

**“It Takes Two to Tango.
The European Union and Democracy
Promotion in the Mediterranean”**

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific
CBSS	Country-Based Support Scheme
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CL	Civil Liberties
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMAA	Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement
EMC	Euro-Mediterranean Conference
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Government Effectiveness
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
GNI	Gross National Income
HCTB	High Casualty Terrorist Bombings
IDP	International Democracy Promotion
IER	Instance Equité et Réconciliation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDH	Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain
IR	International Relations
IPE	International Political Economy
LTDH	Tunisian League for Human Rights
MDP	MEDA Democracy Programme
MEDA	mesures d'accompagnement
MEDEA Institute	European Institute for Research and Euro-Arab Cooperation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MINURSO	Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONU	Organisation des Nations-Unies

PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies
PJD	Partie de Justice et Développement
PITF	Political Instability Task Force
PR	Political Rights
PS	Political Stability and Absence of Violence
RCD	Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique
RMP	Redirected Mediterranean Policy
SEA	Single European Act
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TMC	Third Mediterranean Country
UE	Union Européenne
UFSP	Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires
UMed	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.S.A.	United States of America
VA	Voice and Accountability
WGI	World Governance Indicators
WNIS	Western Newly Independent States
WSIS	World Summit on the Information Society

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1. Introduction

The EU's Mediterranean policy is guided by the principle of partnership, a partnership which should be actively supported by both sides. The EU will work with its Mediterranean partners to: develop good neighbourly relations; improve prosperity; eliminate poverty; promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance and the rule of law; promote cultural and religious tolerance, and develop cooperation with civil society, including NGOs. It will do so by supporting the efforts of the Mediterranean partners to attain the goals set out by the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, by using its bilateral relations to pursue these objectives, and by contributing to the creation of a peaceful environment in the Middle East. (Council of the EU 2000b: 5)

The European Union (EU) introduced the objective to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law into its Mediterranean policy in the early 1990s. The EU and its Mediterranean partners have since repeated their joint commitment to these norms and values in several declarations in the framework of the Barcelona Process (cf. Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed, cf. Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2008a). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, 1995) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, 2003) provide the EU with various instruments to pursue the objective. However, according to many practitioners and observers, the EU's prospects of successfully transforming the region 'into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity' (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995: 2) are dim.

Drawing on the experience of the EU's Eastern enlargement, expectations for effective political conditionality in the Mediterranean indeed appear to be low. Most regimes in the region are authoritarian and lack an EU membership perspective. The high costs of domestic change in the target regimes is neither balanced by a sufficiently big reward nor outweighed by a credible threat of sanctions. In fact, the EU has never applied sanctions based on the 'essential elements' clause in Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAAs). More recently, it has selectively granted financial and political rewards under the ENP, but incentives are small compared to the 'golden carrot' of EU membership. Thus, EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean seems to stand little chance of transforming authoritarian regimes.

Yet, empirical evidence shows that partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, such as political dialogue and democracy assistance, are implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations. This is surprising, given that authoritarian regimes can

hardly be expected to actively engage in the implementation of external democracy promotion efforts. The variation in the timing, extent, and quality of cooperation with individual countries suggests that the willingness of Mediterranean partners to cooperate with the EU in the field of democracy and human rights varies significantly. For example, Morocco has embraced the EU's democracy promotion agenda since 2000, pioneering in the implementation of democracy assistance projects with the judiciary and giving political reform a central role in the various fora for political dialogue, whereas up to the present, Syria fends off most of the EU's ambitions to establish cooperation on sensitive issues. So, why is the EU more or less successful in implementing its cooperative approach with its different partners? And why do the Mediterranean partners engage more or less actively in the EU's democracy promotion efforts?

This empirical puzzle has been largely neglected in the literature on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. More generally, scholars of International Democracy Promotion (IDP) have not paid much attention to the implementation of partnership-based instruments and to the specific challenge of cooperation on promoting democracy with authoritarian regimes. Thus the literature neither provides a comprehensive empirical picture nor does it offer a consistent theoretical explanation for the differential implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Therefore, the central research question the present thesis addresses is

How and under which conditions are partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations?

Drawing on theories of (international) cooperation, the thesis suggests a rationalist model of strategic interaction in order to explain the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. The strategic interaction approach allows integrating three factors that figure prominently in the literature and specifying their interaction effects in shaping the actors' preferences as well as the outcome of cooperation at the country level: the degrees of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country as well as the configuration of interdependence in bilateral relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. The thesis argues that the specific combination of political liberalisation and statehood can account for variation across countries in the timing, extent, and quality of implementation. The level of political liber-

alisation in the target country affects the costliness of implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance in terms of power and stability, while limitations to statehood can make cooperation on democracy promotion either more or less beneficial for the target regime in the same line as interdependence. The implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion is better, the higher the level of political liberalisation in the target country, especially when combined with a medium degree of statehood. By contrast, if the level of political liberalisation is too low, the costs of cooperation become prohibitive; and if the degree of statehood is either too low or too high, cooperation is either not feasible or not beneficial enough for the target regime.

This introductory chapter proceeds by highlighting the relevance of the research question in view of relevant fields of research. It then sketches the research project, including the theoretical framework and the design of the empirical investigation, to find a theoretically and empirically grounded answer to the research question. It finally outlines the organisation of the following chapters and their main argument.

1.1. *The Mediterranean as a hard case for international democracy promotion*

Twenty years into the post-Cold War era, the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992) has not yet come, nor has the ‘third wave’ of democratisation (Huntington 1991) swept away all forms of authoritarian rule. The triumph of democracy as the only globally accepted form of government is impaired by the fact that many regimes claim democratic legitimacy without living up to even minimal standards of liberal, representative democracy. In particular in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) authoritarian regimes have been remarkably successful in preserving their power while adapting to changes in the international and domestic context. By the late 1990s, scholars had to admit that the high hopes for political liberalisation and transition to democracy in the region had not been grounded in democratising regime dynamics. They had been ‘searching where the light shines’ (Anderson 2006), refusing to acknowledge the reality of ‘stubborn authoritarianism’ (Posusney 2005). Especially since the events of 11 September 2001, scholars have turned from complaining about the lack or failure of democratisation to explaining the ‘durability’ (Schlumberger 2007), ‘resilience’ (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004), or ‘persistence’ (Lawson

2007) of authoritarianism in the Arab World. Borne out of the interest to address the underlying causes for international terrorism, the region has at the same time become the focus of international democracy promotion among practitioners and scholars alike, highlighting the limits of and challenges to external efforts at promoting regime transformation and change. Measures initiated in the 1990s have apparently not been successful, and while efforts were significantly stepped up at the beginning of the new millennium, serious doubts about their effectiveness and legitimacy remain.

Authoritarian regimes are the real hard cases for international democracy promotion efforts, particularly for the EU, which is surrounded by regimes that became ‘stuck’ in transition or never even made that transition in the first place. Previous experiences with ‘successful’ democracy promotion pale when considering the domestic context of international efforts. Unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, where most targets were countries already in transition and where external actors could support domestic regime dynamics (cf. Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005; Vachudova 2005), the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbours have been hardly receptive to the EU’s transformative power.

1.2. *The puzzle of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean*

The EU pursues a predominantly ‘positive’ approach to democracy promotion in the Mediterranean relying on persuasion, capacity building, and rewards instead of coercion or negative incentives. Beyond the hope for a long-term socialisation effect, the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean is placed under several caveats.

Regarding political conditionality, the experience of the EU’s Eastern enlargement casts doubt on its effectiveness in the Mediterranean: Most of the EU’s Southern neighbours are (semi-)authoritarian regimes and thus present the real hard cases for international democracy promotion. In addition, they lack a membership perspective which is seen as the crucial incentive in accounting for the EU’s success in stabilising the democratic transitions of Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, most scholars argue that conditionality in Euro-Mediterranean relations is bound to fail (cf. Magen 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). The positive incentives on display under the ENP are hardly attractive enough for authoritarian regimes to trig-

ger substantial political reforms, while the threat of sanctions based on the ‘essential element’ clause in EMAAs is simply not credible. And indeed, Euro-Mediterranean relations are marked by a conspicuous absence of negative political conditionality. Sanctions based on the ‘essential element’ clause introduced in the mid-1990s and integrated into the EMAAs have never been applied. More recently, the EU has stepped up its ‘reinforcement by reward’ approach (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005). The ENP has established positive conditionality, promising financial rewards and partial integration for political reforms. However, the incentives on display are usually regarded as insufficient – funding for the Governance Facility is low compared to overall aid and ‘everything but institutions’ (Prodi 2002: 6) does not grant a membership perspective, the ‘golden carrot’ of EU democracy promotion in candidate and accession countries.

Given the limited prospects of conditionality, the EU heavily relies on political dialogue and democracy assistance to promote democracy vis-à-vis its Mediterranean partners. The EU’s democracy promotion policy is the prototype of a ‘cooperative’, ‘positive’ and ‘partnership-based’ approach that aims at the active engagement of the target regime in promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Based on a joint commitment to human rights and democracy enshrined in the EMAAs, the EU draws on persuasion, socialisation, and capacity-building, thereby complementing the predominant top-down with a bottom-up approach. Political dialogue is conducted with governmental actors at ministerial level in the Association Councils and since 2003 at senior official level in specific human rights subcommittees. The EU’s external cooperation programmes for the region, MEDA (*mesures d’accompagnement*) and its successor, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), allow for democracy assistance since the mid-1990s. These large-scale projects are subject to financing agreements with the target country’s government. While they mostly address state actors, measures can also be implemented with non-state actors. In addition, various programmes under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) since the early 1990s have been designed to directly support civil society organisations. Especially in the Mediterranean, the EU furthermore clearly privileges positive over negative conditionality, selectively granting political and financial rewards under the ENP. The EU has established a regional and highly standardised framework for cooperation on democracy and human rights with its Mediterranean partners.

However, the implementation of these ‘soft’ instruments, based on partnership and cooperation, fundamentally depends on the domestic partner’s cooperation. Especially in the Mediterranean, it is not evident why authoritarian regimes should respond positively to international democracy promotion efforts, given the unique combination of authoritarianism and ‘strong’ statehood, which differs from most other world regions (Schlumberger 2008). Nevertheless, studies show that political dialogue and democracy assistance are being implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations, and increasingly so.

All of these partnership-based instruments have been implemented at some point with Mediterranean partners, but even at first glance, there is significant variation across countries in the level and extent of implementation. For example, while the EU-Jordan Association Council created a human rights subcommittee in 2004, the EU and Algeria have not yet agreed on a similar structure. Similarly, democracy assistance was mainstreamed into MEDA several years earlier for the Maghreb countries than for the others, and the total amount of EU democracy assistance committed over the past 15-20 years varies from next to nothing for Syria to more than €70 million for Algeria and Morocco. The EU’s strategy of engagement is apparently more or less successful in bringing about cooperation on democracy promotion.

Still, this puzzle has hardly ever been addressed in the extensive literature on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. While we have a relatively good overall picture of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, there are still few studies that systematically compare the whole range of instruments across countries and over time. Studies on the EU’s democracy promotion efforts ‘beyond enlargement’ usually focus on political conditionality and neglect the EU’s other, partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, even though these are the instruments that EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean obviously relies on to a large extent. Especially the conduct of political dialogue has been neglected, as it is hard to come by empirically and is usually linked more to the hope of a long-term socialising effect than to the expectation of a more tangible and immediate impact. In addition, many single case studies, focusing on relations between the EU and one of its Mediterranean partners, cannot grasp variation across countries. Furthermore, the analytical focus is often either on the EU’s specific choice of strategy or on the impact of its efforts. However, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance

cannot be accounted for by merely focusing on the EU's side of foreign policy-making alone, but makes a more interactive approach necessary. These instruments require the active cooperation of the target regime, which is not at all evident when dealing with authoritarian regimes. Especially in the Mediterranean, the implementation of partnership-based instruments thus becomes the crucial link between the EU's overall policy and its potential impact. To assess the limits and prospects of the EU's approach to democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, it is therefore necessary to first of all account for the differential implementation of partnership-based instruments.

1.3. *International cooperation, strategic interaction, and democracy promotion*

In order to account for how and under which conditions partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are implemented, this thesis focuses on political dialogue and democracy assistance within the overall field of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. In order to identify conditions under which implementation takes place, it is useful to conceive of these democracy promotion efforts as an instance of international cooperation. The implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion is then the outcome of a process of interaction between the international actor actively pursuing its agenda in external relations, on the one hand, and the targeted regime, on the other. This conceptualisation allows drawing on different International Relations (IR) theories that address the topic of cooperation in international relations from different angles. They provide different models of the process and identify factors helping to explain the emergence and form of cooperation.

The thesis adopts a model of strategic interaction, where the two actors decide to cooperate or to defect regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, leading to different outcomes, ranging from (good to bad) implementation to 'no implementation'. A rationalist model of preference formation suggests that the actors' choice of action and the final outcome depend on fixed interests and ensuing cost-benefit calculations regarding the outcomes and strategies at hand. IR theories help identify several factors that are expected to affect the partners' preferences over outcome and strategy and their capacity to shape negotiations ac-

cordingly. Factors might either mitigate the formation of preferences over outcome, changing the costs and benefits of outcomes with regard to interests, or over strategy, changing the actors' positions within the strategic situation. In particular, three country-specific factors figure prominently in the literature to account for variation across countries: the degrees of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country, as well as the partners' (socio-economic) interdependence (see Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn 2008a; Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Youngs 2001b). The strategic interaction approach allows theorising their impact in a consistent way, including their interaction effects, as the factors take effect at different stages of the process.

These assumptions give rise to a number of hypotheses. At a general level, the institutional environment and previous instances of cooperation are expected to shape the strategic setting for the implementation of partnership-based instruments:

H₁ Institutional Environment: The higher the degree of institutionalisation, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

H₂ Lock-in Effect: If partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are already being implemented, then further cooperation is more likely.

At the country level, political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence shape the actors' preferences over outcome and strategy. Apart from their assumed individual effects, the theoretical framework allows considering their interaction effects:

H₃ Political Liberalisation: The higher the degree of political liberalisation in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

H₄ Statehood: The higher the degree of statehood in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

H₅ Interaction Effect: The higher the degree of political liberalisation, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, reinforced by a high and nuanced by a low degree of statehood.

H_{6a} Interdependence: The more interdependence favours the EU, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

H_{6b} Interaction & Interdependence: The more interdependence favours the EU and the higher the degrees of political liberalisation and statehood, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for

democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime and the lower the degree of political liberalisation and statehood, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

Finally, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance has to be considered in the wider context of the EU's democracy promotion efforts, including its use of unilateral instruments such as political conditionality and *ad hoc* sanctions and rewards:

H_{7a} Use of incentives: The EU is more likely to apply unilateral instruments for democracy promotion if the degree of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country is high. In this case the EU is more likely to

- a) grant rewards if the target regime willingly cooperates or if the target regime is reluctant and the EU is dependent on the target regime, and
- b) apply sanctions if the target regime is reluctant and if the EU is not dependent on the target regime.

H_{7b} Effect of incentives: If the EU applies unilateral instruments, implementation is likely to get better.

In order to test these hypotheses on the conditions under which political dialogue and democracy assistance are implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations, the thesis adopts a comparative approach and combines a deductive with a more inductive empirical analysis. In a first step, a systematic comparison of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance by the EU and seven Mediterranean partners between 1990 and 2008 is conducted. This regional comparison across countries and over time allows testing the explanatory power of hypotheses derived from IR theories on the emergence and quality of implementation. Within the Mediterranean region and the set of the EU's originally 12 Mediterranean partners, the investigation covers all non-member countries that match the criteria of authoritarianism (excluding Turkey and Israel) and statehood (excluding the Palestinian Authority), leaving Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. This study is among the very first to extend the comparative approach beyond a limited number of case studies and covers all of the EU's non-democratic Southern neighbour countries.

The empirical findings of this regional comparison clearly show that institutions matter, shaping the strategic setting for interaction leading to a regional trend towards more and better cooperation (H₁ and H₂). In addition, empirical findings on the role of the three country-specific factors are more or less in line with theoretical expecta-

tions, supporting the hypotheses on a combined positive effect of political liberalisation and statehood, mediating the role of (socio-economic) interdependence (H₃-H₆). The interplay of partnership-based and unilateral instruments for democracy promotion is more complex than expected (H₇). However, there are contradictory findings, challenging the assumed causal effect of the other factors to different degrees. Especially Tunisia resists any interpretation in line with the empirical findings for most of the other countries, and in particular defies expectations on the role of statehood and interdependence. Especially in comparison with Morocco, where theoretical expectations hold, Tunisia clearly is an outlier in the region.

These findings are, in a second step, complemented by two in-depth comparative case studies. Focusing on cooperation since 2000, the cases of Morocco and Tunisia are used to analyse the process of interaction more closely in order to trace causal mechanisms and to refine the theoretical argument about the role of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence for the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The comparative study underlines the pivotal role of political liberalisation and statehood in accounting for variation across countries. The level of political liberalisation does indeed determine the costs of implementing partnership-based instruments, as the 'fit' of external demands crucially depends on pluralism and the role of political participation and contestation in domestic politics. Statehood is first of all an enabling factor for cooperation, but limitations to statehood can make cooperation beneficial if they make the target regime dependent on the EU's support to overcome domestic and international challenges to its legitimacy and power, modifying the original argument on (socio-economic) interdependence. This argument captures the seeming outlier Tunisia and can consistently explain diverging outcomes of cooperation on democracy promotion in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

By analysing how and under which conditions partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations, this thesis makes a number of important theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and IDP vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes more generally. At the theoretical level, the thesis develops a consistent theoretical framework that can account for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as the outcome of a process of strategic interac-

tion, drawing on well-established theories of (international) cooperation. Empirically, the analysis bridges the gap between studies of the EU's democracy promotion policy and of its impact, and it systematically explores alternative ways of democracy promotion beyond (membership) conditionality. The empirical investigation further highlights the advantages of the comparative approach for testing and further developing theoretical assumptions, combining different levels of analysis as well as a comparison over time and across countries. The theoretical and empirical insights into the working of international cooperation on democracy promotion are highly relevant for both scholars and practitioners of IDP.

1.4. Chapter outline

The thesis is divided into three parts: Part A elaborates on the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues of this study (chapters 2-4), while part B comprises the empirical analysis of the emergence and quality of cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in the field of democracy promotion (chapters 5-8). The main component of part C is the conclusion to this thesis (chapter 9), which links the empirical findings to the theoretical framework developed. The conclusion is followed by the appendices and the list of references.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on international democracy promotion to identify the state of the art on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, answering the questions of what it is, why it is done, and to what effect. While there are plenty, well-developed analytical frameworks to grasp the topic, the review finds that work on the other two questions is less satisfactory: Most studies focusing on the second aspect are preoccupied with explaining the external actor's choice of strategy, neglecting the role of the target countries, and impact studies measuring (and explaining) the effectiveness of international democracy promotion are still weak. It is therefore suggested to regard the implementation of democracy promotion instruments as the missing link between the choice of strategy and its impact. Especially for the partnership-based instruments of political dialogue and democracy assistance that the EU relies on heavily, implementation is a necessary condition for their impact and it is neither trivial nor evident, as it depends on the active engagement of the target regime.

Chapter 3 accordingly proposes borrowing from the various theories and approaches in IR on international cooperation to explain how and under which circumstances we can expect cooperation in the field of democracy promotion between the external actor and authoritarian regimes. It conceives of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion as the outcome of a process of strategic interaction. It develops a set of hypotheses on the role of several factors in shaping preference formation and ultimately the outcome.

Chapter 4 outlines in more detail the research design of the dissertation. It elaborates on the choice of a comparative case study design, the selection of the EU, seven Mediterranean partners, and the time frame of 1990-2008, as well as the operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables.

Chapter 5 provides the background for the main empirical analysis in part B, establishing that the EU has a highly standardised framework for cooperation and democracy promotion that mostly relies on consensual measures, i.e. a strategy of active engagement and cooperation. It does not strategically differentiate between the countries and follows a 'one size fits all' approach that gives a prominent place to the partnership-based instruments of political dialogue and democracy assistance.

Chapter 6 comprises the findings of a systematic mapping of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in seven Arab authoritarian countries between 1990 and 2008. The comparison both across countries and over time allows assessing the intensity and quality of implementation beyond the mere emergence of cooperation. A clear, regional trend towards more and better cooperation over time emerges, but there remains significant variation in the implementation of partnership-based instruments across countries.

Chapter 7 investigates the explanatory power of the factors identified in chapter 3 to account for these regional and country-specific patterns of cooperation. Overall, the initial hypotheses investigated in the comparative analysis of the seven countries can account for the regional trend and most of the variation across countries. Theoretical expectations hold in particular for the role of the institutional environment and the lock-in effect of cooperation as well as for the combined effect of political liberalisation and statehood. By contrast, findings challenge the role of asymmetric interdependence and point to a much more complicated interrelation between the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and the EU's active

use of incentives. In addition, the different factors cannot account for the surprisingly difficult implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with Tunisia. The in-depth comparison of EU cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia in chapter 8 traces the process of interaction and identifies causal mechanisms in order to put forward a consistent theoretical argument that can account for both the model and the outlier. It shows that the variation across countries in the timing, extent, and quality of implementation is not so much due to the EU's choice of different strategies but to the differential engagement of the target regimes. The EU is reluctant to push for more and better cooperation even under conditions where it should have some leverage, as the Tunisian case clearly demonstrates, suggesting that the EU's 'democratization-stabilization dilemma' (Jünemann 2003a: 7) applies to the region as a whole rather than being linked to country-specific factors. By contrast, the target regimes' preferences are indeed a function of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence. Especially political liberalisation and statehood are crucial in explaining variation across countries, but statehood matters in different ways than expected. The level of political liberalisation determines the costs of implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance, while the degree of statehood can make cooperation on democracy promotion more or less beneficial for the target regime. This aspect modifies the original argument on (socio-economic) interdependence, highlighting the need for a different conceptualisation of this variable.

To conclude, chapter 9 reviews the main steps undertaken to answer the initial research question, summarising the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of this dissertation. It discusses their theoretical, methodological, and empirical implications for existing and future research on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and international democracy promotion vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes more generally, but also their more political implications for the practice of international democracy promotion efforts.

2. From external democracy promotion to international cooperation: EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean

2.1. *EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean*

The EU has been actively, directly, and openly promoting democracy in the Mediterranean since the early 1990s (see chapter 5). The visibility and scope of its efforts have significantly increased with the Barcelona Declaration (1995) and the launch of the EMP in 1995. The EMP introduced a political dimension to Euro-Mediterranean relations, including a commitment to democracy and human rights. At the same time, the EU extended its nascent democracy promotion policy to the Mediterranean. In conjunction with the rise of international democracy promotion as a field of research in various (sub-)disciplines of political science, EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean became an object of academic research in its own right. For example, the journal *Democratization* has published several special issues on the EU's and European democracy promotion in the MENA region (cf. Gillespie and Youngs 2002, Pace 2009b) and the topic is omnipresent in journals such as *Mediterranean Politics* and the *Journal of North African Studies*. The interest in the topic was reinforced by the events of 11 September 2001 that directed considerable academic – and political – attention to the political situation and the role of external actors in the MENA region. Since the launch of the new ENP in 2003/2004, the Mediterranean has often been subsumed under the EU's 'neighbourhood' and has thus benefited from the extension of enlargement studies beyond accession candidates. The prominence of the topic becomes evident when considering the various policy institutes that have specific research groups concentrating on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, such as the *Centre for European Policy Studies* in Brussels, the Madrid-based *Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior*, and the *Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission* in Lisbon.

This chapter reviews existing theoretical, conceptual, and empirical contributions to the analysis of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean by focusing on their answers to three main research questions: What is EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, why is it done, and to what effect? In addressing these questions, the chapter first takes stock of analytical categories for systematically describing and

analysing activities in the realm of democracy promotion, and then in turn addresses issues of legitimacy and effectiveness. It summarises the respective findings on these aspects for EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and complements them with insights from related fields of research, covering international democracy promotion, the EU and the Mediterranean.

Thus, this chapter develops the specific research question and approach of this thesis and demonstrates its relevance and usefulness for academic study. The implementation of democracy promotion instruments is the missing link between the choice of strategy of external actors and the impact of their efforts. In particular, it is a necessary condition for the impact of partnership-based instruments. Especially when dealing with authoritarian regimes, the implementation of these instruments is neither trivial nor evident, underlining the importance of taking the target countries more seriously as actors in international democracy promotion. Still, political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations have up to now often been neglected, even though scholars have limited expectations regarding the effectiveness of political conditionality in the absence of an EU membership perspective. Applying well-established theories and approaches to cooperation in IR to the (sub-)field of international democracy promotion allows the development of a consistent theoretical framework that can explain variation in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with authoritarian regimes.

2.2. *What? Describing the EU's efforts*

First of all, it is important to narrow down the 'object' of research within the broader field of research on democratisation, looking at domestic and international actors and factors shaping processes of regime transformation and change. Research on democratisation, including the transition to and consolidation of democracy, can be classified along two lines, privileging either structure or agency as the driving forces (cf. Mahoney and Snyder 1999) at the domestic or international level (for an overview see Weiffen 2009). Originally, the focus of this field of research was clearly on the domestic, or internal, dimension: Modernisation theory developed since the 1950s highlights the role of socio-economic and historical-cultural factors in facilitating the evolution of democracy (cf. Lipset 1994, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Transitology and consolidology in the 1970s turned their attention to the role of domestic actors,

especially elites, organisations, and the masses, in shaping the processes of transition and consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1978). When transitology first (re-)discovered the role of ‘international aspects’ (Whitehead 1986, see also O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 18) in processes of democratisation and regime change, they suggested that internal dynamics had to be placed in the ‘international context’ (Pridham 1991b), shaping structural conditions and influencing the choices of domestic actors. Among the ‘international dimensions’ (Whitehead 1996b), the spread of democracy in ‘waves’ (Huntington 1991) was, for example, seen as a form of diffusion or ‘contagion’ (Whitehead 1996b, Whitehead 1996c, also Segal 1991). However, studies also drew attention to more direct ‘international influences’ (Pridham 1991a), e.g. in the form of ‘control’ and ‘consent’ (Whitehead 1996b).

International (or external) democracy promotion (IDP) is thus only a subset of these ‘international dimensions’, focusing on the role of external actors and their deliberate efforts to further domestic processes of democratisation in a target country.¹ Regarding EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, it is useful in the context of this thesis/study to further narrow down the focus and to concentrate on open attempts at directly establishing or advancing democracy as a regime type, leaving out measures more broadly aiming at socio-economic development, following a modernisation theory approach (cf. van Hüllen and Stahn 2007: 2). Therefore, different approaches to the topic borrowing from IR and development cooperation theory help to develop analytical categories for international democracy promotion. IDP is primarily an activity that links the external actor with a target country.²

Regarding the external actors, early research on IDP was mostly concerned with the role of the United States of America. Pointing to the U.S.A.’ tradition of a ‘liberal grand strategy’ (Ikenberry 2000), starting with the democratisation of post-war Germany and Japan, scholars noticed a new form of engagement to promote democracy especially in the field of development cooperation (for an overview see Carothers

¹ Studies on international democracy promotion rarely provide definitions and the wording varies. While often used interchangeably with international democracy promotion, terms such as ‘external democratisation’ carry a different connotation: While the former suggests that an external actor lends its support to domestic processes of democratisation, the latter implies that the external actor is directly democratising the target country. ‘Democracy assistance’, by contrast, simply denotes one type of activity that external actors can carry out to promote democracy.

² Often, scholars denote external actors and target countries as donors and recipients respectively. The donor/recipient terminology borrowed from development cooperation only reflects the situation for a part of democracy promotion, namely democracy assistance, but not for other ways to promote democracy, following different logics of international relations (see e.g. Schmitter and Brouwer 1999, Ethier 2003: 99; Magen and McFaul 2009: 11).

1999, Hook 2002). This focus was slowly broadened to include other Western (European) governments as well as international and regional organisations, and here most prominently the EU (Whitehead 1996a). Apart from these governmental or state actors, there are also non-state actors involved in the ever-growing ‘democracy promotion industry’ (Schraeder 2003: 25), such as the German and American political foundations.³ Regarding the target countries, the original focus was on South and Central America and moved to South and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, following the ‘third wave’ of democratisation (Huntington 1991). Today, countries worldwide have come under scrutiny, but since the late 1990s, the MENA region has received particular attention due to its conspicuous resistance to the supposedly global spread of democratisation (Anderson 2006, Hinnebusch 2006). Especially in recent years, it has been pointed out that external actors are confronted with very different domestic contexts for IDP, as target countries are at different stages of democratisation processes or, rather, exhibit different characteristics regarding regime type and dynamics of regime transformation.⁴ While scholars of IDP usually admit that democratisation is still, and foremost, a domestic affair, there is convincing evidence that external actors can contribute to these processes by influencing structural conditions for and the strategic choices of actors bringing about democracy.

The centrepiece of IDP, finally, is the activity itself. As pointed out before, IDP focuses on deliberate attempts by external actors to exert influence on domestic politics in the target country. The remainder of this section outlines various analytical categories offered in the academic literature to systematically describe and compare these activities before turning to approaches explaining the choice of strategy and their impact. It focuses on a) different modes, logics, or mechanisms of influence, b) their institutional expression in instruments, as well as c) their specific design and choice (and implementation), reflecting different approaches and adding up to different

³ While these political foundations are often publicly funded, studies highlight their greater room for manoeuvre compared to governmental agencies, because they are not so much seen as pursuing national interests in international politics and do thus have the liberty to engage more directly with political parties in the target country. On political foundations in general, see Scott 1999, on American foundations e.g. Melia 2005 and James and Carie 2005, on German *Stiftungen* e.g. Mair 2000.

⁴ Furthermore, the classic distinction of liberalisation, transition, and consolidation, following Linz and Stepan 1978, and its teleological conception have recently been challenged, announcing the ‘end of the transition paradigm’ (Carothers 2002, also Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). More generally, this question links to the debate around the classification of ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2002) between democracy and authoritarianism (cf. Bendel, Croissant, and Rüb 2002, Merkel 2004, Levitsky and Way 2002, Zakaria 1997).

strategies. Finally, it makes use of these categories to take stock of existing empirical findings on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean.

As mentioned earlier, there are more structuralist approaches to ‘international influences’ on democratisation, e.g. in the literature on ‘linkage and leverage’, going back to the early work of Pridham and Whitehead (Pridham 1991a; Whitehead 1996a). However, they often mix different logics of influences, linked both to actors and the structure of the international system (e.g. Yilmaz 2002, Levitsky and Way 2005, Vachudova 2005, also Baracani 2005b). By contrast, approaches drawing on the role of international institutions in IR, such as compliance research, identify four mechanisms of influence, that can be transferred to research on IDP: (1) coercion, (2) incentives, (3) persuasion, and (4) capacity-building (e.g. Magen and McFaul 2009: 11, 11-15). Instruments for democracy promotion are in this context the institutional provisions for exercising influence and translating these mechanisms into measures. Instruments as a category are omnipresent in democracy promotion literature, although different studies identify different sets of ‘tools’ (Carothers 1999: 6), ‘instruments’ (Youngs 2001c: 357), ‘ways’ (Burnell 2000: 7), ‘weapons’ (Schraeder 2003: 26) or ‘types’ (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999), sorting them according to their degree of ‘intrusiveness’ in domestic affairs.

Irrespective of the preferred terminology and the conceptualisation of individual instruments, they can be classified according to the logics or mechanisms of influence they rely on, ranging from military interventions (coercion), to economic or diplomatic sanctions (incentives), to political dialogue (persuasion) and democracy assistance (capacity building). Instruments can further vary along a range of dimensions beyond the mechanisms they draw on, e.g. regarding the actors they address within the target country and the content they convey. For example, the focus on state actors as opposed to non-state actors has been labelled as ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’, or ‘intergovernmental’ versus ‘transnational’ orientations’ (Magen and McFaul 2009: 15; Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn 2008b). Addressing state actors, democracy promotion can be directed at the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary at the different levels of the political system (national, sub-national, i.e. regional and local). Non-state actors can come from a variety of spheres, from politics (e.g. political parties), civil society (e.g. non-governmental organisations), or business. Regarding the content of IDP, it is useful to distinguish between the objectives and the norms and standards

conveyed. Basic categories would follow different dimensions of ‘liberal democracy’, the model underlying external democracy promotion efforts since the 1990s. Finally, the specific combination of instruments, their choice and design regarding underlying mechanisms and approaches, adds up to an external actor’s strategy.⁵

So, what does the academic literature tell us about the EU’s instruments, approaches and strategies for promoting democracy in the Mediterranean? Overall, there is a clear agreement on the finding that the EU has started to institutionalise and actively use various instruments to promote democracy in the Mediterranean since the early 1990s. Except for coercion, the EU draws on all three mechanisms mentioned above: incentives, persuasion, and capacity-building.⁶ This is in line with its general democracy promotion policy that the EU has developed since the early 1990s. Particular attention has been paid to its highly standardised and legalised ‘direct purposive instruments of democracy promotion’ (Youngs 2001a: 35), ranging from (negative and positive) political conditionality, to political dialogue, to democracy assistance programmes (for an overview, see e.g. Gillespie 2006, Gillespie and Youngs 2002, Youngs 2001a, Youngs 2001b, Youngs 2002b, Börzel and Risse 2009).

In line with its global democracy promotion policy, the EU first institutionalised a negative democratic conditionality that builds on the so-called ‘essential element clause’ in the EMAAs, concluded with Mediterranean Partners from the mid-1990s onwards (Bartels 2004, Fierro 2003, Horng 2003). The EU has, however, never applied this ‘punitive conditionality’ (Youngs 2001a:1, see also Youngs 2001b, Youngs 2002), linking cooperation and aid to the respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights: ‘In Arab states democratic conditionality has been particularly absent.’ (Youngs 2009: 897) The ENP then institutionalised the idea of a more ‘positive’ form of conditionality’ (Youngs 2001a: 1) and with the ENP Action Plans and regular progress reports by the European Commission created new mechanisms for benchmarking and monitoring (Baracani 2005b/Baracani 2007, Emerson et al. 2005, Youngs 2008b). There are fewer studies on the other instrument directly linked to the ‘essential element’ clause’, the political dialogue institutionalised in the bodies

⁵ Cf. Burnell 2004, Burnell 2005, Carothers 1997; also van Hüllen and Stahn 2009, van Hüllen and Stahn 2007.

⁶ On the role of the evolving European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for external democracy promotion, see Börzel and Risse 2009. Until today, the EU has never used coercive instruments to promote democracy by the use of military force in the Mediterranean. Sometimes, negative political conditionality is regarded as ‘coercive pressure’ (Youngs 2004: 3) and a ‘hierarchical mode’ of external governance (Youngs 2009: 895).

created under the EMAA (see again Youngs 2001a, Youngs 2001b, Youngs 2002b).⁷ However, political dialogue plays a major role for the characterisation of the EU's overall 'socialization strategy' (Gillespie and Youngs 2002: 13, see also Gillespie 2006, Kelley 2006). The third instrument, democracy assistance, again figures more prominently in the literature. The EU has created several external cooperation programmes on the basis of European Communities' regulations for promoting democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean. These include, on the one hand, programmes specifically designed for democracy promotion, namely the global EIDHR with its regional MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) in the mid-1990s, and, on the other hand, regional cooperation programmes like MEDA and the ENPI, where the EU has mainstreamed the objective of democracy promotion since the late 1990s.⁸ Other instruments, such as 'high-level diplomatic initiatives' (Youngs 2001a: 1) under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or by the European Commission and Parliament, have received less attention.

Taken together, all studies on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean show that there is a strong emphasis on a 'positive' approach, privileging persuasion and capacity-building with the 'widespread and systematic use of inclusion, consultation, dialogue, ownership and similar instruments' (Aliboni 2004: 9), while downplaying the role of negative conditionality and sanctions. Democracy assistance, the 'central component of EU strategy' (Youngs 2001a: 3), focuses on non-state, civil society actors adding a strong 'bottom-up' dimension to the other instruments mainly targeting state actors (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196, Gillespie and Youngs 2002: 11, Youngs 2004: 13). More generally, the EU pursues a 'co-operative strategy' (Aliboni 2004: 8) with the 'most tactful and diplomatic ('softly, softly') of approaches' (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 199). In terms of content, the EU clearly promotes a liberal model of democracy (see e.g. Pace 2009a: 4), tightly linking representative democracy with human rights and the rule of law. However, in its measures, it privileges the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms over procedural and institutional aspects of democracy, more directly touching upon questions of political

⁷ As a rare exception, the Volkswagen Stiftung has funded a project by Katrin Kinzelbach on the implementation of EU political dialogues in 2007-2009, see: Volkswagen Stiftung: Zukunftsfragen der Gesellschaft / Future Issues of our Society. Bewilligungen / Grants 2007, <http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/foerderung/internationales/europe-and-global-challenges/bewilligungen-2007.html?L=0>, last accessed 8 September 2010.

⁸ On the EIDHR see e.g. Bicchi 2009, Holden 2005a, Jünemann 2002, Jünemann 2004, Jünemann 2005, Youngs 2001b, Youngs 2002b, Youngs 2003, Youngs 2006, Youngs 2008c; for democracy assistance under MEDA and ENPI, see Holden 2003, Holden 2005b, Holden 2006.

participation and the distribution of power in the target country (see e.g. Youngs 2004: 11, 13).

While we have a relatively good overall picture of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, there are still only very few studies that systematically compare the whole range of instruments across countries and over time. Richard Youngs definitely provides the most comprehensive empirical mappings of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean (Youngs 2001b, Youngs 2002b), highlighting the EU's overall, regional strategy - but without paying much attention to variation across countries. However, most studies focus on either individual instruments or target countries. This makes it even more difficult to capture variation in the implementation of different instruments or across countries. However, studies on democracy assistance, but also on the rare instances of applied conditionality, highlight the fact that beyond the EU's overall 'positive' approach, the implementation of its policy varies greatly between the individual target countries.

Having taken stock of what is going on in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, it is now time to investigate the two most prominent research questions linked to the topic. On the one hand, many students of the field seek to account for the EU's approaches and strategies. They view its efforts at promoting democracy as the dependent variable and focus on the external actors' choices of action and, in this case, the EU as an international actor. On the other hand, researchers are interested in the impact of the EU's efforts on processes of democratisation, regime transformation and change on the ground. Here, international democracy promotion is the independent variable, linking it to domestic change in the target country. The next two sections will therefore assess, in turn, the state of the art regarding the questions of why the EU promotes democracy in the way it does and to what effect. This includes both theoretical considerations and empirical insights. Moreover, these empirical analytical research agendas are closely linked to normative concerns, challenging the legitimacy of international democracy promotion in general and the EU's democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean in particular.

2.3. *Why? Explaining the EU's choice of strategy*

One question driving research on IDP in general is how to account for the behaviour of the external actors. How can we explain their specific choice of strategy, their

design and use of different instruments? Especially for the EU, this question receives much attention as it is closely linked to the more general research agenda on the EU as an international actor (Bicchi 2006b). Regarding EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, the starting point for many studies are empirical findings pointing towards inconsistencies, between declared objectives and measures taken as well as in the treatment of different target countries, that challenge the notion of the EU as a 'normative power' (Manners 2002). The EU's 'soft' or 'positive' approach is put under scrutiny to discern in how far the EU lives up to its normative claims or whether the foreign policy objective of promoting democracy is only a 'façade' to cover more mundane, egoistic self-interests. Especially the 'failure' to apply negative conditionality in cases where the respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights is evidently violated pushes researchers to ask for the EU's motives and the logic of EU foreign policy-making. Disagreement remains about whether the EU, as a civilian power with limited capacities as an international actor, is simply constrained in its choice of strategy, or if, by contrast, choices are strategically made to cater to different interests.

One approach to accounting for the EU's general democracy promotion policy points to inter-organisational logics of path dependency and isomorphism.⁹ The specific design of the EU's democracy promotion policy in the Mediterranean is, then, not so much a conscious choice of strategy, but the result of either simple emulation of previous experiences in other policy fields, or, at best, of adaptation and learning processes (Kelley 2006). At the root of the EU's democracy promotion policy lies the EU's attempt to externalise its own norms and rules to other countries (Bicchi 2006b, Bicchi 2006a, Lavenex 2004). Tracing the evolution of the EU's democracy promotion policy across different external policies, from development cooperation to enlargement and beyond, it is obvious that instruments devised in one area have travelled to others, incrementally developing and extending the initial policy to all regions and policies. Nevertheless, despite this 'one-size-fits-all' approach (Börzel and Risse 2009), instruments and strategies have been adapted to the different context of regional policies, and these approaches cannot account for the differential application of similar instruments in different countries or regions.

⁹ Cf. Börzel and Risse 2009, Emerson et al. 2005, Kelley 2006, Tulmets 2007.

A general argument often made is the relative importance of the declared objective to promote democracy as opposed to other foreign policy objectives. This is often stylised as a clash of ‘norms’ vs. ‘interests’ (cf. Gillespie and Youngs 2002, Pace 2009a), but should be more generally framed as conflicting interests underlying strategic choices in foreign policy-making (Schraeder 2003). This idea is often expressed in the ‘democratization-stabilization dilemma’ (Jünemann 2003a: 7), postulating that the EU ultimately prefers regional stability over democracy, as more effective democracy promotion strategies risk increased instability and conflict in the course of regime change and transformation (cf. Aliboni 2004, Panebianco 2003, Gillespie and Youngs 2002). The fallacy of these approaches usually is the normative use of the argument to challenge the EU’s ‘sincerity’ and ultimately its legitimacy as an international actor in promoting democracy (see e.g. Gillespie 2006). When viewing this as an empirical question, it is necessary to specify the conditions under which the EU tends to pursue its various interests. In a recent special issue on ‘external governance’, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig develop a theoretical framework to account for the EU’s choice between different modes of (external) governance, drawing on institutionalist, power-based, and domestic structure approaches (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).¹⁰ Applying this framework more specifically to EU democracy promotion, Youngs comes to the conclusion that the varying degree of ‘bargaining power’ vis-à-vis different target countries is the most powerful explanatory factor for the EU’s choice of strategy (Youngs 2009). Similarly, Jünemann and Knodt (2006-2008) have established four conditions for the EU’s use of democracy promotion instruments: the system of EU multi-level governance, with its decision-making procedures and the role it attributes to the EU’s member states; interdependence between the EU and the respective target country; the domestic political situation in the target country as the ‘structure of resonance’ the EU has to take into account; and the international context as a background condition.¹¹

Taken together, this strand of research is more about understanding the EU as an international actor and coming to terms with the nature of its alleged power in international relations than about international democracy promotion as such. It often focuses on the policy design and less on implementation. However, the implementa-

¹⁰ On the origins of the concept of ‘external governance,’ see Lavenex 2004.

¹¹ Cf. Jünemann and Knodt 2006, Jünemann and Knodt 2007, and Knodt and Jünemann 2008 as well as Jünemann 2007 specifically for the Mediterranean.

tion of the instruments available is a necessary condition for the other major question driving research, the question of impact. In fact, the two agendas are closely linked, as much of the concern for the external actors' choice of strategy is linked to issues of both legitimacy and effectiveness. If researchers turn to implementation, they still focus on the external actors and their choices. The target country is not considered as a second actor, but reduced to a passive 'resonance structure' that the external actors factor into their considerations. The interplay between the external actor and the target country is rarely taken into account. However, given the significant variation in the implementation of international democracy promotion efforts, including not only conditionality but also political dialogue and democracy assistance as partnership-based instruments, it is time to develop a more interactive perspective on the translation of a policy into actual measures of democracy promotion.¹²

2.4. *To what effect? Analysing the EU's impact*

Even though the focus on the external actors and their efforts in general dominates research on IDP, preoccupation with the choice of strategy is usually grounded in the ambition to provide policy advice that, apart from normative concerns, is based on (empirical) insights into the effectiveness of different instruments, approaches, and strategies (Burnell 2004, Burnell 2005, Carothers 1997, Gillespie and Whitehead 2002). Analysing the domestic impact of external efforts is the ultimate challenge to research on IDP. Even though authors cannot claim to discover a new field of research anymore, the research community still struggles with the task of framing and measuring impact (Crawford 2003a, Crawford 2003b). Although studies are primarily interested in the effectiveness of IDP in furthering processes of democratisation in the target country, bringing about liberalisation and ultimately the transition to or consolidation of democracy, it is necessary to consider both intended and unintended consequences as well as potential adverse effects. Research on IDP is faced with the double challenge of first establishing the causal link between observable effects at the micro-level of individual measures and their impact on macro-structures regarding the political system, and second of distinguishing it from the impact of other, domestic and international, factors. Apart from actually measuring the impact of

¹² Recently Pace, Seeberg, and Cavatorta 2009 and Pace 2009a have started to develop such a more interactive approach to international democracy promotion.

IDP, the theoretically and empirically grounded identification of conditions and factors determining the effectiveness of instruments remains a major challenge. These factors can pertain to both the design of the instruments themselves, drawing on different mechanisms and approaches, and to their adequacy as a solution to the problem at hand in a given situation.¹³

Especially in the MENA region, the general lack of noticeable democratisation since the early 1990s is often taken as an indicator for the failure of external democracy promotion efforts, including those of the EU. Thus, Gillespie and Whitehead see ‘few if any signs of many tangible results’ (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 192), but concede at the same time that there are ‘many other factors other than EU policy that help account for the lack of fundamental political change in North Africa’ (ibid.). Beyond the difficulty to establish a direct causal link between the various potential actors and factors shaping processes of democratisation, the disappointment with the EU’s apparent lack of success is certainly in part due to a ‘capability-expectations gap’ so often identified in EU external relations (Hill 1993, Ginsberg 1999). The hopes and expectations linked to the EU’s democracy promotion efforts and IDP in general might be too ambitious. Even in the heyday of IDP, studies have pointed to the fact that despite the (re)discovery of the ‘international dimensions’ of democratisation, democratisation and political change more generally remain after all a predominantly domestic affair (Geddes 1999, Whitehead 2002).

The beginnings of IDP are rooted in Latin America and Southern and Eastern Europe, where external efforts met domestic dynamics of regime transformation and change. By contrast, countries in the MENA region have been noted for their resistance to the ‘third wave’ of democratisation, confronting external actors since the 1990s with a very different context for democracy promotion. Even though most regimes in the region formally subscribe to international norms of human rights and representative, electoral democracy, they do not only score badly on compliance with human rights norms, but also exhibit features of well-entrenched authoritarianism. This particular combination has given rise to studies on ‘hybrid regimes’ in an attempt to cope with this phenomenon defying traditional notions of democratic and

¹³ For example, while many scholars place their hopes for effective democracy promotion on sanctions that the EU hardly ever applies, Gillespie and Youngs criticise sanctions as potentially ‘counterproductive’ if applied in the ‘wrong’ political situation (Gillespie and Youngs 2002: 11).

authoritarian regimes.¹⁴ There are few studies that address the implications of this ‘semi-authoritarian’ regime type for IDP and recognise the enormous challenge it poses for external actors (Carothers 2000; Ottaway 2003). The political context and in particular the idea of different phases in a process of democratisation – liberalisation, transition, and consolidation (following Linz and Stepan 1978) – is viewed as an important scope condition for the impact of different instruments and approaches (Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009). For example, Gillespie and Whitehead (2002: 202) conclude that

the EU may need to distinguish between two phases in its democracy promotion policies. There is (i) the current phase, before democratization has begun, when it is not known when, or even whether, it will begin, and when only low key or ‘softly, softly’ measures are possible. But there is also (ii) once local developments have put democratization seriously on the agenda, when events may begin to ‘crowd in’ hastily and unpredictably, probably inducing a sudden upsurge in demands for the EU to move into high gear, and to deliver on its longstanding but until then largely rhetorical commitments.

Of course, there are also empirical and theoretical contributions directly concerned with the impact of EU democracy promotion instruments in the Mediterranean. The most prominent approach stems from the extension of EU (Eastern) enlargement studies to the neighbourhood and beyond. These studies focus primarily on the impact of democratic conditionality and highlight the role of a membership perspective. In the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, a number of conditions for the effectiveness of the EU’s political conditionality, embodied in the first Copenhagen Criteria, were identified (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The overall finding was that the ‘external incentives model’ proved more successful in bringing about political reform and stabilising democratic consolidation than the other two models based on learning and socialisation (ibid.), even though other studies have highlighted the complex interplay of conditionality and socialisation (Kelley 2004). Applying these insights ‘beyond enlargement’, it has quickly been pointed out that most conditions for effective political conditionality are absent in Euro-Mediterranean relations: Neither the size, credibility, or speed of the incentives, nor the domestic political context give rise to (theoretically grounded) hope for a ‘transformative power’ of conditionality in the Mediterranean. And in-

¹⁴ Cf. Bendel, Croissant, and Rüb 2002; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Merkel 2004; Merkel and Croissant 2004; Zakaria 1997, Levitsky and Way 2002; Bogaards 2009.


deed, empirical work confirms this scepticism (Baracani 2007, Kelley 2006, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008).

With the strong focus on conditionality, the other instruments from the EU's toolkit have been neglected. While democracy assistance usually gets some attention as the most tangible 'positive measure', experiences from the field of development cooperation with the evaluation of projects and impact studies have rarely been applied to studies of democracy assistance (Crawford 2003a). Where there are micro-level impact studies, these usually focus on just one country and only a small number of projects so that the larger picture from a comparative perspective is still missing. The EU's socialisation strategy could, on the other hand, well be a mere 'talk shop', based on an affirmative discourse carried by practitioners and analysts alike. The alleged impact is long-term and the more immediate effect at the micro-level of the individual is hard to measure. Thus, both the theoretical conception and the operationalisation for empirical investigation prove to be challenging for backing any hope in this long-term strategy. However, there are serious and promising attempts at analysing the broader socialisation effects of EU 'external governance' (see e.g. Freyburg et al. 2009) and even the impact on individual attitudes and behaviour (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, Freyburg 2009). Nevertheless, political dialogue as the EU's one purposive instrument to engage in persuasion and socialisation has received hardly any attention.

Especially in light of existing 'knowledge' about prospects of democratic conditionality in the Mediterranean, the neglect of democracy assistance and political dialogue in the academic literature is surprising. Even though conditionality has proved to be the EU's most powerful 'leverage' for political reform in enlargement, it would be too easy to simply give up on IDP in a context where this leverage is not given. As pointed out before, different instruments might vary in their impact and effectiveness depending on the context they are used in. It is true, though, that political dialogue and democracy assistance differ from political conditionality in one major aspect: While conditionality as a foreign policy instrument can be applied in a unilateral act, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance requires the active engagement of the targeted actor. Political dialogue can, by definition, not be conducted if there is no partner for dialogue. Similarly, democracy assistance is usually

directed at actors on the ground in the target country.¹⁵ Projects can only be realised if there is cooperation between donor and recipients. If the latter are state actors, they are part of the targeted regime itself. But even if democracy assistance is directed at non-state actors, the implementation of measures might crucially depend on the stance of the target regime on external actors ‘meddling’ with domestic affairs. Taken together, democracy promotion instruments drawing on mechanisms of persuasion and capacity-building, such as political dialogue and democracy assistance, are built on ideas of partnership and cooperation between the external actor and the targeted regime. The implementation of these partnership-based instruments is therefore neither evident nor trivial. The focus on the ‘choice’ of action by external actors ignores the role of the targeted actor in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance. Especially in the Mediterranean, where the EU faces authoritarian regimes, it is not evident that the Mediterranean Partners actively engage in the EU’s efforts (Aliboni 2004: 4-5). However, the implementation of instruments is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for their impact. Investigating the implementation of partnership-based instruments thus establishes a link between the two most prominent research questions sketched above (see figure 2.1): The impact of international democracy promotion efforts does not only depend on the external actor’s choice of strategy because the implementation of several instruments requires the active engagement of the target countries.

Figure 2.1: Issues in international democracy promotion



While we have a good overall picture of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, there is still a lack of systematic, comparative research combining insights from studies focusing on individual countries or instruments to capture the extensive variation in the implementation of different instruments across countries. The present thesis goes beyond asking for the external actor’s choice of strategy by adopting an

¹⁵ Except for, e.g., exile groups or broadcasting programmes in a neighbouring country.

interactive perspective, giving both sides of international democracy promotion an active part in the implementation of instruments such as political dialogue and democracy assistance. Taking into account the specificity of the Mediterranean and the context of (semi-)authoritarian regimes for international democracy promotion efforts, it fills the gap in our knowledge about conditionality and alternatives to conditionality.

2.5. *From external democracy promotion to international cooperation*

Empirical and theoretical contributions to EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean reveal some ‘shortcomings’. First, the focus on conditionality stemming from enlargement studies has led to a relative neglect of other instruments for democracy promotion. In light of the general, empirically and theoretically grounded scepticism regarding the prospects of political conditionality in the Mediterranean, political dialogue and democracy assistance gain all the more importance. Second, these instruments are based on ideas of partnership and cooperation, so that their implementation crucially depends on the active engagement of the target regime. Their implementation cannot be accounted for by merely focusing on the external actor’s choice of strategy but requires a more interactive approach. In addition, implementation becomes the crucial link between an external actor’s policy and its impact. These two aspects become all the more relevant in the context of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, as the EU is deprived of its most powerful leverage and obviously sticks to its ‘positive’ approach, even vis-à-vis semi-authoritarian regimes that can hardly be expected to voluntarily engage in their own transformation. To assess the limits and prospects of the EU’s approach to democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, we should speculate less about the long-term effect of socialisation strategies and produce more empirical evidence and theoretical frameworks for assessing the role of partnership-based instruments.

This thesis therefore focuses on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance within the overall field of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, seeking to explain how and under which conditions partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are implemented. As implementation is seen as the outcome of a process of interaction between the external actor and the target, the

thesis turns to well developed approaches to international cooperation in the IR literature. This also allows making a number of empirical and theoretical contributions to understanding EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and IDP more generally. Empirically, the thesis first of all addresses the neglect of certain instruments and more generally of implementation as a crucial step towards any effect. In addition, it proposes a systematic comparison across countries and over time that covers the implementation of both political dialogue and democracy assistance, placing them in the wider context of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. On a theoretical level, the thesis draws on a well-developed and theorised research agenda in IR to come to terms with different issues in IDP that still lack a coherent theoretical framework. The next chapter develops this idea of external democracy promotion, or more specifically the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, as an instance of international cooperation that can be framed and explained with the help of classic IR approaches.

3. Explaining international cooperation on democracy promotion

3.1. *External democracy promotion as an instance of cooperation*

The implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as instruments of democracy promotion, based on ideas of partnership and cooperation, depends on the willingness and capacity of the target regime to actively engage in external democracy promotion efforts. In contrast to unilateral instruments drawing on incentives or coercion, the implementation of these partnership-based instruments is therefore not entirely left to the discretion of the external actor. Implementation, however, is a necessary condition for the impact of any democracy promotion instrument. In the case of the EU's democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean, political dialogue and democracy assistance are the two main instruments that the EU relies on. Coercion is not an option for the EU, and political conditionalities have been institutionalised but until recently not applied, especially not negative conditionality (see chapter 2). Therefore, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion is a crucial step towards promoting democracy in third countries that is neither trivial nor evident, but that has mostly been neglected in the literature. In order to identify conditions under which implementation takes place, it is useful to conceive of these democracy promotion efforts as an instance of international cooperation. The implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion is then the outcome of a process of interaction between the international actor actively pursuing its agenda in external relations, on the one hand, and the targeted regime, on the other. This conceptualisation allows drawing on different IR theories that address the topic of cooperation in international relations from different angles. They provide different models of the process and identify factors helping to explain the emergence and form of cooperation.

3.2. *Theories of international cooperation*

The manifestation of international cooperation in an increasing number of international regimes seriously challenged the neorealist paradigm in the study of international relations in the 1970s and led to the development of theories of international

cooperation. Especially the emergence of regime theory (or analysis) marked the advent of this new subfield in IR. Since then, a multitude of approaches have scrutinised cooperation both as an outcome and as a process in international relations.

3.2.1. Cooperation as outcome

In the 1970s and 1980s, regime theory was first of all preoccupied with the emergence or creation of ‘regimes’ in international relations in a cooperative endeavour of international actors (Krasner 1983b; Keohane 1984).¹⁶ A rather narrow definition of (international) cooperation, but which is nonetheless widely accepted within the field of regime analysis (or theory) goes back to Robert Keohane who stated that ‘cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination’ (Keohane 1984: 51).¹⁷

Characteristic of this definition is the idea that actors’ interests are not in harmony (Keohane 1984: 51), but that actors realise that they can benefit under certain circumstances from taking other actors’ interests into consideration and coordinate action. Cooperation is then mutually beneficial compared to short-term selfish action. Originally, the focus lay on the conclusion of international agreements creating international regimes. However, the research agenda on international institutions was extended to include different aspects or phases, such as the change of existing regimes, their implementation or ‘enforcement,’ and more generally their impact on state behaviour in international relations (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 492; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000: 4). Accordingly, the understanding of cooperation broadened as well so that ‘cooperation comprises iterated processes, which continue beyond initial agreements and result in complex and enduring governance orders and potential social change’ (O’Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer 2004: 150).

¹⁶ For an overview of the evolution of regime theory into theories on international cooperation and institutions, see Haggard and Simmons 1987, Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1996, 1997, 2000, Milner 1992.

¹⁷ On the conventional character of this definition in regime analytical studies see Milner 1992: 407 and O’Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer 2004: 150; it has e.g. been used in the *International Organization* special issue of 1985 (see Oye 1986b, e.g. Oye 1986a: 6, Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 226). Keohane further defines ‘policy coordination’ by quoting Lindblom (Lindblom 1965: 227): ‘A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in them, such as that the adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or outweighed.’ (Keohane 1984: 51).

After years of focusing on ‘strategic interaction’ and game-theoretic models of cooperation, the more dynamic aspect of the process leading up to or even constituting cooperation came into focus, drawing more heavily (again) on approaches to (international) negotiations and bargaining. It should not be forgotten, however, that Keohane’s initial definition was closely linked to older work on negotiations, both directly referring to cooperation as an outcome of ‘a process of negotiation’ (Keohane 1984: 51) and in describing the strategic ‘situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests’ (Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 226) out of which cooperation can emerge, which has also been identified as a precondition for actors to engage in negotiations (cf. Iklé 1964; Schelling 1963). More recently, scholars have paid tribute to the growing density of international institutions that – assuming some impact of institutions on the behaviour of international actors – has significantly altered the image of ‘anarchy’ as the context within which cooperation may or may not emerge (Oye 1986b; Haggard and Simmons 1987). International institutions seem to be all-pervasive, and international cooperation does not end with their creation. To capture this increasing complexity, scholars have suggested to distinguish between bargaining and enforcement phases of international cooperation (Fearon 1998) or pointed to the importance of ‘post-agreement negotiation’ for cooperation once a regime is established (Jönsson and Tallberg 1998).

Taken together, cooperation relates to both the outcome and the process leading to the outcome. After the initial interest in the creation of international regimes, or more generally international institutions, a broader, more procedural notion of cooperation, in terms of bargaining and negotiations, developed. Either way, in order to understand the emergence of cooperation as an outcome, it is necessary to consider cooperation as a process and develop theoretical models to understand how the outcome comes about. The following sections draw on ‘game theoretic’ models of cooperation as an outcome of strategic interaction that try to find a compromise between structure and agency, embedding actors in institutions that shape and limit their choices of action (e.g. Zürn, Wolf, and Efinger 1990; Lake and Powell 1999; Scharpf 1997; Axelrod 1984, 1997).

3.2.2. Cooperation as process

Cooperation is the outcome of a process of joint decision-making, as the two sides agree – or disagree – on joint action (Zartmann 1977), in this case the implementation of partnership-based instruments. The process of interaction can be thought of as continuous negotiations in which the partners argue and bargain over an initial offer for cooperation.¹⁸ Approaches to cooperation inspired by game theory help modelling this process as ‘strategic interaction’, where the outcome achieved is always the result of both actors’ choices of strategy, hence the need to consider the other actor’s preferences (cf. Zürn, Wolf, and Efinger 1990; Lake and Powell 1999; Scharpf 1997; Axelrod 1984, 1997). To identify conditions under which cooperation occurs, regime theory (Krasner 1983b; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000), international negotiations theory (for an overview, see Jönsson 2002; Iklé 1964), action theories (Risse 2000; Müller 2004), and approaches to compliance with international norms (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Checkel 1997; Underdal 1998) offer useful insights.

For reasons of simplicity, this thesis adopts a rationalist framework for interaction (the following draws on Scharpf 1997). Actors are assumed to make decisions about cooperation consciously and to base their choices on fixed interests and rational (material and immaterial) cost-benefit calculations regarding the possible outcomes and strategies of interaction. In a first step, actors rank the potential outcomes of strategic interaction according to their costs and benefits in relation to their underlying interests and form preferences over outcomes. Achieving the preferred outcome depends on both actors’ choice of strategy, so in a second step they need to analyse the strategic situation. Taking their own and anticipating the other actor’s preferences over outcomes, they consider the costs and benefits of available strategies and their potential for achieving the preferred outcome of interaction, and form their preferences over strategies. Strategic interaction implies that actors might have to make compromises regarding their preferred outcome, as it might be impossible to achieve their first preference in interaction with the other actor. Their final choice of action is based on the expectation that the combination of strategies pursued by both actors leads to an outcome as close as possible to their initial preference.

This does not preclude the notion of norm-guided behaviour: cooperation takes place within bilateral relations which are guided by ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-

¹⁸ For the notion of post-agreement bargaining, see Jönsson and Tallberg 1998.

making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area' (Krasner 1983a: 1).¹⁹ It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to go into the details of game theory. Suffice it to say that it is useful to think of this interaction as a 'mixed motive game', where partners have both diverging and common interests (see Iklé 1964).

3.3. Cooperation on democracy promotion

The purpose of this section is to apply the theoretical considerations outlined above to the specific context of international democracy promotion, and more particularly to EU democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean. Generally, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion can be seen as the outcome of a process of strategic interaction, where the two actors decide to cooperate or to defect. A rationalist model of preference formation suggests that their choice of action and the final outcome depend on fixed interests and ensuing cost-benefit calculations regarding the outcomes and strategies at hand. This section specifies the relevant components of this process for the EU as the external actor and the Arab authoritarian regimes as the target countries of external democracy promotion efforts. These are, first of all, the basic self-interests driving the actors in international relations; second, the potential outcomes and strategies regarding the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance; and finally the basic cost-benefit calculations leading to the formation of preferences over outcomes and strategies.

3.3.1. Interests

The EU and the Mediterranean Partners are treated as collective but unitary actors. In line with general Rational Choice approaches, they are expected to pursue their institutional self-interest in international relations (cf. Gilpin 1981, Downs 1957; also Scharpf 1997).²⁰ This does not imply that norms and identities do not play a role in

¹⁹ It does not further address the role of identities or norms that may shape preferences in the first place or guide actors to follow a logic of appropriateness in certain situations, irrespective of 'objective' cost-benefit calculations. For a discussion of the potential integration of the two logics see Müller 2004.

²⁰ In this context, actors can be expected to strive to maximise their absolute gains, as Powell has elaborated regarding the longstanding debate about absolute as opposed to relative gains between neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists (or structural realists): in Euro-Mediterranean rela-

the choices actors make: actors are socially embedded and consider material and immaterial costs and benefits in their rational calculations of preferences over outcomes and strategies.²¹ Their basic self-interests are assumed fixed and are derived from the point of view of methodological individualism (cf. Elster 2007), instead of tracing internal processes of interest aggregation.²²

The most basic self-interest assumed in the classic IR and International Political Economy (IPE) literature is the actor's 'survival' (cf. Waltz 1979). Accordingly, following methodological individualism, 'for corporate actors, self-interest can be identified with the conditions of organizational survival, autonomy, and growth' (Scharpf 1997: 64). These interests underlie any processes of preference formation in strategic interaction. Even though the possible outcomes are instances of international cooperation, they can affect the realisation of actors' interests at both the international and domestic level (see 3.3.3.). This is even more so as international democracy promotion transcends the boundaries between domestic and international politics. If external actors engage in international democracy promotion efforts, they necessarily try to induce or support domestic change in the target countries. The outcome of international cooperation, in this case the implementation of partnership-based instruments, is therefore expected to directly affect domestic politics and related interests of the regime in the target country.

To make these basic self-interests operational as a basis for strategic action, it is necessary to climb down the ladder of abstraction. The universal interest in 'survival' needs to be translated in the light of the realities of specific actors, as its substance is 'depending on the institutional environment' (Scharpf 1997: 64). In international relations, 'survival' has a political as well as an economic dimension, actors being interested in a) the power and resources to (physically) guarantee their own survival, b) a certain amount of legitimacy or acceptance, and c) welfare (see figure 3.1 below). This roughly corresponds to the three issue areas of (international) politics


tions, the use of force is no option for either actor, so relative gains should not be important (cf. Powell 1991).

²¹ Apart from the basic self-interest, Scharpf identifies three more dimensions shaping actors' preferences in actor-centred institutionalism, namely norms, identities, and interaction orientation (Scharpf 1997: 63). However, these aspects ultimately find their expression in institutions shaping the strategic setting for interaction and are therefore not considered separately from the process of preference formation. For other distinctions of different 'layers' of interests or preferences see e.g. Frieden 1999 and Woll 2005: 7-8.

²² On liberal theory see Moravcsik 1997, on ways of identifying interests or preferences more generally see Frieden 1999.

identified by Czempiel as security, (system of) rule, and well-being (Czempiel 1992; Czempiel 1981).

Figure 3.1: Basic self-interests



For the EU, its basic interests in international politics mirror the domestic situation within the EU as a project of regional integration that aims at stability and welfare and builds on a community of values, including democracy and human rights, from which it derives parts of its legitimacy. Regarding its ‘survival’ as a global actor, the EU is first of all interested in its physical security. Given its ‘civil power’ identity, this does not primarily translate into a struggle for (military) power in international relations (cf. Smith 2005, Sjursen 2006b), but into a concern for political stability in third countries, especially those in its proximity (European Council 2003).²³ Instability and violent conflicts in a country or at the regional level could threaten the EU’s security directly or have repercussions on its internal stability, e.g. through the influx of refugees. This interest in political stability and peace is closely linked to the other two interests in a complex interrelation that is captured by modernisation theories (cf. Lipset 1994, Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and democratic peace theories (cf. Czempiel 1996, Russett and Oneal 2001). According to the former, increasing welfare and socio-economic development is conducive to political liberalisation and democratisation and, in the long run, the stabilisation of regimes. Democratic peace theories establish a link between the quality of regimes and their behaviour in international relations in terms of peace and conflict. The European Community’s strong focus on external trade and its various development policies are, on the one hand, expected to

²³ Cf. Keohane and Nye 2001 on the decreasing importance of military power in a world of ‘complex’ interdependence.

create economic benefits that help sustain and promote welfare within the EU and, on the other hand, to promote socio-economic development world-wide and thereby increase stability. The promotion of a liberal model of democracy is again an external projection of the EU's self-perception as a community of values and closely linked to its quest for legitimacy. However, it is also expected to have a positive impact on stability and development, in line with democratic peace and modernisation theories (cf. Sedelmeier 2007). Taken together, the EU is assumed to have a triangle of interrelated basic interests in international relations: political stability, democracy and legitimacy, as well as (domestic) welfare and (international) socio-economic development (see table 3.1 below). Trying to realise these interests through foreign policies, they might be mutually reinforcing, but could also come into conflict with each other. The 'democratization-stabilization dilemma' (Jünemann 2003a: 7) e.g. postulates that actors cannot realise both interests at the same time because a process of democratisation and particular regime change is likely to compromise stability at least in the short run during a time of transition (cf. Reiber 2009).²⁴

For the Arab authoritarian regimes as the targets of international democracy promotion, it is more important to distinguish between basic interests in domestic and international politics, respectively, because cooperation on external democracy promotion directly interferes with their domestic politics. Regime survival is directly linked to the different dimensions of sovereignty that Stephen Krasner identifies (Krasner 2009): Westphalian and domestic sovereignty guarantee physical security in international relations, on the one hand, and power and autonomy vis-à-vis domestic actors, on the other hand. Beyond formal sovereignty, nation states need to be accepted within the international community to uphold their international sovereignty. Their weight in international politics, but also their position as partners in trade and cooperation hinges on their reputation. Also on the domestic level, regime survival requires at least a minimum of legitimacy and of acceptance by those ruled (cf. Weber 1956). Finally, the interest in welfare translates into a preoccupation with domestic socio-economic development, international trade and economic cooperation, including development cooperation and foreign investments. The analogue triangle of basic

²⁴ 'To sum up, one can say that the nexus between democratization and security has always been one that favours the prior goal of security, whereas the promotion of democracy is a means (to promote security) rather than a goal in itself. This 'democratization-stabilization dilemma' is nothing new, but rather a structural deficit of the EMP that has been in the focus of academic research for many years (Jünemann, 1998; Gillespie and Youngs, 2002; Panebianco, 2003).' (Jünemann 2003a: 7)

interests regarding international politics for the Arab authoritarian regimes is (international and domestic) power and autonomy, (international and domestic) acceptance and legitimacy, as well as (international) trade and (domestic) socio-economic development (see table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Basic self-interests in international democracy promotion

	Organisational Survival	Autonomy	Growth
EU	political stability	democracy and legitimacy	(domestic) welfare and (international) socio-economic development
Target regime	(international and domestic) power	(international and domestic) acceptance and legitimacy	(international) trade and (domestic) socio-economic development

3.3.2. Possible outcomes and strategies

Partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion can only be implemented if both actors agree to work together (i.e. cooperate) to some extent. To conduct political dialogue, any actor needs an interlocutor, and the implementation of democracy assistance is possible neither without a donor nor without a recipient. Both actors choose their strategy, but the outcome is only achieved in the interaction of their respective strategies. Basically, the choice they face is to cooperate or to defect, leading to the possible outcomes regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments. Strictly speaking, these instruments can only be implemented if both actors choose cooperation as their strategy. As soon as one defects and refuses to cooperate, there will be no implementation. In this basic model, actors face the following matrix of strategies and outcomes when making their choices:

Figure 3.2: Strategies and outcomes

	<i>Cooperate</i>	<i>Defect</i>
<i>Cooperate</i>	Implementation	No implementation
<i>Defect</i>	No implementation	No implementation

However, the picture needs to be modified according to the specific context of international democracy promotion. Classic game theory assumes interaction of formally equal actors faced with formally identical options regarding the available strategies in a context of anarchy, void of institutions (cf. Axelrod 1984). Both assumptions are qualified in the case of international democracy promotion. The implementation of

partnership-based instruments takes (or does not take) place within a complex setting of bilateral relations that consist of ongoing interaction in various fields. It is therefore useful to picture the available strategies in a more nuanced way. Actors do not simply have a choice between ‘yes’ and ‘no’, between ‘cooperation’ and ‘defection.’ Even if they both choose to cooperate, they can do so in different ways, leading to different outcomes or ‘qualities’ in the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. In addition, the very idea of external democracy promotion puts the two actors in unequal positions. As ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’, respectively, of international democracy promotion efforts, the external actor and the target regime face slightly different choices of strategies. The external actor can either back its offer for cooperation by a strong demand, insisting on the target regime’s active cooperation (*insistent cooperation*), or it can more passively wait and see in how far its offer for cooperation is taken up by the target regime (*indifferent cooperation*). By contrast, the target regime can either (pro-)actively seek and comprehensively engage in cooperation (*willing cooperation*), or it can engage only selectively and try to dictate its own terms of cooperation (*reluctant cooperation*). Taken together, the external actor can be more or less insistent, whereas the target regime can be more or less reluctant to cooperate.

The EU as the external actor is bound by its own (global, universal, standardised) democracy promotion policy, which constrains its choice of strategy. Given the strong emphasis on a ‘positive’ approach and partnership-based instruments, outright refusal to cooperate is rarely an option for the EU. Formally, it is only foreseen as a consequence of severe non-compliance with the EU’s political conditionality, leading to an interruption of cooperation under certain circumstances. Within this constraint, the EU can nevertheless choose how strongly it demands active cooperation from the target regime, potentially insisting on implementation even if the partner prefers not to cooperate. Given the EU’s democracy promotion policy, the target regime’s basic choice between cooperation and defection means to accept or to refuse/reject the EU’s offer, giving in to or resisting its demands.

This more nuanced picture of the strategies available to the two actors also modifies the set of possible outcomes. Again, instead of ‘implementation’ or ‘no implementation’, emerging implementation can vary along a continuum between ‘good’ implementation and ‘bad’ implementation: If both actors choose comprehensive coopera-

tion, the outcome is smooth, substantial, intensive, meaningful implementation. If the EU is rather indifferent and the target regime is reluctant, implementation should remain at a very low, rudimentary level. In between, there is always the possibility that one actor has a stronger preference for cooperation than the other, resulting in ‘difficult’ or selective implementation. As long as the target regime actively and willingly engages in cooperation, implementation should still be better than in the case that the target regime is reluctant to cooperate but is pushed by the external actor’s insistence.

In sum, the matrix of strategies and outcomes regarding cooperation between the EU and Arab authoritarian regimes on the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion needs to be adapted as follows:

Figure 3.3: Strategies and outcomes – modified

EU Target regime		<i>Cooperate</i>		<i>Defect</i>
		<i>Insistent</i>	<i>Indifferent</i>	
<i>Cooperate</i>	<i>Willing</i>	Implementation (++)	Implementation (+)	No implementation
	<i>Reluctant</i>	Implementation (-)	Implementation (--)	No implementation
<i>Defect</i>		No implementation	No implementation	No implementation

While ‘defection’ of either actor is still assumed to lead to ‘no implementation’, ‘cooperation’ as a strategy is nuanced for both actors according to their inclination to push for or actively engage in cooperation. Depending on the respective choice of strategy regarding cooperation, ‘implementation’ can therefore vary from ‘good’ to ‘difficult’ to ‘bad’.

3.3.3. Preference formation

This section looks at the process of preference formation with regard to the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. Both actors are assumed to weigh the costs and benefits of possible outcomes and strategies (see 3.3.2.) in view of their interests (see 3.3.1.). Hence, the actors’ preferences over outcome and strategy are based on a cost-benefit calculation for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion regarding their interests. Actors anticipate (potential) costs and benefits that do not necessarily materialize, which gives an important role to information and perceptions. The idea is that outcomes and strategies can have direct and indirect effects on the realisation of interests, creating costs and benefits. In the

case of international democracy promotion, it is not so much the outcome itself – (no) implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance – that has implications for the actors, but its expected impact in terms of democratisation and regime transformation or change. The choice of strategy might in turn trigger indirect effects, taking into account the other actor's preferences and possible reactions. While the formation of preferences over outcomes is an 'individual' process theoretically preceding strategic interaction itself, preferences over strategies are shaped by the strategic setting at the same time that they shape the process of interaction.

