The (Un)Civil War

Media Framing and Memory Construction in Wartime and Postwar Lebanon

A Dissertation

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ADF	Arab Deterrent Forces
Amal	Legions of the Lebanese Resistance *(Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya)*
DFLP	Democratic Front of the Liberation of Palestine
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LBF	Lebanese Forces
LCP	Lebanese Communist Party
LF	Lebanese Front
LKP	Lebanese Kataeb Party / Phalange
LNM	Lebanese National Movement
NLP	National Liberal Party
PFLP	Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNO	Popular Nasserist Organization
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party
SSNP	Syrian Social Nationalist Party
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

All translations from the original Arabic are my own.

I have based all transliterations from Modern Standard Arabic on the system provided by the International Journal of Middle Easter Studies [IJMES]. I have translated the glottal stop [ء] as [‘] and duplicated the vowels as a substitute for the consonant [ع] (for example *Zuaama*). To enhance readability, I have used the most common English spelling for personal names or names of authors (for example *Elias* instead of *Ilyãs*).

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Who controls the past, controls the future; who controls the present, controls the past" (Orwell, 1961, p.248). This quote from the infamous dystopian novel *1984* by Georges Orwell inspired this study from the start. Power and narrative are interchangeable; possessing power enables control over narrative and disseminating narratives can topple powers and help others rise. Power and narrative are also fluid; they are subject to change over time and contexts. In post-conflict societies, the past itself holds authority; it haunts the present and shapes the future. Memories, narratives and rhetoric of the past surface when nations undergo healing and reconciliation following traumas. A reconciled past can drive societies forward, and an unresolved past can hinder their growth. The agency of media and intellectuals as social actors in the process of dealing with the past and its narrative(s) is what prompted this study.

Conflicts and their aftermath have been a prevalent research area in various disciplines for decades, and the intersection of media, memory and identity in post-conflict societies has been a growing key concern for interdisciplinary research, involving such diverse fields as history, psychology, media studies and political science. Media memory studies is a particularly new field of inquiry that brought together two multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary fields of study and positioned itself as a complex and multilayered yet salient theoretical and analytical concept (Kitch, 2005; Neiger et al., 2011). Studies in that stream investigate how the media function as memory agents, the cultures in which such processes happen, and the interplay between the media and other realms of society (Neiger et al., 2011, p.2).

For the past two decades, researchers in this new field of knowledge have been bridging the gap between collective memory studies and media studies (eg. Zelizer, 1995; Schudson, 1995; Olick & Robins, 1998; Kitch, 2005; Neiger et al., 2011), investigating how societies or groups mediate and construct memories of their past. Traumatic pasts, in particular, are turning points in the lives of nations and societies. Their ability to deal with the past, to process it, and to overcome it and heal from it reflects how they survive and shape their present and future. The role of media in the process is crucial. They act as a vessel in which recollections of the past are shared and distributed, but they also shape those

practices and influence their outcomes. During conflict, the media can either facilitate peacebuilding or fuel conflict. The same applies to the post-conflict phase: they can either enable memory and identity reconstruction or hamper reconciliation and nurture fragmentation. Commemorations of past events in the media, known as 'anniversary journalism,' provide a framework for studying the interrelations between the shaping or reconstruction of collective memory and the function of mass media in a given context (eg. Zelizer, 1992; Schudson, 1992; Donk & Herbers, 2010; Robinson, 2009). When recalling the past on a specific date, the media construct their own sense of it, thus shaping not only the memory of the past but also the reality of the present. Thus, collective memory, as shared historical consciousness of the past (Halbwachs, 1950) can be a selective representation, a narrative interpretation of the past. In a post-conflict society, historical consciousness has a major effect on the present and the future, as the past can continue to shape contemporary social divisions resulting from conflict. The different media, which convey memory, have been examined in numerous post-conflict settings, and their function and agency have been questioned considerably. Despite the plethora of academic and scholarly literature in this field, the role of the press was particularly studied in the context of news (Lang & Lang, 1989; Edy, 1999; Teer-Tomaselli, 2006; Kitch, 2008; Zelizer, 2008), while the role of opinion journalism remains largely unexplored. The purpose of this study is to offer a fresh understanding of the role of opinion journalism in memory construction in post-conflict settings. The choice of opinion journalism has been guided by the aspiration to bridge the gap between the agency of journalism and public intellectuals as narrators of the past. Intellectuals, whose duty is seen as presenting alternative perspectives on history (Said, 2002), channel their ideas through the media. The press, in particular, offers them a platform through its opinion sections. This study explores the interplay between memory and media, and the role of the press and intellectuals as agents in the process, taking the war in Lebanon (1975-1990) as its focus.

1.1 Problem Definition

The discordant modern history of Lebanon provides a fertile ground for all sorts of historical studies, especially in the field of media and memory studies. Almost three decades after its presumed end, the war in Lebanon remains a contentious moment in the modern history of the country for various reasons. The memory of this war is contested by the various actors, as each political group, confession and ethnic group has its own version of history, in the absence of one official narrative and a collective memory and discourse. There is even a

disagreement on what to call the 15 years of war. Although it is commonly referred to as 'civil war,' many other labels leave out the 'civil' or internal aspect and describe it as a 'war of others,' 'war for others,' 'proxy war,' 'regional conspiracy,' among others. All these labels that define the war from a certain perspective are embedded in larger narratives about the root causes of the war, the actors involved, its outcomes, and indeed, its memory. This fragmentation of narratives also relates to how the prewar era is regarded, either a 'golden age' or a 'gilded age' (Khalaf, 2002), and how the postwar is perceived, either as a period of relative peace or as a "parenthesis between two wars" (Bahout, 2012). National identity, almost three decades after the war's declared end, also remains a contentious issue across many spheres of society, and its citizens often hold competing memories of 'who we were,' or 'who we are.' Despite the Ta'if Agreement – the document that signaled the end of the war – clearly stating that Lebanon is a sovereign Arab country, an identity crisis still exists between two main views: A Lebanese nationalist vision of a unique haven for Christians with Phoenician heritage and westernized values, unique in its Arab environment (Phares, 1995) or a pan-Arabist vision of a Lebanon, deeply rooted in the Arab *Ummah*, or nation. With every narrative comes a set of beliefs that affect identity, memory, and by extension the perception of the present. Despite the presumed end of the war in 1990, the country stayed in turmoil for various reasons. At every turning point, the Lebanese have never shied away from reviving past traumas and waging new battles. The Lebanese media, mirroring the political context, have been fragmented along sectarian and elite lines since the war (Dajani, 1992; Nötzold, 2009) in what Kraidy (2000, 2003) calls a "collection of warring public sphericules." The interest of this study thus lies in exploring the discursive remembering of the past in a peculiar fragmented context where the line between the past and the present is rather blurred. The study attempts to do so by reconnoitering the narratives, or rather 'frames,' to use the methodological term, promoted by the Lebanese press, as constructed by intellectuals, and shared around the anniversary of the war from 1976 to 2013. To illuminate this uncharted area, this study examines two Lebanese newspapers with different ideologies, *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir,* and seeks to examine the way the press approached the discourse of the war, framed the war in wartime and the postwar period, assessing the press and intellectuals' agency as memory mediators.

As highlighted, the study adopts an approach that examines the discourse of media not only in war but also in postwar period. To date, no study has examined the discourse of opinion journalism in wartime and postwar Lebanon from the perspective of memory.

1.2 Current State of Research

This study makes use of two bodies of literature. The first domain relates to the concept of media memory and is broken down into two: one deals with collective memory in the context of war and post-conflict societies, and its connection to identity construction, and another one is concerned with the role and agency of the media and intellectuals in memory construction. The second area conveys knowledge on the media and memory discourse in the Lebanese context. While the first body of literature is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3, the second one that interacts with the Lebanese case and the memory discourse is briefly discussed here in order to pave the way for understanding the context and clarifying this specific field's knowledge gaps that this study fills.

What most scholars studying memory in postwar Lebanon agree on is the role of state in silencing the memory of the war, referred to as "state-sponsored amnesia," which was first mentioned by the local journalist and writer Michael Young (2000). Similarly to many post-conflict societies like Spain and Rwanda (eg. Violi, 2015; King, 2010), following the end of the conflict, the Lebanese state fostered a 'war amnesia' approach, and the war was considered a taboo topic. At the same time, each community or group had developed their own memory of the past and transmitted it either orally or in written form to the next generation. This proliferation of war narratives at the level of communities, and the lack of a national strategy to tackle the memory of the war had led to the following situation in Lebanon: on the one hand, too much memory, and on the other hand, no memory at all. As this study sets to investigate the discourse around the war and the different frames of war in order to shed light on the media and intellectuals' role in memory construction, a brief literature review of the main studies tackling the way the media memory of the war was contextualized in Lebanon, is thus presented to embed this study in. In the recent years, there has been some attention to memory construction in Lebanon, particularly in the 2000s. Research thus far has mainly touched upon on cultural production, focused on war-related literature (Kassab, 1992; Salem, 2003; Saadi Nikro, 2012; Lang, 2016), cinema (Westmoreland, 2008; Khatib, 2008), audio-visual political culture (Maasri, 2009), and space reconstruction (Nagel, 2000; Makdisi, 2006; Sawalha, 2010).

Oren Barak (2007) looked at the politics of remembering and forgetfulness in postwar Lebanon by assessing the role of the state, political actors and civil society actors in the memory discourse. He argued that civil society actors challenged the state-sponsored amnesia and filled the gap in addressing the past while the state and the political society

were busy with reconstruction. What he asserted, though, is that civil society actors have challenged what he calls the state official narrative of 'war of others' and proposed, especially in the period of the mid 2000s following major political events, an alternative way of dealing with the memory of the past. This study seeks to question those claims and investigate whether the media and intellectuals have challenged or adhered to certain narratives.

In a compelling account, Katharina Nötzold (2009) explored the political and media landscape in postwar Lebanon, and analyzed the audiovisual sphere, concluding that it was fragmented along Lebanon's sectarian and political groups. Nötzold argued the implications of this on nation-building, as the media were monitored by power elites who "dominated the discourse and promoted their version of identity based on hegemony" (p.343). This study takes this further by exploring the press sphere and investigating the voices and narratives of memory and identity channeled there.

In her attempt to look into the management of the war memory in postwar Lebanon, Elsa Abou Assi (2011) examined the role and function of the "memory entrepreneurs." Arguing – like many – that the state-sponsored amnesia has led to a silencing of any war narrative, Abou Assi examined how in the early 2000s, intellectuals and social and legal activists took on their fight against amnesia and started to construct a collective memory. She further explored their production of the narrative of the past, and argued it was related to their group's social identity. This study aims to further investigate these layers of narrative.

Sune Haugbolle has extensively worked on the memory of the war in Lebanon and produced various studies that tackled the topic. His book *War and Memory in Lebanon* (2010) remains a valuable reference in any study on the subject. In this comprehensive work, Haugbolle explored how "memory cultures" – as he calls them – are embodied in the Lebanese society by looking at the various – often conflicting – approaches to memory in the postwar period. Like Abou Assi, he asserted that the state-sponsored forgetfulness and narratives of the political parties have promoted one way to look at memory. He agreed with Barak, however, that Lebanese intellectuals and activists encouraged the idea of confronting and remembering the war as vital for a political and cultural revival. By analyzing media, art, literature, film, posters, and architecture, Haugbolle exhibited how the process of recollection and reconstruction of the war fostered a postwar healing process pioneered by cultural production agents, in the absence of any official and state-sponsored attempts to initiate a postwar memory initiative. The aim of a history of remembering, according to

Haugbolle (2010) is "to identify why certain frameworks for understanding the past have been accentuated over others" (p.10). This is at the core of this study's objective; to reveal how certain frames of the war emerged, remained, and were dominant during different periods of time. In a later account, Haugbolle (2012) noted "the role of 'memory makers' has been to foster national recollection by promoting different kinds of social activism, debate and cultural production to shed light on the war years" (p.15). According to Haugbolle, the cultural elites of Lebanon are memory makers. In a much earlier account, he has assigned to them the task of public remembrance, adopting Bastide's description of them as "a choir singing a narrative" (Haugbolle, 2002, p.21). What this study seeks to look into is to what extent intellectuals are a homogenous choir, and whether they all sing the same hymn sheet, or rather narrative.

In his book *Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and forgetting the past*, Craig Larkin (2012), argued that the most significant factor concerning the role of memory in conflict situations is that of identity construction. One of the highlights of Larkin's book is his examination of the Lebanese youth's relationship with memory, and thus the past. He explored Lebanon's postmemory generation, the generation that has not witnessed the war firsthand and unveiled their exposure to Lebanon's postwar narratives of private trauma and public discourses of denial and silence (p.20). He argued that the issue in Lebanon is "less about memory recovery but more about the ongoing contestation of social history in a post-war setting – its meaning, representative forms and interpretative power" (Larkin, 2002, p.3). Larkin, however, disagreed with Haugbolle, Abou Assi and others, with regards to the state-sponsored amnesia. Larkin argued that Lebanon's official policy of postwar silence and denial should not be understood as collective amnesia or a culture of forgetfulness; he claimed that the silence that followed the war represents one discursive approach to the past amongst competing and historical narratives. This study seeks to shed further light on the matter.

A very recent book by Felix Lang (2016) read into the narratives of postwar novels while viewing literature as a "social practice." To Lang, the way different generations write about the war and the memory of the war in the postwar period is as important as the social context of these writers. The intellectuals – here novelists or writers – as Lang showed, were not only acting as "underground historians" in their work in literature but are also "very much espousing this role in their journalistic writing" (Lang, p.119). This study attempts to investigate how this was echoed in the Lebanese press, and what war narratives intellectuals promoted.

This study fills some gaps in the existing literature on media and the memory discourse in Lebanon. First, it explores the framing of the war in the media, specifically in the press, an exercise that has not been performed with a focus on Lebanon. Second, as the literature review discussed, this study tackles the specific role of the media in memory construction in Lebanon, an issue that has not been thoroughly addressed in academic contexts. Third, this study fills a gap in literature on the intellectual representations of the past in the context of memory construction, with a focus on opinion journalism. Despite the recent interest in exploring the role and position of intellectuals and writers in memory discourses in Lebanon (Saadi Nikro, 2012; Lang, 2016; Halabi, 2017), no study to date has attempted to tackle how they practice their role in the media. This study is to be taken as a contribution in this regard.

Guided by insights on Lebanon's postwar discursive memory reconstruction practices, notably the media and intellectuals' role as agents of memory, this study takes a deeper and closer look at the formation and transformation of mediated narratives of the past, an unexplored territory of research in relation to identity and memory construction in postwar Lebanon. The study also connects its findings to the larger discussion on the role of the media in memory construction in post-conflict societies.

1.3 Structure of the Study

This study includes eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, which introduced the problem, set the key aim, and identified main literature and trajectories of work, Chapter 2 sets the stage for the study by putting forward a contextual description. The context is broken into two: a historical and political context of Lebanon, and an overview of the media landscape. The first part presents an overview of three periods: war, prewar and postwar. By doing so, the study de-constructs the three periods, laying down their complexities while tying them at the same time to one trajectory of discourse. The study seeks to highlight how the past, in its three defining moments, of which the war is central, has always been a matter of contention among historians and society members alike. The most recent past in particular, the postwar, was shaped by events that could have been a turning point in the discourse of the war and the process of memory construction. The second part describes the media scene in Lebanon, focusing on its fragmentation that parallels the political context.

Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework of memory adopted in this study. It first outlines the main trajectories of thought in memory studies, and reviews theoretical discussions on collective memory construction while expanding on two main branches: memory and identity, and memory and war. Then, it addresses the theoretical and empirical

debates on media and memory with a focus on two societal agents that shape memory in the process: the media and intellectuals. The chapter ends by formulating three research questions that guide the archival exploration of this study.

Chapter 4 addresses framing analysis as a methodological framework that guides this study's quest to answer the research questions. It introduces the concept, expands on its previous opreationalizations and explains this study's adaptation of the concept. Then, it establishes the research design, consisting of a mixed-method approach; a quantitative content and frame analysis of 202 opinion articles published around the unofficial anniversary of the war over the span 37 years in two local newspapers, *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, and a qualitative textual analysis of 20 articles reflective of the findings of frame analysis. It explains the utilization of the first method in order to answer the first two research questions, and the adaptation of the second method to address the second research question further and answer the third research question.

Chapter 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the findings of this study. After presenting the results, each chapter ends with a discussion section in which the findings are embedded into literature, theories, and context discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 responds to the first research question and discusses the different approaches the press took in addressing the discourse of the war in wartime and postwar. Chapter 6 quantitatively reconstructs the frames of the war promoted in the two newspapers and reads them against the political and media contexts laid in Chapter 2, and in relation to the theoretical groundings on the war/peace journalism paradigm, thus providing answers to the second research question. Chapter 7 sheds additional light on the second research question by qualitatively analyzing a sample of the data. It also delves into the third research question by discussing the findings with a focus on frame changes over time and frame contestation in the two newspapers, and a deeper look at the intellectuals' contribution, assessing the role played by the media and intellectuals in memory construction.

Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes with an overview of this study's theoretical implications and contributions, a discussion of its challenges and limitations, and recommendations for future areas of research.

CHAPTER 2

LEBANON AND THE WAR: A BACKGROUND

Understanding the history of Lebanon is not easy, let alone trying to write it or digest it for the purpose of this study. The controversy over the history of Lebanon is not only centered on the recent history of the war. It dates back to the early formation of Lebanon as a country, and even before. Historians and writers have always highlighted this difficulty, and many have declared their inability to write a comprehensive history of this small country. Notably on the root causes of the war, there is no consensus among historians (Khalaf, 1993). As it explores the framing of the war and the various narratives about it, this study starts by tracing the underlying causes of the conflict and unpacking the various layers of it.

In order to write a background for this study, one must not only write about the war, but also about the overall history of Lebanon. Understanding the war, or at least trying to, is a process of absorbing the prewar, wartime, and postwar history all together. The intertwining of the three times, past, present and future is entirely observed in Lebanon. The three eras are interconnected; what happened before the war affected the war, and the postwar period is a result of these historical dynamics. The war that lasted for 15 years killed more than 100,000 of which close to 20,000 were kidnapped or disappeared, left nearly 100,000 badly injured, and close to a million people, or two-thirds of the Lebanese population displaced (Labaki & Abou Rjeily, 1994, p.20).

The war that erupted on April 13th, 1975 and lasted arguably till 1989 did not start by a simple accident or for a single reason. On the surface, the war exploded because the Phalangists, a Christian militia, clashed with Palestinian factions over the latter's decision to launch attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory. Arguably, underlying causes were building up and let to the big explosion. The conflict developed and changed throughout the 15 years of war; actors changed, alliances changed, battlefields changed, and so did the causes. It rapidly transformed into a fight over the Lebanese state and its political system, pushing the state to the verge of collapse, and creating what Robert Fisk calls a "Mafia system" (Fisk, 1990, p.75) of the various armed groups. Since conflicts are dynamic phenomena, it only stands to reason that the issues that fuel them can and will change over time.

Though the war might be labeled as 'civil war,' a 'Lebanese war,' or a 'Muslim-Christian conflict,' many of its fundamental causes were political and not religious in nature. In fact, some say, the war's most violent episodes took place within religious groups: Sunni Palestinians fought against the largely Sunni Syrian army, Shiite Hizbullah against Shiite Amal, Muslim Amal against Muslim Palestinians, and the largely Christian remnants of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against the Christian Lebanese Forces (LBF) (Gaub, 2015).

When discussing the causes of the war, various of these come into play, notably ones of historical nature. The main concern in Lebanon's modern history, as Tony Badran (2009) puts it, is that the causes of the war remain a matter of contention in Lebanon scholarship. Nevertheless, in order to get a comprehensive reading of the war, one must start with the prewar history, to understand the origins of the conflict. Though the conflict erupted in 1975, the roots of the conflict, as many scholars and historians argue, are rooted in Lebanon's past, stretching back to the 19th century. Accordingly, this chapter divides the historical background into three periods: prewar, wartime, and postwar. In doing this retrospect of Lebanon's history, the study paves the way for understanding not only how past events may have triggered the war, or even postwar violence, but also how the past influences the present in terms of discourse. The study intends to dig deep into the roots to investigate how the discursive representation and remembering of the past influenced media war frames.

First, a historical overview of prewar Lebanon is presented with an outlook at the formation of Lebanon, the reasons for which the country came to exist, and the main events that preceded the start of the war. A synopsis of some of the roots of the sectarian conflict since the 1800s traces the development of the conflict leading to the start of the war in 1975.

Then, the various warring fronts are laid out in building blocks of coalitions divided into two sections: Internal actors and political parties, and regional and international players. This exercise aims at putting into perspective the complexity of the war by showing the interconnectedness of the different militias and non-military actors, before examining how alliances shifted as the war unfolded.

Later, the *Ain al-Remmeneh* incident, the event of April 13th, 1975, commonly regarded as the first day of war, is examined. This study takes this day as a focal point, being the unofficial anniversary of the war, and a day where the discourse of the war come to surface in the media every year. Thus, this chapter looks at this day closely, laying down the controversies over it being the event that exploded the war. Then a detailed timeline of the war is presented; It divides the war into four phases and includes the main battles and episodes that spread over 15 years, and the actors involved in each of them. Finally, the Ta'if

Agreement, believed to be the agreement that ended the war is discussed, while questioning its consequences, and whether it really ended the war.

Subchapter 2.3 focuses on the postwar period. In it, the years following the presumed end of the war are examined, and specific incidents that shaped that period are outlined. It starts with an overview of the end of the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon in May 2000, describes the *Pax Syriana* phase while stopping at the major events of 2005, including the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the protest movement that followed, and the withdrawal of the Syrian military forces from Lebanon, and ends with an outlook on the post-2005 period and the search for sovereignty, while examining the sectarian clashes that persist to this day.

The reasoning behind taking this journey through the history of Lebanon is to facilitate the understanding of the complex political nature of this country, the historical fragmentation, the course of the war and its outcomes, as well as the unfolding of the supposed peacebuilding phase. This chapter puts the study in context and traces the historical occurrences that found their way to the discursive remembering of the war. As the media system reflects the political system it functions within, a closer look at the development and history of the political system in Lebanon is a pre-requisite to understanding the fragmented media landscape. In addition, given the many interpretations of the war, this exercise helps embed narratives in historical accuracies, understand the roots of those interpretations by relating them to relevant historical events, and understand how these interpretations were built within a specific political context.

This recap will lay the groundwork for reconstructing the discourse around the war, as certain terms, names, and events are recalled or used in multiple contexts, and as narratives are built to reflect the contexts that enabled and influenced them.

2.1 A Prelude to War: A Historical Overview of Prewar Lebanon

Lebanon as a country came to existence in 1920 following a declaration made by the French colonial powers. The state of Greater Lebanon – then a state under the French mandate – was formed around what was known before as Mount Lebanon, a Maronite-Druze entity. In addition to these communities, Sunnis and Christian Greek Orthodox living in coastal areas, and Shia living in the South, and other confessional groups were added to this religious mosaic that made Lebanon. In a published interview with Ahmad Beydoun (2012), the Lebanese writer argues that the writing of history in Lebanon has imposed a certain idea that it is a new country that was founded in 1920 through contentious procedures in which some

elements disagreed even on its existence as a legitimate state. Beydoun (2012) further explains: "A dominant group – Christians in general and Maronites in particular – saw the founding of the state of Greater Lebanon as compliant with its aspirations. The overriding narrative on Lebanon's history was determined by this majority view and was imposed on other parties" (p.19). It was very clear since the 1800s that, being the largest Christian faction, the Maronite community in Lebanon saw itself as a major power, entitled to run its own territory. Sharing the Mount with a Druze community – a confession within Islam – the Maronites have long sought to gain support from external powers. By the second quarter of the 19th century, the Maronites were on good terms with the French colonial powers and had gained their support, emerging as the main local sectarian power. This came with a price, as the Maronites found themselves at odds not only with the Ottoman authorities but more closely, with the Druze and other Muslim groups in the Mount Lebanon area. In 1843, following a series of uprisings in Lebanon, the Ottomans yielded to European pressure to create separate sectarian governorships for the various groups they ruled (Yazbek, 1993). Following a series of massacres between the Druze, supported by the British, and the Maronites, supported by the French, the Ottomans created, in 1864, yet another administrative division, one that was essentially the basis for the modern state of Lebanon. Former Lebanese Minister and writer Elie Salem (1979) argues that the 1860 "bloody war between Christians, on the one hand, and the Druze-Muslims, on the other hand, was fanned by the Ottomans and exploited by the European powers who were eagerly searching for a base Near East and hoped to find it in the Lebanese religious mosaic" (p.445). This first episode of sectarian strife signaled a fragile communal co-existence and an ability of the outside (occupying and colonial powers) in exploiting internal conflicts. Following that, a new division called *al-mutasarrifiyya*, the governate of Lebanon, was established based on a system of sectarian representation with an appointed Maronite governor. The political and economic dominance of the Maronite community after 1920, in what came to be known as Lebanon, continued until the Independence of Lebanon in 1943 and carried through the start of the war in 1975. In 1943, Lebanon gained its full independence from France, and began the process of establishing a Republic.

The assumption that various confessional groups or religious sects would be living in peace, united and enjoying equal rights and status in the public domain in Modern Lebanon seemed far-fetched. Thus, the Lebanese identity in that sense came to mean identifying oneself with one of the existing 18 religious communities or sects. The 7 largest sects are Maronites, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims (arguably the largest single sect today), Greek

Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Druze, and Armenian Orthodox. The remaining minorities include Jacobite Christians, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Jews, and Protestants. This diversity was considered both a blessing and a curse at different times in the Lebanese history. To manage this diversity, there had to be a certain balance. This balance was thought to be the National Pact.

Upon independence, it was clear that there is a political confessional system that was meant to govern the country. Major Christian and Muslim powers formalized this power-sharing formula in a National Pact in 1943. The pact was simply a verbal non-written agreement between two major leaders, Bshara al-Khoury (a Maronite leader) and Riyad al-Solh (a Sunni leader). The agreement declared Lebanon as a sovereign, independent, and neutral country. It further recognized the multi-confessional nature of the Lebanese population and advanced a largely confessional power-sharing system based on the 1932 census (the last official census to be conducted in Lebanon), which had set the ratio of Christians to Muslims at six to five (Fawaz, 1994, p.220). Accordingly, all positions – legislative, executive, and judicial, as well as civil service positions – were allocated along confessional lines, with the top three positions in the country, the ruling 'Troika,' distributed as follows: the President, a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the President of the National Assembly, a Shia Muslim (Halawi-Ghosn & Khoury, 2011). With independence from French mandate, the political supremacy of the Maronites was guaranteed in the National Pact (Stewart, 1996). As Halawi-Ghosn and Khoury (2011) further say, on the surface, this agreement seemed to create an equitable power-sharing arrangement that protected all sects from one another and gave the impression of a sectarian balance. Nevertheless, at a deeper level, this ill-fated formula led to a weak state, and as a consequence, a total inability to implement substantive administrative reforms. As Halawi-Ghosn and Khoury (2011) clearly put it, "the prevailing political system tended to foster corruption, nepotism, clientelism, and laxity in upholding the public interest when it conflicted with private interests" (p.382).

With the occupation of Palestine in 1948, thousands of Palestinians fled to Lebanon seeking temporary refuge. But as the years went by, and with the 1967 Exodus, the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon seemed to have no definite end in sight. Living mostly in refugee camps across Lebanon, the Palestinians adjusted to their current living situation, but kept the keys to their homes in Palestine and their compass directed towards their homeland and vowed to continue their liberation struggle. The Lebanese-Palestinian dynamics will come

to play a large part in the 1975 war. What is important to keep in mind at this point is that the Palestinians have started integrating into the Lebanese population since the 1950s.

As much as there is a debate about the history of the war in Lebanon, there also seems to be a debate about the history of the prewar period. While some historians and researchers talk about a 'golden age' of Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s, others view this period as prone, even conducive, to conflict.

The first camp praises the years leading to the war and argues that Lebanon was the 'Switzerland' or 'Paris' of the Middle East. Rich in history, culture, natural landscapes, and beautiful weather, Lebanon was a tourist destination in the 1950s and 1960s. Offering a relatively larger freedom and economic flexibility compared to its conservative Arab neighbors, Lebanon was a hub for media, education, international trade and regional finance and investment, a major shipping and transport port, and a capital for fashion and art. Pre-war Beirut, according to Theodor Hanf (1993), was "a melting pot" (p.199), and its problems were "a problem of foreigners" (p.200). Supporters of this camp tend to mourn the 'lost paradise' and prefer to paint an image of a safe haven devastated by a brutal war caused by the 'foreigners,' the Palestinians, among others.

Historians in the other camp have long argued that the war was a natural consequence of prewar Lebanon. In fact, Samir Khalaf (2002) believes the war to be part of a cyclical pattern of communal strife and atavistic fear and another episode in Lebanon's history of intermittent violence. The 'golden age' tag often masks what Khalaf (2002) calls a "gilded age." Historians of this camp focus on the reasons that made Lebanon prone to war, elaborating on the weaknesses of the Lebanese state itself since its formation, and on colonial remnants and interventions by major regional powers. Domestically, this camp argues, Lebanon suffered major crises related to what some call the 'curse' of diversity. The multi-sectarian Lebanese society has never lived in peace, they say. Add to that the class struggle, which was amplified by the rise of the richer class and the fall of the poorer class, widening the class gap and endangering the middle class (Nasr, 2013). This gap grew even wider after the war, and the middle class seemed to disappear.

At the surface, independent Lebanon seemed to be doing relatively well in the 1950s and 1960s. But a closer examination shows that social tensions grew alongside the economy and a shifting demographic balance saw rural communities, such as the Shia, expand twice as rapidly as urban communities, such as the Greek Orthodox (Picard & Ramsbotham, 2012). Internal factors were not unaffected by the regional context. The crises surrounding the fate of the Palestinians – not least the relocation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

to Lebanon from the late 1960s "succeeded from the early 1970s in destroying 'miracle' Lebanon" (Picard & Ramsbotham, 2012, p.7). This argument fits the slogan often repeated by those who blame the Palestinians for the war. However, to address the causes of the war without examining the Palestinians' role would be an incomplete analysis. Besides this binary approach to glorify or bash the prewar period, scholars writing on Lebanon's history could not agree either on what it meant to be Lebanese.

Kamal Salibi's *A House of Many Mansions* (1988) questions all previous attempts to write a comprehensive history of Lebanon, including his very own earlier book, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (1965). Salibi argues that instead of a coherent historical narrative around which all of Lebanon's sectors could unite, there are as many narratives of the county's history as there are communities. However, he suggests that if the separate and conflicting narratives of its communities could be reconciled, Lebanon could endure. The whole question of identity has been controversial since the formation of Lebanon. Salibi (1988) argues that "In Lebanon, from the very beginning, a force called Arabism, acting from outside and inside the country, stood face to face with another exclusively parochial social force called Lebanism…" (p.37). It is legitimate to say that the Lebanese have never shared a common vision of their country nor had they risen above their religious differences (Salibi,1988). Similarly to Salibi, Khalaf (2006) argues that "the 'Lebanism' of the Christians was pitted against the 'Arabism' of the Sunni Muslims with reverberations among the Shiites and Druze of the hinterland" (p.25). Lebanism, or Lebanonism as coined by William Harris (2006), presumed Lebanon's ties with its Phoenician origins and an attachment to the West. Acting as a vehicle of Maronite nationalism, Lebanism viewed Lebanon as an entity detached from its Arab – read Muslim – surrounding (Harris, 2006). Arabism, on the other hand, conceived of Lebanon as "a temporary aberration, eventually to be dissolved into Arab unity" (Harris, 2006, p.76).

Advocates of this camp say that, as a matter of fact, the Lebanese have experienced religious and communal strife for at least two centuries. The war had in fact been brewing for decades. David Gilmore (1983) explains that the Maronite community's history "is a continuous struggle to maintain national and religious identity in a dominant Muslim environment" (p.75). Philip Hitti (1957) on the other hand recalls that tensions between the Maronites and the Druze were so high that fighting eventually erupted (in 1860) following an incident as trivial as a brawl between two boys, a Maronite and a Druze (p.437). But as Janet Hancock (1987) puts it, "it is Lebanon's misfortune that no one of her largest communities is strong enough to assert control unaided, but all are too strong to be allowed

to coalesce" (p.30). In his study on postwar Lebanon, Simon Haddad (2000) says that "Maronite [Christian] attitudes indicate that they have an inherent fear and lack of confidence in Muslims" (p.473).

Going back to the issue of the National Pact and its implications on a conflicting prewar context, Halawi-Ghosn and Khoury (2011) elaborate that the National Pact seemed to have failed to take into account demographic changes in the country over time, and that the political system the Pact had created started to slowly weaken as it was unable to adapt to and meet the demands of those changes. It is worth noting that, in the pre-1975 political environment, there were numerous calls for a fairer sectarian political power-sharing, particularly by the Muslims who believed that the 6:5 formula in favor of the Christians was no longer reflective of the changing social reality. As no census had been conducted since 1932, the Muslims argued that their population had outgrown the Christian one by more than half. As Halawi-Ghosn and Khoury (2011) put it:

> On one hand, a significant portion of the Lebanese population wanted to modify the distribution of power in the Lebanese political system; on the other hand, other groups, recognizing the flaws of a sectarian power-sharing agreement, called for the abolishment of sectarianism and the creation of a new political system based on secularism and equity. (p.382)

The Maronites disagreed. They had a distinctly different vision for Lebanon: "Maronite leadership assumed that the cultural and political superiority of their community would maintain a Christian dominance in the country" (Phares, 1995, p.70). As argued earlier, the presence of the French and their role as a world power reinforced that attitude. Furthermore, there was a major disagreement over the identity of Lebanon. On the one hand, Muslims in general had an Arab nationalistic feeling towards Lebanon. They viewed Lebanon as part of a larger Arab and Islamic *Ummah*, or nation, and it was only logical that Lebanon identifies ideologically and culturally with its surrounding. On the other hand, the Christians, and specifically the Maronites, advocated a different narrative, a Lebanese nationalist one. Lebanon was a special entity within this Arab nation. It was not strictly Arab but rather had a more 'western' lifestyle and culture. This was foreshadowed by its Pheonician ancestry, the previous French mandate and the strong relations the Maronites had with France and the West afterwards. The debate over identity will re-surface when the war breaks out.

2.2 The War: Scenarios of Chaos

As this study aims to reconstruct the frames of the war, as echoed in the media, it is important to understand the scholarly causal attributes of the war. When the indirect and direct causes of the war are discussed, various scenarios surface. What has been so far outlined in regard to the historical context of the war can give rise to the following scenarios of reading the prewar conditions that led to the war.

In the first scenario, Lebanon's position inside the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the relocating of Palestinians and their military activity as a result of the Cairo Accord of 1969 (O'Ballance, 1998) had much to do with laying the ground for the war. In this scenario, much of the responsibility is attributed to the Palestinian factor and the presence and military activity of the PLO that became active in 1969 in Lebanon. This scenario almost excludes any internal dimension of the war and denies any local factors which have contributed to the eruption of the war. Farid El-Khazen's (2000) analysis of the war reflects this point of view, as the author blames the PLO and its Lebanese allies almost entirely, accusing them of weakening the authority of the Lebanese state. He argues that the power-sharing formula was working fine, but the Palestinian factor destabilized the Lebanese state and caused the outbreak of the war. This Christian and conservative approach externalizes the blame on any internal actors, claiming that the war was imposed by an outside force. Another author echoing this scenario is *An-Nahar*'s Editor-in-chief during wartime, Ghassan Tueni, whose book *Une guerre pour les autres* (1985) written during the war, also externalizes the causes, claiming that Lebanon was an arena for regional and superpowers' fights.

A variation of this scenario suggests that the war was caused by ideological and political differences between two camps: a camp that supported the right of Palestinians to carry out military activities from Lebanese soil, and a camp that opposed it. These two camps also had their own ideological positions on other issues related to the Lebanese prewar context. The first pro-Palestinian camp, represented by the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) was dissatisfied with the power-sharing formula of the National Pact of 1943, wanted to eradicate the sectarian political system, and saw Lebanon's strength in a Muslim-leftist alliance comprising the PLO and Arab countries that support the Palestinian cause, like Syria. The other camp, represented by right-wing Christian parties under the umbrella of the Lebanese Front (LF), was against the Palestinians' presence in Lebanon, saw it as a threat, and considered that Lebanon was a haven for Christians in the Middle East and should remain so. It also viewed Lebanon as the 'Paris' of the middle east, having a rather western identity and outlook, and that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon wrecked this image.

Another scenario internalizes the war, stressing the local factors that paved the way to the war. In what might be called a Marxist interpretation of the causes of the war, leftist scholars like Mahdi Amel (1979), Salim Nasr (1978, 2003, 2013), Boutros Labaki (1984) and Fawaz Traboulsi (1993, 2007) argue that western capitalism that infiltrated Lebanon in the prewar period has created social and economic crises. Nasr (1978) specifically criticked the economic monopoly that affected the livelihood of the lower class, hence presenting a reading of the war through the prism of a class-struggle. Traboulsi (2007), whose work emphasizes the social crisis aspect, adds a sectarian aspect to the image of prewar Lebanon. He argues that "on the eve of the 1967 war Lebanon's social structure was one of small-scale privileges and distinctions produced by patronage and the sectarian system, along with large-scale class privileges and divisions" (Traboulsi, 2007, p.160).

The confessional or sectarian dimension of the war is central to yet another scenario, which argues that the war has roots in an internal sectarian strife and is an extension of Muslim/Christian, and Maronite/Druze wars (Weiss, 2009). This reading puts the emphasis on political sectarianism, as sects are not only considered religious identities or confessional groups, but also political ones with different levels of privileges. In fact, sectarian diversity in this small country has always raised questions on whether the perfect system is a sectarian or a secular one. Some have even suggested that, since the sectarian system merely reflects the makeup of society, it is ultimately better suited to regulate conflict compared to a secular system (Messara, 1994).

Against this background of multiple scenarios, the war broke out. Before going into the different phases of the war, it is important to lay out the main warring fronts, some of which having already been identified.

2.2.1 The warring fronts

The Lebanese war, spanning more than 15 years, involved various internal, regional, and international actors. Figure 2.1 illustrates the clusters of actors, while the following subchapter examines the main actors, from internal to regional and international ones, examining the way they were formed, the role they played in the war and the coalitions they belonged to. While the aim here is to present a visual and explanatory aid to help understand the war, it is important to keep in mind that the war was a complex phenomenon and that, despite some actors being identified within one cluster, it is possible that during the course of the war they shifted alliances. This will be further examined at a later stage.



Figure 2.1: Clusters of Actors

2.2.1.1 Internal actors and political parties

The Lebanese Front, a right-wing anti-Arabism Christian front

The LF was the main right-wing coalition throughout the war. Formed as a coalition on the eve of the war, the front consisted of leaders of the dominant Christian Maronite establishment and right-wing Lebanese nationalist parties with their affiliated military organizations. Its first president was Camil Chamoun from the National Liberal Party (NLP), and its leadership included Pierre Gemayel from the Lebanese Kataeb Party (LKP), Suleiman Frangieh (President of Lebanon 1970-1976 and founder of Marada) and other notable Maronite political and religious figures. The front favored a neutral position of Lebanon with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was strongly opposed to the armed presence of Palestinian organizations in Lebanon and saw the PLO as a real threat to Lebanon's sovereignty and peace. The front was also skeptical of Arab nationalism and

strongly opposed left-wing's proposed reforms. The front comprised various Christian parties, mainly the LKP or Phalange, the NLP, Marada and the LBF. Although each militia contributed to the combating force and had two representatives in the joint command, the main military wing consisted of the Phalangists led by Bashir Gemayel, son of Phalangist leader Pierre Gemayel. By August 1980, the integration of fighting forces was complete (Badran, 2009).

The Lebanese National Movement, a pro-Palestinian Leftist front

Headed by Kamal Jumblatt, and initiated in 1969, the LNM was predominantly left-wing and was formed of various national parties and groups. The movement thought of itself as a front fighting for social and political reforms, as well as economic ones. At the heart of the movement's belief was an agreement that the confessional system and the Maronite predominance over Lebanese government and politics were Lebanon's biggest problems. The movement's position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict was a clear political and sometimes military support to the Palestinian resistance and its struggle for the liberation of Palestine. LNM forces collaborated with the PLO forces at different stages during the war. The LNM was against Syria's military intervention in Lebanon in 1976 and this has led pro-Syria parties in the LNM to withdraw and form the Front of Patriotic and National Parties. The movement weakened as Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated in 1977. It was dissolved immediately after the Israeli invasion of 1982 and as PLO forces were sent away from Lebanon (Badran, 2009). The main parties under this coalition consisted of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), *al-Murabitun*, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP).

The Shiite parties

In addition to the two major internal warring fronts, two Shiite movements were born during the war and were involved either in internal battles or in operations against Israeli forces; Amal and Hizbullah. Amal, or *Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya* (Legions of Lebanese Resistance), was founded in 1975 by the Shia cleric al-Imam Mussa al-Sadr. Amal was formed to be the military wing of *Harakat al-Mahrumin* (Movement of the Disinherited) which was founded in 1974. Amal in fact saw itself a union of the poor and neglected in the face of the rich and the greedy, hinting at how the monopoly of Druze, Sunnis and Maronites has left the Shia poor. Amal is also known for its armed clashes with PLO forces in South Lebanon and Beirut in the 1980s, despite its official support of the Palestinian cause and its

operations against Israel in the South (Al-Mokdad, 1999). Despite being allies at times, Amal has also clashed with *al-Murabitun*, Hizbullah, and the PSP. Hizbullah, on the other hand, came to light upon the Israeli invasion of 1982. In 1984, the party proclaimed itself as the resistance against Israel by putting upfront its military wing, the Islamic Resistance.

These internal actors listed thus far have fought either politically or militarily, along with or against other internal, regional or international players. As the chronology of the war will show, parties joined coalitions at some stage of the war only to ditch these coalitions later and join different – even opposing ones. Militias fought against one another within the same front or coalition and military wings separated from their political parties to establish new ones. The only constant was the involvement of regional and international actors that backed internal ones, either with money, training, or military support, or entered Lebanon, peacefully or aggressively.

2.2.1.2 Regional and international actors

It is no secret that the war in Lebanon involved major regional and international players. In fact, the PLO, considered by some, as argued earlier, the main factor in stirring the 'civil war,' is a regional player.

As the official Palestinian resistance, the PLO comprised a number of organizations with different ideologies, leaderships, and military wings: Fatah, the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Arab Liberation Front, and the Palestinian Liberation Army, the official military wing of the PLO, among others (Chrourou, 1981). The Cairo Agreement in 1969 authorized and regulated Palestinian resistance activities in Lebanon. The agreement, signed between the Lebanese Army Commander and the PLO commander, restricted the PLO's activities to the Southern border area of Lebanon. The PLO moved its headquarters to Lebanon following its expulsion from Jordan in 1969 (O'Ballance, 1998). The organization enjoyed both political and armed support from left-wing and Arab nationalist parties and welcomed Lebanese citizens among its members. Following Syria's intervention in 1976 and its disagreement with the PLO, the organization became openly involved in the armed conflict (Chrourou, 1981).

Formed as an international peacekeeping force, the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF) was created by the Arab League at the Riyadh Summit of October 1976 (Khawand, 2001). This intervention force was composed of almost entirely Syrian army forces and comprised some forces from the armies of the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates.

The force was under the direct command of Syria, despite having a pan-Arab label. The force initially consisted of 30,000 troops, of which 25,000 were Syrians. In 1979, the Arab League extended the mandate of the Arab Deterrent Forces. the Sudanese, the Saudis, the Emirati and the Libyan troops withdrew from Lebanon, and the ADF thereby became a purely Syrian force (Chrourou, 1981). In 1982, and after the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon and Beirut, the Lebanese government failed to extend the mandate of the ADF. However, Syrian forces remained in Lebanon (Khawand, 2003), becoming an active warring party, and transformed into an 'occupying' force in the years following the war, remaining militarily present in Lebanon until 2005. The Syrian military's involvement followed an agenda. According to Bayeh (2017), Syria's support to Palestinian military presence and activity in Lebanon alongside its Lebanese allies helped trigger the war as a prelude to its aspired hegemony, "but soon afterwards, Syria would have to check those same allies lest they jeapordise its regional agenda" (p.143).

The military force of Israel, known as Israel Defense Forces (IDF), became militarily involved in 1978 and 1982. IDF supported the Maronite Militias of Phalanges in the early years of the war, and in 1978, they launched Operation Litani, occupying South Lebanon with the aim of pushing the PLO out of that area (O'Ballance, 1998). And in 1982, they invaded Lebanon, starting from the South, and reached Beirut. In 1985, they withdrew and remained in the South through the South Lebanon Army that they established in 1978, until 2000.

Besides these, other Arab and international players were involved in the war. The two major super powers, the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), got militarily involved at times and supported warring parties at different times during the war. Regional and international actors were mainly involved politically and financially, either by supporting some fronts, training some militias and financing them, or by mediating peace and truces. As the war unfolded, militias, parties, armies and countries took sides, often changing their position and degree of involvement.

2.2.2 On April 13th, 1975

The war broke out on April 13th, 1975. The events of that day are summarized by Fawaz Traboulsi (2007) as follows:

> On 13 April 1975, a car fired shots at a congregation of Phalange partisans in front of a church in Ayn al-Rummaneh, wounding a number of people,

> to which Phalangist militiamen reacted a few hours later by machine-gunning a bus heading for the Tall al-Zaatar refugee camp, killing 21 Palestinians. Fighting broke out throughout the Southeastern suburb of Beirut between the Phalange and the Palestinian resistance and their Lebanese allies. (p.183)

On that spring day of April, Pierre Gemayel, the founder and leader of the Phalange party, was participating in the consecration of a new Maronite church in *Ain al-Remmeneh*, a suburb southeast of Beirut. During the service, a few members of his militia guarding the roads to the church stopped a car with a covered license plate and, following an argument with its passengers, forced it to deviate to another route. It was only a few minutes later that a second car with a covered license plate also appeared. But this time, the vehicle forced its way through the roadblock, and the men in it began shooting in the direction of the church entrance, killing four people including three Phalangists. Later that same day, a bus carrying Palestinians back to Tall al-Zaatar camp from a parade commemorating a previous commando operation was stopped by Phalangist gunmen, and all its passengers were shot dead (Salibi, 1976). It was unclear whether those who killed Pierre Gemayel's militiamen were Palestinian commandos. It was not confirmed either that the Palestinians on the bus were armed and on their way to *Ain al-Remmeneh* to cause trouble. Truth remains that a small massacre was followed by a larger massacre, and the next day, fighting erupted between the Phalange and Palestinians in Beirut (Winslow, 1996, p.182).

This seemingly simplistic way of describing the start of the war and what followed will be examined further in the following subchapter. However, it is crucial here to highlight a few readings about the start of the war, and whether or not it actually started on April 13th, 1975.

The incident that took place on a quiet morning in April would be later referred to by Walid Khalidi (1976) as "the Sarajevo" which kindled the war.

Despite it being commonly held that the start of the war was marked by *Ain el-Remmeneh* incident on April 13th, 1975, the majority of scholars, as highlighted earlier, believed that the origins of the conflict in Lebanon long precede 1975 and even the rise of the Lebanese state. Even as a direct cause, some scholars and journalists who wrote about the war claim that the spark of the war was three months before *Ain al-Remmeneh*. Earlier in 1975, Maarouf al-Saad was a victim of what is commonly called 'the incidents of *Saida*.' During a protest by *Saida*'s fishermen against the creation of a Protein company, a joint

Lebanese-Kuwaiti company they viewed as a move to monopolize the industry, the leader of the demonstration Maarouf Saad, a former mayor of *Saida* and a former MP, and founder of the Popular Nasserist Organization (PNO) who was popular among the Sunni community and leftist groups, was assassinated (El-Khazen, 2000). There was a sudden exchange of fire with the army, during which Saad and two other protestors were wounded and one Palestinian was killed. Al-Mokdad (1999) tells this story explaining that "the situation quickly deteriorated as demonstrators used dynamite and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) against military vehicles, killing an army corporal and injuring two other soldiers. Saad later died from his wounds." Al-Mokdad (1999) here argues that the war actually started then and there, on February 26th, 1975, three months earlier, in *Saida*. However, the big explosion happened on April 13th, 1975.

In this study, the incident of *Ain al-Remmeneh* on April 13th,1975 is identified as the spark of the war. This is done specifically because, despite claims that the war had started before this date, the general scholarship, journalistic approaches, and political and societal points of view identifiy April 13th as the first day of the war. This date is central to this study because it became an unofficial commemoration date of the war. As argued later, this date served as a reminder during the war period that the war was not over, as a reality check in the postwar period on whether the war was truly over, and as a statement of resistance to the dominant official narrative. What followed that day were 15 years of war divided into four phases.

