not have to worry about their security in the world, so they could turn to forming a unity on the continent. Grieco, however, posed a thesis of balancing the economic power of the USA and Japan by the European Communities. Therefore, the states within the integration structures aspired to create a third centre of a global economic superpower. Such a vision was identical with a realistic assumption that all participants of international relations could fight for increasing their material and prestigious position, perceiving their advantage to be a main source of the security.

Michael Mosser focused on determining the influence of non-powerful states on the functioning of international institutions. According to neo-realists, however, weak countries were deprived of the possibility of choice and only served as a balance between neighbouring powers. He also stated that in the process of integration, for instance, small and weak countries could well contribute to the institutionalization, as they might form the opposition to the contradictory interests of superpowers.

The criticism of a realistic approach was expressed in a liberal theory of European integration by Andrew Moravcsik, representing an intergovernmental trend¹³¹. The trend appeared during the first crisis of a regional integration within EEC. At the same time, the concept restored the role of a state, which proved its origin from neo-realism. According to

¹³⁰ Ibidem, p. 104 – 105.

¹³¹ Ibidem, p. 106 – 107.

this concept, the integration process comprised two types of entities: member states and the European Union itself as an organizational unit responsible for supporting countries in order to overcome the integration stagnation. Intergovernmentalism assumed that a slow down of the integration was associated with the conflict between the demand of sovereignty of member states and its limitation by successive decisions, which strengthened the cooperation.

The researchers of the integration processes present the opinion that the only argument for enhancing the processes is the benefits, which result from the acceleration of a regional development. The integration gains in value provided there is a hope for an economic prosperity. Moreover, there appears another argument for speeding up the integration within the EU – the conception of internalization of economics, claiming that a strategy of regional integration might be a strategy of survival for states, which is synonymous with a national security.

Intergovernmentalism dominated in the theory of integration in the 1990s, although it met a big number of opponents, who questioned this liberal model for ignoring internal consequences of membership in the EU, thus diminishing one of the essential principles of the integration process. Moreover, the model found its critics among American institution followers. They claimed that Moravcsik's trend did not include the significance of the EU institutions in the process of decision-making and its influence on the conduct of the EU politicians.

As a continuation of the institutional aspects, in the 1980s and 1990s appeared neo-institutionalism, as an approach with three different definitions of institutions¹³². Supranationalism became an answer to a neo-functionalistic theory, which focused on the mechanics of decision-making. The conception analyzed the system of the establishment of a decision-making process in the European Union. A compromise and a cooperation were perceived as basic tools of integration process. The coordinator of the process became the European Commission, taking a leadership and a role of a mediator between the institutions and the states. The national countries eventually lost their meaning, and their state interests were submitted to the common goals.

Kenneth Shelpse in "Perspectives on Positive Political Theory" and William Riker in "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Major Rule for the Study of Institutions" described institutions as formal rules of a game, which allowed maintaining in a balance independent entities, prone to unpredictable decisions. Social institutionalists, on the other hand, regarded institutions as informal norms, as well as formal principles of ruling and indicated the

¹³² Ibidem, p. 109.

influence of institutions on creating the structures of international relations. Finally, historical institutionalists, focused on the effects of institutionalization, its cyclical nature and changes, and the conduct of the entities undergoing transformations with the passing of time.

In the above-mentioned conceptions of European integration researchers made attempts to find answers to essential questions concerning the process of integration: what its origin is, and what results as an institutional consequence of it are, what entities affect its course, or what kind of cooperation will result from the European integration. No matter what type of visions dominated different periods of the integration processes in Europe, the final idea was to bring the participants of the process the feeling of security and an economic prosperity.

2. Economic reconstruction of Europe after World War II.

The end of the Second World War brought Europe such desirable peace, but left it with a great need for an economic rebuilding after the ravages of war. Moreover, a disintegration of a colonial system, a progressive development of manufacturing forces or a necessity of increasing an international division of labour issued new challenges to European countries. However, the attempts at achieving the goals turned out to be feasible only when acting together.

All these events, along with a political situation, created favourable conditions for a revival of the idea of an economic as well as political integration in Europe. The radicalization of West-European societies in the forties, a strong position of communist parties in France and Italy, a fear of a nationalism rebirth and especially a fear of a military threat from the Soviet Union enhanced the tendencies to a political and economic unity of Western Europe¹³³. As a result of the Second World War a new line-up appeared. Western Europe lost its political and economic leadership in favour of the United States.

2.1. Plans of economic integration in Western Europe.

The first ideas of political and economic integration of Europe occurred long before the World War II, but only after 1945 appeared conditions necessary to carry out the concepts of a regional unity in a western part of the continent. The notion of integration

¹³³ Michałowska-Gorywoda K., *Geneza, cele i członkostwo Unii Europejskiej*, [in:] Ciamaga L., Latoszek E., Michałowska-Gorywoda K., Oręziak L., Teichman E., *Unia Europejska*, Warszawa 1999, p. 11-12.

meant creating the mechanics of economic processes, along with a political and social cooperation of a group of states¹³⁴. Strong motivation of the countries to rebuilding their state economies on the one hand, and to rescuing from being captured by the Soviet Union on the other, initiated an explosion of regional integration plans, both economic as well as political ones.

However, whereas the concepts of an economic unity gained more and more supporters, the plans of acting in a political and military union did not meet a great approval of public opinions. Therefore, Western Europe subjected to the idea of integration mostly in the sphere of economy.

In 1947 Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg signed an agreement about the creation of customs union, which was replaced in 1958 by a treaty of Benelux Economic Union. As those three states displayed a big activity in regional plans of integration, in 1948 altogether with France and Great Britain created Brussels Pact. This treaty was a military alliance against a revival of a German threat. It included also a political, economic and cultural cooperation, therefore, some of its supporters regarded it as a first step towards a military alliance with the United States¹³⁵.

1948 turned out to be an eventful year of economic initiatives. Sixteen countries, which brought to life the European Commission for Economic Cooperation in 1947, transformed it into the Organization for European Cooperation (OEEC)¹³⁶.

Scandinavian countries had been participating in an economic cooperation before the Second World War, but after that their world involvement became closer. In 1948 appeared the Nordic Committee of Economic Cooperation, which began working on a project of a common market for Scandinavian states¹³⁷.

A great involvement in the reconstruction of European continent was revealed by the USA as a political and economic hegemonic leader of the western world, which perceived there a chance for the realization of its own interests. There were two key points, which announced American economic assistance: a fiasco of the Foreign Affairs Ministers conference in Moscow in March-April 1947 and Truman Doctrine (March 1947), according to which the United States accepted the task from Great Britain of supporting Greece and Turkey against a communist threat¹³⁸. In the same year General Marshall, the state secretary of the USA, presented a plan of an economic recovery for Europe until 1951. Marshall plan assumed that the governments of European states would take responsibility for administering

¹³⁴ Ibidem, p. 11.

¹³⁵ Calvocoressi P., *Polityka międzynarodowa 1945-2000*, Warszawa 2002, p. 226.

¹³⁶ Ibidem.

¹³⁷ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 413.

¹³⁸ Ibidem, p. 225.

the assistance and would foster the rebuilding of Europe by undertaking mutual actions. The American assumption, though, required creating a European organization as a bridge for European-American cooperation. Since the offer was rejected by the Soviet Union and the states under Soviet's control, the organization spread over only West-European countries.

The task of meeting American requirements was undertaken by OEEC, which comprised sixteen states of Western Europe, American, British and French occupation zones of Germany, and Trieste. The associate members were Canada, the USA (since 1950), Yugoslavia (since 1955), and since 1957 Finland, as an observer¹³⁹. OEEC was designed to create a program of reconstruction and a development of an economic cooperation of member states as well as a division of American help. Moreover, its purpose was to shape a discussion and consultation forum with the United States about Europe's problems.

At the beginning of 1950s when the task of dividing American funds was completed, there were discussions on the existence of OEEC. However, the member states decided to continue the cooperation, aiming at the liberalization of interchange of goods among the states, a development of a financial as well as nuclear mutual activity. Along with the change of the cooperation scope, the organization was transformed in 1960 into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with a successive increase of its members¹⁴⁰.

Except for the American influence on the integration of European continent, the states of this part of the world did not stay passive. Even before the end of World War II, in 1945, appeared some informal voices in favour of a need of unity during the military action. Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in a speech made in Zurich in September 1945, put forward a proposal of creating the Council of Europe¹⁴¹. After the conference in Hague in May 1948 five states of Brussels Treaty established on 5 May 1949 the Council of Europe, an organization of general competences, for the purpose of achieving more unity among its members in order to protect common ideals and rules as well as ease an economic and social development¹⁴². Initially it included Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and Italy. The principles that state members had to obey concerned the observance of rules of law as well as fundamental human rights. The structure of the Council comprised the General Assembly without legislative rights and subordinated to the Committee of Ministers.

Although economic initiatives dominated the concepts of a regional integration of Western Europe, less popular but present were the ideas for a political unity. The first big

¹³⁹ Ciamaga L. (and others), *Unia...*, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

¹⁴¹ Calvocoressi P., *Polityka...*, op. cit., p. 257-258.

¹⁴² Kaczmarek J., *NATO – Europa – Polska*, Wrocław 2000, p. 174.

military undertaking initiated by the USA was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established in 1949 and thoroughly presented in the first chapter.

A military proposal for cooperation on the European continent was put forward by Rene Pleven, French Minister of Defence, who, soon after the appearance of the first European Community, presented the project of establishing the European Defence Community. France took action to prevent a revival of autonomic military force of Germany, and the Community was to decrease the role of German military units by engaging them in an international organization¹⁴³. In May 1952 six European countries signed in Bonn and Paris an agreement about the European Defence Community (EDC). The situation, however, did not satisfy the initiator, as Great Britain, on whose participation France relied in EDC, signed independent support treaties concerning military assistance in case of an attack on any of EDC partners.

