Wayne Sandholtz

Human Rights Courts and Global Constitutionalism: Coordination through Judicial Dialogue

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Human Rights Courts and Global Constitutionalism: Coordination through Judicial Dialogue

Wayne Sandholtz*

Abstract:

International courts regularly cite each other, in part as a means of building legitimacy. Such international, cross-court use of precedent (or “judicial dialogue”) among the regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee has an additional purpose and effect: the construction of a rights-based global constitutionalism. Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is purposeful in that the courts see themselves as embedded in, and contributing to, a global human rights legal system. Cross-citation among the human rights courts advances the construction of rights-based global constitutionalism in that it provides a basic degree of coordination among the regional courts. The jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), as an authoritative interpreter of core international human rights norms, plays the role of a central focal point for the decentralized coordination of jurisprudence. The network of regional courts and the HRC is building an emergent institutional structure for global rights-based constitutionalism.

* Fellow at the Berlin Potsdam Research Group “International Law – Rise or Decline?”, Professor of International Relations and Law, University of Southern California.
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1. Introduction

International courts regularly cite each other, even though a formal doctrine of precedent does not exist in international law. For instance, the regional human rights courts refer to each other’s case law, in part as a tool for building legitimacy (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019). This study aims to show that judicial dialogue among the regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee has an additional purpose and effect: the construction of a rights-based global constitutionalism. Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is purposeful in that they see themselves as embedded in, and contributing to, a global human rights legal system. Cross-citation among the human rights courts advances the construction of rights-based global constitutionalism in that it provides a basic degree of coordination among the regional courts and the Human Rights Committee (HRC). Though the jurisprudence of the human rights courts necessarily responds to the human rights problems and the political contexts in their respective regions, the sharing of precedent means that fundamental norms and principles develop in common across regions. In this sense, judicial dialogue among the human rights courts contributes to strengthening the international rule of law.

The following section builds on theories of global constitutionalism. Two core elements of global constitutionalism are a normative structure (rules) and an institutional structure to interpret and apply the rules. I will argue that the web of international and regional human rights treaties constitutes the normative structure of global constitutionalism. But the central argument of this study is that the regional human rights courts and the HRC are constructing, in rudimentary form, the institutional component of global rights-based constitutionalism. The following section provides the empirical support for that argument, documenting the network of cross-citations among the regional human rights courts, and from the regional courts to the HRC.

A brief clarification of the term “global” in this context is in order. I argue that the network of human rights courts is building the emergent institutional dimension of a global constitutionalism, but significant parts of the world, including Asia and the Middle East, do not participate in regional human rights courts. I argue that the term “global” applies nevertheless. First, the informal coordination among the human rights courts and the HRC is creating shared interpretations of universal human rights norms and principles. Those interpretations establish baselines, or focal points, that can guide actors in parts of the world that are not covered by a regional human rights court, as they seek to invoke, assert, or apply international human rights norms. Second, though no regional human rights court has jurisdiction in countries of Asia and the Middle East, the Human Rights Committee possesses a global mandate. It is not a court, and its conclusions and general comments are not legally binding. But it is an authoritative interpreter of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is by now global. The ICCPR is global in that (1) it has nearly universal ratification and (2) many of its human rights norms have clearly achieved the status of customary international law (for example, the prohibition on torture). The HRC acts as a point of reference for the interpretation and application of global human rights norms. Finally, I describe the network of courts and the HRC as building an emergent, decentralized institutional structure for global rights-based constitutionalism.

2. Modern constitutionalism

Though diverse approaches to the idea of “global constitutionalism” exist, they all assert that certain international law principles and norms serve functions at the global level akin to (though
not identical to) the role played by constitutions in domestic legal orders. Political scientists, with some exceptions, have paid little attention to the scholarly work on global constitutionalism, perhaps supposing that it is a purely theoretical exercise without relevance for empirical outcomes. This study starts from the contrary premise: that a properly specified conception of global constitutionalism offers a useful framework for understanding the development of the international human rights regime.

The discussion here is not about constitutions, if by “constitution” we mean a document, established by a constituent act, that creates the institutions of government, defines their powers, and establishes rules for the production, interpretation, and enforcement of additional laws. Rather, the argument is about constitutional orders, that is, systems of law and their associated institutions that perform functions that are “constitutional.” I argue that the international human rights regime, comprised of national, regional, and international layers, is such a constitutional order.

Traditional conceptions of constitutionalism have been shaped by the domestic model. In the domestic model, constitutional meta-norms establish the institutions of the state and allocate functions and powers to those institutions. These meta-norms specify procedures for “how legal norms are to be produced, applied, and interpreted” (Stone 1994, 444), including rules for how constitutional rules themselves can be modified. Domestic constitutionalism also grounds the legitimacy of the constitutional order in the will of the people, who establish constitutional rules through a democratic act. As Kumm points out, international law constitutionalism differs from traditional domestic constitutionalism in that it does not establish a supreme authority, is not supported by the coercive apparatus of a state, and is not grounded in “the self-governing practices of a people” (Kumm 2009, 260).

