Summary

Our introduction to the volume sets the discussion about memory in archaeology into current contexts, establishes our reasons for producing this book and discusses a number of crucial aspects of memory, space, and identity. We provide a brief history of memory studies with a focus on contributions from archaeology and discuss a number of topics that play important roles in the papers. These include the relations between forgetting and remembering, and between space, place and memory. Along with our authors, we emphasize that memory is a matter of practices, not just of mindsets. A further element in our discussions is the interface between memory, duration, and history. All of these issues coalesce in an important background theme, the political nature of various modes of memory.

Keywords: Memory; cultural memory; realms of memory; Pierre Nora; forgetting.


Keywords: Erinnerung; kulturelles Gedächtnis; Erinnerungswelten; Pierre Nora; Vergessen.
I Introduction

The 21st century develops into an epoch of the erasure of archaeological sites. This started (in)famously in 2001 with the destruction of the Buddhas in Bamiyan and continued with the looting of the Iraq Museum in 2003, up to the March 2015 destruction of large parts of archaeological sites in northern Iraq: Nimrud, Nineveh and Hatra. Events of August 2015 give us urgent reasons to rethink these relations further: Khaled al Assad, an archaeologist who worked at Palmyra in Syria, was brutally murdered by 'Islamic State' representatives because he was an archaeologist. Memory, its material basis and the claims over its interpretation have become life-threatening issues in some corners of the world. The relations between specific places and their potential to evoke memories, between monuments and the histories that surround them, between material traces of the past and the political interests that led to their survival almost take a backseat in the face of murderous hatred against representatives of the archaeological profession. What are the consequences when current destructions are prosecuted as war crimes? How should perpetrators be treated? Is there a need for more international codes to protect ‘world cultural heritage’?

Despite justified condemnations of murderous groups for whom archaeological work is a crime, we should distance ourselves from visceral reactions. We should be careful not to equate iconoclasm simply with Wahhabi Islam, or much older movements such as ancient Mesopotamian defacements, Roman damnatio memoriae and Byzantine iconoclasm. Wanton destruction of religious and/or memory sites has a long history in modern Western Europe, on a much grander scale than we witness today: the Nazi pogrom of November 1938 led to the murder of hundreds of people, but it was at the same time a cultural eradication of hitherto seldom seen proportions, leading to the complete destruction of more than 1400 synagogues.

The fascist rampage, but also the more recent acts of cultural destruction are paradoxical events. They are meant to destroy memories by erasing their material anchors, whether of an individual, as in the case of shrines of Islamic saints in present-day Northern Iraq, Syria or Mali, of whole religions, for example in the 1938 November pogroms, or of a specific part of history, as in the cases of Nimrud, Nineveh and Hatra, but also in the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. However, the intentional act of material annihilation often radically intensifies memories connected to a particular site. The valley of Bamiyan was known to only a few people before the dynamiting of the huge Buddha statues. Nowadays, this voided heritage has become world famous exactly because of its destruction. Nimrud and Hatra are even less likely to have been known, but have

1 May 2012.
2 See Brubaker 2012.
3 Abu el Haj 2001.
4 Pollock 2016.
now become symbols of the will to eliminate a specific past. With that awareness of an intended destruction, the knowledge about what was supposed to be wiped out is strongly reinforced. The latter effect is further boosted by the conscious staging of practices of defacement, a theatricality that has become a hallmark of the Islamic State’s acts of de-culturation.\(^5\)

The place of the World Trade Center, an otherwise unimaginative modernist high rise, has become a symbol for American defiance, and even the now dismantled Palace of the Republic of the German Democratic Republic is often evoked positively in discussions about the current reconstruction of Berlin’s 19th century imperial palace. Destruction of culturally and mnemonically important sites mostly magnifies what it is supposed to erase: memory.

Nevertheless, we witness a new quality in the ravaging of places since the turn of the millennium. The attempt of the Taliban and the ‘Islamic State’ at ruining of ruins, instead of places that are fully integrated into a lifeworld is a new phenomenon. The obliteration of Jewish synagogues, Byzantine church paintings, statues of Lenin,\(^6\) the Palace of the Republic, or the monuments of and for Saddam Hussein were all part of attempts to destroy belief systems anchored in the minds of people who performed affirmative rituals in and around them. These sites all had well-defined ideological functions that had implications for collective memory.