2.2.3 Chronology of the war

The following subchapters highlight some of the most important phases and battles during the war, from 1975 until 1990. Despite this study's approach in considering 1989 as the last year of war - being the year of the signing of the Ta'if Agreement - the chronology of the war includes battles that took place in 1990. This reflects the disagreement regarding the exact date of the end of the war, and the confusion around it, reflected in the media as the following chapters will show. Figure 2.2 illustrates the timeline of the main events during the war, grouped under four major phases: First, the Two Years' war that started in April 1975 and ended in August 1976; the Syrian involvement phase that lasted from 1978 until 1982; the Israeli invasion phase from 1982 until 1984; and the internal wars phase from 1985 until after the supposed end of war in 1990.



Figure 2.2: The Lebanese War Timeline (1975-1990)

2.2.3.1 The first phase: The Two Years' war (1975-1976)

The war began as a battle between two militias, which was labeled The Two Years' war. Although commonly referred to as a 'Christian-Muslim War,' Traboulsi (2007) explains this phase was one in which internal factors played a major role:

> A duel had been engaged between two 'modern' populist forces that sprang from the country's social crisis: The Phalange party and its allies in the Lebanese Front, on the one hand, and the nationalist and progressive movements of the LNM, on the other. Each attempted to impose itself on the country while simultaneously imposing itself as the unique representative of its own 'camp,' at a time when the increased involvement of the PLO in the fighting encouraged the intervention of outside parties, notably Israel and Syria. (p.187)

During this first phase, the conflict is often reduced to a fight between two warring fronts; the Christians on one side, mainly the LF, and the Muslims on the other side, mainly the LNM and the PLO. Three main battles took place during those two years; the Battle of the Souks (September to December 1975), the Battle of the Hotels (December 1975 to April 1976) and the Battle of the Camps (January to August 1976). Syrian forces entered Lebanon in June 1976 and a ceasefire followed, lasting from November 1976 until February 1978, during which some reconstruction took place (Khawand, 2001). This marked the first explicit regional military involvement in the war that overshadowed the next phase.

2.2.3.2 The second phase: The Syrian involvement (1978-1982)

The second phase can be considered to have lasted from 1978 to 1982. It can be labeled as the Syrian involvement phase, when the ADF came into conflict with Christian parties and militias (Deeb, 2003).

The first major event in this phase is the first Israeli Invasion of South Lebanon in March 1978. The IDF invasion, called Operation Litani, was met with PLO resistance (O'Ballance, 1998, p.74). During this invasion and the Syrian presence, multiple key battles took place. At that point, the Israeli, a second major regional force, became directly involved in the war. By mid-March 1978, thousands were displaced from South Lebanon. And in June of that year, clashes between two Maronite groups, Phalange and Marada, took place within

the ‘Christian Homeland,’ in the Northern area of Lebanon, in what was called the Ehden massacre (Deeb, 2003, p.41).

The Hundred Days’ war that erupted on July 1st, 1978 and lasted until October 1978 is also called ‘The Siege of *Ashrafieh*.’ This was a major sub-conflict within the war. During those 100 days, ADF troops shelled *Ashrafieh*, the Christian area of Beirut. The main warring parties were the ADF and the LF.

Multiple inter-Christian battles took place in 1980. One of them was in July 1980, when fighting erupted between the Phalanges on one side and the NLP on the other side, although both were members of the LF. Soon after, the Battle of *Zahle* started in December 1980 in the town of *Zahle* in the *Bekaa* area, where the LF, backed later by the Israelis, fought against the ADF, later backed by the PLO (O’Ballance, 1998, p.108). Meanwhile, inter-Muslim clashes between various Muslim and LNM-affiliated militias and parties had been taking place since 1979 in Beirut’s southwestern suburbs and west Beirut. The militias and parties involved were Amal, *al-Murabitun*, the LCP, the SSNP, as well as the PLO. Intermittent fighting continued until 1982 (Khawand, 2001).

2.2.3.3 The third phase: The Israeli invasion (1982-1984)

The third phase can be labeled as the Israeli invasion. This phase started with the massive Israeli Invasion in June 1982. The IDF started the invasion in South Lebanon on June 6th and reached the outskirts of Beirut by June 10th, where it was met by resistance from Leftist parties, the Palestinian forces and Amal (Khawand, 2003). On June 13th, the Israelis started bombing West Beirut. The operation called ‘Peace for Galilee’ by the Israelis lasted until August 1982, and the main protagonists were the IDF on one side, backed by some LF Christian militias (Phalanges and Lebanese Forces), and the ADF, the PLO, and the LNM, and to some extent Amal on the other side (Deeb, 2003).

A series of events followed in a chain: LF leader Bachir Gemayel was elected President of the Lebanese Republic, while Beirut was under siege by the IDF. It seemed that the Israelis, who had good relations with Gemayel, wanted him to be elected. A few days later, on September 14th, Gemayel was assassinated. Two days after that, the LF, backed by the IDF, went into the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila and committed a large massacre over the period of three days (Al-Hout, 2004).

From December 1982 to August 1983, ‘The war of the mountain’ took place. As a major sub-conflict in the Lebanese war, clashes between the Druze PSP, backed by the PLO and ADF, and the Maronite LBF, backed by the LAF took place in the area of Mount

Lebanon, and several Maronite villages were emptied and destroyed as a result (O'Ballance, 1998).

2.2.3.4 The fourth phase: The internal wars (1984-1990)

On February 6th, 1984, an *Intifada* (uprising) took place when the LAF clashed with Amal allied with the PSP in west Beirut (Khawand, 2003, p.493).

Another major sub-conflict took place in Palestinian camps in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The battle called 'War of the Camps' was a series of intermittent clashes between Amal and the Palestinians between June 1984 and 1987 (O'Ballance, 1998).

All of this took place while the IDF were occupying South Lebanon. Meanwhile, the rising party of Hizbullah clashed with Amal in the southern suburbs of Beirut between February 1988 and May 1990, in what became known as "War among the Shia" or "Intra-Shia clashes" (Al-Mokdad, 1999).

Another sub-conflict happened in 1989 and was known as 'The War of Liberation' against the Syrian presence, initiated by the LAF led by General Michel Aoun and Lebanese Forces against the PSP, Amal, the PLO, and other pro-Syrian parties (Khawand, 2003). Also in 1989, Aoun, having been appointed by the departing Lebanese President Amine Gemayel as head of the Lebanese government and interim PM, became part of a government that was facing another government at that time. This battle led to the signing of the Ta'if Agreement in October 1989 (O'Ballance, 1998).

However, more fighting took place between January 1990 and October 1990, and was called the 'War of Elimination,' this time between the LAF and the LBF in the eastern part of Beirut. On October 13th, 1990, Syrian forces invaded the presidential palace in *Baabda*, where Aoun was stationed, killing hundreds of Lebanese soldiers and civilians. Aoun then fled to the French embassy in Beirut, and later moved into exile in France until 2005. This was considered the last battle in the war, following which the Ta'if Accord came into force (Khawand, 2003).

2.2.4 The Ta'if Agreement and the 'end' of the war

On October 22nd, 1989, Lebanese parliamentarians met in the city of Ta'if, in Saudi Arabia, and signed what is known as the Ta'if Agreement or the Document of National Accord. The meeting was sponsored by Riyadh and the Arab League, with the support of the US and the direct supervision of Syria (Karam, 2012, p.36). The signed document inaugurated a process that put an end to the war and set the country on a path to peace and reconstruction

(Traboulsi, 2007). The signing of this document did not have an immediate end-of-war effect, given that the 'War of Elimination' took place between January and October 1990, meaning after the Agreement had come into force. October 1990 saw the elimination of Aoun's powers and the Syrian military victory and a declared 'end of war.' As Traboulsi (2007) explains, it took a year-long Syrian-American rapprochement in preparation for peace negotiations in the Middle East. Following Syria's participation in operation Desert Shield in October 1990, Damascus was allowed to launch a final assault to dislodge Aoun from the presidential palace in *Baabda*. Aoun then took refuge in the French embassy and, after long deliberations between the French and Lebanese governments, he was allowed to leave for France as an exile, in August 1991. As Karam (2012) asserts, the task of implementing the Agreement was fully assumed by the Syrian regime as a result of its emergent role as a leading power in the region and its postwar military presence in Lebanon. Karam (2012) further argues that "In 1990 Syria imposed the agreement by force – namely by the exclusion of its Lebanese detractors, essentially important Christian leaders – and subsequently dominated the implementation process" (p.36). This phase has come to be known as *Pax Syriana*, a period where Syrians were present both militarily and politically in Lebanon. Their hegemony over politics extended to the media, which meant that the media had to practice self-censorship over content, specifically with regards to Syria's role and presence in Lebanon. Syria's agenda in Lebanon became apparent in all the attempts at a settlement, in which Syria took a leading role. Bayeh (2017) asserts that Syria demanded compromises on the domestic distribution of power that would weaken the Christian position in the system. It is argued by some that Syria's hegemony led to further weakening of the Lebanese state, while advocated by the Syrians that their presence is what stopped the war in Lebanon.

Despite the fact that the war continued after the signing of the Ta'if Agreement, it is believed that this document ostensibly ended the war and allowed for the establishment of a postwar Lebanon. The rationale behind the Ta'if Agreement, argues Karam (2012), was a twofold ambition for a Lebanese society and polity, symbolizing reconciliation objectives of a society that wanted effective tools to end the war and to reinforce national cohesion, on one hand, and introducing reforms to support the consolidation of the Lebanese state and national institutions on the other hand (p.36). But how did that materialize?

Instead of leading to a third republic, in which political sectarianism would be abolished, The Ta'if Agreement reproduced the sectarian regime with some modifications. The most important modification the Ta'if Agreement introduced was moving the major powers of the president of the Republic to the PM, the cabinet, and the parliament and its

speaker, all confirmed in their representation of the Maronite, Shia and Sunni sects respectively (Traboulsi, 2007). This 'new' system will come to be known as the 'ruling Troika.' This "three-man show" argues Traboulsi (2007), created one of the most unstable power relations imaginable, and thus the Ta'if Agreement merely created another system of discord. The Tai'f indirectly put Lebanon under a sort of Syrian "Guardianship," where the Syrian President himself would play the role of mediation and conflict resolution. Syrian political leverage over Lebanon also manifested itself in a continuous Syrian army presence and a pro-Syrian 'elected' parliament. Syria's influence continued for almost 15 years after the presumed end of the war. Although the Ta'if Accord was able to put an end to the years of violence in a largely divided country, it did not offer any basis for long-term resolution of the conflict (Halawi-Ghosn & Khoury, 2001, p.389).

Despite being signed in 1989, some argue that the content of the Ta'if Agreement dates back to the early days of the war. Kerr (2012) argues that the modifications to the 1926 and 1943 power-sharing formula that ended Lebanon's war in 1989 as part of the Ta'if Agreement have largely been negotiated by Lebanese elites in 1976, under a Syrian-sponsored peace agreement known as the Constitutional Document (p.61). He elaborates that:

> Facing defeat by the PLO-LNM alliance, the Christian leadership invited Syrian military intervention to save themselves and the pre-eminent position that the National Pact guaranteed them. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad fell out with his Soviet backers as US, Israeli and Syrian interests in Lebanon momentarily converged. (p.61)

It is commonly held that the Ta'if was not an exclusively Lebanese product. In fact, it is argued that as much as the war was not purely Lebanese and many regional and international actors had a role to play, the Ta'if was the result of not only a Lebanese agreement, but also a regional and international agreement. One observation is that Ta'if was signed towards the end of the Cold War in October 1989 and that it could be read in connection with that. As Picard and Ramsbotham (2012) argue, the Ta'if Agreement was "effectively a ceasefire with ambitious – but hollow – promises, which it is doubtful that those involved in its creation intended to fulfill" (p.7). In that regard, sectarianism and the power-sharing formula, two of the main root causes of the war, were not resolved in Ta'if, but rather reproduced.

2.3 The Postwar: A Fragile Peace

The postwar period in Lebanon stretches from the signing of the Ta'if Agreement in 1989 and the effective end of war in 1991 until today. Despite being called a postwar period, this period is not a period of 'peace' to say the least, and is even loosely considered a postwar period, as argued that the war, in reality, is not entirely over.

As noted earlier, following the Ta'if, another battle in the war took place, and in fact the date of the end the war, until this day, is not set. The controversy over the end of the war can also be noticed in commemorating the war by the day it started, not the day it ended. For the purpose of this study, the signing of the Ta'if Agreement is considered the beginning of the end of the war. Nevertheless, as the findings will show, this date is contested, and one can argue that by the early 1990s, there was no clear feeling that the war was over, not even today.

Since 1990, Lebanon has gone through different periods of relative war and relative peace. War periods were either in the form of Israeli attacks or sporadic internal conflicts in Lebanon. Peace periods were periods of relative peace, when efforts of reconstruction of the state and the country were carried out.

After the end of Lebanon's war, a political decision to disarm and demobilize all militias was taken on March 28th, 1991 (Khawand, 2003, p.637). An Amnesty Law (26 August 1991) covered all political and wartime crimes prior to 28 March (O'Ballance, 1998, p.213). Most militias had officially handed over heavy weaponry, headquarters and barracks to Lebanese or Syrian army officials ahead of the 30 April deadline. But some 50,000 militia fighters from all denominations had 'vanished' – estimates differ regarding the 1990 numbers of militia fighters among Lebanon's estimated population of around 3.25 million, from 1.25 per cent (40,000) to 3 per cent (nearly 100,000). In reality, postwar militias sold armaments abroad, hid heavy weapons in remote mountainous areas, kept light and medium weapons and continued to train potential fighters (de Clerck, 2012, p.24). This, in fact, explains the re-occurrence of clashes in some parts of the country.

The postwar period was marked by important events that shaped the history of the country after the end of the war, and as this study argues, impacted the way memory discourse was shaped. The three main events highlighted here are: the end of the Israeli Occupation; *Pax Syriana*, Hariri Assassination and the Syrian withdrawal; and the post-2005 political changes.

2.3.1 2000: The end of the Israeli occupation

The first milestone of independence that marked the postwar period came in 2000. After occupying South Lebanon since 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces finally pulled their troops. In spring 1999, during his campaign for the premiership, Ehud Barak had promised that Israel would withdraw its troops from the Security Zone back to the international frontier within a year. After taking office, he began to speak of July 2000 as the deadline (The Middle East and North Africa, 2004, p.18). He had hoped that the withdrawal would be part of a general peace agreement with Syria and Lebanon, which would include a Syrian guarantee of the security of northern Israel and, perhaps, a deployment of Syrian troops in South Lebanon. But the deadlock in the Israeli-Syrian peace talks had gradually persuaded Barak that withdrawal from the Zone would most probably be unilateral and without agreement either with Syria or Lebanon. The IDF General Staff opposed a withdrawal without an agreement; but on March 5th, 2000, the Israeli cabinet unanimously endorsed a withdrawal by July "with or without an agreement" back to the international frontier (The Middle East and North Africa, 2004, p.20). The withdrawal happened between May 23rd and 24th and was met with intermittent fire from Hizbullah. May 25th is celebrated in Lebanon as 'The Day of Liberation,' and is in fact a public holiday, unlike April 13th.

Nonetheless, Israel was not the only occupying force that stayed in Lebanon after the war. Syria, which entered in 1976 to mediate the conflict and stop the fighting, did not leave until 2005.

2.3.2 2005: *Pax Syriana*, Hariri assassination and the Syrian withdrawal

Upon the dissolvement of the militias, and the efforts to re-establish the state in early 1990s, a new era of political governance began. The term *Pax Syriana* was coined when Syria intervened in Lebanon in 1976 to stop the war (Hinnebusch, 1998). But as Syria stayed in Lebanon even after the Ta'if Agreement, the term was used to describe Syria's hegemony over Lebanon, that lead to an apparent temporary stability, but not to postwar reconciliation (El-Husseini, 2012). Syria's presence of course came with security tightening, as well as control over power and the media. Warlords turned political elites had to seek Syria's approval, including business man-turned politician Rafiq Hariri, known for rebuilding the famous 'Downtown Beirut' in the 1990s through his company, Solidere, in itself a controversial postwar reconstruction project. The project, as Makdisi and Silverstein (2006) argue, was "based on an idealization of prewar inter-communal harmony that ignored questions of the particular responsibility among militias for the fifteen years of violence"

(p.6). Hence, the rebuilding of Beirut was the reflection of the postwar government policy of abolishing the memory of the war, as argued in the following chapter. As a business entrepreneur returning from Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s, Hariri was a controversial figure in Lebanon. To some, he was the rich Sunni, the father of reconstruction who not only rebuilt Beirut but also educated thousands of young people and set up charitable foundations (Sorenson, 2010). To others, he was a main player in the neoliberal system of the postwar period (Traboulsi, 2014), and a Saudi spokesperson in Lebanon. On February 14th, 2005, Hariri's convoy was bombed, killing him along with twenty-one others (Baumann, 2016, p.2). Amidst that, the UN Security Council set up an inquiry that initially pointed at a possible Syrian involvement in the attack. At the Lebanese government's request, the Security Council created an international tribunal to investigate the murder.

The assassination of Hariri led to political developments in the country. For the thousands who took to the streets in February and March 2005, there was hope that the spontaneous and peaceful mass protests might initiate a change in Lebanon's political system. As Khalaf (2006) describes, immediately after the announcement of Hariri's death, people from various sides of the political spectrum and all religious groups gathered in Beirut to express their frustration. This mass movement, which became known as the Cedar Revolution or Beirut Spring (Blanford, 2006), eventually led to the resignation of the cabinet and the withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanon.

Thus, one of the protest movement's demands was the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Protesters questioned the legitimacy of Hizbullah's weapons after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and continuous Syrian military presence and called for political reforms. In the wake of Hariri's murder, the March 8 and 14 political coalitions surfaced. Amidst accusations against the Syrian regime of assassinating Hariri, Hizbullah rallied pro-Syrian protests on March 8th, 2005. The party was joined by Amal, and the alliance later included the Free Patriotic Movement, upon Michel Aoun's return from exile. Other anti-Syrian Sunni and Christian forces took to the streets on March 14th, 2005 and formed an alliance with that name afterwards. The two fronts became the two rivals in Lebanese politics for years following that, and the split polarized the country along sectarian lines (Baumann, 2016, p.164), a Sunni-Christian coalition versus a Shia-Christian coalition. The assassination of Hariri was also the beginning of a cycle of political assassinations. In the months that followed, a number of prominent figures, including politicians, journalists and writers were assassinated in random explosions. It seemed like a horrific reminder of the not-so-distant war. These scenes were all too familiar and were still alive in people's

minds, highlighting the near possibility of another cycle of violence (Makdisi, 2006, p.202). The assassination of Hariri had various implications on Lebanon, and one of its consequences re-opened a chapter of the war. Calls for an end to Syrian military presence in Lebanon, calling it openly for the first time Syrian occupation, were signs reminiscent of the war. The Syrian withdrawal on April 26th, 2005 marked a new phase in Lebanon's postwar history.

2.3.3 Post 2005: In search of sovereignty

By the time Syria pulled its military force out of Lebanon, the country seemed to have started to enter a new phase. With both the Israelis and Syrians officially out of the country, Lebanon seemed to be entering a phase of sovereignty, after long years of war and uncertain peace. In May 2005, General Michel Aoun returned from France after more than 15 years of exile, and later in July of that year, Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces militia, the only ex-warlord tried for war-related crimes in Lebanon, was granted amnesty. Two of the main Christian leaders during the war were back on the political stage, only to join the other warlords who dominated that stage in the postwar period.

But the hope for change the Cedar Revolution had brought did not last long. It took only a matter of months to realize that Syria's withdrawal was only a military one, and that Syria had Hizbullah as its major ally who seemed ready to protect Syria's interests. It also seemed that the Israeli threat did not end with Israel's withdrawal from the south.

In the summer of 2006, it seemed clear that Israel remained a major threat not only to Lebanon's sovereignty, but also to Lebanon's internal peace. Israel's attack against Lebanon provoked Hizbullah and illustrated how politically frozen Lebanon remained, and how deeply divided it was between external forces vying for influence in the region (Kerr, 2012).

In the fallout of the 2006 war, an internal conflict erupted with government forces backing down during a bloody clash with Hizbullah in May 2008 (Sorenson, 2010). Clashes that took place in Beirut led to the Doha Accords, an internationally-brokered conflict regulation mechanism that ended an 18-month stand-off between the 8 March and 14 March factions and re-adjusted Lebanon's power-sharing arrangements between the majority and opposition (Kerr, 2012). The Doha agreement, signed in May 2008, reminded the Lebanese of the Ta'if Agreement; both agreements were reached in a Gulf Sunni country, initiated by major international forces, for the purpose of ending a certain conflict, and introduced somewhat new power-sharing formulas. It seemed that somehow the Lebanese were not able to put an end to any conflict, be it armed or political, without foreign intervention.

However, while an agreement was being reached in Doha, a sectarian conflict was brewing in the northern city of Tripoli. Sunni Muslim residents of the *Bab-al-Tibbaneh* and Alawite Muslim residents of the *Jabal Mohsen* neighborhoods of Tripoli were reviving a conflict that dated back to the mid 1980s, during the war in Lebanon. Syrian-backed Alawites fought Sunnis in battles over the span of almost 7 years, from 2008 to 2014. The clashes were particularly strong in 2011 and 2012 amidst the eruption of war in Syria. The conflict was a clear sign that the past still haunts the present, and that regional actors, namely Syria, still played a role in war and peace in Lebanon.

Consequently, despite moving into a postwar period, there still is an unstable pattern of events. Tensions between and within confessions, between and within political parties, and between partisans of regional and international powers are still manifest at the political level, and sometimes at the military level. How could the war be entirely over, and fights still erupt every now and then, here or there? And how could a society like Lebanon move towards a collective memory, when the war's militiamen had become postwar political leaders?

Beydoun (2007) argues that the reasons behind Lebanon's violent history are not the previous wars, but rather the peace settlements. The manner in which internal peace was established in Lebanon and the two instruments used to end the armed conflict – the use of force and political settlement – explain the volatile peace. As discussed earlier, the military power Syrians exercised had put an end to the war, and the settlement reached in Ta'if was a pure political settlement (El-Khazen, 2003). This no-winner-no-loser settlement left the majority of the Lebanese feeling powerless, unable to owning their own present or future. In fact, this "peace from abroad" made Lebanon hypersensitive to its regional environment (Kassir, 2003).

In the years that followed the Ta'if Agreement and the alleged end of war, Syria's presence in Lebanon turned into what some called a mandate and even an occupation. The new political class that joined the traditional ruling elites consisted of warlords and privileged business leaders, that under Syrian patronage were able to protect their economic interests through inter-sectarian deals (Picard & and Ramsbotham, 2012, p.12).

Following Syria's withdrawal, the country has experienced a series of dramatic events. At each of these turning points, opportunities for postwar reconciliation and memory re-configuration were wasted. The situation swinging between war and peace has made it difficult to address the past. Some even believe that stable peace in Lebanon has been nothing more than an illusion (Ghosn & Khoury, 2001 p.387). For almost thirty years since

the alleged end of the war, Lebanon still oscillates between peace and war. As Joseph Bahout (2012) argues, Lebanon is living in precarious parenthesis "between two wars" (p.11). But does this ambiguous state of war and peace allow the Lebanese to claim that the war in Lebanon has not in fact ended? And what does that mean for the memory of the war?

Before delving into these questions, an examination of the media landscape in this political context is needed. A closer look into Lebanon's media system will lay the ground for understanding how the media work and function in Lebanon. Against this historical and political background, where do the media situate? Away from Western contexts, the media function in different models and have rather varying importance in societies. What follows contextualizes the media framework of this study. It explains how the media system functions in Lebanon and provides an overview of the press scene during and after the war.

2.4 The Media in Lebanon: Overview of a Fragmented Sphere

In order to understand the role of media in memory politics, one must take into consideration the dynamics between the political system and media system in the context of Lebanon.

From a normative perspective, the media system follows the political system it functions within. The pluralistic character of Lebanon is reflected in a diverse media scene and a free press. This is what an observer of the media in Lebanon would come to conclude. However, a closer look at the reality of the political system leads to different conclusions. The confessional system Lebanon came to exist as a result of, as noted previously, has influenced the way media initiate and function.

Lebanon has long been recognized as having one of the most open and diverse media environments in the Middle East. Commonly regarded as a 'beacon of plurality' in a region filled with restrictive media environments, Lebanon seemed to impose only few red lines of censorship on the press compared to the neighboring countries. Enjoying a certain margin of freedom, the media often criticizes state authorities and political figures. And in a region where public broadcasting is the norm, Lebanon was the first Arab country to permit private radio and television (International Press Institute, 2006).

As Marwan Kraidy (1999) argues, being the financial and publishing hub of the Middle East, prewar Lebanon was known for its flourishing press and multiple publishing houses. He further adds that press in Lebanon played a central role in the Arab world since the nineteenth century, "it was at the forefront of the political struggles that rocked the Middle East such as the Arab struggle against the Ottoman empire, Arab nationalism, and

the Arab-Israeli conflict" (p 485). The reason behind that, Kraidy (1999) explains, was the fact that Beirut, the Lebanese capital, was a safe haven for Arab dissidents.

At a first glance, the Lebanese media system seems to be pluralistic and free. Freedom however is relative and follows the political situation of the time. During war and in postwar, in the absence of a strong state, the media fell into the hands of non-state actors, owned and run by them. Hence, the diversity in media reflects a diversity or rather a multiplicity of political actors. In the words of Dajani (1992), the Lebanese media system is "disoriented and fragmented." Postwar media scene in particular, Kraidy (2002, 2003) reflects, is a *de facto* fragmentation into a "collective of public sphericules." The various studies on the Lebanese media system and its unique structure that stands out especially in the region have all concluded that the media serve the elite, known as the *Zuaama*, the communal leaders and, in many ways, the warlords (Dabbous-Sensenig, 2000; Rugh, 2004; Nötzold, 2009).

In her book investigating the Lebanese media system, Sara el-Richani (2016) concludes that factors like state weakness, the strengths of non-state actors, the small market and the politicized political culture are indicators that have a significant impact on the Lebanese media system. In her comparative approach to studying the media system in Lebanon against Hallin and Mancini's framework, El-Richani (2016) suggests adapting the CriSPP model, a hybrid model labeled in reference to its crisis-prone and small nature in addition to the attributes it shares with the Polarized Pluralist Model. The key characteristics of this adapted model are the impact of the conflict factor on the political and media system including a contentious political arena and culture, the effect of conflict on the media market and the subsequent instrumentalization of the media in politics, where power is shared.

As shown in this chapter, the political system in Lebanon is the result of ongoing conflicts, not only internally but also regionally. Prewar Lebanon, much like wartime and postwar Lebanon, is a contested battlefield in which many players of different political and sectarian backgrounds, often buoyed by outside support, shape its politics, and also its identity. The heightened political atmosphere in Lebanon has not only affected the political system, but also the media system.

Sectarianism and clientelism resulted in a political system governed by various patrons, or *Zuaama*, who despite being heads of parties and state actors, are still political patrons whose individual interests are far more important than that of the state. Following the political model, the media system in Lebanon is governed by the interests of different patrons and groups, who instrumentalize the media for their own benefit. The media system is a reflection of the political system that is pluralistic, confessional, consociational, and

"democratically-oriented" (Hafez, 2008, p.336). This sectarian-cliental and democratically-looking system has resulted in a weak state that has weak control. As Kraft, Al-Mazri, Wimmen & Zupan (2008) put it, the network of clientelism in Lebanon has not only limited the influence of the state but also taken over sectors that traditionally fall under the remit of the state, including the media. As a result of the war, the already-weak state media was weakened even more, and partisan media gained more influence. This has persisted during the postwar period, with the existence of a quasi-state. As El-Richani (2016) clearly puts it, "While state intervention plays an important role in shaping media systems, in Lebanon and in light of the state's weakness, the role of non-state actors appears to be just as influential" (p.54). The weakness of the state has meant that all state attempts to regulate and monitor the media were in vain – specifically in the postwar period. As the following subchapter explores further, the postwar period witnessed some attempts to change media regulations. However, the problem does not reside in the laws themselves but rather in their implementation – specifically in a context where sectarian warlords are not only more powerful than the state, but also own the media. The latest report on media ownership in Lebanon by the Media Ownership Monitor (Reporters Without Borders (RSF) & Samir Kassir Foundation, 2018) has revealed that the media market is, in fact, controlled by only a few highly politicized owners that are either directly affiliated with political parties or belong to Lebanese dynasties. The report showed that despite the apparent diversity on the Lebanese media scene, 78.4% of the covered media outlets are politically affiliated, and 32% of the most popular media outlets surveyed are in the hands of around twelve prominent Lebanese families. The report in fact coins the term "political familism" to represent the close relationship between political families and the media. According to the report, twelve major families own the media, and can be divided into three groups: those who had been active in the media then gradually entered politics after making a strong name for themselves in the media first – like the family of Tueni that owns *An-Nahar*; those who invested in the media scene after being in the political arena for a while; and those who had a parallel life as their political role has always been backed by a presence in the media sector. This monopoly over the media by a few reflects the parallelism between the political and media systems. Monopolizing the media is problematic not only from an economic point of view, but also from the perspective of media pluralism. This is also challenging in a post-conflict society, where the polarization of the media means a polarized control over the narrative, and a rough path towards memory construction, national identity building and postwar stability.

Although it is safe to say that the media system in Lebanon is fragmented and highly polarized, the press scene in particular seems to be slightly different than broadcast media.

2.4.1 The press scene in Lebanon

Historically, Lebanon has had one of the highest ratios of private newspapers per head in the Arab world (Rugh, 2004). Until the late 2000s, in spite of various laws and regulations which will be discussed later, Lebanon still has 25 permanent political dailies, among which up to 15 are Arabic political dailies (Boutros, 2009). The latest MOM report (Reporters Without Borders (RSF) & Samir Kassir Foundation, 2018) argues that today, out of the 110 licensed print outlets in the country, only 10 daily newspapers and less than 20 political weekly or monthly magazines are still published.

A historical reading of the press scene in Lebanon takes us back to the 19th century, even before Lebanon came to exist as a country. Beirut then was a hub for freedom of expression and home to several newspapers. Press was pluralistic, and journalists enjoyed a large margin of freedom. It is even well acknowledged that *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, a newspaper published in 1857 by Khalil Al Khouri in what was known as Syria (as Lebanon was part of Syria), had played a significant role in its coverage of the early sparks of the 1860 sectarian rivalries in Lebanon. Kraidy (1999) argues that Europe played a role in promoting the media role:

> European efforts to protect Lebanese Christians under nineteenth-century Ottoman rule gave the Lebanese press a relatively high level of freedom, since Christians were active in Lebanese journalistic circles. Consequently, a variety of newspapers and magazines reflected the religious, political, and cultural pluralism of the population. (p.486)

The important role the press played in forming an intellectual and political anti-Ottoman atmosphere put newspapers under strict Ottoman political control, and "over the years, the severe restrictions imposed on the print media served as a unifying factor, bringing together journalists and political activists and creating a nationalistic outlook" (Dabbous-Sensenig, 2007). Ottoman control became violent in 1916, when the Ottoman governor of Lebanon, Jamal Pasha, gave the order to execute 31 nationalist dissidents of whom 16 were journalists (Kassir, 2003). The execution took place in *al-Burj* square in Beirut, which later became the Martyr's square, where major protests took place over the last decade.

However, after independence in 1943, press restrictions lessened and newspapers and magazines proliferated (Kraidy, 1999). Nevertheless, as a result of Arab political sponsoring of Lebanese publications and the decrease in advertising rates due to the abundance of media outlets, a law was adopted in the early 1960s to restrict publishing and limit the number of publication licenses to twenty-five political dailies and twenty weeklies (Kraidy, 1999). The 1962 Law protected the press from random abusive interventions and shielded the state and its citizens from biased campaigns in the press. What it also did, however, was imposing sanctions for insulting heads of states or stimulating sectarian tensions (Kraidy, 1999). This placed more restrictions on the press and reduced its margin of freedom. The press also had to self-censor to protect itself from retaliation.

With the eruption of the war in 1975, the press entered a new era, one in which this study is interested. As Kraidy (1999) notes during the war, "some journalists and publishers were harassed for publishing material offensive to local and regional powers" (p.487). The war witnessed the emergence of new, illegal publications financed by the various militias and warring parties as propaganda tools, to promote their identity and supporting their views. These publications did not present news, but rather highlighted the views of the militias and parties they belonged to. Since the granting of official licenses had been frozen in 1983, illegal publications appeared, mostly directly financed by militias. Financiers and publishers also included religious communities, parties and other domestic and foreign political groups. In terms of content, writings were more similar to underground pamphlets than serious newspapers, which often depicted only a wrapped view of reality. Such selective and biased reporting is seldom of interest beyond the narrow target audience. The purpose of these publications was more to create an identity within a group or community and mobilize it in the face of life-threatening war situations, which "resulted in the fragmentation of the media market and landscape" (Dajani, 1992 p.65).

The war has left the press without any state interreference, as there were greater problems to be dealt with. But this did not mean that media were free. State supervision was replaced by far more serious control from the militias that ruled in their respective provinces or districts. Such supervision was never democratically legitimized and was often imposed by the force of arms. Newspapers were forced to reflect the opinions of those who controlled the area in which the editorial office was located. In fragmented Beirut, if the newspaper's main office was in the east, it was very unlikely that they were able to reflect any opinion hostile to the militias located in the east. This caused serious threats to freedom of expression; journalists were victims of assassinations and editors were constantly threatened.

Political pressure in fact resulted in violent attacks, and two journalists were killed in 1980 (Kraidy, 1999). In addition, some newspapers faced economic pressures. As a result of the war, newspapers were not able to sustain themselves financially, and the rapid currency devaluation of the Lebanese pound coupled with inflation in the late 1980s even forced some newspapers to declare bankruptcy and go out of print. Notable newspapers, like *An-Nahar*, had to borrow money from Banks to continue publishing. *An-Nahar*'s debts to Banque Méditerranée was estimated at the end of the war to be in the order of several million dollars (Nesemann, 2001). As the war came to a supposed end, and with the Ta'if Agreement referring to the need to reorganize the chaos in audiovisual media and the mushrooming of illegal TV and radio stations, a new law was introduced. The Broadcast Law of 1994 limited the creation of new media outlets by introducing a licensing system with prohibitive fees, imposed vaguely-formulated constraints and censorship mechanisms that resulted in random filtering of information, content, and ideas, and allowed financial control by the state. The Audio-Visual Law provided a much-needed regulatory framework for broadcasting in the country, according to Kraidy (1998). As for the print media, no postwar regulation was set, and the press remains governed by the 1962 Press Act and the 1977 amendments (by Decree 104 / 77). What concerns the press is roughly the law's re-affirmation of media freedom within the framework of the constitution (Kraidy, 1998). Article 13 of the Lebanese constitution (Republic of Lebanon, 23 May 1926) clearly states the right to freedom of expression through oral or written means and makes an explicit reference to "freedom of the press."

Nonetheless, this was not implemented. Free press is threatened by many red lines. Unlike the audiovisual sector, there is no official censorship in the press. Rather, auto-censorship is practiced. Reality shows that media freedom is a vague term in Lebanon, and its application falls under a grey area. The fact that newspapers are bound by either their owners or advertisers dictates a certain political allegiance. The press law placed restrictions on licensing and licenses became 'privileges' that could be sold and rented to the highest bidder (Dajani, 1992; El-Richani, 2016). The fee for establishing a political publication is hundreds of thousands of dollars, and investors are forced to buy an existing but dormant license from a license holder. For these reasons, freedom of the press faces political and financial constraints. The survival of newspapers depends on the influence of political or religious affinities (Dajani, 1992, p.52), on whoever provides them with either money or power. Not only is newspaper ownership in the hands of a few families, a few political parties, or financed or supported by regional powers, journalists and press contributors are

also politicized. The macro-level of the press looks quite similar to the micro-level, the journalists. Journalists are either underpaid, and therefore follow the orders of donors (Dajani, 1992) and take bribery, or they are highly politicized and promote the agenda of the political front they adhere to. Journalists and media practitioners in Lebanon tend to view their role not as mere messengers, but as frontline defenders of a certain political position they either truly believe in or are paid to support. During *Pax Syriana*, the press was under an undeclared censorship. At the surface, it seemed there was some sort of political agreement and postwar stability, but in reality, the press was restricted, and there were constraints on freedom of expression imposed by the presence of the 'Big Brother' (Nesemann, 2001, p.96) –or rather 'sister' Syria. The margin grew slightly after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005.

Although the press in Lebanon has a better history of freedom compared to neighboring countries and its journalists have helped establish media outlets in many Arab countries, the war and postwar period constrained the media and the freedom of journalists. Political circumstances limited the margin of freedom, whether by a complex political network of affiliations, or a choice of self-censorship.

Next, the background of two newspapers this study takes as its unit of analysis is put forward. As will be explained in Chapter 4, *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* were selected for being representatives of two different political ideologies. This description shall lay the contextual ground for the theoretical approach to the press role in conflict and post-conflict societies.

2.4.1.1 The two pillars of the Lebanese press: *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*

While the press scene in Lebanon is quite packed, with the existence of partisan and politically-affiliated outlets, two newspapers have existed for a long time, and seen as the main influential newspapers in Lebanon. With one being rather liberal, *An-Nahar*, and another left-wing leaning, *As-Safir*, the two newspapers were the two most popular Arabic newspapers published, with 50,000 and 45,000 daily copies, respectively (Trombetta, 2010). The two newspapers were considered the main opinion-leading outlets in the country.

An-Nahar newspaper: the moderate center-right

An-Nahar, an Arabic-language newspaper, started publishing in 1933. The newspaper that started as a four-page hand-set paper was founded by Gebran Tueni, passed down to his son Ghassan, then to the grandson Gebran. Following Gebran Tueni's (the grandson) assassination in 2005, the father Ghassan took over the editorial role again, until his death

in 2012. From then on, his granddaughter, and Gebran's eldest, Nayla, assumed the role of editor-in-chief. The newspaper has several shareholders, among which was Rafiq Hariri for a few years, and Saudi mogul al-Walid Bin Talal. In the words of Fatima Issawi (2006), *An-Nahar* is an opinion leader, a school of journalism in itself. Considered a leading newspaper in Lebanon, *An-Nahar* abides by a high level of professionalism and has welcomed contributions throughout the years from a wide variety of journalists, writers, politicians, and opinion leaders.

Although it is difficult to put *An-Nahar* in a specific political category, it can be said that the newspaper is moderate, center-right, and liberal. During the war, Ghassan Tueni was its editor-in-chief, and the newspaper, according to one of its editors, Rafiq Chlela (R. Chlela, personal communication, December 20, 2011) was not bias in favor of any warring front. Despite the newspaper's claim, right-wing Christian parties found it to be the closest to them and their ideas. In this context, Chlela (R. Chlela, personal communication, December 20, 2011) says "The newspaper was not blindly supporting the right-wing parties, nor did it defend the leftist parties in a committed way. The "secret of *An-Nahar* was that it presented all viewpoints and news and left the reader to make up their own mind" (R. Chlela, personal communication, December 20, 2011). According to Chlela, the newspaper's real role was to speak up against the war and to call for its end. *An-Nahar*'s attitude towards the war, says Chlela, was a positive bias. In the same way, Issawi (2006) claims that *An-Nahar* was the newspaper of the opposition only when Christians were at risk (p.141). In the postwar period, *An-Nahar* supported reconstruction efforts. Besides physical reconstruction, *An-Nahar* is believed to have fostered discussions about the war. Particularly, in *al-mulhaq al-thaqafi*, a literary supplement that was published weekly, *An-Nahar* fostered discussions especially about memory. *Al-mulhaq* started in the 1960s and stopped during the war. But in 1992, it came back and became home for various intellectuals who saw this space as distinct from the newspaper's right-leaning moderate position, and as a hub for postwar freedom and war discussions. Although this study does not include *al-mulhaq* in its corpus, as it focuses only on articles published in the main newspaper, it is important to acknowledge its existence and role when interpreting the findings of this study. In 2005, *An-Nahar* played a major role in supporting what was called the Cedars Revolution following the assassination of Hariri and was even seen as the mouthpiece of the movement. When its editor-in-chief Gebran Tueni and contributing opinion writer Samir Kassir were assassinated, it became even clearer that the newspaper was seen as a major player in the movement calling for the end of the Syrian presence in Lebanon and considered by its opponents as the mouthpiece of the

muaarada (opposition) in its challenge against the pro-Syrian regime (Haugbolle, 2010). In the post-2005 era, *An-Nahar* became an advocate for the 14 March coalition.

As-Safir Newspaper: the pan-Arab left

As-Safir was first published in 1974 by Talal Salman, who was also the editor-in-chief. The newspaper was an Arabic daily and remained so until December 2016, when the last issue was published on the last day of the year. Its publisher, Talal Salman (T. Salman, personal communication, December 6, 2011) describes the newspaper as a national, progressive, pan-Arab and leftist, in the broad interpretation of the words and not their tight partisan meaning. As its slogan says, the newspaper is "the voice of the Arab world in Lebanon and the voice of Lebanon in the Arab world," The newspaper was thus a mouthpiece for the Lebanese left, in all its different fractions, which has always had pan-Arab tendencies after the war of June 1967 and the rise of leftist intellectuals. Thus, their motto, "The voice of the voiceless" was inspired by the cause the newspaper supported: giving a voice to the left-wing after the big defeat of 1967.

The newspaper has been long known for sympathizing with the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause. During the war, its pro-Arabist and pro-Palestinian stances were clear, and it was considered a newspaper that reflects left-leaning political positions. Its pan-Arab approach also made it read by Muslims and seculars in the country and encouraged progressive Muslim and secular intellectuals to publish in it. From the 1990s on, however, the newspaper manifested clear pro-Hizbullah and pro-Syria tendencies, and dedicated its pages to more writers on that side. At the surface, this might seem to be contradictory: How can a left-leaning publication support Hizbullah and the Syrian regime? A closer look into the Lebanese context explains how a coalition can occur between the pan-Arabist, anti-Western, pro-Palestianin outlet, and what is a self-proclaimed 'resistance front' that is anti-Westernization and wants to liberate Palestine and stand in the face of the American-Israeli Axis. In the postwar period, the newspaper was also known to be critical of Hariri's neo-liberal policies, despite some claims of Hariri's financial support for the newspaper in 1997 (Nesemann, 2001). Post 2005, the newspaper became committed to its pro-Hizbullah stance, and gave space to the March 8th alliance, while continuing to abide by its leftist tendencies. It was however challenged by *Al-Akhbar*, a newspaper emerging in 2006 as the new voice of the left. In 2016, the newspaper stopped publishing for financial reasons, thus ending its long history in the Lebanese press landscape.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

The background presented in this chapter lays ground for the context of this study. Examining the modern history of Lebanon and the media landscape is crucial to understanding how the war was framed. The findings this study discusses are read in conjunction with the political and media context dominating a specific period of time, be it the wartime or the postwar period, with all the internal fragmentations and disputes.

Although the war started in 1975, its causes can be traced back to before the inception of Lebanon as an independent entity. Sectarian divisions and conflicts, privileges associated with belonging to a specific confession, socio-economic inequalities and unfair treatment of underprivileged groups, are among the internal reasons that paved the way for a complex war. The different complexities that characterized the different phases of the war, demonstrate how the past influenced the way the war became and developed. The dispute over Lebanon's identity encouraged the reliance on outside help and facilitated interference in internal affairs at the expense of peacemaking. Regional and international powers intervened in the war and gave leverage to some over others during different battles in the war. As the war unfolded, coalitions changed and alliances shifted, making it difficult to have a clear understanding of the war, and therefore of its memory, as one can argue. Should the war be remembered as a Christian-Muslim war? or as an intra-confessional war? or as a war imposed by the outside? and how can the different scenarios co-exist after the end of the war?

The no-peace-no-war state in the postwar period can be considered a *force majeure* contributing to difficulties facing memory in Lebanon. Two factors must be highlighted in this regard. First, reconciliation or rather the lack of, in the postwar period, has made a national dialogue almost impossible. The Ta'if Agreement was an accord reached between the political elites, or rather warlords, and not amongst the people. Thus, the settlement was reached politically, without any consideration for the resolution of underlying issues of the conflict. To this date, no national reconciliation has taken place, and the war chapter was forcefully closed without any closure. This is linked to a second factor: amnesty. In 1991, the Lebanese parliament passed a General Amnesty Law (No. 84/91), pardoning crimes committed during the war, including war crimes and crimes against humanity (Halawi-Ghosn & Khoury, 2011, p.390). Then, it was believed that this step was necessary to give all parties a clean slate. However, those who benefited most were the warlords who remained in power without any trial. Instead of reconciling citizens based on the principles of justice and the rule of law, what Lebanon's ruling elites did was allowing themselves to remain in

power, consolidating their position as superior to the rest of the population (Halawi-Ghosn & Khoury, 2011, p.390). What this law also did, argues Michael Young (2000) was preventing any acknowledgment of the war, as it simply "encouraged the Lebanese to forget their crimes" (p.45).

So how did this 'negative peace' state, affect the collective memory of the war? This is a core question this study aims to address

With regards to the media landscape, political familism and partisanship dominated in wartime and the postwar period, reflecting similarities in the political and media systems. The press, in particular, was often used as a tool for advancement of certain political agendas, dictated by the sponsors or influenced by political affiliations. Freedom of the press was undermined, and the margins within which the press functions changed according to political circumstances and power relationships. Laws were never applied, and even when they were, they served the elites. In light of the complicated press and media landscape, whether in wartime or in the postwar period, the role of the press as an agent of memory remains unexamined. As the press becomes a tool in the hands of either the wealthy or political parties, does that affect the way it portrays the past? Are media independent, or do they adopt certain narratives imposed or influenced by their sponsors? By looking at how two different newspapers framed the war, this study seeks to provide an understanding of the media's role in constructing memory in a post-conflict fragmented society.

But what is memory, anyway? What are the essential questions on the issue of memory in the Lebanese context? And how does memory as a theory frame this study on the discourse on the war in the media? The following chapter attempts to answer these questions.

CHAPTER 3

MEMORY AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Looking at the complex background of Lebanon's modern history, one is left wondering what individuals in the society retain and remember. Remembering is the keyword here. What one chooses to remember is shaped by many personal and circumstantial factors. How individuals remember has been an important question in the field of psychology. How societies remember became an urgent inquiry in various scholarly fields. As this study investigates how a post-conflict society discursively remembers its past, a memory studies theoretical approach is adapted and put forward.

In this chapter, the main key concepts that come to the forefront frequently in discussions of collective memory and remembering are outlined. The chapter begins by examining how different scholars have treated these concepts in order to establish the broad theoretical framework for this study. This review of literature and concepts, at both the theoretical and empirical levels, entails the links between the broad concepts of collective memory, identity, war and commemoration, and discusses the role of media and public intellectuals in memory construction before posing the main research question in the context of Lebanon. First, it looks at the definitions of collective memory, and the diverse scholarship on the topic, and defines collective memory as understood it in the context of this research. Then, it looks at the relationship between memory and identity in a broader sense in order to comprehend how the two nurture each other. Furthermore, it defines what memory means when it comes to wars, and how this can be theoretically understood in the context of post-conflict societies. On the relationship between memory and the media, this chapter tackles various fronts. It investigates the role of media as agents of memory, questioning their function in providing the public space for other memory agents to practice memory construction. Of the many memory agents, it focuses on public intellectuals, examining the nature and role of their involvement in memory construction. Lastly, it links the theoretical framework to the Lebanese context and formulates the research questions.

3.1 On Collective Memory

The issue of memory has been a topic of major discussion for a few decades now. Academia has been investigating memory in the spheres of neuroscience, psychology,

sociology, history and anthropology. All these various disciplines tried to incorporate memory under their umbrella. However, memory has developed as a discipline of its own, called 'memory studies.' This relatively new field of research also feeds into and build on the other aforementioned disciplines. One can say that memory studies is an inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary field of research at the same time. The term has been used and placed in different contexts to the extent that John Gillis (1994) argued that it may be "losing precise meaning in proportion to its growing rhetorical power" (p.3).

In his review of collective memory literature, Wertsch (2002) notes that collective memory has been examined by scholars from anthropology (Cole, 1998, 2001), sociology (Halbwachs, 1992; Schudson, 1990, 1995; Schwartz, 1991), communication and rhetoric (Billig, 1990; Middleton & Edwards,1990; Schudson,1992), and history (Bodnar,1992; Crane,1997; Confino,1997; Novick,1999). He notices how literature is mostly focused on individual memory rather than collective memory. One of the reasons for that is the lack of agreement on the nature of collective memory and its categories and fields of study.

To trace the history of the emergence of the memory studies field, Joanne Garde-Hansen (2011) argues that early memory studies was established by the seminal texts of Maurice Halbwachs, Henri Bergson, Paul Ricoeur, Pierre Nora, and others. Later in this chapter, their main contributions to this field will be emphasized. What can be said about their works altogether is that they came as a reaction to twentieth century Europe failing to fight fascism, trying to rewrite history and, against the despair and loss of people, their memories and archives. For these writers and thinkers, memory, remembering and recording are the very key to existence, becoming and belonging (Garde-Hansen, 2011, p.18).