Modern constitutionalism, in contrast, sheds the statist features of constitutional theory. In traditional domestic versions of constitutionalism, the primacy of constitutional rules is justified in terms of an authoritative democratic will, that of the people, or of their delegates, or of the founders of the democratic constitutional order. The traditional version, however, can accommodate democratic repression, that is, the possibility (and the historical reality) that the will of the majority can support evils like apartheid and genocide. Modern constitutions, especially since World War II, thus build not just on the will of a people but on the freedom and rights of each person. The laws and policies — and all official deeds — enacted under the constitution must conform to higher-order norms that protect the freedom and dignity of each person by establishing rights. Thus modern constitutionalism is not just about institutional structures and procedures; it incorporates substantive norms on individual rights and freedoms. Rights place limits on the powers of all public officials. Kumm’s theory of cosmopolitan constitutionalism includes both the structural/procedural dimension and the substantive dimension. The latter consists of human rights: “a universal moral requirement that public authorities treat those who are subject to their authority as free and equal persons endowed with human dignity” (Kumm 2009, 303). Gardbaum advances a cognate argument, that constitutional law is no longer just “law containing one or more metarules for the organization and ordering of political authority,” but defines a “legal system for the protecting of fundamental rights” (Gardbaum 2009, 238). Gardbaum also notes that this kind of constitutionalism “is no longer in practice, and so cannot be conceptualized as, limited to the national” (Ibid.). Stone Sweet similarly holds that the core of any modern constitutional order consists of a set of peremptory norms and “other substantive
fundamental rights,” plus “standards of procedural due process, and access to justice” (Stone Sweet 2013, 493). That “code of rights” is the “overarching normative structure” that makes a legal system constitutional (Ibid.). For Stone Sweet, too, modern constitutionalism informs both national and some international legal orders (Stone Sweet and Ryan Forthcoming).

Modern constitutionalism is thus cosmopolitan and pluralist. It is cosmopolitan in that it is not grounded in the sovereign state or its people but in universal rights norms and principles (Kumm 2009; Stone Sweet and Ryan Forthcoming). Modern constitutionalism is pluralist because it necessarily recognizes that separate constitutional orders coexist and interact. Multiple legal orders – domestic, regional, and international – possess an “autonomous claim to legitimacy” and authority (Stone Sweet 2013, 493). The key is that these multiple legal orders are not detached from each other: they overlap and interact. An early, and now archetypal, example of constitutional pluralism is the European Union (EU). It has long been recognized that with the doctrines of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, coupled with judicial review by the ECJ, the EU became a constitutional system (Weiler 1991; Weiler 1999; MacCormick 1999; Stone Sweet 2004). Walker distills the essence of constitutional pluralism in the EU: “Constitutional pluralism, by contrast, recognises that the European order inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome has developed beyond the traditional confines of inter-national law and now makes its own independent constitutional claims, and that these claims exist alongside the continuing claims of states. The relationship between the orders, that is to say, is now horizontal rather than vertical – heterarchical rather than hierarchical” (Walker 2002, 337; see also Walker 2003). The European system of rights protection is likewise an example of constitutional pluralism, in which national courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) engage in “constitutional dialogues” so as to manage the interdependence of domestic and regional protection of rights and to promote “doctrinal coherence” (Stone Sweet and Ryan Forthcoming, chap. 3). Gardbaum regards both the EU and the European human rights regime (centered on the European Convention on Human Rights) as constitutionalized systems (Gardbaum 2008, 760). Kumm argues that constitutional pluralism – better than traditional conceptions of monism and dualism – captures the “relationship between national and international law” (Kumm 2009, 273).

3. Global constitutionalism and human rights

In the previous section I mentioned two elements of constitutional arrangements, the institutional and the substantive (normative content). In this section I offer conceptions of both dimensions in the context of global constitutionalism. The structural component of constitutionalism corresponds with Hart’s secondary rules (Hart 1994). These are “higher-order legal rules and principles that specify how all other lower-order legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and interpreted. . . . They establish governmental institutions . . . and establish law-making procedures” (Stone Sweet 2009, 626). In minimalist (statist) perspectives on constitutionalism, this is all that constitutions do, but in modern constitutionalism a second component comes into play: substantive human rights norms and judicial mechanisms authorized to apply them.

A system of constitutional justice – at any level – incorporates two key elements: a “charter of fundamental rights” and “a mode of constitutional review to protect those rights” (Stone Sweet 2012, 816; Stone Sweet and Palmer 2017, 394). Constitutional rights create “justiciable obligations” on the part of public officials to respect rights, which in turn requires a judicial mechanism to review official acts for their compatibility with basic rights. Courts empowered to exercise rights-
based review act as “trustees” of the constitutional system (Stone Sweet and Palmer 2017, 379). This new constitutionalism took root in Europe after World War II and by the 1990s had “diffused globally” (Stone Sweet 2012, 816; Stone Sweet 2000). It is a “cosmopolitan constitutionalism” in which rights are interpreted not by applying some version of an authoritative will, whether that of the system’s founders or of a legislature, but through “public reason,” based on rights and judicial rights review (Kumm 2009).

Constitutionalism in this sense is visible in an interconnected system linking national, regional, and international orders. The normative dimension is largely in place, as human rights are by now embedded in most national constitutions, in the regional human rights conventions, and in the network of international human rights treaties. These three sources of norms (constitutions, regional conventions, international treaties) contain overlapping, broadly similar lists of rights. The institutional dimension – courts with rights-review jurisdiction – exists in many states and in the regional human rights systems. In this section I describe these relatively well-established components of global constitutionalism. In a subsequent section, I advance the claim that the final piece – an international system of judicial rights review – exists in rudimentary, decentralized form, in the network of regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee.

a) Human rights law: the international level

International human rights norms provide the normative structure of global constitutionalism. The argument here builds on important insights advanced by Gardbaum and others. Gardbaum views the international human rights system as a stage “in the historical development of the idea of constitutionalism” (Gardbaum 2009, 255). In the first stage of constitutionalist thought, the will of the sovereign is law, but sovereignty resides in the people and is delegated to their representatives in government. The second stage sees the creation of domestic legal limits on state power. In the third stage, which Gardbaum labels “global constitutionalism,” “legal limits [on state power] are now imposed by international law and may also be interpreted and applied by — or in the shadow of — international rather than domestic state actors” (Gardbaum 2009, 255). Furthermore, the international human rights system embodies global constitutionalism by affirming that human rights norms apply to all people “as rights of human beings rather than as rights of citizens” (Gardbaum 2009, 257). The rights of citizens derive from domestic constitutions, whereas the rights of human beings are grounded in universal (cosmopolitan) norms. International human rights law thus reinforces one of the core purposes of modern constitutionalism: to set limits on “what governments can lawfully do to people within their jurisdictions” (Gardbaum 2009, 237). In that sense, international human rights law and national constitutional rights are functionally equivalent: they both set boundaries for the exercise of state authority.