The case of ruins and archaeological sites is more complex. “All we are breaking are stones”\(^7\) was the comment of Mullah Omar when interviewed about the cultural values of the monuments the Taliban had blown up. Generalizing from this statement, one could say that not all cultures are open to the notion of ‘heritage’, not to speak of ‘world heritage’. A belief in a connection between an unchangeable past as a background to present identities is not universal, nor can it perhaps be universalized. Still, the Taliban’s actions against the Buddha statues were a contradiction in terms: if it was just stones, then why bother to blow them up at all? Mullah Omar’s interpretation of the dynamiting of two statues as accelerating the decay of meaningless matter stands in sharp contrast to the Taliban’s idea that there was a danger of idol worship inherent in the statues, announced on other occasions as a reason for the violent acts against the already dilapidated figures in Bamiyan.\(^8\) In contrast, the ‘Islamic State’ seems simply to select the most prominent monuments in order to gain maximal publicity and to rile the West. Indeed, the blown-up Palmyra arch of Septimius Severus, a structure without any religious significance or even depictions of human beings was publicized as ‘World heritage’ (and thus part of ‘our’, Western past). This event has gained much more publicity than the annihilation of numerous local Christian, Yazidi or Shi’a shrines that are likely

\(^5\) Falser 2010; Shaw 2015.  
\(^7\) Siri 2002, 107.  
\(^8\) Bernbeck 2010.
to be far more important to the inhabitants of the area and, like the Tomb of Jonah in Niniveh, served as memory sites for members of several different religions co-inhabiting the region. In the latter case, it is presumably also this memory of peaceful co-existence that the ‘Islamic State’ seeks to erase.

The present destructions of monumentalized memory have deeper implications. Conflicts over the past, its material remains and the ‘stewards’ of such remains; the ways the past is narrated, preserved and forgotten all have to do with more general aspects of an increasingly globalized “casino capitalism” whose imposed lifeworld leads to a generalized disappearance of durability and unchangeability in human relations, but also in relations between people and their material surroundings. This produces powerful countercurrents, driven not just by fundamentalist religious convictions, but also research agendas in academia, among them identity politics. These issues lie at the origin of our collection of essays as well as the workshop in 2011 in Berlin that has laid the groundwork for it.

This workshop was specifically meant to discuss Pierre Nora’s idea of lieux de mémoire and potential problems related to it. At the conference, three general problems with the connection between memory and place were discussed. Firstly, when memory is materially concentrated in a specific place it is normally supposed to provide positive points of identification for a collectivity. However, following Lynn Meskell and Alfredo González-Ruibal, lieux de mémoire can have negative connotations as well, they can turn into places of abjection. How do places of commemoration change their significance and value? What are the political parameters that allow or prevent such changes? On a more abstract level, the primary characteristic of places of memory is the crystallization of collective memory in circumscribed places. Secondly, such often monumentalized sites produce a highly uneven landscape of commemoration, one that forces or attempts to force its audiences to perceive specific points as loaded with past meaning while silencing others. How widespread is this topographic imbalance of amnesia and memory? What are the specific ways of remembering (in) a specific place in order to forget another one? And can a similar dynamic be at work along temporal lines, so that temporally specific acts of remembrance serve forgetfulness at other times? The commodification of memory was a third issue we had originally considered relevant. However, this was not much discussed at the workshop and does not play an important role in the papers that follow.

The contributors to this volume, many of whom were participants in the workshop, address notions of memory, geography, spatiality, and identity and the complex set of
power differences that link them. While our initial call for papers was based on a specific interest in scrutinizing the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, we soon realized that discourses on and research traditions concerned with memory vary widely within academia, dependent on language, national and cultural frames. One obvious reason for this ‘state of the art’ is that the memory boom in scholarly circles is closely tied to interests outside of universities. What manifests itself is a widely observable breakdown of walls between politically driven discourses in civil society and supposedly neutral academic research. It is perhaps not astonishing that the field of memory studies is particularly prone to tensions of this kind. Scholars who attempted to uphold the boundaries of the academic ivory tower by declaring history to be strictly separate from memory were unsuccessful. The contributions to this volume illustrate this impossibility rather than defend it.

## 2 Discourses on memories

The memory boom in social, cultural and biological sciences of recent times has led to a tendency to identify ‘memory’ in almost any cultural expression, whether material or not. As both Ruth Van Dyke and Astrid Erll have argued convincingly, its assumed ubiquity has weakened the analytical and theoretical power of memory studies, ending in a situation where phenomena that were hitherto subsumed under notions such as tradition, culture, and even the material world transform into elements of ‘memory’.

This raises the question of whether there is a need to define the difference between what counts as memory (or related terms, from commemoration to recalling and forgetting) and other phenomena of social and personal life.

What counts as being outside ‘memory’ for an archaeologist? Potentially, anything in and from the past can be studied as part of a process that relates past and present – a diachronic relationship. Maurice Halbwachs set memory and history apart by arguing that in the realm of memory, the present is the dominant side, while historical disciplines

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13 For instance, the Latin derived *mémoire* in French and *memory* in English can be pluralized, something that is alien to the German notion of *Gedächtnis*. In the same vein, the difference between *Erinnerung* and *Gedächtnis* cannot be expressed adequately in French or English, while the association between *lieux* and *milieux* remains foreign to German and English – and here we only touch on three Western European languages, with for example Turkish making differences between *anı*, *bellek*, *hatıra*, and *hafızा*.