As pointed out before (see 3.3.2), the EU and the Arab authoritarian regimes are in different positions regarding the implementation of democracy promotion instruments, constraining their choices of strategies available. The status quo in Euro-Mediterranean bilateral relations since the 1950s used to be 'no cooperation' on democracy promotion. It was the EU that first suggested changing this status quo, having developed an external democracy promotion policy from the early 1990s onwards. Introducing a political dimension, including the promotion of democracy and human rights, to Euro-Mediterranean relations was clearly a European agenda. By contrast, the Arab authoritarian regimes are the 'targets' of the EU's democracy promotion policy, reacting to the EU's offer (and demand) for cooperation.

If the actors' preferences are known in 'absolute' terms, the outcome can be clearly determined. However, knowing preferences is the big problem (cf. Frieden 1999, Moravcsik 1997). This section therefore outlines the process of preference formation in general terms. It discusses how interests and conceivable outcomes relate to each other and what the strategic considerations are regarding strategies. To gauge the actors' preferences, it is then necessary to consider the various factors that influence the cost-benefit calculations forming actors' preferences and create conditions under which certain outcomes are more or less likely to occur.

Preferences over outcomes

For the EU, the first and most obvious (potential) benefit of implementing democracy promotion instruments is that this might further democracy and processes of democratisation in the target country. While this is a declared objective in itself, it is also intimately linked to the achievement of the EU's basic interests in international relations, namely political stability in third countries, legitimacy, and welfare (see

chapter 3.3.1. and figure 3.4 below). Supporting a process of democratisation, and potentially regime change, in the target country holds several benefits for the EU. It can increase its reputation as a normative and civilian power, facilitate trade and development in line with modernisation theory, and create, in the long run, the conditions for peace in the international system according to the democratic peace theorem. However, implementing its policy and ensuring cooperation in the field of democracy promotion, the EU is confronted with the more immediate risk of destabilising the political regime, creating costs with regard to its interest in political stability (cf. Jünemann 2003a; Reiber 2009; Vachudova 2005). While consolidated democracy is assumed to have a stabilising impact on a regime, offering non-violent solutions to conflicts of distribution and politics, the liberalisation of a (previously stable) autocratic regime and especially the transitional period of regime change create a power vacuum and are marked by political instability (cf. Reiber 2009). Regime change is not necessarily brought about by military means or accompanied by violence, but it creates a moment of uncertainty regarding the outcome of transition – what kind of a new regime emerges and if it will be able to stabilise. By contrast, if partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are not implemented, this leaves the status quo of bilateral relations untouched. This outcome thus only indirectly creates costs and benefits for the EU. On the one hand, it compromises the objective of furthering democracy, which could create additional reputational costs, as the EU is not living up to its normative claims. On the other hand, however, it is clearly beneficial in not putting political stability in the target country at risk.

Figure 3.4: Costs and benefits of outcomes for the EU

Implementation		Political stability	Legitimacy & democracy	Welfare
yes	costs	Short-term destabilisation		
	benefits	Long-term peace	Democratisation Reputation	Trade Development
no	costs		Reputation	
	benefits			

For the Arab authoritarian regimes, cooperation with external actors in the field of democracy promotion first of all potentially creates costs with regard to the immediate survival of the regime, regarding its interest in power and resources both at the domestic and the international level (see chapter 3.3.1. and figure 3.5 below). At the domestic level, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy

promotion threatens a regime's domestic sovereignty, its power base and autonomy vis-à-vis societal and political, potentially oppositional, actors. If democracy promotion is effective, it might disempower the ruling elite, e.g. through legal reforms creating new checks and balances or through capacity-building for other actors. At the international level, the resulting risk of destabilising the country translates into a loss of power in international relations, compromising its Westphalian sovereignty. By contrast, the implementation of democracy promotion instruments can also be beneficial for an authoritarian regime regarding its interests in legitimacy and welfare, but even concerning its interest in power and resources. It might increase acceptance by the international (democratic) community and thus further its international sovereignty. The effect of the joint implementation of partnership-based democracy promotion instruments on domestic legitimacy and acceptance cannot be anticipated without further going into domestic politics: If nationalism is prevailing, it might trigger a strong criticism of external interference; if reformism is prevailing, cooperation might be appreciated as a reform effort. Similarly to the EU, the target regime can hope for a modernisation effect, furthering socio-economic development and creating a context favourable to foreign direct investment and international trade. Finally, depending on the content and objectives of democracy promotion, the regime can benefit from the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in terms of gaining additional resources to consolidate its power base, by maintaining the status quo or implementing relevant reforms. Conversely, no implementation is indirectly beneficial with regard to a regime's interest in domestic and Westphalian sovereignty, preserving the status quo and leaving domestic and international balances of power untouched. However, it could still be costly for the regime, foregoing potential welfare benefits and damaging its reputation in international relations. Regarding the regime's domestic legitimacy, the effect can again be either positive or negative, depending on the domestic political context and the prevalence of demands for reform or public rejection of external interference in domestic affairs.

Figure 3.5: Costs and benefits of outcomes for the Arab authoritarian regimes

Implementation		Westphalian & domestic sovereignty	International sovereignty & domestic legitimacy	Trade, aid, & socio-economic development
yes	costs	Domestic and international power	<i>Domestic contestation</i>	
	benefits	Resources	International reputation <i>Domestic approval</i>	Trade, investment Development
no	costs		International reputation <i>Domestic contestation</i>	
	benefits		<i>Domestic approval</i>	

Taken together, both actors have to consider both potential costs and benefits in forming their preferences over outcomes regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. To assume fixed preferences over outcomes – e.g. the EU preferring implementation and the Arab authoritarian regimes preferring no implementation – would oversimplify their diversity of interests and the resulting cost-benefit calculations. Looking into the cost-benefit calculations that shape preferences over outcomes creates a more nuanced picture, capturing e.g. the ‘democratization-stabilization dilemma’ (Jünemann 2003a: 7) for the EU and the possibility that the target regimes can have a genuine preference for seeing external democracy promotion efforts getting implemented. Their preference over strategies and choice of action is further shaped by the strategic setting and a second layer of costs and benefits this creates.

Preferences over strategies

Apart from the outcome itself, an actor’s choice of strategy can be either costly or beneficial in view of its interests. This second cost-benefit calculation depends on the other actor’s preferences over outcomes and possible reactions to one’s own choice of action. Costs and benefits are thus created in the process of interaction itself, making necessary strategic considerations about the likelihood and the implications of specific combinations of strategies chosen by the two actors. Actors can anticipate sanctions and rewards when (dis)pleasing their partner, but they can also explicitly create incentives through threats and promises, i.e. conditionality. This mechanism primarily affects concerns for welfare through material incentives linked to trade or aid, but also concerns for legitimacy through immaterial incentives such as reputational costs. Therefore, actors’ preferences over strategy and their actual choice of

action not only depend on ‘objective’ factors, but also on the strategic interaction, bringing together their own preferences over outcomes with what they believe about their partner’s preferences over outcome and strategies. Due to the strategic setting, actors might choose to aim for an outcome that ranks lower than their initial preferences over outcomes. The costs and benefits of certain strategies can simply outweigh the costs and benefits of the outcomes they lead to. The overall cost-benefit calculation would then make it necessary to compromise the most preferred outcome for a lesser preferred one. While the preferences over outcomes shape the initial willingness of actors to cooperate or to defect, their preferences over strategies reflect their capacity to directly pursue their preferred outcome. For example, even though one actor clearly prefers ‘no implementation’ as the outcome of interaction, the costs of ‘defection’ as a strategy might be prohibitive, pushing the actor to cooperate instead.

Recalling the matrix of possible strategies and related outcomes (see figure 3.3 above), it is important to remember that these strategic considerations are only necessary when the two actors have conflicting preferences over outcomes. In the case of ‘harmony’, i.e. when both actors agree on the preferred outcome from the beginning, their choice of strategy is not controversial. Thus, if both actors strongly prefer either ‘implementation’ or ‘no implementation’, these outcomes can be achieved easily without further cost-benefit calculations regarding the strategies. Given the specific context of external democracy promotion, where the external actor is the one to pursue an agenda vis-à-vis the target regime, the two basic scenarios of conflicting preferences over outcomes have different implications for the costs and benefits of the respective strategies, depending on who prefers implementation and who does not. If the EU is less inclined towards implementing its instruments than is the target regime, the costs of the available strategies should be low for both actors, as the authoritarian regimes are unlikely to actively sanction the EU’s indifference or defection. The most controversial situation should be when the EU is more inclined to seeing its instruments implemented than the Arab authoritarian regimes. The resulting conflict of preferences over outcomes might then lead to a struggle to change each others’ preferences over strategies to achieve an outcome closer to one’s own liking.

In the same line, the EU risks costs regarding its interest in legitimacy and welfare if it strongly insists on the implementation of democracy promotion instruments while the target regime has a strong preference for no implementation. Pushing for implementation against the target regime's preference, the latter might 'retaliate' with economic sanctions or blame the EU for having an imperialist agenda (reputational costs). Not insisting on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance, on the other hand, should not create costs for the EU in most cases, as the regime's preference for the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion would have to be extremely strong for the regime to react with some sort of sanctions to the EU's choice of defection.

Similarly, the authoritarian regimes risk sanctions by the EU if they refuse to cooperate, creating additional costs. This risk increases with the EU's inclination to actively push for the implementation of democracy promotion instruments, which could be indicated by explicit negative conditionality. By contrast, cooperation can be beneficial for the target regime regarding welfare and legitimacy through material and immaterial incentives: Implicitly or explicitly, the EU might promise to enhance trade, general cooperation, and aid if the target regime cooperates in the field of democracy promotion (positive conditionality).

While it is impossible to quantify the costs and benefits and objectively determine the preferences over outcome and strategy of the EU and the Arab authoritarian regimes regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion in absolute terms, it is possible to identify factors that shift the weight of costs and benefits - and therefore make cooperation more or less likely - from a comparative perspective, either across countries or over time. Drawing on theories of cooperation and international relations more generally, the next section identifies potential explanatory factors and derives a set of hypotheses on the implementation of partnership-based instruments in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

3.4. *Explanatory factors*

Even though it is not possible to observe the process of interaction itself in order to analyse each partner's initial position and the effects of arguing and bargaining strategies used, IR theories help identify several factors that are expected to shape the partners' preferences over outcome and strategy and their capacity to shape negotia-

tions accordingly. Factors might either mitigate the formation of preferences over outcomes, changing the costs and benefits of outcomes with regard to interests, or over strategy, changing the actors' positions within the strategic situation. The actors' cost-benefit calculations for cooperation (and defection) are first of all shaped by the institutional environment they operate in as a background condition (see 3.4.1.). Similarly, ongoing cooperation changes the strategic context for further cooperation, resulting in a lock-in effect (see 3.4.2.). Beyond this, there are three factors that figure prominently in the literature and which can be expected to influence the processes of preference formation: 1) the degree of political liberalisation in the target country (see 3.4.3.), 2) the degree of statehood in the target country (see 3.4.4.), and 3) the partners' (economic) interdependence (see 3.4.6.) (see Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn 2008a; Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Youngs 2001b). While the former two factors address the actor's preferences over outcomes, the latter shapes their preferences over strategy. In addition, there are interaction effects (see 3.4.5.) and the role of unilateral instruments for democracy promotion to consider (see 3.4.7.). The following sections link these factors back to theoretical arguments in the IR literature.

3.4.1. Institutional environment

Within the strategic setting of interaction, existing institutions shape actions as they constrain actors' choices. They influence the availability (costs and benefits) of possible outcomes and strategies. Institutions embody and create mutual expectations that actors have to consider when choosing their strategy (cf. Krasner 1983a). Joint agreements are concluded in the expectation that partners adhere to their norms and rules, and when institutionalising a framework for cooperation, partners expect its implementation. To ignore these expectations can create reputational costs, changing actors' preferences over strategies. In addition, institutions can shape the availability of outcomes in the first place.

Regarding international democracy promotion efforts, the institutional framework can consist of joint commitments and agreements, but also the external actor's democracy promotion policy, institutionalising opportunities for cooperation. Research on international regimes as well as legalisation approaches to compliance in international relations suggest that the degree of institutionalisation influences the chances

of cooperation to emerge (Abbott et al. 2000). An institutional environment prescribing cooperation and providing monitoring and sanction mechanisms lowers the costs of cooperation for the EU (insisting vis-à-vis a reluctant Mediterranean partner is easier) and increases the costs of defection for the Mediterranean partner (resisting the EU's demand for cooperation is more difficult). The degree of institutionalisation is reflected in the number or density of norms, rules, and procedures and in their specificity and clarity.

H₁ Institutional Environment: The higher the degree of institutionalisation, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

Empirically (see chapters 2 and 5), the institutional environment for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion in the Mediterranean is first of all shaped by the EU's democracy promotion policy. It includes joint commitments by the EU, its member states, and the Mediterranean Partners to objectives of democratisation and respect for human rights, such as the Barcelona Declaration (1995) and the 'essential element' clause in the EMAA. Furthermore, the EMAA create bilaterally agreed structures for cooperation, such as the Association Councils and Subcommittees. In addition, the EU can rely on a set of instruments, including external cooperation programmes, to provide democracy assistance in cooperation with its Mediterranean partners. The EU's policy establishes clear expectations regarding the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance and includes provisions for monitoring and sanctioning compliance with these expectations.

The EU's provisions for democracy promotion and the institutional environment for cooperation they create are marked by an increasing degree of institutionalisation over time. Even though they change, they provide a context that is constant across countries and therefore cannot account for country variation. For example, the eligibility for democracy assistance under MEDA/ENPI and the EIDHR was more or less the same for all Mediterranean Partners and does not explain variation across countries in the implementation of democracy assistance projects (timing, funding levels, content). Similarly, the EMAA contain the same clauses regarding political dialogue for all Mediterranean Partners. Still, the entry into force of the individual EMAA varied between 1997 and 2006, with the Syrian EMAA still pending. The institutional environment is therefore a background condition for the implementation of

partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion in the region and not a country-specific factor shaping the cost-benefit calculation in individual interactions.

So, in line with the hypothesis stated above, the increasing institutionalisation of the EU's democracy promotion policy and of the available instruments should decrease the EU's costs for insisting on cooperation, at the same time that defection becomes more costly for the target regimes. In addition, the EU faces higher reputational costs if it does not succeed in implementing its instruments. Therefore, both actors should be pushed towards strategies of more or better cooperation over time.

3.4.2. Lock-in effect of cooperation

Helpful as the concept of strategic interaction is to model the decision-making processes leading (or not leading) to the implementation of partnership-based instruments, it is necessary to pay tribute to the realities of international cooperation. Choosing their strategy, actors do not make isolated decisions each time, but are, rather, involved in an on-going process of cooperation that is only roughly captured by the concept of 'iterated games' (e.g. Axelrod 1984, 1997). Similarly to the institutional environment, previous instances of cooperation create expectations among actors and limit their choice of strategies (cf. Pierson 1996, Hall and Taylor 1996). So, once there has been initial cooperation in the field of democracy promotion, it becomes increasingly difficult for either actor to go back to the status quo of no cooperation. Having actively engaged in the implementation of partnership-based instruments, i.e. accepted the offer and demand for cooperation, the target regime has a harder time to take back this commitment and persuasively defend a change of strategy back to refusal. In this case, the EU also gets entrapped: if cooperation has been shown to be possible, i.e. it has already succeeded in implementing its democracy promotion policy once and thus set a precedent, there is no reason why it should let the target regime get away with less in the future. Therefore, the EU should be more inclined to insist on cooperation.

H₂ Lock-in Effect: If partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are already being implemented, then further cooperation is more likely.

3.4.3. Political liberalisation

The first country-specific factor shaping the EU's and the Arab authoritarian regimes' preferences over outcome is the degree of political liberalisation of the target regime. It indicates the regime's openness to allow for pluralistic and competitive politics. In general, this factor is closely related to different regime types, ranging from liberal democracy to closed authoritarianism (cf. Held 2006; Linz 2000). In recent years, researchers have taken note of the empirical phenomenon of regimes that do not fall neatly into either category, trying to define these 'hybrid regimes' in relation to democratic regimes (Bendel, Croissant, and Rüb 2002; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Merkel 2004; Merkel and Croissant 2004; Zakaria 1997), authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002), or both (Bogaards 2009). The often persisting co-existence of democratic and authoritarian features challenges the idea of a 'transitional period' that will lead to the consolidation of either regime type (Carothers 2002). However, implications for democracy promotion have, until now, only rarely been considered (Carothers 2000; Ottaway 2003). For international democracy promotion, the distinction of regime types and phases of democratisation clearly has major consequences: Within established democracies, external efforts at democracy promotion are most likely welcomed by the ruling elite if they help a newly established democratic regime to stabilise and consolidate. Closed autocracies, by contrast, can be expected to have a clear (negative) preference over outcome regarding external democracy promotion efforts. However, within the 'grey zone' of 'semi-authoritarian' regimes, the degree of political liberalisation can be expected to play a major role in shaping the costs and benefits of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and thus the preferences over outcome of the actors.

Empirically, the target countries in the MENA region all fall into this last category, so it is more useful to consider their varying degrees of political liberalisation rather than the regime type, trying to account for different outcomes in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Political liberalisation determines the (mis)fit of the external request for democratisation with domestic norms and institutions and thus changes the costs of implementation (Börzel and Risse 2003; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). This in turn either facilitates or constrains the cooperation of an authoritarian regime

in the field of international democracy promotion, as the implementation of partnership-based instruments such as political dialogue and democracy assistance challenge the regime's domestic power base to a varying degree. The less politically liberalised a regime is, the higher are the risks of triggering unwanted political processes and changing the balance of power when engaging in external efforts. Domestic actors could employ the regime's cooperation with external actors in the field of democracy promotion to substantiate their own demand for reforms (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). By contrast, if the regime is already more liberalised or in a process of liberalisation, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion might fit the regime's own political agenda, making implementation less costly with regard to its interest in preserving its power and autonomy in domestic politics and enabling it to reap other potential benefits linked to it.

This interest-based approach is closely linked to an identity-based approach emphasising changing perception of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998). With a higher degree of political liberalisation, the expectations of the international (democratic) community increase, so that non-implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion would entail higher reputational costs. Finally, a structuralist approach could argue that an institutional fit *per se* facilitates cooperation and therefore implementation. From the EU's perspective, a higher degree of liberalisation of the target country increases the chances for a gradual regime transformation through reforms. The implementation of partnership-based instruments thus entails lower costs, as it does not risk regional instability because of a more abrupt regime change and a potential power vacuum during the transitional period (Reiber 2009). It also promises greater benefits with regard to the objective of democracy promotion, as a higher degree of political liberalisation increases the chances for the effectiveness of external democracy promotion efforts and successful democratisation. In addition, the increased expectations of the international community vis-à-vis a more liberalised regime imply that the outcome of 'no implementation' generates higher reputational costs for the EU. Taken together, a higher degree of political liberalisation in the target country reduces the costs and increases the benefits of implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance for both actors, resulting in the following hypothesis:

H₃ Political Liberalisation: The higher the degree of political liberalisation in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

3.4.4. Statehood

The second country-specific factor directly shaping the preference formation regarding the possible outcomes is the degree of *statehood* of the target country. Statehood describes a property of the regime at the intersection between debates on (domestic) sovereignty (e.g. Krasner 2009) and state capacity (cf. Mann 1984; Migdal 1988). Consolidated statehood is understood here as the regime's effective monopoly on the legitimate use of force and its capacity to implement and enforce collectively binding decisions (cf. Risse and Lehmkuhl 2007). Statehood can be limited in either dimension, constraining the regime's control of its territory in general or regarding specific policies (Risse forthcoming 2010). At the opposite end of consolidated statehood are failed states that lack any of the above capacities. This lack of capacities has major implications for the mere possibility of implementing external democracy promotion efforts in cooperation with domestic state actors. However, similarly to political liberalisation, the cases under consideration can all be placed in the spectrum of (more or less limited) statehood, which affects the cost-benefit calculations of the EU and the Arab authoritarian regimes in different ways.

Statehood is directly linked to concerns about national and regional stability for the EU. A regime that is limited in its capacity to govern its own country could be more easily destabilised by processes shaking the domestic balance of power. Therefore, the more limited the statehood of the target country is, the less strongly the EU should prefer the implementation of its partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. A similar argument can be made for the target countries themselves, as strong statehood allows the regime to control processes of political reform that are potentially triggered by external democracy promotion efforts, lowering the costs of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. Limitations to statehood posed by external military or political interventions into domestic affairs, but also domestic challenges to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force threaten the stability and ultimately the survival of a regime. Following this line of argument, the target regime's preference over outcome should also be shifted towards 'imple-

mentation' the stronger its statehood is. However, limitations to statehood can also have the opposite effect for the target regime, as the implementation of these instruments could actually provide it with additional resources, enabling the regime to consolidate its power base and international reputation. Taking this into consideration makes it next to impossible to formulate any clear expectations regarding the impact of statehood on the outcome of interaction. It is difficult to compare the anticipated costs and benefits and to determine in advance a tipping-point when one outweighs the other. The argument would then become indetermined. In a first step, the hypothesis is therefore based on a simplification, focusing on the similar effect of statehood on the preference formation for both actors via their interest in power and stability. If the empirical analysis does not substantiate this straightforward causal link between statehood and the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, it is then possible to consider a more complex effect of statehood on the formation of preferences over outcome and its role in shaping interaction.

In sum, statehood is assumed to have a similar effect on the preference formation of the EU and the target countries, changing the costs of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, resulting in the following (working) hypothesis:

H₄ Statehood: The higher the degree of statehood in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

3.4.5. Interaction effect between political liberalisation and statehood

As the two factors shaping the actors' preferences over outcome outlined so far need to be taken into account simultaneously, it is necessary to consider their relation to each other and potential interaction effects. The respective degrees of political liberalisation and statehood are both expected to affect the preferences over outcomes in a similar way, as they are both linked to the actors' struggle for stability and survival, changing the costs and benefits associated with the possible outcomes. Empirically, the possible scenarios of interaction are limited as the analysis includes neither lib-

eral democracies nor failed or failing states, combining the two spectra of more or less liberalised (semi-)authoritarian regimes with more or less limited statehood:

Figure 3.6: Continuum of political liberalisation and statehood

Statehood	Political liberalisation	++ (liberal democratic)	+ (semi-authoritarian)	- (authoritarian)
+ (consolidated)				
- (limited)				
-- (failing or failed)				

The two factors can therefore be expected to be mutually reinforcing, if they point into the same direction: A combination of high degrees of political liberalisation and statehood should favour, in the cases of both actors, a preference for the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and thus make this outcome most likely. Conversely, low degrees of political liberalisation and statehood should make (a preference for) implementation least likely. However, if the values for these two factors differ and thus point into different directions regarding their influence on the actors' preferences over outcome, their combined impact is less straightforward. Assuming that they mitigate the effect of one another, it is necessary to discuss their respective importance for the preference formation of the two actors to determine which one dominates or whether they even cancel each other out.

Given their basic interests, the first concern of both actors should be the degree of political liberalisation, as it determines the degree of (mis)fit and thus the significance of potential changes in the political system. If the misfit is high, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion is more likely to affect the domestic power balance and international stability, whereas a higher fit doesn't require dramatic changes and significantly reduces the costs of implementation. Against this background, the degree of statehood becomes a secondary concern, as it changes the regime's capacity to handle potential domestic processes triggered by the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in the first place. This argument holds true as long as statehood is not seriously threatened and the regimes possess a minimum of statehood. By contrast, if the public order is at risk, e.g. in light of riots or even civil war, then both actors are likely to prefer 'no implementation', no matter what the degree of liberalisation is. Leaving these cases

aside for the moment, the general argument about the interaction effect posits that political liberalisation is the dominant factor, supporting hypothesis *H₃ Political Liberalisation*, but that it is mitigated by statehood, qualifying hypothesis *H₄ Statehood*, resulting in the following matrix of preferences over outcome:

Figure 3.7: Interaction effect of political liberalisation and statehood

<i>Preferences over outcome</i>		Political liberalisation	
		High	Low
Statehood	High	1	3
	Low	2	4

Preferences over outcome:
 1 = strong preference for implementation
 4 = strong preference for non-implementation

H₅ Interaction Effect: The higher the degree of political liberalisation, the more likely is the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, reinforced by a high degree of statehood and nuanced by a low degree of statehood.

If the more complex argument about the role of statehood is taken into account (see 3.4.4.), the argument about interaction remains the same: political liberalisation trumps statehood. It leads, however, to different matrices for the two actors. A combination of these creates possible scenarios of how their preferences might diverge. These can only be resolved considering the next step of strategic interaction – the formation of preferences over strategies and the role of (inter-)dependence therein. However, comparing the following matrix with the one above clearly shows that, assuming a predominant role of political liberalisation, the combined effect of political liberalisation and statehood is not expected to differ significantly between the two scenarios:

Figure 3.8: Interaction effect of political liberalisation and statehood – modified

<i>Preferences over outcome</i>		Political liberalisation	
		High	Low
Statehood	High	2 // 1	4 // 3
	Low	1 // 2	3 // 4

Preferences over outcome: target regime // EU
 1 = strong preference for implementation
 4 = strong preference for no implementation

3.4.6. Interdependence

In contrast to political liberalisation and statehood, a relationship of dependence, or rather asymmetric interdependence, shapes the strategic situation and therefore affects the formation of preferences over strategy. While the other two factors affect the actors' 'willingness' to cooperate (preferences over outcomes), interdependence impacts on their 'capacity' to pursue possible strategies (preferences over strategies). Interdependence is therefore relevant in the second step of preference formation leading to the actors' choice of action and the final outcome of interaction, taking their preferences over outcome into account. Generally, 'dependence can be described as a situation in which a system is contingent upon external forces' (Zürn 2002: 236). In the context of strategic interaction, dependence implies a power differential between the two actors that gives one a certain amount of influence or leverage over the other.²⁵ Power would then translate into the capacity to inflict and/or bear costs related to the choice of different strategies.

Classic IR approaches highlight the role of the respective power resources of partners, in terms of the sheer size of their territory, population, economy, and military (for an overview see Baldwin 2002). In 'Power and Interdependence', Keohane and Nye elaborated a more differentiated picture of factors creating mutual dependence or 'interdependence' that 'in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries' (Keohane and Nye 2001: 7). This introduces the idea of relational power (see Baldwin 1980), in that '[i]t is *asymmetries* in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another' (Keohane and Nye 2001: 9). Asymmetric interdependence directly affects the 'bargaining power' (Jönsson and Tallberg 1998: 381; Habeeb 1988) of international actors, as it makes them more or less vulnerable to actions taken by other international actors (Keohane and Nye 2001: 8-16; Keohane and Nye 1987). Interdependence is created by 'linkages' or the 'interconnectedness' of actors, but goes beyond the latter due to the 'costly effects of transactions' (Keohane and Nye 2001: 8), e.g. affecting security and welfare interests in terms of trade, energy resources, migration, or regional conflicts. This includes

²⁵ In general, 'power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes. (...) Political bargaining is usually a means of translating potential into effects, and a lot is often lost in the translation.' (Keohane and Nye 2001: 10); on the idea of 'leverage' in international democracy promotion, see Levitsky and Way 2005.

ongoing cooperation in areas other than democracy promotion, e.g. agreements or development assistance. It can provide the actors with an opportunity to directly create costs for each other, e.g. through withholding aid or interrupting the implementation of an agreement. The ‘vulnerability’ depends on the size or significance of costs and the availability of alternatives.²⁶

If dependence alters an actor’s capacity to inflict and bear costs, it affects the costliness of strategic choices available and thus the formation of preferences over strategies. Based on its own preferences over outcome, an actor engages in a sort of ‘risk assessment’ regarding the likelihood and significance of potential costs, considering its own vulnerability to potential costs, but also what it believes about the other actor’s preferences over outcome and vulnerability (see 3.3.3. on preference formation). Basically, if one actor is highly dependent, the other can more easily choose a strategy that is more likely to bring about its desired outcome. This does not necessarily imply conflict, as the two actors could be in a state of ‘harmony’ in the first place, when their preferences over outcome converge. Furthermore, actors are usually in a relationship of interdependence, i.e. mutual dependence that is rarely characterised by ‘pure symmetry’ or ‘pure dependence’ (Keohane and Nye 2001: 9), which makes it difficult to ascertain the degree and direction of asymmetry. In the end, dependence does not determine the absolute costs of the different strategies, but it can shift the cost-benefit calculation and the resulting bargaining power in favour of one actor or the other.

In the end, the impact of (inter-)dependence on the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion in cooperation between the EU and the target regimes cannot be preconceived without considering the configuration of preferences over outcome of the two actors. As pointed out before (see 3.3.3.), the strategic setting and thus (inter-)dependence play a different role whether the actors have diverging or converging preferences over outcome.

²⁶ On the distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability, see Keohane and Nye 2001: 10-11, e.g. ‘The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face. (...) In terms of the cost of dependence, sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation. Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.’ (11)

Figure 3.9: Implementation of partnership-based instruments

<i>Preferences over outcome strategy</i>			EU	
			<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
			<i>Insistent cooperation / Indifferent cooperation / Defection</i>	
Target regime	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Willing co-operation / Reluctant cooperation / Defection</i>	harmony	no conflict
	<i>No</i>	<i>Willing co-operation / Reluctant cooperation / Defection</i>	conflict	harmony

When the two actors share the same preference over outcome, (inter-)dependence is not likely to have any effect on their choice of strategy (see figure 3.9 above). Their preferences regarding implementation being in harmony, their related choices of strategy do not create additional costs. If they both prefer ‘implementation’, the target regime simply accepts the EU’s offer for cooperation, so the EU does not even need to consider backing its insistence on cooperation by otherwise potentially controversial measures. Similarly, if both actors prefer ‘no implementation’, the EU’s offer for cooperation stands formally, but the target regime’s refusal is not met with a strategy of insistence by the EU. In addition, the role of dependence for shaping the outcome is expected to be limited when the target regime’s preference for implementation is stronger than the EU’s. If the EU does not favour implementation, its offer for cooperation still stands formally, so it cannot realistically choose a strategy of outright refusal. Therefore, the target regime does not risk sanctions and is free to choose its preferred strategy, as the EU would never punish cooperation.

By contrast, if the EU and the target regime have conflicting preferences over outcome, the former strongly preferring implementation and the latter not, a relationship of asymmetric interdependence, i.e. dependence, is likely to have an impact on the outcome of interaction. It affects the actors’ respective (capacity and thus) inclination to challenge the other, shaping both actors’ preferences over strategies (feasibility and strength of refusal and insistence). In general, the more symmetric interdependence between the two actors is, the weaker is its effect, whereas highly asymmetric interdependence puts the less dependent actor into a position of strength, allowing it to shape interaction in its favour. If the EU is highly dependent on the target regime, a strategy of insistence might be too costly so that the EU abstains from inflicting additional costs on the regime and chooses a less contentious strategy. The target regime, in turn, can back its own strategy of reluctant cooperation or defection with the threat of creating costs for the EU should it try to push the regime towards more

cooperation. The expected outcome should then be ‘bad’ or ‘no’ implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. Conversely, if the target regime is highly dependent on the EU, the situation turns around, giving the EU some leverage to insist on the target regime’s at least reluctant cooperation, most likely leading to an outcome of difficult implementation.

Figure 3.10: Configurations of interdependence

Conflict of preferences over outcome: EU prefers implementation, target regime does not		<i>EU's dependence on target regime</i>	
		High	Low
<i>Target regime's dependence on EU</i>	High	symmetry = no impact	insistence for EU not costly and defection for target regime costly → difficult implementation
	Low	insistence for EU costly and defection for target regime not costly → bad or no implementation	symmetry = no impact

Assuming a fundamental difference in the preferences over outcomes regarding the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, asymmetries in interdependence favouring the EU should improve implementation, whereas asymmetries in interdependence favouring the target country should make implementation less likely and more difficult. Taking the effect of political liberalisation and statehood on the formation of preferences over outcomes of both actors in count, the picture is slightly modified, resulting in two alternative hypotheses.

H_{6a} Interdependence: The more interdependence favours the EU, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

H_{6b} Interaction & Interdependence: The more interdependence favours the EU and the higher the degrees of political liberalisation and statehood, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime and the lower the degree of political liberalisation and statehood, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

3.4.7. Role of unilateral instruments for democracy promotion

When looking into cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners on the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, it is necessary to consider the EU's use of other instruments for democracy promotion, drawing on different logics of influence, namely coercion and incentives.

In the case of the EU, coercive democracy promotion is not an option, as the EU does not possess the means for military interventions aiming at regime change. Under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), there are a few missions that are linked to objectives of democracy promotion.²⁷ Most of them are civilian, falling into the category of capacity building instead of coercion, as e.g. the civilian rule of law missions EULEX Kosovo (since 2008), EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia, 2004-2005), and EUJUST LEX (Iraq, since 2006). Only in the case of the Congolese elections scheduled for 2006, the EU deployed a military ESDP mission directly linked to the democratic process in a third country. EUFOR DR Congo (2006) supported the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-2010) in helping to stabilise the country to allow for the peaceful conduct of elections.²⁸ During the election period, it was flanked by a civilian police mission (EUPOL Kinshasa, 2005-2006, and EUPOL DR Congo, since 2007).²⁹ Even the EUFOR DR Congo mission does not really qualify as a coercive instrument for democracy promotion, as it was never intended to bring about democratisation against the will of the target regime, but rather to help the regime in creating the basic conditions for the domestically driven political process of democratisation.

²⁷ For an overview of the EU's civil and military missions under the CSDP, see Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009 and Council of the EU: EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>, 10.01.2010.

²⁸ On the EU's mission see Council of the EU: EUFOR RD Congo, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1091&lang=fr>, 31.08.2010; on the UN mission see United Nations: MONUC. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/>, 31.08.2010. Since June 2010, the UN mission operates under a new name as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), see United Nations: MONUSCO. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/>, 31.08.2010.

²⁹ On the two EU police missions see Council of the EU: EUPOL Kinshasa (DRC), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=788&lang=en> and EUPOL DR Congo, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1303&lang=en>, 31.08.2010.

By contrast, the EU actively uses incentives as an instrument within its democracy promotion policy (cf. Fierro 2003). By offering incentives as an intentional measure, an actor creates material and immaterial costs and benefits for another actor. Incentives in the context of democracy promotion are usually associated with (positive or negative) political conditionality, linking promises or threats to desired action. However, actors can also reward or punish behaviour without prior announcement. Incentives as a mechanism of influence are at work both in conditionality and in *ad hoc*, reactive measures and diplomatic statements. They are part of the EU's set of instruments for democracy promotion, including institutionalised negative and positive conditionality and less formalised forms of foreign policy making (see chapters 2 and 5).

Unlike the partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion that are the focus of this study, incentives can be applied unilaterally and their application is not the outcome of a process of strategic interaction. They are not an instance of cooperation in international relations and their implementation does not depend on the active engagement of the targeted regime. Still, they are part of the EU's efforts at promoting democracy in third countries and it is necessary to consider their link to and role for the emergence of cooperation in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance.

Formalised, or even legalised, conditionality is an element of the institutional environment as a background condition for the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The regional framework for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation includes the negative conditionality based on the 'essential element' clause of the EMAAs and the positive conditionality underlying the ENP (see 3.4.1.). It only varies over time but not between countries and thus creates the same 'shadow' of conditionality for all Mediterranean Partners. In contrast, the EU's active use of incentives is a country-specific factor that needs to be considered in accounting for the emergence of cooperation in the field of democracy promotion. This concerns the application of conditionality as well as *ad hoc* sanctions and rewards, e.g. public statements condemning certain behaviour ('naming and shaming') as well as material sanctions under the CSDP. There are several ways in which the use of incentives by the EU could be related to the process of interaction sketched above.

In fact, the use of unilateral and partnership-based instruments is likely to have reciprocal effects. This presupposes that either actor establishes a link between the different instruments, assuming that the application of the former is conditional on the implementation of the latter. The EU can establish this link either explicitly or implicitly at the programmatic or operational level, but even if it does not, the target regime's expectation of the EU's behaviour can create the link. On the one hand, the application of unilateral instruments then shapes the cost-benefit calculation for the target regime, regarding the costs of defection and the benefits of cooperation. On the other hand, the quality of the implementation of partnership-based instruments shapes the EU's preferences over strategy regarding the application of unilateral instruments. In addition, both processes of decision-making are subject to the influence of a similar set of factors, shaping the actors' preferences regarding unilateral action and cooperation. Therefore, this section discusses under which conditions the EU is likely to use what kind of incentives and their effect on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance.

Even though the EU can unilaterally decide on the use of incentives, its decision is embedded in strategic consideration regarding potential reactions of the targeted regime and repercussions for the EU. These are similar to the preference formation regarding cooperation and the implementation of partnership-based instruments. First of all, the EU's overall objective to further democracy, human rights, and the rule of law might be compromised by other 'interests', if the intended outcome, i.e. democratisation, creates other costs, e.g. destabilisation. As elaborated above, the degree of political liberalisation and statehood in the target regime are expected to change this cost-benefit calculation. A higher degree of political liberalisation and statehood decreases the risk of adverse effects. This can potentially create a dilemma for the EU: The stronger the need for democratisation, the higher the potential costs of destabilisation for the external actor. In a second step, the EU's choice of action is based on its preference over outcome and strategic considerations regarding the potential costs and benefits of the available strategies. There is a clear difference between the use of positive and negative incentives: The former do not carry any risks of 'retaliation' for the EU and should only be used in a context favouring cooperation. By contrast, negative incentives are more likely to create some sort of conflict with the targeted regime, creating additional costs. Furthermore, the need for sanctions is most likely seen in a situation where the EU's strong emphasis on cooperation is confronted with

a diverging preference over outcome by the targeted regime tending towards refusal. The likelihood and extent of potential costs varies with the configuration of interdependence between the EU and the target regime, making the two actors more or less vulnerable to each other's actions.

While there is not necessarily a direct link between the application of unilateral instruments and the implementation of partnership-based instruments in the form of explicit conditionality, actors are likely to perceive both outcomes as closely connected and to include them in their respective choices of action. Therefore, any unilateral and cooperative measures taken are expected to reciprocally affect the underlying decision-making processes. While this mutual influence constitutes a circular argument, it can be broken down sequentially for a better understanding and empirical investigation. On the one hand, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance might influence the EU's choice (decision?) to apply unilateral instruments. This is the case if the EU makes sanctions or rewards conditional on the quality of implementation of partnership-based instruments or if the EU effectively responds to it. Thus, the EU could reward particularly smooth and intensive implementation or punish difficult implementation if it perceives the target regime as responsible for the outcome of interaction. On the other hand, setting incentives, the EU manipulates the cost-benefit calculation of the target regime, potentially changing the latter's preference over strategy regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. Sanctions increase the costs of reluctant or no cooperation whereas rewards increase the benefits of implementation.

Taken together, these considerations translate into two sets of hypotheses, one on the conditions under which the EU applies unilateral instruments and in what way and the other on their impact on the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

H_{7a} Use of Incentives: The EU is more likely to apply unilateral instruments for democracy promotion if the degree of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country is high. In this case the EU is more likely to

- a) grant rewards if the target regime willingly cooperates or if the target regime is reluctant and the EU is dependent on the target regime, and
- b) apply sanctions if the target regime is reluctant and if the EU is not dependent on the target regime.

H_{7b} Effect of Incentives: If the EU applies unilateral instruments, implementation is likely to get better.

3.5. Summary

Framing the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion as an instance of (international) cooperation (see 3.1.), this chapter has turned to approaches to IR theories in order to account for variation in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations (see 3.2.). It has elaborated a causal model of strategic interaction between the EU (external actor) and the Mediterranean partners (targets) that leads to the implementation (or not) of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion (see 3.3.). Based on the assumption of fixed underlying interests in organisational survival, autonomy, and growth, rationalist cost-benefit calculations determine actors' preferences over outcomes (implementation/no implementation) and strategies (cooperation/defection). This process is shaped by a range of factors that allow developing hypotheses on the emergence and quality of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance (see 3.4.), which are summarised in table 3.2 below. In the following chapter, the research design of the empirical investigation of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Table 3.2: Hypotheses on the implementation of partnership-based instruments

<i>H₁ Institutional Environment</i>	The higher the degree of institutionalisation, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.
<i>H₂ Lock-in Effect</i>	If partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are already being implemented, then further cooperation is more likely.
<i>H₃ Political Liberalisation</i>	The higher the degree of political liberalisation in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.
<i>H₄ Statehood</i>	The higher the degree of statehood in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.
<i>H₅ Interaction</i>	The higher the degree of political liberalisation, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, reinforced by a high and nuanced by a low degree of statehood.
<i>H_{6a} Interdependence</i>	The more interdependence favours the EU, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.
<i>H_{6b} Interaction & Interdependence</i>	The more interdependence favours the EU and the higher the degrees of political liberalisation and statehood, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime and the lower the degree of political liberalisation and statehood, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.
<i>H_{7a} Use of incentives</i>	The EU is more likely to apply unilateral instruments for democracy promotion if the degree of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country is high. In this case the EU is more likely to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> c) grant rewards if the target regime willingly cooperates or if the target regime is reluctant and the EU is dependent on the target regime, and d) apply sanctions if the target regime is reluctant and if the EU is not dependent on the target regime.
<i>H_{7b} Effect of incentives</i>	If the EU applies unilateral instruments, implementation is likely to get better.

4. Research design

The second part of this thesis (chapters 5-8) empirically investigates how and under which conditions political dialogue and democracy assistance have been implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s. Focusing on the EU as the external actor and on seven Mediterranean partners as the targets of international democracy promotion efforts, the implementation of these partnership-based instruments as the dependent variable is conceived as the outcome of a process of interaction. This chapter first elaborates on the nature of the research design and the comparative case study approach chosen. It then discusses the case selection. Finally, it operationalises the dependent and independent variables to provide an analytical framework for the empirical investigation and outlines the relevant data sources.

4.1. *Comparison and methodology*

In designing the empirical analysis, this thesis is bound to the logic of comparison, aiming at causal inferences.³⁰ In seeking answers to the research question of how and under which conditions the partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are implemented, the thesis follows both a deductive and a more inductive approach (George and Bennett 2005: 234, 244, van Evera 1996). It relies on comparative case studies and the triangulation of several qualitative research methods.³¹ As it starts from the observation of substantial variation in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance over time and across countries, which cannot be accounted for by existing approaches to international democracy promotion, it is rather ‘puzzle-’ or ‘problem-’ than ‘theory-’ or ‘method-driven’ (see Shapiro 2002). To deal with the ‘fundamental trade-off between the respective virtues of complexity and generalisation’ (Peters 1998: 5, see also George and Bennett 2005: 247) of different types of comparative analysis, the research design combines a more variable-oriented (or rather: inspired) with a more case-oriented empirical analysis (Ragin

³⁰ On the logic of comparison, see the classic text by Lijphart 1971, and Peters 1998 for a more recent overview. Regarding the possibility and limits of causal inference in qualitative research see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, and on the role of ‘KKV’ for shaping research in political science Brady and Collier 2004, Mahoney 2010.

³¹ On the design and use of comparative case studies in political science, see Gerring 2007 and Yin 2008, and in international relations more specifically, see Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004 and Bennett and Elman 2007. On qualitative research methods in social sciences, see Bryman 2001, Lauth and Winkler 2002, Marsh and Stoker 2002, and on their triangulation e.g. Pickel 2009, also Mahoney 2007.

2004). It complements the deductive, macro qualitative approach of chapters 6 and 7 with inductive comparative, in-depth case studies in chapter 8. So, while chapters 6 and 7 search for a systematic relationship between the dependent variable and the potential explanatory factors, the analysis in chapter 8 is more concerned with tracing causal mechanisms and accounting for an outlier case, which will result in an inductive refinement of the theoretical approach (George and Bennett 2005: 234, Héritier 2008: 69). As the hypotheses developed in chapter 3 apply established IR theories of international cooperation to a new empirical phenomenon, i.e. external democracy promotion and the implementation of partnership-based instruments, this ‘combination of induction and deduction is useful’ (George and Bennett 2005: 239) to test and further develop the theoretical framework.

In a first step, chapters 6 and 7 empirically test the hypotheses developed in chapter 3 in a ‘structured, focused comparison’ (George and Bennett 2005: 67) of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion by the EU and seven Mediterranean partners. These countries are not a sample that is systematically selected on the dependent or independent variables according to a most similar or most different systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970, also e.g. Peters 1998: 37-41). Rather, they represent the complete population of a certain category of target countries of external democracy promotion within the region.³² Within these seven country cases, the unit of investigation are the two instruments, namely political dialogue and democracy assistance, per year. This increases the number of observations on the dependent variable and allows a systematic comparison both across countries and over time. To reduce complexity and to allow generalisations, the analysis focuses on specific variables, for both the dependent and the independent variables, instead of providing a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) of the seven cases at hand. The analysis is thus ‘*X₁/Y-centered*, for it connects a particular cause with a particular outcome’ (Gerring 2007: 71), testing hypotheses about causal relationships, but it does not presuppose monocausal or deterministic explanations, expecting interaction effects between the independent variables.³³ While the analysis clearly draws on a

³² The specific case selection is discussed in section 4.2.

³³ ‘Note that to pursue an *X₁/Y-centered* analysis does not imply that the writer is attempting to prove or disprove a monocausal or deterministic argument. The presumed causal relationship between *X₁* and *Y* may be of any sort. *X₁* may explain only a small amount of variation in *Y*. The *X₁/Y* relationship may be probabilistic. *X₁* may refer either to a single variable or to a vector of causal factors. This vector may be an interrelationship (e.g., an interaction term). The only distinguishing feature of *X₁/Y-centered* analysis is that a specific causal factor(s), a specific out-

comparative as opposed to a statistical or experimental method, it is inspired by a variable-oriented approach (Della Porta 2008: 200-201) and seeks to find ‘concomitant variation’ (Peters 1998: 29, Della Porta 2008: 204) as the basis of causal inferences. For the dependent variable, the analysis relies on qualitative methods for data mining, especially document analysis and semi-structured expert and elite interviews.³⁴ For the independent variables, in particular the country-specific factors, the analysis draws on existing, macro-level indices.³⁵

In a second step, based on the findings of chapter 7, chapter 8 investigates more closely the process of interaction in two in-depth, comparative case studies. The process tracing approach is a positivist interpretation, where ‘the emphasis is on causality, deduction and causal mechanisms’ (Vennesson 2008: 232, see also George and Bennett 2005), and which allows for more complexity and the identification of the causal mechanisms at work to refine the theoretical argument inductively. Depending on the initial findings, the chapter seeks to substantiate claims of causality supported in chapter 7 and potentially to explain deviant cases (Della Porta 2008: 210). The ultimate case selection needs to consider findings on the overall explanatory power of the different factors and the specific constellation in each country to decide whether the comparison can follow a *most similar* or *most different* systems design and in how far it needs to pay special attention to seeming outlier cases. Again, the analysis relies on qualitative methods such as document analysis and, to a larger extent, qualitative elite interviews as well as country expertise concentrated in area studies.

In fact, both parts of the empirical analysis follow the logic of ‘structured, focused comparison’ (George and Bennett 2005: 67) of a small number of cases:

The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The method is ‘structured’ in that the research writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked

come, and some pattern of association between the two are stipulated. Thus, X_1/Y -centered analysis presumes a particular hypothesis – a proposition.’ (Gerring 2007: 71-72)

³⁴ 26 semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with 27 individuals between 2007 and 2009. Interview partners included officials from different services of the European Commission (Directorate-General External Relations, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, and Delegations to Morocco and Tunisia) and the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, members of the European Parliament, as well as officials of the permanent representations of EU member states, Morocco, and Tunisia to the European Union. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, confidentiality was guaranteed to all interview partners. An anonymous list of the interviews conducted is provided in annex 4. For similar problems with confidentiality see e.g. Powel 2009a.

³⁵ The operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables is specified in section 4.3.

of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is ‘focused’ in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. (George and Bennett 2005*ibid.*: 67)

However, the two analyses resemble different types of comparative studies. While chapter 8 is a classical example of ‘[a]nalyse of similar processes and institutions in a limited number of countries, selected (one expects) for analytic reasons’ (Peters 1998: 10), chapter 6 and 7 borrow more characteristics from ‘[s]tatistical or descriptive analyses of data from a subset of the world’s countries, usually selected on geographical or developmental grounds, testing some hypothesis about the relationship of variables within that ‘sample’ of countries’ (Peters 1998: 10). While the empirical investigation clearly remains in the qualitative comparative realm, the research design resembles a ‘nested analysis’ suggested for mixed-method approaches (see Lieberman 2005).

4.2. Case selection

The topic of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean has gained much popularity over the last 15 years. Interest in the EU as the external actor in international democracy promotion efforts stems from the apparent success of EU enlargement as an effective strategy of external democratisation (Whitehead 1996a, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) and the ongoing debates about the EU’s role and ‘nature’ as an international actor in terms of ‘civil’ or ‘normative’ power.³⁶ The EU’s Mediterranean policy has always been part of the research agenda on the EU as an international actor (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, Pierros, Meunier, and Abrams 1999, Schumacher 2005). The interest in democracy promotion in this region has greatly increased with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, with scholars often focusing on the United States and the EU as two major actors (Carothers and Ottaway 2005, Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009). In addition, the clear geographical and political limits to further EU enlargements have lead European Integration scholars to extend their research agenda ‘beyond’ enlargement and in particular to the immediate ‘neighbourhood’ of the EU (cf. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008, Emerson and Youngs 2009). In sum, while the academic interest in the topic as such is well estab-

³⁶ On the original notion of ‘normative power’ see Manners 2002, for a broader discussion of the EU’s ‘power’ see Manners 2006, Maull 2005, Smith 2005, and Sjursen 2006b, 2006a,

lished, it is necessary to discuss the case selection within the region in view of its potential for generalisation regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments and international democracy promotion. Of course, when making inferences from the experience of EU democracy promotion, it has to be kept in mind that the EU differs from the model of the nation state as the traditional and still dominant actor in international relations. Nevertheless, the analytical framework for both the dependent and independent variables can be applied to any actors in international relations that engage in processes of cooperation to implement partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

As pointed out earlier, the present thesis analyses in a first step the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. EU democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean are confronted with a particularly challenging situation, as many Mediterranean countries are characterised by a specific combination of authoritarianism and ‘strong’ statehood, which differs from most other regions except maybe Central Asia (Schlumberger 2008: 46-50). The remarkable resistance to previous waves of democratisation (Huntington 1991) and the overall stability or durability of these ‘hybrid’ regimes, laying claim to being democracies that they are not according to international standards, have been highlighted.³⁷ This makes Mediterranean countries simultaneously one of the greatest challenges to and least likely cases for effective external democracy promotion, as it is not clear why these regimes should choose to cooperate in the implementation of partnership-based instruments.

Among the twelve original Mediterranean partners of the EMP, the seven countries selected for this study match the criteria of authoritarianism and strong statehood. This leaves aside Malta and Cyprus, Turkey, as well as Israel and Palestine. While the Palestinian Authority is treated as a Mediterranean partner, the West Bank and Gaza Strip do not constitute a Palestinian state yet. The other four countries, by contrast, all qualify as liberal democracies. In addition, Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey have never been fully integrated into the Euro-Mediterranean framework for cooperation (EMAA, MEDA) due to their status as (potential) accession candidates, with Malta and Cyprus joining the EU in 2004 and Turkey opening accession negotiations in

³⁷ Cf. UNDP 2005; Anderson 2006; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Morisse-Schilbach 2007; Brumberg 2002; Ottaway 2003; Carothers 2000.

2005. The case selection also excludes Libya, which would fit into the picture, but due to the United Nations (UN) sanctions imposed on it since 1992 has been isolated for more than 10 years and is at the time being still excluded from the EU's Mediterranean policy framework. A normalisation of relations with the EU and its member states has begun in 2003, but Libya is still not integrated into the institutional framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations.³⁸ Therefore, the EU's institutional provisions for the implementation of democracy assistance and political dialogue are not applicable to Libya. While the focus on regime type and statehood suggests a selection of the seven cases on the basis of two independent variables, the empirical analysis covers the complete population of these strong, authoritarian regimes. It remains an empirical question in how far variation of the two independent variables within this range shapes the process and outcome of cooperation. Insights from the empirical analysis are therefore most immediately applicable to international democracy promotion vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes, but can be extended to the general role of political liberalisation and statehood.

The thesis investigates Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the field of democracy promotion over a period of almost 20 years, from 1990-2008. The EU's general democracy promotion policy has developed since the late 1980s, and its ambition to promote democracy in the Mediterranean region dates back to the early 1990s. The thesis therefore starts the analysis at this early date before the creation of the EMP policy framework in 1995. It can thus fully cover the evolution of cooperation and the variation in the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion by the EU and the seven selected Mediterranean Partners over time. The time frame includes various changes in the EU's policy framework, especially the EMP and ENP. The end of 2008 was chosen as the cut-off date for two reasons, one being that the UMed, launched in July and specified in late 2008, has modified the regional framework for cooperation yet another time, the other resulting from pragmatic considerations regarding the availability of data.

The specific case selection for the second part of the empirical investigation in chapter 8 depends on the initial findings from chapter 7. To allow an in-depth comparison, the analysis will be limited to two comparative case-studies. These two cases are selected at the end of chapter 7 according to the logic most appropriate to comple-

³⁸ See e.g. the European Commission's press release IP/08/1687 on 'EU-Libya: negotiations on future Framework Agreement start' from 12 November 2008.

menting the macro-qualitative comparison. Looking into the process of interaction itself and tracing causal mechanisms, these case studies focus on a shorter period of time. While the empirical findings of the regional comparison meet the theoretical expectations for most of the cases, Tunisia resists any interpretation in line with the initial hypotheses and challenges in particular the role of statehood and interdependence. To shed light on the interaction between political liberalisation and statehood and more generally on the causal mechanisms underlying the three factors, chapter 8 therefore compares Morocco and Tunisia. In both cases, asymmetries in interdependence strongly favour the EU and given medium to high levels of political liberalisation and statehood, both countries are most likely cases for smooth cooperation on democracy promotion. This expectation is met for Morocco, the regional ‘showcase’ in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance, with a relatively high level of political liberalisation and a medium degree of statehood. As regards Tunisia, by contrast, the medium level of political liberalisation and the high degree of statehood go hand in hand with extremely difficult cooperation, making Tunisia the clear outlier in the region.

4.3. Analytical framework

This section operationalises the analytical frameworks for systematically mapping a) the institutional framework for cooperation on democracy and human rights in Euro-Mediterranean relations, providing the necessary context for mapping and assessing measures of democracy promotion, b) the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as the dependent variable, and c) the different explanatory factors identified in chapter 3, in particular the institutional environment, political liberalisation, statehood, interdependence, and the EU’s use of incentives as unilateral instruments of democracy promotion.

4.3.1. The framework for cooperation

To provide the empirical background to the analysis of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance itself, chapter 5 will map in more detail the EU’s Mediterranean democracy promotion policy and the framework for cooperation on democracy and human rights it establishes. Focusing at this point on the concep-

tual design of the EU's policy, the main sources are policy documents, such as Commission communications and Council conclusions, but also legally binding provisions, e.g. in the form of Council regulations for financial instruments. In addition, the policy documents and declarations published in the context of the EMP, e.g. declarations made at the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Foreign Ministers, further highlight the truly Euro-Mediterranean character of this framework for cooperation. The analysis distinguishes between strategic provisions or guidelines for action, on the one hand, and instruments as the institutional provisions for taking action, on the other hand. These two dimensions can be more or less developed and do not necessarily correspond to each other.

At the strategic level, the first step towards a policy (as opposed to *ad hoc* measures) is a *commitment* to democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective. This can be made openly or it can be implied in general statements on the importance of further democracy and human rights. Furthermore, it makes a difference whether the commitment is a political statement or legally binding. Second, the *objectives* pursued in external democracy promotion specify the results the external actor aims at and the kind of changes he pursues. Either explicitly or implicitly, these draw on models of democracy and democratisation and related concepts. Finally, the external actor can specify criteria or guidelines for the implementation of its policy and specific instruments. These can reflect different *approaches* to democracy promotion, e.g. a 'positive' or 'cooperative' as opposed to a 'negative' or 'conflictive' approach. He can either link the use of instruments to specific conditions in the target country ('differentiation') or prescribe a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. These dimensions are all relevant in order to assess the general context of cooperation that aims at the implementation of partnership-based instruments such as political dialogue and democracy assistance.

Instruments are more generally the institutional basis for measures of democracy promotion. These can be general foreign policy provisions that allow 'ad hoc' democracy promotion measures or provisions specifically aimed at promoting democracy. Instruments can be characterised by the logics of influence they draw on as well as the actors and issues they address (see chapter 2). The logics or *mechanisms* of influence range from coercion, as the use of force, to incentives, manipulating the cost-benefit calculations with sanctions or rewards, to persuasion and capacity-

building. In the field of democracy promotion, they commonly but not solely find their expression in political conditionality, political dialogue, and democracy assistance. With these instruments, the external actor can address different actors within the target country. State-actors can come from the Executive (government, ministries, or administration), the Legislature (parliament), and the Judiciary at the different levels of the political system (national, sub-national, i.e. regional and local). Non-state actors are usually corporate actors involved in politics (e.g. political parties), civil society (e.g. non-governmental organisations), or business. For this thesis the distinction of partnership-based instruments is crucial: These actors can be the *targets* of unilateral measures, e.g. if the external actor sets incentives to prompt the compliance of the national government with certain norms or rules (conditionality), or they can be *partners* in implementing measures. The logics of persuasion and capacity-building are more open to the idea of partnership than coercion or incentives, but even attempts at persuasion, e.g. in the form of propaganda or ‘public diplomacy’ (Roberts 2006), can be one-sided measures that do not need the active engagement of the target. Finally, it is important to grasp the content conveyed by these instruments in relation to overall policy objectives, comparing the areas or sectors of intervention and the intended results.

The mapping of this overall framework for cooperation in chapter 5 prepares the further analysis in several ways: It identifies the institutional provisions that are the basis for mapping specific instances of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion in chapter 6. It also provides the context necessary to assess the EU’s strategy of cooperation as well as the evolution of the institutional environment and the EU’s use of unilateral instruments for democracy promotion as explanatory factors in chapter 7.

4.3.2. Cooperation: Implementation of partnership-based instruments

Following the request that ‘researchers should give as much thought to differentiation of the dependent variable in deductive theories as they do to that of the independent variables’ (George and Bennett 2005: 247), this section further operationalises the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. Based on common knowledge about the EU’s Mediterranean democracy promotion

policy (see chapter 2), the focus is more specifically on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as instances of international cooperation (see chapter 3). While the basic distinction of possible values is between ‘no implementation’ and ‘implementation’, ‘implementation’ is understood as a continuum ranging from ‘good’ to ‘medium’ to ‘bad’. This overall quality of implementation is measured by a range of indicators to capture variation, e.g. in the intensity (low vs. high), scope (selective vs. comprehensive), content (formal vs. meaningful), and timing (early vs. late). Chapter 6 separately maps and codes the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. This section outlines the indicators for the mapping and coding of both instruments for each unit (country/year) and specifies how they are aggregated to allow overall assessments for each instrument and country, per year and over time.

Political dialogue

The bilateral EMAAs provide the basis for formalised political dialogue in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The fora for political dialogue are the Association Council meetings and any technical subcommittees created for this purpose. Basically, the mapping assesses for each country the institutionalisation (yes/no, timing: quick, medium, late), formal aspects of the conduct (good, medium, bad), and the content (good, medium, bad) of political dialogue.

The analysis draws first of all on Association Council documents, provided in the Council register or the EU’s Official Journal, including agendas, minutes, and statements surrounding meetings as well as formal decisions and recommendations. In addition, other EU documents are analysed to gain further insight into the conduct of political liberalisation, in particular the EU Human Rights Reports (2000-2008, covering 1998/1999-2007/2008) and country specific ENP Country Reports (CR, 2004, 2005), ENP Progress Reports (PR, 2006, 2008, 2009), MEDA and ENPI Country Strategy Papers (CSP, 2002-2006, 2007-2013), as well as MEDA and ENPI National Indicative Programmes (NIP, 2002-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2010). This document analysis is triangulated with additional information from expert interviews and other sources, e.g. studies on democracy promotion or reports by non-governmental organisations.

Concerning political dialogue, the EU has a highly standardised approach, trying to set up the same institutional framework in every country. While the actual content,

and thus its value as a form of persuasion and social learning, is difficult to discern, this focus on standardisation allows considering some formal aspects of the implementation and especially the set-up of human rights subcommittees. The assessment is not done according to ‘objective standards’, but comparatively, against the regional average, so that the standard for evaluation can change over time.

Figure 4.1: Mapping and coding the implementation of political dialogue

<p>Is formal political dialogue institutionalised (and operational)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - entry into force of EMAA, first Association Council meeting: yes/no, delay (meeting vs. EMAA) - decision to create human rights subcommittee, first human rights subcommittee meeting: yes/no, delay (meeting vs. decision vs. EMAA or 2003) <p>Is formal political dialogue conducted?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Association Council meetings: yes/no, when - Human rights subcommittee meetings: yes/no, when <p>What does formal political dialogue look like?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal aspects regarding Association Council meetings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o intervals between meetings o documentation o agenda o (level of participants) - Role of human rights and democracy in Association Council meetings (content) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o minutes: treatment of human rights and democracy in general, topics of formalised political dialogue o EU comments on political dialogue in statements and other documents - Human rights subcommittee <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o set-up (in comparison to other subcommittees) o intervals between meetings (before/after 2007)

Democracy assistance

Since the early 1990s, the EU has established several generations of programmes designed to promote democracy (‘horizontal’ programmes) or covering the objective of democracy promotion (‘geographical’ programmes). Since 1990/1991, the European Commission diverged funds from various budget headings for promoting democracy. The first proper horizontal programme for the Mediterranean was the MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) established in 1995 and operational between 1995/96 and 1998/99. It merged into the global programmes for the European EIDHR in 2000-2006 and the new EIDHR Instrument in 2007-2008. These programmes target non-state actors. The geographical programmes for external coopera-

tion with the Mediterranean, MEDA I (1995/96-1999) and MEDA II (2000-2006), and the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI, 2007-2008) also allow for implementing democracy assistance projects with Mediterranean partners, mostly but not exclusively state actors.

Again, the mapping assesses the institutionalisation (yes/no), the commitment of projects regarding funding level (high, medium, low) and content (good, medium, bad), and the actual implementation of projects (good, medium, bad). Especially for the horizontal programmes, values have to be aggregated for specific funding periods or programmes and not on a country/year basis.

The data is compiled from EU Human Rights Reports (2000-2008, covering 1998/1999-2007/2008), EC External Assistance Reports (2002-2009, covering 2001-2008), EC MEDA Reports (1998-2001, covering 1996-2000), EC EIDHR Reports (1992-1996, covering 1992-1996, and 1995-2001, covering 1994-2000), some external evaluations, e.g. for the MDP (Karkutli and Bützler 1999), MEDA and ENPI Country Strategy Paper (CSP, 2002-2006, 2007-2013), MEDA and ENPI National Indicative Programme (NIP, 2002-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2010), EIDHR programming documents (2001, 2002-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2010) and annual work/action programmes (2004-2008), several EIDHR compendia and project lists (covering ca. 2000-2008), ENP Country Reports (CR, 2004, 2005), and ENP Progress Reports (PR, 2006, 2008, 2009). Again, this document analysis is triangulated with additional information from expert interviews and other sources, e.g. studies on democracy promotion or reports by non-governmental organisations.

Figure 4.2: Mapping and coding the implementation of democracy assistance

<p>Are democracy assistance programmes used?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- appropriation/commitment of funding under respective programmes (yes/no) <p>How much funding is committed for democracy assistance?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- total funding (for trend per country over time)- funding level (high/medium/low)<ul style="list-style-type: none">o absolute level of total funding (high/low)o total funding as share of aid (high/low) <p>What does implementation look like?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- funding for programmes as share of total funding (balanced/biased)- projects<ul style="list-style-type: none">o partner: state/non-state, local/externalo scope, contento actual implementation

4.3.3. Explaining cooperation

Institutional environment

The mapping of the institutional environment as a background condition for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance and the coding of its degree of institutionalisation directly draws on the framework for cooperation mapped in chapter 5 (for operationalisation and sources, see 4.3.1.). The degree of institutionalisation (high/medium/low) is assessed for each country and year regarding general provisions on democracy promotion and provisions more specifically for political dialogue and democracy assistance. The degree of institutionalisation of the overall framework for cooperation is shaped by the nature of the actors' commitment to democracy promotion (unilateral/joint, strength, specificity), the instruments available in the EU's 'tool kit' (number, scope, legal basis, specificity of provisions), and the EU's guidelines on the use of these instruments. Regarding the provisions for the two partnership-based instruments, the first step is to assess their availability to a country at the given time. If institutional provisions exist and create the 'offer' for cooperation, then the degree of institutionalisation is assessed for political dialogue based on the number of fora provided, their legal basis, and their competency for dealing with different topics such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, etc. For democracy assistance, it is assessed with regard to the legal basis (precision,

specificity, scope) of the programmes and the specificity and transparency of the procedures established for their implementation.

Political liberalisation

The degree of political liberalisation in a target country does not necessarily correspond to the degree of democratisation of a regime, but it touches upon central elements of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It denotes the degree of pluralism the regime allows in politics and society. Political liberalisation can go without democracy, but not the other way around. The thesis relies on the Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' index because, despite its acknowledged limitations (Berg-Schlosser 2004, Schlumberger 2008), the indices for 'Political Rights' (PR) and 'Civil Liberties' (CL) capture well the different dimensions of political liberalisation. In addition, data is available for all seven countries on a yearly/annual basis for 1990-2008, thus allowing a detailed comparison over time. The mapping will compare the scores in absolute terms for each country per year and on average for the whole period and assess these scores in relation to the respective regional average (high/medium or average/low). Additional indicators considered to confirm and nuance this assessment are in particular the World Bank World Governance Indicator for 'Voice and Accountability' (VA), available for 1996-2008, but also the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the 'Polity IV' index. The picture is completed by drawing on qualitative assessments of political liberalisation and democratisation in the region.

Statehood

Chapter 3 suggested that statehood has two dimensions, one referring more directly to the regime's effective monopoly on the use of force ('stability') and the other to its (state) capacity to govern effectively ('capacity'). These dimensions are captured by the World Bank World Governance Indicators 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' (PS), on the one hand, and 'Government Effectiveness' (GE), on the other hand. Both indicators are available for all seven countries for 1996-2008. For the early 1990s, there are unfortunately no comparable indices. The degree of statehood, defined as stability and capacity, is again determined in relative terms, comparing individual country scores, per year and on average, to the respective regional average (high, medium, low). Additional indicators for 'stability' include the Conflict Ba-

rometer of the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) with data on state failure, the list of High Casualty Terrorist Bombings (HCTB) of the Center for Systemic Peace, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and for ‘capacity’ other World Bank World Governance Indicators, such as ‘Regulatory Quality’, the ‘Rule of Law’, and the ‘Control of Corruption’, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.

Interdependence

The strength and direction of asymmetries in (socio-economic) interdependence is assessed on the basis of a power-as-resources approach and in terms of relational power, which looks separately at the EU’s dependence on the respective Mediterranean partner and vice versa. Comparing the power resources in terms of their territory, population, gross domestic product (GDP, total and share of world GDP), and trade volume (total and share of world) of the seven Mediterranean partners allows a first assessment of their relative strength vis-à-vis the EU. More importantly, their respective socio-economic dependence shifts the asymmetries in interdependence more or less in favour of one actor or the other (see figure 4.3). The EU’s respective trade dependence is assessed in terms of exports to and energy imports from each Mediterranean partner, drawing on data provided by Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU. The Mediterranean partners’ respective dependence on the EU considers both trade (exports to EU, energy exports) and aid (aid dependence, role of EU as donor) relations. Here, the main sources are Eurostat, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and OECD statistics.

Figure 4.3: Configurations of interdependence

EU dependence on target Target’s dependence on EU	High	Medium	Low
High	Symmetry	Weak asymmetry in favour of EU	Strong asymmetry in favour of EU
Medium	Weak asymmetry in favour of MP	Symmetry	Weak asymmetry in favour of EU
Low	Strong asymmetry in favour of MP	Weak asymmetry in favour of MP	Symmetry

Unilateral instruments for democracy promotion (incentives)

Beyond these country-specific factors, chapter 3 suggested a complex interrelation between the implementation of partnership-based instruments and the EU's use of unilateral instruments for democracy promotion. Given the EU's abstention from coercion in external democracy promotion, the focus is on the use of positive and negative incentives, in particular formalised conditionality, diplomacy, and sanctions in the form of CFSP common positions. Based on the mapping of the framework for cooperation and the instruments available in chapter 5, chapter 7.7. is going to map actual measures implemented by the EU and classify them according to which instrument the EU uses (formalised, legalised or *ad hoc*), if the EU acts proactively (conditionality) or reactively (*démarches*, declarations, etc.), and whether the incentives provided are positive or negative, material (e.g. aid) or immaterial (e.g. reputation). The main sources for information on measures taken are the EU Human Rights Reports (2000-2008, covering 1998/1999-2007/2008), ENP Country Reports (CR, 2004, 2005), ENP Progress Reports (PR, 2006, 2008, 2009), the Bulletin of the EU (1995-2008) and documents provided by the Council of the EU (Council meetings, press releases, CFSP decisions, etc.).

4.4. Outlook

Having established the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological foundations of this thesis, part B now turns to the empirical investigation of how and under which conditions partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations. This chapter provides the analytical frameworks necessary to guide the analysis of the following four chapters: Chapter 5 provides a more detailed overview of the framework for cooperation on democracy promotion since the early 1990s. Chapter 6, then, systematically maps and assesses the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven Mediterranean partners. Chapter 7 investigates the explanatory power of the various factors identified in chapter 3 to account for variation over time and across countries in the emergence and quality of implementation in the context of a strategic interaction approach. Based on the findings of chapter 7, chapter 8 conducts an in-depth comparison of the EU's cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia, respectively, to further develop and refine the theoretical argument.

5. The framework for cooperation: The EU's Mediterranean democracy promotion policy

The purpose of this first empirical chapter is to lay out the framework for cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in the field of democracy promotion. After briefly sketching the background provided by the EU's Mediterranean policy and its general democracy promotion policy, a closer look is taken at the EU's Mediterranean democracy promotion policy which provides the institutional framework for the joint implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. It analyses the EU's strategic provisions (commitment, objectives, and approaches) and the 'tool-kit' at hand, including unilateral and partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, to trace the evolution of the framework from the early 1990s until 2008.

5.1. *The context*

To better understand the EU's Mediterranean democracy promotion policy, this section provides some background information on the general framework for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the evolution of the EU's general democracy promotion policy.

5.1.1. The EU and the Mediterranean

The EU has maintained relations with Mediterranean third countries since the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (Pierros, Meunier, and Abrams 1999). Over the years, the framework for bilateral relations has changed, increasingly reflecting the idea of a consistent and regionally defined 'Mediterranean policy'. With the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), the EU introduced the idea of standardised bilateral cooperation agreements in the early 1970s. Several generations of bilateral Financial Protocols served as the basis for development cooperation since 1976.³⁹ In the light of global changes and regional security challenges, the EU

³⁹ The Financial Protocols covered five years each. The first three generations were concluded under the GMP (1976-1991), a fourth generation continued to finance bilateral development cooperation under the RMP and even the EMP (1992-1996); see Pierros, Meunier, and Abrams 1999 and Schumacher 2005.

launched the Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in the late 1980s to take another step towards a more comprehensive Mediterranean policy framework.⁴⁰

However, already in the early 1990s, the EU and individual member states started several other initiatives to reform Euro-Mediterranean relations. Negotiations within the EU and with Mediterranean third countries resulted in the EMP which up to this day forms the EU's main framework for its relations with Mediterranean countries (Philippart 2003b). It was officially launched with the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 by the EU, its member states and 12 Mediterranean partners as a joint undertaking (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995).⁴¹ Still, the EU has continued to define its own policy in and through the EMP, setting standards for bilateral relations and creating instruments. Until today, the EU is considered the driving force even behind 'joint' policy initiatives within the EMP (Bicchi 2006a; Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005; Fernández and Youngs 2005; Pace 2007). The objective of 'turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity' is pursued in three 'partnerships' (also called baskets or chapters) on 'political and security', 'economic and financial', as well as 'human, social, and cultural' issues (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995).⁴² The EMP includes first of all the Barcelona Process as the multilateral dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Its most prominent feature are the regular Euro-Mediterranean Conferences (EMC) of Foreign Ministers in the wake of the first EMC in Barcelona in November 1995. In addition, it provides a permanent Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process at the level of senior officials and several other fora at governmental and non-governmental levels. This innovative multi-lateral regional approach is complemented by traditionally bilateral, contrac-

⁴⁰ 'However modestly, the new policy differed from its predecessors in three ways: in its emphasis on regional cooperation, in its willingness to fund horizontal development projects beyond the financial protocols (in the fields of transport, telecommunications, audio-visual, energy, the environment, etc.), and in its support of economic reforms to compensate the TMCs [Third Mediterranean Countries] for the negative social effects of structural reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).' (Pierros, Meunier, and Abrams 1999: 126)

⁴¹ Originally, the partnership was formed between the EU and 27 states from North and South of the Mediterranean – 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, there are 25 respectively 27 member states and 10 Mediterranean partners. Libya has obtained the status of observer of the EMP in 1999. The West Balkan countries are not included in the EMP.

⁴² A fourth 'partnership' on Justice and Home Affairs was established 10 years later, when Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers agreed to include a chapter on 'Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security' in the five year programme adopted at the Barcelona Summit (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2005a).

tual relations. Since 1995, most of the older agreements have been replaced by a new generation of EMAA. In 1996, a regional external cooperation programme (MEDA) was created (Council of the EU 1996; Council of the EU 2000c).⁴³ In general, the EMP complemented Euro-Mediterranean relations with a multilateral dimension, broadened the scope of cooperation (sustainable development, holistic approach), and stepped up assistance (Philippart 2003b, Philippart 2003a; Calleya 2005; Volpi 2004).

The EU's strategic vision of its Mediterranean policy was specified in a CFSP Common Strategy on the Mediterranean in 2000 (Council of the EU 2000b; Council of the EU 2004c; cf. Spencer 2001) and in a Strategic Partnership announced by the European Council in 2004 (Council of the EU 2004a). The new ENP launched in 2003/2004 left the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations in place (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005; Emerson 2004; Emerson and Noutcheva 2005). It strengthened the bilateral relations with the introduction of bilaterally agreed Action Plans that set benchmarks for cooperation, complemented with a regular monitoring and reporting mechanism (Country and Progress Reports).⁴⁴ With the new financial perspective for 2007-2013, the EU created the ENPI that integrated MEDA and its equivalent for the Eastern European and Central Asian neighbours (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006a). The latest addition to the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations is the UMed (2008), a new multilateral initiative that builds on the 'Barcelona acquis', but aims at 'reinvigorating' the multilateral and regional dimension of cooperation through a number of institutional and procedural changes, leaving bilateral relations and the EU's unilateral policy frameworks unaffected (cf. Balfour 2009; Bechev and Nicolaidis 2008; Gillespie 2008).⁴⁵ Table 5.1 below provides an overview of the EU's Mediterranean policy frameworks.