The story of the emergence and expansion of the international human rights regime is well known. The U.N. General Assembly approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, enumerating a list of civil, political, and due process rights. The Genocide Convention was signed the same year. Proponents of the UDHR had hoped that it would quickly be transformed into a comprehensive treaty, but the treaty-making process turned out to be a protracted one. The two covenants – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International

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1 Gardbaum argues that a third model of constitutionalism has emerged in a few common-law states, one that stakes out a middle position between parliamentary supremacy and the new constitutionalism, granting less power to courts for constitutional rights review. See Gardbaum (2001; 2010).
The Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – were signed in 1966 (as was the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)) but did not enter into effect until 1976. The UDHR and the two Covenants embody the core rights of the international human rights legal regime. Subsequent treaties for the most part affirmed Covenant rights, elaborated rights and obligations with greater specificity (torture, disappearances), or applied them to special populations (like women, children, persons with disabilities, or migrant workers). Figure 1 depicts the growth of the human rights regime in terms of the number of treaties and the total number of state ratifications.

Figure 1

Global human rights treaties, total ratifications

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3394927
As Table 1 shows, some of the core human rights treaties have achieved virtually universal state participation and others, including the two Covenants, have reached very high levels of ratification or accession (87 percent of states for the ICCPR and 85 percent for the ICESCR).

Table 1: Total ratifications of human rights treaties, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Ratifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPD</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENOCIDE</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRMW</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Ratification” includes accession and succession. Total UN membership in 2015 was 193 states. Some entities that are not UN member states are registered as parties to some of the treaties. For example, both the Holy See and the State of Palestine are listed as parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

What the international level is generally seen as lacking is the second component of modern constitutionalism: a judicial mechanism for rights review. Gardbaum recognizes the “tremendous growth” in the number of national courts exercising the power of rights review, but also notes that “international human rights courts with similar powers remain the exception rather than the rule, especially at the global level” (Gardbaum 2008, 751). A subsequent section discusses a potential framework for such a function at the international level.

b) Human rights law: the regional level

Regional human rights regimes developed in parallel with the global human rights system. The first of these emerged in Western Europe.

aa) The European system

The member states of the newly created Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in November 1950. The signatory states viewed the Convention as one piece of their collective effort “to prevent future European wars, bolster liberal democracy, oppose Communism, and express a common European identity, through their joint commitment to rights”
(Stone Sweet and Keller 2008, 5). The Convention provided for the creation of a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which held its first session in 1959. The Court was dramatically transformed by an additional protocol in 1998, which abolished the European Commission of Human Rights (which previously held the sole power of referral to the ECtHR), established the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and created the right of individual petition. The ECtHR determines whether a member state has violated Convention rights. Through 2016, it had issued more than 18,000 judgments. Its jurisprudence has been progressive (Cichowski 2007; Stone Sweet and Ryan Forthcoming), in that it treats the Convention as a “living instrument” (Letsas 2013) and has been willing to announce higher standards of rights protection when it deems that a European consensus on a higher standard has emerged (and sometimes when a consensus has not yet developed).

Though the Court’s judgments are, in formal terms, directed at the state that is the subject of a petition, they are widely seen as signaling how the Court will rule in future cases and therefore indicating that its case law applies to all 47 member states. In fact, there is evidence that member states view the Court’s jurisprudence as having these erga omnes effects (Helfer and Voeten 2014). The European Convention and the case law of the ECtHR have been broadly incorporated in domestic legal systems in Europe (Keller and Stone Sweet 2008) and the rate of compliance with ECtHR judgments is – again generally speaking – high (Baluarte and De Vos 2010; Hawkins and Jacoby 2010; Hillebrecht 2014). Thus the ECtHR’s rights-review role has been broadly effective and substantially integrated with national legal systems. In short, “the Convention and the Court perform functions that are comparable to those performed by national constitutions and constitutional courts in Europe” (Stone Sweet and Keller 2008, 7). Indeed, the Court has referred to the European Convention as “a constitutional document” and some scholars view the Court as a constitutional court for Europe (Gardbaum 2008, 760; Greer 2006, 173; Stone Sweet and Ryan Forthcoming).

bb) The inter-American system

The member states of the Organization of American States adopted the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) in 1969, though the Convention did not receive the requisite number of ratifications and enter into force until 1978. The ACHR built on the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which was the world’s first general international human rights document. The Convention provided for the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which held its first session in June 1979. Cases reach the IACtHR through a two-step process in which petitions go first to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which – once the petition is deemed admissible – seeks to bring the petitioners and the respondent state to a “friendly settlement.” If that effort is not successful, the Commission refers the case to the Court. Before procedural reforms in 2001, the Commission had discretion as to whether or not to submit a case that does not reach a friendly settlement to the Court. Since the reforms, it normally must do so.