16 Van Dyke 2013, 243–245; Erll 2011; see also Rowlands 1995; Berliner 2005.

17 For example, the introduction to an important volume on “memory work” reads partly like a description of Giddens’ concept of ‘structuration’, where the notion of ‘structure’ is replaced with ‘memory’, see Mills and Walker 2008a.
give the past the primary place.\textsuperscript{18} At an extreme, such a stance requires a substantial intellectual effort of de-contextualizing a researching self from his or her present concerns, a process that has been theorized by Edmund Husserl in his elaboration of the notion of \textit{epoché} or bracketing. In the present intellectual climate, the very possibility of such an endeavor is severely in doubt in the historical and cultural sciences,\textsuperscript{19} including in some postprocessual strands of archaeology. Cornelius Holtorf almost entirely dismisses concerns with the past and prefers to talk about “pastness”, largely as imagination.\textsuperscript{20} Such a radical constructivist stance is problematic because of its lack of respect for past subjects: their struggles and desires are judged to be irrelevant.\textsuperscript{21}

A second problem stems from attempts at coming to grips with the aforementioned ubiquity of memory. The literature on memories contains a variety of categorizations of specific ‘kinds’ of memory. Below, we name only a few in order to highlight the tremendous variability in definitions. Apparently, discourses are produced as if in splendid isolation, so that parallel attempts at defining specific dimensions, fields of memory, terminological subdivisions by scholars in various linguistically or nationally anchored discourses can be observed.

### 3 Collective memory

One of the most frequently mentioned boundaries is that between individual and collective memory, forcefully argued for by Halbwachs in his attempt at conceptualizing memory as an externalization. Halbwachs tried to distance himself from Sigmund Freud’s deeply influential ideas of what one might call “internalized memory” with processes such as “repression,”\textsuperscript{22} which lead to what Freud described as a generalized discontent among individuals in all cultures: the need to repress some pleasures in order to adhere to collective, cultural principles that allow the maintenance of a community.\textsuperscript{23} Most scholars in the social sciences follow Halbwachs’ lead and stay far away from Freud’s elaborations on memory.\textsuperscript{24} However, some of the readings of Halbwachs’ \textit{mémoire collective} distort his original intent. His idea of collective memory is often understood as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Echterhoff and Saar 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} This is in part a result of 20th century history itself. Saul Friedländer states that a history of the Nazi period, for example, must not be written without losing the feeling of discomposure regarding the dimensions of inhumanity; Friedländer 2007a, 28.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Holtorf 2013.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} On this problem of “diachronic violence”, see Bernbeck 2015, 262–263.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Freud 1991 [1915].
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Freud 1991 [1930]; see also Niethammer 2000, 342–349.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} But see A. Assmann who argues that cultural reservoirs include “das Repertoire verpaßter Möglichkeiten, alternativer Optionen und ungenutzter Chancen” (a repertory of unrealized possibilities, alternative options and unused chances); A. Assmann 1999, 137.
\end{itemize}
the product of a reified “group consciousness.”²⁵ In fact, Halbwachs discusses extensively how groups create, transmit, and change stories about their respective pasts through individual actors’ practices: “the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memories,”²⁶ and the concept of group memory is only used in a metaphorical sense. Halbwachs’ *cadres sociaux* in which memory is present can best be translated as social frames that describe the conditions and the social embeddedness of individual memories, the active commemoration as opposed to memory in the form of a reflection of some reality.

Halbwachs maintains that memories originate in a social context and that they are retrieved and changed during interactions among people. Individual remembering thus always happens in interaction with the memories of others.²⁷ As a consequence, he conceptualizes individual identity as constructed through constant reference and actualization of memories about individual pasts. This actualization of memories changes them;²⁸ they are embedded in new contexts, similar to the reuse of *spolia* in new buildings. In line with such an idea is Daniel L. Schacter’s description of individual remembering as more selective and constructive than perception, because “our memories are the fragile but powerful products of what we recall from the past, believe about the present, and imagine about the future.”²⁹ Even as internal acts of recalling, personal memories – in German *Erinnerungen*, in French *souvenirs* – are based on the social or collective framework of the present. The Halbwachsian concept of memory is nowadays criticized not so much because it disregards the role of individual memories but because it grants collective memory a foundational role. Relations where individual memories and collective ones constitute each other are more realistic.

### 4 Memory as container, memory as contained

Some concepts of memory can be termed ‘structural,’ while others are focused on practices. The former often employ what one might call ‘container models’ of memory. These come in two varieties, memory as *containing* and memory as *contained*.

The container model is at the core of Jan Assmann’s concepts of a “communicative” and a “cultural memory.” He is mainly interested in written traditions and the role

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²⁵ For example Fentress and Wickham 1992, 112; Gedi and Elam 1996; Crane 1997, 1373; see also Forty 1999, 2; Mills and Walker 2008, 5–7.

²⁶ Halbwachs 1992 [1952], 42; compare with Crane 1997.

²⁷ Halbwachs 1992 [1952], 38: “most of the time, when I remember, it is others who spur me on; their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine relies on theirs.”

²⁸ Halbwachs 1992 [1952], 47; see also Halbwachs 2003 [1941].