Nevertheless, the treaty still raised French reservations for a few reasons. Firstly, they disapproved of a possibility of creating full German divisions; secondly, they demanded British participation in the Community, not only a promise of giving assistance. Yet, the USA and Great Britain insisted on their requirements. The USA threatened France with a reduction of financial help if the treaty was not ratified, whereas Great Britain in 1954 expressed additional obligations of a military and political cooperation as part of EDC activity.

All in all, the final was not successful, as French parliament in 1954 opposed a debate on the treaty ratification. Therefore, the agreements from Bonn and Paris lost their validity as well, which annoyed the USA, Germany and, to lesser extent, Great Britain. London made attempts to ease tensions with diplomatic actions and more serious obligations¹⁴⁴.

The extension of Brussels Treaty by Germany and Italy appeared to be the Western European Union, set up in 1954, which took a function of the organization of the treaty and became a military part of NATO¹⁴⁵. As the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was dominant at that time, the Union turned into some aspects of European defence policy. Its significance increased, however, in the middle of 1980s when the concept of a European unity started to become more and more realistic. In fact, though, only the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 involved the Western European Union in political-military matters as part of a common foreign and defence policy, and the process of approaching the organization to the European Union was completed with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴³ Ibidem, p. 228 – 229.

¹⁴⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁵ Ciamaga L. (and others), *Unia...*, op. cit., p. 372.

¹⁴⁶ Kaczmarek J., *NATO...*, op. cit., p. 164.

Undoubtedly, it is essential to mention another trial of shaping a political alliance on the European continent, this time as an initiative of Great Britain. In 1952, after the establishment of the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community and the beginnings of the European Defence Community, appeared a British proposal of joining those communities into a political association, called the European Political Community¹⁴⁷. The cooperation was meant to be of a military and economic nature, with a participation of a majority of non-communist states of Europe. Nevertheless, the whole concept collapsed even before it began to be realized, which resulted not only from the fiasco of the European Defence Community in 1954, but first and foremost, from the reluctance of the countries to resign from their identity, soon after they managed to retrieve it once the Second World War was over.

2.2. The attitude of Great Britain towards the reconstruction of European continent.

The history of British relations shaped before and during the World War II shows how distant the country was from the European continent, although located in this part of the world. Its links and even dependence on the USA as well as an imperialist nature, but also a geopolitical situation and a natural separation from the continent gave the state a feeling of isolation, independence and a special respect for its sovereignty. Therefore, Great Britain did not express much interest in taking a leadership of a strong and a long-lasting European association, although it possessed all virtues to do that in 1945.

Great Britain treasured the British Commonwealth the most. In a post-war period, a dismantlement of the colonial system and a creation of a new line-up with colonies became a task of a high priority. For this reason all the European matters were put aside. The state shaped a conception of three concentric circles of the British policy, which emphasized the significance of the British Commonwealth in the world, and placing the issues of Europe in the end¹⁴⁸. Winston Churchill at the conference of the Conservative Party in September 1948 confirmed his strong approval for the circles' idea and came the British Commonwealth and the Empire to the fore. He stated that the second concentric circle concerned the English-speaking world of the USA, where Canada and other colonies played a really important role. The third circle, however, was a united Europe. Such a distant position of the European continent in the British policy did not mean a lack of respect for a future order in Europe,

¹⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 81.

¹⁴⁸ Gołembski Fr., *Polityka zagraniczna Wielkiej Brytanii*, Warszawa 2001, p. 37.

though, but Churchill realized that shaping a new line-up in a post-war Europe would result from the division of the old continent, with a special regard to the East-West line¹⁴⁹.

After the war Great Britain managed to reconstruct its economy quite fast. Although the development appeared to be stable and people did not suffer much, a great disappointment was brought with a sudden cease of the American assistance as part of *lend-lease* programme, and a surprisingly small amount of help instead with unfeasible conditions to fulfil¹⁵⁰. The government faced some financial difficulties, and moreover, the state stopped to participate in the Marshall plan after two years, which did not improve the conditions. The financial sources from the American Recovery Plan were used for rebuilding industry, but the government did not consider them to be exploited for a complex restructuring of processing industry, which would undoubtedly help to regain the position of the world economic leader.

The indifference of Great Britain to Europe, expressed by the society as well as political leaders, caused a lack of knowledge about a European economic or political activity. However, it did not mean that Great Britain stayed in a total isolation from any form of cooperation, as it did not. The state signed some agreements or other documents, although without much faith in their significance or a great change in the British policy¹⁵¹.

A bit surprisingly, though, the country joined the Organization for European Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, as Great Britain had never been a supporter of this structure. At the beginning of its establishment the superpower questioned its role in the distribution of the American assistance, calling for restricting its activity. However, the attitude of Great Britain towards OEEC changed when in 1956 it turned out that there was only one organization of such a nature, except for the European Community of Coal and Steel, to be able to solve economic problems of Western Europe¹⁵². Making sure of its sovereign nature beforehand, the country decided to join the structure.

The principles of the British policy with reference to the European continent stated that it must not either involve or threaten the country and it must not be dominated by the continent's overland superpower¹⁵³. Such a British diplomacy directed at keeping balance and preventing any state to become a hegemonic leader in Europe. In order to prove how the state treasured independence, it is important to emphasize that Great Britain rejected the participation in the European Coal and Steel Community as the structure designed an organ of High Authority, as a beginning of supranationality.

¹⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 38.

¹⁵⁰ Calvocoressi P., *Polityka...*, op. cit., p. 244.

¹⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 248.

¹⁵² Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 52.

¹⁵³ Ibidem, p. 253.

The attitude of Great Britain towards the integration of Europe began to change about 15 years after the war. Although the mentality of European countries underwent that process soon after the ravages of war, Britain kept its indecisiveness until about 1960. However, the British transformation resulted from earlier events, one of which was the retreat of the British army from India in 1947. The withdrawal from India as well as the losses of resources and forces after the war undermined the position of the superpower in the Middle East and induced Australia and New Zealand to turn to the USA to protect their security. Since the three countries signed the pact in 1951, without the British membership, Great Britain became more European¹⁵⁴.

The next event, which undoubtedly contributed to the European nature of Great Britain and its search for a safe settlement in the economic structures of Europe, was British military intervention in the Suez Canal in 1956. This case evoked an international crisis caused by nationalizing the Suez Canal by the Egyptian government¹⁵⁵. The president of Egypt took revenge for the British and American rejection of financing the building of a dam on the river Nile, which the two states had been obliged to do. However, a common intervention of Great Britain, France and Israel appeared to be a failure, which in fact meant the end of imperialist possibilities of the British Empire and a necessity of submitting to a new line-up in the international arena¹⁵⁶.

Along with the dismantlement of its colonies and the emergence of economic structures in Europe, Great Britain faced the difficulties of making a decision of either following the rule of a “splendid isolation”¹⁵⁷ or joining the European Economic Community. Europe, however, especially France, battled with a similar dilemma.

From an economic point of view, the continent had smaller significance for British foreign trade, as after the war and in the early 1950s the superpower sales concerned the colonies as well as the states-territories of the Commonwealth¹⁵⁸. Moreover, the next argument against the British membership in EEC was a different structure of its economy in comparison with the European states, e.g. in the 1950s only 5% of British population worked in agriculture, whereas in France – 25% and in Germany – 15%¹⁵⁹. Therefore, England was not willing to participate in a common organization with state members of different levels of economy.

¹⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 256.

¹⁵⁵ Zins H., *Polityka zagraniczna Wielkiej Brytanii*, Lublin 2001, p. 83.

¹⁵⁶ Gołembski Fr., *Polityka...*, op. cit., p. 26.

¹⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 39.

¹⁵⁸ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 51.

However, a fast reconstruction of France and Germany and their quick turn to an economic growth gradually became a kind of encouragement to consider consequences of possible success as a member state, although the project of the European Economic Community still aroused aversion in some parts of the British political arena. Nevertheless, the government perceived advantages of such an organization, which would enhance an economic power of Europe and increase British sales with the continent to the Commonwealth's disadvantage. On the other hand, however, a lack of British membership in this structure would cause a negative trade balance with Europe, and its worse position on the continent. The analysis of potential benefits and losses revealed that it was more profitable for Great Britain to become a part of the European Economic Community. Once Great Britain formally crystallized its attitude to integration processes in Europe, France, as the main initiator, began to oppose its membership.

The Euro-Atlantic tendency in the British policy with a "special partnership" with the USA was strongly criticized by general de Gaulle, for whom such close relationships with that world superpower clashed with France's vision of a future united Europe. De Gaulle's conception of creating a "Europe of Homelands" was to attribute to France a dominant role with the maintenance of its superpower position¹⁶⁰. Therefore, the British policy towards the United States as a means of its independence from Europe, appeared as a threat for the continent. Moreover, France perceived a danger for European identity as a result of Great Britain's partnership with the USA, which enhanced additionally a French opposition to the British accession in the European structures.

The European nature of the superpower revealed strongly in 1957 when it expressed its will to join the European Economic Community (EEC), but the rivalry as well as divergent visions of the future in Western Europe between Great Britain and France led to the rejection of the British membership in the new European structure. A wounded ambition of Great Britain forced it to prove its position in that part of the globe and establish an organization which would be competitive to EEC. On 4 January 1960 appeared the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), set up on the initiative of Great Britain, with a membership of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland¹⁶¹. Unfortunately, EFTA was never a real alternative for the Communities for the very reason that it did not have an integrative but only a cooperative nature.