2 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Judgment (Chamber), European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 5856/72, 25 April 1978.
3 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Judgment (Grand Chamber), European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 15318/89, 23 March 1995, para. 75.
4 Before procedural reforms in 2001, the Commission had discretion as to whether or not to submit a case that does not reach a friendly settlement to the Court. Since the reforms, it normally must do so.
Though its caseload amounts to a minute fraction of the ECtHR’s, the Inter-American Court has developed a dynamic jurisprudence and has sought to establish itself as the apex of a legal system for applying the American Convention. The Court’s most assertive effort along these lines is its doctrine of “conventionality control.” The Court announced the doctrine in its judgment in Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, declaring that domestic courts were required to ensure that domestic legal acts conformed with the American Convention; that is, domestic courts were to exercise a form of judicial review for “conventionality.” Furthermore, domestic courts should “take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court.” In a subsequent judgment, the IACtHR extended the doctrine by requiring that all state officials at all levels (not just judges) exercise conventionality control over all legal acts. The analogy to review for constitutionality is clear. Indeed, Dulitzky concludes that the IACtHR, with the doctrine of conventionality control, has sought to establish the ACHR “as an inter-American constitution” and itself as “an inter-American constitutional court” (Dulitzky 2015, 64). That the IACtHR has not fully succeeded in establishing itself as a regional constitutional court is evidenced by the resistance it has encountered from some domestic courts (Huneeus 2011; Contesse 2019). Compliance with IACtHR judgments is patchy and generally lower than is the case for the ECtHR (Baluarte and De Vos 2010; Hawkins and Jacoby 2010; Hillebrecht 2014). Nevertheless, its role as the final arbiter of higher-order, human rights norms and its capacity to judge the compatibility of state actions vis-à-vis Convention rights indicate that a form of regional constitutionalism is being constructed in the region.

cc) The African system

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACTHPR) has only recently begun to function and is still developing its jurisprudence and establishing its authority in the region. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “Banjul Charter”) was adopted by the member states of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) in 1981 and entered into effect in 1986. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established by a protocol to the African Charter; the protocol was adopted in 1998 and came into force in 2004. The ACTHPR issued its first judgment on the merits in 2013. As of the end of 2018, it had issued 26 judgments on the merits, finding violations of the African Charter in 23 of those. It is therefore too early to draw conclusions about the Court’s jurisprudence or the extent of state compliance with its rulings. Formally, at least, the ACTHPR has a constitutional role in the African Union, with the authority to review state acts for their compatibility with the African Charter and other international human rights instruments.

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5 The doctrine of conventionality control has been controversial and has generated an enormous quantity of analysis and debate. For representative assessments see Binder (2011); Dulitzky (2015); Dulitzky (2015) and the works cited therein.
7 Ibid.
9 Though it should be noted that the ECtHR, widely seen as the most effective and influential human rights court in the world, also encounters resistance from some member states (Madsen 2016).
c) Human rights law: the national level

International and regional human rights norms have been incorporated into national legal systems in multiple ways, including via a constitution, legislation, or judicial interpretation. Given the dominance of the “new constitutionalism” in the writing of national constitutions since World War II, I start with the constitutionalization of international rights. The new constitutionalism emerged in Europe in the 1950s and featured three core elements: “(1) an entrenched, written constitution, (2) a charter of fundamental rights, and (3) a mode of constitutional judicial review to protect those rights” (Stone Sweet 2012, 816). By the 1990s, this model “had diffused globally” (Ibid.). Indeed, as Law and Versteeg demonstrate, “it has become standard practice for constitutions to include explicit rights provisions” (Law and Versteeg 2011, 1194). Not only that, but the nature of rights provisions displays clear trends: “a tendency to guarantee an increasing number of rights; the spread of judicial review; and the existence of generic rights that can reliably be found in the vast majority of constitutions” (Ibid.). Stone Sweet finds that all of the 106 constitutions established since 1985 included a charter of rights and 101 included a mechanism of judicial rights review (Stone Sweet 2012, 816, n. 812).

International human rights law has had a clear and demonstrable effect on the domestic constitutionalization of rights. In fact, it is possible to trace domestic constitutional rights to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first international (as opposed to regional) document to enumerate a comprehensive list of basic physical integrity, political, and civil rights. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons show the influence of the UDHR on constitutional rights in several ways. For instance, the similarity between new constitutions and the UDHR is greater after 1948 than before. In addition, the average percentage of UDHR rights included in constitutions rises dramatically after 1948. Finally, analyzing constitutions written after 1948 and a total of 73 rights, they find that UDHR rights are more than one and one-half times as likely as non-UDHR rights (that is, rights not appearing in the UDHR) to be included in constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg et al. 2013, 77, 79, 80). Beck, Meyer, et al. report similar findings. The average number of UDHR rights included in national constitutions rises from about 15 in 1900, to 20 in 1948, to about 35 in 2013. They explain the rise in terms of the influence of world society: the larger the number of global human rights treaties in existence at the time of a constitution’s initial adoption, and the more of those treaties a country has signed, the larger the number of UDHR rights the constitution will include (Beck, Meyer et al. 2017, 10). Sloss and Sandholtz, employing a different coding of 68 UDHR rights, show that the number of UDHR rights included in national constitutions rises dramatically after 1948; see figure 2. The average number of UDHR rights in constitutions in 1947 was 11.5; by 2005 it reached a peak of 30.6 (Sloss and Sandholtz forthcoming). Finally, Versteeg has shown that the international and regional human rights treaties also served as a template for constitutional rights provisions (Versteeg 2015).

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10 The point here is that though some constitutions enacted before the adoption of the UDHR (1948) incorporated rights that would later be included in the UDHR, the overlap between national constitutional rights and UDHR rights is much greater after adoption of the UDHR.
States can also “constitutionalize” international human rights norms without formally writing them into the constitution. Rights can be translated into domestic law through legislation and through judicial decisions. For instance, member states of the ECtHR have incorporated ECHR rights in domestic law through all three means (constitution, statute, jurisprudence) (Keller and Stone Sweet 2008). Latin American states have constitutionalized international human rights treaties through political means (constitution-writing and legislation) as well as judicial means (Góngora Mera 2011). In Africa, the experience is similarly varied, but with the same overall trend. Viljoen shows that international human rights law (with a particular focus on the African Charter) becomes incorporated in domestic law via the constitution, through legislative incorporation, and through judicial interpretation (Viljoen 2012, chap. 12).