⁴³ For an overview of the EC regulations for the various external cooperation programmes, see annex 5.

⁴⁴ See the Commission's Communications European Commission 2003d and European Commission 2004d as well as the corresponding Council conclusions Council of the EU 2003a and Council of the EU 2004a.

⁴⁵ The UMed started as an initiative of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. After major revisions during negotiations with Mediterranean partners and especially within the EU, the UMed was officially launched in July 2008 (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2008b). Amendments to the EMP's multilateral dimension were specified in November 2008 on the occasion of the first Euro-Mediterranean conference of foreign ministers (including a co-presidency, more frequent summits of the head of states, the replacement of the Euromed Committee by a Joint Permanent Committee, and a secretariat in Barcelona) (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2008a). The UMed includes more than the original Mediterranean partners, extending the multilateral dimension to

Table 5.1: The EU's Mediterranean policy framework

Framework or policy	Institutional provisions	Specification
Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP, 1989-1995)	Cooperation Agreements Financial Protocols	
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, since 1995)	Barcelona Process (1995-2008)	Multilateral framework with common institutions, based on the Barcelona Declaration (1995), e.g. Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Foreign Ministers (EMC), Euro-Mediterranean Committee
	Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA)	Bilateral, contractual framework for cooperation
	MEDA I+II (1996-1999, 2000-2006)	EU external cooperation programme
EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean (2000-2006)		EU policy defined by the European Council
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, since 2003)		EU policy defined in Commission Communications and Council Conclusions – complementing the EMP
	Action Plans (since 2005)	Bilaterally agreed framework for 'progress' and cooperation (including objectives, schedules, benchmarks)
	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (since 2007)	EU external cooperation programme
	New neighbourhood agreements (envisaged)	Bilateral, contractual framework for cooperation
Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (since 2004)		EU policy defined by the European Council
The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (UMed, since 2008)		Multilateral framework with common institutions, based on the Barcelona acquis and the Paris declaration (2008) – complementing EMP and ENP

5.1.2. EU (global) democracy promotion

International democracy promotion has been introduced to the EU's foreign policy objectives by the Maastricht treaty (1992/1993). However, the origins of the EU's democracy promotion policy can be traced further back in time. The EU has been from its beginnings a 'community of values', even though the founding treaties of the 1950s did not include any reference to democracy, let alone international democracy promotion. Thus, the so called 'Birkelbach Report' (Birkelbach 1961) confirmed already in the early 1960s that membership in and accession to the three

the Western Balkan (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro), Mauretania, and Libya (as observer).

European Communities was inextricably linked to the values shared by (potential) member states, including democracy and human rights. In the 1970s, the EU imposed sanctions on Uganda because of human rights violations (Börzel and Risse 2004) within its development cooperation with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. In 1986, these values finally found their way into the preamble to the Single European Act (SEA, 1986/1987), where member states committed themselves to ‘promote democracy’ (3rd paragraph) internally and to ‘display the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights’ (5th paragraph) externally to contribute to international peace. In the newly created framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the Council of Ministers reaffirmed its commitment to more actively promote democracy and human rights in international relations (Council of the EU 1986). This declaration was a point of reference for a number of initiatives in 1991 that mark the beginnings of a joint European policy of international democracy promotion, including a political commitment to and the outlines of a policy for international democracy promotion (European Commission 1991; European Council 1991; Council of the EU 1991). It is with the Maastricht treaty revisions (1992/1993) that the idea of active democracy promotion has entered the EU’s legal basis as part of its new external policies. The objective ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ was introduced in the newly created policies of the CFSP (TEU, Article J.1, now 11.1) and Development Cooperation (TEC, Article 130u.2, now 177.2). The Nice treaty revision (2001/2003) finally ascribed the same objective to the then newly created policy on Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (TEC, Article 181a.1).

Despite this legal commitment, ‘International Democracy Promotion’ is not a specific EU or Community policy established by the treaties, but rather a general foreign policy objective to be pursued through the various first and second pillar external policies, such as external trade, enlargement, development and general cooperation (in regional frameworks), and the foreign policy under the (former) second pillar. The EU’s bodies have worked on specifying the implications of this objective since the early 1990s. As early as 1991, the Commission and the Council sketched the overall programmatic outlines of a comprehensive EU democracy promotion policy. The second half of the 1990s has seen a gradual specification of the policy’s framework in a growing number of policy documents with diverse regional and thematic

scope. This ‘patchwork’ of provisions and instruments was consolidated in 2001 as the EU’s policy on ‘human rights and democratisation’ (European Commission 2001c; Council of the EU 2001b). Since then, the agenda has been further developed under the label of ‘democratic governance’ (European Commission 2003e; European Commission 2006f).

Many of the features outlined in the 1991 Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development can still be found in the EU’s policy to promote human rights and democratisation in third countries. Beyond the commitment to ‘further enhance respect for human rights and establishment of representative democratic rule’, the Resolution remained vague on the objectives that should be achieved, but clearly subscribes to a liberal and procedural notion of democracy, highlighting the importance of the rule of law and elections, but also of a pluralist society.⁴⁶ The Resolution clearly stated that ‘a positive and constructive approach should receive priority’, focussing on such instruments as political dialogue (persuasion), financial assistance (capacity-building) and positive conditionality (incentives), and only secondarily drawing on negative conditionality tied to contractual relations. It also highlighted the role of the so-called ‘essential element’ clause that served to enshrine the most basic objectives of EU democracy promotion – the respect for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – in contractual relations with third countries. This clause is the foundation for two of the instruments, political dialogue and (negative) political conditionality. More generally, it serves as a legal basis and source of legitimacy for active EU democracy promotion in its external relations, as it makes traditionally domestic affairs a matter of concern in the implementation of international agreements (European Commission 2001c; Brandtner and Rosas 1998; Eriksen 2006). It originated from the EU’s development cooperation policy, where it was first introduced into the fourth Lomé agreement with the ACP countries in 1989. It then ‘travelled’ to bilateral cooperation and association agreements with other countries (Horng 2003). The wording of the clause was standardised and its inclusion in new agreements with third countries became mandatory in 1995 (European Commission 1995a; Council of the EU 1995).

⁴⁶ In light of the Western European political tradition, it is hardly surprising that the EU and its member states subscribe to a liberal model of democracy, linking the respect for human rights to the rule of law and representative democratic government.

The further development of the EU's democracy promotion policy is characterised more by incrementally refining and extending the initial concept of 1991 than by fundamental reorientations. In this process, the EU has always remained vague on its precise objectives and underlying concepts. The European Commission has only at one point elaborated in more details on the recurring trinity of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (European Commission 1998a).⁴⁷ In addition, the Commission has indirectly specified various aspects of the EU's democracy promotion policy, specifying individual elements such as election assistance (European Commission 2000a) or anti-discrimination (European Commission 1999a), but also relating it to other policies such as conflict prevention (European Commission 1996b; European Commission 2001d). The Council of the EU has furthermore established a set of eight 'guidelines', more narrowly referring to the EU's 'human rights policy' since 1998.⁴⁸ However, with regard to democracy promotion, clear objectives as to what the EU wants to achieve through its policy are not addressed. Thus, the EU does specify neither clear criteria to classify regimes as (non)democratic nor what it might take to (re)establish a democratic regime, e.g. in the sense of regime transformation or change.

Instead, the EU's democracy promotion policy is mainly defined by the instruments created, drawing on three of the four mechanisms of influence (see chapter 2.2): incentives, in the form of positive and negative conditionality, persuasion through political dialogue, and capacity-building through support for state and non-state actors (democracy assistance).⁴⁹ Over time, the Commission and the Council have devel-

⁴⁷ This Communication is placed in the context of the EU's development cooperation policy with Asian, Caribbean and Pacific countries, but itself refers to the objective to promote human rights and democratisation in 'external relations' more generally (European Commission 1998a: 1) and it is cited in the 2001 Communication as one of the reference documents for the policy's development (European Commission 2001c: 3)

⁴⁸ 'Guidelines are legally not binding, but very pragmatic instrument of EU human rights policy. They provide the different EU actors - not only at headquarters, but also in third countries - with elements allowing sustained action in a number of key areas of concern.' (Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008: 26) They include guidelines on Death Penalty (1998/2008), Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (2001/2008), Human Rights dialogues with third countries (2001/2009), Children and armed conflict (2003/2008), Human Rights Defenders (2004/2008), Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child (2007), Violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them (2008), and Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (2005) (cf. General Secretariat of the Council 2009)

⁴⁹ Maybe not surprisingly, the option of coercion has never been considered for EU democracy promotion. This is clearly in line with the discussions on the EU's 'actorness' and 'power' in international relations, including both its self-understanding and its capacities (cf. Sjursen 2006b; Smith 2005). However, there are some EU missions under the European (and now Common) Se-

oped a patchwork of global and regional provisions and specifications for democracy promotion instruments that follow these basic distinctions (European Commission 2001c; Jünemann and Knodt 2006; Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Knodt and Jünemann 2008; Kubicek 2003). However, the specifications contain no clear assumptions on the precise impact of different instruments and potential scope conditions for their success. The EU thus lacks a strategic vision for the application of its instruments beyond the commitment to a ‘positive’ approach (Youngs 2001c; Youngs 2003).

Against this background of the EU’s Mediterranean and general democracy promotion policies, the following sections will now trace the evolution of the EU’s democracy promotion policy as a framework for cooperation with Mediterranean Partners in more detail: When did the EU place active democracy promotion on its Mediterranean agenda? How have the EU’s objectives, instruments, and approaches of democracy promotion vis-à-vis its Mediterranean Partners evolved over time?

5.2. The policy

Turning to the EU’s democracy promotion policy vis-à-vis its Mediterranean partner, this section first analyses the evolution of the EU’s overall strategy over time. The EU’s commitment, objectives, and approaches have not fundamentally changed since the 1990s, but the policy has clearly developed in different stages. The section then pays more attention to the institutional provisions for implementing the EU’s policy, including unilateral and partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

5.2.1. In search of a strategy

According to the European Commission, the EU is committed to promote democracy vis-à-vis Mediterranean countries since 1990 (European Commission 1991: 3). Thus, right from the beginning, the EU has actively pursued its general democracy promotion agenda in the Mediterranean, even though Euro-Mediterranean relations were neither part of the EU’s development cooperation in a narrow sense nor of its emerging pre-accession policy for Central and Eastern European countries (Youngs 2002a). Following its general policy outlined in the 1991 Resolution, it applied global provi-

curity and Defence Policy that could be considered democracy promotion, e.g. the EUFOR RD Congo securing elections or the so-called ‘rule of law’ missions (see chapter 3.4.7.).

sions to Mediterranean countries and integrated them into the regional framework for cooperation. In 1995, matters relating to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law were officially included into Euro-Mediterranean relations. However, it was only in 2000 that the EU made an explicit, open and high-level regional commitment to actively promote democracy vis-à-vis its Mediterranean Partners. At this point, the EU also started to develop a specifically regional strategic vision for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, summarized in a Commission's Communication in 2003 (European Commission 2003c). While the EU's strategy has not much changed in terms of 'content' over time, it definitely has in terms of 'tone', making democracy promotion figure much more prominently in Euro-Mediterranean relations around the year 2000.

Drawing on the global strategy

A European commitment to democracy promotion in the Mediterranean appeared for the first time in the context of a reform of the Mediterranean policy at the beginning of the 1990s. The Commission advanced the 'conclusions of the Council meeting of 19 December 1990 on a restructured Mediterranean policy, containing a declaration on observance of human rights and the fostering of democratic values' (European Commission 1991: 3) as one of the early points of reference for a general democracy promotion policy. While the EU did not repeat this commitment more prominently or devise a Mediterranean democracy promotion strategy, it included Mediterranean countries in the implementation of the 1991 Resolution. Thus, Mediterranean countries were included in the Commission's first attempts at democracy assistance, which were later formalised as the EIDHR. In addition, the EU introduced the so-called 'essential element' clause to Euro-Mediterranean relations in the early 1990s. In line with the EU's general democracy promotion policy (European Commission 1995a), it was introduced into the negotiations of the new generation of bilateral agreements that became the EMAA.⁵⁰ Article 2 of all EMAA contains the clause that 'respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights (...) constitutes an

⁵⁰ Thus, the EU had already introduced this feature into its Mediterranean policy before the more prominent and mutual commitment to democracy in the Barcelona Declaration was made. The negotiations for the new generation of association agreements had already started under the auspices of the 'new' Mediterranean policy at the beginning of the 1990s and were concluded for a few countries before the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference had taken place. A country-specific comparison of the EMAA provisions is easily feasible thanks to an Implementation Guide prepared by the Commission, providing a synopsis of all the provisions (European Commission 2004e). The text of the Syrian EMAA has unfortunately not yet been published.

essential element of this Agreement'. There are only minor differences in the wording, concerning the order of 'democracy' and 'human rights', the attribute 'fundamental' to 'human rights' and the inclusion of a reference to the Universal Declaration of Human rights. Also in the Mediterranean, two of the EU's democracy promotion instruments – political dialogue and (negative) democratic conditionality – explicitly build on this clause (Bartels 2004). Apart from bilateral contractual relations, it was also introduced into the EU's regional external cooperation programmes, namely MEDA in 1995 and ENPI in 2007.

It was in 1995 that democracy, human rights, and the rule of law gained a more prominent place in Euro-Mediterranean relations with the launch of the EMP and the introduction of a political dimension into the traditional economic cooperation. The Barcelona Declaration (1995) included a commitment from all (Mediterranean) partners to respect and promote these issues, and several instruments for EU democracy promotion were institutionalised (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995).

Up to the present day, the Barcelona Declaration (1995) is seen as the major point of reference for anything related to democracy and human rights in Euro-Mediterranean relations, including EU activities of democracy promotion (cf. European Commission 2003c). However, it did not contain any open commitment to active, external democracy promotion. The preamble spelled out a number of 'aspects' necessary to achieve the overall goal of the partnership, i.e. the creation of 'an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity' (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995). Among those 'essential aspects of partnership', the 'strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights' ranked first (ibid.). This joint commitment to democracy was strengthened in the political and security chapter of the partnership, which included references to human rights and democracy. Nevertheless, the partners' 'declaration of principles to (...) develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems' was nuanced by the addition 'while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system' (ibid.). Further ambivalence was introduced through the reference to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: On the one hand, these include respect for 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' and the 'diversity and pluralism in their societies' (ibid.). On the other hand, the principles of sovereignty of nation states and

of non-intervention are stressed. The possibility of external democracy promotion is not mentioned and it is unclear whether it is legitimised or rather ruled out. Adding to this uncertainty, the Barcelona Declaration did not provide further clarification of the concept of democracy, nor did it assess the 'state' of the partners' regimes or address potentially necessary changes. Even if the Barcelona Declaration remains more than vague on the content of a potential democracy promotion policy, it included institutional provisions for active democracy promotion. Thus, in the political and security chapter, a 'political dialogue' was institutionalised. In addition, the partners agreed in the third chapter *inter alia* to 'encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society', opening a window of opportunity for active democracy assistance. However, this provision is not linked to the financial assistance included in the second chapter.

Thus, while the EU did not set out a specific Mediterranean democracy promotion policy at the beginning of the 1990s, it tacitly applied its global provisions to Mediterranean countries and incorporated them into the regional framework for cooperation evolving with the EMP. The EU subscribed to its general notion of liberal democracy, without clearly specifying criteria for regime classification, and a global pursuit of respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights in a 'positive' approach, without any strategic differentiation regarding the context of regimes and changes necessary to achieve that goal. This general approach, broken down to the regional level, made no distinction between countries in the region, or distinguished between the Mediterranean and other regions, for that matter, and thus applied uniformly to all Mediterranean partners.

Developing a Mediterranean strategy

A strong political commitment by the EU to promote democracy vis-à-vis the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries was finally made in 2000 in the EU's Common Strategy for the Mediterranean and repeated in the Strategic Partnership of 2004. The Commission's Communication on 'reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners' (European Commission 2003c) elaborated in much more detail on the challenges of and provisions for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and gave several recommendations for fu-

ture efforts.⁵¹ A decade into its democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean, the EU thus demonstrated for the first time a specifically regional strategic vision.

The EU's Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region adopted by the European Council in 2000 contained prominently and repeatedly the commitment to promoting democracy as an objective in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Thus, it stated that the 'EU will work with its Mediterranean partners to: (...) promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance and the rule of law' (Council of the EU 2000b: 5), a commitment that is taken up as one of the 'goals in its policy towards the Mediterranean region' (ibid.), namely 'to promote the core values embraced by the EU and its Member States, including human rights, democracy, good governance, transparency and the rule of law' (ibid.: 5-6). The more specific content of a democracy promotion policy, however, was only touched upon with regard to 'areas of action and specific initiatives', mixing objectives, approaches and mechanisms of influence. The broad 'areas' of interest can easily be identified as democracy and the rule of law, good governance as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms. In contrast, it is more difficult to trace more specific objectives. In the area of democracy and the rule of law, issues such as (strong) democratic institutions, the (existence of) rule of law, or judicial reform do not reveal much of their content, while the freedom of expression and independent media are more substantial. Good governance is again not at all specified. Apart from the general goal of (respect for) human rights and fundamental freedoms, two concrete objectives are named: the accession to international human rights instruments and the abolition of the death penalty. Interestingly, participation as the core feature of political democracy was not addressed directly, with the Common Strategy focusing more on aspects of capacity and control. A generally 'cooperative' approach was shaped by the principle of partnership, which was advanced several times referring to mechanisms such as dialogue and support. Looking at the addressees of support and dialogue, a top-down approach dominates, but the cooperation with NGOs with regard to human rights introduces a bottom-up dimension. As already pointed out, the mechanisms for influence are specified as support and political dialogue, but also diplomacy. The

⁵¹ In retrospect, the Commission stated itself that '[t]he Commission Communication on Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners constitutes a major contribution to efforts to mainstream Human Rights and is the first time the EU's global Human Rights' policy has been specifically applied to a regional context.' (European Commission 2004a: 53).

Common Strategy does neither include any institutional provisions, nor an explicit reference to existing instruments for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, with the reference to the EMP and its regional and bilateral dimensions, a link to MEDA (and the EIDHR) and the political dialogues institutionalised in the Barcelona Declaration and the EMAA can be established.

Along the same lines, the European Council included a clear commitment to democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region in its Conclusions on a Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East in 2004 (Council of the EU 2004f). It emphasised a cooperative approach ‘through partnership and dialogue’, drawing on ‘existing structures and arrangements’ within the EMP and ENP (*ibid.*). In the Final Report endorsed in 2004, political dialogue and support are advanced as instruments while more specific objectives are barely addressed: ‘rule of law and good governance’, ‘legal reform and human rights’, ‘electoral processes and judiciary reform’ are not further specified (Council of the EU 2004e: 8). By contrast, the report specified the duality of top-down and bottom-up approaches, clearly within the limits of a cooperative approach: ‘a constructive involvement by national authorities’ underlined a cooperative attitude towards governmental actors, while ‘non-violent political organisations’ were explicitly included in the traditionally civil society-focused bottom-up approach (*ibid.*).⁵²

It is interesting to note that this more strategic vision of democracy promotion within the EU is paralleled by an increasing prominence of matters related to democracy and democratisation on the joint agenda of the Barcelona Process relations as reflected in the conclusions of official and informal Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Foreign Ministers. While these matters were hardly addressed during the 1990s, the validity of the Barcelona Declaration (1995) with all its principles and objectives was steadily affirmed. In addition, in the third chapter, a closer link between civil society and (good) governance and human rights was developed in the late 1990s (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1997, 1999).⁵³ In the ‘spirit’ of reinvigoration that was proclaimed in Marseilles (2000), Ministers for the first time explicitly criticised

⁵² Implementation reports were due after the first year and then on a six-monthly basis. While the Brussels European Council in June 2005 has approved the first year report, the document itself is difficult to trace. The second report (December 2005) is in the Council Registers but not mentioned at the respective European Council in Brussels.

⁵³ For an overview of all Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Foreign Ministers in the period 1995-2008, see annex 6.

in the conclusions that the political dialogue on matters within the first chapter was lacking results and that it should be conducted without taboos, including on matters of rule of law, human rights and democracy (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2000). Thus, the political dialogue institutionalised was more explicitly linked to the objective of democratisation and thus openly conceived as an instrument for democracy promotion. In 2002, the Valencia Action Plan introduced a new paragraph on human rights and democracy into the political and security chapter and the explicit reference to democracy as an issue for the political dialogue is repeated (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2002). The language on democracy and democratisation became more explicit at the same time that the initiative of the ENP was carried into Euro-Mediterranean relations. From then on, the conclusions spoke not only of dialogue, but of co-operation on matters of democracy, the rule of law and human rights under the joint Action Plans of the ENP (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2003b). Finally, at the conferences in Dublin (2004) and Luxembourg (2005), conclusions more specifically called for certain aspects of a process of democratisation: ‘extending and strengthening political pluralism, regulatory reform for the implementation of international commitments, improving the judicial and penal systems, greater transparency, education and awareness raising, as well as full acceptance of and improving conditions for activity by civil society’ (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2004a: 7). Although the new Barcelona Work Programme (2005) did not explicitly refer to a need for democratisation, it provided a list of issues that could well be interpreted as a specification of ‘democracy’. It includes aspects at the core of political democracy (participation, competition, elections), but also independent media, an active civil society, and the ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments. Without speaking of external democracy promotion, the EU is given an active role in pursuing these objectives in a cooperative approach, including financial assistance and dialogue (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2005a).

A reorientation on strategy?

In the ENP, the objective to actively promote democracy is again framed more indirectly in the relevant policy documents, pointing to the joint commitment to certain values and principles by both sides (Baracani 2005a; Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005; Emerson et al. 2005). Nevertheless, the ENP brought significant changes to the EU’s framework for democracy promotion in the region. By contrast, the UMed

builds on the Barcelona *acquis* and stresses common commitments and objectives, but does not include democracy promotion on the agenda of the UMed's projects (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2008b).

Although the ENP is often linked to a greater emphasis on 'democracy', it is difficult to find an open commitment to promote democracy in the neighbouring countries. The relevant Commission Communications and Council Conclusions in 2003 and 2004 all included a kind of 'essential element' clause, but only the 2004 Communication contained a paragraph that could be interpreted as a commitment to active, external democracy promotion:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. (...) In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and promoting these values. (European Commission 2004d: 12)

Again, democracy as a goal was not elaborated. However, democratisation was explicitly called for, without specifying where countries are on a continuum between autocratic and democratic regimes:

Nearly all countries of the Mediterranean, the WNIS [Western Newly Independent States, VvH] and Russia have a history of autocratic and non-democratic governance and poor records in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual. (...) Yet political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quickly as desired. (European Commission 2003d: 7)

Most importantly, the ENP has added positive conditionality to the EU's tool-kit and introduced the principle of differentiation. Aiming to systematically adapt bilateral cooperation to the country-specific context, the latter clearly challenges the highly standardised framework for bilateral cooperation in the region (cf. Kelley 2006; Tulmets 2007).

Taken together, the EU's democracy promotion policy in the Mediterranean has evolved over time regarding the density and specificity of provisions, but not fundamentally changed since the early 1990s with respect to the EU's overall 'positive' approach, focusing on partnership-based instruments, targeting state and non-state actors. From the beginning, the EU included the Mediterranean in its emerging general democracy promotion policy, either applying 'global' instruments (EIDHR) or integrating standardised provisions into the regional framework for cooperation (EMAA, MEDA). A clearly regional strategic vision for the Mediterranean appeared around 2000, placing greater emphasis on democracy promotion and more openly

pointing at ‘shortcomings’ in the region. However, the EU did not distinguish between the countries at the strategic level, still addressing the Mediterranean partners uniformly through a highly standardised regional framework for cooperation. The ‘positive’ approach was even emphasised, obviously downplaying the role of negative conditionality institutionalised in the EMAA. The ENP continued this positive approach, adding positive conditionality to the instruments available. However, it brought a slight strategic reorientation away from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, introducing the principle of differentiation that more explicitly links the EU’s agenda to the country context.

5.2.2. Instruments

As was shown above, the EU’s democracy promotion policy is defined through specific institutional provisions rather than by spelling out strategic guidelines. The EU’s instruments for democracy promotion are highly standardised, either applying global instruments to the Mediterranean or incorporating global provisions into regional instruments. Consequently, the EU’s instruments for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean are marked by a high degree of formalisation and institutionalisation. The main instruments are (positive and negative) political conditionality (incentives), formalised political dialogue (persuasion), and democracy assistance (capacity-building). The EU does not use coercion as a mechanism for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean (see chapter 3.4.7).

Aside from these formalised democracy promotion instruments, there are more traditional diplomatic tools that can be used to promote democracy in the EU’s external relations. On the one hand, these concern material and immaterial incentives. At a declaratory level, these range from CFSP statements and common positions, Council declarations and conclusions to European Parliament (EP) resolutions. Additional actions including sanctions can be taken under the CFSP in the form of joint actions or as ESDP missions. On the other hand, diplomatic relations can of course also be used to engage in exchanges with the objective of persuasion (or socialisation), complementing the existing formalised fora for political dialogue. These can include informal meetings, e.g. at the level of the Commission’s delegations to third countries, or official visits by representatives of the different EU institutions (Council, Commission, EP) or the EU Troika to the region, or by representatives of third countries

to Brussels.⁵⁴ However, these provisions are hard to systematically describe as ‘democracy promotion instruments’, as they only provide options that the EU can exercise on an *ad hoc* basis. Here, the focus is therefore placed on formalised instruments, grouped according to the mechanisms of influence they draw on.

Incentives

There is a range of democratic conditionalities formalised by the EU vis-à-vis its Mediterranean Partners. In fact, these conditionalities are regional or regionally standardised provisions that apply to all countries participating in the general cooperation frameworks. Furthermore, they are in line with the EU’s global provisions for democracy promotion. In spite of this ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ (Börzel and Risse 2004), it is important to sketch these different conditionalities for two reasons: First, it allows tracing the framework’s evolution over time. Second, it is the basis for an analysis of their application at country-level. Today, the EU can rely on three types of conditionality formalised in different ways within its Mediterranean and neighbourhood policy: negative, ‘dynamic’, and positive conditionality. They have been introduced at different points of time and mark different ‘generations’ of democratic conditionality.

While the 1991 resolution envisages financial rewards and privileges this ‘positive’ approach, the ‘appropriate measures’ are the first institutionalised democratic conditionality. Thus, a more or less explicit suspension clause is linked to the ‘essential element’ clause in agreements and external cooperation programmes, allowing for the alteration of cooperation and funding up to its suspension (European Commission 1995a; more generally on the EU’s (negative) conditionality see Alston 1999 and Fierro 2003).

In line with the EU’s global democracy promotion policy, the EMAAs contain a second clause complementing the ‘essential element’ clause. These two clauses together indirectly establish a negative democratic conditionality for cooperation under the EMAAs. This clause in the ‘institutional, general and final provisions’ of the agreements allows for both parties to take ‘appropriate measures’ if the other party fails to fulfil its obligations under the agreement. These obligations are not explicitly linked

⁵⁴ The EU-Troika in external relations includes the Presidency of the EU, the General Secretary of the Council, as well as the president of the Commission or the external relations Commissioner.

to the ‘essential element’ clause.⁵⁵ However, the Commission’s 1995 Communication explicitly links the two clauses to form a negative conditionality. The ‘appropriate measures’ may be taken by either side after consultation in the Association Council and must respect the principle of appropriateness. In the EMAAs themselves, they are not further specified, but the European Commission had set out a list in 1995 ranging from the ‘alteration of the contents of cooperation programmes or the channels used’ to a ‘suspension of cooperation’ (European Commission 1995a: Annex 2). This list was subsequently approved by the Council along with a ‘suspension mechanism which should be included in Community agreements with third countries to enable the Community to react immediately in the event of violation of essential aspects of those agreements, particularly human rights’ (Council of the EU 1995). However, the importance of the ‘essential element’ clause as the basis for negative conditionality is consistently downplayed after 1995 (European Commission 2001c), if not altogether ignored in relevant documents on the Common Strategy and the Strategic Partnership.

Similarly to the EMAA, the regulations on the EU’s Mediterranean external cooperation programme (MEDA I+II) contain an ‘essential element’ clause (Council of the EU 1996, 2000c, art. 3). In contrast to the clause in the EMAA, the ‘essential element’ is directly linked to ‘appropriate measures’ in the case of its violation (MEDA I+II art. 3). The initial regulation had arranged for a procedure to be determined by July 1997, which was finally specified in an amendment in April 1998. Thereby, the Council can adopt appropriate measures ‘acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission’ (MEDA I+II art. 16). It is neither specified who should assess according to which criteria whether a situation calls for appropriate measures nor what these measures could be.

In the context of the MEDA regulations, another form of conditionality is realised through the procedure of ‘indicative programming’ of measures and their funding (art. 5). MEDA I only provides for regional and national ‘indicative programmes’ (art. 5.2), while MEDA II introduces a threefold programming with ‘strategy papers’ (art. 5.2), ‘indicative programmes’ (art. 5.3) and ‘financing plans’ (art. 5.3). With the programming procedure, the selection and financing of specific projects and thus the overall allocation of funds should be based on ‘beneficiaries’ priorities, evolving

⁵⁵ Only in the EMAA with Egypt, an additional paragraph defines a ‘material breach’ *inter alia* as ‘a grave violation of an essential element of the Agreement’ (art. 86.2).

needs, absorption capacity and progress towards structural reform' (MEDA I+II, art. 5.1). Possible areas of progress named in the regulations, however, are primarily socio-economic. Only the reference to the general cooperation under the EMAA might allow for a more directly political conditionality (MEDA I art. 5.2, MEDA II art. 5.3). In how far political and more specifically democratic conditions are set up (and monitored) depends on the – country-specific – programming procedure itself, as the indicative programmes 'shall define the main objectives of, the guidelines for and the priority sectors of Community support (...) factors for the evaluation (...) and list the criteria for funding the programme concerned' (MEDA I art. 5.2, MEDA II art. 5.3). The programming procedure introduces a kind of dynamic conditionality that includes both the promise of rewards and the threat of sanctions, allowing flexibility for the up- and downgrading of funds (European Commission 1998b: 48). However, it depends on the concrete procedure whether this provision is made instrumental for democracy promotion. The – potentially negative – effect of this dynamic conditionality and its immediate link to democracy is made more explicit in the ENPI regulation, as 'threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms' allow 'an ad hoc review of strategy papers' (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006a, art. 7.6).

As pointed out, the few strategic guidelines the EU has ever provided on its democracy promotion policy, both generally in the early 1990s and for the Mediterranean in the early 2000s, rather highlighted the role of rewards as part of a 'positive' approach. Accordingly, the importance of the 'suspension clause' in agreements and cooperation programmes has consistently been downplayed.

It is only in the context of the EU's enlargement policy that the 'essential element' clause is turned into a positive conditionality, rewarding compliance with the (political) Copenhagen Criteria with the opening of accession negotiations and ultimately membership (cf. Cremona 2003; Kochenov 2004). Outside the pre-accession policy, the EU introduced explicit positive conditionality into its new ENP in 2003. The early strategy papers envisaged both financial rewards and a deepening of bilateral relations that could amount to 'everything but institutions,' as Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission already stated in 2002 (Prodi 2002). Similar to the enlargement policy, these rewards were linked to regular monitoring and re-

porting mechanisms. The decision regarding rewards rests ultimately with the Council.

With the ENP, the EU introduced the instrument of positive, rewards-based conditionality into Euro-Mediterranean relations. Setting out a range of incentives in the form of enhanced co-operation, support or contractual relations, these are made conditional 'on the degree of the partner's commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities' (Council of the EU 2004a: 11). These 'priorities' are not specified in the overall framework, but this task is delegated to the Action Plans that after 'prior discussion with the partner countries concerned' should be 'agreed in association with each country, setting out common objectives and benchmarks and a timetable for their achievement' (European Commission 2003c: 16-17). Thus, following the principle of 'differentiation', more specific objectives of domestic reform and external democracy promotion are to be set on a country-specific level (cf. Council of the EU 2003a).

Under the auspices of the ENP, the EU has established another form of positive conditionality, this time explicitly linked to monetary incentives. Thus, a Democracy and a Governance Facility have been established, drawing on MEDA and ENPI funds respectively. These Facilities are not part of the regulations for these external cooperation programmes.

The Democracy Facility was proposed by the Commission in 2005 in the context of the EMP's tenth anniversary. It suggested to include the option of additional funding for 'those Partners that also show a clear commitment to common values and to agreed political reform priorities' under the ENPI, without further specifying the criteria or the financial dimension of the facility (European Commission 2005b: 6). The Work Programme agreed at the 2005 Barcelona summit omitted the word 'Democracy' and reduced the proposal to a 'substantial financial Facility to support willing Mediterranean partners in carrying out their [political] reforms' (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2005a: 6). The idea reappeared in a Commission Communication on the ENP in 2006, where it announces the creation of 'two innovative financing mechanisms' to be specified during the ENPI's 'programming exercise', one of them being the renamed 'Governance Facility' (European Commission 2006c: 12).

An amount of €300m (some €43m per year, on average) for a Governance Facility, intended to provide additional support, on top of the normal country allocations, to acknowledge and support the work of those partner countries who have made most progress in implementing the agreed reform agenda set out in their Action Plan. In line with an assessment of progress made in implementing the (broadly-defined) governance aspects of the Action Plans, this funding would be made available to top-up national allocations, to support key elements of the reform agenda; this will help reformist governments to strengthen their domestic constituencies for reform. (European Commission 2006c: 12)

By 2008, the European Commission had finally published a policy paper on the implementation of the Governance Facility (European Commission 2009g).

Persuasion

Political dialogue that is supposed to address, inter alia, issues of democracy and human rights is institutionalised at the both multilateral and bilateral level of Euro-Mediterranean relations. On the one hand, the Barcelona Declaration (1995) introduces a ‘strengthened political dialogue’ on matters of the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process. The annexed Work Programme specifies that ‘senior officials will meet periodically’ to ‘conduct a political dialogue to examine the most appropriate means and methods of implementing the principles adopted by the Barcelona Declaration’ (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995).⁵⁶ Without explicitly naming democracy as an issue, the reference to the principles establishes a link to the mutual commitment to democratic governance.

On the other hand, all EMAA have the objective to ‘provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue’ (art. 1.2, see European Commission 2004e). This includes, except for the agreement with the Palestinian Authority, a ‘regular political and security dialogue’ (art. 3) that should primarily be conducted at ministerial and senior officials’ level (art. 5). This corresponds to the joint bodies established by the EMAA, the Association Council and Committee. However, the objectives of the political dialogue do not explicitly include the promotion of democracy. Concerning the issues to be covered (art. 4), the wording differs slightly between countries: beyond ‘all issues of common interest’, only for Egypt, Israel, and Jordan is democracy named explicitly alongside ‘peace and security’, the latter being the common denominator for all EMAA.

⁵⁶ This includes senior officials of the European Commission, the EU member states and the Mediterranean partners.

This is in line with the EU's general democracy promotion policy, as it has incorporated a forum for political dialogue in most bilateral cooperation and association agreements since the early 1990s. In addition to this general dialogue usually conducted within the body responsible for implementing the agreement (Association or Cooperation Council), the EU has also set up regional fora for dialogue and specific human rights dialogues with some countries like China, Russia, and Iran.⁵⁷ In 2001, the Council even issued so-called 'guidelines' on the conduct of political and human rights dialogues (Council of the EU 2001a; cf. General Secretariat of the Council 2009).

Around 2003, the Commission began to experiment with the institutionalisation of political dialogues at a more technical level and to create specific subcommittees on human rights and democratisation (Council of the EU 2004d: 49). Within the general framework for political dialogue under the EMAA, a more specifically human rights dialogue has been institutionalised with some countries in sub-committees on 'human rights, democratisation and governance', in line with the creation of a sectoral sub-structure to the Association Committees. This development reflects the European Commission's recommendation made in 2003 to depoliticise the political dialogue:

The EU should continue efforts to deepen the substance of this dialogue on Human Rights and democratisation issues, not only in general terms or related to individual cases, but by focusing on specific operational issues. One way to achieve this improved focus could be to establish a technical level of dialogue below the political level. (European Commission 2003c: 11)

Capacity-building

Democracy assistance was formalised in a regional MDP (Karkutli and Bützler 1999) and in 1999 merged into the global EIDHR, but was also mainstreamed into the general cooperation programmes MEDA and ENPI, targeting state actors in large scale projects (Crawford 2000). These two channels for democracy assistance reflect a bottom-up and top-down approach, targeting mainly non-state and state actors respectively. The EIDHR aims to finance 'grassroots' initiatives independently of the regimes' consent, whereas the general cooperation programmes are subject to bilateral financing conventions.

⁵⁷ Cf. Council of the EU 2000d, 2000e, 2002b, 2002a, 2003b, 2004d, 2005b, 2006e; Council of the EU and European Commission 2007; Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008. For a list of the EU's Annual Reports on Human Rights and other regular reports issued by the European Commission, see annex 7.

Democracy assistance was actually the first instrument applied in practice, as the Commission ‘diverted’ funds for development cooperation to human rights and civil society related projects in the immediate follow-up of the 1991 Resolution (European Commission 1992; European Commission 1994; European Commission 1996a). In the beginning, activities in the Mediterranean countries were included in a general budget line for ‘Support for operations promoting human rights and democracy in the developing countries’. In 1994, the EP pushed for the creation of the EIDHR as a specific budget heading under which all activities in this field – mostly small scale projects targeting non-state actors – were subsumed (European Commission 1995b; European Commission 1996c; European Commission 2000d; European Commission 2001b).⁵⁸ In 1996, the MDP was set up under the EIDHR (cf. Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 11-13). Not being part of MEDA, the MDP was not bound by framework conventions with the recipient governments and could directly support non-governmental actors. After a decision by the European Court of Justice, the EIDHR was given a legal basis and set up as a proper external cooperation programme in 1999 (Council of the EU 1999a, 1999b, 2004b; European Parliament and Council of the EU 2004). Together with the ensuing restructuring of the Commission’s external service, the MDP was disbanded as a regional programme and merged into the global programme of the EIDHR. For the financial perspective 2007-2013, the European Commission intended to completely ‘mainstream’ democracy assistance into geographic external cooperation programmes (cf. European Commission 2006d). In the face of protest against the abolishment of the EIDHR, especially by the EP, the EIDHR was finally maintained as a horizontal programme and up-graded by its name from an ‘Initiative’ to a proper ‘Instrument’ (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006b).

A second channel for democracy assistance to Mediterranean countries was opened with the creation of MEDA as a regional cooperation programme. Financial and technical cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia had been conducted under the ‘Financial protocols’ until 1996. These were introduced in the GMP in the 1970s and focussed on classic ‘development aid’ (Pierros, Meunier, and Abrams 1999). They did not touch on political – i.e. human rights or democracy related – issues. With the

⁵⁸ Another report is mentioned, but cannot be found in the Commission’s archives, not even with the help of Commission staff: Report on the use of financial resources in the promotion and protection of human rights and democratic principles (for the years 1992-1993), Doc. FR/CM/242/242847.GH, PE 207.805 of 26.3.93

launch of the EMP in 1995, the EU created MEDA, a regional external cooperation programme for the Mediterranean partners. Similar to the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies) programme for Central and Eastern European countries, MEDA was based on EC regulations and covered regional and bilateral cooperation from 1996-2006.

Although MEDA was primarily conceived to support economic and social reform, one of its purposes was to ‘contribute (...) to initiatives of joint interest in the three sectors of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership: the reinforcement of political stability and of democracy’ (MEDA I+II, art. 2). In an annex to the regulations, the ‘objectives and rules for the implementation of article 2’ (Annex II) were further specified. Comparing the Annex II of MEDA I and II, it is obvious that from 2000 onwards, the provisions on democracy-related objectives are more detailed. In addition, the initial MEDA regulation was amended in 1998 to include an open commitment to democracy promotion in its preamble, stating that the

Community’s Mediterranean policy must play a part in achieving the general objective of the development and strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, as well as in achieving the objective of respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. (Council of the EU 1998)

With regard to democracy assistance, support under MEDA I (1996-1999) could *inter alia* be directed at ‘strengthening democracy and respect for human rights’ to achieve ‘a better socioeconomic balance’ (Council of the EU 1996). MEDA II (2000-2006) extended the scope of such measures to cooperation with NGOs and to cooperation ‘in areas relating to the rule of law’ (Council of the EU 2000c). In addition, both regulations see good governance as one objective of support measures.

For the financial perspective 2007-2013, MEDA has been replaced by the new ENPI, integrating the regional scope of the TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) and MEDA programmes to cover all countries included in the ENP (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006a). The ENPI regulations allows more directly for democracy assistance measures than MEDA, naming related issues as ‘areas of cooperation’ (ENPI art. 2): ‘political dialogue and reform’ (art. 2.a), ‘rule of law and good governance’ (art. 2.d), ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (art. 2.k), ‘democratisation, *inter alia*, by enhancing the role of civil society organisations and promoting media pluralism, as well as through electoral observation and assistance’ (art. 2.l), and ‘civil society’ (art. 2.m). In line with a clear

commitment to democracy promotion (art. 1.3), it also calls for a sort of mainstreaming of democracy promotion in external relations (art. 5.1). Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the EU's instruments for democracy promotion in bilateral relations with its Mediterranean partners.

Figure 5.1: EU provisions for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean

	Conditionality		Political dialogue	Democracy assistance	
	negative	positive		bottom-up	top-down
1990					
1991				Pre-EIDHR	
1992					
1993					
1994					
1995	EMAA MEDA I		EMAA: As- sociation Councils	MDP	MEDA I
1996					
1997	MEDA II			EIDHR I	
1998					
1999					
2000			MEDA II		
2001					
2002	ENP		EMAA: Sub- committees		
2003					
2004					
2005	Action Plans Democracy Facility	EIDHR II			
2006	ENPI	Governance Facility		EIDHR III	ENPI
2007					
2008					

5.3. Summary

Considering the evolution of the EU's Mediterranean democracy promotion policy as a framework for cooperation since the early 1990s, there have been hardly any strategic changes until 2003. However, there have been significant changes in institutional provisions for implementing democracy promotion measures, marked by an increasing degree of institutionalisation and greater emphasis on the EU's political commitment. While the EU clearly follows a model of liberal (representative) democracy, it has never much specified the content of its policy at a strategic level but mostly defined its policy by specific provisions for the implementation of measures. It basically relies on three instruments, namely political conditionality, political dialogue, and democracy assistance. The design of these instruments has become more elaborate over time, broadening the scope of potential measures. However, these changes have never touched upon the central feature of the EU's policy, a clearly

‘positive’ approach, focusing on partnership-based instruments and more recently positive conditionality to engage Mediterranean partners in a process of cooperation and reforms.

Considering the EU’s rhetoric (European Commission 2001c; European Commission 2003c) and the general trends in its application of instruments (Youngs 2002a; Youngs 2002b; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Pace 2007), the EU pursues a dominantly ‘positive’ approach to democracy promotion relying on persuasion, socialisation, and capacity building instead of coercion or negative incentives. There is a strong focus on partnership-based instruments (political dialogue, democracy assistance) that rely on the partner’s consent or active cooperation for implementing measures. By contrast, sanctions as unilateral measures on the basis of formalised negative political conditionality have never been adopted vis-à-vis Mediterranean Partners. Instead, the EU seems to count on ‘reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), given the recent introduction of positive conditionality as a means to foster active cooperation. Whether the EU’s reliance on political dialogue and democracy assistance is driven by a hope for a long-term effect or by reluctance to take action that might bring the EU into conflict with Mediterranean partners is difficult to tell. It definitely seeks to uphold bilateral relations and ‘good-neighbourly’ cooperation at almost any price, potentially compromising the credibility of its (negative) conditionality.

Overall, the EU has a range of strongly institutionalised global and regional instruments to promote democracy that are marked by a very high degree of standardisation. This is reflected in the use of ‘standard clauses’ and a very similar design of regional instruments, which has often led to the verdict of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (Börzel and Risse 2004). At the same time, the EU seeks to promote democracy on a bilaterally agreed legal basis. If the EU insists on its standard clauses and procedures, however, this approach amounts to a ‘take it or leave it’ situation in bilateral negotiations, challenging the notion of partnership. Nevertheless, ‘partnership’ is a central feature of the EU’s democracy promotion policy, in that it clearly pursues a ‘positive’ approach based on cooperation with the targeted regime. Most instruments target state-actors and aim at engaging them in the EU’s democracy promotion efforts. This is most obvious in the political dialogue and democracy assistance

‘mainstreamed’ in general cooperation, but also in the attempt to agree on joint objectives as criteria for the application of positive conditionality in the ENP action plans. The potentially conflictive instruments of negative conditionality and democracy assistance targeting non-state actors are either downplayed or are, in practice, still depending on the regime’s good will to allow projects with non-state actors. Still, strategic objectives and underlying concepts are scarcely specified, and while the EU has well-defined instruments at hand, it lacks a strategic vision and clear guidelines on the use of these instruments in different situations.

Taken together, EU democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean region follow a strategy of ‘engagement’. Refraining from the use of coercion and negative incentives, the EU tries by all means to keep the door open for dialogue and cooperation with its Mediterranean Partners (van Hüllen and Stahn 2009). However, as pointed out before, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion fundamentally depend on the domestic partner’s cooperation. Especially in the Mediterranean, it is not evident why authoritarian regimes should respond positively to international democracy promotion efforts, given the unique combination of authoritarianism and ‘strong’ statehood, which differs from most other world regions (Schlumberger 2008). The following chapter empirically investigates to what extent political dialogue and democracy assistance have been implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations between the EU and seven Mediterranean partners since the early 1990s.

6. Implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion

So, what does cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners look like in the field of democracy promotion? Have the partnership-based instruments been implemented? If so, in what way? Do we see ‘engagement’ of Arab authoritarian countries in the EU’s democracy promotion efforts, reflecting the evolution of its regional democracy promotion policy (see chapter 5)? This chapter first presents the empirical findings of an in-depth, qualitative study of the conduct of political dialogue and the implementation of democracy assistance in bilateral relations between the EU and its seven Arab authoritarian neighbours since the early 1990s. It then proceeds with a comparative analysis both over time and across countries, looking for regional patterns and country-specific variance to assess the respective quality of implementation.

6.1. Countries

This section describes, for each country individually, the implementation of the two partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and how it has changed over time. Regarding political dialogue, the analysis covers formal aspects and the content of Association Council meetings as well as the role of human rights subcommittees. For democracy assistance, it details how much, with whom, and on what the EU has spent in implementing the ‘horizontal’ and the ‘geographical’ programmes. The former include early projects under the EIDHR (1990-1995), the MDP (1995-1998), the global Initiative (1999-2006) and the Instrument (since 2007); the latter include the regional cooperation programmes MEDA I (1996-1999) and MEDA II (2000-2006) as well as the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI, since 2007). While this section provides a thorough picture of the implementation of these partnership-based instruments within each country, the ultimate assessment of the quality of implementation is only possible in a comparative perspective (see 6.2.).

6.1.1. Algeria

Algeria only gained independence in 1962 and for a long time maintained special relations with France, including a free trade area, linking it to the EEC. So the EEC concluded the first cooperation agreement with Algeria only in 1976 under the GMP. While the European Commission started negotiations for a new generation of agreements with the three Maghreb countries Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (cf. Schumacher 1998), negotiations with Algeria were only concluded in 2001 and the EMAA entered into force in 2005. Algeria is eligible for external cooperation under MEDA and ENPI, but it is not fully integrated into the framework for cooperation established under the ENP: As the EMAA had just entered into force, Algeria refused to start negotiations on an ENP action plan right away. Appropriations for external cooperation have significantly increased since the mid-1990s, but compared to its size, the per capita funding is well below average (see annex 8). In addition, Algeria has a persistently low payment-commitment ratio, indicating major difficulties in the practical implementation of aid.

Political dialogue

Since the entry into force of the EMAA in 2005, the Association Council has met three times between 2006 and the end of 2008 (see table 6.1 below). The first meeting, 'originally scheduled for 21 March 2006, was postponed at the request of the Algerian side' (Council of the EU 2006a: 1). Meetings have taken place annually in spring. The delay between meetings hardly varied at between 11 and 13 months. Minutes are available for the first and third meeting, containing little information on the actual content of the dialogue, but including information regarding the agenda, a list of participants, and the statement prepared in advance by the EU and Algeria.⁵⁹ For the second meeting, only drafts of the agenda and the EU's position are available. The first and third meeting were held at ministerial level, including the commissioner for external relations and the high representative of the CFSP.

⁵⁹ In the minutes of the first meetings, the 'Déclaration de l'Algérie' (Annex V) is missing, with a note 'à insérer - nous n'avons qu'une version pdf' (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c: 2).

Table 6.1: EU-Algeria Association Council meetings

No.	Date	Documentation	Reference
1	16.05.2006	- Draft minutes	- EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c
2	24.04.2007	- Provisional agenda - Draft EU statement	- EU-Algeria Association Council 2007b - Council of the EU 2007a
3	10.03.2008	- Draft minutes	- EU-Algeria Association Council 2009

In all three meetings, ‘political dialogue’ was included as a separate item on the agenda. The minutes of the first meeting do not contain any information on the actual content of this political dialogue held in the ‘informal part’ of the meeting:

Ce point a fait l'objet de discussions dans le cadre de la partie informelle du Conseil d'association. Les points discutés étaient: Développements dans l'UE, Développements en Algérie, Questions régionales et internationales. (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c: 6)

As indicated above, the minutes of the first meeting do not reveal anything about what the partners might have discussed in the ‘political dialogue’ itself. They only mention the EU Presidency’s ‘attachement réciproquement reconnu aux valeurs de la démocratie, du respect des droits de l'homme et de l'Etat de droit’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c : 4) and the EU congratulating Algeria on its election onto the new UN Human Rights Council (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c : 6). The Algerian delegation underlined that, overcoming the crisis of the 1990s, ‘[l]e processus de réconciliation nationale et les responsabilités assumées par l'Etat dans ce contexte avaient renforcé l'identité pluraliste de l'Algérie ainsi que ses institutions et avaient consolidé la stabilité politique’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c: 5).

By contrast, the EU’s declarations issued on the occasion of the three meetings all include in a first part several statements on the role of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in EU-Algerian relations, the state of political reforms in Algeria, as well as political dialogue itself. All three documents are marked by a very positive tone on these issues and the statements resemble each other very much over time. However, the EU got slightly more critical over time, asking more openly for the pursuit of reforms and suggesting specific measures, beyond the ending of the state of emergency to better guarantee civil liberties (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c: 11; Council of the EU 2007a: 9; EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 11). While the EU welcomed political reform in Algeria since 1990s in all three statements, it added an explicit call for continuation in 2007 and, in 2008, even included

open criticism of ‘quelques sujets de préoccupation, répertoriés par le Comité de l'ONU [*Organisation des Nations Unies*, VvH] pour les droits de l'homme en novembre 2007’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 11). On the same occasion, it acknowledged legislative and local elections in 2007 as smooth, but ‘dans un esprit d'amitié et de respect mutuel’ suggested several measures such as awareness raising and constitutional reform to strengthen these ‘rendez-vous démocratiques’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 10). In general, the EU underlined in all three documents the importance it attached to the political dialogue institutionalised by the EMAA (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c: 10; Council of the EU 2007a: 5; EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 11).

Already in the first statement, the EU suggested the creation of subcommittees ‘dans tous les domaines couverts par l'Accord d'Association’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c: 10), which would include the issues of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, without explicitly mentioning it. Accordingly, the EU was very pleased at the second meeting that three ‘informal thematic working groups’ (Council of the EU 2007a: 3) had already convened, pushing again for the institutionalisation of formal subcommittees.⁶⁰ This time, the EU explicitly called for a political subcommittee, looking forward to ‘the early establishment of a specific subcommittee dealing with these issues [respect for and promotion of democratic principles and human rights, VvH] in order to deepen the dialogue with Algeria, along the lines of the dialogue being conducted by the EU with other partner countries’ (Council of the EU 2007a: 4). However, the decision formally adopted by the Association Council later in 2007 of ‘setting up subcommittees of the Association Committee and a working party on social affairs’, referred ‘issues concerning democratic principles and human rights’ to the general political dialogue and only envisaged the possibility of an ‘ad-hoc subcommittee’ once ‘the dialogue is significantly advanced’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007a). Accordingly, the EU repeated its call for a further institutionalisation of political dialogue in 2008: ‘L'UE compte bien approfondir le dialogue avec l'Algérie sur ces questions, dans un esprit constructif et de confiance mutuelle, et encourage vivement l'Algérie à mettre en place un cadre approprié de dialogue’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 11). Thus, Algeria is the

⁶⁰ These covered the areas of ‘Industry, Trade and Services’, ‘Justice and Home affairs’, as well as ‘Transport, Environment and Energy’, which were all transformed into regular subcommittees later in 2007 (cf. EU-Algeria Association Council 2007a).

only of the seven Mediterranean Partners considered here that has not yet agreed to the set-up of subcommittees dealing with issues of democracy and human rights.

Certainly owing to the sub-regional situation of Maghreb politics, the EU mentioned several times on the occasion of Association Council meetings with Morocco and Algeria that it had recently paid visits to Algeria ‘to pursue the political dialogue which started in 1997’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2001: 13; see also EU-Morocco Association Council 2003b: 14, EU-Tunisia Association Council 2000: 8).

Democracy assistance

For Algeria, there is only one trace of EU democracy assistance implemented in the early 1990s. The Commission’s report on the EIDHR in 1995 stated that ‘in Algeria Community funding has also helped produce and distribute a weekly magazine focusing on the fundamental issues confronting the country's society and political system’ (European Commission 1996c: 29), without providing any further information.

Under the MDP, Algeria received 6 per cent of total funding between 1996 and 1998, amounting to about €1.4 million or €0,05 per capita (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 33). The evaluation of all projects (number not specified, 13 projects mentioned) shows that they focused on the media and on civil society, funding training, education, awareness building, and campaigns targeting primarily women and journalists, but also youth and NGOs (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 95-96). Of the six projects evaluated between 1996 and 1998, five directly addressed Algerian issues (one is regional), but all of them were implemented by organisations based in Europe, and few activities actually took place in Algeria (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 98-106).

Under the new regulations for the EIDHR, the Commission financed a first project in Algeria in 2000.⁶¹ Between 2000 and 2004, it committed eight macro projects, all except one implemented by international or European NGOs. These projects focused on basic human rights with issues related to the rehabilitation of torture victims and women’s rights, issues related to the rule of law (prisons and access to justice), as well as projects aiming at capacity building for civil society more generally. The

⁶¹ For an overview and further references regarding projects financed under the EIDHR in 2000-2008 in the seven case study countries, see annex 11. As the EU does not provide regular and consistent data on the implementation of projects, the overview has been compiled on the basis of various sources, including the EU’s Annual Reports on Human Rights (see annex 7) and compilations by the European Commission (cf. European Commission 2000b, 2001f, 2001e, 2009h, 2010b, 2010a).

eighth project concerned human rights education in schools, implemented with the Algerian Ministry of Education. Overall, the EU committed €5.7 million, with €0.7 million on average for each project, while the project size varied from €0.2 million to €1.4 million.

The Commission selected Algeria as one of the ‘focus countries’ for 2002-2004 (European Commission 2001a: 15-17). It became therefore eligible for the micro project scheme in 2002 (European Commission 2003a: 68; Council of the EU 2003b). Funds committed for micro projects in Algeria amounted to €3 million for 2002-2006, with annual appropriations between €0.5 million and €0.8 million. And indeed, for 2002-2005, the Commission reported 19 projects, totalling €1.4 million. At least 10 of these projects addressed issues related to women’s and children’s rights, the others mostly focused on capacity building for civil society actors, including human rights organisations.

Algeria is eligible for the country-based support scheme (CBSS) under the new EIDHR which was supposed to be launched in Algeria in 2008. The Commission committed €0.6 million for these new micro projects in 2008 (Ref.).

It remains to be seen whether the Commission is going to fund macro projects in Algeria following its global calls for proposals, e.g. under the Instrument’s first objective of ‘Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries and regions where they are most at risk’ (European Commission 2007c: 8). The ‘Overview of projects funded under EIDHR between 1 July 2007 and 30 June 2008’ in the EU’s Human Rights Report for 2008 does not mention any project in Algeria or any one of the other countries of concern here, but it is not conclusive, as it ‘does not include sensitive projects which will not be published for security reasons’ (Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008: 93). Here, the Commission has an explicit strategy for the selection of projects, as ‘indicators contribute to establishing project relevance: the graver the situation, the higher the priority’ (European Commission 2007c: 8).

Table 6.2: Democracy assistance projects under MEDA/ENPI in Algeria

Year	Priority	Title	Funding (mio. €)
1999	Socio-economic balance support/ Human rights, civil society, gender issues and equality	Support for NGOs (Appuis aux associations algériennes de développement)	5.0
2000	Socio-economic balance support/ Human rights, civil society, gender issues and equality	Support for Algerian journalists and the media (Appui aux journalistes et aux médias algériens)	5.0
2000	Socio-economic balance support/ Human rights, civil society, gender issues and equality	Support for modernising the police force (Modernisation de la police/ Appui à la police algérienne)	8.2
2004	Priorité consolidation de l'Etat de Droit et de la Bonne Gouvernance	Réforme de la Justice	15.0
2005	Rule of law, governance, migration, human rights, combating poverty	NGO II ⁶²	10.0
2005	Rule of law, governance, migration, human rights, combating poverty	Police II ⁶³	10.0
2007	Justice reform	Modernisation of the prison system and social reintegration: Justice II	17.0

Under MEDA I, the EU committed a project in 1999 to support development NGOs that could be considered as democracy assistance.⁶⁴ Even though the project was originally considered as ‘socio-economic balance support’, it was later subsumed under the sector of ‘Human rights/civil society/gender issues and equality’ (European Commission 2002e: 15, 49; also European Commission 2000c: 26 ; European Commission 2001g: 28). The same holds true for two projects committed in 2000 on support for Algerian journalists and the media and for modernising the police force (European Commission 2002e: 15, 49; European Commission 2001g: 28: 28). The 2002 CSP created a fourth project on the reform of the justice system (European Commission 2002e: 37-40, 43) under the new heading of ‘role of law and good governance’. Under the same heading, the EU committed a ‘second generation’ of the NGO and Police projects in 2005 (European Commission 2005c: 17-23, 31). Under

⁶² ‘The NGO II Programme is an extension of the NGO I programme ‘Support for Algerian development organisations’ (DZA/B74100/IB/1999/0172 Project) which is due to be completed in March 2004. The NGO I programme aimed ‘to promote the role of civil society in the development process of Algeria (overall objective)’ and ‘to build NGOs’ capacity to implement development projects’. This programme continues and builds on the previous programme.’ (European Commission 2005c: 20)

⁶³ ‘In supplementing ‘Police I’, the project will thus be in keeping with the programme for the modernisation of justice (rules of evidence, criminology, professional standards, etc).’ (European Commission 2005c: 23)

⁶⁴ Interestingly, at least until 2002 the EU and Algeria had not signed a Financing Convention for this project (European Commission 2002e: 49).

ENPI, 'justice reform' became an individual priority under which a second component of the justice programme was committed for 2007 (European Commission 2007d: 25, 26-28).

Thus, three of the four original projects of democracy assistance under MEDA were extended after a few years (see table 6.2 above). This indicates that the projects were actually implemented and that the EU and Algeria perceived them as useful enough to be continued. In the region, Algeria is the only country with projects explicitly targeting the police.

Taken together, the implementation of democracy assistance has started much earlier than the conduct of political dialogue with Algeria. Since the institutionalisation of formalised political dialogue in 2005, the EU and Algeria have regularly conducted political dialogue in Association Council meetings. Despite the EU's wishes, however, they have not yet agreed on the set-up of a human rights subcommittee. EU democracy assistance has been implemented in Algeria since the mid-1990s, at first under the MDP and since 1999 also under MEDA. Funding for democracy assistance projects under both channels totals almost €80 million, with about 10 per cent of this going to the EIDHR.

6.1.2. Egypt

The EEC and Egypt have maintained contractual relations since 1972. They concluded the negotiations for the new EMAA in 1999, and the agreement entered into force in 2004. Egypt is fully integrated into the ENP, but belongs to the second group of countries that agreed action plans in 2007. Egypt is one of the largest recipients of EU development assistance in the region, but receives only little per capita funding due to its size. Implementation of projects under MEDA has been relatively smooth since around 2000.

Political dialogue

Since the entry into force of the EMAA in 2004, the Association Council has met four times between 2004 and the end of 2008 (see table 6.3 below). Meetings have taken place regularly on an annual basis except for 2005, as there was an interval of two years between the first and second meeting. On average, meetings took place about every 15 months. It is a particular feature of the EU-Egypt Association Council

that it has not once published minutes of its meetings. For three of the meetings, the drafts of agendas and the EU's statements are available. For one meeting, the second in 2006, the EU has restricted access to its draft statement, so the agenda is the only document publicly available. The agendas all include 'political dialogue on subjects of common interest', covering developments in the EU and Egypt as well as regional and global issues. For the second meeting, in 2006, the political dialogue is part of the 'lunch session' as opposed to the preceding 'plenary session'.

Table 6.3: EU-Egypt Association Council meetings

No.	Date	Documentation	Reference
1	14.06.2004	- Draft agenda - Draft EU statement	- EU-Egypt Association Council 2004 - Council of the EU 2004h
2	13.06.2006	- Draft agenda - <i>Draft EU statement: not available</i>	- EU-Egypt Association Council 2006 - Council of the EU 2006h
3	06.03.2007	- Draft agenda - Draft EU statement	- EU-Egypt Association Council 2007 - Council of the EU 2007b
4	28.04.2008	- Draft agenda - Draft EU statement	- EU-Egypt Association Council 2008b - Council of the EU 2008a

As there are no minutes available, there is no documentation of the actual dialogue. Turning to the EU's statements, these can only suggest which topics the EU might have addressed during the meetings. Even though the EU recognised the 'efforts of the Egyptian authorities to promote political, social and economic reforms' (Council of the EU 2004h: 3) in its statement on the first Association Council meeting, it quite openly addressed issues of concern and made recommendations for measures to be taken by the Egyptian government. These concerned the state of emergency, compromising basic human rights, but also the conduct of upcoming legislative elections. In pointing out the need for further efforts, the EU referred to shortcomings identified in the UN Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 and 2003 (UNDP 2003a, 2004) as well as a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) country report in 2003 (UNDP 2003b). It also reminded Egypt of its commitment in two regional declarations on human rights issues in 2004, the Sana'a Declaration and the Alexandria Declaration (Council of the EU 2004h). Overall, the EU considered that 'while some progress has been made in these areas to a varying degree, (...) further serious efforts are needed to improve the overall situation in Egypt with regard to respect for human rights and democracy' (ibid.: 5). Three years later – in addition to the long

interval between the first and second meeting, the EU's statement for the second meeting is not publicly available – the EU again gave a relatively detailed account of its view of the political and human rights situation in Egypt. However, it refrained from similarly general criticism, underlining the joint commitment to political reform and offering support for 'Egypt's own reform measures in the area of the judiciary, civil society, police procedure and individual rights' (Council of the EU 2007b: 5). Still, the EU called openly for measures to be taken on the state of emergency and on torture, and encouraged greater participation of civil society (ibid.). The 2008 statement was very similar in its wording, extending, however, the areas of recommendations to the freedom of expression, press freedom, and anti-discrimination (Council of the EU 2008a: 5-6) and openly criticising 'serious shortcomings in the electoral process' on the occasion of the 2008 local elections (ibid.: 4).

Right from the first Association Council meeting onwards, the EU pushed for the creation of technical subcommittees (Council of the EU 2004h: 3). Highlighting 'with satisfaction the agreement of a number of Mediterranean partners to establish appropriate structures to promote the dialogue on human rights' (ibid.: 4) and in light of a first informal meeting to prepare further cooperation in this field in May 2004, the EU expressed its hope that it would 'soon lead to the creation of the subcommittee on human rights in the framework of the Association Agreement' (ibid.: 5). At the third meeting, the Association Council adopted the decision on 'setting up subcommittees of the Association Committee and a Working Group on Migration, Social and Consular Affairs' (EU-Egypt Association Council 2008a). In its statement, the EU expressed its 'satisfaction at the inclusion of the most recent (and eighth) *Sub-Committee on Political Matters: Human Rights and Democracy - International and Regional Issues*' (Council of the EU 2007b: 4) and welcomed the 'readiness of the Egyptian Government to have a *dialogue on human rights and democracy* issues' (ibid.: 5). However, the political subcommittee did not convene until mid-2008, more than a year after it was formally created. Indeed, the first meeting had been scheduled for the beginning of 2008, but

following the adoption on 17 January [2008, VvH] of a European Parliament resolution on human rights in Egypt, the Egyptian government called-off the political subcommittee initially scheduled to take place on 23-24 January.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ European Commission's Delegation to Egypt, What's New? <http://www.delegy.ec.europa.eu/en/News/551.asp>, 08.08.2008.

Interestingly, the EU did not address this issue in its statement on the fourth Association Council meeting in April 2008 beyond the recognition that the political sub-committee, among others, still had to convene (Council of the EU 2008a: 3). In the end, the first meeting was rescheduled and took place on 2 and 3 June 2008 (SOURCE).

Democracy assistance

As far as it is possible to trace, the EU did not fund any democracy assistance projects in Egypt in the immediate follow-up of the 1991 Resolution.

Under the MDP, Egypt received 4 per cent of the total funding between 1996 and 1998, amounting to about €0.9 million or €0.02 per capita (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 33). The ‘eight projects selected for MDP funding in Egypt’ (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 120) evenly addressed issues relating to civil society, women’s rights, the rule of law, and democracy, mostly funding awareness building measures and campaigns as well as advocacy and monitoring, and primarily targeting women and prisoners. The five projects evaluated for 1996 and 1997 were all implemented with Egyptian non-state organisations, including human rights NGOs (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 123-126). The evaluation severely criticised the neglect of Egypt under the MDP in terms of funding levels (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 51, 121), but conceded that ‘[t]he comparatively low funding in Egypt (...) is not a chosen strategy but rather a result of the small number of applications received from Egyptian NGOs’ (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 34).

The Commission agreed funding for ten macro projects in Egypt between 2001 and 2006, amounting to €5 million, with the project size ranging from €0.2 million to €0.8 million. Three of these projects were implemented by international NGOs, all others were concluded with Egyptian organisations. Activities ranged widely from the situation in prisons (rule of law), to torture and basic human rights to civil society; projects relating to women’s rights addressed both economic and political issues.

Egypt was not a focus country and so it became eligible for the micro project scheme only in 2004 (European Commission 2004b). The Commission appropriated funds, amounting to €2.56 million, and issued calls for proposals on an annual basis from then onwards (see annex 11). In 2004 and 2005, it selected 19 projects with a total funding of €1.7 million. More than half of the projects focused on ‘governance’ and

the ‘rule of law’, according to the Commission’s classification. These included aspects of the political process such as elections and participation, with a gender aspect cross-cutting many of the projects. Most of the other projects focused on civil society (farmers and women) and human rights issues more generally.

Egypt is eligible for the CBSS under the new EIDHR. It was supposed to be launched in Egypt in 2008. The Commission committed €0.9 million for these new micro projects in 2008.

Table 6.4: Democracy assistance projects under MEDA/ENPI in Egypt

Year	Priority	Title	Funding (mio. €)
2003	Stability & sustainable development	Support to social development and civil society	20.0
2005	Supporting sustainable socio-economic development	Strengthening democracy and human rights/governance	5.0
2008	Supporting Egypt’s reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights and justice	Support for political development, decentralisation and promotion of good governance	13.0
2008	Supporting Egypt’s reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights and justice	Promotion and protection of human rights and involvement of civil society in protecting the environment	17.0

The EU only introduced explicit democracy assistance in the 2005 National Indicative Programme (NIP) for the second half of MEDA II with a small-scale project on ‘strengthening democracy and human rights/governance’ (European Commission 2005f: 21-23). However, under the same priority of ‘sustainable socio-economic development’, a project to provide ‘support to social development and civil society’ was committed for 2003 that could be considered democracy assistance (European Commission 2002b: 27, 34-35). Even though the project is completely oriented towards social development (poverty reduction, provision of public services), it pursues this objective by strengthening civil society actors. By pushing for regulatory reform and providing capacity building, it indirectly contributes to the development of pluralism.⁶⁶ With ENPI, the EU introduced a new priority, ‘supporting Egypt’s reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights and justice’. The NIP for 2007-2010 envisages three projects related to democracy assistance: Two with funds committed

⁶⁶ ‘Conditions should exist for civil society organisations to operate without undue restriction under a reasonable regulatory and legal framework. This will require the prior adoption of new and appropriate NGO legislation together with operational regulations that allow for EC support to NGO activities. The social development funding facility will be restricted to civil society organisations that either meet institutional effectiveness criteria or are prepared to accept capacity building support under the programme.’ (European Commission 2002b: 35)

for 2008, one targeting political reform and the other civil society, and a third project on justice and security in 2010 (European Commission 2007b: 27-31, 38).

In summary, while the implementation of bottom-up democracy assistance projects has started in the 1990s, cooperation on democracy promotion more directly with the regime itself has kicked off only much more recently. Formalised political dialogue was institutionalised in 2004. Partners have conducted Association Council meetings regularly since 2006 and created a human rights subcommittee in 2007. The EU has committed more than €60 million for democracy assistance since the mid-1990s. Almost 12 per cent were spent on the EIDHR, starting with the MDP, while the largest share of funding was committed under MEDA and ENPI after 2002.

6.1.3. Jordan

The EEC and Jordan concluded a first cooperation agreement in 1977. They agreed on the new EMAA in 1997. The agreement entered into force in 2002 and was completed by the 2005 ENP action plan. Jordan only receives medium levels of EU assistance compared to the other countries in the region, but the highest per capita funding. Implementation of projects has already under MEDA I been relatively smooth.

Political dialogue

Since the entry into force of the EMAA in 2002, the Association Council has met seven times between 2002 and the end of 2008 (see table 6.5 below). Meetings have taken place very regularly on an annual basis, on average every 13 months. This is true even though the last meeting was postponed once from July to November 2008.⁶⁷ Only three of the seven meetings are covered by minutes while the others are covered by draft agendas and/or EU statements. Agendas are not available for the third and fourth meeting. EU statements were prepared for every meeting. Between 2003 and 2006, the EU even published them as official press releases (Council of the

⁶⁷ Curiously, there is no information to be found (online) as to why this postponement took place – the fact as such is not even mentioned, with news databases etc. containing information on the holding of the meeting in either July or November or even both. Even the European Commission's *ENPI e-bulletin* of 18 July 2008, issue 49, affirms that the meeting took place on 23 July 2008, whereas issue 60 of 14 November 2008 does not mention a meeting. The Council Register contains preparatory documents (agenda and EU statement) for both dates, but in those for November 2008, neither the earlier date nor any reasons for postponement are mentioned, nor are there other documents relating to the issue (EU-Jordan Association Council 2008a, 2008b, Council of the EU 2008b, 2008c).

EU 2004i, 2005c, 2006f), but it has not made its statement on the sixth meeting publicly available.

Table 6.5: EU-Jordan Association Council meetings

No.	Date	Documentation	Reference
1	10.06.2002	- Draft minutes	- EU-Jordan Association Council 2002
2	14.10.2003	- Draft minutes - Public EU statement	- EU-Jordan Association Council 2004b - Council of the EU 2003d
3	11.10.2004	- Public EU statement	- Council of the EU 2004i
4	21.11.2005	- Draft agenda - Public EU statement	- EU-Jordan Association Council 2005 - Council of the EU 2005c
5	14.11.2006	- Draft minutes - Public EU statement	- EU-Jordan Association Council 2007 - Council of the EU 2006f
6	11.12.2007	- Draft minutes - <i>Draft EU statement: not available</i>	- EU-Jordan Association Council 2009 - Council of the EU 2007c
7	10.11.2008	- Draft agenda: July - Draft EU statement: July - Draft agenda: November - Draft EU statement: November	- EU-Jordan Association Council 2008b - Council of the EU 2008b - EU-Jordan Association Council 2008a - Council of the EU 2008c

From 2003 onwards, ‘political dialogue’ features on the agenda of meetings. However, the ‘subjects of common interest’ included only in 2003 ‘Democratic process in Jordan’ (EU-Jordan Association Council 2004b). From 2005 onwards, the political dialogue focused on ‘regional and international issues’ and took place in the informal part of the meetings. Domestic political issues were addressed as part of the general ‘state of EU-Jordan bilateral relations’ (EU-Jordan Association Council 2005, 2007, 2008a, 2009).

At the first meeting, the Spanish EU presidency highlighted the ‘new institutional structure for an intensified political dialogue - a true dialogue, open and constructive in a sense of close partnership, without any taboo issues’, immediately after referring to the EMAA’s essential element clause on the mutual ‘respect for human rights and democratic principles’ (EU-Jordan Association Council 2002: 4). Under the ‘state’ of bilateral relations, the ‘democratic evolution in Jordan and the region’ was addressed by the two parties (ibid.). The Jordanian foreign minister pointed out the ‘steady progress concerning respect for human rights and democratic principles since 1989’, while the Spanish foreign minister somewhat more carefully ‘welcomed the encour-

aging developments in Jordan and stressed the importance of the role of women and civil society’, calling for elections to be held soon (EU-Jordan Association Council 2002: 7). In 2003, apart from the informal ‘political dialogue’ that addressed inter alia the ‘democratic process in Jordan’ (EU-Jordan Association Council 2004b: 6), the parties addressed issues of political reform again in relation to the state of bilateral relations and the implementation of the EMAA. At this point, the EU pledged its willingness to support the Jordanian reform programme and the ‘Commission welcomed the positive response by the Jordanian authorities to the Commission communication on reinvigorating Human Rights and Democracy in the Mediterranean region’ (EU-Jordan Association Council 2004b: 5). In reference to national reform initiatives, the EU, in a slightly more critical stance, ‘encouraged the Jordanian side to uphold its commitment and accelerate the process in order to generate concrete benefits for the citizens’ in 2006 (EU-Jordan Association Council 2007: 5).