Hence, at the beginning of 1960s Great Britain began to change its approach to the Communities, taking its membership into consideration. The British Euro-scepticism raised

¹⁶⁰ Gołembski Fr., *Polityka...*, op. cit., p. 49.

¹⁶¹ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, p. 132.

the threat of sovereignty as a result of joining the Communities. The most distinctive proponent of critical views was a British politician Enoch Powell, who was of the opinion that the integration should first and foremost concern human relations, and then turn to institutions¹⁶².

However, the divergence of attitudes appeared between the Conservative and Labour Party. The former was in favour of the British accession to the European structures, which led to submitting a membership application by the government of Harold Macmillan in July 1961¹⁶³. The Labour Party, on the other hand, took a wait-and-see attitude with a tendency to criticize. The politicians of the party cited the regulations of the Rome Treaty about a political integration as standing in contradiction to the British interest. Nevertheless, the views of the Labour Party were subject to change in the middle of 1960s, when the Prime Minister Harold Wilson took a more flexible attitude¹⁶⁴.

All in all, the year 1972 turned out to be crucial in the British policy, when the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath at the summit of Prime Ministers and presidents of the European Economic Community in Paris officially supported the necessity of building the European Union, and a year later Great Britain became the member of the Communities¹⁶⁵.

2.3. From the European Communities to the European Union.

At the turn of 1949 and 1950 the idea of united Europe with the involvement of Germany came true. In May 1950 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman put forward a conception of the European Coal and Steel Community, a multinational project, but based on a French-German agreement. The agreement, which changed the relations of France with Germany into a partnership.

The idea of European integration originated in France in 1914, when a French politician and entrepreneur Jean Monnet prepared a plan of the coordination of French and British economies for military purposes in order to win the war. However, during the World War II his project became a plan of integrating Europe¹⁶⁶. Monnet's functional conception assumed that the process of integration would develop itself, as the initiation of an economic cooperation in one branch of economy would influence the other areas. Such a project,

¹⁶² Gołembski Fr., *Polityka...*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹⁶³ Ibidem, p. 67.

¹⁶⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem, p. 70.

¹⁶⁶ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 73 – 74.

though, officially presented by Schuman led to the establishment of the first Community, whose members became Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg.

The regulations of the Paris Treaty, first and foremost, emphasised the significance of overcoming hatred of the European states for Germany, but also focused on creating an economic infrastructure in strategic areas, which was supposed to keep and maintain peace¹⁶⁷. Coal and steel were subjected to an international supervision in order to prevent them from being used for non-peaceful purposes. Moreover, the integration of chosen sectors was the beginning of a process of unity of other economic areas as well as a social life in Western Europe.

The first Community was equipped with the bodies, which restricted traditional sovereignty of the states: the High Authority as the executive, the Special Council of Ministers as the legislative, the Common Assembly as the parliamentary body and the Tribunal of Justice as the judiciary branch. The Treaty created a common market of coal and steel, on the area of which the customs were abolished as well as the charges with customs-like effects. All possible forms of discriminations of producers were forbidden, along with all practices, which hindered a free choice of deliverers. Furthermore, the Treaty forbade the practices of limiting competition¹⁶⁸.

The economic cooperation in the scope of coal and steel originated the process of integration successfully. Signing the Treaty was a turning point in intra-European relations, where the necessity of cooperation dominated a negative attitude to the enemy. Moreover, the Community became a precursor of an institutional structure for the body system in the European Union. Finally, ECSC formed the basis for a social dialogue as a method of solving problems¹⁶⁹.

Until the year 1955 six states of the first Community were so involved in a common cooperation and satisfied with its results that they decided at the conference in Messina to extend the scope of mutual activities and establish the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom). The Treaties for both Communities were signed in Rome in March 1957.

The purpose of Euratom was a common usage of nuclear energy for peaceful reasons and its development. Hence, the member states agreed to conduct research on atomic energy, introduce uniform safety norms, coordinate nuclear investments, supervise regular and just supplies of all users in minerals as well as nuclear petrol, form a common atomic market,

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁸ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁶⁹ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 82.

ensure a free flow of capital for nuclear investment, and finally, a liberty of employment of specialists within the Community¹⁷⁰.

It is essential to mention that except for obvious causes of a common supervision of nuclear energy by member states, the establishment of that Community was an attempt of Western Europe to compete with world atomic superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the project of Euratom was not the only conception of the cooperation of West-European countries in the field of atomic energy. There were two more, the former of which created Great Britain at the beginning of 1956. The British assumption concerned the appearance of an international organization of a coordinating nature for all states of Europe, but without any above-national powers. Although the countries of ECSC rejected the proposal, it was accepted by OEEC and formed the basis, within OEEC, for the European Agency of Atomic Energy¹⁷¹. The second conception, though, was originated by European federalists, who opting for the United States of Europe, wanted Euratom to be equipped with extensive above-national competence. The idea, however, did not find its supporters.

A specific trade nature of Euratom could not contribute much to the integration process in Europe, as nuclear energy played, and still does, a different role in all member states. Nevertheless, its success can be perceived in the development of a common European policy for scientific research as well as technological progress.

The greatest contribution and influence on the unity of Europe undoubtedly belongs to the European Economic Community (EEC), which was set up along with Euratom on the basis of the Rome Treaty. The role of the Community was extending and deepening the economic integration of the member states, and with time, reaching beyond the economy.

The very structure of the Treaty, however, resembled the document of the European Coal and Steel Community, although the authors did realize that a majority of the complex goals could not be achieved in the nearest future. Therefore, bearing in mind the failure of the European Defence Community, the regulations of the Treaty expressed much caution in determining above-nationality of the structure. The document, though, avoided referring to either a federation idea or any expression which would suggest the establishment of a super-state. Moreover, the authors restricted the document to determining only the procedures of proceedings, without the dates, leaving all necessary specifications to the institutions and the common European law, which would be enacted by the Council of Ministers¹⁷².

¹⁷⁰ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 72.

¹⁷¹ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 85.

¹⁷² Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 69.

The first stage of the economic integration, aimed at the trade area, was supposed to end within twelve years, and indeed did. The European Community introduced the customs union, based on the common tariff for the third countries as well as on the abolishment of customs and quotas in the trade among the member states. The second stage, however, assumed deepening the economic unity by the common agriculture policy, a free flow of labour and capital, the unification of a social policy as well as the legislation and norms, with the introduction of a common currency unit and a central bank to complete the process¹⁷³.

The institutional system of EEC comprised the Council of Ministers, which was the representative of the member states' interests; the Commission, responsible for the protection and representing the interests of the Community; the Parliament, as the representative of the citizens' interests. Nevertheless, the Rome Treaty did not equip the Commission with such strong powers as the Paris Treaty did with ECSC. Therefore, initially the task of EEC in realizing the idea of integration concerned extending the economic base on all areas of economy¹⁷⁴. The conception of further integration, however, could be realized on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty.

When at the beginning of 1950s it turned out that there were not enough conditions to set up European structures and began a military and political cooperation, the integration in these areas was abandoned. With the passing of time, European Communities were being enlarged with new states: 1973 – Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark, 1981 – Greece and 1986 – Spain and Portugal. However, a new quality of European integration was introduced with the Treaty of the European Union, signed on 7 February 1992. Along with coming the document into force, the end was put to the creation of the internal market on the territory of the member states, and the beginning was given to the realization of the common foreign and defence policy as well as the judiciary and internal affairs. Moreover, the Treaty assigned the Community the establishment of the economic and monetary union¹⁷⁵.

According to the document, the economic and monetary union was to be a final effect of the economic integration in Europe. The common foreign policy, however, ought to protect common values, basic interests of the Community, enhance both the security of the member states as well as the security in an international dimension, and develop the rights of democracy. The issues of the judiciary and internal affairs, on the other hand, concerned providing the citizens with a high level of safety in the field of freedom, security and justice

¹⁷³ Calvocoressi P., *Polityka...*, op. cit., p. 260.

¹⁷⁴ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁷⁵ Osekowski Cz., *Zarys historii integracji gospodarczej w Europie po II wojnie światowej* [w:] Koćwin L. (ed.), *Wprowadzenie do gospodarki Unii Europejskiej. Ekonomika integracji europejskiej*, Zielona Góra 2004, p. 26.

by undertaking common actions as a part of a police and judicial cooperation. Unfortunately, only the economic and monetary union was realized by the Communities within the first pillar of the European Union, whereas for these two beyond-economy areas an international integration procedure was accepted¹⁷⁶.

3. Shaping Poland-European Union relationships.

In 1989 Poland entered the road, which led to achieving a strategic goal for the state as it was a membership in the European Union. Not until the end of 1989, however, Poland was regarded as a country with a non-market economy, which did not contribute to satisfactory relations of the European Community with external partners. Within a short period of time, though, the state advanced from the position of a discriminated country to the status of a country with preference on the European market. The status was initially based on the unilateral decision of the Community, but with time, on the principle of mutuality resulted from the Association Agreement¹⁷⁷.

The process of integrating Polish economy with the economy of EU, originated at the beginning of 1990s, was taking place during great changes in the nature as well as the directions of the Western European integration. The completion of the internal market at the end of 1992, coming into force the Maastricht Treaty and the plan of the economic and monetary union connected with it, the division of the member states into two integration circles: these ones, which shaped the European Monetary Union (EMU), and those ones, which stayed beyond EMU, or unsuccessful attempts of institutional reforms during the intergovernmental conference affected the progress in Poland's accession negotiations as well as their meaningful effects¹⁷⁸.

On the other hand, however, Polish political arena found itself in a new, unpredictable situation, and a lack of a political imagination influenced Poland's foreign policy as well. Although the state reacted a bit reluctantly and cautiously, the effect could be satisfactory at this stage of a transformation period, as Poland managed to form economic relations with the European Community.