Researchers on the history of memory studies seem to argue that the fall of communism and the decline of utopian visions fostered a recall of the past and an incline towards the recollection of past identities and collective pasts. As Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011) explain, the memory boom unleashed a culture of trauma and regret, and states were allegedly judged on how well they atone for their past misdeeds rather than on how well they meet their fiscal obligations or inspire future projects.

In the field of contemporary memory studies, Halbwachs is often considered the founding father whose ideas generated discussion over memory, and particularly collective memory. Halbwachs's interest in memory combined insights from two important figures in late nineteenth-century France, philosopher Henri Bergson and sociologist Emile Durkheim, both of whom were concerned – though in very different ways – with so-called

advances in European 'civilization.' However, and as Olick et al. (2011) assert, Halbwachs gave the term 'collective memory' a theoretical weight previously unknown, and his ideas have indeed been generative for much of the more serious subsequent scholarship.

In his early book *On collective memory* (1992)[1], Halbwachs argues that memory is first of all a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are not simply mediated by social arrangements but are in fact structured by them: "It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories" (p.38). Within the disciplines of sociology, history and cultural theory, the phrase 'collective memory' proposes that practices of remembrance are shaped and reinforced by the societies and cultures in which they occur (Rossington & Whitehead, 2007).

At the same time, a great deal of the contemporary sociological literature on collective memory has been inspired by Halbwachs's and others' implications that memory is formed largely in the present rather than in the past and is thus to be seen from the perspective of contemporary interests. For him, memories are created in the present in response to society which sometimes obliges people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, "but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess" (Halbwachs, 1992, p.51). In that sense, memory serves the present's interests, regardless of its conformity to its past reality.

Research on memory in general is biased towards the past and focuses mainly on memory understood as a retrospective form and practice. However, few researchers focus on the concept of prospective memory (Lang & Lang, 1989; Adam, 2004; Welzer, 2010a, 2010b; Schmidt, 2010; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2011). For many of them, memory is not only a continuous process that takes place in the present, constructing the past, but also a process that includes an illustration of the future. This is what Trümper and Neverla (2013) call the 'prospective turn' in the context of sustainable memory that "serves as an orientation in the present to make decisions and establish future actions" (p.6).

In her article on time and memory, Halas (2010) projects a triangular concept of memory encompassing past, present and future. She discusses the relationship between time, history and memory regarding the reflexivity of knowledge about the past and

[1] The book was written in 1925 in French: *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (1925). It was translated into English in 1992.

orientation towards the future from a cultural perspective. Using the topic of cultural memory and collective trauma as an example, she stresses the temporality of memory, which is not limited to the past but also includes the future. She challenges Jan Assmann's (1995) distinction of cultural and communicated memory and connects these two memory forms and grasps memory as communicative acts, which transmit "reflexive knowledge about the past from the perspective of a future present" (Halas, 2010, p.313).

For Halbwachs, Durkheim's student, studying memory was not a matter of reflecting philosophically on inherent properties of the subjective mind; memory is a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are not simply mediated but are structured by social arrangements: "It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories…" (Halbwachs 1992, p.38).

In order to make a clear line definition between collective memory and individual memory, one needs to define each separately and unwind the distinctions between them. One key component of individual memory is its reliance on a factual past, meaning that individual memory focuses on an accurate representation of the past, while collective memory often regards the past as a contested and negotiable field.

Major distinctions also exist between collective memory and history. Collective memory is single, deriving from a single perspective reflecting a certain group's social framework, and is self-conscious, while history is objective, distancing itself from any particular perspective, reflecting no particular social framework, and has a critical and reflective stance, as Wertsch (2002) argues. Historical consciousness is fixated on the past, the 'then' separately from the 'now.' Collective memory thus denies the pastness of events and links the past to the continuing present and upcoming future.

Novick (1999) argues that typically a collective memory, at least a significant collective memory, is understood to express some eternal or essential truth about the group – usually tragic. Wertsch (2002) recalls Novick's argument on memory that, once being established, it comes to define that eternal truth, and, along with it, an eternal identity, for the members of the group. He agrees with Halbwachs about the simplifying tendencies of collective memory. Its tendency to see things from a "single, committed perspective," its impatience with ambiguities, and its tendency to "reduce events to mythic archetypes" (1999, pp.3–4) all stand in contrast with what professional historians strive to do, at least in principle. Nora (1989) likewise argues that in place of the "dictatorial . . . unself-

conscious, commanding" tendencies of memory, "at the heart of history is a critical discourse that is antithetical to spontaneous memory" (pp.8–9).

Halbwachs considers memory as fluid and flexible. It is subject to change and reconstruction over time, and closely related to identity and present context. The way people remember and how they embody those memories could me more telling about their current needs and concerns than about their past. In Halbwachs's (1992) own words, "the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present" (p.40). Halbwachs's fixed take on society differentiates between history being the primary mode of knowledge of a past with which we no longer have an intimate connection, and collective memory, being an organic, ever transforming social recollection of times past. Collective memory is not seen as an alternative to history (or historical memory) but is rather shaped by it as well as by commemorative symbolism and ritual, as Olick and Robbins (1998) argue. For Halbwachs, history is dead memory, a way of preserving pasts to which we no longer have an 'organic' experiential relation (Olick & Robbins, 1998). The line of division between history and memory is certainly more blurred in today's scholarship than it has ever been before.

Barry Schwartz (1991) has probably put forward the most concise definition of collective memory: "Collective memory is a metaphor that formulates society's retention and loss of information about its past in the familiar terms of individual remembering and forgetting" (p.302). Collective memory by definition refers to the social distribution of beliefs, feelings, and moral judgments about the past. Schwartz (2008) regards history as an adjunct to memory. He sees the primary vehicles of collective memory as history: the establishing and propagating of facts about the past through research monographs, textbooks, museums, and mass media; and commemoration: the process of selecting from the historical record those facts most relevant to society's ideals and symbolizing them by iconography, monuments, shrines, place-names, and ritual observance (p.76).

When defining collective memory, Hirst and Manier (2008) rely on Aleida Assmann's (1999) argument that collective memories must be defined in terms of the function they play in society. Assmann differentiated between the terms *Erinnerung* and *Gedächtnis*. *Erinnerung* is a purely individual act, and it happens when one remembers as an individual person. When it comes to nations, being a larger group, Assmann uses the term *Gedächtnis* to signify when nations create remembrance, for the purpose of keeping part of their past ever-present. Assmann thus advocates 'anniversaries,' or days of remembrance, as they are essential in creating and keeping a nation's collective memory.

Both Maurice Halbwachs and Jan Assmann tackle the issue of duration of individual and collective memory. For them, the duration of memory depends on generations and generational changes, which – according to Assmann (1992) – take place after 80 to 100 years. In this time horizon, people from up to four generations can directly exchange experience as well as narrations about the past through communication (Trümper & Neverla, 2013). As Assmann also emphasizes, the social memory of an event will change once there is no one alive to tell the tale from their own experience, or to have heard it told by those who experienced it themselves. Assmann is one of the pioneers in what is referred to as 'cultural memory.' He has suggested that the way to bridge the gap between 'social' and 'cultural' memory, is by a 'communicative' memory. As Jann Assmann (2008) notes, the term 'communicative memory' was introduced "in order to delineate the difference between Halbwachs's concept of 'collective memory' and Aleida Assmann's understanding of 'cultural memory.' Cultural memory is thus a form of collective memory, shared by a group, and binding them into a collective, that is, cultural, identity. And since Halbwachs was careful to keep his concept of collective memory apart from the realm of traditions, transmissions, and transferences, he broke his concept of collective memory into 'communicative' and 'cultural memory,' while insisting on including the cultural sphere, which he excluded, in the study of memory (Assmann, 2008).

If a memory is widely held by members of a community, but has little meaning for the community, then it should be treated as a 'shared' or 'collected memory,' not as a 'collective memory' (Olick, 1999; Hirst & Manier, 2002; Manier & Hirst, 2008). A collective memory, Hirst and Manier (2002) note, can only be said to form if a community converges on a shared rendering. Collective memory is thus the shared individual memories that shape collective identity. Before further exploring the role of the individual in the construction of collective memory, it is important to stress that the keyword here is 'shared,' as individual memories become collective only when they become shared. A community may construct, appropriate, or in some other manner arrive at social resources and mnemonic practices. Hirst and Manier (2008) refer to this as the design process. This study refers to it as the memory construction process.

When defining collective memory, Neiger, Meyers, and Zandberg (2011) specify five aspects of it. They first identify it as a socio-political construct, in the sense that it's a version of the past, selected to be remembered by a given agent in a community. They note that its construction is a continuous, multi-directional process characterized and defined via an oppositional yet complementary movement from the present to the past and from

the past to the present. The past and present are thus inter-connected. In addition, collective memory is functional; the past is recollected to be used for a certain purpose in the present. For that to happen, collective memory must be concretized, and must not remain in abstract form. And lastly, collective memory is narrational, it comes in the form of a story line, with a beginning and some sort of an end. These five features Neiger et al. (2011) address in their work guide this study's understanding of collective memory in terms of its characteristics, flexibility and complex nature.

But no matter how complicated it may seem, collective memory always starts with the individual, and goes back to the individual. In Halbwachs's theoretical construction, individual memory is entirely dependent on the collective; "it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in [the social framework] and participates in this memory that is capable of the act of recollection" (Coser, 1992, p.38). For Halbwachs, collective memory is not a static entity – like identity, it too is negotiated. Depending on the particular historical and sociopolitical moment, "society represents the past to itself in different ways: it modifies its conventions. As every one of its members accepts these conventions, they inflect their recollections in the same direction in which collective memory evolves" (Coser, 1992, p.173). In terms of social nature of memory, it is Halbwachs' pioneering work that emphasizes the collective role of remembering and the indivisibility of remembering from its social context. Memory is not merely the recall of the past as it was experienced; Halbwachs (1950) states that an individual's memory is the "intersection of collective influences" from that of the conventions of the family to the norms of the culture to which the individual belongs (p.44). The relationship between memory and social environment is not a one-way flow: although what is remembered is dictated by the groups in which we participate, remembering also has a social function in the present. By remembering according to particular social conventions, those conventions are constantly being affirmed and re-constructed (Keightley, 2008, p.176).

Examining memory is a journey that takes us from the individual memory shaped by society, towards a collective production of memory by various practices, communication being one of them. The theoretical approach this study adopts is a comprehensive understanding of collective memory as a dynamic social product, fluid and flexible, constantly changing and molding, often contested, constructed through individual contributions as well as group influences, navigating through narratives that change according to contextual needs and circumstantial changes. This dynamic approach to memory is used to explore how memory is associated with identity in the specific context

of social conflicts, and how memory is constructed through the active agents of media and public intellectuals.

3.1.1 On memory and identity

Memory and identity are mutually reinforcing, for memory shapes identity, and identity interferes with remembering.

Besides its cultural function, memory has a political one – essential to the creation of group identity. Similarly to official history, collective national memory legitimatizes the nation state, and helps envision a post-conflict government. Both during and after conflict, memory is also the means of creating and identifying 'the other,' the 'enemy' that needs to be eliminated in order for the group to survive. Consequently, the two concepts of collective identity and its associated memory can be problematic. Identity politics based on race and ethnicity, feed into traditions of exclusionary nationalism, even genocide. In a society divided by conflict, memory risks becoming used as a tool for further division.

Identity, much like memory, is a social construct. It is constructed with connection to what a certain group feels they are not. The construction of a certain 'we' and a certain 'them' lies in identification and is both constructed and transported through discourse. The discourse eventually circulates in the media, in cultural rituals and practices, thus constructing a collective identity. The link between identity and memory is very tight though.

According to Laclau (2005), society is a construction that does not stem from any pre-defined basis. The defining element of society structures is discourse. Social identities are thus constructed as differential, that is, the existence of externality, or 'the other' is fundamental to their establishment (Laclau, 2005). Laclau and Mouffe (1985) use Lacan's psychoanalysis to explain the construction of collective identities, focusing on identification. They argue that identity is always marked by a lack. Identity, be it individual or collective, is never complete and, accordingly, identification – and not identity - becomes the key category. Collective identities are thus constituted through a process of identification, which is an ongoing and always incomplete process (Thomassen, 2016).

In the presence of a collective memory one must talk about a collective identity, and when memory becomes memories, so does identity risks becoming identities. In postwar societies, memory construction comes along with identity construction, or reconstruction. The relationship between memory and identity is a two-way relationship; memory molds identity, and identity influences how the past is recalled. As Lyons (1996) argues, groups

are likely to construct, sustain and reconstruct memories in such a way as to show their own continuity, collective self-esteem, distinctiveness, efficacy and cohesion. According to Larkin (2012) "this inclination towards exclusive readings of the past and particularistic narratives can lead to the dangerous politicization of memory and the legitimization of ethno-national myths and propaganda" (p.18).

In light of Michel Foucault's discursive practices, one can see collective memory through a power-dominance lens; there are different narratives, different 'memories,' and accordingly the dominance of a certain group at some point in history dictates the narrative or memory to be used, and those to be hidden, marginalized or forgotten. Thus, as this study takes a longitudinal approach throughout a long period of war and postwar, it aims at understanding how narratives change or shift according to the dominance of a certain group, or voice in the media.

In a complex socio-historical context, memory work takes a critical dimension, as not only memory is contested, but so are identities. This is particularly the case when there is a defining link between group identities and memory discourses. As Roudometof (2002) puts it: "It is necessary to view the narratives of the various sides as forms of collective memory – and not as objective accounts of historical process" (p.6). Here, it seems only appropriate to examine some aspects of identity politics.

Identity is malleable; it is not necessarily only religion, history, ethnicity or nationality, it's all of those things together, in fact. What identity politics proposes is the use of a certain aspect of identity in order to form a group. In his interrogation of the definition of identity and its expediency as a concept, Hall (1996) argues that identities are constructed within discourse and it's the production of identity—with its emphasis on the marking of difference, rather than sameness, that falls under the guise of ideology. For according to Hall (1996), "…identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions" (p.4). The whole question of instrumentalization of identity surfaces when put into the context of the future. In a post-conflict society, even though identity construction seems to stem from historical past, it actually addresses "questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being" (Hall, 1996, p.4). Identity construction does not seek to define "who we are" or "where we came from", "so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves" (Hall, 1996, p.4). Constituted within representation, identities connect the past to the future. They

are needed by people who need to differentiate themselves from others – by itself both a manifestation of a need to belong and a need to confront.

Social movement theorist Alberto Melucci (1995) argues that collective identities are not fixed. Rather they are in flux. Defining group identities is always a process of transition, since they are constructed and negotiated through the repeated interaction of the individuals who share and construct them (Melucci, 1995). Sharing and constructing seems to be common prerequisites for any process of identity or memory formation. This takes us to the next dialectic; memory and war. How does the construction of identity come into play with the construction of memory in postwar? And how does a society construct its postwar memory in relation to identity?

3.1.2 On memory and war

What concerns this study is war-related memory. Putting memory in the specific context of wartime and postwar is a crucial theoretical exercise. Memory in this sense is no separate from remembrance, whether it's an act – an actual commemoration, or simply a memory that lingers in every aspect of life, during and after the war.

Memories, especially those of a violent past, tend to remain longer in the collective mind. For when there's also an unresolved past, memories will often come to surface. Memories tend to resurface the most around commemorations. As Schudson (1997) puts it, "the past seeps into the present whether or not its commemoration is institutionalized" (p.15). Remembering the past, in fact, does not serve the recollection of it alone. It tells, as Halbwachs (1992) says, about the present, as the way in which people remember actually tells us more about the present than about the past.

As Keightley (2008) notes, memory has enjoyed a well-charted resurgence in the postwar period in cultural production, social life and academic study (see Huyssen 2000; Misztal 2003; Radstone 2000). This study is a humble contribution, at the theoretical level, to how memory, and the perception of the past, is represented in postwar period, notably in a war that was labeled and contested in various manners.

Memory, as a social product, crafted as the interaction of individual memory and that of social networks and community at large, is a process. This process, as Halbwachs advanced in 1925, is an ever-changing representation of the past. And as Barlett (1932) furthermore develops, humans rely on summaries or 'schemes' of the past in the process of remembering. Memory construction thus starts with a recollection of the past based on those

schemes, often adding or changing into them. How is that appropriated in the context of a past conflict?

Memory studies in the context of war and conflict has been a developing field of study in recent decades and will continue to be. Literature have argued that post-conflict identity and nation building have become conjoined with the urgency to deal with the disruptive past. Without that, it becomes difficult to reach any form of peaceful present and co-existence. The interim period between the past and the present – often coined as 'transitional' - differs from one societal context to the other and provides "a delimited space for negotiation" (Wilson, 2001). It is an on-going process of negotiating the past that fosters memory construction.

The body of literature on the topic is rich with examples from various conflicts. For comparative reasons, this study looks particularly at empirical examples of civil conflicts in order to understand how memory materialized in post-civil conflict societies. A closer look at how post-conflict memory was constructed in Spain, Rwanda, and South Africa hereby follows.

Although the Spanish civil war ended in 1939, Violi (2015) argues that it is not until Franco's death in 1975 that the transition into a new political democratic system was initiated. This transition, she argues, was not however accompanied by a transformation of collective memory or by a process of transitional justice "either retributive justice through courts or tribunals or restorative justice through truth commissions" (Violi, 2015 p.116). Instead, a general amnesty law of 1977, known as 'the pact of silence' was issued and represented both a consequence and a symptom of the serious memory problem that has afflicted Spanish society ever since its exit from the dictatorship (Silva et al., 2004; Vincent, 2010). Violi (2015) further argues that this 'pact of silence' is not an accurate description of what happened. Two conflicting memory discourses existed: a regime memory that was omnipresent through monuments and symbols of Franco and the regime, and a Republican one that was given little space in society and was marginalized as counter-memories. Instead of stimulating a generalized cultural forgetting, the pact ended up suppressing only one of the two opposing memory systems, thus preventing the development of a real "culture of transition" (Golob, 2011), based on mutual respect between both parties involved in the conflict. Transition, Violi (2015) continues to argue, "requires the ability to reconstruct a shared national narrative as a basis for the establishment of a new society" (p.117). Although she admits this is extremely problematic in most cases, she insists that something needed to be done to manage the traumatic past. It is not until the 2000s that initiatives of memory

politics came into play. Various laws, the most important of which being the Law of Historical Memory in 2007, that aimed at giving justice to the victims and interpreting the past were proclaimed. It took distance in time and generations to deal with the traumatic past. Not only can transitions be long-term processes, they are also "complex asynchronous and nonlinear processes in which remembering and forgetting alternate over time" (Violi, p.128). And while legislations can influence such processes, a 'culture of transition' is not merely a matter of transitional justice; it also necessitates the generation of alternative narratives, "which inevitably coexist and confront each other in the longer run" (Violi, p.128). A combination of legislative, societal and cultural factors is thus necessary for a post-traumatic memory construction, one that allows society to rebuild its identity and narrative through a common understanding of the different alternatives of the past.

Similarly, in postwar Rwanda, memory played a crucial role in post-genocide identity and peace building. Elisabeth King's (2010) attempt at highlighting how memory controversies had implications for peace-building concludes that "in order to legitimate its rule, the Rwandan government selectively highlights some memories of violence, and represses others, and that this is likely to hinder sustainable peace" (King, 2010). King found that in post-genocide Rwanda, people have different and nuanced memories of violence, yet only some of those memories of violence are acknowledged. She further argues that in Rwanda, the strong state structures that facilitated genocide remain and determine the representation of violence, adding that the exclusion of certain memories of violence is unlikely to lead to meaningful peacebuilding in Rwanda. The main argument King presents is that "many Rwandans' memories are inconsistent with public ones and there is friction between state discourses and personal narratives" (King, 2010). This conclusion, similar to that of Viloi (2015) indicates how a societal memory re-construction of the past is often obstructed by political elites who have an interest in keeping societies somewhat divided. On the diverse and often contested memories of the past, Erin Jessee (2017) has also shed light on the striking differences between Rwandans' lived experiences from the official narrative in her book *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda: The Politics of History*. The official narrative told in museums and memorials is very different from the one she gathered by interviewing various stakeholders. Years into post-genocide era in Rwanda, memory is still a contested topic.

On the other hand, the situation seems to be different in South Africa. After a conflict that lasted for thirty-six years, post-Apartheid South Africa implemented a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the primary function of which was to offer amnesty in exchange

for full disclosure of the truth. Wielenga (2013) argues that this step allowed South Africans access to information on what had really happened under the secretive system of apartheid. By allowing different memories to be heard, South Africa's approach to remembering the past centered around allowing multiple voices to coexist and to remain in dialogue with one another as South Africans attempt to integrate the trauma of the past (Villa-Vicencio, 2000). Decades after, the struggle in South Africa remains to hold together both the need for a unifying narrative that facilitates nation-building and for that narrative to remain inclusive and allow for contending voices to be heard (Stolten, 2007; Weldon, 2009). By existing together, the various memories of the past become a necessity in the face of a single dominant narrative. As Wielenga (2013) argues, "the inclusion of multiple voices and the space for those voices to be in dialogue with one another seems to bring the necessary challenge to a potentially dominant narrative" (p.45).

As the three examples show, a combination of legislative steps, a societal readiness and openness, and a public debate are necessary for the reconstruction of a postwar memory, identity and peace-building process. The process is long and must involve various stakeholders in order to allow an inclusive vision that does not allow any party to dominate the discourse. Since discourse is generally transmitted in the media, this moves the discussion further to the role of media in this process. What is the function of media in a war-torn and postwar society? How can media foster peacebuilding and memory construction?

3.2 On Media and Memory

The role media play in society has been a central research question in multiple contexts. Theories of media have touched upon the function and role of media in various aspects of society; in politics, social life, education, the individual and so on. In times of conflict, the normative approach suggests media should call for peace, and once the conflict ends, media should lead the discussion on how to restore peace and maintain it. The following subchapter explores the various theories on the role of media in memory construction, stressing on their function in wartime and peacebuilding.

3.2.1 The media as agents of memory

In the field of media research, a belief in the role media and journalism play in memory production and construction has been growing. Several scholars have stressed that mass media are generators and transformers of memory (Reinhardt & Jäckel, 2005, pp.96-101)

and that journalists are agents of memory (Edy, 1999; Zelizer, 2008). Commemorative objects and museums have been fruitfully studied by many scholars (e.g., Katriel, 1997; Schwartz, 1991; Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz, 1991), but studies of the media's role in public memory are unusual (Edy, 1999).This called for an emergence of a new filed of academic inquiry that bridged the gap between media and memory, bringing the two interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary fields together. This intricate and multilayered approach of looking at the role of media in memory construction and commemoration was called 'media memory' (Kitch, 2005; Neiger et al., 2011).

As Trümper and Neverla (2013) review, literature on various topics could prove that three major memory occasions or stable memory patterns exist on how journalists report the past: anniversaries, historical analogies, and historical contextualization (Zelizer, 1992; Edy 1999; Kitch, 2002; Zelizer, 2004; Edy & Daradanova, 2006; Robinson, 2009; Donk & Herbers 2010; Harro-Loit & Koresaar, 2010). However, this body of literature is not enough to clear up the relation between media, journalism, and (collective) memory (Donk, 2009, p.13; Zelizer, 2008 p.85; Donk & Herbers, 2010 p.195). Past literature has been focused on the west, studying mainly western examples, through a western eye, while memory in war-torn countries in the Global South has not yet been established and legitimized in this field of research.

Reinhardt & Jäckel (2005) have looked into three functions and meanings of media as generators and transformers of memory (pp.96-97): 1) Media enable social memory (memory through media), 2) media products are memory products (media as memory) and 3) memory is a topic of mass media (memory in the media). This study is interested in the third approach; understanding how memory is mediated, formed, and transformed in the press.

As Trümper and Neverla (2013) perfectly summarize, there are studies on the interrelations between mediated memory and national identity building (Kitch, 2002, 2005; Harro-Loit & Kõresaar, 2010), on the interrelations between memory and journalistic professional identity building (Meyers, 2002, 2007; Kitch, 2002), on the specifics of anniversary news (Harro-Loit & Kõresaar, 2010; Edy, 1999) as well as on the anniversaries or commemorations of (mainly negative) past events (disasters, civil disorders, attacks, political event, etc.) (Robinson, 2009; Donk & Herbers, 2010; Schudson, 1992; Zelizer, 1992). This study focuses on what has come to be known as 'anniversary journalism.'

As Schudson (1986) expresses, the anniversary – of a person, institution or event – is regularly "news" in the media. Beginnings (debuts, openings) and closings (death of people

or institutions) provide an opportunity to exercise some kind of self-conscious sense of history (p.102). In Edensor's (2006) definition, anniversary journalism is "as a temporal sphere in which national identity is continually reproduced, sedimented and challenged" (p.526). Anniversary journalism enables communities to think together and provides national and cultural consistency by bridging historical gaps (Zerubavel, 2003, p.52) and habitualizing values and norms of behavior by repetition (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p.2). As Harro-loit and Kõresaar (2010) argue, anniversary journalism serves as a framework within which social groups can construct their own sense of public time, that dimension of collective life through which human communities come to have what is assumed to be a patterned and perceptually shared past, present and future (Kitch, 2002,p.48). This is what, according to Harro-loit and Kõresaar (2010), makes anniversary journalism one of the main agents of identity building and mediation of memory. For social groups in particular, anniversaries constitute a social ritual serving to strengthen a community's identity and values through repeated commemoration (Kitch, 2002, p.48). Anniversary journalism thus offers a way to reexamine, reread, and re-present the past.

The construction of memory is a long process. Different agents of society have a role to play in this process during various historical moments. Postwar societies in particular go through many stages in which political and intellectual elites contribute to the production of a memory about the blood-stained past. As journalism is often regarded as the first draft of history, it is also the first draft of memory, a statement about what should be considered in the future as having mattered today (Kitch, 2008, p.312). It is also said to be the second draft of history, where the past is recollected and remolded.

Communities' understanding of personal and public histories is guided by what José van Dijck (2007) terms 'mediated memories.' And as media play a crucial role in the selection/construction process of shaping collective memory, it is important to keep in mind the two aspects of this distinctive role: on the one hand, they present themselves and are perceived by society as a platform for sociocultural struggles. On the other hand, they are also players in the same competition and perceive themselves as authoritative social storytellers of the past (Neiger et al. 2011, p.7). It is Barbie Zelizer (1992) who demonstrated that journalists construct collective memory in ways that retain their roles as authoritative storytellers about public events.

But questions of agency, regarding the role of the media in shaping collective identities, arise. This brings two issues to the fore; one related to constructivism and reality, and the other related to the cultural authority of the media as narrators of the past.

On the question of constructing reality, one must explore both concepts of constructivism and realism in light of the role of media. Though constructivism is initially a theory of knowledge, it is important to contextualize it with media as vectors of information and knowledge. The controversial question on whether media reflect reality or rather construct it has for long been central to media studies.

Winfried Schulz (1990) attempts to explore this controversial aspect of media. In his research, he starts with theoretical re-orientation of news value research with the criticism of the ontologizing comparison of media reality and factual reality. Schulz (1990) then comes to conclude "that the attempt to compare items of news with "what really happened" is impossible in principles, because "what really happened, what the "correct" picture of reality" is, is ultimately a metaphysical question" (p.25). Here he points out that reality is impossible to be reflected in any form of media. From a constructivist perspective, Schulz considers that the problem with research on news-value is no longer the topic of truth, but the characteristics of reality constructed by the media, and the criteria for selection and interpretation. And although many other scholars like Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Jean Baudrillard have criticized the mass media for presenting a deceiving version of reality, a paradox, as Gunn Enli (2015) calls it, remains valid: "Although we base most of our knowledge about our society and the world in which we live on mediated representations of reality, we remain well aware that the media are constructed, manipulated, and even faked" (p.1). This does not however prevent from seeking these different versions of reality from the media, or even adopting one or many of them. In fact, constructivism, one can argue, allows for a deconstructed truth. Different media outlets construct their own versions of reality based on individual or group realities. Media reality can be different from social reality. Nonetheless, media have the ability to construct a media reality into a social reality.

The question of the cultural authority of the media as narrators of the past is related to how the media work through, or rather reconcile their role as a public arena for various memory agents within their own role as memory agents and readings of the past (Bosch, 2016). Therefore, and specifically in the context of this study, it is important to highlight this approach advanced by Neiger et al. (2011). In this context of authoritative storytelling and narrating the past, the media are uniquely positioned:

> On the one hand, they provide a public arena for various agents (political activists, academics, local communities and more) who wish to influence the ways in which collective pasts are narrated and understood. On the

> other hand, specific media outlets as well as individual media professionals act as salient memory agents who aspire to provide their own readings of the collective past. Such a reading is always anchored in individual or institutional experiences of the past and the present while professional, commercial, and ideological inclinations affect the role of the mass media in the narration of the past. (p.10)

What is important to argue in this approach, is how media can act as a medium and subject of memory at the same time. In this study, the press is tackled as a public arena in which various political and intellectual agents draft or shape memory during and after conflict.

However, the profusion of media agents and narratives also challenges the memory and commemoration of the events. Hirsch (2012) terms this 'postmemory,' an era in which memories of great significance are passed on to publics that have not lived or experienced the events, but nevertheless adapted them due to their traumatic nature. Hirsch has put this concept in line with stories of sons and daughters of Holocaust survivors (second generation survivors), but it can also be adapted as a metaphor for the role of the media in different memory construction processes.

Wars are big events, and they often remain a significant and critical part of the history of any nation. They are what Claude Levi-Strauss (1966) refers to as 'hot moments,' historical conjunctures through which a nation or a cultural group takes stock of its own significance. Zelizer (1992) uses the term 'critical incidents' to describe the same concept. "In this view, collective memories pivot on discussions of some kind of critical incident… Critical incidents uphold the importance of discourse and narrative in shaping the community over time" (p.4).

The role of media during transitional justice has been hypothesized mainly in two conflicting ways. The media are either conceived as perpetuating hatred and prejudice (Metzl, 1997; Thompson, 1999; Thompson & Price, 2002; Nguyet Erni, 2009) and inflaming identity politics during the transitional justice processes (Price & Stremlau, 2012), or as having the potential to address past wrongs, define a new future and negotiate issues of identity and narrative (Krabill, 2007; Ojo, 2003). This fostered the development of a new trend of providing a negotiated theoretical framework of 'Peace Journalism' (Galtung, 1998, 2000, 2006; Tehranian, 2002; Hanitzsch, 2004; Hamelink, 2008; Keeble et al., 2010) Although this study does not look into a 'transitional justice' kind of concept, for the lack of

such a process in the case of Lebanon, it does in fact adopt this conceptualization of the role of media and put it in the context of the construction of war memory, in itself a postwar process.

The last few decades witnessed a growing interest in the role of media as active agents in the peacebuilding process. However, a small group of people have championed the development of peace journalism. As Abazi and Doja (2017) discuss in their study on the narrative of the Balkan wars in the media, war propaganda is a popular research topic within the field of communication studies and receives considerable attention from historians, linguists, political scientists, sociologists and other academics. It has been proven that media can be manipulated to create support for genocidal regimes, for example. They argue, however, that the media, and by drawing on certain themes and images "they cyclically perform a sense of collective identity, shared membership and moral beliefs" (p.1013).

The role of media during wartime has been very much discussed in relation to the theory of peace journalism. The peace journalism paradigm developed by John Galtung (1998) emphasizes the responsibility of journalists who cover to balance their reporting and look at alternatives to war by focusing on the victims. Galtung (1998) identifies two approaches: the low road of conflict journalism and the high road of peace journalism. The low road, dominant in the media according to Galtung, considers the conflict to be a battle where fighting parties are usually reduced to two. The media approach in the low road is a military one, as the focus is on which party of the two is having leverage in the fight and getting closer to the win. The losing party is counted in terms of numbers killed or wounded and material damage. The zero-sum perspective focuses on winning and neglects the other side of the story. On the other hand, the high road focuses on conflict transformation. Media, according to Galtung, should use the conflict to find new ways of transforming the conflict creatively into opportunities and not violence. Conflict journalism disseminates violence, victory, and the voice of the powerful, while peace journalism focuses on the causes of and solutions to a conflict, and gives equal voices to all parties involved, namely the victims. Critics of Galtung argue that his understanding of the role of journalists and their power in society is not realistic (Hanitzsch, 2004; Loyn, 2007). For one, Hanitzsch (2004) is skeptical of the assumption that media have powerful, causal and linear effects on conflicts. The function of journalism according to Hanitzch is to provide social co-orientation, but not to take part in peaceful settlement of conflicts, since this is the task of politics or the military. He admits that journalism can contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts but argues that its potential influence is limited. Similarly, Loyn (2007) argues that reporters should not

be confused with peacemakers. Although objectivity and truth are the main tasks for all journalists, it is very difficult – if not impossible – to remain neutral all the time.

This study aims at suggesting new approaches to peace journalism and contributing to the theoretical discussions on the media function in times of conflict and post-conflict, with a focus on opinion journalism. First, the peace journalism approach focuses on news journalism, highlighting the role of reporters and giving guidelines of conflict reporting. While this is an important discussion, this study is interested in opinion journalism, and the role of the press as an opinion maker. In fact, opinion journalism does not adhere to the same guidelines as news journalism. Objectivity and fairness are not required, as subjective opinions are sought. This is not to suggest that subjectivity exists exclusively in opinion journalism. One could argue there is not a zero degree of writing (Barthes, 1953), and hence reporters are also affected by their own subjectivities. This is to say, however, that opinion journalism should be understood within its context. Op-eds and columns should express opinions, and these can be either conflict-focused or peace-focused. Of course, a peace-centered approach should be advocated by the press, and this includes opinion articles and news articles alike. But as not all opinion articles are editorial pieces, the approach of the writer might not always align with that of the newspaper. Previous studies that relied on Galtung's approach, as well as McGoldrick and Lynch's (2000), to quantitatively analyze media coverage of conflicts (Lee & Maslog, 2005; Maslog, Lee & Kim, 2006; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Nicolas, 2012; Fahmy & Eakin, 2014, Neumann & Fahmy, 2016) have only examined news coverage, and not touched upon opinion journalism. Despite one recent study by Roy and Ross (2011) that analyzed US and Indian media editorials, a gap still exists in the literature on peace journalism when it comes to opinion journalism. This study attempts at filling that gap, by providing evidence of the function of opinion journalism within this peace journalism paradigm.

Second, studies adopting peace journalism approach are very focused on the role of press in wartime, and only few recent studies have tackled the media function in post-conflict situations (Suchenwirth & Keeble, 2011; Roy & Ross, 2011). This study aims at bridging the two periods of wartime and postwar by understanding how opinion journalism functions across the different periods. Although this study looks at wartime press in order to trace the discourse of the war, this exercise is not the sole purpose. The main goal instead, is to compare the narratives of the war and postwar periods in order to understand how memory is constructed in postwar through the interplay between the past and the present. Wartime is the point of reference in this study's understanding of narrative and memory construction.

Looking at how discourses develop, change, disappear or integrate into other narratives helps in understanding the process of the postwar understanding and the re-imagining of the past. Thus, although it is important to analyze the role of the press during war, this study takes the analysis as a starting point to dig deeper into postwar memory work and the role of media in this process. This leads to the following question: What is the role of media once the conflict ends?

The role of media in post-conflict societies has recently been a topic of intense discussions and research, despite the lack of agreement on what 'post-conflict' truly means. Williams (as cited in Ismail, 2008) confirms that the concept of post-conflict is a new addition to postwar vocabulary and says that whereas it does not have any exact meaning, it is used vaguely for everything that helps reinstate the 'good times.' In fact, the term is used in contexts of peacebuilding and nation-building, to indicate a clear-cut distinction between a period of conflict and a period that comes after the conflict has ended. However, an end of a war period does not necessarily mean a transition into a period of peace. In fact, calling it a post-conflict period is with a way to avoid using the term 'peace.' Although the role of media during conflict is a topic that gets greater focus than the role of media in post-conflict societies, this does not mean that the latter is any less important. To the contrary, "media can positively influence reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflict just as the negative use of the media magnifies and promotes conflict" (Yamshon & Yamshon 2006). Laplante and Phenicie (2009) go even further and say that any renewal of conflict, or any post-conflict conflicts may be attributed in part, to the media's failure to adequately mediate conflicting views of a country's history, since internal conflicts do not occur spontaneously, but tend to have a history. As much as they can influence society before or during a conflict by taking a peace or a war approach, media can also impact how a post-conflict period.

According to Orgeret (2016) "the media's representations of identity, of history, of the justification of transitional measures – indeed, the narratives of the society itself, become critical in shaping the extent to which stability, reconciliation, new nation building, and community can be sustained" (p.16). She further argues that the media can serve as a "forum where identity issues play out, and they can also provide the space for encouraging acceptance of certain narratives that are part of transitional (post-conflict) efforts" (Orgeret, 2016, p.16). In their book on the role of media in post-conflict contexts, Orgeret and Tayeebwa (2016) gather different perspectives and contributions from different parts of the world, and problematize the concept of post-conflict and strongly advocate – using examples from Afghanistan, Columbia and South Sudan - that the phase between war/conflict and

peace is neither unidirectional nor linear, as the use of the concept sometimes seems to imply. According to De Koster (2009), processes of democratization and building peace are core issues in post-conflict journalism, as are "rebuilding the society infrastructure, resolving the conflict behind the war and building confidence among warring parties" (p.13).

What is then the normative role of media in post-conflict societies? Herman Wasserman has been writing on this with a focus on South Africa for more than a decade. His research has focused on normative ethics and the media in post-colonial settings. Taking the South African example, Wasserman (2006) proposes to view the media not only as a site of transformation, but also as an instrument of transformation by serving as a forum for the exchange of ideas. By promoting new ways of thinking and constructing post-apartheid identities – the media were both product of and contributor to societal change (Steenveld, 2004, p.94; Teer-Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 2001, p.123). Along with his colleagues, Wasserman proposes a new view of post-conflict media that reconciles the two models; the traditional libertarian model that views the media as a watchdog, as well as the developmental model that considers the media as an essential supporter of national development (De Beer et al., 2016).

Focusing on Spanish post-civil war, Laplante and Phenicie (2009) argue that one of the key roles that the media play in transitional justice settings "is facilitating public debate and deliberation on difficult truths about a collective past" (p.267). They admit, however, that "arriving at a collective memory of the past is one of the greatest challenges facing a post-conflict society because it implies reaching a consensus in a polarized context" (p.267). Their starting point nonetheless is that in post-conflict societies, media work along with transitional justice efforts. Through the coverage of truth commissions for example, media can encourage dialogue. Nevertheless, transitional justice scholars argue that reconciliation can only follow once this collective memory has been attained (Laplante, 2007, p.445). Thus, media have the potential of being a site of political contestation in which memory is both constituted and potentially redefined, as they provide channels for carrying out debate on conflicting issues in polarized societies. Media need not to adopt one version of the past, but rather allow the different narratives to be mediated, while promoting a peacebuilding approach rather than a conflict-instigating approach.

By constructing a certain media reality that translates into a social reality, and by asserting a role of constructing a collective identity, media catalyze not only a shared past and its own memory, but also a contemporary understanding of the past and the present. The creation of this reality does not however happen through news articles alone. It is a process

that requires intellectual effort, one that builds, over time, a certain understanding of reality. Media, being agents of memory, create public spaces for other memory agents to exhibit their role in memory construction. These agents include public intellectuals; writers, artists, and academics who take on the opinion sections in the press to practice their role as agents of memory. So, who are they? And why and how is their role in memory construction important?

3.2.2 Public intellectuals as agents of memory

Conceptualizing the idea of public intellectuals has been a contested issue. In fact, the public intellectual existed long before the term 'public intellectual' was coined by C Wright Mills in 1958 (Marshall & Atherton, 2015, p.70). Like many terms in the field of Social Sciences, the term 'public intellectuals,' much more like the term 'intellectual,' is a vague term that can have various meanings, and is one that changes over time and according to societal contexts. Thus, it is important to understand the term in the context it is used in. Despite having some sort of a universal definition, some characteristics of the term should be adapted to society. To define public intellectuals, one must first define each word of the term alone. Defining public and then intellectuals can also be a tricky task.

Of the various scholars who have discussed the concept of public intellectuals, both Russell Jacoby (1987) and Richard Posner (2003) have raised the difficulties of defining public intellectuals. In fact, Jacoby has refused to define it, and said it is too vague and can encompass anyone who has ever had an idea. Posner on the other hand argued that the definitions are far too narrow. While admitting that his definition is not the correct definition, but merely best for his purposes, Posner concludes that "a public intellectual is a person who, drawing on his intellectual resources, addresses a broad though educated public on issues with a political or ideological dimension" (Posner, 2003, p.173).

What Posner states is in line with what the term, in its original use, came to mean. The roots of the term date back to the Dreyfus Affair. Alfred Dreyfus was a French artillery officer accused of selling military secrets and wrongfully sentenced to life imprisonment. What made this affair one of the most scandalous political events in France in the late 19th century is the role media and public opinion played in this case. It is also considered the event that led to the birth of what is now called 'public intellectuals.' Dreyfus, whose case was considered to be clearly based on anti-Semitism feelings, became a center of attention for writers and intellectuals in France at the time. When renowned writer and thinker Emil Zola wrote his famous article "J'accuse" in defense of Dreyfus, he opened the door for an

intellectual movement. A group of writers, academics and thinkers then wrote a petition in support of Dreyfus and were called 'intellectuals' by the anti-Dreyfus camp. Although the latter group meant to give a pejorative meaning to the term, the intellectuals themselves claimed back the term and started using it with a positive connotation. This event also raised the question of who is really considered an intellectual, and whether that term is exclusive to experts or open to any thinker without being forced to be put in any box.

In the beginning, a public intellectual was considered an expert who is both skilled and trained enough to be able to give an opinion on any issue of public interest. The role of public intellectuals is seen as crucial in democratic societies, where an intellectual feeds the public democratic discourse. Public intellectuals are supposed to be critics, and mostly critical of the state, the system, and institutions, as in the Dreyfus affair example. A public intellectual should be able to make statements which involve some sort of political protest.

What literature tend to agree upon with regards to public intellectuals is the channel through which intellectuals' ideas reach the public. The mass media seems to be a main element in this process (Jacoby, 1987; Michael, 2000; Small 2002; Etzioni & Bowditch 2006; Posner 2003; Melzer et.al., 2003). It is self-evident that the Dreyfus Affair has highlighted to role of newspapers as a platform for the public intellectuals. In fact, the media, being the dominant institutions of the public sphere, provide not only information but also analysis, commentaries and opinion. Communication happens through the media, and intellectual discussions also take place there amongst other cultural and political outlets.

"All intellectuals represent something to their audiences, and in so doing represent themselves to themselves" puts it clearly Edward Said (1996, p.XV). In his book *Representations of the Intellectual*, Said (1996) asks whether intellectuals are a "very large or an extremely small and highly selective group of people?" (p.3). Said discusses two of the most famous yet opposing descriptions of intellectuals of the twentieth century. On the one hand, there's Antonio Gramsci's suggestion that all men are intellectuals, yet not all men have the function of intellectuals in society. Gramsci, as Said explains, tried to show that those intellectuals who do actually function in society are two types: traditional intellectuals such as teachers, priests, and organic intellectuals. The first type, traditional intellectuals, repeat the same things from one generation to the other, while the second type, organic intellectuals, are used by classes and enterprises to gain more power and control.

On the other extreme, Said (1996) presents Julien Benda's definition of intellectuals as a "tiny band of super-gifted and morally endowed philosopher kings who constitute the

conscience of mankind" (p.4). Benda even gives them the religious name of 'clerisy' saying they are 'rare creature.' Said notes that Benda was writing in 1927, well before mass media, but he however was able to sense how important it is for governments to have such intellectuals as servants and defenders of state policies.

To Said, Gramsci's definition seemed much closer to reality than Benda's, especially in the twentieth century. He argues that the emergence of new professions namely in the field of mass media has vindicated Gramsci's vision. Taking Gramsci's thesis as a starting point, Said argues that "the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public" (p.11). He links this to one condition: that the intellectual should be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose motives are universal principals of humanity. This ethical approach, combined with a strong critical sense, is what defines an intellectual. Thus, the intellectual's role is to present a counter-narrative, one that explores, unveils and bashes mainstream enforced narratives, and by doing so, stand against power, be it a state or a narrative in the Foucauldian sense.

In what was previously presented, this study switched from using the term 'public intellectuals' to simply 'intellectuals' as per Said's conceptualization. This has to do with the inclusivity of the term itself. In a revisited account of what he wrote in 1993 for the Reith Lectures, that later became the book discussed above, Said (2002) refers to the Arabic words used for intellectual, *al-muthaqaf*, or *al-mufakir*. He rightfully explains that the first comes from *thaqafa* or culture and means a man of culture, while the second derives from *fikr* or thought and means a man of thought. Said notes that "in both instances the prestige of those meanings is enhanced and amplified by implied comparison with government, which is now universally regarded as without credibility and popularity, or culture and thought" (p.20). In this study, the role of the intellectual is seen as Said (2002) describes it, "to present alternative and other perspectives on history than those provided by combatants on behalf of social memory and national identity" (Said, 2002, p.37). The intellectual in this sense challenges dominant narratives and presents counter-narratives and takes on the role of speaking truth to power.

Following this line of thought, one can consider intellectuals as vital agents of memory. Where memory is constructed, kept and shared in this case is the press. The site of memory, or what Pierre Nora (1989) identifies as *lieu de memoire*, is "any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community" (p.7). As the

press is a *lieu de memoire,* intellectuals who write and perpetuate the memory of the war are agents of memory. What intellectuals are expected to do, is question dominant narratives, critique rigid discourses, and challenge the unilateral perspectives of history.

The theoretical framework adopted in this study stems from the understanding of memory, a process that takes place over a long period of time, during which individuals collectively - and sometimes individually – recollect the past and build from its schemes a certain view or views of the past. Memory construction is an important process in any post-conflict society. It is through collective memory that identity forms, and with the help of memory work societies manage to overcome a hurtful past. As argued in this chapter, intellectuals should take a pioneering role in the process of memory construction. Their presence in the public sphere, and duty in mediating memory, using media platforms, shapes memory. Examples from different post-conflict societies have demonstrated the different processes of postwar peace-building and memory work. So how did this materialize in Lebanon?

3.3 Research Questions

As suggested earlier, the interest of looking at war narratives from a memory-focused theoretical approach comes from a belief in the importance of the past in a nation's life, and in the thin line that separates the past from the present and the future. What happened in the past affects the present, and the way a nation remembers its past affects the way it looks at its present and future. The past also shapes identity in the present. Tackling memory in the context of Lebanon, a post-conflict society tormented by a war and struggling to survive the so-called peace, is not complete without tackling identity.

Discussing national identity in the Lebanese context leads to a bumpy ride. Defining identity in the Lebanese context strikes as a disputed concept not only among historians but among the people, as argued earlier. Kamal Salibi accurately described that as a "war over Lebanese history" (Salibi, 1988). What is more, most recent studies about Lebanon refrain from tackling the concept of national identity, "as if the idea of national identity is a taboo: addressing it would mean unearthing much of Lebanon's past and present that is too painful, or perhaps too shameful" (Khatib, 2008).

The struggle over history, or the versions of it, is rooted in the historical conflict over land as well. Each group wants its own territory, one that suits its identity, and that is nourished and supported by a suitable identity discourse.

The intertwining of identity and memory in Lebanon manifests itself in a power struggle over discourse. Different groups used different fragments of memory to construct identities that fit what is needed for the political moment. Sectarian parties that fought each other during the war form electoral alliances in the postwar period and adapt their identity discourse as part of the game. What's the media's role? Gabeba Baderoon (2002) argues that identity is constructed through the media. People, according to Baderoon, use the media to determine who the 'us' and the 'them' are. Identity and memory discourses transmitted by the media shape the process of both identity and memory construction.

The neo-liberal reconstruction projects brought in by Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's company Solidere in the mid-1990s resulted in a Disneyland version of the prewar Beirut (Lang, 2016) erasing any traces of the war, and acting as a statement of a rejectionist nature to any space and time given for the legacy or the memory of the war. The little room that existed for an exercise of this sort was created and used by Lebanon's intellectuals, artists, and writers (Lang, 2016). By tackling the war - and most urgently the question of the memory of the war – in their works, artists and intellectuals have used the public sphere as an experimentation zone allowing them to reimagine the memory and narratives of the past both spatially and discursively.

Thus, by looking into how journalism reflects this power-relationship in discourse, this study seeks to understand how the war is remembered in different political and social circumstances, and by various groups. Memory construction is indeed a complex and challenging process, one that spans decades and generations, and involves many actors and agents. This study looks into the role of both the media and public intellectuals as agents in this process.