Interestingly, the EU’s (draft) statement prepared for the seventh meeting of the Association Council in December 2008 (Council of the EU 2008c) is almost identical to the (draft) statement prepared for the meeting originally scheduled in July of the same year (Council of the EU 2008b). It was apparently only slightly adjusted to fit the situation five months later, e.g. with reference to conferences that had taken place in the meantime. The EU encouraged the Jordanian government ‘to continue, or where necessary accelerate, the effective implementation’ (Council of the EU 2008c: 3) of several legislative and institutional reform initiatives. It also voiced ‘serious concerns about the civil society law recently adopted by the Parliament and endorsed by a Royal Decree without taking into account the recommendations and objections of civil society organisations’ (ibid.: 4).⁶⁸

In its Decision 1/2003 on the creation of subcommittees, the EU-Jordan Association Council only ‘mainstreamed’ ‘matters relating to democratic principles and human

⁶⁸ This criticism remained unchanged in the two statements, even though there had been two open letters by human rights NGOs addressed to EU representatives, asking for a clear stance of the EU on human rights violations in Jordan, on the occasion of the original date of the Association Council meeting in July 2008, see Amnesty International EU Office 2008: Letter to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, on EU-Jordan Association Council, Brussels, 18 July 2008, http://www.aie.u.be/static/documents/2008/0807letterJordanAC_C.pdf, 17.03.2009, and Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network and Human Rights Watch 2008: Letter on the occasion of the Association Council between the EU and Jordan, 23 July 2008, to the Foreign Ministers of Member States of the European Union, the High Representative of the European Union for the CFSP, Mr. Javier Solana, the Commissioner for External Relations, Ms. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Personal Representative of the SG/HR on Human Rights, Ms. Riina Kionka, Brussels, 18 July 2008, <http://www.euromedrights.net/usr/00000022/00000051/00002421.pdf>, 17.03.2009.

rights' in the work of the other bodies (EU-Jordan Association Council 2003). It already contained the option to establish a specific subcommittee or working group should the parties agree. In light of the third Association Council meeting in 2004, the EU was 'pleased that this meeting will establish a sub-committee on human rights, democracy and governance' (Council of the EU 2004i: 2). However, the draft decision taken in 2004 creating a 'Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance' is the only decision not published in the Official Journal of the EU (EU-Jordan Association Council 2004a). It has apparently nevertheless entered into force, as the EU repeatedly referred to the set-up of the human rights subcommittee in later statements and called it 'a positive step towards strengthening the promotion of these values' in 2005 (Council of the EU 2005c: 3; see also Council of the EU 2006f: 12). Even before the set-up of the subcommittee, there had been 'useful discussions' on certain aspects of human rights, such as the death penalty (Council of the EU 2004i: 2). A first meeting was held in 2005 (Council of the EU 2005c: 3, 2006:12), after that, the subcommittee came together again in 2007 and 2008.⁶⁹

Democracy assistance

In the first phase of EU democracy assistance, in the follow-up of the 1991 Resolution, there was one project implemented in Jordan in 1993. It was a 'large' scale project, providing the Jordanian Interior Ministry with technical assistance in the very basic sense of office equipment (European Commission 1995b: 17-19).

Under the MDP, Jordan received between 1996 and 1998 5 per cent of total funding for the region, amounting to about €1.1 million or €0.23 per capita (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 33). Jordan was not included in the detailed country analyses, but projects were nevertheless covered by the general evaluation of all 148 projects. They mostly intervened in the area of civil society (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 37), funding measures of training and education (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 39) targeting women and youth (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 42).

⁶⁹ Apparently, there should have been a meeting in 2006: 'The first meeting in June 2005 was valued by both sides for the quality of the dialogue and the possible gains to draw from it. The EU is looking forward to continuing and strengthening this dialogue at a second meeting to be held before the end of the year.' (Council of the EU 2006f: 12).

Under the EIDHR, the EU apparently funded only one macro project on ‘women in parliament’ in 2001 (see annex 11). Information is scarce beyond the project title and the funding commitment of €0.6 million.

As Jordan was no ‘focus country’, it became eligible for the micro project scheme in 2004. Since then, there were annual calls for proposals and for the period of 2004-2006, the Commission appropriated €2.2 million. In 2004 and 2005, it financed 16 projects with €1.4 million, which matches the funds appropriated for those budget years. Half of the projects addressed gender issues, ranging from women’s basic rights to political participation. Two projects focused on the media. Matters of participation and democracy were linked to general human rights issues, especially human rights education, in another three projects. A few more projects targeted issues such as torture and the situation in prisons (see annex 11).

Jordan is eligible for the CBSS under the new EIDHR. It was supposed to be launched in Jordan in 2007. The Commission committed €1.8 million for these new micro projects in the first two years.

In 2007, the Jordanian Women’s Union was given €0.8 million to implement a regional project on ‘reforming the family laws in Arab countries’.

Table 6.6: Democracy assistance projects under MEDA/ENPI in Jordan

Year	Priority	Title	Funding (mio. €)
2002	Strengthening of pluralism, civil society and the rule of law	Strengthening of pluralism, civil society and the rule of law/ Strengthening of pluralism and human rights	2.0
2005 2006	Technical assistance to the development of democracy, good governance and human rights	Development of democracy, human rights, good governance	3.0 2.0
2008 2010	Political reform, human rights, justice and co-operation on security and fight against extremism	Support for human rights, democracy and good governance	7.0 10.0

While there are no traces of projects related to democracy assistance under MEDA I, there has been continuous support for Jordanian political reform initiatives since 2002. A first small, but clearly democracy, human rights, and civil society related project was committed in 2002 (European Commission 2002c: 38-39, 39). Since then, follow-up projects committed in 2005 (European Commission 2005g: 18-20, 21) and 2007 (European Commission 2007e: 24-26, 37) have covered all areas of

democracy assistance (elections, rule of law, human rights, pluralism/civil society, good governance), aiming at regulatory reform and capacity building for state and non-state actors. The Commission claimed in 2005 that the initial project was ‘the first ever [of its kind, VvH] launched between the EC and a partner country in the Mediterranean region under a bilateral funding mechanism’ (European Commission 2005g: 18). Overall, the repeated renewal of this initial programme can be linked to the Commission’s wish for a sustainable impact of its support, but it also indicates that implementation must have been ‘successful’ enough to realistically sustain this hope.⁷⁰ While support under MEDA was still on a rather small scale, the NIP for 2007-2010 envisaged funding of €17 million during this first phase of ENPI (European Commission 2007e: 37). Funding committed in 2005 and 2007 was divided into two tranches respectively, but there is no indication that the disbursement of the second tranche was conditional upon implementation.

In a nutshell, EU democracy promotion in Jordan has relied only on the bottom-up channel of democracy assistance during the 1990s, while cooperation with the regime itself has gained momentum since 2002. The EU and Jordan have regularly conducted political dialogue since 2002 and set up the first human rights subcommittee in the region in 2004. The first democracy assistance projects under the EIDHR were already implemented in the early 1990s, whereas the partners mainstreamed democracy assistance into MEDA II in 2002. Almost 30 per cent of the total funds for EU democracy assistance to Jordan, amounting to nearly €20 million, were committed for projects under the EIDHR.

6.1.4. Lebanon

Lebanon concluded a first limited non-preferential trade agreement with the EEC in 1965. The 1977 cooperation agreement was replaced by the EMAA only in 2006, after negotiations had been concluded in 2001. Lebanon and the EU adopted an ENP action plan in 2007, at the same time as Egypt. Lebanon has always received a low level of absolute but relatively high per capita funding since the mid-1990s. The im-

⁷⁰ ‘Two successive projects have been agreed under the MEDA programme to support certain key aspects of the democratisation process. Given the importance of these issues, increased support is necessary to ensure that these efforts are sustained and to help meet the National Agenda’s objectives. The programme can therefore continue and deepen the cooperation started in 2002.’ (European Commission 2007e: 25)

plementation of projects under MEDA I proved extremely difficult, but implementation has much improved since.

Political dialogue

Since the entry into force of the EMAA in 2006, the Association Council has met three times between 2006 and the end of 2008 (see table 6.7 below). Meetings have taken place very regularly on an annual basis, on average every 11 months. Draft minutes are available for all three meetings. In addition, the EU and Lebanon issued a joint statement on the occasion of the first meeting. In all three meetings, ‘political dialogue on matters of common interest’, including ‘developments in Lebanon’, features on the agenda, but as this item is always treated in the ‘informal’ part of the meetings, the minutes do not contain any information on topics touched upon under this point.

Table 6.7: EU-Lebanon Association Council meetings

No.	Date	Documentation	References
1	11.04.2006	- Draft minutes - Public joint statement	- EU-Lebanon Association Council 2007b - Council of the EU 2006g
2	24.04.2007	- Draft minutes	- EU-Lebanon Association Council 2008
3	19.02.2008	- Draft minutes	- EU-Lebanon Association Council 2009

The minutes of the three EU-Lebanon Association Council meetings contain virtually no reference to issues of democracy and human rights or to specific Lebanese political reform initiatives. It is not even clear whether these issues were addressed during the ‘political dialogue’ held in the informal part of the meeting. Only in the third meeting, the ‘Commission also underlined the importance of supporting efforts to strengthen the rule of law’ and that ‘Lebanese civil society should also play an appropriate role in the reform process’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2009: 5), to which the Lebanese foreign minister agreed. In its statement for the first meeting in 2006, the EU explicitly pointed out its expectations for the ‘political dialogue institutionalised by the Association Agreement’:

This dialogue, which we envisage to be conducted frankly and openly in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect, and which should be open to all subjects of common interest with nothing excluded, is intended to promote mutual understanding, to bring our positions closer together and to establish lasting ties of solidarity between the partners. (Council of the EU 2006g: 10)

For the following meetings, the EU repeated these expectations, with the wording implying that the dialogue as it was conducted was either not as ‘frank and open’ or not covering ‘all issues of common interest’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2008: 9; EU-Lebanon Association Council 2009: 9). In its statement on the second meeting, the EU explicitly identified areas of cooperation that could be strengthened, inter alia the ‘political dialogue covering such areas as human rights and democracy’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2008: 10). On the situation in Lebanon, it stated quite frankly that

[w]hile recognizing the Lebanese efforts to bring about improvements in the field of democratisation, human rights and governance, the EU notes that the overall human rights record in Lebanon has potential for further improvement. (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2008: 14)

By contrast, the EU’s statement prepared for the third meeting in 2008 did not contain similarly open criticism (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2009).

At the first Association Council meeting in 2006, the Commission ‘proposed to set up, as soon as possible, a number of sectoral sub-committees which would allow a regular stocktaking of progress made in implementing the provisions of the Agreement’, referring to the ‘economic, political and social dimensions of the EU-Lebanon partnership’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2007b: 4). Together with nine other subcommittees, a subcommittee on ‘Human rights, democracy and governance’ was apparently created at the second meeting, even though the corresponding decision was never published in the EU’s Official Journal (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2007a). Shortly before the Association Council meeting, there had apparently been a meeting of a related ‘working group’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2008: 10). It is not clear whether the subcommittee has met again (or actually convened, for that matter). At the third Association Council meeting, the EU still referred to this first meeting, claiming to look ‘forward to developing the dialogue within the relevant sub-committee’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2009: 14).

Democracy assistance

In the early 1990s, there was a first small-scale project on ‘Sensibilisation et formation de plusieurs secteurs de la société civile’ in 1994 (European Commission 1996a: 33-34). It was most likely implemented by an international non-state actor, even

though the acronym of the partner given – A.S.C. – cannot be traced unambiguously to any actor.

Under the MDP, Lebanon received between 1996 and 1998 5 per cent of total funds for the programme, amounting to about €1.1 million or €0.2 per capita for Lebanon (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 33). Overall, projects with Lebanon intervened mostly in the areas of human rights and civil society, funded training and education, as well as awareness building and campaigns, and targeted refugees and prisoners, as well as NGO activists (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 130). All four projects evaluated included at least one Lebanese organisation among the implementing agencies (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 131-134).

Between 2001 and 2006, the Commission committed funds of €3.8 million for five macro projects in Lebanon, with individual projects ranging from €0.2 million to €1.9 million (see annex 11). There was a clear focus on rehabilitation of torture victims, with three projects selected under the thematic campaign for ‘fostering a culture of human rights’ in 2006 (European Commission 2004f: 15). In addition, the EU spent €1.9 million on an election observation mission to the legislative elections in May 2005, implemented by the UNDP (Council of the EU 2005b: 64).

With Lebanon being eligible for the micro project scheme since 2004, the EU appropriated €1.08 million until 2006 and issued calls for proposals annually. The 15 projects funded between 2004 and 2006 have a clear focus on children’s rights. Even three of the four ‘rule of law’ projects targeting the penal system explicitly focus on the situation of minors. Two of the projects more directly address political issues of democracy and elections.

Interestingly, there is some continuity in the funding of projects. The macro project on ‘human rights of migrant workers and asylum seekers’ committed in 2001 and implemented by Caritas Sweden was continued by a micro project committed in 2005, now with the Lebanese section of Caritas as the implementing partner. Also one Lebanese foundation received funds under the micro project scheme twice, in 2004 and 2006, for similar projects.

Lebanon is eligible for the CBSS under the new EIDHR. It was supposed to be launched in Lebanon in 2007. The Commission committed €1.2 million for these new micro projects in the first two years.

Table 6.8: Democracy assistance projects under MEDA/ENPI in Lebanon

Year	Priority	Title	Funding (mio. €)
2005	Support for European Neighbourhood Policy initiatives	Support of European Neighbourhood Policy initiatives	10.0
2007 2009	Support for political reform	Promotion of democracy and Human Rights	2.0 10.0
2008	Support for political reform	Justice, Liberty and Security. Support Efficiency and independence of the judiciary	10,0

There were no democracy assistance projects under MEDA I and II before the 2005 programming exercise, and even the 2005 project was not up-front democracy assistance but only included relevant objectives and measures among others in support for the ENP (European Commission 2005h: 9-12, 20). It mainly addressed the implementation of the EMAA in the areas of a) economic reform and trade aspects, b) rule of law, judicial co-operation, and justice and home affairs issues, and c) the ENP, but it also supported d) human rights, civil society and democracy (European Commission 2005h: 7).⁷¹ It is not clear how much of the envisaged €10 million actually funded measures that could be considered as democracy assistance under the second or fourth aspect. So, it is only with the start of the ENPI that the NIP for Lebanon included ‘support for political reform’ (European Commission 2007f: 14) as a priority. Under the new instrument, the EU committed two larger-scale projects more directly addressing matters of democracy and human rights (electoral system, human rights, women and children, fight against corruption, civil society) as well as the rule of law (judiciary, prisons), respectively (European Commission 2007f: 22-24, 31).

To sum up, apart from some early democracy assistance projects, more comprehensive cooperation on democracy promotion with Lebanon has only started recently. The EU-Lebanon Association Council has met regularly since 2006 and partners

⁷¹ Regarding the latter aspect, the Commission further specifies: ‘Support to be given in line with the CSP, with the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, the Communication for reinvigorating human rights and democracy issues in the Mediterranean, and eventual European Neighbourhood Policy strategies for the sector. This will include underpinning of local democracy through strengthening of institutional aspects of local government and municipalities.’ (European Commission 2005h: 7-8), ‘The approach will be to co-operate in areas where EU support is most needed, i.e. in improving penal and prison systems, strengthening the role and capacity of civil society, and the promotion of advocacy, education and awareness-raising on human rights issues amongst the population. Actions which improve inter-communal understanding and tolerance will be supported. Twinning between EU and Lebanese civil society groups and associations will be encouraged.’ (European Commission 2005h: 12)

have directly created a human rights subcommittee in 2007. Under MEDA, the first democracy assistance project was committed in 2005 and almost 30 per cent of about €30 million of funds for democracy assistance has been spent on the EIDHR.

6.1.5. Morocco

Paying tribute to the special relations with the Maghreb countries, the EEC and Morocco concluded a first association agreement in 1969. Negotiations for an EMAA were concluded in 1995 and the agreement entered into force in 2000. The EU and Morocco adopted an ENP action plan in 2005. Especially since 2000, Morocco is the largest recipient of EU development assistance, amounting to a medium level of per capita funding.

Political dialogue

During the 1990s, before the entering into force of the EMAA, there has apparently been no regular, formalised political dialogue. The last meeting of the then Cooperation Council has been recorded for 1989 (see Schumacher 2005: 143). Since the entry into force of the EMAA in 2000, the Association Council has met seven times until the end of 2008 (see table 6.9 below). The delay between meetings varies between 12 and 20 months. On average, meetings took place about every 14 months. Meetings are mostly documented in minutes published just in time for their adoption at the next meeting, containing little information on the actual content of the dialogue, but including information the agenda, a list of participants, and the statements prepared in advance by the EU and Morocco. The meetings were mostly held at ministerial level, including the commissioner for external relations and the high representative of the CFSP.

Table 6.9: EU-Morocco Association Council meetings

No.	Date	Documentation	Decision at or after meeting
1	09.10.2000	- Draft minutes	- EU-Morocco Association Council 2001
2	09.10.2001	- Draft minutes	- EU-Morocco Association Council 2003b
3	24.02.2003	- <i>Draft minutes: not available</i> - Draft EU statement	- EU-Morocco Association Council 2004 - Council of the EU 2003c
4	26.04.2004	- Draft minutes	- EU-Morocco Association Council 2005
5	22.11.2005	- Draft minutes	- EU-Morocco Association Council 2007
6	23.07.2007	- Draft minutes	- EU-Morocco Association Council 2008
7	13.10.2008	- Draft minutes	- EU-Morocco Association Council 2009

There were no specific agenda items for topics related to democracy and human rights. Most of the times, the domestic political situation was addressed under the ‘state of political and economic relations’ (or similar headings). Since 2003, the agenda included ‘political dialogue on matters of common interest’ as a topic. This dialogue was referred several times to the informal part of the meeting, but matters of human rights and democracy were not listed (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005: 6, EU-Morocco Association Council 2008: 6). However, with the first meeting of the Association council in 2000, the EU considered that ‘institutionalised political dialogue has now been introduced’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2001 Statement: 11).

In 2000, EU representatives touched upon the domestic political situation in Morocco in positive, but very general terms, welcoming ‘progress towards democracy and liberalisation’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2001: 6). Similarly, in 2004 ‘les avancées faites par le Maroc dans ce domaine’ were mentioned by the Presidency (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005 : 4). Commissioner Patten pledged to ‘consacrer, dès 2005, une part importante pour des actions de promotion des droits de l’homme et de l’égalité entre hommes et femmes’ for the implementation of the ENP Action Plan: ‘Le Commissaire a présenté le Maroc comme un modèle et émis l’espoir que le plan d’action pourra rapidement être mis en oeuvre’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005: 6).

At the 5th Association Council meeting, it was the Moroccan foreign minister Mr Fihri who stressed that Morocco was a country ‘en mouvement ayant choisi la démo-

cratie et la modernité’ that aimed at ‘renforcer la démocratie, moderniser son administration et la justice, rénover le système éducatif, décentraliser et élargir l'espace public’ but pointed out at the same time ‘que les Droits de l'Homme étaient d'abord l'affaire des Marocains répondant à un impératif interne’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 5). The EU’s representative appreciated the EU’s commitment to progress in political reforms, but the British foreign minister Mr Howells also mentioned ‘l'importance de continuer à travailler au changement des coutumes et pratiques afin que les réformes deviennent une réalité pour les citoyens marocains’ and suggested some areas that should be included in the reforms (EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 4). In general, the Commission representative praised ‘le bon niveau et l'intensité du dialogue politique entre l'UE et le Maroc’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 5).

Similarly, Mr Fihri stated in 2007 that

le Maroc poursuivait, sous la conduite active de Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI, sa dynamique endogène de réforme, de modernisation et d'ouverture en vue d'atteindre les plus hauts standards de bonne gouvernance et de consacrer l'intégration compétitive du Royaume dans la mondialisation. Ceci se traduit par la mise en œuvre de réformes majeures confortant la pratique démocratique, la primauté du Droit et l'élargissement de l'espace des libertés publiques. (EU-Morocco Association Council 2008: 4)

While still recognising ongoing reforms, the EU refers more directly to issues that Morocco still needed to address. With regard to cooperation with civil society organisations, the Commission ‘a formulé ses remerciements aux autorités marocaines pour leur coopération’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2008: 5).

The EU’s statements prepared for the Association Council meetings follow the tenor of the minutes, welcoming progress and encouraging further reform. Over the time, they get more detailed and specify initiatives and challenges. For the fifth and sixth meeting, they explicitly refer to the ENP’s general conditionality. In the 2007 statement, it is mentioned that Morocco had been eligible to the Democracy Facility as a reward for its progress and a perspective for talks about Morocco’s ‘advanced status’ is opened. For Morocco, it is interesting to see that the Western Sahara issue is regularly included in the statements, albeit in careful terms, rarely going beyond concerns about ‘humanitarian issues’.

The statements also include comments on and evaluations of the political dialogue itself, similarly to the EU’s human rights reports (e.g. Council of the EU 2006e:

198). Thus, the EU states in the very beginning that the parties had already engaged on human rights topics in the political dialogue and asks to continue, deepen, and institutionalise it (EU-Morocco Association Council 2001). Overall, the Commission stated in its 2004 Country Report that ‘[i]n the political dialogue, Morocco has been one of the more open partners as regards human rights and democratisation’ (European Commission 2004c: 3).

In its dialogue with Morocco, the EU emphasised at the 3rd meeting in 2003 that it was the first country in the Mediterranean where the creation of subcommittees was proposed (Council of the EU 2003c: 2). A specific subcommittee on human rights and democratisation was only indirectly addressed on that occasion, but the EU believed that Morocco would be the first country to agree to set up a specific human rights subcommittee.⁷² While six other subcommittees had been set up quickly in 2003 (EU-Morocco Association Council 2003a), the human rights committee did not get beyond a ‘*décision de principe*’ for two more years. In 2004, the Moroccan side declared that ‘*la mise en place de cette structure [d’un sous-comité droits de l’homme] nécessite des échanges de vues afin de définir ses modalités, son format ainsi que ses objectifs à court et moyen*’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005: 37). In particular, the question of whether and how to treat ‘individual cases’ of human rights violations within a human rights subcommittee prolonged negotiations.⁷³ The subcommittee was finally set up in 2006 (EU-Morocco Association Council 2006) and met three times in 2006-2008 (EU-Morocco Association Council 2009: 14).

As early as 2001, Morocco had requested a ‘*statut avancé*’ in bilateral relations with the EU (EU-Morocco Association Council 2003b) and a ‘*cellule de réflexion*’ had met at least once before 2004 (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005). Potentially as a follow up, a ‘*reinforced political dialogue*’ with Morocco was established in

⁷² ‘In the framework of the Action Plans a number of Mediterranean countries have agreed to establish a subcommittee on human rights, democratisation and governance. The first decision setting up such a subcommittee will be taken with Morocco following agreement at the Association Committee meeting on 23 October 2003. Jordan and Tunisia also signalled their acceptance in principle.’ (Council of the EU 2004d: 38)

⁷³ ‘Il [M. Fassi Fihri] a insisté sur le rôle pionnier du Maroc en tant que premier pays partenaire euro-méditerranéen à avoir déclaré sa volonté de créer un tel sous-comité. A cet égard, il a souligné la nécessité pour ce sous-comité de garder sa valeur ajoutée, en abordant les éléments structurels, globaux et multidimensionnels. S’agissant de la proposition faite par l’Union européenne concernant le traitement des « cas individuels », M. Fassi Fihri a rappelé la position du Maroc. Il a réitéré la position du Maroc, de dialoguer et rechercher l’inspiration auprès de l’Union européenne. Par ailleurs, il a souligné la disponibilité du Maroc à aborder tous les sujets.’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 6)

2004 and has been convened on an annual basis since (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005, 2007; also EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 14; EU-Morocco Association Council 2008: 3; European Commission 2008d: 6), which underlines that Morocco's overall engagement in political dialogue has been high, at least since 2004.⁷⁴ In 2007, a 'groupe de travail ad hoc' was finally set up to conduct talks about the realisation of the 'statut avancé' within the ENP (EU-Morocco Association Council 2008). The 2008 Association Council finally adopted a 'joint road map' elaborated by the *ad hoc* Working Party (EU-Morocco Association Council 2009: 12).

Democracy assistance

At the very early stage of EC/EU democracy assistance, only one (bilateral) project targeting Morocco appears in the Commission's reports. In 1994, an international human rights NGO – the International Commission of Jurists – received €50.000 (in the range of the EU's later so-called 'micro-projects') for an identification mission, in order to suggest future projects for the promotion and protection of human rights in Morocco (European Commission 1996a: 34). For 1995, there is no complete overview of projects under the EIDHR. The Commission's report only mentions one project in Morocco that 'combines measures to combat female illiteracy with components designed to make them aware of their rights and training' (European Commission 1996c: 29), without providing any further details.

Under the MDP, Morocco received about 10 per cent of total funds for bilateral projects, amounting to about €2.3 million or €0.08 per capita (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 33). The 1999 evaluation mentioned nearly 20 bilateral and regional projects in Morocco or including Moroccan actors (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 85). Overall, these projects mostly intervened in the areas of women's rights and civil society, funding measures of training and education, as well as awareness building and campaigns and targeting primarily women and youth (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 86). These projects were mostly classified as '*grass roots activities*', but there were also two projects implemented with '*Moroccan authorities*' in 1997, including the Ministries of Justice and Human Rights (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 85). Interestingly, the

⁷⁴ 'In bilateral political relations, the enhanced political dialogue has become a forum for increasingly open political debate.' (European Commission 2006b: 2)

only projects evaluated in more detail were two regional projects where NGOs based in Europe had organised conferences in Europe (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 88-90).

The Commission committed €1.8 million for six macro projects in Morocco between 2001 and 2006. The project size ranged from €0.1 million to €0.6 million. Only half of them were implemented directly with Moroccan organisations, a fourth with a Spanish foundation and for two projects, funding was channelled through IOs. The projects addressed a variety of issues, ranging from human rights issues (in general, children's rights, and torture) to elections to civil society.

Morocco became eligible to the micro project scheme in 2004. Until 2006, the Commission appropriated nearly €3 million for micro projects and issued calls for proposals annually. In 2004 and 2005, it financed 22 projects with Moroccan organisations with a total of €1.7 million. The projects focused on two topics: First, on women's and children's rights, including economic and political participation, and second, on capacity building for civil society actors, including human rights organisations. In addition, projects covered issues ranging from judicial reform to journalism to torture.

Under the new EIDHR, Morocco is eligible for the CBSS. It was supposed to be launched in Morocco in 2007. The Commission committed €1.8 million for these new micro projects in the first two years.

Table 6.10: Democracy assistance projects under MEDA/ENPI in Morocco

Year	Priority	Title	Funding (mio. €)
1999	Socio-economic balance support	Support for Moroccan development associations	4.0
2000	III. Sector: Public Sector Modernisation: privatisation	Modernisation des juridictions	27.7
2005	Other components: Human rights and democratisation in the MED region	Programme to support the national plan for democracy and human rights	2.0
2005	Other components: Human rights and democratisation in the MED region	Strengthening of Moroccan civil society organisations working for democracy and human rights	3.0
2008	Governance/human rights priority	Support for the Ministry of Justice	20.0
2008	Governance/human rights priority	Support for the implementation of the recommendation of the IER	8.0

As far as the Commission's MEDA reports indicate for Morocco, there was only one project that could be considered as democracy assistance under the first MEDA pro-

gramme: In 1999, the Commission allocated €4 million for ‘support for Moroccan development associations’ under the socio-economic balance priority (European Commission 2000c: 39-40; European Commission 2001g: 41).

Under MEDA II, a large-scale capacity-building project targeting Moroccan courts was committed in 2000, but only later put into an explicit democracy assistance context (European Commission 2001g: 39-40 and annex II).⁷⁵ Thus, it is only after the Commission’s 2003 Communication on human rights and democracy in its Mediterranean policy (European Commission 2003c) that the next programming document included two democracy assistance projects supporting the national human rights plan and civil society (European Commission 2005d: 30-33). Interestingly, explaining the introduction of these projects, the Commission explicitly referred back to the Communication and the fact that ‘given that a large majority of Mediterranean countries already have a component devoted to human rights and good governance in their programming, it would be not only desirable but also necessary to give a clear sign of political support to the Moroccan government’ (European Commission 2005d: 8). The two projects more directly targeting human rights and civil society issues received only one sixth of the funds dedicated to capacity-building in the field of rule of law.⁷⁶

With regard to cooperation under the new ENPI, the Moroccan NIP for 2007-2010 includes two democracy assistance programmes, one on the judiciary with €20 million and the other on human rights with €8 million in 2008 (European Commission 2007g: 16-21, 44). It thus continues the line of MEDA II, only stepping up its efforts in this area.

Taken together, Morocco is one of the pioneers in implementing partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion with the EU. Regarding formalised political dialogue, the EU and Morocco have met more or less regularly since 2000 and set up

⁷⁵ In 2001, the Commission specified the budget as follows, with a budget of €27,6 million (European Commission 2001g: 39-40): ‘Modernisation of the law courts: The general objective of the project is to help improve the performance of the judicial system with a view to high ethical standards and transparent, independent and efficient dispute settlement. The specific objective of the project is to improve the structural capacities (and in particular computer systems) and organisation (training, databases and filing) of 44 of Morocco’s courts (16 Appeal Courts, 21 Courts of First Instance and 7 Administrative Courts).’

⁷⁶ Other large-scale MEDA projects that could be related to democracy assistance in the sense of (good) governance (administrative capacity building, legal reform, etc.) are the projects in support of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. These are, however, not put into a context of democracy assistance by the Commission.

a subcommittee on human rights in 2006. Apart from democracy assistance projects under the EIDHR since the early 1990s, democracy assistance had already been mainstreamed into MEDA in 1999. Funding for democracy assistance totals more than €70 million, of which 10 per cent were committed for the EIDHR.

6.1.6. Syria

Bilateral relations between the EU and Syria are still based on the 1977 cooperation agreement. Partners concluded negotiations for the new EMAA in 2004, but the EU's signature has been pending ever since. The agreement was re-initialled in late 2008 and should have been signed in 2009, but now the EU waits for the Syrian side to agree on a date (see below). Without an EMAA, Syria is not fully integrated into the ENP, lacking an action plan. While the country has always been eligible for funding under MEDA and ENPI, funding levels have been extremely low. Especially during the late 1990s, none of the projects committed were implemented. The situation has improved since, but both commitments and payments are still way below the regional average.

Political dialogue

As the EMAA with Syria has not even been signed yet, there is no institutional framework for political dialogue comparable to the other Mediterranean partners. Bilateral relations are still guided by the 1977 Cooperation Agreement which establishes a Cooperation Council, but neither includes an 'essential element' clause nor foresees 'political dialogue'.

Negotiations started in 1998, but apparently proved to be difficult and were finally concluded in 2004 (cf. Council of the EU 2004g, 2005b: 126; European Commission 2003b, 2006e; European Commission 2005i: 6).⁷⁷ The Council has ever since refused to sign the EMAA in light of political conditions in Syria, but particularly its role for regional stability (European Commission 2006e, 2007a: 55, European Commission 2009i, 2008a: 45; Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the

⁷⁷ Interestingly, the Commission contradicts itself in different reports: While it stated on the one hand that 'during 2000 significant progress was made in the negotiation of Association Agreements' (European Commission 2001g), referring to Algeria, Lebanon, and Syria, it complained on the other hand that, also in 2000, 'negotiations with Algeria, Lebanon and Syria did not make satisfactory progress' (European Commission 2001h: 69).

EU 2008: 71). In late 2008, the EMAA was ‘updated’ and it is now up to the Council to decide again on its signature (European Commission 2008e, 2009d), as ‘the question of the Association Agreement with Syria may be re-examined in the light of a thawing of relations between Damascus and the West’ (Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008: 71).⁷⁸

As EU actors have pointed out several times, the EMAA with its ‘essential element’ clause and the bodies established under it would provide a basis for strengthened political dialogue (European Commission 2001h: 69; Council of the EU 2004g; Council of the EU 2005b: 126; European Commission 2006e).⁷⁹ Apparently, Syria even used the argument of an insufficient legal basis to ward off European attempts to discuss matters relating to human rights and democracy in bilateral relations (Council of the EU 2006e: 200, Council of the EU and European Commission 2007, Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008: 71; European Commission 2006e).

Nevertheless, there have been ongoing bilateral contacts and the EU has repeatedly claimed that it addressed such matters vis-à-vis Syrian officials (European Commission 2000c: 41; Presidency of the EU 2002b, Presidency of the EU 2002a; Council of the EU 2004d: 116, Council of the EU 2005b: 125, Council of the EU 2006e: 200; European Commission 2006e). For example, overcoming a crisis of bilateral relations dating from the mid-1980s, meetings of the Cooperation Council have taken place again since 1994 (MEDEA Institute 2009). In addition, the negotiations of the EMAA provided for more or less regular interaction between 1996 and 2004, with at least ‘four rounds of exploratory talks’ between June 1996 and October

⁷⁸ Apparently, ‘Syria is the most recent Mediterranean country to have requested the launching of negotiations for an association agreement’ (European Commission 1999b: 29) and ‘has been quite reluctant to move forward since’ (European Commission 2002d: 6). However, after several years, the European Commission still noted that ‘Syria remains unprepared for the Association process. As will be seen below, a whole range of reforms need to be undertaken before the country is prepared for an EU/MED free trade zone’ (European Commission 2002d: 5) and that ‘Syria has yet to accept the political and economic provisions that have become the standard within the Barcelona Process’ (European Commission 2003b). So, while the delay in negotiations can be attributed to the Syrian regime, the delay in signing the EMAA is clear *ad hoc*, ex-ante political conditionality by the EU, mostly linked to Syria’s role for regional stability (cf. European Commission 2006e, 2009i, 2008a:45, Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008: 71).

⁷⁹ In addition, the question of Syria’s full participation in the ENP, i.e. the conclusion of an Action Plan, depends on the EMAA, as ‘Syria will benefit fully from the opportunities offered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, once the Association Agreement is signed. The EU and Syria will then negotiate an Action Plan of commonly agreed priorities as well as support for its implementation’ (European Commission 2007h: 3).

1997 (European Commission 1997) and at least eleven meetings from May 1998 until the end of 2003 (European Commission 1999b: 29, European Commission 2000c: 41, European Commission 2001g, 2003a: 109, European Commission 2003b). In between high level meetings marking the official negotiations, there were, at least in the beginning, also ‘informal negotiations’ and ‘technical meetings’ (European Commission 1999b: 29). Still, the EU admitted repeatedly that ‘Syrian authorities are traditionally reluctant to discuss human rights with outside interlocutors, including the EU’ (Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008: 71; also Council of the EU and European Commission 2007: 71 and Council of the EU 2006e: 200).

Democracy assistance

There are no traces of the EU providing funding for democracy assistance projects in Syria in the early 1990s. This is not surprising in light of the tense bilateral relations in general and the difficulties of cooperation under the four financial protocols in particular. Even after cooperation resumed, due to the Syrian position on the Iraq war in 1999, the third and fourth financial protocols were temporarily blocked by the EP due to the Syrian human rights situation (MEDEA Institute 2009).

Under the MDP, Syria received between 1996 and 1998 1 per cent of total funding, amounting to about €0.2 million or €0.01 per capita (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 33). Syria was not included in the detailed country evaluation, but the report severely criticised the very low level of funding (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 34, 51), relating it to ‘severe political obstacles to directly assist NGOs in these countries without agreement by the governments and the totalitarian nature of the political system’ (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 51).

As far as it is possible to trace, the EU only financed one macro project in 2004, giving €0.5 million to a German foundation to ‘promote citizenship’ in Syria.

Syria became eligible for the micro project scheme in 2004, together with the other Mediterranean (non-focus) countries. The EU has since then made annual appropriations of a total of €1 million, but only one call for proposals is recorded for 2005. And indeed, the reports until now only mention six projects committed under the €0.5 million 2004 budget. Of those, only one was implemented by the Syrian branch of an international NGO, all other partners were either European or, in one case,

Lebanese NGOs. The projects addressed issues of civil society as well as children's rights.⁸⁰

While information on the actual implementation of projects is scarce as usual in the relevant reports by the European Commission and the Council of the EU, Syrian authorities have apparently interfered more or less directly in the implementation of projects:

The EU was particularly concerned that human rights defender Anwar al-Bunni was sentenced to five years in prison for denouncing torture and poor prison conditions, and to a fine for allegedly not respecting Syrian law when setting up a training centre for civic rights co-funded by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. The centre was closed before starting operations and no solution could be found with the authorities on reopening it. Other EIDHR-funded projects have also faced severe implementation difficulties, the authorities challenging the legality of activities. (Council of the EU and European Commission 2007: 71; see also Council of the EU 2006e: 199)

Syria is not eligible for the CBSS under the new EIDHR.

Table 6.11: Democracy assistance projects under MEDA/ENPI in Syria

Year	Priority	Title	Funding (mio. €)
1996		<i>Municipal administration modernisation (1996-1998) / Modernisation of municipal administration I+II</i>	18.0
2005	Priority 5: Civil society and human rights	civil society development programme	2.0

Under the first MEDA programme, the EU and Syria did not agree any projects that could be regarded as direct democracy assistance. However, the EU committed €18 million for a programme on 'municipal administration modernisation' (European Commission 1999b: 29; European Commission 2000c: 43; European Commission 2001g: 45), that could be an indirect contribution, by building institutions and capacities for (good) governance at the local level. However, none of the projects committed under MEDA I with Syria became operational in 1996-1999: 'Owing to the fact that the MEDA Framework Convention had not been ratified by the end of the reporting period, none of these projects have reached implementation phase'

⁸⁰ However, in an overview of the implementation timetable of ongoing projects, the Commission in 2006/2007 reported the starting date of the EIDHR micro-projects in Syria as end of 2005 and marked the years 2006-2009 for implementation (European Commission 2007h: 55).

(European Commission 2000c: 42).⁸¹ Therefore, some of the MEDA I projects were recommitted under MEDA II, thus not really increasing overall commitments (European Commission 2001g). Thus, the most recent CSP for Syria (2007) reports the ‘municipal administration modernisation’ programme as ‘ongoing’ (European Commission 2007h: 20), with activities having started at the end of 2004 and implementation marked for 2004-2008 (European Commission 2007h: 54).

The EU committed a first project directly related to democracy promotion in Syria in the 2005 NIP. It allocated €2 million to a ‘civil society development programme’ that targeted both state and non-state actors, aiming at regulatory reform and capacity-building for civil society organisations (European Commission 2005i: 8, 23-24, 25; see also European Commission 2006a: 60). The 2007 CSP did not mention this project as ‘ongoing’ (European Commission 2007h: 19-21). Apparently, the financing agreement was only signed in late 2006 and activities had not yet started at the time the CSP was written, but the years 2007-2010 were marked for implementation (European Commission 2007h: 53, 55). However, the Commission did not report on the project at all in its Assistance Reports of 2007 and 2008. The Commission’s own assessment of MEDA II is that

[t]he Country Strategy Paper for 2002-2006 identified *five priorities*: (i) institution building; (ii) industrial modernisation; (iii) human resources development; (iv) trade enhancement; and (v) human rights / rule of law / civil society. The assistance provided has focused on the first three priorities. (European Commission 2007h: 19, emphasis in original)

Under the financial perspective covered by ENPI, the EU envisaged two projects related to democracy assistance for 2010, focussing on judicial reform and, again, local governance, totalling €30 million (European Commission 2007h: 31-32, 37). In addition, a third capacity-building project was made contingent on the creation of a

⁸¹ On the difficulties in signing the framework financing convention and individual programme financing conventions and thus implementing MEDA I programmes, see: European Commission 1998b: 12; European Commission 1999b: 28/29; European Commission 2000c: 4, 9; European Commission 2001g; European Commission 2002d: 6. The situation has slightly improved since 2002, as the European Commission has noted on several occasions: ‘In 2002, a first clear improvement in the EU-Syria MEDA co-operation was observed.’ (European Commission 2005i: 5) and ‘Overall, the Syrian government has improved its absorption capacity during the period. However, several constraints have hampered the effective implementation of projects and caused delays.’ (European Commission 2007h: 21) However, even in 2007, Syria was still clearly a ‘laggard’ in terms of overall cooperation under MEDA, considering that budget support had been introduced in other Mediterranean partners much earlier (and several countries qualified already for Twinning: ‘Aid has taken the form of technical assistance and policy advice. Sectoral support was not envisaged for lack of a clear commitment to reform. Budget support is not yet possible in view of the inadequate public expenditure management.’ (European Commission 2007h: 19)

National Human Rights Council with additional funds to be allocated in 2009 (European Commission 2007h: 25, 37). However, the Commission in 2007 stated that the ‘detail of EC interventions corresponding to these priorities will be defined at a later stage in a revised NIP for 2008-2010, in the light of further work to be undertaken with the Syrian government’ (European Commission 2007h: 32). Such a revised NIP has not yet been published, but there is a draft Commission Decision on ‘approving the Annual Action Programme 2008 in favour of Syria to be financed under Article 19 08 01 of the general budget of the European Communities’, i.e. the EIDHR, reconfirming and detailing commitments for 2008 (European Commission 2008b).

In summary, the picture of cooperation on democracy promotion with Syria is definitely the bleakest in the region, with hardly any cooperation taking place. Without an EMAA in force, there is no formalised political dialogue and human rights and democracy have clearly been excluded from other forms of dialogue. While both channels for democracy assistance have been used eventually, total funds amount to only around €3 million. Although more than a third of this sum has gone to the EIDHR, Syria was initially excluded from the new CBSS in 2007.

6.1.7. Tunisia

Just like Morocco, Tunisia concluded a first association agreement with the EEC in 1969. The EU and Tunisia also concluded negotiations on the new EMAA in 1995, which replaced the 1976 cooperation agreement in 1998 as the first (full) EMAA to enter into force in the region. It is complemented by the 2005 ENP action plan. Tunisia used to receive relatively high levels of development assistance, especially in terms of per capita funding, but the funding level has somewhat decreased under the new ENPI. However, the implementation of projects has been smoother than with most other countries from the very beginning of MEDA I.

Political dialogue

During the 1990s, before the entering into force of the EMAA, no regular, formalised political dialogue seems to have taken place. The last meeting of the then Cooperation Council was recorded for 1993 (see Schumacher 2005: 143). Following the entry into force of the EMAA in 1998, the Association Council met seven times until the

end of 2008 (see table 6.12 below). The delay between meetings varies between 12 and 34 months. On average, meetings took place about every 18 months. Minutes are available for four meetings. For the first session, neither the minutes nor any other document are publicly available. For the fifth and seventh meeting, only the draft agenda and EU statements are available. Formal decisions and recommendations of the Association Councils are published in the Official Journal. In meetings with Tunisia, the minister representing the EU presidency is usually just accompanied by senior officials from the Commission and the Council secretariat. Since 2003, the agenda of every meeting included a ‘[d]ialogue politique sur des sujets d’intérêt commun’, without further reference to the topics discussed.

Table 6.12: EU-Tunisia Association Council meetings

No	Date	Documentation	Reference
1	14.07.1998	- <i>Draft Minutes: not available</i> ⁸²	
2	24.01.2000	- Draft minutes	- EU-Tunisia Association Council 2000
3	29.01.2002	- Draft minutes	- EU-Tunisia Association Council 2003b
4	30.09.2003	- Draft minutes	- EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b
5	31.01.2005	- Provisional agenda - Draft EU statement	- EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005a - Council of the EU 2005d
6	19.11.2007	- Draft minutes	- EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b
7	10.11.2008	- Provisional agenda - Draft EU statement	- EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008a - Council of the EU 2008d

So there are no specific agenda items for topics related to democracy and human rights or a ‘political (human rights) dialogue’ in a narrow sense. However, for the second meeting, the EU notes in advance that

[d]uring dinner, the following points will be raised: human rights, Middle East peace process, Algeria, Libya, enlargement and free movement of persons. Tunisia will also raise the internal situation in Tunisia and developments in the region as well as its role in the UNSC [UN Security Council, VvH]. (Council of the EU 2000a: 1)

Similarly, the minutes for the fourth and sixth meeting mention that during the ‘political dialogue’, parties addressed political issues including democratisation and political reform in an ‘échange de vues informel’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council

⁸² The only trace that draft minutes exist is a recommendation by the Council of the EU to adopt them by written procedure, but the document (UE-TU 2603/98) is not even listed in the Council register (cf. Council of the EU 1999c).

2005b: 6; EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 9). However, the domestic political situation was usually also addressed under the ‘state of political and economic relations’, with a general development over time towards more detailed and more open assessments.

The minutes for the second to fourth meetings do not contain any detailed information on whether issues of human rights and democracy were addressed. On political dialogue itself, the EU called in 2002 for ‘un dialogue politique qui ne devrait pas connaître de sujet tabou’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2003b: 6) and stressed in 2003 ‘la volonté de la Commission d’améliorer l’efficacité de ce dialogue’ on matters of human rights and democracy (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b: 5). At the 2007 meeting, human rights and democracy had a more prominent place with regard to the political situation in Tunisia. The EU openly ‘encourageait le gouvernement tunisien à intensifier ses efforts sur la voie des réformes politiques’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 4), which was echoed by a vague Tunisian commitment to political reform (ibid.: 5). Furthermore, both parties pointed to the ‘relance du dialogue’ (ibid.: 4) and the ‘nouvelle dynamique’ (ibid.: 5), which underlines that this meeting marked the end of a period of serious tensions in EU-Tunisian relations, reflected in the long delay between Association Council meetings in 2005 and 2007.

The EU’s statements on the Association Council meetings provide a more complete picture of what issues the EU deemed relevant to raise (publicly) in advance of the meetings. While the statement in 2000 was very unspecific, welcoming and encouraging political reform and calling for an open and constructive political dialogue, statements from 2002 onwards were more specific and critical on these issues. Thus, from 2002 to 2007, the EU raised concerns about ‘the persistence of certain measures which are not in keeping with respect for human rights’ (same wording in Council of the EU 2005d: 7, EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 15; similar EU-Tunisia Association Council 2003b: 12, EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b: 11), referring to freedom of expression and association, the effective implementation of international human rights law, and the situation of human rights defenders. In addition, between 2002 and 2007, the EU urged the Tunisian authorities to facilitate EU democracy assistance projects under MEDA (civil society, indirectly also justice) and EIDHR (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b: 11, EU-Tunisia Association

Council 2005a: 7, EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 15). At the same time, the EU started to welcome the ‘attitude d’ouverture’ of Tunisian authorities in political dialogue since 2003 (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b: 10, Council of the EU 2005d: 6). In 2007, it highlighted ‘la qualité de ce dialogue politique’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 13), expressed in frequent visits of EU and Tunisian officials, and noted in 2008 a further ‘intensification since 2007’ of the political dialogue (Council of the EU 2008d: 2). At the same time, the open criticism of shortcomings in the field of human rights disappeared: While the same issues were addressed (see above), this was framed as ‘stepping up efforts’ (ibid. 4).

Apparently, the creation of subcommittees had been discussed at least since 2003, but at that time, neither party made a reference to a specific human rights subcommittee at the Association Council meeting (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b: 5). Thus, creating a first set of subcommittees in 2003, the EU-Tunisia Association Council decided only to ‘mainstream’ ‘matters relating to democratic principles and human rights’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2003a) in cooperation under the agreement. In its statements, the EU pushed only indirectly for the creation of such a subcommittee (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b: 11), ‘hoping’ ‘to see the creation of the subcommittee aimed at developing structured dialogue on democracy and human rights’ (Council of the EU 2005d: 6). When the subcommittee on human rights and democracy was finally set up in 2007 (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2007), both parties most enthusiastically welcomed the event (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 4, 6). In its statement, the EU expected this step to provide ‘une nouvelle dynamique dans les relations bilatérales’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 14). The subcommittee met for the first time in December 2007 and for the second time in October 2008, and the EU ‘appreciated’ the ‘constructive atmosphere (...) in which it was possible to broach all subjects with a large high-level delegation’ (Council of the EU 2008d: 4).

Democracy assistance

In the early 1990s, the Commission reported one project implemented in Tunisia. The Tunisian partner for this relatively large project worth €230.000 in 1993 was the Ministry of Justice which was supported in the ‘accomplishment of a miners [sic] code’ through ‘training programmes for judges’ (European Commission 1994: 19). For 1995, there is no complete overview of projects under the EIDHR. The Commis-

sion's report only mentioned 'an innovative scheme in Tunisia, which brings together experts from the region and elsewhere to debate the issue of the death penalty in Islamic countries' (European Commission 1996c: 29), without providing any further details.

Under the MDP, Tunisia received between 1996 and 1998 1 per cent of total funding, amounting to about €0.2 million or €0.01 per capita (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 33). While Tunisia was included in the country evaluation, this did not include an overview similar to that for the other countries evaluated, as '[w]ith only two [bilateral] Tunisian projects, it is difficult to make any useful assessment in more detail' (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 110). The evaluation openly deplored that efforts had been limited from the outset and urged the Commission to step up its engagement despite manifest 'difficulties to implement MDP projects because of the Government's opposition to any such interventions' (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 110, see also 34, 51). Interestingly, two of the projects evaluated in detail for Tunisia are the same regional projects as evaluated for Morocco; a third regional project was actually implemented by a Tunisian NGO in Tunisia (Karkutli and Bützler 1999: 112-115).

Tunisia was one of the focus countries, so there were macro projects committed in 2002-2004 and Tunisia was eligible for the micro project scheme from 2002 onwards.

Between 2001 and 2003, the Commission committed funds of €1.7 million for four macro projects. However, it seems that the 2001 project with the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) was transformed into a smaller project in 2002, which was recommitted in 2006, reflecting fundamental difficulties in implementation. This project aimed at capacity building for the LTDH itself. Another project with the LTDH, focussing on the rule of law, was financed in 2003, and a fourth project on trade unions was implemented by a German foundation.

Even though Tunisia as a focus country was already eligible for the micro project scheme in 2002, the EU's reports do not contain any traces of micro projects implemented. For the first two years, this might be due to the general difficulties encountered by the Commission, as the Delegations were still in the middle of the process of 'deconcentration' and the micro project scheme was put on hold during an internal audit (European Commission 2004b). However, Tunisia is the only country where

the Commission did not appropriate funds for micro projects annually and for 2004 and 2005, no calls for proposals were recorded.

Tunisia is not eligible for the CBSS under the new EIDHR.⁸³

Table 6.13: Democracy assistance projects under MEDA/ENPI in Tunisia

Year	Priority	Title	Funding (mio. €)
2000 2001 2002	Human rights, civil society, gender issues and equality/ Social development, civil society	Renforcement société civile Strengthening of civil society	1.5
2000 2002	Human rights, civil society, gender issues and equality	Appui aux médias	2.15
2003	Priorité 1 : Gouvernance et Etat de droit	Programme de modernisation du système judiciaire	30.0

The Commission's MEDA reports do not indicate any projects in the mid-1990s in Tunisia that could be considered as democracy assistance. Projects directly related to democracy assistance were first committed early under MEDA II. A civil society and a media project were prepared since around 2000 (European Commission 2002a: 101; European Commission 2002f: 38, Annex 2: 3-4; European Commission 2003a: 112, 191). A large-scale project aimed at capacity-building of the judiciary in 2003 was allocated nearly ten times more funding those two projects (European Commission 2002f: 27-29, 38). When going beyond the allocation of funds, however, later programming documents for Tunisia reveal that none of the three democracy-related projects were implemented smoothly: While the civil society project was cancelled, the Commission complained in 2005 and 2007 about the delay of the other two projects, due to 'implementation difficulties' in the case of the media project and to 'lengthy negotiations' for the rule of law project (European Commission 2005e: 2, 5; European Commission 2007i: 13).⁸⁴

⁸³ The Commission specifies two criteria for eligibility (Strategy Paper 2007-2010: 9), but it is not mentioned which of them is not fulfilled by countries not qualifying. Therefore, it is not clear whether Syria and Tunisia are lacking the precondition for support to civil society ('a certain context within civil society allowing for the development and activities of civil society organisations') or whether, on the contrary, their civil societies are simply not in need of support (i.e. there is no 'well-founded need for more effective action by civil society organisations in the field of human rights and democratisation').

⁸⁴ 'Some projects that are under way are considered to be problematic. Implementation of the MEDA so-called third-generation projects covering good governance, the rule of law and civil society is tricky. It was not possible to realise the 'civil society' project, the 'support for the media' project has just been signed and appraisal of the project 'modernisation of justice' will be starting soon.' (European Commission 2005e: 2)

This is reflected in the programming of funds for cooperation under the new ENPI and the Commission's 'lesson learned' from MEDA:

In the light of the difficulties in reaching agreement and in implementing *3rd generation* MEDA projects (media: implementation difficulties; justice: lengthy negotiations; NGO project: cancelled) and EIDHR projects, the Commission takes the view that efforts for the 2007-2010 NIP should focus on strengthening the rule of law by improving the mechanisms of good economic governance (in no sense is this tantamount to pulling out of the 3rd generation projects, because the Media and Justice projects are being implemented during the initial period of the CSP and any follow-up can take place only on the basis of the results of implementation). (European Commission 2007i: 13, emphasis in original)

Translated into the actual programming of funds in the NIP, this means that the Commission did not commit any funds for projects that openly attempted to promote democracy. The only programme addressing issues of (good) governance that could be considered democracy assistance in the broadest sense is one to generally support the implementation of the action plan, to which €30 million were committed.

In a nutshell, the EU's cooperation on democracy promotion with Tunisia presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, cooperation has started early and promisingly, but on the other hand, it is marked by significant difficulties in the actual implementation of measures. The EU and Tunisia opened formalised political dialogue in 1998, but delays between Association Council meetings have been relatively long. After the 2005 meeting, there was a downright interruption of political dialogue, which only resumed in 2007 at the same time that partners agreed on a human rights subcommittee. Similarly, first democracy assistance projects were committed early on, in the mid-1990s, under the MDP and under MEDA II in 2000, but the implementation of projects under both channels has been complicated and a number of projects were cancelled. Of the €35 million initially committed, only around 5 per cent were planned for the EIDHR. In 2007, the European Commission abandoned its efforts at implementing new democracy assistance projects under both ENPI and the EIDHR.

'The MEDA Programme covers the key areas of the modernisation of Tunisia's economy and society: the macroeconomic dimension, sectoral reforms (customs, ports, privatisation, etc.), the education sector as a whole, financial reform, sickness insurance, the media and the justice system. Preparation and implementation of the latter two programmes are delicate by virtue of their very nature, and they are being effected with great difficulty.' (European Commission 2007i: 11)

6.2. Comparison

This section builds on the detailed mapping of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance between the EU and seven Arab authoritarian countries since the early 1990s in section 6.1. above. It provides a systematic comparison of the implementation of these partnership-based instruments over time and across countries, which allows assessing the respective values for ‘cooperation’. This regional perspective shows two major empirical findings: First, there is a clear regional trend over time; second, this trend goes hand in hand with significant cross-country variation. Generally, just as the framework for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion in Euro-Mediterranean relations evolves, so does cooperation. Changes in the EU’s policy are translated into action, including the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. New instruments or new provisions are, after a while, implemented in all seven countries. In addition, there is a clear trend towards ‘more’ and ‘better’ cooperation in line with the EU stepping up its efforts rhetorically. However, the empirical mapping reveals significant variation across countries, both in a synchronous and a diachronic comparison. Some countries are quicker in implementing new instruments than others, and the intensity and content of the resulting cooperation varies, e.g. with regard to the funding levels for democracy assistance or the role of human rights and democracy in political dialogue. What follows is a comparison of political dialogue and democracy assistance with the seven countries during the period from 1990-2008, attributing values for the implementation of the two instruments for each country and, as far as the data allows, for each year. This allows a detailed assessment of variation over time and across countries and an aggregation of overall values of ‘cooperation’ in the final section of this chapter.

6.2.1. Political dialogue

Being concerned with the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, the thesis investigates formalised political dialogue between the EU and seven Mediterranean partners within the Association Councils and specific subcommittees (see chapter 5). Drawing on the empirical findings of the previous country sections (see chapter 6.1.), this section systematically compares the imple-

mentation of political dialogue regarding the institutionalisation of these two fora as well as formal aspects and the content of meetings conducted.

So, the first step is to ask if formal political dialogue has been institutionalised and become operational. Table 6.14 below summarises the empirical findings for the two fora created under the EMAAs, i.e. the Association Council and specific subcommittees. Except for Syria, EMAAs are in place and provide the legal basis for the conduct of formalised political dialogue. This puts Syria in a unique situation in the region, as there is no formal political dialogue institutionalised with Syria up to today. For the other six countries studied here, the first thing to notice is the great variation between the points in time of the entering into force of their respective EMAA, ranging from 1998 for Tunisia to 2006 for Lebanon.⁸⁵ Leaving this variation aside, the first Association Council meetings always took place shortly after the EMAA became effective. Thus, the date that political dialogue conducted in this framework became operational is directly linked to the ratification of the EMAA, but does not vary across countries otherwise. Subcommittees concerned with matters relating to democracy and human rights have been institutionalised with all countries except for Algeria and Syria since 2003/2004. They have all met for the first time shortly after their set-up. However, there is variation across countries regarding the time span between the entry into force of the EMAA and the formal decision to create such a subcommittee.⁸⁶ Jordan and Lebanon agreed to the set-up only a year after this question became relevant. Especially Jordan, the first country in the region to establish a human rights subcommittee, can be considered a 'pioneer'. Morocco and Egypt, but particularly Tunisia as the 'laggard', have taken much longer, hinting at more difficult negotiations with the EU. While the question is again not applicable to Syria due to the lack of a legal basis provided by an EMAA, the fact that the EU-Algeria Association Council has not yet created such a subcommittee is a clear exception to the rule: As the EMAA has entered into force only late, the delay could still be comparable to other countries. Considering the broader picture of political dialogue under the EMAA, however, shows that the delay reflects some difficulties in dealing with matters of human rights and democracy. Compared with Egypt and Lebanon, Algeria is

⁸⁵ On average, the EMAAs came into effect five years after their conclusion, so the delay due to the ratification process is similar across countries and can therefore be ignored. It is interesting to note that only the first EMAA, concluded with Tunisia, was ratified more quickly, after only three years.

⁸⁶ For Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan, the delay is measured with reference to the 2003 policy change, not to the year when their respective EMAAs entered into force.

the only country among the seven case study countries to mainstream matters relating to democracy and human rights instead of setting up a specific subcommittee together with other technical subcommittees after 2003. These other subcommittees were quickly set-up in 2007 and the EU repeatedly and publicly suggested the addition of a human rights subcommittee. The apparent reluctance makes Algeria thus the real ‘laggard’ in the region regarding the institutionalisation of political dialogue in the framework of specific subcommittees.

Table 6.14: Institutionalisation of formal political dialogue

Country	EMAA	Association Council		Specific subcommittee		
	In force	First meeting	Institutionalised & operational	Set-up	First meeting	Institutionalised & operational
Algeria	2005	2006	yes	no	n/a	no
Egypt	2004	2004	yes	2007	2008	medium (0)
Jordan	2002	2002	yes	2004	2005	quick (+)
Lebanon	2006	2006	yes	2007	2007	quick (+)
Morocco	2000	2000	yes	2006	2006	medium (0)
Syria	n/a	n/a	no	n/a	n/a	no
Tunisia	1998	1998	yes	2007	2007	late (-)

Before assessing the conduct of political dialogue in terms of formal aspects and content, table 6.15 and table 6.16 provide an overview of when meetings have actually taken place. They show that overall, the EU and its Mediterranean partners have conducted political dialogue on a regular basis. Especially since 2007, annual meetings of all existing Association Councils and human rights subcommittees have become the regional standard. Of course, the number of meetings varies across countries according to the dates when the EMAA entered into force and the subcommittees were created.

Table 6.15: Association Council meetings

Country	90-97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
Algeria									no	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Egypt								1 st	no	2 nd	3 rd	4 th
Jordan						1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	6 th	7 th
Lebanon										1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Morocco				1 st	2 nd	no	3 rd	4 th	5 th	no	6 th	7 th
Syria												
Tunisia		1 st	no	2 nd	no	3 rd	4 th	no	5 th	no	6 th	7 th

Table 6.16: Meetings of human rights subcommittees

Country	90-97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
Algeria									n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Egypt								n/a	n/a	n/a	no	1 st
Jordan						n/a	n/a	no	1 st	no	2 nd	3 rd
Lebanon										n/a	1 st	2 nd
Morocco				n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Syria												
Tunisia		n/a	n/a	1 st	2 nd							

As the EU has a highly standardised approach to political dialogue in the region, even slight differences in the formal conduct of meetings can indicate variation in the quality of political dialogue. While there is hardly any information on the meetings of the human rights subcommittees, it is possible to collect a range of data on the meetings of the Association Councils. To assess their formal ‘quality’, three indicators are used: the intervals between the meetings; their documentation; and the role of political dialogue on the agenda. Based on the empirical findings in the previous country sections, these indicators are aggregated to arrive at an overall assessment of the formal ‘quality’ of each meeting, followed by an overall assessment of each indicator and of the overall formal ‘quality’ of political dialogue with each country.

As elaborated in chapter 4, the variation in the frequency and transparency of meetings as well as the role given to human rights and democracy on the agenda indicate differences in the formal ‘quality’ of Association Council meetings over time and across countries. Table 6.17 below summarises the aggregate assessment of the formal ‘quality’ of each Association Council meeting as good (+), medium (0), or bad (-), before describing the overall empirical findings for each indicator. Overall, there is little variation over time, as most countries vary between either medium and good or medium and bad values. Standards for political dialogue have changed over time and it is difficult to compare the conduct before and after 2003. However, since 2003, there has been a slight regional trend towards better formal quality, except for Tunisia.

Table 6.17: Formal aspects of Association Council meetings – overall values

Country	90-97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
Algeria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	no	+	0	+
Egypt	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	no	-	0	0
Jordan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	+	0	0	+	+	+
Lebanon	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	+	+
Morocco	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	+	no	0	+	+	no	+	+
Syria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Tunisia	n/a	0	no	+	no	0	0	no	0	no	-	0

On average, annual meetings of the Association Councils are the standard in the region. The intervals between the meetings have been around 12 months for Algeria, Jordan, and Lebanon and only slightly longer for Egypt and Morocco. Only the EU-Tunisia Association Council meetings have often been delayed much longer, with an average interval of around 21 months. Two kinds of special occurrences might indicate difficulties in the conduct of political dialogue: The postponement of meetings might be caused by simple scheduling problems or by a more substantial conflict between the two partners. The same holds true for unusually long delays between meetings. Postponements are recorded for the first meeting of the EU-Algeria Association Council (2006) and the seventh (and last) meeting of the EU-Jordan Association Council (2008). Delays of more than 18 months have occurred in Egypt between 2004 and 2006 as well as in Morocco between 2004 and 2007. Similar delays have been the rule, not the exception, in the case of the meetings of the EU-Tunisia Association Council, but especially between 2005 and 2007, political dialogue has been interrupted for an unusually long time.

Regarding the documentation of meetings, the availability of minutes providing the highest degree of transparency is not the rule and varies across countries. For Lebanon and Morocco, minutes are available for all meetings; for Tunisia, Jordan, and Algeria, minutes are still available for most meetings; only for Egypt, there are no minutes available. When there are no minutes available, the Council secretariat publishes at least the draft agenda and in most cases the draft EU statement. Exceptions are only two meetings without even an agenda, for Tunisia in 1998 and Jordan in 2004, and the 2006 meeting with Egypt, where the EU did not even issue a statement. By contrast, the EU released some of its statements to the press, for Egypt in 2004 and in four cases for Jordan (2003-2006). On the occasion of the EU-Lebanon

Association Council in 2006, the two parties even issued a joint statement (cf. Council of the EU 2006g).

Looking at the agenda of the meetings, it is apparent that ‘political dialogue’ has appeared as a separate agenda item in all meetings since 2003. It is mostly referred to an informal part of the meeting and the topics to be discussed are often not specified or only in very general terms. An explicit reference to the ‘democratic process’ or ‘political reforms’ can only be found for Jordan (since 2003) and Morocco (since 2004). These topics, however, are usually not included under the heading of ‘political dialogue’, but in a section on the general relations between the EU and the country. The agendas for meetings with Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon display a ‘standard’ wording for political dialogue, whereas the agendas for meetings with Tunisia are even less informative. With Morocco, the ‘advanced status’ has appeared as an additional topic since 2004, but the ‘reinforced’ political dialogue has rarely been mentioned.

Table 6.18 summarises the values for each indicator aggregated over time, with short (+), medium (0), or long (-) intervals, good (+), mixed (0), or limited (-) documentation, as well as explicit (+), regular (0), or meagre (-) references to democracy and human rights on the agenda. Taken together, these findings are aggregated to an assessment of the overall formal quality of political dialogue as good (+), medium (0), or bad (-).

Table 6.18: Formal aspects of Association Council meetings – overall values

Country	Intervals	Documentation	Agenda	Overall
Algeria	short (+)	mixed (0)	regular (0)	medium (0 ⁺)
Egypt	medium (0)	limited (-)	regular (0)	medium (0)
Jordan	short (+)	mixed (0)	explicit (+)	good (+)
Lebanon	short (+)	good (+)	regular (0)	good (+)
Morocco	medium (0)	good (+)	explicit (+)	good (+)
Syria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Tunisia	long (-)	mixed (0)	meagre (-)	bad (-)

Overall, most countries meet the regional standards or do even better, indicating mostly ‘medium’ or ‘good’ results for the formal quality of political dialogue. Especially Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco achieve good results, whereas Algeria and Egypt occupy the middle ground. Only for Tunisia, the indicators point at a formal quality of political dialogue clearly below the regional average. The EU and Syria have not yet institutionalised and conducted formal political dialogue.

However, the formal quality is only one dimension to look at. Even more interesting is the content of the political dialogue conducted: Have matters relating to democracy and human rights actually been addressed and if so, in what way? The minutes of the Association Council meetings provide the basis for a first assessment that is then verified based on other sources of information on the conduct of political dialogue more generally. Furthermore, the discussions surrounding the set-up and the meetings of the technical subcommittees dealing with democracy and human rights issues provide further insight into how the two parties handle political dialogue on these matters.

Analysing the minutes of the Association Council meetings, as far as they are available, reveals great variation in the content of political dialogue conducted on these occasions. The role of explicit ‘political dialogue’ has varied during the meetings that have been held since 2003. However, this heading usually does not make any explicit reference to democracy and human rights and the minutes contain no detailed information on this – ‘informal’ – part of the meeting. More interestingly, topics relating to democracy and human rights might or might not be addressed under different headings, ranging from statements made by the EU to the discussion of specific issues. Based on the detailed country mapping (see 6.1.), table 6.19 below summarises the content of individual Association Council meetings in addressing issues relevant for a meaningful political dialogue as good (+), medium (0), or bad (-).

Table 6.19: Summary of the content of Association Council meetings

Country	90-97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
Algeria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	no	0	?	0
Egypt	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	?	no	?	?	?
Jordan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	+	?	?	+	+	?
Lebanon	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	-	0
Morocco	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	-	no	?	+	+	no	+	+
Syria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Tunisia	n/a	?	no	-	no	-	0	no	?	no	0	?

Overall, the content of political dialogue conducted in Association Council meetings qualifies as ‘good’ for Jordan and Morocco and as ‘medium’ for Algeria, Lebanon, and Tunisia. For Egypt, there is no information in the form of minutes available, and EU-Syria relations still lack institutionalised political dialogue. The minutes of the

EU-*Jordan* Association Council meetings contain, from the start, a lot of information on political dialogue relating to democracy and human rights. Interestingly, these topics were not confined to the informal, and usually non-transparent, part of the meetings, but have been part of the general discussions under different headings. Already in the first Association Council meeting in 2002, partners discussed the ‘democratic evolution in Jordan and the region’ (EU-Jordan Association Council 2002: 7), including parliamentary elections, international human rights law, and bilateral cooperation for the ‘promotion of the role of women and civil society’ (ibid.: 5). The following meetings touched upon various issues related to the national agenda for political reform, such as the judiciary, civil society and human and women’s rights (EU-Jordan Association Council 2004b: 4-6), legal reforms on elections, political parties, and the media (EU-Jordan Association Council 2007: 4-5), or the government’s cooperation with NGOs (EU-Jordan Association Council 2009: 5-6). This overall good picture hardly varies over time. By contrast, the case of *Morocco* shows that 2003 really marked a turning point in the conduct of political dialogue, also in terms of content. Before 2003, political dialogue hardly touched upon issues of democracy and human rights, but these issues have been given a much more prominent role ever since. Again, the two partners discussed these issues openly under the general headings instead of limiting them to the informal part of the meetings. Before 2003, the meetings did not include political dialogue as a specific topic, and EU representatives only made very general remarks on Moroccan political reform efforts (EU-Morocco Association Council 2001: 4), highlighting the need to respect human rights in the fight against terrorism (EU-Morocco Association Council 2003b: 7). After 2003, partners apparently spent more time on discussing specific reform projects, e.g. the *Instance Équité et de Réconciliation* and the new family code (*moudawana*) (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005: 4; EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 4; EU-Morocco Association Council 2008: 4), and bilateral cooperation on human rights, gender equality, and the judiciary (EU-Morocco Association Council 2005: 6; EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 4). While the Moroccan foreign minister Fihri had in 2005 still highlighted ‘que les Droits de l’Homme étaient d’abord l’affaire des Marocains répondant à un impératif interne’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2007: 6), in 2008 he claimed that Morocco ‘avait besoin de l’Europe pour la réussite démocratique, et améliorer son système judiciaire’ (EU-Morocco Association Council 2009: 5).

Compared to findings for these two countries for which dialogue is deemed ‘good’, namely Jordan and Morocco, the content of meetings with the three Mediterranean partners with ‘medium’ levels of political dialogue is less comprehensive. The minutes available for *Algeria* contain very little information on dialogue related to human rights and democracy, but by 2008, partners explicitly include ‘la situation politique et des droits de l’homme en Algérie’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 5) in the political dialogue. The few details provided on the actual topics discussed comprehend political pluralism and elections, so there is a slight improvement over time. Not surprisingly, partners are also preoccupied with matters related to the ‘stabilité politique’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2007c: 4) or ‘la situation sécuritaire’ (EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 6). Also for *Lebanon*, the minutes reveal hardly any content related to democracy and human rights, especially for the meeting in 2007. In the context of Lebanon’s socio-economic reform agenda, EU representatives have occasionally asked for ‘necessary reforms in the area of rule of law (e.g.: independence of the judiciary)’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2007b: 5; also EU-Lebanon Association Council 2009: 5), but especially the meeting in 2007 was overshadowed by the ‘tough political and security circumstances’ (EU-Lebanon Association Council 2008: 4). Looking at the EU-*Tunisia* Association Council, the year 2003 is again important as a turning point. Meetings before 2003 did apparently not address democracy and human rights issues at all (cf. EU-Tunisia Association Council 2000, 2003b), while the situation after 2003 is slightly better. In 2005, political dialogue touches upon ‘le processus démocratique en Tunisie’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2005b: 6) and in 2007, partners discuss extensively but in very general terms the need for political reforms to advance pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 4). However, none of the three countries falls consistently behind the minimal regional standard of formally including political dialogue in their Association Council meetings since 2003. As there are no minutes available for the meetings of the EU-*Egypt* Association Council, any assessment of their content has to rely on different sources.

This picture of the content of political dialogue with the different Mediterranean partners is largely confirmed when looking at other sources where the EU has commented on the conduct of political dialogue in the framework of Association Council meetings. Jordan and Morocco have regularly been praised for their ‘intensive’ and ‘open’ political dialogue, whereas there are hardly any comments regarding the other

countries. Interestingly, the EU has repeatedly voiced its ‘hope’ for intensified political dialogue vis-à-vis Tunisia, suggesting that the political dialogue conducted has not been substantial yet. Unfortunately, there is little information on political dialogue with Egypt. Put positively, the EU has at least not voiced any complaints. In addition, an *ad hoc* group on human rights issues in Egypt met in 2004, so political issues must have been addressed between the two parties. However, the delay in the institutionalisation of a formal subcommittee and the postponement of its first meeting suggest difficulties. Taken together, the content of political dialogue conducted in the EU-Egyptian Association Council is assumed to be ‘medium’ in its relevance for discussing human rights and democracy. For Syria, these considerations again do not apply. As the country mapping (see 6.1.6.) has shown, there are regular contacts between the EU and Syria, especially in the context of EMAA negotiations. The EU, however, clearly states that attempts at discussing democracy and human rights in this context have been rebuffed by the Syrian counterparts, alluding to the missing legal basis for such a political dialogue. Table 6.20 below summarises the findings outlined so far for an overall assessment of the quality of the content of political dialogue conducted primarily in the framework of the Association Council meetings.

Table 6.20: Summary of the overall content of political dialogue

Country	Minutes	Other	Overall
Algeria	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)
Egypt	n/a	medium (0)	medium (0)
Jordan	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)
Lebanon	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)
Morocco	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)
Syria	n/a	bad (-)	bad (-)
Tunisia	medium (0)	bad (-)	medium (0)

As mentioned before, it is more difficult to assess the formal quality and content of political dialogue in the technical subcommittees as compared to Association Council meetings. Considering more detailed information on the setting-up of the subcommittees in the first place and on the intervals between meetings as a formal aspect allows, however, to draw some conclusions on how the partners have dealt with the challenge of further institutionalising political dialogue on sensitive issues. Since around 2003, the EU has regularly reported on the state of setting up human rights subcommittees in its annual human rights reports (see annex 7). Difficulties and progress in negotiations reported there reflect the final delays in institutionalisation (see

table 6.14 above). The set-up of these structures was unproblematic with Jordan and Lebanon. The longer delays for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are due to disagreements on the treatment of ‘individual cases’ of human rights violations (Council of the EU 2005d, EU-Morocco Association Council 2007). For Morocco, it is interesting to note that it was the first country to agree ‘in principle’ to the creation of a human rights subcommittee in 2003, so the relatively late set-up betrayed the EU’s expectation that Morocco would be the pioneer on this (Council of the EU 2004d: 38). Similarly, Tunisia has always been a pioneer in Euro-Mediterranean relations, including the creation of technical subcommittees – except for the one on democracy and human rights. Finally, the EU’s repeated calls for a human rights subcommittee with Algeria clearly show that the failure to create such an institution by 2008 is due to a refusal by the Algerian side (EU-Algeria Association Council 2009: 11). While there is hardly any information on the actual conduct of political dialogue within the subcommittees, the intervals between meetings are at least one formal aspect worth considering (see table 6.16 above and table 6.21 below). Meetings have been held more or less on an annual basis, which can be considered as the regional standard. Especially since 2007, the failure to convene a meeting is interpreted as a sign of difficult implementation. By contrast, meetings before 2007 are an indicator of particularly good implementation. Therefore, going beyond the mere fact of whether a meeting has or has not been held, Jordan and Morocco gain extra credit for holding meetings before 2007. The long delay before convening a first meeting of the subcommittee with Egypt betrays difficulties. This impression is confirmed by the postponement of the first meeting by Egyptian authorities in 2008 after a human rights resolution had been passed by the EP (European Parliament 2008).