Finally, just as the normative substance of global constitutionalism has diffused broadly in national legal orders, the institutional component – courts empowered to exercise constitutional rights review – has also spread transnationally. The dominant institutional form is the constitutional court, which holds authority to review official acts for their compliance with a rights-based constitution (Stone Sweet and Palmer 2017, 389, 394; Stone Sweet 2012). The Varieties of Democracy Project has constructed cross-national, cross-temporal data that includes an indicator of judicial review. A country is coded in a given year as having judicial review if “any court in the judiciary [has] the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision” (Coppedge, Gerring et al. 2018, 152; Coppedge, Gerring et al. 2018). The V-Dem definition of judicial review thus corresponds with the concept advanced in work on the new constitutionalism. Figure 3 shows the number of countries each year that are classified as having judicial review. The number of countries with judicial review shows a strong upward trend, with a particularly striking acceleration.
in the 1980s and 1990s (an era of constitution writing and revision after the end of the Cold War). By 2018 judicial review had spread to the vast majority of states in the world – more than 160.

This section has described a global constitutionalism of human rights, which consists of interlocking normative structures at three levels – international, regional, and national – and associated institutions for rights review at two – regional and national. The global system is cosmopolitan in that it is grounded not in sovereign statehood or the will of a specific people but rather in universal rights. It is pluralist in that it embraces multiple legal orders each with autonomous claims to legitimacy. The next section addresses the apparently missing piece: rights review for the global level.

4. An institutional framework for global rights review

I argue in this section that an institutional framework for rights review does exist at the global level. It is pluralist, in the sense that it is a network of multiple judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, each with its own basis of legitimacy and authority. The network consists of the three regional human rights courts – European, Inter-American, and African – plus the U.N. Human Rights Committee. Two potential objections immediately present themselves. First, the regional human
rights courts have no binding jurisdiction outside of their respective regional conventions and the
countries that have ratified them. They are not authoritative interpreters of the global human
rights treaties. Second, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) is not a court; its General Comments
and its “views” on individual petitions are not binding on anybody.

The responses are straightforward. First, the regional human rights courts see themselves as
integral parts of a larger, global system of human rights law. They regularly invoke the global
treaties and treaty bodies as guides in interpreting the regional human rights treaties. For those
states and populations that live within the jurisdiction of the regional courts, those courts are in
practice authoritative interpreters of global human rights law. Outside of those regions, the
interpretations of the regional human rights courts are relevant considerations in determining the
content of the global treaties, much as the interpretations of domestic courts are relevant in
determining treaty obligations. Second, the HRC is an authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR. It
thus serves as a central reference point for the regional courts and, in principle, for domestic
courts. In other words, though the HRC does not issue binding judgments, it plays a coordinating
role in the development of international human rights jurisprudence.

In this section, I provide evidence to support the claim that the regional human rights courts and
the HRC together form a global institutional framework for rights review – the institutional
component of global rights-based constitutionalism. The evidence is the judicial dialogue, taking
the form of cross-citations, in which they participate. I acknowledge at the outset two limitations of
the study. First, important regions of the world do not participate directly in the loose institutional
structure of global rights review. Asia and the Middle East region lack regional human rights
courts; states in those regions are not under the binding jurisdiction of any supranational human rights
court. Of course, the jurisprudence of the regional courts and the HRC is available to activists,
advocates, and courts in those regions, if they are inclined to draw upon it. Second, the analysis
here sets aside the domestic dimension. Domestic courts are the “front line” in applying human
rights law and holding state officials accountable for violations. And national courts in Africa,
Europe, and Latin America are in dialogue – to a greater or lesser extent – with their regional
courts. But incorporating domestic courts would be a project too vast for this analysis. And, in any
case, the central goal of this study is to assess the degree to which we can say that a global
infrastructure for rights-review constitutionalism exists.

a) Precedent, external citations, and the quest for legitimacy

Courts face a permanent crisis of legitimacy because the loser in any dispute may be inclined to
reject the court’s decision as biased, political, or arbitrary (Shapiro 1981, chap. 1). One of the most
important tools for defusing the ongoing crisis of legitimacy is giving reasons, which means
explaining why the court’s decision was not biased or arbitrary but was required by the law (Carter
and Burke 2016, 8). A court’s citations to case law are a crucial part of its giving reasons and thus of
its legitimation strategy. My premise is that courts cite other courts primarily to build or maintain
their own legitimacy.

11 Though the role of domestic judgments in interpreting treaty obligations is subject to ongoing debate, its
relevance appears to be increasingly accepted. The International Law Commission included judicial functions
in its conclusion on “Conduct as subsequent practice” in its Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties; see International Law Commission (2018a,
Conclusion 5; 2018b, Chapter IV). See also the contributions in Aust and Nolte (2016).
Precedent, of course, does not exist in international courts and tribunals, at least as a formal matter. But in practice, litigants and judges in international courts routinely invoke precedent. International courts – like all courts – are drawn irresistibly to the use of precedent (Shapiro 1972; Stone Sweet 2002; Jacob 2012; von Bogdandy and Venzke 2012; von Bogdandy and Venzke 2013), for reasons explained in the preceding paragraph. International courts cite externally not because it is in any sense binding but rather as a means of enhancing legitimacy by showing that their decisions are not arbitrary (Voeten 2010, 553). External citations enhance legitimacy with internal constituencies (national governments, legislatures, courts, activists, advocates, and the public) by showing that the court’s reasons are sound, or that the court’s interpretation of the law is consistent with common practice in other jurisdictions, or that a different court would decide the case in the same way.

b) The regional courts in a global system

I argue that the regional human rights courts cite each other and the HRC for a second reason: because they want to be seen as active participants in the construction of the global human rights regime. They want to influence, and to be seen as influencing, other courts and the broader international regime. International judges care about their reputation and status among their international peers. As Voeten notes, one motive for external citations is “influencing other courts.” Judges who do not cite externally are less likely to be cited themselves (Voeten 2010, 550). External citations, then, target not just internal constituencies but also international ones. External citations signal to other international courts that the citing court is attuned to international jurisprudential currents and desires to participate in their development.