²⁹ Schacter 1996, 328.
past events play in maintaining group identity; he sees memory cultures as literally constructing communities.\textsuperscript{30} J. Assmann cites Cicero, who describes barbarous peoples as having no memories and living in and for the moment. For J. Assmann, the ancient Israelites stand as the primordial example of a group that kept its identity in the long run by subjecting themselves to the dictum of ‘observe and remember’. He posits that the existence of an observed ‘past’, different from the present, must necessarily entail a break with tradition that opens the space for constructions, negation, forgetting and repression. Giorgio Agamben elaborates on the full consequences of this: the past as an object explicitly separated from the present becomes a site of accumulation.\textsuperscript{31} A problem with such an objectivized conception of memory is that it describes societies in which traditions play a dominant role as ahistoric and incapable of any reflection about their past, echoing historicist prejudices of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{32}

J. Assmann’s ideas of memory as a container become fully visible in his interpretation of material culture, which, just as language, functions as one major dimension of memory, albeit a passive one. Material culture frames people, and its endurance enables materiality to transmit meaning across generations. This is another main element in his writings about memory. The difference in diachronic transmission between oral communication and material elements of cultural life, especially textual materials, is used to separate a “communicative” from a “cultural” memory (see Tab. 1).

In J. Assmann’s conceptualization, both kinds of memory envelop societies. Language is thought of as a quasi-independently existing means to communicate, a *langue* without the need for *parole*. Material culture, as image, text, or in other forms, is our daily inescapable framework of life, and as such part of a background of unproblematized and unproblematizable memory. Such a conception of memory produces a strong tendency towards reification, while dynamic relations between people and things are underplayed.

Another conceptual take on externalized memory describes it as *contained*. Aleida Assmann understands memory as a “Speicher, aus dem die Erinnerung auswählt, aktualisiert, sich bedient”.

The theoretical background is an objectivist, and thereby reductionist information theory. In such cases, book and computer are used as metaphors for memory; the practice of remembering is imagined as an act of reaching into a storage box filled with *mémoires* as bits of information. This ‘contained’ concept of memory may be applicable to the work of historians and archaeologists, but Andrew Jones criticizes its generalization and projection into the past as unrealistic and reductionist. A. Assmann further distinguishes between a “stored” and a “functional memory”. She thus adds another aspect to memory, but one equally instrumental to the storage idea.

A. Assmann’s division would be useful if it did not contain strong evolutionary elements that seem highly problematic to us. She contends that memories in purely oral cultures are solely “functional memories”, and thus simply oriented towards the upkeep of collective identities. This implies that such cultures have no possibilities for critique.

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32 Sommer 2014.
34 Jones 2007, 6–12.
However, ethnographies show that oral traditions are in a constant state of transformation, that they often include multifarious competing strains, some of which stand in tension with each other. Memory can be social or collective only if it is capable of being articulated and transmitted. This implies that social memory depends on communicative practices and is the reason why collective memory is usually more formalized than individual memory: for transmission, conventionalization and simplification are needed. While canonization is often observed for past cultures, it is a bit ironic that exactly that labor is carried out by theoreticians of memory themselves, such as Nora. Instead, the conventionalization of memory is a process that should be investigated as opening a field for contention over various strands of memory, for example the role of “material mnemonics” in everyday life that are not necessarily monumentalized.

5 Memory practices

The risk of reification of memory is much less apparent in practice-oriented approaches. Embodiment as an element of social memory may have its roots in the philosophy of Henri Bergson but has been most influentially articulated by Paul Connerton. Starting from the question of the transmission of collective memory, Connerton asserts that incorporated rather than inscribed memory is essential for a tradition’s unbroken survival. This “habit memory” is mainly an embodied one, and performances of commemoration, for instance in formalized rituals, reproduce larger structures. This practice-based approach to collective memory avoids the overdrawn dichotomy between oral and script-based cultures. Barbara Mills and William Walker’s compendium as well as Maria Starzmann and John Roby’s recent volume are good examples of an application of Connerton’s ideas to archaeology. The contributions in these volumes focus on commemorative rituals, on exceptional situations, practices of marginalizing and representing remembrances, but only partly on daily activities.

Not all human practices need to be primarily embodied, however. Personal recall is certainly one neglected element of “memory work,” and, as Jones argues, it is a “process of evocation indexed by objects”, in effect “a process distributed between people and objects”. Such acts of recalling can also have the character of a commemoration, an act of ethically imposed remembering. For Jones, memory is neither an external entity

35 For example Confino 1997, 1398–1400; Barth 2002.
37 Fentress and Wickham 1992, 47.
38 Lillios and Tsimis 2010; Choyke 2009.
40 Connerton 1989.
41 Connerton 1989, 23.
42 See also Battaglia 1992.
43 Mills and Walker 2008b; Starzmann and Roby 2016.
44 Mills and Walker 2008b.
that can be described and analyzed largely without recourse to the specificities of those who remember, nor an internalized phenomenon with performative potentials. Rather, memory itself is fundamentally relational.