As previously noted, public intellectuals change according to the society they function in. Thus, it is important to identify who is an intellectual in the context of Lebanon. The public intellectual, *al-muthaqqaf*, this study is concerned with is the intellectual that writes and publishes in the press. In Lebanon, the term intellectual comprises journalists, writers, professors, artists, and political commentators. This diversity of who holds the title intellectual is reflected in the media, as those who publish can belong to any of these categories. As shown later, this study is also interested in looking at who is writing and making its voice heard in the press. Newspapers examined in this study have opened their opinion pages and columns to the intellectuals to comment on the war, during and after the war. As intellectuals are considered agents of memory, it is interesting to look into the narrative of the war those intellectuals are reflecting in their articles published in the

Lebanese press. Both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* are known for being outlets that renowned journalists and writers like to publish in. During the war, intellectuals took their anger from the war to the spreads of *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, and after the war, they found in those outlets the space to practice their role as intellectuals. What is important to note in this regard, is that during the war, many of those intellectuals belonged to parties, and even fought in militias. Being a writer or a thinker has also been associated with being committed, in the sense of *al-iltizam*, or political commitment. Being a politically committed intellectual, meant not only writing about the war but also being part of it.

Given this background, and embedding this study in broader discussions on the role of media in memory construction, this study seeks to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: *How did An-Nahar and As-Safir approach the discourse of the war in wartime and postwar?*

RQ2: *How was the war framed by An-Nahar and As-Safir in wartime and postwar?*

Embedding the findings of these two research questions in the theoretical media memory framework leads to a third research question:

RQ3*: How did the media and the intellectuals play their role as memory agents in Lebanon?*

The three research questions outlined in this chapter guide the investigation into the mediated remembering of the past. This study's theoretical approach is embedded within a comprehensive definition of memory, and its relationship with identity, the war, the media and the present. Memory, and specifically cultural memory, is both a product of society as well as an important catalyzer in it. Collective memory stems from identity, but also helps build one in postwar societies. In Lebanon, memory has been – and continues to be – contested, as the war ended without any societal healing of the past, or a truth and reconciliation process, leaving every group with their own oral and written memory. As a sociopolitical construct, memory undergoes a continuous, multi-directional process from the past to the present and vice-versa. The past is used to help understand the present and the present provides distance to have a better reading of the past. In a war-torn country struggling to maintain fragile peace, and always afraid of the recurrence of war, the media

play a crucial role in mediating the past and reading the present. As agents of memory, media become a framework in which memory is constructed, drafted, and shared. Using media as their platform, intellectuals practice their role as memory agents, writing about the past, reconstructing its frames, and presenting narratives to the public.

As presented in this chapter, and highlighted in the research questions, this study focuses on the media, through intellectuals, as active agents in memory construction and establishment. By investigating media framing of the war, during and after the war, this study seeks to answer how the war is perceived in Lebanon, and how the past intertwines with the present. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will feature the findings and provide answers to the research questions. The next chapter sets the research design, defining the methodological approaches and their implementation, in what best fits to answer the research questions discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 4

FRAMING ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND MIXED-METHODS APPROACH

Now that the theoretical framework is set, this chapter expounds on the methodological framework that allowed to address the research questions and reach certain findings. This chapter includes a review of the research methodology and research methods adopted in this study and shows how these methods are operationalized. First, it introduces framing analysis as a methodological framework upon which the study relies. It discusses the definitions of framing analysis and how it is used in this study's context and explains the reasons behind this choice. Then, it sets the research design, elaborating on the mixed-methods approach applied in this study and tackling each method separately; the quantitative approach of content and frame analysis, then the qualitative approach of textual analysis.

4.1 Framing Analysis as a Methodological Framework

The choice of framing analysis as a methodology for this research came after considering several methodological approaches. As this study investigates the narrative of the war in the Lebanese press and the role of the press and intellectuals in memory construction, framing analysis was chosen as the methodology that best suits an investigation into the research questions. The aim of this study is not only to look at what the newspapers focus on when commemorating the war, but also to embed these findings in an understanding of how the press and intellectuals take on their role as agents of memory. As argued earlier, intellectuals expressed their positions and narratives of the war in newspapers. The opinions reflected in the press frame the war and its commemoration and play a role in memory construction.

This study looks at the discourse of the war and the role of the press in echoing and promoting certain discourses over others, and framing analysis helps achieve this task. Reconstructing the frames of the war helps to understand better the process of memory construction. As memory construction is a long process that happens over a long period of time, involving individuals as well as institutions, it is crucial to take a global, more comprehensive and historical approach. In the case of Lebanon, attempts at reconstructing the frames of the war by only looking at the war period alone, or the postwar period alone, would yield incomplete findings. As argued in Chapter 2, the war was a series of battles,

during which players as well as interests and fighting motives changed. By studying the war period, the study aims at investigating the frames that dominated the discourse, and the layers of discourse that were reflected. By reconstructing the frames of the postwar period, the study endeavors to compare them to the wartime frames, observing any shifts in frames and understanding those shifts – or lack thereof – in relevance to the political and media contexts of the postwar period.

However, once framing analysis was chosen, the challenge of finding the right approach to framing and how to actually operationalize it began. Framing analysis is used as a theoretical framework in most studies. However, here it is used as a methodological approach. As a theory under development, and gradually gaining prominence as a media analysis methodology, there's a rich literature body on the theory, but also varied and different approaches and operationalizations.

At first, defining framing analysis is essential. It is agreed among framing researchers that Erving Goffman's *Frame Analysis: An essay on the organization of experience* (1974) set the foundation for the framing theory as it is approached today. According to Goffman, frame analysis addresses the organization and analysis of human experience and the individual, while frames are cognitive structures. As such, frame analysis basically allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences (Goffman, 1974, p.21). Goffman's basic frame analysis approach was later studied and its applications and uses were further developed. After Goffman, Robert Entman is considered the first to have studied framing theory in relation to mass media analysis. The classic definition, according to Entman (1993), implies that to frame is to "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (p 52). It is thus the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization (or a political leader, public relations officer, political advertising consultant, or news consumer), defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, p.567). In short, media framing refers to how issues are defined, identities created, and issue narratives are produced (Gurevitch & Levy, 1986). In this study's context, media framing addresses how Lebanese newspapers, in opinion articles they publish, frame the war and create a discourse around its memory.

According to Kinder and Sanders (1990) frames are embedded in political discourse and unearthed by deciphering common themes, patterns or story lines which are inherently

related to meaning. Thus, frames do not come from a vacuum. They stem from political discourse and build on it at the same time. In definition, framing is a process that starts from the communicator and transcends to the receiver. It refers, on the one hand, to the typical manner in which journalists shape news content within a familiar frame of reference and according to some latent structure of meaning and, on the other hand, to the audience who adopts these frames and sees the world in a similar way as the journalists do (McQuail, 2005; Tuchman, 1978). Framing enables journalists and the audience to see that the same event makes different kinds of sense depending on the frame applied (Van Gorp, 2007, p.63). One story can be attributed different meanings depending on which frame is applied. Simply put, a frame is an invitation or an incentive to read news in a particular way (Van Gorp, 2007, p.63). In this study, framing is approached in the same way as approached by the aforementioned scholars, but the focus of this research is opinion pieces, and not news articles. The focus is not on news reporting, but rather on issue framing through opinion journalism. As Hynds and Archibald (1996) point out, the highly subjective editorial pages provide readers with important benchmarks regarding salient issues against which readers can evaluate their own opinion. Opinion sections in newspapers provide a space for editors and writers to freely and subjectively tackle issues without the constraints of objectivity and balance. Thus, frames could be more clearly presented and articulated. Editorials are generally widely circulated in societies, and play an essential role in shaping public opinion, namely during periods of crisis (Billeaudeaux et al. 2003; Zaller, 1992). Op-eds, normally written by guest contributors, "contribute to the ideological work for and of the newspaper, albeit with the nuances of an 'external voice'…and provide opportunities for intertextual dialogue within the newspaper through counterpoint to as well as amplification of the newspaper's own voice" (Roy & Ross, 2011, p.197). In the context of Lebanon, opinion pieces are politically charged. In polarized and fragmented political and media systems, both during war and in the postwar period, as discussed in Chapter 2, opinions are expected to be dissimilar. By taking two newspapers that represent two different political stances in Lebanon as an example, the study not only aims at comparing the discourses of the war, but also at providing a comprehensive description and analysis of memory construction in the intellectual sphere. Opinion pieces, written mostly by journalists, academics, politicians and civil society stakeholders, are loaded with messages directed at the public opinion. Being written by intellectuals, who are memory agents as argued in Chapter 3, opinion articles aim at shaping opinions. Nevertheless, opinions are not shaped overnight, and discourses around memory do not simply materialize. There is a process to that, and time is a main factor. Thus,

analyzing opinion articles that span a long period of time, incorporating both wartime and postwar period, will help not only understand the frames, but also the process of their formation. Reconstructing wartime frames provides a strong starting point for analysis, as those frames can be compared to postwar frames, and analyzed against them to see if and how frames and narrative change over time. Opinion articles provide a good example of how the press, through intellectuals, can push certain frames over others, and hence favor certain war narratives over others. As argued earlier, previous studies argued that intellectuals occupied the public space provided by the press to speak about the war, both during and after the war. Both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* gave space to intellectuals to comment on the war. It is during the war's unofficial anniversary – April 13th of every year – that the press precisely focused on remembering the war. Haugbolle (2010) notes that in the 1990s, "it became an almost ritual practice for journalist and commentators each 13 April to bemoan the lack of any official commemoration of the outbreak of the war" (p.197). Thus, opinion articles published around the anniversary of the war provide good material for this study.

Despite the potential role of opinion journalism in forming public opinion and impacting public discourse over issues, there is no significant amount of literature on it. Most studies tend to focus on news framing. Golan (2010) notes that the application of framing analysis to research on opinion journalism is of particular salience since it allows researchers to identify the central arguments presented by the opinion writer. He further argues that:

> Much like the regular hard news selection process, opinion section gatekeepers face limitations of space and time. Therefore, opinion editors have to identify some opinion articles—both editorial and op-ed—as more newsworthy than others. This leaves many important issues and perspectives out of the media agenda and, subsequently, the public debate. (p.51)

What is said, then, is as important as what is being left out. The frames this study aims at reconstructing are not only understood comparatively and contrasted with what *An-Nahar* promotes versus what *As-Safir* promotes, but also compared to what is not being promoted; which war frames are left out or disregarded. In the memory construction process, what is chosen to be remembered is equally important to what is chosen to be forgotten. In fact, some argue that "artfully selective oblivion" might actually be both healthy and necessary for a society (Forty & Küchler, 1999). Understanding the frames built by Lebanon's

intellectuals, and promoted by newspapers belonging to two different political camps will shed light on how memory is constructed and shaped. In order to do that, frames were first quantitatively reconstructed.

In this study, Entman's approach to framing analysis was adopted, and a mixed operationalization approach was taken on, combining both qualitative and quantitative methods (Neuendorf, 2002). Entman (1993) identifies the four aspects of frames. Frames define problems; they determine what a causal agent is doing with the costs and what the benefits are, usually measured in terms of common cultural values. Frames then diagnose causes; they identity the forces creating the problem. They also make moral judgments by evaluating causal agents and their effects. And lastly, they suggest remedies by offering and typifying treatments for the problems and predicting their likely effects. Thus, when constructing a frame, or looking for a frame in a text, those four elements are to be looked for. Nonetheless, the presence of all four is not obligatory. Entman notes that "A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions, although many sentences in a text may perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four" (p.52). This study follows Entman's model, and reconstructs the frames based on those four aspects adapted to the context of war in Lebanon.

Frames have at least four "locations" —as Entman (1993, p.52) calls them— in the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture. It is to say that frames exist in the communicator's schemata that organize his belief system, in the text itself manifested by frame devices found when analyzing the text, in the receiver's mindset, and in the culture that embraces all other three locations. This study focuses on one location, the text, while connecting it to the other three; the text being newspaper articles, the communicator being the journalist/writer and the newspaper, the receiver being the reader, and the culture being the Lebanese context in which this communication process is taking place. When studying the framing of the Lebanese war, this study looks for the frames in the text, i.e. in newspaper opinion articles. As discussed later in this section, frame elements originated from the data; they were inductively extracted. However, the text is not treated as an isolated unit; it is read and analyzed with regards to the communicator, the receiver, and the culture. The frames found in the texts are also found in those other 'locations,' and this is what makes them salient. By definition, framing involves the interplay that occurs between the textual level (frames applied in the media), the cognitive level (schemata among the audience and media makers), the extramedial level (the discourse of frame sponsors, discussed below) and, finally the stock of frames that is available in a given culture (Van

Gorp, 2007, p.64). The culture factor is very specific to frames. Price and Tewksbury (1997) argue that this implies that framing incorporates a wider range of factors than priming and agenda setting that are both cognitive concepts. Whereas agenda setting is the choice of what event or issue to cover, framing tells the receiver not only what the important issue is, but also how to think about it and perceive it. While this is considered a deviation from objectivity in news reporting, it is normal for opinion articles to be subjective. Opinion articles do not have to present the reader with facts and information; they rather interpret the tackled issues and must present the reader with a clear idea of what the writer thinks. Opinion articles have the function of shaping public opinion, thus, the messages they send are about specific issues and are intended to influence. In addition, opinion articles, written usually by journalists or newspaper contributors that possess certain prestige, regularly address agenda issues. In this sense, Pan and Kosicki's (1993) view of framing which offers an important approach to decipher how politicians and the media "take an increasingly proactive approach to amplify their views of what an issue is about" (p.55) is appropriate for this study.

De Vreese (2005) dissects the framing process into stages: frame building, frame setting, individual and societal level consequences of framing. Each stage includes interaction between the journalist, the audience and the cultural and political context. What this study is mostly interested in is the process of frame building. Borrowed from the concept of 'agenda building' (Cobb & Elder, 1971), frame building is the stage during which a frame is constructed. Frame building concerns the process that takes place between journalists and elites and social movements and results in the frames manifested in the text (De Vreese, 2005).

Frame building looks at the different roles played by various actors that result in the creation of frames. Thus, what is relevant for this study is how the Lebanese political context of the wartime and postwar, and the Lebanese media environment – namely that of the press – came into play with intellectuals and society actors in order to build certain frames of the war in different time periods. Furthermore, frame building connects closely with memory construction, as the frames created and promoted by intellectuals through the media play a leading role in the conception and development of the memory discourse of the war.

Framing theory suggests that frames are important, as research has shown that differences in how media represent, or frame, events has consequences for the reasoning and beliefs of media consumers regarding those events (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001). According to a number of studies, the potential effect of frames largely depends on the degree of resonance between the frames applied in the media and particular schemes of readers (Nabi,

2003; Shen, 2004; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Hwang et al., 2007). In that sense, the stages of framing are connected to each other; When building their frames, journalists do not only rely on their own views, the political context, and the cultural environment. They also have the audience in mind, and they build their frames to target that specific audience, sometimes audiences. At the level of the receiver, frames affect opinions simply by making certain considerations seem more important than others. These considerations, in turn, carry greater weight for the final attitude (Nelson et. al., 1997, p.569). Another aspect to take into consideration is the repetitive exposure to frames (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013). Frames get adopted and repeated and the same frame can be found in different articles in one issue of a newspaper, or in different articles over a period of time. Thus, receivers can be repeatedly exposed to the same frames. As culturally built entities, frames take from context and feed into it, as argued earlier. They are formed from a context, and then directed at receivers who identify with that context, with the purpose of creating an effect. A number of scholars have more or less explicitly argued that repetitive new framing leads to stronger effects by causing higher and more constant levels of accessibility to framed or applicable considerations (Iyengar, 1991; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Nabi, 2003). Furthermore, Neuman, Just, and Crigler (as cited Scheufele, 1999, p.105) argue that, according to constructivist media effects model, audiences rely on "a version of reality built from personal experience, interaction with peers, and interpreted selections from the mass media." Accordingly, media frames tackle already existing ideas in individuals, and influence their opinions by stressing specific values, facts, and other considerations, imbuing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame (Nelson et al., 1997, p.569). Despite the fact that this study does not consider framing effects, it is important to understand that the desired effects the frame is supposed to have over the audience impose themselves in the frame building process. A frame that does not leave a certain effect on the receiver is one that is weakly built. In that respect, as discussed in Chapter 2, the media environment in Lebanon, in its fragmentation, privatization, and partisan tendencies, is highly invested in forming strong frames that stick with the public. Like memory construction, frame building is an orderly process that happens over time. And as this study looks at frames as a means to understand memory, it is only appropriate to reconstruct the frames that intellectuals in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* – two main memory agents in the Lebanese context – adopted and promoted during the war and in the period that followed.

A frame manifests itself in media content through what is called framing devices such as word choices, metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, and visual images (Gamson and Lasch, 1983; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The integrated structure of those devices is called frame package. These framing devices are given an important position within text structure, for example, in the title of the article or in the introduction (Van Dijk, 1988). But they can also occur throughout the text, in explicit and implicit forms. It is not necessary for a framing device to be frequently repeated in order to be capable of activating a frame. Entman (2004) argues that "this is particularly true for frames that are highly salient in a culture" (p.6). To do framing analysis is to first identify the framing and reasoning devices and to relate them to a condensing symbol, which is part of a shared culture. This study conducted framing analysis, extracted and reconstructed frames related to the war, while also looking at whether those frames changed, as it is argued that a frame changes very little or gradually over time (Goffman, 1981; Zald, 1996). The next section outlines the research design and discusses the ways in which framing analysis was conducted.

4.2 Research Design: The Mixed-Method Approach

In this study, the methods of framing analysis incorporated elements from quantitative content analysis, as well as qualitative textual analysis.



Figure 4.1: Research Design

As figure 4.1 illustrates, the research design of this study is split into three stages: an inductive pre-analysis, followed by a quantitative content and frame analysis, and concluded with a textual analysis. This complex approach, as will be further explained, was well suited to provide insights and answers to the main research questions of this study.

The first stage began with an inductive approach of pre-analysis, adopted in order to develop a codebook used to code the data. The approach, as will be explained later, consisted of examining a random sample of the data in order to extract categories that could be coded in order to reconstruct the frames.

The second stage of quantitative analysis was then divided into two. In the first part, a quantitative content analysis was used to extract specific aspects of the data, i.e. articles, their dominant frame dimension and description of the incident of April 13th, 1975, in order to answer the first research question (RQ1) on how the press approached the discourse war. Then, a quantitative frame analysis was conducted in order to rebuild the frames, answering the second research question (RQ2) on the press framing of the war.

The third stage consisted of an in-depth textual analysis. The analysis was conducted in order to qualitatively analyze the reconstructed frames and embed them into context, thus giving more depth to the second research question (RQ2) and leading to answers for the third research question (RQ3).

Not limiting itself to purely quantitative methods, this approach provides a suitable method for this study because it goes beyond merely counting words to examining language intensely for the purpose of classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories that represent similar meanings (Weber, 1990). These categories can represent either explicit communication or inferred communication. The goal of this method is "to provide knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study" (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992, p.314). The phenomenon, in this case, is the discourse of the war.

In addition, this study is interested in analyzing war frames present in opinion articles. Opinion articles, as notes, are complex texts that have both clear and underlying meanings. As Macnamara (2005) notes, researchers who advocate analyzing latent as well as manifest content as a way of understanding meanings of texts integrate qualitative and quantitative message analysis. The methods are detailed in what follows.

4.2.1 Quantitative content analysis

Before justifying the use of quantitative content analysis in this study, a look at how content analysis evolved is necessary. As suggested by Gunter (2002) and many other scholars, attempts to define content analysis go back to the 1950s. A number of definitions of content analysis have since appeared. According to Berelson (1971), content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. Holsti (1968) defines it as any technique for making inferences by

systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages. Krippendorff (1980) considers it a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, while for Weber (1990), content analysis is a research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text. Kerlinger (1986) says content analysis is a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables, while Kerlinger's definition, as interpreted by Gunter (2002, p.220), particularly encapsulates the defining ingredients of any traditional form of quantitative analysis of media output. Content analysis is, first, systematic in that it utilizes a principled form of media output sampling and content coding. Second, it is objective in that the researcher's own idiosyncrasies and biases should not affect the analysis. Operational definitions and rules for the classification of variables should be explicit, so that other researchers might repeat the procedure. Finally, content analysis is quantifiable in that its main focus is counting occurrences of predefined entities in a media text. On this last point, purely quantitative forms of content analysis have been challenged for displaying a lack of sensitivity to hidden meanings that may be conveyed by media texts (Merten 1996). Thus, counting and quantifying may need to be supplemented by interpretive procedures which can clarify the weight and implications of singular media messages in terms of their potential impact upon the audience (Gunter 1985; Hodge & Tripp 1986; Potter & Smith 1999).

This is further highlighted in the limitations of quantitative content analysis, as Newbold, Boyd-Barrett, and Den Bulck (2002) note:

> The problem [with quantitative content analysis] is the extent to which the quantitative indicators are interpreted as intensity of meaning, social impact and the like. There is no simple relationship between media texts and their impact, and it would be too simplistic to base decisions in this regard on mere figures obtained from a statistical content analysis. (p.80)

In other words, it is invalid to assume that quantitative factors are the only or even the main determinants of media impact. They also concluded that quantitative content analysis "has not been able to capture the context within which a media text becomes meaningful" (Newbold et al., 2002, p.84) and thus, they advocated paying attention to qualitative approaches as well. It can be concluded from Hansen, Cottle, Negrine, and Newbold (1998), Shoemaker and Reese (1996) among others, that a combination of quantitative and

qualitative content analysis offers the best of both worlds and, further, that a combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis methodologies is necessary to fully understand the meanings and possible impacts of media texts (Macnamara, 2005). However, it seems difficult to draw a clear line of separation between quantitative and qualitative methods. Berelson (1971) suggested that "much qualitative analysis is quasi-quantitative." He argued that there is no strict demarcation between qualitative and qualitative analysis: "Just as quantitative analysis assigns relative frequencies to different qualities, so qualitative analysis usually contains quantitative statements in rough form" (Berelson, 1971, p.116).

Based on all that, a mixed method that combines both quantitative and qualitative aspects was deemed more appropriate for this study. The use of this method aims to avoid the aforementioned limits of purely quantitative content analysis.

This methodological approach consists of assigning categories to text as a qualitative pre-analysis step, then working through many text passages and analysis of frequencies of categories as a quantitative step. This study maintains this approach as a 2-step content analysis and incorporates a third - purely qualitative - textual analysis approach to explore the reconstructed frames.

The literature suggests that there are three major approaches, which can be used to identify relevant frames: inductive-qualitative, deductive-quantitative, and inductive-quantitative (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Dahinden, 2006, p.202; Matthes & Kohring, 2008). For the purpose of identifying war frames, this study adopted an inductive-quantitative approach: frame elements are initially identified in the material (inductive approach); this was followed by deductive quantitative analysis.

Inductive content analysis is used in cases where there are no previous studies dealing with the phenomenon or when it is fragmented (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Thus, it seemed appropriate to use it here, as the specific Lebanese context this study ventures into is new to this kind of research. In a study on the framing of the Iranian elections of 2009 by Al Jazeera Arabic and CNN International, Schenk & Ahmed (2011) adopt this method and argue that an inductive-quantitative frame approach was selected as the most appropriate design, as it allowed for a more open-ended approach than searching for media frames that are defined a priori. This study takes Schenk & Ahmed's (2011) approach to design its research. This type of design is usually appropriate when existing theory or research literature on a phenomenon is limited. Thus, researchers avoid using preconceived categories (Kondracki & Wellman, 2002), instead allowing the categories and names for categories to flow from the data. Researchers immerse themselves in the data to allow new insights to emerge (Kondracki &

Wellman, 2002). Many qualitative methods share this initial approach to study design and analysis.

As argued, and in accordance with Matthes & Kohring (2008), a frame is understood to be a specific pattern in a media outlet that is composed of several elements; these elements are previously defined components of possible frames (p.263). In this study, instead of coding a whole frame, separate elements are extracted and later coded in a content analysis in order to reconstruct frames.

Initially, this study used Entman's (1993) definition that every frame promotes "a particular problem," "a causal interpretation," "a moral evaluation," and/or "a treatment recommendation" (p.52) to decide what frame elements are. This study was also guided by Schenk and Ahmed (2011), following a 2-step inductive quantitative and deductive quantitative approach, where these frame elements are considered to be variables, and each is operationalized by several categories. Separate elements were first coded, then were statistically sorted into groups in order to ascertain the underlying dimensions, or frames (Schenk and Ahmed, 2011).

This inductive approach has two main advantages (Matthes, 2007); first, it reduces the probability of individual selection bias using a purely inductive method, and second, it increases the empirical validity, since new, previously unknown frames can be identified. By adopting an inductive approach, findings related to frame elements emerge from the repeated, significant or dominant themes and topics inherent in the articles, without any restraints imposed by other types of structured methodologies. Key themes are often obscured, reframed or left invisible because of the preconceptions in the data collection and data analysis procedures imposed by deductive data analysis such as those used in experimental and hypothesis testing research (Thomas, 2006). The inductive approach is recurrent in data analyses methods, especially grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). It is very similar to the general pattern of qualitative data analysis described by others (e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pope et al, 2000). The inductive approach allows for a greater understanding of meaning in a complex set of data through the development of summary themes or categories from raw data, also known as data reduction methods. These approaches are evident in many qualitative data analyses. Some have described their approach explicitly as 'inductive' (e.g., Backett & Davison, 1995; Stolee et al.1999). while others use the approach without giving it an explicit label (e.g., Jain & Ogden, 1999; Marshall, 1999). In this study, and due to lack of former appropriate literature on the frames of the war in Lebanon, an inductive approach seems appropriate. For if there is "not enough

former knowledge about the phenomenon or if this knowledge is fragmented, the inductive approach is recommended" (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Furthermore, an approach based on inductive data moves from the specific to the general, so that particular instances are observed and then combined into a larger whole or general statement (Chinn & Kramer, 1999).

The inductive approach, elaborated further in the subchapter on the Codebook, started with an extensive reading of a random sample of data repeatedly to achieve immersion and obtain a sense of the whole (Tesch, 1990; Burnard, 1991; Polit & Beck, 2004), as one would read a novel. The extensive body of literature on the Lebanese context screened and presented in Chapter 2 guided the reading. Interviews with experts and journalists conducted through different period of the research[2] helped give more insights during the reading process. Then, the articles of the sample were read word by word to derive categories or codes, named here frame elements (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Morgan, 1993; Morse & Field, 1995), by first highlighting the exact words from the text that appear to capture key thoughts or concepts. Next, each text was approached by making notes of any impressions, thoughts, and initial analysis. This was repeated many times over a long period of time, until a clear understanding of major categories present in all articles was obtained. Then, frame elements were constructed according to the Entman model previously discussed. Following Hsieh and Shannon (2005) approach, definitions for each frame element were set in order to develop the codebook, which will be later explained.

Later, every element was coded, and elements were subjected to a statistical test that sorted them into groups. This process is called Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Each group of components or factors, consisting of different related elements, makes a frame. Following this method, frames are neither identified beforehand nor coded with a single variable. Instead, the variables as single frame elements are grouped together afterwards (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p.264; Dahinden, 2006, p.206). PCA helped narrow down all the interconnections of the variables into a set number of factors, thus clarifying how the frames are constructed.

[2] During many fieldwork visits to Lebanon (between 2012 and 2017), I have met with multiple journalists who work for different newspapers, as well as academics and writers who are experts on the topic of war in Lebanon. The meetings were mostly informal conversations, they guided the search and allowed me to have more insights. Two main interviews that were conducted in 2011 with Talal Salman, *As-Safir*'s publisher and Editor in-chief (at the time), and Rafiq Chlela, a journalist in *An-Nahar* and a member of its editorial board (at the time), helped in fine-tuning the codebook.

4.2.1.1 Selection of data

In content analysis, there is a distinction between two types of content units: the unit of analysis and the unit of observation. According to Thayer, Evans, McBride, Queen, and Spyridakis (2007), while the unit of analysis is the overall idea that a researcher studies, the unit of observation is the specific issue that the researcher is investigating. In this study, the unit of analysis are the Lebanese newspapers *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, and the unit of observation is the corpus of opinion articles on the war topic, written by intellectuals and published on the anniversary of the war for around 30 years.

The selection process began with the definition of the opinion article as the unit of observation; an opinion article is defined as any article published in *An-Nahar* or *As-Safir* that falls under opinion; editorial articles, column articles, and articles in the opinion section of the newspapers. The second step was defining the time period that would be taken into account for the selection of the data. This was defined as 10 days around the date of April 13th, first known as the date of the *Ain el-Remmeneh* bus incident (in 1975), and later as the day the war started and, at a later stage, as an unofficial anniversary of the war. Thus, dates from 8 to 17 April were set as the timeframe. As for the years included in the data collection, years from 1976 – the year following the start of the war to 2013 —the year of the start of data collection—were included.

This study analyzed opinion articles published in the two main newspapers in Lebanon, *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*. As underlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1.1), these two newspapers belong to different ideological camps. Center right-leaning *An-Nahar* and left-leaning *As-Safir* were considered the two main newspapers in terms of circulation. However, the choice is not only based on circulation, but also on their different political and ideological stances. Also, the decision not to include any other newspapers stems from the fact that only *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* were published throughout the timeframe of this study.

The selection of opinion articles was somewhat challenging. For *As-Safir*, their archive is unavailable online, and can only be acquired from the newspaper archive division itself. With the help of the personnel at the division, all articles within the timeframe of this study were collected. The total number exceeded 2000 articles. As for *An-Nahar*, their archive from 1984 to 2011 was available through a paid service online. As for articles prior to 1984 and after 2011, they were collected with the help of an online archiving initiative called 'Memory at Work' that made a few articles available for public access, and with a paid service provided by the archiving division at the newspaper, all articles of the 1976-2013 period were collected. A total of more than 1000 articles from *An-Nahar* were collected. The

total, that exceeded 3000 articles, seemed like a large corpus to study. Accordingly, other criteria were taken into consideration in order to reduce the total amount of data. All articles were to be screened at the beginning. Initial screening showed that some articles did not discuss the topic of war at all, while others mention it briefly while discussing other topics, such as political events and elections, among others. Also, some articles were very short, and did not talk about the topic of war in an extensive way. Based on that, only articles that had mentioned 'war' or '13 April' in their title or body text were included in the sample. It is important to note that during some years, no opinion articles matched the criteria, and thus, some years have zero articles included in the study. The count of data yielded 202 articles in total, 100 published in *An-Nahar* and 102 published in *As-Safir*.

4.2.1.2 Codebook and coding

After having collected and sorted all the articles, the next step was to make the codebook. A codebook was developed in accordance with Entman's (1993) four-part typology for classifying the functions of frames to determine how the war was defined, what causes were suggested and what interpretations, on whom the blame was placed, and what treatment recommendations were suggested for bringing an end to the war. As frames can be understood as representative of the social atmosphere in a given place and time, this study used framing as an analytical device to better understand how Lebanese newspapers, through opinion articles written by intellectuals, present the topic of war at varying times during and after the war.

Given the lack of data on existing frames on the war in Lebanon, this study aimed at reconstructing a number of frames, from within Entman's (1993) broader framework. The frames, inductively, and with the help of quantitative content analysis, reconstructed from the corpus, were sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of how the war is defined and categorized by intellectuals in each of these two publications during different periods.

And given the lack of specific codebook guideline on an internal conflict framing, this study developed its own codebook. This is when the inductive quantitative reading of a sample of the material, along with literature research and interviews, was used.

At the beginning, a series of devices, dimensions and variables were needed, which later could be statistically combined into components, or frames. As argued earlier, Entman's (1993) definition of frames was adopted. A frame that promotes a particular problem, a causal interpretation, a moral evaluation, and/or a treatment recommendation (p.52) is to be reconstructed. When these elements are taken as variables, each can be

operationalized by several categories. Those categories, named frame elements in this study, were to be identified.

First, a random sample of articles was rigorously read several times to identify themes, categories, and consider possible meanings and how these fitted with developing themes. Second, literature on the war in Lebanon was screened to extract some key words recurrent in the context of the war, along with findings from interviews with journalists and experts. As a result, a preliminary coding guideline was developed and tested on a random 20% sample of the articles. If new categories emerged or more fitting keywords were found, the coding guideline was adapted. This process resulted in developing categories, which were then operationalized in a codebook. The codebook (Appendix II) was tested on another random sample of the articles and finalized after several adjustments.

As pointed out earlier, prior to frame analysis, a quantitative content analysis was performed to helped take a global look at the material and answer the first research question (RQ1). The categories needed for this analysis were indeed included in the codebook. To gain a general impression of the material, the study wanted to look at the distribution of articles in both newspapers (i.e. *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*) during and after the war, i.e. the number of articles published in each year of the period under study. The reason behind looking at the distribution for articles was an attempt to understand the importance given to the war and the anniversary of the war, from a pure quantitative perspective. These findings were to be read in relation to other findings; every article was coded for its length, its genre, its source and its writer. The length of the article, being short, of medium length, or lengthy, helps in the analysis of the attention given to the topic by the newspaper. Each article in this study was coded as either short, of medium length, or lengthy. A short article does not exceed 500 words, a medium-length article ranges between 500-800 words, and a lengthy one exceeds 800 words. In the absence of an accurate count of words, as the majority of articles was not available in a document format, but in picture format, the reliance was on a manual count of words, and also on the position of the article to code the length. The place the article is occupying in the page gives a visual indication of whether the article is small (marginal), medium (just a regular article), or a lengthy one (occupying many columns). The reason why the length and position of the article were important to look at is the connation they give. An article in an inside page that is on the margin does not give the same impression of importance as one that is on the front page or on an opinion page occupying 3 columns for example. By looking at the length of the articles, this study aimed at comparing from a pure

structural way the importance each the newspaper, and the press in a more general sense, give to the topic of the war.

Since all articles included in this study are opinion articles, the genre of the article criterion can be an editorial, a column article, or an op-ed article. It was important to look at this aspect as it says a lot about whether the framing is reflective of the newspaper's editorial line, through either editorials or op-eds, or is more of an 'outside' opinion expressed by a guest author and does not necessarily reflect the newspaper's position. Accordingly, the author could be an editor, a regular writer (usually a journalist), or a guest writer. These last two categories were important to look at when analyzing 'who is talking,' if it is the newspaper following a clear editorial line, or a guest writer who could oppose editorial policies. In addition, the 'profile of author' was of significant importance in the analysis. The writer, coded as a journalist, a politician, an academic, an artist, a religious figure, a civil society activist, or other, helped identify 'who is talking' more specifically and helped understand frame-building more clearly. All these variables were critical to the analysis of the articles and this study's understanding of the context in which the articles appear, and therefore the context in which the discourse is reflected.

Next, a count of the number of articles published in each newspaper over time, helped track the peak and drop years, when publishing of articles on the war increased or decreased. These findings were to be interpreted in relation to the dominant frame dimension of articles in each given period, wartime or postwar. Following Entman's model, each article was coded regarding its dominant frame dimension, be it *issue definition*, *issue diagnosis and causal interpretation*, *issue evaluation*, or *treatment recommendation*. This criterion helped further understand how frames are built and designed. This was coded by counting the elements in every article. During coding, every article was read, and the four frame dimensions were detected and counted. For example, if an article focused most on defining the war, *issue definition* was coded. This gave insights into the dominant focus of articles during peaks and drops and helped compared the results of wartime and the postwar period.

In addition, an inventory of authors' names was developed, and every article was coded for the name of the author. However, the findings of this particular category will not be displayed in the following chapters, as they only served as background information that helped interpret the findings.

As for the categories of the quantitative frame analysis, they were broken into two: C1 and C2. Given the fact that the codebook was developed largely inductively in the absence of previous content analysis studies on the topic, it was to be expected that not all framing

items would survive testing. Also, items coded in less than 5 articles were omitted. Eventually, 33 items of the original codebook were used for further analysis. C1 comprised 3 variables, and C2 included 30 variables. C1 categories focused on the April 13th, 1975 incident and the 'war' label, while C2 categories dissected the frame dimensions of the war. When doing the initial screening of the articles, it was noticed that there were essential questions to be asked for every article, before delving into the actual frame dimensions of war. These questions were put in a separate category, C1. The first question was whether the article clearly identified what happened on April 13th, 1975. As this date was a focal point in this study and a date around which the data is centered, it seemed important to look at it as an independent event. Thus, before exploring how this date was -with all that it represents- presented in the media, it was essential to question if it is mentioned and defined in the first place. However, defining what happened on April 13th, 1975 does not necessarily mean defining it as the first day of the war. Thus, it seemed important to code whether the article suggested that April 13th, 1975 was the day one. While doing the initial screening, it also noticed that many articles labeled the war simply as 'war,' without describing it further, as a civil war, or Lebanese war, or other. It seemed important to also code this before going into frame dimensions and elements, as giving the war a specific term is a form of initial framing.

As for the categories in C2, following Entman's model, they focused on the framing dimensions of the war. Table 4.1 lists the frame elements as defined by Entman (1993) and the corresponding variables in this study.

Frame Dimension	Variables
Issue Definition (ID)	ID: War is labeled as 'civil war'
	ID: War is labeled as war as 'war of others on our land'
	ID: War is labeled as 'wars'
	ID: War is labeled as 'war of everyone against everyone'
Issue Diagnosis and causal interpretation (CI)	CI: Palestinians are actors involved in the war
	CI: Christians are actors involved in the war
	CI: Lebanese Front/Phalanges are actors involved in the war
	CI: Muslims are actors involved in the war
	CI: Lebanese National Movement/Leftists are actors involved in the war
	CI: Israel is an actor involved in the war
	CI: The United States of America is an actor involved in the war
	CI: USSR is an actor involved in the war
	CI: One or more Arab countries are actors involved in the war
	CI: All Lebanese are actors involved in the war
	CI: Palestinian presence/military activity caused the war
	CI: Socioeconomic factors caused the war
	CI: The cold war caused the war
	CI: Syrian influence caused the war
	CI: The Arab-Israeli conflict caused the war
	CI: Sectarian tensions caused the war
Issue Evaluation (IE)	IE: War is described as a 'dirty' war?
	IE: No one won, everyone lost
	IE: A minority of elites won the war and a majority of people lost
	IE: All Lebanese are equal victims of the war
	IE: Ta'if Agreement only ended the military conflict and froze the war
Treatment Recommendation (TR)	TR: A Lebanese agreement (political consensus, constitutional or institutional solution) is the solution to end the war
	TR: An Arab agreement is the solution to end the war
	TR: An international agreement is the solution to end the war
	TR: A solution related to the Arab-Israeli conflict will end the war
	TR: The original causes of the war should be treated in order to end the war

Table 4.1: Frame Elements as Variables

As Table 4.1 shows, the frame element *Issue definition* was regarded as the starting point. Pre-analysis revealed four major labels of the war; the war was labeled as a 1. Civil war, 2. 'War of others on our land,' 3. 'Wars,' or 4. 'War of everyone against everyone.' What was common was the use of the term war, rather than battles in all four labels.

In the frame element *Issue diagnosis and causal attribution,* variables consisted of actors involved in the war and the causes attributed to the war. Local, regional and international actors were identified, and internal, regional and global causes were adapted as causes of the war. Palestinians, Christians, Muslims, the LF, the LNM, Israel, USA, USSR, one or more Arab countries, and all Lebanese were coded as actors. As for the causes of the war, variables included: Palestinian presence and military activity, socioeconomic factors, the Cold War, Syrian influence, the Arab-Israeli conflict and sectarian tensions.

The *Issue evaluation* dimension of frames included variables describing the war and evaluating its consequences. Those variables included: describing the war as a 'dirty war,' suggesting that a minority of elites won the war and the majority of people lost, suggesting that all Lebanese are victims, and arguing that Ta'if only ended the military conflict and froze the war. It is worth noting, that although the variable suggesting that 'no one won and everyone lost' was included and coded but did not show in any of the reconstructed frames.

As for *Treatment recommendation,* variables included internal, regional and international solutions to end the war. Variables included: a Lebanese agreement to end the war, an Arab agreement, an international agreement, a solution related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, or a treatment of the original causes of the war.

Coding was the quantitative step in the first stage. As Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998) stress, a content analysis must always be conducted in a systematic way for the study to be reliable and valid. Thus, it is crucial that certain elements of the study such as the time frame, the sample size, the focus of the study, and how accurate the different measurements are going to be, are clearly defined before the actual analysis (Firdous, 2009). Accordingly, after defining all these criteria, all 202 articles were coded.

A frequency analysis was conducted on all articles to extract findings on specific variables. Date of publication, genre of article, source, length and profile of writer were coded and analyzed in order to have a general look at the data. Major categories, as mentioned earlier, were also analyzed for frequency and examined in relation to the first research question (RQ1).

Being the single coder, it took several trials and errors to master coding, and ensure that criteria of validity and reliability are present.

4.2.1.3 Validity and reliability

According to Neuendorf (2002), validity represents the extent to which a measuring procedure represents the intended, and only the intended, concepts. In this study, this was attained after formulating the research questions, following the theoretical framework and the development of the codebook from the material. As for reliability, Neunendorf defines it as the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials. To achieve those two measures and taking into account that there is a single coder handling the coding in this study, a 10% random sample of the articles was re-coded, and a reliability test was performed on the data. An intra-coder reliability analysis using Cohen's Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency in coding. The intra-coder reliability was found to be Kappa = 0.96 ($p < .0.001$), considered as almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).

4.2.1.4 Principle component analysis

After coding the material, and insuring validity and reliability, data were subject to analysis. The main method of quantitative analysis applied in this study was SPSS's PCA. PCA is a description "of the variation of a set of multi-variate data in terms of a set of uncorrelated variables each of which is a linear combination of the original variables" (Everitt & Dunn 1991: 45). PCA was conducted with a Varimax rotation on 4 sets of data; wartime *An-Nahar*, wartime *As-Safir*, postwar *An-Nahar* and postwar *As-Safir*.

A simple yes-no category was chosen to extract the frames elements present in the data. For every variable, an answer of yes or no was coded after reading the articles divided into paragraphs. An advantage of such a binary coding strategy is that intra-coder reliabilities are relatively high. This has proved to be the case as pointed out earlier. Nonetheless, a disadvantage of binary data is that they are measured with more measurement error, with the inevitable risk that correlations between such variables are lower than correlations between ordinal or interval variables (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The attenuated correlations between binary variables could therefore readily mask an underlying factor structure that could be clearly visible if the variables had been on a higher measurement level. As a result, after several processes, one in particular was chosen. The process of extracting the factors for PCA normally takes on a default setting of SPSS using the Kaiser stopping criterion, i.e. all factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 to decide how many factors to extract. However, there exists another option; choosing a fixed number of factors to extract. Several tests were run choosing the factors to be 3, 4 or 5. Then, after comparing all the findings on all the datasets (Wartime *An-Nahar*, Wartime *As-Safir*, Postwar *An-Nahar*, Postwar *As-Safir*),

while looking at the KMO, Total Variance Explained and Scree plot for every dataset result, the following results were reached. For the Wartime data (both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*), almost 50% of the data was explained by 3 factors (i.e. frames), while the rest of the data was scattered among 20+ factors. For the Postwar data (both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*), almost 50% of the data was explained by 2 factors (i.e. frames), while the rest of the data was scattered among 20+ factors. All results generated through PCA led to the quantitative reconstruction of frames in the two newspapers and through the two periods of wartime and postwar. Accordingly, this study was able to reconstruct 3 wartime frames in *An-Nahar* and 3 wartime frames in *As-Safir*, and 2 postwar frames in *An-Nahar* and 2 postwar frames in *As-Safir*, providing answers for the second research question (RQ2). This step served to quantitatively extract and reconstruct the frames and was followed by an in-depth textual analysis that studied those reconstructed frames qualitatively in order to discuss them and dig the deeper meanings unexplained quantitatively.

4.2.2 Qualitative textual analysis

As a second stage of analysis, this study employed textual analysis—consistent with critical theory—to uncover the latent meanings embedded in the opinion articles tackling the war, included in this study.

Fürsich (2009) maintains that unlike its social-scientific counterpart, i.e. quantitative content analysis, text analysis in the cultural-critical paradigm does not draw from a united intellectual and methodological tradition. The method is often poorly defined and is employed in myriad ways. In this study, an approach of textual analysis that focused on the underlying ideological and cultural assumptions of the text was adopted. Text is understood as a complex set of discursive strategies that is situated in a special cultural context (Barthes, 1972). This type of analysis involves a prolonged engagement, called by Hall (1975) "the long preliminary soak" (p.15) of the chosen text using semiotic, narrative, genre or rhetorical approaches to qualitative analysis (e.g., Real, 1996).

Textual analysis was developed by Hall (1975) as an alternative to the commonly used quantitative method of content analysis. In contrast with quantitative content analysis, textual analysis is considered an interpretative method that allows the researcher to explore all aspects of content, both the admitted and the omitted. In this study, textual analysis was employed as the second stage of the analysis, following extensive quantitative analysis. Even though several studies have used textual analysis as an adequate method by itself (Musto,

2009; Yoshino, 2008; Yuen, 2013), it is argued here that a mixed-method approach leads to better results in the context of this study.

The reason for utilizing textual analysis in this study is to allow taking a long soak in the material, one that should help bring to the surface all possible meanings of the text, not just manifest meaning (Hall, 1975). Thus, as Barthes (1972) argues, one is able to view the text in totality and surmise the complex layers of meanings embedded in the text. Textual analysis gives insight into "the narrative character of media content, its potential as a site of ideological negotiation, and its impact as mediated 'reality' necessities interpretation in its own right" (Fürsich, 2009, p.238).

In this study, a sample of 20 articles (roughly 10%) was selected to be textually analyzed. Analysis contained both textual and contextual analysis. Textual analysis looked at the frame used in the text, and focused on analyzing the four frame elements, or whatever of them is present. In addition to that, other aspects in the text were studied; namely actors and their representation, language and rhetoric, specifically the tone and style of writing (Carvalho, 2008; Fürsich, 2009). As for contextual analysis, the study looked at the context in which the article was located; the author, the newspaper, and the time period the article appeared in.

This holistic approach to textual analysis aimed at allowing a better understanding of the text in order to put it in its discursive context, providing further insights into the second research question (RQ2). Also, by looking at the narrative character of the articles, the study attempted to establish the link between journalistic texts and memory (Zelitzer, 1992) and the historic or nostalgic contribution of journalism to create a collective identity (Kitch, 2005), a main concern for the third research question (RQ3). Brennen (2008) argues that this type of interpretive analysis of historic-critical media texts over longer periods of time allows researchers to understand how newspapers represent and interpret social change.

As stated earlier, the textual analysis approach adopted in this study aimed at exploring the discursiveness of the frames reconstructed at an earlier stage, by not only interpreting them, but also looking at their textual and contextual aspects, discussing them and exploring them further. Once frames were generated from the first stage, 20 articles (roughly 10% of the data) were selected for the in-depth textual analysis. This selection was guided by the findings of content analysis. Once frames were reconstructed, following the content analysis findings, articles with different dominant frames were chosen to be textually analyzed.

The chosen articles reflected the different frames, and belonged to different time periods, both during and after the war. Articles were divided among the 2 newspapers, *An-*

Nahar and *As-Safir*. A number of articles referring to every frame the content analysis has reconstructed was chosen. Articles belonged to both wartime and postwar period, in order to examine whether the same frame changed across time. Chapter 7 provides a table detailing the selected articles, including date of publishing, newspaper, and frame.

As noted, the analysis of the selected articles looked at the textual aspect of the articles; namely actors and their representation, language and rhetoric, specifically the tone and style of writing. It also looked at contextual analysis, the context in which the article was located, its genre, source, author, and the time period they it appeared in.

This qualitative analysis was sought to complement previous quantitative analysis and give the study a more comprehensive outlook on war framing. Articles were in Arabic language; Thus, all important words and phrases were carefully translated. In addition, as every language has its own cultural settings, some words might appear to mean different things when translated into English. The analysis took that into consideration and looked into latent meanings. When looking into the articles, something very crucial was taken into consideration: the choice of words. Choice of words – especially during conflict – reflects a certain layer in the discourse of war, and hence, is closely connected to memory. In Lebanon, certain terms emerged during the war and spread in the press and were imprinted in the individual and collective memory of the time, while some terms disappeared in later phases of the war or took on a different meaning in the postwar period. Other terms were forced to be forgotten, as they belonged to the dark period of the war. For example, the term *al-iniizaliyyun*, literally translated as the separatists, emerged during the war and was used by the left to describe the Phalange, depicting them as enemies (Haugbolle, 2010, p.152). This term almost disappeared after the war and, if mentioned, is a reminder of the war period and related terminology. Such terms will be analyzed in the context of the articles and the time period they appeared in.

Language is embedded in the collective memory. When an intellectual and a newspaper choose specific words to describe the war or any of the actors, they are making a decision to portray the war and actors in a specific manner that reflects a certain frame of the war. This is what the study aims to investigate. The analytical approach of textual analysis was sought to further accentuate the findings, and embed them in the larger discourse on memory, leading to answer the third research question (RQ3).

CHAPTER 5

MEDIA APPROACHES TO THE DISCOURSE OF THE WAR IN WARTIME AND POSTWAR

In this chapter, the findings of the quantitative content analysis performed on the 202 articles are presented. This chapter seeks to answer the first research question (RQ1) regarding media approaches to the discourse of the war, in wartime and in postwar.

As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3), there is no clear date for the end of the war. Hence, this study made a methodological decision regarding sorting data into wartime and postwar period. Taking the Ta'if Agreement as the event that initiated the end of the war, this study considered any article published up to 1989 as part of the wartime data, and any article as of 1990 as part of the postwar data. This chapter will further highlight this matter.