3.1. The Association Treaty.

¹⁷⁶ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 108 – 109.

¹⁷⁷ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska w drodze do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 1999, p. 7.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

The diplomatic relations between Poland and the European Economic Community were established on 16 September 1988, and a year later both sides signed an agreement about an economic and trade cooperation. These activities were a part of a common policy within the economic structure of the Soviet bloc¹⁷⁹. At the moment of signing the document it was obvious for its signatories that it was the first step of normalizing the contacts with Poland, being a basis for a contract of more significance. According to the agreement Poland was given a most-favoured nation clause and anticipated a gradual abolishment of quantity restrictions put unilaterally by EEC on the goods imported from Poland¹⁸⁰.

The period of system transformations in Poland initiated the development of relations with EEC as well as other Western countries. An important event for Poland, while entering a new democratic reality, was the decision made in June 1989 at the Paris Summit of seven the most industrialized world states about granting Poland and Hungary an economic assistance and initiating PHARE program (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies). In Brussels was opened a Polish diplomatic mission, whose ambassador at the Communities became Jan Kułakowski¹⁸¹.

In October 1989 in Brussels Poland began unofficial talks concerning the future negotiations for forming the accession agreement with the European Communities. During the talks, however, the sides realized that the road of Central and Eastern-European countries would be long and difficult, as the states had a lot of backwardness in comparison with the requirements of the Communities. Therefore, the member states objected to Polish statement that the common purpose of both sides was Poland's membership in the EU. After exhausting negotiations, though, the Commission agreed for an unilateral statement in Polish declaration that Poland's goal was to become a member of the Communities¹⁸².

At the beginning of 1990 the Community presented Poland with the conditions necessary to begin negotiations for the accession agreement, which was constant progress in political and economic reforms, the introductions of the rule of law, the observance of human rights, political pluralism, a democratic election and entering market economy. As Poland fulfilled the requirements, on 16 December 1991 the agreement was officially signed by the name of the European Agreement establishing the association between Poland on the one hand, and the European Communities with their member states, on the other¹⁸³. Its trade

¹⁷⁹ Moczulski L., *Europa Ojczyzn 2004. Geopolityka, gospodarka, cywilizacja*, Warszawa 2003, p. 211.

¹⁸⁰ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 477.

¹⁸¹ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 284.

¹⁸² *Ibidem*.

¹⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 285.

part, known as the Transitional Agreement, came into force since 1 March 1992, whereas the whole Treaty – since 1 February 1994¹⁸⁴.

According to the Treaty, the purpose of the association was the development of the political and economic relations, including the trade, and the acceleration of an economic development in Poland, along with supporting a gradual integration of Poland with the Communities. Moreover, the agreement included the creation of basis for financial and technical assistance for Poland as well as the acknowledgement of cultural cooperation¹⁸⁵.

Despite the attempts of Polish negotiators, though, the Treaty did not mention the Community's obligation to accept Poland as the EU member. Furthermore, the agreement broadened the political and economic cooperation from 1989, regulating the issues of a common trade as well as a free flow of services, labour force, capital and founding firms. It also included the regulations on bringing closer the principles of competition and the harmonization of Polish law with the European common law. The idea of a political dialogue, for instance, was to support political and economic transformations in Poland and to facilitate the integration with the Community as well as to contribute to strengthening democracy, security and stability in the whole Europe¹⁸⁶.

The European Agreement, however, comprised the widest set of decisions that Poland could negotiate with any of its partners after 1989. The Treaty regulated Poland's relationships with the most powerful integrating structures in the world, which undoubtedly contributed to a big social approval. According to the reports of public opinion in January 1992, 80% believed that the agreement would bring the state economic profits, whereas almost half of the respondents associated hopes with the Treaty for the country to become the member of the Communities within five years¹⁸⁷.

Along with the satisfaction of Polish society came positive opinions about the signed document expressed by politicians. Taking into consideration significant effects of the agreement, the Senate appointed the Select Committee for examining the act about the ratification of the European Agreement. During a big number of debates, statements and studies, most speakers perceived the agreement to be a success for Poland, especially in terms of the phrasing that the ultimate Poland's purpose was the membership in the European structures¹⁸⁸. Although the negotiators did not manage to include the statement

¹⁸⁴ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 477.

¹⁸⁵ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 19 – 20.

¹⁸⁶ Parzymies, S., *Problematyka dialogu politycznego w Układzie o stowarzyszeniu Polski ze Wspólnotami Europejskimi*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 1992, nr 4 – 6, [in:] Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁸⁷ Opinia publiczna o stowarzyszeniu Polski z EWG. Komunikat CBOS, Warszawa, January 1992 [w:]

Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 52.

¹⁸⁸ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 53.

about an unambiguous approval of the Community for the future Polish application of the membership, or the date, it was underlined that the Polish side succeeded within the confines of reality.

The determination of Poland for an urgent accession resulted from political as well as economic reasons¹⁸⁹. The main political cause was connected with the problem of national security after the collapse of the military-political Eastern bloc. The anxieties in the Soviet Union, when it began to lose its subordinated countries, even enhanced that argument. Moreover, the necessity of building a permanent system of security was also connected with the completion of the reconciliation process between Poland and Germany. The process, which started with the beginning of the transformation period in Poland, but it could be ended with a full unity of Europe.

Nevertheless, the number of economic reasons for signing the Treaty seemed to outnumber the above mentioned ones. First and foremost, the integration of the economy with the European Communities permanently directed the system transformations in Poland. The hope appeared for the increased inflow of foreign capital, which was extremely necessary to start a new production as well as the modernization of the obsolete and ineffective manufactures. Moreover, the expected benefits of the agreement were associated with its regulations of a gradual improvement of the access to the common market of Polish goods, capital and services. The opening of the internal market for Poland gave opportunities of the increased export, the extension of the production, better usage of the productive resources or better quality of goods and services¹⁹⁰.

The second economic reason for forming the relations with the Community, however, resulted from the lack of alternatives for external economic contacts for Poland after the break-up of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (the structure administered by the Soviet Union) and the economic collapse on the markets of its former members.

The agreement, however, was not deprived of some faults. The Community put in the Treaty the regulations of the liberalization of the access for goods, in which Poland had the greatest potential and advantage in comparison with the other states. However, in these areas the Community maintained the highest protection, which in practice meant that the period of abolishing the protection was so long that Polish exporters could not use their advantage. Furthermore, the principle of granting concessions did not necessarily bring profits, as the

¹⁸⁹ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...* op. cit., p.496.

¹⁹⁰ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 55.

speed and scope of granting them depended on the abilities of Polish entrepreneurs to use their chances, flexibility of their activities, and so on¹⁹¹.

All in all, the economic balance between gained profits and possible losses proved that Poland would definitely incur more costs while not signing the Treaty, and leave beyond the economic integration in Western Europe. It would result in consolidating the obsolete structure of production as well as the economic collapse.

Entering the Association Treaty was the first stage on the road to the European integration, the process, which had already begun for Poland, and which required much patience, diplomacy and compromises.

3.2. The beginning of the accession process.

Since 1989 Poland had successively undertaken some steps to approach the moment of acceding to the European structures. Along with other associate states, the country made efforts to prove its membership in the organization. In September 1992, the states of Visegrad Group – Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia prepared a document, where they expressed their deep conviction about their final goal, which was entering the European Community. Moreover, the countries in their memorandum manifested a strong will for the membership and appealed to the Community for its clear declaration about it¹⁹². This declaration was of special significance for its signatories, as it not only underlined the meaning of the accession, but also aimed at a common attitude of the countries, which initiated democratic transformations in Europe, and which began to negotiate the associate agreements as the first.

3.2.1. Polish aspirations for the European integration.

In April 1994 Poland officially applied for the membership in the European Union. In order to become a rightful member, the state was obliged to fulfil the following requirements within ten years:

- to balance its budget (the country's budget deficit could not exceed 3% GNP) and reduce the inflation,
- to increase the quality of products and services until the level of the products and services of the EU states,

¹⁹¹ Ibidem, p. 56.

¹⁹² Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 114 – 115.

- to rebuild the structure of Polish agriculture and to decide about its model of its participation in the EU market,
- to adjust the structure of the prices as well as the law to the EU one.

The motives, which Poland had been guided by during its efforts for the membership, were of different natures: economic, political and social ones¹⁹³.

From the economic point of view, Poland expected a faster development and modernization. The first and most desired result of the EU membership was trade facilitation: the liquidation of obstacles in the flow of products between Poland and the European Union as well as a gradual disappearance of Polish agricultural goods. Along with the improvement for the economy, Poland hoped for the inflow of products of the member states, which would affect the situation of exporters and the competition of Polish goods. Consequently, the development of trade would influence the increase of production, and that would, undoubtedly, cause the growth of national product.

Poland's expectations for such tendencies were not out of reality, as these economic phenomena had taken place in Western Europe during the creation of a common market. It meant that the opening of Polish economy would enhance the pressure of foreign competition, which would result in the inflow of capital and more interest of investors, and with the lack of national financial resources, foreign investments could contribute a lot to modernizing many branches of the industry. Moreover, Poland counted on the access to all aid programmes of the European Union.

For the political reasons, however, Poland perceived the European structures to be a refuge for its security and a stable position in the international arena. The EU membership would allow the country to enter the zone of peace, stability and partnership among the states. Furthermore, it would also mean leaving "a danger zone" between unpredictable East and stable West, which would additionally contribute to abandoning a debatable location in the neighbourhood of two superpowers: Russia and Germany.