The underdetermined nature of memory as a set of relations needs more exploration. Repetitive and evocative practices that we classify as a part of presencing the past are multifarious and variable. It is exactly the openness of such memory relations that makes the subject important. What are the conditions under which individual, internal, and internalized memories are streamlined into entities that support and constitute communities rather than tearing them apart?

These considerations bring us to an important issue in our collection of essays. The contributions address spontaneous evocation as one aspect of memory (Moshenska), but also its reverse – politically engineered memory constructions. Not too long ago, Alon Confino argued against a politicization of memory in academic studies in a discussion of memory in the frame of the 20th century. In our view, explorations of commemorative structures and practices actually underplay their political dimension. At least, this is the case in those areas of archaeology that deal with the ancient past. To reserve the term ‘collective memory’ for large-scale, official commemorative rituals and speak of ‘social memory’ as similar practices on a smaller scale will not do. The insistence on investigating multiple memory strands as opposed to one “kulturelles Großgedächtnis” is not helpful either – at least not as long as relations of power are excluded from the discussion.

Memories are social, and even if formalized, they are always manifold, constantly changing and contested. This political character and connected issues are investigated by the authors in this volume. We have structured the contributions according to the specific types of diachronic power relations analyzed. The first part is concerned with what one might call “the past in the past”. Attempts at identifying modes of remembering, of reconstructing relations between space, identity and (passing) time, of historical changes in these complex relations are heavily dependent on the sources at our disposal. Thus, for historical periods, memory, practices of remembering, but especially the ideological character of these practices can be reconstructed with more confidence than for prehistoric cases, provided that the elitist character of most early writing is taken into account. A second set of papers problematizes our own present understandings of the ‘past in the past.’ Contemporary concerns range from critiques of academia to histories of a

46 Confino 1997.
47 The set of interesting papers in Starzmann and Roby 2016 has an activist bent. Notably, almost all of them discuss cases from the 18th to 21st centuries.
49 “Large-scale cultural memory”; Wischermann 2002, 7.
50 Yoffee 2008.
mnemonic discourse. Finally, a third section investigates constructions of memory. Authors variously take affirmative and critical approaches. As one might expect, museums play an important role in these discussions, as do cultural heritage and its preservation. Temporal relations are crosscut by spatial ones. Most contributions discuss in detail the situation of memory in space, distributions and spatial hierarchies of remembering, but also obfuscations and other mechanisms that prevent the concentration of remembering and associated practices in one single location.

6 Forgetting and disremembering

Forgetting cannot be exercised intentionally, it happens to us. In contrast, remembering is an act that can be induced through a variety of media. On an individual level, the fundamental imbalance between these two processes is fairly clear. Sybille Krämer mentions Immanuel Kant’s famous paradoxical note about his servant, “[t]he name of Lampe must now be entirely forgotten”. The commitment to memory of the intent to forget has the opposite result – and, as argued above, this is also true for monuments of externalized memory. Inversely, the explicit externalization of what one wants to remember in the form of a text, a tomb, or a monument is in itself already an act of forgetting, as are mindlessly conducted rituals, for example the laying down of wreaths by politicians at public memorials. In her paper Sommer points out how even monumental prehistoric tombs were closed, masked and forgotten as part of their ‘normal’ life-cycle. In the case she describes, the acts of building and burial may have been more important than the monument itself, which failed to conveniently rot away, however.

Externalized memory comes close to the ‘container’ concept discussed above, because it relieves us from the pressure to remember: means of commemoration are roads to forgetfulness. Other means of forgetting belong to the realm of political economy. For instance, declarations of a monument as ‘world cultural heritage’ are a typical hinge that leads to massive forgetting through commoditization. In our volume, Gabriel Mosheńska presents such a case and argues that archaeological excavations as transitory performances can break this mechanism, albeit only momentarily.

Krämer points out another side of forgetfulness. There are practices of willful dis-remembering, her example being the ancient Greek *amnesty* as intentional non-remembrance of the misdeeds of oligarchs in the years 404 to 403 BCE. As Starzmann argues, such “unremembering” needs to be distinguished from forgetting. Intentional oblivion is always a political act. Sommer’s and González-Ruibal’s contribution to this
volume highlight the multiple dimensions of such acts of oblivion. Sommer argues that the past can be perceived as dangerous, in her case the barrows in which the dead of older periods were buried. The bodies of the dead themselves were not the main danger but rather the places of their burial. Neutralization happened through new burials, accompanied by symbolically significant material culture items. In González-Ruibal’s case, “unremembering” concerns the different roles of perpetrators and victims in the Spanish civil war. They are leveled through memory practices. Memory becomes decentered so that the past of those who strove for justice and equality is rendered indistinguishable from a past of those who built the Spanish concentration camps, committed mass murder and established a dictatorship. The result is a *kulturelles Großgedächtnis*, a large-scale cultural memory that levels all political differences. Not only the memory of past roles of people, memory itself is manipulated to the point of disremembering. Not amnesty but amnesia.