Table 6.21: Detailed assessment of subcommittee meetings

Country	90-97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
Algeria									n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Egypt								(+)	n/a	n/a	-	0
Jordan						n/a	n/a	0	+	0	0	0
Lebanon										n/a	0	0
Morocco				n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	0	0
Syria												
Tunisia		n/a	0	0								

Taken together, the institutionalisation and implementation of political dialogue in technical subcommittees is a third factor that needs to be considered when assessing

the quality of political dialogue. As most subcommittees have only recently become operational, this factor helps little with a detailed assessment of variation over time, but adds to an evaluation of the overall quality of political dialogue with a country (see table 6.22).

Table 6.22: Overall assessment of political dialogue in subcommittees

Country	Set-up	Meetings	Overall
Algeria	no	n/a	no (--)
Egypt	medium (0)	malus (-)	medium (0 ⁻)
Jordan	quick (+)	bonus (+)	good (+)
Lebanon	quick (+)	neutral	good (+)
Morocco	medium (0)	bonus (+)	medium (0 ⁺)
Syria	n/a	n/a	n/a
Tunisia	late (-)	neutral	bad (-)

So, to sum up, the remainder of this section brings together the various aspects discussed above to come to an overall assessment of the implementation of formalised political dialogue between the EU and its seven Mediterranean partners. It first of all aggregates the different dimensions in order to give an overall impression of the quality of political dialogue with each country. It then discusses in more detail the variation in the implementation of political dialogue over time, highlighting regional patterns and country-variation.

Regarding the quality of political dialogue conducted in the framework of the Association Councils, the role of content is emphasised over the formal aspects (see figure 6.1 below). In a second step, the role of subcommittees is considered (see figure 6.2 below) and the overall quality of political dialogue assessed.

Figure 6.1: Quality of political dialogue in Association Councils

<i>Formal quality</i>	Good	Medium	Bad
<i>Content</i>			
Good	Jordan Morocco		
Medium	Lebanon	Algeria Egypt	Tunisia
Bad			(Syria)

For most countries, the formal quality and the quality of the content correspond. This is the case for Jordan and Morocco with good overall values as well as Algeria and Egypt with medium overall values. Lebanon and Algeria do fairly well on the content, but Association Council meetings with Lebanon show a much better quality than those with Tunisia. Syria is the only country without a formalised political dia-

logue, and the analysis of EU-Syrian relations suggests that this fact is not compensated by any informal but meaningful dialogue on democracy and human rights related issues.

Figure 6.2: Overall quality of political dialogue

<i>Association Council Subcommittee</i>	Good	Medium	Bad
Good	Jordan	Lebanon	
Medium	Morocco	Egypt	
Bad		Algeria	(Syria) Tunisia

The picture is modified for some countries when considering the set-up and meetings of specific subcommittees dealing with matters of democracy and human rights. The otherwise good Moroccan performance is slightly challenged by the difficulties encountered in reaching an agreement on the set-up of such a subcommittee. In comparison, the process was much less complicated and faster with Lebanon, suggesting an overall good quality of political dialogue. The failure to create a subcommittee at all in Algeria is, by contrast, a serious challenge. Taken together, the quality of political dialogue with the seven countries can be ranked from top to bottom as follows: Jordan; Morocco and Lebanon; Egypt; Algeria; Tunisia; Syria. Finally, table 6.23 below summarises the aggregated assessment of the quality of political dialogue on a country-year basis to discuss variation over time.

Table 6.23: Detailed summary of overall assessment of political dialogue

Country	90-97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
Algeria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	no	0	-	-
Egypt	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	no	-	-	0
Jordan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	+	0	+	+	+	0
Lebanon	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	-	0
Morocco	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	-	no	0	+	+	+	+	+
Syria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Tunisia	n/a	0	no	-	no	-	0	no	0	no	-	0

From this summary and the above mapping, a clear regional pattern regarding the more formal aspects of political dialogue emerges. In all countries except for Syria, political dialogue has been institutionalised and become operational with the entry into force of the respective EMAA. Since 2003, the formal quality of political dialogue has improved in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco, creating a new regional standard, also in terms of content. Technical subcommittees dealing with democracy

and human rights have been set up since 2004, after an initial phase of ‘mainstreaming’ these topics into the work of other bodies under the EMAAs. Except for Algeria, all countries with an EMAA in force had created such a subcommittee by 2007. However, there is significant variation across countries. First of all, the opening of formalised political dialogue crucially depends on the entry into force of the respective EMAA, resulting in a delay of almost ten years between Tunisia as the first and Lebanon as the last country to open dialogue. The regional pattern is confirmed, however, when focusing on the asynchronous comparison, starting with the coming into effect of the EMAAs. Clearly, Syria is the absolute outsider, as no formalised political dialogue at all has been institutionalised yet. However, without an EMAA, this is still in line with the regional pattern. Algeria is the only country that goes against the regional trend, mainstreaming democracy and human rights related issues into political dialogue held in technical subcommittees, but not creating a specific subcommittee for this purpose in 2007. Despite these regional patterns, there is variation in the quality of political dialogue not only across countries but also within countries over time. This variation does not form similarly clear trends but rather oscillates. The quality of political dialogue has been fairly consistent over time with Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Algeria and Egypt seem to experience a slight deterioration while political dialogue with Morocco has rather improved over time. In light of the regional patterns and the relatively consistent variation within countries over time, the variation across countries found in the overall assessment is a fairly accurate summary of the quality of political dialogue in the seven countries.

6.2.2. Democracy assistance

The second partnership-based instrument for democracy promotion investigated in detail is democracy assistance. Since the early 1990s, the EU has created a range of different programmes as the institutional prerequisite for implementing projects. These programmes make use of two different channels for democracy assistance (see chapter 5). The EU’s ‘horizontal’ EIDHR, specifically created for providing democracy assistance, follows a ‘bottom-up’ approach, targeting mainly non-state actors: after a first experimental stage, the EU created the MDP (1995-1999) and applied the global EIDHR ‘Initiative’ (2000-2006) and ‘Instrument’ (since 2007) to the Mediterranean countries. In addition, the EU mainstreamed the option to implement democ-

racy assistance into its 'geographical' programmes, originally created for providing development assistance to Mediterranean countries: MEDA I (1995-1999), MEDA II (2000-2006), and ENPI (since 2007). Based on the empirical mapping of the implementation of democracy assistance under these programmes for each country (see 6.1.), this section systematically compares the implementation of democracy assistance across countries and over time. It investigates in turn whether the programmes were used at all, how much money was spent, and what implementation looked like in detail.

So the first step is to verify in how far the EU and its Mediterranean partners made use of existing programmes to implement democracy assistance. When looking at the commitment of projects under the various programmes, there is a clear trend of extending the use of programmes to all countries in the region (see table 6.24 below). In an initial, 'experimental', phase, new programmes were only selectively implemented with a few countries. This applies to the EIDHR in the early 1990s and to MEDA I in the second half of the 1990s. The next generation of programmes, MDP and MEDA II, were then already applied to all seven countries. This trend is even more pronounced when looking at the different programming stages under MEDA II. However, under the new financial perspective, the use of instruments was more selective. Even though no projects were committed in 2007/2008 under the new EIDHR 'Instrument' and ENPI with some countries, the situation is different for the four countries of concern. For Algeria and Egypt, the start of the CBSS under the new EIDHR was scheduled for 2008. Both countries experienced the usual delays in issuing the necessary calls for proposals and selecting projects, so implementation of the new micro projects should start in 2009 or 2010. The fact that Syria and Tunisia are not eligible for the CBSS in the first place is, however, a clear sign by the EU that it sees major difficulties in implementing micro projects in these countries. While Syria is not a candidate for the CBSS, the 2007 ENPI CSP scheduled democracy assistance projects for 2009 and 2010. Only in the case of Tunisia, the country is neither eligible for the CBSS nor were new democracy assistance projects committed in the 2007 ENPI CSP.

Table 6.24: Use of existing programmes for democracy assistance

Country	90-94		95-99		00-06		00-01	02-04	05-06	07-08	
	Hor.	Geo.	Hor.	Geo.	Hor.	Geo.	Geo.	Geo.	Geo.	Hor.	Geo.
Algeria	no	n/a	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
Egypt	no	n/a	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes
Jordan	yes	n/a	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Lebanon	yes	n/a	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Morocco	yes	n/a	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
Syria	no	n/a	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	no
Tunisia	yes	n/a	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no

Even though most programmes have been used in most countries most of the time, another source of variation across countries and over time is the level of funding. The funds committed for democracy assistance in absolute terms is particularly interesting for a comparison over time. To assess the funding level in a comparative perspective, the absolute funding is put into perspective by considering democracy assistance as a share of overall development assistance provided under the geographical programmes.

Looking at the average annual appropriations for democracy assistance under the different programmes (see table 6.25 below), the extension of programmes to more countries is matched by an overall regional trend towards higher funding levels.⁸⁷ For most countries, funding has increased over time, both under the horizontal and especially the geographical instruments.

In addition, for all countries funds for democracy assistance under the geographical programmes by far exceed appropriations under the horizontal programmes. The trend towards increased funding does not hold for the EIDHR in Morocco, where funding has slightly but steadily decreased, and Jordan, where funding levels dropped in the early 2000s. This is of course notwithstanding the fact that since 2007, the programmes have again been used more selectively. The interruption in EIDHR funding for Algeria and Egypt does not necessarily signify a reversed trend. While for both Syria and Tunisia, no more funds for democracy assistance were committed for 2007 and 2008, the ENP programming up to 2010 at least foresees new funds for democracy assistance for these countries, which is not the case for Tunisia.

⁸⁷ As data on funding is not continuous, the average annual funding is separate for the horizontal and geographical instruments. As funding levels were marginal in the early 1990s, the early EIDHR is left out.

Table 6.25: Democracy assistance (in million €) as average per year

Country	Horizontal			Geographical		
	MDP	EIDHR I	EIDHR II	MEDA I	MEDA II	ENPI
	1996-1998	2000-2006	2007-2008	1999	2000-2006	2007-2008
Algeria	0.46	1.02	0.00	5.00	6.89	8.50
Egypt	0.30	0.96	0.00	0.00	3.57	15.00
Jordan	0.37	0.29	0.86	0.00	1.00	2.33
Lebanon	0.37	0.70	1.04	0.00	1.43	6.00
Morocco	0.76	0.50	0.46	4.00	4.67	14.00
Syria	0.08	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.00
Tunisia	0.08	0.25	0.00	0.00	4.81	0.00

In light of the great country-variation in the total funds for development assistance, the funding level of democracy assistance, including both horizontal and geographical programmes, does not only build on the level of funding in absolute terms, but also on its share of overall appropriations for development assistance (see table 6.26).

Table 6.26: Absolute funding level (in million €) and share of democracy assistance (in per cent of development assistance)

	90-94	1995-1999		2000-2006		2007-2008		Total	
		Abs.	Share	Abs.	Share	Abs.	Share	Abs.	Share
Algeria	(yes)	6.37	3.88	55.33	16.33	17.00	7.73	78.70	10.89
Egypt	no	0.91	0.13	31.71	5.35	30.00	5.38	62.63	3.41
Jordan	yes	1.11	0.44	9.05	2.73	8.71	3.29	19.56	2.30
Lebanon	yes	1.11	0.61	14.93	11.25	14.07	7.52	30.14	6.01
Morocco	yes	6.29	0.95	36.21	3.69	28.92	4.42	71.47	3.12
Syria	no	0.23	0.23	3.01	1.68	0.00	0.00	3.24	0.79
Tunisia	yes	0.23	0.05	35.42	6.84	0.00	0.00	35.88	2.88
<i>Average</i>		2.32	0.66	26.52	6.04	19.74	5.29	43.01	3.84

In general, both indicators vary greatly across countries and over time. The variation in absolute levels of funding has already been discussed (see above). Regarding the proportion of funds for democracy assistance in relation to overall funds for development assistance, the share of democracy assistance has dramatically increased from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, which is in line with the more common use of MEDA II for democracy assistance. The new financial perspective, by contrast, has kept the share at a similar level for Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco and even cut funding for the others. However, shares vary greatly between countries, especially in the early 2000s. Both indicators are assessed as high (+) or low (-) in relation to the average for the respective programming period, resulting in high (+), medium (0), or low (-) overall funding levels (see table 6.27).

Table 6.27: Funding level – a) absolute, b) share, and c) overall

Country	1995-1999			2000-2006			2007-2008			Total		
	a)	b)	c)	a)	b)	c)	a)	b)	c)	a)	b)	c)
Algeria	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	0	+	+	+
Egypt	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	+	+	-	0
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0
Morocco	+	+	+	+	-	0	+	-	0	+	-	0
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	no	no	no	-	-	-
Tunisia	-	-	-	+	+	+	no	no	no	-	-	-

Given the variation in both indicators, it does not come as a surprise that overall funding levels also vary significantly across countries and over time. The countries were neatly divided into two groups in the late 1990s, the selective use of MEDA I in only two countries, namely Algeria and Morocco, resulting in their high level of funding as opposed to low funding levels in all of the other countries. Since then, funding levels have been more diversified. Taken together, Algeria is the only country with an overall and, at most times, high funding level. Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco achieve medium funding levels on average. Egypt has experienced a steady increase from low to high funding levels, whereas Lebanon and Morocco have had more consistent funding levels. In turn, Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia all have on average low funding levels. Jordan has had consistently low levels, whereas Tunisia has experienced the highest degree of variance over time. Finally, it is important to point out that Syria is the downright laggard in terms of absolute figures of funding that amount to next to nothing even at times when democracy assistance has been implemented.

Having established how much the EU has committed for democracy assistance projects with its Mediterranean partners, it is now time to analyse in more detail what democracy assistance looked like. Before investigating more closely the projects implemented in terms of the partners involved and their thematic scope, it is useful to compare the respective roles of the two channels available for democracy assistance.

With the different programmes under the EIDHR, the horizontal programmes, the EU primarily targets non-state and especially civil society actors on the ground. By contrast, projects under the geographic programmes, MEDA and ENPI, are much larger in scale and essentially target state actors. So the implementation of projects under the EIDHR has different implications for cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners than projects under MEDA and ENPI. While the latter types

of projects are implemented in direct cooperation between the EU and some agents of the authoritarian regime itself, the former are intended to bypass the regime. However, experience has shown that the regime of the target country nevertheless plays a major role by directly or indirectly boycotting or supporting the implementation of ‘bottom-up’ democracy assistance projects. In general, it applies to both channels that the more democracy assistance is implemented, the ‘better’ the outcome of cooperation, but the respective weight shapes the final assessment. The exclusive use of either instrument points to some difficulties in implementation: either the regime does not engage in direct cooperation, or cooperation with non-state actors is not feasible. If both channels are used, the funding for geographic projects most like exceeds that for horizontal projects, so the higher the share of funding for horizontal projects, the more comprehensive and ‘better’ is cooperation. Here, one can still distinguish between the predominant use of the geographic channel (more than 80 per cent of democracy assistance) and a balanced use of both channels (more than 20 per cent spent on EIDHR) as the best result of cooperation. Table 6.28 below summarises the results for the different programmes and overall values for 1995-2008.

Table 6.28: Democracy assistance – use of instruments

Country	1995-1999	2000-2006	2007-2008	Total
Algeria	Balanced (+)	Focus MEDA (0)	Only ENPI (-)	Geographical (0)
Egypt	Only EIDHR (-)	Balanced (+)	Only ENPI (-)	Geographical (0)
Jordan	Only EIDHR (-)	Balanced (+)	Focus ENPI (0)	Balanced (+)
Lebanon	Only EIDHR (-)	Balanced (+)	Focus ENPI (0)	Balanced (+)
Morocco	Balanced (+)	Focus MEDA (0)	Focus ENPI (0)	Geographical (0)
Syria	Only EIDHR (-)	Balanced (+)	None	Balanced (+)
Tunisia	Only EIDHR (-)	Focus MEDA (0)	None	Geographical (0)

That said, it is now time to turn to the detailed analysis and comparison of the content of democracy assistance projects implemented to assess their ‘sensitivity’ or ‘costliness’ and thus the ‘quality’ of cooperation. The content is assessed on the basis of the partners involved in implementing the projects and their thematic scope. In addition, information on the actual implementation process, e.g. delays or difficulties with authorities, is considered.

Going beyond the main targets of each channel, the partners in implementing projects with the EU can vary. Under the horizontal programmes, the EU can select local or external actors for implementing measures. Cooperation with local actors comes closest to the idea of a ‘bottom-up’ dynamic and is more difficult to realize if

the regime is opposed (+) than cooperation with external actors, e.g. non-governmental organisations (NGO) based within the EU that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the target regime and might even implement parts of their activities outside of the country (-). For MEDA and ENPI, it is interesting to determine whether the programmes include non-state actors (+) or strictly limit cooperation to state agents (-). Regarding the scope, different topics are potentially more ‘costly’ to the regime than others, e.g. questions addressing the political process, pluralism, political rights and civil liberties can directly undermine the regime’s legitimacy and power base (+). For example, election monitoring missions can help in holding the regime accountable to its own claim to representative democracy, but measures aiming at free media or empowering civil society as a ‘watchdog’ can contribute to levelling the playing field for oppositional actors. By contrast, projects addressing social and economic rights or focusing on capacity-building for state authorities can be considered less controversial (-). Measures directly supporting ‘vulnerable’ groups in society, e.g. children or handicapped people, might be important to guarantee basic human rights, but do not challenge the regime’s authority. On the contrary, they might ease social tensions and take pressure off the regime. Similarly, the provision of technical equipment to the judiciary might make it more efficient but not more independent, thus strengthening the authoritarian regime’s capacity to govern effectively.

Due to the large number of micro projects implemented under the EIDHR, the content is directly aggregated for each phase instead of for individual projects, determining whether partners are predominantly local (+) or external (-) and if topics include or focus on ‘costly’ issues (+) or if less controversial issues dominate (-).⁸⁸ For the geographical programmes, the content of each project is assessed separately and then aggregated for each phase.

Table 6.29 below summarises the results for the horizontal instruments. The quality of the content varies greatly across countries and over time. Projects in Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco were overall of the best quality, with Jordan and Morocco scoring consistently well and Lebanon with slight variation. Egypt is the only country to score on an overall medium level. The content of projects in Algeria, Syria, and Tu-

⁸⁸ For the aggregation of an overall value, the first phase of the global EIDHR was given the greatest weight because funding hugely exceeded the MDP and the first two years of the new Instrument.

nesia is overall bad. Syria and Tunisia score consistently worse – however, while funds committed for projects in Syria were low from the start, Tunisia is the only country where the implementation proved to be extremely difficult, even leading to the cancellation of projects.

Table 6.29: Content of horizontal instruments

Country	MDP	Initiative	Instrument	Overall
Algeria	medium (0)	bad (-)	no	bad (-)
Egypt	good (+)	medium (0)	no	medium (0)
Jordan	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)
Lebanon	medium (0)	good (+)	medium (0)	good (+)
Morocco	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)
Syria	bad (-)	bad (-)	no	bad (-)
Tunisia	bad (-)	bad (-)	no	bad (-)

Turning to MEDA and ENPI, the mapping of partners and scope in the country sections allows to determine the content of individual projects that is then aggregated for each phase (see table 6.30 below), considering the respective number of projects in each category of content and their respective share of total funding for democracy assistance.

Table 6.30: Content of geographical instruments (number / share)

Country	1995-1999	2000-2001	2002-2004	2005-2006	2000-2006	2007-2008	Total
Algeria	0	0	-	0	0	-	0
Egypt	none	none	0	+	+	+	+
Jordan	none	none	+	0	+	+	+
Lebanon	none	none	none	+	+	-	0
Morocco	0	-	none	+	+	0	+
Syria	none	none	none	0	0	none	0
Tunisia	none	(+)	-	none	-	none	-

There is no clear trend over time, but important variation across countries. Based on the number of projects, the content of projects with Algeria would be overall ‘bad’ because most projects focus on pure capacity-building for state authorities, in particular the judiciary and the police as part of the executive. Due to the large number of projects implemented with Algeria, the share of funding is in this case a more reliable indicator, changing the quality of the content to ‘medium’ because there are, after all, still quite a few projects with and on civil society and the media. This also better reflects the fact that Algeria is one of the few countries where democracy assistance has been implemented under the geographic programmes continuously from early on. By contrast, democracy assistance under MEDA has been introduced rather

late for Egypt and Jordan, but the content overall qualifies as ‘good’. The geographic channel for democracy assistance has been used even later in the case of Lebanon and the few projects have varied in their content, resulting in an overall medium value. Morocco has been the other country where democracy assistance under MEDA has been introduced early. The overall content of projects is good, with several projects addressing civil society and national human rights initiatives, including the Moroccan ‘truth commission’ that tries to come to terms with the regime’s serious human rights violations since the 1960s. Even though these were rather small projects and only make up for a relatively low share of total democracy assistance, they counterbalance the rather technical support for the judiciary. With Syria, the overall ‘medium’ assessment is based on only one project. Tunisia is the country with the greatest variation over time. After a seemingly good start under MEDA II, partners encountered major difficulties in implementing the projects, especially but not only the more ambitious ones. The civil society project was cancelled and both the media project and the project to provide large-scale, technical support to the judiciary are marked by lengthy negotiations, significantly delaying their implementation. Therefore, the overall medium content does not adequately capture the actual quality of implementation.

Combining the findings on the content of the horizontal and geographical instruments, table 6.31 below summarises the results for the content of democracy assistance in the respective funding periods. Overall, there is more variation across countries than over time: democracy assistance with Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco has been consistently more ambitious than with Lebanon and especially, Algeria, Syria, and Tunisia.

Table 6.31: Content of democracy assistance

Country	1995-1999	2000-2006	2007-2008	Total
Algeria	0	-	-	-
Egypt	+	+	+	+
Jordan	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	0	+	0	0
Morocco	+	+	+	+
Syria	-	-	none	-
Tunisia	-	-	none	-

The remainder of this section now brings together the findings on funding levels and content in order to assess more generally the implementation of democracy assis-

tance (see table 6.32 below). In contrast to political dialogue, where the role of content was emphasised over the formal quality of the political dialogue conducted, the funding level and content are given the same weight, as it is more difficult to pre-determine the importance of ‘how much’ and ‘on what’ for the ‘costliness’ of cooperation.

Table 6.32: Democracy assistance: Funding level (a), content (b), and quality (c)

	1995-1999			2000-2006			2007-2008			Overall		
	a)	b)	c)	a)	b)	c)	a)	b)	c)	a)	b)	c)
Algeria	+	0	+	+	-	0	0	-	-	+	-	0
Egypt	-	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Jordan	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0
Lebanon	-	0	-	0	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	no	no	no	-	-	-
Tunisia	-	-	-	+	-	-	no	no	no	-	-	-

As pointed out before, there is a clear regional pattern regarding some basic features of the implementation of the various programmes for democracy assistance. The EU has significantly increased the absolute funding for democracy assistance over time, implementing small scale democracy assistance projects across the region since the mid-1990s and gradually applying the geographical channel to all countries since around 2000. After a few experimental projects in the early 1990s, all Mediterranean partners have been covered by regional or global programmes specifically designed for democracy assistance, and there has been a steady increase of funding for the seven countries. Under MEDA I, there has been virtually no democracy assistance implemented, but since then the EU has extended the geographical, more ‘top-down’ channel to all countries, especially around 2003. Funding for democracy assistance under MEDA II and ENPI has increased both in absolute terms and in relation to overall development assistance. However, beyond this regional pattern, there is great variation across countries, which does not result in a region-wide trend regarding the overall quality of democracy assistance over time. Some countries do better on the funding level than on content and others vice versa; some countries show variation in the quality of democracy assistance over time, others do not. Overall, democracy assistance with Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco is of a high quality, that with Lebanon, Algeria, and Jordan is of medium quality, and that with Tunisia and Syria is of low quality (see figure 6.3 below).

Figure 6.3: Overall quality of democracy assistance

<i>Funding level</i>	High	Medium	Low
<i>Content</i>			
+		Egypt Lebanon Morocco	Jordan
0		Lebanon	
-	Algeria		Syria Tunisia

Algeria and Egypt are the two countries that show the most systematic variation over time. While Algeria has consistently had one of the highest funding levels among the seven countries, the content has not been very ambitious, resulting in a steady decline of the overall quality of democracy assistance over time. The opposite has been the case in Egypt: Democracy assistance with Egypt has always been rather ambitious and the funding level has systematically increased over time, improving the overall quality. Variation in the quality of democracy assistance has been more erratic in Lebanon, resulting in overall medium values on both dimensions. Jordan and Morocco have, by contrast, experienced the most consistent quality of democracy assistance over time, Morocco doing well on both dimensions, whereas the good content of democracy assistance with Jordan has been systematically compromised by the much lower funding level. Democracy assistance with Syria and Tunisia are marked by overall low funding levels and the least ambitious content, with one major difference: Attempts to implement democracy assistance with Syria have always been marginal, whereas there have been efforts to implement more and more ambitious projects with Tunisia around the year 2000, both under the EIDHR as one of the ‘focus countries’ and under MEDA II. The extreme difficulties encountered by the partners in implementing agreed projects devalue these efforts, all the more so as there have been no more projects committed since around 2005.

6.3. Summary

This chapter has first mapped the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance by the EU with seven Mediterranean partners since the early 1990s (6.1.). Placing the implementation of these partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion into the context of general cooperation between the EU and the respective country, the mapping has taken stock of formal and content-related aspects

of political dialogue and democracy assistance. Following a qualitative empirical-analytical approach, it has mainly drawn on document analysis and expert and elite interviews. On the basis of the detailed mapping, the previous section has then undertaken a systematic comparison across countries and over time in order to assess the quality of cooperation displayed in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance (6.2.). This section brings together the empirical findings on these two partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion to discuss the countries' overall performance. It considers variation between the two instruments and their different dimensions of implementation both across countries and over time.

The comparison of overall values for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations reveals at first glance great variation between the seven countries (see figure 6.4 below). By contrast, there is much less variation between the implementation of the two instruments within each country. For Morocco, Lebanon, and Tunisia, the overall quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance corresponds, spanning the whole spectrum of more or less difficult implementation. Egypt and Algeria do slightly better on the implementation of democracy assistance than political dialogue, while the opposite is true for Jordan. Syria is the only country where no formalised political dialogue has been conducted at all. The overall performance on the different dimensions of implementation varies in most cases only slightly. Only for Algeria and Jordan, the overall fair performance in implementing democracy assistance obscures divergence between the quantity and quality of cooperation: Algeria has the highest overall funding level while the content of democracy assistance is not very ambitious, whereas the implementation of democracy assistance with Jordan is marked by high quality content but low funding levels. This indicates that the partners' decision to implement a lot of democracy assistance is neither necessary nor sufficient for a high standard of content.

Figure 6.4: Implementation of partnership-based instruments

Political dialogue	+	0	-	no
Democracy assistance				
+	Morocco	Egypt		
0	Jordan	Lebanon	Algeria	
-			Tunisia	Syria
no				

The country sections and the systematic comparison have shown that, at a second glance, a more fine-grained analysis exposes further variation over time and between the different dimensions of the implementation of the instruments.

The overall assessment of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with Algeria obscures variation over time for both instruments, but especially for democracy assistance. When looking at the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance during the different periods, then there is no variation between the instruments. For both instruments, there is a downward trend in the quality of implementation over time. The implementation of democracy assistance in Algeria started early and promising. First projects were already implemented in the early 1990s and the MDP was actively used in the second half of the 1990s. In addition, Algeria was one of the few countries where a democracy assistance related project was already committed under MEDA I. Since 2000, the performance has deteriorated, which is mostly due to a degradation of the content whereas funding levels remained among the highest in the region. This is true both in absolute terms and in relation to the overall level of aid provided by the European Community, which is relatively low considering the country's size. Especially under MEDA II and ENPI, the content of democracy assistance has focused on capacity-building rather than political reform of state institutions, including the judiciary and penal system but also the police, which is a unique feature among the seven countries. Formalised political dialogue was, by contrast, only being institutionalised in 2005 and operational in 2006, due to the late entry into force of the EMAA. While the overall performance regarding formal aspects and the content of political dialogue in the framework of the Association Council has been fair, the failure to set-up a human rights subcommittee together with other technical subcommittees in 2007 puts the quality of overall political dialogue seriously into question. Taken together, partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion have been implemented and in the case of democracy assistance even to a great extent, but they have been used very selectively. The high funding level for democracy assistance is not matched by an ambitious content of the projects implemented, and political dialogue is not supplemented by a specific subcommittee. The seeming divergence between the overall results for the two instruments is only due to the different time frames of their implementation. If they are compared for each period separately, they show a similar and decreasing quality of implementation.

Table 6.33: Algeria

	90-92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	DV
PD														no	0	-	-	-
DA		yes	yes	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	0

Formalised political dialogue with Egypt started similarly late in 2004, but in contrast to Algeria, the overall variation between the quality of implementation of the two instruments remains valid when breaking it down into the different periods. However, the implementation of political dialogue has greatly varied from year to year, not following a clear trend. After a seemingly good start, including the meeting of an *ad hoc* working group on human rights, implementation has not been smooth, e.g. the first meeting of the human rights subcommittee that the partners eventually created in 2007 was delayed due to Egyptian protest against a resolution of the EP on the human rights situation in the country. The implementation of democracy assistance, in turn, started late and at low levels, but has significantly improved since around 2000. With the use of MEDA II and ENPI, the level of funding has greatly increased, adding to the overall good quality of the content of projects implemented under both horizontal and geographical programmes.

Table 6.34: Egypt

	90-92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	DV
PD													+	no	-	-	0	0
DA		no	no	0	0	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

The implementation of both political dialogue and democracy assistance with Jordan shows much less variation over time. Formalised political dialogue has been regularly and well implemented since 2002, with Jordan becoming the regional forerunner in setting up a human rights subcommittee as early as 2004. Similarly, democracy assistance has been implemented from the early 1990s onwards, at first only under the MDP and the EIDHR and since 2002 also under MEDA II and ENPI. While the content of projects has always been ambitious, the funding level has remained very low, both in absolute terms and in relation to overall EC aid to Jordan. The overall medium quality of democracy assistance is thus the result of a clear divergence between the two dimensions.

Table 6.35: Jordan

	90-92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	DV
PD											+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+
DA		yes	yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

For Lebanon, it is again more interesting to consider variation over time, particularly in the implementation of democracy assistance. It has been implemented from the early 1990s onwards, but the quality of implementation has changed over time. Especially in the second half of the 1990s, the funding level under the MDP was very low and the content not very ambitious. The situation changed radically after 2000, when both the funding level and especially the content improved, even though MEDA II was only activated as an instrument for democracy assistance in 2005. In the most recent funding period, the quality in terms of content of both instruments has again dropped slightly, leaving Lebanon with an overall medium performance. Formalised political dialogue, by contrast, has been conducted only lately, since 2006, but with little variation over time. Looking only at the last time period of 2007-2008, the performances in the implementation of both instruments actually match.

Table 6.36: Lebanon

	90-92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	DV
PD															0	-	0	0
DA		yes	yes	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0

Morocco shows the best overall performance in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance among the seven countries. In addition, variation in the quality of implementation over time is marginal. Formalised political dialogue has been conducted since 2000. While there was a clear improvement in the quality of dialogue around 2003, the first few years do not change the overall assessment, as the regional comparison shows that standards for 'good' dialogue were only introduced around that time. Democracy assistance was also implemented from early on. Morocco was one of the first countries to which MEDA I provided funding for democracy assistance. While funding levels have never been the highest in the region, they are relatively high and were matched by ambitious content throughout the 15 years of implementation.

Table 6.37: Morocco

	90-92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	DV
PD									0	-	no	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
DA		yes	yes	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

As pointed out before, Syria is clearly the regional laggard regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments with the EU in every respect and consistently over time. It is the only country where no formal political dialogue had been institutionalised by 2008. While this is in line with the delay in the ratification of the EMAA, it is obvious that any attempt by the EU to engage in informal political dialogue on matters relating to democracy and human rights have been rejected by Syrian authorities. Democracy assistance since the mid-1990s has remained at very low funding levels matched by undemanding content. However, the absolute development of funding levels is in line with the regional trend towards more democracy assistance, and Syria is not the only country where first projects under MEDA II were only committed in 2005. The interruption of democracy assistance in 2007 and 2008 was only temporary. At least under ENPI, the CSP foresees new projects from 2009 onwards, but Syria does not qualify for the new micro-project scheme under the EIDHR. While this limits the EU's possibilities for funding, it is only a reaction to existing difficulties in implementing democracy assistance with Syrian non-state actors. Taken together, democracy assistance is consistently marked by low intensity and not very ambitious implementation, which is, however, in line with the overall difficult cooperation also in other areas of EU-Syrian relations.

Table 6.38: Syria

	90-92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	DV
PD																		(-)
DA		no	no	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	no	no	-

By contrast, Tunisia's poor performance of democracy assistance and political dialogue disappoints in the light of the otherwise advanced economic and political cooperation between the EU and Tunisia. Both instruments were introduced early, but the quality of implementation has remained low. Political dialogue was institutionalised as early as 1998, but even after 2003, its quality has remained below the regional average and it has apparently never developed into a forum for meaningful and open dialogue on matters relating to democracy and human rights. Democracy assistance

was first provided in the early 1990s, but it has never been substantial. During the 1990s, funding under the MDP was extremely low and hardly ambitious. The global EIDHR and MEDA II were meant to change the picture radically, but under both programmes, the implementation of projects proved to be extremely difficult so that in the end, hardly any of the more ambitious projects and projects with non-state actors were realised. Even the implementation of the large-scale MEDA II project aiming at capacity-building for the Tunisian judiciary met with major difficulties, so that democracy assistance was discontinued in 2007 under both channels. The EU did neither find Tunisia eligible for the CBSS nor did it commit any more funds for democracy assistance under ENPI. So, looking at the actual implementation of democracy assistance, the picture is different from but hardly better than in the case of Syria.

Table 6.39: Tunisia

	90-92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	DV
PD							0	no	-	no	-	0	no	0	no	-	0	-
DA		yes	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	no	no	-

Considering the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance for each country over time challenges the overall assessments for the two instruments to a different extent. Taken together, there is little variation over time in the cases of Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. By contrast, Algeria and Lebanon show greater variation over time. For Algeria, the implementation of both instruments is marked by a clear downward trend. In the case of Lebanon, the results for democracy assistance vary more erratically over time. Regarding variation between the instruments during the different periods of time, there is little variation for Algeria (downward trend), Lebanon (overall medium), Morocco (overall good), and Tunisia (overall bad). For Egypt and Jordan, the respective qualities of implementation diverge. With Syria, there is no formalised political dialogue institutionalised and conducted. In sum, the overall assessments adequately capture the situation for Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, whereas for Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon, the analysis needs to keep a more nuanced picture in mind.

Table 6.40: Implementation of partnership-based instruments

Country	1995-1999		2000-2006		2007-2008		Overall	
	PD	DA	PD	DA	PD	DA	PD	DA
Algeria	n/a	+	(0)	0	-	-	-	0
Egypt	n/a	0	(0)	+	0	+	0	+
Jordan	n/a	0	(+)	0	+	0	+	0
Lebanon	n/a	-	(0)	+	0	0	0	0
Morocco	n/a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Syria	n/a	-	n/a	-	n/a	no	n/a	-
Tunisia	(0)	-	-	-	0	no	-	-

Table 6.40 summarises the overall quality of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance during the different periods of cooperation. Having established a detailed picture of the implementation of partnership-based instruments by the EU and seven Mediterranean partners since the early 1990s, chapter 7 now turns to mapping the explanatory factors identified in chapter 3 and to analysing in how far they can account for the variation found in the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

7. Explaining cooperation on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean

After the detailed mapping of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion in Euro-Mediterranean relations, the present chapter turns to the potential explanatory factors identified in chapter 3. It starts with a mapping of five factors for the seven Mediterranean partners of concern, namely the institutional environment, the degree of political liberalisation, the level of statehood, the configuration of (socio-economic) interdependence, and the use of incentives in the form of unilateral instruments for democracy promotion by the EU. In a systematic comparison of overall values and their variation over time, it then investigates the explanatory power of these five factors, the interaction effect of political liberalisation and statehood as well as the lock-in effect of cooperation itself in order to account for the regional and country-specific patterns in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance.

7.1. *Institutional environment*

In describing the regional framework for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion, the institutional environment for the implementation of partnership-based instruments was thoroughly mapped in chapter 5 to provide the necessary background information for the detailed empirical analysis of political dialogue and democracy assistance in chapter 6. Chapter 5 looked at the EU's democracy promotion policy more generally and the institutional provisions regarding political dialogue and democracy assistance in particular. It traced the evolution of the regional framework for cooperation over time and its applicability to the seven Mediterranean partners of concern. The empirical mapping of political dialogue and democracy assistance in chapter 6 has already shown that the institutional environment does play a crucial role for the implementation of these two instruments, e.g. regarding the entry into force of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements as the legal basis for formalised political dialogue. In this section, the analysis will now focus more systematically on the institutional environment as a background condition for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. An assessment of the degree and variation over time of institutionalisation (high/medium/low) of the Euro-

Mediterranean framework for democracy promotion in general as well as the availability of political dialogue and democracy assistance as instruments – and their degree of institutionalisation more specifically (yes/no, degree of institutionalisation: high/medium/low) – is provided.

As chapter 5 has demonstrated, the framework for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion in the Mediterranean is truly regional in nature, even though there is some variation in the timing of the applicability of provisions to individual countries. With the launch of the EMP in 1995, the bilateral EMAAs and MEDA as a regional programme for external assistance are the most visible signs of this regional approach to cooperation. Considering the EU's rhetoric and institutional provisions for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, the institutional environment for the implementation of partnership-based instruments is marked by an increasing degree of institutionalisation with major advances around 1995 and 2000/2003.

Already in the early 1990s, the EU applied its general commitment to promote democracy and human rights in external relations to the Mediterranean. However, this commitment was neither prominent nor strong and it was only from 1991 onwards that the EU developed the outlines of a democracy promotion policy on a global scale. The Barcelona Declaration in 1995 was a major step in bringing a joint commitment to democracy, human rights, and political cooperation to Euro-Mediterranean relations. The commitment to actively work together in the field of democracy promotion remained weak, however, and the EU has only taken a more open and clear stance since around the year 2000. It is a common feature over time that the objectives of democracy promotion and cooperation are never really specified, but there has clearly been an increasing emphasis by the EU on this part of the agenda. Especially the 2003 Commission communication on advancing democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean shows the EU's attempt at 'getting serious' in implementing its policy (European Commission 2003c). After all, it had vastly developed its 'tool kit', which had originally been only roughly laid out in the early 1990s for a global democracy promotion policy, and had introduced it into Euro-Mediterranean relations. The three basic instruments of political dialogue, democracy assistance, and conditionality were translated into more specific institutional provisions during the 1990s and adapted to the regional context. Even though negative conditionality had been envisaged early on, the EU has always emphasised a 'posi-

tive' approach, privileging political dialogue and democracy assistance. Positive conditionality has, by contrast, only been introduced with the ENP. Turning to political dialogue and democracy assistance as partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, this section will now determine whether there were any provisions regarding these at all and in how far their degree of institutionalisation has changed over time.

Formalised political dialogue on matters relating to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is based on art. 2 and 3 of the respective EMAAs. The EU had negotiated these new bilateral agreements with some Maghreb countries as early as the first half of the 1990s. The first EMAAs were concluded with Tunisia and Morocco at the same time that the EMP was launched, establishing the objective to conclude similar agreements with all Mediterranean partners. Nevertheless, negotiations and ratification processes were lengthy with most countries, and the entry into force of the EMAAs varies between 1998 and 2006, with the exception of Syria, where no EMAA has been ratified so far. While the EMAAs provide the legal basis for formalised political dialogue within the respective Association Council, the EU proposed to take political dialogue a step further in 2003 and suggested the creation of specific subcommittees dealing with matters of democracy and human rights. This proposal was discussed at several Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Foreign Ministers and entered into a number of ENP action plans, stipulating the creation of such a subcommittee as one priority action under the political chapter.⁸⁹ Taken together, the basis for formalised political dialogue was laid in 1995 and provisions for the conduct of political dialogue were further institutionalised in 2003, but the applicability of provisions to individual countries crucially depends on the entry into force of the respective EMAA.

After the 1991 resolution on the EU's global democracy promotion (Council of the EU 1991), the European Commission started to use different budget headings in external cooperation to implement democracy assistance projects in third countries. This informal practice of democracy assistance was institutionalised by the EP in 1994, creating the EIDHR under which all related activities were subsumed. Under this heading, the MDP launched in 1995 was the first regional instrument that explicitly applied this horizontal approach to democracy assistance to the Mediterranean.

⁸⁹ All ENP action plans are available on the European Commission's website for the ENP, Reference Documents, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, 14 September 2010.

After a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1998 (European Court of Justice 1998), the EU finally agreed upon a proper EC regulation, providing a legal basis for the EIDHR in 1999 and setting it up as a global programme covering relations with third countries worldwide (see annex 5). With each revision of the *Initiative* (2004) and later *Instrument* (2007), provisions for democracy assistance became more detailed and specific. The EIDHR has, in principal, always been applicable to all Mediterranean partners, except for a brief spell in 2001-2003, when the implementation of micro-projects was limited to so-called 'focus countries'. Interestingly, the Instrument for the first time establishes eligibility criteria for the successor to the micro-project scheme, the CBSS (European Commission 2007c: 9). In addition to this 'horizontal' channel for democracy assistance, the EU mainstreamed the objective to promote democracy and human rights into the regional programme for external cooperation, MEDA, in 1996. Again, the EU strengthened the respective provisions with each revision of the regulation, for MEDA II in 2000 and for the ENPI in 2007.

In sum, there is a clear trend towards increasing institutionalisation of the framework for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion. This holds true for both the general institutional environment and for the provisions for partnership-based instruments. These have basically been applicable to all seven countries, except for some variation caused by the time lag in the conclusion of the EMAAs as the legal basis for formalised political dialogue. While there had been no provisions for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion in 1990, the first half of the 1990s saw first attempts at institutionalisation at a very low level. The launch of the EMP gave a boost to this process in the second half of the 1990s. Since 2000, but especially since 2003, the degree of institutionalisation has again significantly increased.

Figure 7.1: Institutional provisions for partnership-based instruments

	Bilateral political dialogue	Democracy assistance		
		horizontal instruments	geographic instruments	
1990	no	no	no	
1991		Pre-EIDHR – low		
1992				
1993				
1994				
1995	Association Council – medium (Tunisia) (Morocco) (Jordan) (Egypt) – high (Algeria) (Lebanon)	MDP – medium	MEDA I – low	
1996				
1997		EIDHR I – medium (focus countries: Algeria, Tunisia – high)	MEDA II – medium	
1998				
1999				
2000				
2001				
2002				
2003				Subcommittee – high
2004				
2005				
2006				
2007	EIDHR III – high	ENPI – high		
2008				

As outlined in chapter 3 (see 3.4.1.), the general theoretical expectation regarding the outcome of cooperation in light of the overall increasing degree of institutionalisation is that the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion becomes more likely over time throughout the region.

The evolution of the institutional environment constitutes a background condition for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance that is more or less constant for all countries, but varies significantly over time. It should therefore change the costs and benefits of (no) cooperation in a similar way for all countries, making the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance more likely over time. More specifically, however, the existence of provisions for partnership-based instruments is a necessary condition for their implementation in the first place. In addition, the degree of institutionalisation has evolved differently for political dialogue and democracy assistance over time (see figure 7.1 above). Therefore, the theoretical expectations play out differently for the two instruments. Especially for political dialogue, its immediate link to the conclusion of EMAAs is a likely source of variation across countries regarding the start of formalised political dialogue. Before 1995, there were no provisions for formalised political dialogue. Since then, the EU has developed a clear policy that was further elaborated in 2003. Never-

theless, these regional guidelines are only likely to affect the implementation of political dialogue with individual countries once the respective EMAA has entered into force to provide the legal basis for formalised political dialogue. Under this condition, the political dialogue conducted is more likely to be of higher quality from 2003 onwards. Provisions for democracy assistance date back to the early 1990s, at least on an informal basis and for the horizontal channel. By contrast, democracy assistance has only been mainstreamed into the regional programme for external cooperation in the second half of the 1990s, providing a second, 'geographical' channel for democracy assistance. Both channels are marked by increasing degrees of institutionalisation, making the implementation of democracy assistance more likely since 1995 and 2000 respectively. They are applicable to all seven countries most of the time, so implementation of democracy assistance should become more likely over time throughout the region. Only the EIDHR has brief spells of differential treatment of countries, with the concept of 'focus countries' in 2001-2004 and the introduction of eligibility criteria for the CBSS in 2007 potentially causing some country variation.

The empirical findings on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in the seven countries since the early 1990s in chapter 6 showed indeed that the evolution of the institutional environment corresponds to a regional trend towards more and better cooperation over time. All instruments that were institutionalised get implemented sooner or later, and cooperation intensifies regarding both the conduct of political dialogue and especially the level of funding for democracy assistance. This clearly shows the merits of the EU's 'one-size-fits-all' approach to democracy promotion. The explicitly regional approach, relying on highly standardised provisions, makes it difficult for any Mediterranean partner to completely elude the EU's efforts. Formalised political dialogue is conducted once the EMAAs come into effect in the framework of the Association Council. Overall, the implementation has intensified since 2003 when countries apparently had to live up to a new regional standard regarding wording and proceedings. This includes the set-up of specific human rights subcommittees that have again become a sort of new regional standard around 2007. Democracy assistance under the EIDHR has been provided to all countries since the mid-1990s with overall increasing levels of funding. MEDA I has only been used for democracy assistance since 1999, but under MEDA II democracy assistance has been extended to more and more countries and again, funds have in-

creased over time. While this clearly confirms the theoretical expectations and supports the role of the institutional environment as a background condition, the empirical mapping finds significant variation across countries that cannot be accounted for by the regionally more or less uniform institutional environment. While the formal conduct of political dialogue follows a similar pattern across the region, the quality of implementation varies to a great extent between countries. Likewise, the level of funding and the content of democracy assistance vary enormously across countries, as does the introduction of democracy assistance projects under the regional programmes for external cooperation, MEDA and ENPI. In addition, the regional trend does not hold for all countries when looking at the quality of democracy assistance over time. Some countries even go against the general trend towards more and better implementation. On the one hand, Algeria apparently refuses to move on with the ENP and is the only country among the seven that, while conducting formalised political dialogue with the EU, had not agreed to setting up a specific human rights subcommittee by 2008. Tunisia, on the other hand, is the only country where funding levels of democracy assistance have decreased to the point that efforts were discontinued in 2007/2008. Even Syria, where cooperation in the field of democracy promotion is marked by the absence of formalised political dialogue and extremely low funding levels for democracy assistance, by comparison follows the regional trend.

Taken together, the institutional environment is a crucial factor to consider when explaining patterns of implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in the Mediterranean since the early 1990s. However, it cannot account for the significant variation found across countries. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the role of country-specific factors such as the degree of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence. First, however, a closer look is taken at the lock-in effect of cooperation.

7.2. *Lock-in effect of cooperation*

Similarly to the institutional environment, (previous) outcomes of cooperation are expected to change the costs and benefits of (further) implementing partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion (see 3.4.2.). The fact that actors have already engaged in implementation makes further implementation more likely, because implementation becomes less costly compared to 'no implementation'. There-

fore, cooperation should not break off once political dialogue and democracy assistance have been implemented.

The previous section has shown that against the background of an ever-increasing degree of institutionalisation, all countries have started to implement partnership-based instruments sooner or later, even though at varying levels of quality. Investigating the potential lock-in effect of cooperation itself, this section is now interested in the continuity of implementation and in how far the regional trend identified above towards more and better implementation holds for every country. Regarding formalised political dialogue, the Association Councils should have met regularly once the EMAAs had entered into force between 1998 (Tunisia) and 2006 (Lebanon). The same is expected for the human rights subcommittees after their institutionalisation between 2004 (Jordan) and 2007 (Tunisia). Regarding democracy assistance, the lock-in effect should translate into continuous commitment of funds and implementation of projects under the EIDHR starting in the early 1990s and under the geographical instruments (MEDA/ENPI) since 1999 at the earliest. And indeed, with the beginning of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in general, a new standard for bilateral cooperation was created that the EU and most of its Mediterranean partners have not fallen behind again.

With the exception of Syria, the EMAAs mark the starting point for a formalised political dialogue with Mediterranean partners, and all Association Councils have met more or less on a regular basis ever since. The same holds true for meetings of the human rights subcommittees. However, meetings are sometimes subject to political conflicts compromising the conduct of political dialogue. Meetings have been postponed or delayed, as was the case with the first human rights subcommittee meeting with Egypt in 2008, following a critical resolution of the EP on the Egyptian human rights situation. The EU-Tunisian Association Council did not meet for a period of more than two years between 2005 and 2007 due to tensions in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, none of these instances have led to a complete break off of political dialogue, and cooperation has always been resumed eventually. Among the six countries with EMAAs in force, Algeria is the only one that has not taken formalised political dialogue to the next level by creating a specific human rights subcommittee by 2007. It is not in line with the otherwise regional trend, defying the hypotheses on the institutional environment and the lock-in effect of cooperation. However, it might

again simply be a matter of time before Algeria conforms to the new regional standard of cooperation, as

at the first meeting of the Association Committee on 16 September 2008, Algeria indicated a degree of openness to the creation of a structure of this kind by the Association Council. (Council of the EU 2009)

Chapter 6 has shown that the EU and all of its Mediterranean partners have used both channels for democracy assistance and that funds committed have in general increased over time. Since the establishment of the MDP, the EU has applied the EIDHR to all seven countries, even though funding levels vary enormously across countries. Delays in the implementation of targeted and micro projects with individual countries under the global Initiative (2000-2006) reflect initial difficulties in implementing the new regulation and lengthy procedures between the calls for proposals and the selection of projects. However, while funds for democracy assistance were continuously committed vis-à-vis Tunisia, which was one of the two ‘focus countries’ in 2001-2004, implementation of these projects has mostly failed. With the reformed Instrument in 2007, the eligibility criteria for the new micro projects have limited the recipients in the region, excluding Syria and Tunisia from the CBSS. As the extent of actual cooperation with both countries has been marginal under the Initiative, this step does not imply a major change in practice, but formally discontinues efforts in this area. The use of the geographical instruments for democracy assistance was extended to all countries between 1999 and 2005. For most countries, the EU has repeatedly committed funds under MEDA II and ENPI. It is only Tunisia where the programming has not included any more democracy assistance-related projects since 2005, again in light of major implementation difficulties of earlier projects. In contrast to Syria, where implementation started late and has always been difficult, the EU has formally discontinued its more ambitious efforts vis-à-vis Tunisia.

So, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with most countries supports the assumption of a lock-in effect of cooperation. Once these instruments had been implemented for the first time, cooperation has been on-going, usually improving in line with the regional trend towards more and better outcomes. This finding is, however, challenged by Algeria for political dialogue and by Tunisia for democracy assistance. Algeria has not kept up with the regional development in setting up a specific human rights subcommittee. Thus, the partners have not institutionalised political dialogue further, but they have continuously conducted political

dialogue in the framework of the Association Council. The EU and Tunisia cancelled any further democracy assistance efforts around 2007. This suggests that the formal application of an instrument is not sufficient to create a lock-in effect if it is not reflected in the actual implementation of measures.

In light of the overall regional trend towards more and better implementation, the two hypotheses on the institutional environment and the lock-in effect of cooperation, respectively, are (mostly) confirmed. All available instruments had been implemented in all countries at some point, except for formalised political dialogue in Syria, which still lacks the legal basis of an EMAA. In most countries, implementation intensifies over time, reflecting changes in the EU's framework for cooperation, marked by an increasing degree of institutionalisation of the instruments and a stronger political commitment to democracy promotion in the region. This trend is particularly noticeable in the evolution of the regional standards for 'good' political dialogue in the region and the rising funding levels for democracy assistance. In addition, once implementation of a specific partnership-based instrument has started, this instrument has in most cases been used continuously by the EU and its Mediterranean partner. The entries into force of the EMAAs mark the beginning of a (more or less) regular political dialogue in the respective countries, and both the horizontal and the geographical channels for democracy assistance have been successively extended to all Mediterranean partners.

However, there is tremendous variation across countries in the timing and extent of cooperation that the two factors cannot account for. In addition, there are exceptions to the regional trend that challenge the explanatory power of the two hypotheses (H_1 and H_2). Algeria is the only country that up to 2008 refused to take political dialogue to the next level within the framework of the ENP by creating a specific human rights subcommittee. Thus, it has not lived up to the new regional standard for political dialogue established between 2003 and 2007. Extending the analysis beyond 2008, however, shows that Algeria has more recently agreed to discuss matters with the EU (European Commission 2010c: 124). This instance does therefore not refute the postulated effect of the institutional environment but simply suggests another delay in the implementation of new provisions on a country-specific basis that the factor cannot explain. In the case of Syria, the EU did not commit any funds for democracy assistance in the 2007-2008 period, but after opening the CBSS to all coun-

tries again, the European Commission's delegation in Syria has requested at least a small 'envelope' for projects in 2010. In addition, the ENPI programming foresees related projects in 2010 (cf. European Commission 2007h). At least for the geographical channel, this interruption is therefore just another expression of the overall slow and difficult implementation of democracy assistance with Syria. By contrast, the situation is slightly different in Tunisia, where partners had ambitious plans for democracy assistance that failed and led to a discontinuation of efforts in 2007, challenging the assumed impact of the institutional environment and the idea of a lock-in effect of cooperation. Tunisia is thus the only country that clearly goes against the regional trend towards more and better implementation that even holds, at an extremely low level, for Syria. Taken together, the two factors are good at accounting for implementation at a general level and broader changes over time, but they do not capture every instance and in particular not the important cross-country variation in the timing, extent, and quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance.

7.3. *Political liberalisation*

The degree of political liberalisation of the target regime denotes the regime's openness to allow for pluralistic and competitive politics (see chapter 3.4.3.). To measure the degree of political liberalisation, this section draws on indices provided by Freedom House and the World Bank as well as qualitative assessments of the political situation in the target countries (see chapter 4). It first provides a regional overview, comparing the MENA with other world regions regarding the average degree of political liberalisation and prevalent regime types and dynamics. It then looks in more detail at the degree of political liberalisation in each of the seven countries under consideration with the aim to determine their respective level in comparison across countries and trends over time.

The region is known for a conspicuous resistance to the 'third wave' (Huntington 1991) of democratisation (cf. Anderson 2006; Hinnebusch 2006; Pratt 2007). While there have been reforms, none of the countries in the region is in a process of transition. Even though we see regime transformation, no regime changes have occurred since independence and the wave of national revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s. The region is considered exemplary in discussing the 'end of the transition paradigm' (Carothers 2002). At the same time, these countries illustrate the difficulties of clas-

sifying regimes in the 'grey zone' between democratic and authoritarian regimes (cf. Bendel, Croissant, and Rüb 2002; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Merkel 2004; Merkel and Croissant 2004; Zakaria 1997; Levitsky and Way 2002; Bogaards 2009).

Following the Freedom in the World index, only one country – Israel – has constantly qualified as 'free' since 1990 in the MENA region.⁹⁰ The respective shares of 'partly free' and 'not free' countries have varied over time, ranging for the 'partly free' countries from nearly 50 per cent in the early 1990s, dropping to 20 per cent in the mid-1990s and increasing again to about one third around 2005. There is no other world region with a similarly low percentage of 'free' and high percentage of 'not free' countries. Between 1990 and 2009, the number of countries covered by the Freedom in the World index world-wide has increased from 165 to 193, with the number of 'free' and 'partly free' countries rising respectively from 65 to 89 (40 per cent-46 per cent) and from 50 to 62 (around 30 per cent), whereas the number of 'not free' countries has fallen from 50 to 42 (30 per cent-22 per cent).⁹¹ Thus, the MENA region, including the seven countries under consideration here, clearly goes against the global trend of the spread of liberal (democratic) values, even though the strength of the 'third wave' has in general diminished since the mid-1990s (e.g. Diamond 1997).

The seven countries of interest clearly fall into the category of 'hybrid' regimes: They all have representative democratic institutions and hold (more or less) regular elections. However, they lack significant attributes of liberal democracy, and none of them has ever qualified as an 'electoral democracy' according to Freedom House standards since 1989.⁹² The Arab-Mediterranean partners are either (people's) republics (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia) or constitutional monarchies (Jordan and Morocco). While the Freedom House indices for political rights and civil

⁹⁰ Freedom House 2010: Freedom in the World Regional Percentages, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_PercentagesByRegion.xls, last accessed 14 September 2010. During this time, the MENA region covers 18 countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen). The West Bank and Gaza Strip are counted separately as a territory that is not included in the Israeli country score.

⁹¹ Freedom House 2010: Freedom in the World Percentages by Year, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/CountryStatus&RatingsOverview1973-2009.pdf>, last accessed 14 September 2010.


⁹² Freedom House 2010: Electoral Democracies. Freedom in the World 1989-90 to 2009, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/ElectoralDemocracyTable.xls>, last accessed 14 September 2010.

liberties do not provide a thorough picture of the ‘quality’ of democracy in a country, they are a good starting point for systematically comparing the degree of political liberalisation across countries. The annual averages of their combined ratings has never dropped below 5 since 1990 and the country averages for 1990-2008 vary between 4.4 (Jordan) and 6.9 (Syria), placing all of them in the categories of ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’ countries. The overall picture is one of widespread and persisting authoritarianism, but there are differences in degree between the countries. The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), namely ‘Voice and Accountability’ for 1996-2008, allow a similar assessment.⁹³ All seven countries are in the lower third in a world-wide comparison and there is little variation over time, but there are still important variations between countries.

Jordan and Morocco, the two remaining constitutional monarchies, are the only ones consistently ranked as ‘partly free’ since 1990 by Freedom House. Their combined ratings are 4.4 and 4.8 on average for 1990-2008. Lebanon was ranked as ‘partly free’ in 2008, but generally ranked as ‘not free’ since the mid-1990s, just as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, with averages around 5.5 for the last 19 years. Finally, Syria has scored the worst possible during the whole period, with an average of seven.

⁹³ While the team around Daniel Kaufman draws on the Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ ratings for the composite indicator of ‘Voice and Accountability’, ‘Political Rights’ and ‘Civil Liberties’ are only two sources of over 30, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009: 74.

Figure 7.2: Freedom in the World – Political Rights and Civil Liberties⁹⁴




This picture is largely confirmed by ‘Voice and Accountability,’ the relevant World Bank’s WGI (cf. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). As none of them shows significant and lasting changes over time, their average values for 1996-2008 allow a similar grouping as the Freedom in the World index: Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco are in the lead with an overall ‘high’ level of political liberalisation, compared with the other four countries. At the other end of the spectrum, Syria carries the red lantern in the region with a consistently ‘low’ level of political liberalisation. Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia constitute the middle ground with a ‘medium’ level of political liberalisation.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Data: Freedom House 2010: Freedom in the World. Country Ratings, 1972-2007 [sic: 2009], http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_AllScores_Countries.xls, 13 September 2010., see annex 12.

⁹⁵ Considering the *Polity IV* ‘polity’ index, the picture slightly changes, as indicators for ‘institutionalized democracy’ and ‘institutionalized autocracy’ put much more emphasis on procedural aspects. Thus, while Lebanon only achieves mediocre scores on the other indices, it has emerged as the only noteworthy democratic polity once Syria had withdrawn its troops in 2005. Due to the continued foreign intervention in domestic politics, the polity index for Lebanon had been coded as ‘interrupted’ for 1990-2004, the first 15 years after the end of the civil war (1975-1989), which was itself coded as a period of ‘interregnum’. For the use of ‘standardized authority scores’ see Marshall and Jaggers 2008: 17-18. Also, the variation for Algeria over time is more pronounced, with the latest change in 2004 bringing it into the realm of democracy. By contrast, Moroccans might enjoy relative freedom, but the regime itself is qualified as only slightly less autocratic than the Syrian, albeit improving over time.

Figure 7.3: WGI – Voice and Accountability⁹⁶



Nevertheless, there is some variation over time and it is necessary to look at each country in more detail to determine the level of and (slight) trends in political liberalisation over time. Most regimes experienced a period of political opening and liberalisation in the 1980s or early 1990s that did, however, not survive for long in most countries. With the cancellation of the 1992 elections, Algeria is the most prominent example of a failed transition, but other attempts at opening up the political arena were also followed by periods of stagnation and renewed repression, as in Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia. Similarly, the opening in Morocco, initiated under Hassan II, has not led to a clear democratic breakthrough. The high hopes for political reform linked to the generational change in Jordan, Morocco (both 1999), and Syria (2000) have not resulted in significant and lasting improvements. In addition, the events of 11 September 2001 provoked a restriction of political rights and freedoms in many countries in the region in the name of the ‘war on terrorism’ (e.g. Jünemann 2003b).

Algeria experienced a clear democratic opening in the early 1990s that was brought to an abrupt halt with the cancellation of the second round of elections in 1992 (cf. Kausch and Youngs 2008; Volpi 2006). Military control of the political life and the ensuing civil war led to a dramatic reversal of the careful process of democratisation, with levels of political liberalisation dropping dramatically in the mid-1990s. Since

⁹⁶ Data: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, see annex 12.

the late 1990s, there has been a slow upward trend. Egypt has also shifted between low and medium levels of political liberalisation over time, and especially the mid-1990s and the early 2000s were marked by periods of increased repression (cf. Albrecht 2007; Koehler 2008). Jordan, by contrast, has experienced a relatively high level of political liberalisation throughout the almost 20 years, except for a slight regression between 2001 and 2003 (cf. Lust-Okar 2006). In the aftermath of the civil war of 1975-1990, Lebanon has for the most time achieved a medium level of political liberalisation (cf. Abu Jaber 2003). Since 2005, the situation of political rights and freedoms has seen a slight improvement, bringing Lebanon closer to the group of countries with a 'high' level of political liberalisation. Also starting out from a medium level of political liberalisation, the situation in Morocco has improved since the late 1990s, with the exception of a regression after the events of 11 September 2001 (cf. Campbell 2003; Cavatorta 2009). The country with the least variation over time is Syria, which has most stably scored worst of the seven countries with consistently low levels of political liberalisation (cf. Brownlee 2005). Finally, Tunisia has for the most time had a medium score, but in contrast to other countries, recently witnessed a downward trend (cf. Sadiki 2002a).

Taken together, albeit none of the regimes under scrutiny qualifies as a liberal democracy, the degree of political liberalisation varies significantly across countries and less so over time. On average, Lebanon and the two monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, are the most liberalised regimes. In comparison, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia take a middle position well ahead of Syria which is the least liberalised autocracy among the seven. Leaving the early 1990s aside, none of the countries has experienced extreme changes in the degree of political liberalisation, e.g. from 'high' to 'low' or vice versa. However, countries have known more or less variation over time. With its consistently 'low' score, Syria has been the most stable over time. Tunisia and Lebanon had long periods of 'medium' political liberalisation, before the latter improved its score in 2005 and the former deteriorated in 2007. Egypt has several times shifted between low and medium levels, just as Jordan and Morocco have between medium and high levels of political liberalisation. All three had a short period of increased repression in 2001-2003. As pointed out before, Algeria experienced the most dramatic regression in the early 1990s, before again reaching a medium level of political liberalisation in the late 1990s.

As the results for the Freedom in the World index are largely confirmed by the WGI ‘Voice and Accountability’, the former are in the end taken as the basis for determining the annual level of political liberalisation from 1990-2008 in the seven countries of concern (see annex 12).

Table 7.1: Degree of political liberalisation for funding periods ⁹⁷

Country	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2006	2007-2008	Ø
Algeria	medium (0)				
Egypt	medium (0)				
Jordan	good (+)				
Lebanon	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)	good (+)	medium (0)
Morocco	good (+)				
Syria	bad (-)				
Tunisia	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)	bad (-)	medium (0)

As elaborated in chapter 3.4.2., the theoretical expectation is that the likelihood (and quality) of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance increases with the degree of political liberalisation. Based on the average values of political liberalisation compared across countries, the implementation of partnership-based instruments is most likely (the best) with Jordan and Morocco and the least likely (or the most likely to be the worst) with Syria, while Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia take a middle position. Considering variation in the degree of political liberalisation over time, an improvement in the implementation is expected for Algeria (since 1998), Egypt (since 1999/2004), Lebanon (since 2005), and Morocco (since 1998/2004), whereas values for Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia are more stable over time. Beyond these overall trends, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco have experienced a temporary low in their degrees of political liberalisation in 2001-2003, so the implementation of partnership-based instruments should be compromised during that period of time.

Drawing on the empirical findings of chapter 6, the analysis again starts with the overall values for political dialogue, democracy assistance, and overall implementation (see 6.3. and 6.4.). At the level of overall implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, the theoretical expectations are met for Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria. However, the quality of implementation is, on the one hand, better than expected with Egypt and, on the other hand, worse than expected with Algeria and Tunisia.

⁹⁷ For a breakdown per year, see annex 12.

Looking at political dialogue and democracy assistance separately for Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, the implementation of only one instrument diverges from the theoretical expectation for the former two countries. In the case of Algeria, only the quality of political dialogue is worse than expected, whereas the overall quality of democracy assistance matches the fair degree of political liberalisation. The divergence can be further qualified as the overall bad performance of political dialogue hinges on the failure to set up a subcommittee by 2007/2008, while political dialogue conducted in the framework of the Association Council since 2005 would qualify as medium. In Egypt, by contrast, the conduct of political dialogue is in line with theoretical expectations, whereas the implementation of democracy assistance is better than to be expected in the regional comparison. Finally, Tunisia is the only country where the overall quality of both political dialogue and democracy assistance is worse than expected. Taken together, in most cases, the overall quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance is in line with expectations based on the average degree of political liberalisation. However, the level of political liberalisation can only partially account for the results found in Algeria and Egypt and not at all in the case of Tunisia.

Table 7.2: Analysis of political liberalisation – overall

Country	Political dialogue	Democracy assistance	Cooperation	Political liberalisation
Algeria	bad (-)	medium (0)	bad (-)	medium (0)
Egypt	medium (0)	good (+)	good (+)	medium (0)
Jordan	good (+)	medium (0)	good (+)	good (+)
Lebanon	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)
Morocco	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)	good (+)
Syria	no [very bad (--)]	bad (-)	bad (-)	bad (-)
Tunisia	bad (-)	bad (-)	bad (-)	medium (0)

Taking variation over time more seriously, both in the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and in the degree of political liberalisation, the picture becomes somewhat more complex. For Algeria, the improving level of political liberalisation, especially since 1998, cannot account for the opposite trend in the quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance. However, MEDA I was first used for providing democracy assistance shortly after the improvement, and in 2000-2006 the degree of political liberalisation actually matches the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. In the Egyptian case, an increase in the degree of political liberalisation since 1999 and again since 2004 goes

hand in hand with the improvement in the implementation of democracy assistance around 2000 and the start of political dialogue in 2004. The quality of political dialogue matches the degree of political liberalisation, while democracy assistance has been consistently better than should be expected since 2000. Similarly, Jordan shows consistently good results for both political liberalisation and the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, even though the quality of democracy assistance has always been a bit lower than could be expected. This is mainly due to the low funding levels and not to the content that has always been of relatively high quality. By contrast, the varying degree of political liberalisation in Lebanon can neither explain the erratic variation in the implementation of democracy assistance over time nor the consistently fair performance of political dialogue since 2006. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the activation of MEDA II for democracy assistance coincides with an improvement in the degree of political liberalisation around 2005. In the case of Morocco, the consistently good quality of democracy assistance already in the 1990s defies the role of political liberalisation that only improved again in the late 1990s. However, looking at the average degree of political liberalisation for this period, it is again in line with the empirical findings. In addition, the use of MEDA I for democracy assistance in 1999 and then again of MEDA II only in 2005 coincides with (temporary) improvements of the level of political liberalisation around the same time. Syria is the most straightforward case in the region. The constantly lowest degree of political liberalisation is matched by equally bad implementation. Finally, Tunisia presents a unique finding. The medium degree of political liberalisation coexists with extremely difficult implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. The implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion consistently falls behind theoretical expectations except for the last few years, when the degree of political liberalisation has deteriorated to such an extent that expectations and findings eventually match.

Table 7.3: Analysis of political liberalisation – per funding period

Country	1990-94		1995-99			2000-06			2007-08			Overall		
	DA	PL	PD	DA	PL	PD	DA	PL	PD	DA	PL	PD	DA	PL
Algeria	yes	0	n/a	+	0	(0)	0	0	-	-	0	-	0	0
Egypt	no	0	n/a	0	0	(0)	+	0	0	+	0	0	+	0
Jordan	yes	+	n/a	0	+	(+)	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+
Lebanon	yes	0	n/a	-	0	(0)	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0
Morocco	yes	+	n/a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Syria	no	-	n/a	-	-	n/a	-	-	n/a	no	-	n/a	-	-
Tunisia	yes	0	(0)	-	0	-	-	0	0	no	-	-	-	0

In sum, the analysis suggests that political liberalisation is useful as an explanatory factor in accounting for the basic variation across countries in the overall quality of implementation. This is particularly true for the extreme cases in the region, with Jordan and Morocco at the one end of the spectrum and Syria at the other. Medium levels of political liberalisation, by contrast, produce mixed results. In the case of Egypt, the level of political liberalisation can better account for the conduct of political dialogue than for the implementation of democracy assistance. For Lebanon, the degree of political liberalisation has good explanatory power for the overall results, but not for variation over time. In Algeria, political liberalisation and implementation show opposite trends over time. Finally, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with Tunisia is of a consistently lower quality than could be expected.

Figure 7.4: Political liberalisation and implementation⁹⁸

Political liberalisation Implementation	--	-	0-	0	0+	+	++
very good (++)						M* M2, M3	
good (+)			A1 E* E2	E3	L2	M1 J2, J3	J*
medium (0)			E1	A2	L*	L3	J1
bad (-)			A*	L1			
very bad (--)	S* S1, S2, S3	T3		T* T1, T2 A3			

Empirical findings strongly support the assumption that the level of political liberalisation is indeed positively related to the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion (see figure 7.4 above). This effect is particularly pronounced at the extremes, within the limits of (semi-)authoritarian regimes: Morocco and Jordan, on the one hand, are the most liberalised countries among the seven case study countries and the ones where the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance works out best. Syria, on the other hand, consistently scores worst, both regarding its degree of political liberalisation and the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The effect is less clear for the other four countries that have a similar, medium, level of political liberalisation. While Algeria and Lebanon might be well within the limits of expectations, Egypt performs slightly better than expected, compared to Morocco and Jordan, on the one hand, and Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon, on the other hand. Tunisia, in turn, performs much worse than expected, compared to Syria, on the one hand, and Egypt and Algeria, on the other hand. Looking at the two instruments separately, the pattern is more pronounced for political dialogue than for democracy assistance.

⁹⁸ Values for Algeria (A), Egypt (E), Jordan (J), Lebanon (L), Morocco (M), Syria (S), and Tunisia for 1995-1999 (1), 2000-2006 (2), 2007-2008 (3), and overall (*).

7.4. Statehood


Following the definition of statehood as a ‘regime’s effective monopoly on the legitimate use of force and its capacity to implement and enforce collectively binding decisions’ (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2007), this factor has two dimensions that can be described as *stability* and *state capacity* (see chapter 3.4.4.). Chapter 4 suggested the operationalisation of these two dimensions by primarily drawing on two World Governance Indicators, ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’ on the one hand and ‘Government Effectiveness’ on the other (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).

In a world-wide comparison, the seven countries rank on average much better on these two indicators than on the World Governance Indicator for political liberalisation.⁹⁹ However, instability and violence still present a greater challenge in the region than a lack of state capacity in the sense of government effectiveness. Regarding ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’, Tunisia is the only country among the seven that consistently ranks in the upper half, whereas Algeria, Lebanon, and Egypt remain in the lowest quarter. Most countries do better on ‘Government Effectiveness’, where Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco make it into the upper half. Syria is the only country with scores in the lowest quarter, which means that it is also the only country among the seven that scores worse for ‘Government Effectiveness’ than for ‘Political Stability’. This already indicates significant variation across countries which might explain country-variation in the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and which merits further attention. Comparing the scores on the two WGIs across countries and over time allows a more nuanced assessment of the respective degrees of statehood in the two dimensions.

Turning first to ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’, the data first of all show little variation over time except for Algeria and Lebanon. For the other countries, variation over time is marginal and allows assessing the degree of statehood in the sense of stability on the basis of their average scores (see figure 7.5 and data in annex 13).

⁹⁹ For the analysis of the WGI ‘Voice and Accountability’, see chapter 7.3. above.

Figure 7.5: WGI – Political Stability and Absence of Violence¹⁰⁰



Tunisia consistently scores best whereas the remaining four countries occupy the broad middle field, with Jordan, Morocco, and Syria on average in the upper medium and Egypt in the lower medium band. Until 2004, Lebanon was also part of the middle field, but its score sharply dropped in 2005. After a phase of relative stability following the civil war, the growing tensions with Israel and Syria and the 2006 war with Israel severely limited Lebanon’s statehood. On average, Lebanon shows a low degree of statehood, but considering variation over time, it has regressed/dropped from medium to low levels in 2004/2005. Algeria also scores low overall and remains in this category for the whole period studied here. However, while its statehood was severely limited until 2003, it has since then improved its score, approaching the average scores in the region.


¹⁰⁰ Data: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, see annex 13.

Table 7.4: Level of statehood as stability per funding period and overall¹⁰¹

country	1996-1998	2000-2006	2007-2008	Ø
Algeria	low (-)	low (-)	low (-)	low (-)
Egypt	medium (0)	lower medium (0)	lower medium (0)	lower medium (0)
Jordan	high (+) to upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)
Lebanon	lower medium (0 ⁻)	lower medium (0 ⁻) to low (-)	low (-)	low (-)
Morocco	medium (0)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)
Syria	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)
Tunisia	high (+)	high (+)	high (+)	high (+)

As pointed out for the region for the WGI ‘Government Effectiveness’, most countries do better on this indicator compared to world-wide results. Again, variation over time is not pronounced so that for most countries, an overall assessment of the degree of statehood in the sense of state capacity describes the situation adequately (see figure 7.6 and data in annex 13).

Figure 7.6: WGI – Government Effectiveness¹⁰²



Again, Tunisia scores consistently best on this indicator, but it is joined by Jordan with an overall high level of statehood (see figure 7.6 above). Egypt, Lebanon, and

¹⁰¹ For a breakdown per year, see annex 13.

¹⁰² Data: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, see annex 13.

Morocco follow in the middle field. For Lebanon, there is again degradation since 2005, severely limiting its statehood since 2007. Algeria and Syria both have overall low degrees of statehood. In this case, variation over time is most pronounced for Algeria which moved up to a medium degree of statehood in 2004.