The regional human rights courts clearly see themselves as integrated in a larger global human rights system. This self-conception is important because it underpins the courts’ invocation of global human rights treaties and it both explains and legitimizes their references to the Human Rights Committee. That is, if the HRC is the authoritative interpreter of one of the pillar treaties of the global human rights system, then it is appropriate and perhaps even necessary for the regional courts to draw on the HRC for interpretive guidance.

The ECtHR explicitly places the European Convention and its own jurisprudence in the broader context of international human rights law. As the Court stated in Hassan v. United Kingdom, “As the Court has observed on many occasions, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part.”12 The Court routinely cites international human rights treaties and the interpretations of the human rights treaty bodies as it interprets the European Convention on Human Rights.

Similarly, the Inter-American Court recognizes that the American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American human rights system are embedded in the larger system of international human rights law (Neuman 2008, 112). As one of the Court’s influential presidents, Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, put it, “the regional systems of protection operate in the framework of the universality of human rights” (Cançado Trindade 2004, 29). The Court itself repeatedly places the American Convention and the Inter-American Human Rights System within the context of the global human rights regime. A word search of all IACtHR merits judgments in English found the

12 Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgment (Grand Chamber), European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 29750/09, 16 September 2014, para. 77.
phrase “international human rights law” used 474 times in 119 judgments, the phrase “international human rights standards” 31 times in 20 judgments, and “international human rights system” six times in five judgments. In these references the Court regularly affirms that regional human rights law is embedded in a broader system of international human rights law. In its first advisory opinion, for example, the IACtHR declared:

The nature of the subject matter itself, however, militates against a strict distinction between universalism and regionalism. Mankind’s universality and the universality of the rights and freedoms which are entitled to protection form the core of all international protective systems. In this context, it would be improper to make distinctions based on the regional or non-regional character of the international obligations assumed by States, and thus deny the existence of the common core of basic human rights standards.\textsuperscript{13}

Moreover, both the preamble to the American Convention and Art. 29 of the Convention place the regional treaty in an international context. Art. 29 decrees that “[n]o provision of the Convention may be interpreted as . . . restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized . . . by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.”\textsuperscript{14} In \textit{Ituango Massacres v. Colombia} the IACtHR declares that “[t]he corpus juris of international human rights law comprises a set of international instruments of varied content and juridical effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations). . . . This Court, therefore, must adopt the proper approach to consider this question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the individual in contemporary international law.”\textsuperscript{15} Such examples could easily be multiplied. In addition, the IACtHR routinely cites international human rights treaties, the interpretations of the human rights treaty bodies, the jurisprudence of the other regional human rights courts (especially the ECtHR), and international soft law sources (Neuman 2008, 109-110).

Like the ECtHR and the IACtHR, the African Court also sees itself as part of a larger international human rights system. Indeed, the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, under “Sources of Law,” declares, “The Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter \textit{and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned.}”\textsuperscript{16} The African Court also cites routinely to international human rights treaties and treaty bodies, as well as the other regional human rights courts.

c) The web of judicial exchange

The regional courts cite each other often, with the African and Inter-American courts doing so more than the ECtHR. All three regularly refer to the Human Rights Committee. The Human Rights Committee plays a distinct role in this web of judicial exchange. The HRC is not a court and it possesses no binding jurisdiction. However, it is an authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR. Its 18 members are independent experts who are elected in their personal capacity to four-year terms (with the possibility of reelection). The HRC announces its interpretations of the Covenant through

\textsuperscript{13} “\textit{Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court,} Advisory Opinion OC-1, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A No. 1, 24 September 1982, para. 40.

\textsuperscript{14} American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, Art. 29.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ituango Massacres v. Colombia}, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 148, 1 July 2006, para. 157, n. 177.

three main mechanisms: (1) “concluding observations” on the reports regularly submitted by member states; (2) “adoption of views” in response to complaints submitted by states or (far more commonly) by individuals, alleging violations of the ICCPR by a state party; and (3) “general comments,” which the Committee offers on its own initiative as interpretations of the covenant with regard to specific themes or topics. The data reported below include references by the three regional courts to all three types of HRC communications. The data do not include citations by the HRC to the regional courts. The HRC does cite the jurisprudence of the regional courts, but it appears to do so only in delineating the procedural history of the case, that is, when the complaint before it has been the subject of a regional court decision. The HRC appears not to cite the regional courts as persuasive authority when explaining its reasons. Keller and Grover note that “[i]n respect of regional human rights regimes (e.g. European Court of Human Rights), the [Human Rights] Committee is understandably reluctant to rely on their jurisprudence, as many states parties may not have submitted to these regimes” (Keller and Grover 2012, 157). Conte and Burchill state more categorically that the HRC does not cite the regional courts: “The Committee has also eschewed the assistance of the jurisprudence of other international human rights bodies in interpreting the ICCPR” (Conte and Burchill 2016, 16). The regional human rights courts are not obligated to consult HRC communications, but they do.

For the regional courts, the data reported below include only final judgments on the merits; they exclude separate opinions, rulings on admissibility, and advisory opinions. Because my purpose is to analyze the role of cross-regional citations in the development of human rights jurisprudence, the focus on merits judgments is appropriate.