First, the findings on article distribution in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* are interpreted in relation to their length, their genre and author. Findings on *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, as well as the war and postwar periods, are compared and conclusions are drawn.

Next, findings on the distribution of articles over time, tracking the peak years and drop years of publishing on the anniversary of the war are interpreted in light of the dominant frame dimensions that the articles have. This is also done while comparing the two outlets and the two periods and discussing them.

Lastly, findings on C1 categories are highlighted. Findings show whether the articles identified what happened on April 13th, 1975, called it the first day of the war, or labeled the war simply as such, are presented and interpreted across newspapers and time periods.

This excursion into these findings is necessary at this stage, as it helps in understanding the weight, approach, and importance given to the discourse of the war in the press both during and after the war and postulates insights into the first research question (RQ1) on media attitude towards the discourse of the war.

5.1 Wartime Discourse: *An-Nahar*'s Editorial Approach and *As-Safir*'s Op-ed Approach



Source of Article	Length of Article				Genre of Article			Author			Profile of Author						
	An-Nahar / As-Safir	Short	Medium length	Lengthy	Editorial	Column	Op-Ed	Editor	Regular writer	Guest writer	Journalist	Politician	Academic	Artist / Writer	Religious figure	Civil society activist	Other
An-Nahar	30.7%	9.7%	71.0%	19.4%	48.4%	41.9%	9.7%	45.2%	45.2%	9.7%	93.5%	3.2%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
As-Safir	69.3%	21.4%	41.4%	37.1%	20.0%	25.7%	54.3%	21.4%	27.1%	51.4%	55.7%	15.7%	17.1%	0.0%	4.3%	1.4%	5.7%

Figure 5.1: Wartime (1976-1989) Article Distribution

As shown in Figure 5.1 illustrating the distribution of articles among the two sources during the war period, the majority (69.3%) of articles were published in *As-Safir*, and 30.7% of the articles were published in *An-Nahar*. A first impression would be that *As-Safir* gave more weight to discussions on the war than *An-Nahar* during the war. A closer look at the other findings is needed to interpret further.

Looking at the length of the articles, results yielded the dominance of medium-length articles in *An-Nahar* (71%), while almost half the articles in *As-Safir* (41.4%) were medium-length. Publishing medium-length articles that tackle the war seemed to be a pattern in the Lebanese press during the war, despite *An-Nahar* scoring a higher percentage than *As-Safir*. A noteworthy observation was the percentage of lengthy articles being higher than that of short articles for both newspapers, though one should bear in mind that the length of an article is not the only indication as to the importance the newspaper attaches to the topic. In some cases, some layout conditions – such as the way the spread or page are designed– can play a role in deciding the length of the article. Nonetheless, the size of an article can generally indicate the weight and importance of a story/topic for the media outlet, as editors assign article spaces based on that. Thus, the findings here show that the war was given a measurable importance in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* and that it was not a marginal topic, in

general. The high percentage of lengthy and medium-length articles in wartime reflects the importance the topic of the war was given on the anniversary of the war during wartime.

Taking into consideration the genre of articles published in each newspaper during the war, their authors along with their profiles could give a better understanding of those numbers. The findings shown in Figure 5.1 indicate that almost half of *An-Nahar* articles were editorials (48.4%), while a little more than half of *As-Safir*'s articles were op-eds (54.3%). As *An-Nahar*'s wartime articles were mostly editorials (48.4%) and columns (41.9%), it makes sense that the articles were of medium-length, as editorials and columns do not normally occupy a large space in the newspaper sheet. In *As-Safir*, as wartime articles consisted mostly of op-eds (54.3%) and columns (25.7%), it is understandable that medium-length articles (41.4%) and lengthy articles (37.1%) were dominant, as op-eds tend to be lengthy articles, and columns are usually of medium-length.

An important conclusion can be drawn when looking at findings on the genre of articles in *An-Nahar*: the newspaper's voice was the dominant one, reaching 90% of the total articles, almost 50% of them being editorials and 40% of them being columns. The very low percentage of op-eds in *An-Nahar*, scoring only 9.7%, is telling about the representation – or rather non-representation – of the 'other' opinion in *An-Nahar*. In general, editorials, and to some extent columns, reflect the editorial policy or at least the political tendencies of the newspaper. The fact that almost only editorials and columns discussed the war in *An-Nahar* is a result to keep in mind when evaluating the media role in memory construction.

As-Safir's articles were grouped as such: half of the articles were editorials and columns while the other half were op-eds. At first glance, this could be an indication of the extent to which *As-Safir* has allowed various opinions to be channeled through it, and the space it assigned to outsourced contributions. The fact that editorials and columns scored similar percentages also indicates the importance of the war as a topic for the editorial line of the newspaper. The split between the newspaper's own interpretation and the op-ed views on the war might look like a sign of a democratic and healthy media practice. However, given the background of the Lebanese media sphere described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1.1) and how each entity functioned especially during the war, one can argue that not all op-eds are forcibly heterogeneous in opinion. In fact, *As-Safir* could have actually outsourced and reached out to like-minded contributors to advance a certain discourse of the war. This leads to the next findings; the authors and their profiles.

In *An-Nahar*, authors were equally divided between editors and regular writers (45.2%). And although these findings might seem like a discrepancy compared to the

previous one regarding the genre of articles, one can assume that although editorials are normally written by editors, *An-Nahar* had allowed regular writers to contribute to editorials on some occasions. However, the general finding regarding the type of authors confirmed that voices echoed in *An-Nahar* were internal voices, and almost no outsides voices were present (9.7% for guest writers' category). Opposite to that, the guest writer category scored the highest percentage in *As-Safir*, with almost half of the articles (51.4%) written by guests. The reason why the percentage of the guest writer category was slightly lower than the op-ed category is that, in some instance, an editor or regular writer might have written an op-ed. Regardless of the slight discrepancies, the fact remains that *As-Safir* has allowed more guest writers to express their opinions than *An-Nahar*.

As for the profile of the author category, almost all of *An-Nahar* articles were written by journalists (93.5%), while a little more than half of *As-Safir*'s articles were written by journalists (55.7%). These findings come in line with the previous findings regarding the genre and type of author of the article. Interestingly, 20% of the contributors to the op-eds in *As-Safir* were academics, and 18% were politicians. This leads to the following interpretation: the approach towards the discourse of the war in *As-Safir* was mostly forwarded by journalists and academics.

The results could be read in light of the political position of the newspapers during the war. As pointed out in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1.1), *As-Safir*'s left-leaning editorial policy gave space for intellectuals of the left to write and publish during the war. In addition to editorials by its editors Talal Salman and Joseph Samaha, *As-Safir* published column articles and opinion articles written by what one can consider intellectuals of the left, like Hazem Saghieh, Saad Mehio, Jihad Ezzeine and Georges Nassif, Bassem Assabea, and other academics and writers[3]. As highlighted in Chapter 2, *As-Safir* was a hub for Lebanese and Arab intellectuals at that period of time, especially those who advocate socialist and pan-Arab ideoligies, and had pro-palestinian attitudes. *An-Nahar*, on the other hand, was far from that camp. What *An-Nahar* published during the war were merely editorials and articles written by its own editor-in-chief, Ghassan Tueini, and the likes of Elias al-Dairy, Michel Abou Jaoude, Sarkis Naoum, and other main *An-Nahar* writers.

[3] This was found when referring to the inventory of authors' names mentioned in Chapter 4. Check Appendix II (Codebook) for reference.

5.2 Postwar Discourse: The Op-ed Angle



	An-Nahar / As-Safir	Short	Medium length	Lengthy	Editorial	Column	Op-Ed	Editor	Regular writer	Guest writer	Journalist	Politician	Academic	Artist / Writer	Religious figure	Civil society activist	Other
	Source of Article	Length of Article			Genre of Article			Author			Profile of Author						
An-Nahar	68.3%	43.5%	40.6%	15.9%	10.1%	49.3%	40.6%	8.7%	50.7%	40.6%	72.5%	4.3%	10.1%	0.0%	1.4%	7.2%	4.3%
As-Safir	31.7%	31.3%	18.8%	50.0%	9.4%	15.6%	75.0%	15.6%	15.6%	68.8%	46.9%	18.8%	25.0%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%

Figure 5.2: Postwar (1990-2013) Article Distribution

In contrast with the wartime findings, the distribution of articles in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* in the postwar period yielded opposite results. As shown in Figure 5.2, in the postwar period, the majority of articles (68.3%) were published in *An-Nahar*, while 31.7% were published in *As-Safir*.

This interesting change in the distribution of articles provides evidence regarding the position of each newspaper during and after the war, and the role each of them played in each era. Compared to wartime, the postwar period witnessed a shift with regards to the percentage of articles published in the two newspapers, as *An-Nahar* published more than *As-Safir*. A closer look at the length, genre, and authors and their profiles could explain this shift.

As Figure 5.2 illustrates, *An-Nahar* articles in the postwar period were almost equally short (43.5%) and of medium-length (40.6%), and only few (15.9%) were lengthy. Compared to wartime findings, *An-Nahar* had maintained a pattern of publishing medium-length articles, but increased short articles significantly, and decreased lengthy ones. This suggests a change in the way *An-Nahar* addressed the topic of the war in the postwar period and raises questions regarding its importance to the newspaper.

On the other hand, half of As-Safir's articles in the postwar period were lengthy (50%), while 31.3% were short, and the rest (18.8%) were of medium-length. The increase in lengthy articles in the postwar period can be a sign of a greater interest in the war, and a greater importance given to the discussion around it. Having the majority of published

articles long or of medium-length in *As-Safir* is telling of the newspaper's editorial policy of approaching the war thoroughly in the postwar period. A closer look at the genre of articles would help explain the findings regarding the articles' lengths.

The dominant genre of articles in *An-Nahar* was columns (49.3%), followed by op-eds (40.6%), and a very low percentage of editorials (10.1%). It seems that, despite the dominant genres being columns and op-eds, the length of articles was mostly short and of medium-length.

This complete shift of pattern in the genre of articles in *An-Nahar*, between wartime and the postwar period, is interesting. As discussed earlier, *An-Nahar* wartime articles were reflecting of the newspaper's position, as the majority were editorials and columns, while the 'other' position was very marginal. While columns – normally written by in-house writers and journalists – remained the same in terms of percentage (41.9% wartime vs. 49.3% postwar), op-eds became the second most frequent genre of articles (40.6) published in *An-Nahar* in the postwar period, almost equal to columns. This shift indicates *An-Nahar* interest in giving an equal voice to outsourced contributors as much as its own writers.

As for *As-Safir*, although op-eds remained the dominant genre, the percentage of this category significantly increased in the postwar period (up to75% of the total articles), at the expense of both editorials (now 9.4%) and columns (now 15.6%). This mirrors the findings regarding length, as op-eds tend to be long and to a lesser extent of medium-length.

With the majority of articles being op-eds, *As-Safir* has proven to still be "the voice of the voiceless" as its motto asserts – or at least a voice for those who want it – and has also shown an increasing interest in discussing the war from an op-ed perspective more than an editorial angle.

There is a noticeable pattern holding largely in *As-Safir*: In wartime and the postwar period, *As-Safir* has approached the discourse of the war from an op-ed perspective. On the other hand, *An-Nahar* has witnessed a pattern shift, where the op-ed approach to the discourse of the war grew largely in the postwar period at the expense of editorials. Another interesting observation is that the lowest genre coded in the postwar period was editorials in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* (*An-Nahar* 10.1%, *As-Safir* 9.4%, combined 9.8%). This leads to the following conclusion: In the postwar period, the topic of the war was no longer a major editorial concern for the press, and the op-ed voice was more important.

The type of authors followed the genre accordingly and confirms this conclusion; the highest percentage in the case of *An-Nahar* were regular writers (50.7%), and guest writers in the case of *As-Safir* (68.8%). The noteworthy finding here is that the guest writer category,

which scored the least (30.6%) in wartime, became the main 'voice' in the postwar press. This came at the expense of the "inner" voices of the newspaper, namely the editors, as their articles drastically dropped from 33.3% in wartime to 12.2% in the postwar period. However, the regular writers' voices remained almost the same (36.2% in wartime and 33.2% in postwar).

As for the profile of the authors, journalists (72.5%) wrote the majority of *An-Nahar* articles, and almost half of *As-Safir* articles (46.9%). This might contradict previous findings regarding dominant genre and type of authors. Having op-eds as the dominant genre, and guest writers as contributors, one might assume something other than journalists would be the dominant profile of writers. However, a closer look at the data and the inventory of the authors names[4] can provide an explanation. In the opinion section of the two newspapers, and particularly the special feature pages that addressed the war on April 13th, journalists were commonly found signing articles. Writing in the opinion section frees journalists from the obligation of sticking to the editorial policy of their respective newspaper and allows them to speak in their own name – which helps them skip editorial restrictions in some cases. Another noteworthy finding is that in *As-Safir*, a relatively high percentage (25%) of articles were written by academics. This pattern of having academics writing op-eds in *As-Safir* largely holds across the two periods, and in fact increased in postwar. This proves *As-Safir*'s continuous interest in addressing the war from an academic perspective.

5.3 Discourse Across Time: "Let the War End" vs. "Let's Discuss the War"



Figure 5.3: Distribution of Articles Over Time

[4] Check the Codebook, Appendix II.

Dominant frame dimension	Newspaper	
	An-Nahar	*As-Safir*
Issue Definition	19.4%	21.4%
Issue Diagnosis and Causal Interpretation	12.9%	35.7%
Issue Evaluation	19.4%	5.7%
Treatment Recommendation	48.4%	37.1%

Table 5.1: Dominant Frame Dimension (Wartime)

Dominant frame dimension	Newspaper	
	An-Nahar	*As-Safir*
Issue Definition	46.4%	56.3%
Issue Diagnosis and Causal Interpretation	20.3%	37.5%
Issue Evaluation	21.7%	0.0%
Treatment Recommendation	11.6%	6.3%

Table 5.2: Dominant Frame Dimension (Postwar)

Several peaks and drops in article publishing by either of the newspapers were witnessed throughout the years. These peaks and drops are interpreted in light of the findings on the dominant frame dimension during a given time, be it during the war or in the postwar period.

As shown in Figure 5.3, the number of articles published in *An-Nahar* was highest in 1976, one year after the start of the war, and on the first anniversary of the war. When looking at the dominant frame dimension in Table 5.1, one can notice that 48.2% of *An-Nahar* articles focused on *treatment recommendation*, or in this case, on ways to end the war. Thus, on the first anniversary of the war, the peak, and in the following war years, *An-Nahar* extensively published articles that call for an end to the war and suggested ways to end it. Interestingly, however, an equal percentage (19.4%) yielded both *issue definition* and *issue evaluation*, while a lower percentage scored for *causal interpretation* (12.9%). *An-Nahar* has thus primarily focused on echoing *treatment recommendation*, while showing equal interest in both defining and evaluating the war, and less interest in its interpretation. Perhaps to *An-Nahar*, it seemed too early to discuss the root causes of the war. What seemed more important was defining what was happening, giving it a certain evaluation, and trying to find a way to end it. The only other peak in publishing in wartime in *An-Nahar* was in 1986.

As for *As-Safir*, the number of articles published during the war reached three peaks in 1984, 1985 and 1987. Similarly to *An-Nahar*, a good number of *As-Safir*'s articles (37.1%) had a *treatment recommendation* dominant frame element. But *As-Safir* seemed to have a different point of view. Although its main focus was *treatment recommendation*, diagnosing and interpreting the war was equally important, with a very close percentage (35.7%). *Issue definition* scored 21.4%, a similar result to that in *An-Nahar*. As for *issue evaluation*, it scored very low in *As-Safir* (5.7%). For *As-Safir*, ending the war seems to be intertwined with understanding its causal roots, the main actors, and the way it has evolved. Considering that many academics have contributed to *As-Safir*'s discourse of the war, as shown earlier, it seems logical to have this kind of approach, where cause and solution are two faces of the same issue. Also, defining the war, labeling it and giving it names comes next, as a way of interpreting the war and putting it within one or more interpretations.

The three peaks in *As-Safir* can be related to the 10-year anniversary of the start of the war, as they all centered around it.The highest peak was noticed in 1987, and is the highest in all the timeframe this study looked at, for both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*. A qualitative examination of the data shows that in 1987, *As-Safir* dedicated the front page and many inside pages to the anniversary of the war. With a headline that read "13 April 1975 – 13 April 1987: Declaring war on the war," *As-Safir* seemed to have announced a counter-war, a war that aimed to bring peace and end the actual war. That same day, an inside spread with the headline "12 years of war… how shall we start the dialogue?" was published. The spread included articles by various writers. This explains the high number of articles published that year.

It can be concluded that in wartime, the press focused on approaching the discourse of the war from a solution-oriented angle, and without getting too carried away with the war's causes and interpretations.

As Table 5.2 shows, in the postwar period, multiple peaks in publishing were observed in *An-Nahar*; These included the years 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2011. The analysis of the dominant frame dimension in postwar *An-Nahar* articles showed that *issue definition* was the most frequent (46.4%).

The peak in 1995 can be read in light of the 20th anniversary of the start of the war, and the 5th year reminder of its end, 2 events that could have triggered the disucssion around the war. As for the peak in 2000, it could be related to the 25th anniversary of the start of the war, and the 10-year reminder of its end. It seems that every anniversary was not only a commemoration of the start of the war, but also a reminder of the absence of an 'end of war

anniversary.' The peak in 2000 was followed by another in 2001, in what can be considered a breakthrough in the discussions on the war seen in the early 2000s. The peak of 2001 can also be read in light of the major event that happened less than a year earlier: The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon. As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.1), this event marked the first milestone since independence, and pushed the topic of the war to the fore again. As for the last three peaks, they can all be read as reactions to the return of the ghost of the war. The war became again an issue, questions on whether the war really ended were publically discussed, and fears of an upcoming war surfaced following two main events that happened consecutively in 2005 and 2006 and their aftermath. As pointed out in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2), the assasination of Rafic Hariri and the other assasinations that took place in 2005 returned the unresolved issue of the war to the spotlight. Amidst fears of another outbreak or doubts about the actual ending of the war, the press was triggered to focus on the war. And as a result of the Syrian troops' withdrawl from Lebanon in 2005 and the Israeli attacks on Lebanon in 2006, *An-Nahar* reacted by publishing more on the issue for the following 2 anniversaries of April 13th. In addition, the events of May 7th, 2008, when some Hizbullah militants seized western Beirut (See Chapter 2, section 2.3.3), brought back memories of the war. All these events seemed to have made the war – and its anniversary – a crucial discussion. The last interesting peak of 2011, though not as high as the previous ones, can be read in light of the recurrence of clashes in some parts of Lebanon, mainly in North Lebanon as noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3). These clashes made the Lebanese relive the war, and perhaps question whether it really ended. One interesting interpretation of this peak links it to the social movement and demonstrations in Beirut against Lebanon's confessional system of governance and against sectarianism that took place in April 2011. This protest moevement called for abloshing the sectarian system, and blamed the ruling elite - in other words the warlords - for leading the country to a political stalemate. In a way, it was a protest against the war and its aftermath. This perhaps made the press reflect on the war.

As for *As-Safir*, remarkable increases in the number of articles published in the postwar period were seen in 1990, less than a year following the Ta'if Accord, and what many considered to be the no-war-no-peace year. Then, similarly to *An-Nahar*, peaks were seen in the years 2000 and 2005, a decade after the supposed end of war, and following the changing events of 2002 and 2005, as argued earlier. Like *An-Nahar*, the dominant frame dimension in *As-Safir*'s postwar articles was *issue definition* (56.3%).

Significant drops in the number of published articles were witnessed during the first few years of war, and the first few years of 'peace.' In the first few years of war, it was not

yet clear what this war was, whether it was only sporadic battles, like the Two Years' war, or whether it was going to be a long and protracted war. This is understanble, as the first stages in any conflict can be vague; Is it a war? or a series of sporadic battles? In the first few years of peace, the situation was also confusing, and it was not clear whether the war really ended, or whether this was only a lull in preparation for another round of war.

These peaks and drops must be analyzed against the findings on dominant frame dimensions. Contrary to wartime, where it almost scored the lowest percentage (20.4%), *issue definition* became the main focus of half of the articles in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* in the postwar period. Understanding the war, not only by defining it, but also by interpreting its causes became one of the main interests for the press in the postwar period. It can be argued here that it is more realistic to discuss the war, its reasons and what actually happened, after it ended and some years have passed. Thus, the press has seemingly joined and contributed to the public discussion of the war in the postwar period.

Moreover, *treatment recommendation* drastically dropped from being the most common focus in both newspapers during the war to the least common focus in the postwar period (11.6% in *An-Nahar* and 6.3% in *As-Safir*). This finding reflects the pointlessness of finding a way to end a war that has already ended. Interestingly, however, there were still some postwar articles that did in fact focus on treatment recommendation. It seems that to some, the war did not really end, and it was still urgent to address that matter.

Against all these findings, a closer examination of how specific aspects of the war were approached by the press is necessary.

5.4 April 13th in the Press: First Day of 'War'

As noted in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1.2), the pre-analysis screening of data and literature on the war left some unanswered questions regarding the way the press portrays the specific date of April 13th, whether the events of that day are generally regarded as the flame that ignited the war, and whether the war was called such in the first place. These aspects, along with others, coded as variables of C1, were essential to explore and analyze before going into frame analysis. In the context of this study, it seemed important to investigate the a priori assumptions of the press about the start of the war and its weight. During the early years of the war, and even in the postwar period, the war was sometimes referred to as *al-ahdath*, literally translated as the 'events.' This attenuation could be read as a denial statement towards the war. But also, it helps avoid having to define or label the war

in a particular way and shows that the war was indeed a series of 'events' or battles. It also reflects a disagreement on the nature of the war, and thus the narrative around it.

The findings regarding the categories mentioned above are shown in two Tables 5.3 and 5.4, divided into wartime and postwar periods for comparative purposes.

C1 Variables	*An-Nahar*	*As-Safir*
The article identifies what happened on April 13th, 1975	22.6%	75.7%
The article suggests that April 13th, 1975 is the first day of the war	25.8%	74.3%
The article labels the happenings as 'war'	74.2%	81.4%

Table 5.3: C1 Coded Variables in Wartime (1976-1989)

Table 5.3 presents findings of coded C1 variables in wartime articles (1976-1989). Regarding the date of April 13th, 1975 and its significance, the majority (75.7%) of *As-Safir* articles identified this date, while only 22.6% of *An-Nahar* articles did. This finding confirms earlier findings regarding the frame aspects stressed in the articles. As shown earlier, *An-Nahar* did not really focus on defining the war in wartime. The dominant frame dimension in *An-Nahar*, then, was *treatment recommendation,* suggesting ways for ending the war. On the other hand, *As-Safir* stressed *issue definition and interpretation* during the war and assigned them the same weight as *treatment recommendation*. Thus, this finding regarding *As-Safir*'s focus on identifying the event of April 13th does not come as a surprise; it reinforces previous findings.

On a related note, only 25.8% of *An-Nahar* articles suggested that April 13th, 1975 was the first day of the war, while a majority of *As-Safir*'s articles (74.3%) considered it as such. These findings are consistent with previous ones. The majority of articles in *An-Nahar* do not in fact consider April 13th to be the first day of the war, yet they do not necessarily identify another date. Not mentioning this date, and not actually defining what happened that day in *An-Nahar* means one of two things: *An-Nahar* either took it for granted that April 13th was the start of the war and saw no point repeating that, or simply had no interest in approaching the issue altogether. Looking at earlier findings, one can argue that since *An-Nahar* showed little interest in *issue definition* and *issue interpretation* as frame dimensions in its wartime articles, it makes sense not to delve into those aspects of identifying the date

or even mentioning it. *As-Safir*, on the other hand, was interested in defining the war and suggesting when it started before proposing ways to end it.

Regarding labeling the war simply as 'war,' a majority of articles in both newspapers (74.2% in *An-Nahar*, 81.4% in *As-Safir*) used that label during wartime. Resorting to a simple term –the war– could be a way to avoid naming the war and labeling it in a specific way. This common pattern across the two newspapers means that perhaps the press avoided getting into labeling the war during wartime, an observation worth further examination in the coming chapters.

C1 Variables	*An-Nahar*	*As-Safir*
The article identifies what happened on April 13th, 1975	89.9%	87.5%
The article suggests that April 13th, 1975 is the first day of the war	88.4%	84.4%
The article labels the happenings as "war"	94.2%	93.8%

Table 5.4: C1 Coded Variables in Postwar (1990-2013)

Table 5.4 shows the results of the same coded C1 categories in articles of the postwar period (1990-2013). The findings regarding the first variable, on whether the articles identified what happened on April 13th, 1975, are interesting. Contrary to the wartime data, the majority (89.9%) of postwar articles in *An-Nahar*, and the majority of articles in *As-Safir* (87.5%) identified what happened on that day. This result shows that opinions about April 13th and the war have been unified after 1990 in the press, compared to how distinct they were during the war. Postwar *An-Nahar* has joined *As-Safir* in defining what happened on April 13th, and as the coding results of the second variable show, it came to admit that April 13th was in fact the first day of the war (88.4%). *As-Safir*, however, remained confident that *Ain al-Remmeneh* incident sparked the war (84.4%). Perhaps, writing about this incident, and the war in general terms after it has ended, allows the writer to look back at the past more objectively and with fresh eyes. The fact that both newspapers have come to a common understanding and at least agreed on considering *Ain al-Remmeneh* incident as the first day of the war shows that the approach towards the discourse of the war has changed over time, and that opinions expressed in the press have been altered.

As for the 'war' label, findings show that a majority of articles in both newspapers (94.2% in *An-Nahar*, 93.8% in *As-Safir*) used this label. Whether this label was used alone, or with other labels, is an investigation frame analysis will shed light on in the coming

chapter. Using this term in both wartime and postwar periods can be telling as to how using a general and vague term can be a solution to avoiding taking sides or expressing a clear opinion. But resorting to simplistic terms can also be the result of a difficulty in providing a comprehensive reading of the war, either during or after the war.

5.5 Discussion

This chapter addressed the first research question (RQ1) and came to various conclusions regarding how the press approached the discourse of the war in different time periods. As shown in this chapter, the media approach of the war discourse was different across time and news outlets.

During wartime, *As-Safir* published more articles on the war than *An-Nahar* and gave more space to lengthy op-eds written by guest writers, be it journalists or academics. In contrast, *An-Nahar* resorted to medium-length editorials and columns normally written by editors or in-house journalists. The editorial voice was thus loud and clear in *An-Nahar*, while *As-Safir* allowed more voices to speak up about the war. This is a new revelation with regards to the first research question. The findings in this chapter show how *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* approached the discourse of the war differently in wartime, as *An-Nahar* prioritized the editorial approach, while *As-Safir* exhibited openness to non-editorial voices. So, *An-Nahar*'s claim of "presenting all viewpoints" (R. Chlela, personal communication, December 20, 2011) during wartime is challenged by this study's findings, as the editorial voice in *An-Nahar* was the dominant one in its approach to the discourse of the war. As for *As-Safir*, its slogan of "giving voice to the voiceless" proved to accurately describe its wartime approach to the discourse of the war, as it prioritized op-eds. The nature of the discourse – however – is to be further explored in the next chapter that reconstructs the frames of the war.

In the postwar period, *An-Nahar* surpassed *As-Safir* in the number of its published articles on the war. However, this does not mean that *An-Nahar* gave more importance to the war than did *As-Safir*. This is supported by the length and genre of articles, as *As-Safir* remained the main publisher of lengthy op-eds. *An-Nahar*'s shift, however, was in the space it gave to op-eds in the postwar period, compared to that in wartime. The profile of authors that differed significantly between *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* during the war remained similar in the postwar period, as *An-Nahar* relied mostly on its regular writers, while *As-Safir* kept its space for guest writers. These findings provide evidence regarding the approach to the discourse of the war in the press during the postwar period. Compared to wartime, the press

showed more willingness to let voices other than its own writers be featured. Particularly, *An-Nahar* changed its approach, and welcomed more voices. As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1.1), *An-Nahar* played a role in the postwar period in bringing focus to the discussions around the memory of the war. Here, it seems that An-*Nahar* welcomed contributions by journalists, especially some leftist ones that felt abandoned because of the war, and disappointed by *As-Safir*'s pro-Syrian stances. Journalists and intellectuals like Akl al-Awit, Georges Nassif and Samir Kassir, migrated from *As-Safir* to *An-Nahar*. It is in *An-Nahar* that various anti-war and pro-memory construction voices felt home, and were thus writing more frequently. Despite what may seem like a lesser level of engagement with the memory discussion in *As-Safir*, compared to *An-Nahar*, *As-Safir*'s discourse was mostly formed by either journalists or academics in the postwar period.

When results show that absolutely no articles (0%) were written by writers/artists in *An-Nahar*, one might be surprised. As argued, *An-Nahar* was known for being a hub for intellectuals and artists, especially in the postwar period, and having no artists contributing seems illogical. There is, in fact, an explanation. When *An-Nahar* revived its special Cultural issue (*al-Mulhaq al-Thaqafi*) after the war, as noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1.1), it allocated not only an op-ed section, but a whole weekly issue to what one can call an art hub, where writers, artists and intellectuals of various background and interests have freely expressed themselves. However, this study did not extended its corpus to the weekly issues distributed with the newspaper and limited the corpus to articles published in the newspaper itself. Thus, it is important to note that, despite having no writers and artists contributing to *An-Nahar*'s framing of the war in the postwar period, *An-Nahar* was still considered a main source of reference as to the intellectuals' framing of the war.

Given the background described in the introduction, it can be concluded that the press and intellectuals collaborated in claiming back the public space to talk about the war in the postwar period. A critical look at peaks and drops in publishing shall contextualize this further.

Various publishing peak and drop points were observed in both wartime and postwar periods in both newspapers, and each peak or drop was a reflection of the political circumstances and the focus in the discourse of the corresponding year. In wartime, peak years were crucial war anniversary years in both newspapers, either on the first anniversary like *An-Nahar* findings showed, or on the 10th anniversary like *As-Safir* findings demonstrated. On these occasions, the press and intellectuals were mostly focusing on calling for an end to the war by proposing conflict resolution methods and paying less

attention to understanding the causes of the war. For *As-Safir*, however, it was also important to admit that the war, simply identified as 'war,' had started on April 13th, 1975. For *An-Nahar*, this was not very important; ending the conflict was the first priority. The dominance of the *treatment recommendation* frame element during war time resonates with the peace journalism paradigm of Galtung (1998) discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1). By focusing on echoing approaches to end the war, the Lebanese press advocated a high-road of peace journalism, focusing on conflict transformation and advocating an end to the war. As reflected in the findings regarding C1 variables, *An-Nahar* was not pre-occupied in identifying the start of the war, and despite it labeling the happenings as 'war,' it seemed to have focused solely on a conflict-resolution approach. *As-Safir*, on the other hand, equally focused on *issue diagnosis and causal interpretation*, and this was reflected in their identification of April 13th as the first day of war and the 'war' label they assigned to the happenings. According to Galtung, the focus on causes and solutions is a peace journalism approach. Thus, opinion journalism in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* adopted a peace journalism discourse during wartime. The next chapters shall shed additional light on how the press, *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, advocated peace during wartime.

In the postwar period, peak years appeared when significant political or security events took place, ones that marked a disappearance of a certain remnant of the war, like the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, suggested another eruption of the war, like the events of 2005, or the sporadic military conflicts in the late 2000s, or when society was ready to confront its past and discuss the memory of the war in the early 2000s. This was reflected in the focus of the press on defining the war, assessing it and understanding its causes. The remarkable focus of both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* on *issue definition* and *issue diagnosis*, *An-Nahar* increased interest in identifying the start of the war, *As-Safir*'s constant interest in that, and both newspapers' label of 'war' in the postwar period, all reflect the press engagement with the discourse of the war based on a peace journalism approach. The press's interest in peace in wartime extended to postwar, confirming that, in this post-conflict situation, the press kept advocating a peaceful approach by tackling the causes of the war, perhaps to avoid its recurrence.

Identifying April 13th as the first day of the war and describing the war as 'war' proved to be necessary analysis pre-requisites that intellectuals in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* gave importance to in the postwar period. This significant shift – specifically in *An-Nahar* – shows the extent to which the press had a clearer understanding of the war in the postwar period.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1990s witnessed a state-sponsored amnesia. Right after the war was declared over, the state somewhat forced a 'war amnesia' approach, and the war was considered a taboo topic. As clearly reflected in these findings, the media succumbed to the state's policy, and did not talk about the war for the first few years of the 1990s. The country was busy with reconstruction and the reviving of the economy and had no interest in talking about the past. In addition, it can also be argued that it was 'too early' to talk about the war. Right after its end, in the absence of any accountability for the crimes committed, the warlords' transformation into politicians, and with thousands of people still missing, it was still early to discuss the fresh trauma. Talking about the war meant putting the blame on those who became the new political powers, and it was not in their interest to be under such spotlight. From a psychological perspective, this confirms that the first stage of grief in Lebanon's media was denial. As the war was a heavy trauma to deal with for the majority of Lebanese, a feeling of loss and grief dominated. And as a first reaction, the Lebanese were in denial, a sort of shell-shock trauma. Refusing to admit or discuss what just happened was their way of coping with the new reality. In a way, they were also 'forced' to cope with this reality, as the postwar's early period was also the *Pax Syriana* period, when Syria, a major actor in the war, had hegemony over Lebanon – including its media (See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2). Speaking about the war meant incriminating Syria and questioning its continued occupation of Lebanon. This was not an option for the media that was either controlled by Syria's internal allies or controlled by self-censorship for fear of being targeted.

But as the years went by, and for many reasons, namely the intellectual awakening that led to the breaking of silence and the surfacing of the war discourse, the risk of a return of the war and the end of the Israeli occupation, the early 2000s witnessed an emergence of the war as a subject for public discussion. In fact, it was in 1999 that the first open call for memory was made, as well as a call for a unified history textbook that included a section on the war in the official school curricula[5]. Writing the textbook was considered a first step towards memory construction, but such a book is yet to be published. And in 2000, the campaign "It's our right to know"[6] took off as a project by the Committee of the Families of Kidnapped and Disappeared, aiming at bringing the discussion of the war to the public

[5] History textbooks in Lebanon teach different versions, and few even mention the war period (more on: https://www.lebanesestudies.com/programs/history-education/)

[6] The Committee is still active until today. More on their website: https://www.actforthedisappeared.com

sphere and calling for the right to know where their loved ones are, and who is to be held accountable for their disappearance.

All these events have led to what this chapter confirmed, a reaction to the amnesic approach of the war in the postwar period. The press reflected the intellectuals' reactions and joined other society agents in pushing forward the discourse of the war. This is in line with what previous studies have argued with regards to the period of the early 2000s being a milestone in the memory discourse around the war (Barak, 2007; Haugbolle, 2010, 2012; Abou Assi, 2011; Larkin, 2012; Lang, 2016; Halabi, 2017) and gives more insights on the participation of the press in approaching the discourse of the war in the different phases of the postwar period.

Given the findings of this chapter, this study takes the analysis a step further, and explores, in the next chapter, the ways in which the approaches to the discourse of the war were framed, by attempting to reconstruct the war frames projected by intellectuals in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, during wartime and the postwar period.

CHAPTER 6

FRAMES OF WAR: MEDIA AS A BATTLEFIELD

One of the main inquiries of this research was to explore the media framing of the war during both periods: wartime and postwar. This was clearly illustrated in the second research question (RQ2), and the findings shared in this chapter attempt to shed light on this question. The previous chapter showed that *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* approached the discourse of the war differently, and each had a different agenda that coincided with the political and media changes occurring during every given time period. Building on previous findings, this chapter attempts to reconstruct the media frames that spanned the period of 37 years, and explore which frames were promoted by each of the two newspapers within the given understanding of their approaches to the war discourse. In addition, this chapter embeds the reconstructed frames in their historical context and in relation to the newspaper they were published in, paving the way for Chapter 7 that further explores them.

As detailed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1.4), in order to identify frames, a PCA was conducted with Varimax rotation on the framing questions detailed in the codebook, on two sets of data based on the newspaper source, *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*. For each set of data, two PCA tests were conducted; first, wartime articles and then postwar articles. This aimed at exploring opinions on the war as manifested in the press, in a more general sense, in an attempt to investigate the intellectuals' framing of the war, in association with the outlet they published in. This chapter presents and details the frame analysis findings, taking into account three distinct frames for every set of wartime data, and two distinct frames for every set of postwar period data.

First, *An-Nahar* frames in wartime are presented, followed by *As-Safir* frames. Then, postwar frames of *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* are correspondingly explored. Lastly, findings are discussed as answers to the second research question (RQ2).

6.1 *An-Nahar* Wartime Frames: A War Bigger than Lebanon

Rotated Component Matrix			
Frame Element	Complex Civil and Regional war frame	Proxy war frame	Regional war frame
CI: The Arab-Israeli conflict caused the war	.722		
CI: One or more Arab countries are actors involved in the war	.710		
CI: Lebanese National Movement/Leftists are actors involved in the war	.681		
CI: Lebanese Front/Phalanges are actors involved in the war	.666		
ID: War is labeled as 'war of everyone against everyone'	.629		
CI: Syrian influence caused the war	.585		
CI: Israel is an actor involved in the war	.535		
ID: War is labeled as 'wars'	.525		
TR: An international agreement is the solution to end the war	.520		
CI: USSR is an actor involved in the war		.864	
CI: The United States of America is an actor involved in the war		.858	
CI: The Cold War caused the war		.691	
ID: War is labeled as war as 'war of others on our land'		.501	
CI: Christians are actors involved in the war			.765
TR: A Lebanese agreement (political consensus, constitutional or institutional solution) is the solution to end the war			-.725
TR: An Arab agreement is the solution to end the war			-.691
CI: Palestinian presence/military activity caused the war			.684
CI: Palestinians are actors involved in the war	.521		.650

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Table 6.1: *An-Nahar* Wartime Frames

As shown in Table 6.1, the PCA solution of *An-Nahar* wartime articles loaded three distinguishable frames: complex civil and regional war frame, proxy war frame, and regional war frame.

First, the complex war frame that combines internal and regional elements, labels the war both as a 'war of everyone against everyone' and as 'wars.' Actors involved in the war are both internal, like the LNM and leftist parties, and the LF/Phalange, and regional like an

Arab country, Israel and the Palestinians. This frame interprets the war in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while including Syrian influence as a cause of the war. And although this frame does not give any evaluation of the war, it suggests an international agreement as a way to end the war. First, by labeling the war as 'wars,' the frame hints that the war is a sequence, a battle in a long war, or a new war reemerging from the ruins of an older one. Read in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this frame suggests that the war is only a battle in the bigger Arab-Israeli war. As for the actors, naming both internal and regional actors reflects the two labels of the war as a 'war of everyone against everyone' and 'wars.' Internally, actors are identified according to their political identity, i.e. leftist parties - the LNM - and the Phalange – the LF. Regionally, three main powers, an Arab country (or more), Israel and Palestinians are identified as actors. And as the frame mentions Syrian influence as a cause of the war, it can be concluded that the Arab country mentioned as an actor is Syria. The two warring fronts are thus the LNM, the Palestinians and Syria on the one hand, and the LF and Israel on the other. Interestingly, this frame calls for an international agreement as a way to end the war. Despite the regional war and civil war settings the war is put in, the solution has to come from the 'outside,' according to this frame. It thus suggests that the war is a battle in a bigger conflict, and that the resolution has to come through foreign interference. This frame, present in *An-Nahar* during the war, reflects an understanding of the war as one that is bigger than Lebanon itself, a war imposed by regional forces and performed by local actors.

Following the same line of thought, the proxy war frame clearly labels the war as a 'war of others on our land,' mentioning USSR and USA as the main actors involved in the war and identifying the Cold War as a trigger. According to this frame, Lebanon plays no part at all. The Lebanese are spectators – or at best forced actors – in a war bigger than the region, a fight between two superpowers, USA and USSR. The frame does not mention any other reason for the war, nor other actors. All that can be understood regarding this frame is that the USA and USSR are using Lebanon as a battleground where they fight a proxy war, in what seems like a battle in the Cold War. Failing to include more actors, this frame leaves one to wonder who the local actors involved by extension might be, because the two superpowers could not have staged the war without any local collaboration. By putting all the blame on the 'others,' the Lebanese are portrayed as passive, either too weak to stop a war happening on their land, or too controlled and involved in it. This frame acts as a self-defense mechanism for the Lebanese; it is not for the Lebanese to decide how or when the war will end, because the war is forced on them.

As for the regional war frame, Christians are mentioned as actors, while Palestinian presence and military activity is interpreted as the cause of the war, and as the analysis revealed, both a Lebanese and an Arab agreement are rejected as possible pathways to end the war. This particular frame identifies only one local actor, the Christians. It seems here that the Palestinians are blamed for a war in which the Christians are the opposing force. The enemy, therefore, is seen as the Palestinians, and the Christian fight against them seems to be justified. Interestingly, this frame rejects any Lebanese or Arab agreement to end the war. The reason this frame is considered as a regional war frame lies in the causal logic of it. The cause of the war are the Palestinians who are regional actors, and without their presence and military activity in Lebanon, the country would not be at war. Despite this regional dimension, or perhaps because of it, the solution would not come regionally or internally. Though this frame does not clearly state it, perhaps the end should come from a third way, an international kind of agreement. In conclusion, Lebanon's war is caused by regional factors, and not by any internal factor.

6.2 *As-Safir* Wartime Frames: A Conspiracy Against the Palestinians

Rotated Component Matrix			
Frame Element	Civil war frame	Regional war frame	Complex Proxy and Regional war frame
CI: Palestinians are actors involved in the war	.773		
CI: Muslims are actors involved in the war	.763		
CI: Christians are actors involved in the war	.751		
CI: Palestinian presence/military activity caused the war	.661		
ID: War is labeled as 'war of everyone against everyone'	.654		
ID: War is labeled as war as 'war of others on our land'	.570		
TR: The original causes of the war should be treated in order to end the war	.569		
CI: Socioeconomic factors caused the war	.510		
CI: Lebanese Front/Phalanges are actors involved in the war		.831	
CI: Israel is an actor involved in the war		.819	
CI: The United States of America is an actor involved in the war		.778	
CI: The Arab-Israeli conflict caused the war		.716	
TR: A solution related to the Arab-Israeli conflict will end the war			.723
ID: War is labeled as 'wars'			.663
CI: The Cold War caused the war			.627
CI: USSR is an actor involved in the war			.580
TR: An Arab agreement is the solution to end the war			.556

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 9 iterations.

Table 6.2: *As-Safir* Wartime Frames

The PCA solution for *As-Safir* articles during wartime led to three distinguishable frames shown in Table 6.2: civil war frame, regional war frame, and complex proxy and regional war frame. Though the three frames can be interpreted differently, one dominant aspect is the Arab-Israeli conflict and subsequently the Palestinian cause. In *As-Safir*, the war – with its different variations – is portrayed as a conspiracy against the Palestinians.

In the civil war frame, the war is labeled as a 'war of everyone against everyone,' and interestingly, as a 'war of others on our land.' Actors involved in the war are identified as Palestinians, Muslims and Christians. As a diagnosis, Palestinian presence and military activity in Lebanon is mentioned as a cause, alongside socioeconomic factors. The frame

does not evaluate the war but suggests addressing its original causes as a way to end it. A war in which everyone fights everyone, and at the same time, one that is fought by 'others' in Lebanon should by definition go beyond a mere 'civil war.' Giving this frame the name 'civil war' comes from the fact that the actors, diagnosis and treatment recommendation of this frame are mostly of local nature. In a sense, the regional conflict aspect is indirectly present. What this frame suggests is that Palestinian presence and military activity in Lebanon played a direct role in triggering a war that has other indirect causes, such as socioeconomic causes. Including the Palestinians, Christians and Muslims as actors shows how involved the Palestinians were in the war. Identifying local actors by their religious identity reflects a certain political stance that was dominant during the war that Lebanon was divided along sectarian lines on the Palestinian cause. The 'war of others' analogy hints at the outside forces that may have helped the local actors in their fight, without naming them. The civil war aspect is clearly reflected here, as socioeconomic injustices are an entirely Lebanese internal reason for the war. And when the frame suggests addressing the original causes of the war as a way to end it, it focuses on ones stemming from the two main causes it put forward; finding a solution to the Palestinian presence and military activity and addressing socioeconomic injustices.

The regional war frame reflected in *As-Safir* focuses only on the diagnosis and interpretation of the war, naming the LF/Phalanges, Israel and the USA as actors, and reading the war in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For *As-Safir*, the regional war frame is quite simple: A war taking place in Lebanon as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the LF/Phalanges, Israel and the USA are an axis. What is interesting in this frame is the inclusion of the USA in a regional setting. Here, the USA is seen as an active actor in the region. By putting it alongside Israel and the LF/Phalanges, the frame suggests a certain 'axis.' Although each of the actors belongs to a certain geopolitical dimension, as the LF/Phalanges are internal actors, Israel is a regional one and USA is an international one, the causal interpretation of the war puts the frame in a regional perspective. Accordingly, this frame suggests a front consisting of the LF/Phalanges, Israel and the USA, all allied together in a war caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict. What this frame does not mention are the actors on the other front. However, since the frame interprets the war in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and as the 'Israeli' element is hereby represented in the LF/Phalanges-Israel-USA axis, the other axis would assumingly be the Arab one. 'Arab' here refers to Palestinians, and their Lebanese and/or regional allies. By omitting the other actors and reducing the causal interpretation to a single root – the Arab-Israeli conflict – this

frame suggests that the war in Lebanon was more of an ‘attack’ than a war. One can read this frame as a conspiracy by the aforementioned LF/Phalanges-Israel-USA axis against the implicit ‘Arab’ actors, as a battle in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The complex proxy and regional war frame labels the war as ‘wars,’ specifying the USSR as an actor in the war, and the Cold War as a trigger. Interestingly, this frame suggests a regional treatment recommendation, proposing an Arab agreement and a solution related to the Arab-Israeli conflict as ways to end the war. Although the treatment suggestion is regional, the war is still considered caused by the outside, and the main actor is a major world power. And although this frame does not specifically identify the USA as an actor involved in the war, it does mention the Cold War as a trigger for the war. By labeling the war as ‘wars,’ this frame suggests that the war in Lebanon is battle in a series of battles taking place elsewhere as part of the Cold War between an identified actor, USSR, and an unidentified one, USA. Tying the solution to a regional one, this frame suggests that although the war is of a proxy nature, the solution has to be regional. The Arab-Israeli conflict plays a major role, as it is considered the main catalyst for a solution. An Arab agreement as a way for ending the war can be hereby read as a united Arab response to the proxy war in Lebanon. Lebanon, according to this frame, is seen as a passive player, not able to stop the war from happening, without Arab regional help.

6.3 *An-Nahar* Postwar Frames: A Complex Civil War

Rotated Component Matrix		
Frame Element	Complex Civil and Regional war frame	Civil war frame
CI: Palestinians are actors involved in the war	.836	
CI: Palestinian presence/military activity caused the war	.826	
CI: The Arab-Israeli conflict caused the war	.781	
CI: One or more Arab countries are actors involved in the war	.764	
CI: Israel is an actor involved in the war	.763	
CI: Syrian influence caused the war	.709	
CI: Muslims are actors involved in the war	.694	
CI: Christians are actors involved in the war	.689	
CI: The United States of America is an actor involved in the war	.645	
CI: Lebanese National Movement/Leftists are actors involved in the war		.693
CI: Lebanese Front/Phalanges are actors involved in the war		.652
ID: War is labeled as a 'war of everyone against everyone'		.587
ID: War is labeled as a 'civil war'		.552
IE: A minority of elites won the war and a majority of the people lost		.519
IE: All Lebanese are equal victims of the war		.517

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Table 6.3: *An-Nahar* Postwar Frames

The PCA solution loaded two elaborate frames for *An-Nahar* postwar articles. Those two frames shown in Table 6.3 are: complex civil and regional war frame, and civil war frame. In both frames, the civil war dimension is central, and the war is considered an internal issue with regional dimensions.

The complex civil and regional war frame includes categories from both the civil war frame and the regional war frame and interprets the war as a regional conflict with local, regional and international actors. Despite not giving a clear definition of the war, the complex war frame delves into Entman's *issue diagnosis and causal interpretation* frame element. By naming the actors and delving into the causes, this frame focuses on identifying the 'who' and 'why' of the war. Three regional circumstances caused the war: the Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestinian presence and military activity and Syrian influence over Lebanon. Accordingly, the regional actors involved are identified as Israel, the Palestinians, and an Arab country (Syria, in this case). As for internal actors, this frame identifies Muslims

and Christians. In addition, the USA is mentioned as an actor, which resonates with *As-Safir*'s wartime regional war frame that also included the USA as an actor. For *An-Nahar*, the first reading of the war in the postwar period consists of a mixed-approach: It is a regional war that happened for regional causes but involved both local and regional actors. This complex war frame reflected in postwar *An-Nahar* resonates with the frame echoed in wartime *An-Nahar*. Despite some differences, the war is still seen as a regionally-triggered war involving the Lebanese. Combining the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Syrian influence as causes of the war also seems to be consistent in *An-Nahar*. In postwar, the Palestinian presence was added as a cause of a regional/civil conflict, and not as a cause of a regional conspiracy against Lebanon. Contrary to its wartime frames, *An-Nahar* identifies local actors by their religious identity as Muslims and Christians in this postwar frame.