Table 7.5: Level of statehood as capacity per funding period and overall¹⁰³

country	1996-1998	2000-2006	2007-2008	Ø
Algeria	low (-)	low (-) to medium (0)	medium (0)	low (-)
Egypt	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)
Jordan	high (+)	high (+)	high (+)	high (+)
Lebanon	medium (0)	medium (0)	low (-)	medium (0)
Morocco	medium (0)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)
Syria	medium (0) to low (-)	low (-)	low (-)	low (-)
Tunisia	high (+)	high (+)	high (+)	high (+)

Comparing the countries' scores on the two indicators of stability and state capacity, they correspond in most cases, both regarding overall values and variation over time. For Algeria and Lebanon, the same trend over time can be found for both indicators, with a time lag for 'Government Effectiveness'. This clearly suggests that the two indicators are related and that instability and violence affect overall state capacity. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia feature similar levels on both indicators, while Syria is the only country where the two indicators clearly diverge. In the regional comparison, Syria does much better on 'Political Stability and the Absence of Violence' than on 'Government Effectiveness', suggesting that the former might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the latter. Combining the two indicators provides a more nuanced picture of the overall degree of statehood in the countries (see table 7.6).

¹⁰³ For a breakdown per year, see annex 13.

Table 7.6: Level of statehood per funding period and overall¹⁰⁴

Country	1996-1998	2000-2006	2007-2008	Ø
Algeria	very low (--)	very low (--) to low (-)	low (-)	very low (--)
Egypt	medium (0)	lower medium (0))	lower medium (0)
Jordan	very high (++) to high (+)	high (+)	high (+)	high (+)
Lebanon	0 ⁻ lower medium (0 ⁻)	lower medium (0 ⁻) to low (-)	very low (--)	low (-)
Morocco	medium (0)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)	upper medium (0 ⁺)
Syria	upper medium (0 ⁺) to low (-)	low (-)	low (-)	low (-)
Tunisia	very high (++)	very high (++)	very high (++)	very high (++)

Overall, Tunisia emerges as the least contested country in the region – according to the World Governance Indicators, its political stability values are above the regional average, it is not involved in international conflicts, and internally, there have been no violent conflicts since the early 1990s. The two monarchies of Morocco and Jordan also present a picture of stability, with good WGI scores and little internal violence, even though Morocco has not yet settled the conflict over the Western Sahara, neither internally nor with Algeria, and Jordan is situated in a war-prone neighbourhood and has a latent conflict with Israel over water resources and the West Bank. Syria has also been quite stable, but has experienced growing international and internal tensions since 2004 and Israel still occupies the Syrian Golan heights, compromising Syria’s sovereignty. While all these countries have suffered from terrorist attacks after 2001, they are not confronted with movements regularly resorting to violence. By contrast, Egypt still scores similarly on the WGI, but has been challenged by the *Muslim Brotherhood* and militant Islamist groups since 1992. While state repression has ended the ‘revolutionary war’ in 1999, the conflict still overshadows the regime’s approach to dealing with Islamist opposition (Center for Systemic Peace 2009; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010). In 2004-2006, there were three HCTB that hurt international tourism to Egypt (Center for Systemic Peace 2010).

Lebanon and Algeria are at the same time at the lower end of the WGI scores and the only two countries with significant variation over time (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009: 33). Algeria started into the 1990s with a civil war between Islamist

¹⁰⁴ For a breakdown per year, see annex 13.

militant groups and the government, after a short period of political liberalisation that was abruptly ended by the military cancelling elections in 1992. Although the civil war was officially ended in 2000 and the political stability score has much improved since then, the PITF considered the ‘revolutionary war’ as ended only in 2004 (Center for Systemic Peace 2009; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010) and the Conflict Barometer shows that the conflict with Islamist groups, but also with the Berber movement in Kabylia, is persistent (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2010: 39-40). Lebanon, by contrast, had just overcome 15 years of civil war in 1990 so that the 1990s were mainly a period of (economic) recovery. During this period of relative stability, external interventions significantly limited Lebanese statehood. The second country in the region to conclude a peace agreement with Israel in 1994, Israeli troops nevertheless occupied parts of Southern Lebanon until 2000. In addition, Syrian troops remained in Lebanon after the end of the civil war, on the one hand securing the fragile peace, on the other illustrating the Syrian claim to dominate Lebanese politics. Syria only removed its troops after the ‘Cedar Revolution’ on the occasion of former Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination in 2005. At the same time, however, political instability has increased significantly in Lebanon, marked inter alia by terrorist attacks, the war between Hizbollah and Israel in 2006 and an internal conflict with the Palestinian refugees in 2007 and 2008.

Presuming a similar and positive effect of the degree of statehood on the two actors’ preferences over outcome, the values for statehood based on a mapping of ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’ suggest that the quality of implementation should be best with Tunisia, followed by Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Egypt, ahead of Algeria and Lebanon. Variation over time is marginal except for Lebanon, whose level of statehood has significantly decreased since around 2005, and to a lesser degree for Algeria, where statehood has slightly consolidated since around 2003. Expectations based on a mapping of ‘Government Effectiveness’ differ only in some respects: Jordan joins Tunisia at the head of the group, Syria moves down to the lower end, and the variation over time for Algeria is more pronounced. Combining the two indicators, overall values allow ranking the countries from most likely to least likely regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments: Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Algeria. Again, variation over time concerns Algeria, slightly improving over time, and Lebanon, significantly deteriorating over time.

Comparing overall values for the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and levels of statehood, there is some support for a simple and positive effect of statehood, but it is inconsistent. The clearest pattern emerges when aggregating the level of statehood on the basis of the two indicators, political stability and government effectiveness.

Table 7.7: Analysis of statehood– overall values

	Implementation			Statehood		
	PD	DA	Overall	PS	GE	PS+GE
Algeria	-	0	bad (-)	bad (-)	bad (-)	very bad (--)
Egypt	0	+	good (+)	medium (0)	medium (0)	medium (0)
Jordan	+	0	good (+)	medium (0 ⁺)	good (+)	good (+)
Lebanon	0	0	medium (0)	bad (-)	medium (0)	bad (-)
Morocco	+	+	good (+)	medium (0 ⁺)	medium (0)	medium (0 ⁺)
Syria	-	-	bad (-)	medium (0 ⁺)	bad (-)	bad (-)
Tunisia	-	-	bad (-)	good (+)	good (+)	very good (++)

For most countries, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance improves in line with an increasing degree of statehood – with the clear exception of Tunisia. The country with the most consolidated statehood among the seven is at the same time one of the clear laggards regarding cooperation with the EU in the field of democracy promotion. Interestingly, the best quality of implementation is found when the degree of statehood is medium to good, which is the case for Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. In line with the assumption of a simple effect of statehood, cooperation with Lebanon, Syria, and Algeria is more difficult in the light of more limited statehood. While the combination of the two indicators for statehood provides better results than each indicator individually, the diverging outcomes of cooperation with Lebanon and Syria at similar overall levels of statehood suggest slightly different roles for political stability and government effectiveness. The Lebanese level of statehood is hampered by a low level of political stability, which leads to a better outcome of cooperation than a low level of government effectiveness combined with a fair level of political stability in the case of Syria. This is also in line with the variation between Egypt and Morocco, on the one hand, and Lebanon, on the other hand. These three countries have similar levels of statehood, measured as government effectiveness, and the diverging degrees of political stability can in turn account for the different outcomes of cooperation. It is not so much the overall level of statehood, but a specific combination of the two indicators that can account best

for the quality of implementation. As pointed out before, empirical findings for Tunisia contradict the assumption of a simple and positive effect of statehood. In addition to this clear outlier, it is surprising that the Algerian performance in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance is slightly better than the Syrian, even though Algeria suffers from the most limited statehood by far among the seven countries of concern. A more detailed analysis, including variation over time, allows checking these empirical findings on the basis of more observations through within-case variation.

Most countries show little variation over time, both in the quality of implementation and on the level of statehood. The pattern found for overall values is most visible since 2000. By contrast, empirical findings for the second half of the 1990s are much more scattered. This can be easily explained by the very small extent of cooperation during the 1990s that might distort the analysis. For most countries, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion is assessed solely on the basis of the MDP with very low funding levels.

Table 7.8: Analysis of statehood– for funding periods

	1995-1999				2000-2006				2007-2008			
	PS	GE	SH	Imp	PS	GE	SH	Imp	PS	GE	SH	Imp
Algeria	-	-	--	+	-	-/0	--/-	00	-	0	-	--
Egypt	0 ⁻	0	0	0	0 ⁻	0	0 ⁻	0+	0 ⁻	0	0 ⁻	0+
Jordan	+/0 ⁺	+	++/+	0	0 ⁺	+	+	+0	0 ⁺	+	+	+0
Lebanon	0 ⁻	0	0 ⁻	-	0/-	0	0 ⁻ /-	0+	-	-	--	00
Morocco	0 ⁻	0	0	+	0 ⁺	0	0	++	0 ⁺	0	0	++
Syria	0 ⁺	0/-	0 ⁺ /-	-	0 ⁺	-	-	-	0 ⁺	-	-	-
Tunisia	+	+	++	-	+	+	++	--	+	+	++	0-

Taking this into consideration, the picture for overall values (see above) holds up for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia in a comparison over time. Starting from the assumption of a simple and positive effect of statehood on cooperation, theoretical expectations are therefore more or less met for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria for the whole period of investigation. By contrast, statehood can at no point explain the result of cooperation with Tunisia, so the country consistently maintains its status as an outlier: the high degree of statehood goes hand in hand with extreme difficulties in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance, defying both theoretical expectations and empirical findings for most of the other countries. For Algeria and Lebanon, there is more significant variation over time, both in the

level of statehood and the quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance. In the case of Algeria, the quality of cooperation has deteriorated over time, moving from the upper to the lower end of the spectrum (good to bad), although the level of statehood has slightly consolidated (very low to low). This could suggest an inverse relationship between statehood and cooperation. The implementation of partnership-based instruments with Lebanon has, by contrast, become more difficult as statehood became threatened. However, the quality of implementation has remained at a relatively high level, considering the recently severe limitations to statehood.

In sum, the empirical findings do neither lend univocal support to the hypothesis of a more or less linear and positive effect of statehood on cooperation nor to the opposite assumption. Rather, they suggest a more complex but nevertheless direct relationship between statehood and the outcomes of cooperation in the sense that there are certain thresholds at which the effect changes. At the one extreme, very low levels of statehood, particularly limited in the dimension of political stability, are associated with a fair quality of cooperation – capturing the otherwise surprising findings for Algeria until around 2005 and for Lebanon more recently. As long as statehood is not immediately threatened by political instability and violence, there is a positive effect of statehood on cooperation in line with the original assumption until reaching a turning point, when the effect reverts. This would explain findings for Syria, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, on the one hand, and Tunisia as the seeming outlier, on the other hand. Cooperation with Syria is severely hampered by its limited statehood, and especially state capacity, whereas implementation significantly improves with an increasing degree of statehood for Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. Statehood in Tunisia would then be consolidated to an extent that it does not have a similar positive effect any more. Since the basic hypothesis (H₄) on the role of statehood for the outcome of cooperation has been refuted, it is now necessary to search for the possible theoretical underpinning of the pattern described above, lest it remain an *ad hoc*, case-by-case explanation of the empirical findings.

The remainder of this section introduces two possible arguments: The one elaborates on the two dimensions of statehood and their potentially different effect on the outcome of cooperation, affecting both the willingness and the capacity of the two actors. The other starts from the more complex assumption about the effect of statehood on cooperation sketched in chapter 3. In that view, the empirical findings are

then the result of a diverging effect on the two actors' preferences over outcome combined with the specific configuration of interdependence.

The first argument builds on the observation that the two dimensions of statehood, described as 'sovereignty' and 'state capacity' and measured as 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' and 'Government Effectiveness' do not simply add up to an overall level of statehood, but that its effect rather depends on the specific combination of the two indicators. This observation links to distinct theoretical considerations about their diverging causal impact on the actors' preferences regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

Statehood as political stability shapes the partners' interest in cooperation, whereas government effectiveness describes the Mediterranean partners' capacity to cooperate in the first place. If a regime's statehood is severely limited by political instability, this indicates an immediate threat to the survival of the regime, creating an important incentive to cooperate with external actors in the hope for capacity building, either directly through democracy assistance or indirectly through other incentives offered. This would apply to Algeria, especially during the civil war in the 1990s, and Lebanon since 2005, when the normal conduct of political, social, and economic life has been interrupted by violent conflict. The more consolidated statehood is in terms of an effective monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the smaller is the regime's need for or interest in cooperation. State capacity is, by contrast, an enabling factor for cooperation. Here, an extremely low level can make cooperation difficult due to a sheer lack of capacity, e.g. if the ministries involved in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance do not have sufficient or sufficiently well-trained staff, which could be the case for Syria. Increasing state capacity allows the target regime to engage more actively in cooperation with its European counterpart – up to the point that, given no need for cooperation, it enables the regime to control or refuse cooperation, shaping the outcome according to its preferences. Considering these two dimensions of statehood separately, their combination is particularly suited to explain empirical findings at the upper and lower margins of statehood, namely for Tunisia as well as Algeria and Lebanon as opposed to Syria.

The second argument accommodates the more complex theoretical assumption sketched in chapter 3.4.4. about the diverging effect of statehood on the two actors' preferences over outcome. Accordingly, the EU is expected to prefer better imple-

mentation with increasing levels of statehood in the target countries, shying away from increased risks of instability, whereas its Mediterranean partners prefer implementation more strongly the more limited their statehood is, seeking additional resources. As a result, the level of statehood does not have a direct impact on the outcome of cooperation but its effect hinges on the specific configuration of interdependence (see 3.4.6.). While these assumptions cannot be tested empirically without determining the respective degree and direction of asymmetric interdependence (see 7.5. below), they might help to account for the pattern found, especially its ‘surprises’ at the extremes. The two actors’ preferences over outcome only diverge significantly when the level of statehood is extremely low or high. In these cases, asymmetries in interdependence indicate which actor possesses the ‘power’ to realise its preferred outcome. This concerns Tunisia, on the one hand, and Syria, Algeria and at least temporarily Lebanon, on the other hand. In the other cases, medium levels of statehood do not shape preferences over outcome to a similar extent, so the additional effect of interdependence is expected to be less pronounced. Section 7.5. investigates whether the pattern of statehood and cooperation identified empirically is indeed the result of an inverse effect of statehood on the preferences over outcome of the two actors and their respective configuration of (asymmetric) interdependence.

Figure 7.7: Statehood and implementation¹⁰⁵

Statehood	very bad (--)	bad (-)	lower medium (0-)	upper medium (0+)	good (+)	very good (++)
Implementation						
very good (++)				M* M2, M3		
good (+)	A1	L2b	E* E2, E3 L2a M1		J* J2, J3	
medium (0)	L3 A2a	A2b L*	E1		J1b	J1a
bad (-)	A*	S1b	L1	S1a		T1, T3
very bad (--)		S* S2, S3 A3				T* T2

In summary, the analysis does not unequivocally back the hypothesis of a simple positive effect of the degree of statehood on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance (H₄ Statehood). The effect seems to be as expected for low to medium levels of statehood but inverse for more consolidated statehood. While this only concerns Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Jordan (as compared to Morocco and Egypt), the pattern is consistent over time. This pattern can be interpreted in different ways, assuming some effect of statehood on the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. First, the effect could be not ‘linear’ at all, but changing at certain thresholds. Tunisia (and Jordan) would then suggest a threshold of ‘too good’ statehood at which the previously positive effect reverses. Second, statehood could have different effects on the two actors involved, resulting in divergent preferences over outcome. In this case, other factors, e.g. the specific configuration of interdependence, would then decide which actor can assert its preference and shape the outcome of interaction more strongly. Third, the effect

¹⁰⁵ Values for Algeria (A), Egypt (E), Jordan (J), Lebanon (L), Morocco (M), Syria (S), and Tunisia for 1996-1998 (1), 2000-2006 (2), 2007-2008 (3), and overall (*).

could be as expected, but mitigated by other factors not considered here, accounting for the outlier Tunisia (and Jordan).

It was suggested in chapter 3 that the level of statehood could indeed have inverse effects on the EU and its Mediterranean partners. Focusing on concerns of stability, the effect should be similar to the degree of political liberalisation, in that the EU's preference for implementation should be the stronger the higher the degree of statehood in the target country. By contrast, the Mediterranean partner should more strongly prefer implementation the lower its degree of statehood, as the benefits of cooperation in the sense of capacity-building increase. Given the different levels of statehood in the seven countries, the preferences over outcome of the actors involved should diverge most in the cases of Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon, on the one hand, and Jordan and Tunisia, on the other hand. Considering the respective configurations of interdependence, implementation of partnership-based instruments is indeed more difficult with Algeria and Syria compared to Lebanon, as the former two are more favoured by asymmetries in interdependence with the EU. However, Syria performs much worse than Algeria and Tunisia much worse than Jordan, a finding that is not backed by the respective interdependencies and thus clearly challenges the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the following section turns to the interaction of political liberalisation and statehood in order to investigate to what extent these two factors together can account for variation in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance across countries.

7.5. *Interaction effect between political liberalisation and statehood*

As both political liberalisation and statehood of the target country are expected to influence the preferences over outcome of the EU and the Arab authoritarian regimes regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, it is necessary to consider their interaction and joint effect on the outcome of cooperation. The previous analysis showed that both factors relate to the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance, albeit not exactly in the way that had been hypothesised (see 7.3. and 7.4.).

For Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria, overall values of political liberalisation and implementation met theoretical expectations. However, especially in the middle

field, findings were not consistent with the assumption of a positive and more or less linear relationship between political liberalisation and implementation. A similar, medium, degree of political liberalisation led to diverging outcomes of cooperation for Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia. While Algeria and Egypt fulfilled expectations at least partially, Tunisia did consistently worse than expected. In addition, the factor could not account for variation over time, especially in the cases of Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia. The empirical findings on the role of statehood suggested that there is no simple, linear relationship between the degree of statehood and the quality of implementation. While results were more or less as expected within a spectrum of low to medium/high statehood, extremely low and high values produced surprising outcomes that were better than expected for Algeria and Lebanon and much worse for Tunisia. This pattern was confirmed in a detailed analysis over time. Theoretical explanations for this pattern can be found in the alternative assumption for the effect of statehood on the preferences over outcome of the Arab authoritarian regimes. With this modified assumption, however, the factor does not have a direct impact on the outcome of cooperation and its effect hinges on specific situations of (asymmetric) interdependence. Alternatively, the thresholds for a changing effect of statehood that were inductively found can be accounted for by a different effect of stability and capacity on the Arab authoritarian regimes' inclination to implement.

In light of these mixed results for the two factors, analysing their interaction effect is all the more relevant as it might capture some of the inconsistencies regarding the separate hypotheses. Considering the empirical findings so far, there are two possible scenarios for the interaction effect of political liberalisation and statehood, one developed deductively (see 3.4.5.) and the other inductively, based on the assumption of thresholds for the impact of statehood.

The first scenario builds on the assumption that the degree of political liberalisation has a (linear) positive effect on both actors' preferences over outcome, whereas the level of statehood has a similar effect on the EU's, but an inverse effect on the respective Arab authoritarian regime's preferences. Therefore, combining the two factors, the EU and its partners are expected to have diverging preferences regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion (see figure 7.8 below). In general, the more similar their preferences are, the more likely the outcome should resemble their (common) preferences. By contrast, the more their

preferred outcomes diverge, the less the expected interaction effect of political liberalisation and statehood can predict the outcome of cooperation. In line with the model of preference formation outlined in chapter 3, the specific configuration of (asymmetric) interdependence should then play a crucial role in shaping the outcome, either favouring the EU or its partner. More specifically, given that only statehood has inverse effects on the two actors, the degree of political liberalisation should directly affect the outcome of cooperation at a medium level of statehood. The actors' preferences differ the most in cases of extremely weak and strong statehood combined with a medium level of political liberalisation, allowing for any outcome. If both factors score extremely high or low, the range of outcomes is more limited.

Figure 7.8: Expectations for political liberalisation and statehood combined (1)

Political liberalisation Statehood	-	0	+
+	0 // -	+ // -	+ // 0
0	- // -	0 // 0	+ // +
-	- // 0	- // +	0 // +

The second scenario builds on the empirical findings on the role of statehood for the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, suggesting certain thresholds at which the effect of statehood on preferences over outcome changes (see figure 7.9 below). Accordingly, as long as the level of statehood remains within a certain range, becoming neither too low nor too high, both factors can be expected to have a similar positive (linear) effect on the outcome of cooperation. If the level of statehood is extremely low, cooperation should be better than at a slightly higher level; if the level of statehood is extremely high, cooperation should by contrast be much worse than at a slightly lower level. In both cases, the quality of cooperation should nevertheless improve with the degree of political liberalisation.

Figure 7.9: Expectations for political liberalisation and statehood combined (2)

Political liberalisation Statehood	-	0	+
++	--	-	0
+	0	+	++
0	-	0	+
-	--	-	0
--	-	0	+

Combining the mappings for both factors (see sections 7.2. and 7.3. above), the following picture emerges (see figure 7.10 below). Theoretical expectations at this stage are difficult to form, but according to the first scenario, the overall outcomes of cooperation with Morocco and Jordan should be better than with Egypt and again better than with Syria. For Algeria, Lebanon, and Tunisia, any outcome is possible. The second scenario allows stating at least some tendencies for each country. Outcomes of cooperation with Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria should rank from best to worst. Implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion with Algeria should still be better than with Syria, and cooperation with Tunisia should be worse than with Egypt, Lebanon, and Algeria.

Figure 7.10: Political liberalisation and statehood combined¹⁰⁶

Political liberalisation Statehood	--	-	0 ⁻	0	0 ⁺	+	++
++		T3		T* T1, T2			J1a
+						J2, J3	J* J1b
0 ⁺	S1a					M* M2, M3	
0			E1			M1	
0 ⁻			E* E2	E3; L1	L2a		
-	S* S1b, S2, S3			A2b, A3	L* L2b		
--			A* A1	A2a		L3	

For Algeria, Lebanon, and Jordan, both factors show variation over time. In Algeria, both factors improve slightly, with political liberalisation being at an overall medium and statehood at an overall low level. Taken together, the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion should over time become more difficult in both scenarios. In Jordan, both factors fall slightly, but overall remain at very high levels, so that the quality of cooperation should remain more or less the same or slightly increase according to the second scenario. By contrast, the two factors develop into opposite directions for Lebanon, with the level of political liberali-

¹⁰⁶ Values for Algeria (A), Egypt (E), Jordan (J), Lebanon (L), Morocco (M), Syria (S), and Tunisia for 1995/1996-1998/1999 (1), 2000-2006 (2), 2007-2008 (3), and overall (*).

sation improving from medium to high and the degree of statehood decreasing from low to very low, so that both scenarios suggest an overall slight improvement of the quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance. In the case of Syria, political liberalisation remains at an extremely low level while the degree of statehood becomes more limited. It stays within the spectrum where cooperation can be expected to get worse. Tunisia, in turn, only suffers from a slackening of political liberalisation, so that the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion should also become more difficult. Morocco has only slightly consolidated its overall medium level of statehood, and cooperation should thus remain more or less the same or improve slightly. Variation over time for Egypt is marginal, so it should not affect the outcome of cooperation.

Checking these expectations against empirical findings on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance reveals that the specific combination of political liberalisation and statehood in a target country can to a large extent account for variation across countries and over time. Focusing on the second scenario outlined above, which allows forming tentative expectations for all countries and which does not contradict the deductively derived scenario, all expectations regarding the overall quality of cooperation are met. Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt definitely prove to be the leaders in implementing partnership-based instruments, ahead of Lebanon and Syria. Egypt does slightly better than expected, which supports the interpretation that a combination of medium levels of both political liberalisation and statehood is sufficient for overall good cooperation. None of the countries with either very high or low levels of statehood and only low to medium levels of political liberalisation show similarly good quality of implementation. Furthermore, the fact that, on the one hand, Algeria does better than Syria, and, on the other hand, Tunisia does worse than Egypt, Lebanon, and Algeria, also meets expectations and highlights the respective role of political liberalisation and statehood. The fact that the extent and quality of implementation are much higher with Algeria than with Syria can either point to a dominant role of political liberalisation in shaping cooperation (Algeria better than Syria) or the existence of thresholds for a changing effect of statehood (Algeria worse than Syria). As discussed before, the similar levels of political liberalisation for Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon could not account for the very different outcomes of cooperation with these four countries (see 7.3.). Taking into account the different degrees of statehood, the notion of thresholds helps to systematically ac-

count for this variation in outcome. In particular, it suggests an explanation for the seeming outlier Tunisia that would otherwise not fit into the picture. Considering variation over time might provide further evidence for the existence of (a lower) threshold. Especially when focusing on cooperation since 2000 (t2 and t3), this pattern is confirmed (see figure 7.11 below). The additional variation over time for Algeria and Lebanon indeed supports the idea that extremely limited statehood, directly threatening the regime's survival, provides a bigger incentive to cooperate than slightly higher levels of statehood.

Figure 7.11: Political liberalisation, statehood, and implementation¹⁰⁷

Political liberalisation Statehood	--	-	0 ⁻	0	0 ⁺	+	++
++		T3 (--)		T* (--) T1 (--) T2 (--)			J1a (0)
+						J2 (+) J3 (+)	J* (+) J1b (0)
0 ⁺	S1a (--)					M* (++) M2 (++) M3 (++)	
0			E1 (0)			M1 (+)	
0 ⁻			E* (+) E2 (+)	E3 (+) L1 (-)	L2a (+)		
-	S* (--) S1b (--) S2 (--) S3 (--)			A2b (0) A3 (--)	L* (0) L2b (+)		
--			A* (-) A1 (+)	A2a (0)		L3 (0)	

¹⁰⁷ Values for the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion for Algeria (A), Egypt (E), Jordan (J), Lebanon (L), Morocco (M), Syria (S), and Tunisia for 2000-2006 (2), 2007-2008 (3), and overall (*). The shades of grey show the inductively found pattern for the quality of implementation under conditions of political liberalisation and statehood, ranging from good (white) to bad (dark grey).

7.6. *Interdependence*

As elaborated in chapter 3, interdependence affects the outcome of cooperation by shaping the strategic environment in which actors form their preferences over strategy. Interdependence describes a relationship of international actors marked by a degree of ‘interconnectedness’ that makes actors vulnerable to each other’s choices of action, creating mutual dependence. Asymmetries in interdependence then describe a power differential between actors that gives one of them a certain amount of influence or ‘leverage’ over the other. To assess potential asymmetries in interdependence between the EU, on the one hand, and its Mediterranean partners, on the other hand, chapter 3 suggested considering both ‘power as resources’ and ‘relational power’ approaches. While classic (realist) attributes of power in international relations are often assessed by measuring the size of territory, population, economy, and military, it is more challenging to weigh the mutual dependence of actors in terms of socio-economic exchanges. Chapter 4 suggested focusing on aspects of trade and aid, including the role of energy resources. Clearly, all of the seven Mediterranean partners are ‘weaker’ than the EU in terms of size and in general, trade and aid imbalances favour the EU. However, the seven countries vary greatly in their respective power resources and their dependence on the EU as a major trade partner and donor. In addition, the EU is more or less dependent on the individual Mediterranean partners, given their different role as trade partners, especially in providing energy resources. Therefore, the configuration of (asymmetric) interdependence varies between countries and is expected to affect the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance differently. To assess the explanatory value of interdependence, this section maps the different indicators for each country and determines the specific configurations of interdependence in a systematic comparison across countries and over time.

Following a ‘power as resources’ approach, the EU with its member states has more (economic) power than any of the Mediterranean countries. However, even in terms of the sheer size of the countries and their economies, variation between the countries in the region is enormous. Algeria and Egypt are by far the biggest countries among the seven, considering attributes such as territory and population, but also their GDP and the volume of their external trade (imports and exports of goods and services). Morocco takes a middle position, and among the small countries, Syria and

Tunisia are still significantly larger than Jordan and Lebanon. Despite these differences, the countries' roles in the world economy are limited judging by their share in the global GDP and trade volumes (see also Paczynska 2008: 239). While the level of military expenditure varies both with regard to its share of each country's GDP and in total terms, overall 'the region is the most highly militarized in the world' (Gerner and Schrodt 2008: 100). Their overall 'size' is more or less constant over time and can be considered as a stable 'property' of the countries. It does not say much about the countries' absolute power vis-à-vis the EU, but it allows a relative assessment from a comparative perspective, making countries more or less dependent on the EU. Everything else being constant, Algeria and Egypt are least dependent on the EU whereas Lebanon and Jordan are most dependent.

Table 7.9: Factors of size¹⁰⁸

		Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia
Surface area in million sq. km		2.38	1.00	0.09	0.01	0.45	0.19	0.16
Population in million	1990	25	55	3	3	24	13	8
	2007	34	75	6	4	31	20	10
GDP in billion current US\$	1990	62	43	4	3	26	12	12
	2007	116	107	14	22	66	33	31
GDP in % of world total	1990	0.28	0.20	0.02	0.01	0.12	0.05	0.05
	2007	0.25	0.23	0.03	0.04	0.13	0.07	0.06
Trade volume in billion current US\$	1990	30	23	6	3	15	7	12
	2006	95	85	25	18	61	31	39
Trade volume in % of world total	1990	0.36	0.27	0.07	0.04	0.18	0.08	0.14
	2006	0.30	0.24	0.08	0.05	0.17	0.09	0.11
Military spending in % of the country's GDP	1990	1.46	4.7	8.02	7.55	4.14	6.04	2.02
	2007	2.92	2.5	6.94	5.84	3.29	3.94	1.39 ¹⁰⁹
Military spending total in billion current US\$	1990	0.90	2.02	0.32	0.23	1.08	0.72	0.24
	2007	3.94	3.20	1.11	1.40	2.40	1.50	0.49

As pointed out before, it is challenging to assess the respective relationship of (asymmetric) interdependence between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. It is necessary to determine in turn each actor's dependence on the other and to then weigh these results against each other in order to assess the strength and direction of possible asymmetries in their mutual dependence. The degree of trade dependence is

¹⁰⁸ Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online database). The world GDP for 1990 was 21,883 and for 2007 54,583 billion current US\$; the trade volume is calculated as imports + exports of goods and services; the world trade volume for 1990 was 8,369 and for 2006 27,809 billion current US\$.

¹⁰⁹ For 2006.

assessed for both the EU and the target countries, whereas the notion of aid dependence is specific to the Mediterranean partners alone.

The Mediterranean partners' aid dependence on the EU hinges on their general aid dependence and the EU's role as a donor. The level of general aid dependence in terms of Official Development Assistance (ODA) a country receives in percent of its GDP limits the maximum level of aid dependence on the EU. If ODA is not a major source of income for a country in general, then even a high share of funding coming from the EU and its member states does not create dependence. A mapping of both indicators reveals less variation in general aid dependence across countries than in the EU's role as a donor, which also varies more over time.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), all seven countries have emerging economies, but their level of economic and human development varies. Except for Lebanon, which has been classified as an 'upper middle income' country by the World Bank since 1997, all other countries remain in the category of 'lower middle income'. However, the distribution of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is uneven in the region, with Egypt and Syria at the lower and Algeria at the upper end of the category. Similarly, except for Lebanon, all countries show 'medium human development' according to the Human Development Reports of the UNDP, with Lebanon ranked 83th and Morocco ranked as low as 130th in 2009 (UNDP 2009). The countries therefore face different challenges when it comes to economic and social development, which might make them more or less dependent on external assistance.

In terms of ODA and official aid the seven countries receive, again figures vary enormously in absolute terms and, more importantly in view of their respective GDP and populations. In general, the region has seen a major decline of ODA during the 1990s. This trend was reversed around 2001 for all countries except for Syria and, on a high level, for Egypt. Egypt used to be by far the largest recipient of (U.S.A.) external assistance since the Camp David Accord with Israel in 1978. In relation to their size, the smaller countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, receive much higher levels of ODA per capita and as a share of their GDP. They are followed by Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, whereas Algeria only receives negligible amounts of aid. For Syria, the Soviet Union used to be the most important donor until its break-up (see Paczynska 2008: 228). This source of external assistance has not been replaced since the early 1990s, leaving Syria with marginal ODA levels. Setting the threshold for

‘high’ aid dependence at 10 per cent of GDP, none of the seven countries is highly dependent on aid.¹¹⁰ There is a trend for most countries of decreasing general aid dependence, especially since the mid-1990s. Overall, most countries have very low levels of general aid dependence, limiting the possible extent of aid dependence on the EU. Jordan is the only one among the seven with an overall medium level of general aid dependence.¹¹¹

Table 7.10: Socio-economic development and international aid¹¹²

		Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	1990	2420	770	1390	1230	1030	890	1430
	2006	3030	1360	2650	5580	2160	1560	2970
World Bank Analytical Classification L = Low Income LM = Lower Middle Income UM = Upper Middle Income		LM	LM L 1990-1994	LM	LM until 1996 UM since 1997	LM	LM	LM
HDI	1990	0.645	0.572	0.516	0.625	0.625
	2006	0.748	0.716	0.769	0.796	0.646	0.736	0.762
HDI rank 2006 All Medium Human Development		100	116	90	78	127	105	95
ODA and official aid (million current US\$)	1990	132	5426	886	252	1048	683	391
	2006	209	873	580	707	1046	27	432
average		260	2173	583	252	693	243	267
ODA in % of GDP	1990	0,21	12,58	22,04	8,88	4,06	5,55	3,18
	2006	0,18	0,81	4,11	3,11	1,60	0,08	1,43
ODA per capita (in current US\$)	1990	5,21	98,41	279,49	84,75	43,36	53,68	47,95
	2006	6,25	11,77	104,66	174,41	34,29	1,38	42,65

Considering the respective levels of ODA coming from the EU and its member states, however, there is much more variation across countries and within countries

¹¹⁰ Thresholds for different levels of ‘aid dependence’ are hard to find. Deborah Bräutigam suggests in her study for the Swedish foreign ministry that ‘countries receiving aid at levels of 10 percent of GNP or above’ qualify as ‘aid dependent’ (Bräutigam 2000: 2). Most studies use similar indicators – ODA as percentage of GDP, GNI, or government expenditure – but do not specify resulting levels of ‘aid dependence’ (e.g. Collier 1999, Knack 2001, Ear 2007). Bräutigam’s study backs the finding of overall low aid dependence of Mediterranean countries. O’Connell and Soludo have also shown that the ‘resource intensity of aid’ (aid per GNP and GDP) for the MENA region was significantly lower than for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific countries in the 1990s (O’Connell and Soludo 2001: 1535).

¹¹¹ This is backed by the finding that Jordan is the only Mediterranean country ranked among the 20 most aid-dependent countries with an average share of ODA per GDP between 5 per cent and 15 per cent for the period of 1975-1999 (Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008: 173). As the level of ODA per GDP has significantly dropped in the early 1990s, Jordan would not fall into this category anymore for a later period.

¹¹² Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online database); UNDP, Human Development Reports (online statistics).

over time. Overall, the EU is a major donor for Algeria and Tunisia, providing more than 50 per cent of all ODA, whereas this figure is less than 25 per cent for Jordan. The variation over time is often short term and does not follow a clear regional trend like it does for general aid dependence, except maybe for Jordan and Syria, where the EU has played, respectively, a decreasing or increasing role over time. In sum, the rather ‘erratic’ variation over time is ignored here, allowing again an assessment of aid dependence based on average values of both indicators.

Table 7.11: Aid dependence on Europe¹¹³

		Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia
All donors, in million US\$ (current prices)	1990	132	5426	886	252	1048	683	391
	2007	389	1096	516	956	1072	82	323
DAC EU Members, in million US\$ (current prices)	1990	100	664	212	49	395	63	153
	2007	276	314	42	284	547	49	184
DAC EU Members in % of all donors	1990	76	12	24	20	38	9	39
	2007	71	29	8	30	51	60	57

In light of the overall very low general aid dependence, the role of the EU as a donor and resulting aid dependence on the EU is very limited. Most countries have low levels of general aid dependence and therefore their aid dependence on the EU remains low, even though the EU might be the most important donor. Europe is the most important source of funding for Tunisia and Morocco. This is also true for Algeria and Syria, but the importance of Europe as a donor is attenuated by the fact that both countries receive only low levels of aid. Egypt and Jordan, and to a lesser extent Lebanon, have been traditional recipients of U.S.A. aid, even though the role of Europe has been growing for Egypt and Lebanon. Only Jordan has a medium level of general aid dependence, but it is the country where the EU plays the least important role as a donor, so, again, the country’s overall aid dependence on the EU is low.

¹¹³ Source: OECD.StatExtracts, ODA by Recipient by country, <http://stats.oecd.org>, 12 September 2009.

Figure 7.12: Mediterranean partners' aid dependence on the EU¹¹⁴

Aid dependence EU aid	High	Medium	Low
High	→ High	→ <i>Medium</i>	→ <i>Low</i> Algeria Tunisia
Medium	→ <i>Medium</i>	→ <i>Medium</i>	→ <i>Low</i> Egypt Lebanon Morocco Syria
Low	→ <i>Low</i>	→ <i>Low</i> Jordan	→ <i>Low</i>

The Mediterranean partners' trade dependence is first of all constituted by the EU's role as a trading partner and the share of exports going to the EU. However, they might have alternatives to substitute for the EU as an export market, which becomes easier when the share of energy exports to the EU is high, possibly reducing its dependence on the EU. So, if the share of energy in exports to the EU is low, the role of the EU as a market (share of total exports) is decisive for the target country's trade dependence. If the share of energy in exports to the EU is medium or high, it reduces the Mediterranean partner's trade dependence on the EU. In general, shares of 50 per cent or more are considered as 'high' and shares of 20 per cent and less as 'low'. When mapping these two indicators for each country over time since the 1990s, findings show that there is major variation across countries, but little variation over time. Therefore, the assessment of the Mediterranean partners' trade dependence on the EU can draw on average values in most cases for both the EU's role as an export market and the role of energy exports. Only for Lebanon, the share of exports going to the EU has shifted from low to medium in 1997 and back to low in 2002. Combining the two indicators shows that trade dependence on the EU is low for most countries, namely Algeria, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon from 1993-1996 and from 2001-2008. The EU is a major trading partner for Algeria and Syria, but their share of energy exports to the EU is very high. By contrast, the total share of exports from Jordan and Lebanon to the EU is low. Only in 1997-2001, the Lebanese trade dependence reached medium levels, because exports to the EU increased during that period. Morocco and Tunisia are the only two countries highly dependent on the EU

¹¹⁴ See annex 14 for the respective data on general aid dependence and the EU's role as a donor.

in terms of trade, as the EU is their major export market and neither of them exports a significant amount of energy resources.

Figure 7.13: Mediterranean partners' trade dependence on the EU¹¹⁵

Exports	High	Medium	Low
Energy Exports			
Low	→ <i>High</i> Morocco Tunisia	→ <i>Medium</i>	→ <i>Low</i> Jordan Lebanon
Medium	→ <i>Medium</i>	→ <i>Low</i> Egypt	→ <i>Low</i>
High	→ <i>Low</i> Algeria Syria	→ <i>Low</i>	→ <i>Low</i>

In sum, even though there is variation in the role of the EU as a donor across countries, the general aid dependence of all countries is so low that it should not create a situation of 'dependence' vis-à-vis the EU, even if the latter is the major donor. Therefore, the constantly low level of aid dependence in the region does not play a major role in determining the Mediterranean partners' overall dependence on the EU: first, the level of aid dependence on the EU is low for all seven countries, so it cannot cause variation across countries in their overall dependence; second, the target countries' aid dependence on the EU is so low that it cannot counterbalance levels of trade dependence.

Figure 7.14: Mediterranean partners' dependence on EU

Trade dependence	High	Medium	Low
Aid dependence			
Low	→ <i>High</i> Morocco Tunisia	→ <i>Medium</i>	→ <i>Low</i> Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

In turn, the EU can be more or less dependent on the individual Mediterranean partners. Again, the analysis focuses on aspects of trade dependence in terms of the seven countries' role as export markets and energy suppliers for the EU. The higher the share of EU exports going to and the share of EU energy imports coming from a Mediterranean partner, the more important is its role as a trading partner for the EU.

¹¹⁵ See annex 14 for data on Mediterranean partners' exports to the EU and the role of energy supplies.

In combining these two indicators, imports of natural gas and oil play a greater role in shaping the EU's trade dependence in terms of energy security. Effectively, the share of EU exports going to Mediterranean countries is marginal, hardly reaching more than 1 per cent for any country.¹¹⁶ Therefore, it is not useful to speak of EU 'dependence' in this context. There is some variation across countries, but at a very low level.¹¹⁷ So empirically, this indicator plays a secondary role in determining the level of the EU's dependence on the target countries. There is little variation over time, so average values are representative. Regarding energy imports to the EU, by contrast, there are three countries among the seven that export significant quantities of energy supplies to the EU. Overall and with little variation over time, the share of EU energy imports stemming from Algeria is high and medium from Egypt and Syria. All other countries are no major source of natural gas and oil for the EU. Again, there is little variation over time, so average values are representative.

Figure 7.15: EU dependence on Mediterranean partners¹¹⁸

Exports	High	Medium	Low
Energy Imports			
High	→ <i>High</i>	→ <i>High</i> Algeria	→ <i>High</i>
Medium	→ <i>High</i>	→ <i>Medium</i> Egypt	→ <i>Medium</i> Syria
Low	→ <i>Medium</i>	→ <i>Low</i> Morocco Tunisia	→ <i>Low</i> Jordan Lebanon

Weighing the mutual (trade) dependencies against each other, the analysis reveals important variation across countries regarding the (suspected) asymmetries in interdependence with the EU. Although it is impossible to objectively determine and balance the EU's and the Mediterranean partners' dependencies, the data allows a com-

¹¹⁶ Considering their share in EU exports, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon rank consistently among the 50 main trading partners of the EU, with Morocco and Tunisia relatively stable in the middle field (around 30), Egypt and Algeria losing some ground (from 20 to 30), and Lebanon consistently at the bottom (Eurostat 2009b). While there is important variation between countries, their overall share of EU exports is low, with the highest shares (Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt) hardly over 1 per cent. There is little variation over time.

¹¹⁷ Algeria and Morocco are two of the EU's four main trading partners in Africa, with similar shares in EU exports of around 1 per cent, increasing from about 4 billion ECU in the early 1990s (EU-12) to around 15 billion Euro in 2008 (EU-27) (Eurostat 2009b: 24). Regarding EU imports from these two countries, the value and share of imports from Algeria are significantly higher than those from Morocco, increasing in the same period from nearly 7 billion ECU to 28 billion Euro (vs. from 3 to 8 billion ECU/Euro) or 1,4 to 1,8 per cent (vs. decrease from 0,7 to 0,5 per cent) (ibid.: 26), resulting, for the EU, in a clearly negative trade balance vis-à-vis Algeria and a positive one vis-à-vis Morocco (ibid.: 28).

¹¹⁸ See annex 14 for data on the EU's exports to the Mediterranean partners and the role of energy imports from the Mediterranean.

parative assessment of their interdependence. However, variation in the respective dependencies of the EU and the Mediterranean partners suggests shifting configurations of interdependence across the region that more or less favour either the EU or the respective partner.

Taken together, the EU and its member states are by far the most important trading partners for the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, potentially creating some leverage for the EU (Eurostat 2001; Eurostat 2007). However, in contrast to those of its neighbours, oil and gas make up more than 95 per cent of Algerian exports (see Paczynska 2008: 245). This makes Algeria one of the largest sources of energy imports for the EU, shifting the interdependence with the EU in favour of Algeria. The only country in the region with a trade balance surplus, Algeria becomes more dependent on global oil price fluctuations than the EU as a trading partner. The Middle Eastern countries have more diversified trading patterns. For Egypt and Jordan, the United States and countries from the region are more important as trading partners than the EU (Paczynska 2008: 237-238). For Lebanon and Syria, the EU ranks behind other Middle Eastern countries as trade partner. Exporting some oil, Syria is the only other country to have a fairly even trade balance.

Figure 7.16: Configuration of socio-economic interdependence

EU dependence on target Target's dependence on EU	High	Medium	Low
High	<i>Symmetry</i>	<i>Weak asymmetry for EU</i>	<i>Strong asymmetry for EU</i> Morocco Tunisia
Medium	<i>Weak asymmetry for target</i>	→ <i>Symmetry</i>	→ <i>Weak asymmetry for EU</i> (LE 1997-2001)
Low	<i>Strong asymmetry for target</i> Algeria	<i>Weak asymmetry for target</i> Egypt Syria	<i>Symmetry</i> Jordan Lebanon

The seven Arab authoritarian countries under consideration here are definitely the ‘junior partners’ in bilateral relations with the EU. However, the asymmetry of interdependence varies, making them more or less dependent on the EU. In general, there is a clear distinction between the Middle Eastern and the Maghreb countries as regards the EU’s role in international trade and aid, but factors such as a country’s

'size' or the availability of natural resources further differentiates the picture. Thus Morocco and Tunisia are highly dependent on the EU whereas oil and natural gas exports make Algeria one of the least dependent countries. Similarly, Egypt and Syria enjoy relative independence. Egypt heavily relies on the U.S.A. as an alternative source of aid and support and Syria is geared towards other regional actors. Jordan and Lebanon as the smallest countries of the Middle East take a medium position in terms of dependence on the EU in international relations.

Chapter 3 (3.4.6.) elaborated on the role of interdependence in shaping the strategic setting of cooperation and the preferences over strategy of the actors involved. The general assumption is that the more strongly asymmetric interdependence favours one actor, the more likely he can realise an outcome close to his preferences over outcome. Theoretical expectations regarding the impact of interdependence on the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion always depend on the specific constellations of preferences over outcome of the two actors involved. An observable influence of interdependence can only be expected if their preferences diverge and interdependence is asymmetric. If the two actors' preferences over outcome are in harmony or if their interdependence is more or less symmetric, then interdependence should not have a noticeable effect on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. Therefore, the analysis of the role of interdependence in shaping the outcome of cooperation in the field of democracy promotion between the EU and its Mediterranean partners has to consider different scenarios regarding their preferences over outcome.

The most basic scenario assumes fixed preferences over outcome for the EU, on the one hand, and its Mediterranean partners, on the other hand. Drawing on a simplified argument about the role of political liberalisation and regime types (see 3.4.3.), the EU as a community of democracies and pursuing a democracy promotion policy in external relations should prefer implementation, while the Mediterranean partners as authoritarian regimes, potentially threatened in their regime survival by the EU's ambitions, should prefer 'no implementation'. Following this line of argument, asymmetric interdependence should directly affect the outcome of cooperation in the sense that the more asymmetric interdependence favours the EU, the better implementation should be, while the more it favours the authoritarian regime, the more difficult implementation should be. For the seven countries, this means that coopera-

tion should be best with Morocco and Tunisia, followed by Lebanon and Jordan, ahead of Egypt, Syria, and Algeria with the most difficult implementation. However, the level of political liberalisation and statehood in the target countries are two factors that are expected to shape the actors' preferences over outcome. The previous analysis (see sections 7.3., 7.4., and 7.5.) has shown that the two factors are indeed correlated with significant country variation in the quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance.

Comparing the respective interdependencies between the EU and its Mediterranean partners with the mapping of political dialogue and democracy assistance shows that there is no consistent pattern supporting the basic assumption about the actors' preferences over outcome and the effect of interdependence. Findings are as expected for Morocco and Syria. For Algeria and Lebanon, interdependence only relates to the overall quality of implementation but cannot account for variation over time. Already at this point, there are some inconsistencies, as cooperation with Algeria is much better than with Syria, even though the strength of asymmetric interdependence favouring them over the EU would suggest the opposite. For the other countries, empirical findings clearly contradict the theoretical expectations spelt out above. Egypt performs much better than expected, especially compared to Syria, and Jordan also performs surprisingly well as opposed to Lebanon. Most striking is the extremely difficult implementation with Tunisia. It is not in line with expectations created by the strong asymmetry in interdependence favouring the EU and contrasts sharply with the good quality of implementation observed in the case of Morocco.

These findings do not necessarily discredit the expectations regarding the effect of interdependence but clearly show that there is more variation in preferences over outcome, probably both of the EU and the Arab authoritarian regimes, than the simplified assumption suggests. This finding stresses the need to take into account the role of political liberalisation and statehood in shaping the actors' preferences over outcome. The EU and its Mediterranean partners do not prefer any outcome *per se*, but form their preferences on the basis of changing cost-benefit calculations.

Still, combining interdependence with the different hypothesised effects of these two factors, the asymmetries in interdependence between the EU and the respective Mediterranean partner do not have additional explanatory value. Looking at political liberalisation and statehood individually, it does not make any difference whether

their effect is assumed to be the same or inverse on the two actors, interdependence still cannot account for the outcome of cooperation with Tunisia and to a lesser extent with Algeria and Egypt. In cases like Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, interdependence is in line with the expectations created by the other factors, so its explanatory power is impossible to assess. The picture remains more or less the same when considering political liberalisation and statehood together. Even when assuming that the level of statehood shapes the EU's and the target regimes' cost-benefit calculation differently, suggesting diverging preferences over outcome, interdependence does not play a decisive role in pushing the outcome closer to the 'stronger' actor's preference.

In sum, asymmetries in interdependence are in line with the other factors for Morocco and Syria and do not contradict the outcome of cooperation with Jordan. They cannot account for variation over time for Algeria and Lebanon. Finally, they clearly lack explanatory power to account for Egypt and particularly Tunisia. The implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with Egypt is of a surprisingly good quality, considering political liberalisation and statehood on the one hand and interdependence on the other hand. However, the empirical finding might simply suggest that medium levels of political liberalisation and statehood are already sufficient for good cooperation, which is at least not contradicted by the other cases. This leaves only Tunisia, where the combination of medium political liberalisation and very good statehood with interdependence clearly favouring the EU simply cannot account for the extremely difficult implementation, especially when compared to findings for Morocco.

7.7. *Unilateral instruments for democracy promotion*

As shown before (chapters 2 and 5), the EU does not only have partnership-based instruments at its disposal for democracy promotion. Even though political dialogue and democracy assistance are a central part of its democracy promotion policy, it can also draw on instruments that do not depend on the active engagement of the target regime for their implementation but can be applied unilaterally by the EU. Already in chapter 3, it was argued that the EU does not use coercive instruments for democracy promotion, but that its democracy promotion policy foresees positive and negative incentives for promoting democracy and human rights. The most prominent instru-

ment in the EU's toolbox is political conditionality, but it can also issue diplomatic statements and apply sanctions on an *ad hoc* basis (see chapter 5). As these instruments are part of the EU's efforts to promote democracy in third countries, their use can interact with the implementation of partnership-based instruments in different ways, as elaborated in chapter 3. To investigate this interrelationship, this section starts with a summary of the mapping in chapter 5, pointing out the availability of different unilateral instruments to the EU vis-à-vis individual Mediterranean partners. It then specifies theoretical expectations both on the use of unilateral instruments and of their effect on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. A mapping of instances when the EU has actively applied sanctions and granted rewards in the framework of its democracy promotion policy vis-à-vis the seven countries finally allows to empirically investigate the interrelation between the use of unilateral instruments and the implementation of partnership-based instruments and to appraise theoretical expectations.

The EU has established several instances of political conditionality since 1995 (see table 7.12). The 'essential element' clause in the EMAAs concluded between 1998 and 2006, except with Syria, and in the MEDA and ENPI regulations (since 1996/1998) allow for 'negative measures' if the Mediterranean partners violate the respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In addition, programming under MEDA and ENPI is subject to a 'dynamic' conditionality. With the ENP, the EU introduced positive conditionality into Euro-Mediterranean relations. There is a general positive conditionality on cooperation set out in the 2003 and 2004 strategy papers (European Commission 2003d, 2004d). In addition, the Democracy and Governance Facilities have since 2005/2007 provided the option of financial rewards under MEDA II and ENPI, respectively. The specification and application of the ENP's positive conditionalities are closely linked to the ENP Action Plans agreed with five of the seven countries in 2005 (Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia) and 2007 (Egypt and Lebanon). They establish country-specific benchmarks for the implementation of reforms by the Mediterranean partners. In addition to formalised conditionality, the EU has a range of foreign policy instruments at its disposal to sanction and reward third countries on a more *ad hoc* basis. Various EU actors can issue diplomatic statements, e.g. CFSP statements, Council conclusions, Presidency statements, European Council declarations, and EP resolutions. The EU can further adopt (mate-

rial) sanctions in the form of CFSP Common Positions and related EC regulations (cf. Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008: 9).

Table 7.12: Applicability of political conditionalities to Mediterranean partners

Country	EMAA	MEDA/ENPI	ENP	Democracy/ Governance Fa- cility
Algeria	2005	1996/1998, 2000, 2007	n/a	2005, 2007
Egypt	2004		2003/2006	
Jordan	2002		2003/2004	
Lebanon	2006		2003/2006	
Morocco	2000		2003/2004	
Syria	n/a		n/a	
Tunisia	1998		2003/2004	

Before turning to the country-specific application of these unilateral instruments, the mapping in chapter 6 allows to make some general observations on the availability of different forms of incentives, especially regarding variation in the degree of institutionalisation over time and between instruments. The negative conditionality laid out in the MEDA and ENPI regulations is more explicit than in the EMAAs, which might well be due to the different legal status, the former being EU internal legal documents whereas the latter are bilaterally agreed. The provisions included in the MEDA and ENPI regulations become more precise over time, but they never spell out specific criteria for the application of conditionality. The EU has only introduced positive conditionality around 2003 and it has never been legalised in a similar way as the earlier negative (and dynamic) conditionalities. Positive conditionality is therefore scarcely formalised, as the EU has never specified the general conditionality established in strategy papers and only in 2008 laid out some criteria for the Governance Facility (European Commission 2008f). However, the positive conditionality is linked to an elaborate procedure of implementation, starting with the joint setting of benchmarks in the ENP Action Plans and the monitoring of their implementation, leading to a regular evaluation of progress by the EU on which it can base its decisions on rewards.

Chapter 3 outlined the possible interrelation between the EU's application of unilateral instruments and the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. It suggested on the one hand that the EU's decision to actively use sanctions and rewards is based on a similar process of preference formation that is also shaped by the degree of political liberalisation and statehood in the target coun-

try as well as the specific configuration of interdependence between the EU and the target country. On the other hand, it suggested a reciprocal effect of the use of unilateral instruments and the implementation of partnership-based instruments: While the EU might take the quality of implementation into consideration when deciding on the use of unilateral instruments, the incentives it sets can in turn shape the target regime's preferences over strategy regarding the implementation of partnership-based instruments. The analysis therefore includes two steps: investigating, first, in how far the various factors can account for the EU's use of positive and negative incentives and, second, what the role of these measures is for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. The likelihood of the EU's active use of incentives can be expected to increase the higher the degree of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country. If interdependence favours the target regime, then the EU should tend towards positive (or no) incentives, whereas it would use either kind of incentive if interdependence was symmetric or favouring the EU. No or difficult implementation of partnership-based should in turn trigger the use of negative incentives, whereas good implementation would lead to positive incentives. In turn, the use of either form of incentive makes better implementation more likely.

Theoretical expectations on the EU's use of unilateral instruments can draw on the mapping of the various factors in the previous sections, namely political liberalisation (7.3./7.5.), statehood (7.4./7.5.), and interdependence (7.6.), as well as the implementation of partnership-based instruments in chapter 6. Considering the degree of political liberalisation and statehood together, empirical findings supported the hypothesis of a somewhat linear positive relationship with the implementation of partnership-based instruments. If these factors have a similar effect on the EU's preference over outcome regarding its democracy promotion policy and its active use of incentives, then the EU is most likely to use incentives in Jordan and Morocco and least likely to do so in Algeria and Syria. As political liberalisation and statehood, on the one hand, and the implementation of partnership-based instruments, on the other hand, seem to correlate, the EU indeed faces a dilemma: where democratisation is most needed from the point of view of the external democracy promotion actor, looking at the degree of political liberalisation, the EU is least likely to use incentives. Taking the configuration of interdependence into account, the EU should only consider positive incentives vis-à-vis Egypt, Syria, and especially Algeria, whereas it should consider either incentive vis-à-vis Jordan, Lebanon, and especially Morocco

and Tunisia. In sum, the EU is likely to use positive incentives vis-à-vis Morocco and Jordan and potentially in the case of Egypt. It probably does not use unilateral instruments in the case of Lebanon, and potentially uses negative incentives vis-à-vis Tunisia. It is least likely to use unilateral instruments in the cases of Algeria and Syria, where it should be in a dilemma between the need for effective democracy promotion as opposed to the costs of negative incentives.

Looking at the EU's application of formalised conditionality vis-à-vis its Mediterranean partners since the mid-1990s, it is striking that the EU has never applied legalised negative conditionality whereas it has actively used positive conditionality under the ENP framework. Studies on the EU's Mediterranean democracy promotion policy have regularly noted the fact that the EU has never evoked the 'essential element' clause included in the EMAAs (Youngs 2009: 897, Youngs 2002b: 47, see also Emerson et al. 2005 and Youngs 2008a). Compared with other regions, the verdict has been that 'in Arab states democratic conditionality has been particularly absent' (Youngs 2009: 897). The same holds true for the negative conditionality on aid under the MEDA and ENPI regulations. In addition, there is no documentation suggesting that the EU's programming decisions under MEDA and ENPI have actually taken political considerations into account. On the contrary, it has been argued that the EU has rather applied an economic conditionality (Youngs 2002b: 47).

By contrast, the EU has given out rewards to some countries since around 2005 based on the positive conditionality established under the ENP. In 2008, the EU granted Morocco the 'statut avancé' that Morocco had demanded since 2000/2001. This request to upgrade bilateral relations with the EU has been regularly discussed in the framework of the Association Council meetings. In July 2007, the EU finally agreed to negotiate the terms of an 'advanced status' within a special working group.¹¹⁹ A joint document establishing the 'advanced status' of EU-Moroccan relations compared to other (Southern) neighbours was adopted by the Association Council in October 2008 (European Commission 2009e: 2). This road map identifies areas of enhanced cooperation, e.g. on political and security measures, and envisages among other objectives a new trade agreement (cf. Kausch 2009a, Martín 2009). Furthermore, Morocco has received aid under the Democracy and Governance Facilities since 2006 in addition to the regular appropriation under MEDA and ENPI. In total,

¹¹⁹ See European Commission: Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner visits Rabat, press release IP/07/1647, Brussels, 5 November 2007.

the EU granted around €75 million for projects not foreseen in the respective indicative programmes in 2006-2008 (European Commission 2007a: 62, European Commission 2008d: 20, European Commission 2009e: 22). Jordan has also voiced its interest in an ‘advanced status’ at the Association Council meeting in November 2008 (European Commission 2009c: 2), but the EU has not yet given its opinion on this request. In 2006, Jordan received €20 million under the Democracy Facility, but has not received additional funding ever since (European Commission 2007a: 62). Finally, Tunisia has also requested negotiations on an ‘advanced status’ at the Association Council meeting in November 2008 and the EU promised to start discussions in 2009 (European Commission 2009f: 2).¹²⁰

Beyond the application of formalised conditionality, the EU has taken other measures that set incentives on a more *ad hoc* basis. Even though the EU has never evoked the ‘essential element’ clause, it has applied a sort of ex-ante conditionality regarding the conclusion of the EMAs in the first place. The EU had remained conspicuously passive after the 1992 coup interrupting the electoral process in Algeria, but negotiations with Algeria were suspended in 1997-1999 in light of the political situation and in particular the increased violence.¹²¹ The *Groupe Islamique Armé* committed a wave of massacres in 1997-1998, peaking around the 1997 parliamentary elections, and international human rights groups criticised the non-transparent role of the Algerian government in (not) preventing the massacres and human rights violations by state actors.¹²² In June 1997, the EU’s presidency had still expressed its ‘satisfaction at the holding of legislative elections on 5 June 1997, which enabled the Algerian electorate to vote in orderly and safe conditions’ (Bulletin EU 6-1997, 1.4.9.). Only three months later, it was ‘deeply shocked at the wave of killings and other atrocities which have plunged Algeria into bloodshed’ and reaffirmed ‘its outright condemnation of all acts of terrorism and indiscriminate violence’ (Bulletin EU 9-1997, 1.3.5.). However, while ‘the EU completely broke off association agreement negotiations (in 1997) (...) no direct democratic conditionality was imposed, and

¹²⁰ Israel is the only other country in the region that has suggested an ‘advanced status’ to the EU. At the Association Council meeting in June 2008, the EU promised to discuss matters starting in 2009 (European Commission 2009b: 2).

¹²¹ Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, ‘confirmed that Spain and France had (successfully) opposed other European countries’ attempts to suspend EC aid to Algiers’ after the 1992 coup (Kausch and Youngs 2008: 12; also Youngs 2002b: 43).

¹²² amnesty international: Algeria. A human rights crisis, AI INDEX MDE 28/36/97, published 01.07.1997, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE28/036/1997>, 03.09.2010, and Human Rights Watch: Human Rights in Algeria Since the Halt of the Electoral Process, February 1992 Vol. 4, No. 2(E).

talks were renewed in 1999 with conditions seemingly more stable but with political pluralism little advanced' (Youngs 2002b: 47-48).¹²³ In the case of Syria, the signing of the EMAA has been pending since 2004, as the Council of the EU refused to sign the document in light of Syria's role in the Middle East conflict, linking this ex-ante conditionality again rather to regional stability than to democracy. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner suggested in 2006 that 'Syria has a new opportunity, in this critical moment for the peace process, to demonstrate that it is serious about contributing positively to regional stability,' which would be crucial for 'overcoming the political deadlock' in EU-Syrian relations (European Commission 2006e). In her speech to Members of the EP, she pointed out that the EMAA would provide the EU with better opportunities to deal with the political and human rights situation in Syria, so this sanction actually compromises the EU's democracy promotion efforts. In November 2008, Ferrero-Waldner accordingly highlighted the 'recent positive developments in Syria's regional policy, in particular the establishment of diplomatic relations with Lebanon and the indirect peace talks with Israel' and promised speedy signing of the EMAA (European Commission 2008e). The EMAA was revised and initialled again in late 2008 and the EU decided to actually sign the agreement in late 2009, now waiting for the Syrian signature (European Commission 2009i).

The EU has also adopted sanctions in the framework of its CFSP.¹²⁴ After the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Prime Minister of Lebanon, in 2005, the EU adopted a Common Position in 2005 and a corresponding Council Regulation in 2006 (Council of the EU 2005a, 2006c). They placed travel restrictions and economic sanctions on Lebanese and Syrian individuals potentially involved in the assassination. The EU reacted with these sanctions to a violation of human rights and the democratic process in a wider sense, but also to an exacerbation of the regional conflict by a suspected external intervention in domestic politics. Similarly, the EU adopted a Com-

¹²³ This suspension of negotiations is hard to trace, however, as MEDA Reports of that time always list 'negotiations in progress' for Algeria (European Commission 1999b, European Commission 2000c: 14), but 'No formal negotiation sessions were held with Lebanon and Algeria in 1999.' (ibid.: 14) and 'Negotiations with Algeria resumed in 2000, during which three negotiating sessions were held. This pace will be stepped up in 2001 with a view to completing the negotiations by the end of the year.' (European Commission 2001g). See also a note on the visit of Commissioner Patten and Secretary General and High Representative for CFSP Solana to Algiers in 1999 that states that 'The President [of Algeria] agreed to resume formally negotiations on the conclusion of an association agreement with the EU suspended since May 1997.' (Bulletin EU 11-1999,1.5.66.)

¹²⁴ European Commission: Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf, 12 March 2010.

mon Position and a Council Regulation in 2006 in light of the Israeli-Lebanese war, placing an embargo on arms and the provision of certain services (Council of the EU 2006b, 2006d). Here, the conflict and its implications for regional stability were the primary concern, as the sanctions aim to limit the capacity of actors involved in violent conflict.

Finally, there is a variety of diplomatic statements to consider, even though the EU has in general exerted little diplomatic pressure (Youngs 2002b: 47) in the region. The EU's Bulletin documents' conclusions and declarations by the Council of the EU, the European Council, and its Presidency as well as resolutions by the EP on the individual Mediterranean partners.¹²⁵ As far as these statements can be related to democracy promotion, they rather focus on matters concerning the respect for human rights than the democratic process (see also Youngs 2002b: 48). Overall, the EP has clearly been more critical than the other actors, using its resolutions for a naming-and-shaming exercise on the occasion of specific human rights violations and the political situation more generally. Especially in the 1990s, the EP was the only actor taking a stand on these matters, while the Council has become more active since around 2000, which is perfectly in line with the evolution of the EU's democracy promotion policy.

However, there is significant variation across countries regarding the number and content of diplomatic statements, touching upon different issues, e.g. elections, human rights violations, and political trials, and ranging from open criticism to praise. There are no statements documented on Jordan and only very few on Morocco. The only critical statements were made by the EP, which issued a couple of resolutions on the Western Sahara in the 1990s, referring to the humanitarian and human rights situation in the conflict. *Vis-à-vis* Tunisia, there are also some critical EP resolutions to be found, but very little by the Council. Between 1996 and 2002, the EP adopted several resolutions that touch upon the human rights situation in Morocco and the regime's pursuit of human rights activists, including the blocking of EU funds for democracy assistance. This issue was taken up by the EP in 2005 and 2006 on the occasion of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunisia. By contrast, the EU's presidency has issued only one critical statement in 2005 that calls on the Tunisian authorities to stop the harassment of the LTDH. There are signifi-

¹²⁵ European Commission: Bulletin of the European Union. Archives 1996-2009, <http://europa.eu/archives/bulletin/en/welcome.htm>, 03.09.2010.

cantly more statements on the other four countries, both by the EP and the Council. While the EP is in general more critical, critical statements by the Council are usually concerned with individual cases of human rights violations, particularly trials of political prisoners. Especially in the case of Syria, most of the almost 20 statements and resolutions between 1997 and 2008 refer to the persecution of human rights activists, monitoring individual cases of political trials. Most of the other statements are linked to relations between Syria and Lebanon. Similarly, the EU is preoccupied with individual cases in Egypt, but the EU's presidency has also issued more positive statements on the conduct of elections in 2005 and on political reforms. In the case of Algeria and Lebanon, most of the statements are not directly related to democracy promotion, but to the general situation of conflict and open violence, linked to the civil war in Algeria in the 1990s and the Middle East conflict in Lebanon since 2005. On Algeria, the EP and the Council have adopted most resolutions and conclusions in the 1990s. These statements are all related to the civil war, but the topics range from the human rights situation to elections and include positive statements on the regime's attempts to end the civil war. Diplomatic statements on Lebanon mostly come from the Council and relate to the Middle East conflict and especially Lebanese relations with Israel and Syria. In addition, the EU has paid much attention to the political crisis surrounding the election of a new president in 2007 and 2008.

Taken together, these different measures allow an overall assessment of the EU's use of incentives for promoting democracy. In the second half of the 1990s, the EU has used negative incentives only vis-à-vis Algeria, in the context of the civil war. However, in light of an obvious interruption of the democratic process started in 1991 and the ongoing violation of basic human rights, these measures have to be considered as rather light. On all other countries, there have been only few critical EP resolutions during that time – except for Jordan, where no statements are documented at all. From 2000 onwards, the EU has been using incentives more actively. Jordan and especially Morocco have benefited from rewards under the ENP whereas Syria has been subject to negative measures and particularly harsh criticism, especially on the treatment of political prisoners and its role in the Middle East conflict. Sanctions have also been applied to Lebanon, but only in the context of the regional conflict and domestic violence. Diplomatic statements have been only slightly critical on matters related to human rights and elections. There are hardly any critical statements on Algeria, especially compared to Egypt and Tunisia. While most interventions on

Egypt touched upon human rights issues, especially trials of political prisoners, the EP and the Council have repeatedly issued critical statements on the Tunisian authorities hampering the implementation of democracy assistance. In 2007 and 2008, there were only few critical statements on Egypt and Lebanon, while the negative measures vis-à-vis Syria were continued. Morocco has again benefited from various rewards in contrast to Jordan, where the EU has reverted to inaction.

Table 7.13: The EU's use of incentives for democracy promotion

Country	1995-1999		2000-2006		2007-2008		overall
Algeria	negative (conflict)	--	hardly critical	0	none	0	0-
Egypt	slightly critical	0-	critical (trials)	0-	slightly critical (human rights)	0-	0-
Jordan	none	0	positive	++	none	0	+
Lebanon	slightly critical	0-	negative (conflict), but only slightly critical (human rights, elections)	-	critical (conflict)	-	-
Morocco	slightly critical	0-	positive	++	positive	++	++
Syria	slightly critical	0-	negative (conflict) and critical (human rights, trials)	--	negative (conflict) and critical (human rights, trials)	--	--
Tunisia	slightly critical	0-	critical (democracy assistance)	0-	none	0	0-

The likelihood of the EU actively using incentives is not linked to the level of either political liberalisation or statehood in the way that chapter 3 suggested. The few cases of (*ad hoc*) negative conditionality and sanctions applied are associated with very low (Algeria, Syria) or medium (Lebanon) levels of political liberalisation and statehood. Likewise, the expectation that interdependence favouring the target regime limits the EU's use of unilateral instruments to positive incentives is not confirmed, as the cases of Algeria and Syria show. By contrast, the quality of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion might play a role in triggering either positive (Jordan, Morocco) or negative (Syria) measures by the EU, but not in the case of Algeria.

While the theoretical expectations do not hold in the light of empirical findings, there are interesting patterns that shed some light on the possible role of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence for the EU's application of unilateral instruments (see annex 15). The EU has applied positive conditionality only in cases where

the levels of political liberalisation and statehood are high, the configuration of interdependence is either symmetric (Jordan) or favouring the EU (Morocco), and the quality of the implementation of partnership-based instruments is high. By contrast, its use of (ex-ante) negative conditionality and sanctions is associated with low levels of statehood and a configuration of interdependence either symmetric (Lebanon) or favouring the target regime (Algeria, Syria), but any level of political liberalisation and quality of implementation. The EU has apparently taken all of these negative measures on the occasion of open conflict threatening regional stability, while concerns regarding human rights and the democratic process seem secondary in a region where most regimes give plenty of opportunity for criticism on this front. This is supported by the link to extremely low levels of statehood rather than to a certain level of political liberalisation. The EU has not taken any noteworthy, positive or negative, measures in three very different cases. In the case of Jordan, no action can be interpreted as positive action in the light of high levels of political liberalisation and statehood, symmetric interdependence, and relatively smooth implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. In the case of Algeria, the EU's inaction since 2000 would be rather attributed to the configuration of interdependence clearly favouring Algeria while political liberalisation is only medium and statehood low and the implementation of partnership-based instruments is selective and rather deteriorating over time. The absence of any measures against Tunisia in 2007 and 2008 by contrast cannot be accounted for by any interpretation of these factors. The level of political liberalisation is low, the level of statehood is highest among the seven countries, interdependence clearly favours the EU, and the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion has been difficult at the best. The same holds true for the EU's light criticism of Tunisia on human rights matters before. In the case of Egypt, this light criticism but abstention from any further measures is backed by a much higher quality of implementation and interdependence favouring Egypt.

Turning to the effect of the EU's use of unilateral instruments on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance, empirical findings for the application of conditionality and sanctions do not confirm expectations (see annex 15). These measures have not led to an improvement in the quality of implementation (Jordan, Morocco, Syria) in the years following or are even associated with a slight deterioration (Algeria, Lebanon). However, there are some instances of critical diplomatic

statements that seem to have triggered direct responses by the targeted regime. This is certainly true in the case of the 2007/2008 EP resolution on the human rights situation in Egypt that led the Egyptian government to postpone the first meeting of the EU-Egyptian human rights subcommittee from January to June 2008. The effect of the open criticism of Tunisian authorities hampering the implementation of democracy assistance with state and non-state actors by the EP and the Council in 2005 and 2006 is, by contrast, more difficult to discern. Political dialogue with Tunisia had been interrupted from 2005 to 2007, but it is not clear whether this was part of the EU's 'sanction' or a reaction of the Tunisian government to the EU's criticism. Equally, it is not clear why the two partners resumed political dialogue in late 2007, as there was no clear improvement of the implementation of political dialogue, as reflected by the EU's cancellation of any further efforts in 2007.

7.8. Summary

This chapter has investigated the explanatory power of the various factors identified in chapter 3 to account for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance for the EU and seven Mediterranean partners since the early 1990s. For each factor, the chapter has mapped their values, spelt out theoretical expectations regarding their effect on the implementation of partnership-based instruments and compared them with the empirical findings of chapter 6. The analysis suggests some explanatory power for most of the factors, but none of them can satisfactorily account for all of the variation in the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion on its own. This is not surprising, as there are good theoretical reasons for expecting all factors to influence the process of interaction at different levels and stages, suggesting a more complex interplay than can be captured by individual hypotheses. The institutional environment and the lock-in effect of cooperation itself are two factors that shape the strategic setting for cooperation and that are helpful in explaining overall trends over time, but hardly any variation across countries. Political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence, by contrast, are all country-specific factors that together can account for most of the variation found, but not in all cases. Finally, the interrelation between the EU's use of unilateral instruments, actively changing the incentive structure, and the implementation of political

dialogue and democracy assistance also shows interesting patterns, but can hardly account for the latter.

Regarding the role of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence, the empirical story is in line with theoretical expectations, but the previous analysis cannot grasp what is really going on in the process of interaction. In addition, the case of Tunisia defies all theoretical expectations and challenges in particular the assumed role of statehood and interdependence. Therefore, the following chapter conducts an in-depth comparative case-study of the EU's cooperation on democracy promotion with two countries, Morocco and Tunisia. Investigating the actors' strategies in more detail, chapter 8 traces causal mechanisms in order to empirically substantiate causal claims and to inductively develop the theoretical argument with the aim to capture the outlier Tunisia.

8. 'Same same but different': Comparing Morocco and Tunisia

8.1. *Why Morocco and Tunisia?*

For most of the eight countries analysed in chapters 6 and 7, the empirical findings are more or less in line with theoretical expectations developed in chapter 3 (see chapter 7.8.). The three country-specific factors of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence seem to account for most of the variation across countries in the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. However, there are a number of contradictory findings, challenging the assumed causal effect of the three factors to different degrees. Especially Tunisia resists any interpretation in line with the empirical findings for most of the other countries and in particular defies expectations on the role of statehood and interdependence. More generally, the analysis does not fully grasp what is really going on between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance, as it builds on a simplified model of preference formation and strategic interaction. To address the Tunisian puzzle and to substantiate causal claims, this chapter suggests an in-depth comparison of Morocco and Tunisia. By digging deeper into the process and context of interaction between the EU and these two countries, the chapter investigates the plausibility of the original hypotheses and the underlying model of interaction. Following a process tracing approach, it refines the analytical framework and inductively identifies the factors relevant for accounting for the divergent outcomes of interaction. The case selection allows scrutinizing the seeming contradictions between the 'outlier' Tunisia and the Moroccan 'model partner'. Assessing the implications of new empirical insights for the overall findings, the chapter develops a causal argument that captures both of these countries and can be extended to cooperation between the EU and the other Mediterranean partners.