Within the confines of the multilateral forms and arranged rules of cooperation, the possibilities of domination of the most powerful nations would diminish. Therefore, the participation in the EU was associated with a supplementary effect on the other member states, as well as the influence on economic and political decisions. Poland would obtain a support of the European organization, without which it would be condemned to marginalization in an international life. Moreover, the state shared the views of Central and Eastern Europe that the EU enlargement to the East was of great significance for the security

¹⁹³ The whole subsection is based on the author's M.A. thesis.

on the whole continent, as it would allow overcoming the divisions and shaping new bounds of development and wealth of the member states. Poland also hoped that the accession would prevent the revival of influence zones and limit the enslavement of countries, and would enhance internal democracy with the protection of democratic values.

The arguments, which encouraged Poland to aspire for EU membership concerned a political and social climate to reform the economy. As the government and the parliament would be obliged to conduct the changes according to the enclosed schedule, the state expected political interests along with the pressure of different interest groups to play a less important role in such undertakings. Moreover, prospects for a fast membership would be able to contribute to boost a social consent for urgent internal reforms. In other words, the government was prone to take advantage of a wide social approval for the process and use it to present the citizens with the profits of the accession, such as the creation of new jobs, the reduction of unemployment, the improvement of life standards, the reduction of prices for a lot of products, the possibilities of benefiting from the liberties of the European free market.

Nevertheless, Poland did not only appreciate good points of a possible integration, but was aware of the costs it would have to incur. In the economic area the state did realize that with entering the European structures the growth of competition on Polish market would cause the collapse of inefficient companies. Hence, some enterprises would be forced to limit the production, which would result in a temporary rise in unemployment.

For a majority of social groups, however, great importance was given to the political issues, with a special regard for transferring a lot of competences to the EU institutions and bodies. Such a process, though, might be identified with the restriction and loss of sovereignty, although there would be highly improbable that any state should vanish and there would appear a super-state European Homeland.

Despite the fact that the experts were not able to anticipate accurately the costs and benefits of the integration process, the government and the society placed their hope in well-negotiated conditions during the accession process.

3.2.2. Around the negotiation process.

The attitude of the European Union to the process of enlargement, however, underwent some transformations. At the beginning of the collapse of the Iron Curtain in Europe, the Community reacted enthusiastically, but with the passing of time, the

organization realized its role in the rapprochement of two parts of the continent, hence the Community began to act cautiously until 1993¹⁹⁴.

Officially in June 1993 at the summit of the European Council in Copenhagen the EU expressed a political wish to enlarge the Community with the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as it specified the conditions of the membership¹⁹⁵. According to the requirements, the state, which aspired to become a part of the European Union should achieve a stability of the institutions responsible for democracy, the rule of law, the observance of human rights as well as the respect and protection of minority groups. Moreover, such a country ought to develop a market economy and be able to face the conditions of the EU competition within the common market. To complete the economic and political requirements, though, the country should be capable of accepting the goals of the European political, economic and monetary union, altogether with its common law.

On the one hand, these general indicators posed a threat for the aspiring states, as the Community could easily question the progress of the integration process, but on the other, the countries hoped that inaccuracy of the conditions would not allow rejecting the applications.

As the associate countries demanded for more specific conditions, the EU in July 1994 proposed “a structured dialogue” within the “Strategy of preparing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for the membership”, which was accepted in Essen during the summit of EU leaders¹⁹⁶. The essence of the dialogue was regular meetings of the representatives of the associate states with the members of the European Council and the Council of the European Union, as well as the representations of parliaments with the members of the European Parliament in order to discuss some common issues. The strategy, however, offered the countries assistance in participating in the common market.

The most significant fact during the Essen summit concerned the preparation of White Paper on the integration of Central and Eastern European states with the internal market of the European Union, which was formally accepted in Cannes in June 1995¹⁹⁷. The paper comprised three areas of issues, which the aspiring countries were supposed to introduce in a proper order: the law for the common market, the sequence of adjustments to the market and the institutional matters of coming into force the legislation of the internal market.

¹⁹⁴ Ibidem, p. 117.

¹⁹⁵ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 286.

¹⁹⁶ Ibidem, p. 287.

¹⁹⁷ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 122.

The next EU meeting, which took place in Madrid in December 1995, resulted in the initiations of the negotiations with Malta and Cyprus in six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference, which was due to begin in March 1996¹⁹⁸. In the meantime, however, the European Commission presented the opinion about the readiness of each country for the membership. In order to be prepared thoroughly, the states were given the questions on twenty-three areas of politics, economy and social life. Poland handed in the questionnaire on 15 July 1996, and at the beginning of the following year the state initiated the works leading to the integration process in the form of “National Strategy of Integration”¹⁹⁹.

The fulfilment of the integration conditions subjected to the supervision of the European Commission. The first evaluation of Poland’s progress on the road to the European Union was presented in a form of the “Opinion about the membership application” from 1997, called *avis*²⁰⁰. Simultaneously, the Commission put forward the opinion about nine countries of Central and Eastern Union, which also aspired for the European structures.

A positive assessment of Poland’s efforts leading to the EU was of great significance for the whole process, as it recommended the state to the EU members to officially begin the negotiations. Furthermore, *avis* corrected some actions undertaken within the preparation period, especially associated with the application of legal solutions of the common market. The evaluation allowed the country to analyze the adjustments and to enhance the process in some areas. Nevertheless, the remarks included in the opinion were mostly in accordance with Poland’s activities²⁰¹.

Moreover, a favourable opinion encouraged Poland to continue, and even, accelerate the reforms necessary to lead the state to the EU membership. Thanks to the opinion, it was easier for the state to describe the priorities of adjustment’s efforts as well as to speed up some steps, especially in the area of law. The fields, which required further reforms stayed, to a great extent, in accordance with the National Strategy of Integration (NSI)²⁰².

The National Strategy of Integration was accepted by the Polish government on 28 January 1997, and in July 1997 the Council of Ministers established an inter-departmental team for preparing the negotiations. The deputy ministers of the individual departments and the representatives of central offices headed twenty-eight departmental sub-teams and five

¹⁹⁸ Ibidem, p. 126 – 127.

¹⁹⁹ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 287.

²⁰⁰ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 497.

²⁰¹ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 140.

²⁰² Ibidem, p. 141.

horizontal groups. Altogether there were thirty-three sub-teams for individual negotiation issues²⁰³. The Strategy based on fourth main assumptions²⁰⁴:

- Polish membership in EU would include the integration in all areas,
- the integration with EU should enable the highest increase of economic growth, along with the aspiration for gradual fulfilment of economic and monetary union's criteria,
- the integration with EU was a process of mutual benefits,
- the integration was accompanied by the adjustment costs.

However, Poland did not rely on the one document, which was supposed to indicate the direction of the reforms on the road to the membership. In March 1997, the Office of European Integration Committee prepared in cooperation with other governmental institutions "The Schedule of implementing actions of NSI", which allowed preparing and implementing specific programmes by the institutions of central administration²⁰⁵. But a fundamental paper for Poland's membership in the EU was "National program of membership preparations in the European Union", which included the priorities of the Commission from "Partnership for the membership" as well as national goals. In this way, however, an unilateral attitude of the EU towards the enlargement was enhanced by the actions, which Poland regarded as fundamental²⁰⁶.

On the other hand, the European Union made efforts to be ready for new members. The first big step towards the enlargement was made with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when the Community deepened its structures and was transformed into the European Union. Moreover, the creation of treaty basis for common foreign and security policy as well as the judiciary and internal affairs turned out to be the beginnings of the integration process.

Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty indicated the period of "overheating" the process of integration²⁰⁷. The document included the regulations, according to which the member states might not participate in some common EU activities. Furthermore, the possibility of not taking part in some fields of cooperation was confirmed by the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997. Such regulations gave the countries permission for avoiding "inconvenient" areas of common policy, hence loosened the bonds between the members of the organization. For

²⁰³ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 287.

²⁰⁴ *Narodowa Strategia Integracji*, KIE, „Monitor Integracji Europejskiej”, special edition, January 1997, p. 7 [in:] Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 149.

²⁰⁵ *Informacja o przygotowaniach do negocjacji akcesyjnych z Unią Europejską (pierwszy etap)*, KIE, „Monitor Integracji Europejskiej”, special edition, September 1997, p. 17 [in:] Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 151.

²⁰⁶ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 152.

²⁰⁷ Popowicz K., *Strategiczne cele mandatu negocjacyjnego Polski z Unią Europejską*, p. 254 [in:] Kolarska-Bobińska L., *Polska Eurodebaty*, Warszawa 1999.

Poland and other aspiring states, however, the treaty of Amsterdam contributed to opening the road to the beginning of the negotiations with the European Union.

In July 1997 the European Commission put forward the project of Agenda 2000, the document whose aim was to prepare the organization to welcome new members. During the summit, the EU made decisions on introducing improved pre-accession strategy for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in a form of "Partnership for the membership".

The first bilateral accession conferences took place in March 1998 and concerned Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary. The summit in Helsinki in December 1999 decided about the negotiations with the rest of the states. Officially, the process began in Brussels in April 1998 with the screening of the associate states' law, but the real negotiations started in 1999 and found its end in Copenhagen on 13 December 2003²⁰⁸.

3.3. Towards the membership in the European Union.

The process of acceding new countries to the European structures began on 30 March 1998, during a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of fifteen member states, ten candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus. The meeting resulted in the decision about uniform rules of the accession process for eleven states, including a structured dialogue, an enhanced pre-accession strategy, the principles of the assistance within PHARE²⁰⁹. The following day, i.e. 31 March 1998, Poland altogether with five more candidates officially initiated the accession negotiations in Brussels.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, in his inaugural speech, admitted that entering the European Union was the most favourable in terms of a state security, the stability of democratic order, building a balanced economic development as well as forming a new civil society. Moreover, he expressed Poland's approval of EU values, being the basis for European unity. The minister stated that Polish preparations for the integration began along with the period of system transformation and became an encouragement for speeding up the economic development in order to join the Community²¹⁰.