The civil war frame, on the other hand, clearly labels the war as a 'civil war' and a 'war of everyone against everyone.' It mentions the LNM/leftist parties and the LF/Phalange as actors in the war without interpreting its reasons. And as an evaluation, it suggests that a minority of elites won the war and the majority of people lost, while claiming that all Lebanese are equal victims of the war. This frame, emerging in the postwar period, is new to *An-Nahar*. In wartime, *An-Nahar* frames included the civil war aspect but linked it to the regional war. In the postwar period, it seems that *An-Nahar* developed another frame, one that explains the war as a purely civil war with local actors. The LF on one hand, and the LNM on the other constitute the two warring fronts, without any mention of the Palestinians or any other regional involvement. Despite not giving an interpretation, it can be read as a war that had its own political reasons, emerging as a civil conflict, in which everyone was involved.

6.4 *As-Safir* Postwar Frames: Lebanon, a Fertile Ground for Wars

Rotated Component Matrix[a]		
Frame Element	Complex Civil and Regional war frame	Civil war frame
CI: Muslims are actors involved in the war	.869	
CI: Christians are actors involved in the war	.869	
CI: Lebanese Front/Phalanges are actors involved in the war	.865	
CI: Lebanese National Movement/Leftists are actors involved in the war	.865	
CI: One or more Arab countries are actors involved in the war	.834	
CI: Israel is an actor involved in the war	.816	
CI: Palestinians are actors involved in the war	.762	
CI: The Arab-Israeli conflict caused the war	.761	
CI: Syrian influence caused the war	.676	
CI: The United States of America is an actor involved in the war	.585	
CI: Sectarian tensions caused the war		.853
IE: War is described as a 'dirty' war		.777
CI: All Lebanese are actors involved in the war		.770
ID: War is labeled as 'war of everyone against everyone'		.697
IE: All Lebanese are equal victims of the war		.531
IE: Ta'if Agreement only ended the military conflict and froze the war		.526
ID: War is labeled as 'wars'	.526	

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

Table 6.4: *As-Safir* Postwar Frames

Like *An-Nahar*, the PCA solution of *As-Safir* postwar articles led to two distinguishable frames shown in Table 6.4: complex civil and regional war frame, and civil war frame. Although these two frames share the same name in both newspapers, some nuances in their categories were found.

The complex civil and regional war frame labels the war as 'wars,' giving away the first hint of its complexity. Similar to the one in *An-Nahar*, this frame puts the war in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while also mentioning the Syrian influence as a cause of the war. It also divides actors into local and regional ones. What is different from *An-Nahar* frame are the actors. Here, Christians, Muslims, the LF/Phalange and the LNM/leftists are all identified as internal actors by both their political and religious identities in one frame. This gives a broader understanding of the complex nature of the war after it ended.

Introducing the religious/sectarian identity alongside the political one allows for including other Christian and Muslim parties, and not simply the LF and the LNM. This identification also reveals a hidden internal aspect of the war, a sectarian aspect that this frame does not state explicitly. As for regional actors, this frame identifies Israel, the Palestinians, and one or more Arab countries (again, Syria). Similarly to *An-Nahar*, it mentions the USA as an actor in the war. *As-Safir* seems to have a pattern in identifying the USA as an actor within a regional war frame, as it did in both wartime and postwar period. What is missing is the USSR as an actor, in comparison to *As-Safir*'s wartime frames. According to this frame, the war, although not specifically labeled, is caused by regional factors, and carried out by local, regional, and international actors. This frame reflects two warring fronts: on one side, the Christians, the LF, Israel, and the USA, and on the other side, the Muslims, the LNM, the Palestinians, and Syria. The causes of the war in this frame are consistent with two of those found in *An-Nahar*; the Arab-Israeli conflict and Syrian influence over Lebanon. What is missing is the Palestinian factor. This frame elaborates on multiple layers of the war, or more precisely wars, as it makes it seem like different battles involved by different actors, and for different reasons. What is missing in this frame is the evaluation, and the focus is more on the interpretation of the war's causes and actors.

The civil war frame on the other hand clearly labels the war as a 'war of everyone against everyone,' caused by sectarian tensions and involving all the Lebanese as actors. As for the evaluation, it describes it as a 'dirty' war involving all Lebanese as equal victims and asserting that the Ta'if Agreement only ended the military conflict and froze the war. This comprehensive frame explains the war as a purely internal conflict, one that occurred as a result of complex historical sectarian tensions between the different Lebanese sects. The war that broke in 1975 was dirty, according to *As-Safir*, and swallowed all the Lebanese in it. In this sense, the frame victimizes all the Lebanese, and puts them all on an equal distance with the war. By blaming sectarianism for the war, this frame makes it seem as if historical sectarian tensions led the Lebanese to fight, but left them all losers and victims. This internally-focused frame looks only into the Lebanese aspect of the war and dismisses any regional and international involvement, participation or implication. For *As-Safir*, however, the war did not quite end. The Ta'if Accord may have ended the conflict in its military form, but the war continued in other forms.

6.5 Discussion

This chapter addressed second research question (RQ2), exploring the war frames promoted by the Lebanese press during different time periods. It quantitatively reconstructed the war frames of *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* in wartime and postwar. As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), literature on the war in Lebanon do not agree on a single portrayal of the war. Historians, scholars and intellectuals have failed to reach a cohesive understanding of the war in Lebanon. The various scenarios previously outlined (Chapter 2.2) interpreted the war differently and attributed it to a variety of causes and dimensions. Scholars considered it a result of 'foreign' interference and political fanaticism in Lebanese society (Hanf, 1994; El-Khazen, 2000), a manifestation of socioeconomic inequalities and class struggles (Amel, 1979; Labaki, 1984; Nasr 1978, 2003; Traboulsi, 1993, 2007), an extension of historical communal wars (Khalaf, 2002; Weiss, 2009), an outcome of ill-fitted previous peace settlements and failures of the power-sharing formula (Beydoun, 2007), or a war carried out by and for foreign powers (Tueni, 1985). This chapter's findings on the war frames will be embedded in these scenarios, in order to draw conclusions on what scenarios, or frames, intellectuals echoed in the press.

As this chapter showed, frames of the war varied across newspapers and over time. There were some recurrent frames, frames that were common between *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, and frames that appeared in both wartime and postwar period but were read in a different context according to the newspaper or according to the period.

In wartime, more frames were used to describe the war, and most frames were simple, while in the postwar period, frames were fewer but more complex. During the war, frames changed according to the newspaper, while in the postwar, the same two frames were found in both newspapers, but were interpreted differently by each of them. An interesting noticeable change occurred in the postwar period frames, where the proxy war frame completely disappeared as a stand-alone frame and as a sub-frame, and the regional war frame became a sub-frame in the complex civil and regional war frame. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that in wartime, the press framed the war in multiple yet simple frames, while in the postwar period, the understanding of the war became more complex and multi-layered, incorporating various angles.

What has been presented as the existence of multi-faceted readings of the war reflects what was argued in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) regarding the conflict itself: it was a complex conflict fought by various parties and countries, and for various reasons and goals. However,

a closer look at what frames and angles each newspaper decided to feature, in wartime and postwar, is necessary.

During the war, the frames across both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* involved the proxy war aspect, adopting the definition 'war of the others on our land' in *An-Nahar*, and viewing the war in light of the Cold War in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*. The proxy war frame present in *An-Nahar* during the war was entirely representative of Tueni's (1985) 'war of others on our land' scenario of the war. This frame entailed a certain apathy, as if the war is beyond the control of the Lebanese and could not be stopped without foreign intervention. The Lebanese were neither actors nor catalyzers. The war was happening on their land, but they were neither the cause nor the solution. According to this frame, the war was one of others, by the others, despite it happening in Lebanon. The exclusion of the Lebanese from this frame hints at prewar scenarios that claim that Lebanon was established and run by 'others.' It suggests that the Lebanese have been historically subject to all sorts of manipulation, and the war was just another example of how the 'outside' controlled the country. Also, by excluding them, the frame denied any responsibility that the Lebanese may have for the war. They were thus indirectly presented as fragile, powerless, and passive. They were only spectators in a show run by major outside forces. And by conclusion, the war that 'others' were fighting in Lebanon could only end if 'others' ended it. This controversial framing of the war detaches the Lebanese from the war, and considers them all equal and submissive in this war, not actors in it. On the other hand, the proxy aspect in *As-Safir* was mixed with regional dimensions. The war was seen only as a battle in the larger Cold War and Arab-Israeli conflict. The war in Lebanon was a reflection of the superpowers' fight, and Lebanon happened to be a suitable battleground. Nonetheless, *As-Safir* focused on regional dimensions, as a regional conflict-resolution strategy was interpreted a way to end the proxy war.

The regional angle was framed differently in wartime *As-Safir* and *An-Nahar*. It merged with the proxy war frame in *As-Safir*, as noted earlier, and was embedded in a civil war frame in *An-Nahar*, as argued later. In addition, a solid regional war frame was found in both newspapers. It was, however, presented differently. *As-Safir* framed the war as a battle in the Arab-Israeli conflict, one in which the LF/Phalanges, Israel and USA were an axis. This frame portrayed the USA as a supporter of Israel's war on the Palestinians, and the LF as local collaborators, following the idiom "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." In this frame, *As-Safir* vilified this axis and heroized the Palestinians, and by default some of the Lebanese – those who supported the Palestinians. *As-Safir* thus framed the war as a

conspiracy by the aforementioned LF/Phalanges-Israel-USA axis against the Palestinians, as a battle in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

An-Nahar, on the other hand, framed the war as a Palestinian conspiracy against Lebanon, one in which the Christians were the saviors. As argued in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1), one of the scenarios suggested that Lebanon, seen as a Maronite country in the Middle East, has long been subject to 'foreign' interference as an attempt to change its 'Christian character.' This frame reflected a certain conspiracy theory that was dominant in wartime, specifically defended by the Christian parties and militias, and promoted by defenders of the 'foreign threat' scenario (Hanf, 1994; El-Khazen, 2000). This theory notes that the Christian identity was at risk as a result of Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the support it enjoyed among Muslims. It was in fact the main reason behind many coalitions between Christian militias during the war. This frame vilified the Palestinians and heroized the Christians. Thus, *An-Nahar*, contrary to *As-Safir*, framed the war as a Palestinian conspiracy against Christian presence in Lebanon.

The civil war frame was also interpreted differently by *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*. In the latter, it was presented as a solid frame, while in *An-Nahar*, it merged with regional war frame elements. The civil war frame in *As-Safir* interprets the war as such: the Muslims, taking a pan-Arab approach, backed the Palestinians, and fought alongside them in their struggle to liberate Palestine, even if it had to be done from Lebanon. The Christians, specifically the Maronites, on the other hand, cared more about Lebanon as an entity, and originally viewed Lebanon as different and independent from its surroundings. Thus, the Palestinian presence constituted a threat that needed to be dealt with, even if by war. Despite the war being a series of battles, involving regional and international actors, there was always the understanding that the war was not entirely imposed from the outside. The root causes of the war were embedded in the history of Lebanon, and the war erupted as a result of an internal struggles manifested in historical sectarian tensions and socioeconomic injustices. In *As-Safir*, Lebanon was seen as a fertile ground for class struggle, despite the war originating from an attack against Palestinians and their presence as viewed by the Christians. This frame, elaborated in *As-Safir*, reflects the left-wing intellectuals' scenarios (Amel, 1979; Labaki, 1984; Nasr 1978, 2003; Traboulsi, 1993, 2007) of the war as a class struggle, adding a sectarian layer (Khalaf, 2002; Beydoun, 2007; Weiss, 2009) and advocating a holistic approach to conflict resolution.

In *An-Nahar*, the civil war aspect was a sub-frame in a complex regional and civil war frame, where the war was considered linked to regional circumstances and causes, namely

the Arab-Israeli conflict and Syria's presence and influence and carried out by both local and regional actors. According to this frame, the actors were locals in a 'war of everyone against everyone.' This complex wartime frame in *An-Nahar* took civil and regional aspects, projecting once again an understanding of the war as a complex war imposed by regional forces and carried out by local actors. Lebanon was portrayed as a minor actor in a bigger war, a reflection of the 'war of others and for the others' scenario.

Postwar frames, as this chapter showed, seemed more homogeneous across the two newspapers on the surface. A closer analysis of their elements highlighted their differences. The first frame for both newspapers was the complex civil and regional war frame, interpreted differently by each newspaper, but reflecting the same complexities: the war was a regional conflict taking place in Lebanon and involving local, regional and international actors. *An-Nahar*'s complex war frames were very similar in wartime and the postwar period. Despite some differences, the war was still seen as a regionally-triggered war involving the Lebanese. The USA was added in the postwar period as an actor, the Palestinians as well, and the latter's presence in Lebanon was attributed as a cause. Also, the warring parties were identified by their religious identity in the postwar period. Adding these extra layers made the frame more complex yet clearer: Various regional and international powers took part in the war and collaborated with Muslim and Christian actors. As mentioned earlier, Syrian influence was also acknowledged as a cause of the war. In this frame, however, there was no mention of any internal causes of the war. *An-Nahar*, thus, continued to consider the war as one imposed on Lebanon by regional and international actors, for reasons related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, despite local actors' involvement.

As-Safir's frame dimension elements, though at a first glance similar to *An-Nahar*'s, can be interpreted differently. Identifying both religious and political affiliations of local actors added yet another layer to the complex war. In postwar *As-Safir*, calling all actors by their names and attributes was a way of dealing with the past and confronting it. Also, focusing on the regional aspect of the war and its continuation helps hold regional actors accountable for their involvement. *As-Safir* also added the label of 'wars.' Here, *As-Safir* was implying that even though the war seemed to have ended, another one might be on the verge of erupting. This was also reflected in its other postwar frame, the civil war frame.

The second frame present in both newspapers portrayed the war in a purely Lebanese context: the war was a civil war, caused and waged by Lebanese actors. In *An-Nahar*, the two warring fronts were identified according to their political affiliations, and the war was clearly labeled as a 'civil war.' In fact, this was the only time in both wartime and postwar

frames that the war is literally referred to as a 'civil war,' despite the findings that highlighted the civil war frames adopted by the two newspapers. This is an intriguing result, given that the term 'civil war' is widely used in both academic and popular circles to describe the war. In this chapter, it was found that, despite the war being considered a 'civil war,' in wartime *As-Safir*, and postwar *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, it was clearly labeled as such only in postwar *An-Nahar*. What this frame had in common with its *As-Safir* counterpart is the portrayal of the Lebanese as victims. Equally victimizing all Lebanese makes this postwar frame seem a bit apologetic. It identified the Lebanese as actors in a civil war yet victimized all of them. But how can all the Lebanese be at the same time actors and victims? And how is that consistent with the idea that the majority of people lost, and a minority of elites won? This evaluation reflects *An-Nahar*'s stance and considers the Lebanese to be subjects of an unjust war, one that the majority was dragged into and only a few benefited from. Even those who benefited, such as militiamen and sectarian warlords, were also victims as a result of being dragged into the war.

On the other hand, the postwar civil war frame in *As-Safir* highlighted the sectarian cause of a 'dirty' war in which everyone was involved. In addition, the criticism of the Ta'if Agreement as one that only froze the war resonated in this frame, where the war was seen as multiple wars. *As-Safir*, thus, added another complex layer to the seemingly simplistic civil war frame. By joining *An-Nahar* in victimizing all the Lebanese in their 'civil war,' *As-Safir* contributed to the press portrayal of the Lebanese as victims in their own war.

This victimization is quiet problematic. It fosters forgetfulness. Since all the Lebanese fought the war and all the Lebanese are victims, it is impossible to hold anyone accountable, and thus it is best to perhaps move on. In a way, it resonates with the postwar official policy of 'moving on,' a policy that enabled the reconstruction process at the expanse of dealing with the past. These findings are to be discussed further in the following chapter.

As the frame analysis demonstrated, the war was solely understood as a simple event. Local, regional, and international layers seemed to be omnipresent in a way or another even in frames that seemed to be internal on the surface. The USA, for example, was repeatedly mentioned as an actor in the regional wartime frames and the postwar complex regional and civil war frames in both newspapers, as the findings showed. This further proves the complex nature of the war, and the impossibility of reducing the war to a simple narrative. In fact, it debunks the common 'civil war' label used in everyday language and both academic and popular portrayals, as the press opted for far more complex labels.

As shown in Chapter 5, the press approached the discourse of the war from a peace journalism perspective and focused on treatment recommendation as a dominant frame element. The findings in this chapter confirm previous findings by showing that frames developed and promoted during the war focused on suggesting varied ways to end it. *An-Nahar* promoted a Lebanese agreement, an Arab agreement, and an international agreement to end the war, while *As-Safir* opted for an Arab-Israeli solution, a treatment of the original causes of the war, and an Arab agreement as means to end the war. Despite the different approaches, both newspapers agreed on the need for a pan-Arab Agreement as a conflict-resolution strategy. This highlights the weight of Arab regional players, and in fact lays the ground for the Arab-sponsored Ta'if Agreement that ended the war. *As-Safir*'s focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict-resolution approach highlights the centrality of the Palestinian cause for the newspaper, and its mention of a treatment of the original causes of the war is a reflection of the Marxist scenario of class war as well as the sectarian dimension. *An-Nahar*, contrary to *As-Safir*, was interested in an internal political agreement, as well as an international one. This reflects *An-Nahar*'s stance on the war taking a complex internal as well as proxy dimensions, consistent with the views of Tueni (1985).

Consistently with Chapter 5 findings, the postwar period witnessed a shift in focus towards understanding the war, defining it, discussing its reasons, and evaluating its consequences. This is still consistent with the peace journalism paradigm, as peace journalism focuses on the causes of the conflict (Galtung, 1998). In the postwar period, *An-Nahar*'s frames attributed the war to Palestinian presence and military activity, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Syrian influence, while *As-Safir*'s frames mentioned sectarian tensions, and similarly to *An-Nahar*, Syrian influence. *An-Nahar* continued to view Palestinian presence (the foreigners' war scenario) as a causal factor, while *As-Safir* opted for a more internal sectarian attribution (the leftists' scenario). Both, however, became vocal about Syria's role in the war. This is to be interpreted in light of the early 2000s memory discussions, and the 2005 political changes and Syria's withdrawal. The press in the postwar period, as per these findings, gained more freedom to incriminate Syria, instead of just mentioning it as an actor.

Despite evidence that points to a peace journalism approach in the press, wartime and postwar frames examined in this chapter encompass other dimensions that could be considered under the umbrella of war journalism.

As this chapter showed, the different warring fronts included various actors, differently defined in every frame. In civil war frames, actors were often referred to by their religious

identity, reflecting the sectarian dimension of the conflict. In these same frames, the Palestinians seemed to be always present, as if they were considered local actors – not regional ones. In *An-Nahar*, this is in line with their foreigners' conspiracy theory frame, and in *As-Safir*, this reflects the centrality of the Palestinian cause to *As-Safir* and its 'attack on Palestinians' conspiracy theory. What could be concluded regarding the portrayal of actors and its link to peace journalism, is that the press followed the low road of considering the conflict to be a battle where fighting parties are usually reduced to two. Across almost all frames in both newspapers, two warring fronts can be identified; one front consisting of the LNM, the Muslims, the Palestinians and Syria on the one hand, and the LF, the Christians, Israel and the USA on the other hand. These findings are to be further examined in the following chapter. As an initial conclusion, this chapter showed that the press adopted a peace journalism approach in its solution-oriented and causal-attribution tendencies but tended to look at the actors involved in the conflict from a war journalism paradigm.

This chapter discussed the content analysis findings and reconstructed the frames in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, in both wartime and postwar. All the frames reflected a certain context in Lebanon's history, and echoed each of the two newspapers' stances, but also the intellectuals' discourses, as the theoretical grounding argued. In the following chapter, all the reconstructed frames will be further dissected, analyzed, and discussed in an in-depth textual analysis of selected articles, reflective of each of the frames quantitatively extracted, in order to expand on the second research question (RQ2) and lay the groundwork for exploring the third research question (RQ3).

CHAPTER 7

THE FRAGMENTED MEMORY: INSIGHTS ON THE MEDIA AND INTELLECTUALS' WAR DISCOURSE

As the previous chapter showed, content analysis led to the reconstruction of the war frames promoted by *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* in wartime and postwar period. As explained in Chapter 4, the second stage of analysis, presented in this chapter, employed in-depth textual analysis to further analyze the frames and uncover the latent meanings embedded in the opinion articles studied.

As discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2), this study adopted an approach to textual analysis that focuses on the underlying ideological and cultural assumptions of the text. Seen as a set of discursive strategies embedded in a certain cultural context, every selected article was closely examined and analyzed. The 20 articles that were chosen to be textually and contextually analyzed were reflective of the reconstructed frames in wartime and postwar. The following analysis looks at the dominant frame elaborated in the text, and extracts, identifies, and analyzes the frame elements in relation to its author and the newspaper it was published in. For each frame that was found in both wartime and postwar period, analysis starts with wartime articles then extends to postwar articles. First, the three simple frames are examined: the civil war frame, the regional war frame then the proxy war frame. Next, the two complex wartime frames are analyzed: a complex proxy and regional war frame, and a complex civil and regional war frame. In addition to the two complex frames, textual analysis revealed the existence of a third complex war frame: civil, regional and proxy war frame. This comprehensive frame entails elements from all the frames and considers the war a multi-layered civil/regional/international conflict with many actors and causes. The following analysis should be understood as shedding additional light on the findings of the quantitative analysis, further answering RQ2 and giving insights to RQ3.

Table 7.l details the selected articles, including date of publishing, newspaper, and frame. This table is to be referred to when reading Chapter 7 for a better understanding of the distribution.

Article title	Date of publishing	Newspaper	Frame
The war: its causes and the desired solution	15 April 1984	*As-Safir*	The Civil War frame
The war of everyone against everyone	14 April 1989	*As-Safir*	The Civil War frame
Some of us are guiltier than the others	12 April 2005	*As-Safir*	The Civil War frame
They wrote what shouldn't be written and they kept silent about what is not permissible	8 April 2008	*An-Nahar*	The Civil War frame
We shall see…	9 April 1976	*An-Nahar*	The Regional Conflict frame
So that Syria doesn't get involved in Lebanon	12 April 1976	*As-Safir*	The Regional Conflict frame
Small nations and the interests of the giants	8 April 1981	*An-Nahar*	The Proxy War frame
Solutions are forbidden… so are wars	11 Apr 1981	*An-Nahar*	The Proxy War frame
For the defeat of the American game	8 April 1976	*As-Safir*	The Regional and Proxy War frame
13 April 1975: Some lessons	14 April 1979	*As-Safir*	The Regional and Proxy War frame
What peace in the 15th year	10 April 1989	*An-Nahar*	The Civil and Regional War frame
Regional Peace starts in Lebanon	15 April 1991	*An-Nahar*	The Civil and Regional War frame
What matters is the initiative, not the person behind it	11 April 1995	*An-Nahar*	The Civil and Regional War frame
Three messages on the anniversary of 13 April	15 April 2004	*An-Nahar*	The Civil and Regional War frame
Ugly	13 April 1990	*As-Safir*	The Civil and Regional War frame
As-Safir recalls the tragedy of the 'Lebanese wars' after 25 years for its first scene. A series of alliances and mutual betrayals in the name of Sectarianism	10 April 2000	*As-Safir*	The Civil and Regional War frame
Awaiting the sun of 14 April	16 April 2010	*As-Safir*	The Civil and Regional War frame
For 14 April to start	14 April 1992	*An-Nahar*	The Civil, Regional and Proxy War frame
So that this generation knows	13 April 2000	*An-Nahar*	The Civil, Regional and Proxy War frame
13	13 April 2000	*An-Nahar*	The Civil, Regional and Proxy War frame

Table 7.1: List of Articles Selected for Textual Analysis

7.1 The Civil War Frame

The civil war frame was found in both wartime and postwar. As the findings in Chapter 6 showed, this frame was present in wartime *As-Safir*, and postwar *As-Safir* and *An-Nahar*. Examining this frame with textual analysis showed how this frame changed over time, and unwinds its different interpretations in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*.

The civil war frame, as an independent frame, was echoed only in *As-Safir* during the war. An op-ed published in 1984 ***("The war: its causes and the desired solution," As-Safir, 15 April 1984)*** thoroughly discusses the war, adopting the civil war frame, deliberating on its causes and suggesting a solution. As the war enters its 10th year, the author asserts that none of the Lebanese citizens wants the war to continue. Published under the section "letters to *As-Safir*," the article, written by Dr. Mohammad Nour Eddine, an academic and political writer, states its purpose from the beginning "Returning to the root causes of war is the right approach to a radical solution." When defining the war, the article considers it a historical conflict, that precedes even the Independence (1943). The treatment recommendation frame element appears from the beginning. Internal causes are the most important causes to look into, while external causes are only secondary, the article claims. The argumentation behind this frame is simple: if the war was caused by external issues only, it would have already ended. Despite recognizing Palestinian presence and the Arab-Israeli conflict as a cause or a driver of the war, the article clearly says "the Palestinian resistance went out and the war did not end. Israel occupied the south and the war did not end." By that, the author stresses the internal root causes of the war and asserts that the war will not end until internal issues are resolved. The main issues the article focuses on are the socioeconomic inequalities that divide society not along sectarian lines, but into two classes, a partnership between a few Maronites, Sunnis, Shia and Druze, i.e. the rich on one hand, and the oppressed, the poor, on the other hand. The treatment recommendation is thus clear; the war will not end unless this purely internal issue is resolved by reaching full equality among all citizens from all communities and parties, and fully eradicating exploitation and dominance of the first class over the other. Nonetheless, the author is optimistic and considers that the solution – the treatment of the original causes of the war – has started to take shape, namely among what he calls the "national leaders" and has received major support from what he calls "the popular national and Muslim milieu." The author then alerts the leaders to the necessity to confront "the enemies of the national project," without clearly identifying who those 'enemies' are. A contextual reading reveals that those enemies are those who the LNM stood up against in February 6th, 1984. February 6th refers to what is called 'The Uprising of

February 6th,' a series of events involving a militia uprising in West Beirut. The fighting fronts were Amal and the PSP on the one hand, and the LAF backed by President Amin Gemayel on the other hand (Khawand, 2001, p.496). What the author hints at in this article is that the "enemies of the national project" are Gemayel and what he represents in terms of right-wing Christian powers. The frame in this article also resonates with what Amal claims to uphold, a union of the poor and neglected in the face of the rich and the greedy (see 2.2.1.1.3). The article then elaborates on this class division, claiming that a class of few Muslims and Christians collaborated in instigating the war, serving Israeli interests and oppressing the other class, the majority of Muslims and Christians, and indirectly the Shia. This elitist class will not disappear, as the article argues, unless a radical measure is taken, such as the historical examples of the 1789 French revolution, the 1917 Russian revolution and the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution. The author is thus implicitly calling for a revolution. This solution seems the only rational solution in a country of "continuous wars since 1958." Here, the author asserts that the war began prior to 1975. The author ends on an optimistic note, expressing his belief in the awareness of the oppressed class, and their willingness to fight the long war, in order to reach "the country of eternal joy – the country of the good poor people." In a way, the author starts by saying no one wants the war to continue, but ends by saying the war is still long, and is worth fighting. His position reflects the essence of this frame. The war is long, and painful, but is necessary, as the historical socioeconomic inequalities will not end overnight; their end should be the result of a war, a revolution, the type of 'radical solution' the article calls for. Despite most frame elements being present in this article, a couple of elements are missing. This article does not consider the war to be a 'war of everyone against everyone,' quite the opposite. The author clearly identifies two warring fronts, the two classes referred to above; a rich powerful class, and a poor oppressed one. And despite not calling it a 'war of others,' the author mentions other countries involved in the war, namely Syria and Israel, and their presence in Lebanon as part of the war. But he does not mention them to say that the others are instigating the war, but rather to say that despite the others' involvement and active participation in the war, and their retaliation, the war is ongoing, which proves that the root cause of the war is internal and historical. The author clearly adopts a Marxist interpretation of the war, reading it through the prism of a class conflict. The language and rhetoric of this article reflect his viewpoint, as it is rich with words and terms that belong to the leftist ideology lexicon, such as "oppression of a class," "a pariah class," "total equality between all citizens," "needed struggle," for example. This also shows in the examples the author includes when referring to the change needed, talking

about the French, Russian and Iranian revolutions, all bloody revolutions fought by an inferior class against a monarchy.

The contextual analysis of this article puts this article and the frame it echoes into perspective. First, the article appeared in *As-Safir* newspaper, a left-leaning publication. And despite the article being an op-ed, the choice of publishing an article that entails this framing of the war, during the commemoration week, shows that *As-Safir* wanted to disseminate this frame. Indeed, as a socialist-leaning newspaper, class struggle is to be seen as a root cause of the conflict. The author, an academic and political writer, seems to belong to the pro-Muslim camp, and most importantly pro-leftist camp. Thus, choosing to frame the war as a civil war read in light of a class conflict is understandable. In addition, the period of 1984, following the events of February 6th and its consequences, divided the country into two camps; a Muslim left-leaning camp, represented in that specific period by Amal, the slowly growing Hizbullah (though not clearly mentioned in the article), the PSP and other remnants of the disintegrated LNM, and a Christian right-wing camp, represented by the Phalange presidency, supported by the LAF (army), and empowered by other Christian militias. The article reflects the political division at the time and focuses on the civil war aspect of the war.

Adopting the same civil war frame, an *As-Safir* op-ed in 1989 ***("The war of everyone against everyone," As-Safir, 14 April 1989)*** elaborated on the sectarian aspects of the war, rather than its socioeconomic root causes. Written by Hassan As-Sabea, an occasional columnist in *As-Safir*, the article tackles the complexity of the war on its 14th anniversary. The author starts by comparing April 13th,1989 to April 13th, 1975, arguing that despite many things changing, "the faces, slogans, geography and coalitions...The same paralysis keeps its grip on the state, while the nation is still torn apart and destroyed." First, this comparison shows that the author considers April 13th, 1975 the first day of the war, which supports earlier findings in Chapter 6, that a majority in *As-Safir* considered it as such. As for the civil war frame, the first frame element this article adopts is issue definition. The war is clearly defined as both a 'civil war,' and "a war of everyone against everyone, exactly how Ziad al-Rahbani described it when it started." By quoting al-Rahbani, a prominent leftist artist, satirical writer and intellectual, the author re-asserts the leftist ideological layer not only of his article, but of the newspaper in general. "It is a civil war that brought about the collapse of reconciliation on the necessities of internal conciliation in favor of the bloody adventures of the sects," the author emphasizes. This framing of the war interprets it as a sectarian war,

an understanding of the civil war different in its causes from the previous article. However, similarly to the previous article, this frame is a window into other frames. Whether the conflict is sectarian or classist by nature, the internal conflict aspect is dominant, and is a root cause for other layers of the conflict. The author of this article hints at that by saying that the internal sectarian conflict opened the door for the 'wars of others' (in Lebanon), transforming Lebanon into a "dumpster for regional conflicts." The internal conflict seemed to be a fertile ground for other conflicts, as 'others' got involved. The author goes as far as saying that, for 14 years (1975), an "Arab civil war" has been taking place in Lebanon, while an Arab-Israeli confrontation front is open. He even mentions the effects of the "Islamic revolution" in Iran, "the Indian civil wars, the Sri Lankan civil wars, etc." on the war in Lebanon. Adding a layer of a regional conflict frame, and exaggerating links to the Indian or Sri Lankan wars, shows to what extent this article sees the conflict in Lebanon as a manifestation of complex conflicts. But in the end, all comes back to the root cause: the internal conflict. The war, according to this frame, has its Lebanese civil war aspect, but also reflects many warring fronts, hence the title "a war of everyone against everyone." Just like the previous article in this frame, this article suggests an internal solution. However, the author here does not call for a revolution, but suggests a Lebanese agreement. He calls on the Christians, and specifically the Maronites, identified as major actors in this war, to admit that Lebanon has changed drastically since 1943, and calls for introducing some changes into the social and political system. Here, the author is referring to the National Pact of 1943, the power-sharing formula that gave the Maronites certain privileges. What the author is implicitly saying is that the Maronites should admit that there have been demographical changes since 1943, and Christians have ceased to be the dominant sect, thus a new power-sharing formula is to be sought. At the same time, the author calls on the Muslims, also identified as major actors in the war, to realize after 14 years of war that "the reason for which this country came to exist is still valid, and no 180-degree shift can happen in one leap." What the author is referring to here is the Maronites' power, as it can be understood the author considers that Lebanon was created as a haven for Maronites, and that their existing power cannot be taken away all of a sudden. The author's vision of a solution is one of compromise, whereby the fighting sects put "the unity of Lebanon, its democracy and Arabism" above all other considerations. He also stresses the importance of the Arab belonging of Lebanon, linking it to good relations with Syria, which the Maronites consider an enemy. Thus, a Lebanese agreement that takes into consideration the relationship between Lebanon and its Arab neighbors, namely Syria, is what will end this war, according to this

treatment recommendation frame element expressed in this civil war frame. An important frame element – consistent with the civil war frame – is implicit in this article. The Palestinians are not clearly mentioned as actors, and their presence and military activity is not identified as a reason for the war. The author only hints at that by saying "some armies came, some armies left, others stayed, but it [13 April] did not change" in reference to the ongoing war despite the changes. Of the "armies" that left, the PLO, and its militants that left Beirut in 1982, is one of the armies the author hints at. But other than this reference, the Palestinians are not explicitly mentioned at all. In order to understand why, the context of the article should be analyzed.

First, the article published in *As-Safir*, a newspaper with pan-Arab stances, reflects to a certain extent the ideology of the newspaper. Despite the missing classist layer of the war – a leftist perspective that is – this civil war frame reads the war in the context of Lebanon's belonging to the Arab world and quotes a prominent leftist figure, Ziad al-Rahbani. The war, sectarian by nature, has developed into a battleground for regional conflicts. But the issue is internal, related to the two different objectives of the Christians and the Muslims with relation to the question of identity. The Christians –Maronites in particular– want to keep power in Lebanon, while opposing Syria, and the Muslims want to take that power from the Maronites. On one hand, the Maronites hold a Lebanese nationalist political stance, and see Lebanon as detached from its Arab surroundings, as explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1). On the other hand, the Muslims as Arab nationalists, see Lebanon as part of the Arab and Muslim world, and are not satisfied with the political powers they hold (See Section 2.1). This identity discourse is reflected in the article, and the author concludes with the need to find a formula that incorporates both tendencies, a Lebanese consensus that leads to a "real country called Lebanon" according to the author. As an op-ed published in 1989, the article reflects the period towards the end of the war. This explains why the Palestinian factor is missing, as in 1989, The Palestinian issue became less relevant, and Syrian forces' presence became more vital. The article appears during the 'war of Liberation' launched by army general Michel Aoun against Syrian forces in March 1989. By April, the date of publishing, Syria and its allies in Lebanon –the PSP and Amal– had been fiercely fighting Aoun. As pointed out in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3.4), this last phase of the war ended with the Ta'if Agreement in October 1989. The war in its last year was seen as a continuation of various internal brawls, as this article portrays, and the only way to end it is by a Lebanese agreement. The article, in a way, predicts the Ta'if Agreement that was to happen later that year, re-designing the Lebanese system and defining its relationship with its Arab

surroundings, namely Syria. This civil war frame encompasses the complexity of the internal aspect of the war, and projects its end.

In contrast with the war period, the civil war frame was found in both *As-Safir* and *An-Nahar* in postwar. However, the frame was different in the postwar period, as argued in Chapter 6. Some frame elements disappeared, other frame elements emerged, and some frame elements gained a different meaning.

The civil war frame was found in some of *As-Safir* articles in the postwar period, and its elements varied from one article to the other. One particularly interesting article was published in 2005, a critical year in the postwar period, as argued in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2). The column ***("Some of us are guiltier than the others," As-Safir, 12 April 2005)*** written by Houssam Itani, a writer, researcher and journalist, echoed a civil war frame of the war. The title itself notes that everyone is to blame for the war, but to a different extent. This does not necessarily contradict what the findings in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4) showed regarding the presence of the category 'all Lebanese are equally victims of the war' in this frame. The author of this article admits that all Lebanese are victims, but considers some guiltier than others, as some contributed to persecuting the others. The article starts by criticizing the "No victorious neither defeated" formula. As argued in Chapter 2, following the Ta'if Agreement, this formula dominated the politicians' discourse around the war. During the 1990s and early 2000s, this slogan was being promoted, especially among the political elite, as a way to settle the discussion around the war, and as a forced attempt to avoid talking about the war altogether, namely during the commemoration period. As argued in Chapter 2, the war ended, amnesia was imposed, and the country was forced into a rebirth in the 1990s. But the events in 2005 and the fear of a new war erupting after the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri brought back the discussion on the war, as highlighted in Chapter 5. Also, in the early 2000s, some former militia fighters publicly apologized and admitted their crimes during the war (Volk, 2010), while none of the militia warlords were held accountable for any crime, as a result of the General Amnesty granted in 1991. Taking this context into consideration, one can understand why the article, published in 2005, tackles this specific matter of the civil war frame and calls for a different understanding of blame. In its causal interpretation, the article objects to blaming the "Palestinians and Syrians and Israelis for all the bad things that happened" while portraying the Lebanese as passive observers. In the author's argument, taking responsibility for the war is an urgent matter on the 30th anniversary of the war, given the political changes that took place in 2005. In Lebanon, the

author elaborates, every "Lebanese tribe" has its own oral and written history, regardless of whether it is realistic or not, and whether it resonates with the "histories of others." This argument echoes the findings in Chapter 5 on the discourse of the history and memory of the war that dominated the 2000s, when intellectuals broke the silence regarding the war, and started to collectively and individually talk about the war. This article is taking part in the memory discussion in the public sphere by bringing up a controversial issue with memory; the existence of many conflicting memories, to each group its own oral and written history that contradicts the other's. What the author is arguing though, is that the existence of different narratives "does not contest that some Lebanese are guiltier than others." The author makes it clear that by mentioning tribes, he actually means "sects and confessional groups" that fought on sectarian basis during the war and transferred it to state institutions during peace. Thus, sectarian tensions and divisions are interpreted as a cause of the war in this civil war frame. Accordingly, all Lebanese were actors during the war, and the coalitions of the different groups were on sectarian basis. Despite some being guiltier than others, the article ends by considering all the Lebanese equal in one thing: their belonging to the "tribe," as far as possible from their belonging to the state. This conclusion takes the article back to its original argument: sectarianism is at the heart of the conflict.

Contextually, it is not unlikely for the secular *As-Safir* to feature an article that approaches the war from a civil war frame, specifically from the sectarian angle. The author, columnist Houssam Itani, was a well-known Marxist, coming from a prominent leftist family. In the 2000s, he shifted to a more liberal ideology (Nashar, 2013). His ideas are expectedly centered around secularism, justice, and citizenship. Thus, the civil war frame he adopts in this article looks at the war as a sectarian war, fought by "tribes," a war in which all the Lebanese were involved in one way or another. The period of publishing was a critical year in the history of postwar Lebanon. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 2005 was a pivotal year, a time when the discourse of the war surfaced out of a fear of a new battle.

In *An-Nahar*, the civil war frame is only present in the postwar period. In 2008, a series of articles were featured under the theme "The responsibility of the Lebanese elites in the preparation of the Civil War." One of those articles had a dominant civil war frame (***They wrote what shouldn't be written and they kept silent about what is not permissible," 8 April 2008).*** The article, a lengthy analysis written by journalist and writer Rashid al-Qadi, embodies several arguments and explanations, and connects the war to the political situation of the time. What is interesting in the civil war frame it adopts is the clarity of the author's

stances on the war. One of the first facts the author points out is the controversy over labeling the war. Comparing the Lebanese war to the American civil war and the Spanish civil war, the author concludes that the American war was for the unification of the continent in one country, and the Spanish war was in order to topple the existing regime, while in Lebanon, "The Christian Right took up arms in defense of the entity it believed was threatened by the armed Palestinian presence, supported by an Islamic and leftist majority. The Islamic Left took up arms under the slogan of preventing partition and to defend Lebanon's Arab identity." In this sentence, the dichotomy of the two warring fronts – Christians, i.e. LF/Phalanges on the one hand, and the leftists and Muslims on the other hand – is highlighted. Here, the author combines both the left and Islamists in one term "the Islamic Left," despite the ideological and political differences between the two. This shows that this frame does not necessarily portray the conflict as a sectarian one, but rather a political one with a sectarian layer. As the Ta'if Agreement showed, the author argues, Muslims earned their share in the state, and Christians got their reassurance of the Lebanese entity as a final state. The author is adopting a certain issue evaluation, saying that the minority of the elites won the war, got what they want, and reached an agreement that best served their interests. On the other hand, another evaluation is mentioned; the Lebanese were victims of this war. And despite reaching an agreement, the causes of the war should be discussed, in order to prevent further conflict. The elites, according to this article, are to be blamed for not discussing the causes of the war. What the author advocates, and elaborates on in the rest of the article, is discussing the major sensitive topics that are at the heart of the Lebanese crisis, mainly the Resistance (i.e. Hizbullah), the "fundamentalist terrorism that masks itself as Islam," the relationship with Syria, and Palestinians' rights in Lebanon. On Hizbullah, the author argues that the resistance that was largely backed by the Lebanese the beginning (during the war against its fight with Israel) has changed and became identified with a certain sect (read, Shia) and used in the regional conflict. The author demands a discussion on the role of Lebanon in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Here, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Lebanon's role in it are identified not only as causes of the war, but also as causes of the ongoing political conflict. Similarly, the role of Syria is highlighted, as the author demands a clear separation between Lebanon and Syria. Here again, Syria continues to be a major factor contributing to the ongoing unrest. In fact, the author calls for redefining the Lebanese identity as one sperate from Syrian or the larger Arab identity. As a colonial construct, the close ties between what being Lebanese is and what being Syrian is has given Syria political control over Lebanon, as argued earlier. The author, calling for another examination of

identity, joins the postwar intellectual choir calling for a postwar identity reconstruction that takes into consideration Lebanon's modern history as a whole, not just the war period dynamics. Another controversial issue the author brings up is the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. As Palestinians were considered to be major actors in the war, the author argues that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has to be addressed. The reason why this is relevant in 2008 is because in the 2000s, the issue of naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon was used as a propaganda tool in many political debates and campaigns[7]. As for terrorism, the author demands that the Islamic elites confront this dominant discourse and act to counter any terrorist movement that claims to represent Islam. This approach demystifies the separation between religion and its misuse politically and is largely influenced by the global trend of political Islam in the 2000s. The civil war frame in this article of *An-Nahar* involves many of the frame elements found and highlighted in Chapter 6, and acts as a call for digging deeper into the roots of the war, in order for it not to happen again.

Published in 2008, after the events of 2005, the Syrian army withdrawal, and the 2006 Israeli attacks, the article reflects an intriguing approach to the civil war frame position amidst all those events. It proved how, in the early 2000s that witnessed a war memory awakening, *An-Nahar* joined in the effort of re-introducing the discourse of the war in the intellectual and media realms. Discussing the causes of the war and analyzing the driving forces of conflict in Lebanon seemed crucial in that year, especially that fears from another round of internal conflict arose. This op-ed is one in a series of articles under the theme "The responsibility of Lebanese elites in preparing the civil war." Here, *An-Nahar* seems to be advocating a serious discussion of the past.

7.2 The Regional War frame

The regional war frame, specific to the war period as the findings in Chapter 6 showed, is found in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*. In the postwar period, the regional war frame merged with the civil war frame to make a complex frame. In wartime, this frame was observed as a solid frame, even if in its issue diagnosis frame dimension, it involved only local actors.

In *An-Nahar*, a column article by columnist Elias el-Dairy echoes the regional war frame. In his article ***("We shall see…," An-Nahar, 9 April 1976)***, the author views the war in Lebanon as a Lebanese-Palestinian conflict and in fact labels it a "conspiracy." The

[7] The resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, *Tawtin*, has been a controversial issue in Lebanon since the 1950s. (See: Kassir, 2003, p.97).

article's main topic is a parliamentary constitutional session that was due to happen a day after the article was published. The session's aim was to amend article 73 in the constitution, allowing for the resignation of the President of the Republic (Sleiman Frangieh, then), and the early election of a new President (Khawand, 2001, p.340). The session, according to the author is a choice between a Lebanese-Palestinian permanent peace and a new war. Although this frame did not clearly mention the Christians as actors, as per Chapter 6 findings, this article, adopting this frame, implicitly means Christians when talking about the Lebanese. The binary understanding of the warring fronts means that the Palestinians (and their Lebanese allies) are on one side, while the Lebanese (i.e. the Christians/Maronites) are on the other side. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon, although identified as a cause for the conflict, does not seem to be completely vilified by the author. As he speculates about the important parliamentary session, he suggests that "tomorrow will be the day of the dangerous crossroads in the lives of the Lebanese people and the fate of the Palestinian cause." The author, despite what the quantitative findings showed in Chapter 7, HUMMUS hopes for a solution that serves both warring fronts and puts an end to the war. A Lebanese political solution, in the face of an "International and Arab conspiracy and its dirty goals" is much needed and is given a chance to happen the following day (April 10th, 1976). Here, the conspiracy is identified as an international and Arab one, a hint to the extent of foreign intervention in Lebanon. The reasons why this frame is identified as a regional war one are the Palestinian factor, a regionally-imposed issue on Lebanon, as well as the Arab role implicitly referred to. The author does not clearly vilify the Palestinians; he admits that they have their cause, but he does not want them to fight for their cause from Lebanon and considers that other countries want to involve the Palestinians in Lebanon. Although the article does not mention Syria, it hints at it when referring to the "Arab" role in the conspiracy.

This article was published on the first anniversary of the war, and during a critical period in the Two Years' war. The Syrian role in the war was not secondary, quite the opposite in fact, especially during that period. For the Christians, changing Frangieh, a Syria-supported president, was an essential step towards a peace process. A military solution, as this article also sees, was rejected, and a Lebanese political consensus was considered the only way to end the war. As a column, this article should be taken as a reflection of *An-Nahar*'s position. Elias el-Dairy, a core analyst in *An-Nahar*, wrote his article under the daily column that editors take turns on, titled "The position this day," an editorial column. During the early phases of the war, *An-Nahar* seems to have sympathized with the right, without

necessarily standing against the Palestinians, but rather sought a solution-oriented approach and focused on treatment recommendation, as Chapter 5 showed. Thus, the end of the war is what mattered, and there was no point elaborating on the events, players, or definitions of the war. This frame echoed by *An-Nahar* on the eve of an important event that could (and in fact did) change the course of the war reflects the way the war was seen during its early days. *An-Nahar* put the war in the regional frame; it was an international and regional conspiracy against Lebanon and the Christians, and indirectly against the Palestinians. As for Syria's role in this conspiracy, *An-Nahar* considered it a main player that could either be part of the problem, or part of the solution.

In *As-Safir*, the regional war frame was a bit more complex. An article published in the same year, two days after the aforementioned parliamentary session, takes a regional frame as its angle ***("So that Syria doesn't get involved in Lebanon," As-Safir, 12 April 1976).*** Despite having almost the same frame elements as *An-Nahar*'s regional war frame, the frame in *As-Safir* was interpreted differently, as Chapter 6 showed. First, the article starts by openly siding with the LNM and the Palestinians in warning Syria: "With all the love we have for Damascus… [we] alert them [the Syrians] to the American trap being set up for Syria to be more and more involved in Lebanon, against its own interests and ours." The article clearly talks about a conspiracy being orchestrated by the Americans, through their proxies in Lebanon, against Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. This conspiracy targets Lebanon and has Palestinian and Arab implications. The reason for the American involvement has many interpretations that are intertwined with the outcomes of the war on the Palestinians. If the Palestinians come out the war victorious, they should be targeted so that "the Palestinian factor will not be a hindrance to the American settlement of the Middle East crisis." And if the LNM, the major supporter of the Palestinians, grows, then they should be stopped. Also, if Syria played a positive role that benefits the Palestinians and the LNM, then its growing power should also end. For all these reasons, the author argues, an American conspiracy is being planned in order drag Syria into a military intervention in Lebanon, then move the Israelis to stand against this intervention, while pushing *al-iniizaliyyun,* the "separatists" to re-inflame the fronts in Beirut and other areas. This scenario forces the Palestinians and the LNM to make a choice: either preventing the Israeli attack or bowing to the "separatist-American blackmail." The article refers to a statement made by the LNM in which it alerts Syria to the dangers of any military involvement in Lebanon. In fact, the article echoes exactly what the statement is. All of this frame's elements found in Chapter 5

are found in this article. Two axes are competing: the USA, Israel and the Phalange/Christian militias (here labeled Separatists, and considered enemies) axis, versus the Palestinians/LNM axis. In this frame, Syria is seen as a third party, hoped to be part of the latter front, but being pictured as dragged by the first front - and its main motor, the USA - into a conflict that does not benefit it. This whole conflict is triggered by the Arab-Israeli conflict, presented as a crisis created by Israel, the USA, and its "toy" in Lebanon (hinting at Christian militias), and only USA is now imagining and planning the solution for it. This regional conflict frame, as presented by *As-Safir*, vilifies the USA-Israel-Phalange front, and glorifies the Palestinians and the LNM. In fact, calling the Palestinians a "resistance," while calling the Phalange "separatists" is a semiotic connotation of the political position *As-Safir* is taking, portraying the Palestinians as heroes and freedom fighters, while depicting the Phalange as enemies.