The relation between memory and forgetting has also been conceptualized by positing an imbalance between the two: commemoration of specific events, people, and structures always and necessarily leads to the forgetting of others. This is what Walter Benjamin meant when he said, “there is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism”.\(^{55}\) This specific type of forgetting is not a relief from the pressure to remember, but rather a politics of active silencing, so forcefully described by Michel-Rolph Trouillot for Haiti.\(^{56}\) In our collection, Brian Broadrose elaborates on the complexities of these mnemonic processes and points out the dominant dimension that produces the effect of a zero-sum-game: power and differences of power. As he shows, archaeology, and academics in general, are deeply enmeshed in these practices of forgetting, producing discourses of others’ (dis)interest in their own past. He emphasizes the production of a privileged access to the past through the creation of delegitimizing discourses that aim at alternatives. Scholarly attempts at making memory resurface through archaeological excavation can at the same time serve exactly the opposite end. Van Dyke discusses a parallel case from the U.S. Southwest. Joachim Baur’s analysis of immigration museums, and particularly of Ellis Island in New York, shifts from verbal discourse to material exhibits and points out that harmonizing, ‘romantic’ displays of a migratory entry to North America via New York City hands over to oblivion the much more cruel forced migration experiences of African-Americans on slave ships. Overall, Freud’s notion of (psychological) repression is closely related to such practices of scholarly, institutional, and social silencing; in these spheres as well, specific kinds of memory are pushed aside and peripheralized. However, they remain hidden and may reappear in unpredictable places under unforeseeable conditions and at random moments.

\(^{55}\) Benjamin 1968, 256. \(^{56}\) Trouillot 1995.
7 Spatializations of memory: networks and sites

Forgetting and disremembering are not only played out in discourses, they also have important spatial and temporal dimensions. One of the main tenets of the workshop that was at the origin of this book was a concern with what one might call ‘spatialized silencing’. In his contribution, Christopher Ten Wolde discusses “human spaces” and notes how he uses pedagogical means to share and create meanings of and in places, revealing their layering and multidimensionality. Proceeding dialectically, we might ask whether there are any places without meanings. For the French historian Nora, the answer is an assured yes; his concept of lieux de mémoire, memory sites or ‘realms of memory’, is based on the idea that memory coagulates around specific topoi, around places, metaphors, events, and other phenomena. Memory is an empty term, it is in need of specification, and Nora uses the notion of a lieu to achieve this historical precision and set it apart from those milieux de mémoire which he considers lost to the incisive critique of historians. The centralization of memories in a specific place is an ideological act of consolidation, especially when the content of such memory is negatively related to a collectivity. Modern national collectivities handle a war defeat by relegating its remembrance to a specific place, such as the Vietnam Memorial in Washington D.C., with the effect that this event can be forgotten elsewhere. The German artist Gunter Demnig’s project of Stolpersteine or ‘stumbling stones’ counters such tendencies. He has installed tens of thousands of small metal plaques with names, dates of birth, deportation and murder of Jews and other victims of the Nazi terror in cities across Europe. Stolpersteine constitute a dense network of memory that reminds a collectivity of mass murder committed by generations whose last members are still alive. The small metal plaques produce sudden encounters with this past in daily life and at unforeseen locations, they are thus the exact opposite of lieux de mémoire.57

Our age is not the first to associate memory with space. It is common knowledge that the idea of loci in connection with memory is due to Simonides of Keos, as elaborated by Cicero in De Oratore. Events and their details can be remembered best through a spatial visualization, so the claim goes. Thus, the function of ‘memory sites’ lies in providing continuity and support for common pasts and a collective identity – in Nora’s opinion firmly attached to the national scale.

But isn’t the highly selective combination of place, identity and memory with the goal of supporting collective identities another dimension of silencing? Several papers discuss, re-work, and criticize Nora’s vision of memory concentration, mainly understanding “lieu” in the literal sense of place/space. Van Dyke shows how Chaco Canyon produces a complex set of memories through its inscription in a landscape, an effect that

is realized through bodily perceptions. It is ‘visceral’ and thus largely independent from Nora’s discourse-centered histories of localized memory. The narrative dimension of such places is highlighted in Bernd Steinbock’s and Simon Lentzsch’s papers. While Steinbock elaborates on the variability of local memories as a basis of a pyramid of higher-order memories, the apogee of which was a large, unified Athenian narrative, Lentzsch explains why the exaggeration of a disaster can solidify a foundational memory. Both are cases of antique genealogies for truly encompassing cultural memories, the *kulturelle Großgedächtnisse* of ancient Athens and Rome, respectively.