Figure 4 depicts the web of cross-citations in graphic form. The numbers beside the arrows indicate the number of cases in which a citation occurs; the arrows point to the cited body. These data are cumulative, covering the human rights courts from their first judgment through 2015. Figure 5 shows the number of citations among the courts and the HRC, excluding duplications. That is, in preparing the data describe in figure 5, I dropped citations within each judgment that referred to the same external document. Clear differences among the regional courts are apparent. The newer human rights courts – the ACtHR and the IACtHR – cite externally at a much higher rate than does the ECtHR. In fact, the IACtHR has cited the ECtHR in 75 percent of its merits judgments and the HRC in 36 percent. The ACtHR has cited the other two regional courts in 75 percent of its judgments and the HRC in 58 percent.
Figure 4

The international human rights judicial system: cases with citations

ACIHPR
12 judgments
5 years

Human Rights Committee

IACIH
185 judgments
27 years

ECIH
18577 judgments
32 years

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the inclusion of references to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. For the ECIHR, all citations are to the African Commission; for the IACIH, eight of the ten are to the Court.
That the ECtHR cites externally less often makes sense, given that by the time the other two courts were producing judgments, the ECtHR already had a large and well-developed case law of its own. For instance, by the year in which the IACtHR issued its first judgment on the merits (1988), the ECtHR had already issued 180. When the IACtHR reached 100 merits judgments (2008), the ECtHR had more than 10,000. The ACTHPR issued its first judgment on the merits in 2013, and through 2015 it had produced only 12 merits judgments, by which time the ECtHR had accumulated more than 18,000 merits judgments. In other words, the ECtHR had fewer reasons or less need to cite the other two regional courts (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019). Still, the ECtHR has cited both of its peer bodies.

The citations to the African system require some clarification. The African human rights system includes two bodies (as does the Inter-American system), a commission and a court. The African Commission is much older than the Court, having been created by the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and having initiated operations in 1987. It can receive petitions from African Union member states, from organizations, and from individuals. If the Commission finds that a violation of the African Charter has occurred, it can recommend measures for a friendly settlement. It can also refer cases to the African Court. Though the case law of the African Court is still sparse, the African Commission has built a body of jurisprudence, having issued a total of 97 decisions on the merits through 2018. The data reported in the figures include ECtHR and IACtHR
citations to the African Commission because omitting references to its decisions would create the misleading impression that the ECtHR and the IACtHR have paid no attention to their African counterparts.\footnote{The IACtHR has cited mostly the African Court but also the African Commission; the ECtHR has cited only the Commission.}

d) The network in practice: illustrations

It would be impossible to analyze in a single paper the substance and character of the multiple channels of exchange among the regional courts and HRC. Some broad observations, with illustrative examples, may nevertheless be useful.

aa) The ACtHPR

As noted above, because the ACtHPR is so new, it has not yet developed a large body of case law. With only 12 judgments on the merits through 2017, it is hard to generalize about the Court’s pattern of external citations, except to point out that it cites externally in all but one of the 12 judgments.\footnote{The exception is a 2017 judgment in which the Court cites only its own precedents: \textit{Christopher Jonas v. Tanzania}, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Application No. 011/2015, 26 September 2017.} Not surprisingly, the ACtHPR routinely draws on the jurisprudence of its sister regional courts and on the HRC to lend support to its reasoning. It cites them on substantive norms, on due process norms, and on principles of interpretation. This statement captures the ACtHPR’s approach to external precedent: “The Court is fortified in its reasoning by the decisions of the African Commission, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which are courts of similar jurisdiction.”\footnote{\textit{Wilfred Onyango Nganyi et al. v. Tanzania}, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Application No. 006/2013, 18 March 2016, para. 169.} In \textit{Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso}, for example, the Court refers to the ECtHR, the IACtHR, and the HRC on the inappropriate use of criminal sanctions in defamation cases.\footnote{\textit{Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso}, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Application No. 004/2013, 5 December 2014.} In a case involving procedural due process, the Court referred to case law from both of the other regional courts and the HRC in interpreting the obligation of the state to ensure that those accused of criminal offenses have access to effective legal assistance.\footnote{\textit{Wilfred Onyango Nganyi et al. v. Tanzania}, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Application No. 006/2013, 18 March 2016.} The ACtHPR has also adopted proportionality analysis as the most suitable method for determining the permissibility of state restrictions on qualified rights. In laying out the elements of proportionality analysis, the Court quotes from the ECtHR (\textit{Handyside v. United Kingdom}, \textit{Gillow v. United Kingdom}, and other cases) and the IACtHR (\textit{Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama}).\footnote{\textit{Tanganyika Law Society et al. v. Tanzania}, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Application No. 009/2011 (and joined cases), 14 June 2013, para. 106. In \textit{Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso}, the Court cites the ECtHR, the HRC, and the IACtHR on the requirements of proportionality analysis (2014).}

bb) The ECtHR

In the late 1990s many of the ECtHR’s cites to the IACtHR dealt with physical integrity rights, an area in which the ECtHR did not have a large body of precedent but the IACtHR did. For instance, the
ECtHR first cited the IACtHR for its jurisprudence with regard to forced disappearances. It also referred to IACtHR cases with respect to corporal punishment to extract confessions and to capital punishment (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019, 118-119). The ECtHR has occasionally cited the African Commission, for example on the positive duty of the state to protect from violence lawyers representing accused persons. It cited the African Commission on the point that “unremunerated work is tantamount to a violation of the right to respect for the dignity inherent in the human being.”