The article, written in the form of an open letter to Syria, was an editorial support to the LNM and the Palestinians, and was *As-Safir*'s way of positioning itself as an opinion leader, addressing both the public and Syrian authorities. This frame obviously echoes *As-Safir*'s stance as a leftist pro-Palestinian publication that sees the conflict as an attack on the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies. Published on the first anniversary of the war, and on the eve of a Syrian armed intervention in Lebanon, the article sends a clear message: Syria must not get involved in Lebanon for its own good, and the good of the Palestinian cause. The article was an editorial signed by "*As-Safir*" in the famous editorial column *aala al-tariq* (on the road) that usually belongs to the editor-in-chief and publisher Talal Salman. By not signing one can wonder whether it was not written by him. In fact, it can be argued that by signing it with "*As-Safir*," the editor wanted to send another message: *As-Safir*, as a newspaper and not as the individual who wrote the piece, supports the article's content. This could be a real indication of how critical the situation was during that period of the war, and how important it was for *As-Safir* to have a clear position. Here, one can be tricked into thinking that the press is practicing its role in peace journalism amid crisis in its solution-oriented approach. But what peace approach is it when the war is reduced to a fight between a glorified axis and a vilified one?

7.3 The Proxy War Frame

Like the regional war frame, the proxy war frame was a wartime frame. The frame was only found in *An-Nahar* as a solid frame but was also present in wartime *As-Safir* as a sub-frame in a complex frame, as the findings of the previous chapter showed.

In *An-Nahar*, the proxy war frame was an elaborate one, found as an independent frame in many articles. After all, it is *An-Nahar*'s Ghassan Tueni who coined the term 'war of others on our land' that encapsulates the proxy war frame.

Published as *al-mawqif hatha annahar* (the position of the day) column, editor Sarkis Naoum's article embodied the proxy war frame ***("Small nations and the interests of the giants," An-Nahar, 8 April 1981)***. The article focused on the Battle of Zahle, an armed conflict between the ADF on one hand, and the LF on the other in 1980-1981 (See 2.2.3.2). However, the frame in which the article puts this battle is a proxy war frame. The author starts by defining the two warring fronts' positions and noting that both the Syrians (ADF) and the LF have reached "the point of no return" in this fight. The solution, the article suggests, has to come from the Lebanese authority, hence an internal solution. However, the author points out that this might not be possible, as "the two titans, the Americans and Soviets, have revealed their powers and have embarked on an open conflict between the two of them on the Lebanese territory, using the Lebanese and non-Lebanese warring parties present in Lebanon." This sentence recapitulates the essence of the proxy war frame: Lebanon is being used as a battlefield for a war between the two superpowers - USA and USSR - as part of the Cold War. Thus, the solution has to come through an "American-Soviet deal on the Middle East or part of it." According to this frame, Lebanon is seen as a battlefield, a place where the two major powers fight and negotiate. The victim, according to this frame, is Lebanon, as "[it] is already collapsing. The American priority in the region is Israel, and the Soviet priority in the region is Syria and the Palestinian resistance." Despite Lebanon being the victim with all that is happening on its territory, according to this frame, is out of its control, the author suggests an internal agreement to end the war. The president, the author suggests, should invite all the warring fronts to a meeting, and ask them to agree to a ceasefire. This loose solution called for in this article stands no chance in succeeding. As per this frame, the war is being operated from the outside, and the Lebanese do not seem to have a decisive role in it. This frame, therefore, interprets the war in light of the Cold War, a bigger war, which Lebanon only constitutes a battle within.

The contextual analysis of the article leads to two main conclusions. First, the article, a column reflected the ideology of the newspaper. *An-Nahar* saw Lebanon as a weak country, a "small nation," that everyone wants a piece of, and wants to fight over. The author, being an editor in the newspaper, framed the war as such. Second, the period the article reflects, i.e. 1981 amidst the battle of Zahle, was one of the war's determining battles. Zahle's geo-location, neighboring Syria, was essential to stopping any Israeli infiltration into

Syria, after the Syrian Golan heights were occupied by the Israelis (Khawand, 2001, p.395). Thus, Syria wanted to keep this area under its control, while the Christian militias wanted to keep their control over the predominantly Christian area, especially after the Hundred days' war battles in Beirut against the Syrian forces and the ADF. With this context in mind, the proxy war frame placed the war as a battle serving the interests of each of the USA and the USSR. In this scenario, both Syria and the LF were portrayed as victims in this war, and as local (and regional) players in a power game between the two world Titans.

Another article that explicitly adopted the proxy war frame was also written by Sarkis Naoum and published a few days after the first one ***("Solutions are forbidden… so are wars," An-Nahar, 11 April 1981)***. In this article, the author comments on the ceasefire that was reached in Zahle, while adopting the same proxy war frame. Referring to "western diplomatic sources," the author argues that the USA and USSR played a major role in the ceasefire agreement. The article explores how both the USA and USSR had an interest in this ceasefire, and how they forced local actors and Syria to reach an agreement. The solution frame element, however, seems more complicated, and is more related to the "Middle-east crisis" as the author defines it. At the same time, another round of the conflict seems not be an option, because the decision to continue the war or not is not in the hands of the "small or big parties" as the author argues, but in the hands of the USA, which will decide when, how and where the conflict with the USSR, as part of their Cold War, will pick up. Thus, in this frame, all Lebanese efforts to end the war are useless, and might in fact be "suicidal," especially "if the two titans agreed on keeping Lebanon as their battlefield." This argument is consistent with the 'war of others,' scenario, where the two superpowers are fighting in Lebanon as part of their Cold War. Accordingly, all the proxy war frame elements found Chapter 5 are found in this article, from the main actors - USA and USSR – to the diagnosis – a battle in the Cold War – and the definition as the 'war of others on our land.' In addition to those elements, the proxy frame reconstructed in this article identifies the local and regional actors as Syria, the Palestinians, and the LF.

This article was published under the same column as the previous article. What these two articles had in common, besides being written by the same person, and adopting the same proxy war frame, was that both of them were news analysis and commentary pieces. In both articles, the writer presented statements made by diplomatic sources, political sources and well-informed sources, without naming any of them. This style of writing could in fact be considered Sarkis Naoum's style, and his reliance on 'sources' to write his regular

pieces was observed when looking at the articles he published. His analysis and commentary on current events – in this case the events of the Battle of Zahle – stemmed from his contacts with various sources. The way he framed events was however his own. He drafted his frames with the support of the sources' statements but carefully chose what to include in order to fit the frames he drew. By merging his own stance and the information from his sources, he presented the analysis as his own. One interesting aspect worth noting in this contextual analysis is the date of publication. With only a few days separating the two articles, the second article seemed like an extension of the proxy war frame adopted in the first article. The titles for example, when textually analyzed together, seemed to embody the proxy war frame entirely, complementing one another. The first title "Small nations and the interests of the giants" introduced the frame, stating that there were small fighting nations, controlled by the interests of the giants, while the second title "Solutions are forbidden… so are wars" completed the meaning, and gave it another dimension, suggesting that the "giants" i.e. USA and USSR, had the decision-making power, and decided that solution are forbidden, and so are wars. This textual resemblance, combined with the contextual setting related to the date and event of publication, and the newspaper context shows that the proxy war frame was pervasive in *An-Nahar*, at least during that second phase of the war. In fact, it is only a few years later that Ghassan Tueni published his book expanding on the same framing of the war.

7.4 The Complex Regional and Proxy War Frame

Found in wartime *As-Safir*, this complex war frame interprets the proxy war frame dimension quite differently from *An-Nahar* and adds a regional dimension to it, as exhibited in Chapter 6.

The sample article that promotes the complex regional and proxy war frame was written by a prominent editor in *As-Safir* in the early years of the war, Joseph Samaha ***("For the defeat of the American game," As-Safir, 8 April 1976).*** As the title clearly states, there is an American game happening, and it must be defeated. The first proxy war frame element this complex war frame entails is identifying the USA as an actor, the main actor, in this war. In this front-page editorial, Samaha considers that the conflict in Lebanon is a game played by the USA while local actors are the pawns. The article refers to the American initiative in 1976 to stop what has been later called the Two Years' war and compares it with the Syrian initiative. The frame suggests that what the USA wants from its intervention in Lebanon, "supported by the separatist party indeed, is to initiate a fight between the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Movement on one side, and Syria on the

other side, to weaken everyone, and make way for an American solution to the region's crisis." This frame suggests that the USA is intervening in the conflict, and manipulating the other actors, because it wants to push a specific solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author then elaborates on the seemingly different conflicting strategies the USA is using to succeed in its plan. What is interesting is the way this frame depicts the USA as a puppet master, controlling the conflict in Lebanon and moving the LF, Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt according to its own rules of the game. The main conclusion the article draws is a hope to "rediscover the common ground between the large national coalition in order to confront the USA, its delegate, and the separatist forces who act as the actual executer of American projects in Lebanon." Suggesting an internal Lebanese move to confront the threats of the USA and the LF –here again labeled separatists–can be considered a pre-requisite to an Arab agreement, as when the national coalition comes together, and realize their "common ground" as suggested, they would stand by the Syrian initiative and confront the American initiative. In addition to this frame element, suggesting an American solution to the region's conflict is a hint at another regional frame element, namely solving the Arab-Israeli conflict as a way to end the war. However, the war is framed as some sort of conspiracy by the Americans to impose their own vision of a solution to the Middle East conflict. The article makes no reference to the USSR, nor to the Cold War, contrary to the clear references in *An-Nahar* articles. Primarily, this can be interpreted as what *As-Safir* saw as a dimension of the Cold War, considering the war to be one of regional dimensions related to the "security of Israel" as the author states, but with the primary conspiracy coming from the USA. This sheds more light on the findings of the previous chapter that showed how the proxy and regional elements fused under the proxy war frame umbrella. An interesting observation is that throughout the article, the author refers to what is happening using the terms "crisis" and "conflict." This seems to be common in *As-Safir*, especially in the first few years of the war, where these two terms were used, and no mention of the term 'war' except in the context of 'war on the Palestinian resistance.' It can be argued that, at the beginning – in 1976 at least when this article was published – this did not seem like a 'war' that would go on for more than 15 years. It only seemed like a conflict – or a conspiracy – in a series of wars that must be solved.

Contextually, the author was an LNM member, and this perhaps explains the proxy war frame with a regional dimension adopted as such. For the LNM, the events of 1975-76 were not an internal war. They were a collaboration between the USA, Israel, and the Christian right, against the Palestinian resistance and the left. Here, the local and regional

war dimensions came into play, but the primary angle remained that this was a regional conflict fostered by the USA. This complex war frame interpreting the war as a USA game to control the region was found only in wartime *As-Safir*.

Another article published in 1979 reflected this regional and proxy war frame while stressing the American role ***("13 April 1975: Some lessons," As-Safir, 14 April 1979.)*** In this column, writer Saad Mehio touched on the regional aspect of the war but was mostly interested in the effect the war had on Israel and the USA. The article first quotes USA Secretary of State at the time Henry Kissinger on how the Two Years' war "relieved Israel for many months," explaining what Kissinger actually wanted to say, namely that "Lebanon is a point of international balance," and that the war in Lebanon is encouraged to last long, and in a certain geographical area. What the author here means is that the Two Years' war largely benefited Israel, as it gave it a quiet front, and forced the Palestinians to focus on their battle in Lebanon, giving Israel a break. This was encouraged by the USA, as the security of Israel is of great interest to the superpower. The fighting is required to continue in a contained space, i.e. in Lebanon and should not extend to Israel. However, the author argues that the war did not only shake the Lebanese entity, but also "awakened a massive historical operation in the fertile crescent" for the war that was "wanted to be limited in Lebanon has put into question the entities of Sykes Pico agreement and the institutions of the countries established by colonial mandates." The frame dimension the author is referring to here is the regional involvement in this war and its implications. He does so by bringing up historical prewar arguments that date back to the initiation of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, by the colonial powers, and the implications of the Sykes Picot agreement that made those countries exist as such. According to the author, the war in Lebanon has reshuffled the whole region, that went back to "square zero after the events of the Two Years' war in Lebanon." The impact the war in Lebanon has left not only on Lebanon, but also on the region, should be looked at carefully. The proxy and regional war frame echoed in this article presents Lebanon as a "new experiments laboratory that gathered the people of Palestine, Lebanon and Syria." Lebanon is seen as a battlefield in which the people of those three Sykes Picot nations are fighting. The future of the war in Lebanon, according to this frame, is tied to the future of the whole Fertile Crescent region, and to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These regional implications of the war in Lebanon also make it impossible to think of an internal approach to conflict resolution. Lebanon's future is part of a greater Arab future, and that is the only way to perceive it. Thus, this complex frame advocates a regional

approach to dealing with the war, taking into consideration the role the USA plays in sponsoring and instigating the war.

This article paralleled the previous article analyzed in this complex proxy and regional war frame. Appearing 3 years apart in *As-Safir*, these two articles reflected the way the USA and Israel were framed as major agents in the war in Lebanon. Internal factors and actors seemed to be less relevant in the late 1970s in *As-Safir*, especially after the failure of maintaining a ceasefire, and the different forms the battles took. It was clear to *As-Safir*, that the war in Lebanon was not an internal one. It was an American-Israeli conspiracy, and its goal was to destroy the Palestinian resistance. Lebanon's duty, with the help of its Arab neighbors, was to stop this from happening.

7.5 The Civil and Regional War Frame

The complex civil and regional war frame was found in both wartime and postwar periods as the findings in Chapter 6 showed. Present only in *An-Nahar* during the war, this frame became prominent in the postwar period, and was reflected in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*.

Qualitative analysis showed that *An-Nahar* echoed this complex frame particularly towards the end of the war. An editorial published in 1989 adopted this frame, analyzing the events of the war and suggesting initiatives to end it ***("What peace in the 15th year," An-Nahar, 10 April 1989)***. Written in the last year of the war, few months before the Ta'if Agreement that led to the end of the war, this article presented a detailed analysis of the 14 years of war. The author, Ghassan Tueni, chose to focus on the future, and what can be done to end the war, starting from the causes and the events of past years. This focus echoes the quantitative findings highlighted in Chapter 5 that *An-Nahar*'s dominant frame element in wartime was treatment recommendation; suggesting ways to end the war. The title is striking, with its focus on peace and an implicit mention of the war. The title asks, what peace should look like in the 15th year, without clearly saying the 15th year of war. The author, in a way, wants to focus on positivity, and the prospect of peace, a clear illustration of a peace journalism tendency. He also makes it apparent from the beginning of the article that he chose to write about peace on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of "Lebanon wars." Here, the first frame element is reflected, as the author defines the war as 'wars,' an ongoing series of wars with different causes and various outcomes. Amidst a "fragile" ceasefire, as the author evaluates it, and the uncertainty of this war-peace state, it is important to discuss the war. He first states that the war started with a "fight between Palestinians and Lebanese

(not all the Lebanese) as a result of multiple accumulations all related to the liberal Palestinian activity in Lebanon, and the influence of the Palestinian presence on the Lebanese 'formula' and the position of Lebanon in the Arab conflicts." This sentence incorporates various regional frame elements. First, it identifies the Palestinians as actors, and their presence and military activity as a major cause of the war. Also, it situates the conflict in Lebanon within the larger Arab-Israeli conflict and specifies Lebanon's role in it. The article then states that any mention of "the role of the Israeli intelligence or any other intelligence adds to the 'non-Lebanese' aspect of the war," arguing that internal Lebanese-Lebanese fights were much less costly than those that were Lebanese-Palestinian or Syrian or Israeli fights. Here, the author includes Israel and Syria as actors in the war, and further explains his theory of 'wars,' one of 'everyone against everyone,' highlighting the fact that the conflict had both civil and regional layers, and the two merged at certain points; local actors fought with other local actors, some local actors fought against some regional actors, and so on. The author also points out the Syrian role in some of the battles, such as the war of the camps between Amal and the PLO, arguing that all the intra-sect wars between sectarian parties who are allied with regional powers were less costly than most wars identified as sectarian. By refusing to label the war strictly as sectarian, this frame advocates a more complex approach to reading the war as an intersection between internal and regional conflicts. Even when the war was internal, internal actors were controlled by regional powers. The role of Arab countries in the war is relatively highlighted as well and is most noticeably expressed when the author refers to the "conflicts among Arab countries… [that] have stalled solutions and re-ignited wars whenever we thought we reached a solution or a cease-fire." Arab neighbors are thus responsible for the ongoing war and are to blame for the failure to reach an internal Lebanese agreement to end the war. This complex war frame is explicitly illustrated in the sentence "a regional war that has in it another war described an internal one." This inception of the war, presenting a 'war within a war' is what characterizes this frame and what makes it complex. The author is keen on suggesting the steps to be taken in order for peace to happen. Besides internal ceasefire agreements, he suggests an "Arab and international framework" for a solution in which Syria pulls its forces from Lebanon. He also argues that the Israeli withdrawal is key to any Arab-Israeli negotiations. The solutions that come from the outside, or with outside support are the guarantee for peace according to this frame. Although this article does not mention either the LF or the LNM as actors, it does refer to them when mentioning the "Lebanese involved in one way or another in the wars." With almost all the frame elements present, this article reflects the complexity

of the civil and regional war frame during the war and points to the need for a solution that is supported by the outside to reach peace.

It seems like this editorial was in fact predicting the Ta'if Agreement and presenting the gist of the war as a prior step to seeking its end. As an editorial, this article might be considered a reflection of *An-Nahar*'s position as a solution-seeker throughout the war period, and as a peace-preaching outlet towards the end of the war. The article also accurately reflected the period described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3.4): a period of intra-sectarian wars and a volatile ceasefire, amidst the "war of Liberation" launched by General Michel Aoun against the Syrians, and while Arab and international – namely French – efforts were ongoing to gather the warring Lebanese fronts to reach a peace agreement. Nonetheless, by pointing out that the war was a 'war within a war,' a manifestation of a regional conflict in Lebanon, Tueni denied any Lebanese responsibility. This frame makes it seem as if the internal dimension of the war was only a result of the regional conflict, denying any Lebanese responsibility or internal root causes.

In the postwar period, the complex civil and regional war frame was observed in both *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, and the frame elements were rather similar in the two as Chapter 6 demonstrated.

In *An-Nahar*, the three articles chosen for the qualitative analysis of this complex frame were two editorials and one column, all belonging to different periods. The purpose was to see whether there were any nuances in the same frame across time.

In 1991, *An-Nahar*'s editorial on the Anniversary of the war tackled the issue of peace, while positioning the war in its civil and regional context ***("Regional Peace starts in Lebanon," An-Nahar, 15 April 1991)***. The editor-in-chief, Ghassan Tueni, seemed skeptical of whether to call this day "another year of war or a first day of peace," recalling memories of previous failed attempts at peace in 1976, 1978 and 1982. Peace, according to the author, has to happen in Lebanon before it leads to regional peace. Tying the situation in Lebanon to that of the region is in war the same way it is in peace. Peace in Lebanon, according to the author, should be a pre-requisite for any peace in the region. The two reasons the author gives for the importance of peace in Lebanon before any peace in the region are as follows: First, so that Lebanon is not "the subject of regional negotiations" but rather an active party in it, and second, because it is important that Lebanon, as an active agent in the negotiations, is united, sovereign, and able to protect its own territory. These two conditions can be understood in the context of the war. Tying regional peace to peace in Lebanon shows the

author's stance on the war as a complex one in which both civil and regional agents interlink. This connection becomes more obvious when the author touches on the Palestinian issue, and the interest of both the Lebanese and the Palestinians that the situation in Lebanon enables the two to be strong, and not weak as in the pre-April 13th, 1975 phase. What the author is actually referring to when he talks about the negotiations can be contextually understood as what became known as the Madrid Conference of 1991. In October 1991, Spain held an international conference, as an attempt to revive peace negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel. Lebanon, alongside Syria and Jordan, was largely involved in the conference (Robin, 1997). This article precedes those negotiations and represents an urgent call for sustained peace in Lebanon, in order for both Lebanon and the Palestinians to play an effective role in regional negotiations.

Although this article presented a certain civil and regional peace framing instead of a war framing, the latter can be reconstructed using the same logic. If all the Lebanese were urged to maintain peace, then all the Lebanese were actors in the war. Similarly, if the Palestinians were advised to be strong, then the Palestinians were seen as weak, according to the author, as a result of their involvement in Lebanon. Moreover, if Arab-Israeli negotiations were seen as a major condition for maintaining peace in Lebanon, then the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a major cause for the war, and Israel has been a major agent profiting from the war, especially that the author hints that Israel had an "interest in naturalizing the Palestinians in what's left from South Lebanon." Thus, Lebanon's peace, and the agreement between the Palestinians and the Lebanese would strengthen their position in the negotiations and make them able to form a strong front against Israel. Although not very elaborate, this complex civil and regional war frame found in this article gives a sense of the early peace years and how volatile peace seemed to be. It also reflects the connection *An-Nahar* made between peace in Lebanon and peace in the region, a simulation of how the war was perceived in the same way, as a complex civil and regional war.

In 1995, a column by Sarkis Naoum adopted a complex civil and regional war frame ***("What matters is the initiative, not the person behind it," An-Nahar, 11 April 1995)***. In this article, the author discusses the reasons that led to the "dramatic and scary reality of the Christians" in Lebanon by reviewing the causes of the war and the involvement of the various actors. First, he blames the "Christian political elites that had the decision-making power during the war for they are responsible as a result of their stubbornness and short-slightness, and lack of understanding of the regional and international circumstances." The

Christians – identified as actors – are not the only local actors responsible for the war and its consequences. The Muslims are also identified as actors and are blamed for "not realizing that the continuation of war makes everyone lose, as it makes Lebanon a hostage for others." Along with local actors, "neighboring countries considered Lebanon their battlefield, and the Lebanese their tools" were identified as actors according to this complex frame. By neighboring countries, the author is indeed referring to Syria, as he uses the term "sister countries," typically used to describe Syria. The article also blames countries that were "friends, especially the big countries, for they never treated Lebanon as a friend." The author means mainly France and the USA, as they were usually described as Lebanon's friends in the right-wing political discourse. As for Israel, the author identifies it as the main responsible for the war "by default of being an enemy." Having enumerated all the local, regional, and international actors, Naoum suggests that what should be considered are the lost chances of "stopping the war after the Ta'if Agreement." The author echoes an issue evaluation frame element, considering that the war continued even after the Ta'if Agreement, while blaming one or many actors for that. He then holds the "Ta'if state" responsible for not fully implementing the Ta'if, and the political parties – mainly Christian ones – that failed, as well as Syria, and Christian religious authorities. While analyzing the reasons behind the "dramatic Christian situation," the author recalls the war to give an example of how a Maronite clerk can play a constructive role. He says "…like what the late Patriarch Khreish did when the 'National Movement' relied on Palestinians in the 'decisive battle' in the war against the Christians in 1976." In this particular sentence, the author is suggesting a war waged by the left, supported by the Palestinians against the Christians. He then mentions how the clerk asked Syria to interfere to stop the war. And when the left, led by Kamal Jumblatt, refused to listen to Syrian president Hafez Assad, Syrian forces interfered militarily and forced the left to "end their attack after many losses." This particular anecdote, although intended by the author to show the role Christian clergy leadership can play in stopping a conflict and is given as an example for what should be done in 1995 to implement peace, does in fact highlight the role Syria played in the war. By the end of this article, the civil and regional war frame seems to have been constructed with all the frame elements found in Chapter 6.

This frame as reflected in this article should be also read in light of the early postwar period, described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2) as *Pax Syriana*, or the phase of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. In 1995, parliamentary and presidential elections were approaching. The Christians, having boycotted the parliamentary elections of 1992 for

reasons related to the presence of Syrian troops and intelligence in Lebanon that could influence the voting, as well as the post-Ta'if electoral law considered unfair towards the Christians, were facing the same situation again in 1995. Having realized that their opposition to the 1992 elections did not stop Syria from interfering in the elections and ensuring the success of its local proxies, the Phalanges and other Christian parties began considering taking part in the 1996 elections in an attempt to challenge the status quo. This article was published in this context and encouraged the Christians to take lessons from the war. The early postwar period was considered, in sectarian terms, a period of al-*ihbat al-massihi* (Christian disenchantment), as Christians felt a sense of loss under *Pax Syriana* and the ramifications of the war (Dagher, 2000). This complex frame also mirrors the postwar. In the early 1990s, the no-war no-peace situation was fostered by local and regional factors. The opposition of the Christians to the state and Syrian hegemony, and the emerging Muslim political elites (like Rafiq Hariri) were contributing to the status quo. Hence, the civil and regional war frame can also be viewed as a civil and regional war/no war frame in early 1990s Lebanon.

Another editorial published in 2004 adopted the complex civil and regional war frame to tackle postwar issues ***("Three messages on the anniversary of 13 April," An-Nahar, 15 April 2004).*** On the anniversary of April 13th, *An-Nahar* editor-in-chief Gebran Tueni chose to send three messages: to the Palestinians, to the Syrians, and to the Lebanese. Before exploring the content of these messages, one can say that those three sides are being addressed because they were parties to the war, hence the first hint at the issue diagnosis frame dimension in the civil and regional proxy war found in Chapter 6. Tueni writes as a "son of the war generation that paid a high price for the mistakes of the past," and his main target audience is the new generation; he is addressing the three actors in the war, but wants the new generation to read and learn. In this civil and regional war frame, the Palestinians are explicitly considered "the main cause of the war and one of its major tools." The author attacks them, considering that they mistreated the Lebanese who welcomed them since 1948 (See Chapter 2, section 2.1), and "exploited existing Lebanese political and social contradictions" and the weaknesses of the state, creating a "state within a state, which almost led to the 'Kissinger conspiracy' aiming at giving Lebanon as an alternative country to the Palestinians." The conspiracy the author is referring to "would have benefited Israel, some of the Arabs and the USA" and the Lebanese prevented it. This argument blames the Palestinians for the war in Lebanon, and even indirectly accuses them of conspiring against

themselves, giving way to the execution of the Kissinger conspiracy. In addition to that, this frame holds the Palestinians accountable for the near disappearance of Lebanon and the Lebanese state, giving credit to the Lebanese for aborting this conspiracy. Despite all that, the author claims that he supports the Palestinian cause, and the rights of the Palestinians to an independent Palestinian state, but strongly opposes any attempt to naturalize the Palestinians in Lebanon, and says "I say to them [the Palestinians] and others, simply, Lebanon is not for sale or lease!" As for the second actor, the Syrians, the author sends a moderately-toned message. First, he hopes that "the Syrians who entered Lebanon at the beginning of the war and became a party to the conflict" abandoned the dream some of them had in making Lebanon part of Syria, or not acknowledging its independence. Admitting the Syrian role and influence on Lebanon during and after the war, as part of this civil and regional war frame, the author invites Syria to open a new chapter, and establish good relations with its Lebanese counterparts who once considered Syria an "occupier," and with the Lebanese state in general. Here, the author is specifically talking about the Christians, who were vocal in the early 2000s about the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon despite the Ta'if Agreement's call for their withdrawal within a timeframe, and the political influence Syria had on the politics in Lebanon through its direct presence and its proxies and allies, as argued earlier. The article hints at the need for Syria's military and political withdrawal from Lebanon when it stressed the "independence and sovereignty of Lebanon." As for the last actor, the Lebanese, the author addresses the new generation. However, the author denies the responsibility of his own generation for the war: "we were not the drivers of the war, and we were not keen on battles nor wars." Contrary to what this frame might suggest, the Lebanese responsible for the war are the "previous generations that paid the price for their mistakes," and "the sectarian factor was not the main cause of the war." Admitting some causes of the civil war, the author elaborates on the complexity of the war facilitated by "outside interventions." However, in the internal conflict dimension of the frame, the article focuses on how the "Muslims and Christians who fought have paid the high price to defend the Lebanese identity," making it seem as if the Lebanese are mere actors, fighting on behalf of regional powers. The article implies this by saying "our generation has stood in the face of the conspiracy," as though both Christians and Muslims were equal victims of this war. This closing argument in the article makes the civil and regional war frame look more like a regional conspiracy, orchestrated by the Palestinians, the Syrians, and to some extent Israel and the USA to provide an alternative home for the Palestinians, and fought back by the Lebanese, both Muslims and Christians.

The context in which this article appeared reflects the early 2000s in Lebanon. This article addressed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon at a time when the discourse of naturalizing Palestinians became a public opinion issue, and the author wanted to send his messages not only to the Palestinian themselves, but also to any Lebanese politician who thinks in that direction. And as noted in Chapter 3, this was also the beginning of a phase when the elites became vocal with regards to the Syrian presence in Lebanon. It is worth noting that this was one year before the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri and the Syrian withdrawal, but also the assassination of Gebran Tueni, the writer of this article himself. Tueni was assassinated in 2005, and many suggest that Syria in fact eliminated him for being vocal against it, and for supporting the wave of independence especially after the assassination of Hariri. The role of Syria in the war in Lebanon became a central issue in the early 2000s, and the wave of public apologies by war fighters made the war a widely discussed issue, especially the extent to which the Lebanese were responsible for the war or were rather dragged into it. The article is also part of the awareness campaign commemorating the war (Haugbolle, 2010, p.100). In 2004, *An-Nahar* saw the need to create a public memory to teach the new generation about the war as the war generation was staring to realize that the postwar generation was growing up with no or little knowledge about the war. The campaign, as Haubolle (2010) notes, was aimed at a national confrontation with the guilt or embarrassment for participating in the war, or not resisting it, an attitude that haunted the war generation and prevented any sharing of memories. This complex civil and regional war frame seems to reflect the memory discussion of the 2000s and *An-Nahar* framing of the war in that period that especially victimizes the Lebanese and puts the blame on regional powers.

In *As-Safir*, this complex war frame was also echoed in the postwar period. The frame was first observed in 1990, the first anniversary of the war after the Ta'if Agreement ***("Ugly," As-Safir, 13 April 1990).*** The column, published on the anniversary of the war, framed the war in its civil and regional context with a very vile tone. The author, then-columnist in *As-Safir* Bassem As-Sabea, rejects the war and is "sickened" by what happened starting April 13th, 1975. The title itself, "Ugly" gives the first evaluation of the war: it is ugly, as simple and as complex as this label can be. The author is ashamed to be celebrating the "birth of the Lebanese war" as he calls, it, as it is also the "birth of the strife between the Christians and the Muslims, and the birthday of mutual hatreds with the Arabs and Palestinians…" This sentence holds in it the gist of the civil and regional war frame

dimensions. The Christians, Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians are identified as actors involved in the war, and a reference to the sectarian and regional conflict implications is highlighted. The article is a detailed account of what the 15 years of war have been, all full of pain and suffering, and a message of hope that the 16th year will be different. The author recalls the different frames of the war, the one that sees it as "a mirror to others' wars," and the other that considers it a pure internal issue as sectarianism "is a fertile ground for such wars." These two are put in the Arab context, as Lebanon is said to be "the victim of the Arab disintegration… and mutual Arab hatred." Blaming the others, mainly the Arabs and regional conflicts, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict that the author subtly mentions, does not exonerate the Lebanese from sponsoring and providing the ground for all types of political and ideological wars. At the end of the article, the author brings up all the Arab wars that happened and ended lately to say that they all stopped, so "what is the war still doing here? Why does war continue in our country?" His answer: "Ask 13 April, perhaps they didn't find another place for the Arab and Regional war" shows the extent to which Lebanon's war was framed as a battleground for Arab and regional wars, and the size of the involvement of Arab countries in it.

This article encompasses most of the civil and regional war frame elements found in Chapter 6 but refrains from mentioning some key elements. Thus, it is important to understand the context in which the article is published. 1990 was a pivotal year in the history of the war. Some consider it the last year of the war, while others consider it the first year of peace, The formers say that the Ta'if Agreement was signed in 1989, and that anything after the Ta'if should be considered postwar, while the latters claim that fighting continued until October 1990, and the postwar period started when Ta'if was implemented, not signed. In this study, 1990 is considered the first year of postwar, as noted earlier. However, this article reflects the second argument, as it considers that year (1990) as the 16th "birthday" of the war, and asserts that it is not over yet, and stresses the need to end it. In addition, there is no explicit mention of Syria as a major actor in the war. First, as *As-Safir* was considered pro-Syrian in that period of the war, it is understandable that no blame or clear connotation of Syria's involvement in the war is made. Added to that is the Syrian involvement in Lebanon in 1990, in what is considered the last battle of the war, when the Syrians launched an attack in Beirut. In 1990, the article does not explicitly include Syria in the civil and regional war frame, and instead opts to equally blame all Arab countries for the regional implications on the war in Lebanon.

Another article that adopts the same frame but reflects a different period was published in 2000 ***("As-Safir recalls the tragedy of the "Lebanese wars" after 25 years for its first scene. A series of alliances and mutual betrayals in the name of Sectarianism," As-Safir, 10 April 2000)***. The column, written by a prominent leftist writer Nasri al-Sayegh, and published in *As-Safir* on the anniversary of the war clearly considered the incident of Ain al-Remmeneh to be the first day of the war, and the battle that lunched what the author labeled "Lebanese wars." Despite what seems as a civil war frame, judging from the title alone, the article entails a regional frame as well. Not judging the article by its title, a closer reading and analysis reveal the underlying layers of the conflict. According to the author, *As-Safir* chooses to recall 13 April and the war in order to allow for a reflection on the past and a foresight for the future, "so that it [Lebanon] doesn't forget… and so that it [the war] doesn't get repeated." This quote reflects the intellectual discourse of the early 2000s, when the need to recall the war and publicly talk about it emerged with the slogan "Let it be remembered so it doesn't get repeated." The influx of discourse and remembrance witnessed in the 2000s was fostered by various initiatives by the media, intellectuals, and NGO initiatives, in order to revive the memory and reassess the war more than a decade after its end. This article comes in this context and presents an analysis of the war and hopes for the future. "13 April 1975 is the moment of explosion that reduced and hoarded the internal and regional factors of deadlock." With this sentence, the author starts his analysis of the causes of the war, putting it in the civil and regional war frame, a war that was "Lebanese-Lebanese, the wars of the Lebanese with the others, and the wars of the other with themselves… war of everyone against everyone." This parallels the column also published in *As-Safir* in 1989 analyzed above. The consistency of *As-Safir* in framing the war as a 'war of everyone against everyone' shows the extent to which the complexity of the war transcends the war and postwar barrier. This article also includes the Palestinians as actors in this frame, while victimizing everyone, both the Palestinians and the Lebanese, because "in a reading of the outcome of the war, everyone were victims." The author further notes that "everyone lost the war… because everyone got mixed up with who the real enemy was" as the Lebanese saw each other as enemies, and saw the Palestinians as enemies as well, and sought help from Syria, and other outside powers at different stages of the war. The thorough analysis the author makes enumerates the various local actors in the war, the LF and the LNM, the Conservative Right, the Christians, the PSP, Amal, and others, and analyzes how their fights intertwined and changed according to the period of the war. The main layer of the conflict is sectarian, according to this article's frame, and regional forces and their conflicts took part

in instigating the war, sponsoring it, and benefiting from it. The author goes as far as saying "and in some moments, no Arab country was free from involvement with this party or that, whether publicly or secretly." Thus, all Arab countries, for different reasons and motives, were involved in the war. Despite the sectarian layer, the author thinks that sectarianism was a pretext because the war went far beyond a fight between a sect and another and included intra-sectarian battles for political motives and interests. In a nutshell, "it is a war on the victims…war on the poor… war on the defeated since the 'bus' that didn't stop until Ta'if." The war is thus imposed on the victims, Lebanese and Palestinians, who were used as tools in this war that started on April 13th as the 'bus' reference notes and ended with the Ta'if Agreement in 1989. The author then asks dozens of questions of whether the war could happen again or not, analyzing the validity of the causes and their presence in the year 2000. The answer the author ends his article with is that "the Lebanese are torn between a war that ended… and one that could be repeated" suggesting taking the anniversary week to think of ways for the war not to be repeated.

This lengthy article that covered an exhaustive analysis of the war adopting a civil and regional war frame invited the Lebanese to consider another reading of the war, one that takes its causes into consideration, and its outcome as a lesson to be learned. The main message the author was promoting in this article was the need for a public discussion on the war, and a contemplation of ways to prevent another war from happening. Yet, the author seemed to be clear on what the causes were; civil and regional, and on the problematic victimizing the actors, both Lebanese and Palestinians.

In 2010, an article with a literary style, written by the editor-in-chief Talal Salman, and published in an inside page, adopted the civil and regional war frame quiet elaborately ***("Awaiting the sun of 14 April," As-Safir, 16 April 2010).*** In this article, Salman narrated the story of the war, starting with April 13th, 1975, recalling his own memories and the anecdotes he lived on that day. Labeling the war as a 'civil war,' the author explains how it was easy for the war to start in Lebanon, and soon enough the war turned into a global war "involving the countries of the world." The internal causes of the civil war, according to the author, are the ease with which the "parties turn into sects, regions into cantons... making the 'minorities' easily displaced by making them fear the majority... And so Palestine becomes an 'Islamic cause' and the Christians become enemies...while the real enemy remains Israel." In this argument, the Christians, Muslims, Palestinians and Israel are all agents playing different roles in the course of the war. The author, while recalling the

chronology of war, is self-assured that today (in 2010), and after all this time and distance from the war, things can be seen more clearly. What the author realizes, is that since the beginning, there was an "Arab-Israeli dimension to that [Palestinian-Christian] conflict and a position in the Arab-Israeli conflict." The war in Lebanon was never purely civil, according to this article. It was – from the beginning – a civil and regional war. The author continues to recall the events of the war, noting the involvement of Syria, and the "self-victimizing" of Christians while the sectarian aspect of the war remains dominant. A closer and calmer reading of the incident of April 13th unveils, according to the author, the naivety with which the Lebanese and Palestinians deal with the important events that will "be a turning point in the context of the Arab-Israeli war." The war in Lebanon is thus seen as larger than Lebanon. Contrary to the other civil and regional war frames, the war is seen as a planned battle in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Meaning, the war in Lebanon did not happen as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, nor factors and agents of the conflict got involved in Lebanon, but in fact the war was planned, by the Israelis and the parties they dragged with them in Lebanon, to be a deciding battle that will implicate the rest of the Arab world. The author also argues that the outcomes of the war showed that the "Israeli victory doesn't happen without an internal Arab defeat." The war on the Palestinians, portrayed here as a conspiracy, and the war in Lebanon in a more general sense, led to an "Arab civil war." The article ends by noting that forgetfulness is a "deadly political mistake," hoping that the sun of 14 April will shine one day. With this connotation to 14 April, the author wants to say that 13 April is still there, and in fact the past 35 years are all stuck in one day, April 13th. This long day that led to an Arab civil war as the author calls it, is ought to end one day, and peace must prevail. In this complex civil and regional war frame, the civil war in Lebanon plays a secondary role, for the larger regional Arab-Israeli war is the main battle. And for as long as the conflict with Israel exists, the war in Lebanon, and other Arab states, will continue to play out.

7.6 The Complex Civil, Regional, and Proxy War Frame

In addition to the two complex war frames analyzed above, qualitative analysis revealed the existence of a very comprehensive frame, reconstructed from postwar articles in *An-Nahar*. Despite it being missing from the content analysis findings, a complex civil, regional and proxy war frame was found when analyzing the data with a qualitative eye. This does not suggest that the quantitative analysis failed to provide satisfactory answers. To the contrary. It confirms the validity of the mixed-method approach this study adopted, and the need to

combine both quantitative and qualitative methods for more comprehensive findings. This frame was observed in the postwar period and was seen across various columns and editorials. Three articles are hereby analyzed in order to look at this frame, one editorial and two columns.

The first column adopting this comprehensive frame was written in 1992, during the early years of peace ***("For 14 April to start," An-Nahar, 14 April 1992)***. Georges Nassif, a prominent communist/socialist writer who worked in *As-Safir* during the war then moved to *An-Nahar* in the postwar period, seemed skeptical of whether peace has been achieved, just like Tueni was in an earlier 1991 article analyzed above. This consistent pattern of doubt across *An-Nahar* in the first few years following the Ta'if Agreement reflects the uncertainty in the press and among intellectuals of peace in the postwar period. Admitting that April 13th, 1975 was the first day of the war, the author is wondering whether 14 April will start, meaning whether the war will be actually over. This image of a long day of war that stretched for years was also mirrored in Talal Salman's 2010 article in *As-Safir* analyzed earlier. The author feels "that day [April 13th,1975] did not end entirely yet" despite the changes that took place over the 17 years, in actors and parties involved, as well as their connections and affiliations. According to the complex frame reflected in this article, the war is seen as a complex situation in which "the Lebanese contradictions and the viability of Lebanon to receive outside signals, as well as the outside's ability to employ those contradictions to their own benefit, stage by stage." The overlap of the civil, regional and proxy war dimensions in the frame can be summarized in the following quote "…the susceptibility of the Lebanese formula to crack at any major political crossword in the region, and the viability of the dominant movements in the Lebanese sectarian groups to be armed or political tools in the hands of outside powers…" Here, the internal causes of war, coupled with regional circumstances, and the interests of major world powers, created the war. According to this frame, the Palestinians and their presence in Lebanon were a cause for the war, but they stopped to be as their effect on the Lebanese course of events diminished. As for the internal ideological differences that constituted the internal causes of the war and were supposed to be dealt with in the Ta'if Agreement, they failed to be solved. In 1992, the author sees that the transitional period is fragile, and that peace – 14 April – will happen on two conditions: internal unity and stability that absorbs external interventions, and a belief among sectarian groups that external mobilization will lead nowhere. Accordingly, despite war being a

mixture of internal, regional and external elements, peace will only happen internally, and it is only when the Lebanese are united and strong that the war can effectively be over.

The two other articles adopting the complex civil, regional and proxy war frame were published in 2000. As shown in Chapter 5, the year 2000, and the early 2000s in general, witnessed a peak in publishing, as they were the years that witnessed the reviving of the war memory discourse, and public discussions about the war, especially in the media. The two articles are read in that context and reflect a certain framing of the war that *An-Nahar* wanted to present, as its two cents on the war memory discourse.

The first article was an editorial by Gebran Tueni published on April 13th, 2000 ***("So that this generation knows," An-Nahar, 13 April 2000).*** As the title suggests, the author addresses the new generation, narrating his own stories about the war. The title and style of the article are very similar to the article that had followed in 2004 and that was previously analyzed. The preaching style Tueni adopts in addressing the new generation about the war is quite noticeable, and he seems to be consistent in discussing the war in such a manner. Similarly to the article analyzed within the complex civil and regional war frame above, this article entails civil and regional causes of the war, all under the umbrella of a conspiracy. However, here, the proxy war dimension is added, and the influence of the Cold War is highlighted. In this frame, the war is seen as a "conspiracy against Lebanon" reduced to "giving an alternative country to the Palestinians" at the expanse of Christian presence in Lebanon. These "devilish plan" made the Muslims think that "the war is made by the Christians against them in defense of what was called the Christian privileges in Lebanon." As a result, this made the Palestinians impose themselves as the "Muslim army in Lebanon against 'Zionism' and 'reactionaries' and 'separatism until everyone fell for the conspiracy." This narration of the war blames first and foremost the Arab-Israeli conflict for the war, because if the Palestinians did not need a new country, there would not be any reason for the war in Lebanon. But along the local and regional actors and causes identified, the author adds the proxy dimension, by tying the war to the Cold War between the USSR and USA. In this Cold War "the Arabs were, as usual, captivated by slogans that were only shouted in Beirut." These slogans about the need to defy imperialism were echoed in Beirut, where the Palestinians became rulers "of half of Lebanon at least," benefiting from the internal socioeconomic weaknesses that made the Lebanese prone to manipulation. Lebanon is thus framed as a fertile ground for regional and international wars, and the Lebanese, mainly the

allies of the Palestinians (read leftists and Muslims) were manipulated. The other regional dimension added is an Arab one as, besides the Arab-Israeli conflict, the "Arabs were fighting over the leadership of the Middle East, and Lebanon was, as usual, the best of battlefields." Thus, Arab countries are also framed as important players in the war. This complex frame names the Israelis, Palestinians, Iraqis, Libyans, Syrians, Iranians, Americans, and Soviets, as warring parties against Lebanon. Lebanon is pictured as this tiny vulnerable country fighting alone against all those giants. This frame provokes Lebanese nationalist feelings, as it promotes Lebanon as this small yet strong country standing against a conspiracy to eliminate it. The article elaborates on this front further, and addresses the new generation, asking them not to squander "this country and the Lebanese identity, and not to slide into any internal wars or conflicts that only serve the enemies." The Lebanese nationalist tone present at the end of this article can be read as a reaction to attempts to present the war as a stupid and useless one by some intellectuals in that period. The complex war frame, incorporating civil, regional and proxy war elements comes to complement the conspiracy frame presented in this article.

The last article that mirrors this complex war frame was a column by journalist Ali Hamadeh, published in the same year ***("13," An-Nahar, 13 April 2000).*** According to this article's complex civil, regional and proxy war frame, the war is an explosion of various "ticking bombs: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Arab-Arab conflicts, US-Soviet rivalry, all in addition to the internal political and structural crisis Lebanon has suffered from and stayed without treatment since 1943." Including all the different frames of the war in one comprehensive frame, the article analyzes the causes for each of the "bombs" that led to the war. Despite the apparent fight between "a fraction of the Lebanese with the Palestinian riffle," the war had another internal facet, a "civil war…[in which] Lebanon was divided over the political formula and balances" and over its identity, its position in the Arab world and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author is referring here to the Palestinian role in the war and the Arab-Israeli conflict as regional factors, to the power-sharing formula that was established in 1943 and deemed inappropriate in the 1970s, and to the difference in perceptions among Christians and Muslims over the "Arab" identity of Lebanon. Despite admitting the validity of 'war of others on Lebanon' argument, the author defends his stance that the proxy factor was only aggravating the already-existing fertile ground of conflict. In the war, both the Lebanese and the Palestinians were victims of a war that destroyed Lebanon and the Palestinian cause altogether. What the author wants the reader, namely the new

generation addressed, to take from his article is a lesson learned: let 13 April be a rebirth. This preaching style is similar to that of Tueni in being apologetic about the past, and in addressing the new generation, urging them to learn from the past and change their present and future. The discourse surrounding the lessons learned from the past can be observed widely in *An-Nahar*, echoed in articles published during the early and mid 2000s, mostly associated with complex war frames, such as the civil and regional war frame, or the civil, regional and complex war frame reconstructed in this study.

The civil, regional and proxy war frame stands as a comprehensive war frame in postwar *An-Nahar*, lingering in some of the articles, and dominating a few others. The reason why it is observed only in *An-Nahar*, and is missing in *As-Safir*, is that *As-Safir*'s direct stance on the war, expressed by the two postwar frames, considered Palestine the central issue. The war in Lebanon was only a battle fought in this war, and despite the high price paid by the Lebanese, the Palestinian cause is worth it, according to *As-Safir*. Thus, if any external element is to be associated with the war, it will be so in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as a supporter of Israel, like the USA, or as a supporter of the leftist pro-Palestinian front, like the USSR. Besides that, including the proxy war layer in the framing of the war in Lebanon would be an unnecessary layer to an already charged conflict.

7.7 Discussion

This chapter addressed both the second and the third research questions of this study from a qualitative standpoint. In Chapter 6, the study quantitatively reconstructed the war frames of *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* during wartime and postwar. This chapter has taken these findings further, exploring the frames qualitatively by textually and contextually analyzing articles that echoed the reconstructed frames, in order to evaluate how the media and intellectuals played their role as memory agents in Lebanon.

In addition to the quantitatively reconstructed frames in Chapter 6, the qualitative analysis revealed the existence of a third frame in postwar *An-Nahar*, added to the two found earlier. This is not to be seen as a divergence in findings, but rather as empirical proof of how the two methods adopted in this study complement each other. The additional finding confirmed the validity of the mixed-method approach this study adopted, and the depth that qualitative analysis provides to quantitative findings.

The in-depth qualitative analysis in this chapter highlighted the findings of the content analysis, added further dimensions to the frames, and uncovered the existence of layers in every frame. Content analysis alone can generate many findings from the content of a

communicative unit. This study analyzed the content of Lebanese newspapers. Nonetheless, numbers alone can only describe a manifest content (Berelson, 1971). Therefore, an application of mixed quantitative and qualitative methods to reconstruct and interpret the content of opinion articles proved to be an appropriate approach to answer the second research question on how newspapers and intellectuals framed the war in Lebanon.