Chapters 6 and 7 focused on mapping and explaining the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as the outcome of a process of interaction. As elaborated in chapter 6, the extent and quality of political dialogue and democracy assistance implemented by the EU with Morocco and Tunisia, respectively, varies greatly between the two countries. While Morocco is one of the countries, if not *the* country, with the best record in the region, implementation with Tunisia is marked by

enormous difficulties, up to the interruption of cooperation. The analysis of different factors in chapter 7 to account for variation across countries produced mixed results (see table 8.1 below). The high degree of political liberalisation, combined with a medium degree of statehood and interdependence strongly favouring the EU can well account for the good quality of implementation with Morocco. By contrast, the difficulties with Tunisia remain puzzling, especially in view of much better consolidated statehood, interdependence equally favouring the EU, and in the context of overall very smooth cooperation with the EU on other issues.

Table 8.1: Overview of empirical findings in chapters 6 and 7

	Tunisia	Morocco
implementation of partnership-based instruments	bad	very good
general cooperation	very good	good
political liberalisation	medium	high
statehood	high	medium
interdependence	asymmetry strongly favouring the EU	asymmetry strongly favouring the EU
incentives	neutral	positive

In this chapter, the focus is on cooperation between the EU and Morocco and Tunisia, respectively, since around 2000/2003, when the EU's democracy promotion framework was fully developed and efforts intensified. It considers the process of interaction linked to the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance, other areas of cooperation, and the EU's use of unilateral instruments for democracy promotion, such as political dialogue. Drawing on existing studies as well as interviews conducted between 2007 and 2010, the chapter provides a more nuanced analysis of explanatory factors shaping the process of interaction.

Taking the model of strategic interaction elaborated in chapter 3 seriously, the case studies of Morocco and Tunisia allow looking more closely into the process of interaction itself. Thus, it is possible to go beyond the observation of the outcome of interaction and to empirically identify the strategies of action of Morocco, Tunisia, and the EU. The actors' choice of strategy revealed in the implementation of partnership-based instruments, but also in cooperation on other issue areas and the EU's use of unilateral instruments for democracy promotion, provides important indications regarding their actual preferences regarding the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance and the underlying cost-benefit calculations.

On the one hand, the regime has to consider costs and benefits of the outcome itself in terms of its impact on the domestic balance of power, e.g. by way of changing the rules of the political game or directly empowering oppositional actors. Chapter 3 suggested that these costs and benefits depend on the level of political liberalisation and statehood. Judging by the outcome of interaction, this expectation was more or less supported in chapter 7, particularly for political liberalisation, less so for statehood. On the other hand, the EU can inflict additional costs and benefits. As the empirical analysis has shown, neither Morocco nor Tunisia (nor any other Mediterranean partner) needs to fear substantial sanctions inflicted by the EU in the case of reluctant cooperation or defection. However, the two regimes might be more or less dependent on the EU's support on specific issues, going beyond the standard economic cooperation in trade and aid. If this support is linked to the successful implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, it can work as an incentive for the partners to cooperate. Chapter 3 suggested that the 'vulnerability' to EU measures in the process of strategic interaction depends on the configuration of interdependence. Chapter 7 could not consistently confirm this expectation.

Going beyond the macro-level indices used as indicators for these three factors in chapter 7, chapter 8 can investigate in more detail the process of interaction and assess the role of potential explanatory factors by identifying the costs and benefits cooperation actually entails. A closer look at the process of interaction highlights first of all that the diverging outcomes of interaction between the EU and Morocco and Tunisia are not so much due to the EU's choice of strategy, but rather due to the different strategies chosen by the two partners: While Morocco has so far willingly cooperated, Tunisia has oscillated between reluctant cooperation and defection. This finding is not surprising for Morocco, where all explanatory factors point into this direction. By contrast, the factors cannot easily account for the outcome of interaction with Tunisia, which challenges particularly the assumed impact of statehood and interdependence. Their choices of strategies suggest that for Morocco, the costs of implementation are lower than the benefits compared to 'no cooperation', whereas it is the opposite for Tunisia. So, in how far is cooperation less costly and/or more beneficial for Morocco than for Tunisia?

A closer look at the political situation in the two countries reveals that the immediate costs of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance crucially

depend on the degree of pluralism and political participation. Comparing the role of the media, civil society, and political parties shows that the costs arising from cooperation are much lower for Morocco because measures blend into the regime's 'policy' of political inclusion, whereas political dialogue and democracy assistance might actually have disruptive effects in the Tunisian political system. This convincingly illustrates the mechanisms captured by the degree of political liberalisation and supports the central role of this variable. More generally, however, costs and benefits of cooperation with the EU on democracy and human rights have to be assessed against the background of the regime's basis of power and legitimacy. Limitations to statehood or other challenges to the regime's legitimacy and power can create a need for international support not captured by indicators of general socio-economic interdependence. If the regime is under pressure domestically, cooperation can be a means to strengthen the regime against popular demands for political reform or to secure economic or political support from international actors to overcome the challenge to its legitimacy. This argument clearly plays out in the Moroccan case regarding the Western Sahara conflict and the fact that Morocco has a much lower level of socio-economic development than Tunisia. Taken together, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance is less costly and obliging the EU by cooperation is more important for Morocco than for Tunisia.

8.2. *The demand-side of cooperation*

The process of interaction is based on the EU's offer for cooperation. With its Mediterranean democracy promotion policy, the EU creates a framework for cooperation with guidelines for the conduct of political dialogue and institutional provisions for democracy assistance. Therefore, chapter 3 assumed that the EU's choice of strategies regarding the implementation of these two instruments should be limited to 'cooperation', varying only in its emphasis. And indeed, the diverging outcomes of interaction with Morocco and Tunisia are mostly due to their respective choice of strategy rather than to country-specific differentiation of the EU's approach. While Morocco has apparently taken up the EU's offer for cooperation and actively engaged in the process, Tunisia has for most of the time been extremely reluctant to cooperate. This fundamental difference in attitude is noted by most EU officials directly involved in closely observing cooperation between the EU and Morocco and Tunisia or

Euro-Mediterranean relations more generally.¹²⁶ Even in the 1990s, implementation of democracy assistance had been smoother with Morocco than with most other countries in the region, but especially from around 2004, implementation has taken a quality well above the regional average. By contrast, implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance has always been difficult with Tunisia, culminating in the interruption of cooperation in 2005/2006. However, since the partners have resumed cooperation in 2007, Tunisia seems to have been slightly more forthcoming than before.

Morocco had started a process of careful liberalisation in the 1990s and the need for social, economic, and political reforms was highlighted by Mohamed VI after his succession to the throne in 1999 (Desrues and Moyano 2001, Campbell 2003).¹²⁷ So when the two partners opened their formalised political dialogue in 2000, Morocco actually signalled its readiness to engage in a dialogue on human rights and democracy along the lines of its domestic reform agenda. This link between domestic politics and international cooperation is also visible in the EU's support for Moroccan initiatives through democracy assistance, as has been the case with the projects on the national action plan for human rights and the *Instance Équité et Réconciliation* (IER) under MEDA II and ENPI (European Commission 2005d: 30-33, European Commission 2007g: 44). The EU has always been very supportive of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance and has hardly ever issued critical statements on the political or human rights situation in Morocco. This includes even the EP, which normally is the most critical EU actor. Instead, the EU has actively rewarded Morocco for its progress since the beginnings of the ENP (see chapter 7.7.). Morocco had already requested a 'statut avancé' in 2000, asking for an upgrade of bilateral relations going beyond the EMAA that had just entered into force. In 2004, the EU obliged Morocco by agreeing to discuss this repeated request in a 'cellule de réflexion' and to establish an 'enhanced' political dialogue in addition to the Association Council meetings, dealing with political and security matters. In 2007, the EU agreed to establish a working group to elaborate a road map reflecting Morocco's 'advanced status' in the region, which was finally adopted in 2008. Fur-

¹²⁶ Both Commission (interviews 4, 10, 13, 21 and 25) and Council (interviews 8 and 16), but also member states officials (interview 11) support this view; only one interview partner insisted that cooperation with Morocco is neither better nor more open compared to Tunisia (interview 18).

¹²⁷ A recent special issue in *Mediterranean Politics* has taken stock of these various reform projects. For an overview see Maghraoui 2009 and Willis 2009.

thermore, the EU has been granting additional funds under the Democracy and Governance Facilities to Morocco since 2006. Especially the negotiation of the ‘statut avancé’ (see e.g. Kausch 2009a, Martín 2009) is seen as a successful example of ‘reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). However, observers in Brussels agree that the driving force has been the Moroccan demand and that the EU has been reinforcing a pre-existent motivation for cooperation rather than building up a new one (Interviews 8 and 11).

In its statements for the Association Council meetings, Tunisia has always been more reluctant than Morocco to identify areas of future reform, highlighting instead its achievements on women’s as well as economic and social rights (cf. EU-Tunisia Association Council 2000, 2003b, 2005b, 2008b; also Interviews 17, 24, and 25). In addition, Tunisian authorities have actively obstructed the implementation of democracy assistance projects under the EIDHR, blocking European funding for Tunisian human rights NGOs. The resulting difficulties in implementing partnership-based instruments with the EU culminated in a political crisis in 2005 and 2006, during which cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights was frozen. In 2005, the EU – mostly the EP, but also the EU presidency – had issued critical statements on the regime’s human rights policy, referring to the harassment of human rights NGOs and the open repression of freedom of expression and association in the context of the WSIS in November 2005. At this point, it is difficult to determine the causes and consequences of this crisis and which actor first chose to defect. The crisis was eventually resolved at the political level and ended with the resumption of political dialogue in 2007, when the sixth Association Council and the newly established subcommittee on human rights democracy met in November and December respectively to ‘give a fresh boost to bilateral relations’ (EU-Tunisia Association Council 2008b: 14). However, this overall Tunisian reluctance to actively engage in the EU’s democracy promotion efforts is not paralleled by difficult cooperation on other issues, especially trade and aid, clearly suggesting that engagement is not a matter of capacity (Interview 5).

There are contradicting statements on the two actors’ responsibility for not holding an Association Council meeting for more than two years. Some EU officials claim that by refusing to schedule another meeting, the EU made the point that cooperation with the Tunisian regime could not go on as usual under these circumstances (Inter-

views 8 and 16).¹²⁸ Others point to the internal differences between member states on the appropriate response, making the EU effectively incapable of unitary action (Interview 12). A third position blames Tunisian officials for stalling, switching from reluctant cooperation to defection in a reaction to the EU's criticism which was perceived as inappropriate interference in domestic affairs (Interviews 5 and 11).¹²⁹ Sticking to the chronology of events, Tunisian authorities blatantly violating the freedom of expression and association in the context of international cooperation – the WSIS and EU democracy assistance – prompted public EU criticism in the form of EP resolutions and presidency statements in 2005. For the next two years, cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights between the EU and Tunisia was frozen. Political dialogue was interrupted, with no Association Council meeting and extremely long negotiations on the human rights subcommittee, which were probably adjourned as well, and the few democracy assistance projects already committed were also delayed or cancelled. This led the European Commission to give up any short-term efforts of implementing further democracy assistance projects in the 2007 programming exercise for the ENPI and the new EIDHR. The crisis was apparently resolved at the political level in 2007 (Interview 10), and the partners resumed both political dialogue, with meetings of the Association Council and the newly created human rights subcommittee, and democracy assistance, finally implementing the justice programme under MEDA II (European Commission 2008c: 3, European Commission 2009f: 3). Apparently, ever since, cooperation has been much smoother than before, especially since Tunisia has tabled its request of a 'statut avancé' similar to the Moroccan one in 2008 (Interviews 21 and 23), but also because the human rights subcommittee meetings have acted as a confidence-building measure (Interviews 6 and 16).¹³⁰

¹²⁸ This position is backed by Tunisian officials who complain about the EU making cooperation conditional upon too many things (interview 6).

¹²⁹ Interestingly, another position solely blames personal differences between Tunisian and European officials for the crisis in bilateral relations in 2005 and 2006 (interview 26).

¹³⁰ However, by 2010, the EC's delegation to Tunisia has still not requested funding under the EIDHR for the CBSS, which makes Tunisia the only country where the EU makes no attempt to implement the new micro project scheme (interview 19). It is interesting to note that the Tunisian request for a 'statut avancé' was only tabled in preparation for the Association Council meeting in November 2008, after the road map with Morocco had officially been adopted in October of the same year. In June 2008, EU officials and member state representatives did not yet anticipate this move (interviews 12 and 14).

Foreign diplomats often report that even in politically unthreatening areas, their steps are tightly controlled by the government. Many say that Tunisia has been the most difficult placement of their diplomatic careers. As a result of such difficulties, the EU is increasingly inactive when it comes to attempting to support Tunisian human rights and democracy activists, and limits its cooperation to non-political policy areas, thus avoiding confrontation. (Kausch 2009b: 4)

As the EU has not issued critical statements again after 2005, and the interruption of cooperation in 2005-2006 has not been publicly announced as a 'sanction', the EU's strategy has not been fundamentally different vis-à-vis Morocco and Tunisia. Even though the EU is expected to have some 'leverage' over both countries (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008:102; Powel 2009b: 65; Willis 2009: 233), it has not aggressively pushed for cooperation in the light of difficulties. The crisis with Tunisia rather demonstrated the failure of a slightly more confrontational approach, as it was only overcome when both actors agreed to return to a more cooperative approach.

In sum, to account for the diverging outcome of interaction, it is necessary to account foremost for the Mediterranean partners' choice of strategy and their very different 'demand' for cooperation. Neither of the two partners should fear EU sanctions, given the EU's overall 'positive' approach to cooperation in the region. Even in light of extremely difficult or no cooperation, the EU has not taken any measures that could qualify as substantial sanctions. It is even unclear whether the interruption of cooperation was due to the EU's or Tunisia's defection. Both regimes appreciate the EU and some of its member states as their most important international partners, especially in trade, and have strategically turned to the West. Nevertheless, their reaction to the EU's offer of cooperation has differed hugely.

Since the late 1990s, Morocco has admitted to the need for changes and started to adopt political, economic, and social reforms. In fact,

[t]he issue of reforms has become one of the centre pieces of political debate in and about contemporary Morocco. This is largely because the Moroccan state has explicitly acknowledged the need for reforms and started to gradually implement them in a number of areas including the economy, administration, the media, the religious field, and human rights. (Maghraoui 2009: 143)

Even if these changes are only the result of a 'survival strategy' by the regime, this dynamic has opened the door for cooperation with external actors. The EU's offer for cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights has been met by a Moroccan demand for external support. It allowed the Moroccan regime to actively engage in the external efforts to seek the support of the EU for its own domestic reform agenda.

This is reflected by the apparent ‘deal’ between the EU and Morocco to consistently praise Moroccan ambitions and to limit the EU’s role to that of a supporter of a domestically driven process of reform (Interview 24). By contrast, Tunisia has always denied the need for change and reforms leading to more political liberalisation. Highlighting its achievements in certain fields of human rights, in particular socio-economic and women’s rights, it has refused any such suggestion as inappropriate (Interviews 24 and 25). The comparison of Morocco and Tunisia illustrates the importance of a domestic reform agenda that resonates with the idea of political dialogue and democracy assistance and which external actors can take up in their efforts. This argument about the openness of Mediterranean partners to engage in cooperation with the EU on democracy and human rights directly points to the role of political liberalisation for shaping their cost-benefit calculations.

In this context, it is important to note that for neither country, cooperation with the EU on implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance is a problem of capacity (Interview 5). Delays in implementing specific democracy assistance projects have sometimes been due to technical problems, but these do not reflect a lack of state capacity. On the contrary, the successful obstruction of democracy assistance projects with non-state actors by Tunisian authorities reflects the capacity to govern effectively, both in terms of passing new legislation and using prosecution of human rights defenders and organisations as a means of repression. These examples support the argument that, while a minimum of state capacity might be a prerequisite for international cooperation, high levels of state capacity do not guarantee a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. In terms of capacity, strong statehood is an enabling factor for cooperation, but does not affect the regime’s preference formation as such. Thus, its effect depends on the regime’s preferences over outcome in the first place: If the regime is inclined to cooperate, high levels of capacity will reinforce its ability to do so, but if there is no willingness, capacities alone are insufficient or even counterproductive. This highlights the predominant role of political liberalisation in shaping the target regimes’ preferences and the outcome of interaction.

8.3. A matter of fit: EU democracy promotion efforts and domestic politics

The diverging degree of political liberalisation in Morocco and Tunisia is the starting point for a closer analysis of the domestic context of the regime's choice of strategy. When measuring the degree of political liberalisation in a country, this includes the status of political rights and civil liberties in the organisation of domestic politics. While Morocco and Tunisia are both far from the ideal of a liberal (representative) democracy with a meaningful competition for political power, the incumbent regimes allow very different degrees of pluralism and (limited, controlled) participation and contestation through media, civil society, and political parties. According to macro-level indices, such as Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World' and the World Bank World Governance Indicator for 'Voice and Accountability' (see chapter 7.3.), Moroccans enjoy more political liberties than Tunisians. But how does this affect the regimes' preferences regarding the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in cooperation with the EU?

Critics point to the fact that despite Moroccan pluralism, political power is 'under the effective control of the monarchy' (Najem 2003: 187) and not subject to political contestation. Freedom of expression and association is only granted within clear limits, making the monarch, Islam, and the Western Sahara the three big taboos in public debates (Howe 2000: 69, Kausch 2009a: 169; see also Interviews 16 and 21). However, the plurality of opinions expressed in the national media, the existence of a lively civil society including active human rights organisations, and the holding of competitive multi-party elections contrasts sharply with the streamlined press, the tight control of civil society organisations, and the *de facto* one-party system in Tunisia (Brumberg 2003, Layachi 2000, Najem 2003). Despite its comparably good record on socio-economic and women's rights (Grami 2008, Mahjoub 2004), the Tunisian regime has never significantly opened up the political space and exposed itself to any form of contestation (Entelis 2005, Sadiki 2002a, Sadiki 2002b, Sadiki 2002c).

These different situations are usually interpreted as the result of divergent 'survival strategies' (Brumberg 2003: 35). Especially when confronted with the economic crisis of the 1980s, the regimes chose different ways to address the threat this posed to their legitimacy (Layachi 2000). While in Morocco, the regime has traditionally cho-

sen a path of political inclusion to generate input legitimacy, Tunisian authorities have mostly relied on socio-economic development to obtain popular support (output legitimacy).

Social forces that could theoretically pose a challenge to incumbent autocrats and their ruling coalitions are either skilfully incorporated in to the regime or co-opted (such as the military or certain 'loyal' opposition movements), or massively repressed (the Islamist opposition in some countries). (Schlumberger 2007: 14)

In fact, both countries have opted for the co-optation of oppositional movements and political liberalisation at some point, but 'Morocco has a much longer history (...) of seeking to control radicalism through formal political processes' (Willis 2006: 144). At the same time, the regime has always been successful in creating 'divided structures of contestation' (Lust-Okar 2007: 40) to avoid the concentration of power in one party or in a united opposition that could challenge the monarch's political authority (Brumberg 2003: 40, Cavatorta 2009, Willis 2006: 144). The Moroccan constitution of 1956 established a multi-party system and in the 1960s, and the regime successfully managed to co-opt radical movements by legalising them as political parties, integrating them into the political process under the condition that they do not challenge the authority of the monarchy itself. This happened with the radical left in the 1960s and again with Islamists in the late 1980s (Willis 2006: 144-145). Especially the creation of the *Partie de Justice et Développement* (PJD) in 1998 out of the Islamist organisation *Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid* (Reform and Renewal Movement) highlights the regime's preoccupation with its own survival rather than with radicalism as such. While the PJD had a more radical agenda than the larger and very popular Islamist movement *Al-Adl wal Ihsan* (Justice and Spirituality), '[t]he key issue that swung the regime's acceptance of the party was its willingness to accept the particular role of the monarchy' (Willis 2006: 145).

The economic crisis of the 1980s triggered more generally a process of careful political liberalisation. Especially the succession of Mohamed VI to the throne in 1999 created the sense of a new era in Morocco and among its international partners, even though Hassan II had already initiated some political reforms during the last years of his reign (cf. Desrues and Moyano 2001, Campbell 2003, Layachi 2000: 31). These included constitutional reforms in 1992 and 1996, allowing for more pluralism and political and civil rights, and first attempts to tackle the regime's disastrous human rights record since the 1960s. After the 1997 parliamentary elections, Morocco saw

its first 'alternance' when the *Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires* (UFSP) won the majority of seats and Hassan II appointed Abderrahmane Youssoufi as prime minister (Willis 2009: 230-231). This impression of opening up was further supported by the succession of Mohamed VI to the throne in 1999, promising further measures of liberalisation. In a symbolic act, he deposed the minister of the interior Driss Basri only a few months after his accession, who had been in power since 1979 and who was inextricably linked to the so-called 'leaden years' under Hassan II (Howe 2000: 67).

By contrast, Habib Bourguiba and the *Neo Destour party* established a single-party system in post-independence Tunisia in 1956, uniting the country under a 'national-populist social pact' (Heydemann 2007: 31). In the context of the economic crisis of the 1980s, the regime legalised first oppositional parties in the early 1980s. Tunisia was one of the few countries in the region that managed to successfully implement the structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the World Bank in the 1980s and to generate socio-economic development levels well above the regional average (Dillman 1998). It avoided growing socio-economic disparities and tensions by implementing 'costly social programmes' (Layachi 2000: 18). However, economic liberalisation was not paralleled by political liberalisation, leading to the 'Tunisian paradox' (Kausch 2009b: 3; Entelis 2005: 550), clearly challenging any modernisation theoretic expectations. Hopes for political liberalisation were high when Zine El Abidine Ben Ali assumed power in a constitutional 'medical coup' and acceded to the presidency in 1987 (Najem 2003: 194, Willis 2006: 198). He promised a process of political liberalisation and initiated first political reforms, suggesting a 'strategy of political inclusion' (Layachi 2000: 37; Lawson 2007: 124-127), but soon a crack-down on Islamist movements followed (Layachi 2000: 37, Najem 2003: 194, Willis 2006: 138-140, Allani 2009). Despite a quota of seats for oppositional parties in the parliament, president Ben Ali can still rely on a *de facto* single-party rule by the presidential Constitutional Democratic Rally (*Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique*, RCD) (cf. Angrist 1999: 101, Entelis 2005: 551, Layachi 2000:38, Sadiki 2002a: 77). Moreover, 'Tunisia has regressed to a level of political and police control unknown even in the worst times of the post-independence period' (Layachi 2000:37) and some observers do not even qualify the regime as a 'liberalised autocracy' (Albrecht 2007: 61, cf. Brumberg 2003; also Interview 20).

Liberal democratic concerns aside, on one level Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia has been remarkably successful in containing radicalism: not through including radical forces in political processes but by *excluding* them. (Willis 2006: 140)

Both regimes are being attested a certain success of their respective strategies for maintaining power, explaining the 'durability' of authoritarianism in the MENA region (Brumberg 2003: 35). However, their strategies create very different circumstances for the engagement with international actors on matters related to democracy and human rights, directly affecting the potential costs of implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance. As the Moroccan regime has chosen (controlled, limited) political liberalisation as a strategy to cope with domestic contestation anyway, the 'fit' with external demands is of course much higher than for Tunisia, where it is contrary to the regime's policy of socio-economic inclusion and political exclusion (Interviews 7 and 8). For Morocco, it is therefore much easier and less costly to accommodate the EU's idea of partnership-based instruments, whereas the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance could have a disruptive effect in Tunisia (Interview 25). Especially the inclusion and co-optation of opponents in politics creates a direct link to statehood, as the dealing with potential opponents as potential countervailing powers directly affects the regime's stability. Given the international attention paid to Islamism since the events of 11 September 2001, the question of political Islam plays a crucial role for both the regimes and the EU (Interview 24). The regimes' choice of strategies between political inclusion and exclusion and the relationship between religion and politics also highlights the more general issue of 'authoritarian legitimacy'.

8.4. *Legitimacy and power in authoritarian regimes*

As the comparison of Morocco and Tunisia has already shown, the two regimes rely on very different sources of legitimacy and 'survival strategies'. Legitimacy is crucial for a regime's long-term survival, both internationally as the acceptance by other international actors (international sovereignty) and domestically as the regime's 'capacity (...) to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society' (Lipset 1983: 64). While maintaining repressive capacities might be one interest of authoritarian regimes, their potential sources of legitimacy go well 'beyond coercion' (Dawisha and Zartman 1988)

as the ‘regimes can tap into and rely on a potentially large number of forms of ‘autocratic legitimacy’’ (Schlumberger 2007: 15). While Morocco opted for a strategy of political inclusion to overcome the challenges of the 1980s, Tunisia chose a double strategy of economic inclusion and political exclusion (Layachi 2000). Neither of them can truly claim democratic input legitimacy, but the Moroccan regime has ‘established an electoral system as the keystone of royal power based on limited political participation’ (Sater 2009: 381; also Interview 7). The Tunisian ‘façade democracy’ (Entelis 2005: 549, Durac and Cavatorta 2009: 15, Sadiki 2002b: 123) relies to a much larger extent on output legitimacy to balance its repression of contestation. These strategies reflect and perpetuate underlying structural differences between the two regimes in the political and economic sphere.

Both regimes tightly control politics by undemocratic means and seek ‘the legitimization of authoritarian rule through the allocation of rent income, the co-optation of strategic societal groups (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004), and the playing of societal groups against each another (Brumberg 2002)’ (Albrecht 2007: 60-61). But they do it differently because the relationship between their heads of state on the one hand and governments and party politics on the other hand is fundamentally different. In Morocco, the monarch has established himself as a political and religious authority above party politics. In particular the ‘alternance’ of 1998 has shown that the monarchy can hold on to its power in the face of changing parliamentary majorities and governments. The monarch still has the prerogative to appoint the prime minister and key ministries, but potential criticism of his government does not directly challenge his legitimacy. In Tunisia, by contrast, the president is inextricably linked to the ruling party. Even since the introduction of a multi-party system, the RCD ‘continues to monopolise the political sphere’ (Angrist 1999: 101), winning the overwhelming majority of seats in the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary elections. Truly competitive elections therefore pose a serious threat to the incumbent regime, as it would not be able to accommodate an ‘alternance’ as did Hassan II in Morocco. Both regimes use the electoral process as a means to generate legitimacy, but the extent of political liberalisation and participation possible without threatening the power of the regime differs. The Moroccan regime can allow political contestation and competition among political parties, as long as it ensures their loyalty to the monarchy. It has done so through a strategy of co-optation reflected in the selective legalisation of some oppositional movements and the repression of others.

The religious authority of the Moroccan monarchy points to another crucial difference between the two regimes, namely the relationship between religion and politics in general and the role of political Islam in particular (Interview 24). When political parties have to pledge their loyalty to the king as the leader of the faithful (Amir al-Mu'minin) as a precondition for their legalisation and inclusion, this clearly limits the role of Islamist discourse in Moroccan politics. Criticism of the regime on religious grounds is impossible and the PJD had to make major concessions in its political programme before entering Moroccan politics (Willis 2006: 145). This contributes to the success of the regime's strategy of moderation through inclusion. The secular republic of Tunisia, by contrast, forbids the formation of political groups based on religion, giving Islamism no place at all in Tunisian politics. For Islamist movements, there is no chance of legalisation but also no need for moderation. The regime has up to now contained the radicalisation of Islamism through a strategy of repression (Willis 2006: 138-141), which has only occasionally 'shifted between participation and confrontation' (Allani 2009: 258). Especially since the events of 11 September 2001, Tunisian Islamists have been persecuted in the name of the regime's 'war against terrorism' (Kausch 2009b: 18).

Similarly, '[a]ppeals to national unity give the state an excuse to weed out would-be dissidents' (Sadiki 2002c: 510) in Tunisia and legitimise the regime's use of its extensive repressive capacities. However, beyond ideological and security arguments, the Tunisian regime can balance its repressive policy of political exclusion with continuing socio-economic development. As pointed out before,

[u]nder Ben Ali's leadership, Tunisia has been able not only to effectively implement a demanding structural adjustment programme, but also to do so without much of the negative social consequences observed in Algeria and Morocco (Layachi 2000: 32).

It has successfully restructured its economy since the late 1980s, maintaining economic growth and inclusive socio-economic development, which provides the economic basis for continued co-optation of political and social elites and generates a sense of output legitimacy in public opinion. Morocco has not experienced a similar socio-economic development over the past decades, a failure that the regime in part compensates through political inclusion.

The configuration of domestic politics does not only imply different costs of political dialogue and democracy assistance for the regime. The different 'survival strategies'

are more or less in line with the external demand for cooperation on democracy and human rights. In general, the two regimes base their power on different sources of legitimacy. They face different challenges that give cooperation with external actors a different role in their struggle to maintain power, again shaping their costs and benefits associated with the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.

8.5. *External support to overcome challenges to legitimacy*

The configuration of socio-economic interdependence with the EU would suggest that both countries are highly vulnerable to the EU's pressures, so this factor does not explain the very different outcomes of cooperation. Empirically, the EU does not make use of this 'leverage' to pressure either actor into cooperation. However, it was already mentioned that challenges to the regime's legitimacy can create a specific need for external support which could move the regime to a more cooperative stance vis-à-vis the EU's efforts to implement political dialogue and democracy assistance. And indeed, the largely consolidated statehood and the high level of socio-economic development in Tunisia put the regime in a strong position when facing external demands. By contrast, Morocco needs international support in the Western Sahara conflict and grapples with much greater social and economic disparities. Morocco's cooperative stance is not so much due to its 'vulnerability' to EU actions, especially potential economic or political sanctions, because these are not to be expected from the EU. Rather, Morocco needs the EU's support to tackle a range of issues that could well undermine the regime's domestic legitimacy and thus its stability. Morocco clearly depends on the EU's support for handling the Western Sahara conflict and for furthering socio-economic development. In both instances, the EU does not actively use this potential 'leverage', but Morocco's dependence might help to account for the 'apparent enthusiasm that Morocco has adopted in trying to follow these [European] models in comparison to most of its neighbours' (Willis 2009: 232), an enthusiasm that Moroccan officials themselves stress (Interview 22).¹³¹

¹³¹ 'Although the adoption of these models is not particularly remarkable given the power and influence of the European Union in particular and the Western world in general, what is worthy of note is the apparent enthusiasm that Morocco has adopted in trying to follow these models in comparison to most of its neighbours.' (Willis 2009: 232)

In the Western Sahara conflict, Morocco has persistently withstood the solution laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 690 of 1991, refusing a referendum on self-determination and repeating its claim to sovereignty over the territory.¹³² Even though this ‘frozen conflict’ is not high on the agenda of international politics (Gillespie 2010: 91), it is close to the heart of the Moroccan regime which relies on international support to maintain its position. Thus, Morocco enjoys ‘the tacit support of its allies in the UN Security Council’ (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008: 91-92), especially France and the United States (Theofilopoulou 2010: 4).

In EU-Moroccan relations, the issue of the Western Sahara is hardly ever addressed (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008: 102, Gillespie 2010: 96) except for the ‘dialogue politique renforcé’ conducted since 2004 (Kausch 2009a: 167). This is surprising, as the EU officially supports the UN process, asking Morocco to organise a referendum, and human rights violations in the context of the Western Sahara conflict are a major point of criticism regularly raised by international human rights organisations. Despite its claims to play a more active role in conflict resolution in the ENP, the ‘EU role remains circumscribed to that of the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Sahrawi refugees, thus addressing a symptom of the conflict rather than its underlying causes’ (Gillespie 2010: 86). This is usually explained with diverging positions of EU member states, in particular France and Spain, that preclude a unified European position and a more proactive role in the conflict (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008: 103, Gillespie 2010: 93-94). However, the situation has somewhat changed recently. Spain, traditionally an advocate of a referendum on self-determination, taking into account the interests of the Polisario Front and Algeria, has over the past few years moved closer to the Moroccan position (Gillespie 2010: 94, Theofilopoulou 2010: 4). Thus, France and Spain were two of the EU member states pushing for the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between Morocco and the EU in 2006 ‘that includes the territorial waters of Western Sahara, in clear violation of international law’ (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008: 103), echoing the economic interests of other EU member states (Gillespie 2010: 95).

¹³² For an overview of UN activities in the follow-up to the 1991 UN Security Council Resolution, especially the MINURSO mission to the Western Sahara, further resolutions, and the regular reports of the Secretary-General, see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/index.shtml>, 26.07.2010, also Mundy 2004.

While not taking a clear stance, the EU privileges Morocco as a partner in this conflict as opposed to the *Polisario Front* and implicitly supports its position by accepting the taboo that Morocco has made of the issue, reflecting the EU's 'unwillingness to develop initiatives that might upset Morocco' (Gillespie 2010: 98; also Interviews 16 and 18).¹³³ This latent support is vital for the Moroccan regime as Morocco's sovereignty over the Western Sahara is one of the monarchy's pillars of legitimacy (cf. Messari 2001, Willis 2009, Willis and Messari 2005). In the 1970s, Hassan II took up the prevailing nationalist discourse and purported to be the unquestionable defender of Moroccan 'unity', thereby consolidating his widespread acceptance as political leader (Messari 2001: 48). However, this pledge leaves the regime with little room for manoeuvre in the conflict without risking a loss of legitimacy, which explains Morocco's reluctance to hold a referendum on self-determination (Messari 2001: 61). In this situation,

the leadership in Morocco is convinced of the importance of external support for its long-established priority of the recognition of its claim on the territory of the Western Sahara, the success of which is seen as crucial to regime legitimacy and even survival (Willis 2009: 233, also Willis and Messari 2005: 47).

This makes the EU and some of its member states important partners for Morocco. Securing their support or at least their abstention from pushing for a solution of the conflict compromising the Moroccan position is a matter of regime stability and survival for the regime.

The Western Sahara issue presents a challenge to Morocco's sovereignty and statehood. However, the conflict over this disputed territory does not make Morocco more reluctant to engage in the EU's democracy promotion efforts to avoid further instability. On the contrary, as the issue is inextricably linked to the political authority and legitimacy of the monarch, external support for the regime's position becomes vital, increasing Morocco's dependence on the EU and potentially facilitating the rather smooth cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights. The interest in the partner's cooperation nevertheless seems to work both ways, as

¹³³ 'Delicate internal balances, concerns about international law, a desire not to alienate Algeria and sub-Saharan African countries and anxiety over recent forms of popular resistance in Western Sahara are further factors that prevent the EU from tilting further towards Morocco to the extent of actually abandoning the Polisario Front as a potential interlocutor altogether.' (Gillespie 2010: 98-99)

there remains a generalised reluctance in Brussels to become more pro-active at the diplomatic level for fear of upsetting the EU's blooming romance with Morocco and, above all, of sparking more disagreements among member states (Gillespie 2010: 98).

Morocco's relatively low level of socio-economic development is another aspect that supports the argument that Morocco might accommodate the EU's agenda on political cooperation because of its interest in obtaining EU support in dealing with domestic challenges. In response to the economic crisis in the 1980s, the Moroccan regime chose a strategy of (controlled) political inclusion and limited liberalisation to generate new legitimacy, while the structural adjustment programme effectively increased socio-economic exclusion (Layachi 2000: 25-32, Joffé 2009). After his succession to the throne in 1999, Mohamed VI made poverty reduction and 'human development' a priority of his reign (Layachi 2000: 28), because

[t]he conflicts generated as a result of unsatisfied demands in employment, education, housing and social services (...) would have an immediate effect on the political sphere, since popular unrest could become a breeding ground for the advance of anti-system movements (Desrués and Moyano 2001: 26-27).¹³⁴

In this situation, the interdependence in terms of trade and aid between Europe and Morocco makes the EU an important partner on which the Moroccan regime depends in order to advance socio-economic development and to ensure continued stability in the country (Willis 2009: 233). Again, there are no signs that the EU uses this dependence as 'leverage' over Morocco 'for fear of alienating a political leadership deemed to be supportive on important issues such as security, international terrorism and migration' (Willis 2009: 235). Nevertheless, the link between socio-economic development and the legitimacy and stability of the regime creates a clear incentive for Morocco to turn towards Europe and to assure itself of the EU's support in overcoming this challenge.

Taken together, challenges to the regime threatening its statehood and ultimately undermining its legitimacy can increase the regime's dependence on the active sup-

¹³⁴ See in particular the *Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain* (INDH), <http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/index.asp>, 03.08.2010, launched in 2005 and supported with US \$ 100 million by the World Bank in 2006-2011, <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P100026&theSitePK=40941&piPK=64290415&pagePK=64283627&menuPK=64282134&Type=Overview>, 03.08.2010, and a collection of reports published in 2006, *50 ans de développement humain & perspectives 2025*, <http://www.rdh50.ma/Fr/index.asp>, 03.08.2010, and submitted to the UNDP as a national report, see <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/arabstates/morocco/name,3380,en.html>, 03.08.2010.

port of external actors, making it more amenable to the EU's efforts at democracy promotion. This dynamic seems to explain Morocco's active engagement in political dialogue and democracy assistance against the background of the Western Sahara conflict and socio-economic disparities reviving the fear of 'bread riots'. By contrast, a high degree of stability, as in the Tunisian case, might lower the costs of cooperation through enhancing the regime's ability to handle change without risking instability, but as long as cooperation is not deemed beneficial, this is not sufficient to push the regime to prefer implementation over no implementation. If statehood is under threat from domestic actors, e.g. in the form of violent contestation, this aspect directly links back to the question of political liberalisation and pluralism. Especially the radicalisation of Islamism is often seen as a threat to the survival of authoritarian regimes in the Mediterranean, but the role of political Islam and Islamist opposition is inextricably linked to the regime's strategy of inclusion or exclusion in political participation.

This is also the point where most observers contend a converging preference of the EU and its authoritarian partners for not implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance if the price to pay for this might be the empowerment of Islamist movements, compromising their interests in regional stability and regime survival respectively. The EU and other international actors closely link the radicalisation of Islamism to the threat of international terrorism and to their concerns for international security (Powel 2009b), thus supporting incumbent regimes in their attempts at 'containing radicalism' (Willis 2006) at the expense of more insistent democracy promotion efforts. For the EU, 'authoritarian governments offer an equally effective, immediate and proven short-term response' (Powel 2009b: 71). Knowing the European discomfort with political Islam, the incumbent regimes can even use this argument to actively deflect international pressure and seek support for their repressive practices (Kausch 2009b: 18). International actors do not necessarily trust the moderation of political Islam in countries like Morocco, a suspicion that is fuelled by the low voter turnout and the surprisingly poor election result of the PJD in the parliamentary elections of 2007 (Kausch 2008; Storm 2008), fearing that Islamist parties might use electoral success to realise more illiberal policies (Cavatorta 2005: 564). These are all variants of the even more fundamental 'democratization-stabilization dilemma' (Jünemann 2003a: 7) that refers to the potentially destabilising effect of democratisation, especially during a transitional period (cf. Reiber 2009). Beyond

these concerns directly linked to stability and security, the EU sticks to its ‘positive’ approach to democracy promotion ‘for fear of alienating a political leadership deemed to be supportive on important issues such as security, international terrorism and migration’ (Willis 2009: 235, also Maghraoui 2009: 148). This includes its interest in economic integration in the Mediterranean and the economic benefits it derives from bilateral relations (Durac and Cavatorta 2009: 16). Thus, the need for international support in handling challenges to the realisation of fundamental interests can work both ways: Making Mediterranean partners more receptive to the EU’s offer of cooperation and making the EU more reluctant to push for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance if cooperation proves to be difficult.

8.6. *The interplay of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence*

In sum, Morocco cooperates more willingly with the EU in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance than Tunisia because implementation is indeed less costly and cooperation and its benefits are more important for Morocco than for Tunisia. These findings support the crucial role of political liberalisation and nuance the role of statehood and interdependence. For Morocco, (tightly controlled) pluralism and political participation make the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance less costly than for Tunisia, where these partnership-based instruments could actually have a disruptive effect on the regime’s strategy of political exclusion, especially vis-à-vis Islamists movements. In addition, cooperation with the EU seems to be more beneficial to the Moroccan regime, because it gets external support to satisfy domestic demands for political reform and to handle further challenges to its legitimacy, as they are e.g. embodied in the Western Sahara conflict and growing socio-economic tensions (Interview 7). Taken together, the actors’ preferences regarding the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance are shaped by costs and benefits of cooperation in two dimensions.

To understand the cost-benefit calculation of the Arab authoritarian regimes, it is necessary to consider the domestic and international dimension of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. At the domestic level, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance could have an impact on the domestic balance of power, potentially undermining the stability

and survival of the regime. Internationally, while the EU is not likely to impose sanctions for the non-implementation of these instruments, it could well reward their implementation by supporting the regime politically and/or economically.

First, actors need to consider the potential impact of implementation, which is indeed mitigated by the degree of political liberalisation. The implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion interferes with domestic politics and changes the distribution of power, potentially undermining the regime's stability. More specifically, the degree of pluralism and the extent of political participation, reflected in the realisation of freedom of expression and association as well as the degree of competition in the electoral system, determines the 'fit' of the external actor's demands and measures with the organisation of domestic politics. Even if pluralism and inclusion are not geared towards meaningful political participation, they create a framework of (fake) contestation into which the regime can more easily integrate cooperation with external actors. In this context, the holding of political dialogue, the implementation of reforms, and the cooperation with non-state actors do not imply fundamental changes to the rules of the game or make completely new actors appear on the political scene. By contrast, if the regime limits the space for political participation to a minimum, restricting and tightly controlling the media, civil society, and party competition, the engagement in external efforts is much more costly. If support to civil society organisations means that these obtain the capacity to become active agents of contestation in the first place, democracy assistance will fundamentally change domestic politics. Similarly, if the regime restricts the diversity of opinions by controlling the media, then the conduct of political dialogue, while not resulting in concrete measures or reforms, might open a window of opportunity for domestic actors to challenge the official view and engage in criticism of the regime.

Second, actors need to consider the implications of cooperation in a broader sense, including the costs and benefits inflicted by the EU in reaction to their choices of strategy. While empirically, Mediterranean partners do not realistically have to fear any substantial sanctions by the EU, no matter how much interdependence favours the EU, their need for external support to overcome specific challenges varies. So it is not interdependence and the vulnerability to EU measures as such that make Mediterranean partners more or less amenable to cooperation. Rather, when Mediterra-

nean partners face challenges to their legitimacy and ultimately to their survival, cooperation might ensure the political or economic support necessary to stabilise the regime. These challenges are only partially captured by the indicators for statehood used in chapter 7, e.g. in the case of international conflicts threatening national sovereignty and territorial integrity or violent contestation, e.g. through terrorist attacks. However, a regime could also seek the backing from other actors in international relations more generally, e.g. in international negotiations on other issues, or face domestic contestation below the level of violence if a specific political, social, or economic situation undermines popular support. For example, low levels of socio-economic development or great disparities within society can cause widespread dissatisfaction with the regime (output, performance), or the regime is confronted with growing support for an oppositional movement in open confrontation to the regime, be it Islamist or secular. The latter aspect illustrates the close link between the two dimensions, as the organisation of political participation more generally can be both the opportunity structure for and a reaction to the position individual groups occupy.

So, in how far does the modified causal argument capture the situation found in the other five case study countries?

The difficulties in implementing partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion with *Algeria* can be attributed to reluctance on the Algerian side (Interview 15). However, these difficulties have to be judged in a context of overall less than enthusiastic cooperation, e.g. sharp criticism of EMAA, refusal of ENP action plan, and low aid levels. These reservations against cooperation with the EU more generally are not too surprising when considering Algeria's role as an energy supplier for the EU, giving it a strong position in international politics. Rather, it is surprising that in this context, cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights still seems to be better than with Tunisia. Considering most recent developments, Algeria even seems to be willing to finally engage in the creation of a human rights subcommittee under the Association Council (European Commission 2010c: 124). Cooperation had stalled during the 1990s due to the civil war following the military coup in 1992. The decade-long violent conflict is reflected in the extremely low level of statehood at that time. The civil war officially ended in 2002, but even since then, violence has persisted in some areas of Algeria. While macro-level indices attest Algeria a level of political liberalisation similar to the Tunisian one, society and politics are in fact

much more pluralistic than in Tunisia. Freedom of expression and association are, however, compromised by violent conflicts, human rights violations and manipulations of the political and electoral process. The pluralist tradition might make political dialogue and democracy assistance less costly than for Tunisia. In addition, the immediate threat to the country's stability in the aftermath of the civil war might provide an incentive for cooperation to president Bouteflika, elected in 1999, who has started a process of national reconciliation. The revival of violence is an immediate threat to the regime's stability. While this does not create dependence on international support, the regime might see benefits in cooperating with external actors, which might explain its willingness to engage in democracy assistance projects under MEDA and ENPI since 1999. Several of these projects mostly target the security sector and provide capacity-building for the executive, e.g. the police project unique in the region, but also the justice project tackling the situation in prisons. This might be a welcome support in strengthening the state's capacity for maintaining stability.

Similar to Algeria, cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights with *Egypt* has started rather late, but cooperation with Mashrek countries has often lagged behind the Maghreb countries in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Cooperation has never been nearly as difficult as with Tunisia – except for some touchiness of the regime in the light of an EP resolution in 2007, the regime has rather actively engaged in political dialogue, and democracy assistance projects have been implemented. Egypt also has a similar level of political liberalisation to that of Tunisia, and the regime also practices a strategy of exclusion and repeated repression vis-à-vis the most important Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the regime allows a higher degree of pluralism and in the most recent parliamentary elections in 2010, more than 80 'independent' candidates known as being affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood were able to win seats. The regime's control of political participation and contestation is not as tight as in Tunisia. Also, the regime is under much more pressure through mass manifestations and violent contestation, which might make cooperation with international actors much more attractive and might influence the regime's stance on political dialogue and democracy assistance (Interview 9). While the U.S.A. is traditionally the most important international partner for Egypt, aid levels have sharply dropped since the 1990s, making the EU a more attractive partner.

The context of cooperation with *Jordan* is similar to that of Morocco and can well account for the fact that implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance seems much smoother than with other Mediterranean partners in the Middle East. The traditional monarchy is also characterised by a comparably high level of political liberalisation. Similarly to Morocco, the succession of Abdullah II in 1999 created a sense of renewal, the young monarch promising more progressive policies and comprehensive reforms. While the country enjoys a degree of statehood approaching that of Tunisia, the indicators used in chapter 7 do not capture the perilous nature of Jordan's neighbourhood, making the country vulnerable to any development in the Arab-Israeli conflict and dependent on international actors for conflict resolution. Cooperation is not as smooth as with Morocco, which might be explained by at least two factors: cooperation in general is less advanced, and the EU takes a less dominant position as international partner for Jordan than for Morocco.

Cooperation with *Lebanon* in the field of democracy and human rights started only late and has not yet taken on a comprehensive nature. This might be surprising given the country's record of pluralism and competitive politics that clearly differentiate the regime from the other six Arab authoritarian countries and the serious threats to statehood in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Considering that Lebanon was struggling to overcome the legacy of 15 years of civil war, it is not surprising that EU-Lebanese relations were slow to pick up in the 1990s, a fact shown in the lengthy negotiations of the EMAA. Indeed, the start of political dialogue and democracy assistance in 2005/2006 was promising in terms of the quality of cooperation, but with the assassination of Hariri in 2005, the war with Israel in 2006, and the political crisis around the election of a new president in 2007/2008, the priority probably shifted to mere conflict management on both sides.

Finally, from the outset it has not been surprising that cooperation between *Syria* and the EU is almost non-existent, given that the country holds the worst record of political liberalisation and it is rather favoured by interdependence. In light of Syria's role in the Middle East conflict, especially vis-à-vis Lebanon and Israel, and more recently because of its relations with Iran, the country has been isolated in international relations, limiting its cooperation with Western external actors more generally. It is the only Mediterranean partner without an EMAA in force. The picture does not change when considering that the regime's control of domestic politics is as tight as

in Tunisia and that Syria has a strategic role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The low level of state capacity and lack of government effectiveness might create a problem of (output) legitimacy and undermine the regime's repressive capacities, but in light of the potentially enormous costs of even slightly opening the political system through political dialogue and democracy assistance, this incentive is probably not large enough to trigger the regime's active engagement. It will be interesting to see how the regime handles formalised political dialogue once the EMAA enters into force and how the democracy assistance projects envisaged for later under ENPI work out. At least, the EC's delegation to Syria feels optimistic enough to demand limited funds under the EIDHR in 2010 for trying out the CBSS in Syria, which is more than the Tunisian delegation attempts (Interview 19).

The analysis of the seven Mediterranean partners in chapters 6 and 7 used a comparative approach in order to assess the quality of cooperation and the role of country specific factors. Chapter 8 has highlighted the central role of political liberalisation and, more specifically, of pluralism for the potential costs of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance for the incumbent regimes and their preferences over outcome in the first place. This is perfectly in line with the findings on the factor of political liberalisation in Morocco, Jordan, and Syria. It might also shed some light on the divergent outcomes of cooperation with Tunisia, on the one hand, and Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon, on the other, as the Tunisian regime is rather comparable to Syria in its strategy of political exclusion and repression. Especially the comparison with Algeria and Egypt might, more importantly, help to better understand the role of statehood or, rather, of the challenges to legitimacy more generally that might or might not be captured by this variable. Thus, Algeria and Egypt are much more under pressure from violent conflict and threats to stability than Tunisia. Algeria is still struggling to overcome the civil war and might have a strong interest in international support for building up the regime's capacities to effectively handle the security situation. In Egypt, the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood and repeated mass manifestations but also terrorist attacks undermine the country's and the regime's stability and undermine the economic prospects of tourism. Taken together, the degree of pluralism and the exposure to immediate challenges to the regime's legitimacy and stability can well explain why Egypt and even Algeria cooperate more willingly with the EU than Tunisia. Regarding the initial hypotheses and the unequivocal results of the analysis in chapter 7, chapter 8 helps to elaborate the theo-

retical argument on the role of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence for the EU's cooperation on democracy promotion with authoritarian regimes.

First, chapter 8 clearly supports the expectation that a higher degree of political liberalisation decreases the costs of implementation and thus the reluctance of authoritarian regimes to engage in political dialogue and democracy assistance. It suggests, however, that this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cooperation. Second, empirical insights modify the role attributed to statehood as investigated in chapter 7, as the variable captures the underlying mechanism only in part. Limitations to statehood can create a real incentive for the regime to engage in external efforts, if the cooperation with international actors secures support in overcoming challenges to the regime's legitimacy and stability. This aspect only plays out under the condition that the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance is not deemed too costly with regard to the level of political liberalisation. Third, the findings highlight the importance of interdependence in the sense that the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance is subject to strategic considerations regarding bilateral relations more generally. The EU is indeed reluctant to exert pressure on its Mediterranean partners in consideration of its interest in regional stability and economic prosperity, including issues such as migration and energy supplies. In turn, Mediterranean partners are more or less dependent on the EU's support in their domestic struggles for regime survival. This shift in focus, however, challenges the role of general socio-economic interdependence as investigated in chapter 7, because it does neither explain the EU's invariant reluctance to exert pressure nor capture the potential sources of dependence relevant for Mediterranean partners.

9. Conclusions

Democratisation, authoritarianism, democracy promotion – regime dynamics in the MENA region have attracted much attention of scholars and practitioners alike over the past two decades, but especially since the events of September 11, 2001. This thesis contributes to these debates with a comprehensive study on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, explaining how and under which conditions political dialogue and democracy assistance are implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations. It thus shifts the focus away from political conditionality, whose role is negligible, to the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion that rely on the active engagement of the target regimes. Framing the topic as an instance of international cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights, the thesis provides new theoretical and empirical insights into the workings of international democracy promotion in general and into EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean in particular. This concluding chapter summarises the whole endeavour, including an overview of theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues and the essential findings of the empirical analysis. It then discusses their wider theoretical, empirical, methodological, and political implications and presents avenues for future research regarding EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and international democracy promotion vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes more generally, but also their more political implications for the practice of international democracy promotion efforts.

9.1. *Summary*

The thesis starts from an empirical puzzle: Refraining from negative political conditionality and sanctions, the EU relies heavily on political dialogue and democracy assistance for promoting democracy vis-à-vis its Mediterranean partners. However, the implementation of these partnership-based instruments depends on the active engagement of the target regimes, which is not at all self-evident as the EU's democracy promotion efforts ultimately seek to change the incumbent, authoritarian regimes it works with. Nevertheless, these instruments have indeed been implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations – but implementation has greatly varied in its timing, extent, and quality across countries.

Part A: Theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues

The review of existing literature on external democracy promotion in chapter 2 underlines the relevance of the research question for making theoretical and empirical contributions to address several lacunas. Empirically, studies on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean neglect political dialogue and democracy assistance, focussing on conditionality, and there are few studies that systematically compare different instruments and countries. Instead of concentrating on the EU's choice of strategy, the thesis proposes a more interactive approach, taking into account the target countries as actors. Finally, a better understanding of the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion provides the missing link between an external actor's policy and its impact.

In order to account for the variation in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations, chapter 3 elaborates a causal model of strategic interaction between the EU (external actor) and the Mediterranean partners (targets) that leads to the implementation (or not) of political dialogue and democracy assistance, drawing on IR approaches to international cooperation. The extent and quality of the implementation of partnership-based instruments is conceived as the outcome of this process of strategic interaction, in which the actors' preferences over outcome (implementation/no implementation) and strategy (cooperation/defection), their choice of action and ultimately the outcome of cooperation are the result of rationalist cost-benefit calculations. Based on the assumption of fixed underlying interests in organisational survival, autonomy, and growth, the interactive approach identifies a set of factors shaping these cost-benefit calculations of the actors involved and specifies theoretical expectations of how these factors affect the likelihood of implementation and its quality. Corresponding hypotheses account for context variables, the institutional environment and a lock-in effect of cooperation, and country-specific factors, namely political liberalisation, statehood, their interaction effect, and socio-economic interdependence. In addition, the interrelationship between the implementation of partnership-based instruments (political dialogue, democracy assistance) and unilateral instruments (incentives, especially political conditionality) for democracy promotion is considered.

In order to empirically assess the explanatory power of the hypotheses developed, chapter 4 outlines the research design. The empirical analysis follows a comparative approach and is divided into a deductive and a more inductive part. In a first step, it studies the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance of the EU with seven Arab authoritarian countries in 1990-2008 as well as the role of explanatory factors, which allows for a comparison both over time and across countries. Within the region and the set of the EU's originally 12 Mediterranean partners, the investigation covers all non-member countries that match the criteria of authoritarianism (excluding Turkey and Israel) and statehood (excluding the Palestinian Authority), leaving Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. This study is among the very first to extend the comparative approach beyond a limited number of case studies and covers all of the EU's non-democratic Southern neighbour countries. Based on the preliminary findings, in-depth case studies tracing the process of interaction between the EU and two Mediterranean partners more closely probe the plausibility of causal claims and refine the theoretical argument. The investigation relies on qualitative methods of research in social sciences, in particular the analysis of documents and elite Interviews, but also macro-level data and indices. The chapter finally sets out the analytical framework, including the general framework for cooperation created by the EU's Mediterranean democracy promotion strategy and the operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables.

Part B: Empirical Analysis

To set the stage for the empirical analysis itself, chapter 5 maps the framework for cooperation created by the EU's democracy promotion policy. It systematically identifies the institutional provisions for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance and assesses the EU's approach to democracy promotion more generally. Within a highly standardised framework for cooperation, the EU clearly follows a 'positive' approach that privileges engagement and cooperation and the consensual implementation of measures over unilateral instruments, in particular the use of negative conditionality and sanctions.

Chapters 6 to 8 then comprise the empirical investigation of the central research question, mapping the implementation of partnership-based instruments ('how') and assessing the explanatory power of different factors shaping the process of interaction ('under which conditions'). Chapter 6 provides a detailed mapping of the im-

plementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance by the EU and the seven Mediterranean partners from 1990 to 2008. It comparatively assesses the extent and quality of cooperation with each country, capturing variation over time and across countries. Following a deductive approach, chapter 7 accordingly analyses the relationship between these patterns of cooperation and the potential explanatory factors and probes the plausibility of hypotheses put forward in chapter 3. Based on these preliminary findings, the more inductive case studies of cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia in chapter 8 enquire into the process of interaction itself to substantiate causal claims and develop the theoretical argument. The remainder of this section will discuss the empirical findings of chapters 6 to 8 and put forward a refined theoretical argument explaining how and under which conditions partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

9.1.1. Theoretical expectations and empirical findings

Comparing the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance by the EU and the seven Mediterranean partners over the past 20 years, the major empirical finding is the concurrence of a regional trend and country variation (see chapter 6). Democracy assistance projects have been implemented in the region since the early 1990s and formalised political dialogue has been introduced to bilateral relations with the respective EMAA since 1998. Successively extending the implementation of both instruments to (almost) all countries, the extent and quality of cooperation has improved over time, e.g. in terms of increasing funding levels for democracy assistance and in the more open treatment of democracy and human rights in political dialogue. Implementation with the individual countries follows a similar pattern, but the timing, extent, and quality of implementation vary significantly between countries. This allows establishing an overall ranking of the seven countries, ranging from best to worst: Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria.

Institutional Environment and Lock-in Effect

The overall trend towards more and better implementation over time meets the theoretical expectations on the role of the institutional environment and the lock-in effect of cooperation. With an increasing degree of institutionalisation of the framework for cooperation, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance be-

comes more likely, spreading to all countries at some point, and its intensity and quality improve (*H₁ Institutional Environment*, see 7.1.). Furthermore, the trend also supports the idea that once the two actors have agreed on cooperation, they are less likely to fall behind this new standard (*H₂ Lock-in Effect*, see 7.2.). This suggests that institutions do matter in shaping the outcome of interaction regarding the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. However, there remains important variation across countries regarding the timing, extent, and quality of implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance that cannot be captured by these two factors. In addition, there are a few developments that clearly contradict the initial assumptions about their effect. The quality of implementation with Algeria slightly deteriorates over time and implementation with Lebanon does not follow a clear trend at all. Cooperation on democracy and human rights was even interrupted in 2005-2007 and the European Commission apparently gave up its efforts at implementing democracy assistance projects around 2007. This underlines the need to investigate more closely the role of the country-specific factors identified in this thesis, i.e. political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence, to understand what shapes actors' preferences and choices regarding the joint implementation of partnership-based instruments.

Political Liberalisation, Statehood, and their Interaction

The empirical findings presented in this thesis strongly support the theoretical expectation that the degree of political liberalisation in the target country has a positive impact on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance (*H₃ Political Liberalisation*, see 7.3.). This is particularly true for the quality of implementation with Morocco and Jordan, on the one hand, and Syria, on the other hand. However, the similar, medium levels of political liberalisation in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia cannot account for the diverging outcomes of cooperation, ranging from overall good implementation with Egypt to extremely difficult implementation with Tunisia. By contrast, the picture is less clear for the degree of statehood in the target country, the second factor assumed to affect the actors' preferences over outcome (*H₄ Statehood*, see 7.4.). Empirical findings for both dimensions of statehood, i.e. stability and capacity, suggest a positive effect in most cases but not in all. In particular Tunisia is clearly an outlier, as implementation is extremely difficult albeit the country is marked by the strongest statehood among the seven. Similarly,

implementation should be better with Jordan and Syria when considering their degree of statehood and especially their level of capacity and stability, respectively. Considering the two factors together brings an added value to the analysis. The combination of political liberalisation and statehood can account for the overall quality of implementation with most countries, suggesting a cumulative positive effect (*H₅ Interaction*, see 7.5.). The different degrees of statehood can explain the diverging outcomes of cooperation with Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon, and the extremely low level of political liberalisation captures the Syrian case. Still, Tunisia and, to a much lesser degree, Jordan do not fit the picture: These two cases support the idea of a threshold of ‘too good’ statehood at which the effect of statehood gets reversed. So, the cumulative positive effect seems to be limited to a range of low to high level of political liberalisation and low to medium degree of statehood, while the quality of implementation deteriorates again if the degree of statehood is too strong.

Asymmetries in socio-economic interdependence

The regional comparison produces mixed results that clearly challenge the crucial role often attributed to (socio-economic) interdependence in determining international democracy promotion efforts. Based on the assumption of fixed preferences, interdependence cannot explain the diverging outcomes of cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia, on the one hand, and Algeria, Egypt, and Syria, on the other hand (*H_{6a} Interdependence*, see 7.6.). Rather, the findings presented in this thesis support the theoretical expectation that political liberalisation and statehood affect the actors’ preferences more fundamentally than strategic considerations in the face of asymmetric interdependence (*H_{6b} Interaction & Interdependence*, see 7.6.). Even authoritarian regimes are not *per se* reluctant to implement political dialogue and democracy assistance, and asymmetries in socio-economic interdependence play only a minor role in shaping the quality of implementation. Thus, interdependence offers an explanation for why implementation with Morocco is better than with Jordan, eliminating Jordan’s seeming outlier status with regard to the effect of statehood. It might also explain why Algeria and Egypt are more selective in their cooperation, clearly privileging democracy assistance over political dialogue. However, it still cannot solve the puzzle of the surprisingly difficult cooperation with Tunisia, defying all theoretical expectations.

Unilateral instruments: The EU's use of incentives

The theoretical expectations regarding the general likelihood of the EU's active use of incentives (*H_{7a} Use of Incentives*, see 7.7.) and their effect on the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion (*H_{7b} Effect of Incentives*, see 7.7.) were not confirmed. The EU has only rarely applied sanctions and then always in a context of acute crisis, marked by low levels of statehood, linking its intervention more to concerns for regional stability than to promoting democracy. In the context of democracy and human rights proper, the EU has exclusively used rewards and always in cases of high levels of political liberalisation – and smooth implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. This suggests that the level of political liberalisation does not matter for triggering sanctions as long as stability is not threatened. Overall, the quality of implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance could be seen as one trigger for the EU's use of incentives, whereas the latter do not have a direct effect on the implementation of partnership-based instruments.

Taken together, the initial hypotheses investigated in the comparative analysis of the seven countries can account for the regional trend and most of the variation across countries. Theoretical expectations hold in particular for the role of the institutional environment and the lock-in effect of cooperation as well as for the combined effect of political liberalisation and statehood. By contrast, findings challenge the role of asymmetric interdependence and point to a much more complicated interrelation between the implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion and the EU's active use of incentives. In addition, the different factors cannot account for the surprisingly difficult implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with Tunisia. Before turning to the inductive insights of the in-depth comparison of Morocco and Tunisia, table 9.1 below summarises the empirical findings for the initial hypotheses.

Table 9.1: Hypotheses and empirical findings of chapter 7

<i>H₁ Institutional Environment</i>	The higher the degree of institutionalisation, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.	<i>confirmed</i>
<i>H₂ Lock-in</i>	If partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion are already being implemented, then further cooperation is more likely.	<i>mostly confirmed</i>
<i>H₃ Political Liberalisation</i>	The higher the degree of political liberalisation in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.	<i>mostly confirmed</i>
<i>H₄ Statehood</i>	The higher the degree of statehood in the target country, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.	<i>mostly confirmed</i>
<i>H₅ Interaction</i>	The higher the degree of political liberalisation, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion, reinforced by a high and nuanced by a low degree of statehood.	<i>confirmed but outlier: Tunisia</i>
<i>H_{6a} Interdependence</i>	The more interdependence favours the EU, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.	<i>not confirmed</i>
<i>H_{6b} Interaction & Interdependence</i>	The more interdependence favours the EU and the higher the degrees of political liberalisation and statehood, the more likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. The more interdependence favours the target regime and the lower the degree of political liberalisation and statehood, the less likely is a better implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion.	<i>overall not confirmed</i>
<i>H_{7a} Use of incentives</i>	The EU is more likely to apply unilateral instruments for democracy promotion if the degree of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country is high. In this case the EU is more likely to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> e) grant rewards if the target regime willingly cooperates or if the target regime is reluctant and the EU is dependent on the target regime, and f) apply sanctions if the target regime is reluctant and if the EU is not dependent on the target regime. 	<i>not confirmed</i>
<i>H_{7b} Effect of incentives</i>	If the EU applies unilateral instruments, implementation is likely to get better.	<i>not confirmed</i>

Comparing Morocco and Tunisia: Beauty and the beast?

Tracing the process of cooperation more closely for the period 2000-2008, it is obvious that the divergent outcomes are mainly due to different choices of strategy by the target regimes, rather than different approaches by the EU. While Morocco seems eager to cooperate with the EU in the field of democracy and human rights, Tunisia is highly reluctant, up to the point where the regime actively blocks cooperation with

non-state actors and even refuses all cooperation at the intergovernmental level for a while. Considering the domestic political, economic, and social situation in the two countries, the comparison clearly shows that the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance is both less costly and more beneficial for Morocco than for Tunisia. On the one hand, the analysis highlights the role of pluralism, allowing for more or less political participation and contestation, in shaping the costs of implementation. On the other hand, it suggests that if the regime is facing domestic challenges, cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights can be beneficial to the regime in securing external support to overcome these challenges. So, more generally, the target regime's costs and benefits of implementing partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion crucially hinge on its base of power and legitimacy.

The Moroccan and the Tunisian regimes rely on very different 'survival strategies' for maintaining their power and generate sufficient legitimacy to ensure regime survival. The Moroccan monarchy has early on chosen co-optation and selective political inclusion to moderate oppositional movements, but it has neglected economic inclusion. Especially since the 1990s, a strategy of – limited and controlled – political liberalisation has generated 'fake' input legitimacy, allowing political competition without exposing the regime itself to contestation and touching upon the distribution of real power. So, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance fits well into the pluralist organisation of political life and it might even generate additional legitimacy for the regime, demonstrating its willingness to further liberalise without necessarily having to democratise. In addition, the regime faces serious challenges and needs external support, in particular to hold up its position in the Western Sahara conflict and to generate socio-economic development to fight poverty and social disparities. Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia, by contrast, has continued to rely on a combination of political repression and output legitimacy generated through successful socio-economic development. Thus, the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance is much more costly for the Tunisian regime than for the Moroccan one. Allowing even for a small political opening could have disruptive effects on the tightly controlled political life. In addition, as long as the regime can generate sustained economic growth, it can count on popular support. Tunisians have much more to lose if a political opening was to destabilise the regime, and the repression of Islamist terrorism generates legitimacy even domesti-

cally. In general, the in-depth comparison conducted in chapter 8 illustrates well the mechanisms at work in shaping the actors' preferences. It supports the crucial role of political liberalisation in shaping the costs of implementation, and nuances the role of statehood and interdependence with regard to potential benefits within a broader context of cooperation.

9.1.2. The refined theoretical argument

Taken together, the empirical findings back the plausibility of the theoretical approach, framing the implementation of partnership-based instruments as the outcome of a process of strategic interaction. They lend support to some of the hypotheses and allow developing and modifying the initial assumptions about the explanatory factors and the underlying causal mechanisms. On the basis of these findings, this section proposes a refined theoretical argument that can consistently explain the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance in Euro-Mediterranean relations within a rationalist framework of strategic interaction.

The regional comparison has clearly shown that institutions matter, shaping the strategic setting for interaction leading to a regional trend towards more and better cooperation. Together with the in-depth comparison of Morocco and Tunisia, it has further highlighted the fact that the remaining variation across countries regarding the timing, extent, and quality of implementation is not so much due to the EU's choice of different strategies but to the differential engagement of the target regimes. The EU is reluctant to push for more and better cooperation even under conditions where it should have some leverage, as the Tunisian case clearly demonstrates, suggesting that the EU's 'democratization-stabilization dilemma' (Jünemann 2003a: 7) applies to the region as a whole rather than being linked to country-specific factors. By contrast, the target regimes' preferences are indeed a function of political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence. Especially political liberalisation and statehood are crucial in explaining variation across countries, but statehood matters in different ways than expected. The level of political liberalisation determines the costs of implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance, while the degree of statehood can make cooperation on democracy promotion more or less beneficial for the target regime. This aspect modifies the original argument on (socio-economic) interdependence, highlighting the need for a different conceptualisation of this variable.

First of all, an increasing degree of political liberalisation lowers the costs of political dialogue and democracy assistance, because external efforts resonate better with the domestic political context. The fit between external demands and domestic politics increases with higher levels of pluralism and political participation, through the media, civil society, and political parties in the electoral process. The costs of implementation are prohibitive if the level of political liberalisation is too low, because implementation would mean an immediate threat to the regime's survival (shifting the domestic balance of power, potentially causing instability; cf. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).¹³⁵ However, high levels of political liberalisation do not necessarily amount to benefits of implementation, making them a necessary, but not sufficient condition. Cooperation can become beneficial to the regime if it is in line with a domestic reform agenda as a 'survival strategy' of the regime, which does not necessarily imply its interest in genuine democratisation at all.¹³⁶

Second, the impact of statehood on the implementation of partnership-based instruments is more complex, as the indicators capture two different causal mechanisms: On the one hand, statehood as *state capacity* positively affects the target regime's ability to cooperate in the first place. This explains the overall positive effect of statehood on the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. On the other hand, statehood as *stability* captures challenges to the regime's power that can make implementation beneficial because the regime needs to secure external support to guarantee its survival. This threat can be either direct through violent contestation, e.g. in the form of international or civil war, but also indirect, if the regime links its legitimacy to a certain outcome in domestic or international conflicts of national interest. Statehood is only one possible indicator for this second causal mechanism. The regime can also be contested on other grounds, e.g. a lack of socio-

¹³⁵ The implementation of partnership-based instruments is also a question of 'opportunity' captured by political liberalisation: implementing democracy assistance with non-state actors is impossible, if the EU has no partners on the ground. In the Tunisian case, the regime does not only actively block projects under the EIDHR, but the oppressive legal framework stifles civil society in general and 'political' activities, human rights activism, etc. in particular. The lack of a counterpart is one of the reasons given by the EU to explain why it does not even attempt to implement the new CBSS in Tunisia.

¹³⁶ It is important to note that in authoritarian regimes even comparatively high levels political participation and pluralism do not necessarily amount to real contestation and competition, but often leave the distribution of power untouched. The different degrees of political liberalisation and pluralism in the seven countries reflect different 'survival strategies', drawing on political inclusion or exclusion which are in part path-dependent on strategic choices made in the 1970s and 1980s, but also in part shaped by the structure of regime (its basis of power and legitimacy in relation to political process).

economic development undermining its output legitimacy. This need for external support creates an incentive for cooperation, whereas a (too) high level of statehood limits the potential benefits a regime can gain from cooperation. The EU's support can take different forms, including capacity-building measures such as twinning and development assistance, as well as political (and military) support in international politics through the EU's Common Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy or by individual member states, e.g. in the UN Security Council.

While political liberalisation directly shapes the costs of implementation for the target regime, statehood is an enabling factor for cooperation and shapes potential benefits of cooperation. In sum, it is a specific combination of political liberalisation and statehood, shaping the costs and benefits respectively, that is more or less conducive to the implementation of partnership-based instruments (see figure 9.1 below). In a country with a high degree of political liberalisation, the regime faces relatively low costs (risks of power loss, instability) when engaging in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. In this case, the level of statehood determines the size of the benefit the regime can gain from cooperation. Its preference for cooperation increases with the limitations to statehood, provided that they reflect challenges that increase the need for external support. While a high degree of political liberalisation should in principle create a disposition for cooperation, the regime might still not prefer implementation over 'no implementation' if there are no benefits linked to cooperation. This explains the otherwise surprising variation between Morocco and Jordan: While the costs of implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance are similarly low in both countries, its lower degree of statehood and stability indicates that cooperation with the EU is more important to Morocco than to Jordan. Together, the two factors can account for Morocco's greater eagerness to engage in the EU's efforts and reap the benefits of cooperation, e.g. in the form of the 'statut avancé'. At medium levels of political liberalisation, the level of statehood is even more crucial, shaping the potential benefits that counterbalance the (medium) costs of cooperation: If statehood is too high, the regime has no need for cooperation, which was shown to be the case for Tunisia. Statehood has to be limited in such a way that the benefits of cooperation are higher than the costs of implementation, which seems to be the case in Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon. Especially Egypt illustrates that the combination of merely medium levels of both political liberalisation and statehood is sufficient for a regime to actively engage in cooperation, balancing

the regime's capacity with the costs and benefits of cooperation. Comparing Egypt with Algeria and Lebanon highlights the role of statehood and state capacity as an enabling factor, which is severely compromised in times of violent conflict. They suggest on the one hand that at times of civil or international war, neither the regime nor the external actor are preoccupied with implementing partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion. On the other hand, they substantiate the impression that these crises increase the regime's need for external support. Finally, a low level of political liberalisation entails such prohibitive costs of implementation that the degree of statehood might not matter, as the benefits simply cannot compensate the costs. This could be the case for Syria, but the analysis cannot provide ultimate evidence on the role of political liberalisation as compared to statehood respectively, as both arguments for statehood point into the same direction: The extremely low state capacity suggests a problem of capability and the relatively high degree of stability could limit the benefits of cooperation at the same time.

Figure 9.1: Costs, benefits, and capability: political liberalisation and statehood

political liberalisation statehood	--	-	0 ⁻	0	0 ⁺	+	++
++		T3		T* T1 T2			J1a
+						J2 J3	J* J1b
0 ⁺	S1a					M* M2 M3	
0			E1			M1	
0 ⁻			E* E2	E3 L1	L2a		
-	S* S1b S2 S3			A2b A3	L* L2b		
--			A* A1	A2a		L3	

The second causal mechanism underlying statehood is close to the causal argument made for interdependence, as it does not affect the costs or benefits of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance itself, but rather strategic considerations of wider implications of different strategies of cooperation. However, the indicators for interdependence used in this research suggest that the kind of socio-economic interdependence measured (trade and aid) is not or only marginally relevant for shaping actors' strategies. Both sides depend on each other to realise some of their interests, but this is more about ensuring good will than avoiding outright sanctions. At this point, the close link between the implementation of partnership-based instruments and the EU's active use of incentives becomes evident. For the EU, the notion of a 'stability-democracy-dilemma' can explain its general reluctance to insist on cooperation and to ultimately apply sanctions. For the target regimes, it is

not general vulnerability to sanctions that will never be applied, but specific challenges that make them more receptive to the EU's offer for cooperation.