The minister also presented Poland's stand on fundamental fields of the negotiation, which was as follows²¹¹:

²⁰⁸ Popowicz K., *Historia...*, op. cit., p. 288.

²⁰⁹ Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 171.

²¹⁰ *Oświadczenie Rządu RP na otwarcie negocjacji Polski o członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej (Bruksela, 31 marca 1998)*, KIE, „Monitor Integracji Europejskiej” 1998, no. 18, p. 85 – 92 [in:] Kawecka-Wyrzykowska E., *Polska...*, op. cit., p. 171.

²¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 172 – 173.

- Poland declared a wish of an active cooperation within all three pillars of the European Union already in pre-accession period, as the integration with the European as well as Euro-Atlantic institutions was perceived to be of high priority of the foreign policy.
- Polish negotiators would aspire to include Polish citizens in the system of free flow of workers at the day of the accession. He also underlined that all four liberties of the internal market should be treated altogether.
- Polish minister assured that the state could perceive the possibility of finding solutions to the participation of Polish agriculture in the rights as well as obligations resulted from the common agricultural policy, including the participation of Polish farmers in price, income and structural instruments.
- Poland would contribute a lot to the common structural policy, regarding it as an essential instrument of realizing the principle of solidarity. The state expected a loyal aid within the common structural policy, based on the rights similar to other member states.
- Poland hoped for the assistance in the field of the development of infrastructure, as this area required considerable financial outlays.
- In the area of environmental protection Poland stated that the majority of common law regulations had been already implemented, although it was still necessary to search for transitory periods in the fields where Poland depended on the possibilities of its economy as well as a financial and technical level of EU support.
- The aim of Polish government was to prepare in the shortest period of time all sectors to function effectively on the common market. However, as the national capabilities of meeting economic and social costs were limited, Poland would rely on the European structural policy.
- The negotiations of Poland's participations in EU budget ought to consider a level of economic development of the country, making it possible to take part in financial activities of regional, structural, agricultural and social policies.
- Polish minister emphasised the necessity of specifying a working date for ending the negotiations as it would enable Poland to advance the adjustments and limit the possible transitory solutions. Moreover, Poland declared a wish of participating in the discussions on institutional reforms, the common agricultural policy, the structural policy and the EU finances for a better operation in an enlarged Union.

Essentially, before and during the process of negotiation Poland counted on realizing some strategic goals for the state and its good position among the EU countries. The first of them was to negotiate optimally effective transitory periods, based on accurate economic

calculations²¹². The observers of Polish political arena perceived a more favourable situation for Poland when the European Union stayed as an integrated, strong organization. However, in the case of acceding a big number of new countries, the Union might agree to compromise in the field of the common market, without a need of transferring to the above-national level parts of powers connected with foreign and security policy, or the judiciary and internal affairs. Such a situation could lead to the possibility of negotiating longer transitory periods, which would be not beneficial for Polish economy, as it would place the state among the countries, which were less advanced in economic reforms. Therefore, while negotiating, Poland should consider how to encourage the state to fulfil the EU requirements, and not to slow down the economy by prolonging transitory periods.

Furthermore, Polish negotiators as well as the public opinion considered not entering the European Union as first countries, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, to be impossible²¹³. Although it was difficult to explain the assumption of such a stand, Poland was convinced that when the country joined NATO there could be nothing to prevent it from acceding to the European structures in the first place. Moreover, the accession in the later period of time was believed to be unfavourable for the position of Poland among the other members.

Moreover, Poland associated its fast accession in the European organization with a geographical location, as an advantage over other candidates²¹⁴. Despite the fact that the negotiations would be of an economic nature, the country relied on the argument of a political nature. The Polish negotiators did realize that neither the Czech Republic nor Hungary could ever be a link between the West and the East, whereas Poland had always been. Thus, such a geopolitical argument ensured the state that its friendly policy towards Eastern neighbours as well as border's relationships and the minorities' problems regulated by the treaty would undoubtedly guarantee the vision of secure Europe and hence, move Poland closer to the European Union membership.

Finally, a very important goal of the negotiation process should be to guarantee Polish citizens full rights, which would result from the EU membership²¹⁵. Although the idea of integration includes a wide aspect of social life, it is mostly associated with economy. During the pre-accession period, the policy of the Community was restricted to the problems of the internal market, excluding the issues of the third pillar. Therefore, the fears of the negotiations were connected with pushing Poland to the peripheries of the European

²¹² Popowicz K., *Strategiczne...*, op. cit., p. 258.

²¹³ Ibidem, p. 260.

²¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 261.

²¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 262.

economic space. It was taken into account, though, that Poland would probably be given the longest transitory period for the free flow of people, as the EU politicians were afraid of Polish unemployment, organized crime or leakiness of the Eastern borders, which was directly connected with the third pillar. Hence, it would give an impression that Polish citizens could belong to the citizenship of second category.

Nevertheless, the membership of the European Union should be considered as a great challenge for the whole nation, as the integration means the acceptance of common principles and values, the observance of law, democracy, the rights of liberties of the citizens. Moreover, the participation in such structures forms and enhances the solidarity among nations, tolerance, individual liberties and citizen's bonds, shaping at the same time the feeling of European identity. Thus, negotiating for Poles the citizenship of a second category would be a violation of the European idea.

The above mentioned fears dominated the period before and at the beginning of the negotiations with the European Union, and although the experts as well as the observers, politicians or negotiators themselves did realize which criteria they should be directed by, the effects did not satisfy the whole nation. The opinions, views, dissatisfactions as well as achievements of the negotiation process will be presented in the following subchapter.

All in all, the negotiation process found its final in Copenhagen on 13 December 2003, when the candidate states finished the procedure of accession with signing the Accession Treaty. Poland obtained the following transitory periods²¹⁶:

- On introducing a common procedure of registering medicines (until the end of 2008),
- On adjusting the cooperative banks to the common requirements and on ensuring the protection to investors on the capital market (until 2007),
- On delaying the liberty of purchasing properties by foreigners (5 years for so called second houses and 12 years for agricultural and forest properties),
- On keeping the present rules of the functioning of special economic zones (until 2011 for small enterprises and until 2010 for big ones),
- On adjusting to the common agricultural policy and on fulfilling veterinarian and sanitary requirements (several periods altogether from 3 up to 10 years),
- On making road network available to the heaviest vehicles (until the end of 2010) and on limiting the access for carriers from EU states to rail network (3 years),
- On using reduced VAT rates and excise tax (6 periods until 2007 and 2008),
- On ensuring minimum protection requirements and work hygiene (3 years),

²¹⁶ Marszałek A. (ed.), *Integracja...*, op. cit., p. 504 – 505.

- On creating minimum supplies of petroleum for energetic security of the country (6 years),
- On entering competition in fields of some post services (until 2005),
- On improving the quality of air and water, on better administering waste, on limiting industrial pollution and other activities connected with environmental protection (several periods from a few to a dozen or so years).

In conclusion, Poland's efforts during the negotiation period contributed a lot to the final effect specified in the Accession Treaty. Although the state was given a big number of transitory periods in different areas of economy, this fact cannot be treated as an argument against the EU wish to welcome Poland among other member countries. On the contrary, due to economic backwardness, Poland received a chance to adjust some shortcomings while belonging to the European Community, in order to improve its position in a group of the European partners, and in order not to overwhelm the Union. Nevertheless, on 1 May 2004 Poland altogether with nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe officially became the member of the European Union.

4. Polish public opinion on the European integration.

In 1997 Polish government approved the document of "New Integration Strategy. Poland on the road to the EU membership" prepared by the Committee of European Integration, in which the priorities of Polish policy towards the European Union were presented²¹⁷. The document was perceived as suitable for interpreting the results of the Polish public opinion, which underwent two substantial changes: the process of Polish accession in the European structures and the process of system transformation. Both of them, however, were linked to each other, and the second one required the transformations of a political as well as economic system altogether with the shifts of awareness and social customs, which directly influenced the perception of the Polish aspirations for the EU.

²¹⁷ Skotnicka-Illasiewicz E., *Polacy wobec integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, Warszawa 1998, p. 33.

Therefore, the analysis of benefits the Poles could obtain from the development of the market economy and the democratic state seemed to be noticed only by the minority of Polish society, though. The new reality was considered to be of unequal chances, without a clear definition in a social awareness, thus both processes evoked the mechanism of “transferring guilt” for the individual consequences of not adjusting to the situation of the European integration²¹⁸. The public opinion, though, could include the aspect of the EU as being responsible for some people’s failures, which was reflected in the results of the surveys.

Moreover, the examination of the Polish society’s attitudes to the EU membership within several years before the accession brought researchers to the point of three decisive approaches to the problems of European integration²¹⁹. One of them referred to a positive perception of the process, which was regarded as a “driving force” of a system transformation, popular with a young generation. The second belief was connected with perceiving the adjustments to be a burden for the society, therefore the transformation should have overtaken the integration, as it required deep structural changes. The proponents of such a conviction, usually young people from towns, did not deny the necessity of the EU admission, but after Poland consolidated a new reality. Finally, there was a group of people undecided about the process; the people whose main feature was indifference as they neither wished to come back to the situation before 1989, nor wanted to be included in the integrative organization for fear of losing political and economic sovereignty.