As Chapter 6 showed, the war in Lebanon was framed in various ways that differed according to the period and the newspaper. The findings in this chapter supported that and dug deeper to see if and how the newspapers framed the war in ways that correspond to their ideological stances. It also extended the analysis to the authors, by analyzing the frame in relation to the political profile of the author. By doing so, the analysis gave insights into what frames were promoted and by whom. This shed additional light on the scenarios promoted by intellectuals and newspapers, findings that help answer the third research question of this study on the role of the media and intellectuals in memory construction.

As this chapter also demonstrated, frames of war cannot be understood without context. The time of publishing, the newspaper, as well as the author/intellectual, all proved to play a very essential role in the understanding of the frame. Likewise, by understanding the frame, one can better understand its context and the period it reflects. In what follows, the findings of chapter 6 and 7 are incorporated together and interpreted on three levels: the period (wartime and postwar), the newspaper, and the intellectual. This discussion will provide further answers to the second research question on the press framing of the war and address the third research question on the role of the press and intellectuals in memory construction.

First, the findings in chapters 6 and 7 proved that frames change gradually over time (Goffman, 1981; Zald, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997), and that frames are dynamic (Van Gorp, 2007), as most of the frames found in this study experienced changes in their elements. The changes were seen when comparing wartime frames to postwar frames within the same newspaper, and also when taking a general look at the nature of wartime frames and postwar frames across both newspapers. And although the study did not notice any complete frame-shift, frames were proven to change significantly over the span of the two wartime and postwar periods. The dimensions the war frames took changed as the war itself changed, or as the distance from the war became greater. The diversity of wartime frames confirmed that nothing seemed to be certain during the war, and each battle introduced new actors and motives for the war. The nature of the frames reflected the ever-evolving conflict. The complexity of the multi-layered postwar frames established the role time plays in shaping

and changing frames. The civil war frame in *As-Safir*, for example, focused on the sectarian and socioeconomic factors, and reduced the conflict to a fight between a Muslim/leftist pro-Palestinian camp and a Christian/right/separatist camp during wartime, but shifted to victimize the Lebanese while holding them responsible at the same time, portraying the war as a tribal sectarian war, ridding it of its socioeconomic layer, and excluding the Palestinian pretext in postwar. The change in this frame highlights the appropriation of identity discourse in the postwar period, as internal causes of the war were considered crucial paradigms in the process of postwar identity construction. Another frame that changed over time was the regional and proxy war frame found in wartime and postwar *An-Nahar*. In wartime, the war was framed as an intersection between regional and internal conflicts, a war within a war, where Palestinians were not framed as a cause, but only as actors in a bigger regional conflict. In the postwar period, the civil and regional frame in *An-Nahar* tied regional peace to internal peace in 1991, blamed internal actors, both Christians and Muslims, for not defending Lebanon against regional interventions in 1995, and clearly incriminated the Palestinians (and Syrians) in the war, framing the war as a regional conspiracy to provide an alternative home to the Palestinians in 2000. The change in the tone of this frame regarding the Palestinians signifies two things: that internal causes, although viable, were less important than regional threats; and that the war was imposed on the Lebanese, despite their participation in it. This framing has implications for the present and the future more than the past (Zelizer, 1995; Blair, 2006). Remembering the war as such serves to advance certain political agendas. By blaming the Palestinians for the war, this frame acts as a call against their integration into Lebanese society, or their naturalization. By blaming the Syrians, this frame wants to pinpoint their responsibility in the war and link it to their continued presence in Lebanon (in 2000), implicitly calling for their withdrawal. Blaming the 'others' or the 'sectarian monster,' and the changes in attributes to the causes of the war over time, confirm the extent to which memory is fragmented in Lebanon, and show that the media did not necessarily play a constructive role when addressing such fragmentation.

Second, this chapter uncovered the fragmentation of the war narrative in the media, which reflects the fragmented press scene discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1). This chapter, built on the findings in Chapter 6, showed how frames changed according to the newspaper. Even when frames were attributed the same name, analysis in this chapter demonstrated how their elements and approaches changed depending on the newspaper. The civil war frame, for example, was interpreted differently in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, in

wartime and postwar. During the war, the range of frames reflected the political divisions and affiliations of each newspaper with one of the two fighting camps (Section 2.4.1.1). According to Kinder and Sanders (1990), frames are embedded in political discourse and unearthed by deciphering common themes, patterns or storylines which are inherently related to meaning. In addition, frames stem from political discourse and build on it at the same time. The findings in chapters 6 and 7 confirm this. *An-Nahar*, for the most part, echoed right-wing Christian Lebanese nationalist frames, while *As-Safir* resonated with leftist pan-Arab influenced frames. As the analysis showed, the only common wartime frame was the regional war frame. Despite being a common frame, each newspaper interpreted it differently, based on its political position. Although Chapter 6 revealed these findings, this chapter allowed for a deeper and more insightful understanding of the discursive representation of these frames. In *As-Safir*, the regional war frame vilified the USA-Israel axis, accused of a conspiracy against the Palestinian 'resistance,' but more importantly, was defensive towards Syria. It considered Syria a friend and saw its intervention in Lebanon as one being planned and masterminded by the USA. This de-vilifying was not adopted in the regional war frame of *An-Nahar*. What the qualitative analysis added to the understanding of the regional war frame in wartime *An-Nahar* is that the conspiracy against Lebanon was not portrayed strictly as a Palestinian one. It was rather Arab/international; a plot to involve the Palestinians in Lebanon. Another revelation is *An-Nahar*'s framing of the Syrian role; it can either mediate peace or stir the war. As discussed in Chapter 6, findings showed that the Lebanese were considered passive during the war, and victims in the postwar period. However, this chapter's in-depth analysis showed that they were also considered victims during the war, specifically in *An-Nahar*. Articles in *An-Nahar* denied the magnitude of the sectarian aspect and attributed more weight to the conflict between some Lebanese and the Palestinians, Israelis or Syrians. Even when the war was internal, the Lebanese were controlled by regional powers or the USA or the USSR. Lebanon, and the Lebanese, though involved, were thus victims in this war. The war was either a conspiracy against Lebanon, or a manifestation of the Cold War, where every superpower was involved for its own profit: The Americans were supporting Israel, and the Soviets were supporting Syria and the Palestinians. Lebanon was stuck in the middle, again a victim, without any power. What is common between all *An-Nahar* wartime frames, as this chapter found, was depicting the Lebanese as powerless, always controlled by external regional or international puppet masters. The depiction was different in *As-Safir*. In fact, in the civil war frame found in wartime *As-Safir*, the Lebanese were to blame. In this frame, the cause was an internal

reflection of a class war, in its Marxist definition, coupled with a sectarian aspect, as a result of both socioeconomic inequalities, and the failure of the power-sharing Muslim-Christian formula. Even when *As-Safir* blamed the outside in its proxy and regional war frame, not all Lebanese were considered victims. The 'separatists, or the Christian militias, were involved in this proxy and regional conspiracy against the Palestinian resistance and the LNM. The latter were thus the victims, and some Lebanese – the Christians – were guilty for collaborating with outside powers and superpowers against the other Lebanese.

In the postwar period, both newspapers shared the same frames, but exhibited differences in their interpretations. What both newspapers agreed on was the victimization of the Lebanese. In the postwar period, *An-Nahar* continued to consider all the Lebanese as victims but admitted that the war had a sectarian aspect. The regional powers' involvement was still considered the main catalyzer; however, the sectarian dimension was highlighted through the involvement of the different sectarian groups in the war to back the regional forces. It was as if the local actors, Christians or Muslims, got involved in support of a regional actor, or against one. In any case, the Lebanese were still the victims. The civil war frame that emerged in the postwar period hammered that point even more. The Lebanese, though victims, were still responsible, and the war was one that discriminated against no one; everyone was fighting, and the consequences were severe for all the Lebanese. In *As-Safir*, the civil and regional war frame that emerged after the war has put the war in Lebanon in the larger context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while admitting the existence of internal factors. As showed in this chapter, according to this frame, the war was purely sectarian and at the same time not at all. The sectarian aspect was used to fuel the regional powers' conflict, and everyone involved was a victim but also accountable. Similarly, the civil war frame victimized the Lebanese while maintaining the sectarian conflict dimension. What disappeared in this frame, as opposed to its comparable wartime frame, was the socioeconomic cause of the war. In the postwar version of the frame, there was no mention of a class-war, and the focus was solely on the sectarian aspect. Besides victimizing the Lebanese, what was common in the postwar frames across both newspapers was the doubt that the war has truly ended or will not be repeated, to say the least. At the same time, they insisted on the need to talk about the war for it not to be repeated. Both newspapers focused on the fragility of peace, and on considering the Ta'if Agreement a weak solution. At every major political turning point, as this chapter showed, the war and the Ta'if Agreement were reevaluated and re-analyzed. The civil, regional, and proxy war frame this chapter reconstructed allows for a new conclusion regarding *An-Nahar* frames; Lebanon was seen

as susceptible to sectarian conflict and the Lebanese were easily used as tools by outside powers.

This chapter also showed how framing the war in certain ways has implications for identity. Framing the war as a conspiracy against the Palestinians in *As-Safir*, for example, promotes pro-Palestinian feelings and gives the conflict a particular dimension, that of fighting for Palestine, against all the 'enemies.' By tying the regional to the local, this frame justifies the civil aspect of the war as an extension to the regional conspiracy on Palestine. Following this logic, it is accepted that the LNM or any other leftist or Muslim groups defend Palestine by fighting against the LF, who are part of the anti-Palestine axis. Framing the war in *An-Nahar* as a conspiracy against the Christian existence in Lebanon, or one that threatens the Lebanese existence, on the other hand, legitimizes Lebanese nationalist sensations and encourages the Christians to fight any local or regional fraction that wants to jeopardize Lebanon's Christian identity. This brings back the question on the peace journalism approach. Despite the complexity of the phases of the war and the warring fronts (Chapter 2 sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3), the press seems to have always reduced the war to a fight between two camps. By portraying the conflict as such, and justifying the fighting, the press took on a war journalism approach at times. By victimizing the Lebanese in the postwar period, and digging deep in the causes of the war, and calling for national dialogue, the press sought a peace journalism approach at other times. The findings also challenge what Barak (2007) argued regarding the civil society's stance against what he called an official state narrative, as media proved to replicate a discourse within the same lines of 'war of others' on Lebanon, embedded in a narrative of victimization. In summary, the findings reveal that the war was framed differently in *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*, and the frames reflected each newspaper's political orientation, mirroring the fragmented audiovisual media landscape (Nötzold, 2009) and reflecting the warring public "sphericules" (Kraidy, 2000, 2003) and the broader fragmented discourse around memory and identity.

Third, findings in this chapter revealed that newspapers mostly echoed frames constructed by intellectuals that belong to their same ideological camp, thus furthering the fragmentation of the discourse around the war. Looking into the framing of the war from the intellectuals' point of view, one must keep a few things in mind. First, some of those who were writing about the war were party members, politicians, and even militants. The likes of Joseph Samaha, Talal Salman, George Nassif, Nasri al-Sayegh, and Ghassan Tueni, all had clear positions on the war, stemming from their involvement in it, in one way or another. Accordingly, their opinions, as shown in this chapter, reflected their political stances and

involvement. Furthermore, in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, before the media and electronic media infiltration in Lebanon, the press still had its prestige and readership. Writing for the masses was a noble job for some, and a duty for others, and reading opinion articles in the newspapers was an elitist activity. Writing was another form of political involvement. Even in the postwar period, the press was considered a main reference on matters of public opinion, and a main outlet for discussions on the memory of the war, as argued earlier. The writers featured in this chapter reflected different frames of the war. As argued earlier, each newspaper embedded the frames in its larger ideological narrative in what corresponds to its political position and the needs of the present. A look at the names of authors of articles and their backgrounds, as this chapter showed, leads to a clear understanding of the political orientation of intellectuals and writers promoted by each newspaper. *As-Safir* mostly featured leftist intellectuals, such as Houssam Itani, Joseph Samaha, and Nasri Al-Sayegh, while *An-Nahar* introduced Christian writers such as Ghassan Tueni, Sarkis Naoum and Gebran Tueni, who were mostly editors as the findings in Chapter 5 showed. Thus, the intellectuals' framing of the war was present only in newspapers that correspond to their political ideology. This study proves what Abou Assi (2011) argued regarding the intellectuals' replication of the narratives of their groups' identity, and challenges Haugbolle's (2002, 2010) claim that intellectuals and cultural elites acted as a homogenous "choir singing a narrative," as it demonstrated they mirrored political and media fragmentation and polarization. The task that Lang (2016) attributed to intellectuals in the form of "underground historians" through their journalistic writing, turned out to be a task that further fragments discourse, instead of promoting a comprehensive and unified approach to memory.

As the literature suggests, media can either act as a warring front or provide a space for mediating peace. As this chapter showed, the press, by echoing certain frames and ignoring others, acted as another battleground for conflict. Media framing of the war, as proven by this study, has the potential of stirring tensions and lead to further fragmentation in a post-conflict society. The way frames emerged during the war, merged into complex frames at later stages, and slightly shifted to others in the postwar period, leads to the following conclusion: the framing of the war followed a course similar to that of the war itself.

The only common understanding among newspapers and intellectuals, as this study showed, was that the war, despite taking different facets and frames varying across time and outlet, was an ugly chapter in the history of Lebanon. The role of the press and intellectuals

in addressing this ugly chapter, extracting lessons from it, facilitating national identity reconstruction, and allowing the various narratives of the past to co-exist in a collective memory, proved to be a challenge in the fragmented media and political Lebanese context.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The interplay between the media, memory and identity in post-conflict societies has been a research topic of interest for a while in various academic fields. The way nations think about their past, process previous atrocities, and come to terms with a traumatic past can predict the way they handle their future. During and after conflict, individuals both construct and adopt certain memories of a lived trauma. They construct memory by feeding the collective mind their own encounters and experiences and adopt the memory of the group when their own experiences do not suffice to create their own understanding of the past. This two-way relationship enriches the process of societal memory construction and helps both individuals and societies heal. With time, memory keeps getting redefined according to the circumstances and players involved in its shaping. The same applies to identity. Both are constantly redesigned, and most importantly, they both look into the present and future as much as they look into the past. In fact, the past is often remembered and commemorated for the sake of the present; to heal societies and help them learn lessons, in order to maintain peace and survival. In all that, the role of the media is believed to be crucial in catalyzing societies' healing and promoting peace, while allowing various war memories and narratives to coexist, without having one discourse dominate or marginalize others.

This study's key concern, outlined in Chapter 1, was the interplay between media and memory in Lebanon. It followed an approach of longitudinal analysis of mediated memory. By reconstructing the frames of the war as promoted in the press and by intellectuals, this study paved the way for a better understanding of the role and agency of these actors in memory reconstruction in the country. Thus, the study humbly contributes to an emerging body of knowledge on the role of social agents in memory construction, in which post-conflict fragmented societies like Lebanon are not meticulously addressed. The findings in chapters 5, 6 and 7 have thoroughly expanded on the findings and responded to the three research questions outlined in Chapter 3: (1) How did *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* approach the discourse of the war in wartime and postwar? (2) How was the war framed by *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* in wartime and postwar? And (3) How did the media and intellectuals play their role as memory agents in Lebanon? This concluding chapter recapitulates the findings that were extensively addressed in the discussion subchapter in all three findings chapters, while

considering their implications for theory and practice for future studies in the same field. Lastly, it addresses the main limitations of this study and recommends future areas of research.

8.1 Theoretical Implications

Although the field of memory studies is rich in theories and conceptualizations on memory, as discussed in Chapter 3, very few studies have attempted to understand mediated and cultural memory in post-conflict contexts and the role of the media in the process (Edy, 1999; Zelizer, 2008; Laplante & Phenicie, 2009). The findings generated by this study have implications for the understanding of the media role in memory construction in a fragmented post-conflict society and contribute to the ongoing discussions regarding the dynamics and processes of memory formation in the field of media memory.

This study proved that constructing the memory of the war is a long and complex process. In Lebanon, due to the absence of an official narrative of the war, a unified historical textbook, or even an official day for remembrance, the media and intellectuals chose to publicly commemorate the war on the 13th of April of every year while raising questions about what could be done for the present and future. Year after year, and depending on the political situation in the country, intellectuals wrote about the miseries of the war, and fears of a new war. Occasionally, the anniversary acted as a reality check, making intellectuals truly wonder whether the war was over. Whatever was at stake in April of every year, intellectuals would take it as an opportunity to recall the past and compare it to the present, commenting on the status-quo or reflecting on the future. The war, as a recurring theme the press around April 13th, was a central issue for the Lebanese media and intellectuals. This study contributes to a better understanding of the centrality of memory discourse around anniversaries of traumatic events in a nation's history. On the war's anniversary, the media revived a discussion around the war and provided intellectuals with a framework to conduct their memory work. By reclaiming the public sphere in a postwar setting, struggling to maintain a fragile peace amidst state-imposed memory policies and societal shell-shock trauma, the media and intellectuals proved their ability to push the memory discourse to the fore and break the silence around the past. Anniversary journalism (Zelizer, 2008) offered an opportunity to challenge the existing dominant approach to the war memory discourse. Over time, however, anniversaries became a reminder not only of the traumatizing past, but also of the unsatisfying present and uncertain future. By recalling the past, the media intended to encourage a discussion around present dilemmas, one of which was the

disagreement around the country's past. The public discussion of trauma is indeed the first step towards national healing. The findings of this study show the importance of studying the media and cultural production around anniversary years in the context of memory construction, and the necessity of addressing these dates as crucial moments in both memory and identity reconstruction in post-conflict societies and observing the nature of the emerging relevant discourse.

This study also touched upon the concept of peace journalism (Galtung, 1998) and suggested a new approach to adapting this theory to opinion journalism. Thus far, previous studies have focused on analyzing news coverage of conflicts using Galtung's approach (Lee & Maslog, 2005; Maslog, Lee & Kim, 2006; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Nicolas, 2012; Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; Neumann & Fahmy, 2016). This study adapted the peace journalism paradigm and evaluated the approaches opinion journalism adopted while dealing with memory discourse and generated comparable results. By appropriating the peace journalism paradigm into opinion journalism, this study shed light on the applicability of the concept to non-news types of media production. This study argued any genre of media production can be the focus of a study that takes peace journalism as its normative approach. In the context of war, any information or knowledge generated by any form in the media contributes either to the extension of the conflict or the mediation of its end. Also, by extending its corpus to wartime and postwar media production, this study bridged the theoretical gap between the two, allowing a more comprehensive understanding of the role the media play not only during conflict but also after it. This study thus calls for pushing the limits in studies on media in times of conflict and combining both wartime and postwar in a comparative approach for deeper understanding of the function of the media, guided by the peace journalism paradigm, memory construction framework or any other related theoretical grounding.

The findings of this study regarding the changes in frames guide the discussion on memory construction and the role the media, and by extension intellectuals, play in the process. This study proves that memory is fluid and flexible (Halbwachs, 1992) and that it constantly changes according to circumstantial and contextual needs. This study also argues that memory is formed largely in the present, and that it often serves the present's interest (Zelizer, 1995; Blair, 2006), regardless of its conformity to reality (Halbwachs, 1992). Framing the war in a given moment, as this study showed, reflects the present. In wartime, frames reflected the specifics of the war, and in postwar, those same frames were molded and adjusted in response to present needs. Even more, this study confirms that the press, by

adjusting its frames in the present to accommodate present and future needs, served as an agent of prospective memory (Lang & Lang, 1989; Adam, 2004; Welzer, 2010a, 2010b; Schmidt, 2010; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2011; Neiger et. al, 2011). Recalling the past and framing it to help further a political cause allows memory to act as an illustration for the future.

The summary and discussion of the findings regarding the different ways the press framed the war guide the assessment of the role of the Lebanese media in memory construction (RQ3). As argued in Chapter 3, the media are generators of memory (Reinhardt & Jäckel, 2005, pp.96-101) and agents in the interrelation between mediated memory and national identity-building (Kitch, 2002, 2005; Harro-Loit & Kõresaar, 2010). This study shows that their crucial role in the selection or construction process of collective memory has been reduced to "authoritative storytellers" (Zelizer, 1992), projecting only the narratives that match their political positions and avoiding any narratives that contest their own standpoints. The Lebanese media, as narrators of the past, have somewhat failed to construct a compromised reality (Schulz, 1990) of the past and have not entirely acted as a public arena in which various past narratives coexist (Neiger et al., 2011). Instead, they acted as political players, both during wartime and the postwar period, anchoring their war frames in their a priori ideologies, instead of mediating conflicting views and representations. By doing so, they also failed to serve as a forum for the construction of a post-conflict national identity (Wassermann, 2006). By framing the war in competing narratives around the anniversary of the war, the press in Lebanon did not provide a sphere for identity negotiation. Instead, they recycled and reproduced the same identity discussions and same narratives that remained mostly within what each outlet identifies with. Every intellectual projected its own group identity, which mostly matched that of the newspaper, and built narratives that correspond with what the audience of that newspaper most likely wants to read. As argued, anniversaries are essential in creating and fostering the cultural memory of a nation (Assmann, 1999), and serving as a framework within which national identity is reproduced, challenged, reexamined and reconstructed (Kitch, 2002; Zerubavel, 2003; Edensor, 2006; Harro-loit and Kõresaar, 2010). As this study shows, each media outlet adopted frames that fit within their identification of who the 'us' and the 'them' are, reinforcing group identities instead of promoting a channeling of a national identity (Laclau, 2005). Even in the postwar period, when the press had a somewhat closer understanding of the past, and seemed to be interested in mediating identity reconstruction, it encouraged further identity fragmentation, either by victimizing all the Lebanese and vilifying all the 'outside' forces, or by shallowly

blaming the warlords and victimizing the rest of the population without any clear stance on the need for a transitional justice that allows healing and national identity reconstruction. Instead of focusing on "who we might become" as a nation, the press centered the memory discourse around "where we came from" and "who we are," in Hall's terms (1996), thus hampering the process of postwar identity formation.

Reading the findings of this study in light of the polarized political and media landscapes laid out in Chapter 2, one can ask: What is expected from partisan and monopolized media, anyway? And what considerations should be taken into account when studying similar cases? First, in a post-conflict setting, regardless of how polarized and immersed in differences it is, the media should act as mediators and facilitators of peacebuilding. No doubt, financial dependence and clientelism plague the Lebanese media, but the press in particular could have benefited from a margin of freedom to act in a constructivist manner, as in the case of South Africa. Allowing different opinions to be voiced and the often-conflicting narratives to coexist does not necessarily mean adopting a specific viewpoint. After all, this is the function of opinion journalism; to allow even the opposing opinion to present itself. What the press did, as this study shows, was using its op-eds, as much as its editorials and columns, to further its own political cause, excluding the 'other' outlook. Second, what this study stresses in the case of applying the same approach to other similar settings, is the need to take into consideration the context within which the discourse is shaped and the media function. The context in this study implied certain restrictions at times and allowed for a deeper understating of the results at other times.

Arguing its findings against the theoretical grounding of the role of intellectuals established in Chapter 3, this study finds that Lebanese intellectuals did not question dominant narratives nor present alternative perspectives on history (Said, 2002). What they did, instead, was replicating the same narratives and reinforcing the dominant ones, furthering memory fragmentation. As intellectuals took refuge in the newspaper that embodied their *iltizam*, or political commitment, they addressed the past from their own ideological repertoire without any filtering, thus serving their political schemata. Despite their calls for national unity, the re-reading of the past, and the need to publicly discuss memory, they proved to recycle the same war narratives. The findings of this study prompt a re-thinking of the role of intellectuals. What this study suggests, is re-defining the understanding of the role of intellectuals in a given society and reconsidering the channels through which they play their role. As the intellectual discussion moves towards announcing the "death of the public intellectual," in the modern world, this study suggests a re-birth of

the intellectual. This re-birth is necessary in the fragmented Lebanese context, where intellectuals could potentially play a constructivist and positive role in memory construction. This re-birth, however, has to come through a different channel. With the decline of newspapers in Lebanon, as in the rest of the world, and the closing of none other than *As-Safir*, and the more-or-less survival of *An-Nahar*, intellectuals must move towards the digital public sphere (Dahlgren, 2012). In fact, much of the discussion around the memory of the war has been recently taking place in blogs and social networking sites (SNSs). This is where intellectuals can liberate themselves from editorial constraints, if they were under any, and utilize the internet, despite its pitfalls, to address the past. The potential for their work is indeed great, as the postmemory generation is already taking part in different commemorative activities[8] online. There, they can carry conversations with the new generation and partake in memory and identity reconstruction. It is when the intellectuals reclaim their role in challenging the dominant narratives and mediating the co-existence of varied narratives that the true memory reconciliation process begins.

8.2 Challenges and Limitations

The study faced many challenges and unavoidable limitations, specifically at the methodological level. Framing, as a new methodological concept, was challenging to work with, especially when it comes to defining how to employ the understanding of framing in a case study. Also, adopting a mixed-method approach could be seen as though one approach was not scientific or comprehensible enough. What this study did is the exact opposite. By adopting the two-method approach this study showed that each method alone does in fact lead to scientific results but mixing the two will give a deeper understanding of the data and findings. The operationalization of the mixed-method approach is a humble methodological contribution of this study to the field of framing analysis.

There were also challenges specific to the case of Lebanon. Acquiring data proved to be more challenging than expected, especially given the lack of a central archive for newspapers in Lebanon. The most challenging part was in fact the codebook. As this study is original in its approach of using framing analysis on a corpus that expands over time, and deals with two different time periods, wartime and postwar Lebanon, it was tough to write a

[8] Over the recent years, SNSs such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook, in addition to blogs, have become platforms for commemorative practices around the anniversary of the war. Many pages on Twitter and Instagram share photos, videos, and old newspaper clippings, and discuss the war around the anniversary.

comprehensive codebook that does not overlook any aspect of the war. In addition, translating terms and excerpts from articles was perplexing, as language can sometimes be very specific to a context and hard to translate. All these challenges taken into consideration, this study strives to be complete and provide satisfactory findings.

As in every research, this study has potential methodological limitations. The first limitation is the reliance on a single coder. Although the validity and reliability tests were satisfying, the presence of more than one coder would have given even more credibility. Also, only two newspapers were analyzed. And although they reflect two main political stances on the spectrum of Lebanese public opinion, other opinions and frames can be found in other publications or media. In addition, this study's results are not to be regarded as contradictory with any claim that *An-Nahar* acted as a haven for leftist intellectuals in the postwar period[9]. As established earlier, *An-Nahar*'s cultural supplement, *al-mulhaq*, might have served this function. However, as this study shows, *An-Nahar'*s main editorial and op-ed space, similar to that of *As-Safir*, was utilized by intellectuals that belonged to their own camp. That been said, although the results generated by this study cannot be generalized as to what the discourse around the war in Lebanon has been in the media, they contribute to a better understanding of the discourse in the press. As explained, this study takes opinion articles within a certain timeframe, and the findings are representative of the data they stem from. It is thus important to note, given the challenges and limitations, that although the results generated here are not to be generalized, they establish a starting point for further studies in this field, and leave questions for investigation, whether in the Lebanese context or any other similar context.

8.3 Areas for Future Research

The findings of this study suggest the need to conduct further research on the interplay between memory, the media and discourse in war and postwar Lebanon. In addition, they could provide a good starting point for discussion and further research in other contexts.

Four potential areas of research are therefore recommended to guide future investigations on the topic.

[9] See: Saghieh, K. (2019). 1990s Beirut: Al-Mulhaq, memory, and the defeat. (S. Wilder, Trans.). *E-flux Journal, 97*. Retrieved from https://www.e-flux.com/journal/97/250527/1990s-beirut-al-mulhaq-memory-and-the-d

First, future studies could fruitfully explore the issue this study focused on further by extending the corpus. This could be done taking three different approaches; by incorporating the cultural supplement of *An-Nahar*, *al-mulhaq*, in order to examine the discourse of writers and artists who opted to publish there instead of the main newspaper issue; by de-centralizing the focus off the anniversary of the war, and including articles from all year long to explore whether the discourse exists beyond this event; or by including other publications, like the official party and militia newsletters and newspapers during wartime, like *Al-Aamal* of the Phalange or *AlAanba'a* of the PSP, investigating the nuances in the frames, or even by incorporating other dailies, like *Al-Akhbar* in the postwar period. Examining *Al-Akhbar* is interesting, as this newspaper that started publishing in 2006 was initially established as a leftist newspaper. It would be interesting to compare *As-Safir*'s narrative to that of *Al-Akhbar*, for example. Nonetheless, these suggestions hold a potential challenge. As this study mentioned, access to archives in Lebanon is likely to be a difficult task, and it takes a long time not only to get hold of the archives of wartime for example, but also to look into them, as they are not entirely digitized. Thus, the pre-analysis phase in any similar research will require an enormous amount of archive digging and reading, as was the case of this study, before deciding on the corpus or the focus.

Second, future studies could build on this study's codebook and findings to explore what actually exists in the collective mind from the reconstructed frames. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this study focused on the frame-building process, and was not interested in examining frame effects. An interesting area of study could potentially look for those frames in audiences, by conducting surveys or interviews with individuals from the war generation and postwar generations, from different confessional groups and political orientations to see which frames resonate with them.

Third, as this study suggested that intellectuals should move towards the online sphere, future research could be devoted to observing the commemorative practices taking place on the internet, in online alternative media, specifically in blogs and SNSs. Around the anniversary of the war, political and social activists, predominantly those belonging to the postmemory generation, are engaged in discussions, share photos or videos, and write about the war. It would be stimulating to look into the different discourses projected and the discussions taking place online.

Lastly, this study could guide future research in other contexts. As noted earlier, there is a gap in knowledge about the interplay between memory and the media in conflicts outside the 'west,' specifically in the Arab world. Future research could possibly look into the

ongoing wars in Syria or Libya, for example, and examine how memory is being shaped momentarily by different social and media agents. Further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in contexts similar to Lebanon, where memory and identity are constantly contested, and where wars seem to never end.

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APPENDIX I

Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse / Summary of the Results

Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse

Diese Studie verfolgt das Framing des libanesischen Kriegs durch Medien und Intellektuelle sowohl während des Kriegs als auch in der Nachkriegszeit. Sie zielt darauf ab, das Zusammenspiel von Medien und Erinnerung in einem Nachkriegskontext zu beleuchten, indem sie die Rolle und Agency sowohl der Medien als auch der Intellektuellen bei der Konstruktion von Erinnerung untersucht. Dabei werden 202 Meinungsartikel analysiert, die in zwei lokalen Zeitungen mit gegensätzlichen Standpunkten während des inoffiziellen jährlichen Gedenkens an den Krieg zwischen 1976 und 2013 veröffentlicht wurden. Die Studie basiert auf dem theoretischen Ansatz, dass die Medien die Narrative des dominanten Konflikts offenbaren und kollektive Erinnerung konstruieren. Die Komplexität des Krieges im Libanon manifestiert sich in einem ebenso komplexen Überfluss an Meta-Frames über den Krieg. Diese Arbeit wirft Fragen über die Natur der Kriegsnarrative im öffentlichen Raum auf, im Speziellen im Kontext eines facettenreichen Krieges. Sie hinterfragt darüber hinaus die Rolle von sowohl Medien als auch Intellektuellen in der Konstruktion und Prägung von kollektiver Erinnerung und nationaler Identität in einer Nachkriegsgesellschaft. Die drei Forschungsfragen, die in dieser Arbeit gestellt werden, lauten: (1) Wie näherten sich *An-Nahar* und *As-Safir* dem Diskurs über den Krieg während der Kriegszeit und in der Nachkriegszeit? (2) Wie wurde der Krieg durch *An-Nahar* und *As-Safir* in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit geframed? Und (3) Wie übten die Medien und Intellektuellen ihre Rolle als Agenten der Erinnerung im Libanon aus?

Um diese drei Fragen zu beantworten wendet die Studie die Framinganalyse an und wählt einen Mixed-Method-Ansatz: einen quantitativen Ansatz von Inhalts- und Framinganalyse um die ersten beiden Forschungsfragen zu beantworten, und einen qualitativen Ansatz der Textanalyse um die zweite Forschungsfrage anzureichern und die dritte zu beantworten.

Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der ersten Forschungsfrage beleuchten die verschiedenen Ansätze, die *An-Nahar* und *As-Safir* in ihrer Herangehensweise an den Diskurs über den Krieg sowohl in der Kriegs- als auch in der Nachkriegszeit anwandten. Trotz der aktiven Rolle, die sie bei der Adressierung des Krieges und seiner Erinnerung rund um seinen Jahrestag spielten, betrachteten die beiden Zeitungen den Diskurs von unterschiedlichen

Standpunkten aus. Während des Kriegs nutzte *An-Nahar* überwiegend Leitartikel, während *As-Safir* Einblicke aus Gastkommentaren priorisierte. In der Nachkriegszeit gewichteten beide Zeitungen Gastbeiträge stärker, wodurch sie ihre redaktionelle Kontrolle reduzierten. Die Untersuchung von Hoch- und Tiefpunkten in den Veröffentlichungen über die Jahre reflektiert die sich verändernden politischen Umstände und die Haltung der Presse gegenüber dem Krieg und dem entsprechenden Diskurs. Grundsätzlich demonstrierten beide Zeitungen Tendenzen zu Friedensjournalismus während des Krieges, da ihre umfangreichen Veröffentlichungen sich auf Vorschläge zu Konfliktlösungsstrategien konzentrierten.

In der Nachkriegszeit reflektieren Tiefpunkte in der Berichterstattung die Tatsache, dass die Presse sich in den frühen Jahren des fragilen Friedens an die staatlich verordnete Amnesie zum Krieg hielt, sowie die Kriegsneurose der Gesellschaft und den Zustand zwischen Krieg und nicht-Krieg mit seinen neuen Gegebenheiten. Bald darauf, in den frühen 2000ern, spiegeln Höchststände die Auseinandersetzung der Presse mit dem „intellektuellen Wiedererwachen" gegenüber der Notwendigkeit wider, das öffentliche Schweigen um den Krieg zu brechen, sowie die Bereitschaft der Gesellschaft, sich mit ihrer brutalen Vergangenheit auseinanderzusetzen, ihre Frustration mit dem Status Quo und ihre Ängste, verursacht durch das sporadische Wiederausbrechen des Konflikts.

Die quantitativ rekonstruierten Frames des Krieges interpretieren ihn selten als ein einfaches Ereignis. Trotz der unterschiedlichen Positionen, die beide Zeitungen gegenüber dem Krieg in beiden Zeiträumen haben, sickern immer verschiedene lokale, regionale und internationale Ebenen in die einfachen und komplexen Frames ein. Einfache Frames beschreiben den Krieg als einen Bürgerkrieg, einen regionalen Krieg oder einen Stellvertreterkrieg; während komplexe Frames zwei oder mehr dieser Dimensionen einschließen. *An-Nahar* framet den Konflikt überwiegend als einen „Krieg der Anderen" auf libanesischem Boden und vertritt christliche, rechtslehnende Verschwörungstheorien über eine palästinensische Gefahr für die historische, wundersame Existenz des Libanon. *As-Safir*, auf der anderen Seite, projiziert ein linkes Verständnis des Kriegs als Klassenkampf, befeuert von Konfessionalismus, und ein pan-arabisches, pro-palästinensisches muslimisches Szenario einer israelisch-amerikanischen Verschwörung gegen den palästinensischen „Widerstand" und seine Einnistung im Libanon. Trotz einiger Hinweise auf Friedensjournalismus zeigen beide Zeitungen Tendenzen zum Kriegsjournalismus dadurch, dass sie grundsätzlich eine Dichotomie zwischen den sich bekriegenden Fronten beschreiben und die Komplexität des Konflikts zu einer Auseinandersetzung zwischen zwei ethno-nationalen Gruppen reduzieren.

Die qualitative Analyse einer Fallauswahl von 20 Artikeln, die die rekonstruierten Frames repräsentieren, fördert zusätzliche Narrativebenen zutage, die die Komplexität der Frames weiter beleuchten. Darüber hinaus offenbart sie einen zusätzlichen Frame bei *An-Nahar* und entwirrt die Liaison zwischen den Zeitungen und den Intellektuellen. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse unterstreichen die Veränderungen der Frames im Laufe der Zeit je nach den Notwendigkeiten der Umstände und der politischen Wechselwirkungen. Insbesondere die Zuweisung von Schuld stellt ein umstrittenes Thema über die Zeit hinweg und bei allen Medien dar, das sich zwischen der Darstellung der Libanes*innen als Opfer, der Verteuflung von einigen unter ihnen und der Externalisierung von Verantwortung an externe Mächte bewegt. Identität ist ein ebenso umstrittenes Thema, da die Zeitungen den Krieg einsetzen, um ihre eigene Gruppenidentität zu stärken. Das wird auch darin deutlich, dass die Intellektuellen, die ihre Meinung in der Presse zum Ausdruck bringen durften, zu den jeweiligen ideologischen Camps der Zeitungen gehörten. In einer fragmentierten Medienlandschaft, die die Intellektuellen darin bestärkte ihre eigenen ideologischen Standpunkte zu recyceln und die Bildung einer kollektiven Erinnerung sowie die Rekonstruktion von Identität in einem volatilen Nachkriegsmilieu verhinderte, war die „andere“ Stimme abwesend.

Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie fordern ein Überdenken der Rolle von Medien und Intellektuellen in Kriegszeiten und Zeiten des Peacebuilding. Sie trägt zu den laufenden akademischen Debatten im Bereich Medien und der Konstruktion von Erinnerung bei.

Summary of the Results

This study traces the media and intellectuals' framing of Lebanon's war during wartime and postwar. It aims to illuminate the interplay of media and memory in a post-conflict context by investigating the role and agency of both media and intellectuals in memory construction. It examines 202 opinion articles published in two local newspapers with opposing viewpoints during the unofficial annual commemoration of the war from 1976 to 2013. It is grounded in the theoretical approach that the media reveal the narratives of the dominant conflict and construct collective memory. The complexity of the war in Lebanon materialized in an equally complex surfeit of meta-frames about the war. This study raises questions about the nature of the narratives of the war in the public sphere, in the specific context of a multifaceted war. It also questions the role of both media and intellectuals in constructing and shaping collective memory and national identity in a post-conflict society. The three research questions this study poses are: (1) How did *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir*

approach the discourse of the war in wartime and postwar? (2) How was the war framed by *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* in wartime and postwar? And (3) How did the media and intellectuals play their role as memory agents in Lebanon? To answer these questions, the study employed framing analysis and adopted a mixed-methods approach: a quantitative approach of content and frame analysis to answer the first two research questions, and a qualitative approach of textual analysis to add depth to the second research question and respond to the third research question.

Findings in regard to the first research question illustrate the varying approaches *An-Nahar* and *As-Safir* took in addressing the discourse of the war both in wartime and postwar. Despite their active partaking in addressing the war and its memory around its anniversary, each newspaper tackled the discourse from a different standpoint. In wartime, An-Nahar conveyed its editorial voice, while As-Safir prioritized op-ed insights. In postwar, both newspapers gave more weight to guest contributors, thus reducing their editorial control. The study of peak and drop points in publishing throughout the years reflected the changing political circumstances and the press attitudes towards the war and its discourse. In general, both newspapers showcased peace journalism tendencies in wartime as their extensive publishing focused on suggesting conflict-resolution strategies. In postwar, drop points reflected the adherence of the press to the state-sponsored amnesia towards the war in the early years of fragile peace, the shell-shock trauma society was facing, and the no-war-no-peace state with its newly imposed realties. Soon after, in the early 2000s, peak points mirrored the press's engagement in the 'intellectual awakening' to the necessity of breaking the public silence around the war, society's readiness to deal with the brutal past, its frustration with the political status quo, and its fears amid the sporadic re-emergence of conflict.

The quantitatively-reconstructed frames of the war seldom interpreted it as a simple occurrence. Despite the differences in each newspaper's stance on the war in the two periods, various local, regional and international layers always seeped into simple and complex frames. Simple frames described the war as a civil war, a regional war, or a proxy war, and complex frames encompassed two or more of these dimensions. An-Nahar, for the most part, framed the conflict as a 'war of others' on the Lebanese land and echoed Christian right-wing sympathetic conspiracy theories of a Palestinian threat to the historical Lebanese miraculous existence. As-Safir, on the other hand, reflected a left-wing understanding of the war as a class-struggle fueled by sectarianism, and a pan-Arab/pro-Palestinian Muslim scenario of an Israeli/American conspiracy against the Palestinian 'resistance' and its

Lebanese nestle. In spite of evidence supporting peace journalism tendencies, both newspapers revealed war journalism tendencies by always showcasing a dichotomy of warring fronts and reducing the complex conflict into a brawl between two ethno-national groups.

The qualitative analysis of a sample of 20 articles reflective of the reconstructed frames uncovered layers of narrative that shed additional light on the complexities of the frames, revealed the existence of an additional frame in An-Nahar, and untangled the liaisons between the newspapers and the intellectuals. Findings underlined the changing nature of frames over time according to circumstantial needs and political interchanges. Over time and across outlets, the attribution of blame, in particular, proved to be a contested issue between victimizing the Lebanese, vilifying some of them, and externalizing the responsibility to outside powers. Identity too was disputed, as each outlet summoned up the war to reinforce its own group identity. This was reflected in the belonging of the intellectuals featured in the press to the same ideological camp of the respective outlets. The 'other' voice was absent in a fragmented media landscape that fostered the intellectuals' recycling of their own ideological standpoints and hindered collective memory and identity reconstruction in a volatile post-conflict milieu.

The findings of this study prompt a re-thinking of the role of the media and intellectuals in wartime and peacebuilding and contribute to the ongoing academic debates within the framework of media and memory construction.

APPENDIX II

Codebook

Date of coverage under study: 8-17 April 1976-2013

Universe of study: Opinion articles on '13th of April' or 'the war'

Operational definition of '13th of April' and 'the war': Articles that are primarily concerned with the '13th of April' anniversary or 'the war' in a more general sense as judged by mention of the word '13 April' or 'War' in the headline or body text.

B Background:

B1 Newspaper: Assign each article to a newspaper as follows:

100=An-Nahar 200=As-Safir

B2 Title: Insert the title of the Article (translated into English)

B3 Date in day: Insert the one or two-digit day code: Ex. 13, 14, 15…

B4 Date in month: Insert the one-digit month code: Ex. 4 (April)

B5 Date in year: Ex. 1976, 1990, 2002…

B6 Page: Insert the page one or two-digit number

B7 Genre: Define the genre of the article as follows:

1= Editorial 2= Column 3=Op-ed

B8 Author: Define the author of the article:

1= Editor 2=Regular writer 3=Guest writer

B9 Name of the author: Insert the name of the author as follows:

1	A. E.	37	Ghazi Al Aridi	73	Mohammad Hassan AL Amine
2	Aaref El Abed	38	Gregoire Haddad	74	Mohammad Ibrahim Chamseddine
3	Abbas Baydoun	39	Hassan El Sabea	75	Mohammad Machmouchi
4	Abdallah Saade	40	Hassan Fakhr	76	Mohyi Eddine Chehab
5	Abdel Rauf Sinno	41	Hassan Saab	77	Mostafa Karkouti
6	Adel Hamieh	42	Hayat Abou Fadel	78	Nabil Bou Monsef
7	Adel Malek	43	Hazem Saghieh	79	Nasri Sayegh
8	Adnan Kassar	44	Hisham Melhem	80	Nassib Lahoud
9	Ahmad Ayash	45	Houssam Itani	81	Nawaf Salam
10	Ahmad Bahaeddine	46	Hussein Charif	82	Oussama Makdissi
11	Ahmad Bzoun	47	Hussein El Qoutli	83	Pascale Frangieh
12	Ahmad Jaber	48	Ibrahim Haydar	84	Rachid El Kady
13	Ali Hamadeh	49	Igor Belyayev	85	Radwan EL Sayed
14	Amin Qammourieh	50	Ikram Chaer	86	Raghid El Solh

15	Assafir	51	Inaam Raad	87	Rajeh El Khoury
16	Bassem El Jisr	52	Issam Al Jurdi	88	Richard Parker
17	Bassem El Sabea	53	Issam Khalifeh	89	Saad Mehio
18	Bechara Merhej	54	Issam Nohman	90	Salim El Hoss
19	Edmond Saab	55	Jad Charif Al Akhawi	91	Salim Ghazal
20	Elias Atallah	56	Jana Nasrallah	92	Sami Thebian
21	Elias El Dairy OR Zayyan	57	Jihad Ezzeine	93	Samir Frangieh
22	Elias El Habre	58	Joseph Abou Khalil	94	Samir Kassir
23	Elias Saba	59	Joseph Samaha	95	Saoud El Mawla
24	Emil Khoury	60	Kamal Dib	96	Sarkis Naoum
25	Fahima Charafeddine	61	Karim Mroueh	97	Satea Noureddine
26	Faissal Salman	62	Khawla Arsalan	98	Sayed Frangie
27	Fawaz Traboulsi	63	Lucien Aoun	99	Taha Sabounji
28	Fayssal Jalloul	64	Mahmoud Noureddine	100	Talal Salman
29	Fouad Shabaklo	65	Marwan Fares	101	Tarek Ziadeh
30	Gebran Hayek	66	Mary Ksseify	102	Toufic El Hindi
31	Gebran Toueini	67	Massaoud El Achkar	103	Walid Zaghloul
32	Georges Hayek	68	May Daher Yaacoub	104	Youssef Moawwad
33	Georges Massouh	69	May Kahale	105	Ziad Abdel Samad
34	Georges Nassif	70	Michel Abou Jaoude	106	Ziad Saegh
35	Ghassan Salameh	71	Michel Geha	107	Author not mentioned
36	Ghassan Tueni	72	Mohammad Banjak		

B10 Length: Define the length of the article:

1=Short (2 paragraphs or less)

2= Medium (between 2 and 5 paragraphs)

3=Lengthy (more than 5 paragraphs)

B11 Profile of the author: Define the profile of the author:

1= Journalist

2= Politician

3= Academic

4= Artist/writer

5= Religious figure

6= Civil society activist

7= Other

B12 Dominant frame dimension: Identify the article's dominant frame dimension by counting frame elements:

1= Issue definition (ex.: definition of the war)

2= Issue diagnosis and causal interpretation (ex.: the reasons of the war, the actors)

3= Issue evaluation (ex.: the war is over/not over)

4= Treatment recommendation (ex.: Lebanese agreement, international agreement)

C Categories:

C1 Categories

C1.1 Does the article identify what happened on April 13th, 1975?

1=yes 2=no

C1.2 Does the article suggest that April 13th, 1975 is the first day of the war?

1= yes 2= no

C1.3 Does the article label the happenings as 'war'?

1=yes 2=no

C2 Categories

C2.1 Issue Definition (ID)

C2.1.1 Does the article label the war as a 'civil war'?

1=yes 2=no

C2.1.2 Does the article label the war as 'war of others on our land'?

1=yes 2=no

C2.1.3 Does the article label the war as 'wars'?

1=yes 2=no

C2.1.4 Does the article describe it as a 'war of everyone against everyone'?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2 Issue diagnosis and causal interpretation (CD)

C2.2.1 Does the article mention the Palestinians as actors involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C.2.2.2 Does the article mention the Christians as actors involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.3 Does the article mention the Lebanese Front/Phalanges as actors involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.4 Does the article mention the Muslims as actors involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.5 Does the article mention the Lebanese National Movement and other progressive parties (leftists) as actors involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.6 Does the article mention Israel as an actor involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.7 Does the article mention the United States of America as an actor involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.8 Does the article mention the USSR as an actor involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.9 Does the article mention one or more Arab countries as actors involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C.2.2.10 Does the article mention that 'all the Lebanese' are actors involved in the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.11 Is the Palestinian presence/military activity mentioned as a reason for the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.12 Does the article mention socioeconomic factors as reasons for the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.13 Is the Cold war mentioned as a trigger of the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.14 Is the Syrian influence mentioned as a reason for the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.15 Is the Arab-Israeli conflict mentioned as a reason for the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.2.16 Are the Sectarian tensions mentioned as a reason for the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.3 Issue evaluation (IE)

C2.3.1 Does the article describe the war as a 'dirty' war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.3.2 Does the article mention that no one won; everyone lost?

1=yes 2=no

C2.3.3 Does the article suggest that a minority of elites won, and a majority of the people lost the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.3.4 Does the article suggest that all Lebanese are equal victims of the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.3.5 Does the article state that the Ta'if Agreement only ended the military conflict and froze the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.4 Treatment recommendations (TR)

C2.4.1 Does the article suggest that there should be a Lebanese agreement (political consensus, constitutional or institutional solution) to end the war?

1=yes 2=no

C2.4.2 Does the article mention that there should be an Arab agreement to end the war? (ex. Syria's role)

1=yes 2=no

C2.4.3 Does the article mention that there should be an international agreement to end the war? (Ex. US)

1=yes 2=no

C2.4.4 Does the article mention that there should be a solution related to the bigger Arab-Israeli conflict?

1=yes 2=no

C2.4.5 Does the article suggest that there should be a treatment of the original causes of the war in order to end the war?

1=yes 2=no

APPENDIX III

Author Resume

For reasons of data protection, the curriculum vitae is not published in the electronic version.