The EU's concern for stability can explain its reluctance to apply negative conditionality and sanctions throughout the region. This trade-off between different interests limits the EU's scope of action to a positive approach. It is not so much bound to country-specific factors, in particular the actual level of stability, but rather based on more general considerations, nurtured by the fear of Islamism as a threat to security (terrorism) and democracy (non-democratic regime change). It has been convincingly argued that the EU establishes a direct link between Islamism and terrorism and thus with international and European security (cf. Powel 2009b). The EU has a generalised 'fear' of instability prompted by a radicalisation and empowerment of Islamists in the region that does not much take into account the actual role of political Islam and Islamism in each country. If the incumbent regime seems to be in control of the situation, the EU refrains from pressure so as not to upset the regime as an ally in the fight against terrorism and to risk instability. If the country is struggling, the EU lends additional support at the country's request – but to justify this preferential treatment, the regime needs to engage just as actively and comprehensively in cooperation, including democracy and human rights. Interestingly, consolidated statehood thus even 'immunises' regimes against EU sanctions. If the regime is successful in upholding stability and managing the 'threat' of Islamism, the EU seems to be even less inclined to upset the situation and risk instability – which would be clearly the case for Tunisia. This is in line with the few cases in which the EU has applied sanctions – these were mostly motivated by concerns for regional stability in times of open conflict.¹³⁷ The rare use of sanctions is clearly linked to security concerns in cases of limited statehood, when there is an immediate threat to national and/or regional security. This situation often goes hand in hand with low levels of political liberalisation, but this factor alone is not sufficient to trigger sanctions.

The EU is dependent on all the regimes as partners in the 'fight against terrorism'. While democratisation is seen as a long-term cure for underlying reasons for the

¹³⁷ While it might be surprising that the EU does use negative incentives in a moment of crisis, the kind of sanctions applied do not have the potential to further undermine stability but seem to serve as a reminder to those responsible to resolve the conflict as quickly as possible. In the case of Algeria, the interruption of negotiations in the late 1990s can even be interpreted as a reaction to the mere impossibility to conduct negotiations in a context of civil war. Interestingly, socio-economic interdependence favouring the Mediterranean partner does not make the EU less prone to apply sanctions in times of crisis.

radicalisation and growing support of Islamism, the incumbent regimes uphold at least short-term stability. Instances of open criticism as a 'soft' form of reprimand of regimes in light of blatant violations of human rights and democratic practices have seriously disrupted the process of cooperation. This supports the idea that anything below draconian sanctions merely lead to a withdrawal of the regime from cooperation on democracy and human rights. The Tunisian regime could switch to a more confrontational approach during the crisis of EU-Tunisian relations in 2005-2006, as it did not have to fear further sanctions by the EU. In this case, the only channel for democracy promotion, i.e. the implementation of partnership-based instruments, is blocked. As long as it has economic and security interests in the region, and it is likely to have them in its direct neighbourhood, the EU clings to its 'cooperation is better than no cooperation' approach to democracy promotion.

Thus, both sides meet in their fear of an empowerment of Islamism through democratisation: The regimes because their survival is threatened and the EU because regime change would bring instability and not necessarily democracy. Several studies have shown that the regimes actively play the card of Islamism vis-à-vis the EU to fend off demands for reform and criticism of human rights violations, especially in the years directly following the events of 11 September 2001. However, the underlying threats to domestic legitimacy and power can also make the authoritarian regimes more forthcoming on cooperation in the field of democracy and human rights, if they are dependent on external support and benefits linked to cooperation.

The analysis still suggests a secondary role for socio-economic interdependence, shaping the regime's strategy once it has opted for cooperation: Algeria and Egypt are clearly more favoured by socio-economic interdependence vis-à-vis the EU than is Morocco. While all three countries struggle with domestic challenges, this situation might explain, next to their divergent degrees of political liberalisation, why cooperation with Algeria and Egypt is much more selective, mostly focusing on democracy assistance as capacity-building, than cooperation with Morocco, which might have even more need to actively placate the EU. Portraying itself as the 'best pupil' in the Mediterranean class, it justifies the EU's rewards and general support for Morocco.

Rewards are more generally granted in a context of high levels of political liberalisation and a good implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy

promotion. Contrary to expectations, the analysis suggests that rewards actually work, if only under certain circumstances: Given that a regime prefers cooperation anyway, the EU can acknowledge that regime's cooperative behaviour and express its appreciation through rewards, potentially encouraging the regime to follow the path chosen. At the same time, the selective granting of rewards creates a regional dynamic. While the reward as such might not be big enough to prompt better cooperation or reforms, its granting to others creates a situation of competition pushing regimes to reconsider their previous choices and possibly to engage more actively. The long story of the Moroccan 'statut avancé' shows how the more general positive conditionality of the ENP can work at reinforcing the interest of Mediterranean partners to cooperate with the EU on political issues. The fact that Morocco requested a reward on its own initiative shows that the country has a genuine interest in enhancing cooperation with the EU, giving it a 'leverage' that is not captured by socio-economic interdependence alone. In negotiating and finally granting the 'statut avancé', this leverage does not work through pressure, but through the cooperative stance of the target regime, that is willing to accept the EU's conditionality because its costs are lower than the expected benefit. This clearly limits the scope of the EU's policy, because the rewards put on display do not incite the partner's interest in cooperation but build on pre-existing preferences for cooperation with the EU. However, since the EU has granted the 'statut avancé' to Morocco, other regimes have started to request similar rewards. Even if they envy Morocco more for the prestige than for its material benefits, it seems that the EU's introduction of the principle of differentiation might actually work out in creating some sort of competition giving the EU greater leverage ('regatta principle'). Clearly, the EU's positive incentives do not cause regimes to implement democratic reforms over night – but they give greater dynamic to the EU's chosen strategy of engagement and cooperation, whatever their long-term effects may be.

9.2. *Implications*

By investigating how and under which conditions political dialogue and democracy assistance are implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations, this thesis significantly advances our empirical knowledge and theoretical understanding of international

democracy promotion efforts more generally. It also yields some important implications for the practice of external democracy promotion.

First, the thesis provides new insights into the implementation of two partnership-based instruments of democracy promotion, namely political dialogue and democracy assistance, shifting the focus away from conditionality which has up to now heavily dominated research on EU democracy promotion. The comparison over time and across countries captures all relevant cases in the region and thus allows a more systematic analysis that can go beyond the often *ad hoc* and case-centred explanations of findings in single-case studies or smaller samples. The focus on partnership-based instruments also allows a different perspective on international democracy promotion more generally, suggesting an interactive approach to this instance of international cooperation.

Second, the empirical investigation has shown that the strategic interaction approach provides a useful theoretical framework for analysing international democracy promotion, despite all the limitations of a traditional rationalist perspective. Drawing on well-established theories of international cooperation, the approach provides a first comprehensive explanation of EU democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean which holds empirically and can be generalised for other cases and contexts. It can be applied to EU democracy promotion efforts vis-à-vis other target countries and to other international actors, including nation states and other international or regional organizations.

Third, methodologically the thesis has demonstrated the importance of a systematically comparative approach to capture variation across countries. The quality of cooperation on democracy promotion can only be appreciated from a comparative perspective, which opens up the possibility to develop theoretical arguments and test hypotheses. In addition, the combination of a deductive and a more inductive empirical investigation has been useful to identify both macro-level indicators and underlying causal mechanisms.

The empirical and theoretical findings of the thesis also carry some important practical lessons on the political realities of external democracy promotion vis-à-vis authoritarian and 'semi-authoritarian' countries. Ten years into the new millennium and twenty years into the 'new international order' of the post-Cold War era, authoritarianism has proven more durable than expected, making these countries the real hard

cases for international efforts. The crucial role of at least some level of political liberalisation shows that democracy promotion efforts based on partnership and cooperation become more difficult the more they are needed. Furthermore, the emergence of cooperation even with (semi-)authoritarian countries suggests that these regimes are confident that implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance might not touch upon the distribution of power and threaten their survival. This clearly undermines the hope for a longer-term democratising effect of these measures. Nevertheless, as the level of political liberalisation alone is not enough, the need for external support opens a window of opportunity for external efforts: If cooperation on democracy promotion becomes important for a regime to guarantee its survival, it might allow measures that, in the long run, might lead to more fundamental changes in the regime. Authoritarian regimes cannot be expected to have a genuine interest in democratisation, but they might have a strategic interest in international cooperation on democracy promotion. However, none of the actors can necessarily oversee all possible outcomes and their unintended consequences. Their active engagement in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with external actors might have a 'boomerang effect', hitting the authoritarian regimes at some point (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999): Similar to initially purely rhetorical commitments to international human rights law, authoritarian regimes could find themselves entrapped in a process of cooperation and reform that develops a dynamic of its own in light of increasing domestic and international demands placed on the regime. While it is interesting to observe in how far such a dynamic takes hold in Morocco, other countries still need to make the first step towards cooperation on democracy promotion: The biggest challenge to tackle is definitely Syria, while cooperation with Tunisia has taken a more promising turn since the regime has declared its interest in a 'statut avancé'. It seems that the regime had to accept that its self-perception as the regional leader is not reciprocated by the EU. The EU is not willing to change from 'no sanctions' to 'rewards' without some concessions on the part of Tunisia. The EU might not insist on getting a mile, but it does need an inch to justify this step.

9.3. Outlook

This thesis provides a promising starting point for further research to advance our understanding of international democracy promotion. On a general level, the empirical investigation can be extended in a number of ways to probe the plausibility of the theoretical framework beyond the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, focusing on the EU as the external actor and authoritarian Mediterranean partners as the target regimes. Thus, future studies could include other countries in the region, e.g. Israel, or from other regions to vary country-specific factors more widely and to control for the regional context in which political liberalisation, statehood, and interdependence play out. Comparing the EU with other external actors, including nation states and other international and regional organisations, would draw attention to characteristics of the international actor that might affect the process of interaction through the formation of preferences over outcome and strategy. Taking the interactive approach one step further would open up the black box and explore the ‘domestic’ dimension more closely on both sides of interaction. Finally, based on the preliminary findings on the interplay of the implementation of partnership-based and unilateral instruments for democracy promotion, another task is to integrate the active use of incentives, e.g. political conditionality, more systematically into the rationalist model of strategic interaction. All these steps would allow testing, developing, and modifying the theoretical framework of this thesis in a way so that it can be applied to international democracy promotion more generally.

More specifically, future research is needed to test the inductively modified argument about the interaction of political liberalisation and statehood. Remaining in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, an in-depth comparative study could select a number of cases systematically varying these two factors. Two cases complementing the studies of Morocco and Tunisia would be Egypt and Jordan, allowing four paired comparisons within the range of medium to high degrees of political liberalisation and statehood (see figure 9.2 below). Going beyond macro-level indicators, a qualitative analysis could explore the degree to which the indicators for political liberalisation and statehood adequately capture the costs and benefits of the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance for the four regimes, and see if it is possible to trace the same causal mechanisms identified for Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria and Lebanon are the two cases with the most interesting variation over

time, as domestic and international conflicts have temporarily posed serious challenges to statehood, including both stability and capacity. This allows investigating further the role of statehood as an enabling factor, on the one hand, and in shaping the preferences over strategy, on the other hand.

Figure 9.2: Case selection for testing political liberalisation and statehood

Political liberalisation	Low	Medium	High
Statehood			
High		Tunisia	Jordan
Medium		Egypt	Morocco
Low	Syria	Algeria Lebanon	

Of course, future research needs to tackle the challenge of measuring the impact of the various strategies and instruments to promote democracy world-wide. The strategic interaction approach developed in this thesis already suggests major implications for the legitimacy and effectiveness of international democracy promotion efforts. Promoting democracy and the respect for human rights is for most international actors only one interest among many in international relations. If they stylise democracy promotion as the ultimate quest, this only creates false expectations, suggesting that they might systematically use political conditionality in the form of sanctions, compromising their other interests in security cooperation or trade. The experience of military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, toppling the incumbent regimes, further challenges the effectiveness and legitimacy of coercive diplomacy to bring about democratic regimes. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the formation of new blocs, dividing the world into a democratic and an undemocratic camp, seems both unlikely and hardly desirable. While a cooperative strategy, relying on the joint implementation of partnership-based instruments such as political dialogue and democracy assistance, risks stabilising authoritarian regimes in the short run, it opens a window for critical engagement that might prepare more fundamental changes in the target regimes. In any case, the EU's current approach undermines its credibility as a promoter of democracy, as it fails its own standards set too high and thereby significantly curbs its 'transformative power' in the Mediterranean.

Appendices

1. *Erklärung gemäß § 7 (4) der Promotionsordnung*

Ich versichere, dass ich die Dissertation selbständig auf der Grundlage von Hilfsmitteln und Hilfen verfasst habe, die sämtlich in der Dissertation angegeben sind.

Ich versichere, dass die Dissertation nicht schon einmal in einem früheren Promotionsverfahren angenommen oder als ungenügend beurteilt worden ist. Ich erkläre mich bereit, dem Promotionsausschuss auf Anfrage die Arbeiten aus früheren Promotionsverfahren vorzulegen.

2. **Zusammenfassung / Summary**

Diese Dissertation untersucht die Demokratieförderungspolitik der Europäischen Union (EU) gegenüber den Nachbarstaaten des südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraumes. Sie geht dabei von der empirischen Beobachtung aus, dass die EU ihre zwei zentralen Instrumente der Demokratieförderung, den Politischen Dialog und die Demokratiehilfe (*Democracy Assistance*), in der Kooperation mit den Mittelmeerpartnern generell erfolgreich umsetzen kann, diese Umsetzung jedoch über Länder hinweg stark variiert. Dieser Befund ist in zweierlei Hinsicht überraschend. Erstens handelt es sich bei beiden Instrumenten um „partnerschaftliche Instrumente“, d.h. ihre Umsetzung erfordert das aktive Engagement der Akteure in den Partnerländern – was im Fall von autoritären Regimen kaum zu erwarten ist. Zweitens kooperieren die Mittelmeerpartner zwar im Hinblick auf Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit mit der EU, aber es bleibt unklar, warum die Umsetzung in den Ländern jeweils variiert. Dieses Puzzle wurde von der EU-Forschung und der Literatur zu externer Demokratieförderung bisher vernachlässigt. Deshalb lautet die zentrale Forschungsfrage dieser Arbeit: *„Wie und unter welchen Bedingungen werden partnerschaftliche Instrumente der Demokratieförderung in den EU-Mittelmeer-Beziehungen umgesetzt?“*

Unter Rückgriff auf Theorien (internationaler) Kooperation wird in dieser Dissertation ein rationalistisches Modell strategischer Interaktion entwickelt, um die Umsetzung von Politischem Dialog und Demokratiehilfe zu erklären. Der strategische Interaktionsansatz ermöglicht die Integration dreier in der Literatur prominent diskutierter Faktoren: den Grad politischer Liberalisierung und den Grad der Staatlichkeit in dem Zielland sowie die Art der Interdependenz in den bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen der EU und ihren Mittelmeerpartnern. Er spezifiziert darüber hinaus ihre Interaktionseffekte im Hinblick auf die Präferenzen der Akteure und die Ergebnisse der Kooperation auf Länderebene. Im Rahmen einer vergleichenden Studie zur Kooperation zwischen der EU und sieben Mittelmeeranrainern (Ägypten, Algerien, Jordanien, Libanon, Marokko, Syrien und Tunesien) in den Jahren 1990-2008 werden diese Hypothesen getestet. Dieser deduktive Ansatz wird durch eine induktiv vergleichende Fallstudie der Länder Marokko und Tunesien in den Jahren 2000-2008

ergänzt, um Kausalmechanismen aufzudecken und den theoretischen Rahmen weiterzuentwickeln und zu spezifizieren.

Das zentrale Argument der Dissertation ist, dass eine spezifische Kombination von politischer Liberalisierung und Staatlichkeit die Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern hinsichtlich des Zeitpunkts, des Umfangs und der Qualität der Umsetzung der partnerschaftlichen Instrumente erklären kann. Während der Grad der politischen Liberalisierung eines Ziellandes die Kosten der Umsetzung des politischen Dialogs und der Demokratiehilfe im Hinblick auf Macht und Stabilität bestimmt, kann begrenzte Staatlichkeit ähnlich wie Interdependenz die Kooperation im Rahmen der Demokratieförderung entweder mehr oder weniger erstrebenswert erscheinen lassen. Die Umsetzung partnerschaftlicher Demokratieförderungsinstrumente ist damit umso besser, je höher der Grad der politischen Liberalisierung in dem Zielland ist; insbesondere wenn dieses zudem einen mittleren Grad an Staatlichkeit aufweist. Wenn der Grad politischer Liberalisierung im Gegensatz dazu gering ist, wirken die Kooperationskosten prohibitiv; und wenn der Grad an Staatlichkeit zu niedrig oder zu hoch ist, ist Kooperation entweder nicht realisierbar oder aus Sicht des Ziellandes nicht erstrebenswert.

This thesis investigates the European Union's (EU) democracy promotion efforts vis-à-vis its neighbours in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. It starts from the observation that the EU generally succeeds in implementing its two main instruments for democracy promotion, namely political dialogue and democracy assistance, in cooperation with its Mediterranean neighbours but that implementation varies significantly across countries. This finding is puzzling in two regards: First, both instruments are 'partnership-based', i.e. their implementation requires the active engagement of the targeted actor which can hardly be expected in the case of authoritarian regimes. Second, while Mediterranean partners apparently engage in cooperation on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law with the EU, it is not obvious why implementation should vary. This puzzle has been largely neglected in research on EU and more generally international democracy promotion. Therefore, the central research question underlying this thesis is "*How and under which conditions are partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion implemented in Euro-Mediterranean relations?*"

Drawing on theories of (international) cooperation, the thesis suggests a rationalist model of strategic interaction in order to explain the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. The strategic interaction approach allows integrating three factors that figure prominently in the literature, namely the degrees of political liberalisation and statehood in the target country as well as the configuration of interdependence in bilateral relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. It specifies their interaction effects in shaping the actors' preferences as well as the outcome of cooperation at the country level. The thesis tests these hypotheses in a comparative analysis of EU cooperation with seven Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) in 1990-2008. It complements this deductive approach with an inductive comparative case-study of Morocco and Tunisia for 2000-2008 in order to substantiate causal claims and to further develop and refine the theoretical framework.

The thesis argues that a specific combination of political liberalisation and statehood can account for variation across countries in the timing, extent, and quality of implementation. The level of political liberalisation in the target country affects the costliness of implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance in terms of power and stability, while limitations to statehood can make cooperation on democracy promotion either more or less beneficial for the target regime in the same line as interdependence. The implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion is better, the higher the level of political liberalisation in the target country, especially when combined with a medium degree of statehood. By contrast, if the level of political liberalisation is too low, the costs of cooperation become prohibitive; and if the degree of statehood is either too low or too high, cooperation is either not feasible or not beneficial enough for the target regime.

3. Curriculum Vitae

For reasons of data protection,
the curriculum vitae is not included in the online version

For reasons of data protection,
the curriculum vitae is not included in the online version

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For reasons of data protection,
the curriculum vitae is not included in the online version

4. List of Interviews

No.	Date	Partner
1.	06.02.2007	European Commission, DG External Relations
2.	12.06.2007	European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation office
3.	16.05.2008	German ministry of foreign relations
4.	02.06.2008	European Commission, DG External Relations
5.	02.06.2008	European Commission, DG External Relations
6.	03.06.2008	Tunisian ministry of foreign relations
7.	03.06.2008	European Commission, DG External Relations
8.	04.06.2008	Council of the EU, General Secretariat
9.	04.06.2008	Member of European Parliament
10.	05.06.2008	European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation office
11.	06.06.2008	German Permanent Representation to the EU
12.	06.06.2008	Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU
13.	06.06.2008	European Commission, DG External Relations
14.	09.06.2008	European Commission, DG External Relations
15.	09.06.2008	European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office
16.	10.06.2008	Council of the EU, General Secretariat
17.	14.07.2010	Council of the EU, General Secretariat
18.	14.07.2010	Italian Permanent Representation to the EU
19.	14.07.2010	European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation office
20.	15.07.2010	Council of the EU, General Secretariat
21.	15.07.2010	European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation office
22.	15.07.2010	Moroccan ministry of foreign relations
23.	16.07.2010	European Commission, DG External Relations
24.	16.07.2010	European Commission, DG External Relations
25.	16.07.2010	European Commission, DG External Relations
26.	29.07.2010	European Commission, DG External Relations

5. List of EU External Cooperation Programmes

‘Geographical’ programmes:

MEDA I: 1996-1999

Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, Official Journal L 189, 30.07.1996, p. 1-9. (Council of the EU 1996)

MEDA II: 2000-2006

Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, Official Journal L 311, 12.12.2000, p. 1-8. (Council of the EU 2000c)

ENPI: 2007-2013

Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Official Journal L 310, 09.11.2006, p. 1-14. (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006a)

‘Horizontal’ programmes:

MDP: 1996-1999

MEDA Democracy Programme, budget line B-7050 under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), budget line B-70 (cf. Karkutli and Bützler 1999)

EIDHR – the Initiative I: 1999-2004

Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule

of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, Official Journal L 120, 08.05.1999, p. 1-7. (Council of the EU 1999a)

Council Regulation (EC) No 976/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of Community operations, other than those of development cooperation, which, within the framework of Community cooperation policy, contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries, Official Journal L 120, 08.05.1999, p. 8-14. (Council of the EU 1999b)

EIDHR – the Initiative II: 2005-2006

Regulation (EC) No 2240/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, Official Journal L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 3-5. (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2004)

Council Regulation (EC) No 2242/2004 of 22 December 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 976/1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of Community operations, other than those of development cooperation, which, within the framework of Community cooperation policy, contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries, Official Journal L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 21-23. (Council of the EU 2004b)

EIDHR – the Instrument: 2007-2013

Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, Official Journal L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 1-11. (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006b)

6. **List of Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Foreign Ministers**

Place	Date	Meeting
Barcelona	27.-28.11.1995	Euro-Mediterranean Conference: Barcelona Declaration (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995)
Malta	15.-16.04.1997	Barcelona II: Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1997)
Palermo	03.-04.06.1998	Euromed ad hoc ministerial meeting (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1998)
Stuttgart	15.-16.04.1999	Barcelona III: Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1999)
Marseilles	15.-16.11.2000	Barcelona IV: Fourth Euro-Mediterranean conference of foreign ministers (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2000)
Brussels	05.-06.11.2001	Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2001)
Valencia	22.-23.04.2002	Barcelona V: Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2002)
Crete	26.-27.05.2003	Mid-Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2003b)
Naples	02.-03.12.2003	Barcelona VI: Sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2003a)
Dublin	05.-06.05.2004	Euro-Mediterranean Mid-term meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2004a)
The Hague	29.-30.11.2004	Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2004b)
Luxembourg	30.-31.05.2005	Barcelona VII: Seventh Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2005b)
Barcelona	27.-28.11.2005	Barcelona Summit – Tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2005a)
Tampere	27.-28.11.2006	Barcelona VIII: Eighth Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2006)
Lisbon	05.-06.11.2007	Barcelona IX: Ninth Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2007)
Paris	13.-14.07.2008	Paris Summit for the Mediterranean: Paris Declaration (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2008b)
Marseille	03.-04.11.2008	Marseille Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 2008a)

7. *List of Regular Reports by EU Institutions*

For	EU Annual Reports on Human Rights
1998-1999	European Union Annual Report on Human rights 1998/1999, October 1999, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU 2000d)
2000	European Union Annual Report on Human rights 2000, 9 October 2000, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU 2000e)
2001	European Union Annual Reports on Human rights 2001, 9 October 2001, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU 2002a)
2002	European Union Annual Report on Human rights 2002, 21 October 2002, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU 2002b)
2003	EU Annual Report on Human rights 2003, 13 October 2003, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU 2003b)
2004	EU Annual Report on Human rights 2004, 13 September 2004, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU 2004d)
2005	EU Annual Report on Human rights 2005, 3 October 2005, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU 2005b)
2006	EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2006, Brussels, 4 October 2006, Council Register document no 13522/1/06 REV 1, COHOM 146. Brussels. (Council of the EU 2006e)
2007	EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2007, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Council of the EU and European Commission 2007)
2008	European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2008, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (Presidency of the EU, European Commission, and Council of the EU 2008)
For	Commission Reports on the 1991 Resolution
1992	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Report on the implementation of the Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, adopted on 28 November 1991, SEC (1992) 1915, 21.10.1992. (European Commission 1992)
1993	Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation in 1993 of the Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, adopted on 28 November 1991, COM (1994) 42, 23.02.1994. (European Commission 1994)

1994	Commission Staff Working Paper. Report on the implementation in 1994 of the Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, adopted on 28 November 1991, SEC (1996) 378), 29.02.1996. (European Commission 1996a)
For	Commission Reports on the EIDHR
1992-1993	Report on the use of financial resources in the promotion and protection of human rights and democratic principles (for the years 1992-1993), Doc. FR/CM/242/242847.GH, PE 207.805 of 26.3.93.
1994	Report on the implementation of measures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles for 1994, COM (1995) 191, 12.07.1995. (European Commission 1995b)
1995	Report on the implementation of measures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles (for 1995), COM (96) 673 [sic! 672], 17.01.1997. (European Commission 1996c)
1996-1999	Report from the Commission. On the implementation of measures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles in external relations for 1996-1999, COM (2000) 726, 14.11.2000. (European Commission 2000d)
2000	Commission Staff Working Document. Report on the implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000, SEC(2001) 801, 22.05.2001. (European Commission 2001b)
For	Commission Reports on MEDA
1996-1997	Implementing MEDA. 1996-1997 report, COM (1998) 524, 14.09.1998. (European Commission 1998b)
1998	Report from the Commission. Annual Report of the MEDA programme 1998, COM (1999) 291, 22.06.1999. (European Commission 1999b)
1999	Report from the Commission. Annual Report of the MEDA programme 1999, COM (2000) 472, 20.12.2000. (European Commission 2000c)
2000	Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Annual Report of the MEDA programme 2000, COM (2001) 806, 28.12.2001. (European Commission 2001g)
For	Commission Reports on External Assistance
2001	Annual Report 2001 on the EC development policy and the implementation of the external assistance. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2002a)
2002	Annual Report 2003 on the European Community's development policy and the implementation of the external assistance in 2002. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2003a)
2003	Annual Report 2004 on the European Community's development policy and the implementation of the external assistance. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2004a)
2004	Annual Report 2005 on the European Community's development policy and the implementation of the external assistance in 2004. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2005a)

2005	Annual Report 2006 on the European Community's development policy and the implementation of the external assistance in 2005. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2006a)
2006	Annual Report 2007 on the European Community's development policy and the implementation of the external assistance in 2006. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2007a)
2007	Annual Report 2008 on the European Community's development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2007. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2008a)
2008	Annual report on the European Community's development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2008. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. (European Commission 2009a)

8. Development assistance under MEDA and ENPI

Commitments under MEDA I (in million € 1995-1999)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	total	average
Algeria	-/-	-/-	41	95	28	164.0	32.8
Egypt	-/-	75	203	397	11	686.0	137.2
Jordan	7	100	10	8	129	254.0	50.8
Lebanon	-/-	10	86	-/-	86	182.0	36.4
Morocco	30	-/-	235	219	172	660.0	132.0
Syria	-/-	13	42	-/-	44	101.0	20.2
Tunisia	20	120	138	19	131	428.0	85.6

Source: "MEDA Commitments per country and year 1995-2000 (Mio €)" (European Commission 2001g: 12).

Commitments under MEDA II (in million € 2000-2006)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	total	average
Algeria	30.2	60	50	41.6	51	40.0	66.0	338.8	48.4
Egypt	12.7	0	78	103.8	159	110.0	129.0	592.5	84.6
Jordan	15	20	92	42.4	35	58.0	69.0	331.4	47.3
Lebanon	0	0	12	43.7	18	27.0	32.0	132.7	19.0
Morocco	140.6	120	122	142.7	151.8	135.0	168.0	980.1	140.0
Syria	38	8	36	0.7	53	22.0	22.0	179.7	25.7
Tunisia	75.5	90	92.2	48.7	22	118.0	71.0	517.6	73.9

Source: European Commission (2007): Mediterranean Neighbourhood Countries. Commitments and Payments (€million), http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf, 13 September 2010.

Commitments and Payments under MEDA (in million € 1995-2006)

Country	MEDA I			MEDA II		
	Commitments	Payments	P/C Ratio	Commitments	Payments	P/C Ratio
Algeria	164.0	30.2	18%	338.8	142.3	42%
Egypt	686.0	157.0	23%	592.5	659.4	117%
Jordan	254.0	108.4	43%	331.4	345.5	104%
Lebanon	182.0	1.2	1%	132.7	181.5	137%
Morocco	660.0	127.5	19%	980.1	917.4	94%
Syria	101.0	0.0	0%	179.7	90.9	51%
Tunisia	428.0	168.0	39%	517.6	489.2	95%
Total bilateral	2.586.0	651.3	25%	3.595.1	3.348.6	93%

Source: European Commission (2007): Mediterranean Neighbourhood Countries. Commitments and Payments (€million), http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf, 13 September 2010.

Commitments (in million € 1995-2010)

Country	MEDA I	MEDA II	ENPI	Total
	1995-1999	2000-2006	2007-2010	1995-2010
Algeria	164.0	338.8	220.0	722.8
Egypt	686.0	592.5	558.0	1,836.5
Jordan	254.0	331.4	265.0	850.4
Lebanon	182.0	132.7	187.0	501.7
Morocco	660.0	980.1	654.0	2,294.1
Syria	101.0	179.7	130.0	410.7
Tunisia	428.0	517.6	300.0	1,245.6
Sum	2,475.0	3,072.8	2,314.0	7,861.8
Average	351.0	439.0	330.6	1,123.1

Sources: European Commission (2007): Mediterranean Neighbourhood Countries.

Commitments and Payments (€million),

http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf, 13 September 2010 and

European Commission (2007): European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

(ENPI). Funding 2007-2013. Indicative Multi-annual Allocations for the period

2007-10, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi_figures_en.pdf, 13

September 2010.

9. *Political Dialogue*

Association Council meetings

	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia
1990-1997	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1998	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	14.07.
1999	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	--
2000	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	09.10.	n/a	24.01.
2001	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	09.10.	n/a	--
2002	n/a	n/a	16.05.	n/a	--	n/a	29.01.
2003	n/a	n/a	14.10.	n/a	24.02.	n/a	30.09.
2004	n/a	14.06.	11.10.	n/a	26.04.	n/a	--
2005	--	--	21.11.	n/a	22.11.	n/a	31.01.
2006	10.03.	13.06.	14.11.	11.04.	--	n/a	--
2007	24.04.	06.03.	11.12.	24.04.	23.07.	n/a	19.11.
2008	10.03.	28.04.	10.11.	19.02.	13.10.	n/a	10.11.
Average interval in months	12	15	13	11	16	n/a	21

Source: Own compilation.

10. Democracy Assistance

Total democracy assistance under the EIDHR (in million euros)

Country	Early 1990-1995	MDP 1996-1998	Initiative 2000-2006	Instrument 2007-2008	Total 1990-2008	Total 1995-2008
Algeria	0.00	1.37	7.13	0.00	8.50	8.50
Egypt	0.00	0.91	6.72	0.00	7.63	7.63
Jordan	0.69	1.11	2.05	1.71	5.56	4.87
Lebanon	0.03	1.11	4.93	2.07	8.14	8.11
Morocco	0.05	2.29	3.51	0.92	6.77	6.72
Syria	0.00	0.23	1.01	0.00	1.24	1.24
Tunisia	0.23	0.23	1.77	0.00	2.23	2.00
Sum	1.00	7.25	27.12	4.70	40.07	39.07
Average	0.14	1.04	3.87	0.67	5.72	5.58

Source: Own compilation.

Total democracy assistance under MEDA and ENPI (in million euros)

Country	MEDA I 1995-1999	MEDA II 2000-2006	ENPI 2007-2008	Total 1995-2008
Algeria	5.00	48.20	17.00	70.20
Egypt	0.00	25.00	30.00	55.00
Jordan	0.00	7.00	7.00	14.00
Lebanon	0.00	10.00	12.00	22.00
Morocco	4.00	32.70	28.00	64.70
Syria	0.00	2.00	0.00	2.00
Tunisia	0.00	33.65	0.00	33.65
Sum	9.00	158.55	94.00	261.55
Average	1.23	22.65	13.43	37.36

Source: Own compilation.

Total democracy assistance (in million euros)

Country	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2006	2007-2008	1990-2008
Algeria	0.00	6,37	55,33	17.00	78.70
Egypt	0.00	0,91	31,71	30.00	62.63
Jordan	0.69	1,11	9,05	8.71	19.56
Lebanon	0.03	1,11	14,93	14.07	30.14
Morocco	0.05	6,29	36,21	28.92	71.47
Syria	0.00	0,23	3,01	0.00	3.24
Tunisia	0.23	0,23	35,42	0.00	35.88
Sum	1.00	16.25	185.66	99.60	301.62
Average	0.14	2.32	26.52	19.92	43.01

Source: Own compilation.

Democracy assistance under the EIDHR – average per year (in million €)

Country	MDP 1996-1998	EIDHR 2000-2006	EIDHR 2007-2008	Total
Algeria	0.46	1.02	0.00	0.65
Egypt	0.30	0.96	0.00	0.59
Jordan	0.37	0.29	0.86	0.43
Lebanon	0.37	0.70	1.04	0.63
Morocco	0.76	0.50	0.46	0.52
Syria	0.08	0.14	0.00	0.10
Tunisia	0.08	0.25	0.00	0.11

Democracy assistance under MEDA/ENPI – average per year (in million €)

Country	MEDA I 1999	MEDA II 2000-2006	ENPI 2007-2008	Total 1999-2008
Algeria	5.00	6.89	8.50	7.02
Egypt	0.00	3.57	15.00	5.50
Jordan	0.00	1.00	2.33	1.40
Lebanon	0.00	1.43	6.00	2.20
Morocco	4.00	4.67	14.00	6.47
Syria	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.20
Tunisia	0.00	4.81	0.00	3.37

Democracy assistance – respective programme as share of total (in %)

Country	1995-1999		2000-2006		2007-2008		Total	
	Hor.	Geo.	Hor.	Geo.	Hor.	Geo.	Hor.	Geo.
Algeria	21.5	78.5	12.9	87.1	0.00	100.00	10.8	89.2
Egypt	100.0	0.00	21.2	78.8	0.00	100.00	12.2	87.8
Jordan	100.0	0.00	22.7	77.3	19.6	80.4	28.4	71.6
Lebanon	100.0	0.00	33.0	67.0	14.1	85.9	27.0	73.0
Morocco	36.4	63.6	9.7	90.3	3.2	96.8	9.5	90.5
Syria	100.0	0.00	33.6	66.4	0.00	0.00	38.3	61.7
Tunisia	100.0	0.00	5.0	95.0	0.00	0.00	5.6	94.4

Total democracy assistance as share of total aid (in %)

Country	MEDA I 1995-1999	MEDA II 2000-2006	ENPI 2007-2008	Total 1995-2008
Algeria	3.88	16.33	7.73	10.89
Egypt	0.13	5.35	5.38	3.41
Jordan	0.44	2.73	3.29	2.30
Lebanon	0.61	11.25	7.52	6.01
Morocco	0.95	3.69	4.42	3.12
Syria	0.23	1.68	0.00	0.79
Tunisia	0.05	6.84	0.00	2.89
Average	0.66	6.04	5.29	3.84

11. List of projects under the EIDHR 2000-2006

Algeria

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
<i>Macro Projects</i>						
2000			Psycho-Traumatism Training Project for the Algerian Health Service	Association Médecins du Monde	232.275	Human rights B7-704
2001	2002	50540	Supporting the Algerian Penal and Penitentiary System	Association Internationale de Reforme Penale PRI, France	900.003	Rule of law B7-702
2001			DARNA: House for Victims of Terrorist Rape	CLEF – Insertion (France)	520.448	Human rights B7-701
2003	2004	60064	Cooperation Programme with the Algerian Civil Society	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V., Germany	1.425.098	Civil society
2004		95660	Revision of School Texts to incorporate teaching about Human Rights / Intégration de l'Education en Matière des Droits de l'Homme (en abréviation : EMDH) dans le cursus scolaire	Ministry of Education / AL JUMHURIYA AL JAZAIRIYA AD DIMUQRATIYA ASH SHABIYA	750.000	Support to strengthen democratisation, good governance and the rule of law
2004	2005	114966	Supporting Education, Citizenship and Recreating a Space for Democratic Dialogue in Kabylie, Boumerdes and Alger Regions	Comitato internazionale per lo sviluppo dei popoli onlus	752.700	Strengthening of civil society

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
2004	2005	115182	Supporting a Better Access to Justice for the Most Vulnerable Populations in Algeria	Avocats sans Frontieres, Belgium	742.720	Rule of law and justice including the penal
2004	2006	115547	Actions for Women's Physical Integrity, Rights, and Autonomy	IMED ISTITUTO PER IL MEDITERRANEO ASSOCIAZIONE	385.732	Women + strengthening of civil society + promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
Total funding for 8 macro projects 2000-2004					5.708.976	
Average size of macro projects					713.622	
Micro Projects						
2002	2004	95906	Schools of the Eco-Citizenship and the Durable Development	ASSOCIATION POUR LA PROTECTION ET L'AMELIORATION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT MECHERIA, Algeria	48.688	Governance + Children
2002	2005	95910	Nursery for Cerebral Handicapped Children	ASSOCIATION NOUR IMC IMOC, Algeria	32.082	Persons with disabilities
2002	2005	95916	FIDDA (Femmes pour l'initiative des Droits de l'homme et la Démocratie en Algérie, Women for the Initiative of the Human Rights and Democracy in Algeria)	RASSEMBLEMENT CONTRE LA HOGGRA ET POUR LES DROITS DES ALGERIENNES-RACHDA ASSOCIATION	49.971	Women + Governance
2002	2005	95926	The Internet Network of Algerian Associations (...) (renforcer la société civile et favoriser la mise en réseau des acteurs associatifs par la création d'un	ASSOCIATION POUR LA CULTURE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE	47.858	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
			portail Internet consacré aux associations)			
2003	2005	95936	Yadala: Defence of Women's and Children's Rights to have an Identity	BNET NSOUMER ASSOCIATION	90.655	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2003	2005	95938	Avicenne	LIGUE ALGERIENNE POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ASSOCIATION	87.300	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2003	2005	95939	All Together for a Human Rights and Non-Violence Society	LIGUE DE PREVENTION ET DE SAUVEGARDE DE LA JEUNESSE ET DE L'ENFANCE ASSOCIATION	90.023	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2003	2005	95945	Training and Orientation Support Centre for Deprived Women and their Children	FONDATION NATIONALE POUR LA PROMOTION DE LA SANTE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE FOREM	89.836	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2003	2004	95948	One Hand Cannot Clap on its Own.	ARPEIJ - ASSOCIATION POUR LA REHABILITATION PSYCHODUCATIVE INFANTO-JUVENILE, Algeria	40.000	Fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination
2003	2005	96007	Creation of an Observatory of Children's Rights	FONDATION NATIONALE POUR LA PROMOTION DE LA SANTE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE FOREM	89.722	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms + Children
2004	2005	107863	Program of Updating and Training for Associations	ASSOCIATION SCIENTIFIQUE TUSSNA	47.638	Promotion and protection of human

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
			(PROMANFORA)			rights and fundamental freedoms
2004	2005	107873	Mediterranean Early Childhood Institute: (...) centre ressources et réseau (IMPE-CRR)	ASSOCIATION ALGERIENNE ENFANCE ET FAMILLES D ACCEUIL BENEVOLE	62.873	Strengthening of civil society
2004	2006	107951	Promote and Defend the Rights of Disable People in Algeria (PRODEDPERSHAL)	FEDERATION DES ASSOCIATIONS DES HANDICAPES MOTEURS, Algeria	100.000	Persons with disabilities
2004	2005	108178	Solidarity with Women Victims of Discriminations and Violence (SOFEMVIDIVI)	ASSOCIATION FEMININE POUR L'EPANOUISSEMENT DE LA PERSONNE ET L'EXERCICE DE LA CITOYENNETE	66.364	Women + Governance
2005	2007	132148	The mistreatment of Children in Algeria: Current Situation and Actions to Be Carried Out	ASSOCIATION NATIONALE DE PSYCHOLOGIE SON ET IMAGE	98.006	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2007	132157	Development of Ranahna Website	ASSOCIATION POUR LA CULTURE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE	99.300	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2007	132163	Women's Rights Information and Awareness (Information et sensibilisation aux droits des femmes, ISADF)	ASSOCIATION FEMMES EN COMMUNICATION	90.000	Women + Governance
2005	2007	132170	The Human Rights Bus	ASSOCIATION CULTURELLE AMUSNAW DE LA WILAYA DE TIZI-OUZOU	90.099	Promotion and protection of human rights and

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
						fundamental freedoms
2005	2007	132175	Dhakira	ASSOCIATION DJAZAIROUNA	97.623	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms + Governance
Total funding for 19 micro projects 2002-2005					1.418.038	
Average size of micro projects					74.634	

Egypt

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
<i>Macro Projects</i>						
2001			The Program for the Amelioration of Prison Conditions	The Human Rights Centre for the Assistance of Prisoners, Egypt	800.623	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2001			Campaign Against Child Labour in the Egyptian Agrarian Sector	Land Centre for Human Rights, Egypt	182.454	Children
2001			NCW Hotline - Ombudsman	National Council for Women in Egypt, Egypt	439.934	Peaceful conciliation
2001			Expansion of ADEW's Programme for the Empowerment of Female Heads of Household in Low Income Communities	Association for the Development & Enhancement of Women, Egypt	258.032	Women + Governance
2001			Women in the Decision-Making Process	Alliance for Arab Women, Egypt	466.678	Women + Governance
2002	2003	56409	Enhancing the Role of Civil Society in Human Rights and Political Reform in the Arab Region	CAIRO INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES	800.000	Strengthening of civil society
2005	2007	117711	Practising Democracy from the Village up to the Capital: Promoting Participatory Democracy by Strengthening Local Communities	STICHTING NOVIB-NEDERLANDSE ORGANISATIE VOOR INTERNATIONALE ONTWIKKELINGSSAMENWERKING	812.308	Strengthening of civil society
2006			KARAMA: Freedom from Violence	CARE INTERNATIONAL UK	799.239	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
2006			Management and Rehabilitation of victims of torture in Egypt	EL NADIM CENTER FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE	180.677	Torture
2006			Advancing Women Rights: Promoting Attitudes Against Gender-based Violence through Strengthening the Capacities of the Civil Society Organisations	MOVIMENTO PER L AUTOSVILUPPOL INTERSCAMBIO E LA SOLIDARIETA	299.863	Women + Strengthening of civil society
Total funding for 10 macro projects 2001-2006					5.039.808	
Average size of macro projects					503.981	
Micro Projects						
2004	2007	106875	Women are full citizens too; empowering egyptian women to actively participate in the political sphere	THE ASSOCIATION FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENHANCEMENT OF WOMEN	98.569	Governance
2004	2005	106983	Watch, monitoring and evaluation of egyptian parliament elections to enhance democratization	THE EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION ENHANCEMENT	83.899	Governance
2004	2005	107019	Training journalists in covering elections and writing fair and unbiased press reports	THE EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR TRAINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS	71.618	Governance
2004	2005	108936	Women in Democratic Transition	EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS ASSOCIATION	100.000	Governance
2004	2005	109511	Defending the rights of refugees	AL SHEHAB INSTITUTION FOR COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT	54.439	Fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
2004	2005	109529	Family Court Step toward civil and legal rights of women	CENTER OF EGYPTIAN FAMILY DEVELOPMENT	97.253	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2004	2005	110988	campaign for women judge in Egypt	THE ARAB CENTER FOR THE INDEPENDANCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION	93.025	Governance
2004	2005	111031	Defending prisoners and detainees	HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF PRISONERS	85.919	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2004	2005	111846	Supporting and developing farmers rights and participation in Egypt	LAND CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LCHR	91.123	Strengthening of civil society
2005	2006	123768	Strengthening rural civil society organisations to support farmers and improve their economic and social rights	LAND CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LCHR	88.018	Strengthening of civil society
2005	2006	123785	The Egyptian democratic status watch	THE EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION ENHANCEMENT	100.000	Governance
2005	2006	123800	The Egyptian Legislative Reform Forum	EGYPTIAN ORGANISATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION	64.383	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2005	2006	123805	Election observers training programme	THE EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR TRAINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS	75.279	Governance
2005	2006	123808	Fighting violence cultivating democratic culture	EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS ASSOCIATION	100.000	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	123809	The street is ours making Egypt safer for women	EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS ASSOCIATION	95.327	Strengthening of civil society

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
2005	2006	123827	Advocate and support street girl,s rights	ASSOCIATION HOPE VILLAGE SOCIETY	96.300	Strengthening of civil society
2005	2006	124021	Fostering human rights culture in public schools	THE EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION ENHANCEMENT	100.000	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	124023	Gender and governance at local level	COPTIC EVANGELICAL ORGANIZATION FORSOCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION	90.000	Governance
2005	2007	124032	Spporting basic and civic rights in four Governorates in Upper Egypt	UPPER EGYPT ASSOCIATION FOR PEDAGOGY AND DEVELOPMENT	96.909	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
Total funding for 19 micro projects 2004-2005					1.682.061	
Average size of micro projects					88.530	
			Empowering Social and Political Rights of Women	SEKEM DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION	95.009	Governance
			Networking for Reducing Violence in Schools in Fayoum	EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT	97.962	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms + Children
			The Spread of Children's Rights from Schools to Local Communities	TAHA HUSSEIN ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIC EDUCATION	86.896	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms + Children
			Prevention of Torture	HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF PRISONERS	99.972	Torture

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
			Triples Marriage National Campaign	CENTER OF EGYPTIAN FAMILY DEVELOPMENT	97.046	Women
			Children and Women Rights Awareness Programme for Local NGOs	CARITAS EGYPT ASSOCIATION	99.650	Women + Children
Total funding for 6 micro projects					576.535	
Average size of micro projects					96.089	

Jordan

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
Macro Projects						
2001			Women in Parliament		630.514	B7-702
	2007	118155	Reforming the Family Laws in Arab countries	JORDANIAN WOMEN'S UNION	816.000	Women + Strengthening of civil society
Total funding 2 macro projects					1.446.514	
Average funding for macro projects					723.257	
Micro Projects						
2004	2005	106293	Raising Women's Voice in Policy and Planning Forums	THE JORDANIAN HASHEMITE FUND FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	94.540	
2004	2005	108253	Tamkeen: Empowering Jordanian Women	WADI AL ARAB CHARITY ASSOCIATION	39.300	Women + Governance
2004	2005	109407	Promoting Women Legal Rights	ARAB WOMEN ORGANIZATION OF JORDAN	94.760	Women + Fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination
2004	2005	113725	Empowering civil society capacity building in the media field	CENTER FOR DEFENDING FREEDOM OF JOURNALISTS	75.061	Strengthening of civil society + Governance
2004	2006	113828	A New Start - Protecting women in administrative detention and women at risk	FIRAS AZAR AND PARTNERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP	99.932	Women
2004	2005	113846	Enhancing women rights assertion in rural areas	JORDANIAN WOMEN'S UNION	100.000	Women
2004	2005	113891	Human Rights and Democracy in Action in North Badia and Madaba in Action phase II	LAND AND HUMAN TO ADVOCATE PROGRESS	78.261	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms

2004	2005	113919	Project to update the Jordanian juvenile delinquents" law ensuring its consistency with international standards	ARAB ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS JORDAN ASSOCIATION	84.378	Rule of law and justice including the penal system + Children
2005	2007	132214	Tools for Democracy and Human Rights Education	LAND AND HUMAN TO ADVOCATE PROGRESS	86.841	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2007	132322	Establishing networks for promoting human rights and democracy	ARAB WOMEN ORGANIZATION OF JORDAN	98.462	Women + Strengthening of civil society
2005		132431	Create a healthy, safe and productive life based on human principles	THE JORDANIAN HASHEMITE FUND FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	98.812	Women + Governance
2005	2007	132462	Exercise your rights	THE PERFORMING ARTS CENTER OF THE NOOR AL HUSSEIN FOUNDATION	93.604	Governance
2005	2007	132463	Jordanian Women and Reforms" Initiatives	SAMAR KHADER & PARTNERS CO	89.962	Women + Governance
2005	2007	132470	Medial legal aid unit for journalists in Jordan	CENTER FOR DEFENDING FREEDOM OF JOURNALISTS	99.998	Human rights defenders
2005	2007	132696	Advocacy Against Torture	CENTER FOR DEFENDING FREEDOM OF JOURNALISTS	88.265	Torture
2005	2007	132728	Building a Youth Coalition for Advocacy and Civil Participation for Reform in Jordan	FIRAS AZAR AND PARTNERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP	99.852	Strengthening of civil society + Governance
Total funding for 16 micro projects 2005-2006					1.422.027	
Average size of micro projects					88.877	

Lebanon

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
Macro Projects						
2001			Protection for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers and Asylum-Seekers in Lebanon	Caritas Sweden	761.300	Fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination
2005		102419	EUEOM Lebanon	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	1.881.661	Campaign 3 - Promoting the Democratic Process
2006	2007	18123	Rehabilitation program for torture in Lebanon	RESTART ASSOCIATION, Lebanon	348.693	Torture
2006	2007	118151	Torture prevention and monitoring in Lebanon	ASSOCIATION LIBANAISE POUR L'EDUCATION ET LA FORMATION	153.150	Torture
2006	2007	118201	Medical, social and psychological assistance for victims of torture	KHIAM REHABILITATION CENTRE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE, Lebanon	642.000	Torture
Total funding for 5 macro projects 2001-2006					3.786.804	
Average size of macro projects					757.361	
Micro Projects						
2004	2005	105832	Minors in Conflict with the Law (MCL)	FOUNDATION OF FATHER AFIF OSSEIRANFOYER DE LA PROVIDENCE	100.000	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2004	2005	105872	Access to Socio-Legal Rights of Prisoners at the Roumieh Prison	ASSOCIATION JUSTICE ET MISERICORDE	98.010	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2004	2005	105876	Action at the Community Dialogue in South Libyan (ADICS)	THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR POPULAR ACTIVITIES (AMEL)	53.999	Human rights dialogues
2004	2005	105884	Public Awareness on the Concept of Democracy	MAKHZOUMI FOUNDATION	51.030	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental free-

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
						doms
2004	2005	105886	Refugees Rights Program, Legal Aid and Advocacy	RUWAD ASSOCIATION	73.922	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2004	2005	105890	Right to Live, Right of Being and have Been	MOUVEMENT SOCIAL ASSOCIATION	87.940	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2005	2007	121944	Education and Awareness-raising to the Human Rights of the Youth of Poor Regiona on the North of Libyan	FONDATION RE-NE MOUAWAD ASSOCIATION	69.950	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2007	121947	Protection of the human rights of Migrant workers, refugees and Asylum-seekers in the north region of Lebanon	CARITAS LEBANON ASSOCIATION	92.756	Human rights protection mechanisms
2005	2006	121955	Increasing the capacities of political decision makers, professional organisations and civil actors in Human rights and Elections	LEBANESE ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS	39.565	Governance
2005	2007	121963	Human rights activities for Lebanese youth	LEBANON FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION	88.533	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	121964	Theatre Play on the rights of the disabled children	LEBANESE WELFARE ASSOCIATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED	38.477	Children + Persons with disabilities

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
2005	2007	121966	Stop Child Soldiers	PERMANENT PEACE MOVEMENT ASSOCIATION	88.582	Children
2005	2006	121971	Reinforcement and Promotion of Children Rights in the Schools of the Baabda-Aley Region	YOUTH ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL AWARENESS	67.217	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2006	2007	121953	Awareness Raising and Advocacy for the rights of vulnerable children in Lebanon	PARTNERS FOR DEVELOPMENT-CIVIL GROUP PROFESSIONAL CIVIL COMPANY	97.135	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms + Children
2006	2006	121957	Project Integrating the Defence and Social Re-Integration of Minors in Conflict with the Law	FOUNDATION OF FATHER AFIF OSSEIRANFOYER DE LA PROVIDENCE	100.000	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
Total funding for 15 micro projects 2004-2006					1.147.116	
Average size of micro projects					76.474	

Morocco

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
Macro Projects						
2001			Strengthening of Civil Society in Morocco's rural zones - The Necessary Balance between Population, Associations, Local Leaders and Institutions	ASSOCIATION MIGRATIONS ET DEVELOPPEMENT, Maroc	550.826	Strengthening of civil society
2001			(Majara) Pilot plan to improve the standard of living and the social reintegration of street children in Tetuan	COPERACION AL DESARROLLO Y PROMOCION DE ACTIVIDADES ASISTENCIALES (CODESPA), Spain	342.959	Children
2001			Migrant Rights Resource Center in Morocco / Centre of Resources for the Human Rights of Migrants in Morocco	International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	394.854	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2001			Support for the National Human Rights Documentation, Information and Training Centre	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Switzerland	126.097	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	117722	For a Citizenship Observation of Elections	FORUM DES ALTERNATIVES MAROC	197.152	Governance
2006	2007	118203	Creation of a Physiotherapy Unit for the Victims of Torture	ASSOCIATION MEDICALE DE REHABILITATION DES VICTIMES DE LA TORTURE	150.000	Rehabilitation of torture victims
Total funding for 6 macro projects 2001-2006					1.761.888	
Average size of macro projects					293.648	
Micro Projects						
2004	2005	105978	Awareness of the Women's and Children's	ASSOCIATION TANMIA.MA	48.744	Promotion and protection of

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
			Rights through Comics			human rights and fundamental freedoms
2004	2005	106041	Implement Local Associative Dynamics and Promote Good Governance in the North of Morocco	FORUM DES ONG DU NORD DU MAROC	98.370	Strengthening of civil society
2004	2005	107250	Reinforce the Institutional Capacities of Advocacy and Implement a Network of Organisations and Persons in situations of Disabilities, for the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	AMICALE MAROCAINE DES HANDICAPES	100.000	Persons with disabilities
2004	2005	107253	Promote Good Governance of Human Rights in the Reserved Biosphere of Arganeraie	RESEAU DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA RESERVE DE BIOSPHERE ARGANERAIE	89.535	Governance
2004	2005	107257	Centre for Listening for Women Victims of Violence in the Province of Nador	HORIZON DE FEMME ET ENFANT ASSOCIATION	35.100	Women
2004	2005	107275	Promotion of Women's Rights for Students of Law in the Province of Tétouan	UNION DE L ACTION FEMININE SECTIONTE-TOUAN	21.360	Women
2004	2005	107280	Consolidation of a Representative and Participative Democracy to Reinforce the Political Participation of Women in the Management of Public Affairs and Integration of	ASSOCIATION DEMOCRATIQUE DES FEMMESDU MAROC ADFM	100.000	Governance

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
			the Equality and Equity of Gender			
2004	2005	107284	The Blue Door, Reinforcement of the Association's Capacities and Network of Medina de Fes	L'UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS ET DES AMICALES DE FES MEDINA	35.100	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2004	2005	107285	Education of Human Rights, Obligations and Citizenship to the Beneficiaries of the Zakoura Micro-credit Foundation	FONDATION ZAKOURA MICRO CREDIT ASSOCIATION	94.661	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2004	2005	107289	Reinforcement of the Institutional and Operational Capacities of the Associations Protecting the Consumers' Rights and Support the Organisation in a Confederation	ATLAS SAIS	99.000	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2004	2005	107290	Reinforcement of the Institutional Capacities of the Moroccan Human Rights Organisation	ORGANISATION MAROCAINE DES DROITS HUMAINS ASSOCIATION	90.000	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	125822	Activities for the Judiciary Reform in Morocco	ADALA JUSTICE ASSOCIATION	69.545	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
2005	2006	125824	Promote Non-Discrimination and Equality of Opportunities in the Rirak sector of the Province of Fes Boulemane	CARREFOUR D INITIATIVES DE COMMUNICATION D INFORMATION ET DE DOCUMENTATION	21.585	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	125848	Promote the Rights of Child-	ASSOCIATION AL KARAM	100.000	Children

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
			ren in Precarious Situation on the Streets of Marrakeh			
2005	2006	125857	Campaign for an Effective Application of Work Legislation in Morocco	ASSOCIATION MAROCAINE DES DROITS HUMAINS	73.410	Women
2005	2006	125988	Moroccan Observatory of Public Freedoms	FORUM DES ALTERNATIVES-MAROC ASSOCIATION	100.000	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	125996	Promotion of Citizenship through an Awareness Campaign and Support to Local Association in 6 regions of Morocco	FONDATION ZAKOURA POUR L'EDUCATION ASSOCIATION	98.961	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2005	2006	126236	Municipal Council of Youth	ASSOCIATION SOLIDARITE ET DEVELOPPEMENT MAROC	87.537	Governance
2005	2006	126647	Creation of a Psychiatric Unit for Victims of Torture	ASSOCIATION MEDICALE DE REHABILITATION DES VICTIMES DE LA TORTURE	90.000	Torture
2005	2006	126664	Observatory for Good Governance of Medina de Fès	L'UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS ET DES AMICALES DE FES MEDINA	100.000	Governance
2005	2006	126848	Creation of Centre of Documentation, Research, Studies, and Lifelong Learning for the Journalists of Morocco	SYNDICAT NATIONAL DE LA PRESSE MAROCAINE ASSOCIATION	100.000	Governance
2005	2006	127673	Awareness to Fight Against Child Labor	ASSOCIATION AL AMANA POUR LA PROMOTION DES MICRO ENTREPRISES	91.273	Children
Total funding for 22 micro projects 2005-2006					1.744.181	

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
Average size of micro projects					79.281	
			Interactive Hercules-Project for Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Morocco	EVROPAIKO KENTRO DIMOSIOU DIKAIO	145.329	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
			Centre of Juridical Literacy	MOVIMIENTO POR LA PAZ, EL DESARME Y LA LIBERTAD	182.764	Rule of law and justice including the penal system
Total funding for 2 macro projects					328.093	
Average size of macro projects					164.047	

Syria

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
Macro Projects						
2001	2002	50559	Promoting citizenship in Syria	FRIEDRICH NAUMANN STIFTUNG, Germany	513.426	Governance / B7-702
Total funding for 1 macro project 2001					513.426	
Average size of macro projects					513.426	
Micro Projects						
2004	2005	113370	Training on Human Rights Of People with Disability	NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PEOPLE IN LEBANON	84.888	Persons with disabilities
2004	2005	113391	A day care centre for street-children in Qamishli	BERLINER GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FORDERUNG DER KURDOLOGIE EV	88.403	Strengthening of civil society
2004	2005	113651	Out of Home Childcare Professional Development Project	SYRIAN ARAB ASSOCIATION FOR SOS CHILDREN'S VILLAGES	80.000	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2004	2005	113665	Civil Society Training Center in Damascus	INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY ASBL, Brussels	93.397	Strengthening of civil society
2004	2005	113670	Palestinian Civil Society: working together for Human Rights	SERVICE CIVIL INTERNATIONAL BRANCHE BELGE	67.010	Strengthening of civil society
2004	2005	114040	Strengthening a Sustainable Human Rights Movement in Syria	FRIEDRICH NAUMANN STIFTUNG	82.200	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
Total funding for 6 micro projects 2004					495.898	
Average size of micro projects					82.650	

Tunisia

Budget year	Starting date of activities	Contract number	Title	Organisation	Max grant amount (€)	Issue / Campaign
Macro Projects						
2001	2002	50596	Project Restructuring of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights	Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)	229.600	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
	2002		Project Restructuring of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights	Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)	100.518	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2002		116311	Project Restructuring of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights	Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)		
2006		116311	Project Restructuring of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights	Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)		
2002	2003	77881	Strengthening the Trade Union in Tunisia	FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG EV	716.800	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
2003	2004	64006	Towards a Greater Independence of Justice and a Better Access to Law in Tunisia	Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)	725.647	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
Total funding for 4 macro projects 2001-2003					1.772.565	
Average size of macro projects					443.141	
Macro Projects						
2001	2001	50426	Training and Reinforcement of Capacities towards a Better Protection of the Human Rights in the World	Institut Arabe des Droits de l'Homme, Tunisia	1.660.838	Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms

	2006	88625	Reinforcement of the Civil Society Capacities for an Effective Participation in the Democratic Transformations and Elaborations, and Implementation of National Strategies for the Promotion of Human Rights in the Arab World.	Institut Arabe des Droits de l'Homme, Tunisia	735.107	Governance
Total funding for 2 regional macro projects 2001/2006					2.395.945	
Average size of projects					1.197.973	
Total funding for 6 macro projects					4.168.510	
Average size of projects					694.752	

12. Data on Political Liberalisation

Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Combined Index (average of Political Rights and Civil Liberties) and Status (partly free / not free)

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø	
Algeria	4	4	6.5	6.5	7	6	6	6	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.6
Egypt	4.5	5	5.5	6	6	6	6	6	6	5.5	5.5	6	6	6	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.7
Jordan	5	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4.5	4	4	5	5.5	5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	5	4.4	
Lebanon	5.5	5	4.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.2
Morocco	4	5	5.5	5	5	5	5	5	4.5	4.5	4.5	5	5	5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.8
Syria	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.9
Tunisia	4.5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	6	6	5.5	
Ø	4.9	5.0	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.4	

Source: Freedom House 2010: Freedom in the World. Country Ratings, 1972-2007 [sic: 2009],
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_AllScores_Countries.xls, 13 September 2010.

World Bank, World Governance Indicators, Voice and Accountability (estimates, with median as value for missing years)

Country	1996	(1997)	1998	(1999)	2000	(2001)	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø
Algeria	-1.33	-1.35	-1.37	-1.31	-1.25	-1.14	-1.02	-1.05	-0.79	-0.74	-0.96	-1.00	-1.05	-1.06
Egypt	-1.00	-0.92	-0.85	-0.81	-0.78	-0.90	-1.02	-1.00	-0.96	-0.92	-1.27	-1.20	-1.19	-1.02
Jordan	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37	-0.31	-0.26	-0.51	-0.77	-0.68	-0.57	-0.49	-0.60	-0.68	-0.71	-0.55
Lebanon	-0.39	-0.36	-0.34	-0.31	-0.29	-0.51	-0.74	-0.67	-0.37	-0.34	-0.45	-0.45	-0.40	-0.44
Morocco	-0.58	-0.40	-0.22	-0.28	-0.34	-0.35	-0.37	-0.63	-0.55	-0.64	-0.61	-0.70	-0.70	-0.53
Syria	-1.61	-1.54	-1.47	-1.50	-1.53	-1.55	-1.57	-1.57	-1.52	-1.51	-1.74	-1.77	-1.75	-1.60
Tunisia	-0.86	-0.81	-0.76	-0.74	-0.71	-0.84	-0.96	-0.93	-0.81	-0.99	-1.18	-1.27	-1.26	-0.97
Ø	-0.88		-0.77		-0.74		-0.92	-0.93	-0.80	-0.81	-0.97	-1.01	-1.01	-0.88

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009.

Degree of Political Liberalisation per year (1990-2008)

Country	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	Ø
Algeria																				
Egypt																				
Jordan																				
Lebanon																				
Morocco																				
Syria																				
Tunisia																				

13. *Data on Statehood*

World Bank, World Governance Indicators, Government Effectiveness (estimates, with median as value for missing years)

Country	1996	(1997)	1998	(1999)	2000	(2001)	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø
Algeria	-0.65	-0.90	-1.16	-1.04	-0.93	-0.787	-0.63	-0.60	-0.45	-0.35	-0.45	-0.53	-0.50	-0.63
Egypt	-0.10	-0.32	-0.55	-0.40	-0.25	-0.337	-0.41	-0.33	-0.31	-0.44	-0.54	-0.43	-0.37	-0.37
Jordan	0.11	0.05	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.07	0.13	0.24	0.15	0.06	0.16	0.22	0.27	0.13
Lebanon	-0.01	-0.06	-0.11	-0.13	-0.16	-0.21	-0.25	-0.25	-0.32	-0.28	-0.49	-0.59	-0.64	-0.31
Morocco	-0.20	-0.15	-0.10	-0.08	-0.06	-0.11	-0.15	-0.15	-0.08	-0.24	-0.09	-0.12	-0.09	-0.13
Syria	-0.40	-0.65	-0.90	-0.92	-0.93	-0.88	-0.83	-0.94	-0.99	-1.11	-0.94	-0.81	-0.67	-0.85
Tunisia	0.29	0.38	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.58	0.51	0.44	0.38	0.49	0.39	0.35	0.44
Ø	-0.14		-0.33		-0.27		-0.22	-0.21	-0.22	-0.28	-0.27	-0.27	-0.24	-0.25

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009.

World Bank, World Governance Indicators, Political Stability and Absence of Violence (estimates, with median as value for missing years)

Country	1996	(1997)	1998	(1999)	2000	(2001)	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø
Algeria	-2.40	-2.27	-2.14	-1.96	-1.78	-1.76	-1.73	-1.77	-1.43	-1.13	-1.02	-1.12	-1.15	-1.57
Egypt	-0.92	-0.60	-0.27	-0.28	-0.29	-0.48	-0.67	-0.77	-0.87	-0.91	-0.86	-0.65	-0.67	-0.69
Jordan	0.08	-0.07	-0.21	-0.13	-0.06	-0.26	-0.47	-0.32	-0.38	-0.29	-0.65	-0.32	-0.32	-0.30
Lebanon	-0.67	-0.77	-0.88	-0.75	-0.61	-0.67	-0.72	-0.73	-0.98	-1.18	-2.06	-2.22	-1.94	-1.20
Morocco	-0.68	-0.35	-0.02	-0.13	-0.24	-0.24	-0.24	-0.22	-0.39	-0.43	-0.26	-0.43	-0.47	-0.34
Syria	-0.56	-0.38	-0.20	-0.35	-0.51	-0.35	-0.19	-0.29	-0.59	-0.89	-0.62	-0.60	-0.56	-0.50
Tunisia	0.25	0.23	0.20	0.24	0.28	0.17	0.05	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.37	0.23	0.29	0.21
Ø	-0.70		-0.50		-0.46		-0.57	-0.56	-0.64	-0.67	-0.73	-0.73	-0.69	-0.63

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009.

Level of Statehood as Stability per year

	96	98	00	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	Ø
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	0 ⁻	0 ⁺	0 ⁺	0 ⁻							
Jordan	+	0 ⁺	0 ⁻	0 ⁺	0 ⁺	0 ⁺					
Lebanon	0 ⁻	0 ⁻	0 ⁺	0 ⁻	0 ⁻	0 ⁻	-	-	-	-	-
Morocco	0 ⁻	0 ⁺									
Syria	0 ⁺	0 ⁻	0 ⁺	0 ⁺	0 ⁺	0 ⁺					
Tunisia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Level of Statehood as Capacity per year

	96	98	00	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	Ø
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	-
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jordan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	0
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Level of Statehood per year

Country	96	98	00	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	Ø
Algeria	--	--	--	--	--	-	-	-	-	-	--
Egypt	0 ⁻	0 ⁺	0 ⁺	0 ⁻							
Jordan	++	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	0 ⁻	0 ⁻	0 ⁺	0 ⁻	0 ⁻	0 ⁻	-	-	--	--	-
Morocco	0 ⁻	0 ⁺									
Syria	0 ⁺	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++

14. *Data on (Socio-Economic) Interdependence*

Share of exports to the EU in % of total exports

Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Ø
Algeria	71.3	72.8	68.9	69.6	64.9	60.0	63.5	63.9	63.5	63.1	64.7	64.7	59.4	54.0	55.6	52.5	43.6	66.88
Egypt	43.1	38.9	39.6	43.3	44.8	44.6	39.7	37.4	34.6	34.1	25.6	24.2	30.4	30.1	29.0	33.9	29.1	39.35
Jordan	3.2	3.0	4.1	5.2	6.3	8.3	7.3	6.6	5.8	4.2	4.1	7.3	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.2	7.88
Lebanon	-	-	-	15.0	15.8	16.2	21.9	25.3	24.1	22.9	22.9	17.0	11.4	10.5	11.3	12.0	17.5	17.44
Morocco	62.4	64.0	62.4	64.4	62.1	61.4	60.7	72.9	74.1	75.2	72.9	73.8	76.3	74.3	73.7	73.1	72.4	72.94
Syria	49.0	63.0	61.0	56.0	57.0	62.0	55.0	50.9	61.0	68.3	70.0	62.1	61.1	53.9	44.5	40.7	43.5	58.53
Tunisia	76.9	78.2	78.6	80.0	79.0	80.0	78.3	80.2	80.2	73.9	80.2	79.0	88.5	83.4	80.1	77.2	79.3	82.24

Sources: “Share of EU in the external trade of Mediterranean countries (%) – Exports” (Eurostat 2001: 63; Eurostat 2007: 64; Eurostat 2009a: 64).

Share of energy exports to the EU in % of total exports to the EU

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø
Algeria	94	95	75	70	73	73	69	74	73	73	74	71	72	71	75.5
Egypt	47	62	45	38	43	45	38	43	40	40	46	56	44	49	45.4
Jordan	-	-	0	0	1	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	0	0	0.1
Lebanon	4	-	2	0	1	0	0	0	4	2	2	1	0	0	1.2
Morocco	1	1	0	1	1	4	3	1	2	2	3	3	1	2	1.8
Syria	83	87	84	78	85	87	89	89	85	81	86	87	86	87	85.3
Tunisia	7	10	9	4	7	9	8	9	9	9	12	11	17	17	9.9

Sources: calculated on the basis of “EU imports of mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials from Mediterranean countries (value in Euro) (1995-2008)” and “EU imports total from Mediterranean countries (value in Euro) (1995-2008)”, Eurostat online database, External trade, Detailed data, EU27 Trade Since 1995 By SITC, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database#, 13 September 2010.

Share of ODA in % of GDP

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Ø
Algeria	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.47
Egypt	12.6	13.5	8.6	5.1	5.2	3.3	3.2	2.5	2.3	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.8	1.1	0.8	0.8	3.76
Jordan	22.0	22.4	8.0	5.5	6.0	8.0	7.3	6.4	5.2	5.3	6.5	5.0	5.6	12.2	5.3	5.3	3.9	3.1	7.94
Lebanon	8.9	2.8	2.0	1.8	2.4	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.4	2.4	1.1	1.2	1.1	3.2	3.8	2.26
Morocco	4.1	4.4	3.3	2.7	2.1	1.5	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.5	1.92
Syria	5.5	2.9	1.5	1.9	7.4	3.1	1.6	1.4	1.0	1.4	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2	1.73
Tunisia	3.2	2.7	2.5	1.5	0.7	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.8	1.2	1.1	1.9	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	0.9	1.38

Sources: calculated on the basis of “Official development assistance and official aid (current US\$)” and “GDP (current US\$) (1990-2008)”, World Bank, World Development Indicators online database, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>, 13 September 2010.

Share of aid by DAC EU Members in % of aid by all donors

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø
Algeria	76	80	87	61	84	92	86	76	35	63	34	29	35	67	72	75	104	71	71	68.3
Egypt	12	10	33	23	52	37	40	40	27	30	30	31	20	30	26	27	36	28	34	29.8
Jordan	24	19	24	21	21	17	29	18	21	20	15	22	14	7	9	8	6	8	9	16.4
Lebanon	20	25	41	34	21	27	32	25	28	30	27	18	11	29	31	32	32	30	45	28.3
Morocco	38	42	69	48	39	68	53	46	42	42	41	48	38	50	47	51	48	51	40	47.2
Syria	9	32	21	14	4	10	16	13	21	15	19	72	11	27	37	60	107	59	66	32.2
Tunisia	39	61	75	59	84	103	52	39	60	35	43	30	37	45	53	64	65	57	41	54.8

Sources: calculated on the basis of “All Donors, Total (ODA Total, net disbursements, current prices in million US Dollars)” and “DAC EU Members, Total (ODA Total, net disbursements, current prices in million US Dollars)”, OECD.Stat online database, Development, Aggregate Aid Statistics, ODA by Recipient by country, <http://stats.oecd.org/>, 13 September 2010.

Share of EU exports as % of total extra-EU exports (1996: EU-12; 1998: EU-15; 2004: ??; 2009: EU-27)

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø
Algeria	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.9
Egypt	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9
Jordan																				
Lebanon	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Morocco	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1	0.9
Syria										0.3					0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Tunisia	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8

Sources: “Main EU Trading Partners. Exports” (Eurostat 1996: 38; Eurostat 1999: 44; Eurostat 2004 : 36; Eurostat 2009b: 32).

Share of EU imports of different fuel products in % of total extra-EU imports of the respective commodity

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ø
Petroleum oils, crude																				
Algeria	6.2	5.4	5.7	5.6	5.1	5.3	5.0	4.4	5.1	4.6	5.7	5.0	5.6	5.4	5.5	5.1	4.3	3.4	3.9	5.1
Egypt	2.7	2.5	2.9	2.6	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.7
Syria	2.0	2.4	2.9	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.2	2.9	3.0	3.4	2.7	3.7	3.9	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	3.0
Petroleum products																				
Algeria	8.5	11.1	12.9	7.1	7.8	14.0	9.3	10.8	8.6	8.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.9
Egypt	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.9	3.4	3.7	2.4	2.8	2.9	0.2	0.2	0.8	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	2.3
Gas, natural and manufactured																				
Algeria	39.5	40.4	23.5	22.2	20.6	14.7	15.4	21.5	20.5	23.7	23.4	20.9	20.7	17.1	13.0	15.0	14.0	12.8	11.4	20.5
Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	2.1	3.8	3.1	2.7	1.4

Sources: "Main EU trading partners. Fuel products and other combustibles. Imports" (Eurostat 1996: 71; Eurostat 1999: 77; Eurostat 2000: 77 ; Eurostat 2004 : 69; Eurostat 2009b: 65).

15. Incentives

Political liberalisation and incentives

Political liberalisation Incentives	--	-	0 ⁻	0	0 ⁺	+	++
++						J2 M* M2, M3	
+							J*
0		T3		A2, A3		J3	J1
0⁻	S1		A* E* E1, E2	E3 L1 T* T1, T2		M1	
-					L* L2	L3	
--	S* S2, S3		A1				

Statehood and incentives

Statehood Incentives	--	-	0 ⁻	0 ⁺	+	++
++				M* M2, M3	J2	
+					J*	
0	A2a	A2b, A3			J1b, J3	J1a T3
0⁻	A*	S1b	E* E1, E2, E3 L1 M1	S1a		T* T1, T2
-	L3	L* L2b	L2a			
--	A1	S* S2, S3				

Interdependence and incentives

Inter- dependence Incentives	--	-	0	+	++
++			J2		M* M2, M3
+			J*		
0	A2, A3		J1, J3		T3
0⁻	A*	E* E1, E2, E3 S1		L1	M1 T* T1, T2
-			L* L2, L3		
--	A1	S* S2, S3			

Incentives and implementation of partnership-based instruments for democracy promotion

Incentives Implementation	--	-	0⁻	0	0⁺	+	++
++							M* M2, M3
+	A1	L2	E* E2, E3 M1	J3		J*	J2
0⁺							
0		L* L3	E1	A2 J1			
0⁻							
-			A* L1	A3			
--	S* S2, S3		S1 T* T1, T2	T3			

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