4.1. Changes in the attitudes of the Poles towards integration.

Although the Polish society had the periods of delights and disappointments with the European Union, the average level of the support for the process among the Poles was relatively high within the time of Poland’s road to the membership²²⁰. However, the moments of hesitation were not the effect of the support’s decrease, according to the commentators, but more the results of disinformation and vagueness, which led to the increase of uncertainty of the integration and its consequences²²¹. Yet, the European integration was approved for the reasons of Poland’s chance of entering the area of economic

²¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 34.

²¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 35.

²²⁰ Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, *Polacy wobec integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, Zespół poznawanych analiz nierówności społecznych Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa, January 1998.

²²¹ Skotnicka-Illasiewicz E., *Polacy wobec...*, op. cit., p. 38.

stability, established and clear legal regulations, preventing Poland's marginalization, the advance of civilization connected with the development of capitalism, improvements of ecology and higher standards of living, and finally, an opportunity to come back to the West, which if squandered, may have never happened again.

At the end of 1990s the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of Polish Academy of Science conducted the research within "The Poles 1995 cases" under Prof. Adamski's guidance, concerning the attitudes to the EU, which proved the minority of the Polish society to be opposed to the integration²²². Only a tiny part of respondents with the feeling of unwillingness to the cooperation within the organized structures and to foreign investors was accompanied with the conviction of being exploited in the past. According to the author, though, such awareness of history might result in a greater number of people unfriendly to the integration in the future each time any problematic issues occurred. So far, the Polish society could experience agricultural concerns, which contributed to the appearance of aversion to the European Union.

The anti-integration attitudes were less associated with the position of an individual in the society than the pro-integration ones, as, according to the research of the Polish Academy of Science, farmers, unqualified workers and the unemployed presented little enthusiasm to the membership in comparison to the citizens with higher social status. However, the whole Polish society was convinced that Poland should count on itself, regardless of any international agreements, did not treat the EU as only a source of helping the country, which proved the state's sense of independence, again resulting from the resentments of the past.

Moreover, there was also a connection between supporting and rejecting the idea of the EU accession among the Poles and other sources of "for and against" approaches as a fear of foreign investments or loss of sovereignty. Taking demographic and social factors into consideration, however, it was proven that men, better educated people, younger and the inhabitants of cities, with better social status were in favour of the integration²²³. But a lower level of education did not automatically carry out with the intensity of anti-European attitudes, yet was linked with a lack of robust opinions²²⁴. Nevertheless, more crystallized views of the membership were present among people connected with a defined set of values, e.g. political sympathies or religious factors.

Since autumn 1999 the scepticism towards the EU integration had increased, and although still the majority of Poles approved the admission to the organization, there

²²² Ibidem, p. 48.

²²³ CBOS, *Integracja Polski z Unią Europejską*, Research Report, Warszawa, August 1996.

²²⁴ CBOS, *Unia Europejska w świadomości społecznej*, Research Report, Warszawa, May 1995.

appeared some doubts about a fast and full integration, though²²⁵. A greater number of Polish citizens were inclined to believe that the process should take more time, which meant a later date of the entry, with long transitional periods in many areas. The intensity of unfavourable approaches to the EU resulted in negative predictions of the consequences of the integration and growing belief that the current member states were greater beneficiaries of it than Poland. Moreover, although a fixed date of the membership was not known in 1999, the accession negotiations were ongoing, therefore the public opinion was attacked with a big amount of information concerning obstacles in negotiations, criticism of Poland's adjustment or fears of opening labour markets to the Poles.


A predominant problem of the early stage of the negotiations, however, was a poor level of knowledge among the Polish society, which prevented from assessing real benefits and costs after the entry. Paradoxically, the surveys of public opinion showed a high rate of support for the Polish membership in the EU²²⁶. Within the period of 1994-1998, the approval amounted to 59-80%, with 1996 being the peak of Euro-enthusiasm, whereas against Poland's admission was 6-19% Poles, with the highest Euro-scepticism in 1998. As the public debates on the EU began in the Polish media, however, the opinion among respondents underwent some changes with the year 1999²²⁷. Between the beginning of 1999 and March 2001, the number of the EU proponents decreased to 55%, and the number of opponents increased to 30%, which shows the graph.

Graph 1. Support for the integration in the period of 1994 - 2001 (%)

²²⁵ CBOS, *Na drodze do Unii Europejskiej*, Research Report, Warszawa, January 1999.

²²⁶ CBOS, *Opinie o integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, Research Report, Warszawa, March 2001.

²²⁷ Ibidem.



Source: CBOS, *Opinie o integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, March 2001.

In January 1999 two Centres of Public Opinion published reports, conducted at the beginning of December 1998, eight months after the accession talks started, about the range of information of the integration process the Poles had. According to the results of the Centre of Social Opinion, only 18% admitted having satisfactory amount of information, although the government information policy since 1998 had been improved, and the issues of the EU membership among the political arena as well as the society had been constantly present²²⁸. Furthermore, every second respondent had a feeling of poor knowledge, and every third one could regard themselves as quite informed, whereas only 7% were well informed. Therefore, the 5% fall of the people with good knowledge about the process within September 1998 and March 2001, and simultaneously the 5% increase of those poorly informed could lead to the conclusion that either the EU information was insufficient or more questions and anxieties appeared with the passing of time.

Despite numerous discussions in the Polish media on the possible benefits from the integration as well as inevitable costs connected with the process, the Poles seemed to have doubts about the future profits, which were reflected in the growth of scepticism since September 2000, in comparison to the data from the end of 1998, when positive expectations outnumbered the negative ones²²⁹. 48% of the people asked believed, after joining the EU, Poland would be able to enjoy privileges as much as the existing members could, the argument which found only 24% opponents. The support of 44% was given to the faith of

²²⁸ OBOP, *Wyniki badań opinii społecznej w styczniu 1999 roku*, Research Report, Warszawa, January 1999.

²²⁹ CBOS, *Wyniki badań opinii społecznej w styczniu 1999*, Warszawa, January 1999.

enhancing Poland's independence and sovereignty, to 27% against, while 39% perceived in the EU the possibility of improving Poland's economy, thus increasing the standards of living, to 31% rejecting such a view. Finally, the Poles could also see the chance of enriching the country's culture and reinforcing the national identity (38%), 28% of respondents opposed it, though.


However, considering the benefits of the integration, the opinion which prevailed between April 1997 and March 2001 was that entering the EU would be profitable for the economy, which accompanied the stance that Poland should first modernize it and then aspire for the membership²³⁰. The opposite trend, though, was popular with young people, the inhabitants of big cities, with degrees, who were of the opinion that Poland should be admitted to the EU as fast as possible, as the organization would accelerate the development of the economy. Nevertheless, the biggest sceptics in that issue were farmers, who had the greatest doubts about possible advantages for the Polish agriculture in comparison to other social groups.

The analysis of Poles' opinions on the then relations of Poland with the European Union within the period from 1994 till 2001, showed there was a slight deterioration to be observed²³¹. More than half of the respondents (54% in March 2001, 50% in September 2000) considered them to be favourable first of all for the EU states, with only 6% of those being convinced of the benefits only for Poland. (see the following graph)

Graph 2. Poland-EU relations in the period of 1994-2001 – Who do they bring more benefits to? (%)

²³⁰ CBOS, *Przewidywane skutki integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, Research Report, Warszawa, March 2001.

²³¹ CBOS, *Opinie o...*, op. cit.



Source: CBOS, *Przewidywane skutki integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, March 2001.

Moreover, the evaluation of the improvements of Polish companies in terms of competitiveness did not also turn out to be positive, as since September 2000 the number of opponents had increased, altogether with those believing that the EU entry would not have an impact on that aspect²³². When the biggest entrepreneurs were asked to give the concessions to make, 79% agreed the Poles should accept the EU standards on labour legislation, whereas 55% stated that Poland should accept all norms on the environment protection without transitional periods²³³. The big part of Polish businessmen (38%) also claimed to resign from transitional periods in the area of selling the ground to foreigners as well as agree to close down special economic zones once Poland entered the EU (30%).

Nevertheless, the period around the EU enlargement brought the enthusiasm Poland expressed towards its place in the European structures, with 71% of Poles approving the entry in May 2004, which was comparable to the peak of the fascination in August 1997, on the eve of the accession negotiations²³⁴. The periods of 2002-2003, though, were characterized by the changes of the EU positive attitudes, which ranged from 59% in December 2002 and April 2003 to 69% in October 2003. On the other hand, the sceptics of the integration also underwent fluctuations, as the smallest number of them fell on the half of 2003, whereas the highest at the turn of 2003 and 2004, which proved the hottest

²³² CBOS, *Przewidywane...*, op. cit.

²³³ Pentor, survey report from 28.02.2001 to 01.03.2001.

²³⁴ CBOS, *Stosunek do członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej po rozszerzeniu tej organizacji*, Research Report, Warszawa, May 2004.

membership moment. Although the group most unfavourable to Poland's admission was still farmers, the very eve of the enlargement raised quite negative feelings among Poles, with the predomination of terror, sadness and disappointment in April, in comparison to May 2004. The positive emotions, however, appeared with Poland joining the EU, which filled Polish society with hope (65%), interest (47%) or pride (13%). Surprisingly, the sense of anxiety remained at the high level of 51%.

As the Poles concerned about buying out the ground by the Europeans, especially Germans, the fears of accessing Poland and other Eastern countries appeared among the EU states, mostly connected with the invasion of the new members to their labour markets. However, such worries as other possible concerns will be presented in detail in the fourth chapter in terms of analyzing the British attitude to Poland's membership in the European Union.