Spatial dimensions are addressed in very different ways by Baur and Ariane Ballmer. Memory is contained doubly in museums such as those described by Baur. Museum authenticity, produced by using original locations and structures, such as Pier 21 in Canada and Ellis Island in the U.S., turns the structures themselves into externalized memory containing objects from an immigrant past. However, this museological strategy still remains exclusionist because of its excision of those who arrived in North America as slaves. Whole landscapes can also ‘contain’ memories, but Ballmer presents a case where many separate and singular acts of deposition of objects produce an unplanned and imperceptible *mnemoscape*. For those living in such a mnemoscape, there would have been a general knowledge that it was filled with hidden meanings and that specific people could add continually to that meaning. In some ways, we can compare the resulting relation between past subjects and their environment to what Martin Pollack describes for 20th century central Europe as “contaminated landscapes”, entire regions where one can be sure to walk through spaces of collective past crimes of contempt, torture, and annihilation – but single historical events may often remain unknown.58

Spatial authenticity is an important element in Ballmer’s *mnemoscapes*, landscapes of hiding things and perhaps events. A basic argument is the *unrepresentability* of place. The meanings, characteristics, and details of one place cannot be substituted with another. This runs counter to the idea of the museum, a concept that is a materialization of *lieux de mémoire* because it consists of a concentration of things that originally belonged elsewhere. Baur’s critique of immigration museums hinges on this point: the museum building may well be at an authentic site, but its interior pretends to represent other kinds of immigrants whose fates contrast starkly with those on whose history the museum is based. Heidrun Derks uses a lucid discussion of the *lieux de mémoire* to fend off the idea that this could be a useful concept for the Kalkriese Museum, with the burden of 2000 years of changing nationalistic and other discursive constructions around the Roman officer Arminius. While her and Reinhard Bernbeck’s critique of the concept stay close to Nora’s original idea that such *lieux* have their own historiographic dimension, other contributors such as Moshenska clearly view this aspect as unimportant.

58 Pollack 2014.
Not all spatial configurations should be thought of as equal or equally authentic. Bestowing the same degree of importance on all places in a network would be the opposite of Nora’s intent. González-Ruibal criticizes the idea that memory is inherent in whole landscapes by pointing out a political dimension: they fit into a neoliberal ‘all sites are equal’-ideology. Such a pseudo-democratic attitude allows the leveling of differences in commemorated content. In a commodified *mnemoscape*, perpetrators of war crimes and their victims appear in similar ways, even in the same spot.\(^{59}\)

Most approaches to the spatial dimension of memory start from the premise that its spatialization is a straightforward process whereby markings are inscribed into a landscape. Ballmer and Bernbeck argue that there are complex alternatives. Instead of anchoring memory explicitly and materially in a real space so that a site can be regularly revisited, Ballmer discusses Bronze Age landscapes in the High Alps that actively created *invisibility*, places whose general presence may have been known but whose exact position remained unclear, disenabling revisiting and any establishment of place-anchored rituals of commemoration. Bernbeck argues that there are actively created in-between spaces. Jordanian dolmen resemble Homi Bhabha’s “third spaces.”\(^{60}\) The effect of such spaces is similar to that of Ballmer’s High Alps example: intentional obfuscation followed by the impossibility of any sense of spatial authenticity prevents the development of ritualistic, repetitive commemorative practices.

### 8 Memory and time, duration and history

We have set memory apart from history because of its firm placement in the present. Memory is concerned with our own condition and functionalizes the past for this purpose. It would be wrong to keep up a stark divide between this definition of memory and history as a more sober activity that is concerned with the past for the past’s sake. Lentzsch argues that Roman history was a hyperbolic narrative whose intent was an indirect comparison with ancient Athens. The background is political: Rome’s hegemonic relationship with Athens. The problematic nature of a strict division between history and memory is apparent in Van Dyke’s chapter on Hopi and Navajo pasts. They may be called ‘memory’ rather than history from an academic historian’s or archaeologist’s perspective, but archaeologists may also judge that these two collective memories are not equally close to (or far from) historical accounts. Since archaeologists have their own ideas about the past, Van Dyke shows the wide-ranging consequences of two different, academically produced scenarios (‘acculturation’ vs. ‘refugee’) and their concrete consequences for people traditionally associated with the region. This case casts serious doubt

\(^{59}\) A case in point is Berlin’s *Neue Wache*.  
\(^{60}\) Bhabha 1994.
on the reliability of history’s own basis for judgment, on the presumed greater objectivity of history when compared to the subjectivity of memory. In Broadrose’s account, these deeply ideological, twisted characteristics of academic scholarship come to the fore more clearly than in any other paper of our volume. Neither history nor memory can lay any claim to truthfulness. Both Van Dyke’s and Broadrose’s papers also implicitly raise the issue of linear chronology as a scientific measure for today’s world. Since history is more and more enmeshed in public debate, the standard of rights to a territory derived from chronological rather than mnemonic anteriority can simply not be upheld as legitimate.

A politics of time pervades Bernbeck’s account of the temporal dimension of his interpretation of Third Spaces. The archaeological phenomenon he describes defies clear chronological positioning despite decades of research. In this case, material monumentality does not serve to anchor specific memories – it serves to mark an absence. Archaeological efforts to interpret megaliths as places of ancestor veneration fit Michel de Certeau’s description of memory: “Like those birds that lay their eggs only in other species’ nests, memory produces in a place that does not belong to it. It receives its form and its implantation from external circumstances, even if it furnishes the content (the missing detail)”61

Time is not only addressed or criticized in this volume as a linear dimension of past-present-future. Some contributions conceptualize duration and temporal speed as essential elements of memory. Ten Wolde sees in archaeology the guardian of “lasting meaning”, of longue durée itself. He sets it into an age where hyperfast change brings with it a longing for views of an unchanging world.62 Moshenska points out that this durative characteristic of archaeology lends itself all too well to a commodification of the past. The precondition for the socio-cultural production of the tourist as a figure complete with a specific habitus is based on a globalized, alienated monumentality and its need for packaging.