The ECtHR cites the HRC more than it does the other regional courts. For example, the ECtHR cited a General Comment of the HRC in support of the point that states could not invoke states of emergency as justification for violating peremptory norms of international law, including the “fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.” On a due process norm, the ECtHR cited the HRC to the effect that the accused should have access to legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings, including police questioning.

cc) The IACtHR

The Inter-American Court has cited the ECtHR across a wide range of topics, which is not surprising since it cites the European Court in three-quarters of its judgments. One important example deals with the obligation of states to ensure respect for convention rights. In the Cotton Fields case, the IACtHR cited judgments of the ECtHR in support of its finding of state responsibility for violations committed by private actors, and for its determination that the failure to prevent violence against women was part of a generalized pattern that amounted to discrimination against women. The IACtHR has also invoked ECtHR rulings to deal with newly arising rights issues, for example, involving sexual orientation and in vitro fertilization (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019, 115-117). Indeed, the IACtHR cites the ECtHR and the HRC in support of some of its most important contributions to the development of international human rights law.

The IACtHR cites the African Commission and the African Court far less frequently, but it has done so in cases involving media rights and freedom of expression, the right of indigenous peoples to the natural resources on their traditional lands, and in several of its landmark amnesty cases, among other topics.

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23 Bijakaj and others v. Croatia, Judgment (First Section), European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 74448/12, 18 September 2014.
24 J. and others v. Austria, Judgment (Fourth Section), European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 58216/12, 17 January 2017, para. 8, n. 77.
29 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No 172, 28 November 2007, para. 120, n. 122.
The Inter-American Court has developed innovative jurisprudence in a number of areas and in doing so has repeatedly drawn connections to the case law of the other regional courts and the HRC. For instance, beginning with its earliest decisions the IACtHR has advanced the principle that states are under an obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish serious violations of human rights. The Court has noted that both the ECtHR and the HRC have adopted similar views.31 In one of the core amnesty cases, the IACtHR cited the HRC on the “prohibition of amnesties that prevent the investigation and punishment of those who commit serious human rights crimes.”32 The IACtHR has emphasized the right to the truth, that is, to the truth about the fate of victims of rights violations. The Court has cited both the ECtHR and the HRC in establishing that right.33 In the area of procedural rights, the IACtHR cited both the HRC and the African Commission in support of its finding that even in cases involving the expulsion or deportation of foreigners, states must follow minimum standards of due process.34

5. Conclusion

The three regional courts make reference to each others’ case law and to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee. These cross-citations serve as an informal coordinating device. Of course the human rights courts offer their own nuances and innovations (Sandholtz 2017). But the practice of cross-citation enables them to advance shared interpretations of basic international human rights norms and principles. That the HRC serves as a common point of reference enhances the degree of coordination across the regional courts. This coordination has produced common approaches to substantive rights, like access to justice as a human right, and the right to the truth. It has also generated shared methods of interpretation, notably proportionality analysis as a means of determining when governments are justified in impinging on qualified rights (Stone Sweet and Mathews 2019, chap. 6).

Global rights-based constitutionalism requires two main components: an overarching normative structure and an institutional means for interpreting and applying international human rights norms. The first – the normative structure – consists of the interlocking bodies of human rights law at national, regional, and international levels. I have argued that the regional human rights courts and the HRC are constructing, in a decentralized and practice-driven way, the second component, an emergent institutional framework for applying and interpreting human rights norms. These trans-judicial dialogues create a degree of coherence among distinct human rights systems, each with its own political context and basis of authority. Of course, coordination will not be complete and divergences will remain, given the differing challenges and demands placed on the different systems. By the same token, because the network is decentralized and informal, it remains open to new potential entrants, should regional institutions develop in parts of the world where they do

Uruguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 20 March 2013. See also Sandholtz and Rangel Padilla (forthcoming).


not yet exist. And the jurisprudence being developed by this international network is also accessible to activists, advocates, and judges at the national and sub-national levels. To the extent that international judicial dialogue serves as an informal mechanism for coordinating the interpretation and development of human rights norms, it strengthens the international rule of law.
References


Prof. Dr. Wayne Sandholtz holds the John A. McConé Chair in International Relations and is Professor of International Relations and Law at the University of Southern California, where he teaches International Relations, Governance in International Relations, International Law & Politics, and International Courts. Among his published books are Research Handbook on the Politics of International Law (with Christopher Whytock; Edward Elgar, 2017), International Norms and Cycles of Change (with Kendall Stiles; Oxford UP, 2009), and Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change (Oxford UP, 2007). Prof. Sandholtz has published articles on international human rights law, international law in domestic courts, international human rights courts, political corruption, and European integration. His current research projects focus on the empirical analysis of state commitment to the core international human rights treaties, trans-judicial dialogue among the regional human rights courts, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the relationship between domestic and international rule of law. Prof. Sandholtz holds a Master’s degree and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley.
The Kolleg-Forschungsgruppe “The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?” examines the role of international law in a changing global order. Can we, under the current significantly changing conditions, still observe an increasing juridification of international relations based on a universal understanding of values, or are we, to the contrary, rather facing a tendency towards an informalization or a reformalization of international law, or even an erosion of international legal norms? Would it be appropriate to revisit classical elements of international law in order to react to structural changes, which may give rise to a more polycentric or non-polar world order? Or are we simply observing a slump in the development towards an international rule of law based on a universal understanding of values?

The Research Group brings together international lawyers and political scientists from five institutions in the Berlin-Brandenburg region: Freie Universität Berlin, Hertie School of Governance, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universität Potsdam and Social Science Research Center Berlin (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin). An important pillar of the Research Group consists of the fellow programme for international researchers who visit the Research Group for periods up to two years. Individual research projects pursued benefit from dense interdisciplinary exchanges among senior scholars, practitioners, postdoctoral fellows and doctoral students from diverse academic backgrounds.