4.2. Polish political arena about the European integration.

The political elites in Poland began to involve their attitudes towards the membership in the European structures before the parliamentary election in 1997, which coincided with the commencement of the negotiations between Poland and the European Union. It was also the year of issuing the document with the priorities of the state's government towards European policy, therefore this period could be regarded as the start of a public debate on the European integration²³⁵. The dominant parties in the Polish political arena were at that time Solidarity Election Action (AWS), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Freedom Union (UW), Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), with the less significant ones as Movement for Poland's Reconstruction (ROP), Labour Union (UP), Right Union of the Republic of Poland (UPR) and Bloc for Poland (BdP).

The Solidarity Election Action declared the support for "Europe of free nations as Europe of Homelands", perceiving co-creating the unity of the continent based on "Christian origins of our civilization", with preserving national identity to be the purpose of the integration²³⁶. The representatives of the party emphasized their mission of the return to "a Europe of Christian origins", which was presented by the leader, Marian Krzaklewski, stating: "*We pride ourselves on our thousand-year-old history, but traditional values are – both to us and the whole Europe, and the world – necessary, mainly in the future*"²³⁷.

²³⁵ Skotnicka-Illasiewicz E., *Polacy wobec...*, op. cit., p. 33.

²³⁶ Kolarska-Bobińska L., *Polska Eurodebata*, Warszawa 1999, p. 221.

²³⁷ *21 punktów w 21 wiek*, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 September 1997, p. 22.

In the party's programme, however, the EU integration was considered to be an opportunity to make the economical growth and development of Poland more dynamic, which required reinforcing democratic as well as market transformations. Moreover, according to the party's stance, the economic integration was the guarantee of a smaller distance in the economic development between Poland and the EU states. As AWS was a coalition of numerous parties, though, its approach towards the EU was the outcome of liberal, conservative and radical attitudes to Europe.

In the programme of the Democratic Left Alliance, on the other hand, its European image was emphasized clearly, which gave the issue of the EU admission high priority²³⁸. Among ten main programme points of the party, the European Union – called the Homeland of Nations – was regarded (altogether with NATO) as a separate part, whose membership was supposed to be the goal of Poland's foreign policy, though. The independent paragraph, titled "Poland in the European Family", pointed at completing the adjustment of Polish law to the EU legislation to be the main objective.

However, SLD made efforts to enhance its European image by involving the leaders of the significant socialistic and socio-democratic European parties in an electoral campaign, whose essential argument was to guarantee the obedience of European norms, such as the secularism of the state and tolerance. Furthermore, SLD highlighted the merits of the EU integration, although the issues of the integration costs and maintaining rapport with the East could raise some scepticism.

In terms of programme cohesion, though, it was much easier to analyze the Freedom Union, as the party not being the coalition of groups. UW was perceived as the party most enthusiastic, beside SLD, about the EU integration in the 1997 election campaign, which aimed at introducing Poland to the EU and NATO in order to provide security and a better development of the state²³⁹. The politicians of the party reassured that only the continuation of the national reforms after joining the Union would contribute to obtaining all benefits for the sovereign country, whose strength stemmed from a centuries-old tradition of ties with a Christian and democratic Europe. Moreover, UW was willing to protect the most vulnerable areas of economy and wished to include into the integration process the countries Poland had centuries-old bonds with.

Nonetheless, the most fundamental difference between the Freedom Union's programme and the other parties in terms of the EU accession was a lack of making Poland's European membership conditional on negotiating the most favourable entry conditions. UW

²³⁸ Kolarska-Bobińska L., *Polska...*, op. cit. p. 222.

²³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 224.

did not force the Polish society to decide whether or not to join, but how to reinforce the political and economic institutions in order to meet the EU challenges. The party's politicians considered acquiring the EU membership and strengthening its position as the EU partner to be more beneficial than delaying the integration process.

The Polish Peasants' Party was regarded as an opponent of the idea of the EU integration from the very beginning, however it did not appear as the main anti-European party in the election campaign²⁴⁰. The PSL programme was full of the slogans of "a gradual admission to the cooperative, integrative, European and North Atlantic structures", which gave the European integration high priority of foreign policy, whereas the united Europe was considered to be "the most effective way of meeting the future requirements". Yet, the programme was not overflowed with the merits of the membership, since there were a lot of reservations, including the politicians' concerns about the state of wealth to be the main criterion of the United Europe. PSL activists called for the firmness of negotiations, which was supposed to bring success in accordance with Poland's interest. Moreover, in presenting its slogans and demands, the Polish Peasants' Party succeeded in leaving the image of anti-Europeanism in favour of winning the attitude of keeping a distance to the EU direction.

The parties with a smaller electorate in the Polish political arena also took a stance on the issue of the EU membership. The Labour Union, representing the interests of left-hand part of the society, clearly approved the integrative aspirations, but with a common sense, which meant protecting the issue of national identity of Polish culture and economy, democratic values, obedience of law and civil liberties, when joining the EU. The Right Union of the Republic of Poland, on the other hand, promoted itself as a pro-European party, although the campaign proved its more sceptical side, with the statements of the EU being "the creation of bureaucratic socialism, suppressing free market and economic growth"²⁴¹. Surprisingly, though, the Movement for Poland's Reconstruction did not refer to the matters of Poland's accession to the EU, whereas the Bloc for Poland propagated the anti-European views from the very beginning, negating the idea of the Polish nation in the European Union.

The 2001 parliamentary elections brought old as well as new competitors in the political scene, as, apart from "the old guard": SLD, UP, AWS, UW, PSL, appeared the newcomers, such as Civil Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS), with Self-Defence Party gaining more and more proponents. The issue of the European integration was a crucial part of the electoral campaign in 2001, as the accession negotiations were already underway,

²⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 225.

²⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 229.

therefore the attitudes to Poland's membership could turn out to be a bargaining card, though.

However, the parties' programmes abounded with the image of Poland's place or future in the EU, with the majority of them supported the aspirations although not uncritically, and moreover, the potential voters could see the parties questioning the conditions Poland was supposed to accept as a future EU member. The Left Democratic Alliance emphasized its goal of introducing Poland as a state with a strong and stable position of an integrating partner and secure Europe, thus being able to cooperate with other parties, institutions and social organizations²⁴². Furthermore, SLD's aspiration was to bring Poland to the membership as quickly as possible on the conditions providing the country with notable and long-term benefits. Moreover, the vision of Europe the party's politicians presented directed at the evolution of an integrated Europe towards a social Europe, which cared for the dialogue of social partners being fundamental to an economic development as well as the mechanisms of opposing the marginalization of big social groups.

The Solidarity of Right Election Action (AWSP), the renaming AWS, also focused on reassuring the place in a secure family of wealthy states to Poland, with the guarantee of participation in creating a common European home, which would maintain the countries' identities and respect for national traditions and values²⁴³. The Polish Peasants' Party, on the other hand, was more cautious about building an ideal image for Poland's future in the EU²⁴⁴. The party believed the accession should contribute to the country's making up for the civilization backwardness, and providing with a smooth growth. Yet, the model of Europe PSL propagated, resembled the vision of AWSP, with a great care for the national identity of member states and equal participation in decision-making about the EU future.

The party, which became a little known during the previous elections, but without much success, the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland, took part in the 2001 parliamentary elections from a more stable position in Poland, although having a reputation for an aggressive player. In the case of Polish accession to the EU, however, the party's stance was matter-of-fact: despite being aware of having a closer cooperation between nations, the Self-Defence party warned of not comprehending such a cooperation as an act of subordination and domination of well-developed and strongest states in the world over the poorer ones²⁴⁵. Therefore, the party objected to the European integration in the way it was

²⁴² 2001 electoral programme, Internet: <http://www.sld.org.pl>.

²⁴³ Electoral programme from the party's official website, Internet: <http://www.rsaws.pl>.

²⁴⁴ Electoral programme from the party's official website, Internet: <http://www.psl.org.pl>.

²⁴⁵ Electoral programme from the party's official website, Internet: <http://www.samoobrona.org.pl>.

being conducted at that time, being of the opinion that the accession process should proceed altogether with a public debate, which would end up with a referendum.

The Freedom Union, on the other hand, promoted the ideas of Poland's membership as the greatest chance for the state to accelerate the rate of an economic development and widen markets for enterprises²⁴⁶. The party could also discern the guarantee of world security as well as an opportunity for Poles to gain the access to the labour markets. However, the UW politicians were aware that only knowledge and proper preparations of the citizens to exist on the common European market would allow making use of the membership, thus suggesting some initiatives to make the concept closer to the society.

The two newcomers among the Polish political elites, the Civil Platform and the Law and Justice, also included their attitudes to the European integration once they appeared in the campaign. In its electoral programme, PO emphasized the European Union to be the best choice for Poland, which was both hope and challenge for the country²⁴⁷. The hope, for long-lasting peace, stability and development of civil society, and the challenge, for the attention to a constant and harmonious development of the European integration for good of their participants, for the care for own participation and the significance of Poland's identity in a united Europe. Hence, the party was in favour of a consistent and balanced Europe, which was loyal, strong, democratic and economically efficient. PiS, however, perceived Poland to have a dignified place in Europe, which could be provided with a proper foreign policy of the state²⁴⁸. In the party's political manifesto for the 2001 elections, though, the attitude to the European policy was restricted to the view that the final decision should be preceded with an honest analysis of long-term effects of the integration as well as the costs of resigning from the membership.

²⁴⁶Electoral programme from the party's official website, Internet:<http://www.uw.org.pl>.

²⁴⁷*Program europejski Platformy Obywatelskiej*, Internet:
http://www.po.org.pl/_files_/dokumenty/inne/program_europ_po.doc.

²⁴⁸*Nasze miejsce w Europie. Manifest polityczny*, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. Przymierze Prawicy, Internet:
http://www.prawicapolska.pl/wybory_programy_pis.shtml.