Not all materiality encloses a longue durée and monumental scale, however. Daniel Miller made the important observation that there is a basic temporal relationship between things and human life.63 When shorter than human life, he calls things “transient” and sets them apart from those with “longevity” (longer than human lives)64 and “equivalence” (more or less the same duration). Here, duration is not measured as absolute, linear time. Rather, one may speak of a ‘relational duration’. Ballmer’s landscape of invisibilities is a good example for past people’s manipulation of relational duration: they shortened the longevity of bronze objects through specific depositional practices.

61 De Certeau 1984, 86.
62 Han 2009.
64 For example, as “temporal surplus” of things: Pollock and Bernbeck 2010.
On the other hand, Baur’s immigration museums transform transient, quotidian objects into things with a long-term duration. The case of Museum and Park Kalkriese is even more complex. The narratives surrounding the site provide fertile ground for monumentalizing associations by a large public. The importance of the 2000-year-old battle where Quinctilius Varus lost his life has been so intensely and frequently reworked discursively and politically that the museum must try to de-monumentalize a site that was not monumental in the first place. Derks describes some of the ingenious means to do so: depicting one and the same event in two radically different ways, one focusing on the moment of fear, the other on organizational issues, reduces the temporal framing of the battle to a bloody slaughter in a forest, rather than the foundational day of a nation.

9 Conflicts over memory

A further point of this volume is that collective memories cannot simply be understood as a unified and uncontested sphere of social life, the aforementioned kulturelles Großgedächtnis. Memory “is as much a result of conscious manipulation as unconscious absorption and it is always mediated.”65 The assumption that good history produces a unified, coherent narrative is a further important difference to traditional understandings of memory, which is multifarious. However, postmodern historiography also accepts multiple versions of one and the same narrative, even in highly disputed cases such as the Holocaust.66 We have already mentioned Derks’ description of the Kalkriese museum which presents several versions of the same battle.

Memory is not only diverse and disputed in the present, as Steinbock shows for the case of ancient Athens. But while the Athenians’ disputes over memory were readily solved – if we believe the documentation available –, social and especially religious memories are often fought over, even violently. Particularly problematic are sites with religious or ideological connotations. Ayodhya in northern India is a well-known case, similar to the complexity and religiously-politically charged topography of Jerusalem. In both cases, archaeologists have been and are deeply implied in cruel and bloody conflicts.67 For Greece, Yannis Hamilakis has devoted an entire book to sharp conflicts over social memories and the associated abuse of archaeology.68

Gabi Dolf-Bonekämper has discussed this phenomenon as an amendment to Nora’s lieux de mémoire and calls places associated with memory conflict lieux de discorde.69

66 Friedländer 2007a; Friedländer 2007b.
67 See among others, Bernbeek and Pollock 2004, 144–349.
68 Hamilakis 2007.
a term picked up explicitly in the contributions by Van Dyke and Moshenska. Perspectives on the kinds of contestation over memory vary widely. Some authors such as Baur and Van Dyke talk about commemorative disputes as outsiders who observe them from a distance. Others, for instance Moshenska and González-Ruibal, want to use archaeology to instigate such disputes in the first place, but for different reasons. One is the use of archaeology as a discipline that can provoke the consciousness of mnemonic differences by excavating problematic sites such as a fighter plane in the middle of London (Moshenska), another the exposure of places of war, violence, and injustice that a culture of reconciliation tries to level and cover up (González-Ruibal). Broadrose writes from the position of a minority whose sharply different ways of remembering, whose whole lifeways are largely suppressed. In most of these cases, memory is imbued with a deeply political dimension of repression. Dolff-Bonekämper speaks of the “discord value” (Streitwert)\(^70\) of landscapes and monuments. This sounds as if some concrete places have a higher, others a lower potential for fruitful disputes. However, such an approach to conflicts over memory presumes what we might call a level playing field of memories. This is a somewhat unrealistic scenario, and it is entirely untenable when considering the situation in Syria and northern Iraq at the time this volume goes to press.

Memory politics sharply divide people, and people mobilize memory politics to create social rifts. We as archaeologists cannot but be drawn into these games. However, we have the task to develop a disciplinary activism that tries to get us out of this situation. The time between the original workshop and the publication of this volume has brought with it a dramatic increase in violence and destruction of commemorative sites and monuments, with devastating consequences for the civilians living in their vicinity. May the future hold better, more peaceful prospects for people who engage with memory and archaeology.

\(^{70}\) Dolff-Bonekämper 2012, 33–